Lasok’s European Court Practice and Procedure 9781845920661, 9781784519537, 9781526502285

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Lasok’s European Court Practice and Procedure

In Memoriam The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951–2001) European Community Law (1951–2009)

Lasok’s European Court Practice and Procedure Third edition K.P.E. Lasok QC, MA, LLM, PhD

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Preface Much more time has elapsed between the second and the third editions of this book than I  had anticipated. The explanation for the gap is not, as might be supposed, the difficulty in combining full-time practice as a barrister with what turned out to be a rather overloaded programme of publications. Instead, the delay was largely due to a combination of circumstances, the most serious of which was the complete disappearance of the notes that I had spent several years preparing for the purpose of writing this edition. The notes turned out to have been disposed of along with the household rubbish. Then the process of revising, amending and re-amending the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, General Court and Civil Service Tribunal was spread out over several years. As each part of the process was coming to an end, the tantalising prospect was held out of the next part being completed imminently. A brilliant stroke was the announcement, towards the end of 2015, of the prospective abolition of the Civil Service Tribunal (due to take place in September 2016). That presented me with a choice between deleting all references to the Civil Service Tribunal, and taking the risk that the Civil Service Tribunal might not be abolished on the due date after all, or leaving the references to the Civil Service Tribunal in this edition and taking the risk that they would then be completely redundant if the Civil Service Tribunal were abolished on time. I decided to take the latter course (partly because, by that time, I was entertaining the dark suspicion that, if I took the trouble of deleting all the references to the Civil Service Tribunal, some unforeseen event would occur that would prevent the Civil Service Tribunal from being abolished on the intended date). This edition includes the latest changes to the Statute, the General Court’s rules of procedure and its practice directions, consequent upon the winding up of the Civil Service Tribunal. The implications of the Mad Hatter’s Tea Party that passed for the UK’s referendum on its continued membership of the EU are as yet unknown and will be taken into account in the next edition of this book. I would like to extend the customary thanks to the publishers and, in particular, to Andy Hill for his unremitting faith that this edition would eventually be produced and to Maria Skrzypiec for her efficiency in preparing this edition for publication. This edition is dedicated to the memory of two major contributors to the procedural law of the EU that are no longer with us: the ECSC Treaty, the gift that kept on giving; and European Community law. It is also dedicated to my daughters, who cannot read Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner without thinking of this book. KPEL December 2016

v

Contents Prefacev Table of European Legislation xvii Table of Cases xxiii

Chapter 1 Judicial institutions and bodies I Introduction 1 II The instruments governing the Court 9 III The division of jurisdiction between the ECJ, the GC and the CST 20 IV Composition of the ECJ, the GC and the CST 31 A The members 31 B Presidents, Vice-President and Advocates General 50 C The Registrar 55 D Assistant rapporteurs 58 E Other personnel 58 V The structure of the Court 60 A The Court and its formations 60 B The Registry 85 C Other departments 133

Chapter 2 General outline of procedure I Introduction 143 II The language of the case 144 A Selection of the language of the case 144 B Role of the language of the case 147 C Alteration of the language of the case and use of another language150 III Conflicts of jurisdiction 156 A Lack of jurisdiction and referral to the court having jurisdiction156 B Effect on the running of time 160 C Partial lack of jurisdiction 161 D Overlapping jurisdiction 162 E Procedural steps 165 IV Direct actions 166 A Written procedure 167 B Directions and enquiries 184 C The oral procedure 218 D The judgment 255 V References for a preliminary ruling 265 vii

Contents

VI

A The order for reference B The written procedure C The other procedural stages D The expedited procedure E The urgent procedure Appeals and reviews A Appeals from the CST to the GC B Appeals from the GC to the ECJ C Review of appellate decisions of the GC D Review of preliminary rulings made by the GC

267 277 279 289 294 301 301 310 319 324

Chapter 3 Parties I Introduction 325 II Member States, EEA states and third countries 326 III The European Union and the Communities 328 IV EU institutions and related entities 329 V Other persons or bodies 336 VI Restrictions on the ability to participate in proceedings 338 VII Capacity to be a party 342 VIII Cessation of existence of a party 342 IX Adding, removing and substituting parties 343 X Transfer or assignment of a right of action or right to represent a party349 XI Altering the description of a party on the pleadings 353 XII Parties in IP appeals 354 XIII Service on parties 357 Chapter 4 Representation and legal aid I Representation and assistance A Introduction B Persons capable of representation and assistance C The functions comprising representation and assistance D The role of a lawyer as representing or assisting a party E Appointment of a person to represent or assist a party and proof of appointment F Withdrawal of authority to act II Agents, advisers and lawyers III Rights and immunities A Immunity from suit B Exemption from search and seizure C Free movement D The entitlement to rely on a right or immunity E Waiver and loss of entitlement to a right or immunity IV Obligations A Conduct justifying action by the Court B The courses of action open to the Court C Rescission of the Court’s decision viii

359 359 360 360 364 367 370 371 381 383 385 389 390 395 398 398 400 402

Contents

V

Legal aid A Contentious proceedings B References for a preliminary ruling C Payment and recovery of sums advanced

402 403 424 430

Chapter 5 Intervention I Introduction 435 II Who can intervene 439 III Interest 444 A General remarks 444 B Bodies representing collective interests 447 C The distinction between the intervener’s interest and the interest of a main party or the interest of another intervener 454 D Particular examples of interests to intervene 457 IV Rights of the intervener 468 A General 468 B Supporting and opposing the form of order 469 C The freedom to introduce new pleas, exceptions or arguments 472 D Production of evidence 483 E Ancillary proceedings and applications 483 F Appeals and remission 484 V Procedure 485 A General 485 B Intervention in the action and in interim relief proceedings 486 C Late applications to intervene 489 D Timeous applications 494 E Withdrawal of leave to intervene 515 F Effect of refusal of permission to intervene 517 Chapter 6 Procedural issues I Introduction II Types of procedural issues A Evidential issues B Confidentiality C Pleading issues III Raising a procedural issue A General B Written procedure C Handling of the application

519 521 522 524 525 526 526 528 529

Chapter 7 Admissibility I Introduction II Objections to admissibility A Lack of jurisdiction B No locus standi C Lack of capacity D Lack of interest E Prescription

533 535 535 542 544 546 558 ix

Contents

III

F Connexity 591 G Failure to comply with a preliminary procedure 593 H Lis pendens 597 I Res judicata 599 J Defective pleadings 603 Raising an objection 606 A General remarks 606 B Dismissal for manifest lack of jurisdiction or inadmissibility 609 C Summary dismissal by reason of an absolute bar or lack of purpose614 D Dismissal on application 618

Chapter 8 Interim relief I Introduction 621 II The four types of interim relief 625 A Suspension of an act challenged before the Court 625 B Interim measures 637 C Suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court 649 D Suspension of the enforcement of a measure adopted by another institution 651 E Effect of the grant of relief on third parties 651 III Conditions for the grant of relief 656 A Prima facie case 660 B Urgency 671 C Serious and irreparable damage 682 D The balance of interests 705 IV Procedure 715 A General 715 B The applicant 717 C The application 718 D The substantive content of the application 719 E Other pleadings 726 F Evidential requirements 727 G The handling of the application 731 H Intervention 732 I Emergency relief 732 J Orders made without hearing the defendant 733 K Measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry734 L The hearing 734 M The decision 735 N Imposition of conditions on the grant of relief 737 O Variation or cancellation of the order 739 P Renewal of the application 739 Q Appeals 740 Chapter 9 Pleading I Introduction

741 x

Contents

II III

Technical rules relating to format and presentation General rules A General requirements B Form and lodgment C Length D Content E Confidential treatment IV Pleadings in direct actions A Applications commencing proceedings B The defence and preliminary objection to admissibility C Reply, rejoinder and observations on a preliminary objection to admissibility D Subsequent pleadings E Pleadings in ancillary proceedings F Pleadings in IP appeals V Pleadings in appeals A Application commencing appeal B Response C Subsequent pleadings D Cross-appeal E Response to the cross-appeal F Reply and rejoinder on a cross-appeal G Pleadings in ancillary proceedings H Pleadings after referral back to the first instance court VI Pleadings in review proceedings VII Pleadings in references for a preliminary ruling

746 747 747 751 755 756 756 762 762 796 803 819 822 822 829 829 837 841 842 844 845 845 845 847 848

Chapter 10 Evidence I Introduction II The role of evidence in proceedings before the court A Non-contentious proceedings B Contentious proceedings III Proof of law

851 852 854 866 876

Chapter 11 Measures of enquiry I Introduction II Ordering a measure of enquiry A Procedural matters B Substantive matters III Conduct of measures of enquiry IV The personal appearance of the parties V Requests for information and the production of documents A Production by operation of law B Voluntary production C Production by Court order or request VI Oral testimony A Examination of witnesses by the Court B Letters rogatory

879 884 884 893 902 906 909 909 910 911 926 930 940

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Contents

VII Experts’ reports VIII Inspection of the place or thing in question

941 947

Chapter 12 Exclusion of evidence I Introduction II The power to exclude evidence A The general rule of disclosure and its exceptions B Limited disclosure C Exclusion of evidence III Lack of probative value A National and EU security B Conduct of international relations C Business secrets D Administrative confidences E Medical secrecy F Lawyer-client confidences IV Improperly obtained evidence

949 950 950 952 955 959 962 964 965 966 969 971 974

Chapter 13 Rules of evidence I Introduction II The burden of proof III The standard of proof IV The golden rule: unfettered evaluation of evidence A General B Derogations from the unfettered evaluation of evidence C Assessment of probative value D The assessment of particular types of evidence V Presumptions

979 980 994 999 999 1000 1001 1004 1009

Chapter 14 Costs I Introduction II The award of costs A Preliminary rulings B Interlocutory orders and judgments C Intervention D Interim relief E IP appeals F Appeals and reviews G Final judgments and orders H Costs of execution III Recoverable costs A General B Witnesses and experts C Remuneration of agents, advisers and lawyers D Travel and subsistence expenses E Miscellaneous IV Taxation A Commencement of taxation proceedings

1013 1014 1014 1016 1016 1017 1019 1020 1022 1048 1049 1049 1055 1056 1058 1059 1061 1061

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Contents

B Procedure C Taxation of costs D Enforcement

1067 1068 1074

Chapter 15 Appeals and review procedures I Introduction II Appeals A Scope of appeal procedures B Time limits C The parties to the appeal D Grounds of appeal E Initiation of an appeal F Procedural stages G Preliminary issues H Interim relief I Written procedure J Oral procedure K Judgment L Remission to the first instance court III Review of appellate decisions of the GC A Commencement of review proceedings B Written procedure C Interim relief D Intervention E Directions F Oral procedure G The ruling and its consequences H Remission to the GC IV Review of preliminary rulings made by the GC

1075 1076 1076 1078 1079 1083 1091 1096 1100 1100 1102 1107 1108 1110 1116 1118 1120 1121 1121 1121 1121 1122 1122 1123

Chapter 16 Judgments and decisions of the Court I Forms and procedure A Types of decision and the decision-making process B Form C Signature and coming into effect II Effect of judgments and orders A Procedural consequences of a judgment or order B Varying the consequences of a judgment or order C Binding effect of judgments, orders and decisions III Rectification IV Supplementing a judgment or order V Judgment by default A Description of the procedure B Obtaining judgment by default C Setting judgment aside D Scope of the procedure VI Third party proceedings A Description of the procedure

1125 1125 1130 1134 1137 1137 1140 1144 1149 1151 1153 1153 1154 1165 1171 1173 1173

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Contents

B Conditions for bringing third party proceedings C Procedural stages VII Revision A Description of the procedure B Conditions for revision of a judgment or order C Procedural stages D Scope of the procedure VIII Interpretation of judgments and orders A Description of the procedure B Conditions for applying for interpretation C Procedural stages D Scope of the procedure IX Execution and enforcement of judgments and orders A Judgments B Orders

1174 1181 1185 1185 1187 1194 1201 1205 1205 1206 1210 1215 1216 1216 1219

Chapter 17 Forms of action I Introduction 1221 II Exclusion of jurisdiction 1222 III Common procedures 1223 A Actions for annulment 1223 B Failure to act 1232 C Default by a member state 1235 D Actions for the imposition of a financial penalty on a member state 1239 E Actions for damages 1242 F Interim relief 1252 G Staff cases 1252 H References for a preliminary ruling 1257 I Fines and penalties 1281 J Arbitration 1283 K Disputes between member states 1286 L Disputes concerning members of the Commission and of the Court of Auditors and the Ombudsman 1288 M Plea of illegality 1290 N Judicial review of co-operation with the national authorities 1295 IV Special procedures under the TFEU 1297 A Special annulment action 1297 B Disputes concerning the European Investment Bank 1300 C Disputes concerning national central banks 1301 D Opinions 1302 V Special procedures under the EAEC Treaty 1308 A Applications to fix the terms of a licence 1309 B Appeals against decisions of the Euratom Arbitration Committee1310 C Actions for the grant of a licence 1316 D Inspections 1318 E Sanctions 1320 xiv

Contents

VI

F Special procedures under arts 103–105 Special procedures under other instruments A Article 35(7) of the Treaty on European Union (pre-Lisbon Treaty version) B Privileges and immunities C Interpretative rulings D Appointment to an office and removal from an office E Disputes concerning EU Intellectual Property Rights F Miscellaneous

1322 1332 1332 1332 1335 1341 1342 1347

Appendices Appendix 1 Table of concordance of treaty provisions concerning the Court1349 Appendix 2 List of international conventions and agreements conferring jurisdiction on the Court 1353 Appendix 3 Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union 1356 Appendix 4 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice 1378 Appendix 5 Supplementary Rules of the Court of Justice 1447 Appendix 6 Decision of the Court of Justice of 23 October 2012 concerning the judicial functions of the Vice-President of the Court (2012/671/EU) 1456 Appendix 7 Decision of the Court of Justice of 13 September 2011 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (2011/C 289/06) 1458 Appendix 8 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (2012/C 338/01)1461 Appendix 9 Practice Directions to parties concerning cases brought before the Court 1469 Appendix 10 Rules of Procedure of the General Court 1486 Appendix 11 Decision of the General Court of 14 September 2011 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (2011/C 289/07) 1566 Appendix 12 Practice Rules for the Implementation of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court 1569 Appendix 13 Legal Aid Form General Court 1608 Appendix 14 Rules of Procedure of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal1623 Appendix 15 Decision of the Civil Service Tribunal No 3/2011 taken at the Plenary Meeting on 20 September 2011 on the lodging and service of procedural documents by means of e-Curia (2011/C 289/08)1674 Appendix 16 Instructions to the Registrar of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal of 21 May 2014 1677 Appendix 17 Practice Directions to Parties on Judicial Proceedings before the European Union Civil Service Tribunal of 21 May 20141685 xv

Contents

Appendix 18 Guide for Legal Aid Applicants and Standard Form of Application for Legal Aid 1698 Appendix 19 e-Curia: Conditions of use applicable to parties’ representatives1713 Appendix 20 e-Curia: Conditions of use applicable to assistants 1717 Select bibliography

1721

Index

1727

xvi

Table of European Legislation

para CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES Convention defining the Statute of the European Schools (Luxembourg, 21 June 1994) art 26...............................................17.109 27...............................................17.72 Convention establishing the European University Institute (19 April 1972) art 29...............................................17.212 Annex I..................................  17.60, 17.212 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (Rome, 4  November 1950)........................................ 1.3, 1.10 art 6(1)............................................2.109 Convention for the Unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air (Warsaw, 12 October 1929).........17.76 Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities (Rome, 25  March 1957)...........................................3.4 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels, 27 September 1968).....1.8; 17.65, 17.208 art 2, 3.............................................17.83 37..........................................  1.8; 17.68 Protocol............................1.8; 17.68, 17.87, 17.200, 7.208 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Lugano, 16 September 1988)......1.8 Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome, 19 June 1980)..............................1.8 Protocol...........................................1.8

para ECSC Convention on the Transitional Provisions (Paris, 18 April 1951) art 30...............................................16.155 Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference adopting the Lisbon Treaty (Brussels, 23 July 2007) Declaration 38.................................1.33 Single European Act 1986.1.5, 1.8; 17.109 art 4, 11, 26................................1.4 Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the treaty establishing the European Community..................................1.5 Treaty concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union (Athens, 16 April 2003).............................1.1 Treaty concerning the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community (Athens, 28 May 1979) art 152.............................................10.47 Treaty concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community (Brussels, 22 January 1972) art 55(1)..........................................10.47 160.............................................10.47

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para

Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union (Brussels, 9 December 2011) at 22(2)............................................2.148 Treaty establishing a Constitution for European (draft)..........................1.5 Treaty establishing a European Economic Area (Porto, 2 May 1992) art 108(2)........................................1.3 Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (Brussels, 8 April 1965)...............................3.4 art 6.................................................1.48 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Rome, 25 March 1957)..............1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 1.13, 1.14, 1.18, 1.25, 1.28, 1.31; 2.167; 3.16; 5.7; 7.7; 8.8, 8.10, 8.16, 8.21; 16.170; 17.3, 17.6, 17.7, 17.10, 17.45, 17.120, 17.150, 17.154, 17.156, 17.175, 17.179, 17.180, 17.181, 17.187, 17.188, 17.195, 17.196 art 3, 4.............................................1.1 12....................................... 1.19; 17.151 14, 15.........................................17.154 16...............................................17.154 (4)..........................................17.154 17...............................................17.166 (1)..........................................17.154 18.............................. 1.19, 1.146; 10.27, 10.28; 17.159, 17.160, 17.163, 17.164, 17.168 19...............................................17.155 20.......................... 3.28; 17.158, 17.167 (1), (2)....................................17.155 21.......................................1.19; 17.165, 17.166, 17.167 22...............................................17.167 (1).............................. 17.167, 17.168 (1)..........................................17.168 23...............................................17.168 38..................................... 17.31, 17.150 48...............................................17.154 53...............................................17.24 77...............................................17.169 79...............................................17150 81....................... 1.19, 1.54; 8.1; 17.169 (3).................................. 1.53; 17.171 (4)..........................................1.53 82............................ 1.19; 17.31, 17.150 83......................................  1.19; 17.176 (1)...................  2.35; 8.1, 8.8; 17.173 (2)................................  2.35; 8.1, 8.8; 17.173, 17.174

Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Rome, 25 March 1957) – contd art 103............... 1.19; 16.6; 17.146, 17.177, 17.178, 17.180, 17.181, 17.182, 17.186, 17.190 104.................1.19 ,1.146; 16.6; 17.163, 17.177, 17.189, 17.190, 17.191, 17.193, 17.194 105.................1.19, 1.146; 16.6; 17.163, 17.177, 17.194 106a(1)..................1.8, 1.11, 1.19, 1.25, 1.27, 1.28, 1.31, 1.33; 8.28; 16.167; 17.1, 17.3, 17.28, 17.43, 17.59, 17.65, 17.75, 17.102, 17.105, 17.109, 17.112, 17.116, 17.160, 17.173, 17.187 (2).......................17.1, 17.3, 17.75, 17.196 116.............................................5.24 136.................. 1.5, 1.8, 1.22, 1.23, 1.30 137, 138..................................... 1.5, 1.8 140a......................................... 1.5, 1.23 (1)......................................1.22 140b........................................  1.5, 1.30 144...................... 1.8, 1.19; 3.16; 17.152 (b)........................................17.173 145..................................1.8, 1.19; 3.16; 17.175, 17.176 148.............................................17.24 157.......................... 1.8, 1.19; 2.35; 8.1, 8.8, 8.10, 8.20, 8.22 158.............................................8.44 160.............................................1.9 164..................  8.1, 8.51; 14.46; 16.167, 16.170; 17.176 175.............................................8.35 184, 185.....................................3.3 188........................................ 3.3; 17.31, 17.43, 17.108 191.............................................17.196 196.............................................3.16 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 April 1951)...............1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.8, 1.9, 1.17, 1.21, 1.139; 3.15, 3.16; 4.2, 4.10, 4.29; 5.3, 5.15, 5.27; 6.3; 7.7, 7.21, 7.28; 8.16, 8.18, 8.21, 8.22; 10.32, 10.38; 11.3, 11.44, 11.102; 13.12; 16.95, 16.173; 17.43, 17.116, 17.118 art 3.................................................10.27 6.................................................3.3 14...............................................8.18 18...............................................14.20

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para

Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 April 1951) – contd art 31...............................................1.22 32d(1)........................................1.22 33............................... 5.10, 5.49; 10.27, 10.29, 10.30, 10.33, 10.34, 10.35, 10.36, 10.47 36...............................................17.104 37...............................................10.32 39........................................... 8.16, 8.18 42........................................10.36; 17.59 47........................................11.49; 12.32 55(1)..........................................10.47 66(5)..........................................8.46 78...............................................8.16 80...............................................3.15 88...............................................8.20 89........................................5.27; 17.110 95................................... 17.145, 17.148, 17.186, 17.188 97...............................................1.1 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957)............ 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 1.14, 1.18, 1.21; 2.100, 2.167; 3.3, 3.16, 3.17; 7.7, 7.45, 7.89; 8.8, 8.10, 8.16, 8.21; 10.11; 16.95, 16.170, 16.172; 17.7, 17.75, 17.112, 17.120, 17.124, 17.195, 17.196, 17.209, 17.218, 17.227 art 1(2).....................................17.65, 17.75 3, 4........................................... 1.1; 17.4 5, 6.............................................17.4 8(4)............................................17.212 15(1)..........................................1.10 (3)............................1.10, 1.102, 1.40 19(1).......................................... 1.2, 1.5 24...............................................2.9 47–50.........................................1.10 52(2)..........................................1.1 55(1)..........................................2.9 Title V Pt 3 (arts 67–89).............  1.70, 1.71; 2.210; 17.5 art 82–89.........................................17.5 96...............................................13.8 101.......................................7.89; 8.171, 8.182; 13.45 (1)...........................8.25, 8.59, 8.63; 13.43, 13.46 (3).........................8.59, 8.63, 8.111; 10.38; 13.13 106(3)........................................2.30 108.............................................7.27

Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957) – contd art 108(2)..........................1.25; 8.29; 17.31 (3)........................................17.31 114(9)........................................17.31 168a...........................................1.5 169.............................................16.92 207.............................................1.25 215.............................................7.5 218................................. 17.139, 17.145 (1)........................................17.139 (11)....................  1.19; 16.6, 16.141, 16.144, 16.166; 17.137, 17.139, 17.145, 17.146, 17.148, 17.182, 17.183, 17.186, 17.188 220.............................................1.5 221, 222.....................................1.5 225a...........................................1.5 228(1)........................................17.112 (2)....................... 1.19, 1.69; 17.112 245........................................ 1.19, 1.69; 2.36; 17.112 247............................ 1.19, 1.69; 17.112 248.............................................16.92 251........................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.55, 1.69 252.......................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.17, 1.33, 1.58; 2.109 253.......................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.11, 1.33, 1.38, 1.53, 1.59; 16.84 254......................... 1.8, 1.13, 1.34, 1.38, 1.44, 1.53, 1.59 255...................................1.8, 1.33, 1.34 256.............................................1.8 (1).........................1.19, 1.25; 2.167, 2.222; 15.1; 17.160 (2).........................1.19, 1.27; 2.167, 2.222; 14.11; 15.1, 15.64 (3)........................ 1.19; 1.28; 2.222, 2.272; 14.11; 15.79 257................................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.14, 1.27, 1.29, 1.30, 1.35, 1.36, 1.38, 1.67; 2.222 258......................1.5, 1.8, 1.19; 3.1; 7.5, 7.22, 7.30, 7.61; 8.10, 8.19, 8.29, 8.45, 8.89, 8.179; 11.93; 12.27; 13.11, 13.12; 14.37; 16.22, 16.46, 16.92, 16.171; 17.28, 17.30, 17.36, 17.39, 17.40, 17.111, 17.133, 17.136, 17.150, 17.179, 17.181

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Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957) – contd art 259...........................  1.5, 1.8, 1.19; 7.5, 7.61; 17.28, 17.31, 17.36, 17.38, 17.39, 17.40, 17.109, 17.133, 17.136, 17.150, 17.179, 17.181 260........................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.19; 7.61 (1)..................... 16.34; 17.27, 17.34, 17.36, 17.38 (2)................... 16.34; 16.171; 17.37, 17.40 (3)...................16.34; 16.171; 17.35, 17.36, 17.37 261...................... 1.5, 1.8; 10.27, 10.31; 17.102 262................................ 1.5, 1.8; 17.215 263..........................  1.5, 1.8, 1.20, 1.20; 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 3.11; 4.113; 5.10, 5.25; 7.6, 7.7, 7.9, 7.14, 7.24, 7.31, 7.45, 7.49, 7.50, 7.54, 7.89; 8.20, 8.113, 8.139; 9.37; 10.29, 10.30, 10.37, 10.38, 10.44; 17.6, 17.7, 17.13, 17.14, 17.116, 17.134, 17.136 264........................ 1.5, 1.8; 9.37; 15.51; 16.24; 17.6, 17.17, 17.19 265.......................... 1.5, 1.8; 5.31; 7.28, 7.55, 7.61; 13.46; 17.20, 17.22, 17.21, 17.22, 17.24, 17.136 266......................... 1.5, 1.8; 16.34; 17.6, 17.17, 17.20, 17.2317.26 267..........................  1.5, 1.8, 1.19, 1.28, 1.153; 2.187, 2.199, 2.222, 2.170, 2.172, 2.206; 3.11; 10.26; 14.2, 14.2, 14.3; 15.1, 15.79; 17.65, 17.66, 17.67, 17.75, 17.76, 17.83, 17.87, 17.88, 17.93, 17.136 268.................................... 1.5, 1.8; 7.27; 17.43, 17.136 269........................ 1.5, 1.8, 1.19; 10.27, 10.28, 10.29; 17.124, 17.127, 17.128, 17.130 270........................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.31, 1.32; 3.3, 3.17; 7.5, 7.27; 17.59 271.................................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.19; 17.133, 17.136 (a), (b)..................................17.132 (c)................................... 7.6; 17.132 (d)........................................17.136

Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957) – contd art 272..........................  1.5, 1.8, 1.31; 2.66; 7.3, 7.61; 9.56, 9.64; 10.27; 17.105, 17.106, 17.109 273.............................1.5, 1.8, 1.19; 7.3, 7.61; 9.56; 10.27; 17.109, 17.110 274................................ 1.5, 1.8; 17.105 275......................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.21; 2.170; 7.5; 17.4, 17.75 276........................ 1.5, 1.8, 1.21; 2.170; 17.4, 17.5 277.........................1.5, 1.8, 1.152; 7.30; 17.116, 17.117, 17.119 278......................1.5, 1.8; 2.35; 8.1, 8.8, 8.20, 8.22, 8.35; 17.173 279............................ 1.5, 1.8; 8.1, 8.22, 8.28, 8.36, 8.38, 8.44, 8.137; 17.173 280........................... 1.5, 1.8; 4.132; 8.1, 8.49; 11.54; 14.46, 14.79; 16.167, 16.170 281...................................... 1.5, 1.8, 1.9 282(3)........................................3.4 286(5)................................ 1.19; 17.112 (6)....................... 1.19, 1.69; 17.112 288.............................................17.11 289(1)...................................... 1.9, 1.14 (3)........................................17.11 291(2)........................................1.25 294........................................... 1.9, 1.14 299........................ 8.1, 8.49, 8.51, 8.52, 8.179; 14.46, 14.79; 16.167, 16.170, 16.171; 17.11 331(1)........................................1.25 335.............................................3.3 339......................................11.49; 12.32 340.......................... 3.3, 3.35; 7.5, 7.27, 7.89; 17.43, 17.108, 17.136 343.............................................17.196 344................................... 17.28, 17.109 346......................................12.19, 12.21 (1)........................................12.27 (a)....................................12.24 348.............................8.29; 12.24; 17.31 380.............................................3.4 Protocol 3........................................ 1.5, 1.9 Protocol 4.......................... 1.19, 1.22, 1.31; 17.21, 17.136 Protocol 6........................................1.3 Protocol 7........................................1.3 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Brussels, 2 February 2012)..........2.205; 17.109 art 37(3).............................. 17.109, 17.111

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Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and related acts (Amsterdam, 2 October 1997).....1.1 art 9................................................. 1.1, 1.3 (1).............................1.1, 1.3, 1.48; 3.4 (2)............................................1.1 (4)............................................1.3 10...............................................1.48 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Lisbon, 13 December 2007)............... 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 1.21, 1.23, 1.33, 1.40; 17.195 art 2(2)............................................1.1 6(1)............................................1.1 Protocol 2........................................1.1 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts (Nice, 26 February 2001)......1.1, 1.51.31, 1.40 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 7 February 1992).....1.3, 1.8, 1.9, 1.21, 1.40; 10.47; 17.65, 17.75, 17.120, 17.196 art 1.................................................1.1 (2)...........................................1.1 3.................................................1.1 4(3).....................................7.28; 17.180 5.................................................1.1 (1), (2)......................................17.2 (3), (4)...................................1.10, 1.21 6(3)............................................1.10 7........................................... 1.19; 10.28; 17.124, 17.128 8.................................................1.1 11(1), (2)....................................1.10 13(1)........................... 1.1, 1.5; 3.4; 5.3; 15.8; 17.10, 17.22 (2)............................... 1.10, 1.21; 3.4 (4)..........................................3.4 16(2).................... 1.11, 1.13, 1.14; 5.24 17(1)..........................................8.103 19(1)........................ 1.2, 1.8, 1.10, 1.20, 1.21, 1.22, 1.23, 1.29, 1.67; 8.9; 10.2; 17.1, 17.2 (2).................... 1.33, 1.34, 1.37, 1.38 (3)............................. 1.18; 17.1, 17.3 (b)......................................2.170 21, 22.........................................17.4 24(1)........................................ 1.8; 17.4 34(2)..........................................17.195 (d)......................................17.195 35(7)..........................................17.195

Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 7 February 1992) – contd art 40...............................................17.4 47...............................................3.3 55(1)..........................................2.9 265.............................................17.24 278.............................................8.8 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (Brussels, 2 March 2012).............................17.109 DIRECTIVES Dir 77/249............................4.25, 4.33; 12.41 Dir 95/46............................................5.2 REGULATIONS Regulation (EEC) No 1/58 art 7.................................................2.3 Regulation (EEC) No 31/62 Annex..............................................12.32 Regulation (EEC) No 7/63..................17.156 art 10...............................................17.156 411(1)........................................17.156 (2).........................................17.156 14, 15, 17–20, 22.......................17.157 23...............................................17.157 Regulation (EEC) No 42/67................1.48 Regulation (EEC, EURATOM, ECSC) No 259/68..............................1.66; 17.59 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 art 50...............................................10.15 Regulation (EEC) No 3214/75............13.1 Regulation (EEC) No 1860/76............17.59 Regulation (EEC) No 3017/79 art 8.................................................12.29 Regulation (EC) No 40/94..................17.216 Regulation (EC) No 2100/94..............17.214, 17.215, 17.221, 17.222 art 1–4.............................................17.221 33(2)–(4)....................................17.224 33a(3)........................................17.224 73...............................................17.222 (1)–(3)....................................17.221 (4)...............................17.221, 17.222 (5), (6)....................................17.221 74(1), (2)....................................17.222 86(1)–(4)....................................17.223 Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000..........1.8 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001..............1.8 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001..............17.227 art 32(1)–(3)....................................17.227 47(1)(h)......................................17.227 (i)....................................... 5.2, 5.4 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001..........12.31, 12.32 Regulation (EC) No 6/2002..... 17.215, 17.225 art 1, 2.............................................17.225 61(1)–(6)....................................17.225 71(1)–(4)....................................17.226

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Regulation (EC) No 1/2003......  12.32; 17.102 art 31...............................................10.31 Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003..........1.8 Regulation (EC ) No 139/2004...........17.102, 17.214 Regulation (EC) No 930/2004............1.169 Regulation (EC) No 920/2005............2.3 art 2............................................. 1.169; 2.3 Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 art 4.................................................17.199 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008............1.8 Recital 44–46..................................1.8 Regulation (EC) No 207/2009............17.213, 17.215, 17.216, 17.217, 17.218 art 64(3)..........................................17.217 65...............................................3.6 (1)..........................................17.216 (2)..........................................17.217 (3)–(5)....................................17.216 (6)..........................................17.218 78(1)..........................................13.1 86(1)–(4)....................................17.219 118.............................................3.6

Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – contd art 118(2)–(4)..................................17.220 123(3)........................................17.220 136(1), (3)..................................17.213 Regulation (EC) No 874/2009............17.222 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2010..........1.169 Regulation (EU) No 979/2012........1.36, 1.37, 1.38 art 1(1)............................... 1.37, 1.44, 1.52 (2)........................................ 1.37, 1.44 (3)..............................  1.37, 1.44, 1.45, 1.48 2.................................................1.37 4.................................................1.49 5.................................................1.37 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012..........1.8 art 68...............................................1.8 Recital 41........................................1.8 Regulation (EU) No 216/2013............7.44 Regulation (EU) No 2015/2422..........1.2, 1.4, 1.81 art 1(1)............................................1.33 (2)............................................1.34 2.................................................1.34

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Table of Cases para 1.garantovana a.s. v Commission (Case T-392/09) 12 December 2012..........................................1.158 1. garantovana a.s. v Commission (Case T-392/09R) [2011] ECR II-33............ 5.60; 8.122, 8.124, 8.125, 8.129, 8.152, 8.181, 8.183 3F v Commission (Case C-319/07P) [2009] ECR I-5963...............................................................7.9 A A v Commission (Case T-10/93) [1994] ECR II-179......................................................................2.69 A v Commission (Case F-50/13) 8 May 2014.................................................................................14.20 A v Commission (Cases F-124/05 & F-96/06) 13 January 2010.....................................................17.50 A v Parliament (Case T-6/94) [1996] ECR-SC I-A-191, II-A-555..................................................7.8 A2A v Commission (Case C-318/09 P) [2011] ECR I-207...................................................... 10.48; 15.16 A2A v Commission (Case C-320/09 P) [2011] ECR I-210........................................... 10.48; 15.16, 15.21 A Ahlström Osakeyhtïo v Commission (Cases C-89, C-104, C-114, C-116, C-117 & C-125129/85) [1993] ECR I-1307...............................................................  6.4; 11.93, 11.99; 13.21, 13.26, 13.29, 13.41, 13.43; 14.16 A Maas & Co NV v Belgische Dienst voor Bedrijfsleven en Landbouw (Case C-326/94) [1996] ECR I-2643............................................................................................................  4.117, 4.118, 4.121 AB v EC Commission, supported by GH (Case T-1001/93)...........................................................9.115 ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd v Commission (Case T-31/99) [2002] ECR II-181..........................9.47 ABNA Ltd v Secretary of State for Health (Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 & C-194/04) [2005] ECR I-10423................................................................................................................2.149 ACEA SpA v Commission (Case C-319/09P) [2011] ECR I-209...................................................15.16 ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission (Case 41/69) [1970] ECR 661....... 7.25, 7.26; 10.31; 12.20; 13.17 ACNA v Commission (Case 57/69) [1972] ECR 933..............................................................  11.93, 11.94 ADR Center Srl v Commission (Case C-259/14 P) 4 December 2014........................................  4.11, 4.25 ADT Projekt Gesellschaft der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Tierzuchter mbH v Commission (Case T-145/98) [1999] ECR II-2627.......................................................................... 4.17; 9.41; 12.3 AEG Telefunken AG v Commission (Case 107/82) [1983] ECR 3151................. 8.24, 8.153, 8.171; 13.7, 13.21, 13.26, 13.43 AIUFFASS v Commission (Case T-380/94) [1996] ECR II-2169..................................................3.14 AK v Commission (Case T-288/13P) 26 May 2014........................................................................15.21 AKZO Chemie BV & Akzo Chemie UK Ltd v Commission (Case 5/85) [1986] ECR 2585.........9.84 AKZO Chemie BV & AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission (Case 53/85) [1986] ECR 1965....5.90; 17.17 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission (Case C-62/86) [1991] ECR I-3359...............  8.75, 8.81, 8.108; 13.26 ALA SpA & ALFER SpA v Commission (Cases 220 & 221/78) [1979] ECR 1693....... 1.126; 2.34; 4.12, 4.15; 7.24, 7.31, 7.40, 7.75, 7.77 ALMA v High Authority (Case 8/56) [1957–58] ECR 95 ...................................................... 9.54; 17.103 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission (Case 155/79) [1982] ECR 1575............... 1.42, 1.164; 2.140, 2.153; 4.34; 5.6, 5.18, 5.30, 5.36; 7.25; 10.47, 10.48; 11.49, 11.85; 12.19, 12.20, 12.37, 12.38, 12.45; 14.13 ANKO AE v Commission (Case T-17/13) 6 November 2014............................................. 7.14, 7.15, 7.16 AO v Commission (Case T-365/11P) ) 12 December 2011....................................................... 7.41; 15.14 AS Bolderaja v Council (Case T-104/99) [2000] ECR II-451.........................................................7.41 AS v Commission (Case F-55/10) 28 June 2011.............................................................................9.79 ASSIDER v High Authority (Case 3/54) [1954–56] ECR 63 ......................................... 3.15; 11.44; 16.25 ASSIDER v High Authority (Case 5/55 ) [1954–56] ECR 135................ 3.18; 7.71; 16.17, 16.49, 16.151, 16.152, 16.153, 16.154, 16.155, 16.161, 16.163, 16.164, 16.165, 16.173 ATI EAC Srl v ACTV Venezia SpA (Case C-331/04) [2005] ECR I-10109...................................2.149 AVM v Commission (Case T-109/98) [1999] ECR II-3383............................................... 4.86; 7.26, 7.53

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Table of Cases para AX v European Central Bank (Cases F-7/11 & F-60/11) 13 December 2012................................14.20 Aalborg Portland A/S v Commission (Cases C-204/00P, C-205/00P, C-211/00P, C-213/00P, C-217/00P & C-21900P) [2004] ECR I-123.................................................................... 2.149; 11.60 Abad Perez v Council & Commission (Case T-304/01) [2006] ECR II-4857.............. 3.1; 9.34, 9.41, 9.55 Abbott Trust v Council & Commission (Case T-554/93R) [1994] ECR II-1............................. 8.45, 8.172 Abd Aziz Tam (Case C-74/12) 4 July 2012.....................................................................................2.182 Abertal SAT Lda v Commission (Case C-213/91R) [1991] ECR I-5109......................  8.108, 8.114, 8.164 Abdulrahim v Council & Commission (Case T-127/09 RENV) 14 January 2015..........................7.41 Abdulrahim v Council & Commission (Case C-239/12P) 28 May 2013.................................. 2.111; 7.15 Abrias v Commission (Case 3/83) [1985] ECR 1995......................................................................5.6 Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia v High Authority (Case 31/59) [1960] ECR 98............ 8.75, 8.97, 8.111, 12.32 Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission (Case T-158/96) [1999] ECR II-3927......................  5.28, 5.51, 5.98 Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni v Commission (Case 284/82) [1984] ECR 557............................. 7.39, 7.40 Acciaiere e Ferriere Busseni SpA v Commission (Case 81/83) [1984] ECR 2951...................... 7.5; 8.149 Acciaierie e Ferriere Pugliesi v High Authority (Case 8/65)........................................... 13.5, 13.21; 14.59 Acciaierie Ferriere Pietro Oddino v High Authority (Case 60/63R) [1965] ECR 27........ 8.84, 8.90, 8.175 Acciaierie San Michele SpA v High Authority (Cases 9 & 58/65) [1968] ECR 259........... 6.3, 6.4; 11.59; 14.59, 14.66, 14.68, 14.69, 14.74 Aceites del Sur-Coosur SA v Koipe Corporacion SL (Case C-498/07P) [2009] ECR I-7371........9.140 Acerbis v Commission (Case C-320/81) [1990] ECR I-563...................................................... 2.161; 9.55 Acron v Council (Case T-118/10) 7 February 2013.........................................................................9.79 Activision Blizzard Germany v Commission (Case C-260/09P) [2011] ECR I-419................ 13.22; 15.18 Adam v Commission (Cases 80–83/81 & 182–185/82) [1984] ECR 3411............................  2.161; 14.35 Adams v Commission (Case 145/83) [1985] ECR 3539.......  4.110, 4.111; 7.51; 9.84; 17.48, 17.51, 17.52 Adams v Commission (Case 53/84) [1985] ECR 3539...................................................................7.5, 7.68 Aden v Council & Commission (Case T-306/01R) [2002] ECR II-2387.............. 8.13, 8.27, 8.108, 8.110, 8.147, 8.148, 8.160 Adil v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel (Case C-278/12 PPU) 19 July 2012.............2.211 Administracion del Estado v Juntas Generales de Guipuzcoa (Cases C-400/97-C-402/97) [2000] ECR I-1073..............................................................................................................................2.196 Administration des Douanes v Centrale d’achat francaise pour l’outre-mer SA (Case C-161/03) order of 11 July 2003 (unreported)..........................................................................................17.71 Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v Legros (Case C-163/90) [1992] ECR I-4625...17.101 Administration des Douanes v Gondrand Frères SA (Case 169/80) [1981] ECR 1931..................13.45 Administrateur des Affaires Maritimes Bayonne v Dorca Marina (Cases 50–58/82) [1982] ECR 3949.........................................................................................................................................9.154 Adriatica di Navigazione SpA v Commission (Case T-231/00) 12 December 2012.......................2.48 Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH v Commission (Case C-308/90) [1990] ECR I-4499, [1993] ECR I-309..................................................................................................................... 17.173, 17.174 Aer Lingus Group plc v Commission (Case T-411/07R) [2008] ECR II-411.....8.1, 8.25, 8.37, 8.60, 8.64, 8.76, 8.153, 8.169, 8.177 Aerpo v Commission (Case C-119/88) [1990] ECR I-2189................................................ 7.80, 7.99; 9.45 Aeroports de Paris v Commission (Case C-82/01P) [2002] ECR I-9297................................. 10.48; 15.21 Affatato v Commission (Case T-157/96AJ) [1997] ECR I-155....................................................  4.87, 4.92 Afton Chemical Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport (Case C-343/09) [2010] ECR I-7027.......17.77, 17.82 Agapiou Josephides v Commission (Case C-626/10P) [2011] ECR I-169.................................. 9.89; 16.9 Agence Européenne d’Intérims SA v Commission (Case 56/77) [1978] ECR 2215..............  11.45; 14.25 Agence Statistique de la Republique du Kazakhstan v Commission (Case C-3/05SA)..................17.197 Agenzia Dogane Ufficio delle Dogane di Trieste v Pometon SpA (Case C-158/08) [2009] ECR I-4695.......................................................................................................................................7.5 Agostini v Commission (Case C-9/98) [1998] ECR I-4261............................................................2.176 Agostini v Commission (Case 233/83) [1986] ECR 2729......................................................... 7.64; 17.53 Agrar-Invest-Tatschl GmbH v Commission (Case T-51/07) [2008] ECR II-2825...................... 7.5; 11.15 Agricola Commerciale Olio v Commission (Case 232/81) [1984] ECR 3881......................... 11.32, 11.37 Agricola Commerciale Olio Srl v Commission (Case 232/81R) [1981] ECR 2193.........8.22, 8.91, 8.100, 8.115, 8.139, 8.142 Aguirre Zarraga v Pelz (Case C-491/10 PPU) [2010] ECR I-14247...............................................2.211 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen & Silver Line Reisebüro GmbH v Zentrale zür Bekämpfung Unlauteren Wettbrwerbs eV (Case 66/86) [1989] ECR 803 .............................................................  2.148, 2.149

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Table of Cases para Ainsworth v Commission & Council (Cases 271/83, 15, 36, 113, 158 & 203/84 & 13/85) [1987] ECR 167...................................................................................................................................1.72 Ainsworth v Commission (Cases 159 & 267/84, 12 & 264/85) [1987] ECR 1579.....................  7.70, 7.94 Air Bourbon SAS v Commission (Case T-321/04) [2005] ECR II-3469........................................7.38 Air Inter v Commission (Case T-260/94) [1997] ECR II-997.........................................................2.30 Airport Shuttle Express scarl v Comune di Grottaferrata (Cases C-162/12 & C-163/12) 13 February 2014..........................................................................................................................2.141 Air Products & Chemicals Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Cases T-305/06-T-307/06) [2008] ECR II-220...................................................9.100 Airtours plc v Commission (Case T-342/99DEP) [2004] ECR II-1785.............14.56, 14.58, 14.63, 14.70, 14.74, 14.75, 14.76, 14.79 Aker Warnow Werft GmbH v Commission (Case T-68/05) [2009] ECR II-355.............................12.13 Akhras v Council (Case C-110/12 P(R)) 19 July 2012...............................  8.65, 8.85, 8.104, 8.152, 8.161, 8.164, 8.174 Aktien Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council (Case 5/71) [1971] ECR 975..................  7.60; 9.45; 17.47 Aklagaren v Fransson (Case C-617/10REC) order of 7 May..........................................................16.40 Akzo Chemie BV & Akzo Chemie UK Ltd v Commission (Case 53/85) [1986] ECR 1965 ........7.5 Akzo Nobel NV v Commission (Case T-330/01) [2006] ECR II-3389...........................................14.63 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission (Case T-125/03) [2007] ECR II-479.......5.18, 5.20, 5.22, 5.34 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission (Case T-253/03) [2004] ECR II-1617......... 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.18, 5.20, 5.22, 5.34, 5.30, 5.86; 12.42 Akzo Nobel NV v Commission (Case T-112/05) [2007] ECR II-5049...........................................7.2 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission (Case C-550/07P) [2010] ECR I-8301.......... 5.18, 5.21; 12.42 Akzo Nobel NV v Commission (Case C-97/08P) [2009] ECR I-8237...................................... 7.18; 9.118 Akzo Nobel v Commission (Case T-345/12R) 16 November 2012.................................................8.11 Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum eV v Commission (Case T-114/00) [2002] ECR II5121.........................................................................................................................................3.14 Alabaster v Woolwich plc (Case C-147/02) [2004] ECR I-3101....................................................1.49 Al Assad v Council (Case T-407/13) 22 December 2014................................................................7.71 Albani v Commission (Case T-35/89) [1990] ECR II-395.................................  11.25, 11.31, 11.64, 11.83 Albatros Sàrl v SOPECO (Case 20/64) [1965] ECR 29 .................................................................10.7 Alands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten (Case C-573/12) 1 July 2014.....................................2.149 Al-Aqsa v Council (Case T-348/07) [2010] ECR II-4575...............................................................9.54 Al-Aqsa v Council (Cases C-539/10P & C-550/10P) 15 November 2012......................................7.71 Al Assad v Commission (Case T-407/13) 22 December 2014....................................................  2.75; 9.54 Alassini v Telecom Italia (Cases C-317/08-C-320/08) [2010] ECR I-2213............................. 17.78, 17.82 Albani v Commission (Case 148/88R) [1988] ECR 3361...............................................................8.161 Albani v Commission (Case 148/88) 13 June & 13 December 1988 (unreported).........................4.19 Albergo Quattro Fontane v Commission (Cases T-278/00-T-280/00, T-282/00-T-286/00, T-288/00-T-295/00) 20 February 2013....................................................................................2.48 Albertini & Montagnani v Commission (Case 338/82) [1984] ECR 2123......... 9.43; 13.12, 13.28, 13.44; 14.43 Albertini & Montagnani v Commission (Case 338/82R) [1982] ECR 4667, [1983] ECR 145......8.104, 8.111, 8.171, 8.175 Alberto Jorge Moreira da Fonseca Lda v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Cases T-318/06-T-321/06) [2009] ECR II-649........................................2.81 Albert Reiss Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH v Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Case C-466/03) [2007] ECR I-5357..............................................................................................................................2.149 Albert Ruckdeschel & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen (Cases 117/76 & 16/77) [1977] ECR 1753.................................................................................................................................2.72 Albini v Council & Commission (Case 33/80) [1981] ECR 2141........................................... 7.59; 17.117 Albini v Council & Commission (Case 33/80R) [1980] ECR 1671.................................  8.22, 8.42, 8.108 Alcan Aluminium Raeren SA v Commission (Case 69/69) [1970] ECR 385.................................7.50 Alchaar v Council (Case T-203/12) 3 July 2014..............................................................................9.54 Alcoa Trasformazioni v Commission (Case C-194/09P) [2011] ECR I-6311................................15.20 Aldinger v European Parliament (Case 23/87R) [1987] ECR 2841.................  8.80, 8.81, 8.84, 8.92, 8.93, 8.134, 8.148 Alexander Moksel Import-Export GmbH & Co Handels KG v Commission (Case 45/81)[1982] ECR 1129................................................................................................... 2.16; 5.10, 5.29, 5.30, 5.69 Alexandrakis v Commission (Case T-57/89) [1990] ECR II-143................................................ 7.64, 7.66 Alexopoulou v Commission (Case C-155/98P) [1999] ECR I-4069.................................  1.89; 2.55; 5.13, 5.14, 5.32, 5.99

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Table of Cases para Alfieri v European Parliament (Case 3/66) [1966] ECR 437...................................................... 9.45; 11.79 Alfons Lüttick GmbH v Commission (Case 4/69) [1971] ECR 325....................... 7.60; 9.39, 9.48; 17.46 Alfredo Barbini Srl v Commission (Case T-272/00) 29 January 2013............................................2.48 Alfred Toepfer KG & Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v Commission (Cases 106, 107/63) [1965] ECR 429...................................................................................................................................6.16 Algemene Financieringsmaatschappij Nefito BV v Commission (Case T-157/89) 25 September 1990 (unreported).....................................................................................................................5.28 Algera v Common Assembly (Cases 7/56 & 3–7/57) [1957–58] ECR 39 ............................ 5.3, 5.4; 9.55 Ali Mahdi (Case C-146/14 PPU) 5 June 2014.................................................................................2.211 Alimenta SA v Doux SA (Case C-332/88) [1990] ECR I-2077..............................................  2.195; 10.10 Alisei v Commission (Case T-481/08) [2010] ECR II-117.............................................................17.11 Al-Jubail Fertiliser Co v Council (Case C-49/88) [1991] ECR I-3187...............11.27, 11.43; 13.40, 13.43 Allen v Commission (Case F-103/09) 13 July 2010 on appeal (Case T-433/10P) Allen v Commission, 14 December 2011.............................................................................................7.29 Allen v Commission (Case T-433/10P) 14 December 2011............................................................15.70 Allied Corpn v Commission (Cases 239 & 275/82) [1984] ECR 1005........................................ 3.25, 3.26 Allo v Commission (Case 176/83) [1985] ECR 2155, [1986] ECR 2687.................................. 7.64; 17.53 Almamet GmbH Handel mit Spanen und Pulvern aus Metall v Commission (Case C-373/10R) [2010] ECR I-171....................................................................................................................8.122 Almamet GmbH Handel mit Spanen und Pulvern aus Metall v Commission (Case T-410/09R) [2010] ECR II-80................................................................................................... 8.122, 8.180, 8.185 Al Matri v Council (Case T-200/11) 28 May 2013..................................................................... 2.161; 7.16 Alpha Steel Ltd v Commission (Case 14/81) [1982] ECR 749 ...........................  2.161; 9.54, 9.89; 16.25 Alpiq RomIndustries v Commission (Case T-129/13) 16 October 2014.........................................7.2 Alro SA v Commisison (Case T-517/12) 16 October 2014.............................................................7.2 Alsatel v SA Novasam (Case 247/86) [1988] ECR 5987................................................................17/100 Alsteens v Commission (Case T-373/13 P) 12 March 2014................................ 2.38, 2.111; 15.39, 15.42 Alsthom Atlantique v Sulzer (Case C-339/89) [1991] ECR I-107..................................................17.85 Altmann v Commission (Cases T-177/94 & T-377/94) [1996] ECR II-2041.............. 3.42; 6.3; 7.70, 7.71; 14.56; 16.23 Alto de Casablanca SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-14/04) [2004] ECR II-3077...................................................................... 4.10, 4.11 Altstoff Recycling Austria v Commission (Case T-419/03) [2011] ECR II-975.............................9.79 Alt Yimy v Commission (Case C-4/05SA)......................................................................................17.197 Aluminios Cortizo v Commission (Case T-1/14R) 7 March 2014..................................................8.19 Alvarez v European Parliament (Case 206/81) [1982] ECR 3369..................................................2.153 Alvarez v European Parliament (Case 206/81A) [1983] ECR 2865........................16.150, 16.153, 16.156, 16.159, 16.161 Alvarez v European Parliament (Case 206/81R) [1981] ECR 2187 ...............................................8.66 Alvarez v European Parliament (Case 347/82R) [1983] ECR 65................................. 8.104, 8.111, 8.134 Alvarez Sagrario (Case T-257/99AJ) 8 November 1999 (unreported)............................................4.105 Alvino & Benoit v Commission (Cases 18 & 19/64) [1965] ECR 789......................  9.34, 9.43, 9.54, 9.89 Alvis v Council (Case 32/62) [1963] ECR 49.......................................................................... 11.34; 14.20 Amann & Sohne GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-446/05) [2010] ECR II-1255..............17.16 Ambrosetti v Commission (Case 247/83) [1985] ECR 2171..........................................................7.64 Amesz v Commission & Council (Cases 532, 534, 567, 600, 618 & 660/79) [1981] ECR 2569........................................................................................................ 6.14; 9.45, 9.55; 14.16 17.53 Amiraike Berlin GmbH (Case C-497/08) [2010] ECR I-101...................................................... 7.6; 17.70 Amman v Council (Case 174/83) [1986] ECR 2647.................................................................  7.64; 17.53 Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato v Commission (Case T-139/98) [2001] ECR II-3413......................................................................................................................................5.37 Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze v Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl (Case C-2/08) [2009] ECR I-7501..................................................................................................................16.22 Amministrazione delle Finanze v San Giorgio SpA (Case 199/82) [1983] ECR 3595............. 13.1, 13.25, 13.46; 17.69 Amministrazione delle Finanze v Salumi (Cases 66, 127 & 128/79) [1980] ECR 1237................16.37 Amministrazione delle Finanze delle Stato v Ariete (Case 811/79) [1980] ECR 2545...................17.19 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Denkavit Italiana Srl (Case 61/79) [1980] ECR 1205 .....................................................................................................................  16.24, 16.37; 17.19 Amministrazione delle Finanze delle Stato v Salumi Srl (Cases 66, 127 & 128/79) [1980] ECR 1237.........................................................................................................................................17.19 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Salumi (Cases 212–217/80) [1981] ECR 2735.......1.15

xxvi

Table of Cases para Amministrazione delle Finanze delle Stato v MIRECO (Case 826/79) [1980] ECR 2559.............17.19 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (Case 106/77) [1978] ECR 629..................................................................................................................................  17.98, 17.118 Amussen v Commission & Council (Case 50/74) [1975] ECR 1003..............................................9.34 Amylum v Council & Commission (Cases 116 & 124/77) [1979] ECR 3497................................17.49 Anbouba v Council (Case C-605/13P) 21 April 2015................................................................ 9.54; 15.16 Anbouba v Council (Case T-563/11) 13 September 2013...............................................................9.54 Andersen v Commission (Case T-92/11) 20 March 2013............................................................. 5.44, 5.46 Andersen v Council (Case 260/80) [1984] ECR 177........................................ 12.30, 12.32, 12.49; 17.116 André v Council & Commission (Cases 219–228, 230–235, 237–238, 240–242/80) [1981] ECR 1879.....................................................................................................................  3.5; 43.27; 6.15; 7.6 Andreasen v Commission (Case T-17/08P) 9 September 2010.......................................................17.19 Andriotis v Commission (Case T-5/99) [2000] ECR II-235............................................................6.9 Angelidakis v Organismos Nomarkhiaki Aftodiikisi Rethimnis (Cases C-378/07-C-380/07) [2009] ECR -I-3071.................................................................................................................17.83 Angelidis v Commission (Case 17/83) [1984] ECR 2907 ..............................................................2.102 Angelidis v Parliament (Case F-104/08) 15 April 2010...................................................................17.17 Angeletti v Commission (Case T-394/03) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-95, II-A-2-441..........................2.158 Angioi v Commission, (Case F-7/07) 29 June 2011........................................................................5.44 Animal Trading Company (ATC) BV v Commission (Case T-333/10) 16 September 2013..... 17.46, 17.48 Anonimos Etaireia Epicheiriseon Metalleftikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon AE v Council (Case C-121/86) [1989] ECR 3919 .........................................................................................9.82 Anonimos Eteria Epichiriseon Metalleftikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon AE v Council & Commission (Case 121/86R) [1986] ECR 2063......................................................................8.43 An Post v Deutsche Post & Commission (Case C-130/06 P(I)) [2006] ECR I-53..........................5.14 Anselme (née Heirwegh) v Commission (Case 255/78) [1979] ECR 2323 ...................................7.66 Anssens v Directeur des services fiscaux du nord (Case C-325/98) [1999] ECR I-2969; .............2.176, 2.182; 7.5 Antas de Campo v Parliament (Case C-279/02P) 14 October 2004................................................11.24 Antas v Council (Case F-92/06) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-159, II-A-1-859.......................................2.64 Antillean Rice Mills NV v Commission (Case C-390/95P) [1999] ECR I-769..............................5.6 Antillean Rice Mills NV v Commission (Case T-26/97) [1997] ECR II-1347................................6.12 Antillean Rice Mills NV v Council (Case T-41/97) [1998] ECR II-4117.......................................2.28 Antippas v Commission (Case C-1/02SA) [2003] ECR I-2893......................................................17.197 Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corpn v Aivars Lembergs (Case C-350/13) 5 June 2014..............17.81, 17.82 Antonissen v Council & Commission (Case T-179/96R) [1996] ECR II-1641...............................8.5, 8.41 Antonissen v Council & Commission (Case T-179/96 P(R)) [1997] ECR II-425...........................8.41 Antonissen v Council & Commission (Case C-393/96 P(R)) [1997] ECR I-441...........................8.41 Antwerpse Bouwwerken NV v Commission (Case T-195/08) [2009] ECR II-4439.......................7.5, 7.16 Apostolov v Commission (Case T-73/10 P) 2 December 2010.......................................... 7.31, 7.38, 7.40 Appelbaum v Commission (Case 119/83) [1985] ECR 2423..........................................................16.34 Application for authorisation-serve an attachment order on the EC Commission (Case SA 1/71) [1971] ECR 363.......................................................................................................................17.198 Applied Microengineering Ltd v Commission (Case T-387/09) 27 September 2012.....................17.11 Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank (Case F-34/10) 4 February 2011.............. 7.26, 7.29, 7.33 Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank (Case C-334/12RX-II) 28 February 2013....... 7.29; 17.62 Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank (Case T-234/11P) 19 June 2012...........................17.62 Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank (Case T-234/11P-RENV-RX) 9 July 2013...... 7.29; 15.19 Aranovitch v Commission (Cases 736 & 738–780/79) [1987] ECR 2425 .....................................2.160 Arauzo Burillo v Commission (Case F-67/07AJ) [2007] ECR -SC I-A-1-327, II-A-1-1825.........4.91 Arbed SA v Commission (Case 20/81R) [1981] ECR 721 ....................................  8.83, 8.84, 8.134, 8.135 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen v Commission (Case T-25/96) [1997] ECR II-363.......................................................................................................................  2.161; 14.56 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen v Commission (Case T-86/96R) [1998] ECR II-641...............................................................................................................................8.67 Arbeitsgemeinschaft der offentich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD) v Commission (Case T-158/00) [2003] ECR II-3825.............................9.48 Arcelor v Parliament & Council (Case T-16/04) [2010] ECR II-211..............................................17.49 ArcelorMittal Luxembourg SA v Commission (Case T-405/06) [2009] ECR II-771.................  1.1; 14.13 Arch Chemicals Inc v Commission (Case T-120/08) [2011] ECR II-298.......................................16.54 Archer Daniels Midland Co v Commission (Case T-329/01) [2006] ECR I-3255..........................2.151 Archer Daniels Midland Co v Commission (Case T-224/00) [2003] ECR II-2597........................9.42

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Table of Cases para Archer Daniels Midland Co v Commission (Case C-511/06P) [2009] ECR O-5843.....................14.16 ArchiMEDES v Commission (Case T-396/05) [2009] ECR II-70; on appeal [2010] ECR I-150..1.11; 3.3 ArchiMEDES v Commission (Case C-317/09 P) [2010] ECR I-150................................ 3.31; 15.2, 15.25 Architecture, microclimate, energies douces – Europe et Sud SA (ArchiMEDES) v Commission (Case C-317/09P) [2010] ECR I-150.......................................................................................16.9 Area Cova SA v Council (Case T-194/95) [1996] ECR II-343...................... 1.114; 3.14; 5.20, 5.69, 5.70; 7.26, 7.41 Area Cova SA v Council & Commission (Case T-12/96) [1999] ECR II-2301..............................3.14 Areva SA v Commission (Cases C-247/11P) & C-253/11P) 10 April 2014............................  15.25, 15.26 Arizmendi v Council & Commission (Cases T-440/03, T-121/04, T-171/04, T-208/04, T-365/04 & T-484/04) [2009] ECR II-4883............................................................................................7.6, 7.59 Arizona Chemical BV v Commission (Case T-58/39) [2005] ECR II-5839...................................9.41 Arkema SA v Commission (Case C-520/09P) [2011] ECR I-8901................................................15.25 Armada Supply Ltd v Commission (Case 369/87) order of 19 May 1988......................................14.37 Armando Alvarez v Commission (Case C-36/12P) 22 May 2014...................................................15.18 Armement Cooperatif Artisanal Vendeen v Council (Case T-138/98) [1999] ECR II-1797....... 5.13, 5.17, 5.19, 5.20, 5.70, 5.81 Arne Mathisen AS v Commission (Case T-340/99) [2002] ECR II-2905.................................. 2.138; 7.59 Arning v Commission (Case 125/80) [1981] ECR 2539 ................................................................14.24 Arnold Andre GmbH & Co KG v Landrat des Kreises Herford (Case C-434/02) [2004] ECR I-11825...................................................................................................................  2.141, 2.149, 2.153 Arnoldo Mondadori Editore SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-548/14P) 17 September 2015........................  15.21, 15.25, 15.29, 15.41 Arposol v Commission (Case 55/86R) [1986] ECR 1331...............................................................8.108 Artegodan v Commission (Case C-221/10P) 19 April 2012...........................................................7.70 Arturo Mondini SpA v High Authority (Cases 53/65R) [1966] ECR 17........................................8.161 Ascasibar Zubizarreta v Albani (Case T-35/89TO1) [1992] ECR II-1599.................  15.34; 16.95, 16.102 Asia Motor France v Commission (Case T-28/90) [1992] ECR II-2285.........  2.161; 7.2, 7.74, 7.76; 9.45, 9.54; 14.20 Asia Motor France v Commission (Case C-72/90) [1990] ECR I-2181........... 2.23, 2.24, 2.25, 2.26; 14.4 Asia Motor France SA v Commission (Case T-154/98) [1999] ECR II-1703.............................. 9.41, 9.48 Asia Motor France SA v Commission (Case T-387/94) [1996] ECR II-961...................................7.76 Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) v Commission (Case C-547/03P) [2006] ECR I-845........ 2.47, 2.97; 7.88, 7.96 Asian Institute of Technology v Commission (Case T-287/02) [2003] ECR II-2179.....................7.46 Asklepios Kliniken GmbH v Commission (Case T-167/04) [2007] ECR II-2379..........................9.41 Asociacion de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio de la Comunidad Autonoma de Madrid v Commission (Case T-95/03) [2006] ECR II-4739...................................................................9.40 Asociacion Espanola de Empresas de la Carne v Council (Case T-99/94) [1994] ECR II-871......5.79 Asociación Professional de Empresarios de Pesca Comunitarios (Apesco) v Commission (Case 207/86) [1988] ECR 2151 .......................................................................................................7.5, 7.17 Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Bugues de Pesca de Gran Sol de Pontevedra (Arposol) v Council (Case 55/86R) [1986] ECR 1331............................................................................8.101 AssiDoman Kraft Products AB v Commission (Case T-227/95) [1997] ECR II-1185...................16.34 Assidoman Kraft Products AB v Commission (Case T-90/98) order of 25 October 1997..............14.37 Assidoman Kraft Products AB v Commission (Case T-292/97) order of 1 December 1998 .........14.36 Associacao dos Refinadores de Acucar Portugueses (ARAP) v Commission (Case C-321/99P) [2002] ECR I-4287..................................................................................................................9.118 Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) v Commission (Case T-36/04) [2007] ECR II-3201................................................................................................................................. 1.138; 2.70 Association des Acieries Europeennes Independantes v Commission (Case T-239/94) [1997] ECR II-1839........................................................................................................................ 2.161; 5.46 Association des Aciéries Européennes Indépendants (EISA) v Commission (Case 209/87R) [1987] ECR 3453.............................................................................................. 8.80, 8.90, 8.94, 8.105 Association des Acieries Européennes Indépendantes v Commission (Case T-45/89) order of 5 March 1991 .............................................................................................................................14.37 Association des Aciéries Européennes Indépendantes (EISA) v Commission (Case 209/87R) [1987] ECR 3453.....................................................................................................................8105 Association des Amidonneries de Cereales de la CEE (AAC) v Commission (Case T-442/93) [1995] ECR II-1329.............................................................................................................. 3.25; 5.98 Association des Utilisateurs de Charbon du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg v High Authority (Cases 8 & 10/54) [1954–56] ECR 227................................................................................ 3.15; 5.27

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Table of Cases para Association medicale europeenne (EMA) v Commission (Case C-100/14P) 11 June 2015..... 15.21, 15.23 Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission (Case C-322/91) [1992] ECR I-6373.................................................................................... 2.26; 9.41 Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission (Case C-44/92) [1992] ECR I-6387............................................................................. 2.26; 9.41, 9.43 Association of Sorbitol Producers within the EC (ASPEC) v Commission (Case T-435/93) [1995] ECR II-1281.............................................................................................. 3.20, 3.25; 5.98; 7.2 Association pour la defense de l’epargne et de l’actionnariat des salaries de France TelecomOrange (ADEAS) v Commission (Case T-7/13) 3 April 2014................................................5.79 Associazione Agricoltori della Provincia di Rovigo v Commission (Case T-117/94) [1995] ECR II-455........................................................................................................................................2.47 Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v European Ombudsman & Parliament (Case T-103/99) [2000] ECR II-4165..........................................................................  2.161; 3.4; 4.20, 4.21 Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v Commission (Case 223/87R) [1987] ECR 3473............................................................................................................................ 8.80, 8.105 Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v Commission (Case 92/88R) [1988] ECR 2425..........................................................................................  8.81, 8.101, 8.108, 8.111, 8.161 Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche v Commission (Case 223/87R) [1987] ECR 3473................8.94 Associazione italiana del risparmio gestito v Commission (Case T-445/05) [2009] ECR II-289........................................................................................................................................3.14 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del Cemento v Commission (Cases T-447-449/93) [1995] ECR II-1971............................................................................................ 3.14; 5.47, 5.49; 7.16 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del Cemento (AITEC) v Commission (Case T-447/93 (92)) [1996] ECR II-1631........................................................................................................14.59 Associazione Nazionale Commerciali Internazionali Dentali e Sanitara (ANCIDES) v Commission (Case 43/85) [1987] ECR 3131 .........................................................................3.14 Asteris AE v Commission (Cases 97, 193, 99 & 215/86) [1988] ECR 2181........................... 16.34; 17.23 Asteris AE v Greece & EEC (Cases 106–120/87) [1988] ECR 5515..............................................10.20 Astipesca SL v Commission (Case T-180/00) [2002] ECR II-3985................................................4.17 AstraZenica v Commission (Case C-457/10P) 6 December 2012...................................................15.26 AstraZeneca v Commission (Case T-321/05) [2010] ECR II-2805.................................................12.23 Atanasov v Commission (Case F-101/06AJ) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-143, II-A-1-553 ..................4.88 Athanasopoulos v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Case C-251/89) [1991] ECR I-2797.........................4.121 Athinaiki Oikogeniaki Artopoiia AVEE v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-35/04) [2006] ECR II-785............................................................9.41 Atlanta v Council & Commission (Case T-521/93) 14 July 1995...................................................5.32 Atlantic Container Line v Commission (Case T-113/04) [2007] ECR II-171.............. 1.20; 8.1, 8.34, 8.44 Atlantic Container Line AB v Commission (Case T-395/94) [2002] ECR II-875...........................5.47 Atlantic Container Line AB v Commission (Case T-18/97) [1998] ECR II-589................. 5.20, 5.28; 8.11 Atlantic Container Line AB v Commission (Cases T-191/98, T-212/98-T-214/98) [2003] ECR II-3275................................................................................................................................. 2.102; 9.41 Atlas Transport v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-145/08DEP) 21 May 2014..........................................................................................14.8 Attanasio Group Srl v Comune di Carbognano (Case C-384/08) [2010] ECR I-2055............  2.194, 2.205 Atzeni v Regione autonoma della Sardegna (Cases C-346/03 & C-529/03) [2006] ECR I-1875.................................................................................................................................. 2.149; 7.24 Auditel Srl v Commission (Case T-66/94) [1995] ECR II-239.................................... 2.13, 2.15; 5.2, 5.87 Au Lys de France SA v Commission (Case T-458/04) [2007] ECR II-71..........................  3.20; 4.15; 5.46 Austria v Commission (Case C-165/99) 26 October 2000 (unreported).............................  7.32, 7.38, 7.39 Austria v Council (Case C-445/00) [2002] ECR I-9151......................................3.18; 5.52; 6.2, 6.7; 12.35 Austria v Council (Case C-445/00R) [2001] ECR I-1461...............................................................8.85 Austria v Huber (Case C-336/00AJ) 18 April 2002.........................................................................4.115 Austria v Scheucher-Fleisch (Case C-47/10P) [2011] ECR I-10707..............................................15.19 Autexpo SpA v Commission (Case 82/87R) [1987] ECR 2131.............................  8.80, 8.94, 8.108, 8.162 Authié v Commission (Case 34/80) [1981] ECR 665 .................... 3.17; 7.65; 10.39; 13.27; 14.43; 17.62 Authié v Commission (Case 19/78R) [1978] ECR 679...................................................  8.75, 8.84, 8.134 Automec Srl v Commission (Case T-64/89) [1990] ECR I-367............  2.161; 7.5, 7.74, 7.76; 9.43, 9.45, 9.54; 14.13, 14.20 Automobiles Peugeot SA & Peugeot SA v Commission (Case T-23/90) [1991] ECR II-653.....1.15; 8.72, 8.108; 14.1 Automobiles Peugeot SA & Peugeot SA v Commission (Case T-23/90R) [1990] ECR II-195......8.26, 8.39, 8.81, 8.99, 8.108, 8.110, 8.112

xxix

Table of Cases para Automobiles Peugeot v Commission (Case T-9/92) [1993] ECR II-493........................................11.51 Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v Commission (Case C-136/01P) [2002] ECR I-6565........ 1.58, 1.89; 3.3; 7.51, 7.57 Autosalone Ispra Snc v EAEC (Case T-250/02) [2005] ECR II-5227.......................................... 7.51; 9.41 Autostrade dei Fiori v Governo della Repubblica italiana (Case C-12/07) [2007] ECR I-162.......2.180, 2.202 Avogadri v Commission (Case F-58/08) 21 February 2013............................................................2.111 Axel Springer AG v Zeitungsverlag Niederrhein GmbH & Co Essen KG (Cases C-435/02 & C-103/03) [2004] ECR I-8663.................................................................................................2.202 Axen v Germany European Court of Human Rights, Series A No 72, (1984) 6 EHRR 195..........2.109 Ayadi v Commission (Case T-527/09AJ) 22 October 2010.............................................  4.92, 4.111, 4.112 Ayadi v Council (Case T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139......................................................  5.45; 7.58; 16.9 Ayadi v Council (Case C-403/06P) 30 March 2009........................................................................5.61 Ayadi v Council (Case C-183/12 P) 6 June 2013............................................................................2.111 Ayres de Abreu v Economic & Social Committee (Case F-123/11) 13 February 2012..............  4.11; 9.11 Azienda Agricola ‘Le Canne’ Srl v Commission (Case T-241/00R) [2001] ECR II-37............  8.85, 8.113, 8.164, 8.165 B B v Commission (Case 152/77) [1979] ECR 2819..................................................................  1.134; 17.53 B v European Parliament (Case 731/79R) [1979] ECR 3629......................................................  8.80, 8.86 B v European Parliament (Case 731/79RII) [1980] ECR 829.........................................................8.168 B v European Parliament (Case 794/79R) [1979] ECR 3635..........................................................8.86 B v Commission (Case T-130/89) [1990] ECR II-761....................................................................7.78 B v Commission (Case T-41/93) [1993] ECR II-1037....................................................................2.1661 B v European Parliament (Case 731/79) [1981] ECR 107 .............................................................14.25 B v European Parliament (Case 123/80) [1980] ECR 1789.............................................. 2.38; 7.89; 14.26 B v European Parliament (Case 123/80R) [1980] ECR 1793..........................................................14.26 BASF AG v Commission (Cases T-79, T-84-T-86, T-89, T-91, T-92, T-94, T-96, T-98, T-102 & T-104/89) [1992] ECR II-315.......................................... 2.99, 2.103, 2.154; 7.5; 10.47; 13.23, 13.45 BASF AG v Commission (Cases T-80/89, T-81/89, T-83/89, T-87/89, T-88/89, T-90/89, T-93/89, T-95/89, T-97/89, T-99/89-T-101/89, T-103/89, T-105/89, T-107/89 & T-112/89) [1995] ECR II-729...............................................................................................................................7.32 BASF AG v Commission (Case T-4/89REV) [1992] ECR II-1591.......7.46, 7.85; 16.106, 16.112, 16.113, 16.114, 16.118, 16.123, 16.131, 16.132, 16.147, 16.160 BASF AG v Commission (Case T-15/02) [2003] ECR II-213............................................  2.70; 5.13, 5.28 BASF Coatings AG v Commission (Case T-175/95) [1999] ECR II-1581.....................................2.148 BB v Commission (Case F-17/11) 19 February 2013.....................................................................14.24 BCS SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-137/08) [2009] ECR II-4047........................................................................................... 9.94; 11.69 BH v Commission (Case F-129/11R) 28 February 2012.................................................................8.45 BIC SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-262/04) [2005] ECR II-5959......................................................................................... 11.69; 13.33 BJ v Commission (Case F-139/11R) 28 February 2012..................................................................8.45 BMW Belgium SA v Commission (Cases 32 & 36–82/78) [1979] ECR 2435...............................14.15 BN v Parliament (Case F-24/12) 19 June 2004...............................................................................14.24 BNP Paribas v Commission (Case C-452/10P) 21 June 2012.........................................................15.50 BPB Industries plc & British Gypsum Ltd v Commission (Case T-65/89) [1993] ECR II-389......5.28; 9.50, 9.54 BP Chemicals Ltd v Commission (Case T-11/95) [1996] ECR II-599, [1998] ECR II-3235.........2.15; 5.46, 5.90 BP Chemicals Ltd v Commission (Case T-184/97) [2000] ECR II-3145........................................5.46 BPC Lux 2 Sarl v Commission (Case T-812/14R) order of 25 February 2015...............................2.70; 6.3 BP Products North America v Council (Case T-385/11) 16 January 2014......................................9.79 BRT v SABAM (Case 127/73) [1974] ECR 51.................................................. 2.147; 10.19; 17.55, 17.98 BT v Commission (Case T-59/13P) 7 October 2014.......................................................................7.88 BVBA Kruidvat v Commission (Case T-87/92) [1993] ECR II-1369, [1993] ECR II-1383...... 5.17, 5.20, 5.28, 5.36 BX v Commission (Case T-352/13P) 23 April 2015.......................................................................15.25 BaByliss SA v Commission (Case T-114/02) [2003] ECR II-1279.................. 5.44, 5.47; 9.34, 9.82, 9.92 Baccini v ONEM (Case 232/82) [1983] ECR 583...........................................................................17.80

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Table of Cases para Bactria Industriehygiene-Service Verwaltungs GmbH v Commission (Case T-339/00) [2002] ECR II-2287.................................................................................................................  5.27, 5.56, 5.81 Bade (née Herremans) v Commission (Case T-47/90) [1991] ECR II-467.....................................7.18 Badische anilin und Soda-Fabrik AG v Commission (Case 49/69) [1972] ECR 713............. 11.93, 11.94; 14.58, 14.70 Bähr v Commission (Case 12/83) [1984] ECR 2155.......................................................................13.12 Bain v Commission (Case F-112/05) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-111, II-A-1-579.......1.15; 5.50; 16.49, 16.56 Bakonyi v Hungary (Case T-456/09R) [2010] ECR II-20......................................................... 8.19, 8.168 Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof (Case 26/77) [1977] ECR 2031....2.151 Balkan Import-Export GmbH v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof (Case 55/75) [1976] ECR 19........10.26 Ballast Nedam v Commission (Case T-362/06) 27 September 2012...............................................9.79 Balocchi v Ministero delle Finanze dello Stato (Case C-10/92) [1993] ECR I-5015...............17.73, 17.85 Banan-Kompaniet AB v Council & Commission (Case T-57/00) [2003] ECR II-607....................9.41 Banatrading GmbH v Council (Case T-3/99) [2001] ECR II-2123.................................................9.54 Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission (Case T-198/03) [2006] ECR II-1429....................9.40 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA (Case C-116/11) 22 November 2012........................................2.141 Bank Kargoshaei v Council (Case T-8/11) 16 September 2013......................................................9.54 Bank Mellat v Council (Case T-496/10) 29 January 2013...............................................................9.54 Bank Melli plc v Council (Cases T-246/08 & T-332/08) [2009] ECR I-2629..................... 7.67, 7.68, 7.76 Bank Melli Iran v Council (Cases T-35/10 & T-7/11) 6 September 2013.......................................9.54 Bank Melli Iran v Council (Case T-390/08) [2009] ECR II-3967...................................................9.79 Bank Saderat Iran v Council (Case T-494/10) 5 February 2013......................................................9.54 Bank Tejarat v Council (Case T-176/12) 22 January 2015..............................................................9.80 Barassi v Commission (Case T-41/90) [1992] ECR II-159............................................ 2.102; 5.19; 14.20 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group (Case C-262/88) [1990] ECR I-1889 .......2.188; 16.37 Barber (Peinado Guitart) (Case C-262/88INT) [2010] ECR I-174.................................................16.166 Barbi v Commission (Case T-73/89) [1990] ECR II-619............................................ 13.21; 17.64, 17.103 Barbin v Parliament (Case T-228/11P) 17 December 2012.............................................................3.26 Barcella v Commission (Case 191/84) [1986] ECR 1541 ..............................................................9.54 Bareyt v Commission (Case T-175/97) [2000] ECR SC-I-A-229, II-1053.....................................11.5 Barge v High Authority (Case 18/62) [1963] ECR 259........................................ 3.15; 7.10; 14.25; 17.116 Barnardi v Commission (Cases T-479/93 & T-559/93) [1994] ECR II-1115..................................7.60 Barra v Belgium & City of Liège (Case 309/85) [1988] ECR 355.................................................17.101 Barthel v Court of Justice (Case F-59/10) order of 10 May 2011...................................................14.20 Basch v Commission (Cases 100, 146 & 153/87) [1989] ECR 447..................................... 16.153, 16.157 Battaglia v Commission (Case 737/79) [1985] ECR 71............................................................  9.55; 17.53 Battaglia v Commission (Case 321/81) [1987] ECR 2429 ...................................................... 2.160; 14.41 Bauer v Commission (Case 12/65) [1965] ECR 1003 ................................................................  7.58, 7.66 Bauer v Commission (Case C-229/93) [1995] ECR I-839..........................................................  7.16; 7.61 Bauer v Commission (Case 15/67) [1967] ECR 397................................... 7.15, 7.17; 14.25, 14.39, 14.40 Bauer SpA v Commission (Case T-253/00) 12 December 2012 ....................................................2.48 Baumann GmbH (Case C-309/07INT) [2011] ECR O-28..............................................................16.166 Baustahlgewebe v Commission (Case C-185/95P) [1998] ECR I-8417............  1.10; 2.109, 2.245; 11.13, 11.14, 11.15, 11.44, 11.51 Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission (Case T-145/89) [1995] ECR II-987................ 11.5, 11.24, 11.25, 11.52; 13.21 Bavaria NV v Bayerischer Brauerbund eV (Case C-343/07) [2009] ECR I-5491..................  2.141; 17.77 Bayer AG v Commission (Case T-12/90) [1991] ECR II-219, paras 28–29; on appeal Bayer AG v Commission (Case C-195/91P) [1994] ECR I-5619...................... 7.32, 7.38, 7.39, 7.41, 7.46, 7.48 Bayer CropScience AG v Commission (Case T-429/13) 21 October 2014...............  5.17, 5.20, 5.21, 5.41, 5.44, 5.61, 5.70 Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH & Co KG v Council & Commission (Cases 83 & 94/76, 4, 15 & 40/77) [1978] ECR 1209 ................................................................................2.100 Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG v Commission (Case T-56/02) [2004] ECR II-3495........16.56, 16.71 Bayramoglu v Parliament & Council (Case C-28/10P) [2010] ECR I-108................................ 15.1, 15.25 Beamglow Ltd v European Parliament (Case T-383/00) [2005] ECR II-5459................................9.41 Becker v Court of Auditors (Case C-260/02P) order of 28 February 2005 (unreported)................16.10 Beecham Group plc v Andacon NV (Case C-132/07) [2009] ECR I-1775.....................................2.194 Beemsterboer Coldstore Services BV v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst-Douanedistrict Arnhem (Case C-293/04) [2006] ECR I-2263.......................................................................................1.15

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Table of Cases para Beifa Group Co Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-608/11) 27 June 2013.................................................................................................17.17 Beiten v Commission (Case 206/85) [1987] ECR 5301..................................................................2.73 Bela-Mühle Josef Bergmann KG v Grows Farm GmbH & Co KG (Case 114/76) [1977] ECR 1211 ........................................................................................................................................9.84 Belardinelli v Court of Justice (Case C-225/87-Costs) [1989] ECR 2353......................................14.74 Belasco v Commission (Case 246/86) [1989] ECR 2117 ...............................................................2.148 Belfiore v Commission (Case 108/79) [1980] ECR 1769........................................................ 13.12; 14.26 Belgium v Cobelfret NV (Case C-138/07) [2009] ECR I-731........................................................16.37 Belgium v Commission (Case C-242/07P) [2007] ECR I-9757................... 1.114, 1.122; 7.26, 7.41; 9.14, 9.34, 9.118 Belgium v Commission (Case 142/87R) [1987] ECR 2589....................... 8.84, 8.101, 8.102, 8.105, 8.108 Belgium v Commission (Case C-356/90R) [1991] ECR I-2423..............................................  8.102, 8.108 Belgium v Commission (Case T-721/14) 27 October 2015.............................................................17.11 Belgium & Commission v Genette (Cases T-90/07P & T-99/07P) [2008] ECR II-3859................7.66 Belgium v Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA & High Authority (Cases 9 & 12/60) [1962] ECR 171.................................................................. 4.74; 5.1, 5.15, 5.32; 16.83, 16.84, 16.89, 16.90, 16.93, 16.94, 16.98, 16.104 Belgium & Forum 187 v Commission (Cases C-182/03 & C-217/03) [2006] ECR I-5479...........3.14 Belgium & Luxembourg v Mertens (Cases 178–180/73) [1974] ECR 383 ...................................2.204 Belkacem v Germany (Case 276/86) [1986] ECR 3975..................................................................7.6, 7.89 Bell & Ross BV v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-426/10P) (22 September 2011)......................................................... 1.114; 4.12; 7.38; 15.25 Bell & Ross v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-80/10) 25 April 2013............................................................................................................14.8 Bellintani v Commission (Case 116/78) [1980] ECR 23....... 3.17; 14.24; 16.106, 16.109, 16.112, 16.115, 16.117, 16.118, 16.120, 16.123, 16.131 Belov v CHEZ Elektro Balgaria A (Case C-394/11) 31 January 2013............................................17.70 Ben Ali v Council (Case T-301/11) 11 January 2012........................................ 3.31; 5.56;7.31, 7.35; 7.46 Benedetti v Munari Fratelli SAS (Case 52/76) [1977] ECR 163 ........................................... 16.24, 16.171 Bensider v Commission (Case 50/84) [1984] ECR 3991 ................................. 2.159; 3.12; 7.2, 7.11; 9.36 Benvenuto (Case 46/81) [1981] ECR 809.......................................................................................7.5, 7.89 Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappij BV v Commission (Case 77/77) [1978] ECR 1513.........................................................................................................................................7.17 Benzler v Commission (Case T-63/91) [1992] ECR II-2095...........................................................14.26 Benzler v Commission (Case T-72/92) [1993] ECR II-347.............................................................9.41 Berliner Institut fur Vergleichende Sozialforschung eV v Commission (Case T-292/07R) [2007] ECR II-119...............................................................................................................................8.13 Bermejo v Commission (Case F-60/07) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-407, II-A-1-2259.........................1.15 Bermejo Garde v Economic & Social Committee (Case F-41/10R) 14 July 2010...................... 8.25, 8.35 Bernardi v Commission (Cases T-479/93 & T-559/93) [1994] ECR II-1115..................  1.45; 4.5; 7.4, 7.5 Bernardi v European Parliament (Case 48/70) [1971] ECR 175........................................  7.76; 9.52, 9.89 Bernardi v European Parliament (Cases 78/81 & 78/81R) [1981] ECR 1467.................................14.28 Bernardi v European Parliament (Case 150/84) [1986] ECR 1375 ..................... 9.56, 9.82; 14.20; 17.103 Bernardi v Parliament (Case 146/95) [1996] ECR II-769..................................................  7.5, 7.76; 8.149 Berning & Sohne GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-445/07) 27 June 2012........................11.15 Bernusset v Commission (Cases 94 & 96/63) [1964] ECR 297......................................................3.3 Bertelli v Commission (Case T-42/90) [1992] ECR II-181....................................................  2.102; 14.20 Bertelli Galvez v Commission (Case T-337/03) [2004] ECR II-1041.............................................7.5 Bertelsmann AG v Impala [2008] ECR I-4951.............................................................. 15.18, 15.19, 15.42 Berti v Commission (Case 131/8) [1985] ECR 645..............................................  9.45, 9.55; 16.25; 17.53 Bertini & Bisignani v Regione Lazio (Cases 98, 162, 258/85) [1986] ECR 1885.........  2.180; 10.9; 17.82 Besnard v Commission (Cases 55–76, 86, 87, 95/71) [1972] ECR 543..........................................7.16 Besselink v Council (Case T-331/11) 21 February 2013.................................................................12.32 Bethell v Commission (Case 246/81) [1982] ECR 2277.............................................................. 5.31, 5.68 Bettray v Staatsecretaris van Justitie (Case 344/87) [1989] ECR 1621...........................................4.121 Beus GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt München-Landsbergerstrasse (Case 5/67) [1968] ECR 83.....9.45; 10.22, 10.24 Binderer v Commission (Case 147/83) [1985] ECR 257................................................................9.45 Binon & Cie v Agence et Messageries de la Presse (Case 243/83) [1985] ECR 2015....................10.10 Bioelettrica SpA v Commission (Case T-287/01) [2002] ECR II-3283..........................................2.161 Biogen Inc. v Smithkline Beecham Biologicals SA (Case C-181/95) [1996] ECR I-719..............5.2

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Table of Cases para Biovilac v Commission (Case 59/83) [1984] ECR 4057............................................................. 9.45, 9.82 Biret International SA v Council (Case T-174/00) [2002] ECR II-17.............................................9.41 Birke v Commission & Council (Case 543/79) [1981] ECR 2669..................................................6.9; 7.59 Birra Dreher SpA v Riseria Modenese Srl & Council & Commission (Case 267/80) [1986] ECR 3901............................................................................................  16.92, 16.95, 16.98, 16.104, 16.121, 16.123 Birra Wührer SpA v Council & Commission (Cases 256, 257, 265, 267/80, 5/81) [1984] ECR 3693.................................................................................. 2.75, 2.158; 3.33, 3.36; 7.51; 13.10, 13.12; 16.25; 17.52 Bitburger Brauerei Th. Simon GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Cases T-350/04-T-352/04) [2006] ECR II-4225................................. 9.48, 9.100 Blackman v European Parliament (Case T-33 & T-74/89) [1993] ECR II-249....... 2.132; 7.43; 9.41, 9.43; 11.100; 14.55,14.67 Blaizot v Belgium (Case 309/85) [1988] ECR 355.........................................................................16.37 Blaizot v University of Liège (Case 24/86) [1988] ECR 379................................................. 16.37; 17.101 Blanchard v Commission (Case T-368/94) [1996] ECR II-41.........................................................5.62 Blanco Perez v Consejeria de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios (Cases C-72/07 & C-111/07) [2007] ECR I-81..................................................................................................................................2.178 Bligny v Commission (Cases F-142/06 & F-142/06AJ) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-57, II-A-1-317; on appeal Bligny v Commission (Case T-127/07P) [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-19, II-B-1155)..................................................................................................................................... 4.106; 7.32 Blot & Front National v European Parliament (Case C-68/90R) [1990] ECR I-2177....................8.74 Bocker-Lensing v Council & Commission (Case T-1/96) [1999] ECR I-1.................................. 3.32; 9.34 Bode v Commission (Cases 45 & 49/70) [1971] ECR 465............................................... 7.68, 7.94; 14.76 Bodson v Pompes Funèbres des Régions Liberées (Case 30/87) [1988] ECR 2479 ......................17.90 Bodson v European Investment Bank (Case F-83/12) 12 February 2014.......................................12.38 Bodson v European Parliament (Case T-10/91R) [1991] ECR II-133.............................................8.74 Boehringer Ingelheim Vatmedica GmbH v Council & Commission (Cases T-125/96 & T-152/96) [1999] ECR II-3427.............................................................................................. 3.20; 5.44, 5.47; 7.2 Bollore v Commission (Case C-414/12P) 8 May 2014...................................................................15.16 Bogiatzi v Deutscher Luftpool (Case C-301/08) [2009] ECR I-10185...........................................17.76 Bogusz v Frontex (Case F-5/12) order of 3 July 2014.............................................................. 14.70, 14.76 Boizard v Commission (Cases 63 & 64/79) [1980] ECR 2975.................................................  3.17; 17.53 Boliden v Commission (Case T-19/05) [2010] ECR II-1843..........................................................9.79 Bollendorff v Parliament (Case T-15/91) [1992] ECR II-1679........................................................7.26 Bollmann v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof (Case 62/72) [1973] ECR 269............ 14.2, 14.3, 14.170 Bollore v Commission (Case C-414/12P) (8 May 2014).................................................................1.10 Bolognese v Scharf & Commission (Case 292/84TP) [1987] ECR 3563....................  7.71; 16.98, 16.104 Bomcke v European Investment Bank (Case F-127/10) 19 July 2011................................ 3.12; 5.32, 5.79 Bonazzi-Bertottilli v Commission (Cases 75, 146 & 147/88) [1989] ECR 3599............................7.5 Bondi v Bank of America (Case C-341/04) [2006] ECR I-3813.....................................................2.205 Bonik EOOD v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalovane i upravlenie na izpalnenieto’ (Case C-285/11) 6 December 2012....................................................................................................13.21 Bonino v Commission (Case 233/85) [1987] ECR 739..............................................................  5.46; 9.83 Bonnamy v Council (Case C-264/94P) [1995] ECR I-15 ..............................................................17.11 Booss v Commission (Case T-58/91) [1993] ECR I-147.................................................................9.41 Bopp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-263/11) 6 February 2013......................................................................................................9.56 Borbely v Commission (Case F-126/05) [2007] ECR SC-I-A-1-17, II-A-1-89..............................11.40 Borker (Case 138/80) [1980] ECR 1975..........................................................................  2.38; 7.94; 17.69 Borromeo Arese v Commission (Case 6/70) [1970] ECR 815........................................................5.31 Bosch v Hauptzollamt Hildesheim (Case 135/77) [1978] ECR 855...............................................16.151 Bosman v Commission (Case C-117/91) [1991] ECR I-4837.........................................................7.5 Bosman v Commission (Case C-117/91R) [1991] ECR I-3353......................................................8.80 Bossi v Commission (Case 346/87) [1989] ECR 303....................................... 7.59, 7.64; 9.43, 9.45, 9.53 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse (Cases C-503/13 & C-504/13) 5 March 2015.....................................................................................2.151 Bourgaux v Common Assembly (Case 1/56) [1954–56] ECR 361 .........................................  10.31, 10.36 Bouygues SA v Commission (Case C-431/07P) [2009] ECR I-2665...................................... 2.149; 16.10 Bowland Dairy Products Ltd v Commission (Case T-212/06) [2009] ECR II-4073.......................7.5; 9.41 Boyes v Commission (Case T-81/98) [1999] ECR II-3501 ....................................................... 2.160; 3.26 Brack v Insurance Officer (Case 17/76) [1976] ECR 1429 ............................................................10.7

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Table of Cases para Bradbrooke v Aleksandrowicz (Case C-498/14 PPU) 9 January 2015............................................2.211 Brambillo v Commission (Case T-22/90) order of 29 November 1990...........................................2.27 Brandt v Commission (Cases T-158/93) [1994] ECR II-1133.........................................................14.28 Braun-Neumann v Parliament (Case T-306/08P) [2009] ECR I-B-1-1, II-B-1-1............................7.64 Brautigam v Council (Case 236/82) [1985] ECR 2401...................................................................7.16 Bravo-Villasante v Commission (Case T-507/04) [2005] ECR-SC I-A-361...................................4.10 Brazzelli Luardi v Commission (Cases T-17/89, T-21/89 & T-25/89) [1992] ECR II-293; on appeal Commission v Brazzelli Luardi (Case C-136/92P) [1994] ECR I-1981............... 17.54, 17.56 Breda-Geomineraria v Commission (Case 231/86R) [1986] ECR 2639...................................... 8.45, 8.79 Breedband NV v Société des Acièries du Temple (Cases 42 & 49/59) [1962] ECR 145............ 1.11; 3.29; 8.49, 8.100, 8.134; 16.83, 1684, 16.90, 16.93, 16.95, 16.98, 16.102, 16.104 Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG v Commission (Case T-490/93) [1995] ECR II-477..........................2.30 Brems v Council (Case T-75/89) [1990] ECR II-899 .....................................................................17.64 Bressol v Gouvernement de la Communaute francaise (Case C-73/08) [2010] ECR I-2735..........16.37 Bretagne Angleterre Irelande v Commission (Case T-14/96) [1999] ECR II-139........................  9.42, 9.82 Briantex v Commission (Case 353/88) [1989] ECR 3623................................................... 3.3; 9.34; 17.48 Brink’s Security Luxembourg SA v Commission (Case T-437/05) [2009] ECR II-3233.....7.5, 7.59, 7.78; 9.82 British Aerospace plc v Commission (Case C-294/90DEP) [1994] ECR I-5423............................14.56 British Aggregates v Commission (Case T-359/04) [2010] ECR II-4227.......................................9.79 British Airways plc v Commission (Cases T-371/94 & T-394/94) [1998] ECR II-2405...........  2.139; 5.47 British Airways plc v Commission (Case T-219/99) [2003] ECR II-5917......................................5.28 British Airways plc v Commission (Case T-48/11) 16 December 2015..................... 2.54; 9.50, 9.53, 9.54 British American Tobacco Co Ltd & R J Reynolds Industries Inc v Commission (Cases 142 & 156/84) [1987] ECR 4487 ........................................................................................... 7.5, 7.14; 11.60 British American Tobacco International (Investments) Ltd v Commission (Case T-111/00) [2001] ECR II-2997.................................................................................................................2.161 British American Tobacco International (Holdings) BV v Commission (Case T-41/00) [2001] ECR II-1301.............................................................................................................................7.14 British American Tobacco Ltd v Commission (Case T-311/00) [2002] ECR II-2781....................2.151 British Coal Corpn v Commission (Case T-367/94) [1997] ECR II-469.....................................  5.28, 5.30 British Columbia Forest Products Ltd v Commission (Case 129/85) [1989] 4 CMLR 22..............9.87 British Provident Association Ltd v Commission (Case T-289/03) [2005] ECR II-741............ 9.20; 12.29 British Shoe Corpn Footwear Supplies Ltd v Commission (Case T-73/97) [1998] ECR II-2619....................................................................................................................................5.79; 7.20 British Steel plc v Commission (Case T-89/96) [1997] ECR II-835................  2.70; 5.28, 5.70, 5.77, 5.87 British Steel plc v Commission (Case T-243/94) [1997] ECR II-1887....................................... 5.46, 5.47 British United Provident Association Ltd v Commission (Case T-289/03) [2005] ECR II-741.....5.49, 5.87 Broekmeulen v Huisarts Registratie Commissie (Case 246/80) [1981] ECR 2311........................17.70 Brother Industries Ltd v Commission (Case 56/85) [1988] ECR 5655.................... 2.161; 5.29, 5.30, 5.32 Brother Industries Ltd v Council (Case 250/85R) [1985] ECR 3459..................  8.81, 8.141, 8.163, 8.164 Browet v Commission (Cases T-576/93-T-582/93) [1994] ECR II-677..........................................2.39 Brown v Commission (Case F-75/07) 27 September 2011.............................................................7.88 Brown Brothers Harriman & Co v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs (Case C-101/14P) 17 July 2014.......................................................................... 4.23; 7.32 Brown Brothers Harriman & Co v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs (Case T-389/13) 9 December 2013........................................................................4.25 Brüggemann v Economic & Social Committee (Case 248/86) [1987] ECR 3963..................... 7.91; 14.25 Brune v Commission (Case F-5/08DEP) order of 22 March 2012.....................  14.57, 14.70, 14.75, 14.76 Brunnhofer v Bank der osterreichischen Postsparkasse AG (Case C-381/99) [2001] ECR I-4961.................................................................................................................................. 10.45; 13.2 Buccarello v European Parliament (Case T-155/89R) [1990] ECR II-19........................................8.94 Buckl & Söhne OHG v Commission (Cases C-15 & C-108/91) [1992] ECR I-6061................ 7.68; 17.26 Buendia Sierra v Commission (Case T-311/04) [2006] ECR II-4137.............................................2.157 Buga v Parliament (Case T-241/15R) 2 June 2015.............................................................  8.32, 8.59, 8.60 Buhring v Council & Commission (Case T-246/93) [1998] ECR II-171........................................3.3 Buick v Commission (Case 25/83) [1984] ECR 1773.....................................................................14.24 Bui Van v Commission (Case T-491/08P) 12 May 2010.................................................................15.16 Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft v Butterabsatz Osnabrück-Emsland (Case C-345/88) [1990] ECR I-159...................................................................................................10.13

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Table of Cases para Buono v Commission (Cases C-12/13P) & C-13/13P) 14 October 2014...........  2.141; 7.76; 15.16, 15.25; 17.46 Burban v European Parliament (Case C-255/90P) [1992] ECR I-2253..........................................14.13 Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs v Commission (Case C-170/89) [1991] ECR I-5709.......................................................................................................................................7.80 Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission (Case T-256/97) [1999] ECR II-169...................................................................................................................7.14 Buschak v European Foundation for the Improvement of Living & Working Conditions (Case F-47/08DEP) order of 25 June 2014..................................................................................... 2.8; 14.64 Butterfly Music Srl v Carosello Edizioni Musicali e Discografiche Srl (Case C-60/98) [1999] ECR I-3939..............................................................................................................................7.5 Butter-und Eier Zentralgenossenschaft Oldenburg (Case 387/87) order of 27 October 1988 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................2.196 Buttner v Commission (Case 51/79) [1980] ECR 1201............................................................... 2.38; 7.89 Buttner v Commission (Case 51/79R) [1979] ECR 1727..........................................................  8.94, 8.108 Buttner v Commission (Case 51/79RII) [1979] ECR 2387................................................8.11, 8.95, 8.108 C C v Commission (Case T-60/91) [1991] ECR II-1395.......................................................  7.64, 7.66, 7.92 C v Commission (Case T-166/04) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-9, II-A-2-49..................................... 7.17; 17.64 CAM SA v Commission (Case 100/74) [1975] ECR 1393............................................................. 3.5; 7.6 CAS SpA v Commission (Case T-23/03) [2007] ECR II-289.........................................................11.24 CAS Succhi di Frutta SpA v Commission (Case T-191/96) [1998] ECR II-573.........5.13, 5.28, 5.70, 5.82 CD-Contact Data GmbH v Commission (Case T-18/03) [2009] ECR II-1021...............................9.50 CEF City Electrical Factors BV v Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied (Cases C-105/04P-DEP) & C-113/04P-DEP)) [2008] ECR I-3......14.9, 14.75, 14.77 CEPSA Estaciones de Servicio SA v LV Tobar e Hijos SL (Case C-279/06) [2008] ECR I-6681.......................................................................................................................................17.78 CF Sharp Shipping Agencies v Council (Case T-53/12) 26 October 2012......................................9.54 CFDT v Council (Case 66/76) [1977] ECR 305................................................................ 1.20; 3.14; 14.20 CFE-CGC France Telecom-Orange v Commission (Case T-2/13) 3 April 2014.............................5.79 CG v European Investment Bank (Case F-103/11) 10 July 2014............................................... 5.44; 14.56 CICCE v Commission (Case 298/83) [1985] ECR 1105........................................  7.66; 9.55, 9.63; 14.13 CIDA v Council (Case 297/86) [1988] ECR 3531..........................................................................7.2 CILFIT Srl v Minister for Health (Case 283/81) [1982] ECR 3415..............................  17.79, 17.84, 17.93 CIRFS v Commission (Case C-313/90) [1993] ECR I-1125..........................................................7.98 CMB Mashinenbau & Handels GmbH v Commission (Case T-407/07) [2011] ECR II-286.........7.58; 17.10, 17.11 CMBG v Commission (Case T-290/13) 10 November 2014...........................................................8.149 CMC Cooperativa Muratorie e Cementisti v Commission (Case 118/83) [1985] ECR 2325....... 6.6; 9.41; 11.26; 14.20 CMC Cooperativa Muratori e Cementisti v Commission (Case 118/83R) [1983] ECR 2583 ....7.49; 8.45, 8.75, 8.80, 8.81, 8.110, 8.112 CMC Melkunie BV (Case 97/83) [1984] ECR 2367.......................................................................7.5 CN v Parliament (Case T-343/13) 3 December 2015......................................................................17.48 CNTA v Commission (Case 74/74) [1975] ECR 533, [1976] ECR 797 .............  9.45, 9.89; 14.18, 14.20; 11.31; 13.10; 17.48 CODEMI SpA v Euratom Commission (Case 229/81) [1982] ECR 377.................................... 7.75, 7.89 CR v Parliament & Council (Case T-342/14P) 12 December 2014.................................................7.71 CRAM & Rheinzink v Commission (Cases 29 & 30/83) [1984] ECR 1679........................... 10.42; 13.43 CSR Pampryl SA v Commission (Case T-114/99) [1999] ECR II-3331.........................................6.15 CT Control (Rotterdam) BV v Commission (Cases C-121 & C-122/91) [1993] ECR I-3873.... 1.15; 17.17 CW v Court of Auditors (Case 90/87R) [1987] ECR 1801 ......................... 2.82; 8.73, 8.81, 8.108, 8.112 CY v European Central Bank (Case F-68/13) 9 September 2014 ............................................. 2.149; 3.26 Caballero Montoya v Commission (Case T-573/93 (129)) [1997] ECR SC-I-A-271, II-761.........16.150, 16.158 Caisse d’Allocations, Familiales v Meade (Case 238/83) [1984] ECR 2631..................................4.3 Caisse de Pension des Employés Privés v Bodson (Case 212/81) [1982] ECR 1019.....................5.2 Caisse Regionale de Securite Sociale du Nord de la France v Torrekens (Case 28/68) [1969] ECR 125...........................................................................................................................................17.82 Calberson GE v Commission (Cases T-215/01, T-220/01 & T-221/01) [2004] ECR II-587........ 9.41, 9.43

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Table of Cases para Calurla-Boch v European Parliament (Case 107/89R) [1989] ECR 1357.......................................8.74 Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-185/07) [2009] ECR II-1323...................................................................16.34 Calvo Alonso-Cortes v Commission (Case T-29/93) [1993] ECR II-1389.....................................7.5 Camacho-Fernandes v Commission (Case T-20/00) [2000] ECR SC-1-A-249, II-1149................16.56 Camar Srl v Commission (Case T-172/97) [1998] ECR II-77.........................................................2.157 Camar Srl v Council & Commission (Cases T-79/96, T-260/97 & T-117/98) [2000] ECR II2193............................................................................................................................  7.63, 7.76; 9.41 Camara Alloisio v Commission (Cases T-17/90, T-28/91 & T-17/92) [1993] ECR II-841......... 2.81; 7.65, 7.68; 16.34 Camera Care v Commission (Case 792/79R) [1980] ECR 119................. 5.10, 5.69; 8.6, 8.37, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83; 14.5, 14.34; 16.6 Camera-Lampitelli v Commission (Case T-27/92) [1993] ECR II-873...........................................7.17 Caminiti v Commission (Case F-71/09) 11 May 2011....................................................................14.49 Camos Grau v Commission (Case T-309/03) [2006] ECR II-1173.................................................7.67 Campailla v Commission (Case C-210/05P) (unreported order of 8 December 2005)...................1.58 Campailla v Commission (Case T-429/09) [2011] ECR II-48.........................................................7.57 Camper v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-43/05) [2006] ECR II-95................................................................................................... 5.93; 9.97 Campogrande v Commission (Case T-80/91) [1992] ECR II-2459.................................................13.28 Campoli v Commission (Case C-7/99P) [1999] ECR I-2679..........................................................7.46 Campolongo v High Authority (Cases 27 & 39/59) [1960] ECR 391........................................ 9.54; 17.53 Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry & Energy (Case 72/83) [1984] ECR 2727....... 10.6, 10.10; 17.85 Canas v Commission (Case C-269/12P) 28 May 2013..................................  1.34; 2.111; 7.15, 7.16, 7.17 Candiotte v Council (Case T-108/94) [1994] ECR II-863...........................................................  5.15, 5.24 Candiotte v Council (Case T-108/94R) [1994] ECR II-249............................................................5.59 Canon Inc v Council (Cases 277 & 300/85R) [1985] ECR 3491........................ 8.81, 8.141, 8.163, 8.164 Cantiere Navale de Poli v Commission (Case C-167/11P) 22 March 2012....................................15.16 Cantina Sociale di Dolianova Soc. Coop. rl v Commission (Case T-166/98) [2004] ECR II3991.............................................................................................................. 2.64; 17.23, 17.24, 17.25 Carbognani & Zabetta v Commission (Cases 161 & 162/80R) [1980] ECR 2655...................... 8.90, 8.91 Carbunion v Council (Case C-99/14P) 11 December 2014.............................................................15.4 Cargill BV v Commission (Case C-248/89) [1991] ECR I-2987....................................................11.27 Cargill BV v Commission (Case 229/88R) [1988] ECR 5183................................................... 8.94, 8.108 Cargo Partner AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-123/04) [2005] ECR II-3979................................................................................... 4.10, 4.29 Caronna v Commission (Case T-59/92) [1993] ECR II-1132......................................... 9.82; 17.51, 17.64 Carratu v Poste Italiane SpA (Case C-361/12) 12 December 2013.................................................2.141 Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt (Case C-210/06) [2008] ECR I-9641...........  2.149, 2.151, 2.180, 2.182, 2.198; 17.66, 17.70, 17.91, 17.98 Carvalhal Garcia v Council (Case F-40/08) [2009] ECR-SC I-A-1-17, II-A-1-65.........................7.35 Casillo Grani SNC v Commission (Case T-443/93) [1995] ECR II-1375 ....................... 2.160; 3.25; 7.15 Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG v Commission, (Case 56/69 Farbwerke Hoechst AG v Commission (Case 55/69) [1972] ECR 887..................................................................... 11.93, 11.94 Castelletti v Commission (Case T-29/91) [1992] ECR II-77........................................................ 7.64, 7.67 Castelnou Energia SL v Commission (Case T-57/11) 6 November 2012........................................5.17 Castiglioni v Commission (Case T-591/10) 26 February 2013.......................................................9.79 Castiglioni Srl v Commission (Case T-591/10R) [2011] ECR II-47................................ 8.84, 8.96, 8.108 Castille v Commission (Cases 173/82, 157/83 & 186/84) [1986] ECR 497................... 9.54; 11.42, 11.43 Castille v Commission (Case 173/82R) [1982] ECR 4047.................................... 8.73, 8.94, 8.134, 8.135 Cato v Commission (Case C-55/90) [1992] ECR I-2533................................................................7.34 Cauet (J) & Joliet (B) v Commission (Case 48/86R) [1986] ECR 1237................ 2.161; 8.83, 8.154; 9.54 Cauët & Joliot v Commission (Case 100/86) [1987] ECR 3379................................................ 14.7, 14.15 C-Content BV v Commission (Case T-247/08) [2010] ECR II-205..........................................  7.51; 17.50 Cebag BV v Commission (Case C-142/91) [1993] ECR I-553.......................................................17.106 Cedillac v Ministere de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie (Case C-368/06) [2007] ECR I-12327.....................................................................................................................................2.205 Celanese Chemical Co Inc v Council & Commission (Case 236/81) [1982] ECR 1183....... 1.15; 5.6; 6.7; 9.16; 12.3, 12.7, 12.8, 12.10, 12.29 Celant v Commission (Cases 118–123/82) [1983] ECR 2995................................................... 9.88; 14.26 Celestri v Ministry of Finance (Case 172/84) [1985] ECR 963......................................................17.101 Celia SA v Leche Celta SL (Case C-300/08P-DEP) [2010] ECR I-142.........................................14.74

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Table of Cases para Cementir – Cementerie del Tirreno SpA v Commission (Case T-116/95) [1998] ECR II-2261.....17.11 Cendoya v Commission (Case 108/88) [1989] ECR 2711..............................................................7.5, 7.18 Centrale Marketinggesellschaft der Deutschen Agrawirtschaft mbH v EEC (Case 251/84) [1986] ECR 217...................................................................................................................................17.108 Central-Import Münster GmbH & Co KG v Haputzollamt Münster (Case 291/86) [1988] ECR 3679.........................................................................................................................................10.18 Centre Belge d’Études de Marché — Télémarketing SA v Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Téléduffysuib SA & Information Publicité Benelux SA (Case 311/84) [1985] ECR 3261.....2.178 Centre d’Etude et de valorisation des algues SA (CEVA) v Commission (Cases T-428/07 & T-455/07) [2010] ECR II-2431..........................................................................  17.11, 17.105, 17.106 Centre d’exportation du livre francais v Societe internationale de diffusion et d’edition (Case C-199/06) [2008] ECR I-469................................................................................... 13.46; 16.34; 17.6 Centre de promotion de l’emploi par la micro-entreprise (CPEM) v Commission (Case C-350/09P) [2010] ECR I-60...........................................................................................  15.16, 15.25 Centre de promotion de l’emploi par la micro-entreprise (CPEM) v Commission (Case T-444/07) [2009] ECR II-2121..................................................................................  3.14, 3.32; 8.13; 9.41, 9.55 Centro Studi Antonio Manieri Srl v Council (Case T-125/06) [2009] ECR II-69....................... 1.114; 3.6; 7.39; 9.41 Centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-434/09) [2011] ECR II-6227..................................... 11.69, 11.71 Centrotherm Systemtechnik GmbH v centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co KG (Case C-609/11P) 26 September 2013...............................................................................................9.100 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV (Case C-54/07) [2008] ECR I-5187...................................................................................................13.3 Cerafogli v European Central Bank (Case F-23/09) 28 October 2010............................................14.56 Cerafogli v European Central Bank (Case F-43/10) 12 December 2012........................ 7.71; 11.75; 12.30 Cerafogli v Commission (Case T-114/13P) 23 September 2015........................ 11.24, 11.27; 12.30, 12.31 Cerealmangimi SpA & Italgrani SpA v Commission (Cases 244 & 245/85) [1987] ECR 1303....9.88 Cetarsa v Commission (Case C-181/11P) 12 July 2012..................................................................9.135 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérugie Française v High Authority (Case 9/57) [1957–58] ECR 319 ..........................................................................................................................................3.15 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie de l’Est de la France v High Authority (Cases 24 & 34/58) [1960] ECR 281.......................................................................... 5.27; 6.6; 11.59, 11.93, 11.98, 11.99 Chambre Syndicale des Eaux Minérales et de Sources v Commission (Case 202/86) order of 30 September 1987.......................................................................................................................14.37 Champion Stationery Manufacturing Co Ltd v Council (Case T-147/97) [1998] ECR II-4137.....5.94 Chanel SA v Cepeha Handelsmaatschappij NV (Case 31/68) [1970] ECR 403.............................17.100 Charreire v Directeur des Services Fiscaux de la Moselle (Cases C-28/98 & C-29/98) [1999] ECR I-1963..............................................................................................................................7.5 Chart v European External Action Service (Case T-138/14) 16 December 2015....................... 7.51; 17.48 Chassagne v Commission (Case T-253/06P) [2008] ECR-SC 1-B-43, II-B-I-295.........................2.111 Chaussures Bally SA v Belgium (Case C-18/92) [1993] ECR I-2871............................................2.182 Chatzianagnostou v Council (Case T-383/13) 23 April 2015 .........................................................17.10 Chatzidoukakis v Commission (Case F-84/10) 20 March 2014............................................... 14.56, 14.59 Chatzithoma v Commission (Case T-329/13) 16 October 2014......................................................3.6; 9.34 Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v DAF SpA (Case 140/79) [1981] ECR 1 ..........................................2.145 Chemie Linz AG v Commission (Case T-15/89) [1992] ECR II-1275..................................... 2.154; 13.17 Chemie Linz GmbH v Commission (Case C-245/92P) [1999] ECR I-4643..........  2.151; 5.28, 5.37, 5.98; 11.15 Cheminova v Commission (Case T-326/07) [2009] ECR II-2685...................................................1.15; 7.2 Chequita Banana Co BV v Council (Case C-276/93R) order of 6 July 1993 (unreported).............8.74 Chetcuti v Commission (Case C-16/07P) [2008] ECR I-7469........................................................16.34 Chiquita Banana Co BV v Council (Case C-276/93R) order of 6 July 1993..................................14.6 Chiquita Brands International Inc v Commission (Case T-19/01) [2005] ECR II-315...............  9.34, 9.41 Chris International Foods Ltd v Commission (Cases 91 & 200/82) [1983] ECR 417......... 5.6, 5.10, 5.32; 7.79 Christodoulou v Commission (Case T-332/13) 16 October 2014....................................................3.6; 9.34 Christoph v Commission (Case F-63/08) 14 March 2013...............................................................2.111 Chronopost v UFEX (Cases C-341/06P & C-342/06P) [2008] ECR I-4777....................... 1.46, 1.47; 5.46 Chvatal v Court of Justice (Case T-154/96) [1998] ECR-SC I-A-527, II-1579........................... 5.40, 5.41 Cicala v Regione Siciliana (Case C-482/10) 21 December 2011....................................................2.183 Cimenteries CBR SA v Commission (Cases T-10-T-12 & T-15/92) [1992] ECR II-2667........14.20, 14.63

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Table of Cases para Cimenteries CBR v Commission (Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95-T-32/95, T-34/95-T-39/95, T-42/95-T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95-T-65/95, T-68/95-T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 & T-104/95) [2000] ECR II-491................................................................  2.151; 13.28, 13.40; 14.56 Cindu Chemicals BV v European Chemicals Agency (Case T-95/10) 7 March 2013.....................5.46 Cityflyer Express v Commission (Case T-16/96) [1998] ECR II-757............... 7.15, 7.16; 9.11, 9.79; 11.2 Citymo SA v Commission (Case T-271/04) [2007] ECR II-1375............................................ 9.56; 17.105 Claasen (Case C-313/98) order of 11 February 1999 (unreported).................................................17.76 Cladakis v Commission (Case 276/85) [1987] ECR 495.............................................................  7.41, 7.53 Claes (née Agneessons) v Commission (Case 122/77) [1978] ECR 2085 .....................................14.24 Clasen v European Parliament (Case 268/86) [1988] ECR 2453....................................................14.24 Clean Car Autoservice GmbH v Stadt Wien (Case C-472/99) [2001] ECR I-9187........................14.2 ClientEarth v Commission (Case T-120/10) 9 November 2011......................................................9.11 ClientEarth v Commission (Case T-449/10) 9 November 2011......................................................9.11 ClientEarth v Commission (Case T-452/10) [2011] ECR II-257.....................................................4.11 ClientEarth v Commission (Case T-278/11) 13 November 2013....................................................14.24 ClientEarth v Commission (Case C-573/11P) 5 September 2013................  1.122; 4.11; 9.11; 15.5, 15.43 Clotuche v Commission (Case T-339/03) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-29, II-A-2-179...........................4.10 Club Nautico de Gran Canarias v Comunidad Autonoma de Canarias (Case C-186/07) [2008] ECR I-60..................................................................................................................................2.183 Coats Holdings Ltd v Commission (Case T-36/05) [2007] ECR II-110...................................  13.16, 13.22 Coats Holdings Ltd v Commission (Case C-468/07P) [2008] ECR I-127............................... 2.245; 13.16 Cobrecaf SA v Commission (Case T-514/93) [1995] ECR II-621......................................  7.38, 7.58, 7.60 Coca-Cola v Commission (Cases T-125/97 & T-127/97) [2000] ECR II-1733............................ 5.23; 7.19 Cockerill-Sambre SA v Commission (Case 42/85) [1985] ECR 3749............................................7.41 Cockerill Sambre v Commission (Case 214/87R) [1987] ECR 3463 ............. 7.46, 7.48; 8.80, 8.94, 8.105 Coe Clerici Logistics SpA v Commission (Case T-52/00) [2002] ECR II-2553................ 1.15; 2.53; 5.28, 5.62, 5.64 Coedo Suarez v Council (Case F-73/10) order of 5 July 2011........................................................14/20 Coen v Belgium (Case C-246/95) [1997] ECR I-403 .....................................................................2.148 Coenen v Sociaal-Economische Road (Case 39/75) [1975] ECR 1547.......................................... 4.3, 4.8 Cofradia de Pescadores de ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo v Council (Case T-415/03) [2005] ECR II4355.......................................................................................................................  11.15, 11.29, 11.45 Co-Frutta Sarl v Commission (Case 191/88R) [1988] ECR 4551...........................  8.45, 8.80, 8.94, 8.161 Collotti v European Court of Justice (Case 20/65) [1965] ECR 847 ...........................................  7.24, 7.98 Colmant v Commission (Case T-8/90) [1992] ECR II-469.............................................................2.102 Comaco Srl v Council (Case C-288/93R) order of 6 July 1993 (unreported).................................8.74 Comafrica SpA v Council & Commission (Case C-282/93R) order of 6 July 1993 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................8..74 Comafrica SpA v Commission (Cases T-198/95, T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98 & T-225/99) [2001] ECR II-1975...........................................................................................................  6.11; 11.24 Comafrica SpA v Commission (Case T-139/01) [2002] ECR II-799..................................  5.36, 5.62, 5.87 Combescot v Commission (Case T-249/04) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-181, II-A-2-1219...............  4.17, 4.20 Combescot v Commission (Case T-250/04) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-191, II-A-2-1251...................4.17 Combescot v Commission (Case C-525/07) [2008] ECR I-166, [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-21, II-B2-157................................................................................................................................... 2.72; 11.75 Combescot v Commission (Case C-525/07P) [2008] ECR I-166...................................................9.119 Comitato organizzatore del convegno internazionale ‘Effetti degli inquinamenti atmosferici sul clima e sulla vegetazione’ v Commission (Case T-387/00) [2002] ECR II-3031........ 1.85; 2.43; 6.10 Comitato Venezia vuole vivere v Commission (Cases C-71/09P, C-73/09P & C-76/09P) [2011] ECR I-4727..............................................................................................................................15.20 Comite Central d’Entreprise de la Societe Generale des Grandes Sources v Commission (Case T-96/92) [1995] ECR II-1213..................................................................................................7.9 Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société des Grandes Sources v Commission (Case T-96/92R) [1992] ECR II-2579............................................................................................... 8.101, 8.104, 8.129 Comité de Développement et de Protection du Textile et de ‘Habillement (DEFI) v Commission (Case 282/85) [1986] ECR 2469.................................................................................. 3.2, 3.14; 5.25 Comité d’Entreprise de la Société Anonyme Vittel v Commission (Case T-12/93R) [1993] ECR II-449, [1993] ECR II-785...............................................  8.59, 8.80, 8.94, 8.104, 8.129, 8.171, 8.174 Comité d’Entreprise de la Société Générale des Grandes Sources v Commission (Case T-96/92R) [1992] ECR II-2579.......................................................................................... 8.46, 8.59, 8.80, 8.134 Comite des Salines de France v Commission (Case T-154/94) order of 10 February 1995 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................5.28

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Table of Cases para Comite International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthetiques (CIRFS) v Commission (Case C-313/90) [1993] ECR I-1125.............................................................................. 3.14; 5.46, 5.81; 7.2 Comité International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthétiques v Commission (Case C-313/90R) [1991] ECR I-2557............................................................................................................... 8.5, 8.101 Commercy AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-316/07) [2009] ECR II-43.............................................................................. 3.20; 4.83; 9.49 Commerzbank AG v Commission (Case T-219/01) [2003] ECR II-2843.......................................7.2 Commerzbank v Commission (Case T-61/02) judgments of 14 October 2004 (unreported)..........16.56 Commerz Nederland NV v Havenbedrijf Rotterdam NV (Case C-242/13) 17 September 2014....2.141 Commission v ADT Projekt Gesellschaft der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Tierzuchter mbH (Case C-349/99P) [1999] ECR I-6467.....................................................................................15.2 Commission v AMI Semiconductor Belgium BVBA (Case C-294/02) [2005] ECR I-2175........ 1.5, 1.11; 7.10, 7.12; 9.89 Commission v Acentro Turismo SpA (Case T-460/08) [2010] ECR II-6351......................... 2.137; 17.105 Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum eV (Case C-78/03P) [2005] ECR I-10737.....................................................................................................................................9.53 Commission v Albani (Case C-242/90P) [1993] ECR I-3839.............................  5.19; 14.10; 15.34; 17.64 Commission v Albani (Case C-242/90P-R) [1990] ECR I-4329..........................  5.34; 8.94; 15.13, 15.38; 16.34, 16.161 Commission v Antiche Terre Soc Coop. rl Societa Agricola Cooperativs (Case T-51/09) [2010] ECR II-131...............................................................................................................................17.108 Commission v Arci Nuova associazione comitato di Cagliari & Gessa (Case T-259/09) [2010] ECR II-284...............................................................................................................................1.84 Commission v Artegodan (Case C-440/01 P(R)) [2002] ECR I-1489............................................8.183 Commission v Artegodan GmbH (Case C-39/03P) [2003] ECR I-7885.........................................2.92 Commission v Austria (Case C-147/03) [2005] ECR I-5969 .........................................................2.141 Commission v Austria (Case C-320/03R) [2003] ECR I-7929.......................................................8.172 Commission v Austria (Case C-507/04) [2007] ECR I-5939..........................................................9.41 Commission v Austria (Case C-205/06) [2009] ECR I-1301..................................................  2.141, 2.149 Commission v Austria (Case C-535/07) [2010] ECR I-9483..........................................................17.32 Commission v BASF (Case C-137/92P) [1994] ECR I-2555................................................... 10.47; 15.19 Commission v Belgium (Case 77/69) [1970] ECR 237..................................................................17.29 Commission v Belgium (Case 156/77) [1978] ECR 1881................................................... 17.117, 17.118 Commission v Belgium (Case 149/79) [1980] ECR 3881.................................................... 2.166; 16.125 Commission v Belgium (Case 324/82) [1984] ECR 1861..............................................................13.12 Commission v Belgium (Case 306/84) [1987] ECR 675................................................................14.32 Commission v Belgium (Case 85/85) [1986] ECR 1149................................................................7.62 Commission v Belgium (Cases 227–230/85) [1988] ECR 1...........................................................16.34 Commission v Belgium (Case 293/85) [1988] ECR 305................................................................7.62 Commission v Belgium (Case 293/85R) [1985] ECR 3521............... 8.81, 8.89, 8.132, 8.177, 8.182; 9.54 Commission v Belgium (Case 298/86) [1988] ECR 4343........................................................  9.82; 13.12 Commission v Belgium (Case C-248/88) [1991] ECR I-1275........................................................13.12 Commission v Belgium (Case C-290/89) [1991] ECR I-2851........................................... 4.9; 9.63; 16.62 Commission v Belgium (Case C-376/90) [1992] ECR I-6153........................................................14.36 Commission v Belgium (Case C-377/90) [1992] ECR I-1229........................................................2.112 Commission v Belgium (Case C-87/94) [1996] ECR I-2043 .........................................................2.102 Commission v Belgium (Case C-203/98) [1999] ECR I-4899........................................................2.150 Commission v Belgium (Case C-38/03) 13 January 2005 (unreported)..........................................5.40 Commission v Belgium (Case C-221/03) [2005] ECR I-8307........................................................7.90 Commission v Biotrast SA (Case C-523/03) 9 December 2004......................................................16.56 Commission v Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank (Case 85/86) [1986] ECR 2215, [1988] ECR 1281........................................................................................... 2.48; 9.34; 17.134 Commission v Board of Governors European Investment Bank (Case 85/86R) [1988] ECR 1281.........................................................................................................................................17.134 Commission v Bruno Farmaceutici SpA (Case C-474/00 P(R)) [2001] ECR I-2909................. 8.75, 8.81, 8.108, 8.131 Commission v Buczek Automotive (Case C-405/11P) 21 March 2013..........................................3.22 Commission v CODEMI (Case 318/81) [1985] ECR 3693.......... 11.43, 11.94, 11.96, 11.99; 14.2; 17.108 Commission v CODEMI SpA (Case 318/81R) [1982] ECR 1325.................................... 8.45, 8.86; 11.94 Commission v Camacho-Fernandes (Case T-20/00OP) [2003] ECR SC-1-A-75, II-405.........16.70, 16.75 Commission v Cantina sociale de Dolianova Soc Coop arl (Case C-51/05P) [2008] ECR I5341.........................................................................................................................................7.51

xxxix

Table of Cases para Commission v Chambre Syndicale nationale des Entreprises de Transport de Fonds et Valeurs (Sytraval) (Case C-367/95P) [1998] ECR I-1719................................................................. 7.9; 17.15 Commission v Commune de Valbronne (Case T-238/08) [2010] ECR II-260................................9.79 Commission v Cooperacao e Desenvolvimento Regional SA (Case T-174/08) [2008] ECR II332...........................................................................................................................................16.56 Commission v Council (Case 22/70) [1971] ECR 263................................................................  7.22, 7.58 Commission v Council (Case 45/86) [1987] ECR 1493 .......................................... 7.17, 7.21, 7.22; 16.37 Commission v Council (Case 51/87) [1988] ECR 5459........................................................... 2.158; 16.37 Commission v Council (Case 131/87) [1989] ECR 3743 ...............................................................9.87 Commission v Council (Case 165/87) [1988] ECR 5545................................................................14.20 Commission v Council (Case 383/87) [1988] ECR 4051.............................................  2.161; 14.41; 17.26 Commission v Council (Case C-155/91) [1993] ECR I-939....................................................... 5.37, 5.38 Commission v Council (Case C-309/95) [1998] ECR I-655........................................................ 7.46, 7.49 Commission v Council (Case C-29/99) [2002] ECR I-11221...............................................  17.17, 17.182 Commission v Council (Case C-27/04) [2004] ECR I-6649...........................................................2.86 Commission v Council (Case C-370/07) [2009] ECR I-8917.................................................... 7.22; 16.37 Commission v Council (Case C-40/10) [2010] ECR I-12043.........................................................17.19 Commission v Council (Case C-196/12) 19 November 2013.........................................................17.24 Commission v Cresson (Case C-432/04) [2006] ECR I-6387 ............ 2.141, 2.149; 11.70; 17.114, 17.115 Commission v Czech Republic (Case C-343/08) [2010] ECR I-275.................................  7.66, 7.77; 9.53 Commission v Czech Republic (Case C-241/11) 25 June 2013......................................................17.42 Commission v D (Case T-262/06P) [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1 27, II-B-1 191.....................................9.41 Commission v Denmark (Case 278/85) [1987] ECR 4069.............................................................9.54 Commission v Denmark (Case C-243/89) [1993] ECR I-3353......................................... 9.41, 9.54; 17.33 Commission v Denmark (Case C-52/90) [1992] ECR I-2187.........................................................9.42 Commission v Deutsche Post AG (Case C-399/08P) [2010] ECR I-7831......................................15.16 Commission v Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou (Case C-553/12P) 17 July 2014...........................15.52 Commission v EU Research Projects (Case T-220/10) 17 October 2012........................................16.56 Commission v Environmental Management Consultants Ltd (Case T-46/05) [2008] ECR II-13...16.56 Commission v Eugenio Branco Lda (Case T-85/94 (122)) [1995] ECR II-2993......... 2.137; 16.69, 16.73 Commission v European Central Bank (Case C-11/00) [2003] ECR I-7147.......................  17.118, 17.134 Commission v European Parliament (Case C-411/06) [2009] ECR I-7585....................................9.41 Commission v Feilhauer (Case C-209/90) [1992] ECR I-2613.......................................................17.105 Commission v Finland (Case C-185/00) [2003] ECR I-14189.......................................................5.41 Commission v Finland (Case C-195/04) [2007] ECR-I 3351............................................  7.62, 7.76; 9.41 Commission v Finland (Case C-284/05) [2009] ECR I-11705.......................................................16.37 Commission v Finland (Case C-342/10) 8 November 2012............................................................2.149 Commission v France (Case 167/73) [1974] ECR 359...................................................................7.22 Commission v France (Case 232/78) [1979] ECR 2729............................................................. 9.54, 9.89 Commission v France (Cases 24 & 97/80R) [1980] ECR 1319...............  8.3, 8.81, 8.84, 8.97, 8.98, 8.111 Commission v France (Case 42/82R) [1982] ECR 841.................. 8.40, 8.45, 8.75, 8.81, 8.93, 8.94, 8.97, 8.103, 8.111, 8.112, 8.134, 8.135, 8.138 Commission v France (Case 171/83R) [1983] ECR 2621...............................................  8.86, 8.102, 8.112 Commission v France (Case 21/84) [1985] ECR 1355................................................... 9.61; 10.45; 11.24 Commission v France (Case 188/84) [1986] ECR 419...................................................................14.20 Commission v France (Case 216/84) [1988] ECR 793 ............................................................. 2.81, 2.82 Commission v France (Case 318/86) [1988] ECR 3559.................................................................9.92 Commission v France (Cases 92 & 93/87) [1989] ECR 405...........................................................9.55 Commission v France (Case C-64/88) [1991] ECR I-2727.............................................................12.3 Commission v France (Case C-62/89) [1990] ECR I-925...............................................................13.12 Commission v France (Case C-244/89) [1991] ECR I-163.............................................................13.12 Commission v France (Case C-304/02) [2005] ECR I-6263....................................... 16.171; 17.37, 17.42 Commission v France (Case C-232/05) [2006] ECR I-10071.........................................................8.1, 8.88 Commission v France & United Kingdom (Cases 92 & 93/87) [1989] ECR 405...........................14.13 Commission v G & E Gianniotis EPE (Case C-524/03) 5 October 2004........................................16.56 Commission v Gal-Or (Case T-136/09) [2010] ECR II-221...................................... 16.56; 17.105, 17.108 Commission v Germany (Case 12/74) [1975] ECR 181 ......................................................... 2.140; 13.10 Commission v Germany (Case 116/82) [1986] ECR 2519.............................................................14.32 Commission v Germany (Case 325/82) [1984] ECR 777...............................................................7.62 Commission v Germany (Case 208/85) [1987] ECR 4045.............................................................9.82 Commission v Germany (Case 293/85R) [1985] ECR 3521...........................................................8.112 Commission v Germany (Case 412/85) [1987] ECR 3503.............................................................14.32

xl

Table of Cases para Commission v Germany (Case 76/86) [1989] ECR 1021 ..............................................................9.42 Commission v Germany (Case C-217/88) [1990] ECR I-2879.................................................... 7.22, 7.62 Commission v Germany (Case 57/89R) [1989] ECR 2849........................................................ 8.92, 8.163 Commission v Germany (Case C-43/90) [1992] ECR I-1909.........................................................9.48 Commission v Germany (Case C-195/90R) [1990] ECR I-2715, [1990] ECR I-3351..............8.81, 8.108, 8.109, 8.112, 8.172, 8.179 Commission v Germany (Case C-237/90) [1992] ECR I-5973.......................................................7.62 Commission v Germany (Case C-74/91) [1992] ECR I-5437.....................................................8.14; 17.33 Commission v Germany (Case C-317/92) [1994] ECR I-2039.......................................................7.30 Commission v Germany (Case C-198/97) [1999] ECR I-3257.......................................................7.10 Commission v Germany (Cases C-20/01 & C-28/01) [2003] ECR I-3609.....................................5.38 Commission v Germany (Case C-126/03) [2004] ECR I-11197.....................................................16.34 Commission v Germany (Case C-490/04) [2007] ECR I-6095.......................................................9.41 Commission v Germany (Case C-503/04) [2007] ECR I-6153.......................................................16.34 Commission v Germany (Case C-270/07) [2009] ECR I-1983.......................................................7.62 Commission v Germany (Case C-424/07) [2009] ECR I-11431.....................................................7.62 Commission v Germany (Case C-518/07) [2010] ECR I-1885....................................................... 5.2; 7.9 Commission v Germany (Case C-546/07) [2010] ECR I-439.........................................................17.30 Commission v Germany (Case C-426/13 P(R)) 19 December 2013........................ 8.25, 8.75, 8.76, 8.131 Commission v Germany (Case C-591/13) 16 April 2015................................................................17.30 Commission v Gill (Case C-185/90P) [1991] ECR I-4779 ................................  9.128; 14.9; 15.16, 15.41 Commission v Girardot (Case C-348/06) [2008] ECR I-833................................................ 17.51, 17.103 Commission v Greece (Case 276/83) [1985] ECR 2751...........................................................  2.157; 9.13 Commission v Greece (Case 4/85) [1987] ECR 4383.....................................................................14.36 Commission v Greece (Case 132/85) [1987] ECR 5293.......................................................... 14.36, 14.37 Commission v Greece (Cases 194 & 241/85) [1988] ECR 1037....................................................9.46 Commission v Greece (Case 70/86) [1987] ECR 3545...................................................................7.41 Commission v Greece (Case 240/86) [1988] ECR 1835.................................................................7.22 Commission v Greece (Case 272/86) [1988] ECR 4875 ................................................................13.8 Commission v Greece (Case 226/87) [1988] ECR 3611.................................................................7.30 Commission v Greece (Case C-281/87) [1989] ECR 4015........................................... 12.23, 12.46, 12.48 Commission v Greece (Case 305/87) [1989] ECR 1461 ................................................................9.82 Commission v Greece (Case C-35/88) [1990] ECR I-3125............................................................13.21 Commission v Greece (Case 68/88) [1989] ECR 2965...........................................................  16.55, 16.56 Commission v Greece (Case C-132/88) [1990] ECR I-1567..........................................................9.40 Commission v Greece (Case C-347/88) [1990] ECR I-4747 ............................................. 9.42, 9.46, 9.48 Commission v Greece (Case C-110/89) [1991] ECR I-2659 ....................... 2.139; 6.5; 9.46; 11.24, 11.28 Commission v Greece (Case C-230/89) [1991] ECR I-1909..........................................................9.82 Commission v Greece (Case C-61/90) [1992] ECR I-2407....................................................... 9.40; 13.28 Commission v Greece (Case C-328/90) [1992] ECR I-425............................................................16.102 Commission v Greece (Case C-375/90) [1993] ECR I-2055.................................................... 9.80; 10.45 Commission v Greece (Case C-65/91) [1992] ECR I-5245.....................................................  13.10, 13.40 Commission v Greece (Case C-105/91) [1992] ECR I-5871......................................................  7.62; 9.46 Commission v Greece (Case C-210/91) [1992] ECR I-6735.......................................... 2.158; 7.62; 13.12 Commission v Greece (Case C-120/94R) [1994] ECR I-3037 .......................................................8.29 Commission v Greece (Case C-202/99) [2001] ECR I-9319..........................................................9.41 Commission v Greece (Case C-475/01) [2004] ECR I-8923..........................................................17.33 Commission v Greece (Case C-407/09) [2011] ECR I-2467..........................................................17.34 Commission v Greece (Case C-354/10) 1 March 2012...................................................................2.9 Commission v Greece (Case C-601/10) [2011] ECR I-163............................................................17.32 Commission v Greece (Case C-677/13) 11 December 2014................................................... 17.29, 17.30 Commission v Greencore Group plc (Case C-123/03P) [2004] ECR I-11647................................17.43 Commission v Hellenic Ventures (Case T-44/06) [2010] ECR II-127.................................. 17.105, 17.106, 17.107, 17.108 Commission v Hitesys SpA (Case C-356/99) [2000] ECR I-9517..................................................16.56 Commission v Hungary (Case C-286/12) 6 November 2012..........................................................17.33 Commission v Hydrowatt SARL (Case C-323/02) [2003] ECR I-9071.........................................16.56 Commission v IAMA Consultancy (Case T-242/04) [2007] ECR II-7...........................................9.64 Commission v IAMA Consulting Srl (Case C-517/03) order of 27 May 2004 (unreported)..........2.20, 2.24, 2.26; 7.5 Commission v ITEC (Case C-30/03) [2003] ECR I-12217.............................................................16.56 Commission v Imperial Chemical Industries plc (Case C-286/95P) [2000] ECR I-2341...............11.60

xli

Table of Cases para Commission v Impetus Symvouloi Michanikoi – Kainotomia ka Technologia EPE (Case T-138/05) [2007] ECR II-136..................................................................................................1.84 Commission v Implants (International) Ltd (Case C-279/03) order of 24 February 2005 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................16.62 Commission v Instituto Tecnologico para a Europa Comunitaria (ITEC) (Case C-29/03) [2003] ECR I-12205............................................................................................................................16.56 Commission v Ireland (Case 61/77) [1978] ECR 417.....................................................................9.48 Commission v Ireland (Case 61/77R) [1977] ECR 1411..............  8.18, 8.35, 8.55, 8.75, 8.81, 8.93, 8.103 Commission v Ireland (Case 74/82) [1984] ECR 317.................................................................. 5.56; 7.62 Commission v Ireland (Case 415/85) [1988] ECR 3097.................................................................17.30 Commission v Ireland (Case 45/87R) [1987] ECR 1369.......................... 8.90, 8.103, 8.131, 8.134, 8.171 Commission v Ireland (Case 299/87) order of 14 June 1988..........................................................14.37 Commission v Ireland (Case 352/88) order of 6 July 1989..............................................  6.7; 12.13, 12.46 Commission v Ireland (Case C-13/00) [2002] ECR I-2943............................................................5.46 Commission v Ireland (Case C-459/03) [2006] ECR I-4635................................................  17.28, 17.109 Commission v Ireland (Case C-89/08P) [2009] ECR I-11245................................................  9.40; 15.117 Commission v Ireland (Case C-272/12P) 10 December 2013........................................... 9.50, 9.82; 15.17 Commission v Italian Government (Case 7/61) [1961] ECR 317 ..................................................7.22 Commission v Italy (Case 7/61) [1961] ECR 317 ..........................................................................7.62 Commission v Italy (Case 45/64) [1965] ECR 857 .................................................................... 7.62; 13.8 Commission v Italy (Case 7/69) [1970] ECR 111............................................................. 7.62, 7.66; 14.20 Commission v Italy (Case 28/69) [1970] ECR 187.........................................................................9.63 Commission v Italy (Case 31/69) [1970] ECR 25 ..........................................................................7.90 Commission v Italy (Case 48/71) [1972] ECR 527.........................................................................16.171 Commission v Italy (Case 39/72) [1973] ECR 101.........................................................................7.22 Commission v Italy (Case 193/80) [1981] ECR 3019.....................................................................7.62 Commission v Italy (Case 115/82)..................................................................................................12.27 Commission v Italy (Case 166/82) [1984] ECR 459..........................................................  7.62; 9.61, 9.80 Commission v Italy (Case 169/82) [1984] ECR 1603 ....................................................................11.24 Commission v Italy (Case 51/83) [1984] ECR 2793........................................................  7.22; 13.2; 14.25 Commission v Italy (Case 262/83) [1987] ECR 3073.....................................................................9.82 Commission v Italy (Case 274/83) [1985] ECR 1077.....................................................................17.32 Commission v Italy (Case 103/84) [1986] ECR 1759.....................................................................17.33 Commission v Italy (Case 131/84) [1985] ECR 3531.....................................................................16.34 Commission v Italy (Case 309/84) [1986] ECR 599.......................................................................7.62 Commission v Italy (Case 154/85R) [1985] ECR 1753................... 8.81, 8.89, 8.103, 8.112, 8.163, 8.177 Commission v Italy (Case 199/85) [1987] ECR 1039.....................................................................13.12 Commission v Italy (Case 419/85) [1987] ECR 2115.....................................................................9.53 Commission v Italy (Case 3/86) [1988] ECR 3369.........................................................................13.2 Commission v Italy (Case 69/86) [1987] ECR 773.........................................................................16.34 Commission v Italy (Case 257/86) [1988] ECR 3249.................................................................. 9.41, 9.82 Commission v Italy (Case 54/87) [1989] ECR 385..................................................................  14.32, 14.36 Commission v Italy (Case 141/87) [1989] ECR 943............................................ 11.24, 11.93; 13.8, 13.12 Commission v Italy (Case 323/87) [1989] ECR 2275.............................................. 9.88, 9.91; 10.3; 11.25 Commission v Italy (Case 194/88R) [1988] ECR 5647................  8.92, 8.103, 8.129, 8.161, 8.172, 8.173 Commission v Italy (Case 352/88R) [1989] ECR 267.................................... 8.6, 8.47, 8.89, 8.108, 8.109 Commission v Italy (Case C-157/89) [1991] ECR I-57 ................................................... 7.70; 9.40; 11.28 Commission v Italy (Case C-209/89) [1991] ECR I-1575..............................................................17.32 Commission v Italy (Case C-334/89) [1991] ECR I-93..................................................................13.44 Commission v Italy (Case C-362/90) [1992] ECR I-2353..............................................................7.66 Commission v Italy (Case C-272/91R) [1992] ECR I-457..................................  8.81, 8.112, 8.131, 8.183 Commission v Italy (Case C-306/91) [1993] ECR I-2133..............................................................9.41 Commission v Italy (Case C-296/92) [1994] ECR I-1....................................................................7.62 Commission v Italy (Case C-285/96) [1998] ECR I-5935..............................................................16.56 Commission v Italy (Case C-362/98) [1999] ECR I-6299....................................................... 2.112, 2.121 Commission v Italy (Case C-32/02) [2003] ECR I-12063........................ 2.50; 16.51, 16.52, 16.60, 16.64 Commission v Italy (Case C-525/03) [2005] ECR I-9405..............................................................17.30 Commission v Italy (Case C-110/05) [2009] ECR I-519................................................................2.153 Commission v Italy (Case C-280/05) [2007] ECR I-181................................................................8.1 Commission v Italy (Case C-387/05) [2009] ECR I-11831............................................................16.37 Commission v Italy (Case C-531/06) [2009] ECR I-4103........................................................  7.23; 14.13 Commission v Italy (Case C-326/07) [2009] ECR I-2291..............................................................7.62

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Table of Cases para Commission v Italy (Case C-540/07) [2009] ECR I-10983............................................................9.41 Commission v Italy (Case C-334/08) [2010] ECR I-6869..............................................................5.44 Commission v Italy (Case C-496/09) [2011] ECR I-11483............................................................17.42 Commission v Italy (Case C-496/09INT) 11 July 2013..................................................................16.150 Commission v Italy (Case C-196/13) 2 December 2014..........................................................  17.41, 17.42 Commission v Italy (Case C-367/14) 17 September 2015....................................................... 17.41, 17.42 Commisison v Kadi (Cases C-584/10P, C-593/10P & C-595/10P) 18 July 2013...........  2.141; 9.23, 9.25; 12.27 Commission v Kallianos (Case C-323/06P-DEP)) order of 31 January 2012.................................14.59 Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV (Case C-519/07P) [2009] ECR I-8495...........7.16 Commission v Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH (Case C-181/02P) [2004] ECR I-5703.................2.149 Commission v Lualdi (Case C-136/92P) [1994] ECR I-1981..........................................9.136; 15.4, 15.19 Commission v Luxembourg (Cases 22 & 24/84).............................................................................16.46 Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-152/89) [1991] ECR I-3141.................................................7.62 Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-69/92) [1993] ECR I-5907............................................ 16.55, 16.56 Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-274/93) [1996] ECR I-2019 ................................................16.56 Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-430/98) [1999] ECR I-7391.................................................2.81 Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-47/99) [1999] ECR I-8999...................................................2.81 Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-297/00) [2001] ECR I-5189.................................................2.81 Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-23/05) [2005] ECR I-9535...................................................7.90 Commission v Luxembourg (Case C-526/08) [2010] ECR I-6151.............................  2.9, 2.10; 7.70, 7.71 Commission v Manuel Pereira Roldao & Filhos Lda (Case C-59/99) [2001] ECR I-8499............2.157; 9.34; 16.58 Commission v Marcuccio (Case C-513/08P-DEP) order of 28 February 2013............ 14.59, 14.66, 14.72 Commission v Meierhofer (Case T-560/08P) [2010] ECR II-1739............. 2.97; 11.5, 11.17, 11.22, 11.58 Commission v Moschonaki (Case T-476/11P) 25 October 2013.....................................................15.16 Commission v NTN Corpn (Case C-245/95P) [1996] ECR I-559...................................... 5.15, 5.29, 5.32 Commission v NTN Corpn (Case C-245/95P-Intervention I) [1996] ECR I-553...........................5.2 Commission v NTN Corpn (Case C-245/95P-Intervention II) [1996] ECR I-559....................... 5.28, 5.29 Commission v Nanopoulos (Case T-308/10P) 12 July 2012...........................................................15.21 Commission v Nederlandse Antillen (Case C-142/00P) [2003] ECR I-3483..................................2.149 Commission v Netherlands (Case 89/76) [1977] ECR 1355 ..........................................................14.20 Commission v Netherlands (Case 95/77) [1978] ECR 863.............................................................7.22 Commission v Netherlands (Cases 96/81 & 97/81) [1982] ECR 1791...........................................13.8 Commission v Netherlands (Case 213/85) [1988] ECR 281...........................................................8.1 Commission v Netherlands (Case 290/87) [1989] ECR 3083.............................. 13.2, 13.12, 13.21, 13.44 Commission v Netherlands (Case C-96/89) [1991] ECR I-2461..........................  7.28, 8.30; 11.24, 11.28 Commission v Netherlands (Case C-198/90) [1991] ECR I-5799..................................................7.62 Commission v Netherlands (Case C-52/91) [1993] ECR I-3069....................................................14.25 Commission v Netherlands (Case C-75/91) [1992] ECR I-549......................................................16.34 Commission v Netherlands (Case C-157/91) [1992] ECR I-5899..........................  7.62; 9.41, 9.46; 13.12 Commission v New Acoustic Music Association (Case T-464/09) [2011] ECR II-133..................17.107 Commission v Oder-Plan Architektur GmbH (Case C-77/99) [2001] ECR I-7355......... 1.145; 3.12, 3.20; 7.12; 16.56, 16.58 Commission v Parker Hannifin Manufacturing Srl (Case C-434/13P) 18 December 2014......2.149; 15.42 Commission v Parliament (Case C-43/12) 6 May 2014..................................................................16.37 Commission v Parliament & Council (Case C-299/05) [2007] ECR I-8695............................  2.149, 2.151 Commission v Peine-Salzgitter AG (Case C-220/91P) [1993] ECR I-2393...................................17.49 Commission v Petrilli (Case C-17/11RX) 8 February 2011 .................................................... 2.262; 15.66 Commission v Pilkington Group Ltd (Case C-278/13 P(R)) 10 September 2013........................  8.35, 8.78 Commission v Poland (Case C-165/08) [2009] ECR I-6843...................................................... 9.41; 14.16 Commission v Poland (Case C-31/09) [2011] ECR I-2933.............................................................17.32 Commission v Poland (Case C-569/10) 27 June 2013....................................................................17.32 Commission v Poland (Case C-678/13) 4 June 2015......................................................................9.41 Commission v Portugal (Case C-462/05) [2008] ECR I-4183........................................................7.71 Commission v Portugal (Case C-70/06) [2008] ECR I-1.........................................................  17.36, 17.42 Commission v Portugal (Case C-457/07) [2009] ECR I-8091...................................... 7.61; 16.34, 16.171 Commission v Portugal (Case C-292/11P) 15 January 2014...........................................................16.9 Commission v Portugal (Case C-335/12) 17 July 2014...................................................................2.141 Commission v Portugal (Case C-76/13) 25 June 2014....................................................................17.34 Commission v Provincia di Imperia (Case C-183/08P) [2009] ECR I-27...................................  7.16, 7.17 Commission v Q (Case T-80/89P) [2011] ECR II-4313..................................................................15.17

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Table of Cases para Commission v Rednap AB (Case T-352/07) [2009] ECR II-1........................................................16.56 Commission v Royale Belge (Case 23/81) [1983] ECR 2685.............................  11.31; 13.7, 13.10; 14.48 Commission v SGL Carbon AG (Case C-301/04P) [2006] ECR I-5915.................................. 2.141, 2.149 Commission v SIVU du Plan d’Eau de la Vallee du Lot (Case C-172/97) [1999] ECR I-3363......16.56, 16.75 Commission v Schneider Electric SA (Case C-440/07P) [2010] ECR I-73..............................14.67; 17.52 Commission v Scott (Case C-290/07P) [2010] ECR I-7763.........................................................5.2; 17.19 Commission v Siemens AG Osterreich (Cases C-231/11P-C-233/11P) 10 April 2014.......... 9.118, 9.120; 15.14, 15.16, 15.22, 15.26 Commission v Slovakia (Case C-507/08) [2010] ECR I-13489......................................................8.88 Commission v Socurte (Case C-143/95P) [1997] ECR I-1.............................................................7.46 Commission v Solvay SA (Cases C-287/95P & C-288/95P) [2000] ECR I-2391..........................11.60 Commission v Spain (Case C-378/92) [1993] ECR I-5095 ............................................................2.112 Commission v Spain (Case C-499/99) [2002] ECR I-6031.............................................................2.120 Commission v Spain (Case C-404/00) [2003] ECR I-6695.............................................................17.118 Commission v Spain (Case C-463/00) [2003] ECR I-4582.............................................................1.58 Commission v Spain (Case C-195/02) [2004] ECR I-7857................................................. 5.37, 5.38, 5.41 Commission v Spain (Case C-560/08) [2011] ECR I-199...............................................................17.30 Commission v Spain (Case C-529/09) 24 January 2013...........................................................  7.71; 17.32 Commission v Spain (Case C-610/10) 11 December 2012.............................................................17.40 Commission v Spain (Case C-184/11) 13 May 2014......................................................................17.40 Commission v Spain (Case C-38/15) 10 March 2016................................................................ 17.3, 17.32 Commission v Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG (Case C-220/91P) [1993] ECR I-2393.................15.19 Commission v Strack (Cases T-197/11P & T-198/11P) (13 December 2012).........  1.10; 7.71; 14.51; 15.5 Commission v Strack (Case C-579/12RX-II) 19 September 2013..................... 14.11; 15.66, 15.76, 15.77 Commission v Sveriges Betodlares Centralforening (Case C-409/96P-DEP)) [1999] ECR I-4939.......................................................................................................................................14.59 Commission v Sweden (Case C-249/06) [2009] ECR I-1335..................................................  2.141, 2.149 Commission v Sweden (Case C-270/11) 30 May 2013...................................................................17.42 Commission v Systran SA (Case C-103/11P) 18 April 2013; reversing (Case T-19/07) Systran SA v Commission [2010] ECR II-6083........................................... 2.141; 17.43, 17.48, 17.50, 17.52 Commission v Tecnologie Vetrosina SpA (Case C-41/98) [2001] ECR I-341................................2.20 Commission v Tetra Laval BV (Case C-12/03P) [2005] ECR I-987.......................................... 2.10; 11.60 Commission v Tetra Laval BV (Case C-13/03P) [2005] ECR I-1113.............................................2.163 Commission v Thome (Case T-669/13P) 5 November 2014...........................................................15.21 Commission v Tordeur (Case 232/84) [1985] ECR 3223..................................  12.46, 12.48; 17.43, 17.76 Commission v Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (Case C-269/06) [2007] ECR I-187................................................................................................................................2.24 Commission v Transport Environment Development Systems (Case T-448/04) [2007] ECR II104...........................................................................................................................................11.24 Commission v Trendsoft (Irl) Ltd (Case C-127/03) order of 8 July 2004 (unreported)........... 16.56; 17.56 Commission v United Kingdom (Cases 31 & 53/77R) [1977] ECR 921 ............... 8.18, 8.72, 8.92, 8.134 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 170/78) [1980] ECR 417................................. 2.166; 11.26; 16.25 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 1780/78) [1983] ECR 2265 ..............................................14.20 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 804/79) [1981] ECR 1045 ................................................9.53 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 124/81) [1983] ECR 203......................................  7.62; 9.54, 9.89 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 40/82) [1982] ECR 2793 ..................................................16.25 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 165/82) [1983] ECR 3431.................................................14.16 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 23/84) [1986] ECR 3581...................................................7.62 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 416/85) [1988] ECR 3127.................................................1.175 Commission v United Kingdom (Case 246/89R) [1989] ECR 3125............. 8.5, 8.81, 8.112, 8.134, 8.164 Commission v United Kingdom (Case C-279/89) [1992] ECR I-5785........................................ 7.62; 9.84 Commission v United Kingdom (Case C-40/92R) [1992] ECR I-3389...................... 8.6, 8.84, 8.86, 8.87, 8.94, 8.108 Commission v United Kingdom (Case C-199/04) [2007] ECR-1221.............................................7.76 Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens NV (Case C-441/11P) 6 December 2012...........................14.16 Commission v Versalis (Cases C-93/13P & C-123/13P) 5 March 2015..........................................15.19 Commission v Zoubek (Case 426/85) [1986] ECR 4057.......................................  17.105, 17.106, 17.108 Commission & France v TFI (Cases C-302/99P & C-308/99P) [2001] ECR I-5603.....................2.160 Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v The Rank Group plc (Cases C-259/10 & C-260/10) [2011] ECR I-10947...........................................................................................10.3 Commune de Differdange v Commission (Case 222/83) [1984] ECR 2889...................................14.15

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Table of Cases para Commune de Millau v Commission (Case C-531/12P) 19 June 2014....................................... 4.15; 17.48 Community Plant Variety Office v Schrader (Case C-38/09P-DEP)) order of 10 October 2013....14.59, 14.76 Comos-Tank BV v Commission (Cases C-51 & C-59/90R) [1990] ECR I-2167............ 8.14, 8.47, 8.108, 8.111, 8.164 Compagnia Generale delle Acque v Commission (Case T-264/00) 12 July 2012...........................2.48 Compagnia Italiana Alcool Sas di Mario Mariano & Co v Commission (Case C-258/90R) [1990] ECR I-4887............................................................................................................ 8.108, 8.115, 8.131 Compagnie d’Approvisionnement de Transport et de Crédit SA & Grands Moulins de Paris SA v Commission (No 2) (Cases 9 & 11/71) [1972] ECR 391....................................... 7.60, 7.68; 17.49 Compagnie d’Entreprise CFE v European Parliament (Case C-338/92) [1993] ECR I-5237.........9.82 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority (Case 2/57) [1957–58] ECR 199 ....................................................................................................................................... 9.40, 9.82 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority (Case 15/57) [1957–58] ECR 211................................................................................................................................ 17.116, 17.119 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux et Fonderies de Givors v High Authority (Cases 27-29/58) [1960] ECR 241..................................................................................................................  5.43; 9.82 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority (Case 33/59) [1962] ECR 381......9.53, 9.54; 11.59 Compagnie Generale Maritime v Commission (Case T-86/95) [2002] ECR II-1011.....................9.48 Compagnie Industrielle et Agricole du Comté de Loheac v Council & Commission (Cases 54– 60/76) [1977] ECR 645...............................................................................................  7.79, 7.92; 9.82 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport NV v Commission (Case T-24/93R) [1993] ECR II543............................................................................................................................. 5.34, 5.87; 8.105 Compagnie Maritime Belge SA v Commission (Case T-276/04) [2008] ECR II-1277..................7.24 Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines SA (CRAM) & Rheinzink GmbH v Commission (Cases 29 & 30/83) [1984] ECR 1679................................................................... 13.16, 13.19, 13.21 Compania Espanola de Petroleos SA (CEPSA) v Commission (Case T-497/07) (16 September 2013)................................................................................................................. 1.10; 7.70, 7.71; 16.34 Compania Espanola de Tabaco en rama SA (Cetarsa) v Commission (Case C-181/11P) 12 July 2012................................................................................................................................. 10.48; 15.21 Compania Espanola para la fabricacion de aceros inoxidables SA (Acerinox) v Commission (Case C-57/02P) [2005] ECR I-6689, para 26.................................................................. 2.141, 2.149 Compania Internacional de Pesca y Derivados SA (Inpesca) v Commission (Cases C-199/94P) & C-200/94PREV) [1998] ECR I-831.............................................................  16.29, 16.106, 16.112, 16.113, 16.114, 16.123, 16.149 Comptoir National Technique Agricole (CNTA) SA v Commission (Case 74/74) [1975] ECR 533...........................................................................................................................................16.25 Computer Resources International (Luxembourg) v Commission (Case T-422/11) 5 November 2014.........................................................................................................................................9.79 Computer Task Group Luxembourg PSF SA v Court of Justice (Cases T-170/10 & T-340/10) 15 November 2011........................................................................................................................3.5 Comune di Montorio al Vomano v Commission (Case C-334/07R-EX) [2001] ECR I-4229 ........8.50 Comune di Napoli v Commission (Case T-388/07) [2010] ECR II-79...................................... 1.84; 17.46 Comunidad Autonoma de Andalucia v Commission (Case T-29/03) [2004] ECR II-2923.............7.5 Comunidad Autonoma de Cantabria v Council (Case T-238/97) [1998] ECR II-2271...................3.2 Comunidad Autonoma de Galicia v Commission (Case T-520/10R) [2011] ECR II-27.................5.60 Comunidad Autonoma de la Rioja v Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya (Cases C-474/09P-DEP)-C476/09P-DEP)) order of 16 October 2014.............................................................  14.59, 14.70, 14.76 Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia v Commission (Case T-357/05)...............................................4.11 Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia-Generalidad Valenciana v Commission (Case C-363/06P) [2008] ECR I-32......................................................................................................... 4.11, 4.21, 4.25 Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia-Generalidad Valenciana v Commission (Case T-357/05) [2006] ECR II-2015.................................................................................................................4.11 Concept – Anlagen u. Gerate nach ‘GMP’ fur Produktion u. Labor GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-127/02) [2004] ECR II-1113.............................................................................................................................9.47 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana della Finanze (Case 87/75) [1976] ECR 129...........................................................................................................................................17.76 Confederacion Espanola de Transporte de Mercancias (CETM) v Commission (Case T-55/99) [2000] ECR II-3207.................................................................................................................3.14 Confederation Generale du Travail v Premier Ministre (Case C-385/05) [2007] ECR I-611.........2.205

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Table of Cases para Confederazione Generale dell’Industria Italiana (Confindustria) v Commission (Case T-126/00) [2001] ECR I-85......................................................................................................................7.38 Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Légumes v Council (Cases 16 & 17/62) [1962] ECR 471........................................................................................... 3.14; 5.6, 5.17, 5.23, 5.36 Confederazione Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti (Coldiretti) v Council & Commission (Case T-149/96) [1998] ECR II-3841................................................................................................9.41 Connolly v Commission (Case T-203/95R) [1995] ECR II-2919...................................................8.35 Connolly v Commission (Case C-273/99P) [2001] ECR I-1575....................................................11.24 Conseil Nationale des Professions de l’Automobile v Commission (Case C-341/00P) [2001] ECR I-5263......................................................................................................... 5.14, 5.79, 5.81, 5.82 Conseil Scientifique International pour le Developpement des iles (Insula) v Commission (Case T-246/09) 13 June 2012............................................................................ 2.58; 17.11, 17.106, 17.108 Consel Gi. Emme Srl v Sistema Logistico dell’Arco Ligure e Alessandrino Srl (Case C-467/06) [2008] ECR I-44..............................................................................................................  2.176, 2.205 Consortium v Commission (Case T-513/11R) [2011] ECR II-456.................................................8.168 Consorzio Cooperativo d’Abruzzo v Commission (Case 15/85) [1987] ECR 1005.......................7.5, 7.30 Consorzio Gruppo di azione Locale ‘Murgia Messapica’ (Case T-465/93) [1994] ECR II-361.....7.49, 7.78 Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Grana Padana v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-291/03) [2007] ECR II-3081..........................  9.54; 14.13 Consten SA & Grundig Verkaufs GmbH v Commission (Cases 56 & 58/64) [1966] ECR 299.....7.50; 9.82 Contes Jimenez v Commission (Case T-82/92) [1994] ECR-SC II-237..........................................7.65 Conticchio v Commission (Case T-358/12P) 13 September 2013...................................................2.107 Contifex v EEC (Case 250/78) order of 22 September 1982...........................................................3.26 Cooperativa Mare Azzurro v Commission (Case T-218/00) 22 January 2013................................2.48 Cooperativa San Marco fra Lavoratori della Piccola Pesca – Burano Soc Coop rl v Commission (Case T-260/00) 12 December 2012........................................................................................2.48 Cooperatieve Aan- en Verkoopvereniging Ulestraten, Schimmert en Hulsberg BA v Commission (Case T-14/00) [2004] ECR I-497....................................................................... 5.14, 5.15, 5.29, 5.30 Coöperatieve Stremsel-en Kleurselfabriek v Commission (Case 61/80) [1981] ECR 851.............10.31 Cooperatieve Vereniging de Verenigde Bloemenveilingen Alsmeer BA v Florimex BV (Case C-265/97P) [2000] ECR I-2061...............................................................................................2.141 Cooperative Vereniging Suiker Unie UA v Commission (Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111, 113 & 114/73) [1975] ECR 1663............................................................................... 2.72; 12.1; 13.19, 13.31 Coordinamento delle associazioni per la tutela dell’ambiente e dei diritti degli utenti e consumatori (Codacons) v Commission (Case T-313/13R) order of 3 July 2013...................8.168 Copine v Commission (Case 142/82R) [1982] ECR 1911...........................................  8.111, 8.134, 8.135 Corbiau v Administration des Contributions (Case C-24/92) [1993] ECR I-1227..................... 10.7; 17.71 Correia de Matos v Commission (Case C-200/05P) [2006] ECR I-43............................................4.5 Correia de Matos v Parliament (Case C-502/06P) [2007] ECR I-163..........................................  4.10, 4.29 Correia de Matos v Parliament (Case C-502/06P-INT) [2008] ECR I-129............................  16.29, 16.148 Corus UK Ltd v Commission (Case T-171/99) [2001] ECR I-2967...............................................1.174 Corus UK Ltd v Commission (Case T-171/99) [2001] ECR II-2967.......................................  17.43, 17.57 Corus UK Ltd v Commission (Case C-199/99P) [2003] ECR I-11177...........................................11.60 Corus UK Ltd v Commission (Case T-48/00) [2004] ECR II-2325................................................2.72 Cosimex GmbH v Commission (Case T-131/89R) [1990] ECR II-1.................................. 4.92; 8.39, 8.74 Costa v ENEL (Case 6/64) [1964] ECR 585 ........................................................... 5.2; 10.7; 17.78, 17.91 Costacurta v Commission (Case 78/86R) [1986] ECR 1231...........................................................8.90 Costacurta v Commission (Case C-145/90P) [1991] ECR I-5449 .........................................  9.118; 15.15 Cotecna Inspection SA v Commission (Case C-1/00SA) [2001] ECR I-4219................................17.197 Council v Access Info Europe (Case C-280/11P) 17 October 2013................................................15.19 Council v Bamba (Case C-417/11P) 15 November 2012................................................................15.24 Council v Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH & another (Case C-23/00P) [2002] ECR I-1873.......................................................................................................................................6.14 Council v Commission (Case C-66/12) 19 November 2013...........................................................9.48 Council v European Parliament (Case 34/86) [1986] ECR 2155.................... 2.84, 2.85, 2.86; 5.89; 17.10 Council v European Parliament (Case C-284/90) [1992] ECR I-2277............................................16.37 Council v European Parliament (Case C-295/90REV) [1992] ECR I-5299....................................16.106 Council v Fulmen (Case C-280/12P) 28 November 2013, upholding Fulmen v Council (Cases T-439/10 & T-44/10) 21 March 2012.......................................................... 10.29; 13.10, 13.17, 13.21 Council v Hankart (Case T-91/96 (125)) [1998] ECR SC-I-A-597, II-1809...................................16.123

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Table of Cases para Council v Sophie in ‘t Veld (Case C-350/12P) 3 July 2014.............................................................12.28 Council v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group Co Ltd (Case C-337/09P) 19 July 2012....9.119; 15.3, 15.22 Council of European Municipalities & Regions (CEMR) v Commission (Cases T-46/98 & T-151/98) [2000] ECR II-167..................................................................................................2.161 Council of European Municipalities & Regions (CEMR) v Commission (Case T-105/99) [2000] ECR II-4099.............................................................................................................................9.65 Court of Auditors v Williams (Case 9/81-Interpretation) [1983] ECR 2859..............  5.35; 16.150, 16.165 Coussios v Commission (Case C-119/94P) [1995] ECR I-1439.....................................................2.149 Coussios v Parliament (Case C-397/95P) [1996] ECR I-3873........................................................7.70 Cova v Commission (Case F-101/07) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-173, II-A-1-925..............................1.15 Covale v Commission (Case 191/87) [1988] ECR 515...................................................................7.7 Cowan v Trésor Public (Case 186/87) [1989] ECR 195........................................................... 4.121; 17.71 Cowood v Commission (Case 60/82) [1982] ECR 4625..........................................................  11.28, 11.74 Cremoni v Commission (Case T-23/92) order of 9 July 1992 (unreported)....................................2.77 Cremonini & Vrankovich (Case 815/79) [1980] ECR 3583............................................................13.1 Crete Citro Producers’ Association v Commission (Case 112/88R) [1988] ECR 2597..........  8.101, 8.102, 8.106 Criminal proceedings against HFM Nijman (Case 125/88) [1988] ECR 3533...............................4.115 Criminal proceedings against Henri Roelstraete (Case 116/84) [1985] ECR 1705.........................10.49 Crispoltoni v Fattoria autonoma tabacchi di Città de Castello (Case C-368/89) [1991] ECR I-3695........................................................................................................................  2.183; 7.5; 17.80 Cross Czech AS v Commission (Case T-252/10) [2010] ECR II-211 ............................................17.11 Cuallado Martorelli v Commission (Case F-96/09) 18 September 2012.........................................14.24 Cuallado Martorelli v Commission (Case F-96/09DEP) order of 14 November 2013............. 14.74, 14.76 Cuallado Martorelli v Commission (Case T-506/12 P-AJ) order of 29 May 2013..........................4.92 Cucchiara v Commission (Case T-35/93) [1994] ECR-SC II-413...................................................7.66 Culin v Commission (Case C-343/87) [1990] ECR I-225........................................................ 12.1; 17.51 Culmsee v Economic & Social Committee (Case 175/83) [1986] ECR 2667.................  6.14; 7.64; 17.53 Curra v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-466/11) 12 July 2012 ............................................2.182 Curtis v Commission & European Parliament (Case 167/80) [1981] ECR 1499 ...........................7.59 D D Goerrig GmbH v Hauptzollamt Geldern (Case 74/87) [1988] ECR 2771...................................10.15 DAI – Sociedade de Desenvolvimento Agro-Industrial SA v Associacao dos Refinadores de Acucar Portugueses (Case C-321/99 P-DEP) order of 17 February 2004...............................14.70 DAI – Sociedade de Desenvolvimento Agro-Industrial SA v Commission (Case T-381/08) 4 September 2012.......................................................................................................................9.79 DC v Europol (Case F-77/13) 5 March 2014...................................................................................2.48 DD v Council (Case T-228/12AJ) 10 November 2014...............................................................  4.92, 4.112 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v Germany (Case C-279/09) [2010] ECR I-13849............................................................................................................. 4.79, 4.84 DEKA Getreideprodukte GmbH & Co KG v EEC (Case 250/78) [1983] ECR 421......... 3.26, 3.35, 3.36; 9.64, 9.65, 9.89 DGV v EEC (Cases 241, 242, 246–249/78) [1979] ECR 3017, [1981] ECR 1727......... 1.171; 2.73, 2.76; 14.4, 14.16, 14.59, 14.60, 14.63, 14.69, 14.74, 14.75, 14.77 DIR International Film Srl v Commission (Cases T-369/94 & T-85/95) [1998] ECR II-357.........2.72; 3.7, 3.8, 3.11 DIR International Film Srl v Commission (Case C-164/98P) [2000] ECR I-447...........................7.16 DKV Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-19/99) [2000] ECR II-1....................................................2.102 DLD Trading Co v Council (Case T-146/01) [2003] ECR II-6005.............................................. 5.46; 9.41 DMA Die Marketing Agentur GmbH v Austria (Case T-472/11R) [2011] ECR II-374............  8.19, 8.168 DQ v Parliament (Case F-49/14R) 12 June 2014........................................................................  8.32, 8.45 DSM NV v Commission (Case T-9/89REV) [1992] ECR II-2399.......................................  16.113, 16.118 DSM NV v Commission (Case C-5/93P) [1999] ECR I-4695............. 15.2, 15.17, 15.25; 16.108, 16.112, 16.118, 16.125 DSR-Senator Lines GmbH v Commission (Case C-364/99 P(R)) [1999] ECR I-8733..........  8.121, 8.122, 8.186 DTS Distribuidora de Television Digital SA v Commission (Case T-533/10) 11 July 2014..........5.44

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Table of Cases para Da Costa en Schaake NV v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie (Cases 28–30/62) [1963] ECR 31............................................................................................................................. 7.72; 16.24; 17.93 Daemen v Commission (Case T-91/92) [1993] ECR II-1491..................................................... 2.125; 7.80 Dagher v Council (Case T-218/11R) [2011] ECR II-146........................................................... 8.56, 8.176 Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Commission (Case T-26/02) [2006] ECR II-713.......................2.70 Dainichiseika Colour & Chemicals Mfg Co Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-389/03) [2008] ECR II-58....................................9.100 Dairo Air Services v Commission (Case T-283/06R) 17 November 2006 .....................................14.6 Dalmine v Commission (Case T-50/00) [2004] ECR II-2395 on appeal Dalmine v Commission (Case C-407/04P) [2007] ECR I-829................................................................................. 2.72; 13.25 D’Amario v LVA Schwaben (Case 320/82) [1983] ECR 3811 order of 7 July 1983).....................4.115 Danjaq, LLC v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-435/05) [2009] ECR II-2097................................................................................................9.94 Dansk Busvognmaend v Commission (Case T-157/01) [2004] ECR II-917...................................9.41 Danske Slagterier v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-445/06) [2009] ECR I-2119...............7.22 Danske Svineproducenter v Justitsministeriet (Case C-491/06) [2008] ECR I-3339...............2.137, 2.149, 2.170, 2.190 Dansk Pelsdryavlerforening v Commission (Case T-61/89) [1992] ECR II-1931..........................9.50 Dansk Rorindustri v Commission (Cases C-189/02P, C-202/02P, C-205/0P-C-208/02P & C-213/02P) [2005] ECR I-5425.................................................................... 9.47; 11.11, 11.24; 13.39 Dansk Rorindustri A/S v Commission (Case T-21/99) [2002] ECR II-1681...................................11.15 Danvin v Commission (Case 26/67) [1968] ECR 315 ....................................................................14.20 Dautremont v Parliament (Case T-71/89) [1990] ECR II-111.........................................................17.64 Dautzenberg v European Court of Justice (Case 2/80) [1980] ECR 3107......................................4.21 Deboeck v Commission (Case 90/74) [1975] ECR 1123................................................................7.17 de Brito Sequeira Carvalho v Commission (Case F-17/05REV) 15 June 2011....... 2.146; 16.106, 16.107, 16.112, 16.121, 16.123, 16.125, 16.128, 16.132 de Brito Sequeira Carvalho v Commission (Cases T-40/07P-REV & T-62/07P-REV) 16 April 2012.............................................................................................................................. 16.107, 16.131 De Bruyn v European Parliamentary Assembly (Case 25/60) [1962] ECR 21 ..............................3.3; 7.30 De Buggenoms v Commission (Case F-45/06REV) 20 September 2011..................................  4.9; 16.28, 16.106, 16.141 Debus (Cases C-13/91 & C-113/91) [1992] ECR I-3617................................................................17.73 de Bustamento Tello v Council (Case C-10/06P) [2007] ECR I-10381..........................................9.119 Deticek v Sgueglia (Case C-403/09AJ) order of 17 December 2009 (unreported)..................  4.116, 4.121 De Cicco v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben (Case 19/68) [1968] ECR 473 ........... 2.188; 3.30; 5.2 De Compte v European Parliament (Case 293/82R) [1982] ECR 4331...................  8.67, 8.82, 8.94, 8.171 De Compte v European Parliament (Case 141/84R) [1985] ECR 2575..... 2.135; 8.81, 8.112, 8.162; 9.61; 11.43, 11.83; 17.17, 17.26 De Compte v European Parliament (Case 44/88R) [1988] ECR 1669........8.98, 8.100, 8.111, 8.114, 8.161 De Compte v Parliament (Case 122/83R) [1983] ECR 2151..........................................................8.108 De Compte v Parliament (Case T-26/89) [1997] ECR SC-I-A-305, II-847...........4.69; 11.4, 11.93; 16.112 De Compte v Parliament (Case C-2/98P) [1999] ECR I-1787........16.108, 16.113, 16.123, 16.125, 16.127 De Dapper v European Parliament (Case 54/75) [1976] ECR 1381................................................7.18 De Fays v Commission (Case T-355/08P) 19 January 2010..........................................  15.16, 15.25, 15.48 De Franceschi SpA Monfalcone v Council & EC Commission (Case 51/81) [1982] ECR 117.....7.51 Defrenne v SABENA (Case 43/75) [1976] ECR 455............................................................... 16.37; 17.19 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority (Case 30/59) [1961] ECR 1....1.120; 2.9; 5.27, 5.3, 5.42, 5.76, 5.77, 5.90, 5.98; 7.7 Degreef v Commission (Case 80/63) [1964] ECR 391...................................................................3.3 De Greef v Commission (Case 46/72) [1973] ECR 543..................................................................10.39 De Haan Beheer BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzente Rotterdam (Case C-61/98) [1999] ECR I-5003..................................................................................................................2.81 De Hoe v Commission (Case T-85/92) [1993] ECR II-523.......................................................... 9.42, 9.43 De Hoe v Commission (Case C-338/93P) [1994] ECR I-819.........................................................6.3; 9.43 Dehon v Parliament (Case T-432/03) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-209, II-A-2-1077.............................2.39 Deka (formerly Contiflex) v EEC (Case 250/78) [1983] ECR 421.................................................6.3 De Lacroix v European Court of Justice (Case 91/76R) [1976] ECR 1563...........  8.25, 8.84, 8.134, 8.135 Delauche v Commission (Case 111/86) [1987] ECR 5345.............................................................7.16 Delfino v Commission (Case 29/78) order of 23 January 1979.......................................................11.40 Delhaize v Belgium (Cases 2–4/82) [1983] ECR 2973...................................................................17.98 Delhez v Commission (Case 264/83) [1985] ECR 2179..................................................  7.25, 7.64; 17.53

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Table of Cases para Della Pietra v Commission (Case T-140/89) [1990] ECR II-717....................................................2.132 Delloye v Commission (Case T-44/92) [1993] ECR II-221............................................................14.24 Del Plato v Commission (Case 126/87) [1989] ECR 643...................................................  7.18, 7.64, 7.94 Deltafina v Commission (Case C-578/11P) 12 June 2014.......................................................... 1.10; 11.38 De Luca v Commission (Case T-563/10P) 14 December 2011...............................................  15.42, 15.43 Demenagements-Manutention Transport SA (Case C-256/97) [1999] ECR I-3913.......................7.5 Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmund (Case 12/86) [1987] ECR 3719............................................17.76 De Moor v Caisse de Pension des Employés Privés (Case 2/67) [1967] ECR 197 ........................10.7 Demo-Studio Schmidt v Commission (Case 210/81) [1983] ECR 3045........................................14.76 Demouche v Fonds de Garantie Automobile & Bureau Central Français (Case 152/83) [1987] ECR 3833..........................................................................................................................  17.76, 17.98 De Naeyer v Commission (Case 43/83) [1987] ECR 3569 ......... 2.160; 14.41, 14.58, 14.65, 14.74, 14.75 De Nationale Loterij NV v Customer Service Agency BVBA (Case C-525/06) [2009] ECR I-2197................................................................................................................................ 2.198; 17.98 de Nicola v European Investment Bank (Cases T-120/01 & T-300/01) [2004] ECR-SC I-A-365, II-1671.................................................................................................................... 2.126; 11.11, 11.99 De Nicola v European Investment Bank (Case F-55/08DEP) order of 27 September 2011...........14.56 De Nicola v European Investment Bank (Case T-37/10P) 27 April 2012........................................15.18 De Nicola v European Investment Bank (Case T-264/11P) 16 September 2013...................... 15.16, 15.18 De Nicola v European Investment Bank (Case F-63/12) 5 November 2013................... 14.9, 14.56, 14.59 Denka International BV v Commission (Case T-334/07) [2009] ECR II-4205............................ 9.40, 9.41 Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v Finanzamt Warendorf (Case 36/79) [1979] ECR 3439......... 10.10, 10.11, 10.12 Denkavit Futtersmittel GmbH v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case 195/84) [1985] ECR 3181 .....2.204 Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v Commission (Case T-83/08) 2 February 2012.............9.80 Denmark v Commission (Case 349/85) [1988] ECR 169...............................................................7.40 Denuit v Transorient – Mosaique Voyages et Culture SA (Case C-125/04) [2005] ECR I-923......17.70 Department of Health & Social Security v Barr & Montrose Holdings Ltd (Case C-355/89) [1991] ECR I-3479..................................................................................................................17.72 De Persio v Commission (Case T-23/96) [1998] ECR-SC I-A-483, II-1413..................................2.151 Deponiezweckverband Eiterkopfe v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Case C-6/03) [2005] ECR I-2753....2.149 Der Grune Punkt – Duales System Deutschland GmbH v Commission (Case T-151/01) [2007] ECR II-1607.............................................................................................................................9.47 Der Grune Punkt-Duales System Deutschland GmbH v Commission (Case C-385/07P) [2009] ECR I-6155 Seiler v Council (Case 189/82) [1984] ECR 229 ...............................................5.28 De Santis v Court of Auditors (Case 146/84) [1985] ECR 1723.....................................................14.22 Deshormes (née La Valle) v Commission (Case 17/78) [1979] ECR 189............... 7.16, 7.17; 9.89; 17.17 Des Laminoirs, Hauts Fourneaux, Forges, Fonderies et Usines de la Providence SA v High Authority (Cases 29, 31, 36, 39–47, 50 & 51/63) [1965] ECR 911 .......................................7.71 Desmedt v Commission (Case 105/80) [1981] ECR 1701..............................................................14.2 de Szy-Tarisse v Commission (Cases 314 & 315/86) [1988] ECR 6013................................... 7.66; 17.53 Deticek v Sgueglia (Case C-403/09PPU) [2009] ECR I-12193......................................................2.211 Detlef Nolle v Council & Commission (Case T-167/94 (92)) [1997] ECR II-2379........................14.59 Detlef Nolle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Friehafen (Case C-16/90) [1991] ECR I-5163.................... 6.3, 6.6 Deufil GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case 310/85R) [1986] ECR 537.................... 8.94, 8.108, 8.161 Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH BJ Stolp v Einfuhr under Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 78/74) [1975] ECR 421..............................................................................10.26 Deuka Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH BJ Stolp v Eunfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 5/75) [1975] ECR 759................................................................................10.26 Deutsche Bahn v Commission (Cases T-289/11, T-290/11 & T-521/11), EU:T:2013:404 on appeal, Deutsche Bahn v Commission (Case C-583/13P) 18 June 2015....... 2.15; 5.4; 10.29; 17.119 Deutsche Post v Commission (Case T-493/04)................................................................................5.14 Deutsche Post v Commission (Case T-570/08RENV) 12 November 2013.....................................9.79 Deutsche Post v Sievers (Cases C-270/97 & C-271/97) [2000] ECR I-933............................. 2.140, 2.149 Deutsche Post AG v Commission (Case T-388/03) [2009] ECR II-199..................... 7.14, 7.16; 9.42, 9.79 Deutsche Post AG & Germany v Commission (Cases C-463/10P) & C-475/10P) [2011] ECR I-9639.......................................................................................................................................7.21 Deutsche Shell AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg (Case C-188/91) [1993] ECR I-363.........17.76 Deutsche Telekom v Commission (Case C-280/08P) [2010] ECR I-9555.................... 9.119; 15.18, 15.25 Deutsche Telekom v Schroder (Case C-50/96) [2000] ECR I-743........................................... 2.140, 2.149 Deutsche Telekom v Vick & Conze (Cases C-234/96 & C-235/96) [2000] ECR I-799...........  2.140, 2.149 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission (Case T-271/03) [2006] ECR II-1747.......... 5.87; 9.20, 9.22; 12.29

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Table of Cases para Deutsche Verkehrsbank v Commission (Case T-60/02)...................................................................16.56 Développement SA & Clemessy v Commission (Case 267/82) [1986] ECR 1907........................9.45 De Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamsche Boekwezen v Commission (Cases 43 & 63/82) [1984] ECR 1................................................................................................................5.28 Devillez v European Parliament (Case T-46/90) [1993] ECR II-699....... 2.81; 7.5, 7.16, 7.64, 7.65; 14.20 Diadikasia Symvouloi Epicheiriseon AE v Commission (Case T-261/12) 3 September 2014........11.15 Dias v Director da Alfandega do Porto (Case C-343/90) [1992] ECR I-4673.............. 2.180; 10.9; 17.100, 17.101 Di Blasi v Commission (Case 74/72) [1973] ECR 847....................................... 14.25, 14.39, 14.40, 14.42 Diezler v Economic & Social Committee (Case 146/85R) [1985] ECR 1805........ 7.68; 8.75, 8.80, 8.112, 8.114 Diezler v Economic & Social Committee (Case 431/85) [1987] ECR 4283............................... 5.19; 7.68 Dillinger Huttenweke AG v Commission (Case 118/81) order of 14 October 1981 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................14.36 Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG v Commission (Case 102/84) (case withdrawn) order of 22 May 1985.........................................................................................................................................14.59 Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG v Commission (Case 360/85R) [1986] ECR 1319................. 8.80, 8.81, 8.101 Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG v Commission (Case 236/86) [1988] ECR 3761..................................7.49 di Marzio v Commission (Case T-14/03) [2004] ECR-SC I-A-43, II-167......................................7.38 Dimitriadis v Court of Auditors (Case C-140/96P) [1997] ECR I-5635.........................................2.135 Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission (Cases C-471/09P)-C-473/09P) [2011] ECR I-111....................................................................................................  5.41; 9.79; 11.15, 11.51; 15.18 Direccion General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca Privada (Case C-67/91) [1992] ECR I-4785............................................................................... 2.183; 17.71, 17.100 Direct Cosmetics Ltd v Customs & Excise Comrs (Case 5/84) [1985] ECR 617...................... 2.195; 10.6 Direction Générale des Impôts & Procureur de la République v Forest & Minoterie Forest SA (Case 148/85) [1986] ECR 3449..............................................................................................10.6 Distilleria F Palma SpA v Commission (Case T-154/01) [2004] ECR II-1493............................  9.40, 9.41 Distillerie Smeets Hasselt NV v Belgium (Case C-126/08) [2009] ECR I-6809............................7.5 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission (Case 30/78) [1980] ECR 2229.......................  4.20, 4.22; 5.28; 6.2, 6.7; 7.17; 9.88, 9.91; 10.38; 12.3, 12.12, 12.19, 12.20, 12.29 Distrivet SA v Council (Case 376/87R) [1988] ECR 209...............................................................8.80 Dittert v Commission (Case F-82/07) 27 September 2011..............................................................7.88 Diy-Mar Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v Commission (Case T-129/06) [2006] ECR II-4....7.38 Diy-Mar Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v Commission (Case C-163/07P) [2007] ECR I-10125........................................................................................................................  4.12; 7.38, 7.46 Djabili v Caisse d’allocations familiales de l’Essonne (Case C-314/96) [1998] ECR I-1149 .......2.196 Document Security Systems Inc v European Central Bank (Case T-295/05) [2007] ECR II-2835...1.18 Doherty v Commission (Case T-468/10) [2011] ECR II-1497............................................ 7.38, 7.41, 7.52 Dohler Neuenkirchen v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg (Case C-262/10) 6 September 2012..................2.141 Doktor v Council (Case T-248/08P) 2 March 2010.........................................................................15.16 Dole Food Co Inc v Commission (Case T-588/08) 14 March 2013 aff’d Dole Food Co Inc v Commission (Case C-286/13P) 19 March 2015.......................................................... 2.58; 9.47, 9.80 Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd v Council & Commission (Case T-56/00) [2003] ECR II577...........................................................................................................................................9.41 Dominikanerinnen-Kloster Altenhohenau v Hauptzollamt Rosenheim (Case C-285/93) [1995] ECR I-4069..............................................................................................................................7.32 Dominio de la Vega v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-459/09P) [2010] ECR I-111.......................................................................................15.19 Donatab Srl v Commission (Case C-64/93) [1993] ECR I-3595...................................... 7.5; 8.74; 17.117 Donnici v European Parliament (Case T-215/07) [2007] ECR II-5239...........................................2.30 Donnici v Parliament (Case C-9/08) order of 21 February 2008.....................................................2.31 Donnici v Parliament (Case T-43/13) 20 March 2014..................................... 2.45, 2.50; 6.10; 7.51; 17.51 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Council & Commission (Case T-184/95) [1997] ECR II-351...............................................................................................................................5.32 Doux SA v Commission (Case T-434/13) 14 January 2016............................................................17.16 Dover v Parliament (Case T-149/09) [2011] ECR II-69.................................................... 7.38; 8.13; 12.30 Dover v Parliament (Case C-278/11P) 12 July 2012.................................................................  7.38; 9.119 Dow Benelux v Commission (Case 85/87) [1989] ECR 3137................................................. 10.40; 17.16 Dow Chemical Nederland BV v Commission (Case 85/87R) [1987] ECR 4367..................... 8.94, 8.111 Dow Chemical v Commission (Case T-42/07) [2011] ECR II-4531...............................................14.63

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Table of Cases para Dresdner Bank v Commission (Cases T-44/02 OP, T-54/02 OP, T-56/02 OP, T-60/02 OP & T-61/02 OP) [2006] ECR II-3567.............................. 13.15, 13.22, 13.40; 16.56, 16.69, 16.71, 16.75 Druce & Co v Commission (Cases 160, 161, 170/73RII) [1974] ECR 281....................................8.46 Du Besset v Council (Case 130/86) [1986] ECR 2619....................................................................7.64 Dufay v European Parliament (Case 257/85) [1987] ECR 1561............................................... 7.24; 17.62 Dufrane v Commission (Case 141/85) order of 2 July 1987 (unreported) .............. 2.73, 2.81; 3.21; 14.41 Dumortier v Council (Cases 64 & 113/76, 167 & 239/78, 27, 28 & 45/79) [1979] ECR 3091......7.69; 14.74, 14.77; 17.48, 17.52 Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd v Commission (Case T-43/92) [1994] ECR II-441................9.41 Dunnett v European Investment Bank (Case T-192/99) [2001] ECR II-813.......  7.29; 11.44; 12.46, 12.49 Du Pone de Nemours Inc v Customs & Excise Comrs (Case 234/81) [1982] ECR 3515...............11.103 Du Pont de Nemours (France) SAS v Commission (Case T-31/07) 12 April 2013.........................17.17 Dupret SA v Commission (Case C-1/94SA) [1995] ECR I-1.................................................. 2.39; 17.198 Duraffour v Council (Case 18/70) [1971] ECR 515................ 1.134; 7.12; 11.3, 11.26; 13.6, 13.21, 13.43 Duravit AG v Commission (Case T-364/10) 16 September 2013.................................. 9.40; 11.24; 17.103 Durighello v Instituto Nazionale della previdenza sociale (Case C-186/90) [1991] ECR I5773.......................................................................................................................................2.183; 7.5 Duta v Court of Justice (Case T-475/08P) 29 July 2010..................................................................9.135 Duyster v Commission (Case F-80/06) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-7, II-A-1-15..................................7.33 Duyster v Commission (Case F-81/06) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-263, II-A-1-1405..........................2.64 Duyster v Parliament (Case F-82/06) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-455, II-A-1-2583.............. 1.15, 1.114; 7.33, 7.68, 7.73, 7.74 Dyckerhoff Polska sp. Z o.o. v Commission (Case T-284/14) 28 April 2015.................................17.117 Dzodzi v Belgium (Cases C-297/88 & C-197/89) [1990] ECR I-3763...........................  2.183; 7.5; 17.76 E E-Sim Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-325/03) [2004] ECR II-1415................................................................................................2.157 EDP-Energias de Portugal SA v Commission (Case T-87/05) [2005] ECR II-3745...........  2.90, 2.91, 2.92 EI Du Pont de Nemours Inc v Customs & Excise Comrs (Case 234/81) [1982] ECR 3515...........4.33 EISA v Commission (Case 37/84R) [1984] ECR 1749..................................................... 8.94, 8.95, 8.111 EISA v Commission (Case 45/84R) [1984] ECR 1759...............................................................  8.84, 8.95 EMC Development v Commission (Case C-367/11P) [2011] ECR I-46........... 9.119; 15.16, 15.17, 15.25 EMC Development AB v Commission (Case T-432/05) [2010] ECR II-1629........................... 9.82; 17.16 EMI Records v CBS United Kingdom Ltd (Case 51/75) [1976] ECR 811.......2.151; 10.10, 10.11; 11.103 E.on Energie AG v Commission (Case C-89/11P) 22 November 2012.............. 2.141; 13.15, 13.22; 15.19, 15.21 E.ON Energie AG v Commission (Case T-141/08) [2010] ECR II-5761..................... 11.70; 13.15, 13.22 EPAC-Empresa para a Agroalimentacao e Cereais SA v Commission (Cases T-204/97 & T-270/97) [2000] ECR II-2267................................................................................................2.161 ER v Commission (Case C-100/07) [2007] ECR I-136..............................................................  7.2; 11.24 ER v Council & Commission (Case T-138/03) [2006] ECR II-4923..............................................9.41 EURL Le Levant 001 v Commission (Case T-34/02) [2006] ECR II-267.......................... 4.14, 4.15, 4.17 Eagle v EC Commission (Case T-144/02) [2004] ECR II-3381................................................. 7.29; 17.62 easyJet Airline Co Ltd v Commission (Case T-177/04) [2006] ECR II-1931.............. 7.9, 7.14, 7.19; 9.41 Ecologistas en Accion-CODA v Commission (Case T-359/10) 24 April 2012...............................9.79 eCopy Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-247/01) [2002] ECR II-5301................................................................................................9.41 Edeka Zentrale AG v Germany (Case 245/81) 1982] ECR 2745.............. 10.17, 10.18, 10.19; 11.3; 13.27 Editions Odile Jacob v Commission (Case T-279/04) [2010] ECR II-185.................................. 7.5; 11.57 Editions Odile Jacob v Commission (Case T-452/04) [2010] ECR II-4713....................................11.57 Editions Odile Jacob v Commission (Case T-471/11) 5 September 2014.................................. 5.46; 16.34 Editions Odile Jacob SAS v Commission (Cases C-553/10 P-DEP & C-554/10 P-DEP) order of 30 January 2014.......................................................................................................................14.76 Edouard Dubois et Fils v Council & Commission (Case T-113/96) [1998] ECR II-125................7.6, 7.76 Eduardo Vieira, SA v Commission (Cases T-44/01, T-119/01 & T-126/01) [2003] ECR II1209.........................................................................................................................................2.59 Edwin v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-263/09P) [2011] ECR I-5853........................................................................................ 10.48; 15.20 Einberger v Hauptzollamt Frieburg (Case 240/81) [1982] ECR 3699............................................4.110 Eiselt v Commission (Case T-20/90) order of 7 February 1991 .....................................................2.81 Eisen und Metall AG v Commission (Case 9/83) [1984] ECR 2071 ..............................................2.137

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Table of Cases para Eistrup v Parliament (Case F-102/05) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-89, II-A-1-329................................4.13 Eklund v Commission (Case F-57/11DEP) order of 26 November 2014................................. 14.69, 14.72 Ekvo v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees (Case 327/82) [1984] ECR 107.......................................10.15 Elan v Commission (Case T-27/13R) 11 March 2013......................  8.85, 8.87, 8.88, 8.108, 8.112, 8.136, 8.160 Elchinov v Natsionalna Zdravnoosiguritelna kasa (Case C-173/09) [2010] ECR I-8889...............2.198; 17.66, 17.86 Elder v Commission (Case T-178/99) [1999] ECR II-3509......................................................... 2.161; 6.9 Electrabel SA v Commission (Case C-84/13P) 3 July 2014.....................................................  15.16, 15.17 Electrabel SA v Commission (Case T-40/14) 13 November 2014............................................... 7.42, 7.51 Electroimpex v Council (Case C-157/87) [1990] ECR I-3021........................................................14.65 Eleftheriou v Commission (Case T-291/13) 10 November 2014.....................................................8.149 Elf Acquitaine SA v Commission (Case C-521/09 P-DEP) order of 1 October 2013.....................14.64 Elf Aquitaine v Commission (Case C-404/11) 2 February 2012.....................................................15.26 Elinika Nafpigeia v Commission (Case T-466/11) 19 October 2012..............................................11.13 Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo (Case T-213/12) 4 June 2013............................................. 3.11; 7.32; 9.34 Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo (Case T-213/12R) 4 September 2012............................ 7.59; 8.108, 8.110 Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo (Case C-439/13P) 12 November 2015..........................................2.149 Elosta v Commission (Case T-102/09) [2011] ECR II-252.............................................................7.38 Elz v Commission (Case 56/75REV) [1977] ECR 1617.......................................................16.121, 16.123 Elz v Commission (Case 58/60) [1970] ECR 507 ..........................................................................7.58 Emanuel v Continental Shelf 128 Ltd (Case C-259/04) [2006] ECR I-3089............................2.141, 2.149 Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission (Case C-106/90R) [1990] ECR I-3377 ........  2.110; 8.43, 8.74, 8.146; 11.28, 11.93 Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission (Cases C-66/91 & C-66/91R) [1991] ECR I-1143..................8.74 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba (Case C-17/98) [2000] ECR I-667.................... 1.58; 2.141, 2.149 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Council (Case T-43/98R) [1998] ECR II-3055............................5.34 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Commission (Case T-44/98R) [1998] ECR II-3079.....................5.34 Emesa-Trefileria SA v Commission (Case T-406/10) 15 July 2015................................................14.49 Empire Stores Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise (Case C-33/93) [1994] ECR I-2329...17.81 Empresa Nacional de Urânio SA v Commission (Case C-107/91) [1993] ECR I-599...................17.24 Empresa Nacional Siderurgica SA (Ensidesa) v Commission (Case C-198/99P) [2003] ECR I-11111.....................................................................................................................................11.60 Emrich v Commission (Case C-371/89) [1990] ECR I-1555..........................................................1.152 Emrich v Commission (Case C-24/90) [1990] ECR I-3913............................................................1.152 Emsland-Stärke v Commission (Case C-122/90) order of 15 May 1991 (unreported)...................9.13 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority & Secretary of State for Health (Case C-127/92) [1993] ECR I-5535.......................................................................................................... 17.80, 17.85, 17.100 Endesa SA v Commission (Case T-417/05) [2006] ECR II-2533........................................ 2.92; 7.5; 9.41 Enercon v Gamesa Eolica (Case C-35/14P) 12 February 2015.......................................................15.8 Energy Technologies ET SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs (Case T-445/04) [2005] ECR II-677..........................................................................4.25 Eni SpA v Commission (Case C-508/11P) 8 May 2013...........................................................  15.26; 16.9 Enital SpA v Council & Commission (Case 304/86R) [1987] ECR 267.................................. 8.83, 8.108 Enso-Gutzeit Oy v Commission (Case T-337/94 (92)) [2000] ECR II-479....................................14.75 Entorn v Commission (Case T-141/01) [2005] ECR II-95; on appeal Entorn v Commission (Case C-162/05P) [2006] ECR I-12.....................................................................  11.13, 11.15, 11.51; 12.46, 12.48, 12.49 Entorn, Societat Limitada Enginyeria I Serveis v Commission (Case T-141/01R) [2001] ECR II-3123......................................................................................................................................8.122 Enviro Tech Europe Ltd v Commission (Case C-118/12P) 24 January 2013........................... 2.249; 15.29 Environmental Manufacturing LLP v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-570/10) 22 May 2012...................................................................13.20 Environmental Manufacturing LLP v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-383/12P) 14 November 2013......................................................13.20 Epichirisseon Metalleftikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon AE v Council & Commission (Case 121/86) [1987] ECR 1183........................................................................................................3.5 Eppe v Commission (Case C-354/92P) [1993] ECR I-7027.............................  15.14, 15.45, 15.47; 9.118 Eridania v Council (Case 65/83) [1984] ECR 211..........................................................................17.17 Eridania Zuccerifici Nazionali v Commission (Cases 10 & 18/68) [1969] ECR 459 ........ 3.12, 3.14; 7.16 Eridania Zuccherifici Nazionali SpA v Council (Case T-168/95) [1999] ECR II-2245..................9.41 Ernst Hake & Co v Commission (Case 75/69) [1970] ECR 901................................... 14.56, 14.63, 14.74

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Table of Cases para Erste Group Bank AG v Commission (Cases C-125/07P, C-133/07P, C-135/07P & C-137/07P) [2009] ECR I-8681...........................................................................................................  13.24, 13.45 Erzbergbau v High Authority (Cases 3–18, 25, 26/58) [1960] ECR 220, [1960] ECR 173........ 5.10; 8.74, 8.92, 8.98, 8.146 Esedra SPRL v Commission (Case T-169/00) [2002] ECR I-609...................................................2.151 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt (Cases C-204/12-C-208/12) 11 September 2014.................................................................................2.151 Esso v Commission (Case T-540/08) 11 July 2014...................................................................  9.80; 13.40 Estaser El Mareny SL v Commission (Case T-274/06) [2007] ECR II-143................................  7.45, 7.49 Estel NV v Commission (Case 270/82) [1984] ECR 1195..............................................................17.117 Estonia v Commission (Case T-324/05) [2009] ECR II-3681......................... 5.44, 5.70; 7.38; 12.1, 12.31 Etablissements Biret et Cie SA v Council (Case T-210/00) [2002] ECR II-47...............................9.41 Etablissements Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission (Cases 56 & 58/64) [1966] ECR 382 ............................................................................................... 5.14, 5.28, 5.36; 10.38 Ettaghi (Case C-73/12) 4 July 201...................................................................................................2.182 Eugenio Branco Lda v Commission (Cases T-85/94 (92) & T-85/94 (122) (92)) [1998] ECR II2667................................................................................................. 14.62, 14.68; 16.55, 16.56, 16.75 Eugenio Branco Lda v Commission (Case T-271/94 (92)) [1998] ECR II-3761............................14.62 Eugenio Branco Lda v Commission (Case T-142/97) [1998] ECR II-3567....................................2.59 Eurasian Corpn v Commission (Case 82/85) [1985] ECR 3603 ..............................................2.161; 16.25 Eurasian Corpn Ltd v Commission (Cases 82 & 83/85R) [1985] ECR 1191......8.84, 8.108, 8.154, 8.161, 8.168; 9.54 Eurico Srl v Commission (Case 109/83) [1984] ECR 3581 ...........................................................2.137 Euroagri Srl v Commission (Case T-180/01) [2004] ECR II-369.............................................. 11.24; 13.2 Euroalliages v Commission (Case T-132/01) [2003] ECR II-2359......................................... 11.24, 11.60 Euro-Lex European Law Expertise GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-79/99) [1999] ECR II-3555..............................................4.11 Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG v Council (Case C-585/13P) 5 March 2015...............9.118; 15.20 European Coalition-End Animal Experiements v European Chemicals Agency (Case T-673/13) 13 March 2015.........................................................................................................................17.17 Eurosport Consortium v Commission (Case T-35/91) [1991] ECR II-1359...............................  5.15, 5.32 European Council of Transport Users ASBL v Commission (Case T-224/99) [2003] ECR II-2097 European Dynamics Luxembourg SA v European Central Bank (Case T-553/11) 22 May 2014.......................................................................... 7.20; 9.80, 9.82; 11.16, 11.24; 17.119, 17.134 European Dynamics Luxembourg v Commission (Case T-165/12) 13 December 2013.................9.79 European Dynamics Luxembourg SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-556/11) 12 September 2013.........................................................17.10 European Dynamics Luxembourg SA v European Police Office (Cases T-40/12 & T-183/12) 19 November 2014........................................................................................................................9.80 European Dynamics SA v Commission (Case T-303/04 R-II) [2004] ECR II-4621.......................8.185 European Economic & Social Committee v Achab (Case T-430/13P) 27 February 2015..............15.2 European Federation for Cosmetic Ingredients v Parliament & Council (Case T-196/03) [2004] ECR II-4263................................................................................................................  2.48; 6.14; 9.18 European Federation of Ink & Ink Cartridge Manufacturers v Commission (Case T-296/09) [2011] ECR II-425...................................................................................................................11.15 European Fertiliser Manufacturers’ Association v Council (Case T-121/95) [1997] ECR II-87.....2.15 European Maritime Safety Agency v Evropaiki Dynamiki (Case C-252/10P-DEP) order of 13 December 2012........................................................................................................................14.74 European Medical Association v Commission (Case T-116/11) 11 December 2013......................9.1, 9.79 European Medical Association v Commission (Case C-100/14P) 11 June 2015............................9.119 European Night Services Lrd v Commission (Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 & T-388/94) [1998] ECR II-3141.................................................................................................................7.2, 7.46 European Parliament v Council (Case 13/83) [1985] ECR 1513....................................................17.21 European Parliament v Council (Case 302/87) [1988] ECR 5615............................................. 7.22; 17.21 European Parliament v Council (Case 377/87) [1988] ECR 4017..................................................14.41 European Parliament v Council (Case C-70/88) [1990] ECR I-2041, [1991] ECR I-4529........... 7.9; 9.50, 9.76; 15.8; 17.7 European Parliament v Council (Case C-65/90) [1992] ECR I-4593.................................. 7.9; 16.37; 17.7 European Parliament v Council (Case C-295/90) [1992] ECR I-4193............................................16.37 European Parliament v Council (Case C-317/04) [2005] ECR I-2457............................................ 5.2; 7.9 European Parliament v Council (Case C-318/04) [2005] ECR I-2467............................................ 5.2; 7.9 European Parliament v Council (Case C-155/07) [2008] ECR I-8103............................................5.3

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Table of Cases para European Parliament v Council & Commission (Cases C-181 & C-248/91) [1993] ECR I3685...................................................................................................................................... 7.5; 17.11 European Parliament v Eistrup (Case T-223/06P) [2007] ECR II-1581, ECR-SC I-B-1-1, II-B1-1...........................................................................................................4.13, 2.160, 2.161; 7.32, 7.38 European Parliament v Frederiksen (Case C-35/92P) [1993] ECR I-991..............................  9.118, 9.130; 15.15, 15.16, 15.41 European Parliament v Frederiksen (Case C-35/92P-R) [1992] ECR I-2399..........................  8.94, 8.153, 8.161; 15.38 European Parliament v Hanning (Case C-345/90P) [1992] ECR I-949.......................... 14.9; 15.50, 15.52 European Parliament v Hanning (Case C-345/90P-R) [1991] ECR I-231.............  8.2, 8.81, 8.103, 8.112, 8.130, 8.134 15.38 European Parliament v Virgili-Schettini (Case C-348/90P) [1991] ECR I-5211...........1.135; 9.118; 15.41, 15.49 European Parliament v Volger (Case C-115/92P) [1993] ECR I-6549............................................15.15 European Parliament v Yorck von Wartenburg (Case T-42/89OPPO) [1990] ECR II-299..............16.75 European Renewable Energies Federation ASBL v Commission (Case T-94/07) [2009] ECR II220...........................................................................................................................................4.11 European Renewable Energies Federation ASBL v Commission (Cases C-74/10P & C-75/10P) [2010] ECR I-11................................................................................................................  4.11; 15.19 European Training Foundation v Landgren (Case T-404/06P) [2009] ECR II-2841...... 5.47; 9.119; 16.34, 16.150 Europeenne Automobile SARL v Commission (Cases T-9/96 & T-211/96) [1999] ECR II3639...................................................................................................................................... 7.59; 9.41 Europeenne de traitement de l’information v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-414/07) [2009] ECR II-2505............................................7.5 Europemballage Corpn & Continental Can Co Inc v Commission (No 2) (Case 6/72) [1975] ECR 495............................................................................... 13.19, 13.21, 13.45; 14.68, 14.74, 14.75, 14.78 Europemballage Corpn & Continental Can Corpn Inc v Commission (Case 6/72R) [1972] ECR 157......................................................................................................................................  8.84, 8.111 Eurosport Consortium v Commission (Case T-35/91) [1991] ECR II-1359...................................5.37 Eurostrategies Sprl v Commission (Case T-203/06) order of 1 December 2006.............................14.72 Eurostrategies Sprl v Commission (Case C-122/07P) [2007] ECR I-179.................................  14.72; 15.2 Evangelou v Commission (Case T-292/13) 10 November 2014......................................................8.149 Evans v Commission (Cases T-148/98 & T-162/98) [1999] ECR II-2837................................... 7.32, 7.38 Eva von Lachmüller v Commission (Cases 43, 45 & 48/59) [1966] ECR 489...............................8.112 eVigilio Ltd v Priesgaisrines apsaugos ir gelbejimo departmentas prie Vidaus reikalu ministerijos (Case C-538/13) 12 March 2015..............................................................................................13.2 Evonik Degussa v Commission (Case T-391/09) 23 January 2014............................................. 9.84, 9.87 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-340/07) [2010] ECR II-16........................................17.105 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-377/07) [2011] ECR II-442...............................  17.15, 17.26 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-554/08) 24 April 2012..............................................9.79 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-17/09) 22 May 2012.................................................14.20 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-49/09) 19 April 2012................................................11.51 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-247/09) 10 October 2012..........................................14.24 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-340/09) 10 April 2014..............................................14.20 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case C-20/10P) [2011] ECR I-67................................  15.25 17.105 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case C-235/11P) [2011] ECR I-183.....................................15.18 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case C-469/11P) 8 November 2012........ 7.34, 7.42, 7.46, 7.51, 7.58 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-498/11) 26 September 2014......................................9.79 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (Case T-340/07RENV) 2 October 2014.................................17.105 Evropaiki Dynamiki v European Central Bank (Case C-401/09P) [2011] ECR I-4911.................15.25 Evropaiki Dynamiki v European Investment Bank (Case T-461/08) [2011] ECR II-6367..........7.2; 17.10, 17.43, 17.50 Evropaiki Dynamiki-Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v Commission (Case T-409/09) [2011] ECR II-3765.................................................................17.51 Evropaiki Dynamiki-Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v European Central Bank (Case C-401/09P) 9 June 2011........................................................3.32; 7.17 Eximo v Commission (Case 62/83) [1984] ECR 2295.................................................................  9.78, 9.90 Exner (née Berghmans) v Commission (Case 142/78) [1979] ECR 3125......................................11.40 Extramet Industrie SA v Council (Case C-358/89R) [1990] ECR I-431............... 1.135; 8.43, 8.108, 8.113

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Table of Cases para F F v Commission (Case 228/83) [1985] ECR 275..............................................10.31, 10.39; 11.42; 17.103 F v Commission (Case 403/85) [1987] ECR 645..................................................................... 11.25, 11.75 F v Commission (Case C-346/90P) [1992] ECR I-2691........................ 9.118, 9.125, 9.128; 14.10; 15.15, 15.21, 15.40 F v Court of Auditors (Case T-138/01R) [2001] ECR-SC I-A-211, II-987............ 1.114; 7.42; 9.14; 16.40 FB v Commission (Case 135/84) [1984] ECR 3577.......................................................................6.15 FERAM v High Authority (Case 1/60) [1960] ECR 165......................2.8, 2.10, 2.11; 7.33; 13.45; 16.116 FIFA v Commission (Case C-205/11P) 18 July 2013.....................................................................15.16 FLS Midth v Commission (Case C-238/12P) (30 April 2014)....................................................1.10; 15.26 FLS PLast v Commission (Case C-243/12P) (19 June 2014)....................................... 1.10; 9.118; 15.16 FLS Plast v Commission (Case T-64/06) 6 March 2012 on appeal FLS Plast v Commission (Case C-243/12P) 19 June 2014........................................................................................11.70, 11.71 FSL Holdings v Commission (Case T-655/11) 16 June 2015......12.32; 13.16, 13.17, 13.24, 13.25, 13.28, 13.37, 13.38, 13.40, 13.44 Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA v Council & Commission (Case T-69/00) [2005] ECR II-5393..................................................................................................9.41 Fabbro v Commission (Cases 269 & 292/84) [1986] ECR 2983....................................................7.20 Fabbro v Commission (Case 269/84R) [1984] ECR 4333..................................... 8.66, 8.81, 8.101, 8.107 Fabius v Commission (Case 39/83R) [1983] ECR 2147.................................................................8.93 Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi v Commission (Case 351/85R) [1986] ECR 1307............  8.80, 8.81, 8.101, 8.114 Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi SA v Commission (Cases 351 & 360/85) [1987] ECR I-3639.........2.161 Faci v Commission (Case T-46/10) order of 6 September 2012......................................................11.57 Faci SpA v Commission (Case C-291/14P) 11 June 2015..............................................................15.16 Faet Oltra v European Ombudsman (Case C-535/12P) 6 June 2013...............................................4.3; 9.11 Falciola Angelo v Comune di Pavia (Case C-286/88) [1990] ECR I-191........................2.170, 2.183; 10.7 Falck SpA v Commission (Cases C-74/00P & C-75/00P) [2002] ECR I-7869...................... 2.135, 2.151; 5.2, 5.41 Falles Fagligt Forbund (3F) v Commission (Case C-646/11P) 24 January 2013....................  9.118, 9.119 Fapricela v Commission (Case T-398/10R) [2011] ECR II-239; upheld on appeal Fapricela – Industria de Trefilaria SA v Commission (Case C-507/11 P(R)) 20 April 2012.............  8.161, 8.167, 8.175; 15.16 Far v Far (Case C-12/98) [2000] ECR I-527 ..................................................................................2.113 Farage v Parliament & Buzek (Case T-564/11) 5 September 2012.................................................17.9 Farbenfabriken Bayer AG v Commission (Case 51/69) [1972] ECR 745................................  11.93, 11.94 Farrall v Commission (Case 10/81) [1981] ECR 717................................. 2.34; 4.6, 4.12, 4.86; 7.75; 9.11 Farrugia v Commission (Case T-230/94) [1996] ECR II-195.........................................................7.78 Farrugia v Commission (Case T-230/94 (92)) order of 3 December 1998 (unreported).................14.68 Farzoo Inc v Commission (Case 352/87) [1988] ECR 2281...........................................................7.32 Faust v Commission (Case 52/81) [1982] ECR 3745............................................................... 11.45; 13.29 Favre v Commission (Case 346/82R) [1983] ECR 199...................................................................8.81 Favre v Commission (Case 346/82) [1984] ECR 2269..........................................................  10.45; 13.12 Fedele v Parliament (Case 30/80) order of 24 April 1980 (unreported)..........................................4.92 Federacciai, Federazione Imprese Siderurgiche Italiane v Commission (Case 272/87) order of 28 September 1989.......................................................................................................................14.37 Federacion de Cofradios de Pescadores de Guipuzcoa v Council (Cases T-54/00 & T-73/00) [2001] ECR II-2691.................................................................................................................9.34 Federacion Nacional de Empresarios de Minas de Carbon (Carbonunion) v Council (Case T-176/11R) [2011] ECR II-434................................................................................................8.13 Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority (Case 8/55) [1954–56] ECR 245........ 9.48; 13.10 Fédération de l’Industrie de l’Huilerie de la CEE (FEDIOL) v Commission (Case 191/82) [1983] ECR 2913.....................................................................................................................3.12 Federation des industries condimentaires de France (FICF) v Commission (Case T-317/02) [2004] ECR II-4325.................................................................................................................7.2 Fédération Européenne de la Santé Animale v Council (Case 160/88R) [1988] ECR 4121...........8.80 Federation Francaise des Societes d’Assurances v Commission (Case T-106/95) [1997] ECR II-229............................................................................................. 5.45; 7.78; 9.79, 9.84; 11.24, 11.93 Federation Internationale de football association (FIFA) v Commission (Case C-204/11P) 18 July 201315.16, 15.19 Fédération Nationale de la Boucherie en Gros et du Commerce en gros des Viandes v Council (Cases 19–22/62) [1962] ECR 491 .........................................................................................3.14

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Table of Cases para Federation nationale de la cooperation betail et viande (FNCBV) v Commission (Cases T-217/03 & T-245/03) [2006] ECR II-4987............................................................................................9.47 Federation nationale de la cooperation betail et viande (FNCBV) v Commission (Case T-217/03R) [2004] ECR II-239................................................................................................8.120 Fédération de l’Industrie de l’Huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission (Case 70/87) [1989] ECR 1781.................................................................................................................................7.7 Federation nationale de l’industrie et des commerces en gros de viandes (FNICGV) v Commission (Case T-252/03) [2004] ECR II-3795.................................................................14.13 Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Vins de Table et Vins de Pays v Commission (Case 59/79) [1979] ECR 2425.............................................................................................  2.38; 6.14, 6.15 Federazione Italiana dei Consorzi Agrari v Azienda di Stato er gli Interventi nel Mercato Agricolo (Case C-88/91) [1992] ECR I-4035.........................................................................................17.76 Federazione Nazionale del Commercio Oleario v Commission (Case T-122/96) [1997] ECR II1559.........................................................................................................................................3.14 Federazione Sindicale Italiana dell’Industria Estrattiva v Commission (Case C-6/92) [1993] ECR I-6357..............................................................................................................................3.14 Feinchemie Schwebda GmbH v College voor de toelating van bestrijdingsmiddelen (Case C-361/06) [2008] ECR I-3865.......................................................................................... 2.141, 2.149 Feldain v Services Fiscaux de Département du Haut Rhin (Case 433/85) [1987] ECR 3521.........10.6 Felix Swoboda GmbH v Osterreichische Nationalbank (Case C-411/00) [2002] ECR I-10567.....2.184 Feltz v European Parliament (Case T-81/91) [1992] ECR II-1827..................................................14.41 Ferrandi v Commission (Case T-122/89) [1990] ECR II-517.........................................................5.28 Ferrandi v Commission (Case C-403/85REV) [1991] ECR I-1215..........  16.112, 16.122, 16.124, 16.130 Ferrario v Commission (Cases 152–186, 203, 204, 219/81) [1983] ECR 2357..............................5.68 Ferrero Deutschland v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-310/04) [2006] ECR II-107........................................................................................3.41 Ferriera Ernesto Preo e Figli v High Authority (Case 2/65R) [1966] ECR 231........................... 8.74, 8.84 Ferriera Vittoria v Commission (Case 224/83) [1984] ECR 2349....................2.125; 7.39, 7.41, 7.46, 7.48 Ferriere Acciaierie Sarde SpA v Commission (Case C-102/92) [1993] ECR I-801 .......................7.49 Ferriere di Roe Volciano v Commission (Case 234/82R) [1983] ECR 725..............................8.161, 8.179 Ferriere e Acciaierie Napoletane Spa v High Authority (Case 49/65) [1966] ECR 73........... 13.10; 14.59, 14.63 Ferriere San Carlo v Commission (Case 235/82) [1983] ECR 3949...............................................9.43 Ferriere San Carlo v Commission (Case 75/83) [1983] ECR 3123............................... 14.39, 14.40; 16.25 Ferriere San Carlo SpA v Commission (Case 235/82 Rev) [1986] ECR 1799......... 1.135; 16.106, 16.125 Ferriere San Carlo SpA v Commission (Case 95/86) [1987] ECR 1413.........................................9.82 Ferriera Valsabbia v Commission (Case 209/83) [1984] ECR 3089...................................  7.25, 7.39, 7.41 Ferriera Valsabbia SpA v Commission (Cases 154, 205, 206, 226–228, 263, 264/78, 31, 39, 83 & 85/79) [1980] ECR 907...................................................................................... 10.33; 13.21, 13.30 Fialtor Ltd v Commission (Case T-294/13) 10 November 2014..................................... 8.149; 17.9, 17.50 Fiatagri UK Ltd v Commission (Case T-34/92) [1994] ECR II-905...............................................11.24 Fichtner v Commission (Case T-63/96) [1997] ECR-SC I-A-189, II-563.......................................7.58 Fiddelaar v Commission (Case 44/59) [1960] ECR 535................................... 3.4; 8.41; 9.54, 9.55; 11.75 Fiege v Caisse Regionale d’Assurance Maladie de Strasbourg (Case 110/73) [1973] ECR 1001.........................................................................................................................................17.84 Fiehn v Commission (Case 23/69) [1970] ECR 547.......................................................................9.54 Filtrona Española SA v Commission (Case T-125/90) order of 15 February 1990 (unreported)....5.28 Financiaria Siderurgica Finsider SpA v Commission (Cases C-363/88 & C-364/88) [1992] ECR I-359.........................................................................................................................................9.43 Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark v Burda GmbH (Case C-284/06) [2008] ECR I-4571......  2.141, 2.149 Finanzamt Kassel-Goethestrasse v Kommanditgesellschaft Viessmann (Case C-280/91) [1993] ECR I-971................................................................................................................................2.180 Finsider v Commission (Case 392/85R) [1986] ECR 959..............................................................8.180 Finsider SpA v Commission (Case C-320/92P) [1994] ECR I-5697..............................................15.2 Fintecna SpA v Commission (Case T-193/95) order of 30 November 1998...................................14.36 Fioravanti v Amministrazione delle Finanze (Case 99/83) [1984] ECR 3939................................10.13 Fiorucci v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-165/06) [2009] ECR II-1375................................................................................................9.94 Firma Albert Ruckdeschel & Co & Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen (Cases 117/76 & 16/77) [1977] ECR 1753.........................................................................................13.4 Firma Anton Dürbeck v Commission (Case 11/81) [1982] ECR 1251....................................... 9.82, 9.84 Firma A Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz (Case 136/77) [1978] ECR 1245.......................................10.26

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Table of Cases para Firma E Kampffmeyer v Commission (Cases 5, 7 & 13–24/66) [1967] ECR 245......... 7.42; 13.10; 16.25 Firma Ernst Hake & Co v Commission (Case 75/69) [1970] ECR 535........................................ 4.2; 16.25 Firma Gebrüder Dietz v Commission (Case 126/76) [1979] ECR 2131........................ 4.21; 14.50, 14.59, 14.66, 14.72 Firma Handlowa Faktor B. I W. Gesina, Gesina Wojciech v Commission (Case T-468/12) 22 January 2014............................................................................................................................7.41 Firma Karl Könecke v Commission (Case 44/75R) [1975] ECR 637............................. 8.22, 8.111, 8.139 Firma Kurt A Becher v Commission (Case 30/66) [1967] ECR 285....................................... 13.10; 16.25 Firma Kurt A Becher v Hauptzollamt München-Landsbergerstrasse (Case 13/67) [1968] ECR 196..................................................................................................2.204; 16.24, 16.25, 16.43, 16.166 Firma Malic, Gross- und Aussenhandel Arnold Nöll v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken (Case 131/77) [1978] ECR 1041...............................................................................................................10.16, 10.19 Firma Max Neumann v Hauptzollamt Hof Saale (Case 17/67) [1967] ECR 441...........................10.22 Firma Rheinmuhlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 166/73) [1974] ECR 33..................................................................... 17.66, 17.79, 17.84, 17.86, 17.98 Firma Werner Faust OHG v Commission (Case 52/81) [1982] ECR 3745.....................................11.3 Firma Wolfgang Oehlschläger v Hauptzollamt Emmerich (Case 104/77) [1978] ECR 791...........10.10 First Data Corpn v Commission (Case T-28/02) [2005] ECR II-4119............................................7.15 Fiscale eenheid Koninklijke Ahold NV v Staatsecretaris van Financien (Case C-484/06) [2008] ECR I-5097..............................................................................................................................2.149 Fiskano AB v Commission (Case C-135/92) [1994] ECR I-2885...................................................9.84 Flamm v Commission & Council (Case 567/79A) [1981] ECR 2383......................... 2.75; 6.15; 7.6; 9.55 Fleischwaren und Konserven Fabrik Schulz und Berndt GmbH v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Sud (Case 154/84) [1985] ECR 3165........................................................................................................1.15 Flender KG v Commission (Case 74/81) [1982] ECR 395.............................................................14.39 Florimex v Commission (Cases T-70/02 & T-71/92) [1997] ECR II-693.......................................7.44 Fluorsid SpA v Commission (Case T-404/08) 18 June 2013...........................................................7.34 Fluxys SA v Commission de regulation de l’electricite et du gaz (Case C-241/09) [2010] ECR I-12773........................................................................................................ 2.141, 2.147, 2.149; 17.97 Foglia v Novello (Case 104/79) [1980] ECR 745.................................... 2.183; 7.3, 7.5; 10.8, 10.9; 17.82, 17.86, 17.100 Foglia v Novello (No 2) (Case 244/80) [1981] ECR 3045.......... 2.180, 2.204; 7.3, 7.5; 10.8; 17.80, 17.82 Fonderie Acciaierie Giovanni Mandelli v Commission (Case 3/67) [1968] ECR 25......................16.114 Fonderie Acciaierie Giovanni Mandelli v Commission (Case 56/70) [1971] ECR 1...........16.114, 16.116, 16.119, 16.120 Fonderies et Usines de Providence v High Authority (Cases 29, 31, 36, 39–47, 50 & 51/63) [1966] ECR 139................................................................................................ 9.45, 9.82, 9.88; 14.15 Fonseca Ferrao v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-159/97) order of 9 October 1998................................................................................14.38 Fonzi v EAEC Commission (Case 28/65) [1966] ECR 477 .......................... 2.76, 2.183; 6.7; 7.59; 11.49; 12.13, 12.19 Fonzi v Euratom Commission (Case 28/65R) [1966] ECR 508.......................................... 8.75, 8.79, 8.92 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08) order of 16 December 2009 ...........................................................................................................  2.188, 2.205 Footwear Co Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-49/10)..........................................................................................................................3.40 Forafrique Burkinabe SA v Commission (Case C-182/91) [1993] ECR I-2161...... 16.168; 17.196, 17.198 Forcheri v Commission (Case 28/83) [1984] ECR 1425.................................................................10.3 Ford v Commission (Cases 228 & 229/82) [1984] ECR 1129........................................................5.6, 5.59 Ford Werke AG & Ford of Europe Inc v Commission (Cases 228 & 228/82R) [1982] ECR 3091............................................................................................8.39, 8.55, 8.81, 8.101, 8.112, 8.134, 8.135, 8.161, 8.164, 8.171; 13.23 Foreign Trade Association v Council (Case T-37/98) [2000] ECR I-373............ 4.4, 4.12, 4.13, 4.23; 7.41 Foreningen af Jernskibs- og Maskinbyggerier I Danmark, Skibsvaerftsroreningen v Commission (Case T-266/94) [1996] ECR II-1399.................................................... 3.14; 5.46; 7.78; 11.24, 11.93 Forges de Clabecq SA v High Authority (Case 14/63) [1963] ECR 357 ......................... 7.15, 7.16; 14.20 Forges de Clabecq v Commission (Case T-37/97) [1999] ECR II-859...........................................5.44 Forges de Thy-Marcinelle et Monceau SA v Commission (Cases 26 & 86/79) [1980] ECR 1083.................................................................................................................... 7.68, 7.77; 9.42, 9.48 Forgital Italy SpA v Council (Case T-438/10) 4 December 2013....................................................2.39 Forgital Italy SpA v Council (Case C-84/14P) 14 July 2015..................................................... 2.39; 15.17 Formenti Seleco SpA v Commission (Case T-210/09) [2011] ECR II-143.....................................7.51

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Table of Cases para Fornaci Laterizi Danesi SpA v Commission (Case C-498/08P) [2009] ECR I-122........................7.45 Fort James France v Commission (Case T-290/94 (92)) order of 30 October 1998........................14.70 Forum 187 ASBL v Commission (Case T-140/03) [2003] ECR II-2069........................................2.30 Forum des migrants de l’Union europeenne v Commission (Case C-369/03P) [2004] ECR I-1981.............................................................................................................. 1.114, 1.121; 7.32, 7.41 Foshan Shunde Yonghan Housewares & Hardware Co Ltd V Council (Case C-141/08P) [2009] ECR I-9147..............................................................................................................................17.15 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost (Case 314/85) [1987] ECR 4199.................... 13.46; 17.77, 17.82 Fournier v Commission (Case 18/69) [1970] ECR 249 ..................................................................9.34 Fournier v Commission (Case 106/80) [1981] ECR 2759................................................... 7.27, 7.59, 7.79 Fournier (née Mazière) v Commission (Cases 114-117/79) [1980] ECR 1529...................  7.5, 7.89; 16.6 Fouwels v Commission (Case F-8/05REV) 20 September 2011........................ 4.9; 16.28, 16.106, 16.141 Foyer Culturel du Sart-Tilman v Commission (Case C-199/91) [1993] ECR I-2667.....................7.5 Fragd SpA v Amministrazione delle Finanze (Case 33/84) [1985] ECR 1605...............................16.37 Française des Matières Colorantes SA (Francolor) (now SA Produits Chimiques Ugine Kuhlmann) v Commission (Case 54/69) [1972] ECR 851...............................................  11.93, 11.94 France v Comafrica SpA (Case C-73/97P) [1999] ECR I-185........................................................11.15 France v Commission (Cases 15 & 16/76) [1979] ECR 321...........................................................13.1 France v Commission (Case 181/85) [1987] ECR 689............................................................ 7.30; 17.118 France v Commission (Case C-59/91) [1992] ECR I-525...............................................................7.41 France v Commission (Case C-118/91) order of 18 November 1992 (unreported)........................14.41 France v Commission (Case C-296/93R) [1993] ECR I-4181..........................................  8.81, 8.86, 8.104 France v Commission (Cases C-68/94 & C-30/95) [1998] ECR I-1375.........................................5.46 France v Commission (Case T-139/06) [2011] ECR II-7315...................................................  17.34, 17.42 France v Commission (Case T-257/07) [2011] ECR II-5827..........................................................17.16 France v Commission (Case T-154/10) 20 September 2012 revs’d France v Commission (Case C-559/12P) 3 April 2014............................................................................... 9.79; 10.48; 13.21; 15.16 France v European Parliament (Cases 358/85 & 51/86) [1988] ECR 4821...... 5.24; 7.20, 7.50, 7.68; 9.40 France v High Authority (Case 1/54) [1954–56] ECR 1.......................................................... 7.71; 16.155 France v Monsanto Co & Commission (Case C-248/99P) [2002] ECR I-1...................... 2.71, 2.244; 5.41 France v People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (Case C-27/09P) [2011] ECR I-13427..... 10.43; 13.46 France Telecom SA v Commission (Case T-340/03) [2007] ECR II-107.......................................9.47 France Telecom SA v Commission (Case C-202/07P) [2009] ECR I-2369....................................16.10 France Televisions SA v Television francaise 1 SA (Case C-451/10P-DEP) 7 June 2012........14.75, 14.76 Francesconi v Commission (Cases 326/86 & 66/88) [1989] ECR 2087.........................................17.48 Franchet v Commission (Case T-48/05) [2008] ECR II-1585.................................................... 7.38; 12.30 Francovich v Italy (Cases C-6 & C-9/90) [1991] ECR I-5357................................................... 7.22; 17.34 Frank v Court of Auditors (Case 322/87R) [1987] ECR 4375........................................................8.84 Frankin v Commission (Case F-3/06) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-23, II-A-1-117................................2.39 Franssons Verkstader v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-290/10P) [2010] ECR I-109.......................................................................................7.32 Fratelli Cucchi v Avez SpA (Case 77/76) [1977] ECR 987 ............................................................2.165 Fratelli Murri SpA v Commission (Case T-106/98) [1999] ECR II-2553 upheld Fratelli Murri SpA v Commission (Case C-399/99P) order of 6 July 2000 (unreported)........................... 7.51, 7.57 Fratelli Pardini SpA v Ministero del Commercio con l’Estero (Case 338/85) [1988] ECR 2041 ......................................................................................... 2.204; 7.6; 17.80, 17.81, 17.85, 17.99 Frederiksen v European Parliament (Case T-169/89) [1991] ECR II-1403........2.123; 11.26, 11.37, 11.93, 11.94, 11.98 Fred Olsen SA v Commission (Case T-17/02) [2005] ECR II-2031..........................  7.45, 7.46, 7.49, 7.50 Freistaat Bayern v Eurim-Pharm GmbH (Case C-347/89) [1991] ECR I-1747..............................2.195 French v Council & Commission (Case T-319/03) [2004] ECR II-769.............................. 7.76, 7.88; 9.41 Frères Dumortier SA v Council (Cases 64, 113/76, 167, 239/78 & 27, 28, 45/79) [1979] ECR 3017.........................................................................................................................................17.52 Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission (Case T-587/08) 14 March 2013.......................  5.44, 5.92; 9.79 Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc v Commission (Cases C-293/13P & C-294/13P) 24 June 2015......13.45; 15.3, 15.11, 15.39 Fresh Marine Company SA v Commission (Case T-178/98) [2000] ECR II-3331...................... 7.60; 9.41 Fresh Marine Co A/S v Commission (Case T-178/98DEP) [2004] ECR II-3127...........................14.68 Friedrich Stork & Co v High Authority (Case 1/58) [1959] ECR 17..............................................3.15 Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst (Case C-11/05) [2006] ECR I-4285.......................................................................................................................................2.205 Frucona v Commission (Case C-73/11P) 24 January 2013.............................................................9.46

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Table of Cases para Frucona Kosice AS v Commission (Case T-103/14) 16 March 2016..........................................2.101; 8.77 Frucona Kosice AS v Commission (Case T-11/07 RENV) 21 March 2014............................. 2.161; 14.41 Frucona Kosice AS v Commission (Case T-103/14R) 6 May 2014......5.52, 5.77; 8.77, 8.88, 8.155, 8.185 Frucona Kosice a.s. v Commission (Case T-11/07) [2010] ECR II-5453 on appeal ((Case C-73/11 P) Frucona Kosice a.s. v Commission, 24 January 2013...........................................8.88 Frutticoltori Associati Cuneesi v Associazione tra Produttori Ortofrutticoli Piemontesi (Case C-197/91) [1993] ECR I-2639.................................................................................................17.77 Frydendahl Pedersen A/S v Commission (Case 148/87).................................................................14.75 Fuchsuber Agrarhandel v Commission (Case C-491/11P) 27 June 2012........................................7.88 Fuji Electric Co. Ltd v Commission (Case T-132/07) [2011] ECR II-4091....................................17.15 Fulmen v Council (Cases T-439/10 & T-44/10) 21 March 2012................................................ 9.54; 10.29 Fundacao Calouste Gulbenkian v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-541/11) 26 June 2014 .............................................................................14.49 Futura Immobiliare srl Hotelera Futura v Comune di Casoria (Case C-254/08) [2009] ECR I-6995.......................................................................................................................................7.5 Fux v Commission (Case 26/68) [1969] ECR 145..........................................................................7.16 G G v Commission (Case T-199/01) [2002] ECR-SC II-1085............................................................11.10 GAARM Groupement des Associations Agricoles pour l’Organisation de la Production et de la Commercialisation des Pommes de Terre et Légumes de la Région Malouine v Commission (Case 289/83) [1984] ECR 1789..............................................................................................9.56 GAEC v Council & Commission (Case 253/84) [1987] ECR 123..................................................5.46 GAL Penisola Sorrentina v Commission (Case T-263/97) [2000] ECR II-2041..........................  7.44, 7.45 GD Searle LLC v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-383/02) [2003] ECR II-4921......................................................................................2.162 GdM v Council & Economic & Social Committee (Case 108/86) [1987] ECR 3933.........  7.14 7.17, 7.94 GEA Group AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-488/13) 22 January 2015......................................................................................... 7.41; 9.69 GEMA v Commission (Case 45/71R) [1971] ECR 791..................................................................8.112 GEMA v Commission (Case 125/78) [1979] ECR 3173.............................................................  9.89, 9.91 GIMELEC v Electroimpex (Case C-157/87DEP) order of 16 October 1991 (unreported)...... 14.65, 14.74 GL2006 Europe Ltd. v Commission (Case T-435/09) 16 September 2013....................2.164; 4.19; 17.106 GL2006 Europe Ltd v Commission (Case T-435/09R) [2010] ECR II-32......................................8.14 GP v Economic & Social Committee (Case 16/86) [1987] ECR 2409...........................................7.64 GR Amylum NV & Tunnel Refineries Ltd v Council & Commission (Cases 116 & 124/77) [1979] ECR 3497................................................................................... 5.14, 5.15, 5.32; 14.18, 14.20 GUNA Srl v Council (Case T-463/93) [1993] ECR II-1205........................................................  5.79, 5.81 Gabel Industria Tessile SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-85/07) [2008] ECR II-823...........................................................................7.78 Gage v Council & Commission (Case T-11/96) 11 November 1999..............................................14.36 Gaki-Kakouri v Court of Justice (Case C-243/04) 14 April 2005.............................................11.15, 11.24 Galileo International Technology LLC v Commission (Case T-279/03) [2006] ECR II-1291........9.42, 9.52; 17.52 Galileo Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-46/06) [2007] ECR II-93.............7.5 Galileo Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case C-483/07P) [2009] ECR I-959.......7.7 Galinsky v Insurance Officer (Case 99/88) [1981] ECR 941...........................................................4.21 Galtieri v Parliament (Case T-235/94) [1996] ECR-SC I-A-43, II-129....................................  2.125, 2.149 Gambling Commission v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-404/10 RENV) 30 June 2015......................................................................10.48 Gankema v Commission (Case T-210/99) [2004] ECR II-781........................................................2.160 Ganzini v Commission (Case 101/77) [1978] ECR 915 .................................................................14.24 Gao Yao (Hong Kong) Hua Fa Inudustrial Co Ltd v Council (Case C-75/92) [1994] ECR I-3141.......................................................................................................................................3.14 Garage Molenheide v Belgium (Cases C-286/94, C-340/95, C-401/95 & C-47/96) [1997] ECR I-7281...................................................................................................................................2.72, 2.196 Garganese v Commission (Case 185/80) [1981] ECR 1785...........................................................17.53 Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission (Case C-40/12P) (26 November 2013).........1.10 15.16, 15.26 Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH v European Union (Case T-577/14) order of 2 February 2015.........................................................................................................................................17.45 Gassiat v Ordre des avocats de Paris (Case C-467/12) 21 February 2013..................................  17.9, 17.28

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Table of Cases para Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur BV v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (Case C-461/03) [2005] ECR I-10513.....................................................................................17.83 Gavanas v Economic & Social Committee & Council (Case 307/85) [1987] ECR 2435...... 7.6, 7.30; 9.53 Gavilan v Parliament (Case T-73/91) [1992] ECR II-1555............................................2.157; 14.38, 14.42 Gbagbo v Council (Cases C-478/11P-C-482/11P) 23 April 2013...................................................7.35 Gbagbo v Council (Case C-397/13P) 29 January 2014...................................................................7.35 Gbagbo v Council (Case T-119/11) 25 April 2013........................................................................ 7.42; 9.54 Gebrüder Lorenz GmbH v Germany & Land Rheinland Pfalz (Case 120/73) [1973] ECR 1471.........................................................................................................................................7.27 Geigy AG v Commission (Case 52/69) [1972] ECR 787.........................................................  11.93, 11.94 Geist v Commission (Case 61/76RII) [1976] ECR 2075.............................................................. 8.11, 8.93 Geist v Commission (Case 192/80) [1981] ECR 1387.......................................................  6.15; 7.70; 16.6 Geist v Commission (Case 117/81) [1983] ECR 2191....................................................................7.17 Geist v Commission (Cases 285/81R I & II) [1984] ECR 1789......................................................16.114 Geist v Commission (Case 285/81R) (unreported)..................................................................... 8.174; 13.9 Geist v Commission (Cases 285/81RI & II) [1984] ECR 1789....................................10.38; 12.32; 16.123 Geist v Commission (Case 245/85) [1987] ECR 2181........................................................ 7.14, 7.16, 7.64 Geitling v High Authority (Cases 36–38 & 40/59) [1960] ECR 423....................................... 10.38; 12.32 Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft v High Authority (Cases 16–18/59) [1960] ECR 17 ........................................................................................................................................ 14.7, 14.34 Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft GmbH v High Authority (Case 19/59R) [1960] ECR 34............................................................................................................................... 8.25, 8.36; 16.55 Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v High Authority (Cases 36–38 & 40/59) [1960] ECR 423...........................................................................................................................  10.34; 11.49 Geitling Rurhkohlen Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v High Authority (Case 13/60) [1962] ECR 83 ...................................................................................................... 5.10; 10.33; 11.28, 11.55; 13.43 Geitling Selling Agency for Ruhr Coal v High Authority (Case 2/56) [1957–58] ECR 3 ......... 9.40; 10.33 Gemeente Amsterdam & Stichting Vrouwenvakschool voor Informatica Amsterdam (VIA) v Commission (Case C-213/87) [1990] ECR I-221 ................................................................ 2.139; 6.5 Gencor Ltd v Commission (Case T-102/96) [1997] ECR II-879........................................  2.83; 5.87; 7.19 General Electric Co v Commission (Case T-210/01) [2005] ECR II-5575 ................................2.72, 2.151 General Motors Continental NV v Commission (Case 26/75) [1975] ECR 1367 ..........................14.18 Générale de Banque SA v Commission (Case 1/88SA) [1989] ECR 857.......................................17.197 Générale Sucrière SA v Commission (Cases 41, 43–48, 50, 111, 113, 114/73) [1973] ECR 1465 ............................................................................................... 2.148; 3.12; 5.6, 5.17, 5.28; 14.15 General Quimica SA v Commission (Case C-90/09P) [2011] ECR I-1..................................... 15.17; 16.9 Generics (UK) Ltd v Synaptech Inc (Case C-427/09) [2011] ECR I-7099 ............................. 2.125, 2.202 Generlich v Commission (Case T-21/90) [1991] ECR II-1323.......................................................9.2, 9.40 Georgias v Council & Commission (Case T-168/12) 18 September 2014......................................17.116 Gerlach & Co BV, Internationale Expedite v Minister for Economic Affairs (Case 239/84) [1985] ECR 350...................................................................................................................................17.101 Germanwings GmbH v Amend (Case C-413/11) 18 April 2013 ....................................................17.79 Germany v Commission (Case 24/62) [1963] ECR 63...................................................................10.37 Germany v Commission (Case 34/62) [1963] ECR 131.......................................................... 10.37; 13.10 Germany v Commission (Cases 52 & 55/65) [1966] ECR 159.......................................................16.42 Germany v Commission (Case 50/69R) [1969] ECR 449................................  8.25, 8.38, 8.75, 8.81, 8.98 Germany v Commission (Case 18/76) [1979] ECR 343.................................................................14.16 Germany v Commission (Case 44/81) [1982] ECR 1855............................................................ 1.21; 7.24 Germany v Commission (Case 214/83) [1985] ECR 3053................................................. 9.53, 9.54, 9.55 Germany v Commission (Case 278/84R) [1984] ECR 4341......................8.82, 8.102, 8.108, 8.111, 8.129 Germany v Commission (Case C-8/88) [1990] ECR I-2321...........................................................13.12 Germany v Commission (Case C-54/91) [1993] ECR I-3399.........................................................14.42 Germany v Commission (Case C-280/93R) [1993] ECR I-3667....................................................8.163 Germany v Commission (Case C-46/96) [1997] ECR I-1189 ........................................................2.161 Germany v Commission (Case T-236/07) [2010] ECR II-5253......................................................9.54 Germany v Commission (Case T-576/08) [2011] ECR II-1578......................................................17.19 Germany v Commission (Case C-544/09P) [2011] ECR I-128.......................................................15.25 Germany v Commission (Case T-198/12R) 15 May 2013..............................  8.25, 8.35, 8.45, 8.65, 8.102, 8.131, 8.132 Germany v Commission (Cases C-549/12P & C-54/13P) 24 June 2015........................................15.17 Germany v Commission (Case C-399/12).......................................................................................5.48 Germany v Commisison (Case C-102/13P) 3 July 2014.................................................................7.46

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Table of Cases para Germany v Council (Case C-280/93R) [1993] ECR I-3667............. 8.81, 8.102, 8.104, 8.130, 8.154; 9.54 Germany v Council (Case C-122/95) [1998] ECR I-973................................................................7.45 Germany v European Parliament & Council (Case C-406/01) [2002] ECR I-4561........................7.38 Germany v High Authority (Case 19/58) [1960] ECR 225 ................................................ 9.43, 9.50, 9.82 Germany v High Authority (Case 3/59) [1960] ECR 53 ................................................................17.117 Germany v Parliament & Council (Case C-376/98) [2000] ECR I-2247........................................2.70 Germany v Parliament & Council (Case C-406/01) [2002] ECR I-4561........................................5.82 Germany, France, Netherlands, Denmark & United Kingdom v Commission (Cases 281, 283– 285 & 287/85) [1987] ECR 3203.............................................................................................9.13 Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-131/03) [2004] ECR II-3019........................................................3.33 Gesamthochschule Duisburg v Hauptzollamt Mümchen-Mitte (Case 234/83) [1985] ECR 327 ...2.190 Gesamtverband der Deutschen Textil- und Modeindustrie v Council (Case C-2/11 P(I)) [2011] ECR I-152................................................................................................................................5.70 Gesellschaft für Getreidehandel mbH v Commission (Case 24/66A) [1973] ECR 1599..... 16.150, 16.151, 16.155, 16.159, 16.162 Gestetner Holdings plc v Council & Commission (Case C-156/87) [1990] ECR I-781 .......... 2.137; 3.14; 5.15, 5.75; 5.87; 11.45 Gestion Hotelera Internacional SA v Comunidad Autonoma de Canarias (Case C-331/92) [1994] ECR I-1329....................................................................................................................... 2.202; 17.84 Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limberg v High Authority (Case 17/57) [1959] ECR 1...... 7.63; 9.89 Ghezzo Giovanni & C v Commission (Case C-145/13P) 4 September 2014..................................2.48 Giannakouris v Commission (Case F-83/10DEP) order of 20 March 2014....................................14.59 Gigante v Commission (Case 31/71) [1973] ECR 1353, [1975] ECR 337, [1976] ECR 1471.......14.27, 14.39, 14.40; 16.25 Gil do Nascimento v Commission (Case C-5/05SA) order of 24 November 2005 (unreported)....17.198 Gill v Commission (Case T-43/89) [1993] ECR II-303..................... 5.54; 9.82, 9.150; 14.9; 15.53, 15.60, 15.61, 15.63; 16.107 Gill v Commission (Case C-185/90P-Rev) [1992] ECR I-993................................... 15.50, 15.56; 16.107 Gimenez Zaera v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (Case 126/86) [1987] ECR 3697......17.80, 17.100 Giordani v Commission (Case 200/87) [1989] ECR 1877................................................ 7.78, 7.95; 14.24 Giordani v Commission (Case T-48/90) [1993] ECR II-721.........................................  9.89; 16.25; 17.53 Giordano v Commission (Case 11/72) [1973] ECR 417..............................................................  7.57, 7.59 Giordano v Commission (Case C-611/12P) 14 October 2014.........................................................15.21 Giraudy v Commission (Case F-23/05) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-121, II-A-1-657............................2.77 Giry v Commission (Case 1/74) [1974] ECR 1269 ........................................................................9.54 Giuffrida v Council (Case 105/75) [1976] ECR 1395.....................................................................2.9; 9.11 Giuffrida & Campogrande v Council (Case 64/80) [1981] ECR 693..............................................14.43 Glantenay v Commission (Cases F-23/12 & F-30/12) 16 September 2013....................................9.82 Glasoltherm SARL v Commission (Case C-399/97) [1998] ECR I-4521 ..................................7.4; 17.106 Glaxo Group Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-243/11) [2011] ECR II-379........................................................................................4.11 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission (Cases C-501/06P, C-513/06P, C-515/06P & C-519/06P) [2009] ECR I-9291................................. 7.18; 13.14, 13.22, 13.24; 15.6, 15.20, 15.39 Glencore Grain Ltd v Commission (Case T-509/93) [2000] ECR II-3697........................ 2.261; 7.17, 7.58 Gmurzynska-Bscher v Oberfinanzdirecktion Köln (Case C-231/89) [1990] ECR I-4003.......... 2.183; 7.5; 17.76, 17.84, 17.101 Gnemmi v Commission (Case T-199/05) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-125, II-A-2-851.......................7.81, 7.88 Godecke AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-187/00) [2001] ECR II-859..................................................................................................2.160 Gogos v Parliament (Case C-583/08P) [2010] ECR I-4469............1.10; 9.118; 10.36; 15.18, 15.25; 17.64 Gold East Paper (Jiangsu) Co Ltd v Council (Case T-443/11) 11 September 2014........................17.15 Goldstein v Commission (Case C-4/99P) (unreported order of 8 July 1999)..................................1.58 Goldstein v Commission (Case T-302/00R-II) [2001] ECR II-1127...............................................4.69 Goldstein v Commission (Case T-18/01R) [2001] ECR II-1147 ....................................................4.69 Goldstein v Commission (Case C-199/98P) order of 8 July 1999 (unreported)..............................2.107 Goldstein v Court of Justice (Case T-334/00) order of 5 February 2001 (unreported)....................2.9 Gollnisch v Parliament (Case T-357/03) [2005] ECR II-1..............................................................12.31 Gomes de Sa Pereira v Council (Case T-30/96) [1996] ECR II-785...............................................4.105 Gomes Moreira v European Centre for Disease Prevention & Control (Case T-39/14P) order of 7 July 2014...............................................................................................................................15.4

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Table of Cases para Gomez de Enterria y Sanchez v Parliament (Case C-8/99P) [2000] ECR I-6031...........................16.34 Gomez-Limon Sanchez-Camacho v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (Case C-537/07) [2009] ECR I-6525..................................................................................................................7.5 Gonzalez y Diez SA v Commission (Case T-25/04) [2007] ECR II-3121......................................1.1 Gonzalez Holguera v European Parliament (Case T-115/89) [1990] ECR I-831............................9.50 Gonzalez Holguera v European Parliament (Case 171/89R) [1989] ECR 1705.............................8.94 Gordon v Commission (Case C-198/07P) [2008] ECR I-10701 reversing Gordon v Commission (Case T-175/04) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-47, II-A-2-343..........................................................7.18 Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso (Case C-308/07) [2009] ECR I-1059......................1.46, 1.47; 2.61; 7.39, 7.70, 7.71; 16.34 Gorostiaga Atxalandabasa v Parliament (Case T-132/06) [2007] ECR I-35....................................7.70 Gosselin Group v Commission (Case C-429/11P) 11 July 2013.....................................................15.26 Government of Gibraltar v Commission (Cases T-195/01 & T-207/01) [2002] ECR II-2309........2.92; 3.2 Government of Gibraltar v Commission (Case T-176/09) [2011] ECR II-150..................... 7.2, 7.77; 9.54 Government of Gibraltar v Commission (Case C-407/11P) 12 July 2012......................................2.111 GrafTech International v Commission (Case T-246/01R) 24 March 2004......................................14.6 Granaria BV v Council & Commission (Case 90/78) [1979] ECR 1081 ....................................  9.43, 9.45 Granaria BV v Hoofproduktschap voor Akkerbouwproducten (Case 101/78) [1979] ECR 623....8.7, 8.69, 13.46 Grassi v Council (Cases 6 & 97/79) [1980] ECR 2141...................................................................14.26 Gratreau v Commission (Cases 156/79 & 51/80) [1980] ECR 3943........................................ 2.166; 16.25 Grau Gomis (Case C-167/94) [1995] ECR I-1023..........................................................................2.180 Gravier v City of Liège (Case 293/83) [1985] ECR 593.................................................................10.49 Greece v Commission (Case 57/86R) [1986] ECR 1497..................................... 8.80, 8.102, 8.108, 8.134 Greece v Commission (Case 214/86R) [1986] ECR 2631................................................  8.6, 8.108, 8.111 Greece v Commission (Case 214/86R) [1986] ECR 2505..............................................................8.171 Greece v Commission (Case 259/87) [1990] ECR I-2845..............................................................1.174 Greece v Commission (Case C-334/87) [1990] ECR I-2849..........................................................7.39 Greece v Commission (Case C-335/87) [1990] ECR I-2875..........................................................7.39 Greece v Commission (Case 111/88R) [1988] ECR 2591..................................  8.84, 8.101, 8.102, 8.108 Greece v Commission (Case 32/89R) [1989] ECR 985................................................  8.102, 8.108, 8.111 Greece v Commission (Case C-385/89R) [1990] ECR I-561..........................................................8.90 Greece v Commission (Case C-56/91) [1993] ECR I-3433............................................................16.22 Greece v Commission (Case T-231/04) [2007] ECR II-63..............................................................7.5; 9.41 Greece v Commission (Cases T-415/05, T-416/05 & T-423/05) [2010] ECR II-4749....................5.28 Greece v Commission (Case T-33/07) [2009] ECR II-....................................................................7.29 Greece v Commission (Case T-86/08) 5 July 2012...................................................................... 7.58, 7.71 Greece v Commission (Case T-588/10) 13 December 2012............................................................17.118 Greece v Commission (Case T-52/12) 16 July 2014.......................................................................17.119 Greece v Commission (Case C-71/13P) 15 July 2014.....................................................................17.118 Greece v Council (Case 204/86) [1988] ECR 5323 ........................................................................17.118 Greece v Council (Case C-62/88) [1990] ECR I-1527....................................................................17.15 Greece v Council & Commission (Case 129/86) [1987] ECR 1189...............................................3.5 Greece v Council & Commission (Case 129/86R) [1986] ECR 2071.............................................8.43 Greencore Group plc v Commission (Case T-135/02) [2005] ECR II-31.......................................17.43 Grégoire-Foulon v European Parliament (Case 19/85) [1985] ECR 3771............... 2.161; 7.91, 7.94; 9.88 Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles (Case C-322/88) [1989] ECR 4407...................17.76 Grifoni v EAEC (Case C-330/88) [1991] ECR I-1045................................ 9.34, 9.41, 9,45; 11.43; 12.19; 13.25; 17.106 Grifoni v Euratom (Case C-308/87) [1990] ECR I-1203............................................................14.4; 17.48 Groener v Minister for Education & City of Dublin Vocational Educational Committee (Case 379/87) [1989] ECR 3967........................................................................................................4.121 Groupe Gascogne v Commisison (Case C-58/12P) (26 November 2013)................................. 1.10; 15.16 Groupe Gascogne v Commission (Case T-72/06) [2011] ECR II-400; on appeal Groupe Gascogne v Commission (Case C-58/12P) 26 November 2013.........................................  9.79, 9.84, 9.118; 10.40 Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun (GAEC) de la Ségaude v Council & Commission (Case 253/84) [1987] ECR 123........................................................3.5; 5.32; 9.45, 9.83 Groupement d’Achat Edouard Leclerc v Commission (Case T-88/92) [1996] ECR II-1961........5.46; 7.78 Groupement d’Achat Edouard Leclerc v Commission (Case T-19/92) [1996] ECR II-1851..........5.46 Groupement des Agences de Voyages v Commission (Case 135/81) [1982] ECR 3799 ............. 3.1, 3.12; 7.49, 7.92

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Table of Cases para Groupement des Cartes Bancaires ‘CB’ v Commission (Cases T-39/92 & T-40/92) [1994] ECR II-49..........................................................................................................................................3.26 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission (Case T-275/94) [1995] ECR II-2169...........8.1; 16.166 Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v Commission (Case 73/74) [1975] ECR 1491...................................................................................................... 5.28; 14.59, 14.74, 14.75 Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux et Aciéries Belges v High Authority (Case 8/57) [1957–58] ECR 245...................................................................................................................................3.15 Groupement de Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority (Cases 7 & 9/54) [1954–56] ECR 222.................................................................... 2.76; 3.2, 3.15; 5.3, 5.27; 7.7; 14.40 Groupement d’Intérêt Economique Rhône Alpes Huiles v Syndicat National des Fabricants Raffineurs d’Huile de Graissage (Case 295/82) [1984] ECR 575...........................................2.178 Groupe Origny SA v Commission (Case T-38/95DEP) [2002] ECR II-217...................................14.56 Group of the European Right v European Parliament (Case 78/85) [1986] ECR 1753............17.10, 17.11 Group of the European Right & National Front Party v European Parliament (Case 221/86R) [1986] ECR 2969......................................................................  8.80, 8.81, 8.108, 8.112, 8.134, 8.172 Gruas Abril Asistencia SL v Commission (Case C-521/10P) [2011] ECR I-90..............................15.25 Grunderzentrum-Betriebs-GmbH v Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Case C-264/00) [2002] ECR I-3333.......................................................................................................................................2.202 Gruppo Norton Srl v Office for Harmonistion in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-427/13) 10 June 2014.................................................................................................2.38 Gruppo ormeggiatori del porto di Venezia Soc. coop. rI v Commission (Cases T-228/00, T-229/00, T-242/00, T-243/00, T-245-T-248/00, T-250/00, T-252/00, T-256/00-T-259/00 T-265/00, T-267/00, T-268/00, T-271/00, T-274/00-T-276/00, T-281/00, T-287/00 & T-296/00) [2005] ECR II-787.................................................................................................  7.14, 7.15, 7.16, 7.67, 768 Gruslin v Beobank SA (Case C-88/13) 11 September 2014............................................................2.141 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (Case C-184/99) [2001] ECR I-6193..............................................................................................................................16.37 Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority of the ECSC (Case 14/64) [1965] ECR 51............. 2.10; 4.15, 4.30; 6.2; 7.70, 7.71, 7.76; 9.56; 11.24, 11.29, 11.75 Gualtieri v Commission (Case F-53/00) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-107, II-A-1-399. .........................2.22 Gualtieri v Commission (Case T-284/06) [2008] ECR II-70...........................................................2.39 Gualtieri v Commission (Case T-413/06P) [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-35, II-B-1-253.........................2.23 Gualtieri v Commission (Case T-413/06P-DEP) order of 27 November 2012..... 7.70; 14.57, 14.66, 14.75 Gualtieri v Commission (Case C-485/08P) [2010] ECR I-3009.........................................  9.41, 9.79, 9.84 Guangdong Kito Ceramics v Council (Case T-633/11) 22 May 2014.............................................9.79 Guardian Industries Corp & Guardian Europe Sarl v Commission (Case T-82/08) (27 September 2012)................................................................................................................................... 1.137; 2.55 Guardian Industries Corp & Guardian Europe Sarl v Commission (Case C-580/12P) (12 November 2014).....................................................................................1.10, 1.137; 2.55, 2.57, 2.137 Guerin Automobiles v Commission (Case T-195/95) [1997] ECR II-679......................................1.77 Guerin Automobiles v Commission (Case C-282/95P) [1997] ECR I-150.....................................17.24 Guerin Automobiles EURL v Commission (Case T-275/97) [1998] ECR II-253...........................7.46 Guerin Automobiles EURL v Commission (Case T-276/97) [1998] ECR II-261...........................7.46 Guigard v Commission (Case T-301/05) [2008] ECR II-31............................................................7.5 Guigard v Commission (Case C-214/08P) [2009] ECR I-91..........................................................7.5 Guillot v Commission (Case 43/74) [1977] ECR 1309............................ 7.15; 11.26, 11.40, 11.42, 11.89; 16.25 Guillot v Commission (Case 53/72) [1974] ECR 791 ....................................................................16.25 Guinet v European Investment Bank (Case F-107/12) 16 January 2014.........................................14.23 Guja v Poland (Case T-823/14) 14 April 2015.................................................................................17.43 Gunnella v Commission (Case 33/72) [1973] ECR 475..................................................................7.32 Gutermann v Commission (Cases T-456/05 & T-457/05) [2010] ECR II-1443..............................9.79 Gutierrez de Quijano y Llorens v Parliament (Case T-125/99) order of 23 July 1999....................14.36 Gutmann v Commission (Case 92/82) [1983] ECR 3127............................................................ 3.25, 3.26 Gutmann v Euratom Commission (Cases 18 & 35/65) [1966] ECR 103............. 9.89; 12.11, 12.49; 13.27 Gutmann v Euratom Commission (Cases 18, 35/65R) [1966] ECR 135............... 8.44, 8.74, 8.112, 8.134 Gutmann v Euratom Commission (Case 29/66R) [1967] ECR 241........................................... 8.98, 8.134 H H v Council (Case F-127/06) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-177, II-A-1-975...........................................2.65 H v Council (Case T-271/10) 10 July 2014.....................................................................................3.11

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Table of Cases para H v Court of Justice (Case C-221/14P) (26 February 2015)............................ 1.37; 7.32, 7.38, 7.88; 15.2, 15.16; 17.60 H & R ChemPharm v Commission (Case T-551/08) order of 12 June 2012...................................11.57 H Gautzsch Grosshandel GmbH & Co KG v Munchener Boulevard Mobel Joseph Duna GmbH (Case C-479/12) 13 February 2014..........................................................................................13.2 HFB Holding fur Fernwarmetechnik Beteilungsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG v Commission (Case C-335/99 P(R)) [1999] ECR I-8705..............................................................................8.112 HFB Holding fur Fernwarmetechnik Beteiligingsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-9/99) [2002] ECR II-1487...................................................  8.24, 8.119, 8.122; 11.11, 11.60 HS v Council (Case T-11/90) [1992] ECR II-1869.........................................................................6.14; 7.5 HTTS Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping GmbH v Council (Case T-562/10) [2011] ECR II8087.................................................................................................................................. 16.54, 16.56 HZA Göttingen v Miritz (Case 91/75) [1976] ECR 217 ................................................................17.19 Habourdin v Italocremona (Case 80/83) [1983] ECR 3639 ............................................2.183; 7.84; 17.68 Hallet v Commission (Cases 66–68 & 136–140/83) [1985] ECR 2459..........................................16.34 Halyvourgiki Inc v Commission (Cases 39, 43, 85 & 88/81) [1982] ECR 593 .............................17.118 Halyvourgiki Inc v Commission (Cases 39, 41, 43, 85, 88, 121/81) order of 25 November 1981..................................................................................................................................... 14.7, 14.35 Hamas v Council (Case T-531/11) 21 June 2012.............................................................................9.40 Hamborner Bergbau AG v High Authority (Cases 41 & 50/59) [1960] ECR 493 .........................7.63 Hamcho v Council (Case T-43/12) 13 November 2014....................................................... 7.32, 7.47; 9.80 Hameico Stuttgart GmbH v Council & Commission (Case T-99/98) [2003] ECR II-2195............9.41 Hamill v Commission (Case 180/87) [1988] ECR 6141.................................. 17.48, 17.51, 17.63, 17.121 Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiveforening (Case 109/88) [1989] ECR 3199........................................................................................................17.71 Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Co. Ltd. v Council (Case T-459/07) [2009] ECR II-4015.......... 6.3, 6.7, 6.8; 7.20; 8.156; 9.48; 11.4 Hanning v European Parliament (Case T-37/89) [1990] ECR II-463....................... 9.45, 9.50, 9.82; 17.51 Hanning v European Parliament (Case 176/88R) [1988] ECR 3915..................  8.108, 8.134, 8.135, 8.138 Hansa Metallwerke AG v Commission (Case T-566/08) 16 September 2013.......................... 11.24; 14.20 Hanschmann v Europol (Case F-27/09DEP) order of 10 September 2014.....................................14.74 Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen v Commission (Case T-488/93) [1995] ECR II-469........ 2.28, 2.30 Hansen (Case C-233/99) [2002] ECR I-3107..................................................................................2.196 Hansen & Rosenthal v Commission (Case T-544/08) order of 12 October 2012............................11.57 Hansen-Meyer v Economic & Social Committee (Case 14/84) [1984] ECR 4317.........................14.41 Hansen (née Meyer) v Economic & Social Committee (Case 14/84REV) [1985] ECR 1381........14.67 Hans-Otto Wagner GmbH Agrarhandel KG v Commission (Case 12/79) [1979] ECR 3657.........9.82 Hanssens-Ensch v European Community (Case C-377/09) [2010] ECR I-7751............................17.43 Harrison v Commission (Case T-13/91R) [1991] ECR II-179.............................................4.91, 4.92; 8.75 Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Wiener Landesregierung (Case C-169/07) [2009] ECR I-1721.......................................................................................................................................7.5 Hartmann v Council & Commission (Case T-20/94) [1997] ECR II-595.......................................7.34 Hassan & Ayadi v Council & Commission (Cases C-399/06P & C-403/06P) [2009] ECR I-11393....................................................................................... 2.161; 5.61; 7.2, 7.6, 7.14, 7.45; 14.9 Hassan v Council (Case T-49/04AJ) order of 3 April 2006....................................  4.92, 4.97, 4.111, 4.112 Hassan v Council (Case T-572/11) 16 July 2014.............................................................................9.54 Hassan v Council & Commission (Case T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52..............................................7.6 Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Commission (Case 86/82) [1984] ECR 883...............................................14.16 Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Commission (Case 86/82R) [1982] ECR 1555...................................  8.117, 8.179 Hauer v Council & Commission (Case T-119/95) [1998] ECR II-2713.........................................7.26 Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG (Case 251/83) [1984] ECR 4277.........  2.179, 2.180, 2.183 Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen v J Henr. Drunert, Holzimport (Case 167/84) [1985] ECR 2235.........................................................................................................................................10.7 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Dimex Nahrungsmittel Im-und Export GmbH (Case 89/93) [1984] ECR 2815.....................................................................................................................11.34 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Gouralnik & Partner GmbH (Case C-446/02) [2004] ECR I-5841.......................................................................................................................................1.174 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen v Ebbe Sönnischem GmbH (Case C-59/92) [1993] ECR I-2193.......................................................................................................................................16.9 Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau v Chem-tec (Case 798/79) [1980] ECR 2639 ...................................11.103 Hauptzollamt Munchen-Mitte v Technische Universitat Munchen (Case C-269/90) [1991] ECR I-5469.......................................................................................................................................10.39

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Table of Cases para Hautem v European Investment Bank (Case T-140/97) [1999] ECR SC-I-A-171, II-89................9.64 Hautem v European Investment Bank (Case T-11/00) [2000] ECR II-4019.......4.101; 14.7; 16.36, 16.168 Hautem v European Investment Bank (Case T-11/00R) [2000] ECR SC-A-A-71, II-301..............16.157 Hauts Fourneaux, Forges Fonderies et Usines de la Providence SA v High Authority (Cases 29, 31, 36, 39–47, 50 & 51/63) [1965] ECR 911.......................................................................11.3, 11.26 Health Food Manufacturers’ Association v Commission (Case T-296/12) 12 June 2015...............13.40; 17.12, 17.117 Health Service Executive v SC & AC (Case C-92/12PPU) 26 April 2012............................... 2.195, 2.211 Hebrant (née Macevicius) v European Parliament (Case 141/80) [1980] ECR 3509......................6.15 Herbosch (Case C-40/90SA) order of 7 November 1990 (unreported)...........................................17.198 Hecq v Commission (Case 19/87) [1988] ECR 1681......................................................................14.26 Hecq v Commission (Cases C-116/88 & C-149/88) [1990] ECR I-599............................. 6.7; 9.74; 12.13 Hecq v Commission (Case T-227/02) [2003] ECR-SC I-A-115, II-571.........................................7.27 Heineken Brouwerijen v Inspecteur der Vennootschapsbelasting (Cases 91 & 127/83) [1984] ECR 3435.................................................................................................................................7.5 Heinemann v Commission (Case 79/71) [1972] ECR 579..............................................................7.59 Heinrich (Case C-345/06) [2009] ECR I-1659............................................................................  7.5; 16.37 Heintz Van Landewyck Sàrl (FEDETAB) v Commission (Cases 209–215 & 218/78) [1980] ECR 3125.................................................................................................................... 4.20; 5.28; 9.50, 9.82 Hellmut Stimming KG v Commission (Case 90/77) [1977] ECR 2113, [1978] ECR 995........... 3.5, 3.27; 9.78 Henn & Darby v DPP [1981] AC 850..............................................................................................2.172 Hendrickx v European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) (Case T-298/00) order of 12 March 2001..........................................................................................2.161 Hendrickx v European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) (Case C-217/01P) [2003] ECR I-3701...............................................................................................2.161 Henningsen Food Inc v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eiren (Case 137/78) [1979] ECR 1707.........................................................................................................................................10.10 Herbaria Krauterparadies GmbH v Freistaat Bayern (Case C-137/13) 5 November 2014 ............2.141 Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission (Case C-51/92P) [1999] ECR I-4235...............................2.76 Hercules Chemicals NVSA v Commission (Case T-7/89) [1991] ECR II-1711........... 13.12, 13.17, 13.21 Herkenrath v Commission (Case C-327/86) sub nom Herkenrath v Commission (Case T-16/89) [1992] ECR II-275........................................................................................... 6.7; 7.70; 12.46, 12.48 Herpels v Commission (Case 54/77) [1978] ECR 585..............................................................  7.64; 14.26 Herrero Romeu v Commission (Case C-8/06P) [2007] ECR I-10333............................................9.118 Hettrich v Commission (Case T-134/89) [1990] ECR II-565....................................................... 1.32; 9.46 High Authority v Collotti & European Court of Justice (Case 70/63A) [1965] ECR 275..... 14.14; 16.148, 16.150, 16.152, 16.153, 16.156, 16.164 Hilti AG v Commission (Case T-30/89) [1990] ECR II-163, [1991] ECR II-1439.......... 2.132; 5.87, 5.92, 5.97; 12.10, 12.29, 12.42; 13.17, 13.21; 14.4 Hilti AG v Commission (Case C-53/92P) [1994] ECR I-667.........................................  5.92; 9.136; 15.19 Hirschberg v Commission (Case 129/75) [1976] ECR 1259...........................................................7.59 Hirschfeldt v European Environment Agency (Case C-184/01P) [2002] ECR I-10173.................2.149 Hochbaum v Commission (Case T-38/89) [1990] ECR II-43......................................... 7.17, 7.18; 16.168 Hochbaum v Commission (Case C-107/90P) [1992] ECR I-157.........................  5.19, 5.28; 9.118; 15.13, 15.15, 15.21 Hochbaum v Commission (Case T-77/91R) [1991] ECR II-1285................................... 8.48, 8.74; 15.136 Hochstrass v European Court of Justice (Case 147/79) [1980] ECR 3005.....................................4.21 Hoechst AG v Commission (Cases 46/87 & 227/88) [1989] ECR 2859............................. 8.67, 8.94; 9.81 Hoechst AG v Commission (Case T-10/89) [1992] ECR II-629.....................................................2.154 Hoechst AG v Commission (Cases 46/87 & 227/88) [1989] ECR 2859......... 2.151; 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.98; 6.1; 11.15 Hoechst GmbH v Commission (Case T-410/03) [2008] ECR II-881.......................................... 8.1, 8.111 Hoekstra (née Unger) v Bestuur der Dedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten (Case 75/63) [1964] ECR 177............................................................................................................2.179 Hoffmann-La Roche AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH (Case 107/76) [1977] ECR 957.........................................................................................  17.88, 17.89 Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Commission (Case 85/76) [1979] ECR 461................ 2.102; 12.3, 12.32, 12.46, 12.47 Hoffmann’s Stärkefabriken AG v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld (Case 2/77) [1977] ECR 1375.............10.26 Hogan v Court of Justice (Case T-497/93) [1995] ECR II-703.......................  1.45, 1.48, 1.85, 1.89; 2.72; 3.3, 3.5, 3.38

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Table of Cases para Hogan v Court of Justice (Case C-173/95P) [1005] ECR I-4905....................................................3.3 Hogan Lovells International LLP v Bayer CropScience AG (Case C-229/09) [2010] ECR I-11335.....................................................................................................................................2.141 Holcim (Deutschland) AG v Commission (Case T-28/03) [2005] ECR II-1357................... 8.1; 9.41, 9.53 Holcim (Romania) SA v Commission (Case T-317/12) 18 September 2014............................. 9.86; 17.43 Holcim (Romania) SA v Commission (Case C-556/14P) 7 April 2016................................... 17.43, 17.46 Holdijk, Mulder & Alpuro (Cases 141–143/81) [1982] ECR 1299.......................................... 2.180; 10.26 Holding Kompanija Interspeed a.d. v Commission (Case T-587/10) 10 July 2012.................. 11.24, 11.38 Holding Kompanija Interspeed a.d. v Commission (Case C-471/12P) 20 June 2013.....................4.23 Holland Malt BV v Commission (Case T-369/06) [2009] ECR II-3313.........................................9.42 Holtz & Willemsen GmbH v Council (Case 153/73) [1974] ECR 675............................. 3.3; 14.18, 14.20 Honeywell International Inc v Commission (Case T-209/01) [2005] ECR II-5527........... 2.72; 9.41, 9.42, 9.47, 9.48 Honnefelder v Commission (Case T-130/13P) 28 May 2013.............................................. 7.41; 9.14; 15.4 Hoogovens Groep BV v Commission (Cases 172 & 226/83) [1985] ECR 2831................ 7.16, 7.20, 7.49 Hoogovens Groep BV v Commission (Case 219/87) [1989] ECR 1717...................................... 7.68, 7.71 Hoogovens v High Authority (Case 14/61) [1962] ECR 253....................................................... 9.18, 9.50 Hospital Consulting Srl v Esaote SpA (Case C-386/07) [2008] ECR I-67...................  2.180, 2.183, 2.184 Hotel Cipriani SpS v Commission (Cases T-254/00, T-270/00 & T-277/00) [2008] ECR II3269............................................................................................................................... 3.14; 7.2, 7.68 Hotel Cipriani SpA v Commission (Case T-254/00R) 15 July 2008...............................................14.6 Houyoux v Commission (Cases 176 & 177/86) [1987] ECR 4333 ................. 10.31; 17.53, 17.64, 17.103 Howe & Bainbridge BV v Ober-finanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main (Case 317/81) [1982] ECR 3257.........................................................................................................................................11.103 Hoyer v Commission (Case T-51/91R) [1991] ECR II-679............................................................8.112 Huber v Commission (Case 78/63) [1964] ECR 367......................................................................3.3 Hugo Boss AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-94/02) [2004] ECR II-813....................................................................... 3.25, 3.33, 3.41; 5.2 Hüls AG v Commission (Case T-9/89) [1992] ECR II-499................................ 2.154; 13.23, 13.26, 13.45 Huls AG v Commission (Case C-199/92P) [1999] ECR I-4287.............. 2.97, 2.102, 2.143, 2.145, 2.146, 2.151, 2.153, 2.154; 5.28, 5.98; 11.15 Huls AG v Commission (Case C-137/92P-DEP)) order of 16 December 1999............  14.56, 14.59, 14.60 Hunermund v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wurttemberg (Case C-292/92) [1993] ECR I-6787.......................................................................................................................................17.100 Hungary v Commission (Case T-240/10) 13 December 2013.........................................................17.15 Hungary v Slovakia (Case C-364/10) 16 October 2012........................................................... 17.28, 17.32 Hurd v Jones (Case 44/84) [1986] ECR 29.....................................................................................17.76 Huygens v Commission (Case T-281/01) [2004] ECR-SC I-A-203, II-903....................................7.29 Hynix Semiconductor Inc v Council (Case T-383/03) [2005] ECR II-621....................... 5.87; 9.20; 12.23 Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd v Commission (Case C-136/89) order of 4 July 1990 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................5.86 I I Nold KG v High Authority (Case 18/57) [1959] ECR 41.............................................................7.12 IAMA Consulting Srl v Commission (Case T-85/01) [2003] ECR II-4973................  2.24, 2.26; 7.5; 9.41 IBC Srl v Commission (Case 46/75) [1976] ECR 65............................................................ 7.5; 9.88, 9.91 IBM Corpn v Commission (Cases 60 & 190/81R) [1981] ECR 1857........5.28, 5.58, 5.75, 5.81, 5.84; 7.5 ICI Ltd v Commission (Case 48/69) [1972] ECR 619......................................... 9.62; 11.93, 11.94; 13.44 ICI v Commission (Case T-13/89) [1992] ECR II-1021 .................................................................2.154 ICI v Commission (Case T-37/91) [1995] ECR II-1901..................................................................9.48 ICI v Commission (Case C-200/92P) [1999] ECR I-4399....................................................... 2.151; 11.15 ICI SpA & Commercial Solvents Corpn v Commission (Cases 6 & 7/73R) [1973] ECR 357....  5.52, 5.77 IECC v Commission (Cases T-133/95 & T-204/95) [1998] ECR II-3645........................... 5.49, 5.72, 5.92 IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH v Commission (Case C-135/11P) 21 June 2012..11.7 IFG v Commission (Case 68/77) b [1978] ECR 353 ......................................................................9.82 ILFO v High Authority (Case 51/65) [1966] ECR 87.....................................................................11.24 IMS Health v Commission (Case T-184/01) [2005] ECR II-817....................................................2.161 IMS Health Inc v Commission (Case T-184/01R) [2001] ECR II-2349.........................................8.171 IPK-Munchen GmbH v Commission (Cases C-199/01P & C-200/01P) [2004] ECR I-4627......  3.12, 3.26 IPK-Munchen GmbH v Commission (Case T-331/94DEP) [2006] ECR II-51..............14.56, 14.60, 14.74 IPK-Munchen v Commission (Case C-433/97P) [1999] ECR I-6795.............................................13.10 IRO V Commission (Case 348/82R) [1983] ECR 1237..................................................................8.161

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Table of Cases para ISA v High Authority (Case 4/54) [1954–56] ECR 91 .............................................................. 3.15; 11.44 ISAE/VP v Commission (Case C-130/91) [1995] ECR I-407 ................................  16.106, 16.112, 16.123 ISAE/VP v Commission (Case C-130/91REV II) [1996] ECR I-65.....................................16.106, 16.123 ISD Polska v Commission (Case C-369/09P) [2011] ECR I-2011.................................................15.25 ISD Polska sp. z.o.o. v Commission (Cases T-273/06 & T-297/06) [2009] ECR II-2185.............3.14; 7.2, 7.5, 7.45, 7.46 ISO v Council (Case 118/77) [1979] ECR 1277 ............................................................................14.5 Iberdrola v Commission (Case T-486/10R) order of 12 April 2011..............................................8.11; 14.6 Idromacchine SpA v Commission (Case T-88/09) [2011] ECR II-7833.......................  17.48, 17.52, 17.56 Idromacchine SpA v Commission (Case C-34/12P) 3 September 2013.........................................17.48 Ilford SpA v Commission (Case 1/84R) [1984] ECR 423....................  8.55, 8.74, 8.81, 8.92, 8.93, 8.101, 8.104, 8.110, 8.112, 8.153 Iliad SA v Commission (Case C-624/13P) 11 February 2015.......................................  15.16, 15.25, 15.45 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission (Case 212/86) order of 11 December 1986 sub nom Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission (Case T-13/89) [1991] ECR II-1021......11.25 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission (Case C-200/92P) [1999]ECR I-4399................5.41 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission (Case C-286/95DEP) [2004] ECR I-6469..........14.60 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission (Case T-66/01) [2010] ECR II-2631........... 1.10; 7.70, 7.71; 17.17 Imperial Chemical Industries v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs (Case T-487/07) order of 20 October 2008 (unreported)................................. 4.23, 4.25; 6.3 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission (Case 212/86) (reported as (Case T-13/89)) [1991] ECR II-1021).........................................................................................................  11.59, 11.60 Implants (International) Ltd v Commission (Case C-279/03OP) [2006] ECR I-16........................16.75 Import Gadgets Sàrl v LAMP SpA (Case 22/76) [1976] ECR 1371...............................................11.103 Imran v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (Case C-155/11PPU) [2011] ECR I-5095....................2.182 INalca SpA v Commission (Case C-460/09P) 28 February 2013...................................................7.51 Independent Music Publishers & Labels Association (Impala) v Commission (Case T-464/04) [2006] ECR II-2289................................................................................................... 2.92, 2.94; 11.57 Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission (Case C-242/91P) [1995] ECR I-743.....5.17, 5.18; 15.13 Industria del Frio Auxiliar Conservera SA (Infrisa) v Commission (Case C-437/98P) [1999] ECR I-7145......................................................................................................  1.72, 1.83; 2.38; 11.24 Industria Masetto Schio Srl (IMS) v Commission (Case T-346/06R) [2007] ECR II-1781............9.93 Industrias Alen SA de CV v The Clorox Co (Case C-422/12P) 30 January 2014..........15.20, 15.40, 15.42 Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio SpA v International Factors Italia SpA (Case C-295/97) [1999] ECR I-3735.......................................................................................7.5 Industrie Diensten Groep BV v J A Beele Handelmaatschappij BV (Case 6/81) [1982] ECR 707............................................................................................................................  9.16; 12.3, 12.19 Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil v Commission (Case C-282/90) [1992] ECR I-1937......................................................................................................................... 9.82, 9.88; 17.49 Industries Chimiques du Fluor SA v Commission (Case C-467/13P) (9 October 2014)............1.10; 15.21 Industries des Poudres Spheriques v Council (Case T-2/95 (92)) [2000] ECR II-463............. 14.60, 14.70, 14.75 Industries des Poudres Spherique SA v Commission (Case T-5/97) [2000] ECR II-3755..............9.42 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v Dunlop AG (Case 12/76) [1976] ECR 1473...............................2.187 Inet Hellas v Commission (Case T-107/06) [2009] ECR II-4591....................................................7.5 Infortec-Projectos e Consultadoria Lda v Commission (Case C-12/90) [1990] ECR I-4625 ........7.46 Infortec-Projectos e Consultadoria Lda v Commission (Case C-157/90) [1992] ECR I-3525.......9.43 Innova v Commission (Case T-149/00) [2001] ECR II-1................................................................7.5 Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office v Commission (Case T-144/99) [2001] ECR II-1087................................................................................................7.16 Insula v Commission (Case T-366/09) 13 June 2012.......................................................... 9.41, 9.54, 9.79 Intek v Commission (Case C-1/05SA) order of 13 October 2005 (unreported) ..................  17.197, 17.198 Intermills v Commission (Case 323/82) [1984] ECR 3809.............................................................5.23 Instituto Social de Apoio ao Emprego e à Valorizaçāo Profissional & Interdata (Centro de Processamento de Dados Lda) v Commission (Case C-130/91) [1992] ECR I-69.................4.106 Interhotel v Commission (Case C-291/89) [1991] ECR I-2257......................................................9.50 International Business Machines Corpn v Commission (Cases 60 & 190/81R) [1981] ECR 1857.................................................................................................................. 8.66, 8.67, 8.94, 8.108 International Chemical Corpn SpA v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Case 66/80) [1981] ECR 1191.............................................................................................................. 2.204; 16.24

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Table of Cases para International Container et Transport v Direction generale des douanes et droits indirects de Roissy (Case C-19/88) [1989] ECR 577 .................................................................................1.174 Internationale Crediet-en Handelsvereniging NV Rotterdam v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij (Cases 73 & 74/63) [1964] ECR 1..............................................................................10.21 Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbH v Einfur und Forratsstelle für Getrride und Futtermittel (Case 11/70) [1970] ECR 1125................................................................................................10.26 Internationaler Hilsfonds eV v Commission (Case T-294/04) [2005] ECR II-2719.......................9.41 Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission (Case C-331/05P) [2007] ECR I-5475....................2.141 Internationaler Hilsfonds v Commission (Case T-141/05RENV) [2011] ECR II-6495..................9.84 Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission (Case C-362/08P) [2010] ECR I-669......................2.153 Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission (Case T-36/10) [2011] ECR II-1403.......14.41, 14.70, 14.75 Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission (Case C-208/11P) 15 February 2012.......................15.14 Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission (Case C-554/11P) 15 October 2012.....................15.2, 15.19 Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission (Case C-208/11P-DEP)) order of 16 May 2013......14.59 International Express Carriers Conference (IECC) v Commission (Case T-110/95) [1998] ECR II-3605.......................................................................................................................  2.151; 5.72, 5.92 International Express Carriers Conference v Commission (Case T-204/95) [1998] ECR II3645.........................................................................................................................................2.151 Internationale Fruchtimport Gesellschaft Weichert GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case C-73/10P) [2010] ECR I-11535...............................................................................................7.32 International Fruit Co NV v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (Cases 21–24/72) [1972] ECR 1219.........................................................................................................................................10.26 International Power plc v National Association of Licensed Opencast Operators (Cases C-172/01P, C-175/01P, C-176/01P & C-180/01P) [2003] ECR I-11421................................5.2 International Procurement Services SA v Commission (Case T-175/94 (92)) [1998] ECR II601...........................................................................................................................................14.59 Interpipe Nikopolsky Seamless Tubes Plant Niko Tube ZAT v Council (Case T-249/06) [2009] ECR II-383................................................................................................................  9.41, 9.84; 14.16 Interprovinciale des Federations d’Hoteliers, Restaurateurs, Cafetiers et Entreprises Assimileevs de Wallonie ASBL (Horeca-Wallonie) v Commission (Case T-85/97) [1997] ECR II2113............................................................................................................................. 3.38; 7.35, 7.42 Interquell Stärke-Chemie GmbH & Co v Council & Commission (Cases 261 & 262/78) [1979] ECR 3017............................................................................................................................ 2.76; 17.52 Interquell Stärke-Chemie GmbH & Co KG v EEC (Case 261/78A) [1982] ECR 3271.................13.44 Interzuccheri SpA v Ditta Rezzano e Cavassa (Case 105/76) [1977] ECR 1029............................2.165 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament & Council (Case T-18/10 R-II) [2010] ECR II-235 (unaffected by appeal (Case C-605/10 P(R)), 27 October 2011).............................................8.185 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v European Parliament (Case C-583/11P) 3 October 2013.......15.25; 17.11, 17.12 Iorio v Azienda Autonoma delle Ferrovie dello Stato (Case 298/84) [1986] ECR 247..................7.5 Ipatau v Council (Case T-646/11) 23 September 2014; on appeal Ipatau v Council (Case C-535/14P) 18 June 2015......................................................................................... 4.88; 10.29; 17.15 Iran Transfo v Council (Case T-392/11) 16 May 2013....................................................................17.16 Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council (Case T-110/12) 6 September 2013.......9.54 Ireks-Arkady GmbH v Council & Commission (Case 238/78) [1979] ECR ......... 2.76, 2.166; 3.33, 3.36; 14.4, 14.16, 14.60, 14.63, 14.69, 14.71, 14.74, 14.75, 14.78; 16.24, 16.25; 17.49, 17.52 Ireland v Commission (Case 242/86) [1988] ECR 2895.......................................................... 2.158; 14.41 Ireland v Commission (Case C-307/93R) [1993] ECR I-4191..........................................  8.81, 8.86, 8.104 Ireland v Commission (Case C-239/97) [1998] ECR I-2655..........................................................7.41 Iride SpA v Commission (Case T-25/07) [2009] ECR II-245.........................................................9.42 Iride SpA v Commission (Case C-150/09P) [2010] ECR I-5..........................................................15.25 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association v Ireland (Cases 36 & 71/80) [1981] ECR 735..........2.141, 2.153, 2.176; 17.84, 17.85 Isci Partisi v Commission (Case T-223/09) 17 December 2009......................................................17.44 Ismeri Europa Srl v Court of Auditors (Case T-277/97) [1999] ECR II-1825.................................9.41 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corpn v Commission (Cases 6 & 7/73R) [1973] ECR 357..................................................................... 8.27; 8.103, 8.134, 8.172; 13.19 Italgrani v Commission (Case C-100/91) order of 26 November 1991 (unreported)......................5.28 Italsolar SpA v Commission (Case C-257/90R) [1990] ECR I-3841...........................................  8.5, 8.108 Italy v Commission (Case C-458/09P) (24 November 2011)..........................................................1.114 Italy v High Authority (Case 2/54) [1954–56] ECR 37...................................................................7.71

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Table of Cases para Italy v High Authority (Case 20/59) [1960] ECR 325 ....................................................................7.62 Italy v Commission (Case 13/63) [1963] ECR 165....................................................... 10.32, 10.38; 13.43 Italy v Commission (Case 32/64) [1965] ECR 365 ........................................................................8.149 Italy v Commission (Case 55/83) [1985] ECR 683.........................................................................13.2 Italy v Commission (Cases 56/83) [1985] ECR 703.......................................................................13.2 Italy v Commission (Case 289/85) [1987] ECR 5321.....................................................................14.34 Italy v Commission (Case 303/88R) [1989] ECR 801...........................................  8.94, 8.95, 8.102, 8.108 Italy v Commission (Case C-281/89) [1991] ECR I-347........................................................... 7.71; 13.12 Italy v Commission (Case C-55/91) [1993] ECR I-4813..........................................................  9.82; 13.12 Italy v Commission (Case C-372/97) [2004] ECR I-3679..............................................................2.161 Italy v Commission (Case C-107/99) [2002] ECR I-1091............................................................../546 Italy v Commission (Case C-178/00) [2003] ECR I-303............................................................  9.41, 9.52 Italy v Commission (Case C-290/02) order of 10 June 2003..........................................................2.31 Italy v Commission (Case C-224/03) [2003] ECR I-14751 ...........................................................7.5 Italy v Commission (Cases C-138/03, C-324/03 & C-431/03) [2005] ECR I-10043.................2.161; 7.68 Italy v Commission (Case T-222/04) [2009] ECR II-1877..............................................................9.79 Italy v Commission (Case T-308/05) [2007] ECR II-5089..............................................................9.41 Italy v Commission (Case T-394/06) 12 September 2012.......................................................... 9.80; 11.16 Italy v Commission (Case 166/07 & T-285/07) [2010] ECR II-193...............................................2.160 Italy v Commission (Case T-426/08) 9 October 2012.....................................................................9.79 Italy v Commission (Case C-458/09P) [2011] ECR I-179................................................ 4.12; 9.14; 15.16 Italy v Commission (Cases T-99/09 & T-308/09) 19 April 2013.....................................................9.79 Italy v Commission (Case T-257/10) 27 September 2012...............................................................7.71 Italy v Commission (Case T-358/11) 19 June 2015.........................................................................17.119 Italy v Council (Case 166/78R) [1978] ECR 1745.......................................................... 8.22, 8.102, 8.112 Italy v Council & Commission (Case 32/65) [1966] ECR 389.............................................. 13.46; 17.118 Italy v Economic & Social Committee (Case T-117/08) [2011] ECR II-1463................................7.6 Italy v European Parliament (Cases C-393/07 & C-9/08) [2009] ECR I-3679...............................1.11 Italy v High Authority (Case 2/54) [1954–56] ECR 37...............................  9.40, 9.50, 9.82; 11.44, 11.47; 12.32; 16.154 Italy v High Authority (Case 20/59) [1960] ECR 325 ....................................................................9.50 Italy v High Authority (Case 21/59R) [1960] ECR 351.................................... 8.18, 8.20, 8.62, 8.84; 9.50 Italy v Parliament & Commission (Case T-285/07) 16 December 2008 (unreported)....................7.6 Italy & Donnici v European Parliament (Cases C-393/07 & C-9/08) [2009] ECR I-3679........5.24; 12.31, 12.32 Itochu Corpn v Commission (Case T-12/03) [2009] ECR II-883....................................................9.42 Ivanov v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-532/09P) [2010] ECR I-123.................................................................................................15.25 J JFE Engineering Corpn v Commission (Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 & T-78/00) [2004] ECR II-2501.............................................................................3.23, 3.34; 13.16, 13.22, 13.36, 13.38, 13.39 J Langdon Ltd v Commission (Case T-22/96) [1996] ECR II-1009................................................2.161 J Nold KG v Commission (Case 4/73) [1974] ECR 491............................................. 7.16; 16.167, 15.172 JP Morgan Fleming Claverhouse Investment Trust plc v Commissioners of HM Revenue & Customs (Case C-363/05) [2007] ECR I-5517 .......................................................................17.78 Jaber v Council (Case T-653/11) 13 November 2014................................................................... 7.32, 7.47 Jacobucci v Commission (Case 163/80R) [1980] ECR 2661..........................................................8.90 Jacquemart v Commission (Case 114/77) [1978] ECR 1697....................................................... 3.5; 17.53 Jaenicke Cendoya v Commission (Case 108/88R) [1988] ECR 2585.............................................8.81 Jamet v Commission (Case 37/71) [1973] ECR 295..................................................... 1.106; 9.54; 16.114 Jannatian v Council (Case T-328/14) 18 February 2016................................................. 17.4, 17.48, 17.51 Jänsch v Commission (Case 5/76) [1976] ECR 1027......................................................................7.56 Jänsch v Commission (Case 277/84) [1987] ECR 4923..................................................................14.24 Jelenkowska-Luca v Commission (Case T-330/14P) 11 December 2014................ 2.10, 2.14; 9.11, 9.111 Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd (Case 96/80) [1981] ECR 911....................... 4.92, 4.117 Jippes v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (Case C-189/01) [2001] ECR I-5689. .....................................................................................................................................2.205 John Deere Ltd v Commission (Case T-35/92) [1994] ECR II-957................................................11.24 Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd v Commission (Case 3/75R) [1975] ECR 1 ..............  8.46, 8.80, 8.83, 8.103, 8.112, 8.134 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Case 222/84) [1986] ECR 1651...12.24

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Table of Cases para Jones v Commission (Case T-320/07) [2011] ECR II-417......................................... 4.6, 4.17; 9.11; 14.21 Jones v Council & Commission (Cases T-278/93 R, T-555/93 R, T-280/93R) & T-541/93R) [1994] ECR II-11........................................................................................................ 8.42, 8.87, 8.108 Jongen v Commission (Case T-18/90) [1991] ECR II-187....................................... 7.80; 9.44, 9.46; 14.24 Jongeneel Kaas v Netherlands (Case 237/82) [1984] ECR 483......................................................7.5 Josanne vof v Commission (Case T-82/01) [2003] ECR II-2013....................................................2.154 Jose Alejandro SI v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-129/01) [2003] ECR II-2251................................................................................... 2.6, 2.125 Josef Buckl & Sohne OHG v Commission (Cases C-15/91 & C-108/91) [1992] ECR I-6061 .....2.161 Joseph v Commission (Case F-54/07) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-215, II-A-1-1167............................7.40 Joynson v Commission (Case T-231/99) [2002] ECR II-2085..................................................... 9.40, 9.47 Jungbunzlauer AG v Commission (Case T-312/01) [2002] ECR II-3023 ......................................2.161 Jurasinovic v Council (Case T-465/09) 3 October 2012 on appeal Jurasinovic v Council (Case C-576/12P) 28 November 2013................................................................................. 4.69; 11.1; 12.28 K K v Germany & European Parliament (Case 233/82) [1982] ECR 3637............... 4.105, 4.106; 7.85, 7.88 KEK Diavlos v Commission (Case T-190/07) [2010] ECR II-33...................................................1.84 KG Holding v Commission (Cases T-81/07 & T-83/07) [2009] ECR II-2411................................9.90 KME Germany AG v Commission (Case T-127/04) [2009] ECR II-1167............  2.138; 9.11, 9.47; 11.16 KME Germany AG v Commission (Case T-25/05) [2010] ECR II-91............................................9.80 KME Germany AG v Commission (Case C-389/10P) [2011] ECR I-13125............................. 9.80; 11.16 KOGAZ v Zala Megyei Kozigazgatasi Hivatal Vezetoje (Cases C-283/06 & C-312/06) [2007] ECR I-8463 .............................................................................................................................2.205 KUKA Roboter GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-97/08) [2010] ECR II-5059.........................................................................17.15 Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Case C-466/00) [2003] ECR I-2219.......1.58; 2.141 Kaddour v Council (Case T-654/11) 13 November 2014............................................................. 7.32, 7.47 Kadi v Council & Commission (Case T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 on appeal (Cases C-402/05P) & C-415/05P) Kadi v Council [2008] ECR I-6351.............................. 2.161; 3.23; 9.50; 9.23, 10.42, 10.43, 10.44, 10.44; 12.27; 17.15 Kadzoev (Case C-357/09PPU) [2009] ECR I-11189......................................................................2.211 Kaefer & Procacci v France (Cases C-100/89 & C-101/89) [1990] ECR I-4647................... 2.197; 17.72 Kaimer v Commission (Case C-264/11P) 19 July 2012..................................................................15.21 Kalavros v Court of Justice (Cases T-160 & T-161/89) [1990] ECR II-871............................. 11.60; 14.24 Kali-Chemie AG v Commission (Cases 19, 20/74) [1975] ECR 499.......14.50, 14.58, 14.69, 14.72, 14.74 Kali-Chemie AG v Commission (Case 20/74R) [1974] ECR 337.............................................. 8.27, 8.112 Kalkuhl v European Parliament (Case 47/65) [1965] ECR 1011.......................................... 6.9; 7.58, 7.94 Kalliope Agapiou Josephides v Commission (Case T-439/08) [2010] ECR II-230..... 17.9, 17.116, 17.119 Kampffmeyer v Commission (Cases 5, 7 & 13–24/66) [1967] ECR 245................................  17.47, 17.48 Kampffmeyer Muhlenvereingung KG v Commission & Council (Cases 56 - 60/74) [1976] ECR 711.....................................................................................................................................11.34, 11.89 Karl Könecke Fleischwarenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case 76/79) [1980] ECR 665...................................................................................................................  7.17, 7.46, 7.50; 17.17 Kastenholz v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-68/11) 6 June 2013...............................................................................................................11.11 Kastrinaki (Cases C-180/08 & C-186/08) [2008] ECR I-157.........................................................2.184 Katsoufros v Court of Justice (Case 55/88) [1989] ECR 3579........................................................7.16 Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v Mascinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft (Case C-350/07) [2009] ECR I-1513..................................................................................................................7.5 Kaufring AG v Commission (Case C-119/97, T-280/97, T-293/97 & T-147/99) [2001] ECR II1337.........................................................................................................................................5.47 Kaul GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-164/02) [2004] ECR II-3807 ...............................................................................................2.54 Kaul GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-402/07) [2009] ECR II-753............................................................................ 16.34, 16.148; 17.217 Kaysersberg v Commission (Case T-290/94) [1995] ECR II-2247, [1997] ECR II-2137............ 2.15; 5.46 Kedainiu rajono Okainiu ZUB v Council & Commission (Case T-386/13) 3 September 2014......17.117 Kendrion v Commission (Case C-50/12P) (26 November 2013)....................................................1.10 Kenny v Insurance Officer (Case 1/78) [1978] ECR 1510 .............................................................16.40

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Table of Cases para Kerafina Keramische und Finanz-Holding AG v Elliniko Dimosio (Cases C-134 & C-135/91) [1992] ECR I-5699..................................................................................................................2.178 Keramaq Keramische Werke v Commission (Cases T-379/10 & T-381/10) 16 September 2013........................................................................................................................................9.40, 9.79 Kerateas v Commission (Case T-372/07) [2008] ECR II-60...........................................................7.49 Kerelov v Commission (Case T-60/08P) 6 September 2010...........................................................7.42 Kerelov v Commission (Case T-100/08P) 6 May 2010...............................................................7.88; 15.25 Kergall v Common Assembly (Case 1/55) [1954–56] ECR 151................................... 10.36; 11.40; 17.59 Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems GmbH v Commission (Case C-161/97P) [1999] ECR I-2057............2.126 Kerstens v Commission (Case T-222/07) [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-37, II-B-1-267..... 1.58; 7.88; 9.92; 11.24 Kerstens v Commission (Case T-266/08P) 2 July 2010...................................................................15.16 Kerstens v Commission (Case T-498/09P) 24 September 2010............................................... 2.107; 15.17 Kerstens v Commission (Case F-12/10) 8 March 2012...................................................................7.71 Kerstens v Commission (Case F-12/10DEP) order of 12 December 2012................................14.60, 14.76 Kerstens v Commission (Case C-304/12P) 7 February 2013 ....................................................  15.2, 15.20 Kesko Oy v Commission (Case T-22/97) [1999] ECR 11-3775......................................................7.19 Kieffer Omnitec v Commission (Case T-288/11) 6 May 2013........................................................9.79 Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-120/99) [2001] ECR II-2235.........................................................................................................  2.3, 2.9, 2.53 Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-361/01P) [2003] ECR I-8283....................................................................................... 2.3, 2.9; 3.25 Killinger v Germany (Case C-396/03P) [2005] ECR I-4967..........................................................2.38 Kimman v Commission (Case T-644/11P) 4 July 2014............................................................  15.2, 15.17 Kindermann v Commission (Case 60/80) [1981] ECR 1329 .........................................................14.24 Kish Glass & Co Ltd v Commission (Case T-65/96DEP) [2001] ECR II-3261.......................  14.56, 14.60 Klar v Commission (Case T-665/14P) 13 May 2015.......................................................................9.118 Klarenberg v Ferrotron Technologies GmbH (Case C-466/07) [2009] ECR I-803.........................7.5 Kledingverkoopbedrijf De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch GmbH (Case 13/61) [1962] ECR 45........................................................................................................  2.174; 10.19; 14.2; 17.66 Klein v Commission (Case 123/84) [1985] ECR 1907...........................................................17.60, 17.108 Klein v Commission (Case T-309/10) 21 January 2014 on appeal Klein v Commission (Case C-120/14P) 22 April 2015..................................................................................................... 7.51, 7.57 Kloeckner v Commission (Case 119/81) [1982] ECR 2627 ..................................................... 9.82; 11.24 Kloeckner & Hoesch v High Authority (Cases 17 & 20/61) [1962] ECR 325 ...............................9.82 Klöckner-Werke AG v Commission (Case 244/81) [1983] ECR 1451...........................................13.45 Klöckner Werke AG v Commission (Case 263/82R) [1982] ECR 3995.........................................8.179 Klosterbrauerei Weissenohe GmbH & Co KG v Torresan (Case C-5/10P-DEP)) order of 12 September 2012................................................................................................................. 14.63, 14.70 Knauf Gips KG v Commission (Case C-407/08P) [2010] ECR I-6375............................ 13.2, 13.21; 14.9 Kneissl Dachstein Sportartikel AG v Commission (Case T-110/97) [1999] ECR II-2881..............9.46 Knoeppel v Commission & Council (Case 618/79A) [1981] ECR 2387..................... 2.75; 6.15; 7.6; 9.55 Kobler v Austria (Case C-224/01) [2003] ECR I-10239.................................................................17.94 Kobor v Commission (Case 112/78) [1979] ECR 1573 .................................................................9.88 Kobor v Commission (Case T-7/90) [1990] ECR II-721.................................................................14.20 Koelman v Commission (Case T-56/92) [1993] ECR II-1267..................................  2.161; 7.5, 7.76; 9.41 Koelman v Commission (Case T-575/93) [1996] ECR II-1............................................................2.119 Kohler v Court of Auditors (Cases 316/82 & 40/83) [1984] ECR 641............................................14.13 Kohll v Commission (Case 137/79) [1980] ECR 2601 ..................................................................14.24 Koinonia Tis Pliroforias Aniochti Stis Eidikes Anagkaes-Isotis v Commission (Case T-59/11) 16 July 2014..................................................................................................................................17.106 Koinonia Tis Pliroforias Aniochti Stis Eidikes Anagkaes-Isotis v Commission (Case T-562/13) 4 February 2016..........................................................................................................................17.106 Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Eau de Cologne & Parfumerie-Fabrik Glockengasse No 4711 v Provide Srl (Case C-150/88) [1989] ECR 3891...........................................................  2.183; 17.82 Kongra-Gel v Council (Case T-253/04) [2008] ECR II-46.............................................................. 7.2, 7.5 Koninklijke Cooperatie Cosun UA v Commission (Case T-240/02) [2004] ECR I-4237 ..............2.81 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken NV v High Authority (Case 14/61) [1962] ECR 253.......................................................................................................................10.34 Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV & PTT Post BV v Commission (Case C-66/90) sub nom Netherlands v Commission (Cases C-48 & C-66/90) [1992] ECR I-565......... 2.30; 5.86; 9.20; 12.29 Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV & PTT Post BV v Commission (Case T-42/91) [1991] ECR II273...........................................................................................................................................2.30

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Table of Cases para Koninklijke Nederlandsche en Staalfabrieken NV Hoogovensen v High Authority (Case 28/63) [1963] ECR 231.......................................................................................................................14.20 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd (Case C-299/99) [2002] ECR I-5475..................................................................................................................2.149 Koninklijke Scholten Honig NV v Council & Commission (Case 101/76) [1977] ECR 797.........9.48 Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission (Case C-586/12P) 19 December 2013.................15.26 Konle v Austria (Case C-302/97) [1999] ECR I-3099.....................................................................2.182 Konstantinidis (Christos) (Case C-168/91) [1993] ECR I-1191 .....................................................2.127 Kontogeorgis v Commission (Case C-163/88) [1989] ECR 4189................................................ 1.48; 9.82 Koopman v Commission (Case T-202/97) [1998] ECR-SC I-A-163, II-511...............................  7.29, 7.58 Kortas (Case C-319/97) [1999] ECR I-3143...................................................................................7.5 Korter v Council (Case 148/79) [1981] ECR 615....................................................................... 7.16; 14.24 Kotsonis v Council (Case 246/84) [1986] ECR 3989..............................................................  11.27, 11.84 Koubi v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-10/03) [2004] ECR II-719....................................................................................................3.28 Koutchoumoff v Commission (Case 224/87) [1989] ECR 99........................................... 7.64; 9.45; 11.26 Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg (Case C-33/89) [1990] ECR I-2591..........................4.121 Koyo Seiko Co Ltd v Council & Commission (Case 120/77) [1979] ECR 1337 ...........................14.5 Koyo Seiko Co Ltd v Council (Case 256/84) [1987] ECR 1899..................................................... 3.5; 7.6 Kozlowski (Case C-66/08) [2008] ECR I-6041 ................................................... 1.15; 2.205, 2.212, 2.214 Krawczynski v Euratom Commission (Case 83/63) [1965] ECR 623 .................. 7.74; 9.89; 11.27; 14.20 Krikorian v Parliament (Case T-346/03) [2003] ECR II-6037......................................... 2.38; 14.13, 14.21 Krizan v Slovenska inspekcia zivotneho postredia (Case T-416/10) 15 January 2013............  17.66, 17.75, 17.79, 17.80, 17.82, 17.86, 17.91, 17.100 Krohn & Co Import-Export GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case 175/84) [1986] ECR 753.....7.5, 7.60; 17.43 Kronofrance SA v Commission (Case T-27/02) [2004] ECR II-4177.............................................7.7 Kronofrance SA v Germany (Cases C-75/05P-DEP) & C-80/05 P-DEP) order of 4 July 2013.....14.66, 14.75 Kronoply GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-388/02) [2008] ECR II-305...........................7.45 Kronoply GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-162/06) [2009] ECR II-1............................ 7.76; 9.40 Kronoply GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case C-83/09P) [2011] ECR I-4441..........................7.9 Kruger (SA) v Directie van de rechtspersoonlijkerheid bezittende Dienst Wegverkeer (Case C-253/01) [2004] ECR I-1191.................................................................................................2.184 Krupp Stahl AG v Commission (Cases 275/80 & 24/81) [198] ECR 2489 ............................... 2.75; 14.19 Krupp Stahl AG v Commission (Cases 123/81 & 123/81R) [1981] ECR 2391..............................14.36 Krupp Stahl AG v Commission (Case 183/83) [1987] ECR ..........................................................14.63 Krupp Thyssen Stainless GmbH v Commission (Cases T-45/98 & T-47/98) [2001] ECR II3757.............................................................................................................  9.50; 11.44, 11.60, 11.93 Kruse v Commission (Case 218/80) [1981] ECR 2417............................................................. 7.80; 14.24 Kschwendt v Commission (Case 47/70) [1971] ECR 251..............................................................14.26 K-Swiss v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-14/06) [2006] ECR II-106; upheld on appeal K-Swiss v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs (Case C-144/07P)) [2008] ECR I-7367.................7.52 Kuchlenz-Winter v Commission (Case T-66/95) [1997] ECR II-637.............................................7.5 Kulykovska-Pawlowski v Parliament & Council (Case T-503/07) [2008] ECR II-48....................7.26 Kupferberg v Hauptzollamt Mainz (Case 252/83) [1985] ECR 157...............................................10.10 Kupka-Floridi v Economic & Social Committee (Case C-244/92P) [1993] ECR I-2041...............9.119; 11.76, 11.77 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) & Kurdistan National Congress v Council (Case T-229/02) [2005] ECR II-539....................................................................................................... 2.161; 7.2, 7.12 Kurrer v Council (Case 101/74) [1976] ECR 259...........................................................................4.21 Kurt v Burgermeister der Stadt Wien [2008] ECR I-97................................................................ 2.194; 7.5 Kurt Kampffmeyer Muhlenvereinigung KG v Commission & Council (Cases 56–60/74) [1976] ECR 711............................................................................................  3.5; 7.57, 759; 9.45, 9.88; 14.20 Küster v European Parliament (Case 23/74) [1975] ECR 353....................................................  7.64, 7.71 Küster v European Parliament (Case 23/74R) [1974] ECR 331.......................................... 8.13, 8.36, 8.44 Küster v European Parliament (Case 22/75R) [1975] ECR 277...............................................  8.101, 8.134 Küster v European Parliament (Case 30/76) [1976] ECR 1719................................................. 7.71; 17.19 Kuwait Petroleum (Nederland) BV v Commission (Case T-354/99) [2006] ECR II-1475.............2.27 Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV v Commission (Cases 67, 68 & 70/85R) [1985] ECR 1315................................................................................... 2.158, 2.161; 8.75, 8.81, 8.94, 8.98, 8.134

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Table of Cases para L L v Commission (Case T-254/02) [2005] ECR-SC I-A-63, II-277; on appeal L v Commission (Case C-230/05P) [2006] ECR I-55, [2006] ECR-SC I-B-2-7, II-B-2-45.......................... 2.59; 12.18 L v Commission (Case C-230/05P) [2006] ECR-SC I-B-2-7, II-B-2-45.....................  2.143, 2.151; 11.15 L v European Medicines Agency (Case F-13/07) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-105, II-A-1-585............7.46 L v Parliament (Case T-317/10P) 11 September 2013.............................................................. 2.135; 15.43 LC Nungesser KG & Eisele v Commission (Case 258/78) [1982] ECR 2015 ........2.102; 5.38, 5.72, 5.75; 11.40, 11.42 LPN – Liga para proteccao da Natureza v Commission (Case T-155/95) [1998] ECR II-2751.....7.49 LR AF 1998 v Commission (Case T-23/99) [2002] ECR II-1705...................................................13.39 Laakmann Karton GmbH v Commission (Case T-301/94R) [1994] ECR I-1279...........................8.76 Labate v Commission (Case F-77/07) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-31, II-A-2-159........................... 2.161; 7.17 Labeyrie v Commission (Case 16/67) [1968] ECR 293 ............................................................ 9.82; 11.27 Laboratoires Monique Remy SAS v Commission (Case T-281/01) [2002] ECR II-2139..............1.114; 7.38, 7.41 La Cinq SA v Commission (Case T-44/90) [1992] ECR II-1 ................ 2.97; 5.34; 8.72, 8.81, 8.96, 8.111 La City v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-444/09) 16 May 2012 ..................................................................................................... 2.164; 4.19 Lacombe v Council (Case F-9/05) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-87, II-A-1-323.....................................2.65 Lacroix v Commission (Case T-54/90) [1991] ECR II-749........................................................ 7.46; 14.20 Lacroix v Commission (Case 30/68) [1970] ECR 301.......................................................  9.39, 9.56, 9.91 Ladbroke Racing Ltd v Commission (Case C-424/92) [1993] ECR I-2213................................ 2.24; 4.69 Ladbroke Racing (Deutschland) GmbH v Commission (Case T-74/92) [1993] ECR II-535...... 2.15, 2.19; 5.28; 7.5 Lafarge AS v Commission (Case C-413/08P) [2010] ECR I-5361...................... 9.119; 13.2; 15.20, 15.25 Laguillaumie (Case C-116/00) [2000] ECR I-4979.........................................................................2.180 Lahlou (Case C-196/96) [1996] ECR I-3945...................................................................................2.176 Lallemand-Zeller v Commission (Case T-92/92AJ) [1993] ECR II-31......... 4.86, 4.92, 4.110, 4.113; 7.53 Lamberts v Ombudsman (Case T-209/00) [2002] ECR II-2203......................................................3.3 Laminoirs, Hauts Fourneaux, Forges, Fonderies et Usines de la Providence v High Authority (Cases 29, 31, 36–47, 50 & 51/63) [1965] ECR 911...............11.93, 11.97, 11.99; 13.5, 13.21, 13.23 La Mer Technology Inc v Laboratoires Goemar SA (Case C-259/02) [2004] ECR I-1159............2.184 La Navale v Commission (Case T-263/00) 22 January 2013...........................................................2.48 Lancome parfums et beaute & Cie SNC v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Case C-408/08P) [2010] ECR I-1347...............................................................................................7.14 Landbouwschap v Commission (Case C-295/92R) [19992] ECR I-5069...................................  8.74; 14.6 Landesamt fur Ausbildungsforderung Nordrhein-Westfalen v Gaal (Case C-7/94) [1995] ECR I-1031.......................................................................................................................................1.78 Landgren v European Training Foundation (Case F-1/05) [2007] ECR SC-I-A-1-223, II-A1277.........................................................................................................................................16.36 Landtag Schleswig-Holstein v Commission (Case T-68/07) order of 14 June 2007 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................7.68 Langnese-Iglo GmbH v Commission (Cases T-24/92R & T-28/92R) [1992] ECR II-1713.........5.86; 8.26, 8.39, 8.48, 8.81, 8.105, 8.112, 8.131, 8.171, 8.174 Langnese-Iglo GmbH v Commission (Cases T-7/93R & T-9/93R) [1993] ECR II-131.............. 5.34, 5.87; 8.81, 8.112, 8.131 Lantzoni v Court of Justice (Case T-289/04) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-39, II-A-2-171......................7.32 La Pyramide (Case C-378/93) [1994] ECR I-3999.........................................................................2.176 Larsen v Commission (Case F-11/06) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-137, II-A-2-531..............................2.64 Lassalle v European Parliament (Case 15/63) [1964] ECR 31......................................  3.11, 3.12 5.5, 5.8 Lassalle v European Parliament (Case 15/63R) [1964] ECR 57..............................................  8.112, 8.134 La Terza v Court of Justice (Case 76/88R) [1988] ECR 1741...................................................  8.82, 8.112 Latham v Commission (Case T-63/89) [1991] ECR II-19.......................................................... 9.45; 17.51 Latham v Commission (Case T-27/90) [1991] ECR II-35..............................................  7.59; 14.24; 17.51 La Vigile San Marco v Commission (Case T-262/00) 22 January 2013 .........................................2.48 Laytoncret Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-171/06) [2009] ECR II-539........................................................................................7.5 Leali v Commission (Case T-56/10) 9 December 2014...................................................................9.79 Lebedef v Commission (Case F-29/09) 30 September 2010...........................................................17.117 Lebedef v Commission (Case T-52/10P) 16 December 2010..........................................................15.16 Lebedef v Commission (Cases T-116/13P & T-117/13P) 13 January 2014....................................15.25

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Table of Cases para Lebedef & Jones v Commission (Case F-29/09REV) 13 April 2011.......................16.121, 16.123, 16.126 Ledra Advertising v Commission (Case T-289/13) 10 November 2014..........................................8.149 Lee v Minister for Agriculture (Case 152/79) [1980] ECR 1495....................................................4.115 Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v Commission (Case 318/82) [1985] ECR 3727...........  14.72, 14.74 Le Levant 015 v Commission (Case T-34/02DEP) [2010] ECR II-6375.....................  14.56, 14.59, 14.69, 14.74, 14.75 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority (Cases 53 & 54/63) [1963] ECR 239 .................... 14.14, 14.23 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority (Case 111/63) [1965] ECR 677, [1965] ECR 716....5.14, 5.37, 5.78; 9.41, 9.43, 9.49; 11.26, 11.40 Lenoir v Caisse d’Allocations Familiales des Alpes-Maritimes (Case 313/86) [1988] ECR 5391 ........................................................................................................................................2.178 Lens v European Court of Justice (Case 55/64) [1963] ECR 837........... 6.12; 7.58, 7.74, 7.76, 7.79, 7.92, 7.94; 9.52, 9.93 Lenz v Commission (Case T-47/92) [1992] ECR II-2523....................... 1.45, 1.85, 1.127; 6.3; 7.74; 9.11, 9.56; 11.2 Lenz v Commission (Case C-277/95P) [1996] ECR I-6109.....................1.45, 1.47, 1.89; 7.70, 7.71, 7.76 Leonardini v Commission (Case 115/76) [1978] ECR 735.............................................................17.53 Leone v Garde des Sceaux (Case C-173/13) (17 July 2014)...................................................... 1.72; 2.149 Lepape v High Authority (Case 11/63) [1964] ECR 61 ....................................................  2.126; 6.3; 9.54 Leroy v High Authority (Cases 35/62 & 16/63) [1963] ECR 197............................................ 10.39; 14.24 Leroy v High Authority (Cases 35/62 & 16/63R) [1963] ECR 213..................  8.16, 8.22, 8.25, 8.33, 8.34 Les Assurances du Crédit et Compagnie Belge d’Assurances Crédit SA v Council & Commission (Case C-63/89) [1991] ECR I-1799 ...........................................................................  7.5; 9.41; 17.47 Les Commissionaires Réunis Sàrl v Receveur des Douanes (Cases 80–81/77) [1978] ECR 927 ..........................................................................................................................................13.27 Les Editions Albert Rene Sarl v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-16/06P) [2008] ECR I-10053.....................................................................17.217 Lesieur Cotelle et Associés SA v Commission (Cases 67-85/75) [1976] ECR 391........................7.92 Lestelle v Commission (Case C-30/91P) [1992] ECR I-3755 ........................................................15.52 L’Etoile Commerciale & Comptoir National Technique Agricole v Commission (Cases 89 & 91/86) [1987] ECR 3005.......................................................................................  7.50; 17.12, 17.117 Leussinck-Brummelhuis v Commission (Cases 169/83 & 136/84) [1986] ECR 2801..............11.25; 13.8; 17.48, 17.52 Levantina Agricola Industrial SA (Laisa) v Council (Cases 31 & 35/86) [1988] ECR ECR 2285................................................................................................. 12.46, 12.46, 12.48; 17.11, 17.15 Ley v Commission (Cases 12 & 29/64) [1965] ECR 107 ......................................................... 8.186; 9.84 Ley v Commission (Case 12/64R) [1965] ECR 132................................................................ 8.101, 8.103 Leymann & Pustovarov (Case C-388/08PPU) [2008] ECR I-8983.................................................2.211 Lezzi Pietro & C Srl v Commission (Case C-123/92) [1993] ECR I-809 ...............................  2.161; 7.15 Liberal Democrats v Parliament (Case C-41/92) [1993] ECR I-3153 .................................... 2.160; 17.26 Liberos v Commission (Case C-171/00P) [2002] ECR I-451.........................................................1.84 Licata v Economic & Social Committee (Case 270/84R) [1984] ECR 4119.......  8.81, 8.105, 8.112, 8.134 Lichtwer Pharma AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-10/01) [2003] ECR II-2225 .................................................................................  2.39, 2.162 Liga para a Proteccao da Natureza v Commission (Cases C-514/11P & C-605/11P) 14 November 2013.....................................................................................................................................15.2, 15.25 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v Departmento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa (Case C-42/07) [2009] ECR I-7633..................................................................2.141, 2.149 Ligur Carni Srl v Unità Sanitarie Locali nos. XV e XIX (Cases C-277, C-318 & C-319/91) [1993] ECR I-6621..................................................................................................................17.85 Liivimaa Lihaveis MTU v Eesti-Lati programme 2007-2013 Seirekomitee (Case C-562/12) 17 September 2014.......................................................................................................................17.10 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission (Cases T-305/94-T-307/94, T-313/94-T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 & T-335/94) [1999] ECR II-931, para 122; on appeal Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission (Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, C-245/99P, C-247/99P, C-250/99P-C-252/99P & C-254/99P) [2002] ECR I-8375.....1.77, 1.78, 1.87, 1.88; 2.73, 2.102, 2.128; 7.29, 7.71; 16.34 Lindorfer v Council (Case C-227/04P) [2007] ECR I-6767............................................................17.64 Lior GEIE v Commission (Case T-192/01R) [2001] ECR II-3657.................................................8.42 List v Commission (Case 263/81) [1983] ECR 103................................................................. 2.148; 14.24 Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirougiko Kentro AE v Commission (Case C-506/13P) 9 September 2015...............................................................................................................17.15, 17.108

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Table of Cases para Littlewoods Retail Ltd v Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs (Case C-591/10) 19 July 2012.........................................................................................................................................17.57 Loebisch v Commission, Euratom & ECSC Councils (Cases 50, 51, 53, 54, 57/64) [1965] ECR 825 ..........................................................................................................................................7.58 Lofaro v Commission (Case T-293/07P) [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-85, II-B-1-531................ 7.26, 7.32, 7.64 Lo Giudice v Parliament (Case T-43/93) [1995] ECR-SC II-189....................................................3.25 Longevity Health Products Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-84/10P) [2010] ECR I-131.............................................................. 15.19, 15.24 Longinidis v European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Case T-283/08PDEP)) order of 11 December 2014........................................................................  14.63, 14.68, 14.73 Lopes v Court of Justice (Case T-230/94) [1996] ECR SC-I-A-77, II-A-239.................................12.30 Lopes v Court of Justice (Case C-175/96P) [1996] ECR I-6409.....................................................4.5, 4.10 Lord Bruce of Donnington v Aspden (Case 208/80) [1981] ECR 2205..........................................11.48 Loukakis v Parliament (Case F-82/11DEP) order of 25 November 2014.......................................14.75 Louwage v Commission (Case 148/73) [1974] ECR 81.................................................................14.32 Lubking v Commission (Case F-105/06) 27 September 2011.........................................................7.88 Lucchini SpA v Commission (Case T-91/10) 9 December 2014.......................  9.11, 9.34, 9.47, 9.79, 9.80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling KG v Council & Commission (Cases 197–200, 243, 245 & 247/80) [1981] ECR 3211......................................................... 5.6, 5.17, 5.18, 5.32, 5.36, 5.68, 5.75; 12.14, 12.16, 12.19, 12.23, 12.31, 12.48, 12.49; 14.4 Luhleich v Euratom Commission (Case 68/63) [1965] ECR 581 ........................ 9.45; 11.59, 11.74; 14.7, 14.62, 14.74 Luhleich v Euratom Commission (Case 68/63R) [1965] ECR 618...........8.11, 8.41, 8.43, 8.81, 8.90, 8.93 Luigi Pellegrini & C SAS v Commission (Case 23/76) [1976] ECR 1807 ................... 9.56; 14.13, 14.20; 17.106, 17.107 Lúisi & Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro (Cases 286/82 & 26/83) [1984] ECR 377.......................17.100 Luttgens v Commission (Case 267/85) [1986] ECR 3417................................... 9.54, 9.89; 14.20; 17.103 Lütticke v Commission (Case 48/65) [1966] ECR 19.....................................................................17.26 Lux v Court of Auditors (Cases 129 & 274/82) [1984] ECR 4129............................................ 2.81; 16.34 Lux v Court of Auditors (Case 69/83) [1984] ECR 2447......................................................... 11.60; 14.24 Lux v Court of Auditors (Case 69/83R) [1983] ECR 1785......................................................  8.108, 8.175 Luxembourg v European Parliament (Case 230/81) [1983] ECR 255................... 1.1, 1.3; 7.3, 7.21; 14.20 Luxembourg v European Parliament (Cases C-213/88 & C-39/89) [1991] ECR I-5643 ...............9.34, 9.36, 9.41 Lyckeskog (Case C-99/00) [2002] ECR I-4839...............................................................................17.92 Lyder Enterprises Ltd v Community Plant Variety Office (Case T-367/11) 21 October 2013........2.111; 17.15 M M v Commission (Case 155/78) [1980] ECR 1797....................... 1.22, 11.40, 11.49, 11.85; 12.19, 12.20, 12.21, 12.33 M v Council (Cases 175 & 209/86) [1988] ECR 1891 ...................................................................9.40 M v Court of Justice (Case T-172/01) [2004] ECR II-1075............................................ 11.15, 11.69; 13.1 M v Ombudsman (Case T-412/05) [2008] ECR II-197...................................... 3.14, 3.32; 7.10,7.65, 7.76 M v European Medicines Agency (Case T-12/08P-RENV-RX) [2010] ECR II-3735 ............ 2.270, 2.271; 4.86; 15.52, 15.69 M v European Medicines Agency (Case C-197/09RX-II) [2009] ECR I-12033...........2.262, 2.264, 2.269, 2.270; 9.40, 9.54; 10.31; 14.11; 15.52, 15.66, 15.67, 15.76, 15.77, 15.78 M v European Medicines Agency (Case F-6/11) 28 September 2011.............................................7.88 MAG Instrument Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-136/02P) [2004] ECR I-9165.....................................................................................11.93 MCI v Commission (Case T-310/00) [2004] ECR II-3253.........................................................  7.16, 7.19 MMT Mecklenburg-Strelitzer Montage- und Tiefbau GmbH v Commission (Case T-392/05) [2006] ECR II-97.................................................................................................................. 7.38, 7.45 MTZ Polyfilms Ltd v Council (Case T-143/06) [2009] ECR II-4133.............................................9.54 McB v LE (Case C-400/10PPU) [2010] ECR I-8965......................................................................2.211 McCutcheon v Council (Case T-541/93) [1994] ECR II-1235........................................................2.157 Maag v Commission (Case 43/84) [1985] ECR 2581.............................................................  14.43; 17.11 Macchiorlatti Dalmas e Figli SaS v High Authority (Case 22/59) order of 17 November 1959 (unreported).................................................................................................................... 6.1, 6.4; 12.11

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Table of Cases para Macchiorlati Dalmas & Figli v High Authority (Case 21/64) [1965] ECR 175 ........ 11.28; 17.117, 17.119 Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v Council & Commission (Case C-241/87) [1990] ECR I-1797 .......2.65 Maftah v Commission (Case T-101/09) [2011] ECR II-251...........................................................7.38 Maindiaux v Economic & Social Committee & Diezler (Cases 146 & 431/85-Interpretation) [1988] ECR 2003....................................................................... 5.52; 16.150, 16.151, 16.156, 16.157 Maindiaux v Economic & Social Committee (Case 63/88R) [1988] ECR 1659....................  8.108, 8.134 Maindiaux v Economic & Social Committee (Case T-28/89) [1990] ECR II-59....................... 7.68; 17.64 Maiseries de Beauce v ONIC (Case 109/79) [1980] ECR 2883......................................................16.37 Maizena GmbH v Council (Case 139/79) [1980] ECR 3393 .........................................................14.13 Majali Abdel (Case C-75/12) 4 July 2012.......................................................................................2.182 Makedoniko Metro v Commission (Case T-202/02) [2004] ECR II-181........................................7.5 Makedoniko Metro v Elliniko Dimosio (Case C-57/01) [2003] ECR I-1091.................................2.149 Makteshim-Agan Holding BV v Commission (Case C-277/07 P(R)) [2008] ECR I-112..............8.13, 8.19, 8.27, 8.56 Mallis v Commission & European Central Bank (Case T-327/13) 16 October 2014......................3.6; 9.34 Mamoli Robinetteria v Commission (Case T-376/10) 16 September 2013.....................................17.119 Mannesmann v High Authority (Cases 4–13/59) [1960] ECR 113...............................................3.33; 9.64 Mannesmann AG v High Authority (Case 37/64) [1965] ECR 725 .........................................11.26, 11.40 Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG v Commission (Case T-44/00) [2004] ECR II-2223........ 2.72; 13.2, 13.22 Mante v Council (Case F-87/06) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-77, II-A-1-451........................................7.88 Mantzouratos v Parliament (Case F-64/10) 7 June 2011.............................................................9.84; 14.13 Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Nafta Co v Council (Case T-263/12) 14 April 2014.........................................................................................................................................7.71 Manzoni v Fonds National de Retraite des Ouvriers Mineurs (Case 112/76) [1977] ECR 1647....7.72; 10.20; 16.24, 16.171 Marcato v Commission (Case 29/70) [1971] ECR 243............................................................ 10.39; 11.28 Marcato v Commission (Case T-82/89) [1990] ECR II-735.......................... 7.18; 9.41, 9.48; 11.28; 12.13 Marcato v Commission (Case T-5/90) [1991] ECR II-731..........................................6.3; 7.60; 9.74; 12.13 Marcopoulos v Court of Justice (Cases T-32 & 39/89) [1990] ECR II-281...................11.94, 11.98; 17.64 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-236/02) 14 September 2011..............................................  15.53, 15.58 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-109/05) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-1, II-A-1-1..............................2.29 Marcuccio v Commission (Case C-59/06P) [2007] ECR-SC I-B-2-43, II-B-2-335 ......................2.149 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-84/06) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-467, II-A-1-2633 .....................2.29 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-84/06AJ) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-135, II-A-1-745...................4.107 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-133/06) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-343, II-A-1-1883 on appeal Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-9/09P) 24 November 2010....................1.143, 1.145; 4.113; 7.46, 7.53; 15.2, 15.21 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-20/07) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-469, II-A-1-2641......................2.29 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-70/07) [2009] ECR-SC I-A-1-31, II-A-1-135..........................2.26 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-278/07P) [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-59, II-B-1-407......................2.64 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-114/08P) [2009] ECR-SC I-B-1-53, II-B-1-313......................7.29 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-241/03REV) 11 September 2012.............................................16.121 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-16/09P) (23 March 2010).........................................................1.145 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-32/09P) order of 28 October 2010...........................................15.40 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-56/09) 9 June 2010...................................................................14.16 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-78/09) 22 June 2010.................................................................14.69 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-81/09) 15 February 2011..........................................................17.119 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-157/09P) (15 September 2010)................................................1.145 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-166/09P) order of 8 July 2010..................................................15.19 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-239/09P) 4 April 2011..............................................................15.25 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-21/10) order of 16 March 2011................................................14.49 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-67/10) order of 20 June 2011............................................  14.64, 14.68 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-69/10) order of 8 September 2011...........................................14.49 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-69/10DEP) order of 16 October 2014......................................14.59 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-236/10) 14 September 2011.....................................................9.82 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-256/10P) 20 June 2011........................................................  15.2, 15.17 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-256/10P-DEP)) 13 December 2013.................................. 14.59, 14.78 Marcuccio v Commission (Case C-478/10RX)...............................................................................15.70 Marcuccio v Commission (Case C-1/11SA) order of 19 November 2012 (unreported).................17.197 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-3/11) order of 29 February 2012..............................................14.49 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-85/11P) 21 February 2013........................................ 11.21; 15.2, 15.18 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-100/11) 18 June 2013...............................................................14.49

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Table of Cases para Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-118/11) 25 February 2014..................................................... 2.82; 9.11 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-126/11P) 8 March 2012............................................................15.2 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-143/11) 18 June 2013 upheld on appeal Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-447/13P) 2 October 2014........................................... 1.84; 2.111; 14.64, 14.68 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-238/11P) 8 July 2013...............................................................15.2 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-286/11P) 15 November 2012...................................  15.2, 15.16, 15.18 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-491/11P) 20 November 2012...................................................15.2 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-616/11P) 8 November 2012................................................ 15.2, 15.16 Marcuccio v Commission (Case C-617/11P) 3 October 2013........................................... 9.82; 15.5, 15.53 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-28/12) order of 25 June 2013...................................................14.49 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-57/12) 7 October 2013.............................................................14.49 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-57/12R) order of 3 August 2012................................ 4.97; 14.1, 14.49 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-67/12) 6 February 2013............................................................14.49 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-115/12) order of 25 June 2013.......................................... 14.64, 14.68 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-133/12) 12 December 2013......................................................14.49 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-464/12 P(R)) order of 3 December 2012...................... 4.97; 14.1, 14.2 Marcuccio v Commission (Case C-534/12P) 5 December 2013................................. 11.17; 16.30, 16.123 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-58/13).......................................................................................4.75 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-62/13) 22 May 2014.................................................................4.69 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-89/13) 22 May 2014.................................................................4.69 Marcuccio v Commission (Case F-90/13) 22 May 2014.................................................................4.69 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-226/13P) 21 October 2013.................................................. 14.49; 15.2 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-485/13P) 12 December 2013............................................... 9.14; 14.64 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-503/13P) 19 June 2014........................................ 1.84; 4.13, 4.74; 9.14 Marcuccio v Commission (Case T-324/14P) 6 March 2015 ...........................................................2.82 Marcuccio v Court of Justice (Case C-460/10P) [2011] ECR I-63.................................................11.24 Marcuccio v Court of Justice (Case C-433/12P) 7 March 2013...............................................  15.16, 15.21 Marien v Commission (Cases F-5/11R & F-15/11R) 27 May 2011................................................8.11 Marinova v Universite Libre de Bruxelles & Commission (Cases T-213/08 & T-213/08AJ) 5 November 2008............................................................................................................ 16.47, 16.112 Marinova v Universite Libre de Bruxelles & Commission (Case T-213/08REV) 31 July 2009.....7.85; 16.20, 16.21, 16.29, 16.47, 16.103, 16.106, 16.109 Marks & Spencer plc v Commissioners of Customs & Excise (Case C-62/00) [2002] ECR I-6325.......................................................................................................................................17.100 Marlines v Commission (Case C-112/04P) 15 September 2005.....................................................11.24 Marszalkowski v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-159/11) 13 January 2015............................................................................................14.67 Martin & Millet v Commission (Case T-153/89) order of 11 October 1990...................................14.34 Martin v Parliament (Case T-276/07) [2010] ECR II-277...............................................................9.54 Martinez v European Parliament (Case 133/88) [1989] ECR 689...................................................17.63 Martinez v MGN Ltd (Case C-278/09) [2009] ECR I-11099..........................................................7.6 Martinez Erades v European External Action Service (Case F-64/12DEP) order of 2 July 2013.........................................................................................................................................14.63 Masdar (UK) Ltd v Commission (Case C-47/07P) [2008] ECR I-9761...................................17.43, 17.46 MasterCard Inc v Commission (Case C-382/12P) 11 September 2014................... 9.34, 9.41, 9.47; 15.42 Matra Hachette v Commission (Case T-17/93) order of 1 July 1993 (unreported).....................  5.28, 5.46 Matra SA v Commission (Case C-225/91) [1993] ECR I-3203........................................ 5.46; 7.78; 17.16 Matra SA v Commission (Case C-225/91R) [1991] ECR I-582................................................  8.84, 8.108 Mattheus v Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkuhlkast eG (Case 93/78) [1978] ECR 2203.................7.5; 10.7 Mattila v Council & Commission (Case T-204/99) [2001] ECR II-2265........................................9.79 Maudet v Commission (Cases 20 & 21/63) [1964] ECR 621 ............................. 4.20; 14.59, 14.70, 14.72 Maurissen v Court of Auditors (Cases 193 & 194/87) [1989] ECR 1045................... 3.1; 4.15; 5.19, 5.75; 7.14, 7.17, 7.18, 7.74; 8.109; 9.56; 11.43; 13.12, 13.44; 17.10 Mausolf v Europol (Cases T-209/02P & T-210/02P) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-79, II-A-2-335..........2.39 Mavrakos v Council (Case T-49/89) [1990] ECR II-509.................................................................5.19 Mecanarte-Metalurgica de Lagoa Lda v Chefe do Serviço da Conferencia Final da Alfandego do Porto (Case C-348/89) [1991] ECR I-3277.............................................................................17.66 Media-Saturn-Holding v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-92/10P) [2011] ECR I-2.............................................................................15.25 Mediaset v Commission (Case C-403/10P) [2011] ECR I-117.......................................................15.21

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Table of Cases para Medici Grimm KG v Council (Case T-7/99) [2000] ECR II-2671..................................................9.53 Medici Grimm KG v Council (Case T-364/03) [2006] ECR II-79......................................  9.34, 9.41, 9.63 Mediocurso-Estabelecimento de Ensino Particular Lda v Commission (Case C-462/98P) [2000] ECR I-7183..............................................................................................................................1.11 Meganck v Commission (Case 36/72) [1973] ECR 527 ...............................9.50, 9.88, 9.90; 11.15, 11.26 Meggle Milchindustrie GmbH & Co KG v Council & Commission (Case 244/83) [1986] ECR 1101.........................................................................................................................................13.12 Meilicke v ADV/ORGA AG (Case C-83/91) [1992] ECR I-4871...................  2.176; 17.83, 17.85, 17.100 Meinhardt (née Forderung) v Commission (Case 24/71) [1972] ECR 269.................................  9.89; 14.5 Meister v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-48/10P) 16 December 2010..............................................................................................  7.88; 15.2 Meister v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-12/05PREV) [2007] ECR I-167...................................................................................15.20; 16.107 Melli Bank plc v Council (Cases T-246/08 & T-332/08) [2009] ECR II-2629............................ 2.92; 9.84 Melli Bank v Council (Case T-492/10) 20 February 2013..............................................................9.54 Mencarelli v Commission (Case 43/79) [1980] ECR 201 ..............................................................9.82 Menghi v ENISA (Case F-2/09) 24 February 2010.........................................................................2.134 Mercredi v Chaffe (Case C-497/10PPU) [2010] ECR I-14309.......................................................2.211 Mergen v Commission (Case T-53/91) [1992] ECR II-2041........................................... 11.4, 11.27; 17.61 Merhzaoui v Council (Case F-18/09) 10 November 2011...............................................................9.84 Meridania SpA v Commission (Case T-128/09) 3 October 2011....................................................2.164 Merino & Co v High Authority (Cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26, 27/60 & 1/61) [1961] ECR 161.....7.32 Merisider v High Authority (Case 6/65) order of 22 June 1965 (unreported).................................6.3 Merkur — Aussenhandels GmbH v Commission (Case 43/72) [1973] ECR 1055.........................7.60 Meroni & Co Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority (Case 9/56) [1957–58] ECR 133....17.104, 17.118, 17.119 Meroni & Co v High Authority (Case 10/56) [1957–58] ECR 157 ..................................... 17.116, 17.119 Meroni & Co v High Authority (Cases 46 & 47/59) [1962] ECR 411............... 7.76; 9.2, 9.43, 9.53, 9.54; 11.59; 14.19, 14.36, 14.40 Meroni & Co, FERAM & SIMET v High Authority (Cases 5, 7 & 8/60) [1961] ECR 107 .....  7.15, 7.39, 7.40, 7.53; 14.25; 16.25 Meskens v European Parliament (Case T-84/91) [1992] ECR II-1565.........................................  5.19, 5.79 Messe Berlin GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-292/03) [2004] ECR II-1143......................................................................................2.162 Metalgoi SpA v Commission (Case 10/83) [1983] ECR 1271 .......................................................2.125 Metalgoi SpA v Commission (Case 82/84) [1984] ECR 2585............................................ 6.15; 7.46; 14.7 Metallurgica Rumi SpA v Commission (Case 258/80R) [1980] ECR 3867............ 8.13, 8.17, 8.22, 8.142 Metalmarsicabruzzo SpA v Circostel (Cases C-320-C-322/90) [1993] ECR I-393........................17.85 Metock v Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform (Case C-127/08) [2008] ECR I-6241......2.205 Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case 26/76) [1977] ECR 1875....... 5.36; 10.38 Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case 26/76R) [1976] ECR 1353...... 8.59, 8.63, 8.111, 8.137 Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case 75/84) [1986] ECR 3021 ...........2.102 Meyer v Commission (Case T-106/99) [1999] ECR II-3273...........................................................9.41 Meyer v Commission (Case T-72/99) [2000] ECR II-2521...........................................................7.60; 9.41 Meyer v Council & Commission (Case T-73/99) [1999] ECR II-1739...........................................9.41 Meyer-Burckhardt v Commission (Case 9/75) [1975] ECR 1171..................................... 7.27, 7.59; 17.60 Michael v Commission (Case 343/82) [1983] ECR 4023........................................................ 10.39; 14.24 Michaelis v Commission (Case 219/78) [1979] ECR 3349 .............................  7.74, 7.92; 9.40, 9.44, 9.88 Michail v Commission (Case C-268/08P) [2009] ECR I-23...........................................................7.76 Michail v Commission (Case F-100/09) 13 September 2011..........................................................7.71 Michail v Commission (Case T-597/11P) 8 October 2013..............................................................11.17 Michalokopoulou Ktimatiki Touristiki AE v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-365/09) [2010] ECR II-239..............................................3.25 Michel v European Parliament (Case 195/80) [1981] ECR 2861).................................. 2.147, 2.153; 7.42 Micheli v Commission (Case T-183/97) [2000] ECR II-287........................................................ 7.17, 7.20 Microsoft Corpn v Commission (Case T-201/04) [2005] ECR II-1491............ 4.15; 5.20 5.28, 5.62; 7.32, 7.41; 9.47 Microsoft Corpn v Commission (Case T-201/04R) [2004] ECR II-2977..........5.13, 5.20, 5.59, 5.60, 5.63; 8.81, 8.108, 8.109, 8.158, 8.185 Mihal v Danovy urad Kosice (Case C-456/07) [2008] ECR I-79....................................................2.205

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Table of Cases para Milac GmbH, Gross- und Aussenhandel v Hauptzollamt Freiburg (Case 8/78) [1978] ECR 1721.........................................................................................................................................16.44 Milbert v Commission (Case T-434/04) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-273, II-A-2-1423................. 7.2, 7.14; 8.1 Milch- Fette- und Eierkontor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken (Case 25/67) [1968] ECR 207...........................................................................................................................................16.43 Milch- Fett- und Eierkontor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken (No 2) (Case 29/68) [1969] ECR 165............................................................................................. 2.170, 2.204; 7.72; 16.24; 17.65 Milch-, Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Council & Commission (Case 44/76) [1977] ECR 393 ................................................................................................................ 3.3; 6.8; 9.34, 9.45, 9.49 Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG v Commission (Cases 31 & 33/62) [1962] ECR 501 ............................................................................................... 2.76; 7.3, 7.50, 7.94; 17.95, 17.117 Miles v European Schools (Case C-196/09) [2011] ECR I-5105............................................  2.183; 17.72 Miles Druce & Co Ltd v Commission (Cases 160 & 161/73R) [1973] ECR 1049............ 8.46, 8.58, 8.84, 8.86, 8.87 Milk Marketing Board of England & Wales v Cricket St Thomas Estate (Case C-372/88) [1990] ECR I-1345..............................................................................................................................10.15 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission (Case 19/77) [1978] ECR 131........... 9.80, 9.84; 11.64; 13.9 Mills v European Investment Bank (Case 110/75) [1976] ECR 955, [1976] ECR 1613....... 3.3, 3.4; 4.21; 11.15, 11.27, 11.49, 11.64; 12.21; 13.12; 16.25; 17.132 Mindo v Commission (Case C-652/11P) 11 April 2013.................................................... 7.14; 13.2; 15.22 Mindo Srl v Commission (Case T-19/06) [2011] ECR II-6795............ 7.14, 7.15, 7.16, 7.17; 11.51; 14.42 Minebea Co Ltd v Council (Case 260/84) [1987] ECR 1975..........................................................14.75 Ministère Public v Asjés (Cases 209–213/84) [1986] ECR 1425.................................. 2.180, 2.183; 17.84 Ministère Public v Auer (Case 136/78) [1979] ECR 437 ...............................................................2.186 Ministère Public v Blanguernon (Case C-38/89) [1990] ECR I-83 ................................................2.196 Ministère Public v Mirepoix (Case 54/85) [1986] ECR 1067.........................................................7.5 Ministère Public v Mutsch (Case 137/84) [1985] ECR 2681..................................................... 7.5; 17.101 Ministère Public v Tomatis & Fulchirion (Case C-384/89) [1991] ECR I-127...............................17.76 Ministère Public & Ministry of Finance v Profant (Case 249/84) [1985] ECR 3237 ....................2.178 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE ’90 Srl (Cases C-10/97-C-22/97) [1998] ECR I-6307.........17.36 Ministero dell’Industria, del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v Lucchini SpA (Case C-119/05) [2007] ECR I-6199..................................................................................................................1.1 Mita Industrial Co Ltd v Council (Case C-172/87) [1992] ECR I-1301.........................................5.87 Mitsubishi Electric Corpn v Commission (Case T-133/07) [2011] ECR II-4219...........................1.135 Mirossevich v High Authority (Case 10/55) [1954–56] ECR 333..................... 6.2, 6.4; 7.79; 9.90; 10.36; 11.38, 11.78, 11.93, 11.95; 12.11; 13.10, 13.21, 13.43; 14.63 Mische v Commission (Case T-641/11P) 13 December 2012.........................................................15.16 Misset v Council (Case 152/85) [1987] ECR 223...........................................................................7.53 Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission (Case F-50/09) 12 May 2011........... 11.3; 12.6, 12.9, 12.10, 12.27; 14.27 Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission (Case F-50/09DEP) order of 25 October 2012 ......14.74 Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission (Case T-401/11P) 10 July 2014..............................12.6 Miss M v Commission (Case 155/78) [1980] ECR 1797...................................................7.17, 7.92; 17.19 Mitsubishi Electric Corpn v Commission (Case T-133/07) [2011] ECR II-4219........  13.15, 13.16, 13.20, 13.22, 13.25, 13.36, 13.37, 13.40, 13.42, 13.43, 13.45 Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG v Commission (Case C-288/11P) 19 December 2012.....................16.9 Miwon Co Ltd v Commission (Case T-208/95) [1996] ECR II-635 ..............................................2.39 Moallem Insurance Co v Council (Case T-182/13) 10 July 2014....................................................17.119 Moat v Commission (Case T-13/92) [1993] ECR II-287.................................................................14.13 Moat v Commission (Case T-20/92) [1993] ECR II-799.............................................................. 7.59; 9.89 Moat v Commission (Case C-32/92P) [1992] ECR I-6379.............................................................15.29 Moat v Commission (Case T-58/92) [1993] ECR II-1443............................... 7.15, 7.18, 7.32, 7.64; 17.51 Moat v Commission (Case C-318/92P) [1993] ECR I-481.............................................................15.29 Moat & Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission (Case T-78/91) [1991] ECR II-1387............................................ 1.32, 1.152; 2.23, 2.26 Mobistar SA v Commune de Fleron (Cases C-544/03 & C-545/03) [2005] ECR I-7723 ..............2.149 Moccia Irme SpA v Commission (Case T-164/96R) [1996] ECR II-2261......................................8.147 Moccia Irme SpA v Commission (Cases C-280/99P-C-282/99P) [2001] ECR I-4717...................2.72

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Table of Cases para Mogensen v Commission (Case 10/82) [1983] ECR 2397..............................................................5.17 Mohammad Imran v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (Case C-155/11PPU) [2011] ECR I-5095.... 2.182 Moksel v Commission (Case 45/81) [1982] ECR 1129............................................................... 5.81, 5.90 Moli v Commission (Case 121/76) [1977] ECR 1971.............................................................. 12.33, 12.34 Mollet v Commission (Case 75/77) [1978] ECR 897............................................................... 12.33; 17.17 Möllmann-Fleisch GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (Case C-27/92) [1993] ECR I-1701..13.1 Monin Automobiles (Case C-386/92) [1993] ECR I-2049 .............................................................2.176 Mono Car Styling SA v Dervis Odemis (Case C-12/08) [2009] ECR I-6653.............................. 7.5; 17.82 Montecatini SpA v Commission (Case C-235/92P) [1999] ECR I-4539...... 2.151; 5.28, 5.37, 5.98; 11.15 Montecatini SpA (formerly Montedipe SpA) v Commission (Case T-14/89REV) [1992] ECR II-2409........................................................................................................................... 16.113, 16.118 Montedipe SpA v Commission (Case T-14/89) [1992] ECR II-1155......................................... 2.154; 9.89 Montedipe SpA v Commission (Case 213/86R) [1986] ECR 2623.........................................  8.108, 8.180 Montes Doria v Commission (Case F-11/07AJ) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-81, II-A-1-463................4.106 Montgomery v European Parliament (Case 152/87) [1987] ECR 4899...................................  13.12, 13.99 Morabito v European Parliament (Case 105/87) [1988] ECR 1707................... 11.27; 16.46, 16.55, 16.56 Mordt v Court of Justice (Case T-156/89) [1991] ECR II-407..................... 7.18; 9.54, 9.55; 10.31; 11.24; 14.20; 17.64 Moreau v Euratom Commission (Cases 15/64 & 60/65) [1966] ECR 459.....................................14.40 Morello v Commission (Case 9/76) [1976] ECR 1415...................................................................7.17 Moretti v Commission (Case T-51/90) [1992] ECR II-487.............................................................7.18 Morgensen v Commission (Case 10/82R) [1982] ECR 325............................................................8.93 Morina v European Parliament (Case 21/65) [1965] ECR 1033 ....................................................9.91 Morison Menon Chartered Accountants v Council (Case T-656/11R) 16 February 2012.......  8.104, 8.108 Moritz v Commission (Case T-20/89) [1990] ECR II-769..............................................................7.18 Moritz v Commission (Case C-68/91P) [1992] ECR I-6849............................................14.9; 15.18, 15.52 Moritz J Weig GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-317/94) [1998] ECR II-1235..................16.42 Morson & Jhanjan v Netherlands (Cases 35 & 36/82) [1982] ECR 3723.......................................17.89 Moselland eG – Winzergenossenschaft v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-214/10) 31 May 2013...................................................................9.79 Moselstahlwerk GmbH & Co Kg v Commission (Case 220/82R) [1982] ECR 2971.....................8.104 Moser v Land Baden-Württemberg (Case 180/83) [1984] ECR 2539........................ 2.183; 17.84, 17.100 Moser Baer India Ltd v Council (Case C-535/06P) [2009] ECR I-7051................ 7.14, 7.17, 7.18; 9.118, 9.119, 9.135; 15.20 Mosthaf v Euratom Commission (Case 34/65) [1966] ECR 521....................... 6.2, 6.8; 7.24, 7.58; 11.74; 14.20; 17.19 Moussis v Commission (Case 227/83) [1984] ECR 3133...................................... 7.32, 7.38; 14.26, 14.43 Mouzourakis v European Parliament (Case 280/85) [1987] ECR 589............................................14.13 Mrs P v Commission (Case 40/79) [1979] ECR 3299....................................................... 5.36; 14.5; 16.98 Mrs V v Commission (Case 18/78) [1979] ECR 2093....................................................................9.45 Mugraby v Council & Commission (Case T-292/09) [2011] ECR II-255..................... 17.17, 17.23, 17.26 Mugraby v Council & Commission (Case C-581/11P) 12 July 2012.............................................17.17 Mulder v Council & Commission (Cases C-104/89 & C-37/90) [1992] ECR I-3061.............. 7.71; 17.47, 17.49, 17.52 Mulder v Council & Commission (Case C-104/89DEP) [2004] ECR I-1.......... 14.56, 14.58, 14.59, 14.61, 14.69, 14.72, 14.75, 14.76, 14.78 Mulfinger v Commission (Case C-249/87) [1989] ECR 4127........................................................17.105 Müller v Council & Euratom Council (Case 28/64) [1965] ECR 237 ...........................................3.4; 9.89 Müller v Council & Euratom Council (Case 28/64REV) [1967] ECR 141....................................16.121 Müller v Euratom & ECSC Councils (Case 43/64) [1965] ECR 385 .............................................3.4; 7.58 Muller (née Collignon) v Commission (Case 4/67) [1967] ECR 365.............................................7.59 Mullers v Economic & Social Committee (Case 79/70) [1971] ECR 689............... 3.4; 7.26; 13.46; 14.20 Münchener Import-Weinkellerei Herold Binderer GmbH v Commission (Case 147/83) [1985] ECR 257............................................................................................................................ 14.23, 14.24 Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-316/03) [2005] ECR II-1951................................9.47 Mundipharma AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-256/04) [2007] ECR II-449....................................................................................9.48, 9.100 Municipality of Differdange v Commission (Case 222/83) [1984] ECR 2889...............................7.3 Musee Grevin SA v Commission (Cases T-314/03 & T-378/03) [2004] ECR II-1421...................7.5 Musique Diffusion Française SA v Commission (Cases 100–103/80) [1983] ECR 1825..............12.19; 13.19, 13.26, 13.29

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Table of Cases para Mutual Aid Administration Services NV v Commission (Cases T-121/96 & T-151/96) [1997] ECR II-1355...........................................................................................................................7.46, 7.58 Muysers & Tulp v Court of Auditors (Case 161/87R) [1987] ECR 2381.......................................8.134 Mystery Drinks GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-99/01) [2003] ECR II-43.............................................................................3.26; 5.2 N N v Commission (Case F-95/05AJ) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-1556, II-A-1-835............................  4.88, 4.97 NDSHT Nya Destination Stockholm Hotell & Teaterpaket AB v Commission (Case C-322/09P) [2010] ECR I-11911................................................................................................................9.118 NICO v Council (Case T-6/13) 20 January 2015.............................................................................7.38 NICO v Council (Case C-153/15P).................................................................................................7.47 NM v Commission & Council (Cases 83 & 84/84) [1984] ECR 3571...........................................6.15 NMB (Deutschland) GmbH v Commission (Case C-188/88) [1992] ECR 1689........................  9.42, 9.52 NMB France SARL v Commission (Case T-162/94) [1996] ECR II-427.................................. 2.160; 7.2, 7.70, 7.71; 16.23 NMH Stahlwerke GmbH v Commission (Cases T-134/94, T-136/94-T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 & T-157/94) [1997] ECR II-2293..... 1.85, 1.139; 2.72; 11.44 NSK Ltd v Commission (Case C-245/95P-INT) [1999] ECR I-1.......................................... 5.52; 16.150, 16.152, 16.157 NSO v Commission (Case 260/82R) [1982] ECR 4371............................................................. 8.55, 8.112 NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council (Case 113/77) [1979] ECR 1185..................... 3.14; 5.6; 7.6; 13.45; 14.5, 14.13, 14.25 NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council (Cases 113/77R & 113/77 R-I) [1977] ECR 1721.......... 5.52; 8.22, 8.62, 8.68, 8.74, 8.112, 8.113, 8.139, 8.179 NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council (Case 240/84R) [1984] ECR 4093................................... 8.67, 8.74 NTN Corpn v Council (Cases T-163/94 & T-165/94 (92)) order of 17 March 1999.......................14.66 NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie (Case 26/62) [1963] ECR 1 ................................................................17.82 NV Giant v Gemeente Overijse (Case C-109/90) [1991] ECR I-1385............................................17.71 NV Samenwerkende Electriciteits-produktiebedrijven v Commission (Case C-36/92P) [1994] ECR I-1911..............................................................................................................................9.118 Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council (Case 121/77R) [1977] ECR 2107.............. 7.6; 8.11, 8.22, 8.84, 8.112, 8.113, 8.139 Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council (Case 121/77R) [1977] ECR 1721.......................................... 8.62, 8.93 Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council (Case 255/84) [1987] ECR 1861...............................................7.6 Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO) v Council (Case C-153/13P) 10 December 2015...........................7.38 Nagels v Commission (Case 52/70) [1971] ECR 365 ....................................................................14.20 Naipes Heraclio Fournier SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Cases T-160/02-T-162/02) [2005] ECR II-1643......................................................5.2 Nakajima All Precision Co v Council (Case 69/89R) [1989] ECR 1689........................................8.113 Names v Commission (Case C-2/05SA)..........................................................................................17.197 Naranjo v Caisse Regionale d’Assurance Maladie Nord-Picardie (Case C-265/05) [2007] ECR I-347.........................................................................................................................................2.195 Nashua Corpn v Council (Case 150/87) sub nom Nashua Corpn v Commission & Council (Cases 133/87 & 150/87) [1990] ECR I-719................................................. 3.5; 5.86; 8.44; 8.50, 8.58; 9.82; 16.106, 16.141, 16.146 Nateo Perez v Commission (Case F-144/11) order of 24 June 2013...............................................14.25 National Carbonising Co Ltd v Commission (Cases 109 & 114/75) [1977] ECR 381...........  2.158; 14.24 National Carbonising Co Ltd v Commission & National Coal Board (Case 109/75R) [1975] ECR 1193 ...................................................................................................................  5.52; 8.36, 8.75 National Farmers’ Union v Commission (Case T-76/96R) [1996] ECR II-815......................... 2.21; 8.169 National Iranian Oil Co v Council (Case T-578/12) 16 July 2014..................................................3.2 National Iranian Oil Company v Council (Case C-440/14P) 1 March 2016...................................3.2 National Power plc & PowerGen plc (Cases C-151/97P(I) & C-157/97P(I)) [1997] ECR I3491.......................................................................................................................................5.13, 5.30 Navarro v Commission (Case T-556/14P) 9 June 2015...................................................................15.16 Nederlandse Antillen v Commission (Cases T-32/98 & T-41/98) [2000] ECR II-201.......... 3.2; 5.12; 5.98 Nederlandse Antillen v Council (Case C-452/98) [2001] ECR I-8973...........................................5.12 Nederlandse Associatie van de Farmaceutische Industrie (Nefarma) v Commission (Case T-113/89) [1990] ECR II-797..................................................................................................2.72

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Table of Cases para Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v Commission (Case 322/81) [1983] ECR 3461........13.18, 13.26 Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging & Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken v Commission (Case T-138/89) [1992] ECR II-2181............................................................................................. 7.16, 7.20 Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied und Technische Unie BV v Commission (Cases T-5/00 & T-6/00) [2003] ECR II-5761............ 5.37; 9.48 Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission (Case T-5/00R) [2000] ECR II-4121..............................................................  5.28, 5.60 Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission (Case C-7/01 P(R)) [2001] ECR I-2559.............................................................14.9 Nederlandse Spoorwegen NV v Minister Verkeer en Waterstaat (Case 36/73) [1973] ECR 1299.....................................................................................................................................10.7; 17.69 Nederlandse Vakbond Varkenshouders v Commission (Case T-151/05) [2009] ECR II-1219........3.14; 7.2; 9.47, 9.79 Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit- en Groentenimporthandel v Commission (Case 71/74R & RR) [1974] ECR 1031............................................................................. 5.28, 5.36; 8.25, 8.36; 10.38 Nencini v Parliament (Case C-530/10 P(R)) [2011] ECR I-172...................................  8.154, 8.158, 8.161 Nencini v Parliament (Cases T-431/10 & T-560/10) 4 June 2013...................................................7.29 Nencini v Parliament (Case C-447/13P) 13 November 2014............................................ 7.29; 15.2, 15.25 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission & Council (Cases C-305/86 & C-160/87) [1990] ECR I-2945.................................................................................. 5.46, 5.66; 7.20; 8.26, 8.113 Netherlands v Commission (Case 59/70) [1971] ECR 639........................................................ 7.28; 17.24 Netherlands v Commission (Case C-48/91) [1993] ECR I-5611 ............................................  13.12, 13.28 Netherlands v Commission (Case C-325/01) order of 20 November 2001 (unreported)..............2.27, 2.31 Netherlands v Council (Case C-110/97RX) [1997] ECR I-1795....................................................8.171 Netherlands v High Authority (Case 6/54) [1954–56] ECR 103.........................  9.50; 10.26,10.33, 10.47; 13.10, 13.21 Netherlands v High Authority (Case 25/59) [1960] ECR 386 ...................................  5.10, 5.27, 5.68, 5.78 Netherlands v High Authority (Case 9/61) [1962] ECR 213...........................................................5.98 Netherlands v Parliament & Council (Case C-377/98) [2001] ECR I-7079....................................5.3 Netherlands v Reed (Case 59/85) [1986] ECR 1283 ......................................................................17.80 Netherlands Antilles v Council (Case T-310/97) [1998] ECR II-4131.........................................  2.27, 2.31 Netherlands Antilles v Council & Commission (Cases T-163/97 & T-179/97) [1998] ECR II4123...................................................................................................................................... 2.31, 2.72 Netherlands & Leeuwarder Papierfabriek v Commission (Cases 296 & 318/82) [1985] ECR 809.......................................................................................................................................14.5, 14.74 Neubrandengurger Wohnungsgesellschaft mbH v Commission (Case T-407/09) 9 January 2012.........................................................................................................................................17.24 Neue Erba Lautex GmbH Weberet und Vereldung v Commission (Case T-181/02R) [2002] ECR II-5081......................................................................................................................................8.112 Newstead v Department of Transport & HM Treasury (Case 192/85) [1987] ECR 4753...............1.72 Nexans France v European Joint Undertaking for ITER & the Development of Fusion Energy (Case T-415/10) 20 March 2013 ...................................................................................... 17.10, 17.45 Nexans France SAS & Nexans SA v Commission (Case T-135/09) 14 November 2012...............1.140 Nexans SA & Nexans France SAS v Commission (Case C-37/13P) 25 June 2014................... 1.140; 15.2 Nexus Europe (Ireland) Ltd v Commission (Case T-424/08) [2010] ECR II-96.................. 17.106, 17.108 nfon v Fon Wireless (Case C-193/13P) 16 January 2014................................................................15.20 Ngele v Commission (Case T-15/10RII) [2010] ECR II-176...........................................  8.14, 8.24, 8.184 Ngele v Commission (Case C-526/10P(R)) [2010] ECR I-173.......................................................8.14 Nicolet Instrument v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen (Case 6/84) [1985] ECR 765...........................................................................................................................................10.9 Niederrheinische Bergwerks-AG v High Authority (Cases 2 & 3/60) [1961] ECR 133 ......... 10.32; 14.19 Niederrheinische Hütte AG v High Authority (Case 2/59R) [1960] ECR 162.................... 8.74, 8.84; 14.6 Niedzwiecki v European Parliament & Commission (Case T-209/98AJ) order of 2 February 1999 (unreported).....................................................................................................................4.88 Nielsen v Economic & Social Committee (Case T-84/92) [1993] ECR II-949.......................... 9.82; 11.14 Nijman v Commission (Case T-36/89) [1991] ECR II-699..................................................... 11.34, 11.97, 11.98, 11.99 Nijs v Court of Auditors (Case T-184/11) 15 May 2012......................................................... 9.118; 15.16 Nikolaou v Commission (Case T-331/13) 16 October 2014............................................................3.6; 9.34 Nikolaou v Court of Auditors (Case T-241/09) 20 February 2013..................................................7.51 Nippon Seiko KK v Council & Commission (Case 19/77) [1979] ECR 1303...................... 6.8, 6.12; 14.5

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Table of Cases para Nippon Seiko KK v Council & Commission (Case 119/77R) [1977] ECR 1867........... 8.22, 8.112, 8.113, 8.139, 8.141 Nippon Seiko KK v Council (Case 258/84) [1987] ECR 1923.......................................................7.6 Nippon Seiko KK v Council (Case 258/84R) [1984] ECR 4357............................................  8.112, 7.179 Nippon Seiko KK v Council (Case 308/85) order of 3 February 1988...........................................14.5 Nitrogenmuvek Vegyipari v Commission (Case T-387/11) 27 February 2013................................11.1 Nolan v Commission (Case F-90/06AJ) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-105, II-A-1-393...........................4.106 Nold KG v High Authority (Case 18/57) [1957–1958] ECR 121, [1959] ECR 41.............  4.2, 4.16, 4.26, 4.30, 4.31; 8.75, 8.83, 8.98, 8.164; 9.40, 9.43, 9.50, 9.82; 11.41; 13.30; 14.56, 14.59, 14.74 Nold Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v Commission (Case 4/73) [1974] ECR 491, [1975] ECR 985, [1977] ECR 1.................................................................... 9.50; 14.65, 14.69, 14.74, 14.79 Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstem AG &Co KG (Case 102/81) [1982] ECR 1095.......................................................................  17.70, 17.71 Norma Lebensmittelfillialbetrieb v Yorma’s (Case C-191/11P-DEP) order of 10 July 2012 .........14.74 Norsk Hydro A/S v Commission (Case T-106/89) order of 19 June 1990......................................7.48 Norsk Hydro A/S v Commission (Case T-106/89REV) [1994] ECR II-419...................................16.112 Northern Ireland Fish Producers’ Organisation v Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland (Case C-4/96) [1998] ECR I-681.............................................................................................10.39 Noscirai SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-307/11) (order of 28 November 2011 on appeal (Case C-69/12P) ..........1.16, 1.116, 1.118, 1.120; 2.34, 2.41; 7.38, 7.41; 9.13, 9.14 Nour v Burgenlandische Gebietskrankenkasse (Case C-361/97) [1998] ECR I-3101....................17.79 Novartis v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-444/12) 16 October 2014......................................................................................................9.79 Novartis Pharma GmbH v Apozyt GmbH (Case C-535/11) 11 April 2013.....................................2.141 Noworyta v European Parliament (Case F-128/06AJ) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-147, II-A-1-573.....4.107 Ntouvas v European Centre for Disease Prevention & Control (Case F-107/11DEP) order of 21 October 2014............................................................................................................................14.70 Nuova Agricast Srl v Commission (Case T-151/03) [2005] ECR II-1967 ................ 2.137, 2.160; 4.4, 4.9 Nuova Agricast v Commission (Case C-67/09P) [2010] ECR I-9811.............................................15.25 Nuovo Campsider v Commission (Case 25/85) [1986] ECR 1531.................................................17.24 Nuovo Campsider v Commission (Case 25/85R) [1985] ECR 751....................8.5, 8.36, 8.37, 8.75, 8.108 Nutria AE v Commission (Case T-180/95) [1997] ECR II-1317.....................................................17.105 Nynas Petroleum v Commission (Case T-482/07) 16 September 2013...........................................11.11 O O v Commission (Case T-376/02) [2004] ECR SC-I-A-349, II-1595.......................................  2.70; 12.21 Oberthür v Commission (Case 24/79) [1980] ECR 1743................ 9.54, 9.88; 10.31; 14.60, 14.62, 14.70, 14.72; 17.64, 17.103 Ocalan, on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) & Vanly, on behalf of the Kurdistan National Congress v Council (Case C-229/05P) [2007] ECR I-439............. 1.106; 2.161; 3.12, 3.13; 7.12, 7.26 Ocean Capital Administration v Council (Cases T-420/11 & T-56/12) 22 January 2015............ 9.54, 9.84; 16.34 O’Connor v Commission (Case F-12/07) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-239, II-A-1-1333.......................4.98 O’Connor v Commission (Case F-12/07AJ) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-237, II-A-1-1329..................4.91 Odette Nicos Petrides Co Inc v Commission (Case T-152/95) [1997] ECR II-2427......................11.93 Odette Nicos Petrides Co Inc v Commission (Case C-64/98P-REV) [2010] ECR I-65...... 2.7, 2.10; 9.11; 16.29, 16.147 Odigitria AAE v Council & Commission (Case T-572/93) [1995] ECR II-2025............................3.3, 3.37 Offermann v Parliament (Case T-129/89) [1991] ECR II-855.........................................................7.26 Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) v National Lottery Commission (Case C-530/12P) 27 March 2014................................ 1.10; 2.162, 2.163; 9.118; 10.48 Officier van Justitie v van Haaster (Case 190/73) [1974] ECR 1123 .............................................11.26 Officine Elettromeccaniche Ing A Merlini v High Authority (Case 108/63) [1965] ECR 1......... 4.10, 4.68, 4.87; 8.149; 9.11 Øhrgaard & Delvaux v Commission (Case 9/82) [1983] ECR 2379 ..............................................5.17 Oikonomopoulos v Commission (Case T-483/13R) 27 November 2013........................................17.52 Ojha v Commission (Case T-36/93) [1995] ECR-SC I-A-161, II-497............................................2.157 Ojha v Commission (Case T-77/99REV) [2002] ECR SC-I-A-29, II-131......................................16.112

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Table of Cases para Okalux GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-419/07) [2009] ECR II-2477............................................................................................. 7.76; 14.8 Olbrechts v Commission (Case 58/88) [1989] ECR 2643................................................  7.46, 7.48; 13.43 Oleificio Borelli SpA v Commission (Case C-97/91) [1992] ECR I-6313............... 7.5; 9.82; 17.11, 17.43 Oleifici Italiani SpA v Direzione regionale delle entrate per la Puglia (Case C-104/99) order of 16 December 1999...................................................................................................................2.194 Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE v Commission (Case T-68/03) [2007] ECR II-2911...............9.46 Ombudsman v Lamberts (Case C-234/02P) [2004] ECR I-2803....................................................3.3 Omnicare Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-277/06) [2009] ECR II-1303................................................................................................5.44 Omnis Group v Commission (Case T-74/11) 30 May 2013............................................................9.79 Omya AG v Commission (Case T-145/06) [2009] ECR II-145.................................................11.60; 12.31 Ooms v Commission (Case 48/79) [1979] ECR 3121..................................... 3.5; 6.15; 8.22, 8.111; 17.61 Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij (Case 286/81) [1982] ECR 4575 ............................................2.148 Opel Austria GmbH v Council (Case T-115/94) [1997] ECR II-39................................................5.4 Operator ARP sp. z.o.o. v Commission (Case T-291/06) [2009] ECR II-2275............................ 7.14, 7.17 Opinion 1/59 [1959] ECR 259..............................................................................................  17.148, 17.186 Opinion 1/60 [1960] ECR 39...........................................................................................................17.145 Opinion 1/61 [1961] ECR 243 ........................................................................................................16.6 Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355 .................................................................  17.137, 17.139, 17.142, 17.178 Opinion 1/76 [1977] ECR 741....................................................................  17.140, 17.144, 17.148, 17.149 Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871.......................................................  16.6; 17.141, 17.143, 17.144, 17.146, 17.148, 17.149, 17.149 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.................................................................................... 1.8; 17.75, 17.148 Opinion 2/91 [1993] ECR I-1061....................................................................................................17.142 Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I-2821....................................................................... 1.8; 17.65, 17.138, 17.209 Opinion 2/92 [1995] ECR I-521..................................................................... 2.46; 17.137, 17.144, 17.147 Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267............................................................................ 17.139, 17.140, 17.145 Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759...........................................................................................  17.140, 17.41 Opinion 3/94 [1995] ECR I-4577....................................................................................................17.140 Opinion 1/00 [2002] ECR I-3493....................................................................................................17.145 Opinion 2/00 [2001] ECR I-9713....................................................................................................17.144 Opinion 1/03 [2006] ECR I-1145....................................................................................................17.141 Opinion 1/08 [2009] ECR I-11129..........................................................................  17.140, 17.141, 17.144 Ordre des Avocats au Bureau de Paris v Klopp (Case 107/83) [1984] ECR 2971..........................17.101 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones v Conseil des Ministres (Case C-305/05) [2007] ECR I-5305..................................................................................................................4.34 Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores de Espana v Commission (Cases 167 & 168/87, 28 & 123/88) [1989] ECR 55.................................. 2.158; 14.41 Organizacion de Productores de Tunidos Congelados v Commission (Cases T-142/01 & T-283/01) [2004] ECR II-329............................................................................. 5.62; 7.26, 7.38, 7.52 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council (Case T-228/02) [2006] ECR II4665................................................................................................................ 2.161; 7.15, 7.17; 10.42 Orkem v Commission (Case 374/87) [1989] ECR 3283.........................................  7.46, 7.49; 9.88; 11.85 Orlandi v Commission (Case 117/78) [1979] ECR 1613................................................................7.38 Ortega Serrano v Commission (Case T-583/08P) 9 March 2010..................................... 4.11, 4.12; 16.10 Ortega Serrano v Commission (Cases F-48/08 & F-48/08AJ) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-335, II-A1-1835.................................................................................................................................  4.11, 4.106 Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission (Case 160/84) [1985] ECR 675.....................................11.92 Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission (Case 160/84R) [1984] ECR 3217.........  8.45, 8.81, 8.95, 8.108, 8.164, 8.177, 8.179 Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission (Case 160/84R II) [1984] ECR 3615.............................8.108 Oscar Orlando Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank (Case C-334/12RX-II) 28 February 2013.................................................................................................................... 15.66, 15.70 Osterreische Postsparkasse AG v Commission (Cases T-213/01 & T-214/01) [2006] ECR II1601.........................................................................................................................................9.41 Othman v Council & Commission (Case T-318/01) [2009] ECR II-1627..............................  14.13; 16.37 Othman v Council (Case T-318/01AJ) order of 27 October 2006........................... 4.88, 4.92, 4.79, 4.111, 4.112 Outokumpu Oyj v Commission (Case T-122/04) [2009] ECR II-1135...........................................9.43 Outokumpu Oyj v Commission (Case T-20/05) [2010] ECR II-89.............................................. 9.40, 9.79 Oyowe & Traore v Commission (Case C-100/88) [1989] ECR 4285.............................................3.17

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Table of Cases para P P v Commission (Case 40/79) [1981] ECR 361............................................................ 11.15, 11.26; 17.53 P & O European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA v Commission (Cases T-116/01 & T-118/01) [2003] ECR II-2957......................................................................................................................................7.70 P & O European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA v Commission (Cases C-442/03P & C-471/03P) [2006] ECR I-4845.......................................................................................... 1.121, 1.147; 7.70, 7.71; 16.34 PASP v Commission (Case T-177/11R) [2011] ECR II-304...........................................................8.74 PIA HiFi Vertriebs GmbH v Commission (Case C-388/93) [1994] ECR I-387..............................9.53 PKK v Council (Case C-229/05P) [2007] ECR I-439.....................................................................9.118 POIFXG, PALSO & PSIITENSM v Greece & Commission (Cases C-147/86 T01, C-147/86 T02 & C-147/86 T03) [1989] ECR 3103........................................................................................1.135 PPG Industries Glass SpA v Commission (Case T-78/89DEP) [1993] ECR II-573................  14.59, 14.63 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg (Case 17/81) [1982] ECR 1331 .........................10.7 Pace (née Porta) v Commission (Case 109/81) [1982] ECR 2469..................................................17.106 Pacific Fruit Co v Council & Commission (Case T-516/93) order of 17 July 1995 (unreported)...5.32 Padovani v Amministrazione delle Finanze (Case 210/87) [1988] ECR 6177................................16.37 Page Protective Services Ltd v European External Action Service (Case C-501/13P) 2 October 2014......................................................................................................................................  7.42, 7.46 Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH (Case C-145/10REC) order of 7 March 2013.............................2.165 Palacios v Economic & Social Committee (Case T-25/92) [1993] ECR II-201..............................14.20 Panagiotopoulou v European Parliament (Case T-16/90) [1992] ECR II-89..................... 9.82, 9.84; 11.14 Panhellinos Syndesmos Idioktiton Idiotikon Technikon Epangelmatikon ke Naftikon Scholikon Monadon – PSIITENSM v Greece & Commission (Case C-147/86TO3) [1989] ECR 4119.................................................................................................................................16.92, 16.104 Panhellinios Syndesmos Idioktiton Frontistirion Xenon Glosson – PALSO v Greece & Commission (Case C-147/86TO1) [1989] ECR 4111....................................................  16.92, 16.104 Pantochim SA v Commission (Case T-107/96 [1998] ECR II-311..........................................  2.161, 2.168 Papageorgiadis v European Parliament (Case 163/86) order of 18 March 1987.............................14.34 Papageorgopoulos v Economic & Social Committee (Case 277/82) [1983] ECR 2897............ 9.42; 13.10 Papierfabrik August Koehler AG v Commission (Cases C-322/07P, C-323/07P & C-338/07P) [2009] ECR I-7191..................................................................................................................1.10 Paraiki-Patraiki v Commission (Case 11/82) [1985] ECR 207.......................................................14.16 Pardini SpA v Commission (Case 809/79R) [1980] ECR 139.......................................... 8.73, 8.84, 8.108 Parfums Christian Dior SA v Evora BV (Case C-337/95) [1997] ECR I-6013..............................17.72 Parker Pen Ltd v Commission (Case T-77/92) [1994] ECR II-549............................................ 9.41; 14.63 Parliament v Commission (Case C-156/93) [1995] ECR I-2019....................................................5.92 Parliament v Council (Case C-360/93) [1996] ECR 119.................................................................5.41 Parliament v Council (Case 377/87) [1988] ECR 4017...................................................................2.161 Parliament v Council (Case C-155/07) [2008] ECR I-8103............................................................5.4 Parliament v Council (Case C-658/11), 24 June 2014.....................................................................17.4 Parliament v Council (Case C-166/07) [2009] ECR I-7135............................................................16.37 Parliament v Eistrup (Case T-223/06P) [2007] ECR II-1581..........................................................1.114 Parliament v Meskens (Case C-412/92P) [1994] ECR I-3757.................................... 2.169; 16.34, 16.166 Parliament v Innamorati (Case C-254/95P-R) [1995] ECR I-2707.................................................17.64 Parliament v Ripa de Meana (Case C-470/00P) [2004] ECR I-4167....................................... 2.149; 15.40 Parliament v Societe d’amenagement et d’equipement de la region de Strasbourg (Case C-167/99) [2003] ECR I-3269 .............................................................................................  2.20, 2.25 Parliament v U (Case T-103/10 P(R)–(R)) 28 April 2010 ..............................................................8.176 Partex v Commission (Case T-182/96) [1999] ECR II-2673...........................................................1.10 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Commission & Council (Case 216/83) [1984] ECR 3325...............7.96 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Council (Case 297/83) [1984] ECR 3339........................................7.96 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament (Case 194/83) [1986] ECR 1339..... 1.20; 17.10, 17.11 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament (Case 295/83) [1984] ECR 3331....................6.15 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament (Case 296/83) [1984] ECR 3335....................6.15 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament (Case 294/83 & 190/84) [1986] ECR 1339...3.12; 3.26; 9.53; 14.13; 17.11 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament (Case 294/83) [1986] ECR 1339................ 3.1, 3.25, 3.26; 6.15; 7.3, 7.7, 7.12 Pasquali-Gherardi v European Parliament (Case 168/83) [1985] ECR 83......................................7.65 Passetti-Bombardello v Commission (Case 20/68) [1969] ECR 235..............................................7.16 Paul’s Agriculture Ltd v Council & Commission (Case 256/81) [1983] ECR 1707.......................14.39 Pedro IV Servicios SL v Total Espana SA (Case C-260/07) [2009] ECR I-2437...........................7.5

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Table of Cases para Peek & Cloppenburg KG v Cassina SpA (Case C-456/06) [2008] ECR I-2731 .....................  2.141, 2.149 Peine-Salzgitter AG v Commission (Case T-120/89) [1991] ECR II-279.......................................17.49 Peixoto v Commission (Case T-21/93R) [1993] ECR II-463................................8.81, 8.108, 8.112, 8.130 Pelle & Konrad v Council & Commission (Cases T-8/95 & T-9/95) [2007] ECR II-4117.........  7.34, 7.51, 7.57 Pellegrini v Commission (Case C-114/08P(R)-INT) [2010] ECR I-48................................ 16.151, 16.166 Pellegrini & C Sas v Commission (Case 23/76) [1976] ECR 1807........................... 3.5, 3.17, 3.27; 13.10 People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran v Council (Case T-256/07) [2008] ECR II-3019 ..........2.161; 16.34 People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran v Council (Case T-284/08INTP) [2008] ECR II334...........................................................................................................................................16.150 Pérez-Minguez Casariego v Commission (Case T-1/90) [1991] ECR II-143..... 1.15; 2.15; 3.31; 7.5, 7.48; 9.41, 9.42; 11.4, 11.27; 14.25 Performing Right Society Ltd v Commission (Case T-421/08) 12 April 2013................................5.37 Perinciolo v Council (Cases 58 & 75/72) [1973] ECR 511................................................. 7.68, 7.94; 8.79 Peroxidos Organicos SA v Commission (Case T-120/04) [2006] ECR II-4441...................... 11.13; 13.12 Pesqueras Echebastar SA v Commission (Case C-25/91) [1993] ECR I-1719...............................18.26 Peterbroeck, van Campenhout et Cie SCS v Belgium (Case C-312/93) [1995] ECR I-4599.........17.79 Petersen v Commission (Case 102/75) [1976] ECR 1777...............................................................11.42 Petropars Iran Co v Council (Case T-433/13) 5 May 2015.............................................................9.79 Petrotub SA & Republica SA v Commission (Cases T-33/98 & T-34/98) [1999] ECR II-3837.....9.41 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV (Cases C-397/01-C-403/01) [2004] ECR I-8835..................................................................................................................2.202 Pfizer Animal Health v Council (Case T-13/99) [2002] ECR II-3305.............................................5.20 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council (Case C-329/99P(R)) [1999] ECR I-8343..............................5.52 Pfizer International Inc v Commission (Case 65/87) order of 22 September 1988....... 14.60, 14.69, 14.74, 14.75, 14.77 Pfizer International Inc v Commission (Case 65/87R) [1987] ECR 1691..........................8.45, 8.80, 8.112 Pfloeschner v Commission (Case 52/64) [1965] ECR 981 .............................................................7.58 Pfloeschner v Commission (Case T-135/89) [1990] ECR II-153....................................................7.5 Pharos SA v Commission (Case C-151/98P) [1998] ECR I-5441..................................................5.20 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission (Case 730/79) [1980] ECR 2671 ..................................9.91 Phillips-Van Heusen Corpn v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-292/01) [2003] ECR II-4335.......................................................................17.217 Piau v Commission (Case T-193/02) [2005] ECR II-209................................................................5.45 Picciolo v Commission (Case 1/87) [1988] ECR 711.....................................................................14.24 Picciolo v European Parliament (Case 111/83) [1984] ECR 2323..................................................14.25 Pickering v Commission (Case F-103/05) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-101, II-A-1-527.......... 1.15; 5.50, 5.67; 16.49, 16.56 Pi-Design AG v Yoshida Metal Industry Co Ltd (Cases C-337/12P-C-340/12P) 6 March 2014....9.118; 15.20 Pierard v Commission (Case T-169/96) [1998] ECR-SC I-A-85, II-A-205....................................2.161 Pigasos Alieftiki Naftiki Etaireia v Council & Commission (Case C-451/09P) [2010] ECR I-62....................................................................................................15.16; 17.47, 17.48, 17.51, 17.52 Pigs Marketing Board (Northern Ireland) v Redmond (Case 83/78) [1978] ECR 2347............ 2.203; 10.7 Pilato v Bourgault (Case C-109/07) [2008] ECR I-3503.................................................................17.70 Pilkington Group Ltd v Commission (Case T-462/12R) 11 March 2013........................................5.60 Pincherle v Commission (Case T-110/89) [1991] ECR II-635........................................................5.19 Pincherle v Commission (Case C-244/91P) [1993] ECR I-6965................. 5.2, 5.19; 14.10; 15.10, 15.13, 15.15, 15.21 Pinna v Caisse d’Allocations Familiales de la Savoie (Case 41/84) [1986] ECR 1........................16.37 Pioneer v Commission (Cases 100–103/80) [1983] ECR 1825................................................ 11.40, 11.42 Piraiki-Patriaki v Commission (Case 11/82) [1985] ECR 207........................................................17.12 Pistoj v Commission (Case 26/63) [1964] ECR 341.......................................................................3.3 Pitsiorlas v Council (Case C-193/01P) [2003] ECR I-4837............................................................1.114 Pitsiorlas v Council & ECB (Case T-3/00) [2001] ECR II-717; reversed on appeal Pitsiorlas v Council & ECB (Case C-193/01P) [2003] ECR I-4837 ............................................. 2.47, 2.72; 7.32 Pitsiorlas v Council & ECB (Case C-84/08P) [2008] ECR I-104...................................................7.42 Pitrone v Commission (Case C-378/90P) [1992] ECR I-2375................................................. 9.118; 15.22 Pizzinato v Commission (Case 241/84R) [1984] ECR 3619......................................................  8.91, 8.175 Pizziolo v Commission (Case 785/79) [1981] ECR 969...............11.26, 11.93, 11.94, 11.95, 11.96; 17.53 Planet AE v Commission (Case T-320/09) [2011] ECR II-1673.....................................................17.15

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Table of Cases para Planet AE Anonymi Etaireia Parochis Symvouleftikon Ypiresion v Commission (Case C-564/13P) 26 February 2015 appeal from Planet AE Anonymi Etaireia Parochis Symvouleftikon Ypiresion v Commission (Case T-489/12) 9 September 2013......................7.3, 7.15 Plantanol GmbH & Co KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt (Case C-201/08) [2009] ECR I-8343.......2.205 Plantavis GmbH v Commission (Case T-334/12) 12 June 2015......................17.11, 17.12, 17.117, 17.119 Plasticos Espanoles SA (ASPLA) v Commission (Case C-35/12P) 22 May 2014........ 15.18, 15.21, 15.42 Plaumann & Co v Commission (Case 27/62 & Case 25/62) [1963] ECR 95.............. 3.30; 6.3; 7.60; 9.41, 9.43, 9.54, 9.55; 14.59 Plaumann & Co v Commission (Case 25/62RI) [1963] ECR 123...............  8.25, 8.36, 8.108, 8.111, 8.112 Plaumann & Co v Commission (Case 25/62RII) [1963] ECR 126.................................................8.81 Pohotovost sro v Vasuta (Case C-470/12) 27 February 2014..........................................................2.141 Poland v Commission (Case T-257/04) [2009] ECR II-1545....................................... 3.2; 7.24, 7.26, 7.32 Poland v Commission (Case T-183/07) [2009] ECR II-3395..........................................................9.79 Poland v Commission (Case C-335/09P) 26 June 2012...................................... 3.2; 7.9, 7.45, 7.50; 15.16 Politi SAS v Ministry of Finance of the Italian Republic (Case 43/71) [1971] ECR 1039.............10.7 Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v Council & Commission (Case T-376/04) [2005] ECR II3007.........................................................................................................................................9.41 Polyelectrolyte Producers Group GEIE (PPG) v European Chemicals Agency (Case C-625/11P) 26 September 2013..................................................................................................................7.44 Polyvios v Commission (Case T-68/96) [1998] ECR II-153........................................................ 7.32, 7.59 Pomar v Commission (Case 317/85) [1987] ECR 2467.................................................... 7.27, 7.94; 17.62 Pommerehnke v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung (Case 66/81) [1982] ECR 1363 order of 16 March 1982..................................................................................................4.110 Pontin v T-Comalux SA (Case C-63/08) [2009] ECR I-10467.......................................................17.78 Popp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-463/12) 6 November 2014....................................................................................................9.79 Porrini v EAEC & Comont (Case 65/74) [1975] ECR 319.............................................................17.59 Portela-Comercio de artigos ortopedicos e hospitalares Lds v Commission (Case T-137/07) [2008] ECR II-329...................................................................................................................7.5 Portelange SA v Smith Corona Marchant International SA (Case 10/69) [1969] ECR 309 ..........10.7 Portugal v Commission (Case C-204/97) [2001] ECR I-3175........................................................11.55 Portugal v Commission (Case C-365/99) [2001] ECR I-5645........................................................16.56 Portugal v Commission (Case T-33/09) [2011] ECR II-1429; upheld on appeal Commission v Portugal (Case C-292/11P) 15 January 2014.................................................................  16.171; 17.42 Portugal v Transnautica (Case T-385/05) [2010] ECR II-163.........................................................16.94 Portugal v Transnautica (Case C-506/09P) 22 March 2012............................................................16.94 Possanzini v Frontex (Case F-61/11) order of 25 September 2014.......................................... 14.60, 14.72 Postbank NV v Commission (Case T-353/94) [1996] ECR II-921........................................ 7.2, 7.15, 7.17 Postbank NV v Commission (Case T-353/94R) [1994] ECR II-1141.............................................8.59 Poste Italiane SpA v Commission (Case T-53/01R) [2001] ECR II-1479.................................... 5.17, 5.34 Post Invest Europe Sarl v Commission (Case T-413/12) 15 May 2013...........................................9.69 Povse v Alpago (Case C-211/10PPU) [2010] ECR I-6673.............................................................2.211 Powell v Commission (Case 219/84) [1985] ECR 3629.................................................................7.58 Powerserv Personalservice GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-405/05) [2008] ECR II-2883........................................................5.2 Prais v Council (Case 130/75) [1976] ECR 1589................................................... 5.15; 14.5, 14.69, 14.74 Prakash v Commission (Cases 19 & 65/63) [1965] ECR 533, [1965] ECR 574............6.6, 6.8; 8.11, 8.41, 8.43, 8.93; 9.48, 9.81, 9.89; 11.24, 11.27, 11.59, 11.79; 13.10, 13.21; 14.50 Prantl (Case 16/83) [1984] ECR 1299.............................................................................................2.138 Preliminary Ruling by the Acting Judge at the Tribunal d’Instance, Hayange (Case 105/79) [1979] ECR 2257.....................................................................................................................10.7 Prelle v Commission (Case 77/70) [1971] ECR 561..................................................... 2.145; 11.15, 11.75 Preo e Figli v High Authority (Case 2/65) [1966] ECR 219..........11.15, 11.24, 11.26, 11.31, 11.75, 11.94 Preparados Alimenticios del Sur v Commission (Case T-402/11R) [2011] ECR II-439............. 8.11, 8.27, 8.47, 8.60, 8.64 Pressler-Hoeft v Court of Auditors (Case 302/85) [1987] ECR 513................................. 7.32, 7.58; 14.24 Pretore di Genova v Banchero (Case C-157/92) [1993] ECR I-1085............................  2.176, 2.182, 2.189 Pretore di Salò v X (Case 14/86) [1987] ECR 3545 .............................................. 2.176; 3.1; 17.70, 17.85 Pretura Unificata di Torino v X (Case 228/87) [1988] ECR 5099............................................ 2.174; 17.85 Prezes Urzedu Lomunikacji Elektronicznej v Commission (Cases C-422/11P & C-423/11P) 6 September 2012........................................................................................................  4.11, 4.23, 4.27

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Table of Cases para Pringle v Government of Ireland (Case C-370/12) 27 November 2012............ 2.205; 17.75, 17.76, 17.77, 17.109, 17.110 Procureur de la République v Giry & Guerlain (Cases 253/78 & 1–3/79) [1980] ECR 2327.........2.153 Procureur de la République v Tissier (Case 35/85) [1986] ECR 1207 ...........................................2.178 Procureur de la République v Vedel (Case 204/80) [1982] ECR 465..............................................11.93 Proderec-Formacao e Desenvolvimento de Recursos Humanos ACE v Commission (Case T-145/95) [1997] ECR II-823 .............................................................................................. 2.161; 6.9 Prodifarma v Commission (Case T-3/90) [1991] ECR II-1.............................................................11.4 Productos Asfalticos (PROAS) SA v Commission (Case T-495/07) 16 September 2013.......... 7.70; 16.34 Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council (Case C-461/07P(I)) [2008] ECR I-11.............  3.2; 5.28; 10.4; 13.5 Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council (Case C-462/07P(I)) [2008] ECR I-13.................................3.2; 5.28 Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council (Case C-463/07P(I)) [2008] ECR I-14.................................3.2; 5.28 Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council (Case C-464/07P(I)) [2008] ECR I-15.................................3.2; 5.28 Przedsiebiorstwo Handlowe Medox Lepiarz Jaroslaw Lepiarz Alicja sp. j. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-591/11) 11 December 2013..................................................................................................................... 3.27; 9.34 Psarras v European Union Agency for Network & Information Security (Case F-118/10) 2 October 2012............................................................................................................................9.80 Pubblico Ministero v SAIL (Case 82/71) [1972] ECR 119.............................................................17.69 Publishers’ Association v Commission (Case 56/89R) [1989] ECR 1693...........  8.81, 8.89, 8.101, 8.112, 8.131, 8.177 Q Q v Commission (Case F-52/05) [2007] ECR-SC II-A-1-1485......................................................6.3 Qualcomm Wireless Business Solutions Europe BV v Commission (Case T-48/04) [2009] ECR II-2029................................................................................................................................... 7.46, 7.49 Qualitest v Council (Case T-421/11) 5 December 2012..................................................................9.54 Quantel SA v Commission (Cases T-29 & T-30/90) order of 23 January 1991 (unreported).......5.28, 5.66 Quiller & Heusmann v Council & Commission (Cases T-195/94 & T-202/94) [1997] ECR I-2247.......................................................................................................................................2.166 Quinn Barlo v Commission (Case C-70/12P) 30 May 2013...........................................................15.26 R R v Commission (Case T-156/08P) [2009] ECR-SC I-B-1-11, II-B-1-51.................................16.10; 17.63 R v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, ex p Accrington Beef Co Ltd (Case C-241/95) [1996] ECR I-6699..................................................................................................................17.77 R v Lomas (Cases C-38/90 & C-151/90) [1992] ECR I-1781.........................................................16.37 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd (Case C-491/01) [2001] ECR I-11453...............................................................................................12.45 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (Case C-213/89) [1990] ECR I2433.................................................................................................... 2.199; 8.3, 8.7, 8.9, 8.69; 17.96 R v Social Security Comr, ex p Browning (Case 22/81) [1981] ECR 3357....................................10.15 R (on the application of the Alliance for Natural Health) v Secretary of State for Health (Cases C-154/04 & C-155/04) [2005] ECR I-6451.............................................................................2.205 R (on the application of British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health (Case C-491/01) [2002] ECR I-11453....................................................... 17.15, 17.77, 17.83 R (on the application of IATA & ELFAA v Department for Transport (Case C-344/04) [2006] ECR I-403................................................................................................................................2.205 R (on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko)) v Secretary of State for Transport (Case C-308/06) [2008] ECR I-4057...................................17.75 R (on the application of SP Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food (Case C-140/02) [2003] ECR I-10635.....................................................................................2.149 R (on the application of TNT Post UK Ltd) v HMRC (Case C-357/07) [2009] ECR I-3025.........2.149 RAL (Channel Islands) v Commissioners of Customs & Excise (Case C-452/03) [2005] ECR I-3947.......................................................................................................................................10.3 REWE-Zentrale AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-22/10P) [2010] ECR I-135.........................................................................................9.119 RJB Mining plc v Commission (Case T-110/98) [2000] ECR II-971..........................................  9.41, 9.79 RM v Council (Case 175/86R) [1986] ECR 2511...........................................................................8.83 ROGESA v Commission (Case 196/84) order of 18 September 1985............................................14.33 RTL Belgium SA, formerly TVi SA (Case C-517/09) [2010] ECR I-14093..................................17.70 RV Moritz v Commission (Case T-20/89) [1993] ECR II-1423......................................................15.63

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Table of Cases para Rabe v Commission (Case 76/69) [1971] ECR 297........................................................................11.59 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission (Cases 76, 77 & 91/89R) [1989] ECR 1141............. 5.28, 5.59; 8.7, 8.81, 8.89, 8.94, 8.112, 8.130, 8.131, 8.177 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission (Cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P) [1995] ECR I-743........ 5.17, 5.18, 5.34, 5.45; 15.13 Radiotelevisione Italiana SpA (Case C-440/98) [1999] ECR I-8597....................................... 17.69, 17.70 Radiotelevisione italiana SpA v PTV Programmazioni Televisive SpA (Case C-305/07) [2008] ECR I-55..................................................................................................................................2.180 Radlberger Getrankegesellschaft mbH & Co v Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Case C-309/02) [2004] ECR I-11763..........................................................................................................2.149, 2.153 Raffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Commission (Cases T-259/02-T-264/02 & T-271/02) [2006] ECR II-5169.............................................................................................................. 3.25, 3.34 Ragusa v Commission (Case 282/81) [1983] ECR 1245.................................................................14.24 Raiola-Denti v Council (Case T-22/91-INT) [1993] ECR II-817..........................  16.150, 16.151, 16.152, 16.153, 16.159 Rajani v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-559/08P) [2010] ECR I-110.................................................................................................15.25 Rajani (Case C-559/08AJ) order of 21 January 2009 (unreported)........................................... 4.93, 4.111 Ramondin v Commission (Cases C-186/02P & C-188/02P) [2004] ECR I-10653..............  5.2, 5.13, 5.14, 5.20, 5.28 Raponi v Commission (Case 27/63) [1964] ECR 129.....................................................................3.3 Rasmussen v Commission (Case 173/84) [1986] ECR 197............................................................7.64 Razanatsimba (Case 65/77) [1977] ECR 2229................................................................................17.71 Raznoimport v Commission (Case 120/83R) [1983] ECR 2573..................... 2.110; 8.6, 8.26, 8.81, 8.98, 8.113, 8.175 Razzouk & Beydoun v Commission (Cases 75 & 117/82) [1984] ECR 1509................ 7.64; 14.43; 17.60 Reagens SpA v Commission (Case T-30/10) 14 May 2014............................................................11.13 Reali v Commission (Case T-65/09P) 27 October 2010..................................................................17.15 Recheio – Cash & Carry SA v Fazenda Publica/Registo Nacional de Pessoas Colectivas (Case C-30/02) [2004] ECR I-6051...................................................................................................2.149 Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from the Tribunal de Grand Instance, Melun (Case 43/76) order of 30 June 1976 (unreported).........................................................................................7.94 Reference for a Preliminary Ruling by the Acting Judge at the Tribunal d’Instance, Hayange (Cases 105/79 & 68/80) [1979] ECR 2257 & [1980] ECR 771 ................................. 2.183; 7.3, 7.94 Regiao autonoma dos Acores v Council (Case T-37/04R) [2004] ECR II-2153.........................  5.17, 5.19 Regie Networks v Commission (Case T-340/11) 17 October 2012.................................................7.51 Regionalny Fundusz Gospodarczy SA v Commission (Case T-288/06) [2009] ECR II-2247........9.42 Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission (Case T-171/02) [2005] ECR II-2123.............5.44 Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission (Cases T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08 & T-454/08) [2011] ECR II-6255........................................................................................  5.44; 17.116 Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali (Case C-347/03) [2005] ECR I-3785.................................................................................................2.149 Regione Puglia v Commission & Spain (Case T-609/97) [1998] ECR I-4051................................3.14 Regione Siciliana v Commission (Case C-417/04P) [2006] ECR I-3881.......................................3.2 Regione Siciliana v Commission (Case T-190/00) [2003] ECR II-5015.........................................7.45 Regione Siciliana v Commission (Case T-341/02) [2004] ECR II-2877.........................................3.2 Regione Toscana v Commission (Case C- 180/97) [1997] ECR I-5245......................................... 2.24 3.2 Regione Toscana v Commission (Case T-265/97) order of 5 March 1998......................................2.22 Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais v Commission (Cases T-267/08 & T-279/08) [2011] ECR II-1999....2.161; 9.84 Region Wallonne v Commission (Case C-95/97) [1997] ECR I-1787.................................... 2.24; 3.2; 5.3 Regul-Eberhardt v Commission (Case 260/81) order of 21 October 1981.....................................2.13 Reichardt v Commission (Case 174/80R) [1980] ECR 2665..........................................................8.111 Reina v Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg (Case 65/81) [1982] ECR 33.........................  10.7; 17.73 Reinarz v Commission (Case 17/68) [1969] ECR 61.......... 9.52, 9.54; 9.89; 14.69, 14.72; 16.166, 16.173 Reinarz v Commission (Case 46/69) [1970] ECR 275 ...................................................................9.42 Reinarz v Commission & Council (Case 48/76) [1977] ECR 291.........17.60, 17.62, 17.63, 17.73, 17.118 Reinarz v Commission (Cases T-6 & T-52/92) [1993] ECR II-1047......... 7.80; 9.54; 11.47; 17.61, 17.117 Reiseburo Binder GmbH (Case C-116/96REV) [1998] ECR I-1889........................  16.24, 16.141, 16.166 Reliance Industries Ltd v Council & Commission (Case T-45/06) [2008] ECR II-2399................7.6, 7.15, 7.17, 7.58

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Table of Cases para Remia BV v Commission (Case 42/84) [1985] ECR 2545.............................................................9.43 Remy v Commission (Case 74/85R) [1985] ECR 1185...............................................................  8.45, 8.84 Renco SpA v Council (Case T-4/01) [2003] ECR II-171................................................................9.42 Rendo NV v Commission (Case T-16/91) [1992] ECR II-2417..........................................  7.5, 7.92; 9.82 Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades SA v Commission (Case T-496/07) 16 September 2013......7.70, 7.71; 16.34 Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades v Commission (Case T-562/08) order of 5 November 2012.........................................................................................................................................11.57 Repsol YPF v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-466/13P) 22 October 2014...................................................................................................15.17 Retter v Caisse de Pension des Employés Privés (Case 130/87) [1989] ECR 685 .........................2.149 Rewe-Handelgesellschaft Nord v Hauptzollamt Flensburg (Case 278/82) [1984] ECR 721..........17.84 Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Grosshandels GmbH v Hauptzollamt Emmerich (Case 37/70) [1971] ECR 23.........................................................................................................................10.26 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG & Rewe- Zentral A-G v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland (Case 33/76) [1976] ECR 1989..........................................................................................................7.24 Reyners v Belgium (Case 2/74) [1974] ECR 631 ...........................................................................2.186 Reynier v Commission (Cases 79 & 82/63) [1964] ECR 259............. 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.30; 7.70; 14.7, 14.36 Reynier v Commission (Cases 98 & 99/63R) [1964] ECR 276................................................... 8.91; 14.7 Rheinmuhlen Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 6/71) [1971] ECR 719.......................................................................................................................2.191 Rhenania Schiffahrts- und Speditionsgesellschaft mbH v Commission (Case 103/63) [1964] ECR 425................................................................................................................. 14.39, 14.40; 16.25 Rhône-Poulenc v Commission (Cases T-1-T-4 & T-6-T-15/89) [1990] ECR II-637 .....2.74; 6.3, 6.7; 9.20; 12.10, 12.29; 13.25, 13.35 Riccardo Prisco Srl v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato & Ministero delle Finanze v (CASER SpA (Cases C-216/99 & C-222/99) [2002] ECR I-6761...................................  2.149, 2.151 Richez-Parise v Commission (Cases 19, 20, 25 & 30/69) [1970] ECR 325...................................17.48 Richez-Parise v Commission (Case 40/71) [1972] ECR 73............... 9.55; 14.24; 16.123, 16.124, 16.129, 16.132, 16.133 Rienzi v Commission (Case 76/84) [1987] ECR 315...............................................................  14.23, 14.24 Rihoux v Commission (Case 52/85) [1986] ECR 1555..................................................................7.64 Rijksdienst voor Werknemerspensioenen v Vlaeminck (Case 132/81) [1982] ECR 2953....... 2.182; 11.31 Rijn-Schelde-Verolme Maschinenfabrieken en Scheepswerven NV v Commission (Case 223/85) [1987] ECR 4617.....................................................................................................................7.17 Rijnoudt v Commission (Cases T-97/92 & T-111/92) [1993] ECR II-587......................................5.36 Rinau (Case C-195/08PPU) [2008] ECR I-5271.............................................................................2.211 Ripa de Meana v Parliament (Case C-360/02P) [2004] ECR I-10339...................1.121, 1.147; 2.47, 2.97; 6.14; 7.38 Riseria Modenese Srl v Council & Commission & Birra Peroni SpA (Case 267/80REV) [1985] ECR 3499.................................................................................................................................16.109 Ritter Von Wüllerstorff und Urbair v Commission (Case 7/77) [1978] ECR 769...........................7.16 Rittweger v Commission (Case 33/68) [1969] ECR 393............................................................ 7.15; 14.25 Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA v Lo Bue (Case C-233/01) [2002] ECR I-9411.......................2.184 Riviera Auto Service Etablissements Dalmasso SA v Commission (Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 & T-190/96) [1999] ECR II-93................................................................................................  5.46; 7.59 Robards v Insurance Officer (Case 149/82) [1983] ECR 171..........................................................17.100 Robert Bosch GmbH v Haupzollamt Hildesheim (Case 135/77) [1978] ECR 855.................2.204; 16.166 Roberts v Commission (Case T-25/99AJ) order of 20 October 1999 (unreported).......... 4.92, 4.110, 4.111 Roda Golf & Beach Resort SL (Case C-14/08) [2009] ECR I-5439...............................................7.6 Romana Tabacchi v Commission (Case T-11/06) [2011] ECR II-6681..........................................9.79 Romana Tabacchi SpA v Commission (Case T-11/06R) [2006] ECR II-2491........................... 8.165; 9.40 Roquette Frères v Council (Case 138/79) [1980] ECR 3333..................................... 4.21; 5.3, 5.98; 14.13 Roquette Frères v Administration des Douanes (Case 145/79) [1980] ECR 2917..........................16.37 Roquette Frères SA v Commission (Case 20/88) [1989] ECR 1553................................. 7.24, 7.34; 17.45 Roquette Freres SA v Commission (Case T-322/01) [2006] ECR II-3137.................... 2.72, 2.143, 2.151; 9.41, 9.84 Roquette Frères SA v Council (Case 110/81) [1982] ECR 3159.......................................  7.90; 9.50, 9.82 Roquette Frères SA v Hauptzollamt Geldern (Case C-228/92) [1994] ECR I-1445.......................16.37 Rosani v Council (Cases 193–198/82) [1983] ECR 2841...............................................................7.80 Rosenbaum v Commission (Case T-452/09P) 21 June 2011......................................................  15.2, 15.18

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Table of Cases para Rossi v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C214/05P) [2006] ECR I-7057................................................................................................9.41 Rothley v Parliament (Case C-167/02P) [2004] ECR I-3149..........................................................1.20 Roujansky v Council (Case C-253/94P) [1995] ECR I-7........................................................... 15.2; 17.11 Roumengous (née Carpentier) v Commission (Case 158/79) [1985] ECR 39.................. 9.45, 9.55; 17.53 Rounis v Commission (Case F-78/05) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-59, II-A-1-333...............................2.64 Rousse Industry AD v Commission (Case C-271/13P) 20 March 2014............................ 9.2; 11.43; 15.18 Rousseau v Court of Auditors (Case 167/86) [1988] ECR 2705.....................................................3.26 Roviello v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben (Case 20/85) [1988] ECR 2805 ......1.72; 2.140, 2.149, 2.178 Royal Olympic Cruises Ltd v Council & Commission (Case T-201/99) [2000] ECR I-4005........3.3 Royal Philips Electronics NV v Commission (Case T-119/02) [2003] ECR II-1433..........2.92; 5.44, 5.47; 9.56 Royal Scholten Honig (Holdings) Ltd & Tunnel Refineries Ltd v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (Cases 193 & 145/77) [1978] ECR 2037..............................................10.26 Royer (Case 48/75) [1976] ECR 497...............................................................................................10.10 Ruckdeschel & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen (Cases 117/76 & 16/77) [1977] ECR 1753.........................................................................................................................................11.64 Rudolf Flender KG v Commission (Case 74/81) [1982] ECR 395.......................1.21; 2.160; 14.19; 16.25 Ruffler v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wroclawiu Osrodek Zamiejscowy w Walbrzychu (Case C-544/07) [2009] ECR I-3389.................................................................................................7.5 Ruiz-Picasso v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-185/02) [2004] ECR II-1739................................................................................................3.13 Ruling1/78 [1978] ECR 2151........................................................... 16.6; 17.146, 17.177, 17.181, 17.184, 17.185, 17.188 Russo v AIMA (Case 60/75) [1976] ECR 45..................................................................................7.22 Ryanair v Commission (Case C-287/12P) 13 June 2013.................................................................15.21 Ryanair Ltd v Commission (Case T-140/95) [1998] ECR II-3327...................................... 5.46; 6.18; 7.45 Ryanair Ltd v Commission (Case T-500/12) 5 February 2015........................................................5.48 Rydalm v Commission (Case T-5/89) order of 13 February 1990...................................................14.34 S S v Commission (Case C-206/89R) [1989] ECR 2841 ....................... 2.110; 8.5, 8.25, 8.74, 8.108, 8.111 S Lehrfreund Ltd v Council & Commission (Case T-228/95R) [1996] ECR II-111.......................8.45 SA Cimenteries CBR v Commission (Cases T-10-T-12, T-14 & T-15/92R) [1992] ECR II1571.........................................................................................................................  8.94, 8.111, 8.178 SA Cimenteries CBR v Commission (Cases T-10/92 R-T-12/92R & T-14/92 R-T-15/92R) [1992] ECR II-1571.........................................................................................................................  8.74, 8.80 SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission (Case T-7/89) [1991] ECR II-1711............................2.102 SA Intermills v Commission (Case 323/82) [1984] ECR 3809 ................................................2.102, 2.105 SA Métallurgique d’ Espérance-Longdoz v High Authority (Case 3/65) [1965] ECR 1065..........11.28, 11.75 SA Monopole SpA v SA Compagnie des Eaux de Harre (Case 139/88) order of 27 October 1988 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................2.196 SA Musique Diffusion Française v Commission (Cases 100–103/80) [1983] ECR 1825 .............2.102 SA Portelange v SA Smith Corona Merchant International (Case 10/69) [1969] ECR 309...........17.82 SA Roquette Frères v France (Case 29/77) [1977] ECR 1835........................................................10.26 SA Saint-Herblain Distribution, Centre Distributor Leclerc v Syndicat des Libraires de LoireOcèan (Case 299/83) [1985] ECR 2515 .................................................................................2.204 SA Sermes v Directeur des Services des Douanes de Strasbourg (Case C-323/88) [1990] ECR I-3027.......................................................................................................................................10.21 SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) (Case C-364/92) [1994] ECR I-43........................ 2.170, 2.202; 16.171; 17.66, 17.100 SC Belasco v Commission (Case 246/86) [1989] ECR 2117...................................................  12.12, 12.18 SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission (Case C-113/07P) [2009] ECR I-2207...................9.91 SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission (Case C-481/07P) [2009] ECR I-127.....................11.17 SGA v Commission (Case C-39/00P) [2000] ECR I-11201 ..........................................................2.59 SGA v Commission (Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 & T-123/96) [1999] ECR II-3587.........................7.59 SGL Carbon AG v Commission (Case C-308/04P) [2006] ECR I-5977.........................................2.141 SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicacao SA v Commission (Cases T-297/01 & T-298/01) [2004] ECR I-743....................................................................................................................2.161 SICA & SIPEFEL v Commission (Case 114/83) [1984] ECR 2589...........................................  5.32, 5.37

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Table of Cases para SICA & SIPEFEL v Commission (Case 114/83R) [1983] ECR 2315............  8.43, 8.44, 8.83, 8.93, 8.134 SIMET v High Authority (Case 36–38, 40 & 41/58) [1959] ECR 157...........................................7.42 SIMET v High Authority (Case 25/65) [1967] ECR 113................................................................14.68 SIMET & FERAM v High Authority (Cases 25 & 26/65) [1967] ECR 33 ......... 7.32; 9.42; 14.68; 17.119 SITPA v ONIFLHOR (Case C-27/90) [1991] ECR I-133...............................................................10.6 SIVU du Plan d’Eau de la Vallee du Lot v Commission (Case C-172/97OP) [2001] ECR I6699.........................................................................................................................................16.69 SNUPAT v High Authority (Cases 32 & 33/58) [1959] ECR 127...................................................13.12 SNUPAT v High Authority (Cases 42 & 49/59) [1961] ECR 53............. 2.72; 3.15; 5.43, 5.46, 5.72, 5.81; 7.57, 7.58, 7.98; 11.24, 11.64, 11.102; 12.3, 12.4, 12.19 SOREMA v High Authority (Case 67/63R) [1964] ECR 174............................................  8.11, 8.74, 8.93 SP v Commission (Cases T-472/09 & T-55/10) 9 December 2014.................................................9.79 SpA Acciaierie e Ferriere Stefana Fratelli v High Authority (Case 1/66R) [1967] ECR 283.........8.161 STS Consorzio per Sistemi di Telecomunicazione via Satellite SpA v Commission (Case 126/83) [1984] ECR 2769 ....................................................................................................................9.42 SV Capital OU v European Banking Authority (Case T-660/14) 9 September 2015......................17.15 Saarland v Minister for Industry, Post & Telecommunications & Tourism (Case 187/87) [1988] ECR 5013.................................................................................................................................17.150 Sabbagh v Council (Case T-652/11) 26 February 2015............................................................ 2.161; 10.44 Sabbatini née Bertoni v European Parliament (Case 20/71) [1972] ECR 345 ...............................17.116 Sabbatucci v Parliament (Case T-42/98R) [1998] ECR II-3043......................................................2.67 Sacaim SpA v Commission (Case T-261/00) 12 December 2012...................................................2.48 Sachsa Verpackung v Commission (Case T-79/06) [2011] ECR II-406......................................  9.79, 9.84 Sachsa Verpackung v Commission (Case C-40/12P) 26 November 2013....................................  9.79, 9.84 Saddik (Case C-458/93) [1995] ECR I-511.............................................................................  2.176; 17.82 Sadolin & Holmblad A/S members of the Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission (Case 17/74) [1974] ECR 1063................................................................................................10.38 Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council (Case T-384/11) 25 November 2014.........................................  17.48, 17.52 Sagar Srl v Commission (Case T-269/00) 29 January 2013............................................................2.48 Sahinler v Commission (Case 297/84) [1986] ECR 443.................................................................9.34 Sahlstedt v Commission (Case C-362/06P) [2009] ECR I-2903.....................................................7.7 Saint & Murray v Council & Commission (Case T-554/93) [1997] ECR II-563................ 2.64; 7.34, 7.51 Saint-Gobin Glass France SA v Commission (Cases T-56/09 & T-73/09) (27 March 2014)..........1.10 Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v Commission (Case T-476/12) 11 December 2014....  9.40, 9.79 Saintraint v Commission (Case F-103/06REV) 20 September 2011.................. 4.9; 16.28, 16.106, 16.141 Salazar Brier v Commission (Case C-9/06P) [2007] ECR I-10357................................................9.118 Salerno v Commission & Council (Cases 87 & 130/77, 22/83, 9 & 10/84) [1985] ECR 2523......17.117 Salerno v Commission (Case 4/78R) [1978] ECR 1.................  8.25, 8.81, 8.84, 8.94, 8.111, 8.134, 8.135 Salgoil SpA v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade (Case 13/68) [1968] ECR 453 ......... 10.7; 17.79, 17.100 Salonia v Poidomani (Case 126/80) [1981] ECR 1563................................................. 10.7; 17.83, 17.100 Salt Union v Commission (Case T-330/94) [1995] ECR II-2881...................... 2.15; 5.17, 5.28, 5.32, 5.90 Salvador Garcia v Commission (Case C-7/06P) [2007] ECR I-10265............................................9.118 Salzano v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Case 191/83) [1984] ECR 3741.............................................10.10 Salzgitter AG v Commission (Case C-182/99P) [2003] ECR I-1071......................  1.77, 1.87, 1.91; 11.60 Salzgitter AG v Commission (Case T-90/99) [2002] ECR II-4535 ................................................2.161 Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v Commission (Case C-411/04P) [2007] ECR I-959............ 12.19; 13.34, 13.40 Samara v Commission (Case 21/86) [1987] ECR 795....................................................................16.34 Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-Produktiebedrijven NV v Commission (Case T-39/90R) [1990] ECR II-629..........................................................................................................................  8.81, 8.108 Samenwerkende Electriciteits-Produktiebedrijven NV v Commission (Cases C-372/90P, C-372/90P-R & C-22/91P) [1991] ECR I-2043................................ 8.48; 14.10, 14.38; 15.31, 15.34 Samenwerkende Electriciteits-Produktiebedrijven v Commission (Case C-36/92P) [1994] ECR I-1911.................................................................................................................................  14.9; 15.52 Sanders v Commission (Case T-45/01) [2004] ECR II-3315....................................................... 1.32; 7.29 Sanders v Commission (Case T-45/01DEP) [2009] ECR II-4093...................................................14.73 Sandoz AG v Commission (Case 53/69) [1972] ECR 845....................................................... 11.93, 11.94 Santesteban Goicoechea (Case C-296/08PPU) [2008] ECR I-6307................................................2.211 Santopietro v Commission (Case 61/74) [1975] ECR 483 .............................................................14.20 Sarc v Commission (Case T-488/11) 12 June 2014.........................................................................9.79 Sardegna Lines v Commission (Case T-58/98) order of 16 March 1999........................................2.30

