Language, Thought and Perception: A Proposed Theory of Meaning 9783110804492, 9789027930231

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JANUA LINGUARUM STUDIA MEMORIAE N I C O L A I VAN WIJK D E D I C A T A edenda curat C. H. VAN SCHOONEVELD Indiana University

Series Maior,

98

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND PERCEPTION A Proposed Theory of Meaning

by UHLAN VON SLAGLE

1974

MOUTON THE HAGUE · PARIS

© Copyright 1974 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 72-94506

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., The Hague.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study represents an amended version of my doctoral dissertation at Georgetown University. To my mentor at Georgetown, Professor Kurt Jankowsky, I owe a special debt of gratitude for being allowed to work in an atmosphere of genuine intellectual freedom. I should also like to thank Dr. Ernst Coenen of the Thyssen Foundation and Professors Alfred Obernberger, Gerd Quinting and Hans Glinz.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements I. Introduction II. Kantian Universale and Wilhelm von Humboldts Conception of Relativity

5 9

11

III. Psychological Space and Time as Universale

18

IV. Meaning and Sense Experience

24

V. The Proposed Synthesis in the Light of Some Key Issues Facing Linguistics VI. Some Synchronic and Diachronic Considerations

39 45

V n . A Final Note

50

Selected Bibliography

51

Index

59

I INTRODUCTION

The problem of referential meaning together with the problem of semantic universale constitute the two most important issues which face contemporary semantics. Although semantic universale are a topic of considerable interest to a growing number of linguists, the problem of reference is, surprisingly enough, given little attention.1 No one has yet advanced a theory which offers a reasonable answer to both questions. However, many of the issues which hold the key to finding a solution to both problems have found reasonably viable solutions. Unfortunately, these partial answers are imbedded in a variety of different, sometimes conflicting, theories in linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. The lack of meaningful communication between disciplines, indeed between rival factions within disciplines, has made the situation appear bleaker than it actually is. This study, therefore, addresses itself to the task of showing that at the present time a meaningful, empirically oriented 'answer' to the problems of referential meaning and semantic universale can be worked out on the basis of 'material' which is already available. An examination of Wilhelm von Humboldt's position in regard to the problem of universale will constitute the first step in establishing the required foundation for the proposed synthesis. This examination will lead to the consideration of space and time as universals of human experience insofar as they are relevant to the develop1

For an excellent discussion of the difficulties inherent in the problem of reference, see Eugene A. Nida, "Linguistic and Semantic Structure", in Study in Languages and Linguistics in Honor of Charles C. Fries (Ann Arbor: English Language Institute, University of Michigan, 1963), 13-33. On semantic universals, see especially Manfred Bierwisch, "Some Semantic Universals of German Adjectivals", Foundations of Language, ΠΙ, 1 (February, 1967), 1-36; Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge: Μ. I. T. Press, 1965), 27-30, 77, 160-161; Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968); Charles J. Fillmore, "The Case for Case", in Universals in Linguistic Theory, ed. by Emmon Bach and Robert T. Harms (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), 1-88; Jerrold J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 224-282; Paul M. Postal, Review of Elements of General Linguistics, by Andre Martinet, in Foundations of Language, Π, No. 2 (May, 1966), 179-180; Uriel Weinreich, "On the Semantic Structure of Language", in Universals of Language, ed. by Joseph H. Greenberg (2d ed.; Cambridge: Μ. I. T. Press, 1966), 142-216.

10

INTRODUCTION

ment of the ideas forwarded in the present study. After the necessary groundwork is laid in this discussion, it will then be possible to proceed to the superstructure of the theory. A SYNTHESIS of the relevant insights of Ernst Leisi, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Walter Ehrenstein will constitute the basic framework. Ernst Leisi's semantic theory provides the needed linguistic frame of reference, while Kant and Mill furnish extremely valuable insights concerning syncategorematic meaning and universale which, after being modified in the light of Gestalt psychology, will be incorporated into Leisi's theory. Next, Walter Ehrenstein's hypothesis concerning the correlation of perception and conceptualization will be brought into the suggested framework. Due to the nature of the issues involved, the resulting synthesis will necessarily include a theory of mind - for an adequate theory of meaning (i.e., one capable of handling the problems of reference AND universale) is possible only within the framework of an adequate theory of mind.

π KANTIAN UNIVERSALS AND WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT'S CONCEPTION OF RELATIVITY

Humboldt's late work on the theory of language can be regarded as an attempt to provide an adequate theoretical model for explaining linguistic diversity within an essentially Kantian framework of cognitive and perceptual universals.1 Recent studies have tended to stress the relativistic aspects of Humboldt's theory. There has been a marked tendency to exaggerate the encapsulating effect of language within Humboldt's theoretical framework. For example, Robert L. Miller states that Humboldt represented the position that "man's cognitive and sensory powers depend ultimately on the language he speaks".2 Closely connected with this interpretation of the relationship of language, thought and perception in Humboldt's theory, has been the tendency to downplay the role of Kantian epistemology in his theory. Roger L. Brown, for instance, maintains that Kant's influence on Humboldt waned as time passed,' with relatively few traces to be found in "those later works in which his conception of linguistic relativity is presented".4 Brown even goes so far as to suggest that "Humboldt was to replace the Kantian faculty of Understanding by language . . . more specifically, languages came to be seen by Humboldt as the a priori frameworks of cognition".5 1

For useful examinations of Kant's influence on Humboldt, see Roger Langham Brown, Wilhelm von Humboldt's Conception of Linguistic Relativity (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), 85-95; Ernst Cassirer, "Die Kantischen Elemente in Wilhelm von Humboldts Sprachphilosophie", in Festschrift für Paul Hensel-Erlangen (Greiz i. V.: Ohag, 1923), 105-127; Rudolf Haym, Wilhelm von Humboldt: Lebensbild und Charakteristik (Reprint of the 1856 edition; Osnabrück: Otto Zeller, 1965), 446-452, 612; Eduard Spranger, "W. v. Humboldt und Kant", KantStudien, ΧΙΠ (1908), 57-129; Heymann Steinthal, ed., Die Sprachphilosophischen Werke Wilhelm von Humboldts (Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler, 1884), 230-242; Wilhelm Streitberg, "Kant und die Sprachwissenschaft: Eine historische Skizze", Indogermanische Forschungen, XXVI (1909), 405-422. * The Linguistic Relativity Principle and Humboldtian Ethnolinguistics: A History and Appraisal (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), 32. See also Julia Myrle Penn, "Linguistic Relativity versus Innate Ideas: The Origins of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis in German Thought of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1966), 13. * Roger L. Brown, Wilhelm von Humboldt's Conception of Linguistic Relativity, 95. 4 Roger L. Brown, Wilhelm von Humboldt's Conception of Linguistic Relativity, 117. 5 Roger L. Brown, Wilhelm von Humboldt's Conception of Linguistic Relativity, 90.

12

KANTIAN UNIVERSALS AND VON HUMBOLDTS RELATIVITY

The mistake which is revealed in these characterizations of his theory results from a confusion of the undeniable importance which he attributes to the role of language, in general, in the realization of thought with the role which he attributes to differences in specific languages. A further important point in this context is that Humboldt does not replace the Kantian categories with language but rather supplements them in the sense that although language, in his view, is necessary for the realization of thought,· the a priori categories essentially determine the form of thought. Having made explicit our position in relation to that reflected in the studies which characterize Humboldt as having taken a very strong relativistic position, we can proceed to a more detailed analysis. Those who support the view that Humboldt advanced the position that what man perceives and conceives is determined completely by the PARTICULAR language he speaks often cite the following passage which first occurs in "Über die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues": Der Mensch lebt auch hauptsächlich mit den Gegenständen, so wie sie ihm die Sprache zuführt, und da Empfinden und Handien in ihm von seinen Vorstellungen abhängt, sogar ausschliesslich so.7

The foregoing statement is the most extreme which Humboldt makes with respect to linguistic relativity. However, in the very same work, Humboldt asserts: Das Gemeinsame liegt auch noch weit mehr in dem Menschen, als in den Sprachen selbst. Daher versteht der Mensch den Menschen leicht auch da, wo, genau untersucht, die Sprache keine Brücke des Verständnisses darbietet. Man übersieht daher leicht, ob und welche Andeutungen die Sprache selbst, wirklich und körperlich enthält, worauf es doch hauptsächlich bei ihrem unaufhörlichen Einfluss auf den in seinem ganzen Innern immer sinnlich von aussen erregten, bestimmten und bedingten Menschen ankommt.8

How does one reconcile these two conflicting statements? To begin with, it is important to note that Humboldt stresses that there are real differences in the way different languages categorize experience. The general tenor of this and related passages is that if one wishes to fully understand the nature of language one must take this into consideration. As the preceding passage indicates, he does not entertain the idea that these differences impose a barrier to understanding which cannot be overcome. A clear statement of his posture is given in his "Grundzüge des allgemeinen Sprachtypus" (1824-1826), a work in which incidentally he once again might be considered to be taking both sides with respect to the encapsulating effect of language. Here he says: Es ist in allen Sprachen der Fall, dass, was einige durch ein einzelnes Wort ausdrücken, von andern mit mehreren umschrieben wird, und die Klarheit und Bestimmtheit der Bezeichnung kann dennoch dieselbe seyn. INDESS IST ES KEINESWEGES GLEICHGÜLTIG, • See especially Carl Wilhelm von Humboldt, Wilhelm von Humboldts Werke, ed. by Albert Leitzmann (17 vols.; Berlin: B. Behrs Verlag, 1903-1936), VII, 53-56; VI, 151-155. 7 Humboldt, Werke, VI, 180. ' Humboldt, Werke, VI, 122.

KANTIAN UNIVERSALS AND VON HUMBOLDTS RELATIVITY

13

WENN EINE SPRACHE OFT ZUR UMSCHREIBUNG IHRE ZUFLUCHT NEHMEN MUSS. DIE MITTHEILUNG DER GEDANKEN, DER AUGENBLICKLICHE ZWECK DER REDE LEIDET ALLERDINGS NICHT

[small capitals mine]

DADURCH

9

Very revealing, then, is his statement "die Mittheilung der Gedanken . . . leidet dadurch allerdings nicht [wenn eine Sprache oft zur Umschreibung ihre Zuflucht nehmen muss]". Κ this is true, wherein, according to Humboldt, lies the influence of language on thought? The answer lies in the text which follows the passage just cited: . . . allein der Unterschied liegt in der Form der Sprache, ihrer Rückwirkung auf das Denken überhaupt. Denn man darf nie vergessen, dass die Beschaffenheit der Sprache, als eines Werkzeugs des Denkens, einen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf dasselbe ausübt, seine Klarheit, Bestimmtheit, Schnelligkeit, Schärfe erhöht, oder herabstimmt, ihm sinnliche Richtung nach aussen hin, oder geistige nach innen giebt, und dass dies bei weitem die wichtigste Seite in ihr ist. Wo nun jeder Begriff sein ihm bestimmtes Wort findet, da 10 regt dieser Reichthum den Geist an

His point is that although any given idea can be communicated through all languages, the existence of specific lexical units for each specific concept definitely has an enriching influence on the human mind. It is this influence on the mind which Humboldt refers to in his relativistic statements. This point will become increasingly clear when we consider the role of universale in his theory. The question arises as to why Humboldt formulated his ideas in such a misleading way. The probable key to this question lies in the following passage, in which he sums up his position on the influence of the different types of grammatical systems on thought: Dass Sprachen mit keinen, oder sehr unvollkommenen grammatischen Formen störend auf die intellectuelle Thätigkeit einwirken, statt sie zu begünstigen, fliesst, wie ich gezeigt zu haben glaube, aus der Natur des Denkens und der Rede. In der Wirklichkeit können andre Kräfte diese Hemmungen schwächen, oder aufheben. Allein bei der wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung muss man, um zu reinen Folgerungen zu gelangen, jede Einwirkung als ein abgesondertes Moment, für sich und so, als würde sie durch nichts Fremdartiges gestört, beurtheilen, und dies ist hier mit den grammatischen Formen geschehen.11

Here, he suggests that in a "scientific" analysis of the influence of grammatical form on thought one should view the two factors in isolation in order to reach the proper conclusions. Extremely important is the fact that he admits, "In der Wirklichkeit können andre Kräfte diese Hemmungen schwächen, oder aufheben". In the light of what has already been said, it is clear that one should keep the foregoing passage in mind when considering his position with respect to linguistic relativity. In any case, as should already be apparent, Humboldt certainly did not subscribe to the extreme position often attributed to him. The following examination • Humboldt, Werke, V, 435. " Humboldt, Werke, V, 435. » Humboldt, Werke, IV, 312.

14

KANTIAN UNIVERSALS AND VON HUMBOLDTS RELATIVITY

of Humboldt's view of the role of cognitive universale in linguistic theory will underscore this fact, while bringing the Kantian aspects of his theory into focus. A good starting point in our discussion is the passage in "Grundzüge des allgemeinen Sprachtypus" (1824-1826), where Humboldt unequivocally states his position on cognitive universale and their relationship to contrastive linguistics: Die Gleichheit der Gesetze des Denkens bringt das Gemeinsame der Grammatik aller Sprachen hervor, vermöge dessen alle sich auf die allgemeine Grammatik und eine auf die andre beziehen lassen. Jede grammatische Form lässt sich, in irgend einer Art sie wiederzugeben, in jeder Sprache nachweisen... .12 Here there is no way that one might misinterpret the fact that he feels there is no conceptual encapsulation and further that cognitive universale constitute the foundation of contrastive linguistics. Before going on to further evidence supporting this view, it should be pointed out that Humboldt definitely does not think that all languages have the same grammar, for he explicitly states: Wirklich in der Sprache selbst liegt nur diejenige Grammatik, die durch Flexionen, grammatische Wörter oder gesetzmässige Stellung ausdrücklich bezeichnet ist, oder sich in dem Zuschnitt der Sätze und der Bildung der Rede, als nothwendig hinzugedacht, mit Bestimmtheit offenbart.13 Hence, according to Humboldt, languages can vary as to which cognitive universals are grammatically marked. The lack of a specific grammatical marker does not, however, render one incapable of making any given distinction in that: Im Grunde existirt alle Grammatik . . . bloss im Verstände der Redenden. Die Rede selbst enthält nur Andeutungen davon. Alle Grammatik muss also hinzugedacht werden.14 In this context in "Von dem grammatischen Baue der Sprachen" (1827-1829) he says, "Die Grundbestimmungen der Grammatik sind schon in den allgemeinen Gesetzen des Denkens enthalten."15 In this work, once again, he stresses the role of cognitive universals and the fact that they can be expressed in every language: Die allgemeine Grammatik ist der Kanon, auf den jede einer besondren Sprache bezogen werden muss, in Rücksicht auf den überhaupt grammatische Sprachvergleichung möglich ist. Denn sie umfasst und entwickelt, was, vermöge der Einerleiheit der Gesetze des Denkens und der wesentlichen Natur der Sprache, in allen Mundarten Gemeinsames liegt. Jedes durch sie begründete Verhältniss lässt sich, in irgend einer Art es wiederzugeben, in jeder Sprache nachweisen, wenn es dieser gleich an einer besondren Bezeichnung desselben fehlt, der Typus wohnt, als Form des Denkens und des Ausdrucks, dem Menschen als Menschen, mithin allen Nationen ohne Ausnahme bei. Die Zusammenfügung der Wörter könnte sonst gar nicht begriffen werden.16 "

13 11 15 16

Humboldt, Humboldt, Humboldt, Humboldt, Humboldt,

Werke, V, 453. Werke, V, 311. Werke, VII, 649. Werke, VI, 345. Werke, VI, 342.

