Language, Cognition, and Emotion in Keats's Poetry 2022013546, 9781032230917, 9781032230924, 9781003275626

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Routledge Research in Cognitive Humanities

LANGUAGE, COGNITION, AND EMOTION IN KEATS’S POETRY Katrina Brannon

This is a beautifully complex book on John Keats’s emotionality. Katrina Brannon’s cognitive linguistic analyses reveal the many fne shades of feeling, emotion, sensitivity, mood, and desire in Keats’ oeuvre. She explains how and why language, cognition, emotion, and body are all indispensably intertwined in the poetry of one of the greatest romantic poets. Zoltán Kövecses, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary Katrina Brannon has carried out a considerable amount of research, both on linguistics and on poetry and poetics. Her approach is defnitely innovative, and the whole book shows a wide-angled knowledge of cognitive theories which enables her to bring out quite vividly the linguistic, communicative, and esthetic aspects of Keats’s poetry. This long-awaited book should become a landmark in poetry and cognition studies. Nathalie Vincent-Arnaud, Professor of English Stylistics and Translation Studies, Université Toulouse-Jean Jaurès, France Katrina Brannon’s book presents a very clear linguistic analysis of Keats’s poems, which draws on cognitive grammar and poetics, fgurative language, cognitive science, philosophy, and poetry. It focuses on the expression of emotions and emotional experience in his work. It views language and the body as forms of communication through which metaphor may be expressed and conceptualized. It is an innovative book as it is currently the only monograph that takes a cognitive approach to Keats’s poetry and a welcome addition to the feld of poetics and linguistics. It is a must-read for any scholar interested in Keats, poetics, conceptual metaphor, or cognitive grammar. Wilfrid Rotgé, Professor of Linguistics, Sorbonne Université, France

Language, Cognition, and Emotion in Keats’s Poetry

Language, Cognition, and Emotion in Keats’s Poetry applies an innovative cognitive linguistic approach to the poetry of John Keats, the frst of its kind to employ a cognitive-based framework to explore the expression and articulation of emotion in his work. Brannon adopts an embodied perspective to emotion, rooted in cognitive linguistics, cognitive grammar, and cognitive poetics but also works from fgurative language and stylistics, in examining a selection of Keats’s poems. This approach allows for a close interrogation of the texts themselves but also the languages that compose them, comprising lexical and grammatical elements, which, when taken together, bring out the emotional saliency of Keatsian poetry. While revealing fresh insights into the work of John Keats, the book also sheds further light on the importance of cognitive approaches to poetic and grammatical analyses and how both language and the body can serve as forms of communication through which metaphors can be expressed and contextualized. This volume will appeal to students and scholars interested in cognitive linguistics, fgurative language, emotion studies, cognitive science, and Anglophone poetry. Katrina Brannon is Associate Professor of English Linguistics at the Université Polytechnique Hauts-de-France in Valenciennes, France. Her research interests include cognitive grammar, embodied emotion, sensorial expression, cognitive poetics and stylistics, conceptual metaphor theory, esthetics, and translation.

Routledge Research in Cognitive Humanities

Language, Cognition, and Emotion in Keats’s Poetry Katrina Brannon Narrative, Perception, and the Embodied Mind: Towards a Neuro-narratology Towards a Neuro-narratology Lilla Farmasi For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge .com/Routledge-Research-in-Cognitive-Humanities/book-series/RRCH

Language, Cognition, and Emotion in Keats’s Poetry Katrina Brannon

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Katrina Brannon The right of Katrina Brannon to be identifed as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Brannon, Katrina, author. Title: Language, cognition, and emotion in Keats’s poetry / Katrina Brannon. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. | Series: Routledge research in cognitive humanities | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifers: LCCN 2022013546 | ISBN 9781032230917 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032230924 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003275626 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Keats, John, 1795-1821--Literary style. | Emotions in literature. | Cognition in literature. | LCGFT: Literary criticism. Classifcation: LCC PR4838.S8 K43 2023 | DDC 821/.7--dc23/ eng/20220425 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022013546 ISBN: 978-1-032-23091-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-23092-4 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-27562-6 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003275626 Typeset in Sabon by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

To the women of my life: my eyes, my hands, my feet, my heart.

Contents

Foreword Acknowledgments 1

Introduction

xii xiv 1

1.1 Foundational Framework: Presentation 1 1.2 The Principal Angles of a Cognitive Approach to Keatsian Poetry 8 1.3 Keats the Poet 11 1.4 Structural Logic of the Book 13 1.5 Outline and Argumentative Logic 15 Notes 17 2

Cognitive Approaches to Poetry 2.1 Methodological Orientation: Perspectives 19 2.2 Cognitive Grammar 19 2.3 Poetic Grammar, Cognitive Poetics 22 2.4 Conceptual Metaphor and Metonymy 24 2.5 Poetic Conceptual Metaphor and Metonymy 25 2.6 Conceptual Metaphor and Emotion 29 2.7 Force-Dynamics and Causality 30 2.8 Embodied Emotion 31 2.9 Conclusion 32 Notes 33

19

x

Contents

3

Aspect and Conceptual Metaphor: Poetic Expression and Emotion

34

3.1 Introduction 34 3.2 Figurative Foundations in Keatsian Poetry 35 3.3 Aspect in Cognitive Grammar 37 3.4 EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM 40 3.5 “Isabella”: The Stages of Life 43 3.6 “Isabella”: The Basil Pot 51 3.7 “Lamia”: Emotional Emplacement 53 3.8 Conclusion 59 Note 60 4

Emotional Force-Dynamics: Causes Are Forces and Modality

61

4.1 Force-Dynamics: An Introduction 61 4.2 Force-Dynamics in Language 61 4.3 Established Schematic Roles within (Emotional) Force-Dynamics 62 4.4 Metaphorical Extension and Force-Dynamics: The Event Structure Metaphor and Lakoff’s Invariance Hypothesis 65 4.5 Grammatical Representation of Force-Dynamics 68 4.6 Talmy’s “Greater Modal System”: Semantic and Syntactic Closeness, Metaphoricity, and Emotional Salience 81 4.7 Force-Dynamics in Perception and Emotion Verbs 89 4.8 Final Observations 100 Notes 106 5

Grammar and Emotion: The Metaphorical Role of Prepositions 5.1 Introduction 110 5.2 Cognitive Foundations of Prepositions 110 5.3 Static Prepositions 113 5.4 Spatial Path Prepositions 124 5.5 Force-Dynamic Path Prepositions 128 5.6 Unclassifed Prepositional Cases 130 5.7 Prepositional Conclusions 133 Notes 134

110

Contents

6

Emotional Time and Embodiment

xi

135

6.1 Time and Embodiment: An Introduction 135 6.2 The TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR: Foundations 137 6.3 Grammar and Metaphorical Expression 138 6.4 The TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR: Temporally Focused Case Studies 140 6.5 Conclusions on Temporality 157 Notes 157 7

Conceptual Metonymy and the Physiological Expression of Emotion

159

7.1 Conceptual Metonymy in the Expression of Emotion 159 7.2 Emotive and Expressive Choices 162 7.3 Metonymical Analysis 163 7.4 Conclusion 174 Notes 176 8

Conclusion

178

8.1 The Evolution of the Research: Objectives, Context, Argumentation 178 8.2 Presentation of Results 180 8.3 Closing Remarks: Paving the Way for Further Refection 181 Note 182 Bibliography Index

183 188

Foreword

I am both delighted and honored to write this foreword for Katrina Brannon’s book on Keats’s poetry. In modern stylistics, scholars usually distinguish between literary stylistics on the one hand and linguistic stylistics on the other. It is true that, sometimes unconsciously, stylisticians fall into one of these two categories. For some, the theoretical apparatus is paramount and they strive to show how it can be applied to (literary) texts while others are mostly concerned with interpretation—or readerly reception—and merely pepper their studies with linguistic analyses to strengthen their interpretative points. Although both approaches are perfectly valid, I prefer the method adopted by Katrina Brannon who subtly manages to combine thorough linguistic micro-analyses and literary interpretation. This is perfectly in line with Paul Simpson’s defnition of stylistics: Stylistics is a method of textual interpretation in which primacy of place is assigned to language. The reason why language is so important to stylisticians is because the various forms, patterns and levels that constitute linguistic structure are an important index of the function of the text. The text’s functional signifcance as discourse acts in turn as a gateway to its interpretation. Paul Simpson, Stylistics (2014, 3) The corpus was aptly chosen to accommodate Katrina Brannon’s rationale. Indeed, Keats’s poetry provides a rich texture of densely-knitted examples offering a wide array of linguistic constructions begging to be interpreted. The theoretical standpoint was also astutely selected to ft Katrina Brannon’s holistic approach. Indeed, cognitive stylistics allows the analyst to run the entire gamut from detailed textual analyses to more abstract schemata. However, the author avoids the pitfalls of adopting too loose a defnition of “cognitive linguistics,” often used nowadays as a catch-all phrase. She carefully selects and defnes specifc tools to study Keats’s poetry. Although Conceptual Metaphor and Metonymy Theory takes pride of place, she also resorts to more specifc—morpho-syntactic—analyses based on the use of modal auxiliaries or prepositions, to name but a few.

Foreword

xiii

In a letter to George and Georgina Keats dated 1819, Keats wrote: “Nothing ever becomes real till it is experienced.” This echoes the embodied emotional experience such as it appears in his poetry. Katrina Brannon reconciles the two major approaches to “embodiment” such as they have been understood over the past decades. The traditional approach intends to overcome the mind-body dualism inherited from Plato and Cartesian thinking while the other trend stresses the body-mind-culture triad, stressing thus the culture-specifc dimension of cognition, a sort of “situated” embodiment, as it were. In their introduction to Cognitive Grammar in Literature, the editors explain: Cognitive poetics has developed a reasonably strong (but certainly not complete) account of the mechanism of interpretation and meaningfulness, but a large part of the literary experience lies in its ambient value: that is, in the delicate and diffcult vague sense of a literary text’s atmosphere and tone. The experiential atmosphere of a literary work is usually a matter of the sense of the world that is evoked in the reader’s mind by the language of the text. (Harrison et al. 2014, 13–14) Katrina Brannon’s book certainly helps readers to gain a better understanding of the various poems’ “atmosphere” and “tone” and to approach Keats’s “sense of the world.” I am confdent this book will appeal to linguists and romanticists alike and will be treasured as a major cornerstone in the development of cognitive grammar applied to literature. Manuel Jobert Professor of English Language and Stylistics Former chair of the French Society for English Stylistics (Société de Stylistique Anglaise) Université Jean Moulin—Lyon 3—France

Acknowledgments

Firstly, my warmest thanks go out to Wilfrid Rotgé, who has accompanied me from the very beginning stages of this work, when it formed the basis of my doctoral thesis. I would also like to thank the members of CeLiSo at Sorbonne Université, who have supported me in multiple ways over the years. I am also grateful to Caroline Bertonèche, the Société d’Études du Romantisme Anglais, and Giuseppe Albano and the Keats-Shelley House in Rome for providing me with beautiful and invaluable resources during the course of my research. To Manuel Jobert, Élise Mignot, and Nathalie Vincent-Arnaud, thank you for believing in my work and encouraging me to take it further. My sincerest thanks go to the editorial team at Routledge for seeing this project through all of the stages of publication to its present form, as well as two anonymous reviewers. To my students—in Paris, in Caen, in Valenciennes—thank you for inspiring me and for being inexhaustible sources of refection. My deepest gratitude and all of my love go to my parents, Tim and Patti, and my brother, Jack, for your love, presence, constant encouragement, and open ears. To Manuel, for always revolutionizing language with me. To Calliope, for fresh air and love. This book is the culmination of quite a few years of research, and I am so grateful to have had the most excellent encouragement and esthetic inspiration—in so many different forms—along the way, from many others. Thank you. Ver en el día o en el año un símbolo de los días del hombre y de sus años, convertir el ultraje de los años en una música, un rumor y un símbolo, ver en la muerte el sueño, en el ocaso un triste oro, tal es la poesía

Acknowledgments

xv

que es inmortal y pobre. La poesía vuelve como la aurora y el ocaso. A veces en las tardes una cara nos mira desde el fondo de un espejo; el arte debe ser como ese espejo que nos revela nuestra propia cara. “Arte poética,” Jorge Luis Borges (El hacedor, 1960) A few sections of this book draw on previous publications: Parts of Chapter 4 draw on: “Perception, Emotion, and Synesthesia: Metaphorical Combining in Keats.” ExELL (Explorations in English Language and Linguistics), vol. 7, issue 2. Sciendo. 2020. Parts of Chapter 7 draw on: “Conceptual Metonymy and the Physiological, Poetic Expression of Emotion: Studies on a Keatsian Corpus.” Revue TIPA (Travaux interdisciplinaires sur la parole et le langage), no. 35, EmoLanguages. 2019. Parts of Chapter 3 draw on: “EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM ou, ‘Isabelle, ou le pot de basilic’.” Échanges de linguistique en Sorbonne (ELIS), vol 4.2. 2016.

1

Introduction

OH! how I love, on a fair summer’s eve, When streams of light pour down the golden west, And on the balmy zephyrs tranquil rest The silver clouds, far - far away to leave All meaner thoughts, and take a sweet reprieve Fromm little cares; to fnd, with easy quest, A fragrant wild, with Nature’s beauty drest, And there into the delight my soul deceive. There warm my breast with patriotic lore, Musing on Milton’s fate - on Sydney’s bier Till their stern forms before my mind arise: Perhaps on wing of Poesy upsoar, Full often dropping a delicious tear, When some melodious sorrow spells mine eyes. J. Keats, “Sonnet: Oh! How I love, on a fair summer’s eve” (1816)

1.1 Foundational Framework: Presentation 1.1.1 Principal Notions As the title suggests, this book has as its aim an exploration of cognition and emotion in John Keats’s poetry. To do this, this book will specifcally concentrate on the third element in the title: the language that composes Keats’s works and that renders the poetry emotionally salient. The pages that follow are a linguistic and stylistic approach to Keatsian poetry: in a separate, but complementary, realm from the invaluable and numerous studies on Keats’s works that have been undertaken from the point of view of literary theory or criticism.1 This book differs from these more literary approaches in that I will come unilaterally, repeatedly, and consistently back to the language itself. However, this is not done at the expense of an examination and appreciation of the content, quality, and elements present in the poetry, such as the poetic context, the plot, and the poetic effects. I believe that the most effective DOI: 10.4324/9781003275626-1

2 Introduction way to undertake an endeavor is to work with the text from the ground up: that is, beginning with the building blocks of the poetic text, which are the linguistic elements in and of themselves that make up the poetry. These elements then combine to form entire verses, phrases, and fnally, the poems themselves, however short or long they may be: the semantics of each element—based on both lexicality and grammaticality—allows for the unique structure and sense that results in the overall poetic creation. 1.1.2 Keats: The Poet, His Oeuvre John Keats lived a mere twenty-fve years—his life being tragically cut short by tuberculosis—but within this short span of time, this “vulgar Cockney poetaster”2 authored a rich, diverse, and substantial oeuvre. However, a rather small selection of his works was actually published during his lifetime, with the large majority being published posthumously. Keats’s oeuvre is highly varied in terms of poetic form and style, subject matter, and—a quality particularly remarkable within Keats’s works, given the young age at which he began to write and publish—poetic maturity.3 This diversity results in Keats’s oeuvre being of particular interest and wealth for linguistic observation, as certain trends and themes are carried throughout the relative globality of Keats’s works, some are present only at certain periods in time, or within certain types of poems, and some are outgrown as a result of Keats’s development as a poet throughout time, which took place with great speed and intensity. Keats’s linguistic register and the liberty taken within his poetic expression are also two of the principal reasons for which linguistically based examination of his poetry proves worthwhile. In effect, Keats differs from a great number of the other poetic fgures who compose the English Romantic poetic canon (i.e., W. Wordsworth, S. Coleridge, L. Byron, P.B. Shelley, etc.) in the sense that he underwent no formal literary or poetic training, and this was at times refected and visible within his writing (hence his nickname of the “Cockney Poet”); and was often criticized for this. However, this lack of formal4 literary education does not seem to have been a source of shame or uncertainty for the poet: at least to the point of restraining him from creating. On the contrary, his writings—both poetic and epistolary—seem to embrace the wide range of linguistic possibilities as well as points of view and overtures for inspiration, and furthermore, seem to relish in the internal, artistic, and intellectual development that took place on multiple levels throughout his brief career. Keats’s oeuvre, while having encountered sharp and biting criticism upon his frst publications, is now appreciated—even well-loved—by many, or at least endowed with respect within the Anglophone poetic canon. His poetry is refective of the typical Romantic tendencies in terms of subject matter and presentation: references to nature, a fairly elevated and notable affnity for Greek mythology, highly responsive language in terms of emotion, and demonstrative of a notable sensibility to beauty.

Introduction

3

I will now delve into a brief investigation concerning the specifcities that have resulted in Keats’s poetry holding so important a status within the English Romantic canon and in the hearts of his readers and critics, particularly in regard to the verbalization and expression of emotion within his oeuvre. To do this, let’s frst look to the poet himself, with the support of other poets from his époque—and then, follow up with theories on emotion from other sources (of inspiration). 1.1.2.1 Gusto and Negative Capability It seems appropriate to open this introductory exploration of Keats by quoting W. Hazlitt5 on his conception and defnition of the concept of “gusto,” a notion created by Hazlitt himself regarding forms of art—specifcally, but not only, the visual arts, as the textual arts are mentioned as well—by which Keats was particularly fascinated and moved: Gusto in art is power or passion defning any object.—It is not so diffcult to explain this term in what relates to expression (of which it may be said to be the highest degree) as in what relates to things without expression, to the natural appearances of objects, as mere colour or form. In one sense, however, there is hardly any object entirely devoid of expression, without some character of power belonging to it, some precise association with pleasure or pain: and it is in giving this truth of character from the truth of feeling, whether in the highest or the lowest degree, but always in the highest degree of which the subject is capable, that gusto consists. There is a gusto in the colouring of Titian. Not only do his heads seem to think—his bodies seem to feel. […] It seems sensitive and alive all over […] As the objects themselves in nature would produce an impression on the sense, distinct from every other object, and having something divine in it, which the heart owns and the imagination consecrates, the objects in the picture preserve the same impression, absolute, unimpaired, stamped with all the truth of passion, the pride of the eye, and the charm of beauty. […] The blood circulates here and there, the blue veins just appear, the rest is distinguished throughout only by that sort of tingling sensation to the eye, which the body feels within itself. This is gusto. (Hazlitt 1817: 79) Hazlitt continues on to describe gusto as a quality “where the impression on one sense excites by affnity those of another” (1817: 80). We can understand it as the inherent quality in a work of art (of any sort) which awakens emotion within its observer: a qualitative transfer, from the material which composes the work of art to the internal workings of the observer her or himself. This transfer begins with the emotional, creative, and artistic state of the artist her or himself. The movement of gusto thus takes place in three

4 Introduction parts; it is dynamic, revelatory, highly sensible, and open-minded, as D. Bonnecase6 suggests, in proposing that Keats’s poetic voice shapes his works by way of “subjective and impassioned tonality” (2003: 57). Furthermore, the presence of gusto is indicative of an elevated mastery of the art form in question, of which Keats was, at least according to T.S. Eliot, who claimed that the young poet “was occupied only with the highest use of poetry7” (quoted in Bate 1964: 12). This intensity in terms of the ability to result in feeling in the observer is a quality highly revered by Keats, as he expressed in an 18178 letter to his two brothers, criticizing a work of art he had recently viewed (“Death on a Pale Horse9”) which apparently lacked the qualitative makings of gusto. The poet complained that It is a wonderful picture10 […] but there is nothing to be intense upon, no women one feels mad to kiss, no face swelling into reality. The excellence of every art is its intensity, capable of making all disagreeables evaporate from their being in close relationship with Beauty and Truth.11 A. Pilkington, in his 2000 Poetic Effects, presents a theory that may be seen as highly complementary to, and perhaps even, an elaboration on, Hazlitt’s 19th century musings on gusto. Effectively, Hazlittian gusto may be compared with Pilkington’s concept of “qualia,” which he defnes as the “raw feel” (2000: 170), and moreover, that “reference to qualia is demanded since it is a central (if not the central) aspect of poetic effects and esthetic experience” (2000: 173). Pilkington argues that, frst and foremost, “texts are not born literary, they have literariness thrust upon them” (2000: 8), and that furthermore, “a stimulus is more relevant the more cognitive effects it yields, and is less relevant the more cognitive effort is required to process it” (2000: 74). These “cognitive effects” are what Pilkington bases his theory of “poetic effects” on. Indeed, “the force of poetic effects generally is to provide the wider context which may serve to clarify and disentangle what may be relatively complex attitudes” (2000: 153), and that poetic effects are ultimately aesthetic (2000: 167). Keats, highly responsive to the notion of gusto, took Hazlitt’s idea and ran with it, as it were, developing within his epistolary communication with his brothers the notion of “negative capability,” essential to him for artistic—particularly, poetic and/or literary—“success” and resonance. Once again, within his correspondence to his brothers, Keats defnes this notion in the following sense: and it at once struck me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason. Coleridge, for instance, would let go

Introduction

5

by a fne isolate verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge. This pursued through volumes would perhaps take us no further than this that with a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration. (Letter to George and Thomas Keats, Hampstead, December 22, 1817) This concept of negative capability, or the ability to remain in the interstices of knowledge, certainty, and experience, combined with the Hazlittian notion of gusto, are concepts that clearly shaped not only Keats’s frame of mind and spirit and manner of operating within the world, but also his poetry, which often recounted the intensity of his emotional experience during and after having encountered a work of art which possessed particularly elevated manifestations of both gusto and/or negative capability. Let’s have a glance at three poems which are direct responses to these sorts of experiences: “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer” (1816) Much have I travell’d in the realms of gold, And many goodly states and kingdoms seen; Round many western islands have I been Which bards in fealty to Apollo hold. Oft of one wide expanse had I been told That deep-brow’d Homer ruled as his demesne; Yet did I never breathe its pure serene Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold: Then felt I like some watcher of the skies When a new planet swims into his ken; Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes He star’d at the Pacifc—and all his men Look’d at each other with a wild surmise— Silent, upon a peak in Darien. “On Seeing the Elgin Marbles” (1817) My spirit is too weak—mortality Weighs heavily on me like unwilling sleep, And each imagined pinnacle and steep Of godlike hardship tells me I must die Like a sick eagle looking at the sky.

6

Introduction Yet ‘tis a gentle luxury to weep That I have not the cloudy winds to keep Fresh for the opening of the morning’s eye. Such dim-conceived glories of the brain Bring round the heart an undescribable feud; So do these wonders a most dizzy pain, That mingles Grecian grandeur with the rude Wasting of old time—with a billowy main— A sun—a shadow of a magnitude. “On Sitting Down to Read King Lear Once Again” (1816) O golden-tongued Romance with serene lute! Fair plumed Syren! Queen of far away! Leave melodizing on this wintry day, Shut up thine olden pages, and be mute: Adieu! for once again the ferce dispute, Betwixt damnation and impassion’d clay Must I burn through; once more humbly assay The bitter-sweet of this Shakespearian fruit. Chief Poet! and ye clouds of Albion, Begetters of our deep eternal theme, When through the old oak forest I am gone, Let me not wander in a barren dream, But when I am consumed in the fre, Give me new Phoenix wings to fy at my desire.

These three poems, written at varying points during Keats’s creative period, effectively recount his highly emotional experience after having come into contact with three different works of art: George Chapman’s translation of Homer (1616), the Elgin Marbles, and King Lear, mentioned in his correspondence as an epitome of negative capability. Each poem takes on its own, unique, emotional feel and ambiance. The similarity, however, resides in their intrinsic qualities of gusto and negative capability. We see gusto, for example, in the “loud and bold” assumed voice of the translator, or in “the golden-tongued Romance with serene lute!” resulting in various emotional and physical experiences: “Yet I never did breathe its pure serene, / Til I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold, / Then I felt like some watcher of the skies / When a new planet swims into his ken”; “the gentle luxury [of weeping]”; or being “consumed in the fre.” The intrinsic, defnitive certitude that characterizes negative capability is verbalized in a variety of ways, as well, such as: “Such dim-conceived glories of the brain / Bring round the heart an undescribable feud; / So do these wonders a most dizzy pain” or “the ferce dispute, / Betwixt damnation and impassion’d clay.”

Introduction

7

These poems attest for Keats’s sensibility to and admiration for this type of artistic expression and experience, as well as his desire to transmit these qualities into his own works, as the descriptive, intensely emotional language within these poems portrays. In effect, the emotional quality—both on the part of the artist, and thus visible within the work of art itself, as well as on the part of the observer—of the work of art was central for Keats in terms of his perception and apprehension of the artistic object, as well as within the act of artistic or poetic creation. For Keats, the presence of beauty was necessary to the realization and manifestation of such emotional awakening: I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the Heart’s affections and the truth of Imagination—What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth—whether it existed before or not—for I have the same idea of all our passions as of love: they are all, in their sublime, creative of essential beauty. (Letter to Benjamin Bailey, November 22, 1817) The notions of gusto and negative capability, given the importance and reverence placed upon them by the poet himself, are thus foundational for the approach as well as the analyses that will be taken and elaborated upon within the pages and chapters to follow. It is out of respect for these notions—and the respect placed upon them by Keats, which he rarely missed the opportunity to outwardly express—that I chose to focus on the emotive quality of Keatsian verse within this book. His approbation for these qualities—tangible, explosive emotionality, combined with a constant, fuid, dialectic of striving, searching, and evolving—naturally impregnated his works. Moreover, I fnd it important to remark upon the inherent contradictions present in the combination of the notions of gusto and negative capability, and specifcally, in the concept of negative capability, in which the “fou” (blurriness or uncertainty) is revered. According to R. Tsur, negative capability presupposes (maybe even consists in) a complex cognitive structure, characterized neither by rigidly fxed rules, neither by an absence of rules, but by a greater number of conficting rules on the lower levels of information processing which may be accommodated by rules on a higher level. (2008: 292) This tribute to the inherently contrastive nature of negative capability is supported by A. Pilkington, and throughout this analytical endeavor, we can continue to remind ourselves of his exhortation on esthetic examination, which proposes that “we no longer need such accurate representations, but the motivation and enjoyment of seeking them out remains” (Pilkington 2000: 188).

8 Introduction

1.2 The Principal Angles of a Cognitive Approach to Keatsian Poetry Now that I have covered the general prism within which the point of view of this book is formulated, let us take a moment to outline the theoretical framework within which the analyses to follow will operate. Simply stated, the theoretical framework is formed around a fexible, fuid, combination of the cognitive linguistic approach (specifcally, cognitive grammar and cognitive poetics) as well as Conceptual Metaphor Theory. These foundations are supported by other, more philosophical approaches, such as embodiment theory and various theories concerning emotion. Other, not specifcally cognitive grammatical approaches are also used as reinforcement as well as for comparison, such as the theories on emotion that serve as a basis cognition. This means that the effect that emotion has in our conceptual system and the body/mind connection or parallelism may oftentimes be observed in a generally philosophical approach to emotional experience, in the sense of an active, fuctuating dialectic. 1.2.1 Meditations on Emotion The concepts of gusto and negative capability are benefcial in terms of identifying and describing the capacity and power of artistic works in terms of their emotive content: that is, the manners in which they are simultaneously expressive of the emotional point of view of the artist, both globally and regarding the specifc thematic dealt within any given work—and revelatory of emotions within those who observe the work in question. These roles are both highly important and relevant to the examination of the role(s) of emotional content and expression in artistic creation. Nevertheless, “emotion” as a concept is a rather broad one, and subject to many varying theories, opinions, and non-sequiturs, which leaves us potentially swimming around aimlessly with no sight of the shore when we try to decipher from, from a scientifcally sound point of view, the presence and expression of emotion within language. The following paragraphs will attempt to defne the concept of emotion upon which the analyses in the upcoming chapters will be based, so as to provide a solid foundation upon and from which the reader may begin. Firstly, let me be clear: defning and dissecting emotion within a scientifc framework does not necessarily ease the task of fully grasping what emotion actually is, as its manifestations are many, and it remains, to a certain extent, a subjective notion. To a certain extent, emotion is experienced differently by each of us, despite the similarities that do exist. For example, I may express and feel “anger” differently than you. However, if we got down to discussing what it really signifes for the both of us, we would most likely fnd some common ground. Emotional language, as the verbal outpouring of what takes place within our conceptual system (and thus, our bodies), thus possesses the same

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poly-faceted characteristics, and its manifestations are refective of this, as Z. Kövecses observes, in remarking that “the wide range of emotional experience requires us to describe these experiences by means of an equally wide range of linguistic expressions” (2000: 188–189). In other words, the polyvalent and volatile quality of emotion itself is directly reproduced in the language that we use to describe it. This is, perhaps, and to a certain extent, due to “the way in which emotions have become connected to the complex ideas, values, principles, and judgments that only humans can have” (Damasio 1999: 35) that ultimately fnd their place, and often their validation, by way of and within linguistic (whether it be written or verbal) expression. A. Damasio, in his 1999 publication The Feeling of What Happens proposes an outlook on emotion based in neurobiology, in which he elaborates a distinction between the notions of “feeling” and “emotion.” He places them along a “continuum” so as to adequately verbalize the cognitive sequence of events that takes place within the individual experiencing these sensations, indicating that we begin with a state of emotion, which can be triggered and executed nonconsciously; [then, we have] a state of feeling, which can be represented nonconsciously; and a state of feeling made conscious, i.e., known to the organism having both emotion and feeling. (1999: 37) Furthermore, he defnes the “posture of emotion” as “covertly induced and [taking on an] outward posture,” and the “status of human feeling” as “inwardly directed and ultimately known” (ibid.). Feelings, thus, would be “when emotions become images” (1999: 55). Damasio’s approach towards the concepts of emotion and feeling fnds a deep-rooted foundation in Spinozist philosophy12—particularly the notion of the conatus—in the sense that he takes on the view that “just like emotion, consciousness is aimed at the organism’s survival, and that, just like emotion, consciousness is rooted in the representation of the body” (Damasio 1999: 37). Lakoff and Johnson, two linguist-philosophers, put this same notion in different terms, claiming that “the body and brain are essential to our humanity” (1999: 22). Spinoza defned his concept of the conatus as an “endeavor”: that is, “the fundamental expression of self-preservation” (LeBuffe 2015). This notion is more approachable, perhaps, when taken in conjunction with the philosopher’s “geometrical method” (ibid.) of defning emotions. Let us frst note that Spinoza prefers the terminology of “affects,” which may be defned as “the affections of the body whereby the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished,” and “passions,” which are passive expressions of the affections of the body (ibid.). Affections are defned as modifcations or qualities. The Spinozian affects and passions are thus translatable to the concepts of emotion and feeling. Spinoza enumerates three primary affects (to all of

10

Introduction

which desire is central): desire, joy or pleasure, and sadness or pain (ibid.). These may be considered, in other terms, as primary, or central, emotions or feelings: the majority of the emotional sensations we experience are either the above three, on a most basic level, or, nuances of them, in a more elaborated sense. Furthermore, to return to the idea of the inherent “passivity” of the passions, this can be understood by way of a dialectic between the notion of the affects and the passions, meaning that “affects are passions when the causes of the bodily changes are (at least in part) external. They are thus ideas of such things as increase or diminish of the body’s power of acting” (LeBuffe 2015). For Spinoza, the human mind is “constituted by its affects. Insofar as they are active, and thus proper to the mind itself, they work to preserve its being and increase its power of action” (LeBuffe 2015). Furthermore, in Spinozian terms, the body and the mind are one: the understanding of one leads to the comprehension of the other, and viceversa. In light of this, we may see how a neurobiological approach such as Damasio’s fnds strong, healthy resonance and support in a philosophy such as Spinoza’s. The approach towards emotion and feeling that this book takes is based in the philosophies outlined above, based on Damasio’s more globalized defnition of feeling as the “private, mental experience of an emotion, while the term emotion should be used to designate the collection of responses, many of which are publicly observable” (1999: 42); or, in other words, a feeling in essence is an idea—an idea of the body and, even more particularly, an idea of a certain aspect of the body, its interior, in certain circumstances. A feeling of emotion is an idea of the body when it is preserved by the emoting process. (Damasio 2003: 88) I have made the choice to employ the term emotion in this book to designate the domain of these experiences, given the “publicly observable” nature of language, and furthermore, in regard to the preceding research and publications concerning the expression of emotion and feeling within language, and especially by way of conceptual metaphor. However, this choice, while based on the linguistic focus of this work, has been made based on an understanding of Damasio’s proposed scale of distinction between the two notions. Moreover, the linguistic analyses to come will be performed in taking this into consideration, and the distinction between the two is often clear, given the nature of the texts to be examined. Lastly, before closing this section, I fnd it important to insist upon the importance of the body within emotional experience. This point of view will be foundational throughout the chapters to follow. Emotion, feeling, and conscious feeling simply cannot take place without the body. M. Serres claims that “le corps sait dire je tout seul. Il sait jusqu’à quel point je suis en deçà de la barre, il sait quand je suis dehors” (1985: 16).13 The Spinozian

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approach, in this sense, will be upheld as much as possible, meaning that the distinction between the body and the mind will be minimized to a maximum. At the weakest, a compelling parallelism will be seen and drawn between the two, and at the strongest, virtually no difference will be made between the entities of the body and the mind: that is, they will be considered as one. The adoption of this point of view has been taken based upon the research performed concerning Spinoza as well as Damasio’s approach; but furthermore, the tenets of cognitive grammar and conceptual metaphor theory (to put it broadly) simultaneously emphasize and reinforce this notion of collectivity. All of this works together to deepen our understanding of emotion as a stand-alone concept, and moreover, our comprehension of the ways in which emotion is expressed by way of (conceptual or cognitive) language.

1.3 Keats the Poet The expansion of the research for this book in light of the Keatsian oeuvre has been a dynamic one, which I believe, is ultimately founded in the fuid, and fexible nature of the poet’s writings: in terms of the notions of gusto and negative capability, analyzed a few pages back, as well as in terms of the ways in which these characteristics inhabit his use of language. This results in a creation of an open-ended dialectic between the poet and the reader (or the researcher), with the characteristics of the texts themselves—founded in the worldview of the artist himself—being transmitted and palpably felt by the observer. Keats, as an individual, and as a poet, is, and embodies, dynamicity, motion, and the body. He was, and remains, a poet in movement, a poet who acts, feels, fuctuates, develops, and his language does the same. J. Cortázar emphasizes this inherent Keatsian quality of movement in his 1996 Imagen de John Keats: Y cuánto muchacho habrá que anda con el tomito de la Everyman en el bolsillo, para leer a John en la calle, al aire libre, bajo los parasoles verdes de las plazas. Keats es para el bolsillo, donde se llevan las cosas que cuentan, las manos, el dinero, el pañuelo; los estantes se los deja a Coleridge y a T.S. Eliot, poetas-lámpara. Un bolsillo es la casa esencial por y portátil del hombre; hay que elegir lo imprescindible, y solamente un poeta cabe allí. (Cortázar 1996: 23) And how many young people will there be who walk around with a small volume of the Everyman in their pocket, to read John in the street, in the open air, under the green parasols of the squares. Keats is made for the pocket: the place where we carry the things that count, our hands, our money, a tissue; let’s leave the bookshelves to Coleridge and T.S. Eliot, the lamp-post poets. The pocket is man’s essential and

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Introduction portable home: we must choose what is indispensable, and only one poet fnds his place here. (Translation mine)

Keats and his poetry have thus found their place within the mind of the reader in movement, the reader who feels, who wishes for physical confrmation of the text in the body: hence J. Cortázar’s mention of the pocket,14 as opposed to a bag, an entity distinct and separate from the body. These intuitive responses and qualities to and present within Keats’s oeuvre thus clear the path for scientifc research which may be viewed as their extension: the indivisibility of the body and the mind, and the way in which this is expressed by way of poetic language. M. Merleau-Ponty verbalizes this notion in the following manner, in suggesting: esthetic expression confers existence in itself to what it expresses: it installs it in nature as something perceived and accessible to all, or inversely, tears the signs away from their own existence and gives birth to them in another world. (1962: 870, translation mine)15 1.3.1 Keatsian Poetry in This Book In choosing the poems around which this book is centered, the idea was to select a group of poems which could adequately cover Keats’s—albeit relatively short—development as a poet. This goal was achieved by including poems chosen from virtually all points within Keats’s career, as well as poems that were explicitly published by Keats himself and others that were published by others, posthumously. Furthermore, the inclusion of poems from various points in Keats’s career allows for the inclusion of poems appreciated by the poet himself, along with his critics and fans, both past and present (for example, the 1819 “Odes”) as well as others which became almost a source of embarrassment, or at least, dislike for Keats, such as “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” which Keats deemed as “mawkish” shortly after its publication. The selection, from my point of view, is large enough to be comprehensive in this sense, but also small enough so that the majority of poems receive an adequate amount of attention within the analysis. Moreover, the somewhat limited number of poems covered in the book allows for the creation of connections between different types of analyses based on each poem. Also, this permits the reader’s familiarization, at least to a certain extent, with the plots, characters, and general characteristics of the poems in question—without being overly repetitive—which allows for broader poetic contextualization and a more global understanding of Keats’s oeuvre. The corpus also includes poems of differing lengths, both long and short.

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The subject matter of the poems varies as well, ranging from love stories inspired by Boccaccio, to esoteric odes, to exhortations upon works of literary creation, to tributes to laziness, to the metaphorical depiction of seasons, to mention a few. This variation in terms of subject matter allows for both comparison and contrast to be drawn between the lexicon employed within the poems, as well as the uses of certain grammatical tendencies. Moreover, the examination of grammatical usage, along with the analysis of conceptual metaphor and metonymy within such a varied selection of contexts, proves to be highly useful in terms of the reinforcement of the basis of these linguistic theories within our conceptual systems, buttressing the claims of their quotidian presence, as well as the unilateral presence of certain phenomena in both everyday linguistic use as well as the poetic usage and forms of language. The linguistic register and poetic form of the poems vary as well. We come across sonnets, odes, and longer, more narrative poems, and poems with defned and restricted rhyme scheme, as well as poems without. We encounter poems of a high, formal linguistic register and tone; in the same way, we analyze those which are of a much more informal nature. This diversity in register is not only refective of Keats’s personal linguistic baggage, but also of the inherent fexibility he possessed as a writer and artist. This fuidity is indicative of a level of mastery of his medium. Ultimately, these choices were made so as to provide a simultaneously rich and varied analysis of Keats’s oeuvre within the book, while at the same time respecting the spatial and temporal limits of such an undertaking.

1.4 Structural Logic of the Book 1.4.1 Overcoming Obviousness: Or, Creating a New Analytical Structure Keats’s works have been the object of many, many “literary” studies, analyses, and publications: much has already been said about his works. A frst and seminal challenge that remained present throughout the elaboration of this book was therefore not to fall into the trap of rehashing what has already been said, but at the same time, not ignoring valuable conclusions that have already been drawn by those before me, and that could potentially aid in the drawing of my own. Then, a second challenge—which has had, to a certain extent, a palliative effect in regard to the frst, given the linguistic nature of the research at hand—was the constant creation and suspension of tension of balance between the literary and the linguistic approaches: keeping the linguistic point of view in the forefront, but avoiding a place of restriction within which valuable input from a more literary perspective would fall to the wayside. This was realized so that the overall result would be inclusive of the poems in their entirety, while keeping the language as the primary

14 Introduction object of focus. This initial challenge, originally simply a bibliographical one, ultimately could now be defned as the greatest one within the elaboration of this research: that is, the potential quandary within and due to the potentially interdisciplinary nature of this work. This tension was tackled with an intensifed questioning around how to approach the poetic text for what it is—a literary, artistic, poetic work—while also engaging in rigorous linguistic analysis. This is what eventually resulted in the elaboration of the theoretical framework upon which my analyses are founded: that is, out of the necessity for a critical context that was able to go beyond the inherent categories of “discipline,” while at the same time being able to be placed in, and function within, said disciplines, embodying fuidity, and returning to the same point of depart, which is the human conceptual system and the way that it solidifes and is expressed by way of language. 1.4.2 Interest and Relevance This book is the frst strictly cognitive linguistic approach to Keats’s works. I believe that a linguistic approach to poetry is useful for both poetry and linguistics—as poetry is, in effect, constructed out of language, the primary object of study of any theory of linguistics—and will only enhance the understanding and appreciation of the poetic text. R. Jakobson supports this point of view in the following manner16: Insistence on keeping poetics apart from linguistics is warranted only when the feld of linguistics appears to be illicitly restricted, for example, when the sentence is viewed by some linguists as the highest analyzable construction or when the scope of linguistics is confned to grammar alone or uniquely to non-semantic questions of external form or to the inventory of denotative devices with no reference to free variations. (1960: 3) Moreover, the “blending” of linguistics—particularly grammatical investigations—and more literary-focused studies is something that remains somewhat rare within both felds, given its inherent interdisciplinary nature. However, research domains such as cognitive poetics, along with the inclusion of the study of poetic texts by way of conceptual metaphor theory, are becoming more and more present.17 Based on a combination of poetic and linguistic theory, the goal of this book is to explore the ways in which the linguistic components of Keats’s works are essential to his poetic expression—particularly in relation to emotion—each element, given its inherent semantics and grammatical functioning, works alone as well as in conjunction with those surrounding it to structure the poetry and create the fnal expression. This type of analysis would ultimately lead to a comprehension of the poetic oeuvre that is more profound on all levels, as when we understand the object in its most basic terms, on its most

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primary level, we are more capable of understanding its more complex delineations.

1.5 Outline and Argumentative Logic This book is divided into six chapters, not including the introduction and the conclusion. The following paragraphs will provide a brief overview of the structure of these chapters and their subdivisions. Chapter 1, “Cognitive Approaches to Poetry,” follows up on the introduction, proposing an overview of the theoretical foundations of the monograph as a whole. The tenets of cognitive grammar are thoroughly explained, followed up by its more specifc branches of cognitive poetics, conceptual metaphor and metonymy theory, and force-dynamics. The monograph’s approach to emotion is also explained in further depth. Chapter 2, “Aspect and Conceptual Metaphor: Poetic Expression and Emotion,” focuses on the role of emotionally centered metaphor within Keats’s oeuvre, which is examined throughout the chapter in light of its role in the verbalization and conceptualization of emotional experience. The heart of the chapter is constructed upon case studies of conceptual metaphor in “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” and “Lamia.” The metaphors around which this chapter is centered are EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM and EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE. These case studies have as their objective a demonstrative analysis of the role of metaphor within the poem itself and of the poeticity of emotional expression by way of conceptual metaphor. The metaphorical analyses focus on the role of predicative elements and grammatical aspect (expressing dynamicity or stativity) within conceptual metaphor. The goal of this chapter’s interrogations is to bring to the forefront the manner in which grammatical elements are essential to the complete expression of emotional, poetic conceptual metaphor, and in doing so, to highlight the centrality of conceptual metaphor to the expression of emotion in Keats’s poetry. Chapter 4, “Emotional Force-Dynamics: CAUSES ARE FORCES and Modality,” focuses on the Talmyian concept of “force-dynamics” (Talmy 1988), or causality, and its place within emotional expression in “To Fanny,” “The Eve of St. Agnes,” “Ode to a Nightingale,” “Modern Love,” and “I cry your mercy-pity-love!—aye, love!”; poems that involve complex and causal interactions between agents. The chapter also examines this concept as a vector for the verbalization and conceptualization of emotion on a more global level. This is done via a concentration on psychological/psychosocial, causality, and its various schematic elaborations. Here, causality is examined hand-in-hand with emotional conceptual metaphor, naturally falling into place after the previous chapter. The metaphorical analysis of force-dynamics within Keats’s poetry is founded on two principal points of view: the cognitive, linguistic expression of causality is conceptually metaphorical, and said expression is represented grammatically. Furthermore,

16 Introduction the causality verbalized in these types of expressions is central to the development of the emotional situations in the poems at hand—and, thus, the poems themselves. In regard to grammar, this chapter specifcally focuses on the grammatical representation by way of modal auxiliaries (and other predicates which have similar tendencies) and emotion and perception verbs. The analyses of this phenomenon in Keats’s works lead to multiple conclusions concerning the articulation of emotion in his poetry, the Keatsian use of grammar, conceptual metaphor and metonymy, as well as the use of other stylistic effects, such as synesthetic imagery, and the categorization of force-dynamics in general. Chapter 5, “Grammar and Emotion,” acts as a complement to the third and fourth chapters, as it is based in the same methodology and focuses on the same theoretical concepts of conceptual metaphor and force dynamics. However, the grammatical focus in this chapter is prepositions and the ways in which their inherent conceptual structures play a role in the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor and causality in Keats’s poetry: I argue that they allow for the creation of grammatical/syntactical relationships that intensify the salience of the inherent relationships (between source and target domains) within conceptual metaphor. The goal of this chapter’s interrogations is to bring to the forefront the manner in which these grammatical elements are essential to the complete expression of emotional, poetic conceptual metaphor, and in doing so, to highlight the centrality of conceptual metaphor to the expression of emotion in Keats’s poetry. Chapter 6, “Emotional Time and Embodiment,” is centered around embodied emotional experience in Keats’s works, specifcally focusing on the role of the mind/body within the metaphorical verbalization of emotional experience. This chapter specifcally concentrates on the human perception of time. This chapter’s (as well as that of the following chapter’s) starting-off point is the intense presence of the body in Keatsian poetry, used as a tool to express a wide variety of emotions. Here, the poetic analyses are primarily centered around the Odes, with some slight support from “Isabella” and “To Hope.” The notion of time in emotional experience is examined via the lens of conceptual metaphor, in which the various temporal divisions (past, present, future) are analyzed in spatial-temporal terms. Combinations of conceptual metaphors are often frequent, providing a spatially and motion-based approach to emotional temporality. These metaphorical analyses are, of course, linked to the grammatical structure of their verbalizations—particularly concentrating on verbs and prepositions, but the analysis remains global—and examined within their overall poetic context. Chapter 7, “Embodiment and the Physiological Expression of Emotion,” is centered around embodied emotional experience in Keatsian poetry, focusing on linguistic expression of emotion and emotional experience by way of conceptual metonymy, and will thus be centered on the physical and/or physiological, and perhaps, more tangible, aspects of emotion. The analyses

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of embodied emotion have as their bedrock Spinozian philosophy, neuroscience, and conceptual approaches to linguistic expression. The aim of this chapter is, primarily, to analyze the occurrences of conceptual metonymy related to emotion found in the Keatsian corpus upon which this research is founded. As in the previous chapter, the poetic analyses are primarily centered around the Odes. Supporting analysis also brings to light examples of the phenomena in “Isabella,” “La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” and “Oh blush not so!” The metonymies analyzed here often verbalize the moment of the “emergence” of the emotion (Damasio 2003: 86). At this particular moment, the Keatsian verbalizations of conceptual metaphor allow for a profound expression of both the multiple facets of the linguistic expression of emotion and the reader’s interior perception of it. Furthermore, the very frequent combination of conceptual metaphors and metonymies brings to light the multiplicity of emotional experience and augments the inherent poeticity in the verbalization of these two fgures. This type of analysis necessarily highlights the central role that the body holds in emotional experience and our linguistic expressions of said experience, and furthermore, how the verbalization of emotional experience necessitates consciousness of the emotional experience on the part of the agent. This allows for an examination of emotion in its multiple dimensions, all the while solidifying the parallelism between the body and the mind, or the inherent embodiment of emotion. These chapters have been organized in the above manner with the aim of presenting Keats’s emotional language by way of an approach which focuses on the essential conceptual and linguistic elements of such types of expression, in a fashion in which the concepts and analyses build on one another, working together to provide a global, multi-faceted vision of Keatsian language in its most emotive form.

Notes 1 I can cite here W.J. Bate (1958; 1963; 1964); C. Bertonèche (2011); C. La Cassagnère (2003). 2 To quote John Gibson Lockhart. 3 See W.J. Bate, The Stylistic Development of Keats (1958). 4 Keats did, nevertheless, undergo medical, surgical, and pharmaceutical studies. 5 Cf. J. Cortázar 1996: 36: “Su espléndida admiración por William Hazlitt prueba cómo, en ese vórtice que es Hazlitt, en su sincretismo intelectual de lo isabelino (Shakespeare) y lo contemporáneo (con el toque del siglo XVII que hace de un pensador un ensayista) ve Keats la caja de resonancia, el gran caracol de su hora.” 6 In an application of the concept of gusto to Keats’s works. 7 According to Eliot, this was in contradiction to the “lamp-post poets” (Cortázar 1996: 23) so often seen as the defning poetic fgures of the 19th and 20th centuries. The phrase cited above begins in the following manner: “If we take either Wordsworth or Shelley as representative of his age, we cannot so take Keats.” 8 Letter to George and Thomas Keats, Hampstead, December 22, 1817. 9 Benjamin West, oil on canvas, 1817.

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Introduction

10 “but in this picture we have unpleasantness without any momentous depth of speculation excited, in which to bury its repulsiveness—The picture is larger than Christ rejected.” 11 Keats continues on to idolize W. Shakespeare as an emblem of this quality of intensity in his writings: “Examine King Lear, and you will fnd this exemplifed throughout.” 12 “Emotions are complicated collections of chemical and neural responses, forming a pattern; all emotions have some kind of regulatory role to play, leading in one way or another to the creation of circumstances advantageous to the organism exhibiting the phenomenon; emotions are about the life of an organism, its body to be precise, and their role is to assist the organism in maintaining life” (Damasio 1999: 51). 13 “The body knows how to say ‘I’ all alone. It knows at what point I am below the bar, it knows when I am outside” (Translation and emphasis mine). 14 We are also reminded, on a more somber note, that P.B. Shelley’s corpse was found with an 1820 volume of Keats’s works in the pants pocket (cf. Cortázar 1996: 23). 15 “l’expression esthétique confère à ce qu’elle exprime l’existence en soi; l’installe dans la nature comme une chose perçue accessible à tous, ou inversement arrache les signes eux-mêmes […] à leur existence et les nait dans un autre monde” (1962: 870). 16 P. Kiparsky, in his 1973 article “The Role of Linguistics in a Theory of Poetry,” puts forward a highly similar point of view. 17 See R. Tsur (2008); P. Stockwell (2002); G. Steen (1999, 2012) among others.

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Cognitive Approaches to Poetry

2.1 Methodological Orientation: Perspectives In Chapter 1, I provided an introduction to this book, outlining its goals and its foundation in Keats’s poetry. The present chapter builds on Chapter 1 to move on to a more precise, theoretical introduction, outlining the linguistic and conceptual framework upon which the entirety of this book is based. In other words, Chapter 1 provided the why; Chapter 2, in turn, provides the how. I will expound upon this how in eight sections, explaining the theory, and highlighting its relevance to a stylistic study of poetry. The how will then be put into action throughout the remaining chapters of this book. To provide an imagistic basis for the present chapter, the theoretical framework is sketched in the form of a pyramid. Langacker’s cognitive grammar, summarized in the second section of this chapter, is the theoretical bedrock for this book, along with the poetic texts themselves, discussed in Chapter 1 and throughout each subsequent chapter. The approaches that are explained in the following sections: cognitive poetics, conceptual metaphor and metonymy theory, the Talmyan approach to force-dynamics and causality, and the theory of embodied emotions build upon this approach. Each chapter draws upon key work in each domain. These approaches intertwine and infuence one another in various ways, and consistently bring us back to the language itself: ultimately founded in, and representative of, the human conceptual system. This interdependency between multiple theories is what has given way to this book. Moreover, this combination has proven to be most ftting in the examination of the multiple facets of Keats’s oeuvre: this work aims to refect its robustness and multiplicity.