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Table of Cases para Sarl Albatros v Societe des petroles et des combustibles liquids (SOPECO) (Case 20/64) [1965] ECR 29 ....................................................................................................................................17.82 Sarrio SA v Commission (Case C-291/98P) [2000] ECR I-1213.............................................  2.254, 2.259 Saudray v Commission (Case 6/65) [1965] ECR 993 ....................................................................7.58 Savma SpA v Commission (Case 264/81) [1984] ECR 3915....................................... 11.32, 11.37; 17.17 Scaramuzza v Commission (Case C-76/93P) [1993] ECR I-5715 .................................................5.32 Scharf v Commission (Case 292/84R) [1984] ECR 4349........................................ 8.45, 8.74, 8.81, 8.101 Schenker AG v Air France (Case C-589/11 P(I)) 8 June 2012........................................................5.28 Schenker AG v Cathay Pacific Airways (Case C-598/11) 8 June 2012...........................................5.28 Schenker AG v Deutsche Lufthansa (Case C-602/11 P(I)) 8 June 2012.........................................5.28 Schenker AG v Lan Airlines (Case C-600/11 P(I)) 8 June 2012.....................................................5.28 Schenker SIA v Valsts ienemumu dienests (Case C-93/08) [2009] ECR I-903..............................13.20 Schertzer v European Parliament (Case 25/68) [1977] ECR 1729.............. 4.101, 4.132; 7.32, 7.38; 12.11 Scheuer v Commission (Case T-108/89) [1990] ECR II-411..................................................... 7.80; 13.12 Scheucher-Fleisch GmbH v Commission (Case T-375/04) [2009] ECR II-4155............................9.42 Schiavo v Council (Case 122 & 123/79) [1981] ECR 473......................................................... 7.32; 14.26 Schilling v Finanzamt Nurnberg-Sud (Case C-209/01) [2003] ECR I-13389.................................2.149 Schina v Commission (Case 401/85) [1987] ECR 3911................................................... 7.59; 9.82; 17.63 Schiocchet v Commission (Case C-289/99P) [2000] ECR I-10279................................................2.27 Schlieker v High Authority (Case 12/63) [1963] ECR 85...........................................................  1.20; 3.15 Schloh v Council (Case 85/82) [1983] ECR 2105...........................................................................7.16 Schloh v Council (Case T-11/91) [1990] ECR II-203.....................................................................9.50 Schmid (Case C-516/99) [2002] ECR I-4573..................................................................................17.70 Schmidt Spiele GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-492/13 & T-493/13) 3 March 2015.............................................................9.18 Schmoldt v Commission (Case T-264/03) [2004] ECR II-1515............................................ 3.14; 7.1, 7.45 Schneider v Bundesministerium fur Justiz (Case C-380/01) [2004] ECR I-1389...........................7.5 Schneider Electric v Commission (Case T-48/03) [2006] ECR II-111............................................7.5, 7.19 Schneider Electric SA v Commission (Case T-310/01) [2002] ECR II-4071............................ 2.92; 16.34 Schneider Electric SA v Commission (Case T-351/03) [2007] ECR II-2237.............................. 9.41, 9.48 Schoffer v Commission (Case 46/64) [1965] ECR 811 ..................................................................7.58 Schonberger v Parliament (Case F-7/08DEP) 26 April 2010.............................  14.60, 14.70, 14.72, 14.76 Schönherr v Economic & Social Committee (Case T-25/90) [1992] ECR II-63.............................11.63 Schots (née Kortner) v Council, Commission & European Parliament (Cases 15–33, 52, 53, 57–109, 116, 117, 123, 132, 135–137/73) [1974] ECR 177...................................... 7.59, 7.71; 17.19 Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office (Cases T-133/08, T-134/08, T-177/08 & T-242/09) 18 September 2012.............................................................................. 1.158; 2.77, 2.125; 11.24; 13.2 Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office (Case C-546/12P) 21 May 2015........................  2.125; 11.24 Schreckenberg v Euratom Commission (Case 59/65) [1966] ECR 543 ....................................  7.59, 7.59 Schroder v Commission (Case C-221/97P) [1998] ECR I-8255.............................................. 2.137; 16.10 Schroeder v Commission (Case T-390/94) [1997] ECR II-501.................................................  2.137; 3.39 Schulte v Council & Commission (Case T-261/94) [2002] ECR II-44...........................................2.125 Schuerer v Commission (Case 107/79REV) [1983] ECR 3805......................................................16.123 Schuerer v Council (Case T-338/99) [2000] ECR II-2571..............................................................9.41 Schwaaner Fischwaren GmbH v Rugen Fisch AG (Case C-582/11 P-DEP) order of 14 November 2013.........................................................................................................................................14.64 Schwarz (Case C-321/07) [2009] ECR I-1113................................................................................17.65 Schwedler v European Parliament (Case C-132/90P) [1991] ECR I-5745.........9.118; 15.15, 15.21, 15.52 Schwedler v European Parliament (Case T-41/89) [1990] ECR II-79.......................................... 9.54, 9.89 Schwiering v Court of Auditors (Case 142/85) [1986] ECR 3177..................................................4.31 Schwiering v Court of Auditors (Case 321/85) [1986] ECR 3199.................................. 9.15; 14.74, 14.75 Schwiering v Court of Auditors (Case 321/88) order of 15 June 1988...........................................14.78 Scott v Avery (1856) 5 HL Cas 811, 25 LJ Ex 308.........................................................................17.168 Scott SA v Commission (Case T-366/00) [2003] ECR II-1763.................................................. 2.102; 14.6 Scott SA v Commission (Case C-276/03P) [2005] ECR I-8437.....................................................14.13 Scuppa v Commission (Cases 4 & 30/74) [1975] ECR 919 ........................................................  7.59, 7.60 Sebastiani v European Parliament (Case C-294/91P) [1992] ECR I-4997......................................15.21 Secolux v Commission (Case T-90/14) 3 November 2014........................................................... 3.11; 17.9 Securvita – Gesellschaft zur Entwicklung alternativer Versicherungskonzepte mbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-285/08) [2009] ECR II-2171.......................................................................................................................... 7.5; 16.34 Sedef v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg (Case C-230/03) [2006] ECR I-157.................................1.175

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Table of Cases para Sedqhi v Council (Case T-66/12) 4 June 2014.................................................................................9.54 Seiler v Council (Case 189/82) [1984] ECR 229 ............................................................................5.28 Selex Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission (Case T-155/04) [2006] ECR II-4797; on appeal SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission (Case C-113/07P) [2009] ECR I-2207........5.44, 5.49, 5.61, 5.63 Sellier v Commission (Case C-191/07P) [2007] ECR I-113...........................................................7.41 Selmani v Council & Commission (Case T-299/04) [2005] ECR II-20..........................................7.5 Sens v Commission (Case T-117/89) [1990] ECR II-185..........................................................  13.2, 13.43 Sergio v Commission (Cases 64, 71–73 & 78/86) [1988] ECR 1399........................................ 14.7; 14.24 Sergio v Commission (Case 64/86R) [1986] ECR 1081.................................................................8.91 Sergy v Commission (Case 58/75) [1976] ECR 1139....................................................... 7.16, 7.64; 17.62 Serio v Commission (Case 115/73REV) [1974] ECR 671 .................................................. 16.115, 16.118 Serio v Euratom Commission (Case 62/65) [1966] ECR 561 ........................................................9.44 Serrano v Parliament (Case T-47/05) [2008] ECR SC 1-A-2 55, II-A-2 357 on appeal Serrano v Parliament (Case C-496/08P) [2010] ECR I-1793...................................................... 7.18, 7.77; 9.80 Serrano v Parliament (Case F-9/07) 29 September 2011.................................................................7.70 Serrano v Parliament (Case C-496/08P) [2010] ECR I-1793..................................................... 2.157; 9.80 Service pour le Groupement d’Acquisitions (SGA) v Commission (Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 & T-123/96) [1999] ECR II-3587 on appeal SGA v Commission (Case C-39/00P) [2000] ECR I-11201................................................................................  2.59; 6.7; 9.41; 11.62; 12.18, 12.31 Servizi assicurativi del commercio estero SpA (SACE) v Commission (Case T-305/13R) 13 June 2014................................................................................................. 8.104, 8.136, 8.160, 8.177, 8/183 Sequeira Wandschneider v Commission (Case F-28/06) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-119, II-A-1451...........................................................................................................................................5.14 Seton v Commission (Cases 36, 37 & 218/81) [1983] ECR 1789..................................................14.26 Sevenier v Commission (Case T-368/09P) 8 July 2010...................................................................9.119 Sevince v Staatsecretaris van Justitie (Case C-192/89) [1990] ECR I-3461...................................17.76 Shahid Beheshti University v Council (Case T-120/12) 20 November 2012............. 7.25, 7.42, 7.46; 954; 17.117 Shanghai Bicycle Corp (Group) v Council (Case T-170/94) [1997] ECR II-1383....................... 2.61; 3.12 Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise Co Ltd v Council (Case T-299/05) [2009] ECR II-565.........  7.14, 7.15, 7.16; 12.5 Sharp Corpn v Council (Case C-179/87) [1992] ECR I-1635.........................................................5.70 Shaw v Commission (Case T-131/99) [2002] ECR II-2023......................................... 7.2, 7.16, 7.17; 9.41 Shell International Chemical Co Ltd v Commission (Case T-11/89) [1992] ECR II-757......... 2.154; 5.98; 13.26, 13.32, 13.43 Shell International Chemical Co Ltd v Commission (Case C-234/92P) [1999] ECR I-4501.........2.151; 5.98; 11.15 Shell Products v Commission (Case T-343/06) 27 September 2012...............................................9.79 Shevill v Presse Alliance (Case C-68/93) [1995] ECR I-415..........................................................1.72 Shimadzu Europa GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Berlin (Case C-218/89) [1990] ECR I-4391......1.174 Sibilli v Commission (Case F-140/06AJ) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-47, II-A-1-257...........................4.91 Sideradria Industria Metallurgica SpA v Commission (Case 204/84) [1986] ECR 1415...............13.12 Sideradria SpA v Commission (Case 67/84) [1985] ECR 3983......................................................17.117 Sideradria SpA – Industria Metallurgica v Commission (Case 41/85) [1986] ECR 3917..............17.104 Siderurgica Aristrain Madrid SL v Commission (Case T-156/94R) [1994] ECR II-715................8.117 Siderurgica Aristrain Madrid SL v Commission (Case C-196/99P) [2003] ECR I-11005............ 1.87; 8.1; 11.60 Sieckmann (Case C-273/00) [2002] ECR I-11737..........................................................................2.149 Siemens v Commission (Case T-223/11) 15 July 2014...................................................................9.79 Siemens SA v Commission (Case T-459/93) [1995] ECR II-1675.................................................5.41 Siemens AG v Commission (Cases C-238/11P, C-489/11P & C-498/11P)19 December 2013......7.38 Siemens AG v Commission (Cases C-239/11P, C-489/11P, C-498/11P) (19 December 2013)......1.135; 9.40, 9.54; 11.24; 13.15, 13.16, 13.17, 13.25, 13.28, 13.36, 13.37; 15.16, 15.18, 15.21; 17.103 Silver Seiko Ltd v Council (Cases 273/85 & 107/86) [1988] ECR 5927........................................5.30 Silver Seiko Ltd v Council (Case 273/85R) [1985] ECR 3475........... 5.22; 5.87; 8.81, 8.141, 8.163, 8.164 Simba SpA v Council (Case C-287/93R) order of 6 July 1993 (unreported)..................................8.74 Simet v High Authority (Cases 36–38, 40, 41/58) [1959] ECR 157...............................................1.106 Simmenthal SpA v Commission (Case 92/78) [1979] ECR 777.............................................. 7.16; 17.116 Simmenthal Spa v Commission (Case 92/78R)......................................  8.11, 8.22, 8.59, 8.80, 8.84, 8.140

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Table of Cases para Simmenthal SpA v Commission (Case 243/78) [1980] ECR 593............................ 7.15, 7.17, 7.70; 14.26 Simmenthal SpA v Commission (Case 243/78R) [1978] ECR 2391.......................  8.22, 8.59, 8.84, 8.140 Sina Bank v Council (Case T-15/11) 12 December 2012 ............... 6.12; 7.76, 7..93; 9.53; 17.116, 17.119 Sinara Handel GmbH v Council & Commission (Case T-91/05) [2007] ECR II-245.................  9.41, 9.49 Sinatra v FNROM (Case 296/84) [1986] ECR 1047.......................................................................17.101 Since Hardware (Guangzhou) Co Ltd v Council (Case T-156/11) 18 September 2012........... 10.39; 13.14 Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council (Case T-161/94) [1996] ECR II-695.........................................3.12 Sinochem National Chemicals Import & Export Corp v Council (Case T-97/95 (92)) order of 22 March 1999.........................................................................................................................14.75 Sirena Srl v Eda Srl (Case 40/70) [1979] ECR 3169.......................... 2.204; 16.24, 16.89, 16.166, 16.173; 17.187 Sison v Council (Case T-47/03) [2007] ECR II-73..........................................................................2.161 Sison v Council (Case T-47/03DEP) [2009] ECR II-1483..................................14.60, 14.62, 14.63, 14.75 Sison v Council (Case T-341/07) [2011] ECR II-7915............................................  2.90; 7.70; 9.89; 16.34 Sistemul electronic de arhivare, criptare si indexare digitalizata Srl (Seacid) v Parliament & Council (Case C-266/10P) [2010] ECR I-133.........................................................................7.88 Skareby v Commission (Case T-91/09P) 1 September 2010...........................................................15.17 Skatteministeriet v Imexpo Trading A/S (Case C-379/02) [2004] ECR I-9273..............................2.194 Skoma-Lux sro v Celni reditelstvi Olomouc (Case C-161/06) [2007] ECR I-10841......................7.44 Skov AEg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S (Case C-402/03) [2006] ECR I-199..................................16.37 Slob v Productschap Zuivel (Case C-496/04) [2006] ECR I-8257................................ 2.141, 2.149, 2.202 Slovenia v Commission (Case T-507/12) 17 January 2013.............................................................8.7 Smanor SA (Case 298/87) [1988] ECR 4489..................................................................................17.80 Smanor SA v Commission (Case T-182/97) [1998] ECR II-271.............................................  17.12 17.80 Smanor SA v Commission (Case T-150/06) 14 December 2006....................................................8.19 Smanor SA v Commission (Case C-99/07P) [2007] ECR I-70.......................................................8.19 Smets v Commission (Case T-134/96) [1997] ECR II-2333...........................................................1.15 Smets v Commission (Case T-52/91) [1991] ECR II-689...............................................................8.111 Smets v Commission (Case T-52/91R) [1991] ECR II-689.............................................................8.112 Smurfit Kappa Group plc v Commission (Case T-304/08) 10 July 2012........................................4.15 Snauwaert v Belgium (Case C-124/08 & C-125/08) [2009] ECR I-6793.......................................7.5 Sniace v Commission (Case T-238/09) [2011] ECR II-430............................................................9.79 Sniace SA v Commission (Case T-88/01) [2005] ECR II-1165......................................................5.45 Sniace SA v Commission (Case C-260/05P) [2007] ECR I-10005.......................................... 9.118; 11.24 Sociedade Agro-Pecuaria Vicente Nobra Lda v Council (Case 253/86) [1988] ECR 2725......... 7.60; 9.45 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana v Rafael Hoteles SA (Case C-306/05) [2006] ECR I-11519 .....................................................................................................................2.141, 2.149 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE) v Commission (Case C-112/09P) [2010] ECR I-351.........................................................................................................................................7.32 Sociedade Independente de Comunicacao v Commission (Case T-442/03) [2008] ECR II1161.........................................................................................................................................9.46 Società Agricola Fattoria Alimentare v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (Case C-337/88) [1990] ECR I-1.................................................................................................  2.178; 7.44 Società Eridania Zuccherifici Nazionali v Commission (Cases 10 & 18/68) [1969] ECR 459 ......7.50 Società Finanziaria Siderurgica Finsider SpA v Commission (Case T-26/90) [1992] ECR II1789.........................................................................................................................................16.7 Società Industriale Acciaierie San Michele v High Authority (Cases 2–10/63) [1963] ECR 327.....................................................................................................................................7.71; 17.104 Societa Italiana degli autori ed editori (SIAE) v Commission (Case T-433/08) 12 April 2013.......4.11 Società Italiano Vetro SA et al v Commission (Cases T-68, T-77 & T-78/90) [1992] ECR II1403................................................................................. 2.102; 5.38; 9.41, 9.82; 11.31, 11.61; 13.18 Société Acièries et Laminoires de Paris v Commission (Case 151/83) [1984] ECR 3519...... 13.45; 17.117 Société Alsacienne et Lorraine de Télécommunications et d’Electronique (Alsatel) v SA Novasam (Case 247/86) [1988] ECR 5987 ......................................................................  2.178, 2.179 Societe Anonyme a Participation Ouvriere Compagnie Nationale Air France v Commission (Case T-2/93 (92)) [1996] ECR II-235.........................................................14.63, 14.68, 14.73, 14.75 Société Anomyme Générale Sucrière v Commission (Cases 41, 43 & 44/73) [1977] ECR 445....16.150, 16.155, 16.157, 16.163 Societe Anonyme Louis Dreyfus & Cie v Commission (Cases T-485/93, T-491/93, T-494/93 & T-61/98) [2000] ECR II-3659..................................................................................................2.77 Societe Beton Express v Direction Regional des Douanes de la Reunion (Cases C-405/96-C-408/96) order of 7 July 1998...............................................................................2.194

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Table of Cases para Société CdF Chimie Azote et Fertilisants SA & Société Chimique de la Grande Paroisse SA v Commission (Case C-169/84) [1990] ECR I-3083............. 11.27, 11.93, 11.94, 11.97, 11.98, 11.99; 14.35 Societe Chimique Prayon-Rupel SA v Commission (Case T-73/98) [2001] ECR II-867...............2.102 Société Commercial Antoine Vloeberghs SA v High Authority (Cases 9 & 12/60) [1961] ECR 197 .................................................................................... 3.15; 7.60; 9.40, 9.82; 17.46, 17.48, 17.49 Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de l’Azote et Enterprise Miniere et Chimique v Commission (Case T-88/94) [1995] ECR II-221.......................................................................................  2.27, 2.30 Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de l’Azote v Commission (Case T-88/94R) [1994] ECR II-263........................................................................................................................  8.13, 8.172, 8.174 Société Compagnie Commerciale de l’Ouest v Receveur Principal des Douanes de la PallicePort (Cases C-78/90-83/90) [1992] ECR I-1847.....................................................................2.178 Société Coopérative Providence Agricole de la Champagne v ONIC (Case 4/79) [1980] ECR 2823.........................................................................................................................................17.19 Societe de Distribution de Mecaniques et d’Automobiles (Sodima) v Commission (Cases T-190/95 & T-45/96) [1999] ECR II-3617.......................................................................... 9.41; 12.18 Societe de Distribution de Mecaniques et d’Automobiles (Sodima) v Commission (Case T-62/99) [2001] ECR II-655................................................................................................................ 6.7; 12.18 Societe de Distribution Mecanique et d’Automobiles SA (Sodima) v Commission (Case C-44/00P) [2000] ECR I-11231...............................................................................................7.38 Societe d’Economie mixte d’equipement de l’Aveyron (SEMEA) v Commission (Cases T-168/10 & T-572/10) 19 September 2012..........................................17.105, 17.106, 17.107, 17.108 Société des Aciéries de Montereau v Commission (Case 31/79R) [1979] ECR 1077....................8.84 Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) v Sarl La Croisette (Case 373/87) order of 3 February 1988 (unreported).......................................................................2.197 Société des Charbonnages de Beeringen v High Authority (Case 9/55) [1954–56] ECR 311........9.40, 9.48, 9.82 Société des Fonderies de Pont-à-Mousson v High Authority (Case 14/59) [1959] ECR 215... 9.43; 11.102 Societe des Mines de Sacilor – Lormines SA v Commission (Cases T-107/01 & T-175/01) [2004] ECR II-2125...........................................................................................................................1.20; 3.15 Societe des Plantations de Mbanga SA v Council & Commission (Case C-39/09P) [2010] ECR I-38...........................................................................................................................................17.49 Société des Produits de Maïs v Administration des Douanes (Case 112/83) [1985] ECR 719.......2.204; 16.37 Société des Produits Bertrand SA v Commission (Case 40/75) [1976] ECR 1...............................9.45 Société des Usines de Beauport v Council (Cases 103–109/78) [1979] ECR 17 ...........................9.91 Société De Wendel v Commission (Case 29/67) [1968] ECR 263 .................................................13.12 Société d’Hygiène Dermatologique de Vichy v Commission (Case T-19/91R) [1991] ECR II265......................................................................................................................................  8.20, 8.108 Société Eridania Zuccherifici Nazionali v Commission (Cases 10 & 18/68) [1969] ECR 459 ......5.15 Société Fives Lille Cail v High Authority (Cases 19 & 21/60, 2 & 3/61) [1961] ECR 281 ......... 7.74; 9.2, 9.43, 9.82, 9.88; 16.42 Societe Francaise de Transports Gondrand Freres SA v Commission (Case T-104/02) [2004] ECR II-3211.............................................................................................................................2.127 Société Générale d’Entreprises Electro-Méchaniques v European Investment Bank (Case C-370/89) [1992] ECR I-6211........................................................................ 1.72; 3.4; 17.43, 17.132 Société Industriale Acciaierie San Michele v High Authority (Cases 5–11, 13–15/62) [1962] ECR 449...................................................................................................................................7.15 Société Industriale Acciaierie San Michele v High Authority (Cases 2–10/63) [1963] ECR 327 ....................................................................................................................................... 9.39, 9.43 Societe Internationale de Diffusion et d’Edition SA (SIDE) v Commission (Case T-348/04) [2008] ECR II-625...................................................................................................................13.22 Société les Commissionnaires Réunis Sàrl v Receveur des Douanes (Cases 80 & 81/77) [1978] ECR 927...................................................................................................................................10.11 Société Metallurgique de Knutange v High Authority (Cases 15 & 29/59) [1960] ECR 1.............10.34; 11.28; 14.24 Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v Commission (Cases T-79/95 & T-80/95) [1996] ECR II-1491.............................................................................................................................10.40 Société Nationale Interprofessionnelle de la Tomate v Commission (Case C-87/89) [1990] ECR I-1981..................................................................................................................................... 9.45, 9.89 Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres SA v Commission (Case 88/76) [1977] ECR 709...........7.14, 7.44; 14.25

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Table of Cases para Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres v Commission (Case 88/76R) [1976] ECR 1585...........8.74, 8.112 Société Produits de Mais SA v Administraton des Douanes et droits indirects (Case 112/83) [1985] ECR 719.......................................................................................................................10.25 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan (Case C-159/90) [1991] ECR I-4685................................................................................................................ 2.183; 7.5; 17.90 Soerensen Ferraresi v Commission (Case T-2/12P) 29 March 2012...............................................15.4 Sofrimport SARL v Commission (Case C-152/88) [1992] ECR I-153......................... 2.158; 17.49, 17.52 Sofrimport SARL v Commission (Case 152/88R) [1988] ECR 2931.................. 8.75, 8.112, 8.141, 8.164 Sogelma v European Agency for Reconstruction (Case T0411/06) [2008] ECR II-2771...... 3.7, 3.10, 3.11 Soliver v Commission (Case T-68/09) order of 11 September 2012...............................................11.57 Solomon & Peres Ltd v Commission (Case T-55/89) order of 9 February 1990............................14.41 Solvay v Commission (Case T-186/06) [2011] ECR II-2839..........................................................14.63 Solvay et Cie SA v Commission (Case T-12/89) [1992] ECR II-907.........................................2.154; 9.84 Solvay Pharmaceuticals BV v Council (Case T-392/02R) [2003] ECR II-1825.............................2.92 Solvay SA v Commission (Case T-57/01) [2009] ECR II-4621......................................................1.10 Solvay Solexis v Commission (Case C-449/11P) 5 December 2013..............................................15.26 Sommerlatte v Commission (Case 229/84) [1986] ECR 1805........................................................17.51 Sorani v Commission (Case 293/84R) [1985] ECR 251.............................................................8.83, 8.111 Souna v Commission (Case 432/85) [1987] ECR 2229..................................................................7.17 Spain v Commission (Case 128/86R) [1986] ECR 2495..................................... 8.22, 8.102, 8.111, 8.163 Spain v Commission (Case C-217/91) [1993] ECR I-3923..........................................................  9.53, 9.54 Spain v Commission (Case C-443/97) [2000] ECR I-2415.............................................................17.11 Spain v Commission (Case C-501/00) [2004] ECR I-6717.............................................................5.44 Spain v Commission (Case T-219/04) [2007] ECR II-1323............................................................9.41 Spain v Commission (Case C-263/13P) 24 June 2015....................................................................15.17 Spain v Council (Case C-165/02) order of 7 December 2004 (unreported)....................................2.24 Spain v Council (Case C-160/03) [2005] ECR I-2077....................................................................17.59 Spain v Council (Case C-310/04) [2006] ECR I-7285....................................................................1.69 Spain v Council (Case C-442/04) [2008] ECR I-3517..........................................................17.118, 17.119 Spain v Council (Case C-141/05) [2007] ECR I-9485....................................................................5.46 Spain v Council & Commission (Case 119/86R) [1986] ECR 2241....................  8.22, 8.102, 8.111, 8.163 Spain v Eurojust (Case C-160/03) [2005] ECR I-2077...................................................................7.5; 9.43 Spain v Lenzing AG (Case C-525/04P) [2007] ECR I-9947...........................................................9.118 Spain & Finland v Parliament & Council (Cases C-184/02 & C-223/02) [2004] ECR I-7789.......3.27 Sparr v Commission (Case 321/88R) [1988] ECR 6405..............................................................  8.37, 8.74 Sparr v Commission (Case T-50/89) [1990] ECR II-539.................................................  9.39; 14.6; 16.43 Spence v Commission (Case T-135/98) order of 22 October 1999.................................................2.65 Speiser v Parliament (Case T-390/07P) [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-63, II-B-1-427..............................7.38 Speybrouck v European Parliament (Case T-45/90) [1992] ECR II-33............................... 9.50, 9.82; 14.7 Speybrouck v European Parliament (Case T-45/90R) [1990] ECR II-705...... 8.7, 8.41, 8.81, 8.108, 8.114, 8.132, 8.134, 8.135, 8.177 Spie-Batignolles v Commission (Case C-201/86) [1990] ECR I-197......... 9.11, 9.62; 11.60, 11.61; 17.51 Spirlea v Commission (Case T-669/11) 25 September 2014...........................................................9.79 Spitzer v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-123/08) order of 2 September 2010......................................................................................2.164 Spraylat GmbH v European Chemicals Agency (Case T-177/12) 2 October 2014.........................17.119 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v Shipping & Forwarding Enterprise Safe BV (Case C-320/88) [1990] ECR I-285....................................................................................................................2.182 Stachelski v Commission (Case T-53/92) [1993] ECR II-35...........................................................7.66 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten v Bundesminister fur Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft (Case C-221/06) [2002] ECR I-2613...........................6.3, 6.7; 12.17, 12.30, 12.31 Stadt Papenburg v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-226/08) [2010] ECR I-131....................2.153 Staelen v European Ombudsman (Case T-217/11) 29 April 2015.......................17.45, 17.48, 17.50, 17.51 Stagakis v European Parliament (Case T-101/92) [1993] ECR II-63................................ 1.123; 7.74; 9.56 Stagakis v Parliament (Case T-37/93) [1994] ECR-SC I-A 137, II-451..........................................4.95 Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG v Commission (Case 103/85) [1988] ECR 4131............2.161; 9.54, 9.89 Standesamt Stadt Niebull (Case C-96/04) [2006] ECR I-3561 ......................................................17.70 St’art – Fonds d’investissement dans les entreprises culturelles v Commission (Case T-36/14) 6 January 2015...............................................................................................................17.105, 17.106 Stauner v Parliament (Case T-236/00) [2002] ECR II-135..............................................................2.64 Stauner v Parliament & Commission (Case T-236/00R-II) [2001] ECR II-2943............................7.2 Stavridis v European Parliament (Case 73/83) [1983] ECR 3803.............................................. 1.126; 7.75

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Table of Cases para Steffens v Council & Commission (Case T-222/97) [1998] ECR II-4175......................................7.34 Steinmetz v Commission (Case F-131/06) [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-459, II-A-1-2601.....................7.73 Stenhouse v Council & Commission (Case T-247/93) order of 15 December 1998................ 2.158; 4.111 Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council (Case T-327/03) [2007] ECR II-79....................................................2.161 Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council (Case C-539/10P & C-550/10P) 15 November 2012..................15.25, 15.42 Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v Commission (Case T-93/11) 7 June 2013 upheld on appeal Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v Commission (Case C-399/13P) 4 June 2015.........................................................................................................................................12.23 Stichting Sona v Commission (Case T-505/13R) 8 January 2014.............................8.11, 8.25, 8.45, 8.162 Stichting Woonpunt v Commission (Case C-132/12P) 27 February 2014......................................15.52 Stichting Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwalieit (Case C-138/05) [2006] ECR I-8339.......................................................................................2.149 Stim v Commission (Case T-451/08) 1 April 2013..........................................................................9.79 Stipperger v High Authority (Case 49/64) [1965] ECR 521 ...........................................................14.24 Stoss v Wetteraukreis (Cases C-316/07, C-358/07-C-360/07, C-409/07 & C-410/07) [2010] ECR I-8069.................................................................................................................................2.149, 2.202 Stott v Commission (Case T-99/95) [1996] ECR II-2227............................................................ 7.68, 7.78 Strack v Commission (Case 140/86) [1987] ECR 3939..................................................................14.27 Strack v Commission (Case C-237/06P) [2007] ECR-SC I-B-2-5, II-B-2-43................................2.60 Strack v Commission (Case F-121/07) 20 January 2011............................................................ 2.126; 7.37 Strack v Commission (Case F-132/07) 20 January 2011.................................................................7.37 Strack v Commission (Case T-199/11P) 13 December 2012...................................................... 7.71; 14.51 Strack v Commission (Case T-199/11P-REV) 10 September 2013........................... 14.25; 16.107, 16.131 Strack v Commission (Case T-65/12P) order of 12 June 2012........................................................15.19 Strack v Commission (Case C-127/13P) 2 October 2014................................................15.2, 15.16, 15.40 Strack v Commission (Case C-127/13P) (2 October 2014)................................................  1.10, 1.82, 1.83 Strack v European Parliament (Cases 259/84 & 259/84R) [1985] ECR 453..................................7.64 Strack v European Parliament (Case 155/85) [1986] ECR 3561 ....................................................7.60 Strobl v Commission (Case T-630/11P) 6 December 2012.......................................................15.16, 15.41 Stroghili v Court of Auditors (Case 204/85) [1987] ECR 389.........................................  7.16, 7.18; 14.26 Successors of Edmond Ropars v Council (Case T-429/93) [2000] ECR II-2439................ 1.84; 2.81; 3.26 Suiker Unie UA v Commission (Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111, 113 & 114/73) [1975] ECR 1663 ................................................................................................................................. 11.89; 14.16 Sulvida v Commission (Case T-184/04) [2005] ECR II-85.............................................................4.11 Sumitomo Chemical Co Ltd v Commission (Cases T-22/02 & T-23/02) [2005] ECR II-4065.......2.69 Sumitomo Metal Industries v Commission (Cases C-403/04P & C-405/04P) [2007] ECR I-729..........................................................................................................................1.10; 13.16, 13.37 Sun Chemical Group BV v Commission (Case T-282/06) [2007] ECR II-2149................. 2.92; 7.2; 11.57 Sungro SA v Council & Commission (Cases T-252/07, T-271/07 & T-272/07) [2010] ECR II-55..........................................................................................................................................17.50 Sunrider Corpn v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-24/00) [2001] ECR II-449..........................................................................................2.137 Sunzest (Europe) & Sunzest (Netherlands) v Commission (Case C-50/90) [1991] ECR I-2917...7.5 Suss v Commission (Cases C-403/0 Case 265/83) [1984] ECR 4029............................................14.12 Suss v Commission (Case 186/80R) [1980] ECR 3501.....................................8.33, 8.34, 8.74, 8.79, 8.94 Suss v Commission (Case 25/86) [1986] ECR 3929...................... 7.5; 9.82; 14.12, 14.26; 16.151, 16.157 Suss v High Authority (Case 17/64) [1964] ECR 617................................................................  8.97, 8.108 Suvikas v Council (Case F-6/07) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-151, II-A-1-819...................................... 6.7, 6.9 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council (Case T-174/95) [1998] ECR II-2289..........2.70; 3.37; 4.14, 4.71; 5.46, 5.97; 6.3; 7.32; 14.27 Sviluppo Italia Basilicata SpA v Commission (Case C-414/08P) [2010] ECR I-2559..... 1.11; 11.8; 15.18, 15.20, 15.24; 17.46 Sweden v API & Commission (Cases C-514/07P, C-528/07P & C-532/07P) [2010] ECR I-8533................................................................................................................ 1.10; 2.70, 2.107; 4.64 Sweden v Commission (Case T-521/14) 16 December 2015...................................................  17.23, 17.24 Sweden v Council (Cases C-39/05P & C-52/05P) [2008] ECR I-4723..........................................12.31 Swedish Match AB v Secretary of State for Health (Case C-210/03) [2004] ECR I-11893...........2.141, 2.149, 2.153 Swiss Confederation v Commission (Case T-319/05) [2006] ECR II-2073, [2010] ECR II4265......................................................................................................................................... 3.2; 5.3 Syndesmos Melon tis Eleftheras Evangelikos Ekklisias v Greece (Case C-381/89) [1992] ECR I-2111.......................................................................................................................................2.178

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Table of Cases para Syndicat de la Sidérugie du Centre-Midi v High Authority (Case 12/57) [1957–58] ECR 375.....3.15 Syndicat des Producteurs de Viande Bovine de la Coordination Rurale v Commission (Case T-53/96) [1996] ECR II-1579............................................................................................. 2.99; 11.93 Syndicat des Thoniers Mediterraneens v Commission (Case T-574/08) 7 November 2012...........9.84; 17.46, 17.51 Syndicat Française de l’Express International v Commission (Case C-222/92) order of 18 November 1992 (unreported)...................................................................................................14.41 Syndicat Française de l’Express International (SFEI) v Commission (Case C-222/92DEP) [1994] ECR I-5431........................................................................................................... 14.56, 14.74 Syndicat Général du Personnel des Organismes Européens v Commission (Case 18/74) [1974] ECR 933......................................................................................................................... 3.12, 3.14; 5.6 Syndicat Nationale de l’Industrie des Viandes v Commission (Case T-327/04) [2008] ECR II-72.......................................................................................................................................  7.45, 7.46 Synergy Hellas AE v Commission (Case T-106/13) 18 November 2015.....................16.25; 17.43, 17.108 Synopharm GmbH & Co KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-120/03) [2004] ECR II-509.........................................................................2.162 Synthon BV v Merz Pharma GmbH & Co KGaA (Case C-195/09) [2011] ECR I-7011 ........2.125, 2.202 Syria International Islamic Bank PJSC v Council (Case T-293/12) 11 June 2014..........................9.80 T T & L Sugars Ltd v Commission (Case T-279/11) 6 June 2013............................................. 17.12, 17.117 TAT European Airlines SA v Commission (Case T-49/97) [2000] ECR II-51................................6.3 TDK Kabushiki Kaisha v Aktieselskabet (Case C-197/07P-DEP) order of 19 September 2012....14.64, 14.75 TEAM Srl v Commission (Case T-13/96) [1997] ECR II-983, [1998] ECR II-4073....... 6.9; 7.2, 7.20; 941 TEAM Srl v Commission (Case C-13/99P) [2000] ECR I-4671....................................................11.19 TMK Europe GmbH v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt (Oder) (Case C-143/14) 16 April 2015................17.77 T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededinginsautoriteit (Case C-8/08) [2009] ECR I-4529.....................................................................................................16.24 T. Port GmbH & Co v Commission (Case T-39/97) [1997] ECR II-2125............ 2.45, 2.50; 16.49, 16.55, 16.61, 16.66 T. Port GmbH & Co v Commission (Case T-251/97) [2000] ECR II-1775............................... 9.41; 17.16 T. Port GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-1/99) [2001] ECR II-465....................................9.41 TVDanmark A/S v Commission (Case T-336/04) [2007] ECR II-491............ 5.87, 5.88; 9.20, 9.22; 12.29 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-188/92) [1994] ECR I-833..........................................................................................................................  8.88; 17.77 Tabouillot v Directeur de Services Fiscaux de Meurthe-et-Moselle (Case C-284/96) [1997] ECR I-7471.......................................................................................................................................2.141 Tagaras v Court of Justice (Cases T-18 & T-24/89) [1992] ECR II-153..........................................14.75 Talanton AE v Commission (Case T-165/13) 4 December 2014.........................................  7.14, 7.15, 7.16 Tallarico v European Parliament (Case T-1/92) [1993] ECR II-107................................................14.24 Tallarico v European Parliament (Case T-5/92) [1993] ECR II-477................................................2.131 Tameio Pronoias Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v Commission (Case T-328/13) 16 October 2014.........................................................................................................................................3.6; 9.34 Tancredi v Parliament (Case T-74/91) [1992] ECR II-1645.........................................................  7.18, 7.58 Taruffi v Commission (Case F-95/06) [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-163, II-A-1-863..............................7.73 Tay Za v Council (Case C-376/10P) 13 March 2012.......................................................................13.45 Team Relocations v Commission (Case C-444/11P) 11 July 2013................................15.16, 15.25, 15.26 Technion – Israel Institute of Technology v Commission (Case T-216/12) 6 October 2015...........17.106 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission (Case T-198/01 R[III]) [2004] ECR II1471.................................................................................................................. 8.77, 8.83; 9.20; 12.23 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission (Case C-232/02 P(R)) [2002] ECR I-8977....................................................................................................................................  8.76, 8.83 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission (Case T-237/02) [2006] ECR II-5131.......5.44 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission (Case C-404/04P) [2007] ECR I-1.......................5.38; 8.77; 16.10 Technische Universitat Dresden v Commission (Case T-29/11) 24 October 2014..........................17.105 Technointorg v Commission & Council (Cases 294/86 & 77/87) [1988] ECR 6077.................2.161; 8.28, 8.108, 8.113; 14.41 Technointorg v Council (Case 77/87R) [1987] ECR 1793............................................  8.131, 8.141, 8.179 Tecnimed Srl v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-360/10) 3 October 2012..................................................................................................... 7.41; 9.14

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Table of Cases para Tecnoprocess Srl v Commission (Case T-403/09) [2011] ECR II-210............................................17.46 Tedesco v Tomasoni Fittings Srl (Case C-175/06) [2007] ECR I-7929..........................................10.1 Teissonnière v Commission (Case T-119/89) [1990] ECR II-7...................................................  7.32; 9.53 Telefon & Buch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-322/03) [2006] ECR II-835..............................................7.5 Telefonica O2 Czech Republic AS v Czech On Line AS (Case C-64/06) [2007] ECR I-4887.......2.149 Telefonica SA v Commission (Case C-295/12P) (10 July 2014)............................................... 1.10; 15.26 Telekom Austria AG (Case C-256/05) order of 6 October 2005 (unreported)................................17.80 Telemarsicabruzzo SpA v Circostel (Cases C-320-C-322/90) [1993] ECR I-393................... 2.176; 10.10 Television francaise 1 SA v Commission (Case T-144/04) [2008] ECR II-761..........7.46; 9.41, 9.42, 9.47 Television francaise 1 SA (TFI) v Commission (Case T-354/05) [2009] ECR II-471.........7.15, 7.16, 7.45 Television francaise 1 v Commission (Case C-451/10P) [2011] ECR I-851..................................5.16 Television francaise 1 v Commission (Case T-275/11) 16 October 2013..................................11.11, 11.24 Ten Oever v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds (Cases C-106/91, C-110/91, C-152/91 & C-200/91) [1993] ECR I-4879............................................................................................................16.27, 16.37 Tepea BV v Commission (Case 28/77) [1978] ECR 1391........................ 5.28; 14.69, 14.72, 14.74, 14.79 Ter Huurne’s Handelsmaatschappij v Commission (Case T-216/99) order of 23 March 2004.......2.164; 4.19 Territorio Energia Ambiente SO (TEA) v Commission (Case C-500/07P) [2008] ECR I-161.......7.24 Territorio Historico de Alava-Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission (Case T-168/99) [2002] ECR II-1371 ............................................................................................................................2.160 Territorio Historico de Alava-Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission (Case T-77/01) [2002] ECR II-81; on appeal Territorio Historico de Alava-Diputacion foral de Alava v Commission (Case C-75/02P) [2003] ECR I-2903.......................................................................................1.21; 5.3 Territorio Historico de Alava-Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission (Case T-227/01-T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 & T-270/01) [2009] ECR II-3029.................... 3.14; 5.14, 5.17, 5.20, 5.44, 5.92; 7.2; 9.47, 9.48, 9.82 Territorio Historico de Alava-Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission (Cases T-30/01-T-32/01 & T-86/02-T-88/02) [2009] ECR II-2919.................................................... 2.39, 2.99; 5.17; 7.2; 9.84 TerritorioHistorico de Vizcaya - Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission (Cases C-465/09PC-470/09P) [2011] ECR I-83...................................................................................................7.68 Tertir-Terminais de Portugal SA v Commission (Case C-1/04SA) [2004] ECR I-11931...............17.197 Tesoka v European Foundation for the Improvement of Living & Working Conditions (Case F-51/06) [2007] ECR-SC II-A-1-173, II-A-1-953...................................................................7.88 Testa (Case C-101/96) [1996] ECR I-3081.....................................................................................2.180 Tête v European Investment Bank (Case T-460/93) [1993] ECR II-1257.......... 7.6; 14.59; 17.132, 17.133 Tetra Laval BV v Commission (Case T-5/02) [2002] ECR II-4381........ 2.102, 2.128; 14.56, 14.66, 14.70 Tetra Laval BV v Commission (Cases C-12/03P-DEP) & C-13/03P-DEP)) [2010] ECR I-67......14.59, 14.66 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission (Case T-51/89) [1990] ECR II-309 .....................................2.140 Teva Pharma BV v European Medicines Agency (Case T-140/12) 22 January 2015......................17.118 Theofilopoulos v Commission (Case T-91/06) [2007] ECR II-5.....................................................7.5 Theophilou v Commission (Case T-293/13) 10 November 2014....................................................8.149 Thermenhotel Stoiser Franz GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case T-158/99) [2004] ECR II-1.............................................................................................................................  1.126, 1.127 4.13 Thesing v European Central Bank (Case T-590/10) 29 November 2012........................................9.79 Thesing v European Central Bank (Case C-28/13P) order of 6 November 2013......4.11; 5.20; 979, 9.119; 15.2, 15.13, 15.45 The Sunrider Corporation Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-24/00) [2001] ECR II-449...........................................................................9.54 Thierry v Commission (Case T-223/07P) [2008] ECR SC-I-B-1-81, II-B-1-519.....................11.24, 11.30 Thomasdünger GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt-am-Main (Case 166/84) [1985] ECR 3001.........................................................................................................................................10.7 Thomik v Commission (Case 19/72) [1972] ECR 1155.............................................................. 6.14; (16.6 Thomson Sales Europe v Commission (Case C-498/09P) [2010] ECR I-79..................................11.24 Three-N-Products Private Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-22/14P) 2 July 2014....................................................................................16.9 ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni v Commission (Cases C-448/10P-C-450/10P) [2011] ECR I-147.................................................................................................................................. 10.48; 15.21 ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs v Commission (Cases T-144/07, T-147/07 - T-150/07 & T-154/07) [2011] ECR II-5129................................................................................................11.60 ThyssenKrupp Nirosta GmbH v Commission (Case C-352/09P) [2011] ECR I-2359...................7.71

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Table of Cases para ThyssenKrupp Stainless AG v Commission (Case T-24/07) [2009] ECR II-2309............. 7.70, 7.71; 9.42, 9.90; 16.22 Thyssen Stahl v Commission (Case T-141/94) [1999] ECR II-347................................................1.87 Thyssen Stahl AG v Commission (Case C-194/99P) [2003] ECR I-10821....................................2.83 Tiberghien (née Peutman) v Commission (Case 797/79) [1980] ECR 3921 ..................................14.20 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinaporssi Oy (Case C-73/07) [2007] ECR I-7075.......5.2 Tillack v Commission (Case T-193/04) [2006] ECR II-3995..........................................................9.41 Tillack v Commission (Case T-194/04R) [2004] ECR II-3575.................................................... 5.20, 5.34 Timex Corpn v Council & Commission (Case 264/82) [1985] ECR 849.......................7.40; 14.15; 16.37; 17.19 Tirrenia de Navigazione SpA v Commission (Case T-246/99) [2007] ECR II-65.......... 5.93; 14.13, 14.56 Tither v Commission (Case 175/80) [1981] ECR 2345...................................................  4.26, 4.101, 4.112 Toditec NV v Commission (Case T-68/99) [2001] ECR II-1443....................................................11.93 Toepfer v Commission (Cases 106 & 107/63) [1965] ECR 429.....................................................14.59 Tokai Carbon Co Ltd v Commission (Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01-T-246/01, T-251/01 & T-252/01) [2004] ECR II-1181............................................................................................2.151; 3.34 Tokai Europe GmbH v Commission (Case C-262/07P) [2008] ECR I-30....................................7.88, 7.96 Tokyo Electric Co Ltd v Council (Case 260/85R & 106/86) [1985] ECR 3467, [1988] ECR 5855............................................................................................................................. 8.80, 8.90; 9.82 Tokyo Electric v Council (Case C-191/86DEP) order of 4 February 1993 (unreported)................14.74 Toledano Laredo & Garilli v Commission (Cases 255 & 241/81) [1983] ECR 347.......................13.1 Toller v Commission (Case C-149/98P) [1998] ECR I-7623..........................................................4.106 Tomana v Council & Commission (Case T-190/12) 22 April 2015.............................. 3.25; 4.15; 7.2, 7.15 Tomkins Plc v Commission (Case T-382/06) [2011] ECR II-115; upheld on appeal Commission v Tomkins Plc (Case C-286/11P) 22 January 2013.................................................................17.19 Tontodonati v Commission (Case 17/71) [1971] ECR 1059...........................................................7.58 Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH v Commission (Case 378/87) [1989] ECR 1359...............................7.49 Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH v Commission (Case 378/87R) [1988] ECR 161............... 8.74, 8.96; 8.101 Total v Commission (Case C-421/11P) 7 February 2012................................................................15.26 Total SA v Commission (Case T-344/06) 27 September 2012........................................................9.82 Total SA v Commission (Case T-548/08) 13 September 2013........................................................17.119 Total SA v Commission (Case C-597/13P) 17 September 2015.....................................................15.25 Total Raffinage Marketing v Commission (Case T-566/08) 13 September 2013............................14.16 Total Raffinage Marketing v Commission (Case C-634/13P) 17 September 2015.........................14.16 Totaro & Dufrane v Commission (Cases 122 & 141/85) order of 2 July 1987 (unreported) .........2.73 Towa Sankiden Corpn v Council (Case 297/85R) [1985] ECR 3483...................  8.81, 8.141, 8.163, 8.164 Trabelsi v Council (Case T-187/11) 28 May 2013........................................................................ 7.2; 17.15 Tradax Graanhandel BV v Commission (Case 64/82) [1984] ECR 1359.......................................7.79 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v Repubblica Italiana (Case C-173/03) [2006] ECR I-5177........17.94 Tralli v European Central Bank (Case C-301/02P) [2005] ECR O-4071........................................15.2 Tramarin Snc di Tramarin Andrea e Sergio v Commission (Case T-426/04) [2005] ECR II4765......................................................................................................................................  7.45, 7.49 Transnational Company Kazchrome AO v Council (Case C-10/12P) 19 December 2013........ 14.20; 15.2 Transnautica – Transportes e Navegacao SA v Commission (Case T-385/05) [2009] ECR II163...........................................................................................................................................16.94 Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission (Case 17/74) [1974] ECR 1063.............17.15, 17.16 Transporoute et Travaux SA v Minister of Public Works (Case 76/81) [1982] ECR 417...............2.188 Transportes Evaristo Molina SA v Commission (Case T-45/08) [2008] ECR II-265.................. 5.81; 7.45 Transportes Evaristo Molina SA v Commission (Case C-36/09P) [2010] ECR I-145................. 5.81; 7.26 Trapeza tis Ellados AE v Banque Artesia (Case C-329/03) [2005] ECR I-9341.............................2.149 Travelex Global & Financial Services Ltd v Commission (Case T-195/00) [2003] ECR II1677............................................................................................................................. 2.55; 9.41, 9.49 Travetanche Injection SPRL v Commission (Case T-368/11R) order of 4 February 2013.............8.168 Traxdata France Sarl v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-365/07) 12 December 2011........................................................................................2.164 Trentea v European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (Case T-107/13P) (16 January 2015)........................................................................................................................................1.10 Tresplain Investments v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-76/11P) [2011] ECR I-182........................................................... 9.82, 9.84; 10.48 Trevisanato v Commission (Case C-25/12P) 4 July 2012...............................................................2.38 Trevor v Court (Case 98/76) order of 4 April 1977 .................................................................  11.38, 11.40 Triveneta Zuccheri SpA v Commission (Case C-347/87) [1990] ECR I-1083...............................7.5

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Table of Cases para Trubowest Handel GmbH & Makarov v Council & Commission (Case C-419/08P) [2010] ECR I-2259..................................................................................................................... 17.46, 17.49, 17.50 Tsitouras v Greece (Case C-285/90) [1991] ECR I-787..................................................................7.6, 7.89 Tudapetrol Mineralolerzeugnisse Nils Hansen v Commission (Case T-550/08) order of 27 March 2012.........................................................................................................................................11.57 Tunnel Refineries Ltd v Council (Case 114/81) [1982] ECR 3189.................................................5.3 Turner v Commission (Case C-115/90P) [1991] ECR I-1423........................................ 9.118; 15.21, 15.29 Turner (née Krecké) v Commission (Case 266/82) [1984] ECR 1..................................................17.17 Turner (née Krecké) v Commission (Cases 59 & 129/80) [1981] ECR 1883 ................ 11.40, 11.54; 14.7 Turner (née Krecke) v Commission (Case 129/80R) [1980] ECR 2135.........................................8.111 U U v Parliament (Case F-92/09DEP) order of 8 November 2011........................  14.56, 14.70, 14.72, 14.78 UAB Gaumina v European Institute for Gender Equality (Case T-424/12) 28 November 2013.....9.80 UK Coal plc v Commission (Cases T-12/99 & T-63/99) [2001] ECR II-2153................................5.46 UPC France v Commission (Case T-367/05) order of 11 September 2006 (unreported)................5.23 UPS Europe SA v Commission (Case T-182/98) [1999] ECR II-2857...........................................11.24 UOP Ltd v Commission (Case T-198/09) 7 March 2013........................................................... 9.80; 11.16 USINOR v Commission (Case 78/83) [1984] ECR 4177.......................................................... 8.179; 9.88 USINOR v Commission (Case 78/83R) [1983] ECR 2183 ...................... 8.81, 8.134; 8.135, 8.177, 8.179 USINOR v Commission (Case 62/84R) [1984] ECR 2643.............................................................8.180 USINOR v Commission (Case 171/86) see Union Sidérurgique du Nord et de l’Est de la France SA (USINOR) v Commission Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission (Case 2/68) [1968] ECR 435 at 439..........3.17; 7.12, 7.74; 9.11, 9.34, 9.44, 9.53, 9.55, 9.89; 17.197, 17.197 Unibet (London) Ltd v Justitiekanslern (Case C-432/05) [2007] ECR I-2271...............................1.21 UniCredit SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Cases T-303/06 RENV & T-337/0RENV) 25 November 2014..............................................9.136 Unifrex v Commission & Council (Case 281/82) [1984] ECR 1969........................................... 9.41, 9.42 Unindustria v Commission (Case T-273/00) 29 January 2013........................................................2.48 Union de Federaciones Agrarias de España (UFADE) v Council & Commission (Case 117/86) [1986] ECR 3255.....................................................................................................................3.14 Union de Federaciones Agrarias de España (UFADE) v Council & Commission (Case 117/86R) [1986] ECR 2483.....................................................................................................  8.80, 8.102, 8.111 Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council (Case T-173/98) [1999] ECR II-3357.........................5.79 Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council (Case C-50/00P) [2002] ECR I-6677.........................1.20 Union des Minotiers de la Champagne v French Government (Case 11/74) [1974] ECR 877.......10.22 Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH v Commission (Case 97/85R) [1985] ECR 1331......8.108, 8.134 Union Europeenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises v Council (Case T-135/96) [1997] ECR II-373.............................................................................................. 5.23, 5.28 Union Européenne de Radiodiffusion v La Cinq SA & Commission (Case C-98/92P) order of 21 October 1992 (unreported)............................................................................................  15.7, 15.34 Union Francaise de l’Express v Commission (Case C-119/97P) [1999] ECR I-1341....................11.30 Union Francaise de l’Express (UFEX) v Commission (Case T-60/05) [2007] ECR II-3397.........5.46 Union Investment Privatfonds v UniCredito Italiano (Case C-317/10P) [2011] ECR I-5471.........15.17 Union Laitière Normande v French Dairy Farmers Ltd (Case 244/78) [1979] ECR 2553.............2.176 Union Nationale des Coopératives Agricoles de Céréales v Commission & Council (Cases 95– 98/74, 15 & 100/75) [1975] ECR 1615...................................................................................9.11 Union Pigments SA v Commission (Case T-62/02) [2005] ECR II-5057 ......................................2.97 Union Royale Belge des Societe de Football Association ASBL v Bosman (Case C-415/93) [1995] ECR I-4921.......................................................................................................... 2.145; 11.15 Union Sidérurgique du Nord et de l’Est de la France (USINOR) v Commission (Cases 81 & 119/85) [1986] ECR 1777........................................................................................................7.14 Union Sidérurgique du Nord et de l’Est de la France (USINOR) v Commission (Case 150/86) (Case withdrawn order of 28 January 1987)...............................................................  5.15, 5.76; 14.5 Union Sidérurgique du Nord et de l’Est de la France SA (USINOR) v Commission (Case 171/86) order of 28 January 1987 (unreported)............................................................9.11, 9.77; 11.27, 11.28 Union Syndicale v Court of Auditors (Case C-194/87) order of 10 February 1988 judgment reported Maurissen v Court of Auditors (Cases C-193 & C-194/87) [1990] ECR I-95..........9.56 Union Syndicale v Council (Case 175/73) [1974] ECR 917........................................................ 3.12, 3.14

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Table of Cases para Union Syndicale, Massa & Kortner v Council (Case 175/73) [1974] ECR 917.............................14.19 Union Syndicale-Service Public Européen v Council (No 2) (Case 72/74) [1975] ECR 401.........3.14 Unipetrol a.s. v Commission (Case T-45/07) [2011] ECR II-4629.................................................13.22 Uniplex (UK) Ltd v NHS Business Services Authority (Case C-406/08) [2010] ECR I-817.........7.51 United Brands Co v Commission (Case 27/76) [1978] ECR 345 ..................... 2.168; 13.19; 16.40, 16.42 United Kingdom v Commission (Case T-115/10) [2011] ECR II-153............................................7.2, 7.77 United Kingdom v Commission (Case C-416/11P) 29 November 2012.........................................15.16 United Kingdom v Commission (Case 347/85) [1988] ECR 1749.................................................13.12 United Kingdom v Council (Case 68/86) [1988] ECR 855 ............................................................7.21 United Kingdom v Council (Case 131/86) [1988] ECR 905..................................................... 7.21; 14.16 United Kingdom v Council (Case C-150/94) [1998] ECR I-7235..................................................5.41 United Kingdom v Council (Case C-431/11) 26 September 2013...........................................  2.141, 2.149 United Kingdom v European Parliament (Case 23/86R) [1986] ECR 1085..........2.102, 2.132; 8.62, 8.64, 8.75, 8.80, 8.81, 8.108, 8.112 United Phosphorus Ltd v Commission (Case T-95/09R) [2009] ECR II-47...... 8.104, 8.110, 8.112, 8.114, 8.131, 8.177 Universe Tankship Co Inc v Commission (Case 1/87A) [1987] ECR 2807....................................17.197 University of Hamburg v Hauptzollamt Münster-West (Case 236/83) [1984] ECR 3849..............10.15 Unterweger (Case 318/85) [1986] ECR 955................................................................................7.84; 11.71 Usines Emile Henricot SA v High Authority (Cases 23, 24 & 52/63) [1963] ECR 217 .........14.13, 14.14, 14.20 Usines Gustave Boel & Fabrique de Fer de Maubeuge v Commission (Case 76/83) [1984] ECR 859...........................................................................................................................................17.117 Uznanski v Poland (Case C-143/10P) [2010] ECR I-153...............................................................17.9 V V v Commission (Case F-33/08) [2009] ECR-SC I-A-1-403, II-A-1-2159..................12.19, 12.20, 12.21, 12.22, 12.36 V v Commission (Case T-510/09P) 15 June 2011..........................................  4.6; 11.1, 11.22; 12.8; 15.17 V v European Parliament (Case C-18/91P) [1992] ECR I-3997..............9.118, 9.128; 15.22, 15.49, 15.52 VBVB & VBBB v Commission (Cases 43 & 63/82) [1984] ECR 19................. 2.15; 11.29; 13.15, 13.26, 13.45 VBVB & VBBB v Commission (Cases 43 & 63/82R) [1982] ECR 1241................ 5.58, 5.86, 5.87, 5.90; 8.112, 8.182 VIP Car Solutions Sarl v European Parliament (Case T-89/07) [2009] ECR II-1403..................  9.41, 9.89 VZW Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers v Raad voor de Mededinging (Case C-439/08) [2010] ECR I-1247.....2.205 Vaassen (née Göbbels) v Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrif (Case 61/65) [1966] ECR 261.......10.7; 17.70 Vacca v Commission (Case F-34/12) 9 July 2013........................................................... 9.17; 14.24, 14.51 Vakalis v Commission (Case F-38/10) 13 April 2013.....................................................................14.20 Valenergol v Council (Case T-393/03R) 15 January 2004 ..............................................................14.6 Valle Fernandez v Commission (Cases 8 & 264/88R) [1988] ECR 6341.......................................8.168 Valsabbia SpA v Commission (Cases 154, 205, 206, 226–228, 263, 264/78, 31, 39, 83 & 85/79) [1980] ECR 907.......................................................................................................................17.119 Valsabbia SpA v Commission (Case 209/83) [1984] ECR 3089..................................... 7.32, 7.43; 17.119 van Arum v Parliament (Case T-454/09P) 28 June 2011.................................................................15.25 van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid (Case 33/74) [1974] ECR 1299 .............................................................................................................  17.79, 17.80 Van Daanan v Court of Auditors (Case 184/80) [1981] ECR 1951.................................................1.134 van Delft (Fokkens) (Case C-345/09INT) [2011] ECR I-11...........................................................16.166 van den Berg v Council & Commission (Case C-164/01P) [2004] ECR I-10225..........................7.34 Van den Bergh en Jurgens BV v Commission (Case 265/85) [1987] ECR 1155............................9.53 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v Commission (Case T-65/98R) [1998] ECR II-2642....................... 5.28, 5.60 van der Aat v Commission (Case T-304/13P) 11 December 2014..................................................11.24 Van der Hulst’s Zonen CV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen (Case 51/74) [1975] ECR 79.......10.10 van der Stijl v Commission (Case 341/85R) [1985] ECR 3795......................................................8.94 Van der Stijl & Cullington v Commission (Case T-9/90) order of 5 November 1990 (unreported)..............................................................................................................................5.79 van der Weerd (J) v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (Cases C-222/05-C-225/05) [2007] ECR I-4233...........................................................................2.180, 2.182 Vandevyvere v European Parliament (Case 23/64) [1965] ECR 157......................................... 3.17; 14.43

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Table of Cases para Van Eick v Commission (Case 35/67) [1968] ECR 329..................................................................11.29 Van Eick v Commission (Case 13/69) [1970] ECR 3.............................  7.24; 10.31, 10.39; 16.115, 6.118 Van Eick v Commission (Case 57/70) [1971] ECR 613 ...........................................................  7.70; 14.26 van Eycke v ASPA NV (Case 267/86) [1988] ECR 4769..................................................  2.183; 7.5; 10.9 Van Gend en Loos v Commission (Cases 98 & 230/83) [1984] ECR 3763....................................7.39 van Landschoot v Mera NV (Case 300/86) [1988] ECR 3443........................................................16.37 van Parijs v Council & Commission (Case C-257/93R) [1993] ECR I-3917.............................. 8.74; 14.6 Van Pryse v Commission (Case T-11/99R) [1999] ECR II-1355....................................................2.69 van Schijndel v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten (Cases C-430/93 & C-431/99) [1995] ECR I-4705..................................................................................................................17.79 van Soest v Commission (Case F-117/10) 20 September 2011.......................................................14.24 Van Zaanen v Court of Auditors (Case 184/80) [1981] ECR 1951.............................................. 3.31; 4.21 Vardakis v Commission (Cases 264/8(Case T-4/92) [1993] ECR II-357........................................7.64 Vaupel v European Court of Justice (Case 131/83) (unreported, 15 March 1984) ........ 1.122, 1.126; 2.34; 4.11, 4.12; 7.575, 7.76, 794; 9.11, 9.82 Vecchioli v Commission (Case 101/79) [1980] ECR 3069.............................................................9.50 Vedial SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C- 106/03P) [2004] ECR I-9573......................................................................... 2.51, 2.158; 5.2, 5.37 Vela Palacios v Economic & Social Committee (Case T-150/94) [1996] ECR-SC I-A-297, II877...........................................................................................................................................7.59 Vela Srl v Commission (Cases T-141/99, T-142/99, T-150/99 & T-151/99) [2002] ECR II4547..................................................................................................... 2.72; 9.48; 11.11, 11.24; 13.40 Vellozzi v Commission (Case 62/74R) [1974] ECR 895.................................................................8.108 Ventura v European Parliament (Case T-40/91) [1992] ECR II-1697.............................................14.20 Ventura v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben (Case 269/87) [1988] ECR 6411.......................16.37 Venus & Obert v Commission & Council (Cases 783 & 786/79) [1981] ECR 2445......................14.20 Veolia Acqua Compagnia Generale delle Acque v Commission (Case C-436/12P) 13 June 2013.........................................................................................................................................2.48 Verband der freien Rohrwerke eV v Commission (Case T-374/00) [2003] ECR II-2275...............5.93 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen (Case 51/76) [1977] ECR 113 ...........................................................................................................2.151 Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v Commission (Case T-2/03) [2005] ECR II-1121...............5.44 Verein Natura Havel eV v Commission (Case T-538/13) 2 September 2014..................................7.2, 7.81 Vereins- und Westbank v Commission (Case T-54/02)....................................................................16.56 Vereniging Prodifarma v Commission (Case T-116/89) [1990] ECR II-843...................................2.72 Vereniging Prodifarma v Commission (Case T-3/90) [1991] ECR II-1...........................................14.5 Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamse Boekwezen (VBVB) & Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Belangen des Boekhandels (VBBB) v Commission see VBVB & VBBB v Commission (Cases 43 & 63/82) [1984] ECR 19 Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens v Commission (Cases T-481/93 & T-484/93) [1995] ECR II-2941.............................................................................................. 3.14; 7.6, 7.74, 7.76 Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v Commission (Case T-29/92R) [1992] ECR II-2161........................................................................ 5.28; 8.72, 8.83, 8.151, 8.171, 8.177; 11.24 Verros v European Parliament (Case 306/81) [1983] ECR 1755.....................................................9.82 Versalis SpA v Commission (Case C-511/11P) 13 June 2013........................................................15.6 Very v European Parliament (Case T-86/91) [1993] ECR II-45......................................................7.16 Viciano v Commission (Case C-126/90P) [1991] ECR I-781...............................  4.11; 9.11, 9.118; 15.29 Victoria Sanchez v Parliament & Commission (Case C-52/11P) [2011] ECR I-158......................15.25 Vidranyi v Commission (Case C-283/90P) [1991] ECR I-4339.......................... 9.118, 9.121; 15.15; 16.9 Viega v Commission (Case C-276/11P) 14 March 2013...........................................................15.18, 15.20 Viegas v Companhia de Seguros Zurich SA (Case C-166/02) [2003] ECR I-7871; ......................2.184 Vigel v Commission (Case T-370/94) [1995] ECR-SC I-A-1-157, II-487......................................17.63 Viho Europe BV v Commission (Case T-102/92) [1995] ECR II-17..............................................9.41 Villa v Parliament (Case F-4/06) [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-133, II-A-1-505................. 2.39; 7.26, 7.33, 7.42 Vincent v European Parliament (Case 7/86) [1987] ECR 2473 ..............................  9.54, 9.82, 9.89; 14.24 Vinck v Commission (Case 53/70) [1971] ECR 601.......................................................................7.59 Vinzek v Commission (Case T-71/96) [1997] ECR-SC I-A-339, II-921.........................................2.137 Virgili v European Parliament (Case 24/87R) [1987] ECR 2847...................  8.81, 8.84, 8.92, 8.93, 8.112, 8.134, 8.148 Virgili-Schettini v European Parliament (Case T-139/89) [1990] ECR II-535.......................... 1.135; 4.15 Vischim Srl v Commission (Case T-420/05) [2009] ECR II-3841.....................................  7.15, 7.59; 9.54

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Table of Cases para Vischim Srl v Commission (Case T-380/06) [2009] ECR II-3911.......................................... 7.5, 7.9, 7.17 Vischim Srl v Commission (Case T-420/05 R-II) [2006] ECR II-4085; upheld on appeal ((Case C-459/06 P(R)) Vischim Srl v Commission [2007] ECR I-53................................................8.185 Vivendi v Commission (Case T-432/10) 16 October 2013..............................................................17.16 Vivier v Commission (Case F-29/05) 30 September 2010..............................................................9.79 Vlachou v Court of Auditors (Case 143/84) [1986] ECR 459.................................. 5.24, 5.25, 5.98; 13.28 Vlachou v Court of Auditors (Case 162/84) [1986] ECR 481 ......................................................7.5; 17.64 Vlachou v Court of Auditors (Case 134/87) [1987] ECR 3633.................................................... 7.14, 7.16 Vlachou v Court of Auditors (Case 135/87) [1988] ECR 2901............... 9.53, 9.55; 14.26; 16.149, 16.157 Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav dd (Case C-162/13) 4 September 2014...........................................2.141 Vodafone Espana SA v Ayuntamiento de Santa Amalia (Cases C-55/11, C-57/11 & C-58/11) 12 July 2012 .................................................................................................................................2.149 Vodafone Omnitel NV v Autorita pe le Garanzie nelle Communicazioni (Cases C-228/12-C-232/12 & C-254/12-C-258/12) 18 July 2013.......................................................................................2.113 Vonage Holdings Corp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-453/05) [2006] ECR II-1877.......................................................................4.25 Von Bonkewitz-Lindner v European Parliament (Case 13/86) [1987] ECR 1417.............. 7.14, 7.16, 7.94 Von Bonkewitz-Lindner v European Parliament (Case T-33/90) [1991] ECR II-1251...................9.82 von Chamier-Glisczinski v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse (Case C-208/07) [2009] ECR I-6095................................................................................................................................ 2.178, 2.195 Von Gallera v Maître (Case 56/84) [1984] ECR 1769......................................................... 2.183; 7.6, 7.84 von Hoessle v Court of Auditors (Case T-19/90) [1991] ECR II-615....................................7.3, 7.26, 7.64 von Lachmüller v Commission (Cases 43, 45 & 48/59) [1960] ECR 463......................................3.4; 8.81 Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA (Case C-384/10) [2011] ECR I-13275.................................................17.65 Vroege v NCIV Instituut voor Volkhuisvesting BV (Case C-57/93) [1994] ECR I-4541...............16.37 Vtesse Networks v Commission (Case T-54/07) [2011] ECR II-6...............................................  5.61, 5.62 W WAM Industriale SpA v Commission (Case T-303/10) 27 September 2012 aff’d WAM Industriale SpA v Commission (Case C-560/12 P) 7 November 2013.........................................  9.43, 9.56, 9.80 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung (Cases 133–136/85) [1987] ECR 2289 ...............................................................................................2.197 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v Commission (Cases 279, 280, 285 & 286/84) [1987] ECR 1069.....................................................................................................................................  9.45, 9.82 Walton v Commission (Case F-32/13) 27 February 2014 upheld on appeal Walton v Commission (Case T-261/14 P) 25 February 2015.......................................................................................7.70 Walzstahl-Vereinigung & Thyssen AG v Commission (Cases 140, 146, 221 & 226/82) [1984] ECR 951............................................................................................................................ 3.15; 17.117 Warner Bros Inc & Metronome Video ApS v Christiansen (Case 158/86) [1988] ECR 2605 .......2.195 Wasaknäcke Knäckebrotfabrik Gmbh v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 32/72) [1972] ECR 1181................................................................................................7.32 Watgen v Caisse de Pension des Employés Privés (Case 64/85) [1988] ECR 2435.......................10.3 Weber v Commission (Case T-482/93) [1996] ECR I-609..............................................................3.39 Weber v Weber (Case C-438/12) 3 April 2014................................................................................2.141 WebMindLicenses Kft v Nemzeti Ado- ed Vamhivatal Kiemelt Ado- es Vam Foigazgatosag (Case C-419/14) 17 December 2015........................................................................................2.148 Weddel & Co BV v Commission (Case C-54/90) [1992] ECR I-871..................................  6.7; 9.20, 9.41 Weddel & Co BV v Commission (Case C-54/90) [1992] ECR I-871.......................................... 9.20, 9.41 Wedl & Hofmann GmbH v Reber Holding GmbH & Co KG (Case C-141/13 P-DEP) order of 26 February 2015...............................................................................................................14.64, 14.74 Weighardt v Euratom Commission (Case 11/64) [1965] ECR 285.................................................11.75 Weingut Gustav Decker KG v Hauptzollamt Landau (Case 99/78) [1979] ECR 101.....................7.44 Weissenfels v European Parliament (Case T-22/92) [1993] ECR II-1095......................... 9.54, 9.84; 14.20 Welthgrove BV v Staatsecretaris van Financien (Case C-102/00) [2001] ECR I-5679..................2.202 Werner v Commission (Case T-124/93) [1995] ECR II-91.............................................................14.36 Wery v European Parliament (Case T-86/91) [1993] ECR II-45.....................................................7.64 West (Case C-192/12PPU) 28 June 2012........................................................................................2.211 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission (Cases T-228/99 & T-233/99) [2003] ECR II-435...............................................................................................................................5.41 Westfalen Gassen Nederland BV v Commission (Case T-303/02) [2006] ECR II-4567......... 11.15; 13.45 Westfalisch-Lippischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband v Commission (Case T-457/09) 17 July 2014.........................................................................................................................................9.79

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Table of Cases para Westzucker GmbH v Eunfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Zucker (Case 57/72) [1973] ECR 321...........10.26 Whirlpool Europe Srl v Council (Case T-314/06) [2010] ECR II-5005..........................................5.62 White v Commission (Case T-65/91) [1994] ECR-SC I-A 9, II 23.................................................9.54 Whitehead v European Central Bank (Case F-98/09) 27 September 2011.....................................17.116 Wieschemann v Commission (Case T-431/93) [1993] ECR II-1199..............................................2.161 Wilfer v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-315/03) [2005] ECR II-1981................................................................................................4.10 Wilhelm Werhahn Hansamühle v Council (Cases 63–69/72) [1973] ECR 1229......... 3.3; 9.34, 9.84, 9.88 Williame v Euratom Commission (Case 110/63A) [1966] ECR 287.................. 9.52, 9.93; 14.20, 16.149, 16.150, 16.152, 16.159, 16.161, 16.162 William Prym GmbH & Co KG v Commission (Case C-534/07P) [2009] ECR I-7415................7.78 Williams v Court of Auditors (Case 9/81) [1982] ECR 3301..........................................................17.53 Williams v Court of Auditors (Case 257/83) [1984] ECR 3547......................................................9.45 Williams v Court of Auditors (Case 134/84) [1985] ECR 2225.............................................. 14.26; 16.34 Williams v Court of Auditors (Case T-146/89) [1991] ECR II-1293...............................................7.64 Williams v Court of Auditors (Case T-33/91) [1992] ECR II-2499......................  9.43; 11.4, 11.24, 11.28 Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen-und Stahlindustrie v Commission (Case C-180/88) [1990] ECR I-4413 ................................................................................................................................... 7.49; 9.89 Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie v High Authority (Case 13/57) [1957–58] ECR 265 ............................................................................................................................... 3.15; 9.34 Wölker v Commission (Case 89/82R) [1982] ECR 1323................................................................8.91 Wollast (née Schmitz) v Commission (Case 18/63) [1964 ECR 85........................... 3.3; 6.6; 11.59, 11.78 Wonnerth v Commission (Case 12/69) [1969] ECR 577.................................................................3.31 Worms v High Authority (Case 35/58) order of 17 November 1959 (unreported)..........................14.56 Worms v High Authority (Case 18/60) [1962] ECR 195 ................................................................9.41 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Case C-309/99) [2002] ECR I-1577..............................................................................................................................2.149 Wunenburger v Commission (Case C-362/05P) [2007] ECR I-4333.................................. 7.15, 7.17; 15.5 Wünsche v Germany (Case 345/82) [1984] ECR 1995...............................................................10.26; 13.4 Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft v Germany (Case 126/81) [1982] ECR 1479............................. 10.26; 13.4 Wünsche Handelsgesellschaff GmbH & Co v Germany (Case 69/85) [1986] ECR 947.......... 2.204; 7.72; 16.23, 16.24, 16.27, 16.87, 16.171; 17.79 X X v Audit Board (Case 12/68) [1969] ECR 109, [1970] ECR 291..............2.145; 9.94, 9.91; 11.24, 11.93, 11.95; 14.25; 16.25 X v Commission (Cases T-121/89 & T-13/90) [1992] ECR II-2195.......................................... 2.110; 5.19 X v Commission (Cases T-89/91, T-21/92 & T-89/92) [1993] ECR II-1235............................ 2.160; 14.41 X v Council (Case 18/70) [1970] ECR 1205.......................................... 1.134; 11.49; 11.93; 12.19; 13.21; 14.20, 14.43 X v European Central Bank (Case T-333/99) [2001] ECR II-3021..................................... 1.22, 1.31; 9.47 Xeda International SA v Commission (Case T-71/10R-II) [2011] ECR II-82.................. 8.11, 8.84, 8.185 Y YKK Corpn v Commission (Case C-408/12P) 4 September 2014..................................................15.26 YKK Corpn v Commission (Case T-448/07) 27 June 2012............................................................11.72 Yaqub v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case T-580/12) 12 September 2013..................................................................................................2.164 Yasse v European Investment Bank (Case T-141/97) [1999] ECR SC-I-A-177, II-929..................9.64 Yedas Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AS v Council & Commission (Case T-367/03) [2006] ECR II-873...................................................................................................................9.41 Yedas Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret v Council & Commission (Case C-255/06P-REV) [2009] ECR I-53................................................................................. 16.106, 16.112, 16.117, 16.125 York von Wartenburg v European Parliament (Case T-42/89) [1990] ECR II-31 ............ 2.45; 9.67; 16.56 Yorck von Wartenburg v European Parliament (Case T-59/89) [1990] ECR II-25........2.132, 2.135, 2.158; 11.38; 14.34 Yorck von Wartenburg v European Parliament (Cases T-57 & T-75/92) [1993] ECR II-925..........14.43 Yusuf v Council & Commission (Case T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533..........................................2.161 Z Z v Commission (Case T-173/09) [2011] ECR II-211.....................................................................17.17

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Table of Cases para Z v Parliament (Case C-270/99P) [2001] ECR I-9197....................................................................1.10 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Case C-300/11) 4 June 2013....................... 9.23; 12.3 Zabala Erasun v Instituto Nacional de Empleo (Cases C-422/93-C-424/93) [1995] ECR I1567.........................................................................................................................................2.196 Zafeiropoulos v European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) (Case T-537/12) 28 January 2016......................................................................................................17.51 Zafra Marroquineros SL v Calvin Klein Trademark Trust (Case C-254/09P-DEP) order of 12 October 2012.....................................................................................................................  14.64, 14.76 Zakaria (Case C-23/12) 17 January 2013........................................................................................2.202 Zanjani v Council (Case T-155/13) (3 July 2014).................................................................... 1.18; 17.116 Zentralgenossenschaft des Fleischergewerbes v Hauptzollamt Bochum (Case 93/83) [1984] ECR 1095.................................................................................................................................4.22 Ziegler v Commission (Case T-439/11P) 11 July 2013...................................................................9.79 Ziegler SA v Commission (Case T-199/08) [2009] ECR II-2....... 8.121, 8.122, 8.123, 8.124, 8.125, 8.180 Ziegler SA v Commission (Case C-113/09 P(R)) [2010] ECR I-50.................. 8.121, 8.123, 8.124, 8.125, 8.149, 8.175 Ziegler SA v Commission (Cases T-539/12 & T-150/13) 15 January 2015.............7.59, 7.60, 7.71, 17.45, 17.51, 17.52 Zino Davidoff SA v Parliament (Case C-313/00P) order of 23 October 2001................................14.40 Zoder v European Parliament (Case T-30/90) [1991] ECR II-207..................................................7.18 Zuazaga Meabe v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks & Designs) (Case C-325/03P) [2005] ECR I-403......................................................................... 1.114; 7.39, 7.41 Zuckerfabrik Bedburg v Council & Commission (Case 281/84) [1987] ECR 49.................... 16.10; 17.43 Zuckerfabrik Julich AG v Hauptzollamt Aachen (Cases C-113/10, C-147/10 & C-234/10) 27 September 2012.......................................................................................................................17.45 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG & Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe & Hauptzollamt Paderborn (Cases C-143/88 & C-92/89) [1991] ECR I-415.............. 8.9, 8.105, 8.114, 8.179; 13.46; 17.96 Zwartveld (Case C-2/88Imm) [1990] ECR I-3365.............................1.20, 1.21; 4.64; 10.19; 17.2, 17.120, 17.122, 17.123 Zweckverband Tierkorperbeseitigung im Rheinland-Pfalz, im Saarland, im Rheingau-TaunusKreis und im Landkreis Limburg-Weilburg (Case T-309/12) 16 July 2014.............. 11.16; 9.56, 9.80

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Chapter 1

Judicial institutions and bodies

I INTRODUCTION 1.1 The judicial institution of the European Union (hereafter, ‘the EU’) is the Court of Justice of the European Union (formerly known as the Court of Justice of the European Communities).1 The EU adopted the institutional structure of the three European Communities that were in existence at the time when the European Union was established in 19932 and formally assimilated the most important of those Communities into the EU in 2009.3 The three Communities were the European Coal and Steel Community (hereafter, ‘the ECSC’), created in 1951, the European Economic Community (hereafter, ‘the EC’) and the European

1 See art 13(1) of the Treaty on European Union (hereafter ‘TEU’ or ‘EU’), signed at Maastricht on 7  February 1992 (OJ  1992 No C191/1), as amended by: (i) the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and related acts (hereafter, ‘the Amsterdam Treaty’), signed at Amsterdam on 2 October 1997 (OJ 1997 No C340/1); (ii) the Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts (hereafter, ‘the Nice Treaty’), signed at Nice on 26 February 2001 (OJ 2001 No C80/1); (iii) the three later treaties dealing with the accession to the EU of, first, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (see OJ  2003 No L236/1 – also known as the Treaty of Athens), secondly, Bulgaria and Romania (OJ  2005 No L157/1) and, thirdly, Croatia (OJ 2012 No L112/1); and (iv) the Treaty of Lisbon amending the TEU and the Treaty establishing the European Community (‘the Lisbon Treaty’), signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007, which entered into force on 1  December 2009 (OJ  2007 No C306/1). Before its amendment by the Lisbon Treaty, the relevant provisions were TEU, art  1, 3 and 5. Among other things, the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties amended the numbering of the TEU. This book uses the amended numbering. Consolidated versions of the TEU and the TFEU (formerly the EC Treaty) were published in OJ 2010 No C83/1 and in a separate hardback volume. 2 The TEU entered into force on 1 November 1993: see art 52(2) and OJ 1993 No L293/61. 3 Strictly speaking, the assimilation was effected by the Lisbon Treaty (which entered into force on 1 December 2009 and not, as envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty, art 6(1), on 1 January 2009) only in relation to the EC. The ECSC had by then expired and the EAEC was not a significant component of the EU. Accordingly, TFEU, art 1(2) (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty) provides that the TEU and the TFEU constitute the Treaties on which the EU is founded. However, the EAEC (which was extensively amended by Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty) remains institutionally linked to the EU.

1

1.1  Judicial institutions and bodies

Atomic Energy Community (hereafter, ‘the EAEC’), both created in 1957.4 The ECSC ceased to exist upon the expiry of the Treaty establishing it, on 23 July 2002.5 In principle, each of the three Communities had its own court. However, the member states signed a Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, on the same day on which the Treaties establishing the EC and EAEC were signed, which provided, in art 3, that the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the EC and EAEC Treaties ‘shall be exercised … by a single Court of Justice’. In addition, art 4 provided that, upon taking up its duties, that ‘single Court of Justice … shall take the place of the Court provided for in Article 32’ of the ECSC Treaty. Accordingly, the different judicial functions created by the ECSC, EC and EAEC Treaties were exercised by a single institution as from 1957. The Convention included several amendments to the ECSC Treaty intended to bring it into line with the other two Treaties; but the jurisdiction of the Court, as defined by each of the ECSC, EC and EAEC Treaties, was not harmonised in that fashion so that, for example, an action for annulment under the ECSC Treaty was subject to different conditions from those applying to similar actions brought under the EC and EAEC Treaties.6 At the time of writing, the position remains that the EU (which now incorporates the EC) and EAEC are served by a single judicial institution; but that institution derives its jurisdiction

4 The first was established by the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (hereafter, ‘the ECSC Treaty’), signed at Paris on 18 April 1951. The second was established by the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (hereafter, ‘the EC Treaty’ or ‘EC’), signed at Rome on 25 March 1957. Among other things, TEU art 8 amended the title of the EC Treaty by deleting the word ‘Economic’ so that the Community established by it would thenceforth be known as ‘the European Community’. Lisbon Treaty, art 2(2) replaced the title of the EC Treaty by ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (hereafter, ‘the TFEU’). That effectively marked the final assimilation of the European (Economic) Community into the European Union. References in this book to the EC  Treaty are to that treaty before its transformation into the TFEU. The third Community was established by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (hereafter, ‘the EAEC  Treaty’ or ‘EAEC’), also signed at Rome on 25 March 1957. A consolidated version of the EAEC Treaty was published in OJ 2012 No C327/1. 5 Unlike the other treaties referred to above, which were concluded for an unlimited period of time, the ECSC  Treaty was concluded for a period of 50 years running from its entry into force: see ECSC Treaty, art 97. Upon the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, the matters to which it applied then passed into the remit of the EC Treaty (as it then was). Although the administrative and legislative acts provided for in the ECSC Treaty ceased to be adopted, and the forms of action provided for in the ECSC Treaty for judicial review of acts of the ECSC institutions disappeared, with the expiry of that Treaty, it is still possible for references for a preliminary ruling to be made by national courts in relation to the interpretation and application of the ECSC  Treaty and measures adopted under it: Case C-119/05 Ministero dell’Industria, del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v Lucchini SpA [2007] ECR I-6199, para 41. For a more general consideration of the legal consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, see, for example: Case T-25/04 Gonzalez y Diez SA  v Commission [2007]  ECR II-3121, paras 53–59; Case T-405/06 ArcelorMittal Luxembourg SA v Commission [2009] ECR II-771, para 57 ff. 6 Eg Case 230/81 Luxembourg v European Parliament [1983] ECR 255.

2

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.3

separately from different Treaties.7 Until the formal assimilation of the EC into the EU in 2009, the law dispensed by that Court had, over time, been described in different ways, the most prevalent being ‘Community law’ (or ‘European Community law’). Since then, it is proper to speak of ‘European Union law’, a phrase that had become increasingly popular in the 1990s; although the EAEC still exists and has a law, or legal regime, that is not encompassed by the EU or EU law in the strict sense. Unless there is some particular reason to use redundant terminology, reference will be made in this book to the EU, EU law and EU institutions even where, in historical terms, the correct soubriquet would be ‘Community’, or ‘EC’ or the like. 1.2 The Court of Justice of the European Union (often styled ‘the European Court’ or ‘the (European) Court of Justice’), viewed as the judicial institution of the EU, consisted originally of a single judicial body (here referred to as ‘the ECJ’). As a result of the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty, the Court of Justice of the European Union consists of several judicial bodies: the ‘Court of Justice’ (that is, the ECJ), a lower court called the ‘General Court’ (hereafter ‘the GC’ – formerly known as the Court of First Instance) and such specialised courts as may be created from time to time.8 Accordingly, references in this book to the (European) Court of Justice or, more simply, to ‘the Court’ are references to the judicial institution of the EU. References to the ECJ are to the senior judicial body within that institution. 1.3 Neither the Court of Justice of the European Union nor any of the judicial bodies comprising it is to be confused with the European Court of Human Rights (which sits in Strasbourg), created under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of 4 November 1950, or with the EFTA  Court (which sits in Luxembourg), which was established

7 The 1957 Convention was repealed by the Amsterdam Treaty, art  9(1) with the intention that its ‘essential elements’ should be ‘retained’ in the remaining paragraphs of Amsterdam Treaty, art 9. Thus, Amsterdam Treaty, art 9(2) provides that the powers conferred on the Court by (so far as is here relevant) the EC and EAEC  Treaties ‘shall be exercised by the single institutions’ (here, the single Court). As a result of Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty, most of the EAEC Treaty provisions dealing with the Court of Justice were repealed and replaced by the parallel provisions of the TFEU (using, curiously, the numbering of the TFEU provisions that applied before its amendment by the Lisbon Treaty; updated numbering appears in art 106a of the consolidated version of the EAEC Treaty published in OJ 2012 No C327/1). In consequence, disputes under the EAEC Treaty are determined by the same judicial institution as determines disputes arising under the TFEU, using (for the most part) the same basic procedural and jurisdictional provisions; but the substantive law differs. 8 TEU, art  19(1). At the time of writing, there was only one specialised court: the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (hereafter, ‘the CST’). However, the CST was abolished with effect from 1  September 2016 and its jurisdiction transferred back to the GC as from that date: see Regulation 2016/1192 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2016 No L200/137), foreshadowed in recital 9 of the preamble to Regulation 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2015 No L341/4), both of which amend Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. A fuller description of the creation and evolution of the judicial bodies comprising the Court of Justice of the EU is set out below.

3

1.4  Judicial institutions and bodies

under art 108(2) of the Treaty establishing a European Economic Area.9 Since its inception as the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Court of Justice of the European Union has sat in Luxembourg.10 The ECSC, EC and EAEC Treaties provided and the TFEU provides that the ‘seat’ of the Community (now EU) institutions shall be determined by the common accord of the governments of the member states11 but no single seat for all the institutions has ever been decided on. In 1965, the representatives of the governments of the then six member states resolved, inter alia, that the provisional seat of the Court of Justice should continue to be Luxembourg12 and it has remained there ever since. Even so, it has power under the Rules of Procedure to sit in a place other than its seat in a particular instance.13 Under art 1 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union,14 the premises of the Court are inviolable and exempt from search, requisition, confiscation or expropriation. Its property and assets, being those of the EU itself, cannot be the subject of ‘any administrative or legal measure of constraint’ without the authorisation of ‘the Court of Justice’. That is a reference to the ECJ. The buildings in which the judicial bodies comprising the Court reside are in fact owned by the government of Luxembourg and rented by the EU. 1.4 The ECSC, EC and EAEC  Treaties were amended by the Single European Act so as to provide for the creation of a Court of First Instance to be ‘attached’ to the ECJ (as it then was).15 In 1988, the Council of Ministers acted on those amendments pursuant to a request made by the ECJ and adopted a decision establishing what was known as ‘the Court of First Instance of the European 9 Signed on 2  May 1992 (hereafter, ‘the EEA Agreement’). The EFTA  Court was originally located in Geneva but moved to Luxembourg in 1996. 10 For an anecdotal history of the first 35 years of the Court’s existence, see ‘XXXV  Anni, 1952–1987’ (Luxembourg, Court of Justice and Office for Official Publications of the European Communities). 11 TFEU, art  341; EAEC, art  189. Cf Case 230/81 Luxembourg v European Parliament [1983] ECR 255. 12 Decision of the representatives of the governments of the member states on the provisional location of certain institutions and departments of the Communities, art 3 (OJ 1967 No 152/18). Article 3 also covered judicial bodies to be set up under the ECSC, EEC and EAEC Treaties and therefore applies to the GC and the CST (see below). The decision taken by common agreement between the representatives of the governments of the member states on the location of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies and departments of the European Communities of 12 December 1992 (OJ 1992 No C341/1) confirmed Luxembourg as the seat of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (as the ECJ and GC then were). The position is now covered by the Protocol on the location of the seats of the institutions and of certain bodies, offices, agencies and departments of the European Union, attached to the TFEU as Protocol No  6. That Protocol repeats that the Court of Justice has its seat in Luxembourg (without prejudice to the position regarding any future institutions). 13 Rules of Procedure: (ECJ) art 23; (GC) art 40; (CST) art 24(2). For the Rules of Procedure, see further below. 14 Signed at Brussels on 8 April 1965 and originally attached to the Merger Treaty. The Protocol was preserved by the Amsterdam Treaty, art 9(1) and (4) subject to minor changes set out in Amsterdam Treaty, art 9. It was amended by the Lisbon Treaty, under which it is annexed to the TEU, the TFEU and the EAEC Treaty. It forms Protocol No 7 to the TFEU. 15 Single European Act, signed on 17 and 28  February 1986 (OJ  1987 No L169/1), arts 4, 11 and 26.

4

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.4

Communities’16 (hereafter referred to as ‘the CFI’). The CFI was entrusted with exercising at first instance the jurisdiction of the ECJ in respect of certain matters and its seat was at the ECJ.17 The members of the CFI were sworn in on 25 September 1989. By a decision dated 11 October 1989, made following the swearing-in of the Registrar of the CFI, the President of the ECJ declared that the CFI was duly constituted.18 On the date of the publication of that decision in the Official Journal, the CFI was seised with the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Council of Ministers.19 Thereafter, over the years, the jurisdiction of the CFI was progressively expanded by Council decision so as to encompass (in short) all actions that can be brought by private persons against the EU institutions, with a right of appeal to the ECJ.20 In 2003, the Nice Treaty altered the status of the CFI – but in a manner that was not entirely clear – and provided for the creation of a further tier of judicial bodies (below the ECJ and the CFI): judicial panels (later called specialised courts). The first judicial panel was established by Council decision in November 2004: ‘the European Union Civil Service Tribunal’ (hereafter, ‘the CST’).21 The function of the CST was to hear at first instance disputes involving the European Union’s civil service (that is, staff cases).22 Judges were appointed to the CST by Council decision in July 2005, their term of office commencing on 1 October 2005.23 The CST Judges were sworn in on 5 October 2005 and appointed from among their number a President on the following day. The CST Registrar was appointed on 9 November 2005 and, on 30 November 2005, the CST sat for the first time in order to swear in the CST Registrar. By a decision made on 2 December 2005 the President of the ECJ declared that the CST had been duly constituted.24 In December 2005, the staff cases pending before the CFI (as it then was), for which the written procedure had not yet been completed, were transferred to the CST. The CST held its first hearing in a case on 28 March 2006. In 2015, it was decided that the number of judges of the GC (as the CFI had by then become) should be doubled and the CST wound up in September 2016, which was duly done.25 At the time of writing, it was not clear whether or

16 Decision 88/591 (OJ  1988 No L319/1). The text of the decision was the subject of a corrigendum published in OJ 1989 No L241/4. In order to avoid confusion, a corrected text of the complete decision was then published in OJ 1989 No C215/1, and it is to that corrected version that reference is made. From the copious literature on the subject of the CFI and its creation, particular reference may be made to T  Kennedy in [1989] 13  ELR  7; T  Millett in [1989] 38 ICLQ 811; JL da Cruz Vilaça in (1990) 10 YEL 1. 17 Decision 88/591, arts 1 and 3, as amended. The GC (as the CFI is now called) has since acquired a separate address in Luxembourg. 18 OJ 1989 No L317/48. 19 Decision 88/591, art 13. 20 Decision 88/591 was amended by Council Decisions 93/350 of 8  June 1993 (OJ  1993 No L144/21) and 94/149 of 7 March 1994 (OJ 1994 No L66/29). 21 Decision 2004/752 of 2 November 2004 (OJ 2004 No L333/7), art 1. 22 Ibid, Annex 1, art 1. 23 Decision 2005/577 of 22 July 2005 (OJ 2005 No 197/28), arts 1 and 2. 24 See OJ 2005 No L325/1 (technically, as provided for in the President’s decision, the CST was established and began to carry out its judicial functions on the day on which the President’s decision was published in the Official Journal – 12 December 2005). 25 See Regulation No 2015/2422 and Regulation No 2016/1192 (above, note 8).

5

1.5  Judicial institutions and bodies

not, in the light of the decision to increase drastically the size of the GC, there would be any further experimentation with specialised courts. 1.5 As a result of the creation of the CFI (now known as the GC) and, later, as a result of the changes made by the Nice Treaty, the organisational and institutional structure of the Court of Justice of the EU is somewhat complex. The Court of Justice of the European Union is described as an ‘institution’ of the EU.26 The phrase ‘Court of Justice’, without the addition of the words ‘of the European Union’, refers to the senior judicial body comprised within the Court of Justice of the European Union.27 As an institution, the Court can at present be divided into three parts (at least organisationally): the ECJ itself; the GC (formerly CFI); and any specialised courts (before 1 September 2015, only the CST and, thereafter, at the time of writing, none).28 Although the EC and EAEC Treaties, as amended by the Single European Act, originally referred to the CFI (as the GC then was) as being ‘attached’ to the Court (at that time there was no institutional distinction between the ECJ and the Court),29 the ECJ and CFI were accorded equal status in EC, art 220 and EAEC, art 136 (as amended by the Nice Treaty), which defined the essential function of the judicial institutions of the EC and EAEC as being to ensure that the law is observed. Nonetheless, the Treaties did not endow the CFI with independent status as an EU institution. The Protocols on the Statute of the Court of Justice attached to the ECSC, EC and EAEC Treaties (which have now been replaced by a single Protocol30) were amended31 so as to incorporate certain basic provisions regarding the CFI, the proceedings before it and appeals from its decisions to the ECJ, but without altering the titles of the Protocols, which still referred only to the ‘Court of Justice,’ a phrase that, at that time, meant the ECJ. The CFI could therefore be regarded as part of the Court in an institutional sense; but that did not mean that the CFI was to be regarded in every respect as synonymous with the ECJ. For one thing, the Treaty provisions in force at the time still provided that the ‘Court of Justice’ (which, as noted above, was defined as an institution of the EC and EAEC) ‘consists’ of the ECJ judges, ‘assisted’ by the ECJ advocates general;32 the institution did not ‘consist’ of the CFI judges. In consequence, 26 TFEU, art 19(1) (the post-Lisbon Treaty provision); EC, art 7 (the pre-Lisbon Treaty provision); EAEC, art 3. 27 Compare TFEU arts 251–253, 269 and 273, which omit the phrase ‘of the European Union’, with TFEU arts 258–268, 270–272 and 274–281, which include it. That change in phraseology covers a point about the earlier version of the EC  Treaty considered in Case C-294/02 Commission v AMI Semiconductor Belgium BVBA [2005] ECR I-2175, paras 43–53. 28 As noted above, save where the context indicates otherwise, the term ‘Court’ will hereafter be used to describe the Court of Justice of the European Union in its institutional sense, that is, as comprising the ECJ, GC and specialised courts. 29 At the time: EC, art 168a (later art 225); EAEC, art 140a (both as originally worded). 30 That was done by the Nice Treaty. The new Protocol replaced the earlier protocols with effect from 1 February 2003. Post the Lisbon Treaty, the relevant Protocol is Protocol No 3 to the TFEU. 31 By Decision 88/591, as amended. 32 At the time: EC, art 221 and 222; EAEC, art 137 and 138. That meant that the members of the institution (that is, the natural persons comprising it) were the ECJ judges and advocates general.

6

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.5

the CFI was to be regarded as an integral, but subordinate, part of the Court.33 Finally (before the Lisbon Treaty), as a result of the amendments made by the Nice Treaty, the ‘judicial panels’ that might be ‘attached’ to the CFI for the specific purpose of exercising the judicial competences laid down in each of the EC and EAEC Treaties in areas to be specified in the instrument creating them34 would appear to have had the same kind of relationship with the CFI as the latter originally had with the ECJ under the Single European Act: they could be said to be distinct bodies that were part of the institution comprising the ECJ and the CFI but were subordinate to the latter. The only judicial panel established at that time (the CST) was said to be an ‘integral part of the Court of Justice institution’ for institutional and organisational purposes.35 The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe retained the ‘Court of Justice’ as the judicial institution of the EU but defined it so as to include ‘the European Court of Justice’ (that is, the ECJ), ‘the High Court’ (at that time, the proposed new name for the CFI) and ‘specialised courts’ (the then proposed judicial panels).36 That approach was followed in the Lisbon Treaty (as a result, the CST was transformed from a judicial panel to a specialised court). However, although the Court (as the judicial institution of the EU) now ‘includes’ the ECJ, the former CFI (renamed the GC) and specialised courts,37 the specialised courts remain ‘attached’ to what is now the GC (albeit that the GC is no longer ‘attached’ to the ECJ).38 Those vagaries could be explained on the basis that the attachment of the specialised courts to the GC means that, in an institutional sense, the ‘members’ of the Court comprise the ECJ judges and advocates general and the GC judges but not the members of 33 Similarly, the advocates general of the ECJ are an integral part of the Court even though the Court does not ‘consist’ of them and they only ‘assist’ the ECJ judges: see JL da Cruz Vilaça (1990) 10 YEL 1 at p 19. However, it was far from clear that, as with the ECJ advocates general, the CFI judges were ‘members’ of the institution. 34 At the time: EC, art 220 and 225a; EAEC, art 136 and 140b. The decision to create a judicial panel was made by the Council, acting unanimously. The Council could so act either on a proposal from the Commission or at the request of the ECJ. If acting on a proposal from the Commission, the Council had first to consult the Parliament and the ECJ. If acting at the request of the ECJ, the Council had first to consult the Parliament and the Commission. The references, in the Treaty provisions in force at the time, to the ECJ as the maker of such a request or as a consultee were ambiguous since they did not distinguish between the ECJ in an institutional sense (comprising also what was then the CFI) and the ECJ in a juristic sense (as the superior judicial organ comprised within the institution known as the ECJ or, here, the Court). The better view seemed to be that the ECJ was referred to in an institutional sense. Accordingly, a request for the creation of a judicial panel might, technically, originate in a view expressed by the CFI (as it then was), although it would have been articulated as a request made by the ECJ (in its institutional sense) and would therefore have needed the consent or approval of the ECJ (in its juristic sense). The consultation of the ECJ, understood in an institutional sense, would similarly have involved the consultation of all the different component parts of the ECJ (the ECJ, in its juristic sense, the CFI and any existing judicial panels). 35 Decision 2004/752, 3rd recital of the preamble. 36 OJ 2003 No C169/1. See arts 18(2), 28 and III-258–264. The Draft Constitution failed to be approved by referendums held in France and the Netherlands. It was subsequently revamped as a Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (‘the EU Reform Treaty’), adopted at the Intergovernmental Conference held in Lisbon on 18 October 2007 and signed as the Lisbon Treaty on 13 December 2007. 37 TEU, art 13(1) and 19(1). 38 TFEU, art 257.

7

1.6  Judicial institutions and bodies

specialised courts. Even so, that does not resolve entirely the problem of identifying the ‘members’ of the Court, an issue that arises when considering how the Court acts in an institutional, as opposed to a juristic, capacity.39 1.6 In an organisational sense, the ECJ, the GC and (at the time of writing) the CST are separate parts of the same institution (referred to generally as ‘the Court’). Each of them can be further divided into two parts: on the one hand, the members of the ECJ, GC and specialised courts40 and their personal staffs;41 on the other, the Registrar and the different departments (of the ECJ, the GC and the CST, respectively) which fall within his sphere of responsibility.42 The Registrar of the ECJ is responsible directly for the ECJ’s Registry and indirectly, through their heads of department, for the Court’s administration. At the time of writing, the Registrar of the ECJ was responsible for: the directorate general for personnel and finance; the directorate general for library, research and documentation; the directorate general for infrastructure (building, logistics and information technology); the directorate general for translation; the interpretation directorate; the protocol and visits directorate; the press and information service; and the Court’s legal adviser on administrative matters. The Registrar of the GC is responsible for the GC’s Registry and its Administration. As at the time of writing, the CST had its own Registrar but was otherwise supported by the departments of the ECJ and the GC.43 The services of the ECJ’s departments are available to the GC, thus avoiding needless duplication. In addition, there also exist the Secretariat of the Administrative Heads of the Staff Regulations Committee and the Staff Committee. 1.7 This chapter deals with the internal aspects of the Court, in particular its composition, structure and functioning, and with the division of jurisdiction between the ECJ, the GC and the CST. Much of it, save the last aspect, is not pertinent to the conduct of proceedings before the Court but it shows how the Court works as an institution. The functioning of the Registries of the ECJ and the GC and the internal organisation of the Court as a judicial body are clearly of importance to the administration of justice by the Court; but they are of only secondary interest so far as the conduct of a particular case is concerned. For 39 In practice, the Court appears to operate on the basis that decisions are made by the members of the ECJ, who may consult the members of the GC and, it seems, any specialised courts. Thus, proposals for amendments to the Court’s Statute and the rules of procedure (sent to the European Parliament and the Council under cover of letters dated 28 March 2011 and published at the time on the Court’s website) were put forward by the ECJ. On at least one point, the ECJ and the GC had taken different views, those of the latter appearing in a footnote. In the case of the proposed amendments to the Statute, that approach was mandated by TFEU, art 281, which provides that such amendments may be requested by ‘the Court of Justice’ (not ‘the Court of Justice of the European Union’). 40 The judges and the advocates general, in the case of the ECJ; the judges in the case of the GC and the CST. 41 Each judge or advocate general has a personal staff whose size has grown over the years as the demands on the judges and advocates general have increased. The establishments of the President of the ECJ and the President of the GC are larger in order to take account of their additional responsibilities. 42 Internal audit is a responsibility attached to the office of the President of the ECJ. 43 Protocol on the Statute of the Court, annex 1, art 6.

8

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.8

that reason, this chapter is intended only to fill in the institutional background to procedure before the Court. So far as the division of jurisdiction is concerned, the abolition of the CST with effect from 1 September 2016 results in the disappearance of the CST and the reassumption by the GC of the first instance jurisdiction over staff cases that it had before the creation of the CST.

II

THE INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING THE COURT44

1.8 The Court is a creature of the TEU, TFEU and EAEC  Treaty, as amended; and the basic rules governing its constitution and jurisdiction are to be found there.45 The powers conferred on the Court by the Treaties can, of course, be modified by amending the Treaties,46 as was done pursuant to the Single European Act (in order to create the CFI) and, in other respects, by the TFEU (which also limited the jurisdiction of the Court);47 other instruments, including international agreements concluded by the EU, may confer additional powers on the Court provided that, in so doing, they do not change the nature of the functions of the Court as envisaged in the Treaties.48 It is open to the EU to conclude an international agreement that has the effect of making decisions of another court binding on the Court:49 it is not part of the essential nature of the Court, as envisaged in the Treaties, that it is supreme in all respects (save that, by virtue of the supremacy of EU law over national law, judgments of the Court bind all courts in the member states). On the other hand, the Treaties do conceive of the Court as an institution whose decisions are binding in law and not merely advisory.50 The Court’s jurisdiction is not defined exclusively by the Treaties. A plethora of international conventions now exists under which the Court has jurisdiction either to decide disputes between the contracting parties or else to deliver preliminary rulings.51 Historically, the most important of such instruments were 44 The instruments regulating the Court may be accessed through the Court’s website: http:// europa.eu.int/cj/en/index.htm. The EC  Treaty (now TFEU) had been renumbered (on more than one occasion). The current numbering of Treaty provisions is used in this book. In order to relate the current numbering to earlier numbers, reference should be made to the table of concordance set out in Appendix 1 hereto, which covers only those Treaty provisions of direct relevance to the Court. 45 TFEU, art  251–281. EAEC, art  137–143, 146–156 and 158–160 were repealed by Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty and replaced by TFEU, art 221–236 and 238–245, which correspond to TFEU, art 251–270 and 272–281 after the renumbering of the TFEU provisions perpetrated by the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU, art 271 and 275–276 do not apply in the context of the EAEC because they relate specifically to matters falling outside the scope of the EAEC): see EAEC, art 106a(1). EAEC, art 144–145 and 157 remain in effect (EAEC, art 136 was also repealed but the EAEC remains subject to the rule of law through the incorporation of TEU, art 19(1) in EAEC, art 106a(1)). 46 Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I-2821, para 32. 47 TFEU, art 275–276. See also TEU, art 24(1) and see further Ch 17 below. 48 Ibid. If the nature of the Court’s functions is to be changed, that must, and can only, be effected by amending the Treaties. 49 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paras 39–40. 50 Opinion 1/92, above (note 46), para 33. 51 See the list in Appendix 2 below.

9

1.8  Judicial institutions and bodies

the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters52 and the Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual Obligations,53 which conferred on the ECJ jurisdiction to give rulings on the interpretation of those Conventions and the acts relating to them. Those conventions remain in force for certain purposes but, as between the member states (subject to some exceptions), have since been replaced by a regulation;54 and the jurisdiction of the Court to hear references for a preliminary ruling in relation to the regulation in question derives from the TFEU. The Agreement on a European Economic Area55 also extends the jurisdiction of the ECJ by providing for the possibility of the ECJ giving interpretative rulings in response to requests made by courts in EFTA countries56 and requests made by contracting parties to the Agreement who are involved in a dispute concerning the case law regarding provisions of the Agreement that are identical in substance to corresponding rules in the TFEU and the ECSC Treaty and the acts adopted in implementation of them.57 52 Signed in Brussels on 27 September 1968 and usually known as ‘the Brussels Convention’: see art 37 and the Protocol on the Interpretation of the Convention by the ECJ. The Convention was amended on several occasions. A  consolidated version of the Brussels Convention (and the Protocol), as amended, was published in OJ 1998 No C27/1 and 28. A parallel Convention, known as ‘the Lugano Convention’, signed at Lugano on 16 September 1988 (see OJ 1998 No L319/9), revised in 2007 (see OJ 2009 No L147/5), in effect extended the Brussels Convention, as amended, to the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The Brussels Convention was converted into a Council Regulation, which came into effect on 1 March 2002: Regulation No 44/2001 (OJ 2001 No L12/1). Regulation No 44/2001 was repealed and replaced by Regulation No 1215/2012 (OJ 2012 No L351/1). The Brussels Convention remains in force as between those territories covered by it that are not within the EU pursuant to TFEU art 355: see Regulation No  1215/2012, art  68. As between Denmark and the other member states, Regulation No 44/2001 applies: see Regulation No 1215/2012, recital 41. 53 Opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 and hence known as ‘the Rome Convention’: see the Protocol on the Interpretation of the Convention by the ECJ (OJ  1989 No L48/1). A consolidated version of the Rome Convention containing later amendments was published in OJ  1998 No C27/34. Two protocols on the Interpretation of the 1980 Convention by the European Court were eventually signed; and consolidated versions of them were published in OJ 1998 No C27/47 and 52. The Protocols came into force on 1 August 2004. The Rome Convention was superseded by Regulation No  593/2008 (OJ  2008 No L177/6), save for those territories covered by it that are not within the EU pursuant to TFEU art 355 and save for Denmark: Regulation No 593/2008, recitals 44–46 (the United Kingdom opted in to the Regulation in 2008: see the Commission Decision of 22 December 2008, OJ 2009 No L10/22). 54 See notes 52 and 53 above. A similar process of conversion to regulations occurred in relation to some other conventions. For example, the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters (OJ 1998 No C221/1), colloquially known as ‘Brussels II’, was superseded by Regulation No 1347/2000 (OJ 2000 No L160/19), which has now been repealed and replaced by Regulation No 2201/2003 (OJ 2003 No L338/1). Regulation No 2201/2003 does not apply to Denmark but Brussels II does. 55 Signed on 2 May 1992. The Agreement came into force on 1 January 1994: see OJ 1994 No L1/606. The text of the Agreement is also published in [1992] 1 CMLR 921. 56 Article 107 and Protocol 34. The signatories to the EEA Agreement that are not also member states of the EU are here referred to as ‘EEA states’. 57 Article  111(3). The Agreement also provides for a system of exchanging information about judgments delivered by the ECJ, CFI (now GC), the EFTA court to be established pursuant to the Agreement, and the courts of last instance of the EFTA countries: art  106. Art 110 of the Agreement, which concerns the enforcement of judgments and of decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority or the Commission, and the suspension of enforcement, is similar to the parallel provisions in EC, art 256.

10

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.10

1.9 Annexed to each of the ECSC, EC and EAEC Treaties was a ‘Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice’ of the Community in question. As noted above, those Protocols were replaced by a single protocol with effect from 1 February 2003.58 The differences between the earlier protocols are now of historical interest only. For the sake of brevity, the Protocol currently in force will be referred to as ‘the Statute’.59 The Statute contains detailed rules covering the members of the Court and the general form of its organisation and procedure. With the exception of Title I, which deals with the judges and advocates general of the ECJ, and Article  64, which deals with the language arrangements employed by the Court in the proceedings before it, the Statute may be amended by the European Parliament and the Council, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,60 at the request either of the ECJ (after consultation with the Commission) or of the Commission (after consultation with the ECJ).61 Title I and Article 64 can be amended only by the member states, in the same way in which they may amend or repeal the Statute in its entirety. Article 1 of the Statute provides: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the provisions of the [TEU, TFEU and the EAEC Treaty] and of this Statute’ (emphasis added), thus encompassing all the judicial bodies comprising the Court of Justice of the EU. 1.10 As an EU institution, the Court and its component parts are bound by the general obligations imposed on EU institutions, in particular the obligations: to respect the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and fundamental rights; to act within the limits of the powers conferred by the Treaties and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them; and to conduct its work as openly as possible.62 Those obligations are subsumed within the Court’s general function of ensuring that the law is observed.63 The fundamental rights contained in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also apply. The Charter rights relevant or potentially relevant to the Court are the right to good administration, the right of access to documents, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and the 58 The Protocol is now Protocol No  3 to the TFEU. A  consolidated version is included in the consolidated version of the TFEU published in 2010 (see above) and a consolidated version is also available on the Court’s website. The Protocol was amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No  741/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ  2012 No L228/1) and by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2015 No L341/14). 59 Any references to the predecessors to the Statute will be to the protocol attached to whichever of the ECSC, EC and EAEC  Treaties is relevant and will therefore be referred to as ‘the ECSC Statute’, ‘the EC Statute’ or ‘the EAEC Statute’, as the case may be. 60 That is, the procedure described in TFEU, art 289(1) and 294. 61 TFEU, art 281; EAEC, art 160. The reference in those provisions is to ‘the Court of Justice’ without the addition of the words ‘of the European Union’. For an example of such an amendment, see Regulation 2016/1192 (above, note 8). 62 TEU, art 5(3), 5(4), 6(3), 13(2); TFEU, art 15(1). By reason of the nature of the Court’s function within the institutional structure of the EU, the other obligations imposed on EU institutions by TEU, art 11(1)–(2) have little application to the Court. 63 TEU, art 19(1), 1st subpara.

11

1.10  Judicial institutions and bodies

right of defence, the principle of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, and the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence.64 Those rights include the right to obtain judgment within a reasonable time65 (a claim that legal proceedings have taken too long cannot be raised in the same proceedings).66 In addition to those rights under the Charter, citizens of the EU and natural or legal persons residing (or, in the case of legal persons, having their registered office) in a member state have a right of access to documents of the EU institutions (subject to conditions laid down by regulation); and each institution must ensure that its proceedings are transparent.67 In the case of the Court, the non-Charter right of access to 64 Charter 41, 42 (for which see also TFEU, art 15(3)), 47, 48, 49, 50. For a summary of the right to be heard, see (for example) Case C-530/12P Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) v National Lottery Commission, 27 March 2014, paras 52–59, and the cases cited there. For the application of the Charter to the EU institutions, see Charter 51(1). The Court does not have a criminal jurisdiction but may be called upon to rule in criminal cases, in the context of references to it for a preliminary ruling made by a national criminal court, or in cases such as those involving the imposition of a fine or penalty that are akin to (if not the same as) criminal cases. So far as is here relevant, the Charter reflects the Human Rights Convention. To that extent, it has the same meaning and effect as the Convention: Charter, 52(3). 65 Case C-185/95P  Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998]  ECR  I-8417, para  21; Case C-39/00P Services pour le groupement d’acquisitions v Commission [2000] ECR I-11201, paras 43, 45; Case C-270/99P Z  v Parliament [2001]  ECR  I-9197, para  24; Cases C-403/04P and C-405/04P Sumitomo Metal Industries v Commission [2007] ECR I-729, paras 115–122; Case T-57/01 Solvay SA v Commission [2009] ECR II-4621, paras 138–141; Case C-385/07 P Der Grune Punkt – Duales System Deutschland GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR I-6155, paras 176–196; Cases C-322/07P, C-323/07P and C-338/07P  Papierfabrik August Koehler AG  v Commission [2009]  ECR  I-7191, paras 143–150. What is a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances, see, for example: Case T-182/96 Partex v Commission [1999]  ECR II2673, para 177–189; Z v Parliament (above), paras 23–24; Case T-66/01 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [2010]  ECR II-2631, paras 114–117; Cases T-197/11  P  and T-198/11 P Commission v Strack, 13 December 2012, paras 267–268; Case T-199/11 P Strack v Commission, 13 December 2012, paras 217–218; Case C-467/13 P Industries Chimiques du Fluor SA v Commission, 9 October 2014, para 60 (four years, during three of which there was no action, unreasonable); Case T-107/13 P Trentea v European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 16 January 2015, para 84 (two years not unreasonable). On the consequences, when a reasonable time is exceeded, see for example: Z v Parliament (above), paras 40–45; Service pour le groupement d’acquisitions (above), paras 44–47; Partex (above), paras 195–196; Case C-583/08 P Gogos v Parliament [2010] ECR I-4469, paras 56–57; Case C-40/12 P Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission, 26 November 2013, paras 80–102; Case C-50/12 P Kendrion v Commission, 26  November 2013, paras 81–106; Case C-58/12  P  Groupe Gascogne v Commisison, 26  November 2013, paras 72–96; Case C-238/12  P  FLSmidth v Commission, 30 April 2014, paras 115–116; Case C-243/12  P  FLS PLast v Commission, 19  June 2014, paras 134–135; Case C-414/12  P  Bollore v Commission, 8  May 2014, paras 105–107; Case C-578/11 P Deltafina v Commission, 12 June 2014, paras 80–84; Case C-295/12 P Telefonica SA v Commission, 10 July 2014, paras 64–66; Case C-127/13 P Strack v Commission, 2 October 2014, para 62 (annulment of the judgment in question only if the delay affected the result in the case); Industries Chimiques du Fluor (above), paras 57–58; Case C-580/12  P  Guardian Industries Corp and Guardian Europe Sarl v Commission, 12 November 2014, paras 17–19; Trentea (above), para 85. 66 Case T-497/07 Compania Espanola de Petroleos SA (CEPSA) v Commission, 16  September 2013, paras 267–269; Cases T-56/09 and T-73/09 Saint-Gobin Glass France SA v Commission, 27 March 2014, paras 495–500. 67 TFEU, art 15(3).

12

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.10

documents and the obligation of transparency apply only when a component part of the Court exercises an administrative task.68 The same limitation applies by implication to the Charter right of access to documents. In relation to the performance by a component part of the Court of judicial tasks, the right of access to documents is the subject of express provision in the rules of procedure of the ECJ, GC and CST.69 In brief, as between the parties to a case before the ECJ, GC or CST, transparency is secured by the principle that each (principal) party is entitled to see and hear all written and oral submissions made to the court by the opposing party.70 As between the parties and the Court, transparency is secured by the Court’s obligation to give reasons for its decisions71 and by the opportunity given the parties for there to be a hearing before the court reaches a decision.72 However, neither the parties to proceedings nor third parties have a right of access to the court’s deliberations when it is considering the making of a decision affecting a party to proceedings before it.73 So far as third parties are concerned, transparency is secured by the fact that, unless there is good reason otherwise, hearings are held in public,74 by the public delivery of judgments,75 and by the publication by the Court of notices of cases and decisions.76 On the other hand, third parties do not have a right of access to the written submissions

68 TFEU, art 15(3), 4th subpara; Cases C-514/07P, C-528/07P and C-532/07P Sweden v API and Commission [2010] ECR I-8533, paras 77–104. 69 See further below. 70 Part of the rights of the defence guaranteed by Charter 48(2). 71 The obligation to give reasons for a judicial decision having substantive content is a general principle of law and is also expressly provided for in Statute, art 36 (which applies to the GC by virtue of Statute, art 53, and also applied to the CST by virtue of Statute, Annex, art 7(1)). The obligation to state reasons does not apply to decisions that are purely procedural in nature (such as a decision to extend a time limit) or to decisions that do not affect adversely a party. 72 Under Charter 47, 2nd para, there is a right to a fair and public hearing (see also Charter 41(2) (a)). A party may be ‘heard’ where his written submissions are read by the court. An oral hearing may, however, be dispensed with in certain circumstances under the ECJ, GC and CST rules of procedure (see below). 73 Deliberations are held in secret and must remain secret after judgment has been delivered: Statute, art 35, which applies to the GC by virtue of Statute, art 53, and also to the CST by virtue of Statute, Annex, art 7(1). 74 The public nature of the hearing is provided for in Statute, art  31 (which applies to the GC by virtue of Statute, art 53, and also to the CST by virtue of Statute, Annex, art 7(1)). Only ‘serious reasons’ permit a hearing to be held in private. The ‘serious reasons’ in question can be derived from other principles applicable to the Court, in particular, the right to privacy and commercial confidentiality. RP-ECJ, art  79(1) provides that the serious reasons include the security of member states and the protection of minors. 75 Required by Statute, art 37 (which applies to the GC by virtue of Statute, art 53, and also to the CST by virtue of Statute, Annex, art 7(1)). 76 Eg RP-ECJ, art 21(4) and 92.

13

1.11  Judicial institutions and bodies

made by a party.77 The general obligations of the Court may be relied upon in appeals from one component part of the Court to another but otherwise may be invoked, and are respected, in the context of the exercise by any one component part of the Court of its jurisdiction. 1.11 The TFEU and the EAEC Treaty provide78 that the ECJ shall adopt its own rules of procedure, which require the approval of the Council; and that the GC shall adopt its rules of procedure in agreement with the ECJ (those rules also require the approval of the Council).79 Article 63 of the Statute provides: ‘The Rules of Procedure of the [ECJ and GC] shall contain any provisions necessary for applying and, where required, supplementing this Statute’. Although it is left to the ECJ and the GC to draw up their rules of procedure, they must, in addition to being approved by the Council (and also, in the case of the GC, agreed with the ECJ) follow the overall pattern set out in the Statute. It would seem that a provision in the rules of procedure (whether of the ECJ or the GC) may be inapplicable if it is not compatible with the Statute.80 Further, rules of procedure must, amongst other things, advance respect for fundamental rights, such as the protection of the rights of the defence; and that affects the interpretation and application of such rules and may require their supplementing where need be.81

77 There is no provision in the different rules of procedure enabling a third party to have sight of a pleading lodged at the ECJ, GC or CST. Pleadings may not be obtained from an EU institution which is a party to the proceedings to which the pleadings relate unless and until, after the close of the proceedings, there are no longer grounds for presuming that disclosure would undermine the judicial activities of the Court (which could be the case if the pleadings overlapped with pleadings in cases still pending): Cases C-514/07P, C-528/07P and C-532/07P Sweden v API and Commission [2010]  ECR  I-8533, paras 77–104, 130–135. That judgment applies to the institution’s own pleadings. It does not seem that the pleadings of other parties that are in the possession of the institution can be disclosed without the consent of the party in question because documents obtained by a party to proceedings can be used only for the purposes of those proceedings (see further below). 78 TFEU, art  253, last subparagraph, and 254, penultimate paragraph, which apply to the EAEC Treaty by virtue of EAEC, art 106a(1) and Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty. 79 In accordance with TEU, art 16(3), the Council acts by qualified majority. 80 See Cases 42 and 49/59 Breedband NV v Société des Acièries du Temple [1962] ECR 145 at 157 (a case under the ECSC Statute); and, by analogy, Cases C-393/07 and C-9/08 Italy v European Parliament [2009]  ECR  I-3679, paras 47–48 (in that case, the European Parliament’s rules of procedure were concerned essentially with regulating the Parliament’s internal procedures whereas the Court’s various rules of procedure are rather more concerned with the interaction between the Court and the parties before it and between the parties themselves). The Statute may, of course, permit a derogation from its terms, as it does in art 53. 81 Cf Case C-462/98 P Mediocurso - Estabelecimento de Ensino Particular Lda v Commission [2000] ECR I-7183, para 36; Case C-414/08 P Sviluppo Italia Basilicata SpA v Commission [2010] ECR I-2559, para 87. Although those cases concern other institutions, there seems to be no justification for treating the Court’s rules of procedure differently. In AMI Semiconductor (above, note 27), para 68, the ECJ held that a gap in the rules laid down by the Statute and the rules of procedure could be filled by deducing what rule should apply from the principles common to the procedural laws of the member states in the area in question. That appears to apply where it is necessary in the interests of justice (or in order to comply with a superior rule of law) to supplement the rules of procedure (for a case in which that was not so, see Case T-396/05 ArchiMEDES v Commission [2009] ECR II-70*, paras 70–73; on appeal, Case C-317/09 ArchiMEDES v Commission [2010] ECR I-150*, paras 119–125).

14

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.13

1.12 The Rules of Procedure of the ECJ were first drawn up and published in 1953,82 the Court basing them on the Rules of the International Court of Justice at The Hague,83 as a comparison of the two sets of rules at the time makes evident. The current Rules of the ECJ were published in the Official Journal in 2012, replacing (with effect from 1 November 2012) a previous version that had originally been published in 1991 and had been amended on several occasions.84 References to the current Rules will be to ‘RP-ECJ’, followed by the number of the article in question. The Rules of Procedure deal in detail with the organisation and procedure of the ECJ and are supplemented by the ‘Supplementary Rules’,85 which set out the rules relating to letters rogatory, legal aid and reports of perjury by a witness or expert. Those will be referred to as ‘SR-ECJ’. In 2007, the ECJ adopted a Code of Conduct intended to clarify certain obligations arising under the Statute and the Rules of Procedure. It is applicable to the judges and advocates general of the ECJ and the judges of the GC and CST both while they hold office and thereafter.86 1.13 The procedure of the GC is governed by Title III of the Statute, with the exception of those provisions in that Title that are peculiar to the ECJ, any further and more detailed provisions being laid down in the Rules of Procedure to be adopted by the GC in agreement with the ECJ and with the approval of the Council.87 The GC was to adopt its rules of procedure immediately upon its constitution and, until those rules entered into force, was to apply the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure mutatis mutandis.88 In the event, the Rules of Procedure of the GC were first adopted in 199089 and did not come into effect until the first day of 82 OJ of 7 March 1953, p 37; those Rules were replaced in 1959 (see OJ 1970, p 17). A further version of the Rules was published in OJ 1974 No L350/1. It was the subject of minor corrections and various amendments over the years. A consolidated version was published in OJ 1982 No C39/1. 83 Court of Justice of the European Communities, Judicial and Academic Conference 1976, Fifth Report, p 3; Van Houtte Cahiers du Droit Européen (1983) p 3 at 5. 84 The current Rules are published in OJ 2012 No L265/1 (as amended in 2013 – see OJ 2013 No L173/65) and an electronic version can also be found on the Court’s website. For the date of their coming into force, see Article 210. A complete version of the 1991 Rules was published in OJ  1991 No L176/7. Corrigenda and amendments to the 1991 Rules were published in: OJ  1992 No L383/117; OJ  1995 No L44/61; OJ  1997 No L103/1; OJ  1997 No L351/72; OJ 2000 No L122/43; OJ 2000 No L322/1; OJ 2001 No L119/1; OJ 2002 No L272/1; OJ 2002 No L281/24; OJ 2003 No L147/17; OJ 2003 No L172/12; OJ 2004 No L132/2; OJ 2004 No L127/107; OJ  2005 No L203/19; OJ  2005 No L288/51; OJ  2006 No L386/44; OJ  2007 No L332/108–109; OJ 2008 No L24/39; OJ 2008 No L200/18, 20; OJ 2009 No L24/8; OJ 2010 No L92/12; OJ 2011 No L162/17. 85 OJ  2014 No L32/37, which replaced the SR-ECJ published in OJ  1974 No L350/29 and amended on various occasions. An electronic version appears on the Court’s website. RP-ECJ, art 207 refers to the adoption of supplementary rules. 86 OJ 2007 No C223/1. 87 Statute, art 53; TFEU, art 254, penultimate paragraph (which also applies to the EAEC Treaty by virtue of Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty). In accordance with TEU, art 16(3), the Council acts by qualified majority. As a general rule, the provisions of the Treaties relating to the ECJ apply to the GC unless the Statute provides otherwise: TFEU, art 254, last paragraph (which also applies to the EAEC Treaty). 88 Decision 88/591, art 11. 89 OJ 1990 No C136/1.

15

1.14  Judicial institutions and bodies

the second month following their publication in the Official Journal on 5 June 1990.90 They were in force for less than a year before being replaced by new Rules of Procedure, adopted on 2 May 1991, which came into force on the first day of the second month of their publication in the Official Journal on 30 May 1991, that is, as from 1 July 1991.91 Those rules followed very closely the 1991 Rules of Procedure of the ECJ.92 Those Rules of Procedure were then replaced in 2015.93 The 2015 GC Rules of Procedure came into effect on 1 July 2015, subject to transitional provisions dealing with the application of certain provisions to cases pending on that date.94 References to the GC’s Rules of Procedure will be to ‘RP-GC’, followed by the number of the article in question. The GC has not adopted Supplementary Rules: the matters covered by the ECJ’s Supplementary Rules are dealt with directly by the GC’s Rules of Procedure. 1.14 A  specialised court may be created and attached to the GC by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, on a proposal from the Commission (after consultation with the ECJ) or at the request of the ECJ (after consultation with the Commission).95 The legal act creating a specialised court is a regulation which must define the jurisdiction conferred on the specialised court and lay down the rules for its organisation.96 The rules of procedure of a specialised court are determined by the specialised court itself, in agreement with the ECJ and with the approval of

90 See art 130 of those Rules. 91 Those rules were published in OJ 1991 No L136/1 (see art 130 for the date of their coming into force). Corrections and amendments to those rules were published in: OJ 1991 No L317/34; OJ 1994 No L249/17; OJ 1995 No L44/64; OJ 1995 No L172/3; OJ 1997 No L103/6; OJ 1997 No L351/72; OJ 1999 No L135/92; OJ 2000 No L322/4; OJ 2003 No L147/22; OJ 2004 No L132/3; OJ  2004 No L127/108; OJ  2005 No L298/1; OJ  2006 No L386/45; OJ  2008 No L179/12; OJ 2009 No L24/9; OJ 2009 No L60/3; OJ 2009 No L184/10; OJ 2010 No L92/14; OJ 2011 No L162/18; OJ 2013 No L173/66. A consolidated version appeared on the Court’s website (dated, at the time of writing, to June 2013). 92 The last recital to the preamble to the GC’s 1991 Rules of Procedure stated that it is ‘desirable that the rules applicable to the procedure before the [GC] should not differ more than is necessary from the rules applicable to the procedure before the Court of Justice’. At that time, the jurisdiction of the ECJ and the GC over direct actions was more evenly balanced than is currently the case. The subsequent conversion of the ECJ into a court concerned primarily with the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction and with the making of preliminary rulings referred by national courts prompted the revision of the ECJ’s rules of procedure in 2012: see RP-ECJ, recital (1). 93 See OJ 2015 No L105/1. Amendments to the 2015 GC rules of procedure were made in August 2016: see OJ 2016 No L217/71, 72 and 73. The first of those amendments changed the reference to the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), in RP-GC, art 1(2)(g), to the European Union Intellectual Property Office. The second of those amendments concerned RP-GC, art 105(10). The third made a series of amendments consequential upon the abolition of the CST and applied as from 1 September 2016. 94 See RP-GC, art 227. The main point to note is that, under RP-GC, art 227(3), the new RP-GC, art 105 was not to come into effect until the entry into force of implementing arrangements under RP-GC, art 105(11). At the time of writing, no such arrangements had been adopted. 95 TFEU, art 257, 1st para. The ordinary legislative procedure is that described in TFEU, art 289(1) and 294. 96 TFEU, art 257, 2nd para (which also applies to the EAEC Treaty).

16

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.15

the Council.97 However, the provisions of the TFEU and the EAEC Treaty relating to the ECJ and of the Statute apply to specialised courts save to the extent that the regulation creating a specialised court provides otherwise;98 and the jurisdiction, composition, organisation and procedure of specialised courts are to be set out in an annex to the Statute.99 At the time of writing, the annex dealt only with the CST and was to be deleted with effect from 1 September 2016. For the first few years of its existence, the CST had no rules of procedure of its own and, in their absence, applied the annex to the Statute and what were then the CFI’s rules of procedure.100 The CST Rules of Procedure were approved by the Council at its meeting held on 19–20 April 2007 and came into force on 1 November 2007.101 They were replaced by a new set of rules in 2014.102 The CST Rules of Procedure are referred to as ‘RP-CST’. In consequence of the abolition of the CST with effect from 1 September 2016, the rules of procedure of the GC were modified slightly so as to incorporate certain specific rules of the CST that apply in staff cases. 1.15 The general principle is that procedural rules must be provided for expressly; and a rule or procedure that would have the effect of rendering an action inadmissible cannot be inferred in the absence of express provision, particularly where other rules and procedures exist which provide adequate judicial protection for a particular procedural situation.103 In principle, procedural rules apply to all proceedings pending at the time when the rules enter into force and a

97 TFEU, art 257, 5th para (which also applies to the EAEC Treaty). In that provision, it is stated that ‘the specialised courts’ (in the plural) shall establish their rules of procedure. That means that each of them must do so. It does not mean that they must act collectively: the peculiarities of the jurisdiction conferred on one specialised court may be such as to require a lack of uniformity as between the rules of procedure of different specialised courts. Having said that, it is desirable that broadly the same pattern should be followed in all the rules of procedure of the different judicial bodies comprising the Court. In accordance with TEU, art 16(3), the Council acts by qualified majority when deciding whether or not to approve the CST’s rules of procedure. 98 TFEU, art 257 (which also applies to the EAEC Treaty). It appears from that provision that the regulation creating the specialised court may not derogate from Title I and Article 64 of the Statute. 99 Statute, art 62c, as amended by Regulation 2016/1192, art 2(2). 100 As provided for in Decision 2004/752, art 3(4). 101 OJ 2007 No L225/1. Art 121 provides that RP-CST ‘shall enter into force on the first day of the third month following the date of their publication’ in the Official Journal. They were published in the Official Journal issue dated 29 August 2007. The third month thereafter was November 2007. Thus, RP-CST entered into force on 1 November 2007. 102 OJ 2014 No L206/1. 103 Case T-1/90 Pérez-Minguez Casariego v Commission [1991]  ECR II-143, paras 41–43. The need for express wording applies in essence to procedural rules that bar the continuation of proceedings and not to rules or to practices that assist the conduct of a case, such as the practice applied when dealing with confidential material which, as Case 236/81 Celanese Chemical Co Inc v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 1183 shows, may be the subject of impromptu rules.

17

1.16  Judicial institutions and bodies

fortiori to all proceedings commenced afterwards;104 but, where there is a change in the procedural rules while a case is pending, the change does not affect a stage in the procedure that has already passed by the time of the change.105 1.16 Like its predecessors, RP-ECJ, art 15 of the 1991 ECJ rules of procedure provided that the ECJ would adopt instructions to the Registrar. Parallel provisions appeared in the GC and CST Rules of Procedure.106 Historically, the ECJ Instructions to the Registrar107 covered the duties of the ECJ’s Registry, the register of cases before the ECJ, the scale of ECJ and ECJ Registry charges and the ECJ’s publications. Each of the GC and the CST had their own Instructions to the Registrar. When the rules of procedure were revamped in 2012–2015, the provisions for the adoption of instructions to the Registrar were replaced by

104 Cases 212–217/80 Amministrazione Delle Finanze dello Stato v Salumi [1981]  ECR  2735, para  9 and per Advocate General Rozes at 2755; Case 154/84 Fleischwaren und Konserven Fabrik Schulz und Berndt GmbH v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Sud [1985] ECR 3165, per Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat at 3169; Cases C-121 and C-122/91 CT Control (Rotterdam) BV v Commission [1993] ECR I-3873, para 22; Case T-134/96 Smets v Commission [1997] ECR II-2333, para 16; Case T-52/00 Coe Clerici Logistics SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-2553, para 23; Case C-293/04 Beemsterboer Coldstore Services BV v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst - Douanedistrict Arnhem [2006]  ECR  I-2263, para  19. Cf Case T-326/07 Cheminova v Commission [2009] ECR II-2685, para 79; Case F-103/05 Pickering v Commission [2008] ECRSC I-A-1-101, II-A-1-527, para 50; Case F-112/05 Bain v Commission [2008] ECR SC I-A-1111, II-A-1-579, para 49. A different view seems to have been taken in Case C-66/08 Kozlowski, order of 22 February 2008, para 7. It is not clear why. 105 Case F-82/06 Duyster v Parliament [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-455, II-A-1-2583, paras 36–41; Case F-101/07 Cova v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-173, II-A-1-925, para 25 (no shortening of a time limit when time has already started to run). Cf Case T-23/90 Automobiles Peugeot SA & Peugeot SA v Commission [1991] ECR II-653, paras 80–81 (once the case has been taken into deliberation, the procedural rules applicable then apply up to and including the delivery of judgment because the rules applicable to the disposal of the case cannot alter depending upon the delays that may be encountered before judgment can be delivered; it would seem that that does not apply to post-judgment procedural steps, such as rectification). In Case F-60/07 Bermejo v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-407, II-A-1-2259, paras 24–27, the CST seems to have thought that, when the CST’s own rules of procedure replaced the GC rules that the CST originally applied, it meant that the relevant provisions of both sets of rules applied when considering whether or not an action was manifestly inadmissible because admissibility is determined by reference to the situation pertaining at the time of the commencement of proceedings. That seems to be very doubtful where (as was the case) the rules in question are simply the procedural rules for dealing with a manifestly inadmissible action. The position would be different if (for example) a procedural rule that set the time limit for commencing proceedings were replaced, during the course of the proceedings, by another rule that specified a shorter time limit. The former rule would apply to determine the admissibility of the action, not the latter. 106 RP-GC, art  23 (of the 1991  GC  Rules of Procedure) and RP-CST, art  19(4) (of the 2007 CST Rules of Procedure). 107 OJ 1974 No L350/33 (see also OJ 1982 No C39/35), last amended in 1986 (see OJ 1986 No C286/4). The ECJ Instructions to the Registrar do not appear to have been formally repealed or revoked. It appears that, to some extent, they still reflect the practice actually followed by the ECJ. Accordingly, the only references to the ECJ Instructions to the Registrar that have been retained in this work relate to provisions that appear to shed light on current practice.

18

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.17

provisions referring to the adoption of ‘implementing’ rules.108 The ECJ implementing rules take the form of practice directions to parties concerning cases brought before the ECJ (cited here as ‘PD-ECJ’, followed by the paragraph number).109 The practice directions effectively provide binding guidance on the content and presentation of submissions to the Court. The ECJ has also published ‘recommendations’ to national courts and tribunals relating to the initiation of references for a preliminary ruling.110 At the time of writing, the GC had drawn up ‘practice rules’ for the implementation of its rules of procedure (cited here as ‘PD-GC’), which repealed and replaced its Instructions to the Registrar and earlier practice directions.111 At the time of writing, the CST had published Instructions to the Registrar of the CST (‘IR-CST’)112 and ‘practice directions’ (‘PD-CST’).113 In addition, there are the resolutions and decisions made from time to time by the members of the ECJ, GC and CST at their administrative meetings. 1.17 Apart from the ECSC Treaty and the ECSC Statute, whose French text was the only authentic one, all the official language versions of the Treaties, the Statute and the published Rules have equal status. That occasionally leads to problems in reconciling one text with another. All the texts must, however, be interpreted to the same effect and so the meaning of a term in one language version may or may not provide a clue to its proper meaning in another. For that reason it is unwise to place too great a reliance on the precise meaning of a word used in, for example, the English version of an article in the Rules of Procedure or on a semantic analysis of an entire passage.114 There were certain notorious misleading translations in the Treaties, the Statutes and the Rules of Procedure. They have now been largely eliminated from the Rules of Procedure but they remain in the Treaties, the different versions of the Statutes (as they existed before 2001 and currently) and in the reports of cases decided by the Court before the position was remedied. The word ‘submissions’ is one example. It has been used to translate the French word ‘conclusions’ in the Treaties, the old and current Statutes and the Rules of Procedure. Unfortunately, in French, ‘conclusions’ bears a number of meanings, not all of which may happily be ren 108 RP-ECJ, art 208; RP-GC, art 224; RP-CST, art 132. The first and second provisions refer more specifically to ‘practice rules’ implementing the rules of procedure. Implementing rules like the practice directions and instructions to the registrar do not extend the scope of the rules of procedure: Case C-69/12 P Noscirai SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 21 September 2012, para 24. 109 OJ 2014 No L 31/1, which replaced the PD-ECJ published in OJ 2004 No L361/15. The PDECJ do not formally repeal or replace the ECJ Instructions to the Registrar; they revoked and replaced only the 2004 PD-ECJ: see PD-ECJ, para 59. 110 OJ 2012 No C338/1, which replaced guidance published in OJ 2003 No C143/1. 111 OJ 2015 No L152/1 (see para 269 for the repeal of the GC Instructions to the Registrar and the Practice Directions published, respectively, in OJ 2007 No L232/1, as amended, and OJ 2012 No L68/23). The 2015 PD-GC were amended in 2016: see OJ 2016 No L217/78. 112 OJ 2014 No L206/46, replacing those published in OJ 2012 No L260/1. 113 OJ 2014 No L206/52, replacing those published in OJ 2012 No L260/6. 114 That approach can lead to misunderstandings, as can be seen, in another context, from Case 157/79 R v Pieck [1981] QB 571, [1980] ECR 2171, where the United Kingdom government based its case on a mistranslation in the English version of a pre-Accession directive.

19

1.18  Judicial institutions and bodies

dered as ‘submissions’. For example, the advocate general’s opinion is described as his ‘submissions’ in TFEU, art 252 and the Statute, art 20; the form of order was so described in arts 19 and 37 of the EC  Statute but that has now been corrected in arts 21 and 40 of the current Statute. Where there are divergences between the different authentic language versions of a text, it can be interpreted only by a comparative linguistic analysis of all the language versions, in the light of the context and objectives of the provision in question.115

III

THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN THE ECJ, THE GC AND THE CST

1.18 The jurisdiction of the Court (as understood in the institutional sense) is, as stated above, defined for the most part in the TFEU and the EAEC Treaty (which now largely incorporates the TFEU provisions), to which must be added any relevant conventions and other instruments.116 TEU, art  19(3) defines the jurisdiction of the Court in general terms as encompassing: (a) ruling on actions brought by a member state, EU institution or a natural or legal person; (b) giving preliminary rulings, at the request of courts or tribunals of the member states, on the interpretation of EU law or the validity of acts adopted by the EU institutions; and (c) ruling in other cases provided for in the Treaties. 1.19 As explained in more detail below, in connection with the GC, the ECJ (as understood in the organisational sense) was historically entrusted with all the jurisdiction allocated to the Court but, as from the constitution of the CFI (as it then was) in 1989, parts of that jurisdiction were exercised by the CFI (now the GC) subject to a right of appeal to the ECJ. Although, as explained below, the GC can no longer be regarded as exercising a jurisdiction that, in principle, remains a residual part of the jurisdiction of the ECJ, it is more convenient to look at the allocation of jurisdiction between the different judicial bodies comprising the Court of Justice of the EU (that is, the judicial institution of the EU) in terms of the jurisdiction of the GC and (until its abolition) the CST rather than that of the ECJ because the general position under the Treaties is that any part of the jurisdiction of the Court that has not been allocated to the GC or to a specialised court remains within the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Bearing that in mind, in short, the ECJ’s first (and last) instance jurisdiction covers: (i) actions brought by the Commission or a member state against a member state for an alleged infringement of an obligation under the Treaties;117 (ii) certain actions for annulment and

1 15 See, generally, Lasok and Millett, Judicial Review in the EU (Richmond, 2004), para [656] ff. 116 See Ch 17 below for a description of the forms of action that can be brought before the Court and the general limits on its jurisdiction. On the necessity for there to be a provision conferring jurisdiction on the Court, see (for example) Case T-295/05 Document Security Systems Inc European Central Bank [2007] ECR II-2835, paras 50–56; Case T-155/13 Zanjani v Council, 3 July 2014, para 53 (but note the question of the Court’s implied jurisdiction, discussed below). 117 TFEU, arts 258–260 and 348, which apply to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1) and jurisdiction over which has not been transferred to the GC under TFEU, art 256(1).

20

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.20

actions in respect of a failure to act;118 (iii) preliminary rulings;119 (iv) actions brought by a member state against an act adopted by the European Council or the Council under TEU, art 7;120 and (v) various miscellaneous proceedings.121 The ECJ’s jurisdiction covers: decisions of the GC (appeals on a point of law from first instance decisions of the GC in direct actions, the exceptional review of decisions of the GC made on appeal from a decision of a specialised court, and the exceptional review of preliminary rulings made by the GC);122 and jurisdiction over cases referred to it by the GC.123 The ECJ has no direct jurisdiction over decisions of specialised courts. 1.20 Before turning to consider the jurisdiction of the GC, it is appropriate to say a word about probably the most important, and often controversial, aspect of the ECJ’s jurisdiction: its power to lay down binding and definitive interpretations of the provisions defining its jurisdiction. That gives the ECJ scope for the development of its jurisdiction where there is need in order to ensure adequate legal protection for persons subject to the law. Thus, in Case 194/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament,124 the ECJ held that, although the European Parliament was not specifically mentioned in EC, art 173 (now TFEU, art 263) as one of the EU institutions against which an action for annulment could be brought, an interpretation of EC, art 173 that excluded the possibility of bringing such an action would be inconsistent with EC, art  164 (now TEU, art 19(1)) and with the general intention of the EC Treaty to create a complete system of legal remedies and procedures and to make a direct action available against all measures adopted by the EU institutions that are intended to

118 Those brought by: (a) a member state against the European Parliament or the Council or both of them acting jointly (subject to specified exceptions concerning certain acts of the Council); (b) a member state against the Commission regarding participating in enhanced cooperation; (c) an EU institution against the European Parliament, the Council, the Parliament and the Council acting jointly, or the Commission; and (d) an EU institution against the European Central Bank. See Statute, art 51. 119 TFEU, art 267, which applies to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1). 120 TFEU, art 269. 121 TFEU, arts 218(11), 228(2), 245, 247, 271, 273, 286(5), 286(6); TFEU Protocol No 4, arts 11.4, 14.2, 35; EAEC, arts 12, 18, 21, 81–83, 103–105, 144, 145. The grant of interim relief under TFEU, art 278–279 or EAEC, art 157 is an aspect of the procedure in an action over which the ECJ has jurisdiction under some other provision. 122 TFEU, art 256(1), 2nd subpara; TFEU, art 256(2), 2nd subpara; TFEU, art 256(3), 3rd subpara. Those provisions apply to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art  106a(1). At the time of writing, the GC had not been given jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings under TFEU, art 256(3) so the last possibility was not applicable. 123 The GC may refer a preliminary ruling to the ECJ under TFEU, art 256(3), 2nd subpara, where it considers that the case requires a decision of principle likely to affect the unity or consistency of EU law. At the time of writing, that provision was not operational because the GC had not been given jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings. Other cases of referral are referred to in the Statute, art 54, but are instances in which an action has been mistakenly begun before the GC instead of the ECJ. 124 [1986] ECR 1339, paras 23–25.

21

1.21  Judicial institutions and bodies

have legal effect;125 and, in Case C-2/88 Imm. Zwartveld,126 the ECJ asserted for similar reasons jurisdiction to entertain applications made by a national judicial authority for the review of the discharge by the EU institutions of their duty of sincere co-operation with such authorities. The general principle remains, however, that the ECJ has no inherent jurisdiction and no power to depart from the system of remedies provided for.127 1.21 The ECJ’s implied jurisdiction, which goes beyond the jurisdiction expressly conferred on it by specific Treaty provisions, is derived from the necessity to ensure a proper and adequate system of judicial protection in the EU and underpins rather than detracts from the system of remedies expressly provided for.128 That implied jurisdiction does not come into play merely because the Treaties do not provide expressly for a particular right of action;129 there must be some prevailing need for the ECJ to invoke its implied jurisdiction in order to fill a lacuna in the system of remedies expressly provided for, such as where the complete absence of any other form of legal redress (including redress before the courts of the member states) creates a serious injustice and is inconsistent with the rule of law in the EU.130 That remains the position after the changes made to the TEU and the TFEU by the Lisbon Treaty. Under TEU, art  13(2), each EU institution (including the Court) ‘shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them’. The Court, like the other EU institutions, is also subject to the obligations to apply the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as provided for in TEU, art 5(3) and (4); and TEU, art 19(1), 2nd para, provides that the member states are to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law. However, as the EU institution entrusted specifically with the task of ensuring that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed, the Court is not in a position to shrink from securing the effective observance of the law as stated in

125 In consequence of the judgment, EC, art 173 was amended and now takes the form found in TFEU, art 263. 126 [1990] ECR I-3365. 127 Cf Case 12/63 Schlieker v High Authority [1963]  ECR  85; Case 66/76  CFDT  v Council [1977]  ECR  305, para  8; Case C-50/00P  Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, paras 38–45; Case C-167/02P Rothley v Parliament [2004] ECR I-3149, paras 46–52; Cases T-107/01 and T-175/01 Societe des mines de Sacilor – Lormines SA  v Commission [2004]  ECR II-2125, paras 65–66; Case T-113/04 Atlantic Container Line v Commission [2007] ECR II-171*, paras 22–25 (which also comment on the Zwartfeld case, above, note 126). 128 Cf Advocate General Reischl in Case 74/81 Rudolf Flender KG v Commission [1982] ECR 395 at 409: ‘It is … possible to infer … a general principle governing the system of the ECSC Treaty … to the effect that, whenever measures adopted on the basis of the Treaty produce effects on undertakings which are not subject to its provisions and to which certain measures are expressly addressed, such undertakings too, may obtain judicial review of those measures, even where, as in the present case, no such right is granted expressis verbis in the allegedly ultra vires measure’. 129 Cf Case 44/81 Germany v Commission [1982]  ECR  1855, para  7; Case T-77/01 Territorio Historico de Alava – Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2002] ECR II-81, paras 35–40. 130 The Court’s jurisdiction is excluded by express provision in TFEU, art 275–276.

22

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.22

and derived from the Treaties; and the scope for member states to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection is really limited to situations in which the application of EU law in the member state in question is at issue.131 The ECJ’s extensive powers over the definition of its own jurisdiction (which, because it is based upon the ECJ’s power to interpret legal provisions, flows into the jurisdiction of the GC and specialised courts and is shared by at the least the former) nonetheless remain subject to the overriding power of the member states to redefine that jurisdiction by amendment of the Treaties. 1.22 The jurisdiction of the GC was somewhat different. It was originally attributed a defined part of the jurisdiction of the ECJ, which raised questions as to the precise nature of the GC’s jurisdiction. Originally, two factors suggested that the broad approach that could be taken to the definition of the ECJ’s jurisdiction had no place when considering the jurisdiction of the GC. First, judgments of the GC were subject to appeal to the ECJ on points of law,132 thus endowing the ECJ with the last word on the true scope of the jurisdiction of the GC. Secondly, it was apparent from the mechanism of the attribution of jurisdiction to the GC that the status of the GC was different from that of the ECJ. In relation to that second factor, the ECJ’s jurisdiction was (and is) conferred on it by the Treaties within the context of the ECJ’s overriding duty to ensure that the law is observed;133 the GC’s (or, rather, CFI’s) jurisdiction was conferred on it by Council decision, the scope for the Council’s power to attribute jurisdiction being limited by the Treaties, at the time, to ‘certain classes of action or proceeding’ and being subject to certain express exclusions.134 In the result, the GC had, and could only have had, attributed to it a defined part of the jurisdiction of the ECJ; and there appeared to be no attribution of any implied jurisdiction, whether stated expressly or in implied terms.135 That is not to say that the instruments conferring jurisdiction on the GC had to be given a narrow construction: it could have been argued that, as the conferring of jurisdiction on the GC was an exception to the general principle that the ECJ was alone among the EU institutions responsible for the administration of justice, a narrow construction was appropriate; but that seemed an excessively technical and formalistic view; the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the CFI (as it then was) was identified in the relevant Council decision and the provisions defining the jurisdiction so conferred were to be construed accordingly.136

131 Eg Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271. For example, it does not seem that the situation that arose in Zwartfeld (above, note 126) could have been dealt with by the member states acting autonomously under TEU, art 19(1), 2nd para. 132 See, as then worded, ECSC Treaty, art 32d(1); EC, art 168a(1); EAEC, art 140a(1). 133 ECSC Treaty, art 31; EC, art 164 (now TEU, art 19(1)); EAEC, art 136. 134 See, as then worded, ECSC Treaty, art 32d(1); EC, art 168a(1); EAEC, art 140a(1). 135 It may be significant that arts 3 and 4 of Decision 88/591, which identified the Treaty provisions that applied to the CFI (as it then was), did not mention ECSC Treaty, art 31, EC, art 164 (now TEU, art 19(1)) or EAEC, art 136. 136 Hence the approach taken by the CFI (as it then was) to the interpretation of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (now TFEU, Protocol No 4) in Case T-333/99 X v European Central Bank [2001] ECR II-3021, paras 36–44.

23

1.23  Judicial institutions and bodies

1.23 The next step was that the Treaties were amended so as to provide that the ECJ and the CFI (as it then was), ‘each within its jurisdiction’, should ensure that the law is observed; and the definition of the jurisdiction of the CFI became a matter covered directly by the Treaties or by the Statute.137 Finally, as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, it was provided that the function of ensuring that the law is observed was a function of ‘the Court of the Justice of the European Union’138 and therefore applied to each constituent part of that institution. Accordingly, it does not seem appropriate to continue to speak of the attribution to the GC of a part of the ECJ’s jurisdiction. Instead, the division of jurisdiction between the ECJ and the GC has, as it were, been institutionalised at Treaty level. Putting it another way, when the CFI was established and its jurisdiction defined by Council decision, the subsequent revocation of the relevant Council decisions (had it taken place) would have made no practical difference to the administration of the law because, technically under the Treaties, the ECJ had retained the jurisdiction attributed to the CFI and would simply have recommenced exercising it as soon as the CFI had been abolished. The abolition of the GC (as the CFI has now become) would now require an amendment of the Treaty and, were it to occur, a consequential reassignment of jurisdiction to the ECJ. It follows that there are no reasons of principle why the nature of the jurisdiction of the GC should be regarded as being in any way different from the nature of the jurisdiction of the ECJ although, of course, their substantive content differs. 1.24 The evolution of the jurisdiction of the CFI (now GC) since its establishment in 1988 is now a matter of only historical interest.139 At the time of writing and in principle, the GC has jurisdiction over three types of proceedings: (i) direct actions (including IP appeals and, as from 1  September 2016, staff cases);140 (ii) actions or proceedings brought against decisions of specialised courts (an appellate jurisdiction); and (iii) references for a preliminary ruling. However, that statement of the situation reflects the position as it exists as a matter of principle. In reality, it is not as simple as all that. 1.25 In relation to direct actions, the GC has jurisdiction (in principle) over actions for annulment, actions in respect of a failure to act, actions for damages (whether in respect of contractual or non-contractual liability), disputes between

1 37 At the time: EC, art 220 and 225; EAEC, art 136 and 140a. 138 TEU, art 19(1). 139 It is sufficient to refer here to the decisions that created and progressively extended the CFI’s jurisdiction: see notes 19 and 20 above. 140 As to IP appeals, see Ch 17, section VI.E  (para  12.215 ff). IP appeals can be regarded as a species of direct action or as a separate type of proceeding. Strictly speaking, they are the former but, under the GC rules of procedure, they are treated separately from ‘direct actions’ (see Titles III and IV). As to staff cases, see Regulation 2016/1192 (above, note 8), art 2(1), which inserts a new art 50a in the Statute. Cases pending before the CST on 31 August 2016 were to be transferred to the GC and any further procedural steps in the case dealt with under the GC rules of procedure; but where the oral procedure had been closed before the case was transferred to the GC, it had to be reopened (in other words, in any CST case in which the hearing had taken place before the date on which the case was transferred to the GC, the hearing had to be repeated before the GC): see Regulation 2016/1192, art 3.

24

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.26

the Union (formerly the Communities) and its servants (otherwise known as ‘staff cases’) and actions brought under an arbitration clause in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union or the EAEC.141 That jurisdiction is qualified in two ways: (i) the GC does not have jurisdiction to the extent that jurisdiction over a class of action has been assigned to a specialised court or reserved by the Statute to the ECJ; and (ii) the Statute may add further classes of action or proceeding to the jurisdiction of the GC.142 Decisions of the GC on the direct actions over which it has jurisdiction may (but need not) be the subject of a right of appeal to the ECJ on points of law only; the Statute lays down the conditions under which such rights of appeal may be exercised and any limits on them.143 So far as the second qualification imposed on the jurisdiction of the GC is concerned, which can be dealt with shortly, there was at the time of writing no provision in the Statute adding to the jurisdiction of the GC. In relation to the first qualification, in consequence of the creation of the CST, the GC did not have jurisdiction at first instance over staff cases; but its first instance jurisdiction over such cases will revive when the CST is abolished (that is, as from 1 September 2016). Turning now to the limitations imposed by the Statute, jurisdiction over actions for annulment and actions in respect of a failure to act remains reserved to the ECJ (at first and last instance) where such actions are: (1) brought by a member state against an act or default of the European Parliament or of the Council or jointly of both institutions except for (a) decisions of the Council under the third subparagraph of TFEU, art 108(2) (decisions considering a State aid to be compatible with the internal market), (b) acts of the Council adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to protect trade within the meaning of TFEU, art 207 (mainly actions against anti-dumping and similar trade protection measures) and (c) acts of the Council in the exercise of implementing powers in accordance with TFEU, art 291(2) (cases where the Council reserves to itself powers to implement its own measures); (2) brought by a member state against an act or default of the Commission under TFEU, art 331(1) (cases where the Commission considers the wish of a member state to engage in enhanced cooperation); (3) brought by an EU institution or against an act or default of the European Parliament, the Council, the Parliament and Council acting jointly, or the Commission; (4) brought by an EU institution against an act or failure to act of the European Central Bank (‘the ECB’).144 1.26 The reservations listed above are described as derogations from the general rule giving the GC jurisdiction over direct actions. The normal principle of interpretation is that derogations are to be narrowly construed whereas deroga1 41 TFEU, art 256(1), 1st subpara, which applies to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1). 142 TFEU, art 256(1), 1st subpara. 143 Ibid. See Statute, art 56, and Ch 15 below for appeals from the GC to the ECJ. 144 Statute, art 51.

25

1.27  Judicial institutions and bodies

tions from a derogation are not to be narrowly construed.145 Accordingly, the carve outs from the first reservation listed above (that is, the actions over which the GC has jurisdiction) are not to be narrowly construed. It should be noted that the carve outs refer to positive measures (decisions and acts), not defaults, whereas the reservation encompasses both positive measures (acts) and defaults. It does not make sense for the GC to retain jurisdiction over positive acts and for the ECJ to retain jurisdiction over defaults in the context of the three areas that are the subject of the carve outs (State aid decisions, trade protection measures and Council implementing measures). Accordingly, the GC is to be regarded as having jurisdiction over both positive measures and defaults. 1.27 In relation to actions or proceedings brought against specialised courts, the Treaties do not describe such actions and proceedings as ‘appeals’ when defining the GC’s jurisdiction in respect of decisions of specialised courts;146 but they do use that description in the provision dealing with the specialised courts themselves.147 The difference in terminology does not seem to be material. The Treaty provisions dealing with specialised courts provide in general terms for the possibility of an appeal to the GC on points of law and authorise the inclusion of a right of appeal on points of fact in the regulation setting up the specialised court in question.148 At the time of writing, the only specialised court that had been created was the CST, in relation to which an appeal to the GC on points of law only from certain of its decisions had been provided for.149 The Treaties provide for review by the ECJ of decisions of the GC on appeal from specialised courts (in effect, another level of appeal), the conditions and limits of such review being laid down ‘by the Statute’. Such review is by way of exception and applies where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of EU law being affected.150 1.28 In relation to references for a preliminary ruling, TFEU, art  256(3) (which applies to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1)) provides that the GC shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such references when made under TFEU, art  267 (which applies to the EAEC  Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1)) ‘in specific areas laid down by the Statute’. It should first be noted that the Treaties do not provide that the GC has, or can have, jurisdiction over references for a preliminary ruling that may be made under provisions other than TFEU, art 267. Thus, references for a preliminary ruling made under other provisions remain within the jurisdiction of the ECJ and jurisdiction over them cannot, at present, be devolved to the GC under TFEU, art 256(3) (an instrument such as 1 45 Lasok and Millett, Judicial Review in the EU, paras [690]–[692]. 146 TFEU, art 256(2), which applies to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1). 147 TFEU, art 257, which applies to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1). 148 Ibid. 149 See Statute, Annex, arts 9–11, and Ch 15 below. The Annex was deleted with effect from 1 September 2016 save that arts 9–12 of the Annex continue to apply after that date in relation to appeals from the CST to the GC with which the GC was seised as at 31 August 2016 or which were brought after that date: see Regulation 2016/1192 (above, note 8), art 4. The effect is to preserve the GC’s appellate jurisdiction over CST decisions made before the abolition of the CST until the time for appealing has expired. 150 TFEU, art 256(2), which applies to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1).

26

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.29

a convention, that created the possibility of references for a preliminary ruling outside the context of TFEU, art 267, could obviously make provision for such references to be heard and determined by the GC). Even in relation to references for a preliminary ruling made under TFEU, art 267, the GC does not, and cannot, have jurisdiction save to the extent that the Statute so provides. It seems that the reference in the Treaties to ‘specific areas’ was intended to indicate that jurisdiction over particular types of reference for a preliminary ruling (such as questions concerning the classification of goods for customs purposes) could be devolved to the GC where they involved nothing other than the application of facts to well-settled legal principles or where there was a well-established body of fairly stable case-law. It is unclear whether or not there is an obstacle to there being a general provision in the Statute allocating jurisdiction generally to the GC. The reference to ‘specific areas’, even if construed as requiring an area to be identified, does not exclude there being several areas together covering (for example) the entire preliminary ruling jurisdiction under the TFEU. That being so, there would be no difference in substance between a provision conferring jurisdiction generally on the GC and a provision that tediously listed each specific area in question. On the other hand, it is difficult to regard the reference to ‘specific areas’ as being surplus verbiage (not least because the same phrase appears in relation to the jurisdiction of specialised courts). The inference is that the phrase ‘specialised areas’ discloses an intention on the part of the authors of the TFEU that any jurisdiction conferred on the GC to deliver preliminary rulings would not be a general jurisdiction to do so but would have to be confined to an identified area of EU law. However that may be, at the time of writing, the Statute contains no provision conferring jurisdiction on the GC to hear and determine references for a preliminary ruling either generally or in any specific area. 1.29 Before turning to consider the jurisdiction of the CST, it should be noted that the Treaty provisions enabling the creation of specialised courts are expressed in general terms and, apart from defining (in very general language) the limits of the jurisdiction that may be conferred on them and certain other matters such as the qualifications required of their members, do not state the purpose to be served by specialised courts. There are, in consequence, no preconditions for the exercise by the EU institutions of the power to propose and to decide on the establishment of specialised courts. Although that suggests that the institutions have an unfettered discretion, it may be inferred (from the general duty imposed on the ECJ and the GC of ensuring that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed) that the ECJ151 may request the creation of a specialised court only where such a court is necessary in order to improve the quality of judicial protection in the EU. The creation of a specialised court may, in the alternative, arise from a proposal made by the Commission which, while not itself subject to the specific duty imposed by TEU, art 19(1), ought in principle to be motivated by the same considerations having regard to its general obligations under the Treaties. Further, although the Treaties place 151 Under TFEU, art 257, the ‘Court of Justice’ may request the creation of a judicial panel. In accordance with TEU, art 19(1), that phrase is to be understood as referring to the ECJ and not to the Court in its institutional sense.

27

1.30  Judicial institutions and bodies

limits on the jurisdiction that may be conferred on a specialised court, within those limits the choice of what jurisdiction should actually be conferred (within the broad parameters laid down in the Treaties) appears to be a matter for the European Parliament and the Council, acting (as the case may be) at the request of the ECJ or on a proposal from the Commission (and after consulting, as the case may be, the Commission or the ECJ)152 and therefore on the basis of the considerations on which the request or proposal was grounded. It is not stated in the Treaties but is implicit that any modification of the jurisdiction of a specialised court effected after its creation (whether it be by an extension of or a reduction in its jurisdiction) must be initiated by a request from the ECJ, or a proposal from the Commission, that must similarly be necessary for improving the quality of judicial protection in the EU. 1.30 The general position regarding judicial panels (before they became specialised courts) was that they might be attached to the CFI (as it then was) in order to exercise a ‘judicial competence’ laid down in the relevant Treaty, that competence being exercised ‘in certain specific areas’.153 TFEU, art  257 now provides that ‘specialised courts’ may be established and attached to what is now the GC ‘to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or proceedings brought in specific areas’. The facts that such courts are described as ‘specialised’ and that their jurisdiction is to be ‘in specified areas’ indicate that there was no intention to replicate the breadth of jurisdiction of the GC in a lower tier court. Specialised courts are created by a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council which must lay down the rules on the organisation of the specialised court and the extent of the jurisdiction conferred on it.154 Since the Treaties already define the function of specialised courts as being the hearing and determining of actions or proceedings at first instance, the regulation must specify the type of action or proceeding in question and the area (or areas) of EU law within which those actions or proceedings arise. TFEU, art 257 provides that decisions of specialised courts ‘may’ be subject to a right of appeal to the GC. The right of appeal may be on points of law only or, if the regulation establishing the specialised court so provides, on matters of fact as well.155 Since the competence of specialised courts is defined as being one to hear and determine cases ‘at first instance’, it is implicit that final decisions determining proceedings before a specialised court are to be subject to a right of appeal (to the GC). The discretion of the European Parliament and the Council in relation to the existence of rights of appeal really concerns non-final decisions (such as decisions on interim relief applications); and their discretion as to the precise grounds on which an appeal 152 TFEU, art 257. 153 EC, art  220; EAEC, art  136, before their amendment by the Lisbon Treaty. The ‘judicial competence’ referred to was the competence, or jurisdiction, to hear and determine cases at first instance: see EC, art 225a; EAEC, art 140b (first sentence of each) (as they were worded at that time). By implication, a judicial panel (now, a specialised court) was allocated a (first instance) part of the jurisdiction of the CFI (now GC) with the consequence that, if the judicial panel (or specialised court) were abolished, the jurisdiction allocated to it would be reassumed automatically by the CFI (now GC). 154 TFEU, art 257 (second para). 155 TFEU, art 257 (third para).

28

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.31

can be based is limited to whether the appeal should be based on matter of law only or matters of law and fact. It does not appear that an appeal could be limited to matters of fact only (and that would not appear to make much sense). 1.31 In the event, the decision to establish the CST and the definition of the jurisdiction to be conferred on it (within the limits laid down in the Treaties) were motivated by the perceived necessity to improve the operation of the EU courts’ system and answer a ‘call’ made in Declaration No  16 at the time of the adoption of the Nice Treaty in 2001 (the call was simply for the creation of a judicial body to deal specifically with staff cases).156 Article 1 of Decision 2004/752, which created the CST, accordingly provided that the CST shall ‘hear disputes involving the European Union civil service’. The Decision added an Annex to the Statute. Article  1 of the Annex (in its form at the time of writing) provided in more precise terms that the jurisdiction of the CST covered ‘disputes between the Union and its servants referred to in Article  270 of the [TFEU], including disputes between all bodies or agencies and their servants in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice of the European Union’. The jurisdiction of the CST therefore appeared to be limited (primarily) to actions under TFEU, art 270, which applies to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1) and which refers to disputes ‘between the Union and its servants within the limits and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union’. In other words, the action had to concern a dispute arising under the Staff Regulations or the Conditions of Employment. The reference in Article 1 of the Annex to the Statute to ‘disputes between all bodies or agencies and their servants in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice of the European Union’ was expressed as identifying a sub-class of such actions because that phrase is preceded by the word ‘including’. The words ‘all bodies or agencies’ appear to allude to the proliferating group of organisations created by or under the Treaties or by the EU institutions. The underlying assumption is that the servants of such bodies or agencies are employed under either the Staff Regulations or the Conditions of Employment and not under some other instrument or contract.157 Accordingly, for some dispute to fall within the sub-class: (i) the body or agency in question must fall within the concept of ‘the Union’; (ii) the dispute must be between that body or agency and one or more of its ‘serv 156 Council Decision 2004/752, second numbered recital of the preamble (at the time of the adoption of that decision, judicial panels, as they were then known, were created by Council decision). Declaration No 16 to the Nice Treaty is to be found at OJ No C80, 10 March 2001, p  80. Decision 2004/752 was repealed with effect from 1  September 2016 by Regulation 2016/1192, art 1 (above, note 8). 157 The inclusive language in art 1 captures only disputes in respect of which jurisdiction has been conferred on the ECJ. Apart from TFEU, art 270 (which is limited in scope to disputes arising under the Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment), there is no provision of the TFEU itself (apart from TFEU, Protocol No 4, art 36.2, which refers to the conditions of employment drawn up by the European Central Bank for its staff pursuant to art  36.1 — and which is considered below) that would provide the legal basis for jurisdiction apart from (conceivably) TFEU, art 272, which would enable jurisdiction to be conferred by way of an arbitration clause concluded in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the EU.

29

1.32  Judicial institutions and bodies

ants’; and (iii) the Staff Regulations or Conditions of Employment must apply to the relationship between the body or agency and the servant(s) concerned. A  problem with that interpretation of Article  1 of the Annex is that it would exclude from the jurisdiction of the CST disputes between the ECB and one of its servants because, although the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction over such disputes, the conditions of employment of the staff of the ECB are laid down by the Governing Council of the ECB and are not the same as the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the EU referred to in TFEU, art 270.158 That problem first arose in connection with the jurisdiction of the CFI (as it then was) in relation to staff cases concerning the ECB; and the solution was found in a not altogether convincing interpretation of the provisions giving the Court of Justice jurisdiction over ECB staff cases.159 A better solution would have involved a purposive interpretation of what was (before the abolition of the CST) Article 1 of the Annex to the Statute that captured all disputes between the institutions, bodies and agencies of the EU and their servants irrespective of the document containing the servant’s terms of employment. 1.32 In that respect, it should be noted that disputes falling with TFEU, art 270 are in general terms disputes arising from an actual or potential employment relationship between the parties or between a person from whom the applicant derives rights and the defendant institution, including actions brought by persons who were actually employed on terms other than those set out in the Staff Regulations or Conditions of Employment but who claim that they should have been employed under the Staff Regulations or Conditions of Employment.160 Disputes falling within TFEU, art 270 do not include actions brought by an official or other servant of the EU that do not concern the disputed legality of an act or default of the appropriate appointing authority but concern more general questions about the exercise by an EU institution of its powers.161 Nor do they include actions brought by staff associations against an EU institution, which concern the general conditions of employment of officials and other servants of the EU and not a particular employment relationship.162 Staff disputes of that sort, which fall outside the strict scope of TFEU, art 270, could have been brought within the jurisdiction of the CST if the words in Article 1 of the Annex to the Statute, ‘including disputes between all bodies or agencies and their servants in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Justice’, were regarded not as describing a ‘sub-class’ of disputes falling within those Treaty provisions but as defining the jurisdiction of the CST by reference to the subject-matter of the dispute and moving away from a definition by reference to employment status

158 See TFEU, Protocol No 4, art 36.1 and 36.2. 159 Case T-333/99 X v European Central Bank [2001] ECR II-3021, paras 36–44. 160 Eg Case T-45/01 Sanders v Commission [2004] ECR II-3315. 161 See, for example, Case T-134/89 Hettrich v Commission [1990] ECR II-565, paras 21–22. 162 See, for example, Case T-78/91 Moat and Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission [1991] ECR II-1387.

30

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.33

under the Staff Regulations or Conditions of Employment.163 At the time of writing it was not clear which interpretation of Article 1 of the Annex was correct.164

IV

COMPOSITION OF THE ECJ, THE GC AND THE CST

A

The members

1 Number, method of appointment and term of office 1.33 The members of the ECJ are the judges and the advocates general; the Registrar of the ECJ is usually included among their number as a matter of courtesy.165 TEU, art 19(2) provides that the ECJ shall ‘consist’ of one judge ‘from’ each member state166 and shall be ‘assisted’ by what are now 11 advocates general.167 The judges and advocates general are appointed by the common accord of the governments of the member states for a renewable term of six years: every three years there is a partial replacement of the members but retiring judges

163 On that interpretation, the phrase introduced by the word ‘including’ was intended to add a further class of disputes rather than explain what the reference to TFEU, art 270 covers. 164 The writer inclined to the view that Article  1 of the Annex to the Statute sought to confer jurisdiction on the CST in relation to all staff disputes over which the Court of Justice had jurisdiction irrespective of the document containing the servant’s terms of employment. Art 2(1) of Regulation 2016/1192 (above, note 8) amended the Statute by inserting a new art 50a (concerning the first instance jurisdiction of the GC in staff cases after the abolition of the CST) that effectively seeks to achieve that result. 165 The reason for the inclusion of the Registrar may be that, although the ECJ appoints its Registrar (TFEU, art 253) but not the advocates general, the ECSC Statute (but not the later EC and EAEC Statutes) provided in art 10 that the ECJ would be ‘assisted’ by the advocates general and the Registrar, thus placing both on the same plane. 166 That is an innovation introduced by the Nice Treaty. Previously, the Treaties provided that the number of judges was an uneven number; but it was only coincidental if that number was the same as the number of the member states. Where it was not, it was an uneven number higher than the number of member states and some member states had more than one judge. Thus, before the first enlargement of the Communities in 1973, a period during which there were six member states, the number of judges was seven and two of them came from Italy. 167 TFEU, art  252 (which applies to the EAEC pursuant to EAEC, art  106a(1)) refers to eight advocates general but provides that the number of advocates general may be increased by unanimous Council decision where the ECJ has requested an increase. Declaration No  38 attached to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Lisbon Treaty (OJ 2010 No C83/350) stated that, if the ECJ requested an increase in the number of advocates general to 11, the Council would agree the increase. Pursuant to such a request, the number was increased by one advocate general (with effect from 1 July 2013) and by a further two advocates general (with effect from 7 October 2015): see Council Decision 2013/336/EU (OJ 2013 No L179/92).

31

1.33  Judicial institutions and bodies

and advocates general are eligible for reappointment.168 No rules are laid down regarding the method of nominating and appointing a member of the ECJ save that, in consequence of the Lisbon Treaty, the appointment is made after consultation of a panel set up to give an opinion on the suitability of candidates to perform the duties of judge or advocate general.169 It seems always to have been the practice among the member states that each state was entitled to nominate one judge; and that practice has effectively been adopted in the Treaties with the provision that the ECJ shall consist of one judge from each member state. It was also (and appears still to be) the practice that the larger member states nominate one advocate general each; and, where the number of advocates general makes it possible, the smaller member states in turn nominate the remaining advocates general.170 The consultative panel comprises seven persons chosen by the 168 TEU, art 19(2) and TFEU, art 253. The mandates run from the date of commencement of the judicial year of whichever of the ECJ, GC or CST the member has been appointed a member: 7 October, in the case of the ECJ; 1 September, in the case of the GC; 1 October in the case of the CST (see RP-ECJ, art 24(1); RP-GC, art 41(1); RP-CST, art 25(1)). Thus, in the case of a member of the ECJ, a six-year mandate ends at the expiry of 6 October six years later and a three-year mandate ends on the same date three years after commencement. The duration of the mandate is not the same as the duration of the member’s term of office: a member appointed to replace another member before the expiry of the latter’s mandate will initially be appointed for the unexpired part of his predecessor’s mandate. Accordingly, if a judge were appointed for a six year term starting at the beginning of the relevant judicial year, but he died in the January of judicial year 4 of his mandate, his replacement could start his term of office in, say, April of that year (allowing time to recruit a replacement) but his term would expire at the end of judicial year 6 after the start of his predecessor’s term of office. The mandate of one half of the judges ends at each partial replacement of the members of the ECJ unless the total number of members is uneven, in which case, the number alternates between the number next above one half and the number next below one half; the same applies to the advocates general: see Statute, art 9, as amended by art 1(1) of Regulation No 2015/2422 (OJ 2015 No 341/14). The purpose of partial replacement is to avoid all or most of the members being replaced at the same time with the consequence that hard-won expertise is not handed on to the new members. When a new member state joins, the mandate of the first judge appointed from that state is often adjusted so that it is not out of step with the system of partial replacement of members: see, for example, the decisions appointing the first Bulgarian and Romanian judges: Decisions 2007/7 and 2007/8 (OJ 2007 No L 118/18 and 19). 169 TFEU, art 253 (1st para) and 255. For a description of the origins and work of the panel, see Lord Mance, Judges Judged, The European Advocate, Spring 2012 (pp 2–7). 170 For illustrations of past arrangements, see, for example, Bulletin of the European Communities 1981, No 3, p 63 and 1986, No 1, para 1.1.2; and Council Decision 95/1 (OJ 1995 No L1/1), arts 10–11. The Joint Declaration on Article 31 of the Decision of the Council of the European Union (95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC) of 1 January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new Member States to the European Union (published in OJ 1995 No L1/221), indicates that each of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have one permanent advocate general. The remaining three advocates general were to be nominated in turn by the other member states in alphabetical order. Should the number of advocates general be increased to 11 (as eventually happened), Poland would have a permanent advocate general. The rotation system would then apply to five advocates general and would include those member states who do not have the right to a permanent advocate general: see Declaration No 38 attached to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Lisbon Treaty (OJ 2010 No C83/350). When it was decided to increase the number of advocates general to 11 (see note 167 above), that system was implemented. The first additional advocate general was of Polish nationality and the two further advocates general were to be of Czech and Danish nationality, respectively. As and when the UK secedes from the EU, the position will presumably alter.

32

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.34

Council from among former members of the ECJ and GC, members of national supreme courts and lawyers of recognised competence.171 Acting on the initiative of the President of the ECJ, the panel opines only on the suitability of a candidate to perform the duties of judge or, as the case may be, advocate general. As the role of the panel is consultative only, the governments of the member states are obliged to take proper account of the opinion expressed by the panel but are not obliged to follow it. 1.34 The GC consists of ‘at least’ one judge ‘per’ member state, the number being determined by the Statute and not laid down in the Treaties.172 At the time of writing, the number of judges was fixed by the Statute at 40 judges, as from 31 December 2015, rising to 47 as from 1 September 2016, and then two judges per member state as from 1 September 2019.173 As in the case of the members of the ECJ, the members of the GC (all of whom are judges, there being no separate office of advocate general)174 are appointed by the common accord of the governments of the member states for a renewable term of six years; every three years there is a partial replacement of the members but retiring members are eligible

171 TFEU, art  255. One member of the panel is proposed by the European Parliament but the Council still decides on who the members are (by convention, the Council would appoint the member proposed by the Parliament unless he was clearly ineligible to be a member of the panel). The Council also determines the panel’s operating rules. 172 TEU, art 19(2) and TFEU, art 254. 173 Statute, art 48, as amended by art 1(2) of Regulation No 2015/2422. The terms of office of the judges appointed as from 31 December 2015 and until the target of two judges per member state was achieved, and the method of choosing those judges so as to arrive at that result, were laid down in art 2 of that Regulation. At the time of writing, it was not clear what the position would be in the event of the secession of the UK from the EU. 174 TFEU, art 254 (2nd sentence) provides that the Statute may provide for the GC to be assisted by advocates general. Statute, art 49, currently provides that the members of the GC (that is, the judges) may be called upon to perform the task of an advocate general; and that has been carried over into RP-GC, art 2(3) save in regard to the President, Vice-President and Presidents of Chamber of the GC (RP-GC, art  2(1) provides that members of the GC shall ‘as a rule’ perform the function of judge). Thus, although the task of advocate general is known both to the ECJ and to the GC, in the case of the latter it is one that is performed on an ad hoc basis by a judge. Although the GC did ask one of its judges to perform the function of advocate general in a small number of cases relatively early on in its history, it is understood that, in the light of that experience, the GC decided to discontinue the practice. In GC proceedings, there is no requirement that there should be an advocate general: Case C-269/12P Canas v Commission, 28 May 2013, paras 38–39; Case C-239/12P Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 28 May 2013, paras 37–39.

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1.35  Judicial institutions and bodies

for reappointment.175 There are no rules governing the method of nominating and appointing judges of the GC, apart from the fact that, as in the case of members of the ECJ, a panel is consulted on the suitability of candidates to perform the duties of judge of the GC.176 The practice seems to be that each member state is entitled to nominate one. As in the case of the ECJ’s Registrar, the GC’s Registrar is entitled as a matter of courtesy to the same status as a member of the GC. 1.35 The Treaties do not specify how many members a specialised court must have or the manner of their appointment. Those matters are left to the European Parliament and Council regulation creating the court in question. As from 2012, the European Parliament and the Council may attach temporary judges to a specialised court but only in order to cover the absence of one or more judges of that specialised court.177 The type of absence justifying the attachment of a temporary judge is one that prevents the judge in question from participating in the disposal of cases for a lengthy period of time but not one amounting to total disablement (which would justify terminating the judge’s term of office); the instrument attaching a temporary judge to the specialised court in question lays down the conditions of appointment, the rights and duties of the temporary judge, the detailed rules governing the performance of his duties and the circumstances in which the attachment shall come to an end.178 It follows that the number of temporary judges appointed must equal the number of judges whose absence has caused the problem. The type of absence justifying the attachment of a temporary judge appears to be an illness of a lengthy but not permanent duration (or a duration accounting for the remaining part of the mandate of the judge in question). As ‘absence’ is referred to, it does not appear that a temporary judge can

175 TEU, art 19(2) and TFEU, art 254 (2nd para). When the first members of the CFI (as the GC then was) were appointed, it was specified that the term of office of six of the members would be six years and that of the remaining six would be three years: Decision of the representatives of the governments of the member states of the European Communities, OJ 1989 No L220/76. It is not clear whether that reflected a decision previously taken by the Council or was a decision of the governments of the member states (the distinction is an institutional one). The members whose terms of office were to expire at the end of the first three years of the CFI’s existence, at which point the first partial renewal of members occurred, were to be selected by lot immediately after the first members of the CFI had taken the oath: Decision 88/591, art 12. The number of members whose mandate ends at each subsequent partial renewal of members used not to be defined in the Treaties or the Statute: until the Statute was amended by the Lisbon Treaty, Statute, art  47, did not cross-refer to Statute, art  9, 1st para (which provides for the partial replacement of the ECJ judges), presumably because the number of members of the ECJ and the CFI (as it then was) differed. When the GC consisted of only 12 judges, the practice was that the mandate of six members of the GC came up for renewal every three years. Before the matter was regularised by the Lisbon Treaty, the practice was to follow Statute, art 9, mutatis mutandis. At present, Statute, art  9, 1st para, applies to the GC pursuant to Statute, art  47. Accordingly, the same system of partial replacement applies in the ECJ and the GC. 176 TFEU, art 254 (2nd para) and 255 (the panel is the same as the panel that vets candidates for membership of the ECJ). 177 Statute, art 62c. The Parliament and Council act in accordance with TFEU, art 257 and therefore by means of a regulation. 178 Statute, art 62c.

34

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.37

be appointed if a judge is simply prevented from participating in cases as a result of a conflict of interest or other impediment to his sitting. 1.36 At the time of writing (that is, before the CST’s abolition), the CST consists of seven judges who are appointed for a renewable term of six years.179 Additional judges shall be appointed on a temporary basis as and when necessary in order to cover the absence of judges of the CST who are prevented from participating in the disposal of cases for a lengthy period of time but who are not suffering from total disablement.180 The permanent judges in the CST are appointed by the Council acting unanimously181 and after consulting a committee comprising seven persons chosen from among former members of the ECJ and the GC and lawyers of recognised competence.182 Immediately after the CST judges had taken their oath, the President of the Council selected three by lot for whom the term of office would be three years, not six.183 That set in motion a partial replacement of the CST every three years.184 It would appear that, as in the case of the GC, the CST’s Registrar is entitled as a matter of courtesy to the same status as a member of the CST. Members of the CST enjoy a ‘similar’ status to members of the GC.185 1.37 The appointment of temporary judges to the CST is dependent upon there being a proposal to that effect from the President of the ECJ, addressed to the Council. In that event, the Council (acting unanimously) appoints three persons as temporary judges for a four-year term (which may be renewed) and places them on a list. When the assistance of a temporary judge is required, the President of the CST calls upon the judge first in the list (and on other judges, if need be, in the order in which they appear in the list); and informs the President

179 Statute, art 2(1) of the Annex. The number of judges may be increased, at the request of the ECJ, by the Council acting by a qualified majority. 180 Statute, Annex, art 2(2). Reading art 2(2) in conjunction with art 2(1), it would appear that, for a temporary judge to be attached to the CST, a request must first come from the ECJ. There is no other mechanism specified in the Annex (or elsewhere) by means of which the process for attaching a temporary judge to the CST could be activated. In Regulation No 979/2012 (OJ 2012 No L303/83), which seeks to implement Statute, art 62c, and Annex, art 2(2), temporary judges are drawn from a list of three persons established by the Council (see further below). However, the Council is empowered to draw up the list only if the President of the ECJ makes a proposal to that effect: see Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(1). 181 TFEU, art 257 (4th para). 182 Statute, art 3(1) and (3) of the Annex. The operating rules of the committee were laid down by Council Decision 2005/49 (OJ  2005 No L21/13). The members of the committee were appointed by Council Decision 2013/180 (OJ 2013 No L111/48). 183 Decision 2004/752, art 3(2). 184 It would appear that the legal regime governing the partial replacement of members of the CST is more or less the same as that governing the partial replacement of the members of the GC before the Statute was amended by the Lisbon Treaty: Statute, art 9, does not apply (it has been omitted from the cross-reference in Statute, art 5 of the Annex, presumably because the number referred to in art 9 does not fit the CST) and the matter is left somewhat in the air. 185 Decision 2004/752, 3rd numbered recital of the preamble.

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1.37  Judicial institutions and bodies

of the ECJ accordingly.186 The President of the CST may call on the assistance of a temporary judge only where the CST itself (that is, not the President of the CST acting alone) has determined that one of its permanent judges: (i) is or will be prevented on medical grounds from participating in the disposal of cases for a period that will be, or is likely to be, of at least three months’ duration; and (ii) is not suffering from total disablement (in which case, it is to be inferred, the judge in question should resign and be replaced). Where that situation is foreseeable, the CST may make a prospective decision calling upon the assistance of a temporary judge but, in that event, the temporary judge will not take up his duties or participate in the disposal of cases until the moment comes when the permanent judge in question is actually prevented from acting.187 A temporary judge exercises the prerogatives of a judge only in the context of dealing with the cases assigned to him.188 Accordingly, although the selection of a person for inclusion in the list makes him a temporary judge, the status and attributes of the office accrue only: (a) when the judge is called upon to assist the CST; and (b) in relation specifically to the cases on which the temporary judge works. The duties of a temporary judge end when the judge that he is replacing ceases to be prevented from acting; but the temporary judge continues to work on the cases assigned to him until they have been disposed of.189 Three points may be made about the termination of the duties of a temporary judge. First, termination of those duties does not mean that the temporary judge ceases to be a temporary judge. It means that he ceases to assist the CST and goes back on the list of temporary judges.190 Secondly, although it is provided that the duties of a temporary judge end when the judge that he is replacing ‘is no longer prevented from acting’, what that really means is that the duties of the temporary judge end when the medical grounds preventing the permanent judge in question from acting cease altogether or cease to prevent him from acting (that does not mean that the permanent judge must be prevented from acting by exactly the same medical condition throughout the period during which the temporary judge is performing his duties; it simply 186 Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(1) and (2), 2nd subpara. For the decision drawing up the list of temporary judges, see Council Decision 2013/181 (OJ 2013 No L111/49). One of the judges listed later resigned and was removed from the list: see Council Decision 2014/444 (OJ 2014 No L201/24). 187 Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(2), 1st and 3rd subparas. 188 Id, art 2. 189 Regulation No 979/2012, art 5. The cases ‘assigned’ to a temporary judge might be thought to be those in which he is the judge rapporteur because cases heard by a formation are not, technically, ‘assigned’ to each and every member of the formation. They are assigned to the formation. Cases are assigned to an individual judge only if he is the judge rapporteur or, in the CST, if he is the single judge dealing with the case. The word ‘assign’ does not appear to have that limited meaning because Regulation No 979/2012 uses the same word in connection with the scope of the prerogatives of a temporary judge: it would make no sense to say that a temporary judge has the status and attributes of a judge only if he is the judge rapporteur or the single judge deciding the case but not if he is a member of a chamber hearing a case (but not the judge rapporteur). 190 That can be seen from the fact that, when a temporary judge first goes on the list, he swears the oath required of any CST judge on first taking up his duties (which would be when he is first asked to assist the CST) – Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(3) – but is not required to take the oath again if he is called back to assist the CST after spending some time back on the list. While back on the list, however, he does not have the status or attributes of a CST judge: see art 2.

36

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.37

means that there must be medical grounds – however they change or evolve – that prevent the permanent judge from acting during that period). Accordingly, if (for example) the permanent judge is afflicted by an illness preventing him from acting and a temporary judge is asked to replace him, the temporary judge’s duties cease should the permanent judge become totally disabled or, on the other hand, recovers but then chooses to resign. That is so because, at that point, the circumstances justifying the use of a temporary judge (which are limited to medical grounds and not total disablement) have ceased to exist. Thirdly, even if the permanent judge is no longer prevented from acting (in the sense required for the purpose of obtaining the assistance of a temporary judge), the temporary judge ‘shall continue to perform his duties until the cases assigned to him have been disposed of’ (conventionally taken to be no earlier than the delivery of a judgment or order finally disposing of the case), which requires some explanation. Normally, the critical point, in terms of the constitution of a court or a chamber, is the point at which the hearing (if any) takes place. After the hearing, the case is taken into deliberation by the judges. If a judge who was present at the hearing ceases to act in the case, the remaining judges can carry on with the deliberations and, eventually, produce a judgment, if they remain quorate and an uneven number of judges is sitting in the deliberations.191 If both requirements are not satisfied, another judge must be added to the formation but, more importantly, there must be another hearing because the new judge will not have had the benefit of the oral submissions made at the original hearing. If the change in constitution occurs before the hearing or (in the absence of a hearing) before the judges have commenced the deliberations, there is no problem. Accordingly, there is actually no good reason why the temporary judge should continue to perform his duties once the permanent judge, whom he has been replacing, is no longer prevented from acting, save in the case of proceedings in which the hearing has already taken place or (in the absence of a hearing) the deliberations have already commenced.192 The final observation to be made on the subject of temporary judges is that, in the case of the CST, the method of ‘appointment’ draws an awkward distinction between ‘appointment’ in the sense of featuring on a list of ‘temporary judges’ and ‘calling upon’ a ‘temporary judge’ in the list. The result of that distinction is that a temporary judge on the list is a judge in name only because he exercises the prerogatives of a judge only when called upon to perform his duties.193 The compatibility of that system with the Statute is not immediately obvious.

191 In the case of the CST, the requirements that it be quorate and that an uneven number of judges participate in the deliberations are to be found in Statute, Annex, arts 4(4) and 5(1), the latter of which cross-refers to Statute, art 17, 1st para. If the number of judges was an even one, one of the judges would have to withdraw from the deliberations in order to satisfy Statute, art 17, 1st para, in which case the remaining judges could continue to deliberate only if they were quorate. 192 The implication from Regulation No 979/2012, art 5, is (also) that a temporary judge does not take over the indisposed permanent judge’s entire list of cases. In order to make art 5 workable, it would seem that the permanent judge’s list of cases in which he is judge rapporteur must be redistributed amongst the other permanent judges. The temporary judge is then involved only in specific cases allocated to him by the President of the CST. 193 Regulation No 979/2012, art 2.

37

1.38  Judicial institutions and bodies

Judges (whether of the ECJ, GC or a specialised court) are not officials or agents of the EU and the Staff Regulations do not apply to them.194 2 Qualification for office 1.38 The members of the ECJ are ‘chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence’.195 It will be observed that the second and third conditions are alternatives. The members of the GC are ‘chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to high judicial office’.196 Members of specialised courts must be persons ‘whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to judicial office’.197 It is doubtful that the fact that the instrument attaching a temporary judge to a specialised court must specify the conditions under which the appointment is made, affects that description of the qualifications for appointment to a specialised court. The ‘conditions’ referred to seem more likely to be such things as pay and emoluments. Thus, Regulation No 979/2012, which deals with the appointment of temporary judges to the CST, does not specify the qualifications for that office.198 1.39 Independence is a requirement common to appointment to the ECJ, the GC and to specialised courts. The differences between the qualifications for appointment to the ECJ and the GC are that: a nominee to the ECJ, but not one to the GC, can be a jurisconsult of recognised competence; a nominee to the GC must have the ability required for appointment to high judicial office, whereas the nominee to the ECJ (if not a jurisconsult of recognised competence) must have the qualifications for appointment to the highest judicial office; and, further, his or her qualifications as such must relate to the highest judicial office in the nominee’s own country (a limitation that, whatever it means, does not apply in the case of an appointment to the GC). The only difference between the requirements for appointment to the GC and those for appointment to a specialised court is the level of ability required of the appointee. In no case is there any condition of nationality and it is theoretically possible, but hardly likely, that a member of 194 Case C-221/14P  H  v Court of Justice, 26  February 2015, paras 31–44 (a case concerning a former member of the CST). 195 TEU, art 19(2) and TFEU, art 253 (1st para). 196 TEU, art 19(2) and TFEU, art 254 (2nd para). Before the changes wrought by the Nice Treaty, CFI judges (as they then were) had to possess the ability required for appointment to ‘judicial office’, not ‘high judicial office’. 197 TFEU, art 257 (4th para). 198 Recital 2 of the preamble to the Regulation says that temporary judges should be chosen from persons who are capable of performing the function of judge at the CST ‘immediately’; but that is not really a qualification of office (it is more a qualification of selection from among a group of persons qualified for office). The Regulation does, however, define the pool of persons from whom temporary judges are to be chosen: former members of the Court: art 1(1), 2nd subpara (as appears from recital 2, the reference to the ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ means the Court in its institutional sense and not simply the ECJ).

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Judicial institutions and bodies 1.40

the ECJ, the GC or a specialised court could be appointed who is not a national of one of the member states. In such an event, he or she would not, however, benefit in his own country from the immunity granted him by the member states. 1.40 It seems to be assumed that the qualifications for appointment to the ECJ must be construed by reference to the member state proposing the nomination. Thus, the nominee of the French government must be eligible for appointment to the highest judicial office or be a jurist of recognised competence in France. That assumption does not, however, appear to be correct. The wording of the Treaties does not reveal whether ‘in their respective countries’, which relates only to the second condition for appointment to the ECJ, means the country of residence or nationality or the state making the nomination. Before the Nice Treaty, which introduced the provision that there should be one ECJ judge ‘per’ member state, the question of nomination was a practice of the member states which was not consecrated in any authoritative text, far less the Treaties themselves. Accordingly, the third possibility (reference to the nominating state) seemed to be inappropriate. On balance, it appeared that it was the country of nationality rather than residence that was meant but there was no certain authority for that assumption. The change made by the Nice Treaty did not clarify matters. To provide merely that there should be one judge ‘per’ member state most obviously meant that the number of judges might not be more or less than the number of member states. It carried with it the implication that each member state was entitled to make one nomination; and, as a prediction of human behaviour, one could assume with a considerable degree of likelihood that each member state would tend to nominate a person who possessed the requisite qualification within that state. However, predictions as to how a legal provision may come to be applied are not equivalent to the legal consequences that actually flow from the provision or to what its true meaning actually is. The Lisbon Treaty changed the requirement in the English version of the TEU from one judge ‘per’ member state to one judge ‘from’ each member state, a more precise formulation that seems finally to have settled the point in the sense that there cannot be more than one judge ‘from’ the same member state. ‘From’ implies nationality or at least long-term residence.199 Finally on that point, ‘highest’ is to be taken literally, as a comparison with the parallel requirement for membership of the GC indicates. ‘Highest’ does not necessarily mean that the person concerned must be qualified for appointment to a court of last instance since, in many member states, there are courts of a relatively low ranking whose decisions, for one reason or another, may not be the subject of appeal. Further, in member states with a federal or devolved constitution, some regions may have a ‘supreme’ court, or a court at the apex of the local judicial hierarchy; but it does not follow that eligibility for membership of such a court is the same as a qualification for appointment to ‘the highest judicial offices’. That phrase refers to the judicial offices at the very top of the legal system of the state in question. The third condition for appointment to the ECJ, to be a jurist of recognised competence, is not linked to any country at 199 The same argument cannot be made out on the basis of some other language versions of the TEU. The French version (for example) retains the equivalent of the pre-Lisbon Treaty usage of one judge ‘per’ member state.

39

1.41  Judicial institutions and bodies

all so that, it would seem, an expert in comparative law, international law (even EU law, perhaps) or the law of a country other than his or her place of residence or nationality may comply with that condition. So, one may conclude, would an expert in Roman or Canon law.200 However, whatever is the legal knowledge or experience required in order to satisfy the Treaty criteria for appointment, the committee charged with producing an opinion on the suitability of a candidate to perform the function of judge or (as the case may be) advocate general does look for competence in the area of EU law. 1.41 The second condition for appointment to the GC (the ability required for appointment to high judicial office) is not tied to the qualifications required for judicial appointment in any particular country, whether a member state or third country. Hence, someone who is not qualified to take up a judicial appointment in any member state is eligible for appointment to the GC as long as he or she has the ability required to discharge a ‘high’ judicial function as perceived in general terms and not by reference to any particular judicial post in any particular member state. In that connection, ‘high’ is obviously a relative term. What is or is not ‘high’ is a matter for the member states, acting reasonably, to determine. By implication, a judge of the GC occupies ‘high’ judicial office. Accordingly (albeit at the risk of circularity of reasoning), a person may be said to satisfy the conditions for appointment to the GC if it is (reasonably) considered that he or she has the ability to occupy that office. By contrast, the level of ability required of an appointee to a specialised court is simply the ability to occupy a judicial office. That can be rephrased as the ability to act judicially (which, in the present context, is not the same as the ability to act judiciously). As in the case of the GC, that requirement focuses on ability, not the possession of a qualification, and is not related to any particular judicial office in any particular member state or elsewhere. 1.42 Despite the fact that the current practice of nomination to the ECJ and the GC may be criticised for not being based on any legal principle, it does possess certain advantages. A member of the Court is not a delegate or representative of the state nominating him: the first condition for appointment, independence, makes that clear. It is, however, advantageous that the legal systems of the member states should be fully represented on the bench, not merely in order to cope with the problem of understanding points of national law that may arise in a case, but also to give a balanced view of the legal traditions of the member states, particularly when dealing with questions concerning the principles of law on which the Treaties are based. As the ECJ pointed out in Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission,201 the EU is based as much on the legal interpenetration of the national legal orders as on the economic interpenetration of the member states. Although that was particularly the case in the period of the Court’s existence up to the early 1980s, and an understanding of different national legal traditions is

200 On the basis of the French and Italian texts of the Treaties it is possible to argue that ‘jurisconsult’ means a professional legal adviser and not simply a person learned in the law. 201 [1982] ECR 1575, para 18.

40

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.44

now of residual importance only, the significance of differences between those traditions cannot be discounted entirely. 1.43 In contrast to the position regarding the ECJ and the GC, the implementation of the Treaty provisions regarding specialised courts has led, in the case of the CST, to more precise requirements regarding the appointment of members. In addition to the requirements set out in the Treaties, membership is limited to nationals of the member states (or persons who are citizens of the European Union) and the composition of the CST must be ‘balanced…on as broad a geographical basis as possible from among nationals of the Member States and with respect to the national legal systems represented’.202 So far as can be seen, the ‘balanced’ composition is perceived only in terms of the geographical and jurisprudential spread of the members.203 3 Commencement of office and obligations during the term of office 1.44 The term of office of a member of the ECJ or GC and of a permanent member of the CST begins on the day specified in the instrument appointing him or, if no day is mentioned on the date of publication of that instrument in the Official Journal.204 At the first public sitting of the Court which he attends after his appointment, the new member (whether he be a member of the ECJ, GC or CST) swears the following oath before taking up his duties: ‘I swear that I will perform my duties impartially and conscientiously; I swear that I will preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court’.205 That is the same oath sworn by the Registrars of the ECJ, GC and CST when appointed.206 The member then signs a solemn undertaking that, both during and after his term of office, he will respect the obligations arising from his office, in particular the duty to behave with integrity and discretion regarding the 202 Statute, art 3(1) and (2) of the Annex. Appointment is by competition: see art 3(2)–(4). For the conditions set by the Council for the first competition, see Decision 2005/150 (OJ  No L50, 23 February 2005, p 7). 203 Council Decision 2005/577 (OJ 2005 No L197/28), recital 9. 204 RP-ECJ, art 3; RP-GC, art 4; RP-CST, art 2. 205 Statute, art 2 (which used to apply to the GC by virtue of Statute, art 47, and applies to the CST by virtue of art 5 of the Annex to the Statute); RP-ECJ, art 4; RP-GC, art 5; RP-CST, art 3. It seems that, in consequence of the Lisbon Treaty, Statute, arts 2–8 should apply, mutatis mutandis, to the GC and CST by virtue of the fact that the GC and CST form part of the Court. Hence, no cross-reference to those provisions is necessary, either in Statute, art 47 (which has been amended to remove them), or in art 5 of the Annex to the Statute (where they remain). Another explanation of the GC’s position is that, under TFEU art  254, 6th para, the Treaty provisions relevant to the Court (which may be taken to include the Statute, as it is a Protocol attached to the TFEU) apply to the GC save to the extent that the Statute provides otherwise. So far as the CST is concerned, the Annex to the Statute contains some deviations from Statute, arts 2–8 (such as the last sentence of art 2 of the Annex). Hence, it would appear that the retention of art 5 of the Annex in its current form was intentional and, accordingly, that Statute, arts 2–8, apply to the CST only to the extent provided for in the Annex. Statute, art 8, applies art 2 to the advocates general of the ECJ. New members of the GC and the CST take the oath before the ECJ, the current members of the GC (and, as the case may be, the CST) being present. 206 RP-ECJ, art 18(5); RP-GC, art 32(5); RP-CST, art 16(6). The Registrar of the GC takes the oath before the GC, not the ECJ. The CST Registrar takes the oath before the CST.

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1.44  Judicial institutions and bodies

acceptance of ‘certain appointments or benefits’ after he has ceased to hold office.207 As from 1 October 2007, the member (whether of the ECJ, GC or CST) also submits a declaration of financial interests to the President of the ECJ worded as follows: ‘I declare that I have no interest in any property or asset which might compromise my impartiality and my independence in the performance of my duties’.208 While holding office, members may not occupy any political or administrative office and may not engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not, unless with the permission of the Council.209 The members must also reside at the place where the Court has its seat (Luxembourg);210 but the ECJ (and, in respect of their members, the GC and CST) may in proper circumstances grant leave of absence to any member.211 The ECJ settles any question concerning a member’s compliance with the obligations arising from his office and his holding during office of any prohibited office or occupation.212 Under a Code of Conduct drawn up by the ECJ and applicable also to the GC and CST, members are obliged to devote themselves fully to the performance of their duties, must refrain from making any statement outside the Court that might harm the reputation of the Court or that might be interpreted as the adoption of a position by the Court on issues falling outside its institutional role,213 must not accept gifts of any kind that might call into question their independence, must avoid any situation that might give rise to a conflict of interest, and must seek prior approval from

207 Statute, arts 2 and 4 (which apply to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above) and Annex, art 5; RP-ECJ, art 5; RP-GC, art 6; RP-CST, art 4. Statute, art 8, applies arts 2 and 4 to the advocates general of the ECJ. 208 Code of Conduct, art 4 and, for the date of its entry into force, art 8(1) (OJ 2007 No C223/1). The Code also applies to the members already in office on the date of its entry into force, who were to submit their declarations by 30 November 2007: art 8(2). The President of the ECJ, assisted by a committee comprising the three longest serving members of the ECJ, is responsible for ensuring the proper application of the Code: art 7(1). However, the ECJ itself is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Code: art 7(2). 209 Statute, arts 4 and 8 (which apply to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above) and Annex, art 5. 210 Statute, art 14 (which applies to the GC and the CST by virtue of Statute, art 47, and art 5 of the Annex to the Statute, respectively). 211 RP-ECJ, art 24(5); RP-GC, art 41(5); RP-CST, art 25(4). 212 Statute, arts 4, 8 (for its application to advocates general of the ECJ), which apply to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above, and Annex, art 5. In the case of members of the GC and the CST, the decision is made by the ECJ after it has consulted the GC or, as the case may be, the CST. 213 As phrased, the obligation not to make a statement that might be interpreted as the adoption of a position by the Court on issues falling outside its institutional role does not appear to apply to a statement that is expressed to be the personal view of the member concerned. Otherwise, the obligation appears to be particularly wide and capable of preventing a member from (for example) making a statement about the Court’s artistic or bibulous preferences. It seems to be intended to prevent statements on political matters. It ought to have been phrased so as to cover statements on matters of law that had not yet been decided by the Court (for example, a member stating in a public lecture that the Court already had a decided view on a particular point – not yet settled in any judgment of the Court – so that the outcome in any future case raising the point could be predicted with accuracy). However, that would not appear to concern ‘issues falling outside [the Court’s] institutional role’, if that role is conceived to be to ensure that the law is observed (that is, the Court’s judicial role). If the Court’s institutional role is conceived to be confined to its functioning as an institution (that is, its organisation and administration), the scope of the prohibition on making statements would be considerably different.

42

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the Court of which they are a member before taking part in any external activity.214 On the last point, participation in any external activity cannot detract from a member’s availability to perform his or her primary obligation, to devote himself or herself fully to the performance of his or her duties.215 The external activities expressly envisaged are teaching activities, conferences, seminars and symposia (but a member may not receive ‘uncustomary’ financial remuneration),216 other activities of an academic nature and unremunerated honorary duties in foundations or similar bodies in the cultural, artistic, social, sporting or charitable fields and in teaching or research establishments (but the member must undertake not to engage in any managerial or administrative activities that might compromise his or her independence or availability or that might give rise to a conflict of interest).217 The position of temporary judges of the CST is essentially the same218 save that, technically, a temporary judge’s office as such commences when he is listed as a temporary judge; but the appointment is activated only when the President of the CST so decides,219 with the consequence that the date on which a temporary judge commences his functions would seem to be specified by the President of the CST and will be different from the date on which he notionally becomes a temporary judge. 4 Disqualification from sitting 1.45 Although the parties to a case cannot apply for the composition of the ECJ, the GC, the CST or a Chamber of any of them to be altered on the ground that a judge of a particular nationality is either present or absent,220 it seems that an application may be made if a member of the Court is otherwise disqualified from sitting.221 The Statute222 expressly provides that no judge or advocate general may take part in a case in which he has previously taken part as an agent or adviser or has acted for one of the parties, or has been ‘called upon to pronounce’ as a member of a court, tribunal or commission of enquiry or in any other capacity.223 That operates as a ground for automatic disqualification of the member concerned from taking part in the case in 2 14 Code of Conduct (see note 208 above), arts 1(2) and (3), 2, 3 and 5(1). 215 Ibid, art 5(1). 216 Id, art 5(2). 217 Id, art  5(3). ‘Foundations or similar bodies’ means non-profit-making establishments or associations that carry out activities in the general interest. 218 Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(3). The Code of Conduct seems to apply, at least by analogy. 219 Regulation No 979/2012, arts 1(1) and 1(2), 2nd and 3rd subparas. 220 Statute, arts 18 and 47, Annex, art 5; Case T-47/92 Lenz v Commission [1992] ECR II-2523, para 33 (where objection was unsuccessfully taken to the presence of the Belgian judge on the ground that the case was connected with litigation before the Belgian courts); Cases T-479/93 and T-559/93 Bernardi v Commission [1994] ECR II-1115, para 19; Case T-497/93 Hogan v Court of Justice [1995] ECR II-703, para 26. 221 See Case C-277/95P  Lenz v Commission [1996]  ECR  I-6109, paras 22 and 45–46, which concern such an application. 222 Art 18, which applies to the GC by virtue of art 47, to the CST by virtue of Annex, art 5, and to temporary judges of the CST by virtue of Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(3). 223 The last situation may arise, for example, where a member of the ECJ, before his appointment to it, formed part of a national court which made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ or was a member of the GC and participated in deciding a case which was then appealed to the ECJ.

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1.45  Judicial institutions and bodies

question. ‘Having acted for one of the parties’ refers to the case in question. If the member has acted for one of the parties in another case (for example, when in private practice before his appointment), that may be a special reason which may lead him or the President of the ECJ (or, as the case may be, the President of the GC or CST) to feel that he should not sit in order to avoid a conflict of interest, whether real or suspected.224 However, it does not seem to fall within the express wording of the Statute. If it did, those members who, before their appointment, were employed by one of the member states would be unable to sit in a case involving that state. So far, that does not appear to have happened or the point been raised; one may with some confidence conclude that, in that respect, the Statute is to be construed narrowly. It also provides, as indicated, that if a member considers that he should not sit ‘for some special reason’, he shall inform the President of the ECJ (or, as the case may be, the President of the GC or CST). Where the same occurs to the President, he is to inform the member concerned accordingly. Any difficulties are to be resolved by a decision of the Court.225 The ‘special reason’ (being different from the ground, referred to above, creating an automatic disqualification from sitting in a case) must be evaluated (by the President and, if need be, the Court) before it operates as a ground disqualifying the member concerned from sitting. The Statute, perhaps wisely, does not attempt to define what may constitute a ‘special reason’.226 It would seem that it is for the Court to decide whether the reason given justifies the member not taking part. It does not seem that the member’s own doubts about the appropriateness of him sitting bind the President or the Court although, no doubt, both would accede to the delicacy of feeling of a member.227 On the other hand, it would seem that, unless the Court were to 2 24 Statute, arts 18 (2nd para), 47 and Annex, art 5. 225 That is, the court (whether the ECJ, GC or CST) to which the member in question belongs. 226 Some ‘special reasons’ may be inferred from the Code of Conduct adopted by the ECJ in 2007 and applicable to members of the ECJ, GC and CST (see note 208 above): the acceptance of a gift that might call into question the member’s independence (art 2), any situation that may give rise to a conflict of interest (art 3), a financial interest (art 4). Art 1(3) of the Code of Conduct requires members to ‘refrain from making any statement outside the Court which may harm the reputation of the Court or which may be interpreted as the adoption of a position by the Court on issues falling outside its institutional role’ (emphasis added). That does not appear to indicate a ‘special reason’ why a member should not sit in a particular case. For example, if a member alleged that the Court was comprised of persons consumed by vanity or of dubious sexual morality, that might be regarded as casting a slur on the members of the Court and harming its reputation (and would presumably damage personal relations between the member in question and the other members of the Court). It does not follow that it should prevent the member making the allegation from sitting in a particular case. On the other hand, if a member expressed a personal conviction on a particular topic (such as abortion or immigration), that might be regarded as a ‘special reason’ in a case concerning that topic. It should be noted that such a situation does not appear to be covered by art 1(3) of the Code of Conduct. Further, expressions of personal conviction that might constitute a ‘special reason’ are quite different in nature from, for example, expressions of view concerning a legal problem that a member makes in an academic context, such as a public lecture, private seminar or academic publication. Those expressions of view (which are permitted by the Code of Conduct, art 5(2)), by their nature, reflect conclusions reached on the material then before the mind of the member concerned and do not preclude a change of mind at a later stage should further material be put before the member concerned (or should the same material be presented but in a different way) or should the member simply decide to take a different view. The problem about a personal conviction arises where it suggests that the member may have a closed mind. 227 As happened in Case C-277/95P Lenz (above, note 221), para 45.

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decide otherwise, the President may prevent a member from sitting ‘for some special reason’ even if the member in question feels that the reason alleged is specious. 1.46 In principle, the membership of a formation may be disputed on the grounds of either (or both) subjective and objective impartiality.228 The facts that a particular member of the Court was a member of a different formation of the Court which had occasion to rule on the same or a similar point at issue in a different case or (in the event of an appeal followed by a remission of the case) was a member of the formation from whose decision the appeal was brought are neither, in themselves, a reason why the member concerned should not sit.229 1.47 No procedure is laid down for an application by a party to have the composition of the ECJ, GC, CST or a chamber of any of them changed in a particular case although, as has been remarked, the Statute expressly excludes that only where the objection is based on nationality. The possibility must therefore remain although one would expect cogent arguments to be put forward before the ECJ (or, as the case may be, the GC or CST) would be prepared to accede to such a request. In particular, any allegation of subjective impartiality on the part of a member of the formation in question would have to be based upon objective evidence capable of raising at least a doubt about the member’s impartiality (there being a presumption of personal impartiality in the absence of evidence to the contrary).230 It would appear from the Statute that the decision is that of the Court (the ECJ, GC or CST, depending on which of them is hearing the case) and the question would arise whether a member impugned in such an application could or should sit to decide the matter. One would expect that he would not, in order to avoid the conflict of interest that would inevitably arise in appearance if not in fact.231 5 Privileges and immunities 1.48 Members (including temporary judges of the CST) are totally immune from legal proceedings while they hold office but thereafter they benefit only from a partial immunity covering acts (including words spoken or written) per 228 Cases C-341/06P and C-342/06P Chronopost v UFEX [2008] ECR I-4777, para 54 (paras 57– 60 deal with objective impartiality); Case C-308/07P Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v Parliament [2009] ECR I-1059, para 46. 229 Chronopost (above, note 228), paras 51–60 (case remitted to a formation whose membership overlapped with that of the formation whose decision was overturned on appeal); Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v Parliament (above, note 228), paras 43–45 (same judge hearing similar cases); Case C-526/10 P(R) Ngele v Commission [2010] ECR I-173*, paras 8–12. 230 Chronopost (above, note 228), para  54; Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso (above, note 228), paras 46–49. 231 Although this view is disputed it would appear that, in the absence of express provision, an application to change the composition of the ECJ, the GC, CST or a chamber of any of them may be made as a procedural issue under RP-ECJ, art  151 or, as the case may be RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83 (but note the Lenz case, above, note 221). Any factor affecting the capacity of a member in question to act judicially may be relied on (cf van Reepinghen and Orianne Journal des Tribunaux (1961) at p 91).

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formed by them in an official capacity.232 Subject to any limitation period, it would seem that actions may be brought against a member after he has ceased to hold office in respect of acts performed during his term of office but otherwise than in his official capacity. The ECJ can waive a member’s immunity, the decision being made by it in plenary session; as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, the member may then be tried in any of the member states but only by a court ‘competent to judge the members of the highest national judiciary’.233 It does not seem that that applies once the member has left office, unless partial immunity has been waived, nor does it apply to civil proceedings. The members also benefit from rights under arts 11 to 14 and 17 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union.234 Those include exemption, together with their spouses and dependants, from immigration restrictions and formalities for the registration of aliens; the right to the same facilities accorded to officials of international organisations in respect of currency or exchange regulations; the right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first taking up office and the right to re-export free of duty their furniture and effects on termination of office; the right to import and re-export free of duty a motor car for their personal use; exemption from national taxation on salaries, wages and emoluments paid by the EU. Those privileges and immunities are granted solely in the interests of the EU and it seems that the Court would be obliged to waive them if it considered waiver not to be contrary to the interests of the EU235 unless the question arose in the context of legal proceedings against a member, in which case the Court would have discretion whether or not to waive the immunity from those proceedings. The members’ salaries, allowances and pensions, together with those of the Registrars of the ECJ and GC, are fixed by the Council, acting by a qualified majority.236

232 Statute, art 3 (which applies to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above) and Annex, art 5; Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(3) (for temporary members of the CST). 233 Statute, art 3. The decision whether or not to waive immunity is made by the ECJ even when it concerns a member of the GC or the CST; but in that event the ECJ must make its decision after consulting the GC or, as the case may be, the CST, which appears to mean hearing its views. 234 Statute, art 3 (last paragraph) (which applies to the GC for the reason stated in note 204 above) and Annex, art 5; Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(3); Protocol No 7. 235 Protocol No 7, art 17. Cf Case T-497/94 Hogan v Court of Justice [1995] ECR II-703, para 48. In the case of members of the GC and the CST, the decision seems to be one made by the ECJ. 236 Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, signed at Brussels on 8 April 1965, art 6 (which appears still to be maintained in effect despite the repeal of that treaty – see Amsterdam Treaty, art 9(1) and 10; Decision 88/591, art 2(5), so provided in the case of the CFI, as it then was). At the time of writing, the regulation determining the emoluments of members of the ECJ, GC and CST was Regulation 422/67/EC and 5/67/ EAEC, OJ No 187 of 8 August 1967 p 1, as amended. The emoluments of temporary judges of the CST are determined by Regulation No 979/2012, art 3. Where there is a dispute between an institution and one of its former members about the applicability of any regulations, such as those governing pensions or other benefits, a formal complaint to the institution should be made by the former member concerned before the matter is litigated before the Court: Case C-163/88 Kontogeorgis v Commission [1989] ECR 4189, per Advocate General Jacobs, at 4197.

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Judicial institutions and bodies 1.50

6 Cessation of office 1.49 A member may cease to hold office through death, normal replacement, voluntary resignation or by decision of the Court;237 there is no age for retirement. With the exception of the first and last cases, the member continues to hold office until his successor takes up his duties.238 Normal replacement occurs when the member’s term is not renewed. In other cases the vacancy can arise before the termination of his or her term of office. In that event, in the ECJ and GC, his or her successor is appointed for the remainder of the term239 and may, of course, be reappointed when it expires; in the CST, the successor is appointed for a new full term of six years.240 A member may resign voluntarily by sending a letter of resignation to the President of the Court of which he or she is a member who, in turn, passes it on to the President of the Council. The vacancy arises when the letter is received by the latter.241 1.50 A  member may be deprived of office, pension or other benefits, by a unanimous decision of the Court,242 if he or she ‘no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from his office’.243 The member in question does not take part in the deliberation over his fate244 but he is asked by the President of the ECJ to submit his observations on the matter to the other 237 That is, the ECJ in respect of members of the GC and the CST as well as its own members: see Statute, arts 5, 6 (which apply to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above) and Annex, art 5. In the case of temporary members attached to a specialised court, the regulation providing for the attachment must specify the circumstances in which the attached judge ceases to perform his duties (which will include, presumably, the return of the permanent judge to his functions, as well as other circumstances, such as the death or voluntary resignation of the attached judge): see Statute, art 62c. Regulation No 979/2012, art 4, provides that a temporary judge of the CST may be removed from the list of temporary judges on his death or resignation or if deprived of office in accordance with Statute, art 6 (as to which, see below). As pointed out above, although appointment as a temporary judge relates to mention on the list of temporary judges, the actual performance of the function of temporary judge will end when the permanent judge replaced by the temporary judge is no longer prevented from acting (subject to the temporary judge continuing to deal with pending cases), unless, of course, the temporary judge has previously been removed from the list of temporary judges. 238 Statute, art 5 (which applies to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above) and Annex, art 5. 239 Statute, art 7 (which applies to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above). 240 Statute, Annex, art 2. That applies to permanent CST judges. When a temporary CST judge is removed prematurely from the list of temporary judges, the replacement is appointed for the remainder of the period of validity of the list (four years) but can be reappointed: Regulation No 979/2012, arts 4 (2nd para) and 1(1). 241 Statute, art 5 (which applies to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above); Annex, art 5. As the last para of Statute, art 5, indicates, the creation of a vacancy does not mean that the post is vacant: the judge in question continues to hold office until his successor takes up his duties (which cannot be before his successor has taken the oath prescribed by art 2). 242 That is, the ECJ which, in the case of a member of the GC or CST, decides after hearing the GC or, as the case may be, the CST. 243 Statute, art 6 (which applies to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above) and Annex, art 5. That situation may arise, for example, where the member is so incapacitated by illness that he or she is unable to indicate his or her intention to resign voluntarily. 244 Statute, art 6 (which applies to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above) and Annex, art 5; neither does the Registrar of the ECJ, see RP-ECJ, art 6(2).

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1.51  Judicial institutions and bodies

members of the ECJ in closed session.245 In the case of a member of the GC or CST, the first stage of the procedure is that the President (of the GC or the CST, as the case may be) invites the member concerned to make representations to the other members (of the GC or CST, as the case may be) in closed session and in the absence of the Registrar. The members (of the GC or CST, as the case may be) then deliberate on the question (in the absence of the member concerned) and come to a conclusion. Voting is by secret ballot and an opinion to the effect that the member concerned no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or no longer meets the obligations arising from office must be supported by the votes of at least a majority of the judges. Where such an opinion is adopted, it is communicated to the ECJ, together with the reasons for it and particulars of the voting.246 The procedure before the ECJ then follows as in the case of a member of the ECJ. A decision of the ECJ, finding that a member (whether of the ECJ, GC or CST) no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from office, is communicated by the Registrar of the ECJ to the Presidents of the Parliament and Commission. It is also ‘notified’ to the President of the Council, upon which the vacancy arises.247 The difference between a ‘communication’ and a ‘notification’ seems to be this: the former simply conveys the information it contains while the latter is formal service of the document. 7 Obligations after cessation of office 1.51 After a member has ceased to hold office (for whatever reason), he or she continues to be bound by the ‘duty of discretion’ under the Code of Conduct applicable to members of the ECJ, GC and CST.248 Subject to that duty, members may act as counsel, adviser or expert in a case or provide a legal opinion after ceasing to hold office.249 However, they must also undertake: (i) not to become involved in any manner whatsoever in: (a) cases pending in the Court of which they were a member when they ceased to hold office; or (b) cases directly and clearly connected with cases (including concluded cases) which they dealt with as judge or advocate general; and (ii) not to act as a representative of a party (in either written or oral pleadings) in cases before the EU judicature for a period of three years after ceasing to hold office.250 The duty of discretion is not defined

245 RP-ECJ, art 6(1). The predecessor provision (RP-ECJ, art 4 of the 1991 Rules) specified that the matter was dealt with in closed session, which the current RP-ECJ, art 6(1) does not provide. However, that is implicit from the absence of the Registrar: see RP-ECJ, art 6(2). 246 RP-GC, art 7; RP-CST, art 5. The opinion and the reasons for it (but not details of the voting) should also be communicated to the member of the GC or CST concerned, as respect for the rights of the defence requires. 247 Statute, art 6 (which applies to the GC for the reason stated in note 205 above) and Annex, art 5. In contrast to the position that arises when a judge resigns, the occurrence of the vacancy (upon notification to the President of the Council) causes the judge’s post to be vacant because the last para of art 5 (which provides that a judge continues to hold office until his successor takes up his duties) does not apply. 248 Code of Conduct, art 6(1) (see note 208 above). 249 Ibid, art 6(3). 250 Ibid, art 6(2).

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but seems to encompass the duty to maintain the secrecy of the deliberations,251 the duty not to bring the Court into disrepute by making statements that would harm the reputation of the Court252 and a more general duty to act with propriety as befits a former member of the Court. As to (i) above, the duty not to become involved in a case ‘in any manner whatsoever’ seems to refer to a professional involvement whether as representative, behind the scenes adviser or witness. It is not intended to prevent a former member from exercising rights as a party or intervener. The notion of ‘cases directly and clearly connected’ with other cases is also undefined. The requirement of a ‘clear’ connection seems to envisage a connection that is evident at the time when the former member decides whether or not to be involved in the case. The requirement of a ‘direct’ connection seems to restrict the connection to the kind that would make it improper for the former member to be involved in the case. That would be so, for example, where the second case was so similar to the first that the former member could not advise a party to the second without being drawn into disclosing, or fashioning his or her advice on the basis of, secrets of the deliberations in the first case. As to (ii) above, the three-year bar on representing a party in proceedings ‘before the Community judicature’ appears to refer to the ECJ, the GC, the CST and any other judicial panel that might be in existence when the member ceases to hold office. It does not apply to the EFTA Court or to the courts of the member states. At first sight, it seems odd that, for example, a former judge of the CST should be the subject of a complete bar on appearing before, for example, the ECJ for that period of time. However, there is some sense in saying that, for example, a former member of the ECJ should be barred for a time from representing a party before the GC and CST; and it may have been felt that it would not be fair to exempt, for example, a former member of the CST from the same restriction. In addition, there is no doubt a concern that a former member might seek to exploit, or be used by a party to exploit, a friendship with a member of another component of ‘the Community judicature’.253 8 Precedence 1.52 In the ECJ, judges and advocates general and, in the GC and CST, judges (other than the President of the GC or CST and the Presidents of their chambers) rank equally in order of precedence, precedence between the members of each of the ECJ, GC and CST being determined according to seniority of office and members retaining their former precedence on being reappointed; where two or more members are equally senior in terms of office, precedence is determined by

2 51 See note 205 above. 252 Code of Conduct, art 1(3). 253 Human nature being what it is, a former member would be likely to fare less well than another advocate (rather than better) because continuing members can be expected to be more likely to make it clear who is right and who is wrong.

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1.53  Judicial institutions and bodies

age.254 It is usual to list the members of each of the ECJ, GC and CST in order of precedence starting with the President of the relevant Court and continuing with the Vice President (where there is one), the Presidents of the chambers and (in the case of the ECJ) the First Advocate General, ranked in order of seniority. Then come the rest of the members in order of seniority, the Registrar being included by courtesy at the end of the list. The members of the ECJ, GC and CST are not ranked together in order of precedence. Since the GC is a judicial body subordinate to the ECJ, its members are usually regarded as ranking below members of the ECJ; and the same applies as between the GC and the CST.

B

Presidents, Vice-President and Advocates General

1.53 The President of the ECJ (or, as the case may be, the GC or CST) is elected by the judges (of the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC or CST) for a renewable term of three years.255 In the case of the ECJ and the GC, the election takes place after the triennial partial replacement of the members,256 unless the current President vacates office before his term is over, in which case his successor as President is appointed only for the remainder of his term (the appointment still being renewable).257 In the case of the CST, the triennial partial replacement of members does not apply and, therefore, the election of the President is not linked to it; where the office of President falls vacant prematurely, a successor is elected for the remainder of the President’s term (but the successor may be re-elected as President for a further term).258 In relation to each court (ECJ, GC, CST), the election is by secret ballot. The judge who obtains the votes of more than half of the judges (as opposed to more than half or a majority of the votes cast) is elected; if no one obtains the votes of more than half the judges, one or more successive ballots are held until that majority is attained.259 The President’s functions are described in the ECJ, GC and CST Rules of Procedure in similar terms.260 Reduced to their essentials, the functions of the President are: (i) to represent the court of which he is President (in dealings with outside bodies); (ii) to 254 RP-ECJ, art 7; RP-GC, art 8; RP-CST, art 6. For example, when Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn became a judge of the ECJ, he retained the seniority that he had acquired as advocate general and was ranked above members of the ECJ who had been judges (but not members) of the ECJ for longer than he. Temporary judges of the CST appear to fall outside the rules governing precedence, even though, under Regulation No 979/2012, art 1(1), they are drawn from former members of the Court. It would appear that they do not retain their former precedence but would be listed after the CST judges in the order in which they appear in the list of temporary judges. 255 TFEU, art 253, 254; Statute, art 9a, 1st para, (which applies to the GC by virtue of Statute, art 47) and Annex, art 4(1); RP-ECJ, art 8(1); RP-GC, art 9(1); RP-CST, art 7(1). 256 RP-ECJ, art 8(1); RP-GC, art 9(1). 257 RP-ECJ, art 8(2); RP-GC, art 9(2). 258 RP-CST, art 7(2). 259 RP-ECJ, art 8(3); RP-GC, art 9(3); RP-CST, art 7(3). 260 RP-ECJ, art 9; RP-GC, art 10; RP-CST, art 8. In the case of the CST, Statute, Annex, art 4(3) provides that the President presides over the full court and the chamber of five judges whereas RP-CST, art  7(2) provides that the President presides at sittings and deliberations in closed session of the full court, the five-judge chamber and any three-judge chamber to which he is attached.

50

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.54

direct the judicial business of that court; (iii) to preside at meetings, hearings and deliberations;261 and (iv) to supervise and be ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the court’s administration and services. Apart from presiding at hearings and meetings, the Presidents of the ECJ, GC and CST have various miscellaneous powers262 of which the most important is to grant interim relief.263 The President of the ECJ is also responsible for selecting the judge-rapporteur for a case (in cases which are automatically assigned to a chamber, he acts on the basis of a proposal made by the president of the relevant chamber);264 the Presidents of the GC and CST designate the judge-rapporteurs in all cases, on the basis of a proposal from the President of the chamber to which the case has been assigned.265 The President of the GC also designates the judge called on to perform the function of advocate general in cases where the GC decides that an advocate general should be designated.266 Since so much of his time is taken up with such matters, the Presidents of the ECJ and GC are not normally the judgerapporteur in a case. 1.54 As from 2012, the ECJ and GC rules of procedure also provide for a Vice-President, who is elected immediately after the election of the President, also for a renewable term of three years and by the same process of election.267 The Vice-President has the following functions: (i) to assist the President generally in the performance by the latter of his duties; (ii) to take the President’s place when the latter is prevented from acting or the office of President is vacant; (iii) to take the President’s place, at the latter’s request, for the purpose of representing the ECJ or GC (as the case may be) and (in the case of the ECJ) for the purpose of ensuring the proper functioning of the services of the ECJ; and (iv) to take the place of the President in the performance of the latter’s judicial duties under conditions specified by a decision of the ECJ.268 In relation to (iv), at the time of writing, the relevant decision made by the ECJ did not in fact ‘specify the conditions’ under which the Vice-President replaces the President in relation to the latter’s judicial duties. It simply listed the judicial duties that could be performed by the Vice-President: determining applications for the grant of interim relief; determining appeals from decisions of the GC dismissing an application to 261 RP-ECJ, art 9(2) actually states that the President presides at general meetings of the members of the ECJ and at hearings and deliberations of the full Court and Grand Chamber; RP-GC, art 10(3)–(5) similarly state that the President presides at ‘the plenum’ (meetings of the entire membership of the GC at which the decisions referred to in RP-GC, art  42(1) are taken) and over the Grand Chamber or any other chamber to which the President is attached, not ‘hearings’. Those provisions reflect the fact that cases before the ECJ and GC are ordinarily heard by chambers and exceptionally in plenary session. 262 Under, for example, EAEC, art 81(3) and (4) and art 7 of Annex II of the Staff Regulations, so far as the President of the ECJ is concerned. 263 Statute, art 39; RP-ECJ, art 161(1); RP-GC, art 158(1); Statute, Annex, art 7(1), which applies the procedural rules in Statute, Title III (which include art 39) to the CST; RP-CST, art 116(2). 264 RP-ECJ, art 15(1) and (2). 265 RP-GC, art 26(2); RP-CST, art 52. 266 RP-GC, art 31(2). 267 Statute, art 9a; RP-ECJ, art 8(4); RP-GC, art 9(4). The names of the President and the VicePresident are published in the Official Journal: RP-ECJ, art 8(5); RP-GC, art 9(5). 268 Statute, art 9a, 2nd para; RP-ECJ, art 10; RP-GC, art 11.

51

1.55  Judicial institutions and bodies

intervene or decisions of the GC on applications for interim relief; determining applications made under EAEC, art 81. The decision goes on to provide for the replacement of the Vice-President (should he be prevented from acting) by, successively, the presidents of the five judge chambers, the presidents of the three judge chambers, and then individual judges in order of seniority.269 1.55 At present the ECJ sits either in chambers (that is, divisions) of three or five judges or in a Grand Chamber (a large division) but, when the Statute so provides, may also sit in plenary session (as a full court).270 The GC sits in chambers of three or five judges but, where its Rules of Procedure so provide, may sit as a full court, a Grand Chamber or as a single judge.271 The CST sits in chambers of three judges but, to the extent that its rules of procedure so provide, may sit as a full court, a chamber of five judges or as a single judge.272 The role of those formations will be discussed below. Each of those formations has a presiding judge (the President of that formation). 1.56 In the ECJ the President of the ECJ is ex officio the President of the full court and the Grand Chamber.273 The judges elect the Presidents of five-judge chambers for a term of three years immediately after the election of the President of the ECJ and the Vice-President; the method of election is the same as that for the office of President of the ECJ and a judge can be re-elected president of a five-judge chamber only once.274 The Presidents of three-judge chambers are elected in the same way for a term of one year and there is no limit on the number of times that they may be re-elected.275 In the GC, the President presides when the GC sits as a full court or a Grand Chamber or where he or she is assigned to a three or a five-judge chamber.276 As in the ECJ, the judges elect the Presidents of the five-judge chambers for a term of three years but they may be re-elected only once.277 Unlike the ECJ, the Presidents of three-judge chambers of the GC are elected ‘for a defined term’ which need not be one year; but, like the ECJ, there is no limit on the number of times a judge may be re-elected as President of a three-judge chamber.278 In the CST, the President of the CST presides when the

269 Decision 2012/671 of 23 October 2012 (OJ 2012 No L300/47). It would appear that RP-ECJ, art  10(3), which provides that such a decision is to specify the conditions under which the President’s judicial duties are to be performed by the Vice-President, is not entirely accurate. 270 TFEU, art 251. 271 Statute, art 50. 272 Statute, Annex, art 4(2). 273 Statute, art 16, 2nd para. 274 Statute, art 16, 1st para; RP-ECJ, art 12(1). The prohibition on a judge being re-elected more than once appears to apply both to consecutive and to non-consecutive re-election and whether or not re-election would be to the same or a different five-judge chamber. 275 Statute, art 16, 1st para; RP-ECJ, art 12(2)–(3). 276 RP-GC, art 10(3)–(5). 277 Statute, art 50; RP-GC, art 18(1)–(2). The election takes place immediately after the election of the President of the GC: RP-GC, art 18(4). 278 RP-GC, art 18(3).

52

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.58

CST sits in plenary session or as a five-judge chamber; and he or she also presides when assigned to a three-judge chamber.279 The judges elect the Presidents of the three-judge chambers for a term of three years; and they may be re-elected any number of times.280 1.57 In each of the ECJ, GC and CST, in cases assigned to or devolving upon a chamber, the President of the chamber exercises the powers of the President of the relevant court.281 In the GC and the CST, when a case is delegated or assigned to a single judge, he or she exercises the power of the President.282 Where the office of President of a chamber falls vacant before the normal expiry of the President’s term of office, a successor is elected for the remainder of that term.283 When the President of the ECJ, GC or CST (or, in the case of the ECJ and GC, the Vice-President) is absent or prevented from attending or the office is vacant, the functions of President are exercised by one of the Presidents of the chambers in order of seniority (starting, in the ECJ only, with the Presidents of the fivejudge chambers); and, where at the same time all the Presidents are prevented from attending or their posts are vacant, the functions of President are exercised by one of the other judges in order of seniority.284 In the case of the ECJ, express provision is made for situations in which the President of a chamber is prevented from attending: if that occurs in a five-judge chamber, the function of President is undertaken by any member of that chamber who is President of a three-judge chamber and, if there is more than one such person, by the most senior of them; if the chamber does not have a President of a three-judge chamber as a member, the most senior member of the chamber acts as President; in the case of a threejudge chamber, the most senior judge acts as President.285 In the case of the CST, the next most senior member of the chamber acts as President.286 1.58 In both the ECJ and the GC, the advocate general assigned to a case assists the Court by making a reasoned submission on the case in open court, acting with complete impartiality and independence but he or she does not participate in the deliberations between the judges that lead up to the making of the judgment.287 As will be seen, the advocate general must also be heard before the

2 79 Statute, Annex 4(3); RP-CST, art 8(1). 280 Statute, Annex 4(3), 2nd sentence; RP-CST, art 12(1). 281 RP-ECJ, art 11(4); RP-GC, art 1(2)(b); and, to the same effect, RP-CST, art 1(2)(b) and 12(3). 282 RP-GC, art 1(2)(b), 3rd indent; RP-CST, art 15(5). 283 RP-ECJ, art 12(3) (applying RP-ECJ, art 8(2)); RP-GC, art 18(5); RP-CST, art 12(2) (applying RP-CST, art 7(2)–(4)). 284 RP-ECJ, art 13; RP-GC, art 12; RP-CST, art 9. 285 RP-ECJ, art 30. In the case of the GC there is no such express provision but the same seems in any event to follow from RP-GC, art 12 read with RP-GC, art 1(2)(a). 286 RP-CST, art 12(4). 287 TFEU, art 252; Statute, art 49.

53

1.58  Judicial institutions and bodies

Court makes various procedural decisions.288 In regard to the ECJ, an advocate general acts in every case before the Court. Formerly the advocates general of the ECJ were attached to the chambers and cases were assigned to them by the President of the ECJ. At present they float and the function of distributing the cases among the advocates general is exercised by the First Advocate General, who is responsible for taking the necessary steps if an advocate general is absent or prevented from acting.289 If it considers that a case raises no new point of law, the ECJ may decide, after hearing the advocate general assigned to the case, to determine the case without there being an opinion from the advocate general.290 The First Advocate General is appointed by the Court in the same way as the Presidents of the chambers but for a period of one year.291 In the GC, which does not have permanent advocates general, a judge may be designated to act as advocate general in particular cases by reference to criteria laid down in the GC’s rules of procedure.292 The GC (in effect, a chamber) may (but not must) be assisted by a judge acting as advocate general if it is considered that the legal difficulty or factual complexity of the case so requires.293 In that event, the chamber in question must request the GC to designate a judge to act as advocate general; and the decision whether or not to do so is made by the GC in plenary session, applying that criterion.294 The designation of a judge of the GC to perform the

288 The role of the advocate general is discussed in: Warner Journal of the Law Society of Scotland (1975) p 47; Gori Cahiers de Droit Européen (1976) p 375; Dashwood [1982] 2 LS 202; Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba [2000] ECR I-667, paras 10–15 of the judgment; Case C-466/00 Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003]  ECR  I-2219, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, paras 86 and following (pp 2242 and following); Case C-463/00 Commission v Spain [2003]  ECR  I-4582, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, paras 34–35 (pp 4594–4595). 289 RP-ECJ, art 16. 290 Statute, art 20, last para; RP-ECJ, art 76(2)–(3). Unfortunately, if that step is taken, it does not guarantee that the judgment will not dispose of the case on the basis of a novel point of law. 291 RP-ECJ, art 14. The First Advocate General is actually appointed by the judges after hearing the advocates general: see RP-ECJ, art 14(1). There is no limit on the number of times an advocate general can serve as First Advocate General but the tendency is for the post to rotate between the advocates general every year. 292 Statute, art 49, 1st and 3rd paras. See Case C-136/01P Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v Commission [2002] ECR I-6565, paras 17–18. 293 RP-GC, art  30. Where RP-GC, art  30 applies, the decision whether or not to task a judge with the delivery of an advocate general’s opinion is entirely within the GC’s discretion: Case C-199/98 P Goldstein v Commission (unreported order of 8 July 1999), para 17. When the GC sits as a single judge, he or she cannot be assisted by another judge acting as advocate general because cases are heard by a single judge where (in brief) they lack the features that might render them appropriate to be determined with the assistance of an advocate general (see RPGC, art 29(1)–(2)). 294 RP-GC, art  31(1). The plenum, or plenary session, is that referred to in RP-GC, art  42. The provisions in the GC  Rules of Procedure that refer to the advocate general presuppose that one has been appointed. If not, the reference to the advocate general is redundant: see Case C-4/99  P  Goldstein v Commission (unreported order of 8  July 1999), para  9; Case C-210/05P Campailla v Commission (unreported order of 8 December 2005, paras 9–15); Case C-211/05P Campailla v Commission (unreported order of 8 December 2005, paras 9–15).

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function of advocate general in a case is made by the President of the GC.295 In the case of the CST, there is no provision in the Statute or the decision establishing it for advocates general.296

C

The Registrar

1.59 The Registrars of the ECJ, the GC and the CST are not members of their respective Courts. Each is appointed by his or her own Court297 for a renewable term of six years.298 The method of appointment is laid down in the Rules of Procedure. When the post is vacant, it must be advertised in the Official Journal and applicants are given not less than three weeks in which to apply (in the case of the Registrar of the CST, it is also provided that, two weeks before the date fixed for making the appointment, the President of the CST informs the members of the applications which have been made for the post).299 The appointment is made by secret ballot, following the same procedure, mutatis mutandis, for the appointment of the President of the Court.300 The Registrar may be deprived of office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required by, or no longer meets the obligations arising from, it.301 No conditions for holding the office of Registrar appear to be specified in the Treaties, the Statute or the Rules of Procedure. They would no doubt be considered as falling within the ‘rules governing his service’ which the ECJ, GC and CST, respectively, are responsible for drawing up.302 So far as is known no such rules relating to the conditions of service have been formulated by the ECJ, GC or CST. Any decision on whether or not to deprive the Registrar of office is made by the Court appointing him or her after the Registrar has been given an opportunity to be heard.303 If the office

295 RP-GC, art 31(2). RP-GC, art 31(3) lists the decisions in respect of which the advocate general (if there is one) must be heard before the decision is made. The procedure to be followed when a judge is designated to act as advocate general is discussed below. 296 Cf Case T-222/07 Kerstens v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-37, II-B-1-267, paras 50–51. 297 TFEU, art 253, 254; Statute, Annex 6(2); RP-ECJ, art 18(1) and (3); RP-GC, art 32(1) and (3); RP-CST, art 16(1) and (4). 298 RP-ECJ, art  18(4); RP-GC, art  32(4); RP-CST, art  16(5). The CST’s Registrar was initially appointed for a six-year term even though, at the time of his appointment, the CST rules had not been formulated: see OJ 2005 No C322/17. 299 RP-ECJ, art  18(2); RP-GC, art  32(2); RP-CST, art  16(2)–(3). An application must be accompanied by full details of the candidate’s age, nationality, university degrees, knowledge of languages, present and past occupations and experience, if any, in judicial and international fields: RP-ECJ, art 18(2); RP-GC, art 32(2); RP-CST, art 16(2). If the Registrar is reappointed, it is not necessary to first advertise the post in the Official Journal: RP-ECJ, art 18(4); RP-GC, art 32(4); RP-CST, art 16(5). 300 RP-ECJ, art  18(3) and 8(3) (the former specifying that the advocates general participate in the vote); RP-GC, art 32(3) and 9(3); RP-CST, art 16(4) and 7(3). The reappointment of the Registrar must follow the same process of a vote by secret ballot. 301 RP-ECJ, art 18(6); RP-GC, art 32(6); RP-CST, art 17(1). 302 In the case of the ECJ: TFEU, art 253, 5th para. In the case of the GC: TFEU, art 254, 4th para. In the case of the CST: Statute, Annex 6(2). 303 RP-ECJ, art 18(6); RP-GC, art 32(6); RP-CST, art 17(1).

55

1.60  Judicial institutions and bodies

falls vacant before the Registrar’s term was due to end, the ECJ (or, as the case may be, the GC or CST) appoints a successor for a full term of six years.304 1.60 The Registrar takes the same oath and signs the same undertaking as those required of a judge on taking up his duties;305 and is obliged to reside at the place where the Court has its seat.306 He or she benefits from the same privileges and immunities under the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union307 but not those granted by the Statute to members of the Court. The Statute provides that the Court (whether the ECJ, GC or CST) shall, where necessary, arrange for the replacement of the Registrar on occasions when he is prevented from attending the Court.308 By following the same procedure for the appointment of the Registrar, the ECJ (or as the case may be, the GC or CST) may appoint one or more Deputy Registrars.309 Where the Registrar is absent or prevented from attending or the post is vacant, he or she will normally be replaced by the (or a) Deputy Registrar (if any); and, where the latter is also absent or prevented from attending or the post is vacant, the President (of the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC or CST) designates an official or servant to carry out the duties of Registrar.310 1.61 The Registrar’s functions are many and varied but they may be summarised as falling into three separate categories: (1) the Registrar is responsible (under the authority of the President), for the administration of the Court, its financial management and its accounts;311 (2) the Registrar is directly responsible for the Registry and hence is indirectly involved in the progress of cases before the ECJ (or, as the case may be, the GC or CST): RP-ECJ, art  20(1), RP-GC, art  35(1) and RP-CST, art 20(1) provide that the Registrar is responsible, under the authority of the President, for the acceptance, transmission and custody of documents and for effecting service; (3) according to RP-ECJ, art 20(2) (RP-GC, art 35(2) and RP-CST, art 20(2) are to the same effect), the Registrar shall assist the members of the Court 3 04 RP-ECJ, art 18(7); RP-GC, art 32(7); RP-CST, art 17(2). 305 RP-ECJ, art  18(5) and RP-ECJ, art  4–5; RP-GC, art  32(5) and RP-GC, art  5–6; RP-CST, art 16(6) and RP-CST, art 3–4. See also Statute, arts 10, 47 and Annex 6(2). 306 Statute, arts 14, 47 and Annex 6(2). 307 Article 21; Statute, arts 3 (4th para), 47 and Annex 6(2). 308 Statute, arts 11, 47 and Annex 6(2). 309 RP-ECJ, art 19; RP-GC, art 33; RP-CST, art 18. At the time of writing, the ECJ had two and none had been appointed by the GC or CST. 310 RP-GC, art 34; RP-CST, art 19. RP-ECJ, art 14 of the ECJ’s 1991 Rules used so to provide. There appears to be no equivalent in the current ECJ Rules. 311 RP-ECJ, art 20(4); RP-GC, art 35(4); RP-CST, art 20(4). RP-ECJ, art 20(3), RP-GC, art 35(3) and RP-CST, art  20(3) provide that the Registrar (of the ECJ, GC and CST, respectively) has custody of the seals of the Court appointing him and is responsible for its records and publications. The administrative responsibilities of the Registrar of the ECJ are broader than those of the Registrars of the GC and CST because the services of the Court (understood in its institutional sense) fall within the scope of the remit of the Registrar of the ECJ.

56

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.63

in all their official functions and so must attend all meetings and sittings of the ECJ (or as the case may be, the GC or CST) and the chambers312 with the exception of those held to consider whether a member is to be deprived of office313 and the deliberations of the ECJ (or GC or CST) on matters which do not concern its own administration (in general where the Court is considering its judgment in a case).314 1.62 The Registrar of the ECJ is responsible to the ECJ for all its departments but the departmental heads may submit proposals relating to their own departments to the President of the ECJ through the Registrar. In the case of the Registry of the GC such proposals are made directly to the ECJ by the Registrar of the ECJ or his deputy. 1.63 Naturally, with all those responsibilities the Registrar is often unable to meet all his or her commitments, particularly (so far as the Registrar of the ECJ is concerned) with regard to attendance at every meeting and sitting of the Court. RP-ECJ, arts 13 and 23 of the ECJ’s 1991 Rules therefore provided that the ECJ’s Registrar would be assisted by one or more Assistant Registrars and, as far as the financial and administrative functions of the ECJ’s Registrar were concerned, by an administrator. Since the administration of the GC and the CST is much smaller, there was no provision in the GC’s and CST’s Rules for administrative assistance.315 As matters have evolved, the reference in the ECJ’s 1991 Rules to ‘an administrator’ was clearly inadequate; and express provision for assistance in that regard has now disappeared. The Registrars of the ECJ, GC and CST may now be assisted by Deputy Registrars who provide general assistance (not limited to either Registry or financial or administrative matters) and who act in the place of the Registrar when he is absent.316 Judgments and orders are signed by the President and the Registrar317 but it will be observed that, from time to time, judgments of the ECJ have been signed by the Deputy Registrar, a Principal Administrator or other official and even, on occasions, a legal secretary (judicial assistant) who has stood in for the Registrar at the hearing. 312 RP-GC, art 35(5) and 34; RP-CST, art 20(2) and 19. RP-ECJ, art 19 of the ECJ’s 1991 Rules was to the same effect. There appears to be no equivalent in the current ECJ Rules, probably because the duties of the Registrar and the number of hearings makes it impossible for him to discharge that function, which is normally carried out by a Deputy Registrar or a registry official. 313 RP-ECJ, art 6(2); RP-GC, art 7(4); RP-CST, art 5(2) and 17(1) (the latter applying when the CST is considering whether or not to deprive the Registrar of his office). 314 RP-ECJ, art 32(2); RP-GC, art 21(1)–(2); RP-CST, art 29(1)–(2). Where the deliberations of the ECJ, GC or CST concern questions of its own administration, they can be conducted in the absence of the Registrar if the Court so decides: RP-ECJ, art 25; RP-GC, art 42(1); RP-CST, art 29(5). A general summary of the GC Registrar’s functions can be found in PD-GC, para 1. 315 RP-GC, art 35(4) simply provides that the GC’s Registrar will be assisted by the departments of the Court (which really means those of the ECJ). In the case of the CST, Statute, art 6(1) of the Annex, provides that it is supported by the departments of the ECJ and the GC. 316 RP-ECJ, art 19 (a second Deputy Registrar is in charge of the ECJ’s administration); RP-GC, art 33; PD-GC, para2; RP-CST, art 18. 317 Statute, arts 37 and 53; RP-ECJ, art  88(2) and 90; RP-GC, art  118(2) and 120; RP-CST, art 95(2) (CST orders are signed only by the President: RP-CST, art 97).

57

1.64  Judicial institutions and bodies

D

Assistant rapporteurs

1.64 Acting on a proposal from the ECJ, the European Parliament and the Council may (by the ordinary legislative procedure) provide for the appointment of assistant rapporteurs to the ECJ and lay down the rules governing their service.318 So far, no such proposal has been made by the ECJ. Should assistant rapporteurs be appointed, the Statute319 provides that they must be ‘persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the necessary legal qualifications’. What are the ‘necessary legal qualifications’ would no doubt be defined in the instrument providing for their appointment. They would be appointed by the Council, swear the same oath as that sworn by members of the Court320 and benefit from the same immunities as the Registrar of the ECJ.321 1.65 The role played by the assistant rapporteurs is a little obscure. The Statute provides that they ‘may be required, under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure, to participate in preparatory enquiries in cases pending before the Court and to co-operate with the Judge who acts as Rapporteur’.322 The Rules of Procedure of the ECJ323 are hardly more precise, although they do say that assistant rapporteurs shall assist the President in connection with applications for interim relief and the judge-rapporteurs with their work. In so doing, the assistant rapporteurs would be responsible to the President of the Court or a chamber or a judge-rapporteur, as the case may be.324 It is also provided that the assistant rapporteur in a case may take part in the Court’s deliberations.325 The concept of assistant rapporteurs seems to remain very much tabula rasa and could no doubt be so defined as to provide the Court with the equivalent of the English Superior Court masters. Their potential use as a tribunal of first instance to settle questions of fact in particular types of cases, such as staff or competition cases, has now been overtaken by the creation of the GC and the possibility of creating specialised courts.

E

Other personnel

1.66 The Statute provides that ‘officials and other servants’ are to be attached to the ECJ to enable it to function and that they shall be responsible to the Registrar ‘under the authority of the President’.326 The officials and other servants of the ECJ are appointed in accordance with the Staff Regulations.327 The 3 18 Statute, art 13 (that provision does not apply to the GC – see Statute, art 47 – or to the CST). 319 Ibid. 320 Ibid and RP-ECJ, art 17(4). 321 Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, art 21. 322 Statute, art 13. 323 RP-ECJ, art 17(1) and (2). 324 RP-ECJ, art 17(3). 325 RP-ECJ, art 32(2). 326 Statute, art 12. That provision does not apply to the GC or the CST. 327 RP-ECJ, art 20 of the 1991 Rules of Procedure so provided and set out the oath to be taken by officials before they took up their duties. The current rules no longer so provide but the position in practice remains the same.

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Staff Regulations328 apply to all the institutions and set out a comprehensive code dealing with the employment of persons by them. ‘Officials’, that is to say, persons appointed to an established post in one of the institutions, are covered by the Staff Regulations for Officials; ‘other servants’, that is to say, temporary agents, auxiliary agents, local staff and special advisers, fall under the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the EU. Each institution possesses an ‘appointing authority’, which is the person or body empowered to make decisions under the Staff Regulations. In the case of the Court, the various appointing authorities are defined in an internal Decision. 1.67 The Statute provides that the President of the ECJ and the President of the GC are to determine, by common accord, the conditions under which officials and other servants of the ECJ are to render their services to the GC so as to enable it to function; and certain officials and servants are to be responsible to the GC’s Registrar under the authority of the GC’s President.329 Parallel provision is made for the CST.330 The Statute does not provide for officials and other servants to be ‘attached’ to the GC or the CST, as is the case with regard to the ECJ. The Statute therefore seems to envisage two means of providing the GC and the CST with the infrastructure that they require in order to function. The first is by the ECJ making available to the GC the services provided by the ECJ’s own departments (and both making their departments available to the CST).331 The second is by a form of assignment332 to the GC (or CST) of officials and other servants attached to the ECJ. Strictly speaking, officials and other servants working directly for the GC (or CST) are still ‘attached to’ the ECJ in the technical sense.333 However, since they work for the GC (or CST), they fall within the responsibility of the GC’s (or CST’s) Registrar, under the authority of the GC’s (or CST’s) President. The function of appointing authority can, thus, be devolved to the GC (or CST) even though the official or other servant is in formal terms attached to the ECJ. That state of affairs is reflected in RP-GC, art 39 and RP-CST, art 23, which provide that officials and other servants whose task is to assist the President, judges and Registrar of the GC (or, as the case may be, the CST) shall be appointed in accordance with the Staff Regulations and shall take the oath taken by officials and other servants of the ECJ (the oath being taken before the President of the GC or, as the case may be, the CST in the presence of the Registrar of the GC or, as the case may be, the CST).

328 See Council Regulation No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 (OJ No L56/1 of 4 March 1968) as amended. 329 Statute, art 52. 330 Statute, Annex 6(1). 331 Thus, RP-GC, art 35(4) provides that the GC’s Registrar shall be ‘assisted’ by the departments of the Court (the ECJ appears to be meant). The GC’s Rules of Procedure do not, of course, bind the ECJ and, in so providing, they merely state the duty of co-operation between the departments of the ECJ and the GC that flows from the fact that the institution known as the Court of Justice comprises the ECJ and the GC and from the Statute. 332 It is not ‘secondment’ as that term is understood in the Staff Regulations. 333 Since the GC is not an EU institution in its own right but is an organ comprised in an institution, and the CST is ‘attached’ to the GC (TEU, art 19(1), TFEU, art 257; Decision 2004/752, art 1), officials and other servants cannot be attached to either of them in the technical sense (although Statute, Annex 6(1) does use that verb in connection with the GC staff).

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V

THE STRUCTURE OF THE COURT

A

The Court and its formations

1 Sittings and vacations 1.68 The ECJ, GC and CST remain permanently in session and each fixes the time of its vacations.334 That means nothing more than that the ECJ, GC and CST cease to hold hearings and give judgments during the vacation but that in other respects they continue their work. The ECJ, GC and CST work by reference to a judicial year which starts on different dates.335 The vacations of the ECJ and GC are laid down in a decision published annually in the Official Journal.336 During the vacations the functions of the President of the CST continue to be exercised in Luxembourg by the President himself, a President of one of the chambers or a judge selected by the President.337 In the case of the Court of Justice and the General Court, the functions of the President are exercised during the vacations either by him or her, or by the Vice-President, or by the President of a Chamber, or by one of the other Judges, in order of seniority.338 In cases of urgency the President may convene the judges (and, in the case of the ECJ, the advocates general) during the vacation.339 The ECJ and GC observe the official holidays in Luxembourg;340 but the ECJ also publishes an annual list of official holidays341 and the CST applies the holidays contained in that list.342 For procedural purposes, it is the list of holidays drawn up by the ECJ and published in the Official Journal that is important.343 The Registry of the ECJ, GC and CST will be closed on those holidays (in addition to Saturdays and Sundays); during holidays for the Court’s officials that are not mentioned in the list published in the Official Journal, the Court is manned by a skeleton staff.344 The dates and times of the sittings of the CST and its chambers are fixed by the President of the CST and the Presidents of the chambers concerned, respectively.345 Hearings of the ECJ, 334 Statute, arts 15, 47 and Annex, 5; RP-ECJ, art 24(2); RP-GC, art 41(2). The dates of the CST’s vacations are the same as those of the ECJ: RP-CST, art 25(2). 335 The ECJ’s judicial year runs from 7 October to 6 October in the next year: RP-ECJ, art 24(1). The GC’s judicial year is 1 September to the following 31 August: RP-GC, art 41(1); the CST’s judicial year runs from 1 October to the following 30 September: RP-CST, art 25(1). 336 RP-ECJ, art 24(6); RP-GC, art 41(6). The CST follows the ECJ vacation dates: see note 334 above. The ECJ’s decision on its vacations follows its judicial year. At the time of writing, the decision was to be found in OJ 2016 No C145/2 and applied to the 2016–2017 judicial year. In that year, the vacations ran as follows: 19 December 2016 to 8 January 2017; 10 April 2017 to 23 April 2017; 21 July 2017 to 3 September 2017. The GC’s decision was published in OJ 2016 No C111/2 and had the same dates. 337 RP-CST, art 25(3). 338 RP-ECJ, art 10(1) and 13; RP-GC, art 11(1) and 12. 339 RP-ECJ, art 24(3); RP-GC, art 41(3); RP-CST, art 25(3), last sentence. 340 RP-ECJ, art 24(4); RP-GC, art 41(4). 341 RP-ECJ, art 24(6). 342 RP-CST, art 25(2). 343 Those holidays are the ones that apply to time limits: RP-ECJ, art 49(1)(d); RP-GC, art 58(3); RP-CST, art 37(1)(d), which refers back to RP-CST, art 25(2). 344 Eg PD-GC, para 4; IR-CST, art 3(1)–(2). 345 RP-CST, art 24(1), 12(3) and the definition of ‘president’ in RP-CST, art 1(2)(b). The ECJ and GC rules of procedure used so to provide in express terms.

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GC or CST are usually (but not invariably) held on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays each week in term time, with the exception of the weeks following Carnival Monday, Whit Monday and the week of All Saints. According to the list of official holidays published in the Official Journal at the time of writing, the official holidays of the Court are New Year’s Day, Easter Monday, 1 May, Ascension Day, Whit Monday, 23 June, 15 August, 1 November, 25 December and 26 December.346 It does not seem that those comprise all the official holidays in Luxembourg. 2 ECJ formations 1.69 The formations in which the ECJ may sit have changed over the years as the number of judges has increased and its case load has evolved. At the time of writing, the position is as follows. The ECJ may sit in chambers (that is, divisions) of three or five judges, as a Grand Chamber of 15 judges or as a full court, in plenary session.347 The ECJ is obliged to sit in chambers (the number of judges in the chambers not being specified) or in a Grand Chamber to the extent that the Statute so provides; it ‘may’ sit as a full court as provided for in the Statute.348 The Statute simply provides that the ECJ shall form chambers of three and five judges (thus excluding the possibility of there being chambers of, say, seven or nine judges).349 It goes on to oblige the ECJ to sit as a Grand Chamber only when a member state or EU institution that is a party to the proceedings so requests.350 The Rules of Procedure suggest (but do not state expressly) that such a request should be made before the

3 46 OJ 2016 No C 145/2. 347 Statute, art 16 (as amended); RP-ECJ, art 11(1) and 27(1). The use of chambers was regarded as exceptional at the beginning of the Court’s existence but has since become more a matter of course. The principle (however theoretical it might in practice have been) was that the ECJ should ordinarily sit in plenary session. That changed with the introduction of the Grand Chamber, at which point, the plenary session became in formal terms the exception rather than the rule. 348 TFEU, art 251. 349 Statute, art 16, 1st para. Accordingly, RP-ECJ, art 11(1) provides only for chambers of three and five judges. 350 Statute, art 16, 3rd para, implemented in RP-ECJ, art 60(1). Previously, that did not apply to staff cases (which would come to the ECJ by way of appeal only): see RP-ECJ, art 44(3), 2nd subpara, of the 1991 Rules. That provision also made it clear that a ‘party’ to proceedings for those purposes was a principal party, an intervener, or a person that ‘has submitted written observations in any reference of a kind mentioned in Article  103’ (that is, references for a preliminary ruling). There were obvious difficulties in identifying the correct interpretation of ‘any reference of a kind’ mentioned in what was then RP-ECJ, art 103 (now RP-ECJ, art 93). The exclusion of staff cases was a limitation that did not have any legal support in the Statute. The definition of ‘party’ did not seem to be problematical save that, in the case of references for a preliminary ruling, a member state could request the assignment of the case to the Grand Chamber only if it had submitted written observations. The request could not be made if the member state concerned had not yet submitted written observations, preferred simply to make oral submissions at the hearing (cf RP-ECJ, art 96(2)), or was precluded from making written observations (as occurs under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure: see RP-ECJ, art 109(4)– (5)). That restriction also had no legal basis in the Statute.

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ECJ meets to decide the question of assignment to a chamber.351 However, it is arguable that the ECJ could entertain a request made at any time before the date of the hearing. In practice, the ECJ has rejected requests made at a later stage in the proceedings.352 A request should therefore be made no later than the end of the written procedure. Under the Statute, the ECJ is to sit as a full court: (i) as a matter of obligation where the case is brought under one of a specified group of Treaty provisions concerning, in their essentials, action of a disciplinary nature that can be taken against members of the Commission or the Court of Auditors and the European Parliament’s Ombudsman;353 or (ii) as a matter of discretion where the ECJ considers that the case is of exceptional importance justifying its reference to the full court.354 Save where the Statute obliges the ECJ to use a particular formation, it is generally free to decide which formation is appropriate for a particular case; but there is some doubt as to how far that applies to the ECJ sitting as a full court. The Statute provides that the ECJ ‘may’ sit as a full court in cases of exceptional importance, not that it ‘may only’ do so.355 That suggests that the ECJ retains the discretion to sit as a full court in other cases. However, the Statute is in that respect based on TFEU, art 251 which provides (so far as is here relevant) that ‘when provided for in the Statute, the Court of Justice may also sit as a full Court’. Since the Statute so provides only in respect of cases of exceptional importance, it would appear that the ECJ does not have liberty to consider other types of case as a full court (save, obviously, unless it is obliged to do so).356 3 Allocation of cases to an ECJ formation 1.70 Where the ECJ is not obliged to assign a case to a particular formation, it assigns cases as follows: a case is assigned to a three- or five-judge chamber ‘in so far as the difficulty or importance of the case or particular circumstances are not such as to require that it should be assigned to the Grand Chamber’;357 all other cases (being cases for which assignment to a particular formation is not 351 That is an inference drawn from the fact that RP-ECJ, art 60(1), which refers to requests made for a case to be heard by the Grand Chamber, appears in the context of the decisions to be taken by the ECJ when considering the judge rapporteur’s preliminary report on the case: see RPECJ, art 59 and the chapter title applicable to RP-ECJ, art 59–60. The implication is that the request must be before the ECJ when it considers the report. 352 Eg Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, paras 20–25 (request made after the close of the oral procedure). 353 That is: TFEU, art  228(2) (dismissal of the European Parliament’s Ombudsman); TFEU, art 245, 2nd paragraph (breach of obligations of a member of the Commission); TFEU, art 247 (compulsory retirement of a member of the Commission); TFEU, art  286(6) (failure of a member of the Court of Auditors to fulfil the conditions of his office or the obligations arising therefrom). 354 Statute, art 16, 4th to 5th paras; RP-ECJ, art 60(2). The ECJ decides whether or not to refer a case of exceptional importance to the full court after hearing the advocate general. 355 Statute, art 16, 5th para. 356 Further, RP-ECJ, art 60(2) provides for the assignment of a case to the full court when it is of exceptional importance and does not refer to any other circumstance or situation justifying assignment to the full court (other than cases where assignment to the full court is obligatory). 357 RP-ECJ, art 60(1).

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obligatory) are assigned to the Grand Chamber unless a case is considered to be of exceptional importance, in which case it may (but not must) be assigned to the full court;358 and one or more chambers of five judges are designated each year to be responsible for (i) references for a preliminary ruling that raise questions falling within the areas covered by TFEU Part Three, Title V, where the case is, or may be, disposed of by urgent procedure, (ii) the review of appeal decisions of the GC and (iii) the review of preliminary rulings delivered by the GC.359 There are no published rules or guidance on the allocation of cases between three- and five-judge chambers, which appears to be done on an ad hoc basis. Formerly, when the choice of formations lay between three- and five-judge chambers and the full court, cases of minor importance were allocated to three-judge chambers and cases of middling importance were allocated to five-judge chambers.360 Having regard to the overall structure of the formations used by the ECJ, the position can be expressed as follows, so far as cases over which the ECJ exercises some discretion in terms of identifying the appropriate formation are concerned: the full court can hear and determine cases of exceptional importance only; the Grand Chamber can hear and determine any case; the three- and fivejudge chambers can hear and determine only those cases that, by reference to their relative lack of difficulty, importance or of particular circumstances, do not merit the attention of at least 11 judges;361 by parity of reasoning, a three-judge chamber should hear and determine cases that do not merit the attention of more than three judges.362 Assignment by reference to the difficulty, importance or particular circumstances of the case is not automatic but requires an assessment to be made of the case. Formerly, the question to be considered was, in principle, whether there was some reason satisfying one of the criteria of difficulty, importance or particularity363 that did not justify retention of the case for determination by the full court because the decision that had to be made (by the full court) was 358 RP-ECJ, art 60(2). 359 RP-ECJ, art 11(2). The class of cases referred to is described in ambiguous terms in the ECJ’s rules of procedure as being ‘cases of the kind referred to in’ RP-ECJ, arts 107, 193 and 194. RPECJ, art 107 refers to references for a preliminary ruling that raise questions in areas covered by TFEU Part Three, Title V, and that may be dealt with under an urgent procedure. It would appear that the class is defined by the subject-matter of the questions referred (that is, the subject-matter must fall within one or other of the provisions of the TFEU referred to) rather than by reference to the urgency of the case. In cases under RP-ECJ, art 107, the composition of the designated chamber is determined either on the day on which the judge-rapporteur in the case is appointed (which occurs where the referring court has requested the application of the urgent procedure) or on the day on which the President of the Court requests consideration by the chamber of the application of the urgent procedure: see RP-ECJ, art 108(1). As to the urgent procedure, see Ch 2 below. 360 See p 26 of the previous edition of this book. At that time, the phrase in what is now RP-ECJ, art 60(1) (‘in so far as the difficulty or the importance of the case or particular circumstances are not such as to require…’) appeared in RP-ECJ, art 95(1) (now repealed) and alluded to the test for allocating cases to a chamber as opposed to the full court. 361 Eleven is the quorum for the Grand Chamber: see further below. 362 Although the quorum of a five-judge chamber is three (see further below), assignment to such a chamber indicates an intention that, save in unforeseen circumstances, the case will be decided by five judges. 363 There is no real guidance as to which circumstances are sufficiently ‘particular’ to justify allocation of a case to the Grand Chamber.

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whether or not there was sufficient reason to take the positive step of allocating the case to a chamber.364 Otherwise than in cases in which the urgent preliminary ruling procedure is to be, or may be, applied,365 the decision whether or not to assign a case to a chamber is still taken by the ECJ (that is, effectively, the full court) at the end of the written procedure upon consideration of the preliminary report on the case presented by the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general assigned to the case;366 but, where the circumstances justify it, a case may be reallocated to a formation with a greater number of judges at any stage in the proceedings.367 However, as noted above, the full court is not normally the formation appropriate for a case. The question before the ECJ is not, therefore, whether or not there is some reason justifying the positive step of allocating the case to a chamber (the default position being its determination by the full court). Instead the ECJ must identify which of the Grand Chamber and a three- or fivejudge chamber is best suited to hear and determine the case having regard to its difficulty, importance or other circumstances. That requires a positive view to be taken as to which formation is appropriate, not a decision by default. 4 Appointment of the judge-rapporteur and its impact on allocation of a case to an ECJ formation 1.71 As soon as proceedings in a case have begun, whether it is by application originating proceedings or lodgment of the order for reference (in a reference for a preliminary ruling), the President of the ECJ assigns the case to one of the judges who will act as judge-rapporteur;368 and, as noted above, the decision concerning the allocation of the case to a particular formation of the ECJ is normally made at the end of the written procedure, on the basis of a preliminary report produced by the judge-rapporteur, the advocate general having been heard.369 The judge-rapporteur will already be a member of one or other of the three- or five-judge chambers (or, more accurately, be on the list of members of one or other of them).370 If the case is suitable for determination by a threeor five-judge chamber, the chamber selected for that task will normally be that of which the judge-rapporteur is a member. In the following proceedings, the process of selecting the judge rapporteur is slightly different: references for a preliminary ruling concerning matters covered by TFEU  Part Three, Title V; review of GC appeals; and review of preliminary rulings delivered by the GC. Such cases are automatically assigned to a designated chamber on commencement of the proceedings before the ECJ (in the case of TFEU Part Three, Title V references, that occurs if the referring court has requested application of the 364 The ‘default’ position was that cases were heard and determined by the full court but could be allocated to a chamber in the circumstances specified in the rules of procedure. 365 As to the timing of the decision to assign the matter to a chamber in such cases, see note 359 above. 366 RP-ECJ, art 59(2)–(3). 367 RP-ECJ, art 60(3). 368 RP-ECJ, art 15(1). 369 RP-ECJ, art 59(2)–(3). 370 RP-ECJ, art 11(1) and 28.

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urgent preliminary ruling procedure – provided for in RP-ECJ, art  107 – or, in the absence of such a request, if the President of the Court considers that the application of that procedure might be appropriate).371 The President of that chamber selects one of the judges in that chamber to be the judge-rapporteur and makes that proposal to the President of the Court. The President of the Court actually designates the judge as judge-rapporteur in the case and is responsible for reassigning the case to another judge (of the same chamber) should the designated judge rapporteur be absent or prevented from acting.372 The composition of the designated chamber is determined on the day on which the case is assigned to the judge-rapporteur (save that, in the case of TFEU Part Three, Title V references, that occurs if application of the urgent procedure has been requested by the referring court; if not, the composition of the designated chamber is determined on the day on which the President of the Court requests the chamber to consider the application of the urgent procedure).373 In TFEU Part Three, Title V references, the decision whether or not to allocate the case to the urgent procedure is made by the designated chamber.374 If the designated chamber decides that the case is not to be dealt with under the urgent procedure, the President of the Court may then reassign the case to a judge-rapporteur attached to another chamber, which implies reassignment of the case to that chamber.375 A decision that the case is not to be dealt with under the urgent procedure does not inevitably mean that it will have to be reassigned in that way: the President of the Court exercises a discretion in the matter. If the designated chamber has the capacity to deal with the case, there is no reason why it should be reassigned to another judge-rapporteur (and another chamber). However, the intention is that cases heard under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure should be decided by the designated chamber. Accordingly, reassignment of the case to another judgerapporteur (and therefore to another chamber) may have to occur if dealing with a non-urgent case would prevent the designated chamber from being able to deal effectively with an urgent case. In TFEU Part Three, Title V references, if 371 RP-ECJ, art 11(2). The composition of those chambers and the procedure for which they are responsible are published in the Official Journal: RP-ECJ, art 11(5). However, as the composition of the chamber is different from the composition of the chamber for the purpose of hearing and determining a particular case (due to the fact that a chamber consists of a list of judges, from whom the judges hearing a case allocated to that chamber are drawn), the publication in the Official Journal indicates the judges on the relevant list, not the judges who will necessarily comprise the chamber hearing and determining a particular case. 372 RP-ECJ, art 15(2)–(3): it follows from RP-ECJ, arts 15(1), 193(3) and 194(4) that the proposal is made to, and the appointment decision is made by, the President of the Court. The President of the Court does not seem to be obliged to accept the proposal made by the President of the designated chamber but, if the former rejects the latter’s proposal, it is then for the latter to propose another judge in the chamber to act as judge-rapporteur. 373 RP-ECJ, art  108(1), 193(3) and 194(4). The composition of the chamber is determined in the usual way (see below), by taking the President of the chamber, the judge rapporteur and adding the required additional number of judges (three because it is a five-judge chamber – see RP-ECJ, art 11(2)) from the list of judges assigned to the designated chamber: see RP-ECJ, art 28(1). RP-ECJ, art 108(1), 193(3) and 194(4) in fact cross-refer to RP-ECJ, art 28(2) in the context of the determination of the composition of the chamber for the case in question. That is an erroneous cross-reference. 374 RP-ECJ, art 108(1). 375 RP-ECJ, art 15(2).

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the case is connected with a pending case assigned to a judge-rapporteur who is not a member of the chamber designated to deal with TFEU Part Three, Title V references, the designated chamber may propose that that judge be the judge rapporteur in the case. In that event, the case in question is moved to the chamber of which the judge-rapporteur is a member and that chamber becomes the designated chamber for that case only.376 5 Reassignment from one ECJ formation to another 1.72 The formation to which a case has been assigned may at any stage of the proceedings refer the case back to the ECJ in order that it may be reassigned to a formation composed of a greater number of judges.377 When that happens, the larger formation to which the case is then assigned must include the members of the chamber that referred the case back.378 It is not clear to what extent, if at all, a case may be referred back to the ECJ for assignment to a formation with a smaller number of judges than the formation to which it was originally assigned.379 The purpose of the rules relating to the assignment of cases to different formations is to ensure that a case is heard and determined by the formation appropriate to the case. It seems excessively formalistic to conclude that it is impossible for a formation to refer a case back to the ECJ for reassignment to a smaller formation merely because there is no express provision to that effect: after all, the consequence of such a conclusion would be that a formation would 376 RP-ECJ, art 108(2). The criteria for determining whether or not cases are ‘connected’ for that purpose are unclear. It would appear that there must be a sufficient overlap between them, so far as the underlying facts are concerned, rendering the judgment in one liable to influence the judgment in the other otherwise than simply as a matter of precedent or judicial comity. 377 RP-ECJ, art  60(3). In Case C-370/89 Société générale d’entreprises électro-méchaniques v European Investment Bank [1992] ECR I-6211, for example, the decision to refer the matter to a more numerous formation (at that time, the full court, there being no Grand Chamber then) was made following the hearing; in Cases 271/83, 15, 36, 113, 158 and 203/84 and 13/85 Ainsworth v Commission and Council [1987] ECR 167 (see pp 170–171), Case 192/85 Newstead v Department of Transport and HM Treasury [1987] ECR 4753 (see p 4763), Case 20/85 Roviello v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1988] ECR 2805 (see pp 2833–2834) and Case C-68/93 Shevill v Presse Alliance [1995] ECR I-415 (p 452), the decision was made after the hearing and after the advocate general had delivered his opinion. As those cases indicate, a case may be referred to a more numerous formation for a variety of reasons, such as the desirability of avoiding (or resolving) a divergence in the case law of the Court in a particular area as between the decisions of different chambers; or the realisation that a case gives rise to the need to rule on the validity of a provision of secondary legislation; or the desirability of the full court (these days, either the Grand Chamber or the full court) ruling on an unresolved question concerning its jurisdiction. 378 RP-ECJ, art 29(2). 379 The parallel provision in the GC  Rules of Procedure (RP-GC, art  28(1)) is worded differently. It refers to assignment to a formation comprising a ‘different’ number of judges. In Case C-437/98P  Industria del Frio Auxiliar Conservera SA (Infrisa) v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-7145, paras 46–48 of the judgment, the ECJ regarded the use of the word ‘different’ (in the predecessor to RP-GC, art 28(1)) as confirming that, in the case of the CFI (as the GC then was), a case could be reassigned to a formation with a greater or a smaller number of judges than the formation originally seised of the case. That is now reflected in RP-GC, art 28(3)–(4).

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have to hear and determine a case that does not, in truth, meet the conditions for being heard and determined by that formation. The better view is, therefore, that cases may be reassigned to the appropriate formation whether that formation is greater or smaller than the formation to which the case was originally assigned. Any reassignment must, however, be made by the ECJ itself. Representations may be made tending to show that the case deserves to be heard by a greater or a smaller formation but the decision rests with the ECJ. When a chamber of the ECJ raises of its own motion the question whether or not a case before it should be heard by a more numerous formation (that question may be raised by the advocate general in his opinion), it generally decides the matter for itself without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard: the question relates essentially to the organisation by the ECJ of its own procedures and the judges of the ECJ are best able to decide what is the appropriate manner of dealing with a case380. 6 Composition and quorum of ECJ formations 1.73 Formerly, the ECJ would determine the composition of its chambers each year.381 Currently, the membership of a chamber (whether a three or five judge chamber or the Grand Chamber) is made up of a number of judges who participate ex officio, supplemented by the number of additional judges required to bring the chamber up to its full complement. The additional judges are drawn from lists published in the Official Journal.382 1.74 Thus, the Grand Chamber (which consists of 15 judges) comprises, as from 2012, the President and Vice-President of the ECJ, three Presidents of the five-judge chambers, the judge-rapporteur and a sufficient number of judges to take the overall number of judges in the Grand Chamber up to 15 (‘the additional judges’). Accordingly, the number of additional judges would in principle be nine. The process of determining the composition of the Grand Chambers hearing a particular case begins in principle with the identification of the judgerapporteur, which normally occurs at the outset of the proceedings (see above). As a case is heard by the Grand Chamber only if a member state or EU institution so requests (see above), the judge-rapporteur is normally appointed before the case is allocated to the Grand Chamber. The President and Vice-President of the ECJ and the judge-rapporteur are ex officio members of the Grand Chamber for the purposes of the case. At the time of writing, there were five five-judge chambers and therefore five presidents of those chambers, from whom three would be selected to be members of the Grand Chamber. All five presidents feature, in order of seniority, in a list drawn up after the election of the President of the ECJ and of the Presidents of the five-judge chambers; and they are designated as members of the Grand Chamber, for each case assigned to the Grand Chamber, starting with the president listed immediately following the last president to be 380 That explains the reaction of the ECJ to the application made in Case C-173/13 Leone v Garde des Sceaux, 17 July 2014, paras 16–21, for the case to be reassigned to the Grand Chamber. 381 Eg OJ 1993 No C278/11. 382 Eg OJ 2003 No C326/2–3; OJ 2012 No C366/4–6.

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designated from the list.383 Accordingly, if one supposes that A, B, C, D  and E  are the five presidents (in order of seniority), the first case allocated to the Grand Chamber would be heard by 15 judges including A, B and C. The second case allocated to the Grand Chamber would be heard by 15 judges including D, E and A, and so on. The additional judges are taken from a list of the judges that is also drawn up after the election of the President of the ECJ and of the Presidents of the five-judge chambers. The list excludes the President and VicePresident of the ECJ and the Presidents of the five-judge chambers. It sets out the remaining judges in a complicated order beginning with the most senior judge, followed by the most junior judge and then the next most senior judge, followed by the next most junior judge, and so on. Judges are taken from the list in turn, starting from the judge immediately following the last judge taken from the list for the preceding case assigned to the Grand Chamber.384 For example, if one assumes that there are 26 ECJ judges (‘A’ to ‘Z’),385 that A is the President of the ECJ, B is the Vice-President, C, D, E, F and G are the Presidents of the fivejudge chambers, and that H and following are the remaining judges ranked in order of seniority, the first case assigned to the Grand Chamber after election of the Presidents and the drawing up of the list would be heard by a Grand Chamber comprising A, B, three out of C to G (say C, D, E), and the judge rapporteur (say, M) plus nine additional judges drawn from the list in the following order: H, Z, I, Y, J, X, K, W and L. The next case assigned to the Grand Chamber would be heard by a Grand Chamber comprising A, B, F, G and C (the next iteration of three presidents of the five-judge chambers) and the judge rapporteur (say, P) but the nine additional judges would be drawn from the list starting with the judge immediately following L, that is, V (because senior and junior judges alternate in the list). 1.75 To take account of the fact that, in a year in which there is a partial replacement of judges, the term of office of several members of the ECJ will come to an end and their term of office may not be renewed, provision is made for two substitute judges to sit who will replace (in their order on the list) any judge unable to take part in the decision on the case. That is done where the quorum of the Grand Chamber is in doubt. Accordingly, it does not appear to be necessary to appoint substitute judges where maintaining the quorum is not under threat. The substitute judges are those immediately following the last judge selected for the Grand Chamber for the case in question.386 Accordingly, in the example given above, if (in relation to the first case assigned to the Grand Chamber) the last judge taken from the list is L, the two substitute judges will be V and M. V and M act as substitutes for the judges who can no longer take part in the determination of the case,387 which appears to mean those judges who are 383 RP-ECJ, art 27(1)–(3). 384 RP-ECJ, art 27(1), (2) and (4). As noted above, the list is published in the Official Journal: RPECJ, art 27(5). 385 The number 26 has been chosen simply because it corresponds to the number of letters in the alphabet. 386 RP-ECJ, art 27(6)–(7). 387 RP-ECJ, art 27(7).

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actually replaced in the course of the partial replacement of judges. If they are renominated, they can continue to take part in the determination of the case and the substitute judge will not be called upon to replace them.388 It will be observed that, in that example, M is an ex officio member of the Grand Chamber in his capacity as judge-rapporteur. Accordingly, he could not be a substitute judge and that honour would therefore fall on the next person in the list, U. When a second case is allocated to the Grand Chamber, it is not clear if the additional judges for the formation of the Grand Chamber in that case start with V (who is a substitute judge in the first case), M (who is technically next on the list but is an ex officio member of the Grand Chamber in the first case but not, in the example, the judgerapporteur in the second case), U (who is a substitute judge in the first case) or N (who is actually the first judge in the list who has no involvement in the first case). A substitute judge may not, in the event, sit in the case and, if also omitted from the formation of the Grand Chamber that sits in the next case assigned to the Grand Chamber, could be excluded completely from sitting in both cases. On the other hand, if a substitute judge were (as is likely) to replace a retiring member of the Grand Chamber in the first case, he or she would end up sitting in both cases involving the Grand Chamber if substitute judges could be included in another formation of the Grand Chamber. That would be inconsistent with the apparent purpose of listing the judges, which is to spread participation in the Grand Chamber fairly between the judges. On balance, it would seem that the correct interpretation of the rules is that the additional judges drawn from the list when constituting a second or subsequent Grand Chamber start with the judge immediately following any substitute judge because the first additional judge must be the judge immediately after the last judge ‘designated’ from the list; and substitute judges are so ‘designated’ (albeit as substitute judges). Interestingly, when that judge is the judge-rapporteur in the previous case (M, in the example above), he may well be the first additional judge designated from the list in the next Grand Chamber case because, technically, the judge-rapporteur is not a member of the Grand Chamber who is ‘designated from the list’. 1.76 The chambers of three and five judges are made up of the President of the chamber, the judge rapporteur and enough additional judges to bring the number up to three or five, as the case may be. The additional judges are taken 388 That is so because, under RP-ECJ, art 27(6), the occasion for appointing substitute judges arises in respect of cases assigned to the Grand Chamber between the beginning of the calendar year in which there is a partial replacement of judges and the moment when the partial replacement has taken place (the beginning of October in that year), that is, at a point in time when certain judges are liable to be replaced but may not be. If they are not replaced or their replacement does not affect the quorum of the Grand Chamber, the substitute judges need not be called on. However, unless a judge caught up in the partial replacement has had his renomination confirmed beforehand, a substitute judge would have to be used, if the quorum were under threat, for any case whose hearing took place so close to the date of the partial replacement that there was a risk that judgment could not be delivered before then. The position regarding cases in which the hearing takes place after the partial replacement of judges is less clear since, by then, there will be a new list of additional judges for the Grand Chamber. It is assumed that, as it is desirable for the composition of the Grand Chamber to remain unchanged, a substitute judge will have to be used (if the quorum were under threat) even for cases whose hearing takes place after the partial replacement of judges.

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from lists that are published in the Official Journal. Each chamber has its own list of judges, which excludes the President of the chamber; and judges are taken off the list to form the chamber in the same way as in the case of the Grand Chamber. The lists for the five-judge chambers (of which there were five at the time of writing) are organised in the same way as the list for the Grand Chamber. The lists for three-judge chambers (of which there were also five at the time of writing) are organised in order of seniority or, where judges are equal in seniority, by reference to age.389 The constitution of the chambers (including the Grand Chamber), as well as the lists referred to above, are published in the Official Journal.390 1.77 When a member of one of the formations described above is prevented from acting in a case, he or she is replaced by a judge drawn from the list appropriate to that formation, in the order applicable to the formation.391 ‘Prevented from acting’ appears to be a general expression encompassing all the functions performed by a judge as a member of a formation. The intention is, therefore, to maintain the intended number of a formation at all times. However, a critical point is reached when the hearing takes place (where there is one) because only those judges who attended the hearing may take part in the deliberations on the case and vote on its outcome.392 If the number of judges drops for some reason after the hearing, the intended number cannot be restored unless the hearing is repeated.393 A  drop in the number at that stage in the proceedings does not, however, prevent the formation from considering the case (which is what it will normally do) unless it has become inquorate.394 There are two aspects to the logic behind the rule that only the judges who attended the hearing may take part in the deliberations. The first is that, if a judge has not attended the hearing, he has not experienced the development of the argument in the case in its totality and has not been in a position to influence it by asking a relevant question. The second is that, technically, once the oral procedure is over, the case is taken into deliberation and a judge joining the formation after the case has been taken into deliberation may have missed a significant part of the development of the ideas

389 RP-ECJ, art 28. 390 RP-ECJ, art 11(5), 27(5) and 28(4). 391 RP-ECJ, art  31. The previous expression, ‘prevented from attending’, simply meant being unable to attend, whatever the reasons: Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, C0245/99P, C-247/99P, C-250/99P to C-252/99P and C-254/99P  Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV  v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, Advocate General Alber, paras 150–155 (p 8482), and Advocate General Mischo, paras 23–30 (pp 8570–8571), and judgment paras 35–39 (pp 8646–8647), in relation to the analogous provision in what is now RP-GC, art 22. Where the absent judge is the President of the formation, his or her replacement is determined as described in para 1.57 of this chapter. 392 RP-ECJ, art 32(2). 393 RP-ECJ, art 34(2) (the Grand Chamber) and 35(2) (three- and five-judge chambers). 394 Eg Case T-195/95 Guerin Automobiles v Commission [1997] ECR II-679, paras 9–10, which, although a CFI (now GC) case, illustrates the situation (the GC rules are in this respect the same as the ECJ’s). The CFI had sat as a five-judge chamber to hear the case. One judge died. Three judges (the quorum) then deliberated on the judgment. The fourth judge did not because decisions of the Court must be reached by an uneven number of judges.

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of the case held by the other judges.395 Accordingly, the basic principle regarding a change in the composition of a formation, which takes the form of the introduction of a new judge, is that a new judge must be able to participate at the outset of the deliberations (not some later point) on the basis of as full an experience of the arguments and issues in the case as the other judges. Where there is no hearing in a case, the question of repeating a relevant part of the proceedings (the hearing) for the benefit of the new judge does not arise; but it is essential for the new judge to join the formation before the other judges have formally commenced their deliberations. 1.78 The quorum (that is, the minimum number of judges who must participate in the making of a decision of a formation) is three judges, in the case of the three- and five-judge chambers; eleven, in the case of the Grand Chamber; and seventeen, in the case of the full court.396 Any of those formations, with the exception of the first (where the quorum is the same number as the formation itself), may sit with a membership that exceeds the quorum. On the other hand, it does not appear that a formation may sit in a number that exceeds the number of the formation: for example, four judges, in the case of a three-judge chamber. That does not mean that, for example, only three judges can be assigned to a three-judge chamber: the relevant question is not the number that is assigned to a chamber but the number of judges that hears and decides the case.397 In any event, the decisions of a formation are valid only if an uneven number of members sits in the deliberations leading to the making of the decision in question.398 If a sitting of the Grand Chamber is inquorate, the President of the Court designates one of more other judges, as required, to sit in the Grand Chamber, drawn in order from the list of additional judges (see above).399 If a three- or five-judge chamber is inquorate, the first step is to see if the quorum can be made up by taking a replacement judge from the list appropriate to the chamber in question;

395 In that connection, it should be noted that RP-ECJ, art  27(2) of the 1991 rules referred to attendance at the ‘oral proceedings’, which includes the delivery of the Advocate General’s Opinion. RP-ECJ, art 32(2) refers only to participating in ‘the hearing’. However, Statute, art 20, 4th para, still refers to the ‘hearing’ of the Advocate General’s Opinion. Accordingly, RP-32(2), which does not specify which ‘hearing’ it is referring to, is in all probability referring to the oral part of the procedure, as a whole, terminating with the case being taken into deliberation. 396 Statute, art  17. For quorum purposes, the critical point in time is that at which (after final discussion) the conclusions determining the Court’s decision are adopted: see (in relation to the GC) Case C-182/99P Salzgitter AG v Commission [2003] ECR I-10761, para 35 (RP-ECJ, art  32(4) is the provision that parallels what was then RP-GC, art  33(5), which was under consideration in that case – see now RP-GC, art 21(4)). 397 Case C-7/94 Landesamt fur Ausbildungsforderung Nordrhein-Westfalen v Gaal [1995] ECR I-1031, paras 10–15 of the judgment and para 5 of the advocate general’s opinion; the Limburgse Vinyl case (above, note 391), paras 35–39 (pp 8646–8647). 398 Statute, art  17, 1st para; cf RP-ECJ, art  33. The meaning of ‘sitting in the deliberations’ is discussed in Ch 16, paras 16.7–16.8. 399 RP-ECJ, art 34(1).

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if that is not possible, the President of the Court is informed that the chamber is inquorate so that he can designate another judge to complete the chamber.400 1.79 Where several cases are to be heard and determined by the same formation, the composition of that formation is that fixed for the first of those cases in which the preliminary report is examined.401 7 Responsibilities of ECJ formations 1.80 The formation to which a case is assigned is responsible for the conduct of any preparatory enquiries402 and for a number of decisions, such as the taxation of costs.403 Formerly, the rules of procedure provided that various miscellaneous decisions were to be made by chambers (as opposed to the full court); but they now tend to vary the usage, sometimes referring in more abstract terms to a ‘formation’ or else indicating a sub-formation.404 Given the essentially procedural nature of such decisions, they would normally be assigned to a three-judge chamber. In cases assigned to a chamber, the Rules of Procedure apply in the same way as to proceedings before the full Court and the President of the chamber exercises the powers of the President of the ECJ.405 The hearing is before the chamber and judgment given by it after hearing the opinion of the advocate general (unless the hearing or the opinion is dispensed with). 8 GC formations 1.81 The GC may sit as a full court, Grand Chamber, in chambers of three or five judges, and in the form of a single judge.406 The ‘normal’ formations of the GC can be said to be the chambers of three and five judges because those are the formations that the GC is required to have under the Statute, which permits (but does not require) the GC’s Rules of Procedure to contain provision for the GC to sit as a full court, in a Grand Chamber or as a single judge.407 The GC Rules of Procedure define the ‘competent formations’ of the GC as being chambers of three and five judges, a Grand Chamber (which comprises 15 judges) and a single 400 RP-ECJ, art 35(1), which is worded so as to give the impression that the replacement judge is designated by the President of the Court on both occasions. However, as the powers of the President of the Court are exercised by the President of the Chamber – RP-ECJ, art 11(4) – it would appear that the President of the Court is engaged only when it is necessary to take a judge who is not on the list of judges allocated to the chamber in question. 401 RP-ECJ, art 29(1). As to the preliminary report, see Ch 2, para 2.63. 402 RP-ECJ, art  63(2). It may, however, assign the enquiry to the judge-rapporteur: RP-ECJ, art 65(1). 403 RP-ECJ, art 145(1). 404 Eg RP-ECJ, art  116(3) (legal aid), which envisages a five-judge formation representing the chamber of which the judge-rapporteur is a member but not, apparently, requiring the inclusion of the president of that chamber. 405 RP-ECJ, art 11(3)–(4). 406 Statute, art 50. 407 Ibid. The GC sits as a full court only for the purpose of making administrative decisions and decisions under particular provisions of its rules of procedure listed in RP-GC, art 42(1).

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judge.408 At the time of writing (before the number of GC judges was increased pursuant to Regulation No 2015/2422), the GC was organised into nine chambers, each of which could sit with three judges or, in an ‘extended composition’, with five judges.409 In addition, there was a three-judge Appeal Chamber, set up to determine appeals against decisions of the CST, with an extended composition of five judges. In its three-judge form, the Appeal Chamber would consist of the President of the GC and two of the Presidents of Chambers in rotation, or (if the Vice-President was called on to sit), the Vice-President and one President of Chamber. In its five-judge form, the Appeal Chamber would consist of the President of the GC, three judges from the formation initially hearing the case and, in rotation, two of the Presidents of Chambers or (if the Vice-President was called on to sit), the Vice-President and one President of a Chamber.410 9 Allocation of cases to GC formations 1.82 As soon as an application commencing proceedings in a case has been lodged at the GC, the President of the GC assigns the case to one of the three- or five-judge chambers in accordance with criteria laid down in advance and published in the Official Journal.411 At the time of writing, cases other than appeals from the CST were classified in one of four groups, or ‘rotas’: (i) cases concerning the application of the competition rules applicable to undertakings, the rules on State aid and the rules on trade protection measures; (ii) IP appeals (cases concerning intellectual property rights brought against the European Union Intellectual Property Office (formerly, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) and the Community Plant Variety Office)); (iii) staff cases heard at first instance; and (iv) all other cases. Cases in each group were assigned in turn to the three-judge chambers.412 At the time of writing, appeals from the CST were assigned to the Appeal Chamber.413 The President of the GC was empowered to derogate from the rotas where cases were related or in order to ensure an even spread of the workload.414 4 08 RP-GC, art 14, and note also 13(1) and 15(1). 409 See the decision of the GC of 8 October 2015 (OJ 2015 No C354/2). 410 See the decision of the GC of 23  September 2013 (OJ  2013 No C313/5). In relation to the five-judge form of the Appeal Chamber, it is not clear what is meant by the reference to the three judges from the formation initially hearing the case. An appeal from the CST is allocated to the Appeal Chamber as soon as the application commencing the appeal has been lodged at the Registry: see para 1 of the decision of the CST of 23 September 2013 on the criteria for allocating cases to chambers (OJ 2013 No C313/4). The formation initially hearing an appeal is therefore the three-judge form of the Appeal Chamber. The President of the GC is one of the three. By para 1 of a decision made on 11 May 2016 on the criteria for the assignment of cases to chambers (OJ  2016 No C296/2), the GC effectively froze the composition of the Appeal Chamber as at 19 September 2016 because the Appeal Chamber would be composed of the members of that chamber ‘still in office after 19 September 2016, irrespective of their capacity as President, Vice-President or President of a Chamber’. It is apprehended that the Appeal Chamber will no longer sit once the outstanding appeals from the CST have been disposed of. 411 RP-GC, art 25 and 26(1). 412 See the decision of 11 May 2016 (above, note 410), para 2. 413 Ibid, para 1. 414 Id, para 2, last sentence. The President’s power to derogate from the rotas was upheld in Case C-127/13P Strack v Commission, 2 October 2014, paras 50–54.

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10 Reassignment of cases to other GC formations 1.83 A case may be referred to a different formation (whether that formation be a plenary session,415 the Grand Chamber or a chamber consisting of a different number of judges) whenever the legal difficulty or the importance of the case or special circumstances so justify.416 The GC Rules of Procedure do not deal in express terms with reassignments to a formation of the same kind (such as a reassignment from one three-judge chamber to another or a reassignment from one single judge to another), which appear to be effected on the same legal basis as the original assignment of the case to a particular formation.417 So far as assignment to a different type or number of formation (including a single judge) is concerned, the position is as follows. 1.84 The determination of a case by a single judge is an exception to the rule that, in principle, cases heard by the GC are determined by a chamber.418 For a case to be assigned to a single judge (who must be the judge-rapporteur in the case), it must first have been allocated to a three-judge chamber.419 The decision must be an unanimous decision of that chamber and is made after the parties have been heard.420 So far as can be seen, the decision may be made by the chamber of its own motion or at the request of one of the parties.421 Reassignment to a single judge is not possible if a member state or an EU institution that is a party to the proceedings objects; and, in that event, the case is retained by the chamber to which the judge-rapporteur belongs.422 Only the following types of case

415 For the GC to sit as a full court is essentially a theoretical consideration at the present time: see RP-GC, art 14 and note 408 above. 416 RP-GC, art 28(1). The special circumstances referred to include the desire to ensure an even spread of the workload: see, by analogy, Strack (above, note 414), paras 51–52. In that context, a different formation is one having a different number of judges. The number may be greater or lesser than the chamber to which the case was originally assigned: the Infrisa case (note 379 above). On the basis of RP-GC, art 28(1), one formation cannot assign or ask for a case to be assigned to another formation that has the same number of judges, even if it wished to do so because (for example) one or more of the judges in that other formation have particular expertise in the subject matter of the litigation. 417 That seems to have been the ECJ’s view in Strack (above, note 414), paras 51–52. There is no right to be heard before a decision reassigning a case to a formation of the same type is made: see Strack, para 53. One is provided for only in RP-GC, art 28(4), when it is proposed to refer the case to a formation with fewer judges. 418 Case C-171/00P Liberos v Commission [2002] ECR I-451, paras 25–26. 419 RP-GC, art 29(1). The fact that the judge-rapporteur in the case cannot be identified does not generate a presumption that the case was not assigned by the chamber to the judge-rapporteur: Case T-503/13 P Marcuccio v Commission, 19 June 2014, para 15; Case T-447/13 P Marcuccio v Commission, 2 October 2014, para 64 (cases under the parallel CST rule). 420 RP-GC, art 29(3). If a party fails to express a view, when asked to do so, he is taken to be raising no objection to the assignment of the case to a single judge: see Case T-503/13 P Marcuccio (above, note 419), para 14 (a case under the parallel CST rule). 421 RP-GC, art 29(3) is silent on the point but RP-GC, art 28(2) provides that a main party (applicant or defendant) may request that a case be transferred to the Grand Chamber or to a chamber sitting with a different number of judges. It is not clear why that could not, or should not, apply in the case of referral to a single judge. 422 RP-GC, art 29(3).

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may be heard and determined by a single judge:423 (i) IP appeals; (ii) actions for annulment or in respect of a failure to act, brought by natural or legal persons, damages actions and staff cases that raise only questions already clarified by established case-law or that form part of a series of cases in which the same relief is sought and of which one has already been finally decided (otherwise than by a single judge);424 and (iii) cases brought pursuant to an arbitration clause in a contract. A case falling within one of those types may not, however, be heard and determined by a single judge unless, in addition, it is suitable to be so heard and determined by reference to: (a) the lack of difficulty of the issues of law or of fact raised in the case; (b) the limited importance of the case; and (c) the absence of other special circumstances.425 Delegation to a single judge is not possible in the following types of case426 which, because they mark a reversion to the principle that cases are to be decided by a chamber, are not to be regarded restrictively:427 (i) actions for the annulment of an act of general application and actions in which a plea of illegality is raised against such an act;428 (ii) staff cases, in which a plea of illegality has been expressly raised against an act of general application (unless the ECJ or GC has already ruled on the issues raised by that plea); and (iii) those concerning the implementation of the rules on competition and the control of concentrations, State aid, trade protection measures and the common

423 RP-GC, art 29(1)(a)–(c), as amended. Apart from staff cases (during the period of the existence of the CST), the GC rarely made use of the power to assign a case to a single judge. For examples of cases assigned to a single judge, see: Case T-429/93 Successors of Edmond Ropars v Council [2000] ECR II-2439; Case T-138/05 Commission v Impetus Symvouloi Michanikoi – Kainotomia ka Technologia EPE  [2007]  ECR II-136*; Case T-190/07  KEK  Diavlos v Commission [2010] ECR II-33*; Case T-388/07 Comune di Napoli v Commission [2010] ECR II-79*; Case T-259/09 Commission v Arci Nuova associazione comitato di Cagliari and Gessa [2010] ECR II-284*. 424 It is not clear what ‘finally’ decided means. It could mean decided by the GC, or decided by the ECJ on appeal, or in relation to which the time for appeal to the ECJ has expired without an appeal having been made. The better view is probably that there must have been a final judgment of the GC terminating the proceedings or, in the event of an appeal from such a judgment, a final decision on the appeal made by the ECJ. A ‘final’ decision can be a decision on the inadmissibility of the action (if the action is held to be admissible in a judgment or order dealing only with admissibility, the action has not been finally decided because it is then necessary to rule on its substance, or merits). However, a final decision on the inadmissibility of an action cannot be regarded as a final decision for the purpose of RP-GC, art 29(1)(b), so far as a later action in which a different admissibility point (or no admissibility issue) arises for determination. 425 RP-GC, art 29(1). 426 RP-GC, art 29(2), amended. 427 The Liberos case (above, note 418), para 27. 428 That is, acts that apply to objectively determined situations and that entail legal effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in the abstract. A case raises an issue as to the legality of such an act if: (i) an application is made for the annulment of the act; (ii) the plea of illegality is raised in relation to such an act; or (iii) its legality is raised ‘indirectly’ in the course of the proceedings (see the Liberos case (above, note 418), paras 28–36). However, in contrast to the provision at issue in Liberos, RP-GC, art 29(2)(a) now refers specifically to actions for the annulment of an act of general application and cases in which a plea of illegality is expressly raised against such an act.

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organisations of agricultural markets.429 If the single judge to whom a case has been allocated finds that the conditions justifying its allocation to him or her are no longer satisfied, that judge must refer the case back to the chamber originally seised of it.430 1.85 In the case of reassignment to other formations of the GC, reassignment is possible at any stage in the proceedings prior to the delivery of judgment.431 The decision to reassign is made by the GC in plenary session by way of right (or privilege), not obligation, when the conditions for reassignment laid down in the rules of procedure have been satisfied.432 The GC acts only if seised by a request to reassign made by the chamber to which the case is currently assigned or by the President of the GC. The chamber and the President of the GC may make such a request either on their own motion or in response to a request made by one of the parties.433 Reassignment is therefore a two-stage process that requires a decision to be made by the chamber seised of the case, or the President of the GC, before a decision is ultimately made by the GC in plenary session. Where the initiative for the reassignment of the case emanates from one of the parties, it is unclear whether it should take the form of an application addressed to the President of the GC or to the President of the chamber seised of the case. Either possibility seems to be appropriate. In any event, it seems that the burden lies on the party making the request to persuade the chamber currently seised with the case (or the president of the GC) that the conditions for reassigning the case to a different formation have been satisfied. If the chamber or the President is not so persuaded, matters end there. It is only if the chamber or President is so persuaded that matters go further and the chamber puts the proposal to the GC in plenary session.434 However the matter originated, when a request is made to the GC (by the chamber or the President of the GC), the main parties (applicant and defendant) are entitled to be heard before the GC makes its decision only 429 In cases concerning the implementation of the rules relating to a common organisation of the market, a single judge may, nonetheless, hear and determine a case that forms part of a series of cases in which the same relief is sought and of which one has already been finally decided (otherwise than by a single judge). As to the meaning of ‘finally decided’, see note 424 above. 430 RP-GC, art 29(4). 431 RP-GC, art 28(2) (the phrase ‘at any stage in the proceedings’, in that provision, encompasses procedural stages before the delivery of judgment). As the practice of the ECJ indicates, the decision may be made even after the hearing and when the chamber has begun deliberating on the case. However, it cannot be made if the points of principle that might have merited reassignment to another formation have already been decided at an earlier stage in the proceedings: Cases T-134/94, T-136/94 to T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/94 NMH Stahlwerke GmbH v Commission [1997] ECR II-2293, paras 7–9. 432 Case T-387/00 Comitato organizzatore del convegno internazionale ‘Effetti degli inquinamenti atmosferici sul clima e sulla vegetazione’ v Commission [2002] ECR II-3031, para 22. 433 RP-GC, art 28(2). Since the decision may be made at any stage in the proceedings, one of the parties could in principle request the reassignment of the case at any point before the delivery of judgment. However, the later the request is made, the more persuasive the request must be, both in terms of the underlying justification for the reassignment of the case and the delay in making the request. In Case T-497/93 Hogan v Court of Justice [1995] ECR II-703, paras 20 and 25, the request was made in writing four days before the hearing but was unfounded. 434 Cf Case T-47/92 Lenz v Commission [1992] ECR II-2523, paras 30–32.

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where the GC has been requested to refer the case to a formation sitting with a lesser number of judges; if the request is to refer the case to a formation with a greater number of judges, the parties are not entitled to be heard beforehand.435 The reason for that difference is less than obvious.436 The right to be heard would ordinarily be exercised by the submission of written comments on the proposal advanced by the chamber in question or the President of the GC, and not by way of oral hearing unless the question arose only at the hearing of the case by the chamber. The decision whether or not to reassign a case to a different formation is one of the decisions which is to be made after the advocate general has been heard.437 That does not mean that, even where it is only a matter of deciding whether or not a case should be heard by the Grand Chamber or a different chamber, an advocate general must be designated and express an opinion on the question: it is only if an advocate general has previously been designated for the case in question that there is a need to hear his or her views before the decision is made.438 In principle, any case may be reassigned to a different formation (other than a single judge), depending upon the degree of its difficulty or importance or any special circumstances that it exhibits. However, if a member state or an EU institution that is a party to the proceedings so requests, the case must be decided by a chamber composed of at least five judges.439 1.86 A case referred to the Grand Chamber remains with that formation for the purpose of any subsequent proceedings concerning the judgment or order made in the case by the Grand Chamber and also in the event of remission to the GC after an appeal to the ECJ.440 A case referred to a three- or five-judge chamber remains with that formation for the purpose of subsequent proceedings concerning the judgment or order made by the chamber but, in the case of the quashing of its decision by the ECJ on appeal and the remission of the matter to the GC, a different chamber sitting with the same number of judges is designated to deal with the case.441 If a case is heard and determined by a single judge, any proceedings consequential upon the judgment are also determined by that judge; but if his or her decision is quashed on appeal by the ECJ and the matter remitted to the GC, ‘a single judge’ is assigned to the case on its remission to the GC and that judge has discretion whether to deal with the case himself or exercise his power to refer the case for decision by the chamber in which he sits.442 435 RP-GC, art 28(3)–(4). 436 Where the chamber or the President has received an application made by a party, one would suppose that the other (main) parties should be given an opportunity to comment before the chamber or the President decides whether or not to act on the application. If that is not done, the apparent unfairness can be removed if the other (main) parties are heard before the GC decides on the request made by the chamber or the President. 437 RP-GC, art 31(3). 438 RP-GC, art 31(3) states expressly that the advocate general shall be heard, but only after being designated. 439 RP-GC, art 28(5). 440 RP-GC, art 162(1) and 216(2). 441 RP-GC, art 162(1) and 216(1). 442 Reading RP-GC, art 1(2)(a) and (b) together with RP-GC, art 162; and RP-GC, art 216(3). By analogy with the position regarding remission to a three- or five-judge chamber, a different single judge should be designated to deal with the case upon its remission to the GC.

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11 Composition and quorum of GC formations 1.87 The composition of GC formations is usually determined by decision of the GC assigning named judges to each formation.443 The quorum for the chambers of three and five judges is three; the quorum of the Grand Chamber is eleven; and the quorum of the plenary session is seventeen.444 If, when convened, a formation is found to be inquorate, the position is as follows: in the case of a plenary session, the President of the GC adjourns the sitting until there is a quorum;445 in the case of the Grand Chamber, the President of the GC designates another judge (or, if need be, several judges) to render the chamber quorate;446 in the case of a three- or five-judge chamber, the President of the chamber designates another judge from the same chamber to replace the absent judge but, if that is not possible, he informs the President of the GC that the chamber is inquorate and the latter designates a judge to render the chamber quorate.447 In the case of the plenary session and chambers of three judges, the quorum is sufficient for the formation to operate. In the case of the Grand Chamber and the five-judge chambers, the quorum is below the required complement of judges for those formations. Accordingly, where it is known before the date of the hearing that the complement of either formation is below the required complement (albeit above the quorum figure) because a judge is absent or prevented from acting, provision is made for the President of the GC (in the case of the Grand Chamber) or the President of the chamber to designate another judge or judges so as to bring the chamber up to its required complement.448 The same applies to chambers of three judges (although that appears to duplicate the provision for rendering such a chamber quorate).449 In the case of the three- and five-judge chambers, if the President of the chamber cannot find a replacement judge from within the chamber, he informs the President of the GC, who designates a judge from another chamber.450 If the complement of the chamber in question falls 443 Eg the decision of 8 October 2015 published in OJ 2015 No C354/2. For the composition of the Grand Chamber at the time of writing, see the decision of 13 July 2016 published in OJ 2016 No C296/2. 444 Statute, art 47 (which applies Statute, art 17, 2nd and 4th paras, as amended); RP-GC, art 23(1), 24(1) and 42(2). 445 RP-GC, art 42(2). In practice, the sitting would be adjourned for the time needed to enable the President to locate another judge to join the session. 446 RP-GC, art 23(2). 447 RP-GC, art  24(2). Where it is necessary to find a judge from outside the chamber, the replacement judge is the Vice-President or, if he cannot act, another judge selected by reference to order of seniority (and excluding the Presidents of the chamber): see, at the time of writing, the decision of 13 July 2016 published in OJ 2016 No C296/2. 448 RP-GC, art 17(1) and (2). For the purposes of RP-GC, art 17(2), the method of selecting the replacement judge was, at the time of writing, that set out in a decision made on 13 July 2016 (above, note 447). ‘Absent or prevented from acting’ simply means unable to attend, whatever the reasons: Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, C0245/99P, C-247/99P, C-250/99P to C-252/99P and C-254/99P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, Advocate General Alber, paras 150–155 (p 8482), and Advocate General Mischo, paras 23–30 (pp 8570– 8571), and judgment paras 35–39 (pp 8646–8647), in relation to what is now RP-GC, art 22; Case C-196/99P Siderurgica Aristrain Madrid SL v Commission [2003] ECR I-11005, para 156. 449 RP-GC, art 17(2). 450 Ibid.

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below the required complement after the hearing but remains quorate, there is no such provision because: (i) there is no need to ensure that the required complement is in place after the hearing has taken place, as long as the formation is quorate; and (ii) designation of an additional judge would require the hearing to be repeated because only those judges who participated in the hearing can deliberate on the judgment in the case.451 Where a case has been assigned to a single judge, the President of the GC designates a replacement should that single judge be prevented from acting.452 1.88 Where, after the hearing, a judge is absent or prevented from attending any formation, with the consequence that there is an even number of judges in the formation, the most junior judge abstains from taking part in the deliberations unless he or she is the judge-rapporteur (in which case the next most junior judge abstains).453 Where the number of judges assigned to a three- or five-judge chamber is more than the required complement of the chambers (three or five judges, as the case may be), the President of the chamber decides which of the judges shall participate in the judgment on the case.454 12 Designation of an advocate general 1.89 In principle, there is no advocate general in a GC case; but an advocate general may be designated to assist a chamber (including the Grand Chamber) in a particular case if it is considered that the legal difficulty or the factual complexity of the case so requires.455 The decision to designate an advocate general is made by the GC sitting in plenary session, at the request of the chamber seised

451 RP-GC, art  17(1) and (2) do not apply after the case has been ‘pleaded’, which refers to the making of oral submissions at the hearing. RP-GC, art  21(2) accordingly provides that, after the hearing has taken place, only those judges present at the hearing take part in the deliberations. Thus, in Case T-141/94 Thyssen Stahl v Commission [1999] ECR II-347, para 70, the mandate of two members of the chamber expired after the date of the hearing and before delivery of judgment. The remaining three judges carried on deliberating on the case since the chamber was still quorate. For quorum purposes, the critical point in time is that at which (after final discussion) the conclusions determining the Court’s decision are adopted: see Case C-182/99P Salzgitter AG v Commission [2003] ECR I-10761, para 35; Aristrain (above, note 448), paras 157–158). 452 RP-GC, art 17(3). If possible, the single judge should be replaced before the hearing, in which case the replacing judge can carry the case through to judgment. If the single judge has to be replaced after the hearing, the hearing will have to be repeated before the replacing judge: see RP-GC, art 21(1). 453 RP-GC, art 22 (as to which, see the Limburgse Vinyl case, above, note 448). The problem should not arise for any of the competent formations (Grand Chambers, three- or five-judge chambers and a single judge) before the date of the hearing because, if a judge is known to be absent or prevented from attending at that stage, a replacement can be designated. 454 RP-GC, art 26(3). 455 RP-GC, art 30. Cf Statute, art 49, 3rd para, which provides that the criteria for selecting cases in which there may be an advocate general are to be laid down in the rules of procedure. There is no obligation to designate a judge as advocate general: Case C-155/98P Alexopoulou v Commission [1999] ECR I-4069, para 38 of the advocate general’s opinion (p 4077); Case C-136/01P Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi Snc. v Commission [2002] ECR I-6565, para 18.

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with the case.456 There is no provision for the matter to be raised by the parties and no deadline by which the decision must be taken. It would seem that it is open to one of the parties to request the designation of an advocate general;457 but it is for the chamber to decide either of its own motion or in response to such a request whether or not to put the suggestion to the full Court.458 In contrast to the situation that applies where a chamber seeks the referral of a case, by the full Court, to a chamber sitting with a different number of judges, it does not seem that the chamber makes a proposal to the full Court that an advocate general be designated. Instead, the chamber simply makes a request to the full Court that it decide whether or not an advocate general should be designated.459 It does not seem to be necessary to hear the parties before the decision is taken although, if the idea originates in a representation made by one of the parties, the other parties should be given an opportunity to comment on it. The decision on the question whether or not an advocate general should be designated must be made by the time that the judge-rapporteur in the case has presented his preliminary report because the first important function of the advocate general in a case is to assist in deciding what action to take on the recommendations made the judgerapporteur.460 However, it cannot be excluded that the designation of the advocate general may be made at a later stage, albeit no later than the hearing, because the essential function of the advocate general is to deliver an opinion on the case after the hearing and before the closure of the oral procedure.461 While it is for the GC in plenary session to decide whether or not an advocate general should be designated to assist a chamber, it is for the President of the GC to designate the judge who will act as advocate general if the GC so decides.462 Any one of the judges is eligible to be designated advocate general. It is not possible for the President of the GC, the Vice-President or the President of a chamber to be designated advocate general.463 It is understood that, where an advocate general is required in a case heard before a chamber, the practice is to designate as advocate general a judge from another chamber.

456 RP-GC, art 31(1). Hitherto, an advocate general has been designated only in cases where there was no or no unambiguous case law on the point at issue: see B Vesterdorf, (1992) CMLRev 897 at 906 and 912. 457 In the Hogan case (above, note 220), paras 20 and 27, the request was made in writing four days before the hearing but was unfounded. 458 Cf the Lenz case (above, note 434). 459 The construction of RP-GC, art 31(1) given in the text is based on the disparity in wording between that provision and RP-GC, art 28(2). 460 RP-GC, art 31(3) and 87(2)–(3). 461 Statute, art 49, 2nd para; RP-GC, art 112. It would be an infringement of an essential procedural requirement for the advocate general to deliver an opinion without having been present at the hearing of the parties. 462 RP-GC, art 31(1)–(2). 463 RP-GC, art 3(3). Statute, art 49 (last para) provides that the judge called on to perform the task of advocate general may not take part in the judgment of the case. As a result, it would seem to be inappropriate, as a matter of principle (and quite without regard to RP-GC, art 3(3)), for the judge who is the presiding judge in the case to perform the functions of advocate general.

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13 Responsibilities of GC formations 1.90 The Rules of Procedure apply in the same way to cases heard by the Grand Chamber or a smaller chamber and, in cases heard by a chamber, the powers of the President of the GC are exercised by the President of the chamber in question.464 In cases delegated or assigned to a single judge, the powers of the President are exercised by that judge with the exception of powers over the grant of interim relief, which are retained by the President of the GC.465 14 CST formations and quorum 1.91 The CST sits in chambers of three judges but, in cases determined by its rules of procedure, may sit in plenary session, in a chamber of five judges or as a single judge.466 The jurisdiction and quorum of the full court, the composition of the chambers and the assignment of cases to them are governed by the CST’s rules of procedure.467 Initially, the CST applied the CFI rules of procedure (as they then were). By a decision made in November 2005, the CST decided to sit in three chambers and as a full court. The first and second chambers comprised three judges. The third chamber comprised five judges but was intended to sit with three judges: the President of the CST and two of the other four judges comprising the chamber, alternately.468 That system remains in force at the time of writing.469 As from November 2007, when the CST’s rules of procedure came into force, the general position is that the CST sits in chambers of three judges, for which the quorum is three.470 The CST ‘may’ set up a chamber comprising five judges, for which the quorum is three;471 and that chamber is intended to be the third chamber, sitting with all five of the judges allocated to it. When the CST sits in plenary session, the quorum is five judges.472 15 Allocation of cases to CST formations 1.92 For the first year of its existence, the CST decided to allocate cases as follows: the second chamber would hear cases principally concerning questions 464 RP-GC, art 1(2)(a). 465 RP-GC, art 1(2)(b). RP-GC, art 157 specifies that the decision on an interim relief application is made by the President of the GC. 466 Statute, Annex, art 4(2). RP-CST, art 9 therefore provides that the CST may sit in any of the formations provided for in that provision of the Statute. 467 Statute, Annex, art 4(4). For quorum purposes, the critical point in time is both when a sitting takes place (RP-CST, art 26) and when (after final discussion) the conclusions determining the CST’s decision are adopted (see, in relation to the latter point in time, Case C-182/99P Salzgitter AG  v Commission [2003]  ECR  I-10761, para  35: RP-CST, art  29(4) is the provision that parallels what is now RP-GC, art 21(4), which was under consideration in that case). 468 OJ 2005 No C322/16. 469 See the decision of the CST of 17 September 2014 (OJ 2014 No C342/5). 470 RP-CST, art 11(1) (‘the Tribunal shall set up Chambers of three Judges…’) and 13(1) (‘…the Tribunal shall sit in Chambers of three Judges’). For the quorum, see RP-CST, art 26. 471 RP-CST, art 11(1). For the quorum, see RP-CST, art 26. 472 RP-CST, art 26.

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of recruitment, assessment/promotion and termination of service; the first chamber would hear all other cases; cases would be assigned to the third chamber, regardless of their subject matter, at regular intervals to be decided at a meeting of the full CST.473 As from November 2007, when the CST’s rules of procedure came into force, cases are initially assigned by the President of the CST to one of the three-judge chambers.474 The criteria for assigning cases to those chambers are laid down by the CST and published in the Official Journal.475 At the time of writing, cases are attributed to the first, second and third chambers, in turn, as soon as the application commencing proceedings has been lodged at the CST Registry. The President may derogate from that order if there is a connection between cases or so as to ensure a balanced and consistent division of the workload.476 16 Reassignment of cases to other CST formations 1.93 A  case may be referred to the five-judge chamber (that is to say, the third chamber sitting with its full complement of five judges) or to the full court (for which the quorum is five judges) ‘whenever the difficulty of the questions of law raised or the importance of the case or special circumstances so justify.’477 The decision to refer a case to the chamber of five judges or to the full court can be made at any stage in the proceedings; it is made by the full court itself on a proposal from the chamber hearing the case or from any member of the CST (including, apparently, a judge who does not form part of the formation to which the case has been assigned).478 It is implicit that, after a case has been assigned from a three-judge chamber to the five-judge chamber, it may be reassigned from the five-judge chamber to the full court if the circumstances so justify. 1.94 There is no provision for the reassignment of a case from the full court or the five-judge chamber to a formation with a lower number of judges. On the other hand, the President of the CST may reassign a case from one three-judge chamber to another at any time in the course of the proceedings (but not after the judge-rapporteur has presented the preliminary report on the case, which occurs after the close of the written procedure). Such a reassignment may be made only where cases are connected and have been allocated to different chambers, or 473 OJ No C261 of 28 October 2006 p 32. Derogations from that system of allocation could be made where cases were connected or so as to ensure a balanced and reasonably diversified workload within the CST. By a decision made on 15 February 2006, the CST decided to fix the interval at which cases would be assigned to the third chamber at every seventh case in the list of new actions brought before it, without prejudice to the possibility of derogating from that system in order to ensure a balanced and reasonably diversified workload: see OJ 2006 No C108/30. 474 RP-CST, art 52. 475 RP-CST, art 13(2). 476 See the CST decision of 11 September 2015 (OJ 2015 No C323/4). The initial allocation of cases to the first, second and third chambers does not preclude assignment to the full court or to a single judge. 477 RP-CST, art 14(1). 478 RP-CST, art 14(2).

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so as to ensure a balanced and consistent division of the workload between the chambers. The President makes his decision after consulting the judges concerned.479 It is nonetheless implicit that a case can be assigned (or reassigned) to a different formation where it has been assigned to a particular formation by error. Thus, if a case has been assigned to a three-judge chamber contrary to the published criteria for assigning cases to such chambers, it may be reassigned to the correct three-judge chamber; and if, after a case has been assigned to a larger chamber, it is discovered that the circumstances of the case do not in truth justify that assignment, the case can be reassigned correctly. 1.95 There is no provision for assignment of a case from a three-judge chamber to a larger formation to be made on application by a party or for the hearing of the parties before such a decision is made. However, there is no reason for concluding that one or other (or all) of the parties cannot make such an application.480 If one party were to apply, the other party would have to be given an opportunity to be heard on the application. On the other hand, if the CST raises the matter of its own motion, it is not obliged to ask any of the parties for their observations before making its decision. The CST may, nonetheless, do so as a matter of courtesy and also so as to ensure that it is fully and properly informed about the case before it makes its decision. 1.96 Cases assigned to a three-judge chamber may also be referred to a single judge. The procedure for doing so differs from that for the assignment of a case to a larger formation. Assignment of a case to a single judge is possible only if the case is suitable for determination by a single judge by reason of the lack of difficulty of the questions of law or fact raised in the case, its limited importance and the absence of other special circumstances; and (even if those conditions are satisfied) reference to a single judge is not possible where the case raises issues as to the legality of an act of general application (unless those issues have already been the subject of a ruling delivered by the ECJ, GC or CST).481 A case can be referred to a single judge only by unanimous decision of the chamber to which the case has been assigned; that decision may be taken at any stage of the proceedings but only after the parties have been given an opportunity to be heard.482 Although there is no express provision to the effect that a case may be referred to a single judge on application by one or other (or all) of the parties, there is no reason to exclude that possibility. Even if there is no such application, the matter may be raised by the chamber before which the case is pending of its own motion. However, it does not appear that the matter can be raised by a judge who is not a member of that chamber. Where a case is referred to a single judge, that judge will be the judge-rapporteur, not one of the other members of the chamber

4 79 See the CST decision of 11 September 2015 (OJ 2015 No C323/4). 480 For applications of that nature, see the remarks made in para 1.85 above concerning applications made to the GC. 481 RP-CST, art 15(1). See the commentary above on the parallel provisions concerning the GC. 482 RP-CST, art 15(2).

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in question.483 The single judge must refer the case back to the chamber if he or she finds that the conditions for its referral to a single judge are no longer satisfied.484 It would appear that that may occur at any stage in the proceedings before the delivery of judgment. However, since the case may be referred back to the chamber only when the conditions for referral to a single judge are ‘no longer’ satisfied, the implication is that the single judge is bound by the assessment of the chamber that those conditions were satisfied: it is only a change in circumstances after the decision referring the case to a single judge or the discovery of a new factor, not known to the chamber when it made that decision, that can justify the single judge in referring the case back to the chamber. The single judge cannot refer the case back to a different chamber or to a larger formation. The single judge may refer the case back to the chamber of his or her own motion or, it would seem, on application by one or other (or all) of the parties. If an application to that effect has been made by a party, the single judge would have to give the other party an opportunity to be heard before making his or her decision. If the single judge acts on his or her own motion, there is no obligation to hear the views of the parties before the decision is made but the single judge may do so as a matter of courtesy and also so as to ensure that he or she is fully and properly informed about the case before the decision is made. 17 Composition of CST formations 1.97 The CST decides which judges are to be attached to which chambers and, if the number attached to a chamber is greater than the number of judges sitting in a case, the CST decides how to designate the judges taking part in the formation when it comes to deal with the case.485 In cases heard by the full court, matters can proceed even if one or more judges attached to the formation is/are absent, as long as the formation remains quorate. In the case of the five-judge chamber, if a judge is absent or prevented from attending the hearing,486 the President of the CST must designate another judge to complete the formation and keep it to five judges even if, otherwise, the chamber would be quorate.487 A replacement judge is selected from among the judges not attached to the fivejudge chamber in reverse order of seniority.488 The hearing can be held with less than five judges only if it is impossible to find one or more replacement judges and if the five-judge chamber is quorate.489 The position is otherwise where the number of judges in the chamber drops below five during or after the hearing. In

483 RP-CST, art  15(1). If the judge-rapporteur is absent or prevented from acting, the President designates another judge to replace him: RP-CST, art 15(3). The President in question is the President of the relevant chamber: see the definition of ‘President’ in RP-CST, art 1(2)(b). 484 RP-CST, art 15(4). 485 RP-CST, art 11(2). Such decisions are published in the Official Journal: RP-CST, art 11(3). See, at the time of writing, the decision of 17 September 2014 (OJ 2014 No C342/5). 486 As to the meaning of which, see the commentary in paras 1.77 and 1.87 above concerning the parallel provisions concerning the ECJ and GC. 487 RP-CST, art 28. The quorum for the five-judge chamber is three: RP-CST, art 26. 488 RP-CST, art 28. 489 Ibid.

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that event, there is no obligation to find one or more replacement judges as long as the chamber remains quorate.490 1.98 In the case of any formation, if it is inquorate because one or more judges is/are absent or prevented from attending, the President of the formation must adjourn the sitting until the judge(s) in question is/are no longer absent or prevented from attending.491 Alternatively, the President of the formation may complete the formation by designating another judge who is a member of the same formation492 or, failing that, by proposing to the President of the CST that he or she should designate a judge from another formation.493 Where a formation has to be completed after the hearing (in order to remain quorate), the oral procedure must be reopened unless two conditions are satisfied: (i) the formation decides not to reopen the oral procedure so that it can rule on the case within a reasonable period of time; and (ii) the parties agree to that course of action.494 It would appear that that possibility is not open to the formation unless it intends to give judgment in good time after the first hearing. In any event, if more than one judge present at the hearing is absent or prevented from acting, the reopening of the oral part of the procedure is mandatory.495 In cases referred to a single judge, where the single judge is absent or prevented from attending the hearing, the President of the chamber to which the case was originally allocated designates another judge to replace the single judge.496

B

The Registry

1.99 The Registry, whether of the ECJ, the GC or the CST, is the direct responsibility of the Registrar (of the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC or CST). The Registrar is assisted by one of the Deputy Registrars who acts in 490 That is to be inferred from RP-CST, art 28, which applies only where the number of judges goes below five ‘before the hearing’. 491 RP-CST, art 27(1) (see the definition of ‘President’ in RP-CST, art 1(2)(b)). As to the meaning of ‘absent or prevented from attending the hearing’, see the commentary in paras 1.77 and 1.87 above concerning the parallel provisions concerning the ECJ and GC 492 That applies where the number of judges allocated to a formation is greater than the number required to sit: for example, where (as in the case of the CST’s third chamber) five judges are attached to a three-judge chamber. 493 RP-CST, art  27(2). Replacement judges are designated in turn according to their order of precedence, taken in reverse. The President of the CST and the Presidents of the chambers are excluded unless they are the only judges available. 494 RP-CST, art 27(3). The same applies if the hearing has had to be interrupted in order to complete the formation (where, for example, a judge falls ill). 495 RP-CST, art 27(3), last sentence. 496 RP-CST, art 15(3). One might have thought that the task of designating a replacement judge would be left to the President of the CST. However, RP-CST, art 15(3) entrusts that task to ‘the President’, which is defined in RP-CST, art 1(2)(b) to mean ‘the president of the formation of the court’. Since a case is referred to a single judge by the chamber to which it was originally allocated and may be referred back, by the single judge, only to that chamber, the inference is that that chamber remains the formation responsible for the case and that ‘the President’ refers to the President of that chamber. It is also implicit that the replacement judge shall come from the same chamber.

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his place when he is absent or prevented from attending.497 The ECJ  Registry is open to the public Mondays to Fridays from 10 a m to 12 noon and from 3 p m to 6 p m, except on Fridays (when it closes at 5 p m)498 and on the Court’s official holidays.499 The GC Registry is open and closed on the same days as the ECJ Registry but the hours of opening differ: they are from 9.30 am to noon on Mondays to Fridays, from 2.30 to 5.30 pm on Mondays to Thursdays, and from 2.30 to 4.30 pm on Fridays.500 The CST Registry is also open and closed to the public on the same days as the ECJ Registry but the opening hours differ: they are from 9 am to noon and from 2.30 pm to 4.30 pm on Mondays to Fridays (except during vacations, when the Registry is closed to the public on Friday afternoons).501 In addition, the ECJ and GC Registries are also open half an hour before the commencement of every public hearing held by the Court or a chamber.502 If a working day for the Court coincides with a holiday for its staff, the Registries are manned by a skeleton staff during their normal opening hours.503 1.100 There is a difference between a Registry being open and its being open to the public. During opening hours, it is possible to contact a Registry official by telephone or other means of communication and also lodge a procedural document at the Court by hand (although it is more usual to lodge such documents by electronic means or fax or, if necessary, by post). During opening hours, it is also possible to consult the Register or the case file, where that is provided for in the rules of procedure. Physical presence in the offices of the Registry is in practice open only to persons who have a legitimate reason to be there. In the case of the ECJ and GC, ‘anyone’ may consult the register at the Registry;504 and, in the case of the CST, anyone with a duly substantiated interest may do so.505 Accordingly, a person may visit the Registry during opening hours for the purpose of consulting the register. In the case of the GC and CST, access to the case file is limited to the parties; third parties may have access only if they have a legitimate interest and only upon application.506 Further, in the case of the CST Registry, it is expressly provided that the Registry is open only to representatives of the parties or persons duly authorised by them, and to persons making an application for

497 RP-ECJ, art 19; RP-GC, art 33; PD-GC, para 2. The Registrar of the CST may also be assisted by a Deputy Registrar: RP-CST, art 18. 498 The Court itself is normally closed on Friday afternoons during the judicial vacations; but the Registries remain open with a skeleton staff. 499 Cf IR-ECJ, art 1(1), which referred to the official holidays listed in the Annex to the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure. Under RP-ECJ, art 24(6), the list of official holidays is published annually in the Official Journal, not annexed to the Rules of Procedure. At the time of writing, the decision was to be found in OJ 2012 No C389/2. 500 PD-GC, paras 3–5. 501 IR-CST, art 3(1) and (3). 502 PD-GC, para 6. As to the ECJ, cf IR-ECJ, art 1(2), which was to the same effect. 503 PD-GC, para  4; IR-CST, art  3(2). There is no similar provision for the ECJ registry but the practice is understood to be the same. 504 RP-ECJ, art 22(1); RP-GC, art 37. 505 RP-CST, art 22(2), 3rd subpara. 506 RP-GC, art 38; RP-CST, art 22(1) and (2), 1st subpara.

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legal aid.507 Outside opening hours, procedural documents may be lodged with the Court’s janitor who must record the date and time of lodgment.508 1.101 The ECJ and GC Registries are divided into sections dealing with cases according to their procedural language. The responsibilities of the Registries relate to three broad areas of activity: (i) the keeping of the register;509 (ii) the acceptance, transmission, custody and service of documents;510 and (iii) assisting the Court in the discharge of its functions such as by maintaining and keeping up to date the files of pending cases and drawing up minutes and orders and the cause list.511 It is often difficult to draw rigid distinctions between those activities, in particular the first and second: for example, the decisions whether or not to accept a document and whether or not to enter it on the register are often coterminous. Registry procedure is the same mutatis mutandis for all three Registries. In what follows, references to ‘the Registrar’ must be understood as referring to the Registrar of each of the ECJ, the GC and the CST (unless the context indicates otherwise) and to any other person properly authorised to take his or her place. 1 The register 1.102 Each Registrar is responsible for keeping up to date the register of cases brought before the Court to which he has been appointed; in it are entered all pleadings and supporting documents, judgments and orders (often referred to, collectively, as ‘procedural documents’).512 The register for each Court is kept in the Registry of that Court. In the case of the ECJ and the GC, ‘anyone’ may consult the register and obtain copies or extracts on payment of a fee;513 in the case of the CST, persons having ‘a duly substantiated interest’ may do so.514 There is no definition of what is meant by a person having a ‘duly substantiated interest’. The term seems to cover the parties to a case (where they wish to consult the register in respect of some procedural document relating to the case that is

507 IR-CST, art 3(4). Before 2015, the GC Registry was not open to the public. It was open only to lawyers and agents of the member states and EU institutions, or persons duly authorised by them, and to persons making an application for legal aid: IR-GC, art  2(4) (OJ  2007 No L232/1, as amended; repealed by the current PD-GC). The GC Registry was not open to the representatives of the parties to a case (unless the party was a member state or EU institution) otherwise than half an hour before the commencement of the hearing in the case, not at any other time: IR-GC, art 2(3), last sentence. The reason for the disparity of treatment between the representatives of member states and EU institutions, on the one hand, and other parties, on the other, was not immediately apparent. Those restrictions are not present in the current PD-GC. 508 PD-ECJ, para 40; PD-GC, para 7; IR-CST, art 3(5). See also the guidance on the lodging of procedural documents given on the Court’s website. 509 RP-ECJ, art 21(1); RP-GC, art 36(1); RP-CST, art 21(1). 510 RP-ECJ, art 20(1); RP-GC, art 35(1); RP-CST, art 20(1). 511 RP-ECJ, art 20(2); RP-GC, art 35(2); RP-CST, art 20(2); PD-GC, para 1; IR-CST, art 12. RPECJ, art 20(3), RP-GC, art 35(3) and RP-CST, art 20(3) also refer to such matters as keeping custody of the seals of the Court. 512 RP-ECJ, art 21(1); RP-GC, art 36(1); RP-CST, art 21(1); PD-GC, para 8; IR-CST, art 4(1). 513 RP-ECJ, art 22(1); RP-GC, art 37. 514 RP-CST, art 22(2), 3rd subpara.

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entered on the register) and any other person who is able to show some legitimate interest.515 1.103 RP-ECJ, art 21(1) provides that the ECJ register contains entries of all of the following: (i) procedural documents, (ii) supporting items and (iii) documents ‘lodged’. The first category covers primarily the pleadings (which must be lodged at the ECJ Registry) but ‘procedural documents’ is a phrase that also applies to judgments and orders. The last category appears to cover documents that are not pleadings or supporting documents but that are created by a party and then lodged at the Registry. With regard to the GC, the documents entered on the register are ‘all procedural documents’516 and ‘all documents placed on the file’ in cases before the GC.517 In the case of the CST, a similar distinction is drawn: all procedural documents are to be entered in the register;518 or judgments and orders and all the procedural documents placed on the file in the case.519 The implication is that a condition of entry in the register is being placed on the file in the case. That difference appears to mark no material difference in practice between the registries. The reference to the case file reflects the fact that, technically, the most important internal tool is the case file. The register is nothing more than a comprehensive record of everything that is in every file of cases before the Court. 1.104 In the registers of the ECJ, GC and CST, entries are made chronologically in the order in which documents are ‘submitted’ (ECJ and CST) or ‘lodged’ (GC), and are numbered consecutively.520 Annexes to a pleading which have not 515 It should be noted that the right to consult, and obtain copies or extracts of, the register does not carry with it the right to see any procedural document mentioned in that part of the register that is consulted. Further, in the case of the Court, the right of an EU citizen to have access to documents of an EU institution applies only to the Court’s own documents concerning the performance of its administrative tasks: TFEU, art 15(3). It is not clear how consistent is the right to have access to the CST Registry under IR-CST, art 3(4) with the right to consult the CST’s register. Under IR-CST, art 3(4), a member of the public having the right to consult the register cannot attend the Registry to do so. It is not clear how the CST envisages the exercise of the right to consult the register in those circumstances. Presumably, a Registry official carries the register to the person in question, who stands outside the perimeter of the Registry, or in an office nearby, or (conceivably) at the outer door of the Court building. Otherwise, consultation is electronic. 516 RP-GC, art 36(1). Documents generated in the context of the amicable settlement procedure (available under RP-GC, art 125a ff after 1 September 2016) are entered in a separate register to which RP-GC, arts 36–37 do not apply: see RP-GC, art 125c(1) and PD-GC, para 14a. 517 PD-GC, para 8. Such documents include confidential material relied upon by a party. PD-GC, para 9 provides that such material, when produced in the context of RP-GC, art 105 (which sets out a procedure for dealing with the production and dissemination of highly sensitive confidential material), are also entered in the register. That merely confirms the position as it would ordinarily be. Entry in the register does not affect the confidentiality of the material but reveals that something confidential is on the case file. 518 RP-CST, art 21(1). 519 IR-CST, art 4(1). 520 RP-ECJ, art  21(1); RP-GC, art  36(1) and PD-GC, para  10; RP-CST, art  21(1) and IR-CST, art  4(1) and (3). In CST proceedings, documents drawn up for the purposes of an amicable settlement of the dispute between the parties are registered separately for reasons of confidentiality: RP-CST, art 21(2); IR-CST, art 4(1).

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been lodged at the same time as the procedural documents to which they relate are registered separately.521 In principle, procedural documents emanating from the parties should be registered as soon as they are lodged at the Registry because that reflects the chronological order in which such documents are ‘submitted’ or ‘lodged’. In reality, the need to ascertain compliance with the rules relating to the form, presentation and length of pleadings can lead to divergences between the date of lodgement and the date of entry in the register and of the placing of the pleading on the case file. Documents drawn up by the Court are registered on the day of issue. 1.105 The entry in the register is made in the language of the case and contains the information necessary for identifying the document in question, including its date and nature, a reference to the case and the dates of lodgement and registration.522 When the register was kept in paper form and was corrected, a note to that effect, initialled by the Registrar, was made in the margin of the register. In its electronic form, corrections made to the register are noted but no registration can be deleted and, when an entry is amended or rectified, the original entry is preserved.523 1.106 When a document is registered, a note to that effect is made on the original (and, if the party so requests, on a copy) showing the date of registry and the registration number; the note is signed by the Registrar.524 Documents drawn up by the Court bear their registration number on the first page.525 The registration number refers to the entry on the register and has no other significance. So far as the date is concerned, in reckoning time limits, the only relevant date is that of lodgment at the Registry,526 not the date of entry on the register. Historically, where a procedural document was lodged otherwise than on the date of its entry on the register, a note to that effect had to be made on the document; otherwise, the date of registration noted on the document would be taken as the date of lodgment. As at the time of writing, the practice of the ECJ was the same. In the case of the GC, it is expressly provided that the note made on the document must

521 Annexes would be among the ‘supporting items’ referred to in RP-ECJ, art  21(1). For the separate lodgement of an annex, see for example PD-GC, para 76. 522 PD-GC, para 10; IR-CST, art 4(3). IR-CST, art 4(4) provides that the date of lodgment may be any of the following: the date of receipt by the Registrar or a registry official, the date of receipt by the Court’s janitor or, where the document was lodged by mistake at the wrong registry (being the registry of the ECJ or GC), the date of lodgment at that registry. PD-GC, para 14 is to the same effect but applies on its face to the note made on the document being registered pursuant to PD-GC, para 13. It is understood that the same practice is followed in relation to the entry made in the register under PD-GC, para 10 (the practice in the ECJ is the same). 523 PD-GC, para 11; IR-CST, art 4(5). 524 RP-ECJ, art 21(2); RP-GC, art 36(2) and PD-GC, para 13; IR-CST, art 4(2). 525 PD-GC, para 12. The practice in the ECJ and CST is the same. 526 RP-ECJ, art 57(6); RP-GC, art 72(2); RP-CST, art 45(1), 1st subpara. See Cases 36–38, 40, 41/58 Simet v High Authority [1959] ECR 157 at 165–166.

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include the date of lodgement.527 That is not the case with regard to the CST528 but it is understood that the practice is the same. Entry on the register occurs in principle on the same day the document is lodged; but in, for example, Case 37/71 Rev Jamet v Commission,529 the document was lodged on 28 December 1972 and registered only on 2 January 1973, the delay being due to the Christmas-New Year Holiday. Entries in the register and the note of registration marked on documents are ‘authentic’,530 indicating the accuracy of their contents.531 2 Reception of documents 1.107 No provision is made for any formal method of communication between a party to a case and the Court otherwise than by means of a document. The rules and registry practice are highly formalistic on the point. That does not mean that it is impossible to telephone, or have a conversation with, a registry official. It means that, technically, such communications are not formal communications between the Court and a party although they may presage a formal communication. For that reason, ensuring the reception of a document is an important procedural step because, otherwise, there is no means of effecting a formal communication with the Court. 1.108 The Court’s rules draw a general distinction between three classes of document: (i) documents that are provided for in the rules of procedure; (ii) documents that are not provided for in the rules of procedure; and (iii) defective documents. The last is a variation of the first, in the sense that only documents provided for in the rules of procedure can in principle be ‘defective’ (which implies that, if the defect were cured, the document could be given recognition); all other documents lack any kind of recognition in procedural terms. The registrar is obliged to accept and act upon documents falling within the first class. He (or she) is obliged not to accept documents falling within the second class (save in particular circumstances).532 Defective documents are dealt with in different ways depending upon the nature of the defect.533 527 That is stated expressly in PD-GC, para 13. The date of lodgment may be the date of receipt by the Registrar or a registry official, the date of receipt by the Court’s janitor or, where the document was lodged by mistake at the wrong registry (being the registry of one of the ECJ or CST), the date of lodgment at that registry: PD-GC, para 14. See Case C-229/05P Ocalan, on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party v Council [2007] ECR I-439, para 99, for an indication that the Registry’s stamp may not always be conclusive but may have to be corroborated. 528 IR-CST, art 4(2). 529 [1973] ECR 295. 530 RP-ECJ, art 21(3); RP-GC, art 36(3); RP-CST, art 21(1), 2nd sentence. 531 Ocalan (above, note 527), para  99, nonetheless suggests that evidence may (and must) be adduced if the accuracy of the note on the document is disputed. The authenticity of the entry in the register and the note made on the document therefore relates to the acts of the Registry rather than to an underlying fact, such as the date on which the document was actually received. 532 PD-ECJ, para 40, 1st sentence (by implication); PD-GC, para 86; IR-CST, art 8(2). 533 In this section, only the question of the reception of defective documents is considered. In some instances, a defective document is accepted by the registry and the defect dealt with subsequently, usually leading to a delay in service of the document on the other parties until the defect has been cured.

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The three classes of document referred to above will be discussed first, before the process involved in the reception of a document and the treatment of defective documents are considered. Finally, the rules dealing with the lodgement of documents at the wrong registry will be explained. (a) Documents 1.109 The Court’s rules deal essentially with specific types of communication that actual or prospective parties must make with the Court, namely, applications of various sorts and the submissions of legal argument in documentary form that collectively go under the title of ‘pleadings’. The rules say little or nothing about the various ancillary communications that must be made from time to time in the course of proceedings, such as letters written by a party in reply to a letter from the Registrar. A frequently used phrase is ‘procedural document’.534 However, such a document may be a document ‘expressly provided for by the procedural rules’ or a type of document that may or may not be ‘provided for by the Rules of Procedure.535 Further, it is entirely unclear what is meant by a document (procedural or other) that is ‘provided for’ by the rules of procedure; and more so a document that is ‘expressly’ so provided for. Documents specifically identified in the rules of procedure as being documents that may be lodged at the Court are obviously ‘provided for’ in the rules of procedure; but some of the rules of procedure merely imply the possibility of such a document, even though it is difficult to see how they would work without one.536. 1.110 Theoretically, at least, all documents that ought to be generated in a case before the ECJ, GC or CST (both those emanating from the parties and those emanating from the Court) can and should properly be described as ‘procedural documents’ 534 The phrase ‘procedural document’ is not a defined term and the usage of the term is inconsistent. For example, when the GC published a consolidated version of the IR-GC in 2012, the phrase ‘pleadings or procedural documents’ in the preceding version of art  7(2) (for example) was replaced by ‘procedural documents’. In art 3(1), the phrase ‘documents placed on the file’ was replaced by ‘procedural documents placed on the file’. The phrase clearly covered pleadings and judgments and orders. In the current PD-GC, ‘documents’ placed on the case file are entered in the register: PD-GC, para 8. The contents of the case file are explained in PD-GC, para 21 as including ‘procedural documents’, correspondence, and documents drawn up by the Court. It is plain from PD-GC, para 91 and following that ‘procedural documents’ means pleadings but not all the documents (such as correspondence) that a party may be called upon to send to the GC pursuant to the GC rules of procedure. 535 Compare PD-ECJ, para 40 (which, from PD-ECJ, para 41 and following, appears to use the phrase only in connection with ‘procedural documents’) with PD-GC, para 86. 536 For example, the possibility of there being a hearing in camera pursuant to RP-ECJ, art  79 effectively presupposes the possibility of a party making an application to that effect, although no provision in the ECJ rules of procedure expressly refers to such a document (in contrast, RP-GC, art 109(2) does provide for a request for a case to be heard in camera; and RP-CST, art 63(2) does so by implication as a result of the cross-reference to the Statute, art 31). None of the rules of procedure makes any provision at all for a party to draw the attention of the Court to some matter that might indicate that a judge should be recused because of a conflict of interest or for some other reason, although one would have thought that that would be important for the Court to know (there has been at least one instance in which concerns have been raised with the Court by document, only for the document to be returned to the party concerned as being a document not provided for in the rules of procedure).

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(even documents that constitute evidence in a case) because they are of necessity documents that relate to the procedure before the Court. Pleadings are therefore a species of procedural document.537 Pleadings are, however, a specific type of procedural document (namely, a document that sets out a party’s submissions to the Court); and they may be narrowed down to those particular documents identified in the rules of procedure as documents that the Court receives from a party containing that party’s submissions (an application, defence, reply, rejoinder, written observations) or that the Court expressly invites a party to submit for the purpose of obtaining the party’s submissions on a particular point. In principle, the procedural documents generated by a party in proceedings before the Court are, for the most part, pleadings and documents of an evidential nature (for the sake of completeness, although it is not relevant in the present context, the procedural documents generated by the Court are, for the most part, formal notifications, judgments and opinions). 1.111 Documents (however described) that are provided for in the rules of procedure are either documents specifically mentioned in those rules or documents that the Court asks a party to produce either specifically (normally by letter from the Registrar) or generally (such as in a practice direction) in the performance of its judicial functions and for the purposes of the case in question. Any other document (however described) is not provided for in the rules of procedure. That rigid dividing line between the first and second classes of document, referred to above, can pose some difficulties. Any resulting problem can be resolved by the President (of the ECJ, GC or, as the case may be, the CST).538 Defective documents are those documents (however described) that are provided for in the rules of procedure (including those requested from a party by the Court) but that do not satisfy all the formal requirements set out in the rules of procedure (as supplemented by, for example, any relevant practice directions).539 1.112 The difference between a document not provided for in the rules of procedure and a defective document (being a document that is provided for in the rules of procedure) can sometimes be difficult to draw. Thus, a document whose communication to the Court is not provided for in the rules of procedure, such as a pleading lodged after the close of the written procedure in a case (otherwise than pursuant to a request or order of the Court that it be lodged) is difficult to classify. The rules of procedure envisage that, in the ordinary course, no further document will be lodged after that stage in the proceedings. Where a document lodged after the close of the written procedure is obviously one that should not be received, the Registrar will return it to the party concerned without consulting the President and without sending copies to the judge-rapporteur and, as the case may be, the advocate general. However, it is possible for a new plea in law to be introduced even after the close of the written procedure where it is based on matters of fact or of law which have come to light in the course of the proceedings.540 A document 537 IR-CST, art  8(4) uses the phrase ‘procedural documents’ to mean, apparently, pleadings; whereas IR-CST, art 8(5) distinguishes between ‘pleadings’ and ‘procedural documents’. 538 PD-GC, para 90; IR-CST, art 8(2) and (7). IR-ECJ, art 4(2) used so to provide. It is understood that the practice of the ECJ remains the same. 539 Not all practice directions are mandatory. 540 RP-ECJ, art 127(1); RP-GC, art 84(1)–(2); RP-CST, art 56(1)–(2).

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(in that instance, a pleading) raising such a plea cannot be rejected automatically: the admissibility of the plea is to be decided in the final judgment and not before. When such a document is lodged after the close of the written procedure, the practice of the ECJ’s Registry is to refer the question of its acceptance to the President (copies being sent to the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general).541 If the document is accepted, the other parties are given an opportunity to submit their observations. Otherwise the document is returned to the party lodging it. Accordingly, the document may or may not be one that is provided for in the rules of procedure; and, if it is defective, it may or may not, technically, be a defective document. It is not clear to what extent, if at all, a document that fails to satisfy a procedural requirement but that is in all other respects a document whose communication to the Court is envisaged in the rules of procedure is ‘not provided for’ by them. Generally speaking, the better view seems to be that it is. It would appear that the procedural defect may be a reason for not serving the document on the other party or for eventually deciding that the document is formally inadmissible; but it is not a reason for refusing to lodge the document or refusing to register it.542 (b) Reception 1.113 The Court’s rules use a number of different terms in connection with the reception of documents by the Court: ‘lodgement’, ‘registration’, ‘placing on the file’, ‘acceptance’.543 Two of those terms – ‘registration’ and ‘placing on the file’ – appear in principle to be actions that are consequential upon the ‘lodgement’ and ‘acceptance’ of the document. ‘Registration’, as explained above, is the recording of receipt of the document in the Court’s register. ‘Placing on the file’ is the inclusion of the document, physically, in the Court’s case file. In principle, at least, registration is also the formal acknowledgement of inclusion of the document in the case file. 1.114 ‘Lodgment’ is the formal act of communicating a document to the Court and, contemporaneously, the formal act of receiving the document by the Court. For procedural purposes, documents can be lodged at the Court: (i) by physically handing the document over to an official in the Registry of the appropriate Court or, at times when the Registry is shut, handing them to the Court’s janitor;544 (ii) by post, addressed to the registry of the relevant court (lodgment occurring upon physical receipt of the document at the Court through the medium of the postal service used);545 and by certain non-physical means of delivery of a document, 541 In proceedings brought in the ECJ against a member state in respect of an alleged failure to perform an obligation imposed by the Treaties, documents evidencing compliance by that member state with its obligations are accepted, if lodged after the end of the written procedure, and served on the other party for its written observations (usually the applicant — the Commission — is asked to inform the Court within a certain period of time whether or not it intends to go on with the case). 542 Pursuant to PD-GC, para 104, the GC Registrar must ensure that procedural documents placed on the case file are in proper form. If they are defective, the party in question may be given a period of time in which to rectify the defect (PD-GC, para 105) and, in the meantime, service on the other party may be deferred (PD-GC, paras 110–113). Annexes 1–3 set out the defects that may or may not cause service to be deferred. 543 All can be found in, for example, PD-GC, section III.B. 544 PD-ECJ, para 40; PD-GC, para 7; IR-CST, art 3(5). 545 PD-ECJ, para 42; PD-GC, paras 84–85; PD-CST, para 4.

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for which particular rules are laid down, namely, (iii) by facsimile (fax) or electronic mail (e-mail);546 and (iv) by means of the e-Curia system.547 The Court’s rules were originally drawn up at a time when the only means of communication by way of a document was by physical production of the document itself; and, even though other means of communication are now acceptable, conceptually the formal communications made between an actual or prospective party and the Court remain documents and adaptations to the rules have been made to accommodate certain non-physical means of communication only. Thus, technically (and when the e-Curia system is not being used), receipt at the registry by fax or (in the case of the ECJ) other technical means of communication available to the Court (e-mail) of a copy of a signed original of a pleading is merely deemed to be lodgment of the original of the pleading for the purpose of satisfying any relevant time limit – as long as the original document is validly lodged at the registry (by physical means) within 10 days of communication of the copy.548 It follows that, apart from the e-Curia system, the permitted non-physical means of lodging a

5 46 PD-ECJ, para 43; PD-GC, paras 78–83; PD-CST, para 4. 547 For the lodging and service of procedural documents by electronic means using the ‘e-Curia’ system, see the Decisions of the ECJ of 13 September 2011, GC of 14 September 2011 and CST of 20 September 2011 (OJ 2011 No L289, pp 7, 9 and 11, respectively); the e-Curia Conditions of Use applicable to parties’ representatives of 11  October 2011; the e-Curia Conditions of Use applicable to assistants of the same date; PD-ECJ, para  41; PD-GC, para  74–77; PDCST, para 3. For a description of the system, see Christopher Thomas, e-Curia, The European Advocate, Spring 2012 (pp 12–13). 548 RP-ECJ, art 57(7); RP-GC, art 73(3); RP-CST, art 45(2). In Case C-458/09P Italy v Commission, 24 November 2011, paras 23–27, an appeal was transmitted to the ECJ by electronic means in the form of an unsigned Word document accompanied by a PDF  version of the contents page followed by the representative’s signature. The ECJ held that that was effective lodgment of a copy of the signed original (which therefore had to be followed up by lodgement of the signed original). The ten days allowed for lodgement of the original is not added to the original time limit for the lodgement of the pleading but is a condition of treatment of the faxed (or, in the case of the ECJ, e-mail) version as satisfying the original time limit. Thus, if the original is lodged more than ten days after communication of the faxed (or e-mailed) copy, the latter ceases to be relevant for time purposes and the pleading will be out of time unless the original was itself lodged within time: see, for example, T-194/95  INTV II  Area Cova SA v Council [1996] ECR II-343, para 4; Case T-138/01R F v Court of Auditors [2001] ECRSC I-A-211, II-987 (application for rectification); Case T-281/01 Laboratoires Monique Remy SAS  v Commission [2002]  ECR II-2139, paras 20–21; Case C-193/01P  Pitsiorlas v Council [2003] ECR I-4837, paras 15–17; Case C-369/03P Forum des migrants de l’Union europeenne v Commission [2004]  ECR  I-1981, paras 12–14; Case C-325/03P  Zuazaga Meabe v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2005]  ECR  I-403, paras13–19; Case C-242/07P Belgium v Commission [2007] ECR I-9757, paras 33 and 38–40 (mandatory nature of the provision); Case T-223/06P Parliament v Eistrup [2007] ECR II-1581, para 49; Case F-82/06 Duyster v Parliament [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-455, II-A-1-2583, para 42; Case T-125/06 Centro Studi Antonio Manieri Srl v Council [2009]  ECR II-69, para  26. See also Case C-426/10P Bell & Ross BV v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 22  September 2011, in which a copy of the application commencing proceedings was lodged by fax within time; seven, apparently signed, copies of the application were lodged out of time (but within the period of 10 days provided for in RP-GC, art 43(6)); and the signed original (identified by passing a damp cloth over the signature) was lodged thereafter. The application was nonetheless inadmissible. If the original differs from the faxed or e-mailed copy, the lodgment of the copy will not be effective: F v Court of Auditors (above), paras 8–9 (difference in the signature); Ocalan (above, note 527), para 99.

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pleading are not a substitute for, or a replacement of, physical communication of a document.549 The party lodging a document is entitled to ask for a receipt evidencing lodgment.550 The receipt evidences physical lodgment but not acceptance of the document by the registry. Under the e-Curia system, a procedural document is lodged exclusively by electronic means and a paper version of the document (together with the appropriate number of certified copies) need not be sent to the Court.551 1.115 In procedural terms, the registry’s function in relation to the receipt of documents is to complete the formal process of lodgement, initiated by the act of the (actual or prospective) party who has presented the document to the Court, by acting upon the physical or actual lodgement of the document (whether in hard or soft copy form). That involves examining the document to see if it exhibits the characteristics required of a formal communication from a party to the Court, has been presented within any applicable time limit and meets any other applicable formal requirement.552 ‘Acceptance’ is the (successful) result of that process; and it gives rise to registration and the placing of the document on the case file.553 A refusal to accept a document normally occurs after the document has been physically received by the registry (whether in hard or soft copy form) through the process of lodgement. Hence, the formal receipt of documents by the Court (through the registry), manifested by placing it on the case file and entering it in the register, is different from the physical receipt of the document by, for example, the Court’s janitor. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that it is doubtful if physical receipt of any document can be refused save in the extreme case of the attempted lodgement of a document that has manifestly nothing to do with the case in question or any case brought or to be brought before the Court.554 Apart from that extreme case, physical receipt of a document is necessary in order to enable the registry to verify the nature of the document and its compliance with the rules. The non-acceptance of the document can, however, be immediately after physical receipt, such as where the document is handed

549 By way of contrast, RP-ECJ, art  57(8), RP-GC, art  74 and RP-CST, art  45(3) provide that the ECJ, GC and CST, respectively, may determine by decision the criteria by reference to which a procedural document sent to the registry by electronic means may be deemed to be an original of the document (such a decision is to be published in the Official Journal). Those provisions have been implemented by the e-Curia system (see note 547 above and Article 3 of the Decisions referred to in that note). 550 That used to be provided for in express terms. Currently, lodgment is mostly effected using e-Curia. 551 PD-ECJ, para 41; PD-GC, para 75; PD-CST, para 3(b). 552 Cf PD-GC, paras 86–87 (which appear under the heading ‘Non-acceptance of procedural documents and items’); IR-CST, art 8(1)–(3). 553 Accordingly, when PD-GC, para 86 states that the Registrar must refuse to ‘register’ procedural documents which are not provided for in the rules of procedure, and PD-GC, para 87 states that the Registrar must refuse to ‘accept’ procedural documents that do not bear the original, handwritten, signature of the party’s representative, the two provisions are not markedly different in their meaning and effect. 554 For example, if someone turned up at the Court proffering a copy of a child’s comic, it could be refused peremptorily.

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over to a registry official who sees at once that it is a document that cannot be accepted and thereupon hands the document back. 1.116 For the purpose of reception by the Court in hard copy form, the original of every pleading, expressed in the language of the case (or the language that the party submitting the pleading has been authorised to use in the proceedings)555 and accompanied by all annexes referred to therein, must be lodged at the Court with jurisdiction over the case, together with five (ECJ and CST) or three (GC) copies for that Court and one for every other party to the proceedings, all copies being certified by the party lodging them556 (as noted above, the possibility of communicating a pleading by certain technical means does not remove the necessity to lodge the original in physical form). However, where a procedural document is lodged by means of e-Curia, a hard copy form and certified copies do not need to be provided.557 The EU institutions must also provide translations, into the other official languages of the EU, of all their pleadings in the case together with the correct number of certified copies within a time limit fixed by the Court.558 Documents other than pleadings are not subject to the rule that an original document must be accompanied by a specified number of certified cop-

555 As to the language of the case, see Ch 2. As to the importance of lodging the signed original, see Case T-307/11 Noscirai SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), order of 28 November 2011 (on appeal, Case C-69/12 P, above, note 108): by error, the original was retained by the party and only scanned copies provided to the GC; but such a failure cannot be regularised and the action was therefore inadmissible. 556 RP-ECJ, art 57(2); RP-GC, art 73(2); RP-CST, art 45(2), 2nd subpara. The usual practice is for a copy to be marked on the first page (by manuscript or in print) or stamped as a certified true copy and for the party’s lawyer or agent to appose his or her signature or initials on or in the immediate vicinity of the mark or stamp. It is not usual for the copy to be signed in the same way as the original is signed (that is, on the last page of the pleading). The copy may or may not be a copy of the signed original. If it is a copy of the signed original, it will bear (a copy of) the signature of the party’s agent or lawyer on the last page. Even so, it is still necessary for the certification of the copy as a true copy to be accompanied by the lawyer’s or agent’s signature (or initials). If the copy is of the original pleading before it was signed, it is all the more important for the certification of the copy as a true copy to be accompanied by a signature (or initials). At the time of writing, PD-GC, paras 82 and 85 say that the signed original must be accompanied by certified copies; but PD-GC, para 95 says that the first page of each copy ‘of the original of every procedural document bearing the handwritten signature of the representative of the party concerned’ must be endorsed ‘certified copy’, initialled underneath by the representative. The phrase ‘the original of every procedural document bearing the handwritten signature of the representative of the party concerned’ is ambiguous because a copy of the unsigned original is just as much a copy ‘of the original of [a] procedural document bearing the handwritten signature of the representative of the party concerned’ as a copy of the signed original. As a precaution, it is better to produce copies of the signed original. As the cases on the signature of the original of a pleading show, the signature should be the actual signature of the party’s agent or lawyer and not, for example, a stamp or the name of a law firm: see Ch 3. Where, as required by PD-GC, para 95, initials have to be used instead of a signature (for reasons that are not entirely clear), they should be the initials of the representative and should have been placed on the copy by him or her. 557 See Article 4 of the Decisions referred to in note 547 above. 558 RP-ECJ, art 57(3); RP-GC, art 72(5); RP-CST, art 45(1), 4th subpara.

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ies.559 When a statement is sent to the Court in the name of a member state, the Registry must satisfy itself that the document is authentic: member states have often applied to intervene in a case or make other communications by telex or fax and the Registry may require the authenticity of the communication to be confirmed or ask for the name and capacity of the signatory. The fact that a communication is made by fax or by electronic mail rather than by letter does not affect its validity, although there may be some question whether or not the formal requirements for submitting a procedural document in time have been satisfied. Applications for an extension of time and communications of minor importance can in principle be made by fax or e-mail. Any communication made by fax or e-mail should be sent to the fax machine or e-mail address of the relevant registry and not to any other fax machine or e-mail address at the Court.560 It is good practice to ascertain from the registry its preferred means of communication before a minor communication is made. 1.117 Under the e-Curia system for lodgment of documents, an agent or a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a member state or EEA state561 may apply to the registry of any of the ECJ, GC or CST for an account to be opened in his or her name giving access to the functionalities of e-Curia. Once such an account is opened, the agent or lawyer can use e-Curia to lodge procedural documents in every case in which the agent or lawyer is representing a party. It is not necessary to open such an account with each of the ECJ, GC and CST: the account opened by the registry of any one of them is equally valid for all the others. Once the account has been opened, procedural documents can be lodged if sent in PDF form.562 (c)

Defective documents

1.118 Historically, the general rule was that the Registrar of the ECJ must decline to accept or else return without delay by registered post any pleading or other document not provided for in the rules of procedure or not worded in the language of the case unless otherwise expressly authorised by the President or the Court.563 The Registrar of the GC is similarly obliged: not to register or place on the case file procedural documents that are not provided for by the rules of procedure; not to accept procedural documents lacking the original handwritten signature of the party’s representative; and, save in cases expressly provided for in the rules of procedure, not to register or place on the case file procedural 559 That rule applied originally to ‘pleadings’. When the rules of procedure were remodelled in 2012–2015, the revamped provision – RP-ECJ, art  57, RP-GC, art  73, RP-CST, art  45 – substituted ‘procedural document’ for ‘pleading’. Unfortunately, the phrase ‘procedural document’ is often not limited to pleadings unless the context requires it to be so limited. The established practice is that procedural documents that are not pleadings do not need to be accompanied by any copies. 560 The current addresses used by the ECJ, GC and CST for the lodging of procedural documents can be obtained from the Court’s website. See further Ch 9. 561 For agents and lawyers, see Ch 3. 562 See further Ch 9. 563 IR-ECJ, art 4(2). It is understood that that remains the practice.

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documents that are not expressed in the language of the case.564 In the first case, where he is in doubt, the Registrar of the GC may refer the matter for decision to the President; and, in the first and third cases, where the Registrar has decided the matter, it is provided that, if the Registrar’s decision is challenged by the party concerned, the matter must be referred by the Registrar to the President (by implication the same occurs in the second case).565 The same obligations (and the same possibility of the matter being determined by the President of the CST) apply to the Registrar of the CST, save that, in the three cases referred to above, the CST Registrar’s obligations are not to register the document (in the first case) and not to accept it (in the second and third).566 Those obligations of the Registrar do not imply any duty owed to a party to inform him promptly of a defect in a pleading because it is the responsibility of a party’s representative to ensure that a pleading complies with the Rules of Procedure.567 1.119 The first type of document to be treated as indicated above by the Registrar (a pleading—or procedural document—not provided for in the rules of procedure) is not a defective pleading or document. It is a pleading or document that falls entirely outside the scope of communications between the Court and a party within the context of litigation brought or to be brought before the Court. The general rule referred to above also indicates that a pleading or procedural document not drawn up in the language of the case is different from a pleading or document that is not provided for in the rules of procedure.568 Of course, in one sense, a pleading or other document not drawn up in the language of the case is a pleading or document not provided for in the rules of procedure because those rules require pleadings or documents to be drawn up in the language of the case. Pleadings or other documents not expressed in the language of the case are provided for in the rules of procedure only where the obligation to use that language does not, for some reason apply. In that event, however, the rule obliging the Registrar to refuse to accept the document also does not apply. The example of pleadings or documents not drawn up in the language of the case is useful because it shows that the rules accept that there is a distinction between 564 PD-GC, paras 86, 87, 89. Cf PD-GC, paras 104–106, which concern procedural documents that are not in conformity with the rules of procedure etc. (and are therefore defective) but are not, seemingly, documents that are not provided for in the rules of procedure. 565 PD-GC, paras 86 and 90. If the Registrar has refused to accept a procedural document on the ground that it has not been signed by the party’s representative, the document is not registered or placed on the case file. 566 IR-CST, art 8(1)–(3) and (5). Referral of the matter to the President of the CST is provided for in IR-GC, art 8(2), (5) and (7). 567 Case C-69/12 P Noscirai (above, note 108), paras 14–15. 568 If a procedural document not drawn up in the language of the case were a document not provided for in the rules of procedure, there would be no need for a separate rule to deal with such documents. Such documents are provided for by the rules of procedure in terms of their content; but they are defective in terms of their form or presentation because they are not expressed in the language of the case. Such documents are distinct from documents that are evidence in the case. Documents of that nature have to be produced in their original form, accompanied by a translation (or a translation of the relevant part of the document) into the language of the case: RP-ECJ, art  38(2)–(3); RP-GC, art  46(2)–(3) (the GC language rules apply to the CST: see Statute, Annex, art 7(2)).

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pleadings or documents that are not provided for in the rules of procedure and pleadings or documents that are provided for in them but that are defective. Defective documents are dealt with in a number of ways. The position regarding the reception of documents is as follows. 1.120 As noted above, if a pleading or other document is not drawn up in the language of the case, the Registrar must refuse to enter it on the register or place it on the case file (GC) or refuse to accept it (CST). The refusal should be communicated to the party lodging the document forthwith569 so that the defect can be remedied (if possible) before the expiry of a relevant time limit or an application can be made (if possible) for time to be extended.570 In proceedings before the GC (and, at the time of writing, the CST), there is a variation from that rule in the case of applications to intervene originating from a third party other than a member state: the Registrar must require the application to be put in order (that is, expressed in the language of the case) before it is served on the parties; and, if that is done within the period for doing so fixed by the Registrar, the date of lodgement of the first (irregular) application is taken to be the date on which the application was lodged.571 By implication, if an application expressed in the language of the case is lodged after the period fixed by the Registrar, the date of lodgement of the first (irregular) application is ignored. It follows from that rule that the first (irregular) application, although physically lodged, is not accepted; the second (regular) application is accepted, if lodged within the period fixed by the Registrar, with the date of lodgement backdated to the date of lodgement of the irregular application. 1.121 However it is lodged (that is, whether by physical delivery at the registry, post, fax, e-mail or e-Curia), the first pleading lodged by a party either in a case or initiating a procedure relating to a case must provide information enabling the Court to effect service of procedural documents on that party.572 569 Historically, that has been the practice in the ECJ: see IR-ECJ, art 4(2). As the Noscirai case (above, notes 108 and 566) indicates, that is a matter of practice, not obligation. 570 Under PD-GC, para 108 and IR-CST, art 8(5), the position regarding documents annexed to a pleading or procedural document is different. Where such documents are not accompanied by a translation into the language of the case (as is required by RP-GC, art 46(2), which also applies to CST proceedings), the Registrar of the GC must require the party concerned ‘to make good the irregularity’ but only if the Registrar considers that to be necessary for the efficient conduct of the proceedings. It would appear that both the annex in question and the document to which it is annexed must be ‘accepted’ by the Registrar despite the irregularity because, if the irregularity is not made good, the annex must be removed from the case file (which presupposes that it was placed on the case file, and therefore registered, despite the irregularity). The Registrar of the CST may accept an annex that is not in the language of the case ‘where duly justified’. It seems, therefore, that as long as sufficient reason is given (the sufficiency of the reason being judged by reference to the requirements of the efficient conduct of the proceedings just as much as by reference to anything else), the annex may be ‘accepted’. 571 PD-GC, para 109; IR-CST, art 8(6). That rule does not apply in proceedings before the ECJ because applications to intervene need not be made in the language of the case: Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR 1 at 48. The GC (and, it would appear, the CST) do not follow that case. 572 See paras 1.146–1.148 below for the required information and, for the various pleadings in question, see Chs 8, 9 and 16.

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If an application (or any other pleading that must provide service information) fails to set out the required service information, the consequence is that, for as long as the defect remains, service on the party concerned is effected by registered letter addressed to that party’s agent or lawyer and service is deemed to be duly effected by lodging the registered letter at the post office of the place where the Court has its seat.573 Thus, such a defect in a pleading does not preclude the reception of the document by the registry and does not require rectification (although the usual practice is for the party to be requested to rectify it);574 but it will be in a party’s interest to remedy the defect because it is more convenient to have service effected on the party’s representative by fax or e-mail (if not by e-Curia). 1.122 If an application575 or other pleading does not comply with the requirements of RP-ECJ, art 119(2)–(3), RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3) or RP-CST, art 45(1), 2nd and 3rd subparas, 45(2), 2nd subpara, or 46, or an application does not comply with the requirements of RP-ECJ, art 122(1)–(2), RP-GC, art 78(1)–(5) or RP-CST, art 50(1)(a)-(c), (2) or (5), where it is required to do so, the Registrar prescribes a reasonable period within which the pleading must comply with those requirements and so informs the party lodging the pleading; if that party does not comply with the Registrar’s directions, the latter refers the matter to the Court576 and the Court decides whether or not the failure to comply renders the pleading formally inadmissible (in the case of the ECJ, after hearing the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general).577 Under the ECJ and GC rules of procedure, that procedure applies to defects that are not to be found in the pleading itself. The first type of defect to which the procedure applies concerns the question whether or not the party lodging the pleading is properly represented, although the procedure does not apply in the event of a change in the representation of the party (which normally has no procedural consequences unless the 573 RP-ECJ, art  121(3); RP-GC, art  77(2); RP-CST, art  50(4). Eg Case C-369/03P  Forum des migrants de l’Union europeenne v Commission [2004]  ECR  I-1981, paras 10–11. That rule does not apply where the e-Curia system is being used or where the party’s representative has agreed to service by fax or e-mail instead of providing an address for service: Case C-360/02P Ripa de Meana v Parliament [2004] ECR I-10339, paras 21–23; Cases C-442/03P and C-471/03P  P&O  European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA  v Commission [2006]  ECR  I-4845, para 22. 574 It is not one of the defects listed in RP-ECJ, art 119(4), RP-GC, art 51(4) or 78(5), or RP-CST, art 50(6) as calling for action on the part of the Registrar. 575 That is, an application commencing proceedings or a particular procedure envisaged in the Rules of Procedure (such as an application to intervene, an application commencing third party proceedings or an application for revision of a judgment). 576 The Registrar is not competent to rule on the inadmissibility of a pleading: see Case 131/83 Vaupel v European Court of Justice (15 March 1984, unreported), para 10. 577 RP-ECJ, art  119(4) and 122(3); RP-GC, art  51(4) and 78(6); RP-CST, art  50(6). Parallel provisions apply to the defence in GC and CST proceedings: RP-GC, art  81(2); RP-CST, art  53(4). IR-CST, art  8(1) is more broadly expressed. Under PD-GC, para  110 and Annex 1, service on the opposing party is deferred until the defect is rectified or (presumably) the pleading is held by the GC to be admissible. The rules of procedure presupposes that the application (albeit in a defective form) has been lodged in time. If not, that does not apply: see Case C-242/07P Belgium v Commission [2007] ECR I-9757, para 41 (lodging of annexes in time is not equivalent to the lodging of a (defective) application).

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signatory of the pleading was not, or could not be, the party’s agent or lawyer).578 The second type of defect relates to the largely formal documents that must be annexed to, or accompany, the pleading. Only the CST rules of procedure apply the procedure more broadly and, in particular, to defects in the pleading itself.579 Logically, all such defects should be dealt with in the same way, whatever the pleading, although the first is normally relevant only to the first pleading lodged by a party. However, the rules of procedure are patchy and inconsistent on that point.580 For the sake of completeness, the (apparent) intended effect of the rules of procedure is that the requirements in question should be complied with at the time when the pleading in question is presented for lodgment at the Court (if not, the procedure specified in the rules is engaged at that point in time). 1.123 The rule (RP-ECJ, art 119(4); RP-ECJ, art 122(3); RP-GC, art 51(4); RP-GC, art 78(5); RP-CST, art 50(6)) does not specify whether or not, in such a case, the pleading is ‘accepted’ by the Registrar. On one view (in relation to the GC and the CST, and the ECJ, so far as RP-ECJ, art 122 is concerned), that appears to be covered by the general rule of non-acceptance of irregular documents. Accordingly, on that view, while the pleading has been physically lodged, it is not accepted by the Registrar unless and until the irregularity has been corrected in accordance with his direction. If not so corrected, the matter is for the Court, which implies (as the nature of the requirements in question indicates) that the irregularities in question do not affect the lodgement of the pleading (for the purpose of any time limit): it is rather a refusal to comply with the Registrar’s direction, combined with the irregularity in question, that is capable of affecting the admissibility of the pleading.581 In practice, the application used to be registered and notified to the defendant with a copy of the Registrar’s letter to the applicant. Latterly, it is instead registered and retained at the registry until the defect is remedied or the Court has declared that it is admissible notwithstanding the failure to observe the formal requirements referred to in RP-ECJ, art 122(1)–

5 78 Cf Case C-573/11 P ClientEarth v Commission, 5 September 2013, paras 22–23. 579 RP-CST, art 50(6) covers a failure to comply with RP-CST, art 50(1)(a)–(c). 580 RP-ECJ, art 119 and RP-GC, art 51 (representation) affect an application ‘or written pleading’: see RP-ECJ, art  119(4); RP-GC, art  51(4). They therefore apply generally to all pleadings and it is not necessary for them to be applied by express provision to a pleading other than the application. RP-ECJ, art 124, which deals with the defence, does not contain provisions paralleling those applicable to applications. RP-GC, art 81(2) (which deals with the defence) applies the procedure only to one document but, for an unknown reason, duplicates the effect of RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3), through the cross-reference to RP-GC, art 78(5). PD-GC, paras 104–107 deal with the position more broadly (PD-GC, para  111 and Annex 2 provide for service to be deferred in the meantime). RP-CST, art 31 (representation) applies generally but does not set out the procedure to be followed in the case of non-compliance. That is done by RP-CST, art 50(5) and (6) (applications) and RP-CST, art 53(3), 1st subpara, and (4) (defences). RP-CST, art 50(6) and 53(4) apply the procedure generally to annexes and supporting documents (in the case of applications and defences, respectively). 581 In the case of the requirements in RP-ECJ, art 122(1), RP-GC, art 78(1) and RP-CST, art 50(2), which follow from the second paragraph of Statute, art 21, the party’s rights are unaffected if the documents in question are produced after the expiry of the time for bringing proceedings: see the last sentence of Statute, art 21. However, that does not preclude the Court from holding that the application is inadmissible if the Registrar’s direction has not been complied with.

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(2), RP-GC, art 78(1)–(2) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 50(2).582 When the defect is remedied or the pleading has been declared admissible, the pleading is served on the other party.583 The effect of RP-ECJ, art 119 and RP-GC, art 51 is that defects covered by RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and RP-GC, art 51(4) do not concern any pleading at all because, technically, they relate to the representation of the party and affect the pleading only if it has been lodged by an unrepresented party; however, as noted above, the defects covered by RP-ECJ, art 122(3) and 78(5) remain pleading defects. Accordingly, in the case of a failure to comply with the requirements in RP-ECJ, art 119(2)–(3) and RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3), there is no basis at all for failing to accept and register the pleading. On the other hand, the pleading is served only after RP-ECJ, art 119(2)–(3) or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art  51(2)–(3) have been complied with or the Court has declared the pleading to be ‘admissible’.584 1.124 In GC and CST proceedings, a distinction is drawn between procedural documents (that is, pleadings) that are not provided for in the rules of procedure and procedural documents that are not in conformity with the Statute, the Rules of Procedure, any Practice Directions and, where relevant, the Instructions to the Registrar.585 The former may not be ‘accepted’ or registered.586 So far as the latter are concerned, only conforming documents can be placed on the casefile and provision is made for the Registrar to give the party lodging the document time to make good any formal irregularities in the pleading.587 Service is deferred until the pleading is regularised.588 If the pleading is not regularised, the matter is referred to the Court (in GC proceedings) or the President (in CST proceedings).589 By necessary implication, the pleading is lodged, accepted and registered before being transmitted to the Court or the President for a decision on the admissibility of the pleading: transmission to the Court or President is obviously necessary because, otherwise, no decision on admissibility can be 582 At that stage in the proceedings, the Court is concerned only with the formal admissibility of the pleading and not with its substantial admissibility. See, for example, the procedure followed in Case T-101/92 Stagakis v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-63. 583 RP-ECJ, art 123; RP-GC, art 80(2) and PD-GC, para 110; RP-CST, art 51(1). 584 RP-ECJ, art 123; RP-GC, art 80(2), which refers back to RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3) through RPGC, art 78(6); PD-GC, para 110. RP-ECJ, art 123 applies in the same way to both RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and RP-ECJ, art 122(3). However, the wording of RP-ECJ, art 123 is inconsistent with what the ECJ appears to have sought to achieve by dividing what had been RP-ECJ, art 38 into two distinct provisions. The references in RP-ECJ, art 123 to ‘the application’ and to the application being ‘put in order’ are appropriate in the context of RP-ECJ, art 122(3) but not in the context of RP-ECJ, art 119(4). In the context of RP-ECJ, art 119(4), the question is whether or not the party is represented in accordance with the rules of procedure, which may require verification of the professional status of the person signing the pleading; but that is not a defect in the pleading. Further, in order to be consistent, RP-ECJ, art 123 ought to refer to other pleadings, so far as RP-ECJ, art 119(4) is concerned. 585 PD-GC, para 86 and 104; IR-CST, art 8(1)–(2). 586 PD-GC, para 86; IR-CST, art 8(2). 587 PD-GC, para 104–105; IR-CST, art 8(1). 588 That is provided for in detail in PD-GC, paras 104–113 and Annexes 1–3. However, only specific types of formal irregularity are covered by the Annexes. 589 PD-GC, paat 110 (which applies to other pleadings pursuant to PD-GC, para 113); IR-CST, art 8(7).

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taken;590 and provision needs to be made for suspension of service of a pleading only if it would otherwise be in a situation to be served (that is, only if it had been accepted and registered).591 By implication, the Court would not hold the application to be inadmissible if the defect could be cured by the party concerned (before the expiry of any relevant time limit) or if it was a purely formal defect. It should be noted that, so far as GC proceedings are concerned, the defects here in question are not covered by the machinery referred to in the preceding paragraph and, indeed, there is no specific provision in the rules of procedure of the GC for dealing with them. So far as the CST is concerned, there is a partial overlap because defects falling within RP-CST, art 50(1)(a), (b) and (c) are dealt with as indicated in the preceding paragraph but those falling within RP-CST, art 50(1) (d)–(f) are not. The process here in question, set out in the GC Practice Rules and the CST Instructions to the Registrar for dealing with non-conforming pleadings, seems to be an attempt to make up for a perceived gap in the rules of procedure of the GC and CST. 1.125 A non-conforming application (by way of example) could fail to comply with any part of RP-GC, art 76 and RP-CST, art 50(1). The defects in question can be divided up into three groups: (i) defects concerning the description of a party (failure to identify the applicant or defendant) or failure to identify the signatory of the application;592 (ii) defects concerning the substantive content of the application (failure to identify the subject-matter of the proceedings, state the pleas in law relied on or set out a form of order);593 and (iii) failure to indicate the nature of the evidence relied on.594 Defects of the first sort are usually matters of form that can be dealt with by asking the applicant to clarify the position. For example, it was the practice of the ECJ and the GC that, where the application failed to name the defendant expressly (a breach of what was at the time RP-ECJ, art 38(1) – now RP-ECJ, art 120 – or RP-GC, art 44(1) – now RP-GC, art 76 – which was and is not covered by RP-ECJ, art 38(7) – now RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3) – or RP-GC, art 44(6) – now RP-GC, art 51(4) and 78(5))595 but stated that it was directed against a measure of a particular EU institution, the application would be registered and the applicant asked to confirm that it was made against the institution in question. The application would be notified to the defendant only after the applicant’s reply had been received. Defects falling within (i) above become relevant to admissibility only if, upon enquiry, it is discovered that the applicant does not exist, lacks capacity or the ability to bring proceedings, the intended defendant is definitely the wrong person, or the signatory of the application cannot (or none of the signatories 590 Vaupel (above, note 576). 591 A  further point that may be made is that it is difficult to see how the Court can rule on the admissibility of an application commencing proceedings without the application having first been registered and without a case file having been opened. That suggests that defects in a pleading may be of two sorts: defects that render the pleading a nullity (or non-effective) in procedural terms (in which case, the pleading may be rejected without being registered); and defects that render the pleading capable of being rejected as inadmissible but not a nullity. 592 RP-GC, art 76(a)-(c); RP-CST, art 50(1)(a)-(c). 593 RP-GC, art 76(d)-(e); RP-CST, art 50(1)(d)-(e). 594 RP-GC, art 76(e); RP-CST, art 50(1)(f). 595 It is a breach of RP-CST, art 50(1)(c) but is covered by RP-CST, art 50(6).

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can) represent the applicant. Defects falling within (ii) above are capable of being substantive defects affecting the admissibility of the application.596 Defects falling within (iii) above are likely to be capable of affecting the admissibility of the application only in the most extreme cases.597 1.126 RP-ECJ, art  57(1) provides (as do RP-GC, art  73(1) and RP-CST, art  42(2), 1st subpara) that every pleading must be signed by the party’s agent or lawyer (or representative).598 A breach of that rule is not covered by RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3) – formerly RP-ECJ, art 38(7) – or by RP-GC, art 51(4) and 78(5) or RP-CST, art 50(6).599 The ECJ’s practice was that an unsigned application would be registered but returned to the applicant for correction if the applicant was not represented by a lawyer (or, implicitly, an agent) or if it had been lodged with particulars of the lawyer but not signed by him. So far as the GC and CST are concerned, such a situation is covered by the general duty of the Registrar to ensure that documents placed on the case file are in conformity with the rules applicable to the Court.600 Further, the GC and CST Registrars are obliged not to ‘accept’ a document that does not bear the original signature of the party’s lawyer or agent.601 That 5 96 See further Ch 9. 597 The text above is deliberately cautious on the point. The writer, for what it is worth, tends to the view that a failure to identify the nature of the evidence relied upon is incapable of affecting the admissibility of the application since it relates to proof of the matters of fact on which the application is based, which goes to the merits only of the application. 598 According to PD-GC, para  93, the signature must appear at the ‘end’ of the pleading. Where a pleading ends is not defined. The term presumably means the last page of the substantive submissions in the pleading. It is not clear how large a gap may be left between the last line of the pleading and the placing of the signature but PD-GC, para 93 is clear that the signature may not appear on its own on the last page. It should be observed, for the sake of clarity, that, in the case of pleadings lodged by means of e-Curia, use of the party’s representative’s user identification and password to effect lodgement constitutes signature of the document: e-Curia decisions (above, note 547), art 3. 599 The omission is clearly deliberate because RP-CST, art 50(6) cross-refers to the 2nd subpara of RP-CST, art 45(2) but not to the 1st subpara, which contains the requirement that the pleading be signed. 600 PD-GC, para 104; IR-CST, art 8(1). 601 PD-GC, para 87; IR-CST, art 8(3). Under PD-GC, para 88, the GC Registrar may request the lodgement of a lawyer’s or agent’s specimen signature, if necessary certified as a true specimen, in order to verify the signature on the pleading (cf Case T-158/99 Thermenhotel Stoiser Franz GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2004] ECR II-1, paras 44–45, in which the CFI was drawn into comparing different versions of the lawyer’s signature). PD-GC, Annex 2 at (f) indicates that the ‘position’ of the original signature of the lawyer or agent causes service of an application to be delayed (a reasonable period being fixed for putting the application in order). At first sight, if PD-GC, Annex 2 at (f) were intended to cover the complete absence of a signature, that would contradict PD-GC, para 87, since service can be delayed only if the pleading has been received by the registry (in the formal sense of the term), which the registry cannot do in the case of an unsigned application. However, it would seem that PD-GC, Annex 2 at (f) is concerned with the absence of the lawyer’s or agent’s signature from the ‘end’ of the pleading (a requirement of PD-GC, para  93), not with the problem posed by an unsigned application. Hence, if the lawyer or agent has made the shocking error of signing the pleading on, say, the first page or cover sheet (a not unknown practice of some antiquity), the requirement of RP-GC, art 73(1) has been satisfied and the registry is obliged to receive the pleading; but it will do nothing about serving it on the other party or parties until the last page has been signed (cf the Thermenhotel case, above, para 42: signing the first page of the original of the application was regarded as satisfying what is now RP-GC, art 73(1), the dispute concerning other matters).

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implies that such a document can neither be placed in the case file nor registered. It is understood that the current practice of the registries is not to enter a pleading with such a defect on the register but to return it to the party concerned; it would be entered on the register and then returned to the party lodging it for correction only if it appeared on the face of the pleading that the party was represented by a lawyer but (through an oversight) had not been signed by him. If, by chance, it were entered on the register, that does not constitute acceptance of the admissibility of the application (or other pleading).602 1.127 The application and defence must be lodged accompanied by a certificate that the lawyer acting for the party concerned is entitled to practise before a court of a member state or an EEA state.603 A failure to provide such a certificate does not, technically, render the application or defence a defective document.604 However, it seems convenient to deal with that requirement here because a failure to produce the certificate when requested to do so by the Court is, nonetheless, a formal defect which is sufficient to lead to the rejection of the application (or, as the case may be, the defence) as being inadmissible605 since it goes to the requirement that the pleading be signed by a properly qualified lawyer (unless the party can be, and is, represented by an agent). The ECJ’s current practice is understood to be to request the production of the certificate in each case (if it has not been provided at the time of lodgment of the application or defence).606 In addition to the certificate of entitlement to practise (or the equivalent) issued by the bar or other professional body of the lawyer concerned, the professional identity card issued under the aegis of the CCBE is acceptable if produced within three years of its date of issue; otherwise, the card must be authenticated. In the case of the GC and CST, the obligation to produce the certificate of entitlement to practise in conjunction with the application or defence is stated in express 602 See the Vaupel case, above (note 576); Cases 220 and 221/78  ALA  SpA and ALFER  SpA  v Commission [1979] ECR 1693; Case 73/83 Stavridis v European Parliament [1983] ECR 3803. 603 RP-ECJ, art 119(3); RP-GC, art 51(4), 78(4) and 81(2); RP-CST, art 31(2), 50(5) and 53(3). It should be observed that, in the case of RP-ECJ, art  119(3) and RP-GC, art  51(4), which refer generally to ‘the application or written pleading[s]’, the text above states the effect of those provisions rather than what they actually say. First, RP-ECJ, art 119(3) does not associate the lodging of the certificate of entitlement to practise with the lodging of the application or defence; and neither RP-ECJ, art 120 nor RP-ECJ, art 124 does so. The implication from RPECJ, art 123 is simply that service of the application on the defendant will be deferred until the certificate has been produced, following a request from the Registrar, if the certificate has not accompanied the application. Secondly, the application of RP-ECJ, art 119 and RP-GC, art 51 to pleadings generally (discussed above) follows from the broad language used in them. On the other hand, there is no requirement to produce the certificate more than once in the same case for the same lawyer. 604 It is actually the absence of the required professional standing of the signatory of the pleading that does so. 605 The Stagakis case (above, note 582), para 8; the Thermenhotel case (above, note 601), para 43. Where the party is represented by an agent, a failure to produce the certificate of a lawyer assisting the agent is not fatal because in that situation the agent, not the lawyer, is the party’s representative: see Case T-47/92 Lenz v Commission [1992] ECR II-2523, para 35. 606 That also follows from the wording of RP-ECJ, art 119 and its relationship to RP-ECJ, art 123 (see note 603 above). The ECJ has reserved the right to ask for evidence of the lawyer’s capacity at any stage in the proceedings: PD-ECJ, para 2.

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terms.607 The GC’s practice is also to accept the CCBE card. PD-GC, paras129 and 140 provide that, in the case of an application commencing proceedings and the defence ‘reference may be made to a document previously lodged at the Registry’. Hence, if the lawyer in question is currently acting for a party in another case before the GC, it seems to be sufficient to refer to the certificate produced for the purposes of that other case. If the certificate does not accompany an application, the application will not be served on the defendant until the certificate has been provided (the applicant will be given a reasonable period within which to comply).608 For its part, the CST accepts evidence of a lawyer’s entitlement to practise (including by means of a reference to a document previously lodged at the CST registry) as long as the documentary evidence relied on was drawn up less than five years before the date on which ‘the application’ was lodged.609 That seems to limit the rule to the application commencing proceedings; but the intention seems to be to cover the defence as well.610 1.128 So far as the GC is concerned, documents annexed to a pleading or procedural document must be lodged in accordance with the GC’s practice directions. If the practice directions have not been observed, the Registrar will request the party concerned to remedy the defect within a specific period of time. If that is not done, the Registrar refers the matter to the President for him to decide whether or not the annex can be accepted.611 Accordingly, irregular annexes are not accepted unless and until either the irregularity has been cured or the President has decided otherwise. PD-GC, paras110–113 and Annexes 1–3 helpfully classify ‘irregular’ applications into three groups, identifying the defects that will prevent or delay service and those defects that do not prevent service. (d)

Lodgment at the wrong registry

1.129 Where an application or other procedural document addressed to any one of the ECJ, the GC or CST is lodged by mistake with the wrong registry (such as where a pleading addressed to the ECJ is lodged with the registry of the GC or CST), it is to be transmitted immediately by the Registrar receiving it to

607 RP-GC, art 51(4), 78(4) and 81(2); PD-GC, para 128 and 140; RP-CST, art 31(2), 50(5) and 53(3). 608 PD-GC, para 110 and Annex 1 at (a). Presumably, it is sufficient compliance to refer to another document previously lodged at the registry, in accordance with PD-GC, para 129. 609 IR-CST, art 9. 610 IR-CST, art 9 also refers to the certificate of authorisation to practise to be produced by the lawyer assisting a party’s agent. The party in question would be the defendant in the proceedings (or, conceivably, an intervener): cf PD-CST, para 7. 611 PD-GC, para  107. Under PD-GC, para  108, an annex may be removed from the case-file automatically if it is not accompanied by a translation into the language of the case and the party lodging the annex has failed to provide a translation when asked to do so by the Registrar.

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the Registrar of the Court to which it was addressed.612 There is no express provision equating lodging at the wrong registry with lodgment at the correct registry; and the requirement that, in such a situation, the document must be transmitted ‘immediately’ to the correct registry implies that lodgment at the wrong registry has no procedural consequences (in other words, it is not a valid lodgment). In principle, the time taken to transmit the document from the registry where it was lodged by mistake to the registry where it should have been lodged ought not to give rise to any difficulty over the application of any relevant time limit. On the other hand, the possibility that such a mistake might give rise to such a difficulty in a particular case cannot be excluded.613 1.130 In principle, lodgment of a document at the wrong registry may occur either because the document was intended for one Court but sent to or delivered at another or because a mistake occurred in the identification of the Court for which the document was intended. Lest that appear too abstract, suppose a case of the physical delivery of an application commencing proceedings by a courier engaged by the party (a somewhat outmoded example, it has to be said, given that lodgement is mainly by e-Curia). The pleading will identify on its first page in which of the ECJ, GC or CST the party lodging the pleading intends to commence the proceedings. There may be a covering letter addressed to the Registrar of the relevant court. The pleading (together with copies) and the covering letter will be contained in an envelope or outer covering bearing an address. The courier will have received instructions to deliver the package at (presumably) the address indicated on the outside of the package. In that example, there are four possible opportunities for a mistake. The courier may misread the address on the cover of the package or lose his way and hand the package over at a registry that is not the one indicated on the cover of the package. He may deliver the package at the registry indicated on the cover of the package; but that may be the wrong one. The registry official dealing with the matter may open the package thinking that its contents are documents to be registered at the registry at which he works; 612 Statute, art  54 (first para) and Annex, art  8(1). Although the wording of those provisions refers expressly to lodgment ‘with’ a Registrar, lodgment at a registry is clearly meant. After 31 August 2016, a document sent for lodgement at the CST registry would be dealt with by the GC registry. That would not be a case of lodgement at the wrong registry because the CST registry would no longer exist as from 1 September 2016, in consequence of the abolition of the CST on that date and the reattribution of its jurisdiction to the GC. In that situation, the identification of the CST registry is really a misdescription of the GC registry. 613 The difficulty arises only where the document is lodged at the wrong registry (such as where a communication is sent – whether by fax, e-mail or post – to a particular registry), not where it is lodged by delivery to the Court’s janitor because he acts for the ECJ, the GC and the CST. At present, the ECJ, GC and CST have different addresses and notionally occupy different (interconnected) buildings. The janitors are employed by the Court in its institutional sense; the ECJ, GC and CST do not employ different janitors. Were the ECJ, the GC and the CST to occupy different buildings with different janitors for each Court, the position would appear to be the same as where a document is lodged at the wrong registry. Lodgement by e-Curia is in principle analogous to lodgement by hand delivery because the e-Curia system is common to the ECJ, GC and CST and, once an agent or lawyer has opened an e-Curia account, he may use it in every case in which he is representing a party before the Court: see the e-Curia Conditions of Use (above, note 547), paras 5–6.

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but his eyes may fall upon a covering letter addressed to a different registry. Finally, the pleading itself may be addressed to another registry; and, in that event, it may either be correct or incorrect (such as where, by error, an application commencing a staff case is headed ‘In the Court of Justice’ instead of ‘In the Civil Service Tribunal’ or, after 1 September 2016, ‘In the General Court’). In all those cases, the error (wherever it occurs) relates to the identity of the Court to which the pleading is ‘addressed’. There is, however, a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, intending a pleading to go to the correct Court and misaddressing it in some way and, on the other, making a mistake about the Court for which the pleading is intended. 1.131 In principle, where the pleading is intended for the correct Court but the mistake relates to its addressee, the error should be noticed as soon as the document is received by the wrong registry: it should appear on the face of the document that it has been lodged at the registry of a Court other than the one to which it is addressed. At that point, where the document has been lodged in hard copy form by the party or a person acting for him (such as a courier), any difficulty can be avoided by handing the document back to the person lodging it with instructions as to where the correct registry may be found.614 If the document was entered on the register before the mistake was noticed, the register would have to be corrected in order to record the transmission of the document to the correct registry. That, of course, is no bar to its immediate transmission to the correct registry. At that point, however, transmission could be effected only by the Registrar (that is, by a registry official acting on behalf of the Registrar), not by handing the pleading back and asking the person delivering it to take it to the correct registry. In effect, the same occurs where the pleading is lodged at the wrong registry by post, e-mail or fax but the error is identified before the pleading is registered. The pleading is not handed back to the sender but transmitted by the registry receiving the pleading to the correct registry. 1.132 Where the mistake is noticed only after the person lodging the document has left the Court building, or where the registry has undertaken (or, as may be the case once the document has been entered on the register, is obliged) itself to transmit the document to the correct registry, it would be unjust if any subsequent delay in the lodgment of the document at the correct registry were to have adverse consequences for the party concerned. The sensible solution seems to be that, so far as any relevant time limit is concerned, the document is to be regarded as having been lodged at the correct registry on the day and at the time that it was initially lodged (at the wrong registry); and it is understood that that is the current practice of the GC registry.615 In principle, no such difficulties arise in the case

6 14 It does not seem that the lodging of a document is an irrevocable act. 615 PD-GC, para 14 seems to have been drafted with the intention of resolving the difficulty by taking the date of erroneous lodgment at the ECJ or CST registry as being the date of lodgment at the GC registry. IR-CST, art 4(4), last indent, takes the same approach.

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of a pleading lodged using e-Curia because the e-Curia system is common to the ECJ, GC and CST.616 1.133 The situation converse to that where the document is correctly addressed (in the sense of being intended for the correct Court) but delivered at the wrong registry is the situation where the document is delivered at the registry to which it is incorrectly addressed or intended for (no adverse procedural consequences ensue if the document is incorrectly addressed but, by error, delivered at the correct registry). Where an application or other procedural document is lodged at the registry of the Court to which it is addressed but that Court does not have jurisdiction over the proceedings to which the application or other document relates, the position is more complex than in the case of delivery of a correctly addressed document at the wrong registry. It would seem that, in the case of a procedural document subsequent to the application commencing proceedings, the error should be evident because there will be no proceedings pending in the registry at which the document is lodged to which the document can relate. In principle, the document should be treated in the same way as a document lodged at the registry of the Court other than that to which it is addressed. If the error is not evident, that will be due to some failure on the part of the party lodging the document to identify properly the proceedings to which it relates or, exceptionally, to the existence of different proceedings before the ECJ, GC or CST having the same name and case number. In any event, the responsibility for making the error lies entirely with the party lodging the document and he must bear the consequences. Where an application commencing proceedings is addressed to and lodged at the wrong Court, the proceedings are barred from continuing before that Court and must be referred to the correct Court.617 When the problem is fairly obvious, the practice of the ECJ’s registry is to telephone the representative of the party lodging the application and ask him (or her) to rectify the position. If the position is not rectified by the party concerned, the matter can be determined only by the Court at which the application has been lodged, not the Registrar of that Court. A decision finding such an application to be inadmissible or barred from proceeding further and referring the case to the correct Court could easily be made after such an interval of time that it would lead inevitably to the inadmissibility of the proceedings before the correct Court, thus rendering the referral of the case to that Court futile, unless the time limit for commencing the proceedings before the correct Court were observed by lodgment of the application at the wrong Court. It therefore seems to be implicit that, in those circumstances, an action has not been brought out of time merely because the application commencing proceedings was addressed to and lodged at the wrong Court and the case was not referred to the correct Court within time. That appears to strengthen the case for saying that an application or other procedural docu 616 Accordingly, under the e-Curia decisions (above, note 547), art 5, a document is deemed to have been lodged at the time of the validation of lodgement of the document by the party’s representative. There is no need for a provision covering transmission of the pleading from one registry to another. 617 Statute, art 54 (second para) and Annex, art 8(2). The position is considered in greater detail below: see Ch 2, para 2.20 ff.

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ment that has been lodged at the Court other than the one to which it is addressed is to be regarded as having been lodged at the correct Court when it is handed over, by mistake, at the registry of the wrong Court.618 3 Custody of documents and the Court’s file 1.134 Documents originating proceedings619 are given on registration a serial number followed by a mention of the year in order to identify the case; for certain types of procedure, a special reference indicating the procedure is added to the serial number and year.620 The entire combination forms the case number. The name of the applicant, or the names of the main parties, or the subject matter of the application may also be used as indicators of the case in addition to the case number. In some cases, generally for reasons of confidentiality, a party may be referred to by an initial.621 The decision to that effect may be made by the Court of its own motion or upon request. A  person other than a party may also be given anonymity.622 Normally a decision granting anonymity would be made by the Court and would apply to all stages of the proceedings. If the request is made after the advocate general has delivered his opinion, the advocate general’s express consent is required because his opinion would have to be amended. A request for anonymity should ordinarily be made at the earliest opportunity because, otherwise, there is a risk that the identity of the person concerned may be revealed (for example, in the notice of the case published in the Official Journal) before the need for anonymity is appreciated. Anonymity will be granted only if there are legitimate reasons for keeping the identity of the person concerned confidential.623

6 18 As provided for in PD-GC, para 14 and IR-CST, art 4(4). 619 As the case may be, the application commencing a direct action, the order for reference made by the national court in the case of references for a preliminary ruling or the application initiating an appeal or review of a decision of a lower court. 620 PD-GC, para 15–19; IR-CST, art 5. In the ECJ, the case number identifies the case while the names of the parties provide a convenient method of referring to it: see IR-ECJ, art 12 (which reflects current practice). In the GC, the case is known by both the case number and the names of the parties: PD-GC, para 20. In the CST, the only official designation of the case is by its case number. A brief description of what the case is about is given for the Court’s internal use. 621 Eg Case 152/77 B v Commission [1979] ECR 2819. 622 In Case 184/80 Van Daanan v Court of Auditors [1981] ECR 1951, an unrepresented third party asked that he not be named in the judgment or the advocate general’s opinion. That request was granted. In such cases a reasoned request should, it seems, be addressed to the Registrar of the Court with jurisdiction over the case. 623 The only provisions dealing specifically with the problem appear to be: RP-ECJ, art 95 (which concerns references for a preliminary ruling but applies to appeals pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 190(3)); PD-ECJ, para 8; RP-GC, art 66 (which applies to IP appeals pursuant to RP-GC, art 191 and to other appeals pursuant to RP-GC, art 213(1)); PD-GC, paras 68–70; and RP-CST, art 48. Those provisions effectively summarise the practice described above. The ECJ, GC and CST have each adopted guidance on anonymity that can be found on the Court’s website (the current guidance provided by the GC and CST is dated 30 September 2015). In some cases, it is not clear why anonymity was granted. An attentive person would have noticed that, in Case 18/70 X v Council [1972] ECR 1205, the applicant was Mrs Duraffour: see Case 18/70 Duraffour v Council [1971] ECR 515.

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1.135 Since a single numerical list of all cases lodged at all three Courts could not work in the absence of some system for co-ordinating the allocation of case numbers by the registries involved, each registry has its own numerical list; and, in order to avoid confusion as between cases before the ECJ, the GC and the CST, the practice is for the case number allocated to ECJ cases to be preceded by the letter ‘C’, that for GC cases by ‘T’624 and that for CST cases by ‘F’.625 Thus, the first case entered on the register of the ECJ in 2007 is Case C-1/07; while the first case entered on the register of the GC in that year is Case T-1/07; and, for the CST, it is Case F-1/07. Applications for interim relief, which are made separately from the document commencing the action, bear the same number as the action, followed by the letter ‘R’ (for example, Case C-1/07 R or, as the case may be, Case T-1/07 R or F-1/07 R).626 In the same way, where subsequent proceedings are brought which must bear the same case number as the original proceedings (as happens, for example, in proceedings for the revision of a judgment), one or more letters will be added after the case number in order to identify separately those subsequent proceedings; and, where there are more than one such subsequent proceedings, a figure in roman or arabic numerals may be added.627 Where a direct action is preceded by an application for legal aid designed to enable the applicant to commence proceedings, the legal aid application will be given a case number and the subsequent action will bear the same number.628 Where cases are joined, they retain their original case number.629 Where a case bearing one case number is split into more than one case, the original case number is retained but a reference is added to indicate that they have been separated.630 Where an appeal is brought before the ECJ from a judgment of the GC, the proceedings before the ECJ do not use the case number given to the proceedings at first instance; a new case number is used followed by the letter ‘P’.631 The same applies to appeals to the GC from decisions of the CST.632 Where a case is remitted to the GC by the ECJ at the end of an appeal to the latter, it resumes the case number that it originally had in the GC before the appeal to the ECJ but a reference indicating that the case has been referred back is added so that the judgment that is then given 6 24 ‘T’ stands for ‘Tribunal’, the French title of the CFI and, later, the GC. 625 ‘F’ stands for ‘fonctionnaire,’ the French term for an official. 626 Eg Case C-358/89R Extramet Industrie SA v Council [1990] ECR I-431. 627 Eg Case C-147/86 T01, Case C-147/86 T02 and Case C-147/86 T03  POIFXG, PALSO and PSIITENSM  v Greece and Commission [1989]  ECR  3103, 4111 and 4119 (third party proceedings) and Case 285/81 Rev I and II Geist v Commission [1984] ECR 1789 (revision). 628 PD-GC, paras 17–18; IR-CST, art 5(2). The ECJ no longer deals at first instance with actions brought by persons eligible to receive legal aid but an application for legal aid could be made to the ECJ in the context of an appeal to it: see RP-ECJ, art 186(1). In that event, the ECJ’s practice is the same as that of the GC and CST. Legal aid applications are commonly given a number followed by ‘AJ’ (meaning the French term ‘assistance judiciaire’). 629 Eg Cases C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P, C-498/11 P Siemens AG v Commission, 19 December 2013. 630 That is provided for expressly in IR-CST, art 5(2). 631 Thus Case C-348/90 P European Parliament v Virgili-Schettini [1991] ECR I-5211 was the full title of the appeal from Case T-139/89 Virgili-Schettini v European Parliament [1990] ECR II535. The letter ‘P’ stands for ‘pourvoi’, the French term for the application commencing appeal proceedings. 632 Eg Case T-133/07 Mitsubishi Electric Corpn v Commission [2011] ECR II-4219 became, on appeal, Case C-489/11 P (above, note 626).

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is not confused with the judgment that led to the appeal to the ECJ.633 The same applies where a case is remitted by the GC to the CST.634 If a case has been given an incorrect case number, it must be removed from the register and reentered in the register under the correct number.635 1.136 After registration, documents lodged at the Court are filed with the other documents relating to the same case in a case file. For that purpose they are numbered consecutively as they are lodged at the registry and placed in the case file. Thus, throughout the course of the action, documents will be lodged at the registry and given a date and registration number indicating entry on the register; they will then be filed in accordance with the case number and given yet another number representing their position in the case file,636 which is determined by the date of lodgment. Where necessary, the case file is divided into a confidential and a non-confidential part containing, respectively, the confidential and nonconfidential versions of the pleadings and evidential annexes.637 Where a case spawns ancillary proceedings, such as interim relief proceedings, intervention or costs issues, the related documents may be kept in a separate section of the case file.638 The Registrar is responsible for maintaining the files of pending cases and for keeping them up to date as part of his responsibilities concerning the custody of documents.639 The completed case file contains the originals of all the documents relating to the case that have been entered on the register;640 and communications relating to the case between the parties and the registry or between the registry and the Court which are not entered on the register are kept in a separate file of correspondence relating to the case.641 Not all documents sent to the Court by a party are entered on the register or, if entered, figure in the case file. The two 6 33 PD-GC, para 19. The reference that is added is usually ‘RENV’ meaning ‘renvoi’. 634 IR-CST, art 5(2). 635 Thus, Case 235/82 Rev Ferriere San Carlo SpA v Commission [1986] ECR 1799 (proceedings for revision of a judgment) was, contrary to (at the time) IR-ECJ, art 12, originally registered under its own case number instead of the number of the case to which it related. By order dated 4 December 1985 it was removed from the register under the wrong number and reregistered under the correct one. 636 Cf PD-GC, paras 21–22; IR-CST, art 6(1) and (3). For example, the registration number may be 76102, the case number (for a case before the ECJ) C-1/93. The application in that case (assuming it to be a direct action) will, apart from the registration number, bear the number C-1/93-1, indicating that it is the first document in the case file. The next document in the case file, C-1/93-2, which will probably be the Registrar’s letter to the applicant acknowledging receipt of the application, may have as its registration number 76214 because, in the meantime, more documents in other cases have been entered on the register. The case file number, like the registration number, is really for the Court’s internal use. The only number of general importance is the case number (in this example, C-1/93). 637 PD-GC, para 23 (and note also PD-GC, para 27); IR-CST, art 6(5). 638 PD-GC, paras 24 and 24a (the latter implementing RP-GC, art 125c(1), 2nd indent); IR-CST, art 6(4) (which refers only to documents drawn up for the purpose of reaching an amicable settlement). 639 RP-ECJ, art 20(1); RP-GC, art 35(1); RP-CST, art 20(1). 640 Where the Court has occasion to send a letter to a party, the signed original of the letter is sent and an initialled copy is placed in the case file. 641 The ECJ’s registry also keeps a copy of the case file which contains certified copies of all the original documents. The GC registry does not keep a duplicate file.

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main categories of documents generated by cases before the Court that do not figure in the case file are defective documents and documents whose lodgment in the course of proceedings is not provided for in the rules of procedure. Generally speaking, defective documents enter the case file only if and when the defect is rectified. As noted above, documents whose lodgment is not provided for in the rules of procedure are not registered (and therefore cannot be placed in the case file) unless the President (or, as the case may be, the Court) so decides. When the proceedings have come to an end, the case file is closed and archived.642 1.137 In principle, the case file contains all the documents of which the Court can and shall take cognisance in the case; and it is specifically provided (in regard to GC and CST proceedings) that documents forming part of the case file may not be taken into account for the purpose of preparing another case for hearing.643 Accordingly, in formal terms, a document before the Court (in the sense that it is physically in the possession of the Court because it is contained in a case file) is non-existent, for the purposes of a particular case, unless and until it has been included in the case file for that case. That explains in part the Court’s opposition to cross-references in a party’s pleadings to a document in another case file; however, in interim relief cases, that has been taken to an extreme because, technically, documents relating to an interim relief application are contained in a separate section of the same case file containing documents relating to the action (they are not in a separate case file).644 1.138 In the ECJ, the files of pending cases may be consulted in the registry by the parties or their representatives (but not by third parties); files of completed cases are stored in the registry and third parties have no access to them. The parties to a case have the right to obtain certified copies of pleadings and anyone may obtain certified copies of judgments and orders, upon payment of the appropriate charge.645 In the case of direct actions, no provision is made for confidential treatment of pleadings and documents relied on in support of a party’s 6 42 PD-GC, para 26; IR-CST, art 6(7). 643 PD-GC, para  25; IR-CST, art  6(6). Hence, as long as a party is not seeking to adduce new evidence or raise a new plea, he may refer during the hearing to arguments in a document not in the case file; but the Court will assess those arguments solely by reference to what is in the case file: Case T-82/08 Guardian Industries Corp and Guardian Europe Sarl v Commission, 27  September 2012, paras 23–26 (appealed on other grounds in Case C-580/12  P  Guardian Industries, above, note 65). 644 Cf PD-GC, para 24, which provides that documents relating to the special forms of procedure referred to in PD-GC, para 16 (which include interim relief proceedings) are filed separately in the case file (that is, the case file for the case to which they relate). For cross-references to other documents in a pleading, see Ch 9, para 9.48. For the position in interim relief proceedings, see Ch 8, para 8.155 ff. It is likely that the opposition to reference to other documents in the context of interim relief proceedings originated in the fact that the file prepared for the President (or the other judge dealing with an interim relief application) was presented as a separate case file and he was not provided with the other documents in the action. 645 RP-ECJ, art 22(2)–(3). Pleadings are in consequence confidential as against third parties: see Case T-36/04 Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) v Commission [2007] ECR II-3201, paras 85 and 87. Consultation of the register under RP-ECJ, art 22(1) is a different matter: it does not encompass consultation of a document mentioned in the register.

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case, as between the principal parties (the applicant and the defendant). On the other hand, one or other, or both, of the principal parties may claim confidential treatment as against an intervener. An application for such confidential treatment must be made within 10 days of service on the principal party concerned of the intervener’s application to intervene.646 If confidential treatment is ordered, the intervener receives only an expurgated version of the pleading or document in question647 (usually prepared by the party applying for confidential treatment). In the case of references for a preliminary ruling, the Statute648 provides that the decision of the national court making the reference shall be notified to the Court. Some national courts also submit their own file of the case.649 When that happens the file may be consulted at the registry by the parties but only the documents in it which are relevant to the substance of the dispute are translated and distributed to the members of the Court. In principle, if the order for reference is properly drafted, there should be no need to refer to the national court’s file of the case, if available.650 If the case file held at the registry contained documents which the Court regarded as confidential, such documents were placed in a sealed envelope and were accessible only at the written request of the party concerned and with the formal assent of the Registrar. The current practice is that, where confidential treatment is accorded to a pleading or document, two versions are lodged at the ECJ, one confidential and the other non-confidential. In references for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ respects any anonymity granted to a party to the national proceedings by the referring court.651 If it considers it necessary to do so, it may also grant anonymity to any person or entity concerned by the case, either at the request of the referring court, on application by a party to the proceedings before the referring court (the application being supported by reasons) or of its own motion.652 The same provision applies mutatis mutandis to appeals to the ECJ.653 By implication, the anonymity of a party to the proceedings before the referring court is a matter for the latter. 1.139 The position regarding the GC and CST is more explicitly stated.654 Any party to a case may have access to the file in the case, save to the extent that there is a formal Court order according confidential treatment to a document or to a part of the case file, as against the party seeking access.655 The case file referred 646 RP-ECJ, art 131(2). 647 RP-ECJ, art 131(4). 648 Art 23. 649 If it is not submitted, the registry writes to the national court asking for it to send on the file of the case. The national court is not obliged to do so. 650 Cf the requirements relating to the contents of the reference in RP-ECJ, art 94. 651 RP-ECJ, art 95(1). 652 RP-ECJ, art 95(2). See further para 1.134 above. 653 RP-ECJ, art 190(3). 654 RP-GC, art 38; PD-GC, paras 28-33; RP-CST, art 22; IR-CST, arts 6(5) and 7. 655 RP-GC, art 38(1); PD-GC, para 32; RP-CST, art 22(1); IR-CST, art 6(5). PD-GC, paras 28–30 say that it is the representative of a party who may have access to the case file; and PD-GC, para 31 extends that right to a party where the party has applied for legal aid and does not have a lawyer to represent him. Normally, the procedural rights of a party are exercised on his behalf by the lawyer or agent representing him. On that basis, there is no conflict between RP-GC, art 38(1) and PD-GC, paras 28–30.

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to is the file of the case compiled by the Court for the purposes of the proceedings in question.656 PD-GC, para28 also states that the right of the main parties (applicant and defendant) to inspect the case file includes the right to inspect administrative files produced before the Court. That refers to any file created by another person or body (usually the defendant), covering any pre-litigation stage of the dispute, which has been transmitted to the GC.657 Documents drawn up for the purposes of reaching an amicable settlement of the dispute in a staff case before the GC are entered in a specific register and place in a file separate from the case file; they may therefore be inspected by a main party (to the extent that they are not confidential as against that party) but not by an intervener.658 Inspection takes place at the registry.659 Any party to the proceedings may also

656 For the contents of the case file, see PD-GC, para 21 and IR-CST, art 6(1). The case file is not the same as the documents constituting the relevant file held by an EU institution that is a party to the proceedings, even if the latter file has been or is required to be transmitted to the Court: see Cases T-134/94, T-136/94 to T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/94  NMH  Stahlwerke v Commission [1997]  ECR II-2293, para  33 (the provision there in question – art 23, Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, attached to the ECSC Treaty, which made it obligatory for an EU institution to disclose the administrative file held by it relating to the pre-litigation proceedings – is no longer applicable). 657 Administrative files kept by the defendant institution are not normally produced to the Court in the absence of a request for production made by the Court (which is not a step that is commonly taken). However, in the case of proceedings brought against the European Union Intellectual Property Office (formerly the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)) or against the Community Plant Variety Office concerning the application of the rules relating to an intellectual property regime, the relevant Office is obliged to send to the Court the file relating to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: RP-GC, art 178(5). In appeals to the GC from the CST, the latter transmits to the GC’s registry ‘the file in the case at first instance’, which is the case file in the proceedings before the CST: RP-GC, art 193(2). 658 RP-GC, art 125c(1), (3) and (4) (RP-GC, art 125c(2) provides that such documents are to be brought to the attention of the main parties). The opposing main party does not have access to material that a main party has communicated to the judge-rapporteur in a private meeting with the latter: RP-GC, art 125c(2)–(3). That applies as from 1 September 2016. Before then, under the regime applicable in CST proceedings, documents concerning amicable settlement were kept in a separate part of the case file: IR-CST, art 6(4). Such documents were not entered in the register: IR-CST, art  4(1). The reason is that, although the GC and CST are charged with encouraging an amicable settlement of disputes in staff cases (Statue, art 50a(2); RP-GC, art 125a(1)-(2); RP-CST, art 90), documents drawn up for that purpose cannot be relied upon as evidence by the GC or CST or the parties: RP-GC, art 125d; RP-CST, art 92. Accordingly, such documents do not, in formal terms, constitute part of the documents before the GC or CST for procedural purposes. Documents concerning amicable settlement will normally be produced by one of the main parties (applicant or defendant) for disclosure to the other but are not ordinarily accessible by an intervener. Such documents may also be produced by a party, voluntarily or at the Court’s invitation, solely for the use and information of the Court (that is, the CST or, after 1 September 2016, the GC). 659 PD-GC, para 28 and RP-CST, art 22(1) both refer to consultation of the case file ‘at the registry’. In GC proceedings, the ‘specific register’ containing material produced in the context of an amicable settlement in a staff case is also consulted at the registry: RP-GC, art 125c(5).

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request copies of or extracts from procedural documents or the register itself.660 Subject to confidentiality, the lawyers or agents of interveners or of parties to joined cases661 have the same right of access to the case file (but not, in GC proceedings, it appears, to the administrative file).662 No third party, whether a private person or a public body (including a member state or an EU institution) may have access to the case file or to procedural documents without the express authorisation of the President. The decision to grant or refuse authorisation is made after the parties to the case have been given the opportunity to be heard. In order to obtain authorisation, the third party must make a written application setting out a detailed explanation of the third party’s legitimate interest in inspecting the file.663 The application would then be served on the parties to the case and a time limit fixed for them to respond in writing. Where a party seeks confidential treatment of certain matters or certain documents in the case file, a written application to that effect must be made. The application must: (i) identify the confidential matters; (ii) explain why they are confidential; (iii) indicate specifically by reference to the pages of the document concerned the passages that are said to be confidential; and (iv) provide a non-confidential version that excises or summarises in non-confidential form the confidential parts.664 The decision on confidential treatment is made by the GC (or, as the case may be, the CST), not the registrar. If confidential treatment is granted in respect of a pleading or evidence, the confidential and non-confidential versions of the pleading or evidence are kept in separate sections of the case file. Access to the confidential section is confined to those parties in respect of whom no confidential treatment has been

660 RP-GC, art  38(1); RP-CST, art  22(1). In addition, ‘anyone’ or, in the case of the CST, ‘any person having a duly substantiated interest’, not just a party to the proceedings, may consult the registry and obtain copies of, or extracts from, it: RP-GC, art 37; RP-CST, art 222(2), 3rd subpara (in the case of the ECJ, ‘anyone’ may do so: RP-ECJ, art 22(1)). That means no more than a right to see, and obtain a copy of, what the register says. It is not a right to see a document to which the register refers and is therefore less extensive a right than the right given to a party to proceedings to obtain copies (including extracts) of the documents entered in the register that form part of the case file under: RP-ECJ, art 22(2); RP-GC, art 38(1); RP-CST, art 22(1). Access to material produced in the context of the amicable settlement procedure in a staff case, and to the register in which such documents are entered, is more circumscribed: see RP-GC, art 125c and PD-GC, para 33a. 661 Thus, where two cases (say, Case T-1/07 and Case T-2/07) involving different applicants but the same defendant are joined, the applicant in Case T-1/07 has what can be described as an unfettered right to inspect the case file and the administrative file (if produced to the Court) in Case T-1/07 but only what can be described as a limited right to inspect the case file in Case T-2/07. 662 PD-GC, para  29–30; IR-CST, art  6(5) and 7(2). It should be observed that PD-GC, para  28 says that the representatives of the main parties may inspect the case file and request copies of documents, whereas PD-GC, para  29 and 30 refer only to the former in the case of the representatives of interveners and the parties to joined cases. That is not consistent with RP-GC, art 38(1), which grants any party to the proceedings the rights to have access to the case file and to obtain copies of documents. 663 RP-GC, art 38(2); RP-CST, art 22(2), 1st subpara. Cf the API case (above, note 645), paras 85 and 87. 664 PD-GC, paras 68–70 and 212–237; IR-CST, art 7(1); PD-CST, para 40–45.