KANTIAN UNIVERSALS AND VON HUMBOLDTS RELATIVITY

15

Were those who advance such strongly relativistic interpretations of Humboldt right when they assert that in Humboldt's later work he takes a strong position on relativity, then one would expect some rather dramatic changes in his last work Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts. That Humboldt's position on universale did not change in this work is clear from the following passage: D i e allgemeinen, an den einzelnen Gegenständen zu bezeichnenden Beziehungen und die grammatischen Wortbeugungen beruhen beide grösstenteils auf den allgemeinen Formen der Anschauung und der logischen Anordnung der Begriffe. Es liegt daher in ihnen ein übersehbares System, mit welchem sich das aus jeder besondren Sprache hervorgehende vergleichen l ä s s t . .

This puts us in a position to examine Humboldt's view of the way in which differences on the grammatical level influence thought. Concerning the nature of this difference and its effect, Humboldt is quite clear: Der individuellen Verschiedenheit dürfte hier am wenigsten Raum gelassen seyn und der Unterschied der Sprachen in diesem Punkte mehr bloss darauf beruhen, dass in einigen theils ein fruchtbarerer Gebrauch davon gemacht, theils die aus dieser Tiefe geschöpfte Bezeichnung klarer und dem Bewusstseyn zugänglicher angedeutet ist. 18

What he says here fits in well with what he said concerning the fact that what one can express through a single word in one language must be expressed through a number of words in a second language. As is clear from his statements here and elsewhere, while he asserts that it is better to have specific grammatical markers for each grammatical concept and a different word for each "lexical" concept, he also emphasizes that what can be communicated in one language can be communicated in the next. We are now in a position to prove that the "Gesetze des Denkens" which, according to Humboldt, are the same for all men regardless of language are the Kantian categories. That this is the case is clear from Humboldt's discussion of the categories of thought in "Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung", first published in 1822, where he gives practically the full list of categories along with the pure forms of Anschauung (space and time) as presented in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft: . . . das ganze Gewebe der Kategorien des Denkens . . . das Positive das Negative, der Theil das Ganze, die Einheit die Vielheit, die Wirkung die Ursach, die Wirklichkeit die Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit, das Bedingte das Unbedingte, eine Dimension des Raumes und der Zeit die andre, jeder Grad der E m p f i n d u n g . . . ,1» 17

Humboldt, Werke, VII, 90. Humboldt, Werke, VII, 90. Humboldt, Werke, IV, 3-4. Compare this passage with Β 106 in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Due to the large number of editions of this work (Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft), page references to it are cited according to the pagination of the first two original editions, with A denoting the first edition (1781) and Β the second (1787). This well accepted practice is adhered to in the present study. Page references to his other works will follow the pagination

18 w

16

KANTIAN UNIVERSALS AND VON HUMBOLDTS RELATIVITY

In a relatively early piece, finished in 1811, which is often cited as evidence of Kant's influence in Humboldt's relatively early work, Humboldt says that "die Zahl der Casum unmittelbar durch die Tafel der Kategorien bestimmt ist". He then goes on to say: Nun ergiebt sich aus der Beziehung der Substanz und Eigenschaft der G e n i t i v , aus der der Ursache und Wirkung der A c c u s a t i v und in dem ersteren der beiden Begriffe der des h a n d e l n d e n N o m i n a t i v s . 2 0 According to Humboldt, the categories which underlie the grammatical cases listed above are the categories of relation. These categories, as given in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, are: Inhärenz und Subsistenz (substantia et accidens) Causalität und Dependenz (Ursache und Wirkung) Gemeinschaft (Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Handelnden und Leidenden).21 Humboldt, it should be noted, derived the semantic universale of case from the Kantian categories of relation not only in his early work, but also in his later efforts. Thus, more than a decade later, in "Grundzüge des allgemeinen Sprachtypus", he maintains: So fliessen die vier ersten Casus der Declination von selbst und nothwendig aus der Kategorie der Relation, und diese Ableitung liesse noch einen fünften, den der Wechsel22 wirkung zu Nor had Humboldt's position changed three years later in "Von dem grammatischen Baue der Sprachen" where he says: . . . so fliessen der Nominativus, Accusativus, Instrumentalis, Genitivus und Dativus von selbst und nothwendig aus den reinen Kategorien der Begriffsverknüpfung.28 Here he goes on to describe the derivation of the case system in almost exactly the same way that he had in 1811. Far from dropping the categories in his final work Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts, he explicitly extends the use of the categories from the syntactic to the word and root level, when in a discussion of his concept of Form der Sprache he writes: Der Begriff der Form der Sprachen dehnt sich weit über die Regeln der Redefügung und selbst über die der Wortbildung hin aus, insofern man unter der letzteren die Anwendung gewisser allgemeiner logischer Kategorien des Wirkens, des Gewirkten, der Substanz, der Eigenschaft u.s.w. auf die Wurzeln und Grundwörter versteht.24 of his Gesammelte Schriften, critical ed. sponsored by the Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (25 vols.; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1902-1969). «

Humboldt, Werke, III, 257.

21

Kant, Β 106.

» » "

Humboldt, Werke, V, 452. Humboldt, Werke, VI, 347. Humboldt, Werke, VII, 49.

KANTIAN UNIVERSALS AND VON HUMBOLDTS RELATIVITY

17

As can be seen from the material we have examined, Kantian universale play a central role in Humboldt's later works. Indeed, they constitute the basic frame of reference for comparing languages. In connection with this, it has been shown that Humboldt explicitly states that what can be expressed in any given language can, in one way or another, be expressed in all other languages, although he fully recognizes and stresses the fact there are wide differences between languages on both the grammatical and lexical levels. In short, to suggest that "languages came to be seen by Humboldt as the a priori frameworks of cognition"25 is at best very misleading, in that in his later work the Kantian categories remain the a priori framework of cognition which is valid for all men, regardless of language. Although it is impossible to follow Humboldt with respect to specific detail, it seems highly desirable to follow him in his efforts to explain linguistic diversity within a framework of cognitive and perceptual universals. The remainder of this study is devoted to establishing a semantic theory which provides an adequate theoretical foundation for doing justice to both the problem of universals and that of linguistic diversity, while also taking into consideration the extremely important problem of reference. The next chapter will lay the groundwork for such a theory through an examination of space and time as perceptual universals.

85

Roger L. Brown, Wilhelm von Humboldt's

Conception

of Linguistic Relativity,

90.

ΠΙ

PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE AND TIME AS UNIVERSALS

Do space and time offer a frame of reference which is the same for all observers regardless of language? In answering this question, we must distinguish between psychological space and time, i.e., space and time as they are given in immediate experience, on the one hand, and the space of geometry and the space-time of physics, on the other. The fact that Euclidean geometry is not the only possible geometry and Newtonian space and time have been 'replaced' by the space-time of contemporary physics does not mean that psychological space and time are not experienced by all men in the same way.1 In the case of space, this becomes especially clear when one reviews recent research on the space perception of human infants, for it leaves little doubt that the modes of spatial discrimination are innate.2 The findings of contemporary experimental psychology, then, suggest that Humboldt was correct in positing space as a universal which provides an interlingually valid frame of reference for comparing how different languages "segment" experience.* But are these findings not challenged by the views of twentieth century proponents of linguistic relativity such as Leo Weisgerber, Ernst Cassirer and Benjamin Lee Whorf?4 Surprisingly enough, these men, all generally considered to be advo1 On this, see Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "An Essay on the Relativity of Categories", Philosophy of Science, XXII, 4 (October, 1955), 246-254; Ernst Cassirer, Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 1920), 120-129. * For very useful reviews of recent research, see S. Howard Bartley, Principles of Perception (2d ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 33-38; Jerome S. Bruner, et al, Studies in Cognitive Growth (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), 13-16. s For the specific details of Humboldt's view, see Humboldt, Werke, VI, 23, 329; VII, 90, 100-101. One must take all of these passages into consideration in order to understand his position. 1 These men are generally considered the most extreme 'contemporary' proponents of linguistic relativity. There are, however, a number of other linguists and anthropologists who subscribe to some form of linguistic relativity. For an introduction to views of the modern German advocates of this position, see especially Miller's book The Linguistic Relativity Principle and Humboldtian Ethnolinguistics. Worthwhile orientations to the views of the most important American proponents are found in Paul Henle, "Language, Thought, and Culture", in Language, Thought, and Culture, ed. by Paul Henle (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), 1-24; Adam Schaff, Sprache und Erkenntnis, trans, by Elida Maria Szarota

PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE AND TIME AS UNIVERSALS

19

cates of an extreme version of linguistic relativity, consider spatial PERCEPTION to be the same for all men regardless of language. Leo Weisgerber is quite explicit on this point; he maintains that perception is the same for all men, while emphasizing that any given domain of reference can be categorized in a variety of ways.5 There can be little doubt concerning Ernst Cassirer's position on this matter; ALTHOUGH HE DOES STRESS THAT SYMBOLIC SPACE VARIES, he fully realizes that perceptual discrimination is not influenced by language: Newton warns us not to confound abstract space - the true mathematical space - with the space of our sense experience. . . . In primitive life and under the conditions of primitive society we find scarcely any trace of the idea of abstract space. . . . Ethnology shows us that primitive tribes usually are gifted with an extraordinarily sharp perception of space. A native of these tribes has an eye for all the nicest details of his environment. 6

Whorf's account of perceptual space and its significance for linguistics is close to Humboldt's: A discovery m a d e by modern configurative or Gestalt psychology gives us a canon of reference for all observers, irrespective of their languages or scientific jargons, by which to break down and describe all visually observable situations, and many other situations, also. This is the discovery that visual perception is basically the same for all normal persons past infancy and conforms to definite laws, a large number of which are fairly well known. 7

Thus, according to Whorf, ALL VISUAL PERCEPTION, not just spatial perception, is the same for all men regardless of language; he argues that all variations in this area "operate within the frame of known laws, and so do not hinder a normative account of perceived data".8 Hence although our CONCEPT of space is, according to Whorf, linguistically conditioned, "we see things with our eyes in the same space forms as the Hopi".· That the modes of temporal experience are also innate can be argued with considerable assurance. To begin with, as Paul Fraisse notes, "tout conditionnement (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1964), 61-93. Hans Helmut Christmann offers a valuable historical overview of relativistic theories in Beiträge zur Geschichte der These vom Weltbild der Sprache (Mainz: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 1967). 5 See Leo Weisgerber, Von den Kräften der deutschen Sprache, II: Die sprachliche Gestaltung der Welt (3rd rev. ed.; Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1962), 320-321. • Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 44-45. 7 Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Gestalt Technique of Stem Composition in Shawnee", in Language, Thought, and Reality, ed. by John B. Carroll (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1956), 163. Whorf's position has often been rather inaccurately characterized. For example, compare the passage quoted above with the interpretation advanced by Franklin Fearing in Harry Hoijer, ed., Language in Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 180-181. 8 Whorf, "Gestalt Technique of Stem Composition in Shawnee", in Language, Thought, and Reality, 163-164. 9 Benjamin Lee Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language", in Language, Thought, and Reality, 158-159.