2.2 Cognitive Grammar The cognitive grammatical approach takes a holistic, conceptualized view of language. Within this approach, notably elaborated by Langacker, grammatical elements as well as grammatical structure have meaning, and each element of language is semantically signifcant, symbolic, and meaningful in its DOI: 10.4324/9781003275626-2

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own right (2008: 3, 5). Thus, grammar and semantics are seen as naturally intertwined and complementary (Talmy 1978: 1). Furthermore, grammar—as a set of structures holding meaning—allows us to express complex, nuanced situations, points of view, and experiences (Langacker 2009: 5–6). A second facet of cognitive grammar’s (CG) approach to grammar, which is particularly relevant to the objectives of this book, is that “grammar relies extensively on imaginative phenomena and mental constructions” (Langacker 2008: 4). CG opens up the way for grammar to be viewed as a phenomenon which can be applied to interrogations and investigations going beyond an analysis of language in and of itself. It allows for a wider, more profound point of view, necessarily enlarging its scope of analysis. CG makes it possible for us to fully proft from concepts which inevitably touch us daily and on multiple levels: with it, we may gain a deeper understanding of the world and our place within it. Necessarily, thus, the human conceptual system and the realm of linguistic expression are indelibly intertwined. In consequence, language is not arbitrary, but rather is “motivated by cognition and by its basis in an interaction with reality,” as Gavins and Steen (2003: 9) argue. This “connection between experience, cognition, and language,” to quote Gavins and Steen (2003: 9) once again, is what renders CG particularly adapted to an analysis of literary, poetic texts, and to the expression of emotive experience within these types of texts. Indeed, the deep connective tissue between linguistic expression, cognition, and the reality of emotional experience within the body/mind is brought to the fore in CG. 2.2.1 Grammatical Classes in CG According to Langacker (2008: 95), “basic grammatical classes are semantically defnable.” They are also symbolic and “can be given uniform semantic categorizations” (2008: 23). Jespersen (1924: 60) holds a similar point of view, rejecting the typical defnitions that typically create distinctions between the grammatical classes. He thus emphasizes the qualities of “form” and “meaning,” highlighting the importance of both categories, while simultaneously underlining the diffculties that such a classifcation could entail. Bolinger (1968: 86) and Lapaire and Rotgé (1998: 341) also argue for a semantically based categorization of grammatical classes. This view of grammatical classes—and the distinctions between them— naturally brings us back to the foundations of lexical and grammatical semantics in CG. The word, in and of itself, regardless of its grammatical class, possesses its own innate semantics, or meaning, or signifcance, and it is on this basis that words have been divided into grammatical classes or categories. The grammatical function of any given term follows its inherent semantics. This view of the function of language provides a simpler comprehension of it, rendering the linguistic expression of things, events, and qualities—and furthermore, emotions, sentiments, and experiences—all the more

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palpable, reinforced by the inherent qualities of each grammatical category. This point of view is one of the tenets of cognitive grammar, according to Langacker (2009: 1–2), who argues that “lexicology, morphology, and syntax form a continuum.” In this vein, Langacker (2008: 38–43) proposes a “gradiated” view of semantics and pragmatics, eliminating the strict boundary too often placed between the two notions. 2.2.2 Construal and Literariness The notions of semantics and pragmatics bring us back to the most basic claim of CG: that is, that “grammar is meaningful” (Langacker 2008: 3), that I mentioned at the beginning of this section. While this claim, particularly within work which blends linguistic and textual analysis, is simultaneously liberating and captivating, the source and defnition of said meaning must be understood and elaborated upon before being able to fully exploit it. Langacker asserts that linguistic meaning resides in conceptualization […] [which is] dynamic, interactive, imagistic (as opposed to propositional), and imaginative (involving metaphor, blending, fctivity, and mental space construction). […] More broadly, a meaning consists of both conceptual content and a way of construing that content. (2008: 43) In CG, construal is defned as the ways in which we conceive of and depict any given situation (ibid.): and these ways are multiple. If grammar is meaningful, and if meaning inherently blends content and construal, then with CG, grammar and language become richer, more fexible, and much less cut-and-dry. In turn, this means that our language, and in parallel, our ways of conceptualizing the world, become more plentiful as well. In the textual analyses that take place in the forthcoming chapters of this book, I will aim to defend and provide evidence for the imaginative, imagistic, dynamic, and interactive qualities of grammar, and demonstrate the ways in which it bolsters the poetic salience of Keats’s writing. What’s more, these qualities permit grammatical structures, elements, and tools to be key elements in the poetic expression of emotion. This can be both tentatively and safely assumed due to the fact that “the meaning of many linguistic elements—especially those considered as ‘grammatical’—consists primarily in the construal they impose, rather than any specifc content,” as Langacker (2008: 43) suggests. With different terminology, Jakobson1 argues that the “object of literary science is not literature, but literariness.” Literariness can be understood as a literary-specifc construal: it is the linguistic expression that renders a text literary, and performed with this in mind. Construal and literariness are two of the principal guiding structures for this book.2

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This intrinsically fexible or absorbent quality within grammar as a concept is exactly what renders it an essential element within a stylistic analysis of poetry. The phenomena that I will examine throughout this book’s analytical chapters take on many forms and are employed by the poet for a variety of purposes. For example, “minor” grammatical classes such as prepositions are essential to the poetic expression of emotion, that liberty taken within adjectival constructions invokes deeper and more sensual or sensorial (at times synesthetic) imagery, and that verbal aspect enhances the conceptually metaphorical expression of emotion. Moreover, Keats often chooses to push the limits, or even break the traditionally imposed grammatical rules of the usage of all of the above—“putting the language in danger,” as Bachelard (1957) puts it—which not only provides uniqueness to his poetry, but more importantly allows for the construal of emotion in a profound manner.

2.3 Poetic Grammar, Cognitive Poetics If poetry is an art form, language is its medium, its foundation. In the creation of a poem, each lexeme is applied step-by-step to the fnal product of the composition of verses, as strokes of paint layered on a canvas by a brush. As in the analysis of any work of art, the fnal or fnished product should not be the sole consideration. If one truly aspires to comprehend and appreciate the work of art to its fullest extent, one must also aim to understand the steps taken that led to fnished work. Aristotle, in his Poetics, makes a striking parallel between poetry, other forms of art, and CG’s approach to language: the poet being an imitator, like a painter or any other artist, must of necessity imitate one of three objects—things as they were or are, things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be. The vehicle of expression is language,—either current terms or, it may be, rare words or metaphors. (43) Genette (2010: 10) argues, as well, for the inclusion of literature and poetry within the classifcations of art. Berry (1958: 5) goes farther, arguing that the text itself, along with the (grammatical) elements that compose it, must possess a certain level of connection to the external world as a whole. These points of view, among others, have been formalized by a tributary, of CG, cognitive poetics, notably developed by Tsur in his 2008 publication Towards a Theory of Cognitive Poetics. Cognitive poetics consists of a stylistic approach to literary (and potentially non-literary) texts which is based on CG, resulting in analysis based on “how poetic language or literary form is shaped by cognitive processes” (Tsur 2008: 2). This gives way to a holistic

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analysis of the poetic text. As a specialized branch of CG, the object of analysis differs in cognitive poetics, but not the approach. Furthermore, cognitive poetics is multi-faceted in its approach, including not only CG, but force-dynamics, text world theory, and fgure/ground analysis, to name a few other approaches. This shift is refective in Keatsian poetry itself, according to Cortázar (1996: 45) who suggests that “what changes in Keats is the dimension but not the form, the results, but not the intentions.”3 It is unique in the sense that the artistic and emotional sensibilities and elements specifc to the poetic genre have been taken into consideration, and even valued, within it. The linguistic approach to poetic language fnds its foundations in the works and fgure of Jakobson, who can be considered as the founding father of the elaboration of the inherent connection between the two entities. Indeed, a large part of Jakobson’s poetic theory was aimed “towards a science of poetic art” (1979: 541–545). However, in doing this, the inherent artistic quality of poetry is not left behind, and moreover, cannot be, given the etymology of the term poetry itself. Jakobson (1979: 541) reminds his reader that poetry in ancient Greek primarily signifes “creation.” In the ancient Chinese tradition, shih, signifying “poetry, verbal art” and its near-homophone and semantically close chih, signifying “fnality or intention” are closely linked and used to refer to poetry. Jakobson claims that exploring these three facets, or elements, of poetry was his (and the Russian formalists’) goal. Cognitive poetics has similar objectives, and thus fnds resonance in Jakobson’s creation of a complementary, scientifc approach to poetic language, while preserving and respecting its artistic nature. Moreover, cognitive poetics may render poetic texts more approachable and understandable to the reader, as the foundation of its analysis is ultimately found in the human conceptual system, as Tsur (2008: 19) suggests. Thus, cognitive poetics proposes poetic analysis which takes emotional experience—both on the part of the poet and the reader—into consideration, as the expression of emotion in poetry (or perhaps in any other form of artistic manifestation) is a double-sided endeavor. There is, on the one hand, the emotion which emanates from the poet or artist: in poetry, the emotion or sentiment is articulated by way of language. On the other hand, there is the emotion felt by the reader. The two can be one and the same, which is perhaps the aim of the poet. However, this is not a necessity, as Tsur (2008: 10) suggests: the necessity is that emotion is brought forth. With this in mind, Tsur (2008: 82) proposes a three-step process for poetic analysis: beginning with “structural description,” followed by “a description of the ‘given’ effect,” and rounding out with “a cognitive explanation that relates the ‘given effect’ in systematic ways to the description of the structure.” Finding this approach particularly relevant and valuable, I have aimed to adhere to, or at least include the elements of this three-step process throughout the entirety of this book.

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2.4 Conceptual Metaphor and Metonymy Lakoff and Johnson, in their 1980 publication Metaphors We Live By, developed the idea that metaphor is a linguistic tool which structures our manner of conceiving and perceiving the world. This point of view is known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). In other words, according to the two linguists, our representation of the world is, at its most foundational, metaphorical (1980: 3). Metaphor inhabits thought at its most basic level: metaphorical language is no more than a manner of expressing it. Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson suggest that the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor is possible precisely given the fact that conceptual metaphor exists within the human conceptual system. Thus, it is more appropriate to consider conceptual metaphor as an affair of cognition and refection, rather than as purely linguistic (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 6). CMT thus argues that metaphor is a linguistic and mental tool that structures our way of conceiving and perceiving the world. Lakoff and Johnson claim that metaphor is present in everyday life—not only in language—in the way we think about, act on, and represent our conceptual system, which according to CMT, is fundamentally metaphorical (1980: 3). In other words, metaphor inhabits mental processes—or thought—at the most basic level, and metaphorical language is an expression of this (1980: 1). This claim is supported by many in the feld of cognitive linguistics and conceptual metaphor theory, albeit often applied and interpreted in slightly differing ways. Such is the case of Gibbs (1994: 7), who insists upon the metaphorical structuring of our conceptual system, but also highlights the constraints of such a connection, in suggesting that “much of our conceptualization of experience is metaphorical, which both motivates and constrains the way we think creatively.” An example of conceptual metaphor, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4), is ARGUMENT IS WAR. The two linguists claim that our manner of perceiving the concept of the argument is founded in this metaphorical notion, and moreover, that this concept is fundamentally metaphorical and thus structures our daily activity (ibid.). They illustrate this statement with very commonplace examples of statements in contemporary, quotidian English, which refect the above metaphor, such as the following: 1) Your claims are indefensible. 2) I demolished his argument. 3) He attacked every weak point in my argument. Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson suggest that this metaphorical manner of conception structures the way in which humans behave in the midst of an argumentative situation as well as (and equally) the manner in which we understand such situations. They claim that the essence of metaphor is “to understand and experience one thing in terms of another” (1980: 5). When

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we use, or encounter, enunciations such as (1), (2), or (3), we fnd ourselves faced with a concept, as well as an activity, which is metaphorically structured. In consequence, the language used to describe the said concept and activity is metaphorically structured. Lakoff and Johnson remain faithful to the idea “metaphor means “metaphorical concept” (1980: 6). Conceptual metaphor theory thus works in a contradictory sense to what Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 119) deem as the “traditional theory of metaphor,” in which “metaphor is a matter of words, not thought,” and moreover, that metaphorical language “is not a part of ordinary, conventional language,” and “is deviant.” The linguist-philosophers vehemently reject this approach and aim to replace it with the theory outlined above, in which metaphor is a fundamental element of our conceptual systems, expressed outwardly by way of language, and is thus central to the thriving, continuation, and evolution of human existence. Lakoff and Johnson thus argue that conceptual metaphor is what makes most abstract thought possible. […] On the contrary, it is the very means by which we are able to make sense of our experience. Conceptual metaphor is one of the greatest of our intellectual gifts. (1999: 129) Indeed, conceptual metaphor simultaneously shapes, refects, and enriches our conception of both our internal and external worlds, rendering it impossible to ignore in research which aims to focus on the links and syntheses between language, cognition, and reality. As conceptual metaphor is thus an “everyday” phenomenon, it comes as no surprise that a textual analysis of any sort might take interest in the role that conceptual metaphor plays within the text in question. Furthermore, the notion of metaphor as a quotidian—as opposed to a specialized or deviant—use of and approach to language renders the concept particularly interesting when analyzed within a poetic context. What is the role of such an entity within a literary or poetic context? Does conceptual metaphor change, take on different roles, and search for and fnd different types of expression? Since poetic language is not “everyday” language, how does conceptual metaphor translate itself within such a style and use of language?

2.5 Poetic Conceptual Metaphor and Metonymy The same Lakoff, along with Turner, later expanded and elaborated CMT in a specifc application to poetic language in their 1989 publication, More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor, which attempts to respond to the above questions (as well as many others along the same vein). So as to do this, they establish and elaborate an inherent qualitative link between conceptual metaphor and poetic language, in that neither manner of expression

26 Cognitive Approaches to Poetry should be seen as elevated or idiosyncratic. They defend the idea that these same “metaphors we live by” can be applied to poetic forms of language. Furthermore, they claim that the use of conceptual metaphor within poetry adds a notable level of force to this form of linguistic expression. For Lakoff and Turner, regardless of the fact that the conceptual metaphors found in poetry (or poetic language) are founded in more basic, or global, conceptual metaphors, the use of conceptual metaphor within poetry is a particular type of usage, specifcally adapted to the poetic genre. Moreover, they are founded in the (linguistic) culture in which the metaphor is expressed: “General conceptual metaphors are thus not the unique creation of individual poets, but are rather part of the way members of a culture have of conceptualizing their experience” (1989: 9). This is due to the fact that poetic language makes use of the mechanisms of daily thought by broadening them, elaborating them, and combining them, in a way which goes beyond the ordinary (1989: 67). Gibbs (1994: 7) argues for a similar understanding of poetic metaphor and suggests that poets do “not create new conceptualizations of experience, but talk about the metaphorical entailments of ordinary conceptual mappings in new ways.” Lakoff and Turner (1989: 107) further note that certain words also possess the inherent capability to evoke conceptual metaphor, a process which they deem as “metaphorical extension.” Gibbs (1994: 9–10, 157) also observes that polysemy can be explained via conceptual metaphors due to the fact that it is “motivated by the metaphorical projection of knowledge from one domain to another.” The notion that the use of metaphorical linguistic expression plays a role in the elaboration, development, and extension of language in and of itself is also supported by Pilkington who suggests: that the creation of new concepts is the normal state of affairs in utterance interpretation [and that] what is being suggested here for metaphor is a more creative and active version of the process Barsalou (1987) sees as happening in the case of almost every concept. (2000: 107) Sweetser also underlines metaphor’s role in semantic change, claiming that it is a “major force” in relation to the latter, as it operates between domains [and this …] so pervasively that speakers fnd an inter-domain connection between knowledge and vision, or between space and time, to be as natural as the intra-domain connections between fnger and hand or between man and woman. (1990: 19) This is perhaps in large part due to the common situation in which “metaphors appear to introduce information from physical-world source domains into target domains in the nonphysical world” (Quinn and Holland 1987: 27).

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Moreover, Lakoff and Turner argue that the process of metaphorical extension is highly possible within poetic metaphor. However, poets may, so as to evoke conceptual metaphor in a perhaps more subtle manner, make use of terminology which is not naturally or typically employed so as to express the metaphorical concept in question (1989: 107). Pilkington (2000: 88–89), in a similar train of thought, claims that metaphors can differ from everyday language in what they aim to express or open up to the realm of communication, as well as in how they open up communication. Furthermore, Lakoff and Turner (1989: 108) make the reader aware—and even warn her of the fact that—conceptual metaphor may potentially lead to a certain level of confusion, given the essential distinction made between words and the concepts or notions expressed by them. They remind us of the fact that words give rise to much more within our minds than what they evoke, strictly speaking. The words on the page, thus, are not of primordial importance. However, the conceptual content evoked by them is, which permits a greater understanding of our conceptual systems. Lakoff and Turner (1989: 215) suggest that poetic metaphor plays an important role in this understanding, and that the manner in which poets go about it makes them “artists of the mind.” The meaning of poetic, conceptual metaphors is thus found equally in the mind of the reader as well as in the words in their physical form, on the page. This construal, discussed in Section 2.2, is individual for each reader, as “no two speakers speak exactly the same language,” and furthermore, due to the fact that each reader’s conceptual system is unique and individual, “even if one sticks to the conventional, shared meanings of the words, one will necessarily be evoking all of the knowledge in the schemas in which those words are defned” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 109). Steen (1999: 503) supports this “double-sided” apprehension of the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor, relying both on the verbalization and construal provided by the poet and the role of the reader in providing her or his own construal. One of the essential aspects of Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner’s theory of conceptual metaphor is the distinction that is made between so-called “basic” conceptual metaphors and their linguistic expressions (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3–6; Lakoff and Turner 1989: 49). Furthermore, Lakoff and Turner (1989: 50) make a point of highlighting the fact that although poetry, as a linguistic form and/or genre, may provide or contain particular or elaborated expressions of “basic” conceptual metaphors, these metaphors remain nevertheless very commonplace and present in everyday linguistic and mental expressions. Thus, “any discussion of the uniqueness or idiosyncrasy of a metaphor must therefore take place on two levels: the conceptual level and the linguistic level.” In other words, poetic metaphor fnds its foundation in conceptual, metaphorical concepts that structure our way of thinking, and what renders poetic metaphor poetic is the manner in which it takes these concepts beyond the traditional ways of expressing them via language.

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According to Lakoff and Turner (1989: 67) the above is accomplished by a selection of linguistic and expressive techniques that simultaneously rely on the poet and the reader, and thus, in the constant exchange that takes place between the two during the act of the discovery and absorption of the text. The frst is the “extending” of conventional metaphor. The second manner in which this may be done is “elaborating.” The role of the reader is specifcally highlighted in the case of elaborating, as the possibilities of interpretation are high. The third manner of rendering conceptual metaphor poetic is “questioning,” wherein “poets go beyond the normal use of conventional metaphor to point out, and call into question, the boundaries of our everyday metaphorical understandings of important concepts” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 68). The fourth and fnal way in which conventional metaphor may be rendered poetic is by way of “composing”—“the most powerful of all ways in which poetic metaphor goes beyond the ordinary way we use conventional metaphoric thought”—which is defned as metaphorical combining, or “the formation of composite metaphors” (1989: 70). These four manners of grabbing hold of, working with, and taking conceptually metaphoric concepts farther are “a large part of what makes poetic metaphor more interesting than conventional metaphor,” and “they allow the use of ordinary conceptual resources in extraordinary ways” (1989: 71). Thus, poetry can be seen as a “fgurative” manner of employing language that may not fnd its place in everyday uses of language. It can also be a refection of “idiosyncratic thought” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 50). However, conceptual metaphor seems to be a linguistic device by which one can fnd a link between this type of linguistic usage and that with which we are more familiar, that we use day-to-day (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 50–51). Poetic, metaphorical style may thus be envisioned as a mastery of linguistic usage as well as the manner in which concepts are transferred metaphorically via language. In basing my examination of poetic, metaphorical language in the mindset that this type of linguistic use is simply a form of expression— the outward expression of the deliberate refnement of an art form—while integrating the metaphorical concepts that already inhabit our conceptual system, I have found “poetic” language and the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor to be complementary and mutually alimenting and stimulating. Furthermore, it is grounds for fertile analysis of both the language itself and the conceptual metaphors that simultaneously form and spring from it. Given the predominant and permeating nature of conceptual metaphor, it is present in—and its theory applicable to—a wide variety of concepts, categorized within the metaphorical expression as the source and target domains. As emotion is central to the aims of this book, the conceptual metaphors that I analyze in Keats’s works are largely related to the domain of emotional experience.

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2.6 Conceptual Metaphor and Emotion Kövecses (2008, among others) has applied CMT to the expression of emotion, furthering developing the theory so as to render it more appropriate for the linguistic description of enunciations which aim to verbalize or describe one or more emotions (or emotional experiences). According to Kövecses (2002: 23), the conceptual metaphors relative to the expression of emotion are based on those which are considered as “everyday” or conventional, similarly to poetic metaphor. At the same time, however, he upholds the idea that emotional language is a unique use of language, which does not necessarily refer to a “preexisting emotional reality,” but is rather language which can be fgurative and is capable of defning and even creating emotional experiences for, and within, the reader (Kövecses 2002: xii). Emotional language has multiple functions, being divided on the most basic level as either expressive or descriptive: emotionally centered metaphors fall under the category of descriptive, fgurative, emotional language (2002: 6). Furthermore, Kövecses underlines the two “common characterizations” of emotions, which have a direct effect on the language used to describe them. The frst is a “subcategory of states, as opposed to events,” and the second is “a subcategory of passions, as opposed to actions” (2002: 51). Furthermore, following in the tradition established by Lakoff, Espenson, Goldberg, and Schwartz (1991), Kövecses (1990, 2000) has fabricated a glossary of conceptual metaphors and metonymies specifcally relative to the expression of emotion, arguing that “emotional experience is to a large extent metaphorical and metaphorically real” (1989: 88). However, these occurrences are simply elaborations of conventional metaphors (Kövecses 2000: 49). Thus, although emotion metaphors are constructed upon more foundational conceptual metaphors, they are inherent, intrinsic, and ultimately, necessary for our human experience of emotion. Gibbs also elaborates upon the usefulness and effectiveness of conceptual metaphor for the use of linguistic expression of emotion, by way of what he deems the “inexpressibility hypothesis,4” which he sums up in the following manner: people would be more likely to use metaphor and metaphorical comparisons in descriptions of how the felt when they were experiencing an emotion than when describing what they did when they experienced it. (1994: 126) There is thus an indelible connection between the ways in which poetic conceptual metaphor and emotional conceptual metaphor are conceived within the broader realm of CMT. Both types, extensions, or applications of conceptual metaphor are seen as exactly that: secondary forms of conceptual metaphorical expression, that fnd their basis in, and ultimately, can be traced back to, conventional or primary conceptually metaphorical concepts. The analysis and examination of these metaphorical extensions thus

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cannot be apprehended correctly if not done in the light of, and through an understanding of, the manners in which human minds and human language handle the conceptualization and expression of metaphorical notions.

2.7 Force-Dynamics and Causality The concept of force-dynamics as developed by Talmy in his 1988 “ForceDynamics in Language and Cognition” plays a central role in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book. Force-dynamics is a cognitive schema of causality which refers to as “how entities interact with respect to force” and which takes on varying forms of linguistic expression, the most important of which being found in what is deemed as “direct grammatical representation” (Talmy 1988: 46, 50). Force-dynamics is both conceptually metaphorical and grammatically founded, once again emphasizing the deep, intrinsic connection between the language that constructs the metaphor and the conceptual mappings themselves. The representation of a notion such as causality in the terms presented by Talmy allows for the conceptual underpinnings of the concept to be brought to the surface and analyzed on a variety of levels, based in cognition and linguistics simultaneously. Furthermore, the experience of emotion, particularly in light of the Spinozian concepts of the affects, passions, and affections, discussed in Section 1.2 is necessarily and inherently causal. In effect, the “movement” of the affects, thus, “what produces them, strengthens them, leads from one to another and can weaken or ‘overcome’ them” (LeBuffe 2015), is directly refective of relationships and dialectics of causality. Furthermore, “causal and explanatory relations account for the spread of the affects,” which is “part of the order of nature, as anything else” (ibid.). Causality is indeed part of the natural order, and is thus represented in language as such given the fact that “language uses certain fundamental notional categories to structure and organize meaning” (Talmy 1988: 51). When one thinks of the notion of causality, the typical “A makes B do X / A causes B to X” schema(s) come(s) to mind. These kinds of schemas generally hold a physical, or concrete, connotation. Until the publication of Talmy’s seminal paper (1988) on force-dynamics and its role in the domains of language and cognition, the analysis of such interactions was largely restricted to the physical domain. Talmy, however, provides an expanded analysis on this notion and its expression through language, along with its cognitive causes and effects. His analyses of psychological and “psychosocial force-dynamics” (1988: 50), which encompass the realm of emotion, are of particular interest for the purposes of this book, as the presence of emotion necessitates causal interaction between at least two elements. Talmy’s extension of force-dynamics to the linguistic and psychological domains has been linked to and further elaborated within CMT, notably by Lakoff (1990), in which the author identifes the indispensable link between

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force-dynamics in language and what he terms as the “Event Structure Metaphor,” and more specifcally, the cognitive imprint and linguistic expression of said metaphor as the conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES (1990: 57). Here, Lakoff argues that most basic concepts in semantics are […] understood metaphorically […]. These are concepts that enter normally into the grammars of languages, and if they are indeed metaphorical in nature, then metaphor becomes central to grammar. (1990: 51) The Invariance Hypothesis effectively states that “metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive typology (this is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain” (1990: 54). Furthermore, the “aspect of event structure” which is the notion of “cause,” is “understood metaphorically in terms of […] force,” with its general mapping being that of CAUSES ARE FORCES (1990: 57). The Event Structure Metaphor proposes that “various aspects of event structure, including notions like states, changes, processes, actions, causes, purposes, and means are understood metaphorically in terms of space, motion, and force” (1990: 57). This mapping is thus what is understood as a conceptual metaphor: its semantic entailments are essential to the cognitive understanding of this concept of causality (Lakoff 1990: 57). This claim is particularly interesting for my analysis of force-dynamics in Keats’s poetry in Chapter 4, as well as globally for this book as a whole, as one of its primary objectives is to expound upon the semantic and fgurative importance of grammar in (poetic) language. Lakoff (1990: 54) goes so far as to claim that “the Invariance Hypothesis is a possible link between metaphor and Langacker-style analysis.”

2.8 Embodied Emotion Above, I outlined the emotional theory upon which this book is founded, and within that, the importance of the Spinozian (in)distinction between the body and the mind was highlighted. This, along with Damasio’s (1999, 2003) approach to emotion and feeling, is the basis for what may be deemed here as a theory of the embodied mind, central to cognitive linguistics in general (Nuttall 2018: 34) leading to a theory of embodied emotion. My approach to embodied emotion is founded in Spinoza’s philosophy of emotion, which proposes a view of the body and the mind as one entity, with no “division” between the two, as it were, thus rejecting Descartes’ theory of a body-mind duality. The acceptance of the theory of an embodied mind results in the direct creation of a persisting link between the human conceptual system and our outwardly, bodily expressions, which is particularly relevant when examining emotional experience. One cannot fully take on cognitive approaches

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to language and ignore the entailments of embodiment. These points of view are all ultimately connected, on multiple levels. For example, a large majority of conceptual metaphors and metonymies for emotion contain references to the physical human body, whether it be by way of the expression of direct reaction—as is often the case in conceptual metonymy—or by way of references to space, location, continence, or time, which frequently occurs in the case of conceptual metaphor. These theories cannot feasibly function without the acceptance of the existence of the embodied mind.5 The same goes for CG: the understanding of grammatical classes such as spatial and temporal prepositions (see Langacker 1990, 2008, 2009 for more on this)—which, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 5, play an essential role in the expression of conceptual metaphor and metonymy, as well as force-dynamics and causality—is based upon the human relationship to emplacement and time, which necessarily brings us back to the physical body. As Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 37) argue, “in these cases, the body is not merely somehow involved in the conceptualization but is shaping its very nature.” The theory of embodiment, up until recently, was seen as somewhat controversial and in contradiction to the Western, Cartesian tradition of thought. Conversely, embodiment theory proposes a point of view within which “human concepts are not just refections of an external reality, but […] are crucially shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our sensorimotor system” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 22). It therefore logically follows that embodiment theory emphasizes the importance of the body in emotional experience. It simply adds another piece to the various theories that work in harmony to formulate a comprehensive view of the expression of emotion within language.

2.9 Conclusion In this chapter, I have outlined of the theoretical foundations of this book, all of which are cognitive approaches to language. I have also summarized their relevance to stylistic and linguistic studies of poetry. I began by sketching the theoretical framework of cognitive grammar and expanded that framework to the specifc study of poetic texts, elaborating on key concepts within CG that fnd resonance in various conceptual approaches to poetry, and the poetically centered tributaries of CG. The following Chapter 3 focuses conceptual metaphor, throughout which I outline the tenets of CMT as proposed by Lakoff and Johnson, summarizing its principal notions and entailments, then examine CMT’s applications to poetry and emotion. The overview of CMT leads to a discussion of Talmy’s concept of force-dynamics and the inherent metaphoricity of causality, specifcally focusing on psychological causality. The fnal section of the chapter expands upon the discussion of the emotional theoretical framework previously discussed, linking it to CG, CMT, and force-dynamics.

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Notes 1 Quoted in Genette 2010: 13. 2 I will quote Langacker once again concerning the concepts of construal and conceptualization: “In cognitive semantics, meaning is identifed with conceptualization, in the broadest sense. Pivotal to linguistic semantics is our ability to construe the same situation in alternate ways (Langacker 1993a). Among the dimensions of construal are the levels of specifcity at which a situation is characterized, the perspective adopted for ‘viewing’ it, and the degree of prominence conferred on the elements within in” (Langacker 2009: 6). 3 “Lo que cambia en Keats es la dimensión pero no la forma, los resultados pero no las intenciones,” (1996: 45, English translation mine). 4 This is supported by Gibbs’s “vividness hypothesis,” which proposes that “metaphorical language would be more prevalent in descriptions of intense as compared with mild emotional states” (Gibbs 1994: 125). 5 G. Lakoff and M. Johnson support the notion that spatial concepts are embodied, arguing that “they have to be, because they allow us to negotiate space, to function in it, as well as to conceptualize it and talk about it” (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 30).

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Aspect and Conceptual Metaphor Poetic Expression and Emotion

3.1 Introduction In Chapter 2, I enumerated the ways in which cognitive linguistics and its various branches are highly relevant to the stylistic analysis of poetic texts. Three sections specifcally focused on conceptual metaphor theory and its pertinence to metaphorical expressions within poetry. This chapter will attempt to demonstrate this pertinence by analyzing specifc occurrences of conceptual metaphor in Keats’s poetry. Furthermore, the analyses of conceptual metaphor in this chapter will highlight the centrality of grammar to the overall functioning of conceptual metaphor. First, I will provide an overview and broad examination of fgurative language in, and its relevance to, the poetic text. Then, I will outline the CG approach to the grammatical and lexical concept of aspect, as this chapter will suggest that aspect is highly important within verbalizations of conceptual metaphor in Keats’s poetry, particularly those related to emotion. The frst analytic sections of this book will look at the occurrences of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM in “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil.” I will argue that this metaphor constitutes the poem’s backbone. Following up on those, I will continue on with the metaphorical analysis in a second poem, “Lamia,” and will comment on the verbalizations of a second conceptual metaphor, EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE. Finally, the closing analytical section of this chapter, building on the analyses in the precedent sections, will suggest that grammar is essential to conceptual metaphor, and will consequently anticipate the following chapters, in which conceptual metaphor and metonymy are investigated in further detail, and in relation to other grammatical structures and concepts. Before beginning, I should say a few words about the choice of the poems: this book’s poetic corpus. “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” and “Lamia,” both published in the 1820 volume Lamia, Isabella, The Eve of St. Agnes and Other Poems, were selected as central case studies in a frst instance due to the elevated presence of conceptual metaphor within them. Eighty different examples of conceptual metaphor were found in the two poems. In light of this number, the choice was made here to focus on two of the most frequent DOI: 10.4324/9781003275626-3

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and salient conceptual metaphors relative to emotions: EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM (Kövecses 2000: 36) and EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41). These conceptual metaphors were also chosen due to the fact that they allow for the verbalization of rather broad conceptual notions, with varying levels of specifcity relative to particular emotions being enunciated within their more global range of expression. Furthermore, the conceptual basis of these metaphors renders their grammatical analysis particularly relevant, as direct connections can be made between aspectual cases and the conceptual metaphors themselves, such as the concepts of states and events, explained in Section 3.2. Furthermore, both “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” and “Lamia” are poems which are constructed based on conceptually metaphoric concepts: in other words, both poems have “underlying” conceptual metaphors, or the poems are organized in a metaphorical manner, and their plots are elaborated based on metaphorical concepts.

3.2 Figurative Foundations in Keatsian Poetry Poetry is often thought of as being endowed with a high frequency of fgurative language, linguistic tropes, and stylistic idiosyncrasies. This, to a certain extent, allows for the creation and establishment of the distinction between poetic language and other types of language: for example, prose, or quotidian spoken language. However, poetic language—despite its potential particularities and subtleties—remains, at its most foundational level, exactly what the nomenclature just used implies: language. I believe that losing sight of this is potentially problematic for a complete poetic analysis, as a full examination of poetry requires analysis both on the linguistic level and of the text as a whole. Furthermore, defending a stark distinction between “poetic” language and “other” language greatly reduces the scope upon and within which one may investigate the poetic genre, as it reduces the potential for comparison with other linguistic “genres” or styles, and possibly eliminates the opportunity for analysis on the conceptual level. Lakoff and Turner hold this same point of view, suggesting that poetic language is not necessarily distinct from “other” language. Instead, they propose that poetry consists simply of a different use of language, a varied manner of manipulation of lexical, grammatical, and semantic tools, resulting in an outward manifestation which takes on a unique form. They open their 1989 publication, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor, with this idea: It is commonly thought that poetic language is beyond ordinary language—that it is something essentially different, special, higher, with extraordinary tools and techniques like metaphor and metonymy, instruments beyond the reach of someone who just talks. But great poets, as master craftsmen, use basically the same tools we use; what makes them different is their talent for using these tools, and their skill

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Aspect and Conceptual Metaphor in using them, which they acquire from sustained attention, study, and practice. (1989: i)

Aristotle, in his foundational Poetics, makes similar claims: [The poet’s] […] vehicle of expression is language,-either current terms or, it may be, rare words or metaphors. There are also many modifcations of language, which we concede to the poets. Add to this, that the standard of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics, any more than in poetry and any other art. Within the art of poetry there are two kinds of faults, those which touch its essence, and those which are accidental. If the poet has chosen to imitate something, but has imitated it incorrectly through want of capacity, the error is inherent in the poetry. But if the failure is due to a wrong choice […] the error is not essential to the poetry. These are the points of view we should consider and answer the objections raised by the critics. The connection between “poetic” language and “commonplace” linguistic use is simple: it is the language itself. Grasping this foundational concept is key to the elaboration of the analysis throughout this book. Furthermore, entering into the realm of linguistics necessarily leads us to the relevance of cognition and conceptualization, which, according to CG, is indelible to the understanding of language. Language is the verbalization of our ways of thinking and of our conceptualization of the world. Moreover, poetic—or literary—linguistic expression (similarly to any other art form) is strongly intertwined with the expression of emotive concepts, and thus, with a high level of precision, accuracy, and subtlety, as Pilkington (2000: 159) suggests. What Pilkington deems “clarifcation” of emotion concepts is best done when employed with style and motivation: a specifc engagement and identity inhabited and assumed by the artist and used so as to express what she or he aims to manifest via the chosen medium of creation. This motivation is, perhaps, a natural fow of emotions (which is also motivated, see Pilkington 2000: 143 and Neveux 2013: 77–78) from the interior world of the artist to the realm of exteriorization. Nuttall (2018: 66) suggests that “iconically motivated linguistic choices” render the experience of literary texts, and the concepts they express, more tangible and perceptible to the reader. In poetic texts, the expression of emotion concepts often goes hand in hand with the utilization of fgurative language. One manner in which language takes on a more fgurative form—in poetry and in other linguistic expressions—is through the verbalization of metaphor, or metaphorical concepts. Metaphor in its poetic form is key to the development of poetic style, accuracy, and clarity in the outward expression of what is being verbalized within poetic language, as Middleton Murry (1992: 75) argues. Pilkington (2000: 100), going beyond the esthetic

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value of metaphorical expression, suggests that metaphor is a powerful, “convenient, and economical” manner of manifesting artistic motivation by way of language and that, furthermore, “the force of poetic effects [such as metaphor] generally is to provide the wider context which may serve to clarify and disentangle what may be relatively complex attitudes” (Pilkington 2000: 153). Gibbs (1994: 124–124) also defends metaphor’s economy and precision. Lakoff and Turner (1989: ii) suggest that metaphor within poetry provides a universal quality to the text, and simultaneously demands—and leads to—an understanding of our ways of thinking. The question of metaphor and its role in Keats’s poetic language is the focus of the present chapter. The prism through which this notion will be analyzed fnds the bulk of its foundation in CMT, which is deeply intertwined with CG, the latter being helpful to the understanding of the stylistic aspects and effects of conceptual metaphor (Nuttall 2018). Keats’s poetry is generally recognized and admired for the force, high presence, and eloquence of its “emotional” content, as well as for the poet’s use of metaphor. D’Avanzo (1967: 14) argues for the centrality and uniqueness of metaphor in Keats’s poetic style, while Cortázar (1996: 44) emphasizes Keats’s close relation with the esthetic, which inherently goes hand in hand with metaphorical expression. The research undertaken for this book, during which I analyzed the frequency and type of metaphor in the poems selected for analysis, has shown that the frequency of metaphor in Keats’s oeuvre is indeed quite high, and that the metaphors chosen are particularly effective and central to his poetic expression.

3.3 Aspect in Cognitive Grammar With the aim of elaborating an analysis that is both stylistic and grammatical, this chapter’s second focus is on aspect as well as the type of verb1 (being: perfective or imperfective, in line with the criteria presented by Langacker 1987, 1990, 2000, 2008, 2009) within conceptual metaphor. The verb, as the grammatical element which describes action, is essential to the functioning and semantics of any expressive enunciation, providing dynamicity and precision to language. Jespersen (1924: 86) puts forward that “the verb is a life-giving element.” Langacker (2008: 104) defnes the verbal archetype as “diametrically opposed” to the nominal archetype, engaging in an “energetic transaction.” These “energetic transactions,” or events, expressed by way of verbs, “reside primarily in time,” and are heavily dependent on those who participate in the action. This link between the event and the event’s participants is crucial to the understanding of the cognitive and linguistic functioning of the verbal element—and thus, for a full apprehension of its importance within the elaboration of conceptual metaphor. The role of the relationship is central to the understanding of the verb itself: the relationship is what allows the verbs to exist, both conceptually and within the more concrete domain of language.

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This is due to the fact that the verb, in CG, is the element which allows for the creation of relationships on the most basic conceptual level, ultimately leading to the linguistic expression of relationships on a varying scale of linguistic levels (Langacker 2008: 108). The verb is thus the primary linguistic element which provides the linguistic and conceptual space for a situation, as well as the entities which play a role in said situation, to be observed. This is, without a doubt, crucial to the apprehension of conceptual metaphor, as metaphor is ultimately an elaborated verbalization of notions, situations, or concepts which exist in reality, but are often expressed in ways that differ from our primary perception of them. When we observe, and thus, conceive, relationships profled by way of language, we analyze them in regard to their temporal location, and the way in which they move through time, either being “manifested at a single point in time,” in the case of simplex relationships, or “manifested successively through a continuous span of time,” as is the case for complex relationships (Langacker 2008: 109). Our observation of objects or events results in our conceptualization of them, and in CG, this is called scanning (Langacker 2008: 111). Scanning allows us to conceptualize what grammatical classes profle, thus making sense of them. Stockwell (2002: 66) highlights the imagistic repercussions of different types of scanning—and thus grammatical classes—within poetic texts. He likens sequential scanning (applicable to predicative elements) to “watching a flm”: a palpable, emotive image. One way in which sequential scanning is represented linguistically and conceptually is via grammatical aspect. Thus, the grammatical aspect of a predicative element is central to a full comprehension of the relationship it profles. As conceptual metaphor is a linguistic expression of a conceptually comparative relationship between two entities, aspect must play a role in the functioning of conceptual metaphor. CG defnes grammatical aspect relative to the English language by dividing the notion into two parts: progressive and non-progressive. Langacker (2008: 147) then superposes a distinction or opposition between two classes or categories of verbs: perfective and imperfective verbs. The perfective/imperfective distinction has been made in regard to the intrinsic “grammatical behavior” of verbs in English, and the verbal categories are “semantically defnable.” Furthermore, the division between perfective and imperfective verbs “refects the conceptual characterization of perfectives as being “bounded in time,” whereas imperfectives are “not specifcally bounded.” Perfective verbs, such as fall, jump, or ask, thus profle relationships which can be defned as “heterogeneous,” or describing change. Relationships profled by imperfective verbs, such as be, have, believe, or exist, profle relationships are “homogenous,” or static. Grammatically, perfective verbs can take on the verbal form known as the progressive (BE + V…ing), and it is often ungrammatical for them to be used in their present simple form. On the other hand, imperfective verbs are

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often found in the present simple form, and are rarely in the progressive. Regardless, Langacker (2008: 149) prefers “fexible categorization,” particularly in light of the selection of verbs which can be classifed as both perfective and imperfective, relative to the context in which they are placed, such as sit, stand, and lie. Moreover, Langacker (1987: 265) claims that the scope of the relationship is thus of great importance regarding the concept of grammatical aspect and is intrinsic to the perfective/imperfective distinction. Perfective processes are “bounded in the scope of predication,” whereas imperfective processes are “indefnitely expandable or contractible” (Langacker 1990: 87). The existence—or non-existence—of boundaries, or limits, in terms of cases of grammatical aspect has thus been decomposed into two major classes, notably by Radden and Dirven (2007: 176–177). These classes are homogenous “states” (relative to cases of imperfectivity) and heterogeneous “events or processes” (relative to cases of perfectivity). Grammatical aspect, along with the classes of perfective and imperfective verbs, can thus be considered above all as a grammatical expression of temporality in terms of the point of view, the relationship, or the process verbalized by a given predicate. In light of this, Radden and Dirven (2007: 177) suggest that the “non-progressive aspect is characterized by a maximal viewing frame, and the progressive aspect by a restricted viewing frame.” The above distinction, along with the distinction created between the progressive and non-progressive forms, thus brings us to four aspectual classes, once again proposed by Radden and Dirven (2007: 178–179): “bounded events” and “lasting states,” expressed by way of a non-progressive aspect, and “unbounded states” and “states with implicit boundaries,” verbalized by way of the progressive aspect. Furthermore, multiple types of events can be distinguished, in terms of their duration and their telicity: “accomplishments, activities, achievements, acts, accomplishing activities, unbounded activities, culminating activities,” and “iterative activities.” As for states, three distinctions can be made in terms of the non-progressive aspect and lasting states profled by the latter: “indefnitely lasting states, habitual states,” and “everlasting states.” Two distinctions can be made concerning the progressive aspect: “temporary states” and “temporary habitual states” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 190–195). Grammatical aspect is linked to the linguistic expression of emotional experience in multiple ways. Kövecses (2000: 60) remarks upon the direct link between verbal and aspectual classes and the categorization of emotions classifed as “states, events, actions, and passions.” The direct relation between grammatical aspect and emotion is also highlighted by de Sousa (1987: 206), who suggests grammatical aspect is inherently related to a verb’s process “relates to the fow of time.” Furthermore, de Sousa (1987: 210) establishes a link between the linguistic expression of desire (“the most fundamental aspect of emotion” from the Spinozan point of view, and according to Kövecses [1990: 188]) and the grammatical aspect

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used to verbalize it, thus denoting two categories of desire, “standing” and “occurrent” desires. Standing desires would thus be typically evoked by the use of a continuous, or imperfective aspect, whereas occurrent desires would be verbalized by the use of an aspect of verb type expressing punctuality. De Sousa (1987: 211) continues on to elaborate a distinction between what he deems “immediate” and “time-indexed” desires, claiming that the latter “are possible only for beings capable of framing a reference to some particular time,” thus fnding foundation in rationality. On the other hand, immediate desires can be “unproblematically attributed to animals” (ibid.). States are further qualifed as more “passive” expressions or experiences of desire; activities as something one can be “actively engaged in”; and achievements as having “a natural end” (de Sousa 1987: 212). Both states and activities may “endure indefnitely through time,” and a link is created between these categories and the Aristotelian concepts of virtue (aretê), pleasure, and happiness (eudaimonia), in which ethical virtue is qualifed as a hexis, “a state, condition, or disposition,” pleasure is qualifed as “an unimpeded process of a natural state,” and eudaimonia is qualifed as a “virtuous activity” (Kraut 2017). De Sousa’s theory is not as fully elaborated in terms of the depth of the grammatical analysis as are the other points of view mentioned above, but the fact that the link between verbal usage and expression of emotion is highlighted within his theory of emotions provides support for the claims purported in this chapter. Finally, I fnd it important to note that Keats has a statistically proven penchant for frequent verb use within his metaphorical expression. Brooke-Rose (1958: 309–324) has analyzed this both qualitatively and quantitatively. Firstly, she remarks (1958: 174) that Keatsian verse contains an elevated frequency of verbally centered metaphors. According to her (1958: 309, 311), this signifes a general tendency towards the expression of relation, motion, and activity, expressed via what she deems as a “hazy richness.” Although my conceptualization of metaphor differs from that of Brooke-Rose, her analysis does shed light on the wealth of activity and dynamism inherent to Keatsian poetic metaphor, and thus, the essential quality of verbs within them. After having explored their theoretical foundations, the following four sections will analyze the occurrences of conceptual metaphor in “Isabella” and “Lamia” and the role of aspect within them. In Section 3.4, I will explain the semantics of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM and provide a frst demonstration of the metaphorical and grammatical analysis that will also be performed in the subsequent chapters. Sections 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 will examine further instances of the metaphor in the two poems.

3.4 EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM [The poem] will thus resemble a living organism in all its unity, and produce the pleasure proper to it. (Aristotle, 40)

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The conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM acts as the metaphorical backbone of the poem “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil”: it could potentially even be considered as a conceit. It structures the plot and the poetic functioning of the poem, which, adapted from a narrative in Boccaccio’s Decameron, recounts the brief love affair of Isabella and Lorenzo, and tragically ends with the death of both young lovers. Giovanelli (2013: 147) highlights the “self-absorbed” nature of their love, which only increases its tragic quality. Lorenzo is murdered by Isabella’s brothers, and Isabella visibly loses the fame for life due to her shattered heart. The following analyses will reveal that the majority of the aspectual cases are “bounded events” of varying forms. However, a few examples of “lasting states” have also been identifed. The latter act as support or reinforcement for the bounded events, and moreover, that the conceptual metaphor in question expresses, above all, something alive, dynamic, and heterogeneous: life itself. A frst example of the conceptual metaphor is found at the very start of the poem. (1) Love! Thou art leading me from wintry cold Lady! / Thou leadest me to summer clime, / And I must taste the blossoms that unfold / In its ripe warmth this gracious morning time’ / So said, his erewhile timid lips grew bold, / And poesied hers with dewy rhyme: / Great bliss was with them, and great happiness / Grew, like a lusty fower in June’s caress. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 65–72) The frst two italicized verbs, leadest and unfold, are conjugated in the present simple tense, which intrinsically provides them with a maximal viewing frame. They describe bounded events. The frst to appear, unfold, can be characterized as a “realization” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 180): the predication in this case is thus punctual and telic. Unfold is a verb which can behave either perfectively or imperfectively (according to Langackerian criteria) depending on the context in which it fnds itself, as the examples (a) and (b) below demonstrate. However, a statement such as (a), with the verb assuming imperfective behavior patterns, seems much more natural in contemporary language than a phrase such as (b), in the present simple form, thus with a more perfective usage. (a) The fowers are unfolding. (b) ?The fowers unfold. Here, it is indeed the poeticity of the language at hand, expressing the evolution of emotions via images of the changing seasons, and thus demanding impermanence and instability, which results in the perfective use of the verb

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unfold being possible. Jakobson (1977: 93) reminds us that grammatical expression reaches its highest potential within poetry. This use of unfold can thus be qualifed as a “punctual interpretation,” according to Langacker’s (2008: 15) criteria. The unfolding in this case terminates in an accomplishment: the opening up, or blossoming, of the fower. In other words, what is of the utmost importance in this case is the fnal result of the fully blossomed and open fower, rather than the process of blossoming or opening. Furthermore, the reader is led to understand the “blossoming” of the fower as an image standing in for the development of the emotions and love shared by the two young lovers: Keats offers up to the reader an image of verdant fora, full of life, reinforcing the metaphorical notion of EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM. The three verbs that follow, grew, poesied, and grew, are strictly perfective verbs, conjugated in the past simple. An imperfective usage of these verbs would require their being placed within a different context, placing more focus on the act of growing or poesing—which is not the case in these lines. The poet here takes care to describe the evolution of the relationship between Isabella and Lorenzo, step by step: a sequence of events, resulting in the culmination of their passion. The perfective use of these three verbs emphasizes resultant change denoted by them: in other words, what is important here is the fnality of the action, as opposed to the action itself, in the midst of taking place. These verbs prove to be accomplishments: telic events with a duration. The four verbs found in these verses depict the power of the love that blossoms between Isabella and Lorenzo: the emotion they share is petulant, dynamic, fresh—a living organism. Through the use of these verbs, the reader fnds her/himself in front of a painted canvas, confectioned by the poet, putting the images of the progression of Isabella and Lorenzo’s love on display, with the verbs working to sketch the vivacity which is so crucial to the poetic success of these verbs. Moreover, the temporal and spatial order of these verbs is essential to the reader’s comprehension of the development of the love portrayed in this poem. The verses begin with the frst blossoming of the shared emotion. Then, the lover becomes more audacious and emboldened; next, physical consummation of the relationship takes place, resulting in the further growth of their love. In other words, the verbs, together with the images of plants and of the summer season (“summer clime,” “June’s caress,” “blossoming,” “a lusty fower”), highlight the conceptual metaphor with precision, leaving little room for doubt. Moreover, the collocations present in these verses reinforce the metaphorical concept of EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM. Firstly, we witness a change of seasons in Lorenzo’s mind and spirit (“thou art leading me from wintry cold” / “thou leadest me to summer clime” [65–66]); then, the love between Isabella and Lorenzo is depicted as something blossoming, or unfolding: thus, alive. Furthermore, the shared kiss, the act of the embodiment and exteriorization of their love, is fnally consummated (“poesied hers with

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dewy rhyme” [70]); and fnally, “great bliss” arises within the two young lovers’ hearts, like “a lusty fower” (71–72). These lexical combinations allow the poet to aid the reader in comprehending the love between Isabella and Lorenzo as a living organism. In this way, the reader is able to experience and grasp their love in terms other than those typically used to describe such a sentiment (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 4), such as those related to fora, or more generally, those related to a natural organism, in the middle of its period of growth or gestation. Giovanelli (2013: 149) suggests that the lexis in these verses emphasizes the ephemeral quality of Isabella and Lorenzo’s love: alive, but bound to be short-lived. The seasonally centered lexicon brings to mind a second conceptual metaphor, EMOTION IS FIRE/HEAT (Kövecses 2000: 38, 64, 75–77), verbalized by the manner in which the beloved “delivers” her lover from the (metaphorical) winter, so as to lead him towards (metaphorically) warmer climates. The metaphorical winter season here can be understood as Lorenzo’s life prior to being loved by Isabella, and the summer climates, by his life with her. This idea is supported by the conceptual metaphor LUST IS HEAT, or even by the conceptual metonymy BODY HEAT FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 1990, 2000). Furthermore, as love is what allows Lorenzo to undergo this physical (metaphorical) change, conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (Kövecses 1990, 2000) also seems relevant. These examples provide all the more support for the claim that the verbal choices made within the verses at hand, along with their grammatical aspect, are central to the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor. Fire, in particular, implies the notions of movement and change, similar to those found in EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM. The presence of two conceptual metaphors, relative to the same target domain all the more, reinforces the global metaphorical quality of the poem in and of itself. This idea is found in the verbs leadest, unfold, and grew, all behaving in a perfective, or non-progressive, manner, being bounded events, from which fows heterogeneous action.