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ordered by the GC (or CST).665 The rules on confidential treatment are concerned mainly with confidentiality as between: (i) the applicant and defendant (main parties); (ii) main parties and interveners; and (iii) the parties to joined cases. In short, no confidentiality can be claimed, otherwise than by way of express and limited exception, as between main parties but it can be claimed in the other two cases.666 An application for confidentiality made in proceedings before the GC must comply with PD-GC, paras218–222. If it does not, the applicant for confidential treatment will be asked to put it in order. If that proves impossible, the application for confidential treatment will not be processed and the unexpurgated version of the pleading or evidence will be communicated to the party in relation to whom confidential treatment was sought.667 The CST’s practice is effectively the same.668 In some instances, confidential treatment is sought, not as against another party to the case or a party to a joined case, but as against the general public.669 Such applications ought to satisfy the basic requirements for an application for confidential treatment (set out above) but do not give rise to the procedural issues that surround an application directed at another party to the proceedings. At the close of the case, the case file is closed and bound for archiving.670 The parties to a case (whether it be before the GC or CST) may obtain copies of pleadings and authenticated copies of judgments and orders on payment of the appropriate charge.671 1.140 The restrictions referred to above concerning access to the register, the case file and documents held by the ECJ, GC or CST in their judicial capacity are not affected by the obligation of EU institutions to give EU citizens access to documents of the institution. In the case of the Court, that obligation applies only to documents concerned with the exercise by the Court of administrative (and,

665 PD-GC, para  32; IR-CST, art  6(5). In accordance with the order made by the Court, some parties will receive copies of the non-confidential version and some copies of the confidential version. That is discussed further below. 666 The basic principle in GC proceedings is set out in RP-GC, art  64: the GC must decide a case solely by reference to the pleadings and evidence that have been made available to the representatives of the parties and on which they have been given an opportunity of expressing their views. The stated exceptions to that principle are to be found in: RP-GC, art 68(4) (parties to joined cases); 104 (a special case concerning disclosure of a document whose non-disclosure is the subject-matter of the proceedings); 105(8) (main parties); 144(7) (interveners). RP-GC, art 103 (main parties) is also an exception but it is not referred to in RP-GC, art 64, although it is mentioned in RP-GC, art  65(1), which deals with service, and PD-GC, para  213. Its omission from RP-GC, art 64 appears to be an oversight. Effectively the same applies in CST proceedings: the principle is stated in RP-CST, art 47(1) and the exceptions are to be found in RP-CST, art 44(3) (parties to joined cases) and 87(3) (interveners) (see also IR-CST, art 7(2)). IR-CST, art 7(1) is stated to be without prejudice to RP-CST, art 47(1) and therefore takes effect subject to the latter. 667 PD-GC, para 223, which applies to confidential treatment as against an intervener and, pursuant to PD-GC, para  226, as against another party where cases have been joined. The pleading requirements for an application for confidential treatment are discussed in Ch 9, para 9.20 ff. 668 IR-CST, art 7l; PD-CST, paras 40–45. 669 Eg RP-GC, art 66; PD-GC, paras 68–73; RP-CST, art 48. 670 PD-GC, para 26; IR-CST, art 6(7). 671 RP-GC, art 38(1); RP-CST, art 22(1), 2nd indent.

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hence, non-judicial) tasks.672 Those restrictions relate only to access to the register, the case file and documents held by the Court but, in Case T-135/09 Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA v Commission,673 they were relied on in support of the proposition that a party cannot disclose an opposing party’s pleadings to a third party for the purpose of enlisting the third party’s support in defending the party’s interests. In that case, the applicant had disclosed the defence to persons who seem to have been lawyers so that they could produce a legal opinion that the applicant then relied on in its reply. The persons so consulted were not the applicant’s representatives in the proceedings. The GC rejected that proposition on the ground that a party is entitled to disclose another party’s pleadings to an expert for the purpose of defending itself and as long as the expert uses the document only for the purposes of the proceedings. The GC did not endorse the Commission’s interpretation of the provisions on which it had relied but dealt with the matter by reference to the underlying principles. That is correct: the restrictions on access to material held by the Court concern only the position of the Court vis-à-vis a person seeking access; they do not concern the position of a party vis-à-vis a third party. On the other hand, those restrictions stem from the same concern that parties to proceedings before the Court should not feel constrained in the way in which they defend their positions before the Court. 4 Transmission and service of documents 1.141 Where the rules of procedure require that a document be served on a person, the task of ensuring service falls on the Registrar of the appropriate Court, not on the parties.674 For the purpose of effecting service, the registry must therefore have each party’s address or contact details. 1.142 In the case of references for a preliminary ruling, service is effected by post or personal delivery at the address for service of the party concerned; the parties’ address for service is usually provided by the referring court and is the address or contact point used by the referring court for the purposes of the domestic proceedings that led to the making of the reference.675 It is good practice for the parties’ address for service to be stated by the referring court in the order for reference or in a letter under cover of which the reference is sent to 672 TFEU, art 15(3). 673 14 November 2012, paras 103–110. The Commission relied on what are now RP-GC, art 38 and PD-GC, para 28. The appeal (Case C-37/13 P Nexans SA and Nexans France SAS v Commission, 25 June 2014) deals with other issues. 674 RP-ECJ, art  48(1); RP-GC, art  57(1)  PD-GC, para  57; RP-CST, art  36(1). See also Ch 3, para 3.42. 675 Service in the context of references for a preliminary ruling is covered by RP-ECJ, art 48 (which is part of the common rules applicable to all procedures before the ECJ) and RP-ECJ, art 98. RP-ECJ, art 48 specifies service at the address of the person concerned (by post or personal delivery). RP-ECJ, art 98 deals only with service on non-parties to the proceedings before the referring court (Member States, EEA-EFTA States, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and third countries). The address of those third parties, which may serve as the address for service, is either known already to the ECJ or else is the address of the embassy in Luxembourg, or the embassy which serves Luxembourg.

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the Court. If it is not provided to the Court by the referring court, the Registry will contact the latter in order to find out the addresses for service of the parties to the proceedings before the referring court. It is particularly important that the referring court provides accurate addresses for service of the parties to the proceedings before it at the earliest opportunity.676 In principle, service may also be effected using the e-Curia system; but that is possible only if the ECJ has been informed that a party is represented by a person who uses that system. 1.143 In the case of direct actions and appeals (that is, proceedings that begin and end before the ECJ, GC or CST), the question of service of documents arises in two different contexts. The first is that of service of the application commencing proceedings on the person or persons who are defendants or respondents to the application.677 The second is that of service of any document or pleading subsequent to the application. The difference lies in the fact that, in direct actions and appeals, all parties are required to provide the Court with information enabling service to be effected on themselves. However, when an application commencing proceedings is lodged at the Court, the defending or responding parties will not yet have been given an opportunity to provide one. Accordingly, at the outset of proceedings, the Court can effect service on a defending or responding party only by delivery (usually by registered post with a form of acknowledgement of receipt; alternatively, by personal delivery) at the address of the defending or responding party provided by the applicant or, if the defending or responding party is already well known to the Court (as it is in the case of EU institutions and member states), at some other address commonly used by the Court to effect 676 Where the referring court, by error, provides the ECJ with the wrong address for service or a defective address, experience indicates that the ECJ cannot be relied upon to accept that service by it of a document on the party concerned at the wrong or defective address for service is defective even if the party has never received the document. The critical question is whether or not an acknowledgement of receipt of the communication from the ECJ has been signed by someone purporting to be at the address to which the communication has been sent (irrespective of whether or not the signature was provided by mistake). Accordingly, a party can be prejudiced by the referring court’s error (in casu, the defective address for service meant that the party in question did not receive notification of the commencement of the two-month period for submitting written observations and was barred from lodging written observations as a result of the error). Where the reference is to be dealt with under the expedited or urgent preliminary ruling procedures (as to which, see Ch 2, paras 2.205 ff and 2.210 ff), delays in communicating the (correct) addresses for service to the Court ought, in particular, to be avoided. 677 In virtually all direct actions, the respondent to an application is a defendant. In the case of an appeal, the parties other than the appellant submit a response: see RP-ECJ, art  172; RPGC, art  198. They are usually called respondents although there are incidents in the past in which they have been called defendants. There are some direct actions in which the persons entitled to respond to an application are not defendants because they may support the form of order sought by the applicant. The best examples of that situation are proceedings brought against the European Union Intellectual Property Office (formerly, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)) or against the Community Plant Variety Office concerning the application of the rules relating to an intellectual property regime (‘IP appeals’), in which there are responding parties, other than the defendant, who are termed ‘interveners’, although they are not ‘interveners’ in the sense in which that term is understood in other direct actions: see RP-GC, art 173. In IP appeals, the defendant and the ‘interveners’ lodge a ‘response’ not a ‘defence’: see RP-GC, art 179. IP appeals may also involve ‘interveners’ in the conventional sense.

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service on that person.678 If the defending or responding party has so agreed, service may be effected on him by fax or other technical means of communication (e-mail or e-Curia).679 However, it should be observed that a party’s agreement to service on him by those alternative means is actually service on the party’s representative (at the fax number, e-mail address or e-Curia access account of the representative).680 In particular, a procedural document is served by means of e-Curia when the intended recipient (the party’s representative or his assistant) requests access to the document.681 Therefore, it would be unusual for service of an application commencing proceedings to be effected by one of those alternative means because, ordinarily, the representative of the defendant or respondent is not known at the outset of the proceedings. In the case of a member state or EU institution or body, the representative may be known because the state, institution or body may use only one person as its representative before the Court for all proceedings, or the type of proceedings in question. 1.144 In the case of IP appeals, which are brought in the GC, the application is served on the relevant Office, as defendant, by registered post or personal delivery in the usual way, unless the Office has previously agreed to service by e-Curia or fax.682 In the case of the other parties to the proceedings before the

678 RP-ECJ, art 48(1); RP-GC, art 80(1), which applies to appeals pursuant to RP-GC, art 197(1) (in the case of IP appeals, RP-GC, art 80(1) applies where the GC Registrar informs the other parties of the lodging of the application: see RP-GC, art 178(1); but RP-GC, art 178(2)–(3) apply to service of the application); RP-CST, art 36(1). Eg Case T-9/09P Marcuccio v Commission, 24 November 2010, paras 72–77. It should be noted that the applicant must provide the name of the opposing party or parties but is not expressly required to provide their address: RPECJ, art  120(b); RP-ECJ, art  168(1)(c); RP-GC, art  76(c); RP-GC, art  194(1)(d); RP-CST, art 50(1)(c). In the case of IP appeals brought before the GC, the applicant is required to identify the Office against which the application is brought and the names of any other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, together with the addresses of those persons which they had given for the purposes of notification to them at that stage: RP-GC, art 177(1)(c) and (2). Due to the nature of the proceedings before the Court, the defendant (at first instance) is usually an EU institution or a member state rather than a private person. Accordingly, provision of an address is unnecessary. In contrast, stating that the opposing party (defendant or respondent) is ‘X’ (X being the name of a natural person) is an inadequate designation of X unless an address is provided because there may be more than one person in the world known as ‘X’, particularly if X is a common name (there is, however, only one Commission of the European Union and only one United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). In practice, the address of the defendant or respondent is normally given. 679 RP-ECJ, art  48(2) (which is a rule of general application, not limited to service of the application); RP-GC, art 80(1), 2nd sentence; RP-GC, art 197(1) (appeals to the GC); RP-CST, art 36(2) (service by fax). 680 RP-ECJ, art  121(2), which applies to a defence pursuant to RP-ECJ, art  124(2) and to the response to an appeal pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 173(2); RP-GC, art 77(1), which applies to a defence pursuant to RP-GC, art 81(2), to a response to an application in an IP appeal pursuant to RP-GC, art 180(2) and 177(6), and to the response to an appeal pursuant to RP-GC, art 199(2) and 194(5); RP-CST, art 50(3), which applies to a defence pursuant to RP-CST, art 53(2); the e-Curia decisions (above, note 547), art 6. 681 See the e-Curia decisions (above, note 547), art 7. 682 RP-GC, art 178(2). For service to be effected by e-Curia or fax, the Court must first be told who the Office’s representative is.

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Board of Appeal, the position is a little complicated.683 RP-GC, art 178(3) provides that service is effected by the method to which the party has agreed ‘when lodging the procedural document referred to in Article 173(2)’; if no such document is lodged, service is effected by registered post (personal delivery is not an alternative option) at the address given by the party concerned for the purposes of the notifications to be effected in the course of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. The procedural document referred to in RP-GC, art173(2) is ‘a’ procedural document lodged before the expiry of the time limit prescribed for the lodging of a response to the application commencing the IP appeal. Such a procedural document may be an application objecting to the language of the case chosen by the applicant684 or, conceivably, an application for the replacement of a party where an intellectual property right affected by the proceedings has been transferred to a third party.685 Hence, the process in an IP appeal runs as follows. The defendant (the Office) and the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (apart from the applicant in the action) are notified by the Registrar of the commencement of the appeal, the notification being served on them by registered post or personal delivery unless they (or rather their representatives) have previously agreed to service by e-Curia or fax.686 The latter possibility is likely only in the case of the Office. The address used to effect service is that provided by the applicant in the action, who must set out in the application the addresses used by the other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal for the purposes of those proceedings.687 If a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (other than the applicant in the action) lodges a procedural document at that point in the proceedings (that is, after having been notified of the commencement of the IP appeal but before receipt of the application), he must set out in that procedural document his service details, which will be used by the GC when it later on serves the application commencing proceedings. 1.145 At the stage of service of the application commencing proceedings, service is normally proved by reference to the signed receipt given by the recipient when the application is delivered by post or in person;688 and it is from the date of the receipt that the time limit for lodging a defence is calculated.689 If service of the application on the defendant is unsuccessful, then (in GC cases) the Registrar prescribes a period within which the applicant is to provide ‘additional information for service’ (that is, a new address for service on the defendant) or

6 83 See in more detail Ch 3, paras 3.40–3.41. 684 See RP-GC, art 45(4)(c). 685 See RP-GC, art 174–176. 686 RP-GC, art 178(1), which cross-refers to RP-GC, art 80(1). 687 RP-GC, art 177(2). 688 Cf Case C-77/99 Commission v Oder-Plan Architektur GmbH [2001] ECR I-7355, Opinion of Advocate General Alber, para 104, and judgment, paras 23 and 73 (in that case, there was an issue as to whether or not the defendant still existed and the Court’s letter serving the application on the defendant had been returned unopened; but that did not invalidate service). 689 Case T-16/09  P  Marcuccio v Commission, 23  March 2010, paras 63–64; Case T-157/09  P Marcuccio v Commission, 15  September 2010, paras 69–70; Case T-9/09  P  Marcuccio v Commission, 24 November 2010, paras 74–75.

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agree to the use of a judicial officer to re-serve the application (at the applicant’s expense).690 1.146 The position regarding a party’s own service information is as follows. In ECJ proceedings, there is no requirement that a party to preliminary ruling proceedings must provide service information.691 As noted above, the service information relating to the parties to the proceedings before the referring court should be supplied to the ECJ by the referring court itself. The service information of the other parties who may submit written and oral observations in preliminary ruling proceedings is already known to the ECJ, or else easy for it to find, because those parties are states, EU institutions or bodies and the EFTA  Surveillance Authority. That does not prevent a party from providing the ECJ with other service information in the course of the proceedings. For example, a party to proceedings before the referring court may be represented by a person who uses the e-Curia system (which is not available in proceedings before national courts and tribunals). Accordingly, the proceedings may start with the ECJ using the service information provided by the referring court and then switching to e-Curia once the ECJ has been informed that the party’s representative will accept service by that means. In other proceedings before the ECJ, the service information required is an address for service (which need not be in Luxembourg), together with the name of the person who is authorised and has expressed willingness to accept service; in addition to, or instead of, an address for service, the party may state that the party’s representative agrees to service being effected on him by fax or other technical means of communication (effectively, e-mail or e-Curia).692 Where the only service information provided is an address for service, service can be effected only by registered post or personal delivery at the identified address.693 If the only service information provided is a fax number or e-mail address, service will be effected by the means so indicated save that, if transmission by fax or e-mail is impossible or impractical for techni-

690 PD-GC, para 62. Although that provision refers only to service on ‘the defendant’, it would seem to be applicable also to service on respondents. 691 RP-ECJ, art 106(2) (which applies to the expedited preliminary ruling procedure and, pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 114, to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure) does refer to service on a party by fax or any other technical means of communication available to the ECJ and the addressee (that is, the party on whom service is effected or his representative). However, it does not state by whom or how the service information is provided. Initially, so far as the parties to the proceedings before the referring court are concerned, the ECJ has only the service information provided by the referring court. If any other service information is to be used, the ECJ must elicit it from the party concerned. RP-ECJ, art 48(2) (which is one of the common procedural provisions in the ECJ rules of procedure) enables the ECJ to effect service by fax or other technical means of communication where the addressee has agreed that service is to be effected by such means. 692 RP-ECJ, art 121(1)–(2), which apply to the defendant pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 124(2), to an intervener pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 130(4), to an applicant in third party proceedings pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 157(1), to an appellant pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 168(2), to a respondent in an appeal pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 173(2) and RP-ECJ, art 177(2), to applicants in proceedings under EAEC art 18 pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 201(2), and to proceedings under EAEC arts 104 and 105 pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 203. 693 Cf RP-ECJ, art 48(1).

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cal reasons or due to the nature or length of the document to be served, service will be effected by registered post at the party’s address.694 It is therefore more usual to provide both an address for service and other service information (a fax number or e-mail address; or an indication that service may be effected by e-Curia). In that event, a document that cannot be served otherwise than in hard copy form will be served by registered post at the party’s address for service, rather than the party’s address. Where a party’s representative has provided a fax number or e-mail address for service, or has agreed to the use of e-Curia, but the document can be served only in hard copy form, he is informed in advance (by fax or, as the case may be, e-mail or e-Curia) that the document will be served by post. Service is then deemed to be effected by registered post on the 10th day following the lodging of the registered letter containing the document at the post office in Luxembourg. That presumption is displaced where the acknowledgement of receipt of the registered letter shows a different date or where the addressee informs the Registrar, within three weeks of receiving the fax or electronic message warning him that service is to be effected by post, that the document has not reached him.695 1.147 In GC proceedings, the GC Registrar must ensure that service is effected either by electronic means (e-Curia) or fax.696 A  party is required to indicate which of those methods he agrees is to be used in order to effect service on him.697 If a party does not do so, service is effected by registered letter addressed to the party’s representative; and service is deemed to be effected by lodging the registered letter at the post office in Luxembourg.698 Accordingly, if a party agrees to service by either means, the GC can choose which of them to use in order to effect service. The GC has recourse to registered letter only where the party refrains from agreeing to service by either or both of fax and electronic means. Where for technical reasons or on account of the nature or size of the document service by the means to which the party has agreed is impossible or impractical, service is effected at the address of the party’s representative by registered post or personal delivery. As in the case of the ECJ, the addressee is informed in advance (by electronic means or fax) that service will be effected by registered post or personal delivery and service is deemed to have been effected on the 10th day following the lodging of the registered letter at the post office in Luxembourg. That presumption is displaced where the acknowledgement 694 RP-ECJ, art 48(3). In principle, service may be effected either by registered post or by personal delivery because RP-ECJ, art 48(3), 1st sentence, cross-refers to the procedures laid down in RP-ECJ, art 48(1). However, the remaining sentences of RP-ECJ, art 48(3) make it plain that, in practice, service will be effected by registered post (which is sensible given that personal delivery is practicable only if service is to be effected within the city of Luxembourg). 695 RP-ECJ, art 48(3). 696 RP-GC, art 57(1); PD-GC, para 57. 697 RP-GC, art  77(1) (the applicant), 81(2) (the defendant), 143(4) (an intervener), 173(5) and 180(2) (responding parties to IP appeals), 175(4) (an applicant for the replacement of a party in an IP appeal), 177(6) (an applicant in an IP appeal), 194(5) (an appellant), 199(2) (a respondent to an appeal). 698 RP-GC, art 77(2), which applies to parties other than the applicant pursuant to the provisions cited in note 697 above.

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of receipt of the registered letter shows a different date or where the addressee informs the Registrar, within three weeks of receiving the fax or electronic message warning him that service is to be effected by post, that the document has not reached him.699 1.148 In CST proceedings, three alternative ways of accepting service are available to an applicant or defendant under the CST rules of procedure: (i) a party must state an address for service (which need not be in Luxembourg) and the name of the person authorised to accept service; or (ii) a party must state that his representative has agreed to receive service by electronic means or fax; or (iii) the party opts for ‘the three methods of service of documents referred to above’.700 The three methods referred to appear to be post or personal delivery, fax and electronic means.701 An intervener must provide an address for service or state the agreement of his representative to accept service by electronic means.702 In interim relief proceedings, the Registrar may effect service ‘by all appropriate means which urgency requires’,703 which means the quickest of the means referred to above. Where for technical reasons or on account of the nature or length of the document service by fax is impossible or impractical, service is effected by registered post or personal delivery at the party’s address for service or, if the party has not provided one, the party’s address. Service is deemed to have been effected on the 10th day following the lodging of the registered letter at the post office in Luxembourg. That presumption is displaced where the acknowledgement of receipt of the registered letter shows a different date or where the addressee informs the Registrar, within three weeks of receiving the fax message warning him that service is to be effected by post, that the document has not reached him.704 1.149 Depending upon the circumstances, therefore, the methods for effecting service are: (i) delivery in hard copy form; (ii) fax; and (iii) electronic means. When the first method is used, the Registrar ensures that service is effected at the address for service of the person concerned in one of two ways: by the dispatch of a copy of the document by registered post with a form for acknowledg-

6 99 RP-GC, art 57(2); PD-GC, para 59. 700 RP-CST, art 50(3), which applies to defendants pursuant to RP-CST, art 53(2). 701 It is not clear if the three methods ‘referred to above’ are those mentioned earlier in RPCST, art 50(3) or those mentioned earlier in RP-36. It should also be observed that PD-CST, para 2 specifies two methods of service: e-Curia and dispatch in paper form. PD-CST, para 3 deals with e-Curia. PD-CST, para 4 covers dispatch in paper form and distinguishes between transmission of procedural documents to the CST (that is, lodgement) and transmission of procedural documents by the CST to a party (service). In the case of the latter, the methods of service are: registered post; fax; and e-Curia. 702 RP-CST, art 86(2)(e). 703 IR-CST, art 10(2). 704 RP-CST, art 36(3). It will be observed that, although RP-CST, art 36(3) refers to the procedures laid down in RP-CST, art  36(1), which encompass service by registered post or personal delivery, the presumption as to the date of service presupposes that the only method actually used is service by registered post.

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ment of receipt; or by personal delivery of the copy against a receipt.705 Where the first method of service is used, the document is accompanied by a note or letter signed by the Registrar giving the number of the case and the registration number of the document, together with a brief indication of its nature.706 Historically, where a party provided an address for service in Luxembourg, service was usually effected by personal delivery (the Court used its own staff for that purpose). Where the party has an address outside Luxembourg, delivery in hard copy form will almost invariably be by registered post. In the case of service in hard copy form, the key point in time is when delivery of the document was physically effected, evidenced by the signed receipt given by the addressee upon delivery. Where service is deemed to be effected at a different time (namely, by reference to the date when a registered letter has been lodged at the post office in Luxembourg), it is provided that advance warning that service is to be effected by delivery in hard copy form must be given. The giving of advance warning is an essential condition for the use of a deemed date of service that is different from the actual date of service.707 The second method of service (fax) requires no explanation. The third method of service (electronic means) can in principle take one of two forms: e-mail or use of the e-Curia system. The Court has power to determine the criteria for service of a procedural document by electronic means.708 The criteria that have been laid down relate to the e-Curia system.709 1.150 The e-Curia system can be used where the party’s representative has expressly accepted service by that method or has consented to service by that method through lodging a procedural document by means of e-Curia710 (although a person using e-Curia has a single access account that is valid for all the Court’s registries, e-Curia can be used to effect service in a given case only if in that case the person concerned has expressly accepted service by that means or has himself lodged a procedural document by means of e-Curia). The intended recipient of the document is notified by e-mail of service on him or her of the document by means of e-Curia; and the document is served at the time when the intended recipient requests access to the document (if several requests are made, the running of any time limit is measured by reference to the first request in time). If no request for access is made, the document is deemed to have been served on the expiry of the seventh day following the day on which the notification e-mail was

705 RP-ECJ, art  48(1); RP-GC, art  57(2); RP-CST, art  36(1). The original of the document is retained by the Court in the case file. 706 IR-ECJ, art 3(2) (which still seems to reflect current practice); PD-GC, paras 58–59. For the ECJ’s records a copy of that note or letter is appended to the original document kept in the case file. The GC registry retains the signed original of the note or letter in the case file and serves a copy of it. 707 See Case C-360/02P  Ripa de Meana v Parliament [2004]  ECR  I-10339, paras 19–24; Cases C-442/03P and C-471/03P  P&O  European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA  v Commission [2006] ECR I-4845, paras 23–28. 708 RP-ECJ, art 48(4); RP-GC, art 57(4); RP-CST, art 36(4). 709 See above, note 547. 710 See art 6 of the Decisions referred to in note 547 above.

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sent.711 Accordingly, a person using the e-Curia system must take care to review his e-mails on a frequent basis (and must also provide an undertaking to that effect). 1.151 Agents and lawyers entitled to represent a party before the Court712 may use the e-Curia system by making an application to open an access account. The application form is obtainable on the Court’s website and must be completed, printed, dated, signed, and then sent by post to the registry of any of the courts comprised within the Court (at the time of writing, the ECJ, GC or CST), accompanied by the necessary supporting documents. An undertaking covering different aspects of the operation of the e-Curia system must also be given. The application is validated by the registry to which it has been sent. If validated, an access account is opened in the e-Curia system in the name of the agent or lawyer concerned, who is sent his user identification and personal password (the latter must be changed when the agent or lawyer first logs on to e-Curia and at least once every six months thereafter). The agent or lawyer may also apply for one or more accounts to be opened in the name of one or more assistants identified by name. The agent or lawyer is responsible for access accounts in the name of an assistant. As noted above, access accounts are not case-specific but are used by the agent or lawyer for each and every case in which the agent or lawyer is representing a party before any of the ECJ, GC and CST. Accounts in the name of an assistant are used only for cases in which the agent or lawyer for whom the assistant works is the representative of a party. Accordingly, an account opened in the name of an assistant enables the assistant to receive documents served, consult procedural documents lodged or served by means of e-Curia and lodge a document. However, that is always in cases in which the agent or lawyer for whom the assistant works is the representative of a party; and, when an assistant uses his access account to lodge a document, the lodgment must be validated by the agent or lawyer concerned.713 1.152 The Registrar prepares and certifies the copies of the documents to be served unless the parties are obliged by the rules of procedure to provide certified copies for the purposes of service and have in fact provided them.714 If a document is lengthy and only one copy has been lodged at the Court (which occurs in relation to evidential documents in respect of which a part only of the document is relevant) or, for some other reason, evidence cannot be served by physical or non-physical means, the parties are so informed and given an opportunity to inspect the item at the registry.715 Where an application commencing proceed7 11 Ibid, art 7. Any time is taken to be the time in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 712 As to which, see Ch 4. 713 See the e-Curia Conditions of Use adopted by the Registrars of the ECJ, GC and CST (above, note 547), to which is attached the undertaking that a user of the e-Curia system must provide and which is available on the Court’s website. 714 RP-ECJ, art 48(1); RP-GC, art 57(3); RP-CST, art 36(1). 715 Cf PD-GC, para 61 (which refers to an ‘item’ contained in the annex to a procedural document; its predecessor referred to objects as well as documents). Where an object is lodged at the Registry (such as a sample of the goods at issue in a tariff classification case), inspection takes place at the Registry.

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ings is manifestly inadmissible, for whatever reason, it may be dismissed immediately by Court order and, in such an event, the application will be served on the other party together with a copy of the order dismissing it as inadmissible.716 In direct actions, copies of the application and defence (less any annexes) are sent as a matter of course to the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, when they are not parties to the proceedings, so that they may decide whether the inapplicability of one of their acts is being pleaded pursuant to TFEU, art 277.717 1.153 In the case of references for a preliminary ruling, the national court’s order is served by the ECJ’s Registrar on the parties to the case, the member states and the Commission. It is also served on the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in dispute.718 In references for a preliminary ruling made under TFEU, art 267, the EFTA States and the EFTA Surveillance Authority are also served, as are any other non-member states where the provision conferring jurisdiction on the Court to entertain the reference entitles them to submit statements of case or written observations.719 All references for a preliminary ruling are notified to the Council ‘for information’. When the national court’s order is sent to the member states, it used to be accompanied by a translation, made into the official language of the state in question by the Court’s translation service, either of the complete text of the order or, if the order was particularly long, of a summary of the order that included the question or questions referred and, insofar as they were to be found in the order: (i) the subject matter of the proceedings before the referring court; (ii) the essential arguments of the parties to those proceedings; (iii) a succinct presentation of the reasons for the reference; and (iv) the case law, provisions of EU law and domestic legal provisions relied on.720 At the time of writing, it was more usually the case that an abbreviated summary was provided. Where EFTA states, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and other non-member states are entitled to be served with the referring court’s order, the same steps are taken save that the translation accompanying the order must be into one of the Court’s procedural languages identified by the person or entity to be served.721 Since, in preliminary ruling proceedings, the parties are not obliged to have an address for service in Luxembourg, service is made at the address for service used in the proceedings before the national court or, in its absence, at the address of the party’s lawyer (or, if the party has no lawyer, at the party’s own address). As far as the member states are concerned, service is made on the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Embassy with a copy being sent to the Permanent Representative at Brussels. Service on non-member states is likewise effected on the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Embassy. Any written observations submitted in a 716 See, for example, Case C-371/89 Emrich v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-1555, Case C-24/90 Emrich v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-3913 and Case T-78/91 Moat and Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission [1991] ECR II-1387. 717 RP-ECJ, art 125; RP-GC, art 82; RP-CST, art 54. 718 Statute, art 23, 1st subpara. 719 Statute, art 23, 3rd and 4th subparas. 720 RP-ECJ, art 98(1). 721 RP-ECJ, art 98(2)–(3).

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reference for a preliminary ruling are served by the Registrar on all the parties (including the member states, the Council and the Commission and so forth), even if they have not themselves lodged written observations. Normally the written observations will be expressed in the language of the case but a member state may submit observations in its own official language722 and an EFTA State, the EFTA  Surveillance Authority and any other non-member state entitled to participate in the proceedings may be authorised to use one of the Court’s procedural languages other than the language of the case.723 When that happens, the Registrar has the observations translated into the language of the case and served on the other parties, together with the original.724 Translation into a further language may be required for the Court’s own use and such a translation is available to the parties on request, free of charge. 1.154 Final decisions of the GC, decisions of the GC disposing of the substantive issues in part only and decisions of the GC disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility are notified by the Registrar of the GC not only to all the parties to the proceedings but also to all the member states and EU institutions even if they did not intervene in the case725 so that they may consider whether or not to exercise their right of appeal. Apart from that, all persons including the member states and the EU institutions must rely on the notice of the case published in the Official Journal726 to determine whether they may take advantage of the procedure for intervening in a case. If they do decide to intervene, member states are entitled to use their official language and an EFTA state or the EFTA Surveillance Authority may use another of the Court’s official languages, instead of the language of the case, as when taking part in a reference for a preliminary ruling; the Registrar has the application to intervene and subsequent pleadings translated into the language of the case.727 1.155 Apart from pleadings, the Registry also sees to the service of documents emanating from the Court itself, such as the report for the hearing (where there is one), the advocate general’s opinion and the judgment, etc. In the case of references for a preliminary ruling, the judgment is sent to the court making the reference and certified copies to all the parties. The Registrar is, in general, responsible for the dispatch of the Court’s official correspondence. 5 Assistance given to the Court 1.156 The Registry sees to the distribution of procedural documents to the members of the Court. Those include the pleadings, orders and decisions of the 722 RP-ECJ, art 38(4). 723 RP-ECJ, art 38(5)–(6). 724 Last sentence of each of RP-ECJ, art 38(4)–(6) (which does not refer to service of the original; but that is the current practice). 725 Statute, art 55. 726 As required by RP-ECJ, art 21(4), RP-GC, art 79 and RP-CST, art 51(2). 727 RP-ECJ, art 38(4)–(5); RP-GC, art 46(4)–(5) (the GC rules applying to the CST by virtue of Statute, Annex, art 7(2)).

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Court, letters served on the parties, transcripts, and so on. If an annex to a document appears to be too bulky, the President of the Court or the chamber concerned with the case may, after consulting the judge-rapporteur, dispense with its copying and distribution, the members of the Court being simply informed that it has been lodged. Every document registered is to be read by the Registry official in charge of the case as soon as it has been received in order to determine whether it needs translating728 and whether it raises an interlocutory application such as a new claim, application for interim relief and so forth. In the latter event, a memorandum is sent to the President, judge-rapporteur and (where applicable) advocate general drawing their attention to the document. The President is informed of a case as soon as the document commencing the proceedings has arrived at the Registry, by a memorandum summarising its nature and contents. All documents, whether original or in translation, are distributed to the members of the Court. In addition, when asked to do so by the judge-rapporteur, the Registry compiles and distributes a file of the legislation cited by the parties. Reports for the hearing (where they are prepared), judgments, interim orders and the opinions of the advocates general are supplied free of charge to third parties in a limited number and so long as stocks last. 1.157 The Statute provides that a cause (or case) list ‘shall be established’ by the President of the Court.729 In practice, the Registrar arranges for a cause list to be drawn up in the language of the cases featuring in it before every public hearing of the Court or chamber.730 The cause list is displayed at the entrance to the courtroom in which the proceedings take place and contains the date, hour and place of the hearing, the references to the cases to be heard, the names of the parties and the names and descriptions of their agents, advisers or lawyers.731 Historically, the Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs was informed in advance of the contents of the cause list in order to ensure that the parties’ representatives’ rights of immunity from search and seizure etc under what is now RP-ECJ, art 43 are observed.732 The drawing up of the cause list is, of course, dependent on the fixing of the times for the hearings. It should be noted that the cause list covers not merely the oral procedure in a case (including the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion) but also the handing down of the Court’s judgment.

728 All correspondence is, of course, read. So far as pleadings are concerned, in practice, in direct actions, the application commencing proceedings is read as a matter of course; other pleadings are not usually read. In references for a preliminary ruling, the order for reference, but not the written observations, is read. 729 Statute, art 34, which applies to the GC by virtue of art 53 and to the CST by virtue of Annex, art 7(1). 730 Cf PD-GC, para 191; IR-CST, art 12(1). 731 Ibid and IR-CST, art 12(2). 732 It is understood that, in practice, this rule is now obsolete. It is not known when it was last applied.

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1.158 Minutes of each hearing are drawn up by the Registrar and signed by him and the President.733 They may be inspected and copied by the parties (and, in the case of hearings in the course of references for a preliminary ruling before the ECJ, by the persons entitled to participate in those proceedings).734 Apart from hearings, minutes are also drawn up recording the hearing of witnesses735 and every hearing held in the course of a preparatory enquiry.736 The minutes are served on the parties.737 The minutes ordinarily record the fact that a hearing has taken place and give details of the persons involved; they are not transcripts of the hearings but, where a party makes an important statement in the course of a hearing (such as a concession, the withdrawal of a claim or an argument or an important statement of fact), that statement may well (and should) be recorded in the minutes.738 The minutes drawn up when a witness is examined are different: they reproduce the evidence given by the witness and are checked and signed by the witness before being signed by the President or the judge-rapporteur responsible for conducting the examination and by the Registrar.739 The minutes constitute an official record740 and thus evidence the testimony given by the witness or, as the case may be, the events recorded in them, such as any important statement made by a party that is recorded in them. 1.159 Procedural decisions concerning a case made by the Court in administrative meetings (such as decisions concerning the allocation of the case to a chamber, the ordering of a preparatory enquiry, requests for information or documents, or the hearing) are drawn up by the Registry on the instructions of the Registrar but may take the form either of a decision or of an order, depending upon the circumstances. Ordinarily, a decision takes the form of an order where the Rules of Procedure require it to adopt that form or where the established practice of the Court is that it takes that form. Otherwise, a procedural decision will take the form of a decision. It is difficult to discern any principle behind the use of those different forms but, broadly speaking, a decision usually takes the form of a decision when it relates only to the Court’s internal arrangements.741 When in such a form it is signed by the Registrar, entered on the register, placed 733 Statute, art 33, which applies to the GC by virtue of art 53 and to the CST by virtue of Annex, art 7(1); RP-ECJ, art 84(1); RP-GC, art 114(1); PD-GC, para 211; RP-CST, art 65; IR-CST, art 12(3). 734 RP-ECJ, art 84(2); RP-GC, art 38(1) and PD-GC, paras 21 and 28; RP-CST, art 22(1) and IRCST, art 6(1). 735 RP-ECJ, art 74(1); RP-GC, art 102(2); RP-CST, art 73(4). 736 RP-ECJ, art 74(1); RP-GC, art 102(1). 737 RP-ECJ, art 74(3); RP-GC, art 102(3); RP-CST, art 65; IR-CST, art 12(3). 738 See Cases T-133/08, T-134/08, T-177/08 and T-242/09 Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office, 18 September 2012, paras 190–191. For the practice of the GC see, for example, Case T-392/09 1.garantovana a.s. v Commission, 12 December 2012, paras 22 and 24; see also PDGC, para 211 and IR-CST, art 12(3). 739 RP-ECJ, art 74(2); RP-GC, art 102(2); RP-CST, art 73(4). 740 Ibid and: RP-ECJ, art 74(1) and 84(1); RP-GC, art 102(1) and 114(1); RP-CST, art 65. 741 Such as decisions assigning a case to a chamber or joining a preliminary objection or other procedural issue with the substance of the case. Decisions allowing the use of another procedural language also take the form of a decision although they do, of course, affect the parties as well as the Court’s internal arrangements.

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in the case file and a copy is served on the parties, if need be. Otherwise the decision takes the form of an order and, after being drawn up by the Registry,742 is approved by the President, chamber or judge-rapporteur as the case may be (and, where applicable, the advocate general), entered on the register, placed in the case file and a copy is sent to each of the parties. 1.160 Decisions fixing or extending the time limit for a step in the procedure are made by the President unless the time limit is defined in the rules of procedure, the Statute or the Treaties.743 The President of the Court (and of a chamber) may delegate to the Registrar power of signature for the purpose of fixing or extending those time limits which it falls to the President to prescribe or extend under the Rules of Procedure.744 The Registrar of the ECJ has been delegated the power to fix procedural time limits in the name of the President (within certain maximum periods laid down) in respect of the lodgment of: the defence, reply, rejoinder or statement in intervention; written observations on a procedural issue raised by separate document; written observations on applications to intervene, change the language of procedure, join cases or discontinue a case, rectify, revise or interpret a judgment; written observations on applications commencing third party proceedings and applications for legal aid, stay of proceedings and for a decision on costs; statements of position from the parties regarding orders and decisions dispensing with the oral part of the procedure (where the rules of procedure so permit), ordering repeating or expanding a measure of enquiry, deferring the hearing of a case or staying proceedings; and replies to questions put by the Court. The ECJ’s Registrar has also been delegated the power of extending (in the name of the President) those time limits. In the case of the main written pleadings, the Registrar’s power to extend the time limit applies only to the first request for an extension and only if that request is for no more than one month. Otherwise the request for extension of time must be dealt with by the President (of the Court or of the relevant chamber). In the case of the GC and CST, the GC and CST Registrars have power to prescribe and extend time limits provided for in, respectively, the GC and CST rules of procedure in accordance with the authority accorded to him or her by the President of the GC or, as the case may be, the CST.745 It is understood that the Registrar of the GC has been delegated authority to fix the date for the lodgment of pleadings and written observations and grant a first application for an extension of time for lodging the same if the extension requested is no more than one month; when the President is absent during Court vacations, the Registrar has more general authority (including the power to refuse an application for an extension of time) where necessary in order to ensure that the proceedings take their proper course.746 An application 742 If the order must set out the reasons on which it is based, the judge-rapporteur undertakes that task and the order is completed by the Registry. 743 See, for example: RP-ECJ, art 124(3), 126(2), 127(2), 154(2); RP-GC, art 81(3), 83(3), 164(3); RP-CST, art 39(1), 53(5) and 56(2). 744 RP-ECJ, art 52(2); RP-GC, art 61(2); RP-CST, art 39(2). 745 PD-GC, paras 64 and 66; IR-CST, art 11(1). 746 It is understood that, when exercising that more general authority, the Registrar of the GC would not grant extensions of time for periods longer than necessary in order to cover the period of the President’s absence.

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to extend time must set out the reasons justifying the application and must be submitted in good time before the time limit expires.747 That implies that the need for an extension of time (and the extent of the extension required) can be foreseen in good time before then. That is not always the case. In truly urgent cases (such as where some event justifying an extension of time occurs only shortly before the expiry of the time limit), the application may be made in less than good time before the expiry of the time limit (in which case, one would expect the application to be made promptly upon the occurrence of the event in question). The application ought to be made in writing (although it may be served electronically); and it is difficult to think of cases in which an oral application by telephone would really be justified.748 If the application is for an extension that falls within the power granted to the Registrar, the application can be made to, and decided upon by, the Registrar. Otherwise, the application must be made to, and decided upon by, the President. A time limit can be extended more than once only in exceptional circumstances.749 1.161 The Registrar must attend sittings and meetings of the Court and the chambers with three exceptions:750 (i) meetings where the Court hears the observations of a judge who, it is alleged, ‘no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or no longer meets the obligations arising from his office’;751 (ii) deliberations of the Court on questions other than those concerning its own administration;752 and (iii) meetings at which the Court decides whether or not the Registrar is to be deprived of office because he or she no longer fulfils the conditions or obligations

747 PD-GC, para 66; IR-CST, art 11(2). The position regarding the ECJ is essentially the same. The position cannot be remedied retrospectively by an application for an extension lodged after the expiry of the time limit. A late document may, however, be accepted if the President of the GC or, as the case may be, the CST authorises it: RP-GC, art 62; PD-GC, para 65; RP-CST, art 39(3). The CST so decides after hearing the parties. In both GC and CST proceedings, that applies where the time limit is not a mandatory time limit fixed by the provisions governing proceedings before the Court. 748 If, for example, a relevant event occurred shortly before the expiry of the time limit, the pleading or other document that had to be lodged at the Court by then should have been virtually complete and would be capable of transmission to the Court by fax or electronic means: if it was not, then the need for an extension of time must have arisen long before the application was made. One exceptional case that might justify an oral application would be if the party’s lawyer dropped down dead just before signing the pleading and there was a material risk that the party could not get the pleading signed by another lawyer and lodged at the Court before the expiry of the time limit (signing a pleading is not just a formal act; it signifies the adoption of the contents of the pleading by the signatory so that a replacement lawyer ought properly to familiarize himself or herself with the case and with the contents of the pleading before signing it). 749 PD-GC, para 67; IR-CST, art 11(2) (which is expressed more forcefully, in that it states that, ‘in principle’, a time limit may not be extended more than once). 750 RP-GC, art 35(5); RP-CST, art 20(2). RP-ECJ, art 19 used so to provide but was repealed (in that form) in 2012. In the ECJ, a registry official normally replaces the Registrar at the hearing. RP-GC, art 35(5) does not refer to sittings of the chambers of the GC. Such a reference (as also a reference to sittings of a single judge) is implied: see RP-GC, art 1(2)(a). 751 RP-ECJ, art 6(2); RP-GC, art 7(4); RP-CST, art 5(2). 752 Compare RP-ECJ, art  25 (meetings concerning administrative issues) and 32 (judicial deliberations); RP-GC, art 21 (judicial deliberations) and 42 (administrative issues); RP-CST, art 29(1)–(2) (judicial deliberations) and 29(5) (administrative issues).

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of the office.753 The Registrar draws up the agenda of the administrative meetings of the Court and the chambers and those are submitted for the approval of the President of the Court or chamber, as the case may be. He also draws up the minutes of the administrative meetings and these are approved by the Court or the President of the chamber concerned and signed by the President of the Court or chamber, as the case may be, and the Registrar himself. The Registrar ensures that the decisions of the Court are executed.

C

Other departments

1.162 The GC and CST have no departments other than a Registry. It used to be provided that the organisation of the departments of the ECJ was determined and might be modified by the ECJ acting on a proposal from its Registrar.754 The Registrar remains responsible for the administration of the ECJ;755 and the departments of the ECJ provide the support services for the GC and CST. In addition to the Registry, the ECJ comprises (at the time of writing) three departments that are of interest: the Library, Research and Documentation Directorate General, the Translation Directorate General and the Interpretation Directorate.756 The ECJ also possesses other departments, such as the Infrastructure Directorate General; but they are not of interest for present purposes. 1 The Library, Research and Documentation Directorate General 1.163 The main purpose of the library is to aid the members of the Court and its officials in their work. As a result, its contents are restricted to those specialised areas relevant to the work of the Court: EU law, the laws of the member states, comparative law and international law (including the law of international institutions). The library is reserved for use by members of the Court, its officials, and authorities and officials of other EU institutions but the lawyers and agents of the parties to a case before the Court are also free to make use of it and other persons may make use of it with the permission of the library’s director. The library is open during the Court’s working hours. 1.164 The principal role of the research and documentation function of the Library, Research and Documentation Directorate General is the provision of comparative law studies or studies of EU law, as requested by a member of the Court (generally the judge-rapporteur or advocate general) for the purpose of dealing with an issue of law arising in a case. Those studies are for the Court’s internal use. For example, in Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission757 7 53 RP-ECJ, art 18(6) (by implication); RP-GC, art 32(6); RP-CST, art 17(1) read with 20(2). 754 RP-ECJ, art 21 of the pre-2012 rules of procedure (now repealed). 755 RP-ECJ, art 20(4). 756 The ECJ is required to set up a language service: RP-ECJ, art 42. That refers both to a translation and to an interpretation function (those functions being performed under separate directorates). The ECJ is not required to set up any other internal services apart from the registry. 757 [1982] ECR 1575.

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two lengthy and detailed studies of the laws of the member states concerning the confidentiality of legal communications were produced. The research and documentation function also produces studies unconnected with a particular case but which have some bearing on the work of the Court. Among its other activities are the preparation of a digest of decided cases, which is available in electronic form. 2 The Translation Directorate General 1.165 The Translation Directorate General is divided into three directorates, between whom are shared the official EU languages (the directorates are responsible for, respectively, 9, 6 and 8 language units). There is no Irish language unit because, while Irish is a language that may be used in proceedings before the Court758 and, as from 2005, has been an official EU language, there is no practical need to translate documents into it as a matter of course. So far there has been no case in which the language of procedure was Irish. Should that arise, the Court would deal with the problem on an ad hoc basis.759 1.166 The Directorate General translates procedural documents, that is to say, the pleadings in a case, their annexes, the Court’s communications to the parties, the report for the hearing (where there is one), opinions and judgments. All such documents are translated into the language of the case (where, of course, that is necessary) and, as a matter of practice, into French, which is the common language of the Court. It is not usual for a document to be translated into any other language in the absence of a specific request. Requests for translations are transmitted to the Head of the Directorate General through the Registrar. First priority is given to the translation of reports for the hearing (where they are prepared), opinions and judgments, which must be ready by fixed dates. Subject to those, references for a preliminary ruling have absolute priority over other translations and must be translated and copied into all the EU languages within eight days. Statements and observations relating to preliminary rulings must be translated into the language of the case and any other languages requested within 15 days of being lodged at the Registry. The parties may also request translations, subject to payment of a charge, the request being made to the Registrar.760 3 The Interpretation Directorate 1.167 This Directorate is composed partly of officials of the Court and partly of freelance interpreters, with additional help, where needed, from staff seconded to the Court from other EU institutions. Formerly the Court made use of interpreters seconded from the European Parliament but, as the number of hearings 7 58 See RP-ECJ, art 36; RP-GC, art 44. 759 As noted in the text, Irish did not become an official EU language until 2005. Before then, it had been a procedural language that could be used in proceedings before the Court, an achievement of the first Irish judge appointed to the ECJ, who later became President of Ireland (Irish being an official language of the Irish courts). 760 RP-ECJ, art 143(b); RP-GC, art 139(b); RP-CST, art 108(b).

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grew and the demands of the Parliament increased, that arrangement became less and less convenient; so, in 1980, budgetary approval was given for the creation of the Court’s own interpretation service. 1.168 Interpretation into the language of the case must be ensured during hearings and shall be ensured into other EU languages at the request of a member of the Court having regard to their actual needs. If there are special circumstances (such as those provided for in RP-ECJ, art 38 and RP-GC, art 45761), interpretation into a language other than that of the case may be provided; one example is the presence of important persons or groups at a hearing. The Interpretation Directorate is also employed at meetings or conferences organised by the Court. After the hearing in a case a transcript of the proceedings is usually distributed to the members of the Court in the language of the case and any other into which it has been interpreted.762 The latter is not a translation but a transcript of the interpretation given at the hearing. A party (including all entities entitled to participate in a reference for a preliminary ruling) who has participated in either the written or the oral part of the proceedings may listen to the soundtrack of the hearing. In order to do so, a ‘duly substantiated’ (that is, reasoned) request must be made to the President. It is apprehended that a legitimate reason must be shown if authorisation to listen to the soundtrack is to be given. As no further submissions may ordinarily be made to the Court after the hearing and the Court is in full possession of everything said at the hearing, the likelihood is that such a request may be justified if it is necessary (for example) to confirm for the benefit of persons not involved in the proceedings what exactly was said during the hearing. If authorisation is granted by the President, the soundtrack is listened to on the Court’s premises. The soundtrack in question is the recording of the words spoken by each speaker at the hearing in the language used by the speaker. It is not the recording of the simultaneous interpretation provided at the hearing by the Court.763 In the case of the advocate general’s opinion, which used to be read out in public to the Court by the advocate general in his own mother tongue, interpretation into the language of the case was always provided and a written translation into any languages requested was also normally available but, where it was not, direct interpretation might be provided. Latterly, only the final part of the opinion (setting out the advocate general’s recommendation as to the result in the case) has been read out in open court.

7 61 The latter applies to the CST by virtue of Statute, Annex, art 7(2). 762 As French interpretation is often laid on as a matter of course, in (say) a German language case there would be one transcript in German and another in French. The French version would be based on what the French interpreter(s) said during the hearing when interpreting from German but, if a judge (for example) asked a question in French, the French version of the transcript would record what the questioner had said (in French). In the German version of the transcript, the (French) question would appear in the form in which it was interpreted, into German, at the time. In (for example) a reference for a preliminary ruling in which several Member States made submissions at the hearing, there would be one transcript recording everything that was said in the language in which it was spoken and a second version (normally in French) setting out what the (French) interpreters said at the time. 763 RP-ECJ, art 85; RP-GC, art 115; RP-CST, art 66.

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4 Official publications of the Court 1.169 Publications of the Court must be issued in the official EU languages.764 Historically, the Court published in hard copy form a volume of select instruments on the organisation, jurisdiction and procedure of the Court in all the official EU languages and a series of digests of case law; but the most important of the Court’s publications was the report of the judgments and orders made in the cases before it. RP-ECJ, art 20(3), RP-GC, art 35(3) and RP-CST, art 20(3) provide that the Registrar (of the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC or CST) shall arrange for publication of the reports of cases.765 The reports were originally published in paper form in the official languages of the EU.766 As from 1 January 2012 (1 January 2010, in the case of the CST), they have been available only in electronic form (at the time of writing, the form taken by judgments and so forth available on the Court’s website). The reports cover: (1) judgments of the Court or a chamber (unless otherwise ordered); (2) interim orders; (3) other orders where their publication is considered desirable; (4) opinions given by the Court; (5) opinions of the advocates general. In the ECJ, the judge-rapporteur is authorised to give the necessary instructions regarding the omission of the names of one of the parties or of third parties mentioned in the judgments, orders or opinions. In the GC and CST, it is provided that the names of parties or other information may be omitted from the publications relating to a case either at the request of a party or by the GC (or CST) acting on its own motion, where there is a legitimate interest in keeping the information in question confidential.767 1.170 Judgments and orders were published in paper form in chronological order, the reports coming out in parts over the year. As from 1979 the pagination was the same for every language edition but before then only the first page of the report of each case was the same; as far as the English reports are concerned, that applied only as from 1969. As from the beginning of 1990, the reports were retitled ‘The reports of cases before the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance’ (ECR) and were divided into two sections and then, as from 1994, into 7 64 RP-ECJ, art 40; RP-GC, art 48. 765 See also PD-GC, para 56 and IR-CST, art 17(3). 766 By Council Regulation No  920/2005, art  2 (OJ  No. L156 of 18  June 2005, p  3), the Court benefited from a renewable, five-year derogation from the obligation to draft and publish its acts in Irish. A three-year derogation (renewable for a further period of one year) applied as from 1 May 2004 in the case of Maltese: see Council Regulation No 930/2004 (OJ 2004 No L169, p 1). By Council Regulation No 1257/2010 (OJ 2010 No L343/5), the derogation in relation to Irish was extended for five years from 2012. 767 RP-GC, art 66; RP-CST, art 48. The parallel provision in the ECJ rules of procedure is RP-ECJ, art 95, which applies to references for a preliminary ruling and, pursuant to, RP-ECJ, art 190(3), appeals.

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three sections with separate pagination.768 The first contained the reports of cases before the ECJ and the citation of pages in that section should be preceded by ‘I’; the second contained reports of cases before the CFI (now the GC) and the citation of pages is preceded by ‘II’. The third section covered staff cases decided (as from 1994) by the CFI (as the GC then was) and (from 2006) by the CST, and appeals in staff cases. The third section was cited as ‘ECR-SC’ followed by the section of the volume and the page.769 Initially, each published part of the reports contained the two sections dealing with ECJ and (at the time) CFI decisions but, where the volume of cases reported necessitated it, the sections were published in separate parts. Starting with the reports for 1993, cases before the ECJ and the CFI (now the GC) were reported in separate volumes, each issue covering one or more calendar months. The staff cases were hived off into a separate publication in 1994 and made available as a looseleaf series. 1.171 The paper report of a case commences with a headnote which is divided into two parts: the first mentions the articles of the Treaty or any legislation involved together with various key words explaining the subject matter of the judgment; the second repeats the passages in the judgment of particular interest. As the note printed in the report states, the headnote has no binding force and is not an authentic interpretation of the judgment to which it refers. The draft summary was prepared by the research and documentation service in the ECJ’s Library, Research and Documentation Directorate General and was approved by the judge-rapporteur and the other judges. A brief statement of the subject matter of the case was occasionally added under the title of the judgment770 but does not form part of the formal title of the proceedings; the judge-rapporteur was responsible for that. The layout of the remaining part of the report changed over the years. 1.172 Until the 1980s the report of the judgment consisted of two parts: the first, drawn from the report for the hearing and printed in double columns, set out the facts, the history of the proceedings and the arguments of the parties; the second was printed in one column and set out the reasoning of the judgment. It terminated in the operative part of the judgment, which was printed in heavy type and contained the Court’s order. That was (and is) the passage that was (and is) read out, usually by the President, in open court when judgment is handed down. The advocate general’s opinion then followed, printed in double columns. His or her recommendation (the ‘opinion’ stricto sensu) was printed in one column. In the course of the 1980s, the layout was altered because it was felt that there was some duplication between the first part of the judgment (setting out the facts, an account of the procedure followed and the arguments of the parties) and the 768 The first cases decided by the CFI therefore appear in the report for 1990 even though they were decided towards the end of 1989. 769 In the ECR-SC volumes, section I contained abstracts of the CST and (now) GC staff cases and summaries of the ECJ staff cases; section II contained the full text of the judgments in the language of the case. 770 For example, Cases 241, 242 and 245–250/78 DGV V Council and Commission [1979] ECR 3017 bear the soubriquet ‘Maize gritz liability’.

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advocate general’s opinion, which often contained a summary of the same matters. The result was that the first part of the judgment was omitted from the report in all cases save those in which it was considered to be necessary or desirable to include it; and the advocate general’s opinion was substituted for it in the report. After a few years there was a partial reversion to the old layout of the report in the sense that the first part of the judgment, drawn from the report for the hearing, reappeared; but the advocate general’s opinion continued to precede that part of the report (now entitled ‘judgment’) setting out the Court’s reasons and the operative part of the judgment.771 The paper reports of cases before the GC followed a slightly different format. The judgment was set out as a single document, comprising paragraphs numbered consecutively and divided by headings into sections and sub-sections, and terminating with the operative part; there was no division of the body of the report of the judgment into two parts (one essentially factual and the other setting out the GC’s reasons and its order). The advocate general’s opinion (where there was one) preceded the judgment and was printed in double columns, like the opinions of the advocates general of the ECJ. 1.173 For several years as from 1989 the Court adopted the practice of publishing certain cases in summary form only, in particular where a number of cases gave rise to the same point and those following the lead case contained no additional ruling. The complete version of the judgment and, where applicable, the advocate general’s opinion in such cases was available only in the language of the case, French (the Court’s internal working language), and, as regards the opinion, the language used by the advocate general; and it could be obtained from the Court as long as it still had copies.772 The theory behind that step was that the cases in question were anodyne and would not be cited in future cases. Accordingly, it was not necessary to publish a complete report of the case. The summary publication of the case would relieve the burden on the Court of reporting its decisions and help reduce what was, at the time, an embarrassing backlog in the reporting of ECJ and (at the time) CFI cases. Unfortunately, some of the cases selected for summary publication proved to be cases that were worth citing in later cases;773 and parties could encounter considerable difficulties when an opponent cited (or the Court referred in a relevant judgment to) a judgment that had been published in summary form (usually for a proposition that did not appear in the summary report of the case) and a complete text of the judgment

771 If a case is withdrawn before judgment but after the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion the opinion is normally published alone. 772 If the registry ran out of copies, a copy could in principle be made from the original version of the judgment, kept in the Court’s archives. However, the registry was often uncooperative in assisting a party who was trying to locate an unreported judgment cited against it by the other party or referred to in another judgment. The position eased when judgments and orders became available electronically, on the Court’s website; but some unreported decisions are not available even in that form. 773 In some instances, they were cited by the Court itself as a precedent.

138

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.174

was unobtainable.774 As a result, the practice was abandoned after a few years before reappearing again: as from 1 May 2004, judgments in cases other than references for a preliminary ruling that were delivered either by a chamber of three judges or by a chamber of five judges (but, in the latter event, where there was no advocate general’s opinion) and orders were not reported unless the judge rapporteur decided otherwise. 1.174 The difficulty with selecting cases for reporting in full or at all is that a case that might appear to insiders at the ECJ, GC or CST at the time to be of no importance may turn out in retrospect to be an extremely useful authority.775 From the beginning of 2006, some judgments were reported (in paper form) in an abbreviated form with the unnecessary parts of the judgment omitted.776 Where a case was reported in that form, it appeared in a separate section at the end of the report, the first page of the report of the case being preceded by an asterisk (it is therefore to be cited with the inclusion of the asterisk before the page number). That system of selecting cases for full reporting in the European Court Reports suffered from exactly the same defects as the practice that was initiated in 1989 before being abandoned. No lessons appeared to have been learnt. An electronic version of judgments and advocate general’s opinions is obtainable on the EURLex site for the period up to and including 1997 (but the site does not seem to have the full text of judgments that were, at the time, the subject of a summary or abbreviated report). For later years, an electronic version can be obtained from the Court’s website.777 However, such electronic versions were not definitive or authentic and the version printed in the Court’s reports (where there was one) was to be preferred in the event of any disparity between the different versions. Further, unreported cases would often be available only in the language of the case and French (and not always in French). As from 2012 (2010 in the case of 774 The problem is less acute as a result of the availability of most judgments and orders in electronic form on the Court’s website. If the problem were to occur, the judgment should be obtainable from the relevant registry. In case of difficulty, the registry may be reminded that: (i) the problem arises because the Court decided not to report the judgment properly; and (ii) the registry will at the very least retain the original text of the judgment, signed by the judges, which can be copied. 775 For example, Case C-19/88 International Container et Transport v Direction generale des douanes et droits indirects de Roissy [1989] ECR 577 was the subject of a wholly uninformative summary report. It was then cited with approval by the ECJ in Case C-218/89 Shimadzu Europa GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Berlin [1990] ECR I-4391. In the latter case, the Commission had conceded that, because of the earlier case, a position that had been taken by it and that had led to the adoption of more than one legislative measure was no longer tenable. In Case T-171/99 Corus UK  Ltd v Commission [2001]  ECR  I-2967, para  55, the CFI cited Case C-259/87 Greece v Commission [1990] ECR I-2845, para 26, as authority for the proposition that unjust enrichment was contrary to the general principles of EU law. Greece v Commission was the subject of a summary report that revealed nothing of the reasoning behind it. 776 Eg Case C-446/02 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Gouralnik & Partner GmbH [2004] ECR I-5841. It appears that, as from May 2004, ECJ judgments and advocate general’s opinions in direct actions and appeals decided by a three judge chamber and ECJ judgments in direct actions and appeals decided by a five judge chamber (where there is no advocate general’s opinion) were no longer reported unless it was considered that they should be reported. As from September 2005, not all CFI (now GC) judgments have been reported. 777 Http://www.curia.europa.eu/en/index.htm.

139

1.175  Judicial institutions and bodies

the CST), only an electronic version of judgments and opinions is available from the Court. 1.175 Citation of judgments, orders and advocate general’s opinions used to take the form: case number; names of the parties (usually in the form used in the heading of the relevant pages in the ECR); year (in square brackets); a reference to the reports (in the form ‘ECR’); a reference to the relevant section of the ECR (‘I’ for ECJ cases; ‘II’ for GC cases; ‘SC’ for staff cases); and a page number, being the first page of the report of the case in the ECR. Thus, a case would be cited (and referred to at the hearing) in the form: Case C-230/03 Sedef [2006] ECR I-157. That would be so even though the proceedings were Sedef v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg and even though the advocate general’s opinion starts on page 159 and the judgment starts on page 176.778 As from 2014, a new form of citation applies. That takes the form of a reference to the electronic classification of judgments (ECLI) and applies to all judgments, orders and advocate general’s opinions, as from the creation of the Court. The new form of citation is in the form: name of parties; case number; an indication of the jurisdiction (‘EU’ for the CJEU); a single letter indicating the court in question (‘C’ for the ECJ; ‘T’ for the GC; ‘F’ for the CST); year; document number. Hence (for example), Case 416/85 Commission v United Kingdom [1988] ECR 3127 (in the old form of citation) is (under the current form of citation) Commission v United Kingdom, Case 416/85, EU:C:1988:321. The advocate general’s opinion in that case is EU:C:1987:519.779 6 Publications in the Official Journal 1.176 RP-ECJ, art  21(4) requires publication in the Official Journal of the European Union of information relating to the commencement of direct actions and appeals and requests for a preliminary ruling. IR-ECJ, art 25 imposed on the Registrar of the ECJ the duty to arrange for publication of that information and of the following: (i) notices of the removal of cases from the Register; (ii) subject to a decision of the ECJ to the contrary, the operative part of every judgment and interim order; (iii) the composition of the chambers;780 (iv) the appointment of the President of the ECJ;781 (v) the appointment of the Registrar;782 (vi) the appointment of the Assistant Registrar and the Administrator.

778 The reason for the disparity in the naming of the parties is that ‘Sedef’ only is used in the heading of the pages of the ECR in which the case report appears. 779 At the time of writing, the Court’s observance of its new form of citation was not entirely consistent. 780 See also RP-ECJ, art 11(5). 781 To which are to be added the names of the Vice-President, presidents of chambers and the First Advocate General: RP-ECJ, art 8(5), 12(4) and 14(3). 782 See also RP-ECJ, art 18(8).

140

Judicial institutions and bodies 1.178

1.177 RP-GC, art  79 provides for the publication in the Official Journal of notices of applications commencing proceedings before the GC.783 PD-GC, paras 52–55 require the Registrar to publish in the Official Journal: (i) the names of the President, Vice-President and Presidents of chambers; (ii) the composition of the chambers of the GC; (iii) the criteria applied in the allocation of cases to chambers; (iv) the criteria applied when completing a formation or attaining a quorum; (v) the name of the Registrar and any Deputy Registrar; (vi) the dates of the judicial vacations; (vii) the conditions under which the Vice-President takes the place of the President; (viii) the criteria for service by electronic means and for deeming a document sent by such means to be an original; (ix) the security rules for protecting information and material produced in accordance with RP-GC, art 105(1)–(2); (x) the legal aid form; (xi) notices of proceedings that have been brought; and (xii) notices of decisions closing proceedings. 1.178 The rules governing the CST provide variously for the publication in the Official Journal of: the name of the President of the CST;784 decisions on the constitution and membership of chambers;785 the criteria for the assignment of cases to chambers;786 the name of the Registrar;787 the criteria for service by electronic means and for deeming a document sent by such means to be an original;788 any decision setting the maximum length of pleadings;789 notice of the date on which an application commencing proceedings was lodged and other details of the case;790 the CST rules of procedure;791 decisions provided for in the CST rules of procedure, instructions to the registrar and practice directions, notices of proceedings brought and notices of decisions closing proceedings.792 Information for publication in the Official Journal is written in the language of the case and translated as soon as possible into the other official languages.

783 The information to be provided is the same as that required by RP-ECJ, art 21(4) in respect of actions and appeals before the ECJ. 784 RP-CST, art 7(4). 785 RP-CST, art 11(3). 786 RP-CST, art 13(3). 787 RP-CST, art 16(7). 788 RP-CST, art 36(4) and 45(3). 789 RP-CST, art 46 (see PD-CST, para 49). 790 RP-CST, art 51(2). 791 RP-CST, art 134. 792 IR-CST, art 17(2).

141

Chapter 2

General outline of procedure

I INTRODUCTION 2.1 The cases that come before the Court tend to fall into one of six groups: (i) direct actions; (ii) references for a preliminary ruling; (iii) applications for interim relief; (iv) staff cases; (v) proceedings brought against the European Union Intellectual Property Office (formerly the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)) and against the Community Plant Variety Office (collectively referred to as ‘the Office’) concerning the application of the rules relating to intellectual property rights (hereafter, ‘IP appeals’); and, since 1990, (vi) appeals initially from the GC to the ECJ but additionally, since 2005, from the CST to the GC. Certain other types of proceeding exist but, as they occur relatively infrequently, they are considered in Chapter 17, with the exception of certain review procedures that are akin to appeals.1 Of the procedures most frequently encountered, the main procedural differences lie between the first, second, fifth and sixth. Direct actions, jurisdiction over which is divided between the ECJ and the GC,2 are contentious proceedings; references for a preliminary ruling, jurisdiction over which was at the time of writing reserved to the ECJ, are non-contentious proceedings; IP appeals (which are not appeals in the strict sense) are heard by the GC, subject to appeal to the ECJ, and basically follow the format of a direct action subject to some variations therefrom3; appeals (from the GC to the ECJ and also, at the time of writing, from the CST to the GC) have procedural characteristics that set them apart from other cases: with the exception of the procedure by which the ECJ may ‘review’ a decision of the GC (at the time of writing, only an appellate decision of the GC could be reviewed by the ECJ; but a reference for a preliminary ruling delivered by the GC could be the subject of a review if jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings were conferred on the GC), they provide the only instance of the exercise of judicial review by the GC and the ECJ over decisions of another judicial body. Applications for interim relief may be made in all direct actions, whatever their nature and whichever of the ECJ, the GC or the CST has jurisdiction. They are one of a number of interlocutory and other proceedings that may be commenced in a direct action but, in practical terms, they are the only type that is encountered 1 Dealt with summarily in section VI.C, para 2.262 ff below and at greater length in Ch 15. 2 See Ch 1, section III, para 1.18 ff. 3 RP-GC, art  191 provides that the GC rules of procedure apply to IP appeals subject to the variations set out in Title IV thereof (that is, RP-GC, art 171–190).

143

2.2  General outline of procedure

frequently. Such proceedings and the various points of procedure and practice arising in a case are dealt with in detail in subsequent chapters. Staff cases, jurisdiction (at first instance) over which was attributed to the CST at the time of writing but was reattributed to the GC as from 1 September 2016, comprise direct actions brought by present, potential or past employees of the EU institutions, or persons claiming under them, against the employing authority. Their only distinguishing feature is their subject matter. In procedural terms, the conduct of the action before the Court is no different from that in any other direct action. At the time of writing, in consequence of the winding up of the CST and the transfer to the GC of its first instance jurisdiction over staff cases, as from 1 September 2016, the GC’s appellate jurisdiction over CST decisions is limited to those CST decisions made on or before 31 August 2016 against which an appeal had been commenced as at that date or, if commenced after that date, would be in time; and the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review appellate decisions of the GC relating to CST decisions was limited correspondingly. 2.2 This chapter describes the procedural position as at the time of writing (and therefore includes reference to CST proceedings); it considers first the procedural rules relating to the language to be used in proceedings and then the procedure to be followed where proceedings are commenced erroneously before the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC or CST, before summarising the procedure followed in direct actions (including IP appeals and staff cases), references for a preliminary ruling, appeals and reviews. Particular aspects of procedure are dealt with in greater detail in later chapters. The references to the CST can be ignored as from the point at which the CST is abolished (1 September 2016), save to the extent that the practice of the CST sheds light on the practice of the Court generally.

II

THE LANGUAGE OF THE CASE

A

Selection of the language of the case

2.3 The languages that may be used in proceedings before the Court are the official languages of the EU.4 However, for procedural purposes in any case, 4 RP-ECJ, art 36 and RP-GC, art 44 list those languages; see also art 7 of Council Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 (OJ English Special Edition, 1952–1958, p 59), as amended in particular by Council Regulation No 920/2005 (OJ No L156 of 18 June 2005 p 3). At the time of writing, the official languages of the EU were: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish. Derogations such as the derogation concerning Irish to be found in art 2 of Regulation No 920/2005 apply to documents issued by the EU institutions and not to the right of a person to use one of the official EU languages when dealing with an institution or, in the case of the Court, using its procedures. On the scope and status of Regulation No 1 and the right to use the EU languages, see Case T-120/99 Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2001] ECR II-2235, para 58, and Case C-361/01P Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003] ECR I-8283, para 82.

144

General outline of procedure 2.5

one of those languages is the language of the case. As will be explained below, the language of the case is not the only language that may be used in a case; but the language of the case has a particular, formal status in the proceedings and the ‘use’ of another language, where it is authorised by the Court or (in certain cases) permitted as of right, does not detract from that formal status (save that, in certain specified cases, it may result in a change in the language of the case). 2.4 In references for a preliminary ruling, the language of the case is always ‘the language of the referring court or tribunal’.5 Nonetheless, that does no more than provide a rule for selecting which of the languages used in proceedings before the Court is the language of the case; the Rules of Procedure do not appear to envisage the situation where the language of the referring court is not one of the recognised procedural languages and it is considered that, were that situation to arise, it would be necessary for the national court making the reference to the Court to express the reference in the official EU language of its own member state.6 Another language may in certain circumstances be used in references for a preliminary ruling (either as of right or subject to authorisation by the Court); but such ‘use’ of a language other than the language of the case is distinct from a change in the language of the case, for which there is no provision. 2.5 In the case of appeals (from the CST to the GC and from the GC to the ECJ) and the review by the ECJ of appellate decisions of the GC, the language of the case is that of the decision against which the appeal has been brought or which is the subject of the review, without prejudice to the power to authorise use of another language and the right of a member state participating in the appeal proceedings as an intervener to use its own official language.7 Where an appeal is brought by a member state, the language of the case is that of the decision contested in the appeal.8 5 RP-ECJ, art 29(2), 2nd subpara. The underlying premise is that the reference will be made by a court or tribunal of a member state and that, accordingly, the reference will be made in one of the official EU languages. 6 Thus, while the UK was a member state of the EU, if Welsh were a procedural language of the courts in Wales (as opposed to a language that could be used for some purposes of proceedings, such as statements made by the parties in person or by witnesses), the reference would have to be made in English and not, for example, German. 7 RP-ECJ, art 37(2)(a)–(b) and 38(4); RP-GC, art 45(3)(a) and 46(4). The power to authorise use of another language appears in RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b) and (c) and RP-ECJ, art 38(5)–(8), and RP-GC, art 45(1)(b)–(c) and RP-GC, art 46(5)–(7). The opening words of RP-ECJ, art 37(2) and RP-GC, art 45(3)(a) cross-refer only to RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b)–(c) and RP-ECJ, art 38(4)–(5) and RP-GC, art 45(1)(b)–(c), respectively. 8 RP-ECJ, art  37(2) allows a derogation, from the usual rule that the language of the appeal is that in which the judgment appealed against was expressed, only where the member state participates in the appeal as an intervener: see RP-ECJ, art 38(4), to which RP-ECJ, art 37(2) refers. The position under the GC rules of procedure seems to be the same even though RPGC, art 45(3)(a) does not cross-refer to RP-GC, art 46(4) (which commences with the words ‘notwithstanding the foregoing provisions’). A  member state can of course participate in an appeal as the appellant (even though it was not previously a party to the proceedings before the

145

2.6  General outline of procedure

2.6 In IP appeals, the application must be drafted in one of the Court’s procedural languages9 chosen by the applicant10 and that language will be the language of the case if the applicant was the only party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal that generated the proceedings before the Court or if any other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal does not object within a period fixed by the Registrar after the application has been lodged.11 If such an objection is made, the language of the case becomes the language of the decision contested before the GC, not one of the other procedural languages.12 The language of the case is settled at the outset of the proceedings.13 Those rules for identifying the language of the case are without prejudice to the power of the GC to authorise use of another of the procedural languages for all or part of the proceedings.14 2.7 In proceedings ancillary to or consequential upon an action (the main examples being applications for interim relief made in the course of an action or proceeding, applications concerning costs, and applications consequential upon a judgment, such as applications to set aside judgment by default, third-party proceedings and applications for the interpretation, revision or supplementing of a judgment), the language of the case is that of the main proceedings or that of the decision to which the application relates.15

first instance court) or as a direct party to the appeal (where it was an applicant, defendant or intervener in the proceedings before the first instance court). Taken literally, the derogation in RP-ECJ, art 38(4) and RP-GC, art 46(4) does not apply in either of those circumstances. The Statute, art 56, last sentence, provides that appellant member states are in the same position as member states which intervened at first instance. That refers to capacity and standing; it is not evident that it refers to the language regime. The position regarding the review of an appellate decision of the GC is different because such a review occurs (if at all) on the initiative of the ECJ, not a party or third party; and the parties to the proceedings before the GC and other interested persons, on whom the ECJ decision to review the GC decision has been served, may lodge statements or written observations: RP-ECJ, art 195(2). 9 See note 4 above. 10 RP-GC, art 45(4)(b). 11 RP-GC, art 45(4)(a)–(b). 12 RP-GC, art 45(4)(c). The Registrar arranges for the translation of the application into the language of the case. The pre-2015 GC rules of procedure had more complicated rules for determining the language of the case. Case T-129/01 Jose Alejandro SI v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003] ECR II-2251, paras 11–12, is an example of the raising of the objection (under the pre-2015 rules). 13 Under RP-GC, art 178(1), the application is served on the other parties only after the language of the case has been determined under RP-GC, art 45(4). 14 RP-GC, art 45(4) cross-refers to RP-GC, art 45(1)(b)–(c) but RP-GC, art 46(5)–(7) also apply. 15 See RP-ECJ, art 37(2)(c), which refers only to costs applications and applications consequential upon a judgment, but which reflects the practice regarding the other proceedings referred to above; RP-GC, art 45(3)(b). RP-ECJ, art 37(2)(c) is without prejudice to the ECJ’s power to authorise use of another language and to the rights to use another language, provided for in RPECJ, art 37(1)(b) and (c) and RP-ECJ, art 38(4) and (5). RP-GC, art 45(3)(b) is expressed to be without prejudice only to RP-GC, art 45(1)(b) and (c); but that is not to be read as precluding the operation of RP-GC, art 46(5)–(7). Cf Case C-64/98 P-REV Odette Nicos Petrides Co Inc v Commission [2010] ECR I-65* (inadmissibility of application for revision not made in the language of the original case).

146

General outline of procedure 2.9

2.8 In other proceedings (including proceedings before the CST),16 the language of the case is selected from among the recognised procedural languages by the applicant17 save that, (in the ECJ) where the defendant is a member state and (in the GC and CST) the defendant is a member state or a natural or legal person having the nationality of a member state, the applicant has no choice in the matter and the language of the case must be the official language of the member state in question: where it has more than one official language, the applicant can choose between them.18 The language of the case does not change when one case is joined with another case having a different procedural language.

B

Role of the language of the case

2.9 In all proceedings, all written and oral submissions, including the documents annexed thereto,19 must be expressed in the language of the case, which is also used when drawing up the minutes and decisions of the Court.20 In particular, the authentic version of the judgment in a case or an order made in a case is the version expressed in the language of the case, other language versions being translations.21 Supporting documents (that is, documents of an evidentiary nature) which are expressed in any other language must be accompanied by a translation into the language of the case but, in the case of long documents, the translation may be confined to extracts, the Court or chamber retaining power to call at any time for a complete or fuller translation on its own motion or at the request of one of the parties.22 The requirement to use the language of the case applies only to submissions made and documents lodged in the case. Accordingly an appli 16 The linguistic provisions applicable to the GC apply also to the CST: Statute, Annex, art 7(2). 17 RP-ECJ, art  37(1) and RP-GC, art  45(1), opening phrase of each. The applicant has a free choice in the matter, unless constrained by an express rule to opposite effect. In particular, the fact that the applicant was formerly employed by the defendant does not mean that he must use the defendant’s usual working languge: Case F-47/08 DEP Buschak v European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 25 June 2014, paras 43–48. 18 RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(a); RP-GC, art 45(1)(a). The former provision led the ECJ to state in Case 1/60  FERAM  SpA  v High Authority [1960]  ECR  165 at 170 that, unless the defendant is a Community (now EU) institution, ‘the language of the case is the language of the defendant’. 19 See, for example, Case 105/75 Giuffrida v Council [1976]  ECR  1395 at 1405 (Advocate General Warner). 20 RP-ECJ, art 38(1); RP-GC, art 46(1) (in CST proceedings, the GC language rules apply: see Statute, Annex, art 7(2)). Those provisions are not overridden by TFEU, art 24, 4th subpara, which provides that every citizen of the EU may write to the EU institutions in one of the languages referred to in TEU, art 55(1) and receive an answer in the same language: formal communications between the Court and a party in proceedings before it (as opposed to correspondence taking place outside the context of a case pending before the Court) do not fall within the scope of TFEU, art 24. For specific procedural purposes, it is legitimate for an EU institution to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of the official languages of the EU: cf Case T-120/99 Kik (above, note 4), paras 55–63. 21 RP-ECJ, art  38(1) and 41; RP-GC, art  46(1) and 49. In CST proceedings, the GC language rules apply. See also Case T-334/00 Goldstein v Court of Justice, order of 5  February 2001 (unreported), para 6. On authenticity, see note 33 below. 22 RP-ECJ, art 38(2)–(3); RP-GC, art 46(2)–(3). Cf Case C-526/08 Commission v Luxembourg [2010] ECR I-6151, paras 16–20; Case C-354/10 Commission v Greece, 1 March 2012, paras 33–34.

147

2.10  General outline of procedure

cation to intervene may be made in any of the recognised procedural languages (not simply the language of the case) because the applicant to intervene is not a party to the proceedings unless and until his intervention is allowed.23 However, the practice of the GC and CST is that, if an application to intervene is made by a person other than a member state (in relation to whom a different rule applies) otherwise than in the language of the case, the Registrar will require the application to be ‘put in order’ (that is, resubmitted in the language of the case) before it is placed on the file and served on the parties.24 The Registrar must decline to accept and may return by registered post any pleading or document which is not worded in the language of the case unless there is express provision that the pleading or document need not be expressed in the language of the case.25 Normally annexes to a pleading or procedural document are not returned but the party submitting them is asked to produce a translation into the language of the case if that appears necessary for the efficient conduct of the proceedings.26 2.10 Although the language rules are not peremptory procedural requirements,27 it is now accepted that a pleading which is not expressed in the language of the case is inadmissible; and, in consequence, if that pleading initiates (or seeks to initiate) proceedings for which the language of the case has already been determined (such as an application for revision of a judgment or an application commencing an appeal), the proceedings are inadmissible unless a pleading expressed in the language of the case is lodged within time.28 In the case of pleadings other than those commencing proceedings, the time limit for lodging them is usually capable of being extended. Accordingly, the lodgement of such a pleading which is not expressed in the language of the case can be rectified by applying for an extension of time, by applying for permission to use another procedural language, or by lodging the pleading in the language of the case, although those steps would have to be taken before the time limit expired. Formerly, the President or the Court could authorise the Registrar to accept the

23 Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961]  ECR  1 at 48. 24 PD-GC, para 109; IR-CST, art 8(6). If a version of the application to intervene, expressed in the language of the case, is lodged within the period fixed by the Registrar, the date of lodgement for the purpose of registration will be taken to be the date of lodgement of the first version of the application received at the registry. That is relevant only to the operation of the time limit for intervening: if the version in the language of the case were lodged after the expiry of the period fixed by the Registrar but before the expiry of the time limit for intervening, there would be no procedural consequences because the period fixed by the Registrar cannot reduce the period for applying to intervene determined in the rules of procedure (as to which, see Ch 5). 25 PD-GC, para 89; IR-CST, art 8(5). 26 RP-ECJ, art 38(2)–(3); RP-GC, art 46(2)–(3); PD-GC, para 108 and Annex 3 at (d); IR-CST, art 8(5), 2nd sentence. 27 FERAM (above, note 18), p 170. 28 Petrides (above, note 15); Case T-330/14  P  Jelenkowska-Luca v Commission, 11  December 2014, para  25. In Case C-526/08 Commission v Luxembourg [2010]  ECR  I-6151, Advocate General Kokott had thought that an application not drafted in the language of the case was ‘possibly’ inadmissible (see para 18 of her Opinion) but, in that case, the difficulty arose only in relation to two annexes to the application.

148

General outline of procedure 2.11

pleading.29 Currently, in GC and CST proceedings, there is provision for the Registrar to allow the party a period of time to make good any formal irregularities in a pleading; and it is only if that time limit is not respected that an issue concerning the inadmissibility of the pleading arises.30 That may be another way of dealing with a pleading (other than one commencing proceedings) that is not expressed in the language of the case. If such a pleading were served on the opposing party, an application under RP-ECJ, art  151, RP-GC, art  130 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83 to have it declared inadmissible would appear to be appropriate (the only other remedy being an application for service of a translation into the language of the case). Any relevant time limit for responding to such a document would seem to run only from service of the translation into the language of the case, not from service of the version in the language originally used. Where it is an annex which has not been lodged in the language of the case, it is certainly excessive to apply under RP-ECJ, art 151 (or RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83) for the position to be regularised,31 a simple letter to the Registrar pointing the defect out should be sufficient. The inadmissibility of the annex would arise only if the party producing it declined to produce translations (into the language of the case) of at least the material passages in the annex at the request of the Registrar.32 Texts drawn up either in the language of the case or in any other language authorised pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 37–38 or RP-GC, art 45–46 are authentic.33 2.11 There is an irrebuttable presumption of law that the Court, and all the EU institutions, are cognisant of all the official EU languages.34 The consequence of that presumption is that the rules relating to the language of the case are intended primarily to benefit the parties and reduce the necessity for translations; the Court has knowledge of the existence and contents of every document submitted to it which is drawn up in an official EU language, whether or not the 29 PD-GC, para 107 and IR-CST, art 8(5), 3rd sentence, are relics from that time. 30 PD-GC, para  105 (PD-GC, para  107 applies to annexes, not to procedural documents, or pleadings); IR-CST, art 8(1)–(2). 31 Case 14/64 Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority [1965] ECR 51 at 56–57 and 67 (Advocate General Roemer): the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the application. In Case C-526/08 Commission v Luxembourg (above, note 28), paras 18–20, the question of ordering two annexes to be removed from the file because they were not expressed in the language of the case was brushed aside because translations into the language of the case had been provided at the request of the Registry. That seems to make it clear that, at least so far as annexes are concerned, the failure to provide a translation into the language of the case at the time of lodgement of the annex does not render the annex inadmissible. 32 As PD-GC, paras 107–108 provide. 33 RP-ECJ, art  41; RP-GC, art  49. Accordingly, anything expressed in the language of the case is deemed to express the true meaning of the original document. Thus, in Case C-12/03P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, order of 24 July 2003 (unreported), the ECJ refused to order the production of a French translation of a pleading in an English language case because, the language of the case being English, only the English version of the pleading could be relied upon as expressing the true meaning of the case made out by the author of the pleading (it had been argued that the French version might shed light on the meaning of the English version of the pleading). The same rule applies in CST proceedings by virtue of Statute, Annex art 7(2). 34 FERAM SpA v High Authority (above, note 18).

149

2.12  General outline of procedure

parties to the case understand it.35 As a result, while a party may complain that his right to a fair trial has been infringed because a document or statement has been submitted to the Court in a language other than that of the case, he cannot rely on that fact to show that the Court was unaware of the contents of the document or statement.36 The language rules are not peremptory requirements of the Court’s procedure37 and, if infringed, do not themselves cause the proceedings to be vitiated.

C

Alteration of the language of the case and use of another language

2.12 Technically, there is a distinction between changing the language of the case and using another language in the course of the proceedings.38 When the language of the case is changed, the entirety of the proceedings must be conducted in that language (save where use of another language is permitted or authorised) and, where relevant, the minutes and decisions of the Court must be drawn up in the new language of the case. When a language other than that of the case is used, the formal procedural language of the case does not alter and arrangements have to be made for the documents or oral submissions expressed in the other language used to be rendered into the language of the case. In practical terms, the distinction between altering the language of the case and permitting or authorising use of another language (without altering the language of the case) is largely of importance only so far as the internal workings of the Court and the drafting by it of formal documents are concerned. 2.13 In proceedings other than references for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ, GC and CST may authorise the use of a language other than the language of the case or make a change in the language of the case to another of the recognised procedural languages for all or part of the proceedings (and even if the language of the case has already been the subject of change).39 That decision may be made: (i) at the joint request of the parties - all the parties must concur in the application; or (ii) at the request of one party - such a request may not be made by an EU 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid, p 170. 37 Ibid. 38 The distinction is drawn in the titles to RP-ECJ, art 37 and 38, in RP-ECJ, art 37(1) and in RP-GC, art 45(1). RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b) and RP-GC, art 45(1)(b) refer simply to use of another language for ‘all or part of the proceedings’ but not to use of another language as the language of the case; RP-ECJ, art 38(4)–(8) and RP-GC, art 46(4)–(7) refer to use of another language alongside the language of the case. RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(a) and (c) and RP-GC, art 45(1)(a) and (c) refer to use of another language ‘as the language of the case’ (subparas (c), in both instances, adding ‘for all or part of the proceedings’). It is not clear why RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b) and RP-GC, art 45(1)(b) omit the phrase ‘as the language of the case’. 39 RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b) and (c) (referred to, in the case of appeals, the review of a GC decision and ancillary and consequential applications, in RP-ECJ, art 37(2)); RP-GC, art 45(1)(b) and (c) (applicable to appeals from the CST, ancillary and consequential aplications, and IP appeals by virtue of the opening words of RP-GC, art 45(3) and (4). As noted above, in CST proceedings, the GC language rules apply.

150

General outline of procedure 2.14

institution and it can be granted only after the Court has heard the other parties and the advocate general (where there is one).40 The rules of procedure do not specify whether either request should be made by application under RP-ECJ, art 151 or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83.41 The inference from the express requirement that the Court must hear the views of both the other parties and the advocate general (where there is one) before deciding on an application made by one party (but is not obliged to hear the advocate general before considering the request made by all the parties) is that a procedure separate from RP-ECJ, art 151 (or RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83) is envisaged. It is equally plausible that the divergence from the procedure set out in RP-ECJ, art 151 (or RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83) simply reflects the fact that, in the first case, all the parties must apply and it is not necessary to regard the application as contentious. On balance the better view is that the request should be made under RP-ECJ, art 151 (or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83), simply because that provision is supposed to apply to procedural issues in general. However it should be noted that, in Case 260/81 Regul-Eberhardt v Commission,42 such a request was made simply by letter and granted after the Commission had indicated its agreement, also by letter. Such requests may be decided on by the President rather than the Court. Where the President is inclined to accede to a request that is not supported by the agreement of all the parties, he or she must refer the matter to the Court. If all the parties are agreed, the President is not obliged to refer the matter to the Court but may do so.43 Presumably, in such a case, the President would refer the matter to the Court only if he or she felt that there was some good reason for refusing the request even though all parties were agreed that it should be granted. 2.14 It will be observed that the process for seeking a change in the language of the case implies that the proceedings are already on foot by the time when the request for the language of the case to be changed is made. That is not necessarily so where the request emanates from the applicant. As in most direct actions the language of the case is chosen by the applicant, the problem of an application to change the language of the case at the outset of the proceedings arises only where the language of the case is predetermined by another rule, such as where proceedings consequential upon other proceedings are commenced (eg an appeal). Where the language of the case has been predetermined, a pleading initiating a proceeding is inadmissible if not expressed in the language of the case and the defect cannot be cured by an application made to change the language of the case that is made after the expiry of the time limit for commencing the proceedings.44 It has been suggested that the problem can be overcome by making an application to change the language of the case before the expiry of the time

40 RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b) and (c); RP-GC, art 45(1)(b) and (c). 41 In the case of an intervener, the request may, of course, be made in the application to intervene, as was done in Case T-66/94 Auditel Srl v Commission [1995] ECR II-239 (see para 1). 42 Order of 21 October 1981: the case was subsequently withdrawn. 43 RP-ECJ, art 37(4); RP-GC, art 45(2). 44 Jelenkowska-Luca (above, note 28), paras 17–25.

151

2.15  General outline of procedure

limit.45 If so, that application would have to be accompanied by the application commencing proceedings, expressed in the preferred procedural language, so that any decision accepting the change in language could be acted upon immediately and thereby avoid the expiry of the time limit for commencing proceedings. However, technically, it does not seem that that solution is possible because an application to change the language of the case, and the procedure to be followed when dealing with such an application, presuppose that there is a case before the Court which has a procedural language. Therefore, it seems that, in all cases in which a new procedure is inititated, for which there is a predetermined language of the case, the application commencing the procedure must be expressed in the language of the case and any application to change the language of the case can relate only to subsequent steps in the procedure.46 2.15 Requests to change the language of the case or use a different language are rarely made and it is virtually impossible to discern what are the principles which may guide the Court in allowing or refusing them.47 In general terms, however, there is a material difference between situations in which an application to diverge from the language of the case is made by a party who is able to select that language and situations in which the application is made by a person who must, in principle, accept the selection that has been made by another party or has been determined under the rules of procedure. In the first type of situation, since the party applying was entitled to select the language of the case, the starting assumption is that the party chose the language that was most convenient for him or her. A later request made by that party to diverge from use of the language chosen by him must be supported by very good reasons and must, in particular, show why it was that a problem with the language of the case could not have been foreseen when that language was selected.48 So far as concerns situations 45 That is implied in Jelenkowska-Luca (above, note 28), para 24. 46 For the sake of clarity on the point, that applies where the new procedure amounts to a new case (such as an appeal). An application made in the context of an action (such as a costs application) is different. 47 For example, in Cases 43 and 63/82 Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamse Boekwezen (VBVB) and Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Belangen des Boekhandels (VBBB) v Commission [1984] ECR 19 at 27, an application by three interveners to use a different language from the language of the case for their written and oral pleadings was refused even though the reason for the application was that the interveners wished to be represented by a well-known specialist in the subject matter of the litigation who could not understand or express himself in the language of the case (the circumstances were rather unusual because the case concerned the publishing of books in Flemish but the specialist in question was not a Flemish-speaker; language was accordingly a sensitive matter in the case); in Case T-1/90 Pérez-Minguez Casariego v Commission [1991] ECR II-143, paras 20–22, the CFI (as it then was) allowed the parties to use French as the language of the case at the request of the applicant even though the applicant had commenced proceedings using Spanish: the reason for the change seems to have been that the applicant had in the meantime instructed another lawyer to represent him – the application to use another language was made under what is now RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(c) (which was then applicable to CFI proceedings) but was not opposed. 48 Case T-121/95 European Fertiliser Manufacturers’ Association v Council [1997] ECR II-87, paras 11–12. It would seem that an application could be grounded only upon the occurrence of some unforeseen event after the initial selection of the language of the case. That event could, of course, be a falling out between the party and his or her representatives.

152

General outline of procedure 2.16

in which the application is made by a person who has no choice in selecting the language of the case, in Case T-74/92 Ladbroke Racing (Deutschland) GmbH v Commission49 it was held that a request (made by an intervener) to use a language other than the language of the case must provide detailed reasons showing that the applicant’s rights would otherwise be affected. The general practice seems to be that use of a language other than the language of the case during the written procedure will not be permitted because the party concerned can always obtain its own translations of the pleadings and arrange for its pleadings to be translated into the language of the case; on the other hand, use of another language during the oral procedure may be permitted where that is the language of the party’s chosen counsel since there is an obvious interest in a party using counsel that the party has chosen and there are no adverse consequences for other parties or for the conduct of the proceedings.50 If the request for use of another language is confined to its use during the oral procedure, the burden effectively shifts to the other parties to show reason why the grant of permission would delay the proceedings or prejudice the procedural rights of the other parties.51 Automatic authorisation to use a language other than the language of the case is given to member states by the rules of procedure in relation to their written and oral submissions when intervening in a case or taking part in an appeal.52 EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority may be authorised to use one of the Court’s procedural languages, other than the language of the case, when intervening.53 No provision is made for obtaining authorisation. It would appear that it should be done by written application accompanying, or included in, the application to intervene. 2.16 The rules of procedure refer to use of another language and to a change in the language of the case ‘for all or part of the proceedings’.54 On a strict interpretation of the rules of procedure it could be said that that means that, for example, the language used at the hearing may be different from that used during the written procedure; but the language used at the hearing must be used for all purposes during the hearing. Other texts of the rules of procedure are not as tightly worded as the English and refer to ‘use in whole or in part’ of another language,55 suggesting that, in any one part of the proceedings, the language of the case may be changed completely or only for certain purposes and different languages may be used. So far as the use of languages is concerned, that 49 [1993] ECR II-535, paras 14–15. 50 The Auditel case (above, note 41), paras 36–38 (of course, the problem with refusing a party permission to use another procedural language during the written procedure and forcing that party to have recourse to its own translations is that that may well lead to delay in the proceedings); Case T-290/94 Kayserberg SA  v Commission [1995]  ECR II-2247, paras 7–8; Case T-11/95  BP  Chemicals Ltd v Commission [1996]  ECR II-599 (intervener failing to persuade the Court to permit it to rely on documents not expressed in the language of the case). 51 Case T-330/94 Salt Union v Commission [1995] ECR II-2881, paras 26–27. 52 RP-ECJ, art 38(4); RP-GC, art 46(4). 53 RP-ECJ, art 38(5); RP-GC, art 46(5). They may use another language both for written and for oral submissions: Case T-289/11 Deutsche Bahn v Commission, 19 January 2012, para 15. 54 RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b) and (c); RP-GC, art 45(1)(b) and (c). 55 Eg ‘Emploi total ou partiel’; ‘uso parziale or totale’.

153

2.17  General outline of procedure

is, in fact, the interpretation adopted by the Court, as can be seen from cases such as Case 45/81 Alexander Moksel Import-Export GmbH & Co Handels KG v Commission56 where the procedural language was German but an intervener was allowed to present its submissions at the hearing in English. The result was that, for the purposes of the oral procedure in that case, there were two procedural languages, German and English, but the latter was used only for the presentation of the intervener’s case. It does not follow that, where more than one language is used, there is simultaneously more than one language of the case: in most instances, the language of the case is not changed. 2.17 In references for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ rules of procedure did not originally provide expressly for an alteration in the language of the case or the use of another language but it was the Court’s practice to entertain an application made by one of the parties to the proceedings before the referring court (other than a member state or EU institution) to use at the hearing a language other than that of the case. The current position is that the language of the case is that of the referring court and provision is made only for the use of other languages in the course of the proceedings. Only the member states are entitled to use another language (their official language) when taking part in the proceedings; while EEA states, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and any non-member states entitled to participate in the proceedings may be authorised to use one of the Court’s procedural languages (other than the language of the case).57 It will be noted that member states are entitled to use their official language even if it is not the language of the case whereas EEA States, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and non-member states must be authorised to use another language and that language must be one of the Court’s procedural languages (they may not use their own official language if that is not one of the Court’s procedural languages). Nothing is said in the rules of procedure about how authorisation may be obtained. No authorisation is, of course, necessary if the EEA  State, EFTA Surveillance Authority or non-member state concerned is content to use the language of the case. If not, it would appear that authorisation may be sought by written application accompanying the written observations lodged at the Court. So far as other persons are concerned, there is now express provision that the parties to the main proceedings (that is, the proceedings before the referring court) may apply to be authorised to use one of the Court’s procedural languages (other than the language of the case) for the hearing. The application must be made in the form of a ‘duly substantiated request’, that is, in writing setting out proper reasons for granting the request. The other party or parties to the proceedings before the referring court and the advocate general must be heard before a decision is made on the request.58 The other party or parties (to the main proceedings) will normally be given an opportunity to make written submissions on the request but there will not be an oral hearing unless the request has been made so close in time to the date of the hearing that it can be dealt with only then. The 56 [1982] ECR 1129. 57 RP-ECJ, art  38(4)–(6). Where a language other than the language of the case is used, the Registrar is responsible for arranging transaction into the language of the case. 58 RP-ECJ, art 37(3).

154

General outline of procedure 2.19

request may be decided upon by the President rather than the Court. However, where the President is inclined to accede to a request that is not supported by the agreement of all the parties to the proceedings before the referring court, he or she must refer the matter to the Court. If all the parties are agreed, the President is not obliged to refer the matter to the Court but may do so.59 2.18 In any proceedings, the Court or chamber hearing the case may authorise a witness or expert to give his evidence in another language where he ‘states that he is unable adequately to express himself in one of’ the official procedural languages.60 Curiously, the rules of procedure do not specify, in that context, an inability on the part of the witness or expert to express himself in the language of the case. That suggests that there is no obligation on a witness or expert to use that language; it is only when he cannot adequately express himself in any of the recognised procedural languages that authorisation is given for the use of another language. The Registrar makes arrangements for what is said to be translated into the language of the case. So far as witnesses and experts are concerned, the declaration of inability should, for practical reasons, be made in advance, even where it is simply a question of the witness or expert being better able to express himself in one recognised procedural language rather than another. 2.19 The President and Vice-President of the Court and the presidents of a chamber, when conducting the oral procedure, judges and advocates general when putting questions and advocates general when delivering their opinions, may use any of the recognised procedural languages. The Registrar arranges for translation into the language of the case.61 The advocates general normally deliver their opinions in their own maternal tongue. A judge, advocate general or one of the parties may request that things said or written in the course of proceedings be translated into one of the recognised procedural languages. The Registrar arranges for that to be done62 and, where the request is made by one of the parties, may require the translation work to be paid for if he considers its cost to be excessive.63 It would seem that a request submitted by a party must give reasons that the translation is required. It must be shown that the translation is necessary in order to safeguard the right to a fair trial and the Registrar must decide in each case whether sufficient reason has been shown to justify acceding to the request.64 Should the Registrar refuse to entertain it, application may be made to the Court under RP-ECJ, art 151 (or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83).65

59 RP-ECJ, art 37(4). 60 RP-ECJ, art 38(7); RP-GC, art 46(6). 61 RP-ECJ, art 38(8); RP-GC, art 46(7). 62 RP-ECJ, art 39; RP-GC, art 47; PD-GC, para 38. 63 RP-ECJ, art 143(b); RP-GC, art 139(b); RP-CST, art 108(b): the scale of charges is to be found in PD-GC, para 46 and IR-CST, art 16(2). 64 The Ladbroke case (above, note 49), paras 16–18. 65 The use of those provisions for procedural purposes is considered in more detail in Ch 6.

155

2.20  General outline of procedure

III

CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION

2.20 The creation of the GC and the attribution to it of part of the jurisdiction of the ECJ at first instance and, later, the creation of the CST, created in turn the possibility of conflicts of jurisdiction between the GC and the ECJ and between the CST and the GC: in some instances one or other of the ECJ, GC or CST may have jurisdiction over a particular case while the other does not; in other cases more than one of them may have jurisdiction.66 As from 1 September 2016, in consequence of the abolition of the CST, the problem of conflicts of jurisdiction exists only as between the ECJ and GC (until such time as one or more other specialised courts may be created). In general, jurisdiction over an action carries with it jurisdiction over ancillary matters arising in the proceedings, including jurisdiction over any cross-claim made in the proceedings and arising out of the same act or fact that is the subject-matter of the action.67 2.21 As has been explained,68 where an application or other procedural document addressed to the ECJ, GC or CST is lodged at the wrong Registry it must be transmitted immediately by that Registry to the correct Registry69 and proceedings will then carry on before the correct Court without there being any positive or negative conflict of jurisdiction. On the other hand, once an action has begun before the ECJ, the GC or the CST, it may emerge sooner or later that the Court before which it has been brought does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine it; or it may emerge that the Court in question does have jurisdiction but the same issue is also before another Court, in which case the question arises whether the proceedings before one or other of the ECJ, GC or CST should be stayed or some other step taken.70

A

Lack of jurisdiction and referral to the court having jurisdiction

2.22 Where the CST finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action over which either the ECJ or the GC has jurisdiction,71 it is obliged

66 In principle, at least as between the ECJ and the GC, the jurisdiction of one excludes the jurisdiction of the other: eg  Case C-517/03 Commission v IAMA  Consulting Srl, order of 27 May 2004 (unreported), para 15. 67 Case C-517/03 Commission v IAMA Consulting (above, note 66), para 17, which cites Case C-41/98 Commission v Tecnologie Vetrosina SpA  [2001]  ECR  I-341, paras 68–70 and Case C-167/99 Parliament v Societe d’amenagement et d’equipement de la region de Strasbourg [2003] ECR I-3269, paras 95–104 (both being examples of the ECJ entertaining a counterclaim and dismissing it as unfounded without considering the question of jurisdiction). 68 See Ch 1, paras 1.129–1.133. 69 Statute, art 54 (first para) and Annex, art 8(1). 70 Stay is within the discretion of the Court, as part of its powers over the conduct of proceedings before it. Declining jurisdiction is another matter. That requires an express provision in the Statute: see Case T-76/96R National Farmers’ Union v Commission [1996] ECR II-815, paras 33–34 (no power to decline jurisdiction in interim relief proceedings). 71 As to the jurisdiction of the ECJ, GC and CST, see Ch 1, para 1.18 ff.

156

General outline of procedure 2.23

to refer the action to the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC.72 The question of the CST’s lack of jurisdiction is one that can and ought to be raised by the CST of its own motion as soon as proceedings have been commenced (or purportedly commenced) before it. If its lack of jurisdiction is ‘clear’, the CST can make its decision in the form of a reasoned order and without taking any further steps in the proceedings.73 Where the CST’s lack of competence is not clear, it may still be raised by the CST of its own motion as an absolute bar to proceeding with the case.74 The point can also be raised by one of the parties as a preliminary issue,75 in which case the President prescribes a period within which the opposing party may lodge a pleading opposing the application and the remainder of the proceedings is oral unless the CST decides otherwise.76 In principle, the CST can decide the matter one way or the other or reserve its decision for the final judgment;77 but, since the issue would be which court had jurisdiction over the case, the CST would in practice decide the point and not reserve its decision for the final judgment. If it decided that either of the GC or the ECJ had jurisdiction, it would then refer the case to that court.78 Where a party applies to the CST for a decision on admissibility, lack of competence or on some other preliminary plea not going to the substance of the case, and it appears to the CST that the GC or ECJ has jurisdiction over the case, the CST does not rule on the application but refers the case, as a whole, to whichever of the GC or ECJ has jurisdiction.79 Decisions of the CST on its jurisdiction may be the subject of an appeal to the GC;80 but that does not apply where the CST’s decision is to refer the action to the GC (or ECJ), as opposed to dismissing it completely, because then the action is before a higher court anyway.81 At the time of writing, no clear practice had emerged. In principle, the manner in which the CST deals with the problem should be no different from the practice of the GC. 2.23 Where the GC finds that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action in respect of which the ECJ or the CST has jurisdiction, it is 72 Statute, Annex, art 8(2); RP-CST, art 80(1). The decision is made by reasoned order: RP-CST, art 80(2). Eg Case F-53/00 Gualtieri v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-107, II-A-1-399. In the past, it has happened that a party has brought one action before the right court before the wrong court. When the wrong court referred the action before it to the right court, there were then duplicate proceedings before the right court. In that event, the registry of the right court would invite the party to decide which of the two actions would be pursued and the other action would be removed from the register: eg Case T-265/97 Regione Toscana v Commission, order of 5 March 1998. 73 RP-CST, art 81. 74 RP-CST, art  82, which provides that the parties must be heard before the CST makes its decision. Ex hypothesi, the case is not clear enough to apply RP-CST, art 81 (which permits a decision to be made without the parties having been heard) even if it is a matter in which, strictly speaking, the CST has no jurisdiction. 75 RP-CST, art 83(1). 76 RP-CST, art 83(2). 77 RP-CST, art 83(3), 1st subpara. 78 RP-CST, art 83(3), last subpara. 79 That seems to be the sense of RP-CST, art 83(3), last subpara. 80 Statute, Annex, art 9. 81 Case T-413/06P Gualtieri v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-35, II-B-1-253, paras 24–28 sss.

157

2.23  General outline of procedure

obliged to refer the action to the ECJ or, as the case may be, the CST (when the GC decides that a case falls within the jurisdiction of the CST, the latter cannot decline jurisdiction when the case is referred to it).82 Where the CST has jurisdiction, it does not seem that the action before the GC is inadmissible in the strict sense because the GC has not, in principle, been deprived of jurisdiction over cases by reason of the creation of the CST; it retains jurisdiction, in principle, but the exercise of that jurisdiction at first instance is, as it were, suspended in relation to matters falling within the jurisdiction of the CST unless and until the CST refers the matter to the GC.83 The position is arguably different where the ECJ has jurisdiction. At all events, since a reference of the case by the GC to the ECJ or CST is mandatory, the question whether or not a case before the GC falls within the jurisdiction of the ECJ or CST may be raised and decided by the GC of its own motion as soon as proceedings have been commenced (or purportedly commenced) before it; and, where its lack of competence is manifest, the case is simply referred to the ECJ or CST by reasoned order without taking any further step in the proceedings, including serving the application on the defendant before the decision to refer is made.84 Where the GC’s lack of competence is not manifest, it may still be raised by the GC of its own motion as an absolute bar to proceeding with the case.85 The matter may also be raised by the defendant by application under RP-GC, art 130(1) (in which case, the application must be made within the time limit for lodging the defence) or, conceivably, by any party under RP-GC, art 130(2), as a preliminary issue. In either case the President prescribes a period within which the opposite party (the applicant in the action, in the case of an application made under RP-GC, art 130(1); the other parties, in the case of an application under RP-GC, art 130(2)) may lodge its written response to the application.86 The Court then decides whether or not there should be a hearing before it rules on the application.87 In principle, the Court may decide, whether with or without hearing the parties (but in either event after hearing the advocate general, if there is one), to uphold or reject the application or reserve its

82 Statute, art 54 (second para) and Annex, art 8(2). See also the additional comment in note 72 above. 83 Thus, the Statute (Annex, art 8(2)) states that the duty of the CST to refer a case to the ECJ or GC arises where the CST ‘finds that it does not have jurisdiction’; whereas the Statute states that the duty of the GC to refer a case to the CST arises where the GC ‘finds that an action falls within the jurisdiction of’ the CST, not where the GC finds that it does not have jurisdiction. When dealing with the same situation as it arose as between the ECJ and the GC before the latter was given its own jurisdiction, the ECJ held, in Case C-72/90 Asia Motor France v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-2181, that part of the action was manifestly inadmissible; but the part falling within the jurisdiction of the GC was not held to be inadmissible, it was simply referred to the GC. 84 RP-GC, art 126 and 127: see, for example, Case T-78/91 Moat and Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission [1991]  ECR II-1387, para  8. As from 1  September 2016, RP-GC, art  127 refers only to the referral of a case to the ECJ. 85 RP-GC, art 129, which requires the parties to be heard before an order is made. Ex hypothesi, the case is not clear enough to apply RP-GC, art 126 even if it is a matter in which, strictly speaking, the GC has no jurisdiction. 86 RP-GC, art 130(4) and (5). See further below and Ch 6, section III, para 6.9 ff. 87 RP-GC, art 130(6).

158

General outline of procedure 2.24

decision until final judgment in the case; in the situation under consideration, the GC would either reject the application as unfounded or else uphold it and refer the case to the ECJ or, as the case may be, the CST.88 The decision of the GC may be the subject of an appeal to the ECJ;89 but that may not apply, at least where the GC’s decision is to refer the action to the ECJ, as opposed to dismissing it completely, because then the action is before a higher court anyway.90 2.24 Where the ECJ finds that an action brought before it falls within the jurisdiction of the GC or the CST, it is likewise obliged to refer the action to the GC or, as the case may be, the CST, neither of which can then decline jurisdiction.91 Since a reference of the case by the ECJ to the GC or CST is mandatory, the question whether or not a case before the ECJ falls within the jurisdiction of the GC or CST may be raised and decided by the ECJ of its own motion.92 By analogy with the situation where the ECJ has manifestly no jurisdiction over an action, the case may be referred to the GC or CST by reasoned order without taking any further step in the proceedings where it is manifest that the GC or CST has jurisdiction.93 Where it is not manifest, the matter can still be raised by the ECJ at any time but its decision must be given after hearing the parties and the advocate general.94 The matter may also be raised by one of the parties by application under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), in which case the President prescribes a period within which the opposite party may lodge its written response to the application.95 Unless the Court otherwise decides, the remainder of the proceedings is oral.96 In principle the Court may decide, whether with or without hearing the parties (but in either event after hearing the advocate general), to uphold or reject the application or reserve its decision until final judgment in the case.97 In the situation under consideration, the ECJ would either reject the application as unfounded or uphold it and refer the case to the GC or CST. The decision of the ECJ to refer the case to the GC or CST is binding on the GC or CST, with the

88 RP-GC, art 130(7). With effect from 1 September 2016, RP-GC, art 130(7) was amended so as to refer only to the referral of a case to the ECJ. 89 Statute, art 56, 1st para. 90 Cf Case T-413/06P Gualtieri v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-35, II-B-1-253, paras 24–28. 91 Statute, art  54, 2nd para, and Annex, art  8(2). Eg Case C-424/92 Ladbroke Racing Ltd v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-2213; Case C-95/97 Region Wallonne v Commission [1997] ECR I-1787; Case C- 180/97 Regione Toscana v Commission [1997] ECR I-5245; Case C-165/02 Spain v Council, order of 7 December 2004 (unreported), transfer consequent upon extension of the GC’s jurisdiction. 92 It has been treated as a case of no jurisdiction within the meaning of what is now RP-ECJ, art 53(2): see the Region Wallonne and Regione Toscana cases (above, note 91), paras 2 and 8 and 4 and 8, respectively. It may also be an absolute bar to proceeding with a case, within the meaning of RP-ECJ, art 150, or be dealt with on application by a party, under RP-ECJ, art 151. 93 RP-ECJ, art  53(2) does not apply expressis verbis but that approach was followed in the Asia Motor France case (above, note 83) and seems to have been followed in Case C-269/06 Commission v Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union [2007] ECR I-187*. 94 RP-ECJ, art 150. See further below and Ch 7, section III, para 7.78 ff. 95 RP-ECJ, art 151(3). 96 RP-ECJ, art 151(4). 97 RP-ECJ, art 151(5).

159

2.25  General outline of procedure

consequence that the latter cannot decline jurisdiction on the ground decided by the ECJ in its decision to refer.98

B

Effect on the running of time

2.25 Whether it is the CST, the GC or the ECJ that is required to refer a case brought before it to the other Court, the Statute does not explain what are the consequences so far as the running of time is concerned. For example, if proceedings are commenced erroneously before the GC, in a case over which it has no jurisdiction but the ECJ does, the mistake may be discovered and the reference of the case to the ECJ made long after the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings before the ECJ. Must the ECJ then dismiss the proceedings as inadmissible for that reason? At first sight, the inference to be drawn from the Statute is that an action is not to be dismissed as inadmissible due to a failure to observe a time limit when the action was initially brought in time but before the wrong Court and has been referred to the correct Court after the expiry of the relevant time limit: if it were otherwise it would be simpler for the Court before which the action was originally brought to find that it was brought before the wrong Court and then declare it to be time-barred and inadmissible without any reference to the correct Court. However, that inference does not flow inevitably from the Statute. In many instances the reference of the case by the wrong Court to the correct Court can be effected before the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings; and the silence of the Statute on the question of time may be interpreted as indicating that any such reference is without prejudice to the question of time, which must be considered by the correct Court since it is not a question that can properly be considered by the wrong Court. The approach of the GC and the ECJ so far seems to be to regard a case referred by one of them to the other as having been commenced within time even if the reference is made, and the correct Court is seised with the case, long after the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings.99 In consequence, the commencement of proceedings before the wrong Court appears to have no adverse effect on the running of time.

98 Statute, art 54, 2nd para, and Annex, art 8(2). Quite apart from the Statute, the GC and CST appear to be bound by the decision of the ECJ either because that decision constitutes res judicata so far as they are concerned or because the GC and CST are in any event bound by decisions of the ECJ on points of law. The same seems to apply as between the GC and the CST. The lower court is bound by the decision of the higher court as to the question of jurisdiction only. There may, however, be some other reason why jurisdiction should be declined (see further below). For an example of the reversal of a decision declining jurisdiction, see Case C-517/03 Commission v IAMA Consulting (above, note 66), the GC decision being found in Case T-85/01 IAMA Consulting Srl v Commission [2003] ECR II-4973, para 62. 99 See, for example, the Asia Motor France case (above, note 83), where the reference to the GC (as it now is) was made some two months after the expiry of the time limit, cited in Case C-167/99 Parliament v Societe d’amenagement et d’equipement de la region de Strasbourg [2003] ECR I-3269, paras 53–55 (see also Advocate General Geelhoed, paras 26–32, pp 3282– 3284).

160

General outline of procedure 2.26

C

Partial lack of jurisdiction

2.26 Where an action falls partly within the jurisdiction of one Court and partly within the jurisdiction of another Court, the proceedings can in principle be split and replaced by two parallel actions before both Courts.100 However, that presupposes that the claims in the action are discrete, or in some other sense severable. In the Asia Motor France case,101 part of the action was dismissed entirely as being manifestly inadmissible (as regards both the ECJ and the GC) so that, when the remaining part was referred by the ECJ to the GC, there was no other part of the proceedings that could have been retained by the ECJ. The same occurred, so far as the GC was concerned, in Moat and Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission.102 In Case C-322/91 and Case C-44/92 Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission,103 the original actions had been brought jointly by several persons and it was possible to split them by reference to the identity of the joint applicants and the resulting difference in their causes of action. Where part of the action could be retained by one Court and the remaining part should be referred to the other Court, the splitting of the action would, of course, double the legal costs and the burden placed on the Court, unless there were scope for the proceedings before one of the Courts (there the ECJ or the GC) to be stayed pending the outcome of the proceedings before the other Court, as envisaged by the Statute104 in cases of concurrent jurisdiction. At first sight, that outcome does not appear to be satisfactory for reasons of procedural economy save in cases where there is a ‘natural’ split in the action, such as where the problem arises because several persons have commenced proceedings jointly rather than severally. On the other hand, it is likely that the problem would arise only in cases where dissimilar claims that would justify being pleaded in separate actions have been joined in a single application. In consequence, there are arguments for and against the solution of splitting the claims into separate actions. However, if the action were not to be split, it would seem that, if the proceedings had been commenced before the lower of the courts having jurisdiction, that court would have to decline jurisdiction over the entire case and refer it to the higher court because, otherwise, the former would be dealing with a case that fell in part outside its jurisdiction. If the proceedings had been commenced

100 It is not entirely clear whether or not the splitting of an action (effectively the disjoinder of disparate claims made in the same proceedings) is possible but there seems to be no objection in principle to such a course, particularly where the parties do not object. That has been done in the case of cross-claims: see Case T-85/01 IAMA Consulting (above, note 98), para 62 (a counterclaim). That decision was effectively reversed by the ECJ on the ground that jurisdiction over an action carries with it jurisdiction over a cross-claim in the same proceedings which is based on the same act or fact as that which is the subject of the application commencing the action: see Case C-517/03 Commission v IAMA Consulting (above, note 66), para 17. However, ignoring the question of jurisdiction, the GC judgment is a reliable illustration of the possibility that disparate claims in an action may be separated into different actions. 101 Above, note 83. 102 Above, note 84. 103 [1992] ECR I-6373 and 6387, respectively. 104 Art 54, 3rd para, and Annex, art 8(3).

161

2.27  General outline of procedure

before the higher court, or were referred to it in their entirety by the lower court, the higher court could entertain the entire action because, as the power of a lower court (whether the CST or the GC) to refer a case within its jurisdiction to a higher court demonstrates,105 the jurisdictions of the ECJ, GC and CST are essentially concurrent (notwithstanding the occasional dicta to the effect that there is a clear split between their respective jurisdictions, which actually refers to how the jurisdiction of the CJEU – as an EU institution – is in principle organised internally within the institution). Nonetheless, it would remain within the discretion of the higher court to split the action and remit to the lower court the part falling within the latter’s jurisdiction. In the result, it seems to be theoretically possible for the higher and lower courts either to take the course of splitting the action between them or to have the matter heard and determined solely before the higher court. It is difficult to see at this juncture which solution would in the event be adopted; it may be that each case would be considered on its merits or that the splitting of the action would in the final analysis be considered the better course.106

D

Overlapping jurisdiction

2.27 Where the subject matter of cases before the ECJ and the GC and before the GC and the CST overlaps the position is as follows. Where the ECJ and the GC are seised of cases in which the same relief is sought,107 the same issue of interpretation is raised108 or the validity of the same act is called in question,109 the GC may in its discretion stay the proceedings before it until such time as the ECJ delivers judgment.110 The cases need not be

105 Statute, art 54, 4th para, and Annex, art 8(3), 2nd subpara. Curiously, the latter provision applies only as between the CST and the GC, not as between the CST and the ECJ. 106 In Case F-70/07 Marcuccio v Commission [2009] ECR-SC I-A-1-31, II-A-1-135, paras 16–20, part of the action was identified as a separate claim for the taxation of costs incurred in respect of proceedings before the GC and therefore that part was transferred to that court. 107 That includes the situation where actions for the annulment of the same act are brought before both the ECJ and the GC (by different persons). 108 In Case T-22/90 Brambillo v Commission, order of 29  November 1990, the same issue of interpretation arose in proceedings commenced before the CFI against the Commission which caused the latter to commence proceedings before the ECJ against the Council (the CFI therefore stayed the proceedings before it until the judgment of the ECJ in the action against the Council). 109 In Case T-88/94 Societe commerciale des potasses et de l’azote et enterprise miniere et chimique v Commission [1995] ECR II-221, there was only a partial overlap between the cases in question because, in the CFI proceedings (as they then were), the applicant sought only partial annulment of the act in dispute. However, that was sufficient: see para 12. 110 Statute, art 54, 3rd para; RP-GC, art 69(a). Under RP-GC, art 70(1), the decision is made by the President after the parties have been given the opportunity to be heard. Eg Case T-310/97 Netherlands Antilles v Council [1998]  ECR II-4131. The provisions empowering the GC to stay proceedings do not, however, enable it to decline jurisdiction: Case C-289/99P Schiocchet v Commission [2000] ECR I-10279, para 33. If the GC stays the proceedings before it, that does not affect in any way its jurisdiction over the case: Case T-354/99 Kuwait Petroleum (Nederland) BV v Commission [2006] ECR II-1475, paras 37–39.

162

General outline of procedure 2.28

of the same procedural nature or involve the same parties.111 For its part, the ECJ may also in its discretion decide to stay the proceedings before it, in which event the proceedings before the GC are to continue.112 It would seem that the discretion of the Court (whether the ECJ or the GC) should be exercised in accordance with the interests of justice in both cases and having regard, in particular, to: the stage that the proceedings have reached when the question of stay arises;113 the fact that, in principle, where the issue requires a close examination of complex facts, the matter is best considered by the ECJ (on appeal) in the light of the findings made by the GC; and the fact that any ruling on a point of law made by the ECJ is binding on the GC in pari materia. It seems to follow from the fact that proceedings before the GC shall continue to run when the ECJ decides to stay proceedings before it that, if the ECJ is the first to exercise its discretion and does so by staying the proceedings before it, that decision deprives the GC of power to stay the proceedings before it. On the other hand, if the GC is the first to exercise its discretion, that has no effect on the powers of the ECJ; and, further, if the ECJ were then to stay the proceedings before it, the effect would be to remove the stay of proceedings ordered by the GC. In the normal course it does not seem likely that, if the GC had stayed proceedings before it, the ECJ would also order a stay; it is more likely that the ECJ would take account of the GC’s decision and the reasons for it; and the proceedings before the ECJ would be continued. 2.28 Where the action before the GC is an annulment action (and the same act is also being challenged before the ECJ), the GC may (but is not obliged to) decline jurisdiction; and, where both a member state and an EU institution are challenging the same act (ex hypothesi in different proceedings before the ECJ and the GC), the GC is obliged to decline jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction is declined, the ECJ can then rule on both actions or applications.114 The decision of 111 See the cases cited in the five preceding footnotes. Thus, the same issue of interpretation or of validity may be raised in a reference for a preliminary ruling before the ECJ and in a direct action before the GC. The ‘validity’ of an act of an EU institution is in this context to be understood as encompassing both ‘validity’, as that term is used in connection with references for a preliminary ruling and the plea of illegality, and ‘lawfulness’, as that term is used in connection with actions for annulment: it would not make sense to apply the formal distinction between those terms in the present context. Hence, it is of no consequence that the issue in the cases before the ECJ and the GC takes the form, before the ECJ, of an enquiry into the ‘validity’ of an act of an EU institution in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling and, before the GC, of a challenge to the ‘lawfulness’ of the same act in an action for annulment; or that, before the ECJ, it arises in the context of an action for annulment while, before the GC, it arises in the form of a plea of illegality. 112 Statute, art 54, 3rd para. Eg Case C-325/01 Netherlands v Commission, order of 20 November 2001 (unreported). 113 For example, if proceedings before one court have almost reached judgment whereas the proceedings before the other have only just commenced, there would seem to be no point in staying the former whereas there may be reason to stay the latter so that the defence (if it is a direct action) or the written observations (if it is a reference for a preliminary ruling) are lodged after (and can therefore take account of) the judgment in the other case. 114 Statute, art 54, 3rd and 4th paras. It will be noted that cases falling under the 4th para may also be cases in which the question of stay of proceedings under the 3rd para of art 54 arises. Where the two provisions overlap, the obligation to decline jurisdiction prevails. Where the GC has discretion to decline jurisdiction or order a stay, the former is preferable: see cases like Case

163

2.29  General outline of procedure

the GC to decline jurisdiction does not cause the proceedings to halt or to remain in limbo but results in the matter reverting to the ECJ, the exercise of whose jurisdiction over the case revives when the GC declines jurisdiction. 2.29 Where the GC and the CST are seised of cases in which the same issue of interpretation is raised or the validity of the same act is called into question, the CST has discretion to stay the proceedings before it until after the GC has delivered judgment. That discretion is to be exercised after the parties have been heard. Where the CST and the GC are seised of cases in which the same relief is sought (albeit by different parties), the CST is obliged to decline jurisdiction so that the GC may rule on all the cases in question.115 RP-CST, art 42(1)(a) extends the first situation (that where the same issue of interpretation is raised or where the validity of the same act is called into question) to cases before the CST and the ECJ. No similar extension has been made in relation to the second situation (that where the same relief is sought, and in which stay is mandatory), possibly because it was not considered that such a situation would arise as between the CST and the ECJ. Where stay is discretionary, the practice of the CST would be expected to reflect that of the GC. 2.30 By way of illustration of the application of the rules just described, in Case C-66/90 and Case T-42/91, both being Koninklijke PTT  Nederland NV and PTT Post BV v Commission,116 the applicants (who were undertakings) had applied to the ECJ at the same time as the Netherlands for the annulment of a Commission decision made under what is now TFEU, art  106(3). The case brought by the Netherlands had to be dealt with by the ECJ but the other case had to be referred to the CFI (as the GC then was), which had jurisdiction. That was done; but the ECJ declined to stay the proceedings before it and, in consequence, the applicants in what was then Case T-42/91 requested the CFI to decline jurisdiction so that both cases could be heard by the ECJ. Under the rules relating to the reference of cases to the GC by the ECJ,117 the GC may not in such circumstances decline jurisdiction. As stated above, that requirement prevents the GC from disputing the ECJ’s decision on the issue of jurisdiction determined in the ECJ’s decision to refer the matter to the GC. On the other hand, it is without prejudice to the GC’s power to decline jurisdiction for some other reason (namely, the existence now of two parallel actions challenging the same decision). In the event the CFI (as the GC then was) exercised its discretion to decline jurisdiction because: staying the proceedings before the CFI would not have been in the T-488/93 Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen v Commission [1995]  ECR II-469 and Case T-41/97 Antillean Rice Mills NV v Council [1998] ECR II-4117. 115 Statute, Annex, art 8(3). That provision is to be construed and operated in essentially the same way as the corresponding provision in Statute, art  54, described above. In Case F-109/05 Marcuccio v Commission [2006]  ECR-SC  I-A-1-1, II-A-1-1, Case F-84/06 Marcuccio v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-467, II-A-1-2633, Case F-20/07 Marcuccio v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-469, II-A-1-2641, the CST declined jurisdiction, essentially because, in each case, the issue before it concerned matters of fact that would be decided by the GC in two other cases before the latter. 116 [1991] ECR I-2723 and [1991] ECR II-273, respectively. 117 Statute, art 54, 2nd para.

164

General outline of procedure 2.31

interests of justice; the applicants in the proceedings before the CFI could not intervene in the proceedings before the ECJ and, in consequence, the only way that they could be heard was by bringing their own action; it was clearly in the interests of procedural economy for the ECJ to deal with all the issues of fact and law at the same time instead of (possibly) in two stages if it rejected the action brought by the Netherlands but the other action raised different issues.118 In Case T-260/94 Air Inter v Commission,119 a similar situation arose but, after the CFI had declined jurisdiction (causing the proceedings before it to be referred to the ECJ) and before the hearing in the ECJ had taken place, the applicant in the original ECJ proceedings withdrew. Since that meant that there were no proceedings before the ECJ that overlapped with the original CFI action, the ECJ referred the original CFI action back to the CFI which recommenced the proceedings before it from the point that they had reached before the ECJ.

E

Procedural steps

2.31 A decision whether or not to stay proceedings or, as the case may be, to decline jurisdiction may be made by the relevant Court either on its own motion or on application by one of the parties under RP-ECJ, art  151 or (as the case may be) RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83. In proceedings before the ECJ, a decision whether or not to stay proceedings is made by the Court or chamber seised with the case after the advocate general has been heard.120 In proceedings before the GC or CST, the decision on stay is made by the President after hearing the parties and, in the GC, the advocate general (if there is one).121 In CST proceedings, the President may refer the matter to the Court.122 The proceedings may be resumed by order after following the same procedure followed when pro-

118 For cases involving similar reasoning, see the Societe commerciale des potasses case (above, note 109), paras 13–15; Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen (above, note 114), paras 9–15; Case T-490/93 Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG  v Commission [1995]  ECR II-477, paras 9–15; Case T-58/98 Sardegna Lines v Commission, order of 16 March 1999; Case T-140/03 Forum 187 ASBL v Commission [2003] ECR II-2069, paras 7–9; Case T-215/07 Donnici v European Parliament [2007] ECR II-5239, paras 9–12. 119 [1997] ECR II-997, paras 32–38. 120 RP-ECJ, art 55(1)(a). Arguably, the application could be made under that provision rather than RP-ECJ, art 151. The ECJ tends to act by reference to the good (or sound) administration of justice and without giving more specific reasons: eg Case C-325/01 Netherlands v Commission, order of 20  November 2001; Case C-290/02 Italy v Commission, order of 10  June 2003. In general, it would appear that the ECJ prefers to stay its proceedings when there are pending GC proceedings probably (although that is not stated) because an appeal from a judgment of the GC would bring the matter back to it in any event. The procedure can be conducted fairly informally: in Case C-325/01 Netherlands v Commission, the views of the Dutch government were communicated to the Court by means of a telephone conversation between the Dutch government’s agent and the Court’s registrar (see para 10 of the order). 121 RP-GC, art 69(a) and 70(1); RP-CST, art 42(1)(a) and (2). Eg Cases T-163/97 and T-179/97 Netherlands Antilles v Council and Commission [1998]  ECR II-4123; Case T-310/97 Netherlands Antilles v Council [1998] ECR II-4131. 122 RP-CST, art 42(2).

165

2.32  General outline of procedure

ceedings were stayed.123 The stay takes effect on the date indicated in the order imposing the stay (or, in the absence of such indication, on the date of the order) and ends on the expiry of the period of the stay (if defined in the order imposing the stay) or on the date specified in the order lifting the stay (or, in the absence of such a date, on the date of that order); throughout the period of the stay time ceases to run for the purposes of any prescribed time limits for all parties.124 During the period of the stay time continues to run so far as persons who are not parties to the proceedings are concerned; thus, stay does not relieve any third party who wishes to intervene in the proceedings from the obligation to apply to intervene within the relevant time limit.125 Decisions of the GC or CST declining jurisdiction in the circumstances discussed above are made by reasoned order which is served on the parties.126 As in the case of decisions of the ECJ concerning the stay of proceedings there is no express requirement that such decisions be made after hearing the parties. Since such orders are mandatory no purpose is served by hearing the parties beforehand. Decisions on procedural steps in a case that has been referred to one court when another court has declined jurisdiction are made by the former in accordance with its rules of procedure once the case has been referred to it. That is so even if the procedural step was initiated before jurisdiction was declined, as long as no decision on the step had yet been made by the court declining jurisdiction.127

IV

DIRECT ACTIONS

2.32 In principle, proceedings in a direct action (whether conducted before the ECJ, the GC or the CST and whether an ordinary direct action, a staff case or an IP appeal) develop in four phases: (1) the written procedure, in which the parties submit their arguments in writing; (2) directions and enquiries: here the Court decides after the close of pleadings what further steps are to be taken in the proceedings and, in particular, carries out enquiries into the issues of fact; (3) the oral procedure: that consists of the hearing and the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion (where applicable); and (4) the judgment. 123 RP-ECJ, art 55(2); RP-GC, art 70(2); RP-CST, art 42(3). The orders staying the proceedings or lifting the stay are served on the parties. 124 RP-ECJ, art 55(4)–(6); RP-GC, art 71(1)–(3); RP-CST, art 43(1)–(3). When proceedings are resumed, any suspended procedural time limits are replaced by new time limits and time starts to run again as from the date of the resumption of the proceedings: RP-ECJ, art 55(7); RP-GC, art 71(4); RP-CST, art 43(4). 125 That is provided for expressly in RP-GC, art  71(2) and RP-CST, art  43((2) and applies by necessary implication to cases pending before the ECJ. 126 RP-GC, art 128; RP-CST, art 80(2). 127 Eg Case C-9/08 Donnici v Parliament, order of 21 February 2008, paras 3–6 (the ECJ ruled on applications to intervene made before the GC had declined jurisdiction).

166

General outline of procedure 2.34

In practice, the different procedural events that may occur in the course of proceedings cannot all be neatly packaged into one or other of those phases.

A

Written procedure

1 Commencement of proceedings 2.33 The procedure in a direct action commences with the lodgment at the appropriate Court of the application commencing proceedings. The rules relating to the form and content of the application and other pleadings are dealt with in Chapter 9. In brief, the application must be made in writing and the original signed by the applicant’s agent (in the case of a member state or EU institution) or lawyer (in the case of all other persons).128 It must be dated and set out: (a) the applicant’s name and address; (b) details of the signatory (ie  whether he is an agent or lawyer and his professional address); (c) the name of the party against whom the application is made (d) the subject matter of the proceedings; (e) a statement of the pleas in law and arguments on which the application is based; (f) the relief sought (expressed in the ‘form of order’); (g) the nature of the evidence relied on; and (h) information enabling service of documents to be effected on the applicant during the proceedings (normally an indication that service may be effected by e-curia, fax or e-mail on the party’s agent or lawyer).129 Various other documents must be lodged at the same time which do not need to be specified here. 2.34 If the application does not comply with the requirements set out in RP-ECJ, art 119 and 122 (or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3) and 78(1)– (5), or RP-CST, art 45(1)–(2), 46, 50(2) and (5)), which concern, in essence, the various documents that must accompany the application, the Registrar requests the applicant to make good the deficiency within a reasonable period of time fixed by him. If the application has been lodged within the time limit for commencing proceedings, the fact that it is put in good order in that way only after the expiry of that time limit does not affect matters.130 However, if the applicant fails to put his application in order or produce the required documents within the time prescribed by the Registrar, the Court must decide, after hearing the views of the advocate general (where there is one), whether or not the failure to comply with the rules of procedure renders the application inadmissible in

128 Statute, art  21; RP-ECJ, art  57(1); RP-GC, art  73(1); RP-CST, art  45(2). In the case of applications lodged by means of e-Curia, the user identification of the applicant’s representative stands in for his signature: see the e-Curia decisions, art 3. 129 Statute, ibid; RP-ECJ, art 120–121; RP-GC, art 76–77; RP-CST, art 50. A variation to RP-GC, art 76 applies in the case of applications in IP appeals: see RP-GC, art 177. In the case of service by fax or e-mail, a fax number or e-mail address needs to be provided. 130 Statute, art 21, 2nd para, provides so expressly in the case of a failure to produce, within time, a copy of the measure whose annulment is sought or documentary evidence of the date when the defendant institution was requested to act (relevant in an action in respect of a failure to act). The other documents in question are not such as to call in question the admissibility of the action when they are merely produced late.

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point of form.131 That procedure does not, in principle, apply to other defects in a pleading unless there is express provision to that effect.132 The rules do not provide that the application must be rejected; the decision seems to lie within the discretion of the Court. It is unclear on what grounds the Court would hold the application to be admissible or reject it. Since the practice is first to write to the applicant asking him to put the application in order, the question should normally arise only if he declines to do so. In that event, it is the refusal to comply with the rules of procedure and the Court’s request that may bring about the inadmissibility of the application as much as the defect itself. Considering the nature of possible defects, some of the requirements set out in RP-ECJ, art 119(1)–(2) and 122(1)–(2), RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3) and 78(1)–(5), and RP-CST, art 45(1)–(2), 46, 50(2) and 50(5), would not seem to warrant rejection of the application if they are not complied with. For example, if, in an action for annulment, the measure in question has already been published in the Official Journal, it seems excessive to regard the failure to lodge a copy of it to be sufficient to justify the rejection of the application. On the other hand, if the applicant fails to lodge such things as a copy of the instrument constituting it (where relevant), an unpublished measure whose annulment is sought, or (as the case may be) the contract or agreement giving the Court jurisdiction, such a defect may justify rejecting the application because the applicant has not given the proof required by the rules of procedure that it has capacity to act, that the subject matter of the proceedings exists in truth or that the Court has jurisdiction. All three factors are fundamental to the admissibility of the action. 2 Interim relief 2.35 Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, bringing an action before the Court does not in itself freeze matters in the state they were in at the time of the commencement of proceedings.133 Therefore, in addition to the application commencing proceedings, the applicant may also, should need arise, apply to the President of the Court by separate document134 for the grant of interim relief pending judgment in the action.135 An application for interim relief may be made 131 RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3); RP-GC, art 51(4) and 78(6); RP-CST, art 50(6). In IP appeals, the same applies where there is a failure to comply with RP-GC, art 132(2)–(5): see RP-GC, art 132(7). 132 For ECJ and GC proceedings, see Case 131/83 Vaupel v European Court of Justice (unreported, 15 March 1984), para 9; Case T-307/11 Noscirai SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), order of 28 November 2011, paras 16–17 (upheld on appeal in Case C-69/12 P Noscirai SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 21 September 2012, paras 20–24). But see also: Ch 1, paras 1.122–1.126; Cases 220–221/78 ALA SpA and ALFER SpA v Commission [1979] ECR 1693; Case 10/81 Farrall v Commission [1981] ECR 717. The procedure is applied to the defects in RP-GC, art 177(2) and RP-CST, art 50(1)(a)–(c) by RP-GC, art 177(7) and RP-CST, art 50(6), respectively. 133 TFEU, art 278; EAEC Treaty, art 157. By way of exception, EAEC Treaty, art 83(2) provides that an action against a Commission decision imposing a sanction under EAEC Treaty, art 83(1) has suspensory effect. 134 RP-ECJ, art 160(4); RP-GC, art 156(4); RP-CST, art 115(2). 135 See Ch 8.

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at any time in the proceedings before final judgment. It should not be made before the circumstances justifying the application have arisen but cannot be left until after the anticipated change in circumstances has taken place. 3 Legal aid 2.36 An application may also be made at any time (including prior to the commencement of proceedings) for legal aid.136 4 The handling of the application commencing proceedings by the Court and summary dismissal of the action 2.37 In the case of proceedings before the ECJ, when the application commencing proceedings has been lodged, the President of the ECJ is informed and he designates a judge to act as judge-rapporteur.137 The First Advocate General is also informed of the commencement of proceedings and assigns the case to one of his colleagues as soon as the judge-rapporteur has been designated by the President.138 In the case of proceedings before the GC (and the CST), when the application is lodged, the President of the GC or CST is informed and he assigns the case to one of the chambers for all the purposes of the proceedings.139 The President of the relevant chamber then proposes (to the President of the GC or CST) the judge assigned to that chamber who should be designated to act as rapporteur; and the President of the GC or CST decides on that proposal.140 Whether the proceedings are before the ECJ, GC or CST, in assigning a case to a chamber and designating the judge-rapporteur and (where applicable) the advocate general, account is often taken of other cases concerning the same subject matter. 2.38 At that stage, and before the application has been served on the other parties, the Court may dismiss the action: (i) where it is clear that the Court has 136 RP-GC, art 147(1); RP-CST, art 111(1). See further Ch 4, section V. There is no longer provision for the grant of legal aid by the ECJ in direct actions because the ECJ no longer exercises jurisdiction at first instance in direct actions brought by private persons. Private persons are likely to be litigants before the ECJ in references for a preliminary ruling or appeals from the GC, in which case there is provision for the grant of legal aid: see RP-ECJ, art 115 and 185. When deciding to remove provision for legal aid in direct actions, the authors of the current version of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure seem to have overlooked the fact that there are various miscellaneous forms of action, over which the ECJ retains jurisdiction, that take the form of a direct action and that could involve a private person who may require legal aid: see, for example, TFEU, art 245 (compulsory retirement of a member of the Commission or removal of pension rights or other benefits). 137 RP-ECJ, art 15(1). 138 RP-ECJ, art 16(1). 139 RP-GC, art 26(1); RP-CST, art 52, 1st subpara (which specifies assignment to a three-judge chamber). When allocating cases, the President follows the system of allocation adopted by the GC or, as the case may be, the CST. 140 RP-GC, art 26(2); RP-CST, art 52, 2nd subpara. It is not clear to what extent and, if so, on what grounds the President of the Court may refuse to designate the judge proposed by the President of the chamber. In practice the President of the GC always acts on the proposal put to him.

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no jurisdiction; (ii) where the action is manifestly inadmissible; or, in the case of the GC and CST only, (iii) where the action is manifestly lacking any foundation in law.141 The Court’s decision is set out in a reasoned order. There is no provision for hearing the views of the parties and the Court exercises its power sparingly, when the defect in the action is patent.142 2.39 In addition, where it does not appear to the Court that the action suffers from a patent defect of that sort but the Court considers that there is, or may be, an absolute bar to proceeding with the case (for example, that the application may be out of time), the Court may at any time raise the matter of its own motion and gives its decision after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard (save that, if it considers that it has sufficient information to make a decision, the CST may give its decision without taking any further step in the proceedings – that is, without hearing the parties – but is not obliged to do so).143 Absolute bars cannot be waived either by the parties or by the Court itself. The Court must therefore consider them, even if they have not been raised (or have purportedly been waived) by one of the parties, and may do so at any stage of the proceedings.144 In practice that is normally done after the close of pleadings, so that (if appropriate) the rest of the proceedings would be devoted to the question of the admissibility of the action. However, the Court can take the point immediately after lodgment of the application.145 In that event, the normal process would be 141 RP-ECJ, art  53(2); RP-GC, art  126; RP-CST, art  81 (which, in contrast to the ECJ and GC rules, provides that such action can be taken where the problem exists in relation only to a part of the claims made in the application). The fact that the application may be dismissed without taking any further steps in the procedure (including serving the application on the defendant) is not a breach of any procedural rule or principle: Case C-396/03P  Killinger v Germany [2005] ECR I-4967, paras 8–9; Case C-25/12P Trevisanato v Commission, 4 July 2012, paras 20–23. An example of a manifest lack of a foundation in law is where the grounds or pleas in law relied on are irrelevant: eg Case T-427/13 Gruppo Norton Srl v Office for Harmonistion in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 10 June 2014, paras 20–21. See further Ch 7, para 7.82 ff, in relation to summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or inadmissibility. 142 See, for example, Case 59/79 Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Vins de Table et Vins de Pays v Commission [1979] ECR 2425; Case 51/79 Buttner v Commission [1980] ECR 1201; Case 123/80 B v European Parliament [1980] ECR 1789; Case 138/80 Borker [1980] ECR 1975; Case C-437/98P Industria del Frio Auxiliar Conservera SAS v Commission [1999] ECR I-7145, paras 16–24; Case T-346/03 Krikorian v Parliament [2003] ECR II-6037; Case T-373/13 P Alsteens v Commission, 12 March 2014, paras 34–35. 143 RP-ECJ, art  150; RP-GC, art  129; RP-CST, art  82. The ‘hearing’ of the parties before the decision is made may consist solely of giving them an opportunity to respond to a measure of organisation of procedure (as opposed to asking them formally to make submissions on the question of there being an absolute bar): eg Case T-438/10 Forgital Italy SpA v Council, 4  December 2013, paras 59–60 (upheld on appeal in Case C-84/14  P  Forgital Italy SpA  v Council, 14 July 2015, paras 33–36), a case in which the parties were asked to comment on the implications of a recent decision in another case. For the sake of good order, it is, however, better for the Court to be explicit when adopting that approach. 144 However, an absolute bar may be ignored if it is more convenient to dismiss the case on some other ground: eg Cases T-576/93 to T-582/93 Browet v Commission [1994] ECR II-677, paras 20–22 and 68. 145 RP-ECJ, art 149 and RP-GC, art 131(1) also refer to a ruling that the action has ‘become’ devoid of purpose and that there is no need to adjudicate on it. That really refers to what may happen in the course of the proceedings (eg Case T-208/95 Miwon Co Ltd v Commission [1996] ECR II-

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to invite the parties to submit written observations on the potential absolute bar identified by the Court (since a case cannot be dismissed by reason of an absolute bar without the parties first having been heard, the alternative, in ECJ and GC proceedings, would be to fix a date for the hearing of oral submissions on the point; but it is unlikely that that would be preferred to written observations). In contrast, the CST can make its decision immediately by reasoned order but, in the alternative, can raise the matter with the parties and fix a date for the making of their written or oral observations.146 The Court is not obliged to decide the question of the admissibility of the action before considering its merits: if the admissibility of the action is debateable but the action would in any event be dismissed on the merits, the merits may be considered without there being a ruling on admissibility.147 2.40 A  decision of the Court to admit the application without hearing the views of the defendant might prejudice a subsequent claim by the defendant that the application was inadmissible. To avoid a possible duplication of objections, it seems logical that, when the Court raises the question of an absolute bar after lodgment of the application, it serves the application on the defendant in the usual way, informs all the parties that it intends to consider the question of the bar and fixes a date for the making of their written (or, conceivably, oral) observations. The same process would be followed by the CST if it lacks sufficient information to dismiss the application on the ground of the absolute bar. After hearing the views of the parties and those of the advocate general (if there is one), the Court either declares the application to be inadmissible or holds that it is admissible or reserves its decision until the final judgment. In either of the two latter cases, the President then fixes the time limit for the further steps in the proceedings (in the case of consideration of the bar before lodgment of the defence, the next step would be its lodgment). 635 – adoption of a definitive anti-dumping regulation after the commencement of proceedings; Case T-10/01 Lichtwer Pharma AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003] ECR II-2225 – IP appeal becoming devoid of purpose as a result of withdrawal of the opposition; Cases T-30/01 to T2/01 and T-86/02 to T-88/02 Territoria Historico de Alava – Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2009]  ECR II-2919, paras 344–363 – contested measures overtaken by later events) rather than at their outset: if the action is devoid of purpose at the outset, it is inadmissible for lack of interest (see Ch 7, paras 7.14– 7.15). Cases like Case C-1/94 SA Dupret v Commission [1995] ECR I-1 are better understood in that way. 146 RP-CST, art 82 envisages that the CST will make its decision, without taking any further steps in the proceedings, if it considers that it has ‘sufficient information’ to enable it to do so. Should that not be the case, the CST must give the parties an opportunity to be heard before it makes its decision. It would seem to be illogical to suppose that the CST must in that situation carry on with the action in the normal way. The better view is that the CST would give the parties an opportunity to be heard on the point so that it could obtain the further information that it needs in order to make a decision. 147 Eg Cases T-209/02P and T-210/02P Mausolf v Europol [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-79, II-A-2-335, para 29; Case T-432/03 Dehon v Parliament [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-209, II-A-2-1077, para 38. In some cases, it is not stated precisely why the merits are considered before admissibility, see eg: Case F-4/06 Villa v Parliament [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-133, II-A-1-505, para 21; Case F-3/06 Frankin v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-23, II-A-1-117, para 22; Case T-284/06 Gualtieri v Commission [2008] ECR II-70*, para 22.

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5 Service of the application on the defendant 2.41 In the normal course of events, the application is served on the defendant by the Registrar after it has been lodged at the appropriate Court.148 Where the application contains a formal defect referred to in RP-ECJ, art 119(4) or 122(3) or (as the case may be) RP-GC, art 51(4), 78(6) or (in the case of an IP appeal) 177(5), or RP-CST, art 50(6), it is served after it has been corrected; but the Court may also declare the application admissible despite a failure to comply with those provisions, in which case it is served despite the defect.149 It would seem that, if the Court declares the application to be admissible despite the defect, the defendant cannot later raise the point in order to challenge the admissibility of the application. The Court’s power to declare the application admissible is restricted by RP-ECJ, art 123 or (as the case may be) RP-GC, art 80(2) or (in the case of an IP appeal) 178(4), or RP-CST, art 51(1) to formal defects deriving from a failure to comply with the provisions referred to in them (RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3) or (as the case may be) RP-GC, art 78(6) or 177(7), or RP-CST, art 50(6)) but seems to be applied generally, to all similar defects.150 2.42 Once the application has been served on him, the defendant has a choice between: (i) lodging a defence; (ii) raising a preliminary objection under RP-ECJ, art 151(1) or (as the case may be) RP-GC, art 130(1)–(2) (which applies to IP appeals) or RP-CST, art  83(1); or (iii) doing nothing. The defence may challenge both the admissibility and the merits of the application; a preliminary objection challenges its admissibility alone. There seems to be no reason why the defendant cannot lodge both, so long as they are in separate documents, but, if the latter is successful, the former is redundant. If the defendant does nothing, he is exposed to an application for judgment by default. 6 Lodgment of the defence 2.43 The defence must be lodged within two months of service of the application.151 That time limit may be extended on application to the President152 (the application being made before the time limit has expired);153 and, in general, one 148 For service of documents, see further Ch 1, para 1.141 ff. 149 RP-ECJ, art 123; RP-GC, art 80(2) and 178(4); RP-CST, art 51(1). 150 In the light of Case C-69/12 P Noscirai (above, note 132), paras 20–24, it is arguable that a defect can be rectified or regularised only if there is express provision in the rules of procedure to that effect. 151 RP-ECJ, art 124(1); RP-GC, art 81(1) and 179; RP-CST, art 53(1). The defence in an IP appeal is described in the rules of procedure as a ‘response’ to the application. The two-month period benefits automatically from the ten-day extension on account of distance provided for in RPECJ, art 51, RP-GC, art 60 and RP-CST, art 38. 152 RP-ECJ, art 124(3); RP-GC, art 81(3); RP-CST, art 53(5). Power to extend time in response to a first request for an extension has been delegated to the Registrar. If an extension of time has been requested, that does not preclude the defendant from abandoning the idea of lodging a defence and lodging a preliminary objection to admissibility instead: Case T-387/00 Comitato organizzatore del convegno internazionale ‘Effetti degli inquinamenti atmosferici sul clima e sulla vegetazione’ v Commission [2002] ECR II-3031, paras 33–35. 153 PD-GC, para 66, last sentence; IR-CST, art 11(2).

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extension of time is readily granted. The application for extension may be made informally but it must give a reason why the extension sought should be granted, in particular where one has already been granted and a further extension is sought: even the first extension of time must be justified by exceptional circumstances154 and the same criterion applies to any subsequent application to extend time.155 The normal practice in ECJ proceedings is to write to the President, addressing the letter to the Registrar; In GC and CST proceedings, the application is made to the Registrar.156 As a rule the Court discourages requests for the extension of time made by telephone. 2.44 The defence (which, like any pleading, must be dated and signed)157 must, in brief, set out: (a) the name and address of the defendant; (b) the arguments of law and fact relied on; (c) the form of order sought; (d) the nature of any evidence relied on; and (e) information enabling service of documents on the defendant (normally an indication that service may be effected by e-Curia, fax or e-mail on the defendant’s representative).158 It must also be accompanied by various documents which do not need to be specified here. 7 Preliminary objection 2.45 In ECJ and CST proceedings, no time limit is set for lodgment of a preliminary objection but, if it is to be lodged instead of a defence, it must in practice be lodged within the time set for lodgment of the defence. There are two reasons for that. First, even though a defence and a preliminary objection can be lodged at the same time (as an indication to the Court that the case can be disposed of more quickly through the preliminary objection route but must in any event be dismissed), there is no real point in raising a preliminary objection after the proceedings have gone through the initial procedural stages. Secondly, pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 152(1) and RP-CST, art 121(1), the applicant may apply for judgment in default if the defendant ‘fails to respond to the application’ within the time fixed for doing so (phraseology that encompasses lodging either a defence or a preliminary objection).159 If the defendant has not lodged a defence but has raised a preliminary objection, the applicant cannot then apply for judgment in default because the admissibility of his claim has been challenged. It has been inferred that, in the absence of an express time limit for lodging a

154 RP-ECJ, art 124(3); RP-GC, art 81(3); RP-CST, art 53(5). 155 PD-GC, para 67; IR-CST, art 11(2). 156 That is because PD-GC, paras 64 and 66, and IR-CST, art 11(1) identify the Registrar as having the power to fix and extend procedural time limits (albeit in accordance with the authority given to him by the President, which is not published). 157 RP-ECJ, art 57(1) and (6); RP-GC, art 72(2) and 73(1); RP-CST, art 45(1) and (2). The user identification stands in for a signature in the case of a pleading lodged by e-Curia: see the e-Curia decisions, art 3. 158 RP-ECJ, art 124(1)–(2); RP-GC, art 81(1)–(2); RP-CST, art 53(1)–(2). Where service is to be effected by fax or e-mail, a fax number or e-mail address needs to be provided. 159 See, for example, Case T-42/89 York von Wartenburg v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-31 (decided at a time when the ECJ and GC rules of procedure were to the same effect).

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preliminary objection, the time limit for lodging a defence applies.160 However, the alternative view is that a failure to lodge a defence or preliminary objection within the time limit for lodging the former simply exposes the defendant to an application for judgment by default; if such an application is made, that does not preclude the defendant from raising a (late) preliminary objection (at least where the objection raises a point that the Court can take of its own motion),161 it simply prevents the defendant from putting the case back on the normal procedural track by lodging a late defence. In contrast, in GC proceedings, a preliminary objection must be lodged within the same time limit as that for lodging a defence.162 Accordingly, a late preliminary objection is not possible. 2.46 A preliminary objection can be made whenever it appears to the defendant that there is a formal bar preventing the case from proceeding to a consideration of its substance (that is, its merits).163 Various possible bars to proceeding with an action exist and they are usually classified under the general heading of ‘inadmissibility’.164 A preliminary objection is made in the form of an application that the case be dismissed and must be made by separate document.165 The application should be made only where the bar is a complete bar to the action. If it is only partial (for example, if it relates to one only of a number of claims made), it is more appropriate to raise it as part of the defence to the whole action. The objective of making a preliminary objection is to shorten proceedings by requesting the Court to consider the admissibility of the action alone and not delve into its merits. A preliminary objection cannot be made on the basis that the substance of the case is (manifestly) lacking in foundation;166 and, generally, proceeds on the assumption that, in relation to the substance of the case, the allegations made in the application commencing proceedings are correct.167 160 Case T-43/13 Donnici v Parliament, 20 March 2014, paras 38–39 (which concerned the pre2014 GC rules of procedure). 161 As was done in Case T-39/97 T. Port GmbH & Co v Commission [1997] ECR II-2125 (see in particular paras 14, 17, 20 and 25). It is not clear if the GC had the T. Port case in the forefront of its mind in Case T-43/13 Donnici (above, note 160). 162 RP-GC, art  130(1). The former RP-CST, art  78(1) made similar provision (a preliminary objection had to be lodged within one month of service of the application). That was removed in 2014, bringing the CST rules into line with the ECJ rules of procedure. 163 Thus, RP-ECJ, art 151(1) refers to ‘a preliminary objection…not going to the substance of the case’; RP-GC, art 130(1) refers to an application for ‘a decision on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case’; RP-CST, art 83(1) refers to ‘a decision on admissibility, on lack of competence or on any other preliminary plea not going to the merits of the case.’ 164 See further Ch 7. The procedure for making a preliminary objection cannot be invoked in respect of procedures in which the Court is asked for an opinion: Opinion 2/92 [1995] ECR I-521, paras 11–14. 165 RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(1); RP-CST, art 83(1), 1st subpara. 166 A manifest lack of foundation can, however, be raised by the GC or CST of its own motion under RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81, respectively. 167 The Court is unwilling to deal with a preliminary objection that is raised by a defendant on the basis that the applicant’s case is unfounded or debateable as to its merits. Any matters of fact raised by the defendant in the preliminary objection must go to the question of admissibility raised in the objection (facts such as precisely when the act challenged in the proceedings was notified to the applicant and so forth).

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2.47 The application raising the preliminary objection (again, signed and dated) must set out the pleas of fact and law relied on, the form of order sought and include any supporting documents.168 When it has been lodged at the Court it is served on the applicant in the action, who is given time by the President to submit in writing a document (usually described as a ‘reply’ to the preliminary objection raised by the defendant) containing a form of order in response to the defendant’s application and the arguments of fact and law relied on in support.169 The Court may then decide on the preliminary objection or commence the oral procedure; there are no preparatory enquiries (unless the Court so decides).170 The Court comes to a decision after hearing the parties and the advocate general (if there is one). It may either decide on the application raising the preliminary objection or reserve its decision until the final judgment on the case. In both the latter case and in the event that the preliminary objection is rejected, the President prescribes further time limits for further steps in the proceedings.171 2.48 The Court will decide the issue raised in the preliminary objection at this preliminary stage where it considers that it is in the interests of the proper administration of justice for the issue to be resolved before the Court turns to examine the substance of the case.172 In some instances, it may be more appropriate to ignore the preliminary objection if the action can be dismissed, in any event, on the ground that it clearly lacks merit or is manifestly inadmissible.173 On the 168 RP-ECJ, art 151(2); RP-GC, art 130(3); RP-CST, art 83(1), 2nd subpara. 169 RP-ECJ, art 151(3); RP-GC, art 130(4); RP-CST, art 83(2), 1st subpara. 170 RP-ECJ, art 151(4); RP-GC, art 130(6) (which disapplies the obligation to hold a hearing set out in RP-GC, art 106); RP-CST, art 83(2), 2nd subpara. There is no right to an oral hearing: Case C-360/02P Ripa di Meana v Parliament [2004] ECR I-10339, para 35; Case C-547/03P Asian Institute of Technology v Commission [2006] ECR I-845, para 35. Further, if the issue can be decided on the basis of the documents alone, there is no need to open the oral procedure: eg Case T-117/94 Associazione Agricoltori della Provincia di Rovigo v Commission [1995] ECR II-455, para 19. Since the merits of the action do not fall to be considered, a measure of organisation of procedure or of enquiry would not normally be relevant or necessary: eg Case T-3/00 Pitsiorlas v Council [2001] ECR II-717, paras 15–16 (such measures were, however, ordered in the Asian Institute of Technology case). 171 RP-ECJ, art 151(5)–(6); RP-GC, art 130(7)–(8); RP-CST, art 83(3). 172 Case 85/86 Commission v Board of Governors of the EIB [1986] ECR 2215, para 4. 173 Case C-23/00 P Council v Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH [2002] ECR I-1873, paras 51–52; Case T-264/00 Compagnia Generale delle Acque v Commission, 12 July 2012, paras 19–21 (appeal dismissed for other reasons in Case C-436/12  P  Veolia Acqua Compagnia Generale delle Acque v Commission, 13 June 2013); Case T-231/00 Adriatica di Navigazione SpA v Commission, 12 December 2012, paras 18–20; Case T-253/00 Bauer SpA v Commission, 12  December 2012, paras 19–22; Case T-260/00 Cooperativa San Marco fra Lavoratori della Piccola Pesca – Burano Soc Coop rl v Commission, 12 December 2012, paras 21–24; Case T-261/00 Sacaim SpA  v Commission, 12  December 2012, paras 20–22; Case T-218/00 Cooperativa Mare Azzurro v Commission, 22  January 2013, paras 18–21 (appeal dismissed for other reasons in Case C-145/13  P  Ghezzo Giovanni & C. v Commission, 4  September 2014); Case T-262/00 La Vigile San Marco v Commission, 22 January 2013, paras 19–22; Case T-263/00 La Navale v Commission, 22 January 2013, paras 19–22; Case T-269/00 Sagar Srl v Commission 29 January 2013, paras 19–22; Case T-272/00 Alfredo Barbini Srl v Commission, 29 January 2013, paras 19–22; Case T-273/00 Unindustria v Commission, 29 January 2013, paras 19–22; Cases T-278/00 to T-280/00, T-282/00 to T-286/00, T-288/00 to T-295/00 Albergo Quattro Fontane v Commission, 20 February 2013, paras 18–21; Case F-77/13 DC v Europol,

175

2.49  General outline of procedure

other hand, it is not necessarily the case that the preliminary objection will be heard only where the outcome of the objection is fairly certain to be against the admissibility of the action: the fact that the action raises complex questions of law concerning its merits may be a spur to disposing of the case on the ground of its inadmissibility so as to avoid the necessity to consider those complex questions.174 It sometimes happens that a preliminary objection is upheld only in part, in which case the action continues save in respect of the part found to be inadmissible. If the preliminary objection is unsuccessful, the Court’s ruling on the issue raised in the preliminary objection binds the parties by the force of res judicata; however the admissibility of the action may be contested later in the proceedings on grounds other than those canvassed in the unsuccessful objection. 2.49 There is no appeal from a decision of the ECJ upholding or dismissing a preliminary objection to admissibility; where the decision is made by the GC or the CST in proceedings pending before it an appeal lies to, as the case may be, the ECJ or the GC.175 8 Judgment by default 2.50 Where no defence or preliminary objection is lodged at the Court within the time prescribed for lodging a defence, the applicant may: (i) decide not to oppose late lodgement of a defence or preliminary objection;176 or (ii) apply for judgment by default.177 If even a late defence or preliminary objection is not in the offing, the applicant has no way of progressing the action otherwise than by applying for judgment by default. The ‘time prescribed’ is either two months from the service of the application on the defendant178 or such other time as may be prescribed by the President upon application by the defendant under RP-ECJ, art  124(3) or (as the case may be) RP-GC, art  81(3) or RP-CST, art  53(5). It would seem that, at least in ECJ and CST proceedings and at least where the objection raised is one that the Court can take of its own motion, an application for judgment by default when no defence has been served in time does not preclude the defendant from lodging a preliminary objection not going to the 5 March 2014, para 27. In several of the cases just cited, the preliminary objection was ignored where the application was held to be partly inadmissible and partly unfounded. In effect, a preliminary objection need be considered only where the matter is debatable. If the action is manifestly inadmissible or, in GC and CST proceedingas, clearly unfounded, it is procedurally simpler to dismiss the action for that reason instead of pursuing the procedure initiated by the preliminary objection because giving the parties a further opportunity to debate the matter will not put the Court in a better position to decide it. It is less edifying to note that, in most of the cases just cited, it took the GC 12–13 years from the commencement of proceedings to dispose of the actions summarily. 174 Case T-196/03 European Federation for Cosmetic Ingredients v Parliament and Council [2004] ECR II-4263, paras 13–14. 175 Statute, art 56, 1st para, and Annex, art 9, 1st para. 176 Case C-32/02 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-12063, paras 11–12. 177 See further Ch 16, section V, para 16.46 ff. Judgment by default can be applied for even if the defence is only one day late: eg Case T-39/97 T. Port (above, note 161), para 14. 178 Pursuant to: RP-ECJ, art 124(1); RP-GC, art 81(1); RP-CST, art 53(1).

176

General outline of procedure 2.52

substance of the case with the aim of causing the Court to take that objection before proceeding to consider the application for judgment by default.179 It does not seem that the same tactic can be used in GC proceedings because preliminary objections in such proceedings are subject to the same time limit as that for lodging a defence, which implies that a late preliminary objection is precluded.180 Accordingly, by the time when an application for judgment by default can be made in an action before the GC, the time for lodging a preliminary objection will have passed. 2.51 In IP appeals, the defendant is the Office and the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal may participate in the proceedings before the GC as interveners.181 If the defendant has done nothing in response to the application commencing proceedings but an intervener opposes the form of order sought by the applicant, an application for judgment by default cannot be made.182 Interveners in ordinary direct actions cannot stave off an application for judgment by default in that manner. Where, in an IP appeal, the defendant has done nothing and no one has intervened or any interveners support the applicant, judgment by default may be applied for. 9 Intervention and joinder of parties183 2.52 In direct actions, there are two sorts of parties: main parties (the applicant(s) and defendant(s)) and interveners. Only the defendant is a compulsory party. All other parties are volunteers: they choose whether or not to initiate (in the case of the applicant) or participate in (in the case of interveners) the proceedings.184 As the applicant is self-selected and the defendant is identified by the applicant, joinder of parties is limited to third party intervention. With one exception, the Court plays a passive role in relation to intervention, in the sense that it leaves the decision whether or not to apply to intervene to the third parties themselves. The exception occurred in proceedings before the CST and has not been carried over into the GC rules of procedure after the abolition of the CST. At any stage in CST proceedings, the President might, after hearing the parties, invite any person, any EU institution or any member state concerned by the out 179 That was done in the T. Port case (above, note 161), at a time when the GC rules of procedure were to the same effect as the current ECJ and CST rules of procedure. 180 RP-GC, art 130(1) (which seems to be intended to give effect to the ruling in Case T-43/13 Donnici (above, note 160). 181 RP-GC, art 172 and 173(1). 182 RP-GC, art 173(6). For a more general consideration of IP appeals, see Case C- 106/03P Vedial SA  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR I-9573, advocate general’s opinion, paras 31–51; judgment, paras 26–37. 183 See further Ch 5. 184 IP appeals are slightly different in that the defendant is the relevant Office but all the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (with the exception of the applicant) are served with the application: RP-GC, art 178(1). The latter are described as ‘interveners.’ Unlike interveners in other direct actions, they need not apply to intervene, but simply respond to the application served on them, and have the same procedural rights as the main parties: RP-GC, art 173(1) and (3). They are still volunteers, unlike the defendant Board.

177

2.53  General outline of procedure

come of the dispute to inform the CST if he or she or it wished to intervene in the proceedings.185 It is implicit that the idea of extending such an invitation to a third party might be raised by the CST of its own motion or on application by one or other or all of the parties (including existing interveners). A third party receiving such an invitation was at liberty to accept it or turn it down. If the third party expressed to the CST a wish to intervene within the period fixed for doing so by the President, it then became an intervener automatically and was entitled to make a written statement in intervention. The statement in intervention, and the remaining aspects of the third party’s intervention, were subject to the same rules as apply in an ordinary intervention,186 to which we now turn. 2.53 A notice is published in the Official Journal giving details of the application commencing proceedings.187 In staff cases heard by the CST and ordinary direct actions (heard by the ECJ or GC), an application to intervene must be made within six weeks of publication.188 In GC and CST proceedings, if the application to intervene is lodged after that period has expired, it is rejected as being out of time. In ECJ proceedings, an application to intervene may also be made after the expiry of the six week period but no later than the date of the decision to open the oral procedure in the case,189 that is, the date on which the President fixes the date for the hearing in the case, not the date of the hearing.190 Where an application to intervene (made within the six week period) is allowed, the intervener is given an opportunity to submit in writing a statement in intervention setting out the form of order sought by the intervener, the pleas of law and arguments relied on in support and the nature of the evidence relied on by the intervener; and each of the other parties to the proceedings is given an opportunity to submit in writing a reply to the statement of intervention.191 In cases before the ECJ, if the application to intervene is made after the expiry of the six week period and allowed, the intervener has no opportunity to submit a written statement in intervention. Instead, the intervener can make oral submissions at the hearing (if there is one).192 Decisions of the GC or CST dismissing an appli-

185 RP-CST, art 89(1). 186 RP-CST, art 89(2)–(4). 187 RP-ECJ, art 21(4); RP-GC, art 79; RP-CST, art 51(2). 188 RP-ECJ, art 130(1); RP-GC, art 143(1); RP-CST, art 86(1). Time starts to run from the day after publication: RP-ECJ, art 49(1)(a); RP-GC, art 58(1)(a); RP-CST, art 37(1)(a). The six week period is extended automatically by ten days on account of distance: RP-ECJ, art 51; RP-GC, art 60; RP-CST, art 38. RP-ECJ, art 50 or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 59, which provide that, in the case of proceedings against measures adopted by an institution, time runs from the fifteenth day after publication, do not apply. 189 RP-ECJ, art 129(4). RP-GC, art 115(1) of the pre-2015 GC rules of procedure made similar provision; but that no longer applies. 190 RP-ECJ, art 60(4). 191 RP-ECJ, art 132(1) and (3) (‘where necessary’, in the latter case); RP-GC, art 145(1) and (3); RP-CST, art 88(3) and (5). 192 RP-ECJ, art  129(4). Eg Case T-52/00 Coe Clerici Logistics SpA  v Commission [2002]  ECR II-2553, paras 24–28 (which concerns the parallel provisions in the pre-2015  GC rules of procedure and predates the removal of presentation of a report for the hearing from the elements comprising the oral hearing).

178

General outline of procedure 2.54

cation to intervene may be appealed to the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC.193 In IP appeals, the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (other than the applicant commencing proceedings before the GC) are served with the application and are entitled to participate in the proceedings before the GC as interveners.194 Unlike interveners in ordinary direct actions, they have the same procedural rights as the main parties.195 For that reason, no further comment need be made about them at this juncture. On the other hand, persons other than the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (and, of course, the Office itself) may intervene in the proceedings before the GC on the same basis and in accordance with the same rules as apply in an ordinary direct action.196 10 Subsequent pleadings197 2.54 In proceedings before the ECJ, after the defence has been lodged at the Court, it is served on the applicant who is given by the President a period in which to lodge a reply; if the applicant declines to do so, pleadings are closed. If, on the other hand, a reply is lodged, it is served on the defendant, who is given a period in which to lodge his rejoinder; the pleadings then close after the lodgment of the rejoinder or when the defendant waives the right to lodge a rejoinder.198 In proceedings before the GC other than IP appeals, the same happens unless the GC (after hearing the advocate general if there is one) decides that a second exchange of pleadings is unnecessary because the documents before it are sufficiently comprehensive that any further elaboration of the parties’ respective cases can be left to oral argument. If the GC does decide that a second exchange of pleadings is unnecessary, it so informs the parties. The applicant then has two weeks from notification to him of the GC’s decision in which to make a written application for authorisation to supplement his pleadings (such an application cannot be made by the defendant). The application must set out reasons. The GC is not obliged to accede to such a request. It exercises a discretion in the matter.199 If it authorises the parties to supplement their pleadings, the President fixes the time limits within which the pleadings are to be lodged.200 Since the GC will make its decision in the light of an application made by the applicant in the 193 Statute, art 57, 1st para, and Annex, art 10(1). 194 RP-GC, art 173(1) and 178(1). 195 RP-GC, art 173(3). 196 Eg Case T-120/99 Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2001]  ECR II-2235 at p  2240 (there were three interveners; the Commission’s application to intervene was rejected as being out of time but it later intervened successfully in the appeal to the ECJ). 197 See further Ch 9. 198 RP-ECJ, art 126. The President has power to specify the matters to which the reply or rejoinder should relate but it does not appear that he has power to refuse to permit a reply or rejoinder to be lodged. The time limit may be extended on request: see RP-ECJ, art 52. 199 RP-GC, art 83(1)–(2). In Case T-48/11 British Airways plc v Commission, 16 December 2015, paras 11 and 14, the GC decided not to have a second round of pleadings but later ordered a second round in the form of a measure of organisation of procedure, which is one way of curing an over-enthusiastic curtailing of the written procedure. 200 RP-GC, art 83(3). Those time limits may be extended on request: see RP-GC, art 61.

179

2.55  General outline of procedure

action, it is apprehended that the authorisation given by the GC will be given to both parties: to the applicant to respond to the defence and to the defendant to respond to anything new stated in the applicant’s response to the defence.201 In IP appeals, the position is more complex. An intervener who was a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (but not any other intervener) may lodge two pleadings: a response to the application commencing the proceedings; and a cross-appeal. The former is, in effect, a defence to the decision disputed in the proceedings. The latter seeks the annulment or alteration of the decision challenged in the proceedings on a point, and advances pleas in law, not raised in the application.202 The two cannot be combined in a single pleading.203 When only a response is lodged, the written procedure closes at that point.204 When a cross-claim is lodged, the other parties to the proceedings have a right to lodge a response to the cross-claim and the written procedure closes after the last response has been lodged.205 In proceedings before the CST, the application and the defence are the only components of the written procedure unless the CST decides that a second round of pleadings is necessary.206 The CST may so decide either of its own motion or on application by the applicant in the case. The criterion applied by the CST is whether or not it is necessary to supplement the pleadings already before the CST; and, consistently with that criterion, the CST may restrict the second exchange to questions of law or fact that it has specified. It would seem that the CST may authorise only a second exchange of pleadings, not the lodgement of a second pleading by one party only (unless, of course, the other party waives the right to lodge a second pleading).207 2.55 If a party is invited by the Court (generally through the Registrar) to submit a pleading or procedural document on a particular point or for a particular purpose, that limited invitation cannot be construed as permission to lodge a pleading going beyond the confines of the Court’s invitation. An attempt to do 201 It would be consistent with the right to be heard to authorise the applicant to respond to the defence by lodging a reply but restrict the defendant’s right to respond to the reply by making oral submissions at the hearing, as long as the applicant was merely responding to the defence and not raising something completely new. However, it is more efficient (so far as the decisions, whether or not to hold a hearing and, if so, how to conduct the hearing, are concerned) for as much as possible of the parties’ cases to be expressed in writing. 202 RP-GC, art 180 (response), 182 (cross-claim) and 184 (content of cross-claim). The same time limit for lodging a response (two months from service of the application) applies to the lodging of a cross-claim: RP-GC, art 179 and 182(1). Those time limits may be extended in exceptional circumstances on request. 203 RP-GC, art 182(2). 204 RP-GC, art 181. 205 RP-GC, art 185–186. A response to a cross-claim must be lodged within two months of service of the cross-claim; and that time limit can be extended in exceptional circumstances on request: RP-GC, art 185. Unlike the position under the pre-2015 GC rules of procedure (see, by way of example, Case T-164/02 Kaul GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-3807, para 13, where a request to lodge a reply was rejected because it was felt that the party could elaborate its pleas and arguments, and respond to the opposing party, at the hearing) it does not appear to be possible for a request to be made to lodge any further pleading. 206 Statute, Annex, art 7(3). 207 RP-CST, art 55(1)–(2).

180

General outline of procedure 2.57

so is liable to cause the pleading or procedural document to be rejected as one not envisaged in the rules of procedure.208 If a party volunteers a further written submission without being invited to do so by the Court, it risks having the document returned to it; but in some instances such a document has been placed in the case file as, effectively, indicating something to be taken up during the oral procedure.209 2.56 In principle and in any event, the application and the defence are the principal pleadings and should be completed by a reply and a rejoinder only where necessary. Accordingly, there is only a limited possibility of expanding the issues, as defined in the first exchange of pleadings, in a later pleading.210 It suffices at this stage to make the rather obvious point that the purpose of the written pleadings is to identify the issues of fact and law that divide the parties. 11 Production and exclusion of evidence 2.57 In addition to defining the issues of fact and law, the pleadings also serve to identify the sources of any evidence relevant to the case. It is the Court’s function, not that of the parties, to call for evidence; but it remains the duty of the parties to provide the Court with sufficient information so that it can assess how it is to exercise its powers.211 To that end, the information that the parties must provide is not restricted to information that enables the issues of fact to be identified but extends to information enabling the identification of the sources of evidence relevant to those issues that the Court may call upon. Where evidence relevant to the case that a party is advancing is in the possession of that party, there is no need for the Court to exercise any of its powers regarding the production of evidence: the party in possession of the evidence can produce it. In principle, relevant evidence in the possession of a party should be produced to the Court when the first substantive pleading submitted by the party (application, defence, statement in intervention) is lodged at the Court.212 Documents are produced as annexes to the pleading. A thing (such as a sample in a tariff clas-

208 Case C-155/98 P Alexopoulou v Commission [1999] ECR I-4069, paras 61–63 of the advocate general’s opinion (pp 4081–4082). 209 Eg Case T-195/00 Travelex Global and Financial Services Ltd v Commission [2003]  ECR II-1677, paras 12–15; Case T-82/08 Guardian Industries Corpn and Guardian Europe Sarl v Commission, 27 September 2012, paras 19–22 (upheld on appeal in Case C-580/12 P Guardian Industries Corpn and Guardian Europe Sarl v Commission, 12 November 2014, paras 30–36). 210 RP-ECJ, art 127; RP-GC, art 84; RP-CST, art 56. The rules relating to pleadings are considered in detail in Ch 9 below. 211 Each party must be given a reasonable opportunity to put forward his case and must not be put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the opposing party: eg Case C-580/12 P Guardian Industries (above, note 209), paras 30–31. 212 That is expresly stated in RP-GC, art 85(1), in relation to the applicant and defendant. However, that presupposes that the issue of fact to which the evidence relates is known at that point in the proceedings. When deciding what evidence or sources of evidence should be produced or disclosed in or with the application commencing proceedings, an applicant should proceed on the basis that all facts relevant to his case are in issue unless, for example, the fact is stated as a fact in the measure disputed in the proceedings.

181

2.58  General outline of procedure

sification case) can be produced by physical delivery to the Registry. The source of evidence that is not in the possession of the party in question (such as a document held by another person) or that cannot be produced to the Court by being annexed to the pleading or delivered physically to the Court (such as the oral testimony of a witness) must be identified in the pleading with as much detail as possible and may be coupled with an application for a measure of enquiry, set out in the pleading, whereby the evidence may be obtained and produced to the Court.213 The identification of evidence in that manner in a pleading (where it is not and cannot be produced to the Court) is the ‘offer’ of evidence whether or not the pleading contains a formal application for a measure of enquiry. 2.58 After the first exchange of pleadings, the production and offering of evidence is still possible; but it is subject to increasingly restrictive conditions.214 Evidence may be produced or offered in a reply or rejoinder but reasons must be given for the delay in doing so.215 If the Court does not think that the reasons given are good enough (or if no reasons are given), the evidence may be regarded as inadmissible.216 Where the evidence is produced or offered after the close of the written procedure, not only must (good) reasons be given for the delay but the evidence will be admitted only by way of exception.217 The opposing party is given an opportunity to comment on the late production or offering of evidence.218 2.59 Evidence may be excluded as well as produced. In principle, the proceedings should be concerned with relevant evidence and not irrelevant evidence. Accordingly, there is, ordinarily, no ground for excluding the former. As to the latter, there is normally no need to exclude formally from the case file a document that is irrelevant, even if it is (or is said to be) misleading, because it is simpler to ignore it.219 Therefore, there must be some prevailing reason for the Court formally to exclude evidence from the proceedings. Most cases concerning the exclusion of evidence relate to keeping secret or confidential evidence out of the proceedings or managing the use made of such evidence in the course of the proceedings.220 Apart from secrecy or confidentiality, the only prevailing

213 On applications for a measure of enquiry, see Ch 11, para 11.10 ff, below. 214 See further the discussion of late applications for a measure of enquiry in Ch 11, para 11.14 ff, below. Eg Case T-246/09 Conseil scientifique international pour le developpement des iles (Insula) v Commission, 13 June 2012, paras 143–145. 215 RP-ECJ, art 128(1); RP-GC, art 85(2); RP-CST, art 57. 216 Eg Case C-286/13P Dole Food Company Inc v Commission, 19 March 2015, paras 44–46 (the evidence related to an issue identified at the outset of the proceedings; if the need to produce or offer the evidence had emerged later on, the delay in production would have been justified). 217 RP-ECJ, art 128(2); RP-GC, art 85(3). RP-CST, art 57 is applied to the same effect. 218 RP-GC, art 85(4); RP-CST, art 57. RP-ECJ, art 128(2) so provides only in the case of evidence produced or offered after the close of the written procedure. 219 Case T-142/97 Eugenio Branco Lda v Commission [1998] ECR II-3567, paras 114–117; Cases T-44/01, T-119/01 and T-126/01 Eduardo Vieira, SA v Commission [2003] ECR II-1209, paras 222–223. 220 See generally Ch 12 on the exclusion of evidence. Confidential treatment is considered in para 2.68 ff below and in Ch 9, section III.E, para 9.19 ff.

182

General outline of procedure 2.61

reasons for formally excluding evidence seem to be production by mistake221 and an irregularity or illegality in the manner in which the evidence was originally obtained,222 although there is some basis for saying that defamatory documents may be excluded.223 In most instances, a decision on the exclusion of evidence is made after balancing the interests in favour of and against retaining the evidence in the case file. 12 Close of the written procedure 2.60 The written procedure in ECJ and GC cases is closed by one of the following events as the case may be: failure to lodge a defence within time; absence, or waiver by the applicant, of the right to lodge a reply; failure by the applicant to lodge a reply within time; absence, or waiver by the defendant, of the right to lodge a rejoinder; failure by the defendant to lodge a rejoinder within time; lodgment of the rejoinder; lodgment of written observations in response to a preliminary objection to admissibility.224 In CST cases, the written procedure can end with any of those events but, in principle, ends with the lodgement of the defence. Where a third party has intervened in the proceedings the written procedure may well end after the events described above because the intervention is very often allowed at a relatively advanced stage in the written procedure involving the applicant and the defendant. In such circumstances the written procedure ends, as the case may be: on a failure by the intervener to lodge within time a written statement in intervention; on the lodgment by the other parties of their replies to the statement in intervention; or on the failure of the other parties to lodge their replies within time. 13 Reopening the written procedure 2.61 There is no express provision for the reopening of the written procedure. The possibility of doing so may be inferred from the provision that, where a party puts forward a new plea in law (which may occur at or after the close of the written procedure), the President may permit the opposing party or parties time to answer the plea.225 Reopening the written procedure is not a normal step 221 Eg Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96 Service pour le Groupement d’Acquisitions (SGA) v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3587, paras 14–15 and 24 (on appeal, Case C-39/00P SGA  v Commission [2000] ECR I-11201, paras 33–39). 222 See further Ch 12. 223 Case T-254/02  L  v Commission [2005]  ECR-SC  I-A-63, II-277, para  111 (on appeal, Case C-230/05P L v Commission [2006] ECR I-55*, [2006] ECR-SC I-B-2-7, II-B-2-45, para 88), in which there was no reason to order the removal of the document because it was not found to be defamatory as claimed. 224 Cf Case C-237/06P Strack v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-B-2-5, II-B-2-43, paras 49–57. 225 RP-ECJ, art  127(2); RP-GC, art  84(2)–(3); RP-CST, art  56(2). The link between reopening the written procedure and the introduction of a new plea was stated explicity in Case C-308/07  P  Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v Parliament [2009]  ECR  I-1059, paras 29–32. It is not clear if that was the basis on which the written procedure was reopened in Case T-170/94 Shanghai Bicycle Corp (Group) v Council [1997] ECR II-1383, para 14 (in order to enable a party to reply to an intervener’s intervention). Under RP-ECJ, art 127(2), the President of the ECJ acts on a proposal from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general.

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in proceedings since, generally, the written procedure gives parties a sufficient opportunity to set out their respective cases in writing. A request made by a party to reopen the written procedure can be regarded as the raising of a preliminary issue not going to the substance of the case under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(2) and RP-CST, art 83(1).226 Otherwise, if the Court wishes the parties to make a further submission in writing after the close of the written procedure, that is more often done by way of a measure of organisation of procedure or a response to an enquiry made by the Court during the oral procedure.

B

Directions and enquiries

2.62 After the close of the written procedure, each case is discussed by the members of the Court in an administrative meeting and in the light of a preliminary report drawn up by the judge-rapporteur. A number of procedural decisions may be made by the Court at the administrative meeting. Some of them are often made before the administrative meeting but it seems convenient to discuss them here. 1 The preliminary report 2.63 After the close of pleadings, the President fixes a date on which the judge-rapporteur is to present his preliminary report on the case to the Court.227 That report is not circulated to the parties and contains the judge-rapporteur’s recommendations on how proceedings in the case should be conducted. It is discussed by the Court in an administrative meeting at which it is decided what further steps must be taken in the proceedings and the date for the hearing is fixed after hearing the views of the advocate general (where there is one). Decisions that are usually made at this time include the questions of the formation before which the case is to be heard, the need for any preparatory enquiries or measures of organisation of procedure and, in the ECJ, the need for an oral hearing and the need for an advocate general’s opinion.228 Those matters lie largely within the discretion of the Court. The rules governing the exercise of its discretion in relation to the selection of the formation appropriate to the case are discussed above.229 2 Amicable settlement 2.64 It has been known for judges (particularly in the GC) to seek to encourage a settlement of disputes in the course of the hearing of an interim relief

226 See further Ch 6. 227 RP-ECJ, art 59(1); RP-GC, art 87(1); RP-CST, art 58(1). 228 RP-ECJ, art 59(2)–(3); RP-GC, art 87(2)–(3); RP-CST, art 58(2)–(3). 229 See Ch 1, paras 1.70–1.72 and 1.82–1.86, for the position in the ECJ and GC.

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application,230 in the context of measures of organisation of procedure,231 at or after the hearing,232 or after a preliminary judgment on some of the issues in the case.233 The CST is expressly enjoined to examine the possibilities of a settlement between the parties and to facilitate a settlement at all stages in the procedure,234 including at the time of the lodgement of the application; and, as from 1 September 2016, that appies to the GC in the staff cases heard by it at first instance.235 To that end, at all stages in the procedure, the CST (or, after 1 September 2016, the GC) may examine and propose one or more solutions capable of putting an end to the dispute and may adopt appropriate measures with a view to facilitating a settlement.236 It may also seek to settle in the same way applications for interim relief.237 No opinion expressed, suggestion made, proposal put forward, concession made or document drawn up for the purpose of reaching an amicable settlement may be relied upon as evidence by the CST or the parties should there be no settlement and the proceedings must then continue to judgment.238

230 Eg Case T-236/00 Stauner v Parliament [2002] ECR II-135, paras 15–16. 231 As to which see further below. 232 Eg Case F-11/06 Larsen v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-137, II-A-2-531, para 3. In Case T-166/98 Cantina Sociale di Dolianova Soc. Coop. rl v Commission [2004] ECR II-3991, paras 52–57, the proceedings were stayed at the end of the hearing so that the parties could reconsider the case with a view to reaching an amicable settlement but that proved impossible and it was necessary to hold a second hearing. In Case F-78/05 Rounis v Commission [2007] ECRSC I-A-1-59, II-A-1-333, the CST proposed terms for a settlement at a meeting held before the formal end of the hearing but, later, the Commission stated that it was unable to accept that proposal. There were then further exchanges between the parties before the case was settled. 233 Eg Case T-554/93 Saint and Murray v Council and Commission [1997]  ECR II-563, paras 104–105. 234 PD-CST, para 67 refers to the possibility of settlement in the course of the hearing, for which purpose the hearing may be suspended for a time to enable discussions to take place, and a room may be made available for a meeting in private. The parties’ representatives ought therefore to be authorised to settle the case, if need be. 235 For the CST, see: Statute, Annex, art 7(4); RP-CST, art 90(1). For the GC (after 1 September 2016), see: Statute, art  50a(2); RP-GC  125a–125d. Encouraging a settlement carries no implications regarding the admissibility or merits of the action: Case T-278/07P Marcuccio v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-59, II-B-1-407, paras 42–43. 236 RP-GC 125a(1)–(3); RP-CST, art 90(2). The GC and CST act through the judge-rapporteur, assisted by the Registrar: RP-GC 125a(2)–(3); RP-CST, art 90(1), 2nd subpara. The measures envisaged are: asking the parties for information, particulars or documents; inviting to meetings the parties’ representatives, the parties themselves or any official or servant of the institution involved in the case who is empowered to negotiate a settlement (at such meetings, the judgerapporteur may, with the consent of the parties, meet with them separately). Suggesting mediation is specifically mentioned in RP-CST 90(2) but not in RP-GC 125a(3). As the list of possibilities in RP-GC 125a(3) is not exclusive, mediation cannot be regarded as excluded from that provision. In Case F-92/06 Antas v Council [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-159, II-A-1-859, before the hearing, the CST drew the parties’ attention to the fact that, at the hearing, it might try to settle the dispute and asked the representatives of the parties to equip themselves with authority to agree a settlement when they attended the hearing (see para 6). In Case F-81/06 Duyster v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-263, II-A-1-1405, the terms of the settlement proposed by the CST appear in para 3. 237 RP-GC, art 125a(4); RP-CST, art 90(3). 238 RP-GC, art 125d; RP-CST, art 92. That rule seems to apply to statements made and documents issued by the GC or CST (or the judge-rapporteur) just as much as to the parties or any third parties involved in settlement negotiations.

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2.65 A settlement may, of course, be reached through the offices of the Court or out of court. In ECJ and GC proceedings, there are no formal rules dealing with either situation. Settlement, however it is reached, results in the discontinuance of the proceedings, the removal of the case from the register and a decision on costs.239 Before the settlement is actually reached, and while the parties are discussing or negotiating, the proceedings continue unless the parties alert the Court to the fact that a settlement is under consideration and ask for the proceedings to be stayed.240 The CST rules, and the GC rules concerning staff cases heard by the GC, differentiate between settlement ‘before’ the GC, CST or the judgerapporteur and out of court settlement. In the former case, the terms of the agreement settling the dispute may be recorded in minutes signed by the President or the judge-rapporteur (depending upon under whose aegis the settlement was reached) and the Registrar, in which case the minutes stand as an official record of the agreement. The case is then removed from the register by reasoned order of the President; and the applicant and defendant may request the President to incorporate the terms of the agreement in the order.241 In the case of an out of court settlement, the parties inform the GC or (as the case may be) the CST that they have reached an agreement resolving the dispute and state that they abandon all their claims. The President then orders the case to be removed from the register.242 In both cases, the President decides on the costs of the proceedings either in accordance with the agreement settling the dispute or, if the agreement does not settle the question of costs, he decides the matter in his discretion.243 2.66 Settlements reached out of court would normally be regarded as binding agreements under the proper law of the settlement (national law). Questions relating to the interpretation and performance of the settlement would be deter 239 RP-ECJ, art 147(1); RP-GC, art 124(1); RP-CST, art 91. Eg Case C-241/87 Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v Council and Commission [1990]  ECR  I-1797. It should be noted that, in Case T-135/98 Spence v Commission, order of 22 October 1999, the representatives of the parties agreed the terms of a settlement before the Court (the GC sitting as a single judge) but do not appear to have had authorisation from their respective clients formally to settle the case. Accordingly, it was agreed that the proposed settlement terms would be communicated to each party and the Court would be informed of the party’s reaction. In the event, each party agreed to the proposed terms and the Court was so informed by letter. RP-GC, art 124(1) was amended with effect from 1 September 2016 so as to refer only to out of court settlements, possibly because of the contemporaneous insertion in Title III of a new chapter 11a dealing with amicable settlements initiated by the GC. However, that chapter applies only to staff cases. In practice, the amendment of RP-GC, art 124(1) seems to have been pointless because, in cases other than staff cases, a settlement reached with the assistance of the GC would be dealt with in the same way as RP-GC, art 124(1) provides, just as in the case of an out of court settlement. 240 In Case F-127/06  H  v Council [2007]  ECR-SC  I-A-1-177, II-A-1-975, paras 6–7, the CST simply told the parties that, unless there was total agreement on the terms of a settlement by a specified date, it would take the case into deliberation (that is, start considering the terms of the judgment). 241 RP-GC, art 125b; RP-CST, art 91(1). 242 RP-GC, art  124(1), as amended; RP-CST, art  91(2). Eg Case F-9/05 Lacombe v Council [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-87, II-A-1-323. It is good practice to provide the GC (or, as the case may be, the CST) with a copy of the settlement agreement, particularly if it contains an agreement on costs. 243 RP-GC, art 125b(3); RP-CST, art 91(3). As to the award of costs, see Ch 14.

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mined by the proper law. If either party wishes to retain the ability to go back to the Court in the event that, after the settlement has been reached, the dispute breaks out anew (such as where there is a failure by the other party to perform its promises under the terms of the settlement), there seem to be two possibilities open to them. The first is to include a choice of jurisdiction clause in the settlement agreement giving the Court jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the agreement.244 The second possibility is a stay of the proceedings before the Court when the settlement is reached, with the discontinuance of the proceedings being deferred until the settlement has been performed in accordance with its terms: if the action is discontinued but, subsequently, the settlement is not performed, there are no procedural means of reinstating the action before the Court and, depending upon the nature of the dispute and the terms of the settlement, it may not be possible to obtain redress (other than damages) from a national court in an action for breach of contract; if the discontinuance of the proceedings is deferred until after performance of the settlement agreement, then a failure to perform the agreement enables the parties to revert to the Court (but in that event, the action would continue; the proceedings would not concern the non-performance of the settlement agreement but the original matter disputed in the action). 2.67 The same seems to apply, in principle, to settlements reached in the presence of the Court. Such settlements should, for obvious reasons, be set down in writing. They are considered to be legally binding and enforceable by the Court (or the judge before whom they are entered into).245 However, that only means that, in addition to the consequences that may follow under the proper law of the settlement agreement, the Court (or judge) may be called upon to ascertain whether or not the terms of the settlement reached before it (or him) have been respected and, if not, what procedural decisions have to be made in consequence. Thus, where a settlement has been reached before the Court and implemented in accordance with its terms, the applicant is (normally) committed to discontinuing. Should the applicant fail to do so, the Court enforces the settlement by ordering the removal of the case from the register.246 Where the terms of the settlement are incorporated in the Court order disposing of the case, it is open to argument that the settlement has the force of res judicata in the sense that it forms the legal basis for the Court’s decision. On that view, if the defendant (being an EU institution or other body) failed to comply with the terms of the settlement, a further action could be brought (an action for annulment, an action in respect of a failure to act, or an action for damages, depending upon the circumstances), in which the defendant would be bound by the Court order (and the reasoning supporting it) and could not dispute the legal effect of the settlement. If, in the 244 TFEU, art  272. The GC would seem to have jurisdiction whether the settlement agreement related to proceedings before the ECJ, GC or CST because any dispute arising from the settlement agreement would be distinct from the dispute that had originally been brought before the ECJ, GC or CST. In an action originally brought under TFEU, art 272, it is possible that any settlement of the dispute would be covered by the jurisdiction clause in the original agreement; but that depends upon the meaning and effect of that clause. 245 Case T-42/98 R Sabbatucci v Parliament [1998] ECR II-3043, para 30. 246 Cf the Sabbatucci case (above, note 245), which concerned the settlement of an interim relief application (the interim relief proceedings, not the main action, were removed from the register).

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same circumstances, it was the applicant in the action who failed to comply with the settlement agreement, the position is more complex. In a staff case, it is likely that, in most instances, the defendant in the action would be in a position to make an administrative decision whose legality could not be disputed by the applicant in the action, to the extent that the decision was founded on the settlement and, in consequence, the Court order. The other situations in which that scenario might arise appear to be limited to actions in respect of contractual liability; and the dispute over compliance with the settlement agreement could be brought back before the Court if it fell within the scope of the jurisdiction clause in the contract that gave rise to the original action. 3 Confidential treatment 2.68 Proceedings before the Court involve: (i) the disclosure of information between the parties to the proceedings and between them and the Court; and (ii) the disclosure of information to the world as a result of the fact that the hearing of the case is normally in public and the opinion of the advocate general (if there is one) and the judgment are public documents. However, the proceedings may also concern information or evidence that a party considers to be sensitive and may not wish to be disclosed. For example, a staff case may concern matters relating to the personal situation of the official in question whose disclosure would cause embarrassment to that official; a competition case may concern matters relating to the competitive position of an undertaking that would be of interest to its competitors and whose disclosure might, potentially, distort competition. The exclusion of evidence for reasons of confidentiality (amongst other reasons) or its non-disclosure to a party or the Court are considered in Chapter 5 (in relation to interveners), Chapter 9 (in relation to pleadings) and more generally in Chapter 12. At this stage, other aspects of confidentiality will be considered, namely: (a) non-disclosure of confidential material in a judgment, advocate general’s opinion or other document of the Court to which the public has access;247 and (b) non-disclosure to third parties of confidential material that one party to proceedings has obtained from another party in the course of the proceedings. 2.69 So far as non-disclosure of confidential material in a publicly accessible Court document is concerned, in principle, the only material that should come to the attention and knowledge of the Court in the course of the proceedings is material that is relevant to the determination by the Court of the issues between the parties. The disclosure of such material in a document of the Court to which the public has access has nothing to do with the performance by it of its judicial functions but is rather the consequence of two main policy considerations: (i) the 247 Provided for in RP-GC, art 66 and RP-CST, art 48: see also PD-GC, paras 68–73; PD-CST, para 17. There seems to be no equivalent provision in the ECJ rules of procedure for direct actions: RP-ECJ, art 95 applies to references for a preliminary ruling and, pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 190(3), to appeals from the GC. It seems likely that, in case of need, RP-ECJ, art 95 would be applied by analogy. PD-GC, arts 212–237 and IR-CST, art 7, considered in Ch 1, para 1.139, and Ch 9, para 9.19 ff, concern non-disclosure to another party (including an intervener) or to persons having access to the case file.

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openness of the administration of justice; and (ii) the desirability that judicial decisions be intelligible. Both considerations may properly be respected without complete disclosure of all (relevant) material that has been brought to the attention and knowledge of the Court during the course of the proceedings.248 Where a party is sensitive about the disclosure to the public of material in a Court document, the material in question may be omitted from the version of the Court document (judgment, advocate general’s opinion and so forth) that is made available to the public249 or encoded. For example, if there is sensitivity about the disclosure of personal information, the remedy may be to identify the person in question (even if that person is a party to the proceedings) by an initial instead of disclosing the name of the person.250 There are essentially three conditions to non-disclosure of confidential material in a Court document: (a) the material must not be in the public domain; (b) there must be a legitimate reason for refraining from disclosing it; and (c) the measures taken to protect the confidentiality of the material must be proportionate. The first condition is fairly obvious: if the material is already in the public domain, there can be no legitimate reason for suppressing it in a document available to the public.251 So far as the second condition is concerned, the grounds of confidentiality typically invoked by parties are discussed in Chapter 12. Since, in the present context, the question concerns non-disclosure in a Court document made available to the public, not the more serious question of the exclusion or withholding of relevant evidence from the Court or a party, there is no reason to take a particularly strict view of the legitimate reasons that may be invoked. There must, at the least, be some objective and non-trivial reason justifying non-disclosure. The third condition can be illustrated by taking the example given above of the use of an initial to identify a party to, or a person involved in, the proceedings. Complete suppression of the sensitive personal information relevant to the case, rather than suppression of the identity of the person to whom that information relates, would go further than is necessary to protect confidentiality and might render the subject-matter of the litigation unintelligible.252

248 Irrelevant material that has been communicated to the Court in the course of the proceedings ought not to figure in Court documents to which the public has access in any event because the Court ought not to be troubling itself with such material, far less publishing it. 249 Eg Case T-11/99R Van Pryse v Commission [1999] ECR II-1355, para 20. 250 Eg Case T-10/93 A v Commission [1994] ECR II-179, para 12. 251 Eg Cases T-22/02 and T-23/02 Sumitomo Chemical Co Ltd v Commission [2005] ECR II-4065, paras 141–144. However, it should be made clear that it cannot be inferred that material known by some people or in some circles or quarters is generally known or in the public domain. 252 It may be observed that, in that situation, two items of information are involved: the name or identity of the party; and the personal information in question concerning that party (such as the fact that the party suffers from a hideous disease). It is entirely possible for the first item of information to be in the public domain whereas the second is not. It is the publication of the two items of information in conjunction with each other that causes the damage. As suggested in the text, the proportionate way of dealing with the problem may be to suppress the first item of information (even though it is in the public domain) rather than the second, which could well be germane to the reasoning in the Court’s judgment, thus preserving confidentiality by withholding from the public the connection between the two.

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2.70  General outline of procedure

2.70 The confidential treatment of publicly accessible Court documents can be raised by the Court of its own motion or on application by a party.253 However, the Court cannot be expected to identify for itself each and every item of information that ought to be given confidential treatment. The primary burden therefore falls on the parties to identify to the Court information that ought to be kept confidential, specifying the reasons why and proposing ways in which the information may be presented while at the same time preserving confidentiality.254 In particular, the first Court document concerning a case that is made available to the public is the notice of the case published in the Official Journal after the commencement of proceedings.255 If confidential material is likely to appear in that document, the applicant should so inform the Court at the outset of the proceedings in the form either of a written application for confidential treatment or, if confidentiality concerns some person other than the applicant, by alerting the Court to that fact.256 2.71 In relation to non-disclosure to third parties of confidential material that one party to the proceedings has obtained from another in the course of the proceedings, the parties to a case are entitled to use procedural and other documents (and the information contained in them) that they have obtained from other parties to the proceedings (directly or through the Court) only for the purpose of pursuing their own case before the Court. Accordingly, they are not at liberty to disclose to third parties (or to the public generally) material obtained from another party in the course of the proceedings without that party’s consent.257 That also applies to the disclosure of material to an applicant to intervene in the case (even if disclosure would be helpful to the party making the disclosure) because, until the intervention has been allowed, the applicant to intervene is not a party to the proceedings (and, if the intervention is allowed, restrictions may be placed upon the disclosure of procedural documents to the intervener in order to preserve confidentiality).258 On the other hand, no party can be prevented from disclosing his own pleadings voluntarily to a third party, or to the public generally.259 An EU institution cannot be compelled, by the obligation of transparency 253 Cf RP-GC, art 66; RP-CST, art 48. In Case T-15/02 BASF v Commission [2006] ECR II-497, paras 614–618, and Case T-26/02 Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Commission [2006] ECR II-713, paras 185–189, it was raised by the Court. 254 Cf PD-GC, para 72. 255 RP-ECJ, art 21(4); RP-GC, art 79; RP-CST, art 51(2). 256 Cf PD-GC, paras 70 and 73. 257 Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECR II-2289, paras 135 and 137; Case T-376/02 O v Commission [2004] ECR SC-I-A-349, II-1595, paras 48–49 (information covered by medical secrecy). That also applies so as to prevent a party in one case before the Court from disclosing in another case before the Court what has been said by the opposing party in the first case: see Case T-459/07 Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Co Ltd v Council [2009] ECR II-4015 (although the GC pointed out in para 15 that it could itself get over the difficulty by means of a measure of enquiry or of organisation of procedure). 258 Eg Case T-89/96 British Steel plc v Commission [1997] ECR II-835, paras 15 and 33 (in that case, the Court ordered the interveners not to make use of the confidential information that they had received and to return all copies of the confidential material). 259 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000]  ECR  I-2247; Case T-36/04 Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) v Commission [2007]  ECR II-3201,

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applicable to EU institutions, to disclose its own pleadings in proceedings to which it is a party unless and until, after the close of the proceedings, there are no longer grounds for presuming that disclosure would undermine the judicial activities of the Court (which could be the case if the pleadings overlapped with pleadings in cases still pending).260 Given that the pleadings of other parties, in the possession of the institution by virtue of its being a party to proceedings, can be used only for the purposes of those proceedings, it does not seem that the institution can be compelled to disclose them at all without the consent of the party in question. If a party has reason to believe that another party intends to disclose to a third party the contents of a pleading or procedural document lodged by the former, the matter can be brought before the Court as a procedural issue.261 In most instances, parties are willing to undertake not to disclose the contents of another party’s pleadings to a third party.262 4 Joinder and disjoinder of cases 2.72 At any time a number of cases ‘concerning the same subject matter’ may be ordered to be ‘joined’ for the purposes of the written or oral procedure or final judgment ‘on account of the connection between them’.263 Joinder does not affect the position of the parties to the actions concerned nor does it result in the actions themselves losing their separate identity,264 although the facts and the evidence para 88. It does not appear, however, that a party could properly exploit his right to disclose to third parties the contents of his own pleadings so as to reveal to them confidential material obtained from another party in the course of the proceedings (for example, if a party disclosed a reply or rejoinder that set out confidential material from the opposing party’s pleading and then sought to answer it). 260 Cases C-514/07P, C-528/07P and C-532/07P Sweden v API and Commission [2010] ECR I-8533, paras 77–104, 130–135 (the appeal from Case T-36/04 API v Commission, above, note 259). 261 See Ch 6. In Case T-812/14R BPC Lux 2 Sarl v Commission, order of 25 February 2015, paras 14–16, an application was made for a measure of organisation of procedure consisting of an order that the opposing parties undertake that their representatives refrain from making the contents of a pleading public. The President (who dealt with the application in the context of proceedings for interim relief) did not say that that was an inappropriate way of bringing the latter before the Court but, on the other hand, he did not have to rule on it. In principle, such an application should be made as a procedural issue, not as an application for a measure of organisation of procedure. 262 That was the case in BPC Lux 2 (above, note 261). The Commission maintained its application, nonetheless, because it believed that the other parties intended to inform a member state that the Commission’s pleadings contained something of interest to that member state so that it might ask the Commission to disclose the pleading to it. However, the President took the view that the hypothetical possibility of informing a third party that a procedural document might be of interest to the third party, without disclosing the contents of the procedural document, did not interfere with the sound administration of justice. 263 RP-ECJ, art  54; RP-GC, art  68; RP-CST, art  44. There is no obligation to hear the parties before cases are joined or disjoined: Case C-248/99P France v Monsanto Co and Commission [2002] ECR I-1, para 48. A decision on joinder is not appealable: ibid, para 46. 264 Their ‘independence and autonomy’. The reason is that the cases may later be disjoined. See: Cases C-280/99P to C-282/99P Moccia Irme SpA v Commission [2001] ECR I-4717, para 66; Case T-209/01 Honeywell International Inc v Commission [2005] ECR II-5527, paras 69–76; Case T-210/01 General Electric Co v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 38. Accordingly, in Cases T-3/00 and T-337/04 Pitsiorlas v Council and European Central Bank [2007] ECR

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in the joined cases can be considered in the aggregate.265 Joinder is basically an administrative device for dealing efficiently with a number of cases giving rise to the same issues and hence to the same procedural problems.266 The essential criterion for joinder is therefore convenience, so far as the administration of justice is concerned, when dealing with similar cases.267 In the case of references for a preliminary ruling, joinder is proper if the questions referred are identical and have essentially the same object;268 but that is not a universal rule.269 The same seems to apply, mutatis mutandis, to direct actions: if the issues are the same or there is a sufficient degree of connexity between the cases, joinder is proper unless it would not facilitate the future conduct of the proceedings.270 However, II-4779, where the first action was for the annulment of decisions made by the Council and the ECB and the second action was for damages in respect of loss said to have been caused by the decisions contested in the first action, additional grounds for the unlawfulness of the contested decisions included in the second action could not be taken into account in the first action despite the joinder of the cases: see paras 280–285. 265 Case T-113/89 Nederlandse Associatie van de Farmaceutische Industrie (Nefarma) v Commission [1990] ECR II-797, para 1; Case T-116/89 Vereniging Prodifarma v Commission [1990]  ECR II-843, para  1; Case T-44/00 Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG  v Commission [2004]  ECR II-2223, para  264; Case T-48/00 Corus UK  Ltd v Commission [2004]  ECR II2325, paras 129-130; Case T-50/00 Dalmine SpA v Commission [2004] ECR II-2395, para 310; Case C-526/07 Combescot v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-23, II-B-2-177, para 36 (by implication). 266 Joinder usually results in the consolidation of the Court’s case files into a single file covering all the joined cases: Cases T-141/99, T-142/99, T-150/99 and T-151/99 Vela Srl v Commission [2002] ECR II-4547, para 87. Hence, although joinder does not mean that a party in one of the joined cases may rely on an argument that he has not advanced but that has been advanced by a party in another of the joined cases, joinder removes a potential technical difficulty where a party to one of the joined cases has advanced the same argument as one advanced in another of the joined cases by way of a cross-reference to the pleadings in the other joined case. The distinction between not advancing an argument at all and advancing an argument by way of a cross-reference to a pleading in another (joined) case was overlooked by the GC in the Honeywell case (above, note 264, paras 69–76 of the judgment), which remains a valid authority to the effect that the complete failure to advance an argument cannot be cured by joinder. 267 Cases T-134/94, T-136/94 to T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/94 NMH Stahlwerke GmbH v Commission [1997] ECR II-2293, para 11. 268 Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Albert Ruckdeschel & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen [1977]  ECR  1753, Cases 124/76 and 20/77 Moulins et Huileries de Pont à Mousson SA  v Office Nationale Interprofessionnel des Céréales [1977]  ECR  1795, and Cases 187 and 190/83 Nordbutter GmbH & Co KG and Bayerische Milchversorgungs GmbH  v Germany [1984] ECR 2553, at para 2 of the judgments. 269 Eg Cases C-87 to C-89/90 Verholen [1991] ECR I-3757 (joinder of cases raising different issues in the questions referred). 270 Case T-16/89 Herkenrath v Commission [1992] ECR II-275, order of 13 November 1990. In Cases T-163/97 and T-179/97 Netherlands Antilles v Council and Commission [1998]  ECR II-4123, two actions seeking the annulment of different regulations were joined because the subject matter of the two regulations was the same. The Honeywell and General Electric cases (above, note 264) were not joined although they were both actions for the annulment of the same Commission decision. The reason given for not joining them was that the pleas in law advanced by the applicants differed in some respects: see Honeywell, paras 76–77; General Electric, para 39. That is not normally a reason for failing to join cases whose subject-matter is the same (see, for example, the Moccia case, above, note 264, both at first instance and on appeal).

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although two or more direct actions may be joined, and two or more references for a preliminary ruling may be joined, whether they come from the same271 or different272 national courts, the joinder of a reference for a preliminary ruling to a direct action happens rarely, if at all, and appears to be wrong in principle due to the difference in nature of the proceedings. In addition, other factors such as the language of the cases and the various procedural stages that they may have reached must be taken into account.273 However the facts that the cases have different procedural languages274 or that admissibility is contested in one but not the other275 do not appear to be a bar to joinder. On the other hand, joinder of future proceedings with a case nearing judgment276 or with a case that has already come to an end277 is inconceivable. 2.73 Cases may be disjoined where the circumstances justifying their joinder no longer apply or new circumstances have arisen which render their continued joinder inappropriate or inconvenient for the future conduct of the proceedings. For example, in Cases 241, 242, 246–249/78 DGV v Council and Commission,278 the Court disjoined one of the cases because, while agreement had been reached between the parties in all the others, which could then proceed to an adjudication on costs, no agreement had been reached in the remaining case and the Court would have to rule on the substance of the claim; in Cases 122 and 141/85 Totaro and Dufrane v Commission,279 the cases were disjoined when one of them was withdrawn; Case 141/85 Dufrane v Commission was subsequently joined with another case280 because of the similarity between the cases but, when Mrs Dufrane died, the cases were disjoined at the request of her personal representatives and the proceedings in Case 141/85 were stayed pending judgment in the other case.281 271 The Ruckdeschel case (above, note 268). 272 The Pont à Mousson case (above, note 268). 273 Eg Case T-322/01 Roquette Freres SA v Commission [2006] ECR II-3137, paras 28 and 336 (joinder applied for nearly a year after the hearing refused because the case was ready for judgment). A material disparity between the different procedural stages reached by two or more cases is not necessarily an objection to joinder. In Cases C-286/94, C-340/95, C-401/95 and C-47/96 Garage Molenheide v Belgium [1997] ECR I-7281, the written procedure in one of the cases was at an advanced stage when another case came before the Court. Proceedings in the latter were then stayed pending the outcome in the former but, at the hearing in the first case, the close connection between the cases became apparent. The plaintiff in that case stated that it had no objection to joinder even if delay resulted. The cases were then joined and the proceedings in the later joined cases carried on. A further hearing was held – the second hearing in the first case but the first hearing in the other joined cases (see pp 7292–7293). 274 Eg Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Cooperative Vereniging Suiker Unie UA v Commission [1975] ECR 1663. 275 Eg Cases T-369/94 and T-85/95 DIR International Film Srl v Commission [1998] ECR II-357, paras 40–43. 276 Cases 42 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority [1961] ECR 53 at 73. 277 Case T-497/93 Hogan v Court of Justice [1995] ECR II-703, para 29. 278 [1981] ECR 1727 at 1729. 279 Order of 2 July 1987 (unreported) (both cases were withdrawn before judgment). 280 Case 206/85 Beiten v Commission [1987] ECR 5301. 281 For an example of joinder followed by disjoinder and then rejoinder (for no obvious reason), see Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94

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2.74 The fact that the parties in the cases to be joined are competitors or that for some other reason the pleadings and evidence in one or all of the cases to be joined reveal secret or confidential matters that should not be disclosed to persons other than the parties to each case is not in itself an objection to the joinder of the cases: the possibility that joinder may result in the disclosure of secret or confidential material can be avoided by the parties requesting confidential treatment.282 When examining such requests in the context of the joinder of cases, the Court’s function is to resolve the conflict between the principle that business or other secrets should be respected and the principle that all parties having a potential conflict of interest must be in a position to reply to any points raised in the joined cases that adversely affect them.283 2.75 The decision to join several cases is made (in the ECJ) after an advocate general has been assigned to the cases in question and (in the ECJ, GC and CST) after hearing the parties and the advocate general (where there is one); it may subsequently be rescinded.284 The decision is made by the President but, in ECJ and CST proceedings, he or she may refer the matter to the Court.285 Both the decision to join and that to disjoin may be made either on a request by one or all of the parties or by the President of his or her own motion (where the matter is raised by the President of his or her own motion the suggestion usually emanates from the Registry or the judge-rapporteur). A  request from one of the parties need not be made by separate document as a procedural issue within the meaning of RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83(1) and is frequently made in the pleadings.286 The President (or, as the case may be, the Court) is not bound to accede to such requests since the matter lies within his (or her or its) discretion287 but, if all the parties are in agreement and the cases are similar in object,288 it is apprehended that the order will be made. Where the Court raises the matter of its own motion and the parties fail to make their views on the joinder known by the date fixed for so doing, the President will simply make up his and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission [1999] ECR II-931, paras 15– 17 and 21. In the Netherlands Antilles case (above, note 270), the cases were disjoined so that one of them could be stayed and the other transferred to the ECJ, before which there were parallel proceedings challenging the same regulation. 282 Cases T-1 to T-4 and T-6 to T-15/89 Rhône-Poulenc v Commission [1990] ECR II-637 (where the CFI invited requests for confidential treatment because the cases were to be joined). 283 Rhône-Poulenc (above, note 282), para 22. RP-GC, art 68(4), PD-GC, paras 224–226, RP-CST, art 44(3) and IR-CST, art 7(2) provide for confidential treatment as between the parties to joined cases. 284 RP-ECJ, art 54(2)–(3); RP-GC, art 68(2)–(3); RP-CST, art 44(1), 2nd subpara, and (2). In the CST, if the joined cases had previously been assigned to different formations, the President reassigns them so that they will be dealt with by one formation only: RP-CST, art 13(2). There have also been occasions on which the Court has, with the consent of the parties, treated socalled supplementary applications as separate actions, see Case 567/79A Flamm v Commission and Council and Case 618/79A Knoeppel v Commission and Council [1981] ECR 2383 and 2387 respectively. 285 RP-ECJ, art 54(2); RP-CST, art 44(1), 2nd subpara. 286 Eg in Cases 275/80 and 24/81 Krupp Stahl Ag v Commission [1981] ECR 2489 it was made by the Commission in the defence. 287 Eg Case T-407/13 Al Assad v Commission, 22 December 2014, para 46. 288 ‘Connexes par leur objet’.

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(or her) own mind.289 The same applies where the matter is raised by one party and the other parties decline to submit observations. 2.76 The order may join direct actions for the purposes of the written procedure, the oral procedure, final judgment or all stages of the procedure.290 Once the cases have been joined for the oral procedure, the Court might extend the joinder to the judgment stage, if it felt that to be appropriate, without hearing the parties, simply by delivering one judgment.291 That was at a time when the rules of procedure specified that the decision to join cases was made by the Court itself. The rules now provide that the decision is made by the President. In consequence, it would seem that an order would have to be made by him or her if joinder were to be extended to include the final judgment (unless, in ECJ and CST proceedings, the President referred the extension of joinder to the Court). Similarly, the Court could join two applications and decide to rule on their admissibility in one and the same decision at the hearing concerned with their admissibility;292 but it would appear that now the President would first have to join the cases before the Court ruled on their admissibility (although both decisions could in principle be made on the same occasion). An order joining cases for the purpose of the judgment does not preclude separate consideration of them in the same judgment.293 So far as the earlier stages in proceedings are concerned, joinder does not prevent each party to the joined cases from lodging its own pleadings and making its own submissions at the hearing. Where one of the parties appears in all the cases, however, it is usually convenient to present only one pleading covering all of the cases. One hearing would be held and one advocate general’s opinion (where there is one) delivered for all the cases. Where the hearing in two or more cases is fixed for the same time, without there being a formal order joining the proceedings, the advocate general may, however, deal with all the cases in the same opinion.294 Where cases are disjoined the remaining stages of the proceedings are conducted separately. 289 Eg Cases 256, 257, 265, 267/80, 5/81 Birra Wührer SpA  v Council and Commission [1984] ECR 3693: the Court joined the cases for all purposes. 290 RP-ECJ, art  54(1); RP-GC, art  68(1); RP-CST, art  44(1). RP-ECJ, art  54 applies generally to cases before the ECJ and, therefore, to references for a preliminary ruling. However, the practice regarding the joinder of references for a preliminary ruling differs from that followed in relation to direct actions in that the parties to the preliminary ruling proceedings are not usually given an opportunity to be heard before a decision to join such cases is made. As joinder is a discretionary decision, joinder for the purposes of one part of the procedure does not imply an obligation to join for the rest of the procedure: cf Case C-51/92P Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission [1999] ECR I-4235, paras 84–86. 291 See, for example, Cases 241, 242 and 245–250/78 DGV v Council and Commission; Cases 261 and 262/78 Interquell Stärke-chemie GmbH & Co v Council and Commission; and Cases 64 and 113/76, 167 and 239/78, 27, 28 and 45/79 Dumortier Frères SA v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 3017, 3045 and 3091, respectively, at para 2 of the judgments. 292 Cases 31 and 33/62 Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG v Commission [1962] ECR 501 at 503–504. 293 Cases 7 and 9/54 Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority [1954–56) ECR 175 at 188; Cases 24 and 34/58 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie v High Authority [1960] ECR 281 at 292. 294 Case 28/65 Fonzi v EAEC  Commission [1966]  ECR  477 (Advocate General Roemer). The same appears to have happened in Case 238/78 Ireks-Arkady GmbH v Council and Commission

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When cases are joined, the Court may decide to deal with the issues arising in them in their logical order and not by reference to their ordering in the joined cases or to the ranking of the joined cases inter se.295 5 Stay of proceedings 2.77

Proceedings may at any time be stayed in the following circumstances:

(1) a stay may be ordered by one or other of the ECJ, the GC or the CST where the first and second or the second and third of them are seised of cases in which the same relief is sought, the same issue of interpretation is raised or the validity of the same act is called in question; and the CST may stay proceedings before it where both it and the ECJ are seised of cases in which the same issue of interpretation is raised or the validity of the same act is called into question;296 (2) the President of the ECJ has a general power (exercisable in the form of a decision) to stay proceedings before the ECJ after hearing the advocate general and, save in references for a preliminary ruling, the parties;297 (3) the Presidents of the GC and CST have a similar general power exercisable ‘where the proper administration of justice so requires’;298 (4) the Presidents of the GC and CST may order a stay where an appeal is brought before the ECJ against a decision of the GC (or before the GC against a decision of the CST) that disposes of the substantive issues in the case in part only, that disposes of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence (that is, jurisdiction) or inadmissibility or that dismisses an application to intervene;299 (5) the Presidents of the GC and CST may order a stay where one main party (applicant or defendant) requests a stay with the agreement of the other main party (GC proceedings) or where one or all of the parties request a stay (CST proceedings);300 [1979] ECR 2955 and the DGV, Interquell and Dumortier cases (above, note 291), where all the hearings were fixed for the same day and Advocate General Capotorti delivered only one opinion, despite the fact that there does not seem to have been any formal order joining them. The only order made appears to have been to join some of the cases into three separate groups for the purposes of the oral procedure. 295 Eg Cases T-133/08, T-134/08, T-177/08 and T-242/09 Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office, 18 September 2012, para 98. 296 Statute, art 54, 3rd para; RP-ECJ, art 55(1)(a); RP-GC, art 69(a); RP-CST, art 42(1)(a). See further para 2.27 ff above. 297 RP-ECJ, art 55(1)(b). The position in references for a preliminary ruling is considered below. 298 RP-GC, art 69(d) and 70(1); RP-CST, art 42(1)(e) and (2). 299 RP-GC, art 69(b); RP-CST, art 42(1)(b). Eg Cases T-485/93, T-491/93, T-494/93 and T-61/98 Societe Anonyme Louis Dreyfus & Cie v Commission [2000] ECR II-3659, paras 26–28. 300 RP-GC, art  69(c); RP-CST, art  42(1)(d). Eg Case T-23/92 Cremoni v Commission, order of 9  July 1992 (unreported). Under the pre-2014  CST rules of procedure, a stay could not be ordered in the absence of agreement between the parties: Case F-23/05 Giraudy v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-121, II-A-1-657, para 87. That has now been addressed in the current

196

General outline of procedure 2.78

(6) the President of the GC may order a stay where an appeal is pending before the ECJ and an application has been made under RP-GC, art 166 (setting aside a judgment by default), 167 (third party proceedings), 168 (interpretation of a judgment or order), 169 (revision of a decision of the GC) or 170 (dispute over costs) in relation to the judgment or order that is the subject of the appeal to the ECJ. The stay relates to the proceedings before the GC, not the appeal to the ECJ;301 (7) the President of the CST may order a stay where an appeal is pending before the GC and an application has been made under RP-CST, art 125 (third party proceedings), 126 (interpretation) or 127 (revision) in respect of the judgment or order that is the subject of the appeal to the GC. The stay relates to the proceedings before the CST, not the appeal to the GC);302 (8) the President of the CST may order a stay where the CST is seised of cases raising, in a similar factual context, one or more identical questions of law and where one or more of those cases may be treated as a test case.303 That power enables the CST to manage its case load by selecting one or more representative cases for decision and leaving other, similar, cases to be decided later (unless the parties settle the dispute between them in the light of the decision in the test case or cases or one or other of the parties concedes). 2.78 In the first of those cases, the decision whether or not to stay the proceedings is made by the ECJ (in ECJ proceedings) after hearing the advocate general whereas, in GC and CST proceedings, the stay is ordered by the President of the GC or CST after hearing the parties.304 In all the other cases, the decision is made by the President (of the ECJ, GC or CST) after hearing the parties.305 In all those cases (1 to 8), the decision whether or not to stay proceedings may be made either on the Court’s (or, as the case may be, the President’s) own motion or on application by one of the parties under (as the case may be) RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83.306

CST rules of procedure, which permit a decision to be made where only one of the parties applies for a stay. Under the GC rules of procedure, a request made by one main party must have the agreement of the other. If that agreement is not forthcoming, it seems to follow that a stay cannot be ordered unless the President of the GC can exercise his more general power to order a stay where the proper administration of justice so requires. 301 RP-GC, art 163. 302 RP-CST, art 42(1), which cross-refers to RP-CST, art 125(5), 126(4) and 127(6). 303 RP-CST, art 42(1)(c). 304 RP-ECJ, art 55(1)(a); RP-GC, art 70(1); RP-CST, art 42(2) (the President of the CST may refer the matter to the CST itself). 305 RP-ECJ, art 55(1)(b) (the President of the ECJ also hears the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general); RP-GC, art 70(1); RP-CST, art 42(2) (the President of the CST may refer the matter to the CST itself). 306 RP-GC, art 69(c) and RP-CST, art 42(1)(d), which envisage a request made by one or other of the parties (to which, under RP-GC, art 69(c), but not RP-CST, art 42(1)(d), the other main party must have agreed) apply generally but do not limit the scope of the GC’s or CST’s power to order a stay where the rules of procedure expressly so provide.

197

2.79  General outline of procedure

2.79 The proceedings may be resumed by decision of the President of the ECJ or, as the case may be, by order of the GC or CST, or their President (depending upon which of them has power to, and did, order the stay), after following the same procedure followed when proceedings were stayed.307 2.80 A stay takes effect on the date indicated in the order or decision imposing the stay (or, in the absence of such indication, on the date of the order or decision) and ends on the expiry of the period of the stay (if defined in the order or decision imposing the stay) or on the date specified in the order or decision lifting the stay (or, in the absence of such a date, on the date of that order or decision); throughout the period of the stay time ceases to run for the purposes of any prescribed time limits for all parties and time begins to run afresh only from the date on which proceedings are resumed (at which point, any suspended procedural time-limits are replaced by new ones).308 During the period of the stay time continues to run so far as persons who are not parties to the proceedings are concerned; thus, stay does not relieve any third party who wishes to intervene in the proceedings from the obligation to apply to intervene within the relevant time limit.309 2.81 Apart from the situations expressly identified in the rules of procedure, proceedings may be stayed where it is in the interests of justice or procedural convenience so to order: inter alia, where there are prospects that the parties may settle the dispute or that the adoption of some legislative or other measure may resolve the matters at issue;310 where the outcome in the case will follow that in another case which can be treated as a test case or is likely to be decided first;311 where subsequent events seemed likely to lead to further litigation rendering it unnecessary to proceed with the case;312 or where stay was desirable in order to 307 RP-ECJ, art 55(2); RP-GC, art 70(2); RP-CST, art 42(3). The orders or decisions staying the proceedings or lifting the stay are served on the parties. 308 RP-ECJ, art 55(4)–(7); RP-GC, art 71; RP-CST, art 43. 309 That is provided for expressly in RP-GC, art  71(2) and RP-CST, art  43(2), in respect of applications to intervene. 310 Cf Case 216/84 Commission v France [1988] ECR 793 (in case the hope that the infringement of the Treaty alleged against the defendant would be terminated); Case T-20/90 Eiselt v Commission, order of 7  February 1991 (proceedings were stayed for ten months at the joint request of the parties). In actions against member states for a declaration of a failure to comply with EU law, stay is not generally ordered where it is based on a prospect that a change in domestic law will remove the breach: Case C-430/98 Commission v Luxembourg [1999] ECR I-7391, paras 9–10; Case C-47/99 Commission v Luxembourg [1999] ECR I-8999, paras 10–12; Case C-297/00 Commission v Luxembourg [2001] ECR I-5189, paras 14–15. 311 The situation in Case 141/85 Dufrane v Commission (above, notes 279 and 280). See also Cases 129 and 274/82 Lux v Court of Auditors [1984]  ECR  4129; the Garage Molenheide case (above, note 273); Case C-61/98 De Haan Beheer BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzente Rotterdam [1999] ECR I-5003, para 49 (direct action stayed pending preliminary ruling concerning validity of same decision). Per contra: Cases T-318/06 to T-321/06 Alberto Jorge Moreira da Fonseca Lda v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-649, paras 20–23. 312 Case T-17/90 Camara Alloisio v Commission, order of 15  January 1991 (proceedings were stayed sine die but were recommenced when the further litigation that was envisaged was commenced).

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allow one of the parties to obtain evidence and consider its position in the light of that evidence.313 Stay may not be ordered if the event invoked to justify it would have some impact on the litigation but not so significant an impact as to merit staying the proceedings.314 When proceedings are resumed, they continue from where they were left at the time when the stay was imposed but the Court may require the parties to take account of any intervening events.315 2.82 Proceedings in staff cases are stayed automatically where the applicant has submitted to the appointing authority a complaint against an act adversely affecting him or her and has then commenced proceedings before the Court without waiting for a response to the complaint. Ordinarily, an action commenced in such circumstances would be dismissed as inadmissible because the compulsory pre-litigation procedure in staff cases would not have been completed. A necessary condition of the admissibility of the action is that it is accompanied by an application for the suspension of the operation of the act adversely affecting the applicant or interim measures. If the action is accompanied by such an application, it is admissible and the immediate consequence is that proceedings in the action are stayed pending the making of an express or implied decision rejecting the complaint.316 The stay does not extend to the proceedings for interim relief since the purpose of the procedure is to enable a person adversely affected by an act to seise the Court with jurisdiction in order to obtain some form of interim relief preserving him or her from the occurrence of serious and irreparable damage while the pre-litigation procedure is still in progress. When the Court is informed that a decision rejecting the complaint has been made, the stay of the proceedings in the action is removed by a decision of the Court.317

313 Case T-46/90 Devillez v European Parliament, order of 7 March 1991 (proceedings were first stayed for seven and a half weeks to allow the defendant to obtain an expert’s report and then a further extension was granted when the report was obtained so that the defendant could consider what next to do). 314 Case T-429/93 Successors of Edmond Ropars v Council [2000]  ECR II-2439, para  32 (a damages action; other proceedings would have an impact on quantum but not on liability so no stay). In Case T-240/02 Koninklijke Cooperatie Cosun UA v Commission [2004] ECR I-4237, paras 21–23, stay was not ordered because it was opposed by one of the parties and there were no ‘special circumstances’ justifying stay (the application for stay was based upon the existence of parallel proceedings before the ECJ; but those proceedings essentially presupposed that the party applying for stay would be unsuccessful before the CFI, as it then was). 315 For example, in Case 216/84 Commission v France (above, note 310), the proceedings had been stayed after the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion but, when the proceedings were resumed, the Court reopened the oral procedure and asked the parties to restrict their pleadings to any points arising from national legislation that had been enacted in the meantime (see p 801). 316 Staff Regulations, art 91(4). Eg Case F-118/11 Marcuccio v Commission, 25 February 2014, paras 32–44 (on appeal, Case T-324/14 P Marcuccio v Commission, 6 March 2015, paras 26– 27). 317 Eg Case 90/87R CW v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 1801 at 1803.

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2.83  General outline of procedure

6 Expedition 2.83 The parties are entitled to have the proceedings brought to an end within a reasonable period.318 What is or is not a reasonable period depends upon all the circumstances. In some instances, the circumstances require a speedier resolution of the litigation than in others. Accordingly, proceedings may be expedited as well as stayed. At the stage of the written procedure, proceedings can be expedited at the initiative of the parties themselves: they may shorten the written procedure by limiting themselves to a single exchange of pleadings. In addition they may waive the right to a hearing.319 Neither step may be sufficient to expedite the proceedings;320 and neither may be an appropriate or wise step to take. The rules of procedure contain two provisions by which a direct action may be expedited by the Court.321

318 Eg Case C-194/99P Thyssen Stahl AG v Commission [2003] ECR I-10821, paras 154–156. 319 Under Statute, art 20, the oral part of the procedure is mandatory. Hence, express provision in the rules of procedure is required if the Court is to dispense with the hearing. The holding of a hearing follows from RP-ECJ, art 75(1) and RP-CST, art 59(1); but RP-GC, art 106(1) makes the oral part of the procedure mandatory only at the GC’s own motion or at the request of a main party (applicant or defendant). RP-ECJ, art 76(2) and RP-CST, art 59(2) allow the ECJ and CST to dispense with the oral part of the procedure (the latter with the agreement of the parties). The GC may do so if no reasoned request for a hearing has been made by one of the main parties and if the GC considers that it has sufficient information to rule on the action: RPGC, art 106(3). If the parties are unanimous in believing that the hearing can be dispensed with, there does not seem to be any point in the Court organising a hearing unless the Court wishes to ask one or other of the parties some specific questions about the case and considers that an exchange of that nature is better conducted orally rather than in writing. If the Court does not wish to ask any questions, the hearing date could be fixed but, at the hearing, if they did not intend to make any oral submissions, the parties’ representatives would simply stand up when called by the President and sit down immediately, signifying that they had no submissions to make (a practice that, it seems, is followed in the French Conseil d’Etat). RP-GC, art 108(2) and RP-CST, art 62(1) provide that, if the representatives of all the parties have stated that they will not be present at the hearing, the CST may declare the oral procedure closed. Accordingly, it appears to be envisaged that, if a hearing is ordered but the parties do not wish to make oral submissions, they will notify the Court that they do not intend to be present at the hearing. 320 In Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, the applicant sought to expedite the case by waiving the right to lodge a reply and bringing the written procedure to an end at that stage. A period of well over a year then elapsed between the close of the written procedure and the date of the hearing with a further gap of over a year before judgment was delivered. 321 Distinct procedures for ‘expediting’, ‘accelerating’ or dealing ‘urgently’ with a case are envisaged in Statute, art 23a (introduced into the Statute by Council Decision 2008/79, OJ 2008 No L24/42, with effect from 1  March 2008). Article  23a merely enables provision for such procedures to be made in the rules of procedure. It was designed to enable provision to be made for an ‘urgent’ procedure for references for a preliminary ruling in the area of freedom, justice and security. However, according to the preamble to Decision 2008/79, it was thought appropriate ‘for the sake of good order’ for art 23a to refer also to the expedited and accelerated procedures already provided for in the ECJ’s rules of procedure. The reference in art 23a to an ‘expedited’ procedure appears to refer to the expedited procedure in direct actions provided for in the second provision discussed below. The ‘accelerated’ and ‘urgent’ procedures referred to in art 23a are procedures peculiar to references for a preliminary ruling and are discussed below in that context (in the ECJ  Rules of Procedure, a different appellation is given to the ‘accelerated’ procedure). So far as can be seen, only the first para of art 23a is relevant to direct actions.

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General outline of procedure 2.85

2.84 The first provision in the rules of procedure concerns the position as from the close of the written procedure, when the progress of the case lies entirely in the hands of the Court: ‘in special circumstances’ the President (of the ECJ, GC or CST, as the case may be) may order that a case be given priority over others.322 Originally, the power to give a case priority appeared in the ECJ and GC rules dealing with the oral procedure. Therefore, technically, it seemed that priority would be given as from the commencement of the oral procedure. However, it seems that, in practice, that was not regarded as precluding the making of an order to that effect before the commencement of the oral procedure; and priority might, indeed, be ordered as soon as proceedings had begun.323 Under the ECJ, GC and CST Rules of Procedure, as currently structured, the power is not associated with the organisation of the oral procedure although, in both the GC and CST rules of procedure, the power to give priority to a case follows immediately after the provision that cases are to be dealt with in the order in which they ‘become ready for examination’,324 which is at the end of the written procedure. Before then there is little in practice that the Court can do in order to give a case priority apart from arranging for the translation of the pleadings in the case to be given priority over the translation of the pleadings in other cases and resisting applications for an extension of time for the lodging of written pleadings after the application. 2.85 In the normal course, an order giving a case priority is made only on application by a party since, in the absence of such an application, setting out the reasons for it, the Court has no means of deciding whether or not one case should be given priority over another. For example, the factual context of a particular direct action might appear to the Court to indicate that speeding up the decisionmaking process would be desirable; but, if none of the parties says that to the Court, the latter is more likely to conclude that its impression of the urgency of the case may not be well-founded.325 The suitability of a case for priority treat-

322 RP-ECJ, art 53(3); RP-GC, art 67(2); RP-CST, art 41(2). Priority may be given to any type of case including (in relation to the ECJ) references for a preliminary ruling. In RP-CST, art 41(2), it is expressly provided that the President (of the CST) may direct that a case be given priority but only after hearing the parties. RP-ECJ, art 53(3) and RP-GC, art 67(2) do not provide for the hearing of the parties before such a decision is made; but that would normally be the course of action taken by the President (of the ECJ or GC). 323 In Case 34/86 Council v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2155, the power seems to have been exercised the day after the application commencing proceedings was registered: see pp 2157 and 2194 (at that time, there was no other power under the rules of procedure to expedite a case). 324 RP-GC, art 67(1); RP-CST, art 41(1). 325 The exception to that is referred to in RP-CST, art 41(2): the Court may consider that a case should be given priority where it can be treated as a test case. In that event, the test case is given priority over other cases raising, in a similar factual context, one or more identical questions of law (as RP-CST, art 41(2) provides). It does not follow that the test case is given priority over all other cases. If the Court considers that a case should be given priority and thinks that the parties may have overlooked the possibility of giving it priority, it may raise the matter with them; but the Court is still dependent upon the parties’ own assessment of the need to expedite the case. No special rule for test cases appears in the GC rules of procedure even after their amendment to take account of the abolition of the CST.

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ment may be raised directly or indirectly. It is raised directly by an application for priority treatment. Such an application should usually be incorporated in or accompany the party’s first written pleading lodged at the Court: the application commencing proceedings or, as the case may be, defence;326 a separate application seems unnecessary but is wise. If the application were made in a subsequent written pleading or at the hearing, there would have to be particularly strong reasons to support it because, in the normal course, the failure to make an application promptly would tend to suggest that there are no particular reasons why priority should be given to the case, unless there has been a change in circumstances since the initiation of the proceedings. Suitability for priority treatment may be raised indirectly by means of an application for interim relief: the judge dealing with the application might conclude that all the conditions for granting interim relief were not satisfied but that the case exhibited characteristics justifying the grant of priority treatment. 2.86 It is difficult to discern what may constitute the ‘special circumstances’ justifying the making of an order expediting the case because the reported instances of such an order being made are very few and far between. In general terms, all cases should be heard and determined as soon as possible; and an application for interim relief may be made where the normal delays in deciding a case would threaten the effectiveness of the judgment to be given by the Court.327 The special circumstances justifying expediting a case must therefore be such as to place the case outside the normal category of cases which must suffer the delays inherent in the proper administration of justice and either outside the category of cases for which some form of interim relief would be appropriate in order to cope with those delays or within the category of cases in which, even if interim relief were granted, there is a prevailing interest in deciding the case quickly.328 Since giving a case priority over others involves imposing on those other cases delays in their determination that would exceed what would otherwise be the case, the ‘special circumstances’ justifying expedition imply some public interest in the swift determination of the case that overrides the normal interest in the disposal of cases at the Court’s anticipated rate of progress.329 In weighing up the 326 In Case 34/86 Council v European Parliament (above, note 323) it was made in the application commencing proceedings. 327 See further Ch 8. 328 Subject to the point made in the text that giving a case priority involves causing further delays to other cases before the Court, it cannot be excluded that expedition may be a more proportionate remedy than the grant of some more usual form of interim relief. While the grant of interim relief may be one way of resolving any difficulties, it cannot be said to bar giving the case priority: in Case 34/86 Council v European Parliament (above, note 323), both interim relief and priority were granted. The very fact that interim relief has been granted may increase the pressure for an early judgment in the case because, by its nature, interim relief may involve the creation or continuance of a situation that would not otherwise subsist; and it is highly desirable for that state of affairs to be brought to an end sooner rather than later. 329 The facts of Case 34/86 Council v European Parliament (above, note 323) provide a good example. In Case C-27/04 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-6649, order of 13 February 2004, expedition was ordered because it was in the interests of the proper operation of economic and monetary union for the dispute to be determined as rapidly as possible (the case concerned excess deficit procedures involving two member states and was decided on 13 July 2004).

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circumstances account must also be taken of the consequences of expedition for the cases affected by it and the availability of alternative possibilities, such as interim relief. Where priority is given to a case the parties will be expected to act diligently; but in practical terms that means that (if priority is ordered) the parties may not be granted any extensions of time for the lodgment of their written pleadings (save where there is very good reason) and a hearing date will be fixed at the earliest opportunity; it does not seem to be open to the Court to preclude the exercise by the parties of any right to lodge a reply or (as the case may be) a rejoinder. 2.87 The second provision in the rules of procedure enabling a case to be expedited by the Court exists only in relation to the ECJ and the GC and provides for a true expedited procedure. It is initiated either by a written application that must be made by either the applicant or the defendant by separate document lodged at the same time as the application commencing proceedings or, as the case may be, the defence, or else by the President of the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC, acting on his or its own motion.330 Expedition cannot be sought by an intervener; and a defendant who wishes to make a preliminary objection to admissibility, rather than lodge a defence, appears to lose the right to apply for expedition if the preliminary objection is dismissed and a defence has to be served.331 2.88 An application for expedition should state the reasons for the special urgency in the case (in detail, in ECJ proceedings).332 In GC proceedings, the application for expedition should state on its first page that it is lodged under the relevant provisions of the GC rules of Procedure (RP-GC, art 151–152);333 and the same practice ought to be followed in an application made to the ECJ. Since an expedited procedure involves a curtailment of the ability to lodge written pleadings and is largely oral, the party applying for expedition should confine his pleadings (whether it be the application commencing proceedings or the defence) to a summary of the pleas relied upon. In GC proceedings, the pleading should not exceed 25 pages ‘in principle’;334 and the application for expedition 330 RP-ECJ, art 53(4) and 133(1)–(3); RP-GC, art 151(1)–(2). 331 That is not stated expressly in the rules of procedure but it is consistent with its purpose: an unsuccessful preliminary objection prolongs the time taken to deal with the case and it would therefore be inconsistent for a defendant to make such an objection (even in the expectation that it might succeed) but then apply for expedition were the objection to fail. It is also significant that the rules of procedure do not provide that a defendant may apply for expedition at the same time as lodging a preliminary objection. That indicates that, if a defendant wishes the case to be expedited, it must lodge its defence, not a preliminary objection. If expedition is not granted, the Court is not precluded from taking any absolute bar pleaded in the defence before any other issue in the case: see RP-ECJ, art 150; RP-GC, art 129. 332 PD-ECJ, para 17; RP-GC, art 152(1); PD-GC, para 249. 333 PD-GC, para 250. 334 PD-GC, para 251, which refers to ‘the application in respect of which the expedited procedure is requested’. In contrast, PD-GC, para 29 refers to ‘a request for an expedited procedure’. It therefore seems that PD-GC, para 251 refers not to the application for expeditition but to the pleading accompanying that application (and is therefore misleading because it implies that an application for expedition is made by an applicant). The position is correctly stated in RP-

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may state that certain pleas in law, arguments or passages in the application commencing proceedings or, as the case may be, the defence have been raised only in the event that the case is not expedited.335 In consequence, in GC proceedings (and, by parity of reasoning, ECJ proceedings), an application for expedition should be accompanied by two other pleadings: the full version of the application commencing proceedings or defence and an abridged version of the application commencing proceedings or defence. In addition to setting out the reasons justifying the grant of expedition, the application for expedition should list the parts of the full version of the application commencing proceedings or defence that are advanced only if expedition is not granted (and that need not – and therefore will not – be considered if expedition is granted). 2.89 The abridged version of the application commencing proceedings or defence must be the same as the full version, the only difference being the omission from the former of the parts identified in the application for expedition as being parts that need not be considered by the Court if expedition is granted. Hence, the paragraph numbering and annexes must be the same and, in the abridged version, the omitted parts should be replaced by the word ‘omitted’ or the equivalent term.336 Where the applicant in the action applies for expedition, it is conceivable that the full version of the application commencing proceedings could be lodged after the application for expedition (even if the latter is accompanied by an abridged version of the application commencing proceedings), as long as the full version is lodged in time. If lodged after the expiry of the time limit for commencing proceedings, the full version would have to be disregarded and only the abridged version could be taken into account as being the application commencing proceedings. On the face of it, in both ECJ and GC proceedings, it is the full version of the application commencing proceedings which is the critical pleading; the abridged version is lodged simply for the sake of convenience because it embodies and gives effect to the statement in the application for expedition that certain parts of the full version of the application commencing GC, art 252 where it is recommended that the application (for expedition) specify the pleas in law, arguments and ‘passages’ of ‘the pleading in question (application or defence)’ (emphasis added) which are advanced only if expedition is not granted. The 25-page limit specified in PDGC, para 251 seems to be intended to apply only to the application commencing proceedings, or to either that application or the defence (where the application for expedition is made by the defendant), in the form in which it is to be considered if expedition is granted. In other words, if (for example) an applicant seeks expedition, the application commencing proceedings must not exceed 25 pages or the abridged version of it referred to in PD-GC, para 254 must not exceed 25 pages. 335 RP-GC, art 152(2). The rule goes on to say that an ‘abridged’ version of the application, and a list of the annexes that are to be taken into account if the case is expedited, may be enclosed with the application for expedition. That is provided for by way of a ‘particular’ illustration of how the pleadings may be ‘streamlined’ (a term used in the pre-2015 PD-GC) for the purposes of expedition and must be read as applicable to a defence where the application for expedition is made by a defendant. PD-GC, para 252–256 are to the same effect and recommend annexing the abridged pleading (whether application commencing proceedings or defence) to the application for expedition. Thus, a party may offer a ‘streamlined’ application or defence on condition that the case is expedited and, if it is not expedited, revert to its case in full. 336 PD-GC, paras 252 and 254.

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proceedings need not be considered if expedition is granted. Accordingly, one would not expect the abridged version to satisfy purely formal pleading rules, such as the requirement that a pleading be signed by the applicant’s representative (as both the full version and the application for expedition have to be signed by the applicant’s representative, his signature on the abridged version of the application commencing proceedings is entirely superfluous unless the application for expedition contains no indication at all of the parts of the full version that need not be considered if expedition is granted). However, in GC proceedings, the abridged version has to comply with all the formal rules applicable to an application commencing proceedings, which means that everything has to be repeated in both the full and abridged versions.337 If the application for expedition accompanies the full version of the application commencing proceedings, and no mention is made of any parts of the latter that may be left out of consideration if expedition is granted, that is not necessarily fatal to the application for expedition. The Court may consider that no reworking or abridgement of the application commencing proceedings is necessary (particularly, in GC proceedings, if the full version of the application commencing proceedings does not exceed the 25-page limit recommended by the GC). If, in those circumstances, the GC considered that expedition could in principle be granted, but only if an abridged version of the application commencing proceedings were lodged, it may request the lodging of an abridged version.338 The ECJ rules of procedure do not so provide in express terms but it does not seem that they exclude such a procedure. Where the application for expedition is made by the defendant, the same applies mutatis mutandis: a full defence must be lodged in time; an abridged defence may also be lodged; but a full defence would be inadmissible if lodged after the abridged defence and after the expiry of the time limit for lodging the defence; in GC proceedings, it appears that the abridged defence must replicate all the formal requirements that have to be met, and are met, by the full defence. 2.90 Unless the application commencing proceedings raises issues, and is of a length, consistent with the Court’s perception of what can be managed under the expedited procedure, an application for expedition made by the applicant in the action is potentially risky because it may face the applicant with the need to choose between those points that should be considered if expedition is granted and those points that need be considered only if expedition is not granted. By implication, the latter are not points about which the applicant feels particularly confident; and the selection made by the applicant will therefore send a powerful signal to the defendant and to the Court. For example, if the (full) application commencing the action raises, say, five grounds or pleas in law (A, B, C, D and E), an abridged application covering only Grounds A-C is effectively a request 337 PD-GC, para 251 specifies that the application ‘in respect of which the expedited procedure is requested’ must be submitted in accordance with PD-GC, paras 123–134. 338 RP-GC-151(3) (which empowers the GC to lay down conditions as to the volume and presentation of the pleadings of the main parties); PD-GC, para 256. Where the GC so request, the abridged version must comply with PD-GC, para 254. PD-GC, para 251, which requires adherence to PD-GC, paras 123–134, also appears to apply. However, in the scenario here under consideration, full compliance with PD-GC, paras 123–134 appears to be completely pointless.

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made by the applicant for the Court to decide the case definitively on those grounds and not on Grounds D and E. It is not at all clear that, if an application for expedition were made on that basis and granted, the applicant could resurrect Grounds D and E, if he lost on all the other grounds, and have a second bite at the cherry.339 The same seems to apply if a given ground or plea is based on several arguments and the applicant decides to rely on some of those arguments, but not all of them, in the event that expedition is granted. If the application for expedition is made by the defendant, different considerations arise. In principle, the defendant, who must in any event lodge a full defence, is in an odd position because the defendant must answer each of the grounds or pleas relied on by the applicant in the action in the full defence. If, pursuing the example given above, the defendant makes the judgment that, say, Ground E  is a weak one and the case can be expedited on the basis that the dispute is limited to Grounds A to D, judgment in favour of the defendant on those grounds could not dispose of the proceedings because no decision would have been made on Ground E unless the defendant were regarded as having conceded Ground E. But if the defendant was conceding Ground E, a debate about Grounds A–D would be superfluous bcause the defendant would lose the action anyway (unless Ground E was intrinsically incapable of giving the applicant success in the action). It therefore seems that a defendant could not advance an abridged defence that failed to cover each and every one of the grounds or pleas relied on by the applicant in the action. Now suppose that Ground A is supported by five arguments (a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5). The defendance recognises that it is necessary to answer each of Grounds A to E but seeks expedition on the basis that, in relation to Ground A, it is necessary for the Court to consider only arguments a1 to a3. That raises two inferences. One is that the defendant thinks that arguments a4 and a5 are worthless. The other inference is that the defendant is unwilling to address those arguments because a1 to a3 are, from the defendant’s perspective (although not that of the applicant in the action), easier targets. Unless a4 and a5 are obviously bad points, it becomes tricky to decide the case without taking a4 and a5 into consideration. 2.91 In ECJ proceedings, an application for expedition is decided upon by the President of the ECJ after hearing the views of the advocate general, the judge rapporteur and the other party; where the President has raised the matter of his own motion, the decision is made by him after hearing all the parties as well as the advocate general and the judge rapporteur).340 In GC proceedings, the decision is made by the GC after hearing the main parties only and, where applicable, the advocate general.341 339 The process followed in cases like Case T-87/05 EDP - Energias de Portugal SA v Commission [2005] ECR II-3745, paras 31–32 and 40, suggests that the production of an abridged application necessarily involves conceding or abandoning the points omitted from the abridged application where expedition is granted unless, as in Case T-341/07 Sison v Council [2009] ECR II-3625, paras 23–27, the case involves distinct claims and one follows the other (in Sison, an action for annulment and a related action for damages). 340 RP-ECJ, art 133(1) and (3). 341 RP-GC, art  151(1)–(2) and, for the advocate general, 31(3). When the GC acts of its own motion, it does so on the basis of a proposal from the judge-rapporteur. In Case T-87/05 EDP (above, note 339), an informal meeting was first held between the parties and the judge-

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2.92 Expedition may be granted ‘where the nature of the case requires that it be dealt with within a short time’ (and expedition may be raised by the President of the ECJ of his own motion ‘exceptionally’)342 or having regard to the ‘particular urgency and the circumstances’ of the case.343 Applications for expedition are generally rejected. It is therefore difficult to identify what may justify expedition. The factors to be taken into account seem to be no different in principle from those mentioned above in connection with the exercise of the power to give priority to a case.344 2.93 If expedition is granted, the following happens. First, the written procedure is curtailed. In proceedings before the ECJ, a defence is lodged in the usual way (even if the application for expedition is made by the applicant in the action). The application and defence can be supplemented by a reply and a rejoinder and any interveners can lodge a statement in intervention only if the President, not the parties, considers it to be necessary.345 In proceedings before the GC, the position is more complicated. The period prescribed for lodging the defence is automatically reduced to one month when rapporteur in order to discuss the feasibility of expedition. As a result, the applicant lodged an abbreviated version of the application (dropping certain pleas) and the judge-rapporteur produced a provisional time-table for the procedure. The Commission lodged its defence in response to the abbreviated application (presumably in accordance with the judge-rapporteur’s time-table). Only then was the decision made to grant expedition: see paras 31–32 and 40 of the judgment. A similar process was followed in: Case T-464/04 Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala) v Commission [2006] ECR II-2289, paras 14–19; Case T-282/06 Sun Chemical Group BV v Commission [2007] ECR II-2149, paras 31–36. 342 RP-ECJ, art 133(1) and (3). The previous version of the rule – RP-ECJ, art 62a(1), 1st subpara – used the terms ‘exceptionally’ and ‘particular urgency’. 343 RP-GC, art 151(1). 344 The criteria for expedition are not the same as those for establishing urgency for the purpose of obtaining interim relief: Cases T-195/01R and T-207/01R  Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2001] ECR II-3915, paras 94–95; Case T-392/02R Solvay Pharmaceuticals BV v Council [2003] ECR II-1825, para 104. Expedition was granted in Case C-39/03P Commission v Artegodan GmbH [2003] ECR I-7885, para 35, causing the appeal proceedings to be disposed of in a little over five months (the background facts can be gleaned from the interim relief proceedings at [2003] ECR I-4485). Expedition was granted by the GC in Case T-119/02 Royal Philips Electronics NV  v Commission [2003]  ECR  I-1433 (see para  61) but the reasons are not identifiable. A number of the GC cases in which expedition has been granted are actions for the annulment of a Commission decision prohibiting, approving or otherwise affecting a concentration. It would appear from Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric SA  v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071, paras 62–63, that the GC regards the nature of the case and the volume of the application and the documents annexed to it as relevant. Of course, the fact that the pleadings in a case are lengthy is not a reason for rejecting an application for expedition; but it may be a reason why the Court is less able to cope with expediting the case, which presupposes that the pleadings are clear (see the EDP case, above, note 339, para 183). In Case T-417/05 Endesa SA v Commission [2005] ECR II-2533, expedition was granted (see para 39), apparently because the contested decision opened the way to a contested takeover of the applicant. Expedition has also been granted in cases involving challenges to measures freezing the applicant’s assets or applying similar restrictive measures to him: eg Cases T-246/08 and T-332/08 Melli Bank plc v Council [2009] ECR II-2629, para 15 (in which, even so, the proceedings lasted for just over 12 months). 345 RP-ECJ, art 134 (the President makes his decision after hearing the judge rapporteur and the avocate general).

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an application for expedition is made by the applicant in the action and, when expedition is granted, no reply, rejoinder, intervener’s statement in intervention or reply to any statement in intervention may be lodged, unless the GC allows it by way of measure of organisation of procedure.346 The GC may also impose conditions on the volume and presentation of the pleadings and as to the pleas in law and arguments on which the Court will rule.347 When the applicant in the action has applied for expedition and lodged an abridged version of the application commencing proceedings, the defence need respond only to the points raised in the abridged version.348 Where the applicant has applied for expedition but not specified the points to be taken into account only if expedition is refused, the defence must canvass the entire application commencing proceedings.349 Where the applicant has specified those points in the application for expedition but not produced an abridged version of the application commencing proceedings, the defendant must ‘respond…to the pleas in law and argument advanced in the application, in the light of the information provided in the request for the expedited procedure’.350 What that means is, unfortunately, wholly unclear. If the applicant has properly specified the points to be considered should expedition be refused, the sensible thing is for the defence to cover the remainder of the application. If the request for expedition is refused before the lodgement of the defence, the time limit for lodging it is extended by a further month; if the request is refused after the defence has been lodged, the defendant is allowed a further period of one month in which to supplement the defence (and therefore cover any points not already dealt with in the defence).351 Secondly, the parties may supplement their arguments and offer new evidence in the course of the oral procedure, as long as they give reasons to explain why any new evidence was not produced beforehand, in addition to being able to respond to new matters of law and fact that have come to light in the course of the procedure.352 Thirdly, in proceedings before the ECJ, the President fixes the date for the hearing as soon as the defence has been lodged or as soon as the decision to expedite has been made, whichever is the later.353 In proceedings before the GC,

346 RP-GC, art  154(1) and (3). If an application for expedition made by the applicant in the proceedings is dismissed, the defendant is given a further month to lodge or supplement its defence: see also PD-GC, para  67. Those time limits may be extended on a reasoned application. The curtailing of the written procedure can cause difficulties: see the Royal Philips Electronics case (above, note 344), para 205 (in that case, it was, however, possible to exclude the intervener’s submission for another reason: see paras 203–204). 347 RP-GC, art  151(3). If one of the parties does not comply with any condition that has been imposed, the decision to expedite the case may be revoked, in which case the proceedings will continue from that point on in accordance with the ordinary procedure followed by the GC: RP-GC, art 151(4). 348 PD-GC, para 259. 349 PD-GC, para 257. 350 PD-GC, para 258. 351 RP-GC, art 154(2); PD-GC, paras 260–261. 352 RP-ECJ, art 135(2); RP-GC, art 155(2). 353 RP-ECJ, art 135(1). The date of the hearing is communicated forthwith to the parties but may be postponed if any measures of enquiry or other preparatory measures so require.

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the case is given priority over other cases354 but the GC may impose conditions on the conduct of the proceedings after the written procedure.355 In particular, the GC must decide to open the oral procedure as soon as possible after the presentation of the judge-rapporteur’s preliminary report; but the GC can dispense with the oral hearing if the applicant and defendant decide not to participate in it or the GC considers that it has sufficient information to decide the case.356 2.94 The rules of procedure deal only with the impact on the parties of a decision to expedite a case. There is clearly a moral commitment on the part of the Court to decide the case expeditiously when it has been expedited. However, it is also incumbent on the parties (particularly the party that applied for expedition) to act consistently with the letter and spirit of the expedited procedure. The Court may take any shortfalls in that respect into account in its order for costs.357 7 Deferral of a case 2.95 Deferral differs from a stay of the proceedings in that stay involves halting the proceedings for a period of time whereas deferral involves putting back the next procedural step or steps to be taken in the case for a period of time or until some event (such as the delivery of judgment in a related case) occurs. The ECJ and CST rules of procedure refer in general, and vague, terms to deferring a case to be dealt with later, which can be read as covering any procedural step requiring a decision from the Court.358 In GC proceedings, there is no formal rule empowering the deferral of a case.359 2.96 A  case pending before the ECJ or CST may be deferred where there are special circumstances; the question whether or not a case should be deferred may be raised by the President on his own initiative or by one or other, or all, of the parties.360 An application for deferment should be made in writing, comply with (as the case may be) RP-ECJ, art 57 or RP-CST, art 45 and set out the reasons justifying putting the case back. Where it is made by one party, it should be served on the others so that they may submit their written observations. The 354 RP-GC, art 153. 355 RP-GC, art 151(3). For the consequences of a failure to comply with any such condition see note 347 above. 356 RP-GC, art 155(1). 357 The Impala case (above, note 341), paras 546–554. 358 RP-ECJ, art  56; RP-CST, art  41(3). The heading to RP-ECJ, art  56 refers to ‘deferment of the determination of a case’, which implies deferment of the date of the judgment or order disposing of the proceedings; but it does not seem that RP-ECJ, art  56 ought to be read so narrowly. 359 Under the former RP-GC, art 55(2), the President of the GC had a power to defer a case; but that power related only to the fixing of the date of the hearing (it was simply a question of postponing that date). RP-GC, art 55(2) has now been repealed. 360 RP-ECJ, art 56; RP-CST, art 41(3) (which provides that the special circumstances include the facilitation of an amicable settlement of the dispute). In ECJ proceedings, the decision is made after hearing the judge-rapporteur, the advocate general and the parties; in CST proceedings, the decision is made after hearing the parties.

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special circumstances potentially justifying deferral include: the prospect of the settlement of the litigation; and the desirability of deciding the case in the light of judgment in another case. 8 Measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry 2.97 Two further procedural measures generally taken at the administrative meeting remain to be considered: measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry (also known as preparatory enquiries). The purpose of such measures is stated in RP-CST, art 67 as being to ensure that cases are prepared for hearing under the best possible conditions, to ensure efficient conduct of the written and oral parts of the procedure and to facilitate the taking of evidence and the resolution of disputes. The distinction between those two types of measure is set out most clearly in the GC’s rules of procedure,361 which do nothing more than formalise a long-standing practice of the ECJ. The essential difference between them is that measures of enquiry are concerned with the factual aspects of the dispute before the Court (in particular, the gathering of relevant evidence), whereas measures of organisation of procedure are concerned with initiatives that may be taken by the Court by way of case management. In principle, the adoption of measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry is a matter for the Court in the exercise of its discretion in organising the procedure in a case; such measures may be adopted at any time in the course of proceedings but they are more usually adopted at the administrative meeting.362 The adoption of a measure of organisation of procedure or a measure of enquiry does not mean that the case will go through all the usual procedural steps leading to judgment: the Court may still dismiss the action summarily if there are grounds for doing so.363 Many measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry are 361 See RP-GC, art 89 and 91, largely reflected in RP-CST, art 68 and 70. 362 RP-GC, art 88(1); RP-CST, art 69(1) and 71(1). RP-ECJ, art 61–62 (measures of organisation) and 63 (measures of enquiry) contain no restriction or indication when a decision whether or not to adopt either type of measure is, or is to be, taken, although RP-ECJ, art 63(1) provides that the ECJ shall decide whether or not a measure of enquiry is necessary ‘in its general meeting’ (the ‘general meeting’ at which a case is discussed is usually the general meeting at which the judge rapporteur’s preliminary report is tabled). The provisions empowering the Court to adopt measures or organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry use the language of discretion: see also Case T-560/08 P Commission v Meierhofer [2010] ECR II-1739, para 61. For an example of a measure of organisation of procedure adopted at a relatively early stage in a case, see Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-1 at para 16 (an informal meeting with the parties’ representatives was held while the written procedure was in course, as a result of which the applicant waived the right to lodge a reply and thus caused the written procedure to close earlier than usual). A measure of organisation of procedure or measure of enquiry will not be adopted if it does not further the decision in the case: eg T-62/02 Union Pigments SA v Commission [2005] ECR II-5057, paras 182–184 (the proposed measures did not relate to a matter in issue). 363 Case C-547/03P  Asian Institute of Technology v Commission [2006]  ECR  I-845, para  30. Although the judgment refers to measures of organisation of procedure under what is now RPGC, art 89, measures of enquiry can be regarded as being, in principle, a species of measures of organisation of procedure (see Case C-199/92P Huls AG v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287, paras 122–127, pp 4377–4378) and the logic behind the reasoning followed in the judgment is equally applicable to them.

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used for the purpose of gathering relevant facts and evidence. The exercise of the power to adopt them does not indicate a decided view of the Court concerning the result of the case since it remains free in its absolute discretion to assess the value of the whole of the facts and evidence before it when it comes to formulate its judgment in the case.364 9 Measures of organisation of procedure 2.98 As defined in the GC’s Rules of Procedure, the purpose of measures of organisation of procedure is ‘to ensure that cases are prepared for hearing, procedures carried out and disputes resolved under the best possible conditions’365 and, more particularly: (i) to ensure efficient conduct of the written and oral procedure and to facilitate the taking of evidence; (ii) to determine the points on which the parties must present further argument or which call for measures of enquiry; (iii) to clarify the forms of order sought by the parties, their pleas in law and arguments and the points at issue between them; and (iv) to facilitate the amicable settlement of proceedings.366 There is no basis for assuming that the purpose of measures of organisation of procedure is any different so far as proceedings before the ECJ and CST are concerned.367 2.99 Measures of organisation of procedure may be prescribed, and any such measure that has already been prescribed may be varied, at any stage of the proceedings by the GC or CST either of its own motion or on application by one of the parties.368 The decision to prescribe or modify a measure of organisation of procedure is made by the GC and, where the initiative has come from one of the parties, after hearing the other parties.369 In CST proceedings, the decision is made by the judge-rapporteur (unless he refers the matter to the CST because of the scope or importance of the proposed measures)370 and, as in GC proceedings, 364 Cf Case C-360/02P  Ripa di Meana v Parliament [2004]  ECR  I-10339, paras 27–28 of the judgment. 365 RP-GC, art 89(1). 366 RP-GC, art 89(2). On the other hand, the purpose of measures of organisation of procedure is not to make good defects in a party’s pleadings: Case T-53/96 Syndicat des Producteurs de Viande Bovine de la Coordination Rurale v Commission [1996] ECR II-1579, para 26. 367 Cf RP-CST, art 67. 368 RP-GC, art 88(1) and 90(1); RP-CST, art 69(1) and (3). In Cases T-79, 84–86, 89, 91–92, 94, 96, 98, 102 and 104/89 BASF AG v Commission [1992] ECR II-315 a preparatory meeting was held with the parties’ representatives as a result of which certain measures of organisation of procedure were ordered (see para 6), apparently on the initiative of the CFI (as it then was) and as a result of certain allegations made in the written pleadings by some of the applicants. 369 RP-GC, art 88(1) and (3). If there is an advocate general in the case, he is heard before the decision is taken because decisions under RP-GC, art 90 (which duplicates RP-GC, art 88(1) in providing that measures of organisation of procedure are prescribed by the GC) are listed in RP-GC, art 31(3). In Cases T-30/01 to T2/01 and T-86/02 to T-88/02 Territoria Historico de Alava (above, note 145), paras 75–77, the adoption of a measure of organisation of procedure was questioned by the parties. The GC did not comment on the acceptability of doing so. Questioning a measure of organisation of procedure is likely to arise only where the Court has acted of its own motion and without first hearing the parties. In some instances, questioning a measure of organisation of procedure may be construed as an application to vary or modify it. 370 RP-CST, art 69(1)–(2).

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where the initiative has come from one of the parties, after hearing the other parties.371 In principle, where the matter is raised by the Court of its own motion, there is no requirement that the parties be heard before a measure of organisation of procedure is adopted: the adoption of such a measure falls within the powers of the Court to direct its own proceedings as it thinks fit in order to dispose of cases justly and expeditiously. However, in the nature of things, the parties may have to be consulted in order to identify the most appropriate measure to adopt and in order to select the most appropriate means of carrying it out. In GC proceedings, where measures of organisation of procedure are prescribed, the carrying out of the measure may be undertaken by the GC (in effect, the chamber dealing with the case) or entrusted to the judge-rapporteur.372 2.100 The ECJ’s Rules of Procedure contain no equivalent to the detailed rules laid down for the GC (and CST) concerning the adoption of measures of organisation of procedure. However, the ECJ frequently does not go to the lengths of making a formal order but requests one or all of the parties (and occasionally a member state or EU institution not party to the proceedings) to supply information or produce documents. That request is made in the form of a letter from the Registrar and may ask the addressee to comply before or at the hearing. The Court may also ask the parties to argue certain points at the hearing.373 Such requests could be regarded as informal measures of enquiry but are in substance the same as the measures of organisation of procedure referred to in the GC’s rules of procedure. The making of such requests is covered by RP-ECJ, art 61. In addition, under RP-ECJ, art 62, the judge-rapporteur or the advocate general may request the parties to (a) submit within a specified period (i) all such information relating to the facts, (ii) all such documents or (iii) other particulars, that the judge rapporteur or advocate general considers relevant, or (b) answer certain questions at the hearing. The information or documents so provided is communicated to the other parties.374 The power to request information and the production of documents, which is classified under RP-ECJ, art 61–62 as a measure of organisation of procedure, effectively replicates the power of the ECJ to request information and the production of documents by way of a measure of enquiry.375 In the case 371 RP-CST, art 69(3) provides for applications to be made by a party for the adoption or modification of measures of organisation of procedure. There is no express provision for hearing the other parties before the decision is made but RP-CST, art 69(5) provides for ‘written observations submitted by the parties’ to be put in order should they fail to comply with certain pleading requirements. By implication, therefore, the other parties are heard at the very least where a measure of organisation of procedure is proposed by a party. It could be inferred from RP-CST, art 69(5) that the parties must be heard when the CST proposes to act of its own motion; but RP-CST, art 71(1)–(3), which deal with measures of enquiry, provide for the parties to submit written observations only where a party proposes the adoption of a measure of enquiry. There appears to be no reason to suppose that the procedure applicable to a measure of organisation of procedure was intended to be any different. 372 RP-GC, art 90(2). 373 Cf Cases 83 and 94/76, 4, 15 and 40/77 Bayerische HNL  Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH & Co KG v Council and Commission [1978] ECR 1209 at 1212 and [1977] ECR 1222 at 1245 (Advocate-General Capotorti). 374 RP-ECJ, art 62(1). 375 See RP-ECJ, art 64(2)(b).

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of RP-ECJ, art  62, the difference is that the judge-rapporteur or the advocate general may make such a request without needing to go through the ECJ. The continued absence from the ECJ’s rules of procedure of any rules applying to such requests (apart from the exiguous references in RP-ECJ, art 61–62) reflects in large part the fact that the simplest (and the commonest) forms of such measures do not require detailed provision in the rules of procedure and the fact that the more elaborate forms of such measures are unnecessary in most cases now heard by the ECJ. In contrast, the cases over which the GC has jurisdiction at first instance tend to give rise to the kind of complex issues of fact which are best handled by means of some formal measure of organisation of procedure.376 2.101 Measures of organisation of procedure may take various forms. Those mentioned specifically in the GC’s rules of procedure (which are reflected, with minor changes of wording, in the CST rules of procedure)377 are the following: (1) putting questions to the parties;378 (2) inviting the parties to make written or oral submissions on certain aspects of the proceedings;379 (3) asking the parties or third parties for information that the GC considers necessary for the proceedings;380 (4) asking the parties to produce material relating to the case;381 376 The simplest form of a measure of organisation of procedure is the putting of a question to the parties. Examples are legion in the case law of the ECJ. The more elaborate measures of organisation of procedure were adopted by the ECJ in actions for the annulment of Commission decisions made in application of the competition rules set out in what is now the TFEU. It was therefore no coincidence that, when jurisdiction at first instance over that type of case was assigned to what was, at the time, the CFI, express provision was made in the CFI’s Rules of Procedure for the adoption of measures of organisation of procedure. 377 RP-GC, art 89(3)–(4): RP-CST, art 68. For a brief description of such measures, see B Vesterdorf (1992) 29 CMLRev 897 at 912–915. 378 The parties may be asked to respond in writing before (or after) the hearing or orally at the hearing. 379 RP-CST, art 68(b) also refers to clarifying the parties’ forms of order, their pleas, and the issues in the case. 380 RP-GC, art 89(3)(c) cross refers to the Statute, art 24, 2nd para, only. The 1st para deals with requests addressed to the parties to the proceedings and enables the Court to seek production of documents and information that the Court consider ‘desirable’. The 2nd para deals with requests addressed to third parties and is limited to information that is ‘necessary’ for the proceedings. It must be supposed that a conscious decision was taken to restrict requests under RP-GC, art 89(3)(c) to requests for information (but not documents) and, more specifically, information necessary for the proceedings (as opposed to nformation whose production is considered to be desirable). The possible explanation for that is that it was thought that requests for documents should be dealt with separately, in RP-GC, art 89(3)(d) and, as a measure of enquiry, in RPGC, art 91(b). RP-CST, art 68(c) is limited to requests addressed to the parties. In RP-CST, art 70(c), requests addressed to third parties are classified as measures of enquiry, not measures of organisation of procedure. That classification seems to be more logical. 381 RP-CST, art  68(d) refers to the production of ‘documents or any items of evidence’. There is in practice no difference in meaning between RP-CST, art 68(d) and RP-GC, art 89(3)(d). Eg Case T-103/14 Frucona Kosice as v Commission, 16 March 2016, para 188 (production of documents).

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2.102  General outline of procedure

(5) summoning the parties to meetings;382 (6) inviting the parties to concentrate their oral submissions at the hearing (if there is one) on specified issues.383 2.102 Some measures of organisation of procedure are virtually indistinguishable from measures of enquiry.384 The following provide illustrations of the type of measure encountered in practice: a meeting between the judge-rapporteur and the parties with a view to seeking a solution to the dispute (at the meeting the parties expressed their views in the light of information provided by the judge-rapporteur and in response to questions put by him; and there was a further exchange of views in writing);385 a request that the parties indicate which annexes to their pleadings were the most important;386 an informal meeting between the parties’ representatives and the judge-rapporteur in order to determine the organisation of the oral procedure;387 requests for information and the production of documents;388 a request that a third party attend the hearing and be represented in order to provide the Court with any necessary information;389 a request that the parties try to reach agreement on certain facts in issue390 or a meeting to the same end;391 a meeting between the parties’ representatives, the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general to see if the issues or pleadings can be clarified or agreed;392 382 RP-GC, art  89(3)(e) and RP-CST, art  68(f) refer only to the summoning of the parties to meetings. It is implicit that the parties’ representatives may accompany them at such meetings. 383 This is specified as a measure of organisation of procedure in RP-CST, art 68(e). In RP-GC, art 89, it does not appear in the list of such measures set out in RP-GC, art 89(3) but appears in RP-GC, art 89(4). However, its presence there suggests that it is a measure of organisation of procedure (why else would it appear in RP-GC, art 89?). 384 For example, requests for information and the production of documents: compare RPGC, art  89(3)(c) and (d) with RP-GC, art  91(b). The difference seems to be purely formal; although, as noted above, the CST rules of procedure attempt to introduce a rational division between requests addressed to the parties (measures of organisation of procedure) and requests addressed to third parties (measures of enquiry). In Case C-199/92P Huls (above, note 363), paras 122–127 (pp 4377–4378) the ECJ seems to have regarded measures of enquiry as a species of measure of organisation of procedure. 385 Case 17/83 Angelidis v Commission [1984] ECR 2907 at 2910. 386 Case 75/84 Metro – SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1986] ECR 3021 at 3031. 387 Eg Case T-7/89 SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission [1991] ECR II-1711, para 21; Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval BV v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381, paras 67–68. 388 Eg Case T-41/90 Barassi v Commission [1992]  ECR II-159, para  10; Case T-42/90 Bertelli v Commission [1992] ECR II-181, para 10; Case T-8/90 Colmant v Commission [1992] ECR II-469, para 13; Case T-73/98 Societe chimique Prayon-Rupel SA v Commission [2001] ECR II-867, para 97. 389 Case 23/86 United Kingdom v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1085, para 3 (the third party was the Commission and the formal basis for the request was what is now Statute, art 24, 2nd para). 390 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461 at 502–508. 391 Case 258/78 LC Nungesser KG and Eisele v Commission [1982] ECR 2015 at 2024. 392 Cases 100–103/80  SA  Musique Diffusion Française v Commission [1983]  ECR  1825 at 1837 (following the meeting the parties were able to define the issues of fact and law); Case 323/82 SA Intermills v Commission [1984] ECR 3809 at 3814 (the meeting appears to have been inaccurately described in the report of the case as a preparatory enquiry); Case C-87/94 Commission v Belgium [1996]  ECR  I-2043 (advocate general’s opinion, paras 11 and 17– 18); Case T-19/99  DKV  Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2000]  ECR II-1, para  11; Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line AB v Commission [2003] ECR II-3275, para 75.

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the suspension of the written procedure and the organisation of a hearing to consider various procedural submissions;393 a meeting to identify which issues ought to be decided first;394 an invitation to submit a further pleading.395 In Cases T-68, 77 and 78/89 Società Italiano Vetro SpA v Commission396 the judge-rapporteur held a meeting with the parties’ representatives at which he indicated to them that he wanted the reports for the hearing in the cases to be agreed and a common file of documents compiled containing everything that the parties considered to be important; he therefore asked the parties for their comments on the draft reports for the hearing and a draft list of documents. He also invited the defendant to produce the originals of the documentary evidence on which it wished to rely. The parties were able to agree the statistical evidence and the lack of any need for experts’ reports; agreement was also reached on the need for witnesses and on the transcription of handwritten documentary evidence. The defendant admitted that a particular point at issue was essential to its case. Following the meeting (at which the parties also agreed that the cases should be joined) a list of documents and the report for the hearing were agreed. The defendant duly produced the originals of the documents on which it wished to rely, which revealed that the defendant had tampered with some of them. 10 Measures of enquiry 2.103 The Court orders a measure of enquiry (or preparatory enquiry) when it appears from the written pleadings or any measures of organisation of procedure that have been carried out that further evidence must be sought for the purpose of resolving some or all of the issues of fact in the case.397 The decision is made by the Court (or the formation to which the case has been assigned), of its own motion or on application by a party, after hearing the advocate general (where there is one).398 In ECJ proceedings, there is no express provision for the hearing of the parties before the decision is made as to whether or not a measure of enquiry should be ordered. In GC proceedings, the other parties have a right to be heard before that decision is made where the GC is considering an application 393 Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, C0245/99P, C-247/99P, C-250/99P to C-252/99P and C-254/99P  Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV  v Commission [2002]  ECR  I-8375, para  212 (p 8693). The complexities that then ensued are summarised in paras 213–220 (pp 8694–8695). 394 Case T-366/00 Scott SA v Commission [2003] ECR II-1763, para 22. 395 The Scott case (above, note 394), para 25. 396 [1992] ECR II-1403, paras 41–52 and 89–94. 397 See in detail Ch 11 below. For example, in Cases T-79, 84–86, 89, 91–92, 94, 96, 98, 102 and 104/89 BASF AG v Commission (above, note 368) at paras 11–29, several applicants had alleged in the written pleadings facts suggesting that the contested decision might be vitiated by certain procedural defects. That led to a meeting with the parties’ representatives, ordered by way of a measure of organisation of procedure. At that meeting there was a difference of views between the parties and, as a result of an offer of proof made by the defendant, the Court asked it to produce certain documents by way of preparatory enquiry. There was a further exchange of written pleadings between the parties concerning the documents so produced and, at the hearing, the Court ordered the defendant to produce additional evidence. 398 RP-ECJ, art 63 and 64(1); RP-GC, art 88(1) and 92(1) (decisions made under the latter provision are made after the advocate general has been heard, if there is one: see RP-GC, art 31(3)); RPCST, art 71(1) and (2).

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made by a party for a measure of enquiry.399 If the GC has raised the matter of its own motion, the parties have a right to be heard only if the proposed measure is one for the hearing of oral testimony, the commissioning of an expert’s report or an inspection of a place or thing.400 In CST proceedings, the position is slightly different: the parties have a right to be heard where the matter is raised by an application made by a party; where the matter is raised by the CST of its own motion, the parties have a right to be heard (‘where the procedural circumstances so require’) only if the proposed measure is the appearance of the parties in person, a request made to third parties for information, particulars, documents or other evidence, or a request that a party produce documents or other evidence (but only where that party has previously refused to comply with a measure of organisation of procedure to that effect); but the parties must also be heard before an order is made for the hearing of oral testimony, the commissioning of an expert’s report or an inspection of a place or thing.401 2.104 The reason why there are such differences in the procedure to be followed when a measure of enquiry is to be adopted is largely, but not entirely, to be found in the fact that the onus lies on the parties during the written procedure to indicate in their pleadings the facts on which they rely and, for the purposes of proof, that necessitates that they specify the means of verifying those facts (often referred to as ‘offers of proof’). Where the evidence is in documentary form it must, of course, be annexed to the pleadings unless it is not in the possession or control of the party relying on it. In that event, the party should, if possible, indicate to the Court where the document may be found. Accordingly, the need for a measure of enquiry is usually identifiable from the pleadings, including the response made by one party to the assertions of fact (and assertions as to the sources of relevant evience) made by the opposing party. The exchange of pleadings should itself be sufficient to enable the Court to act of its own motion. Where a party makes a formal application for a measure of enquiry, the application may raise matters not canvassed sufficiently in the main pleadings, which makes it appropriate for provision to be made for the other parties to be heard when an application is made. In the case of measures of enquiry ordered by the GC or CST of its own motion, the lack of consistency in the list of types of measure for which there is a right to be heard is not easy to explain. It seems to reflect differing perceptions of the appropriateness of providing for such a right. The fact that, in a particular set of circumstances, there is no formal right of the parties to be heard before the Court makes its order does not exclude the parties from being heard should the Court consider it to be helpful. The Court bases its decisions to a large extent on the recommendations of the judge-rapporteur which are usually contained in his preliminary report to the Court on the case. 2.105 The different measures of enquiry that may be ordered are listed in the rules of procedure. The ECJ and CST rules (but not the GC rules) provide that 399 RP-GC, art 88(3). 400 RP-GC, art 92(2). 401 RP-CST, art 71(2), (3) and (4), 2nd indent. In effect, the parties must always be heard before the order is made.

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those measures are ‘without prejudice’ to the evidence-gathering measures provided for in the Statute, arts 24 and 25, which concern the production of documents and information from the parties and third parties.402 The GC rules seem to proceed on the basis that the GC rules elaborate and supplement the Statute, including arts 24 and 25.403 A measure of enquiry may take one of the following forms: (a) the personal appearance of the parties; (b) a request for information and production of documents; (c) oral testimony; (d) experts’ reports; or (e) an inspection of the place or thing in question.404 Those different forms are not always given the same description in the ECJ, GC and CST rules of procedure;405 but the variations in mode of description have little bearing on the substantive content of the measure. 2.106 The decision prescribing one of those measures of enquiry is set out in a Court order which also specifies the issue or issues of fact to be determined.406

402 RP-ECJ, art 64(2); RP-CST, art 70. 403 The relationship between the Statute, arts 24 and 25, and the rules of procedure is considered in more detail in Ch 11. 404 RP-ECJ, art 64(2); RP-GC, art 91; RP-CST, art 70. According to the report of SA Intermills v Commission (above, note 392) at 3814, the ECJ in the course of its preparatory enquiries requested the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general to meet the parties before the opening of the oral procedure. Such a ‘preparatory enquiry’ is not expressly envisaged in the Rules of Procedure and would seem to be better classified as a measure of organisation of procedure. 405 RP-ECJ, art  64(2)(b) refers to a request for the production of information and documents, without specifying whether the request is one directed at a party or a third party (both are covered). RP-GC, art  91(b) refers to a request directed at a party. A  request addressed to a third party (for information) is dealt with as a measure of organisation of procedure under RP-GC, art 89(3)(c). On the other hand, RP-GC, art 91(b) is broader than RP-ECJ, art 64(2) (b) because it covers the production of information or ‘any material relating to the case’ and is not, therefore, limited to the production of information and documents. RP-GC, art 91(c) deals with the production of a different type of document: the document access to which was refused in the decision contested in the proceedings. Such a document is not an adminicle of evidence like the other types of evidence referred to in RP-GC, art 91. Its presence in RP-GC, art 91 is something of an anomaly. RP-CST, art 70 differentiates between requests for the production of information, particulars, documents or other evidence, addressed to third parties, and similar requests addressed to parties (see RP-CST, art 70(b), (c) and (g)) essentially because the CST rules classify the former as a measure of enquiry and the latter as a measure of organisation of procedure. The latter become suitable for a measure of enquiry where the party concerned has refused to comply with the request when put to him as a measure of organisation of procedure (the assumption is that measures of enquiry are more compulsive in nature than measures of organisation of procedure). The same idea appeared in RP-GC, art 92(3), which provides that a measure of enquiry falling within RP-GC, art 91(b) may be ordered only if there has been a previous refusal to comply with a measure of organisation of procedure to the same effect. 406 RP-ECJ, art 64(1) (repeated in RP-ECJ, art 66(3) in the case of the hearing of oral testimony); RP-GC, art  92(1) (repeated in RP-GC, art  93(1)(c) in the case of the hearing of a witness). RP-CST, art 71(4), 2nd indent, provides that the order must set out the facts to be proved when it is an order for the hearing of oral testimony, the commissioning of an expert’s report of an inspection of a place or thing. RP-CST, art 72(c) repeats that the order sets out the facts to be proved when the measure of enquiry is oral testimony. The same may be inferred, in the case of an order commissioning an expert’s report, from RP-ECJ, art 70(1), RP-GC, art 96(1) and RP-CST, art 75(5). Specifying the facts to be proved does not imply a predisposition to believe the fact in question. It is simply the identification of the issue of fact to which the measure of enquiry relates.

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The order is served on the parties and they are invited to attend the enquiry.407 Although the order is made by the Court or (as the case may be) the formation to which the case has been assigned, the measure of enquiry is carried out by the formation to which the case is assigned or by the judge-rapporteur.408 The manner in which measures of enquiry are conducted is considered below.409 The object of a measure of preparatory enquiry is to put the Court in a position to make a finding of fact. It does not usually itself result in such a finding. When all the evidence required by the Court has been discovered, the Court may invite the parties to submit written observations by a certain date, after which the oral procedure commences.410

C

The oral procedure

2.107 The Statute provides that the procedure before the Court ‘shall consist of two parts: written and oral’.411 The oral part of the procedure is therefore mandatory, not optional, unless there is express provision otherwise.412 1 The components parts of the oral procedure 2.108 From the creation of the ECJ, the oral procedure notionally comprised four public hearings that might be held on the same day: the hearing of the report of the judge-rapporteur (known as the ‘report for the hearing’); the hearing of 407 Only RP-CST, art 71(4), 1st indent (which relates to orders for the appearance of the parties themselves and for the production of information, particulars, documents or other evidence by a third party), refers to parties being notified of (that is, served with) the order. However, orders must be served on the parties and become binding only on service: see RP-ECJ, art 90 and 91(2); RP-GC, art 120 and 121(2); RP-CST, art 97 and 98(2). On attending the measure of enquiry, see: RP-ECJ, art 65(3); RP-GC, art 92(6); RP-CST, art 71(6). Attending the measure of enquiry means being present when the evidence is taken. When information or documents are produced to the Court by a party or third party, there is no occasion on which the parties ‘attend’ the measure of enquiry. 408 RP-ECJ, art 63 and 65(1); RP-GC, art 92(1) and (4); RP-CST, art 71(1) and (5). The advocate general (where there is one) takes part in the measure of enquiry: RP-ECJ, art 65(2); RP-GC, art 92(5). 409 See Ch 11, section III, para 11.31 ff. 410 Cf RP-ECJ, art 75(1). Provision is also made for the submission of evidence in rebuttal and for the ‘amplification’ of evidence previously given: RP-ECJ, art 64(3); RP-GC, art 92(7); RP-CST, art 71(7). That is considered in more detail in Ch 11, section III, paras 11.33–11.37. 411 Statute, art 20, 1st para, applicable to the GC by virtue of art 53, and to the CST by virtue of Annex, art  7(1); RP-ECJ, art  53(1); RP-GC, art  106(1); RP-CST, art  59(1). The same rule applies to appeals from the CST to the GC (Statute, Annex, art  12(2)) and to appeals from the GC to the ECJ (Statute, art  59). When, in cases like Cases C-514/07P, C-528/07P and C-532/07P Sweden v API and Commission [2010] ECR I-8533, para 78, it is stated that the oral procedure is not obligatory, that is an allusion to the situations expressly provided for in the Rules of Procedure, in which the oral procedure, or a part of it, may be dispensed with. It is not a gloss on the Statute. 412 Eg Case T-498/09 P Kerstens v Commission, 24 September 2010, para 38. There is no absolute right to a hearing: Case C-199/98 P Goldstein v Commission, order of 8 July 1999 (unreported), para  18; Case T-358/12  P  Conticchio v Commission, 13  September 2013, paras 45–46. See further section IV.C.4, para 2.111 ff below.

218

General outline of procedure 2.109

the parties; the hearing of the advocate general; and the hearing of witnesses and experts (if any).413 In practice, the first two hearings took place on the same day. The hearing of the report of the judge-rapporteur was in practice a purely formal exercise (a copy of the report was circulated to the parties in advance of the hearing and was made available to the public before the hearing commenced; it was not read out in court). It is now no longer a requirement of the oral procedure. The third hearing (where there is an advocate general in the case) usually takes place some time after the hearing of the parties. The rules of procedure envisage that witnesses and experts are heard at the stage of preparatory enquiries and that the oral procedure commences afterwards.414 It sometimes happens that a witness is heard immediately before the commencement of the oral procedure so that the parties and their representatives have to journey to the Court only once but, in general, witnesses do not seem to be examined during the oral procedure although the power to hear them at that stage in the proceedings is evident from the Statute. Experts, on the other hand, are from time to time heard during the oral procedure, as will be seen. 2 The requirement for a hearing to be held in public 2.109 The oral part of the proceedings must be conducted in public unless the Court decides otherwise for serious reasons.415 The importance of the hearing and of its public nature depends upon which of the hearings comprising the oral procedure is in question. The hearing of the report for the hearing (before it ceased to be a requirement of the oral hearing) was a purely formal act. The public hearing of the advocate general’s opinion (where there is one) is akin to the public delivery of the judgment and hence derives from the public nature of the administration of justice.416 The hearing of the parties and of witnesses and experts is of a different order. The inclusion of a public hearing in the course of judicial proceedings (by which is normally meant the hearing of the parties themselves) is generally regarded as part of the fundamental procedural guarantees accorded to the parties in legal proceedings;417 but it is misleading to regard 413 Statute, art 20, 4th para, applicable to the GC by virtue of art 53, and to the CST by virtue of Annex, art 7(1), before it was amended so as to remove the reference to the report for the hearing. 414 Cf RP-ECJ, art 63, 64 and 75. The GC and CST rules of procedure are less clear on the point. 415 Statute, art 31, applicable to the GC by virtue of art 53, and to the CST by virtue of Annex, art 7(1). 416 TFEU, art 252 and Statute, art 49, specify that the function of the advocate general in a case is to deliver his or her ‘submissions’ (or opinion) ‘in open court’. 417 Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides that ‘in the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing’ and is replicated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, art 47, 2nd para. It has been said that a public hearing means an oral hearing because only an oral trial can truly be said to be open to the public: M Cappelletti and D Tallon (eds) Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation (Giuffré, 1973) at 757. Although the position of courts deciding points of law only on appeal in ‘cassation’ proceedings is somewhat different (see, for example, Axen v Germany European Court of Human Rights, Series A No 72, (1984) 6  EHRR  195, and Sutter v Switzerland, ibid, Series A  No  74, (1984) 6  EHRR  272), orality is an essential element in the public hearing of the parties, at least where courts of first

219

2.110  General outline of procedure

the requirement of an oral and, hence, public hearing as being solely in the interests of the parties to proceedings before the Court. The obligation to hear the oral submissions of the parties satisfies a public, as much as a private, concern that the parties be brought together before the Court so that each can provide a completed answer to the other’s case and so that the concerns of the Court can be put to the parties and answered by them without delay. The obligation not only to hear the oral submissions of the parties but also to do so in a hearing open to the public reflects a public concern that so far as is possible justice should be administered openly.418 The same applies to the hearing of witnesses and experts. The general rule is therefore that the procedure in direct actions always contains an oral part held in public. In the Statute and the rules of procedure, that general rule is dispensed with only in particular cases identified by express provisions. 3 Hearings in private 2.110 The Court may decide to dispense with the public nature of the hearing and exclude the public from the oral procedure only where there are ‘serious reasons’; and it may so decide either of its own motion or on application by the parties.419 As the public nature of hearings may be dispensed with only for ‘serious reasons’, it follows that any application made by a party must set out the serious reasons justifying holding the hearing in private.420 Dispensing with the public nature of the hearing normally applies to the hearing of the parties’ submissions but it may also apply to the hearing of witnesses and experts as part of the oral procedure. An application to exclude the public may be made orally at the commencement of the hearing.421 The submissions of the parties at hearings held in camera are not published and the parties themselves are prohibited from disclosing their content.422 It is very rare for the Court to hold a hearing in and last instance are concerned. In that context, there appears to be no material difference between purely civil matters and the determination of rights and obligations under public law. However, in public law matters, the public nature of the proceedings (and hence the need for some part of the proceedings before the delivery of judgment – the hearing – to be conducted in public) reflects a concern that the dealings of public bodies with private persons, and the way in which the courts approach them, should not escape public scrutiny. 418 Cf Case C-185/95P  Baustahlgewebe GmbH  v Commission [1998]  ECR  I-8417 (advocate general’s opinion, paras 80–95). 419 Statute, art 31, applicable to the GC by virtue of art 53, and to the CST by virtue of Annex, art 7(1); RP-ECJ, art 79(1); RP-GC, art 109(1); RP-CST, art 63(2). RP-GC, art 109(1) provides that the GC may decide to hear a case in camera ‘after hearing the parties’; and RP-CST, art  63(2) refers simply to holding the hearing in camera ‘in accordance with Article  31 of the Statute’. In both cases, the meaning and effect of the Statute, art  31, is not qualified. In particular, the absence of a reference in RP-GC, art 109(1) to the GC acting of its own motion does not mean that the GC can act only on application. RP-GC, art 109(1) simply means that, whether the question is raised by the GC of its own motion or by one of the parties, the decision of the GC must be made after hearing the parties. 420 Accordingly, that is what RP-GC, art 109(2) provides. 421 As happened in Case 120/83R  Raznoimport v Commission [1983]  ECR  2573 and Case C-106/90R Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission [1990] ECR I-3377 (not referred to in the report). 422 RP-ECJ, art 79(2); RP-GC, art 109(3); RP-CST, art 63(2); Case T-36/04 API (above, note 259), paras 90–91. Judgments and advocate general’s opinions occasionally refer to or summarise

220

General outline of procedure 2.110

camera. The serious reasons that may justify such a course are therefore hard to define. It would seem that a case may be heard in camera only where a party appearing in the case would be obliged to mention in the course of its address to the Court facts or matters that it, another party to the proceedings or a third party has a legitimate interest in maintaining confidential.423 It follows from the exceptional nature of the power to hold a hearing in camera that it should be exercised only where strictly necessary. In consequence, where the revelation of the facts and matters justifying the exclusion of the public can be limited to a discrete part of the addresses of the parties to the Court, the hearing should be held in camera as to that part only and the remainder of the hearing should be held in public. It may also be possible to deal with such matters without referring to them expressly and in graphic detail.424 It would seem that, where an intervener has been refused access to secret or confidential documents during the written procedure in accordance with the rules of procedure, he (in addition to the public) may be excluded from that part of the hearing (if any) at which the secret or confidential aspects of such documents are discussed before the Court. However, there is no circumstance in which an applicant (or, as the case may be, a defendant) can be excluded from any part of the defendant’s (or, as the case may be, applicant’s) address to the Court.425 arguments addressed to the Court at the hearing. If the hearing were held in camera, no confidential details of the oral arguments would be mentioned. However, the Court does not publish the oral proceedings in a case, as such, in any event. The prohibition on the publication of the oral proceedings heard in camera is directed rather more at those present at the hearing. The English versions of RP-ECJ, art 79(2), RP-GC, art 109(3) and RP-CST, art 63(2) suggest that the entire oral proceedings are not to be published but that is somewhat misleading: the rule does not apply to the opinion of the advocate general (where there is one), the delivery of which is part of the oral procedure. 423 Cf the Raznoimport case (above, note 421) (business secrets of the applicant); the Emerald Meats case (above, note 421) (matters relating to a third party whose public disclosure might prejudice the interests of that third party); Case C-206/89 R S v Commission [1989] ECR 2841, para 4, and Cases T-121/89 and T-13/90 X v Commission [1992] ECR II-2195, para 30 (matters relating to the applicant’s medical condition). RP-ECJ, art  79(1) refers to ‘serious reasons related, in particular, to the security of the member states or to the protection of minors’. 424 For example, where the further development of the argument at the hearing concerns matters of law only, and the confidential matters have been explored in sufficient depth in the written pleadings (which are not disclosed to the public), it may be sufficient to refer to the section in the pleadings raising the confidential matters (‘in relation to the fourth ground on which annulment of the contested decision is sought…’) and then carry on with the legal arguments. If that way of dealing with matters occurs to one of the parties, it should be raised both with the other party or parties and with the Court: if there is no agreement between the parties on how to deal with the matter, the Court will have to make a ruling; if there is agreement between the parties, the Court needs to be told of it and must assent to that approach lest one of the judges inadvertently reveals the confidential matter by asking a question or making a remark in the course of the hearing. In the ordinary course, the matter will have been raised beforehand, at the very least in an application made to the Court for the confidential matters to be kept out of any court document that is to be made available to the public (see para 2.110 above). 425 See, by analogy, the position regarding the confidential treatment of documents: Ch 12. In cases covered by RP-GC, art 105, an applicant or defendant wishes to rely on information or material that, for good reason, cannot be disclosed to the opposing party. However, it is envisaged that a non-confidential version of the confidential information or material will be made available to the opposing party so that he can make his views known: see RP-GC, art 105(6). The submissions at the hearing would be confined to the contents of the non-confidential version.

221

2.111  General outline of procedure

4 Dispensing with the oral procedure 2.111 In the Statute and the rules of procedure the oral procedure can be dispensed with altogether (that is, in relation to all of its component parts) in the following instances: (i) where the case is to be dismissed on the ground of a ‘clear’ lack of jurisdiction or ‘manifest’ inadmissibility;426 (ii) where the case is inadmissible or devoid of purpose but it is sufficient to ‘hear’ the parties in writing alone;427 (iii) in the ECJ and GC, where the ECJ considers that it has sufficient information to give a ruling;428 (iv) in the GC and CST, where the case is to be dismissed on the ground of a manifest lack of foundation in law;429 (v) in the CST, where there has been a second round of written pleadings and the parties have agreed that the CST can proceed to judgment in the absence of the oral procedure.430 In relation to (i)–(iv), the Court may dispose of the case without a hearing even if one of the parties has requested a hearing431 and even if the written procedure has been followed to its normal conclusion.432 The existence of those exceptions does not detract from the basic principle that the substance of a person’s rights and obligations cannot be determined in a direct action without a hearing. The only true exception to that principle is (iii) because: (i) and (iv) concern situations in which a defect in the case is manifest; (ii) does not involve

426 RP-ECJ, art 53(2); RP-GC, art 126; RP-CST, art 81. A ‘clear’ lack of jurisdiction can technically be classified as a species of manifest inadmissibility. Eg Case F-143/11 Marcuccio v Commission, 18 June 2013, paras 16–17 (appeal dismissed on other grounds in Case T-447/13 P Marcuccio v Commission, 2 October 2014). 427 RP-ECJ, art  149 and 150 (the reference in the latter provision to an ‘absolute bar’ is to inadmissibility) and, where the point is raised by a party under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-ECJ, art 151(3)–(4); RP-GC, art 129 and 131 and, where the point is raised by a party under RPGC, art 130(1) or (2), RP-GC, art 130(4)–(6); RP-CST, art 82 and 85 and, where the point is raised by a party under RP-CST, art 83(1), RP-CST, art 83(2). Eg Case C-407/11 P Government of Gibraltar v Commission, 12  July 2012, para  45; Case C-239/12  P  Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 28 May 2013, paras 41–44 and 48; Case C-269/12 P Canas v Commission, 28 May 2013, paras 42–44 (see also para 49); Case C-183/12 P Ayadi v Council, 6 June 2013, paras 39–42 and 46. 428 RP-ECJ, art  76(2); RP-GC, art  106(3). In ECJ proceedings, such a decision is made by reference to the written pleadings and on a proposal from the judge rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general. In GC proceedings, the decision is made by reference to ‘the material in the file’, which means the pleadings and documentary evidence contained in the case file. The advocate general is also heard (if there is one): see RP-GC, art 31(3), which lists decisions made under RP-GC, art 106 as ones to be made after hearing the advocate general. In neither ECJ nor GC proceedings are the parties ‘heard’ on the proposal to dispense with the hearing. The criterion of there being ‘sufficient information’ to make a decision is somewhat flimsy. Unless the written procedure has been conducted contrary to the rules of procedure, it will always lead to a situation in which there is sufficient information to make a decision (albeit not always the right decision). The correct question to ask is whether or not the hearing is capable of adding usefully to the information already before the Court. 429 RP-GC, art 126; RP-CST, art 81. Eg Case F-58/08 Avogadri v Commission, 21 February 2013, paras 30–31; Case F-63/08 Christoph v Commission, 14 March 2013, paras 30–31. 430 Statute, Annex, art 7(2); RP-CST, art 59(2). 431 Cf Case T-367/11 Lyder Enterprises Ltd v Community Plant Variety Office, 21 October 2013, paras 16–17. 432 Cf Alsteens (above, note 142), para 38.

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General outline of procedure 2.113

a consideration of the substantive issues in the case; and (v) operates where the parties have given their consent.433 2.112 So far as (iii) is concerned, it is implicit that the power to dispense with the oral part of the procedure can be exercised only in cases in which it is apparent at the end of the written procedure that there is no need for any preparatory enquiry or measure of organisation of procedure and that the case can be decided solely on the basis of the written pleadings as they stand.434 As in the case of preliminary issues, it would seem that, in principle, the exercise of the power to dispense with the oral part of the procedure means that, in addition to there being no oral hearing of the parties, there is no delivery by the advocate general of an opinion on the case; but, since the power has so far been exercised very rarely, it is difficult to discern what is the practice regarding the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion.435 As a matter of principle, a power to dispense altogether with the public hearing of the parties must be approached with the greatest of caution in case it leads to an erosion of the fundamental procedural rights of the parties and of public confidence in the proper administration of justice. 2.113 Where the oral part of the procedure in a case is dispensed with, the ECJ can proceed to consider its decision in the case immediately after having decided to dispense with the oral part. If the Court decides to dispense with the oral procedure, that does not prevent it from changing its mind later on and ‘re-opening’ the oral procedure prior to delivering judgment.436

433 It nonetheless remains the case that, save where (v) applies, the Court must be careful to ensure that the facts and matters on which it bases its decision are known to the party adversely affected by the decision before the decision is made. Save in cases that are truly manifest, a party must be given the opportunity to comment on facts and matters that may be used against him. For the difficulties that can arise if such care is not taken, see: Case T-253/06P Chassagne v Commission [2008] ECR-SC 1-B-43, II-B-I-295, paras 21–41. 434 In contrast, where measures of enquiry have been ordered, the President ‘shall’ fix the date for the opening of the oral part of the procedure after the measures of enquiry have been completed (unless the parties are asked to submit written observations in the meantime): RP-ECJ, art 75(1). 435 In Case C-377/90 Commission v Belgium [1992]  ECR  I-1229, Case C-378/92 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-5095 and Case C-362/98 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-6299, the advocate general did deliver an opinion. Since there was no hearing, the report for the hearing (which was then a requirement of the oral procedure) was replaced by a ‘Judge-Rapporteur’s Report’ (a change of title and nothing else). For the position in the case of preliminary issues, see RP-ECJ, art  151(4), which similarly provides for the oral part of the proceedings to be dispensed with, in which case there is no advocate general’s opinion. 436 Eg Case C-12/98 Far v Far [2000]  ECR  I-527 at 536, paras 2–3; RP-GC, art  106(3), last sentence. The ECJ seems to consider that it may open the oral procedure under RP-ECJ, art 83 which, in the present context, would apply if a party has submitted a new fact that is of such a nature as to be decisive for the decision of the ECJ: eg  Cases C-228/12 to C-232/12 and C-254/12 to C-258/12 Vodafone Omnitel NV v Autorita pe le Garanzie nelle Communicazioni, 18 July 2013, paras 24–28 (in that case, the new fact lacked the requisite decisive character). For the reopening of the oral procedure, see further para 2.147 ff below.

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2.114  General outline of procedure

5 Applications for a hearing 2.114 In CST proceedings, there is no need for the parties to apply for a hearing because, save in cases in which the CST has power to decide without hearing the parties, there must be a hearing.437 In ECJ and GC proceedings, the need for an application for a hearing to be made arises from the existence of the power of the ECJ and GC to dispense with a hearing if it considers that it already has sufficient information to decide the case (see the preceding subsection). 2.115 As to ECJ proceedings, before the amendment of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure in 2012, the ECJ’s general power to dispense with a hearing was exercisable subject to the condition that none of the parties had submitted an application setting out the reasons for which that party wished to be heard.438 At that time, the possibility of dispensing with the hearing was normally raised by the ECJ itself in a letter to the parties notifying them of the close of the written procedure.439 At that stage, the ECJ had normally reserved the right to dispense with the hearing but intended to make a decision in the light of any application made by the parties. The position resulting from the 2012 Rules of Procedure is unclear. RP-ECJ, art 76(1) baldly states that ‘any’ reasoned requests for a hearing are to be submitted within three weeks from service on the parties of notification of the close of the written procedure (a time limit that may be extended by the President). It is therefore unclear if the assumption is that there will be no hearing unless such a request is made (and granted by the ECJ). The better view seems to be that art 20 of the Statute (which provides that the procedure consists of a written and an oral part and which is restated in RP-ECJ, art 53(1)) prevails. Accordingly, a hearing will take place unless the ECJ exercises its power to dispense with the hearing on the ground that the written part of the procedure has provided it with sufficient information to give a ruling;440 and the function of reasoned requests for a hearing, made by one or other of the parties, is to assist the ECJ in reaching a conclusion on that point. However, it is not prudent for a party to assume that it is safe to refrain from applying for a hearing (if that party would prefer there to be one) since a failure to apply for a hearing can be taken to imply that the party concerned perceives there to be no need for one. 2.116 As to GC proceedings, RP-GC, art  106(2) sets a time limit of three weeks, running from service on the parties of notification of the close of the written procedure (and extendable by the President on application), within which ‘any’ reasoned request for a hearing may be made by an applicant or defendant (no request by an intervener is envisaged). The reasons supporting the request must explain why the party making the request ‘wishes’ to be heard. RP-GC, art 106(3) empowers the GC to dispense with the oral procedure if two conditions 437 RP-CST, art 59(1). 438 RP-ECJ, art 44a of the pre-2012 rules of procedure. 439 Under RP-ECJ, art 44a, the parties had a period of three weeks from the date of notification within which to apply for there to be a hearing. 440 As RP-ECJ, art 76(2) provides. Cf PD-ECJ, para 45. It should be noted that RP-ECJ, art 76(3) applies only in the context of references for a preliminary ruling.

224

General outline of procedure 2.118

are satisfied: no reasoned request for a hearing has been made in time; and the GC considers that it has sufficient information available to it, from the material in the file, to rule on the action. Read literally, the GC has no power to dispense with the oral part of the procedure if the material in the case file is ‘sufficient’ but a reasoned request for a hearing has been made in time. If no reasoned request is lodged in time and the information in the case file is ‘sufficient’, the GC has discretion as to whether or not to open the oral part of the procedure. In the GC’s commentary on the draft of the 2015 GC rules of procedure, the GC stated that the effect of RP-GC, art 106(2)–(3) is that the parties are ‘invited to inform the [GC]…of the reasons for which they consider it necessary that a hearing be held…’ (which is not what RP-GC, art 106(2) says); and that ‘if a reasoned request is made to the [GC], it must organise a hearing’. It therefore appears that, in the GC’s conception, the organising of a hearing is obligatory if a reasoned request is made; but it also appears that the reasoned request must be directed at establishing the necessity for a hearing. It is not clear what happens if the GC’s assessment of the case leads it to disagree with the reasons advanced in a request made by a party in order to show the necessity for a hearing. On the face of it, the GC is precluded from dispensing with the hearing in those circumstances. 2.117 In ECJ proceedings, any party may apply to be heard;441 but, in GC proceedings, only an applicant or defendant may apply.442 If the application is successful, that means that all the parties will be given an opportunity to be heard (the hearing does not benefit only the party who applied for it).443 2.118 The application (or request) for a hearing must set out the reasons why the party applying wishes to be heard. It is not clear what are the reasons likely to find favour with the ECJ or GC. If the wording of the ECJ and GC rules of procedure is taken at face value, it would seem that the reasons advanced in an ECJ case must be directed at the question whether or not the ECJ has sufficient information to decide the case whereas the reasons advanced in a GC case must be directed at why it is that the party making the request ‘wishes to be heard’ (which encompasses, but is not limited to, the question whether or not the GC has sufficient information to make a decision). However, if the matter is probed further, the position changes somewhat. As noted above, there is a disparity between the wording of RP-GC, art 106(2) and the GC’s description of its object. However, both PD-ECJ, para 46 and PD-CG, para 180 provide (in slightly different wording) that the reason for wishing to be heard orally ‘must be based on a real assessment of the benefit of a hearing to the party in question and must indicate the documentary elements or arguments which that party considers it necessary to develop or disprove more

441 In this context ‘parties’ includes interveners: there is no rational basis for construing RP-ECJ, art  76(1) in a restrictive way and thus limiting the reference to ‘parties’ to applicants and defendants. 442 RP-GC, art 106(2) allows only a ‘main’ party to request a hearing. 443 If there is a hearing, a party can always indicate that it does not intend to attend if it sees no point in doing so.

225

2.119  General outline of procedure

fully at the hearing’.444 That implies a broader understanding of what may justify there being a hearing than is indicated by the criterion specified in RP-ECJ, art  76(2) (the written part of the procedure has provided ‘sufficient information to give a ruling’). More particularly, PD-ECJ, para 46 and PD-CG, para 180 are actually directed at the relevant question: whether or not the hearing is capable of making a useful contribution to deciding the case. 2.119 Bearing in mind the importance of the public hearing of the parties, it would appear to be sufficient that the party applying considers that there are points outstanding at the end of the written procedure that need answering or further development. However, such points need to be identified. It does not seem to be sufficient to base the application on the general desire to exercise the right to a hearing, on a presumption that a hearing would advance the proper disposal of the case, or on the importance of the case.445 The safeguard provided by the opportunity to apply for there to be a hearing seems to satisfy any concerns that there might be about the compatibility with the fundamental procedural rights of the parties of the power to dispense with the hearing. However, it does not deal with the public interest in the open administration of justice or with the public interest in the ECJ being assisted in its task by the advocate general. It would therefore seem that the power to dispense with the oral part of the procedure is to be exercised only in cases which do not give rise to issues of factual or legal complexity, which are not of general public interest and the resolution of which would not be advanced by holding a hearing. That is not to say that the parties should be required to address the Court when they do not wish to do so or see no point in doing so because they feel that they have nothing further to say.446 The point to be emphasised is that the decision to dispense with the oral part of the procedure is one for the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC to make having regard to all the relevant circumstances, not just the wishes of the parties. There may well be cases (such as disputes between EU institutions, or between an EU institution and a member state, or between member states, as well as those between an EU institution and a private person) in which the parties may well wish to avoid the embarrassment of ventilating their differences in public; but such considerations cannot override the public interest in having the dispute aired in public or in ensuring that the Court is in full possession of the material that it needs to decide the case (including an advocate general’s opinion).447 Accordingly, the Court cannot be obliged to dispense with the hearing if no party applies for one.

444 The quotation is from PD-ECJ, para  46. PD-GC, para  180 says: ‘must be based on a real assessment of the benefit of a hearing to the party in question and must indicate the elements of the case-file or arguments which that party considers it necessary to develop or refute more fully at a hearing’. PD-ECJ, para 46 and PD-GC, para 180 also state that the ‘reasoning’ supporting the application for a hearing should not exceed three pages. 445 PD-ECJ, para  46 and PD-GC, para  180 counsel against the reliance on generalities and on assertions about the importance of the case. 446 As appears to have happened in Case T-575/93 Koelman v Commission [1996]  ECR II-1, para 18. 447 It is worthy of note that, in its commentary on the draft of the 2015 rules of procedure (under art 106), the GC referred, disappointingly, to matters of convenience and overlooked entirely the public interest function of the hearing.

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2.120 If a party consents to dispensing with the hearing, that party necessarily foregoes the opportunity to state its views on any matters outstanding at the close of the written procedure that have not been dealt with in writing. Accordingly, it may be inferred that that party does not dispute those outstanding matters.448 The drawing of such an inference would not, of course, be appropriate if the party in question had requested a hearing but the request had not been granted. Where a party disputes an outstanding matter but does not consider that a hearing is necessary, it is probably better practice for the party to inform the Court that the matter in question is in dispute (even though the party does not consider that a hearing is necessary). The Court should then refrain from drawing any inference adverse to the party in question in relation to the matter in question and may take the party’s position into account when deciding whether or not there should be a hearing. If the Court is not warned that an outstanding matter is in dispute, then there is a risk that the Court will draw an inference adverse to the party concerned. Where none of the parties requests a hearing, and various matters remain outstanding as between them, the situation regarding the inferences that may or may not be drawn is particularly complex and best dealt with either through a request from the Court, addressed to the parties, to clarify their position on the point in question or the holding of a hearing (if and to the extent that any outstanding matter is material to the disposal of the case). 6 Dispensing with part of the oral procedure 2.121 In principle, any part of the oral procedure may be dispensed with only if there is express provision enabling the Court to do so. There are only two such provisions applicable to direct actions.449 First, in proceedings before the ECJ, if the ECJ considers that the case raises no new point of law, it may decide to dispense with the advocate general’s opinion. That decision is made after hearing the advocate general.450 The question of dispensing with the advocate general’s opinion should be raised in the judge-rapporteur’s preliminary report. Any recommendation to do so is considered in the light of the views of the advocate 448 Case C-499/99 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-6031, Advocate General Mischo, para 79 (p 6051). See to similar effect PD-GC, para 199, which states that refraining from presenting oral arguments is not taken to be acquiescence in the oral arguments presented by the opposing party ‘where the arguments in question have already been refuted in writing’. 449 Unless RP-ECJ, art 76(2) is to be construed as empowering the ECJ to dispense with a part only of the oral procedure (namely, the hearing of the parties): see Case C-362/98 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-6299, where that seems to have been the advocate general’s view (para 5 of his opinion – p 6300). 450 Statute, art 20, 5th para. In principle, that provision applies also to the GC by virtue of Statute, art 53. However, since an advocate general is used in cases before the GC exceptionally and on the basis of a decision of the GC, it does not appear that Statute, art 20, 5th para, would fall to be applied in proceedings before the GC. The ECJ appears to take a liberal view of Statute, art 20, 5th para, in the sense that a decision to dispense with the advocate general’s opinion is no guarantee that the case raises no new point of law. The approach in practice seems, instead, to be oriented around the question whether or not an advocate general’s opinion would be useful in assisting the ECJ to produce a judgment. Further, there is anecdotal evidence that decisions to dispense with the advocate general’s opinion have at times been influenced by the workload of the advocate general concerned and other considerations.

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general in the case.451 Secondly, in proceedings before the GC, the opinion of the advocate general may be given in writing.452 2.122 Where one or other, or all, of the parties are prevented by supervening events beyond their control from attending the hearing at the appointed time, they do not consent to dispensing with that part of the oral procedure and the Court has no power to cancel the hearing but should refix it. 7 Fixing the date of the oral procedure 2.123 The opening date of the oral procedure is the date of the hearing of the parties; the oral procedure terminates with the end of the hearing of the parties or, if there is an advocate general in the case, with the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion. The President fixes straight away the opening date of the oral procedure where the Court decides to open the oral procedure without a preparatory enquiry or, as the case may be, a measure of organisation of procedure.453 Where a preparatory enquiry is ordered (or, before the GC or CST, where a measure of organisation of procedure is prescribed), the President fixes the date for the opening of the oral procedure when the measures ordered have been completed.454 The practice of the ECJ is different in that, when it prescribes the equivalent of a measure of organisation of procedure, the letter informing the parties usually accompanies the notification of the date of the hearing. The opening of the oral procedure does not limit the power of the Court to order further measures of enquiry or of organisation of procedure during or after the oral procedure.455 2.124 In theory the Court deals with cases in the order in which they become ready for examination456 which, so far as the hearing is concerned, means when 451 RP-ECJ, art 59(2). 452 Statute, art 53, 3rd para, which derogates from Statute, art 20, 4th para. However, the former provision does not state that it also derogates from Statute, art 49, 2nd para, which provides that the role of the advocate general in the GC is to make submissions on the case ‘in open court’. A derogation from that provision is implicit. 453 RP-ECJ, art 60(4). RP-GC, art 107(1) and RP-CST, art 60 simply state that the president fixes the date of the hearing. 454 RP-ECJ, art  75. The same is implicit in RP-GC, art  107(1) and RP-CST, art  60. Where the parties are given an opportunity to submit written observations after the measures (of enquiry or of organisation of procedure) have been undertaken, those measures are to be taken to have been completed when the written observations have been lodged. 455 RP-GC, art  88(1), RP-CST, art  69(1) and RP-CST, art  71(1) provide that measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry may be undertaken at any stage of the proceedings. The same is implied in RP-ECJ, art 83, which provides that the oral procedure may be reopened, inter alia, if the ECJ considers that it lacks sufficient information. For example, in Case T-169/89 Frederiksen v European Parliament [1991] ECR II-1403, paras 34–44, the parties were told by the Court at the end of the hearing that complementary measures of enquiry would be ordered. Those took the form of an order requiring the defendant to provide further information and produce documents relating to a particular point of fact. The information and documents produced in accordance with the order led the Court to commission an expert’s report. 456 RP-GC, art 67(1); RP-CST, art 41(1).

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they are ready to be heard (ie in the order in which the preparatory enquiries are completed or, where there are no preparatory enquiries, in the order in which they are dealt with at the administrative meeting), subject to applications for interim relief, which have priority; where the preparatory enquiries in several cases are completed simultaneously, the order of cases is determined by the date on which the proceedings in each case were commenced (ie the date on which they were first entered on the register). In addition, as noted above, cases may be given priority or deferred.457 The ECJ’s practice is to try to give references for a preliminary ruling priority over direct actions. In practice, matters are not quite so simple because the hearings have to be fitted in where the calendar permits and by reference to the days allocated to hearings by the Court and the chambers (including the Grand Chamber), respectively. In consequence, a case assigned to a particular chamber may be heard before another case assigned to a different chamber, as the case may be, contrary to the proper order in which they should be heard, simply because of the availability of a hearing date. The ECJ usually sits on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays; the GC and CST are more flexible and may also sit on Mondays and Fridays. 8 Notification of the hearing date and communications prior to the hearing 2.125 As a rule, the oral procedure is divided into two parts: the hearing of the parties and the hearing of the advocate general’s opinion458 (where there is one). Both hearings are before the Court or chamber; the parties are invited (but are not obliged) to attend the former.459 There is usually a gap of several weeks between the two so that the advocate general can prepare his opinion. The parties are informed by the Registrar of the date fixed for the hearing of their submissions and are asked to indicate for how long they are likely to address the Court so that the cause list can be drawn up.460 The letter will usually indicate the maximum time that the Court considers will be required for the party’s oral submissions and the time likely to be allocated to a party if he or she fails to indicate how

457 See paras 2.83–2.96 above. 458 ‘Submissions’ in the Statute, arts 20, 4th para, 49, 2nd para, and 53, 3rd para. 459 Eg RP-GC, art 108(1); RP-CST, art 62. From the reports of Case 224/83 Ferriera Vittoria Srl v Commission [1984] ECR 2349 and Case T-91/92 Daemen v Commission [1993] ECR II-1491, para 7, it would seem that the applicant did not attend the hearing of the parties. 460 For the usual contents of the letter sent by the ECJ, see PD-ECJ, para  47. There is no set period that must elapse between receipt of the letter and the date of the hearing, although PD-GC, para 184 refers to at least one month’s notice and PD-CST, para 53 refers to ‘a few weeks’. Accordingly, the kind of difficulties that arose in Cases T-133/08, T-134/08, T-177/08 and T-242/09 Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office, 18 September 2012, paras 217–246 (unaffected by the appeal in Case C-546/12  P  Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office, 21 May 2015), which concerned a mandatory period set out in a legislative measure, do not arise. However, the observation in para 235, that a period of notice sufficient to enable a party to prepare for the hearing, is still relevant by analogy. Nonetheless, it needs to be borne in mind that other factors (such as the need to deal with the case expeditiously) may have to be taken into account, in addition to the need to give the parties’ representatives sufficient time to prepare for the hearing (as PD-GC, para 184 indicates).

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long he or she wishes to take.461 If a party wishes to address the Court for more than the usual maximum period an application should be made to the President in good time before the date of the hearing, setting out the reasons why more time is required.462 Where several parties appear in the same interest they may be asked to co-ordinate their addresses to the Court in order to avoid repetition and to save time. The parties may also be asked to answer certain questions at the hearing or confine their oral submissions to particular points of concern to the Court.463 The parties may also be given a copy of a short guide to conduct at the hearing produced by the Court itself, although considerable detail about the conduct of hearings is to be found in the practice directions issued by the ECJ, GC and CST.464 In the event that one of the parties is unable to attend on the day fixed by the President, a request may be made for the date to be changed. Neither the Statute nor the rules of procedure provide a procedure for doing so but in practice it may be done by writing, fax or e-mail (or even telephone if there is urgency, but there should be confirmation in writing) to the Registrar.465 If a party does not intend to appear at the hearing, he should so inform the Court at the earliest opportunity.466

461 The maximum that a party requires is usually considered to be 15 minutes before the ECJ (see PD-ECJ, para 52), 15 minutes before the GC for a main party or 10 minutes for an intervener (PD-GC, art 201) and 20 minutes before the CST (PD-CST, para 61). Five minutes may be allocated if a party fails to specify how long his or her submissions will be. 462 PD-ECJ, para 52 and PD-GC, para 202 (which specify that the application must be received at least two weeks before the hearing). 463 Cf RP-ECJ, art 61(1) and (2) and RP-ECJ, art 62(2). See, for example, Case 10/83 Metalgoi SpA v Commission [1983] ECR 1271 at 1274; PD-GC, para 204. 464 PD-ECJ, paras 44–57; PD-GC, paras 179–211; PD-CST, paras 50–68. PD-GC, para 194 refers to the GC’s aide memoire on oral argument. 465 RP-GC, art 107(2) confers on the President of the GC power to adjourn a hearing to another date in exceptional circumstances, on his own motion or on application by an applicant or defendant. See also PD-GC, para  185 and PD-CST, para  53. The hearing may be cancelled or postponed for good reason, such as the illness of the party’s representative (Case T-261/94 Schulte v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-44, para 30). However, in Case T-129/01 Jose Alejandro Sl v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003] ECR II-2251, para 15, the CFI (as it then was) proceeded to hold the hearing in the absence of the intervener, who was unable to attend for reasons beyond its control. In Case C-195/09 Synthon BV  v Merz Pharma GmbH & Co KGaA  [2011]  ECR  I-7011 and Case C-427/09 Generics (UK) Ltd v Synaptech Inc [2011]  ECR  I-7099 (both references for a preliminary ruling), some of the parties (including the principal parties) were prevented from travelling to the Court by unanticipated adverse weather conditions (no means of transport were available). Oral applications were made by telephone for the hearing to be cancelled and refixed. Initially, the parties were told that the hearing would go ahead in their absence but that they could send to the Court any written speeches or speaking notes that they had. It appears that the Court later relented and a new hearing date was fixed. There is GC authority that, where a party’s representative is prevented from attending the hearing by a force majeure event, an application to reopen the oral procedure may be made: see Case T-235/94 Galtieri v Parliament [1996] ECR-SC I-A-43, II-129, para 17. 466 Cf PD-ECJ, para 47; PD-GC, para 186; PD-CST, para 55. If a party chooses not to attend the hearing, it will proceed in his absence but, if all the parties indicate an intention not to attend the hearing, the oral procedure will be closed without the hearing taking place: RP-GC, art 108; RP-CST, art 62.

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2.126 Before the start of the hearing, the parties are served with the report for the hearing prepared by the judge-rapporteur, where there is one.467 In proceedings before the ECJ that report originally formed an integral part of the Court’s judgment. It later comprised a self-contained section usually attached to the judgment, referred to in it and reported with it; before becoming a very short, perfunctory, document. In proceedings before the GC and CST the report for the hearing is drawn up solely for the purposes of the hearing. In all three Courts the report consisted of a summary of the facts of the case, the procedure and the arguments of the parties. It was purely descriptive and contained no findings of fact or law, although it might indicate the approach of the judge-rapporteur to the case. Where a report for the hearing is circulated, the parties should, however, check that it represents their side of the case accurately and if necessary write to the Registrar pointing out where it does not do so and suggesting any appropriate amendments.468 9 Conduct of the hearing 2.127 At the time fixed for the hearing of the case, the parties attend with their counsel in one of the courtrooms at the Court. If a party does not appear at the hearing without any explanation, the Registrar will normally check that the absent party was properly informed of the date of the hearing. If not, the hearing should be adjourned. However, if the absent party was informed of the date of the hearing, there is nothing to prevent the Court from proceeding in that party’s absence, should it wish to do so.469 The parties’ representatives wear their national robes and agents of the EU institutions wear special gowns. In the 467 The requirement to draw up a report for the hearing was removed from the Statute in 2012; but nothing prevents the Court from producing a report for the hearing if it thinks it appropriate to do so. The practice in the ECJ and GC was to aim to serve it on the parties three weeks before the date of the hearing: eg PD-GC, para 187. The deadline was occasionally not met. The CST initially sent the report for the hearing to the parties with the notice to attend the hearing but later did so in good time before the hearing: PD-CST, para 54. In Case 11/63 Lepape v High Authority [1964] ECR 61, the applicant submitted, in an application for the reopening of the oral procedure made after the date of the hearing, that he had not received a copy of the report for the hearing and so could not challenge any inaccuracies in it. The Court held (order of 28 November 1963) that, as a copy had been duly served on him in good time, at his address for service, he was deemed to have been able to present his observations on it at the hearing, and rejected the application. Failure to receive the report for the hearing by the time the hearing had commenced did not vitiate the oral procedure in the era when a report for the hearing was required. 468 Eg PD-GC, paras 187–189. The opportunity to comment on the report for the hearing can be used only for the purpose of correcting inaccuracies in it and cannot be used to repeat or advance arguments that should have been canvassed fully in the course of the written procedure: Cases T-120/01 and T-300/01 de Nicola v European Investment Bank [2004] ECR-SC I-A-365, II-1671, para 261. Case F-121/07 Strack v Commission, 20 January 2011, para 42, comments on the role of the report for the hearing and corrections to it. It is pointless disputing a judgment on the ground that the judges had recourse only to a defective report for the hearing: see Case C-161/97P Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems GmbH v Commission [1999] ECR I-2057, paras 57–58 of the judgment (p 2148). 469 RP-GC, art 108(1); RP-CST, art 62(1); PD-CST, para 55. Cf Case T-104/02 Societe francaise de transports Gondrand Freres SA v Commission [2004] ECR II-3211, para 15.

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event that a party appears in person or a lawyer representing a party does not wear a gown in proceedings before the national courts before which he or she is qualified to appear, it would seem to follow that there is no obligation to wear a gown in the proceedings before the Court.470 However, the President of the Court or chamber hearing the case, who is responsible for the proper conduct of the hearing,471 may decide for reasons of decorum that a gown should be worn, in which case it is permissible to use one of the gowns used by the agents of the EU institutions, which are available at the Court.472 In front of the Court bench are tables for the parties’ representatives. There is no rule laying down which is to be occupied by the applicant and which by the defendant. Generally the applicant, and those intervening in his support, and the defendant, and those supporting him, sit in separate groups. The representatives of the Commission generally sit at the table on the President’s right hand but do not appear to have any prescriptive, traditional or other right to do so.473 Where senior counsel is accompanied by junior counsel there may not be enough room for both to sit side by side or even one behind the other. In addition, counsel addressing the Court must speak through a microphone so that what he says may be interpreted and understood by the Court. There is often only one microphone for each side and there is in consequence much toing and froing in the course of a hearing in which one side or the other has more than one counsel to speak for it. 2.128 At any time before the date of the hearing, the Court may indicate to the parties that there are particular questions that one or other of them should answer at the hearing or particular points on which the Court would like to hear submissions.474 Where several parties share a common interest in the case, the Court may ask them to coordinate their submissions in order to avoid any unnecessary

470 Thus, PD-GC, para  195 and PD-CST, para  57 require the parties’ representatives to appear before the Court ‘in their gowns’ or ‘in their robes’, respectively, which presupposes that they have gowns or robes to wear. 471 Cf RP-ECJ, art 78; RP-GC, art 110(1); RP-CST, art 63(1). 472 Cf PD-ECJ, para  4; PD-CST, para  57. Thus, in Case C-168/91 Christos Konstantinidis [1993] ECR I-1191 (a reference for a preliminary ruling), the President required a litigant in person to wear a gown when addressing the Court. PD-ECJ, para  4 reflects that practice. It states that any person presenting oral arguments to the ECJ ‘irrespective of their qualifications or the capacity in which they are called upon’ must wear a gown. No gowns are usually worn at the hearing in an application for interim relief or in a measure of enquiry, eg where the Court or a chamber hears the testimony of a witness, but that is a matter for the President of the Court or chamber to decide. 473 The GC’s aide-memoire on oral argument (available on the Court’s website) says that the applicant should be on the GC’s right hand side and the defendant on the left. 474 Cf RP-ECJ, art 61(1). Eg Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval BV v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381, in which the parties were also given leave to lodge ‘speaking notes’ before the hearing, which gave rise to issues of confidentiality: see paras 68–78. PD-ECJ, para 51 suggests that, where the Court has asked the parties to concentrate on a particular question or issue, only that matter should in general be addressed in oral submissions. PD-GC, para 198 says that issues raised by the GC must be addressed ‘as a matter of priority’ in the oral submissions. Indications from the Court as to how it is thinking are obviously important; but what might have appeared to the Court (or some members of it) before the hearing to be important may not be regarded by it as so important after the hearing.

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repetition.475 In addition, before the case is called on the day of the hearing, counsel are invited by the Registrar, his deputy or the usher to go to the room behind the Court in order to be introduced to the members of the Court. At that point there is often an informal discussion concerning proceedings at the hearing such as the order and length of the speeches.476 The members of the Court, in particular the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general (where there is one), may put questions to counsel and ask them to give particular attention to certain points or issues in the case. Counsel may be asked to respond to those matters in the course of their oral address to the Court, which may cause timing difficulties if the Court’s requests have not been anticipated by counsel. It may therefore be necessary to request the presiding judge to give counsel more time to address the Court (in general, the Court is oblivious to the practical difficulties posed by lastminute questions). 2.129 The Court enters to the cry by the usher of ‘the Court’, uttered in the language of the case. The President of the Court or chamber sits in the centre with the other judges on his right and left in order of seniority. In cases heard by the full Court or the Grand Chamber, he sits with the presidents of the chambers to his immediate right and left followed by the other judges (in order of seniority). The Registrar or his deputy sits to the far left of the President. In cases before the ECJ the advocate general assigned to the case sits to the President’s far right. The President invites the Registrar to call the case and, after that has been done, the President opens the proceedings. Before 2012, the Statute provided that the hearing should commence with the reading by the judge-rapporteur of the report for the hearing. That was invariably dispensed with. If anything, the President simply said that it could be taken as read. Currently, the President begins by calling on counsel for the applicant to open (where a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the application has been made, it is the defendant who opens because it is he or she who has applied to have the action declared inadmissible). 2.130 The usual order of speeches is applicant, those who have intervened in his or her support (in the order: member states, EU institutions, other persons), defendant and, lastly, those who have intervened in his or her support. Each 475 Cf PD-GC, para 204. Coordinating the submissions of a group of parties does not, ordinarily, prejudice any one of them. However, it does not appear that the Court could or should constrain the parties to cooperate since they may well take different views of the strengths or weaknesses of different parts of the case and there may well be conflicts of interest between them of which the Court is unaware. The burden lies on any party who wishes to complain of the way in which the Court has asked the parties to coordinate their submissions at the hearing to make good the complaint: Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, C-245/99P, C-247/99P, C-250/99P to C-252/99P and C-254/99P  Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV  v Commission [2002]  ECR  I-8375, Advocate General Alber, paras 100–107 and 122 (pp 8474-8475), judgment, paras 345–352 (pp 8726– 8728). 476 In GC proceedings, where a party has more than one representative, no more than two of them may normally be allowed to present the party’s case (within the time allotted to the party for making oral submissions) but the other representatives may answer questions put by members of the Court or reply to the submissions of other parties: PD-GC, para 203. In ECJ proceedings, an application must be made before the hearing if a second person is to be permitted to make oral submissions on behalf of a party: PD-ECJ, para 53.

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speaker is given an opportunity to reply.477 The object of the reply is to deal with the points raised orally by the representatives of the other parties and not to repeat the opening speech or present a second prepared speech.478 The President may allow the parties to respond to a reply but that is, naturally, dependent on the circumstances.479 The President and other members of the Court may put questions to the parties.480 Questions and interjections may be made by the members of the Court during or at the end of the speeches. The usual practice followed at the time of writing was that the members of the Court would put their questions to the parties after all the parties had made their opening speeches to the Court and before any replies.481 Interventions from the members of the Court are considerably less frequent than they are in, for example, British or Irish courts. In GC proceedings, if a party refrains from presenting oral arguments at the hearing, that will not be construed as acquiescence in the oral arguments of another party at the hearing where those arguments have already been disputed in the written pleadings.482 That can be taken to be a general rule because it makes common sense. It does not follow that a party will be taken to acquiesce in something 477 The order of the replies is, irrationally, the same as the order of the opening speeches. In principle, each party should be in a position to respond immediately to the submissions of the party or parties that precede him or her, thus limiting the need for replies. That is prevented by the Court’s practice of limiting the time allocated to opening speeches to (in effect) the time devoted to a party’s prepared opening speech. Since replies are necessary for that reason, the rational order of the replies would be the reverse of the order of opening speeches, thus enabling the party who started first to respond to what everyone else has said. 478 Some advocates seem to think that the reply is the occasion for making a (prepared) second speech, including the citation of cases not previously mentioned, which is not directed at responding to the oral submissions of the opposing party. In some instances, the practice seems to be a device to circumvent the time limit placed on the opening speech. One might suppose that the presiding judge would wish to prevent replies from being misused in that way; but the main concern seems to be to prevent replies from taking up too much time. PD-ECJ, para 55 specifies a limit of five minutes for a reply. It is usually better to have identified and numbered the points to be made in reply as the hearing has been going on so that, when replying, it is possible to start off by saying ‘I have the following X points in reply’. The number of each point should then be stated before embarking on the point. In that way, the presiding judge can get an idea of how long the reply is going to take and how much progress the advocate is making. The presiding judge may get impatient and interrupt if the length of the reply cannot be gauged. 479 The problem of replies to replies is largely the result of the current practice regarding the order of replies (see above). Where the Court is reluctant to give a party the opportunity to reply to a reply, a member of the Court can remove the difficulty by asking that party a question (the question being, what is his reply to the other party’s reply?), as has been done in at least one case. 480 RP-ECJ, art 80; RP-GC, art 110(3); RP-CST, art 63(4)(a). RP-CST, art 63(4)(b) also refers to inviting the parties themselves to express their view on ‘certain aspects of the case’, which would normally be those aspects specified by the Court. That provision now (as from 1 September 2016) appears in RP-GC, art 110(4). 481 Eg PD-ECJ, para 54. Unless the presiding judge decides otherwise, there is nothing to prevent a judge from asking a question in the middle of a party’s speech. 482 PD-GC, para 199, which goes on to state that silence does not preclude a party from responding to the other party’s submissions. That means that, for example, the applicant (who goes first) can indicate that there is nothing to add to what has been said in writing but will still be able to reply to the defendant’s oral submissions. In those circumstances, the reply could still be only a reply (not a main speech) and would normally be allowed only for as long as a reply is justified (invariably shorter than a main speech).

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said by another party at the hearing if he or she fails to deal with it expressly and it has not been covered in the written pleadings. While the hearing is the opportunity to tie up all the loose ends in the case, that really applies to those loose ends existing at the close of the written procedure. The current system of organising hearings does not make it possible to resolve everything raised at the hearing. It is very often the case that a party in reply will respond only to those points made by another party that he or she feels need to be dealt with, within the time available, other points remaining in dispute. A general denial of points left unanswered at the reply stage (and that have not been the subject of an express admission at some stage in the proceedings) is implicit. 2.131 At the end of the hearing, the President either declares the oral procedure to be closed or, where there is an advocate general, adjourns proceedings to a later date for the presentation of the advocate general’s opinion.483 It is not usual for the advocate general to deliver his opinion immediately after the parties have been heard although that does happen from time to time. It is sometimes said that to give the opinion straight away does not show due respect for the arguments put to the Court by the parties at the hearing. In many cases, however, there is no reason that the opinion should not be given immediately. Usually the date for the opinion is fixed after the hearing but sometimes the President announces it when he or she adjourns the proceedings or the advocate general indicates when he or she intends to deliver it. The conduct of the hearing is to some extent dependent on the President, who is responsible for directing it,484 but some rules do exist in the Statute and rules of procedure and in the practice of the Court. 2.132 To begin with, a party may address the Court only through his agent, adviser or lawyer.485 The Statute provides, on the other hand, that the Court may examine experts, witnesses and the parties themselves at the hearing.486 It is very rare for any of those persons to be formally examined at the hearing because that is usually done, if at all, at the preparatory enquiry stage of proceedings. However, it sometimes happens that the Court will hear an expert at the hearing on some technical matter which is best explained directly rather than through the medium of the party’s representative.487 The Court has tended to refuse to hear a

483 Cf RP-ECJ, arts 81–82; RP-GC, arts 111–112; RP-CST, art 64(1). In Case T-5/92 Tallarico v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-477, paras 20–23, the oral procedure was suspended at the end of the hearing to allow the parties an opportunity to settle the dispute. They were unable to do so and, when the CFI (as it then was) had been so informed, the oral procedure was formally closed, enabling the case to be taken to the next procedural stage (judgment). 484 See note 471 above. 485 RP-ECJ, art 80 and 119(1) (the reference in RP-ECJ, art 80 to putting questions to a party is relevant only to references for a preliminary ruling from national courts or tribunals in which a party has a right of audience) and PD-ECJ, para 2; RP-GC, art 110(2); RP-CST, art 63(3). An exception to that rule is where the Court actually invites the party himself to express his view about a specific aspect of the case: RP-GC, art 110(4), as amended; RP-CST, art 63(4)(b). 486 Statute, art 32, applicable to the GC by virtue of art 53. 487 For example, in Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, the CFI (as it then was) heard expert economists who addressed the Court with the assistance of visual aids.

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party himself on the ground that he has his lawyer to speak for him. That occasionally causes difficulties where the ‘party’ also says that he is an expert. In such a case, the President exercises his or her discretion in the light of the matter on which the party wishes to be heard. Where the party is represented by an agent488 who is assisted by an adviser or a lawyer, both may address the Court. The parties may be requested to attend the hearing in person, in particular where the Court wishes to encourage489 or confirm490 an amicable settlement of the dispute. The Court may also hear a member state or EU institution which is not a party to the proceedings if it considers that it would be useful to do so.491 2.133 The content of a party’s oral submissions should take into account the fact that the issues in the case should have been fully argued during the written procedure. The hearing is an opportunity to synthesise the issues and answer any points left outstanding in the opposing party’s pleadings. Counsel may cite the pleadings, extracts from the evidence, the Court’s case law etc,492 but extensive quotation is frowned on as being unnecessary and largely repetitive: the Court is capable of reading what is to be found in the pleadings and elsewhere. Counsel need only direct his or her attention to the significant extracts. As a result, the hearing is, by English standards at least, abbreviated. 2.134 In theory, a new plea in law may be introduced at the hearing as long as it is based on matters of fact or law that have come to light in the course of the proceedings.493 However, if a matter of fact or law emerges after the close of the written procedure, it is better to draw the Court’s attention to it, and to the implications of it, in writing before the start of the hearing,494 because it is usually impractical to deal with it at the hearing, particularly if the opposing party has had no warning of the point. New pleas aside, the oral submissions may develop points already debated in the course of the written procedure but factual assertions need to be founded upon the evidence already before the Court.495 2.135 Probably the most important factor to bear in mind during the hearing is the problem of language. Where necessary, counsel’s submissions are interpreted simultaneously; in a French language case there may well not be interpretation because that is the Court’s working language and most of its members

488 As is the case with member states and EU institutions only, see Statute, art 19, 1st para. 489 Eg Case T-59/89 Yorck von Wartenburg v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-25; Cases T-33 and T-74/89 Blackman v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-249, order of 12 July 1990. 490 Case T-140/89 Della Pietra v Commission [1990] ECR II-717. 491 Eg Case 23/86 R United Kingdom v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1085 at para 3. 492 On citations of case law, see PD-GC, para 205 and PD-CST, para 62. An ECLI citation may also be used. Some advocates, out of courtesy, inform their opponents in advance of the hearing of any cases that they intend to cite in the course of the hearing, particularly a case not referred to in the written pleadings. The practice is not widespread. 493 RP-ECJ, art 127(1); RP-GC, art 84(1); RP-CST, art 56(1). 494 That is effectively what RP-GC, art 84(2) requires. 495 Cf Case F-2/09 Menghi v ENISA, 24 February 2010, paras 111–116.

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are familiar with it.496 However good the quality of the simultaneous interpretation, it is rarely possible to convey the full flavour and nuances of the original. Allowance must also be made for the fact that, if a member of the Court is listening to oral submissions made in a language that is not his or her mother tongue (and not relying on simultaneous interpretation), his or her speed and capacity of absorption may not be the same as that of a member in whose mother tongue the submissions are couched. In theory, it is generally better for counsel to speak freely from notes rather than read a prepared text because the latter encourages a swifter, more formal and more cursive delivery which is not always easy to interpret and absorb as the speaker is declaiming. However, the major problem with speaking freely is the need to keep to the time allocated for presenting oral argument.497 If a written text has been prepared it is useful if the interpreters can be given a copy of it a few days before the hearing498 but that does not prevent counsel from diverging from the prepared text as he or she thinks fit. However, if that is done, he or she should bear in mind that the interpreters have to follow. In any event, the delivery should be clear and at a pace that allows accurate interpretation. Presentation should for that reason be simple (for example, using a series of short sentences rather than one, long, involved sentence). Counsel are usually advised to limit their submissions to the minimum essential and not to take up all the time set aside for the hearing so that the Court can ask questions. A transcript of the hearing is made available to the Court499 so that it has the full 496 If a member state were intervening in a case and making use of its right under RP-ECJ, art 38(4) or RP-GC, art 46(4) to address the Court in its own official language, rather than the language of the case, interpretation would be provided even if all the members of the Court were acquainted with both. Interpretation is not merely for the benefit of the members of the Court but also for anyone else participating in the hearing. 497 There are, of course, orators with the talent to declaim at speed when using brief notes or a list of points and without having (apparently) prepared a speech, word for word, in advance. Generally, speaking freely from notes produces a more cadenced delivery, often with irregular pauses and repetitions designed for effect, that is easier for the listener to absorb (and for an interpreter to interpret into another language). A prepared text can achieve the same effect if appropriate pauses for effect are built in and the speech is structured so as to take the linguistic problems into account. The main constraint affecting the style and delivery of a speech is, however, the time limit placed by the Court. Unless an advocate is using a prepared text, speaking freely (whether from notes or memory) risks overrunning the allocated time or imbalancing the presentation of the argument. The guidance given by the Court has evolved over the years and is now reduced to that in PD-ECJ, para 57, PD-GC, paras 200 and 209–210 and PD-CST, paras 64–65. The guidance is based largely on the experience of the Court gained, in particular, before time limits were placed on oral submissions. For example, delivery of oral submissions in the way recommended by the ECJ in PD-ECJ, para 57 (which involves speaking freely on the basis of ‘properly structured’ notes and stating in advance the outline of the argument made) or PDGC, para 200 (which is similarly worded) can easily take half as much time again (if not more) as reading out a properly prepared text. 498 PD-ECJ, para 56; PD-GC, paras 207–208; PD-CST, para 66. 499 The recording from which the transcript is made may be listened to on a reasoned request made by a party: RP-ECJ, art  85; RP-GC, art  115; RP-CST, art  66. That recording is the original language version (not the recording of the simultaneous interpretation provided by the Court). In Case C-140/96 P Dimitriadis v Court of Auditors [1997] ECR I-5635, para 22, the ECJ held that the GC is not required to prepare a full record of hearings. That remains the case: the Court is not required to create a transcript. Minutes of the hearing are drawn up by the Registrar and signed by him and the President; they constitute an official record of the proceedings; in ECJ

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benefit of the parties’ submissions but it is produced some time after the hearing is over; and it is not then possible for points arising at the hearing which were missed at the time to be dealt with unless the Court takes the unusual step of setting a date for another hearing. Since the Court has its own transcript of the hearing it does not accept notes of the hearing made by the parties.500 2.136 The essence of an oral hearing is that it is oral. However, there are occasions on which the presentation of a party’s cases involves something that is not oral, that is, the production of a document or a thing. In that connection, it is important to distinguish between the production of a document (or the use of some other visual aid) in order to illustrate a point made in oral submissions, or in order to make the oral submissions easier to follow, and the production of evidence (on occasion, there may be an overlap between the two). In principle, objections to the former concern considerations relating to the orderly conduct of the hearing and, potentially, procedural fairness. Objections to the production of evidence at the hearing bring in additional factors relating to the procedural rules dealing with evidence. Unfortunately, the cases do not always distinguish between presentational aids and evidence, particularly in the case of documents. 2.137 It can be asserted as a general principle that, at the hearing, the President will normally refuse to admit a document unless it has already been served on the other parties to the case and they have consented to its production.501 Where proceedings they may be inspected by the parties at the Registry (the parties may obtain copies at their own expense) and in GC and CST proceedings they are served on the parties: RP-ECJ, art 84; RP-GC, art 114; RP-CST, art 65. The minutes are not a transcript of the hearing, but they may record important statements made by the parties during the hearing: see, for example, the Yorck von Wartenburg case (above, note 489) at para  8. However, there is no provision in the Treaties or the rules of procedure allowing the Court to take formal note of a party’s intention to bring an action against an EU institution: Case 141/84 De Compte v European Parliament [1985] ECR 1951, para 23. As an official record of the hearing, the minutes cannot be questioned in later proceedings: cf Case T-317/10 P L v Parliament, 11 September 2013, paras 107–109. Accordingly, it is important that any errors be corrected at the time. 500 In the context of an appeal, it is in principle possible for a party to apply to the appeal court for the production of the transcript of the hearing before the lower court; but there is no point in such an application if the events before the lower court at the hearing are not in dispute or the minutes of the hearing provide sufficient information: see Cases C-74/00P and C-75/00P Falck SpA v Commission [2002] ECR I-7869, para 69. 501 In Case T-24/00 The Sunrider Corpn v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2001] ECR II-449, para 14, production of evidence at the hearing was described as a breach of the right to be heard, whence the importance of the views of the opposing party. Eg Case 9/83 Eisen und Metall AG v Commission [1984] ECR 2071 at 2092; Cases T-362/05 and T-363/05 Nuova Agricast Srl v Commission [2008] ECR II-297, para 41 (production of document at the hearing not opposed and allowed without comment). In Case 109/83 Eurico Srl v Commission [1984] ECR 3581 documents were also produced at the hearing but it is unclear whether or not the other party consented to their admission (see p 3597). In Case C-491/06 Danske Svineproducenter v Justitsministeriet [2008] ECR I-3339, photographs seem to have been sent to the Court shortly before the hearing. At the meeting between the judges and the parties’ representatives immediately before the start of the hearing, the latter were informed that the photographs had not been circulated to the judges and that their production at the hearing would not be permitted. The case was a reference for a preliminary ruling and therefore the Court was not confronted with the need to look at evidence of disputed facts. An

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the other parties object to its production or their position is neutral, the matter remains within the discretion of the President and, in making his decision, he will take account of the importance of the document, the nature of the objections to its admission (if any), the ability of the other parties to respond to the points arising from the document at such a late stage in the proceedings and the reasons for the failure to produce the document at an earlier stage.502 While that statement of the position is particularly relevant to the production of evidence, it also covers the considerations that may apply to the production of a document or thing in order to illustrate or clarify an argument (although, in relation to such documents or things, the balancing of the factors in favour of or against admitting them at the hearing would normally be an easier task). 2.138 In principle, there is no objection to the production of a document or visual aid in order to illustrate or clarify an argument503 (the use of visual aids is more frequent in the GC than in the ECJ or CST) although, where the visual aid is a document, sufficient copies of it must be produced and, where the visual aid takes some other form, the Court must be informed in advance so that any application to reopen the oral procedure in order to make submissions on the photographs was accordingly refused: see paras 20–24. The difficulty can be removed by communicating the material to the opposing party a reasonable time before the commencement of the hearing: eg Case C-580/12 P Guardian Industries (above, note 209), paras 33–35 (three days before the hearing; but, according to para 23, one working day beforehand). 502 In Case T-85/94 (122) Commission v Eugenio Branco Lda [1995] ECR II-2993, paras 8–9, the only reason given was that the opposing party was not given sufficient time to give an adequate response. In Case T-71/96 Vinzek v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I-A-339, II-921, para 22, the CFI (as it then was) stated that it was the consistent practice of the CFI that documents could be produced at the hearing only in exceptional circumstances. It went on to say that there had to be valid reasons showing that it had not been possible to produce the document in question during the written procedure (in that case, there were such valid reasons and the CFI then went on to consider whether or not the opposing party’s rights would be prejudiced by the late production of the documents, which was not the case because the documents in question had been in the opposing party’s possession). Vinzek was later cited and followed by the CST in Case F-17/05 de Brito Sequeira Carvalho v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-149, II-A-1-577, paras 30–33. In Case C-156/87 Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission [1990] ECR I-781 the President refused to admit documents at the hearing because of an inordinate delay between the end of the written procedure (at which point their importance became evident) and the point at which they were produced, for which no reason was given (the decision is not referred to in the report of the case). In Case T-390/94 Schroeder v Commission [1997] ECR II-501, para 130, the document was held to be inadmissible simply on account of its production at the hearing but was of insufficient probative value anyway (on appeal, Case C-221/97P Schroeder v Commission [1998] ECR I-8255, para 27). In Case T-460/08 Commission v Acentro Turismo SpA [2010] ECR II-6351, para 23, it seems that the opposing party’s objection was enough to exclude the documents in question. 503 Even so, abhorrence to the production of anything and everything that looks like a document is sometime exhibited, in the fear that it may be a disguised attempt to introduce a new pleading or new evidence, and even if (for example) it is only a diagram or a pictorial representation of a point that is being made orally. In Case T-340/99 Arne Mathisen AS v Commission [2002] ECR II-2905, paras 27–28, such a document was admitted on the ground that it was not fresh evidence but merely illustrated remarks made orally. In Case T-127/04 KME Germany AG v Commission [2009] ECR II-1167, paras 27–28, the documents contained statistics and graphs, and could therefore have been advanced as explanatory or illustrative and not evidential, but the opposing party had not been given an opportunity to verify the contents of the documents and thought that they related to a different period. Accordingly, the documents were not accepted.

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equipment that is needed may be installed before the commencement of the hearing.504 In some instances, the visual aid may be an item of evidence. By way of illustration, at the hearing in Case 16/83 Prantl,505 which concerned a prohibition on the marketing of wine other than wine from Franconia in a particular type of bottle, sample bottles were produced to the Court and discussed in the course of argument. In such situations, the existence of the evidence is not in dispute but the inferences to be drawn from it are. 2.139 The position regarding the production of evidence at the hearing is very different. In principle, evidence may be introduced up until the end of the oral procedure (that is, effectively, the end of the hearing), as long as the failure to introduce it earlier is justified;506 but the hearing is not the proper place to adduce evidence (unless, of course, the Court has so ordered). All evidence should have been obtained in the course of the written procedure, in so far as documentary evidence is concerned, or during the preparatory enquiries. If, however, a new fact or new evidence has come to the attention of one of the parties, the proper course to adopt may be one of the following: to request the Court to exercise its power under (as the case may be) RP-ECJ, art 64, RP-GC, art 88 and 92 or RP-CST, art 71 to order a measure of enquiry; where appropriate, to submit the new evidence in rebuttal or as amplification of evidence given previously;507 or else (if the new material is in documentary form) to make an application under, as the case may be, RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83(1) for leave to introduce the relevant documents.508 In the light of the submissions made at the hearing, the Court itself may ask for further evidence to be produced.509 504 PD-GC, para 192; PD-CST, para 63 (which distinguishes between ‘documents’ and ‘evidence’ and applies to both). 505 [1984] ECR 1299 (a reference for a preliminary ruling). From recollection, the bottles were full but the case did not require an examination of their contents. 506 RP-GC, art  85(3) and PD-GC, para  206 (which envisages that any new evidence will be in documentary form); RP-CST, art 57 and PD-CST, para 63. 507 RP-ECJ, art 64(3); RP-GC, art 92(7); RP-CST, art 71(7). See further Ch 11, section III, paras 11.33–11.37. 508 The last course was adopted in Case C-213/87 Gemeente Amsterdam and Stichting Vrouwenvakschool voor Informatica Amsterdam (VIA) v Commission [1990] ECR I-221 (order of 18 April 1989) and Case C-110/89 Commission v Greece [1991]  ECR  I-2659 (order of 21  November 1990). In the first case cited the application was made two weeks before the date of the hearing. In both cases the documents in question had come to light after the party submitting them had lodged its last written pleading and therefore could not have been taken into account during the written procedure. In the first case cited the Court heard argument on the application to admit the documents at the hearing, admitted the documents because of their relevance and allowed the other party to make written submissions on them. The hearing was in consequence adjourned. In the second case cited the Court held that, after the close of the written procedure, it may authorise a party to produce those documents that appear to the Court to be useful in order to decide the case pursuant to what is now RP-ECJ, art 64(2). The applicant was therefore allowed to introduce documents having a direct relationship to the object of the litigation. The production of documents that provide evidence to support a party’s case is not the same as the introduction of a new plea in the course of the proceedings. It should be noted that RP-ECJ, art 63–64 are worded less flexibly than RP-ECJ, art 60 (in the form that it took before 2012). 509 Eg Cases T-371/94 and T-394/94 British Airways plc v Commission [1998] ECR II-2405, paras 31–33 (the Court had previously decided not to order a preparatory enquiry).

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10 Delivery of the advocate general’s opinion 2.140 The advocate general delivers his or her opinion orally in open court in his or her own native language, not the language of the case (unless that happens to be his or her mother tongue), but the judge acting as advocate general in proceedings before the GC may deliver his or her opinion in writing if he or she so wishes.510 Where the opinion is delivered orally it is delivered in open court and in the presence of the judges who attended the hearing of the parties.511 Originally, the opinion was read out in full. As the text of the opinion is circulated to the members of the Court before its delivery, it was questioned whether it was really necessary for the advocate general to deliver the opinion in open court. The only justification for doing so seems to be that, otherwise, it would be uncertain whether or not the judges had read or taken the opinion into account when agreeing the judgment in the case.512 However that may be, the current practice is for the advocate general to read out only the concluding part of the opinion;513 and, for reasons of efficiency, one advocate general may deliver in that manner another advocate general’s opinion. Where in proceedings before the GC the advocate general delivers his or her opinion in writing, it is lodged at the Registry which then communicates it to the parties.514 After the delivery of the opinion (whether orally or in writing) the President declares the oral procedure closed.515 Where it is delivered orally a copy of the opinion is sent to the parties, if they so request,516 and there is no purpose in them being represented when it is delivered. In his or her opinion the advocate general analyses the facts and points of law raised in the case and recommends to the Court a particular conclusion on them: he or she may also recommend that further measures of enquiry be taken,517 that the case should be referred to a larger formation, or that the oral procedure should be reopened.518

510 Statute, arts 20, 4th para, 49, 2nd para, and 53, 3rd para; RP-ECJ, art 38(8) and 82(1); RP-GC, art 112(1). 511 In Case 155/79  AM & S  Europe Ltd v Commission [1982]  ECR  1575 Advocate General Warner’s opinion was delivered twice. On the first occasion it was discovered, after he had finished reading it, that one of the judges was missing. On the second occasion, with all the judges present, he simply gave his conclusions, referring to the written text of his opinion for the reasoning he followed, but not re-reading the entire opinion. 512 A view expressed extra-judicially by Advocate General Warner. 513 That manner of delivering the opinion does not infringe any rules or the rights of the parties: Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom v Schroder [2000] ECR I-743, paras 20–21; Cases C-234/96 and C-235/96 Deutsche Telekom v Vick and Conze [2000]  ECR  I-799, paras 26–27; Cases C-270/97 and C-271/97 Deutsche Post v Sievers [2000] ECR I-933, paras 23–28. 514 RP-GC, art 112(1). On the first occasion on which an advocate general’s opinion was delivered in proceedings before the CFI (as it then was), it was delivered orally: Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission [1990] ECR II-309 at 312–313. 515 RP-ECJ, art 82(2); RP-GC, art 112(2). 516 The request may be made to the Registry. In the absence of a request the opinion is not served. Where the opinion is delivered in writing a copy is sent automatically to the parties: RP-GC, art 112(1). 517 Eg Case 12/74 Commission v Germany [1975] ECR 181 at 217. 518 Eg Case 20/85 Roviello v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1988] ECR 2805 at 2833– 2834.

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2.141 The Court does not sit on appeal from the advocate general and in consequence the parties are not invited to comment on what he or she has said. The opinion is intended for the Court, not the parties, which is why it is not formally served on them (where the opinion is delivered in writing it is simply ‘communicated’ to them for their information). Although the delivery of the opinion brings the oral procedure to an end, the opinion is regarded as opening the stage of deliberation by the Court on its judgment and, thus, as forming part of the Court’s internal processes for reaching judgment, rather than being part of an exchange with the Court involving the parties.519 The Court’s judgment will be based on the written and oral submissions of the parties and on the advocate general’s opinion. If the advocate general has misinterpreted what the parties have said, the Court may determine that by its own study of the case. It is not bound to follow the advocate general.520 There is accordingly no right on the part of a party to a case before the Court to comment in writing on the advocate general’s opinion and it is not proper for a party to write to the Court after the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion, giving his views on it.521. If the opinion raises a new point not considered by the parties and the Court considers that point to be relevant to its deliberations, it may reopen the oral procedure in order to hear further argument but is not obliged to do so.522 In contrast, in references for a 519 Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV  v Aruba [2000]  ECR  I-665, paras 11–16. See further the analysis of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo in Case C-466/00 Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2003] ECR I-2219, paras 84–117 (pp 2242–2254) and Case C-229/09 Hogan Lovells International LLP v Bayer CropScience AG [2010] ECR I-11335, paras 26–28. 520 Cf Cases 36 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association v Ireland [1981] ECR 735; Delcourt v Belgium (1979–80) 1 EHRR 35 at para 41 (European Court of Human Rights). 521 Such a document is often treated as an application to reopen the oral procedure: eg Case C-284/96 Tabouillot v Directeur de Services Fiscaux de Meurthe-et-Moselle [1997]  ECR  I-7471, paras 20–21. Since it is not usually an application of that nature, it does not focus on the points that such an application needs to make and can therefore be dismissed. On the absence of a right to comment on the advocate general’s opinion, see: Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV  v Aruba [2000]  ECR  I-665, para  2; Case C-265/97P  Cooperatieve Vereniging de Verenigde Bloemenveilingen Alsmeer BA  v Florimex BV  [2000]  ECR  I-2061, paras 62–63; Case C-434/02 Arnold Andre GmbH & Co KG v Landrat des Kreises Herford [2004] ECR I-11825, para 26; Case C-210/03 Swedish Match AB v Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-11893, paras 22–25; Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969, paras 13–15; Case C-57/02 P Compania espanola para la fabricacion de aceros inoxidables SA (Acerinox) v Commission [2005] ECR I-6689, para 26; Case C-259/04 Emanuel v Continental Shelf 128 Ltd [2006]  ECR  I-3089, para  15; Case C-301/04  P  Commission v SGL  Carbon AG  [2006]  ECR  I-5915, paras 14–15; Case C-308/04  P  SGL  Carbon AG  v Commission [2006] ECR I-5977, paras 13–14; Case C-432/04 Commission v Cresson [2006] ECR I-6387, paras 49–52; Case C-496/04 Slob v Productschap Zuivel [2006]  ECR  I-8257, paras 28–36 (preliminary ruling proceedings); Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana v Rafael Hoteles SA  [2006]  ECR  I-11519, paras 25–26; Case C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg KG v Cassina SpA [2008] ECR I-2731, paras 23–24; Case C-284/06 Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark v Burda GmbH [2008] ECR I-4571, para 42; Case C-343/07 Bavaria NV  v Bayerischer Brauerbund eV  [2009]  ECR  I-5491, paras 31–36; Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v Departmento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa [2009] ECR I-7633, paras 32–33; Case C-241/09 Fluxys v Commission de regulation de l’electricite et du gaz [2010] ECR I-12773, para 26. 522 The Emesa case (above, note 521). See also Case 266/97  P  Cooperatieve Vereniging De Verenigde Bloemenveilingen Vereniging van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijproducten [2000] ECR I-2135, paras 63–64; Case C-331/05 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission

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preliminary ruling, perceived deficiencies in the way in which the advocate general analysed the case may be taken up with the referring court with a view to obtaining a second reference to the Court.523 11 Further measures of organisation of procedure or measures of enquiry 2.142 The Court has power even at this stage in the proceedings to order that a measure of enquiry or of organisation of procedure be taken or that a previous such measure be varied (which appears to mean repeated or expanded); the Court may act either on its own motion or on application by one of the parties.524 The ECJ and GC act after hearing the advocate general (if there is one). However, the position is complicated by the existence of other, related, provisions. Thus, in GC and CST proceedings, it is also provided that the parties can produce or offer further evidence only until the end of the oral procedure (that is, the hearing).525 By implication, the parties may not adduce further evidence after the close of the written procedure although, on the face of it, the Court would have power to call for further evidence by means of a measure of enquiry. However, the Court may reopen the oral procedure, inter alia, if, after the close of the oral procedure, a party relies on a new fact which is capable of being decisive.526 That necessarily implies that a party can adduce additional evidence after the end of the oral procedure in order to demonstrate the existence of the new fact, or at least apply [2007] ECR I-5475, paras 16–18; Case C-361/06 Feinchemie Schwebda GmbH v College voor de toelating van bestrijdingsmiddelen [2008] ECR I-3865, paras 34–35 (no need to deal with the case on the basis of new arguments in the advocate general’s opinion); Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria [2009] ECR I-1301, paras 14–15; Case C-249/06 Commission v Sweden [2009]  ECR  I-1335, paras 13–14; Case C-262/10 Dohler Neuenkirchen v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 6 September 2012, paras 29–33; Case C-89/11 P E.on Energie AG v Commission, 22  November 2012, paras 60–63; Case C-116/11 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA, 22  November 2012, paras 26–30; Case C-535/11 Novartis Pharma GmbH  v Apozyt GmbH, 11 April 2013, paras 29–32; Case C-103/11 P Commisiswon v Systran SA, 18 April 2013, paras 39–43; Cases C-584/10  P, C-593/10  P  and C-595/10  P  Commisison v Kadi, 18  July 2013, paras 55–58; Case C-431/11 United Kingdom v Council, 26  September 2013, paras 25–29; Case C-361/12 Carratu v Poste Italiane SpA, 12 December 2013, paras 17–21; Cases C-162/12 and C-163/12 Airport Shuttle Express scarl v Comune di Grottaferrata, 13  February 2014, paras 23–24; Case C-470/12 Pohotovost sro v Vasuta, 27 February 2014, paras 20–24; Case C-438/12 Weber v Weber, 3 April 2014, paras 28–30; Case C-335/12 Commisison v Portugal, 17 July 2014, paras 44–48; Case C-162/13 Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav dd, 4 September 2014, paras 26–32; Case C-88/13 Gruslin v Beobank SA, 11  September 2014, paras 20–24; Case C-242/13 Commerz Nederland NV v Havenbedrijf Rotterdam NV, 17 September 2014, paras 24–28; Cases C-12/13 P and C-13/13 P Buono v Commission, 14 October 2014, paras 24–28; Case C-137/13 Herbaria Krauterparadies GmbH v Freistaat Bayern, 5 November 2014, paras 25–31. 523 As happened in Kaba (above, note 519). 524 RP-GC, art 88(1); RP-CST, art 69(1) and 71(1). Those provisions apply ‘at any stage of the proceedings’. In the case of the ECJ, the same follows by implication from the fact that RPECJ, art 61(1), 62(1) and 64(1) are not limited in their application to a particular stage in the proceedings. 525 RP-GC, art 85(3); RP-CST, art 57. 526 RP-ECJ, art 83; RP-GC, art 113(2)(c) (which limits the ability to do so to a main party). RPCST, art  64(2) sets out a general discretionary power enabling the CST to reopen the oral procedure which could certainly be exercised in the event of a party relying on a new fact.

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for a measure of enquiry after the end of the oral procedure. It therefore appears that the prohibition on the production or offering of evidence after the close of the oral procedure may be circumvented by an application for the reopening of the oral procedure.527 In view of the conflicting nature of those provisions, their relationship requires some explanation. 2.143 The role of measures of organisation of procedure is conceived to be that of facilitating the efficient conduct of the written and oral procedure.528 Accordingly, following that logic, measures of organisation of procedure are otiose once the written and oral procedure have been brought to an end; and there must be some reason for reopening those stages in the procedure in order to regenerate the operation of such measures529 (strictly speaking, the reopening of the written or oral procedure produces the need for a measure of organisation of procedure; the written or oral procedure is not reopened in order to make it possible to adopt a measure of organisation of procedure). In the case law, measures of enquiry are perceived to be slightly different in that the ordering of a measure of enquiry after the close of the oral procedure is not conditional upon the reopening of that procedure.530 That way of looking at the matter glosses over the fact that measures of organisation of procedure are in part organisational and in part evidential in nature (production of documents, for example, is essentially evidential). However, that quibble apart, there is good reason for saying that measures of organisation of procedure, in the strict sense, are relevant only up to the point at which the oral procedure is closed and the case is taken into deliberation. Pursuing the logic of that approach, there would be no cause for the adoption of a measure of organisation of procedure after the end of the oral procedure unless it were ancillary to a measure of enquiry; and certainly the reopening of the oral procedure in order to conduct a measure of organisation of procedure unconnected with a measure of enquiry is not logical. In contrast, measures of enquiry are more specifically directed at putting the Court in a position to make a correct decision in the light of the facts as they actually are. Measures of enquiry are supposed to take place before the end of the oral procedure, at which point the case is taken into deliberation by the Court; but, unlike measures of organisation of procedure, measures of enquiry are not concerned with the efficient conduct of the procedure leading up to the point at which the case is taken into deliberation but are concerned with an element of the proceedings that remains relevant until the point in time at which the Court actually makes its decision: is the Court in full possession of all the material that it needs in order to make a correct decision in the case? In relation to measures of enquiry, the organisational (or strictly procedural) and evidential aspects of that 527 It is not clear if RP-GC, art 85(3) and RP-CST, art 57 can be circumvented by an application under RP-GC, art 88(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 69(3) or 71(2), which deal with applications for measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry. That turns on the question whether the phrase ‘produce or offer further evidence’ in RP-GC, art 85(3) and RPCST, art 57 is to be read as covering an application for an evidential measure of organisation of procedure or a measure of enquiry. That appears to be so only where the evidence in question is in the possession of the party making the application. 528 Case C-199/92P Huls (above, note 363), paras 122–125. 529 Case C-199/92P Huls (above, note 363), para 126; Case T-322/01 Roquette (above, note 273), paras 321–322; Case C-230/05 P L v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-B-2-7, II-B-2-45, para 68. 530 Case C-199/92P Huls (above, note 363), para 127.

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question lead logically to the conclusion that, after the close of the oral procedure, a measure of enquiry may be adopted in order to investigate a newly discovered fact (or newly discovered evidence bearing upon a fact) that is potentially decisive, as opposed to peripheral, to the decision in the case. However, there is no logical connection between adopting a measure of enquiry after the close of the oral procedure and the reopening of the oral procedure, nor is the former logically conditional upon the latter (as appears to be thought).531 A measure of enquiry may result in the production of evidence on which the parties ought to be heard; but they may be heard orally or in writing, that is all. 2.144 As a matter of principle, therefore, there is no call for a measure of organisation of procedure (other than a measure of an evidential nature or a measure ancillary to a measure of enquiry) after the close of the oral procedure. On the other hand, the Court must remain free to decide for itself, in case of need, whether or not to adopt a measure of enquiry (or an evidential measure of organisation of procedure) right up until the point in time at which it has reached a decision on the case. The position of the parties is different because it is reasonable to limit their power of initiative to the residual ability to apply for a measure of enquiry after the close of the oral procedure where a new fact or new evidence of a fact has come to light. 2.145 So far as the Court’s ability to act on its own motion is concerned, the power to order a measure of organisation of procedure or measure of enquiry can be exercised at any time if the Court considers it appropriate.532 For the reasons stated above, there is ordinarily no occasion to exercise that power in relation to measures of organisation of procedure that lack an evidential function. The Court is sometimes led to take the step of seeking further evidence or information after considering the matters raised by the advocate general in his opinion.533 The fact that it lies within the discretion of the Court to take a procedural step such as one of those here under consideration does not mean that the Court is obliged to take that step or that the Court would be acting unlawfully if it failed or refused to take it. Ex hypothesi where it is a question of ordering, repeating or expanding a measure of enquiry, the basic condition is that some matter of fact requires clarification; but that factor, standing alone, does not appear to be sufficient to cause the Court to act of its own motion. An application for a measure of enquiry may be admitted after the close of the oral procedure only if two conditions are satisfied: (i) it must relate to facts which are capable of having a decisive influence on the outcome of the case; and (ii) the party applying must not have been able to put them forward beforehand.534 If those conditions are satisfied, then one would expect the Court to act on an application

531 Hence the difference between paras 126 and 127 of the judgment in Case C-199/92P  Huls (above, note 363). 532 Case 12/68 X v EC Audit Board [1969] ECR 109 at 121 (Advocate General Roemer). The same follows from the plain wording of RP-GC, art 88(1) and RP-CST, art 69(1) and 71(1). 533 Cf Case 140/79 Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v DAF SpA [1981] ECR 1 at 10. 534 Case 77/70 Prelle v Commission [1971] ECR 561, para 7; Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societe de Football Association ASBL v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paras 53–54 (p 5057); Case C-199/92P Huls AG (above, note 363), para 127.

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for a measure of enquiry (and, if it did not do so, without having good reason, that might be a ground of appeal, where an appeal can be brought). Accordingly, one would suppose that, if it appeared to the Court that those conditions were satisfied, the Court could and would act of its own motion, if necessary, in the absence of an application.535 On the other hand, the Court remains free to act of its own motion, if it thinks fit to do so, even if those conditions are not satisfied because it is responsible for the conduct of the proceedings and must consider and act upon what it regards as appropriate for the proper disposal of the case. At the very least, however, the fact requiring clarification must be one capable of being decisive for the decision in the case. So far as the variation of a measure of enquiry is concerned, there must presumably be some objective basis for believing that that step is capable of bearing fruit. 2.146 Applications for measures of organisation of procedure made after the hearing are often combined with applications for the reopening of the oral procedure and are viewed as being conditional upon the reopening of the oral procedure.536 In consequence, both applications are often considered together and without disentangling them. As noted above, in the GC and CST rules of procedure, the ability of a party to produce or offer additional evidence after the close of the oral procedure is conditional on the reopening of the oral procedure because, otherwise, there is a prohibition on the production or offering of further evidence after the close of the oral procedure.537 That appears to be an indirect method of narrowing the scope for the introduction of additional evidence to evidence that may justify the reopening of the oral procedure. On the other hand, there is no formal linking of an application for a measure of enquiry made after the close of the oral procedure to an application for the reopening of the oral procedure.538 In principle, therefore, a party may apply for a measure of enquiry, without formally requesting the reopening of the oral procedure, at least where the evidence is not in the party’s possession (because, if it were in the party’s possession, he could be regarded as producing or offering it in the application for the measure of enquiry).539 Another possibility is simply to send additional evidence to the Court after the end of the hearing without being invited to do so and without formally applying for a measure of enquiry (as the Court is in charge of the production of evidence outside the context of the production of evidence by a party in the form of an annex to a pleading, the unilateral sending of evi-

535 In practice, in such circumstances, the absence of an application from a party might count against the Court using its own initiative. However, a party could be inactive for any number of reasons (including a mistake regarding the operation of the rules of procedure) or, particularly in a case involving a multiplicity of issues, might not realise the degree of importance attributed by the Court to the fact in question. 536 Eg the authorities cited in note 529 above. 537 In the GC’s commentary on the draft 2015 GC rules of procedure (under art 85), the GC stated that the production or offering of evidence by a party ‘is no longer permitted after the oral part of the procedure…without prejudice to the possibility of a request for the oral part of the procedure to be reopened’. 538 No such link is stated in Case C-199/92P  Huls AG (above, note 363), whereas measures of organisation of procedure do have such a link: see paras 126–127 of the judgment. 539 The application can and should be made under RP- ECJ 151, RP-GC, art 130(2) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83 (see Ch 6, paras 6.4–6.6).

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dence to the Court by a party is probably best regarded as an implied application made by the party for a measure of enquiry consisting in the production of the evidence sent to the Court). The Court is inevitably reluctant to accept new evidence produced by a party after the hearing unless the party in question has acted in response to a question or request made by the Court itself; and material volunteered by a party in the absence of an invitation from the Court is liable to be returned to the party producing it. The unilateral production of evidence at such a late stage in the proceedings may, however, be allowed if the evidence is relevant and there are good reasons why the party was not able to produce the evidence beforehand.540 As stated above, the well-established test that has to be satisfied where a party wishes additional evidence to be introduced after the close of the oral procedure (whatever the procedural means adopted to that end) requires the following two conditions to be satisfied: (i) the additional evidence must relate to facts which are capable of having a decisive influence on the outcome of the case; and (ii) the party seeking to introduce the additional evidence must not have been able to put it forward beforehand.541 12 Reopening of the oral procedure 2.147 The Court may also re-open the oral procedure after it has been closed542 or order the advocate general to deliver a further opinion.543 In either case the Court may act on its own motion or on application by one of the parties.544 Technically, there is a distinction between reopening the oral procedure and reopening the hearing. The former involves the latter; but the latter may arise independently of the former, where additional oral submissions are heard after the close of the hearing but before the oral procedure has been formally closed. That may occur where the close of the oral procedure is not contemporaneous with the close of the hearing (such as where an advocate general’s opinion is to be delivered after the close of the hearing. So far as can be seen, however, the criteria applied when deciding whether or not to reopen the hearing are the same as those applied when deciding whether or not to reopen the oral procedure.545

540 Eg Case F-17/05 de Brito Sequeira Carvalho v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-149, II-A1-577, para 31. 541 See the authorities cited in note 534 above. 542 RP-ECJ, art 83; RP-GC, art 113; RP-CST, art 64(2). In ECJ and GC proceedings, the advocate general is heard before the decision whether or not to reopen the oral procedure is made: RPECJ, art 83; RP-GC, art 31(3). 543 Cf Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 51. 544 Eg Case C-241/09 Fluxys (above, note 521), para 25. Strictly speaking the application should be made under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83 but it is more common for it to be made by letter and for the Court to decide the question without hearing the views of other parties. The reason for that is probably that most applications are manifestly lacking in any merit; where the matter is more debatable, the other parties are given an opportunity to submit their observations (eg Case 195/80 Michel v European Parliament [1981] ECR 2861). 545 Eg Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft v Nemzeti Ado- ed Vamhivatal Kiemelt Ado- es Vam Foigazgatosag, 17 December 2015, paras 29–32.

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2.148 There are certain situations in which the reopening of the oral procedure is mandatory. For example, the oral procedure has to be recommenced where: the advocate general assigned to the case is changed after the date of the hearing, but before giving his opinion;546 the formation dealing with the case has become inquorate after the hearing; or a judge is unable to attend the deliberations of the Court and must be replaced by another judge who was not present at the hearing.547 In the second and third cases, the need to repeat the hearing is necessary because of the rule that only the judges who participated in the hearing may take part in the deliberations on the case.548 In such circumstances, at the second hearing the parties generally content themselves with declaring that they stand by their previous submissions and do not repeat them, the members of the Court having the benefit of the transcript of the first hearing.549 In consequence, in GC and CST proceedings, where the second or third situations arise, it is provided that the second hearing can be dispensed with: in GC proceedings, a second hearing is organised only if a main party so requests or the GC so decides of its own motion; in CST proceedings, the position is the reverse in the sense that there must be a second hearing unless the CST decides to dispense with it, with the agreement of the parties and if that would enable the CST to rule on the case within a reasonable period.550 A second hearing is, however, obligatory if more than one judge who participated at the first hearing is unable to participate in the deliberations and, in GC proceedings, if there has been a measure of enquiry involving the personal appearance of the parties, witness evidence or expert evidence.551 2.149 The oral procedure may also be reopened, as a matter of discretion, for a variety of reasons:552 because the advocate general has raised in his opinion a 546 Cf Cases 41, 43 and 44/73 Générale Sucrière SA v Commission [1977] ECR 445 at 460. 547 Case 286/81 Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij [1982]  ECR  4575 at 4584 and Case 263/81 List v Commission [1983] ECR 103 at 110 (where the problem arose from the death of Judge Chloros); Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro GmbH  v Zentrale zür Bekämpfung Unlauteren Wettbrwerbs eV  [1989]  ECR  803 and Case 246/86 Belasco v Commission [1989] ECR 2117 (where the problem arose from the periodic partial renewal of members of the Court). For that reason, the Croatian Act of Accession (OJ 2012 No L112/21) provided in art  22(2) that the composition of a formation would not change on the date of accession of Croatia when the oral procedure had already been commenced as at that date. 548 RP-ECJ, art 32(2); RP-GC, art 21(2); RP-CST, art 29(2). 549 See, for example, the Générale Sucrière and List cases (above, notes 546 and 547); Case C-246/95 Coen v Belgium [1997]  ECR  I-403 at 417 (no hearing was actually held because no one wanted to attend). In Case T-175/95 BASF Coatings AG v Commission [1999] ECR II1581, paras 29–31, the parties were authorised to lodge written versions of the oral submissions made at the first hearing. 550 RP-GC, art 23(3) and 24(3); RP-CST, art 27(3). 551 RP-GC, art 23(3) and 24(3); RP-CST, art 27(3). 552 RP-ECJ, art 83 sets out a non-exclusive list of three illustrative reasons introduced by the words ‘in particular’. RP-ECJ, art 83 has been considered generally in: Case C-573/12 Alands Vindkraft AB  v Energimyndigheten, 1  July 2014, para  35; Case C-173/13 Leone v Garde des Sceauz, 17 July 2014, paras 22–27; Case C-434/13 P Commission v Parker Hannifin Manufacturing Srl, 18 December 2014, paras 25–30. RP-GC, art 113(2) sets out the same three reasons but in a manner suggesting that they are a comprehensive list of the circumstances in which the oral procedure may be reopened. RP-GC, art 113(2) appears to be too narrowly expressed to cover

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point of law that has not been considered by the parties;553 where there has been an intervening change in the law;554 where, since the hearing, judgments material to the resolution of the dispute have been delivered, on which the parties have not had an opportunity to make any submissions;555 where it is considered that the Court should hear persons who were not represented at the previous hearing;556 where there has been a material change in circumstances that may mean that there is no need to proceed to judgment;557 or where a party has submitted a new fact, after the close of the oral procedure, that is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision of the Court.558 The most frequently stated reasons are where the Court considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be decided on the basis of an argument that has not been debated between the parties.559 all the situations in which the reopening of the oral procedure is justified. RP-CST, art 64(2) sets out a general discretionary power to reopen the oral procedure and does not list any grounds for doing so. It is apprehended that the reasons set out in RP-ECJ, art 83, RP-GC, art 113(2) and in the case law provide reasonable guidance as to how the CST can be expected to exercise its power under RP-CST, art 64(2). 553 Case 130/87 Retter v Caisse de Pension des Employés Privés [1989] ECR 685 at 870–871. 554 The Ahmed Saeed case (above, note 547). 555 Case C-119/94P Coussios v Commission [1995] ECR I-1439, paras 20–21. 556 The Roviello case (above, note 518). However, the failure by a party’s representative to attend the first hearing may justify an application to reopen the oral procedure only if the failure to attend was due to a force majeure event (abnormal difficulties, independent of the will of the person concerned, and apparently inevitable even if all due care has been taken): Case T-235/94 Galtieri v Parliament [1996] ECR-SC I-A-43, II-129, para 17. 557 Eg Case F-68/13 CY v European Central Bank, 9 September 2014 (death of a party, causing the Court to seek the views of the party’s successors as to whether or not they wish to continue the proceedings). 558 RP-ECJ, art 83; RP-GC, art 113(2)(c). A new fact need only be capable in principle of being decisive in order to justify reopening the oral procedure. The question whether or not it is actually decisive is another matter. In most instances, the claimed new fact is not capable of being decisive: eg Leone (above, note 552) (legislation adopted after the facts of the case). 559 RP-ECJ, art 83; RP-GC, art 113(2)(a) and (b). See: Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba [2000] ECR I-665, para 18 and the unreported orders cited there; Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom v Schroder [2000]  ECR  I-743, para  22; Cases C-234/96 and C-235/96 Deutsche Telekom v Vick and Conze [2000] ECR I-799, para 28; Cases C-270/97 and C-271/97 Deutsche Post v Sievers [2000] ECR I-929, para 30; Case C-309/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002]  ECR  I-1577, paras 42–43; Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2002] ECR I-5475, para 20; Cases C-216/99 and C-222/99 Riccardo Prisco Srl v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato and Ministero delle Finanze v CASER  SpA  [2002]  ECR  I-6761, para  26; Case C-184/01P  Hirschfeldt v European Environment Agency [2002]  ECR  I-10173, paras 29– 30; Case C-273/00 Sieckmann [2002]  ECR  I-11737, para  22; Case C-57/01 Makedoniko Metro v Elliniko Dimosio [2003]  ECR  I-1091, para  34; Case C-142/00P  Commission v Nederlandse Antillen [2003]  ECR  I-3483, paras 40–43; Case C-140/02  R  (on the application of SP  Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [2003]  ECR  I-10635, paras 37–39; Case C-209/01 Schilling v Finanzamt Nurnberg-Sud [2003] ECR I-13389, para 19; Cases C-204/00P, C-205/00P, C-211/00P, C-213/00P, C-217/00P and C-21900P Aalborg Portland A/S v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, Advocate General RuizJarabo, para 60 (p 362); Case C-147/02 Alabaster v Woolwich plc [2004] ECR I-3101, paras 33–36; Case C-470/00P Parliament v Ripa de Meana [2004] ECR I-4167, paras 32–34; Case C-181/02P Commission v Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH [2004] ECR I-5703, paras 23–26; Case C-30/02 Recheio – Cash & Carry SA  v Fazenda Publica/Registo Nacional de Pessoas

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2.150 Where the oral procedure is reopened, the purpose of doing so is to consider any additional submissions that the parties may have to make.560 The fact that the Court has power to reopen the oral procedure in those and other circumstances does not necessarily mean that the Court is obliged to do so or that it would be acting unlawfully if it failed to reopen the oral procedure. It will be observed that the most frequently used reason for not reopening the oral procedure is that the Court has sufficient information to make a decision. That reason (when expressed in that way) is incorrect: the function of the Court is not Colectivas [2004] ECR I-6051, paras 11–13; Case C-309/02 Radlberger Getrankegesellschaft mbH & Co v Land Baden-Wurttemberg [2004] ECR I-11763, para 22; Case C-434/02 Arnold Andre GmbH & Co KG  v Landrat des Kreises Herford [2004]  ECR  I-11825, para  27; Case C-210/03 Swedish Match AB  v Secretary of State for Health [2004]  ECR  I-11893, para  25; Case C-6/03 Deponiezweckverband Eiterkopfe v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [2005]  ECR  I-2753, para  25; Case C-347/03 Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali [2005]  ECR  I-3785, para  60; Commission v Austria (above, note 521), para 16; the Acerinox case (above, note 521), para 27; Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar SA  v Commune de Fleron [2005]  ECR  I-7723, para  24; Case C-329/03 Trapeza tis Ellados AE v Banque Artesia [2005] ECR I-9341, para 9; Case C-331/04 ATI EAC Srl v ACTV Venezia SpA [2005] ECR I-10109, para 16; Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA Ltd v Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-10423, para 42; Cases C-346/03 and C-529/03 Atzeni v Regione autonoma della Sardegna [2006] ECR I-1875, paras 26–27; the Emanuel case (above, note 521), para 16; the SGL cases (above, note 521), paras 16 and 15, respectively; the Cresson case (above, note 521), para 50; the Slob case (above, note 521), para 32; Case C-138/05 Stichting Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwalieit [2006]  ECR  I-8339, paras 23–24; Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana v Rafael Hoteles SA  [2006]  ECR  I-11519, para  27; Case C-64/06 Telefonica O2 Czech Republic AS  v Czech On Line AS  [2007]  ECR  I-4887, paras 14–15; Case C-466/03 Albert Reiss Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH  v Land Baden-Wurttemberg [2007]  ECR  I-5357, para 29; Case C-299/05 Commission v Parliament and Council [2007] ECR I-8695, para 19; Case C-59/06P Marcuccio v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-B-2-43, II-B-2-335, paras 26–28; the Feinchemie case (above, note 522), para  33; the Peek & Cloppenburg case (above, note 521), para 25; Danske Svineproducenter (above, note 501), para 21; Case C-284/06 Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark v Burda GmbH [2008] ECR I-4571, para 37; Case C-484/06 Fiscale eenheid Koninklijke Ahold NV  v Staatsecretaris van Financien [2008]  ECR  I-5097, paras 19–23 (in that case, the point in question had been debated at the hearing); Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt [2008]  ECR  I-9641, para  46 (in paras 41–53, the ECJ reviewed the evolution of the argument in the case and concluded that no new argument was being raised); Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria (above, note 522), para 13; Case C-249/06 Commission v Sweden (above, note 522), para 12; Case C-431/07 P Bouygues SA v Commission [2009] ECR I-2665, paras 33–36; Case C-357/07 R (on the application of TNT Post UK Ltd) v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2009] ECR I-3025, paras 21–25; Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v Departmento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa [2009] ECR I-7633, para 31; Case C-337/08 X Holding BV v Staatsecretaris van Financien [2010] ECR I-1215, paras 10–14; Cases C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07 Stoss v Wetteraukreis [2010]  ECR  I-8069, para  45; Case C-241/09 Fluxys (above, note 521), para 25; Cases C-55/11, C-57/11 and C-58/11 Vodafone Espana SA v Ayuntamiento de Santa Amalia, 12 July 2012, para 23; Case C-342/10 Commission v Finland, 8 November 2012, para 13; Case C-431/11 United Kingdom v Council, 26 September 2013, paras 26–29; Case C-439/13  P  Elitaliana SpA  v Eulex Kosovo,12  November 2015, para 32 (an unusual case in which the ECJ had originally decided not to hold a hearing but then reopened the oral procedure in order to hear argument on the question of the jurisidiction of the ECJ and GC). 560 In Case C-203/98 Commission v Belgium [1999]  ECR  I-4899, the parties waived a fresh hearing.

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to make a decision (in order to make a decision, the minimum of, or no, information is required) but the right decision in the case (or at least the most accurate decision in the circumstances). The correct question is therefore whether or not reopening the oral procedure would be likely to add sufficiently to the information already before the Court as to be a worthwhile exercise. It is likely that that is the criterion actually applied by the Court. The formulation repeatedly trotted out in the cases seems to be, in reality, an elliptical expression of that criterion. 2.151 Apart from cases in which the Court itself takes the initiative and reopens the oral procedure of its own motion, the Court appears to require an application made by one of the parties for the reopening of the oral procedure to satisfy, in effect, the same two conditions to which applications for the adoption, repetition or expansion of a measure of enquiry are subject:561 (i) the application must refer to facts or matters that are capable of having a decisive influence on the outcome of the case;562 and (ii) the party applying must not have been able to put them forward beforehand. Thus, in Cases 2 and 3/62 Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium,563 the Court rejected the application to reopen the oral procedure because it could not find ‘anything of relevance’ to justify acceding to the request and because the matters which the party applying wished to raise had been known to it before the date of the hearing and could have been argued then. In subsequent cases the Court has rejected the request because the matters sought

561 Case C-199/92P  Huls (above, note 363), paras 127–128; Case C-200/92P ICI  v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4399, paras 60–61; Case C-227/92P  Hoechst AG  v Commission [1999] ECR I-4443, paras 104–105; Case C-234/92 P Shell International Chemical Co Ltd v Commission [1999] ECR I-4501, paras 63–64; Case C-235/92 P Montecatini SpA v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4539, paras 102–103; Case C-245/92  P  Chemie Linz GmbH  v Commission [1999] ECR I-4643, paras 82–83; Case T-311/00 British American Tobacco Ltd Commission [2002] ECR II-2781, para 53; the Riccardo Prisco case (above, note 559), paras 27–29; Cases C-74/00P and C-75/00P Falck SpA v Commission [2002] ECR I-7869, Advocate General Alber, para 82 (p 7899); Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 Tokai Carbon Co Ltd v Commission [2004] ECR II-1181, para 484; the Roquette case (above, note 273), para 323; Case T-329/01 Archer Daniels Midland Co v Commission [2006] ECR I-3255, para 376; Case C-299/05 Commission v Parliament and Council (above, note 559), paras 17–21 (in which the point in question could have been dealt with beforehand); L v Commission (above, note 529), para 68. In Case T-210/01 General Electric Co v Commission [2005] ECR I-5575 (see paras 28–30), the oral procedure was reopened at the request of the applicant in order to allow it to clarify its position on certain points raised at the hearing (order of 8 July 2004, paras 2–3). That led to the production of further documents and written observations (by way of a measure of organisation of procedure). Neither the judgment nor the order is clear about the basis on which the oral procedure was reopened. 562 As to that condition, see (for example): Case T-169/00 Esedra SPRL  v Commission [2002] ECR I-609, paras 210–213; the British American Tobacco case (above, note 561), paras 54–61; the Roquette case (above, note 273), paras 323–335; the Archer Daniels case (above, note 561), paras 376–381; Case T-206/06 Total SA v Commission [2011] ECR II-163*, paras 305–308 (unaffected by the appeal in Case C-421/11  P  Total SA  v Commission, 7  February 2012); Case C-190/12 Emerging Markets Series of DFA Investment Trust Co v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Bydgoszczy, 10 April 2014, para 21. 563 [1962] ECR 425 at 445–447.

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to be raised were not decisive to resolving the dispute or simply irrelevant564 or because the Court felt that every factor needing to be considered for the purpose of giving judgment was already before it (or that it has all the information necessary in order to make a decision).565 Typically, no reasons are given for that conclusion. As, in virtually all the cases, the party applying has fallen at the first hurdle, it has not been necessary to consider the second.566 Accordingly, it is unclear to what extent the second condition remains important to the Court. At all events, if both those conditions are satisfied, then one would expect the Court to reopen the oral procedure and, if it did not without good reason, that might be a ground of appeal (where an appeal can be brought). On the other hand, the Court remains free to reopen the oral procedure, if it thinks it fit to do so, even if those conditions are not satisfied. 2.152 It might be thought that, given the diversity of the situations in which the oral procedure may be reopened, the first condition (the raising of a fact or matter that is capable of having a decisive influence on the outcome of the case) is too narrowly drawn. However, if one looks closely at the two most frequently stated reasons for reopening the oral procedure (where the Court considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be decided on the basis of an argument that has not been debated between the parties), each is applicable only if the fact or matter in question is capable of being decisive: the Court needs to reopen the oral procedure where it lacks sufficient information only if the lack relates to a fact or matter that is decisive (or capable of being so); and the Court needs to reopen the oral procedure in order to consider an argument not previously debated between the parties only if that argument is decisive (or capable of being so). 2.153 One case in which the Court does not appear to have applied the second condition is Case 195/80 Michel v European Parliament.567 There the defendant had alleged a fact and the applicant conceded that it existed. On that basis the 564 See Case 45/75 Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Grosshandels GmbH v Hauptzollamt Landau Pfalz [1976] ECR 181, paras 28 and 29; Case 51/75 EMI Records Ltd v CBS United Kingdom Ltd [1976] ECR 811 at 843; Case 26/77 Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v Hauptzollamt BerlinPackhof [1977]  ECR  2031, paras 19–21; Case T-110/95 International Express Carriers Conference v Commission [1998]  ECR II-3605, para  25; Cases T-133/95 and T-204/95 International Express Carriers Conference v Commission [1998] ECR II-3645, para 37; Cases T-25/95 Cimenteries CBR v Commission [2000] ECR II-491, para 155; Case T-169/00 Esedra Sprl v Commission [2002] ECR II-609, para 212. 565 Eg Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1977] ECR 113 at 123; Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, 11  September 2014, paras 43–49; Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse, 5 March 2015, paras 32–35. See also the cases cited in note 559 above. 566 Only in the Balkan-Import-Export case (above, note 564) does it seem that the second condition had been fulfilled but the matters in question were in any event irrelevant. The second condition is more often fulfilled where, after the hearing, there has been a new development such as a new point raised in the advocate general’s opinion. In Cartesio (above, note 559), the point in question was not found to be a new one. 567 Above, note 544.

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advocate general concluded that the case was inadmissible. After the delivery of his opinion, the applicant’s lawyer decided to verify whether or not the fact did indeed exist. He discovered that it did not and made an application for a measure of enquiry and/or the reopening of the oral procedure. The Court ordered the latter after the defendant admitted that its assertion had been mistaken. Strictly speaking, although the matter was decisive to the case, it could have been raised beforehand had the applicant’s lawyer been diligent. The Court seems to have regarded the circumstances as exceptional but, as the issue to which the fact related was the question whether or not the time limits for bringing proceedings had been observed, it is arguable that the decision is authority that the second condition does not apply where the matter in question is mandatory and should be raised by the Court of its own motion, at least where on the evidence before it the Court is faced with an issue that it is obliged to consider.568 Another exceptional case is Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association v Ireland,569 where application was made for a measure of enquiry and/or reopening of the oral procedure so that the parties could pass comment on the advocate general’s opinion and suggest how the report for the hearing might be supplemented in the light of the hearing. The Court rejected that, apparently on the ground that ‘all the information necessary’ to enable it to decide the case was already available. It is quite clear from this that neither a measure of enquiry nor the reopening of the oral procedure will be ordered simply as a device to allow the parties to criticise the advocate general, no provision for which is made in the rules of procedure.570 On the other hand, the Court may well feel, in the light of his opinion, that it should reopen the oral procedure of its own motion.571 2.154 So far as the GC is concerned, in Case T-9/89 Hüls AG v Commission,572 the CFI (as it then was) was faced with a request for the reopening of the oral procedure for the purpose of ordering measures of enquiry directed to establishing whether or not the contested act was inexistent. The request was made some

568 Case C-199/92P Huls (above, note 363), para 134 (p 4379). 569 Above (note 520), at 745–746. 570 Case 206/81 Alvarez v European Parliament [1982]  ECR  3369, paras 8–10; Case C-309/02 Radlberger Getrankegesellschaft mbH & Co v Land Baden-Wurttenberg [2004] ECR I-11763, paras 21–24; Case C-434/02 Arnold Andre GmbH & Co KG v Landrat des Kreises Herford [2004] ECR I-11825, paras 24–27; Case C-210/03 Swedish Match AB v Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-11893, paras 22–25; Case C-226/08 Stadt Papenburg v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-131, paras 19–26; Case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v Commission [2010] ECR I-669, paras 43–47. A number of the cases cited in note 559 above deal with the same point. See further para 2.141 above. 571 Eg Cases 253/78 and 1–3/79 Procureur de la République v Giry and Guerlain [1980] ECR 2327, at 2359–2360; Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission, above (note 511) at 1616–1619; Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519, paras 5–6 of Advocate General Bot’s Opinion. 572 [1992]  ECR II-499, paras 382–385. See also Case T-10/89 Hoechst AG  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-629, paras 372–375; Case T-11/89 Shell International Chemical Co Ltd v Commission [1992] ECR II-757, paras 372–374; Case T-12/89 Solvay et Cie SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-907, paras 345–347; Case T-13/89 ICI v Commission [1992] ECR II-1021, paras 399–401; Case T-14/89 Montedipe SpA  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-1155, paras 389–391; Case T-15/89 Chemie Linz AG v Commission [1992] ECR II-1275, paras 393–395.

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15 months after the date of the hearing and some eight months after the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion in the case. It was provoked by the fact that, in a similar case decided shortly before the request was made, the CFI had found that the contested act was inexistent because of various defects in its purported adoption. The reasons given for refusing the request were these: the mere fact that judgment had been given in the other case did not justify reopening the oral procedure;573 the point at issue was one that it had been open to the applicant to take but it had not, even though the facts in question must have arisen before the commencement of proceedings; the Court is not obliged to initiate an investigation into the alleged inexistence of the contested act unless the parties bring forward matters sufficient to put in question the existence of the contested act (which was not the case). The CFI terminated by holding that, since the applicant’s arguments could not have grounded an application for the revision of a judgment, there was similarly no ground for acceding to the request for the reopening of the oral procedure. That case was a particularly strong one for the reopening of the oral procedure having regard to the events that had happened.574 The stance taken by the CFI indicates that the GC, like the ECJ, has a very reserved attitude towards applications to reopen the oral procedure (or order measures of enquiry) after the formal closure of that part of the procedure. The parallel drawn by the CFI (as it then was) with the conditions for entertaining an application for the revision of a judgment575 emphasises that reserved attitude; but that approach to the criteria for deciding whether or not to reopen the oral procedure (or order a measure of enquiry at that late stage in the proceedings) does not differ in substance from the approach of the ECJ outlined above. Accordingly, on appeal the ECJ upheld the CFI’s decision.576 In Case T-82/01 Josanne vof v Commission,577 it would seem that the oral procedure was reopened simply because the case got into a bit of a mess with both parties producing additional documents at the hearing and thereafter.

573 In other words, the fact that a similar act had been held to be inexistent in another case did not deprive the contested act of the presumption of validity attaching to acts of the EU institutions; there would have to be evidence of some defect in the contested act itself rather than evidence in the nature of similar fact evidence: see the Shell case (above, note 572), para 374. 574 In the previous judgment relied on by the applicant (delivered in Cases T-79, 84 to 86, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 98, 102 and 104/89 BASF AG v Commission [1992] ECR II-315), it had been revealed that the Commission had made various significant infringements of procedure when adopting decisions in competition cases. At the hearing in those other cases, the Commission had suggested that those infringements were common. That had been repeated by representatives of the Commission to the press. Nonetheless, those statements were not considered sufficient to give cause for concern in the Hüls case (above, note 363) and in those related to it. 575 As to which, see Ch 16, para 16.109 ff below. 576 Case C-199/92P  Huls (above, note 363), paras 122–136 (pp 4377–4380). The advocate general’s approach was rather different: see paras 47–79 (pp 4317–4329). 577 [2003] ECR II-2013, para 18.

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D

The judgment

1 The judgment stage 2.155 In the normal course of events, a direct action is taken into deliberation by the Court immediately upon the termination of the oral procedure or, where for some reason there is no oral procedure, upon the close of the written procedure. Depending upon the complexity of the case and the workload of the Court, the judgment may be delivered several months after the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion (where there is one) or, where there is no advocate general’s opinion, several months after the date of the hearing. The parties may, where necessary, apply to the Court for it to order the stay or suspension of the proceedings, in which case the Court will not proceed immediately to judgment.578 2 Termination of proceedings without judgment 2.156 Not all cases proceed to judgment. Proceedings may be terminated before judgment as a result of discontinuance by the applicant, a settlement of the dispute, the disappearance of the subject matter of the dispute after the commencement of proceedings (such as the withdrawal of the disputed measure, in an action for annulment; or a statement of position by the defendant, in an action in respect of a failure to act), or some other supervening event that makes it unnecessary for the Court to adjudicate on the case. 2.157 The applicant may at any time inform the Court in writing (or orally at the hearing) that he wishes to discontinue proceedings, in which case the President orders the case to be removed from the register579 and awards costs against the applicant unless the other party has not asked for costs or the applicant establishes that discontinuance is justified by the conduct of the opposing

578 See para 2.77 ff above. In a few exceptional cases proceedings have been suspended for very long periods (in one instance some 20 years before proceedings were eventually terminated). 579 RP-ECJ, art 148; RP-GC, art 125; RP-CST, art 84 (which provides that the other parties must be heard before the proceedings are discontinued). See Vandersanden and Barav, Contentieux Comunautaire (Bruylant, 1977) pp 68–69. The intention to discontinue may be inferred from the terms of a communication from the applicant (eg Case T-172/97 Camar Srl v Commission [1998] ECR II-77, para 19) or from the applicant’s concession that the Court does not need to give judgment (eg Case C-496/08P Serrano v Parliament [2010] ECR I-1793, para 55). In Case C-59/99 Commission v Manuel Pereira Roldao & Filhos Lda [2001]  ECR  I-8499, para  19, the application could not be served on one of the defendants due to a lack of information as to its address. The applicant wrote to the Court asking it to continue the proceedings against the other defendants, which was taken by the Court to be an implied abandonment of the claims against the unserved defendant. Where there are several applicants in a case and some but not all wish to discontinue, the case is not removed from the register but the names of the discontinuing applicants are removed from the list of applicants in the case: eg Case T-541/93 McCutcheon v Council [1994]  ECR II-1235, para  6 and p  1244. In actions which must be preceded by a compulsory pre-litigation procedure, discontinuance of the action usually involves discontinuance of the corresponding claims raised in the pre-litigation procedure: see Case T-36/93 Ojha v Commission [1995] ECR-SC I-A-161, II-497, paras 36–40.

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party.580 The applicant’s indication of his wish to discontinue is sufficient to bring the proceedings to an end irrespective of any desire of the opposing party to have the substantive issues in the case resolved.581

2.158 If the parties reach a settlement of the dispute and inform the Court that they abandon their claims before the Court rules on them, the President also orders the case to be removed from the register,582 the criteria for dealing with

580 RP-ECJ, art 141; RP-GC, art 136; RP-CST, art 103(5). Eg Case 276/83 Commission v Greece [1985]  ECR  2751. Discontinuance is a simple and unconditional withdrawal of the claim, with costs to be dealt with pursuant to the rules of procedure. If conditions are attached to the withdrawal of the claim (such as conditions relating to the costs of the proceedings), it is not discontinuance: see Case T-73/91 Gavilan v Parliament [1992] ECR II-1555, paras 20 and 26; Case T-311/04 Buendia Sierra v Commission [2006] ECR II-4137, paras 99–100. Discontinuance does not lead to an order that there is no need to give a ruling: Case T-325/03 E-Sim Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-1415. 581 Case C-120/94 Commission v Greece [1996]  ECR  I-1513. Accordingly, discontinuance is essentially a unilateral termination of proceedings by the applicant. Unlike a settlement, it does not (necessarily) involve a compromise of the dispute between the parties. However, it follows that, unless discontinuance occurs in consequence of there being a settlement, discontinuance has no effect on the possibility of the applicant bringing a further set of proceedings, as long as no relevant time limit has expired. The answer to the question whether or not beginning a second action after an earlier action has been discontinued can be barred as an abuse is not settled: see, for example, Case T-394/03 Angeletti v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-95, IIA-2-441, paras 22 and 41 (an action against a preparatory act is premature and should properly be discontinued but, when a challengeable act is later adopted, an action can be brought and the legality of the preparatory act may be relevant to the legality of the challengeable act; in consequence, there is no obvious reason why the discontinuance of an action brought prematurely against a preparatory act should prevent the applicant from fully developing a case for the annulment of a later, challengeable, act). 582 RP-ECJ, art 147(1); RP-GC, art 124(1); RP-CST, art 91(1). In Yorck von Wartenburg (above, note 489), the GC made the order even though the relevant provision (at the time RP-ECJ, art 78) gave the power to the President. It is not clear why that was done, although it appears to be quite common for the order to be made by the Court rather than the President (possibly because of a confusion with RP-ECJ, art 149, RP-GC, art 131(1) and RP-CST, art 85(1) which, in cases not involving a settlement, give the power to the Court). In Case T-247/93 Stenhouse v Council and Commission, order of 15 December 1998, the applicant informed the GC that the case had been settled and that compensation had been paid by the defendant. That was confirmed by the other parties. However, the applicant did not formally withdraw the action. The GC wrote to the applicant several times asking how the case was to proceed (if at all) but got no response. Accordingly, it took the initiative of acting on the information available to it and ruling that there was no need to adjudicate on the case, thereby closing the proceedings. That seems to have been a situation in which the GC took the view that RP-GC, art 124 did not apply (because there had been no formal abandonment by the applicant of his claims), thus causing it to exercise its power under RP-GC, art  131. In other settlement cases, that is not the explanation why the order was made by the Court rather than the President. It may be that the Court considers that, in the event of a settlement, proceedings can be closed under either provision, at its election. With effect from 1 September 2016, RP-GC, art 124(1) applies only to out of court settlements; but that appears to be because a specific rule applies as from that date to GC-initiated settlements in staff cases: see RP-GC, art 125b. It does not seem to have been noticed that a settlemt can be initiated by the GC in cases other than staff cases, such as damages actions.

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the costs being the same in the ECJ and GC.583 Where the settlement occurs after an interim judgment, the order is made by the Court itself.584 The case is not removed from the register when the parties purport to settle an action for annulment or one in respect of a failure to act.585 The reason for that seems to lie in the public interest in ensuring that the lawfulness of acts (or the failure to act) of the EU institutions be resolved rather than be the subject of some kind of deal between the parties. It would seem that such proceedings can be terminated before judgment only if the applicant formally discontinues them or there are grounds enabling the Court to declare the action devoid of purpose;586 but it has also been stated that, once doubts as to the validity of an act (or default) of an EU institution have been aired in public, they cannot be expunged by the withdrawal of proceedings and that it is inconceivable that the Court should be prevented from annulling an illegal act merely because the applicant has withdrawn.587 It does not seem that, in a case concerning an act (or default) of interest only to the applicant, the public interest in settling the lawfulness of acts (or defaults) of the institutions would ordinarily prevail over the interest of the applicant in making an autonomous decision regarding the conduct of proceedings.588 At all events, the settlement of an action for annulment or in respect of a failure to act does not lead automatically to the removal of the case from the register: before any such decision is made the parties are to be given an opportunity to explain any interest that they might have in continuing the proceedings and to answer any concern that the Court may have in allowing the proceedings to be terminated without judgment.589 2.159 In the case of an action brought by several applicants jointly the discontinuance of the proceedings by one or more of them (whether by death, abandonment of the proceedings or, semble, as a result of a settlement with the opposing party) does not affect the position of the remaining applicants.590

583 RP-ECJ, art 141; RP-GC, art 136. In staff cases, the position is as stated in para 2.65 above. 584 Eg Cases 256, 257, 265 and 267/80, 5 and 51/81 and 282/82 Birra Wuhrer v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 789; Case C-152/88 Sofrimport SARL v Commission [1992] ECR I-153. 585 RP-ECJ, art 147(2); RP-GC, art 124(2). The same does not apply in CST proceedings because of the nature of those proceedings. 586 See, for example, Cases 109 and 114/75 National Carbonising Co Ltd v Commission [1977] ECR 381. In Case 242/86 Ireland v Commission [1988] ECR 2895, Ireland said that it consented to an order to the effect that there was no need to proceed to judgment because the Commission had given a formal assurance to apply the judgment in a previous case to the decision contested in the proceedings. That amounted to acknowledgement of the illegality of that decision. To like effect: Cases 167 and 168/87, 28 and 123/88 Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores de Espana v Commission [1989] ECR 55. 587 Case 51/87 Commission v Council [1988] ECR 5459 at 5469 (Advocate General Lenz). 588 That would explain the position in CST proceedings. 589 Cf Cases 67, 68 and 70/85R  Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV  v Commission [1985] ECR 1315, para 47. For a general discussion of the ability of the parties to determine the scope and existence of the litigation, see Case C- 106/03P Vedial SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004]  ECR  I-9573, advocate general’s opinion, paras 27–39. 590 Case 50/84 Bensider v Commission [1984] ECR 3991 at 4000 (Advocate General Mancini).

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2.160 Proceedings may also terminate without a judgment where their subject matter ceases to exist after their commencement but before the delivery of judgment or where, for some other reason, there is no need for the Court to give judgment.591 In such circumstances proceedings are terminated by a decision (usually in the form of an order unless the oral procedure has by that time been opened) declaring that there is no need for the Court to give a decision.592 2.161 The most common example of a situation where the subject matter of the action disappears in the course of proceedings, thus rendering the delivery of judgment unnecessary, is that where an act whose annulment is sought is with-

591 Eg Cases 736 and 738–780/79 Aranovitch v Commission [1987] ECR 2425 (proceedings stayed pending judgment in a test case; the applicants’ lawyer had no mandate to discontinue once the test case had been decided so the Court had to act); Case 321/81 Battaglia v Commission [1987] ECR 2429 (same); Case 43/83 De Naeyer v Commission [1987] ECR 3569 (settlement but no discontinuance by the parties); Case C-41/92 Liberal Democrats v Parliament [1993] ECR I-3153 (defendant took the action desired by the applicants after the commencement of proceedings); Cases T-89/91, T-21/92 and T-89/92  X  v Commission [1993]  ECR II-1235, paras 21–22 (applicant said that the relief sought in the first two actions had been ‘absorbed’ into the second; this looks more like a case of discontinuance); Case T-443/93 Casillo Grani snc v Commission [1995] ECR II-1375 (loss of interest after the commencement of proceedings – see further Ch 7, para 7.15); Case T-81/98 Boyes v Commission [1999] ECR II-3501 (death of applicant); Case T-187/00 Godecke AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2001] ECR II-859, paras 9–12 (withdrawal of the application for the contested trade mark); Case T-168/99 Territorio Historico de Alava – Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2002] ECR II-1371 (the action had proceeded upon a premise that was overturned by the judgment in another case); Case T-224/99 European Council of Transport Users ASBL v Commission [2003] ECR II-2097 (proceedings had been commenced in 1999 against a decision that had effect for three years; by 2003, the case was nowhere near judgment, for reasons not explained in the order, and the GC asked the parties whether or not there was any need to give judgment – there was not); Case T-151/03 Nuova Agricast Srl v Commission [2005] ECR II-1967 (a superfluous action against a decision refusing the applicant access to a document already in its possession). In Case T-162/94  NMB  France SARL  v Commission [1996] ECR II-427, paras 44–45, the action had become wholly devoid of purpose so far as one applicant was concerned and partially devoid of purpose in relation to the other applicants because they had obtained what they were seeking. In Case T-210/99 Gankema v Commission [2004] ECR II-781, the action was found to be devoid of purpose for a number of reasons, one of which was the applicant’s persistent failure to respond to letters from the Court. In Cases T-166/07 and T-285/07 Italy v Commission [2010] ECR II-193*, paras 32–35, it was claimed that the error giving rise to the commencement of proceedings had subsequently been cured, rendering the actions devoid of purpose; but that argument was rejected. 592 RP-ECJ, art 149; RP-GC, art 131; RP-CST, art 85. For the procedure followed, see Ch 7, section III.C, paras 7.90–7.96. Eg Case 74/81 Rudolf Flender KG  v Commission [1982]  ECR  395; Aranovitch (above, note 591); Battaglia (above, note 591). In such cases, the Court will not express a view on the admissibility or merits of the case: eg  Cases C-302/99P and C-308/99P Commission and France v TFI [2001] ECR I-5603, paras 25–29.

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drawn or revoked,593 replaced or superseded594 or annulled in another case595 after proceedings have begun. Where the act is withdrawn and immediately replaced by another to the same effect, the proceedings commenced originally against the first act can be continued against its replacement as long as the two acts are in substance identical because the subject matter of the action has not in truth disappeared.596 The continuation of the proceedings, in that eventuality, does not arise 593 The effects of the withdrawn or revoked measure must be cancelled in their entirety. Eg Cases 80–83/81 and 182–185/82 Adam v Commission [1984]  ECR  3411, paras 8–9; Case 82/85 Eurasian Corpn v Commission [1985] ECR 3603, paras 11–13; Case 19/85 Gregoire Foulon v Parliament [1985] ECR 3771, paras 7–10; Case C-123/92 Lezzi Pietro & C Srl v Commission [1993] ECR I-809 (contested decision ‘amended’ after commencement of proceedings in such a way as to give the applicant the same result as if it had been annulled); Case T-22/96 J Langdon Ltd v Commission [1996] ECR II-1009; Case T-239/94 Association des Acieries Europeennes Independantes v Commission [1997]  ECR II-1839, paras 34–35; Case T-178/99 Elder v Commission [1999] ECR II-3509; Case T-312/01 Jungbunzlauer AG v Commission [2002] ECR II-3023 (mistake in the identity of the addressee); Cases C-138/03, C-324/03 and C-431/03 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10043, paras 23–26; Case T-184/01 IMS Health v Commission [2005] ECR II-817, paras 34–49 (extensive discussion of whether or not the withdrawal of the contested decision had left any lingering effects justifying the continuation of the proceedings – no); Case F-77/07 Labate v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-31, II-A-2-159, para 7. In Case T-287/01 Bioelettrica SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-3283, paras 55–58, (a contractual dispute, not an action for annulment) the GC rejected the Commission’s claim that the contested decision had been withdrawn. 594 Eg Case 56/85 Brother Industries Ltd v Commission [1988] ECR 5655 (regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty replaced by a regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty); Cases 294/86 and 77/87 Technointorg v Commission and Council [1988]  ECR  6077, paras 11–14 (same); Case C-320/81 Acerbis v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-563, paras 20–21 (contested salary statements replaced by new ones in consequence of the annulment, in other litigation, of the regulations on which they were based); Case T-41/93 B v Commission [1993]  ECR II-1037, paras 19–22 (replacement decision meeting the applicant’s claims in full); Case T-431/93 Wieschemann v Commission [1993]  ECR II-1199; Case T-169/96 Pierard v Commission [1998]  ECR-SC  I-A-85, II-A-205, paras 21–25; Cases T-204/97 and T-270/97 EPAC - Empresa para a Agroalimentacao e Cereais SA v Commission [2000] ECR II-2267, paras 153–159 (replacement of decision suspending State aid by decision prohibiting it); Case T-90/99 Salzgitter AG  v Commission [2002]  ECR II-4535 (decision opening a procedure superseded by a final decision). Where the defendant claims that the action is devoid of purpose because the contested measure has been replaced retrospectively, it appears that the defendant will be debarred from later asserting that the contested measure has legal effect should the replacing measure be annulled: Case T-26/97 Antillean Rice Mills NV v Commission [1997] ECR II-1347, para 14. 595 Eg Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission [2004]  ECR  I-3679, paras 33–37. Cf Case C-66/12 Council v Commission, 19 November 2013, paras 20–21 and 24. 596 Eg Case 14/81 Alpha Steel Ltd v Commission [1982]  ECR  749 (see also Advocate General Reischl at 775); Case 48/86R J Cauet and B Joliet v Commission [1986] ECR 1237, para 4; Cases 351 and 360/85 Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi SA v Commission [1987] ECR I-3639, paras 10–11; Case 103/85 Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG v Commission [1988] ECR 4131, paras 10–12; Case T-64/89 Automec Srl v Commission [1990] ECR I-367, paras 66–68; Case T-23/96 De Persio v Commission [1998]  ECR-SC  I-A-483, II-1413, paras 32–37; Cases T-46/98 and T-151/98 Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) v Commission [2000] ECR II-167, paras 33–38 (rectification of debit note); Case T-111/00 British American Tobacco International (Investments) Ltd v Commission [2001] ECR II-2997, paras 20–24; Case T-298/00 Hendrickx v European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), unreported order of 12 March 2001, para 44; Case C-217/01P Hendrickx v European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) [2003]  ECR  I-3701, para  29; Case

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as a matter of law but is dependent upon an election made by the applicant and appears to be excluded where the applicant commences a separate action against the replacing or substitute measure.597 The Court cannot require the defendant to T-229/02 Kurdistan Workers’ Party v Council [2005]  ECR II-539, para  29 (not referred to on appeal in Case C-229/05P  Ocalan on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party v Council [2007]  ECR  I-439); Case T-306/01 Yusuf v Council and Commission [2005]  ECR II-3533, 71–77; Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005]  ECR II-3649, paras 52–58; Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines de peuple d’Iran v Council [2006]  ECR II4665, paras 27–30; Case T-47/03 Sison v Council [2007] ECR II-73*, paras 36–39 (same as Case T-228/02); Case T-327/03 Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council [2007] ECR II-79*, paras 32–35 (same as Case T-228/02); Case T-256/07 People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran v Council [2008] ECR II-3019, paras 45–47 (the judgment was appealed but the appeal was withdrawn); Cases C-399/06P and C-403/06P Hassan v Council and Commission [2009] ECR I-11393, paras 58–65; Cases T-267/08 and T-279/08 Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais v Commission [2011] ECR II-1999, paras 12–13 and 22–24 (decision replaced because it was not properly reasoned as regards the calculation of the amount of State aid in question); Case T-200/11 Al Matri v Council, 28 May 2013, paras 80–82; Case T-202/12 Al Assad v Council, 12 March 2014, paras 32–34; Case T-652/11 Sabbagh v Council, 26 February 2015, paras 24–26 (the amendment to the pleading must nonetheless be made before the expiry of the time limit for challenging the replacement measure). It is not possible to continue proceedings where the new measure has not yet been adopted: Langdon (above, note 593), paras 15–16; European Council of Transport Users (above, note 591), para 37; Labate (above, note 593), para 8 (in that case, the decision was revoked so that the position could be reconsidered de novo); Sabbagh (above), para 27. As appears from Automec (para 69) and Henrickx (paras 45–48 and 30–32, respectively), it is not possible to continue the proceedings against the new measure if it differs in nature or content from the old one. As appears from Al Assad (see paras 38–40), that procedural device does not apply where the replacing measure replaces a measure that was not originally the subject of challenge. RP-GC, art 86 now provides the procedural means in GC proceedings for extending the scope of the action so as to cover the replacement or amending measure: see Ch 9, para 9.54. 597 Case C-46/96 Germany v Commission [1997]  ECR  I-1189 (the action became devoid of purpose due to the withdrawal of the contested decision and its replacement by a decision that was substantially the same, even though the applicant considered that it was not necessary to commence a second action against the replacing decision – although that was what it had done); Case T-25/96 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen v Commission [1997] ECR II-363 (similar situation); Case T-145/95 Proderec - Formacao e Desenvolvimento de Recursos Humanos ACE v Commission [1997] ECR II-823 (similar). Cf Case T-11/07 RENV Frucona Kosice AS  v Commission, 21  March 2014. In that case (reduced to simplicity), the GC had dismissed an application for the annulment of a Commission decision on one point and did not decide the other. The ECJ overturned the GC’s judgment and remitted the matter to the GC for decision on the second point. The Commission then repealed the decision and replaced it with a new decision that purported to correct the error in the first decision that the ECJ had identified. The Commission claimed that, for reasons of procedural economy, the GC should permit the applicant to amend its pleadings so as to challenge the second decision. The applicant disagreed and commenced another action for annulment against the second decision. The applicant’s position appears to have been procedurally correct because: (i) the GC continued to have jurisdiction in the case only on the basis of the remission to it of the point concerning the first decision that had remained undecided and, in contrast to the procedural position as it exists before any judgment has been given in an action, that jurisdiction was fixed by the ECJ judgment and could not be expanded at the behest of the parties; and (ii) a replacement decision that seeks to remedy an illegality in the original decision, identified in a judgment on the legality of the original decision, is hardly identical to the original decision. The GC found that there was no need to adjudicate on the original action because of the repeal and replacement of the original decision, noting that the applicant had brought an action against the replacement decision, ‘as it was entitled to do’ (para  37). The GC’s order leaves it unclear whether the applicant could have waived the procedural objections to the Commission’s proposed course

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maintain the contested act in force until judgment in order to preserve the subject matter of the action;598 and any such order is unnecessary since the proceedings can be continued to judgment even if the contested act is withdrawn and not replaced as long as the applicant still has an interest in the continuation of the proceedings.599 In an action in respect of a failure to act, the adoption of the measure sought by the applicant, after the commencement of proceedings but before judgment, deprives the proceedings of their purpose and there is no need to give judgment.600 However, if the admissibility of the proceedings has been contested, it may be necessary for the Court to rule on admissibility in order to put itself in a position to find that there is no need to adjudicate and make its decision on costs.601 2.162 In IP appeals the withdrawal of the contested application for registration of the IP right,602 the withdrawal of the opposition to it (whether in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal or in the proceedings before the Court),603 or the original decision becoming otherwise inoperative,604 mean that there is no longer any basis for the proceedings and they are devoid of purpose.

of action and carried on with the original action. It does not seem that, under RP-GC, art 86 (which was not in force at the time), the original action could be extended to cover the repealing decision because, under that provision, the scope of an action cannot be modified after the close of the oral procedure (the oral procedure could not be regarded as being reopened, or capable of being reopened, in relation to the point decided definitively by the ECJ). 598 Cf the Kwekerij Gebroeders case (above, note 589). 599 In such circumstances, that interest will ordinarily be an interest in obtaining a declaration that the contested act was unlawful for the purpose of then claiming damages. There is no such interest where a regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty is replaced by one imposing a definitive duty because the unlawfulness of the former can in any event be relied on in proceedings concerning the latter: eg the Technointorg case (above, note 594). 600 Eg Case 377/87 Parliament v Council [1988] ECR 4017, paras 8–11; Case 383/87 Commission v Council [1988] ECR 4051, paras 8–11; Cases C-15/91 and C-108/91 Josef Buckl & Sohne OHG  v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-6061, paras 14–18; Case T-28/90 Asia Motor France v Commission [1992]  ECR II-2285, paras 35–38; Case T-56/92 Koelman v Commission [1993] ECR II-1267, para 28; Case T-107/96 Pantochim SA v Commission [1998] ECR II-311, paras 28–32; Cases T-297/01 and T-298/01  SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicacao SA v Commission [2004] ECR I-743, para 31. 601 Case T-103/99 Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v European Ombudsman and Parliament [2000] ECR II-4165, para 41. 602 Case C-498/01P Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) v Zapf Creation AG  [2004]  ECR  I-11349, para  12 of the judgment; Case T-292/03 Messe Berlin GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-1143. 603 Case T-10/01 Lichtwer Pharma AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003]  ECR II-2225 (withdrawal of the opposition); Case T-120/03 Synopharm GmbH & Co KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-509, para 20 (at least where the appealed decision has allowed the opposition but has not yet come into effect by the time when the opposition is withdrawn, there is no reason to annul the appealed decision: paras 21–22). 604 Case T-383/02 GD Searle LLC v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003] ECR II-4921.