20

PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE AND TIME AS UNIVERSALS

est dejä une adaptation ä la succession de deux evenements".10 This applies to both classical and operant conditioning.11 Thus although there is a considerable distance between conditioning and conscious orientation with respect to the cyclical phenomena which allow man to measure time through the use of clocks and calendars, it can be seen that temporal orientation constitutes an absolutely essential aspect of man's adaptive repertoire which is manifested from birth.18 What, then, are the modes of temporal experience which provide the basis for this orientation? Before answering this question, we must remember, as Ernst Mach, William James, Kurt Koffka, Paul Fraisse and others have observed, that there is a direct perceptual experience of time.13 In this context, Fraisse maintains that duration, succession, and simultaneity are all immediately experienced as modes of perceptual organization and are all aspects of the psychological present.14 The present, however, has several dimensions. The state of affairs can be characterized rather nicely by noting that memory refers to what is past, sensation to what is present, and expectation to what is future; hence, as St. Augustine observed, there is "a present of things past [memory], a present of things present [sensation], [and] a present of things future [expectation]".15 The "past" and "future", then, are aspects of present consciousness.18 William James sets the importance of the modes of the psychological present into perspective: . . . the original paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious [i.e., the psychological] present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible.17

That the time of the physicist is ultimately based on modes of experience given in the psychological present is brought out clearly by A. d'Abro: Summarising, w e m a y say that in relativity, as in classical science, the sophisticated rules given for the determination of a simultaneity of external events presuppose that w e possess the innate ability to differentiate between a simultaneity and a succession of 10

Paul Fraisse, "Perception et estimation du temps", in Traite de Psychologie experimental, VI: La perception, ed. by Jean Piaget, et al. (Paris: Presses Universitäres de France, 1967), 68. 11 A detailed explanation is given in Paul Fraisse, The Psychology of Time, trans, by Jennifer Leith (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 153-156. 12 On the role of cyclical phenomena in this context, see Richard Schlegel, Time and the Physical World (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1968), 3-16. 13 See Ernst Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen (3d ed.; Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1902), 185-197; William James, The Principles of Psychology (2 vols.; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), I, 605-625, 641-642; Kurt Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935), 433-435; Fraisse, The Psychology of Time, 84-85. 14 See Fraisse, The Psychology of Time, 76-77, 84-85, 104, 281. 15 The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans, by F. J. Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943), 276. The same interpretation is found in Fraisse, The Psychology of Time, 151; Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserliana, ed. by Η. L. Van Breda, X (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 40-57; James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 606-609, 630. 18 On this, see especially James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 629-630. 17 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 631.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE AND TIME AS UNIVERSALS

21

sense impressions [which are modes of perceptual organization given in the psychological present]. These fundamental recognitions then serve as a basis for future discovery... . 18

Just as the modes of temporal organization given in the psychological present constitute the basis for the time of the physicist, so do they provide the basis for the various temporal distinctions made in any given language. This, of course, does not mean that each language will mark the same set of distinctions; it means simply that the basis for whatever distinctions that might be made is given to all men in the same way. Having established a frame of reference for examining the problem of psychological time, we can now meaningfully consider the positions of the most important proponents of linguistic relativity, Leo Weisgerber, Ernst Cassirer and Benjamin Lee Whorf. As has already been pointed out, Weisgerber explicitly states that perception is the same for all men. Further, it seems EXTREMELY unlikely that he would question the universality of memory and expectation. Weisgerber, then, offers no substantive counter argument in the light of our frame of reference. Ernst Cassirer is even less problematic. With the exception of what may be regarded as a temporary aberration in the first volume of his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen,19 Cassirer's position is similar to that taken in this study. His mature views on the problem of time are given in the third and final volume of his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. There he says: Wir können, streng genommen, nicht von drei Zeiten, als seienden, sprechen: sondern richtiger müsste gesagt werden, dass die Zeit als Gegenwart drei verschiedene Beziehungen und Kraft ihrer drei verschiedene Aspekte und Bestimmungen in sich fasst. Es gibt Gegenwart vom Vergangenen, Gegenwart vom Gegenwärtigen und Gegenwart vom Zukünftigen. "Die Gegenwart vom Vergangenen heisst Gedächtnis, die vom Gegenwärtigen heisst Anschauung, die vom Zukünftigen heisst Erwartung."20

Thus, Cassirer adopts the position of St. Augustine, Edmund Husserl, and William James. There can be no doubt that Cassirer considers this structuring of psychological time to be a universal of human experience. . . . die Trias der Zeitstufen, der Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, gibt sich uns in der Anschauung der Zeit als unmittelbare Einheit - als eine Einheit, die eine verschiedene B e w e r t u n g der einzelnen Stufen nicht kennt. Keine Phase ist hier von der anderen abgelöst, keine ist als die "eigentliche", die wahrhafte und ursprüngliche gekenn18

A. d'Abro, The Evolution of Scientific Thought from Newton to Einstein (2d ed., rev.; N e w York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), 174. Henri Bergson makes a similar point in Duration and Simultaneity, trans, by Leon Jacobson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 82-84, 54. For a valuable, closely related discussion, see Cassirer, Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie, 90-91. 19 See Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (3 vols., 4th ed.; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964), I, 172-177. Although the position he takes in that work does vary with the one advanced in the present study, his later views coincide with the interpretation of the nature of time forwarded in this chapter. 80 Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, III, 195.

22

PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE AND TIME AS UNIVERSALS

zeichnet; - sind sie doch alle gleich sehr in dem einfachen "Sinn" der Zeit gegeben und gleich notwendig in ihm beschlossen. 21

Having examined the positions of Weisgerber and Cassirer, we can now turn our attention to Whorf. Whorf made a clear distinction between psychological time and the time of the physicist: Hopi may be called a timeless language. It recognizes psychological time, which is much like Bergson's "duration", but this "time" is quite tinlike the mathematical time, T, used by our physicists. 82

To be sure, what Whorf characterizes as "psychological time" does vary somewhat from that advanced by those who have given the matter a bit more consideration (e.g., William James, Edmund Husserl and Paul Fraisse); nevertheless, the following passage shows beyond any doubt that Whorf does recognize those aspects of consciousness which others consider to be the foundation of time: . . . if we inspect consciousness we find n o past, present, future, but a unity embracing complexity. Everything is in consciousness, and everything in consciousness is, and is together. There is in it a sensuous and a nonsensuous. We may call the sensuous - what we are seeing, hearing, touching - the 'present' while in the nonsensuous the vast imageworld of memory is being labeled 'the past' and another realm of belief, intuition, and uncertainty t h e future'; yet sensation, memory, foresight, [St. Augustine's present of things present, present of things past, and present of things future] ARE ALL IN CONSCIOUSNESS TOGETHER [small capitals mine] - one is not "yet t o be" nor another "once but no more". 2 »

In the same article, Whorf states that Hopi has "modes" which can denote relations of later to earlier and of simultaneity (but not the "absolute" simultaneity of physics).24 Hence, Whorf can argue that although Hopi is a "timeless" language, this does not prevent it from being closely adjusted to the pertinent realities of ACTUAL SITUATIONS.25 From the foregoing, it is apparent that Whorf does not contest the universality of those aspects of consciousness which many theorists would characterize as modes of temporal experience. Thus, although Whorf does contend that language influences one's concept of time, he DEFINITELY does not contend that "psychological time" is influenced by language. It would seem that (psychological) space and time are, as Humboldt suggested, the same for all men regardless of language. Further, there is little evidence of "

Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, III, 217. Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Science and Linguistics", in Language, Thought, and Reality, 216. 23 Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language", in Language, Thought and Reality, 143-144. 24 Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language", in Language, Thought and Reality, 145. On absolute simultaneity, see Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language", in Language, Thought and Reality, 158; see also "Science and Linguistics", in Language, Thought and Reality, 216. M See "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language", in Language, Thought and Reality, 145. a

PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE AND TIME AS UNIVERSALS

23

perceptual encapsulation due to language in any domain of sense experience.26 For years the stronghold of the relativist has been fortified by the seemingly random way in which different languages segment the color spectrum. Now, however, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay have been able to establish that "color categorization is not random and [that] the foci of basic color terms are similar in all languages" Ρ Berlin and Kay go on to suggest that "a total universal inventory of exactly eleven basic color categories exists from which the eleven or fewer basic color terms are always drawn".28 In the experiment which supplied the data on which their conclusions are based, NATIVE informants from some twenty different languages were asked to map the focal point and outer boundary of each of the basic color terms of their color lexicons on an array of standardized color stimuli (329 Munsell color chips mounted on stiff cardboard).29 The conclusions reached on the basis of evidence from the original twenty languages was then shown to hold true for an ADDITIONAL SEVENTY30 EIGHT languages. According to Berlin and Kay, there appears to be NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT DIFFERENCES IN THE COLOR LEXICON REFLECT PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES.31

If we remember that the array of standardized color stimuli (329 Munsell color chips mounted on stiff cardboard) used by Berlin and Kay constitutes an extralinguistic frame of reference, the success of their investigation strongly suggests that it is, in general, possible to set up a universally valid extralinguistic frame of reference for orienting semantic description. On the basis of the findings of this chapter, it would seem that psychological space and time constitute such a universally valid framework. Further, given the fact that there is little if any reason for positing perceptual encapsulation due to the influence of language, the entire domain of sensory experience can be considered as providing the necessary foundation for orienting semantic description on a universally valid basis. The fundamental validity of orienting semantic description in terms of sensory experience will be shown in the next chapter.

28

On this, see especially John B. Carroll, Language and Thought (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), 94-95; Eric H. Lenneberg, Biological Foundations of Language (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), 348, 354. Both books offer valuable reviews of research in this area. 87 Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, Basic Color Terms (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 10. 28 Berlin and Kay, Basic Color Terms, 2. 28 Berlin and Kay, Basic Color Terms, 5. 30 Berlin and Kay, Basic Color Terms, 14-15. 31 Berlin and Kay, Basic Color Terms, 5.

IV MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

The relationship of the structure of sense experience to the structure of meaning and with it the structure of thought is a matter which cannot long be avoided by students of language. The fundamental importance of correlating the structure of sensory experience with semantic structure is brought clearly into focus by C. I. Lewis's observation that psychologically and cognitively, meaning altogether is derivative from the sensuous criteria of recognition. We have first — first in importance at least - certain matters before our minds as presented in experience, or as represented; and the whole business of language - perhaps of thinking also - arises from the desirability, or the necessity even, of signalizing such empirically presented and presentable items.... Further, any usefulness of our linguistic patterns consists eventually in their guidance of our identifications of the sense-recognizable so as to conform these to our intentions and render them consistent.1 The problem of correlating the structure of sense experience with that of semantic structure is one which can, at least with respect to basic principles, be solved at the present time without sacrificing the methodological advances made in structural linguistics. As John Locke observed long ago in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, any adequate examination of the foundations of thought necessarily entails an examination of the problem of linguistic meaning.2 A corollary of this observation is one to the effect that any adequate investigation of the problem of linguistic meaning entails an investigation of the broader problem of cognition in general. With this in mind, it is not surprising that many of the insights necessary to the solution of the problem of reference are found imbedded in psychological, epistemological and logical theories as well as those of a purely linguistic character. 1 Clarence Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, 111.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1946), 141. 2 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by John Yolton (2 vols., 1st ed., rev.; London: Dent, 1964-1965), III. ix. 21, vol. II, 87. A brief, very well documented examination of the relationship of language and cognition in Locke's theory is found in KarlHeinz Weimann's article "Leibniz als Sprachforscher", in Leibniz, ed. by Wilhelm Totok and Carl Haase (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur and Zeitgeschehen, 1966); this article contains a quite interesting comparison of the standpoints of Locke and Leibniz.

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

25

Ernst Leisi's semantic theory provides the n e e d e d linguistic f r a m e of reference f o r integrating all of these contributions i n t o a unified, coherent w h o l e w h i c h c a n provide an adequate theoretical framework f o r correlating linguistic m e a n i n g with its f o u n d a t i o n in experience. Leisi defines m e a n i n g as the set of criterial conditions w h i c h allow a m e m b e r of a given l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i t y t o identify something ostensively as an instance of a given category in accordance with the semantic c o d e of his language. 3 Ostensive definition ( ' Z e i g d e f i n i t i o n ' ) , according t o Leisi, is "die V e r a n k e r u n g der Wortinhalte an der aussersprachlichen Welt". 4 H i s emphasis o n the role of ostensive orientation in semantic description d o e s not m e a n that h e is n o t fully aware of t h e fact that the w a y in w h i c h a given area of experience is segmented c a n and d o e s vary, in s o m e cases widely, f r o m language t o language; indeed, the investigation of the character of these differences constitutes o n e of the m o s t valuable aspects of his work. 6 T h e problems presented b y the nature of these differences h a v e c a u s e d m a n y linguists, in contrast t o Leisi, t o restrict semantic description almost solely t o the examination of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic distributional patterns of lexical items." Just w h y this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs is brought i n t o sharp relief b y Bertrand Russell: Absorption in language sometimes leads t o a neglect of t h e connexion of language with non-linguistic facts, although it is this connexion which gives meaning to words and significance to sentences. N o o n e can u n d e r s t a n d t h e w o r d 'cheese' unless h e h a s a n o n linguistic acquaintance with cheese. 7 I n Leisi's theory, it is through ostensive definition that the c o n n e c t i o n is m a d e b e t w e e n language and nonlinguistic facts w h i c h constitute the criterial conditions f o r » Der Wortinhalt: Seine Struktur im Deutschen und Englischen (3d ed., enl.; Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1967), 19; for restrictions, see 19, 116, 118; when ostensive definition is impossible, Leisi uses distributional restrictions as his guide. For related approaches, see Els Oksaar, Semantische Studien im Sinnbereich der Schnelligkeit (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1958), 48-49; Uriel Weinrich, "Lexicographic Definition in Descriptive Semantics", in Problems in Lexicography, ed. by Fred W. Householder and Sol Saporta (2d ed.; Bloomington: Indiana University, 1967), 29-34. Also relevant is Paul Z i f f s Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960). 4 Leisi, Der Wortinhalt, 115. 5 In addition to Der Wortinhalt, see also his "Die Darstellung der Zeit in der Sprache", in Das Zeitproblem im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by R. W. Meyer (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1964), 11-26; "Deutsch und Englisch: Ein Vergleich zwischen zwei Sprachen", Muttersprache, LXXI (1961), 257-264; "Englische und deutsche Wortinhalte: Zonen der Deckung, Zonen der Verschiedenheit", Wirkendes Wort, XII (1962), 140-150; Das heutige Englisch: Wesenszüge und Probleme (4th ed.; Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1967). » On this, see especially Eugene A. Nida, "Linguistic and Semantic Structure", 13-33. For the historical background of this approach, see Stephen Ullmann, Semantics: An Introduction to the Science of Meaning (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1962), 64-67. Joshihiko Ikegami offers a review of related theories in "Structural Semantics: A Survey and Problems", in Linguistics, 33 (July, 1967), 49-67. 7 "Logical Positivism" in Logic and Knowledge, ed. by Robert Charles Marsh (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1956), 381. Although Russell makes this statement in the context of a discussion of logical positivism, what he says is obviously relevant to our discussion of Leisi's ideas.

