Land Settlement Policies: In Malaysia and Indonesia - A Preliminary Analysis 9789814377362

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I5ER5 The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of development and modernization, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911, and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication, or extracts therefrom, without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore."

LAND SETTLEMENT POLICIES IN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA A Preliminary Anal ysis

by

Colin

MacAndr~ws

Occasional Paper Series No. 52

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies July 1978

CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES 1:

II:

III:

IV:

V:

1

1HE STUDY OF LAND SETTLEMENTS

1

Introduction Tenninology Criteria for Evaluation

1 3 4

LAND SETTLEMENTS IN MALAYSIA

5

Background Land Settlement Models Used in Malaysia The FELDA Model Two FELDA Schemes Bilut Valley {1958) tnujempol (1965) Summary

5 8 10 13 13 15 21

LAND SETTLEMENTS IN INDONESIA

21

Background The Transmigration Programme Case Studies -- Indonesia Introduction The Belitang Area A. Sukanegara ( 1953) B. Harjomuly o (1974)

21 22 28 28 29 30 32

COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF LAND SCHEME POLICIES IN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA

34

LAND SETTLEMENT MODELS -- 1HE VIABILITY OF THE INTEGRATED VS . 1HE NONINTEGRATED APPROACH

39

Page 45

APPENDIX A Expenditure on Land Development as % of Agricultural and Rural Development Expenditure: Peninsular Malaysia, 1966-80

45

2.

Total Land Development: Peninsular Malaysia

45

3.

FELDA Development, 1956-77

46

4.

Estimated Settlers in Select Land Schemes: Peninsular Malaysia, 19 57-7 5

47

5.

FELDA: Finances Received and their Sources, 195 7-77

47

6.

FELDA: Revenue of Main Crops, 1963-77

48

1.

APPENDIX B

Stages in Evolution of Selection of Transmigrants in Indonesia, 1905-77

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

49

53

LIST OF TABLES Page Table No.

1

Public Developm ent Expenditu re for Rural Developm ent in Peninsular Malaysia, 1956-7 5

7

2

Ownershi p of Househol d Items--Survey/Overall -- Ulu J em pol

17

3

Participan ts in the Indonesia n Transmig ration Programme, 1905-74

25

4

Three Models and Range of Services for Land Settlemen ts

40

1: THE STUDY OF LAND SETTLEMENTS

Introduction Designing effective rural development policies presents a challenging problem to many governments in developing countries. Given the wide disparities in size, population, geographical characteristics and -- just as important-- cultural and ethnic differen~:es , the extent to which effective rural development programmes can be meaningfully designed and then applied with any degree of success in these areas presents a seemingl y endless range of problems. One important question that arises in attempts to design e ffective national development strategies is the decision on the appropriate level of a government's intervention to ensure any one particular programme's successful implementation. In this co n te xt, an examination of the use of land settlement policies in Malaysia and Indonesia allo ws us to see -- in the case of these two countries -- what level of government intervention has been needed to ensure the successful implementation of these policies. Clearly, in examining two countries so disparate in population, size, and degree of develo pment as Malaysia and Indonesia, a strict comparative analysis of these policies is difficult. Ho wever, there are a number of reasons that make such an examination wo rthwhile. First, land settlement policies have been important national policies in bo th cou ntries. Secondly , land settlements 1 have been used in both Malaysia and Indo nesia fo r appro ximately the same policy ends -- those of providing employment for the unemployed, meeting an urgent demand for land, raising the incomes and the living standards o f the rural poor and , in man y cases, trying to change the traditional attitu des o f t he settlers to meet what is seen as mo re "modem" development goals. Thirdly, in bo th cou ntries, land settlement p olicies have been used as major national development strategies for a considerable time span and in both countries we find the use, under different circumstances, of a generally successful land settlement model. Thus, in Malaysia, land settlem ent has been a prominent policy since 195 7 and the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) ·· one of the major organizations involved in Malaysian land development -- successfully applies a "fully integrated" 2 Land se ttlement is used to deno te the cultivation of previously uncultivated land and not th e impro ve ment of existing agricultural holdings . The term "scheme" is used interchangeably with "settlement" and " project" as usage varies in both countries. 2 See, for a general discussion of this "integrated" concept, later sections of this~- For its use in FELDA, see Alladin Hashim, "Land Development under FELDA -- Some Socio-Econo mic Aspects." Paper given at the South East Asian Social Science Association meeting, Kuala Lump ur, mimeograph , January 197 5, p . 7.

2

approach to land scheme development which makes an explicit attempt to use its schemes to try and change the traditional attitudes of its settlers so that they become "modern and progressive farmers", able to play an important role in Malaysia's commercial and business sector. 3 In the Indonesian case, the development ofJand settlements through the Indonesian transmigration policy 4 started as far back as 1905. This transmigration policy has provided in the course of some seventy years a fascinating example of a country using transmit,rration and resettlement as a policy mechanism to move larger numbers of people to meet roughly the same aims -- land hunger, unemployment and poverty -- as the Malaysian programme. What perhaps makes this Indonesian policy particularly interesting is that it provides us with a long time span of experimentation and has also taken on added significance as a national policy with the Indonesian Government's recent attempts to maximize the programme in terms of size aided by a World Bank commitment in 1977 to provide US$1 billion to help move 100,000 families a year from Java to the outer islands to newly developed land settlement areas. 5 Although the emphasis in Indonesia has until recently been mainly on the use of transmigration to relieve population pressure, there is a long history of attempts to turn the settlements throughout this period into productive new communities where the settlers can find both land and also a better way of life. Today the programme is also seen as a major means to stimulate regional development rather than just to move surplus population. 6 Consequently, land settlement policies in both Malaysia and Indonesia provide a useful field of study to explore the question that, given a particular policy goal (in this case, that of land settlement trying to meet specific policy aims in the agricultural sector in both countries), what is the appropriate and necessary level of government 3 FELDA, Press R elease, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, p. 4. 4 The term "transmigration" is used to refer to the transfer of population in Indonesia from the central islands of Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok to the outer islands under government sponsorship. See, for a detailed history, J .M. Hardjono, Transmigration in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977) . 5 See Wall Street Journal, New York, 17 November 1977, p. 6. The World Bank commitment is matched by an Indonesian Government commitment of US$4 billion. 6 This linking of th e transmigration programme's ability to move people with regional development programmes first fo und prominence in the literature in the mid-1950s and then was directly linked in with the official aims of the programme in the First National Five Year Plan (Repelita I) in 1969/70-73/74. See, for growing emphasis, literature entries under Chapter 1 and 2 in Paul Meyer and Colin MacAndrews, Transmigration in Indon esia: An Annotated Bibliography (Yogyakarta: University of Gadjah Mada Press, 1978). For Repelita I, see Repelita I (1969/7073/74),Jakarta, 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 113-114.