3.5 “Isabella”: The Stages of Life The analysis of EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM in “Isabella,” which will continue in this section as well as the following, is divided into two parts: the “stages of life” and “the basil pot.” I will begin, in this section, with the stages of life. (2) And of thy lilies, that do paler grow / Now they can no more hear thy ghittern’s tune, / For venturing syllables that ill beseem / The quiet glooms of such a piteous theme. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 149–152) The two predicates that call for analysis in these verses are do … grow and beseem: both of which are found in a non-progressive form, thus providing

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a maximal viewing frame for the reader. Both take on the characteristics of accomplishments—forms of bounded events—they thus are considered as having a duration, and as telic (indicating a clear ending point). Grow, a verb which would typically be classifed as perfective, according to the Langackerian criteria—being more frequently used in its progressive form— is here employed in an imperfective sense, in a complex (hence the collaboration with the auxiliary do) present form. In contemporary English, a phrase such as: 1) The lilies are growing paler would be much more commonly spoken and heard than an enunciation such as: 2) ?The lilies grow paler. The use of this verb in its imperfective form is most likely due to the presence of do, which provides a specifc level of emphasis on the verb grow itself (do is not in the least grammatically necessary in this case). The construction of this phrase has also clearly been elaborated in such a manner for poetic effect. In effect, this use of do (often referred to as “dummy do”) is an archaic/poetic use of do, used in the present tense: “that do paler grow” is another way of saying “that grow paler.” This type of utilization of the auxiliary do is thus distinct from the contemporary use of emphatic do: as in “I do think so.” In which case, that do paler grow can be compared to “that are growing paler.” Beseem, although archaic, would be more easily categorized as an imperfective verb. Finding this verb in a progressive form would perhaps even be grammatically incorrect, if we base this assumption on a similar predicate in terms of etymology, seem, which would very rarely (if ever) be found in a progressive form. One would encounter much more diffculty in producing a sentence such as: 1) ?The fshmonger is seeming melancholy today. as opposed to: 2) The fshmonger seems melancholy today. The use of beseem in the manner in which it is employed in these verses is thus rather straightforward and in accordance with its verbal qualifcation. The images of the plant life, or fora, in these verses, is particularly poignant, given the fact that this sort of imagery necessarily communicates the tangible idea of something full of life: a living organism. However, the life expressed by way of the presence of the fora (specifcally, “the lilies”

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[149]) is depicted in the realm of the loss of life, rather than in its growth or development. The lilies here are withering, growing paler, and exhibiting signs of death and decline. This results in the creation, depiction, and transmission of a rather somber atmosphere, highly appropriate at this point in the poem, as Lorenzo’s death approaches. However, for an entity to experience the loss and decline of its vivacity, it must necessarily be living to begin with. The conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM is therefore highly suitable here. I would also like to remark upon the contrast between the use of the verb grow, which typically would take on connotations of augmentation in terms of whatever it may be referring to—in this instance, life—and the semantics of the verses themselves, along with the direct association of paler to the verb in question, which potentially results in the expression being perceived as somewhat paradoxical. This incongruity semantically reinforces the heterogeneity inherent in the verbalization of the metaphor: the contrast between life and death, a relationship which can be categorically understood as an expression of dynamic movement through time. Furthermore, the contrast between life—understood not only through Isabella and Lorenzo’s love, but also by way of their youthfulness—followed by death is inherent to the entirety of the poem. The metaphor thus exists on multiple levels. Beseem also plays a role in the paradoxical nature of these lines, bent on expressing contrast as much as possible: thus, once again, reinforcing the heterogeneity so central and inherent to the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM. The verb, taken alone, contains connotations of entities which work or ft together, thus, to a certain extent, promulgating notions of homogeneity. The verb associated with an adverb such as ill, however, further reinforces notions of incongruity and dissonance, better suited to this point in the poem. Isabella and Lorenzo’s idyllic romance is breaking apart, as the vengeful brothers indulge in secretive and violent action against their sister’s lover. Ill also takes on a simultaneously premonitory and descriptive role here, making indirect reference to the psychological instability of Isabella’s brothers, and Isabella’s own fall into depression that shortly follows. (3) There was Lorenzo slain and buried in / There in that forest did his great love cease. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 217–218) The predicate in question here is the complex did cease, placed here in a simple past form and conjugated relative to the third-person singular. This complex form of the auxiliary do + lexical verb in its infnitive form is highly similar to the case of did grow analyzed in the previous example, making use of an archaic or poetic usage of the auxiliary do. This phrase thus roughly corresponds to an enunciation such as “His great love ceased in that forest.”

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The non-progressive aspect of this predicate results in a maximal viewing frame. The use of the past tense corresponds with Langacker’s classifcation of the verb cease as a perfective verb, which would necessitate the use of the progressive form if it were to be found in the present tense. Did cease is presented here as an accomplishment, an event both punctual and telic. These verses refer to the death of Lorenzo, cruelly murdered by Isabella’s brothers, and consequentially, that of the love shared between Isabella and Lorenzo. In these lines, their love is contingent with forest-centered imagery, in a similar vein to the foral-based imagery found in the precedent example. This heavily imagistic style acts as another manner of reinforcing the notion of emotion expressed as a living organism, all the while placing emphasis on the (emotional) death of the love between Isabella and Lorenzo and simultaneously, Lorenzo’s own physical death. This is highly symbolic if EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM is considered as the underlying metaphor of the poem itself, given the intensity and insistence of its presence. The poetic choice of the verb cease in these lines crystallizes the metaphorical notion of emotion as a living organism. For something to have the capacity to cease, it must be inherently dynamic; it must change and evolve. As the aspect chosen here affrms, Lorenzo ceases to be just that, all of a sudden: the breath of life was taken from him. This lexical choice is an example of “metaphorical extension” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 3, 107). To cease is perhaps not the most frequently used verb for the verbalization or depicting of emotional situations: however, in such a context, it does its job quite well. An enunciation such as “our love has ceased” allows for the conception of the emotion of love as a living, active organism, one which has the ability to simply pause or cease, or to stop existing. The simplicity of one solitary verb, without the addition of any descriptive elements within the expression of these metaphorical notions, allows the reader to fully become conscious of the power of the verb within Keatsian poetry. A fourth occurrence of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM is found later on in the poem: (4) Your beauty grows upon me, and I feel / A greater love through all my essence steal. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 319–320) The strong relation that results from the spatial proximity between these three verbs allows for the construction of a chain of verbal action, which proves to be, furthermore, chronological. The frst verb found in this extract, grows, is found (as in example 1) in a non-progressive form. It is, however, a verb often used in its progressive form in contemporary English, which would thus allow for the transmission of the notions of evolution and heterogeneity, so often expressed by perfective verbs. Furthermore, grows appears here as the central verbal element which sketches the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM, and can be characterized as an

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accomplishment, due to the fact that it has a duration and an end—the result of the growth undergone by the subject. We understand here that beauty gives rise to greater love. The impression, “growing” stronger and stronger by the day, that Isabella’s beauty leaves upon Lorenzo (more precisely, on Lorenzo’s spirit, speaking to Isabella from the grave) creates a sensation expressed by the verb feel that can be classifed as a lasting state—more specifcally, “an indefnitely lasting state” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 191), enumerated by one of the typical verbs for states of perception. Feel is a verb which can take on the characteristics of a perfective or imperfective verb, according to the context in which it is placed. In other words, it can be used in either a simple or a progressive form, and neither choice would seem out of place. This is the case in enunciations such as: 1) I feel sick. vs. 2) I’m feeling sick. Whereas the difference between the following enunciations is much more palpable: 3) ?I call them at 8. vs. 4) I’m calling them at 8. There are very few verbs in the English language for which there is hardly any difference between the two types of constructions (simple/perfective form or the Be + …ing form): feel is effectively one of these cases. In this instance, feel is used in a rather imperfective sense, conjugated in the present simple. I suppose the poet selected an imperfective verb so as to better express the metaphorical ideas that he desired to transmit via the poem: principally, the unalterable growth of emotion. What is expressed here, fundamentally, is change, a sentimental evolution (cf. grow and steal), which designates an affective heterogeneity felt by the narrator. However, the fact of feeling does not evolve: this remains static. Just as the other verbs analyzed within this example, steal, the last word in this selection of lines, can take on both imperfective and perfective forms. Here, it is found in its imperfective form (in the Langackerian sense of the term, thus as applied to the intrinsic meaning of the verb), as seen by the lack of the –ing ending (or the absence of the marker of the progressive form). The reason for this is the scope of the relationship (Langacker 2008: 150). The narrator observes his “essence” in its entirety: he is thus capable of making a global observation concerning his sentimental state of affairs, which is, for him, “simultaneously visible within the immediate spatial

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scope” and a “stable confguration” (Langacker 2008: 150)—at least for the time being. There are semantic and formal differences between the imperfective and perfective uses of the predicate steal: 1) ?I feel it steal […] vs. 2) I feel it stealing […] compared with the verbal element fall, which is more imperfective: 3) I could feel it fall down my neck. vs. 4) I could feel it falling down my neck. The difference between (1) and (2) is tangible: effectively, when placed outside the poetic context in the Keatsian verses, this appears as a highly poetic and even idiosyncratic use of this verbal construction (combination of the verbs feel and steal, a catenative construction [Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 104]). The difference between (3) and (4) is less noticeable, albeit still present. Falling leads to a greater focus on the “falling” in and of itself; whereas fall places the emphasis on the end result, although the enunciations could generally be perceived as more or less interchangeable. Moreover, steal is a verb which actively reinforces the metaphor, signifying that the emotion acts upon the totality of the mind and body of he or she who experiences the emotion. In other words, the emotion “penetrates” the affective subject. I use penetrates here based on Gallimard’s French translation of Keats, which proposes the following: “Ta beauté enveloppe tout mon être, et je sens, un amour plus puissant pénétrer mon essence” (1996: 100). For an emotion to have such an effect on the one who experiences it, the latter—and her or his spirit—must necessarily be alive, or at least perceived as such. This lexeme may have been selected by the poet so as to reinforce and support the metaphorical concept(s) presented here, and this, with the emotion itself being understood as active, and the one who experiences the emotion, as passive. In my opinion, this dichotomy, or subjectreversal, has been implemented in these verses so as to further underline the importance of the fact that what is alive here, above all, is the emotion itself. Finally, feel and steal are found in the fnal rhyming couplet of the stanza in which they are present. The verses in this couplet are the only lines in the poem which follow an AA rhyme scheme: it is thus diffcult to ignore them (and their rhyme scheme). Jakobson (1977: 101) highlights the analogy between rhyme, grammar, and poetic structure. The juxtaposition between these two “events,” or perfective verbs and the solitary “state,” or imperfective verb, renders the conceptual metaphor expressed by way of these verses more dynamic and ultimately, more alive.

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In consequence, the emotions that follow exhibit life. The order in which these three predicates are presented sketches out the notion of dynamicity in a more precise and just manner: all the while outlining and giving form to the primordial heterogeneity of the conceptual metaphor at hand. The ffth occurrence of the ‘stages of life’ EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM metaphor is found near the end of the poem, after Lorenzo’s brutal murder, and Isabella’s chute into depression. (5) the ancient harps have said, / Love never dies, but lives, immortal Lord: / If Love impersonate was ever dead, / Pale Isabella kiss’d it, and low moan’d / ‘Twas love, cold—dead indeed, but not dethroned (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 396–400) The reader is confronted with a selection of verbs here, two of which are typical lexical elements used to describe the notion of life (or EMOTION AS A LIVING ORGANISM). I will begin with the verb live, here conjugated in the third-person singular form of the present simple tense. This verb falls under the category of a lasting state, given its maximal viewing frame and the nonprogressive aspect in which it is found. The lasting state here may be more specifcally defned as an eternal state, given the presence of the lexical element ever—which is all the more supported by the use of the present simple, allowing the verb to act as an imperfective. This verb has the potential of being categorized within both Langackerian verb classes. The lexical choice in this case is thus not only an esthetic one, but also founded in grammar and logic: so as to further reinforce the notion of a state, necessary for the proper functioning of the conceptual metaphor, a verb acting as an imperfective proves to be ineluctable. The verb die is found in varying temporal forms throughout these verses. Dies, conjugated in the present simple tense, in the third-person singular form, can be construed as a bounded event because the poet in this case is referring to the action of dying as opposed to the state of being dead. This event is thus as an accomplishment which is never actually accomplished or fulflled, an unfnished process. This reinforces the signifcation of the verb live within the expression of the conceptual metaphor in these verses. The contrast between the lasting state that is lives and the bounded event that is dies contributes to the dynamicity which is essential to the linguistic expression of such a metaphor. Further along in the poem, the verb phrase “was ever dead” (398) and the deverbal adjectival phrase “not dethroned” (400) reinforce the contrast with lives and aliment the poem’s vital heterogeneity. These verses also provide a clear example of personifcation: “if love impersonate was ever dead” (398), which supports all the more the metaphorical concept of emotion construed as a living organism. This construal is inherent to the reception of the text: the powerful emotional effects that the poem brings forth are possible due to the deep tragedy—placed in a context of extreme injustice—which is central to the poem. The reader is thus capable

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of apprehending love as an entity which is capable of both living and dying, and which can be “dethroned.” It seems evident that for something to be ideologically placed on a throne (or removed from said throne), it must imperatively be alive. As for kiss’d and moan’d, these verbs are bounded events, both punctual and telic. The fact that Isabella is capable of performing the actions expressed by these verbs further reinforces the contrast between her—still alive—and Lorenzo, who no longer is at this point in the poem. Moreover, the fact that her emotion and her amorous sentiments lead her to act in such a manner (to kiss and to moan) further intensifes the notions put forward by the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM, because to be alive, is to (be capable of) act(ing). A living emotion would thus be one which incites the individual experiencing it to action. The sixth and fnal example in this section is taken from the very end of the poem, once the Basil Pot, incarnation of her love and lover, has been taken from Isabella. (6) For Isabel, sweet Isabel, will die; / Will die a death too lone and incomplete, / Now they have taken away her Basil sweet. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 468–488) As in the previous example, these verses contain the verb die. However, the verb itself is here placed in a different temporal context than in its previous occurrence: the inclusion of the temporal marker will projects us into the future—this section’s frst and only occurrence of a verb in a future form— whereas in (4) the present simple form of the verb placed us in the context of the present. The movement of the verb within time results in the verb and its semantic and conceptual entailments being construed differently in this case. Both occurrences of the verb, however, are in a non-progressive form, providing a maximal viewing frame. The inclusion of the temporal marker of the future will allows for the categorization of the two predicates as being found in a predictive future temporality, and thus classify them as future achievements, as they are both punctual and telic. The emphasis here is placed on the fnality of Isabella’s death, as opposed to the act of dying, which would be verbalized by way of a progressive form. The second predicate to be examined here is have taken: the lexical verb take in its present perfect form. Take is a verb which may be classifed as either perfective or imperfective: either a simple or progressive form would be equally acceptable for this verb, depending on the context. The present perfect form—thus, a temporal placement in the past, with relation to the present (all the more reinforced by the presence of the lexical element now)—creates a chain of event-centered movement, from the bounded event of the taking of the basil plant up until the predicted death of Isabella, the latter partially in reaction to this event, and fully in reaction to the succession of tragic events which take place throughout the poem as a whole. This

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creates a chain of events within the verbalization of the metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM, due to the juxtaposition of the future and the present perfect, allowing for the heterogeneity and dynamicity of the metaphor to be fully elaborated as an energetic interaction throughout temporality. This aliments the dynamicity of the poem itself, as well as the powerful quality of the emotions it portrays, and those that it awakens in the reader. These verses also contain images of vegetation, central to the poem. Here, direct reference is made to Isabella’s basil plant, which covers Lorenzo’s decapitated head. The basil stands in metaphorically for Lorenzo himself and acts as an incarnation of the love shared between Isabella and Lorenzo, as well as the love Isabella herself continued to feel for Lorenzo, even after his death. The temporal dynamicity within these verses, along with the lifegiving and losing imagery presented by the inclusion of the basil plant (and/ or Lorenzo), along with the fact that these verses speak about the death of Isabella, so closely linked to the literal loss of her basil plant (and thus, her love, for the second time) sketch a pure manifestation of the metaphorical notion of EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM.

3.6 “Isabella”: The Basil Pot Building on the analyses of the “stages of life” in Section 3.5, this section will continue my examination of the occurrences of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM in “Isabella,” with a focus on the verses referring directly to the basil pot containing Lorenzo’s decapitated head. The frst example directly refers to Isabella’s basil pot, which throughout the poem becomes the physical incarnation of her love for Lorenzo. (1) And so she fed it with thin tears, / Whence thick, green, and beautiful it grew (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 425–426) These verses present a double representation of the conceptual metaphor in question: Isabella gives life (by way of her tears, regardless of the fact that they are weak and thin) to the basil plant. Her emotion, metonymically incarnated by these tears, is thus fully alive and transfers life from her person to the organism that is the plant. The verb fed (feed conjugated in the past simple tense) provides the reader with a maximal image of this notion, thanks to its non-progressive aspect. It is thus considered as an activity, atelic, with a duration, intrinsic to its action. Feed, in a typical verbalization of the present temporality would not generally be used in the present simple. Thus, it can be classifed as a perfective verb, not only in light of its grammatical behavior but also due to the fact that it profles a bounded event. The active feeding of the basil plant, through the effusion of Isabella’s emotion, renders the metaphorical image of her love (the plant) an organism more full of life, “thick, green, and beautiful” (426):

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the emotion felt and experienced in these verses stems from a living agent (Isabella). Furthermore, the emotion itself is also alive—seen in the active expression of crying, an “emotional” stream of water, source of life—and is received by a secondary agent, who in this case, is dead (Lorenzo’s head), but who has (re)found life by way of the emotion expressed by Isabella (the tears which nourish the plant planted above and within Lorenzo’s head). Here, grew behaves in a similar manner to its previous manifestations analyzed in the preceding pages, as an accomplishment, telic, and with a fxed duration. This grammatically reinforces the fact that the verb behaves in a strictly perfective sense. The use of the past tense crystallizes the expression of a bounded event; and the verbal aspect presented here renders the metaphor all the more full of force, highlighting its emotional vitality. These lines also present a salient example of the conceptual metaphor EMOTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES INSIDE A PERSON/CONTAINER (Kövecses 2000: 141), thus engaging in metaphorical composing (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 70–71). These verses provide a prime example of the verbalization of this metaphor, one which was specifcally used by the Romantic poets, according to Kövecses, who suggests that the Romantic poets experienced the emotional world more in terms of the open container that can overfow than in terms of the container that can lead to an explosion. The general mood seems to have been of more gentle (though powerful) feelings than of explosive passions. (1990: 155) Lord Byron (1788–1824) verbalized a similar sentiment in regard to poetic expression: “poetry is the lava of the imagination whose eruption prevents an earthquake.” Isabella’s tears depicted in these lines—literally fuids—are the expression of the emotions felt and experienced by Isabella (love, sadness, solitude, anger, to name a few). These emotions exist within her body, and given the amplitude of the emotional experience, they are expulsed. Moreover, the presence of tears also provides a metonymic dimension to the verses at hand: the conceptual metonymies of CRYING FOR SADNESS OR ANGER and PHYSIOLOGICAL OR EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 171, 134) come to mind. The second example of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM occurs as the narrator predicts Isabella’s tragic fate, comparing her to a palm, extending the imagery of fora as well as the conceptual metaphor. (2) For simple Isabel is soon to be / Among the dead: She withers, like a palm / Cut by an Indian for its juicy balm. / O leave the palm to wither by itself, / Let not quick winter chill its dying hair! (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 446–450)

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Only one verb in these lines presents a grammatical aspect which merits detailed analysis, but its examination will be performed in conjunction with its surrounding context, which provides elements essential to the expression of the conceptual metaphor. The verb up for aspectual analysis here, withers, explicitly refers to Isabella herself. To wither could refer to either a plant or a person, according to the context, due to the fact that the term contains elements of both the source and target domains of the conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS (Lakoff & Turner 1989: 106–107). Thus, this is a case of metaphorical extension (447) as well as an example of typical usage of this same term (450). Isabella withers as a plant would, because of her pain, her sadness, and especially due to the lack of emotional stimulation which once fortifed her. Keats compares the young beloved here to a palm tree, once full of life. Wither, in its non-progressive aspectual form, behaves here in a similar manner to the previously examined unfold, acting as an accomplishment, both punctual and telic. Wither may be comprehended as a perfective verb, commonly used in the progressive form. The choice made here to place it in the present simple provides the reader with an external point of view on Isabella, and thus renders her capable, by way of the description provided in these verses, of seeing the image in its integrality. This notion is reinforced by the presence of the other verbs within this extract, such as leave, here in its imperative form, and wither, in this case, in its infnitive form, preceded by the infnitive marker to. The readers also encounter dying, in its simultaneously progressive and adjectival form, describing an aspect of Isabella / the palm tree, rendering the idea of her death all the more powerful. The analyses of EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM in “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” have demonstrated that the bounded states found in Keatsian poetic language are grammatically and semantically compatible with the conceptual metaphor. Their combination within the poetic text implies that the parameters of vivacity, dynamicity, and heterogeneity are of high importance. The aspectual cases classifed as states reinforce those classifed as bounded events. In light of this, I suggest that aspect, as well as the verbal type—perfective or imperfective—selected by the poet, can be considered as primordial elements within the comprehension of emotional conceptual metaphor: conceptual metaphor is thus strongly founded in grammar. In this chapter’s fnal analytical section, I will examine the role of a second conceptual metaphor, EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE, in the poem “Lamia.”

3.7 “Lamia”: Emotional Emplacement The three precedent sections focused on the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM, notably found within “Isabella.” The present section proposes a similar analysis, focusing on “Lamia” (1820), and the conceptual

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metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE, a metaphor that can be recognized for its global, or universal, quality within the realm of emotional experience (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41). In other words, the metaphor is applicable to a wide variety of emotional states and experiences, as opposed to other, more specifc conceptual metaphors for emotion, which are relative only to certain emotional states. The conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE is used in the English language to express the general idea that the experience of an emotion, and how it is felt/experienced by an individual, is closely linked, or even indivisible, to the state of being of the individual. Moreover, the feeling is experienced in a particular, given location—either spatial or temporal—which allows for the creation of links between this and the notion of “boundedness” in relation to grammatical aspect, as defned by Radden and Dirven (2007: 178). The aspectual notions of “bounded events” and “lasting states” prove to be quite salient within the metaphorical expression of emotion analyzed by way of its conceptualization as existence or presence in a certain location. For the purposes of the research performed for this section, as well as regarding the texts themselves, I have chosen to combine the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE with two other specifcally delineated conceptual metaphors for emotion, which act as linguistic expression for concepts that are extremely similar. The other two conceptual metaphors are EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE and EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41, 59). These two emotionally centered conceptual metaphors verbalize nuances, as it were, of the slightly broader EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE. All three, however, are based on the same notion that the cognitive apprehension of emotional experience is conceptualized as “taking place” in a given location (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 49). Therefore, it seems appropriate to view these three conceptual metaphors as nuanced delineations of the same metaphorical concepts, relying on similar grammatical and linguistic structures. Furthermore, I consider the combination of these three conceptual metaphors as an instance of composite metaphor (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 70), upon which Keats relied so as to deepen the manner in which he chose to express emotion. The composition and nuancing of the verbalization of these metaphorical concepts appears to be a manner in which the poet was able to aliment the expression of emotion within his poetry, and in turn, render it more relevant for the reader. This results in the experience being perceived as all the more universal by the establishment and elaboration of links between emotional experience and temporal and/or spatial location. This conceptual creation of likeness, or similarity, is one of the ways in which metaphor is particularly effcient as a communicative device (Matravers 1998: 109). The frst occurrence of EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE is found in part one of “Lamia.”

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(1) Break amorous through the clouds, as morning breaks, / and swiftly as a bright Phoebean dart / Strike for the Cretan isle; and here thou art (“Lamia,” part 1, lines 77–79) These lines contain verbalizations of the conceptual metaphors EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE and EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE. These verses present three verbal elements which are of interest here: break, strike, and art, all of which are found in their non-progressive aspect. Art, an archaic form of the predicate be, and the last verb in terms of the order in which the verbs are placed within the verses, is a type of imperfective verb according to Langacker. It is found here in its present simple form, taking on the role of a temporary state, due to the use of here in the context. Here, Lamia is referring to the physical emplacement of Hermes, her interactions with whom will lead to the arousal of emotion for both parties, before they part ways. His presence, in a particular location, or bounded state (here), creates the existence of emotion within her, thus leading to the comprehension and revelation of the conceptual metaphors EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE, EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE, as well as EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS. The “space” alluded to in the second conceptual metaphor can be apprehended as both physical and abstract, which is the case here. “The Cretan isle” (79) refers to a specifc, concrete, physical location, and simultaneously, refers to the arrival of Hermes into Lamia’s emotional space, and vice-versa, as well as the opening up of their emotional space in general. After this interaction, in which Lamia tells Hermes of her dream, Hermes turns the serpent Lamia into a woman—another form of being: the starting point of the love that will soon unfold between Lycius and Lamia. Break and strike, both verbs that could be classifed as perfective or imperfective, are found here in their perfective aspect. This allows for them to be considered as bounded events, and more specifcally, as acts, being both punctual and atelic—not having a defned ending within the linguistic context as it is presented here. This perfective usage may obviously be analyzed in contrast with the imperfective aspectual usage of these two verbs, thus, breaking and striking, which would semantically modify the sense of these verses, by way of a lowering of the intensity of the action. Indeed, we can break and strike with force, in one swift blow, which is clearly what was the poetic intention here. This further reinforces the notion of presence, intrinsic to the conceptual metaphor in question. As acts, break and strike reinforce the notion of the lasting state verbalized by art, which temporally follows in the metaphor. Indeed, these predicates linguistically indicate the movement taking place—metaphorically, and literally in Lamia’s dream, that she recounts to Hermes in these verses—so as to place the emotion in the here, Lamia’s bounded, and evolving, emotional space.

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In this way, break and strike take on the role of conceptual and linguistic support for the verb be, which is the lexical and grammatical element which proves to be the most relevant to the expression of the conceptual metaphors in question here. The three predicates, in their varying aspectual elaborations, create a chain of emotional and physical movement, leading up to a predicative fnality which permits the full expression and apprehension of the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE. The dynamicity inherent to the elaboration of such a chain of abstract movement not only renders the process of sequential scanning highly possible and accessible to the reader, but also reminds us of the dynamicity and heterogeneity inherent in the conceptualization of emotion, as seen in the precedent analyses of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM. The next extract is from the second part of “Lamia.” (2) Love in a hut, with water and crust, / Is- Love, forgive us!- cinders, ashes, dust; / Love in a palace, is perhaps at last / More grievous torment than a hermit’s fast (“Lamia,” part 2, lines 1–4) The two predicates to be examined here are instances of the same verb, be— also examined in (1)—both found here in their present simple form, or perfective aspect—with respect to the third-person singular. This—along with their textual context—allows for the classifcation of these verbs as lasting states, either indefnite or habitual, providing the reader with a maximal viewing frame, and the opportunity for sequential scanning. The two occurrences of is are here employed in conjunction with, and relation to, physical emplacements, lexicalized in the verses, such as ashes, cinders, hut, dust, and palace. This lexis, in conjunction with a predicate which specifcally refers to the notion of existence or emplacement, reinforces the conceptualization of physical presence, and moreover, the metaphorical notions of bounded spaces or regions. Be, as seen in this example, as well as in example (1), analyzed previously, reveals itself as a lexical, semantic, and grammatical choice that is highly appropriate for the verbalization of such metaphorical concepts, as Kövecses (2000: 36) suggests. In terms of construal, a predicative choice such as be within the verbalization of conceptual notions expressed by way of the conceptual metaphors in question here assists the reader in accompanying the poet in the abstract, emotional, or mental realm depicted by way of the conceptual metaphor. This is accomplished by providing clear delineations which could potentially aid in the reader’s construal of the poem. In this particular example from “Lamia,” the verb be, along with the semantic entailments that stem from its categorization as an imperfective verb and its aspectual manifestation as such, places the reader in the domain of the infatuation—love?—that exists between Lamia and Lycius throughout the poem.

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The third instance of the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE is found, once again, in the second part of “Lamia.” (3) “Why do you sigh, fair creature?” whisper’d he: / “Why do you think?” return’d she tenderly: / “You have deserted me; where am I now? / Not in your heart while care weighs on your brow” (“Lamia,” part 2, lines 40–43) These verses include several predicates to be analyzed in terms of their grammatical aspect. As it has been examined in the previous examples, I will begin with the instance of the verb be, found here in line 42, in its present simple form. Similarly to the occurrences of this verb in our previous examples, the predicate is explicative of an indefnitely lasting state, thus providing the reader with the privilege of a maximal viewing frame. The lexeme now in the context may provide evidence that this state is temporary; however, as the end is not in sight, and the focus of these lines is on the current state, I have chosen to categorize it as indefnitely lasting. Here, Lamia asks Lycius where she is “placed” in respect to him and his emotions: the downfall of their relationship, tumultuous from the get-go, has begun. As the object of his emotions, she projects herself somewhere, or rather, as absent from the place where she believes she should exist for him. This is accomplished via the elaboration of the conceptual metaphors EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE and EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE. Desert is a verb that could potentially fall under the category of either perfective or imperfective. It is found here in its present perfect form, taking on the role of a bounded event, and may be further defned as an act, both punctual and atelic, as the focus here is not on the actual process of desertion that has taken place, but on the state of being deserted after the fact. The close spatial proximity of desert with be creates inherent contrast in terms of the semantics of the verses here, as the notion of desertion necessarily implies the notion of absence, or not being (in a given spatial or temporal location). The temporal movement from past to present, given the temporality of the two verbs, also provides a certain level of dynamicity to the lines in which the two verbs are found, which is further emphasized by the presence of both a bounded event and a lasting state. These contrastive elements, somewhat paradoxically, reinforce the conceptual metaphors based on emotion as presence, as the implication of absence reinforces the idea that presence is, indeed, necessary for the experience of emotion. Furthermore, the absence/presence of dialectic here emphasizes the instability and deception upon which Lamia and Lycius’s relationship is founded, and hints at Lamia’s ultimate disappearance, which takes place in the poem’s fnal stanzas. The third predicate in question here is weighs, which takes on the role of a more supporting, rather than central, predicate in the verbalization of the

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conceptual metaphors for emotion in question here. Weighs is a verb which would—in the semantic sense in which it is implied here, evoking ideas of physical presence—appropriately be placed within the category of imperfective verbs. The verb is used in this case to provide imagery for a secondary emotion, in terms of the signifcance and semantics of the verses at hand. This secondary emotion is care (43), which seemingly has taken the “place” of Lamia within Lycius’s emotional realm (his heart [43]). However, this verbal manifestation is particularly expressive of the metaphorical apprehension of emotion as being something which has palpable physical presence (here), as it is verbalized as literally possessing weight or heaviness, which necessarily alludes to physical presence and existence. The contrastive quality of these verses is further elaborated by the predicative element weighs, as well, as it is used in juxtaposition with the emotional absence that is the source of Lamia’s pain. This verb therefore further buttresses the overall metaphorical quality of these verses in regard to the conceptual metaphors which are our focus here. Sigh, like weighs, has a supportive role in these lines, and may be classifed as an act: punctual and atelic. In these verses, it provides linguistic and semantic reinforcement for the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE. It verbalizes the Lamia’s outward expression and manifestation of her despair and hopelessness regarding the (non)role of emotional absence which she feels she has taken on in Lycius’s emotional space. Moreover, Lamia’s sighing may be construed as conceptually metonymic, in the sense that it verbalizes the conceptual metonymy PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134). I will discuss conceptual metonymy in further detail in Chapter 7. The placement of a metonymic expression within the metaphor and the use of such an aspect reinforce the metaphors which follow. I comprehend the sigh as complementary to the emotional emplacements supposed and desired by Lamia: a refection of her disappointment of thinking of herself as being in such a place (or being absent) with respect to Lycius. The analyses of EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE, EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE, and EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS in “Lamia” have been undertaken in the hopes of demonstrating, as in the preceding analytical sections, the ways in which aspect, as well as verb type— particularly that of the imperfective verb type—is essential to its linguistic expression. Grammatical aspect proves to be not only logical but key to the effectiveness and saliency of the verbal transmission of these emotion concepts. Moreover, the consistency in the verb choice—be—in the midst of conceptual metaphors which depict notions of existence is also refective not only of linguistic refexes, and thus of the inherent fuidity and logic within our linguistic and conceptual systems. It also alludes to the manner in which the connection between our conceptualization of certain concepts and the way in which we are able to transmit them through language is indelibly connected, and is perhaps, at times, limiting or constricting. Furthermore,

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building on the analyses in this chapter, it can be concluded that the aspectual cases that are classifed as bounded events are present so as to linguistically and semantically support the metaphorical notions primarily held up by the aspectual cases of lasting states. On a secondary note, I fnd it important to note that the underlying metaphor in Lamia is THE EMOTIONAL SELF IS A DIVIDED SELF (Kövecses 2000: 38), seen by the transformation of Lamia from a snake to a woman, and back again, and then her physical disappearance at the end of the poem. The conceptual metaphor OBJECT OF LOVE IS A DEITY (Kövecses 2000: 27), is also very present in the poem, seen in Hermes’s search for the nymph, as well as in Lycius’s and Lamia’s behavior towards one another. These metaphors present as well as reinforce the notion of state, clearly supported by the aspect in the examples just analyzed, albeit in a differing manner.

3.8 Conclusion Throughout this chapter, I have examined a selection of examples which emphasize the close link between the stylistic functioning of emotional conceptual metaphor and grammar. These analyses have demonstrated that grammatical analysis aids in the clarifcation of the signifcance and sense of conceptual metaphors, and that the choice of aspect is essential to the functioning of the conceptual metaphor in Keats’s poetry. This leads to the understanding the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor results in the formation of a complex grammatical unit, within which each element plays an essential role. Grammar is thus key to the full expression of conceptual metaphor, as Aristotle, in Poetics, argues: “for a thing whose presence or absence makes no visible difference, is not an organic part of the whole.” For example, the aspectual cases of bounded events are particularly relevant semantically in the verbalizations of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM in “Isabella.” This is due to the fact that the metaphor in question necessarily implies notions of dynamicity, movement, and heterogeneity. The aspectual cases which allow for the expression of these notions are key to its poetic expression, with the aspectual cases of states acting as grammatical and semantic support for the events, but being decidedly less central to the workings of the metaphor. An opposite situation is visible within the elaborations of the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE in “Lamia,” a conceptual metaphor relying on implications of static states, a lack of movement, and homogeneity. In the occurrences of this conceptual metaphor, the aspectual instances relevant to the verbalization of states (of existence, or presence) are the central predicative elements, and the aspectual cases leading to verbalizations of events (more dynamic and heterogeneous) act as support for them. The aspectual and verbal choices made by Keats in the examples analyzed in the previous pages lead me to highlight a few important points.

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The frst, being that a poetic use of language may lead to, or even require, a particular verbal usage—we are particularly reminded of this in the cases of verbs that may be either perfective or imperfective—and more generally, of grammar as a whole. This is a mark of fullness of artistic manifestation, as suggested by Aristotle, once again in Poetics. However, it is important to note that the use of verbal forms in English has evolved since the 19th century: specifcally, the progressive BE + V … ing form has become much more commonplace. This should not be ignored, given that CG is principally concentrated on contemporary English. Lastly, my analyses have also revealed that a certain dose of suppleness within the grammatical and conceptual behavior of language, as well as in regard to the categorization of verbal types, proves to be highly constructive for the poetic effects of language intrinsic to poetic writing. The same goes for the use of the auxiliary do in the enunciations within which its use could be avoided (i.e., “that do paler grow” [“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” 149–152]). Keats shows a particular aptitude in taking advantage of this fexibility. Focusing on grammar within the analysis of conceptual metaphor furthermore reveals the artistic, creative, and conceptual motivation present within the poetic work constructed by Keats, which is proven by his specifc mastery and use of the grammaticality of the English language. This can be seen in the ways in which different lexemes and grammatical uses of aspect are employed within the expressions of conceptual metaphor. Furthermore, these analyses highlight instances of linguistic restraint on the part of the poet, as in the almost systematic recourse to the verb be within the various verbalizations of the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE. To conclude, this chapter has aimed to highlight the ways in which grammatical elements and their functioning are indispensable within the full elaboration and reception of conceptual metaphor. The examples from Keats are certainly highly specifc in terms of their poetic context as well as their linguistic context. However, their basis in Conceptual Metaphor Theory in the most foundational conceptualizations of cognition and language may allow our conclusions to be considered as food for thought in a more global and universal understanding of the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphor. In Chapter 4, I will continue to explore the conceptual metaphor in Keats’s poetry, based on the inherent metaphoricity of causality, and the ways that emotion is verbalized through Talmy’s theory of force-dynamics.

Note 1 Often considered as lexical aspect. However, CG prefers to talk about “perfective” and “imperfective” verb types.

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Emotional Force-Dynamics Causes Are Forces and Modality

4.1 Force-Dynamics: An Introduction In Chapter 2, I outlined the cognitive approaches to poetry that are the theoretical basis for this book. Chapter 3 was a frst look Keats’s poems through the lens of these approaches, focusing on the role of grammar—specifcally aspect—in conceptual metaphor. Building on these, the present chapter will look into the expressions of emotional causality found in Keats’s poetry. This chapter will attempt to highlight why causality is important in the schema of emotion and, moreover, how causality is relevant to emotional and poetic language. This will be done by way of detailed linguistic analysis based on Leonard Talmy’s theory of “Force-Dynamics in Language and Cognition,”1 which will be expanded upon in order to apply it to an examination of emotional, poetic language. Talmy defnes force-dynamics as one of the four “imaging systems” of language and cognition (Talmy 1978: 28–29). The causal interaction between language and cognition will be the primary focus of this chapter. Our goal here is to understand the workings, manipulations, and expressions of force-dynamics relative to emotion in language: as it were, how Keats utilizes and elaborates upon various linguistic structures and patterns to present these emotional interactions, the frequency of forcedynamic exchange in the “emotional” expressions within his poetry, and their effectiveness in the transferring and comprehension of emotional experience.

4.2 Force-Dynamics in Language Talmy argues that causal or force-dynamic expression in language has “direct grammatical representation” (Talmy 1988: 50) and claims that “force dynamics thus emerges as a fundamental notional system that structures conceptual material pertaining to force interaction in a common way across a linguistic range: the physical, psychological, social, inferential, discourse, and mental-model domains of reference and conception” (Talmy 1988: 49). Talmy also claims that force-dynamics “plays a structuring role across a range of language levels” (1988: 50). This “direct grammatical DOI: 10.4324/9781003275626-4

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representation” will be one of this chapter’s main foci: our goal will be to not only analyze Keats’s use of Talmy’s predefned grammatical elements which allow for force-dynamic expression but also examine the ways in which Keats’s poetry pushes the limits of said more or less established schemas. In doing so, Keats committed what the Russian formalists referred to as “organized violence against cognitive processes.” This “organized violence,” parsimoniously employed, but with fnesse and creativity, is what this chapter will argue plays an essential role in the power of Keats’s emotional expression by way of force-dynamic expressions and schemas. However, before getting into the heart of the poetic argumentation, it is important to explore how force-dynamics may be represented grammatically. Talmy argues that the grammatical and/or semantic elements that are most apt for the expression of force-dynamic interaction are “closed-class” or “grammatical” linguistic elements.2 In English, this is notably comprised of modals, which have a volitional, forceful, deontic, or epistemic role in language, as well as prepositions and conjunctions, which play a linking or relational role in linguistic expression. In the vein of CG, it seems quite logical that these two grammatical categories would be primary vectors for the linguistic elaboration of causality or force-dynamics, and we will see in the examples analyzed that Keats’s poetry is not lacking in such types of grammatical use. Furthermore, Talmy also claims that elements belonging to open grammatical classes may play a role in the linguistic expression of force-dynamics, particularly in the cases of psychosocial force-dynamics. This often takes place through the use of metaphor or other fgurative languages.3 In Keats’s oeuvre, the most prominent lexical class elements employed to verbalize causality are perception or emotion verbs, along with a particular set of “four transitive verbs in English that take an infnitive complement without the infnitive marker to, namely make, let, have, and help” (Talmy 1988: 65).4 The analyses that follow show that Keats makes use of lexical class elements in various ways, ranging from a more traditional use to a more poetic use of language,5 pushing its limits in order to create more emotionally charged linguistic expression. The role of “grammatical representation” is primordial to the linguistic expression of emotion by way of force-dynamics. This chapter’s analyses will use Talmy’s given elements of grammatical representation as a strong and valuable foundation. They will, furthermore, show the ways in which poetic language gives rise to grammatical and lexical elaboration of said representation, potentially rendering the emotional content of the language more potent, or in any case allowing for a broadening of Talmy’s established grammatical schemas.

4.3 Established Schematic Roles within (Emotional) Force-Dynamics Force-dynamics, or even more generally, causality, requires the presence of at least two entities within the enunciation, each taking on a different

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and, to a certain extent, opposing role within the force-dynamic or causal schema. Talmy defnes and entitles these two roles as the “Agonist” and the “Antagonist.” The Agonist is the “focal force entity,” whereas the Antagonist is the force element that opposes it (1988: 53). Force-dynamics is thus the linguistic depiction of the force-struggle between these two entities, in which one entity imposes (or attempts to impose) force upon the other. The most frequent schema typically includes a stronger Antagonist who tries to impose change, action, or elicit an emotional reaction from the weaker Agonist: however, this is at times reversed. If the Antagonist is stronger than the Agonist, the effect manifests itself in the Agonist’s behavior, in the manner more or less desired by the Antagonist.6 If the Agonist is stronger than the Antagonist, however, the Agonist is able to resist the force applied by the Antagonist, thus resulting in very little or no change to the Agonist’s situation (or, if change does take place, it would be in the way that the Agonist would desire, as opposed to the desires or wishes of the Antagonist). The most common manifestation of an emotionally centered Agonist/ Antagonist schema found in Keats’s oeuvre (and moreover, in general) is thus that of two separate individuals or entities involved in some sort of emotional interaction with one another. This is known as “interpsychological” or “interpersonal” (Talmy 1988: 75) force-dynamics. Let’s consider these three examples from the Keatsian corpus, which contain instances of interpersonal force-dynamics: O, let me once more rest / My soul upon that dazzling breast! / Let once again these aching arms be placed, / The tender gaolers of thy waist! / And let me feel that warm breath here and there / To spread a rapture in my very hair,— / O, the sweetness of the pain! / Give me those lips again! / Enough! Enough! it is enough for me / To dream of thee! (“Lines to Fanny,” lines 48–57) And there into delight my soul deceive. / There warm my breast with patriotic lore, / Musing on Milton’s fate—on Sidney’s bier— / Till their stern forms before my mind arise: / Perhaps on the wing of Poesy upsoar, / Full often dropping a delicious tear, / When some melodious sorrow spells mine eyes (“O! how I love, on a fair summer’s eve,” lines 8–14) Time’s sea hath been fve years at its slow ebb, / Long hours have to and fro let creep the sand, / Since I was tangled in thy beauty’s web / And snared by the ungloving of thine hand. (“To a Lady Seen for a Few Moments at Vauxhall,” lines 1–4) A second type of force-dynamic interaction, intra-psychological or intrapersonal force-dynamics (Talmy 1988: 69) is also quite common and frequently employed throughout Keats’s poetry. This schematic organization

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appears when a force-dynamic exchange takes place within two different parts of the same entity. Consider the following instances of this schematic structure: Yet I do often warmly burn to see / Beauties of deeper glance, and hear their singing, / And foat with them about the summer waters. (“Happy is England,” lines 12–14) For sweet relief I’ll dwell / On humbler thoughts, and let this strange assay / Begun in gentleness die so away. (“Sleep and Poetry,” lines 313–315) I gazed awhile, and felt as light and free / As though the fanning wings of Mercury / Had play’d upon my heels: I was light-hearted, / And many pleasures to my vision started; / So I straightaway began to pluck a posey / Of luxuries milky, soft, and rosy. (“I stood tip-toe upon a little hill,” lines 23–28) Intra-psychological force-dynamics is of particular interest to us here, as this type of schema reveals itself to be the schema within which Keats takes the most poetic liberty, by pushing the organizational limits. Later in this chapter, we will have a look at various schemas of intrapersonal force-dynamics in various confgurations: at times appearing alone, and at times, taking place within an interpersonal force-dynamic schema, thus resulting in a more complex and multi-faceted expression of force-dynamics. In light of this, it is particularly important to note the position and emotional expression of the Self or Ego in these cases. Within a more complex force-dynamic schema (any schema other than the basic inter-psychological force-dynamic schema between two separate entities or individuals), the author highlights the nuances and complexities of the emotional Self. Within Keats’s works, the Self or Ego of the poet is often portrayed as refecting the complexities and paradoxes that accompany artistic or poetic creation. This is even more evident when the poet is placed in an emotionally charged situation, either in relation with another individual or in relation with other, conficting and sometimes darker, parts of the Self. Force-dynamic schemas expressing this type of interaction may be labeled as the “Self Divided” force-dynamic schema, for simplicity of reference throughout the rest of the chapter. In Talmy’s paper, this division is referred to as the “separate parts or components” of the self (1988: 71, 95). Talmy ties this confict within the Self (and its linguistic expression) to Freud’s conceptions of the id and the superego, constructing a parallel between the contrasting desires within the Self and these two Freudian notions, arguing that the id is a deep component of the self which includes basic desires, the superego arises as an internalization of socially derived values, and the

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two are in confict. These Freudian concepts may in part have arisen as a theorization of concepts already built into the semantic organization of language, as well as perhaps into everyday mental models. (1988: 95) The Freudian notions of the id and the superego, or the ego ideal, represent not only the struggle between basic, human, desires, and socially enforced behavioral habits or morals but also the even broader confict between the human unconscious (represented in Freud by the terminology of the “id” [1989: 635]) and the conscious (the “ego,” which becomes, after modifcation [1989: 641], the “superego” [1989: 630]). The presence and expression of the unconscious and the conscious are key in the understanding of the poetic emotion expressed in Keats’s poetry, particularly in the instances of force-dynamics. Keatsian language, by way of causal expression, grasps and proves itself able to portray the complexities of the struggles within the emotional Self. The question of imposed morality (in relation to an emotional reaction) is also to be considered—as Freud considers it—via the conscious and the unconscious. In this schema, “the id [takes on the role of] the ‘non-moral’ entity, the ego [is] the entity which aims for morality, and the superego [has] the possibility of embodying the extremes of absolute morality and near depravity” (1989: 655). Furthermore, the examples in this chapter will show that the poetic expression of emotional or psychological force-dynamics allows for elaboration upon and expansion of Talmy’s basic tendencies of rest or repose, and action or movement (1988: 54, 72).7 We can (and should), of course, take these tendencies as starting blocks for a fuller comprehension of emotional force-dynamics and consider them in terms of the more commonly understood contrasting notions of changing and remaining the same, for example. According to Talmy, the presence of two or more entities, individuals, or facets of the self within the force-dynamic schema is essential to the expression of causality. The examples presented in this chapter are completely in line with this criterion: however, the poeticity of the texts, along with their emotional content, allows for, or even demand, an elaboration of, and an insertion of complexity within these types of schemas. These more complex force-dynamic schemas will be examined in the hopes of opening up the reader’s conception of emotion as presented linguistically and experienced by Keats in his poetry, thus resulting in a deeper understanding of the multiple facets of the poetic, emotional self.

4.4 Metaphorical Extension and Force-Dynamics: The Event Structure Metaphor and Lakoff’s Invariance Hypothesis In Chapter 2, I briefy explored Lakoff’s (1990) extension of Talmy’s extension of force-dynamics to the linguistic and psychological domains: the

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Invariance Hypothesis. He identifes the indispensable link between forcedynamics in language and what he calls the “Event Structure Metaphor” and, more specifcally, the cognitive imprint and linguistic expression of said metaphor as the conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES (1990: 57). The Event Structure Metaphor proposes that “various aspects of event structure, including notions like states, changes, processes, actions, causes, purposes, and means are understood metaphorically in terms of space, motion, and force” (Lakoff 1990: 57).8 This mapping is thus what we understand as a conceptual metaphor: its semantic entailments are essential to our cognitive understanding of this concept (and potentially a plethora of other concepts). The poetic analysis to follow will demonstrate not only the undeniable and infuential presence of the Event Structure Metaphor within forcedynamics in language but also the kind of extended or combined mappings put forward by Lakoff, all fguratively placed within the domain of emotion. 4.4.1 Emotional Delineations of the Event Structure Metaphor The Event Structure Metaphor is broad enough to be effectively applied to a large variety of semantic structures, via the extension of cognitive mappings. Kövecses9 has further expanded upon Lakoff’s claims towards the domain of emotional linguistic expression, by insisting upon the link between the Event Structure Metaphor (and its mapping as CAUSES ARE FORCES) and Talmy’s conception of force-dynamics in language. In applying Talmy’s theory to the “most basic and skeletal emotion scenario in our folk theory of emotion” (Kövecses 2008: 8), we are led to the following mapping: (1) a cause leads to an emotion and (2) emotion leads to some response.10 Kövecses continues on in this vein so as to postulate that the emotional delineation EMOTION IS FORCE of the CAUSES ARE FORCES conceptual metaphor is quite possibly the “single master metaphor for emotion” (2008: 15),11 clarifying that “the various components of the emotion domain are conceptualized as forces that interact with each other” (2008: 15). He proposes examples such as: 1) I was overcome by emotion. 2) She knocked me off my feet. 3) I was magnetically drawn to her. (2008: 10, 13) This schema is perfectly compatible with Talmy’s force-dynamic schema, necessarily presenting the roles of the Agonist and the Antagonist (in their many possible variations) and the interaction between the two agents encompassing causality as well as emotional cause and effect. This is verbalized by way of “emotion-specifc metaphorical source domains” (Kövecses 2008:

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17) or emotion-specifc conceptual metonymies. This type of expression can thus be summed up in the following schematic model: “Cause → existence of emotion (as forceful entity) → expression” (Kövecses 2008: 27). A linguistic expression of this schema would be something like: (1) The news of her cat’s passing brought her to tears. Kövecses12 has proposed a wide range of emotion-specifc conceptual metaphorical mappings in the domain of emotion, a large majority of which can be construed and understood as emotion-specifc delineations of the conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES. These metaphorical mappings necessarily incorporate the idea of emotion as a forceful entity, causing and resulting in some sort of change, action, or response upon or from the secondary agent, or the Agonist. Here are some of Kövecses’s mappings, directly expressed in Keats’s poetry: (1) EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT Ex: “He was struggling with emotion” (Kövecses 2008: 10). Time’s sea hath been fve years at its slow ebb, / Long hours have to and fro let creep the sand, / Since I was tangled in thy beauty’s web / And snared by the ungloving of thine hand. (“To a Lady Seen for a Few Moments at Vauxhall,” lines 1–4) (2) EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE (Kövecses 2008: 12) Ex: “Her beauty blew me away.” Yet I do often warmly burn to see / Beauties of deeper glance, and hear their singing, / And foat with them about the summer waters. (“Happy is England,” lines 12–14) (3) EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL FORCE Ex: “That repels me” (Kövecses 2008: 13). For sweet relief I’ll dwell / On humbler thoughts, and let this strange assay / Begun in gentleness die so away. (“Sleep and Poetry,” lines 313–315) These emotion-specifc mappings, as emotional delineations of the Event Structure Metaphor, ultimately fnd themselves elaborated (à la Lakoff and Turner 1989: 66–71) in multiple fashions in Keats’s poetry and, thus, arguably, because of the “universality” of this conceptual mapping put forward by Lakoff and Kövecses. The Event Structure Metaphor and its conceptual and emotional metaphorical delineations are central to the expression of causality or forcedynamics in language and, perhaps more importantly, to our cognitive

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comprehension of the concept of causality in general. Whenever possible, the analyses presented in this chapter will highlight the role of conceptual metaphor within the force-dynamic expression, and the specifc instances of conceptual metaphor will be enumerated.

4.5 Grammatical Representation of Force-Dynamics 4.5.1 Predicates As I mentioned above, causality is often represented grammatically. Before fully delving into the poetic work, let us briefy go a little deeper into our examination of the grammatical elements which can express causality: how can they do this, and why? We will frst have a look at the predicates. Verbs—and a particular group of them—are repeatedly employed so as to verbalize emotional forcedynamics. I will begin, as Talmy does, with more schematized, closed-class verbal units, such as modals, then move on to a group of predicates that could be classifed as in between an open and a closed class,13 a specifc set of transitive verbs, and fnish with an exploration of the purely lexical, open-class selection of emotion and perception verbs. 4.5.2 Modals: A (Generally) Cognitive Approach Modals are the frst grammatical/lexical14 category mentioned by Talmy in “Force-Dynamics in Language and Cognition” as prime examples of the grammatical representation of force-dynamic situations. He claims that “force opposition […] appears to lie at the core of their meanings” (1988: 77). Talmy’s examples, coupled with the instances of force-dynamics represented by way of modals in Keats’s, make a compelling case for this argument. Let us take a look at the semantics of modals so as to better understand why. Langacker (2008) ties his explanation of the grammatical and lexical concept of modality directly to the concept of force-dynamics in language and cognition as presented by Talmy. He deems that the relationships profled by modal verbs “ascribe to their trajector some kind of propensity, or ‘potency’ which—when unleashed—can lead to its execution of an action” (2008: 304). This inherent property of movement towards the accomplishment of an action is the key to understanding the reasoning behind the inevitable connection between force-dynamics and modality. Moreover, Langacker refers to the concept of force-dynamics—along with that of “future orientation,” another inherent property of modals— as “ancestral properties” (2008: 304), highlighting their high level of cognitive importance. He proceeds to argue that these “ancestral properties are the key to understanding the modern English modals, whose evolution illustrates the diachronic process known as grammaticization” (2008: 304).