26

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

the denotative use of a term. Thus, according to Leisi, "jeder Gebrauch eines Wortes, auch in dem kompliziertesten Satzzusammenhang, ist eine direkte Funktion des Gebrauchs dieses Wortes in der Zeigdefinition."8 His position in this regard in no way conflicts with his recognition of the fact that languages differ with respect to the way they categorize any given domain of reference; implicit in his theory is the standpoint expressed in Ernst Cassirer's Essay on Man: To

give a n a m e to an object or action is to subsume it u n d e r a certain class concept. If this subsumption were once and for all prescribed by the nature of things, it would be unique and uniform. Yet the n a m e s w h i c h occur in h u m a n speech cannot be interpreted in any such invariable manner.... THEY ARE DETERMINED . . . BY HUMAN INTERESTS AND HUMAN PURPOSES. BUT THESE INTERESTS ARE NOT FIXED AND INVARIABLE. NOR ARE THE CLASSIFICATIONS TO BE FOUND IN HUMAN SPEECH MADE AT RANDOM; THEY ARE BASED ON CERTAIN CONSTANT AND RECURRING ELEMENTS IN OUR SENSE EXPERIENCE, [small Capitals mine.] 9

This means that although the criterial attributes selected as a basis for categorization can vary from language to language, those criterial conditions chosen in any given language will be grounded in the recurring sames of sensory experience. The role of ostensive definition is to show which recurring sames are criterial with reference to a given category. Although Leisi HAS RESTRICTED THE APPLICATION OF OSTENSIVE DEFINITION to terms which have concrete denotata,10 this approach to meaning is also applicable to the referential domain of "non-public" abstract concepts such as pain, hope, etc., i.e., phenomena which cannot be exhibited on an intersubjectively demonstrable basis in the same way as books and chairs. Paradoxically, Ludwig Wittgenstein has already removed the theoretical obstacle to a theory such as Leisi's in this domain of reference. According to Wittgenstein there MUST BE PUBLIC CRITERIA for the use of each such NON-PUBLIC CONCEPT.11 This can be done by stating the CRITERIAL ASPECTS of the EXTERNAL PHENOMENA which constitute the CHARACTER12 ISTIC ENVIRONMENT in which one normally has a given experience. Without such characteristic environments there would be NO INTERSUBIECTIVELY DEMONSTRABLE 8

Der Wortinhalt, 115. Cassirer, An Essay on Man, 134. 10 Leisi, Der Wortinhalt, 19. Hans-Martin Gauger in Wort und Sprache (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1970), 56-57, suggests that ALL words can be defined on an ostensive basis. 11 Wittgenstein's position becomes clear if one examines passages 305, 322, 378, 571, 572 and 580 of his Philosophical Investigations, trans, by G. Ε. M. Anscombe (3d ed.; N e w York: Macmillan Company, 1958); this is the standard edition and includes the original German text. Support for the interpretation given here is found in the following studies: John W. Cook, "Wittgenstein on Privacy", The Philosophical Review, LXXXIV, 3 (July, 1965), 281-314; Alan Donagan, "Wittgenstein on Sensation", in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by George Pitcher (Garden City, N e w York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), 324-351; C. A. van Peursen, Ludwig Wittgenstein, trans, by Rex Ambler (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1970), 89-92. u See Donagan, "Wittgenstein on Sensation", 343-344 and 350-351, for a clear formulation of this standpoint. Compare also Gauger, Wort und Sprache, 57. •

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

27

BASIS for correlating the categorization of such experience within a speech community - and without such a correlation communication would be impossible. How, without knowing that a child is probably having a given experience in a given situation, could one possibly teach a child the meaning of any non-public concept? One could, of course, give a verbal description of the situation which correlates with such phenomena, but this approach has the same experiential foundation and presupposes the existence of characteristic environments. If Wittgenstein is right, then Leisi's theory is clearly applicable to the domain of 'non-public' experience. That there is NO MEANINGFUL ALTERNATIVE to this approach is clear from data supplied by experimental psychology; mental images of such a nature as to provide a suitable foundation for orienting a semantic map are, as Roger Brown points out, simply not reported for most utterances.18 Thus, IF A SEMANTIC MAP IS TO BE ORIENTED, IT MUST BE ORIENTED IN TERMS OF INTERSUBJECTIVELY DEMONSTRABLE SENSORY EXPERIENCE. Of central importance in this context are the contributions of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Both attempt to establish a correlation between logic and experience,14 and therein lies the seed of their relevance, for in establishing this correlation they also deal with the problem of the experiential foundation of syncategorematic meaning and semantic universals.15 Kant's schema doctrine represents his answer to the question of the relationship of logic to experience, while Mill's answer to the same problem is found in his System of Logic. Given the developments in psychology and philosophy since their time, it is clear that one cannot apply their ideas to problems of meaning without modification. As a result their formulations can only be used as a starting point. John Viertel puts into perspective the problem of utilizing the ideas of past genius for the solution of contemporary problems: . . . in intellectual history derivations generally take o n a selective form, w h e n the ideas taken o v e r f r o m predecessors are put into a n e w context, indeed this seems t o b e the m a i n w a y ideas e v o l v e and develop. 1 ® 19

See the discussion in Words and Things (New York: Free Press, 1958), 89-93. A detailed, well regarded examination of the role of images in thought is given in George Humphrey, Thinking: An Introduction to its Experimental Psychology (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1951), and should be consulted when evaluating Brown's position. 14 This aspect of Kant's theory is brought out clearly by Bella K. Milmed in her book Kant & Current Philosophical Issues (New York: N e w York University Press, 1961); see especially 28-29 and 236-237. In regard to Mill, see his Autobiography, ed. by Harold J. Laski (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), 190-192. 15 Although Kant and Mill are dealing with logic and not ordinary language, they both realize that there is a close relationship between logic and grammar. Kant's most explicit comment on this question is found in his Prolegomena·, see Gesammelte Schriften, IV, 322-23. Mill's views are found in "J. S. Mill's Inaugural Address at St. Andrews", in lames & John Stuart Mill on Education, ed. by Francis A. Cavenagh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 150-151. w John Viertel, "Concepts of Language Underlying the 18th Century Controversy about the Origin of Language", in Report of the Seventeenth Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Studies, ed. by Francis P. Dinneen, S. J. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1966), 128.

28

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

In this case, the NEW CONTEXT will be Ernst Leisi's approach to the problem of meaning. By interpreting Kant's schema doctrine and Mill's ideas on the problem of reference in the light of Leisi's semantic theory, one can establish the basic framework needed for correlating the structure of meaning with its experiential foundation on an empirical, intersubjectively demonstrable basis. In order to do this, however, one must first lay the foundation by clarifying the key concepts of substance, attribute, and relation with respect to what is ACTUALLY EXPERIENCED AND INTERSUBJECTIVELY DEMONSTRABLE. This problem can be meaningfully considered only within the framework of Gestalt psychology.17 For only Gestalt psychology provides the foundation for the development of a SCIENTIFIC phenomenology, i.e., provides the foundation for examining what is ACTUALLY EXPERIENCED and INTERSUBJECTIVELY DEMONSTRABLE on an EMPIRICAL basis. Within this context, the three most important classes of denotata are: substances, attributes and relations. By substance we mean entities such as houses, trees, ships, etc.·, by attributes such phenomena as size, shape, color, weight; while by relations we mean the experiential correlates of such concepts as resemblance, causality, before, after, above, below, weak, strong, etc. Although the concept of relation is more problematic than that of substance or attribute, the essential characteristic of relations is brought out clearly by John Locke's observation that there must always be in relation two ideas or things, either in themselves really separate or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.18 David Hume focuses upon the underlying problem concerning the phenomenologjcal status of substance, attribute, and relation when he writes: 'Tis certain that the mind wou'd never have dream'd of distinguishing a figure from the body figur'd, as being in reality neither distinguishable, nor different, nor separable; did it not observe, that even in this simplicity there might be contain'd many different resemblances and relations. Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos'd in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we find two separate resemblances, in what formerly seem'd, and really is, perfectly inseparable. After a little more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour . . . that is, we consider the figure and colour together, since they are in effect the same and undistinguishable; but still view them in different aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible.19 17 Technically, it would be more accurate to say that Ganzheitspsychologie provides the needed framework; however, in that all contributions to be considered within the context of this study fall under what in English is generally called Gestalt psychology, it seems desirable to follow this practice in order to avoid possible confusion; in regard to this issue, see George W. Hartmann's examination of the varities of Gestalt psychology in his Gestalt Psychology (New York: Ronald Press, 1935), 78-91. 18 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II. xxv. 6, vol. I, 268. ι» David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), I. i. 7, 25.

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

29

Essentially the same analysis can be forwarded within the framework of Gestalt psychology.20 Thus, substances can be considered as phenomena with a segregated givenness in sensory experience; this definition is most clearly applicable in the domain of spatial experience in which "everything" from airplanes to zithers constitutes an entity with clearly defined boundaries; it is, however, applicable in all areas of sensory experience in which some form of figure ground differentiation is possible. Attributes, then, can be considered modes of partial resemblance between these phenomena. Within this frame of reference relations can be considered modes of resemblance between wholes having two or more distinct parts. Thus, we classify relations on the same basis'as we do substances and attributes, i.e., in terms of modes of resemblance. The categories of relation play a central role in the classical theories of knowledge. Although traditional atomistic psychology provided no adequate framework for showing the foundation of relations in sensory experience, Gestalt psychology does. Hans Cornelius' very insightful analysis furnished the solution which is based on the observation that a particular organization of a perceptual whole can be maintained despite changes in the properties of its parts. 21 This phenomenon is called transposition of form. The most familiar instance is that a given melody can be played in different keys and yet remain the same qua melody; another example would be that apples or dimes, arranged in square patterns will be seen as the same qua squareness.22 The Gestalt principle thus fully covers the traditional concept of relation, for all relations which fall under the classical empiricist definition of relation exhibit the phenomenon of transposition of form. For example, the experiential correlates of relations such as "larger than" or "faster than" are experienced as the "same" whether elephants or mice are considered in relation to some second creature such as the hippopotamus. Transposition of form in these cases shows that we are dealing with invariants of sense experience, in this case RECURRING SAMES OF PERCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION. It is within this frame of reference that Gestalt psychology is able to handle the relations of resemblance and causality. Walter Ehrenstein describes the experiential status of the relation of resemblance in the following way: Das Ähnlichkeitserlebnis gehört zu den Urtatsachen unseres seelischen Seins. Als Urgegebenheit lässt es eine weitere Herleitung aus noch Ursprünglicherem nicht zu. Ein 20

This is best brought into clear perspective by examining Hans Cornelius, Einleitung in die Philosophie (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1911), 244-251; Christian von Ehrenfels, "Über 'Gestaltqualitäten' ", Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, XIV (1890), 273-282; Walter Ehrenstein, Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens (München: Ernst Rheinhardt Verlag, 1965), 89-91. When the issue is viewed from the standpoint of the above mentioned authors, one can also meaningfully consult Edwin Rausch's article "Das Eigenschaftsproblem in der Gestalttheorie der Wahrnehmung", in Handbuch der Psychologie, vol. I: Allgemeine Psychologie, Pt. 1: Wahrnehmung und Bewusstsein, ed. by Wolfgang Metzger (Göttingen: Verlag für Psychologie, 1966), 866-953. 21 See his Einleitung in die Philosophie, 244-251. 18 For a discussion of transposition of form, see Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1947), 196-200.

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MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

rosafarbenes und ein rotes Stück Papier nebeneinander gehalten ergibt mehr als (rosa) + (rot) bzw. eine Summe zweier streng isolierter Erlebnisse. Wir erleben vielmehr ausser rot und rosa noch etwas Drittes, Übergreifendes, dem Gesamterlebnis Anhaftendes, nämlich Ähnlichkeit zwischen rot und rosa... .23

Thus, according to Ehrenstein, RESEMBLANCE IS GIVEN IN SENSORY EXPERIENCE. In this context, it is important to note that although they work within different frameworks, both William James and Bertrand Russell maintain that resemblance is given in immediate perceptual experience.24 Albert Michotte provides a similar account of the status of causality; he maintains that there is a DIRECT PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE of causality.25 It is, according to Michotte, a PERCEPTUAL STRUCTURE. Here, one should remember that one does not experience relations in the absence of given entities standing in said relations; thus relations can be explained ostensively only through exhibiting sample denotata which stand in the desired relationship and serve as a paradigm for purposes of classification. It might be noted that this is the way in which children are taught the meaning of relations. From the preceding discussion, it can be seen that relations do have an intersubjectively demonstrable foundation in sensory experience and can be handled within a theory of meaning such as Ernst Leisi's which provides the framework for the phenomenological orientation of any given semantic map on an ostensive basis. We are now in a position to show the relevance of Kant's schema doctrine and certain related ideas of John Stuart Mill to the development of an adequate semantic theory. As we shall see, the afore mentioned ideas of Kant and Mill can be modified in the light of Gestalt psychology in such a way as to provide the basic framework for correlating the structure of sensory experience with that of meaning. In correlating the structure of sense experience and that of semantic structure, we shall also provide a framework for showing the experiential foundation of syncategorematic meaning as well as providing one for handling semantic universale on an empirical basis. The key to our problem lies in finding the domain of reference of syncategorematic meaning, and therein lies the relevance of Kant's schema doctrine to semantics; for logic constitutes the realm of syncategorematic meaning par excellence. Kant's recognition of the close relationship of grammar and logic is clearly expressed in the Prolegomena: 23

Ehrenstein, Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens, 206. William James, 'Essays in Radical Empiricism' and Ά Pluralistic Universe', ed. by Ralph Barton Perry (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1971), 25-26, 255; Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 172-174. 25 See especially The Perception of Causality, trans, by T. R. Miles and Elaine Miles (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963), 255-259, 358-369. Michotte's book is very useful for its discussion of related literature, much of which supports and augments his findings. Also especially valuable is Michotte and Georges-Louis Thines, "La causalite perceptive", Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique, L X (1963), 9-36; a German translation of this article appears as "Die Kausalitätswahrnehmung", trans, and ed. by Günther Reinert, in Handbuch der Psychologie, vol. I, pt. 1, 954-977. 24

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

31

To search in our common knowledge for the concepts which do not rest upon particular experience and yet occur in all knowledge from experience, of which they as it were constitute the mere form of connection, presupposes neither greater reflection nor deeper insight than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of words generally and thus to collect elements for a grammar (in fact both researches are very nearly related), even though we are not able to give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal constitution, and still less why any precise number of such formal determinations in general, neither more nor less, can be found in it.2« Although no one in linguistics has concerned himself with Kant's schema doctrine, some scholars in the field of philosophy have noted that Kantian schemata can be interpreted as referential rules; Stephan Körner gives perhaps the most convincing formulation of this position: Referential rules link concepts to perception and thus perform the function of Kant's schemata. Whatever else the addition of its schema to a concept may be for Kant, and whatever its psychological mechanism, it is at least the addition of the referential rules of a concept to its non-referential ones - an addition which makes the concept applicable." It is this interpretation which opens the door to the possibility of explaining the foundation of syncategorematic meaning in experience. Kant distinguished between schemata for mathematical and empirical concepts on the one hand, and schemata for cognitive universale on the other, labeling schemata for cognitive universale as transcendental schemata.28 Of special interest to this study is Kant's application of his schema principle to a priori categories, the cognitive universale. The central importance of this doctrine to Kant's philosophy is underscored by Norman Kemp Smith's observation that "what Kant usually means when he speaks of the categories are the schemata".29 Here, one must remember that the TRANSCENDENTAL SCHEMATA FUNCTION, IN A SENSE, AS THE REFERENTIAL RULES FOR THE CATEGORIES. I t is i m -

portant to note, as H. J. Paton points out, that

"THE TRANSCENDENTAL SCHEMATA

ARE NOT DEDUCED FROM THE FORMS OF JUDGEMENT, BUT FROM THE NATURE OF

TIME".30 (small capitals mine.) Paton puts the importance of this into perspective M

Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, IV, 322-323. Translation by Lewis White Beck, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950), 70. On the close correlation of logic and the Kantian categories, see IV, 302-305, 323-324. 17 Stephan Körner, Kant (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955), 71. Compare Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 477-480; Robert E. Butts, "Kant's Schemata as Semantical Rules", in Kant Studies Today, ed. by Lewis W. Beck (La Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1969), 290-300; C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 134. For supporting textual evidence in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, see especially Β 176-187; A 106 is also highly relevant in this context. A critical position is taken by Jonathan Bennett in Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 145. 28 For a general examination of Kant's schema concept, see Herbert J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience (2 vols.; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1936), II, 2-78. Norman Kemp Smith's discussion is also very useful; see especially his Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (2d rev. ed.; N e w York: Humanities Press, 1962), 334-342. !> Kemp Smith, Commentary, 340. 80 Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, II, 77. On this, see also Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's

32

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

when he writes: The connexion of the categories with the synthesis of imagination and the form of time is the most important, and the least artificial, part of the Critical Philosophy. We must not allow the difficulties of an unfamiliar and antiquated terminology to obscure the real significance of the argument. 31

In the second edition of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant is clearly moving toward incorporating space into his (transcendental) schema doctrine insofar as the schemata can be regarded as referential rules.32 Thus, Kant established A CONNECTION BETWEEN SPACE AND TIME AS THE INVARIANTS OF SENSE EXPERIENCE AND THE INNATE UNIVERSAL CATEGORIES OF THOUGHT. This aspect of Kant's doctrine provides the needed frame of reference for correlating the structure of meaning with the structure of sense experience. In the light of our line of reasoning, the relevance of Kant's schema concept to the development of an adequate semantic theory lies i n INTERPRETING THE SCHEMATA AS REFERENTIAL RULES AND IN MAKING WHATEVER

in order to attain the objectives of this study. On this basis, we can provide a satisfactory answer to a number of questions relating to the problem of reference with respect to syncategorematic meaning by viewing the MODES OF SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL EXPERIENCE AS A DOMAIN OF REFERENCE and integrating this idea into Ernst Leisi's theory of meaning. However, in order to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of reference, we must take into consideration not only THE STRUCTURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL MODIFICATIONS IN HIS FORMULATIONS THAT MIGHT BE NECESSARY

SPACE AND TIME BUT ALSO THE STRUCTURE OF SENSORY EXPERIENCE IN GENERAL AS A REFERENTIAL DOMAIN.

Although John Stuart Mill's theory of knowledge is often considered the antithesis of Kant's, there are a number of aspects of his theory which are Kantian in spirit and are relevant to the solution of our problem. By modifying John Stuart Mill's ideas in the light of Gestalt psychology, we can lay the foundation for showing the validity and relevance of considering the STRUCTURE OF SENSORY EXPERIENCE AS A DOMAIN OF REFERENCE. We can begin our examination of Mill by noting that he as well as Kant believed that there was a correlation between grammar and logic: Consider for a moment what grammar is. It is the most elementary part of logic. It is the beginning of the analysis of the thinking process. The principles and rules of grammar are the means by which the forms of language are made to correspond with the universal forms of thought. 33

Just as Kant with his transcendental schemata attempts to show the correlation of logic and experience, so does Mill in his System of Logic seek to accomplish the Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 209-210, 222-223. For textual support in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, see especially Β 177-178, 184-185. S1 Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, II, 76. 32 On this, see Β 291-293. Compare Kemp Smith, Commentary, 309-311. as "I. S. Mill's Inaugural Address at St. Andrews", 150.

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

33

same thing.84 It is in this context that Mill writes: . . . no case can be assigned where that which is predicated of the fact or phenomenon does not belong to one or the other of the five species formerly enumerated: it is either simple Existence, or it is some Sequence, Co-existence, Causation, or Resemblance. 35

He goes on to say that "as these are the only five things which can be affirmed, so are they the only ones which can be denied".36 Most of these categories would appear to be psychological universale in Mill's view: Likeness and unlikeness, therefore, as well antecedence, sequence, and simultaneousness, must stand apart among relations, as things sui generis. They are attributes grounded on facts, that is, on states of consciousness, but on states which are peculiar, unresolvable, and inexplicable. 37

The surprisingly Kantian character of Mill's universale is clearly revealed in his discussion of the nature of simultaneity and succession: Sensations or other feelings, being given, succession and simultaneousness are the two conditions to the alternative of which they are subjected by the nature of our facul38 ties

Mill is just as clear with respect to the status of resemblance as a universal: . . . these feelings of resemblance and its opposite, dissimilarity, are parts of our nature; and parts so f a r f r o m being capable of analysis, that they are presupposed in every attempt t o analyse any of our other feelings. 39

Mill defines existence in much the same way as Kant. According to Mill, "to exist is to excite, or be capable of exciting, any sensations or states of consciousness: no matter what, but it is indispensable that there should be some".40 Causation as a universal creates for Mill a good deal of trouble as it did for everyone prior to the application of Gestalt theory to the problem.41 Here, we need only remember that Albert Michotte and others, through years of research, have firmly established THAT 34 See Mill, Autobiography, 190-192; in this context, compare his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (4th ed.; London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1872), 477. For useful discussions of this aspect of his theory, see Karl Britton, John Stuart Mill (2d ed.; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), 142-144; Oskar Alfred Kubitz, Development of John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XVIII (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1932). Not useful in regard to this problem is Reginald lackson's An Examination of the Deductive Logic of John Stuart Mill (London: Oxford University Press, 1941). 35 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (London: Longmans, 1884), I. v. 7, 70. 38 Mill, A System of Logic, I. v. 7, 70. 37 Mill, A System of Logic, I. iii. 11, 44. 38 Mill, A System of Logic, I. iii. 10, 44. 38 Mill, A System of Logic, I. iii. 11, 44. 40 Mill, A System of Logic, I. v. 5, 65. On the similarity to Kant, see Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Β 182. 41 See especially in Mill's Logic, I. v. 5, 65 and III. v. 1-11. 211-242.

34

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

is GIVEN DIRECTLY IN PERCEPTION.42 Michotte has directly answered Hume's objection; however, even in those instances where one might still be forced to give an account of causality in terms of spatio-temporal contiguity (or temporal contiguity alone), one is still explaining causality in terms of the structural aspects of sense experience.43 Thus all of Mill's universale except existence, which is not problematic on the basis of his definition, can within the framework of Gestalt psychology be regarded as structural elements of sense experience. On the basis of the material advanced thus far, we are in a position to show the foundation of syncategorematic meaning in sensory experience. In this context, the experiential foundation of 'logic' can also be brought into focus. This can be accomplished through examining the relevance of CONSIDERING THE STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF SENSORY EXPERIENCE, such as resemblance, causality, and the modes of temporal and spatial experience, AS A DOMAIN OF REFERENCE. The positions of Mill and Kant, when modified in the light of the suggested framework, point the way. We can begin with resemblance. William James has persuasively argued that resemblance (similarity) is the cornerstone of logic in regard to both classification and inference; more recently Walter Ehrenstein has advanced a similar viewpoint within the framework of Gestalt psychology.44 Resemblance, it seems reasonable to assert, constitutes the basis of all categorization.45 Thus, for example, when we say silver is a metal or Fido is a dog, we are categorizing on the basis of the criterial modes of similarity which must be fulfilled in order to correctly label such phenomena according to the semantic code of the English speech community. In Mill's view co-occurrence also plays a very important role in providing the experiential foundation of logic. According to Mill, for example, the proposition "no horses are web-footed" means that denotata which fulfill the conditions of being categorized as horses do not fulfill the conditions required to categorize something as web-footed, i.e., the criterial sets of conditions (criterial modes of resemblance) do not co-occur; hence, "all men are animals" simply means that all denotata which exhibit the criterial conditions for men also fulfill the criterial conditions for being categorized as animals, i.e., the criterial modes of resemblance do THE CAUSAL IMPRESSION

42

On this, see especially Michotte's Perception of Causality, 255-259, 358-369. There is a considerable amount of supporting data contributed by other researchers in this book. Very interesting in this context is the fact that examinations of the principles of spontaneous grouping in sensory fields show that CONTIGUITY is an organizational factor OF PERCEPTION. See Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, 143-151. 44 See James, Principles of Psychology, II, 641-651; in the same work he states that resemblance is given in perceptual experience; on this, see I, 528-530; compare 'Essays in Radical Empiricism' and Ά Pluralistic Universe', 25-26, 255. For Ehrenstein's view, see his Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens, 170-218. Compare William Stanley Jevons, Pure Logic and other Minor Works, ed. by R. Adamson and H. Jevons (London: Macmillan and Co., 1890), 81-132. 45 For Mill's position, see his System of Logic, II. ii. 3 (note), 117-118. Compare his notes in James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, ed. by J. S. Mill, with notes by A. Bain, A. Findlater, and G. Grote (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869), I, 260-262. His notes in this work provide a valuable key to understanding his mature position on this issue. 43

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

35

co-occur. Mill clearly brings out the role of co-occurrence in syllogistic reasoning, as is illustrated in the following example: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is a mortal. 4 6

This means simply that all denotata that fulfill the criteria for being classified as men also fulfill the criteria for being categorized as mortal (i.e., the criterial modes of resemblance for man always co-occur with those for mortal); hence as Socrates exhibits the criterial modes of resemblance for being called a man, he necessarily manifests the criterial conditions for being classified as mortal in that the criterial conditions for man always co-occur with those for mortal.47 The modes of modality such as necessity, possibility, and probability are also essentially based on co-occurrence. David Hume brings the nature of modal judgements clearly into focus in his observation that 'tis the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind, which constitutes a physical n e c e s s i t y . . . . 4 8

The determination of the mind of which Hume speaks is "that propensity which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant".4» It is not necessary to adhere to an associationist psychological framework in order to recognize the fundamental validity of what he is saying.50 Κ one recalls what has already been established in regard to the phenomenal gjvenness of substances, attributes, and relations, and if one includes under what he labels conjunction the relations of succession, causality (or phenomenal dependence), and simultaneity, then a similar analysis seems viable. For it seems that when one makes a modal judgement, one is in a sense stating whether a given state of affairs can or cannot occur, or whether both possibilities exist, on the basis of the observed "conjunction" of phenomena, with conjunction often including the co-occurrence of modes of resemblance which are experienced as differential aspects of the same phenomena. This is of real importance in that it enables one to reconstruct the past and predict the future; needless to say, both possibilities are essential elements of man's adaptive repertoire. The categories of reality and negation have equally as solid a foundation in sensory experience as those already discussed. That which exists is that which is "capable of exciting any sensations, or states of consciousness: no matter what, but « "

Mill, A System of Logic, II. ii. 3, 116. See Mill, A System of Logic, II. ii. 3-4, 116-119. 49 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I. iii. 14, 171. On the same page he asserts that there is but one kind of necessity. 48 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I. iii. 14, 171. eo Hume was not the atomist he is commonly considered to have been.

36

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

it is indispensable that there be some".51 To say that something exists is to say the criterial attributes for denotation can be experienced within a specified context. Negation, according to Kant, is "a concept of the absence of an object".52 Therefore, for example, to predicate negation of anything is to say that it cannot be experienced within the defined context, i.e., the criterial conditions will not be fulfilled within the specified context. Thus far it has been shown that the STRUCTURAL ASPECTS of SENSE EXPERIENCE such as RESEMBLANCE, CAUSALITY and the modes of PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE AND TIME CONSTITUTE THE REFERENTIAL DOMAIN PAR EXCELLENCE OF SYNCATEGOREMATIC

(In doing this we have brought to light the experiential foundation of logic.) Although the theory as presented does seem to fly in the face of what has been too long the relatively unquestioned doctrine, one should consider this theory and the existent alternatives to it in the light of C. I. Lewis's seemingly undeniable contention that MEANING.