3

intervention to make such a policy effective? In examining this question, land settlement policies offer a particularly interesting field to investigate as, in these new settlements, groups of people are moved into uncultivated and undeveloped areas creating in that process new communities. Consequently, the degree and kind of government aid is clearly an essential element in the likely success of a new settlement. This paper initially examines the evolution of land settlement policies in Malaysia and Indonesia and, in particular, looks at which models or types of schemes have or have not been successful. It then tries to isolate in both cases the factors -- political, economic and cultural -- that have either aided or impeded success. Finally, drawing on these two examples, it examines the kind and levels of government inputs that have been necessary for the successful implementation of these settlement policies in these two countries. However, before examining these questions it is useful first to clarify a number of terms used in this paper.

Terminology Land Development is used in this paper to refer to the development of new and previously uncultivated land in both Malaysia and Indonesia. Thus it does not refer to the improvement of existing landholdings or the provision of additional land on the fringe of already cultivated landholdings nor to any type of land reform. Land development of the undeveloped land can be seen mainly in Malaysia in the work of FELDA and in the work of various State land schemes. In Indonesia it can be seen mainly in the development of large areas for transmigration in the outer islands. Land Development Schemes is used to refer to schemes or settlements which have been opened up in new undeveloped areas for new groups of individuals who have been brought into that area to settle and develop it. Thus the term land schemes refers to settlements on which the individual and his family live and work and not, for instance, the type of scheme in Malaysia where the settlers can commute to the scheme from his village. In Indonesia, the term "project, is used for this kind of land settlement. Integrated and Nonintegrated Settlements. This refers to two contrasting types of land schemes and specifically to the scale of services provided. On the one hand we have the fully integrated model in which a whole range of support services are provided to the settlers and their families and, on the other hand, the simpler nonintegrated model where few or no services are provided. Both models can be seen

4

in Malaysia -- the fully integrated type of settlement in the Malaysian FELDA settlements and the nonintegrated or simple model in the Kelantan State land schemes. Examples in other countries of the fully integrated model can be seen in the "direct colonisation" schemes in South America 7 and of the nonintegrated model in what Warriner has classified as Simple Land Reform pattern in a number of countries where no services are supplied. 8 In between these two extremes we have a number of variations which allow for various levels of support services and consequently a wide range of different models exist in which the levels and degree of services vary considerably. Transmigration is a term used in Indonesia to refer to the movement of people from the central islands of Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok to the "outer" islands (mainly to Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan) usually under government sponsorship. However, the term has been broadened to include spontaneous migrants also moving from these central islands to "outer islands". Thus, in Indonesia, transmigration refers to both the process of the movement from the central islands to the o uter islands and to the movement of individual migTants who are referred to as transmigrants rather than as settlers. Consequently in Indonesia the term "settler" and " transmigrant " are interchangeable.

Criteria for Evaluation In examining the successful utilization of land settlements in these two countries it is useful to identify certain criteria for the evaluation of the various models. This can be done at two levels. The first is the evaluation of the overall policy . Thus we find that in both Malaysia and Indonesia the governments have stated objectives for their land scheme policies. In the Malaysian case it is generally to provide land for the landless rural poor, to raise incomes and to create employment. At the same time these schemes have also been seen -- particularly in the work of the one major organization, FELDA -- as a means to meet development goals by trying to induce a rapid change in the traditional attitudes of the settlers. In Indonesia we find a similar set of aims, though with some differences in emphasis. Thus the main thrust of the policy from its initiation

7 For details of the full degree of services provided by the South America "colonisation" programmes, see Michael Nelson, The Development of Tropical Lands (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), pp. 46-47. 8 For Warriner's comparison of integrated and nonintegrated land reform approaches, see Dorothy Warriner, R esults of Land Reform in Asian and Latin American Countries, Food Research Institute Studies, Vol. XII, No.2, 1973, pp. 119-121.

5

in 1905 until recently was to relieve the population pressure in the densely populated central island of Java and thus to use transmigration as a means for population redistribution. However, towards the late 1960s the emphasis has shifted to using this flow of migrants to meet other developmental goals including the provision and development of land, the improvement in incomes and in the overall standards of living, and the linking up of the process of movement with regional development in the outer islands. In both countries, the costs and level of services needed in implementing the policies are also an important criteria in gauging the overall value of this type of strategy. If these are the general aims in both countries by which the overall policy can be evaluated, there are also more specific criteria that can be used in the evaluation of individual settlements and that can be usefully applied in trying to assess the optimum levels of government intervention. These would include three main types of criteria: ( 1) the overall productivity of the schemes in terms of better incomes, success in land clearing and maintenance, and other signs of economic improvements; (2) the ability of settlement to develop its own organizations and move towards self-sufficiency and thus independence from the need for continuing government inputs; and

(3) attitudinal change, reflected for example in the physical and occupational mobility of the settlers.

II: LAND SETILEMENTS IN MALAYSIA

Background Land settlements have played a significant part in Malaysia's overall development programmes since Independence in 1957. Due to the widescale availability of uncultivated and undeveloped land in Malaysia in 1957 (an availability that still lasts until the present day) these settlements provided the Malaysian Government at Independence with an immediate answer (along with an overall intensified rural development programme) to the then existing problems of widescale demand for land, of unemployment and poverty in the rural areas of the country. 9 Consequently, just before Independence in 195 7, a 9 For a good description of these factors shaping policy at Independence in 195 7, see David Lim, Economic Growth and Development in West Malaysia 1947-70 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), Chapter 4.