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2.163 In appeals against a judgment, a resolution of the dispute at the origin of the litigation does not necessarily render the appeal devoid of purpose since the judgment appealed against still produces legal effects and the appellant may retain an interest in contesting the view of the law taken by the court below.605 Aliter where the appeal is dependent upon the outcome in another case.606 2.164 Finally, in GC and CST proceedings, the Court may close the proceedings by reasoned order if the applicant has ceased to reply to the Court’s ‘requests’. That power may be exercised by the GC of its own motion (on a proposal from the judge-rapporteur) and by the CST either on its own motion or on application made by a party. The parties must be heard before the power is exercised.607 The trigger for such a step (a failure by the applicant to reply to the Court’s requests) is ill-defined. It appears to refer to a persistent and unexplained failure by the applicant to give any response at all to letters from the Court addressed to the applicant, in the ordinary course of proceedings, that require a response of some sort from him.608 The termination of an action without judgment does not preclude the Court from ruling on a counterclaim advanced by the defendant.609

3 Preparation and delivery of the judgment 2.165 The Court (or chamber) deliberates on its judgment in private and in the absence of the advocate general (where there is one).610 The draft judgment is

605 Zapf Creation (above, note 602), paras 10–11 (hence an additional reason – such as that stated in para 12 of the judgment – may be needed in order to justify the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of purpose). 606 Case C-13/03P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-1113, paras 21–23. 607 RP-GC, art 131(2); RP-CST, art 85(2). 608 According to the GC’s commentary on the draft of its 2015 rules of procedure, RP-GC, art 131(2) reflects a practice of the GC exemplified in: Case T-216/99 Ter Huurne’s Handelsmaatschappij v Commission, unreported order of 23  March 2004; Case T-299/06 Leclercq v Commission, order of 20 June 2008; Case T-123/08 Spitzer v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), order of 2  September 2010; Case T-128/09 Meridania SpA  v Commission, 3 October 2011; Case T-365/07 Traxdata France Sarl v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 12  December 2011; Case T-444/09 La City v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 16 May 2012; Case T-580/12 Yaqub v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 12 September 2013. In those cases (with the possible exception of Ter Huurne, the order in which appears to be untraceable, and Yaqub), the applicant had withdrawn his instructions from his lawyers; the GC asked them to inform the applicant that it was necessary to appoint new lawyers to replace them; the applicant was informed several times but showed no intention to appoint new representatives. In Yaqub, the applicant’s lawyer failed to respond to letters from the GC and a direct approach to the applicant bore no fruit. Such cases look more like instances of (implied) discontinuance by the applicant. Case T-435/09 GL2006 Europe Ltd v Commission, 16 September 2013, paras 26–34, is a like case. 609 GL2006 (above, note 608), paras 45–49. 610 Statute, art 35; RP-ECJ, art 32(1)–(2); RP-GC, art 21(1)–(2); RP-CST, art 29(1)–(2).

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prepared (often in French) by the judge-rapporteur.611 Its final form is decided by the Court (or chamber) as a body and there is no dissenting opinion. The authentic text is that in the language of the case.612 As the agreed version will, in many cases, be in French or some other of the Court’s languages common to the judges participating in the deliberations, the authentic version will be a translation of the text agreed by the judges in cases where the language of the case is not that in which the deliberations have been conducted. It is vetted by a judge whose native tongue is the language of the case in order to ensure that it corresponds to the agreed text. Occasionally there are slips.613 The Statute provides that the judgment must (i) state the reasons on which it is based, (ii) contain the names of the judges who took part in the deliberations, (iii) be signed by the President and the Registrar and (iv) be read in open court.614 It adds that the Court ‘shall adjudicate upon costs’.615 The Rules of Procedure are slightly more expansive.616 2.166 The judgment is, in accordance with the Statute, delivered in open court,617 with all the judges who took part in the deliberations present. The parties are given notice of the date of delivery of the judgment,618 but there is no purpose in their attending court on that day; only the operative part of the judgment is read out and the parties are served with certified copies of the entire judgment.619 As a result, counsel do not in practice attend to take the judgment. The original of the judgment is signed by the President, the judges who took part in the deliberations and the Registrar, sealed and deposited at the Registry; the Registrar notes 611 The draft is sent to the ‘reader of judgments’, an official of the Court who acts under the authority of the President of the Court or, in cases allocated to a chamber, the President of the chamber concerned, and whose function is to revise the draft in order to ensure consistency in terminology and check style and presentation. The reader sends his suggestions to the judgerapporteur and the President of the Court or the chamber, as the case may be, and his assistance may also be requested in the preparation of the draft. The necessity for the reader derived from the fact that, whereas all members of the Court knew French, they could not all draft in it easily. In principle, the Court’s internal working language was French at the time of writing, as it had been since the creation of the Court. However, since at least the 1980s, there had been periods in which a different language would be used, generally by a chamber, in the course of the judges’ deliberations. 612 See note 21 above. 613 Cf the variations between, on the one hand, the Danish, German and English texts and, on the other, the Dutch, French and Italian texts of para  16 of the judgment in Case 77/76 Fratelli Cucchi v Avez SpA [1977] ECR 987 and para 10 of the judgment in Case 105/76 Interzuccheri SpA v Ditta Rezzano e Cavassa [1977] ECR 1029. The occurrence of linguistic vagaries has increased in recent years with the consequence that, where the meaning or effect of a judgment turns on its precise wording, it is usually prudent to consult more than one language version of the judgment. Mistakes in a particular language version of a judgment can be corrected using the procedure for the rectification of a judgment: eg  Case C-145/10  REC  Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, order of 7  March 2013, which corrects the German version of the judgment reported at [2011] ECR I-12533 (for the rectification procedure, see Ch 16, section III, para 16.40 ff). 614 Statute, arts 36 and 37. 615 Statute, art 38. 616 See Ch 16, section I.B, para 16.10. 617 RP-ECJ, art 88(1); RP-GC, art 118(1); RP-CST, art 95(1). 618 RP-ECJ, art 86; RP-GC, art 116; RP-CST, art 93. 619 RP-ECJ, art 88(2); RP-GC, art 118(2); RP-CST, art 95(2).

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on the original the date on which it was delivered.620 On occasion the Court delivers a so-called ‘interim’ or ‘interlocutory’ judgment, which gives a ruling on the principal issues between the parties or a direction on the law, leaving them to settle the remaining issues without prejudice to their being decided by the Court in the event that there is no agreement.621 4 Effect of judgments 2.167 With one exception, judgments of the Court are binding from the date of their delivery.622 The exception applies in the case of a decision of the GC declaring a regulation (within the meaning of the TFEU and EAEC Treaty) to be void. Such a decision takes effect as from the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal against the decision or, where an appeal is brought within time, the date of the dismissal of the appeal.623 In the context of an appeal from a judgment of the GC or CST, application may be made to the appeal court (the GC for the CST and the ECJ for the GC) for the suspension of the effects of the judgment appealed against or for some other form of interim relief pending the outcome of the appeal.624 An appellate decision of the GC may be the subject of review by the ECJ but not a further appeal to the ECJ.625 There is no appeal from a judgment of the ECJ. The effects of a judgment are discussed more fully in Chapter 16. 5 Proceedings after the delivery of judgment 2.168 The Court may, of its own motion or on application by one of the parties, made within two weeks (or, in the case of the CST, one month) of delivery of the judgment, rectify clerical mistakes, errors in calculation and obvious slips.626 That is only a slip rule and no correction of a legal error may be made by using that procedure.627 If the ECJ or GC omits to give a decision on a specific head of claim or on costs, or the CST omits to give a decision on costs, any party 620 RP-ECJ, art 88(2); RP-GC, art 118(2); RP-CST, art 95(2). The judgment is normally signed just before it is delivered. 621 Eg Case 238/78 Ireks-Arkady GmbH  v Council and Commission [1979]  ECR  2955; Case 170/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1980] ECR 417; Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881; and Cases 156/79 and 51/80 Gratreau v Commission [1980] ECR 3943; Cases T-195/94 and T-202/94 Quiller and Heusmann v Council and Commission [1997] ECR I-2247, paras 143–145 (where the Court had asked the parties to focus on the question of liability alone). The recommencement of proceedings after the first judgment may be effected by letter to the Court explaining that no agreement has been reached or else that the conditions set by the Court for continuing the proceedings have been met. Although the Court generally reopens the oral procedure, it may not consider that to be necessary (see the Gratreau case). 622 RP-ECJ, art 91(1); RP-GC, art 121(1); RP-CST, art 98(1). 623 Statute, art 60, 2nd para. 624 Statute, art 60, 1st para, and, in relation to the CST, Annex, art 12(1). In relation to such appeals see further para 2.224 ff below and Ch 15. 625 Cp TFEU, art 256(1) and (2). In relation to such reviews, see further para 2.262 ff and Ch 15. 626 RP-ECJ, art 154; RP-GC, art 164; RP-CST, art 122. As can be seen from the Painer case (above, note 613), the Court may act of its own motion without any time limit. 627 Case 27/76 United Brands Co v Commission [1978] ECR 345 at 349.

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General outline of procedure 2.170

may, within one month of service of the judgment, apply to the Court for it to ‘supplement’ its judgment. Such an application is served on the other parties in the usual manner and the President prescribes a period within which they may lodge written observations.628 In relation to the ECJ and GC, that procedure is available only in relation to one of the points in the form of order, ie one of the claims put forward by one of the parties, and is not available in relation to an argument put forward by one of the parties and refuted by the other.629 2.169 Although there is no appeal from a judgment of the ECJ, there are two methods of seeking a review of a judgment by the ECJ itself. The first is ‘third party proceedings’, whereby a person not a party to the original proceedings may challenge the judgment if it is prejudicial to his rights.630 The second method is ‘revision’, by which a party may seek to have the judgment revised if a new fact has since come to light which is a ‘decisive factor’ and which was unknown both to the Court and to the party applying for revision at the time of the judgment.631 Lastly, there is the procedure for the interpretation of the judgment, by which any party or EU institution showing an ‘interest’ in a judgment of the Court may apply for it to be construed by the Court if its meaning or scope is in doubt.632 That procedure is quite distinct from the normal function of a court to analyse previous judgments in order to determine what they hold.633 All three procedures are considered in detail below and all three may also be relied on in relation to judgments of the GC and CST.634 Such procedures are dealt with by the formation responsible for the judgment in question unless that formation cannot be reconstituted.635

V

REFERENCES FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING

2.170 References for a preliminary ruling636 are an instrument of co-operation between national courts and the ECJ (or the GC, to the extent that it is given 628 RP-ECJ, art  155; RP-GC, art  165; RP-CST, art  123. So far as the CST is concerned, the judgment may be supplemented only if the question of costs remains undecided. 629 The procedure is considered in more detail in Ch 16. 630 RP-ECJ, art 157. 631 RP-ECJ, art 159. 632 RP-ECJ, art 158. 633 Case C-412/92P Parliament v Meskens [1994] ECR I-3757, Advocate General Darmon, paras 32–33 (p 3764), judgment, para 35 (p 3778). 634 See RP-GC, art 167 (third party proceedings), 169 (revision) and 168 (interpretation); RP-CST, art 125 (third party proceedings), 126 (interpretation) and 127 (revision). 635 Express provision to that effect is made in RP-ECJ, art 153 and RP-GC, art 162(1). The former provision creates an exception in the case of the revision of a judgment (RP-ECJ, art  159) because of the particular nature of revision proceedings and the much longer time-limit applicable to such proceedings (according to the ECJ’s explanatory note accompanying the draft 2012 Rules of Procedure, in relation to the draft art  155). RP-GC, art  162(2) provides for the assignment of the case to another formation having the same number of judges if the quorum of the original formation cannot be retained. 636 See, in particular, Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, 2010); Millett in Lasok and Millett, Judicial Control in the EU (Richmond, 2004),

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2.171  General outline of procedure

jurisdiction to hear and determine such references) which takes the form of an interlocutory step in the proceedings before a national court or tribunal designed to obtain a ruling from (at the time of writing) the ECJ on a point of EU law which has arisen in the course of the litigation between the parties.637 The procedure is classified by the ECJ as non-contentious and as excluding any initiative by the parties.638 The questions of EU law on which the ECJ can rule at the request of a national court concern the interpretation of the Treaties, acts of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and certain conventions and, as the case may be, the validity of acts of the EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.639 The ECJ is alone competent to pronounce authoritatively and definitively on a question of EU law and so the procedure not only enables it to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law in all the member states but it also allows a national court to seek and obtain authoritative guidance on such a point before deciding the dispute between the parties. The division of competence between the ECJ and the referring court or tribunal is not based, it has been said, ‘on any hierarchical superiority of the Court but rather on a mutual exclusivity of their respective jurisdictions’.640 The ECJ is competent to rule only on the question of EU law referred to it; the national court remains competent to decide the dispute between the parties and any other issue of fact or law. That does not, of course, mean that the referring court is free to ignore the Court’s ruling on the question of the interpretation or validity of EU law with which it has been seised.641 2.171 The nature of the preliminary ruling procedure is such that a fully rounded picture of the procedure would require a description of the procedure to be followed before the national court as well as before the ECJ, an approach that strictly speaking falls outside the scope of this work because it would involve a description of the different procedural rules that apply in the courts and tribunals

para 308 ff; Anderson and Demetriou, References to the European Court (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edn, 2002); Schermers et al (ed) Article  177  EEC: Experience and Problems (1987); Bebr Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities (Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) pp 336 ff. 637 Cf Case 62/72 Bollmann v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof [1973]  ECR  269, para  4; Case C-286/88 Falciola Angelo v Comune di Pavia [1990]  ECR  I-191, para  7; Case C-364/92  SAT  Fluggesellschaft mbH  v Eurocontrol [1994]  ECR  I-43 (advocate general’s opinion, para 5). 638 Eg the Danske Svineproducenter case (above, note 501), para 22. 639 TEU, art 19(3)(b); TFEU, art 267 (to be read subject to TFEU, art 275 and 276 and to art 10 of Protocol No 36 on transitional provisions); EEA, art 107 and protocol 34 (not operational at the time of writing); RP-ECJ, art 93. See further Ch 17. 640 Bebr Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities (Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) p 366. 641 See Case 29/68 Milch- Fett- und Eierkontor GmbH  v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken (No  2) [1969]  ECR  165, para  3: ‘an interpretation given by the Court of Justice binds the national court in question but it is for the latter to decide whether it is sufficiently enlightened by the preliminary ruling given or whether it is necessary to make a further reference to the Court’. The effect of judgments in preliminary ruling proceedings is considered more fully in Ch 16.

266

General outline of procedure 2.174

of all the member states. At this point it is sufficient to describe in general terms the proceedings before the ECJ.642 2.172 The proceedings before the ECJ commence with the lodgment at the ECJ’s Registry of the order for reference made by the national court. Ordinarily, they then develop in the following phases: written procedure; oral procedure; judgment. The procedure is governed by a combination of the common procedural rules in Title II of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure and Title III, which is specifically devoted to references for a preliminary ruling. After the delivery of judgment by the ECJ, the proceedings before the national court continue.643 2.173 Under the Statute, the proceedings before the ECJ can be conducted in accordance with a ‘normal’ procedure (summarised above) or, if the rules of procedure so provide, with an ‘expedited’ or ‘accelerated’ procedure or, in the case of references for a preliminary ruling relating to the Treaty area of freedom, security and justice, in accordance with an ‘urgent’ procedure.644 The alternatives to the ‘normal’ track may provide for a shortening of the time limit for the submission of written observations and for the case to be determined without the delivery of an opinion by the advocate general. In addition, the ‘urgent’ procedure may limit the number of parties authorised to submit written observations or, in cases of extreme urgency, omit the written procedure entirely.645 The alternatives to the ‘normal’ track that the rules of procedure provided for, at the time of writing, are considered after the different stages in the normal track have been described.

A

The order for reference

1 Form and contents 2.174 The order for reference initiates the preliminary ruling procedure and is a document for which the referring court or tribunal bears responsibility. It is sent by the referring court or tribunal to the ECJ.646 Whether or not the referring court or tribunal sends the reference to anyone else is a matter for the rules of procedure of that court or tribunal. Originally, no express or implied requirements

642 A more detailed account of the procedure as a whole is to be found in Ch 17, para 17.65 ff. 643 The effect of the ruling delivered by the ECJ may be to decide the case so that the national court has nothing further to do other than to make an order giving effect to the ruling: eg Henn and Darby v DPP [1981] AC 850. 644 The ‘normal’ track is summarised in Statute, art 23, up to the end of the written procedure, the rest of the procedure being summarised in Statute, art 20. The ‘expedited’, ‘accelerated’ and ‘urgent’ procedures are referred to in Statute, art 23a. The ‘expedited’ procedure appears to be an allusion to the expedited procedure in direct actions. 645 Statute, art 23a, 2nd and 3rd paras. 646 Statute, art  23, 1st sentence; Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ  No C338 of 6  November 2012 p  1), para 33, which states that the order for reference and the relevant documents (including, where applicable, the case file or a copy of it) are to be sent by registered post to the ECJ’s registry. The address is to be found there.

267

2.175  General outline of procedure

were laid down concerning the form and content of the order for reference647 and, for that reason, the Court adopted a liberal attitude to the construction of orders for reference, interpreting them, where necessary, so as to find the question of EU law referred when it was not expressed clearly.648 As from 2012, the position is that the order or decision that, under the referring court or tribunal’s rules of procedure generates the reference to the ECJ, is a matter covered solely by those rules of procedure. In contrast, the request for a preliminary ruling itself is, in terms of its content, subject to the ECJ’s rules of procedure.649 Those rules650 provide that the request for a preliminary ruling should contain (not necessarily in the same order as indicated below): (1) the text of the question(s) on which the ECJ is asked to rule; (2) a summary of the subject-matter of the dispute and any relevant findings of fact made by the referring court or tribunal or an account of the facts on which the questions are based;651 (3) the tenor of any national provisions applicable in the case and, where appropriate, any relevant national case law;652 (4) a statement of the reasons prompting the referring court or tribunal to inquire about the interpretation or validity of EU law or of some measure adopted by an EU institution, body, office or agency; and (where relevant) the relationship between the provision or measure in question and any national legislation applicable to the proceedings before the referring court or tribunal (referred to as ‘the main proceedings’).653 2.175 Guidance published by the ECJ makes additional suggestions, such as: the request for a preliminary ruling be drafted simply, clearly, precisely and without superfluous detail; accurate identification of the provisions of EU law in question; a summary of the arguments of the parties; the referring court’s own

647 Case 13/61 Kledingverkoopbedrijf De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch GmbH  [1962]  ECR  45 at p  50. See also Case 101/63 Wagner v Fohrmann and Krier [1964] ECR 195. 648 Eg Case 228/87 Pretura Unificata di Torino v X [1988] ECR 5099, paras 6–7. 649 The distinction can be illustrated by reference to the practice in England and Wales (at the time of writing), where the making of a reference for a preliminary ruling involves the making of a court order, drawn up in the habitual form appropriate to the court or tribunal in question, to which is attached a schedule setting out the request for a preliminary ruling. It is the latter to which the requirements in the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure apply. 650 RP-ECJ, art 94. See also the Recommendations referred to in note 646 above, paras 20–26. 651 Obviously, the facts need not have been found by the referring court or tribunal. An appellate court or tribunal may well be reliant on the facts found at first instance. The reference to ‘an account of the facts on which the questions are based’ covers the situation where the reference is made before the facts have been found. 652 It is not necessary to quote vast tracts of national law if an accurate summary would be sufficiently informative; but precise references to the texts and their publication enabling the ECJ to consult them directly, if need be, should be provided (see the Recommendations referred to in note 646 above, footnote 1). 653 The text above sets out an expanded version of RP-ECJ, art  94(c) which, as written, is not comprehensive.

268

General outline of procedure 2.176

views on the answer to the question(s) referred (if the referring court or tribunal considers itself able to provide one); the provision of a request in typewritten form with numbered pages and paragraphs; the dating and signing of the request; and the placing of the questions referred in a separate and clearly identified section, preferably at the beginning or end of the request for a preliminary ruling.654 That guidance is not binding.655 While it is in a number of respects common sense, in other respects it is superfluous or lacking in utility (such as the suggestion that the request should be dated and signed, whereas a request for a preliminary ruling may be sent under a court order that will be dated and, perhaps, sealed (but not signed) by the referring court). 2.176 The essential feature of a request for a preliminary ruling is that it sets out in a readily comprehensible fashion the question of EU law that the ECJ is being asked to rule on and the factual and legal context in which that question arises for decision. The context is particularly important for several reasons. First, even though the question referred ought to be framed in abstract terms,656 the role of the ECJ is not to deliver an abstract pronouncement on the content of EU law but to assist the referring court or tribunal in the latter’s task of deciding the litigation before it. Accordingly, the ECJ is in a better position to give an answer that assists the referring court or tribunal if it can see how the question of EU law fits into the dispute that the referring court or tribunal has to decide. Secondly, whether the ECJ is confronted with a question about the meaning or the validity of a provision of EU law or an act of an EU institution, body, office or agency, the context necessarily informs the answer to be given to the question(s) referred. Therefore, it is helpful to the Court if the national court or tribunal sets out its findings, both of fact and national law.657 The importance of defining properly the factual and legal matrix of the questions referred (or at least explaining the factual hypotheses on which the questions are based) is all the greater in relation to areas of EU law (such as the competition rules) where knowledge of the facts is necessary in order to provide a useful interpretation of the relevant legal provisions.658 654 See the Recommendations at note 646, paras 20–26. 655 Ibid, para 6. 656 Eg the Recommendations at note 646 above, para 26, which states that the questions referred must be understandable ‘on their own terms’ and without reference to the reasons for making the reference. 657 See Case 244/78 Union Laitière Normande v French Dairy Farmers Ltd [1979] ECR 2553, paras 5–6; Cases 36 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association v Ireland [1981] ECR 735 paras 6–); and Case 227/81 Aubin v UNEDIC [1982] ECR 1991 at 2008 (Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn). Delaying the reference until the facts have been found is a matter of convenience; it is not a consideration that should be allowed to restrict the exercise of the discretion to make a reference: Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v X [1987] ECR 3545 at paras 10–11. 658 Eg Cases C-320 to C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo SpA  v Circostel [1993]  ECR  I-393, paras 6–9; Case C-83/91 Meilicke v ADV/ORGA AG  [1992]  ECR  I-4871; Case C-157/92 Pretore di Genova v Banchero [1993]  ECR  I-1085, para  4; Case C-386/92 Monin Automobiles [1993] ECR I-2049; Case C-378/93 La Pyramide [1994] ECR I-3999, para 14; Case C-458/93 Saddik [1995] ECR I-511, para 12; Case C-196/96 Lahlou [1996] ECR I-3945, para 4; Case C-9/98 Agostini [1998] ECR I-4261, para 4; Case C-325/98 Anssens v Directeur des services fiscaux du nord [1999] ECR I-2969; Case C-467/06 Consel Gi. Emme Srl v Sistema Logistico

269

2.177  General outline of procedure

2.177 A request for a preliminary ruling that fails to comply, in some respect, with the non-binding guidance provided by the ECJ is not, for that reason alone, defective. Further, the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure do not provide for the rejection of such a request (or its transmission to the referring court or tribunal for correction) where the request fails to comply with the requirements set out in the Rules of Procedure regarding the content of the request. By implication, if the request is defective having regard to the requirements of the Rules of Procedure, the ECJ will deal with the matter in the same way as it dealt with requests for a preliminary ruling before those requirements were incorporated expressly into its Rules of Procedure. In broad terms (and as illustrated in a multitude of cases, many of which are cited below), the ECJ’s concerns centre on two different aspects of a request for a preliminary ruling: the question(s) on which the ECJ is being asked to rule; and contextual material (background facts, provisions of national law, the arguments of the parties, the referring court’s reasons for making the reference) that may explain the relevance of EU law to the dispute before the referring court and the particular angle from which EU law needs to be approached in order to provide a ruling that is useful to the referring court. 2.178 When confronted with a request for a preliminary ruling that raises difficulties, the general approach of the ECJ is to do what it can to resolve those difficulties by reference to the material with which it has been provided by the referring court. Hence, where the questions referred are not framed appropriately or go beyond the jurisdiction of the ECJ, it will nonetheless do its best to extract from all the information available to it (including the documents before it, such as the judgment of the national court ordering the reference) the points of EU law requiring interpretation or whose validity appear to be at issue.659 Nonetheless, the order for reference should contain either an express or an implied question capable of being referred to the ECJ. The jurisdiction of the ECJ depends upon and is defined by the question posed (expressly or by implication): it is for the referring court alone, not the parties or the ECJ, to determine the subject matter of the questions referred; in consequence, the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to go outside the terms of the reference and answer questions or problems that have not been put to it (unless it appears that the questions put have been formulated incorrectly).660 However, where the question referred relates only to the interdell’Arco Ligure e Alessandrino Srl [2008]  ECR  I-44*. For that reason it is helpful if the national court sends to the ECJ its file of the case, including the pleadings of the parties and all other relevant documents. It used to be the practice of the registry to ask for the file to be sent to the ECJ if the national court had not sent it with the order for reference. 659 See Case 249/84 Ministère Public and Ministry of Finance v Profant [1985] ECR 3237, para 12; Case 35/85 Procureur de la République v Tissier [1986] ECR 1207, paras 9–10. 660 The importance of the question referred is twofold. First, it defines the scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction, eg: Case 295/82 Groupement d’Intérêt Economique Rhône Alpes Huiles v Syndicat National des Fabricants Raffineurs d’Huile de Graissage [1984]  ECR  575, para  12; Case 311/84 Centre Belge d’Études de Marché — Télémarketing SA v Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Téléduffysuib SA and Information Publicité Benelux SA [1985] ECR 3261, paras 9–10; Case 247/86 Société Alsacienne et Lorraine de Télécommunications et d’Electronique (Alsatel) v SA Novasam [1988] ECR 5987 at paras 7–8 and at 6001 (Advocate General Darmon), where the national court had been asked to make a reference on a particular point but declined to do so; Case C-337/88 Società Agricola Fattoria Alimentare v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello

270

General outline of procedure 2.180

pretation of a provision of EU law whose validity is fundamental to the issue in the national proceedings it seems that the ECJ should rule on the validity of the provision should there be reason to question it.661 2.179 The lack of formality concerning the order for reference can be illustrated by reference to Case 75/63 Hoekstra (née Unger) v Bestuur der Dedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten662 where the referring court decided that a question of EU law had been raised but simply instructed its President to send the file of the case to the Court and it was the President, in a letter to the Registrar, who formulated the question which he said the referring court felt obliged to refer. The Court accepted that manner of proceeding but it is clearly unsatisfactory, as a matter of practice, because it may leave doubts as to whether the referring court’s intentions have been properly represented. The national court may follow up the order for reference with a supplementary order for reference should it consider it to be appropriate;663 or replace the order for reference with another one which better expresses its concerns.664 2.180 As to contextual material, the essential obligation of the referring court is to provide the minimum necessary to understand the relevance of the question referred to the litigation before the referring court. Even before the Rules of Procedure specified the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ’s case law had made it a requirement that the referring court should explain the reasoning which led it to make the reference and the grounds on which it considered an answer to the questions referred to be necessary in order to give judg-

Stato [1990] ECR I-1, para 20; Cases C-78/90 to 83/90 Société Compagnie Commerciale de l’Ouest v Receveur Principal des Douanes de la Pallice-Port [1992] ECR I-1847, para 15; Case C-381/89 Syndesmos Melon tis Eleftheras Evangelikos Ekklisias v Greece [1992] ECR I-2111, paras 18–19; Cases C-134 and C-135/91 Kerafina Keramische und Finanz-Holding AG  v Elliniko Dimosio [1992] ECR I-5699, para 16. Secondly, it is repeatedly stated that, as long as the question referred is a question of EU law, the ECJ is in principle obliged to rule on it: see, for example, Cases C-72/07 and C-111/07 Blanco Perez v Consejeria de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios [2007] ECR I-81*, para 16 and the cases cited there (multiple other examples of the same dictum could be cited). The ECJ may go outside the scope of the question referred where it is evident that to do so would provide the referring court with all the elements of EU law that will enable it to decide the case: eg Case C-208/07 von Chamier-Glisczinski v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse [2009] ECR I-6095, para 43. 661 Cf Case 20/85 Roviello v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1988] ECR 2805, para 10. Per Advocate General Mancini (at 2825–2826) the point can be taken if the national court has indicated in some way that it is concerned about the validity of the provision even if it has not requested a ruling on that point (the ECJ can consider any ground of invalidity); but it is unclear if a party to the proceedings before the referring court can raise the issue if the referring court has not considered it. See also Case 313/86 Lenoir v Caisse d’Allocations Familiales des AlpesMaritimes [1988] ECR 5391 at 5410 (Advocate General Slynn): in a clear case the point can be raised by the ECJ; in case of doubt or where further argument is required, the ECJ can indicate to the referring court that the question of validity is a matter to be considered. In the second alternative, the ECJ would be inviting a further reference from the national court on the question of validity. 662 [1964] ECR 177 at 188–189 (Advocate General Lagrange). 663 Cf Alsatel v Novasam (above, note 660) at 5990. 664 Cf Case 251/83 Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG [1984] ECR 4277, para 7.

271

2.181  General outline of procedure

ment (or at least give a minimum explanation).665 However, it had also been stated that it is not in the interests of procedural economy for the ECJ to refuse to answer a question referred to it merely because of a failure on the part of the referring court to explain why an answer to the question referred is necessary; and the ECJ had stated that there is a presumption of relevance in favour of the questions referred to it that could be reversed only in ‘quite obvious’ cases.666 With regard to the requirement that the national court should state reasonably clearly the question of EU law raised and the provisions of EU law in question,667 a failure to indicate precisely the relevant provisions of EU law is not important if they can be discerned from reading the judgment ordering the reference to be made.668 Those desiderata are derived from three basic concerns: (i) the need of the ECJ to determine that it actually has jurisdiction in the case; (ii) the need to produce a preliminary ruling that assists the referring court in the more effective way; and (iii) the need to provide the persons having the right to submit written and oral observations in the course of the preliminary ruling procedure that enables them effectively to put forward their views and answer those of the other parties involved. Where the request for a preliminary ruling serves those needs imperfectly, that makes the task of the ECJ and of the parties to the preliminary ruling procedure less easy (or more difficult). The request is fundamentally defective (and the Court may refuse to respond to it) only where the difficulties are so great as to render the performance of that task impossible in practice, not just more difficult than might be desired. 2.181 Where the referring court or tribunal has granted anonymity to anyone involved in the proceedings before it (whether a party or a non-party, such as a witness), the Court acts likewise.669 The referring court or tribunal may also keep other information confidential by omitting it from the order for reference

665 Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello (No 2) [1981] ECR 3045, para 17; Cases 98, 162 and 258/85 Bertini and Basignani v Regione Lazio and Unità Sanitarie locali [1986] ECR 1885, para 6; Case C-343/90 Dias v Director da Alfandega do Porto [1992]  ECR  I-4673, para  19; Case C-167/94 Grau Gomis [1995] ECR I-1023, para 9; Case C-101/96 Testa [1996] ECR I-3081, para 6; Case C-116/00 Laguillaumie [2000] ECR I-4979, para 16; Case C-12/07 Autostrade dei Fiori v Governo della Repubblica italiana [2007]  ECR  I-162*, para  17; Case C-305/07 Radiotelevisione italiana SpA  v PTV  Programmazioni Televisive SpA  [2008]  ECR  I-55*, para 17; Case C-386/07 Hospital Consulting Srl v Esaote SpA [2008] ECR I-67*, para 32. 666 For the first point: Bertini v Regione Lazio (above, note 665), para 7. For the presumption: Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 J van der Weerd v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit [2007]  ECR  I-4233, paras 22–23 (and the cases cited there); Cartesio (above, note 559), para 67. 667 Cf the Court’s remarks in Cases 141–143/81 Holdijk [1982]  ECR  1299, paras 4–7, and the Haug-Adrion case (above, note 664), para 9 and at 4292 (per Advocate General Lenz). 668 Cases 209–213/84 Ministère Public v Asjés [1986]  ECR  1425, paras 14–15. See also Case C-280/91 Finanzamt Kassel-Goethestrasse v Kommanditgesellschaft Viessmann [1993] ECR I-971, para 17. 669 RP-ECJ, art  95(1). In principle, the referring court may grant anonymity before or after the reference has been made but, in the latter event, the order ought to be made and communicated to the Court well before the latter has published any information about the case, such as the notice of the case that is published in the Official Journal (see RP-ECJ, art 21(4)): once someone’s name has become public knowledge, it is futile to anonymise it.

272

General outline of procedure 2.182

or using some other technique to preserve its confidentiality.670 If anonymity has not already been granted by the referring court, it may be requested by the referring court or by a party to the proceedings before the referring court (if a party, the request must be duly reasoned) or it may be granted by the Court of its own motion.671 2 Substantive defects in the order for reference and their consequence 2.182 The ECJ may decline to reply to the reference in whole or in part if it appears that there is no element of EU law which the referring court could usefully apply to the dispute before it;672 if the problem is hypothetical and the ECJ does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer;673 if the question referred is expressed too generally and without reference to any specific matters making it possible to identify the concerns of the national court;674 or if the referring court is in reality asking the ECJ to do something that properly falls within the jurisdiction of the referring court, such as applying the provision of EU law in question to the facts of the case.675 Those objections to the reference may be taken either as objections to the Court entertaining the reference or as going to the substantive response to be given by the Court to the question(s) referred.

670 Cf the Recommendations at note 646 above, para 27. 671 RP-ECJ, art 95(2); the Recommendations (note 646), para 28. As pointed out in note 669, any request for anonymity must be made before the Court has published any information about the case. 672 Eg Case 132/81 Rijksdienst voor Werknemerspensioenen v Vlaeminck [1982] ECR 2953; Case C-18/92 Chaussures Bally SA v Belgium [1993] ECR I-2871, paras 19–21 (where the Court refused to answer a question because it was based on a hypothesis that was contradicted by the referring court’s findings: in that sense, the ruling sought could not usefully be applied to the dispute before the referring court); Case C-302/97 Konle v Austria [1999]  ECR  I-3099, para 33; Case C-466/11 Curra v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12 July 2012 (potential liability in damages of one member state to the citizens of another member state arising from events taking place during the Second World War and therefore before the creation of the European Communities). In contrast, in Case C-319/97 Kortas [1999] ECR I-3143, para 16, the ECJ was asked to rule on provisions that did not have to be implemented by the member states at the time of the events in question. However, it rejected the argument that the reference was inadmissible for that reason because the national proceedings were criminal and the referring court had to apply the least harsh provisions applicable when it came to decide the case. 673 The Konle case (above, note 672), para 33; the van der Weerd case (above, note 666), para 22 (and the cases cited there); Cartesio (above, note 559), para 67; Case C-155/11PPU Imran v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2011] ECR I-5095, para 21; Case C-73/12 Ettaghi, 4 July 2012; Case C-74/12 Abd Aziz Tam, 4 July 2012; Case C-75/12 Majali Abdel, 4 July 2012. In Case C-155/11PPU Mohammad Imran v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2011] ECR I-5095, the reference became otiose after it had been made, at which point the continuation of the proceedings served an hypothetical purpose; in those circumstances, it was not necessary to give a ruling on the request for a preliminary ruling (see paras 16–22). 674 Pretore di Salò v X  (above, note 657) at para  16; Case C-101/96 Testa [1996]  ECR  I-3081, para 7; the Anssens case (above, note 658). 675 Case C-320/88 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe BV [1990] ECR I-285, para 11.

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2.183  General outline of procedure

2.183 So far as objections to entertaining the reference are concerned, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction or where the request for a preliminary ruling is manifestly inadmissible,676 the Court may (after hearing the advocate general) dismiss the order for reference for that reason by reasoned order without any further step being taken in the proceedings.677 Whether the question of lack of jurisdiction or of the admissibility of the order for reference is raised by the ECJ of its own motion or by one of the parties, the order for reference cannot, it seems, be dismissed in that manner save where it is manifest that no question of EU law has arisen in the proceedings before the national court;678 where it appears on the face of the order that the Court has no jurisdiction;679 where it is manifest that the reference bears no relation to the real nature or object of the proceedings before the referring court;680 or where the subject matter of the reference is not sufficiently identifiable.681 If any of those objections to the order for reference are not manifest but may be established after more detailed scrutiny of the case, they go to the answer to be given by the ECJ to the questions referred rather than to the admissibility of the order for reference, in the technical sense of the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain it (even if the answer to the question referred is that the Court cannot answer that question).682 In any event, a manifest error on the part of the referring court concerning the purpose and scope of the provisions of EU law referred to in the order for reference is relevant (if at all) only to the answer to be given to the referring court and not to the question whether or not the ECJ has jurisdiction to entertain the reference.683 In principle, the ECJ does not examine the circumstances in which the national court came to make the reference but it will consider those circumstances if it is manifest in the light of them that the preliminary ruling procedure has been diverted from its true purpose and is being used in the context of a contrived, spurious or non-existent dispute or if it is manifest that the provision of EU law whose interpretation is

676 Lack of jurisdiction is, of course, a ground of inadmissibility; but inadmissibility can extend beyond lack of jurisdiction. 677 RP-ECJ, art 53(2). Eg Case 80/83 Habourdin v Italocremona [1983] ECR 3639 and Case 56/84 Von Gallera v Maître [1984] ECR 1769 (decided under the predecessor to RP-ECJ, art 53(2)). 678 See Cases 105/79 and 68/80 Reference for a Preliminary Ruling by the Acting Judge at the Tribunal d’Instance, Hayange [1979] ECR 2257 and [1980] ECR 771 respectively. 679 Cases 104/79 Foglia v Novello [1980]  ECR  745 and Case 244/80 Foglio v Novello (No  2) (above, note 665). 680 Falciola Angelo v Comune di Pavia (above, note 637), para 9; Case C-368/89 Crispoltoni v Fattoria autonoma tabacchi di Città de Castello [1991] ECR I-3695, para 11; Case C-186/90 Durighello v Instituto Nazionale della previdenza sociale [1991]  ECR  I-5773, para  9; Case C-67/91 Direccion General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca Privada [1992] ECR I-4785, para 26. 681 Cf the Haug-Adrion case (above, note 664), para 11; Case C-386/07 Hospital Consulting Srl v Esaote SpA [2008] ECR I-67*, paras 33–34. 682 Cf Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan [1991]  ECR  I-4685, paras 14–15; Case C-196/09 Miles v European Schools, 14  June 2011 (the body making the reference was not a ‘court or tribunal’); Case C-482/10 Cicala v Regione Siciliana, 21 December 2011. 683 Case 180/83 Moser v Land Baden-Württemberg [1984] ECR 2539, paras 9–10.

274

General outline of procedure 2.185

sought (or whose validity is in question) is incapable of applying to the litigation before the referring court.684 3 Handling by the ECJ of the order for reference and summary dismissal 2.184 The order for reference is notified to the Court by the referring court (not by the parties).685 Upon receipt of the order for reference by the ECJ’s registry, it is entered on the register in the usual way and dealt with, so far as the Court’s internal procedure is concerned, like an application commencing proceedings in a direct action: the judge-rapporteur and advocate general are assigned to the case and so on. As noted above, a manifestly inadmissible order for reference can be dismissed at any stage and, more particularly, before it is served on anyone. In addition, where a question referred is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled, the answer to it is obvious (can be ‘clearly deduced’) from existing case law, or the answer to it admits of no reasonable doubt, the Court may at any time (on a proposal from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general) give its decision on the question in the form of a reasoned order.686 Such an order may also be made before the order for reference has been served on anyone by the Court. The Court is under no obligation to dispose of a case by reasoned order on any of those grounds and retains the right to rule by way of a judgment.687 It is also not obliged to refrain from disposing of the case by reasoned order, where it thinks it appropriate to do so, merely because the referring court and the parties consider that the normal procedure should be followed.688 2.185 After acknowledging receipt of the order for reference the registrar of the Court notifies it to the parties to the proceedings before the referring court, 684 Case 267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA NV [1988] ECR 4769, para 12 (and per Advocate General Mancini at 4783); Case C-150/88 Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Eau de Cologne and ParfumerieFabrik Glockengasse No 4711 v Provide Srl [1989] ECR 3891, para 12; Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi v Belgium [1990]  ECR  I-3763, paras 39–40; Case C-231/89 GmurzynskaBscher v Oberfinanzdirektion Koln [1990]  ECR  I-4003, paras 22–23; Case C-186/07 Club Nautico de Gran Canarias v Comunidad Autonoma de Canarias [2008] ECR I-60*, para 19. Criminal proceedings cannot be described as a spurious or artificial dispute for these purposes: the Asjés case (above, note 668) at 1440 (Advocate General Lenz). 685 Statute, art 23, 1st sentence; the Recommendations at note 646 above, para 33. 686 RP-ECJ, art 99. Eg Case C-233/01 Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA v Lo Bue [2002] ECR I-9411; Case C-166/02 Viegas v Companhia de Seguros Zurich SA [2003] ECR I-7871; Case C-386/07 Hospital Consulting Srl v Esaote SpA  [2008]  ECR  I-67*, paras 15–27 (the remaining question referred was manifestly inadmissible); Cases C-180/08 and C-186/08 Kastrinaki [2008]  ECR  I-157*. Orders made in cases in which the question referred is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled are not normally reported. 687 Case C-411/00 Felix Swoboda GmbH  v Osterreichische Nationalbank [2002]  ECR  I-10567, Advocate General Mischo, para 24 (p 10575), judgment, para 32 (p 10603). 688 Case C-259/02 La Mer Technology Inc v Laboratoires Goemar SA [2004] ECR I-1159, paras 14–17; Case C-253/01 SA Kruger v Directie van de rechtspersoonlijkerheid bezittende Dienst Wegverkeer [2004]  ECR  I-1191, paras 21–23. It will be noted that, in those cases, the ECJ indicated to the referring court and to the parties in advance that it intended to deal with the case by reasoned order and asked for their observations. That appears to be the usual practice.

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the member states, the Commission and the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted the act whose interpretation or validity is in question.689 In cases under TFEU, art 267, the order for reference is also notified to the EEA states and to the EFTA Surveillance Authority.690 If there is in existence an agreement between the Council and a third country (that is, a non-member state) providing that the latter may submit statements of case or written observations in a reference for a preliminary ruling coming before the Court, the order for reference is also notified to that third country.691 In principle, notification should take place on the same day for all parties. 2.186 As far as the member states are concerned, the order for reference is served in both the original language version and in a translation into the official language of the recipient member state; if the order for reference is particularly long, a translation of a summary of the order for reference is provided, which contains the full text of the question(s) referred and a summary of the subjectmatter of the main proceedings, the essential arguments of the parties thereto, a succinct presentation of the reasons for the reference, and the relevant case law and national and EU law provisions. EEA states, the EFTA  Surveillance Authority and, where relevant, third countries receive the original language version of the order for reference and, as the case may be, a translation of the full document or a summary of it into one of the Court’s procedural languages selected by the recipient.692 Service on the parties to the proceedings before the referring court may be effected at their address for service for the purpose of the proceedings before the referring court, the address of their lawyers or, where a party is not represented, at the party’s own address. For that reason, it is helpful if the referring court sets out an appropriate address for service for each party in the order for reference or in a covering letter under which the reference is sent to the Court. In that context ‘parties’ means all persons appearing in the proceedings before the referring court.693 Member states are served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Embassy at Luxembourg with a copy being sent to the Permanent Representative at Brussels. In the case of the EU institutions the order for reference is notified to the president and members of the institution concerned.

689 Statute, art 23, 1st para. In practice all references are notified to the Council for information. 690 Ibid, 3rd para. 691 Id, 4th para (a provision that may have particular relevance in the event of the UK seceding from the EU). As to such an agreement, see art 2 of Protocol 2 of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2007 No L339/3). 692 RP-ECJ, art 98. The ECJ allows eight to ten days for the translation of the order for reference and usually waits until all are available before notifying the order for reference to the parties, and member states, the Commission and the Council. 693 Cf Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631 (an intervener in the national proceedings) and Case 136/78 Ministère Public v Auer [1979] ECR 437 (‘parties civiles’).

276

General outline of procedure 2.188

B

The written procedure

2.187 The persons to whom the order for reference is to be notified are also the persons who are authorised to submit observations to the Court.694 They have two months from the day after notification695 within which to submit their statements of case or written observations to the Court.696 That period is fixed and cannot be extended on request.697 A member state is generally entitled to submit observations in respect of a reference to the ECJ for the interpretation of a provision of EU law even if it is not bound by it.698 EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority are entitled to submit written observations where one of the fields of application of the EEA is engaged by the question(s) referred.699 The right of third countries (apart from EEA states) to submit written observations is dependent upon there being an agreement made with the Council giving them that right.700 2.188 No person other than a person on whom the Court serves the order for reference may be added to the preliminary ruling proceedings701 unless he or she is first made a party to the proceedings before the national court (referred to as ‘the main proceedings’).702 The parties to the main proceedings are those determined as such by the referring court or tribunal in accordance with its rules of procedure.703 However, if a new party is added to those proceedings after the request for a preliminary ruling has been received by the ECJ, the ECJ must be informed by the referring court or tribunal of the addition of that new party. Otherwise, the ECJ will not recognise his addition to the main proceedings and 694 RP-ECJ, art 96(1). 695 As calculated pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 49 and extended pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 51. 696 Statute, art 23, 2nd to 4th paras. There is no difference between ‘statements of case’ and ‘written observations’: for reasons of brevity the latter expression will be used here. 697 It is unclear if Statute, art  45, which provides that no right shall be prejudiced by reason of the expiry of a time limit if the party concerned proves the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure, applies because no rights, stricto sensu, are at stake in the preliminary ruling procedure and the inability to submit written observations can be made up at the hearing. At all events, it seems to be the Court’s practice to apply the Statute (Mortelmans (1979) 16 CMLR 557, p 564). 698 In Case 12/76 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v Dunlop AG [1976] ECR 1473, paras 5–8, a case referred under the Brussels Convention Protocol, the Court held that, by virtue of art 20 of the EC Statute (as it then was, now art 23 of the Statute), even the member states who were not yet parties to the Convention were entitled to submit observations. 699 Statute, art 23, 3rd para. 700 Ibid, 4th para. 701 See Ch 5, para  5.2. The Court cannot join a third party at the request of one of the parties appearing before it: Case 19/68 De Cicco v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1968] ECR 473 at 479. 702 For example, in Case 76/81 Transporoute et Travaux SA  v Minister of Public Works [1982]  ECR  417, the plaintiff before the referring court was declared insolvent after the reference had been made and its liquidators were able to submit observations in the preliminary ruling procedure only because they were given leave to continue the action by the referring court (see p  420). In Case C-262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889 (at 1897–1898) the plaintiff died after the reference had been made but the referring court made an order permitting his widow to continue the proceedings in his name for and on behalf of the plaintiff’s estate. That order was communicated to the ECJ. 703 RP-ECJ, art 97(1).

277

2.189  General outline of procedure

will not, therefore, permit him to participate in the preliminary ruling proceedings. Further, the ECJ should be notified of the addition of the new party at the earliest opportunity because a new party takes the case as he finds it at the time when the ECJ is informed that he is a party. If the ECJ is so informed after the close of the written procedure (for example), the new party will be unable to submit written observations. On the other hand, whatever is the procedural stage at which the ECJ is informed of the addition of a new party to the main proceedings, the new party is entitled to be served with the same procedural documents served on the parties to the preliminary ruling proceedings.704 2.189 The preliminary ruling procedure is often described as a dialogue between the referring court and the ECJ. In that sense it is not a proceeding that is inter partes; the parties are not parties in any substantive sense but only in a formal sense and, in consequence, their ability to submit observations in the course of the procedure is not part of any right to a fair hearing.705 2.190 The submission of written observations is not obligatory and the parties to the preliminary ruling proceedings (ie all the persons served with the order for reference) may content themselves with the submission of oral observations at the hearing.706 In the alternative, they may decide to submit written but not oral observations. No specific requirements are laid down concerning the contents of the written observations but, as in the case of all pleadings, they should comply with RP-ECJ, art  57 and therefore be signed by the party’s agent, lawyer or (in the case of parties to the main proceedings) representative, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the referring court;707 be lodged together with all 704 RP-ECJ, art 97(2). That provision refers to the addition of a new party to the main proceedings ‘when the proceedings before the Court are already pending’. Preliminary ruling proceedings are pending before the ECJ as from the point in time at which the request for a preliminary ruling is received by the ECJ  Registry. RP-ECJ, art  97(2) effectively overrules the decision of the President of the ECJ in Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure, order of 16 December 2009 (unreported), in which it was held that parties added to the main proceedings by the referring court after the reference had been made could not participate in the preliminary ruling proceedings if they were not ‘active’ participants in the proceedings before the referring court. As the parties to the main proceedings are ipso facto parties to the preliminary ruling procedure, even if added after the preliminary ruling proceedings have commenced (Statute, art 23, 2nd para; RP-ECJ, art 96(1)(a); RP-ECJ, art 97), it does not seem that any distinction between ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ parties can be relevant unless it is to be found in the referring court’s rules of procedure. 705 Pretore di Salò v X (above, note 657) at 2559 (Advocate General Mancini). 706 In Case 234/83 Gesamthochschule Duisburg v Hauptzollamt Mümchen-Mitte [1985] ECR 327 the parties to the proceedings before the referring court did not submit any observations (para 10). Due to the short period of time allocated to parties when addressing the Court during the oral hearing it is generally unwise for a party to refrain from submitting written observations (unless it has little or nothing to say). 707 The rules of procedure of the referring court apply to the representation of parties to the main proceedings: see RP-ECJ, art  97(3) and 57(1). Accordingly, if, under those rules, the party concerned is entitled to appear in person, he is also entitled to do so in the preliminary ruling proceedings. If the Court is in any doubt about the position under the referring court’s rules of procedure, it may ask the referring court for further information: RP-ECJ, art  97(1), last sentence.

278

General outline of procedure 2.192

annexes and the correct number of certified copies; bear a date; and contain as annexes all documents relied on in support. The parties (including EU institutions) must frame their observations in the language of the case, which is the official language of the referring court.708 By way of exception to that rule: member states may submit written observations in their own official language; EEA states, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and third countries entitled to submit written observations pursuant to an agreement made with the Council may be authorised by the Court to submit written observations in any one of the Court’s procedural languages.709 Since the object of the preliminary ruling proceedings is a decision on one or more points of EU law, the written observations should be primarily concerned with those issues and not matters of fact or of national law unless that is necessary for the purpose of deciding the issue of EU law. When the written observations are lodged at the Court, it sees that any necessary translations into the language of the case are carried out and then serves on each party copies of the written observations of the other parties.710 The written procedure closes automatically on the expiry of the two-month period for submitting written observations (as extended on account of distance).

C

The other procedural stages

2.191 After the lodgment of the written observations or the expiry of the period for doing so, the rest of the procedure follows as in a direct action from the close of pleadings (subject to certain differences explained below).711 It need only be noted that the parties submit only one set of written observations: there is no exchange of pleadings as there is in a direct action, and the hearing is the only time at which a party in proceedings for a preliminary ruling has the opportunity to reply to what has been said by the other parties. Written observations submitted after the hearing are inadmissible.712 1 Directions 2.192 After the close of the written procedure the case is considered by the Court at an administrative meeting in the usual way. Few directions are usually required. Matters such as joinder are dealt with in the same way as in a direct action. 708 RP-ECJ, art 37(3). It should be noted from that provision that parties to the main proceedings can seek a change in the language of the case only in respect of the oral procedure. 709 RP-ECJ, art 38(4)–(6). 710 Annexes to written observations may not be translated or served on the other parties. If the other parties know that annexes exist and are interested in seeing them, they may ask to consult them at the Registry or to have copies sent to them. Where that is the case, an application to reopen the oral procedure to allow the content of the annexes to be taken into account will be refused: see the Danske Svineproducenter case (above, note 501), paras 20 and 25–26. 711 RP-ECJ, art  59–62 and 76–92. Although the common provisions dealing with measures of enquiry (RP-ECJ, art 63–75) apply in theory to references for a preliminary ruling, they are not relevant due to the specific nature of references. 712 Case 6/71 Rheinmuhlen Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1971] ECR 719.

279

2.193  General outline of procedure

2 Assignment to a formation 2.193 At the administrative meeting the decision is made about the attribution of the case to the full Court or a chamber (including the Grand Chamber). Since a member state or EU institution may require that the case be decided by the Grand Chamber,713 it should request that in writing before the date of the administrative meeting.714 It is unclear what happens if such a request is made after the Court has decided to assign the matter to a smaller chamber. It is doubtful that, in that situation, the Court no longer has power to accede to the member state’s or EU institution’s request unless the chamber voluntarily re-seises the Court with the case by referring the case back to it. In any event, it does not seem likely that the Court or the chamber concerned would stand in the way of a genuine request that the matter be decided by the Grand Chamber, even if made late in time.715

3 Disposal of the case by reasoned order 2.194 Apart from situations in which there is no need to make a ruling,716 a reference may be disposed of by reasoned order if: (i) it is manifestly inadmissible;717 (ii) the question referred is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled or the answer can be deduced from existing case law;718 (iii) if the answer to the question referred ‘admits of no reasonable doubt’.719 In the first case, the decision to dispose of the reference in that manner can be made at any stage in the proceedings after hearing the views of the advocate general. In the second and third cases, the decision can also be made at any time but it is made on a proposal from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general. In all cases, the parties need not be heard and the advocate general’s views do not take the form of an opinion delivered at a public hearing. Formerly, in the second and third cases, the Court had first to inform the referring court and hear any observations submitted by the parties to the reference (including the member states, the Commission and the Council).720 The obligation to inform the referring court 713 Statute, art 16, 3rd para. 714 The request should ordinarily be made in the written observations. 715 Unless, perhaps, it is made at the hearing. 716 Eg Case C-132/07 Beecham Group plc v Andacon NV  [2009]  ECR  I-1775: the proceedings before the referring court were subject to an appeal, after which the case was settled; the appeal court informed the ECJ of the settlement and the ECJ asked the referring court if it wished to maintain the reference; the referring court did not wish to do so. Normally, the ECJ will rely on the evaluation of the referring court as to the need for a preliminary ruling. 717 RP-ECJ, art 53(2) (considered in para 2.183 above). 718 RP-ECJ, art 99 (considered in para 2.184 above). Eg Case C-104/08 Kurt v Burgermeister der Stadt Wien [2008] ECR I-97*, paras 17–24. 719 Also RP-ECJ, art 99. 720 In a case in which the question referred was identical to a question answered in another case, the ECJ would inform the referring court and the parties that it was proposing to make a reasoned order referring to the judgment in that other case. In the absence of good reason otherwise, the reasoned order would simply set out in its operative part the operative part of the judgment in

280

General outline of procedure 2.195

before deciding the case by reasoned order enabled the referring court to make clear to the ECJ the doubt that had caused it to make the reference in the first place. There is now no longer an obligation to inform the referring court or hear the parties. On the other hand, the Court has a discretionary power (exercised after hearing the advocate general) to request clarification from the referring court within a time-limit fixed by the Court; and, in certain cases, that power may usefully be used before a reference is disposed of by reasoned order.721 4 Preparatory enquiries 2.195 It does not appear that a preparatory enquiry is ever ordered in the course of a reference for a preliminary ruling: the reason for that is that, in principle, the parties have their opportunity to bring forward evidence in the proceedings before the referring court722 and the ECJ deals only with matters of law.723 On the other hand, the Court may ask the parties to the preliminary ruling proceedings to answer questions in writing or at the hearing and the judge-rapporteur or advocate general may ask for the production of information or documents (written replies and any documents provided in response are served by the Court on all the other parties).724 The scope for such measures is limited by the fact that the ECJ may not go behind the findings of fact or of national law made by the referring court725 or question the evidence accepted by the referring court.726 There is

question. The ECJ would also rule on any argument advanced in order to dissuade it from taking that course: see, for example, Cases C-405/96 to C-408/96 Societe Beton Express v Direction Regional des Douanes de la Reunion, order of 7 July 1998. In Case C-379/02 Skatteministeriet v Imexpo Trading A/S  [2004]  ECR  I-9273, paras 14–15, a party successfully persuaded the Court not to dispose of the case by reasoned order. The reasons are not reported. 721 RP-ECJ, art 101(1). The referring court’s reply is served on the parties: RP-ECJ, art 101(2). For example, in Case C-384/08 Attanasio Group Srl v Comune di Carbognano [2010] ECR I-2055, paras 28–29, the ECJ queried the interest of the applicant in the national proceedings in obtaining a preliminary ruling because of a recent change in national legislation. The referring court maintained the need for a preliminary ruling, giving reasons, and so the reference was not rejected by reasoned order. In Case C-104/99 Oleifici Italiani SpA v Direzione regionale delle entrate per la Puglia, order of 16 December 1999, one of the parties opposed the disposal of the reference by reasoned order on the ground that the question referred could have been expressed more precisely. The ECJ observed that it is for the referring court to frame the questions referred. That is obviously right; but approaching the referring court before disposing of the case would at least avoid the possibility that the ruling made in the reasoned order might not in fact address the question troubling the referring court. 722 Case 72/83 Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] ECR 2727, para 11. 723 The position is considered in greater detail in Ch 10, para 10.5 ff. 724 RP-ECJ, art  61(1) and 62(1). See, for example: Case 5/84 Direct Cosmetics Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs [1985] ECR 617 at 623, where the ECJ informed itself from a report of a UK House of Commons Committee that the judge-rapporteur had asked the United Kingdom to produce at the hearing. Where a party is asked to reply to a question at the hearing but does not intend to attend the hearing, it may submit its reply in writing: see Case 158/86 Warner Bros Inc and Metronome Video ApS v Christiansen [1988] ECR 2605 at 2608. 725 Eg Case C-347/89 Freistaat Bayern v Eurim-Pharm GmbH [1991] ECR I-1747, paras 14–17. 726 Eg Case C-332/88 Alimenta SA v Doux SA [1990] ECR I-2077, para 9.

281

2.196  General outline of procedure

an express power enabling the Court to request ‘clarification’ from the national court, after hearing the advocate general.727 5 Expedition, stay, withdrawal and termination of proceedings before judgment 2.196 In a procedural sense the ECJ’s only interlocutor is the referring court itself. Hence decisions taken by the ECJ in the course of proceedings relating to the expedition, stay or termination of the proceedings before judgment must ordinarily be taken at the instance of the referring court and not at the instance of the parties to the reference or another national court.728 Thus, once a reference has been made to the ECJ it remains seised of the reference even if the proceedings before the referring court are said by one of the parties to have come to an end for some reason unless and until the referring court indicates expressly to the ECJ that it is withdrawing the reference.729 Even then, the ECJ may still proceed to deliver the preliminary ruling if notice of the date of delivery of the ECJ’s judgment has already been communicated to the parties by the time when the request for a preliminary ruling is withdrawn.730 On the other hand, the ECJ may at any time declare that the conditions of its jurisdiction are no longer fulfilled (that is, it may reject the request for a preliminary ruling on that ground by reasoned order).731 Thus, if from information provided by the referring court 727 See note 721 above. Eg Case C-265/05 Naranjo v Caisse regionale d’assurance maladie NordPicardie [2007] ECR I-347, para 14, request for further information about the domestic legal context; von Chamier-Glisczinski (above, note 660), para 22; Case C-92/12PPU Health Service Executive v SC and AC, 26 April 2012, para 49 (request for further information about a request for application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure). 728 However, the Court can stay the proceedings or progress them as part of its task of managing the cases before it: eg the Garage Molenheide case (above, note 273), pp 7292–7293. 729 RP-ECJ, art  100(1). Cf Case C-38/89 Ministère Public v Blanguernon [1990]  ECR  I-83 at 87 (Advocate General Lenz). Thus, in Case 387/87 Butter-und Eier Zentralgenossenschaft Oldenburg, order of 27  October 1988 (unreported), the case was removed from the register at the request of the referring court as a result of a settlement between the parties reached after the reference was made. In Case 139/88 SA Monopole SpA v SA Compagnie des Eaux de Harre, order of 27 October 1988 (unreported), an appeal had been made against the decision to refer but the referring court had indicated that it did not want the proceedings before the ECJ to be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. The plaintiff in the national proceedings subsequently withdrew, resulting in the termination of the action and the appeal without judgment. Both the referring court and the appeal court informed the ECJ of the termination of the proceedings and asked it to remove the case from the register. It would seem that in strictly formal terms the request need have come only from the referring court. In Cases C-400/97 to C-402./97 Administracion del Estado v Juntas Generales de Guipuzcoa [2000] ECR I-1073, the applicant in the proceedings before the referring court withdrew and the latter accordingly withdrew the reference. In the Beecham Group case (above, note 716), the ECJ checked first with the referring court before terminating the proceedings before it. In Case C-241/09 Fluxys (above, note 521), paras 19–23 and 31–34, a party informed the ECJ of a compromise of the proceedings before the referring court but the ECJ checked with the latter and was told that it wished to maintain the reference. The proceedings then carried on up to judgment but, by that time, the information before the ECJ indicated that the substratum of the dispute between the parties had disappeared. 730 RP-ECJ, art 100(1). The date of the withdrawal of a request for a preliminary ruling is the date when notification of the referring court’s withdrawal of the request is received by the ECJ. 731 RP-ECJ, art 100(2).

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itself it appears that the dispute generating the reference to the ECJ has come to an end, it is for the referring court to state that the proceedings before it remain on foot; otherwise, to all appearances the ECJ no longer has jurisdiction over the reference.732 A reference may also be withdrawn in part, as where the referring court considers that some of the questions referred have since been answered by another judgment of the ECJ; in that event the ECJ deals only with those questions referred that have not been withdrawn.733 The case is removed from the Court’s register whenever the referring court indicates that it wishes to withdraw the reference without the need for the referring court to give its reasons.734 2.197 Where the decision of the referring court has been impugned directly or indirectly or, indeed, overturned in proceedings before the courts of the member state in question the reference is not for that reason alone rendered inadmissible because it must be presumed to be valid and effective unless and until formally withdrawn.735 Where an appeal is brought before the competent national court against the referring court’s decision to make the reference and the effect of the making of the appeal is to suspend the operation of the decision appealed against, the practice of the ECJ is to stay the proceedings in the reference until the outcome of the appeal is known. For the proceedings before the ECJ to be stayed in that way, the ECJ must be informed of the fact and consequences of the appeal by either the referring court itself or the court hearing the appeal.736 If the making of the appeal does not have the effect of suspending the operation of the decision appealed against, the proceedings before the ECJ will not ordinarily be stayed unless the referring court indicates that it wishes them to be stayed.737 Where the proceedings before the ECJ are stayed pending the outcome of an appeal, the referring court’s file of the case is returned to it (if it is in the ECJ’s 732 Cases C-422/93 to C-424/93 Zabala Erasun v Instituto Nacional de Empleo [1995] ECR I-1567, paras 21–30 (an unsatisfactory case not least because of the three negatives in the last sentence of the operative part of the judgment). Cf Case C-314/96 Djabili v Caisse d’allocations familiales de l’Essonne [1998]  ECR  I-1149 (no need to give judgment because the dispute before the referring court had come to an end even though the claimant had not formally discontinued and the referring court did not consider that it had power to withdraw the reference); the Fluxys case (above, note 521). 733 See Case C-3/90 Bernini v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992]  ECR  I-1071, para 11; Case C-246/98 Berendse-Koenen [2000] ECR I-1777, para 15. 734 Eg Case C-233/99 Hansen [2002] ECR I-3107. 735 See Cases 133–136/85 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1987] ECR 2289 at 2304–2305 (Advocate General Lenz). 736 Thus, in Case 69/88 Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directie Belastingen [1990] ECR I-583 (see 585) and Case C-224/98 D’Hoop v Office national de l’emploi [2002] ECR I-6191 (see 6197, paras 12–13), where the Court was informed of the appeal and its effect by the referring court, proceedings were stayed and resumed when the appeal court upheld the referring court’s decision. 737 As in Case 373/87 Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) v Sarl La Croisette, order of 3 February 1988 (unreported), where proceedings were stayed because the referring court said that there was little point in continuing them until the outcome of the appeal was known (the decision making the reference was eventually reversed and the case removed from the register); and Cases C-100/89 Kaefer and Procacci v France [1990] ECR I-4647 at 4651, where the referring court did not consider that the circumstances justified the staying of the proceedings when its decision had been appealed.

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possession) and a copy of the notice of appeal and the ECJ’s order staying the proceedings is sent to the parties to the reference. Where the referring court’s decision is upheld on appeal, the proceedings before the ECJ resume when the ECJ is so informed. The parties to the reference are then given a full period of two months (as extended in accordance with the Rules of Procedure) in which to submit their written observations unless they had already done so before the proceedings were stayed. 2.198 The summary of the position in the preceding paragraph presupposes that the appeal in question concerns only the referring court’s decision to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. The position is different where the effect of the appeal is to take the entire dispute before a different court, removing the dispute (in its entirety) from the jurisdiction of the referring court. In that event, the responsibility to decide the litigation generating the question of EU law has moved to a different court (the appellate jurisdiction). As the original referring court no longer has jurisdiction over the litigation, the reference to the ECJ falls away and need not be formally withdrawn by the referring court. The appellate jurisdiction may then decide the matter itself or make a reference to the ECJ.738 2.199 In references for a preliminary ruling, the President of the ECJ has the usual powers to give a case priority where there are special circumstances,739 defer a case (also where there are special circumstances)740 or stay the proceedings.741 It would seem that, in principle, those powers are to be exercised after the referring court has been consulted even if a request that any of those powers be exercised has been made by all the parties submitting observations. If the referring court itself has asked for one of those powers to be exercised, it would seem that, in principle, the President can exercise the power in the way requested by the referring court without needing to consult the parties.742 On the other hand, under the last paragraph of TFEU, art 267, the ECJ lies under a general obligation to act with ‘the minimum of delay’ in cases concerning a person who is in custody.

738 Case C-525/06 De Nationale Loterij NV v Customer Service Agency BVBA [2009] ECR I-2197, paras 6–11. On the question of appeals, see more generally: Cartesio (above, note 559), paras 88–98; Case C-173/09 Elchinov v Natsionalna Zdravnoosiguritelna kasa [2010] ECR I-8889, paras 21–32. 739 RP-ECJ, art 53(3): eg Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1990] ECR I-2433 at 2439. The request should be made by the referring court itself by separate document (such as a covering letter under which the request for a preliminary ruling is sent to the ECJ). If buried in the order for reference, it may not be noticed. 740 RP-ECJ, art 56. 741 RP-ECJ, art 55(1)(b). 742 Hearing the views of the parties is expressly excluded by RP-ECJ, art 55(1)(b).

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General outline of procedure 2.202

6 Interim relief 2.200 The question of interim relief does not arise in the context of the proceedings before the Court. The referring court retains jurisdiction to deal with interim relief while the reference is pending.743 7 Representation and legal aid 2.201 As in direct actions, a party may apply to the Court for legal aid744 but, unlike direct actions, a party may also appear in person, without being represented by a lawyer, if he has right of audience before the referring court. The reason is that, as regards representation and attendance in the preliminary ruling procedure of the parties to the action before the national court, the Court ‘takes account’ of the referring court’s rules of procedure.745 Member states and EU institutions which are not parties to the proceedings before the national court must be represented as is usual, by an agent. 8 The oral procedure 2.202 The procedure includes an oral part comprising, as in the case of a direct action, the hearing of the parties and the hearing of the advocate general’s opinion746 subject to the ECJ’s power to give its decision in the form of a reasoned order where: (i) the questions referred are identical to questions on which the ECJ has already ruled; (ii) where the answer to the questions referred can be deduced from existing case law; or (iii) where the answer to the questions referred admits of no reasonable doubt.747 After the close of the written procedure, the ECJ may, on the basis of a report from the judge-rapporteur, after informing the parties and after hearing the advocate general, dispense with the oral part if it considers that 743 Case C-186/01 R Dory v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2001] ECR I-7823. Statute, art 23, 1st para, refers to a national court or tribunal ‘which suspends its proceedings and refers a case to the Court.’ The suspension of the domestic proceedings, while not required in express terms by the Statute or the rules of procedure, is implicit in the nature of references for a preliminary ruling: see the Recommendations referred to in note 646 above, para 29. However, it means nothing more than that the referring court does not proceed to judgment while the matter is pending before the ECJ unless and until the referring court withdraws the reference from the ECJ: the continuation of the proceedings before the referring court to judgment would render the reference pointless and frustrate the purpose of the reference procedure. However, the suspension of the proceedings before the referring court does not prevent the latter from taking other steps such as granting interim relief or carrying on with other procedural steps paving the way to a trial. There is no formal prohibition on the referring court or tribunal proceeding to judgment on the matters to which the reference relates, nothwithstanding the fact that the reference is still pending before the ECJ. However, if the referring court or tribunal did so, that could be regarded as an implied withdrawal of the reference. It would certainly have removed the basis for the ECJ’s jurisdiction over the questions referred. 744 RP-ECJ, art 115–118: see Ch 4. 745 RP-ECJ, art 97(3). 746 RP-ECJ, art 53(1). The hearings are conducted, and the oral procedure may be reopened, in the same way as in a direct action: see RP-ECJ, art 76–85. 747 RP-ECJ, art 99 (see para 2.194 above).

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it already has sufficient information to give a ruling; the ECJ’s power to do so is excluded if one of the parties, who did not participate in the written part of the procedure, has submitted an application setting out the reasons why he or she wishes to be heard.748 The position is, therefore, that any party to the preliminary ruling proceedings may submit a reasoned request for a hearing;749 but a party that did not participate in the written part of the procedure is in a stronger position to obtain a hearing. Given the fact that, in the preliminary ruling procedure, the hearing is the only point at which a party has the opportunity to answer the case made out by an opposing party, it is clear that the exercise of the power to dispense with the oral part must be subject to the wishes of the parties (unless no reasons are given as to why a hearing is desired or the reasons given are clearly misconceived);750 but the holding of a hearing is nonetheless subject to the requirement that the party concerned will be properly represented at it.751 In the case of a request from a party who had not participated in the written part of the procedure, one would expect to see an explanation of why no written observations had been submitted.752 Subject to the point that the oral hearing is the only opportunity for one party to respond to another, the same considerations seem to apply to the exercise of the Court’s power as in connection with the power to dispense with the hearing in a direct action; and the same power to 748 RP-ECJ, art 76(2)–(3). Eg Case C-23/12 Zakaria, 17 January 2013, paras 24–27. At first sight, a decision to dispense with the oral part appears to preclude the delivery of an advocate general’s opinion (as in the case of direct actions). The practice is unclear: in cases like Case C-79/91 Knüfer v Buchmann [1992] ECR I-6895, Case C-331/92 Gestion Hotelera Internacional SA v Comunidad Autonome de Canarias [1994] ECR I-1329, the oral phrase of the procedure was dispensed with but there was, nonetheless, an advocate general’s opinion; in other cases, like Case C-102/00 Welthgrove BV  v Staatsecretaris van Financien [2001]  ECR  I-5679, the advocate general has been heard but has not delivered a formal opinion. It should be noted that, in the first case cited, the result of omitting the hearing was to make it impossible for the parties to comment on the implications of a judgment delivered in the course of proceedings. It would seem that, as a result of that judgment, there was no doubt about the outcome of the case and the omission of the hearing was, in consequence, justifiable (see per Advocate General Jacobs at 6908). 749 RP-ECJ, art 76(1): an application to be heard must be lodged within three weeks of service on the party concerned of the other parties’ written observations (that period may be extended by the President). 750 In Case C-264/00 Grunderzentrum-Betriebs-GmbH  v Land Baden-Wurttemberg [2002] ECR I-3333, paras 25–26, the ECJ ignored objections raised by two parties (including a member state) to the disposal of the case by reasoned order. It is not clear what those objections were based on. In Cases C-435/02 and C-103/03 Axel Springer AG v Zeitungsverlag Niederrhein GmbH & Co Essen KG [2004] ECR I-8663, paras 23–24, the objections raised were not persuasive. 751 See Zakaria (above, note 748), paras 24–27, in which the ECJ was minded not to hold a hearing but Mr Zakaria had not submitted written observations. The problem was that he wished to be represented at the hearing by an entity whose rights of audience before the referring court were not evident. The ECJ asked Mr Zakaria for reassurance on that point. In the absence of a response, it decided not to have a hearing. 752 In one case, written observations were not submitted because, due to an error in the address for service, the party concerned did not receive notification from the Court of the time limit for submitting written observations and discovered what had happened only after the time limit had expired. It might also be the case that a party did not submit written observations because it considered that the position was fairly clear but was motivated to make submissions to the Court by what another party had said in its written observations.

286

General outline of procedure 2.203

refix the oral hearing applies.753 However, the Court takes the view that there is a material difference between direct actions and references for a preliminary ruling so far as the oral procedure is concerned: direct actions are adversarial in nature whereas references for a preliminary ruling are non-adversarial,754 with the consequence that, in the latter type of proceedings, the parties ‘are merely invited to be heard’.755 If the Court decides to dispense with the oral procedure, that does not prevent it from later ‘reopening’ the oral procedure.756 Where there has been a hearing, the Court’s approach to a later application to reopen the oral procedure is essentially the same as in relation to direct actions;757 but, if the application is based upon matters of fact, there has been a recent tendency for the Court to decline to reopen the oral procedure (even in relation to matters coming to light after the national court referred the matter to the Court) on the ground that matters of fact are for the referring court or tribunal.758 2.203 At the hearing, the order of speeches is normally the claimant or appellant before the referring court, defendant or respondent, member states, the Council and the Commission (if represented). Attendance at the hearing is not obligatory. Before the hearing, the Court may ask the parties to focus on a par 753 See above paras 2.111–2.113 and 2.147–2.154. As to the cancellation and refixing of an oral hearing, in Case C-427/09 Generics and Case C-195/09 Synthon (both above, note 465), some of the parties (including the principal parties) were prevented from travelling to the Court by unanticipated adverse weather conditions (no means of transport were available). Oral applications were made by telephone for the hearing to be cancelled and refixed. Initially, the parties were told that the hearing would go ahead in their absence but that they could send to the Court any written speeches or speaking notes that they had. It appears that the Court later relented and a new hearing date was fixed. 754 Eg PD-ECJ, paras 10 and 12. 755 Eg SAT Fluggesellschaft (above, note 637), para 9; the Slob case (above, note 521), para 34. Although it is undoubtedly the case that direct actions are adversarial and references for a preliminary ruling are, in principle, non-adversarial (in the sense that they operate as a dialogue between the referring court or tribunal and the Court), it is difficult to take that difference too far for two related reasons. First, the fact remains that references for a preliminary ruling necessarily form a stage in the judicial resolution of a dispute (that is necessarily so because references can be made only by a court or tribunal and only in relation to a matter that has to be decided by that court or tribunal) with the consequence that the eventual outcome will be adverse to one party or the other. Secondly, as a stage in national proceedings, references for a preliminary ruling are inevitably imprinted with the character of the national proceedings from which they stem. Accordingly, the particular relationship that exists between the referring court or tribunal and the Court, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, does not justify a devaluation of basic procedural rights. 756 Eg Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV [2004] ECR I-8835, para 13 of the first advocate general’s opinion (p 8845) and paras 2–4 of the second (pp 8859–8860). 757 See the cases cited in note 559 above. 758 Eg the Stoss case (above, note 559), paras 44–49. The logic behind that approach is questionable. If the newly discovered fact is not relevant to the answer to the question referred to the Court, the application to reopen the oral procedure should be rejected on that ground. If it is relevant (or potentially relevant), the Court should reopen the oral procedure so that it can be taken into account in the judgment. That avoids the risk of there being a second reference. The Court does not have to make a finding as to the existence of the newly discovered (or asserted) fact. It is, however, obviously helpful to the referring court and efficient for the Court to comment on the relevance or impact of the fact.

287

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ticular aspect of the case; and the Court, the judge-rapporteur or the advocate general may ask the parties to answer certain questions at the hearing.759 The Court is not inclined to respond to a request from one of the parties to indicate which matters it (the Court) considers relevant.760 9 Judgment 2.204 The Court’s judgment is served on the referring court and all the persons to whom the order for reference was notified.761 The judgment delivered in response to a request for a preliminary ruling sets out the reasons for the ruling given but, where the issues are identical to those decided in another case (whether a preliminary ruling or a direct action), reference may simply be made to the judgment in that other case and a copy of that judgment annexed to the judgment in the former case.762 Like all judgments, a judgment giving a preliminary ruling may be rectified where it contains clerical mistakes, errors in calculation and obvious slips.763 However, since the judgment closes a non-contentious procedure in which the parties take no active part, other than to submit observations when so invited, none of the other procedures for supplementing,764 interpreting765 and reviewing766 a judgment are applicable. If it is in some way defective or obscure, the only remedy is for the referring court to make another order for reference.767 The judgment given by the ECJ determines conclusively the question of EU law on which it has ruled; and the judgment is therefore binding on the referring court for the purposes of the decision to be given by it in the action before it. The authority of the preliminary ruling does not prevent the referring court from making another reference (in the course of the same action before it) if the referring court encounters difficulties in understanding or apply-

759 RP-ECJ, art 61(1) (questions put by the Court); RP-ECJ, art 61(2) (concentration on specified issues); RP-ECJ, art 62(2) (questions from the judge-rapporteur or advocate general). 760 Case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board v Redmond [1978] ECR 2347, paras 22–24 and 31. Up to a point, one has some sympathy with the Court because it may not wish to be tied down by a prior indication of what it considers relevant or be perceived to have already reached a view about the case. On the other hand, it is not useful or efficient, or in the interests of justice, for the Court to fail to articulate matters of concern to it either at all or in good time. 761 RP-ECJ, art 88(2). 762 Eg Case 195/84 Denkavit Futtersmittel GmbH v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1985] ECR 3181 (where the parallel case was a direct action); Case 299/83  SA  Saint-Herblain Distribution, Centre Distributor Leclerc v Syndicat des Libraires de Loire-Ocèan [1985] ECR 2515 (where the parallel case was a reference for a preliminary ruling). 763 RP-ECJ, art 103: one example is Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello (No 2) (above, note 665). A party to the preliminary ruling proceedings must request rectification of the judgment or order within two weeks of delivery of the judgment or service of the order (judgments are delivered in open court – RP-ECJ, art 88(1); whereas orders are served – RP-ECJ, art 90). 764 RP-ECJ, art  155; see Case 13/67 Firma Kurt A  Becher v Hauptzollamt MünchenLandsbergerstrasse [1968] ECR 187. 765 RP-ECJ, art 158: see the Becher case (above, note 764) at 187, and Case 40/70 Sirena Srl v Eda Srl [1979] ECR 3169, now incorporated in RP-ECJ, art 104(1). 766 RP-ECJ, art 157 and 159. 767 RP-ECJ, art 104(2). See the Becher and Sirena cases (above, notes 764 and 765) and also Case 135/77 Robert Bosch GmbH v Haupzollamt Hildesheim [1978] ECR 855.

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ing the judgment of the ECJ or if there are new considerations which might cause the ECJ to give a different answer or if a fresh question of law has arisen; but another reference cannot be made in order to question the validity of a preliminary ruling.768 A preliminary ruling made at the request of a court of first instance binds national courts with appellate jurisdiction769 and is sufficient reason for any other national court faced with the same issue of EU law to decide it in the same way,770 again without prejudice to the right of the higher court or other national court to make a further reference if it thinks it appropriate. The referring court decides the costs of the reference,771 which means that the ECJ makes no order for costs in the final judgment so far as the parties to the proceedings before the referring court are concerned; the costs incurred by member states and EU institutions lie where they fall unless they are parties to the proceedings before the referring court, in which case the matter lies within the latter’s jurisdiction.772

D

The expedited procedure

1 Introductory 2.205 The expedited (formerly ‘accelerated’) procedure is different from giving a case priority over others.773 It is an abbreviated procedure for dealing with references for a preliminary ruling whose nature requires them to be dealt with in a short time.774 The procedure (under the appellation ‘accelerated procedure’) was originally limited to cases exhibiting exceptional urgency.775 The parallel in direct actions is also called an ‘expedited’ procedure;776 and, in order to distinguish between the two, they are sometimes referred to as ‘the expedited preliminary ruling procedure’ and ‘the expedited procedure’, respectively. At the time of writing, the expedited preliminary ruling procedure (in the form of the accelerated procedure used in cases of extreme urgency) had been used in very few cases, in one of which the time taken to dispose of the reference was just

768 Case 29/68 Milch- Fett- und Eierkontor GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken [1969] ECR 165, para 3; Case 69/85 Wünsche Handelsgesellschaff GmbH & Co v Germany [1986] ECR 947, paras 13–16. The effect of judgments in preliminary ruling proceedings is considered in Ch 16, section II, para 16.24. 769 Case 338/85 Fratelli Pardini SpA v Ministero del Commercio con l’Estero [1988] ECR 2041 at 2058 (Advocate General Darmon). 770 Case 66/80 International Chemical Corpn SpA  v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1981] ECR 1191, paras 11–14; Case 112/83 Société des Produits de Maïs v Administration des Douanes [1985] ECR 719, para 16. 771 RP-ECJ, art 102. See further Ch 14. 772 Cf Cases 178–180/73 Belgium and Luxembourg v Mertens [1974] ECR 383 and Case 53/75 Belgium v Vandertaelen and Maes [1975] ECR 1647. 773 For the expedited preliminary ruling procedure, see RP-ECJ, art 53(4) and 105–106. The term ‘accelerated’ is used in Statute, art 23a, 1st para, and was used in the ECJ Rules of Procedure before their amendment in 2012. Priority can be given under RP-ECJ, art 53(3), as to which, see further paras 2.84–2.86 above. 774 RP-ECJ, art 105(1). 775 RP-ECJ, art 104a, 1st para, before the Rules of Procedure were amended in 2012. 776 Considered in para 2.87 ff above.

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over two and a half months.777 In the first of the cases in which, at the time of writing, exceptional urgency had been found to exist, it arose from the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the Netherlands and, more particularly, a ban on vaccination that, in turn, meant that animals in certain areas were liable to be slaughtered. The referring court referred to the number of outbreaks of the disease, its rapid spread, the uncertainty as to the manner in which it would continue to spread and the number of animals liable to be slaughtered, weighed against the fact that vaccination constituted a means of protection against the virus.778 In other cases, an adverse effect on a fundamental right, such as personal liberty or respect for family life was regarded as sufficient to justify the application of what was then the accelerated procedure. One such case was rather peculiar in that the referring court had requested application of the ‘urgent’ procedure (described below); but, it was held, that procedure could not be applied because it was not in effect when the case commenced before the ECJ. Urgency justifying application of the expedited procedure was considered to lie in the facts that the case concerned the execution of a European arrest warrant in relation to a person currently in custody who would, ordinarily, have been released by the time when the ECJ could normally be expected to give judgment; and the case raised problems of interpretation in a sensitive area affecting core aspects of the arrest warrant, there was no previous authority, and the ruling would have widespread repercussions both for public authorities and for individuals, all of whom were in a state of uncertainty.779 So far as can be seen, the only valid reason for regarding the case as urgent was that, if the ECJ decided the case at its usual speed, its judgment would have been rendered academic so far as the parties before the referring court were concerned. The other points made by the ECJ (the importance of the question, absence of previous authority, repercussions for other cases) are not unusual features. In other cases, there has been urgency but the economic interests at stake did not render the degree of urgency exceptional.780 777 Case C-189/01 Jippes v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2001] ECR I-5689. The accelerated procedure was also applied in Case C-66/08 Kozlowski [2008] ECR I-6041 (see order dated 22 February 2008), where the referring court had actually requested the application of the ‘urgent’ procedure (as to which, see below). The ECJ considered that that procedure could not be applied because the reference for a preliminary ruling in Kozlowski had been lodged some 13 days before the ‘urgent’ procedure was brought into effect (a proposition that appears to be doubtful). In Case C-127/08 Metock v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECR I-6241, the case took four months under the accelerated procedure. 778 The Jippes case (above, note 777), para 44 of the judgment. 779 Kozlowski (above, note 777), paras 10–12 of the order of 22 February 2008. Another case was Metock (above, note 777), order of 17 April 2008, which concerned a number of cases in which continuing uncertainty as to the legal position prevented the individuals concerned from leading a normal family life. 780 Eg Case C-341/04 Bondi v Bank of America [2006] ECR I-3813, order of 15 September 2004 (the appointment of liquidators in two rival jurisdictions made it impossible to administer the assets of the insolvent company to the detriment of creditors). In Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 R (on the application of the Alliance for Natural Health) v Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-6451, order of 7 May 2004, the urgency arose because of the consequences of the implementation of a directive whose provisions were alleged to be invalid. The date for the implementation of the directive was 1  August 2005. It prohibited the marketing of certain products. Manufacturers and distributors would be exposed to criminal sanctions for breach of the prohibition and were threatened with having to make decisions about investments and jobs. Acceleration was not

290

General outline of procedure 2.206

2.206 The requirement that there be exceptional urgency was removed in 2012 and was replaced by a more broadly-based criterion: that the nature of the case requires it to be dealt with in a short time. At the time of writing, there was little practical experience of the application of the new criterion. In general, if the continued detention of a party to the proceedings before the referring court were dependent solely upon the answer to be given to the question referred for a preliminary ruling, the case will be regarded as justifying the application of the expedited preliminary ruling procedure.781 On basic principles, dealing with a case under the expedited procedure in its current form requires a degree of urgency that sets the case apart from other cases (over which it would be given priority if the expedited procedure were applied to it) and that justifies the additional resources involved in dealing with the case under the expedited procedure, based on reasons that indicate that an injustice would be done if the case were dealt with in the normal way.782 ordered but an indication was given that judgment would be delivered before 1 August 2005 (it was actually delivered on 12 July 2005). In general, the following were not sufficient justification to place a case under the accelerated procedure: the risk of economic loss, including a threat to the economic survival of a party (Case C-11/05 Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst [2006] ECR I-4285, order of 18 March 2005, paras 12–13; Case C-467/06 Consel Gi. Emme Srl v Sistema Logistico dell’Arco Ligure e Alessandrino Srl [2008] ECR I-44*, order of 23 January 2007, para 8; Case C-12/07 Autostrade dei Fiori v Governo della Repubblica italiana [2007] ECR I-162*, order of 23 March 2007, para 8; Case C-201/08 Plantanol GmbH & Co KG  v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt [2009]  ECR  I-8343, order of 3  July 2008, paras 8–9; Case C-384/08 Attanasio Group Srl v Comune di Carbognano [2010]  ECR  I-2055, order of 4 December 2008, paras 8–11); economic importance (Case C-344/04 R (on the application of IATA and ELFAA v Department for Transport [2006] ECR I-403, order of 24 September 2004, para 9; Case C-456/07 Mihal v Danovy urad Kosice [2008] ECR I-79*, order of 8 November 2007, para 8; Case C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure, 4 October 2011, order of 3 December 2008, paras 7–8); an effect on a large number of persons or situations (Case C-385/05 Confederation generale du Travail v Premier Ministre [2007] ECR I-611, order of 21 November 2005, para 13; Cases C-283/06 and C-312/06 KOGAZ v Zala Megyei Kozigazgatasi Hivatal Vezetoje [2007]  ECR  I-8463, order of 21  September 2006, para  9; Case C-368/06 Cedillac v Ministere de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie [2007] ECR I-12327, order of 25 September 2006, para 7; Case C-201/08 Plantanol GmbH & Co KG v Hauptzollamt Darmstadt (above), order of 3 July 2008, para 10; Case C403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (above), order of 3 December 2008, para 9; Case C-439/08 VZW Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers v Raad voor de Mededinging [2010] I-1247, order of 3 December 2008 – the number of pending cases was not identified but, even if high, would not ‘necessarily’ have indicated exceptional urgency, see para 7 of the order). In contrast, the reference in Case C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland, 27  November 2012, was accelerated (by an order of 4  October 2012). That case had raised doubts about the validity of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism which were holding up Ireland’s ratification of the Treaty. The effect on the financial stability of the Euro area justified acceleration. 781 Eg Case C-181/14 G, order of 6 May 2014. That acts upon the injunction contained in TFEU, art 267, 4th para. The justification for using the expedited procedure seems to be related only to the dependency of continued custody on the answer to the question referred. It is not related to the length of the custodial term (in G, if the ECJ had decided the matter in favour of G at its normal pace, the period of custody would have been reduced considerably; using the expedited procedure would have reduced it even more). 782 The Recommendations referred to in note 646 above state that the large number of parties or situations potentially affected by the referring court’s decision is not in itself an exceptional circumstance justifying application of the expedited procedure: see para 38.

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2.207  General outline of procedure

2 Commencement of the expedited procedure 2.207 The expedited procedure can be commenced (by a decision of the President of the ECJ made after hearing the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general) if the referring court so requests or, exceptionally, if the President of the ECJ so decides of his own motion.783 There are no rules concerning the form of the request for expedition made by the referring court. Accordingly, in principle, it may be made in the order for reference itself or by separate document. It would seem to be better to make the request both in the order for reference and by separate document, under cover of which the order for reference is sent to the Court. In that way, the risk of the request being overlooked may be minimised. The request for expedition should set out the facts and matters on which it is based. Otherwise, the President cannot determine whether or not recourse to the expedited procedure is justified.784 The ECJ’s guidance suggests that it may be useful for the referring court to state its view briefly on the answer to the question(s) referred (if it is able to do so) because that might focus the issues in the case and speed up the process.785 Ordinarily, the request should be made contemporaneously with the transmission of the order for reference to the Court.786 If it is made some time afterwards, that tends to suggest that expedition is not really necessary unless there is some other explanation for the delay or the request has been prompted by some turn of events taking place after the order for reference was made.787 The fact that the President of the ECJ may assign a case to the expedited procedure of his own motion suggests that the parties may seek to persuade him to do so even in the absence of a request made by the referring court. There is no formal way in which the President may be instigated to apply the expedited 783 RP-ECJ, art 105(1). Case C-181/14 G (above, note 781) was an instance of the ECJ acting of its own motion (the referring court had erroneously requested the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure). 784 See the Recommendations referred to in note 646 above, paras 41–43. 785 Ibid, para  42. Following up the ECJ’s suggestion is capable of slowing up the process by delaying the finalising of the terms of the request for a preliminary ruling and is also capable of misdirecting participants in the preliminary ruling procedure (including the ECJ) who are not parties to the proceedings before the referring court. 786 RP-ECJ, art 105(2) assumes that that is so because it envisages that the decision to apply the expedited procedure and the directions that follow immediately from that decision will be made before the order for reference is served on the parties entitled to submit written observations. 787 It would appear that the request ought specifically to refer to the expedited procedure and to RP-ECJ, art 105: at the time of writing, there had been a number of cases in which the referring court had intended to apply for acceleration of the case (as it was then known) but had used language that was not sufficiently clear to alert the Court to what was meant. In particular, the word ‘expedition’ had to be avoided since it might not be understood as referring to what was then known as the accelerated procedure. It would seem that such terminological difficulties should no longer exist; but it remains the safer course to identify the relevant rule of procedure (RP-ECJ, art 105). By way of alternative, reference may also be made to priority under RPECJ, art  53(3) (that may be of particular importance since it is easier, and more frequently encountered, for the Court to give priority as opposed to dealing with a case under the expedited procedure). However, the two still need to be distinguished. Hence, phraseology like ‘request for the application of the expedited preliminary ruling procedure under Articles  105–106 of the Rules of Procedure or, alternatively, priority treatment under Article 53(3) of the Rules of Procedure’ should be used.

292

General outline of procedure 2.209

procedure; but it seems that it may be done by a letter written by one or all of the parties and addressed to the President or to the Registrar of the ECJ, setting out the justification for the application of the procedure. The President is not obliged to hear the parties before making his decision and there is no appeal from his decision. 3 Directions 2.208 If the President decides that it is appropriate to apply the expedited procedure, he or she immediately fixes the date for the hearing788 and, in principle, the timetable for the intervening steps in the proceedings are fitted in by reference to that date. The President sets a time limit for the lodgement of written observations by the persons entitled to do so in a reference for a preliminary ruling (that time limit cannot be less than 15 days); and may also request (but not, apparently, require) those persons to restrict their written observations to the essential points of law raised by the questions referred.789 When the order for reference is served on the parties, they are notified that it is being dealt with under the expedited procedure and are told of the date fixed for the hearing, the date by which written observations are to be lodged and any request concerning the content of the written observations made by the President.790 4 Other procedural stages 2.209 In other respects, the written procedure is conducted in the same way as in any other reference for a preliminary ruling.791 After the written procedure is closed the case is assigned to the appropriate formation. The oral procedure is conducted as in any other case. The Court rules after hearing the advocate general792 but the practice (insofar as there is one) is for the advocate general’s opinion to be delivered to the Court in closed session. In all other respects the procedure is the same as in an ordinary reference for a preliminary ruling.

788 RP-ECJ, art 105(2). 789 RP-ECJ, art 105(3). The period for submitting written observations is, as usual, extended by 10 days on account of distance: see RP-ECJ, art 51. 790 RP-ECJ, art 105(2) and by implication from RP-ECJ, art 105(3). 791 It is expressly provided that the written observations are served on the parties before the hearing: RP-ECJ, art 105(4). Service is by fax or any other technical means of communication available to both the Court and to the addressee: RP-ECJ, art 106(2). Written observations are deemed to have been lodged at the Court when a copy of the signed original (and any required annexes and supporting documents) has been transmitted to the ECJ Registry by fax or any other technical means of communication available to the Court (the original must also be sent to the Registry, immediately): RP-ECJ, art 106(1). 792 RP-ECJ, art 105(5).

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2.210  General outline of procedure

E

The urgent procedure

1 Introductory 2.210 The ‘urgent’ procedure is applicable only to references for a preliminary ruling in the area of freedom, security and justice,793 more precisely, to those raising questions of EU law (that is, questions concerning the interpretation or validity of EU legislation) in the areas covered by Title V of Part Three of the TFEU (TFEU, arts 67–89).794 The essential feature of the urgent procedure is the attenuation of the written part of the procedure. In short, the only persons able to submit written observations are the parties to the proceedings before the referring court, the member state from which the reference is made, the Commission and, where relevant, the other EU institution whose act or measure is the subject of the questions referred to the ECJ. Those persons may be required to submit written observations within an abbreviated timescale and, in really urgent cases, the written part of the procedure may be omitted in its entirety. The other persons normally entitled to participate in a reference for a preliminary ruling may do so only at the hearing. 2 Urgency 2.211 The subject-matter of the reference determines its eligibility for treatment under the urgent procedure but is not necessarily an indication that the case is genuinely urgent.795 In reality, all cases are ‘urgent’ in the sense that it is in the interests of justice for any case to be decided as soon as is possible. ‘Urgency’, in the present context, refers to some feature of the case that justifies giving it priority over other cases (which is likely to affect adversely the progress of those other cases). The degree of urgency required for the application of the urgent procedure is difficult to identify in the absence of case law that adequately discloses the practice of the Court. Its own published guidance addressed to national courts states that the application of the urgent procedure should be requested only where it is ‘absolutely necessary for the Court to give its ruling very quickly.’ The Court suggests796 that the following situations are instances of ones in which application of the urgent procedure may be considered: the case of a person detained or deprived of his or her liberty, where the answer to the question referred is decisive as to the assessment of that person’s ‘legal situ-

793 Statute, art 23a, 1st para. The urgent procedure could not be used in Case C-181/14 G (above, note 781) simply because the EU legislation in question did not fall within the scope of the area of freedom, security and justice. 794 RP-ECJ, art 107(1). 795 Literally, Statute, art 23a, does provide an urgent procedure for references in the area of freedom, security and justice without requiring that cases in that area be urgent. RP-ECJ, art 107(1) is to like effect. However, RP-ECJ, art  107(2) introduces the notion of urgency by requiring a referring court to specify ‘the matters of fact and law which establish the urgency and justify the application of that exceptional procedure’. That phrase seems to mean ‘matters of fact and law which establish the urgency that justifies…’. 796 The Recommendations referred to in note 646 above, paras 39–40.

294

General outline of procedure 2.212

ation’ (that is, presumably, his entitlement to be released);797 or, in proceedings concerning parental authority or custody of children, where the identity of the court having jurisdiction depends upon the answer to the question referred. In a number of cases, the urgency lay in the need to resolve issues concerning a child before irreparable damage was done to the child and to the child’s relationship with its natural parents or foster parents.798 2.212 Before 2012, the required degree of urgency appeared to be less than that necessary for application of what was then the accelerated (now the expedited) procedure because the latter procedure applied to matters of ‘exceptional urgency’ whereas the urgent procedure applies where there is only ‘urgency’ (although that is only a threshold condition because the urgent procedure can also be applied in cases of ‘extreme urgency’). That was a paradoxical state of affairs since the ‘urgent’ procedure involves a more attenuated (and, in principle, faster) procedure than what was, at the time, the ‘accelerated’ procedure.799 Since urgency is a relative concept, it cannot be excluded that the required degree of urgency may vary from time to time. For example, if applying the urgent procedure would adversely affect a number of anodyne cases that the Court is currently processing, it may require little to justify the conclusion that a particular reference for a preliminary ruling eligible for treatment under the urgent procedure should be so treated. On the other hand, the position would be different if applying the urgent procedure would adversely affect the progress of other, more important or more sensitive cases.800 797 For cases concerning imprisonment, see: Case C-296/08  PPU  Santesteban Goicoechea [2008]  ECR  I-6307, paras 33–34; Case C-388/08  PPU  Leymann and Pustovarov [2008]  ECR  I-8983, paras 38–39; Case C-357/09  PPU  Kadzoev [2009]  ECR  I-11189, paras 32–33; Case C-61/11 PPU El Dridi [2011] ECR I-3015, paras 27–28; Case C-83/12 PPU Vo, 10  April 2012, paras 31–32; Case C-192/12  PPU  West, 28  June 2012, paras 33–34; Case C-278/12 PPU Adil v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 19 July 2012, paras 34–35; Case C-168/13 PPU F v Premier Ministre, 30 May 2013, paras 30–32 (the preliminary ruling was capable of having considerable influence on the duration of the period of imprisonment); Case C-146/14 PPU Ali Mahdi, 5 June 2014, paras 32–36 (the ruling might result in Mahdi’s immediate release). 798 Case C-195/08  PPU  Rinau [2008]  ECR  I-5271, paras 43–46; Case C-403/09  PPU  Deticek v Sgueglia [2009]  ECR  I-12193, para  30; Case C-211/10  PPU  Povse v Alpago [2010] ECR I-6673, para 35; Case C-400/10 PPU McB v LE [2010] ECR I-8965, paras 27– 29; Case C-491/10  PPU  Aguirre Zarraga v Pelz [2010]  ECR  I-14247, paras 39–40; Case C-497/10 PPU Mercredi v Chaffe [2010] ECR I-14309, paras 38-39; Case C-92/12 PPU Health Service Executive v SC and AC, 26 April 2012, paras 49–50; Case C-498/14 PPU Bradbrooke v Aleksandrowicz, 9 January 2015, paras 35–39. 799 At present, the roles of the expedited and urgent procedures have been reversed because the former applies only where ‘the nature of the case requires that it be dealt with within a short time’ (RP-ECJ, art 105(1)) whereas ‘urgency’ is required for the latter (RP-ECJ, art 107(2)). In the Recommendations referred to in note 646 above (paras 38–39), the ECJ differentiates between the two procedures by reference to the constraints imposed by them on the parties, which are greater in the case of the urgent procedure. From that it is inferred that the urgent procedure requires more in terms of justification than the expedited procedure. However, textually, there is little obvious difference between ‘the nature of the case requires that it be dealt with within a short time’ and ‘urgency’. 800 The Kozlowski case (above, note 777) seems to be a good example of a case whose intrinsic features would justify the application of the urgent procedure (the use of the accelerated

295

2.213  General outline of procedure

3 Commencement of the urgent procedure 2.213 A reference for a preliminary ruling may be allocated to the urgent procedure either if the referring court so requests or if the ECJ (not the President of the ECJ), acting of its own motion, considers it necessary to use that procedure.801 No provision is made for the procedure to be used on application by a party (although, as in the case of the expedited procedure, the parties do not seem to be precluded from prompting the ECJ to act of its own motion). 2.214 A request made by the referring court must set out: (i) the matters of fact and law establishing urgency and justifying the application of the procedure; and (ii) ‘in so far as possible’, the answer to the questions referred proposed by the referring court.802 As in the case of the expedited procedure, the request should be made by separate document (which may be the letter under cover of which the order for reference is sent to the ECJ) so that the registry is immediately aware of the need to consider the possible need to allocate the case to the urgent procedure.803 There seems to be nothing to prevent the request from being sent to the Court before the order for reference; but that does not seem to be useful since the Court cannot really deal with the request until it has received the order for reference because (i) it is receipt of the order for reference that commences the proceedings before the Court and (ii) the order for reference actually crystallises the issues referred to the Court. There also seems to be nothing to prevent the referring court from making the request after the order for reference has been lodged at the Court. Normally, in an urgent case, one would expect the request to be made at the outset; but it cannot be excluded that the degree of urgency may become apparent only after the lodgement of the order for reference, particularly where there is a change in circumstances.804 2.215 The rules of procedure envisage that the referring court’s request will be lodged at the Court at the same time as the order for reference. Accordingly, procedure in that case – as the expedited procedure was then known – looks more like a convenient device to get around a perceived problem concerning the date of introduction of the urgent procedure). 801 RP-ECJ, art 107(1). 802 RP-ECJ, art 107(2). The Recommendations referred to in note 646 above state in para 42 that the referring court’s ‘view’ on the answer to the question(s) referred ‘makes it easier for the parties to the main proceedings and the other interested persons participating in the procedure to define their positions and facilitates the Court’s decision, thereby contributing to the rapidity of the procedure’. It is not easy to see why that should be so unless the reference has been made at a procedural stage before all the parties to the proceedings before the referring court have had an opportunity to be heard; but, however that may be, the referring court is not obliged to indicate its own view and there is no reason why it should spend any time on elaborating a view. 803 The Recommendations referred to in note 646 above, para 43. 804 There seems to be an implicit assumption that a reference can be placed under the urgent procedure only if the circumstances justifying it (including the referring court’s request) are extant at the time when the proceedings before the Court commence (that is one interpretation of the Court’s approach in the Kozlowski case, above, note 777); but there is no basis for that assumption in the Statute or the rules of procedure and it would be an unwarranted restriction on the application of the procedure.

296

General outline of procedure 2.216

they provide that, where the referring court has made such a request, the order for reference must be notified forthwith (that is, forthwith upon lodgement of the order for reference at the Court) by the registrar to the parties to the proceedings before the referring court, to the member state from which the reference comes, to the Commission, and to the institution which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in dispute.805 ‘As soon as’ that notification has been made, the order for reference is also notified to the other persons entitled to submit written observations in the ordinary course in a reference for a preliminary ruling.806 In that context, ‘as soon as’ does not appear to mean after the order for reference has been translated into the relevant procedural languages because the communication of a translation of the order for reference is provided for elsewhere.807 At this stage in the proceedings, the other persons entitled to submit written observations must, it appears, make their own translation of the order for reference. 2.216 At the outset of the proceedings before the Court, the case is assigned to a designated chamber and a judge-rapporteur is appointed. The designated chamber decides on the referring court’s request, acting on a report from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general.808 The question before the designated chamber is whether or not it is necessary to deal with the case under the urgent procedure.809 It decides the question by reference to the information available in the case file, which (at that stage in the proceedings) would ordinarily be limited to the order for reference itself and the separate document containing the referring court’s request that the urgent procedure be applied. The chamber may also take into account any other information in its possession (such as whether or not the reference would have repercussions for other cases). There is no reason and no provision of the rules of procedure that would prevent the designated chamber from requesting further information from the referring court or from the parties to the proceedings before the referring court; however, there is no formal provision for hearing the parties (or anyone else) before the designated chamber’s decision is made. Should the designated chamber feel it necessary to make enquiries of some person or entity other than the referring court, it would appear that the parties, at least, ought to be informed and given an opportunity to present their own views because, otherwise, a decision that affects 805 RP-ECJ, art  109(1). The order for reference is notified without having first been translated into any other procedural language of the Court because the recipients at that stage in the proceedings are all capable of dealing with it in its original language version. 806 RP-ECJ, art 109(4). 807 In RP-ECJ, art 110(1). 808 On the assignment of the case to the designated chamber and the appointment of the judgerapporteur, see Ch 1, paras 1.70–1.72. For the decision on the referring court’s request, see RP-ECJ, art 108(1). If the case is connected with a pending case assigned to a judge-rapporteur who is not a member of the designated chamber, the latter may propose to the President of the ECJ that the case be assigned to that judge-rapporteur, in which case, the chamber of which he is a member takes over the case: RP-ECJ, art 108(2). 809 That is what RP-ECJ, art 107(3) provides where it is the President of the ECJ who requests the designated chamber to consider the application of the urgent procedure. There is no basis for believing that the designated chamber must ask itself a different question when the matter comes before it in the form of a request from the referring court.

297

2.217  General outline of procedure

their interests could be made on the basis of inaccurate or incomplete information.810 The designated chamber’s decision on the request is notified forthwith to the referring court and to the persons to whom the order for reference has already been notified.811 As soon as that has been done, the decision is notified to the other persons normally entitled to submit written observations in a reference for a preliminary ruling.812 If the designated chamber’s decision is that the case should not be dealt with under the urgent procedure, the proceedings continue as in a normal reference for a preliminary ruling.813 The next step in the procedure would then be the fixing of the date for the submission of written observations by all the persons entitled to lodge them in an ordinary case. The use of the expedited procedure seems necessarily to be excluded by a decision of the designated chamber not to apply the urgent procedure; but it does not follow that the Court cannot make use of alternative possibilities open to it under the rules of procedure to speed up the disposal of the case. If, on the other hand, the designated chamber decides in favour of the referring court’s request, the urgent procedure is engaged, as described in the next section. 2.217 The Court may act of its own motion ‘exceptionally’ in the absence of a request made by the referring court for the application of the urgent procedure.814 It seems that the initiative must be taken by the President of the Court. If he or she considers that the application of the urgent procedure ‘appears, prima facie, to be required’, he or she asks the chamber designated to deal with such cases to consider whether or not it is necessary to deal with the reference under the urgent procedure.815 The rules of procedure do not state when the President is to consider the matter. The implication is that the President does so at the outset of the proceedings before the ECJ because that is consistent with the rules dealing with the designation of the judge-rapporteur in the case. However, nothing seems to prevent the matter from being considered by the President at a later date. Although it is the President who must decide whether or not, prima facie, the urgent procedure may be appropriate, there is nothing to prevent the President from being asked to do so by another person, such as the judge-rapporteur. The President considers the matter on the basis of the material in the court file at the time of his consideration of it but there seems to be nothing to prevent him (or her) taking into account other knowledge that he has obtained from other sources (such as whether or not the problem raised in the order for reference has repercussions for other cases before the Court). The question before the President is whether or not the information available shows that it is arguable that the refer-

810 That problem should not, in principle, arise where the designated chamber makes its decision on the basis of information provided by the referring court in the order for reference and the referring court’s request because both documents ought to set out matters known to the parties to the proceedings before the referring court and on which they will already have had an opportunity to comment. 811 RP-ECJ, art 109(2). 812 RP-ECJ, art 109(4). 813 RP-ECJ, art 109(6). For the reallocation of the case to a different chamber, see Ch 1, para 1.72. 814 RP-ECJ, art 107(1). 815 RP-ECJ, art 107(3).

298

General outline of procedure 2.219

ence merits the application of the urgent procedure.816 If the President’s view is that there is no prima facie case to that effect, the reference is dealt with under the normal procedure. If the view is that there is such a prima facie case, the President refers the matter to the designated chamber and appoints the judgerapporteur.817 The composition of the designated chamber is determined on the day on which the President requests the designated chamber to consider the matter.818 The registrar notifies the order for reference to the parties to the proceedings before the referring court, the member state from which the reference was made, the Commission and the institution which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in dispute ‘forthwith’ after the President has referred the case to the designated chamber.819 From that point, matters develop as in a case in which the referring court has requested the application of the urgent procedure. 4 Directions and written procedure 2.218 Where the designated chamber decides that the reference should be dealt with under the urgent procedure, its decision (which, as noted above, must be served first on all the persons notified that the Court is considering whether or not to apply the urgent procedure and then on all other persons entitled to submit written observations in a normal reference for a preliminary ruling) must prescribe the period within which the parties to the proceedings before the referring court, the member state from which the reference comes, the Commission and the institution which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in dispute may lodge written observations (the other persons normally entitled to submit written observations are not entitled to do so in the urgent procedure but are limited to making oral submissions at the hearing). Depending upon the circumstances, the decision may also specify the matters of law to be dealt with in the written observations and may lay down the maximum length of the written observations.820 In cases of extreme urgency, the written procedure may be omitted in its entirety and the chamber may proceed directly to the hearing.821 Where the request for a preliminary ruling refers to administrative or judicial proceedings in a member state other than that of the referring court, the Court may invite that member state to provide ‘all relevant information’ in writing or at the hearing.822 That appears to refer to information about the proceedings in question and does not extend to permitting that member state to submit written observations on the question(s) referred. 2.219 The Court must inform all the persons normally entitled to submit written observations in a reference for a preliminary ruling as soon as possible of 816 Cf the prima facie test in interim relief cases considered in Ch 8 below. 817 For the designated chamber and the appointment of the judge-rapporteur, see Ch 1, paras 1.70– 1.71. 818 RP-ECJ, art 108(1). See further note 808 above. 819 RP-ECJ, art 109(1). 820 RP-ECJ, art 109(2). 821 RP-ECJ, art 111. 822 RP-ECJ, art 109(3).

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2.220  General outline of procedure

the likely date of the hearing (which may not be the actual date).823 That enables them to sort out their representation at, and prepare for, the hearing. Any written observations submitted by a person invited to do so are served in the normal way on every other person invited to submit written observations.824 The other persons who, in a normal reference for a preliminary ruling, would be allowed to submit written observations but who are not permitted to do so in the context of the urgent procedure are served with the written observations lodged by the other parties and with the reference for a preliminary ruling, the latter accompanied by a translation (in accordance with the normal rules) which may be in summary form.825 At the same time as those documents are served, all parties are notified of the date of the hearing.826 2.220 Procedural documents are deemed to have been lodged on transmission of a signed copy to the registry by fax or other technical means of communications available to the court (supporting documents and a schedule listing them must also be sent). The signed original of the procedural document and the annexes attached to it must also be sent to the registry. Notification or service of a document by the Court may be effected by transmission of a copy by fax or other technical means of communication available to both the Court and the addressee.827 5 Other procedural stages 2.221 The other procedural stages are in principle the same as in a reference dealt with under the normal procedure. However, since the urgent procedure abbreviates significantly the rights of the persons entitled to submit written observations, the oral procedure plays a fundamental role in the context of the urgent procedure and it does not appear that, ordinarily, it could be dispensed with.828 The designated chamber rules on the reference after hearing the advocate general;829 but that appears to encompass both the situation in which the advocate general delivers in public an opinion in writing (described as the ‘view’ of the advocate general) and the situation where the advocate general expresses the view that no such opinion is required. The designated chamber may sit in a formation of three judges to decide the case, in which case, it must consist of the President of the chamber, the judge-rapporteur and the first judge (or, as the case may be, the first two judges) taken from the list used to constitute the chamber.830

823 RP-ECJ, art 109(5). 824 RP-ECJ, art 110(2). 825 RP-ECJ, art  110(1). The implication is that the written observations may well not be accompanied by a translation. 826 RP-ECJ, art 110(3). 827 RP-ECJ, art 114, which cross-refers to RP-ECJ, art 106 (as to which, see note 791 above). 828 Exceptional cases, in which all parties normally entitled to submit written observations in a reference for a preliminary ruling are agreed that there is no need for the oral hearing, are conceivable. 829 RP-ECJ, art 112. 830 RP-ECJ, art 113(1).

300

General outline of procedure 2.224

The designated chamber may also decide that the case is sufficiently important to be decided by a greater number of judges, in which case, the procedure continues, from the point reached when that decision is made, before that larger formation. If necessary (that is, where the decision is made after the hearing), the oral procedure is reopened.831

VI

APPEALS AND REVIEWS

2.222 Decisions delivered by a specialised court may be made subject to a right of appeal to the GC on points of law only or on points both of law and of fact.832 Appellate decisions of the GC determining such an appeal may ‘exceptionally’ be made subject to ‘review’ by the ECJ where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of EU law being affected.833 In other words, there is no right of appeal from appellate decision of the GC. ‘Review’ by the ECJ is available only if the decision of the GC in question poses the serious risk referred to. By necessary implication, the risk is of an adverse effect on the unity or consistency of EU law. First instance decisions of the GC in direct actions may be made the subject of an appeal to the ECJ as of right on points of law only.834 Where the GC has jurisdiction to hear and determine references for a preliminary ruling made under TFEU, art 267 (which was not the case at the time of writing), there is no right of appeal from its decisions but they may ‘exceptionally’ be subject to ‘review’ by the ECJ where, as in the case of appellate decisions of the GC, there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of EU law being affected.835 There is no provision for an appeal from decisions of the ECJ to another court or for the ‘review’ of decisions of the ECJ by another court. 2.223 Appeals from the CST to the GC will cease for obvious reasons once the CST has been abolished and ceases to deliver appealable judgments and orders. That will in turn eliminate the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review appellate decisions of the GC unless and until one or more new specialised courts are created. Appeals and reviews are considered in more detail in Chapter 15 below.

A

Appeals from the CST to the GC

1 Scope of the right of appeal 2.224 An appeal may be brought before the GC, as of right, from the following decisions of the CST by an unsuccessful party (including an intervener): (1) final decisions; (2) decisions disposing of the substantive issues in part only; (3) decisions disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of jurisdiction

831 RP-ECJ, art 113(2). 832 TFEU, art 257, 3rd para. 833 TFEU, art 256(2), 2nd subpara. 834 TFEU, art 256(1), 2nd subpara. 835 TFEU, art 256(3), 3rd subpara.

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2.225  General outline of procedure

or inadmissibility; (4) decisions dismissing an application to intervene; (5) decisions granting or refusing interim relief; and (6) decisions granting or refusing a stay of enforcement of a decision of the Council or Commission.836 In the case of the decisions referred to in (1) to (3) above, an intervener other than a member state or EU institution may appeal only if he or she is directly affected by the decision in question.837 In the case of the decision referred to in (4), the appellant is necessarily the disappointed applicant to intervene.838 2.225 With the exception of the decisions referred to in (4) above (for which the period for appealing is two weeks from notification of the decision appealed against), an appeal must be brought within two months of notification of the decision appealed against.839 No appeal can be made in respect of a determination of the amount of the costs to be paid by a party or the determination of the party liable to pay them.840 2.226 An appeal may be made only on a point of law: lack of jurisdiction of the CST, a breach of procedure adversely affecting the interests of the appellant, or infringement of EU law.841 An appeal may seek one of the following forms of relief: (i) the setting aside, in whole or in part, of the contested decision; (ii) the same form of order, in whole or in part, as that sought at first instance. A different form of order from that sought at first instance cannot be advanced, and the subject matter of the proceedings before the CST cannot be changed, in an appeal.842 2 General nature of the proceedings 2.227 An appeal is conducted in a manner similar to a direct action: there is a written and an oral part (the latter may be dispensed with)843 and there may be the occasion for the making of various directions but there are no measures of enquiry because appeals are limited to questions of law. Appeals from decisions dismissing an application to intervene, decisions granting or refusing interim relief and decisions granting or refusing a stay of enforcement of a decision of the Council or Commission may be determined by the President of the GC by way of a summary procedure.844

836 Statute, Annex, arts 9 and 10(1)–(2). 837 Ibid, art 9, 2nd para. 838 Id, art 10(1). 839 Id, arts 9 and 10(1)–(2). The time limit is automatically extended by 10 days on account of distance pursuant to RP-GC, art 60. 840 Id, art 11(2). 841 Id, art 11(1). The grounds of appeal are the same as in the case of an appeal to the ECJ from a first instance decision of the GC. Hence, the case law explaining the nature and extent of those grounds is equally applicable to appeals from the CST to the GC. 842 RP-GC, art 195(1) and 196(1). 843 Statute, Annex, art 12(2). 844 Ibid, art 10(3).

302

General outline of procedure 2.229

3 Commencement of an appeal 2.228 An appeal is brought by lodging a notice of appeal at the registry of either the GC or the CST.845 The notice of appeal must set out: (1) the name and address of the appellant; (2) particulars of the status and address of the appellant’s representative; (3) a reference to the decision of the CST appealed against (that is, a basic description of the decision enabling it to be identified, including its date and content); (4) the names of the other parties to the proceedings before the CST (including the interveners); (5) the pleas in law and arguments relied on by the appellant, and a summary of them and, where the appellant requests the case to be referred back to the CST, the reasons why the state of the proceedings does not permit the matter to be decided by the GC; (6) the form of order sought by the appellant; (7) the date on which the decision appealed against was notified to the appellant; and (8) the appellant’s service details (that is, the consent of the appellant’s representative to service by means of e-Curia or fax and, if the latter, the relevant contact details).846 The notice of appeal must comply with the general rules governing pleadings and applications in direct actions; and various documents must be attached to the notice of appeal.847 The language of the appeal is that of the decision appealed against, save that the GC has power to change the language of the case or authorise use of another language, and member states are entitled to use their own official language, as in a direct action.848 4 The handling of the notice of appeal and summary dismissal 2.229 A notice of appeal is handled in effectively the same way as an application commencing proceedings in a direct action: the same rules concerning defects in the pleading initiating the proceedings apply;849 and it is also possible for the inadmissibility of the appeal or its lack of foundation to be raised and decided upon at the outset, where the defect is clear.850 When the notice of appeal is lodged, the CST registry immediately transmits to the GC registry the papers

845 RP-GC, art 193(1). Where the notice of appeal is lodged at the CST’s registry, it must transmit the notice of appeal immediately to the GC’s registry: RP-GC, art  193(2). Appeals initiated after 31 August 2016 may be commenced only by lodging an application at the GC registry because, after that date, the CST registry will have ceased to exist (that explains the amendment of RP-GC, art 193 in August 2016). 846 RP-GC, art 194(1), (2) and (5) and 196(2). In the case of referral back to the first instance court, as from the abolition of the CST, the referral is fro the GC, acting as a court of appeal, to the GC acting as a court of first instance: see Regulation 2016/1192, art 4, and the amended version of RP-GC, art 196(2). The pleas in law and legal arguments in the notice of appeal must identify precisely the disputed points in the CST’s decision: RP-GC, art 195(2). A fuller description of the pleading rules relating to appeals is given in Ch 9. 847 RP-GC, art 72–74 (which apply pursuant to RP-GC, art 213(1)), and 51(2)–(3) (which apply pursuant to RP-GC, art 194(4)). 848 See para 2.5 above. 849 RP-GC, art 194(6). 850 RP-GC, art 208. The appeal would then be dismissed by reasoned order made on the basis of a report from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general (where there is one).

303

2.230  General outline of procedure

in the case (that is, the CST’s file).851 In the ordinary course, the notice of appeal is served by the GC on all the parties to the proceedings before the CST.852 At the time of writing, appeals from the CST were assigned as soon as the application initiating the appeal had been lodged to a five-judge appeal chamber.853 5 Interim relief 2.230 An appeal does not have suspensory effect854 but, when the appeal is against a decision disposing of the substantive issues in part only, a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility, or dismissing an application to intervene, the CST may, in its discretion, stay its proceedings until the appeal has been resolved.855 Otherwise (or if stay of the CST proceedings would not be an appropriate form of interim relief), an application may be made to the President of the GC for interim relief.856

851 RP-GC, art 193(2), which was repealed with effect from 1 September 2016. By implication, as from the abolition of the CST, the CST’s registry was to be absorbed into the GC registry (or, at least, the files of cases pending before the CST and cases that were capable of appeal to the GC were to be transferred to the GC registry). 852 RP-GC, art 197(1). The notice of appeal may be served on the other parties only after it has been put in order (if it did not initially comply with the pleading rules) or has been declared admissible despite the existence of any formal defects: RP-GC, art 194(6) and 197(2). 853 Decision of 26 October 2013 (OJ 2013 No C313/5). 854 Statute, Annex, art 12(1). 855 RP-CST, art 42(1)(b). Where the CST disposes of the substantive issues in part only, disposes of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility that relates to part only of the action, or dismisses an application to intervene, the remaining part of the proceedings continues (in the case of the dismissal of an application to intervene, the action is unaffected but the putative intervener is not able to participate in the proceedings). In the case of the dismissal of an application to intervene, a stay of the proceedings preserves the utility of the putative intervener’s application to intervene in the event that his appeal against the dismissal decision is upheld. In the other cases referred to above, the action could continue while the appeal was pending; but that might lead to a duplication in the time and trouble taken up with the case should the appeal be successful (for example, the action could continue until judgment in relation to Ground A but then have to be repeated in relation to Ground B, assuming the latter to be the ground disposed of earlier in the proceedings by the decision that has been the subject of a successful appeal). Where the CST has dismissed a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility concerning the action as a whole, the continuation of the proceedings would be otiose if the appeal against that decision were successful; but a stay of the action would unduly prolong the action if the appeal were unsuccessful. Stay is not, therefore, an inevitable consequence of the bringing of an appeal. Deciding whether or not to grant a stay turns on a number of different factors, which may include an assessment of the chances of success in the appeal. The CST could also stay the proceedings under RP-CST, art 42(1)(d) at the request of one or all of the parties or, under RP-CST, art 71(1)(e), in particular cases if the proper administration of justice so requires. Stay does not arise for consideration where the entire action is disposed of summarily, either on the ground of its inadmissibility (or for lack of competence) or because it is considered to be manifestly unfounded. Cases in which the CST proceedings were pending as at the date of the abolition of the CST (whether stayed or not as a result of the appeal) were to be transferred to the GC: Regulation 2016/1192, art 3. Stay as an alternative to interim relief would therefore be a matter for the GC. 856 RP-GC, art  156–161, which apply in the context of appeals from the CST under RP-GC, art 213(1). See further Ch 8.

304

General outline of procedure 2.233

6 Responses to the notice of appeal and cross-appeals 2.231 Any party to the proceedings before the CST having an interest in the appeal being allowed or dismissed may lodge a response to the notice of appeal within two months of service on him or her of that notice. That time limit cannot be extended.857 The response must set out: (1) the name and address of the respondent; (2) particulars of the status and address of the respondent’s representative; (3) the date on which notice of the appeal was served on the respondent; (4) the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on by the respondent; and (5) the form of order sought by the respondent.858 The response must comply with the normal rules applicable to pleadings and deal with the respondent’s service information and evidence of the entitlement to practise of the respondent’s lawyer in the same way as in the case of a notice of appeal.859 Originally, a response could seek to dismiss, in whole or in part, the appeal and/or set aside, in whole or in part, the decision of the CST under appeal; and cases decided under the pre2015 GC rules of procedure reflect that. Under the 2015 GC rules of procedure, a response is limited to seeking to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part.860 2.232 If a respondent wishes to have the CST’s decision set aside (in whole or in part) or wishes to have an express or implied decision of the CST on the admissibility of the action set aside, a cross-appeal must be lodged within the same time limit as that for the lodging of the response.861 A cross-appeal must be lodged as a document separate from the response; the two pleadings cannot be combined in one and the same pleading.862 The contents of a cross-appeal are the same as those of a response.863 The form of order in a cross-appeal seeks the setting aside of the decision of the CST in question (either the decision that is the subject of the appeal or an express or implied decision on the admissibility of the original action before the CST contained in the former decision).864 2.233 The relationship between a response and a cross-appeal is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 9 below. At this point, it suffices to note that a CST decision in an action could, for example, find the action to be admissible but unfounded or could find the action to be admissible on Ground A but not Ground 857 RP-GC, art 198. The time limit is automatically extended by 10 days on account of distance pursuant to RP-GC, art 60. 858 RP-GC, art 199(1). 859 RP-GC, art 199(2) cross-refers to RP-GC, art 194(3)–(6). 860 RP-GC, art 200. 861 RP-GC, art 202(1) and 204(1)–(2). 862 RP-GC, art 202(2). 863 Compare RP-GC, art 203 with RP-GC, art 199(1). As in the case of a notice of appeal (see RP-GC, art 195(2)), a cross-appeal must identify precisely the contested points in the CST’s decision; but the pleas and arguments in the cross-appeal must also be ‘separate’ from those relied on in the response: RP-GC, art  204(3). A  cross-appeal need not contain such matters as service details because they must in any event be provided in the response (it is therefore envisaged that, while a response may be lodged in the absence of a cross-appeal, a cross-appeal will always accompmay a response). 864 RP-GC, art 204(1)–(2).

305

2.234  General outline of procedure

B and unfounded on Ground X but not Ground Y. A responding party could be in a position in which it supported, or opposed, the appeal against the decision, in the sense that the responding party either disagreed or agreed with the end result produced by the CST’s decision; but the responding party might disagree with the reasoning of the CST that led to that result. In a response, a responding party either supports or opposes the appellant’s appeal. In a cross-appeal, a responding party goes further and opens up a different set of issues, from those raised in the appeal, which dispute all or part of the CST’s decision.865 2.234 A cross-appeal is not an independent appeal against the CST decision in question but is parasitic upon there being an appeal against that decision. Accordingly, a cross-appeal is deemed to be devoid of purpose if the appeal is discontinued or declared to be manifestly inadmissible because it is out of time or directed against a decision of the CST that is not an appealable decision.866 If the appeal is manifestly unfounded and can be dismissed summarily for that reason, it does not follow that the cross-appeal is devoid of purpose. If no response or cross-appeal at all is lodged, the proceedings continue. The rules relating to judgment by default do not apply.867 7 Subsequent pleadings 2.235 Where no cross-appeal is lodged, pleadings close with the lodging of the responses. Where a cross-appeal is lodged, the appellant and any other party to the appeal having an interest in doing so may lodge a response to the crossappeal as of right; the response must be lodged within two months of service of the cross-appeal and must be limited to responding to the pleas in law relied on in the cross-appeal.868 2.236 Where a response to a cross-appeal is lodged, pleadings close at that point, save that the cross-appellant may apply within seven days of service of that response on him for permission to supplement his cross-appeal by a reply. That application must be reasoned and explain why a reply is necessary. If the President of the GC considers that a reply is necessary, in particular in order to enable the cross-appellant to present his views on a plea of inadmissibility or on new matters raised in the response to the cross-appeal, the President fixes a date by which the reply is to be lodged. He may also limit the number of pages of the reply and the subject-matter of it. Where the President allows a reply to be lodged, that carries with it a right, on the part of the opposing party, to lodge a rejoinder in response to the reply. The President fixes the date for the lodgement 865 For that reason, a cross-appeal may accompany a response to an appeal but is not lodged without an accompanying response. 866 RP-GC, art 210. 867 RP-GC, art 213(1) does not incorporate RP-GC, art 123, which is the provision dealing with judgment by default. 868 RP-GC, art  205. Although the two-month period for lodging the response to a cross-appeal ‘shall not be extended’ (ibid), that time limit is automatically extended by 10 days on account of distance pursuant to RP-GC, art 60.

306

General outline of procedure 2.238

of the rejoinder and may limit its length and contents.869 Pleadings then close with the lodging of the rejoinder or with the waiver by the opposing party of the right to lodge a rejoinder. The same restrictions on the introduction of new pleas after the response(s) applies to replies and rejoinder as in a direct action.870 8 Intervention 2.237 Interveners in the proceedings before the CST are automatically parties to any appeal from the CST’s decision. However, in the event that a third party to the CST proceedings wishes to intervene in the appeal, the application to intervene must be lodged at the GC within one month of publication of the notice of the appeal in the Official Journal.871 9 Directions 2.238 The same rules concerning measures of organisation of procedure, joinder of cases, allocation of a case to a different formation (other than to a single judge), expediting cases, stay of proceedings, declining of jurisdiction and legal aid apply as in a direct action.872 However, enquiries into the facts and the evidence do not, in principle, arise because an appeal can be brought only on a point of law. Accordingly the provisions dealing with measures of enquiry do not apply in the context of an appeal. The preliminary report on the case drawn up for the benefit of the GC by the judge-rapporteur (and in which proposals for directions and the further conduct of the case may be made) is presented after the close of pleadings.873 An appeal or cross-appeal that is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, in whole or in part, may be disposed of (in its entirety or as to the relevant part) at any time in the proceedings by reasoned order.874 If the GC considers that an appeal or a cross-appeal is manifestly well-founded (which may arise where the GC has already ruled on one or more identical questions of law in a previous case), the GC may declare the appeal or cross-appeal to be manifestly well-founded by reasoned order but such a decision can be made only after hearing the parties.875 869 RP-GC, art 206. The seven-day time limit for applying for permission to lodge a reply, specified in RP-GC, art 205(1), is in principle extended by ten days on account of distance pursuant to RP-GC, art 60. It is not clear if it may also be extended on application. It is conceivable that an application for permission might have to be made orally over the telephone in view of the relatively short time limit for making the application unless an extension of the time limit were given (which one would assume would be done if the circumstances justified it). 870 RP-GC, art 213(1) incorporates RP-GC, art 84, which deals with new pleas. 871 RP-GC, art 213(2). The procedure for intervening is the same as in a direct action: see RP-GC, art 142–145, which apply pursuant to RP-GC, art 213(1). 872 RP-GC, art 213(1). See generally section IV.B, para 2.62 ff.above, mutatis mutandis. 873 RP-GC, art 87, which applies pursuant to RP-GC, art 213(1). 874 RP-GC, art  208. The GC acts on a proposal from the judge-rapporteur. Where there is an advocate general, he or she is heard beforehand: RP-GC, art 31(3). 875 RP-GC, art  209. The GC acts on a proposal from the judge-rapporteur. Where there is an advocate general, he or she is heard beforehand: RP-GC, art 31(3).

307

2.239  General outline of procedure

10 The oral procedure 2.239 After the close of pleadings, the GC may decide to dispense with the hearing and proceed directly to the judgment stage if it considers that it has sufficient information available to it from the case file to rule on the appeal. The GC so decides on the basis of a report from the judge-rapporteur and after having heard the advocate general (if there is one).876 There is no obligation to hear the parties before making such a decision. 2.240 Any of the parties may submit an application for a hearing. The application takes the form of a request made by the party applying to state its case at a hearing. The request must be reasoned and must be made within three weeks of notification to the party applying of the closure of the written procedure.877 The mere fact that such an application has been made does not oblige the GC to hold a hearing. It may evaluate the reasons given and the responses of the other parties and decide the matter for itself.878 Where the oral procedure is opened, the same rules apply as in a direct action.879 11 Judgment and its consequences 2.241 The same rules apply to the judgment stage as in a direct action, including the questions of costs, discontinuance, third party proceedings, revision and interpretation of judgments.880 If the appeal is well founded, the CST’s decision is quashed and the GC itself gives judgment on the matter. The matter is remitted to the CST (or, after 31 August 2016, to the GC as a first instance court) for decision only if the state of the proceedings before the GC is such that the GC cannot itself make a decision (as a court of appeal).881 The GC decides on costs when the appeal is unfounded or when it is founded and the GC itself gives judgment.882

876 RP-GC, art 207(2) and, for the advocate general, art 31(3). 877 RP-GC, art 207(1). The three-week period may be extended by the President and is in any event extended automatically on account of distance by the ten-day period provided for in RP-GC, art 60. 878 The position appears to be the same as under RP-ECJ, art 76, which is similarly worded. As to that, see the discussion in paras 2.111–2.113 above. 879 RP-GC, art 213(1) incorporates RP-GC, arts 107–115. See further paras 2.121–2.154 above, mutatis mutandis. 880 RP-GC, art  213(1) incorporates RP-GC, arts 125 (discontinuance), 164 (rectification), 165 (failure to adjudicate), 167 (third party proceedings), 168 (interpretation of judgments), 169 (revision) and 170 (disputes over costs). RP-GC, art 211(1) incorporates the costs regime in RP-GC, arts 133–141 subject to express provision otherwise in RP-GC, art  211(2)–(5). See further paras 2.155–2.169 above. Under RP-GC, art 213(3), the GC’s decision is notified to the ECJ (before the abolition of the CST, it was also notified to the CST). 881 Statute, Annex, art  13(1); Regulation 2016/1192, art  4. The GC’s curious role as a court of appeal and a court of first instance in staff cases is a temporary feature of the abolition of the CST, which prevents remission to the CST after 31 August 2016. 882 RP-GC, art 211(2).

308

General outline of procedure 2.242

EU institutions bear their own costs if they have brought the appeal.883 If not, the losing party may be ordered to pay the costs of an institution. In appeals brought by an official or other servant of an institution, the costs may be apportioned between the parties as equity requires rather than the unsuccessful party being ordered to bear all the costs.884 In the case of an intervener before the CST who is not also the appellant, costs cannot be awarded against him unless he participated in the written or oral part of the appeal procedure before the GC; where he has taken part in the appeal procedure, the GC may decide that he should bear his own costs.885

12 Remission to the first instance court 2.242 Where the matter is remitted to the first instance court (originally, the CST but, after 31  August 2016, a different chamber of the GC acting in the capacity of a court of first instance), the first instance court is, in formal terms, seised of jurisdiction over the case by the judgment of the GC886 and is bound by the decision of the GC on points of law.887 In the case of remission to the CST, the President of the CST assigns the case either to the formation of the CST that originally decided it or to another formation and designates a different judge to act as judge-rapporteur; but, if the formation that made the original decision was a single judge, the case is assigned to a three-judge chamber of which that judge is not a member.888 Whether remission is to the CST or (after 31 August 2016) to a different chamber of the GC, the parties to the appeal before the GC will have been served with the GC’s judgment by the GC in the normal way.889 In the case of remission to the CST, service triggers a two-month time limit for the submission of written observations by the applicant in the action on the points of law that justified setting aside the original CST decision and the referral of the case back to the CST; the defendant follows within one month of service on him or her of the applicant’s written observations; and the intervener may submit written observations one month after service on him or her of the applicant’s and

883 RP-GC, art 211(3). However, RP-GC, art 135(2) also applies. In consequence, the opposing party may be ordered to pay all or part of the institution’s costs if the conduct of the opposing party justifies the making of such an order. 884 RP-GC, art 211(4). 885 RP-GC, art 211(5). An intervener at first instance is automatically a party to the appeal but, if he has taken no part at all in the appeal proceedings, it seems wrong to include him in the costs award made when the appeal is decided. The position is different where he has taken part in the appeal proceedings. In that event, RP-GC, art 211(5) empowers the GC to decide that he should bear his own costs, without prejudice to applying any other rule relating to costs that might be more appropriate. 886 RP-CST, art 128. The same seems to apply (after 31 August 2016) to remission by the GC to a different chamber of the GC under Regulation 2016/1192, art 4. 887 Statute, Annex, art  13(2). In the case orf remission (after 31 August 2016) by the GC to a different chanber of the GC, the same occurs but, semble, by the force of res judicata. 888 RP-CST, art 129. 889 RP-GC, art 118(2), wich applies pursuant to RP-GC, art 213(1).

309

2.243  General outline of procedure

defendant’s written observations.890 Where (after 31 August 2016) remission is to a different chamber of the GC, the position appears to be the same as in the case of an appeal to the ECJ from a first instance decision of the GC, and the consequent remission of the case by the ECJ to the GC, which is considered in para 2.261 below. 2.243 If, on the other hand, the written procedure had not been completed when the GC’s judgment was delivered (as may happen where, for example, the original decision of the CST was on a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the action), proceedings are recommenced, at the stage they had then reached (in the case of remission to the CST, they would be continued by means of measures of organisation of procedure; in other words, the CST itself would determine how the remaining part of the written procedure was to be conducted).891 In principle, there is only one round of written observations but the Court may allow supplementary written observations to be lodged if the circumstances justify it.892 The remaining aspects of the procedure up to and including judgment are conducted in the same way as in an ordinary direct action save that, in the case of remission to the CST, with the agreement of the parties, the CST might decide to dispense with a hearing.893 At the end of the proceedings, when the Court gives judgment, it also decides on the costs, which cover both the costs incurred before it (before and after the appeal to the GC) and the costs of the appeal proceedings before the GC.894 Before the abolition of the CST, the judgment delivered on remission could be appealed to the GC in the same way as in any other situation; after the abolition of the CST, a judgment of the GC on remission from an appellate decision of the GC is appealable to the ECJ in the same way as any other decision of the GC.

B

Appeals from the GC to the ECJ

1 Scope of the right of appeal 2.244 An appeal may be brought before the ECJ as of right from the following first instance decisions of the GC by an unsuccessful party (including an intervener) or (save in staff cases and as the case may be) by a member state or EU institution which was not a party to the proceedings before the GC: (1) final decisions; (2) decisions disposing of the substantive issues in a case in part only;

890 RP-CST, art 130(1)–(3). The time allowed to the defendant to submit written observations can be no less than two months from service on him of the GC’s judgment: RP-CST, art 130(2), last sentence. 891 In the case of remission to the CST: RP-CST, art 130(4). In the case of remission to a different chamber of the GC, RP-GC, arts 217(2) and 218 appear to apply. 892 RP-GC, art 217(3); RP-CST, art 130(5). 893 RP-GC 218; RP-CST, art 130(6) and (8). 894 RP-GC 219; RP-CST, art 131.

310

General outline of procedure 2.246

(3) decisions disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility; (4) decisions dismissing an application to intervene; (5) decisions granting or refusing interim relief; (6) decisions granting or refusing a stay of enforcement of a decision of the Council or Commission.895 In the case of the decisions referred to in (1) to (3) above, an intervener other than a member state or EU institution may appeal only where the decision of the GC directly affects him or her.896 In the case of the decision referred to in (4), the appellant is necessarily the disappointed applicant to intervene.897 With the exception of the decisions referred to in (4) above, an appeal must be brought within two months of notification of the decision appealed against; in the case of the decisions referred to in (4) above, the period is two weeks.898 No appeal lies in respect of a decision of the GC concerning only the amount of the costs to be paid or the identity of the party ordered to pay them.899 2.245 The scope of the appeal is limited to points of law: (a) lack of competence of the GC; (b) breach of procedure before the GC which adversely affects the interests of the appellant;900 or (c) infringement of EU law by the GC.901 The appeal may seek to set aside the decision of the GC, in whole or in part, and the same form of order as that sought at first instance, in whole or in part; a different form of order cannot be claimed and the subject matter of the proceedings before the GC cannot be changed in the appeal.902 2 General nature of appeal proceedings 2.246 An appeal is conducted in a manner similar to a direct action: there is a written and an oral part (the latter may be dispensed with)903 and there may be the occasion for the making of various directions but there are no measures of enquiry because appeals are limited to questions of law. Appeals from decisions dismissing an application to intervene, decisions granting or refusing interim relief and decisions granting or refusing a stay of enforcement of a decision of 895 Statute, arts 56 and 57. An appeal does not lie against a decision not to join cases: Case C-248/99P France v Monsanto Co and Commission [2002] ECR I-1, para 46. 896 Statute, art 56, 2nd para. 897 Statute, art 57, 1st para. 898 Statute, art 56, 1st para; art 57, 1st and 2nd paras. 899 Statute, art 58 (last sentence). 900 The excessive duration of proceedings is a procedural irregularity that may ground an appeal if the appellant was adversely affected by it: eg  Case C-185/95P  Baustahlgewebe GmbH  v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paras 28–54. 901 Statute, art 58. As an appeal must be based on an error of law, it cannot contest the exercise by the GC of the latter’s unlimited jurisdiction on the ground of fairness: Case C-468/07P Coats Holdings Ltd v Commission [2008] ECR I-127*, paras 24–25. 902 RP-ECJ, art 169(1) and 170(1). 903 Statute, art 59.

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the Council or Commission are determined by the President of the ECJ by way of the summary procedure used for applications for interim relief made in the ECJ.904 3 Commencement of the appeal 2.247 An appeal is made by application to the ECJ; the application may be lodged at the Registry of either the ECJ or the GC.905 The appellant must be represented by an agent or, as the case may be, a lawyer, as in the case of direct actions.906 The application (referred to in the Rules of Procedure and hereafter as ‘the appeal’) must contain: (1) the name and address of the appellant; (2) a reference to the GC decision against which the appeal is made and the date on which that decision was notified to the appellant; (3) the names of the other parties to the proceedings before the GC; (4) the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on (and a summary thereof),907 which must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the GC decision which are contested; (5) where the appellant requests that the case be remitted to the GC (should the appeal be upheld), the reasons why the state of the proceedings does not permit the ECJ to decide the matter itself, instead of remitting it to the GC; (6) the form of order sought by the appellant.908 2.248 The question of the appellant’s service details is dealt with in the same way as in a direct action.909 An appeal must comply with the normal rules applicable to pleadings before the ECJ.910 Various documents must be attached to the appeal, including a copy of the decision appealed against,911 which need not be mentioned here. If the appeal is defective, the ECJ Registrar prescribes a reasonable time-limit within which the appeal is to be put in order; and the question whether or not the defect renders the appeal formally inadmissible is determined 904 Ibid, art 57, 3rd para (which cross-refers to art 39). 905 RP-ECJ, art 167(1). Where the application is lodged at the Registry of the GC, that Registry transmits it immediately to the Registry of the ECJ: RP-ECJ, art 167(2). 906 RP-ECJ, art 168(2), which applies RP-ECJ, art 119. 907 The summary is to assist the ECJ in drawing up the notice of the appeal that is published in the Official Journal. 908 RP-ECJ, art 168(1) and (3); RP-ECJ, art 169(2); RP-ECJ, art 170(2). 909 RP-ECJ, art 168(2) applies RP-ECJ, art 121. 910 RP-ECJ, art 57–58 apply by virtue of the fact that they are among the ‘common procedural provisions’ set out in Title II of the Rules of Procedure. For a fuller description of the pleading rules relating to appeals see Ch 9, para 9.111 ff. 911 RP-ECJ, art  168(2) applies RP-ECJ, art  122(1), which refers to ‘the documents specified in the second paragraph of Article  21 of the Statute’. That, in turn, refers to ‘the measure the annulment of which is sought’. Technically, that means the GC decision; but it could also be construed as the measure whose annulment is sought (in an annulment action).

312

General outline of procedure 2.250

only if the appeal is not corrected within that time-limit.912 The language of the appeal is that of the decision appealed against save that the ECJ may authorise use of another language in the same way as it does in direct actions, and member states are entitled to use their own official language.913 4 Handling of the appeal and summary dismissal 2.249 Notice of the appeal is served on all the parties to the proceedings before the GC, if necessary after the appeal has been put in order or declared admissible despite the existence of a formal defect.914 If the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, it may be dismissed (in whole or in relevant part) by reasoned order at any time. The Court so acts on the basis of a proposal from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general.915 The decision may be made after the lodgement of the appeal and before it is served on the other parties. 5 Interim relief 2.250 The making of the appeal does not have suspensory effect.916 Accordingly, in the case of an appeal against a procedural decision of the GC, the proceedings before the GC continue, and a final decision of the GC takes effect (and may be enforced), even if an appeal has been initiated.917 The only exception to that concerns decisions of the GC declaring a regulation to be void: such decisions take effect only as from the expiry of the period for appealing (in the event that no appeal is made) or from the date of dismissal of the appeal. Hence, a regulation declared void by the GC continues to have effect while an appeal against the GC’s decision is pending. A party may nonetheless apply for the suspension of the effects of the regulation by way of an application for interim relief made to the President of the ECJ in the same way as in a direct action.918 In any other circumstance in which interim relief is appropriate pending the outcome of the appeal, application may be made to the President of the ECJ for interim relief.919

912 RP-ECJ, art 168(4). 913 RP-ECJ, art 37(2)(a), which is without prejudice to RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b) and (c) and RP-ECJ, art 38(4) and (5). See further para 2.5 above. 914 RP-ECJ, art 171. 915 RP-ECJ, art 181. Eg Case C-118/12 P Enviro Tech Europe Ltd v Commission, 24 January 2013, para 22. 916 Statute, art 60, 1st para. 917 Where the proceedings before the GC are capable of continuing after the making of the decision appealed against, the GC may stay the proceedings before it pending the outcome of the appeal for that reason or if there is a joint request to do so from the parties or if the proper administration of justice would so require: see RP-GC, art 69(b)–(d). The position is essentially the same as in appeals from the CST to the GC: see note 855 above. 918 Ibid, art 60, 2nd para. 919 RP-ECJ, art 190(1) applies to appeals the interim relief rules in RP-ECJ, art 160–166.

313

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6 Responses to the appeal and cross-appeals 2.251 Within two months of service of the notice of appeal, any party to the proceedings before the GC which has an interest in doing so may lodge either a response to the appeal or a cross-appeal or both.920 A party lodging a response or cross-appeal must be represented by an agent or, as the case may be, a lawyer and the question of service information is dealt with in the same way as in a direct action.921 A response may seek to dismiss the appeal, in whole or in part.922 No other relief (apart from costs) can be sought in a response. A cross-appeal seeks the setting aside of the decision of the GC, in whole or in part (including the setting aside of any express or implied decision relating to the admissibility of the action before the GC).923 The response and cross-appeal are two separate pleadings. They cannot be combined into one pleading.924

920 RP-ECJ, art 172 and 176(1). The two-month time limit may not be extended; but that does not affect the automatic ten-day extension on account of distance provided for in RP-ECJ, art 51. Although RP-ECJ, art 176(1) does not refer to any ‘interest’ in cross-appealing, whereas RPECJ, art 172 does refer to a party having an ‘interest’ in the appeal being allowed or dismissed, the cross-reference in the former to ‘the parties referred to in Article  172’ implies that a party seeking to cross-appeal must have an interest in doing so. The ECJ’s explanatory notes accompanying the draft of the 2012 Rules of Procedure stated that the requirement that a party have an ‘interest’ was ‘intended, in essence, to prevent challenges to decisions of the General Court by strangers to the case, where the decision has been accepted, albeit implicitly, by the main parties’ (commentary on what was then the draft RP-ECJ, art 174). The text as adopted suggests that ‘interest’ is simply the conventional legal or legitimate interest in advancing a case. 921 RP-ECJ, art 173(2) and 177(2), which apply RP-ECJ, art 119 and 121. The fact that a crossappeal must duplicate matters found in a response (the representative’s authority to act and, where relevant, certificate of entitlement to practice; service information) suggests that, in the mind of the draftsman of the ECJ rules of procedure, a cross-appeal may be lodged instead of a response. 922 RP-ECJ, art 174. 923 RP-ECJ, art 176(1) and 178(1)–(2). For the sake of clarity on the point, the ability to seek the setting aside of an express or implied admissibility decision covers two different situations. The first is that where admissibility has been decided (expressly) in an earlier GC decision made in the course of the action before the GC. The second is that where admissibility was decided expressly or by implication in the GC decision appealed by the appellant. Where admissibility has been decided expressly in the same GC decision as the one appealed by the appellant, there is no need for special provision enabling another party to cross-appeal on the admissibility point. Special provision is justified where, before the decision appealed by the appellant was made, the GC made a separate, express decision on admissibility (that decision may not have been appealed on the ground that, until the merits of the action had been determined, there was no legal interest in appealing it). An implied decision on admissibility is harder to identify. Normally, admissibility must be disputed and, in that event, will be the subject of an express ruling. If it is not disputed, there is no ruling on admissibility, whether express or implied, and it is difficult to see how the point could be raised on appeal where it had not been raised at first instance. It may be that what is envisaged is a situation in which the GC proceeds on the assumption that the action is admissible (and then dismisses the action on the merits). 924 RP-ECJ, art 176(2). The relationship between a response and a cross-appeal is discussed further in Ch 15.

314

General outline of procedure 2.253

2.252 The required contents of a response and a cross-appeal are the same;925 and each must comply with the normal rules applicable to pleadings before the ECJ.926 Each must set out: (1) the name and address of the party submitting it; (2) the date on which the appeal was served on that party; (3) the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on (in the case of a cross-appeal, the contested points in the grounds of the GC decision must be identified precisely);927 (4) the form of order sought.928 2.253 In the case of a cross-appeal (but not, apparently, in the case of a response), the cross-appeal must be accompanied (where appropriate) by ‘the measure the annulment of which is sought’ or, as the case may be, by documentary evidence of the date on which the EU institution in question was requested to act (in an action in respect of a failure to act); and, if the cross-appeal is defective in that respect, the ECJ Registrar prescribes a reasonable time-limit within which the cross-appeal is to be put in order. The question whether or not the defect renders the cross-appeal formally inadmissible is determined only if the cross-appeal is not corrected within that time-limit.929 If a cross-appeal is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded (whether as a whole or in part), it may be dismissed by reasoned order (as a whole or in the relevant part).930 If no response to the appeal and no cross-appeal is lodged, the proceedings continue nonetheless.931

925 RP-ECJ, art 173(1) and 177(1). 926 RP-ECJ, art 57–58 apply by virtue of the fact that they are among the ‘common procedural provisions’ set out in Title II of the Rules of Procedure. For a fuller description of the pleading rules relating to appeals see Ch 9, para 9.111 ff. 927 RP-ECJ, art 178(3), which also provides that the pleas in law and arguments in the cross-appeal must be ‘separate’ from those in the response. That appears to mean that, where both a response and a cross-appeal are submitted, each should be a self-contained document with no part of one of them incorporated only by cross-reference in the other. Further the occasion for lodging a separate cross-appeal will ordinarily arise only where the arguments for setting aside the decision of the GC are distinct from those advanced in order to support or oppose the appeal. 928 The content of the form of order would, of course, differ as between a response and a crossappeal: allowing or dismissing the appeal, in the case of a response; setting aside the GC decision, in the case of a cross-appeal. 929 RP-ECJ, art 177(2), which applies RP-ECJ, art 122(1) and (3). As noted above (note 911), ‘the measure the annulment of which is sought’ is, technically, the GC decision; but it could also be construed as the measure whose annulment is sought (in an annulment action). In either event, the ‘appropriateness’ of annexing such documents is doubtful and the value of the crossreference to RP-ECJ, art 122 is unclear. 930 RP-ECJ, art 181. 931 RP-ECJ, art  190(1) does not incorporate RP-ECJ, art  152, which deals with judgment by default.

315

2.254  General outline of procedure

7 Subsequent pleadings 2.254 Where there is no cross-appeal, the appeal and the response may be supplemented by a reply and a rejoinder, on a reasoned application made to the President of the ECJ by the appellant within seven days of the service of the response, should the President think it necessary.932 Where a cross-appeal is submitted, the appellant and any other party to the proceedings before the GC having an interest in the cross-appeal being allowed or dismissed may submit a response limited to the pleas in law relied on in the cross-appeal (that response must be submitted within two months of service of the cross-appeal).933 The situation may therefore be that if (for example, the GC proceedings involved four parties (A, B, C and D) and A appealed, B submitted a response and C submitted a cross-appeal but D did nothing, as there was a cross-appeal, A (as the appellant) would be able to respond to the cross-appeal as of right and B and D could do so if they had an interest in the cross-appeal being allowed or dismissed. D could also do so despite the fact that he had not participated in the appeal hitherto. The cross-appeal and the response thereto may be supplemented by a reply and a rejoinder on the same grounds and in the same way as in the case of a reply and rejoinder to a response to an appeal (save that the application to submit a further pleading must be made by the party who brought the cross-appeal).934 Where the President permits the submission of a reply (either in order to respond to a response or in order to respond to a cross-appeal), he fixes the date by which the reply is to be submitted and, after service of the reply, fixes the date by which the rejoinder is to be submitted (he may limit the number of pages and subject-matter of either pleading).935 The same restrictions on the introduction of new pleas in law apply as in a direct action.936 8 Intervention 2.255 Interveners in the proceedings before the GC are automatically parties to the appeal and may lodge a response to the appeal (or a cross-appeal) if they are not an appellant.937 Persons who were not parties to the proceedings before the GC may intervene in the appeal proceedings on the same basis as in a direct 932 RP-ECJ, art 175(1). The President makes his decision after hearing the judge rapporteur and the advocate general. RP-ECJ, art 175(1) singles out, as instances of ‘necessity’, the need for the appellant to respond to a plea of inadmissibility or a new matter relied on in the response. If the appellant is permitted to submit a reply, the opposing party automatically has the right to submit a rejoinder. On the absence of a right to lodge a reply, see Case C-291/98P Sarrio SA v Commission [2000] ECR I-1213, paras 7–8. 933 RP-ECJ, art 179. The two-month period cannot be extended but benefits from the automatic ten-day extension, on account of distance, provided for in RP-ECJ, art 51. It should be noted that RP-ECJ, art 179 entitles ‘the applicant at first instance or any other party’ to respond to the cross-appeal. The ‘applicant at first instance’ means the appellant, not the applicant in the proceedings before the GC. On the question of ‘interest’, see note 920 above. 934 RP-ECJ, art 180(1), which is in the same terms as RP-ECJ, art 175(1). 935 RP-ECJ, art 175(2) and 180(2). 936 RP-ECJ, art 190(1) applies RP-ECJ, art 127. 937 Statute, art 56, 2nd para; cf RP-ECJ, art 172.

316

General outline of procedure 2.258

action but the application to intervene must be lodged within one month of publication in the Official Journal of the notice of the appeal.938 9 Directions 2.256 The rules relating to the application of time-limits,939 dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction or manifest inadmissibility or by reason of an absolute bar,940 giving a case priority, staying the proceedings or deferral of a decision,941 joinder,942 the presentation by the judge-rapporteur of the preliminary report on the case and assignment of cases to a formation,943 the grant of anonymity,944 expedition,945 amicable settlement, discontinuance and cases not proceedings to judgment946 apply in the same way as in a direct action or (in relation to anonymity) a reference for a preliminary ruling. The rules relating to preparatory enquiries do not apply as a matter of principle because the appeal can relate only to matters of law, not matters of fact. Specific provision is made for the grant of legal aid in the context of an appeal.947 2.257 As in the case of appeals from the CST to the GC, where the appellant discontinues the appeal or the appeal is declared to be manifestly inadmissible for non-compliance with the time-limit for lodging an appeal or on the ground that it is not directed against a final decision of the GC or a decision disposing of the substantive issues in part only, or disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility, any cross-appeal is deemed to be devoid of purpose and would be dismissed for that reason.948 2.258 Where an appeal or cross-appeal is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, it may be dismissed (in its entirety or as to the relevant part) by reasoned order at any time. Where an appeal or cross-appeal is manifestly well-founded (because the ECJ has previously ruled on the same questions of law in another case), the ECJ may declare by reasoned order that the appeal or

938 RP-ECJ, art 190(1) (which applies RP-ECJ, art 129–132) and RP-ECJ, art 190(2). 939 RP-ECJ, art 49–52 (applied by virtue of the fact that provisions in Title II are common to all procedures before the ECJ save where there is express provision otherwise). 940 RP-ECJ, art 53(2) and 150, the latter applied by RP-ECJ, art 190(1). Those provisions need to be read alongside RP-ECJ, art 181, which applies where an appeal or cross-appeal is manifestly inadmissible or unfounded. 941 RP-ECJ, art 53(3), 55 and 56. 942 RP-ECJ, art 54. 943 RP-ECJ, art 59 and 60. 944 RP-ECJ, art 95, applied mutatis mutandis by RP-ECJ, art 190(3). One would ordinarily suppose that, if anonymity were appropriate, it would already have been granted by the GC. 945 RP-ECJ, art 133–136, applied by RP-ECJ, art 190(1). 946 RP-ECJ, art 147–149, applied by RP-ECJ, art 190(1). 947 RP-ECJ, art 185–189. See further Ch 4 section V, para 4.80 ff. 948 RP-ECJ, art 183.

317

2.259  General outline of procedure

cross-appeal is manifestly well-founded; but such a decision can be made only after hearing the parties.949 10 Oral procedure 2.259 After the close of pleadings, the same rules regarding the conduct of the proceedings and, in particular, the oral part of the procedure, apply as in a direct action.950 Waiving the right to request permission to lodge a reply does not engage any right to a hearing and proper reasons must be given why a hearing is sought.951 11 Judgment and its consequences 2.260 The rules applicable to the judgment stage,952 rectification of a judgment, failure to adjudicate, third party proceedings, interpretation and revision of judgments953 are the same as those in a direct action. If the appeal is well founded the ECJ quashes (or sets aside) the decision of the GC and either gives final judgment itself or else refers the case back to the GC for judgment.954 Where the appeal was brought by a member state or EU institution which was not a party to the proceedings before the GC (even as an intervener) and is upheld, the ECJ may, if necessary, state which of the effects of the decision appealed against is to be considered as definitive as between the parties to the litigation.955 The costs rules that apply are the same as those in a direct action.956 Where the result of the appeal is to terminate the proceedings (that is, where the appeal is unfounded or well founded and the ECJ itself gives final judgment), the ECJ decided on costs.957 Where a successful appeal has been brought by a member state or EU institution that was not an intervener in the proceedings before the GC (or, by implication, not otherwise a party to the proceedings before the GC), the ECJ may order that the parties share the costs or that the successful appellant pay the costs which the appeal has caused an unsuccessful party to incur.958 Where the appeal has not been brought by an intervener in the proceedings before the GC, such an intervener may not be ordered to pay costs in the appeal proceedings

949 RP-ECJ, art 181 and 182. In both instances, the ECJ acts on the basis of a proposal from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general. 950 RP-ECJ, art 53(1) and 76–85 (which apply because Title II applies generally to proceedings before the ECJ). See further the discussion in paras 2.111–2.113 and 2.121–2.154 above. 951 See the Sarrio case (above, note 932), paras 9–11. 952 RP-ECJ, art 86–92. 953 RP-ECJ, art 154–155 and 157–159, applied by RP-ECJ, art 190(1). See further section IV.D, para 2.155 ff above. 954 Statute, art 61, 1st para. 955 Ibid, 3rd para. 956 RP-ECJ, art 137–146, applied by RP-ECJ, art 184(1). See further Ch 14. 957 RP-ECJ, art 184(2). 958 RP-ECJ, art 184(3).

318

General outline of procedure 2.262

unless he has participated in the written or oral part of the appeal proceedings; if he has done so, he may be ordered to bear his own costs.959 12 Remission to the GC 2.261 If the case is referred back to the GC, the GC is bound by the decision of the ECJ on the points of law decided in the appeal.960 The proceedings before the GC recommence at the point that they had reached when the decision appealed against was made.961 The procedure before the GC is essentially the same as that before the CST when a case is remitted to it by the GC: where the decision appealed to the ECJ was made after the written procedure before the GC had closed, the parties have two months in which to submit written observations on the ECJ’s judgment before the proceedings are resumed; where the written procedure had not yet been closed, proceedings are resumed at the point that they had reached when the decision appealed against was made.962

C

Review of appellate decisions of the GC963

2.262 Decisions of the GC on appeal from decisions of judicial panels (of which, at the time of writing, only one, the CST, existed) may exceptionally be subject to review by the ECJ where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of EU law being affected by the decision of the GC in question. The conditions and limits of that review by the ECJ are laid down by the Statute. Thus far, the case law indicates that the review procedure does not apply to incorrect GC decisions but only to those incorrect decisions that affect the unity or consistency of EU law.964 Factors that may indicate that an incorrect decision affects the unity or consistency of EU law include: the fact that the GC decision could constitute a precedent for future cases; the fact that the GC judgment departs from the established case law of the ECJ; the fact that the error in the GC decision is of general application and not limited to the particular situation contemplated by the GC decision; the importance of the rule of law that has been misapplied.965 On the other hand, a review is not justified where: the ECJ is being asked to rule on the

959 RP-ECJ, art 184(4). 960 Statute, art 61, 1st para. 961 Eg Case T-509/93 Glencore Grain Ltd v Commission [2000] ECR II-3697, para 13. 962 See paras 2.242–2.243 above and, for greater detail, Ch 15; RP-GC, arts 215–219. The main difference between the procedure on remission to the GC and the procedure on remission to the CST is that the allocation of the case to a formation of the GC is more complex because of the different structure of formations of the GC. 963 See further Ch 15. 964 Case C-197/09  RX-II  M  v European Medicines Agency [2009]  ECR  I-12033, paras 5–6 of Advocate General Mazak’s Opinion (p 12045) and, by implication, para 60 of the judgment (p 12069). 965 M v European Medicines Agency (above, note 964), paras 60–66 of the judgment (pp 12069– 12070).

319

2.263  General outline of procedure

correctness of an evolution in the case law of the GC; the ECJ has not yet ruled on such an evolution.966 1 Commencement of review proceedings 2.263 Review proceedings may be commenced only if, within one month of delivery of the decision of the GC in question, the First Advocate General of the ECJ submits to the ECJ a proposal that the ECJ review the decision.967 In order to make such a proposal, the First Advocate General must consider that the decision poses a serious risk of adversely affecting the unity or consistency of EU law.968 If no proposal is made, matters end there. If the First Advocate General makes the proposal, it is sent to the President of the ECJ and to the President of a fivejudge chamber designated each year to decide whether or not GC decisions are to be reviewed.969 Acting on a proposal from the President of that chamber, the President of the ECJ designates a judge from that chamber to act as judge rapporteur.970 Within one month of receiving the proposal, the ECJ (that is, the reviewing chamber) must decide whether or not the decision should be reviewed.971 No provision is made for hearing the views of the parties before the ECJ makes that decision. 2.264 If the ECJ decides that the GC decision satisfies the criterion for commencing the review proceedings, the First Advocate General assigns the review to an advocate general.972 The decision to review a GC decision is a formal, reasoned decision identifying the question(s) of law arising from the decision that meet(s) the criterion for commencing review proceedings.973

966 Case C-17/11RX Commission v Petrilli, 8 February 2011, para 4. 967 The GC Registry informs the ECJ Registry of the date fixed for the delivery or signature of every GC decision to which the review procedure may apply; and, when the decision has been delivered or signed, it is sent immediately to the ECJ Registry, together with the file of the case, both of which are then made available forthwith by the ECJ  Registry to the First Advocate General: RP-ECJ, art 192 (and note also RP-GC, art 213(3)). 968 Statute, art 62. 969 RP-ECJ, art 193(1) and 191. The file in the case is also sent to the reviewing chamber: RP-ECJ, art 193(2). 970 RP-ECJ, art 193(3). 971 Statute, art 62, last sentence. The chamber acts on a proposal from the judge rapporteur: RPECJ, art 193(4). 972 RP-ECJ, art 195(3). 973 Thus, Statute, art  62a provides that the ECJ ‘shall give a ruling on the questions which are subject to review’, implying that it is not necessarily the decision (that is, the order or judgment) of the GC that is itself subject to review. RP-ECJ, art 193(4) specifies that a decision to review a GC decision must indicate ‘only’ the questions which are to be reviewed. For an example of the ECJ’s approach, see M v European Medicines Agency (above, note 964) at pp 12037–12043 (the decision ordering the review).

320

General outline of procedure 2.267

2 Written procedure 2.265 When review proceedings are commenced, the ECJ notifies the persons entitled to participate in the written procedure, informs them of the questions that are subject to review and sets a period within which those persons must submit their written observations.974 Notification takes the form of service on them of the decision to review the GC decision (the GC is also informed); and the period within which written observations are to be served is one month.975 The persons entitled to lodge statements or written observations are: the parties to the proceedings before the GC; member states; the Commission; the Council, the Parliament and the European Central Bank if the validity or interpretation of an act adopted by any of them is in issue; EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, if the questions under review impinge upon any field relevant to the EEA Agreement.976 Express provision is made for service of a translation of the GC decision on only: members states; EEA states; and the EFTA Surveillance Authority.977 The language of the review proceedings is the language of the GC decision that is the subject of the review, save that the ECJ may authorise use of another language at the joint request of the parties or at the request of one of them, member states may use their own language, and EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority may use any one of the Court’s procedural languages.978 There is no provision for a second round of pleadings. 3 Interim relief 2.266 The initiation of the review procedure does not suspend the operation of the GC decision under review. If necessary, an application for interim relief can be made to the President of the ECJ in the normal way.979 4 Intervention 2.267 No provision is made for intervention by third parties in review proceedings.

974 Statute, art 62a, 2nd para. The notification of those persons is implicit. 975 RP-ECJ, art  195(1)–(2). RP-ECJ, art  193(5) provides that the GC, the parties to the GC proceedings and the interested persons referred to in Statute, art 62a, 2nd sentence, are to be ‘informed’ of the decision to review the GC decision (under RP-ECJ, art 193(6), the date of that decision and the questions to be reviewed are published in the Official Journal). 976 Statute, art 62a, 2nd para. 977 RP-ECJ, art 195(1). 978 RP-ECJ, art 37(2)(b), which is without prejudice to RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b) and (c) and RP-ECJ, art 38(4) and (5). See further para 2.5 above. 979 Statute, art 62b, 1st para.

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2.268  General outline of procedure

5 Directions 2.268 The review of an appellate decision of the GC is to be conducted by means of an ‘urgent procedure’ on the basis of the GC’s case file, which is forwarded to the ECJ.980 Given the nature of review proceedings, there seems little need for directions other than, possibly, directions concerning joinder of similar cases or, in a case of exceptional difficulty, for the case to be reassigned to a formation composed of a greater number of judges.981 6 Oral procedure 2.269 The Statute provides that the ECJ ‘may’ open the oral procedure before giving a ruling on the questions under review.982 If there is an oral procedure, it is conducted as in the case of a direct action.983 7 The ruling and its consequences 2.270 The ECJ rules on the substance of the case after hearing the advocate general.984 The ruling finds that each question under review does or does not affect (adversely) the unity or consistency of EC law. If an adverse effect is found, the ECJ declares what the law, correctly understood, is. If the ECJ finds that the GC decision is in all material respects correct, nothing further happens. If, on the other hand, the ECJ finds that all or part of the GC decision is incorrect, the ECJ can itself set aside the GC decision and give final judgment in the case only if the conclusion in the case follows automatically from the findings of fact on which the GC’s judgment was based as seen in the light of the ECJ’s ruling on the law. Otherwise, the ECJ sets aside the GC decision and remits the case to the GC, stating (where appropriate) which of the effects of the GC decision are to be considered definitive so far as the parties to the case are concerned. The GC is bound by the points of law decided by the ECJ when the case is remitted to it.985

980 Statute, art 62a, 1st para. 981 RP-ECJ, art 195(5). 982 Statute, art 62a, 3rd para. Title VI of the ECJ Rules of Procedure, which deals with reviews, is silent on the point, possibly because it was felt that Title II (common procedural provisions) applied. In Title II, RP-ECJ, art 76–81 cover hearings and are dealt with at para 2.107 ff above. 983 See para  2.127 ff above. No hearing seems to have been held in M  v European Medicines Agency (above, note 964). 984 RP-ECJ, art 195(4). It follows that the oral part of the procedure (which normally consists of a hearing and the delivery of an advocate general’s opinion) cannot be dispensed with in its entirety. 985 Statute, art 62b, 1st para. For example, see M v European Medicines Agency (above, note 964), paras 67–71 (pp 12070–12071); Case T-12/08 P-RENV-RX M v European Medicines Agency [2010] ECR II-3735 (the decision made by the GC in response to the remission of the case to it by the judgment in Case C-197/09 RX-II M v European Medicines Agency).

322

General outline of procedure 2.271

It has been held that all parties to the review proceedings should bear their own costs.986 8 Remission to the GC 2.271 As in the case of an appeal, when the result of a review is that the case is referred back to the GC, the latter is seised of the case by the ECJ’s judgment.987 Where the case was originally heard by the Grand Chamber of the GC, it is assigned to that chamber; where the case was originally heard by another chamber, the President of the GC may assign it either to that other chamber or to another chamber having the same number of judges.988 The ECJ’s judgment will have been served on the parties to the original case by the ECJ.989 They then have one month after service on them to lodge written observations on the conclusions to be drawn from the review for the outcome of the proceedings.990 There is no right to a second round of pleadings. Instead, the GC has a discretionary power to invite the making of further written submissions by way of measure of organisation of procedure; the GC may also decide to hear the parties’ oral submissions but is not obliged to do so.991 The GC then decides the matter before it and rules on the costs; but its ruling on costs is limited to the costs of the proceedings insti-

986 M v European Medicines Agency (above, note 964), paras 72–73 (p 12071). That conclusion appears to have been based on the fact that RP-ECJ, art 123e, as it was at the time (now RPECJ, art 195(6)), which simply provides that, in the case of the review of appellate decisions of the GC, the ECJ ‘shall make a decision as to costs’, set out no specific rule governing how costs are to be awarded. However, the correct interpretation of what is now RP-ECJ, art 195(6) is that costs are within the discretion of the Court. If the rule was that each party bore its own costs, RP-ECJ, art 195(6) would be redundant. In Case T-12/08 P-RENV-RX M v European Medicines Agency (above, note 985), the GC remitted the case to the CST and reserved the costs. 987 RP-GC, art 220. 988 RP-GC, art 221. 989 That follows from RP-ECJ, art 88(2). The assumption made in RP-GC, art 220 and 222(1) is that the ECJ’s review decision takes the form of a judgment. In fact, the Statute, art 62b, 1st para, refers to the ECJ giving judgment only when, having regard to the result of the review, the outcome of the proceedings before the GC flows from the findings of fact made by the GC. In that event, the ECJ gives ‘final judgment’ in the case. The ECJ’s rules of procedure do not specify that the result of the review must be expressed in the form of a judgment; but that is the sensible interpretation and seems to be the practice that is followed. 990 RP-GC, art  222(1). In Case T-12/08  P-RENV-RX  M  v European Medicines Agency (above, note 985), para 29, the Registrar of the GC took the initiative by writing to the parties inviting them to lodge their written observations within one month of service of the ECJ’s judgment. The one-month period may not be extended but benefits from the automatic ten-day extension of time, on account of distance, provided for in RP-GC, art 60. As can be seen from paras 31–32 of the judgment in Case T-12/08 P-RENV-RX M v European Medicines Agency, legal aid may be granted at the stage of the remission of the case to the GC. 991 RP-GC, art 222(2).

323

2.272  General outline of procedure

tuted before it (the appeal to the GC).992 The fact that the GC rules on the matter before it does not mean that it gives final judgment in the case; it may find that it is necessary to remit the matter to the first instance court.993

D

Review of preliminary rulings made by the GC

2.272 Where the GC is given jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings under TFEU, art 267 (which was not the case at the time of writing), its decisions may exceptionally be subject to review by the ECJ where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of EU law being affected by the decision (the conditions and limits under which such review may be carried out are to be laid down by the Statute).994 The procedure followed is the same as that for reviews of appellate decisions of the GC995 save that it is expressly provided that, in the absence of any proposal made by the First Advocate General for the review of the GC’s decision or in the absence of a decision of the ECJ opening the review procedure, the preliminary ruling given by the GC shall take effect only upon the expiry of the period fixed for proposing a review or, as the case may be, for deciding on such a proposal when made. If the review procedure is opened, the ruling given by the GC takes effect (if at all) only when that procedure has come to an end. For that reason, where the First Advocate General proposes a review, the GC, the referring court, the parties to the main proceedings and all those entitled to submit written observations are duly informed by the ECJ’s Registrar.996 If the ECJ finds that the ruling of the GC affects the unity and consistency of EU law, the answer given by the ECJ to the questions subject to review is substituted for the answer given by the GC.997

992 RP-GC, art  223. In Case T-12/08  P-RENV-RX  M  v European Medicines Agency (above, note 985), costs were reserved. It seems that that was so because the GC could not give final judgment but had to remit the matter to the CST. On that basis, presumably, the costs of the proceedings before the GC would be determined by the GC in the light of the CST’s judgment. In an appeal, when a matter is remitted to the first instance court, that court decides on the costs of the proceedings before it and the appeal proceedings: see RP-GC, art  219 and RPCST, art 131. It is not clear why the same would not apply in the situation that arose in Case T-12/08 P-RENV-RX M v European Medicines Agency. 993 As happened in Case T-12/08 P-RENV-RX M v European Medicines Agency (above, note 985). 994 TFEU, art 256(3). 995 See Statute, arts 62 and 62a. RP-ECJ, art 191–192 and 195 apply to the review of preliminary rulings delivered by the GC in the same way as they do to the review of appellate decisions of the GC. RP-ECJ, art 194 replicates RP-ECJ, art 193 with the exception of RP-ECJ, art 194(3). RP-GC, art 220–223 appear to apply generally to the remission of the case to the GC, whether as a result of a review of an appellate decision of the GC or as a result of a review of a preliminary ruling delivered by the GC. However, RP-GC, art  223 (which deals with costs) would be inappropriate in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling. 996 RP-ECJ, art 194(3). 997 Statute, art 62b, 2nd para.

324

Chapter 3

Parties

I INTRODUCTION 3.1 The notion of a ‘party’ to legal proceedings can be defined in a substantive sense, as an entity benefiting from or burdened with the rights and obligations at issue in the proceedings, or in a strictly procedural sense, as an entity entitled to participate in the proceedings but not necessarily one subject to the rights and obligations which are at stake in them. In references for a preliminary ruling, there are no parties in the first sense:1 those persons who are parties to the proceedings before the referring court are entitled to submit observations in the preliminary ruling proceedings (as also are the member states, the Commission, the EU institution, body, office or agency that adopted the act whose interpretation or validity is in issue, and, where appropriate, the EEA states, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and any non-member state entitled to submit written observations)2 in order to assist the Court3 in the discharge of its part of the dialogue between it and the referring court initiated by the making of the reference, rather than for the purpose of determining any rights or obligations of the parties. This chapter is concerned primarily with the position in direct actions, where there are parties in both senses.4 The Treaties define, in relation to each proceeding before the Court, the class of persons who may be applicant or defendant in them. For example, only the Commission can be an applicant in proceedings under TFEU, art 258 and only a member state can be a defendant.5 In direct actions, the only party other than the applicant or defendant is the 1 Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v X [1987] ECR 2545 at 2559 (Advocate General Mancini). 2 Statute, art 23. 3 At the time of writing, only the ECJ heard and determined references for a preliminary ruling but jurisdiction over such proceedings could be extended to the GC. 4 On the subject of parties in proceedings before the Court, see Monaco in Il Processo Internazionale (1975), vol XIV, Studi in onore di G Morrelli, p 563. 5 In proceedings under TFEU, art 263, as originally worded, only the Council and the Commission were envisaged as capable of being a defendant while the applicant might be either a member state, the Council, the Commission or ‘any natural or legal person’. The ECJ extended the class of defendants to the European Parliament (see Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paras 23–25) and to the Court of Auditors (see Cases 193 and 194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989] ECR 1045, para 42). What is now TFEU, art 263 was later amended so as to formalise its extension to the Parliament and so as to include the European Council, the European Central Bank and bodies, offices and agencies of the EU as potential defendants. The Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank and the Committee of the Regions were also included as potential applicants.

325

3.2  Parties

intervener, who acts in defence of an interest in the proceedings and not in order to vindicate a right.6 All those parties (applicant, defendant and intervener) can be said to possess a right to participate in proceedings but there is an additional requirement before a party can act in proceedings: he must have the capacity to exercise the right to participate in them.7 In broad terms, under the Treaties, the persons or entities who may be parties in proceedings can be said to fall into four categories: states (member states, EEA states and states that are neither member states nor EEA states – third countries); the EU or EAEC (formerly, the Communities); EU institutions and related entities; other persons or bodies.

II

MEMBER STATES, EEA STATES AND THIRD COUNTRIES

3.2 No difficulties arise over the right to be a party or the capacity to exercise that right so far as states (whether member states or EEA states) are concerned. States are readily identifiable and, where not specifically mentioned in the Treaties (as is the case of third countries), they are also comprised in the expression ‘natural or legal person’ or ‘person’.8 However, there may be a question about who should represent one of those states in proceedings. In EU law, a member state is to be understood as comprising not only the organs of central government but also the organs of local government and all branches of the legislature, executive, judiciary and administration, so far as the application of EU law to and in the member states is concerned; but, for procedural purposes, 6 The position of interveners is discussed in detail in Ch 5 below. A person cannot appear as a party but purport to act in the proceedings as an intervener: see Case T-304/01 Abad Perez v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-4857, paras 48–55 (hence, in that case, the entities in question had to meet the criteria for participating in the proceedings as a party, not as an intervener). 7 The difference can be seen in, for example, Case 135/81 Groupement des Agences de Voyage Asbl v Commission [1982] ECR 3799. 8 See, for example, Cases 7 and 9/54 Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 222, where the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was allowed to intervene under art 34 of the ECSC Statute, which provided that ‘natural or legal persons’ may intervene; Case T-319/05 Swiss Confederation v Commission [2010]  ECR II-4265 (on appeal, Case C-547/10P, 7 March 2013), an action brought by a third country; Case T-578/12 National Iranian Oil Co v Council, 16 July 2014, para 36 (third countries and emanations of such states entitled to bring proceedings; not discussed in the appeal, Case C-440/14 P National Iranian Oil Company v Council, 1 March 2016). The Swiss Confederation case had started life as Case C-70/04 and had been transferred to the GC by the ECJ by order dated 14 July 2005 (unreported). There was some debate about the procedural status of the Swiss Confederation because it was treated as a member state under EU air transport legislation. However, in Case T-319/05 Swiss Confederation v Commission [2006]  ECR II-2073, para  21, its procedural status was regarded as that of a legal person, not a member state. In Case T-257/04 Poland v Commission [2009] ECR II-1545, paras 48 and 51–62, it was pointed out that Poland could have commenced an action for the annulment of a Commission regulation, adopted before Poland acceded to the EU, in its capacity as a legal person (however, see Case C-336/09P  Poland v Commission, 26 June 2012, in which it was held that a newly acceding member state was entitled to bring an action for annulment in its capacity as a member state only once it had acceded to the EU and that time for commencing proceedings would run from then).

326

Parties 3.2

references to ‘the member states’ are to be understood as references to the government authorities of the member states of the EU.9 Hence, where the phrase ‘member state’ appears in the context of the identification of a party to proceedings, that phrase is to be understood as referring to the government authorities of the member state; or, to put it another way, member states normally appear as parties in proceedings before the Court through their government authorities. Entities that under national law may have legal personality distinct from that of the state in question may nonetheless be regarded as part of the state for the purposes of EU law and, in particular, the procedure before the Court. Thus, in Case 282/85 Comité de Développement et de Protection du Textile et de ‘Habillement (DEFI) v Commission10 the ECJ held that a body whose tasks were entrusted to it by a member state and whose management and policies and the interests to be protected by it were defined by the state did not represent an interest distinct from the state and so did not have a separate right of action. That principle seems to apply only where in a particular case the member state itself is implicated, as where the Commission adopts a decision addressed to a member state that concerns the activities of an entity that is regarded by EU law as forming part of the state. Where the Commission addresses a decision to a member state, it is possible for a state entity to be directly and individually concerned by the decision and therefore to be able to bring proceedings.11 On the other hand, where the contested act is addressed to an entity regarded as forming part of the state, an action against that act can be brought either by that entity or by the member state itself (but not by both). If an action is brought by the entity, a question may arise as to whether or not the entity appears before the Court as a member state or as a ‘natural or legal person’. In relation to that question, the DEFI case cannot be used to support the proposition that, because an entity does not represent an interest distinct from the state, it is to be regarded as representing the state for procedural purposes when it brings an action. Instead, the term ‘member state’, when used to identify a party for that purpose, is construed as referring only to the government authorities of the member states (and, by parity of reasoning, EEA states). Other emanations of the state (regional governments, self-governing communities, organisations like DEFI and so forth) are classified as ‘natural or legal persons’ (always assuming that they can be so described).12 Subject to those remarks, the identification of the person or body competent to 9 Eg Case C-95/97 Region Wallonne v Commission [1997]  ECR  I-1787, paras 6–7; Case C-417/04P Regione Siciliana v Commission [2006] ECR I-3881, para 21. 10 [1986] ECR 2469, paras 17–19. 11 Eg Case T-341/02 Regione Siciliana v Commission [2004] ECR II-2877, para 83 (on appeal, Case C-417/04P Regione Siciliana v Commission, above, note 9). 12 Region Wallonne v Commission (above, note 9), paras 6–8; Case C-180/97 Regione Toscana v Commission [1997]  ECR  I-5245, paras 6–11; Case T-238/97 Comunidad Autonoma de Cantabria v Council [1998] ECR II-2271, paras 42–43; Cases T-32/98 and T-41/98 Nederlandse Antillen v Commission [2000] ECR II-201, para 43; Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paras 52–55 (which indicates that a state entity must have competence in the area that is the subject-matter of the litigation); Case C-461/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council [2008] ECR I-11*, para 15; Case C-462/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council [2008] ECR I-13*, para 15; Case C-463/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council [2008] ECR I-14*, para 15; Case C-464/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council [2008] ECR I-15*, para 15.

327

3.3  Parties

represent a member state or EEA state in proceedings before the Court is a matter of the internal organisation of the state concerned. The position regarding third countries appears to be no different in principle.

III

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMUNITIES

3.3 The three Communities that originally made up what became the EU each had legal personality and enjoyed the most extensive legal capacity afforded to legal persons in each member state; the ECSC was represented by its institutions, each institution acting within the limits of its powers, whereas the EC and EAEC were represented by the Commission.13 The EU was originally an arrangement made between the member states of the EC and EAEC. It lacked legal personality and, so far as the jurisdiction of the Court was concerned, acted through the Communities and the Community institutions (as they then were). Accordingly, for procedural purposes, the EU could not itself be a party to proceedings. The current position is that the EU (which has absorbed the EC but not the EAEC), is a legal person.14 It enjoys the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons in each member state; and (in each member state) is represented by the Commission and by each of the EU institutions (in matters relating to their respective fields of operation).15 The EAEC remains a separate legal person represented by the Commission. Like the member states, the EU and EAEC are easy to identify. Apart from the fact that each has legal personality, in procedural terms, each is separate and distinct simply by virtue of the fact that proceedings may be brought only under or pursuant to the Treaties creating and organising them and, hence, can involve only the entity (the EU or, as the case may be, the EAEC) created by the Treaty in question.16 The EU or EAEC is a party (in a substantive sense) in rare cases, the most important of which is an action for damages, where it is the defendant.17 However, they are not parties in a procedural sense. They do not have the capacity to exercise the right to be a party and are instead represented in legal proceedings by the relevant institution.18 The TFEU, art and EAEC19 provide that the Commission represents the EU and EAEC but that relates to dealings between those entities and third parties and to the representation of the EU and EAEC before national courts; it does not mean that the Commission has a monopoly of legal representation before

13 ECSC, art 6; EEC, art 210–211 (as originally worded); EAEC, arts 184–185. 14 TEU, art 47. 15 TFEU, art 335. 16 Eg Case 153/73 Holtz and Willemsen GmbH v Council and Commission [1974] ECR 675 at 698 (Advocate General Reischl); Case 44/76 Milch- Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Council and Commission [1977] ECR 393 at 412–413 (Advocate General Reischl). 17 TFEU, art 340; EAEC, art 188. 18 Cf Case T-572/93 Odigitria AAE v Council and Commission [1995] ECR II-2025, para 22; Case T-201/99 Royal Olympic Cruises Ltd v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I-4005, para 20. 19 TFEU, art 335; EAEC, art 185.

328

Parties 3.4

the Court where the EU and EAEC are concerned. Hence, in staff cases, where the Court is given jurisdiction under TFEU, art 270 (which applies correspondingly to the EAEC) in disputes ‘between the Union and its servants’, the institution or organ of the EU (or EAEC) employing the applicant official should be named as defendant, rather than the EU (or EAEC) itself21 or, indeed, the person or body (generally the appointing authority) within the institution responsible for the challenged decision.22 In the same way, in actions for damages brought against the EU or EAEC, it is the institution or institutions whose act or omission is alleged to have caused the EU (or EAEC) to be liable which represents the EU (or EAEC) and which, for that reason, may be named as defendant, although it is also permissible to name the EU (or EAEC), represented by the institution responsible.23 That situation led Advocate General Roemer to remark in one case24 that, in the general scheme of legal protection under the Treaties, the parties to proceedings are in principle the institutions and not (as it was at the time of his opinion) the Community in question. 20

IV

EU INSTITUTIONS AND RELATED ENTITIES

3.4 The EU and EAEC institutions are those organs of the EU named as such in the Treaties.25 Other organs created by or under the Treaties may be treated as

20 Case 25/60 De Bruyn v European Parliamentary Assembly [1962]  ECR  21 at 35 (Advocate General Lagrange); Cases 63–69/72 Wilhelm Werhahn Hansamühle v Council [1973] ECR 1229 at 1257 (Advocate General Roemer). 21 See Case 18/63 Wollast (née Schmitz) v Commission [1964 ECR 85 at 96; Case 27/63 Raponi v Commission [1964] ECR 129 at 136; Cases 79 and 82/63 Reynier v Commission [1964] ECR 259 at 265; Cases 94 and 96/63 Bernusset v Commission [1964] ECR 297 at 306; Case 26/63 Pistoj v Commission [1964] ECR 341 at 351; Case 78/63 Huber v Commission [1964] ECR 367 at 375; Case 80/63 Degreef v Commission [1964] ECR 391 at 402; Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank [1976] ECR 955, para 5 ff. 22 Case T-497/93 Hogan v Court of Justice [1995] ECR II-703, para 31, and [1995] ECR-SC II251, para 31; on appeal, Case C-173/95P Hogan v Court of Justice [1005] ECR I-4905, para 13. 23 See Werhahn v Council, above, note 20, paras 7–8; Eie-Kontor GmbH v Council and Commission, above, note 16 (para 1 and per Advocate General Reischl, at pp 412–413); Case 353/88 Briantex v Commission [1989] ECR 3623, para 7; Case T-246/93 Buhring v Council and Commission [1998] ECR II-171, paras 26–27; Case C-136/01P Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi Snc. v Commission [2002] ECR I-6565; Case T-209/00 Lamberts v Ombudsman [2002] ECR II-2203, paras 48–52 (on appeal, Case C-234/02P Ombudsman v Lamberts [2004] ECR I-2803). 24 Raponi v Commission, above, note 21 (at 142). 25 Ie the European Parliament, European Council, Council, Commission, Court of Justice, European Central Bank and Court of Auditors: see TEU, art  13(1). The EAEC uses the institutional structure of the EU. The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions merely ‘assist’ the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission ‘in an advisory capacity’: TEU, art  13(4). Neither the Economic and Social Committee nor the Committee of the Regions is formally classified as an EU institution. The Economic and Social Committee is treated as an institution under the Staff Regulations and therefore has capacity to appear before the Court in proceedings between it and one of its officials: Case 79/70 Müllers v Economic and Social Committee of the Commission and EAEC [1971] ECR 689, paras 2–5. It is to be assumed that the same would apply to the Committee of the Regions.

329

3.4  Parties

a party, for procedural purposes.26 Thus, the European Investment Bank is not an institution but a separate body with its own legal personality.27 As an ‘organ’ of the EU it is treated as an EU institution for the purposes of actions for damages brought against the EU.28 The European Central Bank is also a separate body with its own legal personality29 and is subject to a separate legal regime.30 Nonetheless, like the European Investment Bank, it is treated as an EU institution for procedural purposes. On the other hand, the Ombudsman is not treated as an EU institution.31 Each institution acts autonomously within the limits of its powers as defined by the Treaties.32 However, the Treaties do not expressly state that the institutions have legal personality. It seems that, when they act within their powers, the institutions benefit from legal personality by reason of the fact that, as they represent the EU (or EAEC), their acts are those of the EU (or EAEC).33 That personality is one of public law and the acts of the institutions are therefore governed by public law.34 Originally, due to the separate legal personality of the Communities and the fact that each Treaty set up its own institutions, there were, for legal purposes, three sets of institutions, each one representing a different Community (the ECSC, EC and EAEC). Hence, in Case 28/64 Müller 26 EU entities other than institutions as defined in TEU, art 13(1) may be treated as EU institutions in more than one way. They may be permitted to appear in proceedings before the Court represented by an agent (which the Statute, art  19, limits to member states, EU institutions, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority): see, for example, the European Investment Bank, represented in Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank [1976]  ECR  955 by the Director of its Directorate for Legal Affairs, as agent; and the European Ombudsman, represented by a principal administrator, acting as agent, in Case T-103/99 Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v European Ombudsman and Parliament [2000] ECR II-4165. They may also be assimilated to EU institutions in the provisions describing the forms of action that may be commenced before the Court. In the latter connection, TFEU, art 263, 1st para, specifies that the legality of acts of ‘bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’ may be contested in an action for annulment. That does not necessarily carry with it the implication that the particular author of the act in question can participate as a party (defendant) in such proceedings because the entity from which an act emanates may not necessarily be the entity responsible for defending the act in legal proceedings. On the other hand, Statute, art 23, 2nd para, provides that ‘the institution, body, office or agency’ which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in issue in a reference for a preliminary ruling is entitled to submit written observations to the Court. Hence, an entity of the EU that is not an institution can participate as a party in such proceedings. It would be anomalous to conclude that, when an act of such a body, office or agency is the subject of dispute in preliminary ruling proceedings, the body, office or agency in question can participate in those proceedings; but it cannot do so when the same act is the subject of an action for annulment. However, there are some peculiarities about the procedural relationship between EU institutions and bodies, offices and agencies (see further below). 27 TFEU, art 308. 28 Case C-370/89 Société Générale des Enterprises Electromécaniques v European Investment Bank [1992] ECR I-6211. 29 TFEU, art 282(3). 30 Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, arts 34–35. 31 Case T-103/99 Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v Ombudsman and Parliament [2000] ECR II-4165, para 46. 32 TEU, art 13(2); Cases 7/56 and 3–7/57 Algera v Common Assembly [1957–58] ECR 39 at 57. 33 Cf Cases 43, 45 and 48/59 von Lachmüller v Commission [1960] ECR 463 at 472; Case 44/59 Fiddelaar v Commission [1960] ECR 535 at 543. 34 Ibid.

330

Parties 3.5

v Commission and EAEC Councils,35 the action could be brought, not against the ‘Council of the European Communities’ but against each of the three Councils created by the Treaties, even though they shared a common secretariat. The legal unity of the institutions (but not the Communities, which remained separate legal personalities) was established by the Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities,36 which set up a single Assembly37 and Court of Justice for the three Communities and a single Economic and Social Committee for the EC and EAEC, and by the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities.38 That (followed by the later consolidation of the institutional structure into the single structure used in the EU) did not and does not, however, detract from the fact that each of the single institutions acts autonomously within its own powers: an act of the Commission is still not an act of the Council or any other institution. Despite their autonomy amongst themselves, the institutions together represent the EU (or EAEC) and, for that reason, a judgment of the Court which has the force of res judicata so far as one institution is concerned, binds the EU (or, as the case may be, the EAEC) and, therefore, every other institution, in relation to its functions within the EU (or, as the case may be, the EAEC).39 As the EU and EAEC are separate legal persons, it does not seem that a judgment of the Court to which one of them is a party would have the force of res judicata against the other merely because the same institution (for example, the Commission) performs a function for each of the EU and the EAEC. 3.5 In principle, the scheme of the Treaties is that the EU and the EAEC appear in proceedings before the Court through an institution that represents them; and the representation of the EU or EAEC by the institutions in legal proceedings reflects the separation of the powers of the institutions as defined in the Treaties. In most cases that is stated expressly: actions for annulment, for example, can be directed only against particular measures adopted by a specified institution;40 the fact that another institution may have participated in the procedure leading up to the adoption of the contested act does not make that institution

35 [1965]  ECR  237 at 247–248; see also Case 43/64 Müller v Commission, EAEC and ECSC Council [1965] ECR 385 at 395. 36 Signed at Rome on 25 March 1957 and repealed by Amsterdam Treaty, art 9(1). The remaining paras of the Amsterdam Treaty, art 9(1) were intended to retain the essential elements of the repealed instruments so that the repeal should not alter the legal position. 37 Known as ‘The Parliament’. 38 Signed at Brussels on 8 April 1965 and repealed by the Amsterdam Treaty, art 9(1) (see further note 36 above). 39 Reynier v Commission (above, note 21), at 265–266. 40 Cf Reynier v Commission (above, note 21) at 271 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 100/74 CAM SA v Commission [1975] ECR 1393 at 1417; Case 23/76 Pellegrini & C Sas v Commission [1976] ECR 1807, para 32. For the avoidance of doubt on the point, although the Court is not referred to in TFEU, art 263, an action for annulment can be brought against it in specific circumstances: see, for example, Cases T-170/10 and T-340/10 Computer Task Group Luxembourg PSF SA v Court of Justice, 15 November 2011 (the public procurement regime applicable to EU institutions). That applies to the actions of the Court in its administrative, not its judicial, capacity.

331

3.6  Parties

a proper defendant in an annulment action.41 In other cases, such as staff disputes and, more important, actions for damages, the Treaties give no guidance. So far as the former are concerned, the matter is regulated by the Staff Regulations.42 The rule in actions for damages is that the institution cited as defendant should be the one whose act or omission is alleged to ground the liability of the EU (or EAEC). That does not necessarily mean that only one institution can represent the EU (or EAEC) in an action for damages: in Cases 63–69/72 Werhahn v Council43 the applicant cited the Council for adopting the measure alleged to constitute the wrongful act and the Commission for proposing it.44 An institution which has neither proposed nor adopted the wrongful act alleged should not be cited as defendant;45 and, in Case 90/77 Hellmut Stimming KG v Commission,46 Advocate General Mayras suggested that it is not possible to order the ‘Community’ (now the EU or EAEC) to make good damage caused by one institution when another has been cited to appear. 3.6 The procedural status of EU bodies, offices or agencies that are not EU institutions is unclear. In principle, as the EU (or EAEC) is represented in proceedings by an EU institution, when the acts of entities created by the EU (or EAEC) are subject to judicial control, the interests of the EU (or EAEC) and the entity in question are represented as a party in the proceedings by the appropriate EU institution, subject to express provision (or necessary implication) otherwise in the legal provision creating the form of action or proceeding relied on. Thus, the European Union Intellectual Property Office (formerly the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)) and the Community Plant Variety Office participate as parties (namely, as defendants) to proceedings concerning the legality of their decisions by necessary implication from the legal regime to which they are subject and express provision in the GC’s Rules of Procedure.47 Accordingly, where a body, office or agency is subordinate to an EU institution, the latter would ordinarily be the relevant party in proceedings concerning that body, office or agency unless there is express

41 Eg Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko Co Ltd v Council and Commission [1985] ECR 1351; Case 121/86 Epichirisseon Metalleftikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon AE  v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 1183; Case 129/86 Greece v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 1189; Case 150/87 Nashua Corpn v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 4421. 42 Proceedings must be brought against the appointing authority, ie  the employing institution (not the officials of the employing institution that comprise the appointing authority): see for example, Case 114/77 Jacquemart v Commission [1978] ECR 1697 at 1711, order of 18 January 1978; Case 48/79 Ooms v Commission [1979] ECR 3121; Cases 219–228, 230–235, 237–238, 240–242/80 André v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 1879; the Hogan case (above, note 22). 43 Above, note 20 (at para 8). 44 But see Case 253/84 Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun (GAEC) de la Ségaude v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 123 at 145 (Advocate General Slynn). 45 Cases 56–60/74 Kurt Kampffmeyer Muhlenvereinigung KG  v Commission and Council [1976] ECR 711 at 756 (Advocate General Reischl). 46 [1978] ECR 995 at 1013. 47 Regulation No 207/2009 (OJ 2009 No L78/1), arts 65 and 118; RP-GC, art 172.

332

Parties 3.8

provision otherwise.48 EU institutions are not responsible for the acts of entities that have not been created by them, have not had powers delegated to them by the EU institutions and are not subordinate to the EU institutions.49 3.7 The responsibility (in procedural terms) of an EU institution for the acts of a subordinate body can be illustrated by reference to two cases: Cases T-369/94 and T-85/95  DIR  International Film Srl v Commission;50 and Case T-411/06 Sogelma v European Agency for Reconstruction.51 At the time of both cases, what is now TFEU, art 263 limited actions for annulment to actions against the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and (in Sogelma) the European Central Bank. 3.8 In the DIR case, actions had been brought for the annulment of decisions contained in letters sent by the European Film Distribution Office (EFDO) concerning applications for loans under an action programme to promote the development of the European audiovisual industry. The action programme was based on a Council decision under which the Commission was made responsible for implementing the programme. An annex to the decision provided that one of the mechanisms to be used in implementing the programme was the development of action taken by EFDO to promote the cross-frontier distribution of European films in cinemas. EFDO was a pre-existing private sector association registered in Germany. Pursuant to the Council decision, the Commission entered into an agreement with EFDO concerning the financial implementation of the action programme. Under the agreement, prior approval had to be given by the Commission’s representatives to all matters having an impact on the implementation of the programme and the functioning of EFDO was subject to guidelines adopted by EFDO itself and approved by the Commission. The disputed decisions were made by EFDO and were of two sorts. First, EFDO had decided to postpone a decision on funding the distribution of two cinema films. It made that decision after having received a request from the Commission to defer its decision. The Commission’s request had been made because the Commission was at the time considering the compatibility with the competition rules of various agreements made by the distributor of the films. Secondly, EFDO made a final decision, rejecting the applications for funding. It appeared that the Commission

48 Cf Case T-125/06 Centro Studi Antonio Manieri Srl v Council [2009]  ECR II-69, para  50. For example, in a staff case, the matter would be determined by the provisions governing the employment relationship, which might specify the body, office or agency as the relevant party. Further, in the case of references for a preliminary ruling, there is express provision giving procedural rights to the body, office or agency concerned: see note 26 above. 49 Case T-327/13 Mallis v Commission and European Central Bank, 16  October 2014; Case T-328/13 Tameio Pronoias Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v Commission, 16  October 2014; Case T-329/13 Chatzithoma v Commission, 16 October 2014; Case T-330/13 Chatziioannou v Commission, 16 October 2014; Case T-331/13 Nikolaou v Commission, 16 October 2014; Case T-332/13 Christodoulou v Commission, 16 October 2014. 50 [1998] ECR II-357, see paras 1–22, 45, 51and 52–55. On appeal, the judgment was set aside on other grounds and remitted to the CFI: see [2000] ECR I-447. 51 [2008] ECR II-2771, see paras 1–15 and 28–57. A number of other judgments relating to the point in question, including DIR, are referred to in Sogelma.

333

3.9  Parties

had recommended the rejection of the application but the rejection decision was drafted by EFDO’s own staff and was based on two reasons, only one of which resembled the reason given by the Commission for its recommendation. The actions for the annulment of those decisions identified the Commission as the defendant (EFDO was not a party) and, due to the obscurity of the position, targeted not only the decisions made by EFDO but also ‘the measure whereby the Commission instructed EFDO’ to adopt the decisions that it had taken (the correspondence passing between EFDO and the Commission was not known to the applicants at the time when the actions were commenced). 3.9 As the proceedings unfolded and more information became available to the applicants, the claim against the measures by which the Commission instructed EFDO to act was dropped and the only remaining claim lay against the decisions clearly emanating from EFDO. The Commission conceded that the acts of EFDO were imputable to the Commission, essentially for two reasons. First, even though the relationship between the Commission and EFDO was contractual, the power to decide on applications for financial assistance had to remain with the Commission. Secondly, a decentralised system of decisionmaking and judicial control would detract from the Community character of the action programme. As the question of the imputability of the acts of EFDO to the Commission went to the admissibility of the action, the CFI (as it then was) was not strictly bound by that concession. It concluded that EFDO decisions on funding applications made under the action programme were imputable to the Commission because responsibility for the implementation of the action programme had been delegated to the Commission, which could not lawfully subdelegate the exercise of a discretionary power. Accordingly, the agreement between the Commission and EFDO provided that funding decisions were ‘in practice’ subject to the Commission’s prior agreement and consultation. The CFI added that the Commission had ‘essentially determined’ the content of the decisions made by EFDO, even if EFDO’s reasoning had not followed the Commission’s suggestions exactly. 3.10 In contrast, in the Sogelma case, the defendant (EAR) had been established (with legal personality) by a Council regulation; and the Commission had been empowered to delegate certain responsibilities to EAR. The contested decision was made by EAR in the discharge by it of one of those responsibilities (the Commission intervened in the proceedings). Under the relevant EU legislation, the position of EAR was similar to that of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (provision was made for actions against decisions taken by EAR on the basis of a specified legal provision that was not relevant in the Sogelma case; and the Court had jurisdiction over EAR’s non-contractual liability). The CFI held that the action was correctly brought against EAR, essentially because it took the view that any act of an EU body intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties must be open to judicial review.52 However, it also noted that EAR was taking decisions that the 52 Paras 37 and 48.

334

Parties 3.11

Commission itself would have taken if it had not delegated powers to EAR.53 That raised the question whether, even though the decision made by EAR was subject to judicial review, the action should have been brought against EAR or the Commission. When considering that point, the CFI started off from the premise that, as a general rule, actions must be directed against the body that adopted the contested measure.54 The CFI distinguished cases involving decisions made on the basis of delegated powers (in which, it considered, the delegating institution was responsible for defending the decision in court) on the grounds that EAR had legal personality, it had the relevant power to act, the Commission had not participated in any capacity in the decision-making process, and EAR had for other purposes the status and capacity to be a party to legal proceedings.55 3.11 As a result of the evolution of the case law (Sogelma) and the consequential changes made to what are now TFEU, art 263 and 267, the law appears to have moved away from the principle of representation of the EU (or EAEC) by the relevant institution and towards a regime under which it is the author of an act disputed in proceedings, rather than the institution responsible for that entity, which should be a party to the proceedings. Two qualifications need to be made to that statement: first, it applies where the author of the act is called upon to explain the meaning, or defend the legality, of the act in question; and, secondly, it is limited to entities that are created as distinct entities under EU law (although they may or may not have legal personality) and possess the characteristics necessary for participating in proceedings.56 In contrast, where the role of the entity is as an applicant in proceedings, it would appear that the entity must have legal personality or the essential attributes of personality in order to act as a party.57 Otherwise, the party in the proceedings must be the relevant EU institution to which the acts of the entity in question are imputable. Where, as in DIR, the entity was not created by EU law but (for example) performs functions entrusted to it by EU legislation or (as in DIR) pursuant to an agreement with an EU institution or other body, the entity is not a body, office or agency of the EU. Its actions may therefore be the subject of legal proceedings brought before the courts of a member state (as in the case of any other situation in which, for

53 Para 39. 54 Para 49. 55 Paras 50–56. 56 For those characteristics, see Lassalle (below, note 62) at 51. Lassalle was cited to that effect in Case T-90/14 Secolux v Commission, 3  November 2014, para  16 (which concerned the Office for Official Publications – held to lack the required characteristics). Secolux also cites for the same proposition an unreported order of 12 March 1997 in Case T-149/96 Coldiretti v Commission [1998] ECR II-3841, which concerned the Standing Veterinary Committee (also held to lack the required characteristics). In Case T-213/12 Elitaliana SpA  v Eulex Kosovo, 4 June 2013, paras 18–34, which concerned a ‘Rule of Law’ Mission created by Joint Action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the disputed measures were attributable to the Commission as the delegating institution because the mission lacked legal personality, existed for a certain period of time and did not benefit from any provision stating that it could be a party to proceedings. The mission was not created as a distinct entity but was a group of individuals who were assigned a task and provided with the resources to complete it. 57 As to the essential attributes of personality, see further below.

335

3.12  Parties

example, an emanation of a member state implements EU legislation).58 The capacity of such an entity to be a party to proceedings ordinarily depends upon the national law to which it is subject. The question whether or not its acts and defaults are imputable to the EU (or EAEC), with the consequence that they may be the subject of proceedings before the Court, depends upon the precise nature of the arrangements between the entity and the EU (or EAEC). Where the entity is acting for or at the bidding of an EU institution (as was the case in DIR, in relation to the provision of EU funds), the acts or defaults of the entity are imputable to that institution, which will be the appropriate party in proceedings before the Court.

V

OTHER PERSONS OR BODIES

3.12 The last category of persons or entities that may take part in proceedings comprises natural persons, legal persons and entities lacking personality. The last cause the most difficulty. Natural persons are easily identifiable. So far as legal persons and entities lacking personality are concerned, the basic requirement is the existence of the characteristics which lie at the foundation of personality in law,59 for proving which production of an entry on a commercial register or register of legal persons suffices unless there is evidence that, under the applicable national law, the entry does not carry that inference.60 Initially the view taken was that it was not essential that an entity be either a legal or a natural person in the eyes of the national law governing it; bodies which did not possess legal personality in formal terms under national law might be parties to proceedings if they were endowed with the characteristics of personality

58 Cf the approach of the GC in Case T-271/10 H v Council , 10 July 2014, paras 44–52 (decision by Head of Mission concerning a particular category of staff attributable to national authorities) (on appeal, Case C-455/14 P H v Council, pending). 59 The meaning of ‘legal person’ in the context of EU procedural law is not necessarily the same as that in national law: see, for example, Cases 10 and 18/68 Eridania Zuccherifici Nazionali v Commission [1969] ECR 459 at 493 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 135/81 Groupement des Agences de Voyage v Commission (above, note 7) at para 10. 60 Eg Case T-161/94 Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council [1996] ECR II-695, para 33; Case T-170/94 Shanghai Bicycle Corpn v Council [1997] ECR II-1383, para 28; Case C-400/99 Commission v Oder-Plan Architektur GmbH  [2001]  ECR  I-7355, paras 28–30; Cases C-199/01P and C-200/01P IPK-Munchen GmbH  v Commission [2004]  ECR  I-4627, Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, para 19 (p 4638). The requirement under RP-GC, art 78(3), 177(4) and 194(3), that a legal person governed by private law produce recent proof of its existence, is concerned only with the question of the existence of the legal person, nothing else. Further, it sets out alternative means of proof (extract from the register of companies, firms or associations or any other official document), none of which is mandatory, save that adequate evidence of the person must be produced. Although the requirement is to provide such evidence alongside the application commencing the action, it is sufficient if the evidence is produced at some time during the proceedings (it is not a defect listed in PD-GC, Annexes 2 and 3, as justifying a delay in, or preventing, service of the application): see the Abad Perez case (above, note 6), paras 38–39.

336

Parties 3.12

which enabled them to be the subject of rights or obligations.61 The Court identified, as the characteristics necessary for taking part in proceedings for procedural purposes, the ability, however circumscribed, to (i) undertake autonomous action and (ii) assume liability.62 In the case of entities representing collective interests, such as trade unions, there appears to be an additional requirement: they must be truly representative of the interests which they protect or defend.63 Later, greater emphasis was placed on the need to satisfy the requirements of the applicable national law regarding the acquisition of legal personality. Thus, in Case 50/84 Bensider v Commission64 it was held that a company in the course of formation could bring proceedings if legal personality in accordance with the relevant national law was acquired before the expiry of the period within which proceedings must be brought; if legal personality has not been acquired within that period the action is inadmissible even though there may be a practice in the member state concerned of ratifying with retrospective effect steps taken by a director of a company before its incorporation. In Case 294/83 and Case 190/84 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament65 the ECJ was faced with cases where, in the course of proceedings, the applicant had dissolved itself and merged with another body to form a new person to which was transferred the benefit of the original applicant’s rights of action. The ECJ seems to have regarded the capacity to bring proceedings and the continuation of the personality of the bodies concerned as being essentially matters of national law.66 In the result it would seem that national law ordinarily determines whether or not an entity is a legal or natural person; but the Court will not refuse to recognise the possession of those characteristics of personality that are sufficient for participating in proceedings before the Court merely because of some technical problem under the applicable national law.67 However, another stream of authority has it that an entity will be regarded as a legal person for the purpose of proceedings before the Court if it was treated as an independent legal entity by the defend-

61 So, in Groupement des Agences de Voyage v Commission (above, note 7) at paras 9–12, the Court accepted that a company still in the course of formation could bring an action even though, under national law, it lacked legal personality. 62 Case 15/63 Lassalle v European Parliament [1964] ECR 31 at 51; Cases 41, 43–48, 50, 111, 113, 114/73 Générale Sucrière SA v Commission [1973] ECR 1465 at para 3; Case F-105/10 Bomcke v European Investment Bank, 19  July 2011, paras 14–16; Case F-127/10 Bomcke v European Investment Bank, 19 July 2011, paras 10–12. 63 See Lassalle v European Parliament (above, note 62) at 57 (Advocate General Lagrange); Case 175/73 Union Syndicale v Council [1974] ECR 917 at paras 9–13; Case 18/74 Syndicat Général du Personnel des Organismes Européens v Commission [1974] ECR 933 at paras 5–10. 64 [1984] ECR 3991 (paras 4–9 and see also at 4001–4005 per Advocate General Mancini). 65 [1986] ECR 1339 and [1988] ECR 1017, respectively. 66 [1986]  ECR  1339 at paras 15–18 (and at 1346–1347 per Advocate General Mancini); [1988] ECR 1017 at 1026–1028 (Advocate General Mancini). 67 For example, the applicant in Case 191/82 Fédération de l’Industrie de l’Huilerie de la CEE (FEDIOL) v Commission [1983] ECR 2913 lacked legal personality under the relevant national law but had the essential characteristics of personality and, more important, was an entity specifically envisaged by EU law as entitled to bring the proceedings in question (see at 2939– 2940 per Advocate General Rozès).

337

3.13  Parties

ant institution during the administrative proceedings that preceded the litigation before the Court or in the measure under challenge.68 3.13 If a collective entity is not a legal person or in some other way fails to satisfy the conditions required for being a party to proceedings, it does not follow that there is no party at all to the proceedings. Logically, the consequence is that the name of the collective entity is nothing other than a portmanteau expression covering the natural or legal persons standing behind it or whose interests it represents. Those persons are then the real parties to the proceedings; and the title of the action should be amended accordingly.69

VI

RESTRICTIONS ON THE ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN PROCEEDINGS

3.14 Possession of the essential elements of legal personality, while sufficient to enable an entity to be a party for procedural purposes, is not necessarily sufficient to allow it a right of action: that depends on the system of remedies provided for in EU law.70 In the absence of express provision to the contrary, the Treaties do not enable entities representing collective interests which possess either legal personality or its essential elements to exercise a right of action held by some or all of their members or the persons or interests they represent.71 Nor can they challenge a regulation on the basis that they group together all the persons affected by it.72 In some cases, it seems that a distinction has been drawn 68 Case T-161/94 Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council [1996]  ECR II-695, paras 31–35; Case T-170/94 Shanghai Bicycle Corpn v Council [1997] ECR II-1383, paras 26–30. That appears to be the explanation for Case C-229/05P Ocalan, on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Vanly, on behalf of the Kurdistan National Congress v Council [2007] ECR I-439. 69 Eg Case T-185/02 Ruiz-Picasso v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-1739, paras 19–22. The alternative solution is that the entity may appoint someone to represent it in proceedings, which is a question of fact and evidence: see PKK and KNK (above, note 68), paras 113–122. 70 Eg Case C-75/92 Gao Yao (Hong Kong) Hua Fa Inudustrial Co Ltd v Council [1994] ECR I-3141, paras 28–31 (on the ability of a company to challenge an anti-dumping regulation); Case T-609/97 Regione Puglia v Commission and Spain [1998] ECR I-4051, paras 10–11 (natural and legal persons cannot bring proceedings against a member state); Case T-264/03 Schmoldt v Commission [2004] ECR II-1515, paras 98–106 (the chairman or manager of an entity that has an interest in commencing proceedings does not have, for that reason, a right of action). 71 See Cases 16 and 17/62 Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes v Council [1962] ECR 471 at 479; Cases 19–22/62 Fédération Nationale de la Boucherie en Gros et du Commerce en gros des Viandes v Council [1962] ECR 491 at 499; Eridania v Commission (above, note 59) at 493 (Advocate General Roemer); Union Syndicale v Council (above, note 63) at 931 (Advocate General Reischl); Syndicat Général du Personnel v Commission (above, note 63) at 948 (Advocate General Trabucchi); Case 72/74 Union Syndicale-Service Public Européen v Council (No 2) [1975] ECR 401 (para 17 and, per Advocate General Reischl, at 417). 72 Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits v Council (above, note 71) at 480; Fédération Nationale de la Boucherie v Council (ibid); DEFI  v Commission (above, note 10), para  16; Case 117/86 Union de Federaciones Agrarias de España (UFADE) v Council and Commission [1986]  ECR  3255, para  12; Case T-122/96 Federazione Nazionale del Commercio Oleario v Commission [1997] ECR II-1559, para 69; Case T-194/95 Area Cova SA v Council [1999] ECR II-2271, para 72; Case T-12/96 Area Cova SA v Council and Commission [1999] ECR II-2301, para 71.

338

Parties 3.14

between the representation of a general or collective interest by such entities and the exercise by them of the right of action that each, or some, of their members has or have. In the latter event, the entity can bring proceedings.73 That does not prevent such entities from defending the general interests they represent as interveners in the proceedings.74 In general, however, they can exercise only rights of action which accrue to them personally.75 The parent or holding company in a group of companies is in a different position. In Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing

73 Eg Case T-55/99 Confederacion Espanola de Transporte de Mercancias (CETM) v Commission [2000] ECR II-3207, para 23; Cases T-254/00, T-270/00 and T-277/00 Hotel Cipriani SpS v Commission [2008] ECR II-3269, para 115; Case T-445/05 Associazione italiana del risparmio gestito v Commission [2009]  ECR II-289, paras 55–56, and Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava - Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2009] ECR II-3029, paras 107–118, in which the CFI held that, in State aid cases, an association representing collective interests could bring an action for annulment where the undertakings represented by it (or, in Alava, some of them) were entitled to do so individually. That appears to be based upon a misreading of earlier cases. For example, Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission [2006] ECR I-5479, para 56 (cited as an authority in the Alava case) is based on an obvious misreading of Case C-6/92 Federazione Sindicale Italiana dell’Industria Estrattiva v Commission [1993] ECR I-6357, paras 15–16 (see the Advocate General’s Opinion in the latter case, paras 47–52). However, the line of cases seems to have now established itself. In Case T-151/05 Nederlandse Vakbond Varkenshouders (NVV) v Commission [2009] ECR II-1219, para 44, the association had a separate right justifying the admissibility of its participation on the action but the judgment contains a comment suggesting a sympathetic attitude towards the admissibility of an action brought by a representative body on behalf of its members. Stated more accurately, the position (at least that under the earlier case-law) is that a representative body may bring proceedings either where it itself has the right to do so or where it is actually exercising the right of action of one or more of the persons that it represents: Cases T-481/93 and T-484/93 Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens v Commission [1995]  ECR II-2941, para  64 (cf Case T-412/05  M  v Ombudsman [2008]  ECR II-197*, para  49). In the latter situation, the expression used in Cases T-447/93, T-448/93 and T-449/93 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del Cemento (AITEC) v Commission [1995]  ECR II-1971, para  60, is that the representative body has ‘substituted’ itself for the persons in question. It appears from para 62 that those persons must not have objected to having their rights exercised on their behalf (see generally the discussion in paras 54–62). In Case T-266/94 Foreningen af Jernskibs- og Maskinbyggerier i Danmark Skibsvaeftsforeningen v Commission [1996] ECR II-1399, paras 41–42, an association sued as agent for its members. 74 Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits v Council (above, note 71) at 486 (Advocate General Lagrange); Union Syndicale v Council (above, note 63). 75 Eg Case 66/76  CFDT  v Council [1977]  ECR  305; Groupement des Agences de Voyage v Commission (above, note 7) at para  7; Case 43/85 Associazione Nazionale Commerciali Internazionali Dentali e Sanitara (ANCIDES) v Commission [1987]  ECR  3131 at 3144 (Advocate General Slynn); Case C-313/90 Comite International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthetiques (CIRFS) v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-1125, paras 29–30; Case C-6/92 Federazione Sindicale Italiana dell’Industria Estrattiva v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-6357, para 17; Case T-380/94 AIUFFASS v Commission [1996] ECR II-2169, para 50; Federazione Nazionale del Commercio Oleario v Commission (above, note 72), paras 69–70; Case T-114/00 Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum eV v Commission [2002] ECR II-5121, paras 53 and 65 (and note also para 64 on the procedural advantages of collective actions); Case T-444/07 Centre de promotion de l’emploi par la micro-entreprise (CPEM) v Commission [2009] ECR II-2121, paras 39–40 (organisation incapable of suing for damages on behalf of its employees unless authorised by them to do so). The CETM and Associazione italiana del risparmio gestito cases (above, note 73), which are in other respects unreliable authorities, are in that respect correct.

339

3.15  Parties

Co Ltd v Council,76 the applicant applied on its own behalf ‘and on behalf of its subsidiaries and affiliates in the Common Market’. Apart from clarifying which were the subsidiaries and affiliates in question, no objection was taken concerning the admissibility or effectiveness of that way of proceeding.77 3.15 One particular restriction on the availability of rights of action, which is worth bearing in mind when reading early cases, concerned the ECSC Treaty which, by and large, provided that only undertakings and associations of undertakings might avail themselves of the remedies under that Treaty.78 Undertakings were defined in ECSC, art 80 as ‘any undertaking engaged in production in the coal or the steel industry within the territories’ covered by the Community79 and, for limited purposes, ‘any undertaking or agency regularly engaged in distribution other than sale to domestic consumers or small craft industries’.80 The ECJ assimilated the concept of an undertaking to that of a natural or legal person.81 In consequence, two or more separate companies did not constitute an undertaking even if they were part of the same group.82 A natural person with an interest in an undertaking was not an undertaking within the meaning of ECSC, art 80,83 but might represent an undertaking in proceedings before the Court.84 Associations had to comprise undertakings within the meaning of ECSC, art 80.85 If they did, they had a right of action, where the Treaty provided, even though the interests they represented might diverge86 or the interests of some only of the association’s members had been affected.87 On the other hand, an association whose object was to defend and represent the interests of its members as consumers was not 76 [1979] ECR 1185 at 1241 (Advocate General Warner). 77 The same approach was followed by the applicant in Case C-156/87 Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission [1990] ECR I-781 (see 813). The general rule is that the sole owner of an undertaking which is an addressee of a decision has sufficient interest to challenge the decision as long as it has become sole owner by the time of the commencement of proceedings: eg Cases T-273/06 and T-297/06 ISD Polska sp z o.o. v Commission [2009] ECR II-2185, paras 40–45. 78 There were some exceptions, most notably art 66(5) and actions for damages (see Cases 9 and 12/60 Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA v High Authority [1961] ECR 197 at 214). Under art 34 of the ECSC Statute, only natural or legal persons could intervene. 79 The Court considered the nature of production activities in Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA v High Authority (above, note 78) at 212. See also Cases T-107/01 and T-175/01 Societe des mines de Sacilor – Lormines SA v Commission [2004] ECR I-2125. 80 Eg Case 1/58 Friedrich Stork & Co v High Authority [1959] ECR 17. 81 Cases 42 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority [1961] ECR 53 at 80. 82 Ibid. 83 Case 12/63 Schlieker v High Authority [1963] ECR 85. 84 Cf Case 18/62 Barge v High Authority [1963] ECR 259. 85 Cases 7 and 9/54 Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 175 at 189–190. 86 Case 8/57 Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux et Aciéries Belges v High Authority [1957– 58]  ECR  245 at 252; Case 13/57 Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie v High Authority [1957–58] ECR 265 at 276; Case 9/57 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérugie Française v High Authority [1957–58] ECR 319 at 326; Case 12/57 Syndicat de la Sidérugie du CentreMidi v High Authority [1957–58] ECR 375 at 382. 87 Case 3/54 ASSIDER v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 63 at 69; Case 4/54 ISA v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 91 at 98; Cases 140, 146, 221 and 226/82 Walzstahl-Vereinigung and Thyssen AG v Commission [1984] ECR 951, paras 17–18.

340

Parties 3.18

an ‘association of undertakings’ within the meaning of the Treaty, even if one at least of its members was an ‘undertaking’ within the meaning of ECSC, art 80.88 3.16 The EAEC Treaty also contains a restrictive definition of some of the terms it uses to describe entities covered by it: ‘person’ means ‘any natural person who pursues all or any of his activities in the territories of Member States within the field specified in the relevant chapter of this Treaty’; ‘undertaking’ means ‘any undertaking or institution which pursues all or any of its activities in the territories of Member States within the field specified in the relevant chapter of this Treaty, whatever its public or private legal status’.89 While relevant to some proceedings,90 those limitations do not apply to the principal actions, which are open to ‘any natural or legal person’.91 3.17 So far as other specific forms of action are concerned, reference should be made to the following. Under the TFEU,92 staff cases may be brought by servants of the EU, but that term covers not merely persons having the status of officials or employees, other than local staff, but also their dependants and persons claiming the status of officials etc;93 in actions brought under an arbitration clause, only parties to the clause can be party to the proceedings (otherwise than as interveners).94 Applications under art 1 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union may be made by the authority which is competent under national law to carry out the administrative or legal measures of constraint.95 3.18 A similar situation arises in respect of parties other than applicants. In an action for annulment, for example, only the author of the act whose annulment is sought (or, as explained above, the EU institution to whom that act is to be imputed) can be the defendant; some other institution or body implicated in the circumstances giving rise to the alleged illegality of the challenged act may participate in the proceedings as intervener, not defendant.96 For the purpose of proceedings for the interpretation of a judgment, all persons are considered to be

88 Cases 8 and 10/54 Association des Utilisateurs de Charbon du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 227 at 240. 89 EAEC, art 196. 90 Eg those under EAEC, art 144 and 145 (which remain in force). 91 Ie actions for annulment, a failure to act and damages, to which the TFEU applies. 92 TFEU, art 270. 93 Case 116/78 Bellintani v Commission [1979]  ECR  1585, para  6; Case C-100/88 Oyowe and Traore v Commission [1989]  ECR  4285, para  7; Case 34/80 Authié v Commission [1981]  ECR  665; Case 23/64 Vandevyvere v European Parliament [1965]  ECR  157. For an action brought by the dependants of an official, see Cases 63 and 64/79 Boizard v Commission [1980] ECR 2975. It should be pointed out that the position of dependants depends on whether or not they have a right of action under the provision of the Staff Regulations relied on. 94 Pellegrini & C Sas v Commission (above, note 40) at para 31. 95 Case 2/68 Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission [1968] ECR 435 at 439, which refers to the predecessor Protocol. 96 Case C-445/00 Austria v Council [2003] ECR I-8549, paras 31–34.

341

3.19  Parties

parties to the action who were parties to separate proceedings which were identical in subject matter and in the ground on which judgment was given.97 3.19 The question whether or not a person or body satisfies the conditions for participating in proceedings as a party goes to the jurisdiction of the Court and the fact that the person or body concerned has been treated by the defendant as satisfying those conditions at an earlier stage (or even during the proceedings) is irrelevant.98

VII CAPACITY TO BE A PARTY99 3.20 There are occasions when an entity possessing personality in law is held to be incapable of exercising the rights attaching to personality, eg the case of a natural person who is insane or a minor. So far as EU procedural law is concerned, such questions are determined by reference to the personal law of the entity concerned.100 Where, for the purposes of EU procedural law, a person lacks capacity (or ceases to be capable during the course of the proceedings), that person would normally participate (or continue to participate) in the proceedings before the Court through the person or persons who, under the personal law of the incapable person, would be regarded as taking over the exercise of the latter’s rights.101 If a single action has been brought by an association on behalf of several persons or by several persons and is admissible, it is not normally necessary to consider whether the association or one particular person represented by the association or named as an applicant has capacity to bring the action.102

VIII CESSATION OF EXISTENCE OF A PARTY 3.21 Where a party ceases to exist after the commencement of proceedings, the question that usually arises concerns the succession of the substantive and procedural rights of the party (considered in the next following section). However, in the case of an applicant (or, more generally, the party initiating a procedure, such as an appellant in an appeal or an intervener), the cause of action 97 Case 5/55 ASSIDER v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 135 at 141–142. 98 The Lormines case (above, note 79), paras 50–52. 99 ‘Capacity’ is used in a different sense in the Lormines case (above, note 79). 100 This is discussed in Ch 7, paras 7.10–7.13. Eg Case C-77/99 Commission v Oder-Plan Architektur GmbH v Commission [2001] ECR I-7355, paras 28–30; Case T-458/04 Au Lys de France SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-71*, para 35 (company in liquidation). 101 However, that does not mean that the person exercising a party’s rights is a party to the proceedings in his or her own right, as opposed to acting for and on behalf of the real party: cf Case T-316/07 Commercy AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-43, paras 18–24. 102 Case T-435/93 Association of Sorbitol Producers within the EC (ASPEC) v Commission [1995]  ECR II-1281, para  72 (an association); Cases T-125/96 and T-152/96 Boehringer Ingelheim Vatmedica GmbH v Council and Commission [1999] ECR II-3427, paras 174–175.

342

Parties 3.23

may be extinguished, or the possibility of continuing with the procedure may disappear as a result of the absence of any interest in continuing with it, upon death (or cessation of existence), whether or not there is a successor to the party in question. Whether or not cessation of existence produces that result is a matter of substantive EU law.103 3.22 Where a party other than an applicant (or other initiator of a proceeding), such as a defendant (rarely, given the nature of actions before the Court) or a respondent party in an appeal (more likely), ceases to exist, that need not affect the continuation of the proceedings (again, the usual question concerns succession to the substantive and procedural rights of the party concerned) unless it affects the interest of the applicant (or other initiator of proceedings) in pursuing his claim or proceeding.104

IX ADDING, REMOVING AND SUBSTITUTING PARTIES 3.23 In the procedure before the Court there are limited possibilities of adding, removing or substituting parties (no difficulties arise where a party merely changes its name, such as where a company renames itself in the course of proceedings).105 So far as the removal or withdrawal of a party is concerned, where the party concerned is the sole party representing an interest in the proceedings (that is, the sole applicant or sole defendant), removal or withdrawal would bring the proceedings to an end, one way or another, and therefore arises normally from a voluntary act on the part of the party which takes the form of the withdrawal or discontinuance of the action (in the case of an applicant) or consent to judgment being delivered in favour of the opposing party (in the case of a defendant). If the party concerned is one of a number of applicants or defendants, the withdrawal of the party concerned by voluntary act has no procedural implications (apart from costs) and involves nothing more than the removal of the party’s name from the Court’s register.106 Where removal arises from an external or supervening event, questions of succession and a change of parties arise, which are discussed below.

103 For example, in Case 141/85 Dufrane v Commission, order of 23 March 1988 (unreported), the applicant died and proceedings were stayed until a parallel case had been decided. The defendant lost and the question then arose as to how the Dufrane case should be dealt with. It was a staff case in which the applicant had sued only in order to vindicate her personal rights as an official. She made no pecuniary claim. In consequence, her successors had no interest in pursuing the action and, by reason of her death, the proceedings had lost their object. 104 Eg Case C-405/11P Commission v Buczek Automotive, 21 March 2013, paras 14–19 and 68 (liquidation of a person adversely affected by the disputed decision did not affect the appellant’s interest in appealing against a judgment annulling it; nor did it stand in the way of an order for costs in favour of that person). 105 Cf Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00  JFE  Engineering Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR II-2501, para 45. 106 Eg Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P  Kadi v Council and Commission [2008]  ECR  I-6351, para 119.

343

3.24  Parties

3.24 The first group of situations to be considered, in which there may be a change of parties, comprises: (i) a succession of parties resulting from the cessation of existence of a party (as in the case of death); (ii) the transfer of a right of action or an interest in proceedings, which may give rise to a cumulation of parties; and (iii) a change in the person able to continue proceedings for a party (as in the case of a receiver taking over an action brought by an insolvent legal person where that person continues to exist or, perhaps, the supervening loss of capacity of a party).107 In the first of those situations, the cessation of the existence of a person or entity necessarily causes that person or entity to cease to be a party unless, by legal fiction, it is regarded as continuing in existence for procedural purposes. Normally, the only question is whether or not the rights of the person or entity can pass, or have passed, to another person or entity and, if so, to whom. The second situation is more complex because the original party remains in existence. If the original party has disposed of his right or interest to another, two questions arise: (a) the ability of the original party to continue the proceedings and, if so, the capacity in which he does so; and (b) the ability of the transferee of the right or interest to be a party. That situation is dealt with in the next section. The third situation does not, strictly speaking, involve necessarily a change in parties but there may be procedural reasons why a change is desirable (such as where a receiver carries on litigation for an insolvent undertaking and there is a question about the recoverability of costs should the receiver/the insolvent undertaking be unsuccessful); and a change may simply be a matter of practice. In particular, in the case of loss of capacity in the course of the proceedings, there need be no change in the parties because, where another person takes over the exercise of the incapable person’s substantive and procedural rights, the incapable person’s rights have not been transferred to someone else. Only the legal power to exercise the right has been transferred. However, if the right itself is transferred under the personal law of the incapable person, there may have to be a substitution of the incapable person under EU procedural law. The fact that, in the case of legal and natural persons (in relation to whom incapacity is capable of arising), Statute, art 19, 3rd para, provides that such a party must be represented by a lawyer does not indicate that there must be substitution of an incapable party or that, under EU procedural law, incapacity results in the party’s lawyer taking over the exercise of all the party’s rights. The representation of a party by a lawyer is for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court, the lawyer being the party’s interlocutor vis-a-vis the Court. That does not preclude the interposition of another person as the person with the legal power to exercise the substantive and procedural rights of an incapable party.108

107 In all such cases, the question of a change of a party arises because the event in question does not result in the extinction of the cause of action or the loss of the original party’s interest in the case. No change in a party is possible if the result of the event is otherwise: see (for example) note 103 above. 108 The writer is of the view that, in cases of supervening incapacity, no change of parties is required under EU procedural law; and the question of who is competent to give instructions to the incapable party’s lawyer is a matter governed by the personal law of the incapable party.

344

Parties 3.26

3.25 When a party dies or becomes incapable of continuing proceedings (a phenomenon that in practice affects parties other than the EU (or EAEC) or its institutions or the member states), no order is necessary in order to authorise the party’s successors or representatives to take over the proceedings.109 For example, in Case 92/82 Gutmann v Commission110 the applicant died after the commencement of proceedings and the action was continued by his daughters as his legal successors. In Cases 239 and 275/82  Allied Corpn v Commission111 one of the applicant companies was declared bankrupt after proceedings had commenced and the proceedings were continued by the receiver.112 In neither case does it appear that an order allowing proceedings to be continued in that way was asked from or made by the Court. 3.26 In the Gutmann case the title of the proceedings remained unchanged but in Allied Corpn the title was amended and the name of the receiver substituted for that of the company, it being mentioned that the receiver was suing as such rather than in his own name. In Case T-429/93 Successors of Edmond Ropars v Council,113 the title of the action was changed when the applicant’s successors took over the action upon his death. It would appear, therefore, that there is as yet no established practice concerning the title of proceedings. The applicable national law identifies the person entitled to take over the proceedings in such cases but the procedural devices by which that may be done are a matter of EU law. So far as can be seen, it is necessary to prove to the Court only that there is capacity under national law to continue the proceedings.114 In most instances, an action is capable of being carried on by a deceased applicant’s successors if

109 Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament (above, note 65), paras 13– 18 of the judgment and at 1348 (Advocate General Mancini); Case T-94/02 Hugo Boss AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II813, para 22; Cases T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02 Raffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Commission [2006] ECR II-5169, para 71; Case T-365/09 Michalokopoulou Ktimatiki Touristiki AE v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2010] ECR II-239, paras 20–21 (substitution as addressee of the contested measure by operation of law). 110 [1983] ECR 3127. The same happened in Case T-43/93 Lo Giudice v Parliament [1995] ECRSC II-189, paras 10–11; Case C-361/01P Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003] ECR I-8283, para 19 (see also per Advocate General Jacobs, paras 23–25, p 8294); Case T-190/12 Tomana v Council and Commission, 22 April 2015, paras 50–52. 111 [1984] ECR 1005 (at 1010). 112 In Case T-435/93 Association of Sorbitol Producers within the EC (ASPEC) v Commission [1995] ECR II-1281, paras 29–30, Case T-442/93 Association des Amidonneries de Cereales de la CEE (AAC) v Commission [1995] ECR II-1329, para 30, and Case T-443/93 Casillo Grani SNC v Commission [1995] ECR II-1375, the procedural problem was rather different because the liquidation of the party (an intervener in the first two cases and an applicant in the third) removed its interest in the proceedings (and in obtaining judgment). 113 [2000] ECR II-2439, p 2441 and para 26 (p 2448). 114 Application to continue may no doubt be made under RP-ECJ, art 151 or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 114 or RP-CST, art 78 but the Allied Corpn and Les Verts cases are authority that it is sufficient to write to the Registrar explaining the circumstances, no order to continue being required. In Case T-99/01 Mystery Drinks GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003] ECR II-43, para 13, the insolvency of the applicant seems to have had no procedural consequences.

345

3.27  Parties

they so wish. If they do not take positive steps to continue the action (if necessary when invited to do so), the action will be regarded as devoid of purpose and the proceedings terminated.115 Where an entity is dissolved and merged with or replaced by another, the procedural consequences are in principle the same as where a party dies or becomes incapable of continuing proceedings and proceedings are continued by a successor or representative: the essential question is whether or not, in the light of the applicable national law and the intention of the persons concerned, the merged or substitute body has validly taken over the identity and the rights of the original applicant.116 However a complete change in the person (although not the name) of the applicant during the course of proceedings appears to be impossible,117 at least after delivery of an interlocutory judgment and possibly before: if the original applicant did not in reality have a right of action at the time of the commencement of proceedings and the true applicant did not bring proceedings in time, the position cannot be saved by substituting the one for the other in the course of the proceedings (the situation is otherwise if the original applicant validly assigns the right of action to another during the course of the proceedings). Where proceedings have been brought jointly by several applicants and one wishes to withdraw (or maintains that proceedings were brought in his name without authority), the Court will make an order removing the name of the person concerned, thus excluding him from the proceedings.118 3.27 Under the scheme of EU law, an action lies between an applicant and a defendant. The former must specify the person against whom the application is made119 but the defendant is determined by reference to the nature of the action and the relief sought. An application is, therefore, inadmissible in so far as it is made against a person who lacks the capacity to be a defendant.120 In addition, the applicant cannot extend the scope of the action by purporting, in a pleading subsequent to the application commencing proceedings, to add, as a new defendant, a third party, even if the third party has the capacity to be a defendant,121

115 Case T-81/98 Boyes v Commission [1999] ECR II-3501 (in that case, the successors could have carried on the proceedings but failed to instruct the deceased’s representatives to do so); Case T-228/11  P  Barbin v Parliament, 17  December 2012 (in that case, the deceased applicant’s representatives did not know who his successors were and the Parliament refused to disclose the information because it was confidential so the GC ordered the Parliament to contact the successors); Case F-68/13  CY  v European Central Bank, 5  November 2014 (the successor declined to continue the proceedings). 116 Case 294/83 and Case 190/84 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986]  ECR  1339 (paras 15–18 and per Advocate General Mancini at 1346–1348) and [1988] ECR 1017 (at 1026–1028 per Advocate General Mancini), respectively; Cases T-39/92 and T-40/92 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires ‘CB’ v Commission [1994] ECR II-49, para 37. 117 Case 250/78 Contifex v EEC, order of 22 September 1982 and Case 250/78 DEKA Getreideprodukte GmbH & Co KG v EEC [1983] ECR 421 (at 434–436, Advocate General Mancini). A change in name is not relevant: Cases C-199/01P and C-200/01P IPK-Munchen Gmb h v Commission [2004] ECR I-4627, Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, para 19 (p 4638). 118 Eg Case 167/86 Rousseau v Court of Auditors [1988] ECR 2705 at 2707. 119 RP-ECJ, art 120(b); RP-GC, art 76(c); RP-GC, art 177(1)(c); RP-CST, art 50(1)(c). 120 Eg Pellegrini & C Sas v Commission and André v Council and Commission (above, notes 40 and 42). 121 Case 90/77 Hellmut Stimming KG v Commission [1977] ECR 2113.

346

Parties 3.29

unless the addition of the new defendant is made within the time limit for commencing proceedings.122 The only exception to that appears to be the situation where, although there is a defect in the formal identification of the defendant, the certain implication from the terms of the application is that the correct defendant was intended. Thus, in Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council,123 Spain brought an action for the annulment of a directive ‘of the European Parliament and of the Council’ but named only the latter as the defendant in the proceedings. The ECJ nonetheless regarded it as a certain implication from the application that the action was brought against both institutions as the authors of the directive in question. 3.28 The joinder of other parties at the order of the Court or at the request of the applicant or defendant is not expressly envisaged in either the Statute or the Rules of Procedure although third parties may, of their own volition, apply to intervene.124 An intervener does not, however, have the status of an additional applicant or defendant.125 There are limited exceptions to that. For example, where the Commission brings an action before the Court under EAEC, art 20 (which remains in force), the defendant to the proceedings is, strictly speaking, a member state or the national authority competent to grant or cause to be granted the licence in question; nevertheless, it is expressly provided that the proprietor must be heard by the Court. 3.29 The power of the Court to order, or allow, a third party to be joined (otherwise than as an intervener), in the absence of an express provision entitling it to do so, has been considered in several cases. The idea was rejected by Advocate General Roemer in his opinions in Cases 42 and 49/59 Breedband v Société des Acieries du Temple and Cases 9 and 12/60 Belgium v Societe Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs and High Authority.126 In his view, the structure of proceedings before the Court allowed only ‘voluntary intervention’ and excluded compulsory joinder of third parties.127 Both cases were third party proceedings brought under art 36 of the ECSC Statute, which, in the authentic French version, gave persons the right to commence such proceedings against judgments ‘rendus sans qu’elles aient été appelés’. The English version said ‘rendered without their being heard’, which does not give the full flavour of the original or that of 122 Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council [2004] ECR I-7789, paras 14–16. 123 Above (note 122), para 17. See also Case T-591/11 Przedsiebiorstwo Handlowe Medox Lepiarz Jaroslaw Lepiarz Alicja sp. j. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 11  December 2013, paras 18–22 (identification of intervener as defendant irrelevant because the action was clearly directed against the decision of the Office). 124 RP-CST, art 89 provides for a species of voluntary intervention that may be initiated by the CST; but it is not a form of compulsory joinder of a party. 125 Interveners in IP appeals who were also parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal do, however, have the same rights as the main parties: RP-GC, art 173(3). The entitlement to be a party in an IP appeal derives solely from the fact of being a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Cf Case T-10/03 Koubi v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-719, para 33. 126 [1962] ECR 145 and 171 at 161 and 187 respectively. 127 Other than defendants: ibid p 188.

347

3.30  Parties

other texts such as the German and Italian versions. The same phrase appears in Statute, art 42. It really means ‘without being called on to appear’. The Court did not go so far as Advocate General Roemer. In Belgium v Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs and High Authority it contented itself with holding that third party proceedings ‘provide a method of recourse, on the one hand, for a third party who, having been called upon (‘appelé’) to take part in the original case, was unable to participate for justifiable reasons and, on the other hand, for any person who was not in a position to intervene’.128 The inference is that it regarded being called on ‘to take part’ in the case as being equivalent to intervention: it had previously remarked that the (voluntary) intervention procedure existed in order to allow persons with an interest in the result of the proceedings to raise the matter before judgment in the case. It said nothing about the existence of a compulsory intervention procedure; neither, however, did it exclude it expressly. 3.30 The next occasion on which the problem arose was in Case 27/62 and Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission.129 In both cases the applicant applied to the Court, apparently under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151, for an order joining one of the member states to the proceedings. The Court decided to hear argument on the point and fixed the date for the hearing but, so far as can be seen, the matter did not go further: Case 27/62 appears to have been discontinued because it never came to judgment and, as far as Case 25/62 is concerned, it is certain that the applicant withdrew the request. In Reynier v Commission130 the application was made against the EC with the object of having the Council joined as defendant in order to obtain sight of documents and other information in its possession. The real defendant was the Commission. Advocate General Roemer remarked131 that thought might be given to the necessity in such cases for some means of joining parties compulsorily but said that that ‘has hitherto been foreign to the procedural law of the Court’. In Case 19/68 De Cicco v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben,132 the Court was asked to ‘summon’ a third party to participate in a reference for a preliminary ruling but declined to do so on the ground that the parties to such proceedings are defined in the Statute. 3.31 In Case 12/69 Wonnerth v Commission,133 the applicant applied for the compulsory joinder of a third party but the Court rejected that because ‘compulsory intervention’ was not provided for in the Rules of Procedure. Advocate General Roemer said that ‘whatever one’s opinion on the system of compulsory intervention and, in particular, on the question whether it could exist in our procedural law, the decisive factor is that it does not appear in the provisions at present in force governing the procedure of the Court’.134 In Case 184/80 Van Zaanen v

128 Above, note 126 (at 181–182). 129 [1963] ECR 95 at 106. 130 Above, note 21: a similar situation arose in several of the staff cases decided in 1964. 131 Ibid at 271. 132 [1968] ECR 473 at 479 and 484 (col 1). 133 [1969] ECR 577, para 8. Followed in Case T-301/11 Ben Ali v Council, 11 January 2012, paras 79–80. 134 Wonnerth at 590.

348

Parties 3.32

Court of Auditors135 and Case T-1/90 Pérez Mínguez Casariego v Commission,136 it was argued that the application was inadmissible because a third party affected by the issue was not joined as a party. In both cases the Court rejected that on the ground that the applicant nevertheless had an interest in obtaining judgment; the fact that a third party who could have intervened has chosen not to do so cannot be an objection to the admissibility of an action. Case C-317/09 P ArchiMEDES v Commission137 was a contractual dispute which included a counterclaim made by the defendant and in which the applicant unsuccessfully sought at first instance the compulsory joinder of the other parties to the contract. Joinder was refused on the ground that it was not provided for in the rules of procedure; and that decision was upheld on appeal on the different ground that, whether or not the GC rules of procedure could be construed as enabling compulsory joinder of a third party to the litigation, the appellant had not shown that compulsory joinder was justified. In the result, it is clear that, although the Court has been aware of the advantage, in some cases, of compulsory joinder of third parties, the possibility has been excluded because it would require an express power in the Rules of Procedure.

X

TRANSFER OR ASSIGNMENT OF A RIGHT OF ACTION OR RIGHT TO REPRESENT A PARTY

3.32 A  right of action may validly be transferred or assigned; or one person may be given the right to represent a party in proceedings.138 In the present context, the latter situation is not that which arises when a party’s lawyer or agent changes but that which arises where the person exercising a right of action changes without the right itself being transferred. In most instances, the Court is not concerned with whether or not the transfer or assignment represents a transfer of the right of action or a transfer of the right to represent a person having the right of action. Where the change takes place during the course of proceedings, it may result in the necessity to change the name and identity of the relevant party to the proceedings; but that is not normally necessary in the case of a change in the identity of the person representing a party in the proceedings.

135 [1981]  ECR  1951, see para  13 of the judgment and also, per Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, p 1971. 136 [1991] ECR II-143, paras 41–43. 137 [2010] ECR I-150*, paras 119–125 (on appeal from Case T-396/05 ArchiMEDES v Commission [2009] ECR II-70*, paras 70–73). 138 Eg Case T-1/96 Bocker-Lensing v Council and Commission [1999] ECR I-1, paras 27–30; Case T-412/05 M v Ombudsman [2008] ECR II-197*, para 49 (M could not sue in respect of nonmaterial loss caused to a member of his family unless the right of action had been assigned to him or he had otherwise been authorised to bring proceedings on behalf of the person suffering the loss); CPEM (above, note 75), paras 39–40 (employer cannot sue for damages on behalf of its employees unless authorised by them to do so); Case C-401/09P Evropaiki Dynamiki Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v European Central Bank, 9 June 2011, paras 34–39.

349

3.33  Parties

3.33 In Cases 4–13/59 Mannesmann v High Authority,139 the High Authority had adopted two decisions addressed to two German companies which ceased to exist, pursuant to a reconstruction of the group of which they were a part, before the decisions were communicated to them. As a result of the reconstruction, all their assets and liabilities were transferred to a third company, the applicant in the action. The Court held that the applicant could bring proceedings against the High Authority as assignee of the addressees. A similar situation arose in Case 238/78 Ireks-Arkady GmbH v Council and Commission140 where an action for damages was brought by the assignee of the injured party. The assignment had been made in the context of the reorganisation of the group to which both the assignor and the assignee belonged. The Court held that there was no reason to prevent a right to compensation from being both claimed and enforced in legal proceedings by an assignee ‘in circumstances such as those of the present case which do not give cause to believe that the assignment may have led to an abuse’. If a claim is validly assigned the assignor thereby ceases to be entitled to bring proceedings in respect of the claim.141 The assignee of a right is subrogated to the right of action arising where the right is infringed and therefore an assignment of a right (for example) to payment of a refund carries with it a right to damages in respect of any unlawful refusal to pay the refund.142 In relation to the transfer of intellectual property rights, the view has been taken that the transfer does not, by itself, affect the right of the transferor to be a party to proceedings or affect his capacity or status as such. Accordingly, the transferor does not cease to be a party to the proceedings, and the transferee cannot become a party to them, in the absence of a Court order. In order to effect the substitution of the transferee for the transferor, or the addition of the transferee as a party to the proceedings, it is necessary for the transferee to apply to be joined as a party, using the intervention procedure (although, if joined as a party, the transferee will have the status of a main party, not an intervener). For the transferee to be substituted for the transferor, there must be no objection from the latter and the Court must consider it appropriate after hearing the views of the other parties.143 3.34 A different tack seems to have been taken in the JFE Engineering Corpn case.144 There, a Commission decision finding a breach of the EU competition rules and imposing fines on the perpetrators had been addressed to several undertakings. In the course of proceedings before the CFI (as it then was) for the annulment of the decision, two of the undertakings merged and the rights and obligations of one of them were transferred to the other. The CFI held that an action for annulment brought by the addressee of a measure can be pursued by 139 [1960] ECR 113 at 129, see also per Advocate General Roemer at 137. 140 [1979] ECR 2955, para 5. 141 Cases 256, 257, 265, 267/80, 5 and 51/81 and 282/82 Birra Wührer SpA  v Council and Commission [1984] ECR 3693, para 7. 142 Ibid, para 12. 143 Case T-94/02 Hugo Boss (above, note 109), in particular, paras 24–31; Case T-131/03 Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-3019. For the intervention procedure, see Ch 5, para 5.55 ff. 144 Above (note 105), paras 43–51, followed in Raffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Commission (above, note 109), paras 69–75.

350

Parties 3.35

the transferee of all the addressee’s business, the transferee being ‘necessarily substituted by operation of law for its predecessor as addressee of the contested measure’. However (it held), the Court has no power to amend the decision so as to substitute the correct addressee for the original addressee where the latter still exists. Hence the naming of a person as addressee in the decision fixes the identity of the person who can bring proceedings for the annulment of the decision; and the right of action cannot be transferred to another person even (apparently) when that other person is substituted by operation of law for the original addressee as addressee of the decision. That reasoning appears to be less than entirely satisfactory. To begin with, it is difficult to follow why, if one person is substituted by operation of law for another as the addressee of a decision, the right of action is not also transferred. In such circumstances, the original addressee has no interest in continuing the proceedings and the correct procedural solutions are either to permit the original addressee to continue them, acting on behalf of the true, successor, addressee, or to join the successor addressee to the proceedings in substitution for the original addressee. If the successor does not wish to continue the proceedings, they will come to an end either because the successor refuses to permit the original addressee to continue them or because the successor declines to apply to be joined as a party in substitution for the original addressee. More fundamentally, however, it is far from evident that the transfer of a business from one person to another does substitute the transferee for the transferor as the addressee of the decision by operation of law or, indeed, by any other means. It is perfectly possible for a decision to migrate, as it were, in company with the transfer of a business or a collection of assets: that depends upon the nature of the decision. It is more usual for the addressee to remain the addressee of a decision, despite the transfer of its business and assets, with the right to challenge the decision transferring only by assignment (or the equivalent), as indicated in the cases cited above.145 In JFE Engineering the CFI may have been thinking about the cases that suggest that, where a decision imposes a fine or other obligations on an undertaking (being an economic unit), the liabilities flowing from the decision attach to the assets comprising the undertaking and may therefore pass from hand to hand as those assets are transferred from one person to another. However, the cases are not as simple as that.146 3.35 The kind of abuse that may nullify the effect of an assignment is exemplified by Case 250/78  DEKA  Getreideprodukte GmbH & Co KG  v EEC.147 There, a damages claim had been assigned by an insolvent company in order to avoid the extinguishment of the claim by set-off. The Court held that the assign 145 In the case of an action for annulment or an action in respect of a failure to act, it does not appear that there can be a ‘bare’ assignment of the right of action since such proceedings can be entertained only if the applicant has a legitimate interest (as to which, see Ch 7, para 7.14 ff). Accordingly, an assignment of the right of action would normally be premised on the assignment or transfer of the material elements (property, a business) that, having regard to the legal effects of the decision or failure to act in question, generate the interest in the proceedings. 146 Eg Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01 Tokai Carbon Co Ltd v Commission [2004] ECR II-1181, paras 278–281 (decided just over two moths before JFE Engineering). 147 Above, note 117.

351

3.36  Parties

ment could not be relied on as against the EU because: (i) it was abusive; and (ii) the assignee had not acted in good faith since, at all material times, it knew of the abusive purpose of the assignment. The Court based its judgment on the general principles common to the laws of the member states which govern the EU’s non-contractual liability under what is now TFEU, art 340. It does not, however, seem that that approach is restricted to actions for damages: the better view is that, in any proceedings, an assignment of the cause of action may be excluded if it is found to constitute an abuse of procedure. On the other hand, it must be doubted whether the scope of the possibility of assignment is as broad in most proceedings as it is in actions for damages: it may well be accepted that a claim for damages may be assigned for a consideration to a third party unconnected with the injured party but it would appear that a claim for annulment may pass by assignment or other means only if the interest in obtaining annulment also passes, ie if the assignee is the successor to the assignor as the subject of the act sought to be annulled. 3.36 The possibility and conditions of assignment are governed by EU law but, in Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission,148 Advocate General Capotorti was of the opinion that national law governs the assignment itself.149 In other words, both the form (eg whether notification of the assignment to the debtor is necessary to effect it) and the legal effect of the transaction whereby the obligation passes from one person to another, are determined by the proper law of the transaction. Hence, if the effect of the assignment under national law is to pass the benefit of the obligation but not the right of action to it, proceedings must be brought by the assignor, albeit that the benefit of the action accrues to the assignee. However, a failure to comply with an irrelevant administrative rule applicable to an assignee does not invalidate an assignment so far as EU law is concerned.150 Further, the defendant cannot rely on its own unlawful acts in order to dispute the effectiveness of an assignment.151 One problem that remains unresolved is the question whether the proper law of the assignment is determined by the independent election of the parties or by reference to the country with the closest connection to the subject matter of the assignment. For example, if a claim for damages, which is, ex hypothesi, a claim under EU law not national law, arises from the alleged wrongful abolition of production refunds from which an undertaking incorporated and trading in one member state would have benefited, and if, under the national law of that member state, an assignment is effective to pass the benefit of the obligation but not the right of action, may the parties to the assignment choose the national law of any member state (or a third country) most favourable for their purposes, and so avoid the limitations of the law of the country in which the assignor is established, or are they bound to comply with that law, to the exclusion of others, or some other law, even if the assignee is established in another member state or even a third country? To that question there is no clear answer. There is no doubt but that identification of the 148 Above, note 140, at 2986–2987. 149 See also the DEKA case (above, note 117) per Advocate General Mancini. 150 Birra Wührer v Council and Commission (above, note 141) at paras 8–10. 151 Ibid, paras 13–14.

352

Parties 3.38

proper law of the assignment is a question of EU law. On that basis the question may well be decided on a comparative study of the laws of the member states, but the better view seems to be that the parties to the assignment may select the proper law that they prefer; in the event of a failure to specify the proper law, it would appear to be that of the country with the closest connection to the transfer.

XI ALTERING THE DESCRIPTION OF A PARTY ON THE PLEADINGS 3.37 A  rather different situation is that where a mistaken description of a party in the pleadings is corrected. Strictly speaking, that does not entail the removal or substitution of a party but the correct identification of the true party.152 However, the mistake may lie not so much in the description of the party concerned but in the naming of the wrong person as a party to the proceedings, in which case a correction of the error would involve the substitution of a person as party. 3.38 A  borderline case of that sort was Case T-497/93 Hogan v Court of Justice,153 a staff case in which the named defendant was ‘the appointing authority of the Court of Justice’. The correct description of the defendant was ‘Court of Justice’ and no one was misled about the mistaken description given by the applicant (although the applicant insisted repeatedly that the action was not brought against the Court of Justice but against the appointing authority). It seems to have been accepted by the CFI (as it then was) that the misdescription of the defendant was in itself sufficient to justify dismissing the action as inadmissible; but the CFI decided to deal with the case on the basis that the error had not been made ‘in view of the circumstances and in order to ensure judicial protection.’ Surprisingly, the applicant took objection to that stance and relied on it as a ground of appeal against the CFI’s judgment. The ECJ upheld the CFI on the ground that what the CFI had done did not adversely affect the applicant’s interests. Thus, the ECJ regarded the alteration of the name of the defendant by the CFI as an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, albeit one that, because it entailed no adverse effects for the applicant, could not ground an appeal. The correctness of that analysis is open to doubt. It may be contrasted with an earlier case, Case T-162/89 Mommer v Parliament,154 a staff case in which the applicant named as defendant the secretary general of a political group at the European Parliament rather than either the Parliament or the Parliament’s appointing authority. That was a clear case of the citation of the wrong person as defendant. It was not a misdescription of the true defendant. On the other hand, in Hogan, the applicant had correctly identified the author of the decision

152 Eg Case T-572/93 Odigitria AAE  v Council and Commission [1995]  ECR II-2025, para  22; Case T-174/94 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECR II-2289, paras 40–43 (where the true party was identified by tracking the authority given to bring the proceedings). 153 Above (note 22). 154 [1990] ECR II-709, see paras 18–20.

353

3.39  Parties

contested in the proceedings (the appointing authority of the Court of Justice) but had overlooked the fact that the acts and defaults of an appointing authority are attributable to the institution in question. Hence, the description given of the defendant could have been construed only as a reference to the Court of Justice. In Case T-85/97 Interprovinciale des Federations d’Hoteliers, Restaurateurs, Cafetiers et Entreprises Assimilees de Wallonie SWBL  v Commission,155 the defendant was not identified at all in the application but, on the lodgement of the application at the Court, the lawyer representing the applicant sent a fax to the Court stating that the defendant was the Commission. The proper defendant could have been identified by necessary implication from the fact that the action challenged a Commission decision; but as any doubt was removed (in writing) on the day of lodgement of the application, the case is better classified as an instance of the remedying of a defect in a pleading at the very outset of the proceedings (something which poses no problems). 3.39 In Case T-482/93 Weber v Commission,156 proceedings were commenced by a firm under German civil law that lacked legal personality. The firm consisted of two natural persons who signed the letter of authority granted to the party’s lawyer and empowering him to commence proceedings. After the defendant had objected to the admissibility of the action on the ground that the applicant did not have locus standi, the CFI (as it then was) took the initiative and ‘rectified’ the designation of the applicant by adding the names of the two legal persons that it comprised. The defendant’s objection to the admissibility of the action was rejected on the grounds that: (i) the application was to be construed as having been made by the natural persons comprising the firm as well as by the firm itself; and (ii) since it was a single action, admissible as brought by those natural persons, it was unnecessary to consider the admissibility of the action from the standpoint of the firm.157 On the face of it, that case was one of misdescription of the applicant, the misdescription deriving from the fact that, as the firm lacked legal personality, it could be taken to be nothing more than a compendious reference to the two natural persons who comprised it. However, if that was the correct analysis (and the writer considers that it is), ground (ii) was superfluous because the firm was not, as such, a party at all.

XII PARTIES IN IP APPEALS 3.40 In IP appeals before the GC, there are two compulsory parties: the applicant and the defendant. The latter is the Office to which the Board of Appeal which made the disputed decision belongs.158 Notice of the commencement of proceedings, and the application itself, are also served on all the other parties 155 [1997] ECR II-2113, para 10. 156 [1996] ECR I-609, paras 25, 28 and 40–41. No such problem arose in Case T-390/94 Schroder v Commission [1997] ECR II-501 because the application named the partners in the partnership as applicants, in addition to the partnership itself: see paras 33–34. 157 On the second point, see further note 102 above. 158 RP-GC, art 172.

354

Parties 3.40

to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.159 Those persons are entitled to participate as intervening parties in the IP appeal160 but are not obliged to do so. Although described as ‘interveners’, they have the same procedural rights as the other parties.161 They become intervening parties ‘by responding to the application in the manner and within the time limit prescribed’.162 In fact, the position is more complicated because provision is made for a kind of temporary or conditional status as a party to the proceedings. A party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (other than the applicant in the IP appeal) achieves definitive status as a party to the IP appeal by lodging a response to the application within the time fixed for doing so. If, before the expiry of that time limit, he lodges ‘a procedural document’, he also becomes a party to the proceedings but will lose that status if he fails subsequently to ‘respond to the application in the manner and within the time limit prescribed’.163 The ‘response’ envisaged appears to be the pleading (called a ‘response’) that, in an IP appeal, takes the place of a defence (when lodged by the defendant) and the written observations of an intervener supporting the applicant or defendant (in an ordinary direct action).164 The ‘procedural document’ that gives a person temporary or provisional status as a party to the IP appeal is a pleading or application, other than a response, that is lodged by that person before the expiry of the time limit for lodging a response. Thus, a person becomes (provisionally) a party if he takes a procedural step involving the lodging of a procedural document (such as lodging a preliminary objection to admissibility, written observations on a preliminary objection lodged by another party, or any other step, such as an application to stay the proceedings, or written observations on such an application).165 If the proceedings are terminated (for whatever reason) without any response being lodged, the provisional status as a party persists throughout the course of the proceedings (hence, if a preliminary objection to admissibility is lodged and is successful, thereby obviating the need to lodge a response, a person making, or submitting written observations on, the preliminary objection will be and have been a party to the proceedings even though no response is lodged by anyone). On the other

159 RP-GC, art 178(1) and (3). 160 Described variously in RP-GC, art 173(1)–(4) as an ‘intervener’, ‘a party to the proceedings before the General Court, as intervener’ and ‘a party’. 161 RP-GC, art 173(3). 162 RP-GC, art 173(1). 163 RP-GC, art 173(2). 164 See RP-GC, art 179. 165 The mischief addressed by that complicated way of going about things is supposedly illustrated by the order of 11 August 2010 in Case T-49/10 The Footwear Co Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs). There, the applicant discontinued before a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal had lodged a response and become a party (in accordance with the GC rules as they were then worded). That party had, however, incurred legal costs in preparing its response and applied for (and was awarded) costs upon the discontinuance. It therefore seems to be envisaged that one of the procedural documents making a person a party could be an application for costs made in consequence of the discontinuance of the proceedings by the applicant (on the ground, no doubt, that, until the President orders the removal of the case from the register under RP-GC, art 125 (which applies pursuant to RP-GC, art 191), the proceedings remain pending).

355

3.41  Parties

hand, the provisional status as a party is lost if no response is lodged where, and by the time when, lodging a response is called for. 3.41 In IP appeals, express provision is made for changing a party when an intellectual property right ‘affected’ by the proceedings has been transferred to a third party by a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.166 In that event, the successor in title may apply to replace the ‘original’ party in the proceedings before the GC.167 That provision applies where any of the parties to the GC proceedings is the holder of the right in question and transfers it to a third party at any time in the course of the proceedings.168 The change in the party is not automatic because an application must be made (by the successor in title) to replace the party in question.169 The application is served by the GC on all the other parties and they are given an opportunity to submit written or (as the case may be) oral observations on the application.170 The decision on the application is either made by the President in the form of a reasoned order or is included in the decision closing the proceedings.171 In the latter event, it seems that the judgment disposing of the case simply sets out the reasoning and decision of the President. If the application is refused, costs may be awarded (against the person making the application) in the usual way.172 If the application is upheld, the successor in title takes over as a party from the transferor of the intellectual property right and the proceedings continue. In consequence, the successor in title takes the case in the state in which he finds it and, more particularly, takes over the case as articulated by the transferor of the right at the time when he replaces the latter.173 That does not seem to preclude the successor in title from discontinuing the proceedings (if he replaces the applicant) or conceding a point made previously by the transferor of the right. On the other hand, the replacement of the transferor by the successor in title does not enable the latter to extend or alter in other respects the case previously advanced by the transferor.

166 That seems to have occurred for the first time in Hugo Boss (above, note 109). 167 RP-GC, art 174. 168 RP-GC, art 175(1) states that an application to replace a party may be made ‘at any stage of the proceedings’. Although it must be made in writing, the other parties may be allowed to submit oral submissions on it: see RP-GC, art 176(2). That suggests that the application may be made (in writing) immediately before the hearing. It may also be made when the case has been taken into deliberation but before judgment has been delivered: see, for example, Case T-310/04 Ferrero Deutschland v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006]  ECR II-107*, paras 23–27 (more a case of succession of parties than transfer). 169 RP-GC, art 174. The requirements that must be satisfied by an application are set out in RP-GC, art 175 and considered in Ch 9 below. 170 RP-GC, art 176(1)–(2). 171 RP-GC, art 176(3). 172 RP-GC, art 176(4). 173 RP-GC, art 176(5).

356

Parties 3.42

XIII SERVICE ON PARTIES 3.42 In a direct action the applicant is responsible for identifying the defendant174 (save that, in an IP appeal, the applicant is also responsible for identifying all the other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal);175 but all parties are responsible for indicating to the Court the address to which and manner in which service may be effected upon themselves. In a reference for a preliminary ruling, the referring court is responsible for identifying the parties before it and their address for service; other parties to the preliminary ruling proceedings (such as the member states and EU institutions) are identified by the Court itself. However, as explained in Chapter 1, para 1.141 ff, the service of pleadings and procedural documents on a party is the responsibility of the Court, more particularly, the registry. Any error in service is not, therefore, the responsibility of a party (unless he or she has contributed to the error). If the Court fails to serve an application or other procedural document on a person named as a party in the proceedings, that is in principle something that may be the subject of an application to the Court made by another party to the proceedings, particularly where there is an issue as to whether or not the person concerned is a party to the proceedings or should be served.176

174 RP-ECJ, art 120(b); RP-GC, art 76(c); RP-CST, art 50(1)(c). 175 RP-GC, art 177(2). 176 Eg Case T-177/94 Altmann v Commission [1994] ECR II-1245. The application would be made as a preliminary plea or issue under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83.

357

Chapter 4

Representation and legal aid

I

REPRESENTATION AND ASSISTANCE

A Introduction 4.1 The Statute and Rules of Procedure differentiate between ‘representation’ by an agent (in the case of member states, EU institutions, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority) or by a lawyer (in the case of other persons, including other states), and ‘assistance’, which is provided by an adviser or lawyer to an agent. The precise significance of the terms representation and assistance is not apparent. In proceedings before the International Court of Justice, the representation of states is regarded as comprising two elements which may both be combined in the same person: political representation by an ‘agent’ and professional representation by an advocate or counsel. The difference between the two is that the agent is vested with full power to bind his government and take all decisions necessary in the course of the proceedings while the advocate’s or counsel’s authority does not go so far and statements of a binding character made through an advocate or counsel must be authorised by the agent.1 It is arguable that that distinction was the source of the provision in the Statute that member states and EU institutions are represented by an agent who may be assisted by an adviser or lawyer.2 On the other hand, in, for example, French civil procedure, representation signifies not only the power to bind the party represented but also the authority to submit written pleadings. Assistance is restricted to giving legal advice to the party and submitting oral argument on his behalf but not binding him in any way. Representation may comprise assistance but the reverse is not the case.3 Since, unlike the International Court of Justice, persons other than states (and EU institutions) may be parties before the Court, it is equally arguable that the draftsman of the original version of the Statute (which dates back to the era of the ECSC) had something like the French approach in mind. The topic of representation and assistance can be divided into a discussion of the persons capable of performing either function and a discussion of what those functions comprise.

1 See Rosenne, The World Court (1989) p 117. 2 Statute, art 19, 1st para. 3 Eg Vincent, Procédure Civile (18th edn, 1976) para 371 ff.

359

4.2  Representation and legal aid

B

Persons capable of representation and assistance

4.2 The general rule is that member states, EU institutions, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority are represented before the Court by an agent appointed for each case and that all other persons (including third countries which are not EEA states) are represented by a ‘lawyer authorised to practise before a court’ of a member state or EEA state.4 The meaning of that phrase is considered in section II below. There is one exception to that rule:5 in references for a preliminary ruling, the Court ‘shall take account of the rules of procedure in force before the court or tribunal which made the reference’ in so far as the representation and attendance (before the Court) of the parties to the proceedings before the national court or tribunal are concerned.6 The meaning of that is also considered in para 4.33 below. 4.3 Where a member state or EU institution is represented by an agent, he or she may be assisted either by an adviser or by a lawyer authorised to practise before a member state or EEA state.7 As far as other persons are concerned, the Statute does not provide that their representatives may be assisted by anyone. Parties to the proceedings before a national court or tribunal making a reference for a preliminary ruling appear to be in a different position because, as has been seen, the national rules are taken into account regarding both representation and appearance. Hence it is possible for a litigant in person to submit written and oral arguments to the Court in a reference for a preliminary ruling, without being either represented or assisted by a lawyer, if he or she has right of audience before the national court or tribunal making the reference.8 As will be seen, that is not possible in a direct action and an appeal.9

C

The functions comprising representation and assistance

4.4 At least theoretically, the functions of representation and assistance ought between them to cover each and every one of the different functions that a person acting for a party in legal proceedings must perform in such proceedings. The distinction between representation and assistance, and the proper 4 Statute, art 19, 1st to 4th paras. 5 In proceedings under the ECSC  Treaty, governed by the ECSC  Statute, there was another exception: under the ECSC  Statute there was no provision relating to the representation of persons other than the member states and EU institutions; it was, therefore, to be supposed that, in all proceedings under the ECSC Treaty, the question of the representation of such persons was a matter of national law. Cf Case 18/57 Nold KG v High Authority [1959] ECR 41 at 48–49 of the judgment and 60 (Advocate General Roemer). In Case 75/69 Firma Ernst Hake & Co v Commission [1970] ECR 535, the applicant was ‘represented’ by the person entitled to do so under national law (see the title of the Order reported at [1970] ECR 901) and he was ‘assisted’ by a lawyer. That needs to be borne in mind when looking at ECSC cases. 6 RP-ECJ, art 97(3). 7 Statute, art 19, 1st and 4th paras. 8 See, for example, Case 39/75 Coenen v Sociaal-Economische Road [1975] ECR 1547; Case 238/83 Caisse d’Allocations, Familiales v Meade [1984] ECR 2631 at 2635. 9 In Case C-535/12  P  Faet Oltra v European Ombudsman, 6  June 2013, the ECJ reviewed comprehensively the prohibition on litigants in person and upheld it.

360

Representation and legal aid 4.6

functions of each, are relevant only to certain parties to proceedings before the Court: member states, EU institutions, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority. Other parties are merely ‘represented’ and not ‘assisted’ by another person. Hence, ‘representation’ appears to encompass all the functions required of a person who acts for a party.10 ‘Assistance’ refers to some part of the functions denominated in the aggregate by the term ‘representation’. 4.5 However, the general requirement that any party to proceedings (save a party to preliminary ruling proceedings, to whom the rules of procedure of the referring court apply) must be ‘represented’ by someone (whether an agent or a lawyer) suggests a general proposition that a person cannot act alone and for itself as a party in proceedings before the Court but must have recourse to another person.11 That general proposition is of equal application to those parties who are ‘represented’ by an agent as to those parties who are ‘represented’ by a lawyer; but there is an important distinction that affects only parties who are ‘represented’ (as opposed to being ‘assisted’) by a lawyer. 4.6 In more concrete terms, the original of every pleading must be signed by the party’s agent or lawyer.12 A ‘pleading’ here means any procedural document. The only exceptions to that rule are applications for legal aid13 and, in certain circumstances, written observations in references for a preliminary ruling.14 10 Thus, in Case T-37/98 Foreign Trade Association v Council [2000] ECR I-373, para 20, the GC held that only the lawyer representing a party ‘may validly undertake procedural steps before the Court’. In Case T-151/03 Nuova Agricast Srl v Commission [2005] ECR II-1967, para  29, the GC said: ‘Representation in court proceedings consists in one person acting in such proceedings in the name and on behalf of another person, with the legal effects of the proceedings being exclusively to the benefit of the latter or exclusively to be borne by the latter. The representative, in this case the lawyer, is no more than an intermediary for the person represented, who alone, so far as the court is concerned, is party to the proceedings’. 11 See now RP-ECJ, art  119(1) and RP-GC, art  51(1) (which apply to direct actions). As to the case law, see: Cases T-479/93 and T-559/93 Bernardi v Commission [1994]  ECR II1115, para  20; Case C-174/96P  Lopes v Court of Justice [1996]  ECR  I-6401, paras 11–12 (no infringement thereby of fundamental human rights); Case C-175/96P  Lopes v Court of Justice [1996]  ECR  I-6409, paras 11–12; Case C-200/05P  Correia de Matos v Commission [2006] ECR I-43*, para 10. 12 RP-ECJ, art 57(1); RP-GC, art 73(1); RP-CST, art 45(2), 1st subpara. In the case of pleadings lodged by means of e-Curia, the user identification of the party’s representative (the agent or lawyer) constitutes his signature of the document: see the decisions of the ECJ, GC and CST on the lodging and service of documents by means of e-Curia, art 3 (OJ 2011 No C289/7, 9 and 11). 13 RP-ECJ, art  186(2); RP-GC, art  147(2); RP-CST, art  111(1). In Case 10/81 Farrall v Commission [1981] ECR 717 an application for legal aid was rejected as inadmissible but the reason for doing so is not apparent from the judgment. 14 RP-ECJ, art 57(1) also applies to procedural documents lodged in the course of a preliminary ruling but, under RP-ECJ, art 97(3), the ECJ has regard to the rules of procedure of the referring court in relation to the representation before it of the parties to the proceedings before the referring court. Therefore, written observations do not need to be signed by an agent or lawyer of such a party if the referring court’s rules of procedure do not require him to be represented by an agent or lawyer (on the other hand, if he is represented by an agent or lawyer, it would seem that RP-ECJ, art 57(1) would then apply).

361

4.7  Representation and legal aid

Signing a pleading is not just a formality; it is intended to indicate that the lawyer was responsible for the execution and contents of the pleading.15 Evidence must be presented to the Court by the party’s representative (his agent or lawyer) and not by the party himself.16 Further, the oral part of the procedure consists (so far as is here relevant) of the hearing by the Court of the parties’ ‘agents, advisers and lawyers’,17 that is, a hearing of the persons who ‘represent’ or, as the case may be, ‘assist’ the representative of a party. The only true exception to that is in references for a preliminary ruling, where (as noted above) a party to the proceedings before the referring court may address the Court directly if that is permitted by the referring court’s rules of procedure. During the hearing, the Court may permit a witness or expert, or a party in person, to make a statement or answer questions; but that, technically, is by way of a measure of enquiry and is not, strictly speaking, an instance of a person other than an agent, adviser or lawyer formally addressing the Court. Ordinarily, in the course of the hearing, any communication between the Court and a party is made through the party’s representative.18 4.7 Reading the Statute and the Rules of Procedure literally, in the case of parties represented by a lawyer (for whom there is no provision for assistance by an adviser), the lawyer, as the party’s representative, has conduct of all aspects of the procedure, both written and oral. On the other hand, the inference is that, in relation to those parties who must be represented by an agent (who can, in turn, be assisted by an adviser or lawyer), a lawyer assisting the agent can have conduct of both the written and the oral parts of the procedure whereas an adviser assisting the agent can have conduct only of the oral part of the procedure. The reason for that is that the Rules of Procedure do allow for a pleading being signed by a lawyer (as well as an agent) but not by an adviser. The alternative view is that, when the Rules of Procedure refer to procedural documents being signed by the party’s ‘agent or lawyer’, they mean his representative, in which case, a person (whether adviser or lawyer) assisting the agent can have conduct only of the hearing. Either interpretation is plausible when one contemplates the wording of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure as they currently stand; but there are difficulties when one views their interpretation from the historical perspective. Since the ECSC Statute did not require persons other than member states and EU institutions to be ‘represented’ by a lawyer, but only ‘assisted’ by one, the inference is that ‘assistance’ comprises the conduct of the written and/or oral procedure in any action. Viewed in that light, the fact that the Rules of Procedure omit ‘advisers’ from the class of persons who must sign procedural documents looks like a derogation, specific to those parties who are represented by an agent, from the general rule that ‘assistance’ covers both the written and the oral part of the procedure. 15 Eg Case T-320/07 Jones v Commission [2011] ECR II-417*, paras 63–68. 16 Case T-510/09 P V v Commission, 15 June 2011, para 84. 17 Statute, art 20, 4th para. 18 Statute, art 32; RP-ECJ, art 47(2) and 80; RP-GC, art 110(2)–(3); RP-CST, art 63(3)–(4) (in CST proceedings, the judges have express power to ask a party to express himself or herself directly to the Court, and that has been carried over into GC proceedings by RP-GC, art 110(4)).

362

Representation and legal aid 4.9

4.8 Both representation and assistance therefore include, in principle, the right to submit written and oral argument to the Court. The restrictions on the right to be heard (in the broad sense encompassing the making of written and oral submissions) relate to the quality of the person representing or assisting the party, not to his capacity as a representative or assistant. Thus a person who is an agent has an unfettered right to be heard on behalf of the party in question and the same applies to a person who is a lawyer, irrespective of the fact that he is representing or assisting the party; on the other hand an adviser, who can only assist, may not submit written pleadings in his own name and the party himself cannot be heard directly at all. It should, however, be borne in mind that, as has been noted above, the position in references for a preliminary ruling is different because there the Court ‘takes account’ of the rules of procedure of the national court or tribunal making the reference in so far as the parties before that court or tribunal are concerned. In consequence both written and oral observations can be lodged in such proceedings by, for example, a litigant in person, even though in a direct action he would have to be represented or assisted by a lawyer, as long as the rules of the referring court or tribunal would allow him to do so.19 In that respect the rules of procedure refer only to the ‘representation and attendance’ of the parties before the referring court or tribunal but, as has been seen, ‘representation’ covers the submission of both written and oral pleadings. It will be observed, however, that the Court takes account of the rules of the referring court or tribunal, not the national rules of procedure in general or those of any higher or lower court. Hence, a party may not necessarily be represented by someone who has a right of audience before a higher or lower national court if that person has no right of audience before the referring court (and no independent right of audience before the ECJ). 4.9 In the light of the foregoing, the precise meaning of ‘representation’ and ‘assistance’ is of limited practical importance; but it seems to be clear that the distinction is not the same as that in French civil procedure. It is closer in spirit to the approach of the International Court of Justice. Put into a formula, it would appear that an adviser or lawyer who ‘assists’ a party (or, strictly speaking, a party’s representative) may speak for him and give him legal advice, but nothing more, while an agent or a lawyer who is a party’s representative can do both, and has authority to bind the party as well.20 Statements made by a representative of 19 See, for example, the Coenen case (above, note 8). 20 On the power of the lawyer representing a party to bind him, see Case F-8/05 REV Fouwels v Commission, 20 September 2011, paras 45–46 and 55–56; Case F-45/06 REV De Buggenoms v Commission, 20 September 2011, paras 45–46 and 55–56; Case F-103/06 REV Saintraint v Commission, 20 September 2011, paras 45–46 and 55–56. In those cases, due to a mistake, the lawyer, who represented a large number of parties, had given notice of discontinuance of the action, contrary to the wishes of some of his clients; so far as the CST was concerned, that was a matter between the lawyer and his clients and the notice of discontinuance was effective. It is in that sense that paras 29–30 of Nuova Agricast (above, note 10) should be read. In para 30, the GC observed: ‘the Court cannot accept the statements of the applicant’s lawyer to the effect that, in essence, he has produced the document at issue in his personal capacity and unbeknown to his principal [that is, the applicant]’. The lawyer had produced in evidence, as an annex to the application commencing proceedings, a document that had come into his possession in the

363

4.10  Representation and legal aid

a party (whether an agent, in the case of a member state, EU institution, EEA state or the EFTA Surveillance Authority, or a lawyer, in the case of other parties) are to be attributed in their entirety to the party in question because it is to be presumed that the representative is properly and fully authorised to represent the party in question.21 It remains to consider certain specific features of the role of a lawyer, acting as representative of a party or as the assistant of an agent.

D

The role of a lawyer as representing or assisting a party

4.10 In the Nold case Advocate General Roemer noted that, under the ECSC  Statute, there was a general necessity for a lawyer;22 and that remains the case in actions before the Court.23 Representation by or, as the case may be, assistance from a lawyer is not a purely formal matter. In Case 108/63 Officine Elettromeccaniche Ing A  Merlini v High Authority,24 another case under the ECSC Treaty, the party’s lawyer signed and apparently submitted under a covering letter a memorandum drawn up by the party himself, lodging it as the reply. The point was taken that it was inadmissible as such. Advocate General Roemer said25 that it complied in formal terms with the rules of procedure because it had been signed by the lawyer but he doubted whether it complied with the spirit of the rules: ‘It might in fact be maintained that the obligation imposed on individuals by the [ECSC Statute] to be assisted by a lawyer has as its aim that there shall be submitted to the Court only legal opinions and explanations of fact which, having been examined by a lawyer are considered by him as fit to be put forcourse of other proceedings, apparently when he was acting in a different capacity. The purpose of the action in Nuova Agricast seems to have been to enable the applicant to obtain possession of the very same document, which the lawyer could not pass on to the applicant for ethical reasons: see paras 1, 25–26, 31 and 33 (para 27 appears to be part of the lawyer’s argument to the GC). However, whatever the constraints that might exist in the professional relationship between the lawyer and his client, as between the client (being a party to the proceedings), his lawyer (being his representative) and the Court, what the lawyer tells the Court is attributable to the party whom he represents. Hence, the lawyer could not assert to the Court that his client did not have a document that the lawyer had in his possession and had relied on before the Court, in his capacity as his client’s representative. 21 Case C-290/89 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I-2851 at 2859 (Advocate General Lenz). 22 Above (note 5), at 59. 23 Eg Case T-14/04 Alto de Casablanca SA  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-3077, paras 9–11 – any exceptions to that requirement must be expressly laid down (para 12); Case T-315/03 Wilfer v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2005] ECR II-1981, paras 10–11 (refusal to allow a patent attorney to represent a party but permission for a patent attorney to address the GC under the supervision of a lawyer); Case T-123/04 Cargo Partner AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2005] ECR II-3979, para 18; Case T-507/04 Bravo-Villasante v Commission [2005]  ECR-SC  I-A-361, II-1609, para  36 (lodgment of an application not signed by a lawyer within time cannot be cured by lodgment of a signed application out of time); Case C-502/06P Correia de Matos v Parliament [2007] ECR I-163* (the appeal from Case T-440/05; the application purporting to commence the appeal was signed only by the party); Faet Oltra (above, note 9). 24 [1965] ECR 1. 25 [1965] ECR 1 at 16.

364

Representation and legal aid 4.11

ward’. The Court was more positive and rejected the pleading as inadmissible.26 The same approach has been followed in later cases, indicating that the involvement of a lawyer is not a matter of adding a name or a signature to a document but requires the involvement of the lawyer in the way suggested by Advocate General Roemer.27 As that approach originated in cases under the ECSC Statute, which referred to lawyers ‘assisting’ a party, it seems to apply in principle where a lawyer ‘assists’ an agent, not just where a lawyer ‘represents’ a party. 4.11 Further, where a lawyer has to be the party’s representative, the fact that the party is himself a lawyer (or has an employee who is a lawyer) does not obviate the need to have the pleadings signed, and the party represented during the oral procedure, by the party’s lawyer (being a person independent of the party).28 The reason is that the requirement in the rules of procedure is concerned not with the professional qualification of the signatory of the pleading (or the person addressing the Court at the hearing), as such, but with his or her status as the party’s representative and, therefore, as the person who has the authority to bind the party and who is subject to the obligations owed by a representative of a party to the Court. As it has been put in several cases: ‘The requirement to have recourse to a third party [as a representative] is based on a conception of the lawyer’s role as collaborating in the administration of justice and as being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of justice, such legal assistance as his client needs.’29 Whereas an agent and (it would appear) an adviser assisting an agent do not need to be independent of the party in question, the same is not the case with regard to a lawyer who represents a party (as opposed, apparently, to assisting the party’s agent): as a matter of EU procedural law (and quite without regard to requirements of national law), a lawyer performing the role of representative must be independent not only in the sense of being a qualified lawyer subject to professional ethics and discipline but 26 Ibid at 9. 27 Eg Case T-339/03 Clotuche v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-29, II-A-2-179, paras 137– 138 (citing Lopes, above, note 11): refusal to consider document referred to in rejoinder because it had been drawn up by the party, not the party’s lawyer. The ruling concerns documents drawn up for the purpose of explaining and advancing the party’s case before the Court (that is, a document whose function is advocacy) and not, for example, evidential documents or correspondence. 28 Eg Case 131/83 Vaupel v European Court of Justice (unreported, 15 March 1984), paras 8–9; Case C-126/90P Viciano v Commission [1991] ECR I-781, paras 4–8; the Lopes cases (above, note 11); Case T-79/99 Euro-Lex European Law Expertise GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [1999] ECR II-3555 (the applicant’s legally qualified director); the Correia de Matos case (above, note 11); Case T-583/08P Ortega Serrano v Commission, 9 March 2010, para 25 (on appeal from Cases F-48/08 and F-48/08AJ Ortega Serrano v Commission [2008]  ECR-SC  I-A-1-335, II-A-1-1835, see paras 31–41); Case F-123/11 Ayres de Abreu v Economic and Social Committee, 13  February 2012; Case C-28/13 P Thesing v European Central Bank, order of 6 November 2013, para 4 (application to intervene made on behalf of the party by a legally qualified employee inadmissible). 29 Eg the Euro-Lex case (above, note 28), para  28; the Alto de Casablanca case (above, note 23), para 10; Case C-363/06P Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia - Generalidad Valenciana v Commission [2008] ECR I-32*, para 26 (the appeal from Case T-357/05 Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia - Generalidad Valenciana v Commission [2006] ECR II-2015). The dictum has also been repeated in later cases cited in this section.

365

4.12  Representation and legal aid

also in the sense of having no employment or other similar connection with the party or a related entity.30 4.12 In Cases 220 and 221/78  ALA  SpA and ALFER  SpA  v Commission31 Advocate General Capotorti accordingly held that applications purporting to commence proceedings, which were signed by the parties’ legal ‘representatives’ but not by a ‘lawyer’, were inadmissible (because the parties’ representative had to be a lawyer) and the defect could not be cured with retrospective effect by subsequently putting them in order because the lack of representation by a lawyer is not simply a formal defect in a pleading.32 Therefore, if a pleading has not been approved and signed by the lawyer representing the party before its lodgment at the Court, that defect must be remedied before the expiry of the time limit for lodging the pleading. If it has not been remedied before then, the pleading is not admissible.33

30 Case T-184/04 Sulvida v Commission [2005] ECR II-85, paras 8–12 (an apparently independent lawyer who was managing director of the party); Case T-357/05 Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia v Commission (above, note 29), para  9; Cases C-74/10P and C-75/10P  European Renewable Energies Federation ASBL  v Commission [2010]  ECR  I-11* (at first instance, Case T-94/07 European Renewable Energies Federation ASBL  v Commission [2009]  ECR II-220*) (an apparently independent lawyer who was also a director of the party); Case T-243/11 Glaxo Group Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2011] ECR II-379* (an in-house lawyer employed by another company in the same group as the applicant); Case C-573/11 P ClientEarth v Commission, 5 September 2013, upholding the decision in Case T-452/10 ClientEarth v Commission [2011] ECR II-257* (an independent lawyer who was also a trustee of the party). For the related entity problem, see: Cases C-422/11P and C-423/11P  Prezes Urzedu Lomunikacji Elektronicznej v Commission, 6 September 2012, in particular, para 33–36 (at first instance, Case T-226/10, 23 May 2011) (lawyers employed by a regulatory body related to but, under national law, distinct from the party); Case T-433/08 Societa italiana degli autori ed editori (SIAE) v Commission, 12 April 2013, paras 56–59 (an employed lawyer; no effect on the proceedings because he was one of a ream of four lawyers, three of whom were independent); Case C-259/14 P ADR Center Srl v Commission, 4 December 2014 (an apparently independent lawyer who was a shareholder in, and president of the board of administration of, the party). 31 [1979] ECR 1693. Followed by the CFI (as it then was) in Foreign Trade Association v Council (above, note 10). 32 The Court decided the case on another ground. See also Farrall v Commission (above, note 13) and Vaupel v European Court of Justice (above, note 28) at paras 8–9. 33 Eg Case C-163/07P  Diy-Nar Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v Commission [2007]  ECR  I-10125, para  26; the Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia case (above, note 29), para  34. The strict nature of the requirement can be seen from Case C-426/10P  Bell & Ross BV  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 22 September 2011, in which a copy of the application commencing proceedings was lodged by fax within time; seven, apparently signed, copies of the application were lodged out of time (but within the period of 10 days provided for in what is now RP-GC, art 73(3)); and the signed original (identified by passing a damp cloth over the signature) was lodged thereafter. The application was nonetheless inadmissible. In contrast, in Case C-458/09P Italy v Commission, 24 November 2011, paras 23–27, an appeal was transmitted to the ECJ by electronic means in the form of an unsigned Word document accompanied by a PDF version of the contents page followed by the representative’s signature. The ECJ held that that was effective lodgment of a copy of the signed original. Where the application has been lodged by an unrepresented person, there is no obligation on the Court to take the initiative and invite the applicant to regularise the application: Case T-583/08P Ortega Serrano (above, note 28), para 25.

366

Representation and legal aid 4.14

4.13 The requirement that the pleading be signed by the lawyer means just that: the original of every pleading or procedural document must have the handwritten signature of the lawyer (and not, for example, a stamped ‘signature’) because that is the only means of ensuring that the lawyer has taken responsibility for the document.34 Someone else cannot validly sign (or ‘pp’) for the lawyer as his delegate, even if authorised to do so by the lawyer; and it is not sufficient to give the name of the lawyer’s firm.35 The case law concerning the role of the party’s lawyer expresses in concrete form the essential elements of the lawyer’s role in terms of the relationship between him, the party in question and the Court.

E

Appointment of a person to represent or assist a party and proof of appointment

4.14 In order for someone to represent a party in proceedings before the Court or to assist a party’s representative, that person must be appointed to act in that capacity by someone. The rules of procedure are not generally concerned with the appointment of someone to assist a party’s representative. On the other hand, it is important that the person representing a party in proceedings be actually authorised to do so. RP-ECJ, art  119(2) (which applies to direct actions and appeals)36 provides that an agent or lawyer must lodge at the Registry an official document or authority to act issued by the party whom he represents. That applies irrespective of the identity or legal status of the party. RP-CST, art 31(1) extends that obligation to persons who are assisting a party. In contrast, the GC rules of procedure make no such provision, save that RP-GC, art 51(3) provides that a lawyer representing a legal person governed by private law must lodge at the Registry an authority to act given by the party; no other type of party is required to produce proof of the authority to act given to that party’s representative.37 In order to show that the authority to act has actually been issued or given by the party, it may be necessary to prove that the person issuing or 34 Foreign Trade Association v Council (above, note 10), paras 26–27; Case T-223/06P European Parliament v Eistrup [2007] ECR II-1581, ECR-SC I-B-1-1, II-B-1-1, paras 39–63 (reversing Case F-102/05 Eistrup v Parliament [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-89, II-A-1-329, paras 21–30, in which the CST had held that it was disproportionate to hold the application inadmissible given that it was clear that the lawyer had been responsible for the pleading); Case T-503/13 P Marcuccio v Commission, 19  June 2014, para  20; PD-GC, para  93. For the lengths to which the Court may be prepared to go in order to verify whether or not a pleading has been signed by the party’s lawyer, see Case T-158/99 Thermenhotel Stoiser Franz Gesellschaft mbH & Co KG v Commission [2004] ECR II-1, paras 41–46. 35 The Foreign Trade Association case (above, note 10), paras 29–30. The absence of the lawyer concerned on a business trip on the day in question is not a sufficient reason for the pleading to be signed by someone else: para 31.The GC has been known to send back letters signed with the name of the law firm of the lawyer representing a party on the ground that the name appended to the letter is ‘unknown’ to it (for procedural purposes, the Court ‘knows’ only the lawyer identified as the party’s representative). 36 As to appeals, see RP-ECJ, art 168(2), 173(2) and 177(2). 37 Case T-34/02 EURL Le Levant 001 v Commission [2006] ECR II-267, para 64 (natural persons). The authority to act may have to be produced, even in the case of a party who is a natural person, should its existence be challenged: see below.

367

4.15  Representation and legal aid

giving the authority to act had himself the authority to do so.38 The GC and, to a lesser extent, the CST rules of procedure also require the authority to act to accompany the first pleading lodged on behalf of the party in question (where the obligation to produce an authority to act applies).39 In proceedings before the ECJ, the requirement to produce such proof applies (irrespective of the identity or legal status of the party) but performance of that requirement is not linked to the lodgment of any particular pleading and may therefore take place at a different time. 4.15 Although proof of the authority to act given to the party’s representative need not accompany the first pleading lodged by that party (whether an application or a defence or some other pleading) except where the rules of procedure expressly so provide, it is in the interests of the smooth running of the proceedings if the authority to act is provided to the Court at the outset.40 In any event, the Court is entitled to ask for production of the proof of authority to act (if it so wishes for the sake of good order); and, if the lawyer’s authority is actually challenged (challenges do not seem to be mounted in the case of agents), the proof must be produced, as least if there is reason to doubt the lawyer’s own belief that he has been instructed to represent the party.41 Failure to submit proof of authority to act does not render an application or other pleading a nul 38 Thus, in Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998]  ECR II-2289, paras 41–42, there was evidence that the person who signed the lawyer’s authority to act had been authorised to do so by the applicant (at that time, the GC rules of procedure were more explicit because what was then RP-GC, art 44(5)(b) required production of ‘proof that the authority granted to the applicant’s lawyer has been properly conferred on him by someone authorised for the purpose’). The GC’s commentary on the draft rules eventually adopted in 2015 said, in relation to RP-GC, art 78, that the GC no longer thought it necessary to require proof that the authority to act had been issued by a properly authorised person, that being a matter falling within the responsibility of the lawyer representing the party. However, that does not justify the conclusion that proof that the authority was given by a properly authorised person need not be given if the matter is the subject of challenge. 39 RP-GC, art 78(4) (the application), 81(2) (the defence), 143(4) (an application to intervene) and 194(4) (an appeal). RP-CST, art 50(5) does not require the authority to act to accompany an application: see in that respect PD-CST, para 8 (it is only where the lawyer representing the applicant changes that the CST needs to be informed without delay and provided with the written authorisation given to the new lawyer). On the other hand, RP-CST, art 53(3) requires the authority to act given by the defendant to its representative to be produced at the latest together with the defence. Under RP-CST, art 86(5), the authority to act must be attached to an application to intervene. 40 Case 14/64 Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority [1965] ECR 51 at 62–63 (Advocate General Roemer). Under PD-GC, para 110 and Annex 1 at (c), an application will not be served on the defendant until the authority has been produced. In ECJ proceedings, a failure to produce proof of the authority to act in conjunction with the first pleading lodged by the party concerned is likely to provoke the Registrar into exercising his power under RP-ECJ, art 119(4) or, in the case of an appeal, 168(4) to set a reasonable time-limit within which the authority to act is to be produced. 41 Gualco (above, note 40) at 57; Case T-139/89 Virgili-Schettini v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-535; EURL Le Levant 001 (above, note 37), para 63; Case T-190/12 Tomana v Council and Commission, 22 April 2015, paras 53–63. It should be noted that the Rules of Procedure have been amended since the Gualco case and that both the Court’s judgment and Advocate General Roemer’s Opinion must be read in the light of the Rules as presently framed.

368

Representation and legal aid 4.17

lity but, where (as in the GC rules of procedure) proof of authority to act must accompany the pleading, the failure to do so is a formal defect in the pleading in question which can be rectified with retrospective effect;42 and authorisation of a party’s lawyer ex post facto43 or the later correction of a clerical error in the authorisation44 is acceptable. If, by mistake, the authority given is invalid or proceedings have been commenced before the authority to do so has been given, the pleadings lodged on behalf of the party may still be admissible as long as a valid authority (which may be given with retrospective effect) can be produced;45 but, where the lawyer has no authority to act at all, the pleading is inadmissible. 4.16 The person appointing the lawyer (or agent) may in other respects (such as under domestic procedural rules) properly be described as the party’s ‘representative’ but, for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court only, it is the person (the lawyer or, as the case may be, agent) appointed by him who is the representative. There appear to be no special provisions of EU law governing the method of appointment by a party of its representative or of a lawyer or adviser. Hence, both the appointment by the party of a person charged with the function of appointing the party’s representative in proceedings before the Court (and, in the case of a party represented by an agent, the appointment of a lawyer or adviser to assist the agent) and the actual appointment, by that person, of the party’s representative (and, where relevant, a lawyer or adviser assisting an agent) are determined by national law.46 4.17 In all cases, the authority to act need not take any particular form, such as that of a notarial act. It may use the standard form employed for civil proceedings in the courts of a member state (or, presumably, an EEA state). It is not essential for the authority to act to mention specifically the case before the Court or the particular decision disputed in the action, as long as it is clear that the authority covers the commencement of legal proceedings in relation to the

42 RP-ECJ, art  119(4) and 168(4); RP-GC, art  78(5) (which applies to the defence – RP-GC, art  81(2) – and applications to intervene – RP-GC, art  143(4)) and 194(6); ALA  SpA and ALFER  SpA  v Commission (above, note 31) at 1702 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case T-304/08 Smurfit Kappa Group plc v Commission, 10  July 2012, paras 34–39; see also the Gualco case (above, note 40). However, no similar provision is made in RP-CST, art  53 (defence) or 86 (application to intervene). 43 Cases 193 and 194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989] ECR 1045 (para 33 and at 1062 per Advocate General Darmon); Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2005] ECR II1491, paras 18–21; Case T-458/04 Au Lys de France SA  v Commission [2007]  ECR II-71*, paras 38–39 (authorisation provided by a properly authorised person over 9 months after the commencement of the action); the Smurfit Kappa case (above, note 42), ibid. 44 Cases T-551/93, T-231/94, T-232/94, T-233/94 and T-234/94 Industrias Pesqueras Campos SA v Commission [1996] ECR I-247. 45 The Gualco case (above, note 40) at 62–63; Case C-531/12 P Commune de Millau v Commission, 19 June 2014, paras 33–34. 46 The Nold case (above, note 5) at 48–49 and 60; the Industrias Pesqueras Campos case (above, note 44), paras 51–52.

369

4.18  Representation and legal aid

dispute between the parties.47 The authority to act must also be given by someone who has the power to give it. It is good practice to attach to the first pleading submitted by the party concerned evidence that the issuer of the authority to act has the power to authorise the lawyer or agent; but such evidence can be produced later if required.48

F

Withdrawal of authority to act

4.18 In principle, the relationship between the party and the person representing or assisting him (whether agent, adviser or lawyer) is governed by national law and, in particular, by the professional rules and discipline (if any) to which the agent, adviser or lawyer is subject. The process whereby an agent, adviser or lawyer ceases to act for a party, or the events causing that to happen, are not matters that are subject to the Court’s Rules of Procedure. On the other hand, the Court needs to be informed if there is a change in the person(s) representing or assisting a party for two reasons: (i) the Court needs to be satisfied that a party is properly represented in accordance with the Rules of Procedure; and (ii) the Court communicates with a party through the latter’s representative and therefore needs to know who that person is. Where an agent, adviser or lawyer is replaced, proof of the replacement’s authority to act for the party must be provided to the Court.49 4.19 Where an agent, adviser or lawyer has ceased to act for the party (whether voluntarily or as a result of the party withdrawing the authority to act given to the agent, adviser or lawyer), the position can be more complicated unless a replacement is found fairly quickly. The difficulties usually concern a legal or natural person represented by a lawyer because parties represented by an agent usually change agents without there being any interruption in the representation of the party; and, in the case of persons such as advisers, who assist a party, a change does not affect representation. In the case of lawyers who represent a party, the Court should be informed if and when the lawyer ceases to act for the party as soon as that occurs, unless the appointment of a replacement representative is imminent and the Court can be informed in one communication of the 47 Case T-320/07 Jones (above, note 15), paras 52–59. A single mandate covering several cases is acceptable: Case T-249/04 Combescot v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-181, II-A-2-1219, para 22, and Case T-250/04 Combescot v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-191, II-A-2-1251, para 19. It would therefore seem that a mandate authorising the person concerned to act in ‘any and all proceedings’ before the Court would be sufficient. It is not clear if an even more general mandate, not limited to proceedings before the Court, would be acceptable. It might be if, for example, it were otherwise limited in such a way as to encompass the proceedings before the Court (such as an authority to act in relation to any and all proceedings arising from and in connection with an identified Commission decision, in the case of an action for the annulment of that decision). 48 Eg Case T-145/98  ADT  Projekt Gesellschaft der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Tierzuchter mbH v Commission [2000] ECR II-387, paras 50–54; Case T-180/00 Astipesca SL v Commission [2002]  ECR II-3985, paras 42–46; EURL  Le Levant 001 (above, note 37), paras 54–67 (on formal requirements – date, place and signature). 49 Cf PD-CST, para 8.

370

Representation and legal aid 4.20

replacement of one representative by another. If a party’s lawyer informs the Court that he has ceased to act for a party, without having been replaced by another representative, the practice is for the Court to continue to treat that lawyer as representing the party unless and until the party informs the Court of the party’s new representative. That means that the Court will continue to communicate with the party through the representative identified in the papers in the Court’s file and will expect that representative to pass the Court’s communications on to the party.50 That is so because the Court has no other formal means of communicating with the party and because the Court has not received evidence of the party’s intention or decision to withdraw authority to act from the person identified as being that party’s representative in the papers in the Court’s file. The Court may require the party to appoint a new representative and inform the Court accordingly by a certain date. Where the party in question is the applicant in (or the initiator of) the proceedings, the sanction for failing (without reasonable excuse) to comply with the Court’s order may be the dismissal of the proceedings. Where the party in question is a defending party, the sanction for failing to appoint a new representative is that the party can no longer participate in the proceedings; but the Court must still consider the merits of the claim.51

II

AGENTS, ADVISERS AND LAWYERS

4.20 The Statute refers only to representation or assistance by an agent, lawyer or adviser, as the case may be, in the singular.52 On a strict interpretation, then, there can be only one representative of the party before the Court and assistance (for an agent) from only one adviser or lawyer. In practice it happens fairly frequently that several persons appear before the Court on behalf of a party and are described as ‘representing’ the party.53 In principle, however, that seems to be wrong because a party should have only one representative (even though the

50 Eg Case T-435/09 GL2006 Europe Ltd. v Commission, 16 September 2013, paras 25–27. The same procedure was followed in the cases cited in para 33 of the judgment, the first of which also cites Case T-216/99 Ter Huurne’s Handelsmaatschappij v Commission, order of 23 March 2004 (unreported), para 20. In Case T-444/09 La City v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), order of 16 May 2012 (unreported), cited in GL2006, the problem arose from the insolvency of the party. The lawyer provided the GC with details of the person in charge of the insolvency (who therefore had power to exercise the party’s rights) but the GC still insisted on all communications going through the lawyer). 51 See GL2006 Europe (above, note 50), where the party in question was both an applicant and also a defendant to a cross-claim. Where an action is dismissed, the favoured ground appears to be that (due to the party’s failure to respond to the Court’s invitation to sort out its representation in the proceedings) there is no need to proceed to judgment. 52 Art 19, 1st para. 53 See, for example, Cases 209, 215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck Sàrl (FEDETAB) Asbl v Commission [1980] ECR 3125; Case T-103/99 Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v European Ombudsman and Parliament [2000] ECR II-4165 (the European Parliament).

371

4.21  Representation and legal aid

party may be assisted by more than one person).54 Where there are several representatives there is a risk of confusion because the representatives may say different things. Where a party is ‘assisted’ by more than one person but has only one representative, there is only one person (the representative) to whom the Court need turn in order to obtain a definitive statement of the party’s position.55 It is possible that the reason why a party (other than, typically, a member state or EU institution), is occasionally described as having more than one representative is because the Statute (and the EC and EAEC Statutes – but not the ECSC Statute – before it) does not provide for parties other than member states and EU institutions to be ‘assisted’ by anyone. As far as assistance goes it is the practice to accept that an agent may be assisted by more than one adviser or lawyer and there is no theoretical objection to that, as there is in the case of a multiplicity of representatives. But if the rule that a party has only one representative before the Court were combined with the omission from the Statute of provision for assistance (except in the case of member states, EU institutions and, now EEA states and the EFTA  Surveillance Authority), the result would be that other persons would be limited to only one lawyer. That would not, of course, prevent the party from seeking advice from another lawyer but it would mean that the latter could not address the Court orally or in writing and it might also affect the question of costs.56 However, it is to be inferred from the Court’s practice that there is no restriction on the number of persons who may assist a party’s representative nor any on the number who may represent a party.57 4.21 Parties entitled to be represented by an agent (member states, EU institutions, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority) are free to choose whom they like to act as agent, whether one of their officials or a person not employed by them as such, and to decide if they wish to be assisted by an adviser or law-

54 That seems to have been the view of the Court in Cases 20 and 21/63 Maudet v Commission [1964] ECR 621. 55 Hence, in the Combescot cases (above, note 47), paras 23 and 20, respectively, the critical point was that the defence had been signed by the Commission’s agents. The status of the lawyer assisting them was not material. 56 See RP-ECJ, art 144(b); RP-GC, art 140(b); RP-CST, art 105(c) (which refers to costs of the representative, in the singular); Maudet v Commission (above, note 54). 57 In fact, in some cases (Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 2229 is one) both a lawyer-representative and a lawyer-assistant have been recorded as appearing on behalf of a person other than a member state or EU institution. In Maudet v Commission (above, note 54) the Court appeared to accept that a party other than a member state or EU institution was free to employ an adviser in addition to a lawyer representing him. PD-CST, para 8 implies that there is no limit on the number. PD-ECJ, para 53 says that, ‘for reasons connected with the proper conduct of the hearing’, oral submissions made on behalf of a party must be made by one person; but it allows for a reasoned application to be made for permission for a second person to address the Court ‘where the nature or specific complexity of the case warrants this’. That ‘rule’ concerns only the organisation of the hearing and does not detract from the normal practice that there is no limit on the number of persons who may assist or represent a party. It is worth noting that the reasons connected with the proper conduct of the hearing that supposedly justify limiting the number of persons addressing the Court at the hearing are not identified or even hinted at. As at the time of writing, presiding judges had proved perfectly capable of managing a hearing at which a party’s oral submissions were made by more than one person.

372

Representation and legal aid 4.22

yer. The rule that a party must be represented in proceedings by an independent person (a lawyer) does not apply to member states, EU institutions, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority. They also have an unfettered discretion in whom to select as adviser to assist the agent. No special qualifications are laid down for either in the Statute or the rules of procedure and there is no reference to the position under national law. Hence neither the agent nor the adviser need be a qualified lawyer. It is unclear whether the adviser, at least, need have any legal training. The words used in the different texts give no indication whether the adviser is to be regarded as a legal adviser or, perhaps, a technical adviser. It is a plausible argument that what is envisaged is a person who is a trained lawyer but who is not entitled to practise because, for example, he is employed by the government or institution in question. On the other hand, there are certain practical advantages for a state or institution to be assisted by an adviser who, while having no legal training, is an expert in any technical matters relevant to the case. In the absence of any authority on the meaning of the word ‘adviser’ the position is obscure. The writer, for what it is worth, inclines to the view that ‘adviser’ means ‘legal adviser’, technical advisers being covered by the term ’expert’.59 58

4.22 The Statute60 provides that university teachers who are nationals of a member state which entitles them to plead before a court have the same rights before the Court as lawyers. This means that, even if the university teacher is entitled under national law to appear only before certain courts or in certain proceedings, he is nevertheless on an equal footing with any lawyer from the same member state in so far as proceedings before the Court are concerned. 58 Eg see Case 126/76 Costs Firma Gebrüder Dietz v Commission [1979]  ECR  2131, para  5. The Council and the Commission are usually represented by a member of their legal services, as agent, who is from time to time assisted by an outside lawyer (eg  Case 138/79 Roquette Frères SA v Council [1980] ECR 3333) but, in Case 101/74 Kurrer v Council [1976] ECR 259, the Council’s agent was a Belgian advocate. The Parliament has been represented by its Director-General for Administration, Personnel and Finance, acting as agent, assisted by an outside lawyer (see the Roquette case) or by members of its legal service. The Court itself has been represented by its Registrar (Case 147/79 Hochstrass v European Court of Justice [1980] ECR 3005) or Director of Administration (Case 2/80 Dautzenberg v European Court of Justice [1980] ECR 3107), as agent, usually, but not always, assisted by an outside lawyer. The Court of Auditors has been represented by its Secretary (Case 184/80 Van Zaanen v Court of Auditors [1981] ECR 1951) and the European Investment Bank by the Director of its Directorate for Legal Affairs (Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank [1976] ECR 955), both as agents and both assisted by outside lawyers. The European Ombudsman has been represented by a principal administrator, acting as agent: the Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete case, above, note 53. The practice of the member states varies. Most seem to use government legal advisers who may occasionally be assisted by an outside lawyer. The agents for Ireland and the United Kingdom tend to be the chief State and Treasury Solicitors respectively, or their assistants, assisted by outside lawyers (but not invariably: in Case 99/88 Galinsky v Insurance Officer [1981] ECR 941, for example, a legal adviser from the Department of Health and Social Security represented the British government and addressed the Court without the assistance of counsel). In Case T-357/05 Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia (above, note 29), it was suggested in para 9 that a lawyer employed by a party must be its agent. That simply means that the lawyer could not be regarded as representing the party qua lawyer. It does not mean that agents have to be lawyers employed by the party concerned. 59 See also Wall The Court of Justice of the European Communities (Butterworth, 1966) at p 213. 60 Statute, art 19, last para; RP-ECJ, art 47(1).

373

4.23  Representation and legal aid

An agent, adviser, lawyer or university teacher need not be of the same nationality or be qualified, if necessary, in the same member state as the party for whom he appears. For example, in Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission61 the applicant, a company registered in Scotland, was represented by a Belgian lawyer, while the Commission was assisted by two Scottish advocates and the intervener, another Scottish company, by an Italian advocate. In references for a preliminary ruling, of course, someone with right of audience before the referring court can appear on behalf of a party to the proceedings before it.62 4.23 In relation to ‘lawyers’ (whether the lawyer is a representative of a party or a person assisting an agent), two cumulative conditions must be satisfied for the lawyer to act in proceedings before the Court: (i) the lawyer must be a ‘lawyer’, as that term is understood in the procedural law of the Court; and (ii) the lawyer must be authorised to practise (before the courts of a member state or EEA state). Hence, a ‘lawyer’ cannot represent a party if he is not also authorised to practise; and a person who is authorised to practise in some way before the courts of a member state cannot represent a party before the Court if, nonetheless, he is not a ‘lawyer’.63 The Statute’s predecessors originally used, in the English version, the expression ‘lawyer entitled to practise before a court of a Member State’. Other language versions were worded differently. The French and Italian texts, for example, referred to an advocate who was a ‘member of the bar’ or ‘inscribed in the professional rolls’; the German version to one who was ‘authorised [to practise]’. The texts save the English indicated that a ‘lawyer’ was nothing other than a practising advocate and there seemed to be a clear intention to exclude other types of lawyer qualified to practise (even though lawyers other than advocates existed in the six original member states at the time when the Statute’s predecessors were adopted and for decades thereafter).64 The different language versions of the Statute are now closer aligned and refer to ‘a lawyer authorised to practise before a court.’65 The courts in question are no

61 Above, note 57. 62 Eg Case 93/83 Zentralgenossenschaft des Fleischergewerbes v Hauptzollamt Bochum [1984] ECR 1095 (at 1102), where one party was represented at the hearing by a tax consultant and another by a civil servant. 63 On the latter point, see Case T-487/07 Imperial Chemical Industries v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs, order of 20  October 2008 (unreported) (patent attorney litigator not entitled to represent a party because, although entitled to practise before UK courts, not a lawyer); Case C-101/14 P Brown Brothers Harriman & Co v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs, 17 July 2014 (Swedish lawyer entitled to practise before Swedish courts not entitled to represent a party before the Court because not an ‘advocate’). 64 Until 1971 the relationship between a French avocat and an avoué was analogous to, but in many respects considerably different from, that between an English barrister and a solicitor. The avoué had a right of audience before some courts but a virtual monopoly of it was held by avocats. The two professions, together with that of agrée, were merged at the end of 1971. The specific reference in the Statutes at that time to an ‘avocat’ had the effect of preventing an avoué from appearing before the Court despite the fact that he did have a right of audience before certain French courts. 65 There are still some startling discrepancies in certain language versions: see Cases C-422/11P and C-423/11P Prezes Urzedu Komunikacji Elektroniczney (above, note 30), para 3.

374

Representation and legal aid 4.25

longer just those ‘of a Member State’ but encompass courts ‘of another State which is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area’.66 4.24 Beginning with the word ‘lawyer’, the intention of the authors of the Statute appears to have remained that, save in relation to parties who may be represented by an agent and be assisted by an ‘adviser’, the function of representation or assistance may be discharged only by an ‘advocate’. That does not mean that an advocate who could not represent a party under national law (more precisely, under the domestic law governing the lawyer’s entitlement to practise) cannot appear on his behalf at all in proceedings before the Court: the Statute makes the advocate the party’s representative for the purpose of proceedings before the Court. As a result, by way of example, an Italian advocate would not also have to have been a procurator in order to represent a party before the Court. 4.25 The principal difficulty is to know what exactly is meant by ‘advocate’. On the face of it, the Statute contains a reference back to domestic law in the form of the phrase ‘authorised to practise before a court of’ a member state or EEA state. Accordingly, it is possible to say that the meaning of ‘lawyer’ (or ‘advocate’) is entirely a matter of national law. However, that approach is capable of causing difficulties where, for example, the Swedish language version of the Statute specifies an advocate, and the Statute is then construed in effect as meaning that a Swedish lawyer must be a member of the Swedish Bar, whereas another language version (such as the English, which refers to a ‘lawyer’) is expressed in generic terms. Further, the word ‘lawyer’ or ‘advocate’ itself can be given an independent meaning, reducing the reference to domestic law to either or both of a requirement that the ‘lawyer’ or ‘advocate’ be currently authorised to practise (whether or not he is actually in practice) and a means of identifying, within the domestic legal context, the persons who fall within the class of ‘lawyer’ or ‘advocate’, independently defined. Adopting that approach, which is more consistent with the general approach to the interpretation of EU law (which does not acknowledge that words used in EU legislation refer to concepts of national law unless there is express provision to that effect), and seeking to identify what ‘lawyer’ or ‘advocate’ means by reference to the functions performed by that person in proceedings before the Court,67 ‘lawyer’ or ‘advocate’ means the person who, in the performance of his professional role within the legal system, makes submissions on behalf of his or her client to a court. Accordingly, a 66 Art 19, 4th para. A  lawyer authorised to practise before the courts of a state other than a member state or EEA state cannot represent a party: Case C-471/12  P  Holding Kompanija Interspeed a.d. v Commission, 20 June 2013 (by implication from that case, he may however make an application for legal aid on behalf of his client). Where such a lawyer is registered on a particular list of the bar of a member state (or EEA state), that does not qualify him to represent a party if entry on the list does not entitle him to plead before the courts of that state: Foreign Trade Association v Council (above, note 10), paras 16 and 30. 67 That approach was taken by the ECJ in ADR Center (above, note 30); but it does not seem to have been the approach taken by the GC in Case T-389/13 Brown Brothers Harriman & Co v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs, 9 December 2013, which was rather more focused on the meaning of ‘advocate’ in Swedish law (the GC’s decision was nonetheless upheld on appeal in Case C-101/14 P, note 63 above).

375

4.26  Representation and legal aid

qualified lawyer whose function is only to ‘represent’ a party, within the meaning of national law, but who does not exercise the profession of an advocate, in that sense, is not a ‘lawyer’ or ‘advocate’ for the purpose of representing a party in proceedings before the Court.68 4.26 On the other hand, in Case 175/80 Tither v Commission,69 which was a staff case, the applicant in a direct action was represented only by an English solicitor at a time when, in principle, the function of a solicitor was to represent a party but not to plead orally or in writing on his behalf, that being the preserve of the barrister or (in Scotland) the advocate. Like the French avoué before the fusion of that profession with that of avocat in 1971, the solicitor also had a limited right to plead on behalf of a party before certain minor courts. If all the texts of the Statutes in force at the time were to be construed in the same way, there was at that time much to be said for the view that a solicitor was not an advocate within the meaning of the Statutes although it seems to have been assumed that he was.70 No objection was taken to the appearance of the solicitor in that case. It may therefore be inferred that the Court’s practice is to give a broad interpretation to the Statute. The problem is to know whether the Court’s usage is to be taken as indicating that all the language versions of the Statute are to be construed broadly and more in accordance with the English text (in relation to which the word ‘lawyer’ lacks the more precise meaning that can be given to the word ‘advocate’) or that they are to be construed in the light of the legal system in which the lawyer in question is entitled to practise. In the Nold case71 it was accepted both by the Court and by Advocate General Roemer that the procedural law of the EU refers to national law for the purpose of determining whether a person has the capacity to appear before the Court, but that was said in the context of the requirement that the lawyer be ‘authorised to practise before a court of a Member State’, not in relation to the question, what is the kind of lawyer so entitled envisaged by the Statute. That problem does not occur very often and it is for this reason hard to discern a particular policy of the Court in the matter. At the present it may be supposed that any practising lawyer is entitled to appear 68 That seems to be the basis for the orders in: Case T-445/04 Energy Technologies ET SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs [2005] ECR II-677 (see in particular para 9); Case T-453/05 Vonage Holdings Corp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR II-1877 (see, in particular, para 13); Case T-357/05 Comunidad Autonoma de Valencia (above, note 29), para  10; the Imperial Chemical Industries case (above, note 63); Case T-389/13 Brown Brothers Harriman (above, note 67; upheld on appeal in Case C-101/14  P, note 63 above). In the six original member states, for example, a Dutch or Italian procurator was (at the time when the formulation used in the Statute was first employed) a lawyer who represented a party; but he was not an advocate. In both countries most advocates were also qualified procurators (similarly, in Luxembourg it was usual for an advocate to be an avoué) but the distinction remained and appears to have been incorporated in the Statute. Neither in Denmark nor in the Federal Republic of Germany is the legal profession divided, even formally. There is no reason to assume that ‘lawyer’, for the purposes of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure, means the same as it does in Council Directive No 77/249 of 22 March 1977 (OJ No L78 of 26 March 1977, p 17). 69 [1981] ECR 2345. 70 See, for example, Schneider [1971] CMLR 49–51. 71 Above, note 5.

376

Representation and legal aid 4.27

on behalf of a party if he has a right of audience before any national court, however minor, in his professional capacity and even if he is not regarded, in the jurisdiction in which he is entitled to practise, as an advocate in the strict sense. The theoretical basis for that may be that the intention of the Statute is to give capacity to represent or assist a party to any ‘lawyer’ who has a right of audience before a court of a member state or EEA state.72 The use of the word ‘advocate’ and its equivalents is intended to indicate the function of the lawyer rather than any particular branch of the legal profession in a member state. 4.27 That deals with one problem: the question whether ‘lawyer’ indicates a particular type of lawyer authorised to practise before the courts of a member state or EEA state. The case law has, however, begun to add further elements to the concept of a ‘lawyer’ for the purposes of EU procedural law: to be a lawyer authorised to practise before those courts is a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for representing a party in proceedings before the Court.73 In particular, for procedural purposes in proceedings before the Court, a lawyer must be in a position to collaborate in the administration of justice and be required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of justice, the legal assistance needed by the client.74 Satisfaction of those requirements is first and foremost a matter relating to the professional and ethical regime applicable to the lawyer concerned in the state in which he is authorised to practise. However, that regime must cause those requirements to be satisfied; the fact that, under that regime, the lawyer concerned is considered to have the ability to represent a client is not, in itself, the determining factor. Thus, if a lawyer is regarded by that regime as able to represent a client that is his employer (because, for example, the ethical rules applicable to the lawyer are regarded as overriding any obligations owed to the client by reason of the employment relationship), that will be disregarded under EU procedural law, which regards the absence of an employment relationship as critical to a lawyer’s independent status.75 It should also be observed that the independence required in EU procedural law has two facets: independence visa-vis the client is the necessary condition for the relationship that the lawyer has with the Court. In many respects, the emergence of those additional requirements seems to have been prompted less by the features of the traditional relationship between a lawyer and his client and more by a need felt by the Court to establish the proper relationship between the lawyer representing the client and the Court itself. The consequence is, nonetheless, that, under EU procedural law, a lawyer entitled to practise before the courts of a member state or EEA state cannot act as such before the Court unless the professional and ethical regime to which he is

72 As opposed, for example, to practising lawyers whose only function is to represent a party but who have no right of audience. 73 Cases C-422/11P and C-423/11P Prezes Urzedu Komunikacji Elektroniczney (above, note 30), para 33. 74 See the discussion in para 4.10 ff, above and, in particular, in this context, Case T-226/10 Prezes Urzedu Komunikacji Elektroniczney, para 17, endorsed by the ECJ on appeal at para 23 of its judgment (both above, note 30). 75 That was the issue in Prezes Urzedu Komunikacji Elektroniczney (above, note 30). See further para 4.10 ff, above.

377

4.28  Representation and legal aid

subject places him in the relationship with the Court that the latter has identified in its case law. 4.28 The same considerations do not apply where a party is represented by an agent. The reason for that is, in all likelihood, that representation by an agent is limited to particular entities who traditionally (in the case of member states and EEA states) or by analogy (in the case of EU institutions and the EFTA  Surveillance Authority) are represented by an agent; and those parties have certain procedural privileges that differentiate them from other parties. The Court feels able to define the role of the lawyer who represents a party in terms of the characteristics of what is, in the final analysis, a relationship between the lawyer and the Court but does not (as yet) feel able to do the same with regard to agents.76 4.29 Authorisation to practise may be authorisation of a particular natural person or, depending upon the rules governing authorisation in the member state in question, authorisation of a legal person, which practises through natural persons authorised to represent it.77 There is no requirement that the lawyer be authorised to practise in the same member state or EEA state as the country of origin of his or her client; and no requirement that a lawyer authorised to practise in an EEA state may represent clients only in cases of relevance to the EEA.78 Further, there is no requirement that the lawyer be authorised to practise in the member state or EEA state in which he resides or works as long as he is so entitled in one, at least, of those states. For example, an Irish barrister may represent a party even if his chambers are in Brussels. It does not matter that he may not be entitled to practise there as a Belgian avocat; the only test is whether he is still entitled to practise in Ireland. Whether a lawyer is entitled to practise before a national court is a matter of national law. In the Nold case79 an application was drafted by a German Rechtsanwalt (barrister) who had been suspended from practice by his local Bar Council. The question arose whether the application was invalid. It appeared that, under the law governing the profession, suspension was a disciplinary measure which, if disregarded, could result in further disciplinary sanctions but it did not affect the validity of the lawyer’s acts. Hence the Court concluded that, as the lawyer had not been disbarred and his suspension did not affect the validity of his acts, the application was formally valid. Advocate general Roemer suggested that the Court might still refuse to hear a lawyer against whom disciplinary proceedings had to be taken80 but the Court did not comment on that. It will be observed that the reference in the judgment to disbarment reflects the

76 It should, however, be noted that Statute, art 19, 5th para, refers to ‘the independent exercise of their duties’ in connection with agents, advisers and lawyers, not just the last. 77 The Cargo Partner case (above, note 23), paras 19–23. 78 For example, in the Correia de Matos case (above, note 11), the ECJ contemplated with equanimity a Portuguese litigant being represented by a lawyer authorised to practise in any member state or EEA state. 79 Above (note 5), at 49 and 89 (Advocate General Roemer). 80 Ibid.

378

Representation and legal aid 4.31

French version of the ECSC Statute, the action being one under the ECSC Treaty (which was in force at that time). 4.30 At the time of the Nold case the Rules of Procedure stated that a lawyer could not lodge a valid procedural document before submitting to the Registry a practising certificate. More or less the same wording was used to describe that document as is used in the current version of the Rules (save for the reference to authorisation to practise before a court of an EEA state).81 In the Gualco case82 the Court said that, under the Rules of Procedure, a party’s lawyer need only establish his professional status as a lawyer.83 That case did not concern expressly the problem of any professional impediment barring the lawyer from acting but the question whether he had been properly appointed to act for the party. Nevertheless, when taken with the judgment in the Nold case, it suggests that production of a valid practising certificate does not avoid difficulties relating to the lawyer’s capacity to act of the type raised in Nold. The different language versions of what are now RP-ECJ, art 119(3) and RP-GC, art 51(2) used to diverge, with the English text describing it as a ‘certificate that he [the lawyer] is authorised to practise before a court’ and other language versions identifying it as a document certifying that the lawyer was enrolled as a member of the bar in one of the member states.84 The different texts (together with RP-CST, art 31(2)) have now been aligned but the Court’s interpretation seems to be that the certificate only establishes the lawyer’s professional status as such,85 in other words that he has not been disbarred or struck off. It cannot be regarded as constituting irrefutable proof of capacity to appear on behalf of a party. If there is other evidence of an impediment to his acting, the certificate cannot defeat it. 4.31 It seems clear from the Nold case that the effect of such evidence on the lawyer’s capacity to act depends on whether or not it shows that he is prevented from acting as a matter of national procedural law or by virtue of the disciplinary or ethical rules that bind him as a member of the professional body to which he belongs. If the former prevent the lawyer wholly or partly from acting on behalf of his client, the same impediment applies in the context of proceedings before the Court.86 Thus, in Case 142/85 Schwiering v Court of Auditors,87 where the defendant contested the right of the applicant’s lawyer to act for him on the ground that the lawyer was a Commission official who was on leave from the Commission in order to carry out his functions as an elected member of the European Parliament, the lawyer produced certificates showing that he was inscribed on the roll of certain German courts. On that basis, the ECJ concluded 81 Cf OJ No 6/303 of 7 April 1954, RP-ECJ, art 119(3), RP-GC, art 51(2) and RP-CST, art 31(2). 82 Above (note 40), at 57. 83 ‘Avocat’ in the French version of the judgment. 84 See, for example, the French and Italian versions. 85 Sc as barrister or advocate. For what amounts to the certificate required by the rules and the importance of the certificate, see Ch 1, para 1.127. 86 For example, if the lawyer can submit written pleadings but not oral argument, the same applies in proceedings before the Court; if he is totally barred from acting, he is totally barred before the Court. 87 [1986] ECR 3177, order of 26 September 1985 (unreported).

379

4.32  Representation and legal aid

that the requirements of the Rules of Procedure had been satisfied: had the lawyer’s status as a Commission official (or, indeed, as an elected member of the European Parliament) prevented him from acting under national procedural law, he could not have remained inscribed on the roll. On the other hand, if the lawyer has breached a disciplinary or ethical rule, the Court seems to have discretion whether or not to hear him. Written pleadings presented by him must be accepted as being admissible and cannot be excluded from consideration but the Court may refuse to hear oral argument depending on the gravity of the infraction. Theoretically a breach of a professional rule is a matter for the profession to decide on, not the Court, but it may be so grave a breach as to reflect upon the dignity of the Court, in which case the Court may exercise its powers under RP-ECJ, art 46(1), RP-GC, art 55(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 34(1).88 Where the breach of a professional rule of conduct is a ground under national procedural law for withdrawing or reducing the lawyer’s capacity to act for the party, the matter is no longer a disciplinary or ethical problem which is the concern only of the appropriate professional body. The question whether a lawyer may appear on behalf of a client without being instructed by or in conjunction with another lawyer, where domestic rules so require,89 would be answered by applying those principles. 4.32 Arrangements made by or between national or local bars or professional bodies and any rules of etiquette do not affect the right of audience before the Court under the Statute and the Rules of Procedure. But if a lawyer’s right of audience before the courts of the state in which he or she is authorised to practise is conditional on there being another lawyer instructing, or instructed with, him or her, he or she has no right of audience before the Court if that condition is not fulfilled.90 Where the necessity to be instructed by or in conjunction with another lawyer is a rule of etiquette, it does not affect capacity to plead on behalf of the client. As a result, the Court must accept written pleadings submitted by the lawyer and does not appear to retain any discretion whether or not to hear oral argument from him. Any disciplinary proceedings which might be brought 88 Those Rules allow the Court to exclude an adviser or lawyer from the proceedings where his conduct is incompatible with the dignity of the Court. Its application in this context is a deduction from the Nold case and there is, so far as is known, no precise authority on the point. In Nuova Agricast (above, note 10), para 32, the GC simply observed in passing that it was not for it to consider whether or not the lawyer in question had complied with the ethical rules binding him. That was because of the nature of the issue before the GC. However that observation indicates that, from the Court’s perspective, the relationship between a lawyer and his client (the latter being a party to proceedings before the Court) rests upon the lawyer’s function as the client’s representative in proceedings before the Court; and that relationship is not normally qualified by potentially inconsistent rules of professional discipline and ethics to which the lawyer is subject. 89 For example, as used to be the case, an English barrister acting without being instructed by a solicitor; or a German rechtsanwalt authorised to practise before a particular German court, who would normally appear together with a locally authorised rechtsanwalt when appearing on behalf of a client outside the area of the court before whom he or she is authorised to practise. 90 Thus, if a trainee lawyer is authorised to practise before the courts of a member state or EEA state but may appear only if accompanied by, or under the supervision of, a senior lawyer, the same rule appears to apply to appearances of the trainee before the Court.

380

Representation and legal aid 4.34

because of any breach of a rule of etiquette do not concern the Court. It is not in a position to take a view on matters of professional etiquette in a member state or EEA state nor would such a breach of etiquette (if any) appear to be incompatible with the dignity of the Court. The fact that, in a particular case, a national court might respect a rule of etiquette is irrelevant. 4.33 The rule that, in references for a preliminary ruling, the Court ‘shall take account’ of the rules of procedure of the referring court so far as concerns the representation and attendance of the parties to the proceedings before that court91 appears to have two possible interpretations: (i) the Court is bound to apply the referring court’s rules of procedure, even if they are more restrictive than the Court’s own Rules; or (ii) the Court only applies the referring court’s rules in the event that a party is represented by a person who has right of audience before the referring court but not before the Court itself. The effect of the first interpretation is that, on the one hand, member states and EU institutions which are parties to the proceedings before the referring court cannot be represented by an agent before the Court unless they could have been so represented before the referring court or they elect to appear before the Court pursuant to their right under the Statute and not their right as parties to the proceedings before the referring court; on the other hand, other persons may plead in person, if they could have done so before the referring court, but may find themselves unable to use a lawyer entitled to practise before the Court, if he could not appear before the referring court. The effect of the second interpretation is that the usual rules concerning representation and assistance in proceedings before the Court continue to apply but the Court has power to extend the right of audience to persons (eg a litigant in person or unqualified legal adviser) competent to appear before the referring court. The Court does not appear to have formally ruled on how RP-ECJ, art 97(3) is to be construed. It is to be inferred from a few cases92 that the second interpretation suggested is the correct one.

III

RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES

4.34 Under EU law, certain rights and immunities apply to the representatives of a party to proceedings as part of the rules of natural justice, or the right to a fair trial (more usually referred to as ‘the rights of the defence’). Such rights and immunities are justified by the fundamental right of a party to legal proceedings to have unimpeded access to an independent lawyer and include protection from the disclosure to the opposing party, or to the court or any other body, of legal confidences imparted by the party to his legal representative in the context

91 RP-ECJ, art  97(3). The national court’s rules of procedure are in any event to be construed subject to the provisions of Directive No 77/249, above (note 68). 92 Eg Case 234/81 E I Du Pont de Nemours Inc v Customs and Excise Comrs [1982] ECR 3515, where one of the parties before the referring court was represented by a Scots advocate who did not, ordinarily, have right of audience before the referring court.

381

4.35  Representation and legal aid

of the proceedings.93 In addition, the Statute94 provides that agents, advisers and lawyers ‘shall, when they appear before the Court, enjoy the rights and immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties, under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure’.95 The Rules of Procedure provide that the privileges, immunities and facilities made available by them ‘are granted exclusively in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings’.96 The form of words used in the Statute to justify the grant of rights and immunities to agents, advisers and lawyers is not repeated in the Rules of Procedure. The explanation for that seems to be not so much the desire to avoid needless repetition as that the Statute sets out the purpose for which the rights and immunities are granted and all the immunities, privileges and facilities specified in the Rules of Procedure are to be interpreted in the light of that purpose; the Rules of Procedure set out the conditions under which the immunities, privileges and facilities are granted. As a result, the immunities and so forth mentioned in the Rules of Procedure cannot be applied or defined as being otherwise than for the purpose of safeguarding the independent exercise of the functions of an agent, adviser or lawyer, even if it would be in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings to apply or define them in some other way. On the other hand, even if they do secure the independent exercise of those functions, the immunities etc may not be relied on if that would be contrary to the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings. 4.35 The conclusion to be drawn from that approach is that there is, in effect, a division in the treatment of the representatives of parties between those aspects of the representative’s role that are concerned with his relationship with the client and those aspects that are concerned with his relationship with the Court. There is no special right or privilege for the benefit of the parties themselves to be found in the Statute or the Rules of Procedure. The rights of parties which form part of the rules of natural justice, the right to a fair trial or the rights of the defence, apply as part of the fundamental right of the parties to a fair trial and have an independent legal basis. The rights given by the Statute and the Rules of Procedure to agents, advisers and lawyers are intended to aid the discharge of their functions as such vis-à-vis the Court97 and are not a protection, albeit indirect, of the party on whose behalf they appear.98 Those rights also apply in two additional cases: (a) to university teachers with a right of audience;99 and (b) 93 Eg Case 155/78 AM&S v Commission [1982] ECR 1575; Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones v Conseil des Ministres [2007] ECR I-5305, particularly paras 31–37. 94 Statute, art 19, 5th para. 95 Although ‘duties’ is the word used in the English version of the Statute, other texts refer to ‘functions’ and it is that term that will be used henceforth. 96 RP-ECJ, art  45(1); RP-GC, art  54(1); RP-CST, art  33(1). The English version of RP-ECJ, art 45(1) seems to have been taken from the German text. The French and Italian versions, for example, refer to the ‘interests of proceedings’, not to the ‘proper conduct of proceedings’. It does not seem, however, that there is any difference in substance between those two formulations. The German and English versions just give more precise expression to what is meant in the French and Italian versions. 97 Cf the text to note 96 above. 98 But see Usher European Court Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 1983) at p 223. 99 RP-ECJ, art 47(1); RP-GC, art 56; RP-CST, art 35.

382

Representation and legal aid 4.37

to the parties themselves (and a non-lawyer representative) if and to the extent that the party in question is: (i) a party to proceedings before a national court or tribunal that has made a reference for a preliminary ruling; and (ii) entitled under the rules of the referring court or tribunal either to participate in proceedings without being represented by a lawyer or to be represented by the non-lawyer in question.100 4.36 The phrase in the Statute, ‘when they appear before the Court’, suggests that the rights and immunities apply only during the physical appearance of the agent, adviser or lawyer before the Court. Other language versions, and the Rules of Procedure, do not say ‘when’ but ‘who appear before the Court’.101 A less elliptical way of putting what the Statute seems to mean is ‘who appear on behalf of a party in proceedings before the Court’. That indicates that the rights and immunities attach by reason of a person’s quality as an agent, adviser or lawyer but not by reference to a period of time. Secondly, it is not physical appearance before the Court that matters but appearance on behalf of a party. That seems evident from the facts that some agents, advisers and lawyers may not ‘appear’ in person102 and that immunity from suit covers what the agent, adviser or lawyer has written.103 ‘Appearance’ seems to comprise the functions of ‘representing’ a party and ‘assisting’ his representative. In the context of a procedure which places as much emphasis on written pleadings as does procedure before the Court, a narrow construction of ‘appearance’ is difficult, if not impossible, to justify. The privileges, immunities and facilities made available in the Rules of Procedure are of little importance in practice and do not appear ever to have been invoked.

A

Immunity from suit

4.37 Immunity in respect of words spoken or written concerning the case or the parties is enjoyed by ‘agents, advisers and lawyers’104 who must be appearing ‘before the Court or before any judicial authority to which the Court has addressed letters rogatory’.105 Agents thus benefit not from any general immunity but from an immunity restricted to ‘appearance’ before the Court or ‘any judicial authority’ etc; an agent would for those purposes be representing a member state, EU institution, EEA state or the EFTA Surveillance Authority only in proceedings before the Court106 and immunity is in any event granted only in the interests 100 RP-ECJ, art 47(2). 101 RP-ECJ, art 43(1); RP-GC, art 52(1); RP-CST, art 32(1). 102 Eg in a reference for a preliminary ruling when only written observations are lodged. 103 See RP-ECJ, art 43(1); RP-GC, art 52(1); RP-CST, art 32(1). 104 Including university teachers. 105 RP-ECJ, art 43(1); RP-GC, art 52(1); RP-CST, art 32(1). 106 In the case of letters rogatory, the examination of the witness or expert before the competent judicial authority in a member state is made in the context of an action before the Court and the national authority is deputed by the Court to carry out the examination. It can therefore properly be described as proceedings before the Court.

383

4.38  Representation and legal aid

of the proper conduct of such proceedings.107 The immunity is that of the agent, adviser or lawyer, not the party.108 4.38 The immunity covers both the written and oral pleadings in a case in so far as they relate to the matter before the Court. For example, a libel of a third party inserted in a pleading would not be covered by immunity unless its subject matter related to the dispute between the parties.109 It is a question of fact whether the words do relate to the case or the parties. Apart from the pleadings themselves, all other remarks, whether oral or written, which are addressed to the Court would appear to fall within the category of material which may be covered by immunity but it is unclear whether immunity may extend to communications passing between persons entitled to immunity concerning, for example, the conduct of proceedings and their possible settlement, but not made to or before the Court and perhaps not in the Court building. In the absence of any authority, no firm answer can be given. The writer inclines to the view that immunity should be narrowly construed. The most that can be said is that words addressed to the Court are prima facie covered by immunity; with regard to those addressed to other persons, whether or not they are themselves entitled to immunity, evidence would have to be adduced to show that lack of immunity would be detrimental to the proper conduct of proceedings and the independent exercise of the functions of their author before it could be said that they might be covered by immunity. It seems better to adopt a pragmatic approach. Depending on the circumstances, a ruling on the question whether immunity applies might be obtained either by way of a reference for a preliminary ruling or (in a direct action) in an application under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(2) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83(1) during the course of proceedings. 4.39 Since the words may be written, it follows that immunity does not apply only to persons physically present before the Court at the time when they are expressed. Nevertheless the implication from the Rules of Procedure is that the speaker or writer has capacity to address the Court. In consequence, no immunity would cover words addressed to the Court by a lawyer who is not entitled to practise before a court of a member state or EEA state or by a party himself.110 The same appears to apply even if it is right that words directed at a person other than the Court may be covered by immunity because the privilege is only that of someone who is representing a party or assisting a representative. Unless the lawyer in question is an agent or adviser he can do neither if he is not qualified to practise before the court of a member state or EEA state. The immunity applies whatever the nature of proceedings in which the words were spoken or written. The Statute makes clear that proceedings before a national judicial authority pur 107 RP-ECJ, art 45(1); RP-GC, art 54(1); RP-CST, art 33(1). 108 Save in references for a preliminary ruling, as to which RP-ECJ, art 47(2) applies (for its effect, see note 100 above). 109 A  libel of the opposing party would, of course, be covered by immunity even if its subject matter was not connected with the dispute because the Rules of Procedure state expressly that immunity attaches to words spoken or written which concern the parties. 110 Save where RP-ECJ, art 47(2) applies.

384

Representation and legal aid 4.42

suant to letters rogatory, which are a step in proceedings before the Court, are covered. By parity of reasoning, the same would apply should the Court entrust a preparatory enquiry to an Assistant Rapporteur.111 4.40 It is unclear whether immunity attaches only from the point at which proceedings commence and ends with the final judgment or whether it must be given a wider field of application. The commencement of a direct action, for example, is marked by the lodgment of the application at the Court. It is obvious that the application must have been written before being lodged. If it contains a libel of the opposing party and he or another obtains a copy before the date of lodgment, is it covered by immunity? Common sense suggests that it is. As with defining the matters covered by immunity, the touchstone is the purpose of the privilege. It would be tempting to say that all preparatory acts which lead directly to the commencement of proceedings are covered by immunity (for example, a draft of the application which contains the libel) but the better view is probably to consider each case as it arises. By way of principle it seems right to say that words spoken or written between the commencement of proceedings and final judgment are prima facie covered by immunity but, with regard to words spoken or written at other times, there must be evidence to show that the inapplicability of immunity would be detrimental to the proper conduct of proceedings and the independent exercise of the functions of the agent, adviser or lawyer concerned. It should be noted that the final judgment may not in fact terminate the proceedings: there might be a further application for the Court to supplement its judgment112 or a dispute as to costs113 quite apart from an appeal or a review. Nevertheless, it seems right to take the date of final judgment as marking the prima facie end of proceedings. 4.41 Immunity may be relied on whatever the type of proceedings brought against the agent, adviser or lawyer, whether criminal or civil. Nor is there any time limit to its effectiveness. Clearly, if immunity lasted only for the length of time of the proceedings before the Court, it would not fulfil its function effectively because the person aggrieved by the words in question would simply delay commencing proceedings against their author until after the Court had delivered judgment. Once the conditions for benefiting from immunity have been fulfilled, therefore, it lasts unless and until the Court decides to waive it. The question of waiver is considered below.

B

Exemption from search and seizure

4.42 Papers and documents relating to the proceedings are exempt from search and seizure.114 That privilege is enjoyed only by agents, advisers and law-

111 Although the Statute provides for that possibility (see Statute, art 13, 1st para), no Assistant Rapporteurs have ever been appointed and the Rules of Procedure are silent on the matter. 112 RP-ECJ, art 155; RP-GC, art 165; RP-CST, art 123. 113 RP-ECJ, art 145; RP-CST, art 106. 114 RP-ECJ, art 43(2)(a); RP-GC, art 52(2)(a); RP-CST, art 32(2)(a).

385

4.43  Representation and legal aid

yers, not by the parties or anyone else. The Rules of Procedure leave many questions unanswered concerning its scope but it seems reasonable to put the position as follows. 4.43 The phrase ‘papers and documents relating to the proceedings’ covers all written pleadings, notes of evidence, documentary evidence, drafts, memoranda and so forth relevant to the case before the Court. It is not restricted to material that is brought into existence for the purpose of being presented to the Court but extends to all material which forms part of the brief or file of the party’s representative or his adviser. It is uncertain to what extent protection may be extended, in the light of modern conditions, to material which is not in the form of a paper or document.115 The teleological method of interpretation would, it is submitted, suggest that it is content rather than physical form which attracts protection: the exemption from search and seizure is not granted just because certain papers and documents are papers and documents; it is the fact that they relate to the proceedings that is the determining criterion. Ascertaining whether or not that criterion is satisfied can be done only by assessing the contents.116 The conclusion is that material relating to proceedings is not deprived of protection merely because it lacks the physical form of a ‘paper’ or ‘document’. Computerised records cannot therefore be searched for records of material relating to proceedings and it must be doubted whether telephone conversations conducted by an agent, adviser or lawyer relating to proceedings may be tapped. 4.44 Protection is not restricted to material found in the possession of the agent, adviser or lawyer, for example in his pocket or briefcase or in his office; it also extends to papers sent by him to the Court. It is doubtful if it covers communications moving from the agent, adviser or lawyer to the party he represents or assists, or to material such as copies of any advice given found in the possession of the party because those, ex hypothesi, no longer form part of the file or brief of the agent, adviser or lawyer. On the other hand, a communication relating to the proceedings and sent to him by the party (or third party) is protected from search and seizure because it is destined to form part of the brief. Although not, strictly speaking, in the power or control of the agent, adviser or lawyer if consigned to the post or found in the possession of the party or his servant while being taken to the agent, adviser or lawyer, such material may properly be regarded as protected on the ground that the intended recipient has putative possession of it by reason of the intention of the true possessor that it should form part of the brief. By analogy a telephone conversation or email exchange between the agent, adviser or lawyer and another person which relates to the proceedings would also be protected, whether or not the former initiated the communication. 4.45 Exemption from search and seizure applies in particular to the passage of papers and documents from one part of the EU to the Court at Luxembourg 115 It is implicit that ‘papers’ and ‘documents’ were intended by the authors of the rules of procedure to be understood in the conventional sense prevalent at the time when the rules were originally drafted because it is provided that, in the event of a dispute, they may be ‘sealed’. 116 See the second phrase of RP-ECJ, art 43(2)(a), RP-GC, art 52(2)(a) and RP-CST, art 32(2)(a).

386

Representation and legal aid 4.46

and vice versa but its objective is to prevent access to the Court from being blocked, hindered or prejudiced by acts of public authority and so it may apply generally, not just at the moment when the material passes across the frontier of a member state. Assuming that all the other conditions for benefiting from exemption are fulfilled, it prevents any search or seizure by any public authority in the EU. Thus, for example, the powers of the police or the tax authorities of a member state cannot be used to obtain sight or the seizure of material relating to proceedings before the Court. In the same way, the protection applies where a private person seeks to enlist the aid of a public authority to enforce a right to search or seize documents: while the UK is a member state, the English procedure of disclosure and similar rights cannot be used, where the protection applies, even at the suit of a private person. The crucial question is whether it is sought to rely on an exercise of public authority in order to search or seize. The EU institutions are also bound by this rule and their powers are to be construed subject to the Court’s Rules of Procedure in the absence of a specific provision modifying or overriding them. 4.46 Protection attaches when the physical form (including the electronic form) embodying the material relating to the proceedings comes into existence. It is arguable that, like immunity from suit, it continues indefinitely after the close of the proceedings on the ground that the agent, adviser or lawyer might be deterred from assembling the material, whether for the purpose of preparing the case or for presentation to the Court, by the risk of a search or seizure immediately after the close of proceedings. In fact, on a strict construction of the Rules of Procedure, it is possible to say that a search or seizure may be effected at any time after the hearing because the proper conduct of the proceedings by the agent, adviser or lawyer can no longer be jeopardised: the opinion of the advocate general (where there is one) and the decision of the Court will be based on the submissions and disclosures of the parties that have previously been made and would not be influenced by the search or seizure. It is doubtful if that is correct because, at the very least, there is the possibility of the reopening of the oral procedure (after the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion, if there is one),117 quite apart from any proceedings subsequent to the final judgment. For example, an application for revision of a judgment may be made up to ten years after the date of the final judgment.118 It can be said with some confidence that material which comes into existence after the date of the final judgment is not protected unless it relates to other proceedings but there is good reason to believe that, once material is protected, it remains protected indefinitely. It must be admitted, however, that the justification for maintaining protection after the end of the proceedings is considerably less than in the case of immunity from suit and hence a heavier burden lies on a person relying on the protection to prove that it is justified. The most that can be said is that protection is not in principle ruled out after final judgment but that it depends on the facts of the case if its maintenance remains in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings and

117 RP-ECJ, art 83; RP-GC, art 113; RP-CST, art 64(2). 118 Statute, art 44, 3rd para.

387

4.47  Representation and legal aid

the independent exercise of the functions of agent, adviser or lawyer. The justification of the protection is not, directly at least, that a party may be deterred from making a disclosure to the Court by the fear of a search or seizure but that the agent, adviser or lawyer may be prevented from putting the party’s case fully to the Court and properly carrying out his functions, which comprise a duty to be frank to the Court. 4.47 In the event of any dispute concerning the right to protection, the papers or documents must be sent immediately to the Court for inspection in the presence of the Registrar and the person concerned.119 The Rules of Procedure envisage that the customs officials or police may seal the papers or documents before sending them to the Court. It is, no doubt, arguable that the specific mention of those two branches of public authority indicates that they alone are prevented from searching or seizing papers and documents and they alone have power to refer the matter to the Court in the event of a dispute. Such a narrow construction seems artificial in the light of the purpose of the protection. The Rules of Procedure appear to contemplate that it is when a dispute arises that the police or the customs authorities may be involved, for example where an investigating authority has recourse to either in order to enforce its power to search and seize in the event that there is a refusal to comply with it. There is nothing which suggests that the Rules do anything more than set out a procedure for transmitting the material to the Court. In consequence, once the power to search and seize is challenged, the material must be sent to the Court forthwith. If the police or the customs authorities are involved, they are responsible for doing so and have discretion whether or not to seal the material. If another authority with power to search or seize is concerned, it ought by analogy to do the same; but, if it can enforce its powers only by calling in aid the police or customs authorities, the matter can be referred to the Court only when that has been done. Before then there is, ex hypothesi, no risk of enforcement of the search or seizure: it can happen only if the person concerned consents to it. Where the power cannot be exercised without the person concerned’s consent, there is no need to rely on the exemption from search and seizure given by the Rules. 4.48 The rules do not specify who is to inspect the material. It is implied that verification is undertaken by the Court in the presence of the Registrar and the person concerned.120 It is not clear whether the Court can delegate that function to a chamber or a judge or whether the advocate general (where there is one) must be involved. Since disputes may be either trivial or important, it seems that the better view is that the Court is primarily responsible for deciding, after inspecting the material, whether it is protected or not. However, it may, in the first instance, delegate that function to a chamber or a single judge. The chamber or judge, after seeing the material, may either decide the question or refer it to the full Court for decision. In either event, the decision is made in the form of an order. Where the Court or chamber is involved, the advocate general assigned to

119 RP-ECJ, art 43(2)(a); RP-GC, art 52(2)(a); RP-CST, art 32(2)(a). 120 Ie the agent, adviser or lawyer.

388

Representation and legal aid 4.51

the case (where there is one) must be heard before the decision is made. He or she does not deliver an opinion in public but gives his views orally.121 The Registrar must be present when the material is opened and inspected; the agent, adviser or lawyer concerned is also there and may be asked questions. The investigating authority involved cannot, ex hypothesi, attend, nor do the parties to the proceedings. Whether there is a hearing of the two sides to the dispute122 is a matter for the discretion of the court or chamber.

C

Free movement

4.49 Agents, advisers and lawyers also enjoy the right to ‘travel in the course of duty without hindrance’.123 Again, that does not benefit the party on whose behalf they appear: he may be prevented from attending the hearing but not they. Other texts (for example, the French) use a slightly different phrasing from the English: ‘free movement to the extent necessary for the performance of their duties’. 4.50 What is ‘necessary’ should not be too narrowly construed. For example, it is not strictly ‘necessary’ for someone to appear on behalf of a party at the hearing, whether in a direct action or in a reference for a preliminary ruling: the absence of someone to speak for him will not result in the party losing the case by default, least of all in the latter proceedings, which are non-contentious and in which it frequently happens that a party is not represented at the hearing. Nevertheless, it is part of the duties of a representative to appear in person on behalf of the party before the Court and it is certainly in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings that he should be heard. Whether other journeys around or to and from the EU are ‘necessary’ is largely a question of fact. It is part of the duties of an agent, adviser or lawyer to be fully apprised of the party’s case and, if that should necessitate a trip abroad, he should be entitled to it. 4.51 The right of free movement does not appear to give a right to enter private premises, for example those of the opposing party. As in the case of the other privileges and facilities mentioned in RP-ECJ, art 43(2), RP-GC, art 52(2) and RP-CST, art 32(2), it is a right as against public authority and relates to the exercise of public powers. RP-ECJ, art 44, RP-GC, art 53 and RP-CST, art 32(3) identify what is necessary in order to ‘qualify’ for (that is, benefit from) the privileges, immunities and facilities mentioned in RP-ECJ, art 43, RP-GC, art 52 and RP-CST, art 32, of which free movement is one. Those provisions are considered in detail below. The inference, however, is that the right of free movement can be exercised simply on presentation of the proof referred to in RP-ECJ, art 44, RP-GC, art  53 and RP-CST, art  32(3) (presumably supported by proof of the identity of the person presenting the proof in question) so that there would be no 121 See the analogies offered by preparatory enquiries and applications for interim relief. 122 The agent, adviser or lawyer and the investigating authority. 123 RP-ECJ, art 43(2)(b); RP-GC, art 52(2)(b); RP-CST, art 32(2)(b). See also the general Treaty provisions on free movement.

389

4.52  Representation and legal aid

need of further documentation in order to pass from one member state to another. Immigration officers being what they are, one would still be advised to bring along one’s passport or identity card. It is doubtful if the right of free movement could be relied on to enable the (temporary) release from prison of the agent, adviser or lawyer. That is a largely theoretical question since it is doubtful if a member state or EU institution would in practice select as its agent or adviser a convict or that a lawyer would remain entitled to practise before the court of a member state or EEA state while serving time. On the other hand, restrictions may be imposed by national law on the free movement of a person which might not affect his capacity to plead, such as binding over on condition not to be found in a particular place or not to move from it, or the French rules relating to internal exile. Those, it would seem, no longer apply to an agent, adviser or lawyer in so far as the performance of his duties are concerned.

D

The entitlement to rely on a right or immunity

4.52 In order to ‘qualify for’ (ECJ and GC) or be ‘entitled to’ (CST) the above-mentioned ‘privileges, immunities and facilities’, the person concerned must furnish proof of his ‘status’124 or, in the case of the CST, satisfy certain formalities.125 At one time, the various Rules of Procedure were uniform in terms of what was required and, in particular, what the required proof was and what its function was. At present, so far as the ECJ and GC are concerned, the position is as follows: in the case of agents, the proof of status is ‘an official document issued by the party for whom they act’; in that of lawyers it is a certificate of authorisation to practise before a court of a member state or EEA state together with, where the party represented by the lawyer is a legal person governed by private law, the authority to act issued by the party; in the case of advisers, it is an authority to act issued by the party.126 So far as the CST is concerned, the formalities that must be completed are: in the case of agents, advisers or lawyers acting for a member state or EU institution, lodgment at the Registry of an official document or authority to act issued by the party and, in the case of the lawyers acting for such parties, lodgment at the Registry of a certificate of authorisation to practise; in the case of lawyers representing other parties, lodgment of a certificate of authorisation to practise.127 The Registrar (of the ECJ, GC or, as the case may be, CST) then issues a certificate, if required.128 The certificate is not issued automatically. 4.53 A number of questions arise from those provisions. The ECJ, GC and CST Rules of Procedure do not explain how the required certificate is obtained from the Registrar and what the precise function of that certificate is. The rules can be read in three different ways. First, they may be read as providing that the 124 RP-ECJ, art 44(1); RP-GC, art 53(1). 125 RP-CST, art 32(3). 126 RP-ECJ, art 44(1); RP-GC, art 53(1). 127 RP-CST, art 31, to which reference is made in RP-CST, art 32(3). 128 RP-ECJ, art 44(2); RP-GC, art 53(2); RP-CST, art 32(3). The certificate is valid for a specified period determined (apparently) by the duration of the proceedings).

390

Representation and legal aid 4.54

required proof of status must in all cases be produced to the Registrar for the purpose of enabling the issue of a certificate; it is the certificate issued by the Registrar that entitles the agent, adviser or lawyer to benefit from the privileges, immunities and facilities in question. Secondly, they may be read as providing that, although the required proof of status must be produced to the Registrar, the certificate issued by him merely evidences or confirms the right to invoke the privileges, immunities and facilities derived from status as the party’s agent, adviser or lawyer. Thirdly, the rules may be read as providing that, in order to be able to invoke the privilege, immunity or facility in question, the agent, adviser or lawyer needs to produce (to the relevant national authority) only the evidence specified in the ECJ and GC rules of procedure or, in the case of the CST, evidence that he has lodged the relevant documents at the CST Registry; a certificate may be issued by the Registrar, but only if there is a real need to do so (that is, if the relevant national authority refuses to respect the privilege, immunity or facility in question or there are reasonable grounds for believing that it might refuse to do so). Under that interpretation, the Registrar issues the certificate at the request either of the national authority or of the agent, adviser or lawyer concerned if and when a dispute arises.129 4.54 The writer is of the view that, while the different Rules of Procedure are clear as to what they say, they do not say what they mean. Although RP-ECJ, art 44(1) and RP-GC, art 53(1) speak in terms of what is required in order to ‘qualify’ for the privileges, immunities and facilities in question, and although RP-CST, art  32(3) speaks in terms of the formalities that must be observed (‘beforehand’) in order to be ‘entitled’ to those privileges, immunities and facilities, two conditions must be satisfied in order to qualify for, or be entitled to, them. First, the person invoking the privilege, immunity or facility must have the status of being the agent, lawyer or adviser of a party. Secondly, the privilege, immunity or facility in question must be invoked in circumstances in which it is, or at least appears to be, in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings to do so. Those conditions flow from the facts that the privileges, immunities and facilities in question are enjoyed by a person because of his or her status130 and that they are granted exclusively in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings.131 It follows that no entitlement to a privilege, immunity or facility arises if the person invoking them lacks the required status or if he has that status but seeks to invoke them in circumstances in which the proper conduct of the proceedings is not (or is not plausibly) engaged. In relation to that latter point, the Court is the sole arbiter of what would or would not hinder the proper conduct of proceedings, at least in the case of an immunity;132 but that does not seem to preclude another person or body (such as a national court or public authority) from reaching a view on that point when there is manifestly no connection 129 The ECJ’s commentary on the draft of the 2012 Rules of Procedure is wholly uninformative on the question of the meaning of RP-ECJ, art 44, from which RP-GC, art 53 derives, since the commentary supports each interpretation equally strongly. 130 See the wording of RP-ECJ, art 43, RP-GC, art 52 and RP-CST, art 32(1)–(2). 131 RP-ECJ, art 45(1); RP-GC, art 54(1); RP-CST, art 33(1). 132 RP-ECJ, art 45(2); RP-GC, art 54(2); RP-CST, art 33(2). See further para 4.63 ff below.

391

4.55  Representation and legal aid

between the act, against which the privilege, immunity or facility is invoked, and the conduct of proceedings before the Court. When the Rules of Procedure purport to prescribe the conditions or formalities for ‘qualifying for’ or being ‘entitled to’ the privileges, immunities and facilities, they are in fact prescribing requirements of an evidential nature, not requirements that are constitutive of the entitlement to invoke those privileges, immunities and facilities. That can be illustrated by the example of the immunity in respect of words spoken or written concerning the case. That immunity must attach as soon as a person having the status of a party’s agent, adviser or lawyer utters or writes the words in question (which must concern the case) and not by reference to some other event that may occur at a later date. For example, suppose that an applicant’s lawyer drafts the application commencing proceedings and, for some reason, the contents of the application are made public before the application has been lodged at the Court. It would be absurd to construe the Rules of Procedure literally and say that no immunity attaches to the words used in the application because, following the wording of RP-CST, art 32(3), the lawyer had not lodged a certificate of entitlement to practise at the CST Registry ‘beforehand’. 4.55 Taking the requirements set out in the Rules of Procedure as being evidential in nature, it is necessary to ask the question, what exactly is the relevant evidence, is it that which the agent, adviser or lawyer produces or the certificate issued by the Registrar? The answer appears to be the former because, in RP-ECJ, art 44 and RP-GC, art 53 (which is derived from RP-ECJ, art 44), what is required in order to qualify for the privilege, immunity or facility is stated in the first paragraph and the Registrar’s certificate is mentioned only in the second paragraph. The same pattern appears in RP-CST, art 32(2), where the formalities to be completed in order to be ‘entitled’ to the privileges, immunities and facilities are stated in one sentence and the Registrar’s certificate is then mentioned in another sentence. Further, in all three provisions, it is provided that the Registrar’s certificate is issued ‘as required’, which necessarily implies that that certificate is intended to serve a particular (evidential) function but is not itself the evidence proving the qualification for, or entitlement to, a privilege, immunity or facility. 4.56 It is now necessary to consider the question, to whom is the evidence in question to be produced? Although RP-ECJ, art 44 and RP-GC, art 53 provide that proof of status must be furnished in order to ‘qualify’ for the privileges, immunities and facilities, they do not identify the person or entity to whom such proof must be furnished for that purpose (as opposed to some other purpose).133 They can be read as envisaging that such proof will be furnished to a national court or authority in the event that it becomes necessary to invoke a privilege, immunity or facility. In contrast, it is evident from RP-CST, art 31 and 32(3) that proof of status must be provided to the CST because a person is ‘entitled’ 133 RP-ECJ, art 44(1)(a) and RP-GC, art 53(1)(a) do provide that an agent’s proof of status must be served on the Registrar but, as no equivalent provision applies to a lawyer’s or adviser’s proof of status, it could be inferred that the service of the agent’s proof of status on the Registrar serves a collateral purpose.

392

Representation and legal aid 4.58

to the privileges, immunities and facilities when the formality of lodging the required proof of status at the CST  Registry has been completed. Despite the disparity in wording, the overall impression is that the ECJ, GC and CST rules of procedure all envisage a process involving the Court: the required proof of status is provided to the Court which is then put in a position to issue (through the Registrar) a certificate that formally confirms the status of the agent, adviser or lawyer (should such a certificate be required). If that is so, the authors of the rules of procedure do not appear to have contemplated the possibility that the necessity to invoke a privilege, immunity or facility may arise before the need for the Registrar to issue a certificate has been perceived. The alternative possibility is that a privilege, immunity or facility is invoked by production of proof of status to the relevant national authority or court; and it is only if proof of status is challenged that recourse is had to the Registrar’s certificate to confirm the position. 4.57 So far as agents are concerned, a copy of the agent’s proof of status must be served ‘immediately’ (ECJ and GC proceedings) on the Registrar.134 It is not clear if that means immediately when the agent is appointed, immediately when proceedings are commenced (if the agent represents an applicant) or immediately when it becomes necessary (or is perceived to be necessary) to invoke a privilege, immunity or facility. Where that document constitutes proof of status for the purpose of qualifying for the privileges, immunities and facilities in question, failure to give a copy to the Registrar (or a delay in doing so) does not appear to destroy the value of the document or the entitlement to benefit from the privileges, immunities and facilities: it would seem that the purpose of notifying the Registrar is so that the position can be confirmed, if need be, by issue of the Registrar’s certificate at the earliest opportunity. If the document serves the different purpose of causing the Registrar to issue the certificate that enables the agent to benefit from the privileges, immunities and facilities in question, its service on the Registrar is essential. 4.58 Until 2012, the ECJ, GC and CST Rules of Procedure were to the same effect. The required proof of status in the case of an adviser or lawyer was a certificate signed by the Registrar. It was drawn up by the Registrar and given to the adviser or lawyer if he so requested and if it was ‘required for the proper conduct of proceedings’.135 The process for obtaining a certificate had therefore to be initiated by an application for such a certificate, made (in writing) to the Registrar, setting out why it was required for the proper conduct of proceedings. It did not seem that the adviser’s or lawyer’s position as such was sufficient in itself to give him a right to a certificate. That made sense because, in practice, there has never been a case in which a certificate has had to be issued and a privilege, immunity or facility has had to be invoked. Limiting the issue of a certificate to cases in 134 RP-ECJ, art 44(1)(a); RP-GC, art 53(1)(a). It is possible that the existence of that requirement, and its absence in the case of lawyers and advisers, reflects the status of agents and the parties whom they represent. 135 IR-ECJ, art 9. The legal status of the ECJ’s Instructions to the Registrar was unclear at the time of writing. Since such certificates were not issued in practice, there was no provision in IR-GC (now repealed) or IR-CST similar to IR-ECJ, art 9.

393

4.59  Representation and legal aid

which there was some basis for saying that it was required therefore removed a potential and unnecessary administrative burden on the Registry and prevented certificates from being issued needlessly or as a matter of course. The current position is that certificates are issued ‘as required’,136 which implies the continuation of the pre-2012 regime (now extended to agents). Accordingly, a certificate may be issued only on application and only if the application sets out reasons demonstrating that there is need for it. 4.59 The certificate (whether issued by the ECJ, GC or CST) is limited in validity to a specified period, which may be extended or curtailed according to the length of the proceedings.137 Application for it to be extended or curtailed should be made to the Registrar. The rules, however, imply that the Registrar may also act on his own motion. There is no provision for an appeal from a decision of the Registrar to the Court. 4.60 The fact that the certificate issued by the Registrar is limited in point of time does not of itself indicate that the privileges granted by the rules of procedure are equally limited: the certificate is proof of status or of entitlement to benefit from the privileges, immunities and facilities in question and does not determine whether an agent, adviser or lawyer has been validly appointed to appear on behalf of a party before the Court; nor does it act as proof that the substantive requirements for benefiting from one of the privileges have been satisfied. A fortiori it cannot limit the existence of the privilege in question. On the other hand, it is a formal sine qua non for enjoyment of the privilege, immunity or facility in question (at least in the event of a dispute). 4.61 If it be accepted that immunity in respect of words spoken or written concerning the case or the parties, for example, exists after the end of the proceedings, the problem of taking advantage of that immunity some time after their end arises. RP-ECJ, art 44(2), RP-GC, art 53(2) and RP-CST, art 32(3) suggest that the Registrar’s certificate should usually be issued for a period not exceeding the length of proceedings but there is nothing to say that another cannot be applied for after that time. So, in the event of proceedings being commenced in respect of words spoken or written by an agent, adviser or lawyer, he may apply to the Registrar for a certificate evidencing that he satisfied at the relevant time the formal requirements for reliance on RP-ECJ, art 43(1), RP-GC, art 52(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 32(1)–(2). 4.62 The French and Italian versions of RP-ECJ, art 44(1), RP-GC, art 53(1) and, even more so, RP-CST, art  32(3) indicate that the proof of status must be given, or (in the case of the CST) the relevant formalities completed, before claiming the privilege in question.138 The inference is that a claim to a privilege may be refused unless it is preceded or accompanied by presentation of proof of status or evidence of completion of the relevant formalities, presumably by means of 136 RP-ECJ, art 44(2); RP-GC, art 53(2); RP-CST, art 32(3). 137 RP-ECJ, art 44(2); RP-GC, art 53(2); RP-CST, art 32(3). 138 That seems to be borne out by the German version as well.

394

Representation and legal aid 4.63

the Registrar’s certificate (if required). The rules do not, however, suggest that anything else is needed in order to benefit from RP-ECJ, art 43, RP-GC, art 52 or RP-CST, art 32(1)–(2). So, for example, in the case of a lawyer who wishes to travel to Luxembourg to plead before the Court, presentation of the Registrar’s certificate to an immigration, border control or police officer (and, where necessary, presentation of proof that he or she is the person referred to in the certificate) should without more entitle him or her to enjoy the right to free movement, apparently without the necessity to produce evidence that the journey is necessary to perform his or her duties as the party’s lawyer. That could be taken as suggesting that the immigration, border control or police officer is not entitled to question him at the time of the passage across the frontier as to, for example, the date of the hearing or, at least, to require a reply to such a question. It is doubtful if that is correct. The proof of status seems intended only to be evidence that the holder benefits from the privileges in general but not that he or she benefits from the particular privilege in question under the circumstances existing at the material time. The conclusion appears to be that, unless the agent, adviser or lawyer shows, prima facie, that the substantive conditions for benefiting from the rules of procedure have been fulfilled, his claim to a privilege may be denied despite presentation of his proof of status. Nonetheless, the only proof that may be required of him is that which is reasonably necessary to establish the claim. Otherwise, the requirement of proof could itself be a means of thwarting the purpose lying behind the existence of the privileges, immunities and facilities. The only exception to that rule seems to be exemption from search and seizure because RP-ECJ, art 43(2)(a), RP-GC, art  52(2)(a) and RP-CST, art  32(2)(a) state specifically that the matter must be referred to the Court once a dispute has arisen. That occurs when the power to search or seize is opposed, rather than when the investigating authority challenges the claim to exemption from search and seizure.

E

Waiver and loss of entitlement to a right or immunity

4.63 RP-ECJ, art 45(2), RP-GC, art 54(2), and RP-CST, art 33(2), provide that the Court may waive immunity ‘where it considers that the proper conduct of proceedings will not be hindered thereby’. That refers to the condition upon which all the privileges, immunities and facilities set out in RP-ECJ, art 43, RP-GC, art 52 and RP-CST, art 32(1)–(2) are granted, which is specified in RP-ECJ, art  45(1), RP-GC, art  54(1), and RP-CST, art  33(1), ie  that they are ‘exclusively in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings’. If the Court considers that that condition is no longer satisfied, it will waive immunity. ‘Immunity’ is not, here, a compendious term for the bundle of rights, privileges and facilities specified in RP-ECJ, art 43, RP-GC, art 52 and RP-CST, art 32(1)– (2). That seems to follow clearly from the difference in wording, reproduced in all the texts, between RP-ECJ, art 45(1) and (2), RP-GC, art 54(1) and (2), and RP-CST, art 33(1) and (2): RP-ECJ, art 45(1), RP-GC, art 54(1), and RP-CST, art  33(1), refer to ‘privileges, immunities and facilities’;139 RP-ECJ, art  45(2), 139 In the German text only to ‘privileges’, but all the same, a different word is used in the second sentence.

395

4.64  Representation and legal aid

RP-GC, art 54(2), and RP-CST, art 33(2), just to ‘immunity’. The Court does not, therefore, have express power to waive the privileges and facilities mentioned in RP-ECJ, art  43(2), RP-GC, art  52(2) and RP-CST, art  32(2).140 The existence of that express power in relation to immunity does, however, indicate that immunity is not lifted automatically but only by a decision of the Court. It seems also to exclude waiver by the person benefiting from it (no doubt on the ground that the privileges, immunities and facilities provided for in RP-ECJ, art 43, RP-GC, art 52 and RP-CST, art 32(1)–(2) exist not for the personal benefit of the agent, adviser or lawyer concerned but solely in the objective interest of the proper conduct of proceedings). 4.64 No procedure is specified in the Statute or elsewhere for applying for waiver of immunity. In those circumstances, it seems appropriate to follow that set out in RP-ECJ, art  151, RP-GC, art  130 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art  83. Questions concerning the right to rely on RP-ECJ, art  43(1), RP-GC, art 52(1) or RP-CST, art 32(1) may, of course, arise in the context of proceedings before a national court; but, although a reference for a preliminary ruling could be made concerning the interpretation to be given to the rules of procedure and the extent of any privilege, immunity or facility, it would not be possible to use that procedure in order to request the Court to waive immunity.141 The burden lies on the party seeking waiver to show that it would not prejudice the proper conduct of proceedings. It is possible to argue on the basis of, for example, the Italian text of RP-ECJ, art 45 and RP-GC, art 54, that it is the proper conduct of the proceedings in the action in which the words were said or spoken that matters, not the proper conduct of proceedings in general, hence there is no objection to lifting immunity once the action is over because the proper conduct of proceedings which have terminated can no longer be prejudiced. The full phrase used in RP-ECJ, art 45(1), RP-GC, art 54(1), and in RP-CST, art 33(1), is, however, ‘the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings’142 and it is that to which RP-ECJ, art 45(2), RP-GC, art 54(2), and RP-CST, art 33(2), mean to refer to when they uses the abbreviated phrase ‘the proper conduct of proceedings’.143 The ‘interest’ in this context lies in upholding the legitimate expectation of the agent, adviser or lawyer that he may fully and freely present the case of the party on whose behalf he appears without risk of being prosecuted or sued in respect of what he has said or written.144

140 Vandersanden and Barav, Contentieux Communautaire (Bruylant, 1977), take the opposite view, see p 34. 141 Unless the proceedings were regarded as analogous to the type of situation dealt with by the ECJ in Case C-2/88 Imm Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365. 142 Or, in Italian, ‘the interests of the proceedings’. 143 Cf the other language versions. 144 The considerations at stake are different from those referred to in Cases C-514/07P, C-528/07P and C-532/07P Sweden v API and Commission [2010] ECR I-8533, paras 92–94 and 130–135. The immunity is conferred on the agent, adviser or lawyer in order to ensure complete openness as between the party and the Court; it is not conferred in order to protect the ‘serenity’ of the proceedings or the manner in which the Court conducts its judicial activities.

396

Representation and legal aid 4.66

4.65 Since there is no provision for waiver of the privileges and facilities set out in RP-ECJ, art 43(2), RP-GC, art 52(2) and RP-CST, art 32(2), whether by the Court or by the person benefiting from them, it would seem that they end automatically once they are no longer in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings. The right to free movement would seem to disappear as a matter of course once proceedings have terminated. A problem arises in relation to exemption from search and seizure. Although falling within RP-ECJ, art 43(2), RP-GC, art 52(2) and RP-CST, art 32(2), and so described as a ‘privilege’ or ‘facility’, its legal form is closer to that of an immunity. The structure of RP-ECJ, art 43 and 45, RP-GC, art 52 and 54 and RP-CST, art 32 and 33 nevertheless seems to prevent it from being considered an immunity for the purposes of RP-ECJ, art 45, RP-GC, art 54 and RP-CST, art 33. In addition, if it is right that exemption applies even after the termination of proceedings, the situation may arise that papers and documents are exempt from search and seizure despite the fact that the Court may be prepared to lift immunity from suit in respect of them. That would avail nothing because the material could not be seized in order to be made the subject of proceedings. However, if the Court is prepared to waive immunity, exemption is also likely to disappear because it could no longer be said to be ‘exclusively in the interests of the proper conduct of proceedings’, as required by RP-ECJ, art 45(1), RP-GC, art 54(1), and by RP-CST, art 33(1). The reason for that is that, where both rights apply at the same time, they pertain to the same subject matter145 and the same test for their application applies. In consequence, if a claim to exemption from search and seizure is upheld, there are no grounds for waiving immunity from suit in respect of the contents of the papers or documents. On the other hand, the rejection of the claim to exemption brings in its train a finding that there are also grounds for waiving immunity. Nonetheless, a decision of the Court rejecting the claim to exemption is not equivalent to one lifting immunity. 4.66 Under RP-ECJ, art  46(1)–(2), RP-GC, art  55(1)–(2) and RP-CST, art  34(1)–(2), an agent, adviser or lawyer146 who uses his rights for ‘purposes other than those for which they were granted’, may at any time be ‘excluded’ from the proceedings. That applies to the rights of a representative (agent, adviser or lawyer) in general and not just those rights specified in RP-ECJ, art 43, RP-GC, art 52 and RP-CST, art 32. As far as the latter rights are concerned, the rules of procedure do not exclude the application of any remedies under national law should an agent, adviser or lawyer abuse his (apparent) right to enjoy a privilege, immunity or facility, eg professional disciplinary proceedings or a prosecution. RP-ECJ, art 46(1)–(1), RP-GC, art 55(1)–(2) and RP-CST, art 34(1)–(2) simply specify what action the Court can take in the interests of the proper conduct of its own proceedings.

145 Ie words spoken or written which relate to the proceedings. 146 Including a university teacher with a right of audience before the Court.

397

4.67  Representation and legal aid

IV OBLIGATIONS 4.67 The Statute147 provides that, as regards the advisers and lawyers who appear before it, ‘the Court shall have the powers normally accorded to courts of law, under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure’. The rules of procedure envisage that, in relation to an agent, adviser or lawyer, the Court may take one or other of three courses of action in either of the following circumstances: (i) the agent’s, adviser’s or lawyer’s conduct towards the Court (which includes a chamber), a judge (including the President), an advocate general or the Registrar is ‘incompatible with the dignity of the Court or with the requirements of the proper administration of justice’; or (ii) he is ‘using his rights for purposes other than those for which they were granted’. The three courses of conduct are: (a) informing ‘the person concerned’ (that is, the agent, adviser or lawyer in question); (b) informing ‘the competent authorities to whom the person concerned is answerable’; and (c) excluding the person concerned from the proceedings.148

A

Conduct justifying action by the Court

4.68 In relation to the first type of conduct referred to above, the English text of the ECJ’s rules of procedure refers to behaviour ‘before’ the Court. ‘Before’ is not to be read literally as referring to the physical appearance of the agent, adviser or lawyer before the Court, during a hearing. The Rules of Procedure do not refer expressly to a chamber but the reference is implied by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 11(3), RP-GC, art 1(2)(a) and RP-CST, art 1(2)(a), respectively. In addition, the GC Rules of Procedure do not refer to the advocate general but, in the GC, only a judge can act as advocate general in a case; separate reference to the advocate general would therefore have been superfluous. The Registrar is included in the ECJ’s, GC’s and CST’s rules of procedure because, although he is not a ‘judge’, he is in charge of the administrative aspect of judicial proceedings and acts as the Court’s mouthpiece in dealing with the parties during the course of the proceedings. ‘Conduct … incompatible with the dignity of the Court’ covers a wide range of activities, including both positive actions and omissions: in Case 108/63 Officine Elettromeccaniche Ing A Merlini v High Authority,149 Advocate General Roemer suggested that it might include the submission by a lawyer of a pleading drawn up by his client and not checked by him to see if it was fit to be lodged. Another example is deliberately misleading the Court; but it seems unnecessary to set out a catalogue of examples here. It should be noted that the rules of procedure refer to ‘conduct … incompatible with the dignity of’, as the case may be, the ECJ, GC or CST, which does not point to conduct that, in relation to whichever of the ECJ, GC or CST is in question, is in some respect different in nature or degree from conduct incompatible with the dignity of whichever of the ECJ, GC or CST is not in question; it simply means that the conduct in question must relate to the 147 Statute, art 19, 6th para. 148 RP-ECJ, art 46(1)–(2); RP-GC, art 55(1)–(2); RP-CST, art 34(1)–(2). 149 [1965] ECR 1 at 16.

398

Representation and legal aid 4.71

court or its members and Registrar in question and not one of the other courts or tribunals comprised within the CJEU, or some other court or tribunal. Hence, if (for example) the conduct of an agent, adviser or lawyer is directed at the ECJ, the matter is dealt with by it, not the GC or CST. 4.69 ‘Conduct…incompatible…with the requirements of the proper administration of justice’ also has a wide meaning. It seems better suited to such things as misleading the Court150 or conflicts of interest151 but has been applied to repeatedly bringing manifestly inadmissible or unfounded applications in respect of substantially the same facts and making unsubstantiated allegations of manifest illegality, bad faith or similarly scandalous pleas.152 4.70 The second type of conduct is abuse of the rights attaching to the functions of agent, adviser, lawyer. It is not restricted to those privileges, immunities and facilities specifically recognised by the rules of procedure but encompasses any misuse by the adviser, lawyer or representative of his position as such. The English version of the rules of procedure refer specifically to the use of rights ‘for purposes other than those for which they were granted’. An example of that is the publication of the confidential contents of another party’s pleadings. A party’s representative has the right to see the opposing party’s pleadings for the purpose of preparing his client’s response to them and defending his client’s interests in the context of the proceedings, not for the purpose of disseminating the confidential content of the opposing party’s pleadings to the world.153 4.71 The two types of conduct (conduct incompatible with the dignity of the Court or with the requirements of the proper administration of justice; and abuse of rights) overlap but are not limited to conduct taking place in the physical pres 150 In Case T-465/09 Jurasinovic v Council, 3 October 2012, paras 65, failing to bring a judicial decision to the attention of the Court was not regarded as a ground for excluding a party’s representative from the proceedings in the circumstances of that case (appealed on other grounds in Case C-576/12P Jurasinovic v Council, 28 November 2013). 151 In Case T-26/89 (125) De Compte v Parliament [1997] ECR SC-I-A-305, II-847, paras 9–10, the GC observed that the applicant’s lawyer had represented the defendant in a previous round in the litigation and drew what is now RP-GC, art 55 to the lawyer’s attention. The lawyer then withdrew from the proceedings (there was no effect on the admissibility of the pleadings lodged by him). By implication, the conflict of interest engaged RP-GC, art 55. 152 Case T-302/00R-II  Goldstein v Commission [2001]  ECR II-1127, paras 40–41; Case T-18/01R  Goldstein v Commission [2001]  ECR II-1147, 45–46; Case F-58/13 Marcuccio v Commission, 22 May 2014 (in which there is a lengthy description of the conduct that triggered the CST’s decision); Case F-62/13 Marcuccio v Commission, 22  May 2014; Case F-65/13 Marcuccio v Commission, 22  May 2014; Case F-89/13 Marcuccio v Commission, 22  May 2014; Case F-90/13 Marcuccio v Commission, 22 May 2014. It should be noted that there is nothing wrong about trying to persuade the Court to change its mind about something: see Case C-424/92 Ladbroke Racing Ltd v Commission [1993] ECR I-2213, paras 6–8. The problem in the Goldstein and Marcuccio type of situation arises where the lawyer does not appear to be applying his professional judgment to the legal justification for bringing the proceedings or for making the allegations in question. 153 The position would be different if the opposing party consented to publication or if, for example, the contents of the pleading were disclosed in other court proceedings in order to correct a misstatement of its position made by the opposing party.

399

4.72  Representation and legal aid

ence of the Court or while proceedings are pending. For example, the publication of the confidential contents of the opposing party’s pleadings (without that party’s consent) can be regarded as being inconsistent with the requirements of the proper administration of justice154 or (as suggested above) as being the use of a right for purposes other than those for which the right was granted. In either event, such conduct does not alter its character depending upon whether it takes place while proceedings are pending or after judgment.

B

The courses of action open to the Court

4.72 It would appear that, ordinarily in all cases, the Court must take the first of the three courses of action referred to above, which may be effected orally or in writing. It is within the Court’s discretion to leave matters there or take one or other of the second and third courses of action. However, the first course of action cannot be regarded as just a warning shot across the bows. It may be taken contemporaneously with any of the other two courses of action open to the Court. Accordingly, an agent, adviser or lawyer has no expectation that, before the second or third courses of action are taken, he or she will first receive a warning. In some instances, it will of course be appropriate first to warn the agent, adviser, lawyer or representative and give him or her an opportunity to apologise or take some other appropriate step to remedy the situation. However, the circumstances may be such that there is no reasonable alternative but immediate recourse to the second or third courses of action. 4.73 The competent authorities to whom the person concerned is answerable appear to be those charged with ensuring compliance with the professional and ethical obligations of the agent, adviser or lawyer concerned.155 Those authorities are informed by letter. A copy of the letter must be given by the Court to the agent, adviser or lawyer concerned. 4.74 The decision to exclude is made in the form of an order made by the Court or chamber after the agent, adviser, lawyer or representative in question has been given an opportunity to be heard.156 That means that he must be informed of the matters of complaint alleged against him, and of the action that the Court is considering taking in relation to those matters, and be given a proper opportunity to respond before the decision is taken. There is no requirement that the agent, adviser or lawyer be represented by someone. Equally there is no requirement that the decision be taken by members of the Court other than those before whom the incident had occurred. The advocate general’s opinion (in cases before the ECJ) is heard before the order is made and is given in private. In specifying an order made by the Court or chamber, the rules of procedure appear to exclude a 154 Eg Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998]  ECR II-2289, paras 135 and 137. 155 In the case of an agent, who may not be subject to professional discipline and ethics, the competent authority may be the agent’s hierarchical superior. 156 RP-ECJ, art 46(2); RP-GC, art 55(2); RP-CST, art 34(2). See the procedure followed in Case F-58/13 Marcuccio (above, note 152).

400

Representation and legal aid 4.75

decision made by the President of the Court (or a chamber) in proceedings for interim relief heard by him alone. In such proceedings he sits neither as ‘the Court’ nor as a chamber.157 The fact that the Statute authorises the Court to give effect to the broad principle stated by it in the rules of procedure indicates that the enunciation of the principle in the latter is a full and comprehensive statement of the powers which the Court may exercise.158 However, neither the rules of procedure nor the Statute refer to the President: the lacuna is complete. In that situation it seems right to have recourse to the principle that the Court and, in this case, its members possess the implied powers necessary for the proper functioning of any judicial authority. Hence RP-ECJ, art 46, RP-GC, art 55 and RP-CST, art 34 apply by analogy in proceedings before a single judge, mutatis mutandis. 4.75 The effect of a decision excluding an agent, adviser or lawyer from the proceedings is to deprive a party of the services of the agent, adviser or lawyer appearing for him during the course of the proceedings. It follows that the decision must be made when the incident occurs or is brought to the attention of the Court so that the exclusion of the agent, adviser or lawyer from the proceedings harms the interests of the party less than if it were to take effect at a more advanced stage. Proceedings are stayed for a period fixed by the President when the order is made so that the party concerned can appoint another agent, adviser or lawyer159 but the more advanced they are the less easy it is for someone else to replace the party’s agent, adviser or lawyer. If proceedings are allowed to continue without action being taken against the offender, once the incident has come to light, the Court, chamber or judge must be taken to have waived the breach. After the hearing is over there is no point in making an order to exclude. It is not clear from the rules of procedure whether the Court has power to exclude an agent, adviser or lawyer from the proceedings by reason of an incident which took place in the context of another action. The power is certainly exercisable only in relation to current proceedings and not proceedings in general160 but the phrasing of the rules is wide enough to allow the Court to make such an order in every case in which a particular agent, adviser or lawyer appears if it is of the opinion that a breach by him of his obligations to the Court in earlier proceedings merits it.

157 The single judge sitting in the GC or, as the case may be, the CST is in a different position: RPGC, art 14(3); RP-CST, art 10. 158 See the analogy provided by third party proceedings: Cases 9 and 12/60 Belgium v Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs and the High Authority [1962]  ECR  171 at 187–188 (Advocate General Roemer). 159 RP-ECJ, art 46(3); RP-GC, art 55(3); RP-CST, art 34(3). However, in Case F-58/13 Marcuccio (above, note 151) the intention seems to have been to halt the proceedings themselves. An order made on 19 March 2015 indicates that the CST formally invited the applicant to appoint a new lawyer to represent him but the applicant failed to respond, causing the CST to close the proceedings pursuant to RP-CST, art 85(2) (the same happened in the other Marcuccio cases cited in note 152 above). 160 See, for example, the Italian text.

401

4.76  Representation and legal aid

4.76 Once made, the order has immediate effect161 but can be rescinded at any time.162 The provision that the order has ‘immediate’ effect does not necessarily imply that the order has only prospective effect since an order with retrospective effect can, in principle, take effect ‘immediately’ it is made. However, the strong implication from the rules of procedure is that an order excluding an agent, adviser or lawyer from the proceedings is prospective only (albeit with ‘immediate’ effect) and does not call into question, for procedural purposes, anything said or done before the date of the order.

C

Rescission of the Court’s decision

4.77 The ‘decision’ of the Court may be rescinded.163 The Rules of Procedure are not clear about what that ‘decision’ is. On one view, the ‘decision’ is the decision to take any one of those courses of action. On another view, the ‘decision’ is the decision to take the third course of action because that is the only course that, read literally, the Court ‘decides’ to take (in the case of the first and second courses of action, it ‘informs’ the person concerned or, as the case may be, the competent authorities but does not ‘decide to inform’ them). As the first and second courses of action involve nothing more than ‘informing’ a person, the ‘rescission’ of that course of action seems at first sight to be inappropriate, which lends support to the latter interpretation. However, informing the competent authorities could result in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the person concerned. In that event, the ‘rescission’ of the Court’s decision to inform the competent authorities has some meaning and function because it could (and presumably would) take the form of a communication by the Court to the competent authorities to the effect that, for whatever reason, the Court does not consider that its earlier communication should or need be followed up.164 Accordingly, it seems to be unduly literal and formalistic to construe the power to ‘rescind’ the decision as being limited to the decision to take the third course of action.

V

LEGAL AID

4.78 The Statute contains no provision relating to legal aid but two groups of articles in the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ (RP-ECJ, art 115–118 and 185–189) and five articles in the Rules of Procedure of the GC (RP-GC, art 146–150) and the Rules of Procedure of the CST (RP-CST, art 110–114), respectively, do. RP-ECJ, art  115–118 apply to references for a preliminary ruling; RP-ECJ, art  185–189

161 RP-ECJ, art 46(2); RP-GC, art 55(2); RP-CST, art 34(2). 162 RP-ECJ, art 46(4); RP-GC, art 55(4); RP-CST, art 34(4). 163 RP-ECJ, art 46(4); RP-GC, art 55(4); RP-CST, art 34(4). 164 For example, where the Court has informed the competent authorities of the conduct of the person concerned but has acted on the basis of a misunderstanding of what has actually happened, has received an explanation from the person concerned that satisfies the Court, or has received from that person an apology that (the Court considers) removes the need for further action.

402

Representation and legal aid 4.80

apply to appeals to the ECJ. RP-GC, art  146–150 apply both to direct actions before the GC and to appeals to the GC from decisions of the CST.165 In the normal course of events, the question of legal aid in references for a preliminary ruling would have arisen and been dealt with at the stage of the proceedings before the referring court since the reference procedure constitutes a step in those proceedings. The provisions in the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure for legal aid in such cases therefore provide something of a safety net to be used when the primary source of funds is unavailable. RP-ECJ, art 185–189 apply only to appeals to the ECJ and no provision is made for the grant of legal aid in direct actions originating in the ECJ, seemingly because it was assumed that no direct actions originating before the ECJ would involve a party eligible for the grant of legal aid.166 At the time of writing, the GC Rules of Procedure had not been amended to accommodate the grant of legal aid in references for a preliminary ruling, jurisdiction over which had not, at that stage, been conferred on the GC. 4.79 By way of introductory observation, the last paragraph of art 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU provides: ‘Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice’. That is not an entirely unqualified obligation to provide legal aid where a party (or proposed party) lacks ‘sufficient resources’: access to legal aid may be restricted but any restriction on access to legal aid is to be assessed by reference to its impact on the substance of the right that the person concerned seeks to vindicate, whether or not the restriction has a legitimate aim, and the proportionality of the restriction. In considering those questions, the object of the litigation, the chances of success, the importance of the case for the person concerned, the complexity of the law and the applicable procedures, and the ability of the person concerned to put forward his case effectively, are relevant factors.167 As explained below, legal aid is granted where the party in question lacks sufficient resources and the case is not manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. Other factors, such as the importance of the litigation and its complexity may be taken into account when deciding the amount of legal aid to be granted.

A

Contentious proceedings

1 The applicant for legal aid 4.80 The rules of procedure provide that a party (RP-ECJ, art 185(1)) or a person (RP-GC, art 146(1); RP-CST, art 110(1)) who is wholly or partly unable to meet the costs of the proceedings may at any time apply for legal aid (ECJ) or is entitled to it (GC and CST). 165 As to their application to appeals, see, RP-GC, art 213(1). 166 See Ch 2, note 136. 167 Case C-279/09  DEB  Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH  v Germany [2010] ECR I-13849, paras 59–61. The observation made by the ECJ in the last sentence of para 61 appears to be relevant only to instances where, as in that case (see paras 16 and 27) an advance payment of costs is required.

403

4.81  Representation and legal aid

4.81 The words ‘wholly or in part’ (RP-ECJ, art  185(1)) and ‘wholly or partly’ (RP-GC, art 146(1); RP-CST, art 110(1)) indicate that the applicant for legal aid need not be entirely indigent; it is sufficient if he or she is unable to fund all the costs of the proceedings, irrespective of the extent of the shortfall. 4.82 ‘Party’ (in RP-ECJ, art 185(1)) covers all persons and bodies capable of taking part in the proceedings in question (that is, appeals to the ECJ), whether legal or natural or lacking in personality; and whether an appellant, respondent or intervener. The application for legal aid may also be made prior to the commencement of proceedings, at which point, of course, the applicant cannot really be described as a ‘party’ stricto sensu to proceedings before the ECJ.168 ‘Party’ therefore means an actual or prospective party. 4.83 ‘Person’ (in RP-GC, art 146(1) and RP-CST, art 110(1)) requires some explanation. That word replaces the phrase ‘natural person’ that featured in the previous versions of the GC and CST rules of procedure. The use of the word ‘person’ and, before it, the phrase ‘natural person’ has and had the virtue of removing any ambiguity about the entitlement of a person who wishes to commence proceedings, but has not yet done so, applying for legal aid.169 The phrase ‘natural person’ excluded the possibility of a legal person applying for legal aid. Originally, the GC Rules of Procedure referred, like the ECJ Rules of Procedure, to a ‘party’ applying for legal aid. The scope of legal aid in GC proceedings was limited to ‘natural persons’ in 2005.170 It is unclear what motivated the change. On the face of it, there is no rule or principle of EU law to the effect that only a natural person is eligible for legal aid. In principle, the only relevant rule or principle of law is that an indigent party may be entitled to legal aid (subject to other conditions, such as the availability of funds that can be used as legal aid, the strength of the party’s case, or lack of it, and so forth), irrespective of the character or nature of the party. The crucial question is whether or not the party is indigent (or sufficiently indigent). That is a question of fact and degree. It may be that legal persons and groups of persons who have the capacity to participate as a party in proceedings (or profit-making legal persons, as opposed to nonprofit-making ones) are less likely to be indigent than a natural person; but there is no legal rule or principle to the effect that parties other than natural persons are ipso facto incapable of being indigent (or sufficiently indigent). The availability of legal aid for all indigent parties, irrespective of their type, is particularly relevant where the relevant rules of procedure require a party to be represented by a lawyer. Rules of procedure do not have to be configured in that way because it is possible (although not necessarily efficient) to permit parties to appear and defend themselves in person or by means of an (unqualified) representative of 168 RP-ECJ, art 186(1). 169 As in the case of proceedings before the ECJ, an application for legal aid may be made before the commencement of proceedings: RP-GC, art 147(1); RP-CST, art 111(1). 170 OJ 2005 No L298, p 1. Legal aid for a legal person was refused in Case T-316/07 Commercy AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-43, paras 16–30 (the argument that the person bringing the action was actually the receiver of Commercy AG, and therefore an eligible natural person, was rejected).

404

Representation and legal aid 4.85

their choice. However, if rules of procedure impose on parties the compulsory, and costly, burden of being represented by a lawyer, the rules themselves have created the potential problem posed by the indigent character of a party (whether that party is a natural person, a legal person or a group of persons having the right to appear as a party). In such circumstances, the exclusion of a given class of party from legal aid, without regard to the real ability of the party to bear a costs burden imposed on that party by the rules of procedure, looks distinctly odd (to say the least). 4.84 If the position was not evident beforehand, it was stated expressly in the last paragraph of art 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which sets out a right to legal aid open to ‘those who lack sufficient resources’. That provision is not worded in such a way as to exclude legal persons from the right to obtain legal aid.171 In relation to legal aid in respect of legal proceedings in courts of the member states, a restriction on access by legal persons to legal aid is to be assessed by reference to the same criteria as any other type of restriction on access to legal aid.172 In particular, account may be taken of the form of the legal person, whether or not its aim is profit-making, the financial capacity of the members of or shareholders in the person, and their ability to provide the sums necessary to cover the costs of the litigation.173 As those considerations arise from art 47 of the Charter, they are equally applicable in the context of proceedings before the Court. It follows that, in the case of legal persons, legal aid may be refused only on the conventional grounds applied by the rules of procedure in the case of applications made by natural persons (always bearing in mind that, in the case of legal persons, it may be appropriate to pierce the veil of legal personality and look at the natural or legal persons standing behind the person who is the party). 4.85 The replacement of ‘natural person’ by ‘person’ in the GC and CST rules of procedure must therefore be construed as removing the previous restriction on the eligibility for legal aid to natural persons (for obvious reasons, however, the non-natural persons who appear as parties in CST proceedings do not tend to be indigent). It would be more accurate and appropriate (having regard to the principles stated above) to regard the word ‘person’ as meaning ‘party’ (whether actual or prospective), as in the ECJ rules of procedure, so as to encompass entities that have the capacity to be a party to proceedings (whether a main

171 The DEB case (above, note 167), paras 36–42. The caution with which the ECJ expressed itself in those paragraphs of the judgment may be explained by the fact that, in para 43, it encountered (and passed swiftly over) the rules of the procedure of the GC and CST (as they were then phrased). In para 59 and the first para of the operative part of the judgment, the ECJ concluded that the EU law principle of effective legal protection, as found in art 47 of the Charter, did not exclude legal persons, which (as appears from paras 60–62 and the rest of the operative part) was a characteristically elliptical way of saying that legal persons do benefit from art 47 (that type of formulation has been used by the ECJ for decades when stating that a particular principle does apply in a particular situation). 172 See para 4.79 above. 173 The DEB case (above, note 167), para 62.

405

4.86  Representation and legal aid

party or intervener), but are neither legal nor natural persons, and who lack the resources to undertake litigation before the Court. 2 The making of the application 4.86 When an application for legal aid is made before the proceedings have commenced (whether before the ECJ, GC or CST), it need not be made through a lawyer.174 The making of the application has the effect of suspending the running of any time limit for the commencement of proceedings or, semble, any equivalent step (always assuming that the application for legal aid is made before the expiry of such a time limit).175 The basis for that rule appears to be that, if an impecunious person is presented with the necessity to bring proceedings and engage a lawyer for that purpose, the situation is one of an unforeseeable circumstance (presumably the necessity to bring proceedings within the relevant time limit) or force majeure (presumably impecuniosity).176 4.87 It seems clear from the GC and CST rules of procedure that, when made by the applicant in the action or appeal after the commencement of proceedings, the application also need not be made through a lawyer as long as the

174 RP-ECJ, art  186(2); RP-GC, art  147(2) and (6) (by implication; however, if the applicant for legal aid has already instructed a lawyer to represent him, those provisions would appear to apply and require the application for legal aid to be made through that lawyer); RP-CST, art  111(1), 2nd sentence (but note RP-CST, art  111(2), which generates the same comment as the one just made about the GC rules of procedure). In Case 10/81 Farrall v Commission [1981] ECR 717, however, the application was rejected as inadmissible. It is to be supposed that the reason was that the Court considered that the applicant manifestly had no cause of action (see what was, at the time, RP-ECJ, art 76(3) (now RP-ECJ, art 187(1), last sentence, mutatis mutandis), RP-GC, art 146(2) and RP-CST, art 110(2)) but no reason was given in the Court order. 175 RP-ECJ, art 186(3); RP-GC, art 147(7); RP-CST, art 112(5). Those provisions appear to set out formally what was held in Case T-92/92AJ Lallemand-Zeller v Commission [1993] ECR II-31. The running of time is suspended as from the date of lodgement of the application for legal aid: that is what appears to be meant by the phrase ‘introduction of an application for legal aid’ in RP-ECJ, art 186(3), RP-GC, art 147(7) and RP-CST, art 112(5); and that is what was provided for in Lallemand-Zeller (above), para 3 (which does not correspond to the wording of the last para of the preamble to the order in that case). As to the taking of a step equivalent to the commencement of proceedings, see Case T-12/08 P-RENV-RX-AJ M v European Medicines Agency [2010] ECR II-949, paras 15–17 ((continuation of proceedings after referral back to GC). In Case T-109/98 AVM v Commission [1999] ECR II-3383, paras 27–30, the CFI (as it then was) distinguished Lallemand-Zeller and appears to have held that the running of time is not suspended if the application for legal aid is rejected; accordingly, an application for legal aid cannot be used as a tactical device in order to extend the time for commencing proceedings. That seems to have reflected the then wording of the CFI rules of procedure. Under the rules in their current form, it does not seem that the running of time is suspended only when the application for legal aid is successful because it is the introduction of the application for legal aid that causes the running of time to be suspended. 176 See the reasoning of the CFI (as it then was) in the AVM case (above, note 175) and Statute, art  45, 2nd para. If the application for legal aid is not justified, the circumstances are ex hypothesi not such as to justify the application of Statute, art 45, 2nd para.

406

Representation and legal aid 4.87

lawyer who represented the applicant initially has ceased to do so.177 Persons other than the applicant in the action or appeal will always be in a situation in which legal aid would arise for consideration after the commencement of proceedings, albeit either before or after their involvement in those proceedings. Their position appears to be the same as that of the applicant in the action or appeal: an application for legal aid made before they have taken a procedural step in the proceedings may be made otherwise than through a lawyer but an application for legal aid made at some time thereafter will have to be signed by the lawyer who represents them unless, in the meantime, he has ceased to do so. The position under the ECJ’s rules of procedure is unclear on that point. An application for legal aid is an exception to the general rule that all pleadings must be submitted by a lawyer.178 In the ECJ Rules of Procedure, the wording of the exception is broad enough to cover all applications for legal aid, irrespective of the stage in proceedings at which they are submitted; but it is to be found in RP-ECJ, art 186(2), which deals specifically with applications made before the commencement of proceedings; it does not form part of the more general provision found in RP-ECJ, art 185. The inference is that (in proceedings before the ECJ) an application for legal aid made after the commencement of proceedings (where the applicant for legal aid is the applicant in the appeal) or after some procedural step requiring representation by a lawyer has been taken (in the case of other parties) must be signed by a lawyer. That could have harsh results if, for some reason, the litigant’s money were to run out midway through the proceedings but before he had time to apply for legal aid through his lawyer, if the litigant had lost confidence in his existing lawyer and wished to switch to another one, or if the applicant for legal aid were a respondent to an appeal commenced by someone else (in which case, the application for legal aid could not be made before the proceedings before the ECJ had commenced). In view of that, the better view may be to construe RP-ECJ, art 186(2) consistently with what appears to be the meaning of RP-GC, art  147 and RP-CST, art  111.179 Alternatively, and despite the absence of any authority, the position can be put as follows: an application for legal aid made before the commencement of proceedings in the ECJ may be made without the intervention of a lawyer; one made after proceedings have begun should be made by the party’s lawyer but, if not, may still be admissible if the applicant gives a good and sufficient reason. It would seem that

177 RP-GC, art 147(2) and RP-CST, art 111(1), 2nd sentence, and (2). Taking the CST provisions by way of illustration, they provide that the application need not be made through a lawyer but that, if the applicant for legal aid is represented by a lawyer, the application must be signed by the latter. An applicant commencing proceedings (including an appellant) must have been represented by a lawyer at the time when the pleading commencing the proceedings was lodged. Hence, an application for legal aid made after the commencement of proceedings would have to be made through a lawyer because he would have to sign it. The position would be different if, after the commencement of proceedings, the lawyer had ceased to represent the party. 178 Or an agent, see: RP-ECJ, art 57(1); RP-GC, art 73(1), RP-CST, art 45(2), 1st subpara; Merlini v High Authority (above, note 149). 179 It should be noted that, in Case T-157/96AJ Affatato v Commission [1997] ECR I-155 (at 159), the CFI (as it then was) considered that an application for legal aid could be made without a lawyer after proceedings had begun (at that time, the CFI rules of procedure were to the same effect as what are now RP-ECJ, art 186(1)–(2)).

407

4.88  Representation and legal aid

it would have to be shown that the absence of the lawyer was due to an event beyond the applicant’s control which he could not reasonably have foreseen or avoided (such would be the case if the applicant for legal aid were a respondent in an appeal commenced by someone else). 3 Contents of the application 4.88 The role of the lawyer aside, an application made to the ECJ must comply with the general requirements applicable to pleadings180 and be framed in the language of the case. In the case of applications made by a litigant in person, the Court is open to giving the application a beneficial, rather than a legalistic, interpretation, as long as it contains somewhere all the information that must be provided to the Court.181 Applications made to the GC or CST must use a form provided by the GC and CST and available on the Court’s internet site.182 The guidance provided by the GC and CST warns that the application for legal aid must be complete at the time when it is lodged at the Court and that the information and evidence on which it is based may not be supplemented at a later date.183 There seems to be no objection to modelling an application for legal aid made to the ECJ on the GC or CST form.

180 See Ch 9 below. 181 Eg Case T-209/98AJ Niedzwiecki v European Parliament and Commission, order of 2 February 1999 (unreported); decided before the adoption of a form for applying for legal aid. The applicant had written a letter to the Court stating an intention to commence proceedings against the Parliament and the Commission. The GC  Registrar wrote back saying that, as the letter had not been signed by a lawyer, no action would be taken on the letter. The applicant replied saying that he lacked the means to pay for a lawyer and that the Court should bear the costs. The applicant’s second letter was construed as an application for legal aid (the intended action being outlined in the first letter). However, neither letter indicated what the applicant’s income was. The absence of information about the applicant’s means, together with the unmeritorious nature of the contemplated proceedings, led to the dismissal of the application for legal aid. In contrast, in Case T-646/11 Ipatau v Council, 23 September 2014, paras 58–60 (on appeal, Case C-535/14P Ipatau v Council, 18 June 2015, paras 14–22), the GC (upheld by the ECJ) was unable to construe the application for legal aid as specifying that the proposed action for annulment was directed against the relevant decision. 182 RP-GC, art  147(2); RP-CST, art  111(2). An application for legal aid that does not use the form will not be considered: PD-GC, para  238; PD-CST, para  47. General guidance on the completion of applications for legal aid in GC proceedings can be found in PD-GC, paras 238–248 and the GC’s Guide for Legal Aid Applicants. In relation to the CST, general guidance is provided in an Annex to PD-CST. 183 PD-GC, para 246; PD-CST, Annex, para D.3. If the application is defective it is liable to be dismissed for that reason: see Case F-101/06AJ Atanasov v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A1-143, II-A-1-553 (as can be seen from para 3 of that order, when confronted with a defective application, the Court might ask the applicant to remedy the defects first). There appears to be no difficulty in revising the information provided in the application in order to take account of a change in circumstances: see Case F-95/05AJ N v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-1556, II-A-1-835, paras 8–10. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent the Court from taking the initiative. In Case T-318/01AJ Othman v Council, order of 27 October 2006, the applicant was asked by the President to submit an updated application for legal aid (in circumstances in which the application had been made more than three years before the President had occasion to deal with it).

408

Representation and legal aid 4.91

4.89 In principle, the application must cover two essential points: (i) the applicant’s need for assistance; and (ii) the merits of the case that the applicant wishes to put forward. On the first point, the application must be accompanied by evidence of the applicant’s need of assistance. RP-ECJ, art  185(2), RP-CST, art  147(3) and RP-CST, art 111(3) refer, by way of example, to ‘a certificate issued by the competent national authority attesting to his financial situation’. On the second point, where the application is made prior to the commencement of proceedings, it must ‘briefly state’ the subject of such proceedings (in ECJ cases, the appeal) and, in proceedings before the GC (and CST) must also ‘briefly state’ the facts of the case and the arguments in support of the action and be accompanied by supporting documents.184 Those are the only requirements stated expressly in the rules, apart from formal requirements: the application must be signed by the applicant or, if he is represented by a lawyer, by that lawyer; if the applicant is represented, the lawyer must attach to the application a certificate of his authorisation to practise and, in GC proceedings, provide service details; and, in GC proceedings, if the applicant is a legal person governed by private law, the authority to act given by the applicant for legal aid and recent proof of the applicant’s legal existence.185 4.90 RP-ECJ, art  187(1) implies that legal aid shall be refused where the appeal is ‘manifestly unfounded’: the implication derives from the provision that the formation, which is entrusted with deciding whether or not the application for legal aid should be refused, must also consider (‘if appropriate’) whether or not the appeal is manifestly unfounded, which would seem to have no meaning unless the manifest lack of foundation of an appeal were a ground for refusing the application. In contrast, RP-GC, art  146(2) and RP-CST, art  110(2) state expressly that an application for legal aid shall be rejected if the action to which it relates appears manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded (that is, the two circumstances in which there may manifestly be no cause of action) or if it is ‘clear’ that the Court (the GC or CST) has no jurisdiction.186 In those circumstances, the grant of legal aid is otiose because the proceedings to which the application for legal aid relates (whether that application is made by the applicant in the proceedings or another party) can have only one, identifiable, outcome. 4.91 Where the application for legal aid is made after the commencement of proceedings by the applicant in the action or an appellant, the manifest absence of a cause of action or manifest inadmissibility or lack of foundation can be determined by looking at the pleadings in the main action (or appeal); if the application for legal aid is made beforehand, it must therefore show a prima 184 RP-ECJ, art  186(1); RP-GC, art  147(4); RP-CST, art  111(2), 2nd subpara. The reference to the ‘subject matter’ of the proposed proceedings in RP-GC, art 147(4) and RP-CST, art 111(2) appears to be an allusion to RP-GC, art 76(d) and RP-CST, art 50(1)(d) which provide that an application commencing proceedings must set out ‘the subject matter of the proceedings’. 185 RP-GC, art 147(2), (5) and (6); RP-CST, art 111(2) and (3), 3rd subpara. 186 RP-CST, art 110(2) adds that, if the CST finds that the proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the GC, it must refer the application for legal aid to the GC.

409

4.92  Representation and legal aid

facie case.187 One peculiarity of the ECJ Rules of Procedure is that, where the application for legal aid is made by a respondent in the appeal, there is no express requirement that the application set out, even briefly, the applicant’s proposed case in the appeal. In that situation, the reference in RP-ECJ, art  187(1) (last sentence) to the appeal being manifestly unfounded appears to mean just that: legal aid may be refused if the appeal is manifestly unfounded, in which case, the proceedings must necessarily be determined in favour of the applicant for legal aid (if the applicant opposes the appeal) or against the applicant for legal aid (if he is a respondent who supports the appeal). The other possible situation is that the applicant for legal aid supports the judgment of the GC against which the appeal has been brought, in which case, the applicant’s case in the appeal must by definition be at least arguable (because it was successful before the GC (unless, unusually, the applicant for legal aid wishes to support the GC’s judgment solely on grounds that were unsuccessful before the GC, a situation not contemplated by the ECJ Rules of Procedure). 4 Evidence of need 4.92 In principle, evidence of the applicant’s need for assistance comprises (i) his personal means and (ii) the calls likely to be made on him by his lawyer because it is the relationship between those two factors that determines the need for legal aid. As far as the latter is concerned it seems to be sufficient to state the estimated cost of the proceedings and the (estimated) amount of the legal aid sought.188 The applicant’s personal means must be proved. In that respect, there is a difference of emphasis between the ECJ and the GC and CST rules of procedure. The rules are similar in that they require the applicant for legal aid to produce information and supporting documents enabling the applicant’s financial situation to be assessed ‘such as a certificate issued by a competent national authority attesting to his financial situation’.189 However, under the CST rules, the applicant’s financial situation is to be assessed by reference to ‘objective factors such as income, capital and the family situation’.190 Despite that difference, there appears to be no difference in principle or in approach as between the ECJ,

187 In Case T-13/91R  Harrison v Commission [1991]  ECR II-179 the applicant was unable to demonstrate that he had such a case and the request for legal aid was refused (see para 27). See also the following decisions dismissing applications for legal aid brought before commencement of the action: Case F-140/06AJ Sibilli v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-147, II-A-1-257; Case F-67/07AJ  Arauzo Burillo v Commission [2007]  ECR -SC  I-A-1-327, II-A-1-1825. The dismissal of the action as being manifestly inadmissible and/or manifestly unfounded necessarily entails dismissal of the application for legal aid: see, for example, Case F-12/07AJ O’Connor v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-237, II-A-1-1329, paras 6–7. 188 In Affatato v Commission (above, note 179), at 158, the registrar asked for an estimate but the applicant could not provide one because he wished to change his lawyer. As a result, the registrar indicated that it was sufficient to produce an estimate after the request for legal aid had been processed. 189 RP-ECJ, art 185(2); RP-GC, art 147(3); RP-CST, art 111(3), 1st subpara. 190 RP-CST, art 110(1), 2nd subpara.

410

Representation and legal aid 4.92

GC and CST. The essential point is that the application must be based on objective evidence of the applicant’s lack of resources.191 Neither the ECJ nor the GC or CST rules suggest that it is essential that the applicant submit a document from the ‘competent authority’ but, quite clearly, such a document is likely to have greater probative value than the applicant’s own declaration.192 Historically, it seems in fact to have been the Court’s practice to require production of a certificate of means from the competent authority. Accordingly, if such a document is not submitted, the application may be rejected for lack of proof.193 The rules do not specify what is ‘the competent authority’. Another ‘competent authority’ is named in SR-ECJ, art  4, RP-GC, art 148(5) and RP-CST, art 112(3); but that refers to the national authority that 191 In Affatato v Commission (above, note 179), at 157–158, the applicant received legal aid on the basis of a certificate issued by the local municipality showing that he was dependent upon his parents, a certificate of registration as a job seeker issued by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, a certificate from the Ministry of Finance concerning his income tax and VAT declarations, a certificate from the same ministry that he did not have a VAT number and a certificate from the local municipality attesting to his indigence. Cf the list of acceptable documents set out in PD-CST, Annex, para D.1: certificates issued by social security or unemployment benefit authorities; declarations of income of tax notices; salary slips; bank statements. For an illustration of how lack of resources may be assessed, see Case T-506/12 P-AJ Cuallado Martorelli v Commission, order of 29 May 2013. 192 PD-CST, Annex, para D.1 states that sworn statements made and signed by the applicant for legal aid are not sufficient proof of indigence but accepts the use of ‘declarations of income’, presumably because those will have been made to the national tax authorities under conditions that impose sanctions in the event that inaccurate information is provided deliberately or negligently. 193 See Case 30/80 Fedele v Parliament, order of 24 April 1980 (unreported), where the applicant submitted copies of his employer’s tax declarations showing his earnings but failed to produce a certificate from the competent authority. In the Harrison case (above, note 187), the request for legal aid was not accompanied by any information establishing that the applicant was in need, not even a certificate from the competent authority (see para 27). In the Lallemand-Zeller case (above, note 169), a letter from the national social services was relied on successfully. In Case T-121/99AJ  Irving v Commission, order of 12  October 1999 (unreported), the applicant had asserted that he was in receipt of social assistance and had produced a hand-written declaration made by his local Social Welfare Branch Office and two bank statements. The Commission (which, at that time, was entitled to submit written observations on the application) asserted that no official document showing that the applicant was dependent on social assistance had been produced. The Commission also referred to the fact that the applicant had recently sold a house for a substantial sum and the applicant had not explained if any part of that sum was available to cover his legal costs. Legal aid was refused but, at that time, no reasons were given for such decisions so it is unclear what was the determining factor. In Case T-25/99AJ Roberts v Commission, order of 20  October 1999 (unreported), the applicants originally produced a document attesting to the fact that they were entitled to income support under UK social security legislation. The Commission said that that was not a certificate attesting to the applicants’ resources. The applicants then produced a certificate from the Legal Aid Board of England and Wales confirming that they were currently in receipt of legal aid in the UK (but not in relation to the action before the GC). Legal aid was granted. In Case T-527/09AJ Ayadi v Commission, 22  October 2010, the applicant produced documents showing that he was in receipt of unemployment benefit, that he had a wife and six children, and that he had been granted legal aid on several occasions by the EU courts (he was also the subject of an order freezing his assets). The fact that the applicant’s assets have been frozen is not an objection to granting legal aid but may be a reason why is should be granted: cf Case T-228/12 AJ DD v Council, 10 November 2014.

411

4.93  Representation and legal aid

may make suggestions as to the lawyer who should represent the applicant when the applicant either does not indicate his choice of a lawyer or the Court considers his choice unacceptable. It is to be supposed that the competent authority under RP-ECJ, art  185(2), RP-GC, art  147(3) and RP-CST, art  111(3) is the national body responsible for assessing a person’s financial position for the purpose of granting legal aid under national law. If there is no such body it is difficult to say what other organisation could be competent, probably the revenue or social security services.194 As far as legal persons are concerned, it may be the authority with whom the audited accounts are registered.195 The CST’s guidance warns that copies should be provided, rather than original documents, because the documents supporting an application for legal aid will not be returned to the applicant.196 4.93 In the case of an application for legal aid made in the context of an appeal, or for the purpose of launching an appeal, by a party who had been awarded legal aid by the court below (whether the GC or CST), the fact that the applicant had previously been awarded legal aid can be taken into account. The more relevant question is whether or not there has been a subsequent change in circumstances such as to make the grant of legal aid by the appellate court inappropriate.197 5 Assessment of the application 4.94 The function of the competent authority is only to produce a certificate of the applicant’s financial situation, not to determine the question whether or not the applicant is entitled to legal aid. The certificate should in consequence show a complete picture of the applicant’s financial situation. It is not enough if 194 PD-CST, Annex, para D.1, refers to certificates issued by social security or unemployment benefit authorities. In Case T-49/04AJ Hassan v Council, order of 3 April 2006, it seems to have been assumed that the competent authority was the one responsible for social security. The applicant was in prison and not in receipt of social security benefits so he relied on documents attesting to the grant of legal aid in national proceedings and issued by the national authority responsible for legal aid. That evidence was accepted and the same thing was done in Othman (above, note 183). 195 In Case 96/80 Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd [1981]  ECR  911, the Court asked for the applicant’s company’s audited accounts filed at the Companies Registry. On the other hand, in Case T-131/89 Cosimex GmbH v Commission (case withdrawn; order of 5 July 1990), the applicant produced its accounts but no certificate attesting its lack of means and the application for legal aid was dismissed. 196 PD-CST, Annex, para D.3. 197 Cf Case C-559/08AJ Rajani, order of 21 January 2009 (unreported). The applicant seems to have asserted that he could not afford legal representation on the basis of a document from the competent national authority attesting to his monthly income. The order is unclear as to whether account was taken of the fact that he had been granted legal aid by the court below (the GC) or whether the material used to support the legal aid application made to the GC was recycled for the purposes of applying for legal aid from the ECJ. In the normal course, it would be better to use that material directly instead of relying on the decision of the court below to grant legal aid. However, in any event, it would be important to demonstrate that there had been no subsequent change (in the sense of an improvement) in the applicant’s financial circumstances.