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The two claims that are the most important for our purposes here are the indispensable cognitive link between force-dynamics and modality, and the role played by grammaticization in modality, along with its effects on the linguistic expression of causality, especially as Langacker argues that the grammaticized modals prove to be more effective in their profling of the relationships they express as they result in the focus resting primarily on the “potency” or the actualization of the action. Furthermore, Langacker enumerates a list of the variety of different force-based relationships that can be profled by modality (Langacker 2008: 305). Within this list, one fnds not only support for Talmy’s basic force-dynamic schemas of Agonist vs. Antagonist but also for more complex, multi-level force-dynamic schemas, including Antagonists that present themselves as larger, societally imposed moral standards, for example.15 The possibility of inclusion of a variety of force-dynamic schemas verbalized by modals brings us back to the concepts discussed in this chapter’s introduction concerning the variety of force-dynamic relationships present in Keats’s poetry, specifcally that of the parallel originally made by L. Talmy and then elaborated upon here between the multiple facets of the Self and the Freudian concepts of the id, ego, and superego. Socially and culturally imposed morals and rules are also highly valid and salient forcedynamic Antagonists in the realm of emotion and psychosocial pressure. The inclusion of these kinds of causal relationships in Langacker’s, along with Lapaire and Rotgé’s (1998), analysis of modal relationships thus reinforces and supports these claims.16 In their analysis of modality in English,17 Lapaire and Rotgé highlight pressure or constraint upon the grammatical subject as one essential constituent of modality in English. This pressure results in the realization of the action described by the predicate.18 Adamczewski and Delmas (1982: 142) share a similar point of view, suggesting that this predicative realization is the fundamental role of modals. Moreover, Lapaire and Rotgé suggest that a sort of “authorization” must take place for the modal verb to actually do its job and thus achieve the manifestation of the predicate. This authorization, they claim, can come from a variety of sources19 and that the subject on the receiving end of this interaction is the grammatical subject.20 The interaction explained here is highly similar to L. Talmy’s Agonist vs. Antagonist schema, once again supporting the inherent force-dynamic properties of modals in English. The structural/syntactic role of modals as conceived by J.-R. Lapaire and W. Rotgé is also important to note, as the relation profled in expressions containing a modal verb is explicated in terms of simply that: a relation, with the modals playing the part of the “relating party” between the grammatical subject and the predicate.21 This notion of relation not only coincides with Langacker’s “relation profling” but is also easily extended mentally and metaphorically to the semantics of modality and force-dynamics, which require a relation of infuence between two entities.

70 Emotional Force-Dynamics Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002) view on the modality in English takes a somewhat different approach. They claim that the central concern of modality is “the speaker’s attitude towards the factuality or actualization of the situation expressed by the rest of the clause” (2002: 173). Their approach to modality includes the typical list of modal auxiliaries, along with a category of lexical modals,22 as well as modal clause types (they claim that any other clause type besides the declarative is a “modal clause type”) (2002: 174)23: this larger scope provides a valuable broadening of the concept of modality, transforming the class from a simple set of predicates to a full semantic category. Moreover, their exploration of the scope of negation within modal expressions,24 along with the notions of semantic and pragmatic strength in modality,25 will prove to be a valuable support for the force-dynamic-centered analyses of modality that will follow in the rest of this chapter. Jespersen (1924) classifes modality as a “mood.” He claims that mood is always “shown in a verb” and encompasses a “syntactical, not a notional category” (1924: 313). Furthermore, in a statement that further underlines the ties between emotion, force-dynamics, and grammatical structure, Jespersen argues that moods express certain attitudes of the mind of the speaker towards the contents of the sentence, though in some cases the choice of a mood is determined not by the attitude of the actual speaker but by the character of the clause itself. (1924: 313) This proposition includes not only the important elements of the position and attitude of the speaker (both in terms of subject matter and grammatical structure) mentioned by Langacker and Lapaire and Rotgé but also the inherent modality of certain clause forms present in Huddleston and Pullum’s analysis of modality: the four approaches thus prove to be compatible. Radden and Dirven (2007) defne modality as the way in which “potential reality” is expressed in English. According to them, modality “is concerned with the speaker’s assessment of, or attitude towards, the potentiality of a state of affairs” (2007: 234). The use of the term “potentiality” is important because it emphasizes the subjectivity inherent in modal expressions. In a similar fashion to that of Huddleston and Pullum, Radden and Dirven relate clausal types to the type of “reality” that they express, thus rendering certain phrasal types inherently more modal than others. This is particularly related to the verbal choice that is made within the phrase in question, both in terms of the tense and the type of verb (such as modal or not) (2007: 172). There are other approaches to modality, such as those of Leech and Svartvik (2002), Larreya and Rivière (1991), and Quirk and Greenbaum (1973), which present modality similarly to Huddleston and Pullum. Their

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main focus is the classifcation of the “types” of modality (permission, necessity, possibility, ability, etc.). These concepts are inherently forcedynamic or causal, to varying degrees; however, these approaches do not explicitly mention modality’s basis in this cognitive schema.26 4.5.3 Modality in Keatsian Emotional Force-Dynamics The nine extracts to be examined here come from fve different poems, of different lengths, presenting the somewhat divergent subject matter, from varying periods in Keats’s writing career, and contain varying levels of emotional and/or creative expressions. I’ve chosen these specifc occurrences because they exemplify the use of causal modality in Keats’s oeuvre. And perhaps more importantly, they show how force-dynamics as expressed by modals can lead to a deeper understanding and comprehension of Keatsian poetry as a whole. The analyses will be organized by the “type” of force-dynamics that fgures in the verses: inter-psychological force-dynamics, intra-psychological force-dynamics, or a blend of the two. The role of the Self or Poetic Self will be examined when pertinent. Then, within this broader structure, the modal auxiliaries employed, in order from strongest to weakest,27 will be analyzed within their context, with the aim of fnding differences and similarities in the ways that Keats made use of these grammatical elements so as to express varying (or not) force-dynamic schemas within his poetry. The clausal type and structure of each modal occurrence will also be examined, and we will see how this suggestion applies in poetically structured language. Finally, the presumed level of emotional content or impact of the verses will be examined in light of the grammatical, structural, and schematic schemas mentioned above (and in the introductory sections of this chapter), so as to effectively evaluate the effects of these elements on the potency of the forcedynamic interactions expressed within them. Out of the nine extracts analyzed in this section, six of them contain cases of fairly basic interpersonal (or inter-psychological) force-dynamics, with a stronger Antagonist fgure applying some sort of force upon a weaker Agonist fgure. Most of the examples here are best categorized under the category of psychological or psychosocial force-dynamics, as their content is for the most part based in the realm of emotion, feeling, and abstraction. In his use of modality as the means of expression of interpersonal force-dynamics, Keats employs a variety of modal auxiliaries, ranging from strong to weak. Moreover, in these sorts of force-dynamic expressions, the declarative clause type is the most frequent, with fve out of six of the verses being what one could defne as declarative and only one out of six being an interrogative clause. The clause types opted for by Keats, along with the choice of modal auxiliary, type of force-dynamics, and effects of all of these criteria on the expression of emotional content by way of causality, will be the foci of the following analysis.

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4.5.3.1 Strong and Medium Modality: Do They Necessitate Specifc Emotional Delineations of the Event Structure Metaphor or Vice Versa? It is common knowledge that modal auxiliaries in English inherently possess and express varying levels of strength. As Radden and Dirven note, “not surprisingly, languages provide a wealth of linguistic means which allow the speaker to express degrees and nuances of uncertainty: modal verbs like must, may, and should, modal adjuncts like perhaps, certainly, and in all probability, and hundreds of lexical expressions” (2007: 239). This semantic strength or weakness is the central element of a modal clause and thus is key in the expression of force-dynamics by way of modality. Moreover, the inherent strength of a modal auxiliary is a determining factor in the grammatical structure of a sentence. A strong modal implies a high level of commitment—generally on the part of the speaker—“to the factuality or actualization of the situation” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 175), or, concerning the “high or low probability” of the situation, or “strong [or] weak directive attitude” (Radden & Dirven 2007: 240). As the examples here are taken from a poetic corpus, the role of the speaker is at times less obvious or clearly indicated than in “everyday” speech: thus, the context must be analyzed, along with the innate qualities of the modal, so as to understand where this inherent “strength” comes from. This task is rendered more complicated by the fact that the expression of force-dynamics by way of modality is, for the most part, abstract. Thankfully, the cognitive intertwining of force-dynamic grammatical representation and conceptual metaphor allows for the effectiveness of these types of enunciations in the Keatsian corpus, particularly when the textual situation and content proves itself to be highly abstract. The two examples of strong modality, along with the example of medium-strength modality, in the Keatsian corpus, provide proof of this phenomenon, along with other elements that merit analysis. We’ll start with one example of strong modality (1), from “To Fanny”: (1) Why, this—you’ll say, my Fanny! is not true: / Put your soft hand upon your snowy side, / Where the heart beats: confess—‘tis nothing new—/ Must not a woman be /A feather on the sea, / Sway’d to and fro by every wind and tide? (“To Fanny,” lines 32–38) The strong modal auxiliary (italicized in the lines above28), must, provides a complex, multi-faceted example of interpersonal emotional force-dynamics depicting (metaphorically) the presumed emotional situation of the woman, comparing her to a “feather on the sea,” blown about, “sway’d” by every potential change. Consider the modal must, along with the negation marker that follows it directly, not, and its verbal complement, be. These three elements must also be analyzed in the context of the interrogative nature of

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the clause, which results in the inversion of the negation and the modal auxiliary. The negation here, particularly due to the rhetorical nature of the interrogation in question, seems to semantically fall over the modal itself, thus providing us with an example of “external negation” in which the “negative has scope over the modal auxiliary rather than falling within its scope, i.e. the negation is external to the scope of the modal” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 175). Furthermore, this is a case of epistemic modality (as opposed to deontic modality). The double-nature of the force-dynamic interaction is of particular interest here: one could argue that these verses contain two—complementary and entwined—cases of force-dynamic expression. The inclusion of the modal auxiliary must in this context be a refection of societal standards, conceptions, and pressure upon the feminine fgure, simultaneously presenting her with and constraining her to a particular manner of operating: in this case, emotionally. What can be seen here is thus an example of pressure exerted upon the grammatical subject, obliging her to manifest the semantics of be. The psychosocial pressure or restriction in this case comes from moral standards or generalized opinions about the inherent nature of the female gender.29 The rest of the clause, which contains a second example of force-dynamic interaction, reinforces this case of modally expressed force-dynamics. As previously stated, these verses are overtly metaphorical (direct identifcation of an emotionally fckle woman as a feather blown about on the sea). Verses 37 and 38 express—without the presence of modality—a case of force-dynamics that proves itself to be a pure expression of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE30: the emotion (target domain) here is depicted as the “wind and tide” (source domain) and the woman, as a feather. The Antagonist in this case is effectively forcing the Agonist towards movement (the expression of the verbal phrase, “must be a feather on the sea”). These syntactically separate, but semantically linked, cases of forcedynamics work together to result in what one might call multi-directional force-dynamics, with the female fgure as the Agonist, receiving pressure from two separate Antagonists: societal pressure and her own emotion. It is also important to note the lack of mention of the frst Antagonist in the modal expression and its explicit mention in the second. It is also important to note the interrogative and thus modal nature of the clause31: does the presence of a modal auxiliary within such a clause result in “more modal” sentence characteristics, thus rendering it all the more potent in terms of its force-dynamic expression? The presence of a strong modal auxiliary, placed within an inherently modal clausal type and depicting force exchanges in multiple directions, renders these lines highly salient in terms of their expression of force-dynamic interaction. This thus plays a role in the emotional richness of the verses as well concerning their poetic quality, allowing for a dynamic articulation of the emotional situation at hand in the verses, palpable and understandable to the reader.

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The second example, containing a case of medium-strength modality,32 comes from “Ode to a Nightingale.” (2) Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies; / Where but to think is to be full of sorrow / And leaden-eyed despairs; / Where beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes, / Or new Love pine at them beyond tomorrow. (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 25–30) These verses, through the medium-strength modal auxiliary can (negated by not), present a case of interpersonal force-dynamics, with an Antagonist33 which I would defne as the external environment, exerting a prohibitive force upon two separate, but similar—and connected—Agonists: Beauty and Love. The Agonists here exist as two distinct entities, but the overall restrictive force effects placed upon them by the Antagonist are highly similar. The semantics of the force-dynamic situation can thus be treated, for the most part, together. The internal roles of this force-dynamic situation are highly abstract, with the Antagonist as a broad, somewhat vague entity, and the two Agonists being an abstract, ethereal characteristic (frequently tied to emotional expression in the Romantic oeuvre): Beauty and, an emotion itself, Love. The prohibitive force placed upon the two Agonists by the Antagonist restricts them from the emotional release that they would typically have the propensity to manifest: “beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes,” / “Or new Love pine at them beyond tomorrow” (v. 29–30). The negated modal auxiliary can has scope over the lexical verbs keep and pine, allowing for the presence of the two Agonists. We can note here that the negation in question is an “external” negation, directly negating the modal auxiliary itself, as opposed to negating its complement.34 In this force-dynamic situation, one can clearly see an instance of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT (Kövecses 2008: 10) here. The somber atmosphere depicted in part of the poem—which undeniably has emotional connotations, or could even be defned as an emotional force— acts as an Opponent to the expression of lighter, more positive emotions, such as the externalization of beauty in love and the expression of Love in return. The Opponent (Antagonist) here proves itself to be stronger, blocking the intended emotional movement and exchange that was presumed to occur in the given situation, providing a resultant action of inhibited movement: this brings us back once more to the notion of “authorization” inherently present in modal enunciations.35 The metaphorical content of the surrounding verses should not be ignored either; as it plays a role in the overall emotional saliency and poetic quality of the verses. In line 26, we can see the conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS36: “where but to think is to be full of sorrow.” There are other metaphorical instances in the verses as well, such

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as “leaden-eyed despairs” (v. 27): SAD (read: negative emotion) IS DOWN,37 as “leaden-eyed” refers to a heaviness within the eyes which would cause them to look downward, as one typically does in moments of sadness or despair. There is a striking contrast between the “leaden-eyes” of despair and the “lustrous eyes” (v. 29) that an amorous beauty is supposed to possess. The force-dynamic interaction in these verses takes place within a declarative clause, thus leaving the modality to be solely expressed by the predicate, in which the stronger Antagonist—an external, ethereal, abstract force— places a prohibitive force on the weaker Agonist, thus resulting in a resultant tendency of rest, or the inability to do the action desired by the Agonist. We can now examine with two extracts containing the strong modal auxiliary shall. The force-dynamic interactions present in the two poems, “The Eve of St. Agnes” (3) and “O blush not so!” (4) are structurally and semantically quite similar and thus can be examined more or less hand-in-hand. (3) “And now, my love, my seraph fair, awake! / Thou art my heaven, and I think eremite: / Open thine eyes, for meek St. Agnes’ sake, / Or I shall drowse beside thee, so my soul doth ache.” (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 276–279) (4) O blush not so! O blush not so! / Or I shall think you knowing; / And if you smile the blushing while, / The maidenheads are going. (“O blush not so!” lines 1–4) The modal shall here found in its epistemic sense—expressing “the speaker’s assessment of the potentiality of a affairs” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 234)—depicts force-dynamics in a fairly clear-cut fashion: the speaker urges his listener to act (or, to not act), so as to avoid an emotionally charged response (on his part).38 The structure of the expressions is even identical. Consider the following structural diagram for these two cases: “Demand of the speaker → expectation of disregard by listener → speaker ‘threatens’ what his subsequent action will be (‘Or I shall …’).” This use of the modal auxiliary is a case of strong modality (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 175), with the shall here as synonymous with the predictive, future marker will, contingent on the emotionally based response of the beloved in both of these cases. Furthermore, shall in this case could be pronounced here either in its full form (with a full vowel) or in its weak form (with a schwa). In the frst instance, the full form could express determination, reinforcing the notion of strong modality. In the second—the weak form—we could be in front of a case of mere futurity, a weaker modal, in which case shall would be very close to will, semantically: this link between phonetics and semantics further reinforces the modal’s essential role in these verses. In the example from “The Eve of St. Agnes,” the beloved, or the Antagonist, is Madeline, and the Agonist is Poryphro. In “O blush not so!”

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the Antagonist is the poet’s beloved (unnamed in the poem), and the Agonist is the poet, or the speaker. In both cases, the Antagonist is the more powerful entity. Their actions (or inaction) will indubitably result in a response from the Agonist. Despite the slightly ambiguous quality of the verses, one can safely assume that this is desired, at least to a certain extent, by the Agonist. These examples are, frst and foremost, cases of interpersonal forcedynamics, in which a stronger Antagonist is capable of impinging upon the Agonist. However, the Agonist’s awareness of the situation(s) at hand in both cases renders the force-dynamic structure somewhat more complex, bringing us outside of the traditional “interpersonal” dynamic, as the Agonist is not simply being impinged upon unknowingly, or even unwillingly. The Self (inhabited by the Agonist) is thus fully active and cognizant in these two situations, and even, to a certain extent, desirous of the action of the Antagonist. In “The Eve of St. Agnes,” Poryphro would most likely not be opposed to the idea of “drowsing” at his beloved’s side (although he would perhaps prefer to be there in an awakened state). In “O blush not so!” the “knowingness” referred to is clearly something desired and anticipated by the speaker. Moreover, the futurity of the two situations is central to the analysis of these verses, as they exhibit force-dynamism and future-orientation. Namely, “they ascribe to their trajector some kind of propensity, or “potency,” which— when unleashed—can lead to its execution of an action” (Langacker 2008: 304). One can also see these force-dynamic, modal expressions as examples of “projected reality” (Langacker 2008: 306–307). Beyond the structural similarities present in these verses, it is also essential to note the similarity in their conceptually metaphorical basis: these verses both contain the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE (Köveces 2000: 37), with the NATURAL FORCE in question resulting in embodied expressions of emotion in both cases (drowsing and aching in “St. Agnes”; blushing and conceiving in “O blush not so!”39). These are reinforced by conceptual metonymies for emotions such as BLUSHING FOR LOVE, CHANGE IN HEART RATE FOR EMOTION, or INCAPACITATING EFFECTS OF THE EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 124, 134, 82), further enhancing the emotional saliency of the verses and the force-dynamic interaction, by means of a more tangible expression of said emotions: her feelings are written on her face. These conceptual metonymies are further reinforced by the conditional constructions that stand as the culmination of the force-dynamic expressions in both examples. The conditional structure by nature includes, explicitly or implicitly, the subordinate marker if, which “dictates the conditions for the realization” of the second part of the clause (Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 49640). In lines 278 and 279 of “The Eve of St. Agnes,” we fnd “Open thine eyes, for meek St. Agnes’ sake / Or I shall drowse beside thee, so my soul doth ache,” and in lines three and four of “O blush not so!” we have “and if you smile the blushing while / the maidenheads are going.”

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These conditional structures both continue in the metonymic vein mentioned above, and the second part of the clauses expresses the presumed effect of this metonymical activity. This conditional structure strengthens the metonymically verbalized embodiment of emotion by clearly depicting the results of said emotional experience. This interpretation of the conditional structure renders such a grammatical organization all the more impactful in terms of its metonymical quality: the emotional “trigger” must take place so that the full, metonymic expression can be manifested. Whereas the conditional structure and the modal auxiliary are placed together in “The Eve of St. Agnes” (resulting in an overall strengthening of the expression, thanks to the multiple linguistic elements used to verbalize the force-dynamic interaction), in (4), one can see a sort of “doubling up” of linguistic and cognitive structures and tools. As the modal auxiliary is found in a verse preceding the conditional structure (“Or I shall think you knowing; / And if you smile the blushing while, / The maidenheads are going”) and the conditional structure is a fully elaborated formulation of the if … then type) so as to emphasize the force-dynamic quality of the verses in question, thus allowing for the complete fulfllment of their emotional nature. The inherent futurity in the strong modal shall (Langacker 2008: 304), the epistemic quality of these modal occurrences, the simultaneously imperative and exhortative (thus increasing the emotional quality of the verses) nature of the clauses, and the intrinsically metaphorical quality of the verses in question all result in highly modal and embodied psychosocial forcedynamic interactions. 4.5.3.2 Weak Modality and Lower Levels of Metaphoricity: A Cognitive or Grammatical Link (ForceDynamics in Linguistic Action)? In the previous section, I feshed out examples of the way in which strong and medium modalities present metaphorical cases of force-dynamics Keats’s works. These examples allow me to conclude that a strong link exists between these levels of modality and explicit and detailed metaphorical structures in the texts. This section will focus on cases of force-dynamics expressed with weaker modal auxiliaries. We will see that while these examples still fall into the category of force-dynamic expressions, they contain less of an inherent metaphorical or metonymical quality. This potentially renders their causal and emotional impact weaker, in parallel with the strength of the modal auxiliaries in question. Let us begin with a rather idiosyncratic case of modality, expressed by the auxiliary dare. Dare, while falling under the category of modal auxiliaries, is a great deal more limited in its use than the majority of other modal auxiliaries. Indeed, dare can only be employed in cases of what Huddleston and Pullum call “dynamic modality” (2002: 196).41 Moreover, due to the

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fact that in declarative clauses—as our example from the Keatsian corpus is—“auxiliary dare is normally negative, and the negation is external,” dare is classifed among the weak modals (ibid.). However, due to its idiosyncratic and perhaps intermediary nature, we will see that dare operates somewhere in between the behavioral tendencies of our strong/medium modals and those which are weaker. Consider this example of the auxiliary dare in use in “To Fanny”: (5) To one who loves you as I love, sweet Fanny! / Whose heart goes futt’ring for you everywhere, / Nor, when away you roam, / Dare keep its wretched home, / Love, love alone, his pains severe and many: / Then, loveliest! Keep me free, / From torturing jealousy. (“To Fanny,” lines 42–48) This example of emotional force-dynamics, expressed primarily via the modal auxiliary dare, provides a case of both interpersonal and intrapersonal force-dynamics. The beloved (the Antagonist) imposes emotional force— thus, cause and effect—on the enraptured poet (the Agonist). At frst glance, this interaction appears to be a simple interpsychological relation. However, the poet (the Agonist) is painfully aware of these effects and implores the beloved to impose force—a prohibitive, or even force of release—upon him. The awareness of the Agonist, which could be understood as an expression of the Self in its most conscious form of the Superego, or Ego Ideal, is essential to the analysis of these lines, as this awareness (along with the lexical elements that allow for its expression) leads to our understanding of this interaction as a somewhat intrapersonal instance of force-dynamics. The lexical and structural elements that participate in this expression, such as the refective I in line 43 and the exhortative or exclamatory clausal type in lines 46–47, lead to the comprehension of this example of force-dynamics as somewhat intrapersonal, as the force of the Antagonist is ultimately desired by the Agonist, to a certain extent. The emotional effects here are expressed in a quasi-spatial manner, beginning with references to the “movement” of the poet’s heart, which could be understood as his person, his psyche, or his love: or what’s more likely, all three. The modal auxiliary dare (followed by the base form of the verb keep42) verbalizes one of the effects of this emotion: the heart is unable to stay still, stay home, out of need to be in the presence of the beloved. The force-dynamics here is thus the interaction of an Agonist with a stronger Antagonist, prohibiting the latter from freedom of movement, driving it to be on the move. This spatially based organization also allows for a fuller comprehension of the force-dynamicity, future-orientation, and potency inherent in the modal expression,43 which completely coincides with the innate dynamicity of the auxiliary dare.44 The second verbal example is the imperative form of the verb to keep, which expresses the Agonist’s recognition of the Antagonist’s power over

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him: he implores her to free him from his misery, from imposing force, or emotion, upon him. Thus, the force depicted in the language here is a sort of “negative” force, so as for him to avoid experiencing a certain emotion (and its consequences), all clearly interpreted as negative: jealousy. Here, the Agonist would have a “tendency towards rest” (Talmy 1988: 55). The Antagonist pushes it towards movement, as the Antagonist’s force is greater than the Agonist’s, resulting in an active state: thus, being in opposition to the Agonist’s personal desires. While the force-dynamic character of these lines is clear, complex, and dynamic, the metaphoric quality of the verses is somewhat less developed than in the examples in the previous section on stronger and medium modality. The delineation of the Event Structure Metaphor (CAUSES ARE FORCES) is obviously at play here. Moreover, I’ll go even further down the “metaphorical chain” and categorize these lines as expressions of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT (Kövecses 2008: 10). In this case, the emotion is that of jealousy; an emotion that is cruel and capable of inficting pain: “torturing jealousy” (v. 48) and “love alone, his pains severe and many” (v. 46). We also see an expression of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (Kövecses 2008: 13), which causes or prohibits movement: “whose heart goes futt’ring for you everywhere, / nor, when away you roam, / dare keep its wretched home” (v. 43–45). In terms of structure, as pointed out as habitual by Huddleston and Pullum, the auxiliary dare is accompanied here by a negation marker, not, which is indeed an external negation, over the modal,45 rendering the sense of “would not dare to leave” to the verses. The auxiliary dare acts in its typical, yet unique, manner. The imperative, exhortative nature of the verses also contributes a certain amount of inherent modality to the example at hand. The four remaining examples of force-dynamics with a modal auxiliary carrying this cognitive and linguistic structure continue with the trend frst exemplifed in the previous example: lower modality results in less metaphoricity. The selected examples to be analyzed contain the weak modal auxiliaries (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 178) of may or might. Let us consider them together, as their resemblance is signifcant. (6) If Queens and Soldiers have play’d deep for hearts, / It is no reason why such agonies / Should be more common than the growth of weeds. / Fools! make me whole again that weighty pearl / The Queen of Egypt melted, and I’ll say / That ye may love in spite of beaver hats. (“Modern Love,” lines 12–17) (7) They told her how, upon St. Agnes’ Eve, / Young virgins might have visions of delight, / And soft adorings from their loves receive / Upon the honey’d middle of the night, / If ceremonies due they did aright (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 46–50)

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These four examples, as mentioned above, are highly similar from both the semantic and structural points of view. Through the modal auxiliaries of may and might, these extracts from “Modern Love,” “The Eve of St. Agnes,” and “Ode to a Nightingale” present force-dynamic interactions that fall under the semantic classifcations of permission or possibility. Each example contains its own blend of the two: (6), (8), and (9) are cases of deontic modality, expressing permission, and example (7) is a case of epistemic modality, thus expressing possibility. As modals—regardless of their strength—inherently do, these expressions remind us of the notions of the “realization of the predicate” and the “authorization” present in all modal expressions.46 Each force-dynamic instance is presented within a declarative type clause; thus, a clause that is not inherently modal.47 While (9) does have an exhortative twinge to it, it remains, regardless, a declarative clause. Examples (6), (7), and (9) present strictly interpersonal force-dynamic schemas, with an external Antagonist—either an individual or a situation—providing permission, or opening up the possibility for, emotional experience: love (6), visions of delight (7), or beholding the beauty of one’s beloved (8). These are all quite emotionally charged situations. Example (9) remains, in large part, an interpersonal exchange but does have an intrapersonal element to it, as the Agonist calls upon the external Antagonist to provide him with something (“a draught of vintage”) that would permit him to slide into the depths of the emotional experience for which he longs. In Talmyan terms, I note the stronger Antagonist giving permission to the Agonist (in the case of deontic modality) or rendering possible (in an epistemic case) the realization of the lexical verb—rendering the Agonist active. As is the case in all of the previous examples, these verses are examples of force-dynamic interactions, and thus their cognitive structure is ultimately indivisible from the metaphorical schema CAUSES ARE FORCES. In cases of permission or possibility, the permitting force renders the manifestation of the action possible, thus acting as a CAUSE or a FORCE, resulting in an effect. However, while these force-dynamic interactions take place in the world of emotion and abstraction, further metaphorical elaboration would appear to be quite a stretch in this case, resulting in these occurrences of forcedynamics being somewhat less conducive to metaphorical schematization than the examples containing stronger modals.

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4.5.4 Modality: Conclusions A few conclusions on the functioning of modal auxiliaries in force-dynamic interactions can be enumerated. Firstly, the inherent force-dynamic nature of modal expressions supported in CG coincides with the examples of forcedynamics in the Keatsian corpus examined here. Next, the Keatsian corpus demonstrates that cognitive schemas of force-dynamics and G. Lakoff’s “Event Structure Metaphor” prove themselves to be as intertwined as G. Lakoff and Z. Kövecses argue that they are. However, a parallel between the weakening of the modal verbs and a decline in metaphorical specifcity has revealed itself in my analysis: the weaker the modal auxiliary, the less far along the chain of specifc, metaphorical delineations can the schematization go. Moreover, a variety of structural and semantic links are present in modally centered force-dynamic expressions. For example, declarative clauses tend to lend themselves to less complex (strictly interpersonal) forcedynamic interactions, whereas clauses of the imperative, interrogative, or even exhortative type appear to be fertile ground for more complex ones. This relation between clause type and modality seems to be linked to the strength of the modal auxiliary, as the majority of weak modal-containing clauses are declarative, with the other types of clauses typically going handin-hand with strong or medium modals: having an effect on the overall modality, force-dynamicity, metaphoricity, and emotional potency of the verses in question.

4.6 Talmy’s “Greater Modal System”: Semantic and Syntactic Closeness, Metaphoricity, and Emotional Salience 4.6.1 Sketching the Boundaries of the “Greater Modal System”: Grammatical Proof? The second category of grammatical representatives of force-dynamics is a pseudo-closed class of four transitive verbs, which take the bare infnitive form of the anteceding verb as their complement: make, let, have, and help (Talmy 1988: 65). These four verbs are accorded a special role in the expression of force-dynamics for several reasons. The most important of these, not only for our purposes here but for the general understanding of grammatical representation of force-dynamics in general, is the fact that these four verbs form a “syntactically defnable category [which] can be associated with a semantically characterizable category, thus lending relevance to both and support to the idea of structural integration in language” (Talmy 1988: 65). Talmy includes this set of four verbs in what he deems “the greater modal system” (1988: 80) based on similar tendencies between the set of transitives and the modal auxiliaries. Both share an inherent force-dynamic quality and the grammatical structure of being anteceded by a bare infnitive form of

82 Emotional Force-Dynamics another verb. In light of this, Talmy suggests that “these two categories together can be considered to form a single larger category […] with these same syntactic and semantic properties” (1988: 80–81). The complementary nature of the two verbal categories is made even clearer by the assertion that force-dynamic utterances with a modal auxiliary typically take the Agonist as the subject, while those with make, let, have, or help would take the Antagonist for the subject48: this allows the two sets to work together to express the greatest variety of force-dynamic tendencies possible. Talmy then claims that “with the greater modal system, English appears to have established a syntactic category to correspond, in part, to the semantic category of FD [force-dynamics]” (1988: 81). A quick glance at what CG has to say about these verbs and the common situations in which one can observe these verb constructions will both support and provide greater clarity concerning Talmy’s claims, thus preparing the terrain for poetic analysis. A sentence constructed with the verb help, such as: 1) She helped carry the trunk. falls under the category of a catenative construction, in which each anteceding verb acts as a complement to the precedent one (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 104). Although often identifed by a differing terminology, one can see an identical pattern in a clause containing a modal (auxiliary) verb, such as: 2) She must fnish his chapter before leaving. Huddleston and Pullum suggest that in catenative constructions, there exists “no contrast between auxiliary verbs and main verbs”49: they deem this point of view the “catenative-auxiliary analysis,” which fnds itself in opposition to the “dependent auxiliary analysis,” within which “core auxiliaries […] are dependents of the following lexical verb” (2002: 104). While modal verbs are often deemed as auxiliary verbs, there nevertheless exist high structural/syntactic and semantic similarities between examples (1) and (2): the frst verb, while acting as an auxiliary, is highly salient, semantically—in both cases, it carries a large amount of signifcance for the sense of the sentence, thus rendering it indispensable. In the cases of the other three verbs in the transitive set, make, let, and have, the structure is identical, but there is the addition of an indirect object in between the frst and second verbs, such as in: 3) Ashley had Laura fnish the cooking. The syntax found in the three examples above is also comparable to what Lapaire and Rotgé defne as the “relating” structure of modal auxiliaries: “S—MODAL—P” (1998: 477). The transitive verbs in question take on the same linking role between the subject and the second verb, hence Talmy’s claim for syntactic and grammatically semantic correlations between the two verbal categories. Langacker’s defnition of modality as a grammatical and/or semantic category that “lead[s]

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to the execution of an action” (2008: 304) is also equipollent with the semantics of these four transitive verbs, particularly in light of their inherent force-dynamicity. One can also clearly see a “future-oriented” element in expressions which make use of these verbs, as in the case of modal auxiliaries. In a similar vein to Talmy’s suggestion, Huddleston and Pullum include the lexical verbs allow, permit, and let in their category of weak modality, suggesting that they “express deontic possibility, permission […] [and are] also generally used in a causative sense similar to enable” (2002: 208). While there are clear semantic similarities between these verbs and the “traditional” modal auxiliaries, they are syntactically different, as allow and permit may be followed by to plus the lexical verb. Therefore, allow and permit do not “technically” ft the (structural) description of modal verbs. It is thus clear that semantic and syntactic proof exists concerning the compatibility and resemblance of modal auxiliaries and the four lexical transitive verbs of let, make, have, and help: I thus support Talmy’s opening up of the modal category so as to include this group of four verbs, as an analysis gains validation if it can link together phenomena not previously connected. Such is the case with the present combining of two syntactic categories and their joint association with a semantic category. Such syntactic-semantic linkage is especially signifcant since it attests to linguistic integration. (Talmy 1988: 81) This “linguistic integration” is particularly relevant to the goals of this chapter. The upcoming section will take a look at the utilization of this category of verbs in Keats’s works. 4.6.2 The Greater Modal System in the Keatsian Corpus. Metaphorical and Emotional Consequences: The Case of Let Here, I will discuss the syntax and semantics of let, and the force-dynamic relations that it profles in Keats’s poetry. The examples will frst be analyzed in terms of the type of modal, emotionally force-dynamic interactions that occur thanks to the inclusion of this special, force-dynamic verb. An analysis of the intrinsic modality of the verb will follow, concluding with an examination of the metaphorical benefts and/or repercussions of such syntactic choices. I will take fve examples of the verb let in a force-dynamic context of permission or “enablement” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 208). As the semantics of these examples are highly analogous, it seems fruitful to consider them together.

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These fve extracts present more or less identical examples of the syntactic structure: “VERB—DIRECT OBJECT—BARE INFINITIVE COMPLEMENT.” Another notable congruence is the similarity of the direct objects. In four out of six cases, the direct object reveals itself to be a personal pronoun: me, me, us, and me, respectively. The other two examples provide us with the nominals “my spirit” and “the amorous.” Four out of fve verses are imperative—even exhortative—clauses, with one example falling under the category of a declarative type clause. We can note interpersonal force-dynamics across the board, with a stronger Antagonist and a weaker Agonist. These cases of interpersonal force-dynamics are somewhat particular, however, as the weaker Agonist appeals to the Antagonist (in four out of fve extracts) to provide permission, or enable, a certain action. In each case, however, the Agonist is aware of the power the Antagonist holds over the situation. This brings us back to the concept of the Self, mentioned above: what we have here is an emotional Self, operating consciously within the emotional force-dynamic realm. In force-dynamic vocabulary, we have a stronger Antagonist giving the weaker Agonist the possibility or the permission to accomplish the act verbalized by the lexical verb (Talmy 1988: 82). The Agonist’s impingement in these cases allows for the culmination of an emotional action or state for the Agonist: each case depicts a resultant situation of movement. The emotional nature of these verses—and thus, the lexical elements that compose them—is essential to analyze as well. The verbs that follow in the catenative chain, following let, in the examples are the following: blood,

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begin (my dream), burn, have (thee whole), wish, rest, and laugh. Each of the force-dynamic relations profled in these verses depicts a weaker Agonist urging the stronger Antagonist to permit, or enable him, to fully delve into the emotional experience at hand. The element of enabling is best translatable by the idea of the releasing of a barrier that inhibits full emotional experience. This idea of enablement or permission raises questions concerning the metaphorical structuring of the force-dynamic relationships profled here: how can the conceptual metaphor of CAUSES ARE FORCES (Kövecses 2008)— and, potentially, its emotional delineations—be transferable to this type of interaction, in which the force is actually a sort of letting go? The majority of the previous examples in this chapter have demonstrated direct applications of force. The response can be found in two inherent qualities of these types of constructions. The frst is the innate force-dynamic quality of the lexical element let. The stronger Antagonist enables the Agonist’s movement: we can thus understand the force of permission as within a cause and effect structure, with the cause being a force, a release of tension, instigating motion on the part of the Agonist.50 Second, there is an innate connection between the syntax of such constructions and their inherent metaphoricity. A catenative construction is, indeed, a chain of cause and effect: the placement and type of each verb enable it being anteceded by the following, thus allowing each predicate to manifest. This syntactic schema is grammatical metaphoricity in catenative constructions, with each element necessitating the next, or at least allowing for it to exist within the clause. This catenative element is, moreover, a defning element of force-dynamics in general, but even more specifcally of psychosocial force-dynamics, as Talmy notes, “the forcedynamic system in language is not limited to a small inventory of simplex patterns but has the property of open-ended generativity” (1988: 73). This “generativity” is one of the key traits of force-dynamic, linguistic, expression, particularly in the abstract realm of causality.51 This structural metaphoricity can also be seen in the “relating” (Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 482) schema of modal auxiliaries (SUBJECT—MODAL— PREDICATE). The syntactical succession necessarily found within these constructions is ultimately metaphorical for the semantics of what is expressed via such structures. This is coherent with the criteria for conceptual metaphor proposed by Lakoff, one of the three points of reference being “the systematicity in linguistic correspondences” (1990: 50). The above examples from Keats are metaphorically grounded in the Event Structure Metaphor52: their formal organization, along with the sense of the verses, is proof enough of this. However, a fnal similarity exists between let “modality” and the weak modality analyzed above: Huddleston and Pullum suggest that predicates such as let, allow, and permit can be considered as belonging to the category of weak modality.53 In the analysis of weak modal auxiliaries, I came to the conclusion that weak modals appear more limited

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in their expression of conceptual metaphor. While inherently metaphorical, and having for framework the Event Structure Metaphor, more specifc metaphorical delineations were diffcult or even impossible to identify in the weak modality examples. The same appears to be true for the above examples containing let. As mentioned above, the foundation of these expressions in the Event Structure Metaphor is undeniable, but further, more specifc, emotional delineations of this conceptual metaphor are not possible, in large part due to the fact that the cause/force stems from the Antagonist— an individual or an external element, such as space or time—as opposed to from emotion itself. This grammatical and metaphorical parallel, which not only allows for and supports the inclusion of the four transitive verbs let, make, have, and help in a broader system of modality but also provides cognitive and semantic reasoning to the structure of force-dynamic, modal, and indeed metaphorical schemas. This argument is perhaps best summed up by Lakoff when he says: What is more interesting, and I think more exciting, is the realization that many of the most basic concepts in semantics are also understood metaphorically—concepts like time, quantity, state, change, action, cause, purpose, means, modality, and even the concept of a category. These are concepts that enter normally into the grammars of languages, and if they are indeed metaphorical in nature, then metaphor becomes central to grammar. (Lakoff 1990: 51) The sixth extract containing let employs the term in a different sense than that of enabling or permitting. The following verses come from “To Fanny” and present two occurrences of let, with the second instance followed by the weak modal auxiliary may: (15) Let none profane my Holy See of love, / Or with a rude hand break / The sacramental cake: / Let none else touch the just new-budded fower. / If not—may my eyes close, / Love! On their last repose. (“To Fanny,” lines 51–56) The force-dynamic interaction expressed within these lines is of identical structure to examples (10)–(14), above: VERB—DIRECT OBJECT— BARE INFINITIVE COMPLEMENT. The sole real disparity between example (15) and the previous extracts is the semantics of let: here, the predicate takes on a meaning of prohibition or restriction, in contrast to the frst fve examples. The structure of the force-dynamic interaction remains the same, with a stronger, external, Antagonist (here denoted by the negative marker none), instigating a causal chain of emotional essence. Congruence is also found in the lexical elements that follow let, once again of a highly emotional nature: “profane” and “touch.” The presence of the

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weak modal may in these verses is also interesting to note, as it plays a role in the conditional type structure begun by the let repetition, terminating in “if not—may.” May, along with the conditional formulation, allows for a manifestation of the emotional cause and effect interaction in the verses, providing a concrete (although perhaps slightly metaphorical, or at least hyperbolical) image of the emotional profoundness of the situation, emphasized by the gravity of the potential effect (death). There is a high level of congruence in terms of metaphorical schematization of these verses with the previous examples containing let. The same arguments thus apply: in part, due to the weak modality possessed by the lexeme in question, the extension of the conceptually metaphorical structure appears to slow down after the initial mapping of CAUSES ARE FORCES. A similar grammatical representation of the conceptual metaphor within the syntactic structure of the verses exists here as in (10)–(14). The force-dynamic interactions represented through the transitive verb let have provided evidence to support Talmy’s original claim that the set of four transitive verbs that take a bare infnitive form of the following verb as a complement (make, let, have, and help, as it were) allow for a widening of the scope of the category of modality within the English language, based on their behavior in force-dynamic schemas, the semantics inherent to said schemas, and the grammatical behavior and tendencies that both categories of verbs have in common. The metaphorically based link between modal auxiliaries defned as “weak modals” and the verb let further encourages and supports the creation of the “greater modal system.” The above sections have demonstrated that modal auxiliaries and let hold very similar levels of metaphorical salience, within the semantics of the expressions as well as the grammatical structure of the sentences. This reinforces G. Lakoff’s claim that the “Invariance Hypothesis”54 clarifes the interdependence between grammar and semantics, rendering cognitively based grammatical analysis all the more worthwhile and fruitful to the study of language.55

CASE STUDY: “TO FANNY,” LINES 1–6 (16) Physician Nature! Let my spirit blood! / O ease my heart of verse and let me rest: / Throw me upon thy Tripod, till the food / Of stifing numbers ebbs from my full breast. /A theme! a theme! great nature! give a theme; / Let me begin my dream. (“To Fanny,” lines 1–6)

These verses express a sort of mixed force-dynamics, in terms of the dialectic between the Agonist and the Antagonist, thanks to the transitive form

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(with a base verb complement), thrice repeated, of the verb let. The reader fnds herself/himself in the presence of an Antagonist whose emotional force is greater than the Agonist’s. The Agonist, however, is capable of recognizing said strength and implores the Antagonist to make use of said force. This is done by the use of let in an imperative form: “psychosocial ‘pressure,’” (Talmy 1988: 50). The force-dynamics here is simultaneously interpersonal and intrapersonal. In this extract, the poet draws the reader into the world of emotion resulting in poetic or artistic expression, which demands an even higher self-awareness (on the part of the Agonist) than in the previous example(s). The Antagonist, Nature, possesses the capability of opening up the poet to the sensation of relief from the emotional weight imposed upon him by the duty of poetic creation. The force-dynamics here operates in multiple directions: the Agonist desires a release within his Spirit that only the Antagonist can provide (the Agonist thus has a tendency towards action that visibly needs to be restrained), depicted by the predicates let and throw: they are then lexically and semantically supported by the verbs ease and rest. The fnal tendency towards rest and relief is realized in the last two lines, where the Agonist calls upon the Antagonist to provide him with a “theme” so he can successfully fade away into a slumberous, dreamy state. The use of predicates of a more physical, forceful nature (blood, throw, ebb, etc.) reinforces the metaphorical expression of emotion and artistic expression by using a physical source domain and then softening into a more abstract verbal expression, via the verb dream. These multiple lexical elements allow for a metaphorical understanding of the conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES / EMOTION IS FORCE, particularly by way of the more specifc delineations EMOTION IS A NATURAL / PHYSICAL FORCE, in the sense that the “Physician Nature” is capable of allowing the “Spirit” of the poet to bleed (“blood”), “ease [his] heart,” “throw [him] upon [a] Tripod and let [him] rest,” begin dreaming and, thus, eventually, be at the causal force of poetic creation. Moreover, in terms of stylistic and poetic effects, Keats utilizes here what Tsur calls “emotive crescendos”: “a pattern frequently consisting of two contrasting ends of the emotive scale” (2008: 446). This is executed via the terms food and ebb. Another sort of emotive crescendo consists of “two ends [of a line, poem, etc.] frequently marked by some similar or even identical element” (ibid.), which can be seen in line 2, with ease and rest (directly following an imperative case of let). These reinforce the emotive quality of the lines, thus highlighting the importance of the presence of the predicates in the latter. The special case of let is thus both symbolic and symptomatic of the relationship between force-dynamic interaction and emotion, both of which are at the heart of Keats’s poetry, specifcally in terms of his unique manner of verbalizing emotional experience. Furthermore, the intermediary case of

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let is demonstrative of the inherent fexibility within the modal expression, both in Keatsian verse and beyond.