. . . ANY USEFULLNESS OF OUR LINGUISTIC PATTERNS CONSISTS EVENTUALLY IN THEIR GUIDANCE OF OUR IDENTIFICATIONS OF THE SENSE-RECOGNIZABLE SO a s tO C o n f o r m t h e s e to our intentions and render t h e m consistent, (small capitals mine.)53

Especially interesting in this context is Walter Ehrenstein's hypothesis concerning the relationship of the structure of perception to that of conceptualization: In Wirklichkeit ist das, was wir "Verstand" bzw. "intelligentes Denken" nennen, nichts anderes als das Funktionieren der dem Wahrnehmungs- und Vorstellungsbereich immanenten Ordnungsfaktoren. Sie treten zu Wahrnehmungen und Vorstellungen nicht erst aus einer anderen, nicht bestimmbaren Sphäre des Bewusstseins hinzu, sondern sie sind innerhalb ihrer immanent und von Haus aus wirksam. 54

Thinking being in his system "the functioning of the immanent organizational factors of perception and the Vorstellungsbereich", the question of the relationship of perception and Vorstellungen ('images', i.e., the phenomena of memory and imagination which resemble very faint perception) arises. On this point Ehrenstein is quite explicit; he maintains that there is a correspondence between Vorstellungen and perception both in terms of content, in that Vorstellungen have their foundation in prior perceptual experience, and in terms of having the SAME immanent organizational factors.55 Powerful support for his view of the correlation of Vorstellungen and perception is offered by the very nature of dreams, eidetic images, hypnagogic images, and hallucinations;56 all represent phenomena which prove that »

Mill, Logic, I. v. 5, 65. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Β 347. ts Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge, 141. 54 Ehrenstein, Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens, 207. 55 His clearest Statement with respect to this issue is found in his Probleme der ganzheitspsychologischen Wahrnehmungslehre (3d ed.; Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1954), 318. 69 For an extremely valuable discussion of these phenomena and their implications, one should consult Ulric Neisser, Cognitive Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), 145-170, 196-197. 52

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

37

one can, in a sense, "perceive" things which are not actually physically present; they therefore share a characteristic with the images of memory and imagination, yet have the clarity of perception; such phenomena constitute a bridge between perception and the images of memory and imagination and underscore the ACTIVE ROLE of the human organism IN THE PROCESS OF PERCEPTION. As Ehrenstein observes, there is no reason to posit a separate intellectual faculty.57 In this context we would suggest that the immanent organizational factors of perception are the immanent organizational factors of thought, with concepts being "rules" of perceptual organization. This framework provides a viable foundation for relating the function of similarity as a principle of spontaneous grouping in sensory fields to the function of similarity as the basis of classification and recall.58 Explaining thinking in the suggested way would appear to provide an adequate answer to the crucial problem of imageless thought, for structural reorganization on the perceptual level exhibits many of the same characteristics as imageless thought; the parallels become clear when one examines the phenomenon of reversible figures (e.g., the Necker Cube and the reversible staircase); the changes are imageless and are often marked by sudden, discontinuous leaps from one organization to another; at one moment one sees one organization, at the next another. This sudden change in organization on the perceptual level parallels the Aha-Experience of thought where one is suddenly aware of the answer and the problem is seen in a new light.5· Here it is important to note that, to some extent, changes in perceptual organization can be deliberately controlled by the perceiver, both with respect to changing or maintaining a particular organization.60 Thus, the traditional dichotomy of perception and thought does not exist in the suggested theory.'1 Such a theory in no way need deny the important role of imagination, as the phenomenon of 57

See especially his Probleme der ganzheitspsychologischen Wahrnehmungslehre, 317-318. A n earlier formulation of the same position is found in his Einfährung in die Ganzheitspsychologie (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1934), 127. 58 Our theory is a synthesis of Kant's empirical schema concept and Ehrenstein's theory. Compare Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Β 180, Β 271, A 120 note, Β 162 note, A 124, A 106; Ehrenstein, "Intelligentes Denken", in Die Ganzheit in Wissenschaft und Schule (Dortmund: W. Criiwell, 1956), 72-73. M On the parallels mentioned here, see especially Ehrenstein's Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens, 170, 181-182, 217; in this context, see also 128-150. Humphrey's Thinking provides a detailed examination of research pertaining to the imageless thought problem. 80 For details, see Ehrenstein, Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens, 128-134. Also useful is David Krech, et al, Elements of Psychology (2d ed., rev.; N e w York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 166-185; generally speaking, Krech's book is very valuable for the nonspecialist who wishes to orient himself in psychology. 61 It is interesting to compare this aspect of Ehrenstein's theory with Harry Helson's characterization of the relationship of perception and conceptualization in Gestalt theory; see Helson's article "The Psychology of Gestalt", The American Journal of Psychology, XXXVII (January, 1926), 54. For useful introductions to the Gestalt theory of thought, see especially Hartmann, Gestalt Psychology, 159-201; Humphrey, Thinking, 150-184.

38

MEANING AND SENSE EXPERIENCE

dreaming, which is both perceptual and imaginative in nature, clearly illustrates.62 Hume was right about the great freedom of imagination, but he was just as correct in stating that the ultimate constituents of the constructs of imagination are derived from sense experience.«3 And we would add that the ultimate modes of organization are those of sense experience, especially those of resemblance and psychological space and time; unfortunately, this fact has been obscured by misinterpretations of the implications of non-Euclidean geometries and contemporary physics. Even Euclidean space and Newtonian time are not identical with the space and time of immediate perceptual experience,84 and the same is true of the classical concept of causality. Moreover, the constructions of BOTH classical and contemporary mathematics and physics are based on the content and structures of immediate experience which can be considered as constituting the set of possible distinctive features.65 This does not mean, however, that the CONSTRUCTIONS need be 'copies' of what is given in immediate perceptual experience. It would appear, then, that we are on solid ground in regarding the immanent organizational factors of perception as the immanent organizational factors of thought.66 This, of course, suggests that the idea of ostensively orienting semantic description in sense experience is not an impractical vagary, but rather a realistic and highly desirable objective.

62

In regard to the relationship of dreams, perception, and imagination, see especially Aristotle On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath, trans, by W. S. Hett, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1957), 349-353. Aristotle's discussion is still quite valuable if viewed in the light of Neisser's related examination in Cognitive Psychology, 145-170. " See Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 18-22. For his position on the ideas of mathematics, see ibid., 158. 04 Compare L. von Bertalanffy, "An Essay on the Relativity of Categories", 259. 65 On the foundation of mathematics and physics in immediate experience, see especially Köhler, The Place of Value in a World of Facts, 142-184; compare Solomon E. Asch, "Gestalt Theory", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), VI, 170-171. When the suggested frame of reference is adopted, one can also profitably consult Stephan Körner, The Philosophy of Mathematics (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 28-29, 72-86, 157-158. Körner's book examines the Kantian, logicist, and formalist approaches to mathematics - all of which can be accounted for within the suggested framework as the dichotomy of perception and conceptualization no longer exists. On distinctive features (the ultimate components of meaning), see especially Bierwisch, "Some Semantic Universals of German Adjectivals", 1-4. ββ We have not discussed Jean Piaget's criticism of Gestalt psychology as Ehrenstein's system and ours are more broadly conceived than that of the classical representatives of this school and thus are not subject to the same criticism. For Piaget's viewpoint, see his Psychology of Intelligence, trans, by D. E. Berlyne (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1969), 64-65. It is a task for the future to document in detail the complete invalidity of his criticism.

ν THE PROPOSED SYNTHESIS IN THE LIGHT OF SOME KEY ISSUES FACING LINGUISTICS

Having established our general theoretical frame of reference, it is now possible to consider the proposed SYNTHESIS in the light of some of the key issues confronting linguistics at the present time. In order to make our presentation clearer, it seems desirable to summarize our most important findings: (1) If linguistic meaning is to be correlated with its experiential foundation, then it must be oriented with respect to intersubjectively demonstrable sense experience. (2) Space and time in particular, and perception in general, are the same for all men regardless of language and provide a universally valid frame of reference for orienting semantic description. (3) Meaning can be defined as the set of criterial conditions which allow a member of a given speech community to identify something ostensively as an instance of a given category in accordance with the semantic code of his language. (4) Kant's schema concept and certain related ideas of John Stuart Mill can be modified in the light of Gestalt psychology in such a way as to show that, in general, the structural aspects of perception constitute the referential domain of 'logic'; in this context there are excellent reasons for regarding the immanent organizational factors of perception as the immanent organizational factors of thought. This framework provides a viable solution to the problem of 'imageless' thought while explaining the correlation of perception and conceptualization.1 (5) All categories of meaning can be defined on an ostensive basis. These conclusions provide us with the basis for dealing with several problems of considerable importance. Included among these problems are the relationship of 1

The existence of imageless thought is a fact which we fully recognize. However, those who do not subscribe to this theory will have a difficult time explaining the applicability of imageless thought to problems which relate either mediately or immediately to sense experience. It should be noted that this approach is not tied down to any given neurophysiological theory.

40

SYNTHESIS IN LIGHT OF SOME ISSUES FACING LINGUISTICS

the collocational and ostensive approaches to semantics, the relationship of syntax and semantics, the question of the meaning of semantic form classes, and the issue of semantic universals. The first problem to be considered is that of the interdependence of the collocational and ostensive modes of semantic analysis. Ideally, the distributional approach to meaning2 should be regarded not as an alternative to, but as an invaluable complement of ostensive definition. For analysis of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic distributional patterns of the elements of any given lexicon shows the linguist where to focus his attention in determining the experimental foundation of meaning, as it seems that LINGUISTIC PATTERNING ON THIS LEVEL ULTIMATELY RESTS ON EXTRALINGUISTIC PATTERNING. This extralinguistic patterning underlies what Walter Porzig calls syntaktische Felder. According to Porzig, for example, each verb can co-occur only with certain nouns, and each adjective can co-occur only with a given number of nouns.3 The source of these distributional patterns becomes clear when one examines their experiential foundation. For one does not experience the denotata of "verbs" and "adjectives" in isolation.4 Disembodied "qualities" and "actions" are not given in immediate perceptual experience. For example, on a hike one would not be likely to see "a bent" and a stick as two spatially segregated entities, but one might well spot a bent stick; nor at a track meet would one encounter "a running" next to an athlete, yet it is quite likely that one would come upon a number of running athletes. As the denotata of "verbs" and "adjectives" are in terms of their phenomenological status 'primarily' attributes (i.e., modes of resemblance between phenomena with a 'segregated' givenness), the sets of criterial conditions for given nouns, adjectives and verbs NECESSARILY co-occur in immediate experience. And therein lies the foundation of the correlation of syntax and semantics.5 For it would seem that if the CRITERIAL CONDITIONS for the denotative * For a cross section of the different distributional approaches, see J. R. Firth, "The Technique of Semantics", in Papers in Linguistics, 1934-1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 7-33; Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, trans, by Francis J. Whitfield (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), 46, 67, 70-75; Martin Joos, "Semology: A Linguistic Theory of Meaning", Studies in Linguistics, XIII, 3-4 (1958), 53-70; Eugene A. Nida, "Linguistic and Semantic Structure", 15-30. 3 Walter Porzig, Das Wunder der Sprache (4th ed.; Bern: Francke Verlag, 1967), 124-125; for an earlier formulation, see his article "Wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen", Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutsche Sprache und Literatur, LVIII (1934), 70-97. For related discussions, see Paul Grebe, "Der semantisch-syntaktische Hof unserer Wörter", Wirkendes Wort, XVI (1966), 361-364; Leisi, Der Wortinhalt, 68-70. * Leisi offers a good discussion of this point; see his Wortinhalt, 20-22. s There is a growing realization of the interdependence of syntax and semantics; in this context it is interesting to compare Noam Chomsky's position in Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton, 1957), 100, with this standpoint in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 77, 159. In regard to syntax and semantics, see Klaus Baumgärtner, "Die Struktur des Beleutungsfeldes", in Satz und Wort im heutigen Deutsch, ed. by Hugo Moser (Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1967), 165-197. A valuable review of research in this area is found in Gerhard Helbig and Wolfgang Schenkel, Wörterbuch zur Valenz und Distribution deutscher Verben (Leipzig: VEB Bibliographisches Institut, 1969), 9-68.

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41

use of given adjectives, verbs, and nouns (i.e., the criterial modes of similarity) CANNOT co-occur in experience, then these given adjectives, verbs, and nouns cannot meaningfully co-occur in discourse. The fundamental validity of our interpretation will become more apparent after we have taken up the problem of the meaning of semantic form classes. Roger Brown has given an answer to the question of semantic form class which fits into our suggested theoretical framework rather well. Brown has suggested that the part-of-speech membership of . . . [a] new word could operate as a filter selecting for attention probably relevant features of the nonlinguistic world.®

Otherwise, he maintains, learning the "nonlinguistic attributes that govern proper denotative use" of any linguistic sign "would be a very laborious affair".7 Brown's experimental data suggest that he is right. Yet if Brown is right, what about the process of derivation through which verbs and adjectives become nouns, nouns become adjectives, etc.? A perfectly reasonable answer can be given by incorporating into our theory the account of abstraction forwarded by Walter Ehrenstein. To begin with, we should observe that . . . was sich reizmässig von seiner Umgebung stark abhebt, wird normalerweise auch beachtet - es "fällt uns auf', wie man sagt - und wird durch automatisch erfolgende Fixationsbewegungen auf der Stelle des deutlichsten Sehens zur Abbildung gebracht. 8

This means that normally we are more aware of those phenomena which are set apart from their background (e.g., discrete spatial entities). However, we can also, to some extent, intentionally determine what constitutes the focal point of our awareness. We do this through the process of abstraction. Ehrenstein sets the problem into perspective by noting . . . dass es sich bei jeder Abstraktion um eine Figur-Grund-Differenzierung handelt'. Das, wovon abstrahiert bzw. was beachtet wird, wird Figur. Wenn an einem farbigen Quadrat nur die Farbe, nicht aber die Form beachtet wird, besitzt die Farbe eine weit höhere Bewusstheit als die Form, d.h. sie ist Figur und die Form ist Grund. Eigentümlich an der Abstraktion ist, das bei ihr Figur- und Grunderlebnis von demselben Reiz ausgehen; die erlebnismässige Entsprechung eines Reizes ist aufgespalten in ein Figurund ein Grund-Erlebnis.»

Phenomenologically speaking, we have a higher degree of awareness of the focal point of our attention. The focal point becomes the figure while that which is not focused upon becomes the ground; thus, AS AN ATTRIBUTE CAN BECOME THE FOCAL β

Roger W. Brown, "Linguistic Determinism and the Part of Speech", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LV, 1 (July, 1957), 3. See also his book Words and Things, 243-253. 7 Roger W. Brown, "Linguistic Determinism and the Part of Speech", 3. 8 Ehrenstein, Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens, 129. • Ehrenstein, Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens, 143. According to Ehrenstein, figure-ground differentiation is one of the dominant organizational factors of human experience and is operative in practically all modes of experience. On this, see Ehrenstein, Probleme des höheren Seelenlebens, 128-153.