412

Representation and legal aid 4.95

it simply certifies that the applicant is poor enough to qualify for legal aid under national law. The Court would be in a position to deduce from that that the applicant is unable to meet the cost of proceedings but that is unsatisfactory because, on the one hand, the Court would be bound by national criteria concerning the entitlement to legal aid and, on the other, it could not determine whether the applicant is wholly or partly unable to meet the costs save by relying on further information given by the applicant himself. The Court is not bound by the view expressed by the competent authority: it must assess the proof of lack of means itself in the light of the costs likely to be incurred by the applicant. It may be that it would decide that the competent authority had not taken into account a source of income which it should have taken into account or vice versa. For example, national law might prescribe that a spouse’s income should be considered. The Court is not bound by national law and must decide that matter for itself. The competent authority determines what are the applicant’s financial resources, nothing more. 4.95 The ECJ and GC rules of procedure used to provide that decisions granting or refusing legal aid were to give no reasons.198 It was therefore impossible to say what criteria the Court adopted when deciding whether or not to grant legal aid and, if so, how much. Decisions refusing legal aid (whether in whole or in part, in relation to decisions in ECJ proceedings) must now state the reasons on which they are based.199 However, legal aid decisions are few and far between (outside staff cases) and the general practice of the Court is difficult to discern. This is a situation in which inspiration from national law is of little value since it will only indicate where policy, rather than principle, has fixed the criteria to be taken into account. For the same reason, the rules adopted by the member state in which the applicant resides can be of little relevance. They may, for example, constitute a serious attempt to assess capacity (or incapacity) to pay legal costs in the context of the prevailing charges made by lawyers in that member state. That is of little use if costs of representation or assistance before the Court are in practice higher than those for appearance before a national court or if the applicant wishes to employ foreign counsel. In that situation one can do nothing more than say that the Court must adopt a commonsense approach in its assessment of the applicant’s financial capacity to bear the costs of the action. One obvious rule seems to be that it is the applicant’s disposable resources that should be taken into account: his house, the tools of his trade and a portion of his income reasonably sufficient to ensure his subsistence and that of his family, and so forth, should be left out of account. In the case of legal persons, it is a little more difficult to suggest criteria. The test here would seem to be not whether the accounts show a profit but whether the payment of costs would be so onerous as to endanger the 198 RP-ECJ, art 76(3) and RP-CFI, art 94(2) (before their amendment). 199 RP-ECJ, art  187(3), last sentence; RP-GC, art  148(3); RP-CST, art  112(2), 2nd subpara. A decision refusing legal aid does not, at least in principle, prejudge the Court’s decision in the action to which the application relates: see Case T-37/93 Stagakis v Parliament [1994] ECRSC I-A 137, II-451, para 23. However, if, for example, the application is dismissed because the action is manifestly inadmissible or unfounded, it is difficult to envisage a different outcome for the action itself.

413

4.96  Representation and legal aid

company’s capacity to pay its debts as they arise and risk its bankruptcy or winding up. In companies with a modest profit margin the payment of costs could cause severe cash flow problems and lead to its liquidation even though, after all the debts were paid, there might still be something left for the shareholders. The commonsense approach would indicate that a company is entitled to legal aid if the burden of costs would threaten its commercial existence. 4.96 In brief, the test for the grant of legal aid is whether or not the applicant is ‘unable’ to meet the costs of the proceedings; and that means an inability to incur the expense on top of all normal and reasonable outgoings. Article 47 of the Charter associates the availability of legal aid with the objective of ensuring effective access to justice, which would not be achieved where a person is not able to meet the costs of proceedings. For the most part, litigation before the Court is not about private persons carrying on their private disputes in a public forum but about public law disputes in which, where private persons are involved, the underlying concern is to ensure due observance of the rule of law. That makes the availability of legal aid in appropriate cases all the more important. 6 Scope of legal aid 4.97 The rules of procedure refers compendiously to an inability to pay the ‘costs of the proceedings’.200 In principle, those costs cover both the costs incurred by the applicant for legal aid for his own representation and assistance and the costs to which he is exposed if he loses the case or, even if he is successful, is for some reason ordered to pay all or a part of the costs of another party. It is certainly the case that legal aid covers the former201 and includes costs incurred in conjunction with the application for legal aid. It does not cover legal costs incurred before the application has been made: the theory is that, in the absence of proof otherwise, the applicant must have had the resources necessary in order to bear the costs incurred before the application was made.202 It is less clear that legal aid covers the exposure to paying the costs of another party. 4.98 In GC and CST proceedings, there is a separate rule under which ‘if equity so requires’ the Court may order that, where the legally aided party is 200 RP-ECJ, art 185(1); RP-GC, art 146(1); RP-CST, art 110(1). That seems to be borne out by other texts of the Rules but the French, for example, differentiates between Court costs (or the costs of the proceedings) in RP-ECJ, art  185(1) (‘frais de l’instance’) and costs simpliciter (‘dépens’) in, for example, RP-ECJ, art 184(2). It seems that the latter encompasses the former. The distinction drawn by the President of the CST in Case F-57/12R Marcuccio v Commission, order of 3 August 2012, para 29, between ‘costs’ and ‘Court costs’ (which led to a split costs order, Court costs being awarded against the applicant and other costs being reserved) was disapproved on appeal in Case T-464/12 P(R) Marcuccio v Commission, order of 3 December 2012, para 25. 201 RP-ECJ, art 188(1); RP-GC, art 149(1); RP-CST, art 113(1). 202 Hassan (above, note 194), paras 21–25 (legal aid covers costs arising at the same time as, or after, the making of the application for legal aid); Othman (above, note 183), paras 32–35; N v Commission (above, note 183), para 16 (N was a case in which the application for legal aid was made after the close of the written procedure, by which time N had lost her job).

414

Representation and legal aid 4.101

unsuccessful, all or part of the costs of the successful parties are to be borne by one or other of them or by the Court (in the person of the cashier of the Court) by way of legal aid.203 That suggests that legal aid does not ordinarily cover the costs of another party; where necessary, a separate order granting legal aid to that other party would be made. 4.99 The ECJ rules of procedure do not contain such a provision. RP-ECJ, art 188(2) provides that, in its decision as to costs, the Court may order the payment to the cashier of the Court of sums advanced as legal aid. That refers to the situation that arises where the legally aided party is successful and another party is (or would ordinarily be) ordered to pay his costs: as the legally aided party’s costs have been borne by the Court through the grant of legal aid, the party ordered to pay the costs reimburses the Court directly.204 There is no provision dealing with the converse situation. 4.100 It could well be said that, as a matter of principle, the Court should assist impecunious parties only in shouldering the financial burden of presenting their side of the case rather than act as an insurer for them against the risk of losing. SR-ECJ, art 5 certainly implies that ‘costs’ in the context of legal aid means the expense of bringing the action rather than the overall expenses incurred, such as costs awarded against the legally aided party; and it seems that, in general, the Court tends to grant legal aid only for bringing the action.205 There does not seem to have been a case in which a party has claimed legal aid in order to help him bear the costs of losing. The point therefore appears to remain open so far as proceedings before the ECJ are concerned. If and to the extent that the ECJ’s rules are to be given a different construction from that of the GC’s and CST’s rules, the most that can be said is that the power to grant legal aid to cover the costs awarded against the applicant exists but it is not the ECJ’s practice, so far, to exercise it. 4.101 An indication that legal aid applies in principle only to the costs incurred by the legally aided party appears from the fact that, in the absence of a Court order otherwise, a successful party who is awarded costs must have recourse to the normal procedures under national law in order to recover them from the assisted party. There is no automatic right of recourse against the Court (as the grantor of legal aid to the unsuccessful assisted party). If the legally aided party wins and is awarded costs, the Court may order that the sums advanced as legal

203 RP-GC, art  149(5); RP-CST, art  113(4). For an example of the operation of the parallel provision in staff cases, see Case F-12/07 O’Connor v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-239, II-A-1-1333, para 33. 204 See also to that effect RP-GC, art 149(3) and RP-CST, art 113(3). 205 Most orders granting legal aid set out the figure awarded, which is intended to cover the fees and incidental expenses of the applicant’s lawyer, but nothing more (the sum is expressed in the currency in which the lawyer is to be paid).

415

4.102  Representation and legal aid

aid be paid to the Court by the losing party206 or, as suggested by Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in the Tither case,207 any sum obtained by the legally aided party by way of damages should be used first to satisfy the debt to the Court. Where costs should ordinarily be awarded against the party granted legal aid (or he is to pay his own costs), the Court may order the repayment of all or part of the sums advanced by it;208 but, in the case of an impecunious party, in relation to whom recovery is not realistic, it is only necessary for the Court to determine the disbursements and fees of the legally aided party’s lawyer to be paid by the cashier of the Court.209 It is the Registrar’s function to obtain the recovery of any legal aid ordered to be repaid.210 That will be done by bringing proceedings for execution of the Court’s order in the member state in which the person ordered to pay the money is resident.211 7 Handling of the application 4.102 In the ECJ, when the application for legal aid is lodged at the Court, the President designates a judge to act as rapporteur; on the basis of a proposal from the judge-rapporteur (which must be made ‘promptly’), the matter is considered by the three-judge chamber to which the judge-rapporteur belongs (or a five-judge chamber if the judge-rapporteur is not a member of a three-judge chamber) and a decision is made by the chamber, in the form of an order, after hearing the advocate general.212 It used to be the case that the decision was made after considering the written observations of the other party and after hearing 206 See Case 175/80 Tither v Commission [1981] ECR 2345, para 21; RP-ECJ, art 188(2). RP-GC, art 149(3) and RP-CST, art 113(3) make recovery in that manner mandatory. In Case T-11/00 Hautem v European Investment Bank [2000] ECR II-4019, para 60, an advance of legal aid had been paid to the legally assisted party’s lawyer. The opposing party, who was unsuccessful, was ordered to pay the amount of the advance (or a lesser sum if the actual fees and disbursements were less than the advance) to the cashier of the Court and any additional amount (if the actual fees and disbursements were higher than the advance) directly to the assisted party. 207 Above, note 206. 208 RP-ECJ, art 188(2); and, by implication, RP-GC, art 149(5) and RP-CST, art 113(4). See Case 25/68 Schertzer v European Parliament [1977] ECR 1729. 209 As RP-GC, art  149(2) and RP-CST, art  113(2) provide. Those provisions are to be read in conjunction with RP-GC, art 149(5) and RP-CST, art 113(4), which enable the Court, in those circumstances, either to bear all or part of the costs itself or to order another party to bear all or part of them or to leave them to be borne in whole or in part by the legally aided party. 210 RP-ECJ, art 188(3); RP-GC, art 149(4); RP-CST, art 113(3). In proceedings before the CST, if the party ordered to pay raises a challenge to the order or simply fails to respond to the Registrar’s demand, the matter is referred to the President who makes a reasoned order from which there is no appeal (the President may also refer the matter to the CST): RP-CST, art 113(3), 2nd subpara. 211 The questions of the quantification of the aid granted, its manner of payment and recovery are considered in more detail in paras 4.108–4.113 and 4.125–4.138 below. 212 RP-ECJ, art 186(4) and 187(1)–(3): the three-judge chamber is to consist of the President of the chamber, the judge-rapporteur and the first judge (or first two judges) designated from the list of the judges attached to the chamber in question, as at the date on which the legal aid application is brought before the chamber by the judge-rapporteur; where a five-judge chamber has to be used, it consists of the judge-rapporteur and four judges designated from the list of judges attached to that chamber.

416

Representation and legal aid 4.105

the advocate general. There is no longer express provision to that effect. As the formation must consider whether or not the appeal is manifestly unfounded (in which case, it seems that legal aid must be refused),213 there is an overlap with the power of the Court under RP-ECJ, art 53(2) or 181 to dismiss the appeal (when the application for legal aid is made by the appellant after the commencement of the appeal), without the opposing parties being heard, a point considered in the next paragraph. 4.103 In the GC and CST, the decision to grant or refuse legal aid is made by the President in the form of an order.214 Before the order is made, the opposing party is invited to submit written observations on the application for legal aid unless it is apparent that the applicant for legal aid is able to meet the costs of legal assistance and representation or the action is manifestly inadmissible or unfounded.215 It is implicit that, in his written observations, the opposing party may canvass both of those aspects of the conditions for granting legal aid. 4.104 As worded, the ECJ, GC and CST rules of procedure appear to envisage an application for legal aid being made by the party initiating the action (or the appeal), not the defendant (or a respondent to an appeal). Almost invariably, the defendant in contentious proceedings before the Court is either an EU institution, or other emanation of the EU, or a member state, none of which would normally be expected to be in need of legal aid. However, it is possible for a person other than an EU institution or a member state to be a defendant to proceedings (as was, for example, the case in the third party proceedings brought by one steel company against the High Authority and three other steel companies)216 or a respondent or cross-appellant in an appeal. Further, an intervening party may also be able to apply for legal aid, where appropriate. The rules should therefore be interpreted, in such cases, as also covering situations in which there is ‘manifestly no defence to the action’, ‘manifestly no defence to the appeal’, ‘the cross-appeal is manifestly unfounded’ or there is ‘manifestly no case in the intervention’. 4.105 As noted above, the ECJ, GC and CST rules of procedure differ on the question whether or not the opposing party must be heard before a decision is made on the application for legal aid; and, since that decision must take into 213 RP-ECJ, art 187(1), last sentence. 214 RP-GC, art  148(2); RP-CST, art  112(2). In CST proceedings, the President may refer the matter to the CST (or the relevant chamber) and must do so if the President envisages that the application for legal aid will be dismissed on the grounds that the action is manifestly inadmissible or unfounded or that the CST lacks jurisdiction. No such provision appears in the GC rules. it would therefore seem that, in GC proceedings, the President should not dismiss the application for legal aid on those grounds (which is in principle possible pursuant to RPGC, art 146(2)) before the GC has made a decision on the action, in order to avoid the risk of inconsistent decisions. Alternatively, as suggested below, the President can await a GC decision dismissing the action and then issue an order saying that there is no need to rule on the application for legal aid. 215 RP-GC, art 148(1); RP-CST, art 112(1). 216 Cases 42 and 49/59 Breedband NV v Société des Acières du Temple [1962] ECR 145.

417

4.106  Representation and legal aid

account the arguability of the applicant’s case in the proceedings, there is an overlap with RP-ECJ, art  53(2) and 181, RP-GC, art  126 (and, in the case of appeals from the CST, RP-GC, art 208) and RP-CST, art 81. If a decision on the application for legal aid were dependent in all cases on the other parties first being given an opportunity to submit written observations, that would mean that, where the Court decided to dismiss the action or appeal itself as (for example) inadmissible of its own motion under RP-ECJ, art  53(2) or 181, RP-GC, art  126 (or 208) or RP-CST, art  81, and without hearing the parties, it could not reject the accompanying application for the grant of legal aid until it had served the application on the other parties and awaited their observations. In Case 233/82 K v Germany and European Parliament,217 which was decided at a time when (in ECJ proceedings) an application for legal aid was decided after submissions from the opposing parties, the ECJ avoided that by applying what was then RP-ECJ, art 92 – now RP-ECJ, art 53(2) – instead of what was then RP-ECJ, art 76(3) – now RP-ECJ, art 187(1), last sentence – on the ground, so it seems, that the latter refers to the absence of a cause of action (the phrase now used is ‘manifestly unfounded’) whereas the former speaks of a manifest lack of jurisdiction (the phraseology now used is effectively the same).218 From that, it is to be inferred that what is now RP-ECJ, art  187(1), last sentence, refers only to the substance of the appeal; where the appeal is inadmissible or the Court lacks jurisdiction, RP-ECJ, art 187, last sentence, does not apply but the application for legal aid (whether made before or after the commencement, or purported commencement of the appeal) may be dismissed immediately under RP-ECJ, art 53(2) because of the defective nature of the proceedings to which it relates. 4.106 The same complexities do not arise in relation to RP-GC, art  146(2) and RP-CST, art 110(2), which provide in simple and more direct terms that the application for legal aid is to be refused if the action (in respect of which legal aid is sought) is manifestly inadmissible, manifestly unfounded or there is no jurisdiction to entertain it, a conclusion that may be reached in the context of consideration of the application for legal aid, independently of the decision made on the action (if it has already been commenced) or concommittently (either at the same time or, where the action and the application for legal aid can be dealt with by the

217 [1982] ECR 3637. The application for legal aid had been made before the commencement of proceedings. 218 The same was done by the CFI in Case T-30/96 Gomes de Sa Pereira v Council [1996] ECR II-785, paras 33–34 (what was, at that time, RP-GC, art  94(2), which was applied in that case, reflected what is now RP-ECJ, art 187(1), last sentence, and provided that consideration had to be given to the question whether or not there was manifestly no cause of action). In some instances, the action has been classified as manifestly unfounded, rather than as being manifestly inadmissible, apparently in order to engineer the speedy rejection of the application for legal aid: see, for example, Case T-257/99AJ Alvarez Sagrario, order of 8 November 1999 (unreported), where the proposed action was in large part manifestly inadmissible and, in relation to one proposed defendant, either inadmissible or without foundation. Where the action or appeal is plainly hopeless, there seems to be little merit in being precise about the question whether the defect lies in the admissibility of the action or its underlying merits.

418

Representation and legal aid 4.107

same person, by joining them and disposing of them in the same order).219 In one sense, one would expect RP-ECJ, art 53(2), RP-GC, art 129 and RP-CST, art 82 to apply to the request for legal aid where the action (or the appeal) has already been dismissed on the ground that it was inadmissible because that would raise an absolute bar to the continuation of the ancillary proceedings for the grant of legal aid. In principle, that is correct; but the dismissal of the action (or appeal) also means that there is no need to rule on the request for legal aid because the proceeding to which it relates no longer exists.220 Accordingly, it would appear that an application for legal aid can be disposed of either as a consequence of a previous dismissal of the action (or appeal) or independently of such a decision (which may be relevant where the application for legal aid is made before the commencement of proceedings that are inadmissible).221 Thus, in Case C-149/98P Toller v Commission,222 the ECJ dismissed the appeal under what is now RP-ECJ, art 181, as a result of which the application for legal aid fell away. 4.107 Accordingly, the position is that, in ECJ proceedings, an application for legal aid may be dismissed summarily where the appeal to which it relates (even if a contemplated appeal only) is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. If it is neither, the application for legal aid must be entertained. There is no provision for submissions on the application from an opposing party. The application is therefore dealt with solely by reference to its contents and the material adduced in its support by the applicant. In GC and CST proceedings, an application for legal aid may also be dismissed summarily if the GC or CST proceedings to which it relates (whether pending or contemplated) are manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. If not, the application must be entertained unless it is apparent from the information provided in the application that the applicant is able to meet the costs of legal assistance and representation.223 Where the application is entertained, the opposing party or parties are entitled to submit written observations on the application but there is no provision for a hearing. The written observations may seek to persuade the GC or CST that the proceedings to which the application relates are (or, if brought, would be) manifestly inadmissible, manifestly unfounded or outside the jurisdiction of the GC (or CST). The written observations may also contest the eligibility of the applicant to receive legal aid. The application for legal aid must be refused if 219 Eg Case F-90/06AJ Nolan v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-105, II-A-1-393 (before the commencement of the action); Case F-11/07AJ  Montes Doria v Commission [2007]  ECRSC I-A-1-81, II-A-1-463; Cases F-142/06 and F-142/06AJ Bligny v Commission [2007] ECRSC  I-A-1-57, II-A-1-317, paras 38–39 (joinder, manifestly unfounded; on appeal, Case T-127/07P  Bligny v Commission [2008]  ECR-SC  I-B-1-19, II-B-1-155); Cases F-48/08 and F-48/08AJ Ortega Serrano v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-335, II-A-1-1835, paras 43– 45 (joinder, manifestly inadmissible). 220 Eg Case C-130/91 Instituto Social de Apoio ao Emprego e à Valorizaçāo Profissional and Interdata (Centro de Processamento de Dados Lda) v Commission [1992] ECR I-69. 221 The latter was the situation in K v Germany and European Parliament (above, note 217). 222 [1998] ECR I-7623, paras 42–43. 223 For examples of summary dismissal on the ground that the application did not disclose an inability to meet the costs of the proceedings, see: Case F-128/06AJ  Noworyta v European Parliament [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-147, II-A-1-573; Case F-84/06AJ Marcuccio v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-135, II-A-1-745.

419

4.108  Representation and legal aid

it is concluded that the proceedings to which it relates are manifestly inadmissible, manifestly unfounded, that the GC (or CST) has no jurisdiction, or that the applicant has not proved that he is unable to meet the costs of the proceedings, in whole or in part. Legal aid is granted if the proceedings to which the application relates are not manifestly inadmissible and so forth and the applicant has proved that he is unable to meet all or part of his costs.224 8 The decision on the application 4.108 A  decision refusing legal aid must state the reasons for it.225 There is no express requirement for decisions awarding legal aid to state reasons but in many cases they do. There is no appeal from GC (or CST) decisions on legal aid.226 Where legal aid is refused, there appears to be no obstacle in principle to the making of a second application as long as it is based on materially different (and, presumably, more persuasive) information that addresses the reasons why legal aid was refused.227 4.109 In principle, there are two essential features of an order granting legal aid. The first is the designation of the lawyer appointed to act for the legally aided party or the identification of the process by which such a lawyer will be found. The second is the quantification of the aid that has been granted. Where the application is made before the commencement of the proceedings to which it relates, the order must contain a third feature: provision dealing with the timing of the initiation of the action or appeal in contemplation. 4.110 So far as the first feature is concerned, in an order granting legal aid the Court also orders that a lawyer be appointed to act for the applicant.228 Usually the Court accepts the applicant’s own choice but, if he does not name his lawyer himself or the Court considers his choice unacceptable, the Registrar sends a copy of the order granting legal aid and the application to the authority named in

224 For the sake of clarity on the point, the last two sentences apply also in ECJ proceedings. 225 RP-ECJ, art 187(3); RP-GC, art 148(3); RP-CST, art 112(2), 2nd subpara. 226 RP-GC, art 148(8); RP-CST, art 112(6). 227 It cannot, however, be assumed that a second application would be entertained even if based upon additional evidence that addressed deficiencies in the first application. 228 SR-ECJ, art  4(1); RP-GC, art  148(4)–(6); RP-CST, art  112(3). Eg Case T-25/99AJ  Roberts v Commission (above, note 193, para  2 of the operative part of the order). In practice that is not always done, see, for example, Case 66/81 Pommerehnke v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1982] ECR 1363, order of 16 March 1982; Case 240/81 Einberger v Hauptzollamt Frieburg [1982] ECR 3699, order of 1 April 1981. In more recent orders, the failure to designate or identify the legally aided party’s lawyer appears to have become more frequent. In Case 145/83 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3539, the applicant was granted legal aid with no maximum amount fixed coupled with an order that a lawyer be appointed for him. The applicant applied for certain named lawyers to be appointed and the Court so ordered, specifying that the amount of fees and disbursements due by way of legal aid would be fixed at the end of the case. In the course of the proceedings the applicant’s lawyers were changed at his request, thus indicating that, when legal aid has been granted, any change in the applicant’s lawyers must be approved by the Court.

420

Representation and legal aid 4.111

SR-ECJ, Annex II.229 That Annex sets out the authority competent in each member state to suggest to the Court a lawyer who may represent the applicant. The competent authorities in the United Kingdom are the Law Societies of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The function of the competent authority is only to make suggestions; the power to make a decision appointing a lawyer to act for the applicant remains the Court’s. It seems that the competent authority is determined by the member state in which the applicant resides. That is not expressly stated in SR-ECJ, art  4, RP-GC, art  148(5) or RP-CST, art 112(3) but it emerges from Annex II, where it is so provided for the purpose of determining the authority competent in respect of persons living in different parts of the United Kingdom. So, for an English person resident in Belgium, the competent authority would be the Belgian Minister of Justice rather than the Law Society of England and Wales.230 4.111 So far as the quantification of the legal aid is concerned, the order normally specifies an upper limit to the amount of money that the Court is prepared to pay by way of legal aid. That amount is often subdivided into: (a) an amount covering lawyer’s fees for the written procedure; (b) an amount covering lawyer’s fees for the hearing (if there is one); and (c) the lawyer’s travel and accommodation costs for the purposes of the hearing (again, if there is one).231 The Court is not obliged to accept the estimate of legal costs provided by the applicant in support of the application for legal aid.232 If the estimate is intended to guide the Court as to the amount that could or should be awarded by way of legal aid, the estimate should be fully justified and explained because the costs of legal assistance and representation vary considerably from one member state to another and judges of the ECJ, GC or CST cannot be expected to have a detailed and up-to-date knowledge of the ‘going rate’ for a particular type of case in any one member state. Nor does the Court have specialists in the taxation of

229 SR-ECJ, art 4(2); RP-GC, art 148(5); RP-CST, art 112(3), 2nd subpara. 230 However, it should be noted that, in the Lallemand-Zeller case (above, note 175), the CFI appointed a Luxembourg lawyer for the applicant after giving the latter an opportunity to name the lawyer of his choice but without, it would seem from the report of the case, making enquiry of the competent authority in the member state where the applicant resided (France) or, indeed, of any other competent authority. 231 Eg Rajani (above, note 197). In that case (by way of example), the amounts granted by way of legal aid were €4,000 for the written procedure, €500 for the hearing and €1,000 for travel and accommodation. In Ayadi (above, note 193), paras 17–18, the amount fixed was expressed to be provisional in the sense that a final decision was reserved until the end of the case; but that meant that, if the costs exceeded the upper limit, the legally aided party and his lawyers were at risk because they would then have to show the Court at the end of the case (on the basis of a detailed breakdown of expenses) that it was appropriate to increase the amount granted by way of legal aid. 232 In Case T-25/99AJ  Roberts v Commission (above, note 193), the applicants’ solicitors had submitted an estimate of costs and fees of £41,477.50. The Court considered that that was ‘manifestly disproportionate in view of the object and nature of the dispute, its significance in terms of the points of law raised and the expected difficulty of the case, the amount of work which proceedings before the Court will entail for the agents or counsel involved and the parties’ financial interest in the dispute’. Legal aid was therefore capped at €15,000 (excluding VAT).

421

4.112  Representation and legal aid

costs.233 If the ceiling fixed by the Court risks being exceeded, a further application for legal aid should be made, explaining why there should be an increase in the amount initially specified by the Court. If no such application is made or, if made, the application is dismissed, the legally assisted party has no recourse to the Court in respect of the additional costs.234 The practice is not to inflate the amount of legal aid awarded by reference to the number of lawyers representing the legally aided party. Accordingly, while the Court is often prepared to appoint more than one lawyer to represent the legally aided party (where the latter has so requested), it will still fix the upper limit of the legal aid granted by what it considers to be appropriate in the circumstances; and the legally aided party and his lawyers then have to decide how that amount will be divided up.235 4.112 Legal aid is granted out of the Court’s budget and the money is released by the Court’s cashier.236 The President may, on application, order that the legally assisted party’s lawyer should receive an advance of the legal aid granted.237 Such an application is usually to be made in the application for legal aid. The SR-ECJ provide generally that the Court has power to adjudicate on the lawyer’s expenses and fees.238 The GC and CST rules of procedure provide in more detail that the Court may specify the amount to be paid to the lawyer or fix an upper limit that the lawyer’s disbursements and fees should not exceed and that the Court may provide for a contribution to be made by the legally assisted party (depending upon his economic or financial situation).239 Where the applicant for 233 In the Adams case (above, note 228), where (as a result of an oversight) the order granting legal aid did not specify a ceiling, the Court was taken by surprise by the level of an interim bill of costs. An informal approach was made to a judicial taxation specialist in the member state concerned who confirmed that the interim bill was reasonable. The practice of specifying a ceiling for the legal aid in the order makes it easier for the Court to maintain some degree of control over the costs. 234 In Case T-247/93 Stenhouse v Council and Commission, order of 15  December 1998 (unreported), para 5, the GC granted legal aid and awarded a lump sum of £4,000 to cover the cost of lodging the application commencing proceedings. The legally aided party later lodged a supplementary application for legal aid in the amount of £5,000 to cover additional expenses. That application was rejected. The cap on the legal aid that the Court is prepared to pay does not preclude the legally aided party from obtaining a higher amount from the opposing party in the costs order made at the close of the proceedings: eg Case F-96/09 DEP Cuallado Martorelli v Commission, order of 14 November 2013, paras 18–26 (and note para 23: a lawyer who acts pro bono at the start of the proceedings cannot be held to that if costs are awarded against the opposing party at the end of the proceedings). 235 Eg Hassan (above, note 194), paras 26–28; Othman (above, note 183), paras 36–37; Ayadi (above, note 193), paras 14–18. 236 RP-ECJ, art 188(1); RP-GC, art 149(1); RP-CST, art 113(1), 1st subpara. 237 RP-ECJ, art  188(1), last sentence; SR-ECJ, art  5; RP-GC, art  149(1); RP-CST, art  113(1), 2nd subpara. The English text of the GC and CST rule specifies an application made by the lawyer. Other language versions do not support this and, in the Tither case (above, note 206), an advance was ordered on application by the party, not his lawyer (as the ECJ rule now provides in express terms). As a result, it must be concluded that the English text of RP-GC, art 149(1) and RP-CST, art 113(1) is misleading and that the application can be made by the party. Indeed that is likely to be more usual. 238 SR-ECJ, art 5. 239 RP-GC, art 148(7); RP-CST, art 112(4). It is implicit that the upper limit may be exceeded if the Court permits. It is unclear if the upper limit sets the maximum amount that the Court will finance through legal aid or is actually a fixed limit on the lawyer’s disbursements and fees.

422

Representation and legal aid 4.114

legal aid is the subject of an order freezing his assets or some similar sanction, the payment of any amount by way of legal aid may be made conditional upon the legally aided party producing an authorisation from the competent authorities for the payment to be made; and, even then, the payment may be made directly to the party’s lawyers.240 4.113 As to the third feature of an order granting legal aid, where legal aid is granted in response to an application made before the commencement of proceedings, the Court must specify the date from which the running of time for the commencement of proceedings (suspended as a result of the making of the application for legal aid) recommences. That date will ordinarily be the date on which the order granting legal aid is notified to the applicant but may be the date of notification of the order designating a lawyer to act for the legally assisted party, where that decision is made by the Court.241 Thus, in an action for annulment under TFEU, art 263 brought by an individual resident in a member state, for which the time limit for bringing proceedings is two months and ten days, if the application for legal aid was lodged at the Court one month after time had started to run, the application for annulment would have to be lodged within one month and ten days of the notification of the decision granting legal aid.242 Clearly, in such a situation, the later the application for legal aid is made, the less time is left for the drafting of the application commencing proceedings once legal aid has been granted. 9 Withdrawal of legal aid 4.114 A  decision granting legal aid may be withdrawn at any time by the maker of the order acting on its own motion or on application if the circumstances upon which legal aid was granted change.243 In GC and CST proceedings, the legally aided party must be heard before legal aid is withdrawn; reasons must be given and there is no appeal from the decision.244 It is to be supposed that the ECJ would act in the same way. Logically, withdrawal in the light of a relevant change in circumstances must be prospective in effect, or at least may not take effect before the change in circumstances occurs, unless the retrospective withdrawal of legal aid is clearly justified. For example, if the change in circum 240 Eg Hassan (above, note 194), paras 17–20; Othman (above, note 183), 27–30; Ayadi (above, note 193), paras 19–20; DD (above, note 193). 241 The Lallemand-Zeller case (above, note 175); RP-GC, art 96(4); PD-GC, para 247; RP-CST, art 97(4). The running of time is suspended only if the action contemplated in the application for legal aid is the same as the action that is eventually brought: see Ipatau (above, note 181), in which the action was inadmissible (as being out of time) insofar as it was directed against a decision not identified in the application for legal aid as being the target of the intended action. 242 For an example of the calculation of the time limit when it is interrupted in that way, see Case F-133/06 Marcuccio v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-343, II-A-1-1883, paras 50–51. 243 RP-ECJ, art 189; RP-GC, art 150(1); RP-CST, art 114(1). Accordingly, in PD-CST, Annex, para D.1, the CST advises that any change in the applicant’s financial situation that might justify the application of RP-CST, art 114 must be notified to the CST at the earliest opportunity. 244 RP-GC, art 150(1)–(2); RP-CST, art 114(1)–(2). In CST proceedings, the matter may also be referred to the CST.

423

4.115  Representation and legal aid

stances were that the applicant for legal aid had finally got a job, that might put him in a position in which he could himself finance the remaining stages of the proceedings but would not necessarily mean that he could pay for the costs that had been incurred before the change in circumstances. On the other hand, if the applicant won a huge sum of money in a lottery, enabling him to cover all the costs, it seems to be fair to withdraw legal aid retrospectively.

B

References for a preliminary ruling

1 General 4.115 Before 2012, the ECJ Rules of Procedure provided that the Court could grant legal aid in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling ‘in special circumstances’.245 The ‘special circumstances’ were not defined but were conceived to encompass all circumstances in which, if assistance were not given by the Court, the party in question would simply be unable to present his side of the case.246 Under the current Rules of Procedure, the criterion for the grant of legal aid is an inability to meet the costs of the proceedings before the ECJ in whole or in part.247 The proceedings before the ECJ are the preliminary ruling proceedings, which conventionally start with the lodgment of the national court or tribunal’s reference at the ECJ’s Registry and end with the delivery of judgment by the ECJ on the question or questions referred. The costs that may be covered by legal aid are, accordingly, those relating to the preparation and lodgment of written observations and representation at the hearing (if there is one) by a lawyer or other person having rights of audience.248 Legal aid in references for a preliminary ruling has been granted for the purposes of the hearing alone where that was what was requested.249 Legal aid is not normally granted for the attendance of a party (as opposed to the party’s lawyer or other representative) at the hearing. It would seem that the only justification for doing so would be if the party were a litigant in person with rights of audience before the referring court or tribunal, in which case, travel and subsistence might be covered by legal aid from the Court. As the costs of the preliminary ruling proceedings are a matter for the referring 245 RP-ECJ, art 104(6), as worded before 2012. 246 Eg, Case 152/79 Lee v Minister for Agriculture [1980]  ECR  1495, in which there was no provision for legal aid in the member state from which the reference came, either generally or specifically, in relation to references to the Court; a refusal by the national authority competent to grant legal aid to extend it to cover the reference to the Court (which appears to have been the situation in Case 320/82 D’Amario v LVA Schwaben [1983] ECR 3811, order of 7 July 1983). 247 RP-ECJ, art 115(1). 248 While RP-ECJ, art 115(1) refers to ‘the costs of the proceedings before the Court’, RP-ECJ, art 117 refers to ‘costs involved in the assistance and representation of the applicant [for legal aid] before the Court’. There seems to be no difference in meaning between those expressions. For an example, see Case C-336/00AJ Austria v Huber, order of 18 April 2002 (unreported); judgment reported at [2002]  ECR  I-7699, in which €1,700 were granted in order to cover the fees of Mr Huber’s lawyer and the costs of delivery, copying and telecommunications; a further €898 were granted in order to cover the lawyer’s travel and accommodation costs for the hearing. 249 Case 125/88 Criminal proceedings against HFM  Nijman [1988]  ECR  3533, order of 14 December 1988.

424

Representation and legal aid 4.116

court or tribunal,250 there is no provision for the recovery of sums paid by the Court, by way of legal aid, from any of the parties in a costs order. 2 Relationship between legal aid granted by the Court and legal aid granted or refused by the referring court 4.116 A party applying for legal aid from the Court must produce to the Court ‘the’ decision of the referring court or tribunal granting him legal aid and must specify what is covered by the sums already granted by that court or tribunal.251 The decision in question is a decision made in the course of the proceedings leading to the reference made to the ECJ. It is not a decision made by the referring court or tribunal in some other proceedings. That assumes that legal aid is granted by a decision of the court or tribunal seised with the proceedings, which is not the case in every member state. The obligation should therefore be read as covering any decision granting legal aid in the proceedings before the referring court or tribunal, whoever is the maker of the decision. There is no obligation to produce to the Court any decision refusing legal aid. The purpose of producing to the Court a decision granting legal aid is to enable the Court to avoiding duplicating the award of legal aid.252 It does not appear that the grant of legal aid by the referring court or tribunal (or some other competent national authority) is itself evidence justifying the grant of legal aid by the Court; but any findings made by the relevant body in such a decision, as to the party’s financial situation, may be used in support of the party’s application for legal aid from the Court.253. The absence of any obligation to produce a decision refusing legal aid suggests that any such decision is irrelevant to the Court’s decision whether or not to grant legal aid. That removes from consideration any need for the Court to consider whether or not any decision refusing legal aid was made in breach of the applicable national rules (which the disappointed party could well assert if a decision refusing legal aid were relevant to the Court’s consideration of the matter). It is arguable that, where legal aid is in principle available under national law, there is no justification for the Court granting legal aid because the party has a right to it under national law and should therefore make use of the remedies open to him under that law, in order to force the competent national authority to release the money, before turning to the Court (by parity of reasoning, the Court would not be justified in granting legal aid if the 250 RP-ECJ, art 102. 251 RP-ECJ, art 115(3). 252 Thus, in Case C-403/09AJ  Deticek v Sgueglia, order of 17  December 2009 (unreported); judgment reported at [2009] ECR I-12193, Mrs Deticek had been granted legal aid in the main proceedings but it did not cover representation before the Court. The Court therefore granted a sum of €3,000 to cover the fees of her lawyer and covered travel and accommodation costs (for the hearing) up to €2,000. 253 In Deticek (above, note 252), Mrs Deticek’s inability to meet the costs of the proceedings before the ECJ was established by reference to the information that she produced concerning her economic situation and the fees and expenses of her lawyers. The decision of the referring court to grant legal aid was referred to solely in connection with the extent of the legal aid that had been granted by that court. However, it seems to be common sense that, if the referring court or tribunal has made findings of fact relevant to the party’s financial situation, those findings are relevant to the Court’s decision whether or not to grant legal aid.

425

4.117  Representation and legal aid

party had made no attempt at all to obtain it under national law). However, it would clearly be unfair if the party were to lose his chance of presenting his case to the Court because of delays in obtaining legal aid under national law. In consequence, the position under national law is best ignored unless legal aid for all or part of the proceedings before the Court has been granted.254 3 Persons entitled to legal aid 4.117 As in the case of RP-ECJ, art 185(1) (which applies to contentious proceedings before the ECJ), RP-ECJ, art  115 describes the beneficiary of legal aid as a ‘party’, thus clearly indicating that he may be either a legal or a natural person. However, in what appear to be the only cases in which an application for legal aid has been made by a legal person, the application was turned down by the Court, although not on the ground that the applicant was not a natural person.255 In the first such case,256 as was usual at the time, no reason for doing so was given. It is possible that the view was taken that ‘party’ must be restricted to natural persons. It is also possible that the Court found that there were no special circumstances justifying the grant of legal aid, as was the requirement under the Rules of Procedure at that time. At all events, the position now seems to be settled in favour of the view that persons other than natural persons are not precluded from receiving legal aid.257 The applicant for legal aid must also be a party specifically to ‘the main proceedings’, which means that he must be, in procedural terms, a party to the proceedings before the referring court or tribunal, in the course of which the reference was made.258 4 The application for legal aid 4.118 In order to avoid delay, an application for legal aid ought to be made at the earliest opportunity, particularly where legal aid is necessary in order to cover the costs of preparing and lodging written observations.259 It seems to be 254 The writer has previously suggested that the Court might well take the view that, where it is impossible or unlikely that legal aid would be granted by the national authorities in time, it should grant legal aid itself (always assuming that the party concerned is unable to meet the costs of the proceedings before the Court, in whole or in part) but subject the grant to the condition that the sum awarded would be repaid to the Court if and when the national authority’s responsibility for legal aid were established. That presupposes that legal aid granted by the Court is a fall-back designed to make up for any gap in the provision made for legal aid by the member state of the referring court or tribunal, which is the view taken by the Court in paragraph  32 of its Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2012 No C338/1). 255 Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd (above, note 195); Case C-326/94 A Maas & Co NV v Belgische Dienst voor Bedrijfsleven en Landbouw [1996] ECR I-2643, paras 40–42. 256 Jenkins (above, note 195). 257 See para 4.84 above. 258 RP-ECJ, art 97(1). 259 In the A Maas & Co NV case (above, note 255), the application was, unusually, made in the party’s written observations and seems therefore to have been made on a retrospective basis. However, the application was completely unsupported and seems to have been unfounded.

426

Representation and legal aid 4.120

possible in principle to make the application before the order for reference has been sent to the Court although probably not before the date of the order for reference. In that event, it is unlikely that the Court would make any decision on the application until after lodgment of the order for reference (which provides it with certainty that the reference has actually been made and is the event from which the proceedings before the ECJ are taken to have started).260 4.119 RP-ECJ, art 115(1) provides that a ‘party’ may apply for legal aid; but that is to be read alongside RP-ECJ, art 57(1), which provides that every procedural document must be signed by the party’s agent or lawyer ‘or, in the case of observations submitted in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings, that of the party to the main proceedings or his representative, if the national rules of procedure applicable to those main proceedings so permit’ (emphasis added). Accordingly, reading those provisions literally, an application for legal aid must be signed by the applicant’s lawyer (such an applicant would not be represented by an agent), even though the party in question could submit written observations signed by him or by another person (other than a lawyer) able to do so under the referring court or tribunal’s rules of procedure. That seems to be an oversight in two respects. First, if written observations may be signed by anyone with rights of audience before the referring court or tribunal, it is distinctly odd that every other procedural document lodged in the course of preliminary ruling proceedings (in particular, an application for legal aid) must be signed by a lawyer. Secondly, in the case of contentious proceedings (in which procedural documents may be signed only by, here, a lawyer), applications for legal aid need not be made through a lawyer (at least if they are made before the commencement of proceedings).261 In order to remove the incongruity, it seems to be appropriate to read RP-ECJ, art 57(1) as qualified by RP-ECJ, art 97(3), which provides that, as regards representation and attendance of the parties to the main proceedings, the Court shall take account of the rules of procedure of the referring court or tribunal. Accordingly, the better view is that an application for legal aid may be signed by anyone who, under rules of procedure of the referring court or tribunal could make an application to that court or tribunal. Where, under national law, an application for legal aid is made to a person or body other than the referring court or tribunal, it would nonetheless seem that the person who can sign an application made to the Court must be a person who has the right to represent the party concerned before the referring court or tribunal. 4.120 Apart from the question of who may sign the application, an application for legal aid must comply with RP-ECJ, art 57 and be expressed in the language of the case. In terms of its substantive contents, the only requirements (in addition to the identification of the reference to which the application relates) are that the application demonstrates the party’s inability to meet the costs of the 260 In addition, under RP-ECJ, art 116(1), the application is assigned to the judge-rapporteur in the reference proceedings, which means that the application cannot, in the ordinary course, be dealt with until after the order for reference has been lodged at the Court and a judge-rapporteur has been designated. 261 See RP-ECJ, art 186(2) and paras 4.86–4.87.

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4.121  Representation and legal aid

proceedings before the Court in whole or in part. To that end, the application must be accompanied by: (i) ‘all information and supporting documents making it possible to assess the applicant’s financial situation, such as a certificate issued by a competent national authority attesting to his financial situation’ and, where relevant (and as noted above), (ii) any decision granting him legal aid in the proceedings before the referring court or tribunal (in that event, what is covered by the legal aid that has already been granted must be specified). 4.121 In order to establish the applicant’s inability to meet the costs of the proceedings, the application for legal aid should state the circumstances relied on in support of the application,262 including the (estimated) amount of the legal aid sought (usually identified by reference to an estimate of the fees and expenses of the party’s lawyer or other representative). The means and criteria used to establish the party’s indigence are in principle the same as in contentious proceedings263 but the Court seems to be less fixated on the production of a certificate issued by a competent national authority. The means of proof that have been regarded as acceptable have included: a statement from the party’s employer and a declaration made under oath by the employee himself as to his income;264 a statement of personal circumstances;265 a certificate of property and income;266 a declaration concerning the party’s personal and economic situation and a statement from his lawyer indicating his fees and disbursements.267 4.122 There is no requirement in the Rules of Procedure that the application for legal aid must set out a prima facie case for the applicant’s stance in the reference proceedings. It is doubtful if legal aid can be refused on the ground that the applicant has shown no prima facie case because proceedings for obtaining a preliminary ruling are non-contentious and there is no cause of action in dispute before the Court. Quite apart from that, the applicant’s stance before the referring court or tribunal must have been (or must be taken to have been) at least arguable because, otherwise, the reference could (or should) not have been made in the first place. Further, the applicant may be seeking legal aid in order to make out a case that the reference is inadmissible or that the opposing party’s stance in the reference is (clearly) misconceived. It is noticeable that consideration of the merits of the applicant’s case does not appear to feature in Court orders disposing of applications for legal aid made in the context of references for a preliminary ruling whereas it does feature in orders made in the context of contentious proceedings. On the other hand, the Court has general power to dis 262 In the A Maas & Co NV case (above, note 255), the application was rejected because nothing was stated in its support. 263 See paras 4.92–4.96 above. 264 Case 379/87 Groener v Minister for Education and City of Dublin Vocational Educational Committee [1989] ECR 3967, order of 8 November 1988. In Case C-251/89 Athanasopoulos v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1991]  ECR  I-2797, order of 3  May 1990, there was simply a declaration under oath. 265 Case 186/87 Cowan v Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195, order of 10 February 1988. 266 Case 344/87 Bettray v Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1989] ECR 1621 at 1625. 267 Case C-33/89 Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1990] ECR I-2591, order of 3 May 1990; Deticek (above, note 252).

428

Representation and legal aid 4.124

miss an application where it has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case or where a request is manifestly inadmissible268 and it may rule summarily on a reference for a preliminary ruling where the question referred is identical to one on which it has already ruled, or the reply to it can clearly be deduced from existing case-law, or where the answer to the question referred admits of no reasonable doubt.269 In those cases, the correct procedure to follow would be the disposal of the reference for a preliminary ruling, followed by the disposal of the application for legal aid (which would, in those circumstances, be redundant). As a matter of principle, however, if the order for reference cannot be disposed of in one of those ways, the Court should grant legal aid to an impecunious party. It does not seem that, if the reference cannot be disposed of in that manner, the Court would remain competent to assess the arguments of one of the parties before the referring court or tribunal for the purpose of deciding whether or not he has a case that is sufficiently arguable to justify the grant of legal aid. 5 The handling of the application 4.123 When the application for legal aid is lodged at the Court, the President assigns the application to the judge who is judge-rapporteur in the reference proceedings.270 The matter is considered by the three-judge chamber to which the judge-rapporteur belongs (or a five-judge chamber if the judge-rapporteur is not a member of a three-judge chamber) and a decision is made by the chamber, in the form of an order, on a proposal from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general.271 The other parties to the reference proceedings are not given an opportunity to submit observations on the application for legal aid. 6 The decision on the application 4.124 The position where legal aid is granted is in substance the same as in the case of contentious proceedings.272 As noted above, the order usually sets a ceiling for the amount that will be paid by way of legal aid and commonly distinguishes between the fees of the party’s lawyer (or other representative) and disbursements (such as travel and subsistence where there is a hearing). The cashier of the Court is responsible for paying any sums due to be paid pursuant to the order.273 An advance payment may be made on application to the President by

268 RP-ECJ, art 53(2). 269 RP-ECJ, art 99. 270 RP-ECJ, art 116(1). 271 RP-ECJ, art 116(2)–(4): the three-judge chamber is to consist of the President of the chamber, the judge-rapporteur and the first judge (or first two judges) designated from the list of the judges attached to the chamber in question, as at the date on which the legal aid application is brought before the chamber by the judge-rapporteur; where a five-judge chamber has to be used, it consists of the judge-rapporteur and four judges designated from the list of judges attached to that chamber. 272 See paras 4.108–4.113 above. 273 RP-ECJ, art 117.

429

4.125  Representation and legal aid

either the legally aided party or his representative.274 Where legal aid is refused, the reasons for the refusal must be stated.275 Where legal aid is granted, the formation that makes the decision may at any time withdraw legal aid, either on its own motion or on request, if circumstances change.276 It would seem that legal aid should not be withdrawn without the legally aided party first having been given an opportunity to be heard. Where legal aid is refused, there appears to be no obstacle to the making of a second application based on different (and, presumably, more persuasive) information.

C

Payment and recovery of sums advanced

1 Payment 4.125 The order granting legal aid usually sets a limit to the amount which the Court is prepared to cover. That is only, however, an upper limit; it is not a definitive statement of the party’s entitlement come what may unless the order so provides. Should the situation arise that the amount awarded is insufficient to cover the expenses actually incurred, an application may, it seems, be made for a supplementary grant but evidence would have to be produced to show that circumstances had changed since the date of the original application because, otherwise, the second application could be construed as a disguised attempt to get round the rule that there is no appeal from the Court’s order277 and it might, therefore, be regarded as vexatious. 4.126 The mechanisms for obtaining payment of legal aid are specified in more detail for ECJ proceedings than for GC or CST proceedings but are in practice essentially the same. An application for the payment of the legal aid awarded by the Court is made to the Registrar but he is obliged to require particulars of the costs incurred.278 It is not sufficient, therefore, for the application for payment simply to mention the amount found in the order granting legal aid. It must go further and show what costs justifying the payment have been incurred. It does not seem that a party is entitled to the whole sum awarded merely if he shows that some costs have been incurred unless, under the terms of the order, legal aid

274 RP-ECJ, art 117 and SR-ECJ, art 5. 275 RP-ECJ, art 116(4). 276 RP-ECJ, art 118. 277 See RP-GC, art  148(8); RP-CST, art  112(6). There is, necessarily, no appeal from an order made by the ECJ. 278 IR-ECJ, art 21(1). The English text refers to an ‘advance payment’ but that is misleading. There is a difference between advancing a payment and making an advance payment. An advance payment of legal aid, which may be ordered by the President on application by the party’s lawyer, is provided for in RP-ECJ, art 188(1), last sentence, SR-ECJ, art 5, RP-GC, art 149(1) and RP-CST, art 113(1), 2nd subpara; but RP-ECJ, art 117 and 188(2) and their parallels, RPGC, art  149(1), first sentence, and RP-CST, art  113(1), 1st subpara, make no mention of it. IR-ECJ, art 21(4) deals with the advance payment under SR-ECJ, art 5; IR-ECJ, art 21(1) is concerned only with ‘advancing’ or paying what may be due. Thus, the headings to RP-ECJ, art 117 and 188 refer to ‘sums to be advanced as legal aid’, by which is meant the payment of legal aid, not simply the provision of an advance payment.

430

Representation and legal aid 4.129

were paid out as a lump sum compensation for them.279 Rather, he is entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses he has in fact disbursed up to the amount set by the order granting legal aid. The particulars given should, as a matter of practice, be supported by some evidence justifying the costs, if any. 4.127 The payment of the legal aid due to the person entitled (usually the party’s lawyer) is ordered by the Registrar against a receipt or other proof of payment and, if he thinks that the amount claimed is excessive, he may of his own motion reduce it or order payment by instalments.280 There is no provision for an appeal to the Court against any decision made by him. In the case of an advance payment of legal aid ordered by the President under RP-ECJ, art 117 or 188(1), SR-ECJ, art 5, 2nd para, RP-GC, art 149(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 113(1), the Registrar has no power to require production of particulars of costs but (at least in the case of the ECJ’s Registrar) he may still reduce the amount if he considers it to be excessive or order payment by instalments.281 That appears to allow the ECJ’s Registrar to derogate from the President’s decision but it may be no more than a slip in the drafting of the rules. 4.128 When a party granted legal aid, whether in the context of a direct action or a reference for a preliminary ruling, has incurred registry charges, RP-ECJ, art 76(5) (of the pre-2012 Rules) is said to apply.282 That meant that the costs were initially borne by the Court itself but could be recovered in the order for costs at the end of the action. The successors to that part of the former RP-ECJ, art 76(5) are RP-ECJ, art 117 and 188(1). It seems that the current position is intended to be the same as the position was before 2012. 2 Recovery 4.129 It is unclear whether, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court can recover sums paid out as legal aid. RP-ECJ, art 102 provides that it is for the referring court to ‘decide as to the costs of the preliminary ruling proceedings’ but that seems to apply to decisions determining who is to pay the costs and does not entirely exclude the possibility that the Court may recover legal aid from an assisted party who has been awarded costs by the referring court. Normally, in a direct action, the Court orders repayment of the amounts paid over as legal aid

279 An order specifying a lump sum by way of legal aid has been made in the past, generally covering legal fees (eg the order in the D’Amario case, above, note 246). It is not normal for legal aid to be granted in respect of legal fees at an hourly (or similar) rate; the usual order is for a lump sum payment covering either all fees or a given stage in the procedure (usually divided into the written part and the oral part) or, more rarely, the preparation and lodgment of a particular procedural document (in that event, usually the application commencing proceedings). It is often the case that, in relation to disbursements like travel and subsistence, the order specifies that proof of the disbursements claimed must be provided. 280 IR-ECJ, art 21(2). 281 IR-ECJ, art 21(4). 282 IR-ECJ, art 19.

431

4.130  Representation and legal aid

in the order for costs.283 It is therefore arguable that, in the judgment giving the preliminary ruling, the Court can also order that the legal aid be reimbursed by the party ordered by the referring court to pay the costs of the reference, although that has never been done to date. The alternative view seems to be that legal aid granted in proceedings for a preliminary ruling is not recoverable. The latter hypothesis reflects practice. In proceedings other than references for a preliminary ruling, the recovery of the legal aid that has been granted (if it takes place) is ancillary to the costs order made in the judgment or order closing the proceedings. 4.130 Where another party has been ordered to pay the legally aided party’s costs (normally when the latter has been successful in the proceedings), the legal aid is to be repaid to the Court by the former.284 It is important to note that, under the GC and CST rules, the party ordered to pay the costs must pay ‘any sums advanced by way of aid’.285 In ECJ proceedings, any dispute about the amount payable to the ECJ arises under the costs order made by the ECJ and is dealt with in the same way as any other dispute concerning costs.286 Accordingly, there is scope under the ECJ rules of procedure for the party ordered to pay the costs to dispute any liability to pay the entirety of the amount of the legal aid. In CST proceedings, the legal aid rules apply and there is express provision that any ‘challenge’ is resolved by the President, from whose decision no appeal lies (the President may refer the matter to the CST).287 Therefore, under the CST rules, the amount of legal aid paid by the CST does not necessarily determine conclusively the liability of the person ordered to pay the costs. Oddly, the provisions parallel to those in both the ECJ and CST rules of procedure have been removed from the GC rules of procedure.288 It is possible that the conception underlying the GC rules is that the decision as to costs given in the judgment or order disposing of

283 See para 4.101 above. 284 RP-ECJ, art 188(2) provides in abstract terms that ‘the Court may order the payment to the cashier of the Court of sums advanced as legal aid’. It does not identify the person who may be ordered to make the payment. Where the opposing party has been unsuccessful, he would ordinarily be required to pay the successful party’s costs: see RP-ECJ, art 138(1), which applies by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 184(1). Ordinarily, therefore, the unsuccessful party would be ordered to repay to the Court the legal aid paid by it to the successful party. However, the ECJ retains a discretion in the matter. An unsuccessful party ordered to pay the costs might conceivably be relieved of the obligation to repay the legal aid granted to the successful party if, for example, the former had limited means and could afford to pay only his own share of the costs of the proceedings. In contrast, under RP-GC, art  149(3) and RP-CST, art  113(3), 1st subpara, an unsuccessful party ordered to pay the legally aided party’s costs is obliged to repay to the Court the legal aid granted to the successful party. 285 RP-GC, art 149(3); RP-CST, art 113(3), 1st subpara. 286 RP-ECJ, art 145, which applies to appeals pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 184(1) See further Ch 14 below. 287 RP-CST, art 113(3), 2nd subpara. 288 The former RP-GC, art 92 (which dealt with disputes concerning the costs to be recovered) and 97(3), 2nd subpara (the equivalent of RP-CST, art 113(3), 2nd subpara). The GC’s commentary on its draft rules does not give any explanation.

432

Representation and legal aid 4.132

the proceedings is final and that the amount of legal aid disbursed by the GC is conclusive of the liability of the party ordered to pay the costs. 289

4.131 Where the legally aided party loses or the opposing party is not ordered to pay the legally aided party’s costs for some other reason, the ECJ has an unfettered discretion whether or not to order the legally aided party to repay the legal aid.290 The position in GC and CST proceedings is more complicated. Where the costs order is that the legally aided party must bear his own costs, the President makes a decision (from which no appeal lies) fixing the amounts to be paid to the legally aided party’s lawyer by way of the latter’s disbursement and fees; and that amount is paid by the cashier (of the GC or CST).291 There is no provision for recovering any part of that amount from the legally aided party or anyone else. In contrast, where the legally aided party is ‘unsuccessful’, the GC and CST may order that one or more parties bear their own costs or that all or part of the costs should be borne by the cashier of the Court, ‘if equity so requires.’292 So far as the successful party is concerned, that appears to mean that the Court may order it to bear its own costs or may order the cashier of the Court to bear those costs (in whole or in part). So far as the unsuccessful, legally aided, party is concerned, that means that the Court may order that that party’s costs be borne (in whole or in part) by the cashier of the Court. It also means that, in the alternative, the Court may order the unsuccessful, legally aided, party to bear its own costs. Accordingly, to the extent that the unsuccessful, legally aided, party’s costs have been covered by legal aid, that party must repay the legal aid to the Court and must himself bear any further costs that he has incurred. On the other hand, there is no provision that the unsuccessful, legally aided, party may be ordered to pay all or part of the costs of the successful party. 4.132 Where sums advanced (that is, paid) as legal aid are recoverable under RP-ECJ, art  188(2), RP-GC, art  149(3) or (5) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 113(3) or (4), the Registrar, whose responsibility it is to obtain their repayment,293 first sends a written demand by registered post stating the amount due, the method of payment and the date by which payment should be made.294 If his request is not complied with within the time fixed for doing so, he asks the Court to adopt an ‘enforceable decision’.295 Under the Treaties only judgments of the Court are enforceable296 so it would seem that the decision must, strictly

289 See RP-GC, art 133. 290 RP-ECJ, art 188(2). 291 RP-GC, art  14992); RP-CST, art  113(2). In CST proceedings, the President may refer the matter to the CST. 292 RP-GC, art 149(5); RP-CST, art 113(4). 293 RP-ECJ, art 188(3); RP-GC, art 149(4); PD-GC, para 48; RP-CST, art 113(3), 2nd subpara; IR-CST, art 15. 294 IR-ECJ, art 22(1); IR-CST, art 15(1). PD-GC, para 48 is less detailed about the way in which the demand for payment is made; but the practice seems to be the same. 295 IR-ECJ, art 22(2); PD-GC, para 49; IR-CST, art 15(3). 296 TFEU, art 280. But see Ch 16, para 16.167 ff.

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4.132  Representation and legal aid

speaking, be in that form. The Registrar then takes the steps necessary to execute the judgment pursuant to the Treaties.297 The amount due is paid in euros.298

297 Under TFEU, art 280, enforcement is effected under the conditions laid down in TFEU, art 299. IR-ECJ, art 22(2) and IR-CST, art 15(3) could be read as suggesting that it is the Court which orders the enforcement of the decision but that is an obvious tautology and it stems from a simple mistranslation. PD-GC, para 49 is clearer: the Court makes an enforceable order and the Registrar may require its enforcement. The Court, in the person of the Registrar, is the ‘person concerned’ for the purposes of TFEU, art 299. The order for enforcement is appended to the Court’s order by the competent national authority. In Schertzer v European Parliament (above, note 208), the applicant had received legal aid but lost the case. As it was a staff case, the Court ordered each party to bear its own costs and the applicant to repay the sums advanced as legal aid. In 1979 the Court adopted an order (unreported) requiring payment of the latter and leaving it to the Registrar to fix the method and time for repayment. The order said that it should be enforced (‘l’execution forcée…sera requise’) if the money was not paid on time. 298 RP-ECJ, art 146; RP-GC, art 141; RP-CST, art 107.

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Chapter 5

Intervention

I INTRODUCTION 5.1 The persons who are the main or principal parties to proceedings before the Court are identified at the commencement of the proceedings. Apart from the possibility of changing a main party (discussed in Chapter 3), other persons are unable to join or be joined as a party to the proceedings otherwise than by means of the procedure known as intervention. Different actions may be joined at different stages of the proceedings but joinder results only in consolidation of the proceedings, not consolidation of the actions or the joinder of a new party. The procedure known as third party proceedings is a method of reviewing a judgment of the Court which may be invoked by third parties to the proceedings before the Court (hence the title given to the procedure). But the only true procedure enabling someone who is not a party to proceedings at their commencement to become a party later on is intervention. In Cases 42 and 49/59 Breedband NV v Société des Acièries du Temple and Cases 9 and 12/60 Belgium v Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA and High Authority,1 which both concerned third party proceedings, the Court pointed out that, since it is in the interests of justice and legal certainty that persons having an interest in the result of proceedings before the Court shall be prevented as far as possible from asserting that interest after judgment has been delivered, the procedure of intervention exists in order to allow them to do so at an earlier stage. Nevertheless, intervention does not, as will be seen, give the intervener rights in the proceedings as extensive as those of a party in the true sense (that is, the applicant and defendant – occasionally referred to as ‘the main parties’),2 although the intervener is equally bound by the Court’s judgment. 5.2 Eight sets of provisions deal with the intervention of someone who is not a main party to a case before the Court: (1) art 23 of the Statute makes specific provision for the submission of observations by the member states, the Commission and, where appropriate, the institution, body, office or agency which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in issue, EFTA states, the EFTA  Surveillance Authority 1 [1962] ECR 145 and 171 at 158 and 181 respectively. 2 The applicant and defendant are defined as ‘main parties’ in RP-GC, art 1(2)(d). The definition of ‘parties’ in RP-GC, art 1(2)(c) includes interveners.

435

5.2  Intervention

and, where an agreement between the Council and one or more third countries so provides, the third country or countries in question, in references for a preliminary ruling. That right is distinct from intervention in the true sense because references for a preliminary ruling are non-contentious proceedings; (2) art 40 of the Statute provides for intervention in contentious proceedings,3 and is duly implemented in the rules of procedure of the ECJ, GC and CST discussed below; (3) art 62a of the Statute provides that, in proceedings before the ECJ for the review of GC appellate decisions or preliminary rulings made by the GC, the persons and bodies entitled to intervene in preliminary rulings under art 23 of the Statute and (in reviews of GC appellate decisions only) the parties to the proceedings before the GC may submit observations. That right is distinct from intervention in the true sense because art 62a describes the parties to review proceedings rather than sets out a procedure whereby someone can become a party; (4) RP-ECJ, art 190(1) incorporates by reference RP-ECJ, arts 129–132 (which deal with intervention in direct actions before the ECJ and implement art 40 of the Statute – (2) above), thereby providing for intervention in appeals to the ECJ from the GC. The right to intervene applies to those categories of potential interveners in contentious proceedings recognised by the Statute – see (2) above. Interveners in an appeal can only be third parties to the proceedings in which the judgment or decision appealed against was delivered; if they had been parties to those proceedings, even as interveners, they would automatically be parties to the appeal;4 (5) RP-GC, art 173(1) provides that, in IP appeals, the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (other than the applicant in the proceedings

3 The English text refers to intervention in ‘any case’ but other texts use a word which has the more specific meaning of a dispute or litigation. 4 Eg Case C-244/91P  Pincherle v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-6965, para  16 of the judgment; Case C-245/95P-Intervention I Commission v NTN Corpn [1996] ECR I-553. An application to intervene in an appeal does not need to be preceded by an application to intervene, or intervention, in the proceedings before the court below: eg Cases C-C-186/02P and C-188/02P Ramondin v Commission [2004]  ECR  I-10653, order in Case C-188/02P of 6  March 2003 (unreported), para 11; Case C-290/07P Commission v Scott SA [2010] ECR I-7763, order of 17 July 2008 (unreported), para 11. For a discussion of the right of an intervener at first instance to bring an appeal, see Cases C-74/00P and C-75/00P Falck SpA v Commission [2002] ECR I-7869, paras 50–58 of the judgment (pp 7956–7958) and paras 37–61 of the advocate general’s opinion (pp 7889–7894); Cases C-172/01P, C-175/01P, C-176/01P and C-180/01P International Power plc v National Association of Licensed Opencast Operators [2003]  ECR  I-11421, paras 40–46 of the advocate general’s opinion (pp 11435–11436) and 49–53 of the judgment (pp 11489– 11490). In the case of an appeal from a decision of the GC or CST dismissing an application to intervene, it would seem that only the parties to the intervention proceedings could be parties to the appeal: an applicant to intervene becomes a party to the action only if the application to intervene is upheld and, by the same token, the parties to the action are not parties to the intervention proceedings unless they have been asked by the GC (or, as the case may be, the CST) to submit observations on the application to intervene (and have done so).

436

Intervention 5.2

before the GC) may participate in the proceedings before the GC as interveners. However, those persons must be served with the application commencing proceedings before the GC5 and they have the same procedural rights as the main parties.6 Accordingly, they do not need to apply to become parties to the proceedings. The description of them as ‘interveners’ is somewhat anomalous;7 and the anomaly is underlined by the fact that the intervention procedure in contentious proceedings – (2) above – is also applicable to IP appeals.8 Hence, in such proceedings, there are two possible types of intervener, only one of which is an intervener in the true sense; (6) RP-GC, art  213(1) makes provision for intervention in appeals to the GC from the CST by incorporating the GC rules dealing with (2) above into appeals before the GC. As in the case of appeals from the GC to the ECJ – (4) above – interveners in the proceedings before the CST are parties to any appeal to the GC. The intervention procedure envisaged in RP-GC, art 213(1) is concerned with the addition of new parties at the appellate stage; (7) RP-CST, art 89 provides that the President (of the CST or the relevant formation) may invite any person, institution or member state to intervene in an action before the CST. In all other cases, the person who wishes to intervene must take the initiative. RP-CST, art 89 applies where a person, institution or member state is concerned by the outcome of the dispute before the CST but has not (or not yet) intervened in the proceedings. The invitation to intervene may be extended to the invitee by the President at any stage in the proceedings, but only after the parties have been heard. Such an invitation need not be taken up. If the invitee responds (within the time fixed for doing so) that he wishes to intervene, he is then treated, as from that point, in effectively the same way as any other person who wishes to intervene in CST proceedings. (8) under art 47(1)(i) of Regulation No 45/2001, the European Data Protection Supervisor has an express right to intervene in actions brought before the Court.9 Such anomalous rights to intervene created by EU secondary legis-

5 RP-GC, art 178(1). 6 RP-GC, art 173(3). See, for example, Cases T-160/02 to T-162/02 Naipes Heraclio Fournier SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2005] ECR II-1643, paras 16–24; Case T-405/05 Powerserv Personalservice GmbH  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2008] ECR II-2883, paras 21–24 (on appeal, Case C-553/08). 7 They are assimilated to actual defendants: Case C-106/03P Vedial SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR I-9573, para 32. That explains why, in Case T-99/01 Mystery Drinks GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2003] ECR II-43, para 15, the submissions of the ‘intervener’ had to be taken into account when the ‘defendant’ had failed to lodge an admissible defence. 8 RP-GC, art 191 (Title III includes RP-GC, art 142–145, which are the provisions dealing with intervention); Case T-94/02 Hugo Boss AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR II-813, para 16. 9 See OJ 2001 No L8/1; Case C-317/04 European Parliament v Council [2005] ECR I-2457; Case C-318/04 European Parliament v Council [2005] ECR I-2467; Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-1885, order of 14 October 2008 (unreported).

437

5.2  Intervention

lation may be exercised by the person or body identified in the legislative provision in question, but not any other person or body, and are subject to the express terms of that provision. Accordingly, unless the requirements of art 40 of the Statute have been incorporated by express reference, those requirements do not restrict the exercise of the right to intervene under a special provision like art 47(1)(i). The right under Regulation No 45/2001 is limited to intervention in contentious proceedings and does not apply to references for a preliminary ruling.10 Only the second, fourth, sixth and seventh provisions dealing with intervention will be discussed here. The provisions for intervention made in RP-ECJ, art 190(1) and RP-GC, art 213(1) (the fourth and sixth) are both applications of the general provision for intervention in contentious proceedings set out in the Statute, art 40, and further elaborated in RP-ECJ, art 129–132, RP-GC, art 142– 145 and RP-CST, art 86–88. It will be observed that the restriction of that form of intervention to contentious proceedings means that it is not possible for a person other than a member state, the Commission or, where appropriate, the institution, body, office or agency which adopted the act whose validity or interpretation is in issue (which includes the Parliament, Council, European Central Bank and so forth), EFTA states, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and, where an agreement between the Council and one or more third countries so provides, the third country or countries in question, to be heard in a reference for a preliminary ruling unless he was (or was made) a party to the proceedings before the referring court.11

10 Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinaporssi Oy [2007]  ECR  I-7075. As can be seen from the cases cited in note 9 above, the right under Regulation No 45/2001 is broader than the right under the Statute, art  40, because an intervention can be made in cases between EU institutions and between member states and EU institutions (presumably also in cases between member states). On the other hand, the Supervisor’s right to intervene is confined to matters that fall within his remit. In Commission v Germany (above, note 9), he was permitted to intervene in a case concerning the meaning of Directive 95/46 because the Commission claimed that that directive had the same meaning as Regulation No 45/2001. That argument (or rather the conclusion on it) therefore affected the Supervisor’s position under the Regulation. 11 Applications made by a person, other than a member state or an EU institution, to intervene in a reference for a preliminary ruling were rejected in: Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 614; Case 19/68 De Cicco v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1968]  ECR  473 at 479 (strictly speaking, a case about compulsory intervention); Case 212/81 Caisse de Pension des Employés Privés v Bodson [1982]  ECR  1019; Case C-181/95 Biogen Inc. v Smithkline Beecham Biologicals SA [1996] ECR I-719; the Tietosuojavaltuutettu case (above, note 10) and the cases cited there. In the first case, the Court took the view that the limitation of the right to submit observations in a reference for a preliminary ruling to ‘the parties, the member states, the Commission and, where appropriate, the Council’ (EC Statute, art 20, as it then was; see now Statute, art 23, 2nd para) impliedly excluded any possibility of submitting observations, so far as a private person or undertaking was concerned, if he were not a party to the proceedings before the referring court. The only way of submitting observations in such a situation would therefore seem to be to seek to be joined to the proceedings before the referring court.

438

Intervention 5.3

II

WHO CAN INTERVENE

5.3 The Statute12 divides the persons or bodies who may intervene into three groups: (i) member states and EU institutions may intervene in cases13 before the Court;14 (ii) other persons may do so if they show that they have an interest in the outcome of the case but their right to intervene is restricted to cases between EU institutions, on the one hand, and persons other than member states or EU institutions, on the other; they have no right to intervene at all in an action between member states, between EU institutions or between member states and EU institutions;15 (iii) EEA states and the EFTA  Surveillance Authority may 12 Art 40. The Statute follows the former EC and EAEC Statutes, arts 37 and 38, respectively, rather than the former ECSC Statute, art 34. Under RP-CST, art 89(1), the position is slightly different because only a person, institution or member state may be invited to intervene. That does not, however, affect the ability of someone to intervene in CST proceedings, without having been invited to do so, pursuant to the Statute. For the purposes of RP-CST, art  89(1), a ‘person’ is any legal or natural person or, semble, any entity or group of persons having the basic aspects of personality (see further below in relation to such entities and groups); an ‘institution’ is an EU institution or a body, office or agency established by the Treaties or by an act adopted in implementation of the Treaties (see RP-CST, art 1(2)(d)). 13 Ie contentious proceedings. 14 ‘Member state’ means the government authorities of a member state of the EU: see Case C-95/97 Region Wallonne v Commission [1997]  ECR  I-1787, para  6. An EU institution is an entity specifically described as such in the Treaties: see TEU, art 13(1). An entity not so described is not entitled to intervene generally in cases before the Court: see Case C-155/07 European Parliament v Council [2008] ECR I-8103, order of 25 October 2007 (unreported) dismissing application to intervene made by European Investment Bank. Under the ECSC Statute, art 34, there was no specific provision for member states and EU institutions. They could intervene if and to the extent that (i) they were legal or natural persons and (ii) they had an interest in the result of the case. No difficulty arose in connection with the first condition so far as member states were concerned: see, for example, Cases 7 and 9/54 Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority [1954– 56] ECR 175 at 222 and Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkilenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR 1 at 48. The position regarding the EU institutions was more difficult: the ECSC had legal personality but its institutions did not (Cases 7/56 and 3–7/57 Algera v Common Assembly [1957–58] ECR 39 at 58). The writer considered that, if the ECSC had an interest in the result of a case, it could intervene through an ECSC institution but, if one of those institutions was already a party to the proceedings, it was doubtful (at the least) that another institution could intervene: see the previous edition of this book, pp 154–155. Bebr in Judicial Control of the European Communities (Stevens, 1962) p 169, took the view that EU institutions could not intervene under the ECSC Statute. In the case of the former EC and EAEC Statutes and the present Statute, the problem of representation did (and does) not arise because the EU institutions may intervene as of right: see Case 138/79 Roquette Frères SA v Council [1980] ECR 3333, paras 17–21; Case 114/81 Tunnel Refineries Ltd v Council [1982] ECR 3189, order of 30 September 1981. 15 That restriction on the right to intervene does not apply in the case of actions brought by a non-member state: see Case T-319/05 Swiss Confederation v Commission [2006] ECR II-2073, paras 21–22. When looking at actions brought under the ECSC Treaty, it should be noted that the ECSC Statute, art 34, gave the right to intervene to ‘natural or legal persons establishing an interest in the result of any case submitted to the Court’, without any restriction. ECSC Statute, art 41, permitted member states to intervene in proceedings between member states brought under ECSC, art 89. That appeared only to derogate from the requirement under ECSC Statute, art 34, that an interest in the result of a case had to be shown in order to ground an application to intervene. On the wider right to intervene under the ECSC Statute, see Case T-77/01 Territorio

439

5.4  Intervention

intervene in cases before the Court where ‘one of the fields of application’ of the EEA  Agreement is in issue. It should be noted that, in principle, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority are ‘other persons’ for the purposes of (ii). Hence, the effect of (iii) is to enlarge the ability of EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority to intervene by extending their right to intervene to all cases, including those in which ‘other persons’ would not otherwise be allowed to intervene (that is, cases between member states, between EU institutions, and between EU institutions and member states), where the case concerns ‘one of the fields of application’ of the EEA Agreement.16 5.4 Under the Statute, then, member states and EU institutions have a general right to intervene but ‘other persons’ must show an interest in the result of the case.17 The only qualification to make is that concerning EEA states and the EFTA  Surveillance Authority. They can intervene on the same basis and in the same types of case as ‘other persons’ but benefit from a separate right to intervene in any case concerning ‘one of the fields of application’ of the EEA Agreement.18 Unfortunately, in relation to that enlarged right of intervention, the Statute can be read in more than one way: (i) in relation to proceedings in which ‘other persons’ may intervene but which concern ‘one of the fields of application’ of the EEA  Agreement, is it the case that EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority must have an interest in the result of the case; and (ii) in relation to proceedings in which ‘other persons’ may not intervene (but which concern ‘one of the fields of application’ of the EEA Agreement), do EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority have the same rights to intervene as member states and EU institutions or must they also show an interest in the result Historico de Alava - Diputacion foral de Alava v Commission [2002] ECR II-81, paras 36– 39 (on appeal, Case C-75/02P  Territorio Historico de Alava - Diputacion foral de Alava v Commission [2003] ECR I-2903). 16 That seems to follow from the fact that Statute, art 40, 3rd para (which refers expressly to EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority) is expressed to be ‘without prejudice’ to the 2nd para (which refers to ‘other persons’). If EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority were not ‘other persons’ to whom the 2nd para applied, the phrase ‘without prejudice’ would be otiose. See, for example, Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079, para 5 (intervention of Norway, an EEA state, in an action between a member state and two EU institutions). As appears from paras 6–11, such an intervention is subject to the requirement that it support the form of order of one or other of the parties. 17 ‘Other persons’ include third countries (such as EEA states), bodies from outside the EU (such as the EFTA Surveillance Authority) and entities such as the European Investment Bank (as to the last, see Case C-155/07 Parliament v Council [2008] ECR I-8103, unreported order of 25 October 2007, in which the Bank’s application to intervene was rejected for that reason). The European Data Protection Supervisor, who has a right to intervene under art 47(1)(i) of Regulation No  45/2001 (see above) is also an ‘other person’. However, where he exercises the right to intervene conferred on him by Regulation No 45/2001, he need satisfy only the conditions laid down by that Regulation The conditions laid down by the Statute, art 40, would apply only if he were exercising the right to intervene conferred by that provision, as opposed to the right conferred by Regulation No 45/2001. 18 When intervening, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same obligations as other parties (mutatis mutandis) and are therefore liable like other parties to have costs awarded against them: cf Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council [1997] ECR II-39, para 138.

440

Intervention 5.6

of the case?19 The writer inclines to the view that the correct interpretation is that, where a case (whatever its nature) concerns ‘one of the fields of application’ of the EEA Agreement, that ipso facto justifies the intervention of an EEA state or the EFTA Surveillance Authority.20 In cases that do not concern ‘one of the fields of application’ of the EEA Agreement, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority must show an interest in the result of the case and, like ‘other persons’, may not intervene in actions between member states, between EU institutions and between member states and EU institutions. A  case concerns one of the fields of application of the EEA Agreement where an issue is raised in the case that, if decided by the Court,21 would affect the operation of the EEA Agreement and the measures adopted under or pursuant to it. 5.5 In the context of the former EC  Statute, the Court held that the right to intervene does not extend to entities lacking legal personality or its basic aspects.22 That still appears to be the case under the Statute in its current form. However what that appears to mean is that an applicant to intervene does not have to be recognised as a legal person in formal terms as long as it possesses the basic elements of legal personality. 5.6 At all events, the right to intervene has been accorded, inter alia, to a third country;23 an unincorporated association;24 the Italian National Union of Consumers, a body not possessing legal personality in Italian law;25 the Federation of European Bearing Manufacturers Associations;26 the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Communities (the ‘CCBE’), a body lacking in legal personality, which represents lawyers’ profes-

19 The problem arises from the phrase ‘without prejudice to the second paragraph’ which, as noted above, appears in Statute, art 40, 3rd para. The 3rd para clearly derogates from the 2nd para because it enables EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority to intervene in cases in which ‘other persons’ cannot intervene under the 2nd para. To what in the 2nd para, then, can the 3rd para be ‘without prejudice’ (that is, what in the 2nd para does it preserve)? The apparent answer is the need to show an interest in the result of the case. On the other hand, the need to show such an interest is associated with intervention in a narrower class of case than the cases envisaged in the 3rd para (when examined by reference to the identity of the main parties). Hence, ‘without prejudice’ cannot import the need to show an interest into cases other than those envisaged in the 2nd para. 20 Cf Case T-289/11 Deutsche Bahn AG v Commission 19 January 2012, paras 6–12 (a presumed interest). 21 At the outset of proceedings issues may be raised that fall away as the action progresses or that may not need to be decided by the Court if, for example, the litigation may be resolved on some other point. 22 Case 15/63 Lassalle v European Parliament [1964] ECR 31 at 50; Case T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2004] ECR II-1603, paras 18–19. 23 Cases 91 and 200/82 Chris International Foods Ltd v Commission [1983] ECR 417. 24 Cases 16 and 17/62 Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Légumes v Council [1962] ECR 471 at 488–489. 25 Cases 41, 43–48, 50, 111, 113 and 114/73 Générale Sucrière SA v Commission [1973] ECR 1465. 26 See Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council [1979] ECR 1185. Here the Court took account of the fact that the Association, which had been formed in Germany, had capacity to intervene in similar proceedings under German law and costs could be recovered against it.

441

5.7  Intervention

sional associations in the member states;27 the Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs, an umbrella group covering consumers’ organisations in the EU, which has legal personality under Belgian law;28 and the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers’ Federation.29 A  number of professional or trade organisations were allowed to intervene in Cases 197–200, 243, 245 and 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling KG v Council and Commission.30 A German trade union also applied but its application was rejected because it was held that it had not shown an interest in the result of the case.31 The Court order does not discuss the question whether the union could be regarded as a ‘person’, although there is some authority that trade unions may intervene.32 5.7 As has been remarked, legal personality in formal terms is not the criterion determining capacity to intervene, at least in actions brought under the EC and EAEC Treaties; neither is the fact that a particular body can be classified in the same group, such as that of trade or professional associations as another body which has been allowed to intervene in a previous case. The Court’s approach is set out most clearly in the following two cases. In Lassalle v European Parliament33 the Court appeared to identify independence and responsibility as the two qualities required by a body for the purpose of intervening, both being regarded as forming part of the basic aspects of legal personality. The case concerned an application to intervene made by the Parliament’s Staff Committee. The Court seems to have held that it lacked independence and responsibility because it was only a component of the Parliament which was, of course, the defendant in the action. In Générale Sucrière SA v Commission34 the Court held that ‘bodies not having legal personality may be permitted to intervene if they display the characteristics which are at the foundation of such personality, in particular, the ability, however circumscribed, to undertake autonomous action and to assume liability’. In subsequent cases the question whether an applicant to intervene has fulfilled those two conditions has rarely been challenged, opposition to intervention generally being centred on the question whether the applicant to intervene has shown sufficient interest in the case to justify allowing the intervention. In consequence there has been little further elaboration of that formula by the Court. In one case, an application to intervene made by an unincorporated association was rejected because it lacked the minimum requirements of legal

27 Case 155/79 A M & S Europe Ltd v Commission [1982] ECR 1575, order of 7 May 1980; Akzo Nobel (above, note 22). 28 Cases 228 and 229/82 Ford v Commission [1984]  ECR  1129, orders of 21–22  September 1982 (the proceedings for interim relief) and 1  December 1982 (the intervener had been a complainant to the Commission). 29 Case 236/81 Celanese Chemical Co Inc v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 1183. 30 [1981] ECR 3211 (see, for example, the orders of 18 February and 11 March 1981). 31 [1981] ECR 1041. 32 See Case 18/74 Syndicat Générale du Personnel des Organismes Européens v Commission [1974] ECR 933 at 953 (Advocate General Trabucchi). Staff unions were allowed to intervene in Case 3/83 Abrias v Commission [1985]  ECR  1995, order of 8  December 1983, and interventions by such organisations in staff cases have been frequent since then. 33 Above, note 22. 34 Above, note 25, see p 1468.

442

Intervention 5.10

personality: it had no statutes or constitution, the decision to intervene was made by an informal decision of its founders and it operated as a forum for exchanging information and practical experience and discussing matters of common interest.35 In such cases, that is not usually an end to the matter because the Court must next consider whether or not the entity is a representative association and can, in effect, be regarded as a vehicle for enabling its members to intervene. That involves a consideration of the interest to intervene of the members of the association and is discussed further below. 5.8 By analogy to the Lassalle case, it is arguable that even an entity possessing legal personality under national law may not be entitled to intervene unless it is independent vis-à-vis both the applicant and the defendant to the proceedings. For example, where a subsidiary which is wholly owned or controlled by one of the parties seeks to intervene, it could be said that, in real terms, it is the alter ego of the party due to its position of dependence. There appears to be no clear authority on that point. The better view seems to be that an entity which is recognised as possessing legal personality under national law is deemed to have the capacity to be an intervener (without prejudice to the question – considered below – whether or not it has an independent interest justifying its intervention); it is only if the entity in question does not possess legal personality in formal terms that the substantive test adopted by the Court is to be applied. 5.9 Since the purpose of the intervention is to enable a third party to protect an interest which may be affected by the result of the case, rather than to vindicate a right which he may possess, the significance of legal personality to capacity to intervene is, in theoretical terms, comparatively little: for example, a group of persons can be said to have a (collective) interest in the outcome of a case even though the group does not constitute one legal person (and it is more efficient, in procedural terms, for the group to participate in the proceedings as a group instead of individually); but the possession of a single legal right by the group, as opposed to the bundle of rights possessed individually by those comprising it, presupposes that the group has legal personality. Capacity to intervene depends largely, therefore, on whether the group can act independently, ie whether it can appoint its own representative, and assume liability for the costs incurred by it, rather than on the question whether it can be said to possess an autonomous right or interest. In the nature of things it is likely to fail the latter test. 5.10 In the same way, the question of legal personality aside, a party is not prevented from intervening in a case, assuming that all conditions for intervening are fulfilled, merely because it for some reason lacks capacity to be a party to the action. For example, in Cases 3 to 18, 25, 16/58 Erzbergbau AG v High Authority,36 the interveners were six German Länder; the cases were applications for the annulment of two High Authority decisions made under ECSC, art 33. That gave the Court jurisdiction to hear actions brought by a member state, the 35 The Akzo Nobel case (above, note 22), paras 18–19. 36 [1960] ECR 173. See also Case 13/60 Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v High Authority [1962] ECR 83 at 143.

443

5.11  Intervention

Council and undertakings or associations as defined in the ECSC  Treaty. In consequence the Länder, although capable of intervening, did not have capacity to bring the action themselves.37 In Case 45/81 Alexander Moksel ImportExport GmbH & Co Handels KG v Commission,38 an action for annulment of a Commission regulation pursuant to what is now TFEU, art 263, the intervener was barred by the two-month time limit in TFEU, art 263 from itself bringing an action for annulment but that did not affect its capacity to intervene. The conclusion seems to be that a person may intervene even if he were prevented from bringing the action himself because of the expiry of a time limit or some other ground of inadmissibility. It should be borne in mind, however, that he would still have to show an interest in the result of the case.39 5.11 As a general rule it can be said that the absence of a right of action against a party is not, per se, a bar to intervening because the object of intervention is to protect an interest and not to enforce a right. But the absence of a right may, depending on the circumstances, reflect the inexistence of a relevant interest justifying intervention.

III INTEREST A

General remarks

5.12 Since member states and EU institutions (and, in relation to cases concerning one of the fields of application of the EEA Agreement, EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority) need not justify their application to intervene, it follows that those persons and bodies have a right to intervene (subject only to compliance with the procedural rules governing applications to intervene).40 In all other cases to which art  40 of the Statute applies, however, the entitlement to intervene of the applicant to intervene (here referred to, for the sake of 37 See also Case 25/59 Netherlands v High Authority [1960] ECR 355. 38 [1982] ECR 1129. 39 Bebr, Judicial Control pp 169–172 took the view that the right to intervene is restricted to persons who are under the jurisdiction of the EU (ie  covered by the Treaties), or a member state, and he went so far as to say that an undertaking trading outside the EU cannot intervene unless it owns enterprises within the EU. The basis for that view is uncertain: the object of intervention is not to enable the intervener to enforce a legal relationship that may exist between him and the party against whom he intervenes, whence the capacity to intervene of persons who have no locus standi as parties in the true sense. In consequence the argument that, by ratifying the Treaties, the member states could only bind and confer rights on persons under their jurisdiction, is considerably weakened. The only ‘right’ the intervener relies on is the right to intervene and that is made subject, in particular, to the condition that he shows an interest in the result of the case. An undertaking based in a third country but trading within the EU may, depending on the facts, show such an interest. It seems artificial to exclude intervention simply because the undertaking is not based in the EU. In any event, a Swedish company was allowed to intervene in Case 792/79R Camera Care Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 119 (at a time when Sweden was not yet a member state), and a third country in Chris International Foods Ltd v Commission (above, note 23). 40 Eg Cases T-32/98 and T-41/98 Nederlandse Antillen v Commission [2000] ECR II-201, para 31 (member state entitled to intervene by virtue of its status as a member state); Case C-452/98 Nederlandse Antillen v Council [2001] ECR I-8973, paras 45–46 (same).

444

Intervention 5.14

simplicity, as ‘the intervener’) is contingent upon the intervener establishing ‘an interest in the result of the case’. It does not seem that there is any formal difference in the application of that test to the different categories of persons who may intervene only if they can show an interest in the result of the case; but, in the nature of things, the interest that one person may have in a case may well differ from that of another. In parallel to the Statute, RP-CST 89(1) provides that a person, institution or member state ‘concerned by the outcome of the dispute’ before the CST may be invited to intervene. That does not cut across the ability of member states and EU institutions to intervene as of right in CST proceedings. The requirement that a person, institution or member state be ‘concerned by the outcome of the dispute’ simply defines the class of persons to whom an invitation to intervene may be sent; it does not restrict the class of potential interveners. ‘Concerned by the outcome of the dispute’ means effectively the same as having ‘an interest in the result of the case’. 5.13 In principle, the question, what amounts to ‘an interest in the result of the case’, generates two further questions: (i) what is meant by ‘the result of the case’ (or what must the interest be ‘in’); and (ii) what is the nature of the required interest? The compendious formula developed over the years in answer to those questions is that the intervener must have a direct and existing (also referred to as a ‘present’) interest in the Court’s ruling on the forms of order sought in the proceedings.41 5.14 More particularly, in relation to the first question, an interest in the result of the case means an interest in the operative part of the final judgment which the parties ask the Court to deliver.42 The intervener will be aware of the form

41 Eg Cases C-151/97P(I) and C-157/97P(I) National Power plc and PowerGen plc [1997]  ECR  I-3491, paras 53 and 57; Case C-155/98P  Alexopolou v Commission [1998] ECR I-4935, para 6; Case T-191/96 CAS Succhi di Frutta SpA v Commission [1998] ECR II-573, para 28; Case T-138/98 Armement Cooperatif Artisanal Vendeen v Council [1999] ECR II-1797, para 14; Case C-186/02P Ramondin SA v Commission [2003] ECR I-2415, paras 7 and 14; Case T-15/02 BASF AG v Commission [2003] ECR II-213, para 26; Case T-201/04R Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR II-2977, para 32; Case T-410/03 Hoechst AG v Commission [2004] ECR II-4451, para 14. 42 Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH  v High Authority [1965]  ECR  716 at 717 and 722 (Advocate General Roemer). The facts were that the action concerned an individual decision addressed to the applicant requiring it to pay a sum due under the scrap equalisation scheme. The intervener was another steel undertaking in the same position as the applicant. Its interest in the case was that, if the applicant were successful, the High Authority would have to change its policy, but the intervener had no direct interest in the validity of the decision challenged in the action and hence no interest in the resolution of the dispute between the parties. Its interest was purely collateral. See also the Générale Sucrière case (above, note 25); Case C-186/02P Ramondin SA v Commission [2003] ECR I-2415, para 14; Case T-14/00 Cooperatieve Aan- en Verkoopvereniging Ulestraten, Schimmert en Hulsberg BA v Commission [2004]  ECR  I-497, para  11; Case T-227/01 Territorio Historico de Alava v Commission [2006] ECR II-1, paras 15–18; Case C-130/06 P(I) An Post v Deutsche Post and Commission (unreported order of 6 April 2006, [2006] ECR I-53*, upholding the order made on 26 January 2006 in Case T-493/04 Deutsche Post v Commission), paras 8–9 (Irish postal service could not intervene in support of the German postal service in a dispute about the lawfulness of a Commission decision addressed to the latter that could have had an indirect effect on the former).

445

5.15  Intervention

of order submitted by the applicant from the notice of the case published in the Official Journal. In principle, an interest in the success of the arguments put forward by one of the parties is not enough.43 In practice, in certain cases the distinction between an interest in the result of the case and an interest in the success of the arguments put forward by one of the parties has become blurred; as will be seen, where a case establishes a principle of general application, a third party affected by the operation of that principle may be entitled to intervene.44 5.15 In relation to the second question, in Cases 9 and 12/60 Belgium v Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA and High Authority45 the Court considered the question whether the notice of Case 9/60 published in the Official Journal revealed an interest in the case justifying the Belgian government’s intervention (the case was brought under the ECSC Treaty and, in such actions, member states had to show an interest justifying their intervention). The test it seems to have adopted is that the interest must be both direct and specific (or concrete).46 An abstract interest in the observance of the Treaty would not justify

43 Cases 56 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966]  ECR  382 at 385; Cases 116, 124 and 143/77 GR Amylum NV and Tunnel Refineries Ltd v Council and Commission [1978] ECR 893; Case C-155/98P Alexopolou v Commission [1998] ECR I-4935, para 11. A nice example is the rejection of the application to intervene in Case F-28/06 Sequeira Wandschneider v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-119, II-A-1-451. The applicant was a Commission official who had led various anti-dumping investigations. He brought an application for the annulment of his career progress report for the year 2004 (and damages). He maintained that he had been treated adversely because he had objected to pressure from his superiors to favour Community industry when carrying out his role in antidumping investigations (the judgment in the action is reported at [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-431, II-A-1-2443. A Chinese manufacturer applied to intervene in support of the applicant on the ground that it was involved in one of the anti-dumping investigations in question and had an interest in establishing the existence of pressure of the sort alleged. However, that interest had nothing to do with the form of order sought by the applicant. 44 In general terms, there is a qualitative difference between the interest required of a person supporting an applicant and the interest of a person supporting a defendant. The applicant seeks generally something positive – a change in the prevailing legal situation (or the situation as it appears to be) – whereas a defendant seeks to maintain the status quo (or the status quo as it appears to be). That difference affects the interest of potential intervener. In particular, in the case of a person intervening in support of a defendant, the result of the case that is sought is, in the final analysis, simply the dismissal of the action. The action can be dismissed for any reason, such as its inadmissibility or its lack of merit in relation to one point of substance or another. An intervener in support of a defendant may be particularly interested in obtaining the dismissal of the action for one reason rather than another, but the intervener’s interest in the result of the case lies in the dismissal of the action for any reason whatsoever. Hence, the suggestion in Case C-341/00P Conseil nationale des professions de l’automobile v Commission [2001] ECR I-5263, para 36, that an intervener has no interest in the result of an inadmissible action, considerably overstates the position. Ordinarily, an intervener in support of a defendant has an obvious interest in getting the action dismissed on the ground of inadmissibility (particularly if doing so by means of a preliminary objection to admissibility will obviate the need to expend time and costs on considering the merits of the case). For its part, an intervener in support of the applicant only has an interest in the result of the case if the action is admissible (and for that reason has every reason to wish to establish its admissibility). 45 Above, note 1. 46 See also the Amylum case (above, note 43) at para 9. In other cases, the phrase used is ‘direct and existing’: eg Case T-108/94 Candiotte v Council [1994] ECR II-863, para 5.

446

Intervention 5.17

the intervention of a member state in any and every action. The application in Case 9/60 had claimed damages in respect of a wrongful act or omission of the High Authority and, for that reason, the Belgian government could not have had any interest in the outcome of the case because the Court’s judgment could only have either awarded damages to the applicant or dismissed the action. There could have been no effect on the Belgian government’s position. On the other hand, had the action claimed the annulment of a High Authority decision, the Belgian government would probably have had an interest in intervening because the effects of the Court’s judgment would have been felt by persons other than the applicant. The interest is therefore revealed by an effect on the intervener’s position. In general terms, a person’s interest to intervene can be confirmed by his possession of a right of action in respect of the subject matter of the dispute, whether or not that right of action has been exercised in time or at all.48 By way of example, a person who is the addressee of a decision challenged in the action quite clearly has sufficient interest to intervene.49 However, it should not be inferred that an interest to intervene arises only when the person concerned could himself have brought proceedings. The advantage of the ability to intervene in an action is that it enables persons with an interest in a case but without a cause of action to make their views known (particularly as in the case of persons who wish to support the defendant in the action). 47

5.16 Before illustrating the nature of the interest required to ground an application to intervene in a case by reference to the case law of the Court, consideration will be given to the problems posed by interventions by bodies representing a collective interest and by the identity or near identity of the intervener’s interest with that of the party in whose support the intervener is intervening.

B

Bodies representing collective interests

5.17 The cases concerning interventions by representative bodies suggest that the requirement that the intervener’s interest in the result of the case be direct and concrete is broadly construed. A  representative or collective body (which encompasses not only trade or professional associations and the like but 47 Ie one brought under the ECSC Treaty, where every potential intervener, even a member state, had to show an interest in the result of the case. The judgment remains relevant to interventions generally and also to interventions by states other than member states or, in cases in which they have to show an interest to intervene, EEA states. 48 Eg Case 150/86 Union Sidérurgique du Nord et de l’Est de la France SA (USINOR) v Commission, order of 28 January 1987(unreported); Case C-156/87 Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission [1990] ECR I-781, order of 16 December 1987; Case T-35/91 Eurosport Consortium v Commission [1991]  ECR II-1359, para  15; Case C-245/95P  Commission v NTN Corpn [1996] ECR I-559, paras 8–9. In the first and second cases cited, the order allowing the application to intervene states expressly that the fact that the intervener has brought its own action does not remove the right to intervene in other proceedings. 49 See for example, Cases 10 and 18/68 Société Eridania Zuccherifici Nazionali v Commission [1969]  ECR  459 and Case 130/75 Prais v Council [1976]  ECR  1589. A  different view was taken in Cooperatieve Aan- en Verkoopvereniging Ulestraten (above, note 42), paras 18–22. The cases can be reconciled on the basis of the type of decision involved and the effect on the intervener of its annulment.

447

5.17  Intervention

also local or regional bodies, whose functions include the advancement of the interests of people or businesses within the area covered by them, and organisations for the protection of the environment, where their activities fall within the region or sector involved in the proceedings or, if wider, where they are actively involved in protection programmes or studies relating to the region or sector in question that are or would be affected by the contested measure)50 would seem to have an interest if the persons it represents have one51 or if it is intervening in order to protect interests for whose furtherance it has been brought into existence (as enshrined in its constitution).52 That interest may itself be clearly direct: for example, where a regulation requires the abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports, the effect of its annulment on national producers of the goods in question cannot be other than direct.53 The interest of the individual producers represented by the organisation in question is concrete because the effect of the annulment of the regulation is not to establish a point of principle that might be applied to individual producers, by analogy, should a similar situation arise in another case; instead, annulment directly alters the position of the national producers. Similarly, in the Générale Sucrière case,54 the action was brought by a number of undertakings against a Commission decision finding that they had infringed the competition rules and requiring them to terminate the infringement. A body representing Italian consumers was allowed to intervene on the basis that the correct application of the competition rules not only ensures that the common market operates normally but benefits consumers; the extent of the intervention 50 Eg Case T-138/98 Armement Cooperatif Artisanal Vendeen v Council [1999]  ECR II-1797, para  15 (and the cases cited there); Case T-37/04R  Regiao autonoma dos Acores v Council [2004]  ECR II-2153, paras 57–65 (but note paras 66–71). In relation to environmental organisations, see: Case T-57/11 Castelnou Energia SL  v Commission, 6  November 2012, para 10 ff; Case T-429/13 Bayer CropScience AG v Commission, 21 October 2014, paras 73–99. 51 Producteurs de Fruits v Council (above, note 24); the intervention of the Comité française de la Semoulerie Industrielle in Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling KG v Council and Commission (above, note 30), order of 21  January 1981; the intervention of Intellectual Property Owners Inc (a non-profit-making association of companies, universities and independent inventors with extensive portfolios of intellectual property rights potentially affected by the proceedings) in Case C-241/91P  Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission and Case C-242/91P  Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, orders of 25 March 1992; the intervention of the VDS (an association of salt producers) in Case T-330/94 Salt Union v Commission [1995] ECR II-2881, paras 17 and 20; Case T-227/01 Territorio Historico de Alava v Commission [2006] ECR II-1, paras 11–12; Cases T-30/01 to T-32/01 and T-86/02 to T-88/02 Territorio Historico de Alava – Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2009] ECR II-2919, paras 96–104 (in that case, the association had also participated in the pre-litigation proceedings); Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava – Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2009] ECR II-3029, paras 79–90. In Case 9/82 Øhrgaard and Delvaux v Commission [1983] ECR 2379 and Case 10/82 Mogensen v Commission [1983] ECR 2397, applications to intervene made by a Danish association were rejected because, it seems, the cases concerned an internal recruitment competition in which it had no interest. 52 Case T-87/92  BVBA  Kruidvat v Commission [1993]  ECR II-1369, paras 12–14; Case T-87/92  BVBA  Kruidvat v Commission [1993]  ECR II-1383 (the reported version seems to miss out the relevant part of the reasoning, which seems to reflect that of the order reported at [1993] ECR II-1369); the Salt Union case (above, note 51), paras 18–20; Case T-53/01R Poste Italiane SpA v Commission [2001] ECR II-1479, paras 51–58. 53 Producteurs de Fruits v Council (above, note 24). 54 Above, note 25.

448

Intervention 5.18

was, however, limited to the Commission’s decision as it related to the effects of the restrictive practice in Italy. Ensuring the correct application of the competition rules in regard to Italy clearly has a direct effect on the position of Italian consumers. The interest that Italian consumers might have in the cessation of anti-competitive conduct in another member state is (on the face of it) an interest that is different in character: it is an interest in establishing a point of principle that might be relevant to some situation that might or might not arise in Italy. 5.18 The members of bodies representing collective interests do not, ordinarily, themselves have sufficient interest to intervene in a case that will merely establish a point of principle that may or may not be of relevance to them in some other case. But that is nonetheless one of the situations in which the body representing their interests may have sufficient interest to intervene. Thus, in A M & S Europe Ltd v Commission55 the action claimed the annulment of part of a Commission decision requiring the applicant to disclose certain documents. Annulment would have affected no one but the parties, A  M  & S  and the Commission; disclosure would have affected only A M & S’s interests, and possibly those of the persons or undertakings mentioned in the documents. The CCBE (effectively a body representing the collective interests of other bodies representing the collective interests of individual members of the legal profession) intervened, however, on the basis that, since the documents were alleged to be privileged from disclosure because they were, or contained, communications passing between a lawyer and his client, the Court’s decision would affect the enforcement of the rules of professional conduct binding lawyers in the member states by the CCBE and the national professional organisations represented by it; in addition, the result of the case would have a bearing on the rights and duties of individual lawyers throughout the EU.56 Similarly, in Case C-241/91P Radio 55 Above, note 26. 56 The position is, however, rather complicated as a result of the orders made in Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals v Commission [2007]  ECR II-3523 and in Case C-550/07P  Akzo Nobel Chemicals v Commission [2010]  ECR  I-8301, which concerned the question of the confidentiality of communications between in-house lawyers and the employing undertaking (a topic also touched on in AM&S). In the proceedings before the CFI, the following had been allowed to intervene: the CCBE; the General Council of the Dutch Bar; the European Company Lawyers Association; the American Corporate Counsel Association; the International Bar Association (‘the IBA’). The following had not been permitted to intervene (for differing reasons): the European Council on Legal Affairs; the Section on Business Law of the IBA. In the subsequent appeal proceedings before the ECJ, the following associations were not allowed to intervene: the Association of General Counsel and Company Secretaries of the FTSE 100 (GC 100); the Chamber of Commerce of the USA; the International Chamber of Commerce; the American Bar Association (ABA); the Law Society of England and Wales; the United States Council for International Business (USCIB). The treatment of the General Council of the Dutch Bar and the Law Society of England and Wales appears to be contradictory. Further, on basic principles, the different organisations representing the collective interests of (employed) lawyers should have been permitted to intervene. Some of them were not, on the dubious ground that the case concerned communications between a restricted circle of persons that were relevant to a competition investigation (orders of 5 February 2009 concerning GC 100 and the ABA). The reasoning of the orders rejecting the applications made by the Chambers of Commerce and the USCIB (whose objectives were general and not related in any particular way to the interests of (employed) lawyers) is more plausible.

449

5.19  Intervention

Telefis Eireann v Commission and Case C-242/91P  Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission,57 Intellectual Property Owners Inc (an association incorporated in a third country) intervened on the basis that the Commission and third parties might seek to interpret the judgment under appeal in such a way as to have direct and adverse consequences for the members of the association in relation to the exercise by them of their intellectual property rights. The rights of the members of the association were not in fact in dispute in the proceedings; it was the possibility that the judgment would be used as a precedent in other cases that gave rise to the intervention of the association. In contrast, in the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case,58 an action for damages based on the alleged wrongful fixing of wheat prices, the Court rejected an application to intervene made by a German trade union which relied on the favourable effect, in particular on job prospects, that the action would have on the trade union’s members if it were successful. That, the Court held, was an indirect effect of the potential result of the case and far too removed to justify the intervention of the union. 5.19 More recently, applications to intervene in staff cases made by staff or trade unions have been upheld on the ground that such bodies are generally allowed to intervene (in staff cases) where the outcome of the proceedings is such as to affect a collective interest represented by the applicant to intervene and the case is therefore of general importance: in effect, the intervener is seeking to obtain for its members the rights sought by the party in whose support the intervener is intervening.59 A body representing collective interests may in such circumstances have an interest to intervene even though none of its members is directly affected by the dispute.60 Such a body may also have an interest to intervene where an individual does not. For example, in Case T-121/89 X v Commission,61 a case concerning the defendant’s refusal to recruit the applicant on grounds of health, the CFI (as it then was) allowed a staff union to intervene because the case did not concern just the interests of one person (the applicant) 57 Above, note 51, orders of 25 March 1992. 58 Above note 30, see order of 8 April 1981. See, by way of contrast, Case T-138/98 Armement Cooperatif Artisanal Vendeen v Council [1999]  ECR II-1797, paras 18–21 (in which the Ludwigshafener case was relied on as against one intervener but not another because, in the latter’s case, the impact was much more serious). 59 Case T-49/89 Mavrakos v Council [1990]  ECR II-509, order of 8  December 1989 (the case concerned a change in practice affecting an entire category of officials, including members of the intervener); Case T-110/89 Pincherle v Commission [1991]  ECR II-635, order of 12  December 1989; Case C-107/90P  Hochbaum v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-157, order of 10 October 1990; Case T-84/91 Meskens v European Parliament [1992] ECR II-1565, paras 10–14; Case C-242/90P Commission v Albani [1993] ECR I-3839, order of 15 November 1990; Case C-244/91P Pincherle v Commission [1993] ECR I-6965 (Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, para 47). 60 Cases C-193 and C-194/87 Maurissen and European Public Service Union v Court of Auditors [1990]  ECR  I-95, order of 10  February 1988 in Case C-94/87: the intervener comprised professional organisations or trade unions with the consequence that its character as a representative body could not be put in doubt merely because none of the defendant’s officials was a member of the intervener; the point at issue was one that did not concern the relationship between the defendant and its officials alone. In many staff cases, the point at issue will be of general importance in that sense because the Staff Regulations apply to all the EU institutions. 61 [1992] ECR II-2195, order of 13 February 1990.

450

Intervention 5.20

but the practice of the defendant’s medical services which in principle fell within the scope of the collective interests with which the union was concerned. An application to intervene made by an individual official was rejected because neither his status as such nor his obligation to have an annual medical examination gave him a direct and actual interest in the relief sought by the applicant. An application to intervene made by the Belgian League for Human Rights was rejected because its vocation (to support any person whose fundamental rights have been affected) did not have a sufficiently close connection with the case; further, the action did not concern human rights as such but the legality of certain recruitment procedures.62 A  body representing collective interests may in any event have an interest to intervene in its own right, for example where the case may lead the Court into defining the rights of such bodies;63 or where the body’s interest to intervene derives from its participation in the proceedings leading up to the adoption of the contested act.64 5.20 In the case of interventions by representative bodies that are based upon the interests for which the body exists (as opposed to situations in which the body effectively acts for and on behalf of a group of persons who themselves have a direct individual interest in the action65 and situations in which the interests of the body as a representative body are affected66), it has therefore been held that an interest to intervene exists if: (i) the body represents an appreciable number of persons active in the sector concerned; (ii) the objects of the body in question include that of protecting its members’ interests; (iii) the case may raise questions of principle affecting the functioning of the sector concerned; and (iv) the inter-

62 The emphasis on the general nature of the issue in the case (and therefore on the general importance of the final decision) when considering, and justifying, an intervention by a trade union is more pronounced in other cases, such as Case 431/85 Diezler v Economic and Social Committee [1987] ECR 4283, order of 25 June 1986 (a group of officials being candidates for election to the staff committee allowed to intervene); Case 148/88 Albani v Commission, orders of 13  June and 13  December 1988 (unreported) (staff unions but not individuals allowed to intervene – the case was withdrawn after being transferred to the CFI); Case T-41/90 Barassi v Commission [1992] ECR II-159, order of 28 January 1991. In contrast, the issue in the Regiao autonoma dos Acores case (above, note 50) was concerned specifically with the waters around the Azores. In consequence, organisations with those waters as a particular focus of their activities had an interest to intervene whereas organisations dedicated to the protection of the environment that did not have a particular focus on those waters lacked an interest to intervene: see paras 57–71. 63 Maurissen and European Public Service Union v Court of Auditors (above, note 60), order of 10 February 1988 in Case C-194/87. 64 The classic example is that of the associations representing EU industry in dumping investigations. Complaints to the Commission alleging dumping and requesting corrective action in the form of the imposition of an anti-dumping duty must be made by the EU industry affected by the alleged dumping and, for that reason, are made almost invariably by associations comprising the undertakings affected. Such associations participate in the ensuing administrative proceedings and have an interest to intervene (in support of the EU institutions) in actions for the annulment of the regulation imposing the duty. 65 In which case, the use of the representative body obviates the need for each person represented by the body to intervene (and is procedurally economic): eg Case T-201/04R Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR II-2977, para 38. 66 For example, where (as noted above) the case would define the rights of such bodies.

451

5.20  Intervention

ests of the body’s members may therefore be affected to an appreciable extent by the judgment.67 On that basis, interventions have been allowed where the representative body represented the interests of undertakings or users affected by an alleged anti-competitive practice.68 In the more specific case of local or regional entities, interventions have been allowed where the entity defends the interests of traders affected by the measure contested in the action and where the economic and social structure of the area in question would be materially affected by the measure.69 It is not clear how numerous the membership of a representative body must be for the body to be regarded as sufficiently representative to justify an interest to intervene.70 The best that one can say on that point seems to be that the representative body must have as its members a material or appreciable number of the persons whose interests may be affected; but there is no requirement that the representative body has members from more than one member state.71 So far as the objects of the body are concerned, those are identified by construing

67 Case T-87/92 BVBA Kruidvat v Commission [1993] ECR II-1375, para 14; Case C-151/98P Pharos SA  v Commission [1998]  ECR  I-5441, paras 6–8; Case T-18/97 Atlantic Container Line AB  v Commission [1998]  ECR II-589, para  10; Case T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2004]  ECR II-1603, paras 20–22; Case T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2004]  ECR II-1617, paras 16–23 (where the application to intervene was dismissed because the entity lacked the purpose of advancing its members’ interests; it was part of a larger organisation that had that function but that had not authorised the entity to act on its behalf – that larger organisation was then permitted to intervene when it applied to do so: see the order of 26 February 2007, [2007] ECR II-479); Case T-201/04R Microsoft Corpn v Commission (above, note 65), para 37; Case T-194/04R Tillack v Commission [2004] ECR II3575, paras 24–29; Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2005] ECR II-1491, paras 26–31. Some of the cases use the simpler formulation of ‘representative associations whose object is to protect their members in cases raising questions of principle liable to affect those members’. 68 Case T-201/04R Microsoft (above, note 65), paras 45–47, 54–58, 70–74 and 81–85. The decision in Microsoft contains a number of references to the interest of the interveners in intervening in interim relief proceedings. For further explanation, see section V.B below. The cases are not entirely consistent. In Case C-28/13 P Thesing v European Central Bank, order of 6 November 2013, paras 6–17, an association formed to promote access to documents was found to lack interest to intervene in a case about the promotion of access to documents, seemingly because there is very wide access to documents. The usual criteria were not, apparently, applied. 69 Case T-194/95 Intv I Area Cova SA v Council [1996] ECR II-591, paras 2 and 7; Case T-138/98 Armement Cooperatif Artisanal Vendeen v Council [1999] ECR II-1797, paras 15 (and the cases cited there) and 18–21 (where the intervention of one regional entity was allowed and that of another was not because the effect on its economic and social structure was less and was also indirect); Case C-186/02P Ramondin SA v Commission [2003] ECR I-2415, paras 8–11 and, by way of contrast, 17. 70 In Case T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2004] ECR II-1603, para 22, an organisation consisting of only 25 members was not regarded as representing a sufficiently large number of professionals active in the sector concerned. 71 On the point that the body’s members do not have to come from more than one member state, see Bayer CropScience (above, note 50), para 34. On the question of the number of members, see: Case T-125/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-479, para 15 (emphasis was placed on the fact that the IBA’s members included more than 20,000 individual lawyers, including 3,000 in-house counsel, 195 bars and ‘numerous’ company lawyers’ associations); Bayer CropScience (above, note 50), paras 22–55 (extensive analysis of the representativeness of the bodies in question). It seems that it is the number of members seen in absolute, rather than relative, terms that is sufficient.

452

Intervention 5.21

the instruments creating the body. If no such instruments exist, it is impossible to establish that the objects of the body include protecting the interests of its members.72 If those instruments merely provide that the body’s role is to do such things as facilitating contacts between its members, that is insufficient to establish an interest to intervene.73 On the basis of Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council74 it has been suggested that there is a distinction between the role of a representative body as ‘promoting’ the interests of its members and its role as ‘representing and protecting’ them. In principle, the precise role of a representative body is determined by construing the instruments creating it and giving it power of action. However, such instruments must be given a realistic interpretation and regard should be had to, amongst other things, the way in which the body in question has performed the roles assigned to it in the past and to whether or not it has in other contexts advanced, or sought to advance, the interests of its members in legal proceedings, whether at the national or EU level. As an example of a realistic interpretation of the instruments governing a representative body, the role of ‘assisting’ a body’s members has been construed as meaning the protection of the interests of members and therefore as justifying an interest to intervene.75 However, the more general observation may be made that confining the role of ‘promoting’ the interests of members in such a way as to exclude the role of ‘protecting’ those interests is a remarkably flimsy form of differentiation. It is conceivable that, in a particular context, the ‘promotion’ of the interests of the members of a body may mean no more than organising an annual trade fair or similar event or engaging in advertising initiatives; but, outside such a context, ‘promotion’ would normally be taken to encompass participating in legal proceedings where a point of principle affecting the interests of the members of the body is at stake. 5.21 In cases in which a body representing collective interests intervenes in order to protect the interests of its members, the corollary of the exercise by that body of its right to intervene is, however, that none of its members may intervene in their own right unless they are able to show a separate and distinct interest to intervene.76 72 Akzo Nobel (above, note 70), para 22. See also Case T-227/01 Territorio Historico de Alava v Commission [2006] ECR II-1, paras 7–9 and 12 (failure to produce the documents constituting the entity). 73 Case T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2004] ECR II-1617, paras 20–22. 74 [2002] ECR II-3305, order of 25 June 1999 (unreported). 75 Case T-125/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-479, para 16 (the point addressed by the GC appears in para 11). 76 Case C-550/07P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission (above, note 56; order of 5 February 2009 concerning the application to intervene of the Law Society of England and Wales); Bayer CropScience (above, note 50), paras 65–72. A  member of a body representing a collective interest may have a distinct interest if it takes up a different stance. For example, in Akzo, the Law Society (which was itself a body representing a collective interest and could in principle have intervened in its own right) would not have been swept up into the collective interest represented by the CCBE if it and the CCBE had been in disagreement. Further, a connection between an intervener and an intervening representative body cannot be established solely on the basis that a parent company of the former is a member of the latter: Bayer CropScience, paras 100–105.

453

5.22  Intervention

C

The distinction between the intervener’s interest and the interest of a main party or the interest of another intervener

5.22 A slightly different problem is posed by the question whether or not an intervener’s interest must be distinct from that of the party in whose support the intervener wishes to intervene or that of any other intervener. That problem has arisen in cases where there is some particular close link between that party and the intervener (or between two or more interveners), such as where the intervener is a member or component part of the party (or other intervener), with the consequence that (it is said) the intervener’s interest is merged with or indistinguishable from the interest of the party (or other intervener).77 Where there is no link of that nature, any identity of interest is not relevant. Accordingly, two or more persons who, separately, have exactly the same interest in the case may intervene and their ability to do so is not impeded by the fact that their interests are the same or overlap.78 5.23 In Producteurs de Fruits v Council,79 the Court appears to have rejected the view that the intervener’s interest in the case must be distinct from that of the party which he supports, which tends to suggest that even a wholly owned subsidiary cannot be barred from intervening on the ground that its interest is in substance the same as that of its parent. However, in Case 323/82 Intermills v Commission80 it appears to have been argued that subsidiaries of the applicant in the action did not have sufficient interest to intervene. The Court rejected that on the ground that the applicant had only a minority shareholding in the subsidiaries so that it could not be excluded that the latter had an interest of their own to represent in the proceedings, which could be taken to indicate that wholly owned subsidiaries would not have an interest in intervening in support of the parent company. In Case T-135/96 Union Europeenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises v Council,81 the question was left open but it was held that the intervener had an interest distinct from the main party. In Cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 The Coca-Cola Company v Commission, cross applications to intervene were made by the applicants in each case (in the event that, for some 77 In that sense, the situation is the converse of that where a body representing a collective interest wishes to intervene in support of a party who is a member of that representative body. Where there is no link in an institutional or personal sense but merely a commonality of interest, it does not seem that a problem arises: see, for example, Case 273/85R  Silver Seiko Ltd v Council [1985]  ECR  3475, para  6, where the argument that the intervener’s interests were adequately represented by the defendants (in whose support the intervener wished to intervene) was rejected. 78 An example is the Akzo Nobel litigation (above, note 56), in which a multitude of organisations intervened on the basis of the same interest in the case. The principle that commonality of interest, alone, is not an objection to an application to intervene was expressly stated in Silver Seiko (above, note 77). The position is different where commonality of interest is combined with a particular link between the persons concerned, as was the situation of the Law Society in Akzo Nobel (above, note 76). 79 Above, note 24, at 488; see also the cases cited in note 146 below. 80 [1984] ECR 3809 (see order of 22 June 1983). Minority shareholders were also considered in Case T-367/05 UPC France v Commission, order of 11 September 2006 (unreported). 81 [1997] ECR II-373, para 9.

454

Intervention 5.24

reason, one action might go ahead but the other might not) and were rejected on the ground that one applicant controlled the other. However, that decision was based upon an assumption of fact that was contested in the proceedings.82 5.24 In Case 358/85 France v European Parliament,83 the applicant sought the annulment of a resolution of the European Parliament and various members of the Parliament applied to intervene (under art 34 of the former ECSC Statute) because they had participated in the drafting of the contested resolution and were MEPs. Their applications were rejected on the grounds that it was for the defendant institution to decide how to organise its defence; that the interest of the interveners was not distinct from that of the defendant; and that it is contrary to the system of judicial protection in the EU for members of an institution to be entitled to intervene in support of the institution. By the same token, a commissioner could not intervene in support of the Commission and a minister in the government of a member state could not intervene in support of the Council (which consists of representatives of the member states). That principle has not been taken so far as to exclude intervention by a member state in support of the Council (even though that seems to be a logical conclusion), presumably because the Statute and the EC and EAEC  Statutes that preceded it expressly confer on the member states a right to intervene.84 On the other hand, in Case 143/84 Vlachou v Court of Auditors,85 a case concerning a decision of a selection board, a member of that board was allowed to intervene, albeit only in order to refute the applicant’s allegations that he had infringed the Staff Regulations.86 Thus, it would seem that a member of an EU institution may be able to intervene in sup-

82 [2000]  ECR II-1733, order of 18  March 1999 (unreported). The applicants had brought proceedings for the annulment of a Commission decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market. The decision was favourable to them but was based upon certain findings of fact to which they objected. One of those findings was that The CocaCola Company controlled the other applicant, Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. The applications commencing proceedings adduced copious evidence in support of the view that the former did not control the latter. At the time when the decision on the applications to intervene was made, the Commission had not lodged a defence or produced any evidence to support the assertion that there was control. The cases were eventually disposed of as a result of a preliminary objection to admissibility raised by the Commission with the consequence that the question of control was never considered or decided by the Court. The fact that the interventions were rejected on a ground which implied a rejection of the evidence adduced by the applicants (before the Commission had even had an opportunity to consider that evidence and state its position on it – the Commission might in principle have abandoned that part of its case in its defence, had it lodged one) seems to have been an oversight: it does not seem to be appropriate for matters of fact that are disputed in the action to be decided in the context of an application to intervene and, a fortiori, for an application to intervene to be dismissed where it is based on such matters of fact and there is no evidence to controvert the factual assertions made, or the evidence adduced, by the intervener. 83 [1986] ECR 2149 and [1988] ECR 4821, order of 3 July 1986 (see [1988] ECR at 4836–4837 per Advocate General Mancini). 84 The other view is that the fact that the Council consists of ‘representatives’ of the member states (TEU, art 16(2); EAEC, art 116) is in itself sufficient to say that the members of the Council are not the member states but the natural persons representing the member states from time to time. 85 [1986] ECR 459 (para 8 and per Advocate General Lenz at 463). 86 Compare Case T-108/94 Candiotte v Council [1994] ECR II-863.

455

5.25  Intervention

port of the institution if he (or she) is personally impugned in the action. That occurred, by way of example, in Cases C-393/07 and C-9/08 Italy and Donnici v European Parliament,87 which were actions for the annulment of a decision of the European Parliament invalidating the mandate to the Parliament of Mr Donnici. The person whose mandate was validated, Mr Occhetto, was permitted to intervene in support of the Parliament because he had a personal interest in the validity of his own mandate, which had been impugned in the actions. 5.25 The question whether or not the principle, that members of an EU institution cannot (ordinarily at least) intervene in support of that institution, applies also to the persons or bodies recognised by EU law as forming part of a member state is largely of academic interest: persons other than EU institutions and member states cannot intervene in actions in which member states are applicants or defendants, although the question might arise in other actions if both a member state and a person or body regarded as forming part of that state sought to intervene. It is certainly arguable that the same principle applies.88 If so, such a person or body would not ordinarily have an interest to intervene in a case in which the member state in question had already intervened; but, if that person or body had been allowed to intervene before the member state applied to do so, it does not seem that the member state’s application would cause the intervention of that person or body to be revoked89 and it is doubtful if the member state’s application could be refused (on the ground that its interest was already represented in the proceedings) because a member state has a right to intervene without any need to show an interest. 5.26 That last point does, however, expose a gap in the reasoning justifying the conclusion that a component part of a member state cannot intervene alongside the state itself. As noted above, there are cases where a member of a party before the Court has been permitted to intervene: those are cases where the member is able to identify an interest in the proceedings that is separate and distinct from the interest of the party of which he is a member. Accordingly, if the principle to be applied is actually that a part of a party or an intervener (being a part that has the required elements of personality) can intervene if it can demonstrate an interest of its own in the case, what is to be done in regard to a part of a member state where the member state has intervened without showing any particular interest in intervening (because it may intervene without showing any interest at all)? An example of that situation can be found in Case C-290/07P Commission v Scott SA, a case concerning the legality of a Commission decision finding that France had granted state aid to an undertaking (Scott) and requiring France to

87 [2009] ECR I-3679, order of 21 February 2008 (unreported). 88 Cf Case 282/85 Comité de Développement et de Protection du Textile et de l’Habillement (DEFI) v Commission [1986] ECR 2469, paras 17–19. 89 It is still an open question whether or not the Court can reconsider an application to intervene once it has been allowed: see Vlachou v Court of Auditors (above, note 85), order of 16 October 1985, and para 5.98 below.

456

Intervention 5.27

recover the aid from Scott.90 A French territorial unit (the Departement du Loiret) had granted part of the aid in question. It and Scott each brought an action for the annulment of the decision. The CFI (as it then was) annulled the decision in part in its judgments bringing the action to an end and the Commission appealed against both judgments. France had been an intervening party at first instance in the Scott case and was, therefore, automatically a party to the appeal in that case. The Departement, which had not been an intervener in Scott’s action, applied to intervene in the Scott appeal. On the face of it, the Departement’s interest in that appeal was already represented by France (although France had not been obliged to identify any interest in order to justify its intervention at first instance or its continuation as a party in the appeal). Nonetheless, the Departement was allowed to intervene, on the strength of its obvious interest in defending the CFI judgment on the legality of the Commission decision. The Commission’s argument that the Departement’s interest was indistinguishable from that of France was rejected on the ground that an intervener does not have to show an interest that is exclusive and independent of the interests of the other parties in the case. A different way of putting the matter would have been that the Departement’s interest to intervene lay in its capacity as a party to parallel proceedings seeking exactly the same end result as that sought (by Scott) in the Scott proceedings. That interest was quite distinct from the more general interest that France had in intervening.

D

Particular examples of interests to intervene

5.27 Passing now to particular examples of what constitutes an interest to intervene, in Cases 7 and 9/54 Groupement de Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority and Cases 8 and 10/54 Association des Utilisateurs de Charbon de Grand-Duché de Luxembourg v High Authority91 (in cases under the ECSC Treaty member states had to show an interest in the result of the case), Luxembourg had an interest in the proceedings because they concerned the question whether the system for subsidising domestic fuel introduced by the Luxembourg government was compatible with the Treaty. In Cases 24 and 34/58 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie de l’Est de la France v High Authority92 the French government intervened in an action brought by eight French undertakings and associations for the annulment of a High Authority decision refusing to take action to require the German government to modify transport tariffs that were alleged to discriminate against non-German undertakings, presumably because French economic interests in general were threatened; and in Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority93 the action concerned the High Authority’s acquiescence in the granting of a bonus to miners in Germany which was financed from public funds so

90 [2010] ECR I-7763, order of 17 July 2008 (unreported). A like case is the Swiss Confederation case (above, note 15), para 20. 91 [1954–56] ECR 222 and 241. 92 [1960] ECR 281. 93 [1961] ECR 1.

457

5.28  Intervention

the German government had an interest to intervene in order to defend the system it had introduced. In contrast, it was five Dutch undertakings which sought to intervene in Case 25/59 Netherlands v High Authority,94 an action brought by the Dutch government under art 88 of the ECSC Treaty for the annulment of a High Authority decision recording that the member states had failed to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty in that they had not published or notified to the High Authority the scales, rates and other tariff rules applied to the carriage by road of coal and steel for hire or reward. The decision went on to set out the measures which the member states had to take in order to comply with their obligations and set a time limit for compliance. The interveners were either carriers or users of the goods in question and were directly affected by the decision. Their interest in the outcome of the case was unquestionable but the Court limited the scope of their intervention by holding that they had an interest in the annulment of part but not the whole of the decision. That part was the High Authority’s finding that there had been a failure to comply with the Treaty because that necessitated an interpretation of the Treaty provisions. On the other hand, the interveners had no interest in the annulment of the obligations with which the High Authority had required the member states to comply in its decision. Where a measure affects a wide range of persons, each of them is likely to have an interest in intervening in an action for the annulment of the measure if and to the extent that the measure has (or would have) a significant effect on their actions.95 5.28 A party to, or perpetrator of, anti-competitive conduct (whether an agreement or practice or an abuse of a dominant position) has an interest in an action brought to annul a decision of the Commission requiring it to be terminated,96 exempting it from prohibition or withholding the benefit of exemption,97 declaring that it is not prohibited98 or declining to take action on a complaint about it;99 so has a person whose contractual or property rights are affected by the agreement.100 At a more general level, the complainant in competition cases (including a person who has participated in the administrative proceedings before the Commission) has an interest in an action brought to annul the Commission’s decision;101 so also have 94 Above, note 37, at 386–389. 95 Case T-339/00 Bactria Industriehygiene-Service Verwaltungs GmbH v Commission [2002] ECR II-2287, order of 11 July 2001 (unreported), para 14. 96 The intervener supported the Commission: Case 71/74R & RR Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit-en-Groentenimporthandel (FRUBO) v Commission [1974] ECR 1031 at 1095; Case T-87/92 BVBA Kruidvat v Commission [1993] ECR II-1363. 97 Cases T-29 and T-30 Quantel SA v Commission, order of 23 January 1991 (unreported): the intervener supported the Commission. 98 Eg Case T-125/90 Filtrona Española SA v Commission, order of 15 February 1990 (unreported). 99 Eg Case T-74/92 Ladbroke Racing (Deutschland) GmbH  v Commission [1993]  ECR II-535, paras 8–9; Case T-52/00 Coe Clerici Logistics SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-2553, para 34. 100 Case T-157/89 Algemene Financieringsmaatschappij Nefito BV  v Commission, order of 25 September 1990 (unreported). 101 Case 73/74 Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v Commission [1975] ECR 1491; Case 28/77 Tepea BV v Commission [1978] ECR 1391; Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 2229; Cases 209–215 and 218/78 Heintz Van Landewyck Sàrl (FEDETAB) v Commission [1980] ECR 3125 at 3130–3131 and 3144; Case 60/81 IBM Corpn v Commission [1981] ECR 2639, order of 13 May 1981; Cases 76, 77 and 91/89R Radio Telefis

458

Intervention 5.28

any undertakings whose marketing policy or commercial position is affected by the restrictive practice in question,102 consumers in general103 and persons whose commercial interests are directly affected by the decision104 (aliter where the decision is one withdrawing immunity from fines).105 On the other hand, another undertaking involved in an anti-competitive arrangement prohibited by a Commission decision imposing fines on participants in the arrangement does not have an interest in intervening in an action for the annulment of the decision because the action affects only the applicant undertaking’s liability (not that of the intervener).106 Another party Eireann v Commission [1989] ECR 1141, para 3; Case T-65/89 BPB Industries plc and British Gypsum Ltd v Commission [1993] ECR II-389, order of 18 January 1990 (unreported); Case T-66/94 Auditel Srl v Commission [1995]  ECR II-239, paras 23–28; Case T-367/94 British Coal Corpn v Commission [1997] ECR II-469, para 31; Case T-5/00R Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission [2000] ECR II-4121, paras 26–28; Microsoft (above, note 65), paras 49, 59, 75, 86, 92. The position of complainants and victims was the subject of detailed consideration in: Case C-589/11 P(I) Schenker AG v Air France, 8 June 2012; Case C-590/11 P(I) Schenker AG v Air France-KLM, 8 June 2012; Case C-596/11 P(I) Schenker AG v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, 8 June 2012; Case C-598/11 Schenker AG v Cathay Pacific Airways, 8 June 2012; Case C-600/11 P(I) Schenker AG v Lan Airlines, 8 June 2012; Case C-602/11 P(I) Schenker AG v Deutsche Lufthansa, 8 June 2012. The effect of those decisions is to reduce considerably the possibility of a victim of an anti-competitive practice found by the Commission to defend its interests. 102 Cases 43 and 63/82 De Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamsche Boekwezen v Commission [1984] ECR 19, order of 10 March 1982; Case T-65/98R Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v Commission [1998] ECR II-2642, paras 26–31 (undertakings adversely affected by the conduct in question); Microsoft (above, note 65), paras 90–91, 96, 110–111; Case C-385/07P  Der Grune Punkt Duales System Deutschland GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR I-6155, order of 21 February 2008 (unreported) – a competitor. 103 The Générale Sucrière case (above, note 25). See also the Ford cases (above, note 28) and Case T-29/92 Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid (SPO) v Commission [1993] ECR II-1, para 22 (in the latter case it was, however, regarded as significant that the consumers in question were distinct from the general body of consumers affected by the practices in question). By way of contrast, in anti-dumping cases, a person who buys goods on which an anti-dumping duty has been imposed does not have an interest to intervene: Case C-245/95P-Intervention II  Commission v NTN  Corpn [1996]  ECR  I-559, paras 13–15. It is not immediately obvious why there is a difference, in that respect, between competition and anti-dumping cases. On the other hand, the rejection of the applications to intervene in Case C-461/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council [2008] ECR I-11*, Case C-462/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council [2008]  ECR  I-13*, Case C-463/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council [2008]  ECR  I-14* and Case C-464/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Council [2008]  ECR  I-15* is more understandable. Those were cases in which an Italian regional authority sought to intervene in proceedings for the annulment of an anti-dumping regulation affecting imported shoes. Apart from asserting a general interest arising from the economic well-being of the region in question, it was also asserted that shoe manufacturing was particularly important in the region. The asserted interest was therefore indirect; it was, if anything, local shoe manufacturers (or a body representing them) who would have had a direct interest in the matter. 104 Van Landewyck v Commission (above, note 101): several Belgian trade associations (with legal personality under Belgian law) which traded in the products in question; Microsoft (above, note 65), paras 121 and 134. A person’s commercial interests are not directly affected if they have not yet launched a relevant product or if their commercial operations would not have to change in consequence of the outcome in the proceedings or if any change were contingent upon the actions of a third party: Microsoft (above, note 65), paras 112–113, 132–133 and 137. 105 Case T-18/97 Atlantic Container Line AB v Commission [1998] ECR II-589, paras 13–17. 106 Hoechst v Commission (above, note 41), paras 15–19.

459

5.28  Intervention

to the prohibited arrangement does, however, have an interest in establishing that the decision is non-existent because such a ruling does affect the intervener’s position.107 Where the intervener has benefited from immunity from fines, it has an interest in supporting the Commission and in rejecting the applicant’s claims only if the reversal of the Commission’s decision could lead the Commission to remove the immunity granted to the intervener; but that is an indirect, potential interest, insufficient to justify intervention, that can be protected by bringing proceedings against any eventual decision removing immunity.108 The beneficiary of a state aid109 and the competitor of a beneficiary of state aid110 have an interest in proceedings disputing the legality of the state aid. If the Court’s decision would have decisive effect on other proceedings between one of the parties and the intervener pending before a national court, there is sufficient interest to intervene.111 For example, an insurance company has an interest to intervene in support of the defendant institution in an action for the annulment of a decision refusing to acknowledge that the death of an official was caused by an occupational disease where, if the action were successful, a claim would be made for which the insurance company would ultimately be liable.112 On the other hand, a mere ‘knock-on’ effect (such as where the result of the action would at most strengthen the intervener’s hand in other litigation that the intervener could bring or has brought) is indirect and therefore insufficient to support an application to intervene.113 An effect on the future behaviour of one of the parties to the proceedings is liable to be characterised as indirect, future and hypo-

107 Case C-199/92P Huls AG v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287, paras 53–56 (pp 4358–4359; see also per Advocate General Cosmas, paras 10–17, pp 4298–4303); Case C-227/92P  Hoechst AG  v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4443, paras 29–34; Case C-235/92P  Montecatini SpA  v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4539, paras 76–78; Case C-245/92P  Chemie Linz GmbH  v Commission [1999] ECR I-4643, paras 28–33. 108 Hoechst (above, note 41), paras 20–22; Case T-15/02 BASF AG v Commission [2003] ECR II213, paras 27–38. 109 Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette v Commission, order of 1  July 1993 (unreported), paras 19– 20; Case T-154/94 Comite des Salines de France v Commission, order of 10 February 1995 (unreported), para 9; Case T-330/94 Salt Union v Commission [1995] ECR II-2881, paras 10– 11; Case T-89/96 British Steel plc v Commission [1997] ECR II-835, paras 2 and 17. 110 Case C-100/91 Italgrani v Commission, order of 26  November 1991 (unreported), para  10; Comite des Salines de France (above, note 109), para 15; the Salt Union case (above, note 109), para 17; the British Steel case (above, note 109), paras 20–21; Cases T-415/05, T-416/05 and T-423/05 Greece v Commission [2010] ECR II-4749, para 64. 111 Consten and Grundig v Commission (above, note 43), paras 17–20, where the intervener’s interest was retained after the national proceedings pending at the time of the application to intervene had been withdrawn because it was still possible for proceedings to be recommenced against the intervener (paras 21–22); in BPB  Industries plc and British Gypsum Ltd v Commission (above, note 101) the intervener was merely contemplating claiming damages against the applicants before the national courts on the basis of the contested decision. 112 Case 189/82 Seiler v Council [1984] ECR 229 at 234; Case T-122/89 Ferrandi v Commission [1990]  ECR II-517, order of 23  January 1990. A  similar situation arose in Case T-158/96 Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3927, order of 11  July 1997: if the challenged State aid decision were not annulled, the aid would have to be repaid and an action for recovery could have been brought against the intervener. 113 Eg Case T-191/96 CAS Succhi di Frutta SpA v Commission [1998] ECR II-573, paras 29–34; Case C-186/02P Ramondin SA v Commission [2003] ECR I-2415, paras 13–16; Case T-219/99 British Airways plc v Commission [2003] ECR II-5917, para 32.

460

Intervention 5.29

thetical.114 An effect upon an individual because of the position that he or she holds in an undertaking that is affected is not sufficiently direct to justify intervention.115 In Case T-135/96 Union Europeenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises v Council,116 the interest took the form of a restriction of the intervener’s freedom to negotiate that resulted from the challenged measure. 5.29 One of the more difficult aspects of the requirement of an interest to intervene is what is described above as the ‘knock-on’ effect of judgment in the action. Depending upon the nature of the proceedings and, in annulment actions, the nature of the challenged act, the judgment can have a variety of different consequences for third parties, some of which (on the basis of the case law) are capable of generating an interest to intervene and some of which do not. In Alexander Moksel Import-Export GmbH & Co Handels KG v Commission117 it was argued that the intervener had no interest because it could not benefit from the applicant’s success. The action was for the annulment of a Commission regulation and the intervener could not itself bring an action for annulment because the time for doing so had expired. The Commission relied on Case 92/78 Simmenthal SA v Commission118 for the proposition that, if the applicant won, the regulation would be annulled only as far as the applicant was concerned so the intervener could gain nothing from the action. The Court held119 that, even if the intervener had no direct interest in the case, it did have an interest in the outcome, at least in regard to the reasoning behind the judgment. In contrast, when a similar situation arose in Case 56/85 Brother Industries Ltd v Commission,120 the application to intervene was refused. There, a purchaser of machines manufactured by one Japanese company (Silver Seiko) applied to intervene in support of an action brought by another Japanese manufacturer (Brother) for the annulment of a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty on the products of both manufacturers. It was held that Brother’s claim was for the annulment of the regulation in so far as it applied to Brother; the intervener’s interest was in the annulment of the regulation in so far as it applied to Silver Seiko; therefore the intervener had no interest in the outcome of the action brought by Brother. In Case C-245/95P-Intervention II Commission v NTN Corpn,121 the Court reverted to the approach followed in Moksel and allowed the intervention of a company whose products were subject to an anti-dumping duty (together with its subsidiaries) even though that company had not challenged the anti-dumping regulation and was seeking to support the forms of order sought by two other manufacturers in a similar situation who had done so. In the final judgment in the proceedings, the Court upheld the annulment of the anti-dumping regulation but declared inadmissible the intervener’s claim that the effects of annulment should extend to it.122 That was either 114 CAS Succhi di Frutta SpA v Commission (above, note 113), paras 37–38. 115 Microsoft (above, note 65), para 138. 116 Above, note 81. 117 Above, note 38. 118 [1979] ECR 777. 119 Order of 15 July 1981. 120 [1988] ECR 5655, order of 3 October 1985. 121 [1996] ECR I-559, paras 8–11. 122 [1998] ECR I-401, in particular para 24.

461

5.30  Intervention

a straightforward application of Moksel or else the Court took the view that one manufacturer has a direct and present interest in the liability of a competitor to an anti-dumping duty. The approach in Brother (not that in NTN) was followed in Case T-14/00 Cooperatieve Aan- en Verkoopvereniging Ulestraten, Schimmert en Hulsberg BA v Commission,123 an action for the annulment of a decision that was treated as a bundle of 633 individual decisions which, following a case by case assessment, found that the Netherlands had granted lawful subsidies to 183 individually named service stations and 450 illegal subsidies to 450 individually named service stations. It was held that the intervener (one of the service stations in the second group) had an interest in intervening in support of the applicants (who numbered some 143 service stations in the same group) only if the partial annulment of the decision at the suit of the 143 applicants would require the Commission to reconsider the application of the decision to the intervener. That was not so; and the judgment in the action would not even be relevant to a separate annulment action brought by the intervener. The intervener’s interest was therefore ‘indirect and potential’, not ‘direct and existing’. 5.30 It is true that the ruling in the Moksel case comes very close to admitting, as an interest in the result of the case, an interest in the success of a particular argument but the explanation probably is that, if the regulation were annulled, the intervener might rely on that in an action before a national court.124 The same criticism can be raised in regard to the CCBE’s intervention in the A M & S case; but there again, on closer analysis, the explanation can be seen to lie in the fact that the documents in question were, for the most part, communications to or from a lawyer belonging to one of the professional bodies represented by the CCBE. The interest of the CCBE lay, therefore, not in establishing the existence of a principle of confidentiality, as a general proposition, but in protecting (through the establishment of that principle) the right (or duty) of confidentiality of the lawyers concerned, which was directly threatened by the proceedings (although the conventional understanding of AM&S is that the CCBE’s interest lay in its function as a representative body defending matters of principle that were capable of affecting its members).125 The situation in the Brother case was different because Silver Seiko had brought an action of its own126 and the inter 123 Above (note 41), paras 11–22. 124 In Cases C-151/97P(I) and C-157/97P(I) National Power plc and PowerGen plc [1997]  ECR  I-3491, para  68 (upholding Case T-367/94 British Coal Corpn v Commission [1997] ECR II-469), the President of the ECJ confined Moksel very much to its facts and did not regard it as qualifying ‘established case-law’. The National Power case was one in which the interveners’ interest was said to lie in the success of the arguments advanced by the party in whose support they wished to intervene rather than in that party’s form of order. 125 See, by way of contrast, Case T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2004] ECR II-1603, para 23. 126 Cases 273/85 and 107/86 Silver Seiko Ltd v Council [1988]  ECR  5927. The Brother action was brought against the regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty whereas the Silver Seiko action was brought against the regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty. However, the first action was devoid of purpose because the adoption of a definitive antidumping duty supersedes any provisional duty. In consequence, so far as the intervener was concerned, the Silver Seiko action was alone relevant to its interests.

462

Intervention 5.31

vener’s position would therefore be affected by the outcome of that action, not the outcome of the Brother action. In the Cooperatieve Aan- en Verkoopvereniging Ulestraten case, the existence of a parallel right of action was dismissed as an irrelevant consideration.127 The critical point was really the fact that the contested decision was based upon a case by case analysis. If one applicant (or group of applicants) was successful in annulling the decision as it applied to him (or them), it did not follow that that would have any relevance at all for any of the other addressees of the decision. However, the case can be regarded as authority for a broader proposition, that addressees of a decision cannot intervene in annulment actions brought by other addressees where only partial annulment of the decision will result if the action is successful. In general, that seems to provide a reliable touchstone for analysing cases in which a ‘knock-on’ effect is claimed: there is an interest to intervene if the annulment of the challenged measure will, of itself, alter the legal position of the intervener (even if a further action will have to be commenced in order to establish the change in position); there is no interest to intervene if the judgment will not have that effect but would, at most, act as a precedent or as further support (however powerful) for an attack on another part of the same legal act or some other legal act. Some of the vagaries in the intervention decisions may be explained not by any wavering from the principle just set out but by an evolution in views concerning the effect of the annulment of particular types of legal act. 5.31 Case 246/81 Bethell v Commission,128 was an action brought primarily under what is now TFEU, art  265 for a declaration that the Commission had failed to act and, alternatively, under what is now TFEU, art 263, for the annulment of a letter sent by the Commission to the applicant. Ten airlines were allowed to intervene. It seems that the applications to intervene were based on the argument that it was, in their view, necessary to protect their rights, which they felt were directly or indirectly challenged in the action. Lord Bethell’s essential complaint was that the Commission had not acted to combat restrictive practices in the field of air transport. It seems likely that the interventions were allowed because of the claim under TFEU, art 263. There could have been no interest in the failure of the primary claim, as it was pleaded. The failure to act as alleged was said to be a failure to say that the Commission was going to act against the restrictive practices in question or, on the contrary, to say that it was not going to act. None of the interveners could properly be said to have an interest in that. They would be affected if the Commission did or did not act but they would not be affected by a simple declaration of intention from the Commission saying whether it would or would not act.129 On the other hand, the annulment claim 127 Para 19 of the judgment. 128 [1982] ECR 2277. 129 It is arguable that the airlines’ interest could have been grounded on their interest in obtaining a finding that the Commission was under no duty to act owed to the applicant. The difficulty with that is that any such obligation is a bare duty to act, not one to act in a particular way: an obligation binding the Commission to take steps to end an alleged restrictive practice among the airlines cannot be predicated from an obligation to adopt a position one way or another on the matter; it could be based only on some other article of the Treaty or secondary legislation.

463

5.32  Intervention

was based on the contention that the letter sought to be annulled constituted a decision finding that there had not been an infringement of the competition rules. The interveners undoubtedly had an interest in that part of the action. In Case 6/70 Borromeo Arese v Commission130 a similar situation arose. That case concerned an application under what is now TFEU, art 265 for a declaration that the Commission had infringed the Treaty by failing to adopt a decision laying down rules to be followed in the wording of leases of agricultural land consequent upon the enactment of a draft Italian law dealing with the method of fixing the rents for agricultural land. A lessee of land in Italy, sought to intervene in support of the Commission, saying that he had a material interest in the application of the Italian law. The application to intervene was rejected on the ground that he had not shown a concrete link between his individual interest and the object of an action under TFEU, art 265. 5.32 The judgment in Belgium v Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA and High Authority131 suggests that intervention in an action for damages is not, in general, possible and an application to intervene in such an action has been rejected in a succession of cases.132 As has been seen, however, interventions from a number of organisations were admitted in the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case,133 though it is not clear why. Since the basis of the claim for damages in that case was the alleged wrongful fixing of wheat prices, it is possible that the interest was held to lie in obtaining a judgment that would establish that fact. One could conclude, therefore, that an interest to intervene in a damages action may be established if the alleged liability of the EU or EAEC is based on an act, omission or state of affairs whose wrongfulness or illegality affects the position of the intervener.134 Thus, in Case 253/84 Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun (GAEC) de la Ségaude v Council and Commission,135 it was held that, in an action for damages resulting from a normative act, the form of order sought by the applicant (which determines whether or not the intervener has an interest to intervene) is to be understood as concerning not only the award of damages in favour of the applicant but also the incidental finding that the contested act is unlawful. In Case T-184/95 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Council and Commission,136 the CFI found it difficult to reconcile the Groupement Agricole case with other cases concerning the interest to intervene because of the risk that it would 130 [1970] ECR 815, order of 16 June 1970 (unreported). 131 Above, note 1. 132 Eg Amylum v Council and Commission (above, note 43, para 9); Case T-521/93 Atlanta v Council and Commission, order of 14 July 1995 (unreported), para 12; Case T-516/93 Pacific Fruit Co v Council and Commission, order of 17 July 1995 (unreported), para 12; the Salt Union case (above, para 108). See also Case 114/83 SICA and SIPEFEL v Commission [1984] ECR 2589 at 2591, order of 19 October 1983. The applicants to intervene wished to intervene as parties in their own right, that is, as something more than interveners in the strict sense. Similarly, in the Brother case (above, note 120), the intervener also purported to claim damages. 133 Above, note 29. 134 Eg Chris International Foods v Commission (above, note 23). 135 [1987] ECR 123, order of 20 March 1985. 136 [1997] ECR II-351, paras 16–21.

464

Intervention 5.34

broaden the class of interveners in damages actions (and other actions generally). The CFI seems to have held that, ordinarily, an intervener in a damages action who supports the applicant has no interest in the award of damages to the applicant137 and cannot himself claim the award of damages because interveners are limited to supporting the relief claimed by the applicant or defendant and may not raise a direct claim of their own even if they have an independent right of action in respect of that claim.138 For those reasons, the interest to intervene must be found elsewhere. Merely reciting the basis for a claim does not, therefore, establish an interest to intervene. 5.33 In staff cases, the interest in the result of a case that justifies an intervention by an official or other servant is narrowly construed as an interest in the decision on the particular claim that relates specifically to the act whose annulment is sought in the action. Accordingly, an official or other servant cannot justify an application to intervene on the ground that the action raises questions of principle relating to the organisation of the European civil service or affecting a particular class of officials (which includes the aspiring intervener) or on the ground that there are similarities between the aspiring intervener’s situation and that of one of the parties to the action.139 5.34 Where the object of the action is the annulment of a refusal by the Commission to grant interim relief, the person against whom relief would have been granted has sufficient interest to intervene for that reason alone.140 So far as intervention in proceedings for interim relief brought before the Court is concerned, the position is in principle no different from intervention in the action to which those proceedings relate, so far as the required interest is concerned: it is certainly the case that the entitlement to intervene in the former is contingent upon there being an entitlement to intervene in the latter (although a decision on an application to intervene in interim relief proceedings does not need to await a decision on the application to intervene in the main action)141 but there seems to be no distinct and additional requirement for the intervention in interim relief

137 The possibility cannot be excluded that a creditor of the applicant may have an interest. 138 Cf Eurosport Consortium v Commission (above, note 48), para  15, where the intervener’s intervention was expressly limited to supporting the applicant’s form of order; Case C-245/95P Commission v NTN Corpn [1998] ECR I-401, para 24. The inability of the intervener itself to claim damages seems to have been one of the objections to the applications to intervene cited in Amylum, SICA and SIPEFEL, and Brother (note 132, above). 139 Case C-76/93P  Scaramuzza v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-5715 and 5721; Case C-155/98P Alexopolou v Commission [1998]  ECR  I-4935 and 4943. On the other hand, in relation to litigation arising from the election of staff representatives, each elector has an interest in intervening: eg Case F-105/10 Bomcke v European Investment Bank, 19 July 2011, paras 23– 25; Case F-127/10 Bomcke v European Investment Bank, 19 July 2011, paras 19–20. 140 Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-1, order of 31 January 1991. 141 Indeed, decisions allowing interventions in interim relief proceedings are commonly made some time before the decisions allowing the intervention in the main proceedings: see para 5.58 ff below.

465

5.35  Intervention

proceedings.142 The same applies where the application for interim relief is made in the context of an appeal (whether to the ECJ from a judgment or decision of the GC or to the latter from a judgment or decision of the CST).143 5.35 Proceedings for the interpretation of a judgment are ancillary to the proceedings leading up to the delivery of the judgment in question. As a general rule, therefore, proceedings for the interpretation of a judgment concern only the parties to the judgment (including interveners). In consequence, intervention in the interpretation proceedings by a person who was not a party to the judgment is not possible unless the interpretation requested relates specifically to another case between the intervener and one of the parties to the judgment (in which case the intervener must be allowed to intervene in order to protect his rights of the defence).144

142 Eg Radio Telefis Eireann et al v Commission (above, note 101), para 3; Case T-24/93R Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport NV  v Commission [1993]  ECR II-543, paras 14–16; Case T-43/98R  Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV  v Council [1998]  ECR II-3055, paras 33–34; Case T-44/98R Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Commission [1998] ECR II-3079, paras 38–39. Cf Cases T-7/93R and T-9/93R Langnese-Iglo GmbH v Commission [1993] ECR II-131, paras 16– 18. The Poste Italiane case (above, note 52), a decision of Judge Vesterdorf, contains passages (paras 57 and 60–62) suggesting that an intervener must have a specific interest to intervene in interim relief proceedings (in casu, an effect on the intervener’s ability to carry on its activities if interim relief were granted). On one view, that part of the reasoning goes just as much to the interest to intervene in the action and is not specific to the interim relief aspect of the proceedings. In Cases T-125/03R and T-253/03R Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2003] ECR II4771, paras 46–47, 50–51 and 53–54, and Case T-194/04R Tillack v Commission [2004] ECR II-3575, paras 30–31 (Judge Vesterdorf again), the intervener’s interest to intervene was related specifically to the effect on the intervener of the decision on the interim relief application. The logic behind that is questionable because, once the intervener had been permitted to intervene in the action, the intervener could not be prevented from participating in the interim relief proceedings on such a ground (the report of the latter order is somewhat obscure because it is unclear if the intervener had applied specifically to intervene in the interim relief proceedings or had applied to intervene in the action; it seems to have been the latter). The difficulty with an additional requirement to intervene in interim relief proceedings is that, as such proceedings are intended to protect the effectiveness of the Court’s final judgment, they relate necessarily to the forms of order of the main parties. Accordingly, any specific interest to intervene in interim relief proceedings is nothing other than a particular manifestation of the intervener’s interest to intervene in the action. On the other hand, if the intervener has not already become an intervener in the action when he seeks to participate in the interim relief proceedings, there seems to be no reason why an interest specifically in the outcome of the interim relief proceedings cannot be required. See further paras 5.59–5.60 below. 143 Case C-242/90P-R  Commission v Albani [1990]  ECR  I-4329, para  5: third parties whose appointments had been put in doubt by the judgment appealed against. 144 Case 9/81-Interpretation Court of Auditors v Williams [1983] ECR 2859, para 7.

466

Intervention 5.36

5.36 It seems clear from the cases that, to justify intervention, the result of the case must affect the intervener’s legal position,145 his economic position146 (that is the basic justification for intervening in competition cases)147 or, possibly, his freedom of action.148 The effect must flow directly from the precise subject matter of the dispute, which is to be settled in the operative part of the judgment, and not be collateral to it;149 it must be concrete, or real, and not abstract or theoretical.150 A mere ‘moral’ interest is not sufficient to support a claim to intervene. In Case 40/79 Mrs P v Commission151 an official of the Commission had divorced his wife and then died. His ex-wife claimed a widow’s pension under the Staff Regulations, whereupon the deceased’s mother applied to intervene in support of 145 See, for example, Consten and Grundig v Commission and Fruit-en-Groentenimporthandel FRUBO v Commission (above, notes 43 and 96); Case T-139/01 Comafrica SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-799, paras 25–26 (the intervener’s legal position was affected by the measure challenged in the proceedings and would therefore be affected if the measure was annulled). In that context such an effect is to be distinguished from the binding effect of the Court’s judgment. 146 See Producteurs de Fruits v Council (above, note 24) and possibly the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case (above, note 30). In the Ford cases (above, note 28), which were applications for interim relief made by two members of the Ford group in the context of two actions against the Commission for the annulment of a decision ordering the applicants, by way of interim measures, to resume the sale of right-hand-drive cars in Germany for direct importation by purchasers into the United Kingdom, two dealers of Ford vehicles in England and Scotland applied to intervene. The President rejected their applications on the ground that, having regard to the information before him, they had not shown ‘a sufficiently defined interest’ to be allowed to intervene. It seems that the dealers argued that, if relief were not granted, the Commission’s decision would gravely affect their commercial position. The President’s orders suggest that the applications were dismissed because the dealers did not establish with sufficient certitude that they would be so affected. An alternative view is that they did not show an interest above and beyond that of any other Ford dealer. The validity of that approach is extremely doubtful. The criterion required is an interest in the result of the case, not a greater interest than any other interested person. If two persons have such an interest, it is not reasonable to reject an application to intervene made by one simply because he has no greater interest than the other, the latter having chosen not to intervene. In competition cases, it is true, the class of potential interveners can be vast due to the economic interests involved; in Ford, for example, every car dealer in the United Kingdom could be said to have had an interest to intervene because of the economic or commercial effects of the renewed import of cheaper right-hand-drive vehicles from Germany. That is the defect in the use of economic interests as the guiding criterion for intervention. Nevertheless, once such a criterion has been adopted, it cannot simply be discarded in some cases, but not in others, because the class of potential interveners is particularly large. The Court, however, allowed the interventions in the action (order of 2 February 1983). 147 It was expressly adopted in, for example, NTN Toyo Bearing Co (above, note 26) and Case 26/76 Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG  v Commission [1977]  ECR  1875, orders of 30 November 1977 and 30 November 1976 respectively, where trade associations were allowed to intervene because the nature of their economic interest in the actions was the same as that of the applicants. 148 A M & S Europe Ltd v Commission (above, note 27). 149 As in the case where the intervener’s situation is similar to that of one of the parties but the judgment will not affect directly the legal position of the intervener; at most, the judgment will affect the intervener’s aspirations. Eg Cases T-97/92 and T-111/92 Rijnoudt v Commission [1993] ECR II-587, paras 22–23; Case T-87/92 BVBA Kruidvat v Commission [1993] ECR II1375, paras 11–13. 150 Eg the Rijnoudt case (above, note 149), paras 20–22. 151 [1979] ECR 3299.

467

5.37  Intervention

the Commission in her capacity as ‘subrogée-tutrice’, or supervising guardian, of the deceased’s two children, one of whom was in her custody. Her interest was alleged to be two fold: on the one hand she claimed a moral interest in ensuring that her son’s ex-wife was not recognised as his widow; on the other, the orphans’ pensions granted by the Commission to the children would be halved if the ex-wife received a widow’s pension. The Court held that the application to intervene was inadmissible in so far as it was based on her ‘moral interest’ because the judgment in the case could not decide the question of the ex-wife’s status. The same approach to the assessment of the interest required to intervene is followed in appeals brought before the ECJ against judgments or decisions of the GC.

IV

RIGHTS OF THE INTERVENER

A General 5.37 In general terms, the rights of an intervener are the same whether the intervener has intervened in a direct action at first instance or on appeal. Under the Statute, an application to intervene is limited to supporting the form of order sought by one of the parties.152 The rule indicates the subordinate nature of intervention: unlike a party to the action in a full sense, the intervener cannot determine the scope of the proceedings by introducing a new claim which he thinks ought to have been made;153 he can only support or request the rejection154 of the case already made by one of the parties with the authority of his presence in court and the ingenuity of the arguments he puts forward. He cannot in consequence make a claim of his own even if he has a separate right of action in respect of

152 Art 40, 4th para. Conceptually, the main parties (applicant and defendant) each have the role of dominus litis and define the scope of the litigation. An intervener does not have that role: see, for example, Vedial (above, note 7), paras 28–51 of the advocate general’s Opinion (although it should be noted that the position of interveners in IP appeals is different, as the ECJ found in paras 26–37 of the judgment). The EC and EAEC Statutes, arts 37 and 38 respectively, provided that ‘submissions’ made in an application to intervene were limited to supporting the ‘submissions’ of one of the parties. Under the ECSC statute, art 34, the intervener’s ‘submissions’ might also request the rejection of the ‘submissions’ of one of the parties. The word ‘submissions’ meant ‘form of order’: see Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke v High Authority [1965] ECR 716 at 717–718 and 722 (Advocate General Roemer). The difference in terminology (though not of meaning) is worth noting when looking at older cases. 153 See Case 114/83  SICA and SIPEFEL  v Commission [1984]  ECR  2589 at 2591–2592, order of 19  October 1983; Case T-139/98 Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato v Commission [2001] ECR II-3413, para 106; Cases T-5/00 and T-6/00 Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission [2003]  ECR II5761, para 418. 154 See below for the reading of the Statute so as to incorporate requesting the rejection of a party’s case.

468

Intervention 5.38

that claim155 and cannot claim any relief in respect of himself.156 As the Rules of Procedure157 put it, the intervener must accept the case as he finds it. The intervener is not, however, bound to put forward positive arguments in favour of the total acceptance or rejection of the case put by one of the parties. He may remain silent in regard to, for example, the applicant’s claim for damages and concentrate his arguments on the claim for annulment which accompanies it. Or he may limit the scope of his intervention to the single point which he regards as being decisive for the purpose of obtaining the relief sought or the one in relation to which his intervention would be most valuable.158 Naturally, the points dealt with in the intervention must be relevant to the claims in the action; if not, the application to intervene would be inadmissible because the intervener has no interest justifying his intervention if he intends only to ventilate a question which is not pertinent to the dispute between the parties.

B

Supporting and opposing the form of order

5.38 The forms of order of the parties to an action should be directly contradictory. To the extent that they are not, no issue lies between the parties and there is no dispute in relation to which the Court is called upon to rule. To intervene in support of the form of order of one party is therefore, in substance, to request the rejection of the other party’s form of order, and vice versa. In that sense the Statute permits the intervener to submit that the form of order of one of the parties should be rejected even though the Statute does not so provide in express terms. In practice an intervener always intervenes ‘in support’ of a party, even if the objective is to ‘reject’ the other party’s case. However, the phraseology of the Statute is not apt to deal with the situation in which an intervener finds himself 155 Case T-35/91 Eurosport Consortium v Commission [1991]  ECR II-1359, para  15; Case T-421/08 Performing Right Society Ltd v Commission, 12 April 2013, paras 184–186 (intervener claiming a broader form of relief than main party). In Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-939, paras 22–24, that limitation on the rights of the intervener was construed particularly strictly. The Commission claimed the annulment of a Council directive. The intervener (the European Parliament) claimed the annulment of one specific provision of the directive. That claim was rejected as inadmissible because it did not have the same object as the Commission’s claim. At first sight, on the basis that the greater includes the lesser, one would have thought that the intervener’s claim was within the scope of the applicant’s claim. It was, nonetheless, materially different from the latter. As explained in Case C-195/02 Commission v Spain [2004] ECR I-7857, paras 29–31 of the judgment (p 7888), it was not so much the difference in scope of the forms of order as the fact that they were based upon different and unconnected grounds that caused the problem (see further note 159 below). 156 As RP-ECJ, art 129(1) (applied to appeals by RP-ECJ, art 190(1)), RP-GC, art 142(1) (applied to appeals by RP-GC, art 213(1) and RP-CST, art 86(2)(f) and 88(4)) indicate. See, for example, Case C-227/92P Hoechst (above, note 107), para 35; Case C-235/92P Montecatini (above, note 107), para 79; Case C-245/92P Chemie Linz (above, note 107), para 34. 157 RP-ECJ, art 129(3); RP-GC, art 142(3); RP-CST, art 88(1). The intervener’s acceptance of the case as he finds it when the application to intervene is allowed is an inherent limit on the scope of intervention. The ancillary nature of intervention is also stated in RP-ECJ, art 129(2), 1st sentence and RP-GC, art 142(2), 1st sentence. 158 Eg Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, para 15.

469

5.38  Intervention

in agreement with part of one party’s case but not the whole of it. Despite that, it is well established that, in such a situation, an intervener does not have to repeat slavishly the entirety of the form of order sought by a particular party. Thus, where an action is brought for the annulment of a directive, an intervener may intervene in support of the applicant but confine its intervention to the annulment of one particular article of the directive rather than the whole of it.159 That involves the intervener in supporting the part with which he agrees and remaining silent with regard to the part with which he disagrees: the intervener may therefore support a party in whole or in part.160 A different question is whether or not an intervener can actively oppose the latter part. On the face of it, he cannot do so unless he intervenes in support of the other party, in which case he would find himself in the same dilemma (as far as part, at least, of that party’s case was concerned) of simultaneously supporting and opposing a party’s form of order. In practice, the Court interpreted the EC Statute liberally and allowed an intervener to support different points in both parties’ forms of order.161 As the 159 Cf Case C-195/02 Commission v Spain [2004]  ECR  I-7857, paras 20–30 of the advocate general’s opinion (pp 7863–7865) and 29–31 of the judgment (p  7888), where the United Kingdom supported only part of the form of order sought by the defendant. The Court said that Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-939, paras 22–24 of the judgment (p 969), from which the example given in the text above, of an intervention limited to challenging one article of a directive, is taken, is to be explained by the fact that the grounds relied on for challenging that one article were entirely unconnected with those relied on by the party challenging the whole of the directive. However, it should be noted that the cases on the ability of interveners to rely on grounds (or pleas) different from those invoked by the party supported by the intervener are not unequivocal. On one view, Commission v Council is out of step with some cases (but not others). On another view, it was the combination of a different form of order and different grounds that meant that the intervener’s submissions did not share the same subject-matter as those of the party supported by it. 160 As RP-ECJ, art 129(1), RP-GC, art 142(1) and RP-CST, art 88(4) now provide in express terms. 161 An intervention in support of both parties may give rise to confusion. In Case 258/78 LC Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission [1982] ECR 2015, order of 30 January 1980, the German government had originally applied to intervene in order to expound its views on certain legal aspects of the case without explaining which. In a subsequent telex it explained that it wished to support the applicant’s claim for annulment in relation to part of the decision attacked and to support the defendant’s case in relation to other issues. In Cases T-68, T-77 and T-78/90 Società Italiano Vetro SA et al v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, paras 36–42, the United Kingdom intervened in part in support of the applicant and in part in support of the defendant. The defendant asked the CFI to require the United Kingdom to choose which party it supported. The United Kingdom said that it would limit its oral submissions to supporting the applicant on one point and that satisfied the defendant. In Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany [2003]  ECR  I-3609, paras 35–45 of the advocate general’s opinion (pp 3617–3620) and para 24 of the judgment (p 3640), the United Kingdom’s intervention was apparently regarded with ‘amazement’ by the parties and the advocate general because it had intervened in support of one party but its substantive submissions supported the opposing party. The Court made no comment on the advocate general’s suggestion that the intervention was therefore inadmissible. It looks as though the intervention had been designed to advance one specific point that had arisen in the case. In contrast, in Case C-404/04P Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission [2007] ECR I-1* (the appeal from Case T-198/01), paras 141–142, the intervener supported the Commission but applied for the Commission to be ordered to pay the costs. Accordingly, it supported the Commission’s form of order in relation to the substantive outcome in the case and the opposing party’s form of order in relation to the costs order. As that was inconsistent with its support of the Commission’s form of order, it was inadmissible.

470

Intervention 5.40

current Statute takes over the wording of the EC Statute, the same interpretation applies to it. In practice, that liberal construction may benefit member states and EU institutions with the right to intervene rather than other interveners who must in principle demonstrate an interest in supporting the form of order of one side or the other, which would limit the possibility of both supporting and opposing the same party’s form of order. 5.39 Having said that, it should be observed that RP-ECJ, art  130(2) (d) requires the application to intervene to set out ‘the form of order sought, in support of which the intervener is applying for leave to intervene’. RP-GC, art 143(2)(e) is to like effect. That implies that the intervener must identify one form of order that he is supporting by his intervention; but the language used makes it unclear if the form of order in question is one that the applicant to intervene has crafted or one that he has taken from the pleadings of one of the parties (or inferred from the information available concerning the action because the application to intervene is usually made without sight of anyone’s pleadings). In contrast, RP-CST, art 86(2)(f) requires the application to intervene to set out ‘the form of order sought by the intervener, in support of or opposing the form of order sought by the applicant’. That suggests a form of order, formulated by the intervener, that either supports or opposes the applicant’s form of order but does not seek anything else. As if those variations were not bad enough, when an intervener’s application to intervene is granted, he may submit a statement in intervention but, if so, that must set out: ‘the form of order sought by the intervener in support, in whole or in part, of the form of order sought by one of the [main] parties’ or ‘the form of order sought by the intervener’, which is admissible ‘only if it is made in support, in whole or in part, of the form of order sought by one of the parties’.162 Despite the slight variances in language, the provisions dealing with the content of the statement in intervention seem to bear the same meaning in the sense that they permit an intervener to support all or a part of a party’s form of order. 5.40 Where one party has conceded a claim made in the other party’s form of order, there is no longer any issue between the parties, to the extent of the concession. As the intervener’s right under the Statute is, in principle, to support one party’s form of order (it being implied that that form of order is being resisted by the opposing party), the concession precludes intervention to the extent of the concession: the intervener has no legitimate interest in intervening in support of something that is no longer in issue; and, if the intervener intends to support the form of order of the party making the concession, he cannot support a claim in that form of order which is no longer being made. The intervener is expressly bound to accept the case as he finds it at the time of his intervention and therefore could not seek to oppose a claim that had been the subject of a concession before

162 RP-ECJ, art 132(2)(a), read with art 129(1); RP-GC, art 145(2)(a), read with art 142(1); RPCST, art 88(3)(a) and (4).

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5.41  Intervention

his intervention was allowed.163 The same seems to apply where a concession concerning the form of order is made after the intervention has been allowed for the same reasons.

C

The freedom to introduce new pleas, exceptions or arguments

5.41 Although the intervener must, subject to what has already been said, accept the action as it is defined in the parties’ forms of order, that does not mean that he is bound in every respect by the way in which they have conducted the action. It is common to divide the submissions in a case into pleas (often referred to, particularly in the earlier case law, as ‘grounds’), exceptions and arguments. The first are matters of fact or law upon which the claims made in the form of order are based. Exceptions are specific defences or objections to bringing the claim or action. Arguments are the exposition of the pleas (or grounds) and exceptions relied on. In general, an intervener is free to choose what arguments to advance, as long as they lead logically to the same result sought in the case by the main party whom the intervener supports; and that is so even if the intervener relies upon an argument that has been expressly conceded by the main party supported by the intervener or that is wholly inconsistent with that party’s case.164 The main problems in the cases concern the ability

163 RP-ECJ, art 129(3); RP-GC, art 142(3); RP-CST, art 88(1). See Case C-38/03 Commission v Belgium, 13 January 2005 (unreported), paras 7–9 (intervention inadmissible because it sought the dismissal of the claim whereas the defendant was not resisting grant of the relief sought in the applicant’s form of order). Where a party leaves something to ‘the wisdom of the Court’, that is not a concession of the point: see Case T-154/96 Chvatal v Court of Justice [1998] ECRSC I-A-527, II-1579, para 79. On differences that may emerge after the intervention has been allowed, see Chvatal at para 80. 164 Eg Case T-459/93 Siemens SA  v Commission [1995]  ECR II-1675, paras 21–23; Case C-360/93 Parliament v Council [1996]  ECR  1195, paras 20–22 (the intervener’s arguments were ‘radically opposed’ to those of the principal party that the intervener supported but were admissible because they were directed at achieving the same result in terms of the form of order sought); Case C-58/94 Netherlands v Commission [1996]  ECR  I-2169, paras 14–22; Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v Council [1998] ECR I-7235, para 36; Chvatal (above, note 162), paras 52–67 (different admissibility arguments); Case C-200/92P  Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission [1999]ECR  I-4399, paras 29–32 (arguments withdrawn by main party); Case C-248/99P France v Monsanto and Commission [2002] ECR I-1, para 56; Cases C-74/00P and C-75/00P Falck SpA v Commission [2002] ECR I-7869, para 156 of the judgment (p 7990); Case C-185/00 Commission v Finland [2003] ECR I-14189, paras 89–93 of the judgment (pp 14235–14237); Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission [2003] ECR II-435, paras 145–147; Case C-195/02 Commission v Spain [2004] ECR I-7857, paras 20–30 of the advocate general’s opinion (pp 7863–7865) and 26–28 of the judgment (pp 7887–7888). An extreme example can be found in Case T-429/13 Bayer CropScience AG v Commission, 3 December 2014, paras 110–112, where the applicant failed to support a particular claim with any arguments they were all provided by the intervener.

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Intervention 5.43

of an intervener to invoke pleas (or grounds) or exceptions other than those raised by the main party.165 5.42 In his opinion in Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority166 Advocate General Lagrange doubted whether the intervener could rely on pleas or exceptions (translated in the English text of his opinion as ‘submissions’ and ‘objections’ respectively) which are not relied upon by the parties because the parties must remain in control of the proceedings. On the other hand, the intervener could, in his opinion, raise new grounds or exceptions of the sort which the Court may consider of its own motion.167 In brief, therefore, an intervener would be restricted to the issues as defined by the parties in their pleadings and his only freedom would lie in the choice of arguments, whether of fact or of law, which he might use to support one side’s view of a particular issue, and in the possibility of raising a point which the Court would otherwise be bound to consider of its own motion if the parties failed to do so. The Court made it clear that an intervener can make use of any argument, even if it conflicts with those advanced by the party in whose support the intervener has intervened. As the intervener had not sought to introduce a new ground or exception, the judgment is, in other respects, not particularly informative. 5.43 In Cases 42 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority,168 which was decided a month after the Steenkolenmijnen case, the intervener did raise several exceptions relating to the admissibility of the action which were not put forward by the defendant. The Court accepted that the intervener’s right to make those points ‘cannot be disputed in the present case, since these exceptions or arguments seek the rejection of the applicant’s conclusions’.169 Advocate General Lagrange does not seem to have considered the matter in his opinion. It is arguable that the Court’s view was compatible with that expressed by him in Steenkolenmijnen on the basis that all admissibility points must be considered by the Court even if they are not raised by the parties; so the SNUPAT case would be an example of the second exception to the general rule that the intervener is confined to the dispute as defined by the parties themselves. But that was not in fact the reason given by the Court. In Cases 27 to 29/58 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux et Fonderies de Givors v High Authority170 the Court appears to have envisaged the

165 In Cases C-471/09  P  to C-473/09  P  Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission [2011]  ECR  I-111*, paras 117–119, and Cases C-47409  P  to C-476/09  P  Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission [2011]  ECR II-113*, paras 109–111, the argument seems to have concerned the characterisation of a ground: the same phenomenon could have been given more than one legal description. It is artificial to say that an intervener cannot give a different characterisation to a ground raised by a main party. The real problem arises where the ground is altogether different. 166 [1961] ECR 1. 167 Points which are ‘d’ordre public’ (translated as ‘public policy’) and which the Court cannot ignore, even if not relied on by the parties, if it is to discharge its duty to ensure that the law is observed. 168 [1961] ECR 53. 169 Ibid at 75. The word ‘conclusions’ means ‘form of order’. 170 [1960] ECR 241 at 258.

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intervener raising a point not open to one of the parties to raise but the judgment is in that respect too obscure to rely on as an authority. 5.44 As a matter of principle, the intervener should only be able to raise matters which the party he supports could have relied on had he thought of them. Otherwise the intervener’s subordinate role would disappear and he would become a true party to the action, which is not the intention of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure.171 The same line of reasoning would support Advocate General Lagrange’s view expressed above. On the other hand, what was formerly the second paragraph of RP-ECJ, art 93(5) (later the first paragraph and later still, in amended form, RP-ECJ, art 132(1)) has been cited172 to support the theory that new pleas can be relied on by the intervener, without any limit. The argument is based (more particularly) on the indication given in the Rules of Procedure of the contents of the intervener’s statement in intervention: RP-ECJ, art 93(5), as formerly worded, referred only to the intervener’s ‘grounds for his submissions’, from which it was inferred that the intervener was not constrained by the grounds advanced by the party supported by the intervener since, if the intervener was so constrained, there was no point in requiring him to state what the grounds relied on by him were. ‘Grounds’ could, here, have been intended to cover both arguments and pleas or objections which the Court could take of its own motion. The current wording of what is now RP-ECJ, art 132(2), RP-GC, art 145(2) and RP-CST, art 88(3) refers in general terms to: the intervener’s form of order; the pleas in law and arguments relied on by him; and the evidence on which he relies. That appears to suggest even more strongly that the intervener may raise matters of fact and law that have not previously been raised by the parties, without being limited to those points that the Court is obliged to raise of its own motion.173 Thus, in Case T-171/02 Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission,174 it was held that an intervener has ‘the right to set out argu 171 Cf Case F-7/07 Angioi v Commission, 29 June 2011, para 112, in which the intervener wished to raise a ground that it would have been contrary to the applicant’s interest to raise. RP-CST, art  110(6) used to provide that an intervener ‘shall be treated as a party, save as otherwise provided’. However, it is well-established that an intervener does not have the same status in the proceedings as a main party. Treating the intervener ‘as a party’ could have meant that the word ‘party’, where it appeared in the rules of procedure, covered interveners (unless otherwise provided) or that, in CST proceedings, interveners were more like interveners in IP appeals (as to which, see note 7 above). When the CST rules were amended in 2014, RP-CST, art 110 became RP-CST, art 88 and the former RP-CST, art 110(6) was removed. 172 See Vandersanden and Barav, Contentieux Communautaire (Bruylant, 1977), pp 473–474. 173 Eg Case T-37/97 Forges de Clabecq v Commission [1999] ECR II-859, para 92 (‘an intervener… may freely choose its pleas and arguments…’); Case T-92/11 Andersen v Commission, 20 March 2013, paras 31 and 41. 174 [2005] ECR II-2123, paras 152–153. The cases cited in para 152 are not obvious sources for the proposition set out in the judgment. In particular, Cases T-125/96 and T-152/96 Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH  v Council and Commission [1999]  ECR II-3427, para  183, is support for a slightly narrower, although not dissimilar, proposition. Case T-171/02 Sardegna is directly contrary to Case T-114/02 BaByliss SA v Commission [2003] ECR II-1279, para 417 and Case T-119/02 Royal Philips Electronics NV v Commission [2003] ECR II-1433, paras 203 and 212–213. It has been followed in later cases: eg Case T-277/06 Omnicare Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-1303, para 51 (an odd case in which the intervener raised a time bar that the GC did not deal with: see paras

474

Intervention 5.44

ments as well as pleas independently, in so far as they support the form of order sought by one of the main parties and are not entirely unconnected with the issues underlying the dispute, as established by the applicant and defendant, as that would otherwise change the subject-matter of the dispute … It is thus for the Court, when determining the admissibility of the pleas put forward by an intervener, to determine whether they are connected with the subject-matter of the dispute, as defined by the main parties’. That formulation supports the following: the main parties define the subject-matter and scope of the dispute in their forms of order; within the confines of the dispute, as so defined, the intervener may range freely in his pleas, exceptions and arguments. Accordingly, an intervener supporting the applicant may advance any plea or argument that, if substantiated, would lead logically to the grant of the relief sought by the applicant in the form of order or some part of that relief; and an intervener in support of the defendant may advance any plea, exception or argument that, if substantiated, would lead logically to the dismissal of the action, in whole or in part, sought by the defendant in his form of order.175 In relation to the defendant’s form of order, it should be observed that a defendant could seek the dismissal of the action on the ground of its inadmissibility only, or on the ground of its lack of foundation only, or on the grounds of both inadmissibility and lack of foundation, or could concede both the admissibility and the foundation of some part of the claim made by the applicant but not the rest of it. On the basis that the subject-matter of the dispute is defined by the forms of order of the main parties, the extent to which an intervener may introduce additional pleas, exceptions or arguments therefore depends upon the precise scope of the defendant’s form of order. If, for example, the defendant chooses to contest the admissibility of the claim but not its merits (or vice versa), can an intervener in support of the defendant’s form of order contest the matter (merits or, as the case may be, admissibility) that the defendant has 41–42 and 52–54); Case T-324/05 Estonia v Commission [2009] ECR II-3681, para 353; Case T-587/08 Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission, 14 March 2013, paras 535–538 and 717– 719. It does not appear to have been followed in other cases, in which it has been held that an intervener can introduce additional arguments but not an additional plea: Case F-103/11 CG v European Investment Bank, 10 July 2014, paras 143–145, Case T-533/10 DTS Distribuidora de Television Digital SA v Commission, 11 July 2014, paras 211–214; Case T-429/13 Bayer CropScience, 3 December 2014, paras 209 and 215–216. 175 Cf Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission [2004]  ECR  I-6717, paras 131–157 (an example of an intervener broadening the issues in the case); Case C-334/08 Commission v Italy [2010] ECR I-6869, paras 53–56; Cases T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08 and T-454/08 Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission [2011] ECR II-6255, paras 41–46. It is important to emphasise that the intervener’s liberty to introduce different pleas, exceptions and arguments is limited by the form of order in whose support he has intervened. An intervener cannot introduce arguments that are inconsistent with his chosen form of order: eg  Case T-2/03 Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v Commission [2005]  ECR II-1121, paras 48–55; Case T-237/02 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH  v Commission [2006]  ECR II-5131, paras 38–41. On that point, the decision in Case T-155/04 Selex Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission [2006] ECR II-4797, paras 41–44 (on appeal Case C-113/07P SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission [2009] ECR I-2207, paras 53–57), looks borderline, if not dubious. However, it can be explained on the basis that the decision contested in the proceedings could be defended only by reference to the reasoning on which it was based. The intervener’s plea sought to defend it on a different basis and was inadmissible for that reason. That was also the situation in Case T-237/02 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (above), paras 95–99.

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5.45  Intervention

decided not to contest? On the face of it, that would involve an extension of the scope of the dispute beyond that defined by the parties and would not, therefore, be permissible. The position is different where (for example) the defendant does contest admissibility, but only on a limited set of arguments, and the intervener decides to expand the scope of the admissibility debate. That does not alter the scope of the dispute because admissibility has been put in issue by the defendant. Finally in relation to the formulation used in Regione autonoma della Sardegna, the reference to pleas and arguments ‘not entirely unconnected with the issues underlying the dispute’ is unclear and possibly superfluous176. If the dispute is defined by the forms of order, the issues underlying it appear to be the pleas and arguments supporting the forms of order. Hence, read literally, the formulation requires the intervener’s submissions to be ‘not entirely unconnected’ with the pleas and arguments of the main parties rather than their forms of order. 5.45 There seems to be no difficulty about an intervener raising matters that the party supported by him could have raised but did not.177 The real problem concerns points that a principal party is barred from raising for some reason. There is very little recent authority on that question and, at the time of writing, hardly anything in relation to the current wording of RP-ECJ, art 132(2), RP-GC, art 145(2) and RP-CST, art 88(3). Before turning to the cases, it should be noted that a principal party may be barred from raising a point either under a rule such as RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 56(1) (which preclude a party from raising a new plea in law except in certain circumstances) or because a party has expressly or impliedly conceded the point. The two situations are quite different. There is no obvious reason why an intervener should be prevented from raising a point that, through an oversight, a principal party has omitted to raise and, as a result of the passage of time, is prevented from raising (although there is also a contrary argument). On the other hand, there is no obvious reason why an intervener should be allowed to reverse a concession made by a principal party before the intervention has been allowed (a concession made afterwards is different). As will be seen, a further complication arises in relation to admissibility pleas (with which most of the cases are concerned), by which is meant the admissibility of the action rather than, for example, the admissibility of a new plea or a document. In some cases, the principal party (for obvious reasons, the defendant) has actually conceded admissibility. In other cases, the principal party has failed to contest admissibility; and it is not clear if the situation is one involving an express or implied concession or a failure to spot the point. Where the admissibility point is one that the Court can take of its own motion, the reason why the principal party failed to take it, 176 The phrase seems to relate to points dealt with in paras 180–185 and 190–200 of the judgment. As explored in later GC judgments, the phrase seems to be nothing more than an allusion to the fact that, in an annulment action, the contested act can be defended solely by reference to the reasoning on which it is based and not by reference to substitute reasoning that the intervener puts forward. For an example of consideration of the question of the connection with the issues in the dispute, see Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava (above, note 51), paras 292–294. 177 Eg Cases C-241/91P and C-242/91P Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, Advocate General Gulmann, paras 23–24 (pp 754–755).

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Intervention 5.46

the fact that the intervener has done so, and the entitlement of the intervener to take the point are all irrelevant because the Court is not bound by any concession made by the principal party and would have to consider the point whether or not the intervener could, or did, raise it.178 5.46 In Case 253/84 GAEC v Council and Commission179 Advocate General Slynn suggested that an argument that is inadmissible when advanced by a main party (applicant or defendant) because it is contrary to what is now RP-ECJ, art 127(1) (at the time, RP-ECJ, art 42(2)) is admissible when advanced by an intervener; in Case 233/85 Bonino v Commission180 Advocate General Darmon suggested that an intervener cannot raise a fresh issue unless it is based on matters of fact or law that came to light in the course of the procedure.181 In Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH  v Commission and Council182 the intervener supported the defendants and raised an objection to the admissibility of the action which the defendants disputed but it was not necessary to consider the question whether or not an intervener can raise a point disputed by the party in whose support it intervenes because the point could be taken by the Court of its own motion.183 In Case C-313/90 Comité International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthétiques (CIRFS) v Commission184 it was held that 178 Cf Case T-106/95 Federation Francaise des Societes d’Assurances v Commission [1997] ECR II-229, para 123; Case T-193/02 Piau v Commission [2005] ECR II-209, paras 33 and 35–38 (intervener taking an admissibility point that the defendant seems to have conceded; Court takes point of its own motion); Case T-88/01 Sniace SA v Commission [2005] ECR II-1165, paras 37 and 49–53 (intervener takes admissibility point; defendant belatedly adopts it; Court takes point of own motion); Case T-253/02 Ayadi v Council [2006] ECR II-2139, paras 64–68 (like Piau). 179 [1987] ECR 123 (at 153–154). 180 [1987] ECR 739 (at 753–754). 181 Those cases must now be read subject to the current wording of RP-ECJ, art 127(1) (formerly RP-ECJ, art 42(2)). 182 [1990] ECR I-2945 (at 2970–2971 and para 18). 183 Other cases suggest that, as long as the intervener is supporting one party’s form of order, that party cannot prevent the intervener from putting forward arguments with which it disagrees (see note 164 above). 184 [1993] ECR I-1125 (paras 20–23 and see the opinion of Advocate General Lenz, paras 47–49). The CIRFS case has been followed in a multitude of later cases: Case C-225/91 Matra SA v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-3203, paras 12–13; Case T-266/94 Foreningen af Jernskibs- og Maskinbyggerier I Danmark, Skibsvaerftsroreningen v Commission [1996] ECR II-1399, paras 38–40; Case T-19/92 Groupement d’Achat Edouard Leclerc v Commission [1996] ECR II-1851, paras 50–51; Case T-88/92 Groupement d’Achat Edouard Leclerc v Commission [1996] ECR II-1961, paras 41–42; Case T-239/94 Association des Acieries Europeennes Independantes v Commission [1997] ECR II-1839, paras 23–27; Case T-243/94 British Steel plc v Commission [1997] ECR II-1887, paras 23–29; Case T-290/94 Kaysersberg v Commission [1997] ECR II2137, para  76; Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998]  ECR II-2289, paras 76–79; Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 and T-190/96 Riviera Auto Service Etablissements Dalmasso SA v Commission [1999] ECR II-93, para 25; tacitly in CaseT-184/97 BP Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2000]  ECR II-3145, paras 38–39; Cases T-12/99 and T-63/99  UK  Coal plc v Commission [2001]  ECR II-2153, para  51; Case C-107/99 Italy v Commission [2002]  ECR  I-1091, paras 26–30; Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland [2002]  ECR  I-2943, paras 3–6; Case T-146/01 DLD Trading Co. v Council [2003] ECR II-6005, paras 45–50; Case C-141/05 Spain v Council [2007] ECR I-9485, paras 25–29; Case T-458/04 Au Lys de France SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-71*, paras 30–33; Case T-60/05 Union francaise de l’express (UFEX) v Commission [2007] ECR II-3397, paras 43–47; Case T-471/11 Editions Odile Jacob

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5.46  Intervention

an intervener cannot raise an objection to the admissibility of the action; but any arguments directed to the admissibility of the action may be considered by the Court of its own motion. In that case, the objection to admissibility in question had been expressly disclaimed by the party in whose support the intervener had intervened. While an intervener may well be precluded from raising a preliminary objection to admissibility (which would involve the intervener in initiating a procedural step that ex hypothesi the principal parties had decided not to initiate), to preclude an intervener from disputing the admissibility of the opposing party’s claim or pleading would seem to be inconsistent with the SNUPAT case. The CIRFS and SNUPAT cases may be reconciled by saying that an intervener may raise an admissibility point as long as the party in whose support he has intervened has not expressly conceded the point or renounced any reliance upon it; but, if the point has been conceded or renounced expressly, the intervener cannot raise it, although the Court can do so if it is a point that the Court can and should take of its own motion.185 However, the general trend of the cases suggests that, in relation to admissibility points, SNUPAT no longer represents the currently accepted position. Curiously, the CIRFS problem disappears on an appeal and SNUPAT then applies because, if a main party has contested admissibility at first instance, has been unsuccessful on that point, and then appeals on the merits (but not in relation to admissibility), an intervener at first instance can contest admissibility in the context of the appeal.186 In some cases, the CIRFS SAS  v Commission, 5  September 2014, paras 35–38 (the point was nonetheless considered by the GC of its own motion). In Case T-95/10 Cindu Chemicals BV v European Chemicals Agency, 7 March 2013, para 32, the intervener was barred from disputing the admissibility of the application commencing proceedings on a pleading point (the supposed lack of clarity of the pleading). As the defendant had not raised that point, it was difficult to sustain that argument because, if the application was genuinely obscure, the defendant could not have pleaded to it. The intervener’s objection was rejected as being unmeritorious, which was a more logical ground for dismissing it. 185 That seems to have occurred in Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France v Commission [1998]  ECR  I-1375, paras 70–73. Thus, in Case T-11/95  BP  Chemicals Ltd v Commission [1998] ECR II-3235, paras 84–87, the GC held that the intervener had no standing to contest the admissibility of part of the action because, in reliance on two earlier cases, the defendant (who was supported by the intervener) had raised no objection to admissibility (accordingly the defendant had actually taken a stance on the question of admissibility). However, the GC considered it appropriate to raise the admissibility point of its own motion. The same happened in Case T-140/95 Ryanair Ltd v Commission [1998]  ECR II-3327, paras 21–23 (a plea of inadmissibility had been withdrawn by the party supported by the intervener). In Case T-290/94 Kayserberg SA v Commission (above, note 184), paras 75–77, the GC did not consider that it was necessary to consider admissibility of its own motion (the objection to admissibility was not a good point, which may well explain the GC’s attitude). In Case T-184/97 BP Chemicals (above, note 184), para 40, the GC also did not consider it necessary to consider the intervener’s objection to admissibility. It seems that the GC’s willingness to take such a point turns on its view of the strength of the point. The GC seems to regard the raising of an admissibility point by an intevener as altering the framework of the dispute when the point has not been raised by the defendant: eg Andersen (above, note 173), para 31, and some of the cases cited below. That may be so where the defendant has expressly conceded or renounced the point. 186 Case C-390/95P Antillean Rice Mills NV v Commission [1999] ECR I-769, paras 17–23 of the judgment. The professed reason for that result is that, in the appeal, the intervener is a main party, not an intervener. The position is now stated in express terms in RP-ECJ, art 178(2) and RP-GC, art 204(2) (pursuant to which the point is raised in the form of a cross-appeal).

478

Intervention 5.47

approach has been explained on the ground that an intervener is not entitled to raise an objection to admissibility that has not been formulated in the defendant’s form of order.187 However, a defendant’s form of order need only request the Court to dismiss the action. There is no need to specify the ground upon which the action should be dismissed. That explanation is therefore relevant only in those cases in which the defendant pleads specifically that the application should be dismissed as either inadmissible or unfounded (but not both) and the intervener pleads that it should be dismissed for the reason that the defendant has specifically declined to advance. On the other hand, that explanation of the CIRFS approach does not work if the defendant’s form of order just requests the dismissal of the action. To the extent that it implies that the defendant’s form of order must request dismissal of the action as being inadmissible and as lacking in merit as distinct heads of claim (for which there is no known authority), that explanation suggests that admissibility points are to be treated differently from substantive points when raised by an intervener (a thread that does appear on occasion in the cases for no obvious reason). The better view is that the precise formulation of the defendant’s form of order is not particularly relevant. The question is whether or not the defendant has expressly conceded admissibility. That may be done in the form of order (such as where it is limited to the dismissal of the action as unfounded) but need not be found there. 5.47 In Cases T-447 to 449/93 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del Cemento v Commission,188 a State aid case, the applicants had not contested the finding in the challenged decision that the measure in question was a State aid but the intervener did. The GC held that the intervention was to that extent inadmissible because the intervener was ‘altering the framework of the dispute as defined by the application and the defence’, contrary to the rule that an intervener must take the case as he finds it. That appears to have been a situation in which the intervener was seeking to reverse a concession made by the principal party supported by him (in addition, the concession had removed the need to consider questions of fact and economic analysis that might have been complex and difficult to deal with if they had been in issue earlier on in the proceedings).189 In Case T-243/94 British Steel plc v Commission,190 an intervener raised two argu 187 Eg the Riviera Auto and DLD  Trading cases (above, note 184), which appear to be based upon a misreading of the Kaysersberg case (ibid). The same appears in the ECJ case law: see Cases C-341/06P and C-342/06P Chronopost SA v Union francaise de l’express (UFEX) [2008] ECR I-4777, para 67, which is derived from a misreading of CIRFS and Matra (both above, note 184) adopted in Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943, para 5. The Chronopost case is particularly odd because the admissibility point in question was not one that would normally feature in the form of order anyway: see paras 62–64 of the advocate general’s opinion (pp 4795–4796). 188 [1995] ECR II-1971, para 122. 189 When a similar situation arose in Case T-119/02 Royal Philips Electronics NV v Commission [2003]  ECR II-1433, para  205, the GC said that the admission of the intervener’s argument would infringe the rights of the defence. In that case, the proceedings had been expedited and, for that reason, the argument had not been raised before the hearing. Where it applies, a breach of the rights of the defence is a better reason for refusing to entertain a new argument introduced by an intervener that is based upon matters of contested fact. 190 [1997] ECR II-1887, paras 67–73 and 92–97.

479

5.48  Intervention

ments going to the merits of the case (not its admissibility) that were held by the GC to be inadmissible because they altered the ‘framework of the dispute’. The first argument was inadmissible in any event.191 The second argument was held to be inadmissible as being a new plea. It does not seem to have related to any concession made by a principal party but was a point that had been overlooked. Of the three cases cited in support of that conclusion, two do not do so and the third, the Associazione Italiana case, has a different explanation.192 In Cases T-125/96 and T-152/96 Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH v Council and Commission,193 the GC took a different stance. It accepted the admissibility of a line of argument advanced by the intervener that had not been advanced by the applicants until they had been asked to reply to certain questions put to them by the Court. In fact, the GC decided the case in favour of the applicants on the basis of the intervener’s submissions and after having rejected the applicants’ arguments. Although described as a ‘line of argument [that] has a bearing on the pleas raised by the applicants’ and as one that did not ‘alter the context of the dispute’, the intervener’s submission was clearly a new plea that had been overlooked by the applicants and that they were precluded by the rules of procedure from raising by the time when it occurred to them (which seems to have been after they had read the intervener’s statement in intervention). In Cases T-186/97, T0187/97, T-190/97 to T-192/97, T-210/97, T-211/97, T-216/97 to T-218/97, T-279/97, T-280/97, T-293/97 and T-147/99 Kaufring AG v Commission,194 the GC expressly held that an intervener is free to choose its pleas and arguments (although in that case the new plea was one that the GC held that it had to take of its own motion even if not raised by a main party). One gets the impression that the Court will accept the admissibility of a point raised by an intervener (and not by the party that the intervener supports) if the Court thinks the point is a good one that the main party should have taken but not otherwise. 5.48 The case law was then thrown back into the melting pot by Case C-399/12 Germany v Commission, in which it was held (without reference to previous case law) that the scope of an action is circumscribed not only by the forms of order of the applicant and defendant but also by the pleas that they have advanced; in consequence, an intervener is limited to adducing additional

191 The intervener contended that the decision contested in the proceedings was unlawful because it breached the intervener’s legitimate expectations. That was something that could have been advanced in an action brought by the intervener but it did not support the applicant’s case for the annulment of the decision. 192 The following are similar: Cases T-371/94 and T-394/94 British Airways plc v Commission [1998]  ECR II-2405, para  75; Case T-395/94 Atlantic Container Line AB  v Commission [2002] ECR II-875, para 382; Case T-114/02 BaByliss SA v Commission [2003] ECR II-1279, paras 416–419; Case T-119/02 Royal Philips Electronics NV  v Commission [2003]  ECR II1433, paras 201–204 and 211–214; Case T-404/06P European Training Foundation v Landgren [2009]  ECR II-2841, paras 133–135 (an intervener in an appeal). In the first (which was followed in the later cases), the case cited for dismissing the plea as inadmissible is CIRFS although that case concerned objections to admissibility, not points going to the merits of a party’s case. 193 [1999] ECR II-3427, paras 182–184. 194 [2001] ECR II-1337, paras 134–137.

480

Intervention 5.49

arguments only.195 That appears to be unduly restrictive for a number of reasons. First, it appears to prevent an intervener from relying on exactly the same assertions as the main party whom he supports, should the intervener give them a different legal characterisation (in other words, as is often the case, the same set of facts is said by the main party to generate a particular plea in law and the intervener points out that those facts are also capable of generating a related plea in law: examples frequently encountered are facts that give rise simultaneously to claims of breach of the principles of legal certainty, sound administration and the protection of legitimate expectations). It is not clear why, in the case of a difference of views about how a plea in law should be properly described, there is any utility in ignoring the description advanced by an intervener or any unfairness or injustice in allowing that alternative description to be considered by the Court. Secondly, Germany v Commission also bars an intervener from raising a plea in law which is based on a fact asserted by the main party whom the intervener supports (perhaps also a fact admitted by the opposing party) but which that main party has overlooked. As in the first illustration, the effect of permitting the intervener to run the point opens the dispute up only in relation to the legal arguments put before the Court. But that is exactly what happens when an intervener adds legal arguments in support of a plea advanced by the main party. In many instances, the difference between adding a legal argument to an existing plea and adding a plea in law is merely a matter of legal technicality. It should also be noted that interveners are free to add factual as well as legal arguments in support of a plea advanced by the main party they support. That seems to be more intrusive than allowing an intervener to introduce an additional plea in law (where it does not expand the facts in issue between the main parties). 5.49 In the absence of a definitive ruling by the Court, the better view may be that the intervener can rely on all pleas, exceptions and arguments which the party he supports could have raised, even if the intervener would be prevented for some reason from relying on them in an action brought by himself,196 save (in the case of pleas and exceptions) where the party supported by the intervener has already expressly conceded the point or renounced any reliance upon it.197 195 7 October 2014, para 27. Not followed in Case T-500/12 Ryanair Ltd v Commission, 5 February 2015, para 62. 196 Bebr, op cit, pp 175–176, on the other hand, says that new grounds cannot be added by the intervener, giving as an example the case of an application for the annulment of a general decision brought under art 33 of the ECSC Treaty by an undertaking. Such applications were admissible only if a misuse of powers were alleged. If the application was based on another ground for annulment, its admissibility could not be cured if the intervener made out a case for annulment based on a misuse of powers. That is a powerful argument against the ability of an intervener to adduce new grounds because, on Bebr’s hypothesis, the intervener would in substance take over the role of applicant. If it can be accepted as far as admissibility is concerned (because, if the action goes, there is nothing to support the intervention) it does not necessarily follow that the same line of reasoning must be accepted with regard to the merits of the action. (See also Berri (1971) 8 CMLR 5 at 13–14.) 197 Thus, in Case T-447/93, T-448/93 and T-449/93 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del Cemento v Commission [1995] ECR I-1971, para 122, an intervener was precluded from contesting the characterisation of a measure as a state aid because the finding to that effect in the decision contested in the proceedings had not been challenged (that is, had been conceded)

481

5.50  Intervention

The fact that the intervener must accept the case as he finds it198 means that he is bound by any relevant concession made by the party he supports before his intervention has been allowed but does not mean that the intervener is precluded from raising a new point in his statement in intervention unless he can invoke RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 56(1): the intervener is not restricted in his intervention by any failure of the party whom he supports to raise a point before the intervention was allowed. It is only after the intervention has been allowed and the intervener becomes a party to the proceedings that RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or (as the case may be) RP-CST, art 56(1) applies to him. 5.50 That brings us to the convoluted set of facts in Case F-103/05 Pickering v Commission.199 The Commission had responded to the application by lodging a preliminary objection to admissibility. The Council had then been allowed to intervene in support of the Commission (its application to intervene had been made before the Commission decided to lodge a preliminary objection to admissibility). The Council lodged a statement in intervention canvassing the admissibility question only. The CST then decided to join the preliminary objection to the substance of the case and set a date for the lodgment of the defence. The Commission failed to lodge the defence in time (even after obtaining an extension of time for doing so) but the CST did not think that the procedure for obtaining judgment by default could be applied because the Commission had, after all, lodged a preliminary objection to admissibility. The CST asked the Council to lodge a statement in intervention covering the merits of the case, which the Council did. That produced a situation in which the only party with a pleading opposing the application on the merits was the intervener. The CST did not consider that, in the circumstances, the Commission could be permitted to make good its failure to lodge a defence by adducing new arguments on the merits of the application. However, there was nothing to prevent the Council from doing so. In effect, the result of that was to cause the Council and the Commission to by the main parties. In Cases T-133/95 and T-204/95  IECC  v Commission [1998]  ECR II3645, paras 103–104, certain arguments raised by the interveners were disregarded because they did not form part of the reasoning that lay behind the decision of the defendant (who was supported by the interveners) contested in the proceedings. They were therefore legally irrelevant. Case C-113/07P SELEX (above, note 175), paras 53–57, appears to be a similar case. In Case C-227/92P Hoechst and Case C-245/92P Chemie Linz (both above, note 107), the main party in question conceded a point after the intervention had been allowed but the intervener persisted with the point and was allowed to do so: see paras 31–34 and 30–33, respectively. In Case T-289/03 British United Provident Association Ltd v Commission [2008] ECR II-81, paras 152–154, the defendant had declined to submit arguments against a plea advanced by the applicant. However, the GC did not consider that to be a concession of the point because the defendant’s position was that the plea was irrelevant. Accordingly, two interveners in support of the defendant were not prevented from responding to the plea with their own arguments. On the other hand, one of those interveners could not contest a point that was not in dispute between the main parties: see para  155 (that was an instance of the intervener seeking to substitute different reasoning for the reasoning on which the contested decision was based). 198 RP-ECJ, art 129(3); RP-GC, art 142(3); RP-CST, art 88(1). 199 [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-101, II-A-1-527 (on the intervention point, see para 55). See also Case F-112/05 Bain v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-111, II-A-1-579, para 54.

482

Intervention 5.53

switch procedural roles: the effective defendant was the Council. Nonetheless, there seems to be nothing contrary to principle in that solution: a failure to lodge a defence in time is not taken to be a concession of the case (because an application can be made to set aside judgment given in default of a defence). Accordingly, if the defendant has lodged a preliminary objection to admissibility but failed to lodge a defence on the merits within time, it goes too far to conclude that the defendant has conceded the merits and resists the claim only on the ground of admissibility. The failure to lodge a defence in time is just an error; and there is nothing to bar an intervener from filling the gap in the case.

D

Production of evidence

5.51 An intervener can adduce additional evidence, not relied upon by the party supported by the intervener, that is relevant to an issue in the proceedings.200

E

Ancillary proceedings and applications

5.52 In view of the intervener’s subordinate role, he cannot initiate the various proceedings of which an applicant or defendant may avail himself, in particular, proceedings for interim relief.201 That does not prevent him from intervening in those proceedings.202 On the other hand, an intervener can initiate ancillary proceedings where they concern directly the position of the intervener, such as an application raising a procedural issue (not being a preliminary objection to admissibility),203 proceedings in relation to the taxation of costs204 and proceedings for the interpretation of a judgment.205 5.53 RP-ECJ, art 129(1) and RP-GC, art 142(1) provide that an intervener does not have the same procedural rights as a main party and, in particular, has

200 Case T-158/96 Acciaierie di Bolzano SpA v Commission [1999] ECR II-3927, para 133. The production of evidence by an intervener is expressly envisaged in the rules of procedure: see further below. 201 Eg Case C-329/99P(R) Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [1999] ECR I-8343, paras 86–96 (interim relief: the case for the grant of interim relief cannot be based upon an effect on the position of the intervener although that effect can be taken into account in the context of the balance of interests). 202 Cases 71/74R & RR Fruit-en-Groentenimporthandel Frubo v Commission [1974] ECR 1031; Cases 6 and 7/73R ICI SpA and Commercial Solvents Corpn v Commission [1973] ECR 357; Case 109/75R National Carbonising Co Ltd v Commission [1975] ECR 1193; Cases 113/77R and 113/77R-I NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council [1977] ECR 1721. 203 Case C-445/00 Austria v Council [2002] ECR I-9151 (an intervener applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 (formerly RP-ECJ, art 91) for the removal from the case file of a document containing legal advice that was for that reason confidential and whose disclosure had been unauthorised). 204 See further Ch 14, para 14.69, below. 205 Eg Cases 146 and 431/85 – Interpretation Maindiaux v Economic and Social Committee [1988] ECR 2003 (where the principal party supported by the interveners had not applied for the interpretation of the judgment); Case C-245/95P-INT NSK Ltd v Commission [1999] ECR I-1 (the intervener’s costs).

483

5.54  Intervention

no right to request a hearing. In contrast, RP-CST, art 110(6) used to provide that an intervener is to be treated as a party ‘save as otherwise provided’; but, in its current form (RP-CST, art 88), is silent on the rights of an intervener. It is not entirely helpful to provide that an intervener does not have the same procedural rights as a party, without explaining the extent to which an intervener’s rights are different (otherwise than by saying that an intervener does not have a right to request a hearing). Further, RP-GC, art 1(2)(c) defines ‘party’ as ‘any party to the proceedings, including interveners’. Hence, it is not possible to construe RP-GC, art 142(1) as meaning that, where the word ‘party’ appears in the rules of procedure, it does not mean an intervener. The result is that the limitations on the procedural rights of an intervener are essentially those derived from the case law.

F

Appeals and remission

5.54 An intervener in first instance contentious proceedings is automatically a party to any appeal from the first instance judgment or order206 and remains a party if the case is remitted by the appellate court to the first instance court. An intervener may himself be an appellant in the case of a decision rejecting his application to intervene (in which case, he is not, technically, an intervener).207 He may also initiate an appeal against an interim relief decision or a decision granting or refusing a stay of enforcement of an act of the Council, Commission or European Central Bank.208 In the case of a first instance decision that is a final decision in the proceedings or a decision disposing of the substantive issues in part only or disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility, an intervener other than a member state or EU institution may appeal if two conditions are satisfied: (i) he has been unsuccessful in his submissions, in whole or in part; and (ii) the decision affects him directly. An intervening member state or EU institution has a right to appeal that is subject only to the first condition.209 A third party to the first instance proceedings who intervenes in the appeal remains a party to the proceedings if the case is remitted to the first instance court.210 206 An appeal is served on all the other parties to the proceedings before the first instance court, each of whom is entitled to submit a response to the appeal if he has an interest in the appeal being allowed or dismissed: RP-ECJ, art  171(1) and 172; RP-GC, art  197(1) and 198. An intervener at first instance may for the same reason submit a cross-appeal: RP-ECJ, art 176(1); RP-GC, art 202(1). See the cases cited in note 4, above. The only interveners who might not have an interest in the appeal being allowed or dismissed would be member states and EU institutions, who do not have to demonstrate such an interest when intervening in the first instance proceedings and, accordingly, may not have one. However, it does not seem that the requirement to have such an interest was directed at excluding member states and EU institutions (see Ch 15, paras 15.6–15.8). 207 Statute, art 57, 1st para, and Annex, art 10(1). 208 Statute, art  57, 2nd para, and Annex, art  10(2), which provide that ‘the parties to the [first instance] proceedings’ may appeal, without excluding interveners. 209 Statute, art  56, 1st and 2nd paras, and Annex, art  9. See further note 4 above and Ch 15, para 15.7, below. 210 Case T-43/89 Gill v Commission [1993] ECR II-303, para 24.

484

Intervention 5.56

V PROCEDURE A General 5.55 Interveners are represented in proceedings in the same way as other parties.211 In consequence of the ancillary nature of intervention, an intervention becomes devoid of purpose (and a pending application to intervene is rendered otiose) if the action is terminated prematurely, by discontinuance or withdrawal by a main party (applicant or defendant, as the case may be), agreement between the main parties or a declaration of inadmissibility.212 5.56 An application to intervene may be made:213 (i) in an ordinary direct action, within six weeks of the publication in the Official Journal of the notice of the case;214 (ii) in relation to an appeal made to the ECJ from a judgment or decision of the GC or an appeal from the CST to the GC, within one month of the publication of the notice of the appeal in the Official Journal;215 (iii) in the alternative to (i) and (ii), but only in direct actions and appeals heard by the ECJ (not the GC or CST), before the decision to open the oral procedure in the case;216 (iv) in CST proceedings only, at any stage in the proceedings (including after the expiry of the time limit referred to in (i) above), if the President of the CST (or the relevant formation) invites the person concerned to intervene.217 Apart from (iv), there is no provision for the Court inviting a third party to intervene or even notifying a third party of the case so that the third party may decide whether or not to intervene; notice of a case is given to third parties through the publication of a notice of the case in the Official Journal.218 The time limits referred to above cannot be extended (otherwise than to take account of distance).219 Otherwise, there is no difference of practical importance between the procedure governing

211 RP-ECJ, art 130(3) (RP-ECR 130(4) proceeds to incorporate RP-ECJ, art 119, which requires representation by an agent or lawyer); RP-GC, art 143(3); RP-CST, art 86(4). 212 RP-ECJ, art 129(2); RP-GC, art 142(2). The CST rules of procedure do not contain a comparable provision but the same result follows as a matter of principle. 213 Ie lodged at the Court. 214 RP-ECJ, art  130(1); RP-GC, art  143(1); RP-CST, art  86(1). That includes interventions in IP appeals, which are classified for procedural purposes as ordinary direct actions. In CST proceedings, the time limit was four weeks until the CST rules of procedure were amended in 2014. 215 RP-ECJ, art  190(2) (which derogates from RP-ECJ, art  130(1)); RP-GC, art  213(2) (which derogates from RP-GC, art 143(1). 216 RP-ECJ, art 129(4) (which applies to appeals by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 190(1)). Before 2015, RP-GC, art 115(1) provided to like effect for GC proceedings. 217 RP-CST, art 89(1). As to the definition of ‘the President’, see RP-CST, art 1(2)(b). The person invited by the President must respond to the invitation within the time limit fixed by the President: RP-CST, art 89(2). 218 Case T-301/11 Ben Ali v Council, 11 January 2012, paras 79–80. 219 Not even at the request of a member state: Case 74/82 Commission v Ireland [1984] ECR 317, order of 22 September 1982. The extension on account of distance applies in the same way as any other time limit: see the Bactria case (above, note 95), para 10 of the order (and the cases cited there).

485

5.57  Intervention

interventions in appeals and in direct actions save two.220 First, in direct actions and appeals before the ECJ, as stated in (iii) above, an application to intervene may be made after expiry of the time limit running from publication of the notice of the case in the Official Journal but before the date of the decision to open the oral procedure; and, where an application to intervene is made in those circumstances, ‘consideration may be given’ to an application to intervene made after the expiry of the time limit for doing so but before the decision to open the oral part of the procedure. Secondly, interventions are normally initiated by an application made by the putative intervener but, in CST proceedings only, may be initiated by an invitation extended by the CST to the putative intervener, as stated in (iv) above. Such interventions by invitation may occur at any stage in the proceedings but they are procedurally significant because of the possibility that they provide of intervening after the expiry of the normal time limit for intervening. 5.57 Late applications (whether those referred to in (iii) or in (iv) above) will be considered before timeous applications and after discussion of the relationship between intervention in an action and in interim relief proceedings arising in the context of the action. The procedure governing intervention by invitation in CST cases is described solely in the context of late applications even though the situation can arise before the normal time limit for making an application to intervene has expired.

B

Intervention in the action and in interim relief proceedings

5.58 In the case of applications for interim relief, it does not seem to be necessary for an application to intervene in those proceedings to be made if the intervener’s application to intervene in the action has already been granted because intervention in the action necessarily means that the intervener is an intervening party in all procedural steps undertaken in the course of the action. On the other hand, if the application to intervene has not already been granted when the application for interim relief is made, or the intervener has not yet applied to intervene in the action, he must make two applications, one to intervene in the proceedings for interim relief and the other to intervene in the action itself.221 That may be illustrated by Cases 60 and 190/81R IBM Corpn v Commission.222 There the application for interim relief was made after the Court had allowed the intervener’s intervention in the first action, Case 60/81. A month later IBM began a second action, Case 190/81, and made a second application for interim 220 RP-ECJ, art 190(1) and RP-GC, art 213(1) incorporate into appeal proceedings the intervention procedure for direct actions, subject only to the derogation concerning the time limit for applying to intervene in RP-ECJ, art 190(2) and RP-GC, art 213(1). 221 It is not clear if the two applications can be made in the same document. That seems to have been done in the past without objection being taken, possibly on the basis that, if the application to intervene in the action were allowed, the application to intervene in the interim relief proceedings would be otiose. Technically, however, it would seem that the applications should be made by separate document (particularly so where they may have to be decided upon by different persons). 222 [1981] ECR 1857.

486

Intervention 5.59

relief. Both applications for interim relief were heard together. No order was made allowing the intervener to intervene in the first application, Case 60/81R, because its intervention in the action had already been allowed; but an order was made allowing it to intervene in the second application for interim relief, Case 190/81R, because its intervention in that action had not yet been allowed.223 5.59 An application to intervene in proceedings for interim relief is made to the judge dealing with the case.224 An application to intervene in an action is made to the Court but decided on by the President unless he or she refers the decision to the Court.225 Different persons may therefore have to deal with applications made by the same person to intervene in interim relief proceedings and in the action to which those proceedings relate. The decision of the judge hearing the interim relief proceedings allowing or rejecting an application to intervene in those proceedings does not bind the President or the Court (or chamber), which remain competent to decide on the question of intervention in the action.226 It is unclear what happens where there is, or may be, a conflict between them. It would seem that the judge hearing the interim relief proceedings is bound by a prior decision admitting intervention in the action on the basis that intervention in the action comprises intervention in all ancillary or interlocutory proceedings, such as those for interim relief. It would also be illogical to find that a person can intervene to protect his interest in the outcome of the action but not intervene in proceedings designed to safeguard that outcome. On the other hand, where the judge hearing the interim relief proceedings has first rejected the intervention, the putative intervener might seek to use a subsequent admission of his intervention in the action to reverse the judge’s decision.227 It is doubtful if that is possible, despite the fact that, as has been said, intervention in the action would appear to comprise intervention in the proceedings for interim relief, simply because the intervener would remain bound by the judge’s decision; the Court does not have power to reverse decisions of the judge made in summary proceedings heard by him.228 The position is different where the intervention in the action has been admitted before the matter comes before the judge in the interim relief proceedings: here the decision on the intervention in the action avoids the necessity for applying to the judge; if application is made, it must be allowed on the basis of 223 Separate orders for intervention in the action and in the proceedings for interim relief were made, on the same day, in Cases 43 and 63/82R VBVB and VBBB v Commission [1982] ECR 1241, orders of 10 March 1982. 224 Usually the President of the Court or one of the chambers. Eg Case T-108/94R  Candiotte v Council [1994] ECR II-249, paras 14–17. 225 RP-ECJ, art 129(4) and 131(2)–(3); RP-GC, art 116(1); RP-CST, art 109(6). 226 Cf Cases 228 and 229/82 Ford v Commission [1984] ECR 1129; Case T-201/04R Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR II-2977, para 35. As in Cases 76, 77 and 91/89R Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1989] ECR 1141, para 3, an application to intervene in interim relief proceedings is normally granted only in respect of those proceedings and not in respect of the main action. 227 Assuming, of course, that the decision on the intervention in the action is made before the hearing of the application for interim relief but after the judge dealing with the interim relief proceedings has rejected the application to intervene in those proceedings. 228 Any appeal goes to the appellate court (the ECJ or GC) or to the President of the appellate court in the case of decisions on intervention or the grant of interim relief: see Ch 15.

487

5.60  Intervention

the prior decision admitting the intervener to the action. There is, however, no authority for that and the point remains open to argument. 5.60 Thus far, it has been assumed that there is no relevant difference between the conditions governing intervening in the action and those governing intervening in any interim relief proceedings arising in the context of the action. If there were a difference, then intervention in the action could not be said to comprise intervention in any interim relief proceedings. In Case T-65/98R Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission,229 two applications to intervene were made shortly after the commencement of the action and, before any decision had been made on them, the President of the GC had occasion to consider them in the context of interim relief proceedings. He followed the conventional approach so far as interest to intervene is concerned but found specifically that the interveners had an interest in supporting the form of order of the defendant ‘in the present interlocutory proceedings’. Six years later, in Case T-201/04R  Microsoft Corpn v Commission,230 Van den Bergh Foods was cited as authority for the proposition that the interest of an intervener in interim relief proceedings must relate to the outcome of those proceedings. From that was drawn the conclusion that the intervener’s interest must lie in the effect on the intervener’s economic or legal position of the grant or refusal of interim relief. It seems from the context that that approach was taken in order to broaden rather than narrow the class of interested persons who could intervene, thereby ensuring that, in the interim relief proceedings, the required balancing of interests can be carried out in the light of representations from as many persons potentially affected by the decision on interim relief as possible. It is therefore possible for the class of persons able to intervene in interim relief proceedings to be wider than the class able to intervene in the action. However, it does not necessarily follow that the first class is narrower than the second. In particular, it does not follow that an intervener in the action can be excluded from intervening in interim relief proceedings heard and determined after his intervention in the action has been allowed. The normal rule is that intervention in the action carries with it the right to participate as a party in all the different stages of the action, including any ancillary proceedings, with the result that an existing intervener’s right to participate in interim relief proceedings cannot be brought into question in those proceedings.231

229 [1998] ECR I-2641, paras 25–31. See also para 5.34 above. 230 [2004]  ECR II-2977, paras 33–34. See also: Case T-520/10  R  Comunidad Autonoma de Galicia v Commission [2011]  ECR II-27*, paras 28–37; Case T-392/09  R  1. garantovana a.s. v Commission [2011] ECR II-33*, paras 11–19; Case T-462/12 R Pilkington Group Ltd v Commission, 11 March 2013, paras 14–22 (other aspects of the decisión were the subject of an appeal). In those cases, the interveners in question were not already interveners in the action. 231 Cf Case T-5/00R Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission [2000] ECR II-4121, paras 23–28, in which it was held that a party given leave to intervene in the action has ‘in principle’ an interest in interim relief proceedings (it should be noted that the case cited in support of that ruling is not in fact on that point; the order goes on to provide an alternative basis for accepting the intervener’s interest in the interim relief proceedings).

488

Intervention 5.61

C

Late applications to intervene

5.61 In ECJ proceedings (whether direct actions or appeals to the ECJ, as noted above, ‘consideration may be given’ to an application to intervene made after the expiry of the normal time limit for intervening but before the decision to open the oral part of the procedure.232 A late application to intervene must be made in the same form as, and the other parties are entitled to submit observations on the application in the same way as in the case of, a timeous application. A similar possibility of making a late application existed under the GC rules of procedure before 2015; and some comments about the experience under the GC rules of procedure, the rationale for permitting late applications to intervene and the difficulties in establishing the cut-off point (the decision to open the oral part of the procedure) are set out below. In the case of a late application, the President exercises a discretion when deciding whether or not to allow the application to intervene; but, if it is allowed, the intervener is limited to submitting oral observations at the hearing, if there is one.233 By implication, however, a late intervener is entitled to receive a copy of every procedural document served on the parties (subject to the excision of secret or confidential material) and may therefore participate in the hearing in an informed manner.234 The criteria to be applied by the President when exercising his discretion are not identified in the ECJ Rules of Procedure. Clearly, if the applicant to intervene must demonstrate an interest to intervene235 and cannot do so, or has not done so, there is no ground 232 RP-ECJ, art 129(4). That provision refers to the time limit specified in RP-ECJ, art 130 (actually RP-ECJ, art  130(1)). The time limit for intervening in an appeal is to be found in RP-ECJ, art 190(2), which derogates from RP-ECJ, art 130(1). Therefore, it could be said that RP-ECJ, art 129(4) does not apply in the case of appeals. However, RP-ECJ, art 190(1) incorporates the entirety of RP-ECJ, art 129 into the appeal procedure; and RP-ECJ, art 190(2) does not state that it derogates from RP-ECJ, art 129(4). Therefore, it seems that RP-ECJ, art 129(4) applies also to appeals. On the basis of Bayer CropScience (above, note 50), para 57 (a case under the former GC rule), an intervener cannot circumvent the disadvantages of a late application to intervene by attaching himself to a timeous intervention made by a representative body. 233 Further, no intervener (whether a timeous or late applicant to intervene) has the right to request a hearing: see RP-ECJ, art 129(1). For an example of a case in which there was no hearing and the intervener (who had made a late application to intervene) was not, in consequence, heard at all, see Case T-54/07 Vtesse Networks v Commission [2011] ECR II-6, paras 50–52 (a case under what was then the corresponding GC rule). 234 RP-ECJ, art  131(4) (which is not stated to be disapplied in the case of late interventions allowed by the President under RP-ECJ, art 129(4)). The order of 5 November 2008 in Case C-399/06P Hassan v Council specifically provided for the pleadings and other documents to be served on the intervener (who had made a late application). Under the pre-2015 GC rules of procedure, a late applicant did not receive any of the other parties’ pleadings but had to base his oral submissions at the hearing on the information contained in the report for the hearing unless the applicant or defendant provided him with information voluntarily (but they could not provide a later intervener with a copy of another party’s pleadings). In Case C-113/07P SELEX (above, note 175), paras 30–41, the ECJ took against the exercise by the GC of its power to order measures of organisation of procedure as a way of resolving the difficulties arising from the rules dealing with late applications to intervene. It is to be assumed that the ECJ would take the same stance in relation to its own rules of procedure. 235 As noted above, EU institutions and member states need not show such an interest. In Case C-403/06P Ayadi v Council, order of 30 March 2009, a member state made a late application to intervene which was allowed without comment by the President.

489

5.62  Intervention

for exercising the discretion in favour of allowing the intervention because the ability to give consideration to a late intervention does not override the usual requirements for intervening. The same applies to the requirement that the applicant to intervene supports the form of order of one of the parties.236 On the other hand, if the only defect in the application to intervene is that it has been made late, it would appear that the President’s discretion should be exercised in favour of allowing the application unless to do so would imperil the future conduct of the proceedings. Since a late applicant may only make oral submissions at the hearing (if there is one), it would appear that, ordinarily, allowing a late application to intervene would not have adverse procedural consequences unless, perhaps, the ECJ was confronted with a flood of late applications that, if allowed, would turn a relatively confined hearing into a potentially unmanageable one. Even in that event, however, it would be necessary to consider other factors, such as the issues to be debated at the hearing. For example, if a really serious and controversial issue arose and a flock of member states made late applications to intervene, the seriousness of the issue and the desirability of hearing the member states might well override any adverse effect on the organisation of the hearing. Quite a different point is the question whether or not a late application to intervene may have an effect on the decision whether or not to have an oral hearing. Clearly, if there is not going to be a hearing,237 there is no point in allowing a late application to intervene. Further, if a late application to intervene is made before any decision has been made as to whether or not there will be a hearing, allowing the intervention does not make a hearing inevitable and does not inculcate in the intervener a legitimate expectation that there will be a hearing.238 On the other hand, it is perfectly possible for a late application to intervene to be such as to suggest that holding an oral hearing would be desirable or necessary; and, if so, that would affect the President’s exercise of discretion whether or not to allow the intervention. Since allowing a late intervention involves an exercise of discretion, it would appear that a late applicant to intervene would be well advised to explain why the application had been made late because the reasons might be relevant to the exercise of discretion.239 5.62 Under the pre-2015 GC rules of procedure, an application to intervene made in a direct action before the GC (but not an appeal to the GC), after the expiry of the usual period for intervening but before the opening of the oral procedure, was dealt with like any other application to intervene but, if the intervention was allowed, ‘the intervener may, on the basis of the Report for the Hearing communicated to him, submit his observations during the oral procedure’.240 Although expressed in permissive terms, that really meant that the intervener was confined to making his submissions in the case orally at the hearing, hav 236 See RP-ECJ, art 129(1) and the discussion of that point in paras 5.37–5.40 above. 237 As might be the case under RP-ECJ, art 76(2). 238 Under RP-ECJ, art 129(1), an intervener has no right to request a hearing; and, under RP-ECJ, art 129(4), a late intervener may submit his observations during the hearing ‘if it takes place’. 239 If the reasons were not good ones, the applicant might be best advised to remain silent. The Rules of Procedure do not require any reasons to be given. 240 RP-GC, art 116(6) (pre-2015).

490

Intervention 5.63

ing received none of the pleadings in the case and basing himself solely on the summary of the arguments of the parties that was contained in the report for the hearing.241 It appears that the rule was construed so as to render inadmissible any written submissions on the substance of the case contained in the application to intervene.242 By comparison with what happens when an application to intervene lodged before the expiry of the time limit running from the publication of the notice of the case in the Official Journal is allowed, that was a severe limitation on the intervener’s ability to participate in the proceedings.243 5.63 It would appear that the ability to make a late application to intervene (albeit one made before the decision to open the oral procedure) was introduced into the GC rules of procedure in order to mitigate the rather draconian rule that an application to intervene must normally be made a few weeks after the publication of the notice of the case in the Official Journal (the period had previously been three months), failing which intervention was not possible. However, the reduction of the intervener’s right to participate in the proceedings to a right to make oral submissions (only) based (only) upon the report for the hearing was explicable, and justifiable, only on the assumption that the periods between the expiry of the normal time limit for intervening and the decision to open the oral procedure, and between that decision and the hearing, were relatively short: if late applications to intervene were to be contemplated, that should not be at the expense of the parties’ legitimate interest in avoiding any delays in the determination of the litigation caused by a late intervention. The reality was that the time lags between the expiry of the normal time limit for intervening and the decision opening the oral procedure, and between that decision and the hearing, were so considerable that the parties’ interest in avoiding delays would not have 241 Eg Case T-139/01 Comafrica SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-799, para 22; Cases T-142/01 and T-283/01 Organizacion de Productores de Tunidos Congelados v Commission [2004] ECR II-329, para 22 (the submission of written observations based on the report for the hearing was not acceptable without the leave of the Court: see para 24); Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2005] ECR II-1491, paras 41–44 (in that case, it was unsuccessfully argued that the late intervention was caused by unforeseen circumstances or force majeure constituted by another intervener’s withdrawal from the proceedings: see paras 45–57). A request made by the intervener for copies of the procedural documents would be ignored, although access to the file was not precluded: see Case T-52/00 Coe Clerici Logistics SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-2553, para 31. 242 That argument was raised in Case T-314/06 Whirlpool Europe Srl v Council [2010] ECR II5005, paras 58–61, and rejected only because the submissions contained in the application to intervene did not overstep what was required in order to establish the intervener’s interest in the case. It should be noted that that interpretation of the rule was unnecessary and not mandated by its purpose. 243 As can be seen from Vtesse Networks (above, note 233), if there was no hearing, the intervener would not be given any opportunity at all to make submissions in the case. Interveners had been known to abandon their interventions when they made a late application to intervene and then discovered their very limited rights to participate in the proceedings when the intervention was allowed. A superficial reading of Case T-368/94 Blanchard v Commission [1996] ECR II-41, para 128, might suggest that there could be a costs penalty in a late intervention. However, that was a case in which the intervener added nothing whatsoever to the proceedings and it was felt that, in those circumstances, it would not be right to require the losing party to bear the intervener’s costs.

491

5.64  Intervention

been adversely affected if late interveners had been treated in the same way as timeous interveners; and the shortening of the time limit for intervening, from three months to six weeks, made no sense in terms of maintaining the tempo of the proceedings. It would therefore have been better if the GC rules of procedure had been construed in the permissive way in which they were couched; and late interveners had been confined to making oral submissions only if their application to intervene came so late in the day (but before the decision to open the oral procedure) that treating them like timeous interveners would have risked delaying the proceedings.244 At the time of writing, it was unclear to what extent the experience of late applications to intervene in ECJ proceedings would differ from the experience of such applications in GC proceedings. 5.64 Two further problems arise in connection with such late applications to intervene: the lack of certainty regarding the termination of the period within which a late application may be made; and the absence of provision for situations in which the written procedure is reopened or there is more than one hearing. As to the first, the date of the decision opening the oral procedure (which closes the period within which a late application to intervene may be made) is not the same as the date of the closure of the written procedure245 and is not generally known to persons outside the Court other than the parties to the proceedings. Hence, potential interveners are not in a position to know when the possibility of making a late application to intervene expires. Although that is an unsatisfactory state of affairs, it is doubtful if it amounts to any abridgement of the procedural or other rights of potential interveners: any aspiring intervener has notice of the terms of the rules of procedure and therefore knows (or is to be taken to know) that the ability to make a late application to intervene can be cut off at any time by the 244 The absurdity of the situation as it existed before 2015 can be illustrated as follows: an application to intervene made one day before the expiry of the normal time limit for intervening attracted the full panoply of rights for the intervener if the intervention was allowed; an application made one day after the expiry of that time limit would, if allowed, have resulted in the intervener’s rights being reduced to making oral submissions on the basis of the report for the hearing, even though one year or more might elapse before the hearing took place. There is a technical reason for saying that a late intervener should be confined to making oral submissions when the application to intervene is made close to the decision opening the oral procedure: once that point has been reached, the written procedure is at an end and the remaining part of the proceedings is oral, not written (so far as the parties are concerned). However, the overall interval between the close of the written procedure and the date of the hearing is often so great that there is no practical objection to enabling a late intervener to participate fully in the proceedings. It appears that the prevailing view was that the GC rules of procedure could not be construed in such a way as to avoid the absurdity (see, for example, Microsoft, above, note 241, para  42); but that would not have prevented the Court from itself inviting a late intervener to make written submissions by way of a measure of organisation of procedure (see Microsoft, para  58; Selex Sistemi, above, note 175, paras 18 and 21; disapproved on appeal in Case C-113/07P SELEX, above, note 175, paras 38–39). The GC rules of procedure were amended so as to remove entirely the possibility of making a late intervention because of the GC’s desire to increase the number of cases decided without a hearing and because the report for the hearing had been reduced to a formal, uninformative document. 245 Cf Case T-52/00 Coe Clerici Logistics SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-2553, paras 27–30. RP-ECJ, art 129(4) refers to the decision opening the oral part of the procedure made under RP-ECJ, art 60(4).

492

Intervention 5.65

making of the decision opening the oral procedure. A late applicant is therefore at risk and the risk increases the more the aspirant intervener defers making the application. If the intervener is then caught out by the making of the decision opening the oral procedure, he must take responsibility for the consequences. In relation to the second problem, the purist solution would be that the period within which a late application to intervene can be made ends with the (first) decision opening the oral procedure, irrespective of any later decision reopening the written procedure. However, there is no particular reason why that interpretation should be adopted save that it is tidier than the alternative, which is that the possibility of making a late application to intervene could be extinguished and then revive at a later point in the proceedings.246 The reopening of the written procedure is a rare event;247 and the problem may therefore be regarded as somewhat theoretical.248 5.65 In CST proceedings, a late intervention may be made at any stage in the proceedings but only at the invitation of the President. The invitation may be extended only if the parties have first been heard on the point.249 The consent of the parties is not a necessary condition. An invitation to intervene may be extended if the invitee250 is ‘concerned by the outcome of the dispute’.251 Despite the difference in wording, it would appear that that phrase is to be construed in the same way as the phrase ‘interest in the result of the case’252 because, otherwise, it is difficult to identify the vires for the CST’s power to invite an intervention.253 The invitation must mention the notice of the case published in the Official Journal and specify a period within which the invitee must inform the CST that it wishes to intervene.254 Since the invitee may well not have applied to intervene because the notice published in the Official Journal did not put it on notice that the outcome of the case might affect it, it would seem to be good practice for the President’s invitation to state why it was thought appropriate to propose an intervention. If the invitee responds, within time, indicating a wish to intervene (which is effected by lodging an application to intervene),255 the President so informs the parties in order for them to indicate to the Registry 246 The ability to make a late application to intervene does not revive when the oral procedure is closed because, at that point in the procedure, there is no possibility of there being any further arguments being submitted to the Court unless it so decides. The fact that it may so decide raises the problem. 247 See Ch 2, para 2.61. 248 It seems to have surfaced in at least one case, however, but the matter was not pursued. 249 RP-CST, art 89(1). 250 As to the potential invitees, see note 12, above. 251 RP-CST, art 89(1). 252 See Statute, art 40, 2nd para. That phrase does not, of course, apply to member states and EU institutions; but RP-CST, art 89(1) does not create the possibility of inviting an intervention where there is no interest to intervene. 253 That interpretation is confirmed by the fact that invitees are not required to identify the circumstances establishing their right to intervene which, in the case of legal and natural persons, is an interest in the result of the case: see RP-CST, art 89(2), which cross-refers to RP-CST, art 86(2)(a)–(f) but not to RP-CST, art 86(2)(g). 254 RP-CST, art 89(1). 255 RP-CST, art 89(2).

493

5.66  Intervention

whether or not there are any documents that they consider to be secret or confidential and that they do not wish to be communicated to the invitee.256 If no such documents are identified within the time limit set by the President, the intervention is allowed.257 Otherwise, the President decides on the application to intervene by reasoned order and, where relevant, deals with any secret or confidential material (or else refers either or both matters to the CST itself).258 The reasons why those decisions are oriented around the question whether or not there is any secret or confidential material that might have to be withheld from the invitee are obscure. The application to intervene is served on the main parties only so as to enable them to raise the question of non-disclosure to the invitee of secret or confidential material. That appears to be the only issue before the President. At all events, the President’s order formally constitutes the invitee an intervener; and the invitee is then entitled to receive a copy of the pleadings in the case and lodge a written statement in intervention, like any other intervener, subject to any claims made by one or other of the main parties to confidential treatment of secret or confidential material.259 The statement in intervention must be lodged within a month of receipt of the pleadings; and the rules relating to its contents and subsequent steps in the case are the same as in a normal intervention.260

D

Timeous applications

1 Applying to intervene 5.66 The notice published in the Official Journal contains details of the case, in particular, the relief sought by the applicant and a summary of the pleas in law and the main arguments adduced in support.261 It does not give details of the defence and may, indeed, be published before the defence has been lodged at the Court. In consequence, the decision to intervene must usually be made on the basis of the contents of the application as set out in the notice and in ignorance of the defendant’s defence. The difficulties which that may cause to a person who wishes to intervene in support of the defendant’s form of order are apparent rather than real: unless the defendant concedes the action, his form of order will be precisely contrary to the applicant’s form of order.262 As has been seen, 256 RP-CST, art 89(3), 1st subpara. The question of confidentiality in relation to interventions is dealt with in greater detail below. 257 RP-CST, art 89(3), 2nd subpara. 258 RP-CST, art 89(3), 3rd subpara. 259 RP-CST, art 89(4), which cross-refers to RP-CST, art 88. As to the communication of pleadings to an intervener and the lodgement of the statement in intervention, see further below. 260 RP-CST, art 88(3) (applied by RP-CST, art 89(4)). See further below. 261 RP-ECJ, art  21(4); RP-GC, art  79; RP-CST, art  51(2). Those provisions are not worded uniformly. 262 Thus, in the Neotype Techmashexport case (above, note 182), order of 8 May 1987, the objection to the application to intervene (which was based on the ground that it was inadmissible because it was made before the defendant, in whose support the intervener wished to intervene, had lodged its defence) was dismissed, the Court holding that, in such circumstances, an application to intervene in support of the defendant is to be construed as being made in opposition to the applicant’s form of order and on the assumption that the defendant will oppose that form of order.

494

Intervention 5.68

an intervener is not bound by the arguments put forward by either party so the opportunity to intervene is not prejudiced if he is ignorant of either. It is the form of order that matters.263 5.67 If the defendant fails to lodge a defence, the applicant may apply for judgment in default under RP-ECJ, art 152, RP-GC, art 123 or RP-CST, art 121. It is therefore conceivable for an application to intervene in support of the defendant to be made before the lodgement of the defence and in a situation in which the giving of judgment by default is possible. In that situation, it does not seem possible for the intervener simply to base his intervention (in support of the defendant) on the rejection of the applicant’s form of order: in the absence of a defence, there is no form of order, other than that of the applicant, to support.264 An application to intervene in support of the defendant in those circumstances should not normally be granted unless and until the defence has been served because it may be rendered otiose by the defendant’s concession of the dispute, implied by his failure to serve a defence. Although intervention in support of the defendant may be nugatory if there is no defence, it is probable, but by no means settled, that it revives and there is no necessity to make a second application to intervene, if the defendant applies to set aside judgment by default. If the intervention has not been allowed before then, it would seem that the application can be made after the defendant has lodged his application to set aside, which initiates a proceeding distinct from that initiated by the applicant in the action. 5.68 Several persons may apply to intervene in the same application.265 Where the intervener applies to intervene in several, but not all, cases which have been joined, the intervention is admitted in relation to all,266 unless it would be inadmissible in relation to some. In the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case,267 which comprised several distinct actions joined by order of the Court, a German trade union sought to intervene after the time limit set for doing so had expired in all but one of them. It was objected that to admit the intervention would allow the intervener to intervene indirectly in all the actions despite the time bar. The Court dismissed the application to intervene on other grounds but it would seem, as a matter of principle, that if an application to intervene is made in circum 263 In Cases T-29 and T-30/90 Quantel SA v Commission, order of 23 January 1991 (unreported), where the intervener applied to intervene in support of the defendant before it knew what position the defendant was going to adopt, the application to intervene was allowed since the intervener had shown an interest in the result of the case and had applied within time. The implication is that the fact that the intervener may be intervening in support of a point that does not form part of the defendant’s defence is not relevant to the admissibility of the application to intervene. 264 In Pickering (above, note 199), the situation was different because the defendant had lodged a preliminary objection to admissibility so no concession that the applicant was entitled to judgment had been made. Under the ECSC  Statute the failure to lodge a defence did not preclude an intervention against the applicant: Berri (1971) 8 CMLR 5 at 11. 265 That happened in Case 25/59 Netherlands v High Authority [1960] ECR 386 and Case 246/81 Bethell v Commission [1982] ECR 2277. 266 Cases 152–186, 203, 204, 219/81 Ferrario v Commission [1983]  ECR  2357, order of 29 October 1981. 267 [1981] ECR 3211.

495

5.69  Intervention

stances in which it is within time or otherwise admissible only in relation to one of a number of joined cases, the application should be allowed as to that case alone. In practice that may mean that the intervener is in no worse a position than if he had intervened in all the cases but, on the one hand, the mere fact that the cases have been joined should not give rise to a right to intervene where one would not otherwise exist; on the other hand, it would be perverse to exclude intervention in the one case in which it is certainly admissible simply because it is inadmissible with regard to the other joined cases. 2 The application to intervene 5.69 The application to intervene should take the conventional form of a written pleading (title, submissions and form of order) and satisfy the requirements generally applicable to pleadings (such as being signed and dated);268 and, at least when lodged in paper form, be lodged together with the required number of copies.269 In most cases the application will be very short: the member states have often applied by means of a facsimile message (in the past, a telex message) a few lines long (but a reservation must be expressed about that mode and form of lodging an application to intervene, particularly when used by private parties).270 5.70

An application to intervene must contain the following:

(1) a description of the case; (2) a description of the main parties (that is, the applicant and defendant); (3) the name and address of the intervener; (4) in GC and CST proceedings, particulars of the status and address of the intervener’s representative (or, as the CST rules put it, ‘the professional capacity and address of the signatory’);

268 See generally Ch 9. 269 RP-ECJ, art 57(2); RP-GC, art 73(2); RP-CST, art 45(2), 2nd subpara (which applies by virtue of RP-CST, art 86(6)). 270 In Case 792/79R  Camera Care v Commission [1980]  ECR  119, the Registrar asked the intervener to submit a written application to intervene, but the reason for that was that the intervener had previously sent a telex saying that it wished to apply for leave to intervene: the telex did not therefore constitute an application to intervene and the Court wanted to know for certain whether or not such an application was going to be made. In Moksel v Commission (above, note 38) a company did apply by telex to intervene. On the other hand, in Case T-194/95 Intv II Area Cova SA v Council [1996] ECR II-343, Judge Schintgen rejected an application to intervene made by fax (an original version of the application having been sent after the expiry of the then time limit for intervening). Referring to what the IR-GC (now repealed) provided, he held that a valid application to intervene can be made only by means of lodgement of a signed original. At the time of writing, RP-GC, art 73(3) applied to applications to intervene because RP-GC, art  73 applies generally to the lodgement of a procedural document in paper form. Accordingly, a faxed application to intervene made within time would not be problematical as long as the signed original were lodged within ten days following the receipt of the fax. The same applies in ECJ and CST proceedings: see RP-ECJ, art 57(7) and RP-CST, art 45(2).

496

Intervention 5.72

(5) the form of order sought by one or more of the parties in support of which the intervener seeks to intervene (or, as the CST rules put it, ‘the form of order sought by the intervener, in support of or opposing the form of order sought by the applicant’); (6) except in the case of applications to intervene made by member states or EU institutions,271 a statement of the circumstances establishing the intervener’s right to intervene;272 (7) the intervener’s service details.273 5.71 The title identifies the action to which the application relates and the nature of the pleading (namely, an application to intervene) and may therefore cover (1)–(4) and (7) above.274 For example: In the Court of Justice of the European Union (or, as the case may be: In the General Court or Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union) Case C[or T or F]-1001/15 A B Applicant Against Commission of the European Communities Defendant Application made under Article 40 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice275 to intervene in Case C[or T or F]-1001/15 by: IJ of [address] represented by KL, barrister, of [professional address]. Service on IJ may be effected … 5.72 So far as the submissions in the application are concerned, where the application must show the circumstances establishing the intervener’s right to intervene the bulk of the application will be taken up with that. The rules used to refer to a statement of the reasons establishing the intervener’s interest in 271 The requirement set out in the text does not apply to interventions made under the Statute, art 40, 1st para. 272 RP-ECJ, art 130(2); RP-GC, art 143(2); RP-CST, art 86(2). It is no longer necessary to set out in the application to intervene a summary of the pleas in law on which the intervener relies. Accordingly, the problem that arose in Case T-324/05 Estonia (above, note 174), paras 291– 292, does not now arise. 273 RP-ECJ, art 121 (which applies by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 130(4)); RP-GC, art 77 (which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art 143(4)); RP-CST, art 86(2)(e). 274 If service details – (7) above – are not provided, service is effected by registered letter addressed to the intervener’s representative unless and until the defect is cured: see RP-ECJ, art 121(3); RP-GC, art 77(2); RP-CST, art 86(3). 275 Art 40 applies to all interventions, whether the intervention is made in the ECJ, GC or CST: see Statute, art 53 and Annex, art 7(1).

497

5.72  Intervention

the result of the case rather than a statement of the circumstances establishing the right to intervene. It does not appear that the change in wording makes any difference save that, in relation to EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, the circumstances establishing the right to intervene may include the question whether or not the case concerns one or more fields of application of the EEA Agreement. Interveners often explain at length the substantial points of their intervention but that does not appear to be necessary276 and those points are likely to be disregarded as being premature.277 The Rules of Procedure used to provide that the application to intervene should set out an indication of the evidence relied on by the intervener. At that time, there was authority that the application should mention the evidence relied on only if the intervener’s interest was doubtful, not if it was manifest.278 That suggested that evidence relating to the intervener’s arguments of substance did not have to be set out in the application to intervene.279 The Rules of Procedure no longer require the intervener’s evidence to be indicated in the application to intervene. Nonetheless, it would seem that, where the intervener’s interest to intervene turns on matters of fact, any evidence supporting the existence of that interest should be indicated in the application and, where in documentary form, annexed to it.280 It is essential that the application to intervene should set out clearly those parts of the parties’ forms

276 In SNUPAT  v High Authority (above, note 168), order of 20  January 1960 (unreported), the Court held that the intervener had to set up the grounds for his submissions in the pleading lodged after the intervention was admitted but not in the application to intervene. See also Case T-194/95 Intv I Area Cova SA v Council [1996] ECR II-591, para 7. 277 Case T-138/98 Armement Cooperatif Artisanal Vendeen v Council [1999] ECR II-1797, para 17. 278 The SNUPAT case (above, note 168), order of 20 January 1960. However, in Case C-179/87 Sharp Corpn v Council [1992] ECR I-1635, order of 3 February 1988, the applicant objected to an application to intervene in support of the defendant on the ground that the application did not indicate the evidence relied on. The Court dismissed the objection because the Rules of Procedure, as they then stood, did not require the intervener to submit offers of proof and documents complementing those already submitted by the parties (thus implying that the obligation to indicate in the application to intervene the evidence relied on did relate to the intervener’s substantive submissions in the case – at least where they raised matters of fact going beyond those raised by the applicant and defendant). 279 That was logical given that the arguments themselves would be contained in the pleading lodged after the intervention had been allowed. 280 Cf Bayer CropScience (above, note 50), paras 61–63. The need for evidence depends upon the nature of the facts supporting the intervener’s interest. An application to intervene cannot be dismissed merely because the interest to intervene turns on matters of fact that have not been proved where there is no reason to doubt the facts alleged by the intervener: see, for example, Case T-89/96 British Steel plc v Commission [1997]  ECR II-835, paras 19–21, in which the GC accepted assertions of fact made by the intervener even though those assertions were not accepted by one of the parties (there was, however, no evidence before the GC either way). In other cases, the absence of evidence may be critical: eg Case T-191/96 CAS Succhi di Frutta SpA  v Commission [1998]  ECR II-573, paras 35–38 (the assertions of fact were such that they could not be accepted at face value; they were also problematical for other reasons); Case C-2/11 P(I) Gesamtverband der Deutschen Textil- und Modeindustrie v Council [2011] ECR I-152*; Case C-3/11 P(I) Gesamtverband der Deutschen Textil- und Modeindustrie v Council [2011] ECR I-153*.

498

Intervention 5.74

of order that the intervener supports or opposes.281 If that is not done, the application is certainly inadmissible but the Court may, through the Registrar, ask for it to be clarified.282 5.73 So far as the form of order in the application to intervene itself is concerned, the rules do not require a form of order that is separate from the indication given of the form of order that the intervener supports (or, where relevant, opposes). Hence, the relief normally sought in the application to intervene is an order permitting the intervener to intervene in support of (or, as the case may be, in opposition to) the form of order sought by the main party in question. A claim for costs may also be included. 5.74

The following must be attached to the application to intervene:

(1) the authority to act given by the intervener to his representative (in GC proceedings, that applies where the intervener is a legal person governed by private law); (2) the certificate of authorisation to practise of the intervener’s lawyer; (3) in GC proceedings, where the intervener is a legal person governed by private law, recent proof of the intervener’s existence in law;283 281 Thus, in Case T-110/95 International Express Carriers Conference (IECC) v Commission [1998]  ECR II-3605, paras 31–32 and Cases T-133/95 and T-204/95  IECC  v Commission [1998]  ECR II-3645, paras 50–51, an objection taken to the statement in intervention (on the ground that it did not identify the party in whose support the intervener had intervened) was dismissed because (among other reasons) the application to intervene indicated the form of order supported by the intervener. RP-ECJ, art  130(2)(d) and RP-GC, art  143(2)(e) refer only to the form of order that the intervener supports but, as explained above, if the intervener intervenes in support of the defendant but before the defence is lodged, it is easier to oppose the applicant’s form of order rather than support the defendant’s form of order (which is ex hypothesi non-existent or unknown). Formerly, in the case of both the ECJ and the GC, the statement in intervention could in any event set out a form of order supporting or opposing a party’s form of order (see RP-ECJ, art 93(5)(a) and RP-GC, art 116(4)(a), as they then were) so it seemed illogical to limit the form of order mentioned in the application to intervene to that which the intervener supported. At the time of writing, only RP-CST, art 86(2)(f) retained that phraseology. In Case F-105/10 Bomcke (above, note 139), para  8, it was held that the requirement was essentially formal and that the question of the admissibility of the intervention could be revisited under what is now RP-CST, art  88(4). In principle that is so only if the statement in intervention departs from the application to intervene. 282 This was done in the Nungesser case (above, note 161) in relation to the German government’s application to intervene. The order allowing the intervention was made only after the German government’s clarification had been lodged at the Court. This was done within time so the question did not arise whether a clarification out of time would render the application inadmissible. 283 RP-ECJ, art 119(2)–(3) (which applies by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 130(2)); RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3) (which apply by virtue of RP-GC, art 143(4) through RP-GC, art 78(4)) and RP-GC, art 78(3) (which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art 143(4)); RP-CST, art 31 (which applies by virtue of RP-CST, art  86(5)) Those requirements are discussed further in Ch 9 below. In the case of (1)–(3), a failure to produce them does not render the application inadmissible. The Registrar may prescribe a time limit by which they are to be produced and inadmissibility would become

499

5.75  Intervention

(4) where relevant, any documentary evidence supporting the application to intervene.284 5.75 As long as any defect in the application to intervene is remedied within the time limit for intervening, the application is admissible: in the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case285 a defective application was cured by telex.286 Otherwise, in the case of certain formal defects, the Registrar is allowed to prescribe a reasonable period for an applicant to put his application in order.287 That procedure cannot be applied where there is a defect in the application to intervene that relates to the substantive content of the application.

an issue if that time limit were not complied with: see RP-ECJ, art 119(4); RP-GC, art 78(5) (which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art 143(4)); RP-CST, art 86(6). RP-ECJ, art 130(2) also provides that RP-ECJ, art  122 applies; but that appears to be redundant since, if any of the documents referred to in that provision is relevant, it should already have been produced by the applicant in the action. 284 That is provided for in RP-ECJ, art 57(4) (which is one of the common procedural provisions applicable in direct actions) and, elliptically, in RP-CST, art 86(6). The latter provides that the Registrar may set a time limit for putting the application to intervene in order if the requirements of RP-CST, art  45(1), 2nd to 4th subparas, have not been complied with. Those provisions relate to the annexing of a file of documents containing the evidence relied on, the annexing of extracts and the lodging at the Registry of a full copy where the document is lengthy, and the lodging by EU institutions of translations of procedural documents. 285 Above, note 30, see order of 21 January 1981. 286 If the applicant fails to lodge an application to intervene which does comply with the Rules of Procedure, within time, it will be rejected on the ground of inadmissibility (although, in the case of the ECJ, that would not prevent a second, late application from being made; and, in the case of the CST, that does not seem to prevent the CST from inviting the intervener to make a late application to intervene under RP-CST, art 89). In Case 60/81 IBM Corpn v Commission (above, note 101), the British government applied to intervene without specifying which party’s form of order it supported or rejected and to what extent, on the basis that member states have a right to intervene under the EC Statute (as it then was). The precise reasoning behind that assumption is not altogether clear. The furthest that the EC Statute (and now the current Statute) go is to give member states and EU institutions a right to intervene without showing an interest in the result of the case. There is nothing to suggest that, unlike ‘other persons’, they are not restricted to supporting the submissions (ie form of order) of one of the parties. From the Nungesser case (above, note 161) it seems to be the Court’s view that they are so restricted: it follows that member states must set out in their applications to intervene the precise object of their intervention. The Court did not rule on the British government’s application in the IBM case because it was limited to the substance of the action, which was dismissed as being inadmissible after a preliminary objection had been raised by the defendant. 287 See notes 274 and 283–284 above. For example, in Cases C-193 and C-194/87 Maurissen and European Public Service Union v Court of Auditors [1990] ECR I-95, order of 10 February 1988, for example, the intervener produced the mandate given to its lawyer but only parts of its statutes (see RP-ECJ, art 38(5), as it then was; the corresponding provision are now RP-GC, art 51(3) and 78(3)). Those parts were, however, sufficient to establish its objects, functions and general characteristics for the purpose of determining whether or not it had capacity to be an intervener. There was therefore no need to submit the complete text of the statutes. In Case C-156/87 Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission [1990] ECR I-781, order of 26 November 1987, the Court seems to have relied solely on the statement in one provision of the intervening association’s statutes, that its object was to represent the Community industry concerned and undertake defensive action against unfair and illegal practices, for the purpose of concluding that it possessed the characteristics of personality required in order to intervene.

500

Intervention 5.77

5.76 In principle, the application to intervene may be drawn up in any of the languages accepted by the Court because, until the Court allows the intervention, the intervener is not a party to the proceedings and therefore is not obliged to use the language of the case.288 The practice of the GC and CST is, however, that, if an application to intervene is made by a person other than a member state (in relation to whom a different rule applies) otherwise than in the language of the case, the Registrar will require the application to be ‘put in order’ (that is, resubmitted in the language of the case) before it is placed on the file and served on the parties; if that is done by the date specified by the Registrar, the date of lodgment of the application will be taken to be the date on which the first language version of the application was lodged.289 3 The handling of the application 5.77 Lodgment of the application does not automatically entitle the applicant to join in the proceedings.290 A decision has to be made on the application. The application to intervene is therefore served on the parties, who are given an opportunity to submit written or oral observations on it.291 Usually the parties are asked to submit written observations but that requirement has been dispensed with where 288 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority (above, note 166); Case 150/86 Union Sidérurgique du Nord et de l’Est de la France (USINOR) v Commission (case withdrawn, order of 28 January 1987). The intervener in the Steenkolenmijnen case was the Federal Republic of Germany but the Rules of Procedure in force at the time did not incorporate a provision such as the fourth sub-paragraph of RP-ECJ, art 38(4) and RP-GC, art 46(4), which allow member states to use their own official language when intervening in a case (which implies that they may use their own official language when applying to intervene). RP-GC, art 46(4) also applies to CST proceedings: see Statute, Annex, art 7(2). 289 PD-GC, para 109; IR-CST, art 8(6). It is not evident that that practice is consistent with RPGC, art 46(1) (which applies both to GC and CST proceedings): that provides that the language of the case must be used ‘in the written and oral pleadings of the parties’; but an applicant to intervene is not, ex hypothesi, a party at the time when the application to intervene is lodged. The likely explanation for the practice is that, if the application to intervene were not expressed in the language of the case, the Court would have to translate it into the language of the case for the purpose of serving it on the main parties. As PD-GC, para 109 and IR-CST, art 8(6) do not form part of the rules of procedure, it is arguable that a failure to use the language of the case is not a defect in the pleading. It simply gives rise to an administrative difficulty that is resolved by requiring the intervener to lodge a translation of the application into the language of the case. 290 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority (above, note 166). Accordingly, the party in whose support the intervener wishes to intervene should not communicate to the intervener any documents received from the opposing party before the intervention has been allowed (not least because those documents may contain confidential material): see Case T-89/96 British Steel plc v Commission [1997] ECR II-835, paras 15 and 33 (in that case, the Court ordered the interveners not to make use of the confidential information that they had received and to return all copies of the confidential material). 291 RP-ECJ, art  131(1); RP-GC, art  144(1)–(2); RP-CST, art  87(1). Under RP-ECJ, art  131(2), it appears that, in the case of applications to intervene made under the 1st or 3rd paras of Statute, art 40 (that is, applications to intervene made by member states, EU institutions, the EFTA  Surveillance Authority and EFTA states), written observations on the application to intervene must be lodged within 10 days of service on the party concerned of the application to intervene; and the application is allowed if no observations are lodged within that time. In other cases, the time for lodging observations is fixed by the President.

501

5.78  Intervention

the intervener applies to intervene in an application for interim relief and there is insufficient time to wait for the submission of observations in writing. In such a situation the Court (that is, the President or the judge hearing the interim relief application) decides whether or not to admit the intervention at the hearing in the proceedings for interim relief. After the parties have been heard on the application to intervene, the President (or judge) makes his decision and then continues with the hearing on the application for interim relief.292 At one time, it was the practice of the ECJ to dispense with written and oral observations on applications to intervene made by member states on the ground that they have a right to intervene (as long as the application is made within time) and that therefore giving the other parties to the case an opportunity to submit observations on such an application is pointless. That practice was very unfair to the parties because they often heard of the intervention of a member state at a late stage and at a point in the proceedings at which (at the time) they were barred from replying in writing to an intervener’s written submissions. The Rules as currently worded provide a solution to that problem because the parties may now be allowed to reply to the intervener’s written statement in intervention.293 Even so, the practice of not informing the parties of a member state’s application to intervene is not to be encouraged because it fails to take account of the fact that the opportunity of submitting observations on such an application enables a party to claim confidential treatment for any secret or confidential documents before the Court.294 5.78 The intervener has no right of reply to the observations of the parties on his intervention295 but the President or, as the case may be, the Court may allow a reply if the circumstances justify it. It is very rare for there to be oral argument on an application to intervene296 save in interim relief cases, when the application to intervene is considered at the same time as the hearing of the interim relief application. 5.79 A decision on the application to intervene is not necessary if the proceedings are removed from the register as a result of being withdrawn or discontinued297 or settled between the parties, or where the proceedings are manifestly inadmissible298 or have been declared inadmissible.299 Otherwise the decision 292 See the Commercial Solvents case; Fruit-en-Groentenimporthandel Frubo v Commission; National Carbonising Co Ltd v Commission; NTN Toyo Bearing Co v Council; above, note 202. 293 RP-ECJ, art 132(3); RP-GC, art 145(3); RP-CST, art 88(5). 294 See RP-ECJ, art 131(2) and (4); RP-GC, art 144(2) and (7); RP-CST, art 87. 295 Case 25/59 Netherlands v High Authority [1960] ECR 355. 296 Eg the Lemmerz-Werke case (above, note 42), at 719 (Advocate General Roemer). 297 Eg Case T-9/90 Van der Stijl and Cullington v Commission, order of 5  November 1990 (unreported). 298 Eg Case T-173/98 Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council [1999]  ECR II-3357, para  67; Case C-341/00P  Conseil nationale des professions de l’automobile v Commission [2001]  ECR  I-5263, paras 33–39; Case F-105/10 Bomcke (above, note 139), para  6; Case F-127/10 Bomcke (above, note 139), para 6. 299 Cf RP-ECJ, art  129(2) and RP-GC, art  142(2), which reflect past practice. Eg Case T-463/93  GUNA  Srl v Council [2993]  ECR II-1205, para  19; Case T-99/94 Asociacion Espanola de Empresas de la Carne v Council [1994] ECR II-871, para 22; Case T-73/97 British Shoe Corpn Footwear Supplies Ltd v Commission [1998]  ECR II-2619, paras 17–18; Case

502

Intervention 5.80

whether or not to allow the intervention is usually made by the President (in ECJ proceedings, instead of making the decision himself, he may refer the application to the Court).300 In ECJ proceedings, the decision is made by the President in the form of a decision where the application has been submitted under the first or third paragraphs of art 40 of the Statute; in other cases the decision is made in the form of an order.301 The reason for that distinction appears to be that, under the second paragraph of art 40, an application to intervene can be allowed only if the applicant has an interest in the result of the case, which may require the decisionmaker to set out the reasons why the application has been allowed or refused. In the case of the first and third paragraphs of art 40, the less formal means of a decision may be used because the issues arising from the application are essentially limited to technical questions (compliance with the time limit for applying; the form of order sought; and, in the case of the third paragraph of art 40, whether or not the case concerns one of the fields of application of the EEA). In GC proceedings, the position is slightly different. An application to intervene ‘shall’ be allowed by decision of the President when made by a member state or EU institution and the main parties have not claimed confidential treatment for their pleadings or evidence vis-a-vis the intervening state or institution.302 In all other cases, the President makes the decision (as soon as possible) in the form of an order.303 In those other cases, the President must assess, and reach a conclusion on, the intervener’s interest to intervene and/or a claim to confidential treatment raised by one or both of the main parties. In CST proceedings, the intervention is authorised by decision when no objection to it has been raised by one or other of the main parties and, in addition, no claim to confidential treatment of pleadings or evidence has been raised by them.304 In all other cases, the decision is made by reasoned order.305 5.80 It has been suggested306 that intervention is not possible unless the action has been accepted as admissible. Neither the ECJ nor the CST rules of procedure so provide; but such a provision was included in the GC rules of procedure in 2015. RP-GC, art 144(3) provides that a decision on an application to intervene shall not be given where the defendant has lodged a plea of inadmissibility or lack of competence pursuant to RP-GC, art 130(1). In that event, a decision on the intervention is deferred until after the plea has been rejected or the decision T-2/13 CFE-CGC France Telecom-Orange v Commission, 3 April 2014, para 55; Case T-7/13 Association pour la defense de l’epargne et de l’actionnariat des salaries de France TelecomOrange (ADEAS) v Commission, 3 April 2014, para 45. 300 RP-ECJ, art 131(3); RP-GC, art 144(4)–(5); RP-CST, art 87(2)–(3). It is apprehended that, in ECJ proceedings, an application would be referred to the Court by the President if it gave rise to some point of principle requiring clarification. For an example of such a reference see Case T-84/91 Meskens v European Parliament [1992] ECR II-1565 (at that time, the GC rules of procedure also provided that the President could make the decision himself or refer it to the GC). 301 RP-ECJ, art 131(2). 302 RP-GC, art 144(4). 303 RP-GC, art 144(5). 304 RP-GC, art 87(2). 305 RP-GC, art 87(3). 306 See Bebr, op cit, p 171, and Vandersanden and Barav, op cit, p 461, footnote 77.

503

5.81  Intervention

on the plea has been reserved to the final judgment. Before commenting further on the matter, it should be noted that RP-GC, art  144(3) is relevant only if a preliminary objection to admissibility (or competence) has been lodged by the defendant before the GC has had an opportunity to decide on the application to intervene. RP-GC, art 144(3) does not envisage, or require, that a decision on the application to intervene should be deferred until such time as the defendant has made it clear that no preliminary objection is going to be made by it. Nor does RP-GC, art 144(3) provide that no decision on an application to intervene can or should be made until the admissibility of the action has been determined or conceded. Its application is limited specifically to the situation that arises where the defendant raises a preliminary objection; and it does not apply even to cases in which the inadmissibility of the action is manifest. 5.81 There seems to be no reason at all why an application to intervene should not be accepted unless and until the admissibility of the action has been settled (and, as noted above, not even RP-GC, art 144(3) is to that effect), given that the intervener may himself raise arguments against the admissibility of the action307 or, where he supports the applicant, will justifiably wish to contest the suggestion that the action is inadmissible. In addition, since admissibility is very often decided at the same time as the merits of the case, the result of that approach would be to exclude intervention entirely. On the other hand, there is no point in ruling on an application to intervene if the action is clearly inadmissible.308 Accordingly, the better view is that intervention is always possible before the action has been found to be admissible but there is no utility in deciding on an application to intervene if the action is clearly inadmissible; and there is no reason at all to defer a decision on admissibility in a case of manifest inadmissibility merely because there is a pending application to intervene. If it is not clearly inadmissible, the intervener may well have something useful to add to the proceedings. Therefore, his application can and should be dealt with before the admissibility of the action is considered.309 There are, of course, cases where the intervener states expressly that he seeks to challenge only the merits of a party’s claim or defence, not its admissibility. In such cases the intervener must be taken to have waived any objection to admissibility and it is right to restrict intervention to the substance of the case. On the other hand, where the intervener does not

307 See the SNUPAT case (above, note 168) (but see also CIRFS and the cases following it, above, note 184, in relation to new objections to admissibility raised by an intervener). 308 Eg Case T-463/93 GUNA Srl v Council [1993] ECR II-1205, para 19; Case C-341/00P Conseil nationale des professions de l’automobile v Commission [2001]  ECR  I-5263, paras 33–39 (the reason given in para 36 is patently incorrect unless the ECJ was thinking only of cases of manifest inadmissibility). Eg Case T-45/08 Transportes Evaristo Molina SA v Commission [2008]  ECR II-265*, para  36, in which Conseil nationale des professions de l’automobile was followed and no decision was made on the application to intervene because the action was inadmissible anyway (the disappointed intervener then had to intervene in the subsequent appeal – Case C-36/09P Transportes Evaristo Molina SA v Commission [2010] ECR I-145* – which does not, however, detract from the appropriateness of not deciding on the application to intervene at first instance where the action is inadmissible). 309 As happened in, for example, Case T-138/98 Armement Cooperatif Artisanal Vendeen v Council [1999] ECR II-1797.

504

Intervention 5.82

expressly waive any objection to admissibility, he has every interest to be heard if, for example, the Court decides to deal with admissibility before turning to the merits of the action. It does not seem that the intervener can himself raise an objection to admissibility under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83(1) because the role of intervention does not seem to entitle an intervener to take positive steps in the proceedings.310 When a preliminary objection has been made there is no point in excluding the intervener from that part of the proceedings. The object of proceedings under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 and RP-CST, art 83, which is to settle the issue of admissibility between the parties before turning to the merits, would then be lost. The right of the intervener to challenge admissibility, which is now well established, seems to carry with it the right to be heard if a preliminary objection to admissibility is raised and, possibly, a right to reopen the question of admissibility if the preliminary objection is rejected without the intervener being heard.311 It seems to be the Court’s practice to hear the intervener at the preliminary objection stage unless he evinces an intention only to intervene in regard to the merits.312 5.82 It remains to consider the rationale for RP-GC, art 144(3). It appears that that rule was introduced because the GC considered that it was appropriate not to rule on an application to intervene for as long as it had not ruled on a plea of inadmissibility or lack of competence raised under RP-GC, art 130(1).313 The GC had arrived at that conclusion on the basis of the ECJ’s case law. In fact, of the cases referred to by the GC (both cases of manifest inadmissibility) the ECJ had held in the first that there was nothing to prevent the GC from finding an action to be inadmissible before an application to intervene had been allowed; and, in the second, the ECJ had held that there was no need to rule on various applications to intervene because the action was manifestly inadmissible.314 Neither conclusion is surprising in a case of manifest inadmissibility; but neither justifies the inference that it is inappropriate to rule on an application to intervene while a preliminary objection is pending. While RP-GC, art 144(3) obviously states the 310 There does not, however, appear to be any authority on that point save the provision in RP-ECJ, art 129(2) and RP-GC, art 142(2) that intervention is ‘ancillary’ to the main proceedings and the CIRFS case (above, note184) per Advocate General Lenz. If the CIRFS and Matra cases (above, note 184) are to be understood as precluding the raising of an admissibility point by an intervener even where the party supported by the intervener has unintentionally failed to do so, it seems to follow necessarily that an intervener cannot raise a preliminary objection to admissibility. 311 Sed quaere if admissibility is settled before the date of intervention because the intervener must accept the case as he finds it: see RP-ECJ, art 129(3); RP-GC, art 142(3); RP-CST, art 88(1). 312 See, for example, Case 60/81 IBM Corpn v Commission [1981] ECR 2639; Case 45/81 Moksel v Commission [1982]  ECR  1129; Case T-138/98 Armement Cooperatif Artisanal Vendeen v Council [1999] ECR II-1797, para 22; the Bactria case (above, note 95), para 15 of the order. 313 See the GC’s commentary on its Draft Rules of Procedure under art 144. The GC associated its view with the provision in what is now RP-GC, art 144(5), that preliminary objections should be decided ‘as soon as possible’, implying that, as the preliminary objection would be disposed of swiftly, there would be no delay in dealing with the application to intervene (should the preliminary objection be dismissed or joined to the substance of the case). 314 Conseil nationale des professions de l’automobile (above, note 308), para 37; Case C-406/01 Germany v Parliament and Council [2002] ECR I-4561, para 24.

505

5.83  Intervention

position so far as GC proceedings are concerned, there is no reason why it should be regarded as indicative of the position in practice in ECJ and CST proceedings. 5.83 The Court’s practice is to decline to exploit the need to make a decision on an application to intervene for the purpose of making a ruling on the admissibility of the action.315 In the case of applications to intervene in cases before the GC and the CST, the order made by the President must be reasoned if it dismisses the application316 because an appeal lies from such an order to the ECJ or, as the case may be, to the GC.317 The appeal can be brought only by the applicant to intervene and it must be lodged within two weeks of notification to that applicant of the decision dismissing the application.318 The appeal is heard and determined in summary proceedings before the President of the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC.319 No appeal lies from the GC or CST against a decision allowing an application to intervene. Where the order dismisses the application to intervene, it should contain an order for costs.320 Where the application to intervene is granted, the intervener is provided with a copy of every procedural document served on the main parties (subject to there being any application for confidential treatment – considered below) and is given the opportunity to lodge a statement in intervention.321 The procedural documents referred to are the pleadings and documentary evidence in the case. If the application to intervene is withdrawn, it is removed from the register and a decision is made on the costs incurred by it.322 4 Written observations on an application to intervene 5.84 No formal requirements are laid down for the written observations on the application to intervene but they should in principle comply with the general rules applicable to pleadings.323 Observations have often been submitted in the form of a fax message (and, further in the past, a telex),324 although that does not appear to be appropriate given that, at the very least, written observations ought to bear the signature of the representative of the party submitting them, like any other pleading. In general, written observations should follow the usual format for pleadings (title, submissions, form of order), at least where the written observations object to the application or seek to impose some restriction on the intervener’s rights as intervener. If the intervention is wholly unopposed, there seems to be no objection to expressing the written observations informally, as a simple statement that the main party in question does not oppose the application to intervene. 315 Eg Case T-191/96 CAS Succhi di Frutta SpA v Commission [1998] ECR I-573, para 27. 316 RP-GC, art  144(6); RP-CST, art  87(3). The absence of reasons would ordinarily lead to the quashing of the decision on appeal. In practice, orders allowing an application to intervene need not give any reasons but often do. 317 Statute, art 57, 1st para and Annex, art 10(1). 318 Ibid. 319 Statute, art 57, 3rd para and Annex, art 10(3). See further Ch 15, paras 15.30–15.32. 320 Cf RP-GC, art 144(6). 321 RP-ECJ, art 131(4) and 132(1); RP-GC, art 144(7) and 145(1); RP-CST, art 88(2)–(3). 322 Cf RP-GC, art 144(8). 323 See Ch 9, para 9.11 ff, below. 324 Eg Case 60/81 IBM Corpn v Commission (above, note 312).

506

Intervention 5.86

5.85 Where the application to intervene is opposed, some degree of formality is required in the written observations. The title can follow the style of the title used in, for example, the application but must specify on the first page what the pleading is (namely, ‘written observations on the application to intervene made by IJ, submitted by [insert the name of the main party in question]’). Service details and the description of the party’s representative, which should appear in any event in the application or defence, need not be reproduced unless the main party lodging the written observations is the defendant and the defence has not yet been lodged (in which case, the written observations will be the first pleadings in the case lodged by the defendant and those details will therefore have to be provided). The submissions will normally focus on the reasons why the application to intervene is opposed (such as the intervener’s lack of interest). The form of order will (ex hypothesi) specify an order dismissing the application to intervene and costs; but may also claim confidential treatment for the pleadings or evidence in the case (where appropriate) should the intervention be allowed (see below). 5 Confidentiality 5.86 If the intervention is allowed, the intervener receives a copy of every document served on the parties (save in ECJ proceedings in which the application to intervene was lodged after the expiry of the period running from publication of the notice of the case in the Official Journal)325; but the President may withhold documents which are secret or confidential if one of the parties so requests.326 A request for confidential treatment of documents already before the Court cannot be made as against an intervener after his application to intervene has been allowed.327 In consequence, a party (whether applicant or defendant) who wishes to keep certain secret or confidential material from an intervener must claim confidential treatment either by application when the secret or confidential document is lodged at the 325 See para 5.61 above. 326 RP-ECJ, art  131(2) and (4); RP-GC, art  144(5) and (7); RP-CST, art  87. See VBVB and VBBB  v Commission (above, note 223), order of 10  March 1982: in the order allowing the intervention, the Court asked one of the applicants (which had claimed confidential treatment) to inform the Court which documents should be given confidential treatment and to provide the reasons therefor (in the event, at that stage there were no documents on the file which had to be kept secret from the intervener). In Case C-136/89 Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd v Commission, order of 4 July 1990 (unreported) and Case C-66/90 Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV and PTT Post BV v Commission (reported sub nom Cases C-48 and C-66/90 Netherlands v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-565), order of 5  December 1990 (unreported), the applicants were ordered to prepare a non-confidential version of their pleadings for service on the intervener, only documents not capable of such treatment being withheld in their entirety from the intervener. For obvious reasons, confidential treatment cannot be claimed in respect of a document that is already in the possession of the intervener: eg  Cases T-24/92R and T-28/92R  Langnese-Iglo GmbH  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-1713, paras 16–17. Further, where the application to intervene was made late and the intervener will not, therefore, receive any of the pleadings or documents in the case, there is no need to rule on any application for confidential treatment as against the intervener: Case T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR I-479, para 19 (now relevant only in ECJ proceedings). 327 Cases C-133 and C-150/87 Nashua Corpn v Commission and Council [1990] ECR I-719 (order of 16 March 1988 in Case C-150/87).

507

5.87  Intervention

Court, in the written observations submitted to the Court in response to the application to intervene or by separate document at the same time as the lodgment of those written observations.328 As a matter of practice, applications for confidential treatment should be made by separate document.329 5.87 Any restrictions on the disclosure of secret or confidential documents to the intervener may be set out in the order allowing the intervention or the order may suspend the transmission of the documents served on the parties to the intervener until the question of confidential treatment has been resolved.330 In principle, interveners are entitled to see every document served on the main parties and it is only by derogation from that principle that certain documents or parts of documents may be withheld on account of their secret or confidential nature. In consequence, the President must be satisfied that confidential treatment is justified before he or she will withhold a document or a part of a document from an intervener. When deciding whether or not a claim to confidential treatment is justified, the President must try to reconcile the legitimate concern of the party in question to prevent substantial damage to its interests and the intervener’s legitimate concern to have the information necessary in order to enable it to assert its rights fully and put its case to the Court; account must also be taken of certain principles of law, such as the protection of lawyer-client confidences.331 The party claiming confidential treatment must therefore explain precisely which documents or parts of documents are said to be secret or confidential.332 Confidentiality cannot be claimed merely on the basis that there is a confidentiality agreement between some of the parties to the proceedings or between one 328 RP-ECJ, art 131(2) and (4), RP-GC, art 144(2) and RP-CST, art 87(1) are wholly unclear as to whether or not a request for confidential treatment may be included in the written observations on the application to intervene or must be made by separate document. 329 PD-GC, para 218 and PD-CST, para 42 provide that the application for confidential treatment must be made by separate document. For further details of the GC’s and CST’s requirements, see PD-GC, paras 212–237, PD-CST, paras 40–45 and Ch 9, para 9.19 ff. If an application does not comply with PD-GC, paras 218–219 and 222, the applicant is asked to put it in order and, in the meantime, the application is not processed by the GC registry. If the application is not put in order, confidential treatment will not be granted: see PD-GC, para 223. 330 The latter course was adopted in the VBVB and VBBB case (above, note 223) and in Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission [1990] ECR II-163. In Case T-139/01 Comafrica SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-799, para 30, non-confidential versions of the pleadings were provided to the intervener pending a decision on the application for confidential treatment. 331 The Hilti case (above, note 330) at para 11; Case T-66/94 Auditel Srl v Commission [1995] ECR II-239, para 31; Case T-89/96 British Steel plc v Commission [1997] ECR II-835, paras 23–24; Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd v Commission [1997] ECR II-879, para 12. For an account of the GC’s assessment of the claim to confidential treatment, see Hilti, paras 12–23; Auditel, paras 32–33; British Steel, paras 25–32; Gencor, paras 21–67; Case T-383/03 Hynix Semiconductor Inc v Commission [2005]  ECR II-621; Case T-289/03 British United Provident Association Ltd v Commission [2005]  ECR II-741; Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG  v Commission [2006] ECR II-1747; Case T-336/04 TVDanmark A/S v Commission [2007] ECR II-491. Where confidential treatment arises for consideration in the context of an application for interim relief, the President may accede to the request, on a precautionary basis, if the documents in question appear to be confidential: eg Langnese-Iglo (above, note 326), para 19; Compagnie Maritime Belge (above, note 142), para 17. The matter may be given more searching consideration once the interim relief proceedings have been disposed of. 332 Hilti (above, note 330). Cf PD-GC, para 221; IR-CST, art 7; PD-CST, para 44.

508

Intervention 5.87

of them and a third party; it is always necessary to determine confidentiality by reference to the intrinsic features of the document or evidence in question.333 A waiver of confidentiality vis-à-vis a main party to the action (whether applicant or defendant) does not constitute a waiver of the right to claim confidential treatment vis-à-vis an intervener.334 Confidential treatment may be given to parts of the pleadings as well as to documentary evidence.335 Where confidential treatment is accorded to a document, it is not disclosed to any intervener in relation to whom the document is confidential, including a member state.336 Although a principal party (whether applicant or defendant) can claim confidential treatment as against an intervener, an intervener cannot claim confidential treatment as against a principal party337 and, it may be, cannot claim confidential treatment as against another intervener.338 333 Gencor (above, note 331), paras 13–19. 334 Hilti (above, note 330), paras 12–14. 335 Eg Case 273/85R Silver Seiko Ltd v Council [1985] ECR 3475, para 6. 336 Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission (above, note 48), order of 16  December 1987. Cf PD-GC, para 219. PD-GC, paras 28–33 and IR-CST, art 6, which are more expansive about access to the Court files, provide that the lawyers or agents of interveners have the right of access to the case file save to the extent that confidential treatment has been accorded to the contents of the file: PD-GC, para 29 and 32; IR-CST, art 6(5). The confidential and nonconfidential versions of procedural documents are kept in separate sections of the case file: PDGC, para 23; IR-CST, art 6(5). An intervener therefore has access only to the non-confidential section (unless the claim to confidential treatment does not relate to him). 337 See Ch 12, paras 12.3–12.4. 338 In Case C-172/87 Mita Industrial Co Ltd v Council [1992] ECR I-1301, one intervener claimed confidential treatment not as against the main parties but as against an association comprising its commercial rivals which had intervened in support of a party opposing the first intervener. The ECJ refused to give confidential treatment to the documents in question even though there was no dispute about their confidential nature and even though confidential treatment had been given to the information in question vis-à-vis the association concerned both in the administrative proceedings prior to the commencement of the action and in parallel proceedings before the ECJ. No reasons were given and it is not clear whether or not an order was drawn up. The decision nonetheless seems to be wrong in principle because an intervener is a party once its application to intervene is allowed and, on that basis, is entitled to claim confidential treatment as against another intervener (but not as against a principal party) on the basis of what are now RP-ECJ, art 131(2) and (4). RP-GC, art 144 and RP-CST, art 87 are (since 2015 and 2014, respectively) wholly unclear on the point. RP-GC, art 142(1) provides that interveners do not have the same procedural rights as main parties; and main parties are identified in RP-GC, art 144(2) as having a right to object to the disclosure, to an intervener, of confidential information. On the other hand, RP-GC, art 144(5) refers generally to ‘information which it is claimed is confidential’, the context being ‘any other case’, a phrase that refers to cases other than those contemplated in RP-GC, art 144(4), namely, cases other than those in which a main party has claimed confidentiality. The CST rules follow the same pattern. The main parties are identified in RP-CST, art 87(1) and (2) as having the right to claim confidential treatment; but RP-GC, art 88(2) refers to evidence and documents acknowledged to be secret or confidential under RP-87(3). That provision (needless to say) applies to ‘any other case’ in which there is a claim for confidential treatment, that is, cases other than those in which a main party has applied for confidential treatment. The strong impression is that the GC and CST rules are intended to limit claims to confidential treatment to the main parties and to exclude such claims as between interveners; but the wording actually used can be read to different effect. It is therefore necessary to look at what ought to be the principle to be applied. In fact, there is no reason in principle why an intervener should not be allowed confidential treatment of secret or confidential material vis-à-vis another intervener where the circumstances justify it. If, in such circumstances, confidential treatment is refused, the intervener

509

5.88  Intervention

5.88 Read literally, the rules of procedure envisage that confidentiality is dealt with as between the (main) party claiming it and the President, in the sense that the former makes an application for confidential treatment and the latter makes a decision on it. There is no express provision for the intervener to be heard on the application. Indeed, the intervener is likely to discover that there was an application for confidential treatment only when his application to intervene is allowed and he receives in consequence an expurgated copy of the pleadings in the case. At that point, it may occur to the intervener that all or part of the claim for confidential treatment is unjustifiable. It is striking that the rules of procedure do not cater for that eventuality, even though it is a well-known phenomenon which has been considered in several cases. The solution appears to be an application for the withdrawal of confidential treatment and full disclosure of the material in question made as a preliminary issue.339 6 The intervener’s statement in intervention 5.89 When the intervention is allowed, the intervener may submit a written statement in intervention, but is not obliged to do so,340 unless (in ECJ cases only) the application to intervene was lodged after the expiry of the period running from publication of the notice of the case in the Official Journal.341 In CST proceedings, where the President has invited a person, institution or member state to intervene, and the intervention has been made, the intervener also has the right to submit a written statement in intervention but, as he must accept the case as he finds it at the time of his intervention, that right may be lost if the intervention occurs after the close of the written procedure.342 In ECJ and CST proceedings, the period for lodging the statement in intervention is a fixed period of one month, running from receipt of the procedural documents communicated to the intervener, that may be extended by the President on a reasoned application being made.343 In GC proceedings, the period is prescribed by the President and may also be extended on application.344

should apply to withdraw the pleadings and documentary evidence lodged at the Court and replace them with an edited version that omits the secret or confidential material (which was what was done in the Mita case). 339 See Ch 6, para 6.9 ff, below. In cases like TVDanmark (above, note 331), a different course has been followed: the President has invited the intervener to submit written observations on the application for confidential treatment before he has made a decision on it. 340 The intervener is not obliged to submit its case in writing: in Case 34/86 Council v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2155 (at 2157 per Advocate General Mancini) one intervener contented itself with submitting oral argument alone. However, as cases may in certain circumstances be decided without a hearing and, in any event, the time for making oral observations at the hearing is limited, it is not generally wise to pass up the opportunity to lodging a written statement in intervention. 341 In that event, the intervener may only make oral submissions at the hearing. 342 RP-CST, art  89(4) provides that RP-CST, art  88 applies; and the latter provision contains both the obligation to accept the case as the intervener finds it and the right to lodge a written statement in intervention. 343 RP-ECJ, art 132(1); RP-CST, art 88(3), 1st subpara. 344 RP-GC, art 145(1) and 61(1).

510

Intervention 5.91

5.90 The statement in intervention must be expressed in the language of the case save that member states, when they intervene, are entitled to use their official languages, as opposed to the language of the case, in both their written and oral submissions; and EEA states and the EFTA Surveillance Authority may be authorised to use one of the Court’s procedural languages other than the language of the case.345 The Court may, however, exercise its power under RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(c) or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 45(1)(c) to allow an intervener (other than an EU institution) to use a language other than that of the case, if it so requests.346 The Rules of Procedure do not specify any formal requirements for the statement in intervention but, as in the case of any other pleading, a statement in intervention must comply with the general pleading rules and those applicable to the presentation of pleadings.347 5.91 As indicated above, the normal format taken by a pleading comprises the title, the submissions and the form of order. Although the title need not contain such things as service details and the description of the intervener’s representative (because those will already have been included in the application to intervene), it is still necessary for the statement in intervention to identify the case to which it relates and the nature of the pleading. That is normally done by setting out on the title page of the pleading the case number and the names of the main parties, followed by the legend ‘statement in intervention of [insert the name of the intervener]’ or something like it.

345 RP-ECJ, art 38(4)–(5); RP-GC, art 46(4)–(5) (the GC rules on the language of the case also apply to CST proceedings: Statute, Annex, art  7(2)). All other interveners, including EU institutions, must use the language of the case once their application to intervene has been allowed unless the Court rules otherwise. 346 See De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority (above, note 166) at 50. In Moksel v Commission (above, note 312) the Court required the intervener’s written observations to be in the language of the case (German) but the oral observations could be in English. However, in VBVB and VBBB  v Commission (above, note 223), order of 22  September 1982, several interveners were not allowed to submit either written or oral observations in a language other than that of the case. No reason was given for that decision. In Case 53/85  AKZO  Chemie BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v Commission [1986] ECR 1965, order of 10 July 1985, the intervener was allowed to use a language other than the language of the case for the written and oral procedure. In Case T-11/95  BP  Chemicals Ltd. v Commission [1996]  ECR II-599, the interveners were required to produce translations (into the language of the case) of the annexes to their statement in intervention because they had not shown exceptional reasons why they should be relieved of that obligation. By implication, exceptional reasons would have existed if they had lacked the means to produce translations. The Court also refused to indicate which annexes and which parts of the annexes should be translated, pointing out that, with the exception of lengthy documents, the obligation to provide a translation of an annex applies to the entire document. It is doubtful if the Court has adopted any particular practice in relation to allowing interveners to use a language other than that of the case. In Case T-330/94 Salt Union v Commission [1996] ECR II-2881, para 26, however, the GC stated that an intervener may be permitted to use a language of its choice as long as: (i) that language is one of the Court’s procedural languages; and (ii) the procedure will not be delayed and the procedural rights of the principal parties will not be prejudiced. It went on to say that the Court’s approach should be flexible in the case of the use of another language at the hearing if no justified objection has been raised by the principal parties. 347 See Ch 9, paras 9.7–9.31.

511

5.92  Intervention

5.92 So far as its content is concerned, the statement in intervention must set out348: (1) the form of order sought by the intervener in support of, in whole or in part, the form of order sought by one of the parties;349 (2) the pleas in law and arguments relied on by the intervener;350 and (3) where appropriate, any evidence produced or offered.351 5.93 Those matters do not have to be set out in that order; and it is common for the first to be last. The fact that the intervener should indicate the evidence relied on shows that the reference to ‘pleas in law and arguments relied on by the intervener’ is not intended to preclude reliance upon arguments based on matters of fact. The nature of the evidence relied on (if any) is pleaded in the statement in intervention in the same way as in an application commencing proceedings or defence.352 A statement in intervention may cross-refer to other pleadings in the case353 but not to submissions made in the administrative proceedings prior to the commencement of the action or, more generally, to other documents, such as annexes to the statement in intervention.354 In general, the statement in inter 348 See RP-ECJ, art 132(2); RP-GC, art 145(2); RP-CST, art 88(3). 349 RP-CST, art 110(3)(a) refers more briefly to ‘the form of order sought by the intervener’; but RP-CST, art 88(4) provides that a statement in intervention is admissible only if it supports in whole or in part the form of order sought by one of the parties. The intervener may seek only an order supporting the order sought by one of the parties and may not change the order sought on appeal. Hence an intervener supporting a Commission decision imposing a fine may not ask for the fine to be increased: Case C-53/92P Hilti AG v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, Advocate General Jacobs, para 59 (p 691); judgment, para 49 (p 709). The statement in intervention need not specify the party supported by the intervener as long as that is evident from the tenor of the statement as read in the light of the application to intervene: Case T-110/95 International Express Carriers Conference (IECC) v Commission [1998] ECR II-3605, paras 31–32; Cases T-133/95 and T-204/95 IECC v Commission [1998] ECR II-3645, paras 50–51. 350 An intervener can be selective in the arguments that he takes and need not contest everything asserted by the opposing party: eg Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, para 15. 351 Evidence that is ‘produced’ is the documentary evidence attached to the statement in intervention; evidence that is ‘offered’ is evidence whose source is stated in the statement in intervention (such as oral testimony). RP-CST, art 88(6) expressly incorporates the CST rules on the production of documentary evidence (see RP-CST, art 45(1), 2nd to 4th subparas, and RP-CST, art 45(2), 2nd subapara – the evidence is to be assembled in a file, production of a schedule listing the contents, extracts in the case of lengthy documents, number of copies). The corresponding requirements should be complied with in a statement in intervention in ECJ and GC proceedings. 352 See Ch 9, para 9.51. 353 Case T-374/00 Verband der freien Rohrwerke eV v Commission [2003] ECR II-2275, paras 87–93; Case T-246/99 Tirrenia de Navigazione SpA v Commission [2007] ECR II-65*, paras 63–64 (crossreference permitted in limited circumstances). Cross-references to other pleadings or documents is a contentious topic and is dealt with in greater detail in Ch 9, paras 9.47–9.48 below. 354 Eg Case T-43/05 Camper v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR II-95*, paras 30–33 (although interveners in IP appeals are not in exactly the same position as interveners in other actions, the judgment appears to be applicable to the latter as well); Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava (above, note 51), paras 91–101 (submissions set out in annexes to the statement in intervention; Fresh Del Monte Produce (above, note 174), paras 392–396 and 541–542 (references to an annex).

512

Intervention 5.95

vention serves no useful purpose if it merely repeats what has already been said in the pleadings of one or other of the other parties. It is better practice for the intervener to seek to advance the case of the party whom the intervener supports by introducing additional arguments or developing existing ones. Where the intervener disagrees with a material assertion of fact made by one of the other parties, the statement in intervention ought to identify the area of dispute and the intervener ought to adduce the evidence relevant to the intervener’s interpretation of the facts. Otherwise, there is no point in the statement of intervention reciting the facts unless it is necessary to do so in order to clarify a description of the facts given by another party or provide additional details that are necessary for an understanding of the case or the intervener’s arguments.355 5.94 The rules of procedure assume that the intervener will lodge a statement in intervention and do not state what happens if the intervener declines or fails to do so within time. There appears to be no basis for asserting that a failure to lodge a written statement in intervention precludes an intervener from making submissions at the hearing (where there is one); and there are cases in which an intervener who has not lodged a written statement in intervention has nonetheless presented its arguments orally.356 However, the intervener cannot expect to be given extra time at the hearing in order to make up for the fact that it has failed to lodge a written statement in intervention. 7 Responses to the statement in intervention 5.95 Initially the parties were allowed to answer the case made out by the intervener in writing. Then the Rules of Procedure were amended so as to exclude that possibility. The parties were in consequence able to deal with the intervener’s written case only in their written pleadings (in practice, the reply or rejoinder)357 or at the hearing. That was very unsatisfactory, particularly when the Court began to control the time taken by the parties in their oral submissions to the Court. The Rules currently provide that, after the statement in intervention has been lodged, the President will, where necessary, prescribe a time limit within which the parties (ECJ proceedings) or main parties (GC and CST proceedings) may reply to that statement.358 Therefore, if the statement in intervention is lodged at a time when the other parties still have at least one written 355 Cf PD-ECJ, para  29. PD-ECJ, para  29, PD-GC, para  114 and PD-CST, para  49(b) suggest that a statement in intervention should not exceed 10, 20 (or, in staff cases, 10) pages or 15 pages, respectively (which gives a clue about the reliability of the limits put on the length of pleadings). The caps placed in the practice directions on the length of pleadings are discussed further in Ch 9, para 9.17. 356 Eg Case T-147/97 Champion Stationery Manufacturing Co Ltd v Council [1998] ECR II-4137, para 16. 357 Unless the written procedure had already ended or their last written pleading had been lodged. 358 RP-ECJ, art  132(3); RP-GC, art  145(3); RP-CST, art  88(5) (which allows the President the option of inviting the parties to present their replies at the hearing). The GC and CST rules limit the right to respond to a statement in intervention to the main parties (applicant and defendant), thereby excluding the possibility of one intervener responding to the statement in intervention of another intervener.

513

5.96  Intervention

pleading to lodge, the simplest solution is for them to deal with the statement in intervention in that pleading rather than lodge a separate pleading. If necessary, the President may extend the time limit for lodging any outstanding written pleadings so that the parties can take account of the intervener’s written submissions. On the other hand, if the statement in intervention is lodged after a party has lodged its last written pleading, the President should give that party an opportunity to reply in writing to the statement in intervention in the form of an additional pleading. The ‘necessity’ for a written reply to the statement of intervention is a matter for the parties to consider (they may believe that it is sufficient to make oral submissions in reply at the hearing); it does not seem that the President can decide the ‘necessity’ for a written reply without prejudging the case to some extent.359 No requirements of form or content are laid down in the Rules of Procedure for any written reply to the statement in intervention.360 As in the case of any pleading, the general rules applicable to pleadings apply;361 and the reply should start with the title of the case and a statement of what the pleading is (‘Reply of [the applicant/defendant] to the Statement in Intervention of [name of intervener]’). The reply need only answer the case made out by the intervener. It does not seem that the reply need contain a form of order because the form of order of the party submitting the reply will be contained in its principal pleadings.362 5.96 At the hearing, the intervener addresses the Court in the same way as a principal party. Given the fact that secret or confidential documents may be withheld from an intervener, such material should not be mentioned by another party at the hearing. If it is necessary to mention it, application would have to be made for that part of the hearing to be held in camera, with the intervener excluded. Since such a step runs contrary to the general principle that the hearing is held in public, strong reasons would have to be given for it. 8 Use by the intervener of information obtained in the course of the proceedings 5.97 Where it is feared that an intervener wishes to use information acquired as a result of its participation in the proceedings for purposes unconnected with the proceedings, application may be made for secret or confidential documents to be withheld from the intervener.363 The Rules of Procedure contain no express provision empowering the Court to direct an intervener to use the documents to which he is entitled to have access for the purposes only of the proceedings;364 359 The preceding remarks are subject to the qualification that, in CST proceedings, the President has express power to invite the parties to reply to the statement in intervention at the hearing: RP-CST, art 88(5). 360 PD-ECJ, para  30, PD-GC, para  114 and PD-CST, para  49(b) suggest that a response to a statement in intervention should not exceed 5 or 15 pages. The caps placed in the practice directions on the length of pleadings are discussed further in Ch 9, para 9.17. 361 See Ch 9, paras 9.7–9.31. 362 The application, defence or statement in intervention, as the case may be. 363 See paras 5.86–5.88 above. 364 The Hilti case (above, note 330) at para 23.

514

Intervention 5.98

but parties including interveners are not at liberty to disclose to third parties (or to the public generally) material obtained from another party in the course of the proceedings without that party’s consent.365

E

Withdrawal of leave to intervene

5.98 There is no express provision enabling the President or the Court to reconsider an application to intervene once it has been allowed or to revoke leave to intervene. In Case 9/61 Netherlands v High Authority,366 however, the Court remarked at the beginning of the judgment that the intervention of a number of intervening parties had not been challenged by the parties and there were no reasons for the Court to raise the matter of its own motion. Accordingly, the Court declared the applications to intervene to be admissible. That led Advocate General Reischl to conclude in Case 138/79 Roquette Freres v Council367 that an order allowing intervention ‘opens access to the proceedings only provisionally; the admissibility of the intervention is decided if necessary in the judgment’.368 In that case, the Council had contested the admissibility of the intervention of the European Parliament and the matter was dealt with in the judgment. However, it should be noted from Advocate General Reischl’s Opinion that the Parliament’s intervention had been allowed ‘without hearing the parties to the proceedings’.369 Accordingly, Roquette supports the proposition that, if an intervention is allowed without the other parties having been given an opportunity to make submissions on the application to intervene, the admissibility of the intervention may be revisited in the judgment. The question of actually reconsidering the admissibility of an intervention, after it has been allowed in the light of submissions from the 365 Case T-174/95 Svenska Jounrnalistforbundet v Council [1998]  ECR II-2289, paras 135 and 137. See further Ch 2, para 2.71. 366 [1962] ECR 213 at 231. 367 [1980] ECR 3333 at 3365; see also paras 17–21 of the judgment. 368 Original emphasis. Some value should be attributed to Advocate General Reischl’s Opinion on that point because he had on his staff a legal secretary who had been at the Court since its early years. However, neither the different versions of the ECJ’s rules of procedure nor its judgments or orders actually support the idea that, before 1980, an order allowing intervention was provisional only. Indeed, Advocate General Reischl’s interpretation of Netherlands v High Authority seems to be inconsistent with the terms of the Court’s order in Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority [1961]  ECR  1 at 48. It seems much more likely that Netherlands v High Authority (above, note 366) was concerned with a different point about the admissibility of an intervention, one illustrated by the Steenkolenmijnen case (at 17–18): the possibility that, after the intervention has been allowed, the intervener seeks to introduce inadmissible arguments (a problem that was topical at the time). 369 Above, note 362. At the time, it was the practice of the ECJ to decide upon an application to intervene made by a member state or EU institution without notifying other parties of the application. The only open questions about such an application were whether or not the application was made within time and whether or not it complied with the formal requirements applicable to such an application, both being matters that the Court could (and did) determine for itself (although that practice was not exactly in accordance with the rules of procedure at the time). Accordingly, it was often the case that the first notice given to a party of an application to intervene was receipt of the Court order allowing the intervention. In Roquette, the ECJ seems to have been taken by surprise by the objection raised by the Council to the Parliament’s intervention (an objection that the ECJ considered to be unfounded).

515

5.98  Intervention

other parties, was raised in Case 143/84 Vlachou v Court of Auditors,370 a staff case where the applicant (‘V’) sought the annulment of a decision appointing another official (‘K’) to a particular post. K intervened in support of the defendant. K was married to another official (‘S’), who had brought an action against the defendant for the annulment of the decision appointing V to a different post. Both K and S were represented by the same lawyer. The defendant believed that the object of K’s intervention in V’s action was to obtain sight of certain documents and pass knowledge of them to S so that she could use that knowledge in her action against the defendant. The defendant therefore applied to the Court for it to reconsider its decision to allow K’s intervention.371 The Court made its decision expressly without deciding whether or not it could reconsider an application to intervene. It dismissed the defendant’s request solely on the ground that K had a valid interest in supporting the defendant. It would therefore seem that, even if the grant of leave to intervene could be reconsidered or revoked, that could be so only upon discovery of a new fact or matter affecting the intervener’s entitlement to intervene.372 The problem resurfaced in Case C-199/92P Huls AG v Commission,373 in which it was held, citing the Roquette case and omitting reference to Vlachou, that the order giving leave to intervene does not preclude a fresh examination of the admissibility of the intervention in the judgment. There does not seem to be any basis for objecting to the reconsideration of the admissibility of an intervention on the ground of a new fact or matter (which would include the discovery that a material fact upon which the intervention was allowed was incorrect). However, it must be doubted that there is a general entitlement to reconsider the admissibility of an intervention in the absence of a new fact or

370 [1986] ECR 459, order of 16 October 1985. 371 At that time, decisions on applications to intervene were made by the Court. If the same situation arose under the Rules of Procedure as they are currently worded, the application would be made to the President and dealt with by him. It is not clear how the Court could have power under the rules of procedure to reassess the admissibility of an application to intervene when the decision allowing the intervention had been made by the President and there is no provision for the Court to decide on it. 372 Such as, presumably, evidence that the intervener had ceased to exist or to possess the characteristics or personality required for intervention in proceedings before the Court or, where relevant, evidence that the intervener did not have or no longer had an interest to intervene. The Court is not willing to reconsider the admissibility of the intervention if that involves nothing more than going over the same facts and matters that were considered when the intervention was allowed: see Case T-158/96 Acciaierie di Bolzano SpA v Commission [1999] ECR II-3927, paras 32–35 (a case in which the GC, following Roquette, had concluded that in principle it could reconsider the admissibility of the intervention in the judgment). 373 [1999] ECR I-4287, para 52 (p 4358; see also per Advocate General Cosmas, para 12, pp 4299– 4300); see also Case C-227/92P Hoechst AG v Commission [1999] ECR I-4443, para 27; Case C-235/92P  Montecatini (above, note 107), para  75; Case C-245/92P  Chemie Linz (above, note 107), para 26. Huls was followed by the GC in Cases T-32/98 and T-41/98 Nederlandse Antillen v Commission [2000] ECR II-201, para 30 (citing Case C-234/92P Shell International Chemical Co Ltd v Commission [1999] ECR I-4501, para 25, which repeats the contemporary ruling in Huls); Cases T-30/01 to T-32/01 and T-86/02 to T-88/02 Territorio Historico de Alava (above, note 51), para  95; Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava (above, note 51), para 81. Nobody seems to have been struck by the oddity of the proposition that something that was decided when the application to intervene was allowed could be reconsidered in the absence of there being a new fact.

516

Intervention 5.99

matter: that is inconsistent with the procedure followed when dealing with an application to intervene and the Roquette case is too flimsy a basis on which to establish a practice of the Court to that effect. Alternatively, as has happened in some cases, the discovery that the intervener has no interest (or no longer has an interest) supporting his intervention may lead the Court to disregard his arguments.374

F

Effect of refusal of permission to intervene

5.99 If the application to intervene is refused, the intervener does not become a party to the proceedings. As noted above, in proceedings heard at first instance by the GC and CST, the refusal decision may be appealed.375 Subject to the outcome of any appeal, the refusal decision closes the proceedings opened by the application to intervene and a costs order may be made against the unsuccessful applicant to intervene.376 In theory, the refusal decision does not prejudice the position of the applicant to intervene in any other proceedings that he may have brought.377 What that actually means is that the intervener is not bound by the force of res judicata because, as a result of the refusal decision, he is not a party to, or bound by, the judgment or order closing the proceedings in the action in which he has failed to intervene.

374 Case T-435/93 Association of Sorbitol Producers within the EC (ASPEC) v Commission [1995]  ECR  I-1281, paras 29–30: in that case, the intervener’s interest was based upon the fact that it was in competition with a company in receipt of a state aid but: (i) the interest no longer subsisted when the intervener went into liquidation; and (ii) it turned out that the aid had not been paid so that the intervener’s competitive position could not have been affected before it went into liquidation. The second reason disposed of the possibility that the grant of the aid might have pushed the intervener into liquidation (which might have had a bearing on the utility to the intervener of establishing that the state aid was unlawful). Once the intervener was in liquidation, it could no longer have an interest because it was no longer a competitor whose competitive situation might have been affected by the state aid. See also Case T-442/93 Association des Amidonneries de Cereales de la CEE (AAC) v Commission [1995]  ECR II1329, para 30. 375 See para 5.83 above. 376 Cf RP-GC, art 144(6). Costs are awarded in the same way as in a final judgment or any other order closing proceedings: see Ch 14, para 14.5, and, by way of example, Territorio Historico de Alava (above, note 72), paras 19–20. 377 Case C-155/98P Alexopolou v Commission [1998] ECR I-4935 and 4943, paras 16–17 of each order.

517

Chapter 6

Procedural issues

I INTRODUCTION 6.1 RP-ECJ, art 151 (formerly RP-ECJ, art 91) sets out the procedure for applying to the ECJ for a decision on a preliminary objection or other issue not going to the substance of the case. RP-GC, art 130(1) and (2) (formerly RP-GC, art 114) are more expansive, referring to: (i) a decision on inadmissibility; (ii) a decision on lack of competence; (iii) a declaration that the action has become devoid of purpose; and (iv) a decision on another preliminary issue. RP-CST, art 83(1) (formerly RP-CST, art 78) refers to: (a) a decision on admissibility; (b) a decision on lack of competence; and (c) a decision on any other preliminary plea not going to the merits of the case.1 All those provisions are used principally to raise a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the action (which includes, conceptually, the competence, that is to say, the jurisdiction of the forum). An objection of that nature is ‘preliminary’ because it can be determined without reference to the substance (or merits) of the case; and may therefore be taken as a separate issue, usually at the outset of the proceedings. That type of procedural issue, together with the related provisions contained in RP-ECJ, arts 53(2) and 150 (formerly RP-ECJ, art  92), RP-GC, arts 126–129 (formerly RP-GC, arts 111–113) and RP-CST, arts 81–82 (formerly RP-CST, arts 76–77), is discussed in the following chapter, as is the raising by the Court of its own motion under RP-ECJ, arts 149–150, RP-GC, arts 126, 129 and 131 or RP-CST, arts 81–82 and

1 Although the ECJ and CST Rules of Procedure do not refer in express terms to an application for a decision that the action has become devoid of purpose (RP-ECJ, art 149 and RP-CST, art 85(1) envisage the matter being raised by the ECJ or CST, respectively), it does not appear to be disputed that such an application may be made under RP-ECJ, art  151 and RP-CST, art 83. Apart from that, the differences between RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(1) and (2) and RP-CST, art 83(1), in terms of the decisions that may be made under them, are essentially cosmetic. Lack of competence is a species of inadmissibility and both are encompassed in the phrase ‘preliminary objection…not going to the substance of the case’ in RP-ECJ, art 151(1). In the case of the GC and CST, lack of competence extends to the situation in which the action is within the jurisdiction of the Court but not within the jurisdiction of the particular part of the Court (the GC or CST) at whose registry the application has been lodged. Vandersanden and Barav, Contentieux Communautaire (Bruylant, 1977), p 46, adopt an analytical approach to the types of decision that can be made which is based on the French text of RP-ECJ, art 91 (as it then was) but, in view of the relative poverty of authority, it seems appropriate to be more pragmatic.

519

6.2  Procedural issues

85 of other objections to proceeding to judgment.2 This chapter is concerned with procedural issues falling within the phrases ‘other issue not going to the substance of the case’, ‘another preliminary issue’ and ‘any other preliminary plea not going to the merits of the case’ in RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(2) and RP-CST, art  83(1), respectively. Preliminary objections to admissibility aside, there is no apparent limit to the types of preliminary plea or issue ‘not going to the substance of the case’ which may be the subject of an application under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83 other than that they must not impinge on the dispute concerning the merits of the case (whence their ‘preliminary’ nature). That limit can be illustrated by reference to Case 22/59 Macchiorlatti Dalmas e Figli SaS v High Authority.3 There the defendant produced a document which appeared to have emanated from the applicant. The latter applied, under the predecessor to RP-ECJ, art 151, for the Court to rule on the legal value of the document. No evidence was produced tending to invalidate it and the Court took the view that, in substance, the applicant wanted it to rule on the issue of fact to which the document related. Since that impinged on the merits of the case, the application was rejected as inadmissible. The case also illustrates the essentially procedural nature of the applications that may be made.4 As the word ‘plea’ is mainly used in the Rules of Procedure to describe the grounds on which a party bases its case, the term ‘issue’ or ‘procedural issue’ will be used to describe the preliminary pleas or issues to which RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 and RP-CST, art 83 apply, in order to avoid confusion. 6.2 In brief, RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 and RP-CST, art 83 set out the procedure to be followed for raising all procedural matters which may require a formal decision of the Court, before the substance of the case is settled in the final judgment, other than those specifically provided for elsewhere in the Rules of Procedure. That procedure is available to any party, including an intervener.5 A matter should not be raised if it does not require a formal decision. For example, in Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission,6 Advocate General Warner pointed out that the point in question could have been dealt with at the hearing and, for that reason, although the application under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 should, in his view, have been allowed, the applicant should have borne the costs of it.7 In addition, the purpose of the procedure is to deal only with the matter raised and not with anything connected with the substance of the case. The Court will not, therefore, allow the submission of further written pleadings concerning 2 See Ch 7, para 7.78 ff. See also Ch 2, paras 2.39 and 2.156–2.164, for situations in which there is an absolute bar to proceeding with a case or the action is devoid of purpose or there is no need to adjudicate upon it. 3 Order of 17 November 1959 (unreported). 4 See also Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission [1989] ECR 2859 at 2907–2908 (Advocate General Mischo). 5 Eg Case C-445/00 Austria v Council [2002] ECR I-9151 (an intervener applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for the removal from the case file of a document containing legal advice that was for that reason confidential and whose disclosure had been unauthorised). Interveners may not, however, raise a preliminary objection to admissibility (see further Ch 5, paras 5.41–5.50). 6 [1980] ECR 2229. 7 See also Case 14/64 Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority of the ECSC [1965] ECR 51 at 67–68 (Advocate General Roemer).

520

Procedural issues 6.3

the substance of the case; and the procedure cannot be used in order to obtain an early ruling on a point of law that may well decide the case one way or the other (other than one relating to the admissibility of the proceedings). 8

II

TYPES OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES

6.3 Typical examples of the type of plea (in addition to preliminary objections to admissibility)9 that may be raised under RP-ECJ, art  151, RP-GC, art  130(2) and RP-CST, art  83 are applications for: a declaration that there is no need to adjudicate on the case;10 confidential treatment of pleadings or evidence;11 withdrawal of a document or part of a document from the file;12 a measure of enquiry; the production of documents;13 applications for a case to be transferred to a differently constituted chamber;14 reopening of the written or oral procedure; stay of proceedings. Other problems concerning the conduct of proceedings which have been brought before the Court under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83 include: applications for a third party to be joined to the proceedings15 or to be substituted for one of the parties;16 applications for the reopening of the written17 or oral procedure18 or for the suspension 8 Cf Case 34/65 Mosthaf v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 521; Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 333 at 336, order of 20 January 1956 (unreported). 9 RP-GC, art  130 and RP-CST, art  83 allow any defendant who has been given notice of an originating application to apply by separate document for a decision on its admissibility: Case C-338/93P De Hoe v Commission [1994] ECR I-819, paras 22–23 (p 829). RP-ECJ, art 53(2) is limited to lack of jurisdiction and manifest inadmissibility. 10 Eg Case T-49/97 TAT European Airlines SA v Commission [2000] ECR II-51, paras 14 and 28. 11 Eg Cases T-1/89 to T-4/89 and T-6/89 to T-15/89 Rhone-Poulenc v Commission [1990] ECR II-637, in particular para  21; Case F-52/05  Q  v Commission [2007]  ECR-SC II-A-11485 (application to suppress certain phrases in witness evidence provided during earlier administrative proceedings; rejected). 12 Eg Case T-459/07 Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Co Ltd v Council [2009] ECR II-4015. 13 In Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECR II-2289, paras 128–129, a request was made for the production of an internal Court document (the document was not needed for the purposes of the judgment and therefore no decision was made on the request). 14 Case T-47/92 Lenz v Commission [1992] ECR II-2523, paras 13–14. 15 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95 at 106 (see also Case 27/62, order of 6 December 1962 (unreported)): the applicant applied for the Federal Republic of Germany to be joined and the Court decided to hear argument but the application was eventually withdrawn. 16 Case 250/78 Deka (formerly Contiflex) v EEC [1983] ECR 421, order of 22 September 1982 (unreported): the applicant had purportedly assigned its right to damages to a third party and applied for an order requiring the defendant to pay the money to it; the Court reserved its decision for the final judgment. 17 In Case T-5/90 Marcato v Commission [1991] ECR II-731, order of 24 January 1991, where the applicant had failed to lodge a reply in time, thus causing the written procedure to close, the parties and the Court were in agreement that, due to the complexity of the case, it was desirable for there to be a complete written procedure. 18 Eg Case 11/63 Lepape v High Authority [1964]  ECR  61, order of 28  November 1963 (unreported): a week after the hearing the applicant applied under what is now RP-ECJ 151 for the Court to take account of certain declarations made and reopen the oral procedure because he, allegedly, had not received a copy of the report for the hearing before the date of the hearing and so could not challenge any inaccuracies in it; the Court dismissed the application on the ground that, as the report had been duly served in good time at the address for service, the applicant was deemed to have been able to present any observations on it at the hearing.

521

6.4  Procedural issues

of proceedings;19 applications for the Court to serve a pleading on a party named in the proceedings;20 applications alleging an abuse of procedure by a party or its representative (in casu, publicising the contents of a pleading);21 applications for a person to be authorised to represent a party.22 Other examples are set out in their procedural context in various places in this book or can be drawn directly from the case law. RP-ECJ, art 91 could be invoked in references for a preliminary ruling.23 Its successor, RP-ECJ, art 151, is limited in scope to direct actions, with the consequence that, in theory at least, a procedural issue may be raised by application in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling only where a specific provision in the ECJ rules of procedure so provides. Some specific examples of procedural issues are considered in more detail below.

A

Evidential issues

6.4 The unusual feature of the Macchiorlatti Dalmas case24 was that it seemed to the Court that the application was made only in order to decide an issue of fact relating to the merits of the case and not the procedural issue whether or not the document was admissible as evidence. In other cases, applications have been accepted as admissible because they raised issues concerning the evidence that had to be decided before the Court considered the merits of the case. For example, in Mirossevich v High Authority25 the applicant contested the authenticity of two documents submitted by the defendant. At that time the Rules of Procedure contained a specific provision empowering the Court to verify disputed documents, the procedure following that set out in the predecessor to RP-ECJ, art 151. Since the defendant conceded that it would not use one of the documents, the application was, to that extent, pointless but, in relation to the

19 Case 9/65 Acciaierie San Michele SpA v High Authority [1967] ECR 27 (see also Case 6/65 Merisider v High Authority, order of 22  June 1965 (unreported)): the applicant applied for suspension pending judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court on the lawfulness of the Italian statute giving effect to the ECSC Treaty; the Court dismissed the application on its merits. 20 Case T-177/94 Altmann v Commission [1994] ECR II-1245, [1994] ECR-SC II-969, paras 13– 14, 33 and 45 (the applicants had named a person as co-defendant but the GC registry declined to serve the application on that person; the applicants queried the decision of the registry and the GC interpreted the query as an application raising a preliminary plea under what is now RP-GC, art 130(2), the plea being a request that the application commencing proceedings be served on the named co-defendant). 21 Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECR II-2289, paras 22–24 and 135–139. In Case T-812/14R BPC Lux 2 Sarl v Commission, order of 25 February 2015, paras 14–16, a similar application was made as an application for a measure of organisation of procedure. It is doubtful if that is the appropriate course of action to take, as opposed to raising the matter as a procedural issue. 22 Case T-487/07 Imperial Chemical Industries v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs, order of 20 October 2008 (unreported). 23 Eg Case C-16/90 Detlef Nolle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Friehafen [1991] ECR I-5163, order of 16 May 1991, an application for the production of documents; Case C-221/06 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten and another v Bundesminister fur Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt unde Wasserwirtschaft [2007] ECR I-2613, an application to remove a document from the file. 24 Above, note 3. 25 Above, note 8.

522

Procedural issues 6.6

second document, the Court held that the matter would be dealt with as a measure of enquiry. A  similar situation arose in Cases 9 and 58/65 Acciaierie San Michele SpA v High Authority,26 where the applicant applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for an order that the defendant produce the original of a document on the ground that the copy given to the applicant appeared to be incomplete. By that time the specific provision for the verification of the authenticity of a document had disappeared. The defendant eventually produced the original to the Registrar who compared it with the applicant’s photocopy and ascertained that the two corresponded. The Court took official notice of that fact. 6.5 In Cases C-89, C-104, C-114, C-116, C-117 and C-125 to 129/85  A  Ahlström Osakeyhtïo v Commission27 several applicants applied for an order that certain documents could not be relied on by the defendant because they had been produced too late in the administrative procedure leading up to the making of the contested decision. That application was joined to the substance of the case: the arguments relied on in its support were identical to those relied on in support of the claim for the annulment of the contested act. The application was thus an inappropriate use of RP-ECJ, art 151 because, on the assumption that the argument was that the documents were inadmissible as evidence against the applicant, that argument (and the consequences if it were correct)28 were matters going to the substance of the case which were not suited to a preliminary determination. In Case C-213/87 Gemeente Amsterdam and Stichting Vrouwenvakschool voor Informatica Amsterdam (VIA) v Commission29 and Case C-110/89 Commission v Greece30 the applicants applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for leave, and were allowed, to lodge further documents that had come to light after the end of the written procedure. 6.6 When application is made for the production of evidence, the Court has tended to deal with the matter in the context of preparatory enquiries rather than specifically as a separate procedural issue.31 That means that, although the application is, in formal terms, admissible, the Court will consider whether or not 26 [1967] ECR 1 at 3. 27 [1993] ECR I-1307 (para 29 and see the opinion of Advocate General Darmon at paras 55–57). The admissibility of the evidence did not require a decision because the issue to which it related was decided on other grounds: see para 54 of the judgment. 28 Namely, that it would have to be considered whether or not the defendant had sufficient other evidence to establish its case against the applicant. 29 [1990] ECR I-221. 30 [1991] ECR I-2659, order of 21 November 1990. 31 See, for example, Cases 24 and 34/58 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie de l’Est de la France v High Authority [1960] ECR 281, order of 3 March 1959 (unreported); Case 18/63 Wollast née Schmitz v Commission [1964] ECR 85, order of 13 November 1963 (unreported); Cases 19, 65 and 76/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 533 at 545 and Case 68/63 Luhleich v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 581 at 591, orders of 28 October 1963 (unreported). In Case 118/83 CMC Cooperativa Muratorie e Cementisti v Commission [1985] ECR 2325, however, the decision on the application was reserved to the final judgment (see order of 29 February 1984, unreported). In the Detlef Nolle case (above, note 23), a reference for a preliminary ruling, the application for the production of documents was dismissed on the ground that the document in question was not relevant to the question referred.

523

6.7  Procedural issues

to accede to it only when deciding which measures of enquiry are necessary in order to resolve the issues of fact in the case.

B Confidentiality 6.7 In Case 28/65 Fonzi v Euratom Commission32 and the Distillers case,33 a party applied under what is now RP-ECJ  151 for certain documents to be removed from the file on the grounds of confidentiality. In both cases the application was allowed in part.34 In the same way, in Cases T-1 to T-4 and T-6 to T-15/89 Rhône-Poulenc v Commission,35 the GC invited the parties to request confidential treatment for their pleadings and annexes as a result of the joinder of the cases, treating the matter as a procedural issue under the predecessor to RP-ECJ, art  151 (which was applicable to proceedings before the GC at that time). Confidential treatment will not be given to matters that are not genuinely secret or confidential or deserving of protection from disclosure in the interests of justice.36 In Case C-327/86 Herkenrath v Commission37 the defendant applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for the withdrawal from the Court file of a document introduced by the applicant on the ground that it was an internal note that had come into the applicant’s possession by irregular means. The applicant was asked, but failed, to submit observations in reply. The Court therefore concluded that the defendant’s application was justified and ordered the document to be withdrawn.38 In Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96

32 [1996] ECR 477 at 506. 33 Above, note 6, see p 2237, order of 28 March 1979 (unreported). 34 It is unclear whether the application for confidential treatment of certain documents, made in Case 236/81 Celanese Chemical Co Inc v Council and Commission [1982]  ECR  1183, was based on what is now RP-ECJ, art 151, although, no doubt, it could have been. 35 [1990] ECR II-637, paras 22–25. 36 Eg Case C-54/90 Weddel & Co BV v Commission [1992] ECR I-871, order of 15 May 1991, where an application for the exclusion from the file of the record of the examination of certain witnesses by a national court was dismissed because a summary of the meeting to which that evidence related was being relied on in other proceedings. 37 Order of 15 June 1989 (the case is reported sub nom Case T-16/89 Herkenrath v Commission [1992] ECR II-275). 38 A  similar situation arose in Case C-352/88 Commission v Ireland, order of 6  July 1989 (unreported), where the defendant relied on an internal document emanating from the applicant. The latter applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for the withdrawal of the document. That was not a case in which the document had come into the defendant’s hands by irregular means. Nonetheless, it conceded the application for the withdrawal of the document and the Court made the order without needing to consider the confidential nature of the document. In Case C-445/00 Austria v Council (above, note 5), an intervener applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for the removal from the case file of a document containing legal advice that was for that reason confidential and whose disclosure had been unauthorised. The Court upheld the application. In Case F-6/07 Suvikas v Council [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-151, II-A-1-819, paras 57–71, the CST ordered various annexes to the application to be withdrawn because they were confidential documents. A  person had entered someone else’s office, taken the documents to photocopy them and sent the copies to the applicant. The applicant was not party to the abstraction of the documents.

524

Procedural issues 6.8

Service pour le Groupement d’Acquisitions Sarl (SGA) v Commission39 an oral application was made at the hearing for the removal from the file of an internal document produced by mistake. The application was upheld. An application to remove from the file an internal document setting out legal advice given by one government department to other ministries was upheld in Case C-221/06 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten v Bundesminister fur Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt unde Wasserwirtschaft40 on the ground that it would be contrary to the public interest to allow such documents to be produced in proceedings unless production had been authorised by a competent authority of the Member State concerned or the Court had ordered production. In Cases C-116 and C-149/88 Hecq v Commission41 the applicant applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for the production by the defendant of a document. The defendant produced the document to the Court but claimed that it should be excluded from consideration because of its confidential nature. The Court order was therefore limited to that point: the Court considered that the document added nothing useful and therefore ordered it to be excluded from consideration without ruling on whether or not it was confidential.

C

Pleading issues

6.8 In several cases an application has been made to ‘strike out’ or have rejected as inadmissible part of the opposing party’s pleadings. In Mosthaf v Euratom Commission42 reliance was placed on what is now RP-ECJ, art 127 but the application was rejected on the ground that the opposing party had simply denied the applicant’s argument on one point and not added a fresh issue. In Case 44/76 Milch-, Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Council and Commission,43 on the other hand, the applicant applied for an order that the defendant delete from the defence a sentence that was alleged to be irrelevant, incorrect and defamatory. The latter conceded the point by redrafting the offending sentence but Advocate General Reischl took the view that the applicant was nevertheless entitled to the costs of the issue. A similar situation arose in Case 19/77 Nippon

39 [1999] ECR I-3587, paras 15 and 24 (as the application was made orally and not by a separate ‘document’, it might not technically have fallen within RP-GC, art 130(2)). Upheld on appeal in Case C-39/00P  Service pour le Groupement d’Acquisitions Sarl (SGA) v Commission [2000]  ECR  I-11201, paras 33–40. Followed in Case T-62/99 Societe de distribution de mecaniques et d’automobiles (Sodima) v Commission [2001]  ECR II-655, paras 22–26. The document at issue in Sodima was the same one at issue in the SGA case. It had come into the possession of Sodima because its manager was also the manager of SGA. The more obvious ground for removing the document from the file was that any document obtained by one party from another in the course of proceedings can be used only for the purposes of those proceedings and cannot be given to a third party for use in other proceedings: see, for example, Case T-459/07 Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Ltd v Council [2009] ECR II-4015 (a procedural issue under what is now RP-GC, art 130(2)). See further Ch 2, para 2.71, and, more generally on the exclusion of evidence, Ch 12. 40 [2007] ECR I-2613. 41 [1990] ECR I-599, order of 28 June 1989. 42 Above, note 8. 43 [1977] ECR 393, see pp 405 and 421.

525

6.9  Procedural issues

Seiko KK v Council and Commission.44 Case 76/63, an action commenced by the applicant in Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Commission,45 was ‘an interpretative application and in so far as necessary an application originating proceedings’ whose object seems to have been to clarify the scope of the form of order in Case 65/63. It was eventually discontinued but, in an order removing the case from the Register, the Court suggested (but without deciding the point) that, at most, such a proceeding could be brought only under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151. In Hangzhou Duralamp,46 the applicant lodged written observations in reply to the observations of an intervener in the action; in its written observations, the applicant sought to answer a point made by the intervener (who was supporting the defendant) by relying on a passage in the defendant’s defence in another, parallel, action (in which the applicant was an intervener) and it annexed a copy of that defence to its written observations. The defendant then applied for the deletion of the offending passage in the written observations and the removal of its defence from the case file. The GC accepted the admissibility of both applications (although it acceded only to the latter).

III

RAISING A PROCEDURAL ISSUE

A General 6.9 An application under RP-ECJ, art  151, RP-GC, art  130 or RP-CST, art  83 is made by separate document.47 As a result, to raise, for example, an objection to the admissibility of the action in the defence does not constitute a preliminary objection within the meaning of RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(1) or RP-CST, art 83 and the matter would be dealt with separately only if the Court decided to raise it of its own motion under RP-ECJ, art 150 or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 126 or 129 or RP-CST, arts 81–82.48 The same might be thought to apply where any other procedural issue is raised in an application commencing proceedings, a defence, reply or rejoinder, and not in a separate application. However, there have been instances in which the procedure for raising a pro-

44 [1979] ECR 1303, see p 1273 (Advocate General Warner). 45 [1965] ECR 574. 46 Above, note 12. 47 RP-ECJ, art 151(1); RP-GC, art 130(1) and (2); RP-CST, art 83(1). The fact that a party has lodged a substantive pleading does not preclude him from applying by separate document for a procedural issue to be decided: Suvikas (above, note 38), paras 47–56. 48 Cf Case 47/65 Kalkuhl v European Parliament [1965]  ECR  1011; Case 543/79 Birke v Commission and Council [1981]  ECR  2669, para  30 of the judgment. Contra Case T-13/96 TEAM Srl and another v Commission [1997] ECR II-983, paras 14–15. In Case T-5/99 Andriotis v Commission [2000]  ECR II-235, paras 13–14 and 33–35, one defendant raised a preliminary objection by separate document and another objected to inadmissibility in its defence. Contrary to the approach taken by it in the TEAM case, the GC seems to have regarded only the first defendant as having raised a preliminary objection in accordance with what is now RP-GC, art 130(1). It seems to have taken the second defendant’s objection under what is now RP-GC, art 126, which enables the Court to act of its own motion.

526

Procedural issues 6.11

cedural issue has been taken to have been initiated even though the procedural issue has not been raised by separate document.49 6.10 In contrast to RP-GC, art 130(1), which lays down a time limit for the lodging of a preliminary objection to admissibility (namely, the same, twomonth time limit for lodging a defence), RP-ECJ, art  151, RP-GC, art  130(2) and RP-CST, art 83 lay down no time limit for lodging an application raising a preliminary issue.50 6.11 So far as preliminary objections to admissibility are concerned, such objections are normally made instead of a defence. Apart from the time limit in RP-GC, art 130(1), there does not appear to be any obstacle to the raising of a preliminary objection after the lodgement of the defence as long as the admissibility of the action was contested in the defence: in that event, all that has happened is that the defendant has chosen to request a particular way of disposing of the case on a ground that has already been pleaded. However, if the defence did not contest admissibility, a subsequent preliminary objection to admissibility is,

49 Eg Case T-145/95 Proderec – Formacao e Desenvolvimento de Recursos Humanos ACE  v Commission [1997]  ECR II-823, para  21. In that case, the Commission had first raised a preliminary objection to admissibility, which was reserved for decision to the final judgment. It had then lodged a defence in which it claimed that, due to subsequent events, there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. The GC construed that as a request raising a procedural issue and invited the applicant to submit observations on the need to adjudicate. It then decided the question without an oral procedure, applying what is now RP-GC, art 130(6) (at the time, the relevant provision – RP-GC, art 114(3) – provided that the rest of the procedure would be oral unless the GC decided otherwise). Under what was, at the time, RP-GC, art 113, the same procedure would have been followed in a situation in which the action had become devoid of purpose and there was no need to adjudicate on it. However, it seems clear from the GC’s order that it considered that it was acting under RP-GC, art 114 (that is, what is now RPGC, art 130), not RP-GC, art 113. Case T-178/99 Elder v Commission [1999] ECR II-3509, paras 15 and 18, seems to be a similar case. 50 The time limit referred to in RP-GC, art 130(1), which is that laid down in RP-GC, art 81 for lodging a defence, seems have been inspired by Case T-43/13 Donnici v Parliament, 20 March 2014, paras 38–39. Where the defendant allows the time limit for lodging a defence to pass without lodging either a defence or a preliminary objection to admissibility, he exposes himself to an application (made by the applicant) for judgment by default. In ECJ and CST proceedings, for which there is no time limit for lodging a preliminary objection to admissibility, the making of such an objection would seem to be precluded if the applicant in the action has already made an application for judgment by default. It is not clear if a preliminary objection could be raised before the applicant had done so. The time limit in RP-GC, art 130(1) can be extended on application. Where it is extended because the defendant envisages lodging a defence, the defendant may still lodge a preliminary objection to admissibility instead of a defence: Case T-387/00 Comitato organizzatore del convegno internazionale ‘Effetti degli inquinamenti atmosferici sul clima e sulla vegetazione’ v Commission [2002] ECR II-3031, paras 33–35. The predecessor to RP-CST, art 83(1) – RP-CST, art 78(1) – did provide that an application raising a procedural issue must be made ‘within a month of service of the application’ (meaning the application commencing proceedings). The appearance of such a short time limit (or, indeed, any time limit) for raising a procedural issue was difficult to understand, although it made sense in the context of the raising of a preliminary objection to admissibility by the defendant in the action (see RP-GC, art 130(1)). Its removal indicates that it was a mistake.

527

6.12  Procedural issues

strictly speaking, a new plea in law.51 Even so, if the new plea can be entertained by the Court (either because the conditions enabling a new plea to be raised have been satisfied or because the new plea is one that the Court can take of its own motion),52 there does not seem to be any reason why it cannot be dealt with as a preliminary objection under RP-ECJ, art 151 or RP-CST, art 83 (RP-GC, art 130 does not appear to be applicable because of the time limit on preliminary objections set out in RP-GC, art 130(1)).

B

Written procedure

6.12 The application should comply with RP-ECJ, art 57, RP-GC, art 72 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 45.53 It must set out the pleas and arguments relied on and the form of order sought by the applicant (that is, the form of the order – or relief – that the applicant wishes the Court to grant); any supporting documents or other evidence must be annexed to it.54 If the pleas relied on are not set out,55 or there is no form of order,56 the application may be rejected as inadmissible.57 It should also state the names of the parties to the proceedings and, where necessary, comply with RP-ECJ, art 121, RP-GC, art 77 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 50(3).58 Applications that take the form of a letter have been accepted (as long as they satisfy the substantive requirements set out in the rules of procedure).59 However, it may be better to follow the usual format for a pleading (title, submissions, form of order).60 6.13 After the application has been lodged, it is served on the other parties and the President fixes a period within which they are to present their written replies to the application.61 The period may be extended on application.62 The answer is not given a particular name, such as a defence, reply or even observations, in the 51 As happened in Cases T-198/95, T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98 and T-225/99 Comafrica SpA v Commission [2001] ECR II-1975, para 54. 52 For the raising of new pleas, see Ch 9, paras 9.79–9.84. 53 For the form taken by pleadings, see Ch 9, paras 9.7–9.16. 54 RP-ECJ, art 151(2); RP-GC, art 130(3); RP-CST, art 83(1). Only RP-CST, art 83(1) envisages that the application will set out pleas of fact. 55 Nippon Seiko KK v Council and Commission (above, note 44) at 1273–1274 (Advocate General Warner). 56 Case 55/64 Lens v European Court of Justice [1963] ECR 837 at 840. 57 A generous seems to be taken of formally defective preliminary objections to admissibility. In Case T-15/11 Sina Bank v Council, 11 December 2012, para 42, the basis for the preliminary objection was not stated expressly but seems to have been inferred by reference to general legal principles. 58 It is equally essential that an indication is given of the case to which the application relates. On the other hand, matters already mentioned in an earlier pleading, such as the address for service, do not have to be repeated. Where the application raises a preliminary objection as to admissibility, it often replaces the defence and should therefore comply with the requirements of RP-ECJ, art 124, RP-GC, art 81 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 53, mutatis mutandis. 59 Eg Case T-26/97 Antillean Rice Mills NV v Commission [1997] ECR II-1347, para 11. 60 See, for example, Ch 9, paras 9.34–9.36. 61 RP-ECJ, art 151(3); RP-GC, art 130(5); RP-CST, art 83(2). 62 RP-ECJ, art 52; RP-GC, art 61; RP-CST, art 39(1).

528

Procedural issues 6.14

Rules of Procedure of the ECJ and CST. In RP-GC, art 130(5) it is described as ‘observations’.63 In ECJ and CST proceedings, the reply must contain a form of order and the pleas in law (ECJ) or arguments of fact and law (CST) relied on in support.64 The GC Rules of Procedure are silent on the form and content of the ‘observations’.65 Usually the relief sought (whether or not expressed in a form of order) will seek the dismissal of the application and costs; but that may not always be the case in relation to some of the types of preliminary issue that may be raised. In general, it is better for the reply to conform to the usual model of a pleading (title, submissions, form of order) and to the rules generally applicable to pleadings.66

C

Handling of the application

6.14 The written part of the procedure ends with the lodgment of the reply to (or observations on) the application67 and the Court then decides whether to make its decision on the application immediately or not. There are no preparatory enquiries: RP-ECJ, art 151(4) and RP-CST, art 83(2), last sentence, provide that the remainder of the proceedings shall be oral unless the Court decides otherwise; RP-GC, art 130(6) provides that the GC ‘may’ decide to open the oral procedure but that RP-GC, art 106 (which provides that GC proceedings shall include an oral part) does not apply. Accordingly, there is no right to a hearing.68 More often than not, there is no hearing. In that event, although it occasionally happens that the Court makes a formal order stating that there will be none,69 it is more usual for that to be omitted; after hearing the views of the advocate general (which are not, in this event, published), where there is one, the Court issues an order upholding or rejecting the application or reserving its decision on the matter for final judgment.70 In the case of preliminary objections to admissibility, an order upholding the application, which very often starts by explaining that the Court does not think that there are grounds for opening the oral procedure, terminates the proceedings and includes an order for costs.71 In all other cases the 63 It should be noted that RP-GC, art 130(4) applies to a response to an application made under RP-GC, art 130(1) whereas RP-GC, art 130(5) applies in the case of an application under RPGC, art 130(2). 64 RP-ECJ, art 151(3); RP-CST, art 83(2). 65 As a pleading, ‘observations’ are not usually expected to contain a form of order; but the prudent course is to treat the ‘observations’ like any other pleading and set out both a form of order and the pleas and arguments relied on in support. 66 See Ch 9. 67 However, in Cases 532, 534, 567, 600, 618 and 660/79 Amesz v Commission and Council [1981] ECR 2569 the Council, which had made the application under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151, wrote to the Court, maintaining its position, after the lodging of the reply. 68 Case C-360/02P Ripa di Meana v Parliament [2004] ECR I-10339, para 35 of the judgment (p 10357). 69 Eg Case 19/72 Thomik v Commission [1972] ECR 1155, order of 4 October 1972 (unreported). 70 RP-ECJ, art  151(5); RP-GC, art  130(7); RP-CST, art  83(3). Eg Case 175/83 Culmsee v Economic and Social Committee and Council [1984] ECR 3321 and Case T-3/90 Prodifarma v Commission [1991] ECR II-1, para 16. 71 See, for example, Cases 59 and 60/79 Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Vins de Table et Vins de Pays v Commission [1979] ECR 2425 and 2429 respectively.

529

6.15  Procedural issues

action continues and the President prescribes new time limits for the further steps in the proceedings.72 It does not follow that the admissibility question will then be heard and determined at the same time as the merits of the case. The ordering of the decision(s) on the various issues in the case is a matter that falls within the procedural discretion of the Court. It may decide to take all points together or one point (whether admissibility or merits) before another.73 If the procedural issue has raised the question of the jurisdiction of the GC or, as the case may be, the CST, and it has decided that either the ECJ or the GC has jurisdiction over the action, the case is referred to whichever of those courts has jurisdiction.74 6.15 The criterion adopted by the Court for deciding whether or not to open the oral procedure has been expressed in various ways: for example, where there is ‘need’75 or there are ‘grounds’76 for doing so or where it is ‘necessary’.77 The different terms used express the same idea: if it is possible to come to a decision on the basis of the written submissions, the oral procedure will not be opened.78 It should be observed that the notion of ‘need’, ‘necessity’ or ‘grounds’ is not immutable and varies according to the nature of the decision which the Court feels it must take. By way of illustration, in the case of a preliminary objection as to admissibility, the Court must be convinced by the written submissions that the action is inadmissible before it can dismiss it without hearing the parties. If there is some doubt, the oral procedure should be opened. On the other hand, it does not have to be convinced beyond doubt if it takes the view that it is better to reserve a decision on admissibility until the final judgment. If the Court has serious doubts on the merits of the objection to admissibility, it should, in general, decide to reserve its decision until the final judgment in order to avoid prolonging the proceedings: if there is a hearing on the application made under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83, and the Court decides at the end of the day to reject it, the action continues, there will be a second hearing, advocate

72 RP-ECJ, art 151(6); RP-GC, art 130(8); RP-CST, art 83(3), 2nd subpara. In Case T-11/90 HS v Council [1992] ECR II-1869, order of 15 January 1991, the defendant’s preliminary objection to admissibility was joined to the substance, the order stating that the rest of the written procedure would in particular enable the parties to clarify their position regarding the issues in the case. 73 Eg Case C-23/00P  Council v Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH and another [2002]  ECR  I-1873, para  52, followed in Case T-196/03 European Federation for Cosmetic Ingredients v Parliament and Council [2004] ECR II-4263, paras 12–16. 74 RP-GC, art 130(7); RP-CST, art 83(3), 3rd subpara. 75 Case 192/80 Geist v Commission [1981] ECR 1387; Case 141/80 Hebrant (née Macevicius) v European Parliament [1980] ECR 3509; Case 48/79 Ooms v Commission [1979] ECR 3121; Cases 219–228, 230–235, 237–238, 240–242/80 André v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 1879. 76 Fédération Nationale v Commission (above, note 71). 77 Case 618/79A Knoeppel v Commission and Council [1981] ECR 2387; Case 567/79A Flamm v Commission and Council [1981]  ECR  2383; Case 295/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1984] ECR 3331; Case 296/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1984] ECR 3335. 78 Eg Case 82/84 Metalgoi SpA  v Commission [1984]  ECR  2585; Cases 83 and 84/84  NM  v Commission and Council [1984]  ECR  3571, para  8; Case 135/84  FB  v Commission [1984] ECR 3577, para 5; Case T-114/99 CSR Pampryl SA v Commission [1999] ECR II-3331, para 40.

530

Procedural issues 6.18

general’s opinion (where applicable) and judgment, adding several months to the total length of the proceedings. 6.16 If the Court decides to open the oral procedure, the date is fixed for the hearing and the proceedings follow as in an ordinary direct action: after the hearing the advocate general (where there is one) delivers his opinion in open court and the Court then makes its decision. Once again, the Court may decide between upholding the application under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83, dismissing it or reserving its decision until the final judgment. Save where it upholds a preliminary objection as to admissibility or some other application whose success brings the proceedings to an end, the action continues and the President prescribes new time limits for the further steps in the proceedings.79 The Court may decide to reserve a decision on admissibility if the question cannot be disentangled from the substance of the case80 but it is more usual for the issue to be resolved immediately. 6.17 There is in principle no limit on the number of applications concerning preliminary issues not going to the substance of the case that may be made by a party under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83. For reasons of procedural economy, all matters considered by a party to merit such an application should be included in the same application. Depending upon the circumstances, however, it may not be possible to avoid a multiplicity of different applications. An application that has been rejected cannot be renewed by the same party unless there is a change in circumstances that might justify a reconsideration of the point at issue. In the case of objections to admissibility, it is not clear if a party can make a succession of applications (relying on different grounds). To do so would appear to be vexatious and would tend to delay the disposal of the case. In most instances, there will be no good reason why a subsequent objection to admissibility could not have been raised earlier. Whether that is so or not, the Court may avoid any risk of delay or of a vexatious use of the rules of procedure by joining subsequent objections to the substance of the case. 6.18 The withdrawal of an application for a procedural issue to be determined does not prevent the Court from taking the point itself if it is one that the Court can and should take of its own motion (typically admissibility points)81 or, more generally, if the point needs to be decided in order for the proceedings to be conducted efficiently and fairly (as in the case of the ordering of a measure of enquiry).

79 RP-ECJ, art  151(6), RP-GC, art  130(8) and RP-CST, art  83(3), 2nd subpara, refer to the prescribing of new time limits only in the case of a refusal of the application or the reserving of the decision until final judgment; but there may be other cases in which it is necessary to prescribe new time limits. 80 Cf Cases 106, 107/63 Alfred Toepfer KG and Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v Commission [1965] ECR 429. 81 Eg Case T-140/95 Ryanair Ltd v Commission [1998] ECR II-3327, paras 13 and 22–23.

531

Chapter 7

Admissibility

I INTRODUCTION 7.1 An objection to the admissibility of a proceeding before the Court is not a true defence to the claim made or answer to the issues of substance raised, but a plea that the Court is barred for some reason from entertaining the proceeding with the result that it must dismiss it without considering the merits of the case.1 There are various ways of classifying objections to admissibility. It is usual to distinguish between the admissibility of the cause of action and the admissibility of the application commencing proceedings. If the action is inadmissible, it follows that the application is also barred; on the other hand, if the former is admissible, the inadmissibility of the application does not, in itself, prevent the proceedings from being recommenced. Another division lies between objections to admissibility which are mandatory and must be raised by the Court of its own motion, irrespective of the wishes of the parties, and objections which can be raised only by the parties so that a failure to plead them means that they are waived. A third possible division is between the general conditions of admissibility applicable in most proceedings and the particular conditions applicable in specific types of proceedings. The last are adequately dealt with in most of the leading books on the principal actions which can be brought before the Court2 and are only briefly touched upon here. The object of this chapter is simply to give a general description of the different objections to admissibility and the procedures by which they may be raised and decided. Some aspects of admissibility that are of particular relevance to the status of a person as a party to proceedings are also discussed in Chapter 3 above. 7.2 By way of general remark, the admissibility of an action is determined by reference to the situation prevailing when the proceedings are commenced; if at that time the conditions for bringing proceedings are not satisfied, the action is inadmissible unless the defect is rectified subsequently but within the period

1 See generally De Soto in Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der EG (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1965), pp 48 ff. Accordingly, it is no answer to an objection to admissibility to say that the action is manifestly well-founded: Case T-264/03 Schmoldt v Commission [2004] ECR II1515, paras 146–150. 2 A summary of the different actions that can be brought before the Court is to be found in Ch 17 below.

533

7.2  Admissibility

for bringing the proceedings.3 Lack of capacity and lack of interest are, however, two factors that, if they exist at the time of the commencement of proceedings, are objections to the admissibility of the proceedings but that are also capable of supervening at any time in the course of the proceedings, even if neither existed at the time of their commencement. The loss of capacity or of the required interest at some time in the course of the proceedings (but after their commencement and before the delivery of judgment) does not render the proceedings inadmissible but may be a reason for holding that the proceedings have become devoid of object (or purpose) and that there is no need to adjudicate upon them.4 Further, an objection to the admissibility of proceedings commenced by a person cannot be avoided by that person joining in an application made by other persons against whom the objection cannot be raised: an application brought jointly by several persons is not admissible in respect of them all if, in relation to some of them, it is inadmissible; equally, it is not inadmissible in relation to them all but 3 Eg Case 50/84 Bensider v Commission [1984] ECR 3991, para 8; Case T-28/90 Asia Motor France SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-2285, para 30 (conditions for bringing the proceedings satisfied when proceedings commenced; subsequent change in circumstances has no bearing on admissibility); Case T-236/00R-II  Stauner v Parliament and Commission [2001]  ECR II-2943, para  49; Case T-131/99 Shaw v Commission [2002]  ECR II-2023, para  29; Case T-219/01 Commerzbank AG v Commission [2003] ECR II-2843, para 61; Cases T-273/06 and T-297/06 ISD Polska sp. z.o.o. v Commission [2009] ECR II-2185, paras 42–45; Case T-461/08 Evropaiki Dynamiki v European Investment Bank [2011] ECR II-6367, para 28; Case T-176/09 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2011] ECR II-150*, para 48; Case T-115/10 United Kingdom v Commission [2011] ECR II-153*, para 47; Case T-517/12 Alro SA v Commisison, 16 October 2014, para 46; Case T-129/13 Alpiq RomIndustries v Commission, 16 October 2014, para 44. 4 Eg Case T-162/94 NMB France SARL v Commission [1996] ECR II-427, paras 42–46 (despite the case number, the action started in 1992); Case T-353/94 Postbank NV  v Commission [1996] ECR II-921, paras 47–49 (loss of sufficient interest during the course of the proceedings did not in that case cause the action to be devoid of purpose because there was an alternative basis on which an interest could be asserted); Case T-13/96  TEAM  Srl v Commission [1997]  ECR II-983, paras 28–29. The situation is referred to, elliptically, in Case T-229/02 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdistan National Congress v Council [2005] ECR II539, para 30. The repeal and replacement of the decisions initially contested in the proceedings gave rise to the need to amend the form of order in the application, which was technically possible for the reason stated in para 29 of the judgment; but the possibility of dealing with a supervening event of that nature did not mean that the admissibility of the action, determined as at the commencement of the proceedings, could be ignored. The reference by the GC to the continuance of an interest in bringing the proceedings shows that it considered (rightly) that that interest is not something that is determined once and for all at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. In Cases T-30/01 to T-32/01 and T-86/02 to T-88/02 Territorio Historico de Alava - Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2009]  ECR II-2919, paras 344–363, the GC held that the initial wave of actions had become devoid of purpose as a result of the making of the decisions contested in the second wave of actions. Two reasons for that were given: as a result of the later decisions, the annulment of the earlier ones would not affect the applicants’ position (paras 345 and 348); and, as the lawfulness of the later decisions had been upheld, the applicants had no interest in seeking the annulment of the earlier decisions (para 355). In Cases C-399/06P and C-403/06P Hassan and Ayadi v Council and Commission [2009] ECR I-11393, para 58, the ECJ suggested that a supervening loss of interest could lead to an appeal being declared inadmissible or devoid of purpose. It is difficult to see how the appeal would be inadmissible; and it is noteworthy that, in the following paras, the ECJ focused on whether or not it was devoid of purpose (eg para 62). On the situations in which proceedings may be terminated without judgment, see further Ch 2, paras 2.156–2.164.

534

Admissibility 7.3

is admissible in respect of those applicants who are able to satisfy the conditions required for its admissibility.5 In practice, for reasons of procedural economy, the Court is not usually concerned to investigate and rule on the admissibility of a joint applicant as long as the action is admissible by reference to one of the joint applicants.6

II

OBJECTIONS TO ADMISSIBILITY

A

Lack of jurisdiction

7.3 The Court’s competence (that is to say, its jurisdiction) to hear a matter is defined in the Treaties and the other instruments giving it jurisdiction. All proceedings must therefore be founded on a specific provision or provisions; the Court has no inherent jurisdiction7 and cannot be given jurisdiction simply by

5 Bensider (above, note 3) at 4000 (Advocate General Mancini); Case T-434/04 Milbert v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-273, II-A-2-1423, para 30 (in relation to interest). Cf Case 297/86 CIDA v Council [1988] ECR 3531, paras 7–13 (the action was dismissed as inadmissible so far as one of the applicants was concerned but was admissible in regard to the remaining applicants). In Case C-100/07  ER  v Commission [2007]  ECR  I-136*, paras 16–20, the ECJ pointed out that, in the case of a joint action, each applicant must demonstrate that his claim is both admissible and well-founded. In that case, the action had been held to be inadmissible so far as two of the applicants were concerned and unfounded as to the remainder. It followed that an appeal brought by the former concerned only the decision on the admissibility of their claims. 6 Case C-313/90 Comite International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthetiques (CIRFS) v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, paras 30–31; Case T-435/93 Association of Sorbitol Producers within the EC (ASPEC) v Commission [1995] ECR II-1281, para 72; Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services Lrd v Commission [1998]  ECR II-3141, para 61; Cases T-125/96 and T-152/96 Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH v Council and Commission [1999]  ECR II-3427, paras 174–175; Case T-317/02 Federation des industries condimentaires de France (FICF) v Commission [2004]  ECR II-4325, paras 39–42; Case T-282/06 Sun Chemical Group BV v Commission [2007] ECR II-2149, paras 49–53 (and the cases cited there); Case T-112/05 Akzo Nobel NV  v Commission [2007]  ECR II-5049, paras 29–32; Cases T-254/00, T-270/00 and T-277/00 Hotel Cipriani SpS v Commission [2008] ECR II-3269, paras 43 (lis pendens) and 114 (locus standi); Case T-253/04 Kongra-Gel v Council [2008]  ECR II-46*, para  79; Case T-151/05 Nederlandse Vakbond Varkenshouders (NVV) v Commission [2009] ECR II-1219, paras 45–48; ISD Polska (above, note 3), paras 47–48; Case T-326/07 Cheminova v Commission [2009]  ECR II-2685, paras 67–69; Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava - Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2009] ECR II-3029, paras 75–78; Case T-187/11 Trabelsi v Council, 28 May 2013, para 34; Case T-538/13 Verein Natura Havel eV v Commission, 2 September 2014, para 27; Case T-190/12 Tomana v Council and Commission, 22 April 2015, paras 71–72. There are usually no costs implications in allowing a joint applicant to participate in the proceedings, even if an action brought independently by that person would have been inadmissible, because, if the action is admissible in relation to one joint applicant, the costs of the action would be incurred by the defendant in any event and a joint applicant does not incur costs additional to those incurred by the other joint applicants. 7 See Ch 1, paras 1.18 and 1.20–1.21. Inherent jurisdiction is not the same as implied jurisdiction.

535

7.4  Admissibility

the consent of the parties.8 Where the contested act is based on more than one of the Treaties or relates simultaneously and indivisibly to the spheres of more than one Treaty, an action is admissible if and to the extent that the jurisdiction of the Court and the remedies provided for by the relevant provisions of any one of the Treaties are applicable.9 The Court’s lack of jurisdiction is something which the Court must raise of its own motion.10 RP-ECJ, art 53(1), RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81 provide that, ‘where it is clear that the [Court] has no jurisdiction’ to hear and determine a case (or take cognisance of an action), the Court may give a decision on the action (RP-CST, art 81 also applies to lack of jurisdiction over a particular claim in the action). Lack of jurisdiction is also an ‘absolute bar to proceeding with a case’ within the meaning of RP-ECJ, art 150, RP-GC, art 129 and RP-CST, art 82.11 In both instances, the Court may act of its own motion (as it is obliged to do). ‘Lack of competence’ may be raised by a party under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(1) and RP-CST, art 83. In the particular case of lack of jurisdiction because one or other of the ECJ, GC or CST has jurisdiction, provision is made for the referral of the case to whichever of the three has jurisdiction.12 Otherwise, the case is dismissed as inadmissible. The division of jurisdiction between the ECJ, the GC and the CST has already been described.13 7.4 Lack of jurisdiction can be considered under two headings: ratione materiae and ratione personae. In the first the Court has no jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the proceedings. In the second it lacks jurisdiction over one or both of the parties.14 Without attempting a comprehensive statement of the situations in which the Court lacks jurisdiction, the position can broadly speaking be illustrated by the following examples. 8 Its jurisdiction to arbitrate and to settle disputes between the member states referred to it by special agreement is conferred on it by TFEU, arts 272 and 273. For the Court’s reluctance to entertain references for a preliminary ruling submitted to it by consent of the parties to the proceedings before the referring court, see Case 104/79 Foglia v Novello [1980] ECR 745 and Case 244/80 Foglia v Novella (No 2) [1981] ECR 3045 (and the abundant literature which has grown up concerning both cases). 9 Case 230/81 Luxembourg v European Parliament [1983] ECR 255; Case 222/83 Municipality of Differdange v Commission [1984] ECR 2889, para 6. 10 Eg Case 294/83 Parti ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986]  ECR  1339. para  19; Case T-19/90 von Hoessle v Court of Auditors [1991] ECR II-615, para 28; Case C-564/13P Planet AE  Anonymi Etaireia Parochis Symvouleftikon Ypiresion v Commission, 26  February 2015, para 20 (on appeal from Case T-489/12 Planet AE Anonymi Etaireia Parochis Symvouleftikon Ypiresion v Commission, 9 September 2013). 11 Eg Cases 31 and 33/62 Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG and Alfons Lüttick GmbH v Commission [1962] ECR 501 and Cases 105/79 and 68/80 References for a Preliminary Ruling by the Acting Judge at the Tribunal d’Instance, Hayange [1979] ECR 2257 and [1980] ECR 771. 12 Statute, art  54, 2nd para, Annex, art  8(2); RP-GC, art  127; RP-CST, art  80 and 83(3), 3rd subpara. 13 See Ch 1, para 1.18 ff. For the referral of a case from the Court lacking jurisdiction to the Court with jurisdiction, see Ch 2, para 2.20 ff. 14 Case C-399/97 Glasoltherm SARL v Commission [1998] ECR I-4521 contains examples of lack of jurisdiction ratione personae (paras 7–8) and ratione materiae (paras 9–12). Cases T-479/93 and T-559/93 Bernardi v Commission [1994]  ECR II-1115, paras 27–28 and 31, could be regarded as instances of lack of jusridiction either ratione personae or ratione materiae.

536

Admissibility 7.5

7.5 In general, the Court lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae when the relief sought in the proceedings falls outside the scope of the relief that it is empowered to grant either because no action or proceeding in respect of the matter in question lies before the Court15 or because, if there is such an action or proceedings, the relief sought goes beyond the relief that may be granted in the context of that action or proceeding.16 In references for a preliminary ruling the Court lacks 15 Eg Case T-149/00 Innova v Commission [2001] ECR II-1, paras 25–30 (no jurisdiction over contractual dispute); Case T-337/03 Bertelli Galvez v Commission [2004] ECR II-1041; Case C-160/03 Spain v Eurojust [2005] ECR I-2077, paras 38–40 (no jurisdiction under the Treaty); Case T-299/04 Selmani v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-20*, paras 52–59 (jurisdiction excluded by the Treaties: see now TFEU, art  275); Case C-214/08P  Guigard v Commission [2009] ECR I-91* (no jurisdiction over a contractual dispute over which the Brussels courts had jurisdiciton under a choice of jurisdiction clause; and no jurisdiction over a consequential damages claim – overruling Case T-301/05 Guigard v Commission [2008]  ECR II-31*). In some instances, an apparent lack of jurisdiction can be sidestepped: see, for example, Case T-231/04 Greece v Commission [2007] ECR II-63, paras 73–74. However, that is not so in all cases: eg Case T-85/01 IAMA Consulting Srl v Commission [2003] ECR II-4973, paras 41–55 (attempt to convert contractual claim into an action for annulment; reversed only in relation to the Commission’s counterclaim in Case C-517/03 Commission v IAMA Consulting Srl, order of 27 May 2004); Cases T-314/03 and T-378/03 Musee Grevin SA v Commission [2004] ECR II-1421. 16 Eg Case 81/83 Acciaiere e Ferriere Busseni SpA  v Commission [1984]  ECR  2951, para  25; Case 53/84 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3595 (claim for a declaration made in an action for damages); Case 162/84 Vlachou v Court of Auditors [1986] ECR 481 at 487 per Advocate General Lenz (claim for mandatory order in a staff case); Case 53/85 Akzo Chemie BV and Akzo Chemie UK Ltd v Commission [1986] ECR 1965 at para 23 (claim for the return of documents); Case 15/85 Consorzio Cooperativo d’Abruzzo v Commission [1987] ECR 10005, para 18; Cases 142 and 156/84 British American Tobacco Co Ltd and R J Reynolds Industries Inc v Commission [1987] ECR 4487 at para 13 (claim for a mandatory order in an action for annulment); Case 207/86 Asociación Professional de Empresarios de Pesca Comunitarios (Apesco) v Commission [1988] ECR 2151 at para 31 (idem); Case 108/88 Cendoya v Commission [1989] ECR 2711 at paras 8–9 (claim for declarations); Case T-1/90 Pérez-Minguez Casariego v Commission [1991]  ECR II-143 at para  91 (claim for a mandatory order in relation to execution of a judgment); Case C-63/89 Les Assurances du Crédit et Compagnie Belge d’Assurances Crédit SA v Council and Commission [1991] ECR I-1799 at para 30 (claim for injunction in a damages action); Case C-199/91 Foyer Culturel du Sart-Tilman v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-2667 at paras 17–18 (claim for payment of a sum of money in an action for annulment); Case T-56/92 Koelman v Commission [1993] ECR II-1267, para 18 (a general example of lack of jurisdiction); Cases T-479/93 and T-559/93 Bernardi v Commission (above, note 14), paras 33 and 35; Case T-74/92 Ladbroke (Deutschland) GmbH v Commission [1995] ECR II-115, paras 74–76; Case 146/95 Bernardi v Parliament [1996]  ECR II-769, paras 23–24; Case T-66/95 Kuchlenz-Winter v Commission [1997] ECR II-637, para 26 (mandatory order; relief directed at a member state); Case C-224/03 Italy v Commission [2003] ECR I-14751 (claim for a declaration); Case T-202/02 Makedoniko Metro v Commission [2004] ECR II-181, paras 52–54 (claim for directions); Case T-29/03 Comunidad Autonoma de Andalucia v Commission [2004] ECR II-2923, para 26; Case T-322/03 Telefon & Buch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR II-835, paras 22–24; Case T-91/06 Theofilopoulos v Commission [2007] ECR II-5*, paras 21–22 (claim for physical return of letters of guarantee); Case T-46/06 Galileo Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2007]  ECR II-93*, paras 25–26; Case T-51/07 Agrar-Invest-Tatschl GmbH  v Commission [2008] ECR II-2825, paras 27–28 (no jurisdiction to issue directions even where the Commission lacks discretion); Kongra-Gel (above, note 6), paras 47–48 (claim for findings of fact and discretionary relief); Case T-137/07 Portela - Comercio de artigos ortopedicos e hospitalares Lds v Commission [2008]  ECR II-329*, para  46; Case T-285/08 Securvita v

537

7.5  Admissibility

jurisdiction ratione materiae where the questions which it has been called on to answer do not concern the interpretation or, as the case may be, the validity of the acts specified in the provision conferring jurisdiction on the Court;17 where it is manifest that the dispute before the referring court is contrived or fictitious in character;18 where it is manifest that the subject matter of the reference is irrelevant to the litigation before the referring court or entirely hypothetical;19 Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II2171 (claim for the alteration of a decision of a Board of Appeal); ISD Polska (above, note 3), para 78 (note para 79: relief implicit in the main relief sought); Case T-414/07 Europeenne de traitement de l’information v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-2505, para 10; Case T-380/06 Vischim Srl v Commission [2009] ECR II-3911, paras 46–47 (claim for issue of directions) and 48–56 (claim that partial annulment is inadmissible because the provisions in question are not severable). 17 Eg Case C-104/08 Kurt v Burgermeister der Stadt Wels [2008] ECR I-97* (questions unrelated to matters covered by EU law). For example, the Court does not have jurisdiction to apply a provision of EU law to the facts of a particular case or to rule on the validity of a provision of national law: eg  Case 237/82 Jongeneel Kaas v Netherlands [1984]  ECR  483, para  6; Case 97/83  CMC  Melkunie BV  [1984]  ECR  2367, para  7; Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen v Inspecteur der Vennootschapsbelasting [1984]  ECR  3435, para  10; Case 137/84 Ministère Public v Mutsch [1985]  ECR  2681, para  6; Case 298/84 Iorio v Azienda Autonoma delle Ferrovie dello Stato [1986] ECR 247, para 8; Case 54/85 Ministère Public v Mirepoix [1986] ECR 1067, para 6. But that does not prevent it from giving the referring court guidance that will assist it in performing that function: eg Case C-254/08 Futura Immobiliare srl Hotelera Futura v Comune di Casoria [2009] ECR I-6995, para 28. The Court also cannot answer a question relating to the interpretation of an act that has not been adopted: Case 93/78 Mattheus v Doego [1978] ECR 2203. On the other hand, the Court has jurisdiction irrespective of whether or not the provision of EU law in question is directly applicable: eg  Futura Immobiliare (above), para 34. It has also been held that the objection that the reference raises no question of EU law goes to the answer to be given to the referring court and not to the jurisdiction of the Court: Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan [1991]  ECR  I-4685, paras 14–15. In order to deal with an apparent defect in the admissibility of the reference, the Court may use the information with which it has been provided in order to reformulate the questions referred so as to produce an admissible question: eg Case C-350/07 Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v Mascinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft [2009] ECR I-1513, paras 24–27. 18 Eg Case 104/79 Foglia v Novello and Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello (No 2) (above, note 8); Case 267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA NV  [1988]  ECR  4769, para  12 (and at 4783 per Advocate General Mancini); Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi v Belgium [1990]  ECR  I-3763, para 40; Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher v Oberfinanzdirecktion Köln [1990] ECR I-4003, para 23; Kattner Stahlbau (above, note 17), para 29; Case C-260/07 Pedro IV Servicios SL v Total Espana SA [2009] ECR I-2437, para 33. 19 Eg Dzodzi v Belgium (ibid), para 40; Gmurzynska-Bscher v Oberfinanzdirektion Köln (ibid), para  23; Case C-368/89 Crispoltoni v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi di Città di Castello [1991] ECR I-3695, para 11; Case C-186/90 Durighello v Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale [1991] ECR I-5773, para 9; Case C-319/97 Kortas [1999] ECR I-3143, paras 15–17 (p  3167); Case C-256/97 Demenagements-Manutention Transport SA  [1999]  ECR  I-3913, paras 9–16 (pp 3930–3932); Case C-60/98 Butterfly Music Srl v Carosello Edizioni Musicali e Discografiche Srl [1999]  ECR  I-3939, paras 12–14 (p  3963); Case C-380/01Schneider v Bundesministerium fur Justiz [2004]  ECR  I-1389, para  31; Case C-466/07 Klarenberg v Ferrotron Technologies GmbH [2009] ECR I-803, paras 25–35 (note the unwillingness of the Court to open up a dispute concerning the correspondence of the questions referred to the facts before the referring court); Kattner Stahlbau (above, note 17), para 29; Case C-345/06 Heinrich [2009] ECR I-1659, para 37; case C-169/07 Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Wiener Landesregierung [2009] ECR I-1721, para 25; Pedro IV (above, note 18), para 33; Case

538

Admissibility 7.5

or where the order for reference fails to identify the factual and legal context of the reference and the reasons for it.20 In an action for annulment, the Court lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae where the contested act does not exist;21 where it does not have the required legal effect,22 such as a preparatory act;23 where the

C-544/07 Ruffler v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wroclawiu Osrodek Zamiejscowy w Walbrzychu [2009] ECR I-3389, para 38; Case C-158/08 Agenzia Dogane Ufficio delle Dogane di Trieste v Pometon SpA  [2009]  ECR  I-4695, paras 13–14; Case C-537/07 Gomez-Limon SanchezCamacho v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social [2009] ECR I-6525, para 24–28; Case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling SA v Odemis [2009] ECR I-6653, paras 25–31. As the cases cited show, unless the inadmissibility of the reference is manifest, the Court leaves the question of the relevance of the reference, to the litigation before the referring court, to the referring court to determine. 20 Cases C-28/98 and C-29/98 Charreire v Directeur des Services Fiscaux de la Moselle [1999]  ECR  I-1963; Case C-325/98 Anssens v Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Nord [1999] ECR I-2969; Klarenberg (above, note 19), para 27; Kattner Stahlbau (above, note 17), para 29; Pedro IV (above, note 18), para 33; Ruffler (above, note 19), para 38; Pometon (above, note 19), paras 13–14; Gomez-Limon Sanchez-Camacho (above, note 19), para 25; Mono Car Styling (above, note 19), para 28. There must be a complete failure to provide the necessary contextual information. A partial failure does not lead to the inadmissibility of the reference, as long as the Court has sufficient information to give a useful answer, eg: Case C-295/97 Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio SpA  v International Factors Italia SpA [1999] ECR I-3735, paras 22–27 (pp 3758–3759); Pedro IV (above, note 18), paras 29– 30. Cf Cases C-124/08 and C-125/08 Snauwaert v Belgium [2009] ECR I-6793, paras 14–18 (alleged insufficient reasoning in the order for reference); Case C-126/08 Distillerie Smeets Hasselt NV v Belgium [2009] ECR I-6809, paras 15–20 (same). 21 Eg Case 25/86 Suss v Commission [1986]  ECR  3929, para  5; Case T-64/89 Automec Srl v Commission [1990]  ECR II-367, para  41; Cases T-79, T-84 to T-86, T-89, T-91, T-92, T-94, T-96, T-102 and T-104/89  BASF AG  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-315 (Re PVC  Cartel); Case T-11/90  H.S. v Council [1992]  ECR II-1869, paras 21–24; Case T-16/91 Rendo NV  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-2417, para  39; Case T-46/90 Devillez v European Parliament [1993]  ECR II-699, para  12; Case T-29/93 Calvo Alonso-Cortes v Commission [1993]  ECR II-1389, para 40; Comunidad Autonoma de Andalucia v Commission (above, note 16), paras 28–40; Case T-435/05 Brink’s Security Luxembourg SA  v Commission [2009]  ECR II-3233, paras 55–59. 22 Eg Case T-135/89 Pfloeschner v Commission [1990] ECR II-153, paras 11–14; Case C-64/93 Donatab Srl v Commission [1993] ECR I-3595. Cf Case T-171/06 Laytoncret Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-539, para 21; Brink’s Security (above, note 21), paras 60–78. In Case T-107/06 Inet Hellas v Commission [2009]  ECR II-4591, para  53, it was held that a measure is challengeable if it affects the applicant’s interests by significantly altering the applicant’s legal situation. As the discussion from then on until the end of the judgment shows, that observation concerns the legal effects of a challengeable measure and is not to be confused with the question of the applicant’s interest in challenging it (considered below). 23 Eg Case T-279/04 Editions Odile Jacob SAS  v Commission [2010]  ECR II-185*, paras 89– 92. On the challengeability of preparatory acts, see also: Case 60/81  IBM  v Commission [1981] ECR 2639; Case T-48/03 Schneider Electric v Commission [2006] ECR II-111; Case T-420/05 Vischim Srl v Commission [2009] ECR II-3841, para 237; Case T-195/08 Antwerpse Bouwwerken NV v Commission [2009] ECR II-4439, para 28. An unlawful decision made in the course of a proceeding may, however, affect the legality of the final decision terminating the proceeding, which may therefore be challenged on the ground of the illegality of that prior act. If the prior act does not do so, a challenge to it is not material: Case T-417/05 Endesa SA v Commission [2006] ECR II-2533, paras 58–66 and 72–73.

539

7.6  Admissibility

contested act is not one adopted by an EU institution or other body;24 where the defendant does not have jurisdiction over the matter in dispute;25 or where, in order to decide the case, the Court would have to rule on the compatibility of a provision of national law with EU law.26 An action for damages may be inadmissible by reason of its subsidiary character having regard to the available national remedies;27 and, where it is based on the alleged illegality of an act of an EU institution, it is inadmissible if the act in question has no legal effects.28 In relation to the contractual liability of the EU (or an EU institution), the Court has jurisdiction only if the applicant is able to seise the Court with jurisdiction under an arbitration clause to which the applicant is a party.29 Another example of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae is the use of an inappropriate procedure. In Cases 114–117/79 Fournier née Mazière v Commission30 the wife and children of an official brought actions for damages under what is now TFEU, art  340 based on the unlawfulness of the official’s conditions of employment. What is now TFEU, art 270 gives the Court exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between the EU and its officials. The Court therefore declined jurisdiction, holding: ‘It would be contrary to the system of legal remedies adopted by Community law for rectifying irregularities in conditions of employment to concede that by a misuse of procedure an action for damages based on the same facts may be brought by the members of the family of an official or other servant acting on their behalf, even if they allege that they have personally suffered damage in this connection. These actions do not therefore fall within the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty [now TFEU, art 340]’.31 7.6 In relation to lack of jurisdiction ratione personae, the Court has no jurisdiction over a reference for a preliminary ruling made by a court or body that is not competent to make such a reference32 or by a court that would otherwise 24 Eg Case 46/81 Benvenuto [1981]  ECR  809 (the act was adopted by a member state); Case C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli SpA v Commission [1992] ECR I-6313, paras 9–10; Cases C-181 and C-248/91 European Parliament v Council and Commission [1993] ECR I-3685 para 12 (acts of representatives of the member states acting otherwise than in their capacity as members of the EC Council are not subject to judicial review by the Court). 25 Eg Cases 75, 146 and 147/88 Bonazzi-Bertottilli v Commission [1989] ECR 3599, paras 21–22. 26 Eg Case C-347/87 Triveneta Zuccheri SpA v Commission [1990] ECR I-1083 (the Court can rule on the compatibility of national law with EU law in the context of an action brought under what are now TFEU, arts 258 and 259; but it would prejudge the outcome in such proceedings to deal with such an issue in the context of an action for annulment). 27 Eg Case 175/84 Krohn & Co Import-Export GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1986] ECR 753, paras 27–29; Les Assurances du Crédit v Council and Commission (above, note 16) at 1817 (Advocate General Tesauro). 28 Case C-50/90 Sunzest (Europe) and Sunzest (Netherlands) v Commission [1991] ECR I-2917; Case C-117/91 Bosman v Commission [1991]  ECR  I-4837; Case T-212/06 Bowland Dairy Products Ltd v Commission [2009] ECR II-4073, paras 41 and 43. 29 The Theofilopoulos case (above, note 16), paras 16–20. 30 [1980] ECR 1529. 31 For a similar case see Case 46/75 IBC Srl v Commission [1976] ECR 65. 32 Eg Case 56/84 Von Gallera v Maître [1984] ECR 1769; Case C-14/08 Roda Golf and Beach Resort SL [2009] ECR I-5439, paras 25–30 (in that case, which concerned a Treaty provision that no longer applies, the relevant national law was unclear and the Court concluded that, as the referring court had decided that it could make the reference, there was no basis for contesting

540

Admissibility 7.6

be entitled to make a reference save that there is no dispute pending before it.33 In direct actions, the Court has jurisdiction ratione personae only where all the main parties to the proceedings are the persons specified in the provision giving the Court jurisdiction as being persons (or bodies) who can, respectively, bring and defend the action in question.34 Thus, an action for annulment or for damages is inadmissible to the extent that it is brought against a person or entity other than the (EU) author of the contested measure (in an action for annulment) or an EU institution or other body (in an action for damages).35 Actions for the annulment of a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty are admissible only in so far as particular persons (generally exporters or producers) are concerned.36 Where an act setting up a body, office or agency of the EU specifies that actions against acts of such entities are to be brought against a particular person or body, an action brought against someone else is inadmissible.37 Pursuant to art 91(2) of the Staff jurisdiction); Case C-278/09 Martinez v MGN Ltd [2009] ECR I-11099, paras 10–16 (same as Roda save that the position of the national court was clear). 33 Eg Case 338/85 Fratelli Pardini SpA v Ministero del Commercio con l’Estero [1988] ECR 2041, paras 10–14 (and at 2056–2060 per Advocate General Darmon); Roda Golf and Beach Resort (above, note 32), paras 31–41 (distinction drawn between court functions that are administrative and judicial); Case C-497/08 Amiraike Berlin GmbH [2010] ECR I-101 (reference by a court in its capacity as an administrative authority). 34 Eg Case 276/86 Belkacem v Germany [1986] ECR 3975 (no jurisdiction ratione personae over proceedings brought by individuals against a member state); Case C-285/90 Tsitouras v Greece [1991] ECR I-787 (same); Case T-460/93 Tete v European Investment Bank [1993] ECR II1257 (no jurisdiction over an action brought by a natural person under TFEU, art 271(c)). 35 Eg Case 100/74 CAM SA v Commission [1975] ECR 1393 at 1396 (the action had originally been begun against both the Commission and the Council but the Court ruled that it was inadmissible in so far as it was directed against the latter because the measure challenged was an act of the Commission); Case T-45/06 Reliance Industries Ltd v Council and Commission [2008] ECR II-2399, paras 50–51. But note Case T-49/04 Hassan v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-52*, paras 57–59 (action against Council regulation as amended by Commission admissible against both institutions; reversed on other grounds in Cases C-399/06P and C-403/06P Hassan and Ayadi v Council and Commission, above, note 4). Having regard to TFEU, art 263 in its current form, it is doubtful that the Court would lack jurisdiction ratione personae in any case of an act having legal effect that is adopted by any EU institution or body. Hence, the elaborate reasoning found in cases like Case T-117/08 Italy v Economic and Social Committee [2011] ECR II-1463, paras 29–35, appears no longer to be necessary (in an unreported order dated 16 December 2008, the GC dismissed the action insofar as it was directed against the Commission). In the case of actions for damages, it should also be noted that the question whether the damage suffered was caused by the defendant institution (or body) or by someone else goes to the substance of the case (causation) and not to its admissibility: eg Case T-113/96 Edouard Dubois et Fils v Council and Commission [1998] ECR II-125, para 34; Cases T-440/03, T-121/04, T-171/04, T-208/04, T-365/04 and T-484/04 Arizmendi v Council and Commission [2009] ECR II-4883, para 56. In Cases T-481/93 and T-484/93 Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens v Commission [1995] ECR II-2941, paras 71–74, it was, however, treated as an admissibility issue. 36 Eg Case 240/84  NTN  Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council [1987]  ECR  1809, paras 5–7; Case 255/84 Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council [1987]  ECR  1861, paras 6–8; Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko Co Ltd v Council [1987] ECR 1899, paras 5–7; Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko KK v Council [1987] ECR 1923, paras 6–8. 37 Eg Case T-285/07 Italy v Parliament and Commission, 16 December 2008 (unreported), paras 17–29 (Decision 2002/620 – OJ 2002 No L197/53 – set up an organisation, EPSO, and art 4 of the Decision provided that actions for the annulment of acts of EPSO were to be brought against the Commission; therefore the Parliament could not be a defendant in the action).

541

7.7  Admissibility

Regulations, staff cases must be directed against the official’s appointing authority; the Court does not, therefore, have jurisdiction over an action brought against an institution other than the appointing authority.38 So far as applicants are concerned, lack of jurisdiction ratione personae is often barely distinguishable from the next ground of admissibility to be considered.

B

No locus standi

7.7 Locus standi, in this context, means that a person falls within the category of persons who may bring, or appear before the Court in, a specified type of proceeding. The absence of locus standi may be raised by the Court of its own motion.39 Locus standi depends upon the terms of the provision enabling the action to be brought. For example, TFEU, art 263 lists the persons and entities that may bring an action for annulment. One of the entities listed is the ECB, which may bring an action for annulment under TFEU, art 263 but only for the purpose of protecting its prerogatives. In some cases one of the conditions of locus standi is that the person has sufficient interest. Thus, in the example just given of the ECB, that interest lies in the effect of the contested measure on the ECB’s prerogatives. The classic example, of how locus standi may involve a combination of: (i) identification as a person or body that may bring an action; and (ii) possession of a particular type of interest, is the action for annulment: a natural or legal person40 (for example) may apply for the annulment of a measure which ‘concerns’ them. In the context of the ECSC Treaty that was held to refer to the ‘interest’ which the applicant had in the annulment of the measure.41 In contrast, in actions for annulment under the EC and EAEC  Treaties (now the TFEU), where a natural or legal person may challenge a decision, other than one addressed to that person, only if it is of direct and individual concern to him,42 38 Eg Cases 219–228, 230–235, 237–238, 240–242/80 André v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 1879; Case 567/79A Flamm v Commission and Council [1981] ECR 2383; Case 618/79A  Knoeppel v Commission and Council [1981]  ECR  2387; Case 307/85 Gavanas v Economic and Social Committee and Council [1987] ECR 2435, paras 7–9. 39 De Soto Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der EG, op cit, p 56; Les Verts (above, note 10), para 19; Case 191/87 Covale v Commission [1988] ECR 515, paras 8–11; Case T-27/02 Kronofrance SA  v Commission [2004]  ECR II-4177, para  30; Case C-362/06P  Sahlstedt v Commission [2009] ECR I-2903, para 22. 40 The government of a self-governing territory dependent upon a member state is to be regarded as a ‘natural or legal person’ and not as a member state for these purposes: Case C-298/89 Gibraltar v Council [1993] ECR I-3605, para 14. 41 Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961]  ECR  1 at 16 and 37 (Advocate General Lagrange). That probably meant sufficient interest to bring proceedings (ie locus standi) and did not refer to the interest necessary to allow the claim for annulment to proceed to judgment: the two matters were considered separately by the Court in Cases 7 and 9/54 Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 175 at 190–193. 42 See now TFEU, art 263, 4th para (which also refers to the ability to bring proceedings against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to the legal or natural person concerned and does not entail implementing measures). Direct and individual concern is relevant only if the challenged measure was not addressed to the applicant: see Case C-483/07P Galileo Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2009] ECR I-959, para 29.

542

Admissibility 7.9

the ‘concern’ which must be shown is a formal requirement which distinguishes a particular category of natural or legal persons from the general class of those persons who may be affected by or wish to complain of the measure in question. All other conditions having been fulfilled, the applicant has established his locus standi to bring proceedings when he shows that ‘direct and individual concern’. However, as will be seen, the fact that an applicant has locus standi to bring an action for annulment does not necessarily mean that the applicant has sufficient interest to obtain the annulment of the measure.43 7.8 Although locus standi requirements (apart from the identification of the person or entity that may bring proceedings) can usually be categorised under the heading of ‘interest’ or ‘sufficient interest’, it is generally better to avoid use of those terms because of the risk of confusing standing with what is more usually described as ‘interest’ (or ‘sufficient interest’). The difference between the two concepts can be explained by saying that standing relates to the ability to bring an action whereas ‘interest’ (in the technical sense) relates to the ability to bring the action to a conclusion in the form of a judgment giving the relief proper to the form of action in question (assuming that the applicant would otherwise be entitled to that relief). However, even that ground of distinction is not free from analytical difficulty. It is therefore better to regard locus standi requirements (other than identification of the person or entity able to bring proceedings) as a particular form of interest that is specific to the form of action in question. ‘Interest’, in the commonly used sense, is a general requirement of the admissibility of an action or proceeding. The application of the concept of ‘interest’ in a given procedural context will reflect to some extent the particularities of that context; but it is conceptually rooted in more general considerations concerning the right of access to a court. 7.9 As noted above, in the context of an action for annulment, the standing requirements (other than the requirement of actually being listed as a person or entity having that right of action) take two forms. In the case of the Court of Auditors, the ECB and the Committee of the Regions, an action can be brought ‘for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives’. In the case of natural or legal persons (and save where the challengeable act is addressed to the person in question), an action can be brought where the challengeable act is of ‘direct and individual concern’ or, where the challengeable act is a regulatory act that does not entail implementing measures, it is of ‘direct concern’ to the applicant. In both cases, the question whether or not the prerogatives of the Court of Auditors, the ECB or the Committee of the Regions are engaged or the act is of the relevant ‘concern’ to the person in question is answered in two ways: (i) by reference to the legal effect of the measure in question on the applicant; and (ii)

43 In Case 70/87 Fédération de l’Industrie de l’Huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission [1989]  ECR  1781 (at 1801), however, Advocate General van Gerven suggested that, if the contested act was addressed to the applicant and of direct and individual concern to him, the action is admissible and no further requirements need be satisfied.

543

7.10  Admissibility

by reference to the process leading up to the adoption of the measure.44 The first way is self-explanatory; and the applicant has standing to contest the legality of the merits of the measure.45 The second way arises where, for example, it is asserted that the measure in question was adopted (unlawfully) on a legal basis that excluded a right to participate in the process by which the measure should have been adopted46 or that, even though the correct legal basis for the measure was used, there was a procedural error in the adoption process that infringed the applicant’s rights. In such cases, the applicant has standing to contest the measure only by reference to the (alleged) infringement of the particular procedural right in question. That does not mean that an action for annulment can be brought only on the ground that the procedural right in question has not been observed, as some cases suggest.47 Instead, it means that the action can be brought only in order to protect that right. Accordingly, any plea or argument may be advanced that will lead to the overturning of the challenged act and to the consequent need for the defendant to recommence the decision-making procedure, in the course of which the applicant’s procedural rights will then have to be respected.48

C

Lack of capacity

7.10 Lack of capacity to act in proceedings is a matter which primarily concerns legal and natural persons other than the member states and the EU institutions. That ground of inadmissibility applies where, although the party in question may have locus standi, his capacity to act is challenged by reason of, for example, the fact that he is a minor or, usually in the case of legal persons

44 As to the Court of Auditors, the ECB and the Committee of the Regions, see, by way of analogy: Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council [1990]  ECR  I-2041; Case C-65/90 European Parliament v Council [1992]  ECR  I-4593; Case C-317/04 European Parliament v Council [2005] ECR I-2457; Case C-318/04 European Parliament v Council [2005] ECR I-2467; Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-1885, order of 14 October 2008 (unreported). The cases involving the Parliament were decided before what is now TFEU, art  263 was amended so as to give the Parliament an unrestricted right of action. 45 Eg Case T-177/04 easyJet Airline Co Ltd v Commission [2006]  ECR II-1931, paras 30–39; Vischim (above, note 23), paras 64–79. It is possible for locus standi to change over time. In Case C-336/09P Poland v Commission, 26 June 2012, Poland’s locus standi to bring an action for annulment was initially that of a legal person but, once it became a member state, it obtained locus standi as a member state. 46 Eg Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council (above, note 44). 47 Eg Case T-96/92 Comite Central d’Entreprise de la Societe Generale des Grandes Sources v Commission [1995] ECR II-1213, paras 25–47. 48 Eg Case C-367/95P Commission v Chambre Syndicale nationale des Entreprises de Transport de Fonds et Valeurs (Sytraval) [1998] ECR I-1719, paras 47–48 (in which the applicants were entitled to bring an action alleging that the contested decision was unlawful because of a failure to give reasons, as annulling the decision was the only way in which they could secure compliance with their right to be heard before such a decision was made); Case C-83/09P Kronoply GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2011] ECR I-4441, para 59. The complexities of locus standi in state aid cases are explored in Case C-319/07P 3F v Commission [2009] ECR I-5963, paras 27–40, 57, 78–80 and 85–95.

544

Admissibility 7.12

(including EU institutions),49 no proper authority is given for participating in the proceedings. There are very few cases concerning lack of capacity and, it seems, no clear authority determining whether or not it is an objection that can be waived by the other parties or must be taken by the Court of its own motion.50 In principle, in order for lack of capacity to be an objection to the admissibility of an action (either because the applicant lacks capacity or because the action has been brought against a person lacking capacity), lack of capacity must exist at the time of the commencement of proceedings.51 If lack of capacity occurs during the course of the proceedings, it gives rise to a different procedural situation (no need to give judgment, unless there is another person upon whom the exercise of the rights of the party lacking capacity devolves). 7.11 The law governing capacity is the applicable national law in the sense that that law determines whether or not and, if so, to what extent, the acts of a person or body can have legal effect. The applicable national law does not itself determine the question of capacity so far as proceedings before the Court are concerned: that is a matter governed by EU law which is to be decided by reference to the capacity of the person or body concerned, as defined by the applicable national law.52 7.12 In the case of legal persons the applicable national law is the law of the country in which the legal person in question was incorporated or has its registered office;53 where an unincorporated association or body lacking legal personality is involved, it is the national law governing its activities54 unless the 49 Case C-198/97 Commission v Germany [1999] ECR I-3257, paras 17–22 (pp 3277–3278). In Case T-412/05 M v Ombudsman [2008] ECR II-197*, para 49, the applicant lacked capacity to make a claim on behalf of members of his family. He could have had capacity by means of (in principle) an assignment of their right of action or an authorisation given to him by them to bring proceedings on their behalf. 50 In Case 18/62 Barge v High Authority [1963] ECR 259, the applicant seems to have been the legal representative of the undertaking in question: see per Advocate General Lagrange at 284. 51 Case C-294/02 Commission v AMI Semiconductor Belgium BVBA [2005] ECR I-2175, para 60: see paras 61–62 (dissolved legal person) and 67–72 (legal person against whom insolvency proceedings have been commenced). 52 Hence lack of capacity to be a party to proceedings under national law is not necessarily an objection to capacity to be a party to proceedings before the Court: the essential question is whether or not the capacity recognised by the applicable national law possesses the characteristics required by EU procedural law (see the Bensider case (above, note 3) at 4005 per Advocate General Mancini). 53 Case 18/57  I  Nold KG  v High Authority [1959]  ECR  41; Case C-77/99 Commission v Oder-Plan Architektur GmbH  [2001]  ECR  I-7355, paras 28–30 (a company in liquidation); AMI Semiconductor (above, note 51), para 60. 54 Cf Case 2/68 Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission [1968] ECR 435 at 439 and per Advocate General Roemer at 447; Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986]  ECR  1339, paras 15–18 and 1346–1348 per Advocate General Mancini. In Case C-229/05P Ocalan, on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Vanly, on behalf of the Kurdistan National Congress v Council [2007] ECR I-439 (a case concerning two alleged terrorist organisations), no reference was made to any national law in order to determine whether or not the organisations had capacity to act (at first instance, it had been held that one of the organisations no longer existed as a matter of fact: see Case T-229/02 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdistan National Congress v Council [2005] ECR II-539). Both the GC

545

7.13  Admissibility

body lacking legal personality is a successor to a (legal) person (such as the accumulated assets of a dissolved legal person), in which case, the law of the country in which the legal person was incorporated applies.55 So far as natural persons are concerned, it is their personal law but the position regarding what that law may be is a little unclear. For other purposes56 the Rules of Procedure tend to refer to the country of residence. There seems no better solution to the problem of determining the personal law but there appears to be no authority on the point so far as capacity to act is concerned.57 Other alternatives appear to be the law of the country of which the person in question is a national or the law which has the closest connection to the subject matter of the dispute. One solution which must, however, be rejected, for obvious reasons, is that the Court may pick and choose between different possible national laws, selecting, presumably, the one most favourable to the person in question. Although that approach has a certain air of plausibility,58 it would create uncertainty. 7.13 When a party dies or becomes incapable of continuing proceedings, the applicable national law identifies the person competent to take over the proceedings but the procedural devices whereby that is done are a matter of EU law. So far as can be seen, it is necessary only to prove to the Court that there is capacity under national law to continue the proceedings.

D

Lack of interest

7.14 It has earlier been observed that the locus standi required to bring some proceedings incorporates a condition that the applicant show sufficient interest. In addition, the applicant must invariably show that he has sufficient interest in obtaining the relief sought.59 To take a simple example, TFEU, art 263, 4th para, and the ECJ considered that, in the circumstances of the case, excessive formalism should be avoided (see Case T-229/02, para 28; Case C-229/05P, para 114). In effect, capacity to act was presumed because the alternative would have led to an evident injustice and a breach of human rights. 55 That seems to follow from AMI Semiconductor (above, note 51), paras 61–62. 56 See, in particular, SR-ECJ, Annex II, which identifies the competent authority for the purpose of appointing a lawyer to act for a party in receipt of legal aid. 57 In Case 18/70 Duraffour v Council [1971] ECR 515 an action was brought by the widow of a deceased official ‘acting on her own behalf and as a legal guardian of her infant children’. They appear to have been of French nationality but resided in Brussels. It is unclear what was the national law applicable to determine the widow’s capacity to act on behalf of the children. 58 Why, for example, should a person be held incapable of undertaking legal proceedings before the Court because, in one member state, he would lack capacity if, in another member state, he would not? 59 Cf Case 13/86 von Bonkewitz-Lindner v European Parliament [1987] ECR 1417, para 6; Case 134/87 Vlachou v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 3633, para 8; Case T-388/03 Deutsche Post AG v Commission [2009] ECR II-199, paras 31–57 (locus standi) and 58–65 (interest); Case T-19/06 Mindo Srl v Commission [2011] ECR II-6795, para 80 (see also the discussion at paras 97–99 of the compatibility of the requirement that an interest be shown with the fundamental right of access to a court; the decision was reversed on appeal, for other reasons, in Case C-652/11P Mindo v Commission, 11 April 2013); Case T-165/13 Talanton AE v Commission, 4 December 2014, paras 34, 40 and 71. See also the comments of Advocate General Mancini in

546

Admissibility 7.14

provides that ‘any’ natural or legal person may bring an action for the annulment of an act addressed to that person, an act that is of direct and individual concern to that person or a regulatory act of direct concern to that person (where the regulatory act does not entail implementing measures). There is no express requirement that an applicant should show an interest in having the legality of the act in question reviewed in addition to showing that he falls within the category of potential applicants as so defined. Indeed, in the case of a challenge to an act addressed to a legal or natural person, the applicant need show only that he is an addressee of the act; he does not need to show that it is of direct and individual concern to him (by reference to the criteria that a person who was not an addressee would have to satisfy).60 Nonetheless, it is well established that the admissibility of the action is contingent on there being an ‘interest’, sometimes called a ‘legal’ interest, in the result of the case: the Court does not entertain proceedings brought just for the sake of litigating or to establish a point that is purely abstract or academic. In consequence, in Case 88/76 Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres SA v Commission,61 the Court held the application to be inadmissible due to the lack of any legal interest, even though the applicant in principle had locus standi to bring it: because of its lack of retrospective effect the measure challenged did not in fact apply to the applicant and there was therefore no point in annulling it.62 Lack of interest in bringing proceedings is an absolute bar to the proceedings and may be considered by the Court of its own motion.63 Lack of interest is normally measured by reference to the intended outcome of the proceedings and not by reference to the pleas or arguments relied on in order to

British American Tobacco Co Ltd and R J Reynolds Industries Inc v Commission (above, note 16) at 4546–4549. The position in administrative proceedings is different. The wording of the provision defining the entitlement to commence such proceedings determines whether or not an interest to bring them is required: see Case C-408/08P Lancome parfums et beaute & Cie SNC v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2010] ECR I-1347, paras 36–44. 60 Eg Cases 193 and 194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989] ECR 1045, para 42. 61 [1977] ECR 709. 62 See also: Cases 81 and 119/85 Union Sidérurgique du Nord et de l’Est de la France (USINOR) v Commission [1986] ECR 1777, para 18, where the Court considered of its own motion whether or not the contested decision actually affected the applicant; Case T-41/00 British American Tobacco International (Holdings) BV v Commission [2001] ECR II-1301, paras 19–24. 63 Case 245/85 Geist v Commission [1987]  ECR  2181 at 2190 (Advocate General Darmon); Milbert v Commission (above, note 5), para 29; Case 108/86 GdM v Council and Economic and Social Committee [1987]  ECR  3933, para  10; Cases T-228/00, T-229/00, T-242/00, T-243/00, T-245 to T-248/00, T-250/00, T-252/00, T-256/00 to T-259/00 T-265/00, T-267/00, T-268/00, T-271/00, T-274/00 to T-276/00, T-281/00, T-287/00 and T-296/00 Gruppo ormeggiatori del porto di Venezia Soc. coop. rI v Commission [2005] ECR II-787, para 22; Case C-535/06P Moser Baer India Ltd v Council [2009] ECR I-7051, paras 24; Cases C-399/06P and C-403/06P  Hassan v Council and Commission (above, note 4), para  58; Case T-299/05 Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise Co Ltd v Council [2009] ECR II-565, para 42; Case T-291/06 Operator ARP sp. z.o.o. v Commission [2009]  ECR II-2275, para  26; Case T-19/06 Mindo (above, note 59), para 60; Case T-17/13 ANKO AE v Commission, 6 November 2014, para 30; Case T-64/13 ANKO AE v Commission, 6 November 2014, para 30; Talanton (above, note 59), para 69.

547

7.15  Admissibility

achieve that outcome (as long as the pleas or arguments, if well-founded, would lead to that result).64 7.15 Whether or not an applicant has sufficient interest is assessed by reference to the circumstances existing at the moment the application commencing proceedings is lodged at the Court.65 If, due to a change of circumstances after that date, the applicant ceases to have any interest in continuing with the proceedings (a matter that the Court can raise of its own motion),66 the action is not inadmissible but there is no reason for the Court to proceed to judgment and the continuation of proceedings may well be an abuse of process entitling the Court to order the applicant to pay the costs arising after the date on which the proceedings should have been discontinued.67 However, it should be noted that a change in circumstances after the commencement of proceedings may have differing 64 Cf the easyJet case (above, note 45), para  41. Earlier cases are to different effect: eg  Case T-256/97 Bureau europeen des unions de consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission [1999] ECR II-169, paras 18–21. The approach taken in such cases reflects the consideration that short-term measures may raise issues of law likely to arise again in the future and it is unsatisfactory for such issues to remain unresolved simply because the proceedings before the Court inevitably last longer than the measures in question. 65 Cases 5–11, 13–15/62 Société Industriale Acciaierie San Michele v High Authority [1962] ECR 449 at 460; Case 14/63 Forges de Clabecq SA v High Authority [1963] ECR 357 at 371; Case T-58/92 Moat v Commission [1993] ECR II-1443, para 32; Case T-16/96 Cityflyer Express v Commission [1998] ECR II-757, para 30; Case T-354/05 Television francaise 1 SA (TFI) v Commission [2009] ECR II-471, para 84; the Shanghai Excell case (above, note 63), para 43; the Porto di Venezia case (above, note 63), para 23; Case T-17/13 ANKO (above, note 63), para 38; Case T-64/13 ANKO (above, note 63, para 38; Talanton (above, note 59), para 34; the Planet case (above, note 10), para 31 (and see paras 32–36 – no interest where, at the time of the commencement of proceedings, no situation requiring legal protection had yet arisen). 66 Case T-19/06 Mindo (above, note 59), para 60. 67 Cf Cases 5, 7 and 8/60 Meroni & Co, FERAM and SIMET v High Authority [1961] ECR 107 at 111–112; Forges de Clabecq SA v High Authority (above, note 65) at 376 (Advocate General Lagrange); Case 15/67 Bauer v Commission [1967]  ECR  397 at 402; Case 43/74 Guillot v Commission [1977]  ECR  1309 at 1340 (Advocate General Capotorti) (see also paras 13–14 of the judgment); Case 243/78 Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1980] ECR 593, paras 9 and 11; Case C-123/92 Lezzi Pietro & C. Srl v Commission [1993] ECR I-809 (in that case, the Commission was nonetheless ordered to pay all the costs ); Case T-443/93 Casillo Grani SNC v Commission [1995] ECR II-1375 (the applicant’s interest lay in the fact that it was a competitor of a recipient of state aid; but that interest disappeared when it went into liquidation; see also the explanation in Shaw – above, note 3 – para 34); Case T-28/02 First Data Corpn v Commission [2005] ECR II-4119, paras 35–36 (the event causing the interest to disappear was an action of an intervening party that was beyond the control of the main parties); Case C-362/05P  Wunenburger v Commission [2007]  ECR  I-4333, paras 42–43; the Reliance Industries case (above, note 35), para 35; Shanghai Excell case (above, note 63), para 43; Case T-19/06 Mindo (above, note 59), para  78 (in that case, the costs order was based more on the applicant’s failure to cooperate with the Court: see paras 104–106; the GC judgment was reversed on appeal on other grounds, see above, note 59). The remarks in the Bauer case (at 402) and Case 33/68 Rittweger v Commission [1969] ECR 393, para 9, which tend to suggest that an application may become inadmissible, after it has been lodged, if the defendant concedes the action by voluntarily granting the relief sought, are not compatible with the other authorities, of which the Simmenthal case is a good example. There the Court held that the applicant had no interest in the proceedings after judgment had been handed down in an earlier case. That event took place after the proceedings had been commenced. The application was in consequence dismissed, but not because it was inadmissible.

548

Admissibility 7.16

consequences. The change might or might not have an effect on the applicant’s interest. If the change removes the applicant’s interest in part only, the applicant can still demonstrate an interest (sometimes called, for some reason, a personal interest) in pursuing the case to judgment.68 For example, where the act contested in the proceedings is repealed or revoked in the course of the proceedings and replaced by an act that is materially the same, the applicant has an interest in continuing the proceedings against the replacement act and will be permitted to do so, although he has no interest in continuing the proceedings against the act challenged originally in the action; but the repeal or revocation of an act does not, by itself, deprive the applicant of an interest in contesting its legality where the repeal or revocation operates ex nunc and does not eliminate the past effects of the act in question.69 7.16 The interest required to support an application has been described in various ways: as ‘legitimate, present, vested and sufficiently clear’;70 and as a vested and actual interest or, if the interest concerns a future situation, as derived from an impact on that situation that must be immediate and certain.71 In many 68 Eg the Postbank case (above, note 4), paras 47–49, where the applicant had not lost all its interest in bringing proceedings. Thus, where a contested act is repealed or revoked in the course of the proceedings, the applicant has no interest in pursuing the case to judgment so far as the future effects of the act are concerned; but there is an interest in pursuing the case to judgment in relation to effects of the contested act on the applicant that were felt before its revocation or repeal: see, for example, Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006] ECR II-4665, para 35 and note 69 below. In order to remove the interest completely, the repeal or revocation must be retrospective in effect. In First Data (above, note 64), the change was the abolition, by the intervener, of a rule that the Commission had decided to take no action against. The future interest was entirely hypothetical and the past interest insufficient to maintain the proceedings. 69 Whether or not the repeal, revocation or cessation of effect of the contested act causes the applicant to lose his interest in the proceedings depends upon the circumstances: Case C-239/12P Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 28 May 2015, EU:C:2013:331, paras 61– 85; Case C-269/12P Canas v Commission, 28 May 2013, EU:C:2013:415, paras 62–65; Case T-190/12 Tomana v Council and Commission, 22 April 2015, paras 64–67. On the continuation of proceedings against the successor act, see Ch 2, para 2.161. The replacement act is materially the same as the act challenged originally in the proceedings if it affects the applicant in the same way, such that the nature and quality of the applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings and continuing them to judgment has not been affected. On the continued existence of an interest where repeal or revocation is ex nunc, see: Exporteurs in Levende Varkens (above, note 35), paras 46–48. 70 Eg Case 17/78 Deshormes (née La Valle) v Commission [1979] ECR 189, paras 10–12; Cityflyer Express (above, note 65), para 32; Shaw (above, note 3), para 32; Case T-19/06 Mindo (above, note 59), para 77. As the Cityflyer case indicates, the existence of an interest cannot be negated by reliance on a speculative eventuality (see paras 32–33). On the question of the ‘legitimacy’ of the interest, note Cases T-447/93, T-448/93 and T-449.93 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del Cemento (AITEC) v Commission [1995] ECR II-1971, paras 83–84. 71 Case T-138/89 Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging and Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken v Commission [1992]  ECR II-2181, para  33; First Data (above, note 67), paras 34, 38–43 and 47; the TFI case (above, note 65), para  84; the Porto di Venezia case (above, note 63), para  23 (in that case, the interest related to a future and uncertain situation, causing the action to be inadmissible: see paras 26–37); Operator ARP (above, note 63), para  25; Case C-519/07P  Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV  [2009]  ECR  I-8495, paras 63 (advantage) and 65 (vested and present) (note para 66: an interest cannot be denied on the basis

549

7.16  Admissibility

respects the interest required is similar, mutatis mutandis, to that required in order to intervene in a direct action.72 The basic requirement is that the action, if successful, will lead to a change in the applicant’s position; it is not essential for the applicant to show that a right will be vindicated.73 It is enough if the result of the action would be to bring about a change for the better in the applicant’s material position74 or a return to his original position.75 Hence the fact that, in an action for annulment, the applicant has complied with the contested act pending judgment does not deprive the applicant of an interest in obtaining a decision finding it to be void.76 If the result of the action would be actually inconsistent

of an assertion of fact that has not been legally established or is not undisputed); Case T-19/06 Mindo (above, note 59), para 79 (although the GC’s assessment of the facts was defective and its decision was reversed on appeal: see above, note 59); Case T-17/13 ANKO (above, note 63), paras 37 and 39; Case T-64/13 ANKO (above, note 63, paras 37 and 39; Talanton (above, note 59), paras 34–36 and 40–41 (the declaratory nature of an action does not preclude the necessity for there to be a vested and actual interest in bringing it). 72 See Ch 5, para 5.12 ff. 73 Cf Case 26/68 Fux v Commission [1969] ECR 145; Cases 10 and 18/68 Eridania Zuccerifici Nazionali v Commission [1969]  ECR  459 at 491 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 236/82 Brautigam v Council [1985] ECR 2401, para 21; Geist v Commission (above, note 63), para 15; von Bonkewitz-Lindner v European Parliament (above, note 59), para 8; Cases T-369/94 and T-85/95 DIR International Film Srl v Commission [1998] ECR II-357, paras57–58 (annulment would have led only to the situation challenged in the second action – not affected by the judgment on appeal in Case C-164/98P DIR International Film Srl v Commission [2000] ECR I-447); Case C-183/08P Commission v Provincia di Imperia [2009] ECR I-27*, paras 20 and 26 (no effect on any right but an effect on an interest in obtaining an advantage; interest in not being excluded from a selection process). In Case 148/79 Korter v Council [1981] ECR 615, Advocate General Capotorti said (at 634): ‘An interest to sue exists where the decision which is requested of the Court is a means of making good the damage allegedly done to the applicant’s material interest by the conduct of the defendant’. 74 Eg Case 58/75 Sergy v Commission [1976] ECR 1139, para 5; Case T-310/00 MCI v Commission [2004] ECR II-3253, para 44; the TFI case (above, note 65), para 85 (an ‘advantage’); Shanghai Excell case (above, note 63), para 43 (‘advantage’); Antwerpse Bouwwerken (above, note 23), paras 33–37 (third ranking tenderer has an interest in challenging a contract award procedure if there is an impediment to awarding the contract to higher ranked tenderers); Case T-19/06 Mindo (above, note 59), para 77; Case T-200/11 Al Matri v Council, 28 May 2013, para 83 (‘advantage’); Canas (above, note 69), para 79 (advantage - note also paras 15 and 61). ‘Material’ here can mean financial (see Case T-46/90 Devillez v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-699, para 16) but is not limited to that type of interest: an official, for example, may have an interest in preferring some duties to others (Case 7/77 Ritter Von Wüllerstorff und Urbair v Commission [1978]  ECR  769 at para  11); in Canas, paras 66–85, the interest was reputational (clearing one’s name from the taint of association with terrorist groups). In a case where the interest is financial, the argument that the action is inadmissible for lack of interest because of absence of sufficient proof of any obligation to pay the sum claimed goes to the substance of the case and not to its admissibility: Case T-86/91 Very v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-45, para 26. 75 Eg Case 92/78 Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1979] ECR 777, para 32. 76 Cases 172 and 226/83 Hoogovens Groep BV v Commission [1985] ECR 2831, paras 18–19. Case C-299/93 Bauer v Commission [1995]  ECR  I-839, para  15, appears to be inconsistent with that proposition. That was an action based on an arbitration clause in a tenancy agreement. The Commission gave Mr Bauer notice to quit. He brought proceedings under the arbitration clause for a declaration that the termination of the tenancy agreement and the notice to quit were unlawful. He also claimed damages. Shortly after the commencement of proceedings, he surrendered the premises. It was held that, because he had left the premises of his own volition,

550

Admissibility 7.17

with the applicant’s legitimate interests, the applicant has no interest in proceeding with the action.77 The same applies where the action is brought against a measure that the applicant has requested (unless it met his request in part only and, if he were successful, he might be able to better his position).78 The prospect of a change for the better need not be certain.79 The fact that the change may prove contrary to the applicant’s immediate material position is irrelevant80 if the result is to remedy an unlawful situation81 (but a private individual does not usually have sufficient interest to make a point of general importance which does not affect his position).82 7.17 A  person has an interest in the annulment of a decision addressed to him which indicates a course of conduct that he must pursue.83 But an applicant has no interest in obtaining a judgment which will establish that he was in the right, once the defendant has satisfied the claims made.84 On the other hand, even if the action cannot improve the applicant’s immediate material position, sufficient interest may exist if the circumstances are likely to recur, and the judgment will therefore cause the defendant to avoid re-creating or repeating an unlawful

he had no interest in contesting the lawfulness of the termination of the tenancy agreement and the notice to quit. He did have an interest in claiming damages. The decision is to be explained by the facts that Mr Bauer had resisted his expulsion from the premises for a considerable period of time but had eventually bought an apartment of his own, in consequence of which he moved out of the premises. He had therefore voluntarily abandoned any interest in remaining in the premises. That is different from being compelled to comply with a measure whose legality is disputed. 77 Case 134/87 Vlachou v Court of Auditors (above, note 59), paras 9–10. 78 Case 55/88 Katsoufros v Court of Justice [1989]  ECR  3579 at 3586 (Advocate General Tesauro); Case T-144/99 Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office v Commission [2001]  ECR II-1087, paras 30–35 (the applicant had wanted negative clearance in preference to exemption); Case T-354/05 TFI (above, note 65), paras 85–92. 79 Fux v Commission (above, note 73); Case 4/73  J  Nold KG  v Commission [1974]  ECR  491, para 3. 80 Forges de Clabecq SA v High Authority (above, note 65) at 376 (Advocate General Lagrange). 81 Case 20/68 Passetti-Bombardello v Commission [1969] ECR 235, para 6; Cases 55–76, 86, 87, 95/71 Besnard v Commission [1972] ECR 543, paras 24–26; the Deutsche Post case (above, note 59), paras 62–63 (the immediate interest lay in establishing the applicants’ right to be heard, which would enable them to influence the Commission’s decision; a possible consequential disadvantage arising in another action was to be left out of account). 82 Case 85/82 Schloh v Council [1983]  ECR  2105, para  14; Case 204/85 Stroghili v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 389, paras 8–12; Case 111/86 Delauche v Commission [1987] ECR 5345, para 32; Milbert v Commission (above, note 5), paras 32–41 (requirement of a personal interest in the result of the case; general interest in upholding the rule of law insufficient). See, in contrast, cases like the Shanghai Excell case (above, note 63), paras 56–57, which can be explained as a complementary observation where the applicant has already an accumulation of different reasons for holding that there was sufficient interest to bring the action, rather than a standalone ground. 83 Cases 193 and 194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989]  ECR  1045, para  19; Vischim (above, note 23), paras 58–61. 84 Bauer v Commission (above, note 67); Case 108/86 GdM v Council and Economic and Social Committee [1987] ECR 3933.

551

7.17  Admissibility

situation,85 or if the judgment will affect other proceedings.86 Present uncertainty as to a future, contingent right may give rise to a ‘legitimate, present, vested and sufficiently clear interest’;87 but there is no interest in the speculative review of the lawfulness of hypothetical future acts.88 Injury to reputation may also constitute sufficient interest89 as may the loss of a chance.90 An applicant lacks sufficient interest if the grant of the relief sought has become pointless through some action taken by the applicant or a third party.91 The same is true where, although there is sufficient ground to annul a measure (in the cases, usually a procedural defect in its adoption), the measure could certainly be confirmed in substance,

85 Case 92/78 Simmenthal SpA v Commission (above, note 75); Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493 at 1506–1507 (Advocate General Lenz); Postbank (above, note 4), paras 42 and 47–49; Apesco v Commission (above, note 16), para 16; Case T-509/93 Glencore Grain Ltd v Commission [2000] ECR II-3697, para 31; Wunenburger (above, note 67), paras 50–60; the Reliance Industries case (above, note 35), para  43; Moser Baer India (above, note 63), para 25; Shanghai Excell case (above, note 63), paras 46–52. The position is different where a decision is withdrawn so that errors in it can be corrected in a future decision. The defendant cannot be criticised for trying to avoid future proceedings: Case F-77/07 Labate v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-31, II-A-2-159, paras 9 and 11. 86 Case 77/77 Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappij BV v Commission [1978] ECR 1513; potential liability of the applicant; Case 76/79 Karl Könecke Fleischwarenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1980] ECR 665, para 9: potential liability of the defendant; Case 223/85 RijnSchelde-Verolme Maschinenfabrieken en Scheepswerven NV v Commission [1987] ECR 4617, paras 9–11: potential liability of the applicant; Shaw (above, note 3), para 36 (potential damages claim against a third party); First Data (above, note 67), paras 47–52 (no effect on potential proceedings); the Reliance Industries case (above, note 35), paras 37–42 (potential damages action); Shanghai Excell case (above, note 63), paras 53–55 (same); Vischim (above, note 23), para 62 (same); Operator ARP (above, note 63), para 27 (possible future proceedings for the recovery of money paid in consequence of the contested decision); Provincia di Imperia (above, note 73), paras 30–31 (hence, an inability to give full effect to a judgment annulling the contested measure does not deprive the applicant of interest because that inability goes to the defendant’s potential liability in damages). In Case T-19/06 Mindo (above, note 59), para 100, the threat of third party claims against the applicant was discounted for various reasons, the only plausible one being that, in the action, the applicant was not actually contesting anything that exposed the applicant to such claims; the judgment was therefore reversed on appeal (see above, note 59). 87 Deshormes (née La Valle) v Commission (above, note 70), paras 10–12; Case 167/86 Rousseau v Court of Auditors [1988] ECR 2705, para 7. 88 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council (above, note 68), paras 32–34. 89 Case 155/78 Miss M  v Commission [1980]  ECR  1797, para  6; Benzine en Petroleum v Commission (above, note 86); Katsoufros v Court of Justice (above, note 78), para 11 and at 3586–3587 (Advocate General Tesauro); Case T-183/97 Micheli v Commission [2000] ECR II287, para 40 (in that case, there was no damage to the applicants’ prestige); Canas (above, note 69), paras 66–85. 90 Cases 81–88/74 Marenco v Commission [1975] ECR 1247, para 10. 91 Eg Marenco v Commission (ibid), para 6; Mindo (above, note 59) (in that case, the applicant had challenged a Commission decision imposing on it a fine but only in relation to a small part of the infringement period and the amount of the fine – the applicant claimed that it should have benefited from full immunity; a third party, with whom the applicant was jointly and severally liable for the fine, paid the fine and there was said to be no evidence that the third party intended to claim a contribution from the applicant, a conclusion that led to the reversal of the judgment on appeal, see above, note 59).

552

Admissibility 7.18

in the absence of a mistake of law or of fact.92 Interest cannot be denied on the basis that the action will be decided in favour of the defendant rather than the applicant.93 The addressees of a judgment have an interest in the way in which it is executed.94 7.18 The position in certain types of case (which may provide useful analogies in other cases) can be illustrated by the following examples. In appeals, the appellant has an interest in appealing if, were he to be successful, it would procure him an advantage; if an event subsequent to the decision appealed against removes in its totality the prejudicial effect on the appellant of that decision, he has no interest in appealing.95 In staff cases, voters and candidates in an election have an interest in challenging the lawfulness of the electoral procedure.96 Candidates admitted to take part in a recruiting competition have an interest in the subsequent conduct of the competition.97 An official who is not eligible for a particular post or for promotion has no interest in disputing the legality of steps taken to fill the post or those taken in the promotion procedure;98 but the fact that an official who is eligible for, but has been refused, appointment to a particular post has taken up another post in another EU institution does not mean that he no longer has an interest in the annulment of the decision refusing to appoint him because he may always be transferred back to the first institution and a post in another institution is not nec-

92 See Case 90/74 Deboeck v Commission [1975] ECR 1123, paras 12–15 and the authorities cited by Advocate General Warner at 1140–1142; Case 9/76 Morello v Commission [1976] ECR 1415, para  11; Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission [1980]  ECR  2229, para  26 and, per Advocate General Warner, at 2290; Case 117/81 Geist v Commission [1983] ECR 2191, para 7; Case 432/85 Souna v Commission [1987] ECR 2229, para 20; Case T-27/92 Camera-Lampitelli v Commission [1993] ECR II-873, para 53; Case C-401/09P Evropaiki Dynamiki - Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE  v European Central Bank, 9  June 2011, para 49. 93 Glencore Grain (above, note 85), paras 29–30. 94 Case T-38/89 Hochbaum v Commission [1990]  ECR II-43, para  8; Case T-166/04  C  v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-9, II-A-2-49, para 25 (in that case, the applicant had since retired and his only interest lay in claiming damages: see para 26). 95 Eg Moser Baer India (above, note 63), paras 24–27; Case C-97/08P  Akzo Nobel NV  v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237, paras 33–36; Cases C-501/06P, C-513/06P, C-515/06P and C-519/06P  GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2009]  ECR  I-9291, paras 23–26. More specifically, there is an interest in appealing against a decision rejecting a plea of inadmissibility or any other plea to the effect that the court below need not rule on the merits of the case, even if the court below found that the case lacked merit: eg Wunenburger (above, note 67), paras 37–39. 96 Case 54/75 De Dapper v European Parliament [1976]  ECR  1381, para  27; Cases 146 and 431/85 Diezler v Economic and Social Committee [1987] ECR 4283, para 9. 97 Hochbaum v Commission (above, note 94), para 8. 98 Case 126/87 Del Plato v Commission [1989] ECR 643, para 20; Case T-30/90 Zoder v European Parliament [1991]  ECR II-207; Case T-51/90 Moretti v Commission [1992]  ECR II-487, para 22; Case T-74/91 Tancredi v Parliament [1992] ECR II-1645, paras 14–21. By the same token, if the official’s complaint about being excluded from a competition is unfounded, he does not have a legitimate interest in contesting any steps taken in the course of the competition after his exclusion from it: Case 108/88 Cendoya v Commission [1989] ECR 2711, para 27.

553

7.19  Admissibility

essarily equivalent to what he might otherwise have been entitled to.99 Similarly, a retired official has no interest in the annulment of a decision appointing another person to a post to which he can no longer lay claim but he may still have an interest in claiming damages;100 and, for the same reason, he has an interest in the annulment of a decision excluding him, before his retirement, from a list of candidates for promotion.101 An interest in not having one’s prospects of promotion reduced and not being subject to ‘unlawful’ competition from another official is, however, a future and hypothetical interest that cannot found an action.102 Any official who is a member of a staff or trade union has an interest in challenging a decision affecting the activities of that organisation;103 and a decision addressed to a staff or trade union which mentions one of its members is of interest to that member.104 Certain acts may be challengeable in a staff case if they affect the moral interests or future perspectives of an official and even if they do not affect his material interests.105 7.19 In actions for the annulment of a Commission decision prohibiting a concentration, a judgment will not be delivered until some time (often two years or more, subject to the GC expediting the proceedings) after the decision was made. It is very often the case that a proposed concentration is possible only in the economic and commercial circumstances prevailing at the time of the deal and that any delay in effecting the concentration (even a delay of only a few weeks or months) may prevent the concentration from taking place. Accordingly, it has occasionally been suggested that the parties to a proposed concentration have no interest in contest­ing a decision prohibiting the concentration because the original operation cannot be resurrected after the delivery of judgment, should the action be successful. In the Gencor case, the CFI (as it then was) held that proceedings could nonetheless be brought for the following possible reasons: (a) annulment of the Commission’s decision would eliminate that deci­sion from the EU’s legal order and impose on the Commission a Treaty obligation to eradicate the consequences of the decision; (b) annulment would prevent the future repetition of the original illegal act; (c) the fact that an ap­plicant before the Court is the addressee of a decision is sufficient to confer upon the applicant a legitimate interest in contesting the legality of the decision; (d) the decision may be an obstacle to the exercise of the applicant’s rights; and (e) to bar access to the Court 99 Case T-156/89 Mordt v Court of Justice [1991] ECR II-407, paras 34–36. For further examples of interest in relation to promotion and grading, see: Case T-47/05 Serrano v Parliament [2008]  ECR SC  1-A-2 55, II-A-2 357, paras 64–84 (on appeal Case C-496/08P  Serrano v Parliament [2010] ECR I-1793, paras 66–73). 100 Case T-20/89 Moritz v Commission [1990] ECR II-769, paras 16 and 18. 101 Case T-82/89 Marcato v Commission [1990] ECR II-735, paras 53–54; Moat v Commission (above, note 65), paras 31–33. 102 Stroghili v Court of Auditors (above, note 82), paras 8–12. 103 Maurissen v Court of Auditors (above, note 83), para 18. 104 Ibid, para 20. 105 Case T-47/90 Bade (née Herremans) v Commission [1991]  ECR II-467, para  26. Cf Case C-198/07P Gordon v Commission [2008] ECR I-10701, paras 41–53, reversing Case T-175/04 Gordon v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-47, II-A-2-343, paras 27–39 (an official in a state of total permanent invalidity is unlike a permanently retired official in that he may one day resume his duties; he therefore retains an interest in challenging his career development report).

554

Admissibility 7.20

would be to allow unfavourable Commission decisions to escape judicial review merely because the contractual basis for the transaction disappeared before the Court could deliver judgment.106 In the Kesko case, the ap­plicant had actually disposed of its shares in the target voluntarily before com­mencing proceedings and without reserving the right to repurchase the shares should it be successful in action. The CFI nonetheless held that it had an interest in overturning the Commission decision, repeating the third ground advanced in Gencor and adding two other considerations: (i) the fact that a person complies with a Commission decision does not remove its interest in seeking the annulment of the decision; and (ii) the divestiture of the shares was not in truth voluntary but was the direct consequence of the prohibition of the concentration.107 The CFI reiterated its position in the MCI case, upholding the admissibility of the action, where the notified concentration had been abandoned before the commencement of proceedings and had been objected to by the US authorities.108 Those were cases in which the decision contested in the proceedings prevented the concentration from proceeding, with the consequence that any abandonment of the transaction occurred after and in consequence of the adoption of the contested decision.109 In Schneider Electric, the contested decision closed the investigation into the concentration after it had been definitively abandoned by the parties. The action was therefore inadmissible because Schneider (being a party to the abandoned transaction) could not claim an interest in disputing a decision that was the inevitable consequence of its own act in abandoning the concentration.110 7.20 In actions for annulment, an applicant has no interest in the annulment of the contested act unless the operative part of the act affects him adversely; recitals in the preamble to the contested act or findings made in the reasoning given for it cannot be challenged at all unless they form part of the reasoning supporting a provision in the operative part of the act that adversely affects the applicant.111 In general, only measures capable of directly affecting a specific legal situation may

106 Case T-I02/96 Gencor Ltd v Commission [1999] ECR 11-753, paras 41–45. 107 Case T-22/97 Kesko Oy v Commission [1999] ECR 11-3775, paras 57–64. 108 Case T-310/00 MCI Inc v Commission [2004] ECR II-3253, paras 44–64. 109 But it should be noted that, in MCI (above, note 108), the contested decision was one of two decisions prohibiting the merger, the other being a decision of the US authorities. 110 Case T-48/03 Schneider Electric v Commission [2006] ECR II-111, paras 96–102. It should be noted that, where the merging parties abandon the concentration and thereby render the procedure before the Commission devoid of purpose (the situation in Schneider), an action for the annulment of the decision closing the proceedings is inadmissible when brought by one of the merging parties. It is conceivable that a third party might object to the decision on the ground (for example) that the Commission was wrong to believe that the concentration had been abandoned. In that event, an action brought by the third party for the annulment of the decision would seem to be admissible. The judgment in Schneider does not make clear that the admissibility of an action is affected not only by the character of the challenged decision but also by whether or not the challenger is adversely affected by the decision and has, therefore, a legitimate interest in disputing it (as to which, see also the easyJet case (above, note 45), paras 40–41). 111 Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging (above, note 71), para 31; Cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 CocaCola v Commission [2000] ECR II-1733, paras 77–92. Note Case T-224/99 European Council of Transport Users ASBL v Commission [2003] ECR II-2097, paras 35–37.