4.7 Force-Dynamics in Perception and Emotion Verbs 4.7.1 Foundations In this section, I will look at the fnal verbal category to be examined in terms of its force-dynamic role: perception and emotion verbs. Perception verbs express sensory experience, i.e., hear, see, smell, taste. Emotion verbs are those for which profle relationships are based on abstract or emotional qualities or situations. Givón categorizes verbs of emotion, cognition, and intent as verbs belonging to the selfsame category, with the “common denominator … [of] consciousness” (1979: 337). This brings to mind the psychological, or psychosocial, quality of the force-dynamic interactions that are the focus of this analysis: it is thus not surprising that Keats would have chosen this type of lexical verb as one of the main predicative elements to express psychological, emotionally anchored, force-dynamics. Furthermore, the lexical openness of this category allows for the same quality in the force-dynamic interactions that they verbalize: force-dynamic relations illustrated by these verbs are ones where one can relish in the true poetic heights of Keats’s expression, as these are situations in which the poet allows himself—without hesitation—to “commit organized violence to organized cognitive schemas.” Jespersen claims that “the verb is a life-giving element” (1924: 86). In this section I will attempt to demonstrate that in Keats’s poetry, this is undeniably true: that verbs provide the force-dynamic interactions with their effervescent quality, allowing for full, multi-faceted, and at times complex expansion of causality. Perception and emotion verbs play an essential role in the liberation of the force-dynamic expression chez Keats. They lead to utterances that are often highly metaphorical or metonymical, in the domain of the sensory or the abstract, often synesthetic and promulgating a variety of grammatical tenses. This renders the expressions in which they are placed unique, while all the while remaining within the established cognitive schema of force-dynamics. Moreover, the effect on the reader is potentially one of heightened intensity, as the notion of perception “presupposes a certain kind of cooperation on the perceiver’s part” (Tsur 2008: 30): this is perhaps even more the case in highly metaphorical or synesthetic descriptions of perception. A high level of metaphoricity exists in force-dynamic relations profled via these emotion or perception verbs, combining multiple conceptual schemas, due to the intrinsic causality within the expressions and the abstractness of the subject matter. I will also look at the sensorial content of these types of expressions, along with Keats’s tendency to employ “synesthetic” verbalizations of sensory experiences. Sensorial mixing in this sense is common in Keatsian poetry,

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and not only in utterances that fall under the category of force-dynamic or causal, as Fogle observes: Synesthesia in Keats is a natural concomitant of other qualities of his poetry. […] He has at his command an unexampled abundance of vivid sensory images. Therefore he slips readily from one order of sensation to another when it suits his poetic purpose, like a master improviser who transposes his theme into a different key. […] The synesthetic imagery of Keats is almost always actuated by a desire to attain the fullest possible sensuous effect. (R. Fogle, quoted in Bate 1945: 41) 4.7.2 Metaphorical Doubling: Doubling of Force (Dynamics)? As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, Lakoff suggests that the Event Structure Metaphor is essential to the cognitive schematization and linguistic expression of force-dynamics. Furthermore, he purports that the notions of causation and change contain elevated levels of inherent metaphorical complexity (Lakoff 1990: 61). This most often results from the “combining” of two or more established conceptual metaphors: “this kind of complex interaction is common for the causes-as-forces metaphor” (Espenson in Lakoff 1990: 61). Keats’s language provides more—poetic—proof for Espenson and Lakoff’s joint claim, as this type of combinatory metaphorical interaction is indeed present within his oeuvre, and reveals itself to be a key component of potent, psychosocial or emotional, force-dynamics. These interactions consistently have a stronger Antagonist, impinging upon a weaker Agonist. Furthermore, one can note a tightly wound interweaving, or blending, between the notions of space and emotion: thus, more generally, a “linking of a psychological with a physical force-dynamic pattern” (Talmy 1988: 73). The metaphoricity of emotionally based forcedynamic interactions brings to mind the blurred frontiers between emotional, metaphorical, and physical space: does such a distinction truly exist? And furthermore, what does it mean to truly be, or exist in a certain location? How does one enter into, or exit from, a defned place, be it an enclosed garden, surrounded by hedges or a fence with a lock and key, or state of being: a state of madness, of ecstasy, or, in simpler terms, to simply “be in a good place right now”? The simultaneous simplicity, essentiality, and complexity of force-dynamics may shed some light on these questionings, by eliminating the barriers between the psychological and the physical, between the metaphorical and the literal. Bachelard suggests a more nuanced, less dialectic approach to space, in order to support these arguments: le dedans et le dehors vécus par l’imagination ne peuvent plus être pris dans leur simple réciprocité ; dès lors, en ne parlant plus de géométrique

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pour dire les premières expressions de l’être, en choisissant des départs plus concrets, plus phénoménologiquement exacts, nous nous rendrons compte que la dialectique du dedans et du dehors se multiplie et se diversife en d’innombrables nuances. (Bachelard 1957: 195).56 Emotional force-dynamics allows for an evolution of the rhetoric of space, as space is revealed as inherently metaphorical, whether the space is imaginative, emotional, or concrete. Thanks to the usage of conceptual metaphor, or the cognitive schemas of EXISTENCE IS LOCATION HERE (or the inverse, NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY) (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41) and STATES ARE LOCATIONS / BOUNDED AREAS (Kövecses 2000: 52) blended with the conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES, space is conceived of in a broader sense, based on the presence (or absence) of emotion. So as to apply this open, sensuous, and abstract approach to space, let us consider the following three examples from Keats: (17) Forlorn! The very word is like a bell / To toll me back from thee to my sole self. / Adieu! the fancy cannot cheat so well / As she is famed to do, deceiving elf (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 71–74) (18) Thus plaining, doth she bring / A gentler speech from burning Porphyro (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 158–160) (19) “O leave me not in this eternal woe, / For if thou diest, my Love, I know not where to go.” (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 314–315” Each of these groups of verses presents a combination of one or more of the EXISTENCE / STATE metaphors, along with CAUSES ARE FORCES: each one, of course, operating in a different manner, so that the semantic result is not identical. In the lines from “Ode to a Nightingale,” both STATES ARE BOUNDED AREAS and NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY can be effectively seen. The lines describe an event—here, of a sensorial nature, a word uttered, compared to the tolling of a bell—which moves the poetic Self in question in an internal direction, away from the interlocutor, back to his “sole self.”57 The sensory event (of an auditory nature) in these verses takes on the role of the stronger Antagonist, forcing the weaker Agonist to action. Force-dynamically, impingement from an external source takes place, its force applied to the stronger Antagonist and then directed towards the weaker Agonist. The force and resulting tendencies here thus change throughout the expression: the Agonist has an inherent tendency towards rest, whereas the Antagonist

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applies causal force, thus resulting in the starting of action (tolling, bringing, and knowing) on the part of the Agonist (Talmy 1988: 57). The Antagonist’s effect here is thus one of “causing” (ibid.) a force “applied to the patient” (Lakoff 1990: 63) resulting in the Agonist’s fnding himself in a state of introversion, which is conceived here as a bounded area: one into which he had to re-enter, after having previously exited. The use of the present simple in these verses allows for the expression of an event occurring at one given moment, without question of repetition. However, the inherent metaphor allows for an understanding of the Agonist remaining in the location into which he has been forced: as the STATE is a bounded location, another event must occur for the Agonist to change spaces. In the two extracts from “The Eve of St. Agnes,” the causal action, or movement, of the Antagonist is perceived differently. Unlike the previous verses, in which the Antagonist’s movement is portrayed and perceived as a more brusque, one-time occurrence, the Antagonist’s action in these examples is a more prolonged, elaborated motion, “a continuous application of force” (Lakoff 1990: 62) or “extended impingement of the Antagonist,” or “extended causation” (Talmy 1988: 55). In the frst selection of verses, two conceptual metaphors CAUSES ARE FORCES and EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41) are combined. The predicate bring verbalizes the causal force action of the Antagonist—Madeline, and her complaints. The reader fnds herself once again in the domain of elocution and audition, as in the verses from “Ode to a Nightingale.” Madeline’s complaints which bring about a reaction in Porphyro, somewhat ironically, or coincidentally, in the same domain: language. Bring, in this case, verbalizes an application of force onto the speech event, allowing it to come into existence: specifcally, in the form desired by the Antagonist, a sweeter speech, which gives form to the emotional expression so desired by Madeline (Poryphro’s “gentler speech,” as well as his “burning” with love and lust for her). The imperfective aspect of the frst predicate, plaining,58 further reinforces this notion of a constant application of force, as the –ing ending allows for the comprehension of a repetitive, or fowing, action.59 The sensorial aspect of the interaction, already established by the foundation of the auditory and verbal domains in which the action takes place, is further reinforced by the sensuous adjectives of gentler and burning, which provide, as it were, an inherent contrast in and of themselves. The last selection of verses presents a similar extended application of force, but with a different metaphorical resonance. Due to the application of force upon the Agonist, as opposed to the event, we can see in these lines the metaphorical combination of CAUSES ARE FORCES and EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS (Kövecses 2008: 59). The metaphoricity and abstraction of these lines are particularly high, and this for a couple of reasons. The frst, and perhaps the most foundational, is the fact that Madeline, the speaker in these lines (directing her speech towards her beloved Poryphro), is in a dream-like state at this point

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in the poem, having just experienced, and thus not being fully awakened from, the notorious dreams of St. Agnes’ Eve. Thus, the emotional state she expresses in these lines is not actually refective of the reality at hand, but rather of the contrast between the Poryphro she sees with her real eyes and the Poryphro of her dream world. Madeline’s beloved is not actually on the verge of death, although she elucidates her fear of this in the lines preceding the extract, he simply seems to be so, in contrast with the vision she had of him in her dream. Thus, Madeline’s state of “eternal woe” is in reality not merited, as the situation she is imagining is simply that: imaginary. However, the fanciful aspect of her analysis of her emotional state, combined with the strong metaphoricity of her expression: “in this eternal woe,” in which STATES ARE (BOUNDED) LOCATIONS (Kövecses 2000: 52) allows for a rather elevated level of emotional impact within the expression. Grammar is key here. The spatial preposition in is essential to the verbalization of the conceptual metaphor—the latter could not exist without it (or a prepositional synonym). Madeline verbalizes her sensation of feeling truly within a particular location: that of “eternal woe.” This articulation, however, renders the force-dynamic interaction slightly more complex. The lexical elements preceding the pure metaphorical expression lead the reader to understand that Madeline believes Poryphro to be in control of her emotional STATE, creating fertile ground for a rather typical stronger Antagonist, weaker Agonist force-dynamic schema. However, the fact that Madeline (the Agonist) is aware of the Antagonist’s strength introduces another element into the force-dynamic interaction. Madeline remains in a STATE of submission in regard to Poryphro at this given moment, but her awareness of her position endows her with a certain dose of strength, and the imperative utterance “O leave me not” could even be construed as a possibility to change the situation. Furthermore, the conditional structure in verse 315 (“For if thou diest, my Love, I know not where to go”) further reinforces the spatiality of the metaphor, along with Madeline’s (hypothetical) contingency, or reliance, on Poryphro’s state of well-being. Him no longer being in existence would cause both mental and physical obstruction to Madeline, as clearly emphasized by way of the predicates know (along with the negation marker not) and go. These lines also exhibit the catenative construction previously discussed: each predicate is contingent upon the previous. Madeline’s emotional state is thus dependent on Poryphro’s: this is an example of pure “grammatical representation”—in multiple forms—of emotional force-dynamic interaction. This force-dynamic interaction falls in a sort of “grey area,” unique to psychosocial causal exchanges—or at a minimum, physical force-dynamic exchanges between two conscious entities or beings—as the consciousness of both parties involved is a necessary requisite for this sort of complexity: inanimate objects, for example, obviously cannot be aware of the force being exerted over them. This sine-qua-non thus brings us back to the notions of consciousness enumerated earlier throughout this chapter, thus reminding

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us that heightened, or at least differing, levels of consciousness are essential to the poeticity of a text. 4.7.3 In Between (Spatial/Locative) Metaphor and Synesthesia In Towards a Theory of Cognitive Poetics, Tsur defnes the concept of what he entitles “synesthetic metaphor” as a metaphor containing “terms derived from two sensory domains” (2008: 245). This type of combinatory, abstract language has the potential to heighten the emotional quality of the text through the presence of the conceptual metaphor—which, as I explained in Chapter 2, allows for a deeper cognitive imprint upon the reader—along with the elevated sensorial, emotional, and poetic quality that synesthetic expression permits, as Fogle suggests: Keats’s pursuit of rich, full, sensuous effects is incidental to a more arduous quest, his search for fullness and completeness of meaning. […] Consequently, his fusions and transferences of sensation are incidental to his deeper, more complex syntheses of poetic experience, in which intellect, sense, and emotion are inseparably interwoven. His synesthetic imagery is an outward manifestation of his intuitive sense of the Oneness of things, of the relationships between widely separate and dissimilar phenomena, of the intimate kinship of man and nature. (Fogle, quoted in Bate 1945: 42) Keats’s synesthetic metaphor provides evidence for the expression of rich consciousness that appears to be one of the aims of his poetic creation: a consciousness which allows for a wide-range exposition along with a profound analysis of the Self and its multiple facets. Moreover, I believe that synesthetic expression of sensory experiences provides a certain level of iconicity to a text that employs such expressions, allowing them to potentially leave a deeper imprint upon the mind of the reader. Beyond this, from a combination of senses would logically follow an increase in the level of sensuousness of an expression, thus augmenting the sensate quality of the poetry. These characteristics thus have the capacity to play a role in the potency of the psychological or psychosocial force-dynamic interaction expressed linguistically. Consider the following lines from “To Fanny” as an illustration of these phenomena: (20) Withhold no atom’s atom or I die, / Or living on, perhaps, your wretched thrall, /Forget, in the midst of idle misery, / Life’s purposes,— the palate of my mind / Losing its gust, and my ambition blind! (“I cry your mercy-pity-love!—aye, love!”, lines 10–14) These verses demonstrate, undeniably, the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE. Once again, the spatial preposition in proves

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itself to be essential in the articulation of the metaphor, as seen in line 12: “in the midst of idle misery.” The poet’s expression of his hypothetical STATE of misery is highly analogous to the verbalization of this conceptual metaphor seen in the precedent example: not only is the poet’s emotional state, without question, seen as a location, but the speaker’s (Agonist’s) occupation of such an emplacement is dependent on the stronger Antagonist’s choice of emotional path. If the Antagonist (Fanny) decides to not fully give herself to the poet, he will either: cease to exist, or else fnd himself in a state of “idle misery.” Furthermore, as in the previous example, this is a case of a “consciously” weak Agonist. Lacking in strength in opposition to a stronger Antagonist, the Agonist is nevertheless aware of the Antagonist’s power, and of the actions that the latter could take. This thus results in the manifestation of the spatial conceptual metaphor. The resultant condition for the Agonist is one of rest, as opposed to action. Conceptual metaphor—further reinforced by the dialectic between the notions of life and death evoked in lines 10–11—evolves into sensuous, synesthetic imagery from line 13 onward, in which the mental is compared with the gustative (“the palate of my mind / losing its gust”) and the emotional with the visual (“my ambition blind”). These verses make use of terms related to the more “palpable” senses so as to express the emotional state of the speaker. This technique provides tangibility to the emotional content and delivers a richer image system to the description of the (hypothetical) emotional state of the speaker. The same conceptual metaphor, along with highly synesthetic imagery— employing different senses—is found in the following lines from “The Eve of St. Agnes”: (21) Sudden a thought came like a full-blown rose, / Flushing his brow, and in his painèd heart / Made purple riot (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 146–148) As in the previous verses analyzed, we here have a case of the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE IS LOCATION HERE, or even an emotional delineation of this conceptual metaphor, EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41). In this force-dynamic interaction, the physical entity defnable as the Agonist is Poryphro, and the Antagonist, “a thought,” an abstraction. The latter is clearly emotionally centered, as the effects of its entering into Poryphro’s psyche are evidently emotional. The predicate come, along with the spatial preposition in, renders this metaphorical expression possible. Furthermore, the emotional quality of such reactions is proven and reinforced by the conceptual metonymies of EFFECTS OF A STATE FOR A STATE and BLUSHING FOR LOVE (Kövecses 2000: 134, 124), emphasized, in part, by the predicate (in its imperfective form) fush. The metonymicity of these lines is valuable not only for the cognitive support and universality that conceptual metonymy provides but also for the reinforcement of the force-dynamic

96 Emotional Force-Dynamics quality of the interaction taking place. The physiological effects of the emotion(s) experienced by the Antagonist enumerated in the verses, which through the use of metonymy stand in for the emotions at hand, allow for a most profound verbalization of the result of the force-dynamic relation upon the Agonist. In general, this type of expression elucidates the interdependence of force-dynamics and conceptual metaphor and/or metonymy. The synesthetic language, as in example (1), is found in a comparison between an abstraction and multiple physical senses: “[the thought] in his painèd heart / made purple riot.” First of all, the synesthetic language is placed in close proximity to the linguistic elements of the conceptual metaphor. We could thus talk about “synesthetic metaphor,” as the synesthesia is taking place within the metaphor. The use of the notion of “thought” as the Antagonist, moreover, guides the reader into the realm of consciousness, moving beyond that of simple emotion(s). The synesthetic combination of senses offers a forceful image of said result: purple riot—in conjunction with thought—brings together the mental, the visual (due to the inclusion of a color term, moreover applied to a noun with which it is typically not combined), and a combination of visual and auditory with “riot,” as the term leads to sensory input in both domains. The element of visual input is, obviously, reinforced by the addition of the adjectival color term purple. This is all the more poignant when envisioned near the “fushing” (of pinkish/reddish/purplish hues) mentioned in the precedent line. Lastly, while not necessarily synesthetic, the simile “a thought came / like a full-blown rose” provides a tangible quality to the notion of thought, working together with the conceptual metaphor(s) and metonymies to intensify the overall imagery of the verses and thus deepening the effect of the emotional force-dynamic relation profled. The subtle combination of conceptual metaphor and/or metonymy (particularly those related to the Event Structure Metaphor, space, and the physiological effects of emotion) and synesthetic imagery functions well hand-in-hand with force-dynamic interactions. These cognitively based and stylistic elements fnd their origins, as well as a powerful representation, in grammar. 4.7.4 Sensorial Force = Synesthetic Effects? A simple reading of his poetic oeuvre provides ample evidence for the highly emotional quality of Keats’s writings. This is due, in part, to the recurring presence of elaborated, imaginative, and unique imagery, which has come to be known as one of the defning factors of Keatsian poetry. This is perhaps not surprising in light of his place as a poet of the Romantic tradition. Tsur suggests that this dépassement of more “traditional” imagistic description, towards a more profound description of sensory experiences, moves both the Poet and the Reader into the domain of discovery and of creation of relations that had perhaps not been fully grasped or developed: “the

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Romantic poets sought to discover, with the help of their imagination, the transcendental order inaccessible to the senses in nature, that is accessible to the senses” (Tsur 2008: 428). This is seen in the mixing of the expressions of sensual expressions in order to intensify and clarify the sensorial effects which take place within emotional experience. The verbalization of causal interactions is one of the ways in which Keats excels at articulating such sensory, oneiric, and affective situations and their effects. The following four extracts give form to the rather broad scale of sensory refections in Keatsian force-dynamics: (22) Yet I never did breathe its pure serene / Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold: / Then felt I like some watcher of the skies / When a new planet swims into his ken (“On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer,” lines 8–9) (23) Fools! If some passions high have warm’d the world (“Modern Love,” line 11) (24) The blissful cloud of summer indolence / Benumb’d my eyes; my pulse grew less and less; / Pain had no sting, and pleasure’s wreath no fower: / O, why did ye melt, and leave my sense / Unhaunted of quite of all but—nothingness? (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 16–20) (25) And scarce three steps, ere Music’s golden tongue / Flatter’d to tears this aged man and poor. (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 20–21) To begin with, each group of verses possesses and demonstrates a forcedynamic relationship with a stronger Antagonist, imposing force upon a weaker Agonist. In each case, the Antagonist is explicitly mentioned: in example (22), the Agonist is the grammatical subject, but in examples (23)– (25), the Antagonist reigns as the grammatical subject of the phrase(s) in which it appears. This choice has an obvious effect on the sensorial content, as well as the emotional intensity, of the examples at hand: a quick readthrough of the verses provides proof that the latter three examples are of more forceful character than the frst, thus resulting in a stronger effect on the reader. This is not solely due to this phenomenon. However, it can be safely assumed that the weaker, receptive position of the Agonist, when placed in the position of the grammatical subject, results in a subsequent clause with a lower level of inherent strength, whereas the inverse is the case when the stronger Antagonist is placed in the position of the grammatical subject.60 This phenomenon—and thus, the difference between (22) and (23)–(25), is most likely due to the inclusion of an agent (“Chapman,” or his writings) in example (22)—thus resulting in the classifcation of such

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a clause as an “agentive” clause—whereas the verses found in (23)–(25) would fall under the category of “autonomous” force-dynamic occurrences (Talmy 1988: 60). Although both types of sentences “maintain all the same force-dynamic properties” (ibid.), the distance added into the physical construction of the sentence—specifcally between the agent, the subject, and the result of the force-dynamic interaction—results in a product of the interaction of lesser intensity, acting thus as an (inverse) embodiment of the conceptual metaphor CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT, in which “the effect of the syntax is to indicate the directness of the experience, and the CLOSENESS indicates the STRENGTH of that EFFECT” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 128). Each of these examples contains a similar synesthetic effect analyzed in the previous section: a sort of transfer of emotional experience between an abstract, emotional entity (the Antagonist) and a sensory, physiological effect on the Agonist. This synesthetic transfer is seen in the lines above in fuctuating extremes, in regard to varying senses. The reader encounters the “breathing” of “serene” and the “feeling” of being a “watcher” as a result of an auditory (poetic) experience; “passions” which warm the world; indolence, capable of “benum’b[ing]” one’s vision, combined with a diminution of the pulse, and eventually the loss of all tactile feeling altogether; and the “golden tongue” of Music herself fattering a man to tears. Each of these paraphrased situations is a force-dynamic relation, simultaneously expressed in abstract, emotional, and tangibly sensuous terms. The sensory mixing, or synesthetic effects, results in a more powerful, more “emotional” expression of the force-dynamic interactions on the reader, as Tsur suggests, in saying that “the reader’s attitude, in turn, is determined to a considerable extent by the psychological atmosphere of the specifc text: whether it contains solid objects or thing-free qualities” (2008: 428). Here, Keats offers his reader a mix of both, as if he wished to impart a dreamy, romantic, emotionality to the text, while all the while providing the reader with something palpable to rest her or his spirit upon, so as to not get lost. For each resultant effect of the emotional force-dynamic interactions—possessing a high level of abstraction or, in three out of four cases, an abstract grammatical subject—an embodied, sensuous element fnds its place in the text. With regard to grammar, it is worth noting that each predicate is found in its past simple (perfective) form.

CASE STUDY: “ODE ON INDOLENCE,” LINES 16–20 (26) The blissful cloud of summer indolence / Benumb’d my eyes; my pulse grew less and less; / Pain had no sting, and pleasure’s wreath no fower: / O, why did ye melt, and leave my sense / Unhaunted of quite of all but—nothingness? (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 16–20)

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These verses offer fairly straightforward examples of emotional, interpersonal force-dynamics. Moreover, an abstraction (Indolence itself) acts as the Antagonist and the poet as the Agonist. However, unlike in the previous examples, the emotional force-dynamics result in a loss or lack of emotion. This absence is primarily expressed via the predicates in the lines, and supported by various nominal elements, such as cloud, no sting, no fower, and nothingness. Adjectival and adverbial elements such as less and unhaunted act as further semantic support. In this way, the Antagonist acts as a sort of psychological impediment to the Agonist, robbing him of any emotional experience (be it positive or negative) whatsoever: this results in a tendency towards rest as opposed to action, to translate this situation into concrete force-dynamic terms. The predicates here fall essentially under the category of perception verbs, in the case of benumb’d, reinforced by the possessive “had no sting / no fower,” or emotion verbs, in a metonymic sense, as in grew. There is one example of a particular force-dynamic predicate (Talmy 1988: 60–65) with leave, which can be considered as a sort of supporting predicate for the other linguistic elements present here, which have a more primary role in the force-dynamic and metaphoric expression. “The blissful cloud of summer-indolence” robs the poet of sight: the poet’s eyes are benumb’d, which frst leads to a physical handicap, shortly followed by an emotional one: the inability to feel the sting of pain and the fower—easily interpreted as delight—of pleasure. This sensorial loss could even be considered as going a step further, given the use of the possessive predicate have: the emotional and physical qualities normally associated with pain and pleasure have been removed from them, according to the poet, the expression thus dares to go beyond the poet’s simple perception of the situation. Grew, referring to the diminution of the Agonist’s pulse, allows for the addition of another conceptual metaphor, EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (Kövecses 2000: 37, 83–85). The weakening of the pulse is a physical manifestation of the poet’s loss of the ability to feel or experience. This is yet another physical expression of the preventative or prohibitive force played upon the Agonist by the stronger Antagonist. The stronger Agonist effectively stops the action of the Agonist, preventing it from its inherent tendency towards movement, thus leading to a resultant state of rest. The special force-dynamic verb leave in these lines, placed within dialogue by the Agonist towards the Antagonist, displays the poet’s understanding of Indolence’s strength as opposed to his, as he wonders why she did not “leave his sense unhaunted”: that is to say, why did she not avoid placing the force-dynamic pressure upon him, and thus not impose the psychological brake that has been placed upon him. This dialogue demonstrates the Agonist’s awareness of the submissive situation in which he fnds himself: a certain level of consciousness of the Self is present. However, the expression

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of the Self is rather limited here, as it is simply able to observe what has happened, but remains unable to act. On a more stylistic note, these lines could be considered as “divergent,” according to Tsur’s criteria of convergence and divergence, given the high nominal frequency within them.61 This provides the text with “a certain elusive, emotional, or sublime quality,” or “sensuousness” (Tsur 2008: 106) which is more than appropriate given the subject matter of these lines and the ambiguity of the poem’s namesake, Indolence.

4.8 Final Observations Throughout this chapter, I attempted to demonstrate that the foundational force-dynamic notions of repose, animation, and generativity (Talmy 1988: 72) are highly present in these more abstract cases and, thus, of a great level of importance. A large majority of the cases from Keats’s works analyzed in the preceding pages contain multiple predicates, often forming a catenative verbal chain. This physical verbalization in the language—including syntax, structural organization, and grammatical implications—in combination with the general semantics of the poems, allows for a better overall and more profound articulation of these notions, which are key to forcedynamic interactions, in that they “bear on conceptual organization in language and perhaps more generally” (Talmy 1988: 72). Repose, animation, and generativity are particularly present in psychological expressions of force-dynamics.62 This can also be considered in terms of Langacker’s theory of predicative, or “summary” scanning, which allows for a complex and broad view of the verbal action: As we scan through a complex scene, successively attending to various facets of it, the elements apprehended at each stage are summed, or superimposed. In this way a detailed conception is progressively built up, becoming active and available as a simultaneously accessible whole for a certain span of processing time. (Langacker 2008: 83) It is, however, important to note that Talmy’s argumentation concerning the notions of repose, animation, and generativity tends to focus more or less solely on psychological force-dynamic interactions within the Self, or the Psyche, of one individual. The examples from Keats have shown that this type of catenative action is possible in psychological force-dynamic relations between two (human) entities, as well as within the psyche of one individual, or between an external, but personifed, abstract entity, such as emotion. A further structural and semantic link is found in the linguistic organization of force-dynamic expressions with an Agentive presence. The force of the expression appears typically weakened when more distance is placed

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between the stronger force-dynamic fgure and the predicate representing the effective or resultant action. This is a manifestation of the conceptual metaphor CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 128). Conceptual metaphors relative to the notions of location and space are often present in force-dynamic expressions, and often as a result of the combination of the Event Structure Metaphor and a spatially concerned conceptual metaphor, with varying source and target domains. This phenomenon is natural and observable according to the tenets of CG: Grammar […] is basically metonymic, in the sense that the information explicitly provided by conventional means does not itself establish the precise connection apprehended by the speaker or hearer in using an expression. Explicit indications evoke conceptions that merely provide mental access to elements with the potential to be connected in specifc ways, but the details have to be established on the basis of other considerations. (Langacker 2009b: 46) Furthermore, the connection between the physiological and the psychological within force-dynamic interactions in the Keatsian corpus is both evidence for and strengthened by, the existence of conceptual metaphor and metonymy, and the latter’s direct relation, or intertwining, with the linguistic expression of force-dynamics or causality. As I analyzed in Chapter 3, conceptual metaphor and metonymy relative to emotions necessarily include the physiological aspects of emotion. The cognitive and linguistic transfer of force-dynamics to the realm of the psychological or psychosocial further reinforces these links. Emotion is not only an abstraction, but rather an entity which has palpable physiological effects, repercussions, and consequences. It thus seems logical that a cognitive domain that was originally verbalized uniquely in terms of the physical is used to describe a mental domain such as emotion, which is a pure mix of the physical and the psychological. This chapter was founded on two main theoretical points of view: being that the linguistic and cognitive expression of force-dynamics is inherently conceptually metaphorical and has grammatical representation. These claims are supported by CG. Furthermore, research on conceptual metaphor has shown that a link between the conceptual metaphor and grammar is both cognitively and structurally recognizable, thus rendering grammar more semantically signifcant,63 and conceptual metaphor, more globally perceptible and applicable to a wider variety of linguistic concepts. This connection is indispensable for a comprehensive examination of force-dynamics and its role in language and cognition. I have focused on one small aspect of this much broader linguistic and cognitive concept: the way in which emotion in Keatsian poetry—and thus, interactions with an emotional basis—is verbalized and understood by way of causal

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or force-dynamic expression. The analyses of force-dynamic interaction within Keats’s works have revealed a variety of conclusions concerning the articulation of emotion in poetry, Keats’s utilization of grammar, conceptual metaphor and metonymy, and other stylistic effects, such as synesthetic imagery, and the force-dynamic category in general. Moreover, I have found variety, liberty, fexibility, and complexity in the dynamic and inter-relational structure of the force-dynamic relations profled within the poetry. The relations range from inter-psychological/interpersonal to intrapsychological/intrapersonal (between multiple facets of the Self, operating as two separate entities with conficting or contradicting desires), in fuctuating degrees and often present a blend between the two types of interaction, thus eventuating in force-dynamic interactions an elevated level of complexity. It is important to highlight that when explored in a linguistic domain different from that in which the original research took place (poetic texts, as opposed to everyday speech acts, and with a unique concentration on the psychological realm, as opposed to the physical realm), the foundational arguments concerning the presence of the grammatical representation of force-dynamics and its intrinsic metaphoricity hold true and testable. Moreover, a strong semantic and structural connection between grammatical representation and conceptual metaphor becomes more obvious and visible on multiple levels. This is disclosed to an even further extent when the grammatical categories which have been purported to possess the highest level of grammatical representation of force-dynamics are examined through multiple lenses. My analysis, beginning with cognitively axed analyses of the grammatical categories in question, followed by examinations of the behavior of the grammatical elements in question within the forcedynamic expression and an observation of the presence and comportment of conceptual metaphor related to the grammatical elements in question, has allowed for such conclusions to be drawn. Modal auxiliaries possess an inherent force-dynamic nature. Thus, they are a logical starting point when beginning to analyze the grammatical representation of force-dynamics: they permit, in more or less any circumstance or context, the articulation of causal interaction. Their nature results in their cognitive and linguistic intertwining with the Event Structure Metaphor, and more specifcally, its delineation in the conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES. This metaphorical foundation, when placed in the context of the expression of emotion, permits the further elaboration of conceptual metaphor: particularly, the emotional delineations of CAUSES ARE FORCES: beginning with EMOTION IS FORCE, then leading to more specifc, contextappropriate elaborations such as EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT, EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL FORCE, and EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE. This metaphorical continuation is made possible by the “most basic and skeletal emotion scenario in our folk theory of emotion” (Kövecses 2008: 8), which leads us to the following schematic, cognitive mapping:

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(1) a cause leads to an emotion and (2) emotion leads to some response.64 and can be summed up in the following schematic model: Cause → existence of emotion (as forceful entity) → expression.65 These conceptual metaphors are thus present, in varying levels of strength and weakness, in virtually all linguistic expressions of emotional forcedynamics. However, the grammatical analyses of modal auxiliaries in this chapter have given rise to a link between the level of metaphoricity in forcedynamic expressions which employ modals. A trend can be observed in the comparison between the strength of the modal (ranging from strong, to medium, to weak) and the potential metaphorical elaboration, thus, the metaphorical strength, of the force-dynamic expressions. In simpler terms: the stronger the modal, the higher and more multiple the metaphoricity of the force-dynamic expression. Furthermore, a structural and semantic link is observable between the type of clause and the nature of the force-dynamic interaction. According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 174), certain clausal types are inherently “more modal” than others. That is, declarative clauses are those which contain the least amount (or none at all) of intrinsic modality, exhortative clauses would come next on the scale, still possessing a relatively low amount of intrinsic modality, and imperative and interrogative clauses would close off this ordering with a classifcation of inherently modal clauses. This argumentation has simultaneously guided and found reinforcement in the analyses of the Keatsian corpus in relation to the type of force-dynamic expressions in question (interpersonal, intrapersonal, or a mix of both), in that a link has been measured between the complexity of the interaction and the inherent modality of the clauses, or verses, at hand. This has allowed for the drawing of similar conclusions to those based on modal strength: the more inherently modal the clause type, the more complex the force-dynamic interaction. For instance, taking the example from “To Fanny” (“must not a woman be / a feather on the sea” [lines 34–35]), we fnd ourselves in the presence of a more complex force-dynamic interaction than if we were presented with phrasing such as “a woman is a feather on the sea,” due to the fact that the Keatsian lines rely on the interaction between the modal auxiliary must along with the inherent modality of the interrogative phrasal type. The verses analyzed that are classifable as declarative sentences have a greater tendency to exhibit strictly interpersonal force-dynamic interactions, whereas those that fall under the category of exhortative, imperative, or interrogative typically illustrate intrapersonal or multi-directional forcedynamic interactions. By the same token, a link can be formed between modality and the complexity of force-dynamic expressions, thus creating a further connection between the level and intensity of metaphoricity and the amplitude of the force-dynamic expression. We can also note that the more

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comprehensive the force-dynamic expression—based on the qualities just enumerated—the higher the degree of emotional saliency, thus supporting the argumentation that force-dynamic expression plays a key role in the categorization of Keatsian poetry as qualitatively, eminently, emotional. Following the grammatical representation of force-dynamics that inherently belongs to the category of modal auxiliaries, Talmy (1988) has argued for an increase in the scope of the modal system, so as to include a specifc, defned set of intransitive verbs which take the base form of a lexical verb as their complement. The predicates in this set are: let, make, help, and have. These verbs have the particularity of functioning—grammatically and semantically—in a strikingly similar manner to that of modal auxiliaries. For this reason, Talmy calls for the widening of the modal system to include the above predicates. My analysis was expressly focused on the verb let and its role in emotional force-dynamic expression and the observations made provide support for Talmy’s call for the expansion of the modal category. Firstly, the four verbs in question allow for the construction of catenative constructions—as modals do—and take on the same “relating” role as modal auxiliaries do in syntactical construction. Semantically, let holds a similar meaning as certain modal auxiliaries. Furthermore, let can be qualifed as a vector of weak modality, which is what brings us to the most relevant conclusions of this section: the same link between modal potency and level and elaboration of metaphoricity as outlined above can be made in these cases. Hence, the force-dynamic examples containing let as their central predicate prove themselves to be—while nevertheless inherently metaphoric—more limited in terms of metaphorical elaboration than the force-dynamic expressions containing a stronger modal verb. Lastly, the catenative constructions visible in the verses with let (and with other modal auxiliaries) provide syntactic and structural reinforcement for the forcedynamic schema itself, providing more proof for the interdependent character of grammar, semantics, and cognitive schemas, as Lakoff and Johnson have suggested in claiming that “syntax is not interdependent of meaning, especially metaphorical aspects of meaning” (1980: 138). The third predicative section of this chapter focused on an open class of verbs: emotion and perception verbs. The use of open-class elements intrinsically allows for more creativity and freedom of expression in the conception of poetic texts. This liberty of choice allows for more freedom in the expression of emotional force-dynamics, particularly in terms of the nonconcreteness of the subject matter articulated in these types of expressions, the synesthetic tendency of the imagery within them, and the combining of conceptual metaphors and metonymies within the expressions. These perception or emotion verb-based force-dynamic cases present blends of the conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES (or EMOTION IS FORCE) and other, often spatially centered, conceptual metaphors, such as EXISTENCE IS LOCATION HERE (or the inverse, NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY) and STATES ARE BOUNDED AREAS. The grammatical elements, along with the

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syntactic structure, of these examples allow for this metaphorical doubling and thus result in complex force-dynamic interactions with high levels of metaphoricity. Keats also appears to have a tendency to amalgamate the same causal and spatial metaphors above with synesthetic imagery—a type of imaged language which is frequent throughout his entire oeuvre—resulting, once again, in force-dynamic relations of heightened emotional saliency. What’s more, synesthetic imagery permits the imparting of the physiological aspects of emotion into the force-dynamic, resulting in more comprehensive regard on emotion, and furthermore, supporting the inherent link between the physical and the psychological in force-dynamics, as well as the intrinsic metaphoricity and metonymicity of the emotional force-dynamic expressions, as the above related to emotion do, more often than not, take into consideration the role of the physiological aspects of emotional experience. In regard to these criteria, there is evidence for the grammatical and semantic representation of force-dynamics within the text, and more particularly, the link created through the use of metaphor (often referring to space), metonymy, sensuous or synesthetic imagery and references, and expressions of emotion provide tangible evidence for this. I will close this section with a few more ecumenical observations concerning the expression of emotional force-dynamics in Keatsian poetry. First and foremost, it can be concluded that the use of force-dynamic relations is highly effective when it comes to the expression of emotional situations and interactions. Moreover, the varied and at times complex elaboration of such relations allows for a more profound look into the conception of the Self and interpersonal relations as apprehended by the poet within his oeuvre. This is made possible not only by the content of the expressions in question, but by the grammatical representation of force-dynamics— often performed with a palpable twinge of “organized violence” against the originally structured cognitive schemas for such a concept, but remaining likewise still analyzable and structurally recognizable—and the inherent presence of conceptual metaphor within the force-dynamic verbalizations of emotion. My argument here is thus that these various manners of expression of force-dynamics within Keatsian poetry allow for a higher level of salience in emotional expression. The two examples below support this claim: ‘O leave me not in this eternal woe, / For if thou diest, my Love, I know not where to go.’ “The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 314–315. Whose heart goes futt’ring for you everywhere, / Nor, when away you roam, / Dare keep its wretched home, / Love, love alone, his pains severe and many: / Then, loveliest! Keep me free, / From torturing jealousy. (“To Fanny,” lines 43–47)

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What is key here is the ways in which the force-dynamic schemas present within the above examples allow for deeply expressive verbalizations of emotional experience: the potential of being completely lost, or at a loss, as a result of the death of the beloved, as seen in the extract from “The Eve of St. Agnes,” or the intense, painful, agitation depicted in “To Fanny.” These emotional states are the result of emotion placed upon a weaker Agonist by way of a stronger Antagonist, thus resulting in a change in the state of being of the Agonist, and thus would not be expressed in the same, salient, manner without the presence of the force-dynamic expression. The notion of force-dynamics is essential to a complete grasp of the expression of emotion in language, as causation is “an ultimate building block” of human perception, “a basic human concept” and, moreover, “experiential gestalt” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 69) which provides us with valuable illuminations on the functioning and interactions of human expression and operation within language, in all of their rich complexities. An analysis of such a concept within poetry provides us with only a glimpse of the latter, but the theory behind such analyses allows us to connect them with the universal properties of language, cognition, and emotion. I will close this train of thought with a fnal observation from Lakoff and Johnson: “Even a concept as basic as causation is not purely emergent or purely metaphorical. Rather, it appears to have a directly emergent core that is elaborated metaphorically” (1980: 69). This chapter primarily focused on the expression of force-dynamics through different types of predicates. The example from “To Fanny,” above, leads us to the focus of Chapter 5: prepositions and their role in conceptual metaphor.

Notes 1 Talmy, 1988. 2 “In English, our main language of demonstration, such representation appears not only in conjunctions, prepositions, and other closed-class elements, but, most signifcantly, also as the semantic category that most uniquely characterizes the grammatical category of modals as a whole, both in their basic and in their epistemic uses” (Talmy 1988: 50). 3 “Force dynamic patterns are also incorporated in open-class lexical items, and can be seen to bring numbers of these together into systematic relationships. Lexical items involved in this way refer not only to physical force interactions but, by metaphoric extension, also to psychological and social interactions, conceived in terms of psycho-social ‘pressures’” (Talmy 1988: 50). 4 Italics mine. 5 Cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989. 6 In general (“non-emotional”) force-dynamic schemas, the resultant actions are typically denoted as movement or stagnation (or rest) (Talmy 1988: 54). These tendencies also important to note here, as they remain valid for the type of force-dynamics analyzed in this chapter. 7 Rest refers to the stopping of, or lack altogether of, movement forward: repose is more or less the same thing, “the most basic or unmarked state of the psy-

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che” (Talmy 1988: 72). Action or movement is thus the opposite case, in which movement takes place. These terms can obviously be applied in both literal and fgurative senses. In this vein, G. Lakoff proposes the following examples (list non-exhaustive): “States are bounded regions in space. Processes are movements. Causes are forces. Purposes are destinations” (1990: 54). See Kövecses 2000, 2008, et al. Kövecses 2008: 9. Furthermore, “a large number of emotion metaphors are specifc-level instantiations of this subordinate-level metaphor, each playing a somewhat different role in conceptualizing the emotion domain” (Kövecses 2008: 15). See Kövecses 2000, in particular, for a detailed list and explanations of these mappings. I defne this set of transitive verbs as belonging to an “in-between class” due to the fact that they are technically part of the open-class of lexical verbs; but, Talmy has created a small, limited group of them: thus, an honorary closed class. Langacker (2008:22–23) defnes the category of modals as a category which can be legitimately defned either as a lexical category or a category of “grammatical markers,” highlighting the ambivalence of such polar categorization and adhering to a more gradient understanding. I agree with his stance and thus will employ the terms on an interchangeable or case-by-case basis. A similar, extensive analysis of the different types of relationships profled can be found in Lapaire and Rotgé, 1998:482. G, Radden and R. Dirven also include the inherent force-dynamic nature of modality in their analysis of the subject, in a train of thought quite similar to that of R. Langacker. They delineate the concept by way of the traditional dichotomy between deontic and epistemic modality and that of necessity and possibility (Radden and Dirven 2007: 243–245). See Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 475–510. “La réalisation du prédicat par le sujet grammatical est tributaire d’une contrainte ou d’une pression exercée sur ce dernier” (Lapaire & Rotgé 1998: 482). Cf. discussion in the previous section. Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 482. “Les modaux servent des relateurs entre un sujet et un predicat […] (S-MODAL-P)” (Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 477). The lexical modals defned by Huddleston and Pullum are the following: ADJ: possible, necessary, likely, probable, bound, supposed; ADV: perhaps, possibly, necessarily, probably, certainly, surely; V: insist, permit, require; N: possibility, necessity, permission (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 173). Imperatives are “directives”; interrogatives are “characteristically used to express questions to which the speaker doesn’t know the answer” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 174). Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 175–176. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 176–177. Larreya and Rivière’s argumentation concerning the “objectivity and subjectivity” of modals is perhaps a different approach to an analysis of force-dynamics in modality. Modals are typically classifed in terms of “strength,” whether they are epistemic, deontic, or other. For example, the modal auxiliary must expresses either obligation (in its deontic sense) or epistemic necessity (in its epistemic sense); whereas the modal auxiliary may allows for the verbalization of permission, when used in a deontic manner, or epistemic possibility, when taken in its epistemic sense (Radden and Dirven 2007: 241–244). The frst case would thus be one of strong modality; the second would be a case of weaker modality.

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For a fully feshed-out scale of modals organized by way of strength, see Radden and Dirven 2007: 239. All italics in the poetic examples that follow are mine, unless noted otherwise. Cf. Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 482. An emotional delineation of the Event Structure Metaphor. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 174. See Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 177) for a detailed discussion on medium modality. The Antagonist is not explicitly mentioned in these lines, as is typically the case in force-dynamic instances containing a modal auxiliary. To reinforce this, we can compare: “beauty keeping her lustrous eyes, this cannot be” (comparable to what is found in the text) vs. “beauty not keeping her lustrous eyes, this can be” (case in which the negation marker would not have scope over the modal). Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 482. Kövecses 2000: 65, 77. 92. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 16 (BAD IS DOWN). The epistemic use of shall is based in the “simple future” verbalized by this auxiliary. Shall in its epistemic sense allows for a “projection” into the future, even though shall is technically conjugated in a present form: “le futur est par essence une spéculation présente (‘j’envisage maintenant, à partir de ce que je sais, désire ou entrevois, la réalisation de quelque chose’)” (Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 492) / “The future is essentially a speculation which takes place in the present (I envisage now, based on what I know, desire, or make out, the realization of something)” (translation mine). In this case the embodiment goes in both senses (Agonist Antagonist). Translation mine. Some linguists would call dare a peripheral modal, frstly, because it’s not as common as the prototypical modals, and also because dare can be followed by the infnitive marker to. Also, dare is very different semantically from the prototypical modals. We note the use of the base form of the lexical verb following dare is the main reason why it’s considered a modal. However, this remains—along with dare’s status as a modal at all—debatable, because a lexical verb such as hear can be followed by a base form (such as in heard them talk) and yet hear is not considered a modal. Langacker 2008: 304. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 196. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 196. Lapaire and Rotgé 1998: 482. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 174. Talmy 1988: 81. According to the catenative-auxiliary analysis, auxiliary verbs are “just as much main verb[s]” as are lexical verbs: “both are heads of their respective clauses.” This also applies regardless of the fact that the infnitive marker to is employed (or not) (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 104). “The application of force temporally precedes motion, since inertia must be overcome before motion can take place” (Lakoff 1990: 64). To cite L. Talmy in more depth on this issue: “it appears that language ascribed to the psycho-physical nature of sentient entities the following particular forcedynamic concatenation: A more peripheral part of the psyche overcomes a more central part’s intrinsic repose to animate the otherwise inert physical component into overt force manifestation against a further external force entity” (1988: 73). I believe that we can take this claim further, so as to include interpersonal, or

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interpsychological type force-dynamic interactions: those that are composed of two separate entities, thus not necessarily within the same person. The Event Structure Metaphor proposes that “various aspects of event structure, including notions like states, changes, processes, actions, causes, purposes, and means are understood metaphorically in terms of space, motion, and force” (Lakoff 1990: 57). Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 208. The Invariance Hypothesis proposes the notion that “metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive typology (this is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain” (Lakoff 1990: 54). Lakoff 1990: 54. “The inside and the outside experienced by the imagination can no longer be taken in terms of simple reciprocity: from now on, no longer speaking of geometry so as to verbalize the frst expressions of being, in choosing more concrete beginnings—or to be exact, more phenomenological ones—we realize that the dialectic of the inside and the outside multiplies and diversifes itself in innumerable nuances” (translation mine). G. Lakoff analyzes these types of cases in Lakoff 1990: 61–65. Intransitive verb: archaic form of the now more commonly used complain. See Chapter 3 for more detailed refection on aspect. Of course, this would be the case if the roles were reversed in the force-dynamic relation: for example, a stronger Agonist and a weaker Antagonist, as it were. “convergent poems tend to have a larger number of fnite verbs, divergent ones a larger number of nouns and adjectives” (Tsur 2002: 84–85). “this very linking of a psychological with a physical force-dynamic pattern is an example of the more general capacity of force-dynamic patterns to concatenate or to embed. That is, there is the capacity for the Agonist or the Antagonist of one pattern to serve in turn as a force entity in a further pattern. […] The important point in this is that the force-dynamic system in language is not limited to a small inventory of simplex patterns but has the property of open-ended generativity” (Talmy 1988: 73). See Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 126–138. Kövecses 2008: 9 Kövecses 2008: 27

5

Grammar and Emotion The Metaphorical Role of Prepositions

5.1 Introduction In Chapter 4, I discussed the central place of force-dynamics in Keats’s works, its conceptually metaphorical qualities, and its expression through grammar. In the present chapter, I will continue with the grammatical and semantic analysis of conceptual metaphor in Keats’s works, particularly concentrating on the role of prepositions in conceptual metaphor, both force-dynamic and in a broader sense. To do this, I will discuss various spatial, locative, and abstract prepositions in selected examples of emotional conceptual metaphors in Keats. Prepositions profle “atemporal relationships” (Langacker1987: 243) resulting in a gestation of emotion by the conceptualization of trajector and landmark—the two entities placed in relation by the preposition—“as a part of the same mental [here, emotional] experience” (Langacker 2008: 108). Analyzing these prepositions in the lines of CG, I will suggest in this chapter that the use of prepositions within Keats’s conceptual metaphors is essential to the development of the metaphors in question and renders them all the more potent. The semantic qualities of prepositions result in a deeper cognitive imprint, or understanding, of the metaphorical concepts. I propose thus that they are part of the reason for which Keats’s conceptual metaphors for the emotions are essential to his poetry. This chapter will of course continue in the same vein as the previous ones, holding that the internalization, embodiment, and expression of emotion is grounded in metaphorical language and, thus, in the emotional or physical “space” inhabited by the individual experiencing the emotion.

5.2 Cognitive Foundations of Prepositions In CG, prepositions are understood as grammatical elements which form links, or relations, between two or more constituents of an expression. Langacker (2008: 108) highlights the importance of creating this kind of relation, claiming that, “in the most elemental terms, apprehending a DOI: 10.4324/9781003275626-5

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relationship is a matter of conceptualizing multiple entities as a part of the same mental experience.” What I aim to demonstrate here is the indispensability of these relations created by prepositions to the cognitive functioning of conceptual metaphor. Furthermore, the bond between prepositions (and thus, notions of space, either concrete or fgurative) as conceived in cognitive grammar and conceptual metaphor is considerable, as Radden and Dirven (2007: 303) remark in saying that “the analysis of prepositions of space and their motivated extensions amply demonstrates the pervasiveness of conceptual metaphor in grammar.” In CG, prepositions “profle nonprocessual relationships” (Langacker 2008: 115, 117)—in terms of “profling,” or “directing attention to a particular substructure” (2008: 66) prepositions—along with adjectives, adverbs, infnitives, and particles—are defned as an “intermediate case,” somewhere in between the instance of nouns, which profle things, and verbs, which profle processes, as I looked at in Chapter 4 (Langacker 2008: 112). In his elaboration of the theory of cognitive poetics—an extension of cognitive grammatical theory to the domain of poetry—Stockwell reinforces this idea of prepositions being an intermediary case. He defnes prepositions as inherently relational, but places them in between the categories of “statives” and “passives,” thus expressing the inherent qualities of stativity and dynamicity that they are capable of both possessing and verbalizing, at times simultaneously (Stockwell 2002: 65). In CG, relationships are formed by the components that we call “trajector” and “landmark.” The trajector is the “participant to be made the primary focus, as the entity being located, evaluated, or otherwise described”; whereas the landmark is the “second focal participant” (Langacker 2008: 113). According to Langacker, “a preposition has two focal participants, its landmark being a thing. Since a preposition’s trajector can either be a thing or a relationship, it is characterized schematically as an entity” (2008: 116). The role of prepositions in language is, thus, generally speaking, to allow for the linguistic establishment of relations between two entities or objects. Langacker continues on to observe that “prepositions are indifferent as to the nature of their trajector […] [and that] the distinctive property of this class is the conferring of secondary focal prominence on a thing” (2008: 117). Although often dismissed as “minor” grammatical elements, R. Langacker emphasizes the importance of the relationships profled by prepositions, particularly within a cognitive approach to grammar: “in the most elemental terms, apprehending a relationship is a matter of conceptualizing multiple entities as a part of the same mental experience” (Langacker 2008: 108). Prepositions play an essential, constructive, and linking role in grammar and semantics. In regard to this, Gibbs remarks that “prepositions seem to be particularly good at pushing their objects around” (1994: 48). Furthermore, one intrinsic quality of prepositions in language is their ability to express

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the notions of space and time, which are very often conceptualized and verbalized metaphorically, as there is an inherent “thematic parallelism between space and time that results in a single set of abstract relations between the two domains [of space and time]” (Gibbs 1994: 168). Thus, it is logical to see prepositions as grammatical elements which are fundamentally metaphorical, given the fact that their primary vocation within language is to allow for the expression of processual relationships. This unique quality of prepositions thus renders them particularly salient in the analysis of conceptual metaphor, particularly within poetic language, as the combination and multiplication of metaphorical expression is central. As R. Gibbs observes, “metaphorical mappings do not occur in isolation from one another” (Gibbs 1994: 152). This leads to refection upon the intrinsic metaphoricity of grammatical classes and the ways in which they are capable of rendering conceptually metaphorical concepts more salient metaphorically, by way of the superposing of “higher and lower metaphorical mappings” (Gibbs 1994: 152). Therefore, prepositions are key to the full expression of conceptual metaphor: particularly in poetic metaphor, within which the combination of metaphorical mappings is most welcome. Spatial prepositions, moreover, play a special role in metaphoric expression.1 In Chapter 4, I delved into the inherent link between conceptual metaphor and force-dynamic expressions. This exploration will continue in the present chapter, as prepositions hold an important role in causality. Forcedynamics in language, whether relative to the physical, psychological, or social domain, intrinsically include the notions of rest and movement, and the steps in between or following (animation, impingement, causing, letting, starting, stopping, generativity, etc.). These are all concepts that are often verbalized through the usage of, or at least in part due to, prepositions. As force-dynamic, or causal, interactions are explicit and rich expressions of relationships in a variety of diverse forms, a complete discussion of this schema necessitates the inclusion of the role of these key, relational linguistic elements. Spatial prepositions can be divided in to two groups, dynamic and static prepositions. Dynamic spatial prepositions will be referred to as “path” prepositions, to borrow Radden and Dirven’s terminology (2007: 311), and static spatial prepositions will be referred to as simple locative prepositions, or prepositions of location. Path prepositions play a key role in the sequential scanning of linguistic expressions, whether it be “objective” or “subjective” motion.2 In other words, path prepositions thus aid in the creation and tracing of a mental trajectory within any given linguistic expression. Static or simple locative prepositions are essential in the articulation of place, whether abstract or literal. I will base the prepositional analyses in this chapter on the criteria (when applicable, as each criterion may not apply to each prepositional instance) mentioned above, as well as the features outlined below, naturally inherent

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to each preposition. An examination of their role within the conceptual metaphor will then follow. 1) Landmark and trajector (including the prominence and the relationship between the two entities). 2) Dimension: zero, one, two, or three (Radden and Dirven 2007: 309). Type of preposition: spatial, temporal, abstract, causal, dynamic, or static. Type of prepositional object, if applicable: adjectival, adverbial, or simple prepositional object. 3) Type of relationship profled. Prepositions may profle either simplex or complex relationships. For our purposes here, and using the notion of space as our basis, a simplex preposition “specifes a single location, [and] in contrast, a complex preposition describes a series of locations amounting to a spatial path” (Langacker 2008: 117). 4) Reference frame (objective, subjective, or deictic). 5) Positivity and/or negativity, in terms of Langacker’s notion of “prepositional pairs” (Langacker 1987: 235). 6) Scanning: objective or subjective, solely applicable to path prepositions (Radden and Dirven 2007: 311). The dissection of the prepositions in the selected examples from Keats, in light of these criteria, will allow for a more thorough understanding of each preposition’s behavior within the metaphor, moving towards a more global comprehension of the importance of prepositions in the metaphors analyzed. The following pages will analyze the roles of these preposition groups within conceptual metaphor: both related and directly related to force-dynamics. I will begin with static prepositions, and then move on to dynamic prepositions. Lastly, a brief discussion of prepositions that do not quite fall into one of these two categories will conclude the chapter.

5.3 Static Prepositions 5.3.1 Literal In The frst preposition to be analyzed is in, in its literal, spatial sense: (1) Love in a hut, with water and crust, / Is- Love, forgive us!- cinders, ashes, dust; / Love in a palace, is perhaps at last / More grievous torment than a hermit’s fast (“Lamia,” part 2, lines 1–4) (2) I wander’d in a forest thoughtlessly, / And, on the sudden, fainting with surprise, / Saw two fair creatures, couched side by side / In deepest grass, beneath the whisp’ring roof / Of leaves and trembled blossoms, where there ran / A brooklet, scarce espied (“Ode to Psyche,” lines 7–12)

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As seen in Chapter 3, the lines from “Lamia” (1) are an example of the conceptual metaphors EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE and EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41). The lines from “Ode to Psyche” are somewhat more literal, referring to the actual physical emplacement of the speaker himself. However, I interpret this physical placement as refective, to a certain extent, of the state of mind of the speaker: being caught in the thicket of a forest may very well be understood as an analogy for being lost in one’s thoughts, and being in deep grass may very well be refective of the deep emotional state (of love) that the “two fair creatures” fnd themselves in. Thus, the same conceptual metaphors may be applicable here as well, albeit to a potentially less obvious extent. The trajector, which is the primary focus or has primordial prominence within the prepositional relation, the entity “being located or evaluated” (Langacker 2008: 113) is “love,” for both occurrences of the preposition in (1). The landmark, defned as the secondary focus or prominence within the relationship profled, is “hut,” for the frst occurrence, and “palace,” for the second example. In (2), the trajector is “I,” and the landmark “forest,” for the frst instance of in. In the second occurrence of the preposition in (2), the trajector would be “two fair creatures,” and the landmark, “in deepest grass.” The landmarks act as simple prepositional objects in all four cases. In is a three-dimensional preposition, based on the idea of “containment” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 310), profling a spatial or locative relationship (placing the existence of the emotion: here, love, or thoughtlessness, an emotional state) within a certain space (a hut, palace, forest, or bed of grass, depending on the relation in question). The reader can see a transfer from the physical emplacement of the emotion to more abstract states of being (ashes, cinders, dust, torment, etc.) in (1). In reveals itself as essential to the construction of the conceptual metaphor of these lines. The notion of containment, often expressed by three-dimensional prepositions,3 is crucial to the cognitive formation of the conceptual metaphors EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE and EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS. Being in a certain environment or location necessarily implies a boundary, an entrance, something that must be crossed or passed through in order to be considered as in the location in question. Without the presence of these prepositions, the conceptual metaphors would be much less effective, or perhaps inexistent. Thus, the preposition in acts as a grammatical support for the expression of these two conceptual metaphors.