6

working party was set up to look into the problems of land development in Malaysia and its recommendations to the pre-Independence Malaysian Government in 1956 led to the creation of what was to become the major and undoubtedly most successful Malaysian land scheme organization, FELDA. 10 Two important and interlinking factors have shaped and directed Malaysia's land development strategies throughout their development. One has been the continuing political pressure on the predominantly Malay Government both at Independence and at various periods in the country's development since 1957 to eliminate unemployment and poverty in the rural areas. These were the conditions that affected predominantly the Malay section of Malaysia's multiethnic society, as the Malays were in 195 7 and are still today living mainly in the rural areas and less developed areas of Malaysia.11 At the same time, due to the existence of a weighting system in the allocation of seats which heavily favours the rural areas in Malaysia, the Malay voter is a person of considerable political importance influencing the policies of the predominantly Malay Govemment.12 Secondly, there was widescale land hunger (as well as unemployment and poverty) in the predominantly Malay rural areas at Independence in 1957 owing to a number of factors including the holding up of the processing of land allocations due initially to the Second World War and then due to the Emergency from 1948 to 1960. The result was that there were at least 100,000 land applications in Malaysia lying unprocessed at Independence in 19 57.13 The result of these existing pressures in Malaysia and the general dissatisfaction in the rural areas led to the introduction of a large scale programme of rural development from 1957 that (as Table 1 shows) was to take up between 52.9% and 56.6% of Malaysia's overall rural development budget in the period 1957-75.

10

The original abbreviation FLDA was changed in 1972 to FELDA, by which the Federal Land Development Authority is usually referred.

11

Depending on which census urban classification is taken (either 1,000 over in 19 57 or 10,000 in 1970)there were 62.4% Malays living in rural areas in 1975 and 82.4% in 1970. Development historically has been associated with commercial development and urbanization. Consequently, the western and southern areas of the country have been more "developed" than the north and eastern areas. For a discussion and ranking of the eleven states in Peninsular Malaysia in terms of those "developed" and "less developed" based on industrialization, existence of services and agricultural development, see Third Malaysia Plan 1976-80 (Kuala Lumpur: The Government Printer, 1976), pp. 199-217.

12

As Lim points out, the weighting system is such that in the f'lrst general election in Malaysia in 1955, Malay voters formed the majority in 96.2% of the 52 constituencies although they then only represented 50% of the West Malaysian population, declining in the 1959 and 1964 elections to about 61%. See Lim, op.cit., pp. 62-67.

13

See Annual Report FELDA, Kuala Lumpur, 1963. Higher figures of up to 200,000 are often quoted.

7

Table 1: Public Development Expenditure for Rural Development in Peninsular Malaysia, 19 56-7 5 (in M$ million)

1956-60

1961-65

1966-70

1971-75 (revised allocation)

Agriculture and rural development

227.5

411.1

911.2

1,835.6

Transport

103.2

294.3

177.9

518.3

25.8

56.7

79.8

178.5

119.3

263.7

323.4

415.5

69.4

260.3

322.4

546.9

545.2

1,286.1

1,814. 7

3,494.8

964.0

2,344.4 54.9%

2,964.5 61.2%

6,609.0 52.9%

Communications Utilities Social services (a)

(b)

(c)

Total rural development expenditure Total nonsecurity development expenditure (a) as a% of (b)

Source:

56.6%

Computed from First Malaysia Plan 1966-1970, Table 2.6 and 4.1, pp. 28-29, 69-70; Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Table 5.1, pp. 6871;Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, Table 5.1, pp. 98101.

Computation Note:

50% of the plan allocations for transport, communications, utilities, and social services in Peninsular Malaysia has been arbitrarily assigned to rural development.

Immediately after Independence, the emphasis on rural improvements was concentrated mainly on the provision of infrastructure including ro::tds, mosques and schools. But with the election setback of the Alliance Party in the 1959 General Elections due to the dissatisfaction of the predominantly Malay voters, the rural development programme was given greater weight with the additional allocation of resources and, in

8

particular, intensified land settlement programmes were allocated greater funding. In 1970 similar political demands -- this time in the form of the New Economic Policy (NEP), aimed at restructuring the Malaysian economy to give a greater share to the Malay ethnic group -- resulted again in an increased allocation to rural development programmes. Once again land settlement programmes were given added funds -- a strategy that had a strong attraction as by this time the main organization involved (FELDA) had proved itself to be the most efficient mechanism in Malaysia for the physical development of new land and the settlement of mainly Malay farmers. Thus land development programmes became a central element in Malaysia's overall development policy in the Second Malaysian Plan or SMP (1971-75) and continued to remain so in the Third Malaysian Plan or TMP (1976-80), utilizing in the three plan periods 1966-80, between 39.8% (1966-70), 53.5% (1971-75) and 42.2% (1976-80) of Malaysia's development budget for agriculture and rural development. (See Appendix A, Table 1) Thus, in Malaysia, both the physical nature of the country with its large areas of undeveloped land, and just as important the continual political pressure on the Malaysian Government to bring about rapid change in the rural areas has led to the widescale utilization of land settlement schemes as a major policy mechanism.

Land Settlement Models Used in Malaysia Malaysia has experimented with a number of land settlement models ranging from the fully integrated FELDA type model to the simple or nonintegrated model. At the same time it has also experimented both with the residential types of scheme where the settlers have to live on the scheme and the nonresidential ones where the settlers commute to landholding, living outside the scheme. For the purpose of this paper, only the government sponsored schemes 14 that require resident settlers are examined. Within this category we have in Malaysia since 1957 three main types of schemes: 1 5

14

There have been occasional examples of land schemes sponsored by semiofficial agencies such as Tabung Haji but there have been no significant attempts at nongovernmental group settlement occasionally found in other countries. For these experiments see Peter Domer (ed.), Cooperative and Commun e (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 197 5 ).

15

These are the main categories. There are variations at different perjods in the categories and types of the various schemes reflecting organizational changes. For a discussion of the various types used in both Malaysia and in other Southeast Asian countries see Colin MacAndrews, "Change and Adaptation in Rural Communities : Land Settlements in South East Asia." Paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Conference, Chicago, March 1978.