555

7.21  Admissibility

be regarded as adversely affecting the applicant.112 In actions for the annulment of regulations imposing an anti-dumping duty, there is no interest in challenging the regulation imposing a provisional duty (otherwise than in support of a claim for damages) because such a duty is payable definitively only pursuant to the regulation imposing a definitive duty (an interest does lie in challenging the latter regulation).113 It has been suggested that a person has no interest in seeking the annulment of an individual act before it has been notified because, until then, the act has no effect;114 but if the premature commencement of proceedings is defective for that reason, which is doubtful,115 that defect will disappear as soon as the act is notified and can no longer be a bar to the continuation of the proceedings since ex hypothesi the limitation period will not yet have expired. 7.21 It is usually said that the member states do not need to show interest or locus standi.116 The reason for that is that, in general, the member states are given an unfettered right to participate in proceedings before the Court; and the justification for that is that, as contracting parties to the Treaties, the member states have both the capacity and an undeniable interest in ensuring that the Treaties are properly interpreted and applied. However, if that proposition were to be accepted without qualification, futile or purposeless actions initiated by member states would be admissible even if they were not well founded. At all events, the theory that member states are presumed to have sufficient interest to commence proceedings does not receive unqualified support from the Statute of the Court: witness, for example, arts 42 and 43. Member states do not have to show an interest in the result of the case when intervening in actions; but that is because it is expressly so provided in the Statute, art 40. In view of the absence of a presumption or rule drawn from the instruments defining the Court’s jurisdiction, that the member states are held to have sufficient interest, it is a reasonable inference, from the cases establishing that other persons must show such an interest even when that requirement is not stated expressly in the Treaty or other provision giving the Court jurisdiction in the matter, that the same requirement applies to the member states. However, in the nature of things, their interest is different from and more broadly defined than that of other persons. Hence, while it cannot be said that, as a matter of principle, member states invariably have an interest in proceedings, it can be affirmed that, as a matter of fact, they will do so in all but 112 Cf Cases 269 and 292/84 Fabbro v Commission [1986] ECR 2983, para 9 (a staff case); the TEAM case (above, note 4), paras 27–29 (no interest in contesting decisions relating to an invitation to tender once the process leading to the award of the contract in question had been abandoned altogether); Micheli (above, note 89), paras 35 and 53–54 (no interest derived from the possible implementation of a proposal where, due to lack of funds, that was impossible). 113 Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH  v Commission and Council [1990] ECR I-2945, paras 13–16; Case T-73/97 British Shoe Corpn Footwear Supplies Ltd v Commission [1998] ECR II-2619, paras 10–16. 114 Cases 358/85 and 51/86 France v European Parliament [1988] ECR 4821 at 4838 (Advocate General Mancini). 115 Cases 172 and 226/83 Hoogovens Groep BV v Commission [1985] ECR 2831, para 8. 116 Eg Case 45/86 Commission v Council (above, note 85), para 3 and at 1504 (Advocate General Lenz); Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council [1988] ECR 855 (at 875 per Advocate General Lenz); Case 131/86 United Kingdom v Council [1988] ECR 905, para 6; Cases C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P Deutsche Post AG and Germany v Commission [2011] ECR I-9639, para 36.

556

Admissibility 7.22

the most exceptional cases.117 It is therefore accurate to state that member states do not need to show an interest of the same kind as that required of ordinary litigants. 7.22 The position of EU institutions is, in principle, no different from that of member states, in particular in relation to actions for annulment, although there may be a difference in the nature of the interest which an EU institution may have in proceedings.118 In relation to the Commission’s interest in commencing and continuing proceedings against a member state under what is now TFEU, art 258, the Court held in Case 167/73 Commission v France119 that the Commission ‘does not have to show the existence of a legal interest, since, in the general interest of the Community, its function is to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are applied by the Member States and to note the existence of any failure to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom, with a view to bringing it to an end’. What that really means is that the Commission does not have to show an individual interest in the result of each case brought under TFEU, art 258 because, by reason of its functions, it has a general interest in the result of such proceedings.120 That interest is present when the member state concerned has failed to comply with the Commission’s reasoned opinion by the date for doing so fixed by the Commission.121 If, between that date and the commencement of proceedings before the Court, the member state does so comply, the Commission still has an interest in continuing the action122 in order to ensure that EU law is properly administered and applied123 or to establish the member state’s liability towards other member states, the EU or private persons.124 On the other hand, proceedings brought under TFEU, art 258 in respect of the future conduct of a member state are inadmissible: in such proceedings, the risk of future unlawful conduct only provides the interest in bringing proceedings against past conduct.125 117 See, by way of analogy, the position with regard to intervention in direct actions brought under the ECSC Treaty, in relation to which member states had to show an interest. But note Case 230/81 Luxembourg v European Parliament [1983] ECR 255, para 24. 118 Cf Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971]  ECR  263, paras 56–61. But see Case 45/86 Commission v Council (above, note 85), para 3 and at 1504–1507 per Advocate General Lenz (an action for annulment); Case 302/87 European Parliament v Council [1988]  ECR  5615 at 5628 (Advocate General Darmon), an action in respect of a failure to act; Case C-370/07 Commission v Council [2009] ECR I-8917, para 16. 119 [1974] ECR 359, para 15. 120 Hence, in Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2009] ECR I-2119, para 43, the ECJ held (citing Commission v France) that the Commission does not have to show a specific interest. 121 Case 7/61 Commission v Italian Government [1961] ECR 317 at 326; Case 240/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1835, para 16. In Case 51/83 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 2793 at 2809, Advocate General Lenz suggested the date of the commencement of the action. 122 Case 95/77 Commission v Netherlands [1978] ECR 863 at 874 (Advocate General Reischl). 123 Case 26/69 Commission v France [1970] ECR 565, paras 11–13. 124 Case 39/72 Commission v Italy [1973]  ECR  101, paras 9–11; Case 240/86 Commission v Greece (above, note 121), para  14. If damage has been caused by a member state to an individual through an infringement of EU law, there may be liability in damages under national law: Case 60/75 Russo v AIMA [1976] ECR 45, para 9; Cases C-6 and C-9/90 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 125 Case C-217/88 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-2879 at 2890 (Advocate General Jacobs).

557

7.23  Admissibility

7.23 In all cases, the applicant has in principle discretion whether or not to commence proceedings. How the applicant chooses to exercise that discretion is not normally a matter for discussion before the Court. For example, if a company chooses to contest one Commission decision addressed to it but not another, the decision not to contest the latter does not ipso facto impugn the admissibility of the action actually brought against the former (an admissibility issue would arise only if there were some connection between the two decisions in terms of their subject-matter and legal effect). Member States and EU institutions (particularly the Commission) are in a different position because they may bring proceedings not only in order to protect an interest of the conventional sort that they may have in the result of the litigation but also, depending upon the circumstances, in order to secure observance of the law (an interest that private persons are not acknowledged in EU law as having but may have under national law). In such law enforcement actions, the defendant may be aggrieved at being targeted in the litigation because there may be other potential defendants who have not been sued. In some cases, that feeling has been worked up into an objection to the admissibility of the action. In others, it has been used for forensic effect, in order to show that the applicant’s case is inconsistent or confused or that the applicant lacks confidence. When raised as an objection to admissibility, such an objection is difficult to classify because it can be articulated in different ways. In one sense, the objection is a claim of lack of interest (‘you do not have a sufficient legal interest to enforce the law against me when you are allowing everyone else to disobey the law’). In another sense, the objection is a claim that the decision to commence proceedings is unlawful because it is based upon a failure to observe a general principle of EU law governing the exercise of a legal power (most obviously equal treatment and non-discrimination but conceivably the principle of proportionality). Viewed in that way, the objection does not appear to be a claim that the commencement of proceedings is a misuse of power in the generally understood sense.126 However, it can be seen to be an objection based on lack of interest because the claim is that the applicant lacks a sufficient legitimate interest in carrying the action through to judgment because the decision to commence the proceedings and bring them to judgment is vitiated by illegality. In general, however it is formulated, the objection is a bad one.127

E Prescription128 1 General remarks 7.24 The laying down of reasonable time limits is an application of the fundamental principle of legal certainty129 which also requires that clear and precise

126 As to which, see Ch 17, para 17.15. 127 Eg Case C-531/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-4103, paras 19 and 23–24. 128 See Oliver (1978) 3 ELRev 3. 129 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe- Zentral A-G v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, para 5; Case 34/65 Mosthaf v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 521 at 531; Case T-257/04 Poland v Commission [2009] ECR II-1545, paras 49–50.

558

Admissibility 7.24

wording should be used.130 It is not precluded by the Human Rights Convention.131 Failure to observe a reasonable time limit may result in the loss of the right to bring proceedings, that is, loss of ‘the opportunity to bring the facts forming the subject of the action before the Court for examination of the substance of the case’,132 and is the classic example of an objection to the admissibility of an action.133 In general, delay is a ground of inadmissibility only if there is express provision to that effect. Such a provision may take the form of a specific time limit or a power granted to a specified person or body to fix a time limit. For example, TFEU, art  263, 6th para, imposes a fixed time limit of two months within which application must be made for the review of the legality of an act. If that time limit is not respected, an application made under TFEU, art 263 will be rejected as inadmissible because the cause of action is barred.134 On the other hand, RP-ECJ, art 124(3), RP-GC, art 81(3) and RP-CST, art 53(5) provide that the time limit for serving the defence in an action (which is two months in ECJ, GC and CST actions) can be extended, on application, by the President of the Court. If the time limit fixed by him is not respected, the applicant may apply for judgment by default, in which case the defendant has lost the opportunity to serve a defence and can oppose the application only at the hearing (if there is one) but is actually barred from defending himself only in GC proceedings.135

130 Case 44/81 Germany v Commission [1982] ECR 1855, para 16. 131 Case 257/85 Dufay v European Parliament [1987] ECR 1561, para 10. 132 Case 20/65 Collotti v European Court of Justice [1965] ECR 847 at 850. See also: Cases 220 and 221/78 ALA SpA and ALFER v Commission [1979] ECR 1693 at 1700 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case T-276/04 Compagnie maritime belge SA v Commission [2008] ECR II-1277, para  59. But not all time limits define mandatory limitation periods: see, for example, Case 13/69 Van Eick v Commission [1970]  ECR  3, paras 3–7 (an administrative time limit under the Staff Regulations); Case 20/88 Roquette Frères Sa v Commission [1989] ECR 1553, paras 11–13 (an action for damages). 133 Collotti v European Court of Justice, ibid at 853 (Advocate General Roemer). It should be noted, however, that in some member states the expiry of a time limit for bringing proceedings is regarded as determining the right of action and thus as going to the substance of a claim rather than to its admissibility. The same approach can occasionally be seen in decisions of the Court. 134 It is not possible to circumvent the time limit on the ground that the measure in question could be challenged, after the expiry of the time limit, by way of a reference for a preliminary ruling: see Case C-500/07P Territorio Energia Ambiente SO (TEA) v Commission [2008] ECR I-161*, para  25 (commenting on Cases C-346/03 and C-529/03 Atzeni v Regione autonoma della Sardegna [2006]  ECR  I-1875, paras 30–34). As the Atzeni case indicates, the legality of a measure that is challengeable in an action for annulment cannot be disputed by a person in proceedings before a national court or tribunal once the period for bringing an action for annulment has expired without such an action having been commenced by that person. In Atzeni, the action for annulment had been dismissed as inadmissible because it was out of time but there had been no ruling that the action would otherwise have been challengeable by way of an action for annulment. As it was not self-evident that an action for annulment, brought in time, would have been admissible, it was held that the measure in question could be disputed before a national court. In the TEA case, the measure in question was in principle challengeable in an action for annulment; but the proceedings were brought after the expiry of the time limit. Accordingly, Atzeni did not apply. 135 RP-ECJ, art 152(1)–(2); RP-CST, art 121(1). Under RP-GC, art 123(2), however, the defaulting defendant is barred from defending himself and must make a separate application to set aside a judgment given by default.

559

7.25  Admissibility

7.25 Limitation periods must be fixed in advance136 but there are no general principles of law concerning the length of the period.137 Time limits are governed exclusively by EU law and are not subject to rules of national law.138 In the case of an application made by several persons, the question whether or not it has been made in time is to be decided by reference to each of the applicants considered separately.139 7.26 Time limits (both those governing the commencement of proceedings and those governing certain procedural steps) are often stated to be a matter of public policy.140 That has two consequences. The first is that the operation of a time limit may not be waived by the parties, nor is it subject to the discretion of the Court, and the time limit may be extended, or the running of time suspended, only if there is express provision to that effect.141 The second is that the expiry of a time limit is a point that the Court can take of its own motion.142

136 Case 41/69  ACF  Chemiefarma NV  v Commission [1970]  ECR  661, paras 17–20. On the other hand, the applicant does not have to be informed in express terms of the time limit for commencing proceedings when a measure that he may wish to dispute is communicated to him: Case T-120/12 Shahid Beheshti University v Council, 20 November 2012, para 55. 137 Case 155/79 A M & S Europe Ltd v Commission [1982] ECR 1575 at 1631 (Advocate General Warner). 138 Case 209/83 Ferriera Valsabbia v Commission [1984] ECR 3089, para 12. 139 Case 264/83 Delhez v Commission [1985] ECR 2179, para 15. 140 Eg Case T-129/89 Offermann v Parliament [1991]  ECR II-855, para  31; Case T-15/91 Bollendorff v Parliament [1992] ECR II-1679, para 22; Case T-257/04 Poland v Commission (above, note 129), para 33; Case T-293/07P Lofaro v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-85, IIB-1-531, paras 28 and 39. In the case of procedural steps, see (for example) Case F-4/06 Villa v Parliament [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-133, II-A-1-505, para 24. 141 See further para  7.31 ff. On the justification for the strict application of procedural time limits, see: eg  Case C-242/07P  Belgium v Commission [2007]  ECR  I-9757, para  16; Lofaro (above, note 140), paras 46 and 56. The mandatory nature of time limits applies even in cases involving fundamental rights: Case C-229/05P  Ocalan, on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party v Council [2007] ECR I-439, para 101. The result of the strict application of time limits is that, if the time limit is not met by even a few seconds (as happened in Case F-34/10 Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank, 4  February 2011), the proceedings are inadmissible (a complication in the Jaramillo case is that the time limit applied there was a proxy for the reaonsable time for commencing proceedings, discussed further below; that generated a succession of appeals, referred to in note 156 below; but the CST’s decision seems correct in principle as an application of a time limit expressed in absolute terms). 142 Eg Case 79/70 Mullers v Economic and Social Committee [1971]  ECR  689, para  6; Case T-19/90 von Hoessle v Court of Auditors [1991] ECR II-615, paras 23–24; Offermann (above, note 140), paras 30 and 34; Case T-194/95  INTV II  Area Cova SA  v Council [1996]  ECR II-343, para 2 (time limit for intervening); Case T-119/95 Hauer v Council and Commission [1998]  ECR II-2713, para  22; Case T-109/98  A  V  M  v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3383, para 21; Cases T-142/01 and T-283/01 Organizacion de Productores de Tunidos Congelados (OPTUC) v Commission [2004] ECR II-329, para 30; Case T-503/07 Kulykovska-Pawlowski v Parliament and Council [2008] ECR II-48*, para 6; Poland v Commission (above, note 129), para 68; Case C-36/09P Transportes Evaristo Molina SA v Commission [2010] ECR I-145*, para 33.

560

Admissibility 7.28

7.27 If there is no provision for a time limit, it was for a long time considered that the Court cannot impose one of its own motion.143 For example, the possibility of bringing an action for damages based on the EU’s non-contractual liability under TFEU, art 268 and 340 is, with certain exceptions, prescribed five years after the occurrence of the event giving rise to liability.144 In consequence, when an official of the Commission brought an action for damages, it was pleaded that he was out of time because proceedings were commenced after the expiry of the five-year period. The applicant, however, relied not only on what are now TFEU, art  268 and 340 but also on what is now TFEU, art  270, which gives the Court exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between the EU and its officials ‘within the limits and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations’.145 That means, the Court held, that a dispute between an official and an institution concerning compensation for damage, where it originates in the employment relationship between the parties, falls exclusively under TFEU, art 270 and the time limit on bringing actions for damages under TFEU, art  268 and 340 does not apply. The only time limits applicable are those contained in the Staff Regulations. The Court dismissed the application as inadmissible not because the five-year limitation period had not been complied with but because the threemonth time limit specified in the Staff Regulations for applying to the Court after the end of the pre-litigation administrative procedure had not been observed.146 The result was that there was no time limit on actions for damages falling under TFEU, art 270 (other than those set out in the Staff Regulations) and so, in Case 106/80 Fournier v Commission,147 the claim for damages was admissible even though it was in part based on events that had taken place and damage that had occurred more than five years before the commencement of proceedings.148 7.28 Thus, delay in commencing proceedings was not ordinarily an objection to their admissibility unless a relevant limitation period had expired. Nonetheless, even in cases in which there was no time limit for bringing proceedings, it was considered that an excessive delay in bringing them might effectively bar the proceedings if the defendant could show that the delay had prejudiced its ability to defend itself.149 Another strand appeared in the case law 143 Cf ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission (above, note 136), paras 17–20. The remark in Case 120/73 Gebrüder Lorenz GmbH  v Germany and Land Rheinland Pfalz [1973]  ECR  1471, para 4, that, in proceedings under what is now TFEU, art 108, the Commission must act within a reasonable period, is not the imposition of a period of prescription, as has been suggested (Oliver, p 6), but the imposition of a constraint on the exercise of administrative discretion that is justified by reference to the principle of sound administration. 144 Statute, art 46. 145 That applies to actions brought by an official in his capacity as such and not in some other capacity: Case T-227/02 Hecq v Commission [2003] ECR-SC I-A-115, II-571 (action brought by an official in his capacity as secretary general of a trade union). 146 Case 9/75 Meyer-Burckhardt v Commission [1975] ECR 1171. 147 [1981] ECR 2759. 148 Parts of the claim were rejected as inadmissible for other reasons. See also Case 317/85 Pomar v Commission [1987] ECR 2467. 149 Case C-96/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2461, para 16. That presupposed that the defendant could not have taken steps to protect itself from the consequences of delay: see para 17 of the judgment.

561

7.29  Admissibility

in Case 59/70 Netherlands v Commission,150 an action in respect of a failure to act under the ECSC Treaty. The Commission had taken the view that a French state aid plan called for no action under the ECSC Treaty and had so informed the French Government by letter in December 1968, sending a copy to the Dutch Government a few days later. The Commission’s letter was not itself a challengeable act.151 In June 1970, the Dutch Government formally called upon the Commission to act in relation to the French plan, initiating the equivalent, under the ECSC Treaty, of the procedure in what is now TFEU, art 265. Like TFEU, art 265, an action could be brought within a specified period of time (one month, under the ECSC Treaty) after another specified period of time (two months) had elapsed after the Commission had been called upon to act (unless, within that time, the Commission had acted, which it failed to do). The Netherlands had complied with those time limits but the Commission objected to the gap between December 1968 and June 1970, contending that the Netherlands’ application was out of time. However, calling upon the Commission to act was not subject to any time limit (understandably so, since the action relates to a failure to act and it is normally difficult to identify when such a failure commences, in the absence of a formal notice calling upon the institution concerned to act). The ECJ nonetheless held that the action was inadmissible because, due to its failure to take action sooner, the Dutch Government ‘was no longer in a position to take advantage’ of the action in respect of a failure to act in June 1970. The ECJ inferred from the time limits applicable to actions for annulment and in respect of a failure to act that, in respect of the latter form of action, there was a duty to observe a reasonable time limit once it was clear that the Commission had decided to take no action. That inference was supported by the duty of cooperation imposed on member states by the ECSC Treaty,152 which prompted member states to resort to the procedures and means of legal action available to them in sufficient time to ensure that any necessary intervention would be effective and that the position of third parties would not be needlessly called into question. The judgment was open to a number of interpretations;153 but, in any event, it opened the door to a development of the concept of an obligation to comply with a reasonable time limit, where no time limit at all is provided for, although no advantage seems to have been taken of that possibility for a further 30 years. 7.29 It is now settled law that, unless the legislator has specified a time limit or expressly provided that there is no time limit for commencing proceedings, a 150 [1971] ECR 639, see paras 14–24. 151 See [1971] ECR at 657–658 (Advocate General Roemer). 152 The same duty applies under TEU, art 4(3). 153 Thus, it appears from para 20 of the judgment that the Dutch Government had in fact ventilated its concerns as far back as April 1968, before the Commission’s letter of December of that year. The judgment could be interpreted as holding that, in such circumstances, an applicant may be regarded as being estopped from commencing proceedings, or as having waived the right to do so, or as having no interest in proceeding with an action against a failure to act, once an ‘unreasonable’ period has elapsed after the defendant has made its position clear. It is also unclear from the judgment to what extent the duty of cooperation imposed on member states was a determining factor. Delay is more significant when a party lies under a positive duty to take action than where no such duty applies.

562

Admissibility 7.30

right of action is foreclosed after the expiry of a reasonable time after grounds for bringing proceedings have first come to the knowledge of the applicant.154 Time starts to run from the point at which the applicant becomes aware of the situation of which he later complains, whether or not he is also aware of the unlawfulness of that situation or the fact that it gives him a right of action.155 What is or is not a reasonable period, after that point in time, within which proceedings must be commenced or a claim made depends upon the circumstances of the case.156 A failure to bring proceedings within a reasonable time brings about the foreclosure of the right of action irrespective of whether or not the delay in bringing proceedings has prejudiced the opposing party’s ability to defend itself.157 7.30 The obligation to make a claim within a reasonable period of time is not a universal rule where no time limit is specified and the law is entirely silent 154 Eg Case T-192/99 Dunnett v EIB  [2001]  ECR II-813, paras 48–53; Case T-45/01 Sanders v Commission [2004]  ECR II-3315, paras 59–66; Case T-144/02 Eagle v EC  Commission [2004] ECR II-3381, paras 56–65; Case T-281/01 Huygens v Commission [2004] ECR-SC I-A203, II-903, paras 46–47; Case F-103/09 Allen v Commission, 13 July 2010 (on appeal, Case T-433/10P  Allen v Commission, 14  December 2011). The same obligation to act within a reasonable period of time applies in the case of the discovery of a new fact that entitles a person to request a reconsideration of a decision that has become definitive (as to which, see para 7.58): see, for example, Case T-202/97 Koopman v Commission [1998] ECR-SC I-A-163, II-511, paras 24–27. 155 Eg Sanders (above), paras 73 and 83; in Case T-433/10P Allen (above), para 59, it is awareness of an event that is ‘potentially’ unlawful that causes time to start running. 156 Eg Sanders (above, note 154), para 67. Where the claim is one for damages, the point of reference for determining what is a reasonable period is the time limit for bringing an ordinary action for damages in respect of the EU’s non-contractual liability: see, for example, Sanders (above), paras 69–72. That time limit is not applicable in every case: eg  Case T-114/08P  Marcuccio v Commission [2009]  ECR-SC  I-B-1-53, II-B-1-313, paras 27–28. For further consideration of what a reasonable time means, see Case C-334/12RX-II  Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank, 28  February 2013, and Case T234/11P-RENV-RX  Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank, 9 July 2013 (which relate to an analogous problem affecting staff of the EIB). The Jaramillo case was remitted to the CST but, at the time of writing, proceedings before the CST had been stayed pending the outcome of other litigation having a bearing on the substantive claims raised in the Jaramillo case (see Case F-34/10 RENV-RX Arango Jaramillo v European Investment Bank, order of 6 February 2015). 157 Cf Case C-447/13P  Nencini v Parliament, 13  November 2014, para  54 (overruling Cases T-431/10 and T-560/10 Nencini v Parliament, 4  June 2013). The position in that case was somewhat different because Nencini sought the annulment of a decision addressed to him on the ground that it had been made more than a reasonable time after the events in question had occurred. The GC found against him because he had not asserted that the failure to act within a reasonable time had prejudiced his ability to defend himself (see para 51 of the GC judgment). The GC relied on Case T-33/07 Greece v Commission [2009]  ECR II-74*, para  240, which cited in turn a number of cases concerning the different situation concerning the obligation to bring pending proceedings to an end within a reasonable time (eg Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission [1999] ECR II-931, para 122; on appeal, Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, C-245/99P, C-247/99P, C-250/99P to C-252/99P and C-254/99P  Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375). Nencini did not concern pending proceedings but a long delay in the commencement of proceedings. The ECJ’s reversal of the GC’s decision in Nencini is consistent with earlier GC judgments in which the GC had ignored the argument that failure to commence proceedings within a reasonable time is relevant only if the defendant’s ability to defend himself is prejudiced (eg Allen, above, note 154).

563

7.31  Admissibility

on the point. Thus, there is no time limit for bringing proceedings under TFEU, art 258;158 and a measure can be impeached out of time if it contains such serious and manifest defects as to render it non-existent.159 There is no limitation period in the Treaties regarding actions for damages in respect of breach of contract and delay is relevant only if there is a contractual limitation period or the delay is such as to constitute waiver of the right of action.160 Further the lawfulness of an act may be challenged, either because the contested act implements a normative measure which is invalid161 or because acts preliminary to the contested act are unlawful,162 without the failure to contest the normative measure or the preliminary acts in question being regarded as acquiescence in their unlawfulness or otherwise as precluding reliance upon their unlawfulness. Where a challengeable measure is extended or modified by amendment, the fact that the time limit for challenging the measure has expired does not prevent an action from being brought for the annulment of the amendment made to the measure.163 2 Prorogation of and derogation from time limits (a) Procedural and substantive time limits 7.31 Broadly speaking, there are three types of time limit in proceedings before the Court: time limits set under the Treaties and the Statute;164 time limits prescribed by the rules of procedure;165 and time limits fixed pursuant to the rules of procedure.166 Where a time limit is prescribed by a provision (of the Treaties, the Statute or the rules of procedure), it may not be overridden or extended in the absence of an express provision to that effect. RP-ECJ, art  52(1) and RP-GC, art 61(1) provide that any time limit prescribed pursuant to the Rules of Procedure may be extended by whoever prescribed it (RP-CST, art 39(1) is

158 Case C-96/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991]  ECR  I-2461, paras 14–16; Case C-317/92 Commission v Germany [1994]  ECR  I-2039, per Advocate General Darmon, paras 5–9 (p 2043). 159 Case 15/85 Consorzio Cooperativo d’Abruzzo v Commission [1987] ECR 1005, para 10; Case 226/87 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 3611, para 16. 160 See Case 25/60 De Bruyn v European Parliamentary Assembly [1962] ECR 21 at 27–28. 161 TFEU, art  277. Eg Case 181/85 France v Commission [1987]  ECR  689 at 703 (Advocate General Slynn). 162 Eg Case 307/85 Gavanas v Economic and Social Committee and Council [1987] ECR 2435, para 16. 163 Poland v Commission (above, note 129), paras 69–73 (however, the action must be commenced within time so far as the measure effecting the amendment is concerned). 164 For example, the two month period for commencing proceedings under TFEU, art  263: see TFEU, art 263, last para. 165 For example, the two month period for lodging a defence under RP-ECJ, art 124(1), RP-GC, art 81(1) and RP-CST, art 53(1). 166 For example, the time limit prescribed by the President for lodging a reply under RP-ECJ, art 126(2) and RP-GC, art 83(3).

564

Admissibility 7.32

to similar effect). That applies only to the time limits for making procedural steps, such as those for the lodging of pleadings (after the commencement of the proceedings).167 In contrast, time limits such as those whose expiry bars the commencement of proceedings cannot be extended under RP-ECJ, art 52, RP-GC, art 61 or RP-CST, art 39 or, indeed, RP-ECJ, art 122(3), RP-GC, art 78(5) or RP-CST, art 50(6), which allow defective applications to be put in order.168 The three different types of time limit referred to above fall into three classes: time limits that relate to the right to bring proceedings; those that relate to the conduct of proceedings once commenced; and ‘substantive’ time limits. The first two classes encompass those described as ‘procedural’ in RP-ECJ, art 49(1), RP-GC, art 58(1) and RP-CST, art 37(1). 7.32 With the apparent exception of the time limit applicable to a damages action (which is a substantive time limit), the time limits relating to the right to bring proceedings are mandatory and cannot be waived or varied by the parties or the Court in the absence of express provision to that effect;169 and a failure to comply with them must be raised by the Court of its own motion.170 In the absence of an express provision allowing derogation from their application, neither proof that a party was justified in delaying nor the fact that the delay was not

167 Cf Cases 220 and 221/78 ALA and ALFER v Commission [1979] ECR 1693 at 1700 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case T-73/10 P Apostolov v Commission, 2 December 2010, para 22; Case T-301/11 Ben Ali v Commission, 11 January 2012, para 56. 168 ALA and ALFER (above). 169 Cases 25 and 26/65  SIMET and FERAM  v High Authority [1967]  ECR  33 at 49 (Advocate General Gand); Case 33/72 Gunnella v Commission [1973]  ECR  475, para  4 (and see the authorities cited by Advocate General Mayras at 484); Cases 122 and 123/79 Schiavo v Council [1981] ECR 473, para 22; Case 227/83 Moussis v Commission [1984] ECR 3133, para 12; Case 302/85 Pressler-Hoeft v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 513, para 5; Case 352/87 Farzoo Inc v Commission [1988] ECR 2281; Case T-119/89 Teissonnière v Commission [1990] ECR II-7, para 26; Case T-58/92 Moat v Commission [1993] ECR II-1443, para 39; Cases T-80/89, T-81/89, T-83/89, T-87/89, T-88/89, T-90/89, T-93/89, T-95/89, T-97/89, T-99/89 to T-101/89, T-103/89, T-105/89, T-107/89 and T-112/89 BASF AG v Commission [1995] ECR II-729, para 58; Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECR II-2289, para 50; A V M (above, note 142), para  26; Cases T-190/95 and T-45/96 Societe de Distribution de Mecaniques et d’Automobiles (Sodima) v Commission [1999] ECR II-3617, paras 25–26 (inability to rely on a legitimate expectation); Case C-165/99 Austria v Commission, order of 26  October 2000 (unreported), para  10 (‘fairness’ not a ground for extending a mandatory time limit); Case T-289/04 Lantzoni v Court of Justice [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-39, II-A-2-171, para 40; Poland v Commission (above, note 129), paras 33 and 47; Case C-73/10 P Internationale Fruchtimport Gesellschaft Weichert GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2010] ECR I-11535, paras 41–60 (a case involving the miscalculation of the time limit for bringing proceedings, in which arguments based on fundamental rights were rejected); Case C-101/14  P  Brown Brothers Harriman & Co v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 17  July 2014, paras 24–25. But note Cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26, 27/60 and 1/61 Merino & Co v High Authority [1961] ECR 161 at 173. 170 See further para 7.26 above.

565

7.33  Admissibility

due to his fault are sufficient to justify overriding them.171 Such a provision is to be found in the Statute,172 which provides: ‘No right shall be prejudiced in consequence of the expiry of a time limit if the party concerned proves the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure’. However, it seems that, in addition to unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure, a time limit may not be a bar if the delay in commencing proceedings is attributable to ‘excusable error’ on the part of the applicant, that is to say, exceptional circumstances or where the defendant has behaved in such a way as to induce (either alone or to a decisive extent) pardonable confusion in the mind of a party acting in good faith and with the diligence expected of a normally experienced person.173 7.33 The procedural time limits that relate to the conduct of proceedings once commenced are more difficult to classify. In general terms, such time limits can be divided into two sub-groups by reference to whether or not the time limit can be extended as a matter of discretion (as opposed to automatically, as in the case of the mandatory extension of a procedural time limit on account of distance); and another grouping is between peremptory and non-peremptory procedural time limits. Procedural time limits of the sort here in question that

171 Case 32/72 Wasaknäcke Knäckebrotfabrik Gmbh v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1972] ECR 1181; Case 209/83 Valsabbia SpA v Commission [1984] ECR 3089; Case C-369/03 P Forum des migrants de l’Union europeenne v Commission [2004] ECR I-1981 (the time limit for commencing an appeal); Case T-653/11 Jaber v Council, 13 November 2014, para 48 (irrelevance of an alternative review procedure); Case T-654/11 Kaddour v Council, 13  November 2014, para  48 (same); Case T-43/12 Hamcho v Council, 13  November 2014, para 54. Cf Case C-290/10P Franssons Verkstader v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2010] ECR I-109* (rejection of reliance on the practice in a particular member state). 172 Statute, art 45, 2nd para. That provision applies to the time limits set out in any pre-litigation procedure just as much as to the time limits for commencing proceedings before the Court: eg  Lofaro (above, note 140), para  38. In Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2005] ECR II-1491, that provision was construed as applying only where the expiry of a time limit causes a person to lose a right to commence an action or participate in one (para  48); but the GC left open the question whether or not it applies in the case of a late application to intervene the right is not lost but reduced in scope (para 49). As to the different rules that apply to late applications to intervene, see Ch 5, para 5.61 ff. 173 Case 25/68 Schertzer v European Parliament [1977]  ECR  1729, para  19; Case T-12/90 Bayer AG v Commission [1991] ECR II-219, paras 28–29; on appeal, Case C-195/91P Bayer AG  v Commission [1994]  ECR  I-5619, paras 26–28; Cases T-33 and T-74/89 Blackman v European Parliament [1993]  ECR II-249, paras 32–34; Case C-285/93 DominikanerinnenKloster Altenhohenau v Hauptzollamt Rosenheim [1995]  ECR  I-4069, para  27; Case T-68/96 Polyvios v Commission [1998]  ECR II-153, para  43; Cases T-148/98 and T-162/98 Evans v Commission [1999]  ECR II-2837, para  31; Case T-3/00 Pitsiorlas v Council and ECB  [2001]  ECR II-717, paras 22–24 (reversed on appeal in Case C-193/01P  Pitsiorlas v Council and ECB [2003] ECR I-4837 as being too restrictive an understanding of excusable error); Case T-223/06P  European Parliament v Eistrup [2007]  ECR II-1581, para  64; Case C-112/09P Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE) v Commission [2010] ECR I-351, para  20; Case C-221/14P  H  v Court of Justice, 26  February 2015, paras 48–49. Excusable error has also been applied in the context of administrative (that is, pre-litigation) time limits: see Case T-127/07P Bligny v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-19, II-B-1-155, paras 40–48 (unsuccessfully in that case). It applies only to time limits: Case T-213/12 Elitaliana SpA  v Eulex Kosovo, 4 June 2013, paras 40–42.

566

Admissibility 7.34

cannot be extended as a matter of discretion include the time limit set out in RP-ECJ, art 172 for the submission of a response to an appeal. Such time limits appear to be peremptory. It may be inferred from RP-ECJ, art 52, RP-GC, art 61 and RP-CST, art 39 that the procedural time limits to which they apply are not peremptory so that a failure to comply with them cannot be raised by the Court of its own motion and may be cured, even retrospectively, by the application of RP-ECJ, art 52, RP-GC, art 61 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 39.174 The normal practice, however, is that such time limits cannot be extended in response to an application for an extension of time submitted after the expiry of the relevant period.175 That is a matter of practice; it does not follow from the wording of the Rules of Procedure. 7.34 Turning to ‘substantive’ time limits, as noted above, the time limit for commencing an action for damages (which is expressed in the Statute, art 46, as a ‘bar’ on bringing proceedings after a period of five years) appears to be an exception both to the mandatory nature of time limits and to the ability of the Court to raise the expiry of the time limit as an objection to admissibility of its own motion. The latter point arises from the fact that non-contractual liability in damages is governed by general principles common to the laws of the member states.176 The former seems to have two sources: the same general principles; and the Statute, art 46, which provides for the interruption of the limitation period for bringing proceedings while negotiations for a settlement of the claim for damages are on foot between the claimant and the defendant institution. Thus, the defendant institution may waive the right to rely on the limitation period applicable to actions for damages (whether by letter addressed to the claimant personally or by means of a communication addressed generally to all actual and

174 Cf the reasoning of the Court in Case 1/60 FERAM v High Authority [1960] ECR 165 at 170, an analogous situation. The CST seems to have taken a different view in the Villa case (above, note 140), para 24, when holding that the period for lodging a defence was a matter of public policy (the authority cited is not on point because it concerned the period for lodging an application to intervene). On the other hand, if one takes a situation like that in Case F-34/10 Jaramillo (above, note 141), in which an e-mail was sent immediately before the expiry of the time limit and arrived immediately after its expiry, it seems disproportionate to fail to grant an extension of time of several seconds (or even a minute or two), where there is a power to extend time. 175 Cf Case F-82/06 Duyster v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-455, II-A-1-2583, para 43; Case F-80/06 Duyster v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-7, II-A-1-15, para 45. In those cases, the CST applied what is now RP-CST, art 45(2), 3rd subpara (see RP-ECJ, art 57(7) and RP-GC, art 73(3), the parallel ECJ and GC provisions), to the application for an extension of time: the application had been sent by fax but no signed original was lodged in accordance with that provision. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time was ineffective. That problem arises where the application is made in paper form, not where it is made by means of e-Curia. 176 Case 20/88 Roquette Frères SA v Commission [1989] ECR 1553, para 12 and at 1562–1564 per Advocate General Darmon; Case C-55/90 Cato v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-2533 (per Advocate General Darmon at para 10 of his Opinion). The fact that the applicant asserts that an action for damages has been brought within time (in order to forestall any such objection that the defendant might raise) does not justify the conclusion that such an objection has been raised or entitle the Court to take the point: the Roquette case at 1564.

567

7.35  Admissibility

potential claimants) in the context of the management by it of claims,177 or by agreement.178 Any such waiver must be expressed in sufficiently clear terms as to give claimants (or the claimants to whom the waiver is intended to apply) a legitimate expectation and must therefore state any limitations or conditions attached to the waiver. In consequence, the time limit for bringing an action for damages is classified as a substantive time limit that must be raised by the defendant and that extinguishes a claim only if the defendant so requests by pleading the time limit.179 Cases to which the pre-litigation waiver of the time limit does not apply, or in relation to which it has ceased to apply, are dealt with under the Statute, art  46,180 but the concepts of excusable error, unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure may be relied upon where appropriate. 7.35 It is for the party who has, on the face of it, failed to comply with a time limit to assert excusable error, unforeseeable circumstances or, as the case may be, force majeure; and the point is not taken by the Court of its own motion.181 It would appear that an event classifiable as unforeseeable circumstances, force majeure or excusable error does not justify a failure to comply with a time limit where the event has the effect of shortening the period available to a party to commence proceedings or carry out some procedural step while not making it impossible for him to do so.182 177 Eg Case T-554/93 Saint and Murray v Council and Commission [1997]  ECR II-563, paras 37–44 (interpretation of the waiver in question as part of an offer of settlement) and 90–94; Case T-20/94 Hartmann v Council and Commission [1997]  ECR II-595, paras 134–140; Case T-222/97 Steffens v Council and Commission [1998]  ECR II-4175, paras 35–44; Case C-164/01P van den Berg v Council and Commission [2004] ECR I-10225, paras 92–104; Case T-404/08 Fluorsid SpA v Commission, 18 June 2013, paras 61–64. 178 In Cases T-8/95 and T-9/95 Pelle and Konrad v Council and Commission [2007] ECR II-4117, paras 43 and 97, the GC rejected an argument based on the principles of European contract law. However, that related to a different point (an acknowledgement of liability precluding reliance on a limitation period). If the claimant and the defendant institution actually agreed between themselves how the claim was to be dealt with and over what period of time, that would seem to be covered by the Statute, art 46 (the underlying liability would remain non-contractual in nature). However, it is more likely to be the case that any waiver is unilateral. 179 Case C-469/11  P  Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission, 8  November 2012, paras 51–54. To put it another way, the Statute, art 46, defines a right to sue for loss arising in the five years immediately preceding the commencement of proceedings (subject to any suspension of the operation of the limitation period). 180 See further below. 181 Case F-40/08 Carvalhal Garcia v Council [2009]  ECR-SC  I-A-1-17, II-A-1-65, para  24 (excusable error); Cases C-478/11 P to C-482/11 P Gbagbo v Council, 23 April 2013, paras 72–74; Case C-397/13  P  Gbagbo v Council, 29  January 2014. In relation to unforeseeable circumstances and force majeure, the point appears in several cases, in the form of the Court remarking that neither has been asserted, and then passing on: eg Case T-85/97 Interprovinciale des Federations d’Hoteliers, Restaurateurs, Cafetiers et Entreprises Assimilees de Wallonie ASBL (Horeca-Wallonie) v Commission [1997]  ECR II-2113, para  28. As excusable error, unforeseeable circumstances and force majeure depend upon matters of fact, it is necessarily the case that they must be asserted and proved by the party relying upon them (in the Carvalhal Garcia case, the factual basis for at least arguing that there had been an excusable error was, however, evident to the Court; but the point was not raised by the applicant). 182 That seems to be the meaning of Ben Ali (above, note 167), paras 29–31. In that case, a variety of factors was relied on (threats of violence, freezing of funds, confidential reasons which

568

Admissibility 7.37

(b) Extension of procedural time limits relating to the conduct of proceedings 7.36 The power to set time Iimits that are prescribed pursuant to the rules of procedure and that are not fixed by other provisions lies in principle with the President (of the Court or the chamber) because he is responsible for the direction of judicial business.183 In the case of the CST, the judge-rapporteur has the power to set the dates or time limits by which replies to measures of organisation of procedure prescribed by the judge-rapporteur must be lodged.184 The same applies in ECJ and GC proceedings where the judge-rapporteur is entrusted with the task of conducting a measure of organisation of procedure or measure of enquiry.185 The power to extend such time limits is exercised by whoever originally set the time limit.186 The powers to set and to extend the time limit may be delegated to the Registrar.187 The decisions delegating those powers to the Registrar are not published.188 7.37 In order to obtain an extension of a procedural time limit, it is necessary to make a written application setting out reasons why an extension is justified; and the application must be lodged before the expiry of the time limit.189 There seems little doubt but that a party is entitled to an extension of time where he proves excusable error, unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure to exist; but the Statute and the principle of excusable error are primarily intended to apply to substantive time limits. The grounds for an application for an extension of time are not limited to excusable error, unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure; but, as decisions to extend time are not made public, it is not possible to assemble a complete list of possible grounds. In ECJ and CST proceedings, however, an extension of time is granted only in exceptional circumstances (in GC proceedings, more than one extension may not be granted save for exceptional reasons).190 In general, it is easier to get a first extension of time than it is to get any further extension of time; but multiple extensions of time are not unknown.191

appear to be medical in nature: see paras 32–54). The GC was not satisfied that any of them actually had any effect on the ability of the applicant to bring proceedings in time. 183 RP-ECJ, art 9(2); RP-GC, art 10(2); RP-CST, art 8(2). 184 RP-CST, art 39(1), 2nd subpara. 185 Under RP-ECJ, art 62 or 65(1); RP-GC, art 90(2) or 92(4). The judge-rapporteur is invested with power to set time limits by virtue of his role in conducting the measure in question. 186 RP-ECJ, art 52(1); RP-GC, art 61(1); RP-CST, art 39(1). 187 RP-ECJ, art 52(2); RP-GC, art 61(2) and PD-GC, paras 64 and 66; RP-CST, art 39(2) and IRCST, art 11(1). 188 See further Ch 1, para 1.160. 189 PD-ECJ, para 14 (the defence); PD-GC, para 66; IR-CST, art 11(2). See also the cases cited in note 175 above. 190 Compare PD-ECJ, para 14 and IR-CST, art 11(2) with PD-GC, paras 66–67. 191 The fact that several extensions of time have been granted does not mean that the procedure as a whole is unfair to the opposing party: Case F-121/07 Strack v Commission, 20 January 2011, para 39; Case F-132/07 Strack v Commission, 20 January 2011, para 31.

569

7.38  Admissibility

(c) Excusable error 7.38 The concept of excusable error is to be narrowly construed because the application of substantive time limits is mandatory. The concept of excusable error is associated with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and therefore focuses on the conduct of the opposing party (that is, the defendant) but can also apply in the case of conduct attributable to a third party.192 It applies where, for example, the delay in bringing proceedings arises because the behaviour of the defendant, or the rules governing the defendant’s operations, have obscured the position in a relevant respect, such as by rendering the identity of the body competent to deal with any essential pre-litigation steps unclear and rendering the date of the commencement of the relevant time limit uncertain.193 On the other hand, the exceptional circumstances liable to create an excusable error do not include: conduct wholly attributable to the applicant or his representative;194 oral assurances passed on to the party in writing by someone else, after the adoption of the contested measure, that are inconsistent with the 192 See the SGAE case (above, note 173), paras 28–29; Case C-69/12 P Noscirai SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 21 September 2012, para 38. In Case C-153/13 P Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO) v Council, 10 December 2015, paras 55–61 (upholding Case T-6/13 NICO v Council, 20 January 2015), the ECJ rejected the argument that a judicial explanation of legislative provisions gave rise to confusion. 193 The Schertzer case (above, note 173); Case T-218/01 Laboratoire Monique Remy SAS  v Commission [2002]  ECR II-2139, para  30 (upheld on appeal, Case C-176/02P  Laboratoire Monique Remy SAS  v Commission, order of 30  January 2003 (unreported); Case T-334/02 Viomichania Syskevasias Typopoiisis kai Syntirisis Agrotikon Proionton AE  v Commission [2003]  ECR II-5121, paras 35–43 (no ground for confusion); Case T-14/03 di Marzio v Commission [2004]  ECR-SC  I-A-43, II-167, paras 40–51 (no confusion); Case T-106/05 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission [2006] ECR II-82*, paras 57–58 (no excusable error where position clear); Pelle and Konrad (above, note 178), paras 93–95; Case F-31/07 Putterie-deBeukelaer v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-53, II-A-1-261, paras 38–41 (reversed on other grounds in Case T-160/08P Commission v Putterie-de-Beukelaer [2010] ECR II-3751); Case T-407/07  CMB  Mashinenbau & Handels GmbH  v Commission [2011]  ECR II-286*, paras 99–105; Case T-573/10 Octapharma Pharmazeutica Produktionsgesellschaft mbH v European Medicines Agency, 8  March 2012, paras 47–49 (no excusable error where representation inconsistent with clear provision and not, apparently, relied on); Case T-350/09 ICO Satellite Ltd v Commission, 4 July 2012, para 42 (no excusable error because position clear). Note Case F-84/07 Islamaj v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-201, II-A-1-1117, paras 39–44 (applicant misled by letter from head of personnel; an official cannot be expected to have a better idea of the remedies under the Staff Regulations than the head of personnel, even if the applicant is a trade union representative). 194 Eg Case T-6/94  A  v Parliament [1996]  ECR-SC  I-A-191, II-A-555, paras 53–54 (a case involving a prolonged discussion of various factual circumstances in which time limits were not respected: see paras 45–73); Case C-165/99 Austria v Commission (above, note 169), paras17–18; Apostolov (above, note 167), paras 23–26 (reliance on an oral communication from the Court is lack of diligence); Case C-426/10 P Bell & Ross BV v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2011] ECR I-8849, paras 47–50 (outsourcing the production of copies of the application); Case T-468/10 Doherty v Commission [2011] ECR II-1497, paras 26–29 (a party should regard the provisions of the Rules of Procedure as prevailing over statements made by Court officials) and 30 (periods of absence abroad); Case T-101/09 Maftah v Commission [2011] ECR II-251* (miscalculation of the time limit; delay in applying for legal aid, which shortened the time for drafting the application once legal aid had been granted); Case T-102/09 Elosta v Commission [2011] ECR II-252* (same); H v Court of

570

Admissibility 7.38

definitive and unequivocal character of the measure;195 the fact that the defendant notified the contested act to the applicant’s head office whereas previously all communications were sent to the applicant’s legal service; the fact that the defendant failed to dispute an acknowledgment of receipt wrongly dated by the applicant;196 the fact that the party in question has been incorporated recently, has a limited number of employees and no in-house legal department;197 reliance on public statements of a general nature made by a member of the defendant institution and other statements that are insufficient to found a legitimate expectation;198 a misreading of a letter, unexplained inactivity on the part of the party concerned and eye trouble that is insufficient to prevent the party from sending a letter;199 failure to alert the party concerned to his rights and remedies;200 conduct taking place after the expiry of the time limit (thus, the fact that the defendant, for reasons of its own, deals with a request made out of time does not re-establish a right that is definitely time-barred).201 In that connection, a party does not display the diligence required in order to be able to invoke an excusable error if: he does not contact his lawyers without delay after time has started to run and simply relies on the initiative of his lawyers;202 once he has been informed of the commencement of an administrative procedure, he fails to inform himself of the significance of the procedure, its duration and possible outcomes, and the degree of publicity given to any final decision.203 The wording of the Rules of Procedure is not so difficult to understand as to provide a basis for claiming an excusable error.204

Justice (above, note 173), para 49 (applicant’s reliance on legal provisions whose clear meaning did not support his interpretation of them). 195 Case T-514/93 Cobrecaf SA v Commission [1995] ECR II-621, paras 39–42. 196 Case T-12/90 Bayer (above, note 173), paras 31 and 35–40 (upheld on appeal: Case C-195/91P, above, note 173). 197 Case T-321/04 Air Bourbon SAS v Commission [2005] ECR II-3469, paras 38–39. 198 Case C-44/00P Societe de Distribution Mecanique et d’Automobiles SA (Sodima) v Commission [2000] ECR I-11231, paras 50–53. 199 Case C-360/02P Ripa de Meana v Parliament [2004] ECR I-10339, paras 49–54. 200 Case T-390/07P Speiser v Parliament [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-63, II-B-1-427, paras 32–34. 201 The Moussis case (above, note 169), para 13; di Marzio (above, note 193), paras 43 and 50. 202 Evans (above, note 173), paras 33–36 203 Case T-392/05  MMT  Mecklenburg-Strelitzer Montage- und Tiefbau GmbH  v Commission [2006] ECR II-97*, para 40. 204 In relation to the provisions dealing with time limits, see: Case T-126/00 Confederazione Generale dell’Industria Italiana (Confindustria) v Commission [2001] ECR I-85, paras 20–21; Case C-406/01 Germany v European Parliament and Council [2002]  ECR  I-4561, para  21; the OPTUC case (above, note 142), para 44; SGAE (above, note 173), paras 24–27. In relation to other provisions, see: Case C-163/07P  Diy-Mar Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v Commission [2007] ECR I-10125, paras 35–40 (upholding the judgment in Case T-129/06 DiyMar Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v Commission [2006] ECR II-4*, paras 40–44; the Eistrup case (above, note 173), para 65. In contrast, the Staff Regulations are worded in such a way as to create an excusable error: Case 117/78 Orlandi v Commission [1979] ECR 1613, para 11.

571

7.39  Admissibility

(d)

Unforeseeable circumstances and force majeure

7.39 In SIMET and FERAM v High Authority205 Advocate General Gand took the view that ‘unforeseeable circumstances’ and ‘force majeure’ are ‘external events beyond the control of the person under the obligation, of a kind which that person could not foresee and the consequences of which he could not imagine’. In Case 284/82 Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni v Commission206 the Court held that, in general terms, ‘force majeure’ envisages, in its essentials, external circumstances that make it impossible for the required action to be taken before the expiry of the limitation period; even if it does not presuppose absolute impossibility, there must still be abnormal difficulties which: (i) are independent of the will of the person concerned; and (ii) appear inevitable even if every useful precaution is taken.207 The concepts of force majeure and unforeseeable circumstances therefore contain an objective element (abnormal circumstances unconnected with the party in question) and a subjective element (the party’s obligation to guard against the consequences of the abnormal event by taking appropriate steps without making unreasonable sacrifices). The party must demonstrate diligence in complying with prescribed time limits and therefore pay close attention to the course of the procedure.208 7.40 The SIMET and FERAM case concerned two applications which were sent by post and arrived at the Court out of time. The advocate general did not accept that the Statute applied to postal delays because those are always foreseeable and should be catered for. The Court did not comment on that so the point seems still to remain open.209 The fact relied on by both the Court and 205 Above, note 169 at 50. 206 [1984] ECR 557, para 11 (and at 570–572 per Advocate General Reischl). See also Case 224/83 Ferriera Vittoria v Commission [1984]  ECR  2349, para  13; the Valsabbia case (above, note 171), paras 21–22, where the applicant could have got over the difficulty by invoking what was, at the time, RP-ECJ, art 38(7) and is now RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3) (para 25; however, it is not evident that the Court was right to say that RP-ECJ, art 38(7) could have applied); Cases 98 and 230/83 Van Gend en Loos v Commission [1984] ECR 3763, para 16. 207 The concept of force majeure has been explored by the Court in a number of cases, albeit in a context different from that under consideration here: see, for example, Case C-334/87 Greece v Commission [1990] ECR I-2849; Case C-335/87 Greece v Commission [1990] ECR I-2875; Case C-308/07P Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v Parliament [2009] ECR I-1059, para 67. 208 Case C-195/91P  Bayer (above, note 173), para  32; Case C0165/99 Austria v Commission (above, note 169), paras 8–16 (administrative error committed by the applicant not an external event; lack of diligence because the error was not picked up); Case C-325/03P Zuazaga Meabe v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)[2005] ECR I-403, para 25; Case T-125/06 Centro Studi Antonio Manieri Srl v Council [2009] ECR II-69, para 28. 209 See also ALA  SpA and ALFER  v Commission (above, note 132) at 1700 (Advocate General Capotorti). On the other hand, in Case 264/82 Timex Corpn v Council and Commission [1985] ECR 849, order of 28 April 1983, the Court applied what is now Statute, art 45, in a case where an application to intervene had been sent by registered post and, in the normal course, would have arrived at the Court before the expiry of the period for applying. At the time of the Court’s order, over three months after the application had been sent off, it still had not arrived. Similarly, in the Manieri case (above, note 208), paras 29–30, the party had posted the original signed application well in time and (as shown by the postmark) it had arrived in Luxembourg 9 days before the expiry of the time limit (which was that for lodging a signed original after a

572

Admissibility 7.41

the advocate general was that the delay in lodging the applications arose after they had arrived in Luxembourg. The Court held that the four days required to transmit the applications from Luxembourg railway station to the Court constituted ‘unforeseeable circumstances’ and enabled it to treat the day the applications arrived in Luxembourg as the day of their lodgment at the Registry. That suggests that the Statute operates, not to extend the time limit, but to create a fictitious date within the time period applicable, at which the event in question (there, lodgment of the application) would have occurred had it not been for the unforeseen circumstances or force majeure.210 In the Busseni case211 the application commencing proceedings was lodged out of time because the decision challenged in the application had been notified to the applicant, a steel company, at a time when the business had been closed down and the company was in a form of receivership under Italian law. In consequence, it was said that the management was prevented from knowing of the communication of the decision. The Court rejected that on the ground that, on the facts, the company had not been put in liquidation and its management had not ceased to be responsible for the conduct of its affairs. The company had remained active and there were in consequence no abnormal and inevitable difficulties or external events independent of the will of the management that might have justified a failure to open correspondence. In contrast, in Case 349/85 Denmark v Commission,212 an application to intervene was made out of time as a result of confusion induced in the intervener by the Court’s Registry as to the date of the start of the limitation period.213 The Court considered that, as the failure to observe the time limit was the result of reliance upon an erroneous statement made by the Registry, it was the consequence of unforeseen circumstances. 7.41 The following do not constitute unforeseen circumstances or force majeure: the unavailability of any lawyer and the fact that the local law librarcopy has been lodged at the Court). For unexplained reasons, the Luxembourg postal services retained the missive for 42 days before delivering it. That was held to be a case of force majeure. A similar situation arose in the Telefon & Buch case (above, note 16), paras 19–20, where the delay was held to be due to unforeseeable circumstances. On the basis of Timex, it is arguable that, while postal delays do not fall within art  45, the complete disappearance of a missive does. However, a broader proposition seems to emerge from the cases: postal delays before the missive comes into the possession of the Luxembourg postal services do not fall within art  45 and relatively short delays thereafter probably also do not do so; however, lengthy (unexplained) delays after the missive has arrived in Luxembourg do constitute force majeure or unforeseeable circumstances. 210 Cf the Timex case (ibid). 211 Above (note 206), paras 12–14. 212 [1988] ECR 169, order of 15 October 1986. Followed in Case F-54/07 Joseph v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-215, II-A-1-1167, paras 40–42. See also Apostolov (above, note 167), paras 23–25. 213 The period was at that time three months running from publication of the notice of the case in the Official Journal (it is now six weeks: RP-ECJ, art 130(1); RP-GC, art 143(1); RP-CST, art 86(1)). The issue of the Official Journal containing the notice was dated 31 December 1985 but it did not appear until 22 April 1986. The Registry told the intervener that it considered the date of publication to be 28 April 1986 because that was the day when the Court received the issue in question. The intervener relied on that statement. As a result, its application to intervene was made out of time.

573

7.41  Admissibility

ies are shut for the holidays, at least where there is a period of ten days outside the holiday period and while time is still running;214 the fact that, at the material time, the applicant was closed for business, its staff in receipt of state benefits and its sole director absent for personal reasons (because he could have made any necessary administrative arrangements to cover his absence);215 the fact that the defendant did not reply to the applicant’s request that any decision be addressed to the applicant’s central administration;216 the complexity of the procedure;217 internal problems within the party concerned;218 the fact that the provision setting out the time limit had not been translated into the applicant’s mother tongue (at least where he must have had a satisfactory knowledge of at least one other EU language);219 strikes (at least where they have been announced in the Press);220 (exceptional) malfunctioning of the postal system (at least where the time actually allowed for posting was less than the extension of time granted under the Rules of Procedure to take account of distance);221 courier delays (where the party is partly responsible for the delay and did not keep an eye on what the

214 The Valsabbia case (above, note 171), paras 23–24. 215 Ferriera Vittoria v Commission (above, note 206), para 14. 216 Case 42/85 Cockerill-Sambre SA v Commission [1985] ECR 3749, para 12. 217 Area Cova (above, note 142), para 6. 218 Communication of information: the Cockerill-Sambre case (above, note 216); Area Cova (above, note 142), para 6; Case C-195/91P Bayer (above, note 173), para 33. A dysfunctional organisation: Case C-242/07P Belgium v Commission (above, note 141), paras 18, 24–25, 30 and 40; Case C-69/12 P Noscirai (above, note 192), para 40 (original mistakenly retained by party and copies sent to the GC because the copying system used made it impossible to distinguish the original from the copies). Malfunction of equipment: Case T-488/13  GEA  Group AG  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 22 January 2015, paras 26–34. In Doherty (above, note 194), paras 17–25, difficulties in faxing the pleading to the Court (due partly to the Court’s fax machine) were dismissed; but the evidence supporting the allegation was regarded as dubious. In Case T-360/10 Tecnimed Srl v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 3 October 2012, the delay was attributed to the lack of diligence of the applicant’s lawyers because they neglected to make copies of the application commencing proceedings before they sent it to the Court by fax and e-mail. When they then copied it, the photocopier malfunctioned, destroying the signature page of the original. A new signature page had to be printed and signed, which meant that, in the GC’s view, the document e-mailed and faxed to it was not the same document as the copy sent to it later on and therefore had to be disregarded. 219 Case 276/85 Cladakis v Commission [1987] ECR 495, paras 10–12. 220 Case 70/86 Commission v Greece [1987] ECR 3545, para 9. 221 Case C-59/91 France v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-525, para  10 (the extensions of time on account of distance are granted automatically specifically for the purpose of catering for postal delays); Case C-239/97 Ireland v Commission [1998] ECR I-2655, para 9; the Monique Remy case (above, note 193), paras 13–21; Case T-130/13  P  Honnefelder v Commission, 28  May 2013, paras 18–27 (deferring sending the original until the ten day period is well advanced is a sign of lack of diligence; and even if the postal service operator guaranteed delivery, that would not be relevant); Case T-468/12 Firma Handlowa Faktor B. I W. Gesina, Gesina Wojciech v Commission, 22 January 2014 (prolonged consideration of the relevance of postal delays).

574

Admissibility 7.42

courier was doing);222 reliance on erroneous information provided by the Court’s Registry (as long as the Registry disclaimed responsibility and expressly stated that the calculation of a time limit was for the party concerned);223 reliance on the Court’s Registry to alert the party to the position;224 the absence of the party’s lawyer on a business trip;225 the personal situation of the party’s lawyer (as long as the party has more than one);226 conduct that increases the likelihood of an application arriving out of time;227 difficulties in contacting the party’s lawyer and the absence of a fax and electronic means of communication;228 events taking place after the expiry of the limitation period;229 in the context of an appeal, a lack of clarity as to the consequences of the judgment appealed against;230 in the case of a late application to intervene, the withdrawal of another party.231 (e) Extension on account of distance, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays 7.42 The Statute232 also provides for ‘periods of grace based on considerations of distance’ to be laid down in the Rules of Procedure. Variable periods, depending upon the geographical location of the party, used to be set out in Annex II of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure but have now been replaced by a single period of ten days.233 That period is not a new period but an extension of the original period in question234 and is intended to compensate for the delays inherent in communicating from the seats of the institutions to the different parts of the EU.235 The ten day extension applies to the period for applying to the Court236 222 Case T-365/11 P AO v Commission, 12 December 2011, paras 36–45 (an unfortunate case). See, in contrast, Case T-127/09 RENV Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, 14 Janaury 2015, paras 45–49 (in that case, a copy had been faxed to the Court and a reputable courier service failed to deliver the signed original to the Court within the next ten days, a circumstance that was considered to be exceptional). In both cases, the delay affected lodgement of the signed original so the question concerned the rather technical rule that the signed original of a faxed pleading must be lodged within ten days. The two cases are difficult to reconcile. 223 Case T-104/99 AS Bolderaja v Council [2000] ECR II-451, paras 24–26. 224 Case C-242/07P Belgium v Commission (above, note 141), paras 20–23. 225 Case T-37/98 Foreign Trade Association v Council [2000] ECR II-373, para 31. 226 Bolderaja (above, note 223), paras 27–28. 227 Zuazaga Meabe (above, note 208), para 26. 228 Case C-191/07P Sellier v Commission [2007] ECR I-113*, paras 8–9. 229 Case C-59/91 France v Commission (above, note 221), para 11. 230 Case C-369/03P Forum des migrants de l’Union europeenne v Commission [2004] ECR I-1981, paras 17–19. 231 Microsoft (above, note 172), paras 50–54. 232 Statute, art 45, 1st para. 233 RP-ECJ, art  51; RP-GC, art  60; RP-CST, art  38. The ten day extension applies whether the applicant is within or outside the EU. That does not constitute unlawful discrimination: Shahid Beheshti University (above, note 136), paras 51–53; Gbagbo (above, note 181), para 63. 234 SIMET and FERAM  v High Authority (above, note 169) at 49 (Advocate General Gand); Horeca-Wallonie (above, note 181), paras 25–26; Case T-60/08  P  Kerelov v Commission, 6 September 2010, paras 14–16; Case C-501/13 P Page Protective Services Ltd v European External Action Service, 2 October 2014, paras 34–36. 235 Cf Cases 36–38, 40 and 41/58 SIMET v High Authority [1959] ECR 157; Case C-84/08P Pitsiorlas v Council and ECB [2008] ECR I-104*. 236 Eg Case T-138/01R  F  v Court of Auditors [2001]  ECR-SC  I-A-211, II-987 (application for rectification).

575

7.43  Admissibility

and to other procedural time limits;237 but it does not apply generally to all time periods, such as those within which an institution is to act,238 or to substantive time limits.239 In addition, RP-ECJ, art  49(2), RP-GC, art  58(2) and RP-CST, art 37(2) provide that, if a period would otherwise end on a Saturday, Sunday or an official holiday, it shall be extended until the end of the first following working day. The official holidays envisaged are those identified in a list published annually in the Official Journal.240 Time does, nevertheless, continue to run during official holidays, Saturdays, Sundays and vacations,241 including holidays in the member states.242 3 The running of time (a) General 7.43 Two problems generally arise in relation to the running of time: the identification of the event or act that causes time to start running; and the calculation of the limitation period (including any periods of interruption). The latter topic is dealt with in the next part of this section. In general, it is for the party alleging that the action is out of time to provide evidence of the date on which occurred the event causing time to started running.243 7.44 The Treaties usually provide that time starts to run on or from the occurrence of a particular event. The Rules of Procedure derogate from that by providing, first, that the day during which the event or action from which the period is to run occurs shall be excluded when reckoning any period of time prescribed by the Treaties, the Statutes or the Rules of Procedure themselves;244 and, secondly, that where time for commencing proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution runs from the publication of the measure, the period is to be calculated

237 Letters from the Court informing a party of the date for the lodgment of a procedural document often include the ten day extension in the calculation of the date; it is not added on to that date. However, a mistake by the Registry concerning the operation of the time limit in question (as extended by the ten-day period) does not abridge the party’s right to rely on the ten day extension: the Villa case (above, note 140), paras 25–26. Where there is a need for expedition (as in the case of observations submitted in the context of interim relief proceedings), it may not be possible to apply the ten day extension. 238 Cases 5, 7, 13–24/66 Firma E Kampffmeyer v Commission [1967] ECR 245 at 272 (Advocate General Gand); Case 195/80 Michel v European Parliament [1981]  ECR  2861 at 2882 (Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn). 239 Case C-469/11  P  Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (above, note 179), paras 48–59; Case T-40/14 Electrabel SA v Commission, 13 November 2014, paras 33–37. 240 RP-ECJ, art 24(6). At the time of writing, the list was published in OJ 2013 No C359/2. The holidays are: New Year’s Day, Easter Monday, 1 May, Ascension Day, Whit Monday, 23 June, 15 August, 1 November, 25 and 26 December. 241 RP-ECJ, art 49(1)(d)–(e); RP-GC, art 58(1)(d)–(e); RP-CST, art 37(1)(d)–(e). 242 The Valsabbia case (above, note 171), para 12. 243 Cases T-70/02 and T-71/92 Florimex v Commission [1997]  ECR II-693, para  74; Case T-263/97 GAL Penisola Sorrentina v Commission [2000] ECR II-2041, paras 47–48. 244 RP-ECJ, art 49(1)(a); RP-GC, art 58(1)(a); RP-CST, art 37(1)(a).

576

Admissibility 7.45

from the end of the 14th day after publication in the Official Journal245 (which is to be construed as referring to the date of publication on the internet where publication is not effected by means of the Official Journal).246 Those derogations also affect the calculation of the limitation period. The provision that, in the case of measures that are published,247 time runs from the end of the 14th day after publication (or from the 15th day after publication, as it used to be provided) has been described as ‘nothing more than a closer definition of the concept of ‘notification’ that is to say clarification as to the beginning of the period, which is lacking in the Treaty itself’.248 As that remark indicates, in the case of actions brought against a measure, it is not so much the occurrence of the event in question as knowledge of its occurrence on the part of the person concerned that is the important factor when identifying the point at which time starts to run. That is not the case in relation to actions for damages. (b) Actions for annulment 7.45 In actions for annulment, the event causing time to start to run under the TFEU is the notification or publication of the contested act or, in the absence of both, ‘the day on which it came to the knowledge’ of the applicant where it is not notified or published.249 As has been seen, where the contested act is published, 245 RP-ECJ, art 50; RP-GC, art 59. That provision does not appear in the CST rules of procedure, presumably because the measures that can be challenged in proceedings before the CST are not ones that are published in the Official Journal. When the Official Journal was published in hard copy form, ‘publication’ meant that the measure was made available to the public in all the official EU languages at the Office for Official Publications of the European Union, Luxembourg, and the date of publication was that on which that was first done, whatever the date appearing on the issue of the Official Journal in question: Case 99/78 Weingut Gustav Decker KG v Hauptzollamt Landau [1979] ECR 101, para 3; Case C-337/88 Società Agricola Fattoria Alimentare (SAFA) v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1990]  ECR  I-1, para 12. Since 2013, the Official Journal has been published in electronic form (see Council Regulation No 216/2013 (OJ 2013 No L69/1). A measure is published in the Official Journal in electronic form where the conditions laid down in thet Regulation are complied with. However, it appears that publication must still be in all the official EU languages: cf Case C-161/06 Skoma-Lux sro v Celni reditelstvi Olomouc [2007] ECR I-10841, para 34 (see also paras 48–51, which deal with non-compliant forms of publication). 246 Case C-625/11 P Polyelectrolyte Producers Group GEIE (PPG) v European Chemicals Agency, 26 September 2013, paras 30–37. 247 As the Polyelectrolyte Producers case (above, note 246) makes clear, ‘publication’ refers to the action of making a measure available to the public generally and not just to making it available in a particular form (in casu, the form taken by the Official Journal). 248 Case 88/76 Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres SA v Commission [1977] ECR 709 at 731 (Advocate General Reischl). 249 TFEU, art 263, last para. Eg GAL Penisola Sorrentina (above, note 243), para 44. The date on which the measure comes into effect is not material: Poland v Commission (above, note 129), paras 43–44 (that case should be read subject to Case C-336/09P Poland v Commission, 26 June 2012, in which it was held that the entitlement of a newly acceding member state to bring an action for annulment attaches when it becomes a member state and acquires capacity to sue as such; time for bringing proceedings runs from then). The defendant institution is not obliged to ensure that the applicant has actual knowledge of the contested measure (as opposed to, for example, obtaining that knowledge through publication in the Official Journal): the MMT case (above, note 203), para 34.

577

7.45  Admissibility

time in fact starts to run from the end of the 14th day after publication. It seems reasonably clear that that applies where proceedings are brought against a measure which must be published in the Official Journal; and there is no provision in the Rules of Procedure that excludes its application in the case of a measure that need not be, but is, published in the Official Journal. Accordingly, it has been held that, as between publication and knowledge of the challenged measure, where there is publication of the challenged measure (irrespective of whether or not publication is obligatory), the date of publication is decisive in setting the point at which time starts to run.250 That is so even if the applicant does not acquire the ability to challenge the measure until a later date.251 Publication in the Official Journal ordinarily means publication of the complete text of the measure; but publication of a summary in the Official Journal, coupled with a link to where the complete text may be found on a website is also publication for the purpose of causing time to start running.252 The questions nonetheless arise whether or not publication is in all circumstances sufficient to cause time to start running; and whether or not an earlier event may cause it to do so. 250 Eg Case C-122/95 Germany v Council [1998] ECR I-973, paras 32–40 (publication decisive although not obligatory but consistent practice; Germany would have had actual knowledge of the contested act when it was adopted); Case T-140/95 Ryanair v Commission [1998] ECR II3327, paras 25–27 (it was reasonable for the applicant to anticipate publication); Case T-190/00 Regione Siciliana v Commission [2003]  ECR II-5015, para  30; Case T-264/03 Schmoldt v Commission [2004]  ECR II-1515, paras 51–62 (publication decisive although neither obligatory nor consistent practice); the Transportes Evaristo Molina case (above, note 142), para  37; Case T-354/05 Television francaise 1  SA (TF1) v Commission [2009]  ECR II-471, paras 33–34 (in that case, publication was obligatory: see para 48); Case C-498/08P Fornaci Laterizi Danesi SpA v Commission [2009] ECR I-122*, para 22; Poland v Commission (above, note 126), para 32; ISD Polska (above, note 3), paras 55–57 (legitimate expectation that the decision would be published). 251 Transportes Evaristo Molina case (above, note 142), para  40, upholding Case T-45/08 Transportes Evaristo Molina SA v Commission [2008] ECR II-265*, para 30, in relation to a decision that became of direct and individual concern to the applicant only some time after the date of its publication. In that case, it was held both at first instance and on appeal that, in fact, the legal effect of the decision had not changed as claimed by the applicant, which weakens somewhat the force of the ruling that time starts to run as from publication even if an action for annulment would have been inadmissible for a different reason had it been commenced at that time. Cf Case T-426/04 Tramarin Snc di Tramarin Andrea e Sergio v Commission [2005] ECR II-4765, paras 62–66 (in which it was claimed that the applicant did not know of its interest and the grounds on which the measure could be challenged until some time after it knew of the measure). On the other hand, in the Hassan case (above, note 35), the action was not out of time because the contested measure did not concern the applicant until it had been amended and it was from that point that time began to run (see paras 53 and 56 – not disturbed on appeal: Cases C-399/06P and C-403/06P Hassan and Ayadi, above, note 4). 252 Case T-17/02 Fred Olsen SA v Commission [2005] ECR II-2031, paras 78–83; Air Bourbon (above, note 197), paras 33–37 and 40–41; Tramarin (above, note 251), paras 50–56; Case T-274/06 Estaser El Mareny SL v Commission [2007] ECR II-143*, paras 31–33; Case T-388/02 Kronoply GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2008] ECR II-305*, paras 29–34 (not disputed on appeal); Case T-354/05 TF1 (above, note 225), para 35. The link must take one to the complete text, wherever it is on the website: cf Case T-327/04 Syndicat nationale de l’industrie des viandes v Commission [2008] ECR II-72*, para 31. Those cases ought now to be read in the light of the Polyelectrolyte Producers case (above, note 246), according to which the relevant ‘publication’ may be the making available of the full text on the website rather than the notice in the (electronic) Official Journal.

578

Admissibility 7.46

(c) Notification 7.46 It would seem that, strictly speaking, notification is service of a measure by its author on (or receipt, from the author, by) the person to whom the measure is addressed (and not, for example, the receipt - by however means - of a copy of the measure by a person other than an addressee, which goes to the recipient’s knowledge of the measure).253 A  measure is notified not when it is sent but when it is received in such a state as to enable the addressee to take full cognisance of it.254 A person is an addressee of a measure if identified as such in the measure itself (not everyone to whom a measure is sent by the author of it is, therefore, an addressee).255 Notification may be effected by registered letter with a signed acknowledgement of receipt, in accordance with the rules applicable to mail deliveries in the country in question; but, where relevant, evidence may be produced as to the actually time of receipt.256 A formal error in the name or 253 Cf the BASF case (above, note 169), para 59; Case C-195/91P Bayer (above, note 173), paras 21–23; Case C-309/95 Commission v Council [1998] ECR I-655, paras 16–17; Cases T-121/96 and T-151/96 Mutual Aid Administration Services NV  v Commission [1997]  ECR II-1355, para 40 (decision served by fax); Case C-7/99P Campoli v Commission [1999] ECR I-2679, para  6; Fred Olsen (above, note 252), paras 73–76; Syndicat nationale de l’industrie des viandes (above, note 222), para  33; Case T-48/04 Qualcomm Wireless Business Solutions Europe BV v Commission [2009] ECR II-2029, para 46; ISD Polska (above, note 3), paras 55 and 58; ICO Satellite (above, note 193), para 29. Hence, in Case T-144/04 Television francaise 1 SA (TFI) v Commission [2008] ECR II-761, paras 16–23, the issue turned on the principle that publication is decisive in relation to knowledge. Although para 16 suggests that the contested decision had been ‘notified’ to TFI, that does not appear to have been the case. It was sent a copy: see paras 6 and 22. 254 Case 58/88 Olbrechts v Commission [1989]  ECR  2643, para  10; Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989]  ECR  3283, para  6; Case T-54/90 Lacroix v Commission [1991]  ECR II-749, para  29; BASF (above, note 169), para  59. No particular formalities or methods of communication are required as long as the addressee is given full cognisance of the measure: Case C-102/13 P Germany v Commisison, 3 July 2014, paras 30–44; Page Protective Services (above, note 234), paras 31–33. The cognisance in question is that of the substantive content of the measure (a brief summary of its contents is not enough): Case C-143/95P Commission v Socurte [1997]  ECR  I-1, paras 31–32. Cf the Evropaiki Dynamiki case (above, note 193), paras 37–41. There is no need for the notification to refer to rights of action or remedies against the measure, or to any relevant time limits: see Case T-275/97 Guerin Automobiles EURL v Commission [1998]  ECR II-253, paras 16–17; Case T-276/97 Guerin Automobiles EURL  v Commission [1998] ECR II-261, para 20; Case C-163/07P Diy-Mar Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd (above, note 204), para 41. Notification need not be in the recipient’s maternal language or the language used previously in exchanges between the parties, as long as it is in a language that the recipient can understand effectively: Case F-133/06 Marcuccio v Commission [2008] ECRSC  I-A-1-343, II-A-1-1883, para  42 (on appeal, Case T-9/09P  Marcuccio v Commission, 24 November 2010); cf Qualcomm (above, note 253), para 53. 255 Qualcomm (above, note 253), paras 47–52. 256 BASF (above, note 169), paras 59–61; European Night Services (above, note 6), para  77. It follows that, where the relevant rules are not followed, the notification is defective and time runs from actual receipt: see European Night Services, paras 78–79 (in that case, the rules for the delivery of registered mail required delivery to an authorised person only; the letter was given to an unauthorised person). Unless it is so provided, notification need not be made by registered letter but can be made by any effective means. However, the means used must result in actual receipt of the measure: see, for example, Case T-196/95 H v Commission [1997] ECRSC I-A-1-133, II-A-1-403, paras 32–35 (notification ineffective because made by regular postal delivery at a time when the addressee of the measure was away).

579

7.47  Admissibility

title given to the addressee does not invalidate the notification, at least where the addressee realised at the material time that an error had been made.257 If the form or manner of the notification is such that the person concerned is not put in a position in which he can exercise his rights, the notification is ineffective.258 It is not necessary that the addressee or any particular person (such as the managing director or legal adviser of the addressee) has actual knowledge of the contents of the notification as long as it has actually been received.259 Hence notification to the head office of a company is sufficient; companies have no right to require an EU institution to send the notification to any other place or to a particular person.260 In the case of an unpublished measure, receipt of a letter that expresses precisely and unequivocally a reasoned decision will be regarded as a notification sufficient to cause time to start running in preference to a subsequent communication.261 7.47 Where a measure is both notified to the addressee and published in the Official Journal, time starts to run from the former event because the measure takes effect from that point in time, not from publication.262 Although notification can be described as formal receipt of a measure by the addressee such that the addressee thereby has knowledge of it, notification is different from actual knowledge because it can involve a formal act (such as signed receipt of a registered letter) that is taken to be effective, as notification of the measure, even though it does not necessarily result in the addressee obtaining actual knowledge of the measure at the time of the performance of the formal act in question. 7.48 Where the event causing time to start running is notification, it is for the party claiming that the action is out of time to prove the date on which the contested act was notified; in the absence of proof of the date of receipt, the Court has no basis on which to conclude that the proceedings have been brought out of 257 Case 82/84 Metalgoi SpA v Commission [2984] ECR 2585; Case T-275/97 Guerin Automobiles (above, note 254), paras 11–14; Case T-276/97 Guerin Automobiles (above, note 254), paras 18–19. 258 Case 76/79 Karl Könecke Fleischwarenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1980] ECR 665, para 7 (and at 683 per Advocate General Reischl); H v Commission (above, note 256). Cf Ben Ali (above, note 167), paras 19–20. 259 Ferriera Vittoria v Commission (above, note 206), para 11; the Cockerill-Sambre case (above, note 216), para  10; European Night Services (above, note 6), para  76; Case F-13/07  L  v European Medicines Agency [2007]  ECR-SC  I-A-1-105, II-A-1-585, paras 26–30 (measure notified by registered letter and signed for by the addessee’s wife while the addressee was on holiday; hence notification effective when letter signed for and received, not when read by the addressee). 260 The Cockerill-Sambre case (above, note 216), para  1; Case T-287/02 Asian Institute of Technology v Commission [2003] ECR II-2179, paras 27–28 (notification to branch manager effective); Shahid Beheshti University (above, note 136), paras 35–41. 261 Case C-12/90 Infortec-Projectos e Consultadoria Lda v Commission [1990] ECR I-4625. 262 ICO Satellite (above, note 193), para 35. The relationship between notification and publication is not the same as that between knowledge and publication. Further, in the case of the imposition of sanctions or penalites on a person, the measure in question must ordinarily be notified to that person. Publication in the Official Journal is normally appropriate (as a means of communicating the measure to the person concerned) only if notification is impossible or impractical: eg Jaber (above, note 171), paras 38–47; Kaddour (above, note 171), paras 38–47; Hamcho (above, note 171), paras 43–53; Case C-153/15 P NICO (above, note 192), paras 44–54.

580

Admissibility 7.49

time unless there is other convincing evidence to that effect.263 Where the same act has been notified more than once and at different times or in different countries so that the date of the expiry of the limitation period varies depending upon which notification is relied on, it is an open question whether or not the applicant should be given the benefit of the longest limitation period.264 It is sufficient protection of the procedural rights of the applicant to take the limitation period that terminates earlier rather than later; but it cannot be excluded that there may be cases where it is more appropriate to take the period terminating later.265 (d) Knowledge 7.49 In the case of measures challenged by a person other than the addressee, time starts to run when the applicant receives knowledge of the measure, notification not applying ex hypothesi,266 unless the measure is published (in which case, as noted above, the date of publication is the decisive event).267 Knowledge means that the applicant is sufficiently apprised of the measure that he can identify it and ascertain both its precise content and the reasons for it in such a way as to be able to decide whether or not he can institute proceedings.268 Where the person 263 Olbrechts v Commission (above, note 254), para 10; Case T-1/90 Pérez-Minguez Casariego v Commission [1991] ECR II-143, para 37. Notification should therefore be effected by registered letter with an acknowledgment of service: eg  the Ferriera Vittoria case (above, note 206), para 9; the Cockerill-Sambre case (above, note 216), para 8; Bayer AG v Commission (above, note 173), paras 18–20. 264 The point was left open in Case T-106/89 Norsk Hydro A/S v Commission, order of 19 June 1990 (unreported), where the contested act was notified to the applicant in the United Kingdom (in respect of which the extension of time on account of distance was ten days at the time) and Norway (in respect of which it was four weeks). The rules of procedure currently provide that time limits are extended on account of distance by a single period of ten days but the problem may still arise if the measure is notified on different days. 265 For example, where notification is effected first at a branch office or subsidiary and then at the head office in another country and it would in the circumstances be unfair to calculate the limitation period by reference to the first notification. 266 See, for example, Case 135/81 Groupement des Agences de Voyages asbl v Commission [1982] ECR 3799, paras 15–18; Qualcomm (above, note 253), para 47. 267 Eg Qualcomm (above, note 253), paras 55–57. That can give rise to difficulties where the applicant obtains knowledge of the measure (such as by receiving a complete copy of it) but it is unclear if the measure is going to be published or not. Nothing prevents an applicant from commencing proceedings before the expiry of a time limit (see Cases 172 and 226/83 Hoogovens Groep BV v Commission [1985] ECR 2831, para 8) but it may be risky to defer their commencement in the expectation that the measure will be published unless it is fairly clear that publication will take place: cf the Fred Olsen case (above, note 252), paras 76–86. 268 Eg Case T-465/93 Consorzio Gruppo di azione Locale ‘Murgia Messapica’ [1994]  ECR II361, para  29; Commission v Council (above, note 229), paras 18–22; Fred Olsen (above, note 252), para 73. As the judgment in Murgia Messapica points out (see para 30), it follows that the decisive date for determining the applicant’s state of knowledge is after the disputed measure has been adoptd, not before. Hearsay evidence is insufficient to constitute knowledge of a measure for the purposes of TFEU, art 263: Case 118/83R CMC Cooperativa Muratori e Cementisti v Commission [1983] ECR 2583 at para 48 (Judge Pescatore). For cases involving disputed knowledge, see: Evans (above, note 173), paras 40–47; Case T-372/07 Kerateas v Commission [2008] ECR II-60*, in which the applicant claimed to have obtained knowledge of a decision in 2007 but the copy of the decision attached to the application bore a 2005 date printed on it by the applicant’s fax machine, indicating that the applicant had sent it to someone

581

7.50  Admissibility

concerned has knowledge of the existence of an act that may affect his position but insufficient knowledge to identify it or ascertain its precise content and the reasons for it, he lies under a duty to make a request, within a reasonable time after first receiving knowledge of the possible existence of the act, for the whole text of the act; time will ordinarily start running from receipt of the complete text of the act but, if no such request is made, time will start running from the point at which the request should have been made (that is, from the expiry of a reasonable period of time after the person concerned first had knowledge of the possible existence of the act in question).269 If such a request is made within a reasonable period of time but the institution concerned fails to provide a complete text of the act, the inference is that time does not start to run270 at least unless and until the act is either published in the Official Journal or notified to the applicant; the alternative view is that time does start to run, the applicant being entitled to have the act annulled for lack of reasons.271 Whether or not the person concerned has sufficient knowledge of the possible existence of an act affecting him to put him on enquiry is a question of fact. Possession of such knowledge may be inferred from the fact that the relevant information was in his possession or in the public domain or in the possession of a committee on which that person was represented272 or, presumably, known to an employee of the person concerned or, possibly, a company within the same group.273 Statements from a national authority that fail to show clearly and unequivocally that the EU institution concerned has made a definitive ruling are insufficient to establish that the applicant has knowledge.274 (e) Publication 7.50 In the case of measures which have not been notified (or not notified effectively) to the person concerned and are published in the Official Journal (whether or not they must be published), publication starts time running only if it gives sufficient information to amount to complete knowledge of the measure.275 If it does not, time starts to run a reasonable time after publication if the published information is sufficient to put the applicant on notice of the existence two years before knowledge of it had supposedly been obtained. The applicant claimed that the copy had been misdated but that was rejected on the evidence. 269 Case 236/86 Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG  v Commission [1988]  ECR  3761, para  14; Case C-180/88 Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie v Commission [1990] ECR I-4413, para 22; Case C-102/92 Ferriere Acciaierie Sarde SpA v Commission [1993] ECR I-801 paras 18–19; Tramarin (above, note 251), paras 57–59. Cf Case T-155/95 LPN – Liga para proteccao da Natureza v Commission [1998]  ECR II-2751, paras 42–44 (where the request was made unreasonably late). 270 Cf the Dillinger Hüttenwerke case (ibid) at 3775 (Advocate General Darmon). 271 Cf (by analogy) Estaser El Mareny (above, note 252), paras 37–38. 272 The Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie case (above, note 269), paras 25–27. 273 Cf Orkem v Commission (above, note 254), para 6. 274 Case 378/87 Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH v Commission [1989] ECR 1359, paras 14–15. 275 Cases 89 and 91/86  L’Etoile Commerciale and Comptoir National Technique Agricole v Commission [1987] ECR 3005 at 3014 (Advocate General Cruz Vilaça). As long as publication is in all the official EU languages, as they are at the date of publication, publication is effective (even if there is a later change in the number of official languages): Poland v Commission (above, note 129), paras 40–42.

582

Admissibility 7.50

of a measure which may affect his legal position and thus oblige him to make enquiries as to its exact content.276 Publication in the Official Journal is notice to all the world and an applicant cannot claim that he did not have knowledge of the measure or was not put on enquiry simply because he did not read the relevant part of the Official Journal. Publication is, however, notice only of what is published so that the mere mention of a measure in the Official Journal does not cause even a reader of the Official Journal to have knowledge of the precise contents of the measure. In Karl Könecke Fleischwarenfabrik GmbH & Co KG v Commission277 Advocate General Reischl took the view that, where a contested measure is published, even though publication is not required, and also notified to the persons concerned, the time for bringing proceedings under TFEU, art 263 starts to run from whichever of the dates is later in time. The Court held that time ran from (what was at the time) the 15th day of publication of the measure (a Commission decision) on the basis that the earlier communication of the decision to the applicant did not contain any details ‘which would have permitted the applicant to identify the decision taken and to ascertain its precise content in such a way as to enable it to exercise its right to institute proceedings’.278 The inference is that, where notification and publication both occur, it is the first event in time which starts time running, not the last (the date of publication is decisive as between publication and knowledge, not as between publication and notification). It should also be noted that, in Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission,279 it was held that, where a measure is directed at named undertakings, only the text notified to the addressees is authentic. That suggests that, in relation to such acts, time starts to run from notification rather than publication in the Official Journal. In Cases 358/85 and 51/86 France v European Parliament280 Advocate General Mancini took the view that, where the applicant has full knowledge of the contested act before it is published in the Official Journal, time runs from the acquisition of knowledge and not from publication; but the current case law regards publication as decisive (when knowledge, not notification, is in play).281 Although those principles concerning publication were developed during the era of publication in hard copy form, which was effected, and for technical reasons could be effected only, through publication in the paper version of the Official Journal, they apply mutatis mutandis to electronic pub-

276 Cases 10 and 18/68 Società Eridania Zuccherifici Nazionali v Commission [1969] ECR 459 at 488–489 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 69/69 Alcan Aluminium Raeren SA v Commission [1970] ECR 385 at 396–397 (Advocate General Gand). But see Cases 31 and 33/62 Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG and Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Commission [1962] ECR 501 at 511 (Advocate General Roemer). 277 Above (note 258) at 682 but see 683. 278 Könecke (above, note 258), para 7; see also at 683 (Advocate General Reischl). At that time, the rules of procedure provided that time started to run from the 15th day after publication. The judgment must now be read in the light of the current version of RP-ECJ, art 50 and RP-GC, art 59, which refer to the end of the 14th day after publication. 279 [1966] ECR 299 at 337. 280 [1988] ECR 4821 (at 4838–4839). 281 Eg Fred Olsen (above, note 252).

583

7.51  Admissibility

lication in the Official Journal and to other forms by which publication may be effected.282 (f)

Actions for damages

7.51 In the case of actions for damages, time starts to run as from the date on which liability accrues. The non-contractual liability of the EU depends on the following factors: (i) a wrongful act; (ii) damage; and (iii) a causal connection between them. It follows that time starts to run only when all three factors are in existence. In Cases 256, 257, 265, 267/80 and 5/81 Birra Wührer Spa v Council and Commission283 the Court therefore held that the limitation period cannot begin ‘before the date on which the injurious effects of the unlawful measures adopted by the Community were produced’, rejecting as the date on which time began to run the dates on which those measures entered into force and were published. The Statute284 provides that proceedings in matters arising from non-contractual liability ‘shall be barred after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto’. That event is normally, as has just been seen, the occurrence of the damage flowing from a wrongful act. In the case of damage occurring over a period of time, damage caused outside the limitation period is not recoverable but that does not prevent compensation from being awarded in respect of damage arising during the limitation period.285 However, the expiry of the limitation period is not a valid defence to an action for damages where the applicant became aware of the event giving rise to liability belatedly and without any fault or lack of diligence on his part.286 The inference is that, as in the case of 282 Cf the Polyelectrolyte Producers case (above, note 246). 283 [1982]  ECR  85 and [1984]  ECR  3693, para  15. See also Case 51/81 De Franceschi SpA Monfalcone v Council and EC Commission [1982] ECR 117; Case C-136/01 P Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi Snc v EAEC  [2002]  ECR  I-6565, para  30; Case C-460/09  P  INalca SpA  v Commission, 28  February 2013. In Case T-106/98 Fratelli Murri SpA  v Commission [1999] ECR II-2553, para 26 (upheld on procedural grounds in Case C-399/99 P Fratelli Murri SpA  v Commission, order of 6  July 2000 (unreported), the GC took the date on which time started to run as being, at the latest, when the applicant submitted a claim to the defendant because, at that point, it was possible for the applicant to specify the amount of the loss suffered (and it was also from that point that the applicant claimed interest). In the case of the wrongful act, that condition is satisfied when the act comes into existence, not when its unlawfulness has been determined by a court: eg Case T-43/13 Donnici v Parliament, 20 March 2014, para 56; Case T-340/11 Regie Networks v Commission, 17 October 2012, paras 35–40. 284 Statute, art 46. 285 The Birra Wührer case (above, note 283) at [1984] ECR 3693, paras 19–23; Pelle and Konrad (above, note 178), paras 62–66 and 79; Case T-210/09 Formenti Seleco SpA  v Commission [2011] ECR II-143*, para 50; Case T-309/10 Klein v Commission, 21 January 2014, para 52 (on appeal, Case C-120/14P Klein v Commission, 22 April 2015, paras 40–41); Case T-138/14 Chart v European External Action Service, 16  December 2015, para  81. For an extensive examination discussion of the concept of continuing loss see: Electrabel (above, note 239), paras 38–60. An assertion of continuing loss or damage should not be confused with an assertion that the wrongful act engaging liability is a continuing act: cf Case T-241/09 Nikolaou v Court of Auditors, 20 February 2013, para 24. 286 Case 145/83 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3539, paras 50–51 (where the event giving rise to liability could not have been known to the applicant before the preparatory enquiries undertaken by the Court in the proceedings); Case C-469/11 P Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission (above, note 179), para 35; Donnici (above, note 283), para 49; Chart (above, note 285), para 57. In

584

Admissibility 7.52

actions for annulment, the crucial question is whether or not the applicant has, or should by exercising reasonable diligence have had, knowledge of all the factors necessary for him to decide whether or not to commence proceedings (and, in the context of an action for damages, submit an application for compensation to the responsible EU institution within a reasonable time). However, it should be observed that that criterion is to be applied as an objective test and not by reference to the applicant’s subjective beliefs.287 (g) IP appeals 7.52 An action can be brought before the GC against a decision of a Board of Appeal within two months of the date of notification of the decision.288 As in the case of other actions, that period is extended on account of distance by a period of 10 days.289 The legislation governing IP appeals defines comprehensively what amounts to notification of a decision. Where it is impossible to prove due notification or the provisions relating to notification have not been observed (such as where a decision is communicated to the addressee of the decision by Autosalone (above, note 283), it was emphasised at paras 31–33 and 43 that knowledge of the facts is not material and that Adams deals with the ability to invoke the termination of the limitation period rather than the date on which time starts to run. The observation in Saint and Murray (above, note 177), paras 81–85, that it is knowledge of the event causing the loss, rather than knowledge of its illegal nature, that is relevant, should be read subject to Autosalone. 287 Broadly speaking, the cases consider three types of situation: (i) the satisfaction, in objective terms, of the conditions establishing liability (irrespective of the claimant’s knowledge or capability of obtaining knowledge of that fact); (ii) the satisfaction of those conditions where the claimant knew or ought to have known that they were satisfied; and (iii) a situation in which, despite the fact that the satisfaction of those conditions was objectively ascertainable, the claimant entertained the subjective belief that one or other of them was not satisfied. In Case C-51/05 P Commission v Cantina sociale de Dolianova Soc Coop arl [2008] ECR I-5341, paras 54–70, the ECJ rejected (iii) as a possibility, holding that time cannot start to run by reference to the claimant’s subjective beliefs (and rejecting, in particular, the relevance of litigation before a national court to the question whether or not the conditions establishing liability had been established). Dolianova was followed in (for example) Case T-247/08  C-Content BV v Commission [2010] ECR II-205*, paras 52–55, a procurement case. However, in Case C-406/08 Uniplex (UK) Ltd v NHS Business Services Authority [2010] ECR I-817, paras 30–35, a case under the EU public procurement legislation, the ECJ rejected (i) as a possibility. A case could be made out for distinguishing C-Content from Uniplex on the ground that the time limit in the former was much longer than the time limit in the latter case; but the ruling in Uniplex is expressed in general terms, and as a matter of principle, not by reference to the length of the limitation period (the length may be relevant for the reason stated by the GC in C-Content at para 54; the considerations lying behind the time limit at issue in Uniplex were quite different). That then leaves (ii), which accommodates both the problem of the claimant who did not know that the conditions establishing liability had been satisfied (but could have known) and the problem that arose in the Adams case (above, note 286). Another way of resolving the difficulty posed by Adams is to say that the principle determining when time starts to run is that referred to in (i) but that, in an Adams-type situation, the defendant cannot rely on the expiry of the time limit against the claimant. In cases like Regie Networks (above, note 283), para 37, there is a suggestion that the GC may be working towards differentiating between the wrongful act (to which knowledge of the act, but not its illegality, may be relevant) and the loss suffered (ascertainable objectively). 288 See Ch 17, para 17.215 ff. 289 RP-GC, art 60.

585

7.53  Admissibility

some means that does not amount to notification), notification is deemed to have been made on the date established by the Office as being the date of actual receipt of the decision. Time runs from then in the usual way.290 4 Calculation of limitation periods291 (a) General 7.53 Periods expressed in days, weeks, months or years are to be calculated as follows: (1) the period is to be calculated from the moment at which the relevant event occurs or the relevant action takes place, the day during which that event occurs or that act takes place being excluded; (2) a period expressed as a number of days ends with the expiry of the last of the relevant number of days; (3) a period expressed as a number of weeks, months or years ends with the expiry of whichever day in the last week, month or year is the same day of the week, or falls on the same date, as the day during which the event or action from which the period is to be calculated occurred or took place; (4) in a period expressed in months or years, if the day on which it should expire does not occur in the last month, the period ends with the expiry of the last day of that month; (5) a period expressed in months and days is reckoned first in whole months and then in days; (6) periods are not suspended if they include official holidays, Saturdays, Sundays or the judicial vacations;292 (7) the period is extended on account of distance by adding to the end of the period a single period of ten days;293

290 Eg Case T-14/06  K-Swiss v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR II-106* (upheld on appeal in Case C-144/07P K-Swiss v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2008] ECR I-7367. 291 Various cases go into the detail of calculating limitation periods. See, for example, the OPTUC case (above, note 142), paras 35–46. It should be noted that the date and time at which a period ends is the date and time in Luxembourg: Doherty (above, note 194), para 16. Hence, where a period ends at 24.00 hours, that means 24.00 hours in Luxembourg. A person in a time zone one hour behind Luxembourg, who sends a fax or e-mail at 23.01 hours local time, will be out of time if the period ends at 24.00 hours (Luxembourg time). 292 RP-ECJ, art 49(1); RP-GC, art 58(1); RP-CST, art 37(1). The Rules of Procedure now codify the case law as set out in SIMET and FERAM v High Authority (above, note 169) at 48 (Advocate General Gand); Case 152/85 Misset v Council [1987] ECR 223, paras 7–11 (and at 228–232 per Advocate General Mancini); Cladakis v Commission (above, note 219), para 8; Case C-59/91 France v Commission (above, note 221), para 6. 293 RP-ECJ, art 51; RP-GC, art 60; RP-CST, art 38. Formerly, the extension on account of distance varied depending upon the country in which the party was located.

586

Admissibility 7.54

(8) if the period would otherwise end on a Saturday, Sunday or official holiday, it is extended to the end of the next following working day294 (a period can start or run through but not end on a Saturday, Sunday or official holiday). The running of time is interrupted or suspended where, before the expiry of the time limit for commencing proceedings and before the application commencing proceedings has been lodged, an application is made for legal aid; and time starts running again as from the date of service on the applicant of the order deciding on the application for legal aid.295 (b) Actions for annulment 7.54 If one supposes two actions under TFEU, art 263 for the annulment of a Commission decision notified to one applicant in the United Kingdom at 15.30 hours on 20 December and notified to the other at 10.00 hours on 30 December, the calculation of the periods for commencing proceedings is as follows: the period laid down by TFEU, art 263 is two months, as extended to account of distance by ten days; in the first action the period begins at 00.00 hours on 21 December and in the second it begins at 00.00 hours on 31 December because the day on which the event causing time to start running (notification of the decision) is excluded from consideration; the calculation of the number of months is done by reference to calendar months and not periods of 30 or 31 days; in the first action the first month ends on 21  January and in the second action it ends on 31 January (that is, at 00.00 hours on those days); in the first action the second month ends on 21 February, at 00.00 hours (or, to put it another way, at 24.00 hours on 20 February) and in the second action the second month ends on the last day of February (28 or 29, depending upon whether or not that year is a leap year),296 at 24.00 hours; the ten days on account of distance are then added, which brings the period to 2 March in the first action (assuming that February has 28 days) and to 10  March in the second action; ordinarily, the limitation period will end at 24.00 hours on those dates; if 2 or 10 March is a Saturday, the period is extended to 24.00 hours on the next following working day (Monday 4 or 12 March); the same applies if 2 or 10 March is a Sunday; if, on this example, the Monday following Saturday (or Sunday) 2 or 10 March were Easter Monday (an official holiday of the Court), the period would end at 24.00 hours on the Tuesday as being the next following working day after Saturday/Sunday 2 or 10 March.

294 RP-ECJ, art 49(2); RP-GC, art 58(2); RP-CST, art 37(2). 295 RP-ECJ, art 186(3); RP-GC, art 147(7) (which also provides that time starts to run again from service of the order designating a lawyer to represent the applicant); RP-CST, art 112(5); Case T-92 Lallemand-Zeller v Commission [1993] ECR II-31 (but note the AVM case, above (note 142), paras 25–29). For the calculation of the period when it is interrupted, see Case F-133/06 Marcuccio v Commission (above, note 254), paras 50–51. See further Ch 4, para 4.86 ff. 296 The fact that the event causing time to start running in the second action occurred on the penultimate day in December does not mean that the limitation period should end on the penultimate day in February.

587

7.55  Admissibility

(c) Actions in respect of a failure to act 7.55 The position in an action brought under TFEU, art 265 in respect of a failure to act is as follows. The defendant institution must first be called upon to act and must then define its position within two months. Supposing the letter calling on the institution to act to have been delivered to the institution at 15.30 hours on 20 December, the period of two months starts to run at 00.00 hours on 21 December; it expires at 24.00 hours on 20 February (or, to put it another way, at 00.00 hours on 21 February). If the institution has not defined its position by then, the person concerned has a further two months in which to bring proceedings before the Court. To that further period of two months is to be added the extension of time on account of distance.297 The period for applying to the Court starts at 00.00 hours on 21  February and expires at 24.00 hours on 30  April (subject to any further extension to the end of the next following working day if 30 April is a Saturday, Sunday or an official holiday of the Court). (d) Staff cases 7.56 In staff cases the three-month period for applying to the Court, under art 91(1) of the Staff Regulations, against a decision of the appointing authority rejecting the official’s complaint starts to run again when an express decision is made after the complaint has been rejected by implied decision but before the three-month period has expired.298 Although that applies only where the express decision is adopted within that period, time starts to run again only when it is notified to the official (and so may begin running after the original period has expired) unless any delay in notification is attributable to him and not to the institution.299 (e) Actions for damages 7.57 In the case of actions for damages, the Statute provides for the interruption of the limitation period ‘if proceedings are instituted before the Court of Justice or if prior to such proceedings an application is made by the aggrieved party to the relevant institution of the Union’.300 In the former event, the date of the lodgment at the Registry of the application marks the institution of proceedings and the suspension of the time period. It would seem that the proceedings envisaged are those claiming damages in respect of the wrongful act and not other proceedings, for example an action for the annulment of the wrongful act.301 In the event that application is made to the ‘relevant’ EU institution, which 297 The period set out in RP-ECJ, art  51, RP-GC, art  60 and RP-CST, art  38 is intended to compensate for the distance of a party from the place where the Court has its seat, Luxembourg. In consequence, it has no application to the time limits applicable to proceedings involving other institutions, a fortiori those whose seat is not in Luxembourg. 298 Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations. 299 Case 5/76 Jänsch v Commission [1976] ECR 1027. 300 Statute, art 46. 301 Cf the Autosalone case (above, note 283), paras 56–57; Case T-429/09 Campailla v Commission [2011] ECR II-48*, para 43.

588

Admissibility 7.57

would be the institution representing the EU in any action for damages,302 the proceedings must be instituted within the period provided for in the Treaties for the bringing of an action for annulment or an action in respect of a failure to act. In other words, the Statute gives an injured person an option between commencing an action for damages before the Court and seeking a settlement of the matter. The running of the limitation period is suspended in both cases but, in the latter event, only while negotiations last and subject to the condition that, when the negotiations terminate in a decision with which the injured person is dissatisfied or a failure to make a decision, the injured person must commence an action for damages within the period fixed, respectively, for bringing an action for annulment or one in respect of a failure to act if he wishes to take advantage of the suspension of the limitation period. That does not, however, mean that the action is barred if either period is not observed, merely that the suspension of the running of the limitation period does not operate during the negotiation period if the action is not commenced timeously after the end of the negotiations. Hence, if negotiations begin one year after time has started to run and end after two years with no result satisfactory to the injured person, he still has two years in which to commence proceedings and does not have to rely on the suspension of the limitation period. On the other hand, if the negotiations had lasted five years, the action would be barred unless the running of time were suspended and, in order to avail himself of that, the injured person must commence proceedings within the additional time period specified in the Statute.303 In the two cases in which the limitation period is interrupted (institution of proceedings before the Court and the making of an application), the period of interruption starts when the application commencing proceedings before the Court is lodged at the Registry304 or when the application made to the defendant institution is received,305 respectively. As noted above, the same result follows where negotiations are initiated by the defendant institution rather than the claimant or where the defendant waives the right to rely upon the limitation period, subject to conditions.306

302 That is, the institution whose act or default caused the loss. See Ch 3, para 3.3. 303 Statute, art  46. See Cases 42 and 49/59  SNUPAT  v High Authority [1961]  ECR  53 at 92 (Advocate General Lagrange); Kampffmeyer v Commission (above, note 238) at 260; and Case 11/72 Giordano v Commission [1973]  ECR  417, paras 5–7; Pelle and Konrad (above, note 178), paras 67, 75, 80–82; Case T-309/10 Klein (above, note 285), paras 50–54 (a case concerning continuing loss, in which the applicant made two administrative claims for compensation but followed up only the second with the commencement of proceedings within time). An application for legal aid extends the time for commencing proceedings before the Court but not the operation of the five-year period: Case C-120/14P Klein (above, note 285), paras 43–47. If the defendant simply fails to respond to the applicant’s administrative claim, the applicant cannot afford to let the ‘negotiations’ carry on forever. An action for a failure to act must be brought (within time); if not, the running of the five year limitation period will not be suspended: Fratelli Murri (above, note 283). 304 Eg Saint and Murray (above, note 177), para 90 (1st sentence). It appears from paras 90–92 that, where two interrupting events occur in sequence, the period of interruption starts with the first such event. 305 Eg Pelle and Konrad (above, note 178), para 80. 306 See para 7.34 above.

589

7.58  Admissibility

5 Reopening a time limit 7.58 A party cannot avoid the effects of the expiry of a time limit for bringing proceedings against a measure by attacking a subsequent measure confirming the first307 unless there is a ‘new fact of such a character as to alter the essential circumstances and conditions which governed the adoption of the first measure’308 or the first measure was completed in some relevant respect by the second measure309 (the position regarding amendment of a challengeable measure is different).310 The existence of a new fact shows that the later measure is not a purely confirming measure but alters the legal situation which existed beforehand.311 A judgment of the Court annulling a measure can be a new factor only so far as the parties to the proceedings closed by the judgment or persons directly affected by the measure annulled are concerned.312 On the other hand, the discovery of a new fact revealing that the contested act was made on an erroneous basis and which the applicant did not know and could not have known beforehand may also be sufficient to reopen the time limit for challenging the act.313 If no other time limit applies, proceedings must be brought within a reasonable time of receiving knowledge of the new fact.314

307 Case 17/71 Tontodonati v Commission [1971]  ECR  1059, para  3; Case T-63/96 Fichtner v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I-A-189, II-563, para 27; the Mutual Aid case (above, note 253), paras 48–50; Case T-253/02 Ayadi v Council [2006] ECR II-2139, para 70; Case T-407/07 CMB (above, note 193), paras 89–96. Cf the Reliance Industries case (above, note 35), paras 59–60. 308 SNUPAT v High Authority (above, note 303) at 76; Pressler-Hoeft v Court of Auditors (above, note 169), para  6; Cobrecaf (above, note 195), paras 44–49 (no new fact); Ayadi (above, note 307), paras 71–79; Evropaiki Dynamiki (above, note 179), paras 42–55 (subsequent correspondence did not change the character of the original decision or give rise to a new fact). 309 Glencore Grain (above, note 85), paras 24–28 (the reasoning is not expressed satisfactorily but, on the face of it, the first letter expressed a provisional and incomplete conclusion whereas the second letter set out the Commission’s definitive position). 310 See text to note 163 above. 311 Cf Case 34/65 Mosthaf v Euratom Commission [1966]  ECR  521 at 530; Case 58/60 Elz v Commission [1970]  ECR  507 at 513 (Advocate General Gand); Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 264 at 279. 312 Case 43/64 Müller v Euratom and ECSC Councils [1965] ECR 385 at 397; Case 46/64 Schoffer v Commission [1965] ECR 811 at 816; Cases 50, 51, 53, 54, 57/64 Loebisch v Commission, Euratom and ECSC Councils [1965] ECR 825 at 831; Case 55/64 Lens v European Court of Justice [1965] ECR 837 at 841; Case 52/64 Pfloeschner v Commission [1965] ECR 981 at 987; Case 6/65 Saudray v Commission [1965] ECR 993 at 997; Case 12/65 Bauer v Commission [1965] ECR 1003 at 1009; Case 47/65 Kalkuhl v European Parliament [1965] ECR 1011 at 1014; Mosthaf v Euratom Commission (above, note 311) at 530. 313 Eg Case 219/84 Powell v Commission [1985] ECR 3629. Cf Case T-74/91 Tancredi v Parliament [1992] ECR II-1645, paras 12–13. A judgment stating what the law is and always has been is not a new fact causing time to start running again, even if it alters the previous understanding of the law: Case T-86/08 Greece v Commission, 5 July 2012, paras 48–54. 314 See, for example, Case T-202/97 Koopman v Commission [1998]  ECR-SC  I-A-163, II-511, paras 24–27.

590

Admissibility 7.59

F Connexity 7.59 The Treaties create a system of remedies which are, in general and in principle, separate and independent. It sometimes happens, however, that an applicant seeks to avoid the consequences of his actual or envisaged lack of success in obtaining a particular form of relief (on the ground of inadmissibility) by dressing up the action as something other than what it really is, intending, by that means, to obtain the same relief by a different form of action. A typical example is an action for damages which is nothing more than an action for annulment in masquerade.315 In that situation the rejection of the action for annulment (on the ground of inadmissibility) will bring in its train the automatic rejection of the action for damages whether or not the two claims are made separately or in the same proceedings.316 It is not necessary that the disguised action follows after proceedings which have turned out unsuccessfully for the applicant: if, for example, an action for annulment was not brought at all and the time limit for doing so has expired, a subsequent claim which is in substance no more than an action 315 In Case 59/65 Schreckenberg v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 543 the applicant requested that he be promoted with retrospective effect and, when the Commission refused, brought an action for the annulment of the refusal and, in the alternative, for damages. The damages claimed were not in fact assessed in the light of the loss actually suffered but by reference to what would have been the case had the Commission’s decision been annulled. The Court held (at 550): ‘Although a party may take action by means of a claim for compensation without being obliged by any provision of law to seek the annulment of the illegal measure which causes him damage, he may not by this means circumvent the inadmissibility of an application which concerns the same illegality and has the same financial end in view’. See also Case 28/65 Fonzi v Euratom Commission [1966]  ECR  477; Case 4/67 Muller (née Collignon) v Commission [1967] ECR 365; Case 53/70 Vinck v Commission [1971] ECR 601; Case 11/72 Giordano v Commission [1973] ECR 417; Cases 15–33, 52, 53, 57–109, 116, 117, 123, 132, 135–137/73 Schots (née Kortner) v Council, Commission and European Parliament [1974]  ECR  177; Cases 4 and 30/74 Scuppa v Commission [1975]  ECR  919 at 940–941 (Advocate General Trabucchi); Case 9/75 Meyer-Burckhardt v Commission [1975]  ECR  1171; Cases 56–60/74 Kurt Kampffmeyer Mühlenvereinigung KG v Commission and Council [1976] ECR 711 at 750– 755 (Advocate General Reischl); Case 129/75 Hirschberg v Commission [1976]  ECR  1259; Case 167/80 Curtis v Commission and European Parliament [1981] ECR 1499 at 1532–1533 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 33/80 Albini v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 2141; Case 543/79 Birke v EC Commission [1981] ECR 2669; Case 106/80 Fournier v Commission [1981] ECR 2759 at 2777–2780 (Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn); Case 401/85 Schina v Commission [1987]  ECR  3911; Case 346/87 Bossi v Commission [1989]  ECR  303, paras 31–35; Case T-27/90 Latham v Commission [1991]  ECR II-35, paras 36–39; Case T-20/92 Moat v Commission [1993] ECR II-799, para 46; Cases T-539/12 and T-150/13 Ziegler SA v Commission, 15 January 2015, paras 41–46. Connexity appears to have been relied on in Eulex Kosovo (above, note 173), para 45 (where Bossi is cited); but its employment in the context of that case seems dubious. 316 Where an action for annulment is dismissed on the merits (as opposed to being inadmissible), a related damages claim risks being dismissed for the same reason: eg Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 and T-190/96 Riviera auto service v Commission [1999] ECR II-93, para 90; Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96  SGA  v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3587, para  72; Cases T-9/96 and T-211/96 Europeenne automobile v Commission [1999] ECR II-3639, para 61; Case T-340/00 Arne Mathisen AS v Council [2002] ECR II-2905, paras 134–136; Case T-420/05 Vischim Srl v Commission [2009] ECR II-3841, paras 260–262; Brink’s Security (above, note 21), paras 231– 233. That is not always the case: see, for example, Case T-150/94 Vela Palacios v Economic and Social Committee [1996] ECR-SC I-A-297, II-877, paras 51–53.

591

7.60  Admissibility

for annulment will still be inadmissible.317 The crucial question is whether there is so close a connection between the claim made and a different, inadmissible claim that the former must be rejected. This depends on an analysis of the nature in law of both claims: where the subject matter of and the relief sought in both claims are found to be materially identical, the connection is sufficient to entrain the inadmissibility of the claim made.318 7.60 In the case of parallel claims for annulment and damages, the connection between them does not invariably mean that the inadmissibility of the one leads to the inadmissibility of the other.319 If that were so, a legal or natural person, who could not bring an action for the annulment of a regulation, would also not be able to bring a claim for damages based on an allegation that the regulation was unlawful. Instead, the rule is that, where the applicant has no locus standi to bring a connected claim, its inadmissibility does not result in the inadmissibility of the claim for damages.320 The reason for that is that the objection to admissibility based on connexity is intended to prevent abuse of process. There is no abuse if the applicant could not, in any event, have brought the connected claim. Per contra, if the object is to evade a peremptory rule barring a connected claim which could have been raised or has been raised and rejected.321 Hence most of the connexity cases concern attempts to get round a time bar.

317 Eg Polyvios (above, note 173), paras 44–45. The problem of a time-barred action for annulment dressed up as a claim for damages has also, in some cases, been resolved by holding (i) that the applicant is precluded from relying on the illegality of an act in order to obtain the relief sought (eg the Giordano case, above, note 315, para 4; A v Parliament, above, note 194, para 55) or (ii) that the damage really flows from the applicant’s own failure to bring an action for annulment in time (eg the Schreckenberg case, above, note 315 at 555 (Advocate General Roemer)). 318 For cases in which the connection was not sufficiently close, see Case 79/71 Heinemann v Commission [1972]  ECR  579; Case 106/80 Fournier v Commission (above, note 315); Arizmendi (above, note 35), paras 69–70. 319 Scuppa v Commission (above, note 315) (Advocate General Trabucchi); Case 155/85 Strack v European Parliament [1986]  ECR  3561 at 3569–3570 (Advocate General Mischo); Case 253/86 Sociedade Agro-Pecuaria Vicente Nobre Lda v Council [1988]  ECR  2725 at 2736 (Advocate General Mischo); Case T-5/90 Marcato v Commission [1991] ECR II-731, para 49. Per contra, Cases T-479/93 and T-559/93 Barnardi v Commission [1994] ECR II-1115, paras 38–39. 320 Eg Cases 9 and 12/60 Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA  v High Authority [1961]  ECR  197 (the connected claim was one in respect of a failure to act); Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963]  ECR  95 (the damages action was instead rejected as ‘unfounded’: see the explanation given by Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe in Case 4/69 Alfons Lütticke GmbH  v Commission [1971]  ECR  325 at 343); Case 4/69 Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Commission, itself; Case 5/71 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975; Cases 9 and 11/71 Compagnie d’Approvisionnement de Transport et de Crédit SA and Grands Moulins de Paris SA v Commission (No 2) [1972] ECR 391; Case 43/72 Merkur — Aussenhandels GmbH v Commission [1973] ECR 1055. 321 Cf Krohn (above, note 27), paras 32–33; Cobrecaf (above, note 195), paras 58–61; Case T-72/99 Meyer v Commission [2000] ECR II-2521, para 36; Case T-178/98 Fresh Marine Company SA v Commission [2000] ECR II-3331, paras 45–52 (in which the objection was rejected); Cases T-539/12 and T-150/13 Ziegler SA v Commission, 15 January 2015, paras 42–46.

592

Admissibility 7.62

G

Failure to comply with a preliminary procedure

7.61 Some proceedings before the Court may be commenced only after the completion of a pre-litigation procedure. The most frequent examples are: (i) actions brought against a member state alleging a failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties or a failure to comply with a judgment of the Court;322 (ii) actions in respect of a failure to act;323 and (iii) staff cases.324 In addition, it is possible for actions brought pursuant to an arbitration clause or special agreement325 to be subject to completion of a pre-litigation procedure.326 As that depends upon the terms of the arbitration clause or special agreement, only the pre-litigation procedures laid down in the Treaties will be considered in detail here. 7.62 In actions brought against a member state alleging a failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, the preliminary procedure is intended, on the one hand, to compel the Commission to clarify the Treaty obligations of the member state and the respects in which it is alleged to be in default and, on the other hand, to allow the member state to comply of its own accord with the requirement of the Treaty or else comment on the allegations made or justify its conduct so that an accommodation on the matter may be reached without the need for recourse to the Court.327 Rigid respect of the procedure is unnecessary328 as long as its objectives are satisfied. Naturally, if the preliminary procedure is omitted altogether or is carried out in such a defective manner as to affect adversely the member state’s rights of the defence, the ensuing action is inadmissible.329 In some respects, the most important stage is the delivery of the Commission’s reasoned opinion because that defines the scope of any subsequent proceedings.330 That opinion must contain a coherent statement of the reasons which have led the Commission to believe that the member state has failed to fulfil its obligations.331 The subject matter of the proceedings before the Court cannot diverge from that defined in 322 TFEU, art 258–260. As to actions under TFEU, art 260(2) in respect of a failure to comply with a judgment, see Case C-457/07 Commisison v Portugal [2009] ECR I-8091, in particular, paras 52–69. 323 TFEU, art 265. 324 Staff Regulations, arts 90 and 91. 325 TFEU, arts 272 and 273, respectively. 326 See, for example, Case C-229/93 Bauer v Commission [1995] ECR I-839, paras 21–22. 327 Cf Case 20/59 Italy v High Authority [1960] ECR 325 at 346–347 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 74/82 Commission v Ireland [1984] ECR 317, paras 12–13; Case 85/85 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 1149, para 11; Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1039, para 7. 328 Case 45/64 Commission v Italy [1965] ECR 857 at 871 (Advocate General Gand). 329 Eg Case 51/83 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 2793, paras 4–8; Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 305 (the pre-litigation procedure was not carried out validly because the Commission did not give the defendant adequate time limits). Those cases are to be distinguished from the situation in Case C-424/07 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-11431, paras 31–37, in particular para 35 (where it is said that the pre-litigation procedure was derailed because the Commission misunderstood a response made by the member state concerned, that goes to the sbustance of the case, not its admissibility). 330 Eg Case C-195/04 Commission v Finland [2007] ECR-I 3351, paras 18–20. 331 Case 7/61 Commission v Italy [1961] ECR 317 at 327; Case 325/82 Commission v Germany [1984] ECR 777, paras 8–9; Case C-195/04 Commission v Finland (above, note 330), paras 22–33.

593

7.63  Admissibility

the reasoned opinion332 save in so far as its scope is lessened by a concession or settlement of part of the case. That does not mean that the Commission is bound by the strict terms of the reasoned opinion; for example, as long as the nature of the alleged infringement has been identified, it does not matter if the national measure specified in the reasoned opinion has been repealed and replaced by another measure to the same effect;333 and, where the Commission complains of a single act whose effects extend over a long period of time (or, possibly, a series of recurring acts that are identical in nature), as opposed to a number of distinct infringements of the Treaty, it may include in the proceedings before the Court events taking place after the date of the reasoned opinion.334 7.63 In the case of actions in respect of a failure to act, the object of the preliminary procedure is to put the defendant institution on notice by calling on it to act. The aim of that is to require the institution to define its position expressly or by implication from its silence. If the institution is not put on notice, a subsequent action alleging a failure to act is inadmissible.335 The same ensues if the subject matter of the action is different from that of the notice calling on the institution to act.336 7.64 So far as staff cases are concerned, the preliminary procedure is intended ‘to enable and encourage an amicable settlement of [the] difference which has arisen between officials or servants and the administration’.337 A failure to comply with the procedure leads to the inadmissibility of the action before the Court and, although the scope of the action is not bound by the strict terms of the

332 Case 7/69 Commission v Italy [1970]  ECR  111; Case 193/80 Commission v Italy [1981] ECR 3019; Case 74/82 Commission v Ireland (above, note 299), para 20; Case 166/82 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 459, paras 16–20; Case 23/84 Commission v United Kingdom [1986] ECR 3581, para 49; Case C-217/88 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-2879, paras 11–12; Case C-152/89 Commission v Luxembourg [1991] ECR I-3141, para 9; Case C-198/90 Commission v Netherlands [1991]  ECR  I-5799, paras 14–16; Case C-279/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1992]  ECR  I-5785, para  17; Case C-105/91 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-5871, para 12; Case C-157/91 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR I-5899, para  17; Case C-237/90 Commission v Germany [1992]  ECR  I-5973, paras 20–22; Case C-210/91 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-6735, paras 9–12; Case C-296/92 Commission v Italy [1994] ECR I-1, paras 11–12; Case C-270/07 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-1983, paras 49–50; Case C-326/07 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-2291, paras 29–30. 333 Case 45/64 Commission v Italy (above, note 328); Case C-105/91 Commission v Greece (above, note 332), para 13. But see Case 124/81 Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 203. 334 Case 309/84 Commission v Italy [1986]  ECR  599, para  15 (and at 601–602 per Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat). 335 Case 17/57 Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1959] ECR 1 at 8. 336 Cases 41 and 50/59 Hamborner Bergbau AG v High Authority [1960] ECR 493 at 505. It does not follow that the form of order sought in the application commencing proceedings must be the same as the relief sought in the document calling upon the defendent to act: see Cases T-79/96, T-260/97 and T-117/98 Camar Srl v Council and Commission [2000] ECR II-2193, paras 64–68. 337 Case 58/75 Sergy v Commission [1976]  ECR  1139, para  32; Case 173/84 Rasmussen v Commission [1986]  ECR  197, para  12; Case T-29/91 Castelletti v Commission [1992]  ECR II-77, para 28; Case T/58/92 Moat v Commission [1993] ECR II-1443, para 39; Lofaro (above, note 140), para 34.

594

Admissibility 7.65

complaint submitted at the pre-litigation stage to the administration, the subject matter must remain the same.338 Nonetheless, the Court construes the complaint liberally because it is, in theory at least, submitted by the applicant himself without the aid of (professional) legal advice;339 and where, in the proceedings before the Court, the applicant invokes a plea not raised beforehand solely because of a change in position made by the defendant in the course of the pre-litigation procedure, the defendant is not entitled to object to the new plea.340 Further, where a claim for compensation is ancillary to a claim for the annulment of the disputed measure, it is sufficient that the pre-litigation procedure was completed in relation to the dispute over the legality of that measure.341 7.65 In staff cases, the preliminary procedure is, however, purposeless where the administration has no power to alter the decision of which the applicant complains. The most notable example of that is the decision of a selection board. In consequence the action can, and should, be begun within three months (as extended by any periods of grace, etc) of notification of the selection board’s decision. If the applicant should, instead, go through the preliminary procedure, his eventual action before the Court is out of time and, therefore, inadmissible. The Court has, nevertheless, accepted the admissibility of such actions on the ground that the Staff Regulations are in this respect obscure and misleading so that it would be inequitable to deprive the applicant of his rights.342 The position is otherwise where the prior lodging of a complaint might have served some useful purpose, such as where it is essential for the defendant to know the com 338 The Sergy case (ibid), para  33; Cases 75 and 117/82 Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission [1984]  ECR  1509, para  9; Cases 259/84 and 259/84R  Strack v European Parliament [1985]  ECR  453; Case 174/83 Amman v Council [1985]  ECR  2133; Case 175/83 Culmsee v Economic and Social Committee [1985]  ECR  2149; Case 176/83  Allo v Commission [1985] ECR 2155, para 19; Case 233/83 Agostini v Commission [1985] ECR 2163, para 19; Case 247/83 Ambrosetti v Commission [1985]  ECR  2171, para  19; Case 264/83 Delhez v Commission [1985] ECR 2179, para 25; Case 52/85 Rihoux v Commission [1986] ECR 1555, para 15; Case 130/86 Du Besset v Council [1986] ECR 2619; Case 242/85 Geist v Commission [1987] ECR 2181, para 9; Case 16/86 GP v Economic and Social Committee [1987] ECR 2409; Case 224/87 Koutchoumoff v Commission [1989] ECR 99, para 10 (and at 111 per Advocate General Tesauro); Case 346/87 Bossi v Commission [1989] ECR 303, paras 27–28 (and at 313– 316 per Advocate General Darmon); Case 126/87 Del Plato v Commission [1989] ECR 643, para  14; Case T-57/89 Alexandrakis v Commission [1990]  ECR II-143, paras 9–11; Case T-19/90 von Hoessle v Court of Auditors [1991]  ECR II-615, para  33; Case T-146/89 Williams v Court of Auditors [1991] ECR II-1293, paras 56–57 and 63–64; Case T-60/91 C v Commission [1991] ECR II-1395, para 16; Castelletti (above, note 337); Case T-4/92 Vardakis v Commission [1993] ECR II-357, paras 16–17; Case T-306/08 P Braun-Neumann v Parliament [2009] ECR I-B-1-1, II-B-1-1. 339 See, for example, the Sergy case (above, note 337); Case 23/74 Küster v European Parliament [1975] ECR 353; Case 54/77 Herpels v Commission [1978] ECR 585; Rasmussen v Commission (above, note 337), para 13. 340 Case T-86/91 Wery v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-45, paras 24–25. 341 Eg Castelletti (above, note 337), para  29; Case T-46/90 Devillez v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-699, para 42. 342 See Case 34/80 Authié v Commission [1981] ECR 665 at paras 6–8 and the authorities cited by Advocate General Warner at 686–687. However, if the applicant does decide to go through the preliminary procedure, it must have been complied with if the action is to be admissible: Case T-82/92 Contes Jimenez v Commission [1994] ECR-SC II-237, para 13.

595

7.66  Admissibility

plaints made by the applicant in order to see whether or not the dispute can be settled.343 7.66 A failure to comply with a preliminary procedure is an objection which the Court can raise of its own motion.344 The requirement to go through a preliminary procedure in certain cases is not to be confused with some general requirement that the scope of proceedings before the Court must not go beyond the confines of the dispute between the parties as it has developed in the course of the events leading up to the commencement of the action. No such general requirement exists. Apart from those cases where a preliminary procedure must be followed before the commencement of legal proceedings, there is no requirement that the scope of an action be limited to the matters expressly in dispute in the course of the events prior to the commencement of proceedings. Hence, in an ordinary action for annulment, the applicant’s case against the contested act is not limited to the matters of dispute raised with the author of the contested act before its adoption; the Court is seised of all the elements of fact and of law taken into account by the author of the act when it adopted the act.345 In the same way, when the defendant in Cases 314 and 315/86 de Szy-Tarisse v Commission346 objected that, in an action concerning the defendant’s failure to comply with an earlier judgment of the Court, the applicant’s claim for compensation must be inadmissible because it had not been included in the application that was the subject of the earlier judgment, that objection to admissibility was dismissed: the claim for compensation arose in the normal way out of the preliminary procedure followed immediately prior to the commencement of proceedings and could not be excluded merely because, at some stage in the history of the dispute, before that preliminary procedure had been commenced, the dispute was different in scope.

343 Eg Case 168/83 Pasquali-Gherardi v European Parliament [1985]  ECR  83, para  11 and, in general, claims for damages (see, for example, Devillez (above, note 341), para  43; Cases T-17/90, T-28/91, T-17/92 and T-27/92 Camara Alloisio v Commission [1993]  ECR II-841, paras 46–49. No preliminary procedure applies to an action brought by an official or other servant against the Ombudsman: M v Ombudsman (above, note 49), paras 39–42. 344 Case 7/69 Commission v Italy (above, note 332); Alexandrakis v Commission (above, note 338), para 8; C v Commission (above, note 338), paras 11–16; Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-2353, para 8; Case T-53/92 Stachelski v Commission [1993] ECR II-35, para 14; Case T-35/93 Cucchiara v Commission [1994] ECR-SC II-413, para 15; Case C-299/93 Bauer (above, note 326), para 22; Cases T-90/07P and T-99/07P Belgium and Commission v Genette [2008]  ECR II-3859, para  86 (judgment confirmed on review, Case C-2109RX, 5  February 2009 (unreported)); Case C-343/08 Commission v Czech Republic [2010] ECR I-275, para 25 (although it should be noted that, in that case, the objection to admissibility concerned a pleading defect, not a failure to comply with the preliminary procedure; it is, however, likely that the pleading defect - the making of an unparticularised allegation of failure to comply with a Treaty obligation - also amounted to a failure to comply with the preliminary procedure because the unparticularised allegation may not have featured in the reasoned opinion); Case T-80/09 P Commission v Q [2011] ECR II-4313, paras 129–131. The remark in para 3 of the judgment in Case 255/78 Anselme (née Heirwegh) v Commission [1979] ECR 2323 is to be explained by the Court’s practice in staff cases. 345 Eg Case 298/83 CICCE v Commission [1985] ECR 1105, paras 19–20. 346 [1988] ECR 6013, paras 10–13.

596

Admissibility 7.68

H

Lis pendens

7.67 There is no objection to a particular person bringing more than one action or proceeding having the same subject matter (such as two actions for the annulment of the same measure) as long as the actions are within time and do not give rise to the objection of lis pendens (or lis alibi pendens).347 The justification for that lies in the fact that the scope of an action is defined at the outset of the proceedings and may not be extended later on so as to encompass new grounds, save in very limited circumstances.348 Accordingly, if an action is brought on grounds A, B and C, it is not normally possible to add grounds D, E and F if, on reflection, those additional grounds seem eminently arguable. The solution is therefore to bring a second action covering the additional grounds.349 The objection of lis pendens may be raised where an action before the Court (whether the ECJ, GC or CST) duplicates other proceedings pending before the same Court (including a different chamber of the same Court); the objection of lis alibi pendens may be raised where an action before any one of the ECJ, GC or CST duplicates other proceedings pending before another one of them.350 Both objections may be taken by the Court of its own motion.351 The objection (whether of lis pendens or lis alibi pendens) ceases to be valid if the earlier duplicate action is dismissed as inadmissible or discontinued.352 7.68 For the purposes of lis pendens, actions are duplicates where they are between the same parties, have the same purpose and are based on the same sub-

347 Cases T-246/08 and T-332/08 Bank Melli plc v Council [2009]  ECR  I-2629, para  32. The principle of ne bis in idem is not in point because the actions are not, ex hypothesi, the same. 348 See Ch 9, paras 9.81–9.82. 349 The problem is particularly acute where there is urgency and the applicant has been rushed into commencing the first action (cf Bank Melli (above, note 347), para 36). 350 In Castelletti (above, note 337), the CFI declined to rule on an objection based on lis pendens because the earlier proceedings had not been brought to a conclusion: see para 26. There are two possible explanations for that decision. The first is that the CFI thought that lis pendens does not apply unless the earlier proceedings have been concluded: see para 20. The second is that the CFI doubted that the objection to admissibility should be classified as lis pendens because it was really an objection based on lack of interest: compare para 18 and the phrase in para 26, ‘the objection referred to by it [the Commission] as ‘lis pendens’‘. The latter explanation seems the more likely because, once judgment in the earlier case has been given, the objection is res judicata rather than lis pendens (cf Case T-309/03 Camos Grau v Commission [2006] ECR II1173, paras 41–42, which indicate that lis pendens applies because of the concurrency of more than one action at the time when the later action is brought). 351 Eg Porto di Venezia (above, note 63), para 38. 352 Cases T-17/90, T-28/91 and T-17/92 Camara Alloisio v Commission [1993] ECR I-841, para 58 (inadmissibility); Cases T-254/00, T-270/00 and T-277/00 Hotel Cipriani SpS  v Commission [2008] ECR II-3269, para 43 (discontinuance). If the earlier duplicate action terminates in a judgment, the objection would be res judicata. Hence the Camara Alloisio case is somewhat suspect (not least because of paras 59–61 of the judgment in that case).

597

7.69  Admissibility

missions (grounds).353 An example is an action challenging an act which merely confirms an earlier measure contested in other proceedings where the same submissions are made.354 Minor differences in the formulation of the relief sought in the actions in question do not prevent the objection from applying as long as the effect of the judgments to be delivered in them (if the applicant were successful) would be the same.355 The objection does not apply where the first action was inadmissible for a particular reason and the second action, albeit the same, is not affected by that particular ground of inadmissibility;356 nor does it apply to an action for annulment brought in respect of an act adopted after the commencement of proceedings in respect of a failure to act and in response to the request to act initiating those proceedings.357 7.69 In the case of a parallel action before another court (that is, one other than the ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC or CST), the inadmissibility of proceedings before the Court may ensue if the latter has no jurisdiction to hear the matter but not on the basis of mere concurrency.358 In consequence, the objection of lis alibi pendens does not normally apply to the situation where other proceedings are pending before a national court, an international tribunal or a court in a third country because the Court’s jurisdiction does not overlap with theirs. Since the jurisdictions of the ECJ, GC and CST do overlap, the objection of lis alibi pendens may in principle be raised where similar actions are pending before both Courts. In that event, however, one or other of the ECJ, GC or CST stays the proceedings before it and there is then no need or justification for raising the objection.359

353 Hoogovens (above, note 267), para 9; Cases 358/85 and 51/86 France v European Parliament [1988]  ECR  4821, para  12; Case T-28/89 Maindiaux v Economic and Social Committee [1990] ECR II-59, para 23; Case T-99/95 Stott v Commission [1996] ECR II-2227, paras 23– 25; Cases C-138/03, C-324/03 and C-431/03 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10043, paras 64–68; Porto di Venezia (above, note 63), para 40; Case T-68/07 Landtag Schleswig-Holstein v Commission, order of 14 June 2007 (unreported); Hotel Cipriani (above, note 324), paras 44– 47; Bank Melli (above, note 347), para 34 (note the differences in the two actions, as explained in para 35). Note Case 53/84 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3539 at 3554 (Advocate General Mancini). Lis pendens is the correct interpretation of Case F-82/06 Duyster v Commission (above, note 175), paras 47–52. For en example of a case in which the proceedings differed and lis pendens did not apply, see Cases C-465/09P to C-470/09P TerritorioHistorico de Vizcaya Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission [2011] ECR I-83*, paras 58–60. 354 Cases 45 and 49/70 Bode v Commission [1971] ECR 465, para 11; Cases 58 and 75/72 Perinciolo v Council [1973] ECR 511, para 5; a similar situation arose in Compagnie d’Approvisionnement de Transport et de Crédit SA v Commission (above, note 320), paras 9–11; but see also Cases 26 and 86/79 Forges de Thy-Marcinelle et Monceau SA  v Commission [1980]  ECR  1083, especially at 1077 (Advocate General Capotorti). 355 Cases 146 and 431/85 Diezler v Economic and Social Committee [1987]  ECR  4283, paras 13–16. 356 Ibid, para 12. 357 Cases C-15/91 and C-108/91 Buckl & Söhne OHG v Commission [1992] ECR I-6061, paras 19–20. 358 Cases 64 and 113/76, 167 and 239/78, 27, 28 and 45/79 Dumortier Frères SA  v Council [1979] ECR 3091, para 7. 359 Statute, art 54, 3rd para and Annex, art 8(3). See further Ch 2, para 2.27 ff.

598

Admissibility 7.70

I

Res judicata

7.70 As the Court put it in Cases 79 and 82/63 Reynier v Commission360 ‘the force of res judicata prevents rights confirmed by a judgment of the Court from being disputed anew’. Hence, when the Court has delivered a final judgment on the substance of an action, a subsequent application involving the same parties, having the same purpose and relating to the same cause of action is inadmissible.361 Similarly, where the Court has upheld the lawfulness of part of a measure by rejecting the applicant’s claims that it should, to that extent, be annulled,362 or has ruled on a particular point of law,363 the matter cannot be raised again, in subsequent proceedings brought by the same person, even if the subject matter of the later action is a different measure which reproduces the lawful parts of the earlier measure. On the other hand, where a measure is annulled, a form of res judicata sometimes known as res judicata with absolute effect (because the effect

360 [1964] ECR 259 at 266. Cf Case F-32/13 Walton v Commission, 27 February 2014, paras 40–49 (upheld on appeal in Case T-261/14 P Walton v Commission, 25 February 2015, paras 35–61). See also Ch 16, paras 16.22–16.26 and 16.33–16.39. 361 Eg Case 57/70 Van Eick v Commission [1971]  ECR  613 at 618; Case 192/80 Geist v Commission [1981] ECR 1387; Cases 159 and 267/84, 12 and 264/85 Ainsworth v Commission [1987]  ECR  1579, paras 3–4; Case C-157/89 Commission v Italy [1991]  ECR  I-57, paras 5–7 (no res judicata where the ruling does not relate to the substance of the claim); Case C-397/95  P  Coussios v Parliament [1996]  ECR  I-3873, para  25 (appeals); Case T-162/94  NMB  France SARL  v Commission [1996]  ECR II-427, para  37; Cases T-177/94 and T-377/94 Altmann v Commission [1996]  ECR II-2041, para  50; Cases T-116/01 and T-118/01 P&O European Ferries(Vizcaya) SA v Commission [2003] ECR II-2957, paras 77–81 (reversed on other grounds in Cases C-442/03P and C-471/03P P&O European Ferries(Vizcaya) SA v Commission [2006] ECR I-4845); Case T-132/06 Gorostiaga Atxalandabasa v Parliament [2007] ECR I-35*, para 50; Case C-526/08 Commission v Luxembourg [2010] ECR I-6151, paras 25–35 (res judicata in infringement proceedings); Case T-66/01 Imperial Chemicals Industries Ltd v Commission [2010]  ECR II-2631, paras 196–210; Case T-341/07 Sison v Council [2011]  ECR II-7915, paras 20–25 (res judicata applicable where previous damages action dismissed due to lack of evidence as to the loss and causation); Case F-9/07 Serrano v Parliament, 29 September 2011, paras 41–43; Case C-221/10 P Artegodan v Commission, 19  April 2012, paras 86–87. Case T-413/06  P-DEP  Gualtieri v Commission, order of 27 November 2012, paras 12–16, (taxation proceedings) is better regarded as a claim of res judicata (rejected because the cases in question were not identical and the earlier case had not given rise to a ruling on the merits) than (as pleaded) ne bis in idem. 362 Case 14/64 Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority [1965] ECR 51; Case C-308/07P Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso v Parliament [2009] ECR I-1059, paras 58 and 65–66, upholding the judgment in Case T-132/06 (above, note 361, paras 51–53, 62, 67, 74, 79, 83, 86, 89) (in previous proceedings, a decision had been annulled on one ground and the other grounds had been dismissed; a new decision was then made and challenged, the challenge being based in part on the grounds that had been unsuccessful first time around; res judicata applied). However, in Case 243/78 Simmenthal v Commission [1980] ECR 593, paras 9–11, an earlier judgment concerning the same issue but relating to a different set of circumstances made it ‘certain’ that the applicant would lose the case so the applicant had no interest in pursuing the proceedings and their continuation was an abuse of process (no mention was made of res judicata). 363 Case T-24/07 ThyssenKrupp Stainless AG v Commission [2009] ECR II-2309, paras 144–146.

599

7.71  Admissibility

of annulment is erga omnes) arises.364 Res judicata with absolute effect applies even if the parties to the subsequent litigation are different. Res judicata can arise in an incidental fashion, such as where a procedural application is made that causes the Court to rule on the capacity in which a party acts; the ruling binds the parties to the proceedings in a subsequent action where the same question of capacity arises.365 Res judicata is also capable of applying to certain decisions of a procedural nature.366 An objection to admissibility based on res judicata with absolute effect may be raised by the Court of its own motion.367 7.71 The extent of the effect of res judicata is defined by reference to the operative part of the judgment and to the reasoning in the judgment which supports it.368 The effect covers only those questions of fact and law actually or

364 The P&O case on appeal to the ECJ (above, note 361), paras 40–52 of the judgment. Where the annulled measure is properly to be viewed as a bundle of individual decisions addressed to different persons, its annulment at the suit of one of them, while applying erga omnes so far as the world is concerned, does not usually affect the position of another one of the addressees (insofar as the measure incorporates a decision addressed to it): eg Case T-495/07 Productos Asfalticos (PROAS) SA  v Commission, 16  September 2013, paras 459–462; Case T-496/07 Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades SA v Commission, 16 September 2013, paras 446–454; Case T-497/07 Compania Espanola de Petroleos (CEPSA) SA  v Commission, 16  September 2013, paras 357–366. 365 Case C-277/95P Lenz v Commission [1996] ECR I-6109, paras 50–54 (the applicants had made a procedural application for the case to be transferred to a different chamber, causing the CFI to rule on the capacity in which they were acting – see paras 14–15 – but they did not appeal against the order made, which therefore determined the question of their capacity in three subsequent actions). 366 Eg Case T-16/89 Herkenrath v Commission [1992] ECR II-275, where the case had originally been brought before the ECJ and, at that stage, the defendant had successfully applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art  151 for an order excluding an internal document annexed to the applicant’s pleadings. The case was subsequently transferred to the CFI, at which point the applicant applied to have the document reintroduced on the ground that he had not been heard before the ECJ made its previous order. The CFI rejected the application on the ground that the applicant had not demonstrated that force majeure or unforeseen circumstances had prevented him from being heard at the material time. Nonetheless, the inference is that the decision in question determined the matter and prevented the CFI from considering the question de novo. It may also be inferred that procedural decisions made without a party being heard in accordance with the Rules of Procedure do not have the force of res judicata. Certain procedural decisions do not have the finality of a decision having the force of res judicata: see, for example, decisions granting or refusing interim relief, which may be reconsidered where there is a relevant change in circumstances – RP-ECJ, art 160(7) and 163–164; RP-GC, art 157(2) and 159–160; RP-CST, art 116(2) and 118–119. 367 Cases C-442/03P and C-471/03P P&O (above, note 361), para 45. 368 The Gualco case (above, note 362) at 64 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 30/76 Küster v European Parliament [1976] ECR 1719 at 1731 (Advocate General Reischl); Cases C-442/03P and C-471/03P P&O (above, note 361), para 44; ThyssenKrupp Stainless (above, note 363), para 140; Case T-257/10 Italy v Commission, 27 September 2012, para 104 (on appeal, Case C-587/12 P Italy v Commission, 7 November 2013). The grounds on which a measure has been annulled may not, in any event, be transposable without modification to a measure replacing it (Case T-257/10 Italy v Commission, above, paras 111–114) or to another situation, to which the operative part does not apply (PROAS, above, note 364, paras 463–468; Repsol, above, note 364, para 455; CEPSA, above, note 364, para 366).

600

Admissibility 7.71

necessarily decided in the judgment.369 In consequence, res judicata does not apply to those parts of a judgment that are obiter dicta370 and is no obstacle to the admissibility of a subsequent action which, although it has the same parties and subject matter as earlier proceedings, raises issues different from those already considered by the Court.371 A fortiori, where only the parties are the same and, although the proceedings concern the same Treaty provision, the subject matter is different.372 However, res judicata is not restricted to cases where the proceedings are exact duplicates of earlier proceedings which have already been concluded: it may also, in certain cases, be raised where the parties are different, as long as the subject matter and the issues remain the same. For example, as noted above, the effect of the annulment of a measure by the Court is ergo omnes.373 As a result, if a person not a party to proceedings in which the Court has found a measure affecting him to be void, brings an action in order to achieve the same 369 Case C-281/89 Italy v Commission [1991]  ECR  I-347, para  14; Case C-277/95P  Lenz (above, note 365), para  50; Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV v Commission [1999]  ECR II-931, paras 77–84; on appeal, Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, C-245/99P, C-247/99P, C-250/99P to C-252/99P and C-254/99P  Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV  v Commission [2002]  ECR  I-8375, para  44 (p  8648); Case C-462/05 Commission v Portugal [2008]  ECR  I-4183, para  23; Case C-526/08 Commission v Luxembourg (above, note 361), paras 27–35 (cases not identical); ThyssenKrupp Stainless (above, note 363), para 113; Case T-66/01 Imperial Chemicals Industries (above, note 361), para  198; Case T-86/08 Greece v Commission, 5 July 2012, paras 32–39 (a decision identifying four failures to comply with EU law was annulled because two of them were unfounded; that did not prevent the Commission from making a new decision focusing specifically on the consequences of the two infringements that had been upheld) and 47 (res judicata does not apply to point not raised in previous proceedings); Cases C-539/10  P  and C-550/10  P  Al-Aqsa v Council, 15  November 2012, para 49; Cases T-197/11 P and T-198/11 P Commission v Strack, 13 December 2012, para 87; Case T-199/11  P  Strack v Commission, 13  December 2012, para  43; Case T-342/14  P  CR  v Parliament and Council, 12  December 2014, para  16; Case T-407/13 Al Assad v Council, 22 December 2014, para 50. 370 Case C-352/09 P ThyssenKrupp Nirosta GmbH v Commission [2011] ECR I-2359, paras 123– 134. 371 See, for example, the Gualco case (above, note 362); Cases 29, 31, 36, 39–47, 50 and 51/63 Des Laminoirs, Hauts Fourneaux, Forges, Fonderies et Usines de la Providence SA  v High Authority [1965] ECR 911 at 951–952 (Advocate General Roemer); Stott (above, note 353), para 26; Limburgse Vinyl (above, note 369), paras 45–48; Commission v Portugal (above, note 369), para 27 (a fundamental change in the factual premise on which the previous judgment was based). Cf Case F-100/09 Michail v Commission, 13 September 2011, paras 29–31; Case F-43/10 Cerafogli v European Investment Bank, 12 December 2012, paras 68–69 (consequences of there being different but similar decisions and overlapping arguments). 372 Eg Cases 2–10/63 Società Industriale Acciaiarie San Michele v High Authority [1963] ECR 327 at 339–340; NMB France (above, note 361), paras 37–40; Altmann (above, note 361), paras 51–53; Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I-203, paras 54–56 (default interest different from compensatory interest); Case F-12/10 Kerstens v Commission, 8  March 2012, paras 85–87 (different decisions); Case C-529/09 Commission v Spain, 24  January 2013, paras 64–79 (temporal difference excluding res judicata); Ziegler (above, note 315), paras 37–47 (damages action different from an annulment action; inadmissibility for other reasons). 373 Küster v European Parliament (above, note 368) at 1731–1732 (Advocate General Reischl). In contrast, the interpretation of the law on which the annulment decision is based has the effect of res judicata only as regards the parties to the original proceedings: Case 292/84TP Bolognese v Scharf and Commission [1987] ECR 3563, para 9.

601

7.72  Admissibility

objective, he will be met by the plea of res judicata and the action rejected as inadmissible.374 On the other hand, when the judgment rejects an application for annulment, its effect is only inter partes.375 Res judicata attaches to a judgment or order when it has become final. In the case of judgments and orders that are capable of being appealed, res judicata attaches if no appeal is brought.376 In that event, the effect of res judicata may be avoided only by commencing one of the exceptional procedures for reviewing judgments of the Court.377 7.72 Res judicata is not a ground for rejecting a reference for a preliminary ruling as inadmissible because, although a preliminary ruling is binding on the referring court, it may always make a second order for reference, if it thinks it necessary or desirable.378 As far as other courts are concerned, a preliminary ruling does not constitute res judicata but they remain bound by the authority of the ruling379 with the result that a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is no longer bound to refer to the Court a question of EU law which is materially identical to the one answered in the Court’s ruling.380 Where a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled, the Court

374 Case 5/55  ASSIDER  v High Authority [1954–56]  ECR  135 at 146 (Advocate General Lagrange). In fact, in the case to which he refers, the earlier judgment was delivered after the commencement of proceedings, which is why the Court held that there was no need for it to give judgment on annulment and yet did not reject the applications as inadmissible (the previous judgment was that in Case 1/54 France v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 1; the Court also did not refrain from giving judgment in or declare admissible the second action in the series, Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 37, because the judgment in both cases was delivered on the same date). It should be observed that, if an earlier judgment annuls an individual decision, res judicata binds only the parties to those proceedings: eg  Schots (née Kortner) v Council, Commission and European Parliament (above, note 315), para 36. 375 The ASSIDER case (ibid), Advocate General Lagrange; see also Bebr, Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities (Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p 149. 376 Cases C-442/03P and C-471/03P P&O (above, note 361), para 47; Case C-308/07P Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso (above, note 362), para 57. If an appeal is brought, res judicata would normally arise in consequence of the decision on the appeal. For an example of a situation in which the judgment did not have the force of res judicata because of the bringing of an appeal, see Case T-263/12 Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Nafta Co v Council, 14 April 2014, paras 36–37. 377 See further Ch 16, sections IV (paras 16.43–16.45), VI (paras 16.83–16.105) and VII (paras 16.106–16.147). For example, in Case 219/87 Hoogovens Groep BV  v Commission [1989] ECR 1717, Advocate General Lenz considered that the applicant was precluded from calling into question the legal position resulting from a previous judgment which annulled part only of the contested act because the applicant had taken no step to have the judgment supplemented under what is now RP-ECJ, art 155 (see 1727–1728). 378 Case 29/68 Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor GmbH  v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken (No  2) [1969] ECR 165, paras 2–3; Case 69/85 Wünsche Handelgesellschaft GmbH & Co v Germany [1986] ECR 947, paras 13–16. 379 Case 112/76 Manzoni v Fonds National de Retraite des Ouvriers Mineurs [1977] ECR 1647 at 1661–1663 (Advocate General Warner). 380 Cases 28–30/62 Da Costa en Schaake NV v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 31 at 38.

602

Admissibility 7.74

does not dismiss the reference as inadmissible by virtue of res judicata but gives its decision in the form of a reasoned order.381

J

Defective pleadings

7.73 An objection to the admissibility of the application, or any other pleading, does not, as such, challenge the foundation of the action and is commonly based on a procedural irregularity in the pleading, such as a failure to have it signed by the party’s agent or lawyer or a failure to plead all or part of the party’s case with sufficient clarity. The question whether or not a pleading is defective is determined by reference to the situation prevailing when the pleading was lodged.382 7.74 The Court must consider whether a pleading is inadmissible by reason of a procedural irregularity, if necessary of its own motion, because the provisions governing the form of a pleading relate to the Court’s right to exercise its powers as well as to the interests of the opposing parties.383 Even so, not every defect may lead to the inadmissibility of a pleading: in the case of a failure to comply with the requirements of RP-ECJ, art 119(2)–(3) and 122(1)–(2), RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3) and 78(1)–(4) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 45(1), 2nd and 3rd subparas, 45(2), 2nd subpara, 46 or 50(1)(a)–(c), (2) or (5), the Court has discretion whether or not to admit the pleading as admissible if it has not been put in order within the time limit set by the Registrar for doing so.384 It is apprehended that the Court would accept a pleading suffering from such a 381 RP-ECJ, art 99. Depending upon the circumstances, the order may recite the previous case law in the ordinary way or refer to the previous judgment deciding the point (in which event, a copy of that judgment may be appended to the order) 382 Case F-82/06 Duyster v Commission (above, note 175), para 40; Case F-131/06 Steinmetz v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-459, II-A-1-2601, para 27; Case F-80/06 Duyster (above, note 175), para 42; Case F-95/06 Taruffi v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-A-1-163, II-A-1-863, paras 121–126 (change in requirements regarding contents of an application). 383 Cases 19 and 21/60, 2 and 3/61 Société Fives Lille Cail v High Authority [1961] ECR 281 at 294; Case 219/78 Michaelis v Commission [1979] ECR 3349 at 3361–3362 (Advocate General Capotorti). The Court acted of its own motion, inter alia, in Case 83/63 Krawczynski v Euratom Commission [1965]  ECR  623 (the reply); Case 55/64 Lens v European Court of Justice [1965]  ECR  837 (an application made under what is now RP-ECJ, art  151); Case T-64/89 Automec Srl v Commission [1990] ECR II-367, para 74; apparently, in Exporteurs in Levende Varkens (above, note 35), para 75. There is some authority that the admissibility of the pleading is determined by reference to the date when it is lodged: Case T-28/90 Asia Motor France SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-2285, paras 30, 34–37 and 42–44 (pleading correctly formulated at the commencement of proceedings; action therefore admissible; subsequent change in circumstances affecting the form of order); Case F-82/06 Duyster (above, note 175), para 40. 384 RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3); RP-GC, art 51(4) and 78(5); RP-CST, art 50(6); Cases 193 and 194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989] ECR 1045 at 1062 (Advocate General Darmon). Thus, a failure to lodge a lawyer’s certificate of entitlement to practise is not a procedural irregularity where the party is represented by an agent whom the lawyer is merely assisting, but it is a procedural irregularity of some consequence if the lawyer is the party’s representative: compare Case T-47/92 Lenz v Commission [1992] ECR II-2523, para 35 and Case T-101/92 Stagakis v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-63, para 8. An application may be regularised ex post facto: Maurissen, and cf para 33 of the judgment.

603

7.75  Admissibility

defect, after the party lodging it had been given an opportunity to remedy it but had failed or refused to do so, only if the circumstances were very exceptional. If, on the other hand, the defect is cured, but after the expiry of the period laid down for doing so, the pleading is admissible.385 7.75 It is arguable that a defective pleading is one ‘not provided for by the Rules of Procedure’ within the meaning of IR-ECJ, art 4(2), IR-GC, art 7(2) and IR-CST, art 8(2) with the result that the Registrar must decline to accept it unless expressly authorised by the President or the Court itself. Such authorisation is to be found in the ECJ’s internal rules but it does not prejudice a subsequent finding by the Court that the pleading is inadmissible: IR-ECJ, art 4(2), IR-GC, art 7(2) and IR-CST, art 8(2) concern only the entry of the document on the Register.386 In the case of defects other than those under RP-ECJ, art 119(2)–(3) and 122(1)–(2), RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3) and 78(1)–(4) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 45(1), 2nd and 3rd subparas, 45(2), 2nd subpara, 46 or 50(1)(a)–(c), (2) or (5), it is unclear whether they may be remedied after the pleading has been lodged. In Case 10/81 Farrall v Commission,387 where the applicant made several applications without being represented by a lawyer (contrary to what is now RP-ECJ, art 57(1)), the Registrar requested him to put them in order by causing them to be lodged by a lawyer. According to the report of the case, that request was made under what is now RP-ECJ, art 119(4), which at the time did not apply to such a defect. The same practice was considered in Cases 220 and 221/78 ALA SpA and ALFER v Commission,388 where Advocate General Capotorti indicated that other defects do not fall within the scope of the specific provisions enabling a defect to be remedied, set out in what are now RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3) with the result that, for example, a failure to submit a pleading signed by a lawyer cannot be made good, the pleading being inadmissible. The scope of RP-GC, art 51(4) and 78(5) and RP-CST, art  50(6) (the equivalents of RP-ECJ, art  119(4) and 122(3) so far as proceedings before the GC and CST are concerned) is to be construed accordingly. Since the pleadings in question in that case had, in any event, been lodged out of time the Court did not have to consider that point. There is provision in the ECJ’s internal rules that, where an applicant is not represented by a lawyer, the application should be registered and then returned to him for correction. But a new application signed by a lawyer would have to be lodged in time in order to save the action.389 7.76 At all events, not every defect falling outside the scope of RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3), RP-GC, art 51(4) and 78(5) or RP-CST, art 50(6) leads to

385 At least where it has not caused the proceedings to be delayed: Case 2/68 Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission [1968] ECR 435 at 443 (Advocate General Roemer). 386 Eg Case 229/81 CODEMI SpA v Euratom Commission [1982] ECR 377; the Registrar could have declined to accept the document in question but the Court authorised its entry on the Register, subsequently rejecting it as inadmissible after hearing argument. 387 [1981] ECR 717. See also Case 73/83 Stavridis v European Parliament [1983] ECR 3803. 388 [1979] ECR 1693, see 1700–1702. See also Case 131/83 Vaupel v European Court of Justice (15 March 1984, unreported). 389 The Vaupel case (above, note 388), para 9.

604

Admissibility 7.77

the inadmissibility of a pleading.390 Some certainly do, such as: a failure to set out the pleas in law on which an application is based;391 reliance on pleas that relate to a decision other than the one under challenge in the action;392 reliance on contradictory arguments;393 a failure to plead the constituent elements of a claim or appeal in a sufficiently precise way;394 a failure to set out any, or any correct, form of order when required.395 Others, such as a failure to date the pleadings, probably do not. The Court appears to adopt a flexible approach, the basic criterion for deciding whether or not a procedural defect leads to the inadmissibility of the pleading being its effect on the Court’s ability properly to exercise its powers in the case and on the right of the other parties to a fair trial.396 7.77 The inadmissibility of a pleading is not irredeemable: as long as any relevant time limits are observed, the position can be remedied by submitting a document in the proper form. That does not cure the defect in the previous pleading but is admissible in its own right.397 In addition, where a second application is lodged commencing proceedings having the same subject matter as those begun by an earlier, defective application, and the two cases are joined, the admissibility of the second application may cover the inadmissibility of the first and allow 390 The Gualco case (above, note 362) at 63 (Advocate General Roemer). 391 RP-ECJ, art 120(c); RP-GC, art 76(d); RP-CST, art 50(1)(e). Eg Edouard Dubois et Fils (above, note 35), paras 29–33; Case T-162/06 Kronoply GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2009] ECR II-1, paras 54–57; Bank Melli (above, note 347), para 27 (an apparently unexplained assertion). 392 Case T-419/07 Okalux GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-2477, paras 67–69. 393 Case C-199/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2007] ECR-1221, paras 21–26 (in that case, the contradictions were not, it seems, alternative arguments). 394 Statute, art 21 (at the time, art 19); RP-ECJ, art 120(c); RP-GC, art 76(d); RP-CST, art 50(1) (d)–(e). The Automec case (above, note 383), paras 72–77 (a claim for an unspecified form of damages); Koelman (above, note 16), paras 19–24; Exporteurs in Levende Varkens (above, note 35), paras 75–78; Case 146/95 Bernardi v Parliament [1996] ECR II-769, paras 25–28; Case T-387/94 Asia Motor France SA  v Commission [1996]  ECR II-961, paras 106–111; Camar (above, note 336), compare paras 181–185, 189–196 and 216–222 (approach to pleading of damages claim); Case T-319/03 French v Council and Commission [2004]  ECR II-769, paras 13–25; Case C-195/04 Commission v Finland (above, note 330), paras 22–33; M  v Ombudsman (above, note 49), paras 44–49 (damages claim defective save in regard to claim for non-material loss); Case C-268/08P Michail v Commission [2009] ECR I-23* (an appeal); Case C-12/13P Buono v Commission, 14 October 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2284, paras 33–39 (defective damages claim). 395 Eg Lens v European Court of Justice (above, note 383); Case 48/70 Bernardi v European Parliament [1971]  ECR  175 (at 189 per Advocate General Roemer). Cf Case T-28/90 Asia Motor France (above, note 383), paras 30, 34–37 and 42–44 (correct formulation at the commencement of proceedings but then a subsequent change in circumstances affecting the form of order). 396 See, in particular, Cases 46 and 47/59 Meroni & Co v High Authority [1962] ECR 411. For example, in Lenz v Commission (above, note 365), para 36, the fact that annexes to a pleading had not been communicated to the other party in the language of the case was regarded as sufficient to justify a request by the other party for an extension of time for the lodging of the next pleading but it was not regarded as being in other respects a procedural defect. In Case T-15/11 Sina Bank v Council, 11 December 2012, paras 29–39, the purpose of the application was broadly construed by reference to the terms used in it and its context in order to preserve the admissibility of the claim. 397 Cf ALA SpA and ALFER v Commission (above, note 132) at 1702 (Advocate General Capotorti).

605

7.78  Admissibility

the arguments made in it to be considered by the Court.398 That does not apply where, during the course of the proceedings, the contested measure is replaced by another measure, which is one of the situations in which the form of order may be amended:399 in that situation, the application as originally drafted must have been admissible at the time when it was lodged.400 A defect in a pleading may also lead to the partial, but not total, inadmissibility of the pleading and accordingly, where appropriate, of the action.401

III

RAISING AN OBJECTION

A

General remarks

7.78 An objection to admissibility may be raised either by the parties or by the Court of its own motion.402 In various judgments, it has been held that the Court can raise of its own motion objections of inadmissibility based on public policy (sometimes referred to as absolute bars).403 That seems to imply that some objections to admissibility are not based on public policy, in which case the Court need not raise them of its own motion; and it raises the suggestion that, at least in the case of public policy objections to admissibility, the Court may be obliged 398 Forges de Thy-Marcinelle et Monceau SA v Commission (above, note 354), para 4. 399 See RP-GC, art 86 and Ch 9, para 9.54. 400 Case T-176/09 Gibraltar (above, note 3), paras 46–51; Case T-115/10 United Kingdom (above, note 3), paras 46–48. 401 Eg Case T-47/05 Serrano v Parliament [2008]  ECR SC  1-A-2 55, II-A-2 357, paras 47–50 (claim for the annulment of ‘every act’ consequential or relating to the contested measures dismissed as too imprecise; no effect on the rest of the case); Case C-343/08 Commission v Czech Republic [2010]  ECR  I-275, paras 24–28 (claim that member state failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations ‘in particular’ in specified respects; ‘in particular’ was too vague so the action was admissible only in regard to the matters specifically identified in the pleading). 402 Although an objection to admissibility need not be considered if it is bound to fail (eg Case C-534/07P William Prym GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2009] ECR I-7415, para 25), it is generally considered that inadmissibility can (and possibly must) be raised by the Court of its own motion, whatever the ground, because it is an absolute bar to the proceedings: eg Case 200/87 Giordani v Commission [1989] ECR 1877, para 10 (although, there, the Court rejected the objection); Case T-130/89  B  v Commission [1990]  ECR II-761, para  1 of the headnote; Case T-465/93 Consorzio Gruppo di azione Locale ‘Murgia Messapica’ [1994] ECR II-361, para  24; Case T-230/94 Farrugia v Commission [1996]  ECR II-195, para  15; Case T-99/95 Stott v Commission [1996]  ECR II-2227, para  22; Case T-106/95 Federation Francaise des Societes d’Assurances (FFSA) v Commission [1997] ECR II-229, paras 123–124; Case T-85/07 Gabel Industria Tessile SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2008] ECR II-823, para 15; Case T-435/05 Brink’s Security Luxembourg SA v Commission [2009] ECR II-3233, para 54. 403 Eg Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, para 13; MCI (above, note 108), para 45. The context in a number of those cases tends to be the case law holding that interveners cannot raise a plea of inadmissibility (eg Ryanair (above, note 250), paras 22–23). Reliance on the public policy nature of the objection to admissibility is used to justify the Court taking the point even though the intervener cannot. That looks odd if all admissibility points can, and must, be considered by the Court of its own motion. One interpretation is that the true objection is to an intervener raising a formal preliminary objection to admissibility, which would potentially take the case onto a different procedural path.

606

Admissibility 7.79

to raise them.404 In practice, however, there is no discernible distinction between admissibility points that the Court ‘may’ take and those that it ‘must’ take. 7.79 In references for a preliminary ruling, an objection to the admissibility of the order for reference may be raised by the Court or the parties at any time. In direct actions the matter may be raised by the Court of its own motion but is usually raised by the defendant in the defence or by way of a preliminary objection to admissibility under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83(1);405 if raised in the rejoinder or at the hearing, it constitutes a new plea in law (or fresh issue) within the meaning of RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 56(1) and may itself be inadmissible unless it is a point that the Court is obliged to take of its own motion.406 Where admissibility is challenged only in the defence, the matter is resolved in the final judgment unless the Court decides of its own motion to raise it as a separate issue under RP-ECJ, art 53(2) or 150, RP-GC, art 126 or 129 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 81–82; or the parties agree at the close of pleadings that it would be more convenient to have the issue of admissibility decided first.407 A preliminary objection to admissibility should be raised (by a party) under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(1) or RP-CST, art 83(1) only if the ground relied on is a complete bar to the whole action and is distinct from the issues raised in relation to the substance of the case.408 If it relates to some only but not all of the claims made, it should be raised in the defence and the 404 For example, Case T-266/94 Foreningen af Jernskibs- og Maskinbyggerier i Danmark Skibsvaeftsforeningen v Commission [1996]  ECR II-1399, paras 38–40, and Case T-88/92 Groupement d’Achat Edouard Leclerc v Commission [1996] ECR I-1961, paras 41–42, can be read as implying that the Court has discretion in relation to admissibility points that have not been raised by a party unless, possibly, the point is a public policy point, in which case the Court is obliged to raise it of its own motion. 405 The fact that RP-ECJ, art  151(1), RP-GC, art  130(1) and RP-CST, art  83(1) make special provision for raising an objection to admissibility does not preclude the defendant from challenging admissibility in the defence. Eg Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954– 56]  ECR  333, order of 17  March 1956 (unreported) (see p  336 of the report): the applicant applied for an objection to admissibility raised in the rejoinder to be struck out because it was in breach of what was then RP-ECJ, art  69 which, as then worded, provided for the raising of preliminary objections, as under the current RP-ECJ, art 151. The Court rejected the application, holding that neither RP-ECJ, art 69 nor any other provision required an objection to admissibility to be raised by separate document; the defendant had only elaborated in the rejoinder an objection made in the defence. Normally an objection to admissibility is raised by the defendant but, in Lens v European Court of Justice (above, note 383) at 843–844, Advocate General Roemer appears to have accepted in principle that the applicant may also raise the matter as a preliminary issue under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151. 406 Eg Cases 54–60/76 Compagnie Industrielle et Agricole du Comté de Loheac v Council and Commission [1977]  ECR  645, paras 2–4. It is generally considered that a point that can be raised at any time by the Court of its own motion — which includes all admissibility points — may also be raised at any stage in the proceedings by the parties: eg the Del Plato case (above, note 338) at 651 (Advocate General Darmon). 407 Eg Case 106/80 Fournier v Commission [1981]  ECR  2759 (at 2774); Cases 91 and 200/82 Chris International Foods Ltd v Commission [1983] ECR 417. 408 Where there is a close relationship between the question of admissibility and the substance of the action, it is usually appropriate to proceed directly to consider the latter: eg Case 64/82 Tradax Graanhandel BV v Commission [1984] ECR 1359, para 12.

607

7.80  Admissibility

matter left to the final judgment. Otherwise, the preliminary objection would serve only to lengthen proceedings rather than shorten them. In appeals, there is no provision permitting an objection to admissibility to be made by separate application. It may be raised in a response to the appeal or, depending upon the circumstances, in a cross-appeal or by the Court of its own motion. 7.80 Where an application is manifestly unfounded, the Court may decline to consider a doubtful admissibility point and content itself with dismissing the case on its merits.409 For similar reasons the Court may refuse to consider an objection to the admissibility of a part only of the applicant’s claims where the issues raised by that part would have to be decided by it in any event or involve consideration of disputed facts.410 The question of admissibility may also be indistinguishable from the substance of the case in that, if the action is founded, it is also admissible (because the question of admissibility turns on the existence or otherwise of the right or interest that entitles the applicant to judgment), or vice versa.411 7.81 The power of the Court to raise the question of admissibility of its own motion is defined in: RP-ECJ, art 53(2) (which is a common procedural provision and applies to references for a preliminary ruling, direct actions and appeals), RP-ECJ, art  150 (which applies to direct actions and, by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 190(1), appeals) and RP-ECJ, art 181 (which applies only to appeals); RP-GC, art  126 and 129 (direct actions) and 208 (appeals); and RP-CST, art  81–82. Under RP-ECJ, art 53(2), RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81, the Court may dismiss a case on the ground that it clearly has no jurisdiction to hear and determine (or take cognisance of) it or on the ground that the action is manifestly inadmissible.412 Under RP-CST, art  81, the power also extends to parts of the action. The Court may so order even before the application commencing proceedings has been served on the other parties to the proceedings. Under RP-ECJ, art 150, RP-GC, art 129 and RP-CST, art 82, the Court may at any time of its own motion, after hearing the parties, decide whether there exists any absolute bar to 409 Case 218/80 Kruse v Commission [1981]  ECR  2417, para  5; Cases 193–198/82 Rosani v Council [1983] ECR 2841, paras 9 and 17; Case T-91/92 Daemen v Commission [1993] ECR II-1491. 410 Case C-119/88 Aerpo v Commission [1990] ECR I-2189, paras 13–14 (the action was there dismissed as unfounded; if the applicant had been right on the substance, it would then have been necessary to consider the admissibility of the relevant part of the claim and, if appropriate, to reject it as inadmissible); Cases T-6 and T-52/92 Reinarz v Commission [1993] ECR II-1046, para 50. 411 Eg Case T-108/89 Scheuer v Commission [1990]  ECR II-411, paras 24–31; Case C-170/89 Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs v Commission [1991]  ECR  I-5709; Case T-18/90 Jongen v Commission [1991] ECR II-187, paras 10 and 14–17. 412 Under RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81, the GC and the CST may also dismiss the action if it is manifestly unfounded, that is, manifestly lacking in merit. That is not considered here because this chapter is concerned only with admissibility. However, the procedure followed under RP-GC, art  126 and RP-CST, art  81 is no different whether the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded. A case can be dismissed under those provisions where it is partly manifestly inadmissible and partly manifestly unfounded: eg Case T-199/05 Gnemmi v Commission [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-125, II-A-2-851; Verein Natura Havel (above, note 6).

608

Admissibility 7.84

proceeding with a case.413 Those provisions may be invoked where the objection to proceeding with the case is not clearly established and the matter may require investigation or where the action is admissible but there is some other reason why it should not proceed further. The procedure followed is similar to that followed where an objection is raised by a party under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83(1). RP-ECJ, art 151 does not apply to appeals from the GC to the ECJ;414 and RP-GC, art 126–128 and 130 do not apply to appeals from the CST to the GC.415 It therefore seems that a preliminary objection to the admissibility of an appeal cannot be made by a party to the appeal, although its admissibility can be challenged in the written response to the notice of appeal or at the hearing. The ECJ or, as the case may be, the GC may of its own motion dismiss an appeal to it in whole or in part where it is clearly inadmissible or clearly unfounded.416

B

Dismissal for manifest lack of jurisdiction or inadmissibility

7.82 RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81 apply in the case of ‘actions’ (and, in the case of RP-CST, art 81, ‘certain of the claims’ in and ‘part’ of an action), which may be dismissed on the grounds of (so far as is here relevant) a clear lack of jurisdiction or manifest inadmissibility. RP-ECJ, art 53(2) differentiates between a ‘case’ (which the ECJ can dismiss by reasoned order where it is clear that the ECJ has no jurisdiction) and a ‘request’ or ‘application’ (which the ECJ can dismiss by reasoned order where it is manifestly inadmissible). 7.83 The predecessor to RP-ECJ, art 53(2) referred originally to ‘an application lodged…in pursuance of’ RP-ECJ, art  38(1)’ (now RP-ECJ, art  120). That gave rise to various problems: did what is now RP-ECJ, art  53(2) apply to defective applications, applications lodged otherwise than under what is now RP-ECJ, art 120 and to proceedings commenced otherwise than by application? The current wording of RP-ECJ, art 53(2) (and the wording of RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81) resolves some but not all of those difficulties. 7.84 To begin with, so far as RP-ECJ, art 53(2) is concerned, its repositioning as a common procedural provision applicable to all types of proceeding coming before the ECJ means necessarily that the word ‘case’ indicates any type of action or proceeding. In principle, it would appear to apply to any form of 413 RP-ECJ, art 149 and RP-GC, art 131(1) refer to the action becoming devoid of purpose so that there is no need to adjudicate on it. That is not a case of inadmissibility. The procedure followed in that situation is the same as where there is (or is believed to be) an absolute bar to proceeding with the case. 414 RP-ECJ, art 151 is not one of the common procedural provisions in the ECJ Rules of Procedure and is not incorporated by reference into the title dealing with appeals by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 190(1). 415 RP-GC, art  213(1) does not incorporate RP-GC, art  126–128 and 130 by reference into the provisions dealing with appeals. 416 RP-ECJ, art 181; RP-GC, art 208 (to which one may add dismissal by reason of an absolute bar, pursuant to RP-GC, art 129, which applies pursuant to RP-GC, art 213(1)). See further Ch 15, paras 15.29 and 15.35.

609

7.85  Admissibility

proceeding that has been given a case number417 but not to a procedural step that forms part of a proceeding that possesses a case number where that procedural step does not have its own case number (an example of the former would be proceedings for interim relief, which have their own case number but feature as a procedural step in an action having a slightly different case number; an example of the latter would be a preliminary objection to admissibility launched by a party, which is a procedural step in an action but does not have its own case number). 7.85 The word ‘action’ in RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81 looks at first sight like the equivalent of ‘case’ in RP-ECJ, art 53(2), always bearing in mind that, in the context of proceedings before the GC and CST, the types of actions that come before them are narrower than in the case of the ECJ (and that RP-GC, art 126 does not apply to appeals to the GC). However, there are some divergences between the different language versions of the rules of procedure. For example, in RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81, the word used in the French language version is ‘recours’ which carries the sense of an application commencing proceedings just as much as an ‘action’ (hence, the phraseology of the English version of RP-CST, art 81 - ‘action or certain of the claims therein’ - would seem to look better if the word ‘application’ were substituted for ‘action’). The implication is that RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81 apply at the least to actions commenced by an application within the meaning of Statute, art 21. That they apply generally to all proceedings begun by application, even if not envisaged by Statute, art  21, appears from Case T-4/89 Rev BASF AG  v Commission.418 Thus, other procedures, such as those for interim relief, third party proceedings, legal aid, intervention and so forth, are covered by RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81.419

417 That includes references for a preliminary ruling. References for a preliminary ruling have been dismissed on the basis of the predecessor to RP-ECJ, art 53(2) as being manifestly inadmissible in, for example, Case 80/83 Habourdin v Italocremona [1983]  ECR  3639; Case 56/84 Von Gallera v Maitre [1984] ECR 1769; Case 318/85 Unterweger [1986] ECR 955. 418 [1992] ECR II-1591, para 17. See also Case T-213/08 REV Marinova v Universite Libre de Bruxelles and Commission, 31 July 2009, paras 36–38. As noted above, RP-GC, art 126 does not apply to applications commencing an appeal to the GC from the CST: RP-GC, art 213(1). Not all actions before the Court are commenced by application under Statute, art 21. For example, appeals from decisions of the Euratom Arbitration Committee are dealt with in Statute, art 22 (the application commencing proceedings before the Court is currently made under RP-ECJ, art 201). On the other hand, references for a preliminary ruling are not brought before the Court by way of an application. Accordingly, it does not seem that RP-GC, art 126 could be applied to them were the GC to be given jurisdiction over references for a preliminary ruling (before the amendment of its Rules of Procedure, the ECJ had applied the equivalent provision to RP-GC, art 126 to references for a preliminary ruling – see note 417 above – apparently by analogy, on the basis that what was, at the time, RP-ECJ, art 103(1) provided generally and in unqualified terms that the rules of procedure applied to references for a preliminmary ruling). 419 In Case 233/83 K v Germany and European Parliament [1982] ECR 3637, the ECJ appears to have applied what is now RP-ECJ, art 53(2) to an application for legal aid. At the time, the relevant provision in the ECJ Rules of Procedure (RP-ECJ, art 92(1)) applied to ‘actions’ in the same way as RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81 currently do.

610

Admissibility 7.88

7.86 In contrast to RP-GC, art 126 and RP-CST, art 81, RP-ECJ, art 53(2) applies also in the case of a manifestly inadmissible ‘request’ or ‘application’. That phraseology appears to indicate a pleading in which the author of the pleading asks the ECJ to do something. Hence, in addition to empowering the ECJ to tackle a ‘case’ over which it clearly has no jurisdiction, RP-ECJ, art  53(2) enables the ECJ to deal with a manifestly inadmissible pleading. That evidently applies to the situation where a person lodges at the ECJ a request or application that does not initiate, or purport to initiate, a ‘case’ (such as an attempt to seise the ECJ with a form of action or proceeding that is not known to the ECJ, or to EU law, or that falls outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ).420 What is less evident is whether or not RP-ECJ, art 53(2) applies to requests or applications made in the course of a case over which the ECJ has jurisdiction and whether or not it applies to a part of a case, request or application (such as to one of a number of heads of claim in an application commencing proceedings, over which the ECJ does have jurisdiction). 7.87 Whereas RP-GC, art  126 refers to, and envisages a decision on, ‘the action’, RP-CST, art 81 refers also to, and envisages a decision on, ‘certain of the claims’ in, or a ‘part’ of, the action. It is not clear why the CST rules are broader than the ECJ and GC rules. One possible explanation is that it was felt that staff cases were intrinsically better suited to summary disposal of parts of the claim than other actions. At all events, the CST has the power to dismiss summarily (on the ground of a clear lack of jurisdiction) particular claims in an action while leaving the rest of the action to proceed to judgment in the normal way. In that connection, ‘certain claims’ would normally be understood as referring to certain forms of relief sought in the action (and set out in the form of order in a pleading) but not to a plea, line of argument or assertion made in a pleading (which, linguistically but not technically, may also be described by the word ‘claim’). In addition, the CST has the power to dismiss summarily (on the ground of manifest inadmissibility) the whole or ‘part’ of the action. The reference to a ‘part’ of the action clearly encompasses a claim (in the technical sense of a head of relief set out in the form of order). It is not clear what further meaning is to be given to ‘part’ of an action in RP-CST, art 81 unless the intention was to enable the CST to dismiss as manifestly inadmissible a plea, line of argument or assertion even in cases where the claim (that is, the head of relief) to which it relates is not manifestly inadmissible.421 7.88 Once the application initiating the action has been lodged, the Court may at any time thereafter dismiss it (or, in the case of CST proceedings, parts 420 Examples include a request for a preliminary ruling that is made by a person or body that is not a court or tribunal of a member state; or an action for a declaratory form of relief that does not fall within the scope of the standard actions that can be brought before the Court (see some of the cases cited in note 16 above). 421 As RP-CST, art  81 empowers the CST to dismiss ‘the action, in whole or in part’ as being manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, it could be that the reference to a ‘part’ of the action is better understood as referring, broadly, to claims, pleas and so forth (and not just to claims) because there is some sense in the summary dismissal, as manifestly unfounded, of a particular plea or argument so as to focus the dispute between the parties.

611

7.88  Admissibility

of it) by reasoned order after hearing the advocate general (where there is one) either on the ground of a clear absence of jurisdiction or on the ground of manifest inadmissibility. RP-ECJ, art  53(2), RP-GC, art  126 and RP-CST, art  81 specifically provide that the order may be made ‘without taking further steps in the proceedings’.422 If the defendant has lodged a preliminary objection to admissibility, that does not prevent the Court from summarily dismissing the action as being manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded.423 The Court is not obliged to hear the views of the parties before making its decision: indeed, the function of RP-ECJ, art  53(2), RP-GC, art  126 and RP-CST, art  81 is to enable the Court to act of its own motion and reject an application (or, in CST proceedings, parts of it) immediately.424 However, that necessarily means that, at the time when the Court makes its decision, the ground of rejection must be manifest in the sense that any (further) argument on the point is futile.425 The fact 422 The order may be made without prior publication of the notice of the case in the Official Journal: Case C-266/10 P Sistemul electronic de arhivare, criptare si indexare digitalizata Srl (Seacid) v Parliament and Council [2010]  ECR  I-133*, paras 16–17 (paras 9–14 deal with dismissal by the GC before a judge has been asked to act as advocate general). The fact that the Court has taken a step in the proceedings before exercising its power does not prevent it from summarily dismissing the action: eg  Case C-547/03P  Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) v Commission [2006] ECR I-845, paras 27–30; Case C-262/07P Tokai Europe GmbH v Commission [2008] ECR I-30*, paras 26–27. Thus, in Case F-105/06 Lubking v Commission, 27  September 2011, paras 40–41, Case F-75/07 Brown v Commission, 27  September 2011, paras 36–37, and Case F-82/07 Dittert v Commission, 27 September 2011, paras 38–39, the order was made after the proceedings had dragged on for a considerable length of time and when cases that had been decided in the meantime made it clear that further continuation of the proceedings was futile. 423 Case F-6/11 M v European Medicines Agency, 28 September 2011, para 12. 424 On the absence of a right to a hearing, see, for example: Case T-222/07P Kerstens v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-37, II-B-1-267, paras 31–36; Case T-100/08 P Kerelov v Commission, 6 May 2010, paras 25–26 and 31; Case T-48/10 P Meister v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 16 December 2010, para 29; Case C-491/11P Fuchsuber Agrarhandel v Commission, 27  June 2012, paras 57–59; Case T-59/13  P  BT  v Commission, 7 October 2014, paras 28–42; H v Court of Justice (above, note 173), paras 60–61. 425 Eg the French case (above, note 394), para 12; Case F-87/06 Mante v Council [2007] ECRSC  I-A-1-77, II-A-1-451, para  16; Case F-51/06 Tesoka v European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions [2007]  ECR-SC II-A-1-173, II-A-1-953, para 30. It follows that the inadmissibility of the action must be manifest on the face of the application if the case is dismissed immediately after lodgment of the application (as opposed to at some later stage in the proceedings). It may be manifest that an action is inadmissible because of the result in a previous case: eg Gnemmi (above, note 412), paras 11–14 and 23–27. In AIT (above, note 422), paras 31–33, it was argued that a case cannot be manifestly inadmissible if the ground for its inadmissibility is identified only by means of a measure of organisation of procedure. That argument was rejected on the facts because a plea of inadmissibility had been raised in the defence and the documents on which the plea was based had been annexed to the defence. However, the argument seems to be a bad one anyway. Once it is clear or manifest that the Court lacks jurisdiction or the action is inadmissible, the power to dismiss it can be exercised without the need to take any further steps in the proceedings. It does not matter at what point in the proceedings that becomes clear or manifest. Thus, it does not have to be clear or manifest on the face of the application commencing proceedings because (as in AIT) it may become so from a perusal of the defence or (as in Case T-222/07 Kerstens, above, note 424, para 58) upon a scrutiny of the facts. The fact that related cases have been held to be admissible does not preclude the case in question from being manifestly inadmissible: Meister (above, note 424), para 31.

612

Admissibility 7.89

that the application is defective, in some respect other than that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain it or that it is manifestly inadmissible, does not prevent the application of RP-ECJ, art 53(2), RP-GC, art 126 or RP-CST, art 81.426 As illustrations of the use made of those provisions, reference may be made to the following cases. 7.89 In Case 51/79 Buttner v Commission,427 a staff case, the Court declared that it had no jurisdiction because, under the Staff Regulations, actions may be brought challenging the legality of an ‘act adversely affecting’ the applicant adopted by or on behalf of the appointing authority and the case itself concerned the contents of a report drawn up by a private company, which could not constitute such an act. A similar situation arose in Case 123/80 B v European Parliament,428 another staff case, in which the applicant claimed the annulment of a letter informing him of a draft decision which would be adopted by the defendant: that was clearly a preparatory act and not one adversely affecting the applicant. Cases 114 to 117/79 Fournier (née Mazière) v Commission429 were brought under what are now TFEU, art 263 and 340 by the wife and children of an official alleging that damage had been caused to them by the defendant’s failure to address an unspecified act to the official. The Court held that that method of proceeding fell outside the scope of TFEU, art 340 because a legal remedy already existed for rectifying irregularities in the employment of an official. Case 46/81 Benvenuto430 was an application for a declaration that certain Italian regulations governing the premium rate and general conditions of motor insurance were contrary to what is now TFEU, art 101 and therefore void: the Court, of course, has no jurisdiction under the TFEU to annul acts of a member state and therefore dismissed the application, before it had been served on the named defendants, on the ground that it ‘clearly had no jurisdiction’ to hear it. Similar situations arose in Case 276/86 Belkacem v Germany431 and Case C-285/90 Tsitouras v Greece.432 Lastly, the application in Case 229/81  CODEMI  SpA  v Euratom Commission433 took the form of a letter written by the president of an Italian court asking for the enforcement of an order made by him against the Commission. Whereas, in all the other cases cited, the Court appears to have acted under what are now RP-ECJ, art 53(2), RP-GC, art 126 or RP-CST, art 81 without hearing argument, in that case the letter was served on the parties to the proceedings before the Italian court and they were invited to lodge written observations. The Court rejected the application because it fell outside the scope of any known procedure. The CODEMI case indicates that the Court has discre 426 The Court does not have to wait for a defect in the application to be corrected by the applicant before rejecting it as inadmissible because of lack of jurisdiction: that appears to have happened in K v Germany and European Parliament (above, note 419) where the application was made by the applicant in person and did not, therefore, comply with what is now RP-ECJ, art 57(1). 427 [1980] ECR 1201. 428 [1980] ECR 1789. 429 [1980] ECR 1529. 430 [1981] ECR 809. 431 [1986] ECR 3975. 432 [1991] ECR I-787. 433 Above, note 386.

613

7.90  Admissibility

tion whether or not to reject the application out of hand and may instead ask the parties to submit written (or oral) observations. That is exceptional. Normally the Court makes the order in an administrative meeting after hearing the views of the advocate general (where there is one) and, were it considered necessary to hear argument from the parties, the procedure envisaged in RP-ECJ, art 150, RP-GC, art 129 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 82 could be followed.

C

Summary dismissal by reason of an absolute bar or lack of purpose

7.90 RP-ECJ, art 150, RP-GC, art 129 and RP-CST, art 82 provide that the Court may at any time of its own motion decide whether there exists any absolute bar to proceeding with a case. RP-ECJ, art 149, RP-GC, art 129 and RP-CST, art 85(1) provide that the Court may of its own motion dispose of an action by reasoned order when it has become devoid of purpose and there is no need to adjudicate on it. The power provided for in all the provisions just referred to can be exercised in all direct actions,434 in appeals to the ECJ from a judgment or decision of the GC435 and in appeals to the GC from a judgment or decision of the CST.436 Technically, the difference between disposal on the ground of an absolute bar and disposal on the ground of lack of purpose is that, in the former case, the action should be dismissed but, in the latter case, the proceedings are simply closed (there being, ex hypothesi, no need to adjudicate on the action). The result is the same in both cases: the proceedings are brought to an end. Although the provisions referred to above refer to ‘a case’, it appears that, at least in the case of the application of an ‘absolute bar’, they are construed as applying to a part of an action or case.437 7.91 The circumstances in which an action becomes devoid of purpose have been discussed above.438 The alternative basis for summary dismissal, expressed by the phrase ‘absolute bar,’ is rendered in French as ‘les fins de non-recevoir d’ordre public’ and a similar phrase is used in the Italian version of the ECJ, GC

434 Other language versions do not in fact refer to a bar to proceeding ‘with a case’ so no special meaning attaches to the use of the word ‘case’. RP-ECJ, art 149–150, RP-GC, art 129 and RPCST, art 81 and 85(1) do not allow a party to sidestep the prohibition on the introduction of new pleas in law during the course of proceedings (see RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) and RP-CST, art 56(1)): Case 110/81 Roquette Frères SA v Council [1982] ECR 3159 at para 33 of the judgment. But, obviously, RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) and RP-CST, art 56(1) are no bar to raising a claim which the Court can take of its own motion: eg Case 31/69 Commission v Italy [1970] ECR 25 at para 8. 435 See RP-ECJ, art 190(1), which incorporates RP-ECJ, art 149–150 by reference. 436 RP-GC, art 213(1), which incorporates RP-GC, art 129 by reference. 437 Case C-23/05 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-9535, paras 5–8 (inadmissibility due to failure to comply with a preliminary procedure) and 11–12 (the case can be explained as an instance of Homer nodding). In that connection, the citation of what is now RP-ECJ, art 150 in Case C-221/03 Commission v Belgium [2005] ECR I-8307, para 34, appears to be mistaken). 438 Ch 2, paras 2.156–2.164.

614

Admissibility 7.92

and CST Rules of Procedure439 but the German text is different again.440 There is some uncertainty concerning the precise meaning of the phrases used. The expression used in the French text points to an objection to the admissibility of the cause of action (not just the application commencing proceedings), which is ‘d’ordre public’ and must therefore be raised by the Court of its own motion. That led one writer to suggest that what is now RP-ECJ, art 151(1) (which enables a party to raise an objection to admissibility) applies to objections to the admissibility of the application441 and what are now RP-ECJ, art 53(2) and 150 apply to objections to the admissibility of the cause of action.442 Although it seems to be accepted that any ground of admissibility may be raised by a party under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83(1), it is nevertheless true that the wording of the different language versions of RP-ECJ, art 150, RP-GC, art 129 and RP-CST, art 82 indicates, as the English text has it, absolute bars to the continuation of proceedings. For many years, what is now RP-ECJ, art 150 referred only to dismissal of an action where there was an ‘absolute bar’; and that seemed to include, in addition to the inadmissibility of the action, any other reason why the proceedings should not proceed to judgment, including the situation in which the proceedings had become devoid of purpose.443 Now that the lack of purpose of the proceedings is specifically mentioned in RP-ECJ, art 149, RP-GC, art 131(1) and RP-CST, art 85(1), it does not seem to be necessary (and therefore possible) to construe the phrase ‘absolute bar’ so broadly. 7.92 The problem of the scope of the Court’s power lies more in the question whether or not RP-ECJ, art 150, RP-GC, art 129 and RP-CST, art 82 allow the Court to reject a case where there exists any such bar or only where the bar is itself mandatory and cannot be waived by the parties. The different texts of RP-ECJ, art 150, RP-GC, art 129 and RP-CST, art 82, of which some, as has been mentioned, contain no express reference to mandatory bars as such, may be reconciled by saying that all ‘absolute’ bars are mandatory and must be raised by the Court of its own motion or else by saying that, where a particular language version refers only to mandatory bars, any ambiguity in the other language versions should lead to them being given a narrow construction in order to ensure consistency as between the different texts of the Rules of Procedure. Since any point going to the admissibility of the proceedings can be raised by the Court

439 ‘L’improcedibilità per motivi di ordine pubblico’. 440 ‘Unverzichtbare Prozessvoraussetzungen fehlen’: absence of an indispensable requirement for bringing an action. 441 ‘Exceptions’ in the French text. 442 See De Soto, Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der EG, p 50. 443 Eg Case 19/85 Grégoire-Foulon v European Parliament [1985] ECR 3771, where the action lost its purpose after the commencement of proceedings because the defendant withdrew the contested act (an additional claim raised in the reply was inadmissible). In Case 248/86 Bruggemann v Economic and Social Committee [1987] ECR 3963, the action was dismissed under what is now RP-ECJ, art  150 as being inadmissible for lack of interest, that finding approximating to a finding that there was no case on the substance.

615

7.93  Admissibility

of its own motion,444 the difficulty (in the past) seemed to arise only in relation to those absolute bars that did not concern admissibility, such as the question whether or not the action had lost its purpose. With the introduction of lack of purpose as a distinct ground for dismissing an action, ‘absolute bar’ seems now to be limited solely to grounds of inadmissibility that the Court can take of its own motion. 7.93 In any event, given the fact that the Court must hear the parties before dismissing an action under RP-ECJ, art 149 and 150, RP-GC, art 129 and 131(1), or RP-CST, art 82 and 85(1),445 the Court can raise of its own motion any absolute bar to proceeding with a case and, if there is doubt as to whether or not it is a bar that may be, and is intended to be, waived by a party, the matter can be resolved by hearing the parties. It would certainly be illogical for the Court to be able to dismiss a case summarily because of some bar which the party concerned could and might waive. 7.94 RP-ECJ, art  150, RP-GC, art  129 and (more recently) RP-CST, art  82 have been invoked, with increasing frequency,446 in respect of: lack of jurisdiction;447 prescription;448 lis pendens;449 lack of interest;450 failure to comply with a preliminary procedure;451 res judicata;452 and (even before the inclusion 444 Lens v European Court of Justice (above, note 383) at 844 (Advocate General Roemer); Cases 67 to 85/75 Lesieur Cotelle et Associés SA v Commission [1976] ECR 391, para 12 (and at 419 per Advocate General Warner); Case 219/78 Michaelis v Commission [1979] ECR 3349 at 3361–3362 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 155/78 Miss M v Commission [1980] ECR 1797 at 1813 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 135/81 Groupement des Agences de Voyages v Commission [1982]  ECR  3799 (Advocate General Rozes); Case T-60/91  C  v Commission [1991]  ECR II-1395, para  11; Case T-16/91 Rendo NV  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-2417, para 39. Compagnie Industrielle et Agricole du Comté de Loheac v Council and Commission (above, note 406) may be distinguished because no reasoning or arguments were addressed to the Court in support of the objection. 445 Cf Sina Bank (above, note 396), para 129. The only qualification to be made to that is that RPCST, art 82 provides that the CST may decide by reasoned order, without taking further steps in the proceedings (which implies without hearing the parties), if it considers that it has sufficient information to come to a decision. If there were doubt as to whether or not a particular bar was or was not an absolute bar, one assumes that the CST would not consider that it had sufficient information to proceed directly to making a reasoned order. 446 See generally the Del Plato case (above, note 338) at 650–651 (Advocate General Darmon). 447 Eg Cases 31 and 33/62 Milchwerke H Wöhrmann & Sohn KG and Alfons Lütticke GmbH  v Commission [1962] ECR 501; Case 43/76 Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from the Tribunal de Grand Instance, Melun, order of 30  June 1976 (unreported); Cases 105/79 and 68/80 References for a Preliminary Ruling by the Acting Judge at the Tribunal d’Instance, Hayange [1979] ECR 2257 and [1980] ECR 771; Case 138/80 Borker [1980] ECR 1975. 448 Eg Case 55/64 Lens v European Court of Justice (above, note 383); Case 47/65 Kalkuhl v European Parliament [1965]  ECR  1011 (at least 15 other unreported cases were dismissed, apparently for the same reason in 1965 and one in 1968); Vaupel v European Court of Justice (above, note 388); Case 317/85 Pomar v Commission [1987] ECR 2467. 449 Eg Cases 45 and 49/70 Bode v Commission [1971] ECR 465; Perinciolo v Council (above, note 354). 450 Eg Case 108/86 GdM v Council and Economic and Social Committee [1987] ECR 3933. 451 Eg Case 13/86 von Bonkewitz-Lindner v European Parliament [1987] ECR 1417, paras 5–7. 452 Cases 159 and 267/84, 12 and 264/85 Ainsworth v Commission [1987] ECR 1579, paras 3–4.

616

Admissibility 7.96

of lack of purpose as an express ground for dismissing the proceedings) where the action, although not inadmissible, had become devoid of purpose after the commencement of proceedings453 (at present, that would be done under RP-ECJ, art 149, RP-GC, art 131(1) and RP-CST, art 85(1)). 7.95 The Court may act under RP-ECJ, art  149 and 150, RP-GC, art  129 and 131(1), or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 82 or 85(1) at any stage in the proceedings. In Case 200/87 Giordani v Commission,454 for example, it acted after the hearing because the defendant had not made clear whether or not it was disputing the admissibility of the action. 7.96 When the ECJ raises an absolute bar or the lack of purpose of the action under RP-ECJ, art 149 or 150, it acts of its own motion on a proposal from the judge-rapporteur. The parties are given an opportunity to be ‘heard’ (normally in writing). The advocate general is also heard (but no formal opinion need be produced). A reasoned order is then made. The reasoned order may dismiss the action or case; but that is not the inevitable consequence of the initiaition of the procedure under RP-ECJ, art 149 and 150. Where it is decided that the action has not become devoid of purpose or there is no absolute bar, the proceedings continue to the next procedural step that would have been reached if the process under RP-ECJ, art 149 or 150 had not intervened. Under RP-GC, art 129 and 131(1), the GC rules by reasoned order on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after the parties have been heard. The same procedure is followed by the CST under RP-CST, art 82 and 85(1) save that a proposal from the judge-rapporteur is not required; and, in the case of RP-CST, art 82 but not RP-CST, art 85(1), the CST has express power to make a reasoned order, without taking any further step in the proceedings, if it considers that it has sufficient information to do so. Under the current wording of those provisions (with the exception of RP-CST, art 82, which provides that the CST may in the alternative make a decision without taking any further step in the proceedings), a ‘hearing’ of the parties is a condition precedent to any decision to dismiss the action but that ‘hearing’ may be oral or in writing (or, if appropriate, in both forms).455 Oral argument is unnecessary if the documents before the Court contain all the information that it requires in order to make a decision.456

453 Grégoire-Foulon v European Parliament (above, note 443), para 7. 454 [1989] ECR 1877, para 10. 455 The AIT case (above, note 422), paras 34–37; Tokai Europe (above, note 422), paras 24–28. Those cases were decided by reference to the predecessor to RP-GC, art 129, which incorporated by reference the procedure now laid down by RP-GC, art 130; however, they remain a valid indication of the fact that parties may be heard orally or in writing. 456 Eg Case 216/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Commission and Council [1984] ECR 3325; Case 297/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Council [1984] ECR 3339; AIT (above, note 422), para 36. The absence of a right to an oral hearing was upheld in Canas (above, note 69), paras 42–44.

617

7.97  Admissibility

D

Dismissal on application

7.97 A party may raise a preliminary objection to admissibility under RP-ECJ, art 151(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83(1).457 Under RP-GC, art 130(1), a defendant may make such an application;458 and, under RP-GC, art 130(2), a party may apply for a declaration that the action has become devoid of purpose or for ‘a decision on another preliminary issue’. At first sight, the ‘other preliminary issue’ referred to in RP-GC, art 130(2), that a party may raise, is differentiated from a claim that the action is devoid of purpose and encompasses the issues that may be raised by a defendant under RP-GC, art 130(1).459 Under RP-CST, art 85(1), a party may also apply to have the proceedings in an action closed on the ground that the action has become devoid of purpose and there is no longer any need to adjudicate on it. Disposal of an action on the ground that it has become devoid of purpose is not, technically, its dismissal for lack of admissibility; but, like a preliminary objection to admissibility, it results in the termination of the proceedings without consideration of the merits (or substance) of the case. 7.98 The procedure under those provisions ‘plainly aims at allowing the admissibility of applications to be argued at an early stage of the procedure, in order to save the parties, where appropriate, from having to engage in unnecessary argument on the substance of the case. The sole condition required for the employment of that procedure is that consideration of the substance of the case should not be broached’.460 In most cases it is the defendant who raises the objection, for obvious reasons. It is unclear whether an intervener can do so. There is authority that an intervener may raise an objection to admissibility not considered by the party in whose support he has intervened (at least where the objection can be taken by the Court of its own motion)461 and may, of course, argue in favour of an objection which has been made. On the other hand, to allow an intervener to raise such an objection as a preliminary issue under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 or RP-CST, art 83 or 85(1) would enable him to take the 457 RP-ECJ, art 151(1) refers to ‘a preliminary objection or issue not going to the substance of the case’; RP-CST, art 83(1) refers to an application ‘for a decision on admissibility, on lack of competence or [on any] other preliminary plea not going to the substance [or ‘merits’] of the case’. As noted in Ch 6 above, a number of different procedural applications may be made under those provisions. This chapter is concerned with admissibility issues; and lack of competence falls under that general heading. Although RP-CST, art 83(1) does not refer to a ‘preliminary’ objection, that is what it covers because such an objection is raised in order to be determined separately from, and before, a decision on the merits (or substance) of the case. 458 RP-GC, art 130(1) refers to ‘a decision on admissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case’. As in the case of RP-CST, art 83(1), there is no reference to a ‘preliminary’ objection (see the preceding footnote) but that is what is meant. 459 Obviously, a defendant may make an application under RP-GC, art 130(1). Any party (including a defendant and an intervener) may make an application under RP-GC, art 130(2). 460 Case 20/65 Collotti v European Court of Justice [1965] ECR 847 at 853 (Advocate General Roemer). That observation applies with equal force to the disposal of the case when it has become devoid of purpose (at the time of the Collotti case, the rules of procedure did not contain distinct provisions dealing with inadmissibility and lack of purpose). 461 See the discussion in Ch 5 of Cases 42 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority [1961] ECR 53 (at 75) and the more recent cases on the point.

618

Admissibility 7.99

direction of the case out of the hands of the parties stricto sensu. That seems to be contrary to the essentially subordinate role of interveners in the proceedings. It would seem, instead, that an intervener is restricted to raising the objection in his observations.462 That does not, of course, preclude the Court from taking the point under RP-ECJ, art 53(2) or 150, RP-GC, art 126 or 129 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 81–82. 7.99 The procedure under RP-ECJ, art  151, RP-GC, art  130 and RP-CST, art 83 has already been considered.463 At this point it suffices to say that, when a preliminary objection to admissibility is raised, the facts of the case are, strictly speaking, irrelevant. The reason for that is that, on the one hand, the purpose of raising the objection at a preliminary stage is to dispose of the case without more ado (hence there are no preparatory enquiries in order to ascertain whether or not the facts alleged are true) and, on the other hand, the substance of the case does not fall to be considered. In the nature of things, some grounds of inadmissibility, in particular lack of locus standi or of interest, cannot be assessed without looking at the facts. In some cases, the contention of the party raising the objection is that, even if the allegations of fact made by the opposing party are true, the action is still inadmissible. That puts the Court in a dilemma: if it hears the objection and then decides to reject it, it may subsequently find that the facts alleged are not true and the action is, after all, inadmissible; on the other hand, if the decision on admissibility is reserved until final judgment, the Court may find that the time spent on the further pleadings, any preparatory enquiries and the oral procedure, was wasted because the objection must be upheld. Its decision whether or not to hear the objection as a preliminary issue is therefore reached after assessing the importance of the facts of the case to the question of admissibility and the persuasiveness of the objection raised. When admissibility is clearly dependent on facts which the parties do not agree or are not prepared to admit for the purpose of deciding that question, the decision on admissibility can only be reserved until the final judgment. That suggests that, in such a case, a preliminary objection should not be raised at all, the admissibility of the action simply being challenged in the defence. The same seems to apply where only part of the action is inadmissible and the raising of a preliminary objection to that part will not reduce the scope of the case significantly.464

462 Case C-313/90 CIRFS v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, Opinion of Advocate General Lenz at paras 47–49. See Ch 5, para 5.41 ff. 463 See Ch 6, para 6.9 ff. 464 Cf Aerpo v Commission (above, note 410), paras 13–14, where the Court declined to consider the defendant’s arguments on admissibility because it would have to rule on the substance of the case in any event.

619

Chapter 8

Interim relief

I INTRODUCTION 8.1 In the absence of express provision otherwise, the commencement of proceedings before the Court does not have suspensory effect, in the sense of imposing automatically a prohibition on any changes in circumstances while proceedings are pending before the Court or relieving a person from the obligation to comply with a measure whose legality is contested in the proceedings.1 Interim relief is available in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court, including appeals to the ECJ from judgments or decisions of the GC,2 review proceedings before the ECJ concerning appellate decisions of the GC,3 and appeals from the CST to the GC.4 As set out in the Treaties, the powers of the Court to grant interim relief comprise four distinct remedies: 1 TFEU, art  278; EAEC, art  157; Statute, arts 60, 1st para, and 62b, 1st para, and Annex, art 12(1); Case 213/85 Commission v Netherlands [1988] ECR 281, para 21; Case T-275/94 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission [1995]  ECR II-2169, paras 51–54 and 86; Case C-196/99 P Siderurgica Aristrain Madrid SL v Commission [2003] ECR I-11005, paras 144–145; Case T-28/03 Holchim (Deutschland) AG v Commission [2005] ECR II-1357, paras 121–124; Case C-232/05 Commission v France [2006] ECR I-10071, para 60; Case T-434/04 Milbert v Commission [2006]  ECR-SC  I-A-2-273, II-A-2-1423, para  42; Case C-280/05 Commission v Italy [2007]  ECR  I-181*, para  21; Case T-113/04 Atlantic Container Line v Commission [2007] ECR II-171*, para 36; Case T-411/07 R Aer Lingus Group plc v Commission [2008] ECR II-411, para 102; Case T-410/03 Hoechst GmbH v Commission [2008] ECR II-881, para 466. There are the following exceptions: (i) in the context of references for a preliminary ruling, the referring court or tribunal should not proceed to judgment on the matters to which the reference relates until the ECJ has delivered the preliminary ruling because that would render the reference pointless (there is, however, no formal prohibition on the referring court proceeding to decide those matters, thereby frustrating the reference – the situation could then be regarded as an implied withdrawal of the reference); (ii) EAEC, art  83(2) provides that an action against a Commission decision imposing a sanction under EAEC, art  83(1) has suspensory effect; (iii) Statute, art 60, 2nd para, defers the date on which a GC judgment declaring a regulation to be void takes effect until the date of expiry of the period for appealing against the judgment or, if an appeal is brought, the date on which the appeal is dismissed; and (iv) under Statute, art 62b, 2nd para, the answer given by the GC to a question referred to it for a preliminary ruling (in the event that jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings is conferred on the GC) takes effect on expiry of the period for seeking a review of the GC’s ruling from the ECJ or, if the review procedure is initiated, on the outcome of that procedure (unless the ECJ decides otherwise). 2 Statute, art 60. 3 Statute, art 62b, 1st para. 4 Statute, Annex, art 12(1).

621

8.2  Interim relief

(1) suspension of the application of an act challenged in an action before the Court:5 (2) interim measures pending the final decision in a case before the Court;6 (3) suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court itself;7 and (4) suspension of the enforcement of a measure adopted by another institution.8 To those the chapter of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure which deals with interim relief adds a fifth: compulsory inspections under EAEC, art 81. That is not really a species of interim relief and seems to have been included in the chapter only because of certain procedural similarities to proceedings for interim relief. It is considered elsewhere.9 8.2 In substance, the relief available comprises the remedies referred to in (1) to (4) above; and the conditions that must be satisfied before relief can be granted are the same whether interim relief is sought in the context of proceedings brought directly before the ECJ, GC or the CST, with some variations in the case of appeals.10 The chief characteristics of proceedings for interim relief, whether brought before the ECJ, GC or CST, are that they are summary and heard by a single judge, the President of the Court or of a chamber. It is very rare for an application to be dealt with by the full Court or a chamber. In addition, most applications are made in the context of litigation which is already before the Court. For reasons of clarity the proceedings to which the application for interim relief relates will be referred to as the ‘action’. 8.3 The nature of interim measures was discussed at length by Advocate General Capotorti in his opinion in Cases 24 and 97/80 R Commission v France11 but his remarks seem to be broadly applicable to the various categories of relief, of which interim measures are one, available to a litigant in a direct action in order to preserve his rights pending judgment, and which are here referred to as ‘interim relief’. The topic was also the subject of extensive analysis by Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-213/89  R  v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd.12 The opinions of Advocates General Capotorti and Tesauro can be summarised as follows. 8.4 The need for interim relief arises from the hiatus between the point in time at which a right comes into existence and the point in time at which its existence is established definitively by a judicial decision having the force of res judi 5 TFEU, art 278; EAEC, art 157. 6 TFEU, art 279. 7 TFEU, arts 280 and 299. 8 TFEU, art 299; EAEC, art 164. 9 See Ch 17, paras 17.169–17.172. 10 Cf Case C-345/90  P-R  European Parliament v Hanning [1991]  ECR  I-231, para  26. The procedural aspects of applications for interim relief made in the context of appeals to the ECJ from the GC and to the GC from the CST are discussed in Ch 15, paras 15.30–15.33. 11 [1980] ECR 1319. 12 [1990] ECR I-2433 at 2451 ff.

622

Interim relief 8.6

cata which is enforceable against the parties to the dispute. The fact that a right must wait for a judicial decision before its existence is established definitively does not mean that, in the meantime, it is not an accrued right or is something less than a right or is less worthy of protection; it is simply that, until the Court is in a position to give final judgment in the dispute between the parties, it is not able to give one party or the other the specific and definitive judicial protection of the right in issue that flows from a judgment binding the parties to the dispute. Given such a situation, the purpose of interim relief is to ensure that the passage of the time needed by the Court to deliver a final judgment does not have the effect of depriving the right irredeemably of its substance.13 8.5 The three characteristics of interim relief, then, are its connexity with the substance of the action, its temporary nature and the requirement that it does not prejudice the Court’s final decision in the action. The first indicates that the procedure for interim relief is an integral part of the proceedings in the action and is ‘intended to prevent the effectiveness of the decision from being jeopardised by a situation which is incompatible with the realisation of the rights of one party’.14 It necessarily follows that the interim relief sought must be capable of preventing the effectiveness of the final decision from being jeopardised;15 and that the risk of jeopardy relates to the rights claimed in the action and not other rights.16 The temporary nature of the relief granted, which ensures that it does not prejudice the final decision by producing a situation which is irreversible, is another indication of the ancillary nature of the role played by the procedure in the context of the action: ‘It is the [final] judgment which definitively determines the rights and obligations of the parties with an authority and effectiveness which are logically greater than that of the interim measure’.17 8.6 The requirement that the relief granted does not prejudice the Court’s final decision in the action ‘is justified … on at least three grounds: first of all the relationship between the interim measure and the judgment, characterised … by the ancillary nature of the first, would be reversed if the judgment were influenced or anticipated by the interim measure; secondly, the summary nature of the proceedings in an application for interim measures would not make it possible to

13 Ibid at 2455–2457. 14 [1980]  ECR  1319 at 1337. Eg Case T-179/96  R  Antonissen v Council and Commission [1996] ECR II-1641, para 29. 15 Eg Case 25/85 R Nuovo Campsider v Commission [1985] ECR 751, para 23; Case 206/89 R S v Commission [1989] ECR 2841, paras 15–17; Case 246/89 R Commission v United Kingdom [1989] ECR 3125, para 38; Case C-257/90 R Italsolar SpA v Commission [1990] ECR I-3841, paras 17–21. 16 Eg Case C-313/90  R  Comité International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthètiques v Commission [1991]  ECR  I-2557, paras 19–26, where the applicant’s success in the action would not have prevented the occurrence of the harm from which it sought to be protected by the grant of interim relief; the relief claimed therefore went beyond the scope of the action and was not necessary in order to preserve the effectiveness of a judgment upholding the rights claimed by the applicant. 17 [1980] ECR 1319 at 1337.

623

8.7  Interim relief

reach a decision capable of affecting the substance of the case without seriously affecting the rights of the parties; thirdly, resumption of the normal course of the proceedings in the action after their interruption by the interim measure would lose all purpose if the main problem for decision had already been decided by way of the order for interim measures’.18 In the nature of things, however, an application for interim relief may be dependent on a point of law that, when decided, resolves the entire dispute between the parties.19 The requirement that the grant of relief should not prejudice the outcome in the action applies as much to the effects of the final judgment on the legal position of the parties before the date of judgment as to its future effects.20 8.7 It is worth emphasising that, at the stage at which the decision whether or not to grant interim relief is made, the Court is ex hypothesi in no position to come to a decided view on the rights at issue. All such rights are therefore to be regarded, for the purposes of granting or refusing interim relief, as claimed or putative rights. In particular, the presumption of validity from which acts adopted by the EU institutions benefit unless and until a competent court rules that the act is invalid21 does not in principle place an EU institution in a better position than any other party at the interim relief stage where the validity of the act is in dispute; and it certainly does not operate so as to bar a claim for such relief as against such an act.22 In anticipation of a point to be made later on concerning the need for an applicant for interim relief to show a case for the grant of relief, the presumption of legality from which acts of the EU institutions benefit is a rebuttable presumption and, when rebutted, the presumption disappears with retrospective effect. The presumption of legality is therefore no different from any putative claim. Its function is to ensure that measures benefiting from the presumption continue to be applied, and cannot be ignored, unless and until a competent court has ruled otherwise. In the context of the grant of interim 18 Ibid at 1338. 19 Case 792/79 R Camera Care Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 119 is a rare example. Ordinarily, the outcome in proceedings for interim relief does not produce definitive statements of the law (other than those relating to the grant of relief) because the order made is of its nature without prejudice to the eventual decision on the substance of the case: Case 352/88 R Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 267, para 22. In Case 120/83 R Raznoimport v Commission [1983] ECR 2573, however, the doubts expressed by Judge Mertens de Wilmars about the defendant’s case in the course of the interim relief proceedings seem to have proved so persuasive that the action proceeded no further. Similarly, in Case 214/86  R  Greece v Commission [1986]  ECR  2631, Judge Mackenzie Stuart found that only a certain amount could have been deducted by the defendant from the applicant’s entitlement, thus defining the scope of the action and also resulting in an order that the defendant refrain from all measures of enforcement in relation to the excess (see paras 16–17 and the operative part of the order). 20 Case C-40/92 R Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-3389, para 29. 21 Eg Case 101/78 Granaria BV v Hoofproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1979] ECR 623, para 4. 22 The Factortame case (above, note 12) at 2458–2459 (Advocate General Tesauro). Cf Case T-507/12 Slovenia v Commission, 17 January 2013, para 6, where the presumption of legality is associated with the fact that the commencement of proceedings does not have suspensory effect (the association between the two is repeated in other cases but is dubious). Para 6 goes on to say that interim relief is (therefore) available in ‘exceptional’ cases. That alludes to the fact that interim relief can be granted only where the criteria required for doing so have been satisfied.

624

Interim relief 8.8

relief (in which a competent court may be asked to rule otherwise), the two relevant aspects of the presumption of legality are the consequence that flows from its existence and what its strength is. The existence of the presumption simply causes the burden to fall on the applicant for interim relief to put forward a positive case for the grant of such relief: it is not good enough for the applicant merely to assert that he has a claimed right or that, as both he and the defendant EU institution have only claimed rights, the one is as good as the other and there is nothing further that needs to be shown in order to justify the grant of interim relief. The strength of the presumption of legality is measured by how far the applicant for interim relief has to go in order to show a case for the grant of interim relief; but it is in the nature of interim relief proceedings and the stage in an action at which interim relief arises for consideration that the applicant for interim relief is not required to prove the existence of his claimed right in order to obtain relief. At the risk of stating the obvious, if the applicant for interim relief were required to do that, he would then be entitled to final, not interim, relief. Lastly, the relief granted must not impose on the party against whom it is granted or on any third parties affected by the grant of relief any burden that is greater than necessary in the circumstances of the case.23 Each type of interim relief is here treated separately before consideration of the conditions for the grant of relief.

II

THE FOUR TYPES OF INTERIM RELIEF

A

Suspension of an act challenged before the Court

1 General 8.8 Actions brought before the Court,24 appeals to the ECJ from judgments or decisions of the GC,25 proceedings before the ECJ for the review of appellate decisions of the GC,26 and appeals from the CST to the GC,27 do not have suspensory effect, save as otherwise provided in the EAEC Treaty,28 but the Court (whether the ECJ, the GC or the CST) has power to suspend the application of an act challenged before it and the ECJ and GC have power to suspend the application of an act in issue in an appeal brought before them from, respectively, the GC and the CST (including the first instance judgment or decision under

23 Cf Cases 76, 77 and 91/89 R Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1989] ECR 1141, para 19; Case T-45/90 R Speybrouck v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-705, para 36. 24 TFEU, art 278. 25 Statute art 60, 1st para. 26 Ibid, art 62b, 1st para. 27 Ibid, Annex, art 12(1). 28 EAEC, art 157 (TFEU, art 278 is worded differently). As to the position under the EAEC Treaty, see EAEC, art 83(2), 2nd subpara, which provides that actions against a Commission decision imposing a sanction under EAEC, art 83(1) do have suspensory effect.

625

8.9  Interim relief

appeal).29 In regard to acts whose lawfulness or validity is in issue in proceedings before the GC, it should be observed that, whereas a judgment or decision of the GC normally takes effect when it is delivered, a judgment declaring a regulation within the meaning of the TFEU and EAEC Treaty to be void takes effect only as from the date of expiry of the period for appealing from the judgment or, where an appeal is brought within time, as from the date of the dismissal of the appeal (if it is dismissed). Such regulations thus remain in force even after the GC has delivered a judgment finding them to be void, without prejudice to any application made to the ECJ for their suspension or any other interim measure.30 Thus, in the context of appeals from the GC to the ECJ, the occasion for an application for suspension to be made to the ECJ may arise where the GC has upheld the lawfulness of a measure other than a regulation or where it has either upheld the lawfulness of, or declared void, a regulation. Under the Statute,31 time for bringing an action against the EU in respect of its non-contractual liability ceases to run if proceedings are begun before the Court or if, prior to such proceedings, the aggrieved party makes an application to the appropriate EU institution; but that does not result in the suspension of any act of the EU institutions, such as the act causing the loss. 8.9 In references for a preliminary ruling the referring court suspends the proceedings before it upon making the order for reference32 but that is the automatic effect of making the reference and requires no intervention by the Court. The stay of the proceedings before the referring court in such circumstances is not an interim measure and does not satisfy any requirements of interim protection of the disputed rights.33 If any such protection is necessary, that is a matter for the referring court, not the Court. The referring court decides whether or not to grant such interim relief as may be available under national law in accordance with the requirements of national law subject to two qualifications: where interim relief is sought in order to protect a right under EU law, any rule of national law which constitutes the sole obstacle to the grant of relief must be set aside (that is, where the substantive conditions for the grant of relief are satisfied, a provision of national law may not be relied on in order to refuse the relief sought);34 and, where an act of a member state or emanation of the state 29 TEU, art 278; EAEC, art 157; Statute, arts 60, 1st para, 62b, 1st para and Annex, art 12(1); RP-ECJ, art  160(1), which applies to appeals pursuant to RP-ECJ, art  190(1); RP-GC, art  156(1), which applies to appeals pursuant to RP-GC, art  213(1); RP-CST, art  115(1); Case C-345/90 P-R Hanning (above, note 10), paras 24-26. In the case of an appeal, it may be insufficient to apply only for suspension of the judgment that is the subject of the appeal: eg Case C-208/03 P-R Le Pen v Parliament [2003] ECR I-7939, paras 78–82. 30 Statute, art 60, 2nd para. 31 Ibid, art 46. 32 Ibid, art 23, 1st para. 33 R  v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (above, note 12) at 2451–2452 (Advocate General Tesauro). The stay of proceedings by the referring court is simply intended to ensure that matters do not proceed to judgment until the Court has delivered the preliminary ruling sought by the referring court. It is not intended to freeze the proceedings before the referring court entirely. 34 Factortame, ibid. On the division of responsibility for granting interim relief in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, see also Case C-186/01  R  Dory v Bundesrepublik

626

Interim relief 8.11

is impugned in domestic proceedings on the ground that it implements an act of an EU institution that is unlawful under EU law, the national court may grant interim relief in the form of suspension of the operation of the domestic measure in question where, first, it entertains serious doubts about the validity of the act of the EU institution concerned, secondly, it refers the question of the validity of the EU act to the Court (unless the Court is already seised of that question) and, thirdly, the criteria employed by the Court in deciding whether or not to grant interim relief in similar cases are satisfied.35 8.10 Passing now to consideration of the power of the Court to suspend the application of an act challenged before it, the English version of the TFEU and the EAEC  Treaty refers to ‘the contested act’;36 and, to complete the picture, RP-ECJ, art  160(1), RP-GC, art  156(1) and RP-CST, art  115(1) refer to ‘any measure adopted by an institution…only if the applicant has challenged that measure in an action before’ the Court. In principle, four questions arise from those provisions: (i) who may apply for suspension; (ii) in which proceedings or actions may suspension be sought; (iii) who is the maker of the act or measure whose suspension may be sought; and (iv) which type of act or measure may be suspended? To those questions may be added: (v) what is the nature and effect of suspension? 8.11 An application for suspension cannot be made before the measure has come into existence, even if there is a possibility that it may be adopted,37 and it must be made before the measure is applied or has taken effect.38 Where an

Deutschland [2001] ECR I-7823. Under TEU, art 19(1), 2nd subpara, it is the responsibility of the member states to ensure the provision of remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law. On the question whether or not EU law may confer a right to interim relief in proceedings before national courts even where no such right or no appropriate form of relief is available under national law alone, and on the criteria for the grant of relief, see Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271, paras 66–83. 35 Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415. See further Ch 17, paras 17.83 and 17.96. 36 TFEU, art 258; EAEC, art 157. 37 See Case 51/79  R  II  Buttner v Commission [1979]  ECR  2387; Case T-395/94  R-II  Atlantic Container Line AB v Commission [1995] ECR II-2893, para 39; Case T-345/12 R Akzo Nobel v Commission, 16 November 2012, paras 17–18; Case T-505/13 R Stichting Sona v Commission, 8 January 2014, paras 25–32. As paras 48–50 of Case T-395/94 R-II Atlantic Container Line show, a preventative application can, however, be made as an application for interim measures (see further below). 38 Case 67/63  R  SOREMA  v High Authority [1964]  ECR  174; Case 68/63  R  Luhleich v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 618; Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 576; Case 61/76 R II Geist v Commission [1976] ECR 2075; Case 121/77 R Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council (below, note 172); Case 92/78  R Simmenthal Spa v Commission (below, note 60); Case T-71/10 R-II Xeda International SA v Commission [2011] ECR II-82*, para 20; Cases F-5/11 R and F-15/11 R Marien v Commission, 27 May 2011, paras 39 and 42; Case T-402/11 R Preparados Alimenticios del Sur v Commission [2011] ECR II-439*, paras 11–12.

627

8.12  Interim relief

application for suspension is made, suspension may be ordered on an interim basis pending the hearing and determination of the application.39 2 Who may apply for suspension 8.12 The fact that suspension of the application of a contested act or measure may be sought ‘only if the applicant has challenged that measure in an action’40 indicates that the applicant for such relief must be a party to the proceedings who is also challenging the measure. Such a party is ordinarily the applicant in the action but could be either the appellant or a respondent in an appeal. A defendant in an action does not normally contest the legality of an act or measure otherwise than in the context of a cross-claim. An intervener may be a party who challenges an act or measure in an action where the party in whose support he has intervened does so. However, it has been held that an intervener is not entitled to apply for suspension because intervention in support of a party challenging the legality of a measure does not amount to challenging the measure.41 3 The proceedings or actions in which suspension may be sought 8.13 The wording of the provisions empowering the Court to suspend the application of an act or measure indicates that the power to grant relief is restricted to cases where the lawfulness of a particular act or measure is at stake.42 The most obvious example of that is an action for the annulment of the measure whose suspension is sought by way of interim relief. The next most obvious example is an action for annulment in which the legality of the disputed measure is dependent upon another measure, whose lawfulness is contested by way of

39 Eg Case T-486/10 R Iberdrola SA v Commission, 17 February 2011, para 22. See further paras 8.71–8.72 below. 40 RP-ECJ, art 160(1); RP-GC, art 1546(1); RP-CST, art 115(1). 41 Case T-310/03 R Kreuzer Medien GmbH v Parliament and Council [2004] ECR II-3243, paras 20–21. The exiguous reasoning is not entirely satisfactory. The alternative argument that leads to the same conclusion is that it is settled law that an intervening party supports the form of order of a party but cannot make a distinct claim: see Ch 5, para 5.37. To permit an intervener to make an application for interim relief, where a main party has not done so, would amount to permitting the former to take over the running of the case, which is not the purpose of intervention. 42 The corollary is that, if the lawfulness of a particular act or measure is not disputed, an application for the suspension of that act or measure is inadmissible: see Case T-88/94 R Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de l’Azote v Commission [1994] ECR II-263, paras 31–33; Case T-306/01 R Aden v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-2387, para 46 (in which one of the measures whose suspension was sought had not been challenged); Case T-292/07 R Berliner Institut fur Vergleichende Sozialforschung eV  v Commission [2007]  ECR II-119*; Case T-149/09 R Dover v Parliament [2009] ECR II-66*, para 17. It also follows that, if only part of an act or measure is disputed, an application cannot be made for the suspension of the undisputed part: eg Case T-176/11 R Federacion Nacional de Empresarios de Minas de Carbon (Carbonunion) v Council [2011] ECR II-434*, para 22 (as can be seen from paras 25–34, it may not be possible to obtain suspension of the contested part if that part is not severable from the uncontested part).

628

Interim relief 8.14

the plea of illegality;43 and suspension is sought in relation to that other measure (usually in conjunction with the suspension of the measure directly contested in the proceedings).44 A less obvious example is that where, in an action for annulment, suspension is sought of an act that is the inevitable consequence of the measure challenged in an action for annulment.45 It does not follow that an act or measure cannot be contested or challenged in any other proceedings or that an application for relief can be made only in actions for annulment: the lawfulness of an act (of an EU institution) may also be in issue in actions against a member state for failing to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, in actions for damages where the source of the EU’s liability is alleged to lie in an unlawful (as opposed to wrongful) act, and in contractual disputes brought before the Court under an arbitration clause. In the same way, suspension in the context of appeals to the ECJ (or GC) is not necessarily to be limited to appeals from judgments of the GC (or CST) delivered in actions for annulment. In contrast, in actions in respect of a failure to act, it does not appear that suspension could be sought because, technically, what is contested in the action is a failure to act, which is intrinsically incapable of being an act or measure that can be ‘suspended’. 8.14 In the nature of things, most applications for suspension are made in the context of actions for annulment. Suspension of an act of an EU institution is not likely to arise in actions against a member state for failing to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty.46 In an action for damages, it is arguable that that form of relief is in principle inappropriate because the only relief that may be sought in such an action is compensation for the loss suffered, not an order prohibiting the defendant from continuing with the conduct causing the loss; but the alternative view is that suspension is an appropriate form of interim (albeit not final) relief because it may limit the eventual liability of the defendant or preserve the applicant from future loss that might not be compensatable by an award of damages. It would seem that, if interim relief were to be granted, the applicant would have to be faced with a threat of loss that was either not such as could be com 43 As to the plea of illegality, see Ch 17, paras 17.116–17.119. 44 See, for example, Case 23/74 R Küster v European Parliament [1974] ECR 331. Relief can relate only to that part of a general measure that is implemented by the act challenged in the action: see Case 258/80 R Metallurgica Rumi SpA v Commission [1980] ECR 3867, para 16. 45 Eg Case T-444/07  R  Centre de Promotion de l’emploi par la micro-entreprise (CPEM) v Commission [2008]  ECR II-27*, para  23. It should be noted that, in Case C-277/07  P(R) Makteshim-Agan Holding BV v Commission [2008] ECR I-112*, paras 27–28, it was stated in broad terms that an act not challenged in the proceedings can be suspended if its author was the same EU institution that made the act challenged in the proceedings, and if that institution is a party to the proceedings (which would ordinarily be the case). While that seems to be correct so far as it goes, it is perhaps more accurate to say that some connection between the two acts must also exist. The matter is made more complicated because that type of situation is at the crossing point between suspension and interim measures. 46 The defendant member state cannot normally invoke by way of defence the illegality of a measure of EU law: eg Case C-74/91 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-5437, paras 10–11. Were it to do so, there would normally be no reason to seek the suspension of the application of the measure because the action concerns the member state’s non-compliance with EU law and, if successful, leads to the making of a declaration to that effect. Suspension by way of interim relief is not capable of altering the position.

629

8.15  Interim relief

pensated by any award of damages or disproportionately great by comparison to the inconvenience to the defendant of granting relief.47 In contractual disputes, if the action is based on the unlawfulness of an act or measure of the defendant EU institution or body, having regard to the terms of the contract and the law governing it, an application for the suspension of that act or measure may in principle be made.48 8.15 It would seem that relief cannot be granted in a reference for a preliminary ruling which raises the question of the validity of an act of one of the institutions because of the non-contentious nature of such proceedings: there is no lis between the parties in the proceedings before the Court and its jurisdiction is limited to the questions contained in the national court’s order for reference. That is made clear by the wording of the Treaties: the power to suspend application of an act follows from the fact that ‘actions brought before’ the Court do not have suspensory effect. References for a preliminary ruling are not ‘actions brought before’ it. As pointed out above, the solution is for the party concerned to apply to the referring court for interim relief against any steps taken at the national level to implement the impugned EU act.49 4 The maker of the act or measure that can be suspended 8.16 Under the TFEU and the EAEC Treaty, the term used to describe the measures that may be suspended, ‘act’, is imprecise and could conceivably be taken to cover acts of a member state or even a private person.50 The Rules of Procedure, however, specify that relief can be granted only in relation to a ‘measure adopted by an institution’, which raises the possibility that the Rules of Procedure are more restrictive in that respect than the Treaties would indicate.

47 In Cases C-51 and C-59/90  R  Comos-Tank BV  v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-2167, para  33, Judge Due left open the question whether or not an application for suspension is admissible in an action for damages. In Case T-15/10  RII  Ngele v Commission [2010]  ECR II-176*, para  9, an application for suspension was dismissed because the measure whose suspension was sought was not the subject of a claim for its annulment in the main action (an action for damages). However, from para 11, it appears that there was no causal connection between that measure and the loss alleged to have been suffered (appeal dismissed on other grounds in Case C-526/10 P(R) Ngele v Commission [2010] ECR I-173*). 48 Eg Case T-435/09 R GL2006 Europe Ltd v Commission [2010] ECR II-32* (the possibility of applying for suspension does not seem to have been questioned; the application was dismissed due to a lack of urgency). 49 See para 8.9 above. 50 The ECSC Treaty was more precise. Article  39 referred to the suspension of ‘the contested decision or recommendation’. That phrase encompassed most, but not all, the legally binding acts of the institutions under that Treaty. In Cases 35/62 and 16/63 R Leroy v High Authority [1963]  ECR  213, for example, it appears to have been held that relief could not be granted in relation to a provision of the Staff Regulations on the ground that it did not constitute a ‘measure’ within the meaning of what is now RP-ECJ, art 160(1). At that time the ECSC Staff Regulations were contained in a ‘regulation’ adopted pursuant to the original version of art 78 of the ECSC Treaty, not a ‘decision’ or ‘recommendation’.

630

Interim relief 8.19

8.17 If an order suspending the application of an act or measure can be made only in proceedings in which the lawfulness of an act is at stake (see the preceding section), it seems to follow that relief can be granted only in relation to acts whose lawfulness can be challenged in proceedings before the Court, which implies that the maker of the act or measure in question must be the defendant in the proceedings although, where the plea of illegality is invoked, it could be the third party EU institution or body which adopted the measure against which that plea has been raised.51 8.18 In Case 21/59 R Italy v High Authority,52 a case under the ECSC Treaty, Judge Donner suggested that the power to suspend application related to acts of the High Authority or, where appropriate, those of third parties which affected the applicant. That statement was made in the context of ECSC, art 39, which covered both the suspension of the application of ‘the contested decision or recommendation’ and interim measures. Since suspension was indisputably limited to acts of an EU institution (‘decision’ and ‘recommendation’ were terms defined in ECSC, art 14 as being measures that the High Authority could take), the reference to measures taken by third parties seems to be restricted to interim measures; and, in Cases 31 and 53/77 R Commission v United Kingdom and Case 61/77 R Commission v Ireland53 the Commission applied for suspension of the measures adopted by the two defendant member states in the form of an application for interim measures. 8.19 Since ‘suspension’ of a measure adopted by a person other than an EU institution can be obtained by way of interim measures, there is in practice no call for exploration of the possibility of obtaining the same by way of a different type of interim relief. ‘Suspension’ in the technical sense is therefore limited to the suspension of the application of an act or measure adopted by the defendant EU institution or body.54 The only exception to that appears to be the situation 51 In Metallurgica Rumi (above, note 44), the defendant was the author of both measures. In direct actions, copies of the application and defence are sent to the Parliament, Council and Commission, if they are not parties to the proceedings, so that they can determine whether or not an act adopted by them has been put in issue in the proceedings: RP-ECJ, art 125; RP-GC, art 82; RP-CST, art 54. That enables them to participate in the proceedings as interveners. 52 [1960] ECR 351. 53 [1977] ECR at 921, 937 and 1411. 54 Cf Makteshim-Agan (above, note 45), para 28. In Case T-150/06 Smanor SA v Commission, 14 December 2006, paras 17–18, the GC held that there was no form of action enabling a legal or natural person to seek the suspension of a judgment of a national court or a decision of a national authority (the appeal in Case C-99/07 P Smanor SA v Commission [2007] ECR I-70* was dismissed on procedural grounds). That pronouncement was made in relation to a claim for suspension included in an action in respect of a failure to act by the Commission and concerns private persons only because, for example, the Commission could seek such relief in an action under TFEU, art 258 (albeit in the form of interim measures). The same seems to have been the thinking behind Case T-1/14 R Aluminios Cortizo v Commission, 7 March 2014, para 8. Where a private person brings an action against a member state and seeks suspension of a measure adopted by that state, the action is inadmissible and the application for suspension must be dismissed for that reason, although there is usually no need to rule on it because the Court normally dismisses the action first: eg Case T-456/09 R Bakonyi v Hungary [2010] ECR II-20*; Case T-472/11 R DMA Die Marketing Agentur GmbH v Austria [2011] ECR II-374*.

631

8.20  Interim relief

that arises where the plea of illegality is raised against an act adopted by an EU institution other than the defendant, and it is insufficient to limit suspension to the act of the defendant that is contested in the proceedings. 5 The type of act or measure that can be suspended 8.20 TFEU, art 263 provides that the Court may review the legality of ‘acts’ of specified EU institutions and bodies ‘other than recommendations and opinions’. That indicates that recommendations and opinions are acts within the meaning of the Treaties. For the purpose of defining the ‘acts’ which may be suspended under TFEU, art  278 or EAEC, art  157, the term must be given a narrower meaning consonant with the context in which it is to be applied. As a result, the act in question must be susceptible to attack before the Court and must have effects which can be suspended. For example, in Italy v High Authority55 the Italian Government sought the suspension of a decision of the High Authority made under ECSC, art 88, which provided that the High Authority might record in a reasoned decision its finding that a member state had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty and require the member state concerned to remedy that situation within a specified period of time. Sanctions could be imposed only after that period had expired. Judge Donner held that suspension could not be ordered because the decision was not a measure of ‘application’; it was declaratory and imposed no extra obligation on the member state concerned; the setting of a time limit for compliance with the Treaty was a prerequisite for the application of sanctions and a decision to apply them could no doubt have been suspended. Similarly, in Case T-19/91 R Société d’Hygiène Dermatologique de Vichy v Commission56 Judge Cruz Vilaça dismissed an application for the suspension of the operation of a Commission decision withdrawing the protection from fines afforded (at the time) to agreements notified to the Commission under Regulation No 17 on the ground that such a decision made no order against the person to whom it was addressed requiring it to alter its behaviour and thus did not require enforcement; it merely informed the undertaking concerned of the Commission’s provisional opinion and, as such, was incapable of causing serious and irreparable damage and thus of being suspended. An act is something positive and, for that reason alone, an applicant cannot force an institution to act by alleging a failure to act contrary to the Treaty and then applying to the Court for that failure to be suspended. 8.21 There seems to be no significance in the use of the word ‘measure’ rather than ‘act’ in the Rules of Procedure. It probably reflected originally a difference in wording between, at the time, the EC and EAEC Treaties, on the one hand, and the ECSC Treaty on the other. In any event the same term is used,

55 Above, note 52. 56 [1991] ECR II-265, para 20.

632

Interim relief 8.22

for example, in the Italian and French texts of the TFEU, EAEC Treaty and the Rules of Procedure.57 8.22 The extent to which a regulation or other provision of general effect may be considered an act or measure for the purpose of granting relief has given rise to particular problems which seem to relate more to the interest of the applicant in obtaining the suspension of a measure of general effect than to the question of principle, whether or not such a measure is capable of being suspended by an order of the Court. In Leroy v High Authority58 suspension of a provision of general effect was refused, although the reason may have been that it was not part of a ‘decision or recommendation’ within the meaning of the ECSC Treaty. ‘Decisions’ in that context may be of general effect and so one would have been entitled to conclude that, under the ECSC Treaty, such measures could have been suspended. In Case 44/75 R Firma Karl Könecke v Commission,59 however, an application made under what is now TFEU, arts 278 and 279 but requesting the suspension of a regulation, Judge Lecourt held that, ‘save in exceptional circumstances making it possible to single out the applicant from other persons subject to the law’, the effect of a general provision cannot be regarded as being that of a ‘measure’ within the meaning of what is now RP-ECJ, art 160(1). In Case 92/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission,60 Judge Kutscher seemed to admit the theoretical possibility of suspending a regulation but dismissed the application on the ground that the drastic consequences of doing so were out of proportion to the individual interest which the applicant wished to safeguard.61 On the other hand, in the Japanese Ball Bearing cases,62 he found no difficulty in ordering the suspension of the regulation in question. Those cases are, however, distinct from other cases concerning regulations because the measure in dispute was expressly aimed at the applicants and later found by the Court to constitute, in part at least, a decision which was of direct and individual concern to them.63 A clearer authority that measures of general effect may, in theory at least, be suspended is Case 258/80 R Metallurgica Rumi SpA v Commission.64 In Case 119/86 R Spain v Council and Commission65 and Case 128/86 R Spain v Commission,66 a member state applied for the suspension of various regulations without generating 57 The German version, like the English, uses different words: ‘Handlung’ in the Treaties and ‘Massnahmen’ in the Rules of Procedure. 58 Above, note 50. 59 [1975] ECR 637. 60 [1978] ECR 1129. 61 See also Case 243/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1978] ECR 2391. In Case 166/78 R Italy v Council [1978] ECR 1745, the application was dismissed on other grounds, as were those in Case 48/79 R Ooms v Commission [1979] ECR 1703 and Case 33/80 R Albini v Council and Commission [1980] ECR 1671. 62 Cases 113/77 R and 113/77 R-I NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council [1977] ECR 1721; Case 119/77 R Nippon Seiko KK v Council and Commission [1977] ECR 1867; Case 121/77 R Nachi Fukikoshi Corpn v Council [1977] ECR 2107. 63 A  similar situation arose in Case 232/81  R  Agricola Commerciale Olio Srl v Commission [1981] ECR 2193. 64 Above (note 44), para 9. 65 [1986] ECR 2241. 66 [1986] ECR 2495.

633

8.23  Interim relief

any apparent objection to its entitlement to do so. Further, in the Statute, art 60 (2nd para), it is provided that, in the case of an appeal from a decision of the GC declaring a regulation to be void, the regulation in question remains in effect until the appeal has been disposed of (at which point its lawfulness will finally be settled) ‘without prejudice, however, to the right of a party to apply to the Court of Justice, pursuant to’ TFEU, arts 278 and 279 and EAEC Treaty, art 157 ‘for the suspension of the effects of the regulation which has been declared void or for the prescription of any other interim measure’. The reference to TFEU, art 278 and EAEC, art 157 would be otiose unless the suspension of ‘the contested act’, within the meaning of those provisions, also meant the suspension of a regulation. 8.23 It may therefore be concluded that a regulation or other provision of general effect is an act or measure which may be suspended by application under the first paragraph of RP-ECJ, art 160(1), RP-GC, art 156(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 115(1). In the ordinary course, the applicant for relief would be able to obtain only partial suspension of a measure having general effect: as will appear from the discussion of the conditions that must be satisfied in order to justify the grant of relief, an applicant for relief must generally demonstrate the necessity for relief in order to ward off a threat to the applicant’s own interests, not those of a third party; hence, in the case of a measure having general effect, relief can be granted only to the extent that the measure affects the applicant and not to the extent that it affects other persons.67 6 Nature and effect of suspension 8.24 Although the English text of the Treaties refers to the ‘suspension’ of the ‘application’ of the act in question, the Rules of Procedure68 speak of the suspension of the ‘operation’ of the measure. There is no such variation in some of the other texts69 and, like the use of ‘measure’ and ‘act’, it seems to be of no consequence. Other texts of the Treaties tend to use a word closer to ‘execution’ than ‘application’ or ‘operation’ but, as can be seen from the cases, the latter expressions appear to be more accurate because they avoid the connotations of a word like ‘execution’. When the application or operation of the act is suspended, it ceases to have legal effect and no steps can therefore be taken to execute or enforce it.70 On the other hand, an application to suspend execution or enforce 67 As will be seen, the Commission and the member states may apply for interim relief in order to protect a more general interest represented by them. 68 RP-ECJ, art 160(1); RP-GC, art 156(1); RP-CST, art 115(1). 69 Eg the French and Italian; the German version is, however, different. 70 It should be noted that, in Case T-398/02  R  Linea GIG  Srl v Commission [2003]  ECR II1139, para  62 (upheld on appeal in Case C-233/03  P(R) Linea GIG  Srl v Commission [2003]  ECR  I-7911), it seems to have been thought that suspension of a decision imposing a fine would prevent the Commission from taking any step in the liquidation of the debtor to protect the debt represented by the fine, which seems to presuppose that suspension of the operation of a decision creating a debt renders the debt non-existent in law during the period of suspension. If so, the problem can be circumvented by ordering an appropriate interim measure instead of suspension.

634

Interim relief 8.25

ment, which is properly made under RP-ECJ, art 165, RP-GC, art 161 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 120, aims at the measures taken to secure compliance with the act but not at its other legal effects. A failure to appreciate that distinction led the applicant in Case 107/82 R AEG Telefunken AG v Commission71 to apply for suspension of enforcement before the Commission had taken any such steps. The President nevertheless interpreted the application for relief as implying that what was really sought was suspension of the operation of the act; and it seems that an application seeking suspension of enforcement of an act will be taken to imply an application for the suspension of its operation.72 8.25 The effect of the relief which may be granted is negative only, in the sense that the act (or measure) in dispute ceases to have any effect until the order granting suspension lapses. It is not, of course, necessary to apply to suspend the application of the entirety of the act. It is often the case, particularly in competition matters, that only a part of the measure needs to be suspended and so the applicant can, and should, select that part of it which justifies suspension. The order that can be made suspends only the direct results of the measure73 and has no positive effects other than those flowing immediately from suspension. In consequence, it has been held that suspension of a negative administrative act is inconceivable because the grant of such relief in respect of such an act cannot possibly alter the applicant’s position (unless, conceivably, the negative act alters the status quo).74 For example, in several cases application has been made for the suspension of a decision refusing to grant an authorisation. The object of the application was, in substance, to obtain grant of the authorisation but that was not a result flowing from the suspension of the refusal and the applications were in consequence rejected.75 In such a situation the only possible remedy is to 71 [1982] ECR 1549. 72 Case T-9/99 R HFB Holding fur Fernwarmtechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG v Commission [1999]  ECR II-2429, para  18. In that case, the application for suspension of enforcement was devoid of purpose because the Commission had not taken any measures to enforce the decision (which imposed a fine on the applicants). The Commission had said that it would not enforce the decision if the applicants provided a bank guarantee in the amount of the fine. Accordingly, the question at issue was whether or not the applicants should be relieved of the obligation of providing a bank guarantee: see para 16. 73 Leroy v High Authority (above, note 50). An application for suspension cannot seek a broader form of relief than suspension: eg Case T-15/10 RII Ngele (above, note 47), para 8. In Case C-162/15 P-R Evonik Degussa GmbH v Commission, 2 May 2016, in addition to suspension, an order restraining the Commission from taking the same type of action as that resulting from the operation of the contested decision was sought and granted: see paras 19 and 116. In that kind of situation, that additional form of relief is, strictly speaking, an interim measure that is necessitated because suspension of the contested act would not, in itself, prevent the defendant from taking some other form of action (in casu, disclosure of confidential information) that would cause the applicant serious and irreparable damage. 74 S v Commission (above, note 15), para 14; Case T-411/07 R Aer Lingus Group plc v Commission [2008] ECR II-411, paras 46–48 (which admit the possibility of granting suspension only as a holding measure in order to safeguard the position pending a decision on some other form of interim relief); Case F-41/10 R Bermejo Garde v Economic and Social Committee, 14 July 2010, paras 38–41. 75 See Case 19/59  R  Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft GmbH  v High Authority [1960] ECR 34 and Case 50/69 R Germany v Commission [1969] ECR 449.

635

8.26  Interim relief

apply for an order that authorisation be granted by way of an interim measure.76 Whether such an application would be successful will be considered below. Similarly, suspension of the application of a Commission decision finding that there has been an infringement of TFEU, art 101(1) and ordering the infringement to be terminated does not amount to making the restrictive practice in question provisionally valid: the Court does not have that power.77 Another example is provided by Case 91/76 R De Lacroix v European Court of Justice,78 where the applicant had requested the suspension of the operation of a decision rejecting her candidature for a post and a declaration that she be allowed, in consequence, to take part in the competition. That was rejected because suspension of the decision would not result in her admission to the competition. The most that the Court could do was order the suspension of the whole recruitment procedure. To admit the applicant to the competition would reverse the decision, not suspend it.79 8.26 Application may be made for the suspension of the application of an act that is itself a form of interim relief and whose annulment is sought in the action, such as a Commission decision adopting interim measures in a competition case80 or a regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty.81 In such cases, if the criteria that must be satisfied in order to justify the grant of relief have been satisfied, it may not be possible to preserve the position pending judgment by merely suspending the operation of the contested act: suspension would risk causing the occurrence of the events that the contested act sought to avoid and thus might bring about serious and irreparable damage to the person whose interests were protected by the contested act. Therefore, interim measures rather than suspension may be the more appropriate form of relief.82 8.27 If the measure in question is not going to be applied or has no practical effect (such as where the defendant has already taken steps to suspend its opera-

76 As was done, unsuccessfully, in Case 25/62 R I Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 123 (see also Case 25/62  R  II, ibid, at 126). See, in that respect, Case T-198/12  R  Germany v Commission, 15  May 2013, paras 28–29 (application for suspension of a negative decision inadmissible but possible to apply for interim measures) (upheld on appeal in Case C-426/13 P(R) Commission v Germany, 19 December 2013); Stichting Sona (above, note 37), paras 36–37. 77 Case 71/74  R  and RR  Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit- en Groentenimporthandel v Commission [1974]  ECR  1031; Cases 209–215 and 218/78  R  Heintz van Landewyck Sarl v Commission [1978] ECR 2111. 78 [1976] ECR 1563. 79 See also Case 4/78 R Salerno v Commission [1978] ECR 1; S v Commission (above, note 15), para 16. 80 Eg Case T-23/90 R Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA v Commission [1990] ECR II-195; Cases T-24 and T-28/92 R Langnese-Iglo GmbH and Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1992] ECR II-1713 and 1839. 81 Eg the Raznoimport case (above, note 19). The admissibility of an action for the annulment of such a regulation, upon which the admissibility of the application for interim relief depends, should now be considered in the light of later cases, in particular Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council [1990] ECR I-2945, paras 13–16. 82 Eg the Langnese-Iglo case (above, note 80), paras 29–35. See further below.

636

Interim relief 8.28

tion or has given an undertaking not to apply it), the order will not be made.83 If made, the Court’s order will not necessarily suspend the act pending judgment in the action if an earlier date for the lapse of the order is justified.84 For example, if the contested act is due to expire before the date of judgment and may then be replaced by another measure, suspension can in principle be granted only for the period while the contested act remains in force; if it is replaced by another measure, the applicant must bring an action (or, where appropriate, amend the pleadings in the original action so as to include the replacement measure), and bring any necessary application for interim relief, against the later measure; the Court cannot make an order that would in effect prevent the defendant institution from exercising its powers after the expiry of the contested act.85

B

Interim measures

1 General 8.28 Under the Treaties,86 the Court may prescribe ‘any necessary interim measures’ in ‘any cases before it’. RP-ECJ, art 160(2), RP-GC, art 156(2) and RP-CST, art 115(1), 2nd para, are a little more specific. They provide that an application for interim measures is admissible ‘only if it is made by a [main] party to a case before [the Court] and relates to that case’. The threshold conditions for the grant of interim measures are, therefore, that the applicant for such relief is a ‘party’ or ‘main party’87 and that the application ‘relates’ to the case to

83 Eg Aden (above, note 42), para 46 (suspension of only one of the two measures in question was sufficient); Makteshim-Agan (above, note 45), paras 23–26; Case T-402/11 R Preparados Alimenticios del Sur (above, note 38), para  10. See further below in connection with the requirement of urgency (para 8.85 ff below). 84 Cases 6 and 7/73 R Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corpn v Commission [1973] ECR 357; Case 20/74 R Kali-Chemie AG v Commission [1974] ECR 337 and 787. 85 Case 294/86 R Technointorg v Commission [1986] ECR 3979, paras 20–27. The problem of replacement acts arises in two forms: the replacement of a temporary measure by a permanent one (as in the case of the imposition of anti-dumping duties); and the periodic replacement of an act when it is revised or updated (as in the case of measures imposing sanctions such as the freezing of assets). Although the problem of replacement acts was known at the time of the decision in Technointorg, it became more acute, in the second form, long afterwards and resulted in the general acceptance of the ability to amend a pleading so as to include a replacement measure in an action challenging the original measure: see Ch 2, para 2.161, RPGC, art 86, and the discussion of that provision in Ch 9, para 9.54. In consequence, depending upon the circumstances, either a new action must be brought against the replacement measure or the pleadings in the current action must be amended. In either event, a separate application for suspension of the replacement measure must be made. The position is different where the duration of an existing measure is extended. Although the measure extending the existing measure can and should be disputed, where appropriate, an order granting relief in respect of the existing measure would continue to apply during the period of its extension without the need for any further order. 86 TFEU, art 279, which applies to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to EAEC, art 106a(1). 87 The expression ‘main party’ appears in RP-GC, art 156(2) and means an applicant or defendant: see RP-GC, art 1(2)(d).

637

8.29  Interim relief

which the applicant is a party. The remaining question to consider is the nature and scope of the relief that may be ordered by way of interim measures. An application for interim measures can be made in the context of an application for interim measures, in order to preserve the situation until the judge decides whether or not to grant relief pending judgment in the action.88 2 The proceedings or actions in which interim measures may be sought 8.29 Although the Treaties provide that interim measures may be ordered in ‘any cases’ before the Court, it is considered that that does not include references for a preliminary ruling89 or other proceedings in which there is no lis between the parties. Applications for interim measures have been made in appeals and proceedings under TFEU, arts 108(2) and 258, as well as in actions for annulment90 and actions under what is now TFEU, art 348.91 3 The applicant for interim measures 8.30 An application for interim measures may be made by a party or (under the GC rules of procedure) main party to the case before the Court. That seems to make it impossible for an intervener to apply for the adoption of interim measures in a direct action: his status in the proceedings is not that of a party stricto sensu because he has no right, other than to support or oppose the case made by the applicant or defendant (that is explicit in the case of RP-GC, art 156(2), which uses the expression ‘main party’). In IP appeals heard by the GC, the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (other than the applicant in the action) may participate in the proceedings as interveners but have the same procedural rights as main parties.92 Accordingly, they seem to be entitled to apply for interim measures. In an appeal, an intervener at first instance may be the appellant and, if not, is a responding party without any need to intervene in the appeal.93 It therefore appears that they may also apply for interim measures in the appeal. The effective limit on the ability of such parties to apply for interim measures lies in the question whether or not they have a case for applying for such relief.

88 See the Commercial Solvents case (above, note 84). For such emergency applications, see further paras 8.171–8.172 below. 89 See para 8.9 above and the Dory case (above, note 34). 90 At one time it was thought that, in actions against a member state for a declaration that the state concerned has failed to fulfil a Treaty obligation, the only form of interim relief that could be granted was an interim declaration. The Court has never taken that view and has been prepared to grant whatever form of relief seems appropriate in order to prevent the damage alleged from occurring. 91 Case C-120/94 R Commission v Greece [1994] ECR I-3037, paras 42–43. 92 RP-GC, art 173(1) and (3). 93 Statute, art  56, 2nd para, and Annex, art  9, 2nd para; RP-ECJ, art  171(1) and 172; RP-GC, art 197(1) and 198.

638

Interim relief 8.34

8.31 It should also be noted that, in order for a person to be a party to a case before the Court, the proceedings must already have commenced. Accordingly, an application for interim measures may be made contemporaneously with, but not before, the commencement of proceedings. The applicant for interim measures is ordinarily the applicant in the action (or the appellant in an appeal). It seems unlikely that a defendant in a direct action would have any interest in applying for interim measures save, possibly, where the defendant has raised a cross-claim. 4 The relationship with the case 8.32 An application for interim measures must ‘relate’ to the case in which the application is made. The relationship in question is that between the relief sought by way of interim measures and the final relief sought in the action (essentially because the function of interim measures is to preserve the effectiveness of the final judgment in the action).94 8.33 An example of an application made by a party which did not relate to the case is to be found in Case 186/80 R Suss v Commission.95 There, an official of the Commission claimed by way of interim measure the communication to him of the report of an Invalidity Committee. No such claim formed part of the application commencing the action nor was it pertinent to any issue between the parties. The claim was therefore rejected. Similarly, in Leroy v High Authority96 the applicant claimed that no official should be appointed to fill the post that he had occupied prior to a decision of the High Authority refusing to integrate him as an established official. He sought the annulment of the refusal but annulment would not have resulted in his integration, merely in the necessity for the High Authority to reconsider whether or not to integrate him. In consequence, the claim that the post should be kept open for him, pending judgment in the action, was rejected. 8.34 The relevance of the claim for interim measures to the action is not a matter of whether or not the relief sought is identical to that claimed in the action but whether it will preserve the efficacy of a judgment in the applicant’s favour. In neither the Suss nor the Leroy case did the relief sought in the claim for interim measures relate in that sense to the relief sought in the action. In Leroy’s case in 94 Eg Case F-49/14  R  DQ  v Parliament, 12  June 2014, para  13. In Case T-241/15  R  Buga v Parliament, 2 June 2015, paras 17–19, a pending prosecution by the national authorities was not regarded as related to an application for the annulment of an EU directive (as the action was inadmissible, that observation was obiter). No reasons were stated; and it is therefore difficult to regard the decision as standing for some general proposition. In an appeal, the purpose of interim measures is to safeguard the effectiveness of the decision on the appeal and therefore the interim measures sought should relate to the underlying dispute rather than the first instance decision that is the subject of the appeal: eg  Le Pen (above, note 29), paras 78-85; Evonik Degussa (above, note 73), paras 104–105 (whence the fact that the relief granted went beyond suspension of the decision contested at first instance: see para 116). 95 [1980] ECR 3501, para 16. 96 Above, note 50.

639

8.35  Interim relief

particular, even had annulment resulted in his establishment as an official, he had no right to be appointed to a specific post and therefore no right to require the High Authority to keep any particular post vacant for him. In Atlantic Container Line, the lack of a relationship arose from the fact that the claim for interim measures concerned a future act that, if adopted, would be adopted in accordance with a procedure distinct from that which led to the measure contested in the proceedings and that could be challenged separately.97 5 The nature and scope of interim measures 8.35 In principle, interim measures are of a conservatory nature and apply in particular, but not invariably, to cases where positive action is required in order to prevent the Court’s final judgment from being rendered nugatory by the passage of time or the occurrence of some event; protection of the interests of the applicant is relevant only to the extent that that coincides with the protection of the effect of the final judgment.98 To that end, there is in principle no limit (other than practicalities) to the type of measure that the Court may order,99 save that a form of interim relief covered by more specific provisions (in casu, suspension of the application of a challenged measure) cannot be applied for as an interim measure.100 Where the object is to suspend the operation of a measure whose author is not an EU institution or body or which is not covered by TFEU, art 278 or EAEC, art 175, the relief sought should be suspension by way of an interim measure.101 Certain types of interim measures are discussed below. (a) Administrative and discretionary decisions 8.36 The President’s power to take positive steps to preserve the position of the parties does not extend to the taking of administrative decisions which are the responsibility of another institution or to the substitution of his own discretion for that of another institution.102 In Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission the applicant made two applications for interim measures,103 each 97 Case T-395/94 R-II (above, note 37), paras 41–47 and 51–52. 98 Eg Bermejo Garde (above, note 74), para 25; Case C-278/13 P(R) Commission v Pilkington Group Ltd, 10 September 2013, para 36. 99 Eg Case T-203/95 R Connolly v Commission [1995] ECR II-2919, paras 24–25; Bermejo Garde (above, note 74), para 44. Interim measures may therefore go beyond the effects of the final judgment: Case T-198/12 R Germany v Commission (above, note 76), para 33. 100 Kreuzer Medien (above, note 41), para 18. 101 See, for example, Case 61/77  R  Commission v Ireland (above, note 53) and at 953–956 (Advocate General Reischl). Such a situation is not covered by Kreuzer Medien (above, note 41), para 18, because suspension of the operation of a measure adopted by a person or body other than an EU institution is not covered by TFEU, art 278 or EAEC, art 175. 102 The Geitling case and Germany v Commission (above, note 75); the Küster case (above, note 44); Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit- en Groentenimporthandel v Commission (above, note 77); Case 109/75 R National Carbonising Co Ltd v Commission and National Coal Board [1975] ECR 1193. 103 Above, note 76.

640

Interim relief 8.37

claiming that the Court should declare that the defendant was obliged to authorise the German government to suspend partly the imposition of customs duties on imported clementines. The case arose from a Commission decision refusing to authorise the German government to do so which was challenged by a German importer. Judge Donner held that, while such an order was not clearly excluded by what is now TFEU, art 279, it could be justified only ‘by wholly exceptional circumstances and if there were very good reasons for thinking that the party concerned would otherwise suffer serious and irreparable damage’. That is, of course, significantly different from an application that the Court should itself take the measures requested. In a later case Judge Mackenzie Stuart held that, where the defendant institution enjoys a wide discretion, the Court cannot interfere in interim proceedings at least in the absence of solid evidence of a misuse of powers.104 8.37 The reluctance on the part of the judges to interfere is generally attributable to the fact that the grant of relief would in such circumstances amount to giving the applicant the benefits of a final judgment before the soundness of the applicant’s case in the action had been properly assessed, thus rendering the continuation of the action otiose.105 The situation is all the more delicate where the applicant is challenging a decision of an EU institution (in practice, the Commission) to grant or refuse interim relief and is claiming interim relief in respect of that decision. For example, in Case 109/75  R  National Carbonising Co Ltd v Commission106 Judge Lecourt regarded the application as requesting the suspension of the effect of a decision refusing to take emergency measures, which would amount to a decision of the Judge ordering such measures and impinging on the powers of the Commission. He therefore ordered that the Commission take the measures it thought ‘strictly necessary’ for the preservation of the position until final judgment. The control of the Court, was, in his view, restricted to reviewing the measures taken by the Commission, not dictating to it the precise measures it should adopt. The same approach was taken by the Court as a whole in Case 792/79  R  Camera Care Ltd v Commission.107 That concerned an application for an order that the Commission require two companies to continue to supply goods to the applicant and take the measures necessary to ensure adequate supplies during an investigation under Regulation No  17 (at the time, the procedural legislation applicable in competition cases) or pending the final hearing of the action. The action was itself for a declaration that the Commission had acted unlawfully in failing to take such steps and therefore brought into question the Commission’s powers to adopt measures of interim relief in the context of competition investigations. The Court’s decision on the application for interim relief largely concerned that question. After deciding that the Commission did have power to adopt interim measures, the Court referred the matter back to 104 Nuovo Campsider v Commission (above, note 15), para 30. 105 Eg the Nuovo Campsider case (above, note 15), para 24; Case 321/88R Sparr v Commission [1988] ECR 6405, para 9; Aer Lingus (above, note 74), para 50. 106 Above, note 102. 107 Above, note 19. For a similar case, see Aer Lingus (above, note 74), paras 49–51.

641

8.38  Interim relief

the Commission so that it might take a decision on the request. The question of the grant of interim relief in the context of interim relief is considered further in the next subsection. 8.38 In Case 50/69  R  Germany v Commission108 Advocate General Gand took the view that what is now TFEU, art 279 refers, in essence, to protective measures in financial disputes and was not applicable, for example, to actions for the annulment of a decision under EC art 226 (now repealed), which empowered the Commission to authorise a member state to take protective measures in certain circumstances for the purpose of dealing with economic difficulties faced by an economic sector or a given area within that state. It seems to have been argued that the Court might authorise protective measures to be taken by a member state by way of an interim measure although EC 226(2) gave that power to the Commission. The Court’s refusal to take that step was based on its lack of competence to substitute itself for the Commission. Thus Germany v Commission really highlights the difference between asking the Court to exercise a discretion granted to an institution and asking it to order that institution to exercise its discretion. It is not an authority that interim measures can only, or must usually, be granted in financial disputes. Very often a financial dispute will concern the exercise of a power by an EU institution. That does not prevent the Court or the President from ordering a payment to be made, where the circumstances justify it.109 (b) Interim relief on interim relief 8.39 So far as the grant of interim relief (by the defendant) is concerned, there appears to be no difference in principle between cases where the applicant seeks relief in respect of a failure by the Commission to exercise its power to grant relief, cases where the relief granted by the Commission is inadequate (both being situations where the applicant is the person who sought relief from the Commission) and cases where the applicant is the person against whom the Commission has granted relief, the application to the Court then being for the suspension of the Commission’s order or its modification in order to reduce the burden imposed on the applicant. The application to the Court for interim relief in all those cases takes very much the form of an appeal from the Commission’s decision, the applicant having, in effect, to show why it was wrong in the circumstances. In consequence, to plead a specific form of relief has certain advantages over a general claim that the Court order the Commission to do what is necessary or a claim that the Commission should reconsider the request for interim measures.110 From the Commission’s point of view, it has done what is necessary (even if that is nothing at all) and there is 108 Above, note 75. 109 Interim payments are considered in paras 8.41–8.42 below. 110 The latter claim is in any event inadmissible, at least in an action for the annulment of the decision not to grant relief, because it encroaches on the substance of the action against the Commission and is inconsistent with the division of functions between the Commission and the Court: Case T-131/89 R Cosimex GmbH v Commission [1990] ECR II-1 (Judge Cruz Vilaça),

642

Interim relief 8.41

no reason for it to reconsider the situation (in the absence of a new fact). The applicant must show that the Commission should have acted (if the case concerns a failure on its part to adopt interim relief) or should have adopted no, or a more apposite form of, relief (if the case concerns a decision granting interim relief). In the first situation, the President may avoid any risk of prejudicing the final judgment by giving a general instruction to the Commission, unless he takes the view that the application should be rejected. In the second situation (where the applicant may be the person in whose favour the Commission acted but is more likely to be the person against whom the Commission’s decision was directed), the function of the judge hearing the application for interim relief is in principle to cut down the effects of the contested act (where necessary) so as to ensure that it operates solely as an interim measure.111 In some instances, the appropriate remedy may therefore be the suspension of the offending part of the decision but, in others, the judge may have to take positive steps by way of interim measures in order to ensure that the interests of all the persons affected are properly respected.112 8.40 It is probably sufficient to plead that the Court should order the Commission to take the necessary steps, where the Commission has not acted at all, for then the basic question is whether the Commission was right to hold that there was no necessity to act. If the Commission has acted, but inadequately to protect the applicant’s position or wrongly so as to damage the applicant’s position, it is probably better to plead a specific form of relief because it is necessary to show that the Commission had not adopted a measure that it should and could have adopted. It should be observed, however, that the reluctance on the part of the Court to order a specific form of interim measure applies only where the defendant is an institution, invariably the Commission, which may exercise a discretion to preserve the applicant’s position. In other cases it is in practice indispensable to apply for, and order, relief which is sufficiently precise so that all concerned know what is required and further disputes will be avoided.113 (c) Interim payments 8.41 The possibility of obtaining money payments by way of interim measures seems to have been accepted in principle by Judge Donner in Case 68/63 R Luhleich v Euratom Commission,114 a staff case in which the applicant claimed an allowance for his needs pending judgment. Although the application was dismissed, he held that such an allowance could be granted as an interim

111 Cases 228 and 228/82 R Ford Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc v Commission [1982] ECR 3091, para 14 (Judge Mertens de Wilmars); the Automobiles Peugeot case (above, note 80), para 24 (Judge Cruz Vilaça). 112 Eg the Langnese-Iglo case (above, note 80). 113 See, for example, Case 42/82  R  Commission v France [1982]  ECR  841 at 866 (Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn). 114 Above, note 38.

643

8.42  Interim relief

measure if the action was manifestly well founded.115 In both that case and Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission116 a separate claim was also made for a salary advance. That appears to have been rejected because it was in reality dependent on the success of a further claim for suspension of the decision terminating the applicant’s appointment. It would clearly have been inconsistent to reject the claim that the applicant’s employment with the defendant institution should continue and then uphold the claim for payment of the salary. The rejection of the first necessarily entailed rejection of the second. In Case 44/59 Fiddelaar v Commission117 the applicant claimed a specific sum as an advance on salary arrears or such other sum as equity might determine. It was not established that the applicant’s financial position required payment of the whole sum claimed so a lesser amount was ordered to be paid which was sufficient to cover his immediate needs. The defendant had in fact conceded that that amount was due. In Case T-45/90  R  Speybrouck v European Parliament118 the defendant was ordered to pay the applicant the equivalent of the allowances due to her as a result of the termination of her contract of employment (the lawfulness of which was at issue in the proceedings) until the allowances were actually paid by the institution responsible for doing so (a third party), in order to preserve the applicant from the consequences of any administrative delays in their payment. In such cases, the claim made by way of interim relief should be distinct from the claim made in the action (for example, a claim for a subsistence allowance pending judgment, where the claim in the action is for unpaid salary) because, otherwise, the interim measures claim will duplicate the claim in the action and may be rejected for that reason.119 8.42 Claims for the payment of money run up against the objection that, if the action is successful, the money will be paid in any event so the only damage caused to the applicant is that arising from being kept without his money in the period before judgment. In so far as that damage is pecuniary or financial

115 Under the rules of procedure in their current form, proceedings that are manifestly wellfounded may be the subject of summary decision to that effect, thereby obviating (in principle) the need for interim relief: see RP-ECJ, art 182 (which applies to appeals to the ECJ); RP-GC, art  132 (direct actions) and 209 (appeals). However, such decisions are made by the Court after the parties have been heard. In cases to which those provisions apply, the applicant could apply for interim relief and, by separate application seek an order under, as the case may be, RP-ECJ, art 182, RP-GC, art 132 or RP-GC, art 209. The rules of procedure do not provide for applications to be made under those provisions; but, as the Court can act of its own motion under those provisions, an application would merely serve the purpose of drawing the Court’s attention to the possibility of exercising its power under the rules of procedure. 116 Above, note 38. 117 [1960] ECR 555. 118 Above (note 23), paras 28–37. 119 Case T-179/96  R  Antonissen (above, note 14), para  30, was reversed on appeal in Case C-393/96  P(R) Antonissen v Council and Commission [1997]  ECR  I-441, paras 33–43, in which it was emphasised that an advance payment can be made if the circumstances justify it and, more particularly, if the payment is not irreversible (if it were irreversible, it would be a final or permanent, not an interim, form of relief). In that case, an advance payment would have been irreversible, causing the judge to consider the strength of the applicant’s case: Case T-179/96 P(R) Antonissen v Council and Commission [1997] ECR II-425, paras 27–29.

644

Interim relief 8.43

in nature, it is doubtful if it can in the normal course of events be described as serious and irreparable damage justifying the grant of some form of interim relief. Usually the situation can be remedied at judgment by an award of interest. On the other hand, if the action is lost, it is the other party who will have been deprived of his money and the applicant will have to pay it back,120 if he is able to do so. Therefore, it is usually necessary to demonstrate either that there is a reason why an early payment should be made and that such a payment could be returned at the close of the proceedings, if need be, or that the applicant has a compelling case or that serious damage of a non-pecuniary nature will ensue.121 Where, however, the applicant seeks to retain money which he is required to pay by the decision attacked in the action, it is more likely that relief will be granted (although here the relief would normally be suspension of the operation of the decision rather than an interim measure stricto sensu). (d) Measures relating to documents and evidence 8.43 In the Luhleich and Prakash cases one of the interim measures claimed was an order for the production of documents. Abandoned in Luhleich, the claim was rejected by Judge Donner in Prakash on the ground that it was for the Court or chamber dealing with the case to decide such a question, not the judge on an application for interim relief. In subsequent cases, similar requests have been made for the defendant to hold an enquiry122 and for the Court to appoint an expert to look into certain factual aspects of the case.123 An order to produce documents, appoint an expert to make a report or, generally, to enquire into the facts of the case is usually made as part of the preparatory enquiries undertaken after the close of the written procedure; and there is an appropriate procedure for obtaining such an order.124 There is therefore no question of the applicant’s position being prejudiced by the passage of time unless, for example, the documents in question are in imminent danger of destruction (or a potential witness is on the point of death). Even in that event it is doubtful if 120 See Albini v Council and Commission (above, note 61). In Cases T-278/93  R, T-555/93  R, T-280/93 R and T-541/93 R Jones v Council and Commission [1994] ECR II-11, para 54, a claim for an advance payment of damages was rejected because it would prejudge the outcome of the case and there was no direct link between the damage with which the applicant was supposedly threatened pending judgment and the damage for which compensation was sought. 121 Cf Case T-192/01 R Lior GEIE v Commission [2001] ECR II-3657, where a contractual claim for a sum of money was made and an application for payment of the same sum of money was made by way of interim relief. The applicant was impecunious and no longer had any business. Not only was it not evident what harm would be suffered if the applicant was forced to wait for payment until final judgment in the action but there was an evident risk that the applicant would not be able to repay the money if it lost the action. 122 Case 114/83 R SICA and SIPEFEL v Commission [1983] ECR 2315, paras 6–9. 123 Case C-358/89  R  Extramet Industrie SA  v Council [1990]  ECR  I-431, para  26; Case C-106/90 R Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission [1990] ECR I-3377, paras 28–30. In the latter case the defendant applied for an expert to be appointed to determine the applicant’s claim but, since the defendant maintained that it had no power to adopt a measure that would satisfy the applicant (a submission that the judge seemed to consider well founded), an expert’s opinion could not be of ‘decisive influence’ and the request was dismissed. 124 See Ch 11.

645

8.44  Interim relief

interim relief is the proper remedy because its object is in principle to preserve the applicant’s position pending judgment so that the Court’s decision is not rendered nugatory, not assist the making of that decision. The correct procedure seems to be to write to the Registrar requesting the Court to order a measure of enquiry immediately so that the evidence is taken before it is destroyed or otherwise ceases to exist; and an application, for what is in effect a measure of enquiry, dressed up as an application for interim measures will usually be dismissed because an incorrect procedure has been followed. On the other hand, if there is reliable evidence that evidence relevant to the issues in the case is going to be destroyed and will have ceased to exist before a measure of enquiry can be undertaken, it may be appropriate to seek an order restraining the person in possession of the evidence from destroying it before any necessary measure of enquiries have been completed: although the destruction of evidence does not in itself deprive a judgment in the applicant’s favour of its full effects, it may have just as serious an effect on the applicant’s rights by depriving him of the opportunity to obtain a judgment in his favour. The risk that the opposing party in a case will destroy relevant evidence is an exceptional circumstance which must ordinarily be proved to the satisfaction of the Court; it cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the opposing party is or may be in possession of evidence that favours or may favour the applicant’s case.125 In any event an application for interim measures cannot be used, as a substitute for discovery proceedings, in order to obtain sight of relevant documents in the hands of the other party before lodging the defence, reply or rejoinder or in order to define what constitutes the evidence relevant to the case.126 (e) Suspension of a measure 8.44 Suspension of a measure may be applied for as an interim measure. In an application for the suspension of a measure under RP-ECJ, art  160(1), RP-GC, art  156(1) or RP-CST, art  115(1), 1st subpara, the measure must be contested in the action. Under RP-ECJ, art  160(2), RP-GC, art  156(2) and RP-CST, art  115(1), 2nd subpara, an application for an interim measure is admissible if it ‘relates’ to the case before the Court. The test is therefore less stringent than that for suspension. Thus, in Case 18/65 R Gutmann v Euratom Commission,127 Gutmann was suspended from his duties and then transferred to another post. He submitted a complaint to the Commission and, when it was rejected, appealed to the Court. In the meantime the Commission issued a vacancy notice concerning his original post, inviting candidates to apply for it. If Gutmann won his action, what would happen if the Commission had appointed someone to the post before the date of the judgment? The decision to issue the vacancy notice was not directly in issue and in fact, in order to 125 Case 121/86  R  Anonimos Eteria Epichiriseon Metalleftikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon AE v Council and Commission [1986] ECR 2063, para 17; Case 129/86 R Greece v Council and Commission [1986] ECR 2071, para 17. 126 Cases 121 and 122/86  R  Anonimos Eteria Epichiriseon Metalleftikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon AE v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 833, paras 15–16. 127 [1966] ECR 135.

646

Interim relief 8.45

challenge it, Gutmann would have had to have brought a separate action. Before doing so, he applied for the notice to be suspended as an interim measure under EAEC, art 158 (now repealed and replaced by TFEU, art 279). The Commission naturally objected that the vacancy notice could not be suspended because it was not challenged in the action but Judge Lecourt brushed that aside as being too formalistic: the action related to the removal of Gutmann from his post and so put in question the fact that it was vacant; the application to suspend the operation of the vacancy notice was therefore an inevitable consequence of the action challenging the decision holding the post to be vacant.128 The power to suspend the operation of an act other than the act contested in the proceedings can be exercised in the case of a future anticipated act but only where the future act would immediately create rights for third parties and produce irreversible effects.129 In principle, the Court’s power to suspend, by way of interim measures, the operation of an act other than the contested act may be exercised only if the act in question were adopted by the same institution and that institution is a party to the proceedings (in practice, therefore, the defendant).130 (f) General 8.45 As can be seen, the relief sought by way of interim measure can be wide-ranging in nature; but it may not be contrary to EU law,131 beyond the Court’s jurisdiction132 or be such as to deprive the action of its purpose or render it nugatory.133 The nature of the interim relief sought does not have to be the

128 To like effect see also Küster v European Parliament (above, note 44). See also SICA and SIPEFEL  v Commission (above, note 122). The link between the contested act and the act subject to the interim measure, in the Gutmann case, can usefully be contrasted with the absence of the required link in Case T-395/94 R-II Atlantic Container Line (above, note 37), paras 41–47 and 51–52. In Gutmann, the vacancy notice was, as it were, the other side of the same coin as the contested measure. In Atlantic Container, the (future) act was a decision that, in principle, might or might not have been made. 129 Case T-395/94 R-II Atlantic Container Line (above, note 37), paras 48–50. Strictly speaking, what is envisaged is an injunction restraining the defendant from adopting the act in question rather than an order suspending its operation. The restrictive conditions to which such an interim measure is subject are explicable because, if irreversible third party rights are created, thereby prejudicing the effect of the final judgment in the action, the only way of preserving the effect of the judgment is to take action before the act in question is adopted. 130 Case 133/87 R Nashua Corpn v Commission [1987] ECR 2883, paras 7–8. Nashua should be read subject to the discussion of orders addressed to third parties in paras 8.54–8.64 below. 131 See Case 42/82  R  Commission v France (above, note 113), para  19; Case T-228/95  R  S. Lehrfreund Ltd v Council and Commission [1996] ECR II-111, paras 60–61 (application for an interpretative ruling). 132 Case 191/88 R Co-Frutta Sarl v Commission [1988] ECR 4551, para 24. 133 Case 74/85  R  Remy v Commission [1985]  ECR  1185, paras 9–10; Case 231/86R  BredaGeomineraria v Commission [1986] ECR 2639, para 18; Case F-129/11 R BH v Commission, 28 February 2012, para 30; Case F-139/11 R BJ v Commission, 28 February 2012, para 29; Case F-140/11 R BK v Commission, 28 February 2012, para 31; DQ v Parliament (above, note 94), paras 13–14.

647

8.46  Interim relief

same as that of the relief sought in the action134 but cannot achieve a result that goes beyond the scope of what would ensure if the applicant were successful in the action.135 The relief granted in decided cases or considered as within the Court’s jurisdiction to grant includes: the ordering of an expert’s report;136 an order preventing the defendant institution from concluding a contract or from allocating funds for its performance, if concluded;137 an order that the defendant propose to a particular committee that a product be included on a list of authorised products and inform the member states of that fact;138 an order extending the time for making a payment;139 an order extending a legislative time limit;140 a reminder directed to the defendant to comply with its responsibilities.141 8.46 In Cases 160 and 161/73  R  Miles Druce & Co Ltd v Commission142 the origins of the dispute lay in a proposed take-over of the applicant by Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds Ltd (‘GKN’). The applicant requested the Commission to exercise its powers under what was, at the time, ECSC, art 66(5) to prevent the take-over and, on the Commission refusing to act, brought an action to have the refusal annulled. The application for interim measures claimed a broad selection of types of relief: in brief, an order that GKN (i) acquire no shares in the applicant, (ii) not exercise the voting rights attached to its shares, (iii) not exercise its right to call a general meeting, and (iv) not propose a resolution in the event of a general meeting being held. The application was not granted for various reasons but it was never suggested that such relief might fall outside the Court’s power. In such a case, however, the Court would not, as explained above, be likely to order the Commission to adopt a specific form of relief unless it was clear that no other was adequate to preserve the position of the applicant. Indeed in a subsequent application143 Judge Lecourt ordered the Commission to take ‘all necessary measures’ to preserve the status quo. By that time the Commission’s 134 Case T-198/12  R  Germany v Commission (above, note 76), para  33. The classic example is provided by actions brought under TFEU, art  258: the only relief that can be sought in the action is a declaration but the interim relief that may be sought may be, and invariably is, entirely different in nature (commonly an order that the defendant state suspend any measures that it has implemented or is about to implement that would alter the status quo). Where the nature of the relief sought in the application is the same as that sought in the action (in casu suspension of the operation of a measure whose annulment is claimed), it has been held that the relief sought cannot be ordered in an application for interim measures because it would amount to a provisional annulment of the contested measure: Case 292/84  R  Scharf v Commission [1984] ECR 4349, para 10. It is not clear why relief should be refused for that reason alone. 135 For detailed consideration of the question, see Stichting Sona (above, note 37), paras 39–49. 136 Case 318/81 R Commission v CODEMI [1982] ECR 1325. As can be seen from the later cases discussed above, such an order is unusual. 137 Case 118/83 R CMC v Commission [1983] ECR 2583, para 53. 138 Case 65/87 R Pfizer International Inc v Commission [1987] ECR 1691: the object was to restore the status quo. 139 Case 160/84 R Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission [1984] ECR 3217, para 9 (payment of import duties). 140 Case T-554/93 R Abbott Trust v Council and Commission [1994] ECR II-1, para 19. 141 Eg Connolly (above, note 99), paras 25, 44 and the operative part of the order; Bermejo Garde (above, note 74), para 44. 142 [1973] ECR 1049. 143 Cases 160, 161, 170/73 R II Druce & Co v Commission [1974] ECR 281.

648

Interim relief 8.48

decision on the merger was imminent but it had said that it would include in a decision allowing the merger a provision deferring its entry into force until three weeks after notification to the interested parties, thus allowing the applicant time to commence proceedings against it and, if necessary, apply to the Court for interim relief. In fact, however, that does not seem to have given any protection to the applicant until then: GKN could complete the take-over and then cause the applicant to discontinue its action. In consequence the Commission was ordered to ensure that the entry into force of its decision should not be before a certain date and to take all the necessary measures to ensure that no action was taken until then.144 8.47 It is an open question whether or not, by way of interim measure, the Court can order national authorities not involved in the proceedings to apply a measure contested in the action in a particular way;145 but there is authority that, in principle at least, that is possible where the applicant lies under a serious threat to its existence.146 Where the issue is the interpretation of a provision of EU law, proceedings for interim relief are not an appropriate method for providing a solid basis for future legislative developments: any ruling on the correct interpretation of a provision of EU law made at the interim relief stage is necessarily without prejudice to the final judgment.147 As in the case of the suspension of an act challenged before the Court, the justification for granting relief may disappear if the party concerned gives an undertaking to the Court that satisfies it that there is no need to grant relief.148

C

Suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court

8.48 The same rules as those relating to the suspension of the operation of a measure adopted by an EU institution and to the adoption of any other interim measure apply to applications to suspend the enforcement of a decision of the Court.149 Where the decision whose enforcement is to be suspended is a decision of the ECJ, the application is made to the ECJ; where the decision in question is 144 What would happen when the Commission approves a take-over can be seen from Case 3/75 R Johnson and Firth Brown Ltd v Commission [1975] ECR 1 and, in relation to take-overs and mergers authorised by the Commission under what is now Council Regulation No 139/2004 (OJ 2004 No L 24/1), from Case T-96/92 R Comité d’Entreprise de la Société Générale des Grandes Sources v Commission [1992] ECR II-2579. 145 Cases C-51 and C-59/90 R Comos-Tank BV v Commission [1990] ECR I-2167, para 33. 146 Case T-402/11  R  Preparados Alimenticios del Sur (above, note 38), para  14. See further para 8.54 ff below. 147 Case 352/88 R Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 267, para 22. 148 See further paras 8.90–8.91 below. 149 RP-ECJ, art  165(1); RP-GC, art  161(1); RP-CST, art  120(1). RP-CST, art  120(1) refers to applications ‘to suspend the enforcement of a decision of a jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union’. Read literally, that covers decisions of the ECJ, GC and any specialised court attached to the GC, not just decisions of the CST. RP-ECJ, art 165(1) and RP-GC, art 161(1) refer to decisions of the ECJ and GC only, respectively. In principle, each court comprised within the Court (in the sense of the CJEU) has jurisdiction to suspend the enforcement of its own decisions but not those of another part of the Court, otherwise than in the context of an appeal.

649

8.49  Interim relief

that of a first instance jurisdiction (whether the GC or the CST), the application is made to that jurisdiction save that, if the decision is the subject of an appeal, application may be made to the appellate court (whether the ECJ or the GC) for an interim measure in the form of the suspension of the operation of the decision appealed against.150 8.49 The object of suspension is to halt the proceedings, initiated in a member state under TFEU, art 280 and 299 (which apply to the EAEC pursuant to EAEC Treaty, art 106a(1)), for the enforcement of the decision by the competent authority under national law. Enforcement, in that sense, is to be contrasted with ‘execution’ of the judgment, which may be stayed pursuant to: RP-ECJ, art 152(4), RP-GC, art 123(4) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 121(3) (which uses the term ‘enforcement’), where the judgment has been delivered in default of defence; or RP-ECJ, art 157(4), RP-GC, art 167(3) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 125(6) in the context of third party proceedings. As in the case of applications to suspend the operation of a measure adopted by any other institution, the object of ‘stay of execution’, in the context of those provisions, is to suspend the legal effects of the decision rather than the proceedings taken under national law to enforce it.151 8.50 Suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court, in the sense relevant here (that is, an order halting proceedings for the enforcement of the decision by the competent national authority, or requiring those proceedings to be halted) is a form of interim relief; but it is not clear to which type of proceedings or action (if any) that form of relief relates.152 Such proceedings appear to be those in which the decision in question is under challenge or its meaning is in dispute.153 Where appropriate, the order suspending enforcement of the decision must set a date on which it will expire.154 A decision rejecting an application for confidential treatment of a party’s pleadings is not susceptible of ‘enforcement’ in the sense used in this context and cannot therefore be suspended.155

150 Case T-77/91R Hochbaum v Commission [1991] ECR II-1285, paras 19–23; Cases C-372/90P, C-372/90P-R and C-22/91P Samenwerkende Elektricetits-produktiebedrijven NV v Commission [1991] ECR I-2043, para 11 (an appellate court can entertain an application for the suspension of a decision of the first instance jurisdiction only in the context of an appeal to the appellate court against that decision). 151 In third party proceedings the rules to apply are the same as those for the grant of interim relief generally: RP-ECJ, art 157(4), RP-GC, art 167(3); RP-CST, art 125(6); and the conditions for obtaining ‘stay of execution’ are the same as those for obtaining the suspension of the operation of a measure of an institution: see Cases 42 and 49/59 Breedband NV v Société des Aciéres du Temple [1962] ECR 167. 152 The question did not need to be addressed in Case C-334/07 R-EX Comune di Montorio al Vomano v Commission [2001] ECR I-4229 because the application was misconceived for other reasons. 153 See Ch 16, paras 16.67–16.76 and paras 16.83–16.166. 154 RP-ECJ, art 165(2); RP-GC, art 161(2); RP-CST, art 120(2). 155 Cases C-133 and C-150/87 Nashua Corpn v Council [1990] ECR I-719, order of 19 May 1988 in Case C-150/87 (unreported).

650

Interim relief 8.54

D

Suspension of the enforcement of a measure adopted by another institution

8.51 As in the case of the previous type of interim relief, this remedy applies where a measure adopted by an EU institution is to be enforced (or executed) by the authorities of a member state pursuant to TFEU, art 299 or EAEC, art 164. Only the Court has jurisdiction to suspend enforcement by the national authorities: national courts have jurisdiction only over complaints that enforcement is not being carried out correctly.156 Where the operation of a measure has been suspended, of course, the question of suspending its enforcement never arises. 8.52 The EU institutions, the enforcement of whose measures may be suspended, are specified as being the Council, the Commission and the European Central Bank.157 That is because suspension is related directly to the type of act or measure that is specifically envisaged as being enforceable by TFEU, art 299 and EAEC, art  164 (whereas the EAEC  Treaty contains no express limitation on the type of measure that is enforceable, the TFEU refers to decisions of the Council, Commission or European Central Bank ‘which impose a pecuniary obligation on persons other than States’; those alone are said to be enforceable). 8.53 The same rules govern the grant of this form of relief as the other types and it is in general analogous to the suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court. As a form of interim relief, suspension of the enforcement of a measure presupposes that the lawfulness of the measure in question is under challenge in proceedings before the Court.

E

Effect of the grant of relief on third parties

8.54 Interim relief is sought almost invariably by the applicant in an action against the defendant in the proceedings or against a measure adopted by the defendant. In a few cases, however, the question has arisen of the Court’s powers in relation to persons other than the defendant (such as an intervener or a third party).158 The problem has three aspects: (i) can the Court take into account the position of persons who are not parties to the proceedings; if it can, (ii) can the Court make an order directed at a party other than the defendant in the action; and (iii) can the Court make an order directed to a party to the proceedings which will have an adverse effect on other persons?159

156 TFEU, art 299, 4th para; EAEC, art 164, 3rd para. 157 RP-ECJ, art 165(1); RP-GC, art 161(1); RP-CST, art 120(1). 158 In the cases, such persons are commonly described as third parties whether they are unrepresented in the proceedings or appear as interveners. 159 It may of course be that an order granting interim relief has a beneficial effect on unrepresented third parties, such as where the Commission or a member state seeks relief in order to protect some legitimate interest from serious and irreparable damage pending judgment. The problem of the effect of an order on unrepresented third parties arises only where the effect in question is adverse to their interests.

651

8.55  Interim relief

8.55 In relation to the first aspect, as will be explained in greater detail below,160 hitherto only member states and EU institutions (or at least the Commission) have been held to be entitled to rely on a threat to third parties in order to establish the existence of a threat of serious and irreparable damage justifying the grant of interim relief.161 In virtually all applications for interim relief, the party opposing the grant of relief is either a member state or an EU institution. In consequence, the ability of the Court to take the interests of unrepresented third parties into account appears at first sight to depend upon the identity of the party invoking those interests rather than upon the capacity in which the party acts in the proceedings (as applicant or defendant). However, the better view seems to be that, whereas the applicant for relief may rely only upon a threat of serious and irreparable damage to it or (in the case of a member state or the Commission) to the interests that it represents, the defendant may properly rely upon a threat either to itself (including the interests that it represents) or to third parties: the threat relied on by the applicant goes to its personal entitlement to relief; the threat to the defendant and to others goes to the propriety and proportionality of the exercise by the Court of its powers in the circumstances of the case. 8.56 In relation to the second aspect referred to above, a distinction must be drawn between suspension and interim measures. Suspension of the operation of the act contested in the proceedings is a form of interim relief that, by its nature, cannot be ordered in relation to a person other than the defendant because acts of a third party are not contested or challenged in the action.162 Accordingly, the second aspect of the problem posed by third parties does not arise for consideration, although the third aspect does. In the context of suspension, the only situation in which it seems possible for the question of making an order against a person who is not the defendant to arise appears to be where the plea of illegality is raised against an act adopted by an EU institution that is not the defendant in the action. In that event, the proportionate remedy would normally be suspension of the act adopted by the defendant, rather than the act which is the subject of the plea of illegality; but, if it were necessary to consider suspension of the latter, the author of that act would normally be an intervener in the proceedings and not an unrepresented third party.163 The significance of that distinction lies in the fact that, as an intervener is a party to the proceedings, it is possible for the Court to hear that person before the order is made. An unrepresented third party has no opportunity to be heard. It is obviously easier, from the differing perspectives of procedural propriety, fairness 160 See paras 8.101–8.103 below. 161 Eg Case 61/77 R Commission v Ireland [1977] ECR 937. In Case 260/82 R NSO v Commission [1982] ECR 4371, a threat to the members of the applicant organisation was relied on but, since a threat to them was, in effect, a threat to the applicant, such a threat is not in the same category as a threat to a third party stricto sensu. See also Cases 228 and 229/82 R Ford Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc v Commission [1982] ECR 3091 and Case 1/84 R Ilford SpA v Commission [1984] ECR 423. 162 Cf Makteshim-Agan (above, note 45), para 28; Case T-218/11 R Dagher v Council [2011] ECR II-146*, order of 19 May 2011, paras 3–7. 163 See above, note 51.

652

Interim relief 8.59

and securing the effectiveness of any order made, to be able to hear the views of the person to whom an order may be addressed (or who may be placed under an obligation as a result of an order) before the order is made. 8.57 Unlike suspension, interim measures are a form of interim relief that can in principle be directed against a person other than the defendant in the action because there is no formal limit on their scope, such as applies in the case of suspension. The main issues arising therefrom concern the circumstances in which an order can be addressed to a third party and the question whether or not it is more appropriate to address the order to the defendant and require him to take the appropriate action. The latter solution brings in the third aspect referred to above: can the Court make an order directed to a party to the proceedings which will have an adverse effect on other persons? Before passing to that third aspect of the problem, it is necessary to say a few words about the question of the Court’s power to adopt interim measures that are actually addressed to a person other than the defendant (whether an intervener or an unrepresented third party). 8.58 In Cases 160 and 161/73 R Miles Druce & Co Ltd v Commission164 the first application made for interim relief sought orders binding GKN, a person appearing in the proceedings as an intervener. The application was not granted for various reasons; but there was no suggestion that an order could not have been made against a person represented before the Court as an intervener. The problem whether or not the Court can impose an obligation on a person not party to the proceedings or present only as an intervener was avoided in the second application made in the Miles Druce case165 because the party bound by the order (the Commission) did have power to control the activities of the third party (GKN). There is no doubt but that, where that solution is possible, it will be preferred to an order directed at the third party; but it does not remove the problem entirely. In Case 133/87 R Nashua Corpn v Commission166 Judge Mackenzie Stuart refused to order, by way of interim measures, the suspension of a measure adopted by an EU institution that was not a party to the proceedings. In Cases T-24 and T-28/92 R Langnese-Iglo GmbH and Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission,167 on the other hand, the relief granted limited the rights conferred on the interveners by the contested act without any question being raised about the appropriateness of ordering relief that would directly have an adverse effect on intervening parties. 8.59 In Case 26/76 R Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission,168 the applicant requested the suspension of the operation of a Commission decision that, inter alia, exempted under what is now TFEU, art 101(3) a series of agreements that set up a distribution system and that would otherwise have been prohibited under what is now TFEU, art 101(1). The application also included a 164 Above, note 142. 165 Above, note 142. 166 [1987] ECR 2883, paras 7–8. 167 [1992] ECR II-1713 and 1839. 168 [1976] ECR 1353.

653

8.60  Interim relief

request that measures be taken to ensure that the applicant could obtain supplies from one of the third parties. That was rejected on other grounds but it seems to be implicit that, if the applicant can obtain relief elsewhere, whether from the Commission or national courts, the Court will not act. In the two Simmenthal cases, the Grandes Sources case and the Vittel case169 the question again arose of the effect on third parties unrepresented before the Court but, like the first claim in the Metro case, the effect was indirect in the sense that the Court was asked to make an order directed to the other party which would have repercussions on the position of third parties. Nevertheless Judge Kutscher and, following him, Judge Cruz Vilaça said that, even if it were possible to grant as interim relief a remedy that would deprive unrepresented third parties of their rights, it would be justified only if the applicant were exposed to a situation threatening his very existence. In Case T-353/94 R Postbank NV v Commission,170 Judge Cruz Vilaça appears to have retreated from that position because he observed, without qualification, that the judge dealing with an application for interim measures ‘cannot issue directions to individuals who are not parties to the dispute, and still less to national courts’. That caused him to suspend the operation of the disputed decision and direct the Commission to send copies of his order to the third parties concerned. 8.60 In Aer Lingus,171 a merger case, the applicant sought an order addressed to the intervener. Judge Jaeger accepted that, in order to avoid any lacuna in the scheme of legal protection under EU law, interim measures could be adopted in relation to a third party (that is, a person other than the defendant). He placed particular emphasis on the need to respect procedural rights both of addressees of interim measures and of the parties directly affected by them, but also accepted that an order could be made even in respect of an unrepresented third party. In either case, it appears, he took the view that, before making an order addressed to an intervener or an unrepresented third party, account should be taken of the strength of the prima facie case and the imminence of serious and irreparable harm. He considered that an order could be made against an unrepresented third party in exceptional circumstances (and bearing in mind the temporary nature of interim measures), if it appeared that, without such measures, the applicant for relief would be exposed to a situation liable to endanger its existence. It is not clear if Judge Jaeger thought that the same requirement as to the threat to the applicant applies if the third party is represented in the proceedings as an intervener. 169 Case 92/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1978] ECR 1129; Case 243/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1978] ECR 2391; Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société des Grandes Sources v Commission (above, note 144), paras 36–41; Case T-12/93 R Comité d’Entreprise de la Société Anonyme Vittel v Commission, [1993] ECR II-449, order of 2 April, and [1993] ECR II-785, order of 6 July 1993. 170 [1994] ECR II-1141, para 33. In Buga (above, note 94), para 20, it was observed that Judge Cruz Vilaca’s observation had been ‘attenuated’ in later cases. 171 Above (note 74), para 56 (para 59 concerns the different situation of an order that has an effect on a third party, as opposed to one addressed to a third party). In relation to the possibility of addressing an order to an unrepresented third party, Aer Lingus was followed in: Case T-402/11 R Preparados Alimentacios del Sur SL v Commission [2011] ECR II-439*, para 14; Buga (above, note 94), para 20 (although not cited there).

654

Interim relief 8.64

8.61 So far as the third aspect is concerned, the distinction between suspension and interim measures remains relevant to some extent. When suspension of a measure is ordered, the application is usually made in the context of an action challenging the measure in question and the defendant is in consequence the author of it. Third parties may be affected by suspension in two significantly different ways. 8.62 First, it may be that, as a result of the suspension of the measure, third parties (eg member states) in the process of applying or taking steps to implement it must cease to do so172 or may have to take other steps (which may need to be specified in the order granting relief).173 In such circumstances, the third party has an interest in the case only in the sense that it is the person charged with applying or implementing the measure. In other respects, its position is unaffected by suspension and it does not have any interest that should be taken into account when deciding whether or not to grant relief. In consequence, even if the order granting suspension were to contain an order directed at a third party requiring the third party to implement the suspended provision (or the measure containing the suspended provision) in a particular way,174 that would not be an invasion of the rights or interests of the third party which would constitute an objection in principle to the grant of relief. 8.63 The second way in which third parties may be affected by suspension is the same as in the case of the grant of interim measures: as persons whose rights or freedom of action are affected by the form of interim relief ordered, even though the third party is not the direct addressee of the order and not otherwise placed under an obligation by the order. Thus, in Case 26/76 R MetroSB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission175 the applicant requested the suspension of the operation of a Commission decision that, inter alia, exempted under what is now TFEU, art 101(3) a series of agreements that set up a distribution system and that would otherwise have been prohibited under what is now TFEU, art 101(1). Judge Mertens de Wilmars rejected the request on the ground that it fell outside the scope of an urgent interim measure intended to safeguard the applicant’s interests because of its effect on third parties (that is, the parties to the series of agreements): suspension would have brought into question the lawfulness and enforceability of the arrangements made by them. 8.64 In Aer Lingus,176 when addressing that situation, Judge Jaeger held that the power to grant interim measures was constrained only if the impact on the 172 That was envisaged by Judge Donner in Case 21/59 R Italy v High Authority [1960] ECR 351 and happened in the Japanese Ball Bearing cases (Cases 113/77 R and 113/77 R-I NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council; Case 119/77 R Nippon Seiko KK v Council and Commission; Case 121/77 R Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council [1977] ECR 1721, 1867 and 2107). 173 Case 23/86 R United Kingdom v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1085, in particular para 23. 174 See United Kingdom v European Parliament, ibid. 175 Above, note 168. 176 Above (note 74), para 59. Aer Lingus was followed in Case T-402/11 R Preparados Alimenticios del Sur (above, note 38), para 14. The same situation appears to be the one covered in Case T-218/11 R Dagher (above, note 162, order of 19 May 2011), para 7.

655

8.65  Interim relief

rights and interests of third parties was serious. In that event, interim relief could still be granted if, in its absence, the applicant was exposed to a situation liable to endanger its existence. The position therefore seems to be that, in principle, the mere fact that the interests or rights of third parties (whether interveners or unrepresented third parties) may be affected by the grant of interim relief is not itself a bar to the grant of relief, whether the order is addressed directly at the third party or is addressed to the defendant in the action and has a consequential effect on the third party. It is nonetheless a factor that the judge will take into account when balancing the interests at stake.177 Where the effect on the third party is serious, the Court cannot grant relief unless the applicant for relief is faced with a threat to its very existence (and the adverse effect on the third parties concerned of granting relief is not as serious) unless, perhaps, the third party concerned is before the Court as an intervener, in which case, relief affecting the rights of the intervener may be granted and an order directed at the intervener may be made (without the applicant for relief needing to show a threat to its very existence). Where a party to the proceedings (whether an EU institution or a member state) has the power to control the activities of the third parties in question, it is preferable for the order to be addressed to that party rather than directly to the third parties. Finally, an order may be directed at a third party whose rights or interests have not been adversely affected by the grant of relief where necessary in order to ensure that the consequences of the relief granted are properly understood.178

III

CONDITIONS FOR THE GRANT OF RELIEF

8.65 The orders granting or refusing interim relief are not always unanimous in their presentation of the conditions on which relief is to be granted. The principal reasons for that are that the Court’s case law has been built up piecemeal on the basis of decisions which are usually made by a single judge (the President of the Court or a chamber); in addition, time is of the essence and it is rarely possible to do more than make a quick appreciation of the facts as they appear at the time; lastly, the judge dealing with an application for interim relief exercises a broad discretion,179 which means that he is in principle entitled to weight up the relevant factors as seems to him to be right, always bearing in mind that the ultimate purpose of interim relief is to safeguard the full effect of the final judgment in the action. As a result, there are considerable variations in the terminology used and in the importance given in different cases to particular situations of fact. It is unwise to place too much reliance on the precise manner in which the judge has formulated the conditions for granting relief, above all in cases where relief was refused, because he is likely to have concentrated on one particular point which will decide the question rather than to have canvassed all the points. Even 177 See para 8.127 ff below. 178 Case 23/86R United Kingdom v European Parliament (above, note 173). 179 Eg Case C-110/12 P(R) Akhras v Council, 19 July 2012, para 23; Case T-198/12 R Germany v Commission (above, note 76), paras 22 and 27.

656

Interim relief 8.67

where the order is granted, it is to be expected that there will be variations as the case law has evolved over the years. 8.66 The only guidance given by the Treaties, the Statute or the Rules of Procedure as to what are the conditions for making an order is to be found in RP-ECJ, art 160(3), RP-GC, art 156(4) and RP-CST, art 115(2) which state that an application for relief must ‘state the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’. The essential characteristic of a measure of interim relief is that it preserves the position of the parties pending the final decision in the action in order to prevent the final decision from being rendered nugatory by the passage of time or a supervening event. Hence its temporary nature, which has a formal aspect (in that an order granting relief cannot in any event survive the delivery of final judgment) and a real aspect (in that an order granting relief cannot create a state of affairs that may outlast the order itself).180 The present state of the case law was summed up by the then President of the ECJ, Judge Mertens de Wilmars, in Cases 60 and 190/81R International Business Machines Corpn v Commission181 as follows: ‘It is clear from the consistent case law of the Court that measures of this nature cannot be considered unless the factual and legal grounds relied on to obtain them establish a prima facie case for granting them. In addition there must be urgency in the sense that it is necessary for the measures to be issued and to take effect before the decision of the Court on the substance of the case in order to avoid serious and irreversible damage to the party seeking them; finally they must be provisional in the sense that they do not prejudge the decision on the substance of the case’.

‘Prejudge’, in this context, means that the relief ordered does not ‘decide disputed points of law or of fact or neutralise in advance the consequences of the decision to be given subsequently on the substance of the action’.182 8.67 It is important to note that the mere fact that an action has been commenced before the Court does not mean that the applicant is entitled to anticipate the outcome of the proceedings and obtain all or part of the benefit of a final judgment in his favour, by means of an application for interim relief, as soon as proceedings have been commenced. That restraint applies just as much to the Court: it is obliged to allow the opposing party the opportunity to present written and oral argument as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and must properly consider the arguments presented by the parties and the evidence relating to the facts in issue before making its decision.183 The Rules of Procedure contain no provision for obtaining judgment by a summary or expedited procedure 180 See RP-ECJ, art 162(4); RP-GC, art 158(4); RP-CST, art 117(4). 181 [1981] ECR 1857, para 4. 182 Case 206/81 R Alvarez v European Parliament [1981] ECR 2187 at para 6 (Judge Mackenzie Stuart); Case 269/84 R Fabbro v Commission [1984] ECR 4333, para 3. 183 Summary dismissal of an action is possible (see Ch 2, para 2.38); but that removes the occasion for the grant of interim relief.

657

8.68  Interim relief

where the defendant has no defence;184 and the possibility of applying for interim relief does not provide a substitute for such a procedure. In consequence, subject perhaps to the point about to be considered, the strength of the applicant’s case against the defendant is not a factor that would in itself justify the grant of relief; nor is the fact that the applicant for relief is prepared to offer a security.185 The possible exception to that general proposition emerges from International Business Machines Corpn v Commission where it was argued that, where relief is sought against an act which is manifestly unlawful, it is unnecessary to show that any other damage may be caused if relief is not granted: the gravity of the breach of the law is sufficient justification for making an order. That point was not decided by the President because he took the view that the acts in question did not ‘appear to be measures lacking even an appearance of legality, and as such to require their operation to be suspended forthwith’.186 The same claim was made in Case 46/87 R Hoechst AG v Commission187 where, again, it was not dismissed as a matter of principle but was rejected because the applicant did not succeed in showing that the contested act was manifestly unlawful. In Case T-86/96  R  Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen v Commission,188 the argument that the normal criteria for the grant of interim relief must be modified where the action concerns a measure that is manifestly illegal was dismissed, but the explanation given in the order was that the measure in question was not manifestly illegal. The point therefore remains open; but it seems clear from the IBM case that, for that argument to succeed, it must be shown beyond any shadow of doubt that the act in dispute is unlawful. If the opposing party can raise a doubt as to that fact, the argument fails and the applicant can succeed only if he shows that the usual criteria required for the grant of relief are satisfied. It should be observed that, in this context, the argument that the contested act is manifestly unlawful is not so much an argument that the defendant clearly has no defence to the action as an argument that the illegality is so serious that it constitutes in itself damage justifying the grant of relief and is such that there is no interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the contested act pending judgment. 8.68 The requirement that there be a threat of serious and irreparable damage provides the Court with the justification for departing from the general principle that the commencement of proceedings does not itself have suspensory effect, or entitle the applicant to some immediate form of relief, and with the justifica-

184 Judgment can be obtained where the defendant fails to lodge a defence within time: see RPECJ, art 152, RP-GC, art 123 and RP-CST, art 121. That does not apply where a defence is lodged within time but it fails to disclose any or any seriously arguable defence. 185 Case 240/84 R NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council [1984] ECR 4093, para 6. 186 Above (note 181), para  7. Note Case 293/82  R  De Compte v European Parliament [1982] ECR 4331 at para 12 (Judge Mackenzie Stuart); an EU institution cannot be prevented by an application for interim measures from carrying on with a procedure that will later be annulled because of a procedural defect. 187 [1987] ECR 1549, paras 28–32. 188 [1998] ECR II-641, paras 59–62.

658

Interim relief 8.70

tion for making an order before it is in a position to deliver final judgment.189 In principle, once the party seeking relief has shown a prima facie case and the necessity for immediate action to avoid serious and irreversible damage, he is entitled to an order unless the opposing party can show that he, too, would suffer serious and irreversible damage, if relief were ordered. In order to oppose the grant of relief, it is not sufficient to prove that the opposing party would be adversely affected or inconvenienced by the grant of relief; it must be shown that the relief granted would itself render the Court’s final judgment nugatory so far as the opposing party is concerned. The criteria determining the grant or refusal of relief appear to be the same for all cases and no criteria in addition to those outlined above appear to apply. However, the cases in which relief may be granted differ significantly from one another. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into the following categories: (1) cases in which a legal or natural person (including a member state or EU institution) seeks relief in respect of an individual act threatening serious and irreparable damage; (2) cases in which a member state or EU institution seeks relief against a general normative act threatening serious and irreparable damage; (3) cases in which the Commission (or, theoretically, a member state) seeks relief against an act (or omission) of a member state threatening serious and irreparable damage. 8.69 In the first two categories, the contested act, being an act of an EU institution, benefits from a presumption as to its validity.190 That presumption is not in itself a bar to the grant of interim relief.191 The question is whether or not that presumption (which can also be taken to express an interest, on the part of the EU or the EU institution that adopted the contested act, in its continued application unless and until it is found to be invalid by a competent court) raises an additional obstacle to the grant of relief that may not apply in the third category of cases, even where a member state may be said to have a comparable interest in the application of its legislative or other acts pending a finding by a competent court that those acts are invalid by reason of a conflict with a provision of EU law. As between the first and second categories of cases, the question is whether or not the particular or, as the case may be, the general nature of the contested act makes any (and, if so, what) difference to the assessment of the interest in its continued application. 8.70 At first sight, the facts that the criteria applied by the Court when deciding whether or not to grant interim relief are applied in all cases without excep 189 As noted above, the fact that the applicant for relief is prepared and able to compensate the defendant for the consequences of obtaining the relief sought by providing a security is insufficient justification: NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council (above, note 185). 190 Eg Case 101/78 Granaria BV v Hoofproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1979] ECR 623, para 4. 191 Cf Case C-213/89  R  v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No  2) [1990] ECR I-2433 at 2458 (Advocate General Tesauro).

659

8.71  Interim relief

tion and that they are particularly difficult for an applicant for relief to satisfy lead to the conclusion that those criteria, when satisfied, override any interest of whatever nature opposing the grant of relief: in short, however great the interest of the EU or an EU institution or a member state in the continued application of the contested act, it cannot be more important than the interest of the EU in ensuring that judgments of the Court are effective, which is an essential guarantee of respect for the rule of law in the EU.192 However, in some cases reference has been made to a ‘balance of interests’ or ‘balance of convenience’ and in other cases the usual criteria applied by the Court have been construed in a more strict or more lax way. Although the case law does not as yet demonstrate a consistent and formalised division of cases into different categories so far as the application of the criteria for the grant of relief is concerned, there are traces of the emergence of such a division which it is as well to bear in mind when examining the cases. 8.71 The question of manifest illegality aside, the conditions for granting interim relief can be considered to fall under the following headings: (1) prima facie case; (2) urgency; (3) serious and irreparable or irreversible damage; and (4) the role of the balance of convenience or balance of interests.

A

Prima facie case

1 General 8.72 The requirement of a prima facie case can be understood in various ways. At one level it refers to the degree of examination that the Court can give to an application: the proceedings are summary and subject to the pressure of time; they are not suitable for painstaking analysis. Thus, in Case T-29/92  R  Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v Commission,193 Judge Cruz Vilaça stated that a detailed analysis of the issues in the case was impossible all the more so because an applicant is limited to referring to the pleas of fact and law relied on by him in the action and to asserting that it cannot reasonably be asserted that the action is without foundation; the judge hearing the application for relief must consider the applicant’s arguments to see if they put in doubt the opposing party’s case. Therefore, a prima facie case for the grant of relief does not mean that the applicant’s case 192 The only exception appears to be the case where, although the applicant for relief has satisfied the criteria for the grant of relief, the making of the order would inflict serious and irreparable damage on the other party to the proceedings (or an unrepresented third party); but in such circumstances the relief sought could not be interim relief in the true sense of that term because it would have permanent effects. That being so, the Court would not in any event have jurisdiction to make the order. 193 [1992] ECR II-2161, at para 34.

660

Interim relief 8.74

must be clear and obvious;194 it means that the application for relief must not be manifestly unfounded.195 It is occasionally said that there must at least be ‘fumus boni iuris’, on the ground, no doubt, that there is no smoke without fire. The degree of certainty required when a final decision is made in the case is not required at the interim relief stage.196 It does not follow that there is some limit to the matters which the judge hearing the application can properly look at before deciding whether or not a prima facie case has been shown: for example, the judge is not prevented from examining in detail the application commencing proceedings and the evidence adduced in support of it, if he has the time to do so. 8.73 At another level, the requirement of a prima facie case refers to the case that the applicant must present, viewed as a whole. That falls into two parts: the case to which the application for relief relates (that is, the action); and the case for the grant of relief. In principle, the applicant must have a prima facie case both as to admissibility and as to substance in relation both to the action and to the application for relief: the ‘fumus boni iuris’ presupposes that the applicant for relief has a good case so far as the action is concerned just as much as a good case for the grant of relief before judgment. In consequence, the applicant must show that he has a prima facie case in the action, not just the proceedings for interim relief taken by themselves.197 In most cases, the consideration expressed to be given to the requirement of a prima facie case in fact focuses on the action; the prima facie case for the grant of relief is usually examined by reference to the requirements of urgency, serious and irreversible (or irreparable) damage and, where appropriate, the balance of convenience or balance of interests (save in those cases where the admissibility of the application for relief is also an issue). In this section, therefore, the requirement of a prima facie case will be considered first in relation to the admissibility of the application for relief and then in relation to the admissibility and substance of the action. The remaining aspects of the prima facie case will be dealt with separately in relation to the requirements of urgency, serious and irreparable damage and the balance of convenience or of interests. 2 Admissibility of the application for interim relief 8.74 The applicant will naturally be unable to show a prima facie case if the application for interim relief is itself inadmissible. There are various reasons why that may be so. For example: an application may in general be inadmissible if it fails to state the circumstances giving rise to urgency or the factual or legal

194 Cf Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-1, paras 60–62. 195 Cases 31 and 53/77  R  Commission v United Kingdom [1977]  ECR  921 (Advocate General Mayras). 196 Cf Case T-23/90 Automobiles Peugeot SA v Commission [1991] ECR II-653, para 61, a case concerning the analogous situation of interim relief granted by the Commission. 197 Case 809/79  R  Pardini SpA  v Commission [1980]  ECR  139; Case 173/82  R  Castille v Commission [1982] ECR 4047.

661

8.74  Interim relief

grounds capable of justifying the grant of the relief sought;198 an application for the suspension of the operation of a measure adopted by an institution may be inadmissible if the measure is not contested in the action199 or if the measure has already taken effect;200 the application may also be inadmissible if its subject matter does not relate to an (admissible) claim made in the action201 or if the action has been or is to be dismissed as inadmissible202 (an aspect to be considered in more detail below); an application may be rejected as inadmissible because it is a misuse of procedure, such as where the matter should first have been taken up with the other party because there was a separate and more appropriate, procedure for dealing with the situation;203 it may be dismissed as inadmissible for lack of interest, such as where the relief sought cannot assist the applicant;204 or where the relief sought falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court to grant before final judgment or at all.205 The application may also become devoid of purpose where the circumstances that might otherwise have justified the grant of relief

198 Case 2/65  R  Ferriera Ernesto Preo e Figli v High Authority [1966]  ECR  231; NTN  Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council (above, note 185), para 7; Case 90/87 R CW v Court of Auditors [1987]  ECR  1801, para  8; Case 378/87  R  Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH  v Commission [1988] ECR 161, paras 19–20. 199 Case 2/59 R Niederrheinische Hütte AG v High Authority [1960] ECR 162 (the order refers to an ‘earlier concomitant action’, the phraseology then used in what is now RP-ECJ, art 160(1), which alludes to the action in the context of which the application for relief is made); Scharf v Commission (above, note 134), para 5; Cases C-66/91 and C-66/91 R Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission [1991] ECR I-1143, para 33. 200 Case 67/63 R SOREMA v High Authority [1964] ECR 174; Cases 3–18, 25, 26/58 Erzbergbau v High Authority [1960] ECR 220. 201 Case 186/80  R  Suss v Commission [1980]  ECR  3501; Case 18/65  R  Gutmann v Euratom Commission [1966]  ECR  135; Case 88/76  R  Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres v Commission [1976] ECR 1585; Case T-10/91 R Bodson v European Parliament [1991] ECR II-133, in particular paras 17–18; Case C-257/93  R  van Parijs v Council and Commission [1993]  ECR  I-3917; Case C-282/93  R  Comafrica SpA  v Council and Commission, order of 6 July 1993 (unreported). 202 Case C-68/90 R Blot and Front National v European Parliament [1990] ECR I-2177; Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission (above, note 199), para  33; Case C-295/92  R  Landbouwschap v Commission [19992]  ECR  I-5069; Case C-276/93  R  Chequita Banana Co BV  v Council, order of 6  July 1993 (unreported); Case C-287/93  R  Simba SpA  v Council, order of 6  July 1993 (unreported); Case C-288/93 R Comaco Srl v Council, order of 6 July 1993 (unreported); Case C-64/93 R Donatab Srl v Commission [1993] ECR I-3955. For an example of the close connection between the admissibility of the action and the admissibility of the application for relief, see Ilford v Commission (above, note 161), paras 5–7. 203 Bodson v European Parliament (above, note 201), paras 18–19. 204 Eg Case 107/89 R Calurla-Boch v European Parliament [1989] ECR 1357 (the object of the relief sought was to allow the selection board to take account of the applicant’s certificates but it was common ground that the applicant had succeeded at that stage of the competition and failed only at the later, oral, stage); Case C-206/89 R S v Commission [1989] ECR 2841 (the relief sought was suspension of the operation of a negative administrative decision which could not have the positive consequences that the applicant sought to achieve); Case C-106/90 R Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission [1990] ECR I-3377, paras 22–27. 205 Eg Case 321/88  R  Sparr v Commission [1988]  ECR  6405 (Judge Grevisse); Case T-131/89 R Cosimex GmbH v Commission [1990] ECR II-1 at paras 12–14 (Judge Cruz Vilaça); Hochbaum v Commission (above, note 150), paras 19–23.

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cease to apply before the decision on the application is made;206 but in that event no decision would be made on the application and it would not be held to be inadmissible. 3 Prima facie case: the action generally 8.75 Passing now to consideration of the action, although it is well established that, in considering whether or not to grant interim relief,207 the chances of success of the action cannot be ignored,208 some cases show a certain disinclination to consider the foundation of the action, particularly where it is alleged to be inadmissible.209 The reason for that seems to be the desire to keep separate and distinct the functions of the judge and the Court: it is for the Court to decide on the action and for the judge to decide on the application for interim relief.210 Nevertheless, the judge may have to adopt a view as to the merits or admissibility of the action. In the nature of things that view cannot prejudice the Court’s decision in the action,211 even when the application for interim relief is heard by the Court itself and not a judge,212 because the decision on the application is generally made before the close of the written procedure and in the absence of a comprehensive examination of the facts. The summary nature of the proceedings precludes a decision based on a profound and painstaking analysis of the facts and of the relevant law. There is no contradiction, therefore, if the Court (more usually, a judge), when hearing the interim relief application, should make an order on the basis of a particular finding of fact or law but, when subsequently dealing with the action, should reject that finding in the final judgment in the light of further argument and after a more prolonged period of reflection.213 Although the preliminary view of the action taken by the judge at the interim relief stage does not and cannot prejudge the final decision to be made in the action, some judges have nonetheless demonstrated extreme

206 Cases T-10/92 R to T-12/92 R and T-14/92 R to T-15/92 R SA Cimenteries CBR v Commission [1992]  ECR II-1571, para  28; Case T-177/11  R  PASP  v Commission [2011]  ECR II-304* (abandonment of the action). 207 Sc suspension of the operation of a measure adopted by an institution. 208 Case 50/69  R  Germany v Commission [1969]  ECR  449 (Advocate General Gand); CMC  v Commission (above, note 137), para 63. 209 See, for example, Case 18/57 Nold KG  v High Authority [1957–1958]  ECR  121; Case 28/65 R Fonzi v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 508; Case 109/75 R National Carbonising Co v Commission [1975] ECR 1193. 210 Cf Case C-474/00 P(R) Commission v Bruno Farmaceutici SpA [2001] ECR I-2909, para 76; Case C-426/13 P(R) Commission v Germany (above, note 76), para 43. The distinction is still valid even if, as can be the case in proceedings before the GC and CST, the action is decided by a single judge or if, for some reason, both the interim relief application and the action itself are dealt with by a chamber (or the full court). 211 Case 19/78 R Authié v Commission [1978] ECR 679. 212 Case 42/82 R Commission v France [1982] ECR 841 at 864 (Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn). 213 Cf Case 23/86 R United Kingdom v European Parliament (above, note 173), para 37.

663

8.76  Interim relief

reluctance to be drawn into expressing an opinion on the merits of the action.214 That approach is understandable where the judge’s view of the action is unfavourable to the applicant since, if the relief sought were refused for that reason and the Court took another view in the judgment, the applicant might then have been mistakenly deprived of all or part of the benefit of the judgment. Probably for that reason Judge Donner once took the view that the foundation of the action comes into question only when it has been established that the circumstances justify the grant of relief.215 Subsequent practice has been to the contrary.216 Nonetheless, even though the assessment of the action is not supposed to involve a detailed examination of the contentions raised by the applicant in the action, those contentions should be developed sufficiently clearly by the applicant for relief; otherwise, they may be left out of account when deciding whether or not there is a prima facie case.217 As long as the applicant has demonstrated that he has a prima facie case in respect of the admissibility and the merits even of only a part of the action, the requirement of a prima facie case has been satisfied pro tanto and the applicant’s failure to establish a prima facie case in respect of another part of the action is irrelevant218 unless the claim for interim relief is dependent upon there being a prima facie case for that other part. 8.76 It has been suggested that the case law exhibits an evolution from fumus boni iuris to fumus non mali iuris, implying a move away from a requirement that the action must have a reasonable chance of succeeding, or will succeed, towards a requirement that the action need only be ‘reasonable’.219 In fact, the case law tended to avoid an assessment of the chances of success in the action: the action had to be arguable (and therefore ‘reasonable’ in that sense). The strength of the arguments in the action tended to be relevant only in exceptional cases, such as where interim relief was to be ordered against a third party;220 but there was nothing to prevent a judge from taking the strength of the arguments in the action into account as part of an overall assessment of the justification for granting interim relief, where the circumstances justified doing so.221

214 Eg Case 25/85 R Nuovo Campsider v Commission [1985] ECR 751, para 24; Cases 67, 68 and 70/85 R Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV v Commission [1985] ECR 1315, para 43; Case 62/86 R AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1986] ECR 1503, paras 14–18. 215 Case 31/59 Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia v High Authority [1960] ECR 98. 216 See, for example, Case 61/77 R Commission v Ireland (above, note 53); Case 42/82 R Commission v France (above, note 113); Case T-13/91 R Harrison v Commission [1991] ECR II-179. 217 Case 152/88 R Sofrimport Sarl v Commission [1988] ECR 2931, para 12. 218 Case 146/85 R Diezler v Economic and Social Committee [1985] ECR 1805, paras 4 and 12. 219 Lenaerts et al, EU Procedural Law (2015), para 13.34. 220 Eg Aer Lingus (above, note 74), para  56. In Case T-301/94  R  Laakmann Karton GmbH  v Commission [1994]  ECR  I-1279, para  30, the strength of the arguments in the action was referred to only as a possible exceptional circumstance justifying a departure from the normal rule that an undertaking required to pay a fine is adequately protected by the requirement to produce a guarantee. The comment in Case C-426/13  P(R) Commission v Germany (above, note 76), para 41, that there has to be a sufficiently large probability of success, is anomalous. 221 Cf Case C-232/02 P(R) Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission [2002] ECR I-8977, paras 54–61.

664

Interim relief 8.78

8.77 On the other hand, at a certain point in time, some judges dealing with interim relief applications began to take a particular interest in the merits of the action. That produced increasingly lengthy interim relief decisions and a considerable slowing in the time taken to decide applications for interim relief. Unfortunately, that development (which was not entirely consistent with the summary nature of interim relief proceedings and the need for a swift decision) then merged with another developing view: that the judge dealing with an interim relief application did not need to inform himself fully about the issues in the action. Even at best, the detailed views about the merits of the action, expressed by the judge hearing the interim relief application, could well be an unreliable indication of the eventual result.222 When combined with a rigid refusal to look at material annexed to the application for interim relief before expressing a detailed view about the action, that approach was guaranteed to produce perverse results.223 8.78 Recent formulations of the prima facie case test focus on whether or not the pleas in law raised in the action ‘appear prima facie not unfounded’, which is regarded as being the case where a plea in law ‘reveals the existence of difficult legal issues the solution to which is not immediately obvious and therefore calls for a detailed examination that cannot be carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures but must be the subject of the main proceedings, or where the discussion of issues by the parties reveals that there is a major legal disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious’.224 That formulation largely reflects continuity with earlier cases: the essential question is whether or not the pleas in law raised in the action can be dismissed as unmeritorious without the need for prolonged consideration. It follows that the presumption of the legality of a measure adopted by an EU institution, which is occasionally cited as the reason why the grant of interim relief is ‘exceptional’,225 is not a strong presumption (in the context of the grant of interim relief).226 222 Eg Case T-198/01 R Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission [2002] ECR II-2153, para 87, where a particular argument was held to be ‘prima facie, well-founded’. It was then dismissed as unfounded in Case T-198/01 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission [2004]  ECR II-2717, paras 191–211 (upheld on appeal in Case C-404/04  P  Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission [2007] ECR I-1*, paras 128–136). 223 Eg Case T-103/14 R Frucona Kosice as v Commission, 6 May 2014, paras 43–46, in which arguments later upheld in the judgment closing the proceedings (Case T-103/14 Frucona Kosice as v Commission, 16 March 2016) were held not to establish a prima facie case, partly because they required the judge to read the decision contested in the proceedings. 224 Eg the Pilkington case (above, note 98), para 67; Evonik Degussa (above, note 73), para 22 (which, in paras 23–25, also canvasses the point that, in an appeal, the judge hearing the application for interim relief must take into account the first instance judgment and the matter originally in dispute). That formulation assumes that the defendant can muster arguments countering those of the applicant in the action, as opposed to a situation in which the applicant is clearly right. 225 See para 8.7 above. 226 The link between the presumption and the criteria for the grant of relief is all the more dubious because the presumption is effectively displaced by the applicant showing a prima facie case (an exercise in which the presumption makes no appearance). Nonetheless, the applicant must also show urgency in the sense of the need to take action, before the delivery of judgment, in order to avoid the occurrence of serious and irreparable damage. The presumption seems therefore to be an irrelevance: the critical question is the existence of a threat to the effectiveness of the final judgment.

665

8.79  Interim relief

4 The admissibility of the action 8.79 As far as the admissibility of the action is concerned, it has been said that it is not for the judge to consider it227 and that he cannot in any event decide it;228 the alleged inadmissibility of the action, it has been said, is not, per se, a ground for the inadmissibility of the application for interim relief229 and, when considering the latter, the judge must not, in any event, prejudice questions relating to the former.230 There are indications to the contrary: for example, in Firma Karl Könecke v Commission231 Judge Lecourt held that, where the grant of interim measures may hinder the application of a series of regulations, the applicant may lie under a particularly heavy duty to show that his action is admissible. In Camera Care v Commission232 Advocate General Warner said that an application for interim relief may be rejected if the action is clearly inadmissible. In Case 231/86R Breda-Geomineraria v Commission233 an application for relief was dismissed because the action was premature and inadmissible; in Case 50/84R Bensider v Commission234 it was held that an application for relief should be rejected if the action has been brought out of time. 8.80 It is apparent from the nature of the proceedings that, while the judge may have to decide on the admissibility of the application for interim relief, he has no power to make a decision on the admissibility of the action because that is not in issue before him; on the other hand, the admissibility of the action may, nevertheless, be an element to be taken into account when considering the question whether the applicant has shown a prima facie case for the grant of interim relief.235 The view which the judge may form of the admissibility of the action does not, and cannot, amount to a decision on that issue which binds the parties because the only issue with which he is seised is the question whether or not to grant interim relief.236 Even so, the tendency in the cases is for the judges to entertain serious reservations about any consideration of the admissibility of the action.237 The general rule is that the admissibility of the action should not be considered at all in the interim relief stage. The only exception to that rule appears to be the situation where the action is said to be manifestly inadmissible or, to put it another way, where there is nothing to support any claim that it is

227 Fonzi v Euratom Commission (above, note 209). 228 Suss v Commission (above, note 201). 229 Ibid. 230 Case 75/72R Perinciolo v Council [1972] ECR 1201. 231 [1975] ECR 637. 232 [1980] ECR 119 at 133. 233 Above (note 133), para 17. 234 [1984] ECR 2247, para 24. 235 Eg CMC v Commission (above, note 137), para 37. 236 The judge cannot even rule on the lawfulness of a regulation challenged in the proceedings: see Case 92/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission (above, note 60). 237 Eg Case 23/86  R  United Kingdom v European Parliament (above, note 173), para  12; Case 351/85  R  Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi v Commission [1986]  ECR  1307, para  13; Case 360/85  R  Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG  v Commission [1986]  ECR  1319, para  13; Pfizer International Inc v Commission (above, note 138), para 15.

666

Interim relief 8.81

admissible.238 Even if the admissibility of the action is in doubt, the requirement of a prima facie case has been satisfied (at least to that extent) where the question of the inadmissibility of the action requires further consideration and cannot be said to be manifest239 or where ‘it cannot be stated categorically’ that the action will not be held admissible.240 The prima facie admissibility of the action may be established by reference to an assertion of fact made by the defendant even if it is unsupported by evidence.241 5 The merits of the action 8.81 In relation to the substance or merits of the case, if the action is manifestly without foundation242 or there is no substantial basis for the claims made in it243 or the applicant has failed to produce sufficient evidence or argument to establish a prima facie case,244 the application for interim relief can and should be dismissed. Judge Donner used to take the view that there had to be ‘a strong presumption’ that the action was well founded or at least that it should be prima facie clearly well founded;245 and after considering the case law in a subsequent case, Advocate General Gand came to the similar conclusion that relief would be 238 Eg Diezler v Economic and Social Committee (above, note 218), para 3; Case 221/86 R Group of the European Right and National Front Party v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2969, para 19; Case 82/87 R Autexpo SpA v Commission [1987] ECR 2131, para 15; Case 376/87 R Distrivet SA v Council [1988] ECR 209, para 21; Case 160/88 R Fédération Européenne de la Santé Animale v Council [1988] ECR 4121, paras 22–30; Case C-117/91 R Bosman v Commission [1991] ECR I-3353, paras 7–9; SA Cimenteries CBR v Commission (above, note 206), paras 44– 48; the Grandes Sources case (above, note 144), para 31. In Case 23/87 R Aldinger v European Parliament [1987] ECR 2841, para 8, and Case 209/87 R Association des Aciéries Européennes Indépendants (EISA) v Commission [1987] ECR 3453, para 10, Judge Schockweiler considered that the raising of a ‘serious ground of inadmissibility’ was sufficient to put the admissibility of the action in issue: see also Case 214/87 R Cockerill Sambre v Commission [1987] ECR 3463 and Case 223/87  R  Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v Commission [1987] ECR 3473. 239 Eg the Group of the European Right case, ibid; EISA v Commission, ibid paras 10–11; Distrivet SA  v Commission, ibid paras 21–26; SA  Cimenteries CBR  v Commission (above, note 206), paras 52–54; the Grandes Sources case (above, note 144), paras 31–35; the Vittel case (above, note 169, order of 2 April 1993), paras 20–26. Thus, even the ‘serious doubts’ entertained by Judge Mackenzie Stuart about the admissibility of the action in Case 117/86R  Union de Federaciones Agrarias de España (UFADE) v Council and Commission [1986]  ECR  2483, para 31 and in Co-Frutta SARL v Commission (above, note 132), para 23 did not in themselves justify the rejection of the application. 240 Aldinger v European Parliament (above, note 238), para 9 (Judge Schockweiler). 241 Autexpo SpA v Commission (above, note 238), paras 18–19. 242 Johnson and Firth Brown v Commission (above, note 144); Case 260/85 R Tokyo Electric Co Ltd v Council [1985] ECR 3467, para 15. 243 Case 731/79 R B v European Parliament [1979] ECR 3629. 244 Case 57/86  R  Greece v Commission [1986]  ECR  1497, para  11; Case 108/88  R  Jaenicke Cendoya v Commission [1988] ECR 2585, para 21. 245 See Cases 43, 44 and 48/59 von Lachmüller v Commission [1960]  ECR  489; Case 68/63 R Luhleich v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 618 and Cases 19 and 65/63A Prakash v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 576 (allowances for needs pending judgment). He seemed, however, to have taken a less strict view in Case 25/62 R II Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 126. See also Case 346/82 R Favre v Commission [1983] ECR 199.

667

8.81  Interim relief

granted if the applicant’s case ‘clearly appears well founded or if there is at least a strong presumption that it is well founded’.246 In one case, Judge Sørensen said that it had to be possible to anticipate the Court’s decision;247 in another, Judge Mackenzie Stuart said that the applicant’s arguments ‘cannot be regarded as so clear that they can be accepted by the Court without serious risk of prejudging the arguments which must be presented on the substance of the case’.248 Such cases appear to be the exceptions. In other cases it has been said that the applicant’s case against the defendant does not need to be ‘clear and flagrant’.249 It is sufficient that there is a ‘certain degree of probability’ that the action is well founded;250 that it is ‘arguable’;251 ‘prima facie valid’;252 ‘prima facie sound’;253 ‘based on serious considerations such as to make the legality of [the measures whose annulment was sought] seem doubtful to say the least’;254 gives rise to ‘serious dispute’, ‘cannot be rejected without further consideration’;255 is based on ‘cogent arguments’,256 ‘pertinent arguments’257 or ‘relevant arguments’258 which it will be necessary to examine in greater detail or more thoroughly in the main action; that ‘it cannot be ruled out’ that the contested act may be declared void259 or it is ‘impossible to predict the outcome’ and the possibility that the Court may uphold the applicant cannot be excluded;260 that there is a ‘real dispute’ supported by ‘sound arguments’;261 that the action raises ‘delicate and complex 246 Case 50/69 R Germany v Commission (above, note 75) at 455. 247 Case 4/78 R Salerno v Commission [1978] ECR 1. 248 Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV v Commission (above, note 214). 249 La Cinq SA  v Commission (above, note 194), paras 60–62 (dealing with the analogous requirement applied by the Commission when deciding whether or not to exercise its powers to grant interim relief in competition cases). 250 Case 61/77  R  Commission v Ireland (above, note 53) (Advocate General Reischl); CMC  v Commission (above, note 137), para 37. 251 Camera Care Ltd v Commission (above, note 19) at 134 (Advocate General Warner). 252 Cases 24 and 97/80  R  Commission v France [1980]  ECR  1319 at 1341 (Advocate General Capotorti). 253 Case 42/82 R Commission v France (above, note 113) at 864 (Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn). 254 Case 232/81 R Agricolo Commerciale Olio Srl v Commission [1981] ECR 2193 (Judge Mertens de Wilmars); Fabbro v Commission (above, note 182), para 6; Scharf v Commission (above, note 134), para  8 (Judge Kakouris). Cf Case 92/88  R  Assoziazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v Commission [1988] ECR 2425, para 14. 255 Ford Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc v Commission (above, note 161), para  8 (Judge Mertens de Wilmars); Case 120/83  R  Raznoimport v Commission [1983]  ECR  2573; Case T-201/04 R Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR II-4463, paras 199 and 392 (‘sufficiently serious’) and 204 (‘requires further consideration’). 256 Case 23/86 R United Kingdom v European Parliament (above, note 173), para 37. 257 Judge Mackenzie Stuart in: Case 250/85 R Brother Industries Ltd v Council [1985] ECR 3459, para 14; Case 273/85 R Silver Seiko Ltd v Council [1985] ECR 3475, para 15; Case 297/85 R Towa Sankiden Corpn v Council [1985] ECR 3483, para 13; Cases 277 and 300/85 R Canon Inc v Council [1985] ECR 3491, para 14; Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi v Commission (above, note 237), para 25; Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG v Commission (above, note 237), para 26. 258 Case 211/86 R Group of the European Right v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2969, para 28 (Judge Mackenzie Stuart). 259 Case 160/84  R  Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE  v Commission [1984]  ECR  3217, para  6 (Judge Mackenzie Stuart). 260 Case 90/87 R CW v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 1801, para 11 (Judge Kakouris). 261 Case 141/84 R De Compte v European Parliament [1984] ECR 2575, para 11 (Judge Galmot).

668

Interim relief 8.82

problems’262 or ‘serious problems’;263 is ‘not without foundation’ or ‘not prima facie without foundation’;264 ‘does not appear to be devoid of all foundation’,265 is ‘not manifestly unfounded’ or ‘without foundation’266 or is ‘not, at first sight, altogether without foundation’;267 is supported by ‘weighty factors’;268 reveals ‘factors which are prima facie capable of calling into question the lawfulness’ of the contested act;269 raises questions of principle on which the Court has not yet had occasion to rule;270 or turns on disputed questions of fact that cannot be determined at the interim relief stage without prejudging the action.271 It is also relevant if the defendant’s case is prima facie erroneous272 or gives rise to serious doubts.273 The mere fact that the issues are hotly disputed may make it impossible to say that the applicant’s case lacks any foundation.274 8.82 In Case 278/84 R Germany v Commission275 the test apparently adopted by Judge Mackenzie Stuart was that the applicant’s most important submission gave rise to an interpretation of the relevant EU legislation that ‘cannot be regarded as so obvious that the Court can accept it without a serious risk of 262 Case 78/83 R USINOR v Commission [1983] ECR 2183 at para 8 (Judge Mertens de Wilmars); Cases 76, 77 and 91/89  R  Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1989]  ECR  1141, para  14 (Judge Koopmans); Case C-280/93  R  Germany v Council [1993]  ECR  I-3667, para  21 (the ECJ); Case C-296/93 R France v Commission [1993] ECR I-4181; Case C-307/93 R Ireland v Commission [1993] ECR I-4191. 263 Case T-23/90 R Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA v Commission [1990] ECR II-195, para 22 (Judge Cruz Vilaça). 264 Case 246/89  R  Commission v United Kingdom [1989]  ECR  3125, para  33 (Judge Due); Case C-195/90  R  Commission v Germany [1990]  ECR  I-2715, para  19 (Judge Due); Case C-272/91 R Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-457, para 24 (Judge Due); Microsoft (above, note 255), paras 225, 394 and 404. 265 Case 56/89 R Publishers’ Association v Commission [1989] ECR 1693, para 31 (Judge Due); Bruno Farmaceutici (above, note 210), paras 92–93 (Judge Rodriguez Iglesias), a case not as strong as the defendant’s case but not ‘entirely without foundation’. 266 Case 270/84  R  Licata v Economic and Social Committee [1984]  ECR  4119, para  8; Case 146/85  R  Diezler v Economic and Social Committee [1985]  ECR  1805, para  12 (Judge Kakouris); Case T-39/90 R Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-produktiebedrijven NV v Commission [1990] ECR II-629, para 23, Case T-45/90 R Speybrouck v European Parliament [1990] ECR II705, para 21 and Cases T-7/93 R and T-9/93 R Langnese-Iglo GmbH v Commission [1993] ECR II-131, para 39 (all Judge Cruz Vilaça). 267 Case 23/87  R  Aldinger v European Parliament [1987]  ECR  2841, para  14, and Case 24/87 R Virgili v European Parliament [1987] ECR 2847, para 14 (both Judge Schockweiler). 268 Case C-195/90 R Commission v Germany (above, note 264), paras 27 and 30 (per curiam). 269 Speybrouck v European Parliament (above, note 266), para 20 (Judge Cruz Vilaça). 270 Case C-345/90 P-R European Parliament v Hanning [1991] ECR I-231, paras 29–30. 271 Case 154/85  R  Commission v Italy [1985]  ECR  1753, para  18; Case 293/85  R  Commission v Belgium [1985]  ECR  3521, para  18; Case 62/86  R  AKZO  Chemie BV  v Commission [1986] ECR 1503, para 18. 272 Case 351/85 R Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi v Commission [1986] ECR 1307, para 22; Case 360/85 R Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG v Commission [1986] ECR 1319, para 23. 273 Case 1/84 R Ilford v Commission [1984] ECR 423, paras 11, 14–18 and 20 (Judge Mertens de Wilmars); Case T-21/93 R Peixoto v Commission [1993] ECR II-463, para 24 (Judge Cruz Vilaça). 274 Cases T-24 and T-28/92 R Langnese-Iglo Gmbh and Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1992] ECR II-1839, para 27. 275 [1984] ECR 4341, para 17.

669

8.83  Interim relief

prejudging the arguments to be presented on the substance of the case’. In the context of the decision, that does not seem to mean that the applicant is obliged to produce a case that is ‘obvious’ in that sense: the order seems to mean that the applicant’s case fell short of being so strong that it could be treated as evident without any risk of the Court coming to a different view in its final judgment; but it is implicit that, even so, the applicant’s case was sufficiently strong for the purposes of the interim relief proceedings. In some instances, the requirement of a prima facie case has been regarded as such a low threshold test that, in effect, the burden lies on the defendant to demonstrate that the applicant has no case. For example, in Case 76/88 R La Terza v Court of Justice,276 an action for the annulment of a decision refusing to allow the applicant to work on a part-time basis after she had been allowed to do so for several years, Judge Due considered that it was necessary for the defendant to show the existence of new circumstances necessitating immediate termination of the part-time working and said that the reasons set out in the contested act were so scant and stereotyped as to justify in themselves the commencement of proceedings. A different situation arises where the defendant fails to reply to the applicant’s contentions regarding the action when responding to the application for interim relief. It has been said that such behaviour makes it impossible for the judge hearing the application to come to a conclusion on the relevance, accuracy and nature of the contested facts; but that means neither that the defendant must be taken to admit the applicant’s assertions nor that the applicant’s claim cannot be dealt with; it simply means that the judge must limit himself to taking note of those factors showing that there is a real dispute between the parties and that the applicant’s case is supported by sound arguments.277 8.83 Despite the variation in mode of expression, the meaning of the requirement of a prima facie case seems clear; the judge does not have to be convinced that the applicant will win the action but he must be convinced that it is possible that the applicant will do so.278 Since the material available to him when coming to a conclusion on that point is incomplete, the judge does not have to be so scrupulous when searching for evidence as he would have to be when arriving at a final view of the question: the fact that the evidence is incomplete or that the opposing party shows that there is a doubt as to the inferences that are to be 276 [1988] ECR 1741, paras 19–21. 277 De Compte v European Parliament (above, note 186), paras 9–11 (Judge Galmot). 278 Cf the phraseology used to justify the opposite conclusion: ‘manifestly without foundation’ in Case 3/75R Johnson and Firth Brown Ltd v Commission [1975] ECR 1; ‘clearly inadmissible’ in Case 792/79R  Camera Care Ltd v Commission [1980]  ECR  119 (Advocate General Warner); ‘prima facie serious problems’ in Case 114/83R SICA and SIPEFEL v Commission [1983] ECR 2315, para 5 (Judge Mertens de Wilmars); ‘prima facie unfounded’ in Case 175/86R RM v Council [1986] ECR 2511, para 27 (Judge Bahlmann); ‘devoid of all relevance’ in Case 304/86R Enital SpA v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 267, para 15 (Judge Mackenzie Stuart). In contrast, in Case 293/84R  Sorani v Commission [1985]  ECR  251, para  6, Judge Bosco considered that the applicant’s submissions ‘do not, at first sight, seem particularly solid’ and, in Case 48/86R Cauet and Joliet v Commission [1986] ECR 1237, paras 27–30, Judge Mackenzie Stuart concluded that the applicant had not shown a prima facie case because ‘on a first reading’ of the relevant legislation ‘it appears reasonable to conclude’ that the defendant was right.

670

Interim relief 8.85

drawn from it does not justify a finding that the applicant has no case.279 On the other hand, if the applicant’s case imposes on him a particularly heavy burden of proof or persuasion, such as where the applicant maintains that the contested act is non-existent, it may be easier to say that a prima facie case has not been shown; and, in such circumstances, the applicant may have to advance ‘serious and concrete indications’ supporting his contentions in order to meet the requirement of a prima facie case.280 The relative weakness of the applicant’s case may have to be weighed against the seriousness of the consequences of withholding relief before concluding that there is or is not a prima facie case.281 6 The relief sought 8.84 Apart from the admissibility of the application for relief and the chances of success for the action, an assessment of the case for relief made out by the applicant must also take account of the nature of the relief sought. If it is inappropriate in the light of the claims made in the action or is excessive, relief may be refused.282 It is common to apply a balance of convenience or balance of interests test,283 which is considered below, but that test is not applied in all cases.

B Urgency 1 General 8.85 Urgency is not determined by reference to the speed with which the applicant applies for relief but by the extent to which the applicant needs to obtain relief before judgment in order to avoid certain damage.284 The appli-

279 Cf Case 18/57 Nold KG v High Authority [1957–58] ECR 121 at 127 (Advocate General Roemer) (in German law full proof is not required in similar proceedings); Case C-232/02 P-R Ilmenau (above, note 221), paras 63–69 (upholding the approach to the facts taken at first instance; the GC took a different views of the facts in the judgment closing the proceedings: see Case T-198/01 Ilmenau, above, note 218). But see Case 20//81 R Arbed SA v Commission [1981] ECR 721 at paras 18 and 21. Initially the burden lies on the applicant to show that he has an arguable case. 280 Case T-29/92  R  Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v Commission [1992] ECR II-2161, para 33. 281 Ibid paras 37–38 (those paragraphs in the order are ambiguous in that they may in the alternative be construed as suggesting the application of a balancing test after the applicant has been found to have a prima facie case; but the explanation given in the text is believed to be the correct construction). 282 See Case 91/76  R  De Lacroix v European Court of Justice [1976]  ECR  1563; Case 121/77  R  Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council [1977]  ECR  2107; Case 4/78  R  Salerno v Commission [1978]  ECR  1; Case 19/78  R  Authié v Commission [1978]  ECR  679; Case 92/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1978] ECR 1129; Case 243/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1978] ECR 2391; Case 74/85 R Remy v Commission [1985] ECR 1185, paras 9–10. 283 See, for example, Judge Sørensen in the Salerno and Authié cases and Judge Kutscher in the Simmenthal cases, ibid. 284 Aldinger v European Parliament (above, note 267), para  13; Virgili v European Parliament (above, note 267), para 13. Cf Xeda (above, note 38), para 21 (the relief sought would not have assisted the applicant).

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8.85  Interim relief

cant must show that, if the judge does not make the order, serious and irreparable damage will be caused before the Court can give judgment in the action (or, as it is sometimes more colourfully put, that the applicant cannot await the outcome of the proceedings without having personally to sustain damage that would result in serious and irreversible consequences for him).285 If no urgency in that sense is proved, the application will be rejected.286 More specifically, if the Court can give judgment in the action before the damage is likely to occur,287 there is no necessity for an order to be made.288 The time factor apart, the nature of the relief sought may also be relevant to the question of urgency: the relief sought should be of such a nature as to prevent the occurrence of the alleged damage before judgment is delivered.289 There is no urgency justifying an order suspending the operation of a measure adopted by an institution if there is no reason to fear that it will be implemented or enforced or if it will have no practical effect.290 It is sufficient to disprove urgency that the defendant institution satisfies the applicant’s concerns;291 or gives an undertaking that it will not apply the measure or will apply it only in such a way as to remove the threat to the applicant;292 or, where the threat to the applicant’s position comes from a third party, if the third party gives an undertaking not to act.293 In the same way, there is no urgency if the occurrence of the threat is hypothetical or contingent upon events or the behaviour of third parties and it 285 Case 809/79 R Pardini SpA v Commission [1980] ECR 139; Cases 24 and 97/80 R Commission v France [1980] ECR 1319 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 20/81 R Arbed SA v Commission (above, note 279); Case 142/87  R  Belgium v Commission [1987]  ECR  2589, para  23; Case 111/88  R  Greece v Commission [1988]  ECR  2591, para  15; Case C-225/91  R  Matra SA  v Commission [1991] ECR I-5823, para 19. 286 Case 2/65 R Ferriera Ernesto Preo e Figli v High Authority [1966] ECR 231. Accordingly, it is not sufficient to assert that the disputed measure is about to take effect: the critical question is whether or not its taking effect will cause serious and irreparable damage. That point is made in cases like Case T-591/10 R Castiglioni Srl v Commission [2011] ECR II-47*, para 14, but tends to be obscured by references to the inherent effects of the disputed measure. Whether or not the effects of the disputed measure are inherent is irrelevant. The question is whether or not they cause serious and irreparable damage. 287 Sc before the decision, the suspension of whose operation has been claimed, takes effect or before the state aid causing the alleged distortion of competition would be paid. 288 Case 6/72  R  Europemballage Corpn and Continental Can Corpn Inc v Commission [1972] ECR 157; Matra SA v Commission (above, note 28), paras 24–25. 289 Case 246/89  R  Commission v United Kingdom (above, note 264), para  38; Case C-40/92 R Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-3389, para 31. 290 Case 2/59 R Niederrheinische Hütte AG v High Authority [1960] ECR 162; Case 21/59 R Italy v High Authority [1960]  ECR  351; Case 60/63  R  Acciaierie Ferriere Pietro Oddino v High Authority [1965] ECR 27; Case 322/87 R Frank v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 4375, para 19. 291 Eg Cases 82 and 83/85 R Eurasian Corpn Ltd v Commission [1985] ECR 1191, para 25. 292 Acciaierie Ferriere Pietro Oddino v High Authority (above, note 290); Case 31/79 R Société des Aciéries de Montereau v Commission [1979] ECR 1077; Case 45/84 R EISA v Commission [1984] ECR 1759, paras 12–14. The frequency with which defendant EU institutions are willing to give undertakings that remove a threat is difficult to discern. In cases like Evonik Degussa (above, note 73), in which it takes an extraordinarily long time for a decision on the interim relief application to be made (nearly seven months in that case), it seems likely that an informal undertaking not to do anything before the interim relief application had been decided must have been given by the Commission (no such undertaking is referred to in the order). 293 Cases 160 and 161/73 R Miles Druce & Co Ltd v Commission [1973] ECR 1049.

672

Interim relief 8.87

is insufficiently certain that those events will occur or that the third parties in question will behave in the way feared.294 There are dicta to the effect that the relative strength of the prima facie case is ‘not without effect on the assessment of urgency’.295 That seems to be illogical because the urgency of a threat of serious and irreparable harm cannot be increased or lessened by the strength or weakness of the arguments in the action. It is rather the willingness of the judge to do something about the threat that may be affected by the strength of the prima facie case. 8.86 Where the application for interim relief seeks the same relief as that claimed in the action, no order may be made for fear of prejudging the action since the relief will by its nature be permanent rather than temporary.296 But an order may be made if the applicant shows that he is presented with an imminent threat or that the status quo is threatened.297 Where necessary, the interim relief sought should therefore be distinguished from the relief sought in the action either by a difference in their nature or, where they are the same in nature, by their temporal scope. 2 Determining a threat to the status quo 8.87 Where it is the defendant who has the power to alter or maintain the status quo, urgency (in the sense of a change in the status quo) cannot be inferred merely from the fact that proceedings have commenced and it may be disproved by the stance taken by the defendant before the making of the application for relief.298 In particular, there is ordinarily no urgency where there already exists a mechanism for preserving the position, even if the operation of that mechanism is dependent upon some action on the part of the defendant or a third party.299 There is in consequence no need for the judge to act unless there is evidence that the defendant (or the third party) will or may by his act or omission cause the status quo to be ended; in that event the judge may order the defendant to take

294 Eg Case T-241/00 R Azienda Agricola ‘Le Canne’ Srl v Commission [2001] ECR II-37, para 37; Case T-27/13 R Elan v Commission, 11 March 2013, para 18 (the national authorities had not yet taken any steps to enforce the contested decision). 295 Akhras (above, note 179), para 26, citing Case C-445/00 R Austria v Council [2001] ECR I-1461, para 110. 296 Case 731/79  R  B  v European Parliament [1979]  ECR  3629; Case 794/79  R  B  v European Parliament [1979] ECR 3635; Cases 24 and 97/80 R Commission v France (above, note 252); Case C-40/92 R Commission v United Kingdom (above, note 289), para 29. 297 Miles Druce & Co Ltd v Commission (above, note 142); Case 318/81  R  Commission v CODEMI SpA [1982] ECR 1325; Case 171/83 R Commission v France [1983] ECR 2621; but see also Authié v Commission (above, note 282). 298 Case C-40/92 R Commission v United Kingdom (above, note 289), paras 27 and 31. In Elan (above, note 294), paras 20–21, the Commission had given the member state further time to comply with the decision, thus removing the need for urgent action. 299 Case C-280/93  R  Germany v Council; Case C-296/93  R  France v Commission; Case C-307/93 R Ireland v Commission (all above, note 262).

673

8.88  Interim relief

the steps necessary to preserve the status quo or impose some other appropriate form of relief.300 8.88 In that connection, a particular difficulty arises in relation to Commission decisions ordering a member state to recover allegedly unlawful state aid from the recipient because there is a certain lack of clarity as to who has the power to maintain the status quo. If the recipient of the alleged unlawful state aid wishes to resist the recovery of the aid, an action for the annulment of the Commission decision must be commenced before the Court (that is, the GC).301 The commencement of proceedings does not, in itself, suspend the state’s obligation to take steps to execute the decision while the action before the Court is pending. Initially, the Commission maintained (unsuccessfully) that no application for interim relief could be made in the proceedings before the Court because the beneficiary of the aid should instead wait until the state had initiated national proceedings for the recovery of the disputed aid and seek whatever remedy was available under national law.302 That, of course, presupposed that there were effective national remedies available303 and, more importantly, that the national courts could and would suspend national proceedings implementing a Commission decision even though the decision was fully effective and required action to be taken.304 However, in the absence of the grant of interim relief by the Court, the implementation of the Commission decision would be mandatory, despite the proceedings pending before the Court, and a failure by the state to take steps to recover the alleged aid would be a breach of the state’s Treaty obligations.305 Accordingly, the ECJ’s view is that, 300 Cases 160, 161,170/73 R II Miles Druce & Co Ltd v Commission and GKN [1974] ECR 281; Case C-40/92  R  Commission v United Kingdom (above, note 289). Cf the situation in Case C-156/03 P-R Commission v Les Laboratoires Servier SA [2003] ECR I-6575, paras 38–43, in which there was no indication that the national authorities would act, or fail to act, in such a way as to alter the status quo. 301 If no action is brought within time, the recipient is barred from contesting the legality of the Commission decision in any national proceedings for the enforcement of that decision: eg Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf v Germany [1994] ECR I-833. 302 See the Ilmenau case (Case T-198/01 R, above, note 222, paras 52–58; upheld on appeal in Case C-232/02 P(R), above, note 221, paras 30–36). 303 One of the problems that the EU institutions do not always appreciate is that national remedies can sometimes produce speedy effects that are irreversible or reversible only with difficulty (and after material damage has been suffered), particularly in the case of undertakings in a weak financial position. 304 Cases to that effect are referred to in Case T-103/14 R Frucona (above, note 223), para 65; but occasional examples drawn from one or two member states do not establish a general principle of law or practice applicable across the EU. 305 Case C-507/08 Commission v Slovakia [2010] ECR I-13489, which concerned the Commission decision disputed in Case T-11/07 Frucona Kosice a.s. v Commission [2010] ECR II-5453 (on appeal, Case C-73/11 P Frucona Kosice a.s. v Commission, 24 January 2013). In consequence of the judgment in Case C-507/08, Slovak law was amended so as to make Commission decisions ordering the recovery of state aid immediately enforceable. Execution proceedings had to be commenced within 30 days. The respondent in the execution proceedings had to raise any objection to execution within 14 days of being notified of the commencement of the execution proceedings; but the mere fact that an action had been commenced before the GC for the annulment of the Commission decision requiring recovery of the alleged aid was not an objection to execution. Further, suspension of execution proceedings initiated in order to

674

Interim relief 8.89

while a national court may suspend the enforcement of demands for the recovery of alleged unlawful aid for reasons that do not raise any complaint about the Commission decision in question, where execution is resisted because that decision is disputed, the question of the grant of interim relief is not a matter for the national courts but falls exclusively within the system of remedies provided for by EU law. The grant of interim relief is therefore a matter for the GC (where an action for the annulment of the Commission decision has been commenced before it).306 It follows that the only mechanism for preserving the position pending judgment in the action before the GC is an application for interim relief addressed to the GC itself. However, it appears that a different view is taken at the level of the GC, although the reasons for that different view are unclear.307 In principle, in the case of decisions of the EU institutions, the mechanism for preserving the status quo is primarily the interim relief regime applicable in proceedings before the Court because it is before that Court that such measures are disputed. 8.89 The status quo is ordinarily the situation prevailing at the time when the application for relief is made. In most cases, the application is made at the commencement of the action, in which case the status quo ante is taken to be the situation prevailing before then. In actions for annulment, the status quo can be taken to be the situation prevailing immediately before the adoption of the contested act308 at least where the applicant for relief has commenced proceedings promptly and without undue delay.309 In proceedings that are commenced only recover state aid held by the Commission to be unlawful was precluded. The question whether or not a Slovak court could or would grant interim relief in those circumstances, where the GC had not done so, was unclear as a matter of Slovak law. That situation caused the problems in the later Frucona litigation (as to which, see note 223 above). 306 Case C-232/05 Commission v France [2006] ECR I-10071, paras 55–60. 307 Eg Case T-27/13 R Elan v Commission, 11 March 2013, paras 23–24 (which does not take Case C-232/05 Commission v France, above, note 306, into account). In Case T-103/14 R Frucona (above, note 223), paras 63 and 66, the President of the GC concluded (amongst other things) that the applicant had not established that the condition of urgency had been satisfied because the applicant had failed to show that the relevant Slovak remedies were ‘defective’ (the problem was that Slovak law did not provide for interim relief and there was no Slovak case law on the topic (see above, note 305); the President seems to have thought that, in those circumstances, the burden lay on the applicant to disprove the possibility that the Slovak courts would ignore the absence of legislative provision enabling interim relief to be granted). In the light of Case C-232/05 Commission v France (above, note 306), the position under national law was not relevant. In the event, the competent Slovak court dismissed the applicant’s objection to the execution of the Commission decision. The applicant appealed against that decision and made a second application for interim relief in the proceedings before the GC. That application was also rejected: Case T-103/14 R-II Frucona v Commission, 18 September 2014. The applicant was still in existence when the disputed Commission decision was annulled only because, fortuitously, the execution of the decision had got bogged down in the Slovak appeals system, a state of affairs that is neither satisfactory nor consistent with Case C-232/05 Commission v France. 308 Eg Case 65/87 R Pfizer International Inc v Commission [1987] ECR 1691, paras 25–26. 309 The mere fact that proceedings have been commenced within the limitation period may not be sufficient to take the status quo back to the situation prevailing before the adoption of the contested measure if the threat to the applicant is such that a prudent litigant would and could have commenced proceedings at an earlier point during the running of the limitation period.

675

8.90  Interim relief

after a compulsory pre-litigation procedure, it is unclear whether the status quo ante is to be taken to be the situation prevailing at the commencement of litigation or that prevailing at some earlier time, such as at the commencement of the pre-litigation procedure or some point during it.310 In principle, for the purpose of the grant of interim relief, the status quo should ordinarily be taken to be the situation prevailing at the time when the application for relief is made; but it cannot be excluded that, in some cases, it may be more just to take the situation prevailing at an earlier point in time. In Case 154/85 R Commission v Italy,311 for example, the status quo was taken to be the situation prevailing immediately before the first of the events causing the Commission to commence the pre-litigation procedure, thus resulting in the defendant being required to revert to the position as it had been nearly a year before relief was granted. The fact that the applicant for relief is obliged to go through a pre-litigation procedure before proceedings can be commenced before the Court and an application for interim relief can be made gives the opposing party an opportunity to alter the prevailing state of affairs to its advantage, or allow that state of affairs to alter, while the pre-litigation procedure is taking its course; and in particular cases it may be regarded as unjust to allow the opposing party to take advantage of the delays caused by the pre-litigation procedure, at least where the opposing party has been made fully aware of the point at issue and cannot rely upon some countervailing interest.312 On the other hand, where the commencement and conduct of the pre-litigation procedure lie entirely within the discretion of the applicant for relief, delay on the part of the applicant in commencing the pre-litigation procedure or a failure on its part to pursue with dispatch the conduct of that procedure may militate against the selection of an early point in time as identifying the status quo. Cases where a date before the making of the application for relief is taken for the purpose of establishing the status quo are not, strictly speaking, exceptions to the general rule that interim relief is concerned with maintaining the status quo and not with the reversal of a state of affairs existing at the time application is made because one of the functions of interim relief is to restore the status quo.313 3 Undertakings not to alter the status quo 8.90 In applications for the suspension of an act challenged before the Court, the Court will usually accept an undertaking (if made) from the author of the

310 In practical terms, this difficulty concerns proceedings brought in respect of a failure by a member state to fulfil a Treaty obligation: see TFEU, art 258. 311 Above (note 271), para 21. 312 Case 293/85  R  Commission v Belgium (above, note 271), where the relief granted in effect restored the status quo at the beginning of the academic year even though it had already started when proceedings before the Court were commenced, appears to be an example of such a case. 313 Cf Case 352/88  R  Commission v Italy [1989]  ECR  267, para  23. Other things being equal, maintenance of the status quo (particularly if it is long-standing) is preferable to any alteration of it: cf Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission (above, note 23), para 15; Publishers’ Association v Commission (above, note 265), para 35; Evonik Degussa (above, note 73), para 114.

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Interim relief 8.90

measure that it will not be applied and will then dismiss the application.314 Whereas, in the case of suspension, the undertaking must ordinarily be given by the author of the act in question (that is, the defendant), in the case of an application for interim measures an appropriate undertaking may be given by any party to the proceedings (including an intervener) who is in a position to ensure that the applicant for relief will not be threatened with serious and irreparable damage pending judgment.315 Undertakings made by or on behalf of an EU institution should be made (and, if made, relied on) only if given by the agent of the institution concerned (otherwise, the undertaking will have been given by a person who may not have authority to give it, in which case it might quite properly be repudiated by the institution concerned). When made by the institution’s agent, formal note is to be taken of the undertaking.316 It would appear that, when an undertaking is given in that way, it cannot be repudiated by the hierarchical superior of the institution’s agent but can properly be withdrawn only by the institution itself or an official duly authorised to do so by that institution; until properly withdrawn, the undertaking must therefore be complied with by the officials of the institution concerned, at whatever level they are in the institution, as if it were (as in principle it is) a direct instruction emanating from the persons comprising the institution (such as the College of Commissioners, in the case of the Commission). Even when given by the institution’s agent, however, such undertakings appear to have no legal force as between the institution and the applicant for relief save that they may create a legitimate expectation, on the part of the latter, that they will be performed unless and until properly withdrawn. Undertakings given by or on behalf of a member state must similarly be made by the agent of the member state; those given by or on behalf of any other party must be made by that party’s representative. In all cases, formal note should be taken of the giving of an undertaking. The effectiveness of such an undertaking is dependent upon the good faith of the party giving it. If the party giving the undertaking fails to perform it, the opposing party may renew its application 314 Eg Case 68/63 R Luhleich v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 618; Acciaierie Ferriere Pietro Oddino v High Authority (above, note 290); Société des Aciéries de Montereau v Commission (above, note 292); Cases 161 and 162/80  R  Carbognani and Zabetta v Commission [1980] ECR 2655; EISA v Commission (above, note 292), paras 12–14; Case 78/86 R Costacurta v Commission [1986] ECR 1231; Case C-385/89 R Greece v Commission [1990] ECR I-561, para 10. The Court is not always fortunate in its dealings with the institutions. In the fourth case mentioned, the application requested the suspension of what was alleged to be a decision transferring the applicants, who were officials of the Commission, from Rome to Brussels. At the hearing the Commission said that it did not intend to implement the ‘decision’ until a formal decision had been adopted so the purpose of the application was in substance already achieved and the claim for suspension was otiose. Judge Pescatore agreed and held that there was no need to give judgment on the application. On the same day he also heard the application in Case 163/80R Jacobucci v Commission [1980] ECR 2661, which concerned the same situation. In view of the Commission’s declaration, Jacobucci withdrew her application for suspension and it was removed from the Court’s register. That very evening, it seems, the Commission adopted a decision transferring the applicants. 315 Eg Case 260/85 R Tokyo Electric Co Ltd v Council [1985] ECR 3467, paras 16–17, undertakings given by an intervener. In Case 45/87 R Commission v Ireland [1987] ECR 13369, the defendant was able to give an undertaking which was effective up to a particular date but stated that it could not maintain the status quo thereafter in the absence of an order (para 3). 316 Eg Tokyo Electric Co Ltd v Council, ibid, paras 16–17.

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8.91  Interim relief

for suspension or, as the case may be, interim measures and may well have an independent cause of action for damages in respect of any loss suffered between the breach of the undertaking and the grant of interim relief in consequence of the failure to perform the undertaking;317 but it would seem that the Court could award damages in such circumstances only where an EU institution has failed to perform an undertaking, the liability of other parties in respect of breach of an undertaking ordinarily being a matter for the competent national court. When a party withdraws an undertaking, it should inform the Court and the opposing party or parties in advance so that any appropriate action may be taken in order to maintain the status quo; otherwise, the party giving the undertaking may be acting in breach of the other party’s legitimate expectations. 4 Undertakings not to prejudice the effect of the final judgment 8.91 Urgency may also be disproved where the opposing party gives not so much an undertaking concerning the position pending judgment but makes a concession regarding the situation after the date of judgment which ensures that the judgment will be fully effective despite any change in circumstances in the meantime. Thus, if the defendant gives an assurance that a recruitment procedure will not affect the applicant’s rights, if the latter wins the action, the applicant will then have no interest in pursuing the application for relief because the continuation of the recruitment procedure will not be prejudicial to the effectiveness of the final judgment.318 In one case an application was made for the suspension of a sale of olive oil by tender because, if the applicants made unconditional offers, that would be taken as a waiver of their property rights in the oil whereas, if they made conditional offers, those would be rejected. Relief on that ground was refused because the defendant institution conceded that an unconditional offer would not be a waiver of the applicant’s rights and the judge incorporated that concession in his decision.319 5 Effect of action or inaction on the part of the applicant 8.92 There are two forms of conduct by the applicant that may be relevant to the question of urgency: delay or inaction; and conduct that creates or aggravates a threat. The latter is considered in para 8.104 below. 317 It should be made clear that the failure to perform the undertaking does not provide the applicant for relief with a right to claim suspension or interim measures. However unattractive the behaviour of the party concerned might be thought to be as a result of its failure to perform the undertaking, interim relief could be ordered only if the requirements for granting it were satisfied. Clearly, if those requirements were not satisfied and the applicant’s renewed application were unsuccessful, the failure to perform the undertaking would not, in the event, have caused the applicant recoverable loss unless the applicant was successful in the action. 318 Cases 98 and 99/63  R  Reynier v Commission [1964]  ECR  276; Carbognani and Zabetta v Commission (above, note 314); Case 89/82 R Wölker v Commission [1982] ECR 1323; Case 241/84  R  Pizzinato v Commission [1984]  ECR  3619, paras 9–10; Case 64/86  R  Sergio v Commission [1986] ECR 1081, para 9. 319 Case 232/81 R Agricola Commerciale Olio Srl v Commission [1981] ECR 2193.

678

Interim relief 8.93

Although, as has been said, urgency is a function of the need to grant relief before judgment and not of the speed with which the applicant has applied for relief, delay in making an application may negative urgency320 either by suggesting that there is no real need to act before judgment321 or by allowing the situation to change to the detriment of the applicant for relief: urgency is always to be assessed by reference to future events and not by reference to a change in circumstances which has already occurred by the time when application is made322 save in cases where the applicant applies promptly (or as soon as is possible) in order to restore the status quo after the occurrence of an unforeseen event.323 It should be noted that that does not mean that an applicant for relief can be criticised for not making the application at the outset of the proceedings: an applicant for relief should apply for interim relief only when it appears that damage is likely to be caused before judgment can be delivered. In the nature of things, the circumstances of a particular case may be such that that risk is apparent at the outset or apparent only when the action is well advanced. Where, at the commencement of proceedings, a future event likely to cause serious and irreparable damage to the applicant is perceived as occurring relatively far off in point of time, an application for relief made at that stage of the action risks being dismissed as premature; there is in consequence sound reason for delaying the application for relief until the occurrence of the future event is imminent.324 In such circumstances, delay does not create an artificial degree of urgency but simply reflects a previous absence of urgency. 6 Urgency in relation to measures already in force 8.93 There is authority that, if a measure is already in force when an application to suspend its operation is made, it is impossible to say that suspension is urgent.325 That is not necessarily so in all cases; it depends upon the nature of the measure whose suspension is sought and on whether it takes effect at a given moment or over a given period of time (which passed before the application for relief was made) or has future effects in that, although already in force, it will apply to a future situation or will continue to regulate the situa 320 Case 28/65 R Fonzi v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 508; Cases 31 and 53/77 R Commission v United Kingdom [1977] ECR 921 (Advocate General Mayras). 321 Cf Case 194/88 R Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 5647, para 16, where the defendant’s reliance on a threat to public health and the environment if relief were granted was rejected because the competent national body had itself acted in a dilatory fashion. 322 Cf Case 57/89 R Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 2849, para 18. 323 If the event is foreseeable, it may form part of the status quo: cf Ilford v Commission (above, note 161), paras 22–23. 324 Eg Aldinger v European Parliament (above, note 238), paras 11–13; Virgili v European Parliament (above, note 267), paras 11–13. In Cases 3–18, 25 and 26/58 Erzbergbau v High Authority [1960] ECR 220 at 223–224, the application was made shortly before judgment was delivered because it was only then that the contested measure was going to be implemented. Judge Donner expressed some criticism of the delay but the effective ground for rejecting the application was that any damage suffered would be reversible. 325 Case 61/76 R II Geist v Commission [1976] ECR 2075. But see Ilford v Commission (above, note 161).

679

8.94  Interim relief

tion. For example, the urgency to suspend a decision to transfer the applicant for relief from one post to another, which is expressed to take effect only several months after it was made and came into force, does not arise immediately upon the adoption of the decision but increases with the passage of time; and whereas, at the time the decision was adopted, there might not then have been any urgency at all to justify an application for suspension, the closer one gets to the date on which the decision has its effect, the greater the degree of urgency if no judgment is yet in sight.326 In an application for interim measures, as opposed to suspension, however, it does not seem that the current application of the measure in question is a bar to relief.327 The basic rule seems to be that, if the measure has already taken effect, no relief can be given328 unless it may continue to have effect and thus may give rise to serious and irreparable loss in the future.329 The judge can order relief only in respect of the future loss.330 In the case of measures which have already taken effect, there is urgency if there is no evidence of a real possibility of avoiding future loss from their continued application.331 7 Cases of no urgency 8.94 In general, there is no urgency if there is no discernible causal connection between the events giving rise to the application for relief and the threat of serious and irreparable damage relied on;332 or if any change in circumstances pending judgment would be reversed automatically or deprived automatically of any prejudicial effect on the applicant for relief by a judgment in his (or her) favour333 (in consequence, the judge must first decide whether or not the appli 326 The Aldinger and Virgili cases (above, note 267). 327 Case 61/77 R Commission v Ireland [1977] ECR 1411. 328 Case 10/82 R Morgensen v Commission [1982] ECR 325; Case 39/83 R Fabius v Commission [1983] ECR 2147. 329 Cf Case 67/63 R SOREMA v High Authority [1964] ECR 174; Cases 19 and 65/63A Prakash v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 576; Luhleich v Euratom Commission (above, note 314); Geist v Commission (above, note 325); Case 61/77 R Commission v Ireland (above, note 53); Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council (above, note 172); Case 92/78 R Simmenthal v Commission (above, note 60); Case 42/82 R Commission v France [1982] ECR 841. 330 Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council (above, note 172); SICA and SIPEFELI v Commission (above, note 122); Case 57/89 R Commission v Germany (above, note 56), para 18. 331 Case 42/82 R Commission v France (above, note 113) at 865 (Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn). 332 Case 82/87 R Autexpo SpA v Commission [1987] ECR 2131, para 24; Case 191/88 R Co-Frutta Sarl v Commission [1988] ECR 4551, paras 20–21; Case C-242/90 P-R Commission v Albani [1990] ECR I-4329, paras 22–25 (the judgment of the CFI which the applicant sought to have suspended was not capable of giving rise to the damage feared). Eg in Les Laboratoires Servier (above, note 300), paras 38–43, there was no causal connection because the proximate cause of the damage that was feared would have been action (or inaction) on the part of national authorities which were capable of exercising their own judgment. 333 Eg Case 341/85  R  van der Stijl v Commission [1985]  ECR  3795, para  12; Case 46/87  R  Hoechst AG  v Commission [1987]  ECR  1549, para  34; Case 209/87  R  Association des Aciéries Européennes Indépendantes (EISA) v Commission [1987]  ECR  3453, para  22; Case 214/87  R  Cockerill Sambre v Commission [1987]  ECR  3463, para  22; Case

680

Interim relief 8.94

cant’s success in the action would make it possible to reverse the situation);334 or if the applicant’s position could be adequately protected in other proceedings (in casu, proceedings brought before national courts).335 Urgency also will not be demonstrated where the purpose of the relief sought is to maintain a state of affairs that is itself a disruption of the status quo and appears to be unlawful.336 In an action to suspend the operation of a recruiting competition, urgency is not established if the applicant is young enough to take part in a forthcoming competition.337 There is no urgency if the applicant can protect his rights adequately by bringing another action.338 Dissemination of a report whose contents and conclusions are only under discussion, so that no decision is yet contemplated, does not give rise to urgency:339 there must be more than just a possibility that an act adversely affecting the applicant may be adopted.340 In the same way, the continuation of an administrative investigation341 does not justify relief.342 In a case where the applicant for relief seeks an order enabling it to fill a post, the facts that the post was vacant for several months before the dispute between the parties arose and that the person appointed to it was authorised to occupy it on a parttime basis for over a year indicate that there is no urgency; it is therefore for the applicant to demonstrate some objective need to fill the post before judgment by showing, for example, that there has been a significant increase in the volume of work to be done.343 There is no urgency to suspend a measure that does no more than require an undertaking to produce documents which make it possible for the defendant institution to monitor the development of trade: such a measure is not likely to influence the behaviour of the undertaking and, in consequence, is not likely to cause harm justifying suspension.344

223/87  R  Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche v Commission [1987]  ECR  3473, para  22; Case 85/87 R Dow Chemical Nederland BV v Commission [1987] ECR 4367, para 17; Case 229/88 R Cargill BV v Commission [1988] ECR 5183, para 19; Case 171/89 R Gonzalez Holguera v European Parliament [1989] ECR 1705, paras 13–14; Case T-155/89 R Buccarello v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-19, para 12; Cases T-10 to T-12, T-14 and T-15/92 R SA Cimenteries CBR v Commission [1992] ECR II-1571, para 56. 334 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission (above, note 23), para 15. 335 Case 310/85  R  Deufil GmbH & Co KG  v Commission [1986]  ECR  537, paras 21–22; Case 303/88 R Italy v Commission [1989] ECR 801, para 25; Case C-40/92 R Commission v United Kingdom (above, note 289), para 30; Case T-12/93 R Vittel (above, note 169), order of 6 July 1993 ([1993] ECR II-785). 336 Cases 67, 68 and 70/85 R Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV v Commission [1985] ECR 1315, paras 41–44. 337 Salerno v Commission (above, note 247). 338 Case 186/80 R Suss v Commission [1980] ECR 3501. 339 Case 51/79 R Buttner v Commission [1979] ECR 1727. 340 Case 51/79 R II Buttner v Commission [1979] ECR 2387. 341 Sc into an alleged infringement of the competition rules. 342 Cases 60 and 190/81 R International Business Machines Corpn v Commission [1981] ECR 1857; Case 173/82 R Castille v Commission [1982] ECR 4047; De Compte v European Parliament (above, note 186). 343 Case C-35/92 P-R European Parliament v Frederiksen [1992] ECR I-2399, paras 20–22. 344 Case 37/84 R EISA v Commission [1984] ECR 1749, para 11.

681

8.95  Interim relief

8 Urgent cases 8.95 In addition to the examples referred to above, the requirement of urgency is satisfied in the case of a measure that has an immediate influence on the action of an undertaking, such as by deterring it from a lawful development of its business;345 or where the national authorities are about to take action on the basis of the contested act.346 8.96 In all cases, however, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that a measure contested in the action is about to be put into effect or that the status quo is about to be altered in some other way. In addition to those matters, it is necessary to show that serious and irreparable damage will result before judgment can be given.347

C

Serious and irreparable damage

1 General 8.97 The two adjectives most commonly used to describe the damage that must be threatened are ‘serious’ and ‘irreversible’, although ‘irreparable’ is sometimes used instead of the latter. There appears to be no significant difference between ‘irreversible’ and ‘irreparable’. Both words, ‘serious’ and ‘irreversible’ (or ‘irreparable’), tend to be used together.348 Some early cases, however, suggest that there must be a risk of irreparable or at least serious damage,349 rather than the risk of damage that is both serious and irreparable. In Cases 24 and 97/80 R Commission v France350 Advocate General Capotorti treated both terms as being synonymous: ‘the applicant should be exposed to serious, in the sense of ‘irreparable’ damage’. That appears to be the currently accepted approach in the sense that the phrase ‘serious and irreparable damage’ is regularly repeated in the orders and is clearly used as a formula to describe the damage that must be proved, whose separate elements are not subject to semantic analysis.351 That 345 Case 45/84 R EISA v Commission (above, note 292), para 11. 346 Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission (above, note 259), para 7; Italy v Commission (above, note 335), para 25. 347 Eg Case 378/87  R  Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH  v Commission [1988]  ECR  161, para  18; Castiglioni (above, note 286), para 14. Urgency is an aspect of serious and irreparable harm: Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-1, para 29. 348 See, for example, Case 42/82 R Commission v France [1982] ECR 841, a decision of the full Court. 349 See, for example, Case 31/59 Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia v High Authority [1960] ECR 98; Case 17/64 Suss v High Authority [1964] ECR 617. 350 [1980] ECR 1319 at 1341. 351 An example is Case 20/81 R Arbed v Commission [1981] ECR 721, para 14, where the damage in question comprised the quarterly fixing of steel quotas at a level which the applicants alleged was too low. They applied for an increase of the quotas by way of interim relief. The damage was, on the facts, certainly irreversible or irreparable because, even if they won the action, the judgment could not, otherwise than by an award of damages, which were not claimed, compensate for the production lost in the time leading up to the date of the judgment. On the other hand, the increases sought were relatively small and that led the President to hold that the

682

Interim relief 8.100

must be borne in mind when referring to old cases which do appear to draw a distinction between ‘serious’ and ‘irreparable’ or ‘irreversible’ damage.352 8.98 Whichever the way of expressing the formula to be used, the test seems to have remained the same over the years: as Advocate General Capotorti put it,353 the damage must be ‘such as to make the ultimate judgment pointless, so that in the absence of interim measures there would be no purpose in the ultimate judgment’. The effect of the damage is therefore to be measured by reference both to the position of the applicant for relief and to the purpose of the action. For that reason, proof of moral damage, even if ‘serious and irreparable’ as far as the applicant’s feelings are concerned, is insufficient: moral damage does not prejudice the effect of the final judgment but is, on the face of it, eminently capable of being removed by the final judgment (if it is in favour of the applicant). Put another way, the test for irreparable damage is that it is impossible to safeguard the applicant’s position retroactively if he wins the action,354 the object of interim relief being to prevent the final judgment from being rendered worthless by the passage of time and the infliction of damage that is irreversible.355 If the result of a failure to grant interim relief is simply disadvantageous to the applicant, but not irreversibly so, the order will not be made.356 Nevertheless, it would seem that, if the disadvantage suffered by the applicant is serious, and an obstacle to carrying out its commercial activities357 or, possibly, disproportionate having regard to the interest of the defendant in leaving matters as they are in the absence of interim relief,358 relief may be granted. 8.99 In cases where relief is sought in respect of a measure granting some form of interim relief that has been challenged in the action, the relevant question is whether or not the contested measure, if put into operation immediately, risks causing damage considerably in excess of the inevitable but temporary disadvantages arising from a true conservatory measure.359 8.100 In one case it was suggested that, if dismissal of the application for relief would lead to an ‘almost hopelessly involved situation’ relief might be grantfixing of the quotas at a level that was too low ‘cannot be regarded as being such as to cause serious and irreparable damage to undertakings of the size of the applicants’. If ‘serious’ were truly a distinct attribute to the damage that must be proved, the order would have referred to it alone and not to ‘serious and irreparable damage’. 352 It should also be noted that, in a few later cases, the distinction between ‘serious’ and ‘irreparable’ can be observed, possibly reflecting a more relativist approach on the part of some judges to the justification for granting relief. 353 Cases 24 and 97/80 R Commission v France (above, note 252) at 1342. Cf Cases 67, 68 and 70/85 R Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV v Commission [1985] ECR 1315, para 47. 354 Case 29/66 R Gutmann v Euratom Commission [1967] ECR 241. 355 Case 50/69 R Germany v Commission [1969] ECR 449 (Advocate General Gand). 356 Cases 3–18, 25, 26/58A  Erzbergbau v High Authority [1960]  ECR  220; Case 120/83 R Raznoimport v Commission [1983] ECR 2573. 357 Case 18/57 Nold KG v High Authority [1957–58] ECR 121 at 124 (a decision of the ECJ). 358 Case 44/88 R De Compte v European Parliament [1988] ECR 1669, para 31. 359 Case T-23/90 R Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA v EC Commission [1990] ECR II-195, para 24.

683

8.101  Interim relief

ed.360 The fact that the applicant succeeded in obtaining relief in a previous case does not relieve him of the obligation to demonstrate that the conditions required for the grant of relief have been satisfied in the case pending before the Court.361 The serious and irreparable nature of the loss alleged must be assessed ‘in concreto’.362 2 The persons or interests threatened with damage 8.101 In principle, damage that may be caused to a third party is irrelevant to a claim for interim relief: only that affecting the applicant can be relied on in order to ground a claim for relief.363 It would appear from Case T-96/92  R  Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société des Grandes Sources v Commission364 that employees’ organisations may in principle rely on a threat to the jobs of their members (at least where such organisations exist in order to represent the interests of the employees of a particular undertaking). 8.102 In the case of member states, the position is more complex. Some cases suggest that the damage relied on may be any damage caused to any person within their frontiers or any damage to their national interest.365 In other cases, member states have been precluded from relying on damage other than damage with which they have been ‘personally’ threatened, thus excluding reliance on

360 Cases 42 and 49/59 Breedband NV v Société des Aciéries du Temple [1962] ECR 167 at 169. 361 Case 44/88 R De Compte v European Parliament (above, note 358), para 32. 362 Agricola Commerciale Olio Srl v Commission (above, note 63). 363 Case 12/64  R  Ley v Commission [1965]  ECR  132; Case 22/75  R  Küster v European Parliament [1975] ECR 277; Case 269/84 R Fabbro v Commission [1984] ECR 4333, para 9; Case 292/84  R  Scharf v Commission [1984]  ECR  4349, paras 12–14; Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi v Commission (above, note 237), para 27; Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG v Commission (above, note 237), para 28; Case 55/86 R Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Bugues de Pesca de Gran Sol de Pontevedra (Arposol) v Council [1986]  ECR  1331, para  6; Belgium v Commission (above, note 285), paras 23–24; Top Hit Holzvertrieb GmbH  v Commission (above, note 347), para 18; Case 111/88 R Greece v Commission (above, note 285), para 15; Case 112/88 R Crete Citro Producers’ Association v Commission [1988] ECR 2597, para 20; Case C-313/90 R Comité International de la Rayonne et des Fibres Synthétiques v Commission [1991]  ECR  I-2557, para  24. But see Cases 228 and 229/82  R  Ford Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc v Commission [1982] ECR 3091, para 10; Ilford v Commission (above, note 161), para 21: Case 92/88 R Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v Commission [1988] ECR 2425, para 24; Publishers’ Association v Commission (above, note 265), para 35. 364 [1992] ECR II-2579, paras 43–47. 365 Case 166/78  R  Italy v Council [1978]  ECR  1745 (the action was brought to annul several Council regulations, the damage relied on to justify relief being suffered by the Italian cereal starch industry; the application was rejected on the ground that there was no evidence of serious and irreparable damage, not on the ground that the type of damage relied on did not justify relief); Case 171/83  R  Commission v France (above, note 297); Case 278/84  R  Germany v Commission (above, note 275), para 19; Case 57/86 R Greece v Commission [1986] ECR 1497, para 12; Case 303/88 R Italy v Commission (above, note 335), para 24, damage to the Italian economy resulting from the risk that the recipients of certain state aids might go out of business (the argument was rejected on the facts).

684

Interim relief 8.102

damage to persons within their frontiers.366 The cases can be reconciled by saying that member states can rely upon damage to persons or interests which they represent save where those persons or interests could be adequately and more conveniently protected otherwise than by the member state in question, such as by an action brought by the persons concerned themselves. Thus, where the person threatened with damage is the recipient of a (proposed) state aid whose grant has been prohibited by the contested act, that person (as well as the member state proposing to grant the aid) has a right of action against the contested act; since that person is able to protect its interests by itself bringing proceedings and, in those proceedings, can seek interim relief, it (rather than the member state concerned) should bear the responsibility of protecting its own position; if it does not consider it necessary to commence proceedings and seek interim relief, it is not for the member state to seek interim relief in its stead (although the member state is clearly entitled to seek the annulment of the contested act in order to establish the lawfulness of the grant of the state aid).367 Although that approach appears to reconcile most cases, it does not fit every one of them.368 For example, in Case 119/86  R  Spain v Council and Commission369 Spain sought the suspension of various regulations on the ground that they were seriously damaging Spanish exports because exporters had to lodge a security and that, together with the formalities and additional expense involved, had caused a significant fall in exports and a consequent loss of market share and outlets. The application was dismissed essentially for evidential reasons but not because Spain had invoked a type of damage that could not be relied on in such an application. At about the same time, the Spanish exporters made a similar application which was dismissed on essentially the same grounds.370 In Case C-280/93 R Germany v Council371 the ECJ expressed the principle to be applied in more general terms as being that, as the member states may act in defence of general interests at the national level (in particular, economic and social interests), they may rely on any threat to an entire sector of the national economy, in particular threats to employment and to the cost of living.

366 Case 142/87 R Belgium v Commission (above, note 285), paras 23–24; Case 111/88 R Greece v Commission (above, note 285), paras 14–16; Case 303/88  R  Italy v Commission (above, note 335), para  23; Case 32/89  R  Greece v Commission [1989]  ECR  985, para  16; Case C-356/90 R Belgium v Commission [1991] ECR I-2423, para 24. 367 See also the situation that gave rise to the applications in Case 111/88 R Greece v Commission (above, note 285) and Crete Citron Producers’ Association v Commission (below, note 387). 368 In fact, the inability of a member state to rely upon a threat to a person or interest within its borders seems to arise almost only in state aid cases where the person or interest in question is the recipient or beneficiary of the state aid. In consequence, it may be that that inability is a peculiar feature of state aid cases which does not apply in most other areas. 369 [1986] ECR 2241. See also Case 128/86 R Spain v Commission [1986] ECR 2495. 370 Case 117/86 R Union de Federaciones Agrarias de España (UFADE) v Council and Commission [1986] ECR 2483. Judge Mackenzie Stuart expressed some doubt about the admissibility of the exporters’ action but nonetheless decided their application for interim relief on the ground that they had failed to show the urgency of the situation. 371 Above (note 262), para 27. See in similar vein Case T-198/12 R Germany v Commission (above, note 76) (protection of the health of children).

685

8.103  Interim relief

8.103 In the case of the EU institutions, the damage may be that which would be suffered by them qua institution372 and, at least in the case of the Commission,373 any damage to the interests of the EU,374 including a threat to the rule of law in the EU or to persons whose rights under EU law are threatened.375 The same applies where the Commission (at least) opposes an application for relief: for example, when an undertaking which has been involved in a restrictive practice applies for the suspension of the operation of a Commission decision finding the practice to be contrary to the competition rules, the Commission may, it would seem, rely on the effect suspension would have on the victims of the practice in order to oppose the application, even though the effect on the Commission qua institution would be neither serious nor irreparable; the Commission represents the EU public interest in the proper application of the competition rules. It is not clear to what extent there are limits to the interests that an EU institution may rely on. In Case 3/75 R Johnson and Firth Brown v Commission376 the Commission had adopted a decision authorising the take-over of the applicants. They applied for the operation of the decision to be suspended. There was no doubt that its operation would cause serious and irreparable damage to the applicants. Judge Lecourt found that suspension of its operation would cause equally serious and irreparable damage to the creditors of the company whose shares in the applicants were to be sold in order to effect the take-over. The creditors had an interest in having the shares sold as soon as possible and had intervened in the proceedings. In consequence suspension was not granted but other relief was. It is doubtful if the threat to the creditors could properly be said to be subsumed in the EU public interest represented by the Commission: the Commission’s powers were to be exercised for the purpose of maintaining a healthy steel industry whereas the interveners’ interest was purely pecuniary. It was not necessary to decide that question because the judge could take account of the interest of the creditors since they had intervened in the proceedings.377 372 Eg Case C-345/90 P-R European Parliament v Hanning [1991] ECR I-231, paras 32–33. 373 The position regarding the other EU institutions is unclear. It is tenable that each institution may rely only on a threat to the interests represented by it. The Commission represents broader interests than do the other institutions because of its more wide-ranging powers to ensure the observance of EU law: TEU, art 17(1). 374 See, for example, Commission v Ireland (above, note 53); Case 42/82 R Commission v France (above, note 113); Case 171/83 R Commission v France (above, note 297); Ley v Commission (above, note 363) at 134; Case 154/85 R Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 1753, para 19; Case 45/87  R  Commission v Ireland [1987]  ECR  1369, para  32 (damage to the Commission ‘as guardian of the interests of the Community’). 375 Eg Case 293/85  R  Commission v Belgium [1985]  ECR  3521, para  23 (in casu, the interests of students in a member state); Case 194/88 R Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 5647, paras 6 and 16; Case 246/89 R Commission v United Kingdom [1989] ECR 3125 (in casu, the rights of owners and operators of certain fishing vessels; it should be noted that the Commission commenced proceedings for interim relief after the persons concerned had failed to obtain interim relief from the competent national courts). 376 [1975] ECR 1. 377 Compare Cases 6 and 7/73 R Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corpn v Commission [1973]  ECR  357. There the applicants sought to have annulled a Commission decision requiring them to terminate forthwith a restrictive practice which comprised a refusal to supply a company called Zoja. Zoja intervened in the proceedings and Judge Lecourt held that the potential damage to it, if interim relief were granted, had to be taken

686

Interim relief 8.105

3 Causation and temporal issues 8.104 The applicant cannot rely on a risk of damage which does not arise from the act of another but has been brought on by himself378 or on a risk that the applicant has knowingly assumed.379 On the other hand, a person cannot be expected to take radical and exceptional steps to avert a threat arising from the contested act before the act has been adopted; and the same applies once the act has been adopted and a challenge to it has been brought, at least where the chances of succeeding in the challenge are sufficiently great.380 In an action for annulment, the risk must be sufficiently certain and arise directly from the act whose annulment is sought in the action.381 8.105 Ex hypothesi the damage has not occurred at the time of the application. If it has, relief is not granted save in respect of any future damage that may arise before judgment can be delivered.382 It is sufficient to show that damage383 is a possibility384 but the possibility must be real or concrete and the potential damage actual and specific; a risk of indefinite or hypothetical future damage is not sufficient to ground a claim for relief.385 The fact that the situation giving rise to the threat of damage is temporary and is likely to or will inevitably end before the into account. It would seem, however, that Zoja’s intervention was not strictly necessary in order to bring its interest before the Court because it was an interest that the Commission could properly represent. 378 Case 220/82  R  Moselstahlwerk GmbH & Co Kg v Commission [1982]  ECR  2971; Case 338/82 R Albertini and Montagnani v Commission [1982] ECR 4667; Case 347/82 R Alvarez v European Parliament [1983] ECR 65. 379 Ilford v Commission (above, note 161), paras 22–23. The acceptance by the applicant of a known risk may be inferred from an objective assessment of what a reasonable person in the position of the applicant could reasonably be expected to have known. It is not necessary to establish what the applicant actually knew or believed at the material time. 380 Case T-305/13 R Servizi assicurativi del commercio estero SpA (SACE) v Commission, 13 June 2014, para 47. 381 Case T-96/92  R  Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Générale des Grandes Sources v Commission [1992]  ECR II-2579, para  46; Case C-280/93  R  Germany v Council [1993] ECR I-3667, para 41; Case T-12/93 R Vittel (above, note 169), order of 6 July 1993 ([1993]  ECR II-785); Case C-296/93  R  France v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-4181; Case C-307/93 R Ireland v Commission [1993] ECR I-4191; Akhras (above, note 179), paras 44 (the disputed measure must be ‘the decisive cause’ of the threat) and 51. Eg in Case T-95/09 R United Phosphorus Ltd v Commission [2009]  ECR II-47*, para  56, and Case T-656/11  R  Morison Menon Chartered Accountants v Council, 16 February 2012, paras 23–26, the threat was posed by the risk that persons outside the jurisdiction of the EU, who were not legally obliged to comply with the measures contested in the proceedings, might choose to do so. That did not arise directly from the contested measures. 382 Eg Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1991] ECR I-415, para 29. See above, note 329. 383 Described in the decision as ‘immediate and irreversible’. 384 Cases 209–215 and 218/78 R Heintz Van Landewyck Sarl v Commission [1978] ECR 2111. 385 Case 142/87 R Belgium v Commission [1987] ECR 2589, para 25; Case 209/87 R Association des Aciéries Européennes Indépendantes (EISA) v Commission [1987]  ECR  3453, paras 17–19; Case 214/87  R  Cockerill Sambre v Commission [1987]  ECR  3463, paras 17–19; Case 223/87  R  Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v Commission [1987]  ECR  3473, paras 17–19; Case T-24/93  R  Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport NV (CMBT) v Commission [1993] ECR II-543, para 34.

687

8.106  Interim relief

delivery of judgment is not a reason for refusing to grant relief where the damage likely to be caused during the relevant period (if relief were refused) is serious and irreparable.386 8.106 In Case 112/88 R Crete Citron Producers’ Association v Commission387 it was suggested that the damage must be the ‘direct’ result of the act challenged in the action. That appears to mean that relief may be sought only in order to restore the position to what it was intended to be before the acts prompting the application for relief but not in order to provide the applicant with some collateral advantage: in casu, where the intended consequence of a measure is to restore a member state’s balance of payments, the suspension of the operation of an act repealing that measure can be based only on the resultant damage to the balance of payments and not on the collateral advantage obtained by exporters from the measure in the form of a reduction in their production costs and a consequent increase in their incomes. In many cases, however, distinctions between so-called ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ or ‘collateral’ consequences lack substance. In the Crete Citron Producers case itself, the measure adopted to safeguard Greece’s balance of payments took the form of an authorisation to grant export aid. The contested act withdrew that authorisation. In the circumstances, it seems somewhat artificial to say that the direct result of the authorisation was not that the exporters concerned continued to benefit from export aid but that Greece’s balance of payments continued to be assisted by the exports facilitated by the export aid. 8.107 In contrast, there is a justifiable distinction between damage that is the ‘direct’ or ‘immediate’ consequence of the situation with which the Court is confronted and damage that is merely an indirect consequence, in the sense that there is no direct or immediate causal connection between the damage relied on and the situation as it currently stands. Thus, suspension of a measure is not justified if the damage relied on could not result directly from the continued operation of the act in question but would result if further steps were taken.388 4 Cases of no serious or irreparable damage 8.108 The following situations have been held to constitute neither serious nor irreparable damage: financial loss, where it can be passed on to the applicant’s customers,389 does not threaten the applicant’s continued existence,390 can 386 Case 270/84  R  Licata v Economic and Social Committee [1984]  ECR  4119, para  16; Case 209/87 R EISA v Commission and the Cockerill Sambre and ASSIDER cases (ibid), para 22; Cases T-24 and T-28/92 R Langnese-Iglo GmbH & Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1992] ECR II-1839, see in particular para 26. 387 [1988] ECR 2597, paras 19–20. 388 Eg Case 269/84 R Fabbro v Commission [1984] ECR 4333, paras 12–13. 389 Case 25/62 R I Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 123. 390 Case 160/84  R  Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE  v Commission [1984]  ECR  3217, para  8; Case 160/84 R II Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission [1984] ECR 3615; Case 310/85 R Deufil GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1986] ECR 537, paras 23–24; Case 304/86 R Enital SpA v

688

Interim relief 8.108

be quantified (for the purpose of compensation)391 or can be compensated392 — in general, being kept out of one’s money is not necessarily serious or irreparable damage393 unless the damage (of a non-pecuniary nature) that would ensue constitutes serious and irreparable damage;394 damage, such as the loss of the opportunity to tender for the purchase of goods or exclusion from a market, which can be assimilated to financial loss (and which is therefore assessed in the same way as financial loss);395 an inability to use certain budgetary appropriations in a particular year for specified purposes where, if the final judgment was favourable, the appropriations could be used in the next financial year;396 in staff cases, assignment to another department397 or the continuance of a recruiting competition, even if a third party is, in consequence, appointed to the post in dispute, because the applicant can always challenge the decision appointing the third party to the post398 or apply for another vacant post;399 dissemination of a report Council and Commission [1987] ECR 267, para 16; Cases C-51/90 R and C-59/90 R ComosTank BV v Commission [1990] ECR I-2167, para 24; Bruno Farmaceutici (above, note 210), compare paras 105–107; Elan (above, note 294), para  16 (‘financial viability’). In Case T-398/02 R Linea GIG (above, note 70) (Judge Vesterdorf), a company in liquidation applied for the suspension of the operation of a Commission decision imposing a fine. The application was rejected on the basis of the balance of interests, not because the financial loss resulting from payment of the fine was not serious or irreparable. In that type of case, the debtor has an interest in not paying the fine and its other creditors have an interest in keeping the debtor’s financial liabilities as low as possible because that enhances their ability to get back all the money owed to them. However, from the perspective of interim relief, the implementation of such a decision merely enables the Commission to participate in the liquidation, alongside the other creditors (the fine is not a priority debt unless national law so provides), in the expectation of receiving a payment from the liquidators. On the face of it, suspension of the operation of the decision does not preserve an insolvent debtor from serious or irreparable damage. It is questionable whether or not it affords any assistance to the other creditors (Judge Vesterdorf seems to have thought that it did) but, as third parties, any beneficial effect on them is not relevant to the application for relief. 391 The Comos-Tank case (ibid), para 24. 392 Cases 82 and 83/85  R  Eurasian Corpn Ltd v Commission [1985]  ECR  1191, paras 26–27; Case 229/88 R Cargill BV v Commission [1988] ECR 5183, paras 16–18; Case 32/89 R Greece v Commission [1989]  ECR  985, para  19; Case C-195/90  R  Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3351, para 38; Case C-257/90 R Italsolar SpA v Commission [1990] ECR I-3841, para  15; Case C-258/90  R  Compagnia Italiana Alcool Sas di Mario Mariano & Co v Commission [1990] ECR I-4887, para 26; Case T-21/93 R Peixoto v Commission [1993] ECR II-463, para 28; Elan (above, note 294), para 16. 393 Case 62/74 R Vellozzi v Commission [1974] ECR 895; Case 141/84 R De Compte v Parliament [1984] ECR 2575, para 4; Case 221/86 R Group of the European Right and National Front Party v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2969, paras 38–41. 394 Eg Case 90/87  R  CW  v Court of Auditors [1987]  ECR  1801, paras 12–14; Case T-45/90 R Speybrouck v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-705, paras 23–30. 395 Case C-358/90  R  Compagnia Italiana Alcool Sas di Mario Mariano & Co v Commission (above, note 392), paras 27–28. 396 Case 23/86 R United Kingdom v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1085, paras 42–46 (where it was the defendant who had asserted that serious and irreparable damage would so result, if the relief sought were granted). 397 Case 69/83 R Lux v Court of Auditors [1983] ECR 1785; the reason was that the applicant had retained his post. 398 Case 17/64 R Suss v High Authority (above, note 201); Case 176/88 R Hanning v European Parliament [1988] ECR 3915, para 13: that is contradicted by several other cases, see below. 399 Case 206/89 R S v Commission [1989] ECR 2841, para 18.

689

8.108  Interim relief

whose contents and conclusions are still under discussion, when there is no more than just a possibility of it being acted upon;400 dissemination of business secrets where their continued confidentiality is protected by other legal provisions and there is no evidence that such provisions risk being ignored;401 being kept out of one’s money or being forced to buy goods on the market at higher prices,402 at least in an action for damages (sed quaere in an action for annulment) because the loss can be made good in the judgment;403 the continuance of the Commission’s investigations into an alleged infringement of the competition rules;404 breach of the rules of natural justice (that is, the rights of the defence), if the party’s position is safeguarded by another procedure;405 a refusal to allow an institution’s internal messenger service to be used for the distribution of trade union information (because the trade union was still free to distribute the material itself);406 a refusal to give the applicant time off work to attend trade union meetings (because the applicant was not actually prevented from attending meetings; and, if he was successful in the action, the periods deducted from his holiday entitlement in order to take account of the time taken up by the meetings could be restored by way of compensation);407 use of a particular voting system in elections to a staff committee;408 being obliged to maintain prices at a certain level, where there is no evidence of any loss of customers to competitors as a result;409 damage related more to difficulties inherent in a member state’s legal system than to the contested act;410 a threat to less than 0.4% of the market411 or only a small part of the applicant’s business;412 a loss of revenue equivalent to 0.26% of turnover or a loss of market share equivalent to 3% of turnover (in the case of the latter, at least where there is no indication that such a loss threatens the applicant’s exist-

400 Case 51/79 R Buttner v Commission [1979] ECR 1727; Case 51/79 R II Buttner v Commission [1979] ECR 2387. 401 Case T-39/90  R  Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-produktiebedrijven NV  v Commission [1990]  ECR II-649, paras 31–33. The converse (disclosure of confidential information) is capable of being serious and irreparable damage: eg Evonik Degussa (above, note 73), paras 71-96. 402 Case 809/79 R Pardini SpA v Commission [1980] ECR 139; Case 25/85 R Nuovo Campsider v Commission [1985] ECR 751, para 22. 403 Case 33/80R Albini v Council and Commission [1980] ECR 1671; Case 294/86R Technointorg v Commission [1986] ECR 3979, para 28. 404 Cases 60 and 190/81 R International Business Machines Corpn v Commission [1981] ECR 1857. 405 Case 122/83 R De Compte v Parliament [1983] ECR 2151. 406 Case 193/87 R Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 3445, paras 15–16. 407 Maurissen (ibid), para 17. 408 Case 63/88 R Maindiaux v Economic and Social Committee [1988] ECR 1659, para 28. 409 Case 62/86 R AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1986] ECR 1503, para 26. 410 Case 82/87 R Autexpo SpA v Commission [1987] ECR 2131, paras 24–25. 411 Case 97/85  R  Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH  v Commission [1985]  ECR  1331, para 20: the applicants’ primary concern was the possible extension of the acts complained of to the rest of the EU and their application was in that sense premature. 412 Case T-23/90  R  Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA  v Commission (above, note 80), paras 25–28 (0.24%); Case T-23/90 Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA v Commission [1991] ECR II-653, para 76; Bruno Farmaceutici (above, note 210), paras 105–107 (less than 1%; less than 10% of turnover (but half of overall profits); but an effect on two-thirds of turnover is serious).

690

Interim relief 8.108

ence or is irrecoverable);413 a loss of relative position and reductions in deliveries that are substantially less than 1%;414 in state aid cases, the prohibition of the grant of such aid does not cause serious and irreparable damage if there are other (lawful) ways of achieving the object of the aid,415 if the aid in question does not have a decisive effect on the investment decisions of the intended beneficiaries, there is time to adjust to the contested act and if no important investment plans would be prevented as a result of its continued application,416 or if the recipient would otherwise still be able to meet its obligations;417 the grant of such aid does not cause serious and irreparable damage to a competitor if, without it, the undertakings concerned would have gone ahead with their plans, albeit on a lower scale;418 the cost of providing a guarantee;419 a risk of a creditor’s action should the applicant (a member state) cause the recipient of state aid to be declared bankrupt in implementation of the contested act;420 damage that can be avoided by taking advantage of the procedures available under domestic law;421 a hypothetical and indeterminate threat to damage to the economy of a member state;422 temporary deprivation of a sum representing, in one instance, less than 1% of a member state’s external deficit and, in another, just over 4% of a member state’s annual expenditure (even where the amount in question increases an already considerable budgetary deficit);423 the loss of almost all sales in the EU, where the applicant nonetheless remains profitable because demand for its products on markets outside the EU is still buoyant and there is no imminent threat to the applicant’s survival;424 in the case of a member state, a threat to the stability of its balance of payments where the exports concerned represented less than 1% of the member state’s total exports;425 imposition of a penalty where the fine (or other sanction) is small in relative terms426 or its imposition may be

413 Comos-Tank BV  v Commission (above, note 390), paras 25–26 and 30–31; Morison Menon (above, note 381), paras 28–29. 414 Case 92/88  R  Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v Commission [1988] ECR 2425, paras 26–27. 415 Case 57/86 R Greece v Commission [1986] ECR 1497, para 12. 416 Case 248/84 R Germany v Commission [1985] ECR 1813, para 11. 417 Case C-356/90 R Belgium v Commission [1991] ECR I-2423, para 25. 418 Case C-225/91 R Matra SA v Commission [1991] ECR I-5823, paras 21–25. 419 Case 213/86  R  Montedipe SpA  v Commission [1986]  ECR  2623, para  23; Technointorg v Commission (above, note 403), para 28. 420 Case 142/87 R Belgium v Commission (above, note 285), para 25. 421 Deufil GmbH & Co KG v Commission (above, note 390), paras 21–22; Case 142/87 R Belgium v Commission (above, note 285), para 26; Aden (above, note 42), paras 104, 108 and 114. 422 Case 303/88 R Italy v Commission [1989] ECR 801, para 24: the damage was said to result from the risk that the recipients of certain state aids might go out of business if the Commission’s decision requiring the recovery of the aids were implemented; but the undertakings in question accounted for only 2.5% of production in the sector concerned and there was no evidence that would make it possible to evaluate the alleged risk. 423 Case 214/86  R  Greece v Commission [1986]  ECR  2631, para  20; Case 32/89  R  Greece v Commission (above, note 392), paras 17–18. 424 Case C-358.89 R Extramet Industrie SA v Council [1990] ECR I-431, paras 18 and 23. 425 Case 111/88 R Greece v Commission [1988] ECR 2591, paras 17–18. 426 Case 46/87 R Hoechst AG v Commission [1987] ECR 1549, paras 33 and 35.

691

8.108  Interim relief

avoided by conduct in compliance with the law427 that does not itself cause serious and irreparable damage and where there is adequate protection against the unlawful imposition of the penalty;428 the withdrawal of protection from fines afforded by EU legislation;429 a requirement to provide information;430 administrative inconvenience;431 a loss of potential profits (at least where the loss is small by comparison with the applicant’s existing business);432 a loss of competitiveness due to late entry into the market (too uncertain to justify relief);433 a threat to plans for future marketing efforts434 or a very short period in which it would be impossible for the applicant to plan its business (in casu, three weeks);435 a loss of income, where the loss is made up in sufficient part to avoid serious and irreparable damage by the grant of various benefits and allowances;436 withdrawal of a claim in return for compensation when the other party accepts that the claim can be reintroduced if the basis for calculating the compensation is found to be unlawful in other proceedings;437 a prohibition on performing an agreement;438 compulsory licensing and disclosure of confidential information, at least where royalties would be received in exchange and any financial damage is small by comparison with the size of the applicant for interim relief;439 damage to an undertaking’s trade marks.440 Cessation of activity is not serious harm where the activity is non-profit-making.441

427 Case 55/86 R Arposol v Commission [1986] ECR 1331, para 18; Case T-23/90 R Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA v Commission (above, note 80), para 32. 428 The Arposol case (ibid), para 19. 429 Case T-19/91 Société d’Hygiène Dermatologique de Vichy v Commission [1991] ECR II-265, para 20. 430 Case C-213/91 R Abertal SAT Lda v Commission [1991] ECR I-5109, paras 19–20. 431 Ibid, paras 21–22. 432 Case 352/88 R Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 267, para 25; Castiglioni (above, note 286), para 17 (loss of the chance of winning a contract); Case T-213/12 R Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo, 4 September 2012, paras 12–13 (same). In the case of the loss of the chance of winning a contract, compensation for the loss is usually recoverable in an action for damages. 433 Case 352/88 R Commission v Italy (above, note 432), para 26. 434 Case C-40/92 R Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-3389, para 30. 435 The Autexpo case (above, note 238), paras 24–25. 436 Speybrouck v European Parliament (above, note 23), para  28; Case T-51/91  R  Hoyer v Commission [1991] ECR II-679, para 22. 437 Cases T-278/93 R, T-555/93 R, T-280/93 R and T-541/93 R Jones v Council and Commission [1994] ECR II-11, para 53. 438 CMBT v Commission (above, note 385), para 33. 439 Microsoft (above, note 255), paras 246–324. That kind of proposition depends very much upon the facts and the evidence, as can be seen from the different factors considered in paras 246– 324. 440 Microsoft (above, note 255), paras 468–470 (emphasis was placed on the function of trade marks as differentiating one undertaking’s product from another’s). 441 Aden (above, note 42), para 118 (a rather odd conclusion; cessation of a business is normally regarded as serious – see subsection 6 below – and one would have thought that forcing an end to an activity conducted for altruistic and benevolent purposes, rather than for commercial gain, was just as serious, if not more so).

692

Interim relief 8.111

8.109 Interfering with an undertaking’s business policy or intellectual property rights is not ipso facto serious and irreparable.442 The failure to obtain an advantage (such as a financial benefit) from which a person has not previously benefited under the status quo is not serious and irreparable damage, at least where a change in the status quo is necessary in order to enable the person concerned to obtain it.443 In contrast, where a person has a chance of obtaining a future benefit, the loss of that chance by an alteration in the status quo may be serious and irreparable damage. 8.110 It is unclear if damage to reputation constitutes serious and irreparable damage.444 In the ordinary way, damage to reputation would be cured by a final judgment in the applicant’s favour which would have the effect of restoring the applicant’s name and reputation.445 Such damage could not therefore be regarded as irreparable, even if it were serious. If damage to reputation were, as is sometimes claimed, to manifest itself in the form of loss of business or income in the period pending the delivery of final judgment, it would fall to be assessed as loss of business or loss of income, rather than damage to reputation, when deciding whether or not it constituted serious and irreparable damage. It should be noted that, where the applicant for relief has knowingly placed itself voluntarily in a particular situation in which it is at risk, the damage arising therefrom is liable to be regarded as having been accepted by the applicant and, for that reason, as not constituting serious and irreparable damage.446 5 Cases of no irreparable or irreversible damage 8.111 The following situations have been held not to constitute irreparable or irreversible damage: the disclosure of confidential information to Commission inspectors, at least if the inspectors are bound by an oath of secrecy;447 the absence of a right to claim reimbursement of money (wrongly or mistakenly) paid out, if the competent authority has at least a discretion to reimburse and

442 Microsoft (above, note 255), paras 409–441 (business policy) and 471–474 (intellectual property rights). 443 Cases 352/88 R Commission v Italy (above, note 432), paras 23–25; Case C-195/90 R Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3351, paras 42–43. 444 Such a claim was made but rejected on the facts in: Case 118/83  R  CMC  v Commission [1983] ECR 2583, para 51; Case T-23/90 R Automobiles Peugeot v Commission (above, note 80), para 30; Microsoft (above, note 255), paras 442–466 (in Microsoft, there was a strong, if unsuccessful, emphasis on the practical consequences of the damage to reputation). In Hoechst AG  v Commission (above, note 426), para  33, the applicant relied unsuccessfully on nonmaterial damage in the form of a bare infringement of its constitutional rights. 445 Cf United Phosphorus (above, note 381), paras 60–61; Aden (above, note 42), paras 116–117; Eulex Kosovo (above, note 432), para 14. 446 Case 1/84 R Ilford SpA v Commission [1984] ECR 423, paras 21–23, where relief was granted only in respect of the period during which the applicant was not on notice that its supplies might be the subject of interruption. 447 Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia v High Authority (above, note 349): the application was for the suspension of the operation of a decision ordering an inspection; Case 37/84  R  EISA  v Commission [1984] ECR 1749, para 1.

693

8.111  Interim relief

if it is not certain that it will not exercise its discretion to do so;448 a request that the applicant submit proposals for terminating an infringement of the competition rules (as opposed to being required to terminate it forthwith or by a date likely to be before the judgment in the action);449 an inability to import or sell perishable goods which are in cold storage, unless it is shown that it is impossible to prevent damage to the goods;450 in staff cases, exclusion from a recruiting competition, if there is sufficient likelihood of another competition being held before the applicant reaches the age limit for candidates451 or, where the object of the competition is to create a reserve list of candidates, if the candidate can be admitted to the list before it closes (assuming that he wins the case and passes the competition);452 delay in paying money due;453 inability to practise as a doctor, at least if the applicant had previously acted only in an administrative capacity (a staff case);454 inconvenience and extra expense in moving from one country to another (because it can be compensated for in damages);455 the termination of an official’s employment (for the same reason);456 financial loss if it is otherwise recoverable under EU law or national law;457 a refusal to extend an invitation to a visiting expert and a change in an official’s responsibilities (in the latter case, if the defendant accepts that the official would be reinstated if he wins the action);458 in the case of an application to suspend the operation of a Commission decision granting an exemption under TFEU, art  101(3), it was held that no order would be made because there was no proof that it was impossible for the applicant to comply with the exempted agreement or that compliance would cause irreparable loss;459 a significant fall in exports (unless there is evidence of a loss of certain markets);460 a loss of market share (or of relative position in the market) where it is potentially recoverable in the event of a change in the law461 or where it is easily

448 Case 25/62 R I Plaumann & Co v Commission (above, note 389) but see below. 449 Case 6/72 R Europemballage Corpn and Continental Can Co Inc v Commission [1972] ECR 157. 450 Case 44/75 R Firma Karl Könecke v Commission [1975] ECR 637. 451 Case 4/78 R Salerno v Commission [1978] ECR 1; S v Commission (above, note 399), para 18. 452 Case 142/82 R Copine v Commission [1982] ECR 1911; Case 293/84 R Sorani v Commission [1985] ECR 251, para 8. 453 Case 48/79 R Ooms v Commission [1979] ECR 1703; Case 214/86 R Greece v Commission (above, note 423), para 21. 454 Case 129/80 R Turner (née Krecke) v Commission [1980] ECR 2135. 455 Case 174/80 R Reichardt v Commission [1980] ECR 2665. 456 Case 347/82 R Alvarez v European Parliament [1983] ECR 65. 457 Case 42/82 R Commission v France (above, note 113) at 865 (Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn); Cases 24 and 97/80  R  Commission v France (above, note 252) at 1342 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 278/84 R Germany v Commission [1984] ECR 4341, para 22; Hoechst AG v Commission (above, note 426), para 35; Case 44/88 R De Compte v European Parliament (above, note 358), para 31; Hoyer v Commission (above, note 436), para 19; Case T-52/91 Smets v Commission [1991] ECR II-689, para 20. 458 Case 338/82 R Albertini and Montagnani v Commission [1983] ECR 145. 459 Case 26/76 R Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1976] ECR 1353. 460 Case 119/86  R  Spain v Council and Commission [1986]  ECR  2241, para  30; Case 117/86 R Union de Federaciones Agrarias de España (UFADE) v Council and Commission [1986] ECR 2483, para 30; Case 128/86 R Spain v Commission [1986] ECR 2495, para 30. 461 Case 92/88 R ASSIDER v Commission (above, note 414), para 28.

694

Interim relief 8.112

recoverable or the loss can be quantified;462 generally, any form of damage that may be prevented or reversed by bringing other proceedings, including proceedings before national courts.463 6 Cases of serious and irreparable damage 8.112 The following have been found to constitute serious and irreparable damage: loss of income by an official who has been dismissed and cannot find work, aliter if he is in a position to get another job;464 where rights and benefits may be conferred on third parties which would be difficult to withdraw if the action succeeded,465 the filling of a post, in an action challenging the decision leaving it vacant;466 the vacancy of a post for a lengthy period;467 a risk of having to change an appointment;468 a serious disturbance in the business and interests managed by the applicant469 or a serious effect on established distribution systems that may create changes in the market that might be very difficult or impossible to reverse;470 the exclusion of the applicant’s product from the market, resulting in a significant drop in orders, where the lost market share is being taken over by competing products and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the applicant’s product to regain its previous position;471 a 93% decline in an undertaking’s imports;472 the risk of closure of part of a business and the tying up of substantial investments (consequent upon a Commission decision ordering an infringement of the competition rules to be terminated forthwith);473 the threat of a take-over which may result in the applicant withdrawing the action;474 loss of interest on

462 The Comos-Tank case (above, note 390), paras 30–31. 463 Eg Case 85/87 R Dow Chemical Nederland BV v Commission [1987] ECR 4367, paras 17–18; Case 32/89 R Greece v Commission (above, note 392), para 16; Cases T-10 to T-12, T-14 and T-15/92 R SA Cimenteries CBR v Commission [1992] ECR II-1571, para 56. The statement to the contrary in Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-1, paras 79–81, which was made in the context of the analogous powers of the Commission to grant interim relief in competition cases, is unsupported by the case law on the grant of interim relief by the Court. 464 Cases 43, 45 and 48/59 Eva von Lachmüller v Commission [1966] ECR 489. 465 Case 15/63 R Lassalle v European Parliament [1964] ECR 57; Case C-272/91 R Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-457, para 27. 466 Case 18, 35/65 R Gutmann v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 135. 467 Case 176/88  R  Hanning v European Parliament [1988]  ECR  3915, para  14; Case C-345/90P-R European Parliament v Hanning [1991] ECR I-231, para 32. 468 Ibid [1991], para 33. 469 Case 45/71 R GEMA v Commission [1971] ECR 791, para 3 (but see also para 4); Cases 228 and 229/82 R Ford Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc v Commission [1982] ECR 3091. 470 Cases 76, 77 and 91/89 R Radio Telefis Eireanne v Commission [1989] ECR 1141, para 18; Case 56/89  R  Publishers’ Association v Commission [1989]  ECR  1693, paras 33–34; Cases T-24 and T-28 Langnese-Iglo GmbH & Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1992] ECR 1839, para 29; Cases T-7/93 R and 9/93 R Langnese-Iglo GmbH v Commission [1993] ECR II-131, paras 40–42. 471 Case 65/87 R Pfizer International Inc v Commission [1987] ECR 1691, paras 18–19. 472 Case T-23/90 Automobiles Peugeot v Commission (above, note 80), para 72. 473 Case 20/74 R Kali-Chemie AG v Commission [1974] ECR 337 and 787. 474 Case 3/75 R Johnson and Firth Brown Ltd v Commission [1975] ECR 1.