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The relationship profled by in is static in (1) and in the second instance of in in (2)–(4). It is dynamic in the frst case of in in (2), due to the inherent dynamicity of the verb wander. Moreover, in profles what Langacker (2008: 117) deems a “simplex” relationship: “specifying a single location.” This remains true for the frst instance in (2), even though the relationship is dynamic: the speaker moves, but only within the forest, thus remaining within the same bounded space. The fact that in profles a simplex relationship also reinforces the notions presented in the conceptual metaphors: technically, one can only be present in one (physical) bounded space4 at a time, and the relationship of an entity within one such space can be understood in the same way. In example (3), Poryphro’s physical location, verbalized by the static, spatial preposition in, acts as a precedent to the central predicative expression which takes place in the following verse, giving way to the key forcedynamic interaction in these verses. Verse (4), from “Ode to a Nightingale,” can be understood in a similar manner. However, in this example, the prepositional phrase based on in has a primarily esthetic role—combined with its semantic role—in the verses, simply adding poetic and sensory quality to the vintage that acts as the Antagonist in the force-dynamic interaction taking place here. The reference frame in which the relationship profled by the preposition is presented is “absolute” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 304). The fact that the reference frame is considered as absolute corresponds with the understanding of the simple preposition in: cases of such a preposition being considered as profled by a deictic or relative reference frame are quite rare. In terms of Langacker’s notion of “prepositional pairs” (Langacker 1987: 235), in “is qualifed as ‘positive’” (as opposed to its counterpart, out). The qualifcation of in as the positive member of a prepositional pair reinforces the metaphorical notions presented in the two conceptual metaphors: existence or presence is inherently positive, whereas absence or non-existence brings up connotations of negativity and, in any case, would be referred differently in regard to taking place within a particular space or region. 5.3.1 Figurative In In this subsection, I will continue with the analysis of in, this time in its more fgurative sense. (5) “Love, thou art leading me from wintry cold, / Lady! Thou leadest me to summer clime, / And I must taste the blossoms that unfold / In its ripe warmth this gracious morning time!” / So said, his erewhile timid lips grew bold, / And poesied hers with dewy rhyme: / Great bliss was with them, and great happiness / Grew, like a lusty fower in June’s caress (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 65–72)

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Grammar and Emotion (6) “Why do you sigh, fair creature?” whisper’d he: / “Why do you think?” return’d she tenderly: / “You have deserted me; where am I now? / Not in your heart while care weighs on your brow” (“Lamia,” pt 2, lines 40–43) (7) Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a fane / In some untrodden region of my mind (“Ode to Psyche,” lines 50–51) (8) I saw pale kings and princes too, / Pale warriors, death-pale were they all; / They cried—“La Belle Dame Sans Merci / Thee hath in thrall!” (“La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” lines 37–40) (9) Let me not wander in a barren dream, / But when I am consumed in the fre, / Give me new Phoenix wings to fy at my desire. (“On Sitting Down to Read King Lear Once Again,” lines 12–14)

The lines from “Isabella” (5) are examples of the conceptual metaphors EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM; HAPPY IS WARM; HAPPINESS IS VITALITY; DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE ACTING ON ANOTHER (Kövecses 2000: 36, 24, 113). The trajector of the relation profled via the frst example of in in (5) is “blossoms,” with the landmark, a simple prepositional object, being “ripe warmth this gracious morning time.” The second instance takes “happiness” as its trajector, and “June’s caress” as its landmark, once again as a simple prepositional object. In, once again, expresses the idea of “containment” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 310), verbalizing a spatial, or even temporal, relationship, placing the existence of the emotion—here, metaphorically depicted as blooming vegetation—within a certain space (the warmth of a particular moment). The relationship here could be understood as metaphorically physical (“to be within warmth”) as well as temporal (“morning time”) in the frst case, and in the second case, a relationship (placing the existence of the emotion: here, happiness) within a certain (abstract, metaphorical) space (“June’s caress”). The emotion depicted here is compared by way of a simile to a fower, reinforcing the idea of EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM, as well as HAPPINESS IS VITALITY and HAPPY IS WARM, as the growth of the fower depicts the idea of vitality, and the warmth of the morning provides a proper environment for the efforescence of the fower, or the love between the two individuals. The two occurrences of in in these lines reinforce, in particular, the notions of life and growth inherent to the conceptual metaphors exemplifed in these verses. This is so because the instances of in in this extract refer to the blooming or growing of a fower (thus, the emotions relative to love represented poetically in “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil”). Furthermore, the notions of containment and stability inherent

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to this preposition render the metaphors all the more potent, placing the expression of a locative relationship within a particular environment, providing life, thus resulting in the manifestation of the notions presented in the metaphors. The relationship profled by in (in both cases) is static and profles a simplex relationship. The static relationships (in spatial terms) profled by in, in contrast with the more dynamic relationships profled by to and from in the same verses, result in an overall presentation of the two sorts of relationships, thus emblematically reinforcing the notions of vigorousness presented in the conceptual metaphors in question. The reference frame, in which the relationship profled by the preposition is presented, can be qualifed as absolute. As already mentioned, in terms of Langacker’s notion of “prepositional pairs” (1987: 235), in is qualifed as positive (as opposed to its counterpart, out). The lines from “Lamia” (6) present examples of the conceptual metaphors EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41) and the conceptual metonymy PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134). The trajector in the relationship profled by in here is Lamia, whereas the landmark is Lycius’s heart (or not …). This landmark can be defned as a simple prepositional object. In, once again, allows for the expression of containment. Here, the preposition helps in placing the existence of the emotion—Lycius’s supposed love for Lamia, and thus, metaphorically, Lamia herself—within a certain abstract, metaphorical space. This metaphorical location is Lamia’s “emotional presence” in Lycius’s heart, signifying metaphorically his love for her. In’s prepositional and metaphorical salience can be understood here in a similar fashion to the way in which it was analyzed previously in this subsection, that is, reinforcing the idea of “containment,” thus, emotion existing within a certain region, within boundaries. Therefore, the situation depicted here expresses the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE through showing the way in which Lamia defnes Lycius’s love for her (or lack thereof) by the fact that she would or would not be present in his heart. In other words, whether or not his love for her exists is understood by her metaphorically as her “inhabiting” his heart, or not, which she seems to understand and portray as a static emplacement. The contrast between the negative marker not in conjunction with the spatial preposition in is important to note here, as it in fact reinforces the idea of “positivity” inherent in the preposition, due to its role as a part of a prepositional pair. The fact that Lamia deems herself as “not in” where she wishes to be renders the situation all the more negative for her, painfully emphasizing the fact that due to her metaphorical lack of existence in a certain place, the emotion generated by the relationship between Lamia and Lycius has thus ceased to exist, at least for Lamia at this point in time in the poem.

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In this example, in profles a static, simplex relationship, rendering the negativity of the situation all the more emotionally poignant for Lamia. The emplacement verbalized by way of this prepositional relation can be considered as subjective: in relation to the speaker’s point of view/emotional assessment of the situation. The subjectivity of the emplacement here is due to the fact that Lamia’s claim is based on her understanding of her own inhabitance of a certain space. Verses (7)–(9) also provide instances of EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE: we see one “in some untrodden region of my mind” (7; “Ode to Psyche” v. 51), “in thrall” (8; “La Belle Dame Sans Merci” v. 40), “in a barren dream” (9; “On Sitting Down to Read King Lear Once Again” v. 13), and “in the fre” (0; ibid. v. 14). The prepositional landmarks, as is the case in the examples above, are all abstract entities, making direct reference to the emotional state or experience which is described in these verses. The trajectors are those who are undergoing the emotional experience. The behavior of the preposition in within these three examples is the same as was explained in (5) and (6). The only notable difference is the reference frame, which can be defned as subjective in all four instances here, as it is dependent on the point of view of either the speaker or those who are observing him. As seen in (7)–(9), analyzed in the above paragraphs, in and the complex prepositional phrase in the midst of act as grammatical and semantic structuring for the conceptual metaphors EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41), and STATES ARE LOCATIONS (Kövecses 2000: 52), and at times, a combination of the above. Consider the following excerpts: (10) Which was, to lead him, in close secrecy (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 163–167) STATES ARE LOCATIONS (11) “O leave me not in this eternal woe” (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 314–315) EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE; STATES ARE LOCATIONS (12) Forget, in the midst of idle misery, / Life’s purposes (“I cry your mercy-pity-love! –aye, love!” lines 10–14) EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE; STATES ARE LOCATIONS (13) Flushing his brow, and in his painèd heart / Made purple riot (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 146–148) EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE

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These conceptual metaphors are foundational to the linguistic expression of emotional force-dynamic interaction, and also play a key role in the cognitive interpretation of such relations, in varying manners. In example (10), the state or mannerism in which the “leading” is done, is essential to the articulation of the Antagonistic force in the force-dynamic relation. The predicative expression which follows—the climax and heart of the force-dynamic expression—is dependent on this secretive movement of Porpyhro’s. In example (11), the emotion woe, articulated as a physical location by way of the spatial preposition, is delegated the semantic and syntactic role of the explication of the emotional state in which the speaker (Isabella, Agonist) fnds herself, acting as both the hypothetical, emotional cause and effect of the potential death of the lover (Poryphro, Antagonist). Madeline’s verbalization of her emotional State reinforces the awareness and consciousness of the Self that plays a role in the added complexity of the force-dynamic interaction at hand. This would not be possible, or as effective, without the expression of the emotional state as physical Presence and as a physical State of being: and all of this would be impossible, or in the best case, rendered much less syntactically and grammatically economical without the spatial preposition in. Example (12)’s reliance on the prepositional phrase in the midst of can be understood in a nearly identical fashion, with the negative emotion misery being articulated as a physical location, and taking on the role of both the hypothetical precedent and antecedent of the emotional effects imposed upon the weaker Agonist by the stronger Antagonist. In extract (13), the emotional heart is seen as a physical location in which emotion takes place, or is present, thus relying upon and expressing the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE. The predicate made is also simultaneously dependent on and a result of this conceptual metaphor, as the psychological creation of the emotion is necessary for its existence in a certain location, and vice versa. Furthermore, in these specifc verses, the EXISTENCE metaphor, made possible by the spatial preposition in, gives rise to the powerful, multidimensional, and synesthetic imagery which follows in the next line. 5.3.2 On Our prepositional investigation continues with the analysis of the spatial, static preposition on: (14) “Why do you sigh, fair creature?” whisper’d he: / “Why do you think?” return’d she tenderly: / “You have deserted me; where am I now? / Not in your heart while care weighs on your brow” (“Lamia,” pt 2, lines 40–43) (15) I wander’d in a forest thoughtlessly, / And, on the sudden, fainting with surprise, / Saw two fair creatures, couched side by side / In deepest

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The lines from “Lamia” (14) present examples of the conceptual metaphors EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE and the conceptual metonymy PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION. The same conceptual metaphor and metonymy are present in (15) and (16). Beyond this, (16) presents an instance of the conceptual metonymy CHANGE IN THE COLOR OF THE FACE FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134). In (14), the trajector of the relation profled by this preposition is “care” and its landmark is “brow,” which is a simple prepositional object. On takes on the role of a two-dimensional preposition, expressing the idea of “contact” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 312). This part of the phrase is an example of the conceptual metonymy PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION, with the preposition being essential in the expression of this metonymical relationship. The metonymy is clear in the enunciation “while care weighs on your brow” (“Lamia,” pt 2, v. 40)—leading the reader to picture Lycius with a furrowed brow, frowning, or any other sort of physical expression of worry or preoccupation which would allow Lamia to deduce that Lycius is experiencing the sentiment alluded to in these lines. On here particularly reinforces the cognitive metonymy, expressing a spatial or locative relationship, placing the existence of the emotion (here, happiness) in contact with a certain space (Lycius’s forehead), thus providing a palpable and tangible image of the emotional expression, rendering it metonymic. (16) is a highly similar case to the above example, from the notions of contact up to the presence of emotion (metonymically) profled on the forehead (here, once again, the brow) which acts as the landmark, with the trajector being the lily, or the paleness of the Knight-at-arms, due to his lamentable emotional state in these lines, and furthermore, throughout the vast majority of the poem. The relationship profled by way of the preposition on in (15) is somewhat different than those in (14) and (16), as the on here is temporal, as opposed to spatial. The trajector in this case is the speaker (and thus, his temporality) and the landmark is the insistently present temporality of “sudden.” The relationship profled by way of this preposition immediately leads to the manifestation of the emotion which directly follows in the next verses5: “surprise.”

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As on in these Keatsian examples profles simultaneously static and simplex relationships, the stability and pellucidity of the relationship profled here reinforce the salience and meaningfulness of the emotion experienced by Lycius and observed by Lamia in (14), the insistent presence of the emotion in the forest in (18), and the force of the negative emotions felt by the Knight in (16). Moreover, the reference frame in which the relationship profled by the preposition is presented can be qualifed as absolute in all three cases. The qualifcation of the reference frame as absolute reinforces the metonymic, and physical, expression of emotion, by way of the expression simply being on display, not in relation to any particular individual’s assessment of the situation. However, the static locative prepositions in these extracts are key elements relative to the imagery and the poetic effects of the verses at hand, thus often playing a more supportive role in terms of the causality expressed within the poetry. In example (17), the comparison of woman to “a feather on the sea” is not only a complement to the modal auxiliary must—essential to the force-dynamic expression—but also is an essential part of the forcedynamic image of the weaker woman (Agonist) and the stronger Antagonist (natural forces), thus allowing for the expression of the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE (Kövecses 2000: 37, 64, 71–72). In terms of Langacker’s concept of “prepositional pairs” (1987: 235), on is qualifed as positive (as opposed to its counterpart, off). This notion of positivity within the preposition further reinforces the conceptual metonymy of PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134), as physical expression implies the presence of said responses, thus, positivity rather than negativity, or absence. 5.3.3 Intermediary Cases: By and Beside Let us now consider the preposition by: (18) her brethren wonder’d much / Why she sat drooping by the Basil green, / And why it fourished, as by magic touch (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 457–459) (19) I wander’d in a forest thoughtlessly, / And, on the sudden, fainting with surprise, /Saw two fair creatures, couched side by side / In deepest grass, beneath the whisp’ring roof / Of leaves and trembled blossoms, where there ran / A brooklet, scarce espied (“Ode to Psyche,” lines 7–12) (20) Yet even in these days so far retir’d / From happy pieties, thy lucent fans, / Fluttering among the faint Olympians, / I see, and sing, by my own eyes inspir’d. (“Ode to Psyche,” lines 40–43)

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The lines from “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” (18) contain examples of the conceptual metaphors EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM; LOVE IS A NUTRIENT / VITALITY; and SADNESS IS A LACK OF VITALITY (Kövecses 2000: 36, 26, 28, 25). The lines from “Ode to Psyche” (19) are indicative of the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE, EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS, and INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS (Kövecses 2000 36, 41, 92). In (20), once again from “Ode to Psyche,” we fnd an instance of EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE and INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIPS ARE (ECONOMIC) EXCHANGES (Kövecses 2000: 37, 64, 71–72, 112). By in (18) takes Isabella as its trajector and the basil plant as its landmark. The landmark in this case is a simple prepositional object. By is a “zerodimensional preposition, expressing the idea of “connection”” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 311). It expresses here a spatial or locative relationship, placing the existence of the emotion—here, Isabella sits next to the basil plant as a way of manifesting her sadness over the loss of, and her love for, Lycius—within the proximity of a certain object (the basil plant). The closeness and subsequent transfer of Isabella’s emotion towards the basil plant, with her tears nourishing it, only possible to do in close proximity, depicts the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM, as Isabella’s love and sadness transferred to the basil plant allow it to thrive. The conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A NUTRIENT / VITALITY is also verbalized within these lines, as Isabella’s love, metonymically expressed as her tears, feeds, and thus renders the plant extremely healthy. The conceptual metaphor SADNESS IS A LACK OF VITALITY is also present here: whereas Isabella’s emotion allows the plant to thrive, she can do nothing but remain next to the plant and cry. This frst example of by, expressing Isabella’s physical presence next to the basil plant, reinforces the notion of the transfer of vitality and nutrients, with Isabella’s love as their source. Isabella’s tears, and thus, her physical presence, are essential to the life and vitality of the basil plant: this vitality could not be transferred but for her being right by the plant. To even further bolster the importance of Isabella’s proximity to the basil plant, the relationship profled through by is static. Furthermore, the transfer which takes place in these lines is emotional and based on Isabella’s emotional condition. Her sadness, her enduring love for Lorenzo, and her feelings of loss—the reference frame in which the relationship profled by the preposition is presented—can be qualifed as relative deictic. The second case of by in (18) (line 459), while being the same lexical element as the previous preposition examined, is behaviorally disparate. Its trajector is “plant,” and its landmark is “magic touch.” This landmark can be defned in an “adverbial sense […] where its trajector is a relationship” (Langacker 2008: 117). As in the previous occurrence, by can be analyzed as a zero-dimensional path preposition, allowing for the manifestation of the

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idea of proximity. However, here, this is formulated by way of an abstract use of the preposition. This occurrence of by does not profle physical proximity as in the previous example, but by expressing the notion of “cause,” or more specifcally, the “means” (the imaginary “magic touch” [v. 459] is what makes the basil plant fourish) (Radden and Dirven 2007: 329).6 This second, more abstract, example of by profles a causal relationship, thus qualifying Isabella’s tears as the means by which the basil plant fourishes, and aids in the cognitive grasp of the notion of “emotional transfer.” Isabella’s love nourishes and provides vitality to the basil plant, which stands in physically for Lorenzo, whereas lugubrious Isabella lacks vitality on her own. These two ends of the metaphorical spectrum can be summarized by the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM: these lines verbalize the two extremes of vitality and thus are globally alive. The relationship profled by by is dynamic in this case, and the prepositions profles what Langacker (2008: 117) deems a “complex” relationship – “describing a series of locations,” or here, a series of states of being. The dynamicity and complexity of the relationship profled by by in its abstract sense reinforces the “life” in the emotion, expressed here metaphorically. The instance of by in (20) is highly similar to the second case of by in (18): we can make a direct comparison between “by magic touch” (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” l. 459) and “by my eyes inspired” (“Ode to Psyche,” l. 43). In (19), by behaves as a zero-dimensional preposition, as in the above instances. However, here, we are confronted with a case of static by, as the two entities profled in relation with one another are “side by side” (“Ode to Psyche,” l. 9): not moving. The static, stable quality of this relation reinforces the conceptual metaphors which are verbalized by way of these verses: EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE, EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS, and INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS. All of these conceptual metaphors rely on notions of stability and presence within a particular location in space (or time). The stable conceptual metaphors rely on notions of stability and presence within a particular location in space (or time): the stable by is thus an ideal grammatical element to aid in this type of profling. By also lends itself to both subjective and deictic frames of reference. In (18) and (20), the frame of reference is subjective, or based on the speaker’s personal, individual frame of reference; whereas in (19), it is objective, or based on the positions of the two entities in relation to one another. Example (21) makes use of the spatial preposition beside so as to emphasize the emotional and physical proximity between Madeline and Poryphro that exists throughout “The Eve of St. Agnes,” rendering the force-dynamics that take place between the two protagonists all the more evident. The couple’s emotional intimacy, transferred by way of linguistic expression to a personal one, results in their being highly infuential upon one another, leading to a variety of causal or force-dynamic interactions throughout the course of the relatively lengthy poem.

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5.4 Spatial Path Prepositions Spatial path prepositions, or spatial prepositions which verbalize movement, tend to express abstract movement in Keats’s works. There are, however, a selection of cases that refer to concrete movement and emplacement. What’s more, dynamic prepositions tend to play a more central role in the force-dynamic or causal expressions within his poetry. This is at times articulated by using physical traits or locations as trajectors and/or landmarks within the prepositional relation. Regardless of the specifcities relative to their trajectors and landmarks, the clauses containing such elements express, all the same, psychological or emotional “movements.” These paths, essentially articulated by the spatial prepositions of motion in question, are typically employed as a linguistic tool to emphasize emotional movement. 5.4.1 From The frst dynamic preposition we will look at is from, in three separate instances. (1) “Love, thou art leading me from wintry cold, / Lady! Thou leadest me to summer clime, / And I must taste the blossoms that unfold / In its ripe warmth this gracious morning time!” / So said, his erewhile timid lips grew bold, / And poesied hers with dewy rhyme: / Great bliss was with them, and great happiness / Grew, like a lusty fower in June’s caress (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 65–72) (2) O what can ail thee, knight-at-arms, / Alone and palely loitering? / The sedge has withered from the lake, / And no birds sing. (“La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” lines 1–4) (3) Faded the fower and all its budded charms, / Faded the sight of beauty from my eyes, / Faded the shape of beauty from my arms, / Faded the voice, warmth, whiteness, paradise (“The day is gone, and all its sweets are gone!” lines 5–8) As mentioned above, the lines from “Isabella” (1) offer examples of the conceptual metaphors EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM; HAPPY IS WARM; HAPPINESS IS VITALITY; DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE ACTING ON ANOTHER (Kövecses 2000: 36, 41, 24, 113). In (2) and (3)—the lines from “La Belle Dame Sans Merci” and “The day is gone, and all its sweets are gone!,” we fnd instances of the conceptual metaphors DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE ACTING ON ANOTHER, EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE, EMOTION/LOVE IS A NATURAL FORCE,

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and INTENSITY IS AMOUNT/QUANTITY (Kövecses 2000: 113, 36, 41, 37, 64, 71–72, 42). The trajector in the relation profled by from in (1)—the entity “being located or evaluated” (Langacker 2008: 113)—is “me,” who is, in this case, Lorenzo, Isabella’s lover, acting as the speaker in these lines and those surrounding them. The landmark, or secondary focus of the relation profled here, is “wintry cold.” In (2), the trajector can be identifed as “the sedge,” and the landmark as “the lake.” In (3), the trajectors are “the shape / the sight of beauty” and the landmarks, “my eyes” and “my arms.” The landmarks can be defned as simple prepositional objects in all four instances. From is qualifed as a zero-dimensional preposition, “expressing the idea of moving towards a source, along a line,” or “extent in a dynamic relation” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 307, 310), profling a “path” or “source” relationship (Radden and Dirven 2007: 310). Furthermore, from profles what Langacker (2008: 117) deems a “complex” relationship, “describing a series of locations amounting to a spatial path.” This metaphorical movement embodies and presents the conceptual metaphors of HAPPY IS WARM and HAPPINESS IS VITALITY in (1), as the speaker qualifes the evolution in his amorous situation as a migration towards the positive from the negative, calling to mind the standard metaphorical conceptions of cold as negative and warm as positive. The relationship profled by from is thus dynamic, as it grammatically depicts movement and progress. This is particularly emphasized in this example by way of the object of the preposition, “wintry cold,” which renders the notion of movement palpable to the reader. In (2) and (3), the movement that takes place is a more negative movement: effectively, we are no longer in a state of moving towards something, but rather, something is moving away. This particularly salient in terms of the inherent negativity of the preposition itself: in terms of Langacker’s notion of “prepositional pairs” (1987: 235) from is qualifed as “negative” (as opposed to its counterpart, to, which is “positive”). The negativity inherent in this preposition augments the notion of movement inherent in this path preposition, a passage from one place to another. This displacement can be metaphorically understood as a shift from negative to positive, from cold to warm, thus, from sadness to happiness, and from a state of inertia or lifelessness to a state of vitality. The emplacement and movement expressed by way of this prepositional relationship is subjective, thus, based on the speaker’s perception of the situation. Although one can fnd metaphorical and cognitive support for the perceptions of the emotions expressed here (seeing happiness and warmth as positive, or vitality as positive as opposed to negative), these perceptions remain subjective, as these experiences or situations could potentially be perceived as negative in certain contexts. Langacker emphasizes the place of subjectivity based on perception in cognitive semantics and grammar, which can thus be applied to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, in saying: “a foundational claim of cognitive semantics is that an expression’s

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meaning cannot be reduced to an objective characterization of the situation described: equally important for linguistic semantics is how the conceptualizer chooses to construe the situation and portray it for expressive purposes” (1990: 316). 5.4.2 To To is the second path preposition I will explore, looking at two instances from Keats. (4) “Love, thou art leading me from wintry cold, / Lady! Thou leadest me to summer clime, / And I must taste the blossoms that unfold / In its ripe warmth this gracious morning time!” / So said, his erewhile timid lips grew bold, / And poesied hers with dewy rhyme: / Great bliss was with them, and great happiness / Grew, like a lusty fower in June’s caress (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 65–72) (5) She took me to her Elfn grot, / And there she wept and sighed full sore, / And there I shut her wild wild eyes / With kisses four. (“La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” lines 29–32) The conceptual metaphors present in (4) have been enumerated in earlier chapters. Verse (5), the lines from “La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” can be analyzed as instances of EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE / IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE (Kövecses 36, 41) and LUST IS INSANITY (Kövecses 2000: 29, 31). In the instance of the path preposition to in (4), the trajector is once again “me” (Lorenzo), and the landmark is “summer clime,” which takes on the grammatical role of a simple prepositional object. This line, and thus, the relation profled within it, takes on the role of the poetic and metaphorical counterpart of line 65, which profles the relationship by way of to’s prepositional and semantic converse, from. This preposition, similar to from in the previous line, is a zero-dimensional path preposition, expressing the metaphorical movement of the speaker’s emotional state of being from a colder environment towards warmer climes. The relationship profled by to is dynamic, as it grammatically depicts movement. The situation is highly similar in (5): the trajector in this case is “me,” the speaker (with the understanding that La Belle Dame accompanies the speaker in this movement), and the landmark is her “Elfn grot”: her bower of love, a simple prepositional object. To once again plays an essential role in the profling of the dynamic relation linguistically expressed here, in which the Elfn grot is both literally and fguratively the location in which the (tormented, slightly insane) lust/love between the Knight and La Belle Dame is consummated.

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As to is classifed as a “path” preposition, the relations profled here are complex relationships, as is its counterpart, analyzed in the previous subsection. In terms of Langacker’s notion of “prepositional pairs” (1987: 235), to is qualifed as “positive” (as opposed to its counterpart, from). The emplacements and movements presented within these examples, and made possible by the path preposition, are subjective, or based on the speaker’s perception of the situation. 5.4.3 To and From: Joint Analysis To further explore their polarities and complexities, I will now provide a joint analysis of the pair prepositions to and from. This analysis is founded in the examples analyzed in the two previous subsections. (6) Love, thou art leading me from wintry cold, / Lady! Thou leadest me to summer clime (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 65–66) (7) The sedge has withered from the lake, / And no birds sing. (“La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” lines 3–4) (8) Faded the sight of beauty from my eyes, / Faded the shape of beauty from my arms (“The day is gone, and all its sweets are gone!” lines 5–8) (9) She took me to her Elfn grot, / And there she wept and sighed full sore (“La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” lines 29–30) In the lines from “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” (6) to and from, as path prepositions, thus profling dynamic relationships, reinforce the metaphorical notion of “vitality” inherent in the conceptual metaphor HAPPINESS IS VITALITY (Kövecses 2000: 24). An entity deemed as exemplifying “vitality” would not typically be characterized as “sedentary” or “static,” hence the importance of the presence of path prepositions. Moreover, the dynamicity within these profled relationships acts as a reinforcement for the conceptual metaphor DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE ACTING ON ANOTHER (Kövecses 2000: 113), as the “beloved” is leading (thus exerting some sort of force or persuasion) upon the lover, moving him out of a certain type of emotional environment and into another. This leads to a more causal understanding of the relationship(s) profled by the prepositions in these lines. In the lines from “La Belle Dame Sans Merci” (7), the dynamicity profled by from provides emphasis for the death, or end, of the relationship explicated throughout the entire poem. The drying-up of the lake is a

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metaphorical stand-in for the fading of the lust/love relationship between the two entities in the poem: thus, in terms of conceptual metaphor, the existence of the emotion—verbalized in terms of the physical presence, or existence, of the body of water—is fading away (a dynamic state of affairs). This can be easily contrasted with the situation profled in (6), in which the movement to a specifc, physical, location is metaphorical for the existence, consummation, and manifestation of the relationship. The negative and positive qualities of these two prepositions are clearly expressed in these two examples. Furthermore, (7) presents a case highly similar to that of (6): the fading away verbalized here—by way of the preposition from—is refective of the recrudescence of the emotion present at the beginning of the poem, once again emphasizing the negativity of the path preposition from. The qualifcation of the relationships profled by to and from as “complex,” thus “describing a series of locations” (Langacker 2008: 117) allows for a more profound understanding of the change from “wintry cold” to “summer clime” in (6): the change here clearly occurs gradually, as the love blooms or develops, just as the seasons change. The maturation of the emotion of love here is aligned with elevated, summery temperatures— thus, warmth—which results in the expression of the conceptual metaphor HAPPY IS WARM (Kövecses 2000: 24), as being in love in this poem is clearly understood as synonymous with happiness. This is also the case in the other examples. Finally, the dynamicity of the juxtaposition between the pair to and from reinforces the notions of positive and negative inherent in these conceptual metaphors. Moreover, by the use of these two “path prepositions,” the text provides the reader with examples of subjective motion,7 i.e., “mental scanning along a path leading from a reference point to the trajector’s static location” (Langacker 1990: 329).

5.5 Force-Dynamic Path Prepositions In this section, I will continue with the analysis of dynamic, path prepositions. The analysis here, however, will be more centered around the role of these prepositions in causality. Chapter 4 mainly focused on the verbalization of force-dynamics via verbal structures. A more minor, but nonetheless important, element of the grammatical representation of force-dynamics in language is the category of prepositions. Prepositions notably play a role in the creation of relationships between the grammatical and lexical components of linguistic enunciations of force-dynamics, granting them the ability to function in harmony. Prepositions also are essential to the proper functioning—or more extensively, to the pure and simple existence—of conceptual metaphor—not only in the case of force-dynamic expressions, but in general.8 Additionally, the semantic fexibility inherent to prepositions to oscillate and create links between the literal and the abstract, the temporal

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and the spatial, or the physical and the emotional, result in their being a powerful addition to the linguistic expression of force-dynamics. Seven examples of these types of cases will be looked at. (1) Put your soft hand upon your snowy side, / Where the heart beats: confess—‘tis nothing new—/ Must not a woman be / A feather on the sea, / Sway’d to and fro by every wind and tide? (“To Fanny,” lines 32–36) (2) That I might drink and leave the world unseen, / And with thee fade away into the forest dim (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 19–20) (3) Throw me upon thy Tripod, till the food / Of stifing numbers ebbs from my full breast. (“To Fanny,” lines 3–4) (4) But pr’ythee, do not turn / The current of your heart from me so soon. (“To Fanny,” lines 20–21) (5) And turn, sole-thoughted, to one Lady there (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” line 42) (6) A gentler speech from burning Porphyro (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” line 159) (7) When a new planet swims into his ken (“On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer,” line 10) Each path preposition above (with the exception of upon in examples [1] and [3], and into in example [7]) has the role of expressing the resultant action which follows the predicate, or the turning point of each force-dynamic expression. This notion of motion or movement is one of the essential concepts within the force-dynamic schema, along with its binary notion of rest. It thus comes as no surprise that grammatical and semantic units possessing the sole role of expressing motion would be of great importance to the expression of force-dynamics in linguistics (and the cognitive effects of the latter). In “Force-Dynamics in Language and Cognition” (Talmy 1988), a great majority of examples presented contain path prepositions, regardless of whether the interactions fall within the domain of the physical, the psychological, or the social. All seven examples enumerated above contain a stronger Antagonist impinging action upon a weaker Agonist. The cognitive schema thus demands a resultant state action: in these cases, the resultant situation is

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that of movement, thus necessitating the use of at least one path preposition (i.e., “swims into his ken” [“On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer,” line 10]). Even if the action is hypothetical or imaginary within the poem, the chain-like reaction of cause and effect is clearly articulated and emphasized, and this kind of verbalization relies heavily on the use of path prepositions. The metaphorical entailments of force-dynamics also necessitate the use of path prepositions when the resultant state is that of movement. The conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES, and any of its emotional delineations (EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT; EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE; EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL FORCE) or the metaphorical “combinations” presented and analyzed previously in this chapter, often result in (as in the cases above) an abstract “movement,” hence the need for a grammatical and semantic element to express this. Upon in examples (1) and (3) and into in (7) hold a more peripheral position in the expressions of emotional force-dynamics within which we fnd them. Upon (1) is simply descriptive within the lines at hand: no more, no less. Upon (3) is a prepositional complement of the lexical verb throw, which acts as a result/follow-up to the force-dynamic verb let in the preceding lines: it exists as part of the exhortation verbalized by the enunciator in the lines in question. It thus is a key element within the overall catenative chain of events taking place within these verses. Into (7) is an indispensable part of the clause expressing one of the causal situations within the lines from “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer.” It is placed at the end of the expression, although it is causal as opposed to having the role of effect. The arrival of a new planet within the mental and emotional space of the Poet has for result his experience of a certain situation: the path preposition, essential for this “arrival,” thus holds a key position in the force-dynamic expression.

5.6 Unclassifed Prepositional Cases There are prepositions which cannot be categorized within the spatial categories discussed in the sections above, as they are not strictly spatial. In this fnal section, I will explore the different roles of these prepositions in Keats’s poetry. I have chosen to divide this analysis into the following semantic categories: Metaphorical Enhancement, Verbal Support, and Antagonistic Reinforcement. Let us begin with Metaphorical Enhancement. Consider the verses below: (1) Where but to think is to be full of sorrow / And leaden-eyed despairs (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 27–28) (2) the palate of my mind / Losing its gust, and my ambition blind! (“I cry your mercy-pity-love!—aye, love!” lines 13–14)

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The preposition of in these two excerpts aids in the verbalization of the conceptual metaphors and evocative imagery present within the verses at hand. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, on force-dynamics, “to be full of sorrow” (“Ode to a Nightingale,” 27) articulates the conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS (Kövecses 2000: 146, 170). Of allows for the expression of this conceptual metaphor, which contributes to the potent description of the somber, desolate place depicted in these lines. The metaphorical interaction, which uses the negated modal auxiliary cannot, is, to a certain extent, dependent upon the said description, as the predicate would be rendered more or less obsolete without it. In example (2), the preposition of falls within the synesthetic imagery which happens to be very central to the force-dynamic interaction in these lines. Effectively, we are confronted with a mixing of the emotions and the senses—the intellectual and the gustative (“the palate of my mind” [“I cry your mercy-pity-love! –aye, love!” l. 13]) and the intello-emotional and the visual (“my ambition blind” [ibid., 14]). Furthermore, of exists here within a part-for-the-whole (metonymic) relation, which is one of the two main roles—according to R. Langacker—that can be taken on by this preposition (Langacker 2009: 74). Of in such a role (or in its other possible roles) is a powerful grammatical and/or semantic element in CG, as opposed to its relative unimportance in the generative tradition (Langacker 2009: 73). Langacker, concerning this part/whole relational role of of, suggests that “a part/whole relation is just one type of intrinsic relationship, albeit one with special cognitive salience. Though participants may not, strictly speaking, be subparts of an event, they are clearly intrinsic to it” (ibid.). The part-for-the-whole relation profled in this case plays a key role in the synesthetic imagery employed by Keats in these verses. It creates a connection between two sensory elements from differing domains and indicates the spatial placement of one within the other, resulting in grammatical and semantic intimacy between the two notions, thus providing compactness to the poetic expression. This is perhaps due to the fact that of “is the most highly grammaticised of all prepositions”: effectively, its original basic locative meaning was that that of away/from, indicating source, but this disappeared early on, and a complex historical development led to its expressing a large number of meanings, as ‘movement away’ gave way to concepts like geographic origin, belonging, selection from a set, and many others. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 658) I have categorized the next two excerpts under the category of prepositional Verbal Support: (3) […] Whose heart goes futt’ring for you everywhere, / Nor, when away you roam, / Dare keep its wretched home, / Love, love alone, his

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In excerpt (3), the preposition for provides verbal and semantic extension of the verb futt’ring, which acts as a supportive predicate for the main forcedynamic verb, the modal auxiliary dare. The preposition here allows for the expression of the emotional reasons why the poet’s heart moves in the way it does. It also provides physical imagery to the lines so as to reinforce the poetic quality of the verses: it can be simultaneously understood as an expression location and of a goal, or something aimed at. From, in the same example, acts as support for the predicative clause in the preceding line (“keep me free”), reinforcing the prohibitive action solicited by the poet, a key part of the multiple-direction force-dynamic interaction in these verses. On, in example (4), has the grammatical and semantic role of the second and complementary part of the phrasal verb to live on (the resultant combination of the predicate live combined with the particle on). This phrasal verb is one of the imagined, or hypothetical, results of the force-dynamic interaction profled within these lines. To live on also possesses a high level of semantic potency in these lines, as it is placed in close physical proximity with its antonymic die, providing elevated emotional force to the expression in question. The phrasal verb (made possible by the particle on) is, moreover, the beginning of the conceptually metaphoric expression(s) which follow. Our fnal prepositional category is that of Antagonistic Reinforcement, in which the preposition acts as grammatical and semantic reinforcement of the Antagonist’s. I will explore one example of this phenomenon. (5) They told her how, upon St. Agnes’ Eve, / Young virgins might have visions of delight (“The Eve of St. Agnes,” lines 46–47) In this instance, the temporal event of St. Agnes’ Eve acts as the (stronger) Antagonist for the (possible: hence the modal auxiliary might) “visions of delight” that young women hoped to experience once a year. The spatial preposition upon, in this case, takes on a temporal role, resulting in a blend between the two notions of space and time, expressing “a temporal trajector […] located on the time axis, [which is] a situation” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 317).9 The temporal fexibility of the preposition allows for the Antagonist to be a temporal notion in and of itself. This thus permits the effectiveness of the force-dynamic expression within these lines. Moreover, the relationship between the Agonist(s) and the Antagonist is verbalized as

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taking place within a certain moment, on a certain day: the preposition here thus plays a key role in the profling of the relation at hand.

5.7 Prepositional Conclusions In this chapter, I have suggested that the cognitive functioning of conceptual metaphor (here, relative to the notion of emotions, and more precisely, emotions expressed via the medium of poetry) is closely linked to the grammatical structure and elements of the metaphor. Conceptual metaphors work as a unit, with each linguistic element operating in relation with the others, and thus playing an indispensable role in their performance. Langacker sums up this importance when he says that: “relations are conceptually dependent, i.e. one cannot conceptualize interconnections without also conceptualizing the entities that they interconnect” (Langacker 1987: 215). The spatial, temporal, and abstract prepositions used within Keats’s poetry result in a deeper comprehension of the conceptual metaphors in which they play a role, aiding in the articulation of emotional space, emotional expression, or the dynamicity or stability of certain sentiments. The metaphors would be much less conceptually salient without the presence of the prepositions, or even impossible to formulate. The link between prepositions and the cognitive effect and grasp of conceptual metaphor thus reinforces and elaborates on the notion that grammatical structures are indistinguishable from structures of sense. This chapter’s objective was to emphasize the ways in which relationship profling, intrinsic to the class of prepositions according to cognitive grammatical theory, allows for an augmentation of the salience of the relationships already formed within the expression of conceptual metaphor: the relationship between the source and the target domain. The presence of prepositions is thus highly central to the full expression of conceptual metaphor, particularly in the domain of poetics, in which the complexity and combination of multiple metaphorical mappings is key. Although limited in their number of letters and in their number, prepositions—whether statically spatial, dynamically spatial, or with another, varied role—are not lacking in their semantic and grammatical value, particularly in the expression of force-dynamics. This grammatical category’s ability to link together the literal with the abstract, the temporal with the spatial, and the physical with the emotional, as well as its inherent semantic fexibility, proves itself to be key in the expression of force-dynamics in language. Furthermore, prepositions seem to be essential to force-dynamic, or causal, expression, whether it be physical, psychological, or social, thus providing their value, and the proof of it, with higher importance. The semantic fexibility inherent to prepositions so as to oscillate and create links between the literal and the abstract, the temporal and the spatial, or the physical and the emotional, result in their being a powerful addition to the linguistic expression of force-dynamics.

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In the upcoming chapter, I will explore the notion of time in Keats’s works, centered around the question of embodiment.

Notes 1 “The analysis of prepositions of space and their motivated extensions amply demonstrates the pervasiveness of conceptual metaphor in grammar” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 303). 2 See Langacker 1990: 91, 327–328. 3 Other examples of three-dimensional prepositions are: “within, inside, between, among, out of, outside of, in(to), through, throughout” (Radden & Dirven 2007: 310). 4 Even if the place in question could be defned or qualifed in multiple ways. 5 Cf. the conceptual metaphor CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 128). 6 By as a causal preposition often “construes a cause as a means controlled by an agent” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 329). 7 Thus, motion is viewed or perceived from the point of view of the narrator, in this case. 8 See Lakoff and Johnson 1989: 73–75. 9 To support this statement, Radden and Dirven provide the example We got engaged on Valentine’s Day, thus expressing an event “which occurred during the period of Valentine’s Day” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 317).

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6.1 Time and Embodiment: An Introduction In Chapter 5, I explored the ways in which prepositions play a role in the various expressions of space and time in Keats’s poetry, both concretely and metaphorically. Building on this as well as on the topics explored in the other preceding chapters, the focus of this chapter is the linguistic expression of time within the context of emotional experience, and through the linguistic conception of the body, in Keats’s oeuvre. Throughout the forthcoming pages, I will take a look at the human conceptualization of time and the impact that this conceptualization has on emotion—and inversely, the impact that the conceptualization of emotion may have on our conceptualization of time—and fnally, the ways in which these conceptualizations are crystallized linguistically by way of conceptual metaphor and metonymy. Time is a concept which can greatly vary from culture to culture. My analyses in this chapter will concentrate on emotional time in the English language in which John Keats wrote his poetry, within their larger poetic and literary context, and along with the cultural ramifcations that are associated with this type of language. Lakoff and Johnson suggest, despite the fact that time is considered a rather basic concept—effectively, we think and speak about the time several times a day, as I have just done in this sentence—that “time, in English and in other languages is, for the most part, not conceptualized and talked about on its own terms. [Moreover] very little of our understanding of time is purely temporal. Most of our understanding of time is a metaphorical version of our understanding of motion in space” (1999: 139). Time is, in most cases, comprehended and verbalized by way of conceptual metaphor. Moreover, and on a more basic level, Lakoff and Johnson argue that “we defne time by metonymy: successive iterations of a type of event stand for intervals of ‘time’” (1999: 138). Given the above statement, the linguistphilosophers propose the following “basic literal properties of our concept of time,” established on inherent characteristics of events:

DOI: 10.4324/9781003275626-6

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1) Time is directional and irreversible because events are directional and irreversible; events cannot “unhappen.” 2) Time is continuous because we experience events as continuous. 3) Time is segmentable because periodic events have beginnings and ends. 4) Time can be measured because iterations of events can be counted. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 138) As time is a concept experienced and conceptualized by all users of language, it is only natural that it would enter into and hold an important place in our conceptualization of emotional experience, as emotional experience can also be considered a universal part of the human experience.1 Moreover, the conceptualization of time as “spatial” is an inherent reinforcement for the theory of the embodiment of emotions, as “the egocentric frame of reference involved in emotion also is a spatial frame of reference; […] [providing] a bodily-centered perspectival framework in which the body functions as an indexical ‘here’” (Maiese 2014: 233). This blend between references of space and time is also essential to the universal, artistic quality of a poetic oeuvre, as Tsur suggests, in suggesting that “poetry is essentially a ‘time’ art.” But, many images in poetry are related to space perception because “spatial organization is of central importance in human cognition” (Tsur 2008: 345). Our bodies, thus, can be considered as central points of reference upon and around which our conceptions and perceptions of space and time—and their inherent metaphorical interchangeability—are based, according to Merleau-Ponty: Ce qui nous permet de centrer notre existence est aussi ce qui nous empêche de la centrer absolument et l’anonymat de notre corps est inséparablement liberté et servitude. Ainsi, pour nous résumer, l’ambiguïté de l’être-au-monde se traduit par celle du corps, et celle-ci se comprend par celle du temps. (Merleau-Ponty 1976: 764) What allows us to center our existence is also what prevents us from centering it completely, and the anonymity of our bodies is inseparably both liberty and servitude. Thus, to sum up, the ambiguity of the beingin-the-world is translated by that of the body, and the latter is understood by that of time. (Translation mine) Our conceptualization of space and time is thus based on our bodies and minds, whether we consider the latter as one, inseparable entity, in the vein of Spinoza, in the sense of a closely related parallelism, in line with Damasio, in terms of both the inherent concepts of both essential characteristics of the body and the latter’s place within its cultural context, as does Kövecses, or in terms of conceptual metaphor, as does Sweester, in her elaboration

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of the conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS A BODY2 (1990). All of the above conceptualizations lead to the same fnal conclusion: that these one or two entities are inherently key to our conceptualization of the world around us. The endeavor to understand the conceptualization of time must essentially pass by this more basic-level conceptualization, resulting in a sort of mental, conceptual, and physiological gymnastics, which occurs on the most basic or subconscious level, as such that we, for the most part, do not even fully realize the complexities of what is happening.

6.2 The TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR: Foundations The conceptual metaphor that will provide the constructive foundation for this chapter’s discussion is based on the spatial conception of time I outlined in the previous paragraphs, with a suitably ftting name: The TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. This conceptual metaphor simultaneously proposes and responds to a conceptualization of time as spatial—hence the term “orientation” within the metaphor’s title—and places the speaker, or observer, at the center of the spatial and temporal “movement” taking place. The observer is thus designated as the center of the conceptualization of the temporal event(s) evoked in or by way of the conceptual metaphor. She is the point of departure, the entity around which all turns. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 140) provide three delineations of this conceptual metaphor,3 related to the past, present, and future. They are the following: 1) The Location of the Observer→The Present 2) The Space in Front of the Observer→The Future 3) The Space Behind the Observer→The Past Lakoff and Johnson argue that such a manner of apprehending time is “a common way of orienting time in the world’s languages” (1999: 140). There exists, however, a certain amount of diversity in the linguistic expressions of such a conceptualization of time, in regard to the lexical and grammatical structure and organization of each language. In English, one can observe a fairly straightforward correlation between this conceptualization and the language used to express this temporal/spatial relationship, as English not only possesses verb tenses or verbal expressions that express the three temporal notions of past, present, and future but also boasts a nuanced selection of spatial and temporal prepositions, which are often used interchangeably and fexibly. This relation to space/time is essential to our conceptualization of language. Langacker suggests that “conceptualization is inherently dynamic—not something that statically exists, but rather something that happens. It resides in mental processing (or neurological activity) and therefore occurs through time” (2008: 79). Furthermore, the multi-faceted quality of linguistic time is an important foundation for any analysis of time within language, in the sense that multiple temporalities

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are at play within any given utterance, as Huddleston and Pullum suggest. In effect, the two linguists delineate the following temporalities: i) ii) iii) iv)

The time referred to4 (Tr) The time of orientation5 (To) The time of the situation (Tsit) Deictic time6 (Td)

(2002: 125–126)7

The majority of the semantic and temporal categories mentioned above hold an important place in the linguistic verbalization of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR in Keats’s works. At times, two or more temporalities work together to establish the spatial and temporal orientations related to time, resulting in the creation of an active, dynamic representation of temporality, possessing a variety of spatial and temporal renditions. This is obviously due to the fact that language has the inherent potential to refer to more than one semantic instance of temporality at a time, and this is due to the “inherently relational” quality of the categories themselves. Indeed, “one time is defned by its relation to another” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 125). This relational quality becomes all the more logical when considered in light of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR, in which time is apprehended by way of its relation to the observer (and, to a certain extent, vice versa).

6.3 Grammar and Metaphorical Expression The functioning of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR in Keatsian verse is heavily reliant on predicates and prepositions. The verbal elements are of central importance to the expression of action and movement relative to time—as has been demonstrated in previous chapters—whereas the prepositions allow for the expression and comprehension of movement, (em)placement, and/or spatial location, and also, in the instances of the EMOTIONS ARE FLUIDS IN A CONTAINER/THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS (Kövecses 2000: 77, 146) metaphor. To get an idea, one such example is the following extract from “Ode on Melancholy,” which will be examined in more detail later on in the chapter: For shade to shade will come too drowsily, / And drown the wakeful anguish of the soul. / But when the melancholy ft shall fall / Sudden from heaven like a weeping cloud (“Ode on Melancholy,” lines 9–12) The two grammatical classes in question—verbs and prepositions—often work together to provide a full, salient, manifestation of conceptual metaphor. This is accomplished in conjunction with the elements that function

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as their context, being both other classes of grammatical and lexical units— including their grammatical and semantic properties—as well as the poetic elements that make up the bulk, or globality, of the poem, such as the plot, underlying themes, and extended metaphors or metonymies. Furthermore, the occurrences of the TIME ORIENTATION conceptual metaphor to be analyzed here have revealed that this conceptual metaphor is rarely found alone. That is, it is most often placed within the presence of at least one other conceptual metaphor or metonymy, a phenomenon which is fairly recurrent.8 Lakoff and Johnson suggest that the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR is often associated with, or used in combination with, THE MOVING TIME METAPHOR (and its various declinations, with a special focus on the TIME-SUBSTANCE delineation) and the MOVING OBSERVER, OR TIME’S LANDSCAPE, METAPHOR. In the frst instance, “the observer is static, and time fows around her; in the second case, the opposite takes place, in that it is the observer who is in motion, surrounded by, or observing, time as an unmoving entity” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 141–145). Linguistic expressions of these conceptualizations are indeed present in the examples of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR that I will examine in the present chapter. Furthermore, other conceptual metaphors have revealed themselves as playing a complementary or supporting role to the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. The presence of the other metaphors—as I have argued in earlier chapters—typically reinforces the potency and effciency of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR in and of itself and moreover, plays a role in the poeticity of the verbalizations of the conceptual metaphors, as metaphorical “combining” or expanding is one of the key manners in which “poetic” conceptual metaphor defnes itself (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 70–71). The analyses of the occurrences of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR that are to follow will be organized in terms of the temporality that they express: that is, present, past, future, or various combinations of the three (either two temporalities together or all three within the same expression). The singular temporal instances will come frst, followed by the multifaceted expressions of temporality. The analyses will frstly identify the conceptual metaphors present in the examples and the interactions that take place between the metaphors and/or metonymies at hand. Then, the grammatical elements which play a role in the poetic, linguistic, expression of the conceptual metaphor will be identifed and also analyzed in terms of their roles within the metaphor, resulting in a global analysis of the verbalization of the metaphor in its entirety. The conclusions drawn from this more central analysis will then lead to an examination of the role of the conceptual metaphor regarding the poetic context in which it is placed, allowing conclusions to be drawn about the expression of emotion in the poems themselves. The poems which are the center of this chapter’s focus are “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” “Ode on Melancholy,” “Ode on Indolence,” “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” To Autumn,” “Ode to a Nightingale,” and “To Hope.”