9

Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) schemes: These are fully integrated schemes in which the settler is allocated ten to twelve acres of rubber or a fourteen acre share in an oil palm bloc. The settler lives on the scheme with his family. The scheme is a fully integrated model where the land has been cleared, a house built, access roads laid down, the crop planted before the settler enters the scheme and where he is given a repayable subsistence allowance to live on until his crop matures after a period of two to three years. Fringe Alienation and Youth schemes; These are set up both under the Federal and State Governments. In the case of Fringe Alienation, the schemes are aimed at developing agricultural land within three to four miles of existing villages with the primary purpose of improving the income of existing smallholders. The settlers on these are nonresident and commute to the scheme. 16 Youth schemes are usually State run schemes for unemployed youth in which the settlers are unmarried, live on the scheme 17 and are allocated five to eight acres of land with eventual ownership. State schemes: These are a wide range of schemes run by the State Government of Malaysia. In most of these, the settler is not required to live on the scheme nor is given ownership of land. However, an important exception are the Kelantan State schemes where the settler is given five to eight acres of land, lives on the schemes but clears the site and plants the crop himself.l8 The most successful of these three main types of schemes in Malaysia since 195 7 have been those of FELDA which was responsible for 37.9% of all land developed in Malaysia in the 1957-75 period.19 Altogether FELDA had developed by 1976 one million acres of land, opened up 210 schemes and settled 40,559 families20 or a total of some 200,000 people. 21 Figures for other schemes are difficult to ascertain but 16

These were originall y developed by the National Land Council until 1966 through direct grants to State Governments. By 196 7, 401 schemes had been opened up in 8 of Peninsular Malaysia's 11 States. In 1966 the work was taken over by the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority created in October 1966. For an analysis of the Fringe Alienation Programme see Shamsul Bahrin, ''A Preliminary Study of the Fringe Alienation Schemes in West Mal aysia," j o urnal of Tropical Geograph y, Singapore, Vol. 28, 1969, pp. 75 -83.

17

These are usually State run schemes although FELDA has also run at various periods youth schemes known as Youth Brigades.

18

For details of the Kelantan State schemes see Syed Hussein Wafa, "Land Development Strategies in Malaysia : An Empirical Analysis," Pb. D. thesis, Stanford University, 1972.

19

See Appendix A, Table 2.

20

See, for a detailed breakdown of these figures, Appendix A, Table 3.

21

For this estimate and for an analysis of FELDA's overall role in inducing movement (some 8% of all movers in the 1957-70 intercensual period), see Colin MacAndrews and Kazu~i Ya~amoto, "Induced and Voluntary Migration in Malaysia," in South East Asian journal of Social Sc1ences, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1976.

10

generally the only type of scheme that has successfully taken in large numbers of settlers and developed extensive areas of land have been the State schemes. 22 But these State schemes as well as the other types of schemes have suffered, as a 1975 Ministry of Land and Mines noted, from: Lack of planning on the part of these state agencies leading to the indiscriminate opening of land, at unsuitable locations, wrong crops, and mismanagement, often resulting in poor field maintenance or even abandonment. Quite often too, a project is launched without regard to the availability of funds to carry a project through .23

The FELDA Model For the purpose of looking at the fully integrated land settlement model the FELDA type of scheme in Malaysia provides us with an interesting case study of the kind of inputs and the kinds of policies that have to be utilized to make even a fully integrated model work effectively. First set up in 1956, FELDA24 went through three distinct stages in its operations between 1956 to 1977, moving from an initial period from 195 7 to 1960 when it was mainly a grantee of funds to State Governments for the opening up of land schemes, to a markedly enlarged role under the SMP (196065) when it was given full powers to develop land by itself throughout Malaysia. Then from 1967, FELDA moved into a third and important phase of its overall development when it opened up a Settlers Social Development Division with the express aim of changing the traditional attitudes or "modernizing" its settlers. At the same time, it started to expand rapidly into large scale processing, shipping and marketing. Some idea of FELDA's rapid growth is shown in its scale of operations. By 19 77, FELDA has an annual operational budget of M$266.5 million (US$108.8 million), revenues from its crops of M$458.4 million (US$187.1 million) and 210 schemes spread throughout Peninsular Malaysia. 25

22

See Appendix A, Table 4. State schemes represented 24.9% of land developed in the 1957-75 period.

23

"Land Development Programme 1976-80," mimeograph (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Lands and Mines, 1975), p. 10.

24

For a detailed history of FELDA see Colin MacAndrews, Mobility and !.~ ~ demization : The Federal Land Development Authority and Its Role in Modernizing the Rural Malay (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1977).

25

"FELDA and Its Activities," mimeograph (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Land Development Authority, 1977), pp. 1-3. See, for details, Appendix A, Tables 5 and 6.

11

What is of particular interest about FELDA's work is what has been become articulated as its "package approach." This approach involves both the physical opening up of land and also the extensive provision of institutional infrastructure aimed at improving both the economic and social well-being of the settler. How exactly this modernizing role helps is shown in a recent FELDA Press Release: FELDA's approach to land development and settlement is based on the concept of providing a "package deal" to settlers. This means that apart from opening up new land and planting crops, FELDA's activities must also include establishment of physical and institutional infrastructure conducive to both the economic and social well-being of settlers. A land settlement programme has both economic and social objectives and it is not possible to isolate one from the other. The overall objective is to maximise the use of available resources to provide the settler with a better life. To the settler this means having a reasonable income, being able to send his children to school and having access to some, if not all, of the modem conveniences in life. Agricuhure is supposed to provide him with an economic holding. The next and perhaps the most difficult task is to see to it that he cultivates the land according to practices that will bring about maximum or near maximum yields. Even if he is able to make the best use of his land, he is still not assured of his entitlement t o the full value of his production. The crop by its very nature may require processing before sale. Beyond this is the question of the price he receives for his product. Thus what one really has to consider is the integration of a range o.f interrelated economic actions. The economic process is thus used as the basis of the overall social transformation objective but it is not in itself the total objective. It is therefore inevitable that the social aspects of development must do vetail into the economic aspects and vice-versa-- the eventual aim of this programme is to create modern and progressive farmers playing a proper role in the commercial and social fields. 26

Thus to achieve the maximum integration, the settler is brought into the settlement at the third year of the clearing and planting of the area and is provided with a house, garden area, ten to twelve acres of rubber (or fourteen acres of palm oil), an initial monthly allowance until the first crop, and a wide variety of support services including schools, medical facilities, agricultural and social welfare advice. In more recent times, he has also benefited from extension services showing him how best to utilize his money. 2 7 The financial arrangement in FELDA is that settler has to eventually pay back about 90% of the cost of the development of the schemes, including the cost of his house , the initial monthly allowance (in J Q77, M$1 00) and 26

FELDA, FELDA Press Release, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp. 4 -5.

27

See, for details, MacAndrews, op.cit., Chapter 4.