42

SYNTHESIS IN LIGHT OF SOME ISSUES FACING LINGUISTICS

POINT OF ATTENTION, IT CAN BECOME THE 'FIGURE' AND ATTAIN AN EXPERIENTIAL STATUS 'ANALOGOUS' TO THAT OF PHENOMENA WHICH ARE SET APART FROM THEIR

the focal point of awareness). As a result, what 'normally' would belong to the 'adjectival' or 'verbal' domain of reference can be considered 'apart' from its phenomenal dependence and therefore belong to the 'substantival' domain of reference. Note that there are parallels between syntactic dependence and phenomenological dependence. Thus, we can use the noun "hardness" in a sentence without mentioning what is hard. On the other hand, when we use the adjective "hard", we must specify what is hard (i.e., "hard" is used as a modifier). Related explanations can be given for all other cases in which syntactic form class varies. "Verbs" can be considered as focusing upon phenomena in such a way as to regard as criterial the temporal aspects of the modes of partial resemblance (partial resemblance in terms of the code of a given language) such as spatial or qualitative change (or lack of change in time), while 'adjectives' can be considered as focusing upon the modes of partial resemblance between phenomena in such a way as to regard the temporal aspects of these partial modes of resemblance as noncriterial.10 Therefore, although the 'REFERENT' MAY REMAIN THE 'SAME', the SET OF CHARACTERISTICS CHOSEN AS CRITERIAL CHANGES; from a semantic point of view, it really makes little difference whether or not the change in focus is signaled on the morphological or the syntactic level. In English, for example, both morphological and syntactic devices are used to mark such changes. Although what is chosen as criterial for form classes may vary from one language to the next, the principle remains the same - a shift in form class represents a shift in focus. Thus, Brown's explanation of form class meaning as a "filter for selecting for attention probably relevant features of the nonlinguistic world" would appear to be valid. In general, his interpretation provides solid support for our theory. BACKGROUND AND NORMALLY WOULD CONSTITUTE THE FIGURE {i.e.,

We can now turn our attention to the issue of semantic universals. A general framework for dealing with this problem has been established by showing that (1) the criterial conditions for all categories of meaning must be oriented in terms of the recurring sames of intersubjectively demonstrable sensory experience; (2) perception is the same for all men regardless of language. Perception, therefore, constitutes a valid extralinguistic frame of reference for characterizing those aspects 'chosen' as criterial in the categorization of any given domain of reference in any given language.11 Perhaps the most important finding 10

The examples given are merely illustrative and in no way are considered to constitute the entire range of possibilities; nor are the names "noun", "verb", and "adjective" to be regarded as anything more than convenient, easily understood labels used in order to show the relevance of our argument. 11 On this, compare Helmut Gipper, Bausteine zur Sprachinhaltsforschung (2d ed.; Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1969), 433.

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43

of this study in regard to the problem of universale is the fact that 'logic', which is often regarded as constituting the most 'abstract' and 'universal' realm of 'grammatical meaning', can be satisfactorily interpreted with respect to its experiential foundation. On the basis of what has been established thus far, it seems safe to suggest that although languages may vary considerably with respect to which 'grammatical' distinctions are made, the underlying basis for whatever distinctions are made is given to all men in the same way. The importance of the structure of sensory experience in our theory leads to the conclusion that linguistics must utilize the resources of psychology if semantic theory is ever to be adequate to its subject. What is needed, of course, is a scientific phenomenology; i.e., a qualitative analysis on an INTERSUBJECTIVELY DEMONSTRABLE basis of what is given in immediate experience. In general, Gestalt psychology, because of its phenomenological orientation, comes closest to providing the needed extralinguistic frame of reference for semantic research.12 The value of the analysis of immediate experience is brought clearly into focus by Wolfgang Köhler: Never, I believe, shall we be able to SOLVE ANY PROBLEMS OF ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE until we go back to the sources of our concepts, - in other words, until we use the phenomenological method, the qualitative analysis of experience, (small capitals mine.)13 As Kurt Koffka observes in a discussion of the validity of the phenomenological approach, a good description of a phenomenon may itself rule out a number of theories and indicate definite features which a true theory must possess.14 Hence, for example, the fact that the criterial conditions for denotation of "nouns", "adjectives", and "verbs" necessarily co-occur in experience precludes the possibility of validly separating the study of syntax from that of semantics when working with natural language. One of the major reasons that orienting semantic description in direct experience has been neglected is the assumption of a dichotomy of perception and conceptualization.15 As we have seen, however, a very strong case can be made for regarding the immanent organizational factors of perception as the immanent organizational factors of thought. This approach provides a viable answer to the problem of 'imageless' thought, while at the same time showing the underlying basis for the application of conceptual knowledge to sense experience. Within such an explanatory framework it can reasonably be argued that the content and structures 18

On the phenomenological orientation of Gestalt psychology, see Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology (2d ed.; N e w York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950), 601-607. 15 Wolfgang Köhler, The Place of Value in a World of Facts, vii. 14 Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology, 73. 15 The positing of this dichotomy is related to what Gilbert Ryle has called "the dogma of the ghost in the machine". For his viewpoint, see The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson and Company, Ltd., 1949).

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of immediate experience constitute the ultimate basis for the theoretical constructions of physics and mathematics, in that although these constructions, as in the case of microphysics, may, on superficial inspection, appear to have nothing in common with what is given in immediate experience, the ultimate constituents of these constructions, which are analogous to semantic features, are derived from immediate experience. This interpretation is supported by the suggestion that the structural aspects of sense experience can be regarded as the referential domain of logic. Such an interpretation of logic takes away one of the strongest arguments of those who posit a dichotomy of thought and perception. Let those who reject this approach explain the basis for applying logic and mathematics to sense experience. It seems much more than a coincidence that our position on the experiential foundation of logic and the correlation of perception and conceptualization parallels the growing recognition by linguists of the interdependence of syntax and semantics in natural language. In each case there is the underlying assumption that form and content are interdependent. Explaining the correlation of perception and conceptualization in this way does not, of course, deny the crucial role of imagination, but simply shows the limits (in terms of possible distinctive features) within which imagination can function.

VI SOME SYNCHRONIC AND DIACHRONIC CONSIDERATIONS

We are now in a position to consider certain issues which were passed over earlier in order to keep our presentation of the general theoretical framework as uncomplicated as possible. Before beginning our examination of these issues, it seems desirable to recall our position concerning the centrality of ostensive definition in the semantic theory advanced in this study. Our viewpoint finds eloquent expression in S. S. Stevens's suggestion that description of a concept may, at a certain level, be made in terms of constructs with little obvious relation to what we see or hear, but, when the description of the constructs themselves must be given, inevitably appeal is made to objects or events to which v,f> can point. This resort to denotation occurs whenever description or explanation is pushed far enough. 1

As was pointed out earlier, this applies to 'non-public' concepts such as pain and happiness as well as phenomena such as books and chairs which can be exhibited on an intersubjectively demonstrable basis. Ostensive orientation in this case provides the external phenomena which characteristically co-occur with given 'private' experiences. These external phenomena can include both the characteristic circumstances and the characteristic behavior (of the experiencer) which co-occur with given experiences. Without such characteristic external phenomena there would be no public criteria for correlating the linguistic categorization of emotions and other non-public experiences. And without public criteria, of course, as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alan Donagan have observed, communication concerning such experiences would be impossible.2 ALTHOUGH ANY GIVEN LINGUISTIC SIGN CAN THROUGH CONVENTION BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH ANY GIVEN SET OF CRITERIAL CONDITIONS FOR ITS DENOTATIVE USE, 1

S. S. Stevens, "The Operational Basis of Psychology", The American Journal of Psychology, XLVII (1935), 327. Stevens's viewpoint is embedded in a different epistemological theory than that advanced in this study. 1 For Wittgenstein's position, see especially his Philosophical Investigations, passages 378-379, 580. Donagan's position is clearly expressed in his article "Wittgenstein on Sensation", 343-344, 350-351.

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it is not surprising that diachronic semantic studies often reveal that words for given private experiences were originally descriptive of some aspect of the external phenomena which characteristically co-occur with these non-public experiences. It is not that our ancestors were so fond of 'colorful' speech; it is simply that they had to operate within the same epistemological framework as we do today - and this is clearly reflected in their use of terms for public perceptual data in order to denote private phenomena. The derivation of terms for private phenomena from terms which signify public perceptual data has been noted by many scholars. In his Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages, Carl D. Buck observes that W o r d s for thought processes or e m o t i o n s are, all theoretically and a great demonstrably, based upon, indicative physical acts or conditions. 3

many

Support for the theory advanced in this study is found in Buck's work and Hans Kurath's Semantic Sources of the Words for the Emotions in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and the Germanic Languages* Consider, for example, the fact that English pain is derived from the Latin poena 'penalty'; Greek ρhobos 'fear' originally signified 'flight'; Sanskrit tras- stood for both 'tremble' and 'be afraid'; German schrecken 'be afraid' originally meant springen 'jump'; Latin intellegere 'understand' is a compound of inter 'between' and legere 'collect, choose'; German fassen and English grasp both mean 'seize' and 'understand' (compare Latin comprehendere and German begreifen)·, English understand and Greek epistamai 'understand' are compounds based on verbs for 'stand'; English see means both 'see with the eyes' and 'understand'. 5 These examples, as Kurath's study amply docments, do not constitute exceptions but rather illustrate a general pattern. 6 Here it must be remembered that we are not suggesting that words for private phenomena must be derived from words which denote intersubjectively demonstrable perceptual data. What is being argued is that there must be public criteria for the use of such terms and that this is reflected in the derivation of terms for private phenomena from terms for the characteristic behavior which accompanies them and the external environment in which they (e.g., emotions) are normally experienced. Using the same sort of evidence, it is possible to shed light on the experiential 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), vii. Humboldt advanced the same general viewpoint when he wrote, "Die unkörperlichen Begriffe bezieht die Sprache auf körperliche . . . " See Humboldt, Werke, V, 440. The same opinion is expressed in his last work; see Humboldt, Werke, VII, 100-101, Compare also Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III. i. 5, vol. II, 10. 4 (Menasha, Wis.: George Banta Publishing Company, 1921). 5 All examples except for the last one are taken from Buck; see his Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages, 1116 (pain), 1153 (phobos), 1155 (trasand schrecken), 1207 (intellegere), 1288 (understand and epistamai). β Kurath's work should be consulted by everyone interested in this problem. His book contains a very valuable theoretical discussion in addition to a great number of examples.

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47

foundation of grammatical case. Following Blake and Fillmore, we can distinguish between 'case form' and 'case relationship', with 'case form' meaning the expression of a 'case relationship', whether by means of constraints on word order, prepositions, postpositions, suppletion {e.g., I, me), or affixation.7 For our purposes, it is desirable to focus upon prepositions. It is well known that what in one language is expressed through affixation (i.e., case markers in the traditional sense) is often expressed in other languages through prepositions. This becomes especially clear if one compares Finnish, the Caucasian languages, or Eskimo with a language such as English. For an extreme example, in Eskimo and some of the Caucasian languages the relationship of similarity is expressed through affixes, and thus constitutes a case category in the traditional sense.8 This relationship, of course, would be signaled through a preposition in English. Very enlightening in view of our discussion is the fact that William D. Whitney, Berthold Delbrück, and Karl Brugmann, all eminent scholars, have suggested that the original meanings of case markers were based on relationships given in sensory experience.9 Ernst Cassirer gives a clear formulation of this standpoint in characterizing the development of the Indo-European case system: Allgemein zeigt sich, dass die indogermanischen K a s u s f o r m e n von jeher der Darstellung äusserer örtlich-zeitlicher oder sonstiger anschaulicher Bestimmungen gedient haben, und dass sie von hier aus erst allmählich ihren späteren "abstrakten" Sinn gewonnen haben. 10

According to Cassirer and the others mentioned, this state of affairs represents a universal feature of the development of case systems. If we remember that prepositions also express case relationships, Leibniz's observation concerning prepositions is highly significant in this context: Indessen wird es gut sein, diese Analogie zwischen den sinnlichen und unsinnlichen Dingen zu bedenken . . . wie zum Beispiel zu, mit, von, vor, in, ausser, durch, für, über, gegen, die alle von Beziehungen des Ortes, des Abstandes und der Bewegung genommen 7

See Frank R. Blake, "A Semantic Analysis of Case", in Language Monograph No. 7 (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1930), 34-36; Fillmore, "The Case for Case", 19-21. 8 See Franz Boas, ed., Handbook of American Indian Languages, pt. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), 1017-1018; Adolf Dirr, Einführung in das Studium der kaukasischen Sprachen (Leipzig: Verlag der Asia Major, 1928), 133-134; Louis H. Gray, Foundations of Language (New York: Macmillan Company, 1950), 201. Gray's book may not reflect all the advances of structural linguistics but the material contained in it is invaluable. • See William D. Whitney, "General Considerations on the Indo-European Case-System", in Transactions of the American Philological Association, XIII (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1882), 91; Berthold Delbrück, Grundfragen der Sprachforschung (Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1901), 133. Brugmann's position is clearly expressed in Karl Brugmann and Berthold Delbrück, Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen, II: Lehre von den Wortformen und ihrem Gebrauch (Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1911), 473. Also relevant in this context is Wilhelm Wundt's discussion in his Völkerpsychologie, I: Die Sprache, pt. 2 (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1900), 73-75. 10 Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, I, 161. Cassirer's discussion provides valuable bibliographical information on this topic.

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und später auf alle Arten von Veränderungen, Ordnungen, Folgen, Verschiedenheiten und Übereinstimmungen übertragen wurden.11 A pair of examples for a number of the prepositions mentioned by Leibniz will help illustrate the validity of his observation. For each preposition first an example (or an explanation if more suitable) will be given illustrating its spatial application; this example will be followed by another one illustrating its nonspatial application. SPATIAL

NONSPATIAL

Sie geht zum (zu dem) Bahnhof ('She goes to the train station'). Er ist von Paris nach Berlin gereist ('He traveled from Paris to Berlin'). Der Hund liegt vor der Tür ('The dog lies in front of the door'). Der Vogel flog über das Haus ('The bird flew over the house'). Er fiel ins (in das) Wasser ('He feil into the water'). Ausser originally could mean both aus ('out of') and ausserhalb ('outside of').12 Gehen Sie durch diese Tür ('Go through this door').

Es ist zu deinem Besten ('It is for your good'). Sie denkt schlecht von ihm ('She thinks badly of him'). Das Kind fürchtet sich vor dem Hunde ('The child is afraid of the dog'). Er sprach über das neue Buch ('He spoke about the new book'). Er ist in sie verliebt ('He is in love with her'). Ausser Zweifel ('Beyond all doubt').

Die Fussballmannschaft musste gegen den Wind spielen ('The soccer team had to play against the wind'). Für was originally related to vor and signified motion toward a position before something.13

Die Niederländer schützen sich durch Dämme gegen den Ozean ('The Dutch protect themselves from the ocean by means of dikes'). Das Mittel ist gut gegen Husten ('The remedy is good for coughs'). Das ist für sie ('That is for her').