695

8.112  Interim relief

a deposit, at least in an action for annulment;475 the payment of a considerable sum of money forthwith (where it was doubtful if it could be recovered)476 and the loss of interest resulting therefrom, having regard to the possible duration of the action and the rates of interest applicable at the time;477 ‘serious difficulties’ to an industry (the applicant was a member state);478 the making of payments or binding commitments to make payments, before the date of judgment, where it would be very difficult or impossible to recover the sums in question if the applicant were successful in the action;479 the possibility that students will not be enrolled if they are unable or unwilling to pay a disputed fee;480 being driven out of business;481 liquidation and disappearance from the market;482 the imposition of import controls creating a considerable backlog of goods waiting to be imported into a member state and preventing their disposal on the importing country’s market;483 the inability to reconstruct a restrictive practice or marketing arrangements if the decision banning them were annulled;484 the conclusion of a contract awarded to a competing tenderer;485 cutting off an undertaking’s sources of supply, at least where its stocks are insufficient to enable it to trade until the date of judgment in the action;486 depriving a person of money and thus compelling him to sell property on unfavourable terms, thereby permanently depriving him of a part of his assets, where a judgment in his favour would not allow him to recover his property on the same terms;487 damage to family relationships or

475 Case 88/76 R Société pour l’Exportation des Sucres v Commission [1976] ECR 1585. But see Case 221/86 R Group of the European Right and National Front Party v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2969, paras 38–41: the obligation to take out a loan and pay interest on it does not constitute serious damage where the applicant can afford to pay the interest. 476 Cases 113/77 R and 113/77 R-I NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council [1977] ECR 1721 (an action for annulment); Case 119/77 R Nippon Seiko KK v Council and Commission [1977] ECR 1867; Case 121/77 R Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council [1977] ECR 2107. In the last case some money had already been paid but the President refused to order that the applicant should be reimbursed. Cf Case 25/62 R I Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 123. 477 Case 258/84 R Nippon Seiko KK v Council [1984] ECR 4357, paras 16–17: the application was rejected on other grounds. 478 Case 166/78  R  Italy v Council [1978]  ECR  1745; Case 171/83  R  Commission v France [1983] ECR 2621. 479 Case 23/86 R United Kingdom v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1085, paras 41–46. 480 Case 293/85 R Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 3521, paras 20–23. 481 Cases 209–215 and 218/78 R Heintz Van Landeswyck Sarl v Commission [1978] ECR 2111; Case 154/85  R  Commission v Italy [1985]  ECR  1753, para  19; Case 152/88  R  Sofrimport Sarl v Commission [1988]  ECR  2931, para  32; Case C-195/90  R  Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3351, para 39. 482 Case C-335/99  P(R) HFB  Holding fur Fernwarmetechnik Beteilungsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG  v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-8705, para56; Case T-181/02  R  Neue Erba Lautex GmbH  Weberet und Vereldung v Commission [2002]  ECR II-5081, paras 84–85; Case T-95/09 R United Phosphorus (above, note 381), para 34; Elan (above, note 294), para 16. 483 Case 42/82 R Commission v France [1982] ECR 841. 484 Cases 43 and 63/82 R VBVB and VBBB v Commission [1982] ECR 1241; Case 260/82 R NSO v Commission [1982] ECR 4371; Case T-29/92 R Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v Commission [1992] ECR II-2161, para 31. 485 Case 118/83 R CMC v Commission [1983] ECR 2583, para 52. 486 Case 1/84 Ilford SpA v Commission [1984] ECR 423, para 21. 487 Case 141/84 R De Compte v European Parliament [1985] ECR 2575, paras 5–6.

696

Interim relief 8.113

the educational prospects of a member of the family and damage to health;488 the holding of elections to a staff committee;489 in the case of a person elected to a position for a limited period of time, preventing that person from exercising his functions;490 In the case of a fishing vessel, the loss of the right to fly the flag of a member state and the consequent cessation of fishing activities;491 irremediable changes in market shares which would make the development and completion of the common transport policy more difficult;492 a loss of professional expertise;493 a threat to the health of children arising from exposure to certain substances.494 7 Serious and irreparable damage in anti-dumping cases 8.113 Applications for the suspension of the operation of regulations imposing definitive anti-dumping duties have given rise to an assessment of serious and irreparable harm that is different from that in other cases.495 Originally, relief was granted (inter alia) on the ground that the financial consequences of the imposition of definitive duties were serious and, because it was uncertain whether or not the sums in question would be recovered in full if the applicant were successful in the action, irreparable.496 Such damage is, of course, a direct, necessary and intended consequence of the adoption of an anti-dumping duty. Although the duty is imposed by regulation, it is well established that exporters to the EU of the goods subject to the duty who are identified in the relevant regulations are entitled to seek the annulment of the regulation in proceedings under TFEU, art 263: so far as such persons are concerned, the regulation is regarded as a decision of direct and individual concern to each of them. The threat of damage that can be relied on in support of an application for suspension is the threat, to the exporter making the application, of financial loss caused to a sub-

488 Case 90/87 R CW v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 1801, paras 12–14; Case 24/87 R Virgili v European Parliament [1987] ECR 2847, para 17; Case 76/88 R La Terza v Court of Justice [1988] ECR 1741, para 18; Case T-21/93 R Peixote v Commission [1993] ECR II-463, para 37. 489 Case 146/85 R Diezler v Economic and Social Committee [1985] ECR 1805. 490 Case 270/84 R Licata v Economic and Social Committee [1984] ECR 4119, para 14 (election to a staff committee); Le Pen (above, note 29), paras 102 and 107 (member of the European Parliament: in that case, the application was rejected on the basis of the balance of interests). 491 Case 246/89 R Commission v United Kingdom [1989] ECR 3125, para 37. 492 Case C-195/90 R Commission v Germany (above, note 264), paras 39–40. 493 Case T-51/91  R  Hoyer v Commission [1991]  ECR II-679, para  24; Case T-52/91  R  Smets v Commission [1991] ECR II-689, para 25. 494 Case T-198/12 R Germany v Commission (above, note 76), paras 75–78. 495 Applications for the suspension of regulations imposing provisional, as opposed to definitive, anti-dumping duties are in principle inadmissible on the ground that there is ordinarily no interest in challenging such a regulation: Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council [1990] ECR I-2945, paras 13–16. Such regulations are in any event a form of interim relief pending the decision whether or not to adopt a definitive duty; and, were an application for interim relief to be admissible; it would in principle have to be dealt with in the same way as any other application made in respect of an administrative measure adopting interim relief: see Case 120/83 R Raznoimport v Commission [1983] ECR 2573; Case 294/86 R Technointorg v Commission [1986] ECR 3979. 496 Eg NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council (Judge Kutscher), Nippon Seiko KK v Council and Commission and Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council (all above, note 477).

697

8.114  Interim relief

sidiary, branch or agency in the EU which is liable to pay the anti-dumping duty when the goods are imported into the EU.497 A different tack was taken in Case 258/84  R  Nippon Seiko KK  v Council,498 where Judge Mackenzie Stuart suggested that an applicant had to show some special damage in addition to the consequences likely to arise in every case where an anti-dumping duty is imposed.499 That approach was followed by him in Case 77/87 R Technointorg v Council500 and by Judge Due in Case 69/89 R Nakajima All Precision Co v Council501 and Case C-358/89 R Extramet Industrie SA v Council.502 The result of that approach is that an applicant cannot rely upon a threat of serious and irreparable damage to him which is ‘inherent’ in the measure whose suspension is sought.503 Further, the applicant cannot rely upon such a threat even if it is likely to have a particularly devastating effect upon him by reason of some factor peculiar to him (such as the fact that the applicant has only one customer in each member state and, if deprived of that customer, will lose all its existing markets),504 save (perhaps) where the threat is so devastating as to give rise to an imminent risk to the survival of the applicant.505 In consequence, it is not at all clear what damage short of the destruction of the applicant can possibly constitute serious and irreparable damage sufficient to ground a claim for relief. What is clear is that, so far as the definition of serious and irreparable damage is concerned, the approach taken in relation to anti-dumping duties is atypical, not to say anomalous. 8 Pecuniary loss 8.114 Where the damage relied on is pecuniary, the attitude of the Court has hardened over the years.506 Formerly, the determining factor for characterising such damage as serious and irreparable damage was whether or not it was recoverable as a direct consequence of the applicant winning the action (if he did do so). As a result, pecuniary loss might not be serious and irreparable in the con 497 In principle, therefore, the fact that the duty is imposed by a legislative measure (a regulation) is not relevant to the application for suspension save that the case law indicates that the consequences of granting relief must be considered (an aspect of the exercise of the discretion to grant relief that is dealt with in the next section of this chapter and that is not relevant to the question whether or not a threat of serious and irreparable damage to the applicant has been established). 498 Above (note 477), para 20. 499 Applications for the suspension of a regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty made in the following year were dismissed by Judge Mackenzie Stuart on other grounds: see, for example, Case 250/85 R Brother Industries Ltd v Council [1985] ECR 3459. 500 [1987] ECR 1793, paras 16–17 and 19. 501 [1989] ECR 1689, para 10. 502 [1990] ECR I-431, paras 20–21. 503 The concept of certain types of harm being ‘inherent’ in certain kinds of measure has surfaced in other cases: see, for example, Le Canne (above, note 294), para 33. It is unclear what such a concept adds to the analysis to be carried out. 504 The Nakajima case (above, note 501), paras 11–12. 505 The Extramet case (above, note 502), para 23. 506 See, for example, Case 351/85 R Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi v Commission [1986] ECR 1307, paras 28–34; Case 360/85 R Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG v Commission [1986] ECR 1319, paras 27–33.

698

Interim relief 8.115

text of an action for damages or in proceedings where the Court had unlimited jurisdiction and could award damages even though the claim was only for annulment. On the other hand, in an action for annulment where the Court did not have unlimited jurisdiction, the loss might well be serious and irreparable unless it would be fully compensated by the annulment of the measure in question. For example, if the effect of annulment were the repayment to the applicant of money wrongfully withheld, plus interest thereon, in order to show that there was risk of serious and irreparable damage there would have to be evidence that the delay in payment of the sum in question (resulting from the need to wait until final judgment) would cause damage which could not be compensated by payment of interest. Later case law indicates that pecuniary damage is not in principle serious and irreparable unless there are exceptional circumstances.507 The assumption is that pecuniary loss is always recoverable in some way or form; whether it is recoverable as a direct consequence of the final judgment or as a result of bringing further proceedings does not matter. If pecuniary loss is or may be recoverable only in part, the question then arises whether or not the inability to achieve compensation in total would result in serious damage or at least damage to the applicant that is out of proportion to the interest of the defendant in avoiding the grant of relief.508 Even if pecuniary loss is eventually recoverable, serious and irreparable damage may still be caused in the meantime; but, in relation to that issue, the case law exhibits a very reserved attitude towards claims made by legal persons. It is often stated that there must be proof that, in the meantime, the applicant’s very existence is under threat509 whereas a more realistic test would be whether or not the conduct of the applicant’s business would be materially affected for the worse. 9 Damage to property rights 8.115 Where the damage consists not simply of pecuniary loss but of an injury to property rights, not even an award of damages may prevent such damage from being considered serious and irreparable. In Case 232/81 R Agricola Commerciale Olio Srl v Commission,510 the applicants were designated as the purchasers of a quantity of olive oil sold by lot at a fixed price pursuant to a Commission regulation. In two subsequent regulations the Commission purported to repeal the first regulation and offered the same amount of oil for sale by tender. The applicants claimed that they had acquired property rights in the oil under the first regulation

507 Eg Case 44/88  R  De Compte v European Parliament [1988]  ECR  1669, para  31; Case T-45/90  R  Speybrouck v European Parliament [1990]  ECR II-705, paras 23–24; Cases C-51 and C-59/90  R  Comos-Tank BV  v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-2167, para  24; Case C-195/90 R Commission v Germany (above, note 264), para 38; Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1991] ECR I-415, para 29; Case C-213/91 R Abertal SAT Lda v Commission [1991] ECR I-5109, para 24. See, in particular, the detailed discussion of the problem in United Phosphorus (above, note 381), paras 35 and 63–82. 508 Cf Case 44/88 R De Compte v European Parliament (above, note 507), para 31. 509 Eg the Comos-Tank case (above, note 507), para 24. 510 [1981] ECR 2193.

699

8.116  Interim relief

and applied for the annulment of the other two and an order suspending their operation. Apart from the threatened loss of their property rights, the applicants also argued that, if they participated in the sale by tender, they would suffer a heavy financial burden and could not be sure of obtaining precisely the same lots sold to them under the first regulation. On top of that, they had difficulty in obtaining oil from other sources. The Commission argued that that did not constitute serious and irreparable loss because an action for damages could be brought. The President rejected that argument on the ground that the loss ‘cannot be offset by the prospect of an unspecified amount of compensation in the future when all the evidence suggests that [the applicants] are being deprived of their property’. It is at this stage unclear whether the same approach will be followed in future or be superseded by a greater tendency to transmute certain forms of damage into pecuniary loss. In Case C-358/90 R Compagnia Italiana Alcool Sas de Mario Mariano & Co v Commission,511 for example, a situation similar to that in the Agricola Commerciale Olio case arose and the applicant complained that it would be excluded from the market for alcohol for use in the fuel sector as a result of the defendant’s decision not to take action on the tenders received but to open new tender procedures under different conditions. The damage was characterised as financial in nature and, since there was no evidence that it could not be made good in its entirety, the application for relief was dismissed.512 In many instances, damage of a commercial nature can be remedied by an award of financial compensation and, in such cases, as long as the loss is quantifiable there seems no particular reason why interim relief need be granted unless the disruption caused to the applicant or the difficulty in obtaining financial compensation is disproportionately great having regard to the interest of the opposing party in avoiding the grant of interim relief. 10 Relevance of third party resources 8.116 Where interim relief is sought in respect of a disputed act which requires money to be paid (typically, a Commission decision imposing a fine or requiring alleged unlawful state aid to be repaid), the question whether or not the applicant for interim relief can be expected to pay the money over and await final judgment in the action (at which point, the sum paid over may be restored to him if the action is successful) or perform a lesser, but equally effective, obligation (such as to provide a guarantee for payment) is determined by taking into account the position of the applicant for relief and the ‘group’ of persons to which the applicant belongs. Accordingly, in order to demonstrate serious and irreparable damage, it is necessary to show that all the members of the ‘group’ would suffer such damage if interim relief were not granted. 8.117 The case law dealing with the relevance of third party resources originated in cases in which one member of a corporate group was placed under

511 [1990] ECR I-4887, para 28. 512 The action was one for annulment and damages.

700

Interim relief 8.119

a financial obligation.513 It should be observed that, in that type of situation, a pecuniary obligation placed upon one member of a corporate group remains a liability only of that member of the group and, where the obligation is commuted to an obligation to provide a bank guarantee (by way of interim relief), the bank guarantee must relate to the amount of that liability and cannot be extended so as to cover the liability (if any) of another member of the group.514 The position of other members of the corporate group is relevant only insofar as it indicates the extent of the resources that the member of the group subject to the pecuniary obligation can call upon in order to meet its liabilities. 8.118 The justification for looking at the resources available to a corporate group as a whole can be expressed in a number of different ways. In some instances, a corporate group may be created and operate as a single economic undertaking. In that event, the separate legal personality of the members of the group serves a business purpose; but the underlying reality is that the group, as a whole, constitutes a single commercial entity. In other instances, a corporate group may consist of a number of different economic undertakings under a single holding company, either directly or through one or more intermediaries. For example, a corporate group may consist of a number of operating companies, each carrying on business independently of the other, with the profits being passed on to a single holding company. In such arrangements, the operating companies may be thinly capitalised, that is, they may retain sufficient resources to cover their ordinary commercial needs, with the excess passed up to the holding company. A more extreme version of that scenario is that where payments due to each operating company are actually paid directly by customers to another company, sitting under the holding company, which provides the administrative support for the group as a whole. The operating companies then hold only enough cash and resources for their day-to-day activities, nothing more. It is easy to see that, in those circumstances, a realistic view of the resources actually available to an operating company (which may find itself fined for engaging in anti-competitive conduct) must take into account the resources of other members of the group.515 8.119 It will be observed that, in the case of a corporate group, there is always a single entity operating behind a number of other entities. The latter are effectively emanations of the former. Behind the single entity there may be a number of other persons, as in the case of a holding company whose shares are owned by members of the public. However, the important point is that a clear commercial and economic link can be drawn between the operating subsidiaries and the con-

513 Eg Case 86/82 R Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Commission [1982] ECR 1555, para 4. 514 Cf Case T-156/94 R Siderurgica Aristrain Madrid SL v Commission [1994] ECR II-715, paras 29–30 and 32–34. 515 In competition cases, in many instances, a holding company may be jointly and severally liable for the anti-competitive conduct of its subsidiary. That is not relevant to the point made here: whether or not two entities form part of the same undertaking for the purposes of the competition rules, it is artificial to regard a particular trading or organisational structure adopted for commercial purposes as disrupting the underlying economic reality.

701

8.120  Interim relief

trolling entity in the group. It does not matter if the controlling entity is a legal or natural person.516 8.120 The same approach has been taken in relation to associations of undertakings where the objective interests of the association are not independent of those of the member undertakings. In general terms, that is so where the association serves the purpose of advancing the interests of its members. The question whether or not the association can call upon its members for financial support may be relevant but is not determinative in that respect.517 8.121 The case law is not confined to corporate groups and associations but extends to ‘groups’ and ‘networks’ in a general and undefined sense. In consequence, the limits to the principle are hard to identify.518 In principle, the question whether or not the resources of a third party can be taken into account depends upon the facts of the case and is not the subject of a general or abstract rule.519 However, there has been a creeping tendency to turn the approach into a rule or a presumption that has to be rebutted by the applicant for relief.520 It is therefore necessary to examine what the approach in the case law is actually based on. To begin with, the issue here under consideration does not arise where the members of an entity are liable (whether jointly or severally) for the debts of the entity. In that situation, there is no need to invoke the approach here in question because the members’ obligation is sufficient justification to regard the position of the members as relevant when examining the basis for the entity’s claim for interim relief. The approach here under consideration is applied where no such obligation exists. Indeed, the members of the entity often benefit from a limited, or no, liability for the debts of the entity. That fact is commonly ignored by the Court.521 That makes an investigation of the arguments enlisted in the case law to justify the approach taken by the Court all the more important. 8.122 In some cases, it has been stated that the interest of the applicant for interim relief in its own survival cannot be considered separately from the interest of the ‘controlling group’ (or those ‘directing’ the applicant) in seeing it survive where the interests of those persons or entities are ‘not wholly distinct’ or

516 Eg Case C-335/99 P(R) HFB (above, note 482), para 64. The controlling entity need not have 100% control. 517 Case T-217/03  R  Federation nationale de la cooperation betail et viande (FNCBV) v Commission [2004] ECR II-239, paras 77–87 (in that case, Judge Vesterdorf accepted that relief should be granted, but only for two months, so that the association could take steps to obtain the necessary resources from its members). 518 For that reason, it is in practice extremely difficult to gather relevant evidence from third parties who, often, find the Court’s case law unrepresentative of reality outside situations involving a controlling entity. 519 Eg Case C-364/99 P(R) DSR-Senator Lines GmbH v Commission [1999] ECR I-8733, para 55. 520 Eg Case T-199/08 Ziegler SA  v Commission [2009]  ECR II-2*, para  68 (it is necessary for the applicant to prove that it cannot count on economic assistance from other members of the group) (on appeal, Case C-113/09 P(R) Ziegler SA v Commission [2010] ECR I-50*). 521 Eg Case C-364/99 P(R) DSR-Senator Lines (above, note 519), para 54. See also Case T-199/08 Ziegler (above, note 520), para 58 (dismissal of parallel drawn with the rights of a liquidator).

702

Interim relief 8.123

‘overlap’522 or not ‘independent’.523 The ramifications of that formula are not really explored in the cases, in particular the distinction between interests that merely overlap or are partially distinct and interests that are not independent or autonomous. Three elements appear in the formulation: On the face of it, the key is lack of autonomy (wholly or in a material respect) in terms of a combination of function and control.524 It will be observed that, on the basis of that reason, the mere existence of a financial stake that a shareholder or investor has in the applicant for interim relief does not suffice to justify taking into account the resources of that shareholder or investor.525 There is much sense in that. A  shareholder typically has an interest in a company which is defined by the number of shares held by him; but that does not necessarily connote any ‘overlapping’ of interests or any degree of control that the shareholder has over the company. In general terms, there are two types of shareholder: those who passively enjoy the rights derived from holding shares and those who are actively engaged in the direction and control of the company in which the shares are held. The former are interested in the possibility of obtaining dividend income in respect of their shares and, usually, in the possibility of selling the shares at a profit. The first interest (for example) looks like an interest in the business of the company but, in reality, it is no different from the interest that a lender to the company has in the survival of the undertaking for as long as the debt remains outstanding and interest on the debt is being earned. It does not follow that the lender’s interests ‘overlap’ with those of the undertaking or that the lender has any control over it. Shareholders actively involved in the business of the company are in a recognisably different position.526 8.123 In cases concerning associations, the element of control is not emphasised, possibly because, in such cases, the role of the association is simply to advance the interests of its members and there is no separate business rationale for the association. In the Ziegler case, which concerned a conventional corpo 522 Eg Case C-335/99 P(R) HFB (above, note 482), para 62. 523 Eg Lior (above, note 121), para 55. 524 Eg Case C-364/99  P(R) DSR-Senator Lines (above, note 519), paras 50–55; Case T-141/01 R Entorn, Societat Limitada Enginyeria I Serveis v Commission [2001] ECR II-3123, para 52; Case T-392/09 1. Garantovana a.s. v Commission [2011] ECR II-33*, para 79 (degree of influence equating to membership of a group or network). 525 That appears to be confirmed by Garantovana (above, note 524), paras 11–19, in which applications to intervene made by minority shareholders were dismissed. If their position was relevant to Garantovana’s interim relief claim, they should have been allowed to intervene. In Case T-410/09 R Almamet GmbH Handel mit Spanen und Pulvern aus Metall v Commission [2010]  ECR II-80*, para  57, the position of minority shareholders was considered but they were substantial shareholders who may well have been capable of exercising control (upheld on appeal in Case C-373/10 R Almamet GmbH Handel mit Spanen und Pulvern aus Metall v Commission [2010] ECR I-171*). In general, the Court’s approach works in relation to large shareholders who exercise control or material influence. The approach declines in plausibility as the size of the shareholding decreases. Small shareholders rarely have a coincidence of interests, with the company in which they hold shares, of the sort envisaged by the Court. 526 See for example the complicated intra-group arrangements described in Case T-199/08 Ziegler (above, note 520), in particular, paras 52–56 and 59. In that case, the central management and reciprocal financial arrangements were referred to as additional factors to the factors identifying the different entities as forming part of a ‘group’ (see para 59).

703

8.124  Interim relief

rate group, the control element was also dropped; but it is unclear if that was intentional.527 8.124 Another reason that has been advanced is the public interest in the enforcement of Commission decisions imposing fines and other pecuniary obligations and the protection of the financial interests of the EU.528 It is difficult to understand the thinking behind that justification. Either the entity obliged to pay the money has the resources to do so, in which case interim relief is unnecessary, or it does not, in which case neither the grant nor the refusal of interim relief will make the entity better able to pay the debt, should the Commission decision be upheld in the final judgment closing the proceedings.529 An associated reason is that failing to take the position of other members of the ‘group’ into account would compromise the public interest, which would be put in question if the members of the ‘group’ thought that it was in their personal interest to allow the entity seeking interim relief to go into liquidation rather than step in and provide a bank guarantee.530 Again, the reasoning underpinning that justification is difficult to follow. If the other members of the ‘group’ actually have a commercial interest in the continued survival of the applicant for interim relief, they will provide the necessary resources; if they do not have such an interest, they will not do so. The existence or non-existence of a commercial interest in supporting 527 Case C-113/09 P(R) Ziegler (above, note 520), para 46, which refers to persons in control of the entity in question or members of the group. 528 Eg Case T-199/08 Ziegler (above, note 520), para 51 (upheld on appeal in Case C-113/09 P(R) Ziegler (above, note 520), para 45). 529 The grant of interim relief to an impecunious undertaking almost invariably enables the undertaking to carry on in existence and participate in the action that it has commenced. It would be exceptional for interim relief to enable such an undertaking to recover its financial position by the time of the final judgment so that, if it lost the case, it would then be able to pay the debt (although that was partially the case in Garantovana (above, note 524), para 109, in which keeping the applicant out of insolvency would have enabled it to use the yield from maturing loans to pay off the debt to the Commission instead of the money going to the general body of creditors, which included the Commission). The refusal of interim relief places such an undertaking in jeopardy because it may be placed in liquidation while the proceedings are pending and thereby both rendered incapable of advancing its own case in the proceedings (as has happened more than once in proceedings before the Court) and deprived of the full benefits of a judgment in its favour. The paradox in the Court’s approach to the grant of interim relief in cases concerning challenges to decisions imposing a pecuniary obligation (and the Commission’s corresponding administrative practice) is that interim relief (in the form of the interim commutation of the obligation to pay the debt to an obligation to provide a bank guarantee) benefits only undertakings that have no need of interim relief. A  bank will not expose itself to a liability under a guarantee unless, in addition to the usual fee for providing the guarantee, it obtains a security over cash or assets with which it can compensate itself in the event that the guarantee is called upon (cf the situation in Linea GIG, above, note 70, paras 30, 33 and 59, in which it appears that enough money to pay the fine or persuade a bank to provide a bank guarantee had been scraped together but, as Linea was in liquidation, the money could not be ring-fenced from Linea’s other liabilities, with the consequence that it was not available either to pay the Commission or to secure a bank guarantee; accordingly, no guarantee could be provided). Therefore, an undertaking able to provide a bank guarantee is ordinarily an undertaking which possesses the resources to pay the debt but which finds it inconvenient or expensive to use those resources to pay the debt. 530 Eg Case T-199/08 Ziegler (above, note 520), para 71.

704

Interim relief 8.127

an entity is normally evident from the business relationships between the entity in question and the other members of the ‘group’.531 8.125 Finally, it has also been said that the Court’s approach is justified because of the advantages that shareholders or the ‘group’ derive from anti-competitive conduct.532 That, of course, prejudges the question in cases in which the anti-competitive conduct in question is disputed. In addition, it presupposes that the shareholders and other members of the ‘group’ did get advantages from the conduct in question, which would normally be a fact that the person alleging it would have to prove.533 8.126 Reviewing the different reasons for the Court’s approach, it is readily apparent that, apart from cases involving associations acting for their members, third parties are relevant to the assessment of the position of the applicant for interim relief only where the third parties have by their conduct involved themselves in a relevant respect in the activities of the applicant.

D

The balance of interests

1 The nature and role of the balance of interests 8.127 In most cases the decision whether or not to order relief is made solely on the basis of the evidence put forward by the applicant to show that he is threatened with serious and irreparable damage. In some cases, however, the Court has also considered the damage that may be caused to others if the relief sought is granted and has sought to balance the interests in the case. The frequency of such cases has grown over the years and they now seem to represent an established development in the case law on interim relief.534 However, the expression ‘bal 531 As was the case in Ziegler (see Case T-199/08, above, note 520, para 59). 532 Eg Case T-199/08 Ziegler (above, note 520), para 51 (upheld on appeal in Case C-113/09 P(R) Ziegler (above, note 520), para 45). 533 It is obvious that money can be extracted from an entity by its members or shareholders or by a related entity (such as where a related entity charges an exaggerated price for the supply of management or other services). Whether or not that has actually occurred in any given case is a question of fact. If, for example, the shareholders took large sums of money out of a company before it was fined by the Commission for engaging in anti-competitive conduct, thereby rendering the company incapable of paying the fine, there would be good reason for saying that, by their action, the shareholders had demonstrated that they had the same interest as the company in engaging in the conduct in question and in avoiding payment of the fine (see, on that point, Garantovana (above, note 524), paras 86–87: need for evidence of misappropriation designed to avoid payment of the fine). However, there are plenty of instances in which (impecunious) companies have engaged in anti-competitive conduct without the knowledge, and contrary to the intentions, of the shareholders but with the object of benefiting the employees of the company by preserving their jobs. 534 For relatively early suggestions that the Court or judge balances the respective interests of the parties when deciding whether to order interim relief see Slusny (1967) Rev Belge Droit Int, 127 and 146; Gray (1979) ELR 80 ff (citing the practice of the International Court of Justice and of English courts); Temple Lang (1981) CMLR 49 at 51, footnote 5 (citing the practice of English courts); Bebr Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities pp 145– 146. For a contemporary review of the case law, see Lenaerts et al, op cit, para 13.42.

705

8.128  Interim relief

ance of interests’ (occasionally also ‘balance of convenience’) has been used to express a variety of different operations and it is necessary to be clear about the sense in which the interests at stake can be balanced in the context of the grant or refusal of interim relief. 8.128 As a matter of principle, the decision whether or not to grant relief cannot and does not depend upon anything more than the finding that one party or the other lies under the greater risk of damage if relief is refused or, as the case may be, granted: the authorities indicate without any ambiguity that the starting point is for the applicant to show that he is under the threat of serious and irreparable damage. Anything less than that is not good enough. The applicant must therefore satisfy an irrelative test (in the sense that it requires no examination of the relative positions of the applicant and the opposing party or parties). When the risk threshold is set so high for the applicant, it necessarily follows that mere inconvenience to the defendant or the possibility that, in relative terms, the damage to the defendant resulting from the grant of relief may be greater than the damage with which the applicant is threatened (if relief is not granted) cannot bar the claim for relief. 8.129 In order to counter the case for the grant of relief, the defendant (or, as explained above, unrepresented third parties) would have to be threatened with serious and irreparable damage (as that expression is understood in the context of interim relief), if relief were ordered. There is no doubt that that is in principle a good answer to a claim for relief because: first, ex hypothesi, serious and irreparable damage to the defendant would render the final decision in the action otiose and that would be contrary to the principle that interim relief is only temporary and does not prejudice the effect of the final judgment;535 and, secondly, in the case of a threat to third parties, it is well established that a threat of serious and irreparable (or at least serious) damage to the rights or interests of third parties bars a claim for interim relief unless the applicant’s very existence is under threat. It is in that sense that occasional statements in the case law, to the effect that the judge must weigh up all the interests involved, are to be understood.536 In the ordinary case, the plea that serious and 535 That appears to be the sense in which the balance of interests was understood in, for example, Le Pen (above, note 29), para 108; Garantovana (above, note 524), para 101. In order to resolve the difficulty, the judge may have recourse to factors other than the damage with which each party is threatened (in Le Pen, paras 109–111, any advantage from which one party has previously benefited and the strength of each party’s case). If the damage with which the defendant is threatened would arise in any event and even if relief were not granted, it cannot be relied on as an objection to the grant of relief: Case 194/88 R Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 5647, para 17. 536 Eg Case 278/84  R  Germany v Commission [1984]  ECR  4341, para  20, where the grant of relief would have prejudiced the Court’s final judgment by creating a serious disturbance of the market (see para 21); Case T-96/92R Comité d’Entreprise de la Société Générale des Grandes Sources v Commission [1992] ECR II-2579, paras 36–41 and Case T-12/93R Vittel (above, note 169), order of 2 April 1993, para 30 and order of 6 July 1993, where the grant of relief would have affected the exercise of a third party’s voting rights, thus seriously affecting the operations of a group of companies, or prolonged a situation of dominance on a market in such a way as to risk having irreversible effects on competition.

706

Interim relief 8.130

irreversible damage may be caused to the defendant (or to third parties) does not, however, cause the judge to balance that risk with the risk to the applicant: if the effect of granting relief is to cause such damage, it falls in principle outside the judge’s powers to order it. In consequence, if it is not probable that such damage will be caused to the defendant (or to third parties), the judge rejects the defendant’s plea. If it is probable, he either rejects the applicant’s claim entirely or awards a different kind of relief which will safeguard the applicant’s position but either will not render final judgment in the action nugatory as far as the defendant is concerned or will not inflict serious or serious and irreparable damage on third parties. 8.130 It is really only in cases where, although the extent of the threats to the applicant and the defendant is the same (that is, the damage with which each is threatened is serious and irreparable), the degree of probability of the threats to the opposing parties differs that the judge is called on to perform a balancing exercise: he must then weigh, on the one hand, the nature of the threat to one party and the likelihood that it will materialise before judgment against, on the other hand, the nature of the threat to the other party and the likelihood that that threat will materialise before judgment. Theoretically, the balancing exercise should be limited to the degree of probability of the threat to either party because the nature (or rather extent) of the threat is identical: serious and irreparable damage.537 Depending upon the circumstances of the case, however, the balancing exercise may relate to either or both of the nature of the threat and the degree of probability that it will materialise: in the present state of the case law, it cannot be excluded that, even where the damage with which both parties are threatened (depending upon whether relief is granted or refused) is serious and irreparable and the degree of probability of the damage being caused before judgment is the same, the judge may be entitled to examine more specifically the nature and extent of the threat to each party in order to identify which is intrinsically the more serious.538 Such an approach appears to have more merit than the alternative solution, which is that the judge refuses to grant relief, even though the applicant is faced with serious and irreparable damage, simply because, if relief were granted, the defendant would then be faced with serious and irreparable damage (the probability of the threats materialising being the same), without considering the nature and extent of the threat. At first sight, that alternative appears to be a sensible solution because there is ordinarily no good reason why, before final judgment is given and the respective rights and duties of the parties have been determined, the judge should transfer a risk of serious and irreparable damage from one party to the other.

537 For an example of the balancing of probabilities, see Cases 76/77 and 91/89 R Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1989] ECR 1141, paras 15–18; Case C-280/93 R Germany v Council [1993] ECR I-3667, paras 49–54; Peixoto v Commission (above, note 392), paras 36–39. 538 That appears to have been done in Case C-345/90  P-R  European Parliament v Hanning [1991] ECR I-231, para 33.

707

8.131  Interim relief

8.131 The mechanistic application of that approach could, however, create injustice in particular cases, such as where the threats to both parties, while being threats of damage that is serious and irreparable in the technical sense in which that expression is used, are nonetheless different in nature (such as where the damage to the applicant is to its commercial interests whereas the damage to the defendant is to the interests of the EU in disposing of intervention stocks or protecting public health)539 or extent (such as where the imposition of an antidumping duty would cause serious and irreparable damage to the business of one exporter to the EU but the suspension of the measure imposing the duty pending final judgment would cause serious and irreparable damage to the business of many undertakings in the EU).540 In such cases, if no solution is available which would ward off the threats to both parties, the just solution may be to lessen the threat to one party or the other, which may lead to a sharing of the risk as between the opposing parties.541 Such cases may also be resolved by balancing the opposing interests of the parties in obtaining relief or, as the case may be, ensuring the continued effectiveness of the disputed measure: in a balancing exercise of that sort, the status quo and the past attitudes of the parties may play an important part.542 It should be emphasised that the balance of interests referred to here applies where one or other of the parties is threatened with serious and irreparable damage whether the judge grants the relief sought or refuses it; such an approach is not necessary where one or other of the parties is faced with a threat falling short of serious and irreparable damage. 8.132 A different kind of balancing of interests applies where the judge is considering the form of the relief to be granted. In that situation, the applicant has ex hypothesi satisfied all the conditions for the grant of relief. The judge is then concerned only to ensure that the relief ordered is proportionate in the sense that it is effective and imposes on the opposing party and on third parties burdens

539 The Compagnia Italiana Alcool case (above, note 392), para 29; Bruno Farmaceutici (above, note 210), paras 108–116 (where an additional factor was that the potential for a risk to health would have been factored into the commercial calculations of the applicant for interim relief); Case T-198/12 R Germany v Commission (above, note 76), damage to health to be weighed against the interest defended by the Commission (which, on appeal in Case C-426/13  P(R) Commission v Germany (above, note 76), para 76, was held to be limited to the objectives of harmonising national legislation). In United Phosphorus (above, note 381), paras 83–88, the balance of public health interests worked in favour of the applicant’s commercial interests. 540 Cf the test suggested in Case 77/87 R Technointorg (above, note 403), para 17. 541 Eg Cases T-24 and 28/92 R Langnese-Iglo v Commission [1992] ECR II-1839, paras 26–35; Cases T-7 and T-9/93 R Langnese-Iglo v Commission [1993] ECR II-131, paras 43–45. 542 Eg Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission (above, note 537), para 15; Case 56/89 R Publishers’ Association v Commission [1989] ECR 1693, para 35. In Case 45/87 R Commission v Ireland [1987] ECR 1369, paras 32–33, the comparison was between the applicant’s interest in ensuring observance of EU law and the defendant’s interest in putting an early end to a health hazard; in Case C-272/91 R Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-457, para 28, the comparison was between the defendant’s interest in rapid automation of a public lottery and the applicant’s interest in preventing infringements of fundamental rules of EU law in circumstances where there had already been one judgment against the defendant.

708

Interim relief 8.133

that go no further than is absolutely necessary in order to provide the degree of protection to which the applicant is entitled.543 When the competing interests are weighed, a preference for maintaining the status quo can determine the outcome.544 2 Weighing the relative importance of threats to the parties and to third parties 8.133 It remains to be considered whether or not there is authority for the application of a balance of interests, or balance of convenience, test that is different from the test discussed above, in particular, whether or not relief may be granted or refused on the basis that the damage with which one party is threatened is more important in nature or extent than the damage with which the other party is threatened and even if the damage in question is not ‘serious and irreparable’ in the technical sense. Such a balancing exercise involves solely a relative examination of the threats to the parties (or to third parties) and does not require a threat of ‘serious and irreparable’ damage. The cases requiring comment in that connection fall broadly speaking into three categories: (1) cases in which a threat to third parties was considered; (2) those in which it was a threat to the defendant (or to an interest represented by the defendant) that was taken into account; (3) applications for the suspension of the operation of a regulation or measure of general effect. The cases falling within the last category give rise to particular problems and will be examined separately.

543 Eg Case 293/85 R Commission v Belgium [1985] ECR 3521, para 24; Speybrouck v European Parliament (above, note 23), para  36. The principle of proportionality also requires that the means used be proportionate to the aim sought in the sense that, even if the means used are both effective and the minimum necessary to achieve the desired aim, their adverse consequences must be outweighed by the benefits derived from achieving the desired aim. That aspect of the principle of proportionality does not need to be considered at the stage of selecting the relief to be granted because the application of the criteria for the grant of relief (in particular the requirement that the applicant be threatened with serious and irreparable damage) will have rendered it otiose. 544 Case T-198/12 R Germany v Commission (above, note 76), paras 80–83.

709

8.134  Interim relief

(a) Weighing threats to all the parties and to third parties 8.134 The first545 and second546 categories547 for the most part comprise cases where the test adopted was whether or not the defendant or third parties would suffer serious and irreparable damage if relief were ordered; or where the application was either upheld or rejected on other grounds and the judge went on to pass some observations on the alleged threat to the defendant or to third parties. There are serious difficulties in the way of construing such cases as showing the existence of a balance of interests or balance of convenience test (in a sense other than as discussed above) because remarks to the effect that there is no threat or risk of detriment to the defendant can be interpreted simply as emphasising the fact that the defendant had not come anywhere near establishing a risk of serious and irreparable damage which would justify refusing relief. They do not indicate that the judge would have dismissed the application had a threat of a lower degree been proved.

545 Cases 6 & 7/73  R  Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corpn v Commission [1973] ECR 357; Johnson and Firth Brown Ltd v Commission (above, note 144); Case 91/76 R De Lacroix v European Court of Justice [1976] ECR 1563; Case 4/78 R Salerno v Commission [1978]  ECR  1; Case 19/78  R  Authié v Commission [1978]  ECR  679; Case 142/82 R Copine v Commission [1982] ECR 1911; Cases 228 and 229/82 R Ford Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc v Commission [1982] ECR 3091; Case 173/82 R Castille v Commission [1982] ECR 4047; Case 114/83 R SICA and SIPEFEL v Commission [1983] ECR 2315; Cases 67, 68 and 70/85R Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV v Commission [1985] ECR 1315, para 45; Case 57/86 R Greece v Commission [1986] ECR 1497, para 12; Case 221/86 R Group of the European Right and National Front Party v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2969, paras 38–41; Case 161/87 R Muysers and Tulp v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 2381, para 13; Case 63/88 R Maindiaux v Economic and Social Committee [1988] ECR 1659, para 28; European Parliament v Hanning (above, note 538), para 33; the Grandes Sources case (above, note 144), paras 36–41. 546 Cases 42 & 49/59 Breedband NV  v Société des Aciéries du Temple [1962]  ECR  145; Case 15/63  R  Lassalle v European Parliament [1964]  ECR  57; Cases 18, 35/65  R  Gutmann v Euratom Commission [1966]  ECR  135; Case 29/66  R  Gutmann v Euratom Commission [1967] ECR 241; Case 22/75 R Küster v European Parliament [1975] ECR 277; De Lacroix v European Court of Justice (ibid); Cases 31 and 53/77  R  Commission v United Kingdom [1977]  ECR  921 at 931 (Advocate General Mayras); Salerno v Commission (ibid); Authié v Commission (ibid); Case 174/80  R  Reichardt v Commission [1980]  ECR  2665; Case 20/81  R  Arbed v Commission [1981]  ECR  721; Case 78/83  R  USINOR  v Commission [1983] ECR 2183; Case 42/82 R Commission v France [1982] ECR 841 (Advocate General Slynn); Case 347/82 R Alvarez v European Parliament [1983] ECR 65; Case 270/84 R Licata v Economic and Social Committee [1984] ECR 4119, para 14; Case 97/85 R Union Deutsche Lebensmittelwerke GmbH v Commission [1985] ECR 1331, para 21; Case 45/87 R Commission v Ireland (above, note 46), para  33; Muysers and Tulp v Court of Auditors (ibid), para  13; Case 23/87 R Aldinger v European Parliament [1987] ECR 2841, para 17; Virgili v European Parliament (above, note 267), para 17; Maindiaux v Economic and Social Committee (ibid), para  28; Case 176/88  R  Hanning v European Parliament [1988]  ECR  3915, para  9; Case 246/89 R Commission v United Kingdom (above, note 264), para 39; Speybrouck v European Parliament (above, note 23), para  36; European Parliament v Hanning (above, note 538), para 33. 547 As can be seen, some cases fall into both categories.

710

Interim relief 8.135

8.135 The cases falling within the first and second categories which do lend some apparent support for a balance of interests or balance of convenience test in a sense different from that discussed above include the following. De Lacroix v European Court of Justice548 was a confused case: Judge Donner treated the application as one for the suspension of a competition held by the Court to fill three vacant posts. He said that to grant relief would cause serious difficulties for the Court, because there was a need to fill the posts as soon as possible, and serious inconvenience for the other candidates. In Salerno v Commission, Authié v Commission (both decisions of Judge Sørensen), Copine v Commission and Castille v Commission (both decisions of Judge Bosco),549 which also concerned recruitment or promotion procedures, the applications were rejected on other grounds but the judges, following De Lacroix, added that the balance of convenience did not favour the granting of relief. In Reichardt v Commission,550 an application for the suspension of the operation of a decision transferring the applicant, Judge Mertens de Wilmers held that, apart from urgency, the only issue in the case was whether the application of the decision would cause irreversible damage which could not be remedied if it were annulled or damage which would be out of proportion to the interest of the defendant. Similar remarks appear in some of his other decisions: for example, in Arbed v Commission551 he assessed the extent of the damage with which the applicants were threatened by reference only to their capacity to bear it, which suggests a balancing approach. In his opinion in Case 42/82 R Commission v France, Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn referred to the balance of convenience552 but, since he had earlier accepted that the applicant had shown that there was a threat of serious and irreparable damage, it is possible that he considered that the defendant would also have to show the existence of such a threat in order to justify the rejection of the application. In Case 176/88 R Hanning v European Parliament,553 Judge Moitinho de Almeida said that the applicant had to be threatened with irreversible damage but that the relief granted must not be out of proportion to the defendant’s interest in having the contested act applied. That suggests that the applicant could in principle obtain relief if he or she were threatened with irreversible damage of a minor nature unless the defendant could demonstrate a risk of more serious (but equally irreparable) damage if relief were granted. In Speybrouck v European Parliament554 a case concerning the termination of the applicant’s contract of employment, Judge Cruz Vilaça said that it was necessary to balance the interests of the parties to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the applicant and also avoid obliging the defendant to maintain the employment relationship in a situation in which mutual confidence was lacking. In that context, however, he seems to have been envisaging the balancing exercise undertaken when select 548 Above, note 545. 549 Above, note 545. 550 Above, note 546. 551 Above, note 546. See also the Ford case (above, note 161), para 14, and USINOR v Commission (above, note 546), para  8. Note Case 141/84  R  De Compte v Parliament (above, note 393) (Judge Galmot). 552 Above (note 113) at 867. 553 Above (note 546), para 9. 554 Above (note 266), para 36.

711

8.136  Interim relief

ing the appropriate form of relief to grant and not any exercise to be undertaken when deciding whether or not relief ought to be granted as a matter of principle. 8.136 A  particularly interesting line of cases consists of those in which the applicant has applied for suspension of the operation of a Commission decision requiring a member state to recover sums that the Commission has found to be illegal state aid. The judge has then weighed the applicant’s interest in obtaining the relief sought against the Commission’s in ensuring that competition is not distorted by unlawful state aids. In those cases, it has been held that the Commission’s interest normally prevails over the applicant’s interest in deferring payment until final judgment has been delivered.555 Two characteristics of those judgments are that it is assumed that the applicant’s action will be unsuccessful and no consideration is actually given to the relative weight of the Commission’s general interest in securing compliance with the state aid regime and a private interest that cannot, in the nature of things, be other than temporary. Approaching the question on basic principles, one would have supposed that the judge would keep an open mind and consider the evidence (to be adduced by the Commission) revealing the possible impact on competition of deferring the recovery of the aid for several months.556 However, of greater interest is the fact that the cases admit of the possibility of the applicant’s interest prevailing over that of the Commission where there are exceptional circumstances or where the condition of urgency is satisfied.557 Since, on a conventional view of the criteria for the grant of interim relief, an applicant must show that there is urgency and a failure to show urgency will lead to the dismissal of the application for interim relief without any need to consider the balance of interests, it is far from obvious what that understanding of the balance of interests adds to the analysis. 8.137 Thus, a review of the cases falling within the first and second categories, taken within the general context of the case law, reveals no certain authority for the propositions that relief may be granted, in the absence of proof of serious and irreparable damage, merely on the ground that the threat to the applicant outweighs that to the defendant; or that relief may be refused, if the applicant does show that there is risk of irreparable damage, merely on proof of some threat to the defendant which is less than serious and irreparable. There are, clearly, a few cases which are not easy to explain and which are best regarded as anomalies since the case law, when taken as a whole and subjected to proper analysis, simply does not support the view that relief is, as a matter of practice, granted or refused on the basis of an assessment or balance of the respective interests of the parties alone. There is no doubt but that such a balance can be drawn when the judge is deciding what is the most appropriate form of relief to order: he

555 Eg Elan (above, note 294), para 50; SACE (above, note 380), paras 50–51. 556 It is entirely possible that deferring the recovery of the alleged unlawful state aid might have adverse consequences for competition but that cannot be assumed always to be the case. 557 In SACE (above, note 380), para  51, the exceptional circumstance was the fact that final judgment in the action was going to be given in a short time; and the applicant had demonstrated both urgency and a prima facie case.

712

Interim relief 8.139

must, in accordance with the principle of proportionality,558 ensure that the relief granted is adequate to achieve its objective of preserving the status quo and that it does not impose an excessive burden on the defendant to the application in comparison with some other, equally appropriate, form of relief.559 Nonetheless, it is not a condition of entitlement to relief in general (as opposed to a specific form of relief) that the balance of the interests of the parties weighs in favour of the applicant. 8.138 On the other hand, several decisions made by Judge Mertens de Wilmars and the decision of Judge Moitinho de Almeida in Case 176/88  R  Hanning v European Parliament560 indicate that they did employ the relativist balance of interests or balance of convenience approach. The explanation for that probably lies in the fact that they did not require proof of serious and irreparable damage in order to ground a claim for relief, particularly (in the case of Judge Mertens de Wilmars) where the applicant was prepared to lodge a security under what is now RP-ECJ, art 162(2). There is insufficient evidence in the case law to infer that their decisions can be taken to herald a shift in approach.561 (b) The approach in cases involving measures of general effect 8.139 One important category of cases in which special problems have arisen comprises cases involving measures of general effect. They are too few in number to have produced a settled and consistent line of authority. In Case 44/75 R Firma Karl Könecke v Commission562 Judge Lecourt held that, save in exceptional cases making it possible to single out the applicant from other persons, the judge cannot consider the effect of a general provision as amounting to that of a ‘measure’ within the meaning of what is now RP-ECJ, art 160(1); on the other hand, where the application is for relief by way of an interim measure (as opposed to suspension of the operation of the provision in question), the applicant must prove in a particularly clear fashion that he is concerned directly and individually by the provision. The action was for the annulment of several Commission regulations and, in adopting those two tests, Judge Lecourt seems to have been influenced by the conditions for the admissibility of an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person under what is now TFEU, art 263. Neither test was expressly mentioned by Judge Kutscher in the Japanese Ball Bearing cases563 nor by Judge Mertens de Wilmars in Case 232/81 R Agricola

558 It will be noted that TFEU, art 279, refers to the adoption of the ‘necessary’ interim measures. 559 This seems to be the true explanation of Case 26/76 R Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG  v Commission [1976]  ECR  1353, which has been cited as authority for the balance of convenience approach. 560 Above, note 538. 561 In particular, such an inference seems to be contradicted by decisions such as the Court’s judgment in Case 42/82 R Commission v France (above, note 113). 562 [1975] ECR 637. 563 Cases 113/77 R and 113/77 R-I NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council; Case 119/77 R Nippon Seiko KK v Council and Commission; Case 121/77 R Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn v Council (above, note 476).

713

8.140  Interim relief

Commerciale Olio Srl v Commission.564 The probability is that, in all those cases, the regulations in question plainly singled out the applicants and were therefore, prima facie at least, of direct and individual concern to them. 8.140 In the two Simmenthal cases,565 in contrast, the applicants sought the suspension of the operation of a Commission decision fixing the EU selling prices and import quotas for beef and veal and of several regulations. As far as the first was concerned, Judge Kutscher refused to grant relief on the ground that it would deprive unrepresented third parties of their rights. Even if it were possible, he held, it would be justified only if the applicant were exposed to a threat to its very existence. Suspension of the operation of the regulations was simply held to be out of all proportion to the interests which the applicants wished to safeguard. It should be noted that the decision was addressed to the member states so the action for annulment would have been admissible only if the decision was of direct and individual concern to the applicants. In addition, the decision was in substance a measure of general effect, as was amply demonstrated by the fact that it impinged on the rights of third parties, because it was an administrative measure intended to achieve a particular regulatory effect on an entire sector of the common agricultural policy. 8.141 In a number of cases in which the suspension of regulations imposing anti-dumping duties was sought, Judge Mackenzie Stuart emphasised the need to balance all the interests concerned by the case and compare the effect on the applicant, if relief were not granted, with the effect on Community industry (generally represented by an intervener in the proceedings), if it were granted.566 In parallel, he also developed the principle, followed in later anti-dumping cases, that the applicant must demonstrate both a threat to it of special damage over and above that arising in the normal course from the imposition of an anti-dumping duty and the absence of any appreciable injury to Community industry if relief were granted.567 The reasoning behind that approach seems to be that, otherwise, the usual conditions required for the grant of interim relief would be easily satisfied and, if relief were then granted, the effect would be to frustrate the purpose of the regulation imposing the duties. On the other hand, in the Sofrimport case,568 a case concerning regulations limiting imports of apples into the EU (that is, trade protection measures similar in objective to anti-dumping duties), Judge Mackenzie Stuart did not, at least expressly, adopt the same approach followed by him in anti-dumping cases. The Sofrimport case was, however, one where there was evidence that, if relief were not granted, the applicant would be forced 564 Above, note 63. 565 Case 92/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1978] ECR 1129 and Case 243/78 R Simmenthal SpA v Commission [1978] ECR 2391. 566 Case 250/85 R Brother Industries Ltd v Council (above, note 499), para 17; Case 273/85 R Silver Seiko Ltd v Council [1985] ECR 3475, para 18; Case 297/85 R Towa Sankiden Corpn v Council [1985] ECR 3483, para 16; Cases 277 and 300/85 R Canon Inc v Council [1985] ECR 3491, para 17. 567 Case 258/84  R  Nippon Seiko KK  v Council (above, note 477), paras 19–20; Case 77/87 R Technointorg v Council (above, note 403), paras 16–20. 568 Above, note 481, paras 32–33.

714

Interim relief 8.143

to cease trading and there was no indication that, if relief were granted, it would cause a serious disturbance of the market. 8.142 In all those cases, save Agricola Commerciale Olio Srl v Commission,569 the judges have stressed that account must be taken of the effect of granting relief on the public interest. That has been expressed in different ways: Judge Lecourt spoke both of the public interest and the impact on administrative action; Judge Kutscher of an appreciable detriment to the EU, the effect on the public budget and the rights of third parties; Judge Mackenzie Stuart of the effect on Community industry, which the contested regulations sought to protect. In consequence it seems possible to summarise the cases as follows. Where an application for interim relief is made in respect of a measure of general effect, the applicant must, in addition to the other conditions required for the grant of relief, show that: (1) the measure is of direct and individual concern to him or singles him out for special treatment, in the technical sense used in the context of the admissibility of the action;570 (2) it threatens him with damage over and above that normally arising from a measure of that type;571 and (3) the applicant’s private interest in obtaining relief outweighs the public interest in refusing it. In assessing the public interest weighing against the grant of relief, broader considerations may have to be taken into account than the question whether or not serious and irreparable damage may be caused.

IV PROCEDURE A General 8.143 An application for interim relief may be made in the context of a direct action brought before the ECJ, GC or, as the case may be, the CST. In addition, it may be made (to the ECJ) in the context of an appeal (to the ECJ) from a judgment of the GC or (to the GC) in the context of an appeal (to the GC) from a judgment of the CST, the procedure followed when seeking interim relief in the context of an appeal being the same as when application is made in the context of a direct action brought before the Court.572 569 Above, note 63. 570 It is not enough to show that, because of some idiosyncrasy, the applicant just happens to be affected to a greater extent than others: it must be possible to determine that that is within the intendment of the measure. But see Case 258/80 R Metallurgica Rumi SpA v Commission [1980] ECR 3867. 571 The fact that such special damage arises by reason of some particular weakness or peculiarity of the applicant and is not within the intendment of the contested measure appears to be irrelevant. 572 Statute, art 60, 1st para; Annex, art 12(1); RP-ECJ, art 190(1) (which cross-refers to RP-ECJ, art 160–166); RP-GC, art 213(1) (which cross-refers to RP-GC, art 156–161).

715

8.144  Interim relief

8.144 The Statute573 provides only that the President of the Court (that is, the President of the Court hearing the action or appeal in question) may hear applications for interim relief ‘by way of summary procedure, which may, in so far as necessary, differ from some of the rules contained in this Statute’. Should he be prevented from sitting, the President’s place is taken by the Vice-President, one of the presidents of the chambers, in order of seniority, and, should there be no president of a chamber available, one of the judges, in order of seniority.574 Cases may be assigned to a chamber and never be heard by the full Court but the application for interim relief in such cases is nonetheless heard ordinarily by the President of the Court. In the case of proceedings before the ECJ, the President of the ECJ may decide that, although there is no reason preventing him from sitting, the application is one best considered by the Court (or, as the case may be, by the chamber to which the action or appeal has been assigned).575 That usually occurs only in cases of real difficulty or importance and, when it happens, the Court (or chamber) will decide the issue, setting aside for the time being all other cases before it in order to deal with the application expeditiously. The procedure is the same whether the President (of the ECJ, GC or, as the case may be, CST) or a judge replacing him alone decides the question or, in cases before it, the ECJ or a chamber of the ECJ does so: the application may be granted before hearing the other side but a decision so made may be reviewed; otherwise, the other party is asked to submit written or oral observations and a preparatory enquiry may be ordered.576 A decision of the ECJ (or chamber) is given only after hearing the advocate general.577 When the ECJ is seized of the application it has the same powers as those entrusted to the President and its order has no effect on its final judgment in the action.578 8.145 Interim relief decisions of the President of the CST (or a judge replacing him) may be appealed to the President of the GC; and interim relief decisions of the latter (or the judge replacing him) may be appealed to the President of the ECJ.579 There is no appeal from interim relief decisions made by the President of the ECJ or by the ECJ itself or one of its chambers.

573 Statute, art 39, applicable to the GC by virtue of art 53 and to the CST by virtue of Annex, art 7(1). 574 Statute, art 39, 2nd and 3rd paras; RP-ECJ, art 161(1)–(2), 13 and 7; RP-GC, art 157(4), which cross-refers to RP-GC, art 11 and 12; RP-CST, art 116(2), 9 and 6. 575 RP-ECJ, art 161(1). 576 RP-ECJ, art 160(5)–(7); RP-GC, art 157(1)–(3); RP-CST, art 116(1)–(2). Gowns are not worn in hearings before the President (or a judge replacing him) but they are worn in hearings before the full Court (or a chamber). 577 RP-ECJ, art 161(3). 578 RP-ECJ, art 162(4) applies just as much to interim relief applications decided by the ECJ as it does to those decided by the President of the ECJ (or another judge). 579 In relation to appeals from decisions of the President of the GC (or a judge replacing him), see Statute, art 57, 2nd and 3rd subparas, which provide that the procedure to be followed is that set out in Statute, art 39; in relation to appeals from decisions of the President of the CST (or a judge replacing him), see Statute, Annex, art 10(2)–(3).

716

Interim relief 8.147

B

The applicant

8.146 An application for suspension of the operation of an act contested in the action may be made only by the person challenging the act.580 An application for interim measures may be made by any party to the action.581 In practice, applicants for interim measures are almost invariably applicants in the action.582 Interveners are not thought to be ‘parties’ for the purpose of making an application for interim measures.583 In the case of the suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court or of any measure adopted by another institution, there is no definition of the persons who may apply.584 It is thought that an application may be made by anyone with sufficient interest, typically the person against whom the decision or other measure is being enforced. In appeals from the GC to the ECJ, the applicant for interim relief may be ‘a party’ to the appeal where the relief sought is the suspension of the effects of a regulation which has been declared void by the GC or any other interim measure (the rule being that the declaration made by the GC does not take effect until dismissal of the appeal – if it is dismissed - unless interim relief is granted);585 that is (it would seem), the appellant to the ECJ (even if an intervener before the GC) or any other party. There seems to be no reason to confine that broad right to seek relief to the case of a judgment of the GC declaring a regulation to be void: the right to seek relief in the context of an appeal to the ECJ seem to be limited only by the ability of the applicant for interim relief (being a party to the appeal) to demonstrate that the conditions for granting relief have been satisfied. In appeals from the CST to the GC, there is no provision that sheds light on who may apply for interim relief (to the GC). It would seem that, as in the case of appeals from the GC to the ECJ, any party to the appeal may apply as long as the applicant can show that the conditions for granting interim relief have been satisfied. 8.147 It is occasionally said that an applicant for interim relief must have an interest in obtaining the relief sought; and that has often been expressed as raising the question whether or not the interim relief sought, if granted, would be of ‘use’ to the applicant.586 Strictly speaking, that way of putting matters is inaccurate. Although an applicant for interim relief must be applying in order to protect an interest that he entitled to protect in the proceedings,587 the purpose of the application is to safeguard the effectiveness of the final judgment. Hence, the ‘interest’ that the applicant must have relates to two different things: the relevance of the interim relief sought to protecting the effectiveness of the final 580 RP-ECJ, art 160(1); RP-GC, art 156(1); RP-CST, art 115(1), 1st subpara. In Cases 3–18, 25, 26/58 Erzbergbau v High Authority [1960] ECR 220 at 223, the President left open to question whether or not an intervener could apply for suspension. 581 RP-ECJ, art 160(2); RP-GC, art 156(2) (a main party only); RP-CST, art 115(1), 2nd subpara. 582 Case C-106/90R Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission [1990] ECR I-3377, paras 28–30, provides a rare example of the defendant applying for a form of interim relief (appointment of an expert). 583 That follows from the express wording of RP-GC, art 156(2). 584 See RP-ECJ, art 165; RP-GC, art 161; RP-CST, art 120. 585 Statute, art 60, 2nd para. 586 Eg Case T-164/96 R Moccia Irme SpA v Commission [1996] ECR II-2261, paras 26–27. 587 See para 8.74 above.

717

8.148  Interim relief

judgment (if it is in the applicant’s favour); and the relevance of the final judgment to the applicant’s legitimate interests. In general, it does not appear that discussion of the applicant’s ‘interest’ in obtaining relief adds anything useful to the analysis to be conducted.588

C

The application

8.148 An application for interim relief may be made at any stage as long as it is not made so late in the day as to have lost any usefulness.589 It does not seem possible to make an application for suspension of the operation of a measure or for some other form of interim relief before the commencement of the action or appeal in question;590 save that, in CST (and, after 1 September 2016, GC) proceedings, an application for interim relief may be made in accordance with Article 91(4) of the Staff Regulations as soon as a complaint has been submitted to the appointing authority as envisaged in Article 90(2).591 An application for the suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court or of any measure adopted by another institution need not be made in the context of an action pending before the Court.592 8.149 An application for suspension of the operation of a measure or for interim measures must be made by separate document593 and will be held to be inadmissible if made in the application commencing the action, rather than separately.594 The application must make clear on the first page that it is an application for interim relief so that it will be processed quickly by the Court.595 An 588 See, for example, Aden (above, note 42), paras 56–60 and 92–115, which cover the same ground. 589 Aldinger v European Parliament (above, note 267), para  11; Virgili v European Parliament (above, note 267), para 11; Aden (above, note 42), para 90. 590 RP-ECJ, art 160(1)–(2), RP-GC, art 156(1)–(2) and RP-CST, art 115(1) make the admissibility of an application for suspension of the operation of a measure or for some other form of interim measure dependent upon there being proceedings before the Court. 591 RP-GC, art 156(3), as amended; RP-CST, art 115(1), 3rd subpara. 592 For example, where the validity of the contested act is disputed in proceedings before a national court and has been the subject of a reference for a preliminary ruling, an application to suspend the enforcement of the measure may be made to the Court (where necessary) without the need to commence proceedings directly before the Court. 593 RP-ECJ, art 160(4); RP-GC, art 156(5); RP-CST, art 115(2), 2nd subpara. PD-GC, para 268 suggests that the application should be no longer than 25 pages. That is indicative only: Case C-113/09 P(R) Ziegler (above, note 520), para 33. The caps imposed on the length of pleadings are discussed further in Ch 9, para 9.17. 594 See Case 108/63 Officine Elettromeccaniche Ing A Merlini v High Authority [1965] ECR 1; Case 32/64 Italy v Commission [1965]  ECR  365 at 372; Case 81/83 Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni v Commission [1984]  ECR  2951 at 2966 (Advocate General Lenz); Case 146/95 Bernardi v Parliament [1996]  ECR II-769, para  29; Case T-289/13 Ledra Advertising v Commission, 10 November 2014, para 62; Case T-290/13 CMBG v Commission, 10 November 2014, para 61; Case T-291/13 Eleftheriou v Commission, 10 November 2014, para 61; Case T-292/13 Evangelou v Commission, 10 November 2014, para 61; Case T-293/13 Theophilou v Commission, 10 November 2014, para 61; Case T-294/13 Fialtor v Commission, 10 November 2014, para 61. 595 Cf PD-GC, para 265.

718

Interim relief 8.151

application for the suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court or of any measure adopted by another institution must also be made by separate document.596 Whatever the nature of the relief sought, the general form of the application is the same as that for an application commencing proceedings in a direct action but it must comply with RP-ECJ, art 120–122, RP-GC, art 76–78 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 45 and 50 as well as RP-ECJ, art 57 or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 72–73.597 As a result, it must set out all the matters required in an application commencing proceedings (including the applicant’s name and address, the name of the defendant and the applicant’s service details);598 it must bear a date, be signed by the party’s agent or lawyer, as the case may be, be lodged with the required number of copies and also be drawn up in the language of the case. Most of the documents which are required to accompany an application will in any event be annexed to the application commencing the action and it is apprehended that, where that is so, a simple reference to them in the application for interim relief is sufficient.599

D

The substantive content of the application

8.150 The matters of substance which are required to be set out in the application for interim relief are defined partly in RP-ECJ, art  120, RP-GC, art  76 and RP-CST, art 50 and partly in RP-ECJ, art 160(3), RP-GC, art 156(4) and RP-CST, art 115(2). They comprise: (1) the subject matter of the dispute; (2) the circumstances giving rise to urgency; (3) the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim relief applied for; (4) the form of order sought; and (5) the evidence relied on. It is not essential to set them out in that order or in that way. Basically the application falls into three parts. 8.151 The first part consists of a description of the dispute between the parties and the arguments advanced by the applicant in the action. In principle,

596 RP-ECJ, art 165(1), RP-GC, art 161(1) and RP-CST, art 121(1) provide for the application of the normal rules applicable to interim relief applications. 597 RP-ECJ, art 160(4); RP-GC, art 156(5); RP-CST, art 115(2). For the general rules applicable to pleadings, see Ch 9, para 9.11 ff. 598 If the application commencing the action provides for the modalities of service but the application for interim relief does not, it may be assumed that the omission is an oversight and, in the interim relief proceedings, service should be effected as specified in the application commencing the proceedings. 599 For the avoidance of doubt, that refers to documents of a strictly procedural nature, not to documents of an evidential nature (an example is the evidence of the applicant’s existence, required by RP-GC, art 78(3)).

719

8.152  Interim relief

that part need not be as detailed as the application commencing the action, in order to avoid repetition. Its purpose is to set out the context of the application for relief and show that the applicant has an arguable case in the action.600 Accordingly, the GC’s guidance is that the application for interim relief should set out the details of the action (including the pleas raised in it) ‘with the utmost concision’ and need not set out in full the text of the application in the action.601 However, as the interest that the judge takes in the merits of the action cannot be predicted and the consequences of failing to provide him with sufficient information in the body of the application for interim relief are potentially serious, it is risky to follow the GC’s guidance and engage in any significant reduction in length of the arguments set out in the application commencing proceedings.602 8.152 The second part deals with the need for urgency and the risk of serious and irreparable damage. In principle, the summary nature of proceedings for interim relief means that a full scale investigation into the facts is not to be expected, nor is it required; but the judge must be given reasonable cause to believe that the conditions for obtaining relief have been fulfilled. In practice, the degree to which the nature of the proceedings entitles the judge hearing the application to rely upon assertions made by one or other of the parties that are not supported by evidence is controversial; and different judges have taken different views.603 The prevailing view is that the applicant for interim relief must present a case that is soundly based on available evidence and excludes every alternative solution other than the grant of some form of interim relief.604 In consequence, even if only as a matter of precaution, the applicant must produce relevant documents in his possession or control and indicate with precision any other source of evidence. Evidence of witnesses ought to be presented in the form of signed witness statements. Inaccuracies and omissions in the presentation of the relevant facts and the evidence bearing upon them are liable to be criticised.605 8.153 The third part consists of the form of order, in which the prayer for relief is set out. The relief sought should be set out in precise terms and be clearly justi-

600 The suggestion in Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v Commission (above, note 484), para 34, is that the applicant need only list the grounds relied on in the application commencing the action and assert that the application cannot reasonably be said to be without foundation (but the judge must still verify whether or not that is so). At the time of writing, that was not considered to be sufficient. 601 PD-GC, paras 266–267. 602 Some pleaders annex a copy of the application commencing the action to the application for interim relief. In recent years, that tactic has been disapproved on the ground that the judge hearing an application for interim relief cannot be expected to read the annexes to the application in order to inform himself about the case (see further below). 603 See para 8.161 ff below. 604 Eg Garantovana (above, note 524), para  39; Akhras (above, note 179), para  43 (‘hard and precise information’). 605 Eg Case T-410/09 R Almamet (above, note 525), para 49 ff.

720

Interim relief 8.154

fied by reference to the matters set out in the body of the application.606 It is nevertheless admissible to add a plea for ‘further or other relief’ because the judge may decide that, while the relief sought is not appropriate, some other form of relief should be ordered. In contrast to other proceedings, the judge is not faced with a choice between granting the order sought by the applicant and refusing it altogether. He may, and often does, make his decision on the basis of what is appropriate in order to preserve the position pending judgment in the action.607 However, it is important to note that a claim for ‘further or other relief’ is not some free-ranging claim but is simply a claim for some variation on the specific form(s) of relief sought that addresses the urgent need for interim relief identified in the application.608 In other respects, the relief that can be claimed is limited to that proper to interim relief proceedings and may not include, for example, a claim for symbolic damages.609 As is usual, the applicant should ask for costs, although the normal order is for the question of costs to be decided in the final judgment. 8.154 The application may be amended in the course of the proceedings in response to any change in circumstances which may affect the nature of the relief to be granted;610 but otherwise any change in the nature or extent of the relief sought must remain within the scope of the claim as originally formulated.611 Since the focus of an application for interim relief is safeguarding the effectiveness of final judgment in the action, one would expect that the judge dealing with the application would concentrate upon the merits of the arguments for and against the grant of relief and not adopt a formalistic approach. That certainly seems to have been the view of the judges dealing with interim relief applications in the first several decades of the Court’s existence. In more recent years, the approach has become more formalistic and less attentive to the purpose of interim relief.

606 In Case 107/82 R AEG Telefunken AG v Commission [1982] ECR 1179 and 1549, the application sought suspension of the enforcement (ie execution) of a Commission decision imposing a fine on the applicants. The Commission naturally argued that relief was neither urgent nor necessary because no proceedings had begun before a national court for the recovery of the sums due. The President, however, construed the application as impliedly seeking the suspension of the operation of the decision. This would cause enforcement to be suspended by freezing its level effects. It should be observed that it is not always possible to save an application in that way. 607 Cf Ilford v Commission (above, note 161). 608 Cf Aer Lingus (above, note 74), paras 52–58. 609 Case C-35/92P-R European Parliament v Frederiksen [1992] ECR I-2399, paras 25–26. 610 Eurasian Corpn Ltd v Commission (above, note 392), paras 14–16; Case 48/86 R J Cauet v B Joliet v Commission [1986] ECR 1237, para 4, where the parties agreed that the proceedings should continue as against a decision which replaced the decision that had originally been contested. In Case C-530/10 P(R) Nencini v Parliament [2011] ECR I-172*, paras 16–19, the replacement of the contested acts by replacement measures that were to the same effect (but written in another language) was not regarded as sufficient justification to render it unnecessary to rule on the application for interim relief. 611 Case 293/85R  Commission v Belgium (above, note 271), para  4, where at the hearing the applicant narrowed the scope of the relief sought; Case C-280/93R Germany v Council (above, note 262), paras 15–16.

721

8.155  Interim relief

8.155 Since an application for interim relief is normally lodged either contemporaneously with, or a short time after, the lodgement of the application commencing the action, and since there is inevitably some overlap between the two applications (and, often, the evidence relied on in them), there is an inevitable tendency, driven by considerations of efficiency and time constraints, to limit the application for interim relief to what is necessary and to avoid duplication with the contents of the application commencing the action (or the evidence annexed to it) by having recourse in the former to cross-references to the latter. Cross-references to the application commencing the action (and to the evidential documents annexed to it) are, however, frowned on and risk leading to the partial (or, conceivably, total) inadmissibility of the application for interim relief.612 On the other hand, wholesale incorporation of the application commencing the action in the application for interim relief is also frowned on,613 as is summarising the application commencing proceedings and attaching a complete copy of it to the application for interim relief so that any obscurity in the summary can be clarified by consulting the related passage in the application commencing the proceedings.614 Bizarrely, it has been suggested that the way around that is for the application for interim relief to summarise the case made out in the application commencing proceedings and cross-refer to annexes (to the application for interim relief) developing those submissions (as long as none of the annexes sets out the entirety of the application commencing proceedings).615 That would involve dividing the application commencing proceedings into sections and attaching each section as an annex to the application for interim relief. When commenting on that, it is important to differentiate between cross-references to other pleadings and cross-references to documents annexed to the application for interim relief. 8.156 The objection to cross-references to the application commencing the action (and the evidential documents annexed to it) contained in the application for interim relief appears on the face of it to be rather odd. It derives from the fact that the application commencing the action (including the evidence exhibited with it) is destined for the Court (or, more usually, a chamber) whereas the application for interim relief is destined for the President (or the judge replacing him or her) and is therefore placed in a separate case file.616 In principle, what

612 Eg Case T-306/01 R Aden v Commission [2002] ECR II-2387, paras 48–55, in which all the main parties engaged in making references to their pleadings in the action and the President decided to take account only of what was said in the pleadings before him (that is, the pleadings in the interim relief proceedings); Case T-252/10 R Cross Czech a.s. v Commission [2010] ECR II-157*. Cf PD-GC, para 264. 613 PD-GC, para 267. 614 Eg Case T-103/14 R Frucona (above, note 223), paras 21–22 and 46. 615 Ibid, para 22. 616 On the importance placed on the insular nature of the case file, see, for example, Case T-459/07 Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Co. Ltd. v Council [2009] ECR II-4015, para 12. The first case in which a judge objected to cross-references to the pleadings in the action seems to have been a case in which both parties made repeated references at the hearing to the pleadings in the action, which the judge did not have with him because he had only the case file for the interim relief proceedings.

722

Interim relief 8.158

is before the judge in interim relief proceedings is what is contained in the case file for those proceedings, not what is in the case file for the action. That is not simply an example of pedantic formalism: the pleadings and evidence in interim relief proceedings are (where necessary) translated by the Court into its internal working language in priority over other translations because of the need to decide on the interim relief application quickly. It is therefore necessary for the Court to know exactly what is relevant to the interim relief proceedings. For that reason, the interim relief application ought to be a self-contained pleading, to which is annexed all the evidential documents supporting it (even if that involves duplication with material annexed to the application commencing the action).617 8.157 The objection to cross-references in the application for interim relief that relate to documents actually annexed to the application for interim relief cannot be justified by those reasons. The objection stems from a transposition, to applications for interim relief, of the Court’s dislike of annexes that develop a line of argument figuring in the main body of a pleading.618 In an application for interim relief, the arguments supporting the application are not usually developed in an annex: annexes normally serve an evidential purpose. On the other hand, as noted above, in relation to that part of the application that explains the issues in the action, it is frequently the case that, in order to assist the judge, the application commencing the action is annexed to the application for interim relief and a cross-reference made to the former so that the judge can check the summary contained in the application for interim relief against the application commencing proceedings itself. Technically, the annexed application commencing proceedings serves an evidential purpose (because it evidences the arguments supporting the admissibility and merits of the action) and there should be no objection to it. However, in recent years, that approach has invariably drawn criticism from the judge dealing with the application for interim relief. That puts the applicant for interim relief in a difficult position, particularly where the arguments advanced in the action are best understood by reading yet more documents, such as the measure contested in the action and evidential documents annexed to the application commencing proceedings, none of which the judge dealing with the application for interim relief may be prepared to read in order to inform himself about the case, even if they form part of the case file before him. 8.158 Having said that, two further points need to be made. First, an objection to the admissibility of an application for interim relief based upon the fact that it cross-refers to the application commencing the action (or the evidential documents annexed to it) is in truth entirely futile and vexatious when raised by the opposing party because the cross-reference does not, in the nature of things, prevent the opposing party from understanding and responding to the interim relief application. The problem is a technical one concerning the contents of the file before the judge and it is therefore best left to the judge to

617 See PD-GC, para 264. 618 See further Ch 9, para 9.47.

723

8.159  Interim relief

take it, if he or she wishes to do so.619 Should the judge wish to take the point, the correct procedure would in principle be for the judge to raise the matter with the applicant for interim relief before the hearing, so that the applicant can remedy the defect, rather than leaving it until the hearing or even to the decision on the application.620 The cross-reference is either to material that does not, in the final analysis, affect the outcome of the interim relief application or to material that does affect the outcome. If it is the former, the objection to the cross-reference is superfluous. If it is the latter, the application can be renewed with the crossreference removed, or the original application may be withdrawn and replaced, and the material in question incorporated into, or annexed to, a revised interim relief application. In that event, the opposing party has no reasonable ground for objecting to a more or less immediate hearing of the revised application because, by that time, the opposing party has had more than an ample opportunity to consider the application. There is no basis for the judge refusing to consider the revised application because there is no time limit on the making of an application for interim relief. The objection to a cross-reference therefore serves no purpose other than to delay a decision on the application for interim relief – unless the objection is entirely lacking in relevance because the cross-reference is itself irrelevant to the application. However, in practice, the judge is more likely to reject the application, which then produces the problem that, in order to renew the application with a correctly formulated application, it seems that the applicant needs to base the application on a new fact,621 although, logically, the necessity to identify a new fact applies only where an application for interim relief is dismissed on its merits, not when it is dismissed because of a pleading defect. Another way of looking at the matter is to say that if, because of a pleading defect, the judge deciding on the application has not had before him a relevant fact, a renewal of the application after the defect has been remedied is based on a new fact, namely, a fact not previously considered by the judge. However, that is not the approach currently taken by the judges dealing with interim relief applications. 8.159 Secondly, there is a material difference between cross-references to matters that relate to the merits of the application for interim relief and crossreferences to matters going to the arguability of the action. In general, it is relatively rare for the arguments and evidence supporting the assertion that there is urgency and a threat of serious and irreparable damage to overlap to any 619 In at least one case, the objection has been raised by the opposing party and rejected by the judge because he was not disadvantaged by the cross-reference. It has nonetheless become common to assert that even the defendant need only consult the application for interim relief: eg Case C-530/10 P(R) Nencini v Parliament [2011] ECR I-172*, para 28. That proposition seems particularly implausible when one considers a case like Aden (above, note 612), in which both parties had no difficulty at all in referring to the pleadings and evidence in the action in support of their arguments in relation to interim relief. 620 Cf Case T-201/04 R Microsoft (above, note 255), para 85. Note also paras 87 (not every assertion based on a document not annexed to the application for interim relief must necessarily be excluded from the proceedings), 88, 93 and 97. Although the practice in the GC is mechanistic, the correct criterion ought to be what is just in the circumstances. 621 RP-ECJ, art 164; RP-GC, art 160; RP-CST, art 119.

724

Interim relief 8.159

significant degree with the arguments and evidence relied on in the application commencing the action. Where that does occur, there is no obvious reason why a cross-reference to the application commencing the action is appropriate because that implies a division of the arguments and evidence supporting the application for interim relief between two documents (the application for interim relief and the application commencing the action), a tactic that is not normally desirable because it is usually more forceful to group together the arguments and evidence bearing upon a particular issue. In contrast, so far as matters going to the arguability of the action are concerned, in reality, a prima facie case on the admissibility and merits of the action cannot in practice be established with complete certainty otherwise than by incorporating the entirety of the application commencing the action in the interim relief application, by annexing a copy to the interim relief application, or by some form of cross-reference to the application commencing the action. Further, if the application for interim relief is made after lodgement of the defence in the action, it does not seem to be sufficient to repeat passages from the application commencing the action because then no account will be taken of the defendant’s criticisms of the application commencing the action, contained in the defence. On the other hand, an application for interim relief is not the proper place for the applicant to set out its reply to the defence. The position is even worse if the application for interim relief is made at an even later stage in the action, such as after the hearing, at which point it is even less appropriate for the applicant and the defendant to engage, in effect, in a further round of written submissions on the admissibility and merits of the action. Although it would appear that the application for interim relief should reflect the evolution of the debate between the applicant and defendant in the action at the time when interim relief is sought, some judgment has to be exercised as to just how much of the debate actually needs to be included in the application for interim relief. The further the action has progressed, the less is the utility in devoting space in the application for interim relief to demonstrating the arguability of the action622 unless the defendant has managed to land some killer (or apparently killer) blow on all or a part of the admissibility or the merits of the action (at least in so far as the killer blow affects a part of the case that is relevant to the application for interim relief).623 That is particularly so in relation to admissibility: if the action’s admissibility were genuinely unarguable, the defendant would lodge a preliminary objection to admissibility; if the defendant does not do so, that amounts to acceptance of the arguability of the admissibility of the action (not, of course, acceptance that it is admissible) and therefore, as from the point at which a preliminary objection should and could have been made (but has not

622 In at least one case, Judge Vesterdorf said at the hearing of an interim relief application that he was not willing to entertain any debate about the existence of a prima facie case in the action once the written procedure had closed. 623 For example, suppose that an action for annulment is based upon three grounds, each of which (if well-founded) is alone sufficient to justify the annulment of the challenged measure. An application for interim relief cannot be defeated merely by showing that one or even two of the grounds are unarguable (whether as to their admissibility or as to their merits) since the third is alone sufficient.

725

8.160  Interim relief

been made), discussion of the arguability of the admissibility of the action, in the context of the interim relief proceedings, seems pointless. Accordingly, so far as the arguability of the action is concerned: (i) it should normally be sufficient to provide in the application for interim relief a short but intelligible summary of the case made out in the application commencing the action, with appropriate cross-references to the relevant passages in the latter, and the judge hearing the interim relief application need not take a particularly strict view of that requirement; and (ii) the later the stage in the action at which interim relief is applied for, the less important is the requirement to demonstrate the arguability of the action otherwise than in relation to points that the defendant has shown to be particularly weak and that have a bearing on the application for interim relief. However, in relation to (i), the practice of the Court has not yet reached the point at which it can be regarded as safe to provide only an intelligible summary of the case in the action.

E

Other pleadings

8.160 The other pleadings in interim relief proceedings normally consist only of the written observations on the application for interim relief, lodged by the defendant and the interveners (if any). Little needs to be said about the written observations. Like the application for interim relief, they must be self-contained documents in the sense that they should not cross-refer to the pleadings and documents lodged in the action.624 It is to be noted that no ‘defence’ is lodged in response to the application. Instead, proceedings are analogous to those for intervening in a case and the emphasis is less on their contentious nature. The opposing party’s observations should answer the assertions made in the application for relief and may, where appropriate, request an alternative order to that proposed by the applicant.625 Where the opposing party fails to dispute part of the applicant’s case (in casu, the existence of a prima facie case) but does not admit it expressly, it has been said that the judge dealing with the matter cannot fail to take that into account.626 That appears to mean that, while the judge should satisfy himself that the applicant’s assertions are not unfounded, he need not be so concerned with their merits as would be the case if the point had been contested. There is no second round of written pleadings unless the judge dealing with the matter invites the parties to lodge a further pleading.627

624 Aden (above, note 42), paras 48–55. The reason is that the case file before the judge dealing with the application for interim relief does not contain the pleadings in the action. 625 The opposing party generally requests the rejection of the form of order proposed by the applicant for relief. It is almost unheard of for the opposing party itself to claim some form of interim relief; but such a claim was made in the Emerald Meats case (above, note 123), paras 28–30, where it was dismissed as unnecessary, not inadmissible. 626 SACE (above, note 380), para 30. 627 Cf Elan (above, note 294), para 34.

726

Interim relief 8.161

F

Evidential requirements

8.161 Passing now to consideration of the evidential requirements in interim relief proceedings,628 the general position is that the applicant for relief must produce evidence bearing out the assertions of fact on which the application for relief is based;629 and, more particularly, that all relevant evidence must be produced together with the application for interim relief, not tendered afterwards (unless there are difficulties in presenting the evidence at the outset).630 In Cases 53/65  R  Arturo Mondini SpA  v High Authority and 1/66  R  SpA  Acciaierie e Ferriere Stefana Fratelli v High Authority631 Judge Hammes rejected an application because it was based on mere assertions and did not adduce any evidence or refer to any material of probative value which would support those assertions.632 At least in the case of matters that can easily and most appropriately be proved by documentary evidence, such as the capacity of the applicant to bear financial loss or damage, a failure to produce such evidence cannot be remedied by mere unsupported assertion.633 In relation to other matters, not all judges have adopted as strict an approach as Judge Hammes. In Ford v Commission634 Judge Mertens de Wilmars felt able to make a preliminary assessment of one issue of fact on the basis of statements made at the hearing; in Cases 82 and 83/85 R Eurasian Corpn Ltd v Commission635 Judge Koopmans was able to accept the assertions of the parties as reliable evidence; in Case 148/88 R Albani v Commission636 Judge Due rejected one of the applicant’s submissions on the basis of certain assertions of fact made by the defendant at the hearing. The current tendency is to be more exacting in terms of the evidence that needs to be produced.637 628 Where, due to the urgency of the situation, the judge grants relief before hearing the other party, the evidential requirements are much less even than when the judge is considering the matter in the light of the other party’s observations. Thus, in Case 194/88 R Commission v Italy (above, note 535), Judge Mackenzie Stuart remarked that the applicant’s assertions ‘may, at this stage of the proceedings, be regarded as true’. At a later stage in the interim relief proceedings, the judge must inevitably be more sceptical. 629 Eg Case C-507/11 P(R) Fapricela – Industria de Trefilaria SA v Commission, 20 April 2012, paras 35–36, 52–55, 65–70 and 84–87. 630 Eg Nencini (above, note 610), paras 29–31; Akhras (above, note 179), para 56 (which explains that the need for expedition is the reason why the evidence should be produced at the outset). 631 [1966] ECR 17 and [1967] ECR 283 respectively. 632 See also Judge Mackenzie Stuart in Case 310/85  R  Deufil GmbH & Co KG  v Commission [1986]  ECR  537, para  23, a requirement of ‘convincing evidence’; the same in Case 92/88  R  Associazione Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v Commission [1988]  ECR  2425, para  24, a requirement of ‘cogent evidence’; Judge Due in Case 148/88 R Albani v Commission [1988] ECR 3361, para 18, a requirement of ‘firm evidence’; Judge Mackenzie Stuart in Case 191/88  R  Co-Frutta Sarl v Commission [1988]  ECR  4551, para  21, a requirement of ‘objective evidence’; Judge Joliet in Case C-35/92  P-R  European Parliament v Frederiksen [1992] ECR I-2399, para 21. 633 Case 44/88 R De Compte v European Parliament [1988] ECR 1669, paras 33–36. Compare Case 234/82 R Ferriere di Roe Volciano v Commission [1983] ECR 725 with Case 348/82R IRO V Commission [1983] ECR 1237. 634 Above, note 111. 635 [1985] ECR 1191, paras 7–21. 636 Above (note 632), para 24. There seems to have been nothing to controvert the assertions made by the defendant. 637 See, for examples, Stichting Sona (above, note 37), paras 57–62.

727

8.162  Interim relief

8.162 Where the assertions made by the applicant are unsupported by any evidence but are expressly conceded by the opposing party, no difficulty seems to arise.638 On one view, if the opposing party fails to contest the applicant’s assertions, the opposing party should be taken to concede them, at least for the purposes of the interim relief proceedings. However, in Case 141/84 R De Compte v European Parliament,639 Judge Galmot took the view that, if the opposing party fails to reply to the applicant’s assertions, that does not betoken acceptance of them; the judge hearing the application must still ascertain whether or not there is a real dispute between the parties and whether or not the applicant’s claims are supported by sound arguments. 8.163 Where the applicant’s assertions are disputed by the opposing party and there is conflicting evidence before the judge, the judge is inevitably drawn into considering the sufficiency of the evidence relied on by the parties,640 save where one party does not ‘seriously’ contest an assertion made by the other party.641 Where there is a dispute between the parties, there seems to be nothing to prevent the judge from coming to a provisional conclusion. However, in Case 250/85 R Brother Industries Ltd v Council,642 where the question of the threat of damage was hotly contested between the parties, Judge Mackenzie Stuart considered that, in such a situation, it was impossible to accept the figures submitted by one party in preference to those submitted by another party without prejudicing the substance of the case unless there were other factors weighing in favour of the view of one or other of the parties. In such a situation, the evidence adduced by the party opposing the application seems to cancel the effect of the evidence adduced by the applicant; the case is then to be decided on the basis of the burden of proof, which lies on the applicant, resulting in the dismissal of the application.643 8.164 The standard of proof in interim relief proceedings is not as high as in direct actions. In Case 18/57 Nold KG  v High Authority,644 Advocate General Roemer pointed out that ‘full proof’ is not necessary and only a prima facie case need be shown. In Ford v Commission645 Judge Mertens de Wilmars referred 638 Cf Case 82/87  R  Autexpo SpA  v Commission [1987]  ECR  2131, paras 18–19, where Judge Mackenzie Stuart felt able to accept the prima facie admissibility of the action on the basis of an assertion of fact (made by the defendant) that was unsupported by evidence. 639 [1984] ECR 2575, paras 9–11. 640 Eg Case 119/86  R  Spain v Council and Commission [1986]  ECR  2241, paras 25–30; Case 128/86  R  Spain v Commission [1986]  ECR  2495, paras 25–30; Case 57/89  R  Commission v Germany [1989]  ECR  2849, paras 19–22; Case C-280/93  R  Germany v Commission [1993] ECR I-3667. 641 Eg Case 154/85 R Commission v Italy (above, note 271), para 20. 642 [1985] ECR 3459, para 16. See also Case 273/85 R Silver Seiko Ltd v Council [1985] ECR 3475, para 17; Case 297/85 R Towa Sankiden Corpn v Council [1985] ECR 3483, para 15; Cases 277 and 300/85 R Canon Inc v Council [1985] ECR 3491, para 16. 643 The Brother case, para 18; Silver Seiko, para 19; Towa Sankiden, para 17; Canon, para 18 (all above, note 566). 644 [1957–58] ECR 121 at 127. 645 Above (note 111), para 7. See also Cases C-51 and C-59/90 R Comos-Tank BV v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-2167, para  29, and Case C-213/91  R  Abertal SAT  Lda v Commission [1991] ECR I-5109, para 24, where Judge Due referred to ‘the required degree of probability’ without explaining what that degree was.

728

Interim relief 8.166

to ‘a degree of probability sufficient for the purposes of this order’. A  ‘sufficient degree of probability’ has become the most frequently used formula.646 On the other hand, in Case 250/85  R  Brother Industries Ltd v Council647 (a dumping case), Judge Mackenzie Stuart required from the applicant ‘reliable and uncontested evidence’ to the effect that the grant of relief would not cause damage to Community industry. In contrast, in Case 152/88 R Sofrimport Sarl v Commission648 (also a trade protection, albeit not a dumping, case) he was prepared to accept that, at first sight, grant of the relief sought would not lead to a serious disturbance of the market in the EU. The difference in approach between those cases is really a reflection of their different factual circumstances and not a matter of legal principle. In Case 160/84 R Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission649 Judge Mackenzie Stuart referred to a lack of ‘convincing’ evidence but was nonetheless prepared to grant relief because of the scale of the alleged threat to the applicant, which suggests that a weakness in the evidence relied on need not be a barrier to the grant of relief but may be a factor to be taken into account when deciding whether or not to grant relief or to grant it only for a short period in order to preserve the position until the applicant has obtained better evidence. In Case 246/89 R Commission v United Kingdom,650 when considering the effectiveness of the relief sought by the applicant, Judge Due considered that ‘the possibility could not be excluded’ that that relief would be effective in certain cases. 8.165 Where the evidence relates to an existing state of affairs (as opposed to the evaluation of the probability and extent of a threat of future damage), typically the financial state of the applicant for interim relief, the judge dealing with the application usually expects complete information, supported by evidence (preferably from independent sources), to be provided and will scrutinise it carefully.651 8.166 The position can therefore be summarised as follows. It is for the applicant to demonstrate a prima facie case for relief and for the opposing party to negate the material relied on by the applicant or else to demonstrate a prima facie case for the existence of some bar to the grant of relief (such as that it would itself cause serious and irreparable damage to the opposing party). Each party’s assertions ought to be supported by evidence, where available. The evidence and assertions of each party must be sufficiently persuasive but need not be ‘convinc 646 Eg Le Canne (above, note 294), para 34; Akhras (above, note 179), para 42. 647 Above (note 566), para 17. See also Silver Seiko, para 18, Towa Sankiden, para 16, and Canon, para 17 (all above, note 642). 648 [1988] ECR 2931, para 33. 649 Above (note 390), paras 8–9. See also Case 160/84 R II Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission [1984] ECR 3615. 650 [1989] ECR 3125, para 38. 651 Eg Le Canne (above, note 294), para 35; Case T-11/06 R Romana Tabacchi SpA v Commission [2006] ECR II-2491, paras 97–124 (a comparatively rare example of a successful application to be relieved of the obligation to provide a bank guarantee covering the payment of a fine); Akhras (above, note 179), paras 49–50 (treatment of statements produced by the applicant himself).

729

8.167  Interim relief

ing’ in the sense that, at the interim relief stage, the judge hearing the application is required to come to a provisional and not a definitive view of the position. Whether or not evidence or an assertion is sufficiently persuasive depends in large part on the extent to which it is contested by the other party and on the gravity and degree of imminence of the threat of damage to either party depending upon whether or not relief is granted. 8.167 Finally, in some cases, the evidence concerning the threat of serious and irreparable damage, the sufficiency of alternative remedies (such as the provision of a bank guarantee instead of the payment of a fine – as to which see further below) and the adequacy of the type of interim relief sought may relate to matters of a technical nature or matters that require specialist knowledge.652 It cannot be assumed that the judge hearing the application (or, for that matter, the party opposing the application for interim relief and its representatives) have any knowledge or understanding of such matters.653 It may appear to the applicant for interim relief that the matters in question are clear and obvious; but that does not obviate the need to prove them. That is particularly the case in relation to matters that are perfectly normal in ordinary commercial relations. For example, in Case T-398/10 R Fapricela v Commission,654 Judge Jaeger expressed scepticism about letters from various banks refusing to provide the applicant with a bank guarantee; the letters were said to be ‘laconic’. In one sense, the scepticism was justified because a bank with a good working relationship with a customer might be happy to provide, as a favour, a letter refusing to provide a bank guarantee, if that was what the customer wanted. A person might also request a bank to provide a bank guarantee but not give the bank the information needed to enable the bank to make an informed decision, thus causing it to respond with a short letter refusing the request. On the other hand, the extent to which a bank would provide reasons (or evidence) supporting why it was refusing to provide a bank guarantee depends largely upon banking practice. A  laconic reply could well be normal practice; and it would be far from unusual for a bank to prefer not to explain the reasons for a decision.655 But, if that is the case, the judge must be provided with 652 Matters requiring specialist knowledge include such things as: common business practices; business practices peculiar to the industrial sector in question; banking practices; and the nature and operation of both common and rarefied financial instruments. The judge hearing the application is a lawyer who, more often than not, has no knowledge or experience of commerce. The same goes for the representatives of EU institutions. 653 For example, in one case, the fact that an employee of the applicant company exercised a share option was taken to belie the assertions of the company that it was in dire financial straits despite the facts that the share option had been made available under a scheme that pre-existed the difficulties in which the company found itself and was a normal method of remunerating employees and that there was little point in the employee refraining from exercising the option because, by doing so, he at least acquired the possibility of the shares rising in value if and when the company got out of its difficulties. 654 [2011] ECR II-239*, paras 26–30 (upheld on appeal, Case C-507/11 P(R) Fapricela – Industria de Trefilaria SA v Commission, above, note 629). 655 Contrary to what a judge might think, banks and other third party financial institutions do not see themselves as assisting in the administration of justice. They are carrying on a business. Trying to get such entities to produce evidence can be a frustrating and fruitless enterprise for which, frequently, there is insufficient time.

730

Interim relief 8.169

evidence of banking practice so that he can reach an informed conclusion on the inferences that can or cannot be drawn from correspondence of that sort.

G

The handling of the application

8.168 An application not made in the proper form may, of course, be rejected as inadmissible.656 The application may be rejected as inadmissible without being served on the opposing party if the action to which it relates is also rejected as being outside the Court’s jurisdiction, manifestly inadmissible or the subject of an absolute bar.657 Otherwise, the application is served on the other party in the usual way and the President prescribes ‘a short period’ for the submission of any written or oral observations.658 Different applications may be dealt with together, like similar actions, if they have the same purpose and are closely connected.659 When an application is made, the Court entertaining it may not suspend the proceedings or decline jurisdiction on the ground that a parallel application is before another jurisdiction within the Court (although that is possible if the action to which the application relates has been stayed or jurisdiction over it has been declined).660 8.169 The reference to ‘written or oral observations’ (emphasis added) suggests that the President may fix a date for the hearing of the application without giving the other party the opportunity to answer the application in writing. The usual practice is for the President to invite, and receive, written observations from the opposing party and then to decide whether or not further oral observations are necessary, unless the matter is so urgent that there is no time for written observations. The omission of an opportunity to submit written or, as the case may be, oral observations does not, of course, deprive the opposing party altogether of his right to be heard since he will invariably be given the opportunity to be heard either orally or in writing, if not in both forms, at some point unless the application is so obviously inadmissible or unfounded that it can be dismissed immediately.

656 See Case 731/79 R II B v European Parliament [1980] ECR 829. 657 Eg Cases 264/88 and 264/88 R Valle Fernandez v Commission [1988] ECR 6341. Alternatively, there may be, in that situation, no need to rule on the application because the action to which it relates no longer exists: Case T-456/09  R  Bakonyi v Hungary [2010]  ECR II-20*; Case T-472/11 DMA (above, note 54); Case T-513/11 R Consortium v Commission [2011] ECR II456*; Case T-368/11 R Travetanche Injection SPRL v Commission, order of 4 February 2013; Case T-313/13  R  Coordinamento delle associazioni per la tutela dell’ambiente e dei diritti degli utenti e consumatori (Codacons) v Commission, order of 3 July 2013. 658 RP-ECJ, art 160(5); RP-GC, art 157(1); RP-CST, art 116(1). IR-CST 10(2) provides that the registrar may send procedural documents ‘by all appropriate means which urgency requires’. A fax transmission will be followed by service in the normal way. 659 Eg Cases 82 and 83/85R Eurasian Corpn Ltd v Commission [1985] ECR 1191, para 4. 660 Case T-76/96 R National Farmers’ Union v Commission [1996] ECR II-815, paras 31–35.

731

8.170  Interim relief

In principle, an application for interim relief should be decided swiftly: that is the reason why the procedure followed is ‘summary’.661 However, a speedy disposal of the application cannot be guaranteed.662

H Intervention 8.170 A third party with sufficient interest may apply to intervene in interim relief proceedings. In principle, a person who is already a party to the action, as an intervener, does not have to make a separate application to intervene in the interim relief proceedings.663

I

Emergency relief

8.171 The President has power to grant the application even before the defendant’s observations have been submitted.664 That situation may arise in cases of extreme urgency where it is necessary to preserve the position pending the receipt of the defendant’s observations on the application for relief and the eventual decision on the application.665 For example, in Case 107/82 R AEG Telefunken AG v Commission666 the Commission had, in brief, adopted a decision requiring the payment of a fine within three months. AEG lodged an application commencing proceedings for the annulment of the decision some four weeks before the fine was to be paid and also applied for the operation of the decision to be suspended. The President granted relief without hearing the Commission, five days after the lodgment of the application for interim relief, suspending the operation of the relevant part of the decision pending a final decision on the application. Similarly, in Cases 228 and 229/82  R  Ford Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc v Commission667 the Commission had exercised its powers to order interim measures pending the 661 Statute, art 39. 662 In Aer Lingus (above, note 74), for example, the application for interim relief was lodged on 19 November 2007 and the order was made on 18 March 2008. 663 See further Ch 5. The cases dealing with the interest to intervene in interim relief proceedings do not seem to differentiate between situations in which the intervener is not already a party to the action and those in which the intervener is a party. 664 RP-ECJ, art 84(2); RP-CFI 105(2); RP-CST, art 104(3). 665 See, for example, Case 293/82R De Compte v European Parliament [1982] ECR 4001; Case 338/82R  Albertini and Montagnani v Commission [1982]  ECR  4667; Case 214/86R Greece v Commission [1986]  ECR  2505; Case 45/87R  Commission v Ireland [1987]  ECR  783; Cases T-24 and T-28/92R  Langnese-Iglo GmbH & Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co KG  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-1713; Case T-29/92R  Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v Commission [1992] ECR II-2161, para 8; Case 12/93 R Vittel (above, note 169), order of 2 April 1993; Case C-110/97 RX Netherlands v Council [1997] ECR I-1795, paras 26–30 (the contested measure was due to expire a matter of weeks after the commencement of proceedings); Case T-184/01 R IMS Health Inc v Commission [2001] ECR II-2349, para 19. 666 [1982] ECR 1179 and 1549. 667 [1982] ECR 2849.

732

Interim relief 8.173

termination of an investigation under what is now TFEU, art  101, and the applicant had commenced an action for the annulment of the order so made. An application for the suspension of the operation of the Commission’s order was also made, only a few days before the order was to come into effect. The President promptly suspended its operation pending a decision on the application for interim relief made by Ford on the ground that ‘it is desirable in the interests of the proper administration of justice not to put this measure into effect before the parties have had the opportunity of stating their views during these proceedings relating to an application for interim measures’. 8.172 In Cases 6 and 7/73  R  Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corpn v Commission668 the applicant specifically asked for relief pending a decision on the application for interim relief. It is good practice for such a request to be made where the applicant believes that the occurrence of serious and irreparable damage is imminent. In such cases, the lack of time to consider the matter makes it impossible for the judge dealing with the application to make a proper assessment of the arguments for and against the grant of relief; the decision to grant relief may therefore be based more on the seriousness and degree of imminence of the threat and less on a profound analysis of the applicant’s case in the action.669 Where necessary, the order may go further than the relief sought by the applicant.670 Such an order may be made by the President immediately even though the final decision on the application for interim relief is to be made by the Court itself (in ECJ cases).671

J

Orders made without hearing the defendant

8.173 Where the order is made without hearing the views of the defendant to the application, it may subsequently be varied or cancelled, either on application or by the President of his own motion.672 It is arguable that that rule also applies where the defendant to the application has failed to submit his observations within time; but that is uncertain. Since the proceedings are not wholly contentious, because of the judge’s interest in ensuring that the Court’s final judgment is not rendered nugatory, the order cannot be made merely on the ground that the 668 [1973] ECR 357. A holding order may also be made pending the decision in another case: Case T-554/93 R Abbott Trust (above, note 140). 669 Eg Case 194/88  R  Commission v Italy [1988]  ECR  4547; Case C-195/90  R  Commission v Germany [1990]  ECR  I-2715, paras 18–20. Cf Case T-88/94  R  Societe Commerciale des Potasses (above, note 42), paras 45–46 (the judge did not have sufficient information to exclude the possibility that serious damage might be suffered); Case C-320/03 R Commission v Austria [2003] ECR I-7929, paras 19–24 (the arguments put forward by the applicant must not be prima facie entirely unfounded and the facts alleged must show the possibility that there is urgency). 670 Case 221/86 R Group of the European Right and National Front Party v European Parliament [1986] ECR 2579. 671 Case C-195/90 R Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3351, para 4. 672 RP-ECJ, art  160(7); RP-GC, art  157(2); RP-CST, art  116(2), 2nd subpara. Eg Case 194/88 R Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 4559 (original order extended until the date of the final order on the application for interim relief in order to preserve the position until the hearing of the application).

733

8.174  Interim relief

defendant to the application had impliedly consented to it by failing to submit any observations in time, as is (on one view) the case where judgment in contentious proceedings is obtained in default of a defence. In consequence, as the order must have been made because the judge considered that the conditions for granting relief had been satisfied, it is arguable that, where the judge has granted relief after the defendant has defaulted in submitting observations on the application for relief, his order can be varied or cancelled only where there is a change in circumstances.673

K

Measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry

8.174 Before making his decision, the President may order measures of organisation of procedure or a measure of enquiry.674 It has not so far been the regular practice to order a measure of enquiry.675 Measures of organisation of procedure (usually consisting of a request for information) are more common; although it is more usual for the judge dealing with the application to refrain from seeking further information or evidence and to decide the case on the material before him or her. Interim relief may be granted as a protective measure while the information necessary for a decision on the application for relief is being gathered.676

L

The hearing

8.175 The rules do not specify that there must be a hearing: that is a matter for the President to decide in the light of the facts of the case, the arguments of the parties and the degree of urgency. He may be satisfied that a decision can be made on the basis of the written submissions only.677 If there is a hearing,

673 RP-ECJ, art 163; RP-GC, art 159; RP-CST, art 118. 674 RP-ECJ, art 160(6); RP-GC, art 157(3); RP-CST, art 116(2), 3rd subpara. On the President’s discretion, see: Akhras (above, note 179), paras 57–59; Stichting Sona (above, note 37), para 63. 675 A  relatively rare instance (at the time) of the ordering of a preparatory enquiry is Case 285/81 R Geist v Commission (unreported), where the applicant was asked to produce evidence of his financial circumstances (verified, where possible, by a public authority or accountant) but declined to do so. As a result, the Court was unable to rule on the application. No further step was taken in the interim relief proceedings until 29 September 1983, when the application was dismissed on the ground that, as final judgment had been given in the action, there was no need to rule on the application for interim relief. 676 Eg Cases T-24/92  R  and T-28/92  R  Langnese-Iglo GmbH  v Commission [1992]  ECR II1713, para  22 (information was sought from both the applicants and an intervener); Case T-12/93  R  Vittel (above, note 169), order of 2 April 1993, para  33; Case T-88/94  R  Societe Commerciale des Potasses (above, note 42), para 46. 677 See, for example, Case 60/63  R  Acciaierie Ferriere Pietro Oddino v High Authority [1965]  ECR  27; 338/82  R  Albertini and Montagnani v Commission [1983]  ECR  145; Case 69/83 R Lux v Court of Auditors [1983] ECR 1785; Case 241/84 R Pizzinato v Commission [1984] ECR 3619, para 3.

734

Interim relief 8.177

it is held before the President alone678 although, if he wishes, he may invite the advocate general (where there is one), the judge-rapporteur or anyone else, if he has a mind to, to attend. The President also has discretion to call on the parties to present further evidence or further argument after the hearing.679

M

The decision

8.176 The decision on the application must be reasoned and is served on the parties ‘forthwith’.680 There is no need to make a decision if, in the meantime, the action or appeal to which it relates has been decided or otherwise disposed of.681 8.177 The order granting relief is normally limited to preserving the position of the applicant and not third parties;682 and it will go only so far as is necessary in order to preserve the position.683 Where appropriate, provision may be made for monitoring compliance with the order.684 An order granting interim relief in the form of suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court or of any measure adopted by another EU institution must, where appropriate, specify the date on which the interim measure is to lapse.685 That date may be indicated either as a calendar date or by reference to the occurrence of some relevant event, such as the date of any judgment ruling on the validity or interpretation of the decision or measure in question (which cannot normally be predicted with accuracy). An order granting suspension of the operation of a measure challenged in an action before the Court or any other interim measure must have only an interim or temporary effect and must be without prejudice to the decision of the

678 Robes are not usually worn unless the President decides otherwise. The hearing is generally conducted in an informal manner. Although the case is usually heard by the President alone, the hearing is not, in formal terms, in camera. A party may, however, apply in writing or orally at the hearing itself for the proceedings to be heard in camera (see Case 120/83 R Raznoimport v Commission [1983] ECR 2573). 679 Eg Case C-113/09 P(R) Ziegler (above, note 520), paras 17 and 29–34. On the extent of the President’s discretion in organising the hearing of the parties, see also Fapricela (above, note 629), paras 49–51 and 56. 680 RP-ECJ, art 162(1); RP-GC, art 158(1); RP-CST, art 117(1). 681 Eg Case T-103/10 P(R)–(R) Parliament v U, 28 April 2010 (an application for interim relief made in the context of an appeal against an interim relief decision made at first instance); Case T-218/11 R Dagher v Council, 27 February 2012. 682 Eg the order made in Case 23/86 R United Kingdom v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1085. 683 Eg Cases 76, 77 and 91/89  R  Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1989]  ECR  1141, paras 19–20; Case 56/89 R Publishers’ Association v Commission [1989] ECR 1693, paras 38–40; Case T-45/90 R Speybrouck v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-705, paras 31–37, where the defendant was ordered to pay certain sums due from a third party in case, and for so long as, the third party was in delay in paying them; Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende v Commission (above, note 665), paras 39–42; SACE (above, note 380), paras 52–55 (part payment ordered). 684 Eg Case 154/85 R Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 1753, para 21; Case 293/85 R Commission v Belgium [1985] ECR 3521. 685 RP-ECJ, art 165(2); RP-GC, art 161(2); RP-CST, art 120(2).

735

8.178  Interim relief

Court on the substance of the case;686 unless the order fixes the date on which the relief granted is to lapse,687 the order lapses automatically when final judgment in the action is delivered.688 Since the suspension of the operation of a contested act and other forms of interim measures (with the exception of the suspension of the enforcement of a decision of the Court or other measure) are granted solely in the context of proceedings before the Court and must not prejudice the Court’s final judgment in the action, it follows that, in principle, such relief cannot survive the delivery of final judgment. It would therefore seem that the order granting such relief cannot specify, as the date on which the order is to lapse, a date after the delivery of judgment. The discretion to limit the temporal effect of the order operates within the period before the ending of the action by the delivery of final judgment. Since the date of the final judgment is not usually predictable, it would appear that, if the order does specify a date which happens to fall after the delivery of the final judgment, the order lapses automatically when final judgment is delivered and is not prolonged until the date specified in it. It is for the Court, in the final judgment, and not for the President (or, as the case may be, the Court or a chamber) in an earlier interim relief order, to deal in an appropriate manner with the situation in the event that there is some compelling reason why the final judgment should not take effect when it is delivered. By the same token, where interim relief is granted in the context of proceedings before the CST or GC and the CST’s or GC’s final judgment is the subject of an appeal to (as the case may be) the GC or the ECJ, the interim relief order expires in principle on the delivery of the CST’s or GC’s judgment and the continuation of the relief granted until then is a matter for the President of (as the case may be) the GC or ECJ to decide in the context of the appeal proceedings. 8.178 Even where an application for interim relief must in principle be dismissed, it may be appropriate to grant some form of relief covering the period after the dismissal of the application in order to prevent the time taken to decide the matter from causing the applicant difficulties.689

686 RP-ECJ, art 160(4); RP-GC, art 158(4); RP-CST, art 117(4). 687 Where necessary, the application for relief may be renewed if the duration of the original order is limited: see, for example, Case 160/84  R  Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE  v Commission [1984] ECR 3217, para 9, where the original order was in principle a holding order designed to preserve the position so that the applicant could, if need be, obtain further evidence to support the claim for relief (the subsequent proceedings are reported in [1984] ECR 3615); and United Phosphorus (above, note 381), in which the original order was extended twice (see [2010] ECR II-3* and 257*). 688 RP-ECJ, art  162(3); RP-GC, art  158(3); RP-CST, art  117(3). Eg Case 78/83  R  USINOR  v Commission [1983] ECR 2183; Aer Lingus (above, note 74), para 45 (the end date of the order cannot be delivery of judgment in another action). 689 Eg Cases T-10 to 12 and T-14 to 15/92 R SA Cimenteries CBR v Commission [1992] ECR II1571, para 58.

736

Interim relief 8.179

N

Imposition of conditions on the grant of relief

8.179 The operation of an order granting relief may be made subject to the lodging by the applicant of a security690 or other condition fixed by the President. The purpose of requiring a security is to cover the situation where the party ordered to provide it (the applicant for relief) is liable for the sum covered by the security and there is a risk that it may become insolvent and therefore unable to pay the sum due.691 In consequence, the lodging of a security will not be required if the applicant would be able to pay the sum due692 or if the security relates to an amount that the applicant is not otherwise liable to pay. Thus, the requirement to provide a security is not intended to ensure that the opposing party is compensated by the applicant for any loss caused to the opposing party as a result of the grant of relief should the applicant lose the action or should it eventually turn out that relief should not have been granted, unless the applicant would otherwise be liable in respect of that loss.693 In the result, the cases where a security has been required are those where relief has been sought in respect of the payment of a sum of money (usually a fine).694 In such cases, the judge’s willingness to make the order, or to put it another way, his willingness to accept that the conditions for granting relief are fulfilled, may be affected by the applicant’s willingness to lodge a security. For example, in AEG Telefunken AG v Commission695 and 690 RP-ECJ, art  162(2); RP-GC, art  158(2); RP-CST, art  117(2); Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe et al [1991] ECR I-415, para 32. The word actually used is ‘execution’ (ECJ and GC rules) or ‘enforcement’ (CST rules) but ‘operation’, as it is used in RP-ECJ, art 160(1), RP-GC, art 156(1) and RP-CST, art 115(1), is perhaps more accurate because it is the legal effect of the order which is made conditional on the lodging of a security, not the possibility of ‘enforcing’ or ‘executing’ it within the meaning of, for example, RP-ECJ, art 165, RP-GC, art 161, RP-CST, art 120 or TFEU, art 299. 691 Case C-195/90 R Commission v Germany (above, note 264), para 48. In that case, the Commission relied on a comparative study of national law indicating that, where a state acts to enforce the law rather than to protect its own proprietary or contractual interests, it is required to lodge a guarantee only in highly exceptional circumstances: see Oliver, (1992) 29 CMLRev 7 at 8. 692 Case C-195/90 R Commission v Germany (above, note 264), para 49. 693 Case C-195/90 R Commission v Germany suggests that, at least in proceedings under TFEU, art 258, the applicant for relief (the Commission) may be liable in damages to the opposing party in respect of any loss resulting from the grant of relief (presumably in the event that the applicant loses the action); but that is an inference from para 49 of the judgment and it cannot be relied on in support of some general proposition that, in all proceedings, the applicant for relief may be so liable. The other view is that the applicant for relief is not ordinarily liable for the loss arising directly from the grant of relief (if any) because the proximate cause of that loss is not the applicant’s decision to apply for relief but the decision of the Court to grant it. Further, it would be contrary to public policy to make the Court liable for any loss arising from the exercise of a judicial discretion (save in very exceptional cases). Having said that, it is not to be excluded that the EU may be liable to compensate a member state for loss arising from the grant of interim relief in the course of unsuccessful infringement proceedings brought against that member state. The basis for liability would be a general obligation to compensate rather than liability based on fault lying in the commencement of infringement proceedings or the exercise of the power to grant interim relief. 694 In Case 160/84 R Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE (above, note 390; and see the comment in note 687) relief was granted subject to provision of a bank guarantee covering the payment of customs duties. 695 Above, note 666.

737

8.180  Interim relief

Case 86/82 R Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Commission696 the President suspended the operation of two Commission decisions imposing fines on the applicants subject to the condition that the latter should provide bank guarantees covering the amounts of the fines. In the first case the guarantee had already been given. In the second case the President found that the applicant had not shown that there existed ‘exceptional circumstances…such as to justify the granting of a suspension without the provision of a guarantee’, but suspended the operation of the decision subject to the provision of a guarantee within eight weeks. If one were not obtained within that time, the order granting suspension would lapse. A similar order was made in Case 263/82 R Klöckner Werke AG v Commission697 but the applicant was unable to obtain the security required and made a second application for relief without that condition. The President rejected it on the ground that it had neither been shown nor affirmed that the applicant had tried to negotiate the grant of a bank guarantee.698 When the operation of a decision imposing a fine is suspended on condition that the applicant provide a bank guarantee, the applicant cannot claim the costs of providing the guarantee, if it is successful in the action, because, in the absence of the order, the applicant would have had to pay the fine forthwith.699 8.180 As a result of the availability of interim relief in such cases, where a bank guarantee was provided by the applicant, the Commission adopted the policy of refraining from seeking payment of fines imposed by it on undertakings if they commenced proceedings for the annulment of the decision imposing the fine and also provided a security for the eventual payment of the fine in the event that they were unsuccessful. That policy made it no longer necessary for the Court to grant interim relief in such cases, although the Court will do so should the need arise700 and, in particular, where there are exceptional circumstances (namely, that the applicant is an undertaking which either cannot provide the security required or would suffer serious and irreparable damage if it did so).701

696 [1982] ECR 1555. 697 [1982]  ECR  3995 and 4225. See also Ferriere di Roe Volciano v Commission and IRO  v Commission (both above, note 633); Case 78/83 R USINOR v Commission (above, note 688). 698 The same approach was originally followed in cases where applicants sought the suspension of the operation of regulations imposing anti-dumping duties: see, for example, Cases 113/77  R  and 113/77  R-Int NTN Toyo Bearing Co Ltd v Council [1977]  ECR  1721. It was abandoned when a more restrictive view was taken of the conditions for the grant of interim relief in such cases: see Case 258/84 R Nippon Seiko KK v Council [1984] ECR 4357; Case 77/87 R Technointorg v Council [1987] ECR 1793. 699 Case 78/83 USINOR v Commission [1984] ECR 4177 at 4206–4207 (Advocate General Slynn). 700 As it did in Case 62/84 R USINOR v Commission [1984] ECR 2643. 701 Eg Case 392/85  R  Finsider v Commission [1986]  ECR  959; Case 213/86  R  Montedipe SpA  v Commission [1986]  ECR  2623; Case T-199/08  R  Ziegler (above, note 520); Case T-410/09 R Almamet (above, note 525), paras 34–37. In some cases, considerable attention has been focused on the number of banks who have been approached in search of a bank guarantee. Generally speaking, a bank guarantee is always obtainable if the undertaking concerned has cash or unencumbered assets equal to or exceeding the amount of the guarantee; and, if the undertaking has neither, a bank guarantee is not obtainable. There is little mysterious about the matter.

738

Interim relief 8.184

8.181 In other cases, the conditions to which interim relief has been made subject have included: a prohibition on the divestment of assets, pending final judgment, without the opposing party’s authorisation, an interim part payment, and provision of information to the opposing party enabling it to monitor developments.702 8.182 Those cases concern the giving of security by, or other conditions imposed on, the applicant for relief. In Case 293/85 R Commission v Belgium,703 Belgium was ordered to suspend the exaction of discriminative fees for vocational training but the order provided that students (that is, third parties to the proceedings) benefiting from the order had to give a personal undertaking in writing to pay the fees in question if the action against Belgium were dismissed. An example of another sort of condition to which the order may be made subject is Cases 43 and 63/82 R VBVB and VBBB v Commission,704 which concerned a Commission decision finding that a restrictive agreement infringed what is now TFEU, art 101 and requiring the infringement to be terminated. Relief was granted on condition that the sanctions against breach of the agreement set out in it were not applied if persons bound by the agreement did not comply with its terms.

O

Variation or cancellation of the order

8.183 An order granting interim relief (whether made by the President of the ECJ, the GC or the CST, or the ECJ itself) may at any time be varied or cancelled on application on account of a ‘change of circumstances’,705 that is, a change in the factual circumstances that is capable of altering the assessment of urgency.706 An application for the order to be varied or cancelled should be made in the usual form and it is to be supposed that proceedings are the same as for an application for interim relief under RP-ECJ, art 160 ff or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 156 ff or RP-CST, art 115 ff, mutatis mutandis

P

Renewal of the application

8.184 Where the application has been dismissed, the applicant is not barred from making a further application where there are ‘new facts’.707. By implication, an application which has been rejected may not be renewed in the absence of new facts. A second application that seeks a different form of interim relief from

702 Eg Garantovana (above, note 524), paras 115–120. 703 Above, note 271, para 24. 704 [1982] ECR 1241. 705 RP-ECJ, art  163; RP-GC, art  159; RP-CST, art  118. See, for example, Case C-272/91 R Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-457 and 3929. The order cannot be varied or cancelled because of a change of circumstances if it rejected the application for interim relief: eg Case C-440/01 P(R) Commission v Artegodan [2002] ECR I-1489, paras 62–64. 706 Eg Garantovana (above, note 524), para 121; SACE (above, note 380), para 56. 707 RP-ECJ, art 164; RP-GC, art 160; RP-CST, art 119.

739

8.185  Interim relief

the first application is not caught by that rule and may be made in the absence of new facts.708 8.185 On the face of it, the implied prohibition on renewing an application for interim relief in the absence of a new fact applies where the application has been rejected on its merits. In such circumstances, a renewed application is unwarranted unless a new fact having a bearing on the assessment of the urgency of the situation has come to light. A new fact is therefore a fact appearing after the making of the order dismissing the application for interim relief, or a fact that the applicant was not able to invoke in the first application for interim relief or during the proceedings leading up to the making of the order, which is relevant to the assessment of the case.709 However, in the Frucona case,710 the requirement for there to be a new fact was applied to a pleading defect. That appears to be wrong in principle because the concern of the judge dealing with an interim relief application must be to ensure the effectiveness of the final judgment in the action, which depends on the facts relating to urgency and serious and irreparable damage.

Q Appeals 8.186 There is no appeal from an order of the President of the ECJ;711 an order of the President of the GC may be appealed to the ECJ, and an order made by the President of the CST may be appealed to the GC. Such an appeal is heard by the President of the appellate court by way of summary procedure (that is, the same procedure followed in an application made directly to the President of the appellate court for interim relief).712 The appeal is on a point of law only. Matters of fact are for the judge deciding the case at first instance, subject only to the usual rules applicable in an appeal in relation to disputed questions of fact.713

708 Case T-15/10 RII Ngele (above, note 47), para 7. 709 Eg Case T-303/04 R-II European Dynamics SA v Commission [2004] ECR II-4621, para 60 (in that case, the new facts appear to have consisted of evidence that could have been produced earlier); Case T-420/05 R-II Vischim Srl v Commission [2006] ECR II-4085, para 54 (upheld on appeal in Case C-459/06  P(R) Vischim Srl v Commission [2007]  ECR  I-53*); Case T-410/09  R  Almamet (above, note 525), para  55; Case T-18/10  R-II  Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council [2010] ECR II-235*, paras 18–23 (unaffected by the appeal, Case C-605/10 P(R), 27 October 2011); Xeda (above, note 38), para 13 (in that case the new facts did not affect the conclusion). Note also the observation in Microsoft (above, note 255), para 325. See, by analogy, Ch 16, paras 16.110–16.123 (new facts in the context of revision). 710 Case T-103/14 R-II Frucona (above, note 223), paras 16–17. A previous application for interim relief had been rejected for lack of urgency and also because of a pleading defect. A second application was made after a change in circumstances affecting the urgency of the situation (a decision of the competent national court delivered after the President’s decision on the first interim relief application). The second application, based on the new fact, did not contain the pleading defect identified in the first application. 711 RP-ECJ, art 162(1). See Cases 12 and 29/64 Ley v Commission [1965] ECR 107 at 121. 712 Statute, art 57 (second and third paras) and Annex, art 10(2)–(3). 713 Eg Case C-364/99 P(R) DSR-Senator Lines (above, note 519), paras 43–45. As to the extent to which an appeal can dispute matters of fact, see Ch 15, paras 15.20–15.22.

740

Chapter 9

Pleading

I INTRODUCTION 9.1 For procedural purposes, a distinction is often drawn between ‘procedural documents’ and other documents, often described as ‘communications’. The former comprise the pleadings (application, defence, reply, rejoinder and so forth) and other documents, generally requiring action on the part of the Court (applications for an extension of time and the like), lodged by the parties at the Registry, and procedural acts of the Court (such as notifications of procedural documents and procedural decisions).1 ‘Communications’ comprises a heterogeneous collection of documents (such as the written consent given by a party to a proposal to dispense with the oral part of the procedure before the CST)2 which are difficult to list or define but which pass between the Court and a party. Party

1 There is no standard definition of what a ‘procedural document’ is. RP-ECJ, art 57 and RP-GC, art 72 refer to ‘procedural documents’ without defining what they are. By implication, there are other documents that are not ‘procedural’. RP-ECJ, art 58, which has the heading ‘procedural documents’, implies that ‘procedural documents’ are ‘pleadings’ and ‘observations’. The latter term seems to allude to written observations submitted in the course of a reference for a preliminary ruling. The parallel GC provision, RP-GC, art 75, refers to ‘written pleadings’ but not ‘procedural documents’. PD-ECJ, para  40 implies (but does not state expressly) that ‘procedural documents’ are ‘documents expressly provided for by the procedural rules’ (which extends the class beyond pleadings and observations). PD-GC, para 21 distinguishes ‘procedural documents’ from other documents in the case file (such as correspondence with the parties, the report for the hearing, minutes of hearings and the decision in the case). The parallel CST provision, IR-CST, art  6(1) provides that the case file shall include ‘the procedural documents…with the exception of’ decisions taken in the case (including decisions refusing to accept a document), preparatory reports for the hearing, minutes of the hearing, documents served by the Registrar and ‘any other documents or correspondence to be taken into consideration in deciding the case’. Hence, all such documents are ‘procedural documents’. PD-GC, paras 91–113 imply that ‘procedural documents’ are written pleadings. IR-CST, art 4(1) distinguishes procedural documents from judgments and orders but does not otherwise explain what a procedural document is. The decisions of the ECJ, GC and CST on the lodging and service of documents using the e-Curia system refer to ‘procedural documents, including judgments and orders’ (emphasis added): see art 6 of each decision (OJ 2011 No L289, pp 7, 9 and 11, respectively). 2 See RP-CST, art 59(2). Another example is the innominate pleading referred to in Case T-116/11 European Medical Association v Commission, 11 December 2013, paras 67–69.

741

9.2  Pleading

to party communications have no procedural significance.3 Broadly speaking, procedural documents are those documents that mark the passage of proceedings from one stage to another; communications are any other document. Procedural documents are subject to certain formal requirements; communications are not. With the exception of the most obvious examples, the classification of a particular document as a procedural document or as a communication is often unclear; and the treatment of some documents is on occasion inconsistent with their classification. The distinction between procedural documents and communications and the consequences of that distinction are therefore best regarded as matters of practice rather than logic. In case of doubt about the correct classification of a document, it is better to draw it up and lodge it as if it were a procedural document. This chapter is concerned with those procedural documents that a party communicates to the Court, in particular, pleadings, although some brief remarks about communications appear in the next two sections of this chapter; particular pleadings relating to a specific aspect of procedure (such as intervention and interim relief) are dealt with in the chapter devoted to that aspect. 9.2 The pleadings in a case (by which is meant the statement of a party’s case, whether or not accompanied by a statement of the order sought from the Court and whether relating to the Court’s final judgment or to some preliminary procedural point) are written and, where there is a hearing, oral. The former are more important, the role of oral pleadings in the Court’s procedure being very limited and, in most cases, little more than an adjunct to the written pleadings. This chapter is concerned only with material that takes a written form.4 All pleadings are addressed to the Court and are intended to inform it, as well as the other parties, of a party’s case. In consequence, certainly in contentious proceedings, a pleading must satisfy two duties: one owed to the Court of explaining how the party wishes it to exercise its powers and the reasons why; and the second, owed to the opposing party, of setting out clearly the case which he must answer.5 Clarity of exposition is a factor common to the discharge of both duties. The Rules of Procedure do not lay down any standard form of pleading, nor has any emerged in practice, although there are certain basic requirements relating to the form and content of written pleadings. As a result, practice and the influence of national legal traditions play a large part in the drafting and presentation of pleadings. The object of this chapter is to set out the basic rules, which may be subject to specific exceptions. 3 In procedural terms, the parties communicate with each other through the Court, which is responsible for receiving from a party documents that, under the Rules of Procedure, are destined for another party and for transmitting such documents to that other party. Direct communication between parties is not provided for in the Rules of Procedure and therefore takes place outside the scope of formal proceedings before the Court. 4 Oral pleadings are discussed above: see Ch 2, paras 2.130–2.135. 5 Eg Cases 46 and 47/59 Meroni & Co v High Authority [1962] ECR 411 at 419; Cases 19 and 21/60, 2 and 3/61 Société Fives Lille Cail v High Authority [1961]  ECR  281 at 294; Case T-21/90 Generlich v Commission [1991]  ECR II-1323, para  31; Case C-271/13P  Rousse Industry AD v Commission, 20 March 2014, paras 16–25 (which also note that, if the Court asks a question about a point that has not been pleaded, that does not mean that the point has ceased to be inadmissible).

742

Pleading 9.4

9.3 The rules applicable to procedural documents have become increasingly complex, not to say bureaucratic, over the years, as the basic rules in the Rules of Procedure have been overlain by further prescriptive rules set out, usually at some (occasionally inordinate) length, in Practice Directions (particularly those of the GC) and Guidance Notes.6 Some rules governing the presentation of procedural documents are driven by the exigencies of the electronic means of transmission and storage used by the Court. Other rules, governing the length, organisation and content of pleadings, appear to have been driven partly by the constraints on the Court’s resources (its limited capacity to translate proceedings in good time leads the Court to be less tolerant of lengthy pleadings) and partly by a developing view within the Court about how pleadings ought to be couched. Some rules have no apparent rationale.7 The views held internally within the Court about how written pleadings are to be formulated, as manifested in the pleading requirements laid down from time to time, do not always correspond to the view held by a person charged with pleading a case on behalf of a party (the advocate). That may lead to misunderstandings. Hence, it may be worthwhile making a few remarks about the different perspectives, held by the Court and advocates, about pleadings. 9.4 Although (as noted above), a pleading must discharge two duties, one owed to the Court and the other owed to the opposing party, the essential function of a pleading is persuasive; and the audience to which a pleading is directed is first and foremost the Court, because the essential purpose of the pleading is to persuade the Court. Pleading is therefore effective if it provides the consumer of the pleading – the Court – with what the Court needs, in order to decide in favour of the party on whose behalf the pleading is lodged, in the most attractive and approachable manner. The duty owed by a pleading to the opposing party is normally satisfied automatically by a pleading that is properly directed at the needs of the true consumer, the Court. In practice, the ability of the advocate to present a truly effective pleading is often hampered by the demands of the advocate’s client, who may have a different agenda and a differ-

6 The increasing bureaucratisation of procedural rules is not, of course, a feature unique to the Court: it has occurred in certain member states as well. 7 For example, the pages of a pleading must be numbered consecutively in the top right-hand corner, nowhere else: PD-ECJ, para  35, 4th indent; PD-CST, para  21. PD-GC, para  96(d) specifies consecutive pagination of each procedural document but does not require the page number to be in the top right-hand corner (although the PD-GC used so to provide). Under PD-GC, para 101(d), annexes to a procedural document must be paginated, in the top righthand corner and the pagination must be ‘in ascending order’ and ‘consecutive’ (thus excluding both consecutive pagination in reverse order and non-consecutive pagination in ascending order); but annexes must be paginated separately from the procedural document to which the annexes are attached. Consecutive pagination (or pagination ‘in ascending order’) is obviously a good idea (not entirely original, however; non-consecutive pagination would undoubtedly be an original, if surreal, concept). The PD-ECJ and PD-CST appear to envisage unbroken consecutive pagination from the first page of the document to the last page of the last annex attached to it; whereas the PD-GC envisage separate pagination for the pleading, on the one hand, and the documents annexed to it, on the other. Why the page number has to be in the top right-hand corner is not immediately obvious.

743

9.5  Pleading

ent understanding of what amounts to an effective pleading.8 That consideration can be left out of account for present purposes. It is a fact of life; but not something that should be permitted to intrude into a consideration of the different perspectives of the Court and the advocate concerning the requirements of an effective pleading. 9.5 In order to be truly effective, a pleading must be couched by the advocate in such a way as to tap into a favourable process of reasoning present, usually latently, in the mind of the Court. It is at that point that the perspectives of the advocate and of the Court regarding what is an effective pleading diverge because the advocate has to discharge his task of divining what will, or is most likely to, be persuasive at the beginning of the process whereas the Court is put in a position to judge what is or is not an effective pleading at the end of the process (the process referred to here is that involved in the conception of the pleading and its production in final form, invariably against the backdrop of a time limit and other constraints on the time that the author can devote to refining the pleading). When contemplating the finished product, it is perfectly possible for the Court to conclude that what needed to have been said could have been said more succinctly and that certain points made are superfluous. The advocate is never in a position to make that kind of judgment because, save in the clearest of cases, the task of the advocate is to lay before the Court a range of different possibilities, from which the Court can make its selection.9 An effective pleading, from the advocate’s perspective, must necessarily be longer and more detailed than what the Court’s perspective dictates.10 It might be thought that, at least where 8 It might be thought that the client would have the same agenda as the advocate: achieving success in the proceedings. However, in practice, clients often perceive the role of the pleading as including the function of making statements of the client’s position that are not directed at winning the case but serve some collateral purpose such as signalling to the opposing party (and, on occasion, to a wider audience) the client’s intention or seriousness or the client’s view of a point of principle or of importance to the client. The client’s perception of the case, and of what may be needed to win it, is affected by the client’s own interest in the case and past experience of the developments leading up to the litigation. Clients are often not sensitive to the fact that the Court comes to the case afresh and will often perceive as peripheral or irrelevant elements of the background that loom large in the mind of the client. 9 One of the problems of advocacy is repetition. In the case of complex propositions, it is often necessary to repeat the same point, while varying the language in which the point is articulated, because different (trained) minds are perfectly capable of reacting differently (or not at all) to any given formulation. Further, any given formulation of a point is likely to have a greater or lesser impact on the mind of a given judge not so much by reference to the inherent merits (or defects) of the formulation, but more by reference to the stage in the evolution of the judge’s thinking at which the formulation is assimilated (or re-assimilated) by the judge. After the event, it is easy to point to the (most) successful formulation and say that the alternatives are useless repetition; but which was the (most) successful one and which were the useless alternatives are not commonly identifiable in advance. 10 The views of the Court, and of its different component parts, regarding the appropriate length of a pleading differ and have also varied over time. PD-ECJ, para 44 (in the pre-2014 version) stated: ‘It is the Court’s experience that, save in exceptional circumstances, effective pleadings need not exceed 10 or 15 pages and replies, rejoinders and responses can be limited to 5 to 10 pages.’ PD-ECJ, para 12, 15 and 16 (2014 version) give 30 pages as the maximum for an application or defence and 10 pages as the maximum for a reply or rejoinder. In similar vein, the GC and CST have formal limitations on the length of a pleading: PD-GC, paras 114–118;

744

Pleading 9.6

the advocate and the members of the Court share the same legal culture, there should be no, or no material, divergence of views between them concerning what are the material points in a case and how they may be ranked in terms of their importance. However, even within a single legal culture, it is common for views to differ (even as between experienced and knowledgeable judges) about what is or is not a favourable process of reasoning; and EU law has the feature that no shared legal culture has, as yet, emerged.11 9.6 So far as the advocate (the manufacturer of the pleading) is concerned, the essential points are that pleadings may need to be translated and, more often than not, will be read by the Court in a language that is not the reader’s mother tongue.12 Those factors are primarily of relevance to the length of the pleading and the mode of expression used in it. The longer the pleading, the more the proceedings are delayed by the need for translation. In addition, a lengthy pleading is more tiring to read and digest than a shorter one. The risk of points being overlooked or their significance under-appreciated (by the reader, not the translator) is greater in a long pleading than in a short one. So far as mode of expression is concerned, simplicity of language and sentence construction is advantageous. The avoidance of large blocks of text is generally desirable. It is often better to make use of headings and sub-headings, or other markers, to identify discrete

PD-CST, para 49. In the case of the GC, authorisation is required if the maximum length is exceeded: PD-GC, paras 115, 117, 119, 120–121. In the case of the CST, a pleading that is not in conformity with the practice directions may have to be ‘put in order’: PD-CST, para 49. There is no uniform view of what the proper length of a pleading should be. Although such limitations are well-intentioned, they and their application are affected adversely (from the procedural perspective) by the fact that they reflect the Court’s ex post facto perception of what a pleading should be and are not based properly upon an understanding of the discipline of pleading a case. In particular, it is highly dangerous to require pleadings to be shortened before the close of the written procedure in case what may, in retrospect, be perceived to be a significant point is obscured or lost altogether. 11 A former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Goddard, was reputed to ask advocates appearing before the court over which he presided (at a time when advocacy was entirely oral), ‘what is your best point?’ That was a way of focusing the oral submissions on the point selected by the advocate; and, given that the court and the advocates were operating within a shared legal culture, the unspoken (and untested) assumption was probably that, more likely than not, the advocate’s ‘best point’ would also be considered by the opposing advocate and the court to be the best point in the case (for the party represented by the advocate). However, it is a commonplace observation, based on experience, that, even in a shared legal culture, what is or is not the ‘best point’ can be heavily disputed. The proof lies in the existence of appeals. Where a first instance judgment can be appealed and the result of the appeal appealed again, it is perfectly possible for three completely different ‘right’ answers to the litigation to emerge, within the same legal culture, each of which, taken in isolation, is plausible or entirely convincing or just as convincing as the others. Final courts of appeal do not always identify the right answer. They often select from more than one right answer the right answer that they prefer. 12 A pleading will be available internally in the Court in the language of the case and in the Court’s internal working language (at the time of writing, French). The reader’s mother tongue may be neither the language of the case nor the Court’s internal working language.

745

9.7  Pleading

lines of reasoning, unless to do so risks fragmenting the argument and obscuring its overall thrust.13

II

TECHNICAL RULES RELATING TO FORMAT AND PRESENTATION

9.7 The format of a procedural document or communication is relevant for two purposes: (i) transmission to the Court, where electronic means are used; and (ii) storage and internal dissemination within the Court, irrespective of the means by which the document is transmitted to the Court. 9.8 So far as transmission by electronic means is concerned, the ECJ contemplates the transmission of a procedural document either by means of e-Curia or as an attachment to an e-mail.14 The GC and CST contemplate only the former.15 Where the e-Curia system is used, the conditions for using e-Curia must be satisfied; but the document need not be signed because the personal user identification and password used in the transmission stand in for a signature; any annexes referred to in the document must accompany it, together with a schedule listing the annexes.16 In ECJ proceedings, where e-Curia is not used, and the document is simply sent by e-mail, a scanned copy of the signed original must be sent; and the signed original (in paper form), together with the required annexes and copies, must reach the Court within ten days from the sending of the e-mail.17 9.9 Transmission of a procedural document by post or fax is not subject to any requirements particular to the mode of transmission used; but the rules applicable to the transmission of documents in paper form apply (the requirement of a signature, the necessary number of copies and so forth; in the case of transmission by fax, the signed original must be received by the Court within ten days from the sending of the fax message, as in the case of transmission by e-mail).18 9.10 For the purpose of use by the Court, a procedural document must be in a form making it possible to scan the document and use character recogni 13 Cf PD-ECJ, para 43. One difficulty is that breaking up the text so as to make it more digestible (by using shorter paragraphs, headings and sub-headings) increases the number of pages and the risk that the maximum length of the pleading may be exceeded. It is occasionally the case that, in order to meet the Court’s requirements as to length, it is necessary to remove from the pleading everything that assists the Court in assimilating and understanding the pleading easily. 14 PD-ECJ, paras 41 and 43. 15 PD-GC, para 74; PD-CST, para 2. 16 E-Curia decisions, arts 3–4 (above, note 1). PD-GC, para 76 states that annexes that cannot be lodged by e-Curia must be so identified in the schedule of annexes and may be sent separately but must reach the Registry within 10 days of the lodging of the procedural document by means of e-Curia. PD-GC, para 103 states that annexes must be contained in one or more files separate from the file containing the procedural document (but one such file can contain more than one annex). See, to similar effect, PD-CST, paras 19 and 23(f). 17 PD-ECJ, para 43. 18 PD-ECJ, paras 42–43; PD-GC, paras 78–85; PD-CST, para 4(a).

746

Pleading 9.11

tion. To that end, in pleadings used in ECJ proceedings, the text of the pleading must appear only on the recto side of each page; any paper used should be white, unlined A4; the font used should be in common use (Times New Roman, Courier and Arial are specifically mentioned); the size of the text should be at least 12 points in the main body of the text and at least 10 points in the footnotes; line spacing should be 1.5; horizontal and vertical margins should be at least 2.5 com; the paragraphs in the text should be numbered consecutively; the pages should be numbered consecutively in the top right hand corner, the pagination running without a break from the first page of the pleading to the last page of the last annex (including any contents pages and the schedule listing the annexes); the pages of any pleading submitted in hard copy form should be capable of easy separation and should not be permanently attached by any means, such as glue or staples. Similar requirements apply to pleadings in GC and CST proceedings.19

III

GENERAL RULES

A

General requirements

9.11 Procedural documents and communications must comply with the rules relating to the language to be used in proceedings.20 Apart from that, no particular rules appear to exist, so far as communications are concerned. Communications that do not take the form required for a pleading or procedural document are commonly replies by letter to a letter from the Court. However, it is wise to follow the technical requirements for the presentation of procedural documents (discussed above), in particular because it may be necessary for the Court to process the communication electronically. Further, any communication must be made by a person who is on the record as representing or assisting the representative of the party concerned.21 RP-ECJ, art 57, RP-GC, art 72–73 and RP-CST, art 45 set out several requirements which must be fulfilled by every pleading or procedural document.22 In 19 PD-ECJ, para 35; PD-GC, paras 96 and 101; PD-CST, paras 20–21. 20 A  pleading not in the language of the case is inadmissible: Case C-64/98  P-REV  Odette Nicos Petrides Co Inc v Commission [2010] ECR I-65*; Case T-330/14 P Jelenkowska-Luca v Commission, 11 December 2014. 21 It has been known for communications to be rejected by the Court because the communication was not expressly made (or signed) by the party’s agent or lawyer (such as letters signed in the name of a firm of lawyers, as opposed to the name of the lawyer in the firm who was representing the party). 22 See, for example, the French version of the Rules of Procedure. The terms ‘pleading’ and ‘procedural document’ are in this context interchangeable. The letter treated as a defence in Case F-118/11 Marcuccio v Commission, 25 February 2014, para 38, presumably satisfied the requirements applicable to pleadings. In Case T-320/07 Jones v Commission [2011] ECR II417*, paras 63–68, a letter was lodged by way of a reply, to which three other letters were attached, which had been written by the applicants themselves. The objection taken to the pleading was that the lawyer representing the applicants had merely countersigned the three letters attached to the covering letter. The covering letter was not otherwise disputed as a pleading.

747

9.11  Pleading

fact, however, the Rules of Procedure sometimes provide expressly that those provisions apply mutatis mutandis to specific pleadings,23 sometimes that they apply only in part24 and sometimes remain silent.25 It is, therefore, open to argument that RP-ECJ, art 57 and RP-CST, art 45 are not applicable to every written submission to the Court.26 Nonetheless, it would seem that, at least as a matter of practice, RP-ECJ, art 57 and, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 45 should be complied with unless there is express provision otherwise in the Rules of Procedure. The position regarding RP-GC, art 72–73 is different because those provisions are expressed to be associated with the lodging of a procedural document at the Registry. The requirements set out in RP-ECJ, art  57, RP-GC, art  72–73 and RP-CST, art 45 are the following. (1) The original of every pleading must be signed by the party’s agent or lawyer.27 The only exceptions to that appear to be applications for legal aid,28 written observations submitted in references for a preliminary ruling29 and

23 Eg RP-CST, art 115(2), 124(2), 125(2), 126(2) and 127(2). The parallel provisions in RP-ECJ and RP-GC now refer to the pleading requirements in RP-ECJ, art 120–122 and RP-GC, art 76– 78, respectively, rather than to the general pleading requirements in RP-ECJ, art 57 and RP-GC, art 72–73. 24 Eg RP-CST, art 55(3). 25 Eg RP-ECJ, art  115 and 185, 151, 152(1), 105(3), 196(1); RP-GC, art  147 (which refers in para 2 to the form to be used), 130 and 123(1); RP-CST, art 83(1), 111 (which in fact derogates in part from RP-CST, art 45) and 123. 26 In Case 2/68 Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission [1968]  ECR  435 at 442, Advocate General Roemer suggested that RP-ECJ, art 37 and 38 (now spread over RP-ECJ, art 57 and 119–122) might apply by analogy to an application for an order allowing an applicant to enter the premises of the Joint Research Centre establishment at Ispra and did not, it must be supposed, think that those provisions applied directly to such a pleading. 27 RP-ECJ, art 57(1); RP-GC, art 73(1); RP-CST, art 45(2). PD-GC, para 93 and PD-CST, para 10 (applied to other pleadings by PD-CST, para 30) require the signature to be placed at the end of the pleading, apparently because it is considered that, if it is placed there, the signatory must have read the preceding pages whereas, if the signature is to be found on the cover page of the pleading, the inference is that the signatory may not have read the contents of the pleading. A change in the identity of the party’s agent or lawyer does not affect the admissibility of a pleading as long as the signatory of the pleading is the party’s representative at the time the pleading was signed and also at the time when the pleading was lodged. Where the signatory was not, or could not be, the party’s agent or lawyer, a subsequent correction of the position does not render the pleading admissible and is not covered by the rules enabling a pleading to be put in order: see Case C-573/11 P ClientEarth v Commission, 5 September 2013, para 23 (which effectively overrules what, according to para  22, seems to have happened in Case T-120/10 ClientEarth v Commission, 9 November 2011, and Case T-449/10 ClientEarth v Commission, 9 November 2011). 28 RP-ECJ, art 186(2); RP-GC, art 147(2); RP-CST, art 111(1), 2nd sentence. 29 That follows from RP-ECJ, art 97(3) which requires the Court to ‘take account’ of the rules of procedure of the referring court regarding the representation and attendance of the parties to the proceedings before it (see also RP-ECJ, art 47(2)). In consequence, if a party to the proceedings before the referring court is entitled to plead his case in person or with the assistance of someone other than a lawyer, that party may in the preliminary ruling proceedings before the ECJ submit written observations signed otherwise than by a lawyer. In that event, the written observations must be signed by the party himself or by his representative, pursuant to the applicable national rules of procedure: RP-ECJ, art 57(1).

748

Pleading 9.11

pleadings submitted by means of e-Curia.30 In other cases a pleading may be rejected as inadmissible if it does not comply with that requirement.31 It is not sufficient if the (agent or) lawyer has simply signed or adopted something drafted by the party himself;32 he must at least have examined the pleading.33 The fact that the party concerned is himself a lawyer does not obviate the need for the pleading to be signed by the lawyer representing the party;34 the purpose of the rule is to ensure that the pleading has been adopted and lodged by the person who bears the responsibility for the conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the party. (2) Every pleading must bear a date.35 (3) The original of every pleading must be lodged; the original must be accompanied by all annexes referred to therein and, save where lodgement is effected by e-Curia, by the requisite number of certified copies.36 The party lodging the pleading certifies that the copies are true copies by marking that information on each one.37 The required number of copies is five (in ECJ and CST proceedings) or three (in GC proceedings) for the Court and one each for every other party to the proceedings (including interveners). There seems to be an agreement between the EU institutions that, in addition, they lodge all the copies needed by the Court (the Court’s needs are greater than the rules suggest). The institutions are also required to produce translations of all their pleadings into the other official EU languages within a time limit set by the Court38 and the same applies to documents annexed to the 30 E-Curia decisions, art 3 (above, note 1). Accordingly, RP-GC, art 73(1) is specifically limited to the lodging of the original paper version of a procedural document (where lodgement is effected by fax, it must be followed up by lodgement of the signed original: see RP-GC, art 72(1) and 73(3)). 31 Case 108/63 Officine Elettromeccaniche Ing A  Merlini v High Authority [1965]  ECR  1 (the applicant’s reply); Case 10/81 Farrall v Commission [1981]  ECR  717 (the application commencing proceedings); Case 131/83 Vaupel v European Court of Justice, 15 March 1984, unreported. See further Ch 4. In Case C-535/12 P Faet Oltra v European Ombudsman, 6 June 2013, the application (which commenced an appeal) was not rejected as inadmissible because it was an appeal against a first instance decision holding the application commencing the action to be inadmissible because it had not been signed by a lawyer. The ECJ therefore felt that it was necessary to entertain the appeal in order to explain why the first instance decision was correct. 32 Officine Elettromeccaniche Ing A  Merlini v High Authority (above, note 31); Case T-320/07 Jones (above, note 22), paras 63–68. 33 Merlini (above, note 31), per Advocate General Roemer at 16. 34 The Vaupel case (above, note 31); Case C-126/90P Viciano v Commission [1991] ECR I-781, paras 4 and 8; Case F-123/11 Ayres de Abreu v Economic and Social Committee, 13 February 2012. 35 RP-ECJ, art 57(6); RP-GC, art 72(2); RP-CST, art 45(1). The date of the pleading appears to have no procedural significance whatsoever since it is expressly provided that only the date and time of the lodgement of the original pleading at the Registry are relevant when calculating time limits. Accordingly, the absence of reference in RP-CST, art 55(3) to the 1st subpara of RP-CST, art 45(1) (which sets out the requirement that all pleadings bear a date) does not mean that the absence of a date is an incurable defect rendering the pleading inadmissible. 36 RP-ECJ, art 57(2) and PD-ECJ, para 41; RP-GC, art 73(2) and PD-GC, paras 75–76, 82 and 85; RP-CST, art 45(2), 2nd subpara, and PD-CST, para 3(b). 37 Cf PD-GC, para 95. 38 RP-ECJ, art 57(3); RP-GC, art 72(5); RP-CST, art 45(1), 4th subpara.

749

9.11  Pleading

pleadings. In fact, however, it appears to be the practice to lodge French translations of the pleadings and annexes alone unless the Court requests otherwise. The rules relating to the number of copies to be lodged apply equally to translations. Under the Rules of Procedure, the annexes here in question are not matters of evidence (to which (4) below applies) but certain formal documents that must be provided to the Court and, occasionally, a more detailed development of a line of argument raised in the body of the pleading.39 However, it should be observed that the Court dislikes the use of annexes as a means of developing an argument and prefers them to be used solely for the purpose referred to in (4) below.40 (4) To every pleading must be annexed a file containing all the items of evidence and documents relied on in support of the pleading, together with a schedule listing them.41 The schedule is itself a document showing the number of each annex and a brief description of the annex, together with a list 39 Accordingly, PD-GC, para 128 states that the formal documents to be annexed to an application pursuant to RP-GC, art 78 (the certificate proving a lawyer’s authorisation to practise, the proof that the applicant’s lawyer has been properly authorised to bring the proceedings, the formal documents proving the existence of an applicant legal person, the measure contested in the proceedings, where relevant, the contract under which the GC has jurisdiction and, in staff cases after 1  September 2016, the applicant’s pre-litigation complaint to the defendant and the defendant’s decision on the complaint) must be produced ‘together with’ the application; but PD-GC, para 100 states that ‘only those items mentioned in the actual text of a procedural document which are referred to in the schedule of annexes and which are necessary in order to prove or illustrate its contents may be submitted as annexes to a procedural document’. The author of the PD-GC assumes annexes to have one of two functions: evidential and expository. In contrast, RP-GC, art 78 envisages that annexes (also) serve a formal (occasionally described in the cases as an ‘instrumental’) function. 40 Eg Case T-91/10 Lucchini SpA  v Commission, 9  December 2014, paras 66 and 69 (it is not entirely clear to what extent Lucchini is consistent with PD-GC, para 100, which accepts that an annex may serve to ‘illustrate’ the contents of a pleading; it seems that PD-GC, para 100 ascribes to annexes a broader role in the proceedings than the case law normally allows them). In the case of written observations in a reference for a preliminary ruling, PD-ECJ, para 39 states that legal arguments must be set out in the body of the written observations and not in any annex thereto; only documents mentioned in the written observations that are necessary in order to prove or illustrate a statement made in the body of the written observations should be annexed. 41 RP-ECJ, art 57(4); RP-GC, art 72(3); RP-CST, art 45(1), 2nd subpara. Apart from the documents that are required to be annexed to a pleading (such as a copy of the measure contested in the proceedings), the case law admits that the purpose served by annexes is essentially evidential only. Annexes that contain arguments that should be in the body of the pleading are liable to be ignored or rejected as inadmissible: eg  Case T-127/04  KME  Germany AG  v Commission [2009]  ECR II-1167, paras 57–59; Lucchini (above, note 40), paras 66 and 69. See further para 9.47 below. Normally, the items of evidence relied on are in documentary form. Where the item takes some other form (such as, in a tariff classification case, a sample of the object in issue – such as a disposable gas mask), there are obvious physical difficulties in incorporating the annex into a ‘file’ along with the other (documentary) annexes. In such cases, the annex may have to be presented in the form of a box containing the item in question and carrying a label identifying it as the relevant annex to the pleading in question. It is not always the case that the documents referred to in a pleading are annexed to it. Where that occurs, the opposing party may apply for disclosure of the missing documents; but disclosure will ordinarily be ordered only as a measure of enquiry and where the circumstances justify it: see, for example, Case T-16/96 Cityflyer Express Ltd v Commission [1998] ECR II-757, paras 98–106.

750

Pleading 9.12

of the pages or paragraphs in the pleading in which the annex in question is referred to.42 Where they are in documentary form, the annexes should be expressed in the language of the case.43 Hence, a document written in another language should be accompanied by a translation into the language of the case. If that is not done, the Registrar may ask the party concerned to provide a translation and the opposing party may in any event be entitled to ask for an extension of time in order properly to consider the document; but a failure to provide a translation of the document into the language of the case is not otherwise a defect of procedure.44 It is good practice to ensure that the annexes are readily identifiable and legible. As a result, documents which are entirely or partly in manuscript should be accompanied by a typewritten transcription. In the case of lengthy documents, the relevant extracts may be annexed but the whole document or a copy of it must be lodged at the Registry.45 All the documents mentioned in the pleading do not need to be annexed; it is only those relied on in support of the claims made in the pleading that must be.46 A failure to annex relevant documents may embarrass the other party in the preparation of his case; but is not necessarily a ground for holding the pleading to be inadmissible.47 The requirement to annex relevant documents is in principle a formal requirement regarding the presentation of evidence in proceedings; it is not a condition of the proof of facts in issue48 and does not amount to a requirement that the party lodging the pleading demonstrate at least a prima facie case for his claims on the (documentary) evidence.

B

Form and lodgment

9.12 Although RP-ECJ, art 57, RP-GC, art 73(1) and RP-CST, art 45 require that a pleading be signed, the Rules of Procedure do not specify that the body of 42 PD-ECJ, para 39; PD-GC, para 98; PD-CST, para 23(d). 43 RP-ECJ, art 38(1)–(2); RP-GC, art 46(1)–(2); PD-CST, para 23(c); Case 105/75 Giuffrida v Council [1976] ECR 1395 at 1405 (Advocate General Warner). 44 Case T-42/92 Lenz v Commission [1992]  ECR II-2523, para  36. PD-GC, para  108 provides that, if an annex is not in the language of the case and is not accompanied by a translation into the language of the case, the Registrar will, if necessary, ask for a translation to be provided; if it is not provided, the annex is removed from the case file. PD-CST, para 23(c) says that an annex not in the language of the case or not accompanied by a translation ‘cannot in principle be accepted’; but a derogation from that rule is possible where it is ‘duly justified’. The essential point is that a party relying on a document as evidence in the case needs to produce it in the language of the case and cannot expect the cost of providing a version expressed in the language of the case to be borne by the opposing party or the Court. However, the difficulties of dealing with a document not expressed in the language of the case are usually manageable. 45 RP-ECJ, art 57(5); RP-GC, art 72(4); RP-CST, art 45(1), 3rd subpara. 46 See, in the case of an application, Case 171/86 Union Sidérurgique du Nord et de l’Est de la France SA (USINOR) v Commission, order of 28 January 1987 (unreported), para 19; and, in the case of a defence, Case 201/86 Spie-Batignolles v Commission [1990] ECR I-197, order of 16 December 1987 (unreported), para 13. 47 Cf Cases 95–98/74, 15 and 100/75 Union Nationale des Coopératives Agricoles de Céréales v Commission and Council [1975] ECR 1615, para 4. 48 Case 171/86 USINOR (above, note 46).

751

9.13  Pleading

the pleading must be presented in any particular form (typed, manuscript). On occasion a manuscript pleading has been received and no objection seems ever to have been taken as to its admissibility on that ground alone. Nonetheless, there are obvious practical difficulties in reading a manuscript and it is better to have pleadings typed.49 9.13 Sometimes pleadings are submitted in the form of (in former times) a telex or (more recently) a facsimile message or e-mail.50 Since a telex or e-mail clearly cannot be ‘signed’, even if the name of the agent or lawyer appears on the message, and a facsimile message or an emailed PDF document can only reproduce a signature affixed to another document (the original of the facsimile message or emailed document), it is arguable that a telex, facsimile message or e-mail can be regarded only as a warning to the Court that a pleading is about to be lodged and does not itself constitute lodgment. The alternative, and better, view is that, in the absence of a specific rule on the question (such as the e-Curia rules), such a communication is to be regarded as a copy of the pleading and that its lodgment at the Court in that manner is not effective lodgement of the pleading.51 It should, therefore, as a rule, be followed by lodgment of the original and the remaining copies within the relevant time limit. On the other hand, documents that can safely be classified as ‘communications’ may be lodged by remote means (these days, by facsimile machine or e-mail). Where the original of a procedural document is lodged after the expiry of a time limit, the question may arise whether (in the absence of a specific provision covering the situation, as to which, see below) as a matter of principle the position is saved if a preceding facsimile or e-mail message was lodged in time. The Rules of Procedure do not envisage that situation because they suppose that copies are presented at the same time as the original.52 In addition, it seems to be the lodgment of the original of the pleading that is important from the point of view of the reckoning of time limits. In consequence, on a strict construction of the Rules, the lodgment of a copy, such as a facsimile message or e-mail, amounts to communication of the contents of a pleading but does not constitute its lodgment and, therefore, has no effect on the running of time.53 It would seem an 49 A requirement that pleadings be typed or printed by machine may be inferred from the Practice Directions, which lay down technical rules concerning format and presentation, such as type size and font (see para 9.10 above). However, those rules could in principle be complied with by a manuscript document (although that would be a laborious exercise and one not likely to be encountered in practice). 50 For example, in Case 276/83 Commission v Greece [1985] ECR 2751, the defendant consented to the withdrawal of the action by facsimile message. If a pleading or communication is sent to the Court by facsimile machine, it should be sent to the number of the machine in the appropriate Registry and not to any other facsimile number held by the Court. 51 See Case C-122/90 Emsland-Stärke v Commission, order of 15 May 1991 (unreported). On the importance of lodgement of the signed original, see: Case C-69/12 P Noscirai SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 21 September 2012. 52 RP-ECJ, art 57(2); RP-GC, art 43(1); RP-CST, art 45(2), 2nd subpara. 53 See the Emsland- Stärke case (above, note 51); Noscirai (above, note 51). The problem was not discussed in Cases 281, 283–285 and 287/85 Germany, France, Netherlands, Denmark and United Kingdom v Commission [1987] ECR 3203 because the pleading in question was in any event lodged out of time (see para 5 and per Advocate General Mancini at 3229–3230).

752

Pleading 9.14

exceptionally harsh result if the lodgment of the original out of time due to, for example, postal delays, were to result in its inadmissibility even though an accurate copy had been lodged within time. It is possible that, in such circumstances (and as long as the relevant time limit is one that can be extended), the Court would not be too inflexible and would regard the pleading as having been made in time if the position were regularised by the lodgment of the original.54 At all events, the lodgment of a copy (in the form of a facsimile message or e-mail) does not appear to be adequate compliance with the Rules and must, in the ordinary course, be completed by lodgment of the original pleading; and that poses problems in cases where the time limit is mandatory and cannot be extended. 9.14 In order to resolve those problems, and in addition to the e-Curia system, the Rules of Procedure contain a specific rule that, for the purpose of compliance with procedural time limits, the lodgement at the Registry, by facsimile message or any other technical means of communication available to the Court, of a copy of the signed original of a complete pleading (including the schedule listing the items of evidence and documents relied on in support of the pleading) determines the time and date of the formal lodgement of the pleading at the Court as long as the hard copy form of the signed original (together with all the annexes and the required number of copies) is lodged at the Registry no later than 10 days after the receipt of the fax or other communication in question.55 Those conditions are applied strictly; and it is lodgement of the pleading itself, not just the annexes to it, that is crucial.56 The severity with which compliance with those conditions is enforced57 looks at first sight to be extreme when one bears in mind that, unless there is a substantive and substantial difference between the copy lodged in time and the original lodged later on, there has been de facto compliance with the time limit in question. However, the case 54 See the practice of the Court, as described in Ch 1, paras 1.114–1.116. 55 RP-ECJ, art 57(7); RP-GC, art 73(3); RP-CST, art 45(2), 3d subpara. The ten-day period starts to run upon receipt of the fax or e-mail, not upon expiry of the period for bringing proceedings: Case T-130/13 P Honnefelder v Commission, 28 May 2013, paras 16–17. 56 Eg Case C-242/07P Belgium v Commission [2007] ECR I-9757, paras 33–34 and 38–41; Case T-307/11 Noscirai SA  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), order of 28 November 2011, upheld in Case C-69/12 P Noscirai (above, note 51). 57 Eg in Case T-138/01 R F v Court of Auditors [2001] ECR SC-I-A-211, II-987, paras 8–9, Case T-485/13P  Marcuccio v Commission, 12  December 2013, and Case T-503/13  P  Marcuccio v Commission, 19  June 2014, paras 19–22, the signature on the hard copy original did not correspond to the signature on the copy lodged earlier. Accordingly, the latter was not regarded as a true copy of the original and the proceedings were out of time. On the other hand, emailing a copy of the application in Word format, accompanied by the signature page in PDF format, (followed by the signed original) is compliant with the Rules of Procedure: Case C-458/09 P Italy v Commission [2011] ECR I-179*, paras 25–26. In Case T-360/10 Tecnimed Srl v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 3 October 2012, the applicant’s lawyers neglected to make copies of the application commencing proceedings before they sent it to the Court by fax and e-mail. When they then copied it, the photocopier malfunctioned, destroying the signature page of the original. A new signature page had to be printed and signed, which meant that, in the GC’s view, the document emailed and faxed to it was not the same document as the copy sent to it later on. The application was therefore inadmissible. Tecnimed is one of those decisions about which any comment is superfluous.

753

9.15  Pleading

law is in part to be explained by the fact that the Rules of Procedure derogate from a basic rule regarding the operation of time limits with the consequence that taking a relaxed view of that derogation is not really justifiable (it should also be noted that e-Curia provides a more efficient and easier to use alternative to lodgement by fax or e-mail). 9.15 If the lodgment of a copy in the form of a facsimile message or e-mail is to be regarded as lodgment within any relevant time limit, it would seem that the entire message must have been received at the Court before the expiry of the time limit. If, for example, the final page or pages (in particular, the page containing the agent’s or lawyer’s signature) of a pleading or communication sent by facsimile are not received until after the expiry of the time limit (whether because the message is particularly long or because the Court’s facsimile machine runs out of paper58 or because of an interruption in transmission), it would seem that the pleading as a whole must be regarded as having been lodged out of time. It is appreciated that that may seem to be a harsh result, particularly where the main parts of the pleading have been received before the expiry of the time limit. On the other hand, a line must be drawn somewhere; and, since the time limits for lodging pleadings are extended by ample periods to take account of the distance of a party from the place where the Court has its seat, there seems to be sufficient justification for adopting a strict view regarding the lodging of pleadings at the very end of that extended time limit. The application of a time limit may not be circumvented by lodging a pleading in instalments.59 9.16 In all cases where a pleading is to be served by the Court on other persons, it must be lodged at the Court in such a state that service is possible: a party cannot impose on the Court any condition seeking to restrict service where service is required by an instrument governing the Court’s procedure or by considerations of natural justice or the rights of the defence. A pleading which is lodged purportedly subject to any such condition may be rejected by the Court.60 The confidential treatment of a pleading is considered in para 9.19 ff below.

58 It does not seem that, in the latter event, the party lodging the pleading could invoke exceptional circumstances or force majeure (see Statute, art 42) because the risk that the machine might run out of paper is foreseeable as a possibility. Any prudent person would inform the Court in advance that the pleading was being sent by facsimile machine so that the Court’s machine could be checked to see that it had sufficient paper and so that someone would be in attendance in case the message was incomplete for some reason. 59 Case 321/85 Schwiering v Court of Auditors [1986] ECR 3199 (order of 15 June 1988, para 2, in taxation proceedings after the judgment), where a party was given a date by which written observations on the application for taxation were to be submitted and lodged its observations within time, indicating that it would submit further written observations shortly. Those further observations were lodged out of time and were therefore excluded from consideration because there had been no request to extend the time limit. 60 Cf Case 236/81 Celanese Chemical Co Inc v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 1183 at para 2 (a direct action); Case 6/81 Industrie Diensten Groep BV v J A Beele Handelmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 707 (a reference for a preliminary ruling).

754

Pleading 9.17

C Length 9.17 The Court has power to set the maximum length of pleadings.61 Any such limitations are usually to be found in the Practice Directions issued from time to time by the ECJ, GC and CST.62 In particular cases, the President or the Court may set a limit to the length of a pleading.63 Where any such limit is exceeded, the consequence depends upon the situation. In some instances, the pleading will be returned to its author.64 In GC proceedings, authorisation to exceed the maximum length of a pleading will be given only in cases involving particularly complex legal or factual issues.65 Otherwise, the pleading may or must be ‘regularised’ depending upon the extent to which it exceeds the maximum limit provided for.66 A pleading that must be ‘regularised’ has been lodged within time but will not be served on any other party until it has been ‘regularised’. ‘Regularisation’ is left to the party lodging the pleading: the pleading is returned to that party so that it can carry out the amendments necessary to put it into order.67 ‘Regularisation’ or, more generally, the reduction in length of a pleading so as to put it in order is essentially a mechanical exercise. It is not intended to cause the party concerned to abandon a point. It seems that a failure to comply with a limit on the length of a pleading renders the pleading inadmissible only if compliance with the limit has expressly been made a condition of 61 RP-ECJ, art 58 provides that, in the case of the ECJ, the power is exercised by way of a decision published in the Official Journal. RP-GC, art 75(1), 189(1) and 212(1) and RP-CST, art 46 are to like effect (the decision takes the form of rules implementing the Rules of Procedure adopted under RP-224 and RP-CST, art 132, respectively). 62 Written observations in preliminary ruling proceedings: PD-ECJ, para 11. Application in direct actions: PD-ECJ, para 12; PD-GC, para 114; PD-CST, para 49(a). Application in IP appeals before the GC: PD-GC, para  116. Defence: PD-ECJ, para  15; PD-GC, para  114; PD-CST, para  49(a). All other pleadings in CST proceedings: PD-CST, para  49(b). Response, crossappeal and response to cross-appeal in IP appeals before the GC: PD-GC, para 116. Preliminary objection to admissibility and observations thereon in direct actions before the GC and IP appeals: PD-GC, paras 114 and 116. Reply and rejoinder: PD-ECJ, para 16; PD-GC, para 114. Statements in intervention and observations thereon in direct actions and IP appeals before the GC: PD-GC, paras 114 and 116. Application for interim relief in a GC action: PD-GC, para 268. Application in expedited proceedings before the GC; PD-GC, para 251. Appeal to the ECJ: PD-ECJ, para 20. Response to an appeal to the ECJ: PD-ECJ, para 22. Application to lodge a reply in an appeal to the ECJ: PD-ECJ, para 25. Pleadings in staff cases heard at first instance by the GC (after 1 September 2016): PD-GC, para 114. Pleadings in appeals to the GC (including applications to lodge a reply): PD-GC, paras 118 and 177. Request for a hearing in ECJ proceedings: PD-ECJ, para  46. PD-ECJ, para  13, PD-GC, para  130 and PD-CST, para 16 also specify a two page summary of the dispute that must accompany an application commencing proceedings. Strictly speaking, the summary is not a pleading. 63 RP-ECJ, art 109(2), last sentence (the Court – written observations under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure); RP-ECJ, art 175(2), RP-ECJ, art 180(2) and PD-ECJ, para 26 (the President – reply or rejoinder in an appeal to the ECJ and a cross-appeal). 64 PD-ECJ, para 26. 65 RP-GC, art 75(2), 189(2) and 212(2); PD-GC, paras 115, 117, 119. 66 PD-GC, paras 120–122. 67 The position in CST proceedings is essentially the same: see PD-CST, para  49. Although regularisation by reducing the font size is a well-known practice, in Case F-34/12 Vacca v Commission, 9 July 2013, para 38, the CST thought that it is not in accordance with the spirit of the rules of procedure.

755

9.18  Pleading

admissibility either under the Rules of Procedure, any formal implementing rules (such as the Practice Directions) or a decision of the President or the Court.68

D Content 9.18 There appear to be no general principles regarding the content of a pleading save the obvious, common sense, rule that the contents should be relevant, clear and succinct. However, it is worth observing that, in certain circumstances, a party may be precluded by his own conduct from advancing a particular argument.69 In general, a party should not seek to anticipate in a pleading a procedural step whose necessity or appropriateness can be determined only at some later stage in the proceedings.70

E

Confidential treatment

9.19 In the present context, confidential treatment of a pleading means the withholding of a part of a pleading from another party to the proceedings.71 The normal rule is that the Court can take into account only matters that all the parties have seen and been able to comment on.72 That rule is relaxed, where the circumstances justify it, primarily in relation to the disclosure of material by a main party to an intervener and as between main parties where different actions have been joined. Non-disclosure as between main parties to the same action is not normally permitted. It can occur where disclosure would harm the security of the EU, or that of one or more of the member states, or the conduct of their international relations.73

68 For example, PD-ECJ, para 26 states that observance of the instructions given by the President when permitting the lodging of a reply or rejoinder in an appeal to the ECJ is an ‘essential condition’. Those instructions may include a limit on the length of the reply or rejoinder. By implication, observance of such a limit is an essential condition for the admissibility of a reply or rejoinder. In contrast, PD-CST, para  49 specifies the ‘penalty’ for non-compliance with the limits placed on CST pleadings as being the application of the various provisions in the CST Rules of Procedure pursuant to which the Registrar requires a pleading to be put in order within a given time limit. Accordingly, an excessively long pleading is not, for that reason alone, inadmissible. The question of inadmissibility would arise in the event of a failure by the party concerned to comply with the Registrar’s request to put the pleading in order. 69 Case 14/61 Hoogovens v High Authority [1962] ECR 253 at 273. 70 Eg Case T-196/03 European Federation for Cosmetic Ingredients v European Parliament [2004]  ECR II-4263, para  19 (premature application for confidential treatment); Cases T-492/13 and T-493/13 Schmidt Spiele GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 3 March 2015, paras 8–12 (premature application for a hearing). In relation to matters of evidence, a party must always indicate the source of an assertion of fact and it does not seem to be objectionable to request a preparatory enquiry (otherwise known as a measure of enquiry) when doing so (see further Ch 10). 71 For confidentiality in relation to the non-disclosure to third parties of a pleading or information contained in a pleading, see Ch 2, para 2.71. 72 Cf RP-GC, art 64; RP-CST, art 47(1). 73 RP-GC, art 105(1).

756

Pleading 9.21

9.20 In general terms, if a party wishes to obtain such confidential treatment for its pleadings, it must first apply to the Court under, as the case may be, RP-ECJ, art 131(2) or 151(1), RP-GC, art 105, 130(2) or 144(2) or RP-CST, art 44(3), 83(1) or 87(1).74 The application must be made before the confidential material has been communicated to the party (whether or not an intervener) in relation to whom the claim for confidentiality is being asserted so that the Court will withhold the material until the issue of confidentiality has been resolved.75 In the case of pleadings, confidential treatment is normally limited to the assertions of fact in the pleading that relate to or reveal the contents of documentary or other evidence that is entitled to confidential treatment. The confidential treatment of pleadings is therefore ancillary to that of evidence.76 Confidential treatment will not be granted unless the material in question is genuinely secret or confidential77 and it is in the interests of justice to protect such material.78 Deciding on an application for confidential treatment therefore involves balancing the interests for and against disclosure.79 9.21 RP-GC, art 105 sets out a particular procedure for dealing with confidential treatment as between the main parties and is considered in more detail below. The general position is that applications for confidential treatment are made by separate document, to which the general rules relating to pleadings apply. The general form of such an application is: title; submissions; form of order. The title follows the style of the title used in an application commencing

74 Eg Cases T-1/89 to T-4/89 and T-6/89 to T-15/89 Rhone-Poulenc v Commission [1990] ECR II-637. Application may be made at or after the commencement of proceedings. In the case of confidential treatment as against an intervener, if not already applied for by the time when a person has applied to intervene, the application should be made in the party’s written observations on the application to intervene: see Ch 5, para 5.86. 75 Cf RP-GC, art 105(3); RP-CST, art 47(2). 76 For the confidential treatment of evidence, see Ch 12, paras 12.6–12.18. 77 Eg information about a party’s prices that was not public knowledge: Case C-66/90 Koninklijke PTT  Nederland NV and PTT  Post BV  v Commission (reported sub nom Cases C-48 and C-66/90 Netherlands v Commission [1992] ECR I-565), order of 5 December 1990. In Case T-198/01  R[III] Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH  v Commission [2004]  ECR II-1471, paras 28–29, confidential treatment was refused in the case of certain information that had already become public knowledge. Other examples of examination of claims for confidential treatment are: Case T-383/03 Hynix Semiconductor Inc v Council [2005]  ECR II-621 (see, in particular, paras 38–40 – the question whether or not something is secret or confidential is a matter for the Court, which is not bound to reach that conclusion by the terms of any confidentiality agreement or the treatment given to the material by another body); Case T-289/03 British Provident Association Ltd v Commission [2005] ECR II-741; Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2006] ECR II-1747; Case T-336/04 TVDanmark A/S v Commission [2007] ECR II-491. 78 Cf Case C-54/90 Weddel & Co BV v Commission [1992] ECR I-871, order of 15 May 1991, where the Court refused to exclude from the file a record of the examination of certain witnesses by a national court because a summary of the meeting to which the testimony of the witnesses related was being relied on in other proceedings. 79 That is stated in most of the cases referred to in note 77 above and is expressly stated in RP-GC, art 105(5).

757

9.22  Pleading

proceedings;80 and the application is described on the first page as an ‘application for confidential treatment’, with a reference to the particular rule of procedure on which the application is based. The submissions should first identify exactly the passages or annexes for which confidential treatment is claimed and, secondly, set out in relation to each passage or annex the reasons why it is secret or confidential. A non-confidential version of the material in question should be annexed to the application. The form of order need only seek an order that the claim for confidential treatment be upheld and that the annexed non-confidential version be served on the party against whom confidential treatment is sought.81 9.22 Confidential treatment can be claimed only for a specific item of information (or evidence) that is secret or confidential; and the non-confidential version must omit only that particular item.82 Thus, for example, if a pleading states ‘Contrary to the assertion made in paragraph 421 of the Contested Decision, the price charged by the applicant at the time was 150 euros’, the only likely candidate for confidential treatment is ‘150 euros’ (always assuming that disclosure of that figure would amount to the disclosure of a business secret). The nonconfidential version of that sentence could read: ‘Contrary to the assertion made in paragraph 421 of the Contested Decision, the price charged by the applicant at the time was [….]’ or, conceivably, ‘Contrary to the assertion made in paragraph 421 of the Contested Decision, the price charged by the applicant at the time was [less than 200 euros or more than 100 euros or between 100 and 200 euros]’. Precisely how the non-confidential version is phrased depends upon the circumstances. It has been suggested that it is not open to a claimant for confidential treatment to request the withdrawal of a document or parts of it in the event that the claim for confidential treatment is rejected.83 That does not appear to be correct as a matter of principle.84 9.23 So far as RP-GC, art 105 is concerned,85 where a main party (that is, applicant or defendant) intends to base his case on information or material whose communication would harm the security of the EU or one or more of the Member States, or the conduct of their international relations, and wishes confidential treatment to be given to such information or material vis-a-vis another main

80 See below. Certain matters that feature in the title of an application commencing proceedings, such as service details, are not normally required because they will usually have been mentioned in an earlier pleading. 81 Cf PD-CST, paras 40–45. 82 See, for example, TVDanmark (above, note 77), para 22. 83 Deutsche Telekom (above, note 77), para 13. 84 Cf RP-GC, art  105(4), which provides for the automatic return of material when a claim to confidential treatment is rejected. It is difficult to understand why a party cannot withdraw a document in those circumstances. On the other hand, the withdrawal of part of a document is a different matter because, in principle, a document which is relied on must be produced in its entirety. 85 According to the GC’s commentary on the draft of its rules of procedure, RP-GC, art 105 is based on the ECJ decisions in Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P Kadi v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 4 June 2013 and Cases C-584/10P, C-593/10P and C-595/10P Commission v Kadi, 18 July 2013.

758

Pleading 9.25

party,86 the information or material in question must be produced by separate document accompanied by a separate application for confidential treatment that shall not, itself, contain anything that is confidential.87 RP-GC, art 105 is intended to come into effect once the GC has determined the security rules for protecting confidential information or material88 (because the nature of the interests at stake under RP-GC, art 105 requires more stringent measures than in cases involving such things as commercial confidentiality). 9.24 RP-GC, art 105 works as follows. In the usual type of case, the defendant in the action (who will be defending the legality of a measure imposing sanctions on a person) will lodge a defence. The defence has to set out the pleas in law and arguments on which the defendant relies in opposition to the claim advanced by the applicant in the application, together with any evidence relied on (which is normally annexed to the pleading).89 In the defence, the defendant will plead that he is relying on information or material to which RP-GC, art 105(1) applies and for which the defendant is seeking confidential treatment. The defendant will need to think carefully about how he expresses himself. On the one hand, he cannot plead his case fully in the defence without abandoning confidentiality. On the other hand, he cannot rely on a cross-reference to the confidential information or material if it is not set out within the body of the defence: pleading by cross-reference to another document, including an annex (such as, here, an annex to the defence) is inadmissible.90 It looks as though, from the perspective of the sufficiency of the defence, the defendant must plead a non-confidential form of the gist of the information or material and couple that with a cross-reference to the full text for which confidential treatment is sought. Where the information or material comprises evidence, the assertion of fact to which the evidence relates must be set out in the defence (unless confidential treatment is claimed for all or part of it). As the evidential source of any assertion of fact in a pleading must be identified,91 it is necessary to plead in the defence that the source is one for which confidential treatment is being claimed. 9.25 Thus far, the defendant has assembled his defence. He also has to produce an application for confidential treatment. The application is a separate 86 Confidential treatment as against an intervener is covered by the provisions dealing with intervention: see in particular Ch 5, paras 5.86–5.88. 87 RP-GC, art 105(1). An alternative possibility is production in accordance with a measure of enquiry ordered by the GC, which is referred to in RP-GC, art 105(2). RP-GC, art 105 operates independently of the ‘normal’ regime for dealing with confidential information and material disclosed in the course of a measure of enquiry (as to which, see RP-GC, art 103). RP-GC, art 105 may usefully be compared with art 72 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. 88 RP-GC, art 227(3). That had not been done at the time of writing. In its commentary on the draft GC rules of procedure, the GC referred, in that context, to Council Decision 2013/488 of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ 2013 No L274/1). That refers (amongst other things) to limiting access to individuals who have a need to know, have been security cleared to the relevant level, and briefed on their responsibilities (art 7). 89 RP-GC, art 81(1)(c) and (e). See further para 9.58 ff below. 90 See further paras 9.47–9.48 below. 91 See para 9.11 above at (4).

759

9.26  Pleading

pleading (not, for example, an annex or attachment to the defence). As the application for confidential treatment must not contain anything that is confidential, its drafting will require some care and attention. Applications for confidential treatment are usually fairly simple pleadings because, in the usual case, it is sufficient (but essential) to identify the material for which confidential treatment is claimed and the reason why such treatment is claimed (such as commercial or medical confidentiality). The body of the application contains the reasons and identifies the passages and documents for which confidential treatment is claimed (which may also be listed in an attachment or annex to the pleading). A non-confidential version of the pleading or document in question is annexed to the application. The grounds for claiming confidential treatment (in a conventional case) are extremely narrow and it is a simple enough task to compare the reason given with the terms of the passage or document for which confidential treatment is sought in order to come to a decision on the claim for confidential treatment. In the context of RP-GC, art 105(1), the task is rather different. The application for confidential treatment must set out ‘the overriding reasons which, to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, justify the confidentiality of that information or material being preserved and which militate against its communication to the other main party’.92 That must be done without disclosing anything that is confidential. It is apprehended that it would be helpful to attach to the application for confidential treatment non-confidential versions of the information and material in question, where possible (if that has not been done in the defence).93 9.26 In addition to that, the defendant must lodge the information and material for which confidential treatment is claimed ‘by a separate document’. That separate document accompanies the application for confidential treatment. The information and material in question is not, therefore, presented to the GC in the form of an annex or group of annexes to either the defence or the application for confidential treatment.94 RP-GC, art  105(1) clearly envisages that the information or material will be in documentary form. Hence, it is assumed that oral testimony from a witness will have been set down in the form of a witness statement. In order to be produced as a ‘separate document’ the information and material can, it seems, be put together and presented as a single, paginated, document with a cover page indicating the case to which the information and material relates, the party lodging it, and the general nature of the contents (namely ‘confidential information and material’). 9.27 When presented in that manner, the information and material in question is held by the GC and is not communicated to any other party until

92 RP-GC, art 105(1). 93 In Cases C-584/10P, C-593/10P and C-595/10P  Commission v Kadi, 18  July 2013, the ECJ referred to the disclosure of (non-confidential) summaries of information and evidence in para 129 of its judgment. 94 That is probably in order to avoid confidential information and material being circulated by error as an annex to a non-confidential pleading, a particular danger in an electronic environment.

760

Pleading 9.30

a decision has been made as to its disclosure.95 No provision is made for the application for confidential treatment to be served on the opposing party for it to make its views known on the application, even though the application must not itself contain anything that is confidential.96 The GC considers the application for confidential treatment (apparently in the absence of submissions from the opposing party) by reference to two criteria: relevance to the GC’s ruling in the case (which involves a prognostication based on the issues between the parties identified in the pleadings and on which the GC will have to rule); and the confidential nature of the information or material vis-a-vis the opposing party.97 If the information or material is relevant but not confidential, the party claiming confidential treatment is asked whether or not it consents to disclosure to the other main party.98 If that party objects to disclosure or fails to reply, the information or material is returned to that party and is not taken into account by the GC.99 9.28 If, on the other hand, the GC considers that the information or material is both relevant and confidential, it then has to ‘weigh the requirements linked to the right to effective judicial protection, particularly observance of the adversarial principle, against the requirements flowing from the security of the Union or of one or more of the Member States or the conduct of their international relations’.100 One of the factors that (one would suppose) would be taken into account is the question whether the information or material could be obtained from another source without jeopardising the security of the Union or of one or more of the Member States or the conduct of their international relations. 9.29 The weighing of those competing interests is not carried out in an adversarial procedural environment (if RP-GC, art 105 is to be read as it stands). The exercise is carried out internally, within the GC. It cannot be excluded that, in order to perform its function, the GC may have to ask the party seeking nondisclosure questions. However, no provision is made for the involvement of the opposing party in the process; and the exclusion of that party appears to be intentional. 9.30 The result of that balancing exercise is a reasoned order specifying how the matter is to be dealt with and from which there is no appeal; as possible solutions adopted in the reasoned order, the Rules refer to communication to the

95 RP-GC, art 105(3) states that it is not communicated ‘to the other main party’. RP-GC, art 105 is concerned with non-disclosure as between main parties. In the case of disclosure to an intervener, the matter would be dealt with under RP-GC, art 144(2). 96 The requirement that the application for confidential treatment shall not contain anything confidential is therefore explicable on the ground that it may be (or risks being) disseminated within the GC outside the security arrangements put in place under RP-GC, art 105(11). 97 RP-GC, art 105(3). 98 If consent is given, it does not entail consent to disclosure to an intervener. 99 RP-GC, art 105(4). 100 RP-GC, art 105(5).

761

9.31  Pleading

other main party of a non-confidential version or summary.101 No express reference is made to other forms of restricted disclosure, such as disclosure within a confidentiality ring (although such arrangements are known to the GC). If the party seeking confidential treatment is not content with the terms of the reasoned order, it may withdraw the information or material in question before the reasoned order takes effect, in which case, the GC takes no account of the information or material.102 The opposing party must put up with the order made. 9.31 Decision by reasoned order is specified only in the event that the GC decides to uphold the application for confidential treatment. It is unclear to what the reasons in the reasoned order refer. The reasoned order is to specify the procedures to be adopted to accommodate the competing requirements of effective judicial protection, on the one hand, and security and the conduct of international relations, on the other. On one interpretation, the reasoning in the reasoned order should refer to that topic. On another interpretation, the reasoning should extend to the decision to uphold the application for confidential treatment. However, as the reasoned order would have to be disclosed to the opposing party, the reasons stated in it would have to be in a non-confidential form.

IV

PLEADINGS IN DIRECT ACTIONS

9.32 Sections A to E cover direct actions generally.103 Section F covers pleadings in IP appeals.

A

Applications commencing proceedings

9.33 RP-ECJ, art  120–121, RP-GC, art  76–78 and RP-CST, art  50 set out minimum requirements concerning the contents of the application and the documents which must be annexed to it.104

101 RP-GC, art 105(6). On the question of appeals, see Statute, arts 56–57: the reference in art 56, 1st para, to a decision disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of inadmissibility is a reference to the inadmissibility of the action or a claim in the action, not an issue concerning the admissibility of evidence (or a claim to confidential treatment of evidence). The confidential material is returned to the party submitting it after the expiry of the period for appealing to the ECJ against the GC’s judgment in the case but, where an appeal is brought, the information or material is made available to the ECJ under the conditions laid down in the decision made pursuant to RP-GC, art 105(11) defining the security arrangements under which confidential information and material are held: see RP-GC, art  105(10), as amended. The ECJ respects the confidentiality of the information or material, which is held under security arrangements defined by the ECJ and returned to the party submitting it once the appeal has been decided: RP-ECJ, art 190a. 102 RP-GC, art 105(7). 103 For suggested pleading precedents, see Atkin’s Court Forms, Vol 16. 104 PD-GC, paras 91–102 set out a useful summary of the position regarding pleadings generally; and PD-GC, paras 123–135 set out a useful summary of the position regarding applications. See also PD-ECJ, paras 12–13; PD-CST, paras 5–28.

762

Pleading 9.34

1 Contents 9.34

The application must set out the following.

(1) The name and address of the applicant.105 The applicant should be clearly identifiable, either by express reference or, at the least, indirectly from the contents of the application.106 One application may be brought by several applicants,107 in which case the name and address of each of them must be given.108 The criteria determining whether or not a joint application should be made are the same as those applied by the Court when deciding whether to join different proceedings.109 (2) The description of the signatory.110 The required signatory is the party’s agent or lawyer (other persons are not prohibited from signing the application but the party’s agent or lawyer must do so); and his description is usually to be found either on the title page of the application or in immediate proximity to his signature.111 (3) The name or designation of the party against whom the application is made,112 that is, an indication or description of the defendant. A slip in the naming of the defendant does not make the application inadmissible as long as it does not affect the right to a fair trial113 or the applicant’s intention is

105 RP-ECJ, art 120(a); RP-GC, art 76(a); RP-CST, art 50(1)(a). 106 Eg Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission (above, note 26), at 439 and 443 (Advocate General Roemer); Cases T-54/00 and T-73/00 Federacion de Cofradios de Pescadores de Guipuzcoa v Council [2001] ECR II-2691, paras 27–29; Case T-304/01 Abad Perez v Council and Commission [2006]  ECR II-4857, para  37 (address not stated but identifiable from an annexed document). 107 Eg Case 50/74 Amussen v Commission and Council [1975] ECR 1003, an action brought by 59 persons. 108 In CST proceedings, where there are more than three applicants, a list of their names and addresses must be appended to the application: PD-CST, para 15. 109 Case 13/57 Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie v High Authority [1957– 58]  ECR  265 at 277, see also at 317 (Advocate General Lagrange). In Cases 18 and 19/64 Alvino and Benoit v Commission [1965] ECR 789 some of the original forms of order were mutually incompatible as between different applicants and so their interests in the case might conflict but the inconsistencies were withdrawn in the reply (see 796). 110 Statute, art 21; RP-GC, art 76(b) (status and address); RP-CST, art 50(1)(b) (which specifies the professional capacity and address of the signatory). RP-ECJ, art  120 does not expressly require a description of the signatory to be provided. However, as the signatory must be the applicant’s agent or lawyer, and proof of the signatory’s status as such must also be provided, that requirement is implicit. 111 PD-CST, para  9 states that the lawyer’s address, name of practice or chambers and, where appropriate, his telephone and fax numbers and e-mail address, should appear on the first page. 112 Statute, art 21 (name); RP-ECJ, art 120(b) (name); RP-GC, art 76(b) (name of the ‘main party’, by which is meant the defendant); RP-CST, art 50(1)(c) (name). 113 Cases 63–69/72 Wilhelm Werhahn Hansamühle v Council [1973]  ECR  1229, para  8. Thus, where an action for damages is directed against an EU institution and not the EU itself, or the EAEC, the action is not inadmissible because the defect is purely formal: Case 353/88 Briantex SAS and Di Domenico v EEC and Commission [1989]  ECR  3623, para  7 and at 3631 per Advocate General Jacobs.

763

9.34  Pleading

clear;114 formal defects in the description of the defendant may be rectified even after lodgment of the application and, as a last resort, at the delivery of judgment.115 The correct defendant can be identified from the contents of the pleading, in particular the description given of the measure contested in the proceedings, where the defendant has not been identified expressly or the applicant has clearly made a mistake; but the application may be inadmissible if the applicant persists in naming the wrong defendant in full knowledge of who the correct defendant is.116 It does not appear to be necessary to give the defendant’s address.117 Normally one person is named as defendant but, in actions against the EU or EAEC, it often happens that several institutions, usually the Council and the Commission, are cited. (4) The subject matter of the dispute, the pleas in law and arguments relied on, and a summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based.118 The account given of the subject matter of the dispute is normally understood as encompassing the facts relevant to the dispute. Originally, the applica 114 Case 44/76 Milch-, Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Council and Commission [1977] ECR 393 at 413 (Advocate General Reischl); Case 85/86 Commission v Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank [1986]  ECR  2215; Case T-364/03 Medici Grimm KG  v Council [2006]  ECR II-79, para  47 (damages action); Case T-591/11 Przedsiebiorstwo Handlowe Medox Lepiarz Jaroslaw Lepiarz Alicja sp. j. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 11 December 2013, paras 18–22 (identification of intervener as defendant irrelevant because the action was clearly directed against the decision of the Office). 115 Case 85/86 Commission v Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank [1988] ECR 1281 at 1297 (Advocate General Mancini). 116 Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission (above, note 26) at 443–444 (Advocate General Roemer); Commission v Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank (above, note 114), para 6; Case T-327/13 Mallis v Commission and European Central Bank, 16 October 2014, para  36; Case T-328/13 Tameio Pronoias Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v Commission 16  October 2014, para  36; Case T-329/13 Chatzithoma v Commission 16  October 2014, para 36; Case T-330/13 Chatziioannou v Commission 16 October 2014, para 36; Case T-331/13 Nikolaou v Commission 16 October 2014, para 36; Case T-332/13 Christodoulou v Commission 16 October 2014, para 36. On the other hand, it has been held that, if the identified defendant is readily identifiable but happens to be the wrong person or entity, the Court will not assist: Case T-213/12 Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo, 4 June 2013, paras 38–39 (the identified defendant lacked capacity to be a party and the correct defendant should have been the Commission, which had delegated powers to the named defendant). Elitaliana does not appear to be consistent with the other cases cited in this footnote. 117 That appears to be a hangover from the time when the only defendant would be an EU institution or a member state. If the defendant is none of those, the defendant’s address should be provided so that service can be effected on the defendant. In Case C-59/99 Commission v Manuel Pereira Roldao & Filhos Lda [2001] ECR I-8499, para 19, the application could not be served on one of the defendants due to an absence of information concerning the defendant’s address. That led to the applicant writing to the Court asking it to continue the proceedings against the other defendants, which was taken by the Court to be an implied abandonment of the claim against the unserved defendant. 118 Statute, art 21 (subject matter of the dispute and a brief statement of the pleas in law relied on); RP-ECJ, art 120(c); RP-GC, art 76(d); RP-CST, art 50(1)(d)–(e) (subject matter, chronological summary of the relevant facts, separate summary of the pleas and arguments in law). According to Advocate General Roemer (Case 18/69 Fournier v Commission [1970] ECR 249 at 285) a clear exposition of the claims made must be given in the application itself ‘or at least in a written pleading submitted to the Court within the time limit for making an application’. In Case C-382/12 P MasterCard Inc v Commission, 11 September 2014, para 39, the ECJ held (citing

764

Pleading 9.34

tion had to contain only a brief statement or summary of the pleas in law on which it was based, probably because of the relative shortness of the time limits for commencing most direct actions. In RP-ECJ, art 120, however, the reference to a ‘summary’ of the pleas in law is construed as a reference to a separate document (which must also be drawn up for the purposes of GC and CST proceedings) to be used as the basis for the notice of the case published by the Court in the Official Journal.119 (5) The form of order sought by the applicant.120 The expression ‘form of order’ is often rendered in the English texts as ‘conclusions’ or ‘submissions’, which can cause confusion. It refers to the claim for relief. (6) The evidence relied on by the applicant (often referred to as the ‘offer of proof’).121 The applicant should annex to the application all documents relied on by him122 but, in the nature of things, some relevant documents may not be in his possession or control and some facts in issue may be provable only by other forms of evidence such as testimony. Such evidence can be produced only pursuant to a court order and the applicant should, therefore, indicate with precision the evidence whose production he wishes the

Fives Lille Cail (above, note 5) and Case C-330/88 Grifoni v Euratom [1991]  ECR  I-1045, para 18) that the ‘summary’ referred to in the Statute, art 21, has to set out what the plea on which the application is based comprises and be contained in the application. That means that the essential content of the plea must be explained. 119 PD-ECJ, para 13. For the corresponding GC and CST provisions, see PD-GC, paras 130–132 and PD-CST, para 16. The reference in Case T-114/02 BaByliss SA v Commission [2003] ECR II-1279, para 305, to a ‘summary’ of the pleas in law is to the predecessor to RP-GC, art 76(d), which was differently worded. On the other hand, the basic point made there and in paras 300–304 remains valid: as long as a plea is sufficiently pleaded in the application, it may be developed further in later written submissions. 120 Statute, art 21; RP-ECJ, art 120(d); RP-GC, art 76(e); RP-CST, art 50(1)(d). 121 RP-ECJ, art 120(e) (‘evidence produced or offered’); RP-GC, art 76(f) (‘evidence produced or offered’); RP-CST, art 50(1)(f) (‘evidence offered’). For the purpose of effecting the lodgment of the application within time, it is not necessary for each and every document listed as an annex to the application to be lodged at the same time (or before the expiry of the time limit): Case C-242/07P Belgium v Commission [2007] ECR I-9757, para 41. It seems that evidence must be produced if it relates to a fact that is either in issue or likely to be in issue and is in the possession or control of the applicant. Documentary evidence may be produced after the lodging of the application (usually as an attachment to the next pleading) if it relates to a fact that has, in the meantime, been put in issue by the opposing party or is ‘amplificatory’ evidence (RP-ECJ, art 64(3); RP-GC, art 92(7); RP-CST, art 71(7); eg Case T-1/96 Bocker-Lensing v Council and Commission [1999] ECR II-1, paras 29–30 (evidence of the assignment of the claim) or more generally if the delay in adducing it is justified (RP-ECJ, art 128; RP-GC, art 85(2)–(3); RPCST, art 57). See further para 9.80 below. Apart from the risk that the Court will not permit late production of evidence that the applicant could have lodged with the application, there is no formal procedural sanction if the applicant fails to adduce evidence of the facts in issue unless (semble) the failure makes it imposible for the defendant to assemble its defence: Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International Inc v Commission [2005] ECR II-315, paras 71–74. 122 RP-ECJ, art 57(4); RP-GC, art 72(3); RP-CST, art 45(1), 2nd and 3rd subparas. Eg Lucchini (above, note 40), paras 61–62.

765

9.35  Pleading

Court to order by way of a preparatory enquiry for the purpose of proving each and every fact in issue. Where the case raises points of law alone and no facts are in issue, that requirement is otiose.123 (7) Information relating to the service of procedural documents on the applicant. In the case of the ECJ and CST, that means the applicant’s address for service and the name of a person who is authorised and has expressed willingness to accept service.124 What is required is the name of a person (no objection has so far been raised to the use of a legal, as opposed to a natural, person; but it is normal to identify a natural person) and a declaration of his willingness to accept service on behalf of the applicant. Alternatively, the application may state that the applicant’s lawyer or agent has agreed that service may be effected on him by fax or other technical means of communication.125 In the case of the GC, the requirement is to specify where the applicant’s representative agrees to service by electronic means or by fax.126 If the application does not contain the required information relating to service, service on the applicant is effected by registered letter addressed to the applicant’s agent or lawyer unless and until the position is rectified.127 The address or contact details of a person who is willing to accept service is necessary so that the Court can contact the applicant with ease. There are no qualifications for accepting service but it is advisable for a party to choose someone with the technical means to transmit documents without delay to the party or its agent or lawyer.128 9.35 The Rules of Procedure do not prescribe a particular order or form in which those requirements must be expressed. The Court has not sought to impose a particular formal style of pleading but has become interested in stipulating matters of detail concerning the formal presentation of an application. An application in GC proceedings must state on the first page its title (by which is meant an identification of the type of pleading, here, ‘application’), the 123 Cases C-213/88 and C-39/89 Luxembourg v European Parliament [1991] ECR I-5643 at 5673 (Advocate General Lenz). 124 RP-ECJ, art 121(1); RP-CST, art 50(3). PD-CST, para 9 states that the applicant’s own address cannot be used as the address for service. 125 RP-ECJ, art 121(2); RP-CST, art 50(3), which also permits identification of the three methods of service referred to in what appears to be RP-CST, art 36. 126 RP-GC, art 77(1). 127 RP-ECJ, art  121(3); RP-GC, art  77(2); RP-CST, art  50(4). Service is deemed to be effected by lodging a registered letter addressed to the applicant at the post office in Luxembourg. The application is admissible even if no address for service is given. Under the Rules of Procedure as previously worded, the applicant was obliged to provide an address for service in Luxembourg, otherwise the application would be dismissed as inadmissible (see Case 297/84 Sahinler v Commission [1986]  ECR  443); but the application would be admissible if that defect was remedied unless, perhaps, it was remedied after the time fixed for doing so by the Registrar and had caused the proceedings to be delayed (Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission, above, note 26, at 442–443 per Advocate General Roemer). 128 It used to be the case that the address for service had to be somewhere in the vicinity of the Court and preferably within the Commune of Luxembourg because the Court effected service in Luxembourg by hand. That is no longer the case where service is effected through e-Curia or by fax.

766

Pleading 9.36

names of the parties to the case and the name of the party on whose behalf the applications is lodged (that is, the applicant).129 An ‘introductory part’ to the application should be followed by a brief account of the facts giving rise to the dispute; the legal arguments should be set out and grouped by reference to the pleas in law relied on, with each argument or group of arguments preceded by a summary statement of the plea in law and a heading; the form of order must be stated at the beginning or end of the application.130 In CST proceedings, the application must state on the first page the name and address of the applicant’s lawyer, the name of his chambers or practice, and his contact details; there must be a clear summary of the facts in chronological order and a separate, precise and structured summary of the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on; the form of order must be at the beginning or end of the application and the different heads of claim must be numbered.131 Requirements as to the contents of the first page of an application can be difficult to comply with where the first page is not large enough to contain them (there may also be limits to the extent to which reducing the font size can provide a solution). It is generally considered that no sin is committed if the contents of the first page slip over into the second. Both the GC and the CST require the paragraphs of the text to be numbered consecutively.132 9.36 Applications can, in general, be said to fall into three parts: title; submissions; and form of order. The body of the application sets out the submissions of fact and law which entitle the applicant to the relief sought, which is defined in the form of order. Completion of the title page is essentially a mechanical exercise. The submissions and form of order are the most important parts of the application: for the purposes of admissibility, it is essential that the application has a form of order and sets out the facts and pleas in law invoked in support of it; as long as the application states the minimum necessary in order to identify the relief sought and the factual and legal grounds relied on, the requirements of admissibility have been satisfied and any deficiencies in the presentation of the case made out in the application go to the substance of the case.133 It is comparatively rare for either of the submissions or the form of order to be omitted entirely from an application; most of the decided cases concern statements of the grounds relied on and forms of order which are said to be deficient in some respect. It may be observed in passing that the subject matter of the dispute should be evident from the statement of the grounds relied on and the form of order but, for the

129 PD-GC, para 91 (as the pleading is an application, no case number will have been allocated to the case). 130 PD-GC, paras 125–127. 131 PD-CST, paras 9, 12, 13. 132 PD-GC, para 92; PD-CST, para 14. It is not clear what form of paragraph numbering other than consecutive might occur to the lawyer representing the party. For the avoidance of doubt on the point, the numbering should be in ascending, not descending order (starting with 1). 133 Cases C-213/88 and C-39/89 Luxembourg v European Parliament (above, note 123), paras 20–21 and pp 5670 and 5672–5673 per Advocate General Lenz.

767

9.37  Pleading

purposes of exposition, those two parts of the application will be commented on separately.134 2 Title 9.37 The title identifies the nature of the pleading and the action which it commences and sets out the information that must be provided on the first page of the pleading. Of the requirements in RP-ECJ, art 120–121, RP-GC, art 76–77 and RP-CST, art 50 set out above, it comprises (1), (2), (3) and (7), which need not be set out in precisely that order.135 The Statute136 also requires the ‘description of the signatory’ of the pleading137 to be mentioned (the GC and CST Rules of Procedure reflect that requirement; although the ECJ Rules of Procedure do not, it is normal for the description of the signatory to appear in applications made to the ECJ). The description of the signatory is usually set out after either (1) or (7) depending on the taste of the draftsman. After (3) there generally follows the designation of the pleading (in this case ‘application’). That is not the only conceivable method of entitling the application; sometimes the pleading is headed by the word ‘application’ and the names, etc of the parties follow. Since the word ‘application’ is often qualified by a brief description of the nature of the proceedings, the full title may be somewhat as follows: In the Court of Justice of the European Union (or, as the case may be: In the General Court or Civil Service Tribunal)138 A B139 of [address], represented by C D, [insert professional designation, such as barrister or advocate140 and, in CST proceedings, the name of CD’s chambers or practice], with an address for service at the office of E F of [address] or who has agreed to accept service at [insert contact details]

134 Although the admissibility of an action is determined by reference to the situation prevailing when the application is lodged, it would seem that a technical ground of inadmissibility applicable at that stage may not render the application (and the action) inadmissible if it is cured within the period for commencing proceedings: Case 50/84 Bensider v Commission [1984] ECR 3991, para 8. 135 The usual way of identifying the action to which a pleading relates is to quote the number of the case and the names of the parties. The number of the case cannot, of course, be used in the application which commences the proceedings because it is added by the Court when the application is lodged at the Registry. 136 Art 21. 137 Ie the applicant’s agent or lawyer: see RP-ECJ, art 57(1); RP-GC, art 73(1); RP-CST, art 45(2). 138 Some pleadings say ‘to the President and Members of the [Court of Justice, General Court or Civil Service Tribunal, as the case may be]’ or simply ‘In the case of…’. The essential point is to identify which part of the Court is considered to have jurisdiction over the proceedings. PD-CST, para 5 states that an application must be ‘addressed’ to the CST Registry. That seems to refer to the addressee of any covering letter or envelope or to the electronic address to which the application is sent. 139 A  natural or legal person would not ordinarily commence an action before the ECJ. In GC proceedings, the applicant is in most cases a legal person. 140 The designation sometimes states ‘admitted to the bar of….’ or something similar.

768

Pleading 9.39

Applicant Against European Commission141 Defendant Application made under Articles 263 and 264 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union for a declaration that Commission Decision No  83/1004 of 12 December 1983 is void. 9.38 That way of setting out the title places a considerable amount of information in the line devoted to the applicant. In order to spread the information more evenly across the title page, the title may be set out as follows: In the Court of Justice of the European Union (or, as the case may be: In the General Court or Civil Service Tribunal) A B of [address] Applicant Against European Commission Defendant Application made under Articles 263 and 264 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union for a declaration that Commission Decision No  83/1004 of 12 December 1983 is void. AB is represented by CD [insert professional designation and, in CST proceedings, the name of CD’s chambers or practice] The applicant’s address for service is [insert address]. And/or CD has agreed to accept service by fax [insert fax number] and by e-mail [insert e-mail address]. Where the applicant is a legal person, the description of the applicant is usually in the form: AB, [insert description of the applicant’s legal status and the law governing it, such as a company with limited liability governed by the laws of England and Wales] with its address/registered office at [insert address]. 9.39 As can be seen, when set out in that way, the title also states the subject matter of the dispute;142 and, to some extent, the nature of the relief sought (the full form of order would include any alternative claims for relief and a claim 141 For obvious reasons, the address of most defendants (ie EU institutions and member states) is usually known. 142 As far as admissibility is concerned, it is not necessary to mention expressly the Treaty provision under which the action is brought (Cases 2–10/63 Société Industriale Acciaierie San Michele v High Authority [1963] ECR 327 at 341) but to make such an omission is an unsatisfactory way of pleading.

769

9.40  Pleading

for costs). So far as the subject matter of the dispute is concerned, it is essential to give sufficient details to establish the subject matter with certainty.143 In actions for annulment it is, in particular, necessary to identify clearly the measures sought to be annulled; if that is not done, the application may be inadmissible.144 In Case T-50/89 Sparr v Commission145 the application did not provide sufficient information to enable it to be classified so the CFI (as it then was) classified it from the procedural point of view and did not dismiss it as inadmissible because it was defective. For the purpose of the title, the description given of the relief sought need only be sufficient to indicate the form of the action. It is not necessary to set out the form of order in full (hence, it is not necessary to set out the claim for costs in the title); but, if that is done, the form of order must be complete and must, therefore, include such matters as the claim for costs. 3 Submissions 9.40 An application which does not contain any statement of the submissions relied on is inadmissible;146 but if the failure to adduce any argument in the application relates only to one claim out of several, the Court may simply refuse to consider that claim.147 That part of the application setting out the applicant’s submissions must be drafted ‘in such a way that the essential features of the grounds on which it is based can be clearly discerned and it is possible to distinguish the provisions on which the action is founded’.148 The term ‘grounds’ was used in the Statutes,149 in the English version of the Rules of Procedure and 143 See Case 4/69 Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Commission [1971] ECR 325, para 2. 144 See Case 30/68 Lacroix v Commission [1970] ECR 301, paras 21–26. 145 [1990] ECR II-539, para 5. 146 Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 37 at 59 (Advocate General Lagrange); Case 9/55 Société des Charbonnages de Beeringen v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 311 (see also Advocate General Lagrange, at 266). The defective nature of the application can be raised by the Court of its own motion: Case T-154/01 Distilleria F Palma SpA v Commission [2004] ECR II-1493, para  57; Case T-162/06 Kronoply GmbH & Co KG  v Commission [2009]  ECR II1, para  55. In reality, the point is usually raised by the defendant. If the defendant can understand the pleading, it is unlikely to be sufficiently defective as to be inadmissible (eg Case T-11/06R  Romana Tabacchi SpA  v Commission [2006]  ECR II-2491, paras 46–49). On the other hand, if the defendant has misunderstood the application, it does not follow that it is insufficiently clear: eg Case T-198/03 Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission [2006] ECR II-1429, paras 52–54. 147 Case C-132/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR I-1567, para 15. 148 Case 219/78 Michaelis v Commission [1979] ECR 3349 at 3360 (Advocate General Capotorti); Generlich v Commission (above, note 5), paras 31–32. In Case C-61/90 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-2407, para 15, a point made by one party was rejected because it was insufficiently precise and detailed. The fact that the defendant chooses to respond to a particular point only in the rejoinder does not indicate that the application is defective in that respect: the Generlich case, para 33. 149 ECSC  Statute, art  22; EC and Euratom Statutes, art  19. The Statute, art  21, now uses the expression ‘pleas in law’. In principle, ‘pleas in law’ (in French, ‘moyens’) are supported by ‘arguments’ (in French, ‘arguments’). However, the English translations of some judgments exhibit a rather haphazard usage. For example, in Case T-231/99 Joynson v Commission [2002] ECR II-2085, paras 156–157, ‘submission’ is used indiscriminately to describe a ‘plea in law’ and an ‘argument’. Joynson is then cited in Case T-20/05 Outokumpu Oyj v Commission

770

Pleading 9.40

in the case law to describe what, since the amendment of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure in 1991, are now called ‘pleas in law’ (the latter is the term that will be used henceforth save in quotations from the case law). The grounds or pleas in law are the matters of law raised by the applicant to justify grant of the relief sought (a ground or plea may consist entirely of a matter of law or may be a matter of law based upon an assertion of fact). Each claim for relief in the form of order must be supported by at least one ground or plea in law.150 In support of each plea the applicant may adduce any number of arguments and may add to them at will in the course of the proceedings151 but the application is intended to state the pleas relied on exhaustively and, as a general rule, the scope of the action cannot subsequently be broadened by the addition of new pleas not mentioned in it.152 There are, in principle, three exceptions to that: pleas which are mandatory and must be raised by the Court of its own motion even though they have not been pleaded;153 pleas based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure;154 and pleas that ‘amplify’ an existing plea and are ‘closely connected’ to that plea.155 Those exceptions are considered below. Unless one of those exceptions applies, the only way that a new plea not mentioned in the application can be brought before the Court is by commencing [2010] ECR II-89*, para 58, as authority for the proposition that a new ‘complaint’ supporting a plea in law may be adduced in the course of the proceedings. The linguistic confusion is not limited to English. The French version of some judgments uses ‘griefs’ (variously translated into English as ‘submissions’ or ‘complaints’) instead of ‘arguments’. In other cases, the distinction between pleas and arguments is either blurred or not recognised: eg Case T-334/07 Denka International BV v Commission [2009] ECR II-4205, para 107. 150 Cf Cases T-379/10 and T-381/10 Keramaq Keramische Werke v Commission, 16  September 2013, para 34. 151 Eg Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority (above, note 146) at 51; Case 2/56 Geitling Selling Agency for Ruhr Coal v High Authority [1957–58]  ECR  3 at 17; Case 2/57 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority [1957–58] ECR 199 at 206; Cases 9 and 12/60 Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA v High Authority [1961] ECR 197 at 215; the Generlich case (above, note 5), para  32; Case T-95/03 Asociacion de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio de la Comunidad Autonoma de Madrid v Commission [2006] ECR II-4739, para 50 (further information in support of admissibility arguments in the application adduced at the hearing); Case T-476/12 Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland GmbH v Commission, 11 December 2014, para 36. 152 Case 18/57 Nold KG v High Authority [1959] ECR 41 at 51. 153 Eg Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority (above, note 146) at 52; Case C-89/08P  Commission v Ireland [2009] ECR I-11245, paras 34–40 (but when the Court takes a point of its own motion, it must alert the parties and give them an opportunity to make their views on the point known: paras 50–62); Case C-197/09  RX-II M  v European Medicines Agency [2009]  ECR  I-12033, paras 56–59 (same). The Court’s unlimited jurisdiction must be pleaded and cannot be taken by the Court of its own motion: Case T-364/10 Duravit AG v Commission, 16 September 2013, paras 43 and 48; Cases C-239/11P, C-489/11P and C-498/11P  Siemens AG  v Commission, 19 December 2013, paras 332–340. 154 RP-ECJ, art 127(1); RP-GC, art 84(1); RP-CST, art 56(1). See paras 9.81–9.88 below. Before 1991, the Rules of Procedure were more restrictive in that a new plea (other than one that the Court could take of its own motion) could be introduced only if based on matters of law or fact which had come to light during the written procedure; the current version of the Rules allows the introduction of new pleas based on matters that have come to light after the close of the written procedure (that is expressly envisaged in RP-GC, art 84(2)). 155 Eg Case T-20/05 Outokumpu (above, note 149), para 58 (where it is also stated that the same applies in the case of a ‘complaint’ – that is, an argument – supporting a plea in law).

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9.41  Pleading

a second action (always assuming that the time for doing so has not yet expired); but if the second action repeats any plea made in the first action, it will to that extent be inadmissible by virtue of the principle of lis pendens.156 9.41 When the Statute157 provides that there need only be a ‘brief’ statement’ of the pleas relied on, what is meant is that, although all the pleas must be set out and none may be left out, each one can be stated shortly and without a lengthy, comprehensive exegesis of the arguments used in support.158 The statement in the application may be completed in the course of the proceedings.159 Nonetheless, the pleas must be specified with sufficient particularity as to (i) their nature and content, (ii) the facts on which they are based and (iii) the rules of law invoked: it must be possible to identify the complaints made and the essence of the arguments invoked in support of them.160 There is now in the case law a considerable body of examples of cases in which the pleading has been considered to be insufficiently precise161 or (despite the protestations of the defendant) 156 Cases 175 and 209/86 M v Council [1988] ECR 1891 at 1905 (Advocate General Mancini); Cases 358/85 and 51/86 France v European Parliament [1988] ECR 4821, paras 7–12; Case C-157/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-57, paras 5–7 and at 73 per Advocate General van Gerven; Case T-531/11 Hamas v Council, 21 June 2012, paras 15–19. 157 Statute, art 21. 158 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95 at 120 (Advocate General Roemer). Cf MasterCard (above, note 118), para 39. 159 Eg Case 18/60 Worms v High Authority [1962]  ECR  195 at 203; Case 281/82 Unifrex v Commission and Council [1984]  ECR  1969, para  15; Case 118/83  CMC  Cooperativa Muratori e Cementisti v Commission [1985] ECR 2325, para 33, where the Court asked the applicant to present more detailed arguments at the hearing; Case 257/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 3249, para 15 (partly a more precise exposition of an earlier submission and partly a response to the defence); Case T-82/89 Marcato v Commission [1990] ECR II-735, para 74; Case C-243/89 Commission v Denmark [1993]  ECR  I-3353, para  17. But contrast: Cases T-33/89 and T-74/89 Blackman v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-249, paras 64–65; Case C214/05P Rossi v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006]  ECR  I-7057, para  37; Case C-485/08P  Gualtieri v Commission [2010]  ECR  I-3009, paras 104–106. The completion of the case made out in the application at a later stage in the proceedings (by its further elaboration) is quite different from a late attempt to cure a defect in the case as originally made out, due to its unintelligibility. The defendant is entitled to be able to understand the applicant’s case, to the full, when preparing the defence and without having to wait until a later stage in the proceedings. 160 Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority [1965] ECR 677 at 696; the Blackman case (above, note 159), para 64; Case T-35/04 Athinaiki Oikogeniaki Artopoiia AVEE v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR II-785, paras 18–21; Case T-249/06 Interpipe Nikopolsky Seamless Tubes Plant Niko Tube ZAT v Council [2009] ECR II-383, paras 340–342; Case C-165/08 Commission v Poland [2009] ECR I-6843, paras 42–48. 161 Examples of failure to plead sufficiently precisely are: Case T-1/90 Pérez-Mínguez Casariego v Commission [1991] ECR II-143, paras 57 and 62; Grifoni (above, note 118), paras 17–18; Case C-63/89 Les Assurances du Crédit et Compagnie Belge d’Assurance Crédit SA v Council and Commission [1991] ECR I-1799, para 25; Cases T-68, T-77 and T-78/89 Società Italiano Vetro SA  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-1403, paras 83–84; Case C-157/91 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR I-5899, para 12; Case C-322/91 Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-6373, para13; Case C-44/92 Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-6387, paras 9–12; Case C-306/91 Commission v Italy

772

Pleading 9.41

sufficiently clear.162 Some illustrations of the main points arising from the cases are set out below. [1993]  ECR  I-2133 paras 23–28 (see also paras 12–17 of the Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann); Case T-72/92 Benzler v Commission [1993] ECR II-347, paras 16–24; Case T-56/92 Koelman v Commission [1993]  ECR II-1267, paras17–24; Case T-43/92 Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd v Commission [1994] ECR II-441, paras 183–185; Case T-77/92 Parker Pen Ltd Commission [1994] ECR II-549, paras 99–100; Case T-102/92 Viho Europe BV v Commission [1995] ECR II-17, paras 68–70; Case T-73/99 Meyer v Council and Commission [1999] ECR II-1739, paras 7–9; Case T-168/95 Eridania Zuccherifici Nazionali SpA v Council [1999] ECR II-2245, para  37; Case T-106/99 Meyer v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3273, paras 46–49 (damages); Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96 Service pour le Groupement d’Acquisitions v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3587, para  68 (abstract pleading of misuse of powers); Cases T-190/95 and T-45/96 Societe de Distribution de Mecaniques et d’Automobiles (Sodima) v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3617, paras 41–46; Cases T-9/96 and T-211/96 Europeenne Automobile SARL v Commission [1999] ECR II-3639, para 57 (same); Case T-251/97 T. Port GmbH & Co v Commission [2000] ECR II-1775, paras 90–92 (substantiation of the plea in the reply irrelevant); Cases T-79/96, T-260/97 and T-117/98 Camar Srl v Commission and Council [2000] ECR II-2193, paras 181–185 and 216; Case T-338/99 Schuerer v Council [2000] ECR II-2571, paras 16–26; Case T-110/98 RJB Mining plc v Commission [2000] ECR II-971, paras 23–40; Case C-202/99 Commission v Greece [2001] ECR I-9319, paras 20–22; Case T-131/99 Shaw v Commission [2002] ECR II-2023, paras 171–172; Case T-247/01 eCopy Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2002] ECR II-5301, paras 15–17; Case C-178/00 Italy v Commission [2003] ECR I-303, paras 6–8, 40–41 and 48–49; Cases T-191/98, T-212/98, T-213/98 and T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line AB v Commission [2003]  ECR II-3275, paras 276–285 and 1637–1642; Case T-85/01  IAMA  Consulting Srl v Commission [2003] ECR I-4973, paras 56–60; Cases T-215/01, T-220/01 and T-221/01 Calberson GE  v Commission [2004]  ECR II-587, paras 176–180 (damages); Case T-319/03 French v Council and Commission [2004] ECR II-769, paras 13–25 (damages); Case T-157/01 Dansk Busvognmaend v Commission [2004] ECR II-917, paras 45–51; Distilleria F Palma (above, note 146), paras 56–63; Case T-28/03 Holcim (Deutschland) AG v Commission [2005] ECR II1357, paras 41–46; Case T-376/04 Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3007, paras 54–57; Case T-209/01 Honeywell International Inc v Commission [2005]  ECR II-5527, paras 105–119; Case T-5839 Arizona Chemical BV  v Commission [2005]  ECR II-5839, paras 119–124; Case T-367/03 Yedas Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AS v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-873, paras 52–53; Case T-177/04 easyJet Airline Co Ltd v Commission [2006]  ECR II-1931, paras 58–60 and 66–68; Case T-417/05 Endesa SA v Commission [2006] ECR II-2533, para 247; Case T-322/01 Roquette Freres SA v Commission [2006]  ECR II-3137, paras 207–210 (unclear cross-reference to arguments in another part of the application); Case C-195/04 Commission Finland [2007] ECR I-3351, paras 22–32; Case C-507/04 Commission v Austria [2007] ECR I-5939, paras 77–78 (contradiction in pleading rendering claim inadmissible); Case T-231/04 Greece v Commission [2007] ECR II-63, paras 77–78; Case T-219/04 Spain v Commission [2007] ECR II-1323, paras 88–93; Case T-308/05 Italy v Commission [2007] ECR II-5089, paras 71–75; Case T-91/05 Sinara Handel GmbH v Council and Commission [2007] ECR II-245, paras 87–90 and 108–122 (damages); Case T-144/04 Television francaise 1 SA v Commission [2008] ECR II-761, para 29 ff; Case T-125/06 Centro Studi Antonio Manieri Srl v Council [2009]  ECR II-69, paras 71 and 98– 103; Case T-89/07 VIP Car Solutions Sarl v European Parliament [2009] ECR II-1403, paras 96–97 and 103–108; Case T-444/07 Centre de Promotion de l’emploi par la micro-entreprise v Commission [2009]  ECR II-2121, paras 32–38; 49–50 and 121; Case T-212/06 Bowland Dairy Products Ltd v Commission [2009] ECR II-4073; Denka International (above, note 149), para 150; Case T-366/09 Insula v Commission, 13 June 2012, paras 228–232. 162 Eg CMC  Cooperativi Muratori e Cementisti v Commission (above, note 159) at 2331 (Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat); Luxembourg v Parliament (above, note 123), paras 18–22; Weddel & Co BV v Commission (above, note 78), para 16 and at 883–884 (Advocate General van Gerven); Case T-58/91 Booss v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-147, para  65; Case

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9.42 It should be emphasised that the test used to decide whether or not a pleading is insufficiently clear is whether or not the opposing party was able to adopt a position on the case in the light of it and whether or not the Court is able to exercise its powers of review.163 For the purposes of satisfying the requirements of the Rules of Procedure, it is not necessary for the application to set out a good T-149/96 Confederazione Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti (Coldiretti) v Council and Commission [1998] ECR II-3841, paras 45–52; Case T-13/96 TEAM v Commission [1998] ECR II-4073, paras 27–30 (damages); Case T-154/98 Asia Motor France SA  v Commission [1999]  ECR II-1703, paras 49–61; Case T-277/97 Ismeri Europa Srl v Court of Auditors [1999] ECR II1825, paras 28–32, 40–43, 55–90; Cases T-33/98 and T-34/98 Petrotub SA and Republica SA v Commission [1999] ECR II-3837, paras 145–146; Case T-145/98 ADT Projekt v Commission [2000]  ECR II-387, paras 65–78; Case T-72/99 Meyer v Commission [2000]  ECR II-2521, paras 30–35; Case T-178/98 Fresh Marine Co SA v Commission [2000] ECR II-3331, paras 30–34; Case T-1/99 T. Port GmbH & Co KG v Commission [2001] ECR II-465, paras 36–41 (damages action); Case T-174/00 Biret International SA  v Council [2002]  ECR II-17, paras 31–32; Case T-210/00 Etablissements Biret et Cie SA v Council [2002] ECR II-47, paras 34–35; Case T-56/00 Dole Fresh Fruit International Ltd v Council and Commission [2003] ECR II577, paras 38–43 (damages); Case T-57/00 Banan-Kompaniet AB v Council and Commission [2003]  ECR II-607, paras 38–43 (same); Case T-195/00 Travelex Global and Financial Services Ltd v Commission [2003] ECR II-1677, paras 26–30 (same); Case T-99/98 Hameico Stuttgart GmbH v Council and Commission [2003] ECR II-2195, paras 26–34 (same); Case T-146/01  DLD  Trading Co v Council [2003]  ECR II-6005, paras 39–44 (same); Chiquita Brands (above, note 121), paras 64–70 (same); Case T-294/04 Internationaler Hilsfonds eV v Commission [2005] ECR II-2719, paras 23–29 (same); Case T-250/02 Autosalone Ispra Snc v EAEC  [2005]  ECR II-5227, paras 34–40; Case T-69/00 Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-5393, paras 67–72; Case T-383/00 Beamglow Ltd v European Parliament [2005]  ECR II-5459, paras 78–83; Medici Grimm (above, note 114), paras 51–57; the Yedas Tarim case (above, note 161), paras 31–33; Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01 Osterreische Postsparkasse AG v Commission [2006] ECR II1601, paras 167–171; Case T-193/04 Tillack v Commission [2006] ECR II-3995, paras 89–95; Abad Perez (above, note 106), paras 44–46; Case T-138/03  ER  v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-4923, paras 34–37; Case C-490/04 Commission Germany [2007] ECR I-6095, paras 29–32; Case T-351/03 Schneider Electric SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-2237, paras 92–99; Case T-167/04 Asklepios Kliniken GmbH  v Commission [2007]  ECR II-2379, paras 39–44; Case T-262/06P Commission v D [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1 27, II-B-1 191, paras 49–52; Case C-411/06 Commission v European Parliament [2009]  ECR  I-7585, paras 26–29; Case C-540/07 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-10983, paras 16–19; Case C-678/13 Commission v Poland, 4 June 2015, paras 16–19 (a disorganised presentation of the case does not necessarily render the application defective). 163 Unifrex v Commission and Council (above, note 159), paras 14–15 and at 1991 (Advocate General Mancini); Case T-85/92 De Hoe v Commission [1993]  ECR II-523, para  20; Case T-14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irelande v Commission [1999] ECR II-139, para 67 (where certain arguments in the application had been made, apparently erroneously, in the context of a different ground); Case T-5/97 Industries des Poudres Spherique SA v Commission [2000] ECR II-3755, paras 192–195; Case T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland Co v Commission [2003]  ECR II2597, paras 36–38; Honeywell (above, note 161), para 55; Case T-279/03 Galileo International Technology LLC  v Commission [2006]  ECR II-1291, paras 36–59; Television francaise 1 (above, note 161), para 29; Case T-288/06 Regionalny Fundusz Gospodarczy SA v Commission [2009] ECR II-2247, paras 25–27 (note also paras 37–38: clarification at the hearing); Case T-24/07 ThyssenKrupp Stainless AG v Commission [2009] ECR II-2309, paras 155–159 and 251–253; Case T-369/06 Holland Malt BV v Commission [2009] ECR II-3313, paras 31–33. If the applicant’s case is incomprehensible even after the applicant has been given the chance of clarifying the position in a later pleading and at the hearing, the application is inadmissible: eg Case T-4/01 Renco SpA v Council [2003] ECR II-171, para 87.

774

Pleading 9.43

case: the strength of the case shown in the application goes to the foundation of the action.164 The application should be brief and avoid unnecessary repetition but it should not be too concise.165 The Court may be prepared to interpret the application freely if the defendant is not prejudiced thereby.166 If the application does nothing more than set out various legal provisions and judicial authorities but fails to indicate the facts and circumstances relied on to support the claims made against the defendant, it will be held to be inadmissible because such a manner of pleading makes it impossible for the Court to rule on the case.167 If an application is defective in that respect, the defect may be cured if the proceedings are joined to other proceedings having the same subject matter;168 otherwise, the application will be inadmissible or excluded from consideration to the extent of the defect.169 However, even a confused application is admissible if it has not misled the defendant.170 9.43 The applicant is not obliged to identify the pleas relied on properly or at all by reference to their legal classification as set out in the Treaties or elsewhere:171 it is enough if they are designated ‘in terms of their substance’ as long as they are sufficiently clear.172 On the other hand, an abstract statement is

164 Cf Case 126/83 STS Consorzio per Sistemi di Telecomunicazione via Satellite SpA v Commission [1984] ECR 2769 at 2782 (Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat). In consequence, where an argument advanced in support of a plea is itself unsupported, the argument is defective and should be rejected as such (as in Cases T-17/90, T-28/91 and T-17/92 Camara Alloisio v Commission [1993] ECR II-841, paras 86–91) and not because it is inadmissible. 165 Case 46/69 Reinarz v Commission [1970] ECR 275 at 286 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 76/86 Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 1021 at 1035 (Advocate General Jacobs). 166 Eg Cases 25 and 26/65  SIMET and FERAM  v High Authority [1967]  ECR  33 at 43; Case C-188/88  NMB (Deutschland) GmbH  v Commission [1992]  ECR  1689, para  20, where the application claimed the annulment of the defendant’s ‘policy’ but was construed as aiming at the decisions applying that policy; Case T-388/03 Deutsche Post AG v Commission [2009] ECR II-199, para 54; Case T-12/03 Itochu Corpn v Commission [2009] ECR II-883, para 108; Case T-375/04 Scheucher-Fleisch GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR II-4155, paras 62–64. On the other hand, the Court dislikes being expected to hunt around in a pleading to find a point: Case T-25/07 Iride SpA v Commission [2009] ECR II-245, para 60. 167 Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR I-4747 at 4770 (Advocate General Tesauro); Case C-52/90 Commission v Denmark [1992] ECR I-2187, paras 17–19. 168 Eg Cases 26 and 86/79 Forges de Thy-Marcinelle et Monceau SA v Commission [1980] ECR 1083, para 4. 169 Cf Case 277/82 Papageorgopoulos v Economic and Social Committee [1983]  ECR  2897, para 14. 170 Pérez-Mínguez Casariego v Commission (above, note 161), paras 45–49. 171 Case 18/57 Nold KG v High Authority (above, note 152) at 66 (Advocate General Roemer); Société Fives Lille Cail v High Authority (above, note 5) at 295; San Michele v High Authority (above, note 142) at 348 (Advocate General Roemer). It does not follow that the applicant can leave it to the Court to choose the appropriate legal basis for the action: Case C-160/03 Spain v Eurojust [2005] ECR I-2077, paras 34–35. 172 The Société Fives Lille Cail case (above, note 5) at 295; the San Michele case (above, note 142) (see also per Advocate General Roemer at 348); Case 338/82 Albertini and Montagnani v Commission [1984] ECR 2123, para 5; Case 42/84 Remia BV v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para 16; Cases C-363/88 and C-364/88 Financiaria Siderurgica Finsider SpA v Commission [1992] ECR I-359 at 394 (Advocate General van Gerven), where the applicant’s written and oral pleadings made it clear that the action was based on a further Treaty provision in addition to

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9.43  Pleading

insufficient173 and so is a formal reference to all the grounds mentioned in the Treaty:174 the applicant must give particulars of the constituent elements of the plea.175 This means that he must set out the precise facts relied on: the defendant is ‘obliged to reply only to facts explicitly defined and to refute only clear and precise allegations’; he must be allowed to submit his defence with full knowledge of the facts at issue.176 The applicant is not, however, bound to plead precisely facts which it is not possible for him to identify accurately and which are within the knowledge of the defendant.177 So, for example, in an action for annulment, a failure to state in the application the date and contents of the contested act is not a defect, at least where the applicant is not in possession of sufficient information to be more precise than he has been.178 Also in an action for annulment, it is not enough simply to allege one of the grounds for annulment mentioned in the Treaties: particulars must be given of the respects in which it is relied on.179 In an action for damages, the applicant must give particulars of the wrongful acts alleged, the damage caused and the causal connection between them.180 A claim for default interest in respect of the delay in the performance of an obligation need not be supported by specific reasons because the obligation to pay default interest is a general principle of EU law.181

the one mentioned expressly in the application; Case T-122/04 Outokumpu Oyj v Commission [2009] ECR II-1135, para 53. 173 The Société Fives Lille Cail case (above, note 5); Case T-33/91 Williams v Court of Auditors [1992] ECR II-2499, para 32. 174 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority (above, note 160) at 705 (Advocate General Roemer). 175 ‘An indication of the essence of the arguments which will be of decisive importance in the evaluation of the submissions put forward’: ibid at 705 (Advocate General Roemer). Cf Case 235/82 Ferriere San Carlo v Commission [1983] ECR 3949, para 22; De Hoe v Commission (above, note 163), paras 21–26 (upheld on appeal in Case C-338/93P De Hoe v Commission [1994] ECR I-819, paras 28–29). 176 Meroni & Co v High Authority (above, note 5) at 419; see also the Société Fives Lille Cail case (above, note 5) and the Blackman case (above, note 159); Case T-303/10 WAM Industriale SpA v Commission, 27 September 2012, paras 62–67 (upheld on appeal in Case C-560/12 P, WAM Industriale SpA v Commission, 7 November 2013). 177 See Alvino and Benoit v Commission (above, note 109) at 797. 178 Case C-157/90 Infortec-Projectos e Consultadoria Lda v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-3525, paras 11–15. 179 The Société Fives Lille Cail case (above, note 5); a complaint stated in vague terms and not based on any specific argument must be rejected at once (see Case 19/58 Germany v High Authority [1960]  ECR  225 at 239). See also Case 14/59 Société des Fonderies de Pont à Mousson v High Authority [1959] ECR 215 at 233. 180 Meroni & Co v High Authority (above, note 5); Plaumann & Co v Commission (above, note 158) at 120 (Advocate General Roemer); Case T-64/89 Automec Srl v Commission [1990] ECR II-367, para  73; Case C-44/92 Association of Independent Officials for the Defence of the European Civil Service v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-6387, paras 10–12. In Case 90/78 Granaria BV v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1081 Advocate General Capotorti took the view that a lack of proof regarding the causal connection between the wrongful act alleged and the damage caused goes to the substance of the case rather than the admissibility of the application (see 1097–1098). In Case 346/87 Bossi v Commission [1989]  ECR  303 at 316, Advocate General Darmon said that a failure to plead a causal connection is not fatal if one can easily be inferred from the facts. 181 Calberson (above, note 161), paras 89–92.

776

Pleading 9.45

9.44 The rules of law relied on by the applicant should be identifiable182 although a specific reference to them is not necessary if they can be determined with sufficient clarity from a reading of the application.183 The wrong citation of a provision of EU law does not cause the application or the ground to which it relates to be inadmissible184 although it undoubtedly goes to the substance of the claim. 9.45 In several damages actions the defendant has objected that the applicant has not produced the figures on which the claim is based. The rule is that ‘a claim for any unspecified form of damages is not sufficiently concrete and must therefore be regarded as inadmissible’.185 In the nature of things, however, it may not be possible to assess the extent of the damage caused at the outset of proceedings, particularly where the damage is imminent or still continuing. In such circumstances, it is permissible for more detailed information concerning the claim to be produced at a later stage in proceedings, even if the result is to alter the amount claimed in the light of new or better information, at least as long as the defendant has an opportunity to reply;186 but the applicant must plead the existence of special circumstances making it impossible for him to indicate the precise extent of the damage suffered or the amount claimed187 or, at the least, must plead the precise nature of the loss so that the defendant can plead to the application even if it does not know the exact sum claimed.188 In the case of damage that is imminent, the claim in the application can be framed as a claim for a declaration that the EU (or EAEC) will be liable but, in such circumstances, the threat of damage must be foreseeable with a sufficient degree of certainty;189 if the damage alleged is a mere possibility or is contingent on some event which has not taken

182 Michaelis v Commission (above, note 148) at 3360 (Advocate General Capotorti); see also Ufficio Imposte de Consumo di Ispra v Commission (above, note 26) at 444 (Advocate General Roemer). 183 Case 62/65 Serio v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 561 at 568 and at 575 (Advocate General Roemer); Case T-18/90 Jongen v Commission [1991] ECR II-187, para 13. 184 Case 12/68 X v Audit Board [1969] ECR 109, para 7. 185 Case 5/71 Aktien Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975, para 9; Case 3/66 Alfieri v European Parliament [1966]  ECR  437 at 447; Case 68/63 Luhleich v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 581 at 605. See also Case 40/75 Société des Produits Bertrand SA v Commission [1976]  ECR  1; Case T-64/89 Automec Srl v Commission [1990]  ECR II-367, para 73; Case T-28/90 Asia Motor France SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-2285, paras 48–51, where the particulars given related to the period before the defendant could have been held liable, the Ismeri case (above, note 162), upheld in Case C-315/99P  Ismeri Europa v Court of Auditors [2001]  ECR  I-5281. In Case T-63/89 Latham v Commission [1991]  ECR II-19, para 43, an unparticularised claim for damages was simply dismissed. 186 See, for example, Cases 29, 31, 36, 39–47, 50, 51/63 Fonderies et Usines de la Providence v High Authority [1965]  ECR  911 at 934–935; Case 59/83 Biovilac NV  v Commission [1984]  ECR  4057, para  9 and at 4085 (Advocate General Slynn); Cases 279, 280, 285 and 286/84 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v Commission [1987]  ECR  1069 at 1095 (Advocate General Lenz); Grifoni (above, note 118) at 1057–1058 (Advocate General Tesauro). 187 Automec Srl v Commission (above, note 185), paras 75–76; Case T-37/89 Hanning v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-463, para 82. 188 Case 253/86 Sociedade Agro-Pecuaria Vicente Nobra Lda v Council [1988] ECR 2725, para 18 and page 2736 per Advocate General Mischo. 189 Biovilac v Commission (above, note 186), para  9; Case 147/83 Binderer v Commission [1985] ECR 257, para 19.

777

9.45  Pleading

place or may not take place, the claim must be dismissed.190 The claim may also be rejected if the applicant fails to provide particulars of the loss when asked by the Court to do so.191 It has been suggested that the applicant cannot increase the amount claimed beyond the amount specified in the application192 but it would seem that that may be so only in cases where there is no excuse for the failure to indicate the correct amount in the application and not in cases where the applicant is going no further than being more precise than he could have been at an earlier stage in the proceedings.193 In other cases the Court has been asked to give an interlocutory judgment deciding the question of the defendant’s liability, the question of the amount recoverable being settled in the light of this decision.194 When that happens, the applicant must still give sufficient particulars to enable the opposing party to defend itself and the Court to rule on the dispute but they need not be as detailed concerning the damage alleged to have been suffered as they would otherwise have to be:195 the scope of the claim may not, however, be extended after interim judgment on liability has been delivered.196 An action for the declaratory judgment on the issue of liability in which the loss is not adequately particularised or in which the claim is for a nominal sum by way of damages is therefore inadmissible.197 Where a claim is made for damages to be fixed ex aequo et bono, generally in cases of non-material loss such as damage to reputation, the Court fixes the amount due at its own discretion198 but the exact nature of the non-material loss must still be identified.199 A claim for compensatory interest must be pleaded specifically and proved by evidence of loss caused by the delay in payment but a claim for default interest is implicit in any claim for damages and does not require any prior request for payment or proof of damage.200 Where the defendant is or is alleged to be liable to several persons jointly, a failure to specify in the application how the damages are to be apportioned between the applicants does not affect the admissibility of the application.201 190 Case 257/83 Williams v Court of Auditors [1984] ECR 3547, para 28; the Binderer case (above, note 189), paras 20–21. 191 Case 253/84 Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun (GAEC) de la Ségaude v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 123, paras 12–13. 192 Grifoni (above, note 118) at 1057–1058 (Advocate General Tesauro). 193 Case 224/87 Koutchoumoff v Commission [1989]  ECR  99, para  11 and at 112 (Advocate General Tesauro). 194 See, for example, Case 74/74  CNTA  v Commission [1975]  ECR  533; Cases 56–60/74 Kurt Kampffmeyer Mühlenvereinigung KG  v Commission and Council [1976]  ECR  7211; Case 44/76 Milch- Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Council and Commission [1977] ECR 393; Case 90/78 Granaria BV v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1081. 195 Ibid; Case C-87/89 Société Nationale Interprofessionelle de la Tomate v Commission [1990] ECR I-1981 at 2002 (Advocate General Lenz). 196 Cases 532, 534, 567, 600, 618, 660/79 and 543/79 Amesz v Commission [1985] ECR 55, para 9; Case 131/81 Berti v Commission [1985] ECR 645, paras 16–18. 197 Case C-119/88 Aerpo v Commission [1990] ECR I-2189 at 2205 (Advocate General Jacobs). 198 Eg Case 18/78 Mrs V  v Commission [1979]  ECR  2093, para  19, where the Court held that symbolic damages would be enough and ordered payment of a sum corresponding to one ‘European Monetary Unit’. 199 Case 346/87 Bossi v Commission [1989] ECR 303, para 37. 200 Case 158/79 Roumengous (née Carpentier) v Commission [1985] ECR 39, para 14 and at 41– 42 (Advocate General Mancini). 201 Case 267/82 Développement SA and Clemessy v Commission [1986] ECR 1907, para 19.

778

Pleading 9.46

9.46 In the particular cases of actions brought by the Commission against a member state alleging a failure by the latter to comply with its obligations under the Treaties and staff cases, the scope of the action is determined by the application but the claims made in the application must have been raised against the defendant in the pre-litigation stage of the procedure.202 The application need not be a perfect copy of the claims raised beforehand203 and it is sufficient if a claim was raised implicitly in the course of the pre-litigation procedure.204 On the other hand, a failure to include in sufficient detail in the application a point elaborated in the pre-litigation procedure may be fatal.205 In actions brought by the Commission against a member state, a change in the law that takes place after the commencement of proceedings (other than one that makes no material difference to the original matters of complaint) cannot be relied on against the defendant.206

202 Case T-134/89 Hettrich v Commission [1990]  ECR II-565, paras 11–19; Case C-157/91 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR I-5899, para 17. Cf Case T-110/97 Kneissl Dachstein Sportartikel AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-2881, paras 101–104. In the Kneissl case, the GC distinguished the situation regarding pre-litigation procedures from that regarding an administrative investigation leading to the making of a decision. In the former situation, there is a general restriction on the introduction of new arguments after the end of the pre-litigation procedure. In the latter situation, the question whether or not a point of fact not made during the investigation may be raised in a subsequent action for annulment depends upon the precise nature of the investigation and the rights of the applicant. There is no restriction on the raising of new points of law. State aid investigations – which were at issue in Kneissl – are atypical in that regard, in relation to matters of fact, due to the peculiar procedural position of private parties in the investigation. Further, in cases in which the challenged decision is based on a judgmental evaluation of the facts, the evaluation may be attacked only on the basis of the facts known by the decision-maker at the time when the decision was made. Properly understood, that means that the evaluation is challengeable by reference to the facts existing at the time when the evaluation is made, as opposed to by reference to facts that come into existence afterwards (and that may show, retrospectively, that the evaluation was flawed), because it is settled law that a judgmental evaluation may be challenged if the decision-maker based the evaluation on an error of fact (including a failure to take into account a material existing fact): eg Case C-73/11P Frucona v Commission, 24 January 2013, paras 73–76. Some GC formulations do not make the position clear: eg Case T-68/03 Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE v Commission [2007]  ECR II-2911, paras 72–73. In order to get over the difficulty, any attempt to raise a new factual argument in the action challenging the decision must be characterised (or be characterisable) as a point of law or as arising from a fact known before the challenged decision was made: eg Olympiaki (ibid), paras 76 and 246; Case T-442/03 Sociedade Independente de Comunicacao v Commission [2008] ECR II-1161, para 141. 203 Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece (above, note 167) at 4768–4769 (Advocate General Tesauro); Case C-105/91 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-5871, para 13, where the national legislation had changed in the meantime but the system complained of had remained the same. 204 Case T-18/90 Jongen v Commission [1991] ECR II-187, para 22. The Court is more likely to be indulgent to the applicant in a staff case than to the Commission in an action against a member state. 205 Hettrich v Commission (above, note 202), para 16; Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece (above, note 167), paras 28–30 and at 4766 (Advocate General Tesauro); Case C-110/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-2659, para 6 and at 2676 (Advocate General Lenz), a point raised only at the hearing. 206 Cases 194 and 241/85 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1037 at 1045 (Advocate General Cruz Vilaça).

779

9.47  Pleading

9.47 One peculiarity of the pleading rules is that a party’s submissions must be discernible from a reading of the pleading itself and not any document annexed to it, annexes serving (it is said) an evidential and ‘instrumental’ purpose only.207 Originally, there was no issue about the development of a submission in an annex to the pleading, which often seemed a desirable course to take where the inclusion of detailed argument in the body of the pleading might unbalance the shape of the action (the relative importance of the grounds on which an action is based is not always indicated by the length and detail required in order to set out each ground). At some point in time, the Court took against that (well-established) practice. The reasons seem to have been essentially resource-driven: the increasing number of cases coming before the Court, very often cases involving lengthy pleadings as a result of the length and detail of the (mainly) Commission decisions under challenge, was placing serious strains on the Court’s translators. In particular, once the Court had embarked on the exercise of imposing limits on the length of pleadings, it was inevitably faced with the problem that such limits could be circumvented if grounds and arguments were developed in an annex to the pleading. The Court therefore decided that annexes should serve only an evidential purpose. However, it could not bring itself to forbid entirely the well-established practice of using an annex to develop an argument set out in the pleading. Accordingly, what has emerged is a compromise position in which grounds and the arguments in their support must be set out in the pleading itself; but an annex may be used to develop the point further, as long as the contents of the annex are sufficiently keyed in to the contents of the pleading. What is not admissible is to set out the essential submissions supporting a particular ground in an annex (even if the alternative appears to be useless repetition).208 The result 207 Eg Television francaise 1 (above, note 161), para  29; Case T-127/04  KME  Germany AG  v Commission [2009]  ECR II-1167, paras 57–59; Case T-151/05 Nederlandse Vakbond Varkenshouders v Commission [2009] ECR II-1219, paras 60–63; Lucchini (above, note 40), paras 56–60 (and note also paras 66 and 69); Case C-286/13P Dole Food Co Inc v Commission, 19 March 2015, paras 50–51. ‘Instrumental’ appears to refer to the role of certain attachments to a pleading as evidencing such matters as the status of the signatory of the pleading. 208 Eg Case T-31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd v Commission [2002] ECR II-181, paras 112–114 (unfortunately, those passages have been deleted from the report of the case), upheld on appeal in Cases C-189/02P, C-202/02P, C-205/02P to C-208/02P and C-213/02P Dansk Rorindustri v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, paras 96–101 (the cases cited in para 96 are not authorities for the proposition for which they have been cited); Case T-127/02 Concept – Anlagen u. Gerate nach ‘GMP’ fur Produktion u. Labor GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004]  ECR II-1113, paras 17–21; Case T-316/03 Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2005] ECR II-1951, para 23; Honeywell (above, note 161), paras 56–57; Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava – Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2009]  ECR II-3029, paras 94–97 (in which an intervener had annexed copies of its statement in intervention in a group of previous cases, naively believing that that would save the GC time and resources because the GC would not have to duplicate their translation); MasterCard (above, note 118), paras 38–47 (upholding Case T-111/08 MasterCard Inc v Commission, 24  May 2012, paras 183–189; the case is an extremely dubious example of the rule because the annexes appear to have contained economic evidence). Compare: Cases T-217/03 and T-245/03 Federation nationale de la cooperation betail et viande (FNCBV) v Commission [2006] ECR II-4987, para 79 (admissible reliance upon an annex setting out a legal opinion – apparently Asea Brown Boveri and Dansk Rorindustri

780

Pleading 9.48

is that using an annex to develop an argument must be approached with caution because it is necessary to strike a careful balance between what is in the body of the application and what is in the annex (the Court cannot be expected to be sympathetic to the intentions of the draftsman). Further, a ‘general’ reference to an annex developing a point appears to be insufficient; it is still necessary to include at least a succinct resume of the content of the annex in the application.209 Unfortunately, what might otherwise have been regarded as a legitimate point of view (the objection to pleading a case in an obscure way so that it cannot be understood) is often expressed in the case law in language that creates the impression that the Court cannot be expected to read the documents before it which, if correct, would be a little strange, at least so far as concerns litigants and practising lawyers from member states in which it is customary for the judge hearing the case to acquaint himself with the contents of the file before him so that he can decide the case properly. In general terms, when drafting an application, the prudent approach is to assess the intelligibility of the arguments stated in the application on the assumption that the Court will not look at any other document unless, perhaps, it is purely evidential. 9.48 A  related problem is that of cross-references from one pleading to another (otherwise than in the situation where, in the same case, one party crossrefers to something said in the opposing party’s pleadings in order to answer it or cross-refers to an earlier pleading that he had lodged for the same or a related purpose).210 References to what has been said in other proceedings or in other documents are not sufficient to comply with the requirement to state the pleas relied on211 and, when both parties adopt that practice, it has been regarded by the were not followed); Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, paras 91–99, 202, 400 and 483 (permission given to rely on some arguments in the annexes but not others). 209 Eg Case T-333/99 X v European Central Bank [2001] ECR II-3021, paras 115–117 and 189– 191; Case T-231/99 Joynson v Commission [2002] ECR II-2085, paras 154–155; Case T-340/03 France Telecom SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-107, paras 30, 166–169, 204; Case T-151/01 Der Grune Punkt – Duales System Deutschland GmbH  v Commission [2007]  ECR II-1607, paras 74–81. In Dansk Rorindustri (above, note 208), para 101, the citation of passages in the offending annex in footnotes in the pleading was not regarded as sufficient. The case law is not consistent. 210 In Case 101/76 Koninklijke Scholten Honig NV v Council and Commission [1977] ECR 797, para 4, one co-defendant simply adopted the other’s submissions. That would now be regarded by the GC as questionable. 211 Société des Charbonnages de Beeringen v High Authority (above, note 146) at 325; Case C-43/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-1909, paras 7–8 and at 1924 (Advocate General Darmon); Case T-86/95 Compagnie Generale Maritime v Commission [2002]  ECR II-1011, paras 34–35; Case T-158/00 Arbeitsgemeinschaft der offentich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD) v Commission [2003]  ECR II-3825, para  97; Cases T-5/00 and T-6/00 Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied und Technische Unie BV  v Commission [2003]  ECR II-5761, paras 100–101; Cases T-350/04 to T-352/04 Bitburger Brauerei Th. Simon GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006]  ECR II-4225, paras 32–35. However, wholesale incorporation of another document in the body of the pleading may or may not be admissible either: compare De Hoe (above, notes 163 and 175) (insufficient) and Case T-154/98 Asia Motor France (above, note 162) (sufficient).

781

9.48  Pleading

Court as unacceptable because it makes it impossible to check the exact content and significance of the submissions and arguments put forward.212 Such references are, therefore, regarded as inadmissible213 save where: (1) the two cases are so closely connected that they are or will be joined;214 (2) the proceedings have been commenced after the completion of a mandatory pre-litigation procedure, in which case limited reference may be made to the pre-litigation exchanges in order to clarify the scope of the action and the arguments relied on in the application;215 and

212 Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission [1965]  ECR  533 at 546. One solution that has been adopted is to annex to the pleading a complete copy of the pleading to which the cross-reference relates. That then runs into the difficulty posed by the Court’s reluctance to look at annexes that contain submissions rather than evidence. On the other hand, that technique did not produce any objections in Case C-66/12 Council v Commission, 19 November 2013, para 20. 213 Ibid; but they do not bring about the inadmissibility of the entire application if it otherwise conforms to the Rules of Procedure (Case 4/69 Alfons Lütticke GmbH  v Commission [1971] ECR 325, para 2). 214 Société des Charbonnages de Beeringen v High Authority (above, note 146); Case 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 245 at 266 (Advocate General Lagrange); Forges de Thy-Marcinelle et Monceau SA (above, note 168), para 4. The basis for accepting cross-references to other pleadings when the pleadings are in joined cases is that, by reason of the joinder of the cases, the pleadings are, or are taken to be, part of a single case file: Cases T-141/99, T-142/99, T-150/99 and T-151/99 Vela Srl v Commission [2002]  ECR II-4547, para  87. The Court cannot refuse to take cognisance of matters in the case file (accordingly, facts asserted in one of the joined cases can be taken into account in relation to the other joined case) but it may ignore matters not contained in the case file (see Case T-459/07 Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Co Ltd v Council [2009] ECR II-4015, para 12). In Case 61/77 Commission v Ireland [1978] ECR 417, a direct action, the Court took account of certain arguments raised in parallel preliminary ruling proceedings ‘in order that all aspects of the dispute may be fully examined’ (para 21), even though the two cases were not joined. That is exceptional and is probably to be explained by the fact that direct actions are not joined to references for a preliminary ruling even where the proceedings are heard and decided at the same time. In Honeywell (above, note 161), paras 69–77, the GC decided not to join the cases in question, apparently because of a concern that doing so would permit one party to rely on a number of arguments raised by a party to the other case (to which it had cross-referred in its application). The judgment contains some observations on crossreferences in joined cases but no analysis of why it had been previously stated that crossreferences are permitted in joined cases. In Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava (above, note 208), para 98, the GC referred to the fact that joinder does not cause the joined cases to lose their autonomy, which is not to the point. 215 Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece (above, note 167) at 4767 (Advocate General Tesauro).

782

Pleading 9.50

(3) the Court permits such references to be made.216 9.49 Statements contained in the application which are disclaimed by the applicant are not regarded as forming part of the case made out by him.217 There is no provision for the amendment of the pleas and arguments set out in the application218 although corrections of typing errors and other slips are permitted.219 The only possibility of changing what has been said is by addition or concession in the reply or at the hearing. 9.50 The Court may take some pleas of its own motion and, when those are raised by the applicant, they must be considered even though they do not appear in the application.220 Such issues are those which ‘bring into question matters of such importance that the Court ‘would disregard the rule of law which it has the duty of seeing observed, if the decision which it gives does not take account thereof’.221 For the most part they appear in actions for annulment and include

216 Case T-82/89 Marcato v Commission [1990]  ECR II-735, paras 22–24; Case T-37/91  ICI  v Commission [1995] ECR II-1901, paras 45–48 (regard must be had to the specific features of the case and a cross-reference may be permitted where there is a close link between the cases in terms of the parties involved and the subject-matter); Honeywell (above, note 161), paras 58–68 (in which the GC distinguished between a cross-reference made by a party to its own pleadings in another case and a cross-reference to someone else’s pleadings); Case T-351/03 Schneider Electric (above, note 162), paras 95–96. Case T-256/04 Mundipharma AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2007] ECR II-449, paras 13–15 may be read as implying that the problem lies with a general and non-specific reference and that, if the cross-reference is specific, it may be admissible. In Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava (above, note 208), para 99, the GC suggested that it was an essential condition for permitting a cross-reference that the parties were identical. 217 Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority [1965] ECR 677 at 696. 218 Cf the Sinara case (above, note 161), para  107 (rejection of late attempt to ‘reinterpret’ application). But see Milch- Fett- und Eier-Kontor GmbH v Council and Commission (above, note 114) at 421 (Advocate General Reischl). 219 Eg Travelex (above, note 162), paras 44–52 (correction of erroneous reference in the application to annex 3 instead of annex 21); Case T-316/07 Commercy AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-43, para 32 (correction made orally at the hearing). The determining criterion alluded to in para 49 is whether or not the amendment is a ‘material’ amendment (which appears to mean an amendment of substance). 220 Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council [1991]  ECR  I-4529 at 4544–4545 (Advocate General van Gerven); Cases T-45/98 and T-47/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless v Commission [2001] ECR II-3757, paras 124–126. 221 Case 36/72 Meganck v Commission [1973] ECR 527 at 539 (Advocate General Mayras, quoting from Odent, Cours de Contentieux Administratif, a textbook on French administrative law); Case C-272/12P Commission v Ireland, 10 December 2013, paras 27–36. In Cases 209–215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck Sarl v Commission [1980] ECR 3125 at 3302, Advocate General Reischl said that the Court could raise of its own motion ‘particularly important issues’. In Case 14/61 Hoogovens (above, note 69), pp 273–274, it is not clear why the Court took one point of its own motion. For an example of a point that was not considered something that the Court need take of its own motion see: Case T-18/03 CD-Contact Data GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR II-1021, para 130.

783

9.51  Pleading

the following: infringement of an essential procedural requirement;222 lack of reasoning in a decision;223 lack of competence.224 9.51 Although RP-ECJ, art 129, RP-GC, art 76 and RP-CST, art 50(1) mention the nature of any evidence founded upon by the applicant as a constituent part of the application, after the form of order, there is no requirement that the application should end with a list of the evidence relied on, distinct from the list of documents referred to in the application, which is annexed to it. It seems to be better practice to set out the nature of any relevant evidence after each assertion of fact made in the body of the application; although some pleaders place immediately before the form of order a distinct section of the application devoted to evidence which indicates the nature and source of the evidence relied on in support of the assertions of fact made earlier in the application.225 The case law shows what are the minimum requirements for complying with the Statutes and the Rules of Procedure. It is obviously better practice to seek to do more than just the minimum. 4 Form of order 9.52 The inclusion of a form of order in the application is an essential condition of its admissibility226 and omission of the form of order cannot be cured 222 Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority [1954–56]  ECR  37 at 52; Case 6/54 Netherlands v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 103 at 112; Case 20/59 Italy v High Authority [1960] ECR 325 at 347 (Advocate General Roemer); Case C-291/89 Interhotel v Commission [1991] ECR I-2257. But not all procedural defects (see Case 101/79 Vecchioli v Commission [1980] ECR 3069, para 19 and at 3099 (Advocate General Warner)). 223 Case 18/57 Nold KG v High Authority [1959] ECR 41 at 52; Case 4/73 Nold KG v Commission [1974] ECR 491 at 512 (Advocate General Trabucchi); Hanning v European Parliament (above, note 187), para 38; Case T-115/89 Gonzalez Holguera v European Parliament [1990] ECR I-831, para  37; Case T-45/90 Speybrouck v European Parliament [1992]  ECR II-33, para  89; Case T-11/91 Schloh v Council [1990] ECR II-203, para 83; Case T-61/89 Dansk Pelsdryavlerforening v Commission [1992]  ECR II-1931; Case T-65/89  BPB  Industries plc and British Gypsum Limited v Commission [1993] ECR II-389, para 98; Cases T-45/98 and T-47/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless (above, note 220), para 125 (absence or inadequacy of reasons); Case T-48/11 British Airways plc v Commission, 16 December 2015, para 29 (deficiency in the statement of reasons). 224 Case 19/58 Germany v High Authority [1960] ECR 225 at 233; Meganck v Commission (above, note 221) at 540 (Advocate General Mayras); Case 110/81 Roquette Frères SA  v Council [1982] ECR 3159, para 34; Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, para 61 (on appeal, Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council [2008] ECR I-6351). 225 For example, where one of the grounds relied on in a claim for annulment is misuse of powers, the allegation should be particularised by reference to specific facts. In respect of each fact alleged, the means of proving it should be set out, eg ‘The applicant relies on the documents annexed hereto and on the testimony of A  B  of [address and occupation]’. In the case of witnesses, it should be explained why a particular person is competent to give evidence. There is no reason that the content of the evidence should not be annexed to the pleading in the form of a statement or declaration under oath (this has been done in some cases) but there may be tactical reasons why a party would not wish to do so. 226 Cf Case 55/64 Lens v European Court of Justice [1965] ECR 837 at 840; Case 110/63A Willame v Euratom Commission [1966]  ECR  287 at 291; Case 17/68 Reinarz v Commission [1969] ECR 61, para 47; Case 48/70 Bernardi v European Parliament [1971] ECR 175 at 189 (Advocate General Roemer).

784

Pleading 9.53

by subsequent amendment.227 The form of order defines the relief sought by the applicant (not the pleas relied on)228 and is usually expressed as setting out the order which the applicant wishes the Court to make. The terms of the form of order are usually determined by the form of action selected by the applicant and its subject-matter: in an action for annulment, for example, the relief sought is limited to, first, the annulment of, secondly, the contested measure, not some other form of relief (such as damages) in relation to some other measure.229 In actions for damages, the relief sought may go beyond pecuniary compensation where (for example) injunctive relief would alone be capable of remedying the consequences of the unlawful act rendering the defendant liable.230 In that event, the relief sought must be pleaded in precise terms. 9.53 The relief sought should be set out unequivocally and precisely for two reasons: (i) if it is ambiguous or obscure the Court may be led to give judgment ultra petita (which it is not entitled to do) or to fail to give judgment on one of the heads of claim; and (ii) the defendant must be in a position to know exactly the case which he must answer.231 The fact that the form of order is unclear does not lead inevitably to the inadmissibility of the application: the form of order should be construed in the light of the application as a whole, and the statements of the pleas relied on in particular;232 in general terms, how the claims made are expressed does not affect their admissibility as long as what is claimed is dis 227 Bernardi v European Parliament (above, note 226). 228 Invoking the invalidity of a regulation in support of a claim for the annulment of a decision is a plea and therefore does not need to figure in the form of order: Case C-188/88  NMB (Deutschland) GmbH v Commission [1992] ECR 1689, para 25. 229 Cf Case C-178/00 Italy v Commission [2003]  ECR  I-303, paras 50–54 (claim unrelated to measure contested in the action). 230 Galileo International (above, note 163), paras 60–73. 231 See Cases 46 and 47/59 Meroni & Co v High Authority [1962]  ECR  411 at 419. On the prohibition on deciding ultra petita, see for example: Case T-48/11 British Airways (above, note 223), para 88. 232 Case 33/59 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority [1962] ECR 381 at 393 (Advocate General Lagrange); Meroni & Co v High Authority (above, note 231) at 419– 420. See also Cases 25 and 26/65 SIMET and FERAM v High Authority [1967] ECR 33; Case 2/68 Ufficio Imposte diConsumo di Ispra v Commission [1968] ECR 435 at 437–438 and at 449 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens BV v Commission [1987] ECR 1155, para 46 (in that case, a claim for relief in the form of order was construed in the light of the arguments advanced in support of it for the purpose of identifying the legal basis for the claim and its legal nature); Case 419/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2115, para 8; Case 307/85 Gavanas v Economic and Social Committee and Council [1987]  ECR  2435, para 12; Case 190/84 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1988] ECR 1017 at 1029 (Advocate General Mancini), where the application identified the acts whose annulment was sought by reference to their subject matter for want of more precise information concerning them, without interfering with the defendant’s ability to marshal its defence; Bossi v Commission (above, note 180), paras 15–18, where the act whose annulment was sought was identified by drawing inferences from the body of the application; Case T-119/89 Teissonière v Commission [1990] ECR II-7, para 20; BPB Industries v Commission (above, note 223), para 162; Holcim (above, note 161), paras 41–46 (refusal to construe an action for damages as one for annulment); Case T-15/11 Sina Bank v Council, 11 December 2012, paras 29–39. For an instance in which the interpretation of the form of order was not justified, see Case C-78/03P  Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum eV [2005] ECR I-10737, paras 44–49.

785

9.54  Pleading

cernible.233 Where necessary, the Court may ask the applicant to clarify the order sought.234 A mistake made by the applicant when formulating the form of order goes to the substance of the case, not the admissibility of the action (although it cannot be excluded that the discordance between the form of order and the pleas invoked in its support may be so great as to render it pointless to rule on the substance of the case).235 9.54 The applicant is entitled only to the relief claimed expressly or by implication in the form of order contained in the application.236 There is no general provision for amendment of the form of order and while, in some cases, the Court has not excluded entirely the possibility of amendment,237 the furthest it 233 Case 135/87 Vlachou v Court of Auditors [1988] ECR 2901 at 2908 (Advocate General Lenz); Case C-388/93 PIA HiFi Vertriebs GmbH v Commission [1994] ECR I-387, paras 8–11; Case T-7/99 Medici Grimm KG  v Council [2000]  ECR II-2671, paras 33–36. In Case C-343/08 Commission v Czech Republic [2010]  ECR  I-275, paras 26–27, the use of the phrase ‘in particular’ in the form of order was criticised: only the matters that had been particularised could be regarded as forming part of the claim. If the contested act is unclear, that may excuse a lack of clarity in the applicant’s form of order: Case 214/83 Germany v Commission [1985] ECR 3053 at 3069 (Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat). 234 Eg Meroni & Co v High Authority (above, note 231); Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045 at 1053. 235 Case C-217/91 Spain v Commission [1993]  ECR  I-3923 (Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann, para 7). The Court took a different view: see paras 12–17. 236 See Case 8/56  ALMA  v High Authority [1957–58]  ECR  95 at 100 (the Court there had unlimited jurisdiction); Case 44/59 Fiddelaar v Commission [1960]  ECR  535 at 542; Case 33/59 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority (above, note 232) at 388; Case 17/68 Reinarz v Commission (above, note 226), para 47; Cases 173/82, 157/83 and 186/84 Castille v Commission [1986] ECR 497 at 502 (Advocate General Lenz); Case 191/84 Barcella v Commission [1986] ECR 1541 (paras 5–6 and at 1543 per Advocate General Darmon); Case 7/86 Vincent v European Parliament [1987] ECR 2473 (at 2486 per Advocate General Cruz Vilaça); Case 278/85 Commission v Denmark [1987] ECR 4069, para 37; Case C-217/91 Spain v Commission (above, note 235), paras 12–17; Case T-6 and T-52/92 Reinarz v Commission [1993] ECR II-1047, para 38; Case T-65/89 BPB Industries plc v Commission [1993] ECR II389, para 162; Case T-65/91 White v Commission [1994] ECR-SC I-A 9, II 23, para 83; Case T-24/00 The Sunrider Corporation Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2001]  ECR II-449, paras 12–13; Case T-276/07 Martin v Parliament [2010] ECR II-277*, para 65. 237 Eg Case 33/59 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority (above, note 232) at 388; Meroni & Co v High Authority (above, note 231) at 420 (those are the passages cited in Case T-48/11 British Airways, above, note 223, para 90). The reference to an amendment being effected formally and subject to strict requirements regarding is precision and content implies that, without prejudice to the general problem of the admissibility of such an amendment, it should be done in writing (as opposed to on the hoof at the hearing), setting out the amended form of order and explaining the reasons justifying the amendment. In Case T-236/07 Germany v Commission [2010] ECR II-5253, paras 27–28, the GC suggested that the form of order could be modified by reference to matters of fact or law coming to light during the written procedure, in the same way in which a new plea may be raised (see further below). The suggestion was repeated in Case T-48/11 British Airways (above, note 223), para 90. It is not clear how far that can be taken beyond the scope of the exceptions referred to below because the GC has also held that the ability to introduce a new plea does not enable an applicant to introduce a new claim: eg Case T-3/99 Banatrading GmbH v Council [2001] ECR II-2123, para 28; Case T-246/09 Insula v Commission, 13 June 2012, paras 100–104; Case T-48/11 British Airways (above, note 223), para 91.

786

Pleading 9.54

has gone is to allow a change in the wording, but not the subject matter, of the order sought.238 For example, in Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission239 the applicant originally claimed a declaration that the defendant was liable to compensate him for future damage arising from a wrongful act. In the reply this was converted into a claim for a specified sum by way of damages. The Court held this to be a ‘permissible amplification’ of the claim made in the application: as Advocate General Roemer pointed out,240 the amendment simply quantified the damage claimed. In the same way, in Case C-243/89 Commission v Denmark,241 the Court stated that the form of order may be expressed in more precise terms in a later pleading in order to take account of information coming to light in the course of the proceedings. In such cases the amplification or particularisation of the form of order is not an extension of its true scope. The only exceptions to the rule that the Court cannot grant relief other than that claimed in the application are: (1) Where a mandatory ground has been raised which would entrain the annulment of a contested measure in its entirety but the applicant has sought only its partial annulment.242 (2) Where the Court has unlimited jurisdiction.243 (3) Where, after the commencement of proceedings for annulment, the act challenged is amended or replaced by another measure which is identical in nature and subject matter to the act first challenged, in which case the applicant may amend the form of order in a subsequent pleading or (if the second act was adopted after the close of the written procedure) at the hear 238 See, for example, Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR 2729, para 3; Case 124/81 Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 203, para 6; Case T-41/89 Schwedler v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-79, para 34. In Case T-291/03 Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gran Padano v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2007]  ECR II-3081, paras 20–23, the defendant’s form of order was ‘amended’ by the GC because, due to a procedural misunderstanding, the defendant thought that it could not formally support the applicant’s form of order although that is what its defence sought to do. A new claim raised subsequently to the application cannot be saved by severing it and treating it as a separate action: Case T-22/92 Weissenfels v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-1095, paras 27–29. 239 [1963] ECR 95 at 108. 240 At 118. 241 [1993] ECR I-3353, para 20. 242 Case 37/71 Jamet v Commission [1972] ECR 483, para 12. 243 Fiddelaar v Commission (above, note 236) at 542–543; Case 23/69 Fiehn v Commission [1970]  ECR  547, para  17; Case 24/79 Oberthür v Commission [1980]  ECR  1743, para  14; M  v European Medicines Agency (above, note 153), para  56. See also ALMA  v High Authority (above, note 236) at 100 and Cases 27 and 39/59 Campolongo v High Authority [1960]  ECR  391 at 415 (Advocate General Roemer). Contra, see Case 267/85 Luttgens v Commission [1986] ECR 3417, para 6, inadmissibility of a claim for compensation introduced during the oral procedure. Even where the Court has unlimited jurisdiction, it cannot order the defendant to take measures to comply with the judgment: Case T-156/89 Mordt v Court of Justice [1991] ECR II-407, para 150. Reliance on the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction must nonetheless be pleaded and the basis for exercising it identified: eg Cases C-239/11P, C-489/11P and C-498/11P  Siemens (above, note 153), paras 332–340. It is the precise outcome of the Court’s exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction that does not have to be identified in the form of order.

787

9.54  Pleading

ing but must do so expressly.244 RP-GC, art 86 specifies that the amendment to the form of order must be made by separate document (a statement of modification) lodged within the time limit for applying for the annulment of the replacing measure and before the closure of the oral procedure or, as the case may be, before the GC decision to rule without there being an oral part to the procedure. The statement of modification must set out the modified form of order sought, the modified pleas in law and arguments (if necessary) and any relevant evidence. The measure causing the modification of the form of order must be attached to the statement of modification.245 (4) Where the applicant brought an action in respect of the defendant’s failure to act and, in the course of the proceedings, the defendant adopted a chal-

244 Case 14/81 Alpha Steel Ltd v Commission [1982] ECR 749, para 8, and the cases cited in Ch 2, para 2.161; Case 48/86R J Cauet and B Joliet v Commission [1986] ECR 1237, para 4; Automec Srl v Commission (above, note 180), paras 67–68; Case T-318/01 Othman v Council and Commission [2009] ECR II-1627, paras 52–58; Cases T-439/10 and T-440/10 Fulmen v Council, 21 March 2012, para 37; Case T-496/10 Bank Mellat v Council, 29 January 2013, para 32; Case T-494/10 Bank Saderat Iran v Council, 5 February 2013, para 30; Case T-492/10 Melli Bank v Council, 20 February 2013, para 42. The ability to amend the form of order depends upon the action, as originally configured, being admissible: Case T-176/09 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2011] ECR II-150*, paras 46–51; Case T-176/09 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2011] ECR II-150*, paras 46–48; Case T-120/12 Shahid Beheshti University v Council, 20 November 2012, para 57; Case T-203/12 Alchaar v Council, 3 July 2014, paras 46 and 62–70; Case T-407/13 Al Assad v Council, 22 December 2014, para 72. The evidence relied on may be modified to take account of the matters on which the replacement measure is based: Case T-563/11 Anbouba v Council, 13 September 2013, paras 50–53 (unaffected by the appeal in Case C-605/13 P Anbouba v Council, 21 April 2015); Case T-592/11 Anbouba v Council, 13  September 2013, paras 59–62 (unaffected by the appeal in Case C-630/13  P  Anbouba v Council, 21 April 2015). The ability to alter the form of order in such circumstances does not enable the applicant to refashion the scope of the action in other respects: Case T-420/05 Vischim Srl v Commission [2009] ECR II-3841, paras 53–55 and 258–259. 245 On the start date of the period within which the statement of modification must be lodged, see: Cases T-35/10 and T-7/11 Bank Melli Iran v Council, 6 September 2013, para 57; Case T-110/12 Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, 6 September 2013, para 21; Case T-8/11 Bank Kargoshaei v Council, 16 September 2013, paras 38 and 40–42; Case T-66/12 Sedqhi v Council, 4 June 2014, paras 29–31; Case T-572/11 Hassan v Council, 16 July 2014, paras 31–33 and 37–38; Cases T-420/11 and T-56/12 Ocean Capital Administration v Council, 22 January 2015, paras 36–37. It seems that the amendment may be made after the expiry of the time limit for challenging the replacing measure where that measure is a duplicate of the earlier, differing from it only in terms of its temporal application: see Case T-348/07 Al-Aqsa v Council [2010] ECR II-4575, paras 32–35 and 44; Case T-53/12 CF Sharp Shipping Agencies v Council, 26  October 2012, paras 25–26 and 28–29; Case T-421/11 Qualitest v Council, 5  December 2012, paras 22–27; Case T-119/11 Gbagbo v Council, 25 April 2013, paras 40–43. Where an act that cannot be challenged is replaced by one that can, such an amendment is not possible because the subject matter of the action would then be changed: Automec (above, note 180), para 69. In staff cases, the position is covered by RP-GC, art 86(3), as amended, which requires the modification of the application to be made by separate document lodged within the time limit set by art 91(3) of the Staff Regulations for applying for the annulment of the measure justifying the modification of the application. It is doubtful if RP-GC, art 86(3) is intended to bear a different meaning to RP-GC 86(2), mutatis mutandis. On that basis, cases like Al-Aqsa would apply in staff cases.

788

Pleading 9.55

lengeable act to the same effect as the deemed refusal decision inferred from the failure to act.246 (5) In interim relief cases, where there is a change of circumstances requiring a corresponding change in the relief sought and the ability of the opposing party to defend itself is not affected.247 (6) Where the applicant concedes a head of claim in whole or in part.248 Subject to the exceptions referred to above, the Court is precluded only from awarding relief that goes outside the scope of that claimed in the application; it is not precluded from granting less than the relief claimed in circumstances where the Court concludes that the applicant’s claim is founded, but not to the extent claimed in the form of order in the application.249 9.55 A number of claims may be joined in the form of order, whether made cumulatively or alternatively, even if they are different in nature, such as a claim for annulment and one for damages.250 There is no requirement that different claims be expressed in some order of priority but an ordering of the claims made into primary, secondary and, where appropriate, other claims is consistent with the Rules of Procedure.251 Where the claims made are inconsistent, they should be expressed as alternative claims. If that is not done expressly in the application, the Court will construe them as being alternative claims, in which case the applicant will be precluded from seeking as a subsidiary form of relief a claim that is wider than the claim regarded by the Court as being the primary claim made.252 A claim for default interest is usually implicit in any claim for damages 246 Case 103/85 Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG  v Commission [1988]  ECR  4131, paras 11–12. The position is different where the deemed refusal is not replicated by the later decision actually made: eg Case T-28/90 Asia Motor France SA v Commission (above, note 185), paras 37 and 43. In that event, the action for failure to act has been rendered redundant. 247 Cases 82 and 83/85R Eurasian Corpn Ltd v Commission [1985] ECR 1191, paras 15–16. In Case C-280/93R Germany v Council [1993] ECR I-3667, paras 15–16, the changes in the relief sought do not seem to have reflected a change in circumstances but were simply alternative claims whose admissibility was to be assessed by reference to the scope of the relief originally sought. 248 Case 11/63 Lepape v High Authority [1964]  ECR  61 at 69; Cases 18 and 19/64 Alvino and Benoit v Commission [1965] ECR 789; Case 214/83 Germany v Commission (above, note 233), para 19; Case 293/85R Commission v Belgium [1985] ECR 3521, para 4. A concession can only be deduced from an express statement or unambiguous conduct: Case 1/74 Giry v Commission [1974]  ECR  1269 at 1282 (Advocate General Trabucchi, citing the maxim ‘nemo res suas iactare praesumitur’). 249 Cf Case T-143/06 MTZ Polyfilms Ltd v Council [2009] ECR II-4133, paras 24–28 (claim for annulment treated as being for partial annulment of the contested measure). 250 Cases 7 and 9/54 Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority [1954–56]  ECR  175 at 189 and at 206 (Advocate General Roemer) (a claim for annulment and a claim for a declaration); Cases 7/56 and 3–7/57 Algera v Common Assembly [1957– 58] ECR 39 at 64; Plaumann & Co v Commission (above, note 158) at 118–119 (Advocate General Roemer) (claims for annulment and for damages). 251 Case 214/83 Germany v Commission (above, note 233), para 20 and at 3069–3070 (Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat): the Court is not obliged to consider alternative or subsidiary claims unless it dismisses the principal claims made. 252 Vlachou v Court of Auditors (above, note 233), paras 2–3 and at 2908 (Advocate General Lenz).

789

9.56  Pleading

but a claim for compensatory interest is a distinct claim which must be pleaded specifically.253 A  claim for costs should always be made unless the applicant does not wish to recover costs if he should be successful.254 A claim for ‘further or other relief’ should normally be made only in cases where the Court has unlimited jurisdiction. Where claims are joined improperly, the application is not inadmissible for that reason alone: the proper course is to disjoin the claims.255 Claims may be improperly joined where there is no (factual) connection between them256 or where they comprise distinct actions which are governed by different procedural rules.257 A claim made in the form of order which is outside the Court’s powers to order is inadmissible258 but may be construed as an argument in support of any admissible claims.259 5 Attachments 9.56

To the application should be annexed the following:

(1) A certificate showing that the lawyer acting for the applicant is entitled to practise before a court of a member state.260 RP-ECJ, art 119 and 122 say that it is the lawyer himself who must lodge the certificate (not the applicant) and do not expressly provide that it must accompany the application (RP 253 Roumengous v Commission (above, note 200) at 41–42 (Advocate General Mancini). Claims for compensatory interest were dismissed because they were not made in the application in that case (para 14 of the judgment) and in a number of other cases, including Amesz v Commission (above, note 196), para  17; Case 737/79 Battaglia v Commission [1985]  ECR  71, para  13; Berti v Commission (above, note 196), paras 16–18; Case C-320/81 Acerbis v Commission [1990] ECR I-563, para 23. 254 Cases 92 and 93/87 Commission v France [1989]  ECR  405 at 436 (Advocate General van Gerven). By failing to claim costs in the application (or, so far as the defendant is concerned, in the defence), a party risks losing the right to claim them entirely: Case 298/83  CICCE  v Commission [1985] ECR 1105, para 32. 255 Cf Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority (above, note 250) at 206 (Advocate General Roemer); for examples of disjoinder, see Case 567/79A Flamm v Commission and Council [1981] ECR 2383 and Case 618/79A Knoeppel v Commission and Council [1981] ECR 2387. 256 Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgeoises v High Authority (above, note 250). 257 Case 40/71 Richez-Parise v Commission [1972]  ECR  73, paras 2–3. The applicant sought annulment of an act and the revision of a judgment. The Court found it possible to adjudicate on both claims in one judgment because the latter was made in the alternative and, in substance, sought a similar result to the former. 258 Fiddelaar v Commission (above, note 236) at 542; Mordt v Court of Justice (above, note 243), para 140. 259 Case 150/84 Bernardi v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1375, para 24. 260 RP-ECJ, art 119(3); RP-GC, art 51(2) and 78(5); RP-CST, art 31(2) and 50(5). The meaning of entitlement to practise before a court of a member state is discussed in Ch 4, paras 4.29–4.32. It is understood that the Court will accept a professional identity card issued in the form agreed by the CCBE, at least if it has been issued or validated within the previous year. PD-GC, para 129 states that reference may be made to a document previously lodged at the Registry of the GC. Hence, if the lawyer in question has produced the certificate in a previous GC case, he need not repeat the exercise in a subsequent case. However, unless the Registrar decides otherwise, the certificate must not have been lodged at the GC Registry too far in the past.

790

Pleading 9.56

GC, art 78(5) and RP-CST, art 50(5) do provide that the certificate must be attached to the application). It is to be inferred from RP-ECJ, art 119(4), however, that the certificate must be annexed to the application because, if it is not, the Registrar must prescribe a reasonable period within which the applicant is to produce it; if he fails to do so, the Court may reject the pleading (here, the application) as being formally inadmissible.261 Under RP-GC, art 51(4) and RP-CST, art 50(6), the obligation to rectify a failure to produce the certificate also falls on the applicant and the consequence of a failure to do so within the time limit prescribed by the Registrar is also the formal inadmissibility of the application. Strictly speaking, a failure to produce the certificate is capable of rendering the application inadmissible but does not necessarily do so.262 The certificate is essential for determining whether or not the requirements that a party be represented by, and that the pleadings lodged on his behalf have been signed by, a lawyer entitled to practise before the courts of a member state have been properly complied with.263 There are no rules defining what may constitute a certificate. It is, nonetheless, quite clear that it must be a document which shows that the lawyer fulfils the requirement in the Rules of Procedure for acting on behalf of a party in proceedings before the Court and that it must be issued by a national authority competent to do so. (2) In actions for annulment or against a failure to act, the measure whose annulment is sought or documentary evidence of the date on which the defendant institution was requested to act.264 The object of that is to identify clearly the subject matter of the action and a failure to comply with that requirement may lead to the inadmissibility of the application.265 In the nature of things, that requirement can be satisfied only if the applicant is in possession of a true copy of the measure whose annulment is sought or of the evidence required. In actions in respect of a failure to act, the applicant can be expected to have evidence of the request to act but, in actions for annulment, it occasionally happens that the applicant knows or believes that a challengeable act has been made, or purportedly made, but does not possess a true copy of it.266 In such circumstances, the applicant may ask 261 Eg Case T-101/92 Stagakis v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-63. 262 RP-ECJ, art  119(4), RP-GC, art  51(4) and 78(6) and RP-CST, art  50(5) all provide that the Court must decide ‘whether’ failure to produce the certificate renders the application formally inadmissible, not ‘that’ it is formally inadmissible (if the failure led inevitably to the inadmissibility of the application, there would be no need for the matter to be the subject of a decision of the Court). 263 In consequence, where a party is entitled to be, and is, represented by an agent who has signed the pleadings, a failure to produce a certificate for the lawyer assisting the agent is not a procedural irregularity: Case T-47/92 Lenz v Commission [1992] ECR II-2523, para 35. 264 Statute, art 21, 2nd para; RP-ECJ, art 122(1); RP-GC, art 78(1). RP-GC, art 78(2), as amended (which applies as from 1 September 2016), and RP-CST, art 50(2) refer to the pre-litigation documents relevant in a staff case. 265 Cf Case 30/68 Lacroix v Commission [1970] ECR 301. 266 For example, the applicant may have been informed orally of the existence of a decision of direct and individual concern to him or may have nothing more than a letter which suggests that such a decision has been made but does not constitute a copy of the decision.

791

9.56  Pleading

the author of the act (that is, the intended defendant in the proceedings) to supply a true copy so that it may be attached to the application. However, in such cases, it is not unknown for the author of the act to refuse to comply with such a request. In cases where the applicant is not in possession of a true copy of the contested act, the applicant’s failure to attach a true copy to the application cannot be a procedural defect and cannot be relied on by the defendant (being the author of that act) in order to challenge the admissibility of the application.267 Where the application is put in order after the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings, the applicant is not barred from continuing the action,268 at least if he has complied with the time limit set by the Registrar for producing the missing evidence. Where that time limit has not been respected, the application may be formally inadmissible269 but the action is not necessarily time-barred. If the measure whose annulment is sought has been published in the Official Journal by the time the application is lodged it does not seem that a failure to annex a copy of it would lead to the inadmissibility of the application as long as the measure is clearly identifiable by a citation of the appropriate part and page number of the Official Journal. There is, however, no authority for that so it would be wise to annex a copy of the measure to the application in all cases. (3) In the case of applications made by a legal person governed by private law, (a) ‘recent proof of that person’s existence in law (extract from the register of companies, firms or associations or any other official document’270 and (b) ‘an authority to act’ given by the legal person to the lawyer representing it.271 Although those two requirements appear separately in the Rules of Procedure (previously, they were together), they form a whole. Their object is to establish the existence of the applicant, its capacity to initiate legal proceedings and the fact that it is properly represented. Accordingly, they constitute a body of consistent evidence showing the regularity of the commencement of proceedings. Technically, that body of evidence should cover: the existence of the applicant and its capacity to act;272 the decision of the applicant to engage in the proceedings; and the decision (or deci 267 In Case T-119/02 Royal Philips Electronics NV v Commission [2003] ECR II-1433, paras 303– 307, the GC appears to have taken the view that, in an action for annulment, the application would be inadmissible only if the Registrar had asked it to be put in order (by producing the disputed decision) and the applicant could, but declines to, do so (para 305). The Commission conceded that, if it has refused to provide the applicant with a copy of the contested decision, the application cannot be said to be inadmissible (para 306). 268 Statute, art 21, last sentence. 269 RP-ECJ, art 122(3); RP-GC, art 78(6); RP-CST, art 50(6). Those provisions state that the Court must rule ‘whether’ the application is formally inadmissible in the case of non-compliance with the requirement. 270 RP-GC, art  78(4). No such requirement applies in ECJ proceedings because a legal person governed by private law cannot initiate proceedings in the ECJ otherwise than as an appellant from a decision of the GC (in which case, it must have complied with the requirement under the GC Rules). 271 RP-GC, art 51(3). 272 It is not necessary for an applicant which is a legal person to produce evidence of its ‘object’ (that is, the activities that it has been brought into existence in order to perform): see Abad Perez (above, note 106), para 39.

792

Pleading 9.56

sions) implementing that decision by appointing the lawyer to act for the applicant and authorising him to commence proceedings in the applicant’s name.273 The Rules of Procedure originally provided that a legal person governed by private law had to provide a copy of the instrument or instruments constituting and regulating it or an extract from the relevant register or some other proof of its existence. It was usual to produce the instrument or instruments constituting and regulating the applicant because, by that means, it was possible to demonstrate that the authority to act granted to the applicant’s lawyer had been granted by a person or body with the capacity to do so under the applicant’s constitution. Hence, it was said that proof that the applicant is properly represented may be by production of ‘a company’s documents of constitution, an extract from the commercial register and an authority ad litem’.274 The emphasis is currently on the recent nature of the proof of the applicant’s existence, which tends to suggest that the instrument or instruments constituting and regulating the applicant may not meet the requirement to prove the existence of the applicant (in the current form of that requirement) because they may not be recent (what is or is not ‘recent’ is unclear; but it may be interpreted as meaning in close temporal proximity to the commencement of proceedings). So far as the requirement to provide an authority to act is concerned, the position does not appear to have changed. The authority to act must have been given by ‘that person’, that is, the applicant.275 Normally, in the case of a legal person, an authority to act is not given by that person but by one or more natural persons who have power to do so under the constitution of the legal person. Accordingly, establishing that an authority to act has been given by the applicant itself will ordinarily require demonstrating that the natural person or persons instructing (or purporting to instruct) the lawyer has or have been properly authorised to do so. In the case of a company governed by English law, it would therefore be necessary to produce the memorandum and articles of association or an extract from the Companies Register and, for example, a copy of any resolution of the board of directors authorising the commencement of proceedings and the appointment of the lawyer. Where the commencement of proceedings or the appointment of the applicant’s lawyer has been effected or authorised by a director, officer or organ of the applicant whose power so to do does not appear on the face of the instrument constituting or regulating the applicant which has been attached to the application (or that instrument has not been produced because reliance has been placed on a recent extract from the relevant register), it is necessary to provide fur 273 For example, a copy of the instrument creating the applicant and identifying the person or body (such as a board of directors) with power to take relevant decisions; the decision of that person or body authorising the commencement of proceedings in the name of the applicant and delegating to someone else authority to appoint a lawyer; and the decision of that person appointing the applicant’s lawyer (often taking the form of a formal letter from that person to the lawyer instructing him to commence proceedings). The importance lies in showing an uninterrupted chain of authority running from the act creating the applicant to the action of the applicant’s lawyer in lodging the application commencing proceedings at the Court. 274 Ufficio Imposte di Consumo v Commission (above, note 26) at 443 (Advocate General Roemer). 275 RP-GC, art 51(3).

793

9.56  Pleading

ther evidence to establish that proceedings have been properly commenced and the lawyer properly appointed, such as a declaration before a notary. A  failure to produce recent evidence of the applicant’s existence or the authority to act may cause the application to be formally inadmissible.276 It will be observed that, in the case of a legal person governed by public law, there is no similar requirement. That does not mean that such persons are presumed to have capacity to bring proceedings and to be properly represented. The silence of the Rules of Procedure suggests nothing more than that they are not obliged to annex evidence of either fact to the application. Should the defendant challenge capacity or the lawyer’s authority to act, the applicant would be bound to produce the evidence. In order to avoid difficulties and delays in the proceedings,277 it is better to annex such evidence to the application even though there is no express requirement to do so. The same applies in the case of applicants whom the Court recognises as having capacity to bring proceedings but who are not legal persons under national law.278 When the Rules of Procedure were drafted, it was probably not envisaged that persons lacking legal personality in the formal sense could bring proceedings. As far as such persons are concerned, the question of their existence and capacity to bring proceedings and be represented before the Court is all the more delicate and liable to be challenged by the opposing parties. (4) In actions brought before the Court pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the EU279 or pursuant to a special agreement concluded between member states,280 a copy of the arbitration clause in the contract or the special agreement in question.281 Where 276 RP-GC, art 51(4) and 78(6). A failure to attach to the application evidence of the applicant’s existence (in casu, a copy of the instrument constituting or regulating the applicant) can lead to the inadmissibility of the application: Case 289/83 GAARM Groupement des Associations Agricoles pour l’Organisation de la Production et de la Commercialisation des Pommes de Terre et Légumes de la Région Malouine v Commission [1984] ECR 1789. It is not fatal as long as the evidence is produced in the course of the proceedings: Cases 193–194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989] ECR 1045, paras 31–32; Abad Perez (above, note 106), para 38. Where the evidence adduced consists of the instrument or instruments constituting and regulating the applicant, a complete copy of the instrument(s) should in principle be attached but, in Case C-194/87 Union Syndicale v Court of Auditors, order of 10 February 1988 (judgment reported as Cases C-193 and C-194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1990] ECR I-95), an association which had applied to intervene (and which therefore had to produce the instrument constituting or regulating it) annexed to its application part only of its statutes; that was held to be sufficient compliance with the Rules of Procedure because the parts disclosed to the Court were enough to establish the objects, functions and general characteristics of the association. 277 Cf Ufficio Imposte di Consumo v Commission (above, note 26). It is understood that the Court requires compliance even from a member state. 278 Eg an unincorporated association. It is not clear what was the legal status of the applicant in Case T-444/07 Centre de Promotion de l’emploi par la micro-entreprise (above, note 161). The observation in paras 39–40 that the absence of authorisation to bring a particular claim meant that the applicant lacked an interest in bringing proceedings is doubtful. 279 TFEU, art 272. 280 TFEU, art 273. 281 RP-ECJ, art  122(2) (for TFEU, art  273); RP-GC, art  78(3) (for TFEU, art  273). Cf Case T-271/04 Citymo SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-1375, para 56.

794

Pleading 9.56

the provision under which the Court has jurisdiction is contained in or made applicable by several documents, all should be produced.282 (5) The authority to act of the applicant’s representative. Save in the case of applicants that are legal persons governed by private law (see (3) above), that requirement is not mandatory283 and, hence, a failure to annex the authority to the application does not entitle the Court to reject it on the ground of want of form.284 Nonetheless, proof of authority to act should be produced at some time and a failure to do so when challenged may lead to the inadmissibility of the application.285 It is, of course, arguable that the grant of authority (without retrospective effect) after the expiry of a time limit for the bringing of proceedings does lead to the inadmissibility of the action: the first application is inadmissible because the lawyer lodging it had no authority to do so and a subsequent application would be inadmissible because it would be out of time. In the interests of the smooth running of the proceedings, the Court has always, as a matter of practice, required an authority to be produced with the application.286 Adequate proof is a signed statement by the applicant or, in the case of a legal person, a natural person properly authorised to do so, indicating that the lawyer has been given authority to act. The EU institutions and some member states also produce proof that the agent representing them has authority to act but that is not necessary unless requested by the Court. (6) A summary of the pleas in law and main arguments relied on in the application (which is intended to facilitate the drafting by the Court of the notice of the case published in the Official Journal).287 282 Cf Case 23/76 Luigi Pellegrini and CSAS v Commission [1976] ECR 1807: an arbitration clause was contained in a draft agreement which was incorporated into the contract between the parties orally, later confirmed in writing; the applicant showed that the arbitration clause applied by producing the correspondence passing between the parties. 283 RP-ECJ, art  44(1) and RP-GC, art  53(1) require agents to produce an official document evidencing their status as such and advisers assisting a party to produce an authority to act. Lawyers are required by those provisions to produce an authority to act only if the party that they represent is a legal person governed by private law. However, those requirements are relevant only if it is necessary to establish the status of a party’s agent, adviser or lawyer in order to claim one of the privileges, immunities and facilities to which agents, advisers and lawyers are entitled. Under RP-ECJ, art 119(2), agents and lawyers must produce either ‘an official document’ or an authority to act. Under RP-CST, art  31 and 50(5), the position is slightly different. Agents, advisers or lawyers acting for a Member State or EU institution must produce ‘an official document’ or authority to act; lawyers must produce an authorisation to practise (irrespective of the quality of the party that they represent) but are not required to produce an authority to act. PD-CST, para 8 confirms that no authority to act need be produced on lodgement of the application. Instead, an authority to act must be produced only if there is a subsequent change in the lawyer representing the party. 284 Case 14/64 Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority [1965] ECR 51 at 57. 285 Cf RP-ECJ, art  119(4); RP-CST, art  50(6). It does not seem that, if the authority to act is conferred on the lawyer after the lodgment of the application, the application is inadmissible, at least where the authority is retrospective: Cases 193 and 194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989] ECR 1045, para 33 and at 1062 (Advocate General Darmon). 286 Cf the Gualco case (above, note 284) at 62–63 (Advocate General Roemer). 287 PD-ECJ, para 13; PD-GC, paras 130–132; PD-CST, para 16.

795

9.57  Pleading

(7) A file containing all the documents relied on in support of the claims made and a schedule listing those documents.288 It is important to bear in mind that, at the stage of the lodging of the application, the position of the defendant on the facts of the case may or may not be known. The applicant cannot proceed on the basis that a fact need not be proved unless and until it is disputed by the defendant.289 Unless a fact is one asserted by the defendant and not disputed by the applicant (or else is a fact that is so well known that it does not need to be proved),290 the applicant must assume that all facts on which the applicant relies need to be proved. The attachments listed at (1) to (6) above should be presented separately from the attachments listed at (7): the former serve a purely formal purpose whereas the latter are relevant to the substantive contents of the application.291

B

The defence and preliminary objection to admissibility

9.57 The minimum requirements concerning the defence are to be found in RP-ECJ, art 124(1)-(2), RP-GC, art 81(1)-(2) and RP-CST, art 53(1)-(3) which, in addition, apply to the defence the provisions of RP-ECJ, art  121, RP-GC, art  77 and 78(4) to (6), and RP-CST, art  50(3)-(4), respectively.292 Instead of a defence, the defendant may lodge a preliminary objection to admissibility which contests the admissibility of the action and does not address its merits or substance. In pleading terms, a preliminary objection to admissibility should be dealt with in the same way as a defence save that it is titled ‘preliminary objection to admissibility’, not ‘defence’. Accordingly, in this section, the comments made about defences are transposable mutatis mutandis to preliminary objections to admissibility (see further, Chapter 6, paras 6.12–6.13). 1 Contents 9.58

The defence must state:

(1) The name and address of the defendant.

288 See para 9.11 at (4), above. 289 Cf Case T-303/10  WAM (above, note 176), paras 68–72; Case T-309/12 Zweckverband Tierkorperbeseitigung im Rheinland-Pfalz, im Saarland, im Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis und im Landkreis Limburg-Weilburg, 16  July 2014, para  224 (the appeal – Case C-447/14  P  – was withdrawn). In those cases, a fact was asserted in the application but no evidence was relied on in support of the assertion. The defendant disputed the fact but put in no evidence. The applicant then sought, unsuccessfully, to adduce evidence in support of the existence of the fact at the reply stage. An exception to that appears to be the case where the disputed fact is within the knowledge of the defendant and the defendant is perceived to be disputing an assertion made by the applicant that the defendant knows or ought to know is true: Case T-263/11 Bopp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 6 February 2013, paras 29–37. 290 As to the existence of such facts, see Ch 10, para 10.4. 291 Cf PD-GC, para 100. 292 See also PD-ECJ, paras 14–15; PD-GC, paras 91–102 and 136–140; PD-CST, paras 30–35.

796

Pleading 9.59

(2) In the case of GC and CST proceedings, particulars of the status (or professional capacity) and address of the defendant’s representative (who must have signed the defence). (3) The pleas in law and arguments of fact and law relied on (RP-CST, art 53(1) (d) refers to ‘the legal context of the case, a clear summary of the relevant facts presented in chronological order, and a separate, precise and structured summary of the pleas in law and arguments of law relied on’). (4) The form of order sought. Usually this requests the rejection of the application and costs. (5) The nature of any evidence offered by the defendant. (6) Information relating to service on the defendant (as in the case of the application: an address for service and the name of a person authorised and willing to accept service; or a statement that the defendant’s agent or lawyer agrees to accept service by telefax or other technical means of communication).293 Like the application, the defence usually falls into three parts: title; submissions; and form of order. 2 Title 9.59 The title is in the same form as that of the application with the addition of the case number (which the Court will have indicated to the defendant when serving the application), the name of the person representing the defendant and, where necessary, the defendant’s service details.294 For example: In the Court of Justice of the European Union Case C-400/14 (or, as the case may be: In the General Court Case T-400/14 or In the Civil Service Tribunal Case F-400/14) A B of [address], represented by C D, barrister, [set out the applicant’s service details as indicated in the application], Applicant

293 The consequences of failing to provide service information are the same as in the case of an application. 294 It is not necessary to set out the subject matter of the action. There is no obligation on the defendant to use the same style as the applicant when setting out the title.

797

9.60  Pleading

Against European Commission, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels, represented by G H, a member of its Legal Service acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the offices of I J, a member of its Legal Service, Jean Monnet Building, Kirchberg, Defendant Defence295 3 Submissions 9.60 The submissions are often divided into two parts: those relating to the admissibility of the application or the action and those going to the merits of the claim. There are no requirements regarding the ordering of the submissions in the defence save that PD-GC, para 139 states that legal arguments should be set out and grouped by reference to the pleas in law in the application. That enables a direct comparison to be made between the two pleadings.296 9.61 There appear to be no formal, technical rules concerning admissions so that a failure to deny expressly or by implication an assertion of fact or of law in the application is not inevitably treated as an admission of the assertion.297 On the other hand, a failure to contest an assertion made in the application may be taken to indicate that, although the assertion is not formally admitted by the defendant, no issue arises in the proceedings in respect of it; and the defendant may then be precluded from subsequently seeking to contest the assertion (should it wish to do so).298 Since the main written pleadings in a direct action are the application and defence, the reply and rejoinder being optional supplementary pleadings, it is incumbent on the defendant to plead specifically in the defence to those allegations in the application that it wishes to contest. If the defendant fails to reply to a particular point made in the application, the applicant (and the Court) may reasonably conclude that the defendant is not raising a defence to that point. Further, in relation to that point, the applicant has nothing to reply to; and, in principle, the written procedure must therefore be taken to be closed pro

295 Cf PD-GC, para 91; PD-CST, para 34 296 Cf PD-ECJ, para 15. In that connection, it should be noted that, technically, the pleas in law set out in a defence are those advanced in support of the inadmissibility of the application. So far as the substance, or merits, of the case is concerned, the defence advances arguments countering the arguments adopted in the application in support of the pleas in law on which the action is based. 297 Cf Case 166/82 Commission v Italy [1984]  ECR  459, para  21; Case 141/84R  De Compte v European Parliament [1984] ECR 2575, paras 10–12. In the De Compte case the problem arose in the context of interim relief proceedings and before the defendant had lodged its defence. It may well be that, at such an early stage in an action, a defendant may have a legitimate reason for not wishing to commit itself in relation to the facts of the case. No such justification can be relied on by the time the defendant must lodge its defence. 298 Cf Case 21/84 Commission v France [1985] ECR 1355, para 10.

798

Pleading 9.63

tanto in regard to that aspect of the case.299 Technicalities apart, it is obviously better practice to deal clearly with each and every allegation in the application. If not, there is risk of confusion and the possibility that adverse inferences may be drawn from the state of the pleadings. Accordingly, PD-GC, para 138 (but not any of the rules of procedure of the ECJ, GC or CST) states: ‘Any fact alleged by the applicant which is contested must be specified and the basis on which it is contested expressly stated’. 9.62 The defence should not canvass matters which do not fall within the scope of the proceedings; to the extent that it does so, it may be inadmissible.300 As in the application, each assertion of fact should be supported by a reference either to a document which has been produced to the Court in the application or is annexed to the defence, or to the other types of evidence relied on. Annexes to the defence serve an evidentiary purpose and, as in the case of the application, cannot be used as vehicles for expanding matters of argument. The obligation (applicable to all pleadings) to annex to the defence a file of all the documents relied on does not oblige the defendant to annex documents that the applicant has already produced or documents in the possession of third parties (at least where those third parties fall outside the control of the defendant).301 4 Form of order 9.63 The form of order is usually to be found at the end of the defence. PD-GC, para  137 states that it must be either there or at the beginning of the defence. In most cases the form of order in the defence requests the Court to dismiss the application and award costs in favour of the defendant302 but it is occasionally necessary to plead in more detail.303 If the defence contains no form of 299 If a rigorous attitude were not taken with regard to the duty of the defendant to answer in the defence all the assertions made in the application that the defendant wished to contest, there would be a risk that the defendant would seek to steal a march on the applicant by reserving its main points of argument for the rejoinder, thus depriving the applicant of a fair opportunity to answer the defendant’s case in writing. That risk is markedly less where a second exchange of pleadings is optional and not automatic. 300 Cf Case 48/69 ICI Ltd v Commission [1972] ECR 619, order of 11 December 1969 (unreported). The defendant lodged a defence containing several references to documents concerning other proceedings. The Court took the view that that was capable of embarrassing the applicant when answering the case made out by the defendant and held that the defence should be purged of the references to matters falling outside the scope of the proceedings. It therefore sent the defence back to the defendant and set a new date for the lodgment of an acceptable pleading. 301 Case 201/86 Spie-Batignolles v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-97, order of 16  December 1987 (unreported), para 16. 302 It is not necessary for the defendant to state in the form of order why the application should be dismissed (in other words, there is no need for the form of order to contain separate claims for the application to be dismissed as inadmissible and on the merits, where each are contested) as long as the reason appears from the submissions set out in the defence: Case T-364/03 Medici Grimm (above, note 114), paras 48–49. If the defendant fails to include a claim for costs and introduces it only in the rejoinder, it may be dismissed as inadmissible: the CICCE case (above, note 254), para 32. 303 Where, for example, part of the applicant’s claim is conceded.

799

9.64  Pleading

order at all, it seems to be open to the applicant to apply for judgment by default on the ground that no defence in proper form has been lodged within time.304 If the applicant should fail to apply for judgment by default, proceedings continue in the normal way and the absence of the form of order is relevant only to any claim for costs that the defendant may later make.305 It is arguable that, where the submissions made in the defence make it clear that the defendant does not concede the applicant’s claims, the absence of a form of order in the defence is just a formal defect (because neither the applicant nor the Court can have been misled about the defendant’s position) and the defendant cannot be precluded from rectifying the situation by including a proper form of order in the rejoinder.306 The same possibilities of amending, supplementing or extending the defence are available as in the case of the application, mutatis mutandis. 9.64 There is no express provision enabling a defendant to raise in the defence a separate claim against the applicant: the scope of the defence is limited to answering the claim made by the applicant and so any claims which the defendant may wish to raise can normally be made only by commencing a separate action and are inadmissible if raised as a counterclaim.307 As direct actions are, for the most part, public law claims, there is no possibility, as there is, for example, in many national civil procedures, of adding a counterclaim to the defence. The nature of the system of remedies in EU law is such that the possibility of cross-claims rarely arises and circuity of action is not the problem that it is in a national legal system. The exception to that statement of the position is the action under TFEU, art 272 (the action on an arbitration clause contained in a contract made by or on behalf of the EU) because the litigation framework created by the arbitration clause may permit a set off or cross-claim.308 In other direct actions, nothing, however, prevents the defendant from raising a separate claim if it can be pleaded as a defence.309 Hitherto that situation has arisen only in actions for damages.

304 RP-ECJ, art  152(1); RP-GC, art  123(1); RP-CST, art  121(1). See further, Ch 16, section V, para 16.46 ff. 305 Case C-290/89 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I-2851 at 2859–2860 (Advocate General Lenz, citing Case 28/69 Commission v Italy [1970] ECR 187 at 190). 306 Cf Case 28/69 Commission v Italy (above, note 305). That does not mean that the defendant can claim costs if no such claim was made in the defence: cf Case 298/83 CICCE v Commission [1985] ECR 1105, para 32. 307 Eg Case T-140/97 Hautem v European Investment Bank [1999] ECR SC-I-A-171, II-897, paras 88–90; Case T-141/97 Yasse v European Investment Bank [1999]  ECR SC-I-A-177, II-929, paras 143–145. 308 Eg Case T-242/04 Commission v IAMA Consultancy [2007] ECR II-7* (the successor to Case T-85/01, above, note 161). 309 In Cases 4–13/59 Mannesmann v High Authority [1960] ECR 113 the applicants claimed to set-off their claims for damages against the obligation, imposed on them by the High Authority in a number of decisions contested in the action, to repay equalisation payments made out of the Scrap Equalisation Fund. The Court did not find it necessary to consider these claims. It is doubtful if an applicant can properly claim a set-off in an action for annulment.

800

Pleading 9.66

9.65 In Case 250/78  DEKA  Getreideprodukte GmbH & Co KG  v Council and Commission310 the Court upheld the applicant’s claim for damages and ordered the parties to agree the amount due to be paid. The following year, while negotiations were still in progress between the applicant and the Council and Commission, the German government claimed from the applicant a sum, twice as great as the damages claimed, which was due to it by way of export refunds paid over by a mistake induced by the fraud of a director of the applicant. That debt was assigned to the Commission, which asserted that the applicant’s damages claim was thereby extinguished. The Court accepted that. It is to be observed that both the claim for damages (for non-payment of production refunds) and that for the repayment of the export refunds arose from the operation of the Common Agricultural Policy; the debt owed by the applicant to the German government, like the claim for damages, concerned sums chargeable to the EU’s budget and did not constitute a wholly independent obligation. In substance, the two claims were closely connected in their subject matter despite the fact that, due to the administrative structure of the Common Agricultural Policy, two separate persons — the EU and a member state — were responsible in respect of each claim. The case is not, therefore, authority that a claim for damages can be extinguished by the assignment of an unconnected claim, eg one in respect of unpaid income tax. It is at this stage unclear how close the connection between the claims must be in order to allow one to be set off against the other. The Court is likely to proceed case by case on the basis of comparative studies of national law. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that one claim may extinguish another in whole or in part if, having regard to the nature and basis in law of the two claims, it would be inequitable to uphold the one without taking into account the other. The DEKA case suggests that set-off is not restricted to claims which are true defences311 and may apply whenever it is the only practicable method of vindicating the defendant’s rights.312 5 Attachments 9.66

The defence must be accompanied by:

(1) An official document or authority to act issued by the defendant to, as the case may be, his agent, adviser or lawyer.313

310 [1983] ECR 421, see also [1979] ECR 3017. 311 Ie those based on a vice in the applicant’s own claim. 312 Cf para 14 of the judgment; Case T-105/99 Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) v Commission [2000] ECR II-4099, paras 56 and 62 (note the Commission’s argument at paras 45–48) (that case was an action for the annulment of a Commission decision to effect a set-off against a debt owed by the Commission to the applicant). 313 RP-ECJ, art 119(2); RP-GC, art 51(3) and 78(5), which applies to defences by virtue of RPGC, art 81(2); PD-GC, para 140 (which cross-refers to PD-GC, para 128); RP-CST, art 31(1) and 53(3), 1st subpara; PD-CST, para 31. RP-GC, art 51(3) applies only if the defendant is a legal person governed by private law. See the parallel requirements concerning the application: para 9.56 at (1) and (3), above.

801

9.67  Pleading

(2) A certificate showing that the lawyer acting for the defendant is entitled to practise before a court of a member state.314 (3) Where the defendant is a legal person governed by private law, recent proof of the defendant’s existence in law (relevant only in GC proceedings).315 (4) In staff cases heard at first instance by the GC, any acts of general application cited which have not been published in the Official Journal (in CST proceedings, the parallel requirement was the production of any texts not published in the Official Journal that formed the legal context of the case).316 (5) A file of the documents relied on in support of the defence and a schedule listing those documents.317 9.67 Save where indicated otherwise below, the rules applicable to the attachments to the application commencing proceedings apply also in the case of the defence. Where (4) and (5) have already been complied with by the applicant, it does not appear to be necessary for the defendant to repeat the exercise. A defective defence may be put in order in relation to the absence of: the official document or authority to act issued by the defendant to his agent or lawyer, a lawyer’s certificate of entitlement to practise and complete service information;318 in GC proceedings, evidence of the existence of a defendant that is a legal person governed by private law;319 and, in CST proceedings, the accompanying file of evidential documents and a schedule summarising them, lodgement of the whole of a lengthy document or other item of evidence, lodgement of a required translation, the required number of certified copies, and lodgement of a defence that respects the CST’s requirements regarding the length of a defence.320 As the time limit for lodging the defence can be extended by the President,321 there is arguably no need for detailed provision for putting a defective defence in order because, if a defence is rejected on the ground of want of form, the defendant can be given an extension of time in which to cure the defect (if it is curable) and there is no risk that rights will in the meantime be barred by the expiry of a substantive time limit, as may happen in the case of a defective application.322 314 RP-ECJ, art 119(3); RP-GC, art 51(2) and 78(5), which applies to defences by virtue of RP-GC, art 81(2); RP-CST, art 53(3). See the parallel requirement concerning the application: para 9.56 above. 315 RP-GC, art 78(4), which applies pursuant to RP-GC, art 81(2). See the parallel requirement concerning the application: para 9.56 above. 316 PD-GC, para 140a. The dates on which those acts were adopted, entered into force and, where applicable, were repealed should also be provided. PD-GC, para 140a replicates the preceding CST provision: RP-CST, art 53(3), 2nd subpara (which used the word ‘texts’). PD-CST, para 33 referred to the texts in question as measures of general application. 317 RP-ECJ, art 57(4); RP-GC, art 72(3); RP-CST, art 45(1). See para 9.11 at (4), above. 318 RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 124(2); RP-GC, art 51(4) and 81(2); RP-CST, art 53(2) and (4). 319 RP-GC, art 78(4) and (6) and 81(2). 320 RP-CST, art 53(4). 321 RP-ECJ, art 124(3); RP-GC, art 81(3); RP-CST, art 53(5). 322 On the other hand, the period for lodging the defence cannot be extended if no application for an extension of time has been made within the period; and an extension cannot be obtained on the basis of the Statute, art  45, 2nd sentence (in the absence of proof of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure): Case T-42/89 Yorck von Wartenburg v European Parliament

802

Pleading 9.70

C

Reply, rejoinder and observations on a preliminary objection to admissibility

9.68 Where the defendant responds to the application by lodging a preliminary objection to admissibility, the applicant in the action is given an opportunity to submit written observations on the objection.323 If, instead, the defendant lodges a defence, the written procedure may end there or be extended to include a second exchange of pleadings. 1 Observations on a preliminary objection to admissibility 9.69 The title to the written observations on a preliminary objection to admissibility follow the same pattern as the title to the application commencing proceedings save that the pleading is entitled ‘written observations on the preliminary objection raised by the defendant’ and it is not necessary to repeat the service information. The written observations set out the response of the applicant in the action to the arguments advanced by the defendant in support of the defendant’s claim that the action should be dismissed as inadmissible. In principle, the issues raised in the preliminary objection to admissibility are matters of law only. Accordingly, the written observations responding to the preliminary objection are in principle similarly limited;324 but it may be necessary to refer to contextual facts and, to that end, annex relevant evidence to the written observations.325 The written observations end with a form of order seeking the dismissal of the preliminary objection. 2 The scope for a second exchange of pleadings 9.70 The lodging of a preliminary objection to admissibility apart, the application and the defence are the principal pleadings in a direct action and are supposed to be the essential vehicles for the raising of all the matters of law and fact put in issue in the case, including the production of evidential documents and the disclosure of all other types or sources of evidence.326 The question whether

[1990] ECR II-31, para 4. It is therefore arguable that, if a defective defence is lodged within time, an extension of time designed to allow the defect to be cured cannot be granted once the original period for lodging the defence has expired. In addition, the power to extend the time for lodgement of the defence applies in ‘exceptional’ circumstances, which may not cover a formal defect in the defence. The better view seems to be that a purely formal defect in the defence does not invalidate the lodgment of the defence within the period for doing so and therefore does not prevent such a defect from being remedied subsequently. 323 RP-ECJ, art 151(3); RP-GC, art 130(4); RP-CST, art 83(2). 324 RP-ECJ, art 151(3) and RP-GC, art 130(4) envisage that the written observations will set out pleas in law only. RP-CST, art 83(2) refers to arguments of fact and law. 325 Cf Case T-413/12 Post Invest Europe Sarl v Commission, 15  May 2013, para  21; Case T-488/13 GEA Group AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 22 January 2015, para 30. 326 On the question of evidence, see (for example) RP-GC, art 85(1).

803

9.71  Pleading

or not there is a second round of pleadings varies as between the ECJ, GC and CST.327 9.71 In ECJ proceedings, the application and defence may be supplemented, if need be, by a reply from the applicant and a rejoinder from the defendant, as of right, save only that the President (who prescribes the time limits within which the reply and rejoinder must be lodged) has power to specify the matters to which the reply and rejoinder should relate.328 It is to be assumed that, before exercising that power, the President would consult his colleagues so that his decision reflects the considered position of the members of the ECJ hearing the case. 9.72 In GC proceedings, the parties may supplement the application and defence as of right unless the GC decides that a second exchange of pleadings is unnecessary because the contents of the file in the case are sufficiently comprehensive.329 Where the GC so decides, it is nonetheless open to the applicant to submit to the GC a reasoned request to supplement the file in the case (that is, place a document in the case file). Such a request must be lodged at the GC within two weeks from service on the applicant of the GC decision dispensing with the second round of pleadings.330 The GC is not obliged to accede to any such request. It is to be inferred that its decision on the question will be determined by reference to the utility, from the perspective of reaching a decision in the case, of supplementing the case file, which should be explained in the applicant’s reasoned request.331 No provision is made for the GC so deciding on an application from the defendant. At first sight that is logical because the defendant should have said all that it wanted and needed to say in its defence. However, there are cases in which something turns up after the lodgement of the defence and may be better dealt with in a written pleading, as opposed to at the hearing. If the applicant does not take the initiative (for whatever reason), it is still open to the defendant to act, not by requesting the case file to be supplemented but by applying for a measure of organisation of procedure or, as the case may be, a measure of enquiry.332 The President prescribes the time limits for the lodgement of any reply, rejoinder or document supplementing the case file and may specify the matters to which the reply or rejoinder should relate (it is implicit that, in the case of a document supplementing the case file, the GC decision allowing the lodgement of the document determines its contents and scope).333

327 A second round must always comprise a reply. The defendant can choose whether or not to lodge a rejoinder in response to a reply; but the defendant cannot lodge a rejoinder in the absence of a reply. 328 RP-ECJ, art 126(1). Cf PD-ECJ, para 16. 329 RP-GC, art 83(1). 330 RP-GC, art 83(2). 331 RP-GC, art 83(2) states that the GC may authorise ‘the main parties’ to supplement the file. That phrase refers to the applicant and the defendant. Hence, what is envisaged is a supplementing of the case file by both of them, not just the applicant alone. However, the circumstances may be such that the case file need be supplemented by only one of them. 332 See Ch 2, paras 2.97–2.102, and Ch 11. 333 RP-GC, art 83(3).

804

Pleading 9.74

9.73 In CST proceedings, the question whether or not there is a second round of pleadings is a matter for the CST to decide.334 The CST may so decide either of its own motion or on a reasoned application made by the applicant. As in the case of the parallel provision in GC proceedings, that appears to exclude the possibility of the CST acting on an application from the defendant. However, in contrast to the position under the GC rules, it seems to be open to the defendant to prompt the CST into acting of its own motion (as an alternative to applying for a measure of organisation of procedure or a measure of enquiry). The CST rules do not prescribe a time limit by which an application for a second round of pleadings must be lodged. By implication, the applicant should make such an application within a reasonable time after service on him of the defence unless the need for a second exchange of pleadings arises from some event occurring after lodgement of the defence (such as an evolution in the case law applicable to an issue in the case). Where the CST allows a second exchange of pleadings, it may restrict the exchange to particular issues of law or fact (which must be identified to the parties).335 Provision is made for requiring a reply or rejoinder to be put in order if it contains one of the following defects: failure to attach as annexes any items of evidence or evidential documents or to provide a schedule listing them; failure to lodge a complete version of a bulky item of evidence or document; failure to produce a required translation; failure to lodge the original together with all the annexes referred to in it or all the required certified copies; failure to respect the maximum length set for the pleading (if any); failure to restrict the pleading to the questions of law or fact to which it has been limited by the CST.336 9.74 The written procedure closes in any event if the applicant waives the right to lodge a reply or fails to lodge the reply within the period fixed for doing; the same happens where the defendant waives the right to lodge a rejoinder in response to the reply or fails to lodge the rejoinder within the time for doing so. In such circumstances, if the applicant or, as the case may be, the defendant wishes to lodge a reply (or rejoinder) out of time, there seem to be three possibilities.337 First, an application may be made under RP-ECJ, art 151(1), RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83(1) for the written procedure to be reopened.338 Secondly, a further pleading may be lodged if its purpose is to raise a new plea in law under

334 RP-CST, art 55(1). 335 RP-CST, art 55(2). 336 RP-GC, art 55(3). 337 Cf Ch 2, para 2.60. 338 See Case T-5/90 Marcato v Commission [1991] ECR II-731, order of 24 January 1991, where the applicant failed to lodge a reply in time, apparently because the applicant’s lawyer had asked a colleague to prepare the reply and it had not been lodged in time due to illness and secretarial errors. The written procedure was reopened because the opposing party accepted, and the Court agreed, that, due to the complexity of the case, it was in the interests of justice that there be a complete written procedure.

805

9.75  Pleading

RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(2) or RP-CST, art 56.339 Thirdly, the matter can be dealt with as a measure of organisation of procedure.340 3 Timing of the second exchange of pleadings 9.75 Where there is a second exchange of pleadings, in ECJ and GC proceedings the President prescribes the time limit within which the pleading in question must be lodged341 whereas, in CST proceedings, the decision is made by the CST.342 9.76 The reply or, as the case may be, rejoinder is almost invariably drafted in order to answer the points made in the pleading(s) immediately preceding it (that is, the defence or reply and any statement in intervention of an intervener),343 although that does not prevent a party from adducing new arguments in respect of the issues as they are already defined in the application and defence.344 Accordingly, the second exchange of pleadings normally takes place (if at all) immediately after the completion of the first exchange. 9.77 It follows that a reply or rejoinder is drafted without the benefit of any evidence other than that previously disclosed in the proceedings or in the possession of the party in question (that is, the applicant, in the case of the reply, or the defendant, in the case of the rejoinder). However, a party is not precluded from applying to the Court for the production of documents or some measure of enquiry to be carried out in order to prepare the reply or, as the case may be, the rejoinder, which may require a deferral of the date by which the reply (or, as the case may be, the rejoinder) would normally be expected to be lodged. The possibility of making such an application was not excluded in Case 171/86 USINOR v Commission345 but the Court indicated that convincing arguments would have to be adduced in support of it.

339 In Cases C-116/88 and C-149/88 Hecq v Commission [1990] ECR I-599 (at 602) the defendant failed to lodge a rejoinder in time. Its application for an extension of time to do so was rejected by the President on the ground that the circumstances did not fall within RP-ECJ, art 42 (now RP-ECJ, art  127), thus indicating that, as the written procedure had closed, the application could be upheld only if its purpose was to raise a new plea in law. 340 See: RP-GC, art 88(1), 89(2) and 89(3)(b); RP-CST, art 68(b) and 69(3). 341 RP-ECJ, art 126(2); RP-GC, art 83(3). 342 By inference from RP-CST, art 55(1). 343 See Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council [1991]  ECR  I-4529 at 4544 (Advocate General van Gerven). 344 Ibid. 345 Unreported order of 28 January 1987, para 24. The application was made in connection with the preparation of the reply. The Court remarked that knowledge of the content of the contested act should normally be sufficient.

806

Pleading 9.79

4 Form and contents 9.78 Apart from the general rules applicable to all pleadings, no requirements are laid down concerning the form and content of the reply and rejoinder. In practice, they usually follow the format of the application and defence. The title, of course, remains the same unless proceedings have been discontinued so far as one of the parties is concerned or a third party has been joined as an intervener.346 9.79 Since the function of the reply and rejoinder is to complete and clarify, in the light of the opposing parties’ pleadings, what has been said in the application or defence, it is not, in principle, possible to amend the forms of order in the application or defence and, apart from points that the Court can take of its own motion, no new issues can be raised, although those already canvassed can be expanded or amplified by the addition of further pleas in law or arguments347 (in cases in which the Court has unlimited jurisdiction, the position is more flexible).348 The exceptions to that principle (new pleas in the strict sense) are considered below. It is first necessary to consider the question of the expansion of 346 The applicant cannot add a new defendant in the reply: Case 90/77 Hellmut Stimming KG v Commission [1977] ECR 2133; Case 62/83 Eximo v Commission [1984] ECR 2295 at 2318 (Advocate General Lenz). Where a third party has been joined as an intervener, the words ‘supported by’, followed by his name, address, the name of his representative and the address for service, are added after that of the party in whose support he has intervened. 347 Any further arguments adduced in the reply or rejoinder must be found in the body of the pleading, not the annexes thereto: eg Lucchini (above, note 40), paras 56–60, 66 and 69. For the extent to which further arguments may be introduced, see for example: Cityflyer Express (above, note 41), para 40; RJB Mining (above, note 161), para 24; Case T-222/04 Italy v Commission [2009] ECR II-1877, paras 119–121; Case T-390/08 Bank Melli Iran v Council [2009] ECR II-3967, para 30; Cases T-456/05 and T-457/05 Gutermann v Commission [2010] ECR II-1443, paras 198–199; Case T-359/04 British Aggregates v Commission [2010] ECR II-4227, para 87; Case F-29/05 Vivier v Commission, 30 September 2010, para 32; Case T-419/03 Altstoff Recycling Austria v Commission [2011] ECR II-975, para 44; Cases C-465/09P to C-470/09P Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission [2011] ECR I-83*, para 84; Case T-11/06 Romana Tabacchi v Commission [2011] ECR II-6681, para 124; Case T-238/09 Sniace v Commission [2011] ECR II-430*, paras 31–35 and 87; Case T-359/10 Ecologistas en Accion-CODA  v Commission, 24 April 2012, paras 33–34 and 45; Case T-554/08 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission, 24 April 2012, para 119; Case T-366/09 Insula (above, note 161), paras 88–89 (counterclaim introduced in rejoinder inadmissible); Cases T-99/09 and T-308/09 Italy v Commission, 19 April 2013, para 63; European Medical Association v Commission (above, note 2), paras 310–324 (same as Case T-554/08); Case T-288/11 Kieffer Omnitec v Commission, 6 May 2013, para 72; Cases T-379/10 and T-381/10 Keramag Keramische Werke v Commission, 16  September 2013, para  205; Case T-570/08  RENV  Deutsche Post v Commission, 12  November 2013, paras 114–115; Case T-165/12 European Dynamics Luxembourg v Commission, 13 December 2013, para 55; Case T-385/11 BP Products North America v Council, 16 January 2014, paras 91 and 119; Case T-223/11 Siemens v Commission, 15 July 2014, paras 9098; Case T-669/11 Spirlea v Commission, 25 September 2014, para 112; Case T-444/12 Novartis v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 16 October 2014, para 51; Case T-422/11 Computer Resources International (Luxembourg) v Commission, 5 November 2014, para 94. The principle that the issues cannot be expanded after the first exchange of pleadings applies to all direct actions, whatever their nature: see Case T-238/08 Commission v Commune de Valbronne [2010] ECR II-260*, paras 67–69. 348 Eg Case T-343/06 Shell Products v Commission, 27  September 2012, paras 271–272; Case T-362/06 Ballast Nedam v Commission, 27 September 2012, paras 137–138.

807

9.79  Pleading

an existing plea in law by the addition of further pleas in law or arguments. As to expansion by adducing an additional argument, the traditional position was that a party was free to amplify an existing plea in law by adding further arguments in a later pleading.349 That is necessarily the case, not least because, as the debate between the parties evolves in the course of the written procedure, one argument advanced by one party in relation to a particular plea in law may trigger a development in the other party’s case in relation to the same plea in law. As arguments are logically a sub-set of a particular plea in law, it is relatively easy to determine whether or not an additional argument is truly an amplification of an existing plea in law or a completely new point. More recently, the view has taken root that additional arguments are admissible either on the same or on an analogous basis as additional pleas in law, that is to say, that a new point (whether a plea in law or an argument) can be added if it amplifies an existing point (whether a plea in law or an argument) and is ‘closely linked’ to the existing point.350 That formulation is a tautology for which some excuse may be advanced when the formulation is employed in relation to a plea in law but that is difficult to justify in the case of an argument. When an argument amplifies a plea in law, it cannot avoid being ‘closely linked’ to the plea in law and the arguments previously advanced in support of that plea.351 In contrast, where the new point is a plea in law, the position is more problematical because one plea in law is not really a sub-set of (or a different way of putting) another plea in law. In general, the concept of one plea in law being both an amplification of and closely linked to another plea in law is deceptive: if that is the case, the former is more likely to be an argument in support of the latter. Conversely, if a new ‘argument’ is not an amplification of an existing plea in law (or an existing argument forming part of that plea in law), it is more likely that it is a new plea in law. The case law contains a large number of illustrations of the application of the ‘amplifying and closely linked’ test;352 349 See note 151 above. 350 Eg Case T-20/05 Outokumpu (above, note 149), para 58; Case T-19/05 Boliden v Commission [2010]  ECR II-1843, para  90 (which uses the term ‘submission’ to refer indiscriminately to an ‘argument’ and to a ‘plea in law’; whereas the English version says that the position is the ‘same’, the French version says that it is ‘analogous’); Commune de Valbronne (above, note 347), para 67 (which uses the correct terminology); Case T-587/08 Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission, 14 March 2013, para 792; Case T-301/10 In ‘t Veld v Commission, 19 March 2013, paras 97–100. 351 Hence, the formulation used in (for example) Case T-394/06 Italy v Commission, 12 September 2012, para 48, is more reliable than the formulation used in the cases cited in the preceding footnote. 352 Eg Case T-106/95 Federation Francaise des Societes d’Assurances (FFSA) v Commission [1997]  ECR II-229, paras 122–129 (amplification); Case T-204/99 Mattila v Council and Commission [2001] ECR II-2265, paras 30–34; Travelex (above, note 162), paras 33–42; Case T-388/03 Deutsche Post (above, note 166), paras 71–73; Case T-151/05 Nederlandse Vakbond Varkenshouders (above, note 207), paras 19–120; Case T-20/05 Outokumpu (above, note 149), paras 57–58 (the same point made in different ways); Case T-183/07 Poland v Commission [2009]  ECR II-3395, paras 71–79; Gualtieri v Commission (above, note 159), paras 35–38 (amplification); Boliden (above, note 350), paras 90–92 (a point about the short period of time in which an undertaking was a member of a cartel is not the same as a point about the gravity of its participation in the cartel); Case T-246/09 Insula v Commission (above, note 237), paras 197–201; Case T-366/09 Insula v Commission (above, note 161), paras 222– 226; Case T-72/06 Groupe Gascogne v Commission [2011]  ECR II-400*, paras 27–30 (on

808

Pleading 9.79

but the analytical position is not assisted by the existence of the phenomenon of the plea or argument that is considered to be both an amplification of, and closely related to, an existing point and, simultaneously, neither.353 In some instances, that phenomenon has materialised because the pleading is ambiguous. In others, it seems to have arisen because, in EU law, the same point is capable of being characterised in law in more than one way. Hence, if (for example) an action for annulment is brought on Ground A but not Ground B, an argument introduced in the reply that is capable of going to both Grounds should be read as going to Ground A unless the applicant pleads reliance in Ground B and can introduce it as a new plea.354 appeal, Case C-58/12P  Groupe Gascogne v Commission, 26  November 2013, paras 30–35) (unrelated arguments); Case T-79/06 Sachsa Verpackung v Commission [2011] ECR II-406*, paras 91–95 (cf the decision on appeal, Case C-40/12P  Sachsa Verpackung v Commission, 26 November 2013, paras 28–30) (same); Case T-381/08 DAI – Sociedade de Desenvolvimento Agro-Industrial SA  v Commission, 4  September 2012, paras 32–36 (exception of illegality raised in reply unconnected with pleas in application); Case T-154/10 France v Commission, 20 September 2012, paras 53–57 (reversed on that point, on appeal in Case C-559/12P France v Commission, 3 April 2014, paras 38–44); Case T-590/10 Thesing v European Central Bank, 29 November 2012, paras 24–26 (amplification; on appeal, Case C-28/13P Thesing v European Central Bank 6 February 2014); Case T-118/10 Acron v Council, 7 February 2013, para 92; Case T-591/10 Castiglioni v Commission, 26  February 2013, paras 34–41; Case T-451/08 Stim v Commission, 1 April 2013, paras 66–72; Case T-74/11 Omnis Group v Commission, 30 May 2013, paras 68–69; Case T-214/10 Moselland eG – Winzergenossenschaft v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 31 May 2013, paras 68– 75 (amplification); Case T-488/11 Sarc v Commission, 12 June 2014, para 70 (one new point an admissible amplification; the other not); Case T-439/11P  Ziegler v Commission, 11  July 2013, paras 45–46; Case T-633/11 Guangdong Kito Ceramics v Council, 22 May 2014, par 65; Case T-457/09 Westfalisch-Lippischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband v Commission, 17  July 2014, paras 160–163 (variation of a point admissible); Case T-498/11 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission, 26  September 2014, paras 38–41 (amplification); Case T-463/12 Popp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 6  November 2014, paras 16–23 (challenge to evidence introduced by an intervener an amplification of a plea); Cases T-472/09 and T-55/10 SP v Commission, 9 December 2014, para 66; Lucchini (above, note 40), paras 120 and 159–160; Cases T-489/09, T-490/09 and T-56/10 Leali v Commission, 9 December 2014, paras 62–63; Case T-476/12 Saint-Gobain (above, note 151), paras 34–39. The CST seems to take a more relaxed view: see, for example, Case F-55/10 AS v Commission, 28 June 2011, paras 51–53. 353 Eg Case T-426/08 Italy v Commission, 9 October 2012, paras 36–37. 354 Unfortunately, the case law exhibits a considerable lack of clarity concerning the difference between pleas and arguments and also the correct classification of a particular procedural problem. For example, in Case T-433/13 Petropars Iran Co v Council, 5 May 2015, the position was that the applicants were seeking the annulment of their inclusion in a sanctions list. They had been listed in 2013 because of their connection with entities assisting the Iranian government. In brief, in the application, they asserted that they were independent of the entities in question (but, apparently, without providing details). In the reply, they asserted that their ultimate parent, which had previously been a subsidiary of the entities in question, had been sold off in 2012 with the consequence that it and its subsidiaries no longer formed part of the group controlled by the entities in question. The defendant objected to that argument. The GC dealt with the issue in paras 51–59 of the judgment, rejecting the applicants’ argument that they had ceased to be part of the group in 2012 as being inadmissible because it was a new plea or argument which was not based on a new fact coming to light in the course of the procedure. However, it is obvious that the argument in the reply was nothing other than an amplification of a point made in the application. The problem in the case was rather different in nature. It appears that, in the

809

9.80  Pleading

9.80 Further evidence may be adduced, in the form of documents, or indicated in the reply or rejoinder but reasons should be given justifying the delay in production.355 The evidence may relate either to a fact already in issue between the parties or to a fact that has come to light in the course of the written procedure and which gives rise to a new issue admissible pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 56(1). Ordinarily, where the evidence relates to a fact already in issue, it is admissible if: (i) it is adduced in rebuttal of evidence adduced by the opposing party; (ii) it amplifies evidence already given; or (iii) it was not possible for the party adducing the additional evidence to have produced it beforehand.356 Evidence which was not produced or application, the applicants had muddied the waters by relying on a diagram that suggested that they were part of the corporate group in question and had run various other arguments but not (in express terms) the argument that the shares in the ultimate parent had been sold off in 2012 (the GC’s account of the facts tends to suggest that the applicants had not given their lawyers a full account of the relevant facts at the time when the application was drafted, behaviour that practising lawyers encounter and have to deal with more often than should be the case). The questions that the GC should have addressed were: (i) had the applicants conceded or admitted a relevant fact in the application; and, if so, (ii) should they be permitted to resile from that concession or admission once it had been found to have been based on a mistake (if that was, indeed, the position)? In public law cases, it is wrong in principle to regard as inadmissible a correction to a relevant fact, at least where the error has been identified and brought to the attention of the Court and the other party in good time. 355 RP-ECJ, art 128(1); RP-GC, art 85(2); RP-CST, art 57. Eg Case T-540/08 Esso v Commission, 11  July 2014, paras 65–66. The requirement to give reasons implies a prohibition on the introduction of new evidence if no reasons are given or the reasons provided are inadequate: eg Case T-47/05 Serrano v Parliament [2008] ECR SC-I-A-2-55, II-A-2-357, para 56 (unaffected by the appeal – Case C-496/08 P Serrano v Parliament [2010] ECR I-1793); Lucchini (above, note 40), paras 64–65. 356 RP-ECJ, art  64(3), RP-GC, art  92(7) and RP-CST, art  71(7) permit evidence to be adduced in rebuttal or in amplification of previous evidence. There is accordingly no difficulty in adducing additional evidence in order to expand on material put before the Court by the party in a previous pleading or in order to rebut a point made by the opposing party: eg Case T-25/05  KME  Germany AG  v Commission [2010]  ECR II-91*, paras 54–56 (unaffected by the appeal, Case C-389/10  P  KME  Germany AG  v Commission [2011]  ECR  I-13125); Case T-394/06 Italy v Commission, 12 September 2012, para 45; Case F-118/10 Psarras v European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, 2  October 2012, paras 40–41 (which seems to be a case about amplificatory evidence); Case T-198/09  UOP  Ltd v Commission, 7 March 2013, paras 32–33; Case.T-553/11 European Dynamics Luxembourg SA v European Central Bank, 22 May 2014, paras 72–74. In the GC’s conception, evidence is not evidence in rebuttal if the opposing party did not adduce any evidence but relied on the fact that the party in question had failed to produce evidence in an earlier pleading: Case T-303/10 WAM (above, note 176), paras 68–72 (unaffected by the appeal – Case C-560/12 P, above, note 176); Case T-309/12 Zweckverband Tierkorperbeseitigung, (above, note 289), para 224. If the additional evidence is neither evidence in rebuttal nor amplificatory evidence, it must be both relevant and incapable of production beforehand: eg  Case T-47/05 Serrano (above, note 355), paras 51–59. The position is different where the evidence in question is not evidence in rebuttal or amplificatory evidence and there is no good reason at all why the evidence was produced late: eg Case T-83/08 Denki Kagaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v Commission, 2 February 2012, paras 69–70; Case T-588/08 Dole Food Co Inc v Commission, 14 March 2013, paras 40–48 (upheld on appeal in Case C-286/13 P Dole Food Co Inc v Commission, 19 March 2015, paras 44–47) (evidence relating to assertions made in the contested decision); Lucchini (above, note 40), para 67 (same); Case T-293/12 Syria International Islamic Bank PJSC v Council, 11 June 2014, paras 76–82; Cases T-40/12 and T-183/12 European Dynamics Luxembourg SA  v European

810

Pleading 9.81

referred to in the application or defence through an oversight may be indicated in the reply or rejoinder.357 The rules relating to late production of evidence are interpreted and applied in a highly formalistic manner and are not based upon considerations such as the risk of prejudice to the opposing party or the risk of an injustice should the evidence be admitted or excluded. It is not necessary to repeat in the reply or rejoinder points made in an earlier pleading. Thus, where the defendant denies an assertion of fact made in the application, it is not necessary to set out in the reply a denial of that denial. On the other hand, it is necessary for a party to take up a position in the reply or, as the case may be, the rejoinder in respect of every point made in the opposing party’s earlier pleading (that is, the defence or reply) that is not covered by an assertion made in the application or, as the case may be, the defence.358 A general denial of all the opposing party’s assertions will normally make it clear that a party does not accept those points made by the opposing party that he does not choose to answer specifically. In that context, it should be noted that, where the applicant waives the right to lodge a reply, or the defendant waives the right to lodge a rejoinder, neither answers (in writing) the assertions made by the opposing party in the defence or, as the case may be, the reply. However, it has never been considered that, in giving up the right to answer in writing, the party concerned must be taken to have conceded the assertions made by the opposing party in the last pleading lodged by him. On the contrary, the assumption is that the party waiving the right to submit a further pleading takes issue with the assertions made in the latest pleading to be lodged. In effect, therefore, there is an implied joinder of issue on the pleadings as they stand when the written procedure ends. 5 New pleas 9.81 RP-ECJ, art 127(1) and RP-GC, art 84(1) provide: ‘No new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure’. RP-CST, Police Office, 19 November 2014, paras 63–68. The same principles apply where there is no second round of pleadings: eg Case T-424/12 UAB Gaumina v European Institute for Gender Equality, 28 November 2013, paras 44–46. The only difference between the criteria applied to the admissibility of additional evidence produced during a second exchange of pleadings and evidence produced after the close of the written procedure is that amplificatory evidence is not admitted in the latter situation (unless it was impossible to have produced it beforehand): eg Gaumina (above); Case T-406/09 Donau Chemie AG v Commission, 14 May 2014, paras 212–213; Case T-43/12 Hamcho v Council, 13 November 2014, paras 91–92. 357 Case 19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission [1978] ECR 131 at 162 (Advocate General Warner): papers forgotten in an old file. Per contra, Lucchini (above, note 40), para 68; Case T-176/12 Bank Tejarat v Council, 22 January 2015, paras 44–51. 358 Eg Case C-375/90 Commission v Greece [1993] ECR I-2055, paras 29 and 34–35, where the applicant failed to contest assertions made by the defendant, leading the Court to conclude that the applicant failed on the issues in question. Some assertions made by the opposing party do not need a specific reply: for example, as pointed out in Case 166/82 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 459, paras 19–22, the mere fact that the applicant has failed to reply to suggestions made by the defendant that the applicant has narrowed the scope of the action does not establish that the scope of the action has in fact been narrowed; for that to be so, there would have to be some express concession by the applicant.

811

9.82  Pleading

art  56(1) is to the same effect save that it states that no new plea in law may be introduced after the first exchange of pleadings (that is, the application and defence), rather than ‘in the course of the proceedings’. Before 1991 the Rules of Procedure provided that no new plea in law (then described as a ‘fresh issue’) could be raised unless it was based on matters of law or of fact coming to light in the course of the written procedure. As Advocate General Mischo pointed out in Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission,359 that produced a lacuna in the Court’s procedure: a fresh issue could not be raised in respect of matters of fact or of law coming to light between the close of the written procedure and the date of judgment.360 In consequence, he suggested that what is now RP-ECJ, art 127(1) should also apply to fresh issues based on facts coming to light after the end of the written procedure; and that suggestion was incorporated into the Rules of Procedure when they were amended in 1991. The previous case law still provides reliable guidance regarding what constitutes a new plea in law (or ‘fresh issue’) based on matters of law or of fact which have come to light in the course of the procedure, always bearing in mind that the right to introduce a new plea in law is now more extensive. 9.82 RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) and RP-CST, art 56(1) indicate that, in principle, the scope of an action is restricted to the issues between the parties as they are defined in the application and the defence; it is by way of exception to that principle that one or other of the parties may introduce a new plea in law based on matters of law or of fact coming to light in the course of the procedure. That exception apart, neither the applicant nor the defendant can broaden the areas of dispute, whether of fact or of law, in a pleading subsequent to the application or, as the case may be, the defence or at the hearing. Any attempt to do so is inadmissible.361 That general prohibition on the extension 359 [1989] ECR 2859 at 2908–2909. 360 In fact, there was some authority that such an issue could be raised: see para 9.91 below. It was perhaps more accurate to state that the then wording of what is now RP-ECJ, art 127(1) (at the time, RP-ECJ, art 42(2)) suggested the existence of a lacuna that was in the process of being filled by a practice adopted from time to time by the Court. The amendment of RP-ECJ, art 42(2) (as it then was) removed any risk that the Court’s practice might be regarded as being at variance with its Rules of Procedure. 361 The cases on that point are numerous. See, for example, Case 9/55 Société des Charbonnages des Beeringen v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 311 at 326; Case 18/57 Nold v High Authority [1959]  ECR  41 at 51; Cases 27–29/58 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Givors v High Authority [1960] ECR 241 at 256; Cases 19 and 21/60, 2 and 3/61 Société Fives Lille Cail v High Authority [1961] ECR 281 at 295; Cases 17 and 20/61 Kloeckner and Hoesch v High Authority [1962]  ECR  325 at 347; Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten SA and Grundig Verkaufs GmbH  v Commission [1966] ECR 299 at 335–356 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 16/67 Labeyrie v Commission [1968] ECR 293 at 311 (Advocate General Roemer); Cases 54–60/76 Compagnie Industrielle et Agricole du Comté de Leheac v Council and Commission [1977] ECR 645, paras 2–4; Case 68/77  IFG  v Commission [1978]  ECR  353 at 378 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 12/79 Hans-Otto Wagner GmbH  Agrarhandel KG  v Commission [1979]  ECR  3657, para  8 and at 3678 per Advocate General Warner; Case 43/79 Mencarelli v Commission [1980]  ECR  201 at 216 (Advocate General Mayras); Case 11/81 Firma Anton Dürbeck v Commission [1982]  ECR  1251; Case 119/81 Kloeckner v Commission [1982]  ECR  2627 at 2678–2679 (Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat); Case 110/81 Roquette Frères SA  v Council [1982]  ECR  3159, para  31; Case 59/83 Biovilac v Commission [1984]  ECR  4057,

812

Pleading 9.82

of the scope of proceedings applies just as much where the proceedings are the subject of an appeal362 and where, at the close of the appeal proceedings, the matter is remitted to the lower court for judgment;363 but it does not, of course, prevent a party from elaborating the submissions made in connection with an existing issue.364 Further, the prohibition on raising new pleas does not apply para 24; Case 150/84 Bernardi v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1375, para 22; Case 25/86 Suss v Commission [1986]  ECR  3929, para  9; Cases 279, 280, 285 and 286/84 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v Commission [1987]  ECR  1069, paras 38–39 and at 1096 per Advocate General Lenz; Case 95/86 Ferriere San Carlo SpA  v Commission [1987]  ECR  1413, para  5; Case 7/86 Vincent v European Parliament [1987] ECR 2473 at 2486 (Advocate General Cruz Vilaça); Case 262/83 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 3073, para 24 at 3084–3085 per Advocate General Cruz Vilaça; Case 208/85 Commission v Germany [1987]  ECR  4045, para  9; Case 298/86 Commission v Belgium [1988]  ECR  4343, para  8 and at 4355 per Advocate General Cruz Vilaça; Cases 260/85 and 106/86 Tokyo Electric Co Ltd v Council [1988] ECR 5855 at 5909 (Advocate General Slynn); Case 305/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1461 at 1469 (Advocate General Jacobs; the Court refused to consider the point on the ground that it was not supported by any new evidence: see para 11); Case C-121/86 Anonimos Etaireia Epicheiriseon Metalleftikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon AE v Council [1989] ECR 3919 at 3937 (Advocate General Tesauro); Case T-33/90 Von Bonkewitz-Lindner v European Parliament [1991] ECR II1251, para 55; Case C-230/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-1909, para 14; Case T-45/90 Speybrouck v European Parliament [1992] ECR II-33, para 88; Case T-16/90 Panagiotopoulou v European Parliament [1992] ECR II-89, paras 69–74; Cases T-68, T-77 and T-78/89 Società Italiano Vetro SA  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-1403, para  82; Case C-282/90 Industrie-en Handelsondernerning Vreugdenkil BV v Commission [1992] ECR I-1937, para 10 and at 1949 per Advocate General Darmon; Case C-385/89 Greece v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-3225, para 21; Case C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli SpA v Commission [1992] ECR I-6313, para 18; Case T-84/92 Nielsen and Möller v Economic and Social Committee [1993] ECR II-949, paras 35–38 (a reversal of position concerning part of the case as originally pleaded; the CFI refused to consider the offer of proof made in connection with the new plea because it did not establish why the new plea could not have been made earlier – para 39); Cases T-227/01 to T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Historico de Alava (above, note 208), paras 188–193; Case T-437/05 Brink’s Security Luxembourg SA  v Commission [2009]  ECR II-3233, paras 49–53; Case T-432/05 EMC Development v Commission [2010] ECR II-1629, paras 51, 83, 96, 99–100, 103, 128; Case C-55/91 Italy v Commission [1993] ECR I-4813, para 40; Cases F-23/12 and F-30/12 Glantenay v Commission, 16 September 2013, para 34; Case C-617/11 P Marcuccio v Commission, 3  October 2013, para  45 (claim for damages introduced in the reply); Case T-553/11 European Dynamics Luxembourg v European Central Bank, 23 May 2014, para 57. 362 See RP-ECJ, art  170(1) and 190(1) (which applies RP-ECJ, art  127 to appeal proceedings); RP-GC, art 196(1) and 213(1) (which applies RP-GC, art 84 to appeal proceedings). Eg Case C-76/11P  Tresplain Investments v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2011] ECR I-182*, paras 51–57. 363 RP-GC, art  218 (which applies Title III, including RP-GC, art  84); RP-CST, art  130(6) (which applies RP-CST, art 56). Eg Case T-43/89RV Gill v Commission [1993] ECR II-303, para 47; Case T-236/0 Marcuccio v Commission, 14 September 2011, para 88 (on appeal Case C-617/11 P Marcuccio, above, note 361). 364 Eg Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 37 at 51; Case 2/57 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority [1957–58]  ECR  199 at 206; Case 19/58 Germany v High Authority [1960]  ECR  225 at 239; Cases 9 and 12/60 Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs SA  v High Authority [1961]  ECR  197 at 215; Cases 29, 31, 36, 39–47, 50 and 51/63 Fonderies et Usines de la Providence v High Authority [1965] ECR 911 at 935; Cases 209–215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck Sarl v Commission [1980]  ECR  3125 at 3302 (Advocate General Reischl); Case 306/81 Verros v European Parliament [1983]  ECR  1755, para 9; the Walter Rau case (above, note 186) at 1095 (Advocate General Lenz); Case 257/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 3249, para 15 and at 3259–3260 (Advocate General Darmon);

813

9.83  Pleading

to the Court and the Rules of Procedure do not prevent the Court from taking a point of its own motion.365 On occasion, the Court has preferred to consider the merits of a new plea rather than dismiss it as inadmissible; but those seem to be cases where the plea could be rejected with little difficulty and with less trouble than by applying RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or RP-CST, art 56(1).366 9.83 The inability to raise a new plea in law (otherwise than as permitted by RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or RP-CST, art 56(1)) applies just as much to interveners as it does to the applicant and defendant.367 That does not mean that, if the applicant or defendant is precluded from raising a plea in law which has been omitted from the application or defence, an intervener is similarly barred from raising the issue in its statement in intervention; it simply means that an intervener is barred from raising a new plea after lodging the statement in intervention (unless RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 56(1) may be relied on).368 6 Matters of law or fact justifying a new plea 9.84 The raising of a new plea is justified only if it is based on a matter of law or fact that has ‘come to light’ in the course of the procedure, unless it is a point that the Court can take of its own motion. A matter of law, such as the (alleged) unlawfulness of a regulation or a recent judgment, cannot be relied on to justify adding a new plea in law if it was capable of being known and pleaded at an earlier stage369 unless, so far as the applicant is concerned, it arises from Case C-163/88 Kontogeorgis v Commission [1989]  ECR  4189 at 4197 (Advocate General Jacobs); Case T-37/89 Hanning v European Parliament [1990]  ECR II-463, para  38; Case T-16/91 Rendo NV  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-2417, para  96; Case C-338/92 Compagnie d’Entreprise CFE  v European Parliament [1993]  ECR  I-5237, paras 7–9; Case T-59/92 Caronna v Commission [1993]  ECR II-1129, para  34; Case T-14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irelande v Commission [1999] ECR II-139, para 66; Case T-344/06 Total SA v Commission, 27 September 2012, para 98. 365 Eg BaByliss (above, note 119), para  306. On the taking of points by the Court of its own motion, see: Case 131/83 Vaupel v European Court of Justice (unreported), para 5; Cases C-133 and C-150/87 Nashua Corpn v Commission and Council [1990] ECR I-719 at 743 (Advocate General Mischo), where the defendant had originally accepted that the application was admissible but reversed its position at the hearing; Case T-16/90 Panagiotopoulu v Parliament [1992] ECR II-89, para 83; Case C-272/12P Commission v Ireland (above, note 221), paras 27–36. Unless the Court can take a new point of its own motion, to do so would involve the Court in ruling ultra petita, which is an appealable error of law. 366 Eg Case 401/85 Schina v Commission [1987] ECR 3911, para 15. 367 Case 233/85 Bonino v Commission [1987] ECR 739 at 753–754 (Advocate General Darmon). 368 Cf Case 253/84 Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun (GAEC) de la Ségaude v Council and Commission [1987] ECR 123 at 153–154 (Advocate General Slynn). 369 Roquette v Council (above, note 224), para 31; see for example, Case 114/76 Bela-Mühle Josef Bergmann KG v Grows Farm GmbH & Co KG [1977] ECR 1211 at 1243 (Advocate General Capotorti); Durbeck (above, note 361), para  17; Case C-135/92 Fiskano AB  v Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, paras 31–33 (Advocate General Darmon, paras 49–56); FFSA (above, note 352), paras 55–58. In contrast, the definitive annulment of a measure, during the course of the proceedings, does justify the introduction of a new plea: Cases T-420/11 and T-56/12 Ocean Capital Administration GmbH v Council, 22 January 2015, para 49.

814

Pleading 9.84

a proposition of law adopted in the defence.370 The replacement of the measure contested in the action by another measure having the same effect is regarded as a new matter permitting the applicant to modify the relief sought and the pleas in law.371 An amendment to the Treaties is not a new matter justifying the introduction of a new plea (or new argument) if it relates to a matter that could have been raised before (such as an existing principle of EU law) or was previously anticipated in the case law.372 For a new fact to be able to justify raising a new plea in law, it must not have existed or must not have been known to the applicant when the action was commenced or to the defendant when the defence was lodged (and the applicant or, as the case may be, the defendant was not in a position to know the fact)373 or, if known beforehand, its relevance to the case must not have been known.374 A new fact is capable of being a fact brought to light by means of a measure or organisation or procedure.375 A judgment delivered after the commencement of proceedings does not in principle justify raising a new plea (the reason being, in essence, that the principle of law decided in the judgment is ordinarily capable of being raised at the proper time, the judgment

370 Cases 12 and 29/64 Ley v Commission [1965]  ECR  107 at 119; Cases 63–69/72 Wilhelm Werhahn Hansamuhle v Council (above, note 113) at 1273–1274 (Advocate General Roemer). A new point is not admissible merely because it has been raised in response to a question put by the Court: eg Panagiotopoulu (above, note 361), para 72. 371 Eg Cases T-267/08 and T-279/08 Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais v Commission [2011]  ECR II1999, para  23; Case T-141/05  RENV  Internationaler Hilsfonds v Commission [2011]  ECR II-6495, para  34. The cases on this point are legion: see further Ch 2, para  2.161 and notes 244–245 above. 372 Eg the Groupe Gascogne and Sachsa Verpackung cases, at first instance and on appeal (above, note 352, at the passages cited there). 373 Firma Anton Dürbeck v Commission (above, note 361), para  17; Miller International Schallplatten GmbH  v Commission (above, note 357); Case 145/83 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3539 at 3552 (Advocate General Mancini), where the relevant fact on which the defendant’s liability was based was not discovered until a preparatory enquiry held in the course of the proceedings; Case 5/85  AKZO  Chemie BV and Akzo Chemie UK  Ltd v Commission [1986]  ECR  2585, paras 14–17, points based on facts known to the party before the action was brought; Case 246/84 Kotsonis v Council [1986]  ECR  3989, para  18, a point based on documents not produced until after the close of the written procedure; Case T-22/92 Weissenfels v European Parliament [1993] ECR II-1095, paras 33–35; Interpipe Nikopolsky (above, note 160), paras 128–129 (point arising from information provided in defence); Cases T-30/01 to T-32/01 and T-86/02 to T-88/02 Territorio Historico de Alava – Diputacion Foral de Alava v Commission [2009] ECR II-2919, paras 330–331 (same); Case T-303/08 Tresplain Investments v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2010]  ECR II-5659, para 167 (on appeal, Case C-76/11), above, note 362); Case T-574/08 Syndicat des thonniers mediterraneens v Commission, 7 November 2012, pars 50–53; Cases T-420/11 and T-56/12 Ocean Capital Administration v Commission, 22 January 2015, paras 48–49. 374 Case T-12/89 Solvay & Cie SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-907, para 47; Case T-246/08 and T-332/08 Melli Bank pc v Council [2009] ECR II-2629, paras 27–30. 375 Case F-64/10 Mantzouratos v Parliament, 7  June 2011, para  48 (which also states that the prohibition on raising a new plea should be given a restrictive interpretation, a view that is not reflected in many GC cases).

815

9.85  Pleading

merely strengthening the force of the argument).376 A change in the law that does not date back to the time when the contested measure was adopted is not a new matter of law that is capable of justifying a new plea.377 7 The procedure when a new plea is raised 9.85 A new plea based on matters of law or fact that have come to light in the course of the procedure ought to be raised as soon as possible after the matter of law or fact in question has come to light, that is, as soon as that matter has come to the knowledge of the party in question.378 It follows that, where the matter of law or fact comes to light before the reply or, as the case may be, the rejoinder has been lodged (where there is a second exchange of pleadings), it should be included in that pleading.379 If necessary, an application for an extension of time to lodge the reply or rejoinder may be made so as to enable the party to include the new plea in the pleading. For the sake of clarity, the new plea should be identified as such in the reply or rejoinder.380 9.86 When the matter of law or fact in question comes to light after the close of the written procedure (for example, after the rejoinder or, where there is no second exchange of pleadings, after the defence), the Rules of Procedure are notably vague about how the new plea is to be raised. Although a new plea can in principle be introduced at the hearing, that is not really appropriate unless the matter of law or fact justifying the introduction of the new plea came to light so close to the hearing that it would not be practicable to organise an exchange of written pleadings on the new plea before the commencement of the hearing. Unless that is the case, it would appear that a new plea should be raised by a written application seeking to introduce it.381 The application would set out the plea, the arguments in support of it and, importantly, the matters of law or fact justifying the introduction of the plea as a new plea (including the date on which the party making the application first obtained knowledge of the matter(s) of law or fact in question).382 If those matters of law or fact come to the knowledge of the party after the hearing, the same process may be followed.

376 Case C-279/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-5785, para 17 and at 5809–5810 (Advocate General Gulmann); FFSA  v Commission (above, note 352), paras 54–60; RJB (above, note 161), para 36; Case F-18/09 Merhzaoui v Council, 10 November 2011, para 36; Case T-391/09 Evonik Degussa v Commission, 23  January 2014, para  280 (on appeal, Case C-155/14P, pending). 377 Gualtieri v Commission (above, note 159), paras 25–27. 378 Cf RP-GC, art 84(2), 2nd sentence. 379 Cf RP-GC, art 84(2), 1st sentence. 380 As RP-GC, art 84(2), 1st sentence, provides. 381 See also the comments in paras 9.90–9.92 below. It would seem that such an application could be based directly on RP-ECJ, art 127, RP-GC, art 84 or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 56. Alternatively, the application could be characterised as an application for a measure of organisation of procedure or a preliminary issue not going to the substance of the case. 382 It is usual for the Court to want an explanation of the reasons why the new plea was not raised earlier: eg Case T-317/12 Holcim (Romania) v Commission, 18 September 2014, para 219.

816

Pleading 9.88

9.87 Whenever in the course of the proceedings a new plea is raised, it must comply with the usual rules relating to clarity and completeness, failing which it may be inadmissible in any event.383 When a new plea in law is raised during the procedure, the President gives the other party or parties an opportunity to answer it.384 That is without prejudice to the admissibility of the plea, which is decided in the final judgment.385 Where a new plea in law is raised during the written procedure, it is normally incorporated in the pleading (reply or rejoinder) and it is only where it appears in the rejoinder that it may be necessary for the President to allow the other party (the applicant) time to answer it in writing. 9.88 The object of the restriction on the raising of new pleas in law is twofold:386 to prevent a time limit from being evaded387 and to safeguard the opposing party’s right to be heard.388 In a number of cases, therefore, when a new plea in law has been rejected as inadmissible, the Court or advocate general has noted that the opposing party had not had an adequate opportunity to answer it.389 It has in consequence been suggested that what is now RP-ECJ, art 127(1) (and therefore RP-GC, art 84(1) and RP-CST, art 56(1)) should not be rigidly applied

383 Eg Case T-391/09 Evonik Degussa (above, note 376), paras 276–286. 384 RP-ECJ, art 127(2); RP-GC, art 84(3); RP-CST, art 56(2). Eg Case 131/87 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3743 at 3746. In ECJ proceedings, the President acts on the basis of a proposal from the judge-rapporteur and after hearing the advocate general; in CST proceedings, the President acts on the basis of a report from the judge-rapporteur. In ECJ and CST proceedings, the President ‘may’ allow the other parties to respond to the plea; in GC proceedings, he ‘shall’ do so. The difference appears to be cosmetic only because, unless the new plea is manifestly unmeritorious, a failure to allow the other parties an opportunity to respond would infringe their right to be heard. 385 That is the meaning of the reference to ‘the decision to be taken’ by the Court on the admissibility of the new plea in RP-ECJ, art  127(2), RP-GC, art  84(3): see RP-CST, art  56(3). Thus, the application made in Case 129/85 British Columbia Forest Products Ltd v Commission, order of 27 September 1988, [1989] 4 CMLR 22, for the striking out of certain passages in the rejoinder seems to have been misconceived as well as unfounded. 386 Case 219/78 Michaelis v Commission [1979]  ECR  3349 at 3361–3362 (Advocate General Capotorti). 387 Société Fives Lille Cail v High Authority (above, note 361) at 295; Case 36/72 Meganck v Commission [1973] ECR 527 at 539 (Advocate General Mayras); Wilhelm Werhahn Hansamuhle v Council (above, note 113) at 1273–1274 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 19/85 GrégoireFoulon v European Parliament [1985]  ECR  3771, para  8; Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v Commission (above, note 186) at 1096 (Advocate General Lenz); Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283 at 3335 (Advocate General Darmon). That usually applies to issues raised in the reply. 388 See Case 46/75  IBC  v Commission [1976]  ECR  65 at 89 (Advocate General Warner); Case 112/78 Kobor v Commission [1979] ECR 1573 at 1581 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission [1980]  ECR  2229 at 2291–2292 (Advocate General Warner); Case 24/79 Oberthür v Commission [1980]  ECR  1743 at 1764–1765 (Advocate General Mayras); Cases 118–123/82 Celant v Commission [1983] ECR 2995, para 20. 389 Eg Cases 244 and 245/85 Cerealmangimi SpA and Italgrani SpA  v Commission [1987] ECR 1303, para 23 and at 1320 per Advocate General Mischo; Case 323/87 Commission v Italy [1989]  ECR  2275 at 2296 (Advocate General Jacobs); Case C-282/90 Industrie-en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenkil BV  v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-1937 at 1949 (Advocate General Darmon).

817

9.89  Pleading

where no time limit is involved390 or where the other party has had an adequate opportunity to reply to the point.391 Advocate General Reischl expressed the opinion that what is now RP-ECJ, art 127(1) (and therefore RP-GC, art 84(1) and RP-CST, art 56(1)) is not applied if it is felt to be expedient not to apply it,392 but there is no clear authority for that unless it is taken to be an allusion to the suggestions just mentioned. 8 Changes to the form of order 9.89 RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) and RP-CST, art 56(1) do not in terms apply to an amendment of the form of order in the application or defence or to a change in the subject matter of the action; and the addition of a new claim cannot, in consequence, be based on them.393 While a concession may be made394 or the form of order clarified395 in the reply or rejoinder, a substantial change in the nature of the action or the relief sought (even in the alternative) is inadmissible.396 There is in consequence a tendency to take a variation in a party’s claims 390 Fonderies et Usines de la Providence v High Authority, (above, note 186) at 951 (Advocate General Roemer); Wilhelm Werhahn v Council (above, note 113) at 1273–1274 (Advocate General Roemer). 391 Kobor v Commission (above, note 388) (Advocate General Capotorti); Distillers Co Ltd v Commission (above, note 388) (Advocate General Warner); Oberthür v Commission (above, note 388) (Advocate General Mayras); Case C-279/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1992]  ECR  I-5785 at 5809–5810 (Advocate General Gulmann). Cf Case 78/83  USINOR  v Commission [1984] ECR 4177 at 4207 (Advocate General Slynn). 392 Cases 56–60/74 Kurt Kampffmeyer Mühlenvereinigung KG  v Commission and Council [1976] ECR 711 at 754; see also the Dürbeck case (above, note 361) at 1275. 393 Case 267/85 Luttgens v Commission [1986] ECR 3417, para 6 and at 3429 (Advocate General Cruz Vilaça); Case T-41/89 Schwedler v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-79, para 34; Case T-20/92 Moat v Commission [1993]  ECR II-799, para  45. There have been cases where the Court has dismissed a new claim as unfounded rather than as inadmissible, possibly because it was less troublesome to deal with the claim on that basis: eg Case 7/86 Vincent v European Parliament [1987]  ECR  2473 (contrast paras 24–27 with 2486 per Advocate General Cruz Vilaça: one explanation of the case is that, as the Court had unlimited jurisdiction, the new claims were not inadmissible). 394 Cases 18 and 19/64 Alvino and Benoit v Commission [1965] ECR 789. 395 Case 28/64 Müller v Council and Euratom Council [1965] ECR 237 at 249; Cases 18 and 35/65 Gutmann v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 103 at 125 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 2/68 Ufficio Imposte di Consumo di Ispra v Commission [1968] ECR 435 at 449 (Advocate General Roemer); Case 74/74  CNTA  v Commission [1975]  ECR  533, para  5; Case 17/78 Deshormes v Commission [1979] ECR 189 at 212 (Advocate General Reischl); see also Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 533 at 576 but compare Bernardi v European Parliament (above, note 361), paras 2–4. 396 Case 17/57 Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limberg v High Authority [1959] ECR 1 at 8; Case 83/63 Krawczynski v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 623 at 633 and 640; Case 17/68 Reinarz v Commission [1969] ECR 61, para 47; Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR 2729, para 3; Case 125/78 GEMA v Commission [1979] ECR 3173, para 26 and 3201–3202 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 124/81 Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 203, para 6; Case C-180/88 Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen-und Stahlindustrie v Commission [1990] ECR I-4413 at 4433–4434 (Advocate General Darmon); Case T-14/89 Montedipe SpA  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-1155, para  38; Case T-48/90 Giordani v Commission [1993]  ECR II-721, para 94 (claim for moral damage rejected because raised only at the hearing); Case C-294/02 Commission v AMI Semiconductor Belgium BVBA [2005] ECR I-2175, paras 73–78 (in that case,

818

Pleading 9.90

into account only as an argument on the interpretation to be given to the relief originally sought.397 The only exception to that appears to be where a new factor intervenes during the course of the proceedings and it would not be in the interests of the administration of justice and due process, or it would be inequitable in all the circumstances, to disallow an amendment and require proceedings to be started again. That occurred in Alpha Steel v Commission398 where the applicant sought the annulment of a decision which was replaced by another decision after the commencement of proceedings. The defendant claimed that the applicant should therefore have commenced a new action against the latter. The Court rejected that submission and allowed an amendment of the form of order, extending it to cover the second decision.399 As a result, it does not seem that the reply or rejoinder need contain a form of order unless it is intended to concede or clarify a claim or rely on a new factor justifying a substantial change in the relief sought.

D

Subsequent pleadings

9.90 In theory there are no further written pleadings after the rejoinder (where there has been a second exchange of pleadings) or the defence (where there is no second exchange). Where the applicant waives his right to lodge a reply or the defendant waives his right to lodge a rejoinder, the pleadings end with the defence and the reply, respectively. A  subsequent pleading which purports to ‘complete’ the written procedure is in principle inadmissible400 unless lodged in an additional reason for the inadmissibility of the additional claim was that it impleaded persons who were not already parties to the proceedings: see para 76); VIP Car Solutions (above, note 161), paras 109–12; Case T-439/08 Agapiou Josephides v Commission [2010] ECR II-230*, paras 168–169. See also Case 24/71 Meinhardt (née Forderung) v Commission [1972] ECR 269 at 280 (Advocate General Roemer), where the applicant amended the form of order in the reply and then reverted to the original claim for relief at the hearing. The Court did not rule on the admissibility of the amendments made by the parties to the forms of order in Deka Getreideprodukte GmbH & Co KG v Council and Commission (above, note 310). 397 Eg Case C-87/89 Société Nationale Interprofessionnelle de la Tomate v Commission [1990] ECR I-1981 at 1993 (Advocate General Lenz). 398 Case 14/81 [1982] ECR 749 at para 8. In such circumstances, the form of order may be amended pursuant to a separate application for permission to amend it: eg Case T-341/07 Sison v Council [2009] ECR II-3625, paras 30–40 and 47–50 (decided before the GC rules of procedure were amended to provide expressly for such an application). See further Ch 2, para 2.161, and notes 244–245 above. 399 The same approach was followed in Case 103/85 Stahwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG v Commission [1988] ECR 4131, paras 11–12, where the ECJ allowed an action in respect of a failure to act to be transformed into an action for annulment. 400 Eg Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 333, order of 20 January 1956 (unreported): the Court rejected a pleading lodged by the applicant after the lodgment of the rejoinder. In Case 62/83 Eximo v Commission [1984]  ECR  2295 (see 2299) the applicant appears to have lodged a ‘supplementary pleading’. Its admissibility was reserved to the final judgment but, since the applicant’s case was dismissed, it was not necessary for the Court to rule on admissibility. In Case T-24/07 ThyssenKrupp Stainless (above, note 163), paras 41–43, objection was taken to the Commission’s written comments on the report for the hearing but the Commission was not considered to have added any new arguments (where a report for the hearing is produced, it is usual for it to be sent to the parties for their comments, which should

819

9.91  Pleading

connection with a new plea in law admissible pursuant to RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or RP-CST, art 56(1), as a consequence of the GC authorising the parties to supplement the case file under RP-GC, art 83(2), or in response to a request made by the Court. 9.91 There is considerable authority against the admission of new pleas after the close of the written procedure and, in particular, at the hearing,401 based on the grounds that (i) RP-ECJ, art  42(2) (before it was amended in 1991; now, in further amended form, RP-ECJ, art 127(1)) envisaged the raising of such pleas during the written procedure only and must be taken implicitly to have excluded their raising during the oral procedure, and (ii) the opposing party does not have an adequate opportunity to answer a new plea (as opposed to an argument) raised for the first time after the close of the written procedure or at the hearing.402 In fact, however, RP-ECJ, art 42(2) (as it was at the time) only excluded the raising of new pleas which were not based on matters of fact and law that had come to light during the written procedure; it did not expressly exclude the raising of a new plea which was based on such a matter but which could not have been raised beforehand, eg  a new plea raised by the applicant and based on a matter which emerged for the first time after the lodgment of the reply. In that situation, even before the amendment of RP-ECJ, art 42(2) (as it then was) to allow a new plea to be raised in relation to a matter of fact or law coming to light at any time in the course of the procedure, it seems that the new plea was admissible at the hearing403 or might be raised (by the applicant) in a supplementary pleading.404 The current wording of RP-ECJ, art  127, RP-GC, art  84 and RP-CST, art  56 makes the position plain by allowing the Court to admit a new plea whether it is based on a matter of fact or law that has come to light during or after the written procedure. Where a party wishes to raise a new plea after the close of the written procedure, application may be made in writbe restricted to pointing out any inaccuracies in the report for the hearing; see, by way of contrast, Cases T-81/07 and T-83/07 KG Holding v Commission [2009] ECR II-2411, para 35 – comments on report for the hearing ignored). 401 The Court may also reject as inadmissible a clarification of the relief sought which is made at the hearing: Case 30/68 Lacroix v Commission [1970] ECR 301, para 26. 402 See Case 12/68 X v Audit Board [1969] ECR 109 at 121 (Advocate General Gand); Meganck v Commission (above, note 221) at 539 (Advocate General Mayras); Case 46/75  IBC  v Commission [1976]  ECR  65 at 89 (Advocate General Warner); GEMA  v EC  Commission (above, note 396) at 3201–3202 (Advocate General Capotorti); Cases 103–109/78 Société des Usines de Beauport v Council [1979]  ECR  17 at 31 (Advocate General Warner); Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671 at 2704 (Advocate General Capotorti); Case 323/87 Commission v Italy [1989]  ECR  2275 at 2296 (Advocate General Jacobs). 403 Case 21/65 Morina v European Parliament [1965] ECR 1033 at 1040. 404 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission (above, note 388): The Court found it unnecessary to give a ruling on the admissibility of the pleading because it considered the matters raised to be irrelevant (see para 29) but Advocate General Warner did think it was admissible because the other parties had had an opportunity to answer the points raised (see 2292). In Case C-113/07P SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission [2009] ECR I-2207, paras 42–48, the rejection of a supplementary pleading lodged after the end of the written procedure was upheld because it was not based on a new fact, not because such a pleading cannot be lodged where the circumstances justify it.

820

Pleading 9.92

ing or orally at the hearing.405 A written application must comply with the general rules applicable to pleadings. No other requirements are laid down in the Rules of Procedure. It would seem that the application would set out the matter of fact or law which has come to light, aver that it was not known and could not have been pleaded beforehand and state the new plea to be raised and the arguments relied on in support of it. The form of order in the application would comprise a prayer that the Court admit the issue.406 At that stage in the proceedings, the Court is not concerned with the question whether or not the new plea is admissible in accordance with RP-ECJ, art 127(1), RP-GC, art 84(1) or RP-CST, art 56(1); the only relevant question is whether or not the other parties should be given an opportunity to answer the application in writing. If the nature and content of the application suggest that the other parties should be given that opportunity, the President will then fix a date by which they must submit an answer in writing. The answer must be limited to the points raised in the application and may contain a form of order requesting the rejection of the application as inadmissible or the dismissal of the new plea as unfounded. 9.92 In the course of the proceedings the Court may ask the parties to submit observations on a point, answer questions or supply evidence or information etc.407 The pleadings containing the answers to such requests should comply with the basic rules governing all pleadings and should avoid unnecessary formalism. The titles should be sufficient to identify the case to which the pleading relates but it does not appear to be necessary to comply to the letter with the requirements that apply to the application commencing proceedings and the defence. The opposing party may reply to the answer given at the hearing (if not allowed to do so in writing beforehand); a written pleading in reply is in principle inadmissible and so can be lodged only at the invitation or with the consent of the Court. Where evidence has been produced pursuant to a request or order of the Court, the opposing party may be given an opportunity to submit evidence in rebuttal408 but his only opportunity to submit observations on the evidence pro 405 See para  9.86 above. In the Distillers case reliance appears to have been placed on what is now RP-ECJ, art 127. If the application is made orally at the hearing, there must be some very good reason why it was not made beforehand: the Court has been known to refuse to take at the hearing even points going to the admissibility of the action (which it is usually regarded as obliged to consider whether or not the point is raised by the parties) where they turn on matters of fact that have not been the subject of debate between the parties at an earlier stage in the proceedings. 406 It is unclear if the application need include a prayer for the costs of the application to be awarded to the applicant. Such a prayer would in principle be encompassed in the general prayer for costs normally included in the principal pleading of the party concerned (the application or defence). 407 Eg BaByliss (above, note 119), paras 300–304; Case T-222/07P  Kerstens v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-37, II-B-1-267, paras 73–75 (endorsing the CST’s decision to ask the applicant to comment on a document attached to the rejoinder on the ground that the adversarial nature of proceedings means that a party is entitled to comment on the evidence adduced by the opposing party); Esso (above, note 355), paras 56–62 (the applicant took advantage of a request to respond on certain points and broadened its submissions to cover other points arising from the rejoinder; the pleading and the attached evidence were admitted). 408 RP-ECJ, art 64(3); RP-GC, art 92(7); RP-CST, art 71(7).

821

9.93  Pleading

duced is at the hearing unless the Court decides to invite the parties to submit written observations.409

E

Pleadings in ancillary proceedings

9.93 As a general rule, applications in ancillary proceedings (interim relief, intervention, third party proceedings and so forth) follow the same pattern as the application commencing the action and are subject to the same basic requirements as to the need for clearly articulated pleas and submissions.410 If a form of order is not included, the pleading may be inadmissible, at least where it is required expressly.411 It is arguable that all applications must contain a form of order even in the absence of an express requirement in the Rules of Procedure because, otherwise, they are to be construed as articulating a wish on the part of the applicant, not a request for the Court to make an order. There is no clear authority for that but it seems the better course to ensure that there always is a form of order. The form of order should request in precise terms the relief which is sought. In applications for interim relief it may also include a claim for ‘further or other relief’ because the President may find that, while the application should not be dismissed, an order in the form set out in the application is not appropriate. When the Rules of Procedure specify that a party is to submit ‘observations’, the pleading is framed in the same way as an application or defence and is entitled ‘observations’. It is debatable whether it is necessary to include a form of order but that is usually done, even if the relief sought is only an award of costs.

F

Pleadings in IP appeals

1 General 9.94 Subject to express provision otherwise, the rules relating to direct actions in the GC apply also to IP appeals.412 Pleadings in IP appeals may not change the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.413 That restriction on the scope of an IP appeal has generated the same kind of argument about whether a particular point is a new one or an expansion of a point raised before the Board of Appeal as can be seen in the cases concerning new pleas in direct actions.414 As in the case of pleadings generally, the GC has power to set a maximum length for pleadings in IP appeals; authorisation to exceed the maximum may be given by the President only in cases involving particularly 409 Cf RP-ECJ, art 75(1). Eg Case 318/86 Commission v France [1988] ECR 3559 at 3563, where the applicant submitted certain information to the Court with the leave of the Court and the defendant was allowed to make submissions on the information. 410 Eg Case T-346/06  R  Industria Masetto Schio Srl (IMS) v Commission [2007]  ECR II-1781, paras 61–69. 411 Case 110/63A Williame v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 287 at 291; Case 55/64 Lens v European Court of Justice [1965] ECR 837 at 840. 412 RP-GC, art 191. 413 RP-GC, art  188; Case T-165/06 Fiorucci v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-1375, paras 21–23. 414 Eg Case T-435/05 Danjaq, LLC  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-2097, paras 15–16.

822

Pleading 9.96

complex legal or factual issues.415 All the pleadings referred to below have an appropriately worded title (Application, Response, Cross-Claim and so forth) that follows the format indicated above for pleadings in direct actions. The written procedure closes after the lodgement of the responses to the application or, where a cross-claim has been lodged, after the lodgement of the responses to the cross-claim.416 Accordingly, there is no provision for the lodgement of a reply or rejoinder. A new plea cannot be introduced orally at the hearing.417 2 Application 9.95 An application follows the conventional form of an application in direct actions. The defendant named in the application is the Office to which the Board of Appeal that made the decision contested in the proceedings belongs418 but the application must also cite all the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. 9.96

The application must contain the following:

(1) The name and address of the applicant. (2) Particulars of the status and address of the applicant’s representative. (3) A statement whether the method of service to which the applicant’s representative agrees is by electronic means (that is, e-Curia) or telefax (in which case, contact details must be provided). (4) The name of the Office against which the action has been brought. (5) The names of all the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal and the address that each gave for the purpose of notification to them in those proceedings. (6) The subject-matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on; and a summary of the pleas in law. The subject-matter of the proceedings includes identification of the decision contested in the proceedings. The date on which that decision was notified to the applicant must also be stated. (7) The form of order sought by the applicant.419 415 RP-GC, art 189. 416 RP-GC, art 181 and 186. 417 Case T-137/08 BCS SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-4047, paras 22–23. 418 RP-GC, art 172. 419 RP-GC, art  177(1), (2), (3), 2nd sentence, and (6); PD-GC, paras 143–146. If the service information – (3) – is not provided, service is effected by registered letter addressed to the applicant’s representative and service is effected by lodging the letter at the post office in Luxembourg: see RP-GC, art 77(2), which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art 177(6). In the event of a failure to comply with (5), the Registrar prescribes a time limit within which the application must be put in order and it is only if the applicant fails to rectify the defect within that period that the GC must decide whether or not non-compliance with the Registrar’s direction renders the application inadmissible: RP-GC, art 177(7).

823

9.97  Pleading

9.97

The following must be attached to the application:

(1) The contested decision. (2) Where the applicant is a legal person governed by private law, recent proof of the applicant’s existence in law (an extract from the register of companies, firms or associations or any other official document). (3) A certificate showing that the lawyer representing or assisting the applicant is authorised to practise before a court of a member state or of another state that is a party to the EEA Agreement. (4) Where the applicant is a legal person governed by private law, an authority to act given by the applicant to the lawyer representing it.420 For an explanation of those requirements, see the commentary above on the corresponding requirements in direct actions. The same requirements regarding the clarity and intelligibility of the application and its key parts (submissions and form of order) apply as apply in the case of an application commencing a direct action.421 3 Response to the application 9.98 The pleading replying to an application is called a ‘response’, not a ‘defence’. In other respects, a ‘response’ is materially the same as a ‘defence’ in a direct action. The defendant and each party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (other than, obviously, the applicant) are entitled to submit a response to the application. Responses must be submitted within two months from service on the party concerned of the application. That time limit is extended (in the usual way) by ten days on account of distance and may be further extended by the President in exceptional circumstances at the reasoned request of the party concerned.422 9.99

A response must contain the following:423

(1) The name and address of the party lodging the response.

420 RP-GC, art 177(3)–(5). In the event of a failure to comply with any of those requirements, the Registrar prescribes a time limit within which the application must be put in order and it is only if the applicant fails to rectify the defect within that period that the GC must decide whether or not non-compliance with the Registrar’s direction renders the application inadmissible: RP-GC, art 177(7). 421 Eg Case T-43/05 Camper v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR II-95*, paras 18–27 (clarification of admissibility of the form of order at the hearing etc.). 422 RP-GC, art 179. On the ten day extension, see Statute, art 45; RP-GC, art 60. 423 RP-GC, art 180(1) and (2) (the latter applies RP-GC, art 177(6) to a response); PD-GC, paras 147–151. If the service information – (3) - is not provided, service is effected by registered letter addressed to the applicant’s representative and service is effected by lodging the letter at the post office in Luxembourg: see RP-GC, art 77(2), which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art 177(6), through RP-GC, art 180(2).

824

Pleading 9.101

(2) Particulars of the status and address of the representative of that party.424 (3) A statement whether the method of service to which the applicant’s representative agrees is by electronic means (that is, e-Curia) or telefax (in which case, contact details must be provided). (4) The pleas in law and arguments relied on. (5) The form of order sought by the party lodging the response. 9.100 A party to proceedings before the Board of Appeal other than the applicant in the GC proceedings may support the form of order of the applicant or of the Office or else apply for a different form of order; and the pleas in law relied on may also differ from those advanced by the applicant or the Office.425 However, where such a party seeks an order annulling or altering the decision of the Board of Appeal on a point not raised in the application commencing the GC proceedings, it is necessary to bring a cross-claim by separate document.426 On the other hand, cross-references to the proceedings and submissions before the Board of Appeal, and the introduction of evidential material not before the Board of Appeal, are not permitted.427 9.101 The following must be attached to a response: (1) Where the applicant is a legal person governed by private law, recent proof of the applicant’s existence in law (an extract from the register of companies, firms or associations or any other official document). (2) A certificate showing that the lawyer representing or assisting the applicant is authorised to practise before a court of a member state or of another state that is a party to the EEA Agreement.

424 Representation is governed by Statute, art 19: see RP-GC, art 173(4). That is (in short), EU institutions, member states and EFTA states are represented by an agent; other parties are represented by a lawyer. 425 RP-GC, art 173(3). 426 See subsection 4 below. The bringing of a separate cross-claim addresses difficulties such as those that arose under the pre-2015  GC rules of procedure in Case C-609/11P  Centrotherm Systemtechnik GmbH  v centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co KG, 26  September 2013, paras 39–44, in which a party sought the dismissal of the application in the form of order in the response but really wanted the contested decision to be altered. 427 Eg Case T-350/04 Bitburger Brauerei Th. Simon GmbH  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR II-4255, paras 32–35; Case T-256/04 Mundipharma AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2007] ECR II-449, paras 13–15; Case T-389/03 Dainichiseika Colour & Chemicals Mfg Co Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2008] ECR II-58*, paras 13–16 (no reference to evidence produced for the first time in the proceedings before the GC) and 17–19; Cases T-305/06 to T-307/06 Air Products and Chemicals Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2008]  ECR II-220*, paras 21–22.

825

9.102  Pleading

(3) Where the applicant is a legal person governed by private law, an authority to act given by the applicant to the lawyer representing it.428 4 Cross-claims 9.102 In the context of IP appeals, a cross-claim is a claim that the decision challenged in the proceedings should either be annulled or altered but on the basis of a point that the applicant has not raised in the application.429 Although a cross-claim is therefore, in all appearances, distinct from the application commencing the IP appeal, it does not initiate a distinct appeal against the decision contested in the application: a cross-claim becomes automatically devoid of purpose should the applicant in the IP appeal discontinue or the IP appeal is held to be manifestly inadmissible.430 Where a party considers that the decision should be upheld (and not altered), the arguments leading to that conclusion should be set out in a response and do not fit into a cross-claim. The parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (other than the applicant) may submit a cross-claim by a document that is distinct from the response. The time limit for submitting a cross-claim is the same as that for submitting a response.431 The requirement that a cross-claim take the form of a document separate from the response means that a cross-claim cannot form a separate section of a response or be annexed or attached to a response. It is a self-standing pleading with its own title. 9.103 A cross-claim must contain: (1) The name and address of the party lodging it. (2) Particulars of the status and address of the representative of the party lodging the cross-claim. (3) The pleas in law and arguments relied on, which must identify precisely the points in the grounds of the decision challenged in the proceedings that are contested in the cross-claim. (4) The form of order sought, which must seek an order annulling or altering the decision challenged in the proceedings on a point that has not been raised in the application.432 The cross-claim must contain those matters even if the party lodging the crossclaim is also lodging a response that also contains them. A cross-reference to the

428 RP-GC, art  180(2), which applies RP-GC, art  177(4)–(7) to responses. In the event of a failure to comply with those requirements, the Registrar prescribes a time limit within which the application must be put in order and it is only if the applicant fails to rectify the defect within that period that the GC must decide whether or not non-compliance with the Registrar’s direction renders the application inadmissible: RP-GC, art 177(7). 429 RP-GC, art 184(1); PD-GC, para 152. 430 RP-GC, art 187. 431 RP-GC, art 182(1) and (2). 432 RP-GC, art 183–184.

826

Pleading 9.106

response (for example, to the particulars given in the response of the status and address of the party’s representative) is inappropriate. 5 Response to a cross-claim 9.104 Where a party lodges a cross-claim, each of the other parties to the proceedings may lodge a response to the cross-claim. The time limit for lodging such a response is two months from service on the party concerned of the cross-claim (that time limit is automatically extended by ten days on account of distance and may be extended further by the President in exceptional circumstances at the reasoned request of the party seeing to lodge the response to the cross-claim).433 A response to a cross-claim is limited to a response to the form of order sought in the cross-claim and the pleas in law and arguments relied on in the cross-claim.434 6 Application for replacement of a party 9.105 Where the party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal which is the proprietor of the IP rights in dispute transfers the right to a third party, the latter may make an application to replace the original party in the proceedings before the GC.435 Otherwise, the original proprietor may continue the proceedings but a question may arise as to whether or not it has a continued interest in pursuing the proceedings. An application to replace an original party must be made by separate document and may be made at any stage of the proceedings before the GC.436 9.106 The application must contain the following: (1) A description of the case (which will normally include the case number if one has been allocated at the time when the application to replace the original party is made). (2) A description of the parties to the case and of the party whom the applicant for replacement proposes to replace. (3) The name and address of the applicant for replacement. (4) Particulars of the status and address of the representative of the applicant for replacement. (5) A statement whether the method of service to which the applicant’s representative agrees is by electronic means (that is, e-Curia) or telefax (in which case, contact details must be provided).

433 RP-GC, art 185. 434 RP-GC, art 185. 435 RP-GC, art 174. 436 RP-GC, art 175(1).

827

9.107  Pleading

(6) A statement of the circumstances justifying the replacement, together with supporting evidence (strictly speaking, the supporting evidence is annexed to the application).437 9.107 The following must be attached to an application to replace an original party: (1) Where the applicant is a legal person governed by private law, recent proof of the applicant’s existence in law (an extract from the register of companies, firms or associations or any other official document). (2) A certificate showing that the lawyer representing or assisting the applicant is authorised to practise before a court of a member state or of another state that is a party to the EEA Agreement. (3) Where the applicant is a legal person governed by private law, an authority to act given by the applicant to the lawyer representing it.438 7 Observations on an application to replace an original party 9.108 When an application to replace an original party is lodged at the GC, it is served on the other parties and the President gives them an opportunity to submit written or oral observations on the application.439 Written observations take the conventional form of a pleading save that the title of the pleading is ‘written observations on [the application to replace an original party]’. Oral observations would be appropriate if the application to replace an original party were made close to the date of the hearing. 8 Procedural documents 9.109 Under RP-GC, art  173(1)-(2), a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal (other than the applicant in the IP appeal itself) becomes a party to the proceedings before the GC, as intervener, immediately upon lodging a ‘procedural document’ before the expiry of the time limit for lodging a response to the appeal. The phrase ‘procedural document’ is intended to cover all the possible pleadings that such a person might lodge at that stage in the proceedings (prior to lodging a response) and is not limited to a response. It therefore covers such pleadings as a preliminary objection to admissibility, a cross-claim, an application for a declaration that there is no need to adjudicate, and written 437 RP-GC, art  175(2) and 77(1) (which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art  175(4)). If the service information – (5) – is not provided, service is effected by registered letter addressed to the applicant’s representative and service is effected by lodging the letter at the post office in Luxembourg: see RP-GC, art 77(2), which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art 175(4). 438 RP-GC, art 175(4), which applies RP-GC, art 78(4)–(6). In the event of a failure to comply with those requirements, the Registrar prescribes a time limit within which the application must be put in order and it is only if the applicant fails to rectify the defect within that period that the GC must decide whether or not non-compliance with the Registrar’s direction renders the application inadmissible: RP-GC, art 78(6). 439 RP-GC, art 176(1)–(2).

828

Pleading 9.111

observations on such matters as the language of the case or any application for a stay that may have been made. Status as a party will be lost automatically, if the intervener fails to respond to the application ‘in the manner and within the time limits prescribed’.440 That appears to allude to a formal ‘response’ to the application and not simply to any of the other pleadings that such a party might lodge in order to address the claims made out in the application (cross-claim; objection to admissibility). 9.110 As it is envisaged that a ‘procedural document’ will be lodged before the response (if lodged afterwards, the party concerned will, by having lodged a response, already have obtained unconditional status as a party), a ‘procedural document’ must provide the required service information, be accompanied by recent proof of the party’s existence in law and the authority to act of the party’s representative (if the party is a legal person governed by private law), and the lawyer representing the party must produce a certificate of authorisation to practise.441 In terms of their layout and contents, such written pleadings take the conventional form appropriate in any direct action (title, submissions form of order).

V

PLEADINGS IN APPEALS442

A

Application commencing appeal

9.111 An appeal from the GC or CST is commenced by application whether it is made against a final judgment of the CST or GC (as the case may be), a judgment or order disposing of the substantive issues in part only of the case or disposing of a procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of competence or inadmissibility, an order dismissing an application to intervene or an order granting or refusing some form of interim relief.443 In all cases, the rules relating to the form and content of the application are the same. In appeals to the ECJ, like any pleading, the application must comply with the general requirements relating to pleadings.444 In the GC Rules of Procedure, appeals from the CST are dealt with under a separate title and there is no general incorporation of, or cross-reference to, the rules generally applicable to pleadings in direct actions, apart from the prohibition on the introduction of new pleas.445 In appeals to the ECJ and the GC, 440 RP-GC, art 173(2), penultimate sentence. 441 RP-GC, art 173(5). Under RP-78(6) (to which RP-GC, art 173(5) also refers), the procedural document can be put in order if it fails to comply with RP-78(4)–(5). 442 This section should be read alongside Ch 15, paras 15.14–15.27 and 15.39–15.48. 443 RP-ECJ, art 167(1); RP-GC, art 193(1). 444 RP-ECJ, art 57 (signature and date, number of copies, translations where required, annexes) and 58 (length); in addition, RP-ECJ, art 168(2) refers to RP-ECJ, art 119 (authority to act, certificate of authorisation to practise), 121 (service information) and 122(1) (contested decision or evidence of the date of the request to act). 445 Instead, RP-GC, art 194(4)–(5) refer only to RP-GC, art 51(2) (certificate of authorisation to practise), 51(3) (authority to act, where the appellant is a legal person governed by private law, which would be unusual in a staff case) and 77 (service information). RP-GC, art 213(1) incorporates by reference RP-GC, art 84 concerning new pleas.

829

9.112  Pleading

the application initiating the appeal must be in the language of the case, which is the language of the decision against which the appeal has been brought.446 The Rules of Procedure refer to that application both as such and as ‘the appeal’.447 The appeal can therefore be taken to have the general form of an application (and thus comprises the title, submissions and form of order) while being entitled ‘Appeal’. 1 Contents 9.112 The appeal must contain the following:448 (1) the name and address of the appellant; (2) a reference to the decision (of the GC or CST) appealed against; (3) the names of the other parties to the proceedings before the GC or CST; (4) the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on and a summary of the pleas in law; (5) the form of order sought by the appellant;449 (6) the appellant’s service details;450 (7) the date on which the decision appealed against was served on the appellant;451 (8) the GC Rules of Procedure require particulars of the status and address of the appellant’s representative,452 which would ordinarily also feature in an appeal to the ECJ. 9.113 Since the appeal is limited to points of law, there is no express provision for the inclusion of an indication of any evidence relied on by the appellant: in principle, all the relevant facts have been found by, or are contained in the judgment or order appealed against; and, if that is not so, it may be a ground for

446 RP-ECJ, art 37(2)(a); RP-GC, art 45(3)(a). Both provisions refer to the possibility of authorisation being given for the use of another language under, respectively, RP-ECJ, art 37(1)(b)–(c) and RP-GC, art 45(1)(b)–(c); but that possibility would ordinarily arise after the commencement of the appeal. RP-ECJ, art 37(2)(a) is also without prejudice to RP-ECJ, art 38(4)–(5); but, so far as is here relevant, those provisions apply only to an intervener in the appeal. If the application initiating the appeal is not in the language of the case, it is inadmissible: Jelenkowska-Luca (above, note 20) (on the question whether or not the language of the case may be changed, see Ch 2, paras 2.12–2.18). 447 Compare, for example: RP-ECJ, art 167(1) with RP-ECJ, art 168(1); and RP-GC, art 193(1) with RP-GC, art 194(1). 448 On the contents of an appeal to the GC, see PD-GC, paras 154–164. 449 RP-ECJ, art 168(1) and PD-ECJ, paras 20–21; RP-GC, art 194(1). The summary referred to in (4) above is intended to facilitate the publication of the notice of the case by the Court. Technically, therefore, it should take the form of a separate document. 450 RP-ECJ, art 121, applied by RP-ECJ, art 168(2); RP-GC, art 77, applied by RP-GC, art 194(5). 451 RP-ECJ, art 168(3); RP-GC, art 194(2). 452 RP-GC, art 194(1)(b).

830

Pleading 9.115

setting aside the judgment or order appealed against, with or without a remission of the matter to the GC or CST, but is not in other respects relevant. 9.114 In appeals to the ECJ, a failure to comply with any of (1)–(7) above does not render the appeal automatically inadmissible; it simply results in the Registrar requiring the defect to be remedied within a time limit fixed by him, failing which the ECJ decides (after hearing the judge-rapporteur and advocate general) whether or not the failure renders the appeal inadmissible.453 In appeals to the GC, that process of allowing an appeal to be put in order applies only in the case of (7) above.454 2 Title 9.115 The title may satisfy all the requirements set out in (1)–(8) above with the exception of (4) and (5). It should identify both the nature of the pleading (as an appeal) and also the subject of the appeal because, where the appeal concerns a decision dismissing an application to intervene or granting or refusing interim relief, the appeal is heard by summary procedure.455 In consequence it is desirable for the Registry officials to be able to see at a glance the type of appeal in question. As in the case of all other pleadings, there is no specific form for the title of a pleading but there appear to be two forms that may be regarded as appropriate to follow in the case of appeals. The first is as follows: In the Court of Justice [or General Court] of the European Union AB of [address], represented by CD, barrister, of [address] Appellant against (1)  European Commission (2) GH, Respondents Appeal against a [judgment/order] of the [General Court/Civil Service Tribunal] [state chamber, where applicable] of [date] in [provide details of the case, e.g. Case T-1001/93 AB v European Commission, supported by GH], served on the Appellant on [date], by which the [General Court/Civil Service Tribunal] [set out summary of the operative part of the judgment or order, such as: dismissed the Appellant’s application for the annulment of the Commission Decision of [date]; or dismissed the Appellant’s application for interim relief]. The applicant’s address for service is [insert address]. 453 RP-ECJ, art 168(4). In relation to the service information – (6) – RP-ECJ, art 121(3) also applies by virtue of RP-ECJ, art  168(2). Accordingly, unless and until service details are provided, service is effected by registered letter addressed to the appellant’s agent or lawyer. RP-ECJ, art 168(4) does not refer to a failure to comply with (8) – particulars of the status and address of the appellant’s representative – because that is not a requirement of RP-ECJ, art 168(1)–(3). 454 RP-GC, art 194(6). In the case of a failure to provide service details – (6) – RP-GC, art 77(2) applies by virtue of RP-GC, art  194(5) and service is effected by register addressed to the appellant’s representative. 455 Statute, art 57 and Annex, art 10.

831

9.116  Pleading

And/or CD has agreed to accept service by fax [insert fax number] and by e-mail [insert e-mail address]. 9.116 As in the case of the title for an application commencing proceedings in a direct action, there is more than one way in which the required information may be set out in the title.456 An alternative approach, which reflects more closely the title used in many of the reported cases is: In the Court of Justice [or General Court] of the European Union AB of [address], represented by CD, barrister, of [address] Appellant Appeal against the [judgment/order] of the [General Court/Civil Service Tribunal] [state chamber, where applicable] of [date] in [insert details, such as, Case T-1001/93 AB v European Commission, supported by GH,] served on the Appellant on [date], by which the [General Court/Civil Service Tribunal] [set out summary of the operative part of the judgment or order, such as: dismissed the Appellant’s application for the annulment of the Commission Decision of [date]; or dismissed the Appellant’s application for interim relief]. The other parties to the proceedings before [the General Court/Civil Service Tribunal] are: (1)  European Commission (2) GH The applicant’s address for service is [insert address]. And/or CD has agreed to accept service by fax [insert fax number] and by e-mail [insert e-mail address]. 9.117 It will be observed that the title does not set out the case number of the appeal: the appeal does not inherit the case number used for the original action before the GC or CST but is given a new case number when it comes before the appellate court. All the parties to the case at first instance (including interveners) must be mentioned, listed preferably in the order in which they appeared in the original proceedings, that is, applicant, followed by any interveners in its support, and then the defendant, followed by any interveners in its support. Thus, where the appellant is the defendant in the original proceedings, the applicant in the original proceedings will be the first respondent, followed by any interveners in its support and then the interveners in the defendant’s support; and, if the appellant is an intervener, the first respondent will be the original applicant, followed by any interveners in its support, and then the defendant, followed by any interveners in its support. The Rules of Procedure do not require the appellant to set out the address, address for service and name of representative of the 456 See paras 9.37–9.38 above.

832

Pleading 9.118

other parties, which will in any event be found in the papers of the case at first instance.457 It is important to give an indication in the title of the broad effect of the judgment or order appealed against (in addition to providing its date and the case in which it was delivered) only if the appeal concerns an order dismissing an application to intervene or granting or refusing interim relief because, in that event, the appeal is decided by way of a summary procedure. However, it is good practice to state the broad effect of the judgment or order in the title in any event. 3 Submissions 9.118 The submissions are limited to one or more of the following grounds of appeal: lack of competence (that is, jurisdiction) of the first instance court; a breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant; infringement of EU by the first instance court.458 A ground of appeal which contests a finding of fact made at first instance is inadmissible;459 but a ground of appeal which disputes the legal characterisation of a factual situation is not inadmissible.460 The difference between an inadmissible and an admissible challenge to a finding of fact made at first instance has been explored in a large number of cases. It is usually stated that matters of fact and evaluation of evidence do not give rise to a ground of appeal save where the first instance court has distorted

457 It would no doubt be helpful to set out each party’s address, address for service and name of representative but it could be misleading to do so since a party might have changed one or other or might decide to use a different address for service or representative for the purposes of the appeal. 458 Statute, art  58 and Annex, art  11(1); Case C-132/90P  Schwedler v European Parliament [1991]  ECR  I-5745 at 5757 (Advocate General Tesauro); Case C-346/90P  F  v Commission [1992]  ECR  I-2691, paras 6–7. The grounds of appeal are therefore those arising from the judgment appealed against, not those arising from the measure originally contested at first instance: cf Cases C-231/11 P to C-233/11 P Commission v Siemens AG Osterreich 10 April 2014, para 125. By way of illustration, the following are not grounds of appeal: that the first instance court dealt with an objection to admissibility separately without joining it to the substance and that the appellant was required to have his application signed by a lawyer even though he himself was a lawyer (Case C-126/90P Viciano v Commission [1991] ECR I-781, paras 4–8); that the first instance court failed to assess properly the pre-litigation correspondence for the purpose of calculating a time limit and that it erred in finding that an assessment of a medical committee was medical in nature (Case C-346/90P  F  v Commission (above), paras 8–11 and 17–18). 459 Case C-115/90P Turner v Commission [1991] ECR I-1423, para 13; Case C-283/90P Vidranyi v Commission [1991]  ECR  I-4339, paras 12–13; Case C-132/90P  Schwedler v European Parliament (above, note 458), para  11; Case C-107/90P  Hochbaum v Commission [1992] ECR I-157, para 9; Case C-378/90P Pitrone v Commission [1992] ECR I-2375, para 12; Case C-18/91P V v European Parliament [1992] ECR I-3997, paras 15–17 and 42–44; Case C-35/92P European Parliament v Frederiksen [1993] ECR I-991 (Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, para 2); Case C-354/92P Eppe v Commission [1993] ECR I-7027, paras 29 and 33; Case C-525/04P Spain v Lenzing AG [2007] ECR I-9947, para 54; Case C-260/05P Sniace SA v Commission [2007] ECR I-10005, paras 34–40. 460 Case C-145/90P Costacurta v Commission [1991] ECR I-5449 at 5459 (Advocate General van Gerven); Schwedler v European Parliament (above, note 458) at 5758 ff (Advocate General Tesauro).

833

9.119  Pleading

the clear sense of the evidence.461 Further, the appellant cannot rely on a ground or plea that he did not rely on, or failed to pursue, at first instance462 or a ground that is based on evidence that was not before the first instance court463 save where the new ground or plea is one that can be taken by the Court on appeal of its own motion464 or where the ground arises for the first time from the decision appealed against itself.465 Subject to that, the applicant can rely on any relevant argument as long as the subject-matter of the action is not changed in the appeal.466 9.119 The grounds of appeal relied on must be identified and, in principle, all the arguments relied on to develop the submission must be set out in the appeal because there may be no further exchange of written pleadings after the lodgment of the response(s) to the appeal.467 The same approach followed in relation to applications generally is to be followed in relation to appeals: the pleading must be sufficiently clear to enable the Court to exercise its powers and to enable the other parties to the proceedings to understand the issues and respond to them. The appeal must therefore indicate precisely those parts of the judgment or order of the GC or CST which are contested in the appeal and the legal arguments relied on in support of the objection taken to each of those parts; and a failure to do so renders the appeal inadmissible.468 That is particularly so where the appel 461 Eg Case C-535/06P Moser Baer India Ltd v Council [2009] ECR I-7051, paras 31–34 and 42; Case C-585/13P Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG v Council, 5 March 2015, paras 48–49. For an example of an error of fact that is also an error of law in that sense, see Cases C-337/12P to C-340/12P Pi-Design AG v Yoshida Metal Industry Co Ltd, 6 March 2014, paras 62–64. 462 V  v European Parliament (above, note 459), para  21; Eppe (above, note 459), para  13; Case C-36/92P NV  Samenwerkende Electriciteits-produktiebedrijven v Commission [1994] ECR I-1911, per Advocate General Jacobs, paras 66–67, where the point in question was considered to be an amplification of a point put to the GC); C-321/99P Associacao dos Refinadores de Acucar Portugueses (ARAP) v Commission [2002] ECR I-4287, paras 110–113; Moser Baer India (above, note 461), para 58; Case C-97/08P Akzo Nobel NV v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237, paras 37–40; Case C-583/08 P Gogos v Parliament [2010] ECR I-4469, paras 22–28; Case T-184/11 P Nijs v Court of Auditors, 15 May 2012, paras 58 and 66; Case C-646/11P Falles Fagligt Forbund (3F) v Commission, 24 January 2013, paras 65–71; Case T-665/14  P  Klar v Commission, 13  May 2015, para  41. Contra Case C-283/90P  Vidranyi v Commission (above, note 459) at 4358 (Advocate General Lenz). 463 Case C-126/90P Viciano v Commission (above, note 458), para 10; Case C-242/07P Belgium v Commission [2007] ECR I-9757, para 19; Case C-58/12P Groupe Gascogne (above, note 352), paras 30–36. 464 Per contra Case C-348/90P European Parliament v Virgili-Schettini [1991] ECR I-5211 at 5222 (Advocate General Lenz). 465 Eg Gogos (above, note 462), paras 41–42; Case C-58/12P Groupe Gascogne (above, note 352), paras 66–71; Case C-530/12P Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) v National Lottery Commission, 27 March 2014, paras 52–60; Case C-243/12P FLS Plast v Commission, 19 June 2014, paras 23–26 and 44–48. 466 Eg Case C-229/05P PKK  v Council [2007]  ECR  I-439, para  66; Case C-7/06P  Salvador Garcia v Commission [2007]  ECR  I-10265, paras37–40; Case C-8/06P  Herrero Romeu v Commission [2007]  ECR  I-10333, paras 31–34; Case C-9/06P  Salazar Brier v Commission [2007] ECR I-10357, paras 35–38; Case C-322/09 P NDSHT Nya Destination Stockholm Hotell & Teaterpaket AB v Commission [2010] ECR I-11911, para 41. 467 A second round of pleadings may be permitted by the President acting on a reasoned application made by the appellant: RP-ECJ, art 175(1); RP-GC, art 201(1). 468 RP-ECJ, art  169(2); RP-GC, art  195(2); Case C-244/92P  Kupka-Floridi v Economic and Social Committee [1993]  ECR  I-2041, para  9; Case C-525/07P  Combescot v Commission

834

Pleading 9.120

lant seeks to challenge the first instance court’s approach to the facts and the evidence because it is necessary to identify precisely the evidence in question and the error of law that is said to have vitiated the first instance court’s treatment of that evidence.469 An appeal is inadmissible if it merely repeats, refers to or reproduces word for word the pleas and arguments put to the first instance court.470 Therefore, even if it is necessary to place reliance in the appeal on substantially the same pleas and arguments as those advanced at first instance, they must be reformulated as objections to the relevant parts of the judgment appealed against.471 Where the appellant requests the appellate court to refer the case back to the first instance court if the decision appealed against is set aside, the appeal must state the reasons why the appellate court cannot itself determine the matter.472 4 Form of order 9.120 The appeal must contain a form of order. In principle, the relief that can be sought is limited to: an order setting aside the decision appealed against in whole or in part; an order granting the same relief sought at first instance in whole or in part (or, alternatively, the referral of the matter back to the first instance court); and costs.473 In the ordinary course, the form of order will comprise all three heads: a prerequisite of an order granting the relief sought at first instance is the making of an order setting aside the decision appealed against; and it would be unusual for an appellant to forgo the opportunity to claim costs. If it considers that an appeal is well founded, the appellate court has power to quash the decision appealed against and then either determine the matter decided [2008]  ECR  I-166*, [2008]  ECR SC-I-B-1-21, II-B-2-157, paras 34–36 and 50–52; Moser Baer India (above, note 461), paras 78–80; Case C-280/08  P  Deutsche Telekom AG  v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555, paras 24–25; Case C-22/10 P REWE-Zentrale AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2010] ECR I-135*, paras 35–36; Case C-367/10 P EMC Development AB v Commission [2011] ECR I-46*, paras 39–43 and 58–60; Case C-278/11P Dover v Parliament, 12 July 2012, paras 21–28 and 47–49; Falles Fagligt Forbund (above, note 462), paras 50–52; Case C-28/13P Thesing v European Central Bank, 6 February 2014, paras 24–31. 469 Eg Case C-413/08  P  Lafarge SA  v Commission [2010]  ECR  I-5361, para  16; Case T-368/09 P Sevenier v Commission, 8 July 2010, para 53. 470 Kupka-Floridi (above, note 468), paras 10–11; Eppe (above, note 459), paras 7–8; Case C-10/06P de Bustamento Tello v Council [2007] ECR I-10381, paras 28–31; Moser Baer India (above, note 461), paras 49–54; Falles Fagligt Forbund (above, note 462), paras 72–73. But see also Case C-337/09P Council v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group Co Ltd, 19 July 2012, para 61. 471 Eg the ARAP case (above, note 462), paras 48–50; Case T-404/06P  European Training Foundation v Landgren [2009] ECR II-2841, paras 140–142. 472 RP-ECJ, art 170(2); RP-GC, art 196(2). A failure to provide reasons does not render the request for remission to the first instance court inadmissible: Case C-100/14  P  European Medical Association v Commission, 11 June 2015, para 42. 473 RP-ECJ, art 169(1) and 170; RP-GC, art 195(1) and 196. An appeal cannot seek a form of relief that is the opposite of what was claimed at first instance or that is relevant to some other party: Cases C-231/11 P to C-233/11 P Siemens (above, note 458), paras 119–121. An appeal cannot be made solely on the question of costs: Statute, art 58 (last sentence) and Annex, art 11(2). See further Ch 15.

835

9.121  Pleading

by that decision (which may be the final, substantive decision in the case or a decision on admissibility, on interim relief, or on an application to intervene) or remit the matter to the first instance court for decision in the light of the ruling on points of law made by the appellate court.474 The Rules of Procedure do not state expressly that the form of order may comprise a request that the matter be referred back to the first instance court; but that seems to be implicit.475 In most cases, no doubt, the appellant would prefer the appellate court to set aside the disputed decision and then grant the relief sought by him; but it cannot be excluded that in a particular case it will be more appropriate for the matter to be remitted. In that event, there seems to be no objection to the appellant claiming that the decision appealed against be set aside and the matter remitted to the first instance court. Unless it is clear that the matter cannot be resolved by the appellate court, such a claim would ordinarily appear as an alternative to a claim that the appellate court decide in favour of the appellant. 9.121 It is important to note that an appeal is directed at the decision made at first instance, as expressed in the operative part of the decision appealed against.476 That excludes appeals against matters contained in the disputed decision that do not feature in the operative part, such as an appeal directed only against a particular conclusion reached in the reasoning leading to the operative part, but not against the operative part itself. The appellant is not obliged to appeal against the entirety of the operative part of the disputed decision.477 However, if a particular part of the form of order follows inevitably from another part, the latter must be appealed against as well as the former. The subject matter of the proceedings at first instance may not be changed in the appeal and, to the extent that the appeal goes beyond the scope of the form of order in the proceedings at first instance, it is inadmissible.478 In consequence, where the appellant claims that the appellate court should itself decide the matter at issue (after setting aside the judgment appealed against), the appellant is limited to claiming before the appellate court the relief that he claimed in his application, defence or, as the case may be, statement in intervention in the proceedings at first instance (subject to any subsequent concession made by the appellant).

474 Statute, art 61 and Annex, art 13. 475 The fact that an order remitting the matter to the first instance court is not one of the forms of relief listed in RP-ECJ, art  169(1) and RP-GC, art  195(1) does not seem to preclude the inclusion of such a claim in the form of order: on one view, the possibility of making such an order is implicit in the form of relief specified in those provisions (setting aside the decision appealed against) where the form of relief specified in RP-ECJ, art  170(1) and RP-GC, art 196(1) (granting the relief sought at first instance) is not granted when the appeal is upheld. Alternatively, the matter is covered by RP-ECJ, art 170(2) and RP-GC, art 196(2), which are to be construed as referring to a ‘request’ for referral that is set out in the form of order (the reasons relied on in support being set out in the body of the pleading). 476 RP-ECJ, art 169(1); RP-GC, art 195(1). 477 See the reference to ‘in whole or in part’ in RP-ECJ, art  169(1) and 170(1) and RP-GC, art 195(1) and 196(1). 478 RP-ECJ, art 170(1); RP-GC, art 196(1); Case C-283/90P Vidranyi v Commission (above, note 459), paras 9–10 and at 4359, per Advocate General Lenz.

836

Pleading 9.124

5 Attachments 9.122 The following must be attached to the appeal: (1) the authority to act issued by the appellant to the person representing  him; (2) a certificate showing that the lawyer acting for the appellant is entitled to practise before a court of a member state or EEA state;479 (3) in appeals to the ECJ and where appropriate (that is, where relevant), the decision contested at first instance or, where the action at first instance concerned a failure to act, documentary evidence of the date when the EU institution in question was requested to act;480 (4) in appeals to the GC, where the appellant is a legal person governed by private law, recent proof of that person’s existence in law.481 9.123 It used to be the case that the judgment or order appealed against also had to be attached to the appeal; but that is no longer required. If any of the requirements listed above is not complied with, the Registrar is to prescribe a period within which the defect is to be rectified; and, if the appellant fails to rectify the defect within that period, the Court must decide (in the case of the ECJ, after hearing the judge rapporteur and the advocate general) whether or not that failure renders the application formally inadmissible.482

B Response 9.124 The appeal is served on all the parties to the proceedings before the first instance court (save, of course, the appellant)483 and each is entitled to lodge a response in writing within two months of service of the notice as long as that party has an interest in the appeal being allowed or dismissed.484 It follows that the respondents may include parties who supported the appellant’s case at first instance (such as interveners at first instance) as well as parties who opposed that case (including interveners at first instance). In consequence, the response is not necessarily a hostile pleading. The question whether or not a responding

479 RP-ECJ, art 119(2)–(3), which apply by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 168(2); RP-GC, art 51(1)–(2), which apply by virtue of RP-GC, art 194(4). In the case of an appeal to the GC, the requirement to produce an authority to act applies only where the appellant is a legal person governed by private law. However, it is better practice to produce the authority to act in all cases in order to avoid a later debate as to whether or not authority to appeal has been given. 480 RP-ECJ, art 122(1), which applies by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 168(2). 481 RP-GC, art 194(3). 482 RP-ECJ, art 168(4); RP-GC, art 194(6). 483 RP-ECJ, art 171(1); RP-GC, art 197(1). 484 RP-ECJ, art 172; RP-GC, art 198. The time limit for lodging the response cannot be extended. See PD-ECJ, para 22.

837

9.125  Pleading

party has an interest in the appeal being allowed or dismissed is determined in the conventional way.485 9.125 Responses were originally the only principal pleading that a party other than the appellant lodged. Since the relief sought may include not only the dismissal of the appeal but also the upholding of the appeal (both ‘in whole or in part’),486 the consequential relief flowing from the latter might involve the setting aside of the decision appealed against or the relief sought by the respondent in the proceedings before the first instance court; and both the primary relief sought and the consequential relief following therefrom were covered by a response.487 The current positon is that a response is limited to seeking to have the appeal allowed or dismissed (in whole or in part) whereas, if the responding party seeks to have the first instance decision set aside (in whole or in part), a cross-appeal must be brought by separate document.488 Where a cross-appeal is brought, the pleas in law and arguments supporting it must be ‘separate’ from those relied on in the response.489 Accordingly, it appears that a cross-appeal is warranted where there is a particular reason, distinct from the reasons supporting a decision to allow the appeal, for setting aside the first instance decision.490 Before 2012 (in the case of the ECJ) and 2015 (in the case of the GC), the appellant and any other party could submit a reply as of right where a response sought to set aside the contested decision (in whole or in part) on the basis of a plea in law not raised in the appeal.491 The introduction of cross-appeals seems to have been directed at that situation. If so, the decision whether or not to lodge a cross-appeal in addition to a response to the appeal turns on whether or not the respondent wishes to support the appeal on additional pleas in law not relied on by the appellant. 1 Contents 9.126 The response must contain:492 (1) the name and address of the party submitting it; (2) the date on which the appeal was served on him; (3) the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on;

485 See Ch 7, paras 7.14–7.23. The draft of what are now the 2012  ECJ  Rules of Procedure contained a provision explaining when a party to the first instance proceedings would not have an interest in the appeal. What appears to have been envisaged was the exclusion, from the appeal proceedings, of a party to one joined case when another of the joined cases was appealed (but not the joined case to which that party was a party) and the exclusion of a party where the particular aspect of the contested decision that is the subject of the appeal concerns only the appellant. 486 RP-ECJ, art 174; RP-GC, art 200. 487 Eg Case C-346/90P F v Commission (above, note 458) at 2698. 488 See RP-ECJ, art 176(2) and 178(1)–(2); RP-GC, art 202(2) and 204(1)–(2) 489 RP-ECJ, art 178(3); RP-GC, art 204(3). 490 A somewhat fanciful scenario. 491 RP-ECJ, art 117(2) of the pre-2012 rules; RP-GC, art 143(2) of the pre-2015 rules. 492 On the contents in an appeal to the GC, see PD-GC, paras 165–172.

838

Pleading 9.128

(4) the form of order sought by the respondent;493 (5) the respondent’s service details;494 (6) the GC Rules of Procedure require particulars of the status and address of the appellant’s representative,495 which would ordinarily also feature in an appeal to the ECJ. The response may therefore be divided into three parts: title (which may comprise (1), (2), (5) and (6) above); submissions; and form of order. 2 Title 9.127 The title may follow that used in the appeal, with the addition of the case number (supplied by the Court), the respondent’s address, the date on which the notice of the appeal was served and the description of the pleading, as follows: In the Court of Justice [or General Court] of the European Union Case C [or T]-2002/15P AB Appellant against (1)  European Commission (2) GH, Respondents Response of GH [address], represented by IJ, barrister of [address] submitted in consequence of service of the appeal of AB on [date]. GH’s address for service is [insert address]. And/or IJ has agreed to accept service by fax [insert fax number] and by e-mail [insert e-mail address]. 3 Submissions 9.128 The submissions must be set out in full because a further exchange of written pleadings may not take place.496 Since the relief sought may include not only the dismissal of the appeal but also the upholding of the appeal (both ‘in whole or in part’),497 the consequential relief flowing from the latter may involve the setting aside of the decision appealed against or the relief sought by

493 RP-ECJ, art 173(1); RP-GC, art 199(1). 494 RP-ECJ, art 121, applied by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 173(2); RP-GC, art 77, applied by virtue of RP-GC, art 199(2) through RP-GC, art 194(5). 495 RP-GC, art 199(1)(b). 496 RP-ECJ, art 175(1); RP-GC, art 201(1). 497 RP-ECJ, art 174; RP-GC, art 200.