12

of the other services. This is recovered from his earnings over an eighteen-year period at which time, with the full repayment of his loan, he is given final title to his land. 28 Thus, even if the FELDA settler is heavily subsidized at first, a major portion of that initial subsidy is eventually recoverable. In terms of choice of site, selection of settlers and village structure, the site is initially carefully surveyed by FELDA and once the decision is taken on whether it is appropriate, the scheme is cleared by contractors, the house built and then the settlers are moved in. The settlers have to be married, aged between eighteen and forty, 29 Malaysian nationals and physically fit. The selection process is also weighted towards those applicants who have an agricultural background. Finally in terms of income the FELDA settler, particularly in recent times, has done well. The 1975/76 Malaysian Treasury Economic Report noted that the average income in 1974 of FELDA settlers on rubber schemes after deduction ofloan payments (about 30% of the total income) averaged, according to the size of the plot, between M$238 and M$277 for rubber and M$802 and M$1,218 for oil palm. For a further sign of affluence the same report noted that a survey of fifty-one oil palm schemes showed that 4.8% of the settlers owned cars, 62% motorcycles and 17% television sets. 30 Although FELDA today uses a generally integrated approach to land scheme development, it has also experimented with a nonintegrated type in its initial years (1957-60) in its early schemes before moving after 1960 to the fully "integrated" and more successful approach. FELDA's experience in land settlement thus provides an interesting example of the use of both types of model. However, it should be emphasized that, in looking at the initial and unsuccessful attempts by FELDA to use a nonintegrated model in its early history, part of the failure of these early nonintegrated type of schemes can well be attributed to FELDA's lack of experience and that, except for the one scheme examined in the next section (Bilut Valley), FELDA's other early schemes were also indirectly administered through State Governments and lacked central direction from FELDA. Again it must be recognized that FELDA in this 1956-70 period and until the mid-sixties was still gradually learning about and overcoming the various problems of land scheme management. However, given these reservations, it is useful to look at an 28

The total loan is at 6% interest and is deducted on monthly basis from the settler's income once the crop matures.

29

See, for details of settler selection, MacAndrews, op.cit., pp. 126-128. The age requirements to be a FELDA settler have been occasionally changed since 1957.

30

The Treasury, Economic Report 1975-76 (Kuala Lumpur, 1976), pp. 102-104.

13

example of a FELDA scheme of the nonintegrated type, such as the settlement at Bilut Valley, as it offers an interesting contrast to FELDA's later attempts after 1960 to use a more fully serviced and generally more successful integrated model.

Two FELDA Schemes31 Bilut Valley. Bilut Valley was the first FELDA scheme to be opened up and was the first scheme directly administered by FELDA in the initial stage (1956-61) of its overall development. Seen generally as a "disaster",32 it is a scheme that today still presents FELDA with major problems. Situated in Western Pahang, Bilut Valley is a rubber scheme opened up in 1958 with 568 settlers. In Bilut Valley the settlers were brought in at the first stage of development, had to clear the jungle and plant the rubber themselves and build their own houses. As a result of these initial hardships and the early lack of amenities, the Bilut Valley settlers became over the years a bitter, and generally unhappy, group. This in 1975 could be seen in a number of ways. One was the lack of any marked improvement in incomes on the scheme. Thus the average settler's income in 19 75 was only M$1 72 in comparison to the average income of M$28833 in that year on other FELDA schemes. At the same time there is little evidence of savings,34 a low level of ownership of appliances35 and a low level in investment for the improvement of the houses.36

31

The research was carried out on FELDA from 1974-76 with detailed case studies (based on participant observation and a stratified sample survey) of seven schemes from November 1974 to December 1975. Both these schemes-- Bilut Valley and Ulujempol- belonged to the seven schemes that were extensively studied and surveyed. See for details Colin MacAndrews, op.cit., pp. 86-192.

32

See Tang Teng Lai, "FELDA- Formation and Growth," mimeograph, Kuala Lumpur, 1973. This paper by the Agricultural Director of FELDA provides some interesting details of FELDA's earliest attempts at land development, particularly the early years at Bilut Valley.

33

See MacAndrews, Mobility and Modernization, op.cit., pp. 111-114. This was the claimed income by the settler in the survey . ·Family income was higher, averaging M$307. For average incomes on other FELDA schemes see Treasury Economic Report 1975/76, op.cit., pp. 102-104.

34

MacAndrews, op.cit., p. 117. Only 13% of the respondents saved on a monthly basis.

35

MacAndrews, ibid., p. 118, Table 4.3. This was much lower than the average FELDA scheme surveyed in 197 5. Treasury Economic R eport, op.cit., pp. 102-104.

36

MacAndrews, ibid., p. 115. What was noticeable here was the low level of house investment hy t'le Malay settl ers with 52.9% spending less than M$300 on house h •. j)rovements since 195 7. In general, investment in improving houses is a good indication of economic well-being and general development of a FELDA scheme.

14

This lack of well-being on the scheme was also reflected in otherpatterns of economic activities. An analysis of shops on the schemes in 1975 showed that, while there was a total of fifty-one, 3 7 they were all of the same traditional Malay kampung (village) type of shop and that, generally, the level of business reflected that of the traditional Malay village. Bilut Valley did not, for instance, have the modern centralized shopping centre that had become a common feature of most FELDA schemes by 1975 nor, with one exception, 38 had any of the settlers taken advantages of FELDA assistance to branch out into other business activities. Organizationally, Bilut Valley fared badly with little evidence of the settlers either actually participating in organizational activities on the scheme or willing to take on the responsibility for its general running. This again is a significant feature of the degree of the settler's involvement in other FELDA schemes of this age moving by 1975 into a final independent and self-sufficient status. Thus the main settler organization, the J awatan Kuasa Kemajuan Ranchangan QKKR), played a generally inactive role in the life on the scheme, being neither willing nor able to take on the general running of the scheme. 39 Generally, there was little organizational activity of other kinds on the scheme. The Youth Club, for instance, which clearly could have played a useful role in light of the large number of young dependants on the scheme, had "ceased to function" in 1975, as I was told by a local official, due to "lack of interest". In terms of occupational mobility and attitudinal change, a number of measurements were used in the survey and generally these indicated a low level of change. There was, as it has been noted, little desire on the part of the Bilut Valley settler to move into business or into more lucrative side occupations. However, the settler dependants had benefited from better educational facilities on the scheme and the parents generally had high aspirations for their children.40 But while a majority of the settlers said that they had a better life on FELDA schemes, there was a significant number who said that this was not so, due to the "hard work", a "bad social environment" and "too much responsibility" .4 1

37

Mac Andrews, op.cit., p. 107, Table 4.6.

38

This was one settler who had set up a successful bakery and who, at the time of the author's research, was expanding his operations to other FELDA schemes.