The state of affairs illustrated through these German examples should not be taken to mean that it is restricted to Indo-European languages Thus, for example, in Finnish, a Finno-Urgic language, the use of affixes which serve as grammatical markers for local (spatial) case relationships offers many interesting parallels to the use of local

11

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand, trans, and ed. by Wolf von Engelhardt and Hans Heinz Holz (2 vols.; Frankfurt: Insel-Verlag, 1961), III. i. 5, II, 11. 12 See Hermann Paul, Deutsches Wörterbuch, rev. and expanded by Werner Betz (5th ed.; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1966), 63. 13 See Paul, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 758.

DIACHRONIC CONSIDERATIONS

49

prepositions in the Indo-European languages.14 Another example would be that of the Sudan languages, in which according to Diedrich Westermann, substantives which have local meaning are also used "as prepositions" to denote relationships of cause and purpose.15 Given the fact that the criterial conditions for the use of any given term must be grounded in the intersubjectively demonstrable aspects of sense experience, it does not seem surprising that many terms for nonspatial relationships are derived from those for spatial relationships, if we recall that spatial relationships constitute the highest level invariants of public sense experience. Once again, it is not being argued that this pattern {i.e., that observed by Leibniz) is necessary in all instances, but it is suggested that such a development does support the position advanced in this study.

See M.-H. Aaltio, Essential Finnish (London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1964), 61, 146-147; Lauri Hakulinen, The Structure and Development of the Finnish Language, trans, by John Atkinson (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1961), 331-336. 15 Diedrich Westermann, Grammatik der Ewe-Sprache (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1907), 52-53; Diedrich Westermann, Die Sudansprachen (Hamburg: L. Friedrichsen and Co., 1911), 51. 14

νπ A FINAL NOTE

The synthesis proposed in this study differs somewhat from most current linguistic theories. The nature of this difference is reflected in the suggestions that: (1) Semantic description can and should be anchored in immediate experience. (2) The structure of sensory experience can be correlated with the structure of linguistic meaning and that of thought. The suggested approach provides the necessary foundation for handling the problems of referential meaning and semantic universale within a unified framework.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY«

Aaltio, M.-H., Essential Finnish (London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1964). Aaron, Richard I., The Theory of Universals, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). Abro, A. d', The Evolution of Scientific Thought from Newton to Einstein, 2d ed., rev. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1950). Aebi, Magdalena, Kants Begründung der "Deutschen Philosophie" (Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1947). Alexander, Samuel, Space, Time, and Deity, 2 vols. 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966). Aristotle, The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, translated by Harold P. Cook and Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1938). —, The Physics, translated by Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis Cornford, Loeb Classical Library, 2 vols. (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1957). —, On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath, translated by W. S. Hett, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1957). Asch, Solomon E., "Gestalt Theory", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan Co., 1968). Augustine, St., The Confessions of St. Augustine, translated by F. J. Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943). Bartley, S. Howard, Principles of Perception, 2d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). Basilius, Harold, "Neo-Humboldtian Ethnolinguistics", Word, VIII (August, 1952), 95-105. Baumgärtner, Klaus, "Forschungsbericht 'Syntax und Semantik'", Deutschunterricht für Ausländer, XVII, 2-3 (1967), 49-67. —, "Die Struktur des Bedeutungsfeldes", Satz und Wort im heutigen Deutsch, edited by Hugo Moser (Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, 1967). Beck, Lewis White, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). Bennett, Jonathan, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966). Bergson, Henri, Duration and Simultaneity, translated by Leon Jacobson (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1965). Berlin, Brent, and Paul Kay, Basic Color Terms (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969). Bernhardt, August Ferdinand, Anfangsgründe der Sprachwissenschaft (Berlin: Heinrich Frölich, 1805). Bernsdorf, Wilhelm, ed., Wörterbuch der Soziologie, 2d ed., rev. (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1969). Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, "An Essay on the Relativity of Categories", Philosophy of Science, XXII, 4 (October, 1955), 243-263. Bieri, Peter, "Zur Geschichte des Begriffsproblems", Studium Generale, XIX, 8 (1966), 462-476. 1 This list includes all works cited or referred to in the text or notes but only a representative sampling of the additional works consulted.

52

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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INDEX

Abro, A. d', 20-21 Abstractions as figure-ground differentiation 41 Attributes, 28 phenomenological status of, 28-29 Augustine, St., 20 Bergson, H., 21n.l8 Bertalanffy, L. von, 18n.l, 38n.64 Brown, R. L., 11 Brown, R. W., 27, 41-42 Buck, C., 46 Cassirer, E., 18-19, 21-22, 47 Causality, perception of, 30, 34 Chomsky, N., 9n.l Concepts as rules of perceptual organization, 37 Cornelius, H., 29 Distinctive features, set of possible, 38, 43-44 Ehrenstein, W., 29-30, 36-37, 41 Fraisse, P., 19-20 Humboldt, W. von, 11-17, 18n.3, 46n.3 Hume, D., 28, 35, 38 Humphrey, G., 37n.59 Husserl, E., 20n.l5 James, W., 20, 30, 34 Kant, I., 11-12, 15-17, 27-28, 30-34, 36, 37n.58, 39 Koffka, K., 20, 43 Köhler, W., 38n.65, 43 Körner, S., 31 Kurath, H., 46 Leibniz, G. W., 24n.2, 47-49 Leisi, E., 25-28, 30 Lewis, C. I., 24, 36 Logic, referential domain of, 34-36 Locke, J., 24, 28, 46n.3 Mach, Ε., 20 Michotte, Α., 30, 33-34 Mill, J. S., 27-28, 32-36, 39 Nida, E., 9n.l

Ostensive definition, 25-26, 39 of non-public concepts, 26-27, 45-46 of relations, 30 relationship to the distributional approach, 40-41 Paton, H. J., 31-32 Perception relationship to the images of memory and imagination, 36-37 as universally valid frame of reference, 18-23 Psychological present; see also time modes of, 20 as basis of all conceived times 20-21 Relations, 28 phenomenological status of, 29 as recurring names of perceptual organization, 29 Resemblance as basis of all classification, 28-29, 34 perception of, 29-30 Schemata, Kantian as referential rules, 31-32 empirical, 31, 37n.58 transcendental derived from nature of time, 31-32 Semantic form classes as markers of perceptual focus, 41-42 Substance, 28 phenomenological status of, 28-29 Thought Ehrenstein on, 36-37 imageless, 37 immanent organizational factors of perception as the immanent organizational factors of, 37, 39, 43 Time; see also psychological present perception of, 20 physical versus psychological, 18 Whorf on, 22 Universals, 42-43

60 Humboldt on, 14-17 Mill on, 32-34

INDEX Whorf, B. L., 18-19, 22 Wittgenstein, L., 26-27,

janua linguarum Series Maior

Dfl. a I· m^

Greimas, A.J. et al (eds.): Sign. Language. Culture 215 FF/140,5 Iiuria, A.R..: Traumatic Aphasia 96,12 Lunt, H.G. (ed.)j Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists 198,13 Zinkin, N.I.: Mechanisms of Speech 115,14 Weir, R.H.: Language in the Crib 38,15 Sebeok, T.A., A.S.Hayes and M.C.Bateson (eds.): Approaches to Semiotics 58,16 Rosetti, Α.: Linguistica 70,20 Bright, W. (ed.): Sociolinguistics 58,21 Fishman, A. et al: Language Loyalty in the United States 82,24 Pike, K.L.: Language in halation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior 80,26 Sutherland, R.D.: Language and Lewis Carroll 52,27 Cohen, D. (ed.): MSlanges Marcel Cohen 292 FF/190,31-33 To Honor Roman Jakobson 450,38 Botha, R.P.: The Function of the Lexicon in 58,Transformational Generative Grammar 39 Zgusta, L.: Manual of Lexicography 64,-40 Garvin, P.L. (ed.): Method and Theory in 68,Linguistics 41 Akin, J. et al (eds.): Language Behavior 63,42 Malmberg, B.: PhonStique generale et romane 175 FF/115,43 Bierwisch, M. and K.E.Heidolph (eds.): Pro54,gress in Linguistics 45 Saumjan, S.K.: Principles of Structural Lin80,guistics 48 Makkai, Α.: Idiom Structure in English 76,49 Firchow, E.S. et al (eds.): Studies by Einar Haugen 150,50 Vandamme, F.J.: Simulation of Natural Language 48,52 Smith, M.E. (ed.): Studies in Linguistics in 130,Honor of George L.Trager 64,53 Bolinger, D.: Degree Words 55 Brend, R.M. (ed.): Kenneth L.Pike 78,57 Rigault, A. and R.Charbonneau (eds.): Proceedings of the .Seventh International Congress of Phonetic Sciences 320,59 Firchow, E.S. et al (eds.): Studies for Einar 120,Haugen 62 Gross, M., M.Halle and M.-P.Schützenberger (eds.): 80,The Formal Analysis of Natural Languages 80,63 Dijk, T.A.van: Some Aspects of Text Grammars 66 Halmberg, Β.: Linguisticrue gSnSrale et romane 169 FF/110,67 Nowakowska, M.: Language of Motivation and 68,Language of Actions 70 Lebrun, Y. and R.Hoops (eds.): Neurolinguistic Approaches to Stuttering 54,74 Xenstowicz, M.J. and C.W.Xisseberth (eds.): 50,Issues in Phonological Theory 83 Schaerlaekens, A.M.: The Two-Word Sentence in Child Language Development 58,84 Botha, R.P. with the collaboration of W.K. Wincklers The Justification of Linguistic 70,Hypotheses 93 Parret, H.: Discussing Language 1

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Palmatier, R.A.: A Descriptive Syntax of the 40,. "Ormulum" Plant, H.R.: Syntaktische Studien zu den 24,Monseer Fragmenten Keiler, A.R.: A Phonological Study of the 30,Indo-European Laryngeals Rayfield, J.R.: The Languages of a Bilingual 28,Community Kao, D.L.: Structure of the Syllable in Can54,tonese Schogt, H.G.: Le Systeme verbal du franeais 20,contemporain Zvelebil, K.: Comparative Dravidian Phonology 54,Cohen, D.: Etudes de linguistique semitique et arabe 83 FF/ 54,Parker, G.J. : Ayacucho Quechua Grammar and. Dictionary 64,Gair, J.W.: Colloquial Sinhalese Clause Structures 40,Sebüktekin, H.I.: Turkish-English Contrastive Analysis 30,Seebold, E.: Vergleichendes und Etymologisches 132,Wörterbuch der Germanischen Starken Verben N'diaye, G.: Structure du dialecte basque de Maya 102 FF/ 66,Fuchs, Α.: Morphologie des Verbs im Cahuilla 35,Chappel, A.H.: Saga af Viktor ok Blavus 28,Carlton, C.M.: A Linguistic Analysis of a Collection of Late Latin Documents 84,Wiesemann, U.: Die phonologische und grammatische Struktur der Kaingäng Sprache 62,Copeland, J.E.: A Stepmatricial Generative Phonology of German 28,Longyear, C.R.s Linguistically Determined Categories of Meanings 45,Saltarelli, M.: A Phonology of Italian in a Generative Grammar 24,Miltner, V.: Theory of Hindi Syntax 28,Johnson, D.B.: Transformations and their Use in the Resolution of Syntactic Homomorphy 39,Tompa, J.: Ungarische Grammatik 90,Jacobson, R. : The London Dialect of the Late 48,Fourteenth Century Capell, A. and H.E.Hinch: Maung Grammar 68,Zirin, R.A.: The Phonological Basis of Latin Prosody 25,Mok, Q.I.M.: Contribution ä 1'etude des categories morphologiques du genre et du nombre dans le fran^ais parle actuel 40,Brown, W.H.: A Syntax of King Alfred's Pastoral Care 18,Prideaux, G.D.: The Syntax of Japanese Honorifics 28,Shores, D.L.: A Descriptive Syntax of the Peterborough Chronicle from 1122 to 1154 50,Hewson, J.: Article and Noun in English 30,Babcock, S.S.s The Syntax of Spanish Reflexive Verbs 21,-

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106 d'Ans, A.-M. : Le Creole francais d'Haiti 54,· 107 Tsuzaki, S.: English Influence on Mexican Spanish in Detroit 25,· 108 Steiner, R.J.: Two Centuries of Spanish and English Bilingual Lexicography, 1590-1800 23,· 109 Glover, B.R.: A History of Six Spanish Verbs Meaning "To Take, Seize, Grasp" 24,· 110 Binh, D.T.: A Tagmemic Comparison of the Structure of English and Vietnamese Sentences 68,· 111 Carlton, C.: Descriptive Syntax of the Old English Charters 48,· 112 Grady, M.: Syntax and Semantics of the English Verb Phrase 14,· 113 Isacenko, A. and H.-J.Schädlich: A Model of •Standard German Intonation 21,114 Nash, R.: Turkish Intonation 56,115 Haudricourt, A. et A.Juilland: Essai pour une histoire structurale du phonetisme francais 38 FF/ 25,116 Rosenberg, S.N.: Modern French Ce 55 FF/ 36,119 Railides, C.: The Tense Aspect System of the Spanish Verb as used in Cultivated Bogota Spanish 18,120 Redfern, J.: A Lexical Study of Raeto-Romance and Contiguous Italian Dialect Areas 28,121 Newton, B.: Cypriot Greek 58,124 Millward, C.M.: Imperative Constructions in Old English 15,125 Nilsen, D.L.F.s English Adverbials 38,126 Hough, G.A., 3rd: Structures of Modification in Contemporary American English 22,127 Matteson, E. et al: Comparative Studies in Amerindian Languages 75,128 Abdel-Malek, Z.N.: The Closed-List Classes of Colloquial Egyptian Arabic 50,129 Sroka, K.A.: The Syntax of English Phrasal Verbs 42,130 Logan, H.M.: The Dialect of the Life of Saint Katherine 68,132 Seaman, P.D.: Modern Greek and American English in Contact 90,133 Wingo, E.O.: Latin Punctuation in the Classical Age 50,134 Benk6', L. and S.Imre (eds.): The Hungarian Language 72,136 Wyatt, J.L.: A Computer Validated Portuguese to English Transformational Grammar 96,137 Sotiropoulos, D.: Noun Morphology of Modern Demotic Greek 38,138 Kelly, R.C.: A Descriptive Analysis of Gascon 92,50 FF/60,139 Bahnick, K.R.: The Determination of Stages in the Historical Development of the Germanic Languages by Morphological Criteria 48,140 Gardner, F.F.: An Analysis of Syntactic Patterns of Old English 22,-