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6.4 The TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR: Temporally Focused Case Studies As mentioned above, the analyses of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR will be organized in terms of the temporality that they refer to: present, past, future, or a combination of two or three of the above. Each temporal case has a selection of between one and four examples of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. Let us begin with the present. 6.4.1 Pure Present I will begin with verses presenting the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR within references to the present, and the present alone, focusing on two examples of this particular type of case. The frst is found in “To Autumn,” in which the speaker is involved in observation of his psychological, emotional, and physical state in the autumnal season, as well as a multi-dimensional, indirect address to the season itself. The poem lends itself to both literal and metaphorical understandings of this seasonal phenomenon. The second comes from “Ode to a Nightingale,” and at this point in the poem, the speaker is intensely contemplating the ripeness of the present moment. Let us frst take a look at the verses in question; the analysis will then follow. (1) And sometimes like a gleaner thou dost keep / Steady thy laden head across a brook; / Or by a cyder-press, with patient look, / Thou watchest the last oozings hours by hours. (“To Autumn,” lines 19–22) (2) Now more than ever it seems rich to die, / To cease upon the midnight with no pain, / While thou art pouring forth thy soul abroad / In such an ecstasy! (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 55–58) These two extracts verbalize the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR while making reference to the present situation in which the speaker observes and recounts an individual in relation to time. Firstly, in regard to the grammatical representation of the present, varying aspectual cases are present: in “To Autumn,” (1) the verbs are in their present form—dost keep and watchest—and thus in a non-progressive aspect. In the lines from “Ode to a Nightingale,” (2) the progressive aspect is utilized: art pouring. However, regardless of the aspectual differences that the verses present, the same idea of a present instant in which the protagonist is fully involved in her/his relation to time is transmitted. This relation to time is expressed in various ways within the verses at hand. Firstly, the reader is confronted with a clear expression of the speaker’s location as a manifestation of the present. In (1), we fnd a static, “steady,

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patient,” protagonist, observing time as it fows by her: “thou watchest the last oozings hours by hours” (v. 21). Interestingly, here, the speaker is directly addressing Autumn itself: thou, thy. The narrative technique here is particular, as the role and time-related activities assigned to the season here could also easily be those undertaken by the speaker himself, as he watches Autumn unfold and evolve. In terms of the stativity of the protagonist—which reinforces the notion of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR itself—multiple lexical elements act as support: keep, steady, laden, across, by, patient, watchest, and oozings. Keep, steady, laden, by, and patient inherently radiate the notions of solidity, stativity, waiting, and lack of movement. Each one acts in its own unique and nuanced manner and according to the possibilities provided by their respective grammatical classes. Watchest holds similar implications, as the act of watching is a rather passive one, typically requiring the watcher to be still, whereas the object of her attention is in motion or activity. By and oozing are the lexical elements referring to mobility—thus creating a contrast between the Protagonist / Speaker and Time—in these verses. Let us focus for a moment on the predicative elements. The contrast is clear between the verbs found in the non-progressive aspect (keep and watchest) and the nominal, deverbal form of the verb ooze—oozings, which expresses slow, gentle movement. Such a transformation of the verb ooze is rather idiosyncratic, drawing the reader’s attention to it, allowing the semantics of the term to be heard in their full capacity. The interaction of the predicative—or idiosyncratically nominal—elements in these verses leads to the comprehension of the complementary (to the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR) conceptual metaphor, the MOVING TIME METAPHOR, in which “there is a long, stationary observer facing in a fxed direction [and] there is an infnitely long sequence of objects moving past the observer” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 141). In this conceptual metaphor, the “motion of objects past the observer” is mapped onto the domain of “the ‘passage’ of time” (ibid). In (2), do we see the oozings of the cyder-press—or of time itself? The lines here are highly ambiguous—and are put into direct relation with terminology referring to temporality (“hours by hours”), which clearly indicates the passage of time, but without removing the inherent fgurative quality of the enunciation. The prepositions across and by also reinforce the double metaphorical mapping going on in the verses from “To Autumn.” Effectively, their inherently dynamic nature—in light of their context—reinforces the immobile quality of the protagonist and/or speaker, by emphasizing the dynamic quality of the passage of time. The spatial prepositions across (line 20) and by (line 21) refer to the actual physical emplacement of the protagonist, thus providing the reader with essential information regarding the motion (or lack thereof) of the latter. The second instance of by in line 22, takes on the simultaneous role of both a spatial and a temporal preposition. Time is in motion—hence the temporal semantics of the preposition—but it is

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conceived in terms of space, movement from one location towards another, hence the spatial semantics of the preposition. The other lexical items mentioned as contextual support for the presence of the conceptual metaphors related to time in these verses are keep, steady, laden, patient, and watchest, which all refer to the static, observatory qualities of the Protagonist / Speaker. The Speaker, as well as the season of Autumn itself—as the time of narration—is not in motion, but in a fxed, designated location, with time as the active element surrounding them. These terms buttress the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR—which emphasizes the “location” of the observer—and the MOVING TIME METAPHOR, which is based upon the notion of the individual as unmoving and time as dynamic. The ambiguity, or openness, rather, of the verses at hand—the fact that the verses could be understood as describing either Autumn as observed by the Speaker, or Autumn itself, observing Time—further reinforces the poeticity of the metaphor. In both or either interpretation of these verses, the metaphor holds the same semantic role. The inherent semantics of the conceptual metaphors expressed in a complementary fashion within these verses is the portrayal of dynamics between time and the individual. This ultimately expresses, and results in, the “affection” of one entity upon another, to refer to Spinoza’s theory of affects and passions. The inherently fexible, supple, and soft nature of the human body/ mind allows it to be open—or vulnerable—to changes brought about by external elements: in this case, time, conceived metaphorically as an entity on its own. The acceptance of time as an entity that has the power to affect us as humans leads to the acceptance of the fact that time plays a role in the way in which we conceive and perceive and are molded by it, which ultimately leads to emotional “consequences” or effects—the movement of the affects. Time is affected by and affects our emotional experience. We conceive of our emotional experience, to a certain extent, in temporal terms, and vice versa. The above is further reinforced in these verses by the presence of declination of the conceptual metonymy LOVING VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE (Kövecses 2000: 124). The role of the Protagonist and/or Speaker as an explicit “observer”—a role which is not only explicitly mentioned in the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR but is also literally verbalized in the verses, as seen by way of the terminology mentioned above—places a certain emphasis on the physical act of observation, a most basic type of visual behavior. There is an inherent metonymical link between the act of “loving visual behavior” as standing in for, or expressing, the experience of the emotion of love: this is expressed here in a slightly different sense. While the emotional experience taking place here not is explicitly related to love, the visual behavior still acts as an expression of the emotional state of the Season (or the Speaker, and his admiration for the season), evocative of their relationships to time and its passing. Example (2), from “Ode to a Nightingale,” places the reader in the pure, immediate present: this time, however, by way of the use of the

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progressive aspect in the central predicative element, art pouring. As is habitually the case, the use of the progressive aspect reinforces a solely present, restricted viewing frame or point of view. In other words, what captures the reader’s attention here is the pouring of the soul that is taking place here by the Nightingale, at the exact time of the enunciation, clearly elucidated as now: the exactness of the present moment. The global semantics of these lines leads to the comprehension of a pressing need to act within the present moment. Now more than ever: as if no other instant in time has been, or will be, as appropriate as now, to do a number of things (all time related); to die (to stop one’s personal time clock); to cease upon the midnight hour (to engage in, then stop, a direct relationship with a moment of time), etc. The dynamism of the act of soul-pouring is reinforced through of the prepositions forth and abroad, which take on both spatial and temporal roles here. The reader receives an image of the soul moving forward, beyond the current spatial emplacement of the protagonist, in a forward direction (forth), and visibly, far away (abroad). This temporal/spatial movement leads to the expression of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR with the Protagonist in her current location—the present—making an effort to send the soul—an explicitly emotive term—“in front of her,” thus, to the future. Furthermore, the narrative quality of the poem creates a second dialectic in this sense, in which the static Speaker, within her/his own relationship to time, observes the Nightingale operating within hers. The emotive and locative/temporal aspect of these verses is further reinforced by the presence of the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS. The Speaker/Poet provides an image of the Nightingale’s soul in ecstasy. The spatial preposition in, in conjunction with the mention of the emotional or psychological state of ecstasy, allows for this metaphor to be easily apprehended, thus highlighting the emotional experience that is taking place in these verses along with the notion of emplacement and location so essential to the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. Similar dynamics between the individual and time are present here, as in the previous example. 6.4.2 Pure Past After having considered the pure present in the last section, (1) and (2), I will now take a look at the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR situated within the past. The lines to be studied are found in “Ode on Indolence” (3) and in “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” (4), (5). The latter has been analyzed in depth throughout the previous chapters, in light of its linguistic and poetic richness on multiple levels: the context and storyline of the poem remain fresh in our minds. “Isabella” is rife with representations of emotional expression, due to the fact that the poem itself recounts a love story, in narrative form and chronological order, and is thus centered around amorous experience.

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In “Ode on Indolence,” the Speaker recounts a vision, a surreal and dreamlike experience. The narrative quality of the poem places its temporality within the past, with a transfer to the present in the fnal stanza, in which the Speaker addresses the “Ghosts” directly. Beyond the narrative temporality of the poem, it is important to note that the poem’s subject matter itself—Indolence—involves an inherent relationship with time. One who is indolent feels no urgency and operates slowly—if at all, as there is almost an element of rejection here—within time. The lines analyzed here are a selection, chosen so as to provide a case study, but many of the observations here could be applied to the poem in its entirety. (3) The blissful cloud of summer-indolence / Benumb’d my eyes; my pulse grew less and less; / Pain had no sting, and pleasure’s wreath no fower: / O, why did ye not melt, and leave my sense / Unhaunted of all but—nothingness? / A third time pass’d they by, and passing, turn’d, / Each one the face a moment whiles to me; / Then faded, and to follow them I burn’d / And ached for wings, because I knew the three (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 16–24) (4) With every morn their love grew tenderer, / With every eve deeper and tenderer still; / He might not in house, feld, or garden stir, / But her full shape would all his seeing fll; / And his continual voice was pleasanter / To her than noise of trees or hidden rill; / Her lute-string gave an echo of his name, / She spoilt her half-done broidery with the same. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 9–16) (5) He knew whose gentle hand was at the latch, / Before the door had given her to his eyes; / And from her chamber-window he would catch / Her beauty farther than the falcon spies; / And constant as her vespers he would watch, / Because her face was turn’d to the same skies; / And with sick longing all the night outwear, / To hear her morning-step upon the stair. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 17–24) In (3), from “Ode on Indolence,” the speaker appears placed in an environment strictly related to the past. This is both proven and clarifed by the use of the simple preterit form of the vast majority of the predicates found within these verses: passed, faded, burn’d, ach’d, and knew. Firstly, I will reiterate the fact that the preterit—or generally, the past temporality—is employed in this poem given its narrative form and structure: the speaker is effectively recounting a situation that occurred (psychologically or hypothetically) in the past. The TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR comes into play in these lines when the context and the plot of the poem are both fully taken into account. Simply beginning with the title of the poem, “Ode on Indolence,” a specifc

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temporal rapport comes into play. Indeed, Indolence alludes to a specifc relation with temporality—particularly, one that could be considered to be in a certain sense of rebellion against societally imposed standards of appropriate “usage” of one’s time. Indolence goes hand-in-hand with the idea of languor or torpidity, the opposite of action. Moreover, the notion of Indolence has connotations of the idea of a lucid choice made by the indolent individual (for example, to reject the notion of time-structured work) resulting in the creation of a specifc dialectic with time. These inherent semantic notions lead us once again to the idea of immovability on the part of the Protagonist/Speaker, allowing time to be considered as the active agent, in motion. Furthermore, this moving/unmoving relationship is enhanced by the images presented in these lines, of the three ephemeral beings passing by the speaker, while he remains in a fxed location—almost in spite of himself, as he “burned” to follow their path, and “ached for wings,” entities which would endow him with the possibility of locomotion.9 This spatial fxedness is thus revelatory of the same complementary conceptual metaphor as is present in (1): the MOVING TIME METAPHOR, in which the observer looks on as time passes by him. This is all the more reinforced by the evanescent and mobile qualities inherent to the three goddesses, who allow for the embodiment, to a certain extent, of the Speaker’s dilettante-esque relationship with time, punctuating his laziness and lack of movement. Effectively, they pass by the speaker—three times, to be exact—and then fade. Furthermore, this spatial movement is placed in direct relation with temporality by way of the lexemes moment and while, which not only reveals the awareness on the part of the Speaker of the temporality in which he and his interlocutors are found and which also surrounds them but also reinforces the peripatetic quality of the three deities. They pass by, they enter into dialogue with the speaker, but they do not, by any means, remain in the same place: they are effectively the opposite of indolent. The emotiveness that this clearly tense interaction appears to awaken in the speaker is further elaborated by the presence of two conceptual metonymies, specifcally related to emotion: BODY HEAT FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134) (“and to follow them I burn’d” [23]) and PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 82) (“and to follow them I burn’d / And ached for wings because I knew the three” [23–24]). The causality refected in the subordinating conjunction because all the more amplifes the emotional quality of the verses, as it verbalizes the way in which the presence—and departure—of the three divine creatures arouse emotion on the part of the speaker, resulting in direct effects on and within the body/mind, verbalized by way of the conceptual metonymies. The recognition of the present as the current spatial location and the future as a location “in front of” the observer is emphasized here by lexical items such as follow, which directly project an image of moving forward—particularly in light of the emotions revealed in the lines, in which the speaker burns to take the same path as the three female deities. One

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typically does not fret over the fact of not being in a position to follow someone into the past, but rather, we long to shadow along their path towards the future. However, although the notions of present and future are both evoked here, the scope of the narration—being namely, the past— is the predominant temporality in this case, in light of the poetic genre itself as narrative art. This is clearly illuminated by the verbal choices made by the poet in “Ode on Indolence.” Examples (4) and (5) are highly similar in the way in which they present the past temporality: these verses come from the same poem and, moreover, are found in close proximity to one another within the said poem. The narrative vein is more or less the same. Here, the reader encounters an omniscient, unidentifed narrator or Speaker/Poet, who tells the tale of Isabella and Lorenzo from a referential present. However, this present is not necessarily or explicitly represented within the poetic text itself. In light of this, I will not include it as part of this analysis, as it can be considered external to the poet and the poet’s schematization. That being said, the narrative present does hold a somewhat infuential position in the sense that the present temporality of the speaker/observer allows for the situation of the narrative in the past—resulting in a “use of the preterit to indicate that Tr is earlier than To” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 136): “behind” the spatial and temporal location of the observer. The past temporality acts as a point of reference here: it takes on the role of the time of situation or time referred to as well as the time of orientation (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 126). The past is linguistically expressed in these verses by cases of the preterit, such as grew, was, gave, spoilt, and knew, as well as an instance of the past perfect, had given. The more or less consistent use of the preterit allows for a general smoothing over of the past temporality, placing all of the predicates in the same general temporal framework. The use of the past perfect, however, does result in the nuancing of the past temporality, as the combination of a perfect with a primary tense expresses two temporal relations (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 140). Further lexical markers which enhance the spatial and temporal expression of time in these lines are also found, such as with every morn, with every eve, constant as the vespers, all the night, and morning-step. Firstly, the latter lead to the comprehension of the complementary MOVING TIME conceptual metaphor. Time here is depicted to be in constant, habitual, movement, and its daily evolution and progression are highlighted by way of the inclusion of this type of terminology. However, the MOVING TIME metaphor is employed here in a different manner than in the previous examples, in which Time was mobile and the observer, or protagonist, stable. This is not exactly the case here, as these verses describe both physical and emotional movement and evolution on the part of Isabella and Lorenzo: the latter is manifested both by fuidity and stativity. They are active, circulating and operating within their own personal and shared domestic and emotional contexts. In light of this, the presence of the complementary TIME LANDSCAPE

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(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 141–145) metaphor can be feasibly argued for in these lines, as well. Indeed, their love is evolving, just as time is passing, and the movement of time provides a sort of background of mobility for their own. Both instances of movement are refective of the other, and they thus work together within these verses to create a highly salient, temporally (and thus spatially) based depiction of an emotional situation, experienced by two actors, both separately and together. Secondly, the direct allusions made to morning and night—the celestial and lunar cycles10—install a highly present night/day dialectic, reinforcing, on multiple levels, the three conceptual metaphors relative to time mentioned above. The representation of the past in these verses further allows for the verbalization and conceptualization of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR and its respective delineations of the MOVING TIME and TIME AS LANDSCAPE metaphors. This non-deictic past is expressed in multiple ways throughout these poems. This is specifcally accomplished through the use of modal auxiliaries, such as might and would, expressing a past-oriented epistemic modality. The latter is partially based on the omniscient role of the speaker, and thus the narrative style of the poem—but also, in (5), founded in the emotional connection between the two young lovers: “He knew whose gentle hand was at the latch, / Before the door had given her to his eyes; / […] And constant as her vespers he would watch, / Because her face was turn’d to the same skies” (v. 17–18, 21–22). Would, for example, expresses a past, habitual, predictable action, characteristic of Lorenzo. The intense emotional connection between Isabella and Lorenzo is reinforced by the use of modal auxiliaries in an epistemic sense, thus ultimately providing semantic and grammatical support for the emotional salience and potency of these verses, and of the poem as a whole. Moreover, other lexical elements semantically reinforce the representation of a past habit, such as still and continual. Time is situated along a “vertical” temporal axis in these verses, emphasized not only by the celestial vocabulary present here but also by terms such as deeper, which directly refect vertical directionality. Regarding fgurative language, these examples are rich in multiple metaphors and metonymies, as seen in the frst instance by the presence of the three complementary, temporally oriented metaphors elaborated on above. Example (4), moreover, provides verbalizations of the conceptual metonymies PREOCCUPATION WITH ANOTHER FOR LOVE (“And his continual voice was pleasanter / To her than noise of trees or hidden rill” [v. 13–14]); INABILITY TO THINK FOR LOVE (“He might not in house, feld, or garden stir, / But her full shape would all his seeing fll” [v. 11–12]), and INTERFERENCE WITH ACCURATE PERCEPTION FOR LUST (OR LOVE)11 (“He might not in house, feld, or garden stir, / But her full shape would all his seeing fll” [v. 11–12]; “Her lute-string gave an echo of his name, / She spoilt her half-done broidery with the same” [v. 15–16]). Example (5), on the other hand, contains instances of the following conceptual metonymies: PREOCCUPATION WITH ANOTHER FOR LOVE (“And constant

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as her vespers he would watch, / Because her face was turn’d to the same skies / And from her chamber-window he would catch / Her beauty farther than the falcon spies” [V. 19–22]); PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR LOVE (OR LUST), and DIZZINESS FOR LOVE12 (“And with sick longing all the night outwear, / To hear her morning-step upon the stair” [v. 23–24]). This is refective of the fact that the physical effects of the emotional state of Isabella and Lorenzo are highly dynamic, agitated, and malleable, based on the emotional state they fnd themselves in at the time of the narration. The reader witnesses the young lovers both fully—almost obsessively—occupied with one another and highly agitated on both a physical and a psychological level due to their infatuation with the other. This is manifested by way of the inability to work, artistic expression impregnated with emotion and thoughts of the beloved, sleepless nights, and feeling ill, among others. 6.4.3 Pure Future In this third case study of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR, I will focus on enunciations referring to the pure future. (6) Make not your rosary of yew-berries, / Nor let the beetle, nor the death-moth be / Your mournful Psyche, nor the downy owl / A partner in your sorrow’s mysteries; / For shade to shade will come too drowsily, / And drown the wakeful anguish of the soul. / But when the melancholy ft shall fall / Sudden from heaven like a weeping cloud (“Ode on Melancholy,” lines 5–12) In these lines, the reader is directly placed in the context of the future, by way of the temporal marker/auxiliary will, associated with the lexical verbs come and drown, projecting the fulfllment of the action of these verbs into a future temporality. The modal auxiliary shall,13 associated both semantically and syntactically with the lexical verb fall, also contributes to the temporal placement of the narration in the future. Most linguists would agree with the statement that English does not actually possess a future tense, as it were, but rather, expressions of future time. Moreover, we can understand the category of modals (such as will and shall) as “auxiliary(ies) of mood, not tense” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 208–209), an argument which resonates particularly with the link between grammar and the expression of emotion. Furthermore, the fact that the lexical verbs mentioned above all inherently express movement, in varying senses, contributes all the more to the linguistic representation of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR, with the future being presented as a collection of imminent events, spatially spread out before the speaker, that are intrinsically active. The protagonist here is static, surrounded by imagistic representations of time in motion, allowing for the abstract comprehension of the MOVING TIME

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METAPHOR, coupled with, as in all of the examples within this subsection, the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR, in which the future temporality is considered as being situated “in the space in front of the observer14” (“the melancholy ft shall fall” [v. 11]): here, I draw your attention to the cognitive blend between “in front of” and “up.” Furthermore, in terms of the emotional content of these verses, the active elements here—in other words, the subjects of the predicates mentioned above—are, effectively, emotions themselves, in the case of, once again, “the melancholy ft” (v. 11) or the abstract, natural elements which are portrayed as potentially having a direct impact on the emotional state of the protagonist (your rosary of yew-berries, the beetle, the death-moth, Your mournful Psyche, the downy owl, etc.). Other lexical elements enhance the metaphorical relationship with time depicted within, and by way of, these verses. For example, the adverb sudden explicitly refers to a certain temporality: one which happens quickly, and to a certain extent, unexpectedly, to the observer. These are elements that further reinforce the intrinsic stability of the observer and, conversely, the inherent dynamicity of time itself, thus ultimately providing lexical and semantic support for the MOVING TIME METAPHOR. In addition, the adjective wakeful and the adverb drowsily, which, on a most basic level, refer to the state of being of the entity modifed by these elements (the coming of the shade, in the case of drowsily; the anguish, in the case of wakeful), also bring into the scope of reference allusions to temporality. The action of awakening, or the state of being wakeful, and the action of dozing, or the state of being drowsy, fnd their foundation in notions of time, as they are refections of the human circadian cycle, based on the rhythms of waking and sleeping, ultimately based in the rising and falling of the sun and moon: ways in which humans traditionally observe and apprehend time. These temporal references fnd themselves in direct relation with emotive experiences on multiple levels. Firstly, the overall poetic schema and subject matter of “Ode on Melancholy” are, in the most primal sense, emotional: even the title of the poem is refective of this, as an emotion is the recipient of the Ode itself. Moreover, the verses in question here are rife with emotionally centered lexical elements, such as anguish, melancholy, and weeping. This emotional content is further reinforced by linguistic expressions of metonymy related to emotion, such as PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION (wakeful anguish; melancholy ft), and EFFECTS OF A STATE FOR THE STATE (For shade to shade will come too drowsily, / And drown the wakeful anguish of the soul”), in conjunction with CRYING FOR SADNESS15 (“the melancholy ft shall fall / Sudden from heaven like a weeping cloud” [v. 11–12]). The conceptual metaphor the BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS is also palpable in these lines (“drown the wakeful anguish of the soul,” [v. 10]). This is accomplished by way of the verbalization of the soul as a recipient which has the potential to receive and store liquid—to the point of extremity in

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this case, as a phenomenon of drowning takes place. The soul/body/mind is effectively overwhelmed by the fuent quality of the shade (negative emotions), too much for it to contain. The bodily reactions concretized via these conceptual metonymies permit a full expression of the rich emotional content present within these verses, which aids in the overall emotivity of the poem itself. Furthermore, the combination of multiple conceptual metaphors and metonymies results in an overall intensifcation of the poetic quality of the verses (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 70–71), as well as providing a simultaneous refection of their inherent poeticity. 6.4.4 Present + Future The past three subsections focused on singular temporalities. The following subsections will be centered around more complex expressions of time: here, I will take a look at three instances of the present and future combined, from “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” “Ode on Melancholy,” and “Ode to a Nightingale.” (7) Ah, happy, happy boughs! that cannot shed / Your leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu; / And, happy melodist, unwearied, / For ever piping songs for ever new; / More happy love! more happy, happy love! / For ever warm and still to be enjoy’d, / For ever panting, and for ever young; / All breathing human passion far above, / That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy’d (“Ode on a Grecian Urn,” lines 21–29) (8) No, no, go not to Lethe, neither twist / Wolf’s bane, tight-rooted, for its poisonous wine; / Nor suffer thy pale forehead to be kist / By nightshade, ruby grape of Proserpine; (“Ode on Melancholy,” lines 1–4) (9) And as, in sparkling majesty, a star / Gilds the bright summit of some gloomy cloud; / Brightening the half veil’d face of heaven afar: / So, when dark thoughts my boding spirit shroud, / Sweet Hope, celestial infuence round me shed, / Waving thy silver pinions o’er my head. (“To Hope,” lines 42–47) The above extracts all possess interwoven references to both the present and the future; furthermore, the representation of the present and future temporalities is rather analogous between them, in the way in which the present temporality is effectively characterized as the current state of being and location, and the future is portrayed as a forwardly—or even upwardly—located space, towards which the protagonist projects herself, others, and anticipated and/or potential actions. These dynamics are

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verbalized in varying ways throughout the verses at hand. For example, a fairly wide range of lexical elements aids in the description of these two temporalities and the poem’s place within them. Despite this lexical diversity, there are similarities in expression that are most fruitful to analyze. For instance, all of the verses have an omniscient narrator, interacting with the protagonist in various ways. This narrator, in the frst instance, facilitates the poetic representation of the double temporality at hand. The point of view from which the poetic context is expressed—the time of the utterance—is observed from a maximal viewing frame, as is the time of the situation. Secondly, the verbal tense does not play as much of an essential role in these instances as in the examples analyzed in the previous subsections referring to other temporal contexts. Specifcally, there are no predicates present with an overtly “future-oriented construction” (such as going to or will).16 Instead, the poet prefers to rely upon other lexical elements for the expression of the future, such as those referring to the future temporality (such as when and for ever). Imagistic language, such as references to movement, particularly metaphorical movement, plays a role in this as well. For example, in “Grecian Urn” “Ah, happy, happy boughs! that cannot shed / Your leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu” (l. 21–22); in “Melancholy” “go not to Lethe” (l. 1); or in “To Hope” “Sweet Hope, celestial infuence round me shed, / Waving thy silver pinions o’er my head” (l. 46–47). The imperative verbal form, a “clausal construction with a future time interpretation,”17 also plays an important role in future-oriented reference in these extracts and is used multiple times. Thirdly, the ethereal and almost sacrosanct nature of the elements which compose the imagistic furnishings in these lines reinforces the notions of both spatial and temporal projections. The future is depicted as something beyond—in some instances, above—the poems’ protagonists. This verticality is often buttressed by way of terminology that could be easily related to concepts of a celestial or heavenly experience: or conversely, an otherworldly experience that falls somewhat on the darker side. I will now examine the linguistic elements which compose the similarities mentioned above, going extract by extract, starting with (7), the selection of verses from “Ode on a Grecian Urn.” In terms of the temporal placement of these verses, both the present and the future are highly salient. The present is, frst of all, the linguistic time in which the narration takes place, so it may be considered the dominant temporality throughout the poem’s entirety. This is visible here by way of the point of view of the poem’s speaker, who seemingly observes events as they are taking place. The happy boughs, happy melodist, and happy love are clearly entities that exist in the narrator’s present temporality—thus, the deictic time is situated in the present—and they are apprehended as fxed points in both the narrator’s perception as well as when taken in consideration with the state of the entities themselves. Their present-ness, verbalized and visualized

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in this fashion, is indicative of the expression of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR, inherent to the functioning of these lines. Moreover, the narrator’s ability, capacity, and desire to project information concerning the future endeavors of the boughs, melodist, and love are refective of this, particularly in light of the interpretation of the future as a mood, as opposed to as a tense. The speaker’s observations of the joyful emotional state of the three main “protagonists” also reinforce the presence of the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR in these verses. In effect, the emotion itself is utilized as a sort of gauge for the potential, or hypothetical, temporal movement in which the protagonists are operating, or will be operating. Their current emotional state(s) is (are) portrayed as their present location (in space and in time), and the continued effects of said emotional state(s) are envisioned as temporal/ spatial emplacements before the protagonist. For example, the boughs are described as being located within an eternal Spring, a simultaneously temporal and spatial location. Temporal, in terms of the fact that it is a season, thus falls within and during a particular moment of the year, and spatial, given the physical descriptions and effects of the “state” of Spring, being unable to shed one’s leaves, for example. In purely emotional terms, happy (or happiness) is obviously the emotional state that these entities are in at the time of the utterance. They are, furthermore, presumed to remain in this state once they have entered into the future temporality. This is represented verbally by way of projections into the future, such as “that cannot shed / Your leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu” (l. 21–22); “for ever piping songs for ever new” (l. 24); or “For ever warm and still to be enjoy’d, / For ever panting, and for ever young” (l. 26–27). Interestingly enough, after these future-oriented projections, the reader fnds herself thrown back into a present temporality at the very end of the verses, with “all breathing human passion far above, / That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy’d” (l. 28–29). The future—and the events that took, or will take place there—are depicted as spatially above the present temporality (“far above”), thus placing the present and future temporalities along a vertical axis18—similar to the horizontal axis inherent to the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. The conceptual metaphor HAPPY IS UP (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 58) also comes to mind in this case. Moreover, this discrepancy in terms of placement leads to direct emotional effects. Effectively, it is an emotional state that is placed in the future (human passion) and its emplacement there results in other emotional outpourings (sorrow, and the physical/emotional state of being cloyed). This emotional imagery is also refective of the conceptual metonymy PHYSICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF A STATE FOR THE STATE on multiple accounts: the body and its expression of emotion are highly present here. In (8), the reader encounters the imperative mood which verbalizes a direct relation with the future temporality—the time referred to19—acting as an inhibitor for potential action but simultaneously placed in the

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present, the time of utterance. The imperative mood is present in three separate predicates in these verses: go, twist, and suffer. The predicate go directly refers to motion: here, forward motion, towards Lethe—a notion which also intrinsically alludes to movement and migration—thus reinforcing the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. The abstract state of Lethe is seen as something both temporally and spatially placed in front of the observer, in the future. Lethe, however, does add in another spatial complexity: as it is one of the rivers of the Underworld, it does hold a connotation of downward, future movement (as opposed to upward in the other extracts). The predicates twist and suffer are once again part of an enunciation which aims to dissuade from a certain type of action and take on a more supportive, rather than central, role in these lines. Their imperative mood buttresses the notions of the present and future temporalities—concerning the time of the utterance and the time of reference—and further reinforces the emotive quality of the verses at hand, as they make specifc emotional references. Example (9) is a prime example of the temporal and spatial universe of “To Hope,” relying on celestial imagery, such as sparkling majesty, star, heaven, and silver pinions. This type of imagery once again implements the notion of a vertical, rather than horizontal, temporal axis (even further reiterated in line 47, “o’er my head”). All of the potential elements that work together to construct the universe depicted in these lines are just that: potential, thus located in the spatial and temporal future. Concerning the predicates in these lines, there are the verbs gilds and shroud, conjugated in the present but referring to the future, along with another case of the imperative mood, in which the speaker calls out to Hope—an emotion, lest we forget—to shed her celestial infuence around him. The inclusion of an imperfective aspect, waving, as a supportive, descriptive, and lexical predicate also allows for the deepening of the imagery presented, rendering the future context tangible and palpable, as the reader fnds herself placed in a crystallization of the time of orientation at the time of the utterance. The imperfective aspect found in brightening has a similar effect. Temporal markers such as when also enhance the temporal description taking place in these verses, providing a description of both a temporal and spatial universe, existing between the present and the future. In the above examples, the future is ultimately verbalized as a projection: something not yet attained—in the realm of the possible or the potential—that a certain chain of events may lead up to, or, in the case of (6), something to be on guard against, given its inherent potentiality (as well as potential danger). This notion of “projection” enhances the notions verbalized, conceptualized, and purported by the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR and, moreover, elaborates upon this metaphor in the sense that the axis upon which both the observer and the temporalities are situated is often portrayed as a vertical one.

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6.4.5 Past + Present + Future The fnal temporal dialectic that I will explore here is the combination of the three temporalities: that is, the past, the present, and the future. We will analyze the four extracts, below: (10) Thou still unravish’d bride of quietness, / Thou foster-child of silence and slow time, / Sylvan historian, who canst thus express / A fowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme (“Ode on a Grecian Urn,” lines 1–4) (11) The blissful cloud of summer-indolence / Benumb’d my eyes; my pulse grew less and less; / Pain had no sting, and pleasure’s wreath no fower: / O why did ye not melt, and leave my sense / Unhaunted quite of all but—nothingness? (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 16–21) (12) A whole long month of May in this sad plight / Made their cheeks paler by the break of June: / ‘To-morrow I will bow to my delight, / To-morrow I will ask my lady’s boon.”— / ‘O may I never see another night, / Lorenzo, if thy lips breathe not love’s tune.’— / So spake they to their pillows; but, alas, / Honeyless days and days did he let pass; (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 25–32) (13) Forlorn! The very word is like a bell / To toll me back from thee to my sole self! / Adieu! the fancy cannot cheat so well / As she is famed to do, deceiving elf. / Adieu! adieu! thy plaintive anthem fades / Past the near meadows, over the still stream, / Up the hill-side; and now ‘tis buried deep / In the next valley-glades: / Was it a vision, or a waking dream? / Fled is that music:-do I wake or sleep? (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 71–80) To begin with, the issue of the time of the utterance or of the narration in these lines must be investigated. Examples (10) and (13) are similar in their narrative temporalities: that is, both of these selections have a time of utterance in the present, making references to both the past and the present within their narratives. Examples (11) and (12), on the other hand, have a narrative temporality more situated in the past, with references being made throughout the narrative to the present as well as the future. This tripartite blend of temporalities is seen in a variety of ways. In (10) and (13), the reader is confronted with direct present-ness in terms of the narration, as stated above. This takes on different forms, however, when a comparison is made between the two extracts. In (10), the speaker is involved in direct dialogue with the Grecian Urn—or at least, a monologue

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is aimed at the Urn—which takes place in the present. Within said monologue, however, references are made both to the past and the present. Still unravished alludes to the three temporalities at once, whereas Sylvan historian refers to the present role of the Urn and its relation with the past and, potentially, the future, given the immortal characteristics placed upon it. Canst thus express, within which the modal auxiliary can, in its negated form, allows for reference to both the present and the future, simultaneously: the Urn cannot “express” at the given moment. In light of the inherent future orientation of modal auxiliaries (Langacker 2008: 306–308), it may be assumed that in the future, this will remain the case. Here, the Grecian Urn may be visualized as the “observer,” or Protagonist within the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR. Furthermore, the intrinsic immobility of the Urn allows for the conceptualization of the MOVING TIME METAPHOR, with time being seen as in motion, in multiple directions, surrounding the stable Urn. Verbalization of the conceptual metonymy MENTAL INCAPACITIES FOR THE EMOTIONS (Kövecses 2000: 75) may also be apprehended, as the Urn’s inability to speak is construed as a consequence of the heavy load of emotional content that it stores within it—explicated later on in the poem in multiple fashions, for example, in verse fve: “What leaf fringed legend haunts about thy shape?”. The “body” of the Urn is inherently restricted in these lines. It is unable to convey what it would wish to communicate, both verbally and physically. Example (13), from “Ode to a Nightingale,” is similar in the sense that the time of narration, or deictic time, is that of the present, whereas the time of situation, or time referred to, encompasses both the past and the future. In other words, this is a present-oriented narrative, all the while fuctuating between the current spatial or temporal location of the speaker and the past and future temporalities—both mental and physical—as seen in lines 71–72: “The very word is like a bell / To toll me back from thee to my sole self!”: a case of an abstract, or emotional situation. The (quite Keatsian) phrasal verb toll back, in its perfective, infnitive form, assists in this emphasis: the particle is just as key here as the lexical verb. Lines 75–78 depict natural, more concrete images, of movement—an elaboration of both the TIME LANDSCAPE METAPHOR and the MOVING TIME METAPHOR. Spatial prepositions such as past, over, near, and up are essential in the metaphoric illustration of time and its multiple orientations in these cases. Lines 79–80 bring the reader back to a more abstract, Elysian atmosphere, as the line between reality and the oneiric is blurred. Modal auxiliaries, such as can (once again in a negated form: “Adieu! the fancy cannot cheat so well”) also play a role in these lines in the sense of the projection from the past, to the present, to the future. Cannot in this line effectively refers to the inherent abilities or capabilities of Fancy: what she has not been able to do in the past, what she cannot do in the present, and presumably, what she will not be capable of doing in the future. This is further reinforced by the following verse: “As she

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is famed to do, deceiving elf.” Clearly, Fancy has not, does not, and will not live up to her reputation in the future. In examples (11) and (12), from “Ode on Indolence” and “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” respectively, the time of situation is the past, as seen in the repetition of the preterit form throughout these verses: benumb’d, grew, had, made, spake, and did let. The time of utterance is the narrative present, which is understood implicitly by way of the situation of the narrative in the past. Moreover, these past-oriented descriptions are rife with emotionally centered content. Effectively, the descriptions here are of almost a purely affective nature (although the emotional experiences portrayed in the two poems are highly disparate). The present temporality comes into play in another sense in these extracts as well, as they both contain instances of dialogue, which are articulated in the present. These occurrences of present dialogue, however, also make references to the past and to the future: “O why did ye not melt, and leave my sense / Unhaunted quite of all but—nothingness?” (“Ode on Indolence,” v. 20–21) and “To-morrow I will bow to my delight, / To-morrow I will ask my lady’s boon.”— / ‘O may I never see another night, / Lorenzo, if thy lips breathe not love’s tune.’— /” (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” v. 27–30). Both references to the past as well as projections into the future are found in these speech acts, crystallized by the use of the will form, along with the lexical, temporal marker tomorrow, the modal auxiliary may, or the futureoriented present form of breathe not, presented as a condition partially due to the presence of the marker if, in “Isabella.” In “Ode on Indolence,” direct references to the past are made, along with a non-fulflled projection into the future which never came, or will come to be: “and leave my sense unhaunted.” Lexical elements which provide both spatial and temporal depictions of time are also present here, such as references to the seasons or specifc months, mentions of the human heartbeat, or references to quotidian instances of temporality such as tomorrow and night. Furthermore, the enunciation “days and days did he let pass” is a direct, clear, verbalization of the MOVING TIME METAPHOR. In “Isabella,” time is also represented as an (emotional) location by way of the spatial/temporal preposition in (“a whole long month of May in this sad plight”), which also is an instance of the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS. The emotional quality of these verses is also reinforced by the conceptual metonymy CHANGE IN THE COLOR OF THE FACE FOR EMOTION (“Made their cheeks paler by the break of June” [v. 26]). In verse 17 of “Ode on Indolence” CHANGE IN HEART RATE FOR EMOTION (“my pulse grew less and less”) and MENTAL INCAPACITIES/ INABILITY TO THINK FOR EMOTION (“Benumb’d my eyes” / “my pulse grew less and less; / Pain had no sting, and pleasure’s wreath no fower” [l. 17–18]) can be identifed as well. The body/mind is clearly and intensely present here, holding an essential role in the expression and verbalization of emotion and its multiply nuanced temporalities.

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6.5 Conclusions on Temporality Throughout this chapter, I have presented various case studies with the aim of elucidating the wide variety of ways in which the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR functions within the expression of emotion in Keats’s poetry. The examples analyzed in the above pages provide variety in terms of temporal nuances and variations, as well as metaphorical and metonymical combination and elaboration accomplished linguistically by way of a range of linguistic tools, such as predicative elements, spatial and temporal prepositions, and various supportive lexical elements, generally with connotations of time and space. The narrative quality of some poems adds additional temporal nuances to the enunciations, allowing for more complexity and elements of interchangeability within the descriptions of time and their metaphorical conceptual mappings and verbalizations. Finally, this conclusion would not be complete without a fnal mention of the important role of the body/mind in the emotional experiences expressed within the poems at hand—particularly in light of the analyses to follow in the upcoming chapter—which are, most often, verbalized by way of conceptual metonymy.

Notes 1 See Maiese 2014: 233. 2 THE MIND IS A BODY conceptual metaphor subsystem proposes the following conceptual mappings: (1) THINKING IS PHYSICAL FUNCTIONING, (2) IDEAS ARE ENTITIES WITH AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE, and (3) THINKING OF AN IDEA IS FUNCTIONING PHYSICALLY WITH RESPECT TO AN INDEPENDENTLY EXISTING ENTITY (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 236). 3 So as to further fesh out this conceptual metaphor, G. Lakoff and M. Johnson provide the following linguistic examples: that’s all behind us now. We’re looking ahead to the future. He has a great future in front of him. (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 140). One may note that in these examples the use of spatial prepositions is key to the linguistic expression of the conceptual metaphor: in effect, the verbalization of the metaphor would be rendered much more diffcult—if not impossible—without the presence, and thus, the semantics, of these spatial prepositions. 4 “Identifed with Tsit when aspectuality is perfective” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 126). 5 “Identifed as Td in the default case” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 126). 6 “Normally the time of utterance” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 126). 7 R. Langacker presents a similar analysis: see Langacker 2008: 79–85. 8 “The TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR has a spatial source domain, but it says nothing about motion. The observer might be stationary or moving. As it happens there are two additional metaphors for time that typically are combined with the Time Orientation metaphor. Both involve motion, but in one the observer is stationary and time is moving, while in the other the observer is moving and time is stationary” (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 141). 9 However, despite his burning and aching, the continuation of the poem ultimately proves that the desire to remain indolent and outside of the temporal bustle was stronger on the speaker’s part than the desire to partake in motion.

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10 Cf. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 132) on the grammatical representation of “cyclic events in nature.” 11 The metaphors mentioned come from Kövecses 2000: 124. 12 The metaphors mentioned come from Kövecses 2000: 124. 13 See the chapter on force-dynamics (Chapter 4) for a more detailed discussion of the modal auxiliary shall. 14 Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 140. 15 Kövecses 2000: 134. 16 Moreover, as previously mentioned, I am, more or less, in disagreement with this perception of the future (cf. Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 208). 17 The imperative form, in this sense, is also a carrier of deontic modality, “which characteristically involves futurity of the situation” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 210). 18 A typical poetic characteristic, according to G. Bachelard (1943: 226). This vertical axis would have as its objective to “briser les cadres sociaux, phénoménaux, et vitaux de la durée” (1943: 227) / “break the social, phenomenal, and vital codes of duration” (Translation mine). 19 Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 125–126.

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Conceptual Metonymy and the Physiological Expression of Emotion

La poésie est une métaphysique instantanée. En un court poème, elle doit donner une vision de l’univers et le secret d’une âme, un être et des objets, tout à la fois. […] Elle refuse le doute. (G. Bachelard, Le droit de rêver, 224)

7.1 Conceptual Metonymy in the Expression of Emotion In Chapter 6, I discussed the expressions of temporality in Keats’s works, taking an approach founded on embodied and conceptual emotion. Building on these explorations of conceptual metaphor and metonymy, this chapter will focus on the linguistic expression of emotion and emotional experience by way of conceptual metonymy. In prior chapters, I have dealt with the more metaphorical verbalizations of emotion, expressed linguistically by the creation of relationships between unrelated sources and target domains. On the other hand, our concentration here, as has been highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, will be centered on the physical and/or physiological—and thus, somewhat more concrete—aspect of emotion. Past and current works on conceptual metonymy and embodied emotion have led to the decision that conceptual metonymy as a means for the expression of emotion is a rich and evocative manner of analyzing the physical domain of emotion. The physical domain of emotion is the internal and external physical outpourings of emotional experience and its linguistic verbalizations, due to the fact that “that conceptual metonymies of emotions refect, at least for the most part, real universal physiology” (Kövecses 2000: 177). My hope in this is that the combination of the analyses concerning conceptual metaphor and metonymy presented throughout the rest of this book will work together to provide a broad and global look at the subtleties exploited by Keats within the large range of expressions of emotion within his poetry and, furthermore, the manners and confgurations in and by which these various expressions function together to create a poetic oeuvre that is highly emotionally salient on multiple levels.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003275626-7

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That being said, my endeavor for the present chapter or so is the way in which the body/mind is present in the Keatsian conceptualization and realization of emotion. Bachelard reminds us, in Le droit de rêver, of the importance of this type of expression within the poetic text, suggesting that Le poète anime une dialectique plus subtile. Il révèle à la fois, dans le même instant, la solidarité de la forme et de la personne. Il prouve que la forme est une personne et que la personne est une forme.1 (1943: 232) 7.1.1 Conceptual Metonymy v. Conceptual Metaphor Metonymy, simply put, is an association or contiguity between two elements. Radden and Kövecses provide the following defnition: “metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model”2 (2009: 21). Two examples are statements such as “She was my ruin” (STATE/EVENT FOR THING/PERSON/STATE CAUSING IT) or “She is my joy” (EMOTION FOR CAUSE OF EMOTION) (Radden and Kövecses 2009: 14). Here is an example of emotional metonymy from “La Belle Dame Sans Merci” (lines 9–12): “I see a lily on thy brow, / With anguish moist and fever-dew, / And on thy cheeks a fading rose / Fast withereth too.” In effect, the paleness of the face of the Knight (frst described as a “lily on the brow” and then reinforced by the “fast-withering rose on the cheeks”) as well as the cold sweat that covers his body stands in as the expression of the negative emotion that he is experiencing at the moment of description or enunciation. Creating an opposing or contradictory rhetoric or dialectic between conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy would not be useful: it is rather preferable to consider the two as similar and highly complementary: not only to one another but to a variety of concepts and notions, as Kövecses (2000: 137) observes. The intrinsically complementary and relational natures of conceptual metaphor and metonymy render them relevant to the conceptualization and understanding of a large part of the world in which we operate as humans. This includes emotion, which, moreover, allows for the creation, elaboration, and establishment of links between cultures and languages,3 as Kövecses (once again) argues: Figurative language, including metaphor and metonymy, contributes a great deal to the conceptualization of emotion concepts. […] Metonymies may also denote universal aspects of emotions, such as the idea that anger is internal pressure, loss of muscular control, redness, a rise in body temperature, and loss of rationality. (Kövecses 2000: 188)

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Although the analyses in this chapter will be heavily focused on verbalizations of conceptual metonymy, conceptual metaphor remains present, and complementary, as was the case in Chapter 6, in which the TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR was often allied with instances of conceptual metonymy, so as to result in a more precise and powerful expression of emotional experience. This combinatory use of conceptual metaphor and metonymy can easily be linked back to Lakoff and Turner’s conception of the poetic exploitation of fgurative language (1989: 70–71). I see the combination of both conceptual metaphor and metonymy as another manner of exploiting the concepts of metaphorical elaboration, composing, questioning, and extending that tends to take place within poetic metaphor (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 66–71), reinforcing the poeticity of the expressions themselves, as well as the texts as a whole. 7.1.2 The Role of Consciousness Damasio, in his more or less Spinozian4 approach to emotion and emotion concepts, emphasizes the role of consciousness within the realm of emotional experience. In effect, for Damasio, “consciousness and emotion are not separable” (1999: 16). The author provides the following defnition of consciousness in his 1999 The Feeling of What Happens: The organism in question is that within which consciousness occurs; the object in question is any object that gets to be known in the consciousness process, and the relationships between organism and object are the contents of the knowledge we call consciousness. Seen in this perspective, consciousness consists of constructing knowledge about two facts: that the organism is involved in relating to some object, and that the object in the relation causes a change in the organism. (Damasio 1999: 20) This defnition, particularly in light of the role of the body, makes sense. The ways in which the body reacts are central to what we refer to as the mental experience of emotion, particularly as we are typically aware, at least to a certain extent, of the changes and reactions taking place within our bodies during the emotional experience.5 What is especially interesting here is the “moment of emergence” of the emotion: the moment when the physical system attains its “critical pitch, […] [and] the process is felt” (Damasio 2003: 86). This “feeling” of the process, of the experience of emotion, is what is meant by “consciousness.” Damasio describes the experience of consciousness as “stepping into the light”: the specifc moment when, as we sit waiting in the audience, the door to the stage opens and a performer steps into the light; or, to take the other

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Conceptual Metonymy and the Physiological Expression of Emotion perspective, the moment when a performer who waits in semidarkness sees the same door open, revealing the lights, the stage, and the audience. (1999: 3)

The importance of consciousness within emotional experience is emphasized by Sartre, who refers to the emotional experience as a “state of consciousness,”6 or, as a moment in which the experiencer of the emotion fnds herself in the possession of a “moved consciousness”7 (1939: 16). The role of language as a means of expressing emotion also reinforces the centrality of consciousness within the emotional experience. To begin with, the verbalization of an emotional state—including its various causes, effects, and consequences—stems from a certain (typically, somewhat elevated) level of consciousness concerning the emotional state itself. Expressing this in a poetic manner requires an even more augmented level of consciousness, as Tsur suggests (particularly in relation to the English Romantic period poets) in saying: “The Romantic poets sought to discover, with the help of their imagination, the transcendental order inaccessible to the senses, in nature, that is accessible to the senses” (2008: 412). The consciousness required to poetically depict the physiological effects and results of emotional experience is thus based on a level of consciousness relative to oneself, but also to the surrounding world: as is the devoir of the artist and her or his creation. Therefore, within the poetic expression of the physiological side of emotion—especially by way of conceptual metonymy, which is refective of cultural and linguistic universals—we witness multi-layered consciousness: that of the poet towards himself, that of the poet towards his object, and within the transfer of the poetic object to subject within the narrative, the consciousness of the subject of and towards herself/himself, and of and towards the objects he/she encounters and fnds herself/himself in relation to. According to Damasio, consciousness is “the unifed mental pattern that brings together the object and the self” (1999: 11).8

7.2 Emotive and Expressive Choices Emotion—englobing the physical and the mental—and consciousness are rather inseparable. The links and parallelisms between these two entities ultimately reinforce the role of the body within the emotion, as “just like emotion, consciousness is aimed at the organism’s survival, and that, just like emotion, consciousness is rooted in the representation of the body” (Damasio 1999: 37). The body is therefore essential to full comprehension and assertion of emotion. The previous chapters of this book have already established that Keats’s poetry is rich in references to emotional experience and that this is accomplished with a wide range of linguistic and conceptual tools. This chapter will look at one fnal tool: the metonymic verbalization of the physiological side of emotional experience, or “conceptualized

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physiology” (Kövecses 2000: 162), organized around the instances of conceptual metonymies relative to the bodily expression of emotion. As is the case with conceptual metaphors, the existence of a delineative, chain-like structure within the development of the linguistic expression of conceptual metonymy is observable in the realms of both language and thought. That is, both metaphors and metonymies (relative to virtually any target or source domain, or virtually any vehicle and target) may be apprehended as beginning with broader expressions and/or verbalizations, which then taper off to more precise metonymies.9 There are two broader conceptual metonymies that are highly present in Keats: PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR AN EMOTION and EFFECTS OF A STATE FOR THE STATE. The global, universal quality of these metonymies is comparable to the “master metaphor for emotion” of EMOTION IS FORCE (Kövecses 2000: 63–64), discussed in Chapter 4. These metonymies act as a conceptual basis for the apprehension and expression of the role of the physical body within the emotional experience. All of the instances of conceptual metonymy to be examined throughout the forthcoming pages represent either one or both of the above metonymies (thus, they will not be mentioned in each poetic analysis): I view them thus as points of departure, upon and within which the other, more precise conceptual metonymies fnd their conceptual, structural, and linguistic foundations. The metonymies I will explore will generally take the physical expression of an emotional experience (for example, tears, blushing, temperature changes, variations in heart rate, etc.) as the vehicle which opens both the linguistic and cognitive doors to the emotional experience itself, which here may be considered as the target. I will focus on the semantics and grammar of the language used to verbalize the metonymies, as well as the context, the plot of the poem (if applicable), the poetic effects, and the global effect of the expression of emotion that all of the above play into. The extracts to be examined come from the following works: “Ode to a Nightingale,” “Ode to Psyche,” “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” “Ode on Melancholy,” “To Hope,” “Ode on Indolence,” “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” “O blush not so!”, and “La Belle Dame Sans Merci.”