39

Only 4 7% of the respondents went to JKKR meetings and they showed generally little interest in either the JKKR activities or in organized life on the schemes.

40

For educational mobility and settler's aspirations for their children, see MacAndrews, ibid., p. 108 (Table 4. 7) and p. 120.

41

Ibid., p. 120.

15

In general, Bilut Valley was a badly organized scheme with low participation by the settlers in its day-to-day running and a lack of morale that underlined the fact that there had clearly been very little development in the twenty years of its existence. In analysing this situation, two main factors seem to explain this situation. The first was the initial nonintegrated nature of the scheme. In Bilut Valley, the settler in the early years found considerable hardship in dearing the land, building his house and settling down. Some of the results of these initial experiences remained in 1975 as, owing to the lack of advice in 1957, many of the settlers' rubber plots had been badly chosen and thus yields and incomes remained low. And,although in the mid-sixties FELDA introduced a wide range of facilities into all its schemes including Bilut ValleY, the effects of these early years remained. Thus Bilut Valley in 1975 was a bitter scheme marked by constant disputes with the FELDA authorities, and by the lack of settler's interest and participation in the running of the scheme. The second factor that may well have hindered the development of Bilut Valley was perhaps the mixed ethnic composition of the settlers, a common feature in many of these early types of FELDA schemes. Thus, Bilut Valley had settlers from all three of Malaysia's major ethnic groups, with 65.1% of the settlers being Malay, 26.6% Chinese and 8.3% Indians. These three groups live in separate areas of the schemes (a practice changed by FELDA after 1960) and there was a marked lack of co-operation and 4 participation among the three groups. 2 A fmal factor that has to be taken into account in looking at Bilut Valley's history is that FELDA's staff in 1957 were inexperienced in the administratio n of land schemes and some of the early problems of Bilut Valley might 4 well have been overcome if more experienced staff had been available. 3 When we look at FELDA's experience in Bilut Valley, two points are striking. The frrst is that it would seem to demonstrate that the settler in land settlements such as these in Malaysia cannot be expected without extensive guidance to adequately develop his land, build his house and make the right decisions on suitability of the plot. Secondly, it is clear that the settler, particularly in the initial stages of settlement, also needs adequate services to help develop the area. tnujempol. In contrast to Bilut Valley, Ulujempol is a fully integrated type of FELDA scheme. Situated in central .Pahang, it was first opened in 1965 with its

42

The J KKR Committee had, for instance, no Chinese or Indian representatives in 197 5.

43

While able and highly skilled staff are a marked feature of FELDA's present day workers, its staff were very inexperienced in the early days. Tang identifies staff inexperience as a major problem in Bilut Valley and notes that one manager had to be "dismissed". See Tang, op.cit.

16

377 settlers moving in by November of that year. In contrast to Bilut Valley , Ulujempol in 1975 was a highly organized and clearly successful scheme. Yet if, as we will see, there was every sign of marked development by the time o f my research in 1975, an earlier report on this settlement in 196 7 -- some two years after its opening -- offers a very different picture. Thus it is interesting to examine Ulu J em pol in both periods to see why there was this marked change and to see to what ex tent the " integrated " services could be said to have contributed to it. In 197 5 three aspects of Ulu J em pol were examined to measure its degree of success and development, these being ( 1)

economic measurements, including income and savings ;

(2) the organizations on the scheme, particularly those developed by the settlers and the degree that they now played in the running of the scheme; and (3)

attitudinal change.44

In terms of economic well-being, the Ulu J en:tpol settlers had good incomes in 1975, averaging M$1,050 a month. This was due both to the type of crqr- in this case palm oil-- but also clearly due to the efficient co-operative work of the Ulu J em pol settlers as the successful cultivation and cropping of oil palm demand a high level of group organization. Not surprisingly, the survey showed that some 40% of the respondents save regularly every month, averaging M$60. At the same time 53.5% of the respondents had spent an average of M$955 on house improvements, usually repairing the original wood structure with bricks. Overall the economic prosperity of the scheme was demonstrated in the wide range of appliances owned by the settlers includingthe high percentage of motorcycles (75.6%) and of T.Vs (57.8%) (see Table 2). The Ulu J em pol settler also placed a high value on his household possessions, averaging a sum of M$4,135. In looking at the organization of this scheme in 19 7 5 two characteristics are particularly obvious. The first was the wide variety of organizations on the scheme. The second was the predominant role played by the settlers in running the scheme. Thus, in the first instance, we find in Ulujempol a large number of clubs (18 in all) including a youth club, a women's club and an exservicemen 's association. In addition, there was a modem shopping complex, built by the settlers, of thirty-two

44

For a detailed analysis of illujempol in 1975, see MacAndrews, op.cit., Chapter 4.

17

Table 2:

Ownership of Household Items -- Survey /Overall -- Ulu J em pol

%

Overall No. N = 377

9

20.9

50

13.3

Televisions

28

65.1

218

57.8

Motorcycles

36

83.7

285

75.6

Bicycles

4

9.3

272

72.1

Radios

36

83.7

240

63.6

Generators

22

51.2

44

11.7

Household appliances

39

90.7

323

85.7

N=61

Survey No.

Cars

Sources:

%

1 Survey 1975. 2 FELDA Records- Ulujempol1975.

shops; a stage; and three settler owned and run transport companies set up initially to move the palm fruit from the plot to the factory but now expanding into other activities. These companies each had a capital of M$100,000 (US$40,800), 50% of which was contributed by the settlers and 50% by FELDA.45 ln these various business enterprises the settlers had, as the interviews showed, taken the initiative with some initial guidance from FELDA and clearly the overall conditions in the scheme had also contributed to this kind of development. What is just as interesting in the case of Ulu Jempol is the role played by the settlers in organizing the life on the scheme. Thus we find the main settler's organization, the JKKR,46 was extensively organized with a large number of active subcommittees and 45

Tills pattern was often found in the initial stage of setting up this kind of company when FELDA would lend up to 50% of the initial capital at a 6% interest rate . Usually after a few years, the settlers repaid the FELDA portion of the capital and financed the companies entirely themselves. Alternatively, as in the cas e o f another schem e -- Bukit Bes:.tr inj o hore -- •'1e settler borrowed money from outaide lending sources. For details of the business activities in Bukit Besar, see MacAndrews, op.cit., pp. 179-183.

46

The organizational structure of the JKKR (which is found on every FELDA scheme) is a twelveman elected committee with the FELDA scheme Manager acting as Chairman but with the effective control and decision-making in the hands of the settlers.