839

9.129  Pleading

the respondent in the proceedings before the first instance court.498 However, while the scope of the submissions need not be limited to answering (or, as the case may be, supporting) the points made in the appeal, if a respondent wishes to make out an entirely different case (from that set out in the appeal) for the setting aside or variation of the decision appealed against, he must lodge a cross-appeal. As in the case of the appeal, the response is limited to matters of law, not fact. The respondent may rely only upon pleas advanced at first instance,499 although he is not limited to those pleas advanced at first instance that were actually considered in the contested decision.500 On the other hand, if a particular point arises for the first time in the decision appealed against itself, the respondent is not precluded from taking it. 4 Form of order 9.129 The relief that may be sought in a response comprises:501 (1) an order dismissing the appeal, in whole or in part; (2) an order allowing the appeal, in whole or in part; (3) costs. 9.130 Other forms of relief appear to be inadmissible. For example, a claim for nominal damages representing the moral damage resulting from a dilatory and vexatious appeal is inadmissible; the appropriate way of dealing with an abusive appeal is to reject it as manifestly inadmissible or unfounded.502 As noted above, relief in the form of the setting aside of the contested decision should be claimed in a cross-appeal, at least where the grounds for setting it aside are distinct from the grounds advanced in support of allowing the appeal. On the other hand, the Rules of Procedure do not provide much of a clue with regard to the problem that may arise where a responding party supports the appeal but disagrees on whether or not, if it is successful, the matter can be determined by the appellate court or ought to be referred back to the first instance court. Where the appellant considers that the matter should be referred back, he is supposed to make a reasoned request to that effect in the appeal.503 Logically, that requirement should also apply to a responding party who supports the appellant; however, it does not feature in the rules that deal either with the contents of a response or with the contents of a cross-claim.

498 Eg Case C-346/90P F v Commission (above, note 458) at 2698. 499 As in the case with regard to the appellant: see V v European Parliament (above, note 459), para 21. 500 Case C-185/90P Commission v Gill [1991] ECR I-4779 at 4803 (Advocate General Jacobs). 501 RP-ECJ, art 174; RP-GC, art 200. 502 Case C-35/92P European Parliament v Frederiksen [1993] ECR I-991 (Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, para 12). 503 RP-ECJ, art 170(2); RP-GC, art 196(2).

840

Pleading 9.134

5 Attachments 9.131 The following must be attached to a response: (1) a certificate showing that the lawyer acting for the respondent is entitled to practise before a court of a member state or EEA state; (2) the authority to act issued by the respondent to his representative;504 (3) in appeals to the GC, where the respondent is a legal person governed by private law, recent proof of that person’s existence in law.505

C

Subsequent pleadings

9.132 There is no right to lodge a reply and rejoinder after the response has been lodged. Outside the context of the exchange of pleadings that may arise where a cross-appeal is lodged, a further written pleading may be submitted only with the leave of the President. Thus, the written procedure ends with the lodgment of the response (or, more accurately, the last response where there are several) unless the President allows a reply to be lodged. 9.133 Leave to lodge a further pleading is sought by a reasoned application made in writing by the appellant within seven days of the service of the response.506 The President may give leave if he ‘considers it necessary…in particular to enable the appellant to present his views on a plea of inadmissibility or on new matters relied on in the response’.507 If leave is given, the other parties automatically gain the right to lodge a rejoinder to the appellant’s reply.508 The President sets the dates by which the reply and rejoinder must be lodged and may limit both their length and the topics covered by them.509 9.134 It is to be observed that the President cannot give leave of his own motion. He can act only in response to an application from a party. However, that does not appear to preclude the Court from requesting the parties to make additional submissions in writing on a particular point should it think it desirable. The rules do not limit the grounds that may justify the grant of leave by

504 RP-ECJ, art 119(2)–(3), which apply by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 173(2); RP-GC, art 51(2)–(3), which apply by virtue of RP-GC, art 199(2) through RP-GC, art 194(4). In the case of appeals to the GC, the requirement to produce an authority to act applies only where the party is a legal person governed by private law; but it is better to produce it in all cases. In the event of a failure to comply with those requirements, RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 194(6) apply (the Registrar allows the respondent time to rectify the defect). 505 RP-GC, art 194(3), which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art 199(2). 506 In principle, all responses should be served on the applicant simultaneously but, if that is not the case, the time for applying to lodge a reply starts to run from service on the applicant of the response generating the need for a reply. 507 RP-ECJ, art 175(1); RP-GC, art 201(1). 508 Ibid: both provisions refer to the supplementing of the appeal and response by a reply and a rejoinder. 509 RP-ECJ, art 175(2); RP-GC, art 201(2). Cf PD-ECJ, paras 25–26; PD-GC, paras 175–178.

841

9.135  Pleading

the President because the reference to responding to a plea of inadmissibility or new matters is preceded by the phrase ‘in particular’. Although the application to lodge a reply must set out the ground(s) justifying granting leave and the reasons supporting them, it is not necessarily the case that the President is bound by the reasons given by the appellant. At all events, the decision of the President is based on his assessment of the position. He is not obliged to grant leave merely because a request has been made. In consequence, a request must set out the reasons justifying the exercise of the President’s discretion in favour of allowing a further pleading. It does not appear to be necessary for the President to allow any of the other parties to make submissions in response to the application. If they are concerned by the grant of leave, they have the opportunity to respond to the reply by lodging a rejoinder. 9.135 The application for leave to lodge a reply may follow the usual format of a pleading (title, submissions, form of order).510 A subsequent pleading (whether reply or rejoinder) should set out the title of the appeal followed by the submissions that the party lodging the pleading wishes to make. The prohibition on the introduction of new pleas applies, as in an ordinary direct action.511 In consequence, a subsequent pleading may not raise a new plea in law unless it is based on matters of fact or law which have come to light in the course of the procedure.512 In view of the fact that the form of order in the appeal or, as the case may be, the response cannot, in principle, be amended, it does not seem that a subsequent pleading need contain a form of order.

D Cross-appeal 9.136 A cross-appeal does not initiate a separate proceeding or appeal. It is a pleading by which a party who is entitled to lodge a response seeks to have the decision contested in the appeal set aside, in whole or in part. A cross-appeal is not a substitute for a response: a party to the proceedings at first instance who wishes to participate in the appeal must lodge a response;513 the function of the cross-appeal is to put before the Court and the other parties a case that effectively extends the scope of the appeal as defined by the appellant.514 However, a party

510 The form of order requests permission to lodge a reply. 511 RP-ECJ, art 127, which applies by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 190(1); RP-GC, art 84, which applies by virtue of RP-GC, art 213(1). 512 Eg Moser Baer India (above, note 461), paras 40–41; Case T-475/08P Duta v Court of Justice, 29 July 2010, para 28; Case C-181/11P Cetarsa v Commission, 12 July 2012, paras 60–61. 513 Thus, RP-GC, art  203 does not provide for the provision of service details, which would necessarily feature in the response. In contrast, RP-ECJ, art 177(2) does require service details to be provided, apparently because of a slavish repetition of the requirements applicable to appeals and responses. 514 Cf Cases T-303/06 RENV and T-337/0 RENV UniCredit SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 25 November 2014, para 104 (which reflects the pre-2015 GC rules of procedure, pursuant to which the cross-appeal could be included in a response). See PD-ECJ, para 23.

842

Pleading 9.140

cannot go further in a cross-appeal than he did at first instance.515 A cross-appeal is made by a document separate from the response and must be lodged within the same time-limit as that for lodging the response.516 Content 9.137 A cross-appeal must contain the following:517 (1) the name and address of the party bringing the cross-appeal; (2) the date on which the appeal was served on him; (3) the pleas in law and arguments relied on; (4) the form of order sought;518 (5) in appeals to the ECJ, the party’s service details;519 (6) in appeals to the GC, particulars of the status and address of the party’s representative520 which would ordinarily also feature in an appeal to the ECJ. A cross-claim may therefore be divided into three parts: title (which may comprise (1), (2), (5) and (6) above); submissions; and form of order. Title 9.138 The title of a cross-appeal is effectively the same as the title of a response save that it is entitled ‘cross-appeal’. Submissions 9.139 The pleas in law and supporting arguments in a cross-appeal must identify precisely the points in the contested decision which are challenged and must be ‘separate’ from those relied on in the response.521 Form of order 9.140 The relief that may be sought in a cross-appeal comprises: 515 A respondent in the appeal has no greater right to seek a specific form of relief than at first instance: cf Case C-53/92P  Hilti AG  v Commission [1994]  ECR  I-667, paras 48–50 (per Advocate General Jacobs, para 59). 516 RP-ECJ, art  176; RP-GC, art  202. A  claim for an order setting aside the decision appealed against is admissible notwithstanding the expiry of the period for appealing before the crossappeal is lodged: Case C-136/92P Commission v Lualdi [1994] ECR I-1981, paras 70–73 (and per Advocate General Lenz, paras 113–117) (at that time, a cross-appeal was made in the response, not by separate document). 517 On the contents in an appeal to the GC, see PD-GC, para 173. 518 RP-ECJ, art 177(1); RP-GC, art 203. 519 RP-ECJ, art 121, which applies by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 177(2). 520 RP-GC, art 203(b). 521 RP-ECJ, art 178(3); RP-GC, art 204(3).

843

9.141  Pleading

(1) an order setting aside the decision contested in the appeal (in whole or in part); (2) an order setting aside an express or implied decision relating to the admissibility of the action and contained in the decision contested in the appeal; (3) costs.522 To be considered as a valid cross-appeal, the pleading must contain a form of order seeking such relief.523 Attachments 9.141 In appeals to the GC, no particular documents are required to be attached to the cross-appeal. In appeals to the ECJ, the following must be attached (repeating the requirements applicable to a response): (1) an authority to act issued by the party to his representative; (2) the certificate of the party’s lawyer’s authorisation to practise; (3) where appropriate (that is, where relevant), the decision contested at first instance or, where the action at first instance concerned a failure to act, documentary evidence of the date when the EU institution in question was requested to act;524

E

Response to the cross-appeal

9.142 The appellant and any of the other parties to the proceedings at first instance may submit a response to a cross-appeal within two months of being served with the cross-appeal.525 Accordingly, a party (other than the appellant) who has not lodged a response to the appeal may lodge a response to a crossappeal. That is justified because the cross-appeal may put in dispute something that such a party objects to which might not have been put in issue in the appeal. A response may not be lodged unless the party lodging it has an interest in the cross-appeal being allowed or dismissed.526

522 RP-ECJ, art 178(1)–(2); RP-GC, art 204(1)–(2). 523 Case C-498/07P Aceites del Sur-Coosur SA v Koipe Corporacion SL [2009] ECR I-7371, paras 87–94. 524 RP-ECJ, art 119 and 122(1), which apply by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 177(2). In the event of a failure to comply with any of those requirements, RP-ECJ, art 119(4) and 122(3), respectively, apply by virtue of RP-ECJ, art 177(2) (the Registrar gives the party time to put the cross-appeal in order). 525 RP-ECJ, art  179; RP-GC, art  205. The period of two months cannot be extended. RP-ECJ, art 179 contains a misprint: it refers to ‘the applicant at first instance’ rather than to the appellant. 526 Ibid. Neither provision is clearly worded. They can be read as applying the requirement to have an interest either to both the appellant and the other parties to the proceedings at first instance or only to the latter. The writer’s view is that it applies to both. As to the required interest, see note 485 above.

844

Pleading 9.146

9.143 No requirements are laid down in the rules of procedure concerning the form and contents of a response to a cross-appeal save that the response must be limited to the pleas in law relied on in the cross-appeal.527 A response to a crossappeal can be modelled on the response to an appeal. There is no need to repeat matters already covered by the party lodging the response to the cross-appeal in an earlier pleading lodged by him in the appeal. However, it is necessary to respond to the pleas of law raised in the cross-appeal. The form of order in the response will be determined by the form of order sought in the cross-appeal: the response will seek either the same form of relief or the rejection of the relief sought in the cross-appeal.

F

Reply and rejoinder on a cross-appeal

9.144 The position regarding the supplementing of a cross-appeal and response thereto by a reply and rejoinder is the same as in the case of the supplementing of the appeal and the response(s) thereto;528 and those pleadings may be used as the model for the reply and rejoinder on a cross-appeal.

G

Pleadings in ancillary proceedings

9.145 Pleadings in ancillary proceedings (interim relief, intervention and so forth) are in principle no different (save as to title) from similar pleadings in a direct action.529

H

Pleadings after referral back to the first instance court

9.146 Where the ECJ sets aside a judgment or order of the GC, or the GC sets aside a judgment or order of the CST, it may decide the matter itself or refer it back to (as the case may be) the GC or CST for decision.530 Where the written procedure had not been completed before the first instance court when the judgment referring the case back to it was delivered (such as where the first instance court gave judgment on a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the action and the appeal court annulled its decision), the written procedure is resumed, at the stage which it had reached previously, either by applying the relevant procedural (usually a decision setting a time limit for the completion of the next procedural step) or by means of measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the first instance court (the CST rules refer only to the latter).531

527 RP-ECJ, art 179; RP-GC, art 205; PD-GC, para 174. 528 RP-ECJ, art 180 and PD-ECJ, paras 25–26; RP-GC, art 206. See para 9.70 ff above. 529 See para 9.94 above. 530 Statute, art 61, 1st para, and Annex art 13(1). In the case of appeals to the GC from the CST decided by the former after 1 September 2016, any reference of the case back is to a different chamber of the GC: Regulation 2016/1192, art 4. 531 RP-GC, art 217(2); RP-CST, art 130(4). See further Ch 15, para 15.53 ff.

845

9.147  Pleading

9.147 On the other hand, where the written procedure had been completed by the time when the judgment referring the case back to the first instance court was delivered (such as where the judgment appealed to the appellate court was a final judgment of the first instance court), further written pleadings may be lodged. Those further written pleadings are referred to in the Rules of Procedure as ‘written observations’ or ‘statements of written observations’.532 The parties are not obliged to lodge such statements. 9.148 In GC proceedings, the parties to those proceedings may submit written observations on the conclusions to be drawn from the ECJ’s judgment for the outcome of the GC proceedings within two months of service on them of the ECJ’s judgment.533 The President may, if the circumstances justify it, allow ‘supplementary’ statements of written observations to be lodged.534 That would be so if the first round of written observations produced a range of views raising issues that were best resolved by a second round of written observations. 9.149 In CST proceedings, the applicant in the proceedings is entitled to lodge written observations on the points of law which justified the setting aside of the original CST judgment and the referral of the case back to the CST. Those written observations must be lodged within two months of the service on the applicant of the GC judgment.535 If lodged within time, the applicant’s written observations are served on the defendant(s). The defendant is then entitled to lodge written observations on the GC judgment within the month following service on him of the applicant’s written observations; the time limit for doing so may not be less than two months from service on the defendant of the GC judgment (not the applicant’s written observations). The same applies if the applicant fails to lodge written observations on the GC judgment (save that, in that event, the CST informs the defendant by letter that no written observations have been lodged by the applicant within time and, in that letter, invites the defendant to lodge its written observations).536 The written observations of the applicant and defendant are served on any intervener, who is also given an opportunity to submit written observations (within one month). In the absence of written observations from the applicant and defendant, the intervener is so informed by letter and given an opportunity to submit written observations anyway (also within one month).537 A further round of written observations supplementing the first may be allowed by the CST if the circumstances justify it; a party has no right to reply in writing to the observations lodged by any of the other parties.538

532 RP-GC, art 217(1) (written observations) and (3) (statements of written observations); RP-CST, art 130 (written observations). 533 RP-GC, art 217(1). The two month period cannot be extended (otherwise than by the usual ten day period provided for in RP-GC, art 60, which applies pursuant to RP-GC, art 218). 534 RP-GC, art 217(3). 535 RP-CST, art 130(1). 536 RP-CST, art 130(2). 537 RP-CST, art 130(3). 538 RP-CST, art 130(5).

846

Pleading 9.151

9.150 Written observations retain the number and title of the proceedings before the first instance court,539 to which should be added ‘Written observations submitted by…’. The statement must comply with the general rules applicable to all pleadings.540 The body of the statement sets out the party’s observations, that is, submissions on the issues remaining to be decided by the first instance court in the light of the appellate court’s judgment. The latter’s judgment will have overturned the original first instance judgment on a point of law; but the issues to be decided by the first instance court in the light of the appellate court’s judgment may not be limited to matters of law. It is clearly unnecessary and undesirable to repeat matters covered adequately in the pleadings already lodged at the first instance court. The starting point for a party’s submissions is therefore the state of the case as it has been left by the judgment of the appellate court. RP-GC, art  84 and RP-CST, art  56 (which concern new pleas) apply541 with the consequence that no further evidence may be offered and no new plea in law may be introduced unless an exception to the general prohibition on the introduction of new evidence and new pleas in law can be relied on. A new plea may be raised if it is based on the findings made by the first instance court in the judgment appealed against or on any statement made by the appellate court in its judgment.542 It is doubtful if written observations need to contain a form of order: in principle, the relief that the parties may seek can be no different from that sought at the outset of the proceedings so the inclusion of a form of order would be repetitive. However, it would be advisable to include a form of order.543 Ordinarily, written observations will not require any attachments.

VI

PLEADINGS IN REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

9.151 The only written pleadings provided for when the ECJ reviews a decision of the GC are the ‘statements’ or ‘written observations’ that the parties and other interested persons, on whom the ECJ’s decision to review the judgment has been served, are invited to lodge on the questions that are subject to review.544 Those statements or written observations must be lodged within one month of service on the person concerned of the ECJ’s decision to review the GC judgment.545 Although no express requirements are laid down concerning the form, contents and presentation of the pleading, it should comply with the general rules applicable to pleadings.546 The title of the pleading should follow the title used in

539 See Case T-43/89 RV Gill v Commission [1993] ECR II-303. As can be seen, the only change is the addition of the letters ‘RV’ (or a variant such as ‘RENV’) to the case number. 540 RP-GC, art 218 incorporates by reference Titles III and Title IV; RP-CST, art 130(6) incorporates RP-CST, art 36, 45–48 and 56 (new pleas). 541 By virtue of RP-GC, art  218 and RP-CST, art  130(6). See the Gill case (above, note 539), para 47. 542 The Gill case (above, note 539), paras 48–49. 543 The written observations lodged in the Gill case included forms of order. 544 RP-ECJ, art 195(2). 545 Ibid. 546 See paras 9.7–9.31 above.

847

9.152  Pleading

the ECJ decision to review the GC judgment and feature the case number given to the review proceedings by the ECJ. The pleading may be described either as ‘statement submitted by [insert name of the person lodging the pleading]’ or ‘written observations submitted by [insert name of the person lodging the pleading]’. The representative of the person lodging the pleading (who will also sign it) should be identified. Service details and such things as an authority to act or, where relevant, a certificate of entitlement to practise, need be provided only if the person lodging the pleading has not previously appeared in the proceedings. The submissions contained in the pleading should address only the questions set out in the ECJ’s decision as being the questions arising from the GC judgment that are to be reviewed by the ECJ. There appears to be no necessity for the pleading to contain a form of order but, in particular cases, it may be appropriate to include one.

VII PLEADINGS IN REFERENCES FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING547 9.152 The only written pleadings in a reference for a preliminary ruling are the parties’ written observations.548 The Rules of Procedure do not impose any requirements regarding the form and contents of the written observations.549 They usually fall into four parts: title; an explanation of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the reference; submissions on the questions referred; and recommendations on the form of the answer to be given to the referring court.550 In the case of parties to the proceedings before the referring court who are represented before the Court by the same person representing them before the referring court, it would not appear to be necessary to adduce evidence of the representative’s capacity to represent them in the preliminary ruling proceedings or his authority to do so, as is required in the case of direct actions, because both may be presumed from the fact that the representative has represented the party in question in the proceedings before the referring court. On the other hand, if the representative is different in the preliminary ruling proceedings, it would seem that evidence of capacity and authority to act should be produced, particularly where the party’s representative has a right of audience before the referring court but not (ordinarily) before the ECJ in a direct action. 9.153 For the title of the observations, it is enough to indicate with sufficient clarity the case to which the pleading relates. That is normally done by setting out the case number and the title of or the names of the parties to the proceedings before the referring court. The name of the person on whose behalf the pleading 547 For suggested pleading precedents, see Atkin’s Court Forms, Vol 16. 548 In Statute, art  23, RP-ECJ, art  105(3) and (4), 109(2) and 110(1)–(2), reference is made to ‘statements of case or written observations’ (RP-ECJ, art 96(1) refers only to ‘observations’). No practical significance appears to attach to either expression. 549 Cf PD-ECJ, paras 10–11 (the ECJ’s estimate of the desired maximum length of written observations is 20 pages). 550 In cases where the admissibility of the order for reference may be in doubt, it is usual to set out any submissions on that point before turning to the questions referred.

848

Pleading 9.155

is lodged should also be set out, together with an address for service. The title may, therefore, take the following form: In the Court of Justice of the European Union Case C-401/93 A B Ltd against C D Ltd Observations submitted on behalf of A B Ltd of [address] represented by E F, Barrister of [address]. AB Ltd’s address for service is [insert address]. And/or EF has agreed to accept service by fax [insert fax number] and by e-mail [insert e-mail address]. 9.154 Since the object of the reference is to obtain a preliminary ruling on a question of EU law, a recitation of the facts of the case is usually necessary only in order to clarify or supplement the order for reference in a material particular. The role of fact-finding in proceedings for a preliminary ruling is discussed below551 and the pleading of fact should be considered in the light of the principles set out there. The submissions on the questions referred are generally set out in separate headings relating to each question unless the logical connection between two or more questions is so great that it is not convenient to deal with them separately. For the same reason, it may not be convenient to examine each question in the same sequence as that adopted in the order for reference. The submissions should be limited to those relevant to the questions referred.552 There is no form of order. By analogy, however, the observations often end with the parties’ suggestions concerning the answer to be given to the referring court.553 Those may also be placed individually, at the end of the submissions devoted to each question. 9.155 The Court makes no order for costs so far as the parties to the proceedings before the referring court are concerned and the costs of any member state or EU institution which chooses to submit observations lie where they fall, so there is no need for any party submitting observations to claim costs. There is no restriction on the raising of new points at the hearing, which is normally the only time at which it is possible to comment on the matters raised by the other parties in their observations. 551 See Ch 10, paras 10.5–10.26. 552 In Cases 50–58/82 Administrateur des Affaires Maritimes Bayonne v Dorca Marina [1982]  ECR  3949, para  13, for example, the Court refused to consider an argument on the ground that it did not fall within the scope of the order for reference. 553 Eg ‘For these reasons it is respectfully submitted that the question set out in the order for reference should be answered as follows: (1) examination of the question has not revealed any factor which renders Regulation No … invalid (or: Regulation No … is invalid); (2) Article … of Regulation No … is to be interpreted to the effect that…’.

849

Chapter 10

Evidence

I INTRODUCTION 10.1 The principal subject of this and the following three chapters is the proof of the existence of facts, not law, from material (evidence) which is either primary, in the sense that it constitutes the direct perception of a fact, or secondary in the sense that the perception of the fact is not achieved directly, through the senses, but indirectly through inference. The degree of elaboration necessary in the drawing of inferences depends on the nature of the evidence used and its relationship to the fact to be proved. The process involved has been described as follows: in general, the ‘taking’ of evidence presupposes that the party with the burden of proof must specify the matter to be proved and the evidence to be adduced in support thereof; the actual taking of the evidence consists of the sensory perception and appraisal of an item capable of constituting evidence (such as the hearing of the evidence of a witness, the reading of a document and the examination of an object), which requires access to the evidence.1 In that threestage process, the first stage (the identification of the issues of fact to be determined by the Court and, where possible, the identification of relevant sources of evidence) depends upon the actions of the parties (in adversarial proceedings). Through their written pleadings (discussed in the preceding chapter), the parties define the issues of fact in the case; and, in relation to each issue of fact, the party bearing what is best described as the evidential burden of proof indicates, so far as he is able, relevant sources of evidence. The second stage, the obtaining of relevant evidence, is accomplished in part by the parties and in part by the Court. The parties produce the evidence that they are able to produce (usually documents; but it is also possible for the parties to set down in writing, and disclose, the statements made by relevant witnesses). The Court obtains additional evidence including, in particular, evidence that a party has not disclosed and the actual testimony of a witness, by means of a measure of enquiry (discussed in the next chapter). Subject to the exclusion of evidence (see Chapter 12), the Court then evaluates and draws conclusions from the evidence before it, in the light of the parties’ submissions on the evidence and the relevant rules relating to the assessment of evidence (considered in Chapter 13). This chapter deals, as

1 Case C-175/06 Tedesco v Tomasoni Fittings Srl [2007]  ECR  I-7929, paras 47 and 55–56 (Advocate General Kokott).

851

10.2  Evidence

a preliminary matter, with the role of evidence and fact-finding in proceedings before the Court and the anomalous topic of the proof of law.

II

THE ROLE OF EVIDENCE IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT2

10.2 The importance of fact-finding in a particular case depends in part on the nature of the proceedings and in part on the way the case is pleaded. If, for example, the parties are agreed on the facts, the Court does not normally seek to reopen the matters of fact in the case. That does not, however, mean to say that the Court is invariably bound by concessions or agreements made by the parties. In principle, most proceedings before the Court are adversarial in character in that one case or contention is met by an opposing case or contention.3 Where that is so, the extent to which the opposing cases or contentions are actually in opposition with one another (there may be aspects on which the parties agree) defines the issues that the Court must decide and, ordinarily, the Court may not go outside the scope of those issues. The method of deciding those issues is neither wholly accusatorial nor entirely inquisitorial.4 The inquisitorial character of proceedings stems, in essence, from the Court’s function, as defined by the Treaties,5 to ensure that the law is observed. It is also inherent in its jurisdiction, which enables it to give judgment on matters involving the public interest and not just the private interest of the parties. For example, an action for damages brought against the EU may put in question the lawfulness of an act of one of the institutions. The Court’s decision on the issue can therefore have repercussions on matters other than the applicant’s entitlement to damages. In some cases, such as staff cases, the interests involved can be said to be purely private; but those cases tend to be exceptional. More often, when the Court gives judgment on the lawfulness of an act of an institution or its interpretation, the public, EU interest is also at stake and requires that the Court take a positive role in the disposal of the case. Accordingly, although in adversarial proceedings the parties define the issues between them that the Court must resolve (including the extent of any issues of fact), the choice of method by which those issues are determined by the Court does not lie within the hands of the parties. There is, nevertheless, a distinction to be drawn between the existence of a power to investigate a question of fact, even against the inclinations of the parties (who may have their own ideas about how the question should be resolved), which reveals the inquisitorial side of the Court’s procedure, and the exercise of that power. The Court is not bound in any and every case to carry out a detailed investigation into every 2 See, inter alia, Rigaux, Miscellanea W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, Volume II, p  365; Asso (1966) Rev Trim Droit Européen 21 and 177; Bebr Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities (1981) pp 125 ff; Lasok in De 20 Ans a l’Horizon 2020 (Court of Justice, 2010) at pp 163 and following. 3 Cf RP-GC, art 64. There are exceptions. For example, references for a preliminary ruling are not adversarial. 4 See, for example, André [1967] 5 CMLR 38 ff. 5 TEU, art 19(1).

852

Evidence 10.3

conceivable fact in issue. Its duty to ensure that the law is observed is tempered by the need to ensure that cases are decided expeditiously so that justice is not denied by delay. The Court is only bound to take those steps that are sufficient to ensure that justice is done. It is under no duty to undertake excessive measures. In consequence, where certain facts are not disputed by the parties, are not in doubt, or are not material, there is no reason for the Court to exercise of its own motion its powers of investigation. In contrast, where the proceedings are not adversarial in character, the Court’s jurisdiction is not limited to a lis defined by the parties. In that situation, the extent to which the Court is limited in relation to the questions of fact that it must determine is identified by other features of the procedure such as, in the case of references for a preliminary ruling, the terms of the question referred and the need to give a useful answer on that question to the referring court (see further below). 10.3 One of the features of the way in which the Court operates is its willingness to rely on ipse dixit6 or a priori assumptions7 rather than evidence in order to establish the existence of a fact. To some extent that is a development which has been forced on the Court by its increased workload: in earlier days, as can be seen from the reports, it took pains to gather the evidence necessary to decide issues of fact.8 It also reveals an assumption, but not a presumption, held by the Court that the member states and the EU institutions can be relied on to give an accurate presentation of the material facts. That supposes not only that the member states and EU institutions would not deliberately seek to mislead the Court but also that they are conscientious in setting out the true position and avoiding unintentional misrepresentations. Where the parties to proceedings are either member states or EU institutions, it is no doubt sufficient to proceed on that basis: both parties have, in general, sufficient resources and adequate access to relevant information to look after themselves; if a fact asserted by one party is not challenged, or is expressly conceded, by the other party, what need is there for the Court to interfere? On the other hand, where natural or legal persons are involved as parties,9 the situation is somewhat different. There is no equivalence of position, or anything approaching it, even when the natural or legal person does have extensive resources, as, for example, in the case of a large multinational corporation. The reason is that the relationship between the member states 6 For example, in Case 28/83 Forcheri v Commission [1984] ECR 1425, para 17, the Court took ‘formal notice’ of statements of facts made by an intervening member state and, on the basis of those facts, found in favour of the defendant (in whose support the state had intervened); in Case 64/85 Watgen v Caisse de Pension des Employés Privés [1988] ECR 2435 (at 2446–2447), Advocate General Mancini remarked on the fact that, in an earlier case, the Court had made a finding about the effect of national legislation even though no proof of the relevant facts had been furnished to it. 7 For example, in Cases C-259/10 and C-260/10 Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Rank Group plc [2011] ECR I-10947, para 57, the ECJ stated, without referring to any facts or evidence: ‘the attraction of games of chance lies chiefly in the possibility of winning’. Unfortunately, the ECJ had previously rejected that view in Case C-452/03  RAL (Channel Islands) v Commissioners of Customs & Excise [2005] ECR I-3947, paras 27 and 31. The games of chance in question in both cases were the same. 8 That is an evolution that has affected the GC just as much as, before it, the ECJ. 9 In practice, in actions against an EU institution or in references for a preliminary ruling.

853

10.4  Evidence

and the EU institutions is at times so close that material evidence in the form, for example, of internal documents, is more likely to be known to all parties concerned.10 A  natural or legal person, however, even if a large and wealthy multinational corporation, may easily be kept ignorant of relevant evidence held by an EU institution or a member state (generally the former). In those circumstances it is dangerous for the Court to rely on ipse dixit: justice cannot be done, and is certainly not seen to be done, where one party is not required to produce evidence in support of the assertions of fact made by it. Even when the parties are in an equivalent position, ipse dixit may not be reliable where the assertion is made at a stage in the proceedings at which the other party is unable to take up an informed position in regard to the assertion; and, in such circumstances, evidence is required.11 10.4 Quite a different matter is the fact whose existence (or non-existence) is so evident that evidence is not required in order to prove it.12 Such facts are relatively few and far between. More problematical are facts whose existence or non-existence are considered, or appear, to be truisms or matters of common sense. Such facts need to be approached with caution because it is generally the case that they are not truisms and that common sense is a poor guide to establishing their truth or otherwise.13 For the purpose of considering the role of evidence, it is convenient to distinguish between non-contentious proceedings, principally references for a preliminary ruling, and contentious proceedings.

A

Non-contentious proceedings

10.5 The role of evidence in non-contentious proceedings depends upon the nature of the proceedings and the relevance to them of findings of fact. In principle, the fact that proceedings are non-contentious in nature means that factfinding is inquisitorial rather than accusatorial and, in consequence, that there is no evidential burden of proof (although there may well be a legal burden of proof arising as a matter of substantive law).

10 That cannot, however, be assumed in all cases. The Commission sometimes appears to act as if whatever it says about obscure events in the course of the legislative history of a measure were common ground; but it cannot be assumed that member states have retained all records or that the civil servants who may have been present at a meeting at which something may or may not have been said can still be contacted. 11 Cf Case 323/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 2275 at 2296 (Advocate General Jacobs). 12 Cf Case C-461/07P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Sun Sang Kong Yuen Shoe Factory (Hui Yang) Corpn Ltd [2008]  ECR  I-11*, paras 9–10 (‘well-known’ facts). Cases C-462/07P(I), C-463/07P(I) and C-464/07P(I) [2008] ECR I-13*, 14* and 15* are to the same effect. 13 According to a statement attributed to Albert Einstein, common sense is a deposit of prejudices laid down in the mind before the age of eighteen. It can be described in another way as a view of the world, inculcated in a person through a combination of cast of character and that person’s experience of the world, for which no proof is considered (by that person) to be required because all persons are presumed to hold the same (reasonable) view of the world. Needless to say, common sense is not a mode of proof.

854

Evidence 10.7

10.6 The most important category of non-contentious proceedings is the reference for a preliminary ruling. In that proceeding the Court is seised of a question of EU law relating to the interpretation or validity of, as the case may be, a provision of the Treaty, a Convention or an act of one of the institutions or some other body. The question arises in the context of litigation before a national court or tribunal. Three categories of fact can be identified in proceedings for a preliminary ruling: (i) those relating to the admissibility of the reference; (ii) those relating to the dispute between the parties before the national court; (iii) those relating to the answer to the question of law put to the Court. Before dealing in detail with those different categories of fact, it should be noted, as a general observation, that the parties to the proceedings before the referring court have their chance to bring forward evidence in the proceedings before that court and not in the preliminary ruling proceedings before the Court.14 The parties who can appear only in the preliminary ruling proceedings (the member states, Commission, EFTA  Surveillance Authority, and the author of the act whose interpretation or validity is in question) do not have the opportunity to bring forward evidence in the proceedings before the referring court. To the extent that an investigation of the facts can be undertaken by the Court, they are therefore restricted to bringing forward evidence in the course of the preliminary ruling proceedings. The facts that, as will be seen, the Court may assess the evidence, make findings in relation to certain facts in order to come to a conclusion on the question referred to it and take account of evidence not before the referring court, do not discharge the parties to the proceedings before the referring court from the duty to bring forward their evidence at that stage, before the reference is made, rather than thereafter. In cases where the facts are or may be critical to the Court’s ruling, it is all the more necessary for the parties to the proceedings before the referring court, and for the referring court itself, to ensure that the relevant facts are found so far as it lies within the power of the parties to adduce evidence in relation to them and of the referring court to find them. Where the Court finds it necessary to look at facts other than those set out in the order for reference or to assess evidence, it may inform itself from reports made by a national authority;15 unchallenged information or statistics furnished by some of the parties before it;16 facts found in a direct action involving one of the parties and dealing with the same situation.17 1 Facts relating to admissibility 10.7 By and large, the Court does not take cognisance of the facts of the case otherwise than for the purpose of understanding the context in which the refer-

14 Case 72/83 Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] ECR 2727, para 11. 15 Case 5/84 Direct Cosmetics Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs [1985] ECR 617 at 623. 16 Case 148/85 Direction Générale des Impôts and Procureur de la République v Forest and Minoterie Forest SA [1986] ECR 3449, para 11; Case 433/85 Feldain v Services Fiscaux de Département du Haut Rhin [1987] ECR 3521, para 16. 17 Case C-27/90 SITPA v ONIFLHOR [1991] ECR I-133, para 18.

855

10.8  Evidence

ence was made and its ruling must be given;18 but it does consider certain matters relating to the admissibility of the order for reference: such as whether the referring court is a body competent to make the reference,19 whether the question referred relates to a matter on which a reference can be made20 or whether it is ‘quite obvious’ that the question of law bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or to the subject matter of the proceedings before the national court.21 The Court is not usually in a position to appreciate the relevance of the question of law raised in the order for reference and the necessity for a preliminary ruling because it does not have direct knowledge of the facts.22 In consequence, it is in no position to question the assessment made by the referring court; aliter if the lack of relevance or necessity is clear on the face of the order for reference.23 In Case 93/78 Mattheus v Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkuhlkast eG,24 where there were suspicions that the reference had been made by the national court simply because a contract between the parties provided for a reference to be made, Advocate General Mayras took the view that it was not right to assess how seriously the dispute between the parties was taken by the national court, even if there were suspicions that it was in fact a fictitious dispute. 10.8 In Case 104/79 Foglia v Novello25 the Court did investigate and draw conclusions from the facts leading up to the making of the order for reference, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the reference because there was, in its view, no genuine dispute between the parties. The referring court then made a second order for reference26 asking, inter alia, what were the Court’s 18 See, for example, Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at 593; Case 20/64 Albatros Sàrl v SOPECO  [1965]  ECR  29 at 34; Case 2/67 De Moor v Caisse de Pension des Employés Privés [1967] ECR 197 at 205; Case 13/68 Salgoil SpA v Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade [1968]  ECR  453 at 459; Case 10/69 Portelange SA  v Smith Corona Marchant International SA  [1969]  ECR  309 at 315; Case 17/81 Pabst and Richarz KG  v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg [1982] ECR 1331 at para 12; Case 167/84 Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen v J Henr. Drunert, Holzimport [1985] ECR 2235, para 12. 19 Eg Case 61/65 Vaassen (née Göbbels) v Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrif [1966] ECR 261 at 272–273; Case 36/73 Nederlandse Spoorwegen NV  v Minister Verkeer en Waterstaat [1973] ECR 1299 at 1317–1320 (Advocate General Mayras); Case 17/76 Brack v Insurance Officer [1976]  ECR  1429 at 1456 (Advocate General Mayras): Case C-24/92 Corbiau v Administration des Contributions [1993]  ECR  I-1227. But see Case 65/81 Reina v Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg [1982] ECR 33 at paras 6–8. 20 Case 105/79 Preliminary Ruling by the Acting Judge at the Tribunal d’Instance, Hayange [1979] ECR 2257. 21 The Salgoil case (above, note 18); Case 126/80 Salonia v Poidomani and Giglio [1981] ECR 1563, para 6; Case 166/84 Thomasdünger GmbH v Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurtam-Main [1985] ECR 3001, para 11; Case C-286/88 Falciola Angelo SpA v Comune di Pavia [1990] ECR I-191, paras 8–9. 22 See, for example, Case 43/71 Politi SAS  v Ministry of Finance of the Italian Republic [1971]  ECR  1039; Case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board (Northern Ireland) v Redmond [1978] ECR 2347. 23 The Salgoil case (above, note 18) and the Salonia case (above, note 21). 24 [1978] ECR 2203. 25 [1980]  ECR  745 (it seems that the Court’s view was heavily influenced by the behaviour of the parties’ representatives at the hearing). See Barav (1980) 5  ELR  443; Bebr (1980) 17 CMLR 371; Wyatt (1981) 6 ELR 447. 26 Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello (No 2) [1981] ECR 3045.

856

Evidence 10.9

powers of appraising the facts found by a national court in the order for reference. The Court then ruled that it should be put in such a position by the referring court that it could make any assessment necessary for the discharge of its functions in the context of preliminary rulings in particular for the purpose of determining whether it is competent to answer the reference. That seems to make it clear that the Court does have power to find facts for the purpose of determining admissibility but the judgment is not clear as to the precise extent of that power. In his opinion, Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn suggested that the Court can look only at the order for reference or the file of the case: if it was apparent from either that the order for reference was not admissible, the Court could refuse to deal with the reference (but, it seems, had discretion whether or not to do so); if it was not apparent, it was to be supposed that the reference was admissible. 10.9 Assuming that that approach is right, the referring court should set out in the order for reference the basis for making it so that the Court can decide whether or not it is obliged to answer it.27 If it appears on the face of the order (as completed, where need be, by the file accompanying it) that the reference is inadmissible, the Court is under no duty to answer it and may send the matter back to the referring court.28 Where there is a conflict between the order for reference and the file of the case sent to the Court by the referring court, the order for reference should be preferred because that is the instrument which seises the Court with jurisdiction. The file is relevant only in so far as it explains or supplements the order for reference. It is unclear whether the Court may decide to answer the reference despite the fact that it is inadmissible. The judgment in the first Foglia v Novello case29 seems to have held that the absence of a duty to answer the reference meant that the Court had no jurisdiction to do so, not that the Court had discretion whether or not to answer it. If the order for reference is not ex facie inadmissible, the Court remains under a duty to answer but it would seem that, if the order is obscure or doubt is thrown upon it in the observations of a party, the Court has discretion (but no duty) to delay giving judgment until the national court has clarified the question. The Court cannot, however, reject the order as inadmissible simply because it is obscure or some doubt as to its admissibility has been raised, unless inadmissibility is manifest on the face of the order (as explained or completed, where need be, by the file of the case).30 A fortiori, the Court cannot order a measure of enquiry in order to find any facts relating to the issue of admissibility.

27 Eg Cases 98, 162 and 258/85 Bertini v Regione Lazio [1986] ECR 1885, para 6; Case C-343/90 Dias v Director da Alfandega do Porto [1992] ECR I-4673, paras 19–20. 28 Eg Bertini v Regione Lazio (ibid), para 8; Case 267/86 van Eycke v ASPA NV [1988] ECR 4769, paras 12–13 and at 4783, Advocate General Mancini. 29 Above, note 25. 30 Thus, in Case 6/84 Nicolet Instrument v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen [1985] ECR 765, para 7, where the Commission expressed a reservation about the admissibility of the reference in its written observations but withdrew those reservations at the hearing, the Court considered it unnecessary to examine them even though, ordinarily, the Court is obliged to consider of its own motion the admissibility of proceedings brought before it.

857

10.10  Evidence

2 Facts relating to the dispute between the parties 10.10 It is well established that the referring court has exclusive jurisdiction over the facts relating to the dispute before it.31 The facts of the dispute give rise to the issue of EU law referred to the Court and may therefore influence how the Court approaches the question of law referred to it and how the Court expresses the ruling to be given. That issue should be defined in the light of the facts in the order for reference32 and, once it is so defined, the Court cannot go behind it because the extent of its jurisdiction is determined by the order for reference.33 The Court may interpret the order for reference but cannot redraft it.34 Where the order for reference does not contain any findings of fact or is deficient in that respect, the Court may in principle make enquiries or consider evidence35 or make assumptions36 in order to clarify the issue raised in the order for reference; but the Court cannot itself decide any issues of fact relating to the dispute between the parties and, if it were to do so, its findings would not bind the national court, since they could have been made only for the purpose of defining the issue of EU law with which the Court is seised by the order for reference. Since the preliminary ruling procedure is intended to deal with questions of law only (even though the questions of law raised may give rise to subsidiary issues of fact), it seems to follow that matters of fact relating to the context of the reference should not be the subject of investigation by the Court (in the event that they are not set out adequately in the order for reference) unless they are agreed between the parties or, if in dispute, are such that the Court may come to a (provisional) conclusion, for the purposes of the reference, without prejudicing the utility of the ruling given or the resolution of the issue by the referring court.37 10.11 The two most detailed analyses of the role of evidence in references for a preliminary ruling cover facts falling within this second category and come from the advocate general’s opinion in EMI v CBS and Denkavit Futtermittel v 31 See, for example, Case 51/74 Van der Hulst’s Zonen CV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1975] ECR 79, para 12: Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, para 16; Case 51/75 EMI Records v CBS United Kingdom Ltd [1976] ECR 811 at 854 (Advocate General Warner); Case 104/77 Firma Wolfgang Oehlschläger v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1978] ECR 791, para 4; Case 36/79 Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v Finanzamt Warendorf [1979] ECR 3439, para 12 and at 3461, Advocate General Reischl; Campus Oil (above, note 14), para  10; Case 252/83 Kupferberg v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1985]  ECR  157, para  13; Case C-332/88 Alimenta SA  v Doux SA [1990] ECR I-2077, para 9. 32 In consequence, if the order for reference does not set out the factual background, the Court may not be able to answer the question referred to it: see, for example, Cases C-320 to C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo SpA v Circostel et al [1993] ECR I-393. 33 In particular, the Court cannot go behind the facts found by the national court on the basis of a mere oral statement by counsel: see Case 137/78 Henningsen Food Inc v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eiren [1979] ECR 1707 at 1723 (Advocate General Warner). 34 EMI v CBS (above, note 31) at 854 (Advocate General Warner). 35 Eg Case 191/83 Salzano v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1984]  ECR  3741, para  8, reliance on documents before the Court in order to make a finding of background relevance to the question of interpretation raised. 36 Case 243/83 Binon & Cie v Agence et Messageries de la Presse [1985] ECR 2015, para 21. 37 In general, that will be so only where the disputed facts are simple in nature or where no serious issue arises in respect of them.

858

Evidence 10.13

Finanzamt Warendorf.38 The former concerned the question whether trademark rights could be used to prevent the importation of trademarked goods from a third country and so the interpretation of what is now the TFEU. The parties before the Court produced a considerable amount of documentary evidence relating, not to the question of interpretation stricto sensu but to the general context of the dispute. Advocate General Warner took the view that that evidence could be looked at for two purposes only:39 (i) to explain and complete the facts stated in the order for reference, in so far as the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence were common ground; and (ii) for enlightenment concerning the issues between the parties in so far as they disagree on what are the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. He went on, however, to say that, where the reference concerned the validity of an act of an institution, the Court could admit evidence on a relevant issue of fact.40 10.12 The Denkavit case also involved a question of interpretation: whether EU law forbade certain action to be taken if a given state of affairs existed. The Commission challenged the accuracy of the assumption that that state of affairs did exist. Once again the issue of fact did not relate to the question of EU law but to the context in which it was to be applied. Advocate General Reischl said that the Court was bound by the facts found by the referring court and that the response to the question in the order for reference had to be framed on the basis that those facts did indeed exist;41 however, he went on to say that he had considerable misgivings over whether the Court is unconditionally bound by findings of fact which are subject to well-founded doubts concerning their accuracy and relevance to the resolution of the dispute before the referring court. He thought that the Court might be bound by an agreement between the parties, but not in regard to facts relating to the validity of a provision of EU law. In such a case the Court42 ‘is entitled to adopt a critical stance, nay perhaps even bound to investigate the questions of fact at issue. Further the same must however be assumed if…it is a question of the interpretation of Community law for the purpose of assessing the validity of a national provision. If this depends on a particular economic situation as a whole and if there are serious doubts regarding the assessment made by the national court, then it seems to me hardly sustainable that the Court should simply overlook it and give an interpretation of Community law in respect of facts which are probably not true’. 10.13 In that case, the national court’s findings were based solely on statements made by the plaintiff before it which had been accepted by the defendant without checking them. He therefore took the view that, even in a reference concerning the interpretation of a provision of EU law, the Court can correct the facts found, but ‘only if it is clearly possible from the documents, that is to 38 Above, note 31. 39 EMI v CBS (above, note 31), at 854–855. 40 See also Cases 80 and 81/77 Société les Commissionnaires Réunis Sàrl v Receveur des Douanes [1978] ECR 927 at 957. 41 Above, note 31 at 3461. 42 Ibid at 3461–3462.

859

10.14  Evidence

say, without additional, time-consuming evidence, for which there is basically no place in proceedings for interpretation’.43 It is not the Court’s usual practice to correct the facts found by the national court, even if serious doubts are raised concerning their accuracy, in proceedings for interpretation. It is more likely for the Court to take the dispute on the facts into account when framing its answer to the question. The facts are not, of course, directly relevant to the problem of interpretation itself44 but certainly affect the way the Court’s answer is to be put. It is not therefore necessary to consider the accuracy or otherwise of the findings of fact.45 The situation is, as will be seen, completely different in proceedings concerning the validity of a provision of EU law, where the facts do affect that question and are not simply general background material of no relevance to the issue before the Court. 3 Facts relating to the reference 10.14 Facts determining the answer to the question of law posed in the order for reference fall, as a matter of principle, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court and it is not bound by findings made by the national court which relate to that aspect of the case, as opposed to the background to the question referred. If the national court could bind the Court in so far as the factual basis to the question of law referred were concerned, the Court would no longer be in a position to ensure that the law is observed: the rulings given by the Court on a particular matter would vary from case to case, depending on the facts found by the referring court, giving rise to uncertainty in the law and reducing the preliminary ruling to a judgment on a hypothesis. However, since the preliminary ruling procedure is designed to be a step, in the proceedings before the referring court, which is in principle concerned only with a question of law, the usual practice is to rely on the findings of fact made by the referring court even where they relate to the question of law that has been referred, unless those findings are put in issue in the course of the preliminary ruling procedure. 10.15 In the nature of things, facts determining the interpretation of a provision of EU law give rise to few disputes. They comprise such things as: (i) the text of the provision itself; and (ii) evidence other than the text of the provision to be interpreted that is relevant to the interpretation to be given, such as pre 43 Ibid at 3463; his emphasis. 44 Save in cases where the teleological method of interpretation is used, in which case the relevant facts are properly to be regarded as falling within the category of facts relevant to the question of law referred to the Court, rather than the category of facts relating to the dispute between the parties. 45 Eg Case 99/83 Fioravanti v Amministrazione delle Finanze [1984] ECR 3939, para 10, where the referring court assumed a fact and one of the parties produced documentary evidence that suggested that the fact was wrongly assumed, but the Court left the question to the referring court; Case C-345/88 Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft v Butterabsatz OsnabrückEmsland [1990] ECR I-159, para 14, where a fact suggested in the question referred was not apparent from the documentary evidence but the Court limited itself to proceeding on the basis that that fact existed, saying that it was for the referring court to verify the assumptions on which the reference was made.

860

Evidence 10.16

paratory documents (for example, the minutes of the Council or a Commission working paper which may be relevant to the intention behind the provision) or evidence relating to the effect in practice of the different contending interpretations of the provision (which may be useful in deciding which interpretation is to be preferred). A dispute over the text of the provision in question, as opposed to the meaning to be given to it, is almost unheard of.46 Preparatory documents are not usually considered to be material which may be relied on for the purposes of interpretation, as opposed to ascertainment of the object or intention of the draftsman; and, even then, are usually considered to be relevant only if they have been published, in which case little difficulty arises in regard to proving them. Reference to the practice of the contracting parties to an international convention has been rejected as an aid to the construction of a provision.47 Where evidence of the different consequences of the different contending interpretations of a provision is relevant, it is clearly better for the material facts to be found in the order for reference.48 Where it is argued that a provision is to be interpreted by analogy to another provision, it is necessary to demonstrate that the factual substratum of both provisions is the same, which may well involve the Court in examining evidence in addition to the facts found in the order for reference.49 Facts giving rise to the problem of interpretation, as opposed to those relating to its solution, may also fall within the jurisdiction of the Court to determine, particularly where the Court is in a better position than the referring court to establish their existence or non-existence.50 10.16 Facts which are pertinent to the validity of an act of an institution may be the subject of findings made by the national court in the order for reference or may not even be the subject of dispute between the parties to the proceedings before the national court. The first situation arose in Case 131/77 Firma Malic, Gross- und Aussenhandel Arnold Nöll v Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken,51 where the validity of a regulation turned on the question whether the price of powdered whey depended on the price of skimmed milk powder. The referring court made the order for reference on the basis of certain findings on that point to which it had come after considering the facts. The existence of those findings did not

46 In Case 22/81  R  v Social Security Comr, ex p Browning [1981]  ECR  3357 the text was the English version of art 50 of Council Regulation No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 (OJ No L149/2 of 5  July 1971), which had been subjected to various amendments and corrections over the years. Counsel for one party placed great emphasis on the meaning of the word ‘fixed’, which appeared in a version he was working from, and Counsel for the other party placed equally great emphasis on the meaning of the word ‘determined’ which was used in another version. 47 Case 236/83 University of Hamburg v Hauptzollamt Münster-West [1984] ECR 3849, para 23: the reason seems to have been that reliance was placed on assumptions regarding the intentions of the other contracting parties rather than on established facts. 48 See, for example, Case C-372/88 Milk Marketing Board of England and Wales v Cricket St Thomas Estate [1990] ECR I-1345. 49 Case 74/87 D Goerrig GmbH v Hauptzollamt Geldern [1988] ECR 2771, para 13. 50 Cf Case 327/82 Ekvo v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1984]  ECR  107, para  10, in casu, variations in cutting and boning methods as between the member states that led to variations in the meaning given to terms used in EU legislation. 51 [1978] ECR 1041.

861

10.17  Evidence

prevent the Court from carrying out its own investigation, which confirmed the conclusions of the referring court. 10.17 An example of the second situation is Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale AG v Germany.52 There an action had been brought by an importer against the Germany authority responsible for the issue of import licences for preserved mushrooms. The latter had rejected an application for import licences on the ground that their issue had been suspended by a Commission regulation. The dispute concerned the validity of that regulation, which determined the validity of the refusal to grant the licences. The regulation had suspended the grant of import licences in respect of goods from those third countries which did not agree to limit their exports to the EU and its validity depended in part on how the Commission had conducted the negotiations on self-limitation agreements with third countries. The defendant in the proceedings before the German court had no direct knowledge of the negotiations but it did not challenge certain assertions as to the facts made by the applicant and conceded others. From a procedural point of view, it could have been said that, as far as the German court was concerned, the issues of fact had to that extent been determined in favour of the applicant by the time that the order for reference was made, even though the unchallenged or conceded facts had not in substance been incorporated in the order for reference and formally adopted by the referring court. Nevertheless the Court did review the facts. 10.18 One of the reasons why the Court should not be bound by findings made by the referring court or concessions made by the parties to proceedings before it, which relate to the answer to be given to the question of law in the order for reference, is that, as in the Edeka case, the facts may not be within the capacity of the referring court to determine or the parties to prove because neither has access to the evidence on which a reliable conclusion can be based. The Court’s duty to ensure that the law is observed could not properly be discharged if its decision on the validity of a provision of EU law were based on findings that were probably unsafe, unreliable or untrue.53 10.19 In both the Milac and Edeka cases the Commission challenged the facts found by or agreed before the national court so there was, to that extent, an issue of fact before the Court when it came to consider the question of law put to it. Had the Commission conceded the facts, would the Court have been bound to accept the concession? Clearly not. Proceedings for obtaining a preliminary ruling are non-contentious and so a concession of fact does not remove an issue from the competence of the Court to decide, as may happen where its function is to decide a lis between the parties: the object of the preliminary ruling procedure

52 [1982] ECR 2745. 53 Thus, in Case 291/86 Central-Import Münster GmbH & Co KG  v Haputzollamt Münster [1988] ECR 3679, paras 25–30, the facts relevant to the validity of the contested measure were proved by evidence adduced by the Commission in the course of the proceedings before the Court.

862

Evidence 10.21

is not to determine the legal position of the parties inter se54 but to consider a matter of public interest.55 It seems, however, that the Court may, in its discretion, accept a concession where it is made by a party submitting observations who has knowledge of the facts. Such a concession can be relied on. A concession made by a party who has no knowledge of the facts is unsafe. In both cases the Court remains free to seek evidence on the point by ordering a measure of enquiry or exercising its other powers. It is not necessary to refer the matter back to the national court for further findings and that would, indeed, be fruitless in most cases because any relevant evidence is likely to be in the possession of EU institutions or other persons or bodies within the control of the Court, not the referring court.56 Although the decision to accept a concession should, in principle, be based on whether or not its maker has knowledge of the facts conceded, it would seem that the Court may take other relevant factors into account, such as the relative importance of the fact in question and whether or not the person making the concession might have some interest other than in revealing the truth when admitting the fact. 10.20 Findings of fact made by the Court for the purpose of answering the question referred to it bind the referring court by virtue of the principle of res judicata,57 but only in regard to the question of law decided by the Court. In consequence the national court is free to ignore them for the purpose of deciding the dispute before it. 10.21 The extent to which it is necessary to investigate material questions of fact, even in cases concerning the validity of a provision of EU law, is determined in part by the terms of the order for reference. In several early cases it was said that the Court could only consider grounds of invalidity raised by the referring court in the order for reference and could not consider additional arguments put by the parties, save in exceptional circumstances. For example, in Cases 73 and 74/63 Internationale Crediet-en Handelsvereniging NV  Rotterdam v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij,58 Advocate General Roemer said: ‘a national court cannot pose a completely general question on the validity or invalidity of acts of the institutions in its order making the reference…[It] must clearly state the 54 Case 13/61 Kledingverkoopbedrijf De Geus en Uitenbogerd v Bosch GmbH [1962] ECR 45 at 61 (Advocate General Lagrange). 55 Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 51 at 69 (Advocate General Mayras). 56 The EU institutions are, of course, obliged to give active assistance to the national courts, so far as it lies within their power to do so, by producing documents or authorising their officials to give evidence: Case C-2/88 Imm Zwartfeld [1990] ECR I-3365, para 22. Nonetheless, once the matter is before the Court in the form of a reference for a preliminary ruling, it would delay the final determination of the proceedings unnecessarily for the Court to refer the matter back to the referring court instead of seeking the relevant evidence and deciding the question of fact itself. 57 See, for example, Case 112/76 Manzoni v Fonds National de Retraite des Ouvriers Mineurs [1977]  ECR  1647 at 1661–1663 (Advocate General Warner). National courts may also be obliged to adopt findings on matters of EU law made by the Court in parallel proceedings before it; cf Cases 106–120/87 Asteris AE v Greece and EEC [1988] ECR 5515, para 18 and at 5528 (Advocate General Slynn). 58 [1964] ECR 1, at 26 and 28.

863

10.22  Evidence

questions on which it requests a preliminary ruling and must indicate the grounds which are said to entail the invalidity of a particular act. That is as far as the opinion of the Court of Justice may extend. If it were otherwise, the matter in dispute, other than in annulment proceedings, would not be precisely defined and the Court would have to make an examination from all imaginable points of view, which might be contrary to the intention of the parties in the national proceedings’.59 10.22 Although he excluded an exhaustive examination of the question of validity, he did accept that the order for reference could be given an extensive interpretation so as to cover questions not raised expressly by it. Nevertheless, the parties could still not extend the scope of the order for reference unilaterally.60 The Court held the measure in question to be valid ‘in the absence of any other defect which can be examined by the Court of its own motion’.61 In Case 5/67 Beus GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt München-Landsbergerstrasse62 Advocate General Gand, while basically following the same approach as that of Advocate General Roemer, also said that the Court ‘cannot hold a measure to be valid if it appears to [it] to be vitiated by a defect of such gravity that it ought to be raised’ by the Court of its own motion. Later still, in Case 11/74 Union des Minotiers de la Champagne v French Government63 Advocate General Trabucchi said that ‘the task of this Court, in proceedings for the preliminary examination of the validity of Community acts is not to test, in a thorough and definitive manner, the legality of the act in question but solely to declare whether the doubts in the matter expressed or merely referred to by the national court are well founded’.64 10.23 In fact, the scope of the Court’s enquiry into different grounds of invalidity depends very much on the wording of the question referred to it. If the question concerns a specific ground,65 the Court’s jurisdiction is restricted to that ground. If, however, it was manifest that the measure was invalid for another reason, the Court would not be ensuring that the law is observed if it refrained from examining that ground and drawing the national court’s attention to it. But the Court is clearly not bound to consider any and every conceivable argument. Nor does it do so in practice. A judgment finding that a measure is valid usually states that no cause has been shown to cast doubt on the validity of the measure;

59 To similar effect, see Case C-323/88  SA  Sermes v Directeur des Services des Douanes de Strasbourg [1990] ECR I-3027 at 3038–3040 (Advocate General van Gerven). 60 But see Case 17/67 Firma Max Neumann v Hauptzollamt Hof Saale [1967] ECR 441 at 460, where he suggested that the Court was not bound to consider only the points of law raised by the national court in the order for reference but could look at points raised by the parties. 61 [1964] ECR 1 at 14. 62 [1968] ECR 83 at 108. 63 [1974] ECR 877 at 888. 64 Thus, in Cases 50–58/82 Administrateur des Affaires Maritimes, Bayonne v Dorca Marina [1982]  ECR  3949, para  13, the Court refused to consider an argument that the disputed regulation infringed general principles of law on the ground that that issue did not fall within the scope of the reference. 65 For example: ‘is such and such a regulation invalid because the Council did not give adequate reasons?’

864

Evidence 10.26

it is never said that the measure is valid. In consequence, it is always possible to challenge the validity of the measure again, in subsequent proceedings, on a ground or on facts other than those considered by the Court. 10.24 It is more usual for the question in the order for reference to be phrased in general terms66 and for the arguments which have occurred to the national court to be set out in the order for reference. In such a case, the order for reference often, but not invariably, reflects the submissions made by the parties to the proceedings. In that situation the question to be answered by the Court is not restricted to any particular ground of invalidity and there is in consequence no reason to limit argument to the grounds that may be set out in the body of the order for reference: those are mentioned for the purpose of informing the Court of the issues between the parties and show the preoccupations of the national court but they do not limit the Court’s jurisdiction in answering the question, which is defined by the question itself. If, therefore, a new ground of invalidity is put forward by one of the parties, the Court can consider it. It does not extend the scope of the order for reference because the crucial part, the question referred, is quite general.67 Nevertheless, the Court tends only to consider the arguments addressed to it and gives the same cautious reply if it finds the measure to be valid. It is undoubtedly true that it is easier to deal with a case in which the national court asks a specific question but the mere fact that the question asked is in general terms, or no findings are made which narrow down the scope of the reference, does not make it inadmissible.68 10.25 Although facts relating directly to the question of the validity of the contested act thus seem to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court to find, the question whether or not a finding of invalidity in relation to one case may be relied on in relation to another case may depend upon facts that lie within the jurisdiction of the referring court.69 10.26 The validity of a provision of EU law cannot be reviewed by reference to rules or concepts of national law.70 In Cases 21–24/72 International Fruit Co NV  v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit71 the Court held that its jurisdiction to review validity under what is now TFEU, art 267 extends to all grounds capable of invalidating a provision of EU law including, where applicable, rules 66 For example: ‘is such and such a regulation valid?’ 67 See, for example, Beus GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt München-Landsbergerstrasse (above, note 62) at 96. 68 See, for example, Cases 193 and 145/77 Royal Scholten Honig (Holdings) Ltd and Tunnel Refineries Ltd v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce [1978]  ECR  2037 at 2012 (Advocate General Reischl); the Foglia v Novello cases (above, notes 25 and 26); Cases 141– 143/81 Holdijk, Mulder and Alpuro [1982] ECR 1299, paras 4–8: the relevance of and necessity for the reference are different matters. 69 Case 112/83 Société Produits de Mais SA  v Administraton des Douanes et droits indirects [1985] ECR 719, para 13. 70 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbH v Einfur und Forratsstelle für Getrride und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, para 3. 71 [1972] ECR 1219, paras 5–7.

865

10.27  Evidence

of international law. In later cases, however, the grounds of review have been stated variously to be restricted (at least in cases where the measure in question involves an assessment of complex economic facts) to patent error and misuse of power;72 manifest error, misuse of power or a clear exceeding of the bounds of the relevant institution’s discretion;73 or manifest error and manifest failure to observe EU law.74 That appears to mean that, when an institution has not simply applied the law to the facts but has appreciated, assessed or drawn inferences from the facts before acting, the Court’s jurisdiction to review does not normally extend to the appreciation, assessment or inference made. The Court may always determine whether the institution took into account facts that were relevant in law, whether the facts were correctly found and whether the institution acted lawfully, given the correctness of its assessment. But the Court cannot review the measure by substituting its own assessment of the facts for that of the institution, except when the institution’s assessment is itself tainted with illegality.75

B

Contentious proceedings

10.27 In direct actions, the importance of evidence depends on the provisions giving the Court jurisdiction. Broadly speaking those fall into three categories: (1) provisions which set a specific limitation to the Court’s jurisdiction over the facts;76 72 See Case 57/72 Westzucker GmbH v Eunfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Zucker [1973] ECR 321, para 14; Case 78/74 Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH BJ Stolp v Einfuhr under Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1975] ECR 421, para 9; Case 5/75 Deuka Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH BJ Stolp v Eunfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1975] ECR 759, para 4. 73 Case 55/75 Balkan Import-Export GmbH  v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof [1976]  ECR  19, para 8; Case 29/77 SA Roquette Frères v France [1977] ECR 1835, paras 19–20; Case 136/77 Firma A Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1978] ECR 1245, para 4 (see also Case 37/70 ReweZentrale des Lebensmittel-Grosshandels GmbH v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1971] ECR 23 at 42 (Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe)). 74 Case 2/77 Hoffmann’s Stärkefabriken AG  v Hauptzollamt Bielefeld [1977]  ECR  1375 at 1405 (Advocate General Mayras); in Case 126/81 Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft v Germany [1982] ECR 1479, Advocate General Rozés referred only to manifest error but it seems that that was the only ground then in issue. See also Case 345/82 Wünsche v Germany [1984] ECR 1995, para 21. 75 In Case 6/54 Netherlands v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 103, an action brought under art 33 of the ECSC Treaty, which also excluded the review of assessments or evaluations of economic facts or circumstances save where there was a misuse of powers or a manifest failure to observe the provisions of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, the Court construed the latter exception as resulting, in that case, only ‘from the finding by the Court of the existence of an economic situation which prima facie reveals no necessity for the contested measure in the pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 3 of the Treaty’ (see p 115). The Court’s approach to reviewing the validity of measures in references for a preliminary ruling, even those brought under the other Treaties, seems to have been broadly the same in that respect as that required by art 33. That being the case, a manifest failure to observe EU law or a clear overstepping of the institution’s discretion appears to be covered by saying that the Court can always review whether the institution was wrong in law, whatever the accuracy of its evaluation of the facts (see below). 76 Eg TFEU, art 269; EAEC Treaty, art 18.

866

Evidence 10.30

(2) those which set no specific limitation;77 (3) those which provide that the Court has ‘unlimited jurisdiction’.78 Save in respect of the last category, which comprises, in general, certain specified types of financial dispute and in which the Court can examine all matters of fact and law including matters of discretion,79 the Court’s jurisdiction may be limited not only by an express stipulation but also by the nature and object of the proceedings. 10.28 For example, art 18 of the EAEC Treaty is one of the rare provisions which appear expressly to exclude review by the Court of the facts of the case because the grounds of review are restricted to ‘the formal validity of the decision and to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty’. TFEU, art 269 also restricts the Court’s jurisdiction to consider the legality of an act adopted by the European Council or the Council since the Court’s jurisdiction lies ‘in respect solely of the procedural stipulations contained in [TEU, art 7]’. Those provisions fall within the first category referred to above. 10.29 TFEU, art 263 gives the Court jurisdiction to annul different types of acts adopted by an EU institution or body ‘on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers’. It is not expressly stated that the Court has power to annul on the ground of a mistake of fact but that is implied: if the basis in fact of an exercise by an EU institution or body of its powers is wrong, it follows necessarily that the exercise is wrong in law on one of the grounds set out in art 263.80 Unlike the ultimate predecessor of TFEU, art 263 (ECSC Treaty, art 33), TFEU, art 263 does not go on to say: ‘The Court may not, however, examine the evaluation of the situation, resulting from economic facts or circumstances, in the light of which the [EU institution or body] took its decisions or made its recommendations save where the [EU institution or body] is alleged to have misused its powers or to have manifestly failed to observe the provisions of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application’. The significance of that is discussed below. 10.30 For the moment, it is sufficient to point out that, unlike ECSC Treaty, art 33 which, like art 18 of the EAEC Treaty, contained an express stipulation 77 Eg TFEU, arts 263, 272, 273. 78 Eg TFEU, art 261. 79 See Bebr Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities pp 125 ff. 80 The fact that an action for annulment is concerned both with matters of law and with matters of fact is well-established. For recent (at the time of writing) restatements of the position, see: Cases T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11 Deutsche Bahn v Commission, EU:T:2013:404, paras 109–112 (on appeal, Case C-583/13P Deutsche Bahn v Commission, 18 June 2015, paras 41–43); Case C-535/14P Ipatau v Council, 18 June 2015, para 42. Where matters of fact are in issue, it is necessary to examine the evidence supporting the allegations of fact on which the disputed measure is based; mere assertions are not enough: eg Case C-280/12 P Council v Fulmen, 28  November 2013 (upholding Cases T-439/10 and T-44/10 Fulmen v Council, 21 March 2012).

867

10.31  Evidence

limiting, albeit to different degrees, the Court’s powers of review in regard to the facts, TFEU, art 263 contains no such express limitation. It therefore falls, for present purposes, within the second category of provisions giving the Court jurisdiction. Nevertheless the Court has proceeded to impose on itself a limitation similar to that set out in ECSC, art 33. The reason for that is that the object of an action for annulment is the review by the Court of the lawfulness of an act and the review of an exercise of discretion falls outside the scope of proceedings of that nature. 10.31 The object of proceedings in which the Court has unlimited jurisdiction (the third category referred to above) is not simply the review of a measure, which may be annulled if it is held to be unlawful or not well founded, but the remaking of it. Hence the Court can substitute its own judgment in the matter for that of the body whose decision is in question, even when it is necessary to overturn an evaluation of fact or some other exercise of discretion.81 An additional consequence is that the Court is not bound merely to grant or refuse the relief sought in the applicant’s form of order: it may order other relief even if it has not been pleaded.82 In general, the Court is given unlimited jurisdiction by express provision in the Treaties or subordinate legislation. For example, art 31 of Council Regulation No 1/200383 provides that the Court has unlimited jurisdiction ‘to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty’ in the exercise of its powers under the Regulation.84 What that means is that the Court can review all matters of fact and law in connection with such a decision; it can therefore substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the Commission and substitute its own assessment of the gravity of the infringement or the appropriateness of the sanction imposed by the Commission, when considering whether the fine or periodic penalty should be reduced, increased or cancelled. It should be noted, however, that the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction is 81 Eg Case C-197/09 RX-II M v European Medicines Agency [2009] ECR I-12033, paras 55–56. See Bebr Judicial Control pp 129–131. In Case 1/56 Bourgaux v Common Assembly [1954– 56] ECR 361 at 375, Advocate General Roemer suggested that unlimited jurisdiction does not entitle the Court to review every exercise of a discretion but he seems subsequently to have qualified that view (for example, in Case 13/69 Van Eick v Commission [1970] ECR 3, he said that the Court could not substitute its own evaluation for that of the Commission because it did not have unlimited jurisdiction in the matter). The remark was made in connection with the discretion of the EU institutions to order their own internal affairs and it is doubtful if it applies outside staff cases, if at all. 82 Eg Case 24/79 Oberthür v Commission [1980] ECR 1743. 83 OJ 2003 No L1/1. 84 The ultimate source of this provision is TFEU, art 261. In Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission [1970] ECR 661 at 704, Advocate General Gand remarked, in relation to the effect of the predecessor provisions, that the ‘dispute as a whole is brought before the Court so that it has full power to consider the facts and, according to the view it takes as to the existence of the alleged infringements and their gravity, it may uphold, cancel or reduce the fine or, if necessary increase it’. It is interesting to observe that, although Case 61/80 Coöperatieve Stremsel-en Kleurselfabriek v Commission [1981] ECR 851 did not involve a fine, so the Court would not, in theory, have unlimited jurisdiction, the judgment was based in part on the finding that the object of the restrictive practice was to prevent competition despite the fact that the decision challenged did not find that but was based on the fact, put at issue by the applicant, that the practice had that effect.

868

Evidence 10.33

usually restricted to the financial aspects of the dispute (in competition cases, the imposition of a fine). Hence, while the Court may come to its own assessment in relation to such aspects, it cannot substitute its own assessment of the case for that of the body whose act is in question in respect of other aspects of the dispute.85 Evidence plays its most influential role, therefore, in cases where the Court has unlimited jurisdiction. 10.32 As can be seen, the most important limitation on the Court’s powers, so far as facts are concerned, is that, in proceedings in which the object is the annulment of an act, it cannot normally review evaluations of the facts or the exercise of a discretion. The reason for that is that the focus of an action for annulment is the judicial control of the legality of the disputed measure, by which is meant scrutiny of compliance with the legal conditions (including those relating to matters of fact) defining the scope of the legal power that was exercised when the disputed measure was adopted and scrutiny of the circumstances in which that power came to be exercised. Examination of the merits of the actual exercise of discretion, within the legal scope of the power, is not judicial control by reference to legality in that sense.86 That has remained the case in all essential respects since the era of the ECSC Treaty. 10.33 In the context of ECSC, art 33, the position was as follows. Although the Court could review any findings of fact made by the Commission, it could not review the conclusions drawn from those facts by the Commission when evaluating the situation,87 save under the conditions mentioned in art 33. While the restriction of the Court’s powers of review set out in that provision did not expressly apply to an evaluation of facts or circumstances which were not ‘economic’, the nature of the proceedings (an action for annulment) meant that the Court could not, in general, review any evaluation. In that context, a misuse of powers was (and is) the exercise of a power for a purpose other than that for

85 Thus, in Cases 176 and 177/86 Houyoux v Commission [1987] ECR 4333, para 16, a staff case (in respect of which the Court has unlimited jurisdiction in relation to disputes of a financial character), the Court held that it could of its own motion award the successful applicant financial compensation for the damage caused by the defendant’s maladministration. In Case T-156/89 Mordt v Court of Justice [1991] ECR II-407, para 150, on the other hand, the Court held that it could not order the defendant to take specific measures to comply with the judgment, even though it had unlimited jurisdiction; and, in Case 228/83 F v Commission [1985] ECR 275, para 34, it held that it could not substitute its own judgment for that of the appointing authority except in the case of a manifest error or misuse of powers. It was the non-pecuniary nature of the matters at issue in Mordt and F v Commission that precluded the Court taking the same approach as in Houyoux. 86 See the contrast drawn between an action for annulment and the action under ECSC, art 37: Cases 2 and 3/60 Niederrheinische Bergwerks-AG v High Authority 1961] ECR 133 at 146 and per Advocate General Lagrange at 152–153; Case 13/63 Italy v Commission [1963] ECR 165 at 182–183. 87 See Netherlands v High Authority (above, note 75) at 114; Case 2/56 Geitling Selling Agency for Ruhr Coal v High Authority [1957–58]  ECR  3 at 18; Case 13/60 Geitling Rurhkohlen Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v High Authority [1962] ECR 83 at 116; Cases 154, 205, 206, 226– 228, 263, 264/78, 31, 39, 83 and 85/79 Ferriera Valsabbia SpA v Commission [1980] ECR 907, para 50.

869

10.34  Evidence

which it was given. As far as a manifest failure to observe the provisions of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application was concerned, ‘manifest’ means that ‘a certain degree is reached in the failure to observe legal provisions so that the failure to observe the Treaty appears to derive from an obvious error in the evaluation, having regard to the provisions of the Treaty, of the situation in respect of which the decision was taken’.88 When raising either ground in order to establish jurisdiction to review an evaluation of economic facts or circumstances, it was not necessary to adduce ‘full proof’ of the allegations made but it was equally insufficient to make a mere assertion: the ground relied on must be supported by ‘appropriate evidence’.89 In other words, sufficient evidence had to be produced to set up a prima facie or arguable case.90 10.34 The restriction imposed by art  33 was not limited to the ‘evaluation’ of facts and circumstances stricto sensu. As the Court pointed out in Cases 15 and 29/59 Société Metallurgique de Knutange v High Authority,91 it extended to the expediency92 of the measures adopted because review of expediency would necessarily entail review of the evaluation made. That did not leave discretionary powers unfettered by the possibility of review: as Advocate General Lagrange pointed out in the same case,93 ‘power of discretion does not mean arbitrary power. The High Authority must respect the Treaty and the general principles of law, particularly when it adopts regulations and in doing so makes use of legislative power. Yet it enjoys a margin of discretion within the limits which you [the Court] have already had occasion to trace in some important judgments’. The same applied to evaluations:94 a decision based on an evaluation was only partly outside the jurisdiction of the Court to review;95 the power of appraisal given to the institution did not affect the Court’s jurisdiction to see if the decision was right in law.96 88 Netherlands v High Authority (above, note 75) at 115. 89 Ibid. 90 See Valsabbia v Commission (above, note 87) at para 12. 91 [1960] ECR 1 at 10. 92 ‘Opportunité’. 93 Above, note 91 at 13. 94 While it is possible to distinguish (subjective) evaluations of facts from (subjective) evaluations of what is an expedient solution to a problem, as defined by an evaluation of facts, the one rests on the other and both characterise a discretionary power. For that reason, the limitation on the Court’s powers of review under ECSC, art 33, although expressed to apply to the evaluation of a situation of fact, reveals in substance a general restriction on the review of discretionary powers (cf Asso, above, note 2). The extent of the discretion afforded to an EU institution depends on the Treaty or legislative provision giving it power to act. 95 Cases 36–38 and 40/59 Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH  v High Authority [1960] ECR 423 at 439. 96 Case 14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken NV  v High Authority [1962] ECR 253 at 268. See also at 284 (Advocate General Lagrange); ‘legal [sic] control must be exercised in the normal conditions of an application for annulment of a decision. It is for the Court to investigate whether the different reasons stated in the contested decision are, on the one hand, correct in substance and, on the other, such as to justify the decision in law. In particular, the Court must review the administration’s concept of the legal nature of the interests which it must take into consideration and it is only within these limits that the discretionary power of the High Authority can be exercised’.

870

Evidence 10.37

10.35 In brief, under ECSC, art 33, the Court had power to determine whether the facts taken into account were correctly found and relevant in law and whether the institution correctly interpreted and applied the law. But it could not, in general, review the deductions drawn from the facts, including assessments of expediency when a discretionary power was being exercised. 10.36 In annulment cases where the Court’s powers of review in regard to the facts are not expressly limited by the Treaty provision on which its jurisdiction is founded, the same limitation as that found in ECSC, art 33 can be seen. Thus, in the first staff case heard by the Court, Case 1/55 Kergall v Common Assembly,97 an action brought under art 42 of the ECSC Treaty. Advocate General Roemer observed: ‘in so far as the regularity of an administrative decision is at issue, review by the Court is subject to the same limits as for a direct application for annulment. The Court will therefore examine whether the measure was legal and whether the limits of the discretionary power were respected. But it is not also required to assess whether the administrative measure was appropriate’.98 In consequence, in that and succeeding cases, the Court held that the evaluation of a person’s capacity to carry out his duties falls within the discretion of the appointing authority99 as does the selection of candidates for a post100 (at the present time, the Court has unlimited jurisdiction in staff disputes of a financial character by virtue of an express provision to that effect101 but that was not so when the first staff cases were decided by the Court). That limitation on the Court’s power of review springs essentially from the character of what it is reviewing, for the purpose of determining its legality. 10.37 In Case 24/62 Germany v Commission,102 an action under what is now TFEU, art 263, the Court accepted that its powers of review could be limited, not by the Treaty provision giving it jurisdiction, but by the nature of the powers whose exercise it was reviewing. After examining the relevant articles of what was then the EC Treaty, the Court concluded that the Commission’s discretionary power was exercised by it independently and without any fetter, subject only to limits which are laid down by the Treaty and whose respect is reviewed by the Court.103 The same approach was taken in Case 34/62 Germany v Commission,104

97 [1954–56] ECR 151: see para A(b) of the judgment and p 165 (Advocate General Roemer). 98 ‘Elle n’est pas tenue d’apprécier aussi l’opportunité de la mesure administrative’. 99 Eg Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 333 at 342 and 351 (Advocate General Lagrange). 100 Eg Bourgaux v Common Assembly (above, note 81) at 368 and 374–375 (Advocate General Roemer). 101 Articles  22 and 91(1) of the Staff Regulations. Eg Case C-583/08P  Gogos v Commission [2010] ECR I-4469, paras 44–53. 102 [1963] ECR 63 at 68. 103 The English version of the judgment is misleading because it can be taken as indicating that the discretionary power is subject to review by the Court. The French version, on the other hand, makes it clear that the Court can only determine whether or not the Commission has overstepped the limits of its discretion; it cannot review the exercise of the discretion itself. 104 [1963] ECR 131 at 146–147 and 152 (Advocate General Roemer).

871

10.38  Evidence

also an application made under what is now TFEU, art 263. Advocate General Roemer said that the exercise of discretionary powers could be reviewed but: ‘only the actual area of discretion, to which the balancing and evaluation of the various decisive criteria belong, is not subject to legal [sic] review. It can be submitted to judicial review only by means of a complaint of misuse of powers, so that the Court cannot substitute its own reasons for the reasons why the Executive considered its decisions to be appropriate. There appears to me to be no doubt that the facts upon which a discretionary decision is based are subject to judicial review. In this connection we do not only have to think of the existence of the conditions for action laid down in a provision but also of the whole background of facts which determine and characterise discretionary decisions’.

10.38 Similarly, in Case 13/63 Italy v Commission105 the Court declined, in proceedings under what is now TFEU, art 263, to review an assessment made by the Commission because it was not ‘clearly erroneous’. Advocate General Lagrange pointed out that the Commission was free to act within the limits of its discretionary powers and, after examining the facts and matters of the case, he concluded that it had kept within the limits of its ‘power of appraisal’ and had not made an error of law or of fact. He did, however, hold that the decision in question could be attacked if there were misuse of powers. Review of the Commission’s power under what is now TFEU, art 101(3) to grant exemption from what is now art 101(1) was like review of decisions adopted under the corresponding provisions of the ECSC Treaty: ‘the exercise of the Commission’s powers necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic matters. A judicial review of these evaluations must take account of their nature by confining itself to an examination of the relevance of the facts and of the legal consequences which the Commission deduces therefrom. This review must in the first place be carried out in respect of the reasons given for the decisions which must set out the facts and considerations on which the said evaluations are based’.106 10.39 The question whether or not there is some limitation on the Court’s power to review evaluations of facts depends, in the first place, on whether or not the provision under which the defendant acted granted it a discretionary power. If so, in actions concerning the lawfulness of the defendant’s acts, the Court is restricted to determining whether the defendant took into account facts that were relevant in law, whether those facts were correctly found and whether the defendant correctly interpreted the provision authorising it to act. But the Court cannot substitute its own evaluation of the facts for that made by the defendant; 105 Above, note 86, at 178 and 183–184, 189 (Advocate General Lagrange). 106 Cases 56 and 58/64 Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-GmbH  v Commission [1966]  ECR  299 at 347; Case 17/74 Sadolin & Holmblad A/S  members of the Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission [1974] ECR 1063, para 16; Case 71/74 Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit- en Groentenimportlhandel (Frubo) v Commission [1975] ECR 563, para 43; Case 26/76 Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1977] ECR 1875, paras 45 and 50; Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission [1980]  ECR  2229 at 2286– 2287 (Advocate General Warner). Cf Cases 36–38 and 40/59 Geitling v High Authority [1960] ECR 423.

872

Evidence 10.39

its power to review extends to what is reviewable and not to the making of executive decisions.107 That is particularly so in the case of the review of legislative acts which, ex hypothesi, do not deal with individualised factual situations but approach matters of fact in a general manner.108 In the nature of things, evaluations of facts and assessments of what is an apposite solution, particularly in complex economic matters, do not always produce answers that can be described objectively as being right or wrong; the more complex the basic facts, the more likely it is that a number of equally acceptable interpretations can be identified. In such circumstances, the Court cannot always say that a decision-making body was wrong to adopt one rather than another. To do so is not to review the decision made, a judicial function, but to remake it, which is, in principle, an executive or administrative function.109 The Court’s attention therefore shifts to aspects of the decision-making process that surround the exercise of discretion itself and that the Court is in a position to evaluate as being either right or wrong. For example, where an exercise of discretion involves technical or specialist knowledge, it is critical to the legality of the evaluation made by the decisionmaker that he has equipped himself with the necessary knowledge and expertise, as well as satisfying the requirements of due process.110 Apart from proceedings in which the Court has unlimited jurisdiction, the cases in which the Court will, exceptionally, review an evaluation or assessment, which have been mentioned above in connection with references for a preliminary ruling, are instances in which it is possible to say that the evaluation or assessment is, for one reason or another, objectively wrong.111

107 Cf Cases 35/62 and 16/63 Leroy v High Authority [1963]  ECR  197 at 207: ‘the applicant’s criticisms are not directed against the material accuracy of findings of fact which are capable of objective verification, nor against assessments which may be objectively reviewed, but against complex value-judgments the merits of which, by their very nature and subject, cannot be reviewed by the Court’. In Case 29/70 Marcato v Commission [1971] ECR 243, para 7, the Court declined to review an assessment involving ‘complex value judgments which, by their very nature, are not capable of objective proof’. 108 Cf Case C-4/96 Northern Ireland Fish Producers’ Organisation v Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland [1998] ECR I-681, para 42. 109 See generally Lagasse L’Erreur Manifeste d’Appréciation en Droit Administratif (Brussels, 1986); Schwarze European Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006). 110 Case C-269/90 Hauptzollamt Munchen-Mitte v Technische Universitat Munchen [1991] ECR I-5469, paras 13–14 and 20–22. 111 To those cases may be added Case 13/69 van Eick v Commission [1970] ECR 3 at 21 (Advocate General Roemer), Case 46/72 De Greef v Commission [1973]  ECR  543, para  46 and Case 228/83 F v Commission [1985] ECR 275, para 34, staff cases in which the Court did not have unlimited jurisdiction, and in which it was held that an evaluation or assessment could be reviewed only if it contained an obvious error or was outrageously severe (van Eick) or was clearly excessive or an abuse of power (De Greef) or a manifest error or misuse of powers (F v Commission). A common lawyer would probably have said that the question was whether a reasonable person could have come to such a conclusion on the facts (cf Case 34/80 Authié v Commission [1981] ECR 665 at 689 (Advocate General Warner); the Court referred in para 13 of the judgment to ‘exceeding the limits of authority’ and ‘mistake’). In view of the wide range of formulations adopted at different times, it seems clearer to say that the test is whether the evaluation or assessment is objectively wrong (cf Case 343/82 Michael v Commission [1983] ECR 4023, para 24). For other examples of the criteria employed, see: Case T-156/11 Since Hardware (Guangzhou) Co Ltd v Council, 18 September 2012, paras 136 and 182.

873

10.40  Evidence

10.40 It is, however, important not to confuse the review of evaluations or assessments, in relation to which the Court’s jurisdiction is limited, with the review of inferences or conclusions drawn from facts or evidence. It is normal for facts or evidence to require a certain degree of interpretation in order for a conclusion on a question of fact to be reached; but, when it is necessary for the Court to examine a conclusion of fact reached by a process of inference or interpretation of evidence, the test to be applied by the Court is not whether or not the person or body whose conclusion is under review came to a decision that falls within the spectrum of inferences or interpretations that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Thus, in Cases T-79/95 and T-80/95 Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v Commission,112 the Commission reached a conclusion of fact regarding what had been agreed between the parties to a contract. The Commission had material to support its conclusion.113 The GC also looked at the relevant evidence but held that the Commission’s conclusion was wrong. The reasonableness of the Commission’s conclusion was not relevant.114 A  related point is that, although the legality of an administrative decision is to be tested by reference to the relevant facts in existence at the time when the decision was made, and not by reference to facts that come into existence at a later point in time,115 it is not normally tested by reference only to the evidence of the relevant facts that was in the possession of, or known to, the decision-maker at the time when the decision was made. Where the legality of an administrative decision depends upon the existence of a particular fact or group of facts, the critical question is whether or not the relevant fact or facts exist(s). That is objectively verifiable by reference to all the relevant evidence. Hence, evidence discovered after the making of the decision must be taken into account, even if the decisionmaker did not happen to have it, or know about it, at the time when the decision was made.116 10.41 It is therefore necessary to define in some way what are the situations in which the Court’s powers of review, in relation to matters of fact, are limited and what are the situations in which those powers are not limited. In general terms, the distinction lies in the question whether or not the particular finding of fact is 112 [1996] ECR II-1491, paras 42–59. 113 Eg ibid, paras 50 and 53. 114 Cases can be found in which the Court upholds a conclusion of fact on the ground that what is described as an assessment or evaluation has not been shown to be erroneous: see, for example, Case T-72/06 Groupe Gascogne v Commission [2011] ECR II-400*, para 93 (on appeal, Case C-58/12P  Groupe Gascogne v Commission, 26  November 2013). Some care needs to be exercised when assessing such cases. In most instances, the Court seems to be simply agreeing with the conclusion reached. If and insofar as such language is suggesting what the correct legal test is, the cases are unreliable. 115 Eg Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v Commission [1989] ECR 3137, para 49. 116 Eg Cases 29 and 30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink v Commission [1984] ECR 1679, paras 16–20 (evidence that had been overlooked by one of the companies and not drawn to the attention of the Commission during the course of the administrative procedure). The exception to the general proposition stated in the text above is where procedural rules limit the evidence that may be relied on (such as a rule that a finding of fact adverse to a person may be made and justified only by reference to evidence disclosed to that person in the course of the procedure leading up to the making of the decision).

874

Evidence 10.43

objectively verifiable by applying a trained mind to the relevant evidence. The Court’s powers are limited only where the nature of the finding to be made (as opposed to the nature of the evidence relevant to the finding) is such that there is necessarily a subjective, judgmental, element in the finding.117 10.42 A different type of restriction on the Court’s ability to look at matters of fact arose, or was perceived to have arisen, in actions for the annulment of sanctions and similar restrictive measures imposed on private persons. Such measures may be adopted by the EU institutions either in consequence of an act attributable to the UN or in consequence of an act attributable to the EU itself. In the latter case, the GC has adopted a more or less conventional approach to the judicial review of EU decisions imposing sanctions, including resistance to the exclusion of secret or confidential information, particularly given the restrictions on the disclosure of such material to the person concerned at the stage prior to the commencement of legal proceedings.118 In the former case, the GC held in Kadi that any dispute about the correctness of the conclusions reached by the UN had to be taken up with the UN through the procedures provided for by it. It was not possible to question the factual accuracy of those conclusions in proceedings before the GC.119 However, that position was rejected by the ECJ on appeal.120 10.43 The ECJ held that the UN origin of a sanction imposed on a person did not exclude a legal challenge to the EU measures implementing the UN sanction based on conventional EU law grounds. The ECJ accepted that, due to the particular nature of sanctions, the EU authorities are not required to respect the rights of the defence (including the right to be heard) before the name of a person or entity is first entered on the relevant list. On the other hand, either then or at least a reasonable time thereafter, the persons or entities concerned must be provided with the evidence justifying their inclusion on the list and given an opportunity to make their point of view known. In Kadi, no evidence had been produced at any time, including during the course of the annulment action before the GC (because the view had been taken by the Council that the findings on which the disputed regulation was based could not be questioned). In consequence, the disputed measure was annulled both because of procedural defects prior to the commencement of the annulment action and because of the failure to produce relevant evidence in the course of the action.121 The obligation to dis117 See further Lasok in De 20 Ans a l’Horizon 2020 (Court of Justice, 2010) at pp 200–214. 118 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran [2006] ECR II-4665, paras 152–174. 119 Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, paras 253–292. 120 Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P Kadi v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, paras 280–330. 121 Ibid, paras 333–353. Unusually, the ECJ maintained the effects of the annulled regulation for three months so as to allow the Council the opportunity to cure the defects in the regulation: see paras 373–376. That resulted in a request made to the UN Sanctions Committee to publish the reasons for including Mr Kadi on the UN sanctions list. The reasons were communicated to Mr Kadi and he was given an opportunity to respond to them, which he did to no avail. That generated Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission [2010] ECR II-5177, see paras 49–62 (on appeal, Cases C-584/10P, C-593/10P and C-595/10P Commission v Kadi, 18 July 2013) – collectively, ‘Kadi(2)’.

875

10.44  Evidence

close the evidence relied on also applies where new evidence is used in order to justify keeping a person on the list (in which case, the right to be heard must be respected before the decision to keep the person on the list is made).122 10.44 On the question of the failure (of the author of the disputed measure) to produce evidence supporting the measure during the course of the action, the ECJ classified the failure as an infringement of the fundamental right to an effective legal remedy, as the Court was deprived of the ability to assess the legality of the measure.123 That is akin to another ground for contesting the legality of a measure under art 263 TFEU: lack of reasoning. However, if reasons are given but no evidence is adduced to support them, the Court has no objective basis for concluding that the conditions of fact that surround the exercise of the power in question have been satisfied. That is a substantive defect in the measure.124 10.45 In relation to those matters of fact that may be in issue in the proceedings before the Court, facts alleged by one party which are not disputed by the other party are often (but not invariably) considered to be established, with the consequence that their formal proof becomes unnecessary.125 Facts in issue must ordinarily be proved by sufficient evidence adduced by the party alleging the fact (although EU law admits a shifting of the burden of proof in certain circumstances)126 or in the course of a measure of enquiry ordered by the Court. A submission which is unsupported by evidence will be rejected.127

III

PROOF OF LAW

10.46 Although proof of facts is of particular concern here, it is not out of place to consider briefly at this stage the proof of law, both EU and ‘foreign’ law, whether it be that of a member state or a third country. 122 Case C-27/09P  France v People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran [2011]  ECR  I-13427, para 62. 123 Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P (above, note 120), para 351. 124 See para 123 of the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi(2) (above, note 121). In the first Kadi case (above, note 120), the ECJ took the course that it did (classifying the error as preventing the ECJ from assessing the legality of the disputed measure) because, presumably, it did not intend the principle of res judicata to attach to the annulment of the contested measure in such a way as to preclude the Council from remedying the position by producing the evidence in a replacement decision. In an ordinary case, the person challenging a measure bears the burden of proving that the findings of fact on which it is based are unfounded; but that arises in a context in which the decision-maker must first have shown that it had a case for believing that the conditions governing the exercise by it of its power had been satisfied. That explains the ECJ’s observation in para 121 of its judgment in Kadi(2) (above, note 121). In Case T-652/11 Sabbagh v Council, 26 February 2015, para 50, the point is put as a failure on the part of the decision-maker to discharge the burden of proof lying upon it. 125 Cf Case 21/84 Commission v France [1985] ECR 1355, para 10; Case C-375/90 Commission v Greece [1993] ECR I-2055, paras 29 and 34–35. 126 Eg Case C-381/99 Brunnhofer v Bank der osterreichischen Postsparkasse AG [2001] ECR I-4961, paras 52–53. 127 Case 346/82 Favre v Commission [1984] ECR 2269, paras 31–32.

876

Evidence 10.48

10.47 EU law may be proved by reference to the official texts of the Treaties or other instruments or by reference to the Official Journal. Not all measures having legal effect may be published in the Official Journal. The Statute provides128 that an application commencing proceedings for annulment must be accompanied by the measure challenged in the action. Ordinarily, production of a document which appears to embody the measure in question is sufficient proof of the measure to satisfy that procedural rule; but that does not preclude any dispute over the questions whether or not the document at issue actually embodies the measure, whether or not the measure has the required legal characteristics (for example, whether or not it constitutes in law a challengeable act) and whether or not it exists at all.129 Certified copies of judgments of the Court are served on the parties (ECJ) or provided on request (GC and CST).130 For the purposes of argument (as opposed to enforcement) decisions of the Court are normally established by citation from the European Court Reports. Proof of the meaning of a text of EU law is to be found in the authentic text. Where there are several authentic texts in different languages, they must all be taken into account as evidence of the meaning.131 Drafts and other preparatory material may constitute proof of the intention of or the object sought to be achieved by the draftsmen132 but are not proof of the meaning of the text itself.133 10.48 There are no rules relating to the proof of ‘foreign’ law. The only question relates to the weight which can be attached to the evidence submitted to the 128 Statute, art 21. 129 See, for example, Cases T-79, T-84 to T-86, T-89, T-91, T-92, T-94, T-96, T-98, T-102 and T-104/89  BASF AG  v Commission [1992]  ECR II-315, where what had every appearance of being a Commission decision was found on investigation to be non-existent as such. Although that judgment was overturned on appeal in Case C-137/92P  Commission v BASF  [1994]  ECR  I-2555, the ECJ reiterated the principle that an act may be legally nonexistent, despite appearances, where it is tainted by a sufficiently grave irregularity: see paras 49–52. 130 RP-ECJ, art 88(2); PD-GC, paras 35–36; IR-CST, art 14(1)–(2). RP-GC, art 118(2) and 120 and RP-CST, arts 95(2) and 97 refer only to the provision of copies of judgments and orders to the parties. 131 The sole authentic text of the ECSC  Treaty was French (see art  100) but the EEC and EAEC  Treaties were drawn up in four equally authentic texts: German, French, Italian and Dutch (arts 248 and 225 respectively). The TEU was drawn up in 23 equally authentic texts: see art 55(1). The Official Journal was in the beginning published in the four original official languages of the EU. As more member states acceded to the EU, the Official Journal also began to be published in the various languages of the acceding states. Various pre-accession acts were translated into the languages of the new members and are authentic versions as from the date of accession: see, for example, art 155 of the 1972 Act of Accession, as amended, and art 147 of the 1979 Act of Accession. The Acts of Accession also provide that the texts of the Treaties expressed in the language of a newly acceding member state are authentic versions: see, for example, arts 160 and 152 respectively of the 1972 and 1979 Acts of Accession. The authentic version of judgments of the Court is that drawn up in the language of the case: RP-ECJ, art 41; RP-GC, art 49 (which applies to the CST). 132 See, for example, Case 6/54 Netherlands v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 103 at 116. 133 See, for example, Case 155/79  AM & S  Europe Ltd v Commission [1982]  ECR  1575, per Advocate General Warner. For a review of methods of interpretation used by the Court, see the reports to the Judicial and Academic Conference, held by the Court in 1976, presented by Judge Kutscher and F Dumon; and Lasok & Millett, Judicial Control in the EU, para 656 ff.

877

10.49  Evidence

Court. Photocopies of official publications setting out the text of legislation or court decisions are adequate proof; so may be testimony from a witness.134 In the case of the national laws of the member states, the Court is aided by its Research and Documentation Division and the knowledge and expertise of its members. It is not, therefore, constrained to rely on the presentations made by the parties, even by agreement between them, and may, indeed, reject views which do not accord with its own knowledge.135 In IP appeals, where national law may be relevant to the validity of a contested IP right, ascertaining the meaning and effect of national law is not purely a question of fact to be answered by reference to the evidence of national law presented to the Court by the parties; the Court must investigate the matter itself, if necessary of its own motion, and may obtain the information about national law that it requires by whatever means are considered appropriate.136 The interpretation of national law is in other respects assimilated to a question of fact.137 10.49 In references for a preliminary ruling, the Court does not question statements of national law made by the referring court in the order for reference138 but, in the absence of any such statements, it may draw inferences from information provided by the parties or from the evidence.139

134 There are no rules concerning the qualifications necessary for giving evidence of ‘foreign’ law. 135 See, for example, AM & S v Commission (above, note 133) per Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn at 1651. 136 Case C-530/12P Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) v National Lottery Commission, 27 March 2014, paras 37–46, following Case C-263/09P Edwin Co Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2011] ECR I-5853 (note also Case C-76/11P Tresplain Investments v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2011] ECR I-182*, para 66). As appears from National Lottery Commission, paras 52–60, the Court must give the parties the opportunity to make their views known on the material obtained by the Court. For what happened when the case returned to the GC, see Case T-404/10  RENV  Gambling Commission v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 30  June 2015 (the GC decided the relevant issues of national law itself). 137 Case C-82/01 P Aeroports de Paris v Commission [2002] ECR I-9297, para 63 (a misinterpretation of national law is appealable if perverse; the cross-reference to para 56 of the judgment is to cases dealing with findings of fact); Edwin (above, note 136), paras 53–57; Cases C-448/10 P to C-450/10 P ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni v Commission [2011] ECR I-147*, para 33; Case C-318/09 P A2A v Commission [2011] ECR I-207*, para 125; Case C-320/09 P A2A v Commission [2011] ECR I-210*, para 125; Case C-181/11 P Compania espanola de Tabaco en rama SA (Cetarsa) v Commission, 12  July 2012, para  59; Case C-559/12  P  France v Commission, 3 April 2014, paras 77–84. 138 Eg Case 116/84 Criminal proceedings against Henri Roelstraete [1985] ECR 1705, para 10. 139 Case 293/83 Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593, paras 3, 13 and 14.

878

Chapter 11

Measures of enquiry

I INTRODUCTION 11.1 The topic covered by this chapter is the obtaining of evidence in proceedings before the Court. It is important to observe that, save in the case of facts whose existence is so notorious as to obviate the need for evidence in order to prove them,1 a fact in issue before the Court is proved by reference to the evidence produced in the case in question; the Court’s knowledge of relevant evidence does not extend to evidence before the Court in another case.2 The parties do not have a right or power to submit evidence save in the case of documentary evidence which is in their possession. The power to submit such evidence is set out in RP-ECJ, art 57(4), RP-GC, art 72(3) and RP-CST, art 45(1), 2nd subpara, which provide that, to every pleading, there must be annexed the documents relied on in support of it. Those provisions presuppose that the party concerned is in possession of the evidence in question. They also refer to the annexing of items of evidence in addition to documents but, in the nature of things, it is difficult to annex to a pleading lodged in electronic or paper form something that does not take the form of a document and cannot physically be contained within the ‘file’ into which items of evidence (including documents) are supposed to be put when lodged at the Registry.3 The power to adduce evidence is therefore limited to items of evidence (adminicles) in a party’s possession that take, or can be put into, documentary form or else have the form of a physical object that can be physically delivered to, and held by, the Registry. Further, the production of evidence is effected through the party’s representative and not by the party itself.4

1 As to which, see Ch 10, para 10.4. 2 Eg Case C-576/12P Jurasinovic v Council, 28 November 2013, para 62. Unless cases are joined (in which case, all the evidence forms part of the same case file, at least notionally, and can be taken into account by the Court – see Ch 2, para 2.72), a party must therefore proceed on the basis that evidence before the Court in one case is not known to it for the purposes of another case before the same judges, even if the parties to both cases are the same. 3 ccordingly, other forms of evidence, such as the oral testimony of a witness, must be converted into documentary form so as to be produced as annexes to a pleading and placed in the file of evidential material supporting the pleading. The Court may also allow a party to produce a thing for its inspection, see para 11.103 below. Things can be lodged at the Registry in physical form but that has to be done separately from the lodging of a pleading and the file of evidence annexed to it. 4 Cf Case T-510/09 V v Commission, 15 June 2011, para 84 (rejection of a document tendered by a party otherwise than through the party’s representative).

879

11.2  Measures of enquiry

11.2 The provisions referred to above do not actually define a power, right or privilege enjoyed by a party to proceedings before the Court. They impose a general obligation on parties to submit to the Court the evidence relevant to the case that is capable of production as (in theory at least) an annex to a pleading.5 The rules dealing with the content of specific types of pleading (application, defence and so forth) also impose specific obligations relating to the production of evidence: the obligation is that the pleading should ‘state’ or ‘contain’ any evidence ‘produced’ or ‘offered’.6 That is a duty to specify the existence of an adminicle in the relevant pleading; it is completed by the duty to annex adminicles to the pleading, referred to above. Thus, the pleading should identify the evidential source of each relevant assertion of fact and, where the source is capable of being annexed to the pleading, it should be produced in that way. Where the adminicle cannot be produced as an annex to the pleading, the description of it given in the pleading enables the Court to exercise its powers regarding the obtaining of evidence by means of a measure of enquiry (also known as a preparatory enquiry). It should be noted that the duty to produce adminicles (essentially documents in the party’s possession) or describe them in a pleading is restricted to evidential material that the party wishes to rely on in support of the case that he is advancing. There is no duty in the rules of procedure to produce evidence, or identify a source of evidence, which contradicts one’s own case or assists the case of an opposing party. In direct actions, the parties’ obligation to disclose documents relevant to their case and to indicate relevant sources of evidence applies primarily at the stage of the first exchange of pleadings.7 At the second exchange of pleadings (if there is one), further evidence may be produced and further sources of evidence may be identified but reasons have to be given for the delay in submitting them.8 The same applies after the second round of pleadings and up until the close of the oral procedure, at which point the case is taken into deliberation; but, in ECJ and GC proceedings, the production or offering of further evidence after the second round of pleadings is permitted by way of exception only.9 11.3 Necessity imposes on the parties the obligation to do all in their power to ensure that the Court is in possession of everything that is needed for it to decide the issues of fact in their favour. For this, as will be seen, the parties must provide the Court, at the earliest opportunity, with the relevant evidence in their possession 5 It is not always the case that the documents referred to in a pleading are annexed to it. Where that occurs, the opposing party may apply for disclosure of the missing documents; but disclosure will ordinarily be ordered only as a measure of enquiry and where the circumstances justify it: see, for example, Case T-16/96 Cityflyer Express Ltd v Commission [1998] ECR II-757, paras 98–106. 6 See, for example: RP-ECJ, art 120(e) and 124(1)(d); RP-GC, art 76(f) and 81(1)(e); RP-CST, art 50(1)(f) and 53(1)(e). Evidence is ‘produced’ when it is lodged at the Registry (as an annex to a pleading or separately, as in the case of a thing). Evidence is ‘offered’ when it is not produced but is identified to the Court, such as in an application for a measure of enquiry: see Case T-47/92 Lenz v Commission [1992] ECR II-2523, para 38 (which refers to the request for a measure of enquiry set out in para 14). 7 That is stated expressly in RP-GC, art 85(1), which sets out the general position. 8 RP-ECJ, art 128(1); RP-GC, art 85(2); RP-CST, art 57. 9 RP-ECJ, art  128(2); RP-GC, art  85(3); RP-CST, art  57. The opposing party is entitled to comment on the new evidence produced or offered.

880

Measures of enquiry 11.3

and, through indicating in as precise terms as possible other sources of evidence, provide it with adequate material on which to judge precisely what measures of enquiry, if any, are to be ordered. Beyond that, there is authority that the parties lie under a duty owed to the Court to ensure that evidence and sources of evidence are placed before it fairly and accurately; it seems to follow from that that they are also under a duty not to mislead the Court as to the existence or non-existence of a relevant fact, whether by act or omission, by word or by silence. In one case,10 Advocate General Lagrange said that the adversary nature of proceedings in a direct action obliged the parties ‘to collaborate with a view to enabling the Court to decide, with all the facts at its disposal’, an issue before it. It seems to be that duty which led him to say: ‘even when the defendant is an administrative body it must, at least within certain limits, produce the documents or the information which it alone possesses in its capacity as a public authority’.11 Unfortunately, such a principle was incorporated expressly only in art 23 of the ECSC Statute which, in proceedings under the ECSC Treaty against decisions adopted by an EU institution, required the defendant institution to transmit to the Court all the documents in the case. As far as the duty lying on the EU institutions is concerned, Advocate General Lagrange is something of a voice crying in the wilderness because, in practice, the institutions are almost notorious for their reticence.12 10 Cases 29, 31, 36, 39–47, 50 and 51/63 Laminoirs Hauts Fourneaux, Forges Fonderies et Usines de la Providence SA v High Authority [1965] ECR 911 at 944. 11 That principle seems to apply to staff cases. In Case 18/70 Duraffour v Council [1971] ECR 515, para 31, the Court held that ‘it is for the defendant institution, as the appointing authority, to cooperate with those claiming under one of its servants in order to discover the truth’. See also at 533 (Advocate General Roemer). 12 For example, in Case 52/81 Firma Werner Faust OHG v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, the Commission had asked certain third country producers to limit their exports to the EU and then had suspended the issue of import licences save in regard to goods from countries which had agreed to self-limitation. There was an issue concerning the negotiations between the Commission and the third countries involved prior to the suspension of the issue of import licences. The applicant produced a series of telexes, passing between third parties, which showed that the Commission had asked Taiwan to export no more than a certain amount and that Taiwan had agreed to that limitation before the suspension. There was, however, no direct evidence that the telex containing the Taiwanese agreement to limit exports was shown to the Commission. The Commission asserted that there had been no self-limitation agreement with Taiwan (but produced no documents or other evidence) and that the suspension of import licences in respect of products from Taiwan was therefore lawful. Subsequently, in Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale AG v Germany [1982] ECR 2745, a reference for a preliminary ruling which gave rise to the same issue, the Court asked the Commission to give further information about the negotiation of the self-limitation agreements with third countries. The Commission, represented by the same person as in the Faust case, replied in writing and again asserted (without producing any documents, etc) that there had been no agreement with Taiwan. At the hearing, however, counsel for Edeka relied strongly on the telexes produced in the Faust case and, in the face of this, the Commission’s representative finally admitted that the Commission had known of the Taiwanese reply to its request to limit exports before the issue of import licences was suspended. The Commission had, in fact, simply ignored the Taiwanese guarantee for what were said to be administrative reasons but it is extraordinary that that was never said in the Faust case and that no documents or other evidence were ever produced. The result of that behaviour was to leave the Court, at least until the hearing in the Edeka case, with the impression that the Commission had never known of the Taiwanese telex. Another example of a lack of clarity bordering (on one view) on a lack of frankness is Case F-50/09 Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission. 12 May 2011, in which the correct factual position was difficult to drag out of the Commission.

881

11.4  Measures of enquiry

11.4 The same responsibilities exist in references for a preliminary ruling as in direct actions. The only difference is that the scope of any enquiries which may be made by the Court is limited in the former by the questions set out in the order for reference and in the latter by the parties in their pleadings. The Court can exercise its powers of investigation only to the extent that they are necessary for resolving the issues with which it is seised: it is not entitled to indulge in an investigation going beyond the confines of the action as determined by the parties’ pleadings or the order for reference. Nevertheless, although its jurisdiction in a case is limited to the issues of fact to which the case gives rise, the Court’s powers of investigation are not restricted by the nature of the evidence or sources of evidence adduced by the parties. No party has a right to prove facts in any particular way. Hence the Court is not obliged to restrict its investigation of the facts to the documents produced in the pleadings;13 it is not bound to accede to a party’s desire to prove a fact by, for example, the testimony of a string of witnesses. The means to prove facts lie within the discretion of the Court to order.14 11.5 In principle, the means by which the Court extracts evidence of a fact from a person is a measure of enquiry. However, some types of measure of organisation of procedure are evidential in nature.15 Such measures of organisation of procedure are considered here in conjunction with any related measure of enquiry. 11.6 Measures of enquiry are defined in RP-ECJ, art 64(2), RP-GC, art 91 and RP-CST, art  70 ‘without prejudice’ to the powers of the Court set out in arts 24 and 25 of the Statute. Under those provisions of the Statute, the Court may require the parties to produce all documents and to supply all information which the Court considers desirable. It may also require those member states and 13 In Case T-3/90 Prodifarma v Commission [1991] ECR II-1, para 3, the Court of its own motion took account of the facts set out in the file in a connected case. Subsequently, the GC has expressed resistance to referring to matters not in the file of the case, even where the same parties are involved, but has reserved the right to do so where appropriate: see Case T-459/07 Hangzhou Duralamp Electronics Co. Ltd v Council [2009] ECR II-4015, paras 9–12 and 15. 14 Eg Case T-1/90 Pérez-Mínguez Casariego v Commission [1991]  ECR II-143, para  94; Case T-26/89 De Compte v European Parliament [1991] ECR II-781, paras 224–229; Case T-53/91 Merger v Commission [1992] ECR II-2041, para 26; Case T-33/91 Williams v Court of Auditors [1992] ECR II-2499, para 31. 15 See: RP-ECJ, art 62 (production of information relating to the facts and documents); RP-GC, art 89(3)(c) and (d) (production of information by parties and third parties; production by a party of ‘material’ relating to the case); RP-CST, art 68(c) and (d) (production by a party of information, documents or items of evidence). In principle, however, measures of organisation of procedure are concerned with the efficient conduct of the procedure before the Court whereas measures of enquiry are concerned specifically with determining an issue of fact in the case: cf Case T-175/97 Bareyt v Commission [2000]  ECR SC-I-A-229, II-1053, para  90; Case T-560/08P  Commission v Meierhofer [2010]  ECR II-1739, para  64. Thus, a request for the disclosure of information or documents to a party is a measure of organisation of procedure (see Case T-145/89 Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission [1995] ECR II-987, paras 32–33) because it enables that party to advance its case before the Court. That is different from the disclosure of information and documents as part of a fact-finding exercise undertaken by the Court. Under RP-CST, art 67, measures of organisation of procedure and measures of enquiry serve the same purposes.

882

Measures of enquiry 11.7

EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies which are not parties to the case to supply all information which the Court considers necessary for the proceedings. In addition, the Court may entrust ‘any individual, body, authority, committee or other organisation it chooses’ with the task of giving an expert opinion. The Statute goes on to provide for the hearing of witnesses and experts16 and for the examination of the parties themselves.17 RP-ECJ, art 64(2), RP-GC, art 91 and RP-CST, art  70 specify five types of measure of enquiry that the Court may order: (1) the personal appearance of the parties; (2) a request for information and production of documents; (3) oral testimony; (4) the commissioning of an expert’s reports; (5) an inspection of the place or thing in question. 11.7 So far as (2) is concerned, RP-ECJ, art  64(2) is expressed in entirely general terms and does not differentiate between a request addressed to a party to the proceedings and a request addressed to someone else. RP-GC, art 91 distinguishes between two types of such a request: (i) a request made to a party for information or the production of ‘material’ relating to the case; and (ii) a request for production of documents to which access has been denied by an institution in proceedings relating to the legality of that denial. The former may be ordered in only two cases: where the party concerned (that is, the party against whom the order is made) has not complied with a measure of organisation of procedure previously adopted to the same end; and where the same party requests a measure of enquiry to be ordered against it. The latter type of request refers to proceedings in which a refusal by an EU institution to disclose a document on request has been challenged. The GC may need to see the document in question for itself (in camera) in order to determine whether or not the claim to withhold the document is justified.18 RP-CST, art 70 distinguishes between three types of such a request: (a) asking third parties for information or particulars; (b) asking third parties to produce documents or items of evidence relating to the case; and (c) asking a party to produce documents or any items of evidence relating to the case. As in the case of the GC, the last is stated to apply where the party in question has refused to comply with a measure of organisation of procedure adopted to the same end. The implications of those variations are considered in section V (para 11.43 ff) below. That is not a list of the means of proving a fact but an enumeration of the powers that the Court may exercise; it is not exhaustive because it is ‘without prejudice’ to the powers contained in the articles of the Statute expressly referred to.

16 Statute, arts 26–30 and 32. 17 Ibid, art 32. 18 Eg Case C-135/11P IFAW  Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH  v Commission, 21  June 2012, paras 70–77.

883

11.8  Measures of enquiry

II

ORDERING A MEASURE OF ENQUIRY

A

Procedural matters

1 General 11.8 The obtaining of evidence arises in a direct action at first instance, not the appeal stage, because appeals are limited to points of law.19 At the close of pleadings at first instance, the Court considers the case in an administrative meeting and decides what further steps are necessary for its swift and efficient disposal.20 Amongst those steps is the acquisition of further evidence. The ECJ rules of procedure prescribe a two-stage process in which the Court (or the relevant formation) decides whether or not a measure of enquiry is necessary and then, after hearing the advocate general, prescribes ‘the measures of enquiry that it considers appropriate by means of an order setting out the facts to be proved’.21 In GC and CST proceedings, measures of enquiry may be taken at any stage of the proceedings; but the point at which it is normal for them to be proposed (by the judge-rapporteur) and adopted is at the stage of the administrative meeting.22 As in the case of the ECJ, the GC rules provide that measures of enquiry are prescribed ‘by means of an order setting out the facts to be proved’.23 11.9 Both the GC and CST rules of procedure provide in express terms that measures of enquiry may be adopted by the Court of its own motion or on application by a (main) party.24 The ECJ rules of procedure are silent on that point but it has always been the case that, in ECJ proceedings, a measure of enquiry may be adopted by the Court either of its own motion or on application by a party, where a fact is in issue. The ordering of a measure of enquiry is therefore dependent upon the appropriateness, of making such an order, being made apparent to the Court either from a scrutiny of the parties’ pleadings or from an application made by one or other of the parties. The process set out below, concerning GC and CST proceedings, is no different in principle from that to be followed in practice in ECJ proceedings (although the relevance and frequency of measures of enquiries in ECJ proceedings are much lower due to the nature of the ECJ’s jurisdiction).

19 Eg Case C-414/08P Sviluppo Italia Basilicata SpA v Commission [2010] ECR I-2559, paras 113–115. 20 Cf RP-CST, art 67 on the purpose of measures of enquiry. 21 RP-ECJ, art 63 and 64(1). 22 RP-GC, art 88(1) and 87; RP-CST, art 58 and 71(1). There appears to be no reason why a measure of enquiry cannot be ordered at an earlier stage in the proceedings than the administrative meeting; but that would seem to be likely only in a highly exceptional case, such as where it was necessary to examine a witness who was dying or obtain evidence that would otherwise be at risk of destruction if action were not taken promptly. 23 RP-GC, art 92(1). 24 RP-GC, art 88(1); RP-CST, art 71(1)–(2). The GC rules exclude interveners from making such an application. The CST rules do not do so.

884

Measures of enquiry 11.11

2 Applications for a measure of enquiry 11.10 Neither the GC nor the CST rules provide that an application for a measure of enquiry need be made by separate document. Ordinarily, the application is made in the body of a different pleading (application or defence and so forth); and the order sought would feature in the form of order included in that pleading.25 However, there may be circumstances in which the application must be made by separate document, such as where a fact is put in issue only at the end of the first exchange of written pleadings and no second exchange takes place. Where made by separate document, the application must be in the language of the case and comply with the general rules relating to a pleading mutatis mutandis.26 11.11 Whether made by separate document or incorporated in another pleading, an application must state precisely the purpose of the measures sought and the reasons for them.27 An application for a measure of enquiry must therefore: (i) identify the fact to be proved; (ii) explain the necessity to prove it, or the appropriateness in doing so, for the purpose of giving judgment in the case;28 (iii) identify a suitable and proportionate means of proving the fact (that is, the

25 In Case T-199/01  G  v Commission [2002]  ECR-SC II-1085, para  27, it was suggested that a request for a measure of enquiry (there, an expert’s report) is not, strictly speaking, part of the form of order, although it is open to a party to present it as such. That is technically correct because the form of order in a pleading such as an application or defence should set out the relief sought in the action by the party lodging the pleading. The reason for including an application for a measure of enquiry in the form of order is so that the Court cannot be in any doubt about the fact that the party lodging the pleading is formally requesting that a measure of enquiry be ordered. 26 See Ch 9, paras 9.7–9.31. 27 RP-GC, art 88(2); RP-CST, art 71(2). In effect, the precision of the request for the measure of enquiry triggers the duty of the Court to assess the relevance of the request and the necessity to make an order: eg Case T-68/11 Kastenholz v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), 6 June 2013, para 19. RP-GC, art 88(2) and RP-CST, art 71(2) also apply to the modification of a measure of enquiry, to which the same considerations apply as to a proposal for the adoption of a measure of enquiry. A measure of enquiry may require modification when, after it has been commenced, it appears that it should be extended or reduced in scope or type. It is doubtful that a proposal to modify a measure of enquiry can be made immediately after the GC or CST has decided to adopt a measure of enquiry unless, for some reason, the party so proposing was not heard by the GC or CST before the decision was made. If that party had been heard beforehand, a subsequent proposal to modify the measure of enquiry would be nothing more than an attempt to reargue the matter. 28 In Cases T-141/99, T-142/99, T-150/99 and T-151/99 Vala Srl v Commission [2002]  ECR II-4547, paras 405–412, the request for measures of enquiry was dismissed because it did not relate to facts relevant to deciding the case. See also: Cases T-120/01 and T-300/01 De Nicola v European Investment Bank [2004] ECR-SC II-1671, paras 324–328; Case T-387/11 Nitrogenmuvek Vegyipari v Commission, 27  February 2013, paras 129–133; Case T-482/07 Nynas Petroleum v Commission, 16 September 2013, paras 104–111; Case T-275/11 Television francaise 1 v Commission, 16 October 2013, para 121 (need to plead the argument to which the issue of fact relates).

885

11.12  Measures of enquiry

particular measure of enquiry sought);29 and (iv) demonstrate that there is no better or more proportionate way of proving it. 11.12 For example, suppose that the issue of fact is whether or not one company (A) controls another company (B), in circumstances in which A has a substantial shareholding in B and is, individually, the largest shareholder in B (with a corresponding level of representation on B’s Board of Directors) but there is a large number of minority shareholders in B, a number of whom are represented on B’s Board of Directors. Classically, in that type of situation, it is necessary to examine the dynamics of decision-making by the Board of Directors in order to decide the issue of fact. In particular, the fact that proposals made by A’s representatives on the Board of Directors are commonly adopted is not, in itself, indicative that A controls B because, if those proposals made sound commercial sense, they would be adopted because of their inherent qualities. The true test of control is whether or not A could push through a proposal that lacked merit or was contrary to B’s interests, or block a proposal that made sound commercial sense (from B’s perspective); but it is not often that such a situation can be identified. Deciding the issue of fact can therefore be an onerous task requiring oral testimony from a range of Board members concerning the operation in practice of the decision-making process in the Board of Directors and the true nature of A’s influence. Accordingly, once the issue of fact has been identified, it is then necessary to determine how important deciding that issue is to disposing of the case (a question that can often be answered only provisionally, not definitively, at the time when the possibility of ordering a measure of enquiry is under consideration). If the decision in the case turns or may turn on the issue of fact, the means of proving the fact identified in the application ought to be appropriate and go no further than is necessary. Hence, it might be proposed that certain identified individuals, who had direct experience of how the Board of Directors operated, should be called as witnesses; and the number would be limited to a representative group of witnesses. That presupposes that there is no better alternative. The form of order, so far as such an application for measures of enquiry is concerned, would be along the following lines: ‘an order that the following persons be examined as witnesses: [set out the names and addresses of the witnesses]’. Where the application is incorporated in another pleading, that claim for relief would appear along with the other forms of relief claimed in the pleading. 11.13 It will be observed that, in the example just given, the proposed witnesses are identified with precision and not generically (for example, ‘an order

29 In Case T-9/99 HFB Holding fur Fernwarmetechnik Beteiligingsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG v Commission [2002]  ECR II-1487, paras 36–38, several persons had been identified in the application commencing proceedings as potential witnesses in relation to particular assertions made in the pleading; but the application for a measure of enquiry referred to a completely different group of people. As the proposed witnesses were not correlated to the identified issues of fact, the application for a measure of enquiry was defective (on appeal Cases C-189/02P, C-202/02P, C-205/0P to C-208/02P and C-213/02P  Dansk Rorindustri v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, paras 52–76).

886

Measures of enquiry 11.14

that members of the Board of Directors be examined as witnesses’). Applications have been criticised for not stating with precision the evidence to be obtained by means of the measure of enquiry.30 In some instances, that will be a legitimate criticism. In other instances, where the evidence, or knowledge of a relevant source of evidence, is in the possession of a person other than the party making the application, requiring an application to be expressed in precise terms (such as requiring it to seek the production of a particular, identifiable document) would be perverse. An applicant cannot be required to give more details than he can reasonably be expected to put forward in the circumstances. However, where a request is made in general, or generic, terms (such as a request for documents of a particular class, type or description or a request for a person to be examined as a witness, where that person is identified by reference to his job or function in an organisation and otherwise than by name), attention will inevitably shift to two other factors that need to be addressed in the application: (i) the reasons for believing that the evidence, or source of evidence, exists and can be located; and (ii) the importance of the evidence, or source of evidence, in question to the disposal of the case. For example, if the application seeks the disclosure of a document, described by its type, from a party or third party, there must be some good reason to believe that that party or third party actually possesses documentation of that type and that, if the measure of enquiry were ordered, it would be possible to find and produce such documents. Further, the vaguer and less precise is the description of the document, the more important it is to show that the resolution of an issue of fact in the case requires a correspondingly vague and imprecise order to be made, as opposed to a more targeted measure of enquiry, not least because of the possibility that compliance with the order might produce a vast number of useless and irrelevant documents.31 3 The timing of an application 11.14 In GC proceedings, evidence should be produced or offered in the first exchange of pleadings.32 Strictly speaking, an application for a measure of enquiry is not the production of evidence. It is occasionally referred to as the ‘offer’ of evidence in that, although the evidence can be identified to a greater or lesser extent, it cannot be produced in the absence of a Court order (the hearing 30 Eg Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paras 93–94, in relation to a request for documents (although a request for a measure of organisation of procedure, the same principles apply to a request for a measure of enquiry). Slightly different reasons for rejecting the application were given in the first instance judgment: see Case T-145/89 Baustahlgewebe (above, note 15), paras 34–35. See also: Case T-120/04 Peroxidos Organicos SA v Commission [2006] ECR II-4441, para 80; Case T-466/11 Elinika Nafpigeia v Commission, 19  October 2012, paras 27–31 (para  28 makes odd reading; the better point to make would have been that the documents requested could only have been supporting documents and not the contested decision itself); Case T-30/10 Reagens SpA v Commission, 14 May 2014, paras 54–62. 31 Cf the approach in Case T-141/01 Entorn v Commission [2005] ECR II-95, paras 132–135 (on appeal, Case C-162/05P Entorn v Commission [2006] ECR I-12* – the judgment deals with matters of evidence in paras 55–56 but seems to be unobtainable). 32 RP-GC, art 85(1).

887

11.15  Measures of enquiry

of witness evidence is an example).33 In any event, an application for a measure of enquiry ought to be made at the earliest opportunity and is commonly made in the first substantive pleading lodged by a party. In GC proceedings, if the application for a measure of enquiry is made after the first exchange of pleadings (which may be done by separate application if there is no second exchange or else in the reply or rejoinder), the party submitting the application must state the reasons why he was ‘unable’ to submit it earlier.34 That requirement does not appear in the CST rules, although those rules do provide that evidence may be produced or offered until the end of the hearing as long as the delay in producing or offering it is duly justified.35 In any event, it is good practice to explain why an application is being made at the stage at which it is being made rather than earlier. So far as concerns the GC’s (implicit) requirement that an application for measures of enquiry be made at the first exchange of pleadings, it is at first sight odd to require an application to be made then by anyone other than the defendant because the facts in issue in the case, and their relative importance, are identifiable only once the defence has been lodged. The proper and natural stage at which an application for measures of enquiry should be made (by the applicant) is therefore after the first exchange of pleadings; the proper and natural stage at which such an application should be made by the defendant is at the time of lodging the defence (and the application should therefore be included in the defence). In reality, the applicant in the action usually has a fair idea of the facts that are relevant to deciding the case and of those that the defendant is likely to dispute; and, if he is in a state of ignorance about the defendant’s stance on the facts, the applicant in the action can nonetheless assume that he will be put to proof of the facts in relation to which the burden of proof lies on him. Therefore, it is not inappropriate to proceed on the basis that applications for measures of enquiry should normally be made in the course of the first exchange of pleadings. 11.15 Further, although there is no formal time limit, after which the production of evidence is barred, as the proceedings progress, the criteria for determining whether or not a measure of enquiry should be ordered (which are based essentially on the objective need to ascertain the facts for the purpose of deciding the case) come more and more under the influence of purely procedural considerations. Thus, in GC proceedings, further evidence may be produced or offered36 at the second round of pleadings (if there is one) but only if the delay 33 The use of the term ‘offer’ seems inappropriate where the evidence is not in the possession of the party applying for the measure of enquiry. 34 RP-GC, art 88(2). A failure to state reasons when required to do so can be fatal: eg Case T-16/90 Panagiotopoulu v Parliament [1992] ECR II-89 (an application made at the hearing). In cases like Panagiotopoulu, the GC has rejected the application purportedly because it was out of time but the better reason is failure to explain satisfactorily the delay in making the application, cf Case T-84/92 Nielsen v Economic and Social Committee [1993] ECR II-949, para 39 (where the two reasons are conflated); Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission (above, note 30), paras 60–75. 35 RP-CST, art 57. 36 In the present context, ‘offer’ is the critical term because evidence that is offered is not produced but identified as being the potential subject of a measure of enquiry, whether or not it is the subject of a formal application for a measure of enquiry to be ordered.

888

Measures of enquiry 11.15

in disclosing it is justified; and evidence that is produced or offered thereafter and before the hearing is acceptable not only if the delay is justified but also by way of exception37 (exceptional reasons include: an inability to obtain possession of the evidence beforehand; and the need to complete the file in the light of evidence produced belatedly by the opposing party).38 An application for a measure of enquiry made after the close of the oral procedure may be admitted only ‘if it relates to facts which are capable of having a decisive influence and which the party concerned was not able to put forward before the close of the oral procedure’.39 In that connection, in most cases the Court reopens the oral procedure when it orders a measure of enquiry after the advocate general has delivered his opinion (if there is one) but that is not necessary. The parties’ right to be heard on the evidence is inherent in any measure of enquiry and it is not 37 RP-GC, art 85(2)–(3). Cf RP-CST, art 57. Eg Case T-141/01 Entorn (above, note 31), para 134 (late application justified because, as a result of a previous measure of organisation of procedure, it became apparent that not all documents had been disclosed); Case T-21/99 Dansk Rorindustri A/S  v Commission [2002]  ECR II-1681, paras 24–26 (late application to hear witnesses dismissed, apparently because the proposed witnesses were members of the management or board of directors of the applicant and no reason had been given to explain why their evidence could not have been proposed in the application commencing the action or the reply); Case T-172/01 M v Court of Justice [2004] ECR II-1075, paras 39–42 (late production of evidence admissible because made as soon as possible after the evidence came into the possession of the party; on appeal Case C-243/04 Gaki-Kakouri v Court of Justice, 14 April 2005); Case T-445/07 Berning & Sohne GmbH & Co KG v Commission, 27 June 2012, paras 37–41 (the fact that a potential witness is employed by someone else does not justify a late application); Case T-261/12 Diadikasia Symvouloi Epicheiriseon AE  v Commission, 3  September 2014, paras 39–43 (late application for the examination of an officer of the applicant as a witness unjustified). Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe (above, note 30), paras 69–77, must now be read in the light of the GC rules as they currently stand. However, that case shows that, in order to justify a refusal to order a measure of enquiry, resort may be had to highly technical (not to say contorted) reasoning regarding such matters as what is or is not evidence in rebuttal. Case T-303/02 Westfalen Gassen Nederland BV v Commission [2006] ECR II-4567, paras 188–191, is either an incomplete or inaccurate explanation or an extremely odd decision. For the pleading aspects, see Ch 9, paras 9.75–9.77. 38 M v Court of Justice (above, note 37), paras 44–46 (the exceptional reasons given were those applicable ‘in a case such as this’, so the list does not appear to be comprehensive); Case T-51/07 Agrar-Invest-Tatschl GmbH v Commission [2008] ECR II-2825, para 57 (the list in M v Court of Justice now appears to be comprehensive); Case T-296/09 European Federation of Ink and Ink Cartridge Manufacturers v Commission [2011] ECR II-425*, paras 22–23 (same). For an example of a case in which the exceptional circumstances applied, see Cases C-474/09P to C-476/09P Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission [2011] ECR I-113*, paras 84–86 and 89–90. 39 Case 77/70 Prelle v Commission [1971]  ECR  561 at 566; Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association v Bosman [1995]  ECR  I-4921, para  53 (in that case, a reference for a preliminary ruling, the decisive reason for rejecting the application was stated in para 54: the application could have been made beforehand); Case C-73/97P France v Comafrica SpA  [1999]  ECR  I-185, paras 12–14; Case C-199/92  P  Huls v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4287, para  127; Case C-200/92P ICI  v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4399, para  60; Case C-227/92P  Hoechst AG  v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4443, para  104; Case C-234/92P Shell International Chemical Co Ltd v Commission [1999] ECR I-4501, para 63; Case C-235/92P  Montecatini SpA  v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4539, para  102; Case C-245/92P  Chemie Linz GmbH  v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-4643, para  82; Case T-415/03 Cofradia de Pescadores de ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo v Council [2005] ECR II-4355, para 143. See also Ch 2, paras 2.142–2.154.

889

11.16  Measures of enquiry

necessary to reopen the oral procedure in order to allow them to comment on the results of the enquiry.40 That would be necessary, however, if the advocate general were to make his views known formally. 11.16 When considering the progressive increase in the hurdles to the making of a request for a measure of enquiry, as the procedure advances, it is important to bear in mind that the rules of procedure are really concerned with limiting the ability to introduce new evidence, not limiting the ability to introduce evidence in rebuttal of evidence or arguments that have been put forward by the opposing party at the procedural stage immediately preceding that at which the request for a measure of enquiry is made or further evidence introduced.41 4 Where there is no application 11.17 It does not seem that a failure to make an application is an obstacle to the Court ordering a measure of enquiry. For example, if a party has identified an issue of fact and the sources of evidence relating to that issue but has not made a formal application for a measure of enquiry, that does not, in itself, obviate the need to find the fact and the necessity to order a measure of enquiry in order to enable the Court to make the finding.42 However, it is difficult to discern from the 40 Cf RP-ECJ, art 83; RP-GC, art 113(2); RP-64(2). The oral procedure was not reopened in, for example, Case 2/65 Preo e Figli v High Authority [1966]  ECR  219, Case 36/72 Meganck v Commission [1973] ECR 527 and Case 40/79 P v Commission [1981] ECR 361. In some cases, however, it may be necessary to reopen the oral procedure if new evidence is admitted, in order to allow the other party to comment upon it: see Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank [1976] ECR 1613 at 1635 (Advocate General Warner). In M v Court of Justice (above, note 37), paras 31–32, the GC deferred closing the oral procedure while it pondered the question whether or not further evidence might be required after the hearing. The position regarding measures of organisation of procedure is different because, after the hearing, such a measure may be adopted only if the oral procedure is reopened: Case C-199/92P Huls (above, note 39), paras 125–126; Case C-230/05P L v Commission [2006] ECR I-55*, [2006] ECR-SC I-B-2-7, II-B-2-45, para 68. 41 Case T-127/04 KME Germany AG v Commission [2009] ECR II-1167, paras 54–56 (unaffected by the appeal, Case C-389/10  P  KME  Germany AG  v Commission [2011]  ECR  I-13125); Case T-394/06 Italy v Commission, 12 September 2012, para 45; Case T-198/09 UOP Ltd v Commission, 7  March 2013, paras 32–33; Case.T-553/11 European Dynamics Luxembourg SA v European Central Bank, 22 May 2014, paras 72–74. In the GC’s conception, evidence is not evidence in rebuttal if the opposing party did not adduce any evidence but relied on the fact that the party in question had failed to produce evidence in an earlier pleading: Case T-309/12 Zweckverband Tierkorperbeseitigung im Rheinland-Pfalz, im Saarland, im RheingauTaunus-Kreis und im Landkreis Limburg-Weilburg, 16 July 2014, para 224 (the appeal in Case C-447/14 P was withdrawn). 42 Cf Meierhofer (above, note 15), paras 61–62; Case T-597/11P Michail v Commission, 8 October 2013, paras 39–40; Case C-534/12P  Marcuccio v Commission, 5  December 2013, para  14. Those cases also point out that an inference cannot be drawn from absent evidential material if the Court has not exercised its powers in order to obtain the material. As will be seen below, the position is different where the source of the evidence required to prove the fact is a document in the possession of the party in question. In that event, it is up to that party himself to produce the document and, if he neglects to do so, he risks the issue of fact being decided against him because of a lack of evidence.

890

Measures of enquiry 11.18

cases what the Court’s attitude is when no application for a measure of enquiry is made. Instances in which the Court rejects an application for a purely procedural reason (usually lateness) are not a useful guide because they are frequently coupled with the observation that the requested measure of enquiry is superfluous or irrelevant. Quite a different matter is a failure by a party to indicate sources of evidence and adduce documents in his possession in relation to matters for which he bears the burden of proof.43 5 The right to be heard before an order is made 11.18 In GC and CST proceedings, observance of the right to be heard, before a decision ordering a measure of enquiry is made, is the subject of relatively complex (and inconsistent) provisions. Where an application for a measure of enquiry is made, the other parties are given an opportunity to comment on the application (in writing).44 If the application is made in another pleading, the normal place to comment on it is in the next following written pleading. Hence, if the application is made in the application commencing proceedings, the defendant should comment on the application for measures of enquiry in the defence. In GC proceedings, it is also provided that the parties are to be heard before the GC decides to make an order for the provision of oral testimony or an expert’s report or the inspection of a place or thing.45 That seems to be relevant only where the GC is acting of its own motion. If it is acting upon an application being made, the parties would have been heard in any event. In contrast, no provision for hearing the parties beforehand is made where the GC decides to order the personal appearance of one or other of the parties or requests a party to provide information or produce material relating to the case. In CST proceedings, the parties are entitled to submit observations or be heard before the CST orders any type of measure of enquiry.46 By implication (and as in the case of the GC), the right to submit observations arises where the CST is acting of its own motion and not on application.47 The reasons for those variations in the right to be heard (if any) are not immediately obvious; and it is difficult to reconcile the position under the rules with general principles. On the face of it, if the right to be heard is accorded in relation to one particular type of measure of enquiry, it should be available in

43 Eg Case C-481/07P SELEX  Sistemi Integrati SpA  v Commission [2009]  ECR  I-127*, paras 39–44. 44 RP-GC, art  88(3); RP-CST, art  71(2). It should be noted that the former provision entitles ‘the other parties’ to submit comments. Hence, interveners are so entitled although they cannot themselves make an application for measures of enquiry in GC proceedings. In CST proceedings, interveners may make such an application and comment on an application made by another party. 45 RP-GC, art 92(2). 46 RP-CST, art 71(3) and 71(4), 2nd indent. 47 RP-CST, art 71(3) commences with the words ‘Where the procedural circumstances so require’. That appears to be an allusion to the CST acting of its own motion.

891

11.19  Measures of enquiry

relation to them all unless there is a particular and obvious reason why the right to be heard would be otiose.48 6 Timing of the measure of enquiry 11.19 Measures of enquiry ought to be ordered (where appropriate) in such a way and at such a time that the parties have an adequate opportunity to make submissions to the Court about the evidence gathered as a result of the enquiry. A failure to do so is an error of law.49 7 Conduct of the measure of enquiry 11.20 The conduct of a measure of enquiry varies depending upon the nature of the measure ordered. Where the measure involves a hearing, the Registrar draws up minutes of the hearing, which are signed by him, the President and, depending upon the circumstances, the judge-rapporteur, witness or expert. The minutes constitute the official record of the hearing and are served on the parties.50 8 Failure to comply with an order 11.21 There are in principle two ways in which an order may not be complied with. The first is production of the evidence required to be produced by the order otherwise than completely in accord with the terms of the order, such as a failure to lodge a document within the time specified for doing so. The second is a failure to produce the evidence in question or to do what the order requires. Ordinarily, the former (defective compliance with the order) has limited or no consequences: late production of a document whose disclosure was ordered by a measure of enquiry does not, for example, render the evidence inadmissible because its relevance to the proceedings has effectively been established by the order requiring its production.51 Non-compliance with the order is a different matter. 48 There are sound reasons for saying that it is a matter for the Court itself to determine what measures of enquiry are necessary in the case and there is no need to hear the parties on that point because, whether or not any of them has applied for a measure of enquiry, the appropriateness of ordering some particular measure of enquiry flows from their written pleadings in any event. The parties need be heard only in relation to the practicalities of implementing the order once it is made. That is not, however, the way in which the GC and CST rules are structured. 49 Cf Case C-13/99P TEAM  Srl v Commission [2000]  ECR  I-4671, paras 36–39 (production of documents two weeks before the hearing gives a party sufficient time to respond to the evidence). 50 RP-ECJ, art 74; RP-GC, art 102. In CST proceedings, that is expressly limited to witnesses and experts: RP-CST, art 73(4) and 75(9). Those are the two types of measure of enquiry in which a hearing is provided for (the personal appearance of the parties is another possibility, although there is no express provision for there being a hearing); but it is conceivable that there may be a hearing in the course of the inspection of a place or thing. 51 Case T-85/11P  Marcuccio v Commission, 21  February 2013, para  39. The position might be different where the document is produced in such a way as to ambush the opposing the party (and always assuming that the document supports the case of the party producing it; if it supports the opposing party, it would be perverse to permit a manoeuvre, carried out by the party disclosing the document, to render the document inadmissible).

892

Measures of enquiry 11.23

11.22 Under the Statute, art 24, the Court may take ‘formal note’ of a refusal by a party to produce documents or information that the Court considers desirable; and the Court has the powers generally granted to courts and tribunals in relation to defaulting witnesses and may impose pecuniary penalties under conditions laid down in the rules of procedure. Those matters are considered in more detail below.52 In general terms, however, no sanction may be imposed in respect of a failure or a refusal to comply with a measure of enquiry.53 It is rare for there to be a failure or refusal to comply with a measure of enquiry and any practice in the matter is difficult to identify. Where the failure or refusal is attributable to the defendant, the consequence may be that the Court is prevented (by the defendant) from performing its function of reviewing the legality of the contested measure, in which case (in an action for annulment), the measure may be annulled for that reason alone.54 That course of action is justified where the burden lies on the defendant to disclose the factual basis for the contested measure. It does not involve the Court in drawing any inferences from the failure (or refusal).55 The Court comes to no conclusion about the factual issue in question. It can decide the case only on the basis of the material before it.56 If the party defending the contested measure, who should have had access to the evidence upon which the measure is based, fails to disclose that evidence, it has simply failed to put the Court in a position in which the Court can uphold the legality of the measure. In other situations, that solution may not be open to the Court and the question may arise, what inferences can or should the Court draw from the failure, or refusal, to comply with the measure of enquiry? The drawing of adverse inferences is a last resort and must take account of what is known about the reasons for the failure to comply with the order.57

B

Substantive matters

11.23 Various terms are used to describe the criteria for adopting a measure of enquiry, either in general or in relation to a specific type of measure of enquiry 52 See paras 11.63–11.66 and 11.85 below. 53 Eg Meierhofer (above, note 15), para 73. 54 Case 155/78 M v Commission [1980] ECR 1797, paras 20–21. In that case, the key issue of fact was a matter of medical confidentiality. The applicant had expressly given consent to disclosure of the medical information relating to her but the defendant nonetheless failed to produce it. It seems that the refusal to disclose the information came from the defendant’s doctors rather than the defendant itself (see para 15 of the judgment and per Advocate General Capotorti at p 1822). Nonetheless, the refusal to disclose the evidence was attributable to the defendant. 55 Contrary to what the GC thought in the Meierhofer case (above, note 15), para 73. 56 Cf V  v Commission (above, note 4), paras 69–78, in which the applicant refused to waive confidentiality based on medical secrecy, thereby preventing the defendant from producing documents to the Court that it wished to produce. In that case, no order for production was made given the applicant’s attitude and the CST (at first instance) relied on the evidence available to it. 57 Meierhofer (above, note 15), paras 62 and 74. It should be noted in that connection that a refusal to produce evidence on the ground of its confidentiality does not justify the inference that the evidence in question exists, is credible or is relevant. For procedural purposes, evidence is nonexistent unless and until produced. On the drawing of inferences, see further paras 11.63–11.66 below.

893

11.24  Measures of enquiry

(such as the supply of information or the production of documents) and whether the measure of enquiry is made in the form of an order or in some other form: ‘desirable’,58 ‘necessary’,59 ‘relevant’,60 ‘relating to the case’61 and ‘appropriate’.62 The first term appears only in the Statute, in relation to the obtaining of documents and information from a party, and, in that context, is to be contrasted with the term ‘necessary’, which applies to the seeking of information from a third party.63 ‘Necessary’ also appears in other contexts: generally in relation to the ordering of a measure of enquiry by the ECJ and CST; and in relation to the examination of witnesses by the GC and CST. In relation to the other terms used, and the use of ‘necessary’ in contexts other than the Statute, it does not seem that the variation in terminology should be used to justify any methodological differences in approach. 11.24 As a general proposition, the Court does not order a measure of enquiry to be taken or repeat or expand a previous enquiry unless it seems to it to be appropriate to do so in order to decide the case;64 and the Court is not obliged to order a measure of enquiry just because one of the parties has submitted an application to that effect.65 Despite the fact that it is for the Court to order a measure of enquiry, the burden lies, in the first instance, on the parties, in a direct action, to indicate the steps necessary for the purpose of investigating an issue of fact, whether or not that is crystallised in a formal application for a measure of enquiry.66 The inquisitorial character of proceedings in a direct action extends 58 Statute, art 24, 1st para. 59 Statute, art 24, 2nd para; RP-ECJ, art 63(1); RP-GC, art 93(1) (witnesses); RP-CST, art 71(1) (‘necessary for disposing of the case’); RP-CST, art 72 (witnesses). 60 RP-ECJ, art 62(1). 61 RP-GC, art 91(b); RP-CST, art 70(c) and (g). 62 RP-ECJ, art 64(1); RP-GC, art 92(1). 63 See further paras 11.46–11.50 below. 64 Case 12/68  X  v Audit Board [1969]  ECR  109 at 121 (Advocate General Gand); Williams (above, note 14); Cases T-198/95, T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98 and T-225/99 Comafrica SpA  v Commission [2001]  ECR II-1975, para  112; Case T-448/04 Commission v Transport Environment Development Systems [2007] ECR II-104*, para 195; Case C-498/09P Thomson Sales Europe v Commission [2010]  ECR  I-79*, paras 137–141; Case C-460/10P Marcuccio v Court of Justice [2011]  ECR  I-63*, paras 49–51; Case T-587/10 Holding Kompanija Interspeed a.d. v Commission, 10 July 2012, paras 81–85; Case T-375/10 Hansa Metallwerke v Commission, 16  September 2013, paras 117–119. Cf Case T-182/98  UPS  Europe SA  v Commission [1999] ECR II-2857, para 51. The tests of necessity and appropriateness set out in RP-ECJ, art 63 and 64(1) for the decision whether or not to order a measure of enquiry and the decision as to which form of measure of enquiry to adopt, respectively, ultimately boil down to a single test of appropriateness. 65 Case C-279/02P  Antas de Campo v Parliament, 14  October 2004, paras 34–36; Case C-112/04P Marlines v Commission, 15 September 2005, paras 38–39; Cases C-189/02P Dansk Rorindustri (above, note 29), paras 68–71); Gaki-Kakouri (above, note 37), paras 52–54; L  v Commission (above, note 40), para  47; Case C-260/05P  Sniace SA  v Commission [2007] ECR I-10005, paras 77–79; Case T-223/07P Thierry v Commission [2008] ECR SCI-B-1-81, II-B-1-519, paras 21–25; Case T-364/10 Duravit AG v Commission, 16 September 2013, paras 47–54 and 135; Cases C-239/11P, C-489/11P and C-498/11P  Siemens AG  v Commission, 19 December 2013, paras 321–326. 66 Cf Case C-100/07P ER  v Council and Commission [2007]  ECR  I-136*, paras 27–28; Case T-222/07P Kerstens v Commission [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-37, II-B-1-267, paras 73–75.

894

Measures of enquiry 11.24

only to the method of obtaining evidence; it remains the responsibility of the parties to set up their own cases.67 To begin with, the relevant facts must be put in issue: if the facts are not disputed,68 not open to dispute69 or not disputed in any serious way,70 the Court may well conclude that there is a sufficient basis to make appropriate findings of fact without the need for any measure of enquiry. Where a party alleges a fact or seeks to put in issue a fact alleged by another party, it is not enough to rely on assertion alone; there must be at least the appearance of some substance behind the assertion.71 By way of example, in Cases 42 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority72 an intervener based certain arguments on the wording of a contract which it did not produce because it was confidential. The Court held that, since it was relying on a document in its own possession, it should have adduced proof of its allegations by disclosing the contract: ‘it is not acceptable to rely on the Court to take the initiative in obtaining for itself 67 In the case of actions brought by the Commission against member states, it has been said that it is for the Commission, and not the Court, to ensure that all necessary evidence is before the Court: Case 169/82 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 1603 at 1631 (Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat); Case 141/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 943 (para 17 and at 972, Advocate General Jacobs). 68 See Case 21/84 Commission v France [1985] ECR 1355, para 10. 69 Eg Case C-437/98P Industria del Frio Auxiliar Conservera SA v Commission [1999] ECR I-7145, paras 39–40; Case T-23/03  CAS  SpA  v Commission [2007]  ECR II-289, paras 323–324 and 325–333 (the proposed measures of enquiry sought to dispute a finding that fell solely within the competence of a foreign customs authority – see paras 120–121 and 150 – or else related to matters of fact that were not considered to be relevant to the issues in the case). 70 See Case C-96/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991]  ECR  I-2461, paras 21–22, where the applicant relied on inferences drawn from the documents while the defendant failed to indicate any basis on which those inferences could be said to be unfounded; Case C-110/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-2659 (paras 10–16 and at 2680–2682, Advocate General Lenz), where the applicant’s case was based inter alia on newspaper reports but the defendant failed to adduce any evidence to counter that relied on by the applicant, despite being invited to do so, and proved unable to explain itself effectively; Case T-145/89 Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission (above, note 15), paras 68, 94 and 138 (where the relevant facts were clear on the face of the documents so there was no need to order a measure of enquiry in order to hear various witnesses deny what the documents said (upheld on appeal in Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission (above, note 30), para 68); Case T-180/01 Euroagri Srl v Commission [2004] ECR II-369, paras 203–204, where the applicant relied on alleged differences between the contested decision and the conclusions reached in national proceedings but did not identify the differences. 71 In addition to the illustrations set out above, see: Case T-34/92 Fiatagri UK Ltd v Commission [1994] ECR II-905, paras 25–27; Case T-35/92 John Deere Ltd v Commission [1994] ECR II957, para 31; Case T-29/92 Vereniging van Samenwekende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v Commission [1995] ECR II-289, para 55 (‘serious and convincing evidence’ of an irregularity in the adoption of a measure); Case T-266/94 Foreningen af Jernskibs- og Maskinbyggerier i Danmark, Skibsvaerftsforeningen v Commission [1996]  ECR II-1399, para 200; Case T-106/95 Federation Francaise des Societes d’Assurances (FFSA) v Commission [1997] ECR II-229, para 115; Case C-273/99P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-1575, para 42; Case T-132/01 Euroalliages v Commission [2003] ECR II-2359, paras 91–93; Case T-275/11 Television francaise 1 v Commission (above, note 28), para 115; Case T-304/13P van der Aat v Commission, 11  December 2014, para  61; Case T-114/13P  Cerafogli v European Central Bank, 23 September 2015, para 45 (need for a prima facie case but not proof to the requisite legal standard). Case T-553/11 European Dynamics Luxembourg v European Central Bank, 23 May 2014, paras 317–318, appears to be such a case. 72 [1961] ECR 53.

895

11.24  Measures of enquiry

by measures of enquiry information intended to prove the cogency of the argument relied upon by the intervener, which itself possesses that information’. The Court ‘taking note of the reservations and hesitations’ of the intervener, did not order production and simply said that it was unnecessary to consider the arguments because of lack of proof.73 A similar situation arose in Case 14/64 Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority.74 There a series of arguments was put forward by the applicant, who did not produce any documents to ‘support her assertions or render them plausible’. The Court therefore rejected them as unfounded, holding that there was no need to order the measures of enquiry (testimony) suggested by the applicant on the ground, seemingly, that, by failing to produce any evidence at all, she had failed to set up the arguments as worthwhile to investigate, even though all the evidence had in fact been in her possession or at her disposal. The offers of proof, the Court held, ‘are not supported by any facts worthy of consideration’.75 The necessity to plead specifically was again emphasised in Case 51/65 ILFO v High Authority,76 where the applicant asked for measures of enquiry to be adopted, including the ordering of an expert’s report, and said that it was ready to produce all necessary documents to prove its allegations. The Court rejected that because no evidence had been adduced to justify such measures and the grounds on which the application was based were also ‘too imprecise’. Advocate General Gand said measures of enquiry ‘could only be ordered if the applicant first put forward specific facts…of such a nature as to justify further study and a reconsideration of the High Authority’s decision’. In Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission77 the Court said that the ordering of an expert’s report in order to resolve an issue of fact would be justified only if the facts already proved raised a presumption in favour of the applicant’s arguments because the burden of proof rested on him. In Case T-156/89 Mordt v Court of Justice78 the applicant raised a point at the hearing but did not develop the factual basis for it so the CFI concluded that there was no reason to order a measure of enquiry.79

73 Ibid, at 84 and 85. 74 [1965] ECR 51. 75 Ibid, at 59–60. See also Preo v High Authority (above, note 40) at 231 (Advocate General Gand). The parties had agreed that an expert should be appointed to ascertain the facts but, for a reason not mentioned in the report, he did not do so. The applicant then asked for witnesses to be heard. The advocate general said that that request should be rejected for several reasons: (i) the applicant had declined to have the matter settled by an expert; (ii) ‘it limits itself to bringing before you mere allegations quite unsupported by any shred of evidence’; and (iii) it was ‘hazardous’ to prove facts as remote in time as those in question by means of witnesses who were mostly employees of the applicant. The second reason was, he said, sufficient to reject the request. See also Case 119/81 Kloeckner AG v Commission [1982] ECR 2627, para 8. 76 [1966]  ECR  87 at 96–97 and 101. In Case C-546/12P  Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office, 21 May 2015, paras 73–79, the ECJ approved the application of the approach in ILFO by analogy in other proceedings on the basis that it reflected a general principle (at first instance, Cases T-133/08, T-134/08, T-177/08 and T-242/09 Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office, 18 September 2012, paras 137–138). 77 [1965] ECR 533 at 554. 78 [1991] ECR II-407, para 126. 79 See also Case 323/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 2275 (at 2296, Advocate General Jacobs).

896

Measures of enquiry 11.26

11.25 The conclusions to be drawn from the cases cited seem to be the following: the Court will not undertake a fishing expedition on behalf of one of the parties; for that reason, simply to raise an argument is not sufficient to cause the Court to investigate its basis in fact; some justification must be put forward to show that the matter is worth investigating further. That appears to mean that a contention must be supported by sufficient evidence or indications as to make it arguable. If a party refrains from producing, for that purpose, (documentary) evidence which is in its possession or at its disposal, the Court may infer that the contention is not supported by sufficient evidence and refuse to order a measure of enquiry.80 For a measure of enquiry to be ordered, it must be shown then, that: (1) an argument has been raised which is relevant to deciding the case;81 (2) the argument cannot be accepted or rejected without finding certain facts; (3) a measure of enquiry is necessary in order to find those facts.82 11.26 So far as the first of those requirements is concerned, a relevant argument is one which is pertinent to the resolution of the dispute, ie  one whose acceptance or rejection determines whether the relief sought is to be granted or not, either directly or indirectly.83 At the close of pleadings it is usually possible to decide which arguments are relevant and which are not. At that stage, which is the point at which the decision to order a measure of enquiry is usually made, all the relevant arguments are still to be considered by the Court although, in the judgment, it may find that one issue settles the case and it is not necessary to decide the others. As a matter of principle, it is not possible to establish whether an argument is necessary, as opposed to relevant, to the decision in the action, before the parties have fully presented their cases to the court (and, where there is one, the advocate general has delivered his opinion). Even then, some points may require further clarification, which is why the Court has power to order a measure

80 Thus, in Cases 169/83 and 138/84 Leussinck-Brummelhuis v Commission [1986] ECR 2801, paras 16–17, where the defendant was best able to provide evidence on a particular issue of fact, but did not do so, the uncertainty as to what was the truth led the Court to accept the applicant’s contentions. That is not invariably the practice: in Case T-35/89 Albani v Commission [1990] ECR II-395, paras 48–49, the Court ordered one party to produce documents in order to enable it to discharge the burden of proof under which it lay. 81 Cf Case 403/85 F v Commission [1987] ECR 645, para 9, where the measure of enquiry sought did not relate to matters relevant to the legal issues in the case; Case T-145/89 Baustahlgewebe (above, note 15), paras 55–58 (same). 82 In some cases, those requirements are rolled up into one: thus, in Case 212/86 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission, order of 11 December 1986 (reported sub nom Case T-13/89 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission [1991] ECR II-1021, see per Judge Vesterdorf at [1991] ECR II-867 at 889–891), where a request was made under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for the production of documents, the Court held that the test was whether or not production was indispensable for the judicial review of the contested act. 83 Cf Case 224/87 Koutchoumoff v Commission [1989] ECR 99, para 19, where the measure of enquiry did not relate to an issue that the Court had to decide.

897

11.27  Measures of enquiry

of enquiry at any stage of the proceedings.84 In consequence, sufficient evidence should be obtained to find the facts relating to all the relevant arguments, not just the most important or promising ones. In practice, however, it often happens that a measure of enquiry is not ordered or, where there has been a formal application for such a measure to be ordered, the decision to order a measure of enquiry is reserved to the judgment in the action simply because it appears to the Court at the close of the written procedure that the case may be decided on a ground other than that to which the proposed measure of enquiry relates.85 Thus, in practice (and whatever principle may suggest), a measure of enquiry will not usually be ordered unless it is necessary in order to decide a point that is not merely relevant but essential to the disposal of the case. 11.27 In relation to the second requirement referred to above, the question whether or not a particular argument or point cannot be accepted or rejected without finding certain facts needs no further elaboration. In contrast, the third requirement (that a measure of enquiry is necessary in order to find the relevant facts) does merit further exploration. In dealing with that requirement, it should be borne in mind that the proposal to order a measure of enquiry may emanate from the Court itself, from the party seeking to establish a particular point or from the party contesting an assertion made by an opposing party. The Court will not order a measure of enquiry of its own motion unless it has concluded that the evidence before it is deficient in some material aspect.86 In that sense, the Court’s 84 RP-GC, art  88(1); RP-CST, art  69(1). See, for example, Case 5/67 Beus GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt München Landsbergerstrasse [1968]  ECR  83 (note p  107) (a reference for a preliminary ruling); Preo v High Authority (above, note 40 at 255) (there was no second advocate general’s opinion); Case 43/74 Guillot v Commission [1977]  ECR  1309 at 1323 (witnesses were heard after the first hearing and the Court then adjourned proceedings to allow the parties to submit written observations); Case 190/73 Officier van Justitie v van Haaster [1974] ECR 1123 at 1128 (reference for a preliminary ruling); Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v High Authority [1965] ECR 677 at 688; Case 37/64 Mannesmann AG v High Authority [1965] ECR 725 at 738; Meganck (above, note 40) at 529 (the oral procedure was not reopened as well); Duraffour v Council (above, note 11); Usines de la Providence v High Authority (above, note 10); Case 40/79 P v Commission [1981] ECR 361 at 370 (the oral procedure was not reopened); Case 785/79 Pizziolo v Commission [1981] ECR 969; Case 170/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1980] ECR 417. 85 Eg Case 118/83 CMC Cooperativa Muratori e Cementisti v Commission [1985] ECR 2325, paras 20–25, where the application for the production of documents was reserved to the final judgment and, in the meantime, the opposing party voluntarily produced certain documents, thus obviating the need for a formal order (the course of events incidentally demonstrates the disadvantages of reserving the decision on the application to the final judgment: if the opposing party had not produced the documents voluntarily, what would the Court have done in the final judgment?). The complications and delays that may arise when the ordering of a measure of enquiry is left until late in the procedure can be illustrated by Case T-169/89 Frederiksen v European Parliament [1991] ECR II-1403, paras 34–44. 86 Thus, in Case 246/84 Kotsonis v Council [1986] ECR 3989, para 20 the Court heard evidence because there were discrepancies in the documentary evidence before it. In Case C-169/84 Société CdF Chimie Azote et fertilisants SA and Société Chimique de la Grande Paroisse SA v Commission [1990] ECR I-3083, para 28, an expert’s report was ordered because the parties had provided contradictory information concerning certain facts in issue. In contrast, in Case C-248/89 Cargill BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-2987, the advocate general advised the Court to accept the defendant’s offer of proof of a fact and the Court therefore decided that there was

898

Measures of enquiry 11.27

assessment of the need for a measure of enquiry is objective: the Court’s concern is to decide the case properly; it has no interest in any particular outcome to the case. Where the initiative comes from a party, the test to be applied by the Court is in principle the same: the party applying for a measure of enquiry must demonstrate that the evidence before the Court is deficient and that the measure of enquiry sought is both necessary and sufficient to make up for that deficiency.87 Where the measure is sought by the party asserting the existence of the fact in question, the nature and source of the evidence are clearly relevant: if the nature of the evidence is documentary and if the relevant documents can be expected to be in the possession of the party in question, the need for a measure of enquiry is questionable (because, in principle, all the relevant evidence should be attached to the party’s pleadings) and the fact that that party has requested a measure of enquiry tends to suggest that the assertion of fact is unsupported by relevant evidence. The position is different where the nature of the evidence (such as where it takes the form of testimony) or its source (such as where it is documentary in nature but the documents are in the possession of another party or a third party) is such that the party making the assertion could not adduce the evidence in the absence of a Court order. Even in such circumstances, whether or not an order will be made depends in large part on the attitude of the opposing party. Where the existence of the asserted fact is conceded by the opposing party, there is, of course, no need for a measure of enquiry because the fact is not in issue. Where the opposing party denies the asserted fact, it is in issue and, in principle, a measure of enquiry is necessary. However, there are cases where the Court has refused to order a measure of enquiry sought by a party opposing an assertion of fact made by the other party on the ground that, in order to obtain such an order, a party must demonstrate that there are doubts about the accuracy of the other party’s assertions.88 Thus, where a party makes an assertion of fact or, at the least, no need to verify the fact by hearing testimony. In Case 105/87 Morabito v European Parliament [1988] ECR 1707, para 7, a case where the defendant failed to lodge a defence within time, the Court held that, since the applicant’s assertions were supported by documentary evidence, they could be regarded as proved for the purposes of the proceedings. 87 So, in Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Commission and Case 83/63 Krawczynski v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 533 and 623, at 562 and 641 respectively, the Court took the view that it was not necessary to admit the offers of proof made by the parties because it had all the information necessary to decide the dispute. See also Case 16/67 Labeyrie v Commission [1968] ECR 293 at 304; Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank [1976] ECR 1613 at 1635, where Advocate General Warner said that a document produced to the Court need not be served on the other party because it did not, in his view, say anything new; Case T-1/90 Pérez-Mínguez Casariego v Commission [1991] ECR II-143, para 94; Case T-53/91 Merger v Commission [1992] ECR II-2041, para 26. 88 Eg Case 171/86  USINOR  v Commission, order of 28  January 1987, para  21 (the case was subsequently withdrawn). In Case C-157/89 Commission v Italy [1991]  ECR  I-57 (para  15 and at 77 and 80, Advocate General van Gerven), the Court did not order any preparatory enquiries but asked the parties to specify, on the basis of scientific publications, their factual allegations; the defendant disputed the probative value of the publications relied on by the Commission but that objection was dismissed on the ground that the defendant had not produced alternative scientific studies challenging the date relied on by the other party. In Case C-96/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2461, paras 21–22, the defendant failed to produce the slightest evidence (‘commencement de preuve’) to contradict the applicant’s assertions. In Case C-110/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-2659 (at 2680–2682, Advocate General

899

11.28  Measures of enquiry

a prima facie plausible assertion, it is not enough simply to deny the assertion; the opposing party must indicate that there is some reasonable doubt about the assertion. In consequence, whether the measure of enquiry is sought by the party making the assertion or the party opposing it, the factor determining whether or not a measure of enquiry is ordered is whether or not there is a reasonable doubt about the truth of the assertion. The position is different where the assertion is one of law, even though it is dependent upon the existence or otherwise of certain facts. Thus, in Case C-49/88 Al-Jubail Fertiliser Co v Council89 it was held that the mere assertion that the rights of the defence have been respected is not good enough; evidence to support the assertion must be produced. 11.28 In relation to measures of enquiry sought by a party, an additional factor to be taken into account is the nature and extent of the measure of enquiry sought. The fact that there is a reasonable doubt about the truthfulness of an assertion does not justify the making of an order that is disproportionate.90 Therefore, a measure of enquiry will not be ordered if it is unnecessary to investigate the facts for the purpose of accepting or rejecting a relevant argument. For example, in Case 3/65 SA Métallurgique d’Espérance-Longdoz v High Authority91 the Court refused to accede to the applicant’s request that witnesses be examined because, even if the facts alleged were true, the claim would still have to be rejected; in Cases 15 and 29/59 Société Métallurgique de Knutange v High Authority92 the Court declined to examine certain disputed facts because they could not influence the decision in the case; and in Case 21/64 Macchiorlatti Dalmas and Figli v High Authority93 the Court did not hear testimony because its content would not have revealed a fact capable of supporting the point being made. In Case 60/82 Cowood v Commission94 the Court invited the applicant to suggest the names of witnesses who might give evidence on the issues of fact. The Court decided not to hear the witnesses proposed because, even if that evidence could be accepted, it did not relate to any relevant facts.95

Lenz) the applicant’s evidence comprised newspaper reports but the defendant failed to produce anything to affect the value of that evidence. Cerafogli (above, note 71), paras 42–50, seems to be best explained as a case where the opposing party’s reliance on the completeness and accuracy of a report was contested on the ground that there were identifiable inaccuracies in it which justified ordering a measure of enquiry in order to ascertain whether or not the report was a reliable reflection of the evidence on which it was supposedly based. 89 [1991] ECR I-3187 (para 20 and the Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, para 83). 90 Case 171/86 USINOR v Commission (above, note 88), para 23. 91 [1965] ECR 1065 at 1084; see also Case T-82/89 Marcato v Commission [1990] ECR II-735, para 81. 92 [1960]  ECR  1 at 8; see also Case 13/60 Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH  v High Authority [1962]  ECR  83 at 116, where the Court did not consider errors of fact (sc ‘trifling’ discrepancies of fact) which did not in fact or in law affect the decision at issue; Case 29/70 Marcato v Commission [1971] ECR 243 at 247; Case C-106/90R Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission [1991] ECR I-3377, paras 28–30. 93 [1965] ECR 175 at 189. 94 [1982] ECR 4625. 95 See also Williams v Court of Auditors (above, note 14), para 31.

900

Measures of enquiry 11.30

11.29 Once it is established that an enquiry is necessary in order to ascertain the existence of a relevant fact, the question arises, what measure of enquiry is to be adopted? It is up to the parties to indicate in their pleadings the precise method of proving a fact which is most appropriate. In the case of witnesses that is done by specifying the person or persons to be called to give evidence and explaining why they are competent to do so in relation to the facts in question; the same approach should, it seems, be adopted, mutatis mutandis, as far as other sources of evidence are concerned.96 The Court will not order a measure of enquiry if the evidence that may be obtained is obviously unreliable97 (a fortiori if the party requesting the measure of enquiry has declined to produce or assent to the production of more trustworthy evidence)98 or intrinsically incapable of assisting in deciding the issue of fact.99 In Case 35/67 Van Eick v Commission100 the Court laid down rules for the exercise, by a Disciplinary Board convened under the Staff Regulations, of the power to call witnesses. It held that the Board was ‘bound in the exercise of its powers to observe the fundamental principles of the law of procedure’, so it would appear that the same rules bind the Court. Hence: ‘In accordance with these principles [the Court] could not refuse to comply with an application for the examination of witnesses, once this request clearly indicates the facts on which there is reason to hear the witness or witnesses named and the reasons which are likely to justify their examination. It is, however, for the [Court] to assess both the relevance of the application in relation to the subject matter of the dispute and the need to examine the witnesses named. The [Court] could, in principle, take the view that the examination of only some of the witnesses called by the applicant was sufficient for the purposes of the enquiry into the case’. 11.30 If the parties do not request the ordering of a measure of enquiry, the Court can, of course, consider the matter of its own motion. Although it is not bound to accede to a request that is made, it should do so, as the van Eick case shows, in so far as the issues of fact are relevant and the measure sought is necessary or appropriate for the resolution of the issues. A failure to order a measure 96 Cf RP-ECJ, art 66(2). RP-GC, art 88(2) and RP-CST, art 72(2) are to the same effect but apply generally to all applications for a measure of enquiry. In the case of witnesses, see further para 11.75 below. 97 See, for example, Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority and Preo e figli v High Authority (above, notes 40 and 74, at 66 and 231 respectively (Advocates General Roemer and Gand): in both cases the applicant requested witnesses to be called to give evidence in respect of events taking place several years beforehand. Both advocates general doubted the competence of the persons concerned to give reliable testimony in view of the lapse of time. In the first case there was further reason for doubt because the applicant did not indicate why the witnesses would be in a position to give relevant testimony; in the second, the advocate general drew attention to the fact that the witnesses were employees of the applicant. 98 Ibid at 59 and 231 respectively. 99 Eg the San Pedro case (above, note 39), para 144 (it should be noted, however, that the judgment is expressed in a confused way: the requested measure of enquiry was an expert’s report; the documents referred to in para 144 had actually been produced to the GC – see para 28 – and were not the subject of the application for a measure of enquiry). 100 [1968] ECR 329 at 342. Cf Cases 43 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission [1984] ECR 19, para 18.

901

11.31  Measures of enquiry

of enquiry where the circumstances justify it is an error of law that may justify overturning the Court’s final judgment in the action (if an appeal lies against the judgment).101

III

CONDUCT OF MEASURES OF ENQUIRY

11.31 In ECJ and GC proceedings, a measure of enquiry is prescribed by a Court order (made after hearing the views of the advocate general, where there is one) which sets out the facts to be proved.102 The rules no longer provide that the order is served on the parties; but that should ordinarily be done, particularly if the Court wishes the order to be binding on the parties.103 In CST proceedings, a decision requiring the personal appearance of the parties or the production of information, particulars, documents or items of evidence by a third party is notified to the parties; a decision ordering the taking of oral testimony, the provision of an expert’s report or the inspection of a place or thing is made in the form of an order and sets out the facts to be proved; a decision asking a party to produce documents or items of evidence takes the form of an order.104 The procedure followed is dealt with in detail below in relation to each type of measure. In essence, the enquiry is conducted by the Court, a chamber or the judge-rapporteur.105 In ECJ proceedings, at a time when cases would be heard and determined by the full Court, each case was assigned to a chamber for the purpose of carrying out any preparatory enquiries.106 That meant that the evidence might be gathered by a pool of judges smaller than the pool that would eventually give judgment. As most cases are now heard and determined by a chamber, that situation no longer arises. Normally, in cases assigned to a chamber, any preparatory enquiries are carried out by the chamber unless they are entrusted to the judge-rapporteur.107 101 Eg Case C-119/97P Union Francaise de l’Express v Commission [1999] ECR I-1341, paras 107–112; the Thierry case (above, note 65). 102 RP-ECJ, art 64(1); RP-GC, art 92(1). The order may be amended or supplemented with little difficulty. In Case T-35/89 Albani v Commission (above, note 80) at paras 26–33 the Court had ordered two witnesses to be examined on a certain day. On the day in question, one of the parties suggested that a third person be examined and the Court so ordered. 103 Orders are binding from their date of service: RP-ECJ, art 91(2); RP-GC, art 121(2); RP-CST, art 98(2). It is presumably because of those provisions that the ECJ and GC rules of procedure no longer provide expressly that an order prescribing measures of enquiry be served on the parties. 104 RP-CST, art 71(4). 105 RP-ECJ, art 65(1); RP-GC, art 92(4); RP-CST, art 71(5). 106 In Preo (above, note 40) at 224 and Case 74/74 CNTA v Commission [1976] ECR 797 at 799, for example, the enquiry was assigned to the Second Chamber. 107 In Cases T-68, T-77 and T-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA  v Commission [1992]  ECR II1403, order of 7 May 1991, the judge-rapporteur was ordered inter alia to identify all relevant documents referred to by the parties, identify any others, ensure any necessary transcriptions and translations, decide whether or not it was necessary to examine witnesses and, if so, whom, proceed to any measures of organisation of procedure and, to those ends, convoke the parties and ask them any necessary questions. That order, as can be seen, related more to measures of organisation of procedure under RP-GC, art 90 than to measures of enquiry under RP-GC, art 92.

902

Measures of enquiry 11.33

In cases before the ECJ it was rare for an enquiry to be entrusted to the judgerapporteur alone.108 The ECJ, GC and CST rules envisage that the examination of a witness or expert shall take place before all the judges involved in the case, in which case, the President conducts the hearing;109 but the CST rules also provide for the examination of a witness by the judge-rapporteur only.110 The advocate general (where there is one) ‘takes part’ in the measure of enquiry, whoever is entrusted with it, but does not ‘conduct’ it.111 11.32 The Rules of Procedure also provide that the parties are ‘entitled to attend the measures of enquiry’.112 An enquiry which consists of an order for the production of documents does not readily lend itself to the notion that a party has a right to ‘attend’. On the other hand, the rules relating to the hearing of testimony and experts’ reports expressly state that the parties may attend the enquiry and ask questions.113 That reflects a general principle of procedural law.114 It also seems to have been the ECJ’s practice when carrying out an inspection under RP-ECJ, art 64(2)(e).115 The Rules of Procedure do not, however, expressly provide that the parties have a right to give their views on the evidence obtained by the enquiry. Nevertheless, that seems implicit in their right to attend and is the usual practice.116 RP-ECJ, art 75, which deals with the close of the preparatory enquiry, indicates only that, in cases before it, the ECJ may allow the parties to comment on the evidence in writing. 11.33 RP-ECJ, art 64(3) and RP-GC, art 92(7) state: ‘Evidence may be submitted in rebuttal and previous evidence may be amplified’. The phrasing used in those provisions is slightly ambiguous in that it suggests either that it lies within the discretion of the Court to allow the submission of evidence in rebuttal etc or that that is a facility of which the parties may take advantage, if they so wish, but as of right. Both views are tenable, given that the calling of evidence is in general the responsibility of the Court but that, as a matter of principle, the Court cannot refuse to accept relevant evidence from one party which would tend to rebut 108 In Case 23/81 Commission v Royale Belge [1983] ECR 2685, the enquiry was assigned to the judge-rapporteur but, as it concerned an expert’s report, that was in any event necessary in view of what was, at the time, RP-ECJ, art 49(2), which placed experts under the supervision of the judge-rapporteur. On the other hand, in Case 132/81 Rijksdienst voor Werknemerspensionen v Vlaeminck [1982]  ECR  2953, the order reopening the oral procedure also assigned any necessary measures of enquiry to the judge-rapporteur. Both that and the Royale Belge case were heard by a chamber. It is supposed that the judge-rapporteur is more likely to be entrusted with a preparatory enquiry in that situation than when the case is heard by the Grand Chamber or full Court. 109 RP-ECJ, art 67 and 70; RP-GC, art 94 and 96; RP-CST, art 73 and 75(8). 110 RP-CST, art 73(3). 111 RP-ECJ, art 65(2); RP-GC, art 92(5). 112 RP-ECJ, art 65(3); RP-GC, art 92(6); RP-CST, art 71(6). 113 RP-ECJ, art 67(2) and (4) and 70(2) and (4); RP-GC, art 94(2) and (4) and 96(2) and (4); RPGC, art 73(3) and 75(8). 114 Case 141/84 De Compte v European Parliament [1985] ECR 1951, paras 17–18. 115 See paras 11.101–11.102 below. 116 Eg Case 232/81 Agricola Commerciale Olio v Commission [1984] ECR 3881 at 3884; Case 264/81 Savma v Commission [1984] ECR 3915 at 3918.

903

11.34  Measures of enquiry

evidence produced at the behest of the Court by the other party. On balance it is preferable to regard RP-ECJ, art 64(3) and RP-GC, art 92(7) as indicating that the matter lies within the discretion of the Court because, while the submission of evidence in rebuttal could, arguably, be left to the parties, the amplification of previous evidence cannot; and there is no textual reason to consider the two parts of the rule independently. On the other hand, RP-CST, art 71(7) provides: ‘A party may submit evidence in rebuttal or amplify previous evidence at any stage of the proceedings’. That formulation makes it plain that the submission of evidence in rebuttal and the amplification of evidence previously given are both procedural rights that a party has. However, save in the case of documents and (in rare cases) things, a party cannot exercise either right in the absence of a Court order. 11.34 There are very few cases in which it is evident that evidence was submitted in rebuttal. In Case 32/62 Alvis v Council117 the order prescribing the measure of enquiry invited the defendant to name its witnesses on the issues of fact before a certain date, the right of rebuttal being left to the applicant, who was given the same period of time in which to name his witnesses. An order so framed is, however, comparatively unusual. In Case 89/93 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v Dimex Nahrungsmittel Im-und Export GmbH,118 a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court asked one of the parties to confirm or rebut a statement of fact made by the other party. The report of Cases 56 to 60/74 Kampffmeyer Muhlenvereingung KG  v Commission and Council119 says that, after the Court had decided to hear several witnesses, the Commission put in a written statement concerning one of the issues of fact on which they were to be examined. That statement ‘submitted evidence in rebuttal’, in the form of documents and a request that other persons should be heard as witnesses on the issue in question. From that it can be seen that ‘evidence in rebuttal’ need not be of the same type as the evidence it seeks to rebut and that it is up to the parties to adduce evidence or sources of evidence which may rebut that produced by or at the request of the opposing party. In Case T-36/89 Nijman v Commission,120 a party sought to adduce witness evidence in order to rebut the conclusions of an expert’s report. That offer of proof was dismissed as inadmissible. The explanation seems to be that the evidence could have been drawn to the attention of the Court at an earlier stage in the proceedings (indeed, before the expert’s report was ordered), no reason was given for the delay in producing it and, further, the party concerned had never asserted previously what it was now asserting on the basis of the ‘new’ evidence. The case thus shows that evidence in rebuttal cannot be used in order to remedy a failure to adduce evidence at the proper time; and that evidence in rebuttal is limited to countering the impact of the evidence produced by the measure of enquiry and cannot extend to questioning the assumptions on the basis of which the measure of enquiry was ordered.

117 [1963] ECR 49, order of 1 February 1963 (unreported). 118 [1984] ECR 2815 at 2821. 119 [1976] ECR 711 at 716. 120 [1991] ECR II-699, paras 26–29.

904

Measures of enquiry 11.37

11.35 It may be concluded that the opportunity to submit evidence in rebuttal may be dealt with in the order providing for the measure of enquiry or may be the subject of a separate application to submit evidence in rebuttal made by the party concerned. The same seems to apply to the amplification of evidence previously given. It remains the Court’s responsibility to decide whether or not to act on any such application. The exercise of the Court’s discretion in the matter would appear to be guided by the same principles that apply to the ordering of a measure of enquiry and by the need to have due regard for the rights of the defence. 11.36 In ECJ proceedings, at the close of the preparatory enquiry either the ECJ may give the parties an opportunity to comment on the evidence obtained in writing, a period being fixed for the submission of written observations, or the President sets the date for the opening of the oral procedure and the parties may comment on the evidence at the hearing.121 In GC and CST proceedings, the process of completing a measure of enquiry and then moving on to the oral part of the procedure is not the subject of any provision. Read literally, the rules envisage that (as indicated above) measures of enquiry are considered after the close of the written procedure and, after the completion of any measure of enquiry, the GC and CST move straightaway to fixing the date for the oral hearing (if there is one), without there being any opportunity for the parties to lodge written submissions on the outcome of the measure of enquiry. 11.37 In practice, matters are not always so clearcut as the rules of procedure imply. In Case 232/81 Agricola Commerciale Olio v Commission and Case 264/81 Savma v Commission,122 the ECJ had originally opened the oral procedure without any preparatory enquiries but asked the defendant to reply to certain questions and provide certain information. The defendant’s response caused measures of enquiry to be ordered, resulting in a further round of enquiries. In Case T-169/89 Frederiksen v European Parliament,123 the procedure followed was more complex: the defendant had been requested to produce documentary evidence in the course of the proceedings and had duly done so but, at the end of the hearing, the Court was not satisfied that it was in full possession of all the necessary evidence; it informed the parties that it was going to order a complementary measure of enquiry and subsequently ordered the defendant to provide further information and documents on a particular question of fact; the information and documents produced by the defendant caused the Court to order an expert’s report.

121 RP-ECJ, art 75. 122 [1984] ECR 3881 at 3884 and 3915 at 3918, respectively. 123 [1991] ECR II-1403, paras 34–36.

905

11.38  Measures of enquiry

IV

THE PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF THE PARTIES

11.38 The parties cannot be required to give evidence as witnesses124 although, under the Statute, they may be required to produce documents and supply information125 and the Court has power during the hearing to question them, albeit that they can address the Court only through their representatives.126 In consequence, if a question is put directly to the party at the hearing, the answer must come from the lips of his representative.127 The questioning of a party (through his representative) at the hearing is in principle limited to obtaining the party’s submissions on a relevant point of fact or law and is quite distinct from the obtaining of evidence concerning a disputed fact, which requires oral testimony to be given formally.128 The parties are not normally obliged to be present in court at the hearing but the Court may order them to be present in person under RP-ECJ, art 64(2)(a), RP-GC, art 91(a) or RP-CST, art 70(a). In the case of legal persons and bodies lacking legal personality, appearance is by the natural person competent to represent them under national law. The same rule seems to apply as far as the member states are concerned, but the position is not entirely clear and it is arguable that appearance is by the agent appointed to represent a member state in proceedings before the Court. How an EU institution or other body can appear in person otherwise than by its agent is obscure.129 11.39 It is comparatively rare for a party to be ordered to appear in person by way of a measure of enquiry. In theory (at least in ECJ and GC proceedings) the order must set out the facts which are to be proved.130 No details of the procedure which is to be followed appear in the Rules of Procedure or elsewhere. The general rules for the conduct of a measure of enquiry131 indicate that the other parties are entitled to attend; the hearing is held in open court unless it is decided otherwise; the members of the Court may put questions to the party ordered to be present. It does not seem that the other parties can put questions directly but they may ask the Court to do so. The party ordered to be present cannot be required to swear to the veracity of what 124 Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 333, order of 4 June 1956 (unreported). 125 Statute, art 24. 126 Statute, art 32. In staff cases, the CST (and, after 1 September 2016, the GC) may invite the parties themselves to express their views on certain aspects of the case: RP-GC, art 110(4); RPCST, art 63(4)(b). 127 Where that would be impracticable, the President has been known to allow the party to address the Court itself. 128 Case C-578/11P Deltafina v Commission, 12  June 2014, paras 59–62. In Interspeed (above, note 64), para 85, the GC interpreted a request to hear the applicant’s legal representative as a request for oral testimony to be taken. 129 In Case 98/76 Trevor v Court, order of 4 April 1977 (unreported) (the case was withdrawn before judgment) both parties were ordered to be heard in order to resolve certain questions of fact: the Court was represented by the Registrar. In Case T-59/89 Yorck von Wartenburg v European Parliament [1990] ECR II-25, the European Parliament was ordered to attend in person at the hearing by means of a representative duly empowered by the Parliament to bind it by his statements; but that was in the context of an attempt by the CFI to achieve an amicable settlement of the dispute, presumably by way of a measure of organisation of procedure under what is now RP-GC, art 89(3)(e), not the giving of evidence. 130 RP-ECJ, art 64(1); RP-GC, art 92(1). 131 See RP-ECJ, art 65; RP-GC, art 92; RP-CST, art 71.

906

Measures of enquiry 11.40

he says and it is to be inferred that there is no sanction if he conceals or falsifies any evidence because power to impose a sanction is not to be found expressly stated in the Rules of Procedure or elsewhere and, since it would affect the liberties of the individual, an express provision would be necessary to establish its existence. Moreover, the Statute provides132 only that the Court can take ‘formal note’ of a refusal to give the information requested by it. There is therefore no sanction other than that if the party refuses either to appear before the Court or to make a statement or answer questions. In ECJ and GC proceedings, an official record is made of the enquiry and signed by the President and the Registrar.133 11.40 In practice the decision to order a party to appear in person is taken by the Court at the administrative meeting and the formal order circulated to the parties is drawn up on the basis of the note of the decision made in the minutes of the meeting. Generally speaking, there appear to be two types of situation in which a party is ordered to attend in person: where the object is that the party may be asked to reply to questions or comment on the content of the testimony given by a witness; and where the object is to obtain information, particularly specialised or technical information.134 In the first situation the order usually says that a certain person is to be ‘heard as a witness’ in relation to some issue of fact and that the party is to be ‘heard as a party’ or simply ordered to attend the hearing of the witness.135 In the second situation the measure of enquiry takes the usual form, there being an order specifying the questions to be put to the party or parties or the issues of fact on which they are to give evidence. Occasionally the hearing is held in camera but the other parties are invited to attend.136 That situation is to be distinguished from instances where there is an informal meet132 Statute, art 24, 1st para. 133 RP-ECJ, art  74(1); RP-GC, art  102(1). Where a party is required to attend the hearing, a different rule applies: see RP-ECJ, art 84–85; RP-GC, art 114–115; RP-CST, art 65–66. 134 In Case F-126/05 Borbely v Commission [2007]  ECR SC-I-A-1-17, II-A-1-89, the personal appearance of the applicant at the hearing was ordered. However, as the applicant was ill, the order was revoked and the hearing went ahead because of the need to get on with the case: see paras 16–17. Accordingly, the utility of having the applicant present at the hearing was rather limited. 135 See, for example, Case 43/74 Guillot v Commission [1977]  ECR  1309; Case 29/78 Delfino v Commission, order of 23 January 1979 (unreported) (the case was later withdrawn and never came to judgment); Cases 59 and 129/80 Turner (née Krecké) v Commission [1981] ECR 1883 at 1892. 136 See, for example, Case 1/55 Kergall v Common Assembly [1954–56] ECR 151 at 153 (parties ordered to appear in person in camera in order to supply full information and any relevant documents concerning the questions of fact set out in the order); Case 37/64 Mannesmann AG v High Authority [1965] ECR 725 at 738 (parties ordered to attend in the Deliberation Room to provide certain technical information: see also Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke GmbH  v High Authority [1965]  ECR  677 at 688); Trevor v Court (above, note 129); Case 74/74  CNTA  v Commission [1976] ECR 797 at 799 (parties ordered to appear before the Second Chamber, the applicant being invited to answer the questions specified in the order and to produce documents in support of its answers; it was also said that the applicant’s representative should be accompanied by those members of the applicant’s staff best placed to explain the facts); Case 54/75 De Dapper v European Parliament [1976]  ECR  1381, order of 20  October 1976 (unreported) (the matter had been referred to the Second Chamber which ordered the parties and their representatives to attend at the Deliberation Room in order to give certain information and answer questions); Case 155/78 M v Commission [1980] ECR 1797 at 1801 (applicant ordered to appear in person at a hearing in camera); Case 142/78 Exner (née Berghmans) v Commission [1979] ECR 3125 at 3129 and 3136 (applicant ordered to appear at the hearing and give evidence).

907

11.41  Measures of enquiry

ing between the parties and their representatives and the Court137 to discuss the procedural aspects of the case, such as the need to order measures of enquiry, to see if the issues in the case can be clarified or agreed or with a view to reaching a settlement of the dispute.138 11.41 The weight to attach to the evidence given by a party in person depends, as in the case of any other witness, on a number of factors such as the extent to which it is supported by other evidence, such as documents or testimony, the appearance of the party when answering questions and the obvious factor that the party has an interest in putting across a story favourable to his own case.139 A party’s evidence may corroborate or confirm other evidence.140 In Case 18/57 Nold KG v High Authority141 Advocate General Roemer said that written declarations made by the partners in the applicant undertaking had no probative value because they were neither testimony nor documentary evidence, although he appears to have accepted that they had some corroborative value. The Court did not, however, take that line. It seems to have accepted the evidence of the written attestations.142 The parties’ evidence may also be of considerable value where technical matters are involved. In Case 228/83  F  v Commission143 Advocate General Mancini said that, when seeking to establish the facts concerning alleged punishable conduct, the most effective and clearest means of separating fact from fiction, the relevant from the irrelevant and the intentional from the unintentional, is direct confrontation between the parties. 11.42 Two rough rules can be said to lie at the heart of the Court’s treatment of evidence from a party: (1) the less important the subject matter is to the issues in the case, the more likely is the evidence to be trustworthy (so, for example, background information which helps to an understanding of the case is more likely to be worth relying on than evidence relating to a critical issue of fact); and (2) evidence which tends to go against the party’s own case is likely to be more reliable than evidence which tends to support it.

137 Ie usually the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general. 138 See, for example, Case 258/78  LC  Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission [1982]  ECR  2015; Cases 100–103/80 Pioneer v Commission [1983]  ECR  1825; RP-GC, art 89(3)(e); RP-CST, art 68(e) and 90(2). 139 See the treatment given by Advocate General Warner in Case 102/75 Petersen v Commission [1976] ECR 1777 at 1802. 140 See the Guillot case (above, note 135) at 1337. 141 [1959] ECR 41 at 61. 142 See Rec V at 111. In Cases 173/82, 157/83 and 186/84 Castille v Commission [1986] ECR 497 (see at 504, Advocate General Lenz), the position was slightly different because the ‘evidence’ on which a party based certain allegations made about a third party comprised letters that had been written by that party himself. The underlying principle, of course, is that a person can only give evidence of what he himself knows. 143 [1985] ECR 275 at 284.

908

Measures of enquiry 11.44

V

REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

11.43 Information and documents may be produced by the parties (or, as the case may be, by third parties) either by legal compulsion or voluntarily. The instances of legal compulsion can be divided into two: automatic production by operation of law; and production pursuant to a Court order. An intermediate form is production pursuant to a request from the Court. If the request is not complied with, the Court may make an order requiring production of the information or documents. Those forms of production will be considered in turn. By way of introductory remark, it should be noted that a document is of probative value if it constitutes independent evidence of the existence of a fact. Hence, a party cannot create documentary evidence of a fact by setting out his assertions in the form of a document and producing that document as evidence.144 It is in part for that reason that internal documents (that is, documents drawn up by a party for its own use) are commonly regarded as lacking in probative value:145 in substance, they are nothing more than assertions made by that party. However, such documents do have probative value where they are used to establish the knowledge or belief of the party concerned at the material time or, generally, where the internal procedures of the party concerned (usually an EU institution) are relevant to an issue in the case. Where the Court asks for information or a document, it does not follow that the Court is bound to determine the issue of fact or law to which the information or the document relates.146

A

Production by operation of law

11.44 A person’s rights of access to the administrative file or to the production of documents from the administrative body holding them are distinct from the procedural rights and mechanisms which are laid down in the Statute and the Rules of Procedure. Although a person may exercise the former rights whether or not he is a party to litigation before the Court, those rights do not apply, as such, in the context of an action before the Court, to which the provisions in the Statute and the Rules of Procedure regarding the production of evidence apply.147 There is no general provision in EU law for the automatic production and disclosure of documentary evidence in proceedings before the Court, with one historical exception: art 23 of the ECSC Statute, which provided that, when 144 Cases 173/82, 157/83 and 186/84 Castille v Commission (above, note 142) at 504 (Advocate General Lenz); Case C-330/88 Grifoni v Euratom [1991]  ECR  I-1045 at 1060 (Advocate General Tesauro). In Cases 193 and 194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989] ECR 1045 (at 1066) Advocate General Darmon went so far as to say that ‘no document purporting to support a party’s allegations which emanates from that party should be taken into account by the Court’. 145 Eg Case C-49/88 Al-Jubail Fertiliser Co v Council [1991]  ECR  I-3187 (Advocate General Darmon at para  82 of his Opinion). In contrast, in Case 318/81 Commission v CODEMI [1985] ECR 3693, para 47 certain internal documents were held to be of no probative value because they were contradicted by evidence from experts, which tends to suggest that they would otherwise have been regarded as having probative value. 146 Case C-271/13P Rousse Industry AD v Commission, 20 March 2014, para 24. 147 Eg Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe (above, note 30), paras 89–90.

909

11.45  Measures of enquiry

proceedings were begun (under the ECSC Treaty) against a decision of an institution, that institution ‘shall transmit to the Court all the documents relating to the case’.148 The institution therefore sent the documents to the Court and the Court decided upon their dissemination to the other parties after, if need be, screening out confidential material.149 If the institution failed to comply with its duty under article 23, the opposing party could apply to the Court for an order requiring production of the documents; but production would be ordered only if and to the extent that it was necessary in order to decide the case.150 Article 23 reflected a general principle regarding judicial control in public law matters but was not carried over into the EC and EAEC  Treaties and did not survive the expiry of the ECSC Treaty. The fact that a document is mentioned in a pleading does not generate an obligation to produce the document (or, for that matter, justify ordering its production): the relevance of the document to deciding the issues in the case must first be established and may then justify production by means of a measure of organisation of procedure or measure of enquiry.151

B

Voluntary production

11.45 Voluntary production of information and documents by a party is possible only in accordance with the rules of procedure and the practice of the Court. It is a general rule that to every pleading (by which is meant every formal procedural document addressed to the Court) is annexed a file containing the documents relied on in the body of the pleading.152 That rule does not require the disclosure of all documentary evidence in the possession of a party, only that on which he wishes to rely.153 However, relevant information and documents in the possession of a party should be disclosed in the first substantive pleading lodged 148 Article  26 of the Staff Regulations provides that, in staff cases, the official’s personal file is to be sent to the Court. That is not the same as art  23 of the ECSC  Statute because the official’s personal file does not necessarily contain any or all of the documentary evidence relating to the dispute before the Court. The obligation to disclose the personal file provides the Court with background information relating to the official concerned and with the exchanges between the official and the employing institution made during the compulsory pre-litigation procedure. On art 23, see: Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 37; Cases T-34/94, T-136.94 to T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/94 NMH Stahlwerke v Commission [1996] ECR II-537 and [1997] ECR II-2293; Cases T-45/98 and T-47/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless GmbH v Commission [2001] ECR II-3757. 149 See Italy v High Authority (above, note 148), pp 54–55. 150 In Case 3/54 ASSIDER v High Authority and Case 4/54 ISA v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 63 and 91 respectively, the High Authority did not, it seems, comply with art 23 and, at the hearing, the applicant asked for the production of all documents relating to the case (at 65 and 94). The Court rejected that application, holding that there was already sufficient evidence available to the Court (at 71 and 100). 151 Cf Case T-192/99 Dunnett v European Investment Bank [2001] ECR II-813, para 39. 152 RP-ECJ, art 57(4); RP-GC, art 72(3); RP-CST, art 45(1), 2nd subpara. 153 In Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, the applicant set out in his pleading the gist of an exchange of telexes but did not annex copies of the telexes themselves to the pleading. The Court requested him to produce the telexes and he did so. It does not seem to be necessary to annex copies of documents which are referred to in the documents relied on although it is, within limits, good practice to do so, if the document is important. In any event, the Court may, if it thinks appropriate, ask for such a document to be produced.

910

Measures of enquiry 11.47

by that party (application, defence, statement in intervention and so forth). After that point, the freedom to introduce information and documents is gradually curtailed, in the same way as the ability to make an application for a measure of enquiry.154 It is bad practice to produce a document for the first time at the hearing, without giving the other parties adequate notice of it.155 Occasionally they may wish to consent to production only if they are allowed the opportunity to submit further written or oral observations on the document. In consequence, the party producing the document may be penalised for its late production in the order for costs.156 On the other hand, even if the other parties raise no formal objection to the production of a document after the close of the written procedure, the admissibility of the document is still a matter for the Court to decide and there have been cases where the Court has refused to allow the production of relevant documents.157

C

Production by Court order or request

1 Production under the Statute 11.46 The Court has power under the Statute158 to ‘require’ the production and supply of ‘all documents and…all information which [it] considers desirable’. Only the parties to the proceedings before the Court may be so required; but the Court can also ‘require’ the member states and EU institutions and other EU bodies who are not parties to the case ‘to supply all information which [it] considers necessary for the proceedings’. By implication, the Court’s power is wider in relation to parties than it is in relation to third parties. 11.47 The use of the term ‘desirable’ in relation to a request addressed to a party implies that the Court must consider production of the information and documents in question to be conducive to the discharge of its function to decide the case before it. The use of the term ‘necessary’ in relation to a request addressed to a third party member state or EU institution or body implies that production of the information in question is not only conducive to deciding the case but also that there is no useful alternative, in the sense that, in order to decide the case, addressing the issue of fact to which the information in question relates is unavoidable and, further, there are no other sources capable of providing that

154 See paras 11.14–11.16 above. For an example of late production of documents, see the San Pedro case (above, note 39), paras 28 and 143–144 (production after the hearing). 155 On the production of documents at the hearing, see Ch 2, paras 2.136–2.139. 156 Eg Case 56/77 Agence Européenne d’Intérims SA  v Commission [1978]  ECR  2215 at 2230 and 2238. 157 Eg Case C-156/87 Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission [1990] ECR I-781, where the Court refused to admit certain documents at the hearing, despite the fact that the opposing parties raised no formal objection, because no reason was given to explain why they had not been produced earlier (the relevance of the documents in question had become apparent only at the end of the written procedure but there had been sufficient time between then and the date of the hearing for the documents to have been produced). 158 Statute, art 24.

911

11.48  Measures of enquiry

information. In Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority159 the Court used the word ‘necessary’, in another context, to mean essential for the resolution of the dispute. Sometimes it is possible to say at the outset that a particular category of document or information is not ‘necessary’, in that sense, to deciding the case. But, in the present context, necessity has to be judged before the Court comes to deliberate on its judgment in the case, at which point, it is less clear what is or is not ‘necessary’ in order to produce a judgment. Further, particularly in the case of a document or class of documents, it may happen that what initially appears to be a necessary document is found, on examination, to be irrelevant or unnecessary to resolve the dispute. It is not for the third party member state or EU institution (or body) to decide for itself whether the Court’s request is a proper one. Therefore a request for production should be complied with even if the member state or EU institution (or body) believes that it is not necessary for deciding the case. 11.48 Under the Rules of Procedure, a request for information and the production of documents is listed among the measures of enquiry that the Court may adopt ‘without prejudice’ to the provisions of the Statute160 and is also listed among the measures of organisation of procedure that may be prescribed (where the phrase ‘without prejudice’ to the Statute does not appear).161 It is not clear what is the significance of the appearance of the phrase ‘without prejudice’ (to the Statute) in relation to measures of enquiry but not in relation to measures of organisation of procedure. It is possible that measures of organisation of procedure that take the form of a request for information or documents are not conceived as having the compulsory nature of such requests when ‘required’ under the Statute. So far as measures of enquiry are concerned, the phrase ‘without prejudice’ (to the Statute) appears to reflect the fact that the Rules of Procedure give, or purport to give, the Court a wide discretionary power that is not fettered by express provision; whereas the power under the Statute is restricted by the criteria of ‘desirability’ (in the case of a request addressed to a party) and ‘necessity’ (in the case of a request addressed to a third party). It is doubtful if those nuances have any practical implications. No formal requirements attach to the exercise of the power under the Statute.162

159 [1954–56]  ECR  37. See also Cases T-6 and T-52/92 Reinarz v Commission [1993]  ECR II1047, para 116. 160 RP-ECJ, art 64(2)(b); RP-GC, art 91(b); RP-CST, art 70(b), (c) and (g). 161 RP-ECJ, art 62(1); RP-GC, art 89(3)(c) and (d); RP-CST, art 68(c) and (d). 162 A request may be sent by letter through the Registrar. For example, in Case 208/80 Lord Bruce of Donnington v Aspden [1981] ECR 2205 a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Registrar’s letter conveyed the request of the Court that the Parliament answer certain questions and produce relevant documents by a certain date, enclosing a copy of the questions set out in the order for reference. The Court invited the Parliament to send an authorised representative to attend the hearing with a view to helping the Court with any additional information. A letter was also sent to the Council asking it ‘to be good enough to supply the Court’ with certain documents referred to by the parties (sc extracts from the Council minutes and a letter from the President of the Council to the President of the Parliament annexed to the minutes) (see at 2209).

912

Measures of enquiry 11.50

11.49 A  person required to produce information or documents under the Statute may decline to do so on the ground that production would be contrary to a provision or principle of EU law (usually the principle of the protection of confidentiality). The Court may then order production subject to conditions or qualifications, set out in the order, that are sufficient to prevent the provision or principle in question from being breached.163 The mere fact that a particular document is described as being confidential does not, of itself, render it privileged from disclosure;164 there must be some evidence to support the assertion.165 Where an obligation not to disclose information arises neither expressly nor by necessary implication from a provision of the Treaties but from a provision of secondary legislation, the question may arise whether or not the latter is valid. If it is not, it cannot, in any event, override the duty to respond to a request made under the Statute. A right to withhold information may also be derived from the general principles of EU law.166 In that respect a person cannot rely on the confidentiality of the relationship between a lawyer and his client, save in respect of communications passing between him and an independent lawyer,167 but it is not excluded that a person may rely on some other privilege based on the public interest.168 It is unclear to what extent the Statute would override any such privilege: the better view is that any conflict between it and a right to withhold information is to be resolved by balancing the public interests in favour of and militating against disclosure.169 11.50 A particular problem arises in connection with the use of the Statute as against a third party: third parties cannot, on the face of it, apply to the Court under RP-ECJ, art 151 or, as the case may be, RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83 for the purpose of raising the question of the exclusion from the Court’s file of information or documents that they have been asked to produce, on the

163 Cases 36, 37, 38 and 40/59 Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v High Authority [1960]  ECR  423 at 437 (a request made by the Court under the parallel provision of the ECSC  Statute). The Court had made a request for information. The High Authority wrote to the Court to say that it had reservations about answering one of the questions put by the Court because that might lead to a breach of art  47 of the ECSC  Treaty (the equivalent of TFEU, art 339). The Court therefore made an order allowing the High Authority to supply the information sought but omitting the business names and addresses of the persons in question. 164 Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank [1976] ECR 1613 at 1635 (Advocate General Warner). 165 Case 155/79 AM & S v Commission [1982] ECR 1575). 166 See the AM & S case (above, note 165). 167 Ibid. 168 In Case 18/70 X v Council [1972] ECR 1205, some documents ordered to be produced by the Court were withheld by the defendant’s medical officer on the ground that they were covered by the principle of medical secrecy (see at 1211, Advocate General Roemer). The Court did not seek to force their disclosure but instead appointed an expert to examine the question of fact to which they related. More detailed consideration was given to the question in Case 155/78 M v Commission [1980] ECR 1797 (see especially the Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti). 169 See Mills v European Investment Bank (above, note 164) (Advocate General Warner). It would appear from Case 28/65 Fonzi v Euratom Commission [1966]  ECR  477 at 506–507 that, if disclosure is ‘essential for the efficient administration of justice’, the Court may require the production of relevant but confidential evidence.

913

11.51  Measures of enquiry

ground of secrecy or confidentiality.170 It appears that, in the absence of some other solution, they would have to decline to respond to the request, citing the secrecy or confidentiality of the material, thereby throwing the matter back into the hands of the Court, which would then have to find a solution to the problem. Producing the material to the Court before it had made an appropriate order safeguarding the confidentiality of the material would be hazardous because it is unclear to what extent the Court could or would refrain from disclosing the material to the parties.171 2 Production by measure of organisation of procedure 11.51 The production of information and documents by a measure of organisation of procedure has an ambiguous function. In ECJ proceedings, there is a general power, exercisable by the judge-rapporteur and, separately, by the advocate general, to request the parties or, in references for a preliminary ruling, the ‘interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute’172 to provide information, documents and particulars. The only limit to the scope of such requests is that what is requested must be considered by the person making the request to be ‘relevant’.173 The request can therefore cover background material as well as material relevant to the making of a finding of fact. It would appear from their relative informality that the primary function of such requests is the former but that is not clear. In GC proceedings, measures of organisation of procedure have the function of ensuring that cases are properly prepared for hearing, procedures carried out and disputes resolved under the best possible conditions.174 However, they also have the purpose of facilitating the taking of evidence.175 In that con170 Those provisions apply to applications made by a ‘party’; but, in the hypothesis under consideration, the applicant would not, ex hypothesi, be a ‘party’ within the meaning of the second para of art 24 of the Statute. It is arguable that, once the Court has made a request under the Statute, the addressee of the request is a ‘party’ to the case thenceforth as far as procedural matters connected with the request are concerned. That would then enable it to take advantage of RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130 and RP-CST, art 83. A less formalistic approach is to say that reliance on those provisions is unnecessary because any difficulties concerning the request can be sorted out on an informal basis between the Court and the member state or EU institution or body concerned. The difficulty with that is that it leaves the parties, stricto sensu, with no role to play in regard to a matter which may turn out to be very important for the case. 171 As appears from the process for disclosing documents in GC proceedings (see below), the GC considers that, in the absence of express provision in the rules of procedure, material produced to it and included in the case file must be disclosed to the parties. Accordingly, the practice that it follows is to adopt a measure of organisation of procedure, which enables the party required to produce the material to withhold it and claim confidential treatment, which can be provided (in the view of the GC) only in the context of a formal measure of enquiry. 172 Statute, art 23, does not refer to ‘interested persons’. The allusion appears to be to the persons identified in art  23 as being entitled to submit written observations in a reference for a preliminary ruling. 173 RP-ECJ, art 62(1). 174 RP-GC, art 89(1). 175 RP-GC, art 89(2)(a). In Case T-9/92 Automobiles Peugeot v Commission [1993] ECR II-493, para 12, for the sake of good order, the GC asked the parties for their agreement that certain documents produced in earlier proceedings between the same parties could be used in the current proceedings. That was more concerned with the efficient conduct of the procedure.

914

Measures of enquiry 11.52

text, and to those ends, a measure of organisation of procedure may take the form of asking the parties or third parties for information that the GC considers to be ‘necessary’ for the proceedings and asking the parties to provide ‘material’ (which covers documents) relating to the case.176 Such measures of organisation of procedure may be taken by the GC at any stage of the proceedings either of its own motion or on application by a main party (not, therefore, an intervener).177 An application for such measures must state precisely the purpose of the measure sought and the reasons for it (which include, primarily, the utility of the proposed measure and its proportionality); and, when made after the first exchange of pleadings, reasons must be given for the failure to make the request earlier.178 In CST proceedings, measures of organisation of procedure serve essentially the same purposes as in GC proceedings; but, in contrast to GC proceedings, share those purposes with measures of enquiry.179 The main difference between measures of organisation of procedure in GC and CST proceedings is that, in CST proceedings, such measures may be directed only at the parties. The CST may ask the parties for information or particulars or for the production of documents and other items of evidence.180 As in the case of the GC, the CST may act of its own motion or on application by a party (interveners are not, apparently, precluded from applying) at any stage of the proceedings.181 11.52 In principle, the measures of organisation here in question involve the production of information or documents to the Court and their consequent inclusion in the case file and dissemination to the parties. However, it appears that such a measure of organisation of procedure may cover disclosure to the parties, or one of them,182 in which case, it seems to be open to the Court to decide

176 RP-GC, art 89(3)(c), which is to be read with the second para of art 24 of the Statute (which, itself, applies only to member states and EU institutions or other bodies who are not parties to the case); and RP-GC, art 89(3)(d). For an example of a request addressed to a third party, see Case T-19/06 Mindo Srl v Commission [2011] ECR II-6795, para 46. In T-141/01 Entorn (above, note 31), para 132, a request had been made for production of the record of a criminal investigation before national judicial authorities (third parties to the proceedings before the GC). That was treated as a request for a measure of organisation of procedure. At that time, the GC rules of procedure (RP-GC, art 64(3)) provided that measures of organisation of procedure included asking third parties for information or particulars and, more generally, asking for the production of documents or papers relating to the case. Under RP-GC, art 89(3)(c), in its current form, third parties may only be requested to provide information. Hence, a request such as that in Entorn would have to be couched as a request for information contained in the record of the criminal investigation in question. 177 RP-GC, art 88(1). 178 RP-GC, art  88(2). The other parties (including interveners) have the right to comment on the application: RP-GC, art  88(3). On the need for precision and utility, see Case C-185/95P  Baustahlgewebe (above, note 30), paras 93–94; Cases C-471/09P to C-473/09P Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya v Commission [2011] ECR I-111*, paras 85–93; Cases Cases C-474/09P to C-476/09P Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya (above, note 38), paras 84–96; Case T-49/09 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission, 19 April 2012, para 83. 179 Compare RP-CST, art 67 with RP-GC, art 89(1)–(2) and see note 15 above. 180 RP-CST, art 68(c)–(d). 181 RP-CST, art 69(1) and (3). 182 Case T-145/89 Baustahlgewebe (above, note 15), paras 32–33.

915

11.53  Measures of enquiry

whether disclosure is to be made solely on an inter partes basis or should involve placing the material in the Court’s case file. 11.53 It is legitimate for a person to whom a measure of organisation of procedure is addressed to refuse to produce the information or documents in question on the ground of confidentiality (where, naturally, the claim to confidentiality is justified).183 In that event, the Court may order production by measure of enquiry. The information or documents in question are then produced to the Court for it to verify the claim to confidential treatment and, pending its decision thereon, the material is not communicated to the other parties.184 The same concerns may cause a party in possession of relevant information and documents, who considers itself constrained from producing the material, to apply for a measure of organisation of procedure in order to manage the disclosure of the material consistently with its legal obligations. 3 Production by measure of enquiry 11.54 In ECJ proceedings, there are no detailed rules concerning the making of a request for the production of information or documents by way of a measure of enquiry. In principle, such a measure of enquiry requires the making of a formal order setting out the facts to be proved.185 By and large, the ECJ adopts an informal approach, the request being made in a letter sent through the Registrar. The Court usually requests an answer before the hearing so that all the parties have the opportunity to consider the information or documents well beforehand. A formal order would request the production of information or documents relating to a question of fact specified in the order by a specified date. Usually any information sought is presented in written form but the Court may ask for it to be given orally by the representative of the party at the hearing or by some other person.186 Like the informal approach under the Statutes, however, no sanction is laid down if the order is ignored. In the case of orders summoning a witness, there is specific provision for the enforcement in the member states of a measure adopted by the ECJ in the event that the witness fails to appear.187 No such provision exists in the case of an order requiring the supply of information or the production of documents so it is to be inferred that the order is unenforceable as such.188

183 In the ordinary course, the problem is disclosure of the information or documents to the other main party because confidential treatment can be claimed at the outset with regard to disclosure to an intervener. 184 See further paras 11.54–11.58 and Ch 12. 185 RP-ECJ, art 64(1). 186 Eg in Cases 59 and 129/80 Turner (née Krecké) v Commission [1981] ECR 1883 the ECJ heard evidence from a doctor, just before the hearing, for the purpose of information only (see at 1903). The doctor did not take the oath. 187 RP-ECJ, art 69(2). 188 The Treaties refer only to the enforcement of ‘judgments’ of the Court: see TFEU, art 280. On the consequences of non-compliance with a measure of enquiry, see paras 11.21–11.22 above. On enforcement of a judgment, see Ch 16, Section IX, para 16.167 ff.

916

Measures of enquiry 11.55

11.55 In GC proceedings, only a party may be requested by measure of enquiry to produce information or ‘material’ (usually documents) relating to the case.189 As noted above, there is separate provision for the production of documents to which access has been denied by an institution in proceedings relating to the legality of that denial.190 The former measure of enquiry may be ordered in only two circumstances: (i) where the party in question has not complied with a measure of organisation of procedure directed at obtaining the information or documents in question; or (ii) where the party in question expressly requests that an order be made against it.191 In the first scenario, it follows that the ordering of a measure of organisation of procedure is a condition precedent to a measure of enquiry regarding the production of information or documents and that an opposing party who wishes to obtain the production of information or documents from a party must first apply for that to be done by measure of enquiry (there seems to be no objection to an application being made for a measure of organisation of procedure and, in the alternative, for a measure of enquiry). The second scenario also looks like one in which the ordering of a measure of enquiry is a condition precedent because it looks like a situation in which the party against whom a measure of organisation of procedure has been directed has responded with a request that it should be ordered to produce the information or documents in question. However, it would appear that situation (ii) is also intended to encompass the situation in which, in response to an application for a measure of organisation of procedure (or even in the absence of one), the opposing party proposes that an order be made against it or else volunteers the assertion that it cannot or will not respond positively to a measure of enquiry but will respond to an order. Where, however, the party in question says that it will not comply with a measure of organisation of procedure directed against it but does not request (expressly or at all) that an order be made against it, the GC is forced to proceed first by measure of organisation of procedure (which, on the face of it, would be completely pointless). What appears to have happened is that the GC rules of procedure (in their current form) represent an attempt to codify a practice that has grown up when the GC has been dealing with particular situations in which a party asked to produce information or documents has declined to do so for reasons of secrecy or confidentiality. There is nothing new in that problem;192 and it can easily be accommodated within an appropriately drafted order for a measure of enquiry (or, for that matter, an appropriately drafted measure of organisation of procedure).193

189 RP-GC, art 91(b). 190 RP-GC, art 91(c). Such documents are produced to the GC and not to the other parties: RP-GC, art 104. See para 11.44 above. 191 RP-GC, art 92(3), which expresses the practice of the GC that had previously developed. 192 See, for example, Geitling (above, note 163). 193 Eg Case C-204/97 Portugal v Commission [2001] ECR I-3175, order of 21 September 1999 (unreported) (on application, the Court ordered production of certain documents, without which it could not review the legality of the challenged measure, but required the Commission to indicate the documents or parts of documents for which it wished to claim confidential treatment (and why) so that the Court could decide whether or not the documents could be disclosed to the opposing party and the intervener).

917

11.56  Measures of enquiry

11.56 The two-stage process for the production of information or documents (measure of organisation of procedure and then measure of enquiry) seems to have developed so as to enable the party in possession of the information or documents in question to object to production (generally on account of the secret or confidential nature of the material). The thinking194 appears to have been that the consequence of transmitting information or documents to the GC in accordance with a measure of organisation of procedure is that the material will be served on the other parties. If it is not produced to the GC (because the party possessing the information or documents objects to disclosure to the other parties), the GC must then decide whether or not an order for its production should be made; but material produced pursuant to a measure of enquiry will not automatically be communicated to the other parties.195 If, on the other hand, the party in question informs the GC, with reasons, that it will not be able to disclose documents or information in response to a measure of organisation of procedure, it makes sense to proceed immediately to a measure of enquiry. What is not obvious is why that step is dependent upon the party in question requesting that an order be made against it. It should be observed that a party in possession of information or documents may feel constrained in disclosing them either by operation of law (such as the obligation of professional secrecy) or because it obtained the information or documents from another person, to whom it gave a promise not to disclose the information or documents to others. In neither case would it appear to be appropriate for the party in possession of the information or documents to request the GC to make an order unless that party is itself proposing a method of production that would avoid breaching the obligation imposed on, or accepted by, it:196 in the first situation, it is for the Court, not a party, to determine what balance to strike between the legal provision or principle precluding production and the administration of justice; in the second situation, a party who had promised to keep something confidential would be acting inconsistently with that promise if he took active steps to achieve its extinction. On the other hand, a party in that position could not be criticised for putting forward a method of ensuring disclosure that would not involve any breach of its obligations. 11.57 At all events, recourse by the GC to a measure of enquiry depends upon an objection to the production of information or documents being raised either in response to a measure of organisation of procedure or in anticipation of the making of such a measure; but in the latter event, the GC may proceed directly to a measure of enquiry only where the party raising the objection has expressly requested a measure of enquiry. The decision to order a measure of enquiry may, incidentally, involve a consideration of the objection to produc-

194 See the GC’s commentary on the draft 2015 rules of procedure under art 92. 195 See RP-GC, art 103, which deals with the treatment of information or material that is claimed to be confidential. It applies to material produced in the context of a measure of enquiry but not in the context of a measure of organisation of procedure. 196 Hence, it may be the party in possession of the information or documents who takes the initiative by applying for a measure of organisation of procedure consisting of the adoption of a method of disclosing the material that will avoid a failure to observe whatever impediment to full disclosure is at issue.

918

Measures of enquiry 11.57

tion and its dismissal at that stage. Otherwise, there are two possibilities open to the GC. The first, appropriate in some cases, is to include in the order provision that the other parties may inspect the information or documents only at the Registry and may not make copies.197 The second possibility is that, when the information or documents are produced to the GC and the party producing them is still maintaining his objection, the GC considers the merits of the claim to non-disclosure and, in the meantime, retains the information or documents in question and does not communicate them to any other party. In order to carry out that exercise, the party maintaining the objection must identify the particular parts of the information or documents that pose the problem and provide the GC with the reasons why those parts should not be disclosed to the other parties. For its part, the GC must first consider whether the material that is the subject of the objection to disclosure is relevant in order for it to rule on the case. If so, the next question that is to be considered is whether or not the material is confidential vis-à-vis the other main party (if it is confidential as against an intervener, there is no objection to non-disclosure to the intervener). If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, the GC must then weigh the confidentiality of the material against the requirements linked to the right to effective judicial protection and observance of the adversarial principle (the principle that the GC should in principle take into consideration only material which has been made available to the parties and on which they have had an opportunity to comment).198 The outcome of that balancing exercise may be one or other of the following solutions: (a) full disclosure of the material to the other main party; (b) full disclosure subject to the other main party (or his representatives) giving specific undertakings as to the use made of the material; or (c) non-disclosure.199 So far as (a) is concerned, the rules do not provide that the objecting party may withdraw the information or documents in question.200 The reason for that is that the information or documents have not been relied on voluntarily by the party producing them but have been produced pursuant to an order. So far as (b) is concerned, disclosure may be limited to an identified group of individuals (a confidentiality ring) on terms that it will be not be disclosed to anyone else. In a number of instances, it appears that the representatives of the parties have been required to sign a confidentiality agreement by which they have undertaken not to communicate the secret or confidential material to

197 RP-GC, art 92(3), last sentence. That provision was apparently included, in particular, in order to preserve the effectiveness of the Commission’s leniency programme in competition cases and is exemplified by the following cases: Case T-550/08 Tudapetrol Mineralolerzeugnisse Nils Hansen v Commission, orders of 27  March 2012; Case T-551/08  H&R  ChemPharm v Commission, order of 12 June 2012; Case T-46/10 Faci v Commission, order of 6 September 2012; Case T-68/09 Soliver v Commission, order of 11 September 2012; Case T-544/08 Hansen & Rosenthal v Commission, order of 12 October 2012; Case T-562/08 Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades v Commission, order of 5 November 2012. 198 RP-GC, art 103(1)–(2). As to the adversarial principle, see RP-GC, art 64. 199 RP-GC, art 103(3). 200 RP-GC, art 105(7) does so provide. However, RP-GC, art 105 does not apply in the present context: see RP-GC, art 103(4).

919

11.58  Measures of enquiry

their clients.201 It is important that such arrangements should take the form of legally binding agreements that are capable of being enforced, if necessary, by legal proceedings before national courts because the Court has no means itself of securing respect for confidentiality. So far as (c) is concerned, the text of the relevant rule of procedure is as follows: ‘it may decide not to communicate such information or material, specifying, by reasoned order, the procedures enabling the other main party, to the greatest extent possible, to make his views known, including the production of a non-confidential version or a non-confidential summary of the information or material, containing the essential content thereof.’202 It seems that the intention is that non-disclosure may be permitted on the basis that appropriate steps are taken (pursuant to the GC’s order) to secure the maximum disclosure to the opposing party such as by provision of a non-confidential summary of the confidential material. It is not clear what the position is if disclosure on such a basis is impossible or would not provide the opposing party with a useful insight into the evidential significance of the material: although ‘the essential content’ of the secret or confidential material is supposed to be made available (in a non-confidential form), it cannot be guaranteed that that will be possible in all cases. There are good reasons for saying that, where that proves to be the case, the confidential and undisclosed material should be ignored where it assists the party objecting to its disclosure and may be taken into account only where it is adverse to that party.203 11.58 In CST proceedings, third parties may be required to produce information, documents or items of evidence by means of a measure of enquiry.204 The request, which is notified to the parties, need simply identify the material whose production is sought; it is not necessary for the measure of enquiry to take the form of an order or to state the facts to be proved by means of the measure of enquiry.205 In the case of the parties to the proceedings, a measure of inquiry may require them to produce documents or items of evidence but, as in the case of GC proceedings, may be made only where the party in question has refused to comply with a measure of organisation of procedure directed at the production of the information or documents in question and, in that event, takes the form of an order.206 The comments made above about the two-stage sequence used in GC proceedings in the case of production of information and documents by a party apply mutatis mutandis to CST proceedings.

201 That appears to have happened in Case T-464/04 Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala) v Commission [2006] ECR II-2289, paras 18–19 (by agreement between the parties); Case T-282/06 Sun Chemical Group v Commission [2007]  ECR II-2149, paras 34–37; Case T-279/04 Editions Odile Jacob v Commission [2010] ECR II-185*; Case T-452/04 Editions Odile Jacob v Commission [2010] ECR II-4713. 202 RP-GC, art 103(3). 203 RP-GC, art 103 is not listed in RP-GC, art 64 as an exception to the adversarial principle. 204 RP-CST, art 70(b) and (c). 205 Compare the first and second indents of RP-CST, art 71(4). 206 RP-CST, art 70(g) and 71(4), 3rd indent. The provision that the request takes the form of an order seems to have been a response to Case T-560/08P  Meierhofer (above, note 15), paras 65–71.

920

Measures of enquiry 11.60

4 Scope of disclosure 11.59 As noted above, it is for the Court itself to determine whether or not to exercise its powers; it is not bound to act in accordance with a request made by one of the parties and it can act in the absence of such a request. Nevertheless, the burden lies on the parties in the first instance to make clear what are the questions of fact and to indicate so far as possible how best they may be resolved. The parties themselves have no power to request or require the production of documents or information by another party or a third party. They may, however, set out in their pleadings the documents or categories of documents which they feel the Court should order to be produced. Alternatively, an application can be made for the production of documents.207 A request can also be made informally, by letter.208 11.60 An order for the production of documents may be very extensive in scope: in Cases T-160 and T-161/89 Kalavros v Court of Justice,209 the defendant was ordered to produce all documents relating to the contested act, a form of order equivalent to the automatic disclosure of relevant documents provided for in art  23 of the ECSC  Statute. An application for the production of documents, which seeks the disclosure of the internal files or documents of a party which is an EU institution, is regarded as requesting an exceptional measure of enquiry. Normally, such applications are made in the context of proceedings for the annulment of a measure adopted by the institution in question. In

207 See, for example, Case 33/59 Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v High Authority [1962] ECR 381 at 386 and Cases 46 and 47/59 Meroni & Co v High Authority [1962] ECR 411 at 417 (the applicants applied for further measures of enquiry, sc permission to submit further documents and that the defendant be ordered to answer certain questions and produce documents; the application was granted in part, the defendant being ordered to produce a report, a decision on the request for questions to be asked being reserved and the applicant being allowed to submit the documents specified in the order); Cases 9 and 58/65 Acciaierie San Michele SpA  v High Authority [1967]  ECR  1 at 3 (the applicant applied, inter alia, for an order that the High Authority produce the original of an annex to a letter; it produced the original to the Registrar, who compared it with the photocopy received by the applicant, and the Court took formal note of this); Cases 24 and 34/58 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie de l’Est v High Authority [1960] ECR 281, order of 3 March 1959 (unreported) (the applicant requested that the High Authority should produce a number of documents, some mentioned generally, eg correspondence relating to the matter exchanged between the High Authority and the German government, minutes of meetings of the High Authority relating to the dispute, some specifically, eg several documents referred to in a letter; the Court dealt with the request in the general context of the measures of enquiry necessary in the case); Case 18/63 Wollast (née Schmitz) v Commission [1964] ECR 85, order of 13 November 1963 (unreported); Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 533 at 545 and Case 68/63 Luhleich v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 581 at 591 (orders of 28 October 1963 (unreported): as in the Schmitz case, application was made for the production of certain documents but the Court merely reserved its decision); Case 212/86 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission (reported as Case T-13/89 [1991] ECR II-1021), order of 11 December 1986 (see per Judge Vesterdorf [1991] ECR II-867 at 889–891). 208 Case 76/69 Rabe v Commission [1971] ECR 297, order of 6 May 1970 (unreported). 209 [1990] ECR II-87, paras 14–15.

921

11.60  Measures of enquiry

such cases, the measure of enquiry sought will not be ordered (because internal documents are not normally sources of evidence of relevant facts) unless the circumstances surrounding the making of the contested act give rise to serious doubts about the real reasons of the institution concerned and to suspicions that there has been a misuse of powers. It is therefore necessary for those doubts and suspicions to be raised by the applicant as part of the case for the annulment of the contested act and it is also necessary for there to be some objective foundation for them. Mere assertion is not good enough.210 Disclosure of the contents of an administrative case file is a different matter. Where such a file is relevant, it is because it contains evidential material relating to the making of the contested measure; and the contents of the file may have to be examined if it is alleged that non-disclosure of the case file infringed the applicant’s procedural rights in the process leading up to the making of the contested measure.211 Where internal documents are relevant, the party in possession of them may be ordered to produce the original or, depending upon the nature of the document, a certified copy.212 Production of a translation of a document will not be ordered unless the proceedings concern a semantic or linguistic issue to which the translation may be relevant.213 Production of an authenticated act may be ordered where there is an issue as to whether or not the act was authenticated; but there is no need for the act to be challenged for some other

210 Cases 142 and 156/84 British American Tobacco Co Ltd and R  J  Reynolds Industries Inc v Commission [1986] ECR 1899, paras 11–12; Case C-201/86 Spie-Batignolles v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-197, order of 16  December 1987, para  20; Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission (above, note 207); Krupp Thyssen Stainless (above, note 148), paras 34–40; Euroalliages (above, note 71), para 94; the HFB case (above, note 29), para 40 (application for disclosure of an internal accountant’s report). In Case T-145/06 Omya AG v Commission [2009]  ECR II-145, para  126, the judgment is worded in such a way as to suggest that the Court asked for the production of certain internal documents but did not disclose them to the applicant. If that is what happened, it is incorrect. 211 Eg Cases C-204/00P, C-205/00P, C-211/00P, C-213/00P, C-217/00P and C-219/00P Aalborg Portland A/S v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, paras 100–106. 212 Eg Case 69/83 Lux v Court of Auditors [1984] ECR 2447 at 2450 (order for the production of the minutes of a meeting of the defendant, or, at the very least, a certified copy of the passages in the minutes relating to the contested act). 213 In Case C-12/03P  Commission v Tetra Laval BV  [2005]  ECR  I-987, order of 24  July 2003 (unreported), the respondent applied for a measure of enquiry consisting of the production by the Commission of the French translation of the application initiating the appeal (which the Commission had provided to the ECJ, but not to the respondent, pursuant to what is now RP-ECJ, art  57(3)). The language of the case was English. The application for the measure of enquiry was based on the argument that the Commission’s case was based on semantic arguments that the respondent would understand better if it was able to see how the Commission had expressed its case in French. The application was rejected on the ground that the language of the case both at first instance and on appeal was English. Therefore, only the English version of the application initiating the appeal was authentic (pursuant to what is now RP-ECJ, art 41). That meant that the Commission’s arguments could be understood correctly only from the perspective of how they were expressed in English. It does not follow that, in an appropriate case, a request for production of a translation cannot be made (however, the translation must already be in existence; a request to have something translated is a completely different matter).

922

Measures of enquiry 11.61

reason. In proceedings concerning the legality of an administrative decision, a previous such decision will not ordinarily be ordered to be produced because a past decisional practice does not usually form part of the legal context of the disputed measure.215 214

11.61 In Case C-201/86 Spie-Batignolles v Commission216 it was held that the Court will not order the production by a party of documents drawn up by third parties, at least where the actions of the third party are outside the party’s control. In fact, it is occasionally the case, particularly in competition cases where an undertaking seeks the annulment of a Commission decision finding the existence of an infringement of the competition rules, that a party may be in the possession of relevant evidence taking the form of documents drawn up by a third party, and the Court may well require such evidence to be produced.217 In consequence, the ruling in the Spie-Batignolles case should be understood as referring to documents drawn up by a third party which are not in the possession of the party concerned (and which that party could not obtain from the third party as of right) or which have come into the possession of the party in circumstances which indicate that that party is either not free to disclose them as it wishes or is free to disclose them only for certain limited purposes (which do not include disclosure in proceedings before the Court or, generally, public disclosure). By way of illustration, the Spie-Batignolles case was an action for damages based on the alleged wrongful conduct of the Commission regarding the preparation and implementation of two contracts concluded between the applicant and a third country (Rwanda). The Commission could not be required to disclose official correspondence in its possession emanating from the Rwandan authorities without overriding the legitimate interest of those authorities in maintaining the confidentiality of their communications with the Commission. On the other hand, where in the course of an investigation under the EU competition rules the Commission comes into possession of documents drawn up by third parties which are relevant to the investigation, such documents are liable to be used by the Commission for the purposes of the investigation and cannot, in consequence, be excluded from any subsequent obligation to disclose relevant evidence that attaches in the course of proceedings before the Court (subject, of course, to the question of the protection of business secrets).

214 Case C-286/95P  Commission v Imperial Chemical Industries plc [2000]  ECR  I-2341, paras 45–49; Cases C-287/95P and C-288/95P  Commission v Solvay SA  [2000]  ECR  I-2391, paras 49–53. On ascertaining whether or not an act has been authenticated or properly adopted, see: Case C-182/99P  Salzgitter AG  v Commission [2003]  ECR  I-1071, paras 38– 56; Case C-196/99P  Siderurgica Aristrain Madrid SL  v Commission [2003]  ECR  I-11005, paras 67–69; Case C-198/99P  Empresa Nacional Siderurgica SA (Ensidesa) v Commission [2003]  ECR  I-11111, paras 16–29; Case C-199/99P  Corus UK  Ltd v Commission [2003] ECR I-11177, paras 67–70. 215 Cases T-144/07, T-147/07 to T-150/07 and T-154/07 ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs v Commission [2011] ECR II-5129, paras 153 and 211. 216 Above (note 210), paras 16–17. 217 Eg Cases T-68, T-77 and T-78/89 Società Italiano Vetro SA v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, para 41.

923

11.62  Measures of enquiry

5 Disclosure by error 11.62 Where a document is disclosed erroneously in the course of complying with a measure of enquiry, an application may be made for the document to be removed from the case file.218 6 Consequences of non-disclosure 11.63 If a person refuses to comply with a request of the Court, the most it can do is to take ‘formal note’ of the refusal.219 It may also, however, draw inferences from the refusal. There is no obligation on it to do so nor any rules as to what inferences it may draw but, in the nature of things, its decision on the facts may be coloured by a refusal of a person to produce the information or documents requested. 11.64 There are very few cases in which a party or a member state or EU institution not a party to the proceedings has declined to comply with a request of the Court. In Case T-35/89 Albani v Commission220 a party was able to comply in part only with an order to produce documents because some of the documents in question had been destroyed. That caused the Court to hear evidence from the persons who had destroyed them. In Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank221 the Court asked the defendant to produce a document ‘on the simple principle that the Court may always order production of a document that is referred to in a document that is itself in evidence’.222 The defendant initially refused to comply on the ground that (i) the document was irrelevant and (ii) it was confidential, but later relented. In Cases 42 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority,223 on the other hand, the intervener refused to produce a document on which it relied because it was confidential. It said it was willing to produce the document to a person bound by professional secrecy, in the presence of the judge-rapporteur, or to the defendant but its arguments depended on an interpretation of certain parts of the document which could only be appreciated in their context. The Court took note of the intervener’s reservations and hesitations and did not order production but simply rejected its arguments because of lack of proof. Similarly, in Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel & Co v Hauptzollamt 218 Eg Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96 Service pour le Groupement d’Acquisitions (SGA) v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3587, paras 14–15 and 24 (on appeal, Case C-39/00P SGA  v Commission [2000]  ECR  I-11201, paras 33–39). In such cases, it is the combination of production by mistake with some other factor (usually the confidential nature of the evidence) that justifies removing the evidence from the case file. It is doubtful if it would be appropriate to order a relevant document to be removed from the file merely because it had been produced by error and had not been specifically requested by the Court or a party. 219 Statute, art 24. See Case T-25/90 Schönherr v Economic and Social Committee [1992] ECR II63, paras 30–31: the failure to comply with the order was one of the factors taken into account in the decision to annul the contested act. 220 [1990] ECR II-395, paras 48–49. 221 Above (note 40). 222 Ibid, per Advocate General Warner at 1634. 223 [1961] ECR 53 at 85.

924

Measures of enquiry 11.66

Hamburg-St Annen,224 the Council and the Commission relied on certain facts to support the validity of a regulation. The plaintiffs in the action before the national court disputed the correctness of those facts and the Court asked the Council and the Commission to produce evidence in support of their assertions. The Council did not reply to the request. Advocate General Capotorti remarked: ‘The Council and the Commission have not therefore been in a position to provide the information requested of them by the Court’. He then went on to say: ‘In the circumstances the conclusion must be drawn that there is no evidence of the facts to which the two institutions attached importance’.225 11.65 A refusal from the adverse party to produce any evidence may lead to the inference that the assertion is well founded. It is less clear if that inference can be drawn where the refusal emanates from someone who is not a party to the proceedings. If he has an interest in seeing the assertion rejected, it may be that the inference could be drawn. For that reason, if there is some ground for the refusal to comply, such as the public interest in favour of non-disclosure, it ought to be revealed to the Court. That may avoid the drawing of unnecessary inferences. On the other hand, the Court may persist in its request either by rejecting the reason given or by suggesting that the matter be resolved by a chamber or a judge unconnected with the case looking at the material in question. Only if those suggestions were rejected or the material were not disclosed after the chamber or judge had come to a view in favour of disclosure, would the Court then be entitled to draw inferences from the refusal to comply with the request. 11.66 There is no provision for the case where information or documents are concealed or misleading, inaccurate or forged material is produced in purported compliance with a request. It is to be supposed that, if such action were taken within the knowledge or with the connivance of a party’s adviser or lawyer, that would constitute conduct ‘incompatible with the dignity of the Court’ within the meaning of RP-ECJ, art 46(1), RP-GC, art 55(1) or RP-CST, art 34(1) and the adviser or lawyer could be excluded from the proceedings. If the matter comes to light before the judgment is given, the evidence in question may, of course, and should be, rejected, the Court drawing what inferences it may from the relevant facts, of which the incident in question would be one. If it comes to light after the date of judgment, it may give rise to proceedings for revision226 if all the other conditions for revision of a judgment are satisfied. There is no provision analogous to those in respect of defaulting witnesses.227

224 [1977] ECR 1753. 225 Ibid, at 1784. See also Case 19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH  v Commission [1978] ECR 131, paras 21–22. 226 See Ch 16, para 16.106 ff. 227 Eg Statute, art 27.

925

11.67  Measures of enquiry

VI

ORAL TESTIMONY

11.67 The Statute provides228 that witnesses may be heard ‘under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure’ and that they may be heard on oath.229 The oath may be taken either in the form laid down in the Rules of Procedure or in the manner laid down by the law of the country of the witness.230 Any ‘violation’ of an oath by a witness shall be treated by each member state as if it had been committed before a national court with jurisdiction in civil proceedings; at the instance of the Court, the member state concerned shall prosecute the offender before the competent national court.231 In the case of ‘defaulting’ witnesses (that is, persons who refuse to give evidence), the Court has the powers generally granted to courts and tribunals and may impose pecuniary penalties under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure.232 Instead of examining the witness itself, the Court may order him or her to be heard by the judicial authority in the place of his permanent residence.233 Thus there are two separate methods of examining a witness: by the Court and through letters rogatory. 11.68 Oral testimony is the provision of evidence of a fact by a human being, the evidence being provided by the witness directly to the Court or, in the case of letters rogatory, to a national judicial authority. Two observations may be made about oral testimony. The first is that the evidence is provided directly from the source of the evidence (the witness) to the judicial authority in question (the Court or national judicial authority) without there being any intermediary other than, where appropriate, a communications device such as a video link. Secondly, the evidence provided by means of oral testimony is not simply the words used by the witness to express himself or herself. The evidence that the witness gives also comes from his (or her) comportment and demeanour when giving evidence because those factors shed light on the accuracy and credibility of the words used by the witness.234 11.69 Oral testimony is not provided in writing and is to be distinguished from the presentation of the evidence of a witness in the form of a written statement. 228 Statute, art 26. 229 Statute, art 28. 230 Ibid. That appears to include the law of a third country where the witness comes from that country. 231 Statute, art 30. 232 Ibid, arts 24 and 25 respectively. 233 Statute, art 29. 234 Thus, effective examination of a witness through putting questions to him or her works by putting the witness under a degree of stress that is likely to make the behavioural clues as to the likelihood of the witness lying or telling the truth more evident (the technique of crossexamination is directed at that end). It is, of course, important to have an accurate idea of what those clues are. For published research on the subject, see, for example: S Leal (et al) ‘The time of the crime: Cognitively induced tonic arousal suppression when lying to a free recall context’ (2008) 129 Acta Psychologica 1–7; S Leal (et al) ‘Detecting true and false opinions: The Devil’s Advocate approach as a lie detection aid’ (2010) Acta Psychologica, doi:10.1016/j. actpsy.2010.03.005; A Vrij (et al) ‘Outsmarting the Liars: Toward a Cognitive Lie Detection Approach’ (2011) 20(1) Current Directions in Psychological Science 28.

926

Measures of enquiry 11.70

In IP appeals, statements in writing (whether sworn or affirmed or having similar effect under the law of the state in which the statement is drawn up) are an admissible form of evidence (subject to checks on the probability and veracity of the statement by reference to a range of factors including the person from whom the statement originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and its inherent soundness and reliability).235 There is no reason to take a different view where such statements are used in other types of proceeding; but they are not the same as oral testimony. Hence, where a party provides a written statement made by a witness, and the witness then gives oral testimony, the written statement is not the witness’ testimony and is merely evidence ‘offered in support’; the same applies where a written statement is provided and the witness is not called to give oral testimony.236 The precise status of a written statement that is evidence ‘offered in support’ is unclear; but it may be inferred that, due to its method of production and the absence of the procedural safeguards intended to ensure the completeness and reliability of oral testimony, a written statement cannot be regarded as being of the same probative value as oral testimony. 11.70 In addition to written statements of a witness’ evidence and oral testimony given to the Court by a witness, a third form of such evidence is the giving of evidence by a witness to a different court or tribunal (that is, otherwise than in the form of oral testimony delivered directly to the Court or by means of letters rogatory). There seem to be very few examples of that situation. One illustration comes from Case T-64/06 FLS Plast v Commission.237 In that case, 235 Eg Case T-434/09 Centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2011] ECR II-6227, para 33. It should be noted that the test for the probative value of such statements is that used to determine the probative value of a document (the source of the cases cited in para 33 is Case T-262/04 BIC SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2005] ECR II-5959, para 78). Statements made by employees of a party may be of questionable value if not corroborated by other evidence: Case T-137/08 BCS SpA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009]  ECR II-4047, para  75 (in that case, the statements had also been partially disproved, which was another reason why they were questionable). 236 M v Court of Justice (above, note 37), para 94. 237 6  March 2012, paras 48–61, 66–67 and 79–81 (on appeal, on unrelated points of law, Case C-243/12P FLS Plast v Commission, 19 June 2014). The English version of the GC judgment refers in a number of places to ‘witness statements’ where what is actually referred to is the oral testimony of the witness concerned, recorded in the transcript of the proceedings before the arbitral tribunal. ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs (above, note 215), para  152, gave rise to a different situation. A  request was made for oral testimony to be heard to prove what the Commission had been told before it made the contested decision. The Commission had not been persuaded by the matters put to it and had preferred other evidence. The request for oral testimony should therefore have been directed at obtaining evidence controverting the material relied on by the Commission rather than evidence designed to show something that was not in dispute (namely, that the Commission had considered but not been persuaded by evidence favourable to the applicants). In Case C-89/11P  E.ON  Energie v Commission, 22  November 2012, para  135 (at first instance, Case T-141/08  E.ON  Energie v Commission [2010] ECR II-5761, particularly paras 84–86), the ECJ upheld an apparent refusal by the GC to hear oral testimony from individuals who had provided affidavits to the Commission during the administrative proceedings; but it is unclear what further value oral testimony would have brought to the proceedings, not least because para 85 of the first instance decision suggests that the evidence was irrelevant.

927

11.71  Measures of enquiry

the same issue of fact came before an arbitral tribunal and the Commission. In the proceedings before the former, various witnesses provided written statements and gave oral testimony (including under cross-examination). In its decision, the Commission relied on an extract from the transcript of oral evidence provided by one of the witnesses to the arbitral tribunal. The Commission ignored the rest of the evidence before the arbitral tribunal and did not obtain any evidence of its own from the witnesses in question (or anyone else). In methodological terms, the Commission’s approach was obviously defective because its decision was not based on the totality of the relevant evidence (even as it was known at the time of the making of the Commission decision). The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the Commission and the arbitral tribunal came to diametrically opposite conclusions on the issue of fact.238 There were two possible explanations for that state of affairs. One was that the Commission and the arbitral tribunal had not entertained the same understanding of the relevant law or, at least, had been looking at the facts and the evidence from different legal perspectives.239 The other explanation for the divergent conclusions on the issue of fact was that the arbitral tribunal had assessed the totality of the evidence, including how the witnesses had reacted when giving evidence orally, which affects their credibility. In contrast, the Commission had read and paid attention to some of the words recorded on the transcript of the oral evidence but had no means of gauging the credibility of the evidence on which it was relying. If the first interpretation was correct, it meant that the evidence given by the witnesses to the arbitral tribunal was not reliable, for the purposes of the Commission decision, because it was not directed to the particular issue of law before the Commission. The Commission’s reliance on an extract from that evidence was therefore dubious, to say the least. If the second interpretation was correct, the Commission’s handling of the evidence was defective. 11.71 When the Commission decision was challenged before the GC, the applicant relied on the conclusions of the arbitral tribunal (as being evidence of the relevant facts) and applied for measures of enquiry, including oral testimony from one of the witnesses whose evidence had been ignored by the Commission. The GC declined to accept the decision of the arbitral tribunal as evidence of the facts but did look at parts of the record of the evidence given to the arbitral tribunal, which suggests (not unreasonably) that, in the case of a factual enquiry conducted by another body, the Court will at most regard as relevant the raw evidence collected by that body but not the conclusions drawn by that body from the evidence. However, although it noted that some of that evidence had to be interpreted with care and found itself looking at nothing more than the relative

238 The decision of the arbitral tribunal was delivered some 12 days after the Commission decision was adopted. 239 When two courts look at the same facts from differing legal perspectives, there is no reason to suppose that the factual conclusion reached by one of them should be relevant to the factual conclusion that the other must reach in the case before it; and courts may also differ in their conclusions on matters of law: eg Case C-432/04 Commission v Cresson [2006] ECR I-6387, paras 118–125.

928

Measures of enquiry 11.72

plausibility of differing interpretations of extracts from the evidence,240 the GC did not order a measure of enquiry. Nor did it assess the evidence in question by reference to the criteria normally applied.241 Nor did it have any idea as to the credibility of the evidence from which it and the Commission were drawing inferences (even though, given the conclusion of the arbitral tribunal, the credibility of the witness evidence relied on by the GC and the Commission was clearly in doubt). Even if the evidential problems had been limited to arguments about the plausibility of the different interpretations to be given to the evidence, the correct solution would have been to hear oral testimony. The point about oral testimony is that it gives the Court the opportunity to have a correctly formulated question put to a witness with a view to ascertaining what the answer is, enabling disputes about the ‘interpretation’ of the evidence to be resolved and ambiguities in the evidence removed. That is all the more important where the evidence under scrutiny may reflect a process of evidence-gathering that is not directed at exactly the same question as that before the Court. The general approach followed in FLS Plast is not, therefore, an example to be followed. 11.72 In some cases, the GC has expressed a reluctance to order oral testimony where the purpose of such testimony is to controvert what is stated in a document or where there is a significant body of evidence that goes against the proposed oral testimony. In some instances, where the tenor of a document is clear, the giving of oral testimony designed to contradict the clear content of the document is futile; but some caution must be exercised before concluding that oral testimony is always redundant in such a situation. For example, if a document evidences the making of an agreement between two persons, oral testimony intended to show that no agreement was ever made does appear to be futile; but oral testimony directed at showing that the agreement was later abandoned is a different matter. Further, documents can easily be misread. It is often the case that, in a particular business or technical context, words acquire a particular meaning that is not the same as the meaning that they might convey to a reader not acquainted with the context in which the words have come to be used. In such cases, oral testimony is indispensable if the document is to be understood correctly. Similarly, where there is an overwhelming body of evidence countering what (it is said) a witness is going to say, it seems to be a wasted exercise to hear oral testimony from the witness. However, in order to reach that conclusion, the Court needs to be confident that whatever the witness says is incapable of weakening the factual or legal conclusions to be drawn from the other evidence.242

240 FLS Plast, para 67. 241 See Centrotherm (above, note 235). 242 For an illustration of such a case, see Case T-448/07 YKK Corpn v Commission, 27 June 2012, paras 43–45 and 98–120 (para 119 makes unfortunate reading given that the GC had decided not to permit the applicant to advance oral testimony in support of its case).

929

11.73  Measures of enquiry

A

Examination of witnesses by the Court

1 Own motion 11.73 In ECJ proceedings, where the Court of its own motion orders facts to be proved by witnesses, the initiative to make the order usually comes from the judge-rapporteur or the advocate general. In any event, the latter is heard before the order is made. There is no express provision for the parties to be heard beforehand. In GC and CST proceedings, the parties must be given an opportunity to be heard before a measure of enquiry in the form of oral testimony is ordered, whether the testimony is taken directly by the Court or through letters rogatory.243 11.74 The Court order summoning witnesses specifies the precise question of fact upon which each witness is to be examined. In order to make the order, the Court must be in a position to know what are the important issues of fact in the case and who are the persons best qualified to give evidence on them. It is the duty of the parties, in their pleadings, and, if necessary, in a formal application for the summoning of witnesses (see below), to place the Court in that position. In some early cases, the Court was able to identify only the issues of fact on which testimony was required. It then made an order requiring the parties to indicate in writing the persons who could give evidence on the issues specified in the order.244 If such a situation arose now, it would be more likely that it would be dealt with by means of an informal meeting between the judge-rapporteur, the advocate general (where there is one) and the parties and their representatives; in cases before the GC and CST, that has been formalised as measures of organisation of procedure.245 2 On application 11.75 Where a (main) party applies for the summoning of a witness, he must set out both the precise facts upon which the witness is to be heard and the reasons justifying his examination.246 If the party does not show that the witness is in a position to give relevant evidence, the Court will not summon him.247 The Rules

243 RP-GC, art 88(1) and 92(2); RP-CST, art 71(1) and 71(4), 2nd indent. 244 See Case 68/63 Luhleich v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 581 (the order also required the parties to give reasons why each witness proposed should be examined, to limit their proposals to the minimum necessary and to communicate the proposals to both the Court and the other parties); Case 34/65 Mosthaf v Euratom Commission [1966] ECR 521; Case 60/82 Cowood v Commission [1982] ECR 4625, paras 11–12. 245 See RP-GC, art 89; RP-CST, art 68. 246 RP-ECJ, art  66(2); RP-GC, art  88(2); RP-CST, art  71(2). On the need for detail, see Case C-525/07 Combescot v Commission [2008] ECR I-166*, [2008] ECR-SC I-B-1-21, II-B-2-157, paras 59–61. 247 Eg Case 14/64 Gualco (née Barge) v High Authority [1965] ECR 51 at 66 (Advocate General Roemer); Cowood v Commission (above, note 244), para  13; Case 403/85  F  v Commission [1987] ECR 645, para 9; Case F-43/10 Cerafogli v European Central Bank, 12 December 2012, para 223.

930

Measures of enquiry 11.76

of Procedure do not specify that the application must be made by separate document. It can and, as a matter of good practice, should be made in the pleadings. In addition to identifying the facts to be proved by means of the witness’ testimony, the witness ought to be clearly identified, by name, address, occupation and competence as a witness, so that the Court can assess his capacity to give evidence. Alternatively, the application can be made separately and, it would seem, at any time, subject to the qualifications to be made about late applications.248 Although parties have on occasion requested witnesses to be heard,249 it is not evident that the matter was raised as a procedural issue.250 In GC and CST proceedings, it is expressly provided that the other parties (including interveners) will be given an opportunity to comment on the application.251 By implication, the same should apply in ECJ proceedings. 3 Objecting to a witness 11.76 The parties have two weeks, from the date of service on them of the Court’s order summoning a witness to give oral testimony, to object to the witness.252 The grounds upon which the objection may be based are that the witness is (a) not competent, (b) not a proper person or (c) any other reason.253 The basic, but not only, objection to a witness would seem to be that there exists some circumstance which would render the probative value of his testimony worthless, even if it is given under oath.254 Apart from specifying that the objection must

248 See paras 11.14–11.16 above. 249 See, for example, Case 44/59 Fiddelaar v Commission [1960] ECR 535 at 545–546; Gualco v High Authority (above, note 74); Case 11/64 Weighardt v Euratom Commission [1965] ECR 285; Case 3/65  SA Métallurgique d’ Espérance-Longdoz v High Authority [1965]  ECR  1065; Case 2/65 Preo e Figli v High Authority [1966] ECR 219; Case 77/70 Prelle v Commission [1971] ECR 561. 250 See also Ch 6, paras 6.4–6.6. 251 RP-GC, art 88(3); RP-CST, art 71(2) and (4), 2nd indent. 252 RP-ECJ, art 72(2); RP-GC, art 99(2); RP-CST, art 77(2). 253 RP-ECJ, art 72(1); RP-GC, art 99(1); RP-CST, art 77(1). 254 In Case C-244/92P Kupka-Floridi v Economic and Social Committee [1993] ECR I-2041, paras 12–19, the appellant contested a judgment of the CFI on the ground, inter alia, that a person examined as a witness by the CFI could not have given testimony as such because, by his conduct before the commencement of the action, he had made himself a party to the case (although he had not participated in the proceedings as an intervener or other party). That claim was dismissed because the appellant had in fact acquiesced in the examination of the person concerned as a witness. It was not necessary for the Court to consider the question whether or not a party is competent to give evidence as a witness. In principle, an objection that a person cannot be heard as a witness because he or she is a party to the proceedings is a technical objection to the form of the Court order: if the person concerned is a party, he or she should be ordered to be ‘heard as a party’ and not ‘as a witness’. It is not an objection to the competence of the person concerned to give evidence; and any difference in the probative value of the evidence given which results from the fact that the person concerned is a party goes to the assessment of the evidence given and not to its admissibility. Lastly, it is doubtful if an employee of a party is to be regarded as a party to the proceedings for the purpose of giving oral evidence: employees, whether they be officials of an EU institution or employed by an undertaking which is a party to the proceedings, are invariably examined as witnesses and not as parties.

931

11.77  Measures of enquiry

set out the grounds on which it is based and the evidence relied on,255 the Rules of Procedure make no further specific provision. The objection must nonetheless be expressed in the language of the case and comply with the general rules applicable to pleadings.256 It is unclear whether the objection is to be raised and dealt with as a preliminary issue257 or not. At all events, it is to be supposed that the Court would not decide to uphold the objection without hearing the views of the other parties and, if need be, the witness himself. 11.77 It would appear that any objection is to be made after the making of the Court’s order, not in the course of making submissions on any application for the examination of a witness or on any proposal emanating from the Court itself, because the objection is to be directed at an impediment to the giving of evidence by the person ultimately selected by the Court to be summoned to give evidence. The objection is not supposed to canvass more general questions. However, if, before the making of the order, a party knows of an objection to a person who is being considered as a witness, it would seem that the objection should be raised at that point instead of being left until later. If no objection is made within the period for doing so, it is unclear whether or not any objection may be raised thereafter. In principle, the existence of an express time limit for the raising of an objection leads to the inference that the parties are precluded from raising any objection after the expiry of the time limit. However, it does not seem that a party could be precluded from raising an objection thereafter if it were based on a material fact that had come to the attention of the party concerned only after the expiry of the time limit. In that event, the objection should be raised promptly. If a party is aware of an objection or potential objection to the examination of a person as a witness and nonetheless fails to raise an objection or even agrees to the examination of the person concerned as a witness, that party will be taken to have acquiesced in the examination and will be precluded from asserting that the examination of the person concerned was a procedural defect.258 In such circumstances, while the admissibility of the testimony given by the witness cannot be contested, it is still open to the parties, or any one of them, to rely on the objection (where appropriate) in order to undermine the weight to be attached to the testimony of the witness. 4 The Court order 11.78 Formerly, whether the Court acted on its own motion or on application, the ECJ and GC rules of procedure provided, first, that the examination of a witness was the subject of a Court order stating the facts to be proved by witness evidence; and, secondly, that the Court may by order summon a witness either of its own motion or on application by a party or at the request of the advocate

255 RP-ECJ, art 72(2); RP-GC, art 99(2); RP-CST, art 77(2). 256 See Ch 9, paras 9.7–9.18. 257 As to which, see Ch 6. 258 Kupka-Floridi v Economic and Social Committee (above, note 254).

932

Measures of enquiry 11.78

general.259 That led to the suggestion260 that two separate orders were made. The first comprised the order, envisaged also in what are now RP-ECJ, art  64(1), RP-GC, art , art  92(1) and RP-CST, art  71(1), which opens the measure of enquiry and specifies the issues of fact which are to be investigated and the witnesses who are to be called. The second order was the one actually summoning the witnesses.261 Whatever may have been the practice of the Court in former times, the present position seems to be that the decision to hear testimony is made at the administrative meeting and one order drawn up on the basis of the minutes of that meeting (after the parties have been given an opportunity to be heard). That order sets out: (1) the surname, forenames, description and address of the witnesses; (2) an indication of the facts on which they are to be examined; (3) the date and place of the examination; (4) where appropriate, particulars of the arrangements made by the Court for reimbursement of expenses incurred by the witnesses and of the penalties which may be imposed on a defaulting witness.262 An example of one such order is set out in the report of Case 18/63 Wollast (née Schmitz) v Commission.263 The order is served on the witnesses cited in it (that is how they are ‘summoned’ to appear as witnesses) and also on the parties.264 The Court may make the summoning of the witness conditional on the parties or one of them lodging with the Court’s cashier of security for the witness’ costs.265 The cashier of the Court may make an advance payment towards the witness’ travel and subsistence expenses.266

259 The former RP-ECJ, art 47(1) and RP-CFI 68(1). 260 Wall The Court of Justice of the European Communities – Jurisdiction and Procedure (1966) pp 240–241. 261 Cf RP-ECJ, art 66(4); RP-GC, art 93; RP-CST, art 72. 262 See RP-ECJ, art 66(3), 2nd sentence (which is expressed as applying only to an order made on application); RP-GC, art 93(1); RP-CST, art 72. Only RP-CST, art 72 expressly retains (4) (which has now been dropped from the ECJ and GC rules of procedure for no obvious reason). It should be noted that a witness who fails to appear exposes himself to a pecuniary penalty: see RP-ECJ, art 69(2); RP-GC, art 95(2); RP-CST, art 74(2). It follows that the order should include (4). 263 [1964] ECR 85 at 95. 264 RP-ECJ, art  66(4); RP-GC, art  93(1); RP-CST, art  72. Service on the parties is no longer expressly provided for in the rules of procedure. However, it is implicit from RP-ECJ, art 67(2), RP-GC, art 94(2) and RP-CST, art 73(3) (the parties are given notice to attend the measure of enquiry). 265 RP-ECJ, art 66(4); RP-GC, art 93(2); RP-CST, art 78(1). 266 RP-ECJ, art 73(2); RP-GC, art 100(2); RP-CST, art 78(2). The practice was to make an advance payment where the Court decided to hear witnesses of its own motion: see, for example, Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954–56]  ECR  333. Where that occurs, it is without prejudice to the Court’s power to order that one of the parties shall bear the burden of such costs at the end of the day.

933

11.79  Measures of enquiry

5 The obligation to attend to give evidence and failure to appear 11.79 Witnesses who have been duly summoned are obliged to attend and give evidence.267 There is no provision making any particular person or category of persons uncompellable as a witness. If without good reason a witness fails to appear before the Court, it may impose a fine of not more than €5,000 and order a further summons to be served on him at his own expense.268 In GC proceedings, the fine or a decision requiring the witness’ attendance may be enforced in accordance with the usual rules for enforcing a judgment.269 That appears no longer to be the case in ECJ and CST proceedings.270 It does not seem that, when a witness defaults, the Court must first consider fining him before seeking to secure the witness’ attendance by means of a second order requiring him to give evidence. It lies within its discretion whether or not to fine or, where appropriate, commence proceedings to have its order enforced. It may, indeed, decide to take no action at all. In Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission271 the Court ordered testimony to be heard from several witnesses. One lived in the United States of America and did not appear but sent a written reply to the questions on which he was to give evidence. The Court decided to dispense with his testimony and add his letter to the file. In Case 3/66 Alfieri v European Parliament272 a similar approach was adopted when one of the witnesses excused himself on valid grounds (unspecified in the report) and submitted a written declaration. That was read out at the hearing with the consent of the parties. Although the Statute declares that the Court has ‘the powers generally granted to courts and tribunals and may impose pecuniary penalties’ in respect of defaulting witnesses, those powers are said to be exercisable under the conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure,273 which refer only to a power to fine and a power to require appearance before the Court. It does not, therefore, seem that, under the Rules of Procedure as presently worded, the Court exercises any other powers.

267 RP-ECJ, art 69(1); RP-GC, art 95(1); RP-CST, art 74(1). 268 RP-ECJ, art 69(2); RP-GC, art 95(2); RP-CST, art 74(2). It used to be provided that the amount of the fine could be cancelled if the witness gave a valid excuse or reduced at the request of the witness where he established that it was disproportionate to his income. That remains only in RP-CST, art 74(4). In the ECJ’s commentary on the draft version of its 2012 rules, it said that the concept of ‘valid excuse’, which had appeared in the previous RP-ECJ, art 48(3) – the equivalent of RP-CST, art 74(4) – was encompassed in ‘good reason’. 269 RP-GC, art 225. 270 The former RP-ECJ, art  48(4) – the equivalent of RP-GC, art  225 – was repealed by the ECJ’s 2012 rules and not replaced. 271 [1965] ECR 533 at 545. 272 [1966] ECR 437 at 446. 273 Statute, art 27. Another interpretation of art 27 is that the phrase ‘under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure’ qualifies only the power to impose pecuniary penalties. On that basis, the ‘powers generally granted to courts and tribunals’ would be identified by a comparative study of the powers of national courts and tribunals regarding defaulting witnesses, or at least by reference to general principle. However, the fact remains that, under the Rules of Procedure, the Court’s powers are limited to making an order obliging a person to come to the Court to give evidence and fining that person if he or she fails to do so.

934

Measures of enquiry 11.81

6 The examination of the witness 11.80 However he may be summoned, whether by the Court of its own motion or at the request of one of the parties, the witness remains a witness of the Court and gives his evidence to it; the parties are given notice to attend at the examination of the witness but are not obliged to do so.274 The President of the Court (or chamber)275 first establishes the identity of the witness.276 In ECJ and GC proceedings, the President then informs the witness that he will be required to ‘vouch the truth’ of his testimony in the manner laid down in the Rules of Procedure.277 He also instructs the witness to tell the truth and warns him of the criminal liability which he may incur under national law in the event of a failure to do so.278 In CST proceedings, the witness then swears to tell the truth, unless he is exempted from doing so.279 In ECJ and GC proceedings, the oath (if any) is taken after the witness has given his evidence.280 The timing of the taking of the oath explains the differences in the rules about the remarks made by the President to the witness before he gives his evidence. A witness may be exempted from taking the oath after the parties have been heard on the point.281 11.81 Currently the rules of procedure assume only two possibilities: taking an oath or being exempted from doing so. Formerly, witnesses were heard: (1) on oath, taken in the form laid down in the Rules of Procedure or in the manner specified by the law of the country in which the witness resides;282 (2) after making an affirmation, if the law of the country in which he resided so provided and in the manner laid down by it;283 or (3) without taking an oath or affirming, if the law of the country in which he resided provided for neither but after being instructed by the President that he must tell the truth and being warned of any criminal liability under national law if he failed to do so.284

274 RP-ECJ, art 67(2); RP-GC, art 94(2); RP-CST, art 73(3). 275 It will in fact be almost invariably the president of a chamber. 276 By asking him to give his name, address and occupation. 277 RP-ECJ, art 67(1); RP-GC, art 94(1). ‘Vouching the truth’ means making a formal statement (often but not necessarily in the form of an oath, as provided for in the rules of procedure) that what the witness has said is true. The CST rules do not so provide because a witness takes the oath before giving evidence. 278 RP-GC, art 97(1); RP-CST, art 73(1). That no longer appears in the ECJ rules of procedure; but it remains good practice. 279 RP-CST, art 73(2). 280 RP-ECJ, art 68(1); RP-GC, art 94(5). 281 RP-ECJ, art 68(2); RP-GC, art 94(6) (which limits the right to be heard on the point to the main parties); RP-CST, art 73(2). 282 Statute, art 28; RP-ECJ, art 68(1); RP-GC, art 94(5) and 97(2); RP-CST, art 73(2). The oath prescribed in the rules of procedure is: ‘I swear that I have spoken the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ (the formulation is slightly different in RP-CST, art 73(2) because, in CST proceedings, the oath is taken before the evidence is given). 283 The former RP-ECJ, art 124(2) and RP-CFI 71(3). 284 Ibid.

935

11.82  Measures of enquiry

11.82 References to the possibility of affirming seem to have been removed as being anachronistic and out of step with the Statute.285 However, when the question arises as to whether or not a witness should be exempted from the obligation to take an oath, it does not seem to be precluded for exemption to be granted on condition that the witness makes a solemn affirmation or some similar statement that, under the law of the country in which he resides, would engage liability for perjury. 11.83 The way in which the witness gives his evidence depends very much on how the chamber entrusted with the measure of enquiry wishes to conduct the proceedings. The Rules of Procedure envisage that the witness first makes a deposition and then answers questions which may be put to him by the judges, the advocate general, or the representatives of the parties.286 On occasion, however, the entire examination may be conducted by the judge-rapporteur or the parties may be allowed to examine the witnesses themselves. Since the witness is the Court’s, there is no examination and cross-examination in the sense understood in the context of proceedings in an English or Irish court. Instead, subject to the control of the President, the parties, through their representatives, may put questions to the witness, confront him with any documents, etc. The end result, where that happens, is very similar to the examination of a witness in an English or Irish court. Questions may be asked of the witness either directly or through the President, depending upon how the President wishes to conduct the examination. It is a fundamental procedural rule that, at least in cases where a person is threatened with a decision adverse to his or her interests, that person or his representative is entitled to attend the examination of a witness and put or have put to the witness there and then any question that may be useful to his defence.287 An additional witness, not included in the Court order, may be examined on the same occasion as the other witnesses if the Court should consider it appropriate.288 Gowns are not normally worn at the examination of witnesses. 11.84 The Registrar has a record of the evidence (referred to in the rules as ‘minutes’), which constitutes the official record of the proceedings, drawn up and signed by him, the President or (as the case may be) judge-rapporteur and the witness, after the content has been checked by the witness.289 The examination of the witness is tape recorded and it is the transcript of the recording that is signed. The minutes are served on the parties.290 After the examination of a witness, a supplementary statement made by the witness may be accepted by the Court.291

285 See the ECJ’s commentary on its draft rules of procedure (under art  69) and the GC’s commentary on its draft rules of procedure (under art 95). 286 RP-ECJ, art 67(2)–(4); RP-GC, art 94(2)–(4); RP-CST, art 73(3). 287 Case 141/84 De Compte v European Parliament [1985] ECR 1951, paras 17–18. 288 Case T-35/89 Albani v Commission [1990] ECR II-395, paras 26–33. 289 RP-ECJ, art 74(2); RP-GC, art 102(2); RP-CST, art 73(4). 290 RP-ECJ, art 74(3); RP-GC, art 102(3); RP-CST, art 73(4). 291 Case 246/84 Kotsonis v Council [1986] ECR 3989, para 22.

936

Measures of enquiry 11.85

7 Refusal to give evidence or take the oath 11.85 If a witness refuses to give evidence or take the oath, the matter is dealt with by the Court.292 If the refusal is without ‘good reason’ he may be fined up to €5,000.293 In CST proceedings, the fine may be cancelled if the witness has a ‘valid excuse’ that he was not able to proffer beforehand or reduced at the request of the witness where he establishes that it is disproportionate having regard to his income.294 A GC decision imposing a fine is enforced in the same way as a judgment of the Court.295 It is not entirely clear what may be a good reason or valid excuse (the two expressions seem to mean the same) for not giving evidence or taking the oath. The existence of any privilege entitling a witness to refuse to give evidence seems to be a matter of EU law, but there is practically no authority as to its existence and the grounds on which it might be invoked. In Case 155/79 AM & S v Commission296 the Court recognised the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship and, although the case actually concerned the Commission’s powers to require the disclosure to it of documents, it is to be supposed that a lawyer, as defined in the judgment, may refuse to give evidence on confidential matters failing within the scope of the relationship with his client.297 The fact that the Court does respect confidentiality based on other grounds is evident from Case 155/78 M v Commission,298 where the Court made an order requiring several doctors to give evidence ‘subject always to the limits imposed by their rules of professional conduct’.299 In some member states it is unlawful for certain classes of person to give evidence relating to a confidential relationship; to do so can result in them being prosecuted under the code of criminal law. Hence it is uncertain whether the Court proceeds on the basis that it will not require a witness to give evidence where it would be contrary to his national law to do so or might lead to the imposition of a penalty; or whether it simply respects certain confidential relationships. In view of the various links with the law of the country in which the witness resides (concerning the method of taking an oath and the sanctions for violating the oath or concealing or falsifying evidence), it is arguable that a witness is entitled to refuse to give evidence on the ground that to do so would be contrary to national law.300 Whether the 292 RP-ECJ, art 72(1); RP-GC, art 99(1); RP-CST, art 77(1) (which specifies action by reasoned order). 293 RP-ECJ, art 69(3); RP-GC, art 95(3); RP-CST, art 74(3). Where a witness is exempted from taking the oath if a condition is satisfied (such as the making of a solemn affirmation), a failure by the witness to satisfy the condition would cause the obligation to take the oath to apply. If the witness then refused to take the oath, he could be fined. Otherwise a failure to satisfy a condition attached to the exemption does not appear to carry any sanction. 294 RP-CST, art 74(4). 295 RP-GC, art  225. As noted above, the same does not seem to apply to decisions of the ECJ or CST. 296 [1982] ECR 1575. 297 For the same reason, one of the parties may object that he is not a competent witness regarding such matters. 298 [1980] ECR 1797 at 1801. 299 It seems that, in that case, the Court regarded the doctors’ reliance on medical secrecy as excessive but it does not seem to have taken any action against them. 300 Against that see M v Commission (above, note 298 at 1821) (Advocate General Capotorti).

937

11.86  Measures of enquiry

existence of a privilege against self-incrimination should be accepted, is another question.301 It also seems right that the Court should respect the confidentiality of certain relationships even in the absence of any rule of national, or indeed written EU, law forbidding a breach of confidence, as a matter of public policy. At this stage in the development of the Court’s case law, it is, however, impossible to say whether, and if so to what extent, the Court is prepared to limit the exercise of its powers to require evidence to be given in a particular case. 8 Perjury 11.86 Under the Statute,302 ‘a Member State shall treat any violation of an oath by a witness or expert in the same manner as if the offence had been committed before one of its courts with jurisdiction in civil proceedings. At the instance of the Court of Justice, the Member State concerned shall prosecute the offender before its competent court’. It will be observed that the Statute does not cover the situation where the witness has only affirmed or has in some other respect attracted the duty under the laws of his own state to tell the truth to a (national) court but has nevertheless deliberately lied to the Court. The GC and CST Rules of Procedure envisage that, when a witness commits perjury, the Court reports the matter to the competent authority of the member state concerned.303 The same arises under the ECJ’s Supplementary Rules.304 The procedure is that the Court (in ECJ proceedings, after hearing the advocate general) determines that the witness in question has committed perjury and that the matter must be referred to the competent authority in question with a view to the commencement of proceedings before a national court having penal jurisdiction. The competent authority is that specified in Annex III of the Supplementary Rules.305 The criterion for selecting the competent authority is the place where the witness resides.306 The Court’s report appears to be made in the form of an order which is served by the Registrar on the competent authority and which sets out the facts and circumstances causing the Court to refer the matter.307 The competent authority then acts. 11.87 It would seem from the Statute that the competent authority is bound to prosecute the witness and has no discretion to refrain from doing so.308 It would seem that both the competent authority and the judicial authority responsible for deciding the witness’s guilt are bound by the findings of fact made by the Court. The judicial authority’s function is only to decide whether those findings consti301 See, in a different context, Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283, paras 28–35. 302 Art 30. 303 RP-GC, art 98; RP-CST, art 76. 304 SR-ECJ, art 6. 305 SR-ECJ, art 6; RP-GC, art 98(1); RP-CST, art 76(1). 306 That follows from the identification of the competent authority in the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, which is based on residence, and it is to be supposed that the same test applies as between the member states. 307 SR-ECJ, art 7; RP-GC, art 98(2); RP-CST, art 76(2). 308 That follows from the use of ‘shall’ in the Statute, art 30.

938

Measures of enquiry 11.89

tute an offence under national law and what the appropriate penalty should be. That does not mean that it cannot supplement those findings where necessary. For example, the witness’s state of mind may be an ingredient of the offence but the Court’s order may only set out the facts and respects in which he did not tell the truth. In that event, the judicial authority can and must investigate the witness’s state of mind. What it cannot do is call into question the Court’s findings of fact. 9 Costs and expenses 11.88 Witnesses are entitled to have their travelling and subsistence expenses reimbursed309 and to be paid compensation for any loss of earnings.310 The cashier of the Court may make a payment towards travelling and subsistence expenses in advance311 but compensation for loss of earnings is paid only after the witness has given evidence.312 In ECJ proceedings, an application for payment of expenses or compensation is made by the witness to the cashier of the Court. The Rules of Procedure do not lay down any formal requirements but it seems that it should be in writing and addressed to the Registrar. Evidence must be produced to justify a claim for loss of earnings and particulars must be given of the costs for which any advance payment is requested.313 The Registrar orders the payment of the sums due and requires a receipt or acknowledgment of payment.314 If he is of the opinion that the amount applied for is excessive, he may reduce it of his own motion or order it to be paid by instalments.315 There is no provision for an appeal against his decision.316 In GC and CST proceedings, it appears that the initiative is taken by the Registrar because he is to obtain from witnesses evidence of their expenses and loss of earnings and he is to cause the sums due to the witnesses to be paid to them. If there is a dispute about the sum that the Registrar considers to be due to a witness, the Registrar refers it to the President for him to decide the matter.317 11.89 The Court may require, as a condition of summoning a witness, that the parties, or one of them, deposit with the Court’s cashier a sum which it considers to be sufficient to cover the taxed costs of hearing the witness.318 That does not preclude the Court from ordering, in the judgment closing proceedings, one 309 RP-ECJ, art 73(2); RP-GC, art 100(2); RP-CST, art 78(2). 310 RP-ECJ, art 73(3); RP-GC, art 100(3); RP-CST, art 78(3). 311 RP-ECJ, art  73(2), 2nd sentence; RP-GC, art  100(2), 2nd sentence; RP-CST, art  78(2), 2nd sentence. 312 RP-ECJ, art  73(3), 2nd sentence; RP-GC, art  100(3), 2nd sentence; RP-CST, art  78(3), 2nd sentence. 313 IR-ECJ, art 21(1). Although the legal status of the ECJ Instructions to the Registrar was unclear at the time of writing, the practice of the ECJ seemed to follow that indicated in them. 314 IR-ECJ, art 21(2). 315 Ibid. 316 IR-ECJ, art 21(1) mentions only ‘advance payments’ but it seems that it really means ‘advances’ simpliciter. 317 PD-GC, para 41; IR-CST, art 13(2)–(3). 318 RP-ECJ, art 73(1); RP-GC, art 100(1); RP-CST, art 78(1).

939

11.90  Measures of enquiry

of the parties to bear the costs of hearing witnesses, whether or not they were summoned by the Court of its own motion.319 In such an event, the costs of the preparatory enquiry normally follow the event.320

B

Letters rogatory

11.90 The Court may order a witness to be examined by a judicial authority in the place where he resides permanently.321 The order may be made on application by a party or by the Court of its own motion.322 As letters rogatory are simply one means of obtaining the oral testimony of a witness, the same rules apply to an application for letters rogatory and to the procedure to be followed leading up to the making of such an order as in the case of any other measure of enquiry. 11.91 Letters rogatory are issued in the form of an order which sets out the name, forenames, description and address of the witness, the facts on which he is to be examined, the parties, their agents, lawyers or advisers, their address and a brief description of the subject matter of the dispute.323 The Registrar sends the order to the competent authority in the member state in which the witness is to be examined324 (in ECJ proceedings, the order is also served on the parties;325 and one would expect the same to apply in GC and CST proceedings). Annex I of the Supplementary Rules identifies the competent authority for each member state. The country in which the examination is to take place is that where the witness resides permanently.326 Where necessary, the order is accompanied by a translation into the official languages of the member state to which it is addressed.327 The competent authority passes the order on to the judicial authority that has power under national law to carry out the examination328 and it is that authority which must give effect to the letters rogatory, in accordance with the national law applied by it.329 Once the order has been executed the judicial authority gives the order embodying the letters rogatory, any documents arising from its implementation and a detailed statement of the costs to the competent authority, which

319 Eg Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Suiker Unie UA v Commission [1975] ECR 1663 at 2025. 320 Cf Case 43/74 Guillot v Commission [1977] ECR 1309, para 110: they may also be divided between the parties, see Cases 56–60/74 Kampffmeyer Muhlenvereinigung KG v Commission and Council [1976] ECR 711, para 24. 321 Statute, art  29. Where it does so, the CST may order the parties, or one of them, to lodge security for the costs of the letters rogatory: RP-CST, art 79(5). 322 RP-GC, art  101(1); RP-CST, art  79(1). The ECJ rules of procedure used so to provide: the former RP-ECJ, art 52 (now repealed for an unknown reason). That does not appear to make any difference. 323 SR-ECJ, art 1(1); RP-GC, art 101(2); RP-CST, art 79(2). 324 SR-ECJ, art 2(1); RP-GC, art 101(3); RP-CST, art 79(3), 1st subpara. 325 SR-ECJ, art 1(2). 326 Statute, art 29, 1st para. 327 SR-ECJ, art 2(1); RP-GC, art 101(3); RP-CST, art 79(3), 1st subpara. 328 SR-ECJ, art 2(2); RP-GC, art 101(4); RP-CST, art 79(3), 2nd subpara. 329 SR-ECJ, art 2(3); RP-GC, art 101(5); RP-CST, art 79(3), 3rd subpara.

940

Measures of enquiry 11.93

sends them on to the Registrar.330 The Registrar then has all those documents translated into the language of the case.331 11.92 The Court bears the costs of the letters rogatory but may, where appropriate, charge them to the parties.332 In the first instance, the Registrar instructs the cashier of the Court to refund the costs directly to the body designated by the competent authority (which need not be the judicial authority which carried out the examination) in the currency of the member state concerned and against proof of payment.333 As can be seen, those are the costs incurred by the body responsible for implementing the letters rogatory, not the costs incurred by the parties. It is the former alone that may be borne by the Court unless it decides to charge them to the parties. So far as is known, letters rogatory have been used only once.334

VII EXPERTS’ REPORTS 11.93 Under the Statute335 the Court can at any time entrust the task of giving an expert opinion to ‘any individual, body, authority, committee or other organisation it chooses’. An expert’s report may be ordered where expert opinion would make it possible to resolve an issue of fact in the case,336 usually one relating to a technical matter for which the Court lacks the appropriate knowledge.337 Experts’ reports have been ordered, inter alia, to assess the quality of a translator’s work,338 an official’s mental state339 and the applicant’s qualifications and abilities;340 to examine the rates for and conditions of transport of mineral

330 Ibid. 331 SR-ECJ, art 2(4); RP-GC, art 101(6); RP-CST, art 79(4). 332 Statute, art 29, 3rd para; SR-ECJ, art 3; RP-GC, art 101(7). Under RP-CST, art 105(b), the costs of letters rogatory are recoverable costs. 333 IR-ECJ, art 21(3). 334 In Case 160/84 Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE v Commission [1985] ECR 675. 335 Statute, art 25. 336 For cases in which an expert’s report would not have done so, see, for example: Case C-106/90R Emerald Meats Ltd v Commission [1990] ECR I-3377, paras 28–29; Case T-26/89 De Compte (above, note 14), paras 224–229; Case T-53/96 Syndicat des Producteurs de Viande Bovine de la Coordination Rurale v Commission [1996] ECR II-1579, para 26 (failure to plead sufficient facts to render an expert’s report relevant); FFSA (above, note 71), para 115 (failure to put a factual assessment in doubt); Skibsvaerftsforeningen (above, note 71), para  200; Case T-152/95 Odette Nicos Petrides Co Inc v Commission [1997]  ECR II-2427, para  107; Case T-68/99 Toditec NV v Commission [2001] ECR II-1443, paras 40–41. In Krupp Thyssen Stainless (above, note 148), paras 104 and 122, a request for an expert’s report on divergences in the language versions of the decision contested in the proceedings was rejected on the ground that the alleged divergences were not material to the issues in the case. 337 Case C-35/92P Parliament v Frederiksen [1993] ECR I-991, paras 17–20 (the appeal from Case T-169/89 Frederiksen v Parliament, above, note 85). 338 Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 333. 339 Case 12/68 X v Audit Board [1969] ECR 109 and Case 18/70 X v Council [1972] ECR 1205. 340 Case 785/79 Pizziolo v Commission [1981] ECR 969.

941

11.94  Measures of enquiry

fuels,341 price rises and the market in dyestuffs342 and the economic consequences of certain gas tariffs;343 to verify the conclusion drawn in the contested act, the evidence relied on and the characteristics of the market;344 and to investigate the damages claimed and the issues of fact between the parties.345 On occasion, the parties have themselves submitted an expert’s report or, at the hearing, an expert has addressed the Court on behalf of one of the parties.346 In neither case is that, strictly speaking, the hearing of expert evidence within the meaning of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure because the expert’s opinion has been commissioned by and provided to the party in question. It is not the Court’s evidence. In the first case, the evidence tendered by the party is documentary (or at least an implied request for the ordering of an expert’s report) and, in the second, it is either testimony or a parole plea as to the facts.347 In principle, the ordering of an expert’s report is inconsistent with proceedings under TFEU, art 258.348 11.94 The decision to obtain an expert’s report is made by the Court in the form of an order setting out the facts to be proved after (at least in GC and CST proceedings) the parties have been given an opportunity to be heard.349 As in the case of any other measure of enquiry, the order may be made by the Court acting of its own motion or on application.350 The Court’s order appoints the expert, defines his task and sets a time limit for the making of his report.351 The Court may request the parties or one of them to lodge a security for the costs of the

341 Cases 24 and 34/58 Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie de l’Est v High Authority [1960] ECR 281. 342 Case 48/69 ICI Ltd v Commission [1972] ECR 619; see also Case 49/69 Badische anilin und Soda-Fabrik AG  v Commission, Case 51/69 Farbenfabriken Bayer AG  v Commission, Case 52/69 Geigy AG v Commission, Case 53/69 Sandoz AG v Commission, Case 54/69 Française des Matières Colorantes SA (Francolor) (now SA  Produits Chimiques Ugine Kuhlmann) v Commission, Case 55/69 Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG  v Commission, Case 56/69 Farbwerke Hoechst AG v Commission and Case 57/69 ACNA v Commission [1972] ECR 713, 745, 787, 845, 851, 887, 927 and 933, respectively. 343 Case C-169/84 Société CdF Chemie Azote et Fertilisants SA and Société Chimique de la Grande Paroisse SA v Commission [1990] ECR I-3083. 344 Cases C-89, C-104, C-114, C-116, C-117, C-125 to C-129/85  A  Ahlström Osakeyhtio v Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, paras 31–32 and 137–138. 345 Cases 29, 31, 36–47, 50 and 51/63 Laminoirs, Hauts Fourneaux, Forges, Fonderies et Usines de la Providence v High Authority [1965] ECR 911. 346 In Case 204/80 Procureur de la République v Vedel [1982]  ECR  465, a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court asked the French government to send a representative to the hearing, accompanied by an expert. 347 Cf Case C-136/02P MAG  Instrument Inc v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004]  ECR  I-9165, paras 76–77 (request that the author of an expert’s report produced by a party be heard orally treated as a request for the hearing of a witness). 348 Case 141/87 Commission v Italy [1989]  ECR  943 (para  17 and at 972, Advocate General Jacobs). 349 RP-ECJ, art  64(1); RP-GC, art  92(1)–(2); RP-CST, art  71(4), 2nd indent. In Case 318/81R Commission v CODEMI SpA [1982] ECR 1325 an expert was appointed as an interim measure, not a measure of enquiry. 350 In Pizziolo v Commission (above, note 340) the request was made in the Reply, see 973. 351 RP-ECJ, art 70(1); RP-GC, art 96(1); RP-CST, art 75(1).

942

Measures of enquiry 11.95

expert’s report.352 The order is then served on the parties, who have two weeks after service to make any objection to the appointment of the expert.353 They cannot complain about the other contents of the order. The objection is made in the same form and must be based on the same grounds as in the case of a witness; if an objection is raised within time, it is dealt with by the Court.354 The usual order is that the parties should, by a specified date, agree between themselves the person to be appointed as the expert and that, if they fail to agree, either the Court shall appoint one or more persons355 or there shall be two experts nominated by the parties.356 On the other hand, in Case 785/79 Pizziolo v Commission357 and, so it would seem, the Dyestuffs cases,358 the order was that, failing agreement between themselves, each party should send in its nomination, giving reasons for its objections to the other party’s proposal. In the event, the parties to the Pizziolo case proposed one expert each and agreed that they should nominate a third. The Court accepted that suggestion just as, in the Dyestuffs cases, it had accepted the parties’ agreement that there should be two experts.359 In Case 318/81 Commission v CODEMI360 the Court ordered that the report should be drawn up by a panel of experts and nominated the chairman of the panel, ordering him to choose the other members from lists of names submitted by the parties. In Case C-169/84 Société CdF  Chimie Azote et Fertilasants and Société Chimique de la Grande Paroisse SA v Commission361 the order underlines the appropriateness of agreement between the parties on the identity of the expert because, in the absence of agreement, they would each have to nominate one expert who together would nominate a third. Clearly, from the point of view of the costs involved, one expert is better than three. In Case T-169/89 Frederiksen v European Parliament362 the Court asked the parties to agree the expert but one of the parties contested the need for an expert’s report and did not co-operate in the nomination of an expert. In consequence, the Court appointed the expert of its own motion. 11.95 In CST proceedings (which follow what used to be provided in the ECJ and GC rules of procedure) the expert receives a copy of the order appointing him and is given all the documents necessary for carrying out his task; he is instructed to tell the truth and carry out his task conscientiously and impartially 352 RP-ECJ, art 73(1); RP-GC, art 100(1); RP-CST, art 78(1). 353 RP-ECJ, art 72(2); RP-GC, art 99(2); RP-CST, art 77(2). 354 RP-ECJ, art 72(1); RP-GC, art 99(1); RP-CST, art 77(1). 355 See, for example, Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie v High Authority (above, note 341) order of 26  June 1959 (unreported); Usines de la Providence v High Authority (above, note 345); Cases T-32 and 39/89 Marcopoulos v Court of Justice [1990] ECR II-281, paras 12–16. 356 Case 23/81 Commission v Royal Belge [1983]  ECR  2685, order of 9  December 1981 (unreported). 357 Above (note 340). 358 [1972] ECR 619, 713, 745, 787, 845, 851, 887, 927 and 933. 359 See [1972] ECR at 647; in Case 2/65 Preo e Figli v High Authority [1966] ECR 219 the Court assigned the conduct of preparatory enquiries to the Second Chamber, it heard the parties in camera and they agreed on the appointment of an expert (see at 224). 360 [1985] ECR 3693 (at 3696–3697). 361 [1990] ECR I-3083. 362 [1991] ECR II-1403, paras 36–41.

943

11.96  Measures of enquiry

and he is informed of the consequences provided for in his national law in the event of breach of those obligations.363 He is supervised by the judge-rapporteur, who is entitled to be present during his investigations and who is to be kept informed of his progress.364 The ECJ and GC rules of procedure move straight from the appointment of the expert to the production of his report; but it would seem that the CST rules of procedure reflect accurately what in practice happens in between.365 11.96 The expert himself has no powers of investigation. If, for example, he requires a document which is not in his possession or that of the Court, he must ask the Court to require its production unless the possessor is willing to disclose it at the expert’s own request.366 Similarly, he has no power to enter premises. The CST rules of procedure expressly provide367 that the CST may order witnesses to be examined by it, if the expert so requests, the examination following the usual rules. In the CODEMI case,368 however, (at a time when the ECJ rules of procedure were to the same effect as the CST rules of procedure) the ECJ’s order provided expressly that the board of experts could hear witnesses and call for the production of documents. 11.97 The expert’s opinion is restricted to the points expressly referred to in the order appointing him369 and is given in the form of a report which is served on the parties.370 The report should be submitted to the Court within the time limit set in the order but it would seem that the Court may extend the time if

363 RP-CST, art 75(2). Eg Mirossevich v High Authority (above, note 338) at 353. In Case 12/68 X v Audit Board [1970] ECR 291, the expert was to have access to the parties and both the defendant’s medical advisers and the applicant’s doctors were to give him all useful information; in Pizziolo v Commission (above, note 340) order of 30 November 1981 (unreported), the order specified that a copy of the Court’s judgment, the order appointing the experts and all pleadings and annexes should be served on the experts. 364 RP-CST, art 75(3). 365 RP-GC, art  97(1) does, however, require the President to instruct an expert to tell the truth and carry out his task conscientiously and impartially, in the same way as RP-CST, art 75(2) provides. 366 So, in Pizziolo v Commission (above, note 340) the experts approached the Court for additional documents. The Court, through the Registrar, then asked the parties if they agreed to their production (which they did) and also requested them to draw up a list of agreed documents. 367 RP-CST, art 75(4). 368 Above (note 360). 369 That is expressly provided in RP-CST, art 75(5). The ECJ and GC rules of procedure used so to provide. The same result seems to follow from RP-ECJ, art  70(1) and RP-GC, art  96(1). If a party wishes to object that the report goes beyond the scope of the matters on which the expert was ordered to report, he should raise the objection immediately (usually in written observations on the report). If any such objection is not raised until the hearing in the case, it may be dismissed as inadmissible: Case T-36/89 Nijman v Commission [1991]  ECR II-699, paras 30–31. 370 RP-ECJ, art 70(2); RP-GC, art 96(2); RP-CST, art 75(7). Where the report contains confidential matters, such as business secrets of one of the parties or a third party, a non-confidential version of the report may be prepared for disclosure to the parties: see Société CdF  Chimie Azote (above, note 361) at 3085–3086, where the Court sent the non-confidential version prepared by it to the experts for their approval before serving it on the parties.

944

Measures of enquiry 11.98

so requested.371 It does not seem that the President alone has power to extend time because the original time limit is contained in a Court order and the Rules of Procedure give him no express authority to override it.372 No formal requirements as to the contents of the report are laid down. Where more than one expert has been appointed, the report is the report of them all. That does not mean that the experts must be unanimous: the practice of appointing an uneven number of experts indicates that the report may be based on the opinion of the majority. After presenting his report the expert takes the following oath in the presence of the Court: ‘I swear that I have conscientiously and impartially carried out my task’.373 However, after hearing the parties, the Court may exempt the expert from taking the oath374 and, as in the case of witnesses, the oath may be taken in the manner laid down by the expert’s own national law.375 11.98 The Court may, after the presentation of the report, order that the expert be examined.376 In that event, the parties are given notice to attend the examination, which is conducted as if the expert were a witness and may be ordered by letters rogatory.377 The parties may also be allowed to submit written observations or questions. The expert is examined on his report but not on matters falling outside the definition of his task contained in the order appointing him. The procedure for examining an expert varies from case to case.378 In Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie v High Authority379 the Court allowed the parties and the advocate general time to put written questions to the expert and the latter gave written replies. In Usines de la Providence v High Authority380 only the defendant thought it necessary to submit observations on the expert’s report. There was then an examination in open court under what is now RP-ECJ, art 70(2), at which the expert presented an oral report on the defendant’s observations and took the oath. Subsequently he wrote a letter to the Court containing certain corrections he wished to be made to his report in the light of the oral examination. X v Audit Board and the Dyestuffs cases381 followed a similar pattern but, in Case 18/70 X v 371 See Usines de la Providence v High Authority (above, note 345) at 934. 372 RP-ECJ, art 52(1) is silent on the point. RP-GC, art 61(1) provides only that the person who has prescribed a time limit under the Rules of Procedure may extend it. RP-CST, art  39(1) empowers the President to extend time limits for lodging procedural documents and the judgerapporteur to set time limits for replies to measures of organisation of procedure. An expert’s report is neither. 373 RP-ECJ, art 71(1); RP-GC, art 96(5); RP-CST, art 75(6). 374 RP-ECJ, art 71(2); RP-GC, art 96(6); RP-CST, art 75(6). 375 Statute, art 28; RP-GC, art 97(2). 376 In the Société CdF Chimie Azote case (above, note 361) at 3085–3086, the parties were asked for their views on whether or not the experts should give oral evidence and take the oath. They did not consider that either step was necessary and did not formulate any question on the report to be put to the experts. 377 Statute, art  29; RP-ECJ, art  70(2); SR-ECJ, art I–3, RP-GC, art  96(2) and 101; RP-CST, art 75(7) and 79. As to letters rogatory, see paras 11.90–11.92 above. 378 Useful descriptions of the procedure followed may be found in Cases T-32 and T-39/89 Marcopoulos v Court of Justice [1990] ECR II-281, paras 12–16; Nijman v Commission (above, note 369), para 11 ff; Frederiksen v European Parliament (above, note 337), para 34 ff. 379 Above (note 317) see at 292. 380 Above (note 345) see 933–934. 381 Above, notes 339 and 358 respectively, see pp 293 and 648 respectively.

945

11.99  Measures of enquiry

Council,382 due to the sensitivity of the evidence, the expert gave his presentation and was extensively examined and cross-examined by the parties at the hearing in camera. After he had made his observations and taken the oath, the hearing was resumed in public. 11.99 The function of an expert is basically to give an opinion on questions of fact but, on occasion and depending on the scope of his remit, he may be called on to examine questions of mixed fact and law. His conclusions do not constitute a decision on the matters submitted for his consideration but evidence of how they are to be resolved.383 It remains for the Court to decide the question, taking account of all the evidence including the expert’s report and whether or not the expert has followed the right approach in law.384 The Court is not bound by his conclusions and may review them.385 In Société CdF Chemie Azote386 the Court accepted the findings in the report because it contained ‘detailed and consistent reasoning…based on precise information’. The Court may also decide that a further report should be ordered.387 A party cannot rely upon evidence (such as the testimony of a witness) in order to undermine the conclusions of an expert unless that evidence was offered at an earlier stage in the proceedings (and erroneously left out of account) or could not have been offered before the expert made his report.388 11.100 The same sanctions apply to an expert who breaks his oath as to a witness.389 Where an expert is unable to produce his report, the Court may have recourse to a different measure of enquiry in order to obtain the evidence sought.390 Like witnesses, experts are entitled to have their travel and subsistence expenses reimbursed391 and to fees in respect of their services.392 The former may be paid in advance but the latter are paid only after the expert has performed the

382 [1972] ECR 1205 at 1207 and 1212. 383 Cf De Nicola (above, note 28), para 265 (an expert may be asked to deal with factual or technical matters but cannot be entrusted with making a decision on an issue in the case, particularly if it involves some exercise of discretion by the Court). 384 For example, in Commission v CODEMI (above, note 349) at 3701, Advocate General Slynn accepted a finding made by the experts because it ‘followed the right approach’ when calculating the sums due. 385 See, for example, Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie v High Authority (above, note 341) at 310 ff, and Usines de la Providence v High Authority (above, note 345) at 940. In A Ahlström Osakeyhtio v Commission (above, note 344), Advocate General Darmon thought that the opinion of the experts was doubtful and that it was therefore difficult for the Court to base its judgment on it (see paras 432–433 of his Opinion); but the Court concluded that the experts’ report could be relied on. 386 Above, note 361, para 31. 387 This was done in the Dyestuffs cases (above, note 358) see 667. 388 Nijman v Commission (above, note 369), paras 26–29. 389 Statute, art 30; SR-ECJ, art 6; RP-GC, art 98; RP-CST, art 76. 390 Cf Cases T-33 and T-74/89 Blackman v European Parliament [1993]  ECR II-249, para  18, where, for some reason, the experts appointed by the Court were unable to contact each other and produce a report. The Court therefore ordered certain persons to be heard as witnesses. 391 RP-ECJ, art 73(2); RP-GC, art 100(2); RP-CST, art 78(2). 392 RP-ECJ, art 73(3); RP-GC, art 100(3); RP-CST, art 78(3).

946

Measures of enquiry 11.102

task entrusted to him.393 In ECJ proceedings, a request for their payment should be made to the Registrar but, if he considers the request to be excessive, he may reduce it of his own motion or order payment by instalments and there is no express provision for an appeal against his decision.394 In GC and CST proceedings, the Registrar pays the expert’s fees and expenses on the basis of a fee note issued by the expert and any dispute is referred to the President for a decision.395

VIII INSPECTION OF THE PLACE OR THING IN QUESTION 11.101 An inspection may be ordered in the same way as any other measure of enquiry. In GC and CST proceedings, it may be ordered only after the parties have been given an opportunity to be heard.396 The object of inspection is to enable the Court to appreciate a relevant fact at first hand. No precise rules are laid down for the conduct of an inspection. 11.102 There seem to have been only two occasions on which the Court has inspected a place.397 In Case 14/59 Société des Fonderies de Pont-à-Mousson v High Authority398 the problem before the Court was whether molten pig iron was a product covered by the ECSC  Treaty and whether the Treaty covered foundries. The Court decided to inspect the foundry premises and wished to see it in action. The inspection took place with the parties and their representatives present. The Court requested that technicians employed by both parties should also be present to explain the manufacturing process and answer any questions that might be put by the Court or the parties’ representatives. Advocate General Lagrange regarded the visit as ‘interesting and amply commentated’.399 In Cases 42 and 49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority400 the Court inspected the premises of two steel undertakings which had intervened in the case, which put in issue the criterion of ‘local integration’ adopted by the High Authority for the administration of the scrap equalisation scheme, ie whether group scrap was ‘own arisings’ or ‘bought scrap’. At the time of the inspection, which seems to have followed the same format as the inspection in the Pont-à-Mousson case, questions were asked of the interveners and statements made. The value of the inspection was expressed by Advocate General Lagrange401 in these terms: ‘As regards the technical aspects of integration, they are well known to the Court because of the complete explanation which it received during its visit to the premises and from

393 Ibid. 394 IR-ECJ, art 21. 395 PD-GC, paras 40–41; IR-CST, art 13(2)–(3). 396 RP-GC, art 92(2); RP-CST, art 71(4), 2nd indent. 397 By 1983, three, according to Van Houtte Cahiers de Droit Européen (1983) p 3 at p 21 (no more up to date statistic appears to be available). 398 [1959] ECR 215 at 224. 399 Ibid at 237. 400 [1961] ECR 53, see at 72, 84–85 and 87. 401 Ibid at 100.

947

11.103  Measures of enquiry

the memories which it has no doubt retained regarding that visit which was so interesting in every respect’. 11.103 Inspection of a thing by way of a measure of enquiry is comparatively rare;402 more often a party volunteers to produce an article for the Court’s information. That mostly happens in tariff classification cases. By way of example, the Court has been shown gramophone records,403 a laughing sack404 and various items made from what was alleged to be artificial stone.405 The Court does not, in general, refuse to admit things which a party proffers as evidence to illustrate a point in his argument but it is sparing in the exercise of its power to call for production of a thing. In consequence, if a party wishes to have something inspected by the Court, it is often better simply to lodge the item in question at the Registry, preferably before the hearing.406 The other parties are, of course, allowed to inspect it.

402 In Case 22/76 Import Gadgets Sàrl v LAMP SpA [1976] ECR 1371, the Court requested one of the parties to produce for inspection a ‘laughing device’ which Advocate General Warner described in his opinion as ‘a small battery-powered gadget, in a pink plastic casing, which, when a button on it is pressed, makes a noise like human laughter. In the case of this particular specimen the laughter was masculine and somewhat sardonic’ (see 1377). Similarly, in Case 798/79 Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau v Chem-tec [1980] ECR 2639 (see 2648) the Court asked for a specimen of the disposable gas-masks in dispute and received a box of several assorted varieties, some of which were demonstrated to the Court at the hearing. 403 Case 51/75 EMI Records v CBS United Kingdom Ltd [1976] ECR 811. 404 The Import Gadgets case (above, note 402) see 1379. 405 To wit, a large slab, a triangular piece of broken slab, a basin with plastic overflow pipe attached and a statue of a tiger: Case 234/81 Du Pone de Nemours Inc v Customs and Excise Comrs [1982] ECR 3515. 406 In particular if the item is not known to the other parties. In tariff classification cases, however, the item is generally a sample and the other parties usually have knowledge of what it is like. It is sufficient, then, to bring the sample along to the hearing (as was done in Case 317/81 Howe and Bainbridge BV  v Ober-finanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main [1982]  ECR  3257; a bale of sailcloth in its wrappings).

948

Chapter 12

Exclusion of evidence

I INTRODUCTION 12.1 Evidence is produced to the Court and disclosed to the parties. On occasion a party objects either to producing evidence or to its disclosure to another party; it also happens that a party seeks to have excluded from the proceedings evidence which has already been produced to the Court or disclosed to the parties.1 Both situations are dealt with here. The Court is concerned only with evidence that is relevant to an issue in the case and will not, therefore, consider irrelevant evidence when reaching a decision, even though it may have been disclosed and form part of the file of the case.2 In consequence, objections to the production or disclosure of evidence, in theory, arise only in connection with relevant evidence, whereas an application to remove evidence from the file may also concern irrelevant evidence which the Court will not, in any event, consider but which may, for example, be confidential. The removal of evidence from the file requires a positive step to be taken by the Court and is not usually justified simply because the evidence is irrelevant (where that is the case). There must be some additional reason why the Court should order its removal.3 On the other hand, there is no obvious reason at all why any relevant evidence should be removed from the file. The removal of such evidence could, logically, be based only upon some particularly important principle capable of overriding the proper administration of justice. Therefore, cases concerning the removal of evidence from the file usually involve a combination of two factors: the relevance or lack of relevance of the material and the additional factor relied upon to justify

1 It should be noted that a distinction is to be drawn between the exclusion of evidence from consideration in a case because, for example, it is irrelevant and the exclusion of evidence from the proceedings. The former requires no formal step on the part of the Court and usually follows as a matter of course from the nature of the evidence; it relates to the substance of the case. For example, in Case C-343/87 Culin v Commission [1990] ECR I-225 (para 15 and at 234, Advocate General Mischo) a later correction made to the statement of reasons in the contested decision was simply left out of account (because it was submitted after the commencement of proceedings and, in consequence, could not be admissible as evidence of the reasoning followed when the decision was made). The latter requires a formal Court order and relates not to the substance of the case but to the procedural admissibility of the evidence in question (that is, its inclusion in the file of the case). 2 Cf Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Coöperative Vereniging Suiker Unie UA v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, para 327. 3 Eg Case T-324/05 Estonia v Commission [2009] ECR II-3681, para 58.

949

12.2  Exclusion of evidence

excluding the evidence.4 As the value of the evidence to the proceedings rises from irrelevance and through the various degrees of relevance (slight, important and, ultimately, essential), so the importance of that additional factor must rise if there is to be any justification for excluding material from the case file.

II

THE POWER TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE

A

The general rule of disclosure and its exceptions

12.2 The Court has power to withhold secret or confidential documents from an intervener in direct actions5 but the general rule is that all evidence must either be disclosed to the main parties or left out of account altogether. The basis for that approach is that a party’s rights cannot be determined on the basis of evidence which has not been disclosed to him or her; but, as the judgment will not, in principle, determine the rights of an intervener, there is no objection in principle to the withholding of evidence from him (or her). 12.3 As the Court put it in SNUPAT v High Authority:6 ‘It would infringe a basic principle of law to base a judicial decision on facts and documents of which the parties themselves, or one of them, have not been able to take cognisance and in relation to which they have not therefore been able to formulate an opinion’. For that reason, the Court was not willing in that case to accept conditions which were sought to be imposed on the production of a relevant document.7 Similarly, in Case 6/81 Industrie Diensten Groep BV v J A Beele Handelmaatschappij BV,8 a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court refused to accept a written answer 4 Hence the statement in Case T-48/05 Franchet v Commission [2008] ECR II-1585, paras 74–75, Estonia (above, note 3), para 51, and Case T-149/09 Dover v Parliament [2011] ECR II-69*, para 61 (on appeal, on different issues, Case C-278/11P Dover v Parliament, 12 July 2012), that neither confidentiality nor impropriety in the obtaining of evidence is, in itself, a reason for excluding evidence from the case file. It is not clear how GC statements that impropriety is not a ground for excluding evidence stand against the ECJ’s observation in Cases C-238/11P, C-489/11P and C-498/11P Siemens AG v Commission, 19 December 2013, para 128, that the admissibility of evidence cannot be contested where it has been obtained lawfully. 5 RP-ECJ, art 131(2)–(4); RP-GC, art 144(4), (5) and (7); RP-CST, art 87. 6 Cases 42 and 49/59 [1961] ECR 53 at 84, followed in, for example: Case C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 4  June 2013, paras 55–56; Case C-280/12  P  Council v Fulmen, 28  November 2013 (upholding Cases T-439/10 and T-44/10 Fulmen v Council, 21 March 2012). The principle is now stated in RP-GC, art 64 and RP-CST, art 47(1). 7 One of the interveners wished to rely on the terms of a contract but did not want it to be shown to the applicant and another intervener, who were its competitors. It said that it was willing to reveal the document to any person bound by professional secrecy, in the presence, if need be, of the judge-rapporteur, or to the High Authority. The Court applied the same rule to proceedings before the Commission in competition investigations: see Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para 14. See also Case T-145/98 ADT Projekt Gesellschaft der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Tierzuchter mbH v Commission [1999] ECR II-2627 (Commission ordered to produce documentation, for which it had claimed confidential treatment, so that the opposing party could see an unexpurgated version). 8 [1982] ECR 707. See also Case 236/81 Celanese Chemical Co Inc v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 1183.

950

Exclusion of evidence 12.4

to a request made by it for the disclosure of information because the party submitting the answer objected to it being served on the opposing party. The Court asked for a document to be produced which could be served on all the parties.9 Where, on the other hand, the information which a party wishes to keep confidential is only of peripheral importance from the point of view of the evidential value of a document, the Court may agree to the information being suppressed. For example, in Case C-64/88 Commission v France,10 the applicant relied on certain reports in order to establish its case against the defendant but claimed confidentiality for the reports on the ground that confidential treatment was necessary in order to guarantee the future effectiveness of its inspectors and protect the third parties referred to in the reports. The Court therefore asked the applicant to produce non-confidential versions of the reports for use in the proceedings. The defendant claimed that the non-confidential versions could not be relied on because it was unable to identify the incidents mentioned in them. That objection was dismissed on the ground that the omissions from the reports were not such as to prevent the defendant from carrying out cross-checks against its own reports. Thus, in that case, the material omitted from the reports produced for use by the Court and disclosure to the other party did not prevent the other party from defending itself.11 Evidence which is withdrawn or excluded in that way is not considered by the Court. 12.4 The exception to the rule requiring full disclosure as between the main parties, which applies against interveners, but not, as the SNUPAT case shows, in their favour, is justified only because of the intervener’s ancillary role in a direct action. In the course of time, further exceptions have emerged. In GC proceedings, there may be non-disclosure of confidential material as between the main parties in joined cases (that is to say, as between – usually – the applicants in each joined case); in proceedings concerning the legality of a refusal to give access to a document, the document in question is not disclosed to the applicant; and, where a main party claims that disclosure to the opposing party of relevant information or material would harm the security of the EU or that of one or more of the member states or the conduct of international relations, the material in question may be withheld from the opposing party but taken into account by the GC.12 In addition to interveners, the first and second of those exceptions also apply in CST proceedings.13 The exception relating to joined cases is not a true exception to the rule. Cases are joined for procedural convenience; joinder does 9 It construed ‘opposing party’ to mean, in this context, all parties within the meaning of what is now art 23 of the Statute. In the Celanese case the Court rejected a ‘confidential’ pleading. 10 [1991] ECR I-2727 (para 11 and at 2736, Advocate General Lenz). 11 See also Case 30/78 Distillers Co Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 2229, where the applicant asked that certain figures mentioned in a written reply to a request for information be kept confidential so the Court simply deleted them from the text. 12 RP-GC, art 64, which cross-refers to RP-GC, art 68(4) (joined cases), 104 (actions contesting a refusal to give access to a document), 105(8) (disclosure harming security or international relations) and 144(7) (disclosure to an intervener). The situation contemplated in RP-GC, art 103 is not listed as an exception to RP-GC, art 64. 13 RP-CST, art  47(1), which cross-refers to RP-CST, art  44(3) (joined cases) and 87(3) (intervention); and RP-CST, art 47(3) (contested denial of access to a document).

951

12.5  Exclusion of evidence

not result in a merger of the rights and interests of the parties to the different joined cases. Hence, it is logical to permit a party to one of the joined cases to claim confidential treatment of relevant material as against a party to one of the other joined cases. The exception relating to documents whose non-disclosure is actually the subject-matter of the action follows from the nature of the proceedings: the disclosure of the document would effectively decide the case in favour of the applicant. The one true exception is therefore non-disclosure of material whose communication would harm security or the conduct of international relations because, in such a case, a judicial decision will be based upon material to which a main party will not be given access.14 12.5 The cases indicate that the Court alone has the power to derogate from the general rule that all evidence must be disclosed and the parties themselves are not entitled to withhold evidence or attach conditions to its disclosure unilaterally. Evidence may be withheld from an intervener but, in the absence of express provision otherwise, evidence may not be withheld from a main party unless it is of no evidential significance to the issues in the case or the party consents to the Court taking into account material that has been withheld from that party.15 Evidence which is excluded for some reason is excluded totally and is treated, for the purposes of the case, as being non-existent, unless there is express provision otherwise.

B

Limited disclosure

12.6 A  party may apply for confidential treatment for documents which it wishes to produce to the Court. The Court has discretion whether or not to accede to such a request but, where the request is accepted in principle by the other parties, it is apprehended that the Court would not reject it. The effect of confidential treatment is (usually) simply that the documents in question may be disclosed only to the other parties to the proceedings, who are bound not to show or pass on the information contained in them to third parties, and not to the interveners; in addition, the information contained in them will not be included in the publicly available copy of the judgment or be made public in the report of the case. Other forms of limited disclosure are disclosure only to the opposing party’s representative and disclosure only in the offices of the Registry; and disclosure only to the Court itself. Those other forms of limited disclosure are ordered relatively rarely.16 12.7 In the leading ECJ case concerning confidential treatment, Celanese v Council and Commission,17 the ECJ ordered that its President should decide upon 14 For the procedure to be followed in such cases, see Ch 9, paras 9.21–9.31. 15 Eg Case T-299/05 Shanghai Excell M&E  Enterprise Co Ltd v Council [2009]  ECR II-565, para 29. 16 For an example, see Case F-50/09 Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 12 May 2011, paras 45–69 (on appeal on different grounds, Case T-401/11P Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, 10 July 2014). 17 Above, note 8: the proceedings were later discontinued.

952

Exclusion of evidence 12.8

any requests for confidential treatment after examining the documents in question and hearing the views of the other parties. If he refused to grant confidential treatment, the party applying could withdraw the documents, in which case they could not be relied on at all in the proceedings. The ECJ, however, reserved the right to exclude from the file those documents which, if it considered them, would have to be made public in the judgment or the advocate general’s opinion. The effect of exclusion would be that the documents concerned would be ignored completely. 12.8 In GC and CST proceedings, the position is more complex. In principle, the Celanese case applies. In addition, in the case of information or material that a main party is requested to produce by a measure of enquiry ordered by the GC under RP-GC, art 91(b), an application may be made for the information or material, or parts of it, not to be communicated to another main party on the ground of its confidentiality.18 The process involves the production of the information or material in question to the GC, which does not communicate it to the opposing party before it has reached a decision on the claim for confidential treatment. The GC then scrutinises the claim. If the information or material for which confidential treatment is sought is not relevant, there is in principle no difficulty because the material should be capable of disclosure in a non-confidential form that does not result in the non-disclosure of anything that is relevant to the proceedings. If, on the other hand, the information or material for which confidential treatment is sought is relevant, the question whether or not it can or should be disclosed to the opposing party is determined by weighing the confidentiality of the information or material against the requirements of effective judicial protection and, in particular, observance of the adversarial principle; and consideration is given to the modalities of effecting disclosure in such a way as to preserve confidentiality as much as possible, such as the use of confidentiality rings or the disclosure of a non-confidential summary. If the material is particularly important, the claim for confidential treatment may be overridden. Where it is decided that the information or material should not be disclosed to the opposing party, it is ignored for the purposes of the proceedings.19 Effectively the same procedure is followed by the CST.20 That procedure is appropriate, in particular, for material, only parts of which are confidential, where the party applying for confidential treatment is content for the remainder of the material to be disclosed to the opposing party. The procedure is less useful where it leads to non-disclosure of relevant material that would assist the opposing party; and it does not apply where a party asserts confidentiality as against the Court itself, rather than (or in addition to) asserting it against the opposing party.21

18 RP-GC, art 103(1). For the procedure followed, see Ch 11, para 11.56. 19 RP-GC, art 103 is not listed as one of the exceptions to the adversarial principle in RP-GC, art 64. The GC’s commentary on its draft rules is to the same effect. 20 RP-CST, art 47(2). 21 Case T-510/09P V v Commission, 15 June 2011, para 75. Only some grounds for confidential treatment can be invoked against the Court.

953

12.9  Exclusion of evidence

12.9 Where a party wishes to rely on evidence, and have it taken into account by the Court, but does not wish it to be communicated to the opposing party, or where the evidence would be of assistance to the opposing party, the only procedure currently available is that under RP-GC, art 105 which, as noted above, applies where it is claimed that communication of the information or material in question would harm security or the conduct of international relations. However, similar solutions have been reached pragmatically outside the context of RP-GC, art 105.22 The primary concern in such cases is not met by limiting access to the material to the main parties and refraining from including mention of the material in the version of the judgment that is made available to the public. The concern lies in the mere fact of disclosure to the opposing party (including his representatives) and to Court staff who may not have acceptable security clearance.23 12.10 The Court does not accept claims to confidential treatment at face value but will require a claim to be justified and, where necessary, will carry out its own assessment of the claim.24 The fact that, for the purposes of the proceedings, a party has waived the right to claim confidential treatment for a particular adminicle as against the opposing party does not preclude him seeking confidential treatment as against an intervener and in order to prevent publication of the information in question in the judgment and report of the case.25 In principle, as illustrated by the procedure followed in Celanese, the members of the Court who vet information or material for which confidential treatment is sought should not be involved in the final decision in the case; but the contrary appears to be often the case. It is usually said that judges (and advocates general) have trained minds and can exclude from their reasoning processes material that should not be taken into account; but the fact remains that the ability of trained minds to exclude material that has already entered their consciousness is very much exaggerated and, as there is no means of controlling the thought processes of the individuals deliberating on a case, justice cannot be said to be seen to be done if the individuals deciding a case have actually seen material that they should not take into account.26

22 Missir Mamachi di Lusignano (above, note 16) appears to have been such a case (see paras 150–157). 23 See further Ch 9, para 9.19 ff. 24 Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission [1990] ECR II-163, paras 10–11; Cases T-1 to T-4 and T-6 to T-15/89 Rhône-Poulenc v Commission [1990] ECR II-637, paras 22–25. 25 Hilti AG v Commission (ibid), paras 1214. 26 Missir Mamachi di Lusignano (above, note 16), para  46, can be explained on a number of grounds. The Commission had simply refused to produce part of the evidence and another part had been disclosed to the Court only in the form of extracts (which were themselves claimed to be confidential). The Commission resisted disclosure of the evidence essentially because of a potential threat of harm to third parties rather than because it was inappropriate to decide a question of fact by reference to the material (as is usually said to be the case with regard to lawyer-client confidences and medical secrecy). Further, the evidence tended to favour the applicant’s case and its exclusion would therefore have given an unjustified procedural advantage to the Commission.

954

Exclusion of evidence 12.11

C

Exclusion of evidence

12.11 A party may also apply for an adminicle to be excluded from consideration by the Court (often articulated as an application for information or material to be excluded from the case file). Article 33(7) of the old Rules of Procedure27 provided that the authenticity of a document could be challenged under what was then the equivalent of RP-ECJ, art 151. That procedure was used for the purpose of excluding an adminicle on the ground that it did not constitute relevant evidence.28 Although art 33(7) no longer forms part of the Rules of Procedure, it is still possible to bring before the Court under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(2) or RP-CST, art 83 a dispute concerning the admissibility of evidence.29 In Cases 18 and 35/65 Gutmann v Euratom Commission,30 for example, both parties referred to the Court, as a procedural issue, the question whether two written witness statements annexed to the rejoinder were admissible, although the matter was, in the event, settled between them. Similarly, in Case 25/68 Schertzer v European Parliament31 the defendant contested the validity and authenticity of certain documents produced by the applicant. The President ordered the originals of the documents to be produced and, after the defendant had submitted written observations, there was a hearing in camera as a result of which the Court authorised the documents to be lodged and the defendant was allowed to submit further observations.32

27 OJ 7 March 1953 p 37 at 44. 28 See Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954–56]  ECR  333; the applicant applied contesting the authenticity of two documents produced by the defendant. The latter subsequently waived reliance on the first document and the Court ordered an enquiry into the authenticity of the second (at 336). This was a translation which the defendant had produced in order to show that the applicant was obviously incapable to act as a translator. The applicant first claimed not to be the author of the document (she only made manuscript alterations to it: see 352) but then conceded that it was ‘legally authentic’, although it did not represent the true position. The authenticity of the document, ie whether it really was a translation into Italian made by the applicant from a French original, was proved by documents produced by the defendant and corroborating evidence from witnesses (at 343). The Court also obtained an expert’s opinion on the quality of the translation but that did not relate to the question of ‘authenticity’. In Case 22/59 Macchiorlatti Dalmas v High Authority, order of 17 November 1959 (unreported: the case was removed from the Register before judgment) the defendant produced in the course of proceedings a document which appeared to have emanated from the applicant. The latter applied to the Court for it to rule on the legal value of the document but no evidence was produced tending to invalidate it. The Court held that, in substance, the applicant wished it to rule on the issue to which the document related and rejected the application as inadmissible because matters relating to the substance of the case could not be decided in such proceedings. 29 See further Ch 6. It is not clear what was the basis for the application made in Case T-109/07  L’Oreal SA  v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2009] ECR II-675, para 12. 30 [1966] ECR 103 at 115. 31 [1977] ECR 1729 at 1732. 32 The proceedings were then stayed pending judgment in several actions brought before French courts, among them claims that the applicant had committed forgery and uttered a forged document. The latter were eventually dismissed.

955

12.12  Exclusion of evidence

12.12 In Case 30/78 Distillers v Commission33 the applicant applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 to have certain documents withdrawn from the file on the case. The Commission argued that the Court had no power to accede to that request but the latter held that the power to authorise withdrawal of documents is essential for the interests of the proper administration of justice. Some of the documents in question were not of importance to the case whereas others constituted ‘an essential part’ of the administrative procedure before the Commission and had been relied on in the proceedings before the Court. Withdrawal was therefore authorised only in regard to the former category.34 That was not the first case in which an application had been made to have certain documents excluded from consideration by the Court, although it was the first in which the Court’s power to do so was challenged and the Court expressly held that it existed. Under the old Rules of Procedure such a power was in any event implied in art 33(7), at least in the case of documents whose ‘authenticity’ was not upheld. Even after the removal of art 33(7) from the Rules of Procedure in 1960,35 the Court’s power to order the removal of documents from the file was unquestioned. 12.13 For example, in Case 28/65 Fonzi v Euratom Commission36 the Commission applied for an order that certain documents annexed to the reply be removed from the file. The Court ordered one of the documents in question to be excluded from consideration but reserved its decision on the rest of the application to the final judgment. The document initially removed from the file comprised draft minutes of a meeting of the Commission37 and its retention in the file was held to be ‘capable of amounting to a violation of the secrecy of the deliberations of the Commission … in a matter which is unconnected with the present dispute’. The reason why it was excluded was its lack of relevance rather than the fact that it was confidential. That follows from the order of the Court which required production of the Commission’s minute-book so that the Court could look at the minutes of the same meeting. Production of the minutes was ‘essential for the efficient administration of justice’ in order that the Court could be placed in possession of the authentic text of a decision in issue in the case. The procedure adopted was that the parties should attend before the judge-rapporteur; the Commission would produce the minute-book and the judge-rapporteur would make a copy of the relevant part. The other documents sought to be excluded were a copy of a report made by a private detective agency on the activities of two colleagues of the applicant prior to their employment by the Commission and a telex passing between two officials of the Commission.38 Advocate General Roemer took the view that neither document was relevant to 33 Above, note 11, order of 28 March 1979 (unreported), see p 2237 of the report. 34 The same approach was followed in Case 246/86 S C Belasco v Commission [1989] ECR 2117, order of 3  February 1988, paras 5–6, where the intervener applied for certain documents annexed to the reply to be excluded because they made adverse comments about a third party. The Court declined to exclude the documents because the matters in question were relevant to the case but it suppressed a part of one of the documents which was not important to the case. 35 See OJ 1960, pp 17 ff. 36 [1966] ECR 477 at 490, 492–493 and 506. 37 See ibid at 480 and 496. 38 See ibid at 480, 493 and 503.

956

Exclusion of evidence 12.14

a decision in the case but only the removal from the file of the report need be considered, if the Court also thought it to be irrelevant, because it was capable of prejudicing persons who were not parties to the proceedings.39 The Court decided that the report should be excluded because it was ‘capable of prejudicing third parties not involved in the present proceedings and unable to defend themselves’. On the other hand, it decided not to exclude the telex because it was relevant to the proceedings and ‘manifestly incapable of prejudicing the rights of third parties’.40 Exclusion of documents on the ground of their lack of relevance is relatively common.41 12.14 It is not, however, necessary to raise an objection to an adminicle formally under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(1) or RP-CST, art 83. In Cases 197–200, 243, 245 and 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling KG v Council and Commission42 the Commission objected at the hearing and the Court decided then and there that the document in question, which had been lodged by the interveners, should be withdrawn from the file and that the extracts from it reproduced in the body of the intervener’s observations should be considered ‘non-existent’. The document appears to have been a draft report prepared by officials of the Commission which was not approved by it and never submitted to the Council. The interveners said that it had been distributed at a meeting of the ‘Advisory Committee on Cereals’, which included representatives of the various industrial and trade sectors involved, and given to them by someone attending the meeting. The Commission’s view was that the document had been improperly obtained: at the meeting in question, there was an oral report but the document was not distributed because it had not been submitted to the Commission for its approval; furthermore, the front page of the copy placed before the Court, which would show its original and date etc, was missing. The interveners were unable to say who had given them the document and why it was incomplete. 39 Ibid at 503. 40 Ibid at 493. 41 For example, in Case 352/88 Commission v Ireland, order of 6 July 1989, the applicant applied to exclude an internal document of its own that was relied on by the defendant; the document was ordered to be excluded essentially because it related to a matter on which there was no issue in the case. in Cases C-116 and C-149/88 Hecq v Commission [1990]  ECR  I-599, order of 28 June 1989, the applicant had applied under what is now RP-ECJ, art 151 for the production of a document; the defendant produced it but claimed that it should be excluded from consideration; the Court excluded it because it added nothing useful to the case, without needing to rule on its confidential character. In Cases T-47 and T-82/89 Marcato v Commission [1989]  ECR II-231, order of 6  December 1989, and Case T-5/90 Marcato v Commission [1991]  ECR II-731, paras 3–5, various documents adduced by the defendant were excluded from consideration on application by the applicant because they related to events after the contested act and added nothing useful to the resolution of the dispute. In Case C-308/87 Grifoni v Euratom [1994] ECR I-343 (para 7; per Advocate General Tesauro, para 4), documents proving the applicant’s income were inadmissible because they contributed other information given previously. Other documents were admissible because they were produced at the Court’s request. The excluded documents were not relevant to the pleaded case. Documents produced in response to a request or order made by the Court are not normally excluded from the case file as irrelevant: eg Case T-68/05 Aker Warnow Werft GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR II-355, paras 25–26. 42 [1981] ECR 3211, paras 13–16 and at 3241.

957

12.15  Exclusion of evidence

12.15 Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat thought that it was going too far to say that persons can never make use of confidential and internal Commission documents because it was well known that such documents are frequently leaked and even published. It was ‘an exaggeration and a disregard of practice’ to say that that made any internal proposals or discussions impossible. As a result, the burden lies on the institution to show in each case that use of such documents is inadmissible. The document in question, however, apart from being confidential and internal, was also incomplete and its nature therefore confusing; the Commission’s view that the members of the Advisory Committee could not legitimately have taken cognisance of it was not rebutted by the interveners. He regarded those as the reasons for the Court’s decision to exclude the document from consideration. In its judgment the Court simply said that it found that ‘there exists…a doubt both as to the actual nature of the contested document and as to whether the interveners obtained it by proper means. In the circumstances, the document must be removed from the file, together with the quotations from it included in the intervening party’s statement’. Although neither the Court nor the advocate general relied expressly on it as a ground for excluding the document, it appears from the latter’s opinion that the report was ‘irrelevant as far as the formation of the Commission’s and Council’s definitive opinion is concerned’. 12.16 It appears that any party (including an intervener) may apply for an adminicle to be excluded either under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(1) or RP-CST, art 83 or by reference to the Court’s powers to direct and control the conduct of proceedings. So far as the former are concerned, while it seems that an intervener cannot raise a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the action,43 it would be excessively formalistic to say that he also cannot raise a procedural issue under RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(1) or RP-CST, art 83; and those provisions are not restricted in their scope of applications made by a main party. An intervener would nonetheless be best advised to make an application based on RP-ECJ, art 151, RP-GC, art 130(1) or, as the case may be, RP-CST, art 83 and the Court’s implied power to make the order, in the context of organising the procedure before it, in the alternative. It should be noted that, since the intervener must accept the case as he finds it at the time of his intervention,44 an intervener can probably apply to exclude evidence only if it has been placed before the Court after the intervention has been permitted. That again, however, is a point on which there is no authority. As can be seen from the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case, an application need not necessarily be made in writing under RP-ECJ, art 151. RP-GC, art 130(1) or RP-CST, art 83 but it would seem that there should be some justification for not raising the matter formally as a procedural issue. 12.17 The ability to apply for the exclusion of evidence without raising the matter as a procedural issue is particularly important in references for a prelimi-

43 See Ch 5, para 5.41 ff. 44 RP-ECJ, art 129(3); RP-GC, art 142(3); RP-CST, art 88(1).

958

Exclusion of evidence 12.19

nary ruling heard by the ECJ. Originally, such an application could be made as a procedural issue.45 When the ECJ rules of procedure were reshaped in 2012, the scope of procedural issues was limited to direct actions and, since then, there has been no express provision on which reliance can be placed in order to raise a procedural issue, like exclusion of evidence, in references for preliminary ruling. 12.18 There appear to be, in essence, two substantive grounds on which evidence may be excluded: lack of probative value and impropriety in its production. The fact that evidence contains scandalous material (in the sense that it is damaging to the reputation of a person) is not sufficient to justify the exclusion of the evidence (whether or not the scandalous material is true) if the evidence, or the parts of it containing the scandalous material, are relevant to the issues in the case.46 Mistaken production of evidence is also, in itself, insufficient to justify the exclusion of the evidence. Ordinarily, evidence produced by mistake will be excluded from the case file if, in addition, it is irrelevant and there is some prevailing reason why it should be removed from the file (usually its confidential nature).47

III

LACK OF PROBATIVE VALUE

12.19 Evidence may be excluded for lack of probative value where, for example, it lacks relevance or authenticity or is secret or confidential. Of those, the most important (in the sense of being the reason for lack of probative value encountered most frequently in practice) is lack of relevance: any adminicle which is irrelevant to the issues in a case is in principle capable of being excluded whether or not it is confidential. However, the simplest way of dealing with irrelevant material is to ignore it. Lack of relevance is not, therefore, of itself sufficient to take the further step of formally excluding an adminicle from the

45 Eg Case C-221/06 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten v Bundesminister fur Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft [2002] ECR I-2613, para 17, where the application was made under the predecessor to RP-ECJ, art 151. 46 Cf S  C  Belasco v Commission (above, note 34), paras 5–6. A  different view seems to have been taken in Case T-254/02  L  v Commission [2005]  ECR-SC  I-A-63, II-277, para  111 (on appeal, Case C-230/05P L v Commission [2006] ECR I-55*, [2006] ECR-SC I-B-2-7, II-B-245, para 88), where an application was made to remove a document from the case file on the ground that it was defamatory and the application was rejected because it was not considered to be so. On the other hand, the document appears to have been irrelevant anyway. 47 Eg Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96 Service pour le Groupement d’Acquisitions (SGA) v Commission [1999]  ECR II-3587, paras 14–15 and 24 (on appeal, Case C-39/00P SGA  v Commission [2000]  ECR  I-11201, paras 33–39); Case T-62/99 Societe de distribution de mecaniques et d’automobiles (Sodima) v Commission [2001] ECR II-655, paras 22–26.

959

12.19  Exclusion of evidence

case file.48 There must be some further reason for taking further steps to exclude it, such as that it is confidential or that it may prejudice third parties. Lack of authenticity comprises cases where an adminicle is found not to be genuine. Confidentiality may be included under the heading ‘lack of probative value’ because the claim that an adminicle is confidential constitutes in substance an assertion that, so far as concerns the proceedings in which the claim is raised, the adminicle is deprived of any probative value in deciding the case by reason of its secret or confidential nature.49 The exception to that arises under RP-GC, art 105, which provides for the placing of restrictions on the disclosure of secret or confidential material, primarily as against the opposing main party, but not the exclusion of such evidence (although exclusion may arise as a consequence of a decision made under RP-GC, art 105). Hitherto, claims of confidentiality have fallen into one of six categories: (1) national or EU security;50 (2) harm to the conduct of international relations;51 (3) business secrets;52 (4) administrative confidences;53 (5) medical secrecy;54 and

48 For example, in Case C-330/88 Grifoni v Euratom [1991] ECR I-1045 (para 10 and at 1058– 1059, Advocate General Tesauro) a legal requirement that an agreement be in writing rendered evidence of an oral agreement legally irrelevant; but the fact that such evidence could not be taken into account did not mean that it should be excluded from the Court file. Similarly, in competition cases, credible evidence which the Commission did not reveal to the undertaking concerned or on which the undertaking was not given an adequate opportunity to present its views during the course of the proceedings before the Commission, is inadmissible as proof of a fact found in the Commission’s decision: eg Cases 100–103/80 Musique Diffusion Française SA v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paras 29–30 and 65. Such evidence is therefore legally irrelevant; but that is a factor that goes to the substance of the case and not to the question whether or not such evidence should be formally excluded from the proceedings. 49 On the other hand, if a document is confidential in part only, that does not deprive the rest of the document of its probative value. Hence, steps may be taken to produce a non-confidential version of the document that can be used in evidence. If certain aspects of the document are confidential and cannot be disclosed (such as the identity of the author and the context in which the document came into existence), that may reduce the probative value of the non-confidential parts of the document that may be produced in evidence: cf Case C-411/04P  Salzgitter Mannesmann GmbH v Commission [2007] ECR I-959, paras 43–47 (which, although primarily relevant to the pre-litigation administrative stage, is also applicable in the context of an action before the Court). 50 See TFEU, art 346; RP-GC, art 105(1); Case 115/82 Commission v Italy (later withdrawn). 51 RP-GC, art 105(1). 52 Eg the SNUPAT case (above, note 6); BV  Industrie Diensten Groep v J  A  Beele Handelmaatschappij BV (above, note 8); Distillers v Commission (above, note 33); Celanese v Council and Commission (above, note 8). 53 Eg Fonzi v Euratom Commission (above, note 36); the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case (above, note 42). 54 Eg Case 18/70  X  v Council [1972]  ECR  1205 (see 1211); Case 155/78  M  v Commission [1980] ECR 1797.

960

Exclusion of evidence 12.21

(6) lawyer-client confidences.55 It is not excluded that other categories of confidentiality may be recognised by the Court on the basis of the principles common to the member states56 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.57 12.20 Confidentiality of whatever sort can be waived, in certain circumstances, by the person for whose benefit it exists.58 The waiver of confidentiality is a matter for the person concerned.59 It would seem that confidentiality is deemed to be waived as soon as an adminicle has been produced but it may be reasserted to exclude the adminicle if it is not relevant to a decision on the issues in the case.60 12.21 A different matter is the question whether confidentiality may be overridden by the Court. The confidentiality of business secrets and administrative confidences is not absolute and may be overridden where it is in the interests of the efficient administration of justice.61 The same seems to apply to medical secrecy; but the matter is not entirely clear.62 In A M & S v Commission, however, the Court defined the scope of lawyer/client confidentiality narrowly and linked it to the right to a fair trial.63 It is therefore arguable that confidentiality, as so defined, gives an absolute privilege unless it is waived. Confidentiality on grounds of national security is also absolute and cannot be overridden where it is based on TFEU, art 346 and as long as no ‘improper use’ has been made of the

55 Eg Case 155/79 A M & S v Commission [1982] ECR 1575. 56 See ibid at para 18. 57 In Case F-33/08 V v Commission [2009] ECR-SC I-A-1-403, II-A-1-2159, paras 113 and 116, the applicant seems to have based her claim to confidentiality in part on art 7 of the Charter and in part on medical secrecy. It is not clear to what extent the CST accepted the former ground. 58 For information protected by professional secrecy, see Cases 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission, 44/69 Buchler & Co v Commission and 45/69 Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v Commission [1970] ECR 661, 733 and 769 respectively; for medical secrecy, where the position is more complicated than the other categories of confidentiality recognised by the Court, see M v Commission (above, note 54); for lawyer-client confidences, see the A M & S case (above, note 55), para 28. 59 Cf V v Commission (above, note 21), paras 69–78, in which, at first instance, the CST left the waiver of confidentiality to the applicant, who declined to waive it. 60 That follows from the Distillers case (above, note 11). It does not apply where a document is produced for the purpose of deciding whether it may benefit from confidential treatment: see the A M & S and Celanese cases (above, notes 55 and 8, respectively). 61 Fonzi v Euratom Commission (above, note 36); Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank [1976] ECR 1613 at 1635 (Advocate General Warner). Since business secrecy is of less public importance than administrative confidentiality, it seems to follow that, if the latter can be overridden, so can the former. 62 Compare M  v Commission (above, note 54) with V  v Commission (above, note 21). In the latter case, neither the CST (at first instance) nor the GC (on appeal) considered that it could override the applicant’s claim to the confidentiality of certain documents on the ground of medical secrecy even though the documents were in the possession of the defendant and it wished to produce them to the Court. On the other hand, in Case T-376/02 O v Commission [2004]  ECR SC-I-A-349, II-1595, paras 48–49, the Commission simply annexed medical reports concerning the applicant to its defence, without drawing any criticism from the GC. 63 ‘The rights of defence’, see above (note 55), para 21 of the judgment.

961

12.22  Exclusion of evidence

privilege within the meaning of art 348. The same seems to apply to confidentiality based upon harm to the conduct of international relations. 12.22 Yet another different question is whether or not confidentiality may be invoked as against the Court itself. In one sense, confidentiality can be raised against the Court because a party in possession of a relevant document may simply refuse to produce it on the ground of confidentiality: the Court has very limited powers when faced with a straightforward refusal to divulge evidence.64 That is, however, a practical answer to the question. The legal answer is more complex. In general terms, nothing is confidential as between a party and the Court; confidentiality operates as between parties and as between them and the general public. That can be seen from the fact that, when a question of confidentiality arises, the confidential material is produced to the Court for it to decide on the disclosure of the material and on the modalities of disclosure.65 12.23 An adminicle is confidential by reason of the circumstances in which it came into existence, but only for so long as it is treated as being confidential: if it or its contents are published at large, confidentiality ceases even though it may originally have been confidential.66 On the other hand, the fact that an adminicle has been circulated to several people does not mean that it is no longer confidential as against the world: in Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck Sarl (FEDETAB) v Commission67 the Court held that ‘information in the nature of a trade secret given to a trade or professional association by its members and thus having lost its confidential nature vis-à-vis them does not lose it with regard to third parties’. The question whether or not something is secret or confidential is a matter for the Court, which is not bound to reach the conclusion that it is so by the terms of any confidentiality agreement or the treatment given to the material by another body.68 The types of confidentiality which have been considered by the Court may be briefly described as follows.

A

National and EU security

12.24 TFEU, art  346(1)(a) provides: ‘No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security’. That privilege is restricted to information relating to 64 See Ch 11, paras 11.21–11.22. 65 See paras 12.7–12.10 above. The same point is made in V  v Commission (above, note 21), para 73. 66 See, for example, the remarks of Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat in the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case (above, note 42); Case C-281/87 Commission v Greece [1989]  ECR  4015, para 10; Case T-198/01R[III] Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v Commission [2004] ECR II-1471, paras 28–29; Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v Commission [2010] ECR II-2805, para 25. 67 [1980]  ECR  3125, para  46. See also, by analogy, Case T-93/11 Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v Commission, 7  June 2013 (upheld on appeal in Case C-399/13P  Stichting Corporate Europe Observatory v Commission, 4 June 2015). 68 Case T-383/03 Hynix Semiconductor Inc v Council [2005]  ECR II-621, in particular, paras 38–40.

962

Exclusion of evidence 12.26

‘the essential interests’ of the security of a member state and does not, therefore, apply to all information relating to national security. Although the test of what is essential is subjective, the right to invoke art 346(1) may be reviewed by the Court under TFEU, art 348 at the suit of the Commission or any member state. No proceedings have ever been brought before the Court under that provision so it is a little difficult to define with authority what is the scope of the Court’s powers of review and, hence, the scope of the privilege to withhold information. It seems, nonetheless, that a member state is only entitled to refuse to supply information which falls within a class or category of matters, defined objectively by the Court in the light of the purpose and objectives of the Treaties and the principles common to the member states, relating to ‘security’. Secondly, the information in question must relate to the security of the member state invoking the privilege, not any other member state or a third country. That is a question which is also subject to review by the Court. Next, the information must concern the ‘essential interests’ of national security. It would appear that it is left to the member state concerned to define what are its ‘essential interests’ in the matter of its security and to determine whether the disclosure of information of such a nature as to comply with the three preceding criteria is ‘contrary’ to those interests.69 Nevertheless, the Court would be entitled to find that a member state was making improper use of the privilege if it were manifest that essential interests were not involved or that disclosure was not contrary to them. In the face of a judgment against it the member state could no longer withhold the information. 12.25 The parallel provisions in the EAEC Treaty are more elaborate because it is envisaged that information whose disclosure is liable to harm the defence interests of one or more member states is the subject of a security system to be elaborated in secondary legislation.70 Nonetheless, there is no express provision preventing, as a general rule, disclosure to the Court of matters subject to a security system, should the need arise, and that would, in any event, appear to be contrary to the nature of the system envisaged in the Treaty, which allows disclosure subject to observance of the appropriate security measures. That does not exclude the possibility that, in a particular case, disclosure may be prohibited; but that depends on the proper interpretation to be given to the relevant Treaty provisions and the secondary legislation applicable. So far as can be seen, no secondary legislation purports to prohibit disclosure to the Court. 12.26 The security of the EU and one or more of the member states is also referred to in RP-GC, art 105(1). In the context of that provision, it is the communication of the information or material in question that must pose a threat of harm to the security of the EU or one of the member states. Accordingly, the security issue may arise either from the content of the information or material, the form that it takes or the manner in which it was obtained. There is no difference in the nature of the security interest in question (as between the security 69 Cf Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, para 26. 70 Articles 24 ff and 194; see Council Regulation (Euratom) No 3 of 31 July 1958 (OJ 1958 p 408, English Special Edition, 1952–1958, p 63).

963

12.27  Exclusion of evidence

of the EU or of a member state). The only difference concerns the person or entity whose security is at issue: that of the EU or one of the member states. Where security is raised in the context of RP-GC, art 105, it need not relate to the security of the party raising the issue but can relate to the security of the person (whether the EU or a member state) from whom the information or material was obtained.71 12.27 A refusal to produce material on grounds of national security used to be rare. One of the few cases in which a party has declined to produce information or evidence on that ground is Case 115/82 Commission v Italy,72 an action brought under what is now TFEU, art 258 in which it was alleged, inter alia, that certain restrictions on the export of various types of sea-going vessel were prohibited by art 34 of the Treaty. Without expressly relying on TFEU, art 346(1), the Italian government attempted to justify the restrictions on the ground that the vessels in question were of military importance but refused to give any details on the basis that that would compromise national security. More recently, reliance on the threat to security has been raised in cases concerning the imposition of sanctions on persons or entities who support or are connected with persons, organisations or states who engage (or are believed to engage) in terrorism or other such acts;73 and in relation to security measures for the accommodation of EU staff in delegations falling within a particular risk category.74

B

Conduct of international relations

12.28 Harm to the conduct of international relations appears in RP-GC, art 105(1). Communication of the information or material must pose a threat of such harm. In principle, such a threat may arise from the content of the information or material, the form that it takes or the manner in which it was obtained, or, where the information or material was obtained from a third country or international organisation, as a result of any conditions or expectations regarding its disclosure that may have come into existence when it was first provided. For example, if information or material provided to the security services of a member state by a third country were to be disclosed, that might halt any further cooperation in security matters between that member state and the third country concerned. Information relating to the conduct of international relations includes or is capable of including: documents drawn up for the purpose of determining the policy to be pursued in regard to a third country or an issue affecting international relations (and the need to maintain such information confidential may

71 Cf RP-GC, art 105(1), last sentence. 72 Above (note 50). 73 Eg Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P Kadi v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351; ZZ (above, note 6), and Cases C-584/10P, C-593/10P and C-595/10P Commission v Kadi, 18 July 2013, which inspired RP-GC, art 105. 74 Missir Mamachi di Lusignano (above, note 16), paras 45–69 and 150–157.

964

Exclusion of evidence 12.29

subsist long after the events in question;75 documents revealing a disagreement between the EU institutions relating to a matter affecting international relations (but not documents disclosing the existence of a legal debate about the competences of the institutions).76 It is incumbent on the party relying on an effect on the conduct of international relations to show how disclosure of the information or material in question would or could be harmful.77

C

Business secrets

12.29 Save in the case of the withholding of evidence from an intervener78 or where different cases have been joined,79 there is no authority to the effect that relevant evidence may be withheld or excluded because it is a business or trade secret. The most that can be said is that, on the basis of the Distillers case, irrelevant or unimportant evidence may be excluded on that ground.80 That reflects the general nature of proceedings before the Court, in which the disclosure of business secrets in the course of the proceedings will normally be to a main party which is, in any event, bound to maintain the confidentiality of the material.81 Business secrets cover: information about prices and other factors affecting competition between undertakings that are not generally known;82 confidential know-how and information about production processes; information about business tactics and strategies.83 In order to determine whether or not an adminicle

75 See, by analogy, Case T-465/09 Jurasinovic v Council, 3 October 2012, paras 38–54 (on appeal, Case C-576/12P Jurasinovic v Council, 28 November 2013), where the documents related to events some 14 years before. 76 By analogy, Case C-350/12P Council v Sophie in ‘t Veld, 3 July 2014, paras 44–45. 77 By analogy, Sophie in ‘t Veld (above, note 77), paras 52–60 and 64–67. 78 Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission [1990] ECR II-163, paras 11 and 19–22. 79 Rhône-Poulenc v Commission (above, note 24), para 22. 80 The same would appear to be true, in general, for an adminicle which can be said to be confidential in nature. The true test of the strength of a claim to confidentiality is when it is made in order to justify the withholding or exclusion of relevant evidence. The decision in the Celanese case (above, note 6) which could be taken as suggesting that relevant evidence may be withheld or excluded because of business secrecy, was based in part on art  8 of Council Regulation No 3017/79 of 20 December 1979 (OJ No L339/1) and in part on the fact that the defendants conceded confidential treatment for the documents. As has been said, that took the form only of a ban on publication to interveners and third parties, it did not prevent disclosure to the Court or to the opposing parties. The case is exceptional because the Court allowed documents to be disclosed, on a conditional basis, for the purpose of deciding whether they were confidential and entitled to such treatment. Its decision not to take into account documents whose publication could not be avoided was the corollary to the confidential protection afforded to them. For those reasons, the case should be regarded as an application of the procedural rules relating to non-disclosure to an intervener and not as authority that the evidence in question could be withheld or excluded simply because it was a business secret. 81 See Ch 2, para 2.71. 82 Eg information about a party’s prices that was not public knowledge: Case C-66/90 Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV and PTT Post BV v Commission (reported sub nom Cases C-48 and C-66/90 Netherlands v Commission [1992] ECR I-565), order of 5 December 1990. 83 See generally: Case T-289/03 British Provident Association Ltd v Commission [2005] ECR II741; Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2006] ECR II-1747; Case T-336/04 TVDanmark A/S v Commission [2007] ECR II-491.

965

12.30  Exclusion of evidence

contains material that constitutes a business secret, account must be taken not only of the nature of the information in question, but also its age: some business secrets lose their character as such or the value of their remaining secret in a much shorter period of time than others.84

D

Administrative confidences

12.30 As far as administrative confidences are concerned, both the member states and the EU institutions appear to be in the same position but the problem of the disclosure of administrative confidences has arisen almost exclusively in relation to the latter.85 The Court’s jurisdiction over acts of the institutions necessarily means that administrative confidentiality cannot be raised against the Court itself or an order for production of evidence made by it. If that were not so, the institutions could in many cases prevent effective judicial review of their acts by withholding relevant evidence on the ground that it is confidential. The principle, therefore, is that, whatever the position regarding third parties, administrative confidences are not privileged from disclosure in proceedings before the Court. Case 260/80 Andersen v Council86 shows that there must be some further reason relating to the nature or content of an administrative confidence to justify excluding it from consideration or, semble, refusing to disclose it. It should be noted, however, that the Court does not have power to force disclosure. 12.31 Administrative confidentiality falls into two parts: confidences contained in internal communications; and confidences obtained from contacts with third parties. Internal communications are relevant in exceptional cases because an action is usually concerned with the final position adopted by an EU institution or body, including the facts, evidence and other considerations that support that final position, not earlier ruminations which often concern discarded lines of thought.87 In any event, openness is already provided for in the Charter and related second-

84 Cf the Hilti case, paras 19–22, and the Rhône-Poulenc case, para 23 (both above, note 24). 85 For an example of a case concerning national administrative confidences, see Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten (above, note 45) (internal legal opinions removed from the file). 86 [1984] ECR 177, paras 5–6. See also Franchet, para 74, and Case T-149/09 Dover, para 61 (both above, note 4). 87 Thus, a factual investigation preceding the making of the decision contested in the proceedings does not normally give rise to material that can be withheld from disclosure as an administrative confidence because it is intrinsically related to the merits of the decision. The ruling made by the CST in Case F-43/10 Cerafogli v European Central Bank, 12 December 2012, paras 221–222, which is relevant to that point, was specifically limited to the kind of inquiry there in question and was overturned by the GC in Case T-114/13 P Cerafogli v Commission, 23 September 2015, paras 42–50. The GC accepted that, when deciding on disclosure, the interest in obtaining the evidence could be weighed against the disadvantages of disclosure. The exceptions to the nondisclosure of administrative confidences include an allegation of misuse of powers: eg  Case T-230/94 Lopes v Court of Justice [1996] ECR SC-I-A-77, II-A-239, para 59.

966

Exclusion of evidence 12.31

ary legislation.88 The confidentiality of internal communications therefore arises where those provisions may not be relied upon in order to obtain disclosure. In those cases, confidentiality attaches because it is important from the perspective of good administration for there to be an internal expression of views, before the institution or body has fixed its position, that is not constrained by the concern that those views will be disclosed.89 Accordingly, not all internal documents necessarily attract confidentiality, even if their contents are not generally known.90 In that connection, internal legal advice is treated differently from other internal communication. The cases do not, generally, classify the confidentiality attaching to internal legal advice under the heading of lawyer-client confidentiality (the classification seems to remain that of administrative confidentiality) but assign the same justification for the confidentiality of internal legal advice as in the case of lawyer-client confidentiality: the public interest in the obtaining of independent legal advice and, hence, the need for there to be a frank exchange unimpeded by the concern that it might become public knowledge.91 If, therefore, internal legal advice has become known, it must still be excluded from the case file (unless it has been disclosed voluntarily to the opposing party).92

88 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, arts 41(2)(b) and 42; Regulation No 1049/2001. 89 Cf Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96 SGA, paras 14–15 and 24 (on appeal, Case C-39/00P SGA, paras 33–39) (both above, note 47); Sodima (above, note 47), paras 22–26. As can be seen from the remarks of Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat in Ludwigshafener Walzmühle (quoted above), there are differing views on the point. 90 The general position is that internal documents can be included in the case file: see Estonia (above, note 3), paras 50–58; Case T-149/09 Dover, para 62 (above, note 4). The Court will order disclosure only of the documents required in order to resolve the issues of fact in the case and will not order disclosure of superfluous confidential material: eg Case T-145/06 Omya AG v Commission [2009] ECR II-145, para 126. 91 Eg Case C-445/00 Austria v Council [2002]  ECR  I-9151, para  12 (EU institutions); Case T-357/03 Gollnisch v Parliament [2005]  ECR II-1, para  34; Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten (above, note 45), para  19 (national institutions; but note para  22 – the internal advice does not seem to have been relevant); Cases C-393/07 and C-9/08 Italy and Donnici v Parliament [2009] ECR I-3679, order of 29 January 2009 (unreported) in Case C-9/08, which also cites Cases C-39/05P and C-52/05P Sweden v Council [2008] ECR I-4723, para 42; Case F-43/10 Cerafogli (above, note 87), paras 225–231. It should be observed that internal legal advice, while no doubt interesting to read, is not generally relevant to any issue, whether of fact or law. It is not relevant to an issue of law because the law is determined by the Court; the views expressed internally within an institution (or by the services of a member state) represent what the provider of the legal advice thought not what the law actually is. Internal legal advice is not generally relevant to an issue of fact because the fact that a party has sought and received advice of a particular content is usually irrelevant. That fact might conceivably be relevant in a damages action, for the purpose of establishing that the unlawful conduct was a sufficiently characterised breach of EU law, or for the purpose of proving a misuse of powers. 92 Gollnisch (above, note 91), para  36; and, on voluntary disclosure, Case F-43/10 Cerafogli (above, note 87), paras 232–233. In Gollnisch, it was suggested that the Parliament’s internal advice had been disseminated to a number of members of the Parliament, including one of the applicants. The extent of the disclosure may not have been enough to deprive the advice of its confidentiality (see van Landewyck and the other cases cited in note 67 above).

967

12.32  Exclusion of evidence

12.32 Confidences obtained from contacts with third parties are often protected by the principle of professional secrecy.93 Therefore, unauthorised disclosure is prohibited as a matter of law.94 In both cases, the evidence is not privileged absolutely from disclosure in proceedings before the Court and the Court may require it to be produced, subject, if need be, to certain safeguards to protect the essential core of confidentiality.95 Although the EU regime governing transparency and the disclosure of internal administrative documents and information to the citizen does not apply directly in the context of proceedings before the Court, it has been regarded as being relevant to the balancing of the different interests at stake when an administrative confidence is the subject of a request either for disclosure in, or for exclusion from, proceedings before the Court;96 and it has also been held that the party producing an internal document without the consent of the author of the document should first have sought to obtain the evidence from the institution concerned and, if that has not been done, must show particular circumstances (including 93 See, for example, TFEU, art 339; art 28 of Regulation No 1/2003 (OJ 2003 No L1/1); the Staff Regulations, arts 17 and 19, set out in the Annex to Regulation 31/62 (OJ  145, 14.6.1962, p  1385), as amended from time to time (a consolidated version was published on 1  May 2014). The obligation in the parallel provision of the ECSC Treaty, art  47, applied whether the information was obtained lawfully or not: per Judge Donner in Case 31/59 Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia v High Authority [1960] ECR 98. 94 A  copy of a document covered by professional secrecy is not, however, privileged from disclosure and there is no objection to obtaining a copy of such a document by some means that permits its use in proceedings: eg Case T-655/11 FSL Holdings v Commission, 16 June 2015, paras 66–70 (in that case, the original communication of the documents in question to the Commission does not appear to have been covered by professional secrecy under EU or national law or made in an irregular manner or subject to any conditions as to the use that could be made of the documents: see paras 71–90). 95 See Case 2/54 Italy v High Authority [1954–56] ECR 37 at 42 (internal communications) and Cases 36–38 and 40/59 Geitling v High Authority [1960] ECR 423 at 437 (professional secrecy) – in both cases the Court allowed the persons who had uttered the confidences to remain anonymous; Case T-114/13 P Cerafogli (above, note 87), para 43. In Italy v High Authority it described that as an ‘exceptional measure’. The same expedient was used by the Commission in Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paras 16–19, but it is unclear whether that was done with the permission of the Court, although the information was revealed pursuant to a request made by it. The Court’s unwillingness to exclude administrative confidences unless there is good reason can be seen from Andersen v Council (above, note 86). Internal legal advice appears to be treated no differently in that respect: in Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten (above, note 45), para 19, the ECJ made the confidentiality of internal legal advice expressly subject to the possibility of the Court ordering disclosure. 96 Eg Donnici (above, note 91), order of 29  January 2009, paras 17–18. In that case, it was considered that the document (internal legal advice), which had been disclosed by the applicant, should be excluded from the proceedings (subject to the possibility of the applicant requesting its disclosure by means of a measure of enquiry) because admitting the document would amount to a circumvention of the regime for the disclosure of documents under Regulation No 1049/2001. It was considered that the applicant’s private interest in relying on the document did not outweigh the public interest in non-disclosure because of the Parliament’s interest in being able to obtain frank legal advice. That suggests that, if the Court had ruled on the applicant’s request for production of the document by way of a measure of enquiry (which became otiose because of the way in which the action was eventually disposed of), it would have rejected the request. That would remove what would otherwise be an oddity in the case: the exclusion from the file of material that was known to both parties in the case.

968

Exclusion of evidence 12.33

but not limited to the decisive nature of the evidence for resolving an issue in the proceedings) in order to justify retaining the evidence in the case file.97 It is worth nothing that, under art 19 of the Staff Regulations,98 the duty binding officials of the EU institutions not to disclose in legal proceedings information obtained in the performance of their duties without permission from the appointing authority, does not apply where the official concerned is giving evidence before the Court; but that dispensation seems to apply only in cases concerning officials or former officials.

E

Medical secrecy

12.33 Medical secrecy has come up for consideration in staff cases in the context of the obligation binding the appointing authority to give reasons for any decision adversely affecting an official or servant of an institution.99 The Court has held that the obligation to give reasons is tempered by the confidentiality of medical secrets, which means that, save in exceptional circumstances, it is left to the individual doctor to decide whether to communicate to those whom he is treating or examining the nature of the condition from which they may be suffering.100 The need to give reasons is satisfied if the person concerned requests the information to be imparted to another doctor of his own choice. In proceedings before the Court, however, it seems that confidential information obtained by a doctor examining or treating a person may and, where the Court requires, must be disclosed. The authority for that is M v Commission.101 There the Court found that the laws of the member states recognised certain limitations to the confidentiality of the relationship between a patient seeking treatment and a doctor. It selected three sets of circumstances from which such limitations could ‘in particular’ result: (1) ‘where the person concerned has expressly given his consent’ (to the lifting of confidentiality); (2) ‘where the doctor’s involvement takes place in the context of administrative checking procedures so that the spontaneous confidential relationship which is the basis of professional secrecy does not exist’;

97 Case T-331/11 Besselink v Council, 21 February 2013. That case then took a strange turn because, after the document in question had been excluded from the proceedings, it was published on the website of the Dutch government. Besselink then applied for the document to be reintroduced (by way of a measure of organisation of procedure or measure of enquiry). That was rejected as an attempt to call into question the order previously made to exclude the document: see the order of 12 September 2013, paras 21–26, in the same case. It is obvious that, after publication on the Dutch government’s website, the document had lost its confidentiality and there was no longer any reason to exclude it from the proceedings (other than, if appropriate, its lack of relevance). The reasoning in the 12 September 2013 order is therefore questionable. 98 See above, note 93. 99 Eg Case 121/76 Moli v Commission [1977]  ECR  1971; Case 75/77 Mollet v Commission [1978] ECR 897; M v Commission (above, note 54). 100 Ibid. 101 Above, note 54, paras 18–20.

969

12.34  Exclusion of evidence

(3) ‘where reliance on such confidentiality would have the result of obstructing the normal course of justice’. 12.34 The apparent limitation of confidentiality to the relationship between a patient seeking treatment and a doctor giving it seems too narrow because the case actually concerned a medical examination made for the purpose of deciding whether a candidate for a post was physically fit for the performance of her duties. Subject to the second set of circumstances identified by the Court, it would seem that confidentiality extends to any medical information obtained during an examination even if the person concerned is not seeking treatment, as the Court’s earlier decisions102 had suggested. The Court proceeded to hold: ‘In this case it must be observed that the applicant has expressly given her consent to all relevant information relating to the medical examinations which were carried out being given to the Court. The medical examinations in question were carried out pursuant to the Staff Regulations in the context of an administrative recruitment procedure the legality of which must, at every stage, be capable of review by the Court. In these circumstances the refusal to give any information whatever concerning the basis of the medical records and the reliance, by the doctors in the confidence of the Commission, on the confidentiality of medical findings as grounds for refusing to provide any useful indication has the result of making it impossible for the Court to carry out the judicial review entrusted to it by the Treaty and the Staff Regulations’. 12.35 It seems possible to attribute each part of that extract from the judgment to one of the sets of circumstances imposing a limit on confidentiality.103 If that were so, it would seem to follow that the applicability of the third followed from the fact that the first two also applied, thus suggesting that all three are cumulative and that one alone may not be sufficient to lift confidentiality. A similar approach was adopted by Advocate General Capotorti,104 who formulated the principle that professional (here medical) secrecy cannot be relied on in judicial proceedings ‘at least where…a dispute between a public employee and the administration is involved, where, moreover, the medical examinations have been carried out on behalf of the administration and not at the request or in the interests of the patient and where, finally, the person concerned agrees to the information in the possession of the doctor being disclosed to the Court’. Later on, he reformulated it as ‘a duty on the doctor, within the compass of disputes between a public employee and the administration and provided that the patient’s consent has been given, to provide an administrative court with information acquired in the course of medical examinations carried out at the request of the authority’.

102 Moli v Commission and Mollet v Commission (above, note 99). 103 If so, however, the examinations would not have been confidential by virtue of the second set of circumstances. Although that may be supported by reference to the apparent exclusion of examinations as capable of constituting a confidential relationship between doctor and patient, it is hard to place in the context of the case: if the examinations did not give rise to a confidential relationship, the applicant’s consent to the disclosure of the information would be irrelevant because it was not confidential. 104 [1980] ECR at 1820–1821.

970

Exclusion of evidence 12.38

12.36 In V v Commission,105 the evidence in question consisted of records of medical examinations of the applicant held by the defendant. The records were held subject to medical secrecy, which meant that they could not be disseminated (even within the defendant’s organisation) without the applicant’s consent. The question at issue was their production as evidence before the CST. The defendant wished to produce the records but considered that it could not do so without the applicant’s consent. The applicant refused to waive confidentiality. Accordingly, the evidence was not ordered to be disclosed. On appeal, it was suggested that an order could not be made for the disclosure of the evidence in those circumstances. That seems to be an unduly narrow reading of the rules of procedure. However, a different way of looking at the matter is that, if a party is entitled to claim confidential treatment of evidence relevant to the issues in the proceedings and does so, the Court will respect the claim save to the extent that the party in question bases his case on assertions that might be inconsistent with the facts as disclosed in the confidential material.

F

Lawyer-client confidences

12.37 As defined in A M & S v Commission106 the confidentiality of the lawyerclient relationship has three characteristics: (1) it serves the requirement ‘that any person must be able, without constraint, to consult a lawyer whose profession entails the giving of independent legal advice to all those in need of it’; (2) it applies to ‘communications…made for the purposes and in the interests of the client’s rights of defence’ (ie the right to a fair trial); and (3) the communications ‘emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment’.107 12.38 The A M & S case actually concerned the question whether confidentiality applied in the context of an investigation carried out by the Commission under the competition rules. The judgment establishes that confidentiality applies, not only in proceedings before the Court, but also in administrative proceedings which may result in a decision directly affecting the person seeking to take advantage of confidentiality. In consequence, protection covers communications made after the initiation of any procedure which will or may result in such a decision and earlier written communications which have a relationship to the subject matter of that procedure. The communications must concern legal advice, not, for example, business advice. Legal advice provided for the purpose 105 Above (note 21), paras 69–78 (at first instance, Case F-33/08 V v Commission, above, note 57, paras 112–117). 106 Above (note 55); see (1982) ECLR 99. 107 Lawyer-client confidences are interesting for an outsider to see, and are often relevant to legal proceedings, because of the information they reveal about the client’s perception of the facts, the reasons why the client behaved in a particular way, and the extent to which the client knew or should have known that what he was doing was wrong or illegal.

971

12.39  Exclusion of evidence

of negotiations, outside the context of an administrative procedure or litigation, is not protected.108 12.39 There are frequent references in the judgment to communications ‘emanating’ from an independent lawyer. That would tend to suggest that only documents containing legal advice and drawn up by the lawyer would be protected, but not a request for legal advice. That inference seems to be incorrect. The ECJ says that the principle of confidentiality serves the requirement that persons may be able to consult a lawyer whose profession entails the giving of independent legal advice. That shows that the act of the client in requesting legal advice and the act of the lawyer in giving it were both present in the mind of the ECJ. In addition, there are a number of references (more in the French text of the judgment than in the authentic, English version; but the former provides the form of words on which the judges agreed) to an ‘exchange’ of communications. An exchange is two-way. Lastly, of the documents in respect of which the claim to protection was upheld, one (No 5), according to Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn’s opinion,109 comprised requests for legal advice made by executives of A M & S to a solicitor in private practice. 12.40 The judgment indicates that, in order for the communications to be protected, the lawyer involved must possess the following qualities: (1) he must be entitled to practise in one of the member states; (2) he must be bound by rules of professional ethics and discipline laid down and enforced in the general interest by institutions with power to do so; (3) he must not be bound to the client by any employment relationship; and (4) the exercise of his functions must be subject to the overriding interests of justice. The reason for that approach seems to be that the ECJ regarded the lawyer’s role as ‘collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts’ and as providing ‘in full independence, and in the overriding interests of that cause [ie the administration of justice], such legal assistance as the client needs’. 12.41 The phrase ‘lawyer entitled to practise’ is not used in the French version of the judgment. That says ‘avocat inscrit au barreau’ and indicates what would more aptly be described in English as a ‘barrister’. The English phrasing of the judgment is to be preferred for the simple reason that three of the documents recognised by the ECJ as protected (Nos 4, 5 and 7) were sent by or to a solicitor in private practice. The judgment is not, therefore to be understood as applying only to practising lawyers who are barristers or advocates but to all practising lawyers who possess the qualifications set out in the judgment. It is likely that the ECJ intended to refer to those persons defined as ‘lawyers’ in Council Directive

108 Case F-83/12 Bodson v European Investment Bank, 12 February 2014, paras 46–47. 109 [1982] ECR at 1643.

972

Exclusion of evidence 12.44

No 77/249 of 22 March 1977110 but that is not entirely clear because the judgment also refers to the Court’s Statutes (now the single Statute). 12.42 The ECJ excluded lawyers entitled to practise in third countries even though they otherwise fulfil the strict requirements of independence, etc, specified by it. The reason for that is obscure and particularly so given that, at the time some of the documents in the case were drawn up, the UK was not a member of the EU and so correspondence with British lawyers would not have been protected on the basis of the ECJ’s own definition. It is arguable that the judgment is to be interpreted as holding that a document which is not protected at the time when it comes into being may later become protected once all the conditions for protection have been fulfilled. As far as employed lawyers are concerned, Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn pointed out that, in some member states, they were subject to professional ethics and discipline while in others they were not. At first blush, the judgment is sufficiently unclear to suggest that, if an employed lawyer is also entitled to practise and his ethical and disciplinary obligations as a practising lawyer effectively outweigh his contractual obligations to his client so that he can in truth be said to be independent and bound by the overriding interests of justice, communications passing between him and his client are protected. The ECJ, however, withheld protection from every document involving an employed lawyer so the employment relationship must itself be regarded as sufficient to negative the existence of protection. That approach was confirmed by the ECJ in Case C-550/07P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission,111 in which it was emphasised that the absence of an employment relationship between the lawyer and his client is critical to the former’s independence. 12.43 The ECJ appears to have rejected the view that documents summarising legal advice are protected112 but it upheld the claim to protection made in respect of communications containing legal advice which had been sent to an executive of a company in the same group as A M & S and which had then been passed on to it. In doing so the ECJ seems to have accepted that the common interest of the members of a group of companies may justify the retention of confidentiality in respect of documents drawn up by or for one member of the group and found in the possession of another.113 12.44 The existence of an employment relationship between the lawyer and an EU institution (or, for that matter, an institution of a member state) means that confidential treatment for internal legal advice provided by a lawyer to an EU

110 OJ No L78/17. 111 [2010] ECR I-8301 (at first instance, Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-3523). 112 In contrast, in Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission [1990] ECR II-163, paras 15–18, the CFI seems to have regarded internal notes of advice from external lawyers as protected. 113 Cf Heintz van Landewyck Sàrl (FEDETAB) v Commission (above, note 67), para 46.

973

12.45  Exclusion of evidence

institution (or member state) cannot be claimed on the basis of lawyer-client confidence. Instead, the claim must be based upon administrative confidentiality.114 12.45 It seems that, when a claim to protection from disclosure on grounds of confidentiality arises before the evidence in question has been produced to the Court, it must be supported by evidence of such a nature as to demonstrate that it fulfils the conditions for being granted legal protection: a bare claim is not enough.115 The Court may, in its discretion, call for production of the evidence in question. In A  M  & S  v Commission only the judge-rapporteur and the advocate general actually saw the documents but that was a case heard by the full Court. In the event that the claim to confidential treatment were heard by a chamber, all the judges in the chamber could look at the material without prejudicing any subsequent proceedings, which could be heard by a differently constituted formation.

IV

IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

12.46 The second ground on which evidence may be excluded, impropriety in its production, seems to have been raised in only a few cases.116 In broad terms, the position seems to be that an impropriety in the manner in which evidence (normally a document) has been obtained is a ground for ordering the exclusion of irrelevant evidence (whereas, otherwise, the evidence might simply be left in the case file but ignored). If the improperly obtained evidence is relevant, then it may be necessary to weigh the nature and degree of the impropriety against the importance of the evidence in order to decide whether or not the evidence should be excluded. If the evidence is relatively unimportant, the 114 In Case C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, at para 35 of his Opinion (pp 1997– 1998), Advocate General Jacobs took the view that internal legal advice provided to the Council should not be invoked in proceedings before the Court (unless the Council had authorised disclosure) because that would be prejudicial to the public interest in the provision of legal advice, citing the A  M  & S  case (above, note 55). Advocate General Geelhoed took a more nuanced view in Case C-491/01  R  v Secretary of State for Health, ex p British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd [2001] ECR I-11453, paras 33–35 (pp 11477–11478). However, his approach was aligned more on administrative confidentiality than lawyer-client confidentiality. In both cases, the fact that the existence of an employment relationship precludes the operation of lawyer-client confidentiality was overlooked. 115 Cf A M & S v Commission (above, note 55): there the Court dealt with the procedure to be followed when such a claim is raised as against the Commission but it seems right to apply the same rules, mutatis mutandis, when the claim is made in proceedings before the Court (eg the Celanese case (above, note 8)). 116 Eg Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission (above, note 95); the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case (above, note 42); Case 232/84 Commission v Tordeur [1985] ECR 3223; Cases 31 and 35/86 Levantina Agricola Industrial SA (LAISA) v Council [1988]  ECR  2285; Case 352/88 Commission v Ireland, order of 6  July 1989 (the point did not need to be decided); Case C-281/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 4015; Case T-16/89 Herkenrath v Commission [1992] ECR II-275; Case T-141/01 Entorn v Commission [2005] ECR II-95. No impropriety was alleged in Andersen v Council (above, note 86).

974

Exclusion of evidence 12.48

impropriety in its production may justify its exclusion. On the other hand, if the evidence is important or, potentially, determinative, its exclusion might lead to an injustice and to a failure by the Court to ensure respect for the rule of law. In such circumstances, it would seem that a high degree of impropriety would be required to justify the exclusion of the evidence: in effect, admitting the evidence would have to lead to the condoning of a breach of the rule of law in the obtaining of the evidence as serious as the breach alleged in the action (which may be condoned as a result of the exclusion of the evidence). The existence of a balancing exercise shows that the mere assertion of an impropriety in the production of evidence is not sufficient to justify its exclusion from the case file.117 By way of illustration of the balancing of the interests at stake, in Case T-192/99 Dunnett v European Investment Bank,118 an application for the removal of confidential documents that were said to have been obtained improperly was rejected, without any consideration of the circumstances of the alleged impropriety, because the assessment of the merits of the action required consideration of the documents. 12.47 In Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission the applicant claimed that the procedure initiated by the Commission, which resulted in the decision challenged in the action, was irregular because the applicant’s own internal documents had come into possession of the Commission by unlawful means. That claim was later abandoned and the Court did not, therefore, rule upon it; it did, however, state that it was not an issue which should be examined by it of its own motion.119 It is doubtful, given the circumstances in which the claim was made, that that can be regarded as authority that an impropriety in the obtaining of evidence can never be raised by the Court of its own motion, even when the impropriety directly affects the course of proceedings before the Court itself. The point remains open but it is submitted that, as a general rule, where evidence has been obtained by improper means from a party to the action (including interveners), it is for that party to object to the inclusion of the evidence; if an objection is not made, both the confidentiality of the evidence and the impropriety in its production are taken to be waived. The Court may, however, raise of its own motion the admissibility of evidence improperly obtained from a person not a party to the proceedings. 12.48 In the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case120 Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat took the view that it was for the Commission, which raised the question of inadmissibility, to prove it. The Court, on the other hand, merely intimated that the existence of a doubt as to whether the evidence was obtained by proper means could be enough to exclude it. In consequence it would seem that the burden lies on the party seeking to exclude evidence on this ground to show that there is doubt as to the propriety of its production. It is then for the 117 That is how Franchet (above, note 4), paras 73–82, Estonia (above, note 3), paras 50–58, and Case T-149/09 Dover (above, note 4), para 61, are to be understood. 118 [2001] ECR II-813, paras 32–35. 119 Hoffman-La Roche (ibid) at para 7 of the judgment. 120 Above (note 42).

975

12.49  Exclusion of evidence

party producing the document to satisfy the Court that the doubt is unfounded. Mere assertion is not enough to establish that the party producing the document has acted improperly or to cast on that party the burden of proving that the document was obtained properly.121 On the other hand, once the issue has been raised, a failure by the party producing the document to explain the position will lead the Court to conclude that the allegation of an impropriety is founded and to exclude the document from consideration.122 It is not sufficient for the party producing the document to assert that it was given the document by a third party and has no reason to suspect any impropriety: evidence must be produced of the circumstances in which the document was obtained at every stage at which it passed from one person to another. Thus, in Case 232/84 Commission v Tordeur123 Tordeur stated that he had obtained the documents from a trade union which had been given them by the Commission itself. The Commission denied that it had given them to the trade union. At the hearing the Court excluded the documents from the file on the ground that Tordeur was unable to prove that the Commission had in fact done so. In Cases 31 and 35/86 Levantina Agricola Industrial SA (LAISA) v Council124 the applicant said that the document had come into its hands without any indication of its origin or confidential nature; there was nothing to lead it to believe that the defendant’s consent was necessary in order to rely on the document. Nonetheless, although the Court did not exclude the possibility that internal documents may legitimately form part of the file, it excluded the document on the ground that the applicant could not prove that it had acquired the document in a regular manner. In contrast, in Entorn,125 it was held that irregularly obtained evidence cannot be excluded if the party lodging it did not commit any unlawful act precluding its reliance on the evidence. 12.49 What constitutes an impropriety in the obtaining of evidence is not at this stage entirely clear due to the lack of authorities. It would seem, however, that (despite Entorn) impropriety is not restricted to the use of unlawful or dishonest means in obtaining the evidence: it is sufficient if there is a breach of

121 Case C-281/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 4015 (para 11 and at 4024, Advocate General Jacobs). 122 Case 327/86 Herkenrath v Commission, order of 15 June 1989 (reported sum nom Case T-16/89 [1992] ECR II-275). When the case was transferred to the CFI, the applicant sought to contest the decision of the ECJ to exclude the document on the ground that the letter from the ECJ asking the applicant to submit observations on the allegation that the document had been obtained improperly had been lost in the post. The opposing party claimed that the matter was not res judicata but the CFI dismissed the application on the ground that the letter had been delivered to the applicant’s address for service in Luxembourg and there was no suggestion that force majeure or unforeseen circumstances had prevented the applicant from responding within time. 123 [1985] ECR 3223, order of 19 March 1985. 124 [1988] ECR 2285, order of 15 October 1988. 125 Above, note 116, paras 37–39.

976

Exclusion of evidence 12.49

a confidence or the abuse of a position of trust.126 In addition, it is not necessary that the party producing the evidence is the person who has used improper means: it is sufficient that he has (innocently) received the evidence from the hands of a person guilty of the impropriety.127 Where the party concerned has come into possession of evidence emanating from the opposing party without any impropriety, the mere fact that the opposing party would ordinarily require its consent to be given to production of the evidence in proceedings before the Court and has not been asked for, or given, its consent is insufficient to establish any impropriety or other reason justifying the exclusion of the evidence.128 As noted above, it does not appear that the Court is obliged to exclude evidence improperly obtained. It has a discretion in the matter because, as in cases like Dunnett129, the impropriety may be doubtful, trivial or purely formal and it would be excessive to exclude the evidence. The burden would nevertheless lie on the party seeking to rely on the evidence to show that the public interest in favour of its disclosure outweighed that in favour of its exclusion.

126 To those may be added procedural defects in obtaining the evidence, if Cases 18 and 35/65 Gutmann v Euratom Commission [1966]  ECR  103 at 118 are to be regarded as an example of the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. According to Advocate General Roemer (at 130) the evidence comprised statements taken by the Commission from the applicant’s former subordinates; the applicant was not given an opportunity to defend himself or confront his accusers and he was not shown the texts of the statements. It is possible that the Court rejected the evidence because of those procedural irregularities but it could also be because the evidence was of doubtful credibility in view of the fact that the deponents had not been properly examined on their statements. 127 Cf the Ludwigshafener Walzmühle case (above, note 42), where the intervener had received the document from a third party. 128 Case 260/80 Andersen v Council [1984] ECR 177, paras 5–6. 129 Above, note 118.

977

Chapter 13

Rules of evidence

I INTRODUCTION 13.1 Advocate General Warner said, on one occasion, ‘there are, as far as I can discern, no rules of evidence’.1 There is a great deal of truth in that observation. The English common law rules of evidence were largely exclusionary because the tribunal of fact was generally a jury and it was therefore important to prevent unreliable evidence from being put to it. That approach is naturally out of place when facts are to be found by a body trained to do so. In civil law countries attempts were made to reduce the intellectual process of weighing up the cogency of evidence and coming to a decision on it to technical formulae. Those were gradually swept away and replaced simply by the criterion that the judge should be convinced.2 Although there are cases where EU legislation has determined what is to be the proof of a fact,3 those are exceptional. Where EU law lays down no requirements of proof, any appropriate means of proof may in principle be used.4 In addition, the case law of the Court contains very few statements on questions of evidence. That is not surprising given that, in the realm of evidence, rules other than the most rudimentary tend to be artificial and difficult to reconcile with what goes on in the real world.

1 (1976) 14 JSPTL 15. 2 ‘Intime conviction’. 3 See, for example, art 10 of Directive No 73/23 of 19 February 1973 (OJ No L77 of 26 March 1973 p  29) and Case 815/79 Cremonini and Vrankovich [1980]  ECR  3583, paras 9–10; Regulation No 3214/75 of 3 December 1975 (OJ No L323 of 15 December 1975 p 1), which provided that a valid certificate of origin must be accepted as proof of the origin of the goods; Cases 15 and 16/76 France v Commission [1979] ECR 321 (aids paid in disregard of the formal requirements as to proof); Case C-27/92 Möllmann-Fleisch GmbH v Hauptzollamt HamburgJonas [1993] ECR I-1701; art 78(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 (means of giving or obtaining evidence in EU trade mark cases). 4 Cases 255 and 241/81 Toledano Laredo and Garilli v Commission [1983] ECR 347, para 13. So far as the national authorities (and probably the EU institutions) are concerned, what constitutes an appropriate form of proof may, however, be determined by general principles of EU law: eg Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze v San Giorgio SpA [1983] ECR 3595. Case T-172/01 M v Court of Justice [2004] ECR II-1075, paras 85–93, concerned a different situation, in which it was necessary to refer to Greek law in order to determine whether or not one divorced spouse lay under an obligation to maintain the other.

979

13.2  Rules of evidence

II

THE BURDEN OF PROOF

13.2 The ‘burden of proof’ can be understood in two ways: (I) the burden of proving one’s case (the legal burden); and (ii) the burden of adducing evidence to prove a fact (the evidential burden).5 The difference between the two burdens is, essentially, that the legal burden of proof indicates the party at risk of losing should the evidence in the case prove insufficient or inconclusive; the evidential burden is related to the legal burden but has more of a procedural function in that it is more directly connected with the procedural mechanisms for managing the gathering and production of the evidence required to decide the case. The general rule, which, so far as both burdens are concerned, determines the party on whom the burden of proof lies, is expressed in the maxim ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (occasionally the maxim actori incumbit onus probandi is used): it is for the party who asserts a proposition or a fact to prove it; a party does not bear the burden of proving purely negative facts.6 In general terms, it is an error of law to impose upon a party a burden of proof that it is impossible to discharge.7 However, that refers to the evidential burden and applies where a party is required to produce evidence that it is not within his power to produce. 13.3 The application of that principle and the very existence of a burden of proof, including the need (if any) to distinguish between the two senses of the term, depend on the nature of the proceedings and on whether or not any special

5 Eg Case C-413/08P  Lafarge SA  v Commission [2010]  ECR  I-5361, para  30; Case C-407/08P  Knauf Gips KG  v Commission [2010]  ECR  I-6375, para  80. Case T-44/00 Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG  v Commission [2004]  ECR II-2223, paras 261–263, is better understood if the legal and evidential burdens are distinguished. 6 Case T-117/89 Sens v Commission [1990] ECR II-185, para 20. For examples of the burden of proof attaching to the party making an assertion, see Case 51/83 Commission v Italy [1984]  ECR  2793, para  17; Case 55/83 Italy v Commission [1985]  ECR  683, paras 15–16; Cases 56/83 Italy v Commission [1985]  ECR  703, paras 15–16; Case 3/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 3369, para 13; Case 290/87 Commission v Netherlands [1989] ECR 3083, paras 11 and 20; Case C-381/99 Brunnhofer Bank der osterreichischen Postsparkasse AG [2001] ECR I-4961, para 52 (but note para 53); Case T-180/01 Euroagri Srl v Commission [2004] ECR II-369, para 92; Case C-461/07 P(I) Provincia di Ascoli Piceno v Sun Song Kong Yen Shoe Factory (Hui Yang) Corp [2008] ECR I-11*, para 9 (and Cases C-462/07, C-463/07 and C-464/07 reported at pp 13*, 14* and 15*); Lafarge (above, note 5), para 29; Knauf Gips (above, note 5), para 80; Cases T-133/08, T-134/08, T-177/08 and T-242/09 Schrader v Community Plant Variety Office, 18 September 2012, para 132. For an example of the use of the same principle outside the context of proceedings before the Court, see Case C-479/12 H. Gautzsch Grosshandel GmbH & Co KG v Munchener Boulevard Mobel Joseph Duna GmbH, 13 February 2014, para 41 (copyright infringement actions under EU law). In paras 42–44 of Gautzsch, the ECJ says that the burden of proof may have to be ameliorated or flexed where its normal application would render the exercise of an EU law right impossible in practice or excessively difficult. That seems to be an injunction addressed to national courts (unless it were to be the case that the Court’s operation of the burden of proof were to produce such situations). 7 Case C-652/11P  Mindo v Commission, 11  April 2013, paras 50 and 54. See also Case C-538/13 eVigilio Ltd v Priesgaisrines apsaugos ir gelbejimo departmentas prie Vidaus reikalu ministerijos, 12 March 2015, paras 42–45.

980

Rules of evidence 13.5

rule exists.8 Special rules aside, the existence of the legal burden presupposes that the proceedings are contentious or adversarial; the legal burden has, in principle, no place in non-contentious proceedings. The evidential burden, on the other hand, can be said to exist wherever there are facts to be proved and whatever the nature of the proceedings; but the allocation of that burden is dependent on whether the proceedings are inquisitorial or accusatorial in character. 13.4 Even a cursory reading of the judgments and opinions in preliminary rulings does reveal the application by the Court of a burden of proof relating to the ascertainment of a fact. By way of example, in Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Firma Albert Ruckdeschel & Co and Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen9 the Court had asked the Council and the Commission to supply evidence to support certain assertions made by them. Adequate proof was not forthcoming and Advocate General Capotorti said: ‘in the circumstances the conclusion must be drawn that there is no evidence of the facts to which the two institutions attached importance’. That tends to suggest that, in references for a preliminary ruling, each party who submits written or oral observations to the Court must discharge a burden lying on him to satisfy it that the assertions of fact he makes are true. Since the preliminary ruling procedure is in theory non-contentious, there should be no legal burden of proof. An indication to the contrary is to be found in Case 126/81 Wünsche Handelgesellschaft v Germany,10 where Advocate General Rozès said that the burden of proof lay on Wünsche to show that the Commission had exceeded its discretion.11 13.5 In direct actions both the applicant and the defendant lie under a duty to adduce the documentary evidence and sources of evidence on which they rely to prove an assertion of fact12 (unless the fact in question is ‘well-known’)13 but the power to call for the production of evidence lies with the Court. Hence any allocation of the burden of adducing evidence to prove a fact, even in direct actions, must, in practice, be reduced to the pleading stage of the procedure, at which the parties put forward the documents and sources of evidence on which they rely. In that connection, Advocate General Gand once said:14 ‘I do not think that it is right to apply with undue strictness the concept of ‘burden of proof’…In the final analysis, a reasonable degree of certainty must be attained on examining the documents produced by each of the parties and the reply made to them by the opposing party, subject to the Court’s power, if it considers that the mat 8 For an example of a special rule (reversal of the burden of proof), see Case C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV [2008] ECR I-5187, paras 29–34. 9 [1977] ECR 1753 at 1784. 10 [1982] ECR 1479 at 1496. 11 In a subsequent case, Case 345/82 Wünsche Handelgesellschaft v Germany [1984] ECR 1995 (at 2025–2026), Advocate General Rozès said that the burden of proof is a matter for the national court, applying national rules of procedure. 12 See Ch 9, para 9.11 at (4), and Ch 11, paras 11.1–11.4. 13 The Provincia di Ascoli Piceno cases (above, note 6). As to ‘well-known’ facts, see Ch 10, para 10.4. 14 In Case 8/65 Acciaierie e Ferriere Pugliesi SpA v High Authority [1966] ECR 1 at 12.

981

13.6  Rules of evidence

ter is insufficiently clear, to make an order for’ a measure of enquiry. Similarly, in Cases 29, 31, 36, 39–47, 50 and 51/63 Laminoirs, Hauts Fourneaux, Forges Fonderies et Usines de la Providence SA v High Authority15 Advocate General Lagrange remarked, in the context of a claim for damages: ‘the onus of proof lies with the injured party. However the defendant must not remain inactive. It is incumbent on him to produce to the Court all the evidence which can be used to dispute the relevance of the evidence put forward by the party opposing him. Even when the defendant is an administrative body it must, at least within certain limits, produce the documents or the information which it alone possesses in its capacity as a public authority. Briefly, therefore, although the parties oppose each other, they are required, and indeed precisely because they are opponents, to collaborate with a view to enabling the Court to decide, with all the facts at its disposal, whether the damage is sufficiently proved’. 13.6 The remarks of Advocate General Gand evince a natural unwillingness that cases should be decided on the basis of the burden of proof (that is, that where there is lingering uncertainty the decision should go against the party bearing the legal burden); and both advocates general indicate that the way of avoiding such an outcome is co-operation between the parties and the Court in the production of all relevant evidence, the parties by producing the evidence in their possession and the Court by exercising its powers to order a measure of enquiry. Thus, while one party may bear the legal burden of proof, both parties may lie under a duty to adduce evidence relevant to an issue of fact connected with it. The limit to the evidential burden lying on the parties is, however, the inability of the parties to adduce certain evidence in the absence of any exercise by the Court of its powers. Another example of that is Case 18/70 Duraffour v Council.16 The facts were that the applicant, the widow of a deceased official of the Council, applied for the lump sum payable under the Staff Regulations when an official dies. The issue was whether the official had committed suicide, thus entitling the Council to withhold the money. A dispute arose over the question whether it was for the applicant to prove that the deceased had not committed suicide, to justify the claim, or whether it was for the defendant to prove that he had, to justify rejecting the claim. Advocate General Roemer came to a view on that point after a comparative study of national law, finding that ‘in public law cases…the Court plainly has the power to order measures of enquiry of its own motion. That accords with the principle that in proceedings of this nature there is strictly speaking no individual burden of proof but rather an obligation, in fact on both parties, to co-operate effectively to discover the facts’.17 The Court seems to have held that the burden of proving the issue lay with the applicant18 but that the defendant also was bound ‘as the appointing authority, to co-operate…in order to discover the truth’.19 15 [1965] ECR 911 at 943–944. 16 [1971]  ECR  515: see also the subsequent proceedings, reported sub nom X  v Council [1972] ECR 1205. 17 [1971] ECR 515 at 533. 18 See [1972] ECR at 1212 (Advocate General Roemer). 19 [1971] ECR 515, para 31.

982

Rules of evidence 13.8

13.7 The conclusion seems to be that, even in contentious proceedings, there is, strictly speaking, no allocation of the burden of adducing evidence as between the parties. Both lie under an equal duty to the Court to produce evidence or sources of evidence relating to the issues of fact in the case.20 Nevertheless, in contentious proceedings, only one party bears the risk if an issue of fact is not proved. In consequence, where the evidence produced to the Court, considered as a whole, is inconclusive as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue, the Court is entitled to find that the legal burden of proof has not been discharged to that extent21 but it does not do so on the basis that the party bearing the legal burden has failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his case. In proceedings before the Court, which are semi-inquisitorial in character, the production of sufficient evidence to decide an issue of fact is, in the final analysis, a matter for the Court to decide. The most that the parties can be held to do is to set up their own cases and give the Court sufficient documentary evidence and indications of sources of evidence22 so that, if the matter still remains in doubt, the Court can exercise its own investigative powers. The parties cannot force the Court to act nor can they produce, of themselves, testimony or evidence that is not in their own possession or control. It follows that judgment cannot, in general, be given against a party on the basis that he has failed to produce sufficient evidence. 13.8 The one exception to that general rule appears to be the situation where the evidence in question is in the sole possession of one only of the parties. That party then bears the burden of producing the evidence. For example, in Case 45/64 Commission v Italy,23 the Commission brought an action alleging that the Republic of Italy had infringed what was, at the time, art  96 of the EEC Treaty, which required that any tax refund paid on the exportation of goods must not exceed the internal taxation previously levied on them. So far as is relevant for present purposes, the burden of the Commission’s complaint was that exports of certain products benefited from a flat-rate refund calculated by reference to their weight and not to the various taxes which had previously been imposed. The inevitable result, it was alleged, was that the amount of certain refunds would exceed the actual tax burden. The defendant asserted that the burden lay on the Commission to prove that the refunds were greater than those authorised by the Treaty and, certainly, if the Commission lost on that 20 The existence of such a duty, bearing on both parties, nonetheless presupposes that, in contentious proceedings, the applicant has demonstrated that its assertions have substance and raise questions that the defendant must answer. The defendant’s duty to adduce relevant evidence does not come into play at all if the applicant fails to present a case that calls for an answer. 21 Cf Case 23/81 Commission v Royale Belge [1983] ECR 2685, paras 22–25. 22 It was the failure to comply with that duty, the evidential burden applicable at the stage of the written procedure (at which point proceedings are still accusatorial in character), that led the Court to reject an allegation made by the applicant in Case 107/82  AEG  v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, para 130. 23 [1965]  ECR  857 at 867 and at 874–875 (Advocate General Gand). For the subsequent proceedings, see [1969] ECR 433. But see also Cases 96/81 Commission v Netherlands and 97/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1791 and 1819, respectively, at paras 6–8.

983

13.9  Rules of evidence

issue, it would lose the case. However, the information necessary to decide whether the refunds exceeded the tax burden was in the possession of the Italian government and the only figures that it had ever produced tended to suggest that the flat-rate system did contravene art 96. The Court held that it was for the defendant, not the Commission, to prove that the system complied with the Treaty by producing the evidence. In Cases 169/83 and 136/84 LeussinckBrummelhuis v Commission24 the applicants claimed that a road accident had been caused by the defendant’s negligence. The accident had occurred because the tread came away from a tyre on a car belonging to the defendant which was being driven by a chauffeur employed by the defendant at a time when the car was being used for a mission authorised by the defendant. The official report of the accident said that the detachment of the tread could be attributed to a number of possible causes (poor maintenance, inadequate inspection of the vehicle, negligent use). The defendant was best placed to provide the Court with any evidence enabling it to determine exactly what the cause was; but the defendant failed to produce any evidence. In consequence, the Court construed the uncertainty against the defendant and found that the accident had been caused by negligence for which the defendant was responsible. Those cases appear to show that a party cannot rely on the fact that the opposing party bears the burden of proof in order to avoid producing evidence.25 13.9 In the same way, in Case 19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH  v Commission,26 where the applicant refused to produce its accounts in order to support the plea that a fine imposed by the Commission should be reduced because it was ‘extremely burdensome’, the Court dismissed the application, remarking that the applicant had prevented verification of its assertion. It is to be observed that the Court did not draw the inference from the failure to produce the accounts that the evidence to support the assertion did not exist nor did it find in favour of the Commission on the issue of fact. The applicant had failed to discharge the evidential burden imposed on it by the Court when the Court requested production of the accounts; that made it impossible to resolve the issue of fact one way or the other; judgment was therefore given against the applicant because it bore the legal burden of proof. 13.10 There are some cases which appear to suggest that there may be an allocation of the burden of adducing evidence as between the parties. In Case 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority27 the Court described a particular fact as a ‘serious presumption’ in support of the applicant’s claim; it was for the defendant to rebut

24 [1986] ECR 2801, paras 15–17. 25 See also the explanation given by Advocate General Jacobs of Case 272/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 4875 (see in particular paras 21 and 31) in Case 141/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 943 at 972; Case T-58/92 Moat v Commission [1993] ECR II-1443, para 65. 26 [1978] ECR 131, para 21. See also Case 285/81R Geist v Commission, order of 29 September 1983 (unreported), para 4. 27 [1954–56] ECR 333: see 343–344 and 352 (Advocate General Lagrange).

984

Rules of evidence 13.11

the presumption but evidence sufficient to do so had not been produced. That suggests, not only that the burden of adducing evidence may lie as between the parties, but also that it may shift in the course of proceedings. Similarly, in Cases 19 and 65/63 Prakash v Euratom Commission28 the Court held that to order an expert’s report would be justified only ‘if the facts already proved raised a presumption in favour of the applicant’s argument, since the burden of proof rests, generally speaking, on him’. Advocate General Gand said: ‘in this case the burden of proving the accuracy of the facts which might be called in question does not fall on the defendant institution’. Since the Court refers to a presumption ‘in favour of the applicant’s argument’, it may well have been thinking of the normal burden of proving one’s case, which would determine who has the burden of persuading the Court to order a measure of inquiry. A slightly different situation arose in Case C-65/91 Commission v Greece,29 where the applicant produced photocopies of certain documents to prove its case and the defendant failed to produce any evidence or explanation to negative the inferences to be drawn from the photocopies. The totality of the evidence before the Court was sufficient to discharge the (legal) burden of proof lying on the applicant; any other evidence would have been in the possession of the defendant alone but it failed completely to produce anything that might weaken the force of the evidence produced by the applicant. 13.11 That the legal burden of proof exists in contentious proceedings is apparent from, for example, cases such as Case 6/54 Netherlands v High Authority,30 Case 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière Belgique v High Authority,31 Case 34/62 Germany v Commission,32 Case 23/76 Pellegrini & C SAS v Commission,33 Case 277/82 Papageorgopoulos v Economic and Social Committee,34 where the Court held that an allegation of misuse of powers had not been proved sufficiently in law.35 In theory that burden does not shift in the course of proceedings, whatever the burden of adducing evidence may do. On the other hand, in Case 12/74 Commission v Germany36 Advocate General Warner said that, in proceedings under what is now TFEU, art  258, the burden might shift.37 The explanation for that seems to lie in the distinction between propositions advanced to show that the opposing party has not discharged the burden lying on him to prove his

28 [1965] ECR 533 at 554 and 569 (Advocate General Gand). 29 [1992] ECR I-5245, paras 9–10. 30 [1954–56] ECR 103. 31 [1954–56] ECR 245 at 302. 32 [1963] ECR 131. 33 [1976] ECR 1807, para 30. 34 [1983] ECR 2897, para 13. 35 The point is stated more generally in Case C-280/12 P Council v Fulmen, 28 November 2013, para 68 (upholding Cases T-439/10 and T-44/10 Fulmen v Council, 21 March 2012). 36 [1975] ECR 181 at 213. 37 See also Acciaierie e Ferriere Pugliesi SpA v High Authority (above, note 14).

985

13.12  Rules of evidence

case and pleas raised to rebut the case made out.38 That can be illustrated by reference to actions for damages. It is well established that the applicant must prove the existence and the amount of the loss39 and, therefore, where the claim seeks the reimbursement of sums paid out to a national authority without cause, the applicant must prove that he has exhausted all possibility of recovering the money under national law in order to establish the loss for which the EU may be made liable.40 In the Kampffmeyer41 and Becher42 cases the applicants proved the existence of the loss. It had arisen from the withdrawal of a zero levy with effect from a certain time of day; normally levies remained applicable throughout the whole day. The defendant pleaded that the applicants should also have to prove that the relevant contracts were made either before the relevant time or without knowledge of the change. The Court regarded that as reversing the burden of proof. The defendant was in substance arguing that its liability should be reduced because the applicants had contributed to the loss through lack of foresight; in raising the burden of proof point the defendant was trying to force the applicants to prove that they had not contributed to the loss. Strictly speaking that was a separate issue raised by the defendant and it followed that the burden lay on it to show that the applicants had contributed to the loss, not the other way around. In the same way, in Case 238/78 Ireks-Arkady GmbH  v Council and Commission43 the defendants argued that the loss incurred by the applicants could have been avoided by passing on the effect of it to customers in the form of higher prices. Advocate General Capotorti regarded that as raising a separate plea so that the burden of proving that the loss could have been passed on lay with the defendants.44 13.12 In a few cases the Court has identified where the burden lies in relation to particular issues. For example, it has been held that, in staff cases, it is for the party alleging that the application is out of time (ie  the defendant institution) to prove the date of the notification of the rejection of a complaint; if the rejection is not sent by registered post or some similar means, the institution cannot adduce conclusive evidence concerning the date of notification and the applicant is therefore entitled to the benefit of any doubt as to the start of any 38 Cf Commission v Royale Belge (above, note 21), para  25; Case C-433/97P IPK-Munchen v Commission [1999]  ECR  I-6795, paras 14–17. In IPK, the applicant had adduced evidence sufficient to prove its contention that the Commission’s interference in the management of a project was likely to have had an impact on the smooth running of the project. The ECJ held that the burden lay on the Commission to show that, despite the interference, the applicant remained able to manage the project satisfactorily. That is an example of the discharge of the burden of proof lying on one party resulting in the burden falling on the opposing party to assert (and prove) a positive defence. 39 See, for example, Case 49/65 Ferriere e Acciaiere Napoletane SpA  v High Authority [1966] ECR 73 at 82; Case 74/74 CNTA v Commission [1976] ECR 797 at paras 13 and 17. 40 See Cases 5, 7 and 13–24/66 Firma E Kampffmeyer v Commission [1967] ECR 245 at 264. 41 Ibid. 42 Case 30/66 Firma Kurt A Becher v Commission [1967] ECR 285. 43 [1979] ECR 2955. 44 Ibid at 3006. See also Cases 256, 257, 265, 267/80, 5 and 51/81, 282/82 Birra Wührer v Council and Commission [1984] ECR 3693 (para 28 and at 3737–3738, per Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat).

986

Rules of evidence 13.12

limitation period.45 On the other hand, where the completion of a pre-litigation procedure is a prerequisite of the admissibility of the action, the burden lies on the applicant to prove that the pre-litigation procedure has been properly completed.46 The burden lies on the party alleging a misuse of powers to prove the allegation by reference to objective, relevant and consistent evidence.47 Again, in staff cases, the burden lies on the applicant to adduce evidence to show that the contested decision is contrary to the interests of the service.48 Article 60(1) of the ECSC  Treaty prohibited certain pricing practices, in particular discriminative practices involving the application by a seller of dissimilar conditions to comparable transactions. Where the Commission found that there had been discrimination of that nature, it was for the undertaking challenging the Commission’s decision to show that the conditions were not dissimilar or that the transactions were not comparable.49 According to Advocate General Warner the burden lies on the defendant institution in staff cases to prove the reason for the official’s dismissal.50 Although the burden of proving the defence of limitation lies on the party raising that defence, the burden of proving the duration of an infringement of the competition rules and the date when the infringement ceased lie on the party alleging that there was an infringement.51 In actions for annulment or for damages (the latter where based on the unlawfulness of an act of the defendant), the burden of proving unlawfulness lies on the applicant.52 In actions under what is now TFEU, art 258, the burden (both legal and evidential) lies on the Commission to prove that there has been a failure on the part of the defendant to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties53 but the burden lies on the defendant to prove a defence (such as that its measures are proportionate54 or benefit from a derogation).55 In actions relating to the clearance of accounts, it is for the defendant (the Commission) to prove that the applicant (a member state) has infringed the rules and for the applicant to prove that the defendant

45 Case 108/79 Belfiore v Commission [1980] ECR 1769, para 7; Cases 193 and 194/87 Maurissen v Court of Auditors [1989]  ECR  1045, para  46. That appears to be a principle of general application: see Cases 32 and 33/58 SNUPAT v High Authority [1959] ECR 127 at 136. 46 Eg Case 152/87 Montgomery v European Parliament [1987] ECR 4899, para 9. 47 Case T-108/89 Scheuer v Commission [1990] ECR II-411, paras 50–53. 48 Ibid, para 48. 49 Case 29/67 Société De Wendel v Commission [1968] ECR 263 at 278, see also at 288 (Advocate General Roemer). 50 Case 110/75 Mills v European Investment Bank [1976] ECR 1613 at 1627–1628. 51 Case T-120/04 Peroxidos Organicos SA v Commission [2006] ECR II-4441, paras 50–54. 52 Case 204/84 Sideradria Industria Metallurgica SpA v Commission [1986] ECR 1415, para 11, an action for annulment; Case 244/83 Meggle Milchindustrie GmbH & Co KG v Council and Commission [1986] ECR 1101, paras 26–27, an action for damages. 53 Case 298/86 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 4343, para 16; Case 141/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 943, para 17; Case 290/87 Commission v Netherlands [1989] ECR 3083, para 11; Case C-62/89 Commission v France [1990] ECR I-925, para 37; Case C-244/89 Commission v France [1991]  ECR  I-163, para  35 and at 184, Advocate General Jacobs; Case C-248/88 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I-1275, para 6; Case C-157/91 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR I-5899, para 12; Case C-210/91 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR I-6735, paras 22–23. 54 Case 324/82 Commission v Belgium [1984] ECR 1861, para 31. 55 Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1039, paras 14–15.

987

13.13  Rules of evidence

erred in calculating the financial consequences;56 save where no distinction can be drawn between those aspects of the dispute, in which case the entire burden falls on the applicant.57 In contrast, where an assignee of a right claims damages, the burden lies on him to prove an infringement of the right; it is not necessary for him to prove that he gave the assignor value to the equivalent of the amounts claimed in exchange for the assignment of the right.58 The Court will adopt the ordinary and natural inferences to be drawn from evidence unless the party wishing the Court to come to a different conclusion discharges the burden of proving that other conclusion.59 13.13 The relationship between the two burdens of proof can be illustrated by considering an action for the annulment of a Commission decision finding that the applicant has infringed the competition rules (including actions contesting the legality of Commission decision granting or refusing an exemption from prohibition under what is now TFEU, art 101(3)); but such cases have also generated some degree of confusion concerning the use of the expression ‘burden of proof’ in the context of the pre-litigation administrative stage. 13.14 In EU law (as in other legal systems), a person or body exercising a public power may do so lawfully only where the factual and legal conditions, to which the exercise of the power is subject, have been satisfied. The administrative stage leading up to the making of a decision in exercise of the power is therefore concerned, essentially, with determining whether or not those conditions have been satisfied and, often, the manner in which they have been satisfied (which may determine the content of the decision that is to be made). The administrative stage is not usually one in which the decision-maker decides a dispute between two opposing parties (although it is often the case that the private persons involved in the procedure take up opposing stances). Instead, the decision-maker must satisfy itself as to what are the relevant facts and how the relevant legal provisions are to be applied; and it must make its decision accordingly. In EU law (as in other legal systems), the decision-maker must disclose the reasons for its decision. If (as it is assumed must ordinarily be the case), the decision-maker wishes to exercise its power lawfully, it must therefore take care to ensure that it has discharged its duty to assemble the material that justifies its decision; and, for that purpose, the decision-maker normally possesses (and, in

56 Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749, para 16; Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, para 28 and at 2351–2353, Advocate General van Gerven; Case C-281/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-347, para 19 and at 356, Advocate General Mischo; Case C-48/91 Netherlands v Commission [1993] ECR I-5611 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, paras 39–48). 57 Case C-281/89 Italy v Commission (above, note 56), para 20 and at 356; Case C-55/91 Italy v Commission [1993] ECR I-4813, paras 14, 35 and 71. 58 Birra Wührer v Council and Commission (above, note 44), paras 31–32. 59 Case 338/82 Albertini and Montagnani v Commission [1984]  ECR  2123, para  30; Case 12/83 Bähr v Commission [1984] ECR 2155, paras 15–17; Case 346/82 Favre v Commission [1984] ECR 2269, para 25; Case T-7/89 Hercules Chemicals NVSA v Commission [1991] ECR II-1711, paras 43–44 and 145.

988

Rules of evidence 13.15

the context of investigations under the competition rules, does possess) powers of investigation. In that sense, the decision-maker always bears the ‘burden of proof’. The position is normally different where the power in question is exercisable on an application being made by a person because then the applicant is normally required to put the decision-maker in possession of sufficient material to justify the making of the decision sought by the applicant. In that type of situation, it is common to say that the applicant bears the burden of proof.60 However, in all the situations referred to above, the expression ‘burden of proof’ is really used in an evidential sense, to identify who, at the administrative stage, bears the procedural responsibility of assembling the material required in order to justify the making of a (lawful) decision. ‘Burden of proof’ is not used in the specific sense that it bears in the context of judicial proceedings, where it (also) designates a judicial technique for deciding a dispute between two parties where the evidence bearing upon a relevant issue of fact is inconclusive (or insufficiently conclusive). 13.15 At the judicial stage, when the decision-maker’s decision is under challenge before the Court, the legal burden lies on the applicant to show that the decision is wrong as a matter of law.61 The applicant may do that by identifying deficiencies in the reasoning advanced by the decision-maker in support of the decision. The decision-maker must normally have evidence that positively supports the conclusion that a relevant fact exists and cannot (normally) assert that a fact can be regarded as established merely because it has not been challenged.62 In that sense, the applicant may discharge the (legal) burden of proof lying upon him at the judicial stage by showing that the decision-maker failed to discharge the (evidential) ‘burden of proof’ lying upon it at the administrative stage. The applicant may also allege that the decision-maker erred when it found a particular fact on which it based its decision. If that assertion is not made out, the applicant risks losing the case. Technically, an error of fact may be identified in two ways. The first is by the applicant proving positively that the finding made in the decision is wrong. Secondly, the applicant may demonstrate that the finding is based upon insufficient evidence or, to put it another way, that the standard of proof required in order to sustain the finding has not been satisfied. One way of

60 Eg Cases C-501/06P, C-513/06P, C-515/06P and C-519/06P  GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, paras 82–83 (which refer indirectly to the legal and evidential burdens, the latter being the one that may shift); Case T-156/11 Since Hardware (Guangzhou) Co Ltd v Council, 18 September 2012, para 185 (a dumping case). 61 Eg Cases 43 and 63/82 VBVB und VBBB v Commission [1984] ECR 19, paras 34 and 59. 62 Eg Case T-133/07 Mitsubishi Electric Corpn v Commission [2011] ECR II-4219, para 50 (on appeal, Cases C-239/11P, C-489/11P, C-498/11P  Siemens AG  v Commission, 19  December 2013). The matter is determined by reference to what the decision actually says and the decision-maker cannot seek to alter the nature or effect of the decision, or the reasons on which it is based, at the judicial stage: eg Cases T-44/02 OP, T-54/02 OP, T-56/02 OP, T-60/02 OP and T-61/02 OP Dresdner Bank v Commission [2006] ECR II-3567, paras 78–79.

989

13.16  Rules of evidence

doing the latter is by proving the existence of circumstances that cast a finding made by the decision-maker in a different light and set up an alternative, plausible explanation. When the applicant contests a finding of fact by using either of those two ways of doing so, both the legal and the evidential burden lie on him.63 13.16 It has been held that, where the decision-maker has gathered sufficient evidence to support a finding of fact, there is no need to examine whether or not there is a plausible alternative explanation.64 That observation, which is relevant both to the burden of proof and to the standard of proof, requires some explanation. The route leading to it is somewhat windy and a number of the cases decided on the route are not good law. The story starts with Cases 29 and 30/83 Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines SA (CRAM) and Rheinzink GmbH v Commission,65 in which the Commission drew an inference from the material before it; and one of the applicants produced before the Court a document which, when taken alongside the evidence relied on by the Commission, showed that the inference was untenable (thereby discharging the legal and evidential burdens of proof). Some time later, the GC decided that that was a principle guiding the use to be made of evidence where an inference was drawn from the conduct of the undertakings concerned and not from other evidence, such as documentary evidence.66 Later still, the GC took the view that that principle did not apply in all cases in which an inference was drawn from non-documentary evidence.67 The principle, correctly stated, has nothing to do with the

63 In some cases, such as Case T-141/08 E.ON Energie AG v Commission [2010] ECR II-5761, para 55 (on appeal, Case C-89/11P E.ON Energie AG v Commission, 22 November 2012), it has been said that, where the Commission relies on ‘direct evidence’, it is for the applicant to demonstrate that that the evidence relied on by the Commission is insufficient. That is described in those judgments as a ‘reversal’ of the burden of proof. Properly analysed, it is not a reversal of the burden of proof because the applicant always bears the burden of proof (as can be seen vividly in those cases in which the GC cites the presumption of the legality of an EU act: see para 13.46 below). The reference to a ‘reversal’ of the burden of proof is instead a confusion of the role of the decision-maker at the administrative stage with what happens once an action for annulment has been commenced. 64 Siemens (above, note 62), para 220. 65 [1984] ECR 1679, paras 16–20. 66 Eg Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00  JFE  Engineering Corpn v Commission [2004] ECR II-2501, paras 186–187 and the cases cited there (a particularly tortuous example of that line of thinking appears in Case T-36/05 Coats Holdings Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-110*, paras 71–74; on appeal, on other grounds, in Case C-468/07P  Coats Holdings Ltd v Commission [2008]  ECR  I-127*). The GC’s view was not shared by the ECJ when JFE Engineering was the subject of an appeal in Cases C-403/04P and C-405/04P Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd v Commission [2007]  ECR  I-729. As the ECJ pointed out, the issue concerned the relevance of the claimed absence of a commercial interest in concluding an anti-competitive agreement where the evidence of the existence of the agreement relied on by the Commission is sufficient: see paras 44–46 of the ECJ’s judgment. The other way in which the undertakings’ case had been put was that barriers to trade explained sales patterns (see JFE  Engineering, para  62); but that was an argument that went to a different point – the effectiveness, rather than the existence, of the agreement (see the Commission’s riposte at para 89 and the GC’s summary of the position at paras 190–194). 67 Mitsubishi (above, note 62), para 80. In Case T-655/11 FSL Holdings v Commission, 16 June 2015, paras 180–181, the GC seems to have reverted to a pre-Mitsubishi formulation.

990

Rules of evidence 13.17

type of evidence in question. It concerns the relative strength of the evidential basis for a finding of fact made by the Commission and the consequential effect on how far the applicant needs to go in order to undermine the finding. Raising the possibility of a plausible alternative explanation is really nothing more than an exercise in demonstrating that there is a degree of doubt about the finding and it does not go as far as the making out of a positive case that the true facts are otherwise than as found by the Commission. What the applicant needs to do in order to sow the seed of doubt in the mind of the Court depends, necessarily, upon the evidential strength of the Commission’s case. At a certain point, it is not good enough for the applicant to seek to raise a doubt. In order to discharge the (legal) burden of proof, it is necessary for the applicant to adduce a positive case that the Commission’s finding is wrong, for which the applicant may also need to discharge an evidential burden. The view that, where the decisionmaker has gathered sufficient evidence to support a finding of fact, there is no need to examine whether or not there is a plausible alternative explanation, is a warning about attempts to contest a strongly-based evidential case merely by seeking to raise a doubt and instead of advancing a positive case that the finding in question is wrong.68 13.17 Both parties must produce the documents in their possession and inform the Court of the other sources of evidence on which they rely in order to support the positions they adopt on the issue of fact. The decision-maker (in competition cases, the Commission), in particular, must reveal the evidence on the basis of which it found the disputed fact69 because the essential question is whether or not, at the time when the contested decision was adopted, the Commission had sufficient evidence to support its findings.70 Thus, whereas the legal burden lies on the applicant, the primary evidential burden lies on the defendant.71 If the Commission successfully demonstrates that the evidence at its disposal at the time when the decision was adopted was sufficient in law to support its findings, the evidential burden shifts to the applicant to produce evidence to establish that

68 For an example of a case in which doubts about the probative value of the evidence relied on by the Commission accumulated to the point at which the Commission’s conclusion failed to meet the standard of proof, see Dresdner Bank (above, note 62), paras 82–148. 69 Cf Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission [1970] ECR 661 at 708 (Advocate General Gand); FSL Holdings (above, note 67), paras 175–176; Case C-280/12 P Fulmen (upholding Cases T-439/10 and T-44/10 Fulmen) (both above, note 35). 70 Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, para 44. 71 In that type of situation, the applicant should be in possession of all the evidence relied on by the Commission in support of its findings because, in the course of the proceedings leading up to the adoption of its decision, the Commission lies under a duty to reveal to the undertakings whose conduct is being investigated all the evidence relied on against them. Any other evidence which has not been revealed to the undertakings concerned is inadmissible in support of any findings made against them. Nonetheless, the Commission bears the evidential burden of producing to the Court the evidence on which it relied in support of its findings.

991

13.18  Rules of evidence

those findings were erroneous.72 In practice, due to the particular characteristics of the judicial review of Commission decisions in application of the competition rules, the discharge of the evidential burden is more complex. 13.18 To the extent that the undertaking does not, at the judicial stage, raise an issue relating to the inferences drawn from evidence used by the Commission of which it had knowledge and an opportunity to rebut in the proceedings before the Commission, the Court is entitled to assume that the Commission’s findings are not challenged.73 In relation to those findings which are challenged, in strict theory the Commission should, no doubt, produce all the evidence at its disposal when it adopted the decision which relates to the disputed findings of fact, not just a selection of the evidence which tends to support them. The Court can exercise its powers of review and determine whether or not the evidence at the Commission’s disposal was sufficient in law to support its findings only if the Court is in a position to assess the weight of the evidence relied on by the Commission; and the weight of any particular adminicle depends not only on its intrinsic value but also on its relationship with other adminicles.74 In practice, the parties often content themselves with producing to the Court only the evidence relied on by the Commission which they believe is important enough to look at. That is not necessarily all the evidence available to the Commission. Apart from evidence referred to expressly in the decision, the Commission may have implicitly based its findings on, or been influenced by, other evidence, some of which may not have been disclosed to the undertaking concerned. Where the Commission has not disclosed evidence to the undertaking concerned and has not given the undertaking an opportunity to rebut such evidence in the course of the proceedings before the Commission, the Commission has disabled itself from relying on that evidence in the proceedings before the Court in order to support the findings made against the undertaking.75 The evidential burden lying on the Commission cannot be discharged by reliance upon such evidence. However, such evidence may be of assistance to the undertaking because it may be exculpatory in nature or else may tend to weaken the force of the evidence 72 Hercules Chemicals NV SA v Commission (above, note 59), paras 43–44 and 145; Case T-15/89 Chemie Linz AG v Commission [1992] ECR II-1275, para 44. Thus, where the Commission infers the existence of an infringement of the competition rules from the behaviour of the undertakings in question, the first question is whether or not that behaviour is sufficient evidence to justify the inference. If it is, the evidential burden shifts to the undertakings to prove the existence of circumstances that generate another, plausible explanation of the undertakings’ behaviour: eg Mitsubishi (above, note 62), para 79. The observation in para 80 that that approach does not apply to all cases in which non-documentary evidence is used must be regarded as directed to the point made at para 81, that ultimately the evaluation of evidence is unfettered (see the more broadly-based statement of the position in Siemens, above, note 62, para 220). 73 The position at the judicial stage is not, therefore, the same as suggested in Mitsubishi (above, note 62), para 50, at the administrative stage. 74 For example, the weight to be given to a particular document relied on by the Commission may have to be revised considerably if it is found that the Commission was also in possession of a number of other documents of equal probative value which all suggest that the facts were otherwise than as suggested by the first document. 75 Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983]  ECR  3461, para 9 and note 115 below.

992

Rules of evidence 13.19

expressly relied on by the Commission. Ex hypothesi, the undertaking is not in a position to draw the Court’s attention to such undisclosed evidence in any specific way: the most that the undertaking can do is to make the general assertion that the Commission may be in possession of evidence that may assist the undertaking, an assertion that would ordinarily be regarded as insufficient to justify a measure of enquiry such as an order that the Commission produce all undisclosed evidence in its possession. By continuing to conceal (consciously or unconsciously) any undisclosed evidence in its possession, the Commission can give an entirely false picture of the conclusiveness of the proof on which it relied expressly to make its findings.76 It is for that reason that the duty binding the Commission to produce to the Court all the evidence on which a disputed finding is based covers no more and no less than all the evidence relating to that finding, including material inadmissible as incriminatory evidence in the proceedings before the Court. The Commission cannot avoid the duty to reveal the evidence in its possession by, for example, pleading that it neither admits nor denies the existence of the disputed fact, thus leaving, as the only ‘assertion’ of fact requiring proof, the applicant’s contention that the fact did not exist. For pleading purposes, the Commission is bound by the decision attacked unless it concedes that the decision was wrong in whole or in part. The Court reaches a conclusion on the issue of fact after considering all the evidence at its disposal. If the Commission does not produce any evidence at all, the Court is entitled to conclude that the Commission had no grounds for finding the fact and the decision may be annulled, to the extent that it turns on the existence of the fact, even if the applicant has not been able to produce any evidence to show that the fact did not exist. A failure on the part of the applicant to produce any evidence does not normally affect the resolution of the dispute because, in the nature of things, the Commission could only have found the fact in its decision on the basis of evidence in its possession or at its disposal. Evidence available to the applicant and not to the Commission is relevant only in so far as it tends to contradict or weaken the evidence relied on by the Commission. 13.19 The crucial role played by the evidence on which the Commission based its findings has been emphasised in several cases77 but it should not be forgotten that the burden still lies on the applicant to prove that the Commission erred in finding a relevant fact, in the sense that it is the applicant that risks losing the case if the assertion that the Commission erred is not made out. That the Commission is required to disgorge the evidence relating to a disputed finding of fact simply reflects the fact that only it knows exactly where all that evidence is to be found,

76 See, for example, Cases T-68, T-77 and T-78/89 Società Italiano Vetro SA  v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, paras 89–94. 77 See, for example, Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Coöperative Vereniging Suiker Unie UA v Commission [1975] ECR 1663 (Re European Sugar Cartel) (paras 210 and 418–420 and at 2061, Advocate General Mayras); Case 6/72 Europemballage Corpn and Continental Can Co Inc v Commission [1973] ECR 215, para 37; Case 27/76 United Brands Co v Commission [1978] ECR 207, paras 264–267.

993

13.20  Rules of evidence

not that the ‘burden of proof’, in a general sense, has shifted to it.78 The burden of proof lying on the applicant is discharged if the Court determines that the Commission was not in possession of evidence which was sufficiently conclusive to ground its findings of fact; and, for that purpose, the Court may take into account evidence produced after the date of the Commission’s decision which contradicts the evidence relied on by the Commission.79 It is not necessary for there to be enough evidence to show that a fact in issue found by the Commission did not exist although the burden of proof is also discharged where that is the case. On the other hand, where the evidence relied on by the Commission is sufficient in law to support a finding of fact in the decision but all the evidence produced to the Court leaves the matter inconclusive (as where further evidence throws doubt on some material relied on by the Commission but is not sufficient to set up a positive case that the fact was wrongly found) the question whether or not the legal burden lying on the applicant has been discharged depends upon the degree of doubt and, hence, upon the standard of proof.

III

THE STANDARD OF PROOF

13.20 The standard of proof can be understood in two, radically different, ways. In one sense, it can be understood as referring to what has to be proved or, to put it another way, what is sufficient to give rise to an inference. In another sense, it can be understood as referring to the degree of probability or certainty that must exist in the mind of the Court in order for it to reach a conclusion on a particular issue of fact or draw a reliable inference.80 For example, in Case T-570/10 Environmental Manufacturing LLP v Office for Harmonisation in the 78 When reading Advocate General Warner’s remarks in Cases 6 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corpn v Commission [1974] ECR 223 at 269 and those of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in Cases 100–103/80 Musique Diffusion Française SA v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, it should be borne in mind that neither advocate general expressly distinguishes between the two senses in which the expression ‘burden of proof’ is used, although the distinction between them is apparent in what is said. 79 Eg CRAM and Rheinzink (above, note 65), paras 16–20. 80 What is here under discussion is the standard of proof applied by the Court in proceedings before it, as opposed to the standard of proof that may be required of (for example) an administrative body when exercising a public power. So far as the latter situation is concerned, the standard of proof may vary in accordance with the situation and the legislative provisions defining the power and setting conditions for its exercise. For example, a decision suspending the marketing of a medicinal product may have to be based upon solid and persuasive evidence showing a reasonable doubt about the safety of the product: Case C-269/13P Acino AG v Commission, 10 April 2014, paras 80–84. In subsequent legal proceedings, the issue before the Court may be whether or not the available evidence met that standard. A decision of the Commission finding an infringement of the competition rules is subject to a higher standard of proof (see further para 13.22 below). Compliance by the Commission with that standard is one of the factors that the Court (the GC) must consider when verifying the legality of the decision; but, in doing so, the Court is also called upon to make findings of fact and has itself to apply the same standard. Not every proceeding before the Court involves the repetition (or scrutiny), by the Court, of a fact-finding exercise carried out by another body in accordance with certain rules. Where the Court is itself engaged in fact-finding, it must apply a standard of proof that it regards as appropriate to the process.

994

Rules of evidence 13.21

Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs),81 the GC held (in a case concerning the risk of confusion between trade marks) that the mere fact that competitors use similar signs to identify their goods compromises the connection made by the public between the signs and the goods in issue. On appeal, the ECJ overturned that finding on the ground that a higher standard of proof was required. By that, the ECJ meant that the proprietor of an earlier mark has to prove actual and present injury to its mark or a serious risk of such injury occurring in the future. It is not enough to point to the fact that competitors are using similar marks. The ECJ went on to say that, while logical inferences can be drawn from the evidence presented by the proprietor of the earlier mark, those inferences cannot just be suppositions but must be based on an analysis of probabilities and take into account all relevant circumstan