7.3 Metonymical Analysis 7.3.1 Change in Color of Face for Emotion (Blushing for Love) Our frst conceptual metonymy is CHANGE IN COLOR OF FACE FOR EMOTION (BLUSHING FOR LOVE) (Kövecses 2000: 134). I will look at fve instances of this metonymy, all of which refer to varying facets of the possibilities of the change in the color of the facial skin as a response, reaction, or component of certain emotional experiences. In effect, there are examples of both loss

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and gain of color in the face: going pale and blushing. This expression is metonymical as the bodily reaction of the change in face color is perceived as the expression of the emotion itself: the color of the skin is directly associated with the emotion in question. Consider the following verses: (1) Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies; / Where Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 25–26) (2) A whole long month of May in this sad plight / Made their cheeks paler by the break of June (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 25–26) (3) I see a lily on thy brow, / With anguish moist and fever-dew, / And on thy cheeks a fading rose / Fast withereth too. (“La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” lines 9–12) (4) There’s a blush for won’t, and a blush for shan’t, / And a blush for having done it (“O blush not so!” lines 5–6) (5) O blush not so! O blush not so! / Or I shall think you knowing; / And if you smile, the blushing while, / Then maidenheads are going. (“O blush not so!” lines 1–4) The above examples are organized from palest to rosiest, in regard to the description of the subject undergoing the emotional experience. Verses (1) and (2) describe poetic subjects (specifcally, youthful ones, rendering their paleness all the more notable) in the state of becoming pale, verbalized by way of a lexical verb tied together with an adjective: “grows pale” and “made [their cheeks] paler.” The loss of color or diminution in blood fow to the face is gradual in both cases. This is refected by way of the verbal structure itself and the semantics of the lexical verbs chosen to express the given states, as well as the perfective aspect in which the verbs appear here, providing a maximal, heterogeneous viewing frame: the process is thus heavily emphasized. Paleness here is metonymic for the experience of a negative emotional state: one that diminishes the zest for life and results in a physical toll being taken on the experiencer. In (1), the emotion represented metonymically is the darkness and despondency of a world lacking in artistic creation and freedom; in (2), it is lovesickness, or the possibility of unrequited love, that results in a diffcult emotional state for Isabella and Lorenzo. Verse (3) may be apprehended as an intermediary case—that is, in between paleness and blushing—as the individual in question (the “palely

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loitering” knight-at-arms [l. 1–2]) is described as having once been the possessor of rosy cheeks. This refects a more positive emotional experience: in this case, lust and sexual fulfllment—but the rosiness of his cheeks is now fading and has already become comparable with the pale coloration of a lily on other parts of the face. Once again, we see a transformative process, as in (1) and (2). Verses (4) and (5) provide two occurrences of heavy or intense blushing: (4) being slightly more intense than (5), which is emphasized by the exhortations (seemingly against, but the reader knows better …) the blushing of the young maid in the frst two lines of the extract. The blushing, or increase in blood fow to the face, verbalized in these lines is indicative of a positive— or at least, arousing—experience, both emotional and physical, on the part of the interlocutor. Furthermore, the blushing seems to result in a positive, excitable (albeit somewhat tortured) state on the part of the speaker, thus creating a doubling-up of the emotional intensity. I would also like to note the differences in terms of the mention of the emotion, or the cause of the emotion, found between these verses: (1) and (3) do not mention the emotion itself nor the cause of the emotional state expressed, rendering them highly metonymic. Whereas (2), (4), and (5) allude to various reasons for the physical state expressed: (“this sad plight,” “there’s a blush for shan’t,” etc.). However, they do not explicitly mention the emotion itself, nor its cause, resulting in a high metonymic, fgurative quality in these expressions as well. 7.3.2 Change in Heart Rate for Emotion Our second metonymy is CHANGE IN HEART RATE FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134). The verbalization of this conceptual metonymy allows for the crystallization of the ways in which the pulse varies as an element of emotional experience, typically slowing down in the instances of a negative emotion (think: sadness, depression, or lack of stimulation leading to various emotional responses) and speeding up in the cases of more positive emotions (read: love, happiness, or increased stimulation, once again leading to varied reactions of the affective type). I will look at fve occurrences of this metonymy, from fve different poems. They have been ordered in terms of slowness to the rapidity of the heart: (6) My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains / My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk, / Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains / One minute past, and Lethe-wards had sunk (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 1–4) (7) The blissful cloud of summer-indolence / Benumb’d my eyes; my pulse grew less and less; / Pain had no sting, and pleasure’s wreath no

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Conceptual Metonymy and the Physiological Expression of Emotion fower: / O why did ye not melt, and leave my sense / Unhaunted quite of all but—nothingness? (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 16–20) (8) Should e’er unhappy love my bosom pain, / […] O let me think it is not quite in vain / To sigh out sonnets to the midnight air! (“To Hope,” lines 12–14) (9) And for that poor Ambition! It springs / From a man’s little heart’s short fever-ft (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 34–35) (10) So said he one fair morning, and all day / His heart beat awfully against his side; / And to his heart he inwardly did pray / For power to speak; but still the ruddy tide / Stifed his voice, and pulsed resolve away (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 40–45)

Verses (6) and (7) present clear-cut instances of the slowing of the speaker’s heart rate, albeit perceived and received differently. In (6), the emotional situation is tied to overall sensations of pain (“my heart aches”)—which gradually lessen throughout the verses at hand—and the slowing of the pulse alluded to by references to the effects of opiates and tendencies toward intensive states of rest. This is further reinforced in “Ode to a Nightingale” (6) by verbalizations of the slowing of the brain: “though the dull brain perplexes and retards” (v. 34). The body/mind here is illustrated as being on the verge of actually shutting down. In (7), the slowing of the heart rate is intertwined with the intense state of indolence in which the speaker fnds himself, which is characterized by an apparent overall lack of sensation, emphasized by the “benumb’d eyes” and the fact that “pain had no sting, and pleasure’s wreath no fower.” This state of unfeeling slothfulness is visibly the state desired by the speaker, as the exhortative statement at the end of the extract emphasizes. Verses (8) and (9) are intermediary, and the emotions expressed within them are revelatory of a certain ambiguity. Verse (8) is an act of verbalization of the potential of emotional pain (due to heartbreak, “unhappy love”), rendered metonymical by the reference to physical pain in the chest, thus ultimately refective of a variation in heart rate, either slowing down or speeding up. However, in contrast to the notion of the potential pain expressed here, the poem is one of an overall hopeful tone, as its title suggests, and the pain, if it does take place, is placed in contrast with a second potential, future action. This future action is emphasized here by the use of the imperative use of the verb let, part of Talmy’s “Greater Modal System,” thus directing us by way of two grammatical and semantic senses towards the future, which is artistic creation: in other words, the

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development of the positive out of the negative. The use of the metonymy CHANGE IN HEART RATE FOR EMOTION here allows for this contrast to be verbalized to its fullest. Verse (9) is a similar instance, with a fairly positive emotional and mental reaction, “ambition,” springing from the intensifcation of the heart rate of man. It is important to note, however, that this poem is indeed an “Ode on Indolence,” thus, a contradictory state in regard to an ambitious one. As in (8), the metonymy allows for the full elaboration of such a contrast. The emotive state of ambitiousness is even, to a certain extent, degraded within the verses themselves, by way of adjectival elements expressing diminutive stature: little, short, and ft. Verse (10) is an explicit verbalization of the delineation of this metonymy in the sense of INCREASE IN HEART RATE FOR EMOTION: the emotion referred to here is love (tied with the nervousness that so often accompanies new love): “his heart beat awfully against his side.” Lorenzo, here, is overtaken by his love for Isabella, a situation which is expressed by way of the rapid increase of his pulse, allowing for an intense, fgurative expression of his emotional state. Furthermore, this extract presents occurrences of other conceptual metonymies, to be analyzed further along in this chapter, allowing for a deeper intensifcation and poeticization of the emotional experience described here. 7.3.3 Physical Agitation for Emotion There are six instances of the emotional, physiological conceptual metonymy PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 82) in the poems I have worked with for this book. This conceptual metonymy has a global quality, allowing for a wide range of emotions and their various physical agitations or responses to be viewed through its prism. The extracts are organized in terms of the intensity of the physical agitations verbalized within them, from the most delicate to the most intense: (11) They could not in the self-same mansion dwell / Without some stir of heart, some malady; / They could not sit at meals but feel how well / It soothed each to be the other by; / They could not, sure, beneath the same roof sleep / But to each other dream, and nightly weep. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 3–8) (12) And with sick longing all the night outwear, / To hear her morningstep upon the stair. (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 24–25) (13) The weariness, the fever, and the fret / Here, where men sit and hear each other groan; / Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 23–25)

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Conceptual Metonymy and the Physiological Expression of Emotion (14) Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a fane / In some untrodden region of my mind, / Where branched thoughts, new grown with pleasant pain, / Instead of pines shall murmur in the wind (“Ode to Psyche,” lines 50–54) (15) Should e’er unhappy love my bosom pain, / […] O let me think it is not quite in vain / To sigh out sonnets to the midnight air! / Sweet Hope, ethereal balm upon me shed (“To Hope,” lines 24–27) (16) Or if thy mistress some rich anger shows, / Emprison her soft hand, and let her rave, / And feed deep, deep upon her peerless eyes. (“Ode on Melancholy,” lines 18–20)

For ease of analysis, I will group these six extracts into two separate, more precise clusters in terms of the emotion expressed via the conceptual metonymy, as well as the physical tumult central to the verbalization of the metonymy itself. Verses (11)–(13) may be categorized together due to the fact that they express outward, physical manifestations of illness. Verses (11) and (12) are quite simple to analyze together as the poetic context is the same and the emotions expressed are also similar: what is expressed here is the agitation, both in the body and the mind, created by the experience of fresh, young (potentially unrequited) love, coupled with lust. The “sickness” expressed here through nominal elements—thus giving these physical agitations a secondary subject role, providing them with their own lives— such as “stir of heart,” “malady,” and “sick longing,” may thus literally be considered as an instance of “lovesickness,” resulting in motion, movement, and dynamism. Moreover, temporary relief is within the young lovers’ reach (“it soothed each to be the other by” and “to hear her morning-step upon the stair”). Verse (13) provides a different context: “weariness, fever, and fret,” coupled with groaning and shaking. These physical agitations are related to the elderly—literally, near-death—temporality in which the speaker as well as his co-actors fnd themselves. The agitated qualities of illness are present here; but, they are combined with a certain vacuity, lacking the fervent quality found in the examples from “Isabella.” Examples (14)–(16) are indicative of states of physical pain and agitation. Verses (14) and (15) are similar in the sense that the pain referred to within them is construed positively, as it is either referred to as the cause or the effect of emotional, intellectual, or creative growth or productivity: “branched thoughts, new grown with pleasant pain”; “O let me think it is not quite in vain / To sigh out sonnets to the midnight air!” Moreover, these extracts both have an exhortative element, increasing their poetic and emotional saliency due to the inherent causality and fgurative qualities that they verbalize.

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Verse (16) refers to a more negatively construed notion: anger. The physical agitation is the “raving” (line 19), which stands physically for the emotion experienced by the poem’s “mistress.” The physicality is further emphasized here by the “imprisonment” of the mistress’s hand here, standing in for her emotional self, with the raving anger simply being a temporary outpouring. Relief is offered as a possibility to the physical agitations and their corresponding interior emotions in all of these extracts, providing yet another link to the frst three examples in this section. The inclusion of this possibility allows for a reinforcement of the emotional concepts of growth and pain as both temporary and formative, and as entities which, by way of their infuence upon the malleable, fexible human body/mind, open the possibility for artistic creation and expression: forms of liberty, the ultimate objective and drive of the human spirit, according to the Spinozian view. 7.3.4 (Increase in) Body Heat for Love/Emotion The next conceptual metonymy to be analyzed is that of (INCREASE IN) BODY HEAT FOR LOVE/EMOTION, based on Kövecses’s BODY HEAT FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134), which I have slightly tweaked so as to allow for an even fuller apprehension of the conceptual metonymy, which I believe may encompass somewhat more global and varied concepts than the original version. I will look at three occurrences of this metonymy. Once again, they are ordered here in terms of intensity: here, from the least amount of heat expressed to the most: (17) And for that poor Ambition! It springs / From a man’s little heart’s short fever-ft (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 34–35) (18) For ever panting, and for ever young; / All breathing human passion far above, / That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy’d / A burning forehead, and a parching tongue. (“Ode on a Grecian Urn,” lines 27–30) (19) And to follow them I burn’d / And ached for wings, because I knew the three (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 23–24) Verse (17) expresses the notion of heat—both cause and effect of the emotional and mental state of ambition—in the terms of “fever”: but, it is a short, rapid, miniaturized fever. However, it is hot enough to entail—or the ambition which fueled it was strong enough to kindle—a certain amount of fre. The cause and effect relationship here goes in both directions.

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Verse (18) presents multiple expressions of the physical effects of the increase in body heat for emotion: “panting,” “a burning forehead,” and a “parching tongue,” all of which are indicative of passion, which has resulted in the rise of body temperature to desert-like conditions, in which one would have diffculty breathing and could be close to dehydration. The intense nature of the heat described here is thus refective of the intensity of the emotion experienced. Furthermore, the inherent contrast between the intrinsic qualities of the Grecian Urn itself and the highly volatile passion expressed by way of this conceptual metonymy renders the latter all the more potent. Verse (19) refects a similar intensity to that expressed in (18), as the speaker burns with emotion: here, the desire to follow the three graces which remain present throughout the poem. The burning, coupled with the aching described in line 24, which is also indicative of the speaker’s desire to follow the three angelic entities, all the more magnifes the heightened emotional content of these verses. Furthermore, aching can easily be linked with burning sensations, thus emphasizing the overall increase in temperature verbalized by way of the conceptual metonymy. 7.3.5 (Loving, Joyful) Visual Behavior for Love / Facial Expressions The next conceptual metonymy to be analyzed is (LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE / FACIAL EXPRESSIONS (Kövecses 2000: 124). I have chosen to place “loving, joyful” within parentheses in the title of the conceptual metonymy, due to the fact that the conceptual metonymy upon which mine is based necessarily included one or both of these adjectives. However, to fully analyze the globality of the emotion of love expressed by way of visual behavior, I have extended the metonymy to any type of visual behavior that could be indicative of love, which is not always joyful or necessarily “loving” at the moment. We will look at fve instances of this conceptual metonymy, arranged from the least jubilant to the most expressive of joy: (20) If Isabel’s quick eye had not been wed / To every symbol on his forehead high; / She saw it waxing very pale and dead, / And straight all fush’d (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 51–54) (21) If looks speak love-laws, I will drink her tears (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” line 39) (22) She looked at me as she did love, / And made sweet moan (“La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” lines 19–20) (23) Where Beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes, / Or new Love pine at them beyond tomorrow. (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 29–30)

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(24) And if you smile, the blushing while, / Then maidenheads are going. (“O blush not so!” lines 3–4) Verses (20)–(22) verbalize visual behavior which could be described as an act or a refection, of deep attachment, and given the contexts in which they are placed, indicative of the emotion and exchange of love. The notion of attachment is expressed in varying ways: in (20), we fnd Isabella’s eye “wed to every symbol” on Lorenzo’s forehead. The lexical verb wed explicitly refers to romantic relations, as well as legal attachment, thus emphasizing the depth of the physical and emotional attachment between the two lovers. In (21), also from “Isabella,” the legal element comes into play once again—“if looks speak love-laws”—manifested by way of Isabella’s visual behavior towards Lorenzo. Verse (22) creates a parallelism between the act of loving—another manner of physical expression of the emotion of love— and the visual behavior that “la belle dame” enacts during this specifc act, providing a doubling-up of the intensity of the emotion expressed by these two behaviors. These lines portray love as more dynamic and tangible on various levels and, furthermore, render the hopelessness of the Knight in the poem all the more powerful once this powerful emotion is no longer present within his frame of emotional operation. Verses (23) and (24) verbalize more joyful and beatifc visual behavior: in (24) we fnd this coupled with the expression of a smile. However, in (23), the subjects, Beauty and Love, who are intended to engage in this lighthearted, ecstatic behavior (keeping one’s lustrous eyes, and then, pining after them) appear unable to actually fulfll these actions, due to the murky and glum atmosphere which characterizes the poem at this point. This incapacity to manifest such behavior emphasizes the necessity of an emotional state centered around love for such visual behavior. Verse (24) is presented more in a context of lust—leaning towards love, but perhaps not quite there yet—in which the “smile” is refective of the emotional state of the woman described in the poem. A genuine smile necessarily implies visual reactions as an accompaniment (Ekman 1992: 36), hence the motivation behind the consideration of this extract as an instance of (LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE / FACIAL EXPRESSIONS. The inclusion of “the maidenheads are going” is a secondary reinforcement for the existence of a love/ lust relationship in these lines, as another physical expression of the emotion of love, which I will discuss near the end of this chapter. 7.3.6 Change in Respiration for Emotion The next metonymy to explore is CHANGE IN RESPIRATION FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134), of which we have two occurrences, from “O blush not so!” and “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” ordered in terms of the quality of the respiration verbalized within the verses:

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Conceptual Metonymy and the Physiological Expression of Emotion (25) O sigh not so! O sigh not so! / For it sounds of Eve’s sweet pippin (“O blush not so!” lines 9–10) (26) For ever panting, and for ever young; / All breathing human passion far above, / That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy’d / A burning forehead, and a parching tongue. (“Ode on a Grecian Urn,” lines 27–31)

Verse (25) mentions sighing: thus, unnatural breathing that almost always is refective of a particular emotional state. The metonymy for emotion (here, love, lust, desire) is clearly indicated within these two verses: the sigh is directly referred to as refective of the emotional state of the young lady in the poem, which, conversely, incites emotion in the speaker. Hence his exhortation that she avoids this particular physical expression. Verse (26), seen above in the analyses of the occurrences of (INCREASE IN) BODY HEAT FOR LOVE/EMOTION, emphasizes the changes in breathing patterns as refective of the intensity of the heat—the passion—experienced within the “Ode on a Grecian Urn.” The “panting,” the “breathing human passion,” and even the “parching tongue” are refective of the intensifcation of the breathing patterns, a secondary physical expression of the fames of passion nearly devouring the protagonist in these lines. 7.3.7 Sex for Love Our next emotional, conceptual metonymy to examine is that of SEX FOR LOVE (Kövecses 2000: 124), of which we have three occurrences, two of which have been examined in previous metonymical cases in this chapter: (27) Yet even in these days so far retir’d / From happy pieties […] I see, and sing, and by my own eyes inspir’d. / So let me be thy choir, and make a moan / Upon the midnight hours (“Ode to Psyche,” lines 40–45) (28) She looked at me as she did love, / And made sweet moan (“La Belle Dame Sans Merci,” lines 19–20) (29) O blush not so! O blush not so! / Or I shall think you knowing; / And if you smile, the blushing while, / Then maidenheads are going. (“O blush not so!” lines 1–4) Here, the poetic extracts have been grouped together in terms of the similarities in the manners in which the conceptual metonymies are verbalized within them. In (27) and (28), the sexual act—representative of the emotion of love, which is, moreover, clearly explicit in (28)—is depicted in regard to the auditory and verbal senses: that is, the moan. The poet leaves no room for doubt

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in these references, as the context clarifes the act of sexual intercourse (“as she did love”), as well as its spatial and temporal (“upon the midnight hours”) contexts, as well as the quality of tone of the auditory output (“sweet”). In (29), the sexual act is not necessarily referred to as taking place within the enunciation itself, but the references to the loss of virginity (“then maidenheads10 are going”) in conjunction with the conceptual metonymies BLUSHING FOR LOVE and (LOVING/JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE render the situation quite clear and, furthermore, reinforce the lusty, amorous atmosphere, characteristic of the poem in its entirety. Despite the fact that the instances of conceptual metonymy are quite clearly enunciated in these extracts, we can note that the lexical, semantic, and conceptual contexts play a very important supporting role in the full elaboration of the metonymy here. 7.3.8 Incapacitating Effects of the Emotion for the Emotion The third-to-last metonymy to be analyzed here is INCAPACITATING EFFECTS OF THE EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 82). This analysis can be taken as a complement to the analysis of these verses in Section 7.3.2. (30) My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains / My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk, / Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains / One minute past, and Lethe-wards had sunk […] (“Ode to a Nightingale,” lines 1–4) The “incapacitating effects” here are directly referred to as similar to those which one would encounter after having consumed hemlock or a drug of the class of opiates: a numbing, jading sensation, ultimately rendering its experiencer incapacitated on multiple levels, but most importantly, in terms of the ability to experience sensation and emotion. Ironically, this overall lackluster, attenuating emotional quality is the direct result of another emotion—the overwhelming atmosphere of hopelessness found at the beginning of the poem—and leads to the lack of further emotion. These verses are rife with lexical elements which act as reinforcement for the metonymy, such as “drowsy numbness,” “dull,” “drains,” and “sunk.” 7.3.9 Inability to Speak for Emotion I have one example of INABILITY TO SPEAK FOR EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 75), this chapter’s penultimate conceptual metonymy: (31) So said he one fair morning, and all day / His heart beat awfully against his side; / And to his heart he inwardly did pray / For power to speak; but still the ruddy tide / Stifed his voice, and pulsed resolve away (“Isabella, or the Pot of Basil,” lines 41–45)

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Once again, as is the case with “Isabella,” we are in the context of two young lovers experiencing frst love. Here, Lorenzo is unable to speak, due to the intensity of the love and emotion he feels for his beautiful Isabella: his voice is not only “stifed,” but his resolve is also “pulsed away.” Moreover, these lines emphasize the inner turmoil experienced by Lorenzo, a sort of va-et-vient expressed by way of the images of the “ruddy tide,” and his ability to speak, or “pray,” inwardly, but not externally, leading us back to the interior alcoves of the individual, the birthplace of emotion and feeling. 7.3.10 Crying for Sadness This chapter’s fnal conceptual metonymy is perhaps one of the simplest and most common conceptual metonymies for emotion—CRYING FOR SADNESS (based on Kövecses’s CRYING FOR ANGER [2000: 171])—but is presented in these lines with an inherent complexity, as the actual act of the physical expression does not fully manifest itself. The example is found in “Ode on Indolence”: (35) Tho’ in her lids hung the sweet tears of May […] / O Shadows! ‘twas a time to bid farewell! / Upon your skirts had fallen no tears of mine. (“Ode on Indolence,” lines 46, 49–50) The shedding of tears is referred to here as an appropriate response to the act of saying farewell: typically a moment which could incite emotions of sadness, despair, or regret. However, the speaker here is numb and indolent and, therefore, is unable to, or refuses to, engage himself in and manifest this kind of emotion and hence this kind of emotional response. This reinforces the possibility that the speaker does not actually feel sadness in this given moment.11 The lack of physical expression may be analyzed here as a metonymy for lack of emotion, which strengthens the force of conceptual metonymy in the poem, as well as the role of conceptual metonymy in our perception and apprehension of emotion in general.

7.4 Conclusion Throughout this chapter, I provided an overview of the multiple conceptual metonymies relative to bodily expression of emotions within Keats’s works. By way of these examples and their analyses, we have seen, frst and foremost, that the role of the body in the Keatsian comprehension of emotion is of the utmost centrality. Effectively, Keats’s oeuvre is not lacking in highly elaborated, dynamic, representations of the body within emotional experience. Moreover, these analyses have allowed accounting for the foundational presence of the “master metonymies for emotion”: PHYSIOLOGICAL

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EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR AN EMOTION and EFFECTS OF A STATE FOR THE STATE. The more precise or specifc conceptual metonymies analyzed above have either one or both of these metonymies as their starting-off point: the metonymies that follow are understood as more specifc delineations of these metonymies, relative to specifc aspects of the emotion itself. In regard to grammar, there is the overwhelming use of the perfective, or non-progressive, aspect in these cases—providing a maximal viewing frame while simultaneously injecting dynamicity into the expressions in which it is found—refective of the highly universal quality of the role of the body in emotional experience. This chapter has combined embodiment theories of emotion based on both philosophy and neuroscience with conceptual approaches to linguistic expression, so as to examine and decipher the ways in which the role of the body/mind is present in verbalizations of emotional experience within our Keatsian corpus. A wide variety of emotions—and more particularly, “aspects of emotion concepts” (Kövecses 2000: 4)—are represented by way of the emphasis on the body within Keats’s works. This is often done by the exploitation of verbalization of conceptual metaphor and metonymy so as to describe the moment of the “emergence” of the emotion: that is, the moment when the emotion is consciously felt and observed by the experiencer. The verbalizations of conceptual metaphors and metonymies for this specifc moment allow for a full expression of the emotional experience, with the facets of the experience of the emotion itself shaping the language we use to refer to it while molding our perception of the emotion itself. Conceptual metaphor and metonymy thus play an essential role in the ways in which we comprehend and respond to emotion, and this includes both the mind and the body, if we choose to separate the two (which is a highly questionable act, based on the views of Spinoza which render the link between the body/mind, emotion, and linguistic expression so clear). Furthermore, the analyses presented throughout this chapter have further emphasized the fact that emotion is a highly complex collection of perceptions, moments, and interactions, all of which are founded in our conceptual system and physical workings. This is proven by the ways in which conceptual metonymies and metaphors are, more often than not, found in combination with others, highlighting the multiplicity of the emotional experience and, also, augmenting the inherent poeticity of the verbalizations of these metaphors and metonymies within Keats’s poetry. Finally, verbalizations of conceptual metaphor and metonymy for the emotions are multi-faceted, multi-layered, complex structures in terms of their lexical choices, semantics, and grammatical usage. All of these elements work together within the verbalization of metaphor and metonymy to create functioning and poetic metaphors and metonymies. The Keatsian verbalizations of these conceptual mappings can be visualized as refective of the interactions within our bodies and minds when we experience emotion: AND

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each element is essential and plays its own specifc role, both alone and in conjunction with its surrounding elements and its context, resulting in the fascinating, beautiful, and disorderly expressions of emotion itself. This chapter closes the analytical, exploratory chapters of this book. In the next chapter, I will propose some concluding remarks.

Notes 1 “The poet puts a more subtle dialectic into action. He reveals, simultaneously, at the same instant, the solidarity of the shape and of the person. He proves that the shape is a person and that the person is a shape” (Translation mine). 2 The “idealized cognitive model,” a notion proposed by G. Lakoff (1987), “is meant to include not only people’s encyclopedic knowledge of a particular domain but also the cultural models they are a part of” (Radden & Kövecses 2009: 20). 3 Conceptual metaphor and metonymy may also be indicative of differences between languages and cultures, which can be useful in the comprehension of emotion concepts, as Z. Kövecses notes: “Cultural linguistic variation may arise from whether a language emphasizes metaphors or metonymies in its conceptualization of emotion. For example, Taylor and Mbense (1998) note that English primarily uses metaphors to understand the concept of anger, whereas Zulu predominantly uses metonymies. In addition, metonymic processes appear to play a bigger role in the understanding of emotions in Chinese than in English, as the work of King (1989) and Ning Yu (1995) indicates” (Kövecses 2000: 172). 4 Whether or not the role of consciousness played an essential role in the experiencing of emotion for Spinoza himself (and, thus, within his philosophy) is rather unclear, although A. Damasio’s defnition of consciousness is highly relatable to the Spinozian conatus in the sense that “at its simplest and most basic level, consciousness lets us recognize an irresistible urge to stay alive and develop a concern for the self” (Damasio 1999: 5); or, in other words, “Spinoza said that the effort to preserve oneself is the frst and unique foundation of virtue. Consciousness enables that effort” (Damasio 1999: 25). 5 “To be sure, at this point in evolution and at this moment in our adult lives, emotions occur in a setting of consciousness. We can feel our emotions and we know we feel them” (Damasio 1999: 43). 6 “État de conscience” (Translation mine). 7 “La conscience émue” (Translation mine). 8 A. Damasio also provides a defnition for what he calls “extended consciousness,” which he specifcally relates to creativity: “If it is true that core consciousness is the rite of passage into knowing, it is equally true that the levels of knowing which permit human creativity are those which only extended consciousness allows. When we think of the glory that is consciousness, and when we consider consciousness as distinctively human, we are thinking of extended consciousness at its zenith” (Damasio 1999: 17). 9 The conceptual metonymies upon which our analyses are based have been directly taken from, or inspired by Kövecses 2000 (listed in the Metaphor and Metonymy Index [p. 222–223]). 10 Maidenhead (archaic): “the state or condition of a maiden; virginity” (OED 1989: vol. IX, 210). We may also note that maidenhead is typically employed as a non-count noun, so its plural usage is rather surprising.

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11 This is explicitly manifested at the end of the poem: “So, ye three Ghosts, adieu! Ye cannot raise / My head cool-bedded in the fowery grass; / For I would not be dieted with praise, / A pet-lamb in a sentimental farce! / Fade softly from my eyes, and be once more / In masque-like fgures on the dreamy urn; / Farewell! I yet have visions for the night, / And for the day faint visions there is store; / Vanish, ye Phantoms! from my idle spright, / Into the clouds, and never more return!” (l. 51–60).

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8.1 The Evolution of the Research: Objectives, Context, Argumentation 8.1.1 Primary Objectives The objectives for this book were simultaneously simple and complex. On a most basic level, the goal was to proceed with an analysis of Keatsian language within the boundaries of a specifc selection of poems composed of various types, styles, and forms of his works, based on an inherent affnity and curiosity concerning the essential qualities of Keatsian writing. More specifc goals developed throughout the course of its elaboration, as a more intimate relationship between Keats, his oeuvre, and myself was formed. Although Keats’s works were, indeed, the basis for the original inquiries and objectives upon which this book was founded, the theories of cognitive grammar, cognitive poetics, and conceptual metaphor and metonymy were also equally infuential in this sense. The intrinsic link between the human conceptual system, reality, language, and experience as presented within these theories was—and remains—simultaneously fascinating, inspiratory of passion, and beautifully obvious. The fact that language, an entity which permeates our everyday existence, on both the personal and the public level, would be so deeply ingrained in the human conceptual system on a sensorimotor and neurological level ultimately makes a great amount of sense, and is simply refective of the place that language holds in our lives. However, the question arose: if this type of linguistic theory can be applied to everyday language, what is its place in “literary” language, in poetry, a manner of linguistic and artistic expression that has (and continues to) existed, evolved, and has refected the fuidity of the human experience, all the while possessing “the greatest continuity of form in the Western tradition. [… within which] styles and conventions have shifted, but no truly new forms have emerged” (Kiparsky 1973: 231)?

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“Poetic” language has consistently been an entity that has inspired complex, composite, emotive, and affective reactions within its observer, listener, or reader. One of the foundational questions that inspired this undertaking was in direct response to this: why? And then, how? R. Jakobson proposes a response which sheds a certain amount of light on this subject: “il s’agit dans le langage poétique d’un changement essential du rapport entre le signifant et le signifé, ainsi qu’entre le signe et le concept1” (Jakobson 1979: 542). Although the answer to these questions is not clear, the response to where to fnd said answers is in the language itself. 8.1.2 The Research in Current Context This book may be considered as a specialized and specifcally oriented continuation of both research on Keats’s poetry and in the vein of cognitive linguistics. It may thus be situated within the fairly current context of the domain of cognitive approaches to language (which have held an important place within the world of linguistics since the 1980s) and furthermore, within the more recently expanding domain of cognitive linguistic approaches to literature and cognitive poetics itself. 8.1.3 Argumentative Logic (A Brief Reminder) The logic and approach that this book has been engaged in is based on an intimate relationship with Keatsian language itself. Each analysis, each application of theory, insisted and acted upon a return to the language, by taking the linguistic elements in their individuality as well as within their relative contexts on both minor levels (extracts, stanzas) and in broader contexts (entire poems, the present study, Keats’s oeuvre as a whole). This relationship with the language was, furthermore, nourished and pushed to its limits by way of a mise en relation with the combination of linguistic and philosophical theories which took on the role of the critical framework and context within which the language operates. This multifaceted relation thus developed into a symbiotic relationship, a space within which the language, the elements analyzed within the language, the human conceptual system, reality, and the theoretical bases for their analysis ultimately became refective of elements which existed in each entity, possessing resemblance and unity on multiple levels. This symbiotic state of affairs led to an analytical fow which was most natural in the sense that the three-step process of poetic analysis proposed by R. Tsur—suggesting an analysis of the language within and outside of its initial context, and within relation to the poet as well as the reader— was followed with ease, as one ultimately led to the other, and back again, resulting in a simultaneously circular and linear analysis of each linguistic or conceptual tendency.

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8.1.4 Methodological Choices The methodological choices that guided the evolution of this book were made rather organically: the analysis of poetic language, and the deepening knowledge of Keats’s oeuvre which was developed throughout the time spent on this research endeavor naturally led to an affnity for and an acceptation of the application of cognitive linguistic theory and Conceptual Metaphor and Metonymy Theory, as an application of these theories to poetic language proved highly appropriate for such an undertaking. Moreover, the above proved revelatory in the sense of the emotional salience of Keatsian language. The work on, and application of these theories instinctively led to various investigations concerning theories of emotion, and ultimately, those relative to embodied emotion. This is because an embodied theory of emotion is the only cognitive-philosophical approach which allows for the fullest application of cognitive linguistics in general, with the theory of conceptual metaphor and metonymy following suit. Thus, both the theoretical and methodological choices were realized by way of each entity opening the door to the next, once again creating a constructive, circular, manner of approaching the research as well as the manifestation of the application of theory to text.

8.2 Presentation of Results As the conclusions drawn from the analyses performed in this book have been fully feshed out within their respective chapters and those chapters’ respective conclusions, the results of this research can be globally summed up in the following manner: the specifc linguistic—thus, lexical, grammatical, and semantic—choices made by Keats have a direct effect on the expression of emotion within his works. Furthermore, this effect is more often than not directly related to, and a consequence of, grammar, and the inherent semantics attached to grammatical classes and categories and their natural functioning and roles within the enunciation. Each conceptual entity analyzed has specifc relations with specifc grammatical elements. That is, certain expressions rely on certain grammatical classes more than others, with some categories acting as central support within the verbalization of the conceptualization in question—thus being essential to its linguistic expression—and others take on more secondary, or supporting roles, reinforcing the place of the more central elements. Furthermore, the roles that ended up being “assigned” to specifc grammatical elements and/or classes within Keatsian language are explicitly refective of the semantics of said categories as proposed within various approaches to CG. The conclusions drawn from these analyses reinforce the broad scope of CG by opening it up to the realm of poetry, while simultaneously affrming the general importance of grammatical structures within poetic language itself, and more specifcally,

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its capacity to express emotion. Moreover, they provide tangible evidence for the potency of expression of Keats’s poetic oeuvre.

8.3 Closing Remarks: Paving the Way for Further Refection As the original objective of this book was to discover, in a more profound manner, the ways in which language in its purest form, as well as in its Keatsian-specifc context, shapes, molds, and forms the poetic oeuvre in its entirety, the conclusions drawn from the analyses performed in the undertaking of this research were, frankly speaking, welcomed with open arms, as they were what was originally hoped for. It does, however, seem as if certain linguistic elements take on a more formative role within the linguistic expression of emotion—at least in Keats’s works. These are specifcally the verbal—or predicative—elements, with prepositions being those that would take second place, in this sense. Given the inherent dynamicity of Keats’s language, as well as the conceptual entities (force-dynamics, conceptual metaphor and metonymy) analyzed and developed upon within the preceding chapters—let us note that the presence of the latter is essential to the intrinsic energy of Keats’s poetics: this is not necessarily surprising, as it were. However, in light of the elevated metaphorical and imagistic quality of Keats’s language, I would have assumed that nominal and purely descriptive elements—being, nouns, adjectives, and adverbs—would hold a broader place within the general verbalization of emotion within Keats’s poetry. In the instances of emotionally centered metaphor and metonymy, these more “static” elements act as reinforcing, or supportive elements. They certainly hold an important place but are not necessarily central to the expression. In the instances of force-dynamics, they are even much less central to the realization of the expression and thus, the manifestation of causality itself. This quantitative imbalance is refective of the language itself within the selected poems. I will conclude this escapade as I opened it, by returning to the words of the poet himself: When I have fears that I may cease to be Before my pen has gleaned my teeming brain, Before high-pilèd books, in charactery, Hold like rich garners the full ripened grain; When I behold, upon the night’s starred face, Huge cloudy symbols of a high romance, And think that I may never live to trace Their shadows with the magic hand of chance; And when I feel, fair creature of an hour, That I shall never look upon thee more,

182

Conclusion Never have relish in the faery power Of unrefecting love—then on the shore Of the wide world I stand alone, and think Till love and fame to nothingness do sink. (“When I Have Fears That I May Cease to Be,” 1818).

Note 1 “In poetic language, an essential change in the relationship between the signifer and the signifed, as well as between the sign and the concept, occurs” (Translation mine).

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Index

activities 40 affections 9 Agonist 63, 69, 74, 84 allow 83 Antagonist 63, 69 Antagonistic Reinforcement, prepositions 132 argumentative logic 179 Aristotle 22; poetic language 36 art (verb) 55 art, poetry as 22–23 aspect, cognitive grammar 37–40 authorization 69 Bachelard, G. 22, 90–91, 159–160 basil pot, “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” 51–53 be 56, 73, 90 beauty 7, 74 benumb’d 99 Berry, F. 22 beseem 44–45 beside 121–123 BLUSHING FOR LOVE 95, 163–165 bodies, emotion 10–11 bodily reactions 149–150 BODY HEAT FOR EMOTION 43, 145, 169–170 BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS 74, 149 Bolinger, D. 20 bounded events 41, 54 break 55–56 Brooke-Rose, C. 40 burning 170 by 121–123 Byron, Lord 52

causality 68; force-dynamics and 30–31 CAUSES ARE FORCES 66–67, 80, 85, 88, 91–92, 102, 104, 130 cease 46 CHANGE IN COLOR OF FACE FOR EMOTION (BLUSHING FOR LOVE) 163–165 CHANGE IN HEART FOR EMOTION 165–167 CHANGE IN RESPIRATION FOR EMOTION 171–172 CHANGE IN THE COLOR OF THE FACE FOR EMOTION 156 clausal types 103 CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT 98, 101 CMT see Conceptual Metaphor Theory cognitive effects 4 cognitive grammar 19–20; aspect 37–40; construal and literariness 21–22; grammatical classes 20–21; prepositions see prepositions; verbs see verbs cognitive linguistic approach 8, 14 cognitive poetics 22–23, 111 conatus 9 conceptual metaphor 25–28, 95; BODY HEAT FOR EMOTION 145; BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS 74; CAUSES ARE FORCES 66–67, 80, 85, 88, 91–92, 130; CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT 98, 101; vs. conceptual metonymies 160–161; DIZZINESS FOR LOVE 148; DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE ACTING ON ANOTHER 116, 124, 127; emotion and 29–30; EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM 40–43, 116, 122, 124; EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE 67, 73, 76; EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL FORCE 67,

Index 88, 99; EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT 67, 74, 79; EMOTION IS FIRE/HEAT 43; EMOTION IS FORCE 88; EMOTIONAL SELF IS A DIVIDED SELF 59; EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS 54, 58, 114, 122; EMOTIONS ARE FLUIDS IN A CONTAINER/THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS 137; EXISTENCE IS LOCATION 91; EXISTENCE IS LOCATION HERE 95; EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE 54–58, 114; EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE 54–59, 92, 95, 117–119; HAPPINESS IS VITALITY 116, 124; HAPPY IS WARM 116, 124, 128; INTERFERENCE WITH ACCURATE PERCEPTION FOR LUST (OR LOVE) 147; INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS 122; LOVE IS A NUTRIENT/VITALITY 122; LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE 43; LUST IS HEAT 43; THE MIND IS A BODY 137; MOVING TIME METAPHOR 142, 145–146, 148–149, 155–156; NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY 91; OBJECT OF LOVE IS A DEITY 59; PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION 145; PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR LOVE (OR LUST) 148; PREOCCUPATION WITH ANOTHER FOR LOVE 147; prepositions 113; SADNESS IS A LACK OF VITALITY 122; STATES ARE BOUNDED AREAS 91; STATES ARE LOCATIONS 91, 118; TIME LANDSCAPE METAPHOR 146–147, 155; TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR see TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) 8, 24–25, 32 conceptual metonymies 76, 162–163; BLUSHING FOR LOVE 95; BODY HEAT FOR EMOTION 43; BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS 149; CHANGE IN HEART FOR EMOTION 165–167; CHANGE IN RESPIRATION FOR EMOTION 171–172; CHANGE IN THE COLOR OF THE FACE FOR EMOTION (BLUSHING FOR LOVE) 156, 163–165; vs. conceptual metaphor 160–161; CRYING FOR SADNESS 174; EFFECTS OF A STATE FOR THE STATE 95, 163; expression of emotion 159–162; INABILITY TO SPEAK FOR EMOTION 173–174; INCAPACITATING EFFECTS OF THE EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION 173; (INCREASE IN) BODY HEAT FOR LOVE/EMOTION 169–170;

189

(LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR LOVE/FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 142, 170–171; PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION 167–169; PHYSICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF A STATE FOR THE STATE 152; PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION 117, 120, 163; PREOCCUPATION WITH ANOTHER FOR LOVE 147; SEX FOR LOVE 172–173 congruence 86 consciousness 161–162, 176n4 construal, cognitive grammar 21–22 convergence 100 Cortázar, J. 11–12, 23, 37 CRYING FOR SADNESS 174 FOR

Damasio, A. 9–10, 161–162, 176n8 dare 77–79, 108n41 de Sousa, R. 39 desert 57 desire 10, 39–40 die 49–50 direct objects 84 Dirven, R. 39, 70, 111 divergence 100 DIZZINESS FOR LOVE 148 do 44, 45 dream 88 dying 53 dynamic prepositions 112 DYNAMIC RELATION BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE ACTING ON ANOTHER 116, 124, 127 EFFECTS OF A STATE FOR THE STATE 95, 163 ego 64–65, 69 ego ideal 65, 78 elaborating 28 Eliot, T.S. 4 embodied emotion 31–32 embodiment 32 emotion 8–11, 48, 101; conceptual metaphor and 29–30; consciousness 161; embodied emotion 31–32; woe 119 EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM 40–43, 116, 122, 124 EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE 67, 73, 76 EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL FORCE 67, 88, 99 EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT 67, 74, 79 EMOTION IS FIRE/HEAT 43

190

Index

EMOTION IS FORCE 88, 102 emotion verbs 62; force-dynamics 89–100 emotional delineations, Event Structure Metaphor 66–67 emotional emplacement 53–59 emotional experience 163; CHANGE IN HEART FOR EMOTION 165–167; CHANGE IN RESPIRATION FOR EMOTION 171–172; CHANGE IN THE COLOR OF THE FACE FOR EMOTION 163–165; CRYING FOR SADNESS 174; INABILITY TO SPEAK FOR EMOTION 173–174; INCAPACITATING EFFECTS OF THE EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION 173; (INCREASE IN) BODY HEAT FOR LOVE/ EMOTION 169–170; (LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE/FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 170–171; PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION 167–169; SEX FOR LOVE 172–173 emotional force-dynamics 91; modality 71–81 EMOTIONAL SELF IS A DIVIDED SELF 59 EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS 54–58, 114, 122 EMOTIONS ARE FLUIDS IN A CONTAINER/ THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS 137 EMOTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES INSIDE A PERSON/CONTAINER 52 emotion-specifc mappings 67 emotive crescendos 88 enablement 85; see also let established schematic roles, forcedynamics 62–65 ethical virtue 40 “The Eve of St. Agnes” 75–76, 79–80, 84, 91–93, 97, 105–106, 114, 118, 129, 132 Event Structure Metaphor 31, 65–68, 76–77, 79, 102, 122 EXISTENCE IS LOCATION 91 EXISTENCE IS LOCATION HERE 95, 104 EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN BOUNDED SPACE 54, 58, 114 EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE 54–59, 92, 95, 117–119, 122 expression of emotion see time facial expressions 170–171 fall 148 falling 48 fed 51

feel 47, 48 feelings 9, 10 fgurative foundations 35–37 futt’ring 132 Fogle, R. 90, 94 force-dynamic path prepositions 128–130 force-dynamics 61–62, 103–106; causality and 30–31; emotion verbs 89–100; emotional force-dynamics see emotional force-dynamics; established schematic roles 62–65; grammatical representation see grammatical representation; greater modal system 81–89; interpersonal forcedynamics 63; intra-psychological force-dynamics 63–64; metaphorical doubling 90–94; metaphorical extension 65–68; modals 68–71; perception verbs 89–100; “Self Divided” force-dynamic schema 64 Freudian notions 64–65, 69 from 124–128 future, TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 148–150 Gavins, J. 20 generativity 85 Genette, G. 22 Gibbs, R. 26, 29, 37, 111–112 Giovanelli, M. 43 given effect 23 grammar 101; see also cognitive grammar grammatical aspect 38–39 grammatical classes: cognitive grammar 20–21; force-dynamics 68–81 grammatical representation 62, 102; transitive verbs 81–82 greater modal system 81–89 grew 52, 99 grow 44, 46–47 gusto 3–7 HAPPINESS IS VITALITY 116, 124 happy 152 HAPPY IS WARM 116, 124, 128 have 81, 83 Hazlitt, W. 3 heart 78, 119 help 82–83 hexis 40 Huddleston, R. 70, 82–83, 103 human conceptual system 23

Index “I cry your mercy-pity-love!--aye, love!” 84, 94, 118, 130 id 64–65, 69 idiosyncratic thought 28 imagination 7 imperfective verbs 38–39 in 93; fgurative in 115–119; literal in 113–115 in between (spatial/locative) metaphor 94–96 INABILITY TO SPEAK FOR EMOTION 173–174 INCAPACITATING EFFECTS OF THE EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION 173 (INCREASE IN) BODY HEAT FOR LOVE/ EMOTION 169–170 inexpressibility hypothesis 29 INTENSITY IS AMOUNT/QUANTITY 125 INTERFERENCE WITH ACCURATE PERCEPTION FOR LUST (OR LOVE) 147 interpersonal force-dynamics 63 interpsychological force-dynamics 63 INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS 122 into 130 intra-personal force dynamics 63 intra-psychological force-dynamics 63–64 Invariance Hypothesis 31, 65–68 “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” 115–116, 121, 124; the basil pot 51–53; BLUSHING FOR LOVE 164; CHANGE IN HEART FOR EMOTION 166; EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM 41–47, 49–52, 122; EMOTION IS FIRE/HEAT 43; EMOTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES INSIDE A PERSON/CONTAINER 52; INABILITY TO SPEAK FOR EMOTION 173–174; (LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE/FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 170–171; lust 43; PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION 167; prepositions 126–127; stages of life 43–51; time 143–144, 154, 156; verbs 41–42 Jakobson, R. 14, 21, 23 jealousy 79 Jespersen, O. 20, 37, 70, 89 Johnson, M. 9, 24–25, 135, 137, 139 joy 10 Keats, John, overview 2 Kövecses, Z. 9, 29, 39, 52, 67, 136, 160, 176n3

191

“La Belle Dame Sans Merci” 116, 120, 124; BLUSHING FOR LOVE 164; conceptual metonymies 160; (LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE/FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 170–171; prepositions 126–127; SEX FOR LOVE 172–173 Lakoff, G. 9, 24–28, 30–31, 86; Event Structure Metaphor 65–68; Invariance Hypothesis 65–68; metaphor 37; poetic language 35–36; prepositions 131; time 135, 137, 139 “Lamia” (1820) 53–59, 113–115, 117, 119 landmarks 111, 117 Langacker, R. 20–21, 37, 39, 68, 100, 111, 115, 125 language 35–36 Lapaire, J.-R. 20, 69 lasting states 41, 54 leave 53, 99 let 81, 83–89 likeness 54 linguistic integration 83 linguistic meaning 21 linguistics 14 literariness, cognitive grammar 21–22 live 49, 132 love 74 LOVE IS A NUTRIENT/VITALITY 122 LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE 43 (LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE/FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 170–171 LOVING VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE 142 lust 171 LUST IS HEAT 43 make 81 may 79–80, 87, 156 Merleau-Ponty, M. 12, 136 metaphor 24–25, 36–37; in between (spatial/locative) metaphor 94–96; poetic conceptual metaphor 25–28; synesthetic metaphor 94; see also conceptual metaphor metaphorical doubling 90–94 metaphorical extension 26–27; forcedynamics 65–68 metonymy 25–28, 160; see also conceptual metonymies Middleton Murry, J. 36–37 might 79–80, 147 THE MIND IS A BODY 137 moan 172–173

192

Index

modal auxiliaries 147, 148 modality 70–71; emotional forcedynamics 71–81 modals 108n27; force-dynamics 68–71 “Modern Love” 79–80, 97 moment of emergence, emotion 162 mood 70 movement 11–12, 78 MOVING TIME METAPHOR 142, 145–146, 148–149, 155–156 must 72–73 negative capability 4–5, 7 NONEXISTENCE IS LOCATION AWAY 91, 104 Nutall, L. 36 “O blush not so!” 75; BLUSHING FOR LOVE 164; CHANGE IN RESPIRATION FOR EMOTION 172; (LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE/FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 171; SEX FOR LOVE 172–173 OBJECT OF LOVE IS A DEITY 59 “Ode on a Grecian Urn:” CHANGE IN RESPIRATION FOR EMOTION 172; (INCREASE IN) BODY HEAT FOR LOVE/ EMOTION 169–170; time 150–151, 154–156 “Ode on Indolence” 97–98; CHANGE IN HEART FOR EMOTION 165–166; CRYING FOR SADNESS 174; (INCREASE IN) BODY HEAT FOR LOVE/EMOTION 169–170; time 143–144, 154, 156 “Ode on Melancholy” 137; PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION 168; time 148–150 “Ode to a Nightingale” 74, 80, 91–92, 114; BLUSHING FOR LOVE 164; CHANGE IN HEART FOR EMOTION 165; INCAPACITATING EFFECTS OF THE EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION 173; (LOVING, JOYFUL) VISUAL BEHAVIOR FOR LOVE/FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 170–171; PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION 167; prepositions 129–130; time 140–143, 150–156 “Ode to Psyche” 113–114, 116, 120–122; PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION 168; SEX FOR LOVE 172–173 of 131 on 119–121, 132 “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer” 5, 97, 129–130

“On Seeing the Elgin Marbles” 5–6 “On Sitting Down to Read King Lear Once Again” 6, 116 pain 10 panting 172 passions 10 past, TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 143–148 past+present+future, TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 154–156 path prepositions 112, 128 perception verbs 62; force-dynamics 89–100 perfective verbs 38 permit 83 PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR EMOTION 145, 167–169 PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR LOVE (OR LUST) 148 PHYSICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF A STATE FOR THE STATE 152 PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION 117, 120, 163 Pilkington, A. 4, 7, 26–27, 36 pleasure 10 poetic analysis 23 poetic conceptual metaphor 25–28 poetic grammar 22–23 poetic language 35–36, 179 poetry 22 posture of emotion 9 predicates 68, 88; see also verbs PREOCCUPATION WITH ANOTHER FOR LOVE 147 prepositional pairs 115, 125 prepositions 110–113; force-dynamic path prepositions 128–130; from 127–128; in 93, 113–119; into 130; of 131; on 119–121, 132; spatial path prepositions see spatial path prepositions; spatial prepositions 112; static prepositions 113–123; to 126–128; unclassifed prepositional cases 130–133; upon 130 present, TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 140–143 present+future, TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 150–153 pressure 69, 73 projected reality 76 psychosocial pressure 88 Pullum G. 70, 82–83, 103

Index pure future, TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 148–150 pure past, TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 143–148 pure present, TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 140–143 purple riot 96 qualia 4 questioning 28 Radden, G. 39, 70, 111 relating party 69 relief 169 rest 106n7 Romantic poets 52, 162 Romantic tradition 96–97 Rotgé, W. 20, 69 SADNESS IS A LACK OF VITALITY 122 Self 64, 78 “Self Divided” force-dynamic schema 64, 69, 84, 99–100 sensorial force 96–100 sensory mixing 98 sensuousness 100 sequential scanning 38 SEX FOR LOVE 172–173 shall 75, 108n38, 148 sigh 58, 172 similarity 54 similes 96 societal pressure 73 “Sonnet: Oh! How I love, on a fair summer’s eve” 1 soul-pouring 143 spatial path prepositions 124; from 124–128; to 126–128 spatial prepositions 112 Spinoza, B. 9–10, 31 Spinozian approach 10–11 Spinozist philosophy 9 stages of life, “Isabella, or the Pot of Basil” 43–51 state of emotion 9 state of feeling 9 state of feeling made conscious 9 states 40; lasting states 41, 54 STATES ARE BOUNDED AREAS 91 STATES ARE LOCATIONS/BOUNDED AREAS 91, 118 static prepositions 112–123; beside 121–123; by 121–123; in 115–119; on 119–121

193

steal 47–48 Steen, G. 20, 27 Stockwell, P. 38, 111 strike 55–56 structural description 23 superego 65, 69, 78 Sweetser, E. 26, 136–137 synesthesia 90, 94–96 synesthetic effects 96–100 synesthetic metaphor 94 take 50 Talmy, L. 30, 61–62, 64, 68, 81–89 temporality see time “The day is gone, and all its sweets are gone!” 124, 127 theoretical framework 8 time 135–136; MOVING TIME METAPHOR 142, 145; TIME LANDSCAPE 146–147; TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR see TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR TIME LANDSCAPE METAPHOR 146–147, 155 TIME ORIENTATION METAPHOR 137–139, 157; past+present+future 154–156; present+future 150–153; pure future 148–150; pure past 143–148; pure present 140–143 to 126–128 “To Autumn” 140–142 “To Fanny” 72, 78, 84, 86–87, 94–95, 103, 105–106, 120, 129 “To Hope” 150, 153, 166, 168 to keep 78–79 trajectors 111, 114 transitive verbs, greater modal system 81–89 Tsur, R. 7, 23, 88, 94, 96, 136, 162 Turner, M. 25–28, 35–37 unclassifed prepositional cases 130–133 unfold 41–42 upon 130 verbal support prepositions 131–132 verbs 37–38; allow 83; art 55; be 56, 73, 90; benumb’d 99; beseem 44–45; break 55–56; cease 46; dare 108n41; desert 57; die 49–50; do 44–45; dream 88; dying 53; emotion verbs 62, 89–100; falling 48, 148; fed 51; feel 48; futt’ring 132; force-dynamics 68; grew 52, 99; grow 44, 46–47;

194

Index

have 81, 83; help 82–83; imperfective verbs 38–39; leave 53, 99; let 81, 83–89; live 49, 132; make 81; perception verbs 89–100; perfective verbs 38; permit 83; sigh 58; steal 47–48; strike 55–56; take 50; to keep 78–79; unfold 41–42; wander 115; waving 153; wed 171; weighs 57–58; withers 53 virtue, ethical 40

wander 115 waving 153 wed 171 weighs 57–58 “When I Have Fears That I May Cease to Be” 181–182 will 148 withers 53 woe 93, 119 would 147