18

a large budget made up of contributions from the settlers and income from its various activities. Settlers' participation in theJKKR was impressive with 87% of the respondents belonging to it and taking an active part in its work. In terms of budget, the U1uJempolJKKR in 1975 controlled some M$570,000 (US$232,700) and generally the JKKR in 197 5 was playing a major role in the major decision-making on the scheme. 4 7 Thus all matters on the day-to-day running of the scheme were discussed by the Manager with the JKKR officials and any matter of dispute between the settlers and the FELDA management was mediated by theJKKR.48 At the same time, the JKKR took on other responsibilities concerning the internal running of the scheme such as organizing go tong royong (mutual self-help) among the settler dependants to keep the scheme tidy. 4 9 Some idea of the position and status of the JKKR in Ulu J empol is demonstrated in the case of the JKKR Vice Chairman who had been invited to be a member of the FELDA main Board of Directors in Kuala Lumpur, and also of the FELDA Cooperative Society that had stores in all of FELDA's 210 schemes. He was also the "ombudsman" chosen by the nearby town of Tonkiat in case of dispute between its two main ethnic groups, in this case the predominantly Chinese and the Malay inhabitants. The third criteria used to measure the development of this scheme was to see what degree of change there had been in the settler's pattern of life and attitudes. Consisting predominantly of traditional rural Malay farm ers (87%), the settlers had clearly changed with the improved conditions on the scheme branching out into a whole range of activities, both in business and in social activities. At the same time, the survey showed both educational and occupational mobility among the respondents' children and a high range of aspirations by the settlers for their children's future. Thus while 84% of the respondents said that they would recommend their friends to join FELDA, only 53% said they would like their children to become FELDA settlers, preferring them instead to go on to university (9 7%) and professional jobs in the government service. 50

47

The JKKR ran, below the shopping centre, a set of offices which were open everyday, to which the settlers could, and did come, to discuss their problems.

48

One example of this in 1975 was the handling of an outbreak of theft on the scheme. The Manager called on the JKKR, rather than the police, to deal with this, although the latter had a unit on the scheme.

49

The settlers' dependants had to work one day a week, cleaning the scheme's village area.

50

See MacAndrews, op.cit., pp. 167-168, Table 5.8. While government service is seen by most i'vla1ay~ as the stams occupauun, it was perhaps significant Lhat 737o of i.he respondents had high aspirations wanting, for instance, their children to go to the higher professional level government jobs, 35% suggested business careers and only 2.3% wanted their children to bcome farmers.

19

In contrast to this state of affairs in 1975 (when by these criteria Ulu J empol was a rapidly developing scheme), a Social Development Department report in 1967 made some two years after the settlers had joined the scheme, offers a very different picture and raises some interesting questions as to the process and degree of change that can be brought about by the kind of services provided in an integrated scheme such as Ulu Jempol. This report written by a Social Development Department team51 who lived on the scheme for a month showed a very different set of conditions from those I found in 19 7 5. Relations -- it noted between the management and the settlers -- were generally bad; the settlers had major problems in adapting to the life of the scheme, and there was little organized life and no clubs of any sort. It also noted that, while the scheme was well endowed with good houses and health facilities, there was generally very low morale, with the settlers' reluctant to adjust to making use of the modem facilities available in the new area or to listen to the management's advice on diet and other matters. The observers also reported marked regional groupings in living and in socializing, and a general lack of co-operation among the settlers. Some idea of the conditions can be seen from the following extract: One marked feature in 196 7 was the bad relations between the settlers and the FELDA Manager. The Social Welfare team were told for instance by the Manager that a number of letters of complaint had been sent to Tun Razak [the then Deputy Prime Minister and later Prime Minister] by the settlers. The Manager also revealed that 11 settlers had been given warning letters by the FELDA management for refusing to "be subordinate to the management". The Social Welfare team so clearly felt the tension on both sides that as they noted they "were extremely careful in not being seen with the Manager too often". Settlers on their part complained of insulting remarks by the management who had met their complaints of the work being "too hard" [or] of "too much discipline". The causes of their tension were various. One clearly is the inadequate knowledge of the FELDA and of what to expect by some of the settlers. None of the settlers, the team reported, "understood the project as a whole and nearly all of them were quite hazy about details of the scheme". This was particularly in relation to land ownership and the Social Welfare team reported that they were continually questioned as to whether they would own any land as promised. There were those who were happy with the facilities but also those who were unhappy (notably the Pahang settlers)

51

Department of Social Welfare, Government of Malaysia, Social Welfare Officers' Living Experience in FELDA Schemes, Kuala Lumpur, 196 7.

20

over the pay and being paid piece rates wanting "easy work with high . rates of payment".52 In looking at these contrasting pictures of UluJempol in 1967 and 1975 a number of explanations for this disparity come to mind. Clearly a major problem in the early stages of any settlement -- whether integrated or not -- is the general problem of the settler's adaptability. As a 1967 report notes, a whole change of lifestyle is involved for these FELDA settlers moving into the hew settlement from different areas across Malaysia. The process of moving into a FELDA sheme involves both a marked physical change of environment as well as a soCial and occupational change. In the kampung the settler, for instance, would have had his house, the fruit trees and vegetables usually found throughout rural Malaysia, and all the resources of the village, both material and social, to fall back on. In a new FELDAschemehelacks all these except the bare house and will particularly miss the support services of his compound and his friends. Then, there is the major social change involved. Before he moved, the settler would have been used to living and dealing with people from his own kampung, but here in UluJempol he was faced with people from across Malaysia and cons.~quently had to make an adjustment in his social life and attitudes. At the same time, instead of the previous personal type of relationships with his village leader, he had now had to deal with the impersonal relationship with the FELDA management. Thus it is not surprising that the Social Welfare team's report brings out directly and indirectly the problems of the initial adjustment required by new settlers and the change that a FELDA scheme imposes on a settler. In Ulu J em pol different people from different states had to interact and live with each other and, as a result, friction arose, the scheme broke into factions, and no clear leadership initially emerged. Work schedules and methods of payment were not understood and resented, and the scheme was devoid of social activities. At the same time the settlers, still tradition bound, were unable to understand and utilize health facilities, could not understand the need for a balanced diet and their children were often absent from school on the slightest of causes. 53 But, in looking at the ch_ange in the eight years between 1967 and 19 78, it is clear that the settlers had not only adjusted to their new conditions but, by 197 5, had learned to fully utilize them. In this, the existence of a wide range of integrated facilities clearly helped to stimulate rapid development. At the same time, the FELDA

52

Ibid .. pp. 22-23.

53

The bidan (traditional midwife) reported that the settlers were "quite receptive" to modem treatment and did not return to the kampung bidan when they were ill. But the Ministry of Health nurse found little co-operation and said that "they did not understand" diet or malnutrition (the major causes of illness). The scheme had one bomoh (traditional medicine man) who provided "emergency" treatment to patients waiting to go to hospital.

21

management and staff also played a key role. With a FELDA staff of some fifteen to twenty living in a scheme, these officials are immediately available to help in every aspect of scheme life. Thus we find FELDA officials working with the settlers on their plots and the FELDA's social development officers helping the settlers and their families to utilize the full range of facilities available on the scheme. Consequently the existence of facilities, services and trained leadership seem to be the key components in the rapid change that took place in l.nujempol between 1967 and 1975.

Summary In looking at the Malaysian experience with land settlement, some distinctive features stand out. First, Malaysia has managed to evolve and successfully apply a fully integrated model for land scheme development in the FELDA model. These would seem to show that in Malaysia it has been possible to take a large, mixed group of individuals, move them into new, undeveloped and usually isolated parts of the country and tum these settlements into progressive and economically viable new communities. It should be noted that much of this success has been due to the existence of two strong supporting features in Malaysia -- one being the very strong political backing that FELDA has had since its inception in 1957 and, secondly, the availability of almost unlimited financing for its work. Secondly, the general failure of the nonintegrated models in Malaysia seems to indicate that-- as FELDA found out itself when it tried to use a nonintegrated approach in its early years-- the clearing of the jungle, the building of the houses and the planting of the crop demand far too much of an individual settler. At the same time, the lack of adequate scheme extension services, including experienced staff to help organize the settlers particularly in the early stages, is also clearly a critical factor in the development of a scheme.

Ill: LAND SETTLEMENTS IN INDONESIA

Background When the Indonesian experience with land settlement is next examined, one is immediately struck by some marked differences and yet many basic similarities to the

22

Malaysian experience. One basic similarity, for instance, is that Indonesia has generally tried to utilize an integrated model throughout its land settlement efforts, starting with the first schemes opened up in 1905. But di~ferences also exist, due to the major disparities between the two countries in size, stages of development and policy aims. When the two countries are examined, the marked contrast in their physical size, land use, population and degree of economic development becomes very evident. If Malaysia can be seen as a relatively small and concentrated country, the size and disparity of Indonesia ·· with its land area of some 2 million square hectares, 13,667 islands, 300 ethnic groups and a population of 124.1 million (1971) ·· inevitably create a very different range of problems. 5 4 At the same time, the population movement under the Indonesian transmigration programme to undeveloped areas for land settlement has been much larger, totalling an estimated 790,45655 between 1905 and 1974 and with plans under Repelita II (1974-79) to move 1.5 million people from Java to the outer islands and, in the long term, of moving some 20% of the population (or 8.5 million people) from the densely overcrowded central island of Java over the next 30 years. And although these figures are staggering in their magnitude and already have been revised for the recent Repelita II period (from 1.5 million to 0.52 million), transmigration is seen by the Indonesian Government as a major mechanism to move people, both to reduce the serious problem of overcrowding in Java and also to meet a variety of other aims, of which the regional development of the outer islands is now the most important. 56

The Transmigration Programme The Indonesian transmigration programmeS 7 can be divided into two distinct periods and within these a number of different stages of development. In the first 54

. For these figures, see Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 1975 Uakarta: Central Office of Statistics), pp. 3 and 108.

55

See, for this estimate, Ga,yin W. Jones, "Recent Development and Transmigration Programme," in Robert J . Pryor (ed.), Migration and Developm ent in Sou th East Asia: A Demographic Perspective, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

56

Historically in Dutch times and in the Indonesia programme until the mid-nineteen sixties, the aim of transmigration was to relieve population pressure. However, although this rationale often comes up today ( 197 7) in Indonesia and is inherent in the recent Indonesian Government commitment to try and maximize large scale movement, the emphasis since the late 1960s has been on the interlinking of transmigration with regional development of the outer islands. For a summary of aim~ tocl:ty, see Law No . ?.Q, 1960 (Chapter II, oara 2) quoted in McNicholl, op. cit., p. 65; First Five Year Development Plan (Repelita I) 1969/70-1973/74, op.cit., Vol. 2C, pp. 113-114; Second Five Year Development Plan (Repelita II) 1974/75-1978/79, Vol. 2, pp. 117-118.

57

The term "transmigration programme" usually refers to the post-Independence Indonesian programme from 1950 onwards and is distinct from the colonization programme (1905-41) under the Dutch. The term is used here for convenience to cover both programmes and thus covers the total period 1905-77.

23

period we have the colonization programme first starting in 1905 with a total movement of 155 families to Sumatra. This movement was to continue for the next thirty-six years until the Second World War brought the termination of the initial policy in 1941. After Independence, Indonesia started its own national transmigration programme in 1950. Although this has seen periods of considerable unevenness in its implementation, it has continued to move people throughout the whole period with its importance as a national programme recognized particularly today as it is seen as a significant component of both Indonesia's present and projected plans. 58 In the first colonization period ( 1905-41) we have four stages of development. 59 The first comprised the small scale early attempts starting in 1905 when the Dutch authorities first initiated the programme and lasting until 1911 with a total of 6,500 persons being moved. In the second stage, from 1911 to 1922, we have a change in policy with greater organizational inputs by the Dutch authorities including a credit bank and an increase in the total number of transmigrants to 17,000 persons. Then from 1922 to 1931, the Dutch colonial authorities' interest in the programme declined, due to the general attempts to cut back government expenditure and due to its lack of success with its credit services. However, the demand for plantation labour --labour that transmigration could provide-- led to renewed interest. Thus from 1932 we see the introduction of the bawon system60 and consequently a rapid increase in movement with a total of 162,600 transmigrants being settled until the Second World War hal ted the programme in 1941. In total, the Dutch period saw some 190,000 persons moved from Java to the outer islands in the 1905-41 period (Table 1 ). Within this period, there are two distinct features that are of marked interest as we study present problems. One is the Dutch authorities' early attempts to provide extension services, such as credit services, that eventually failed but are significant for the designing of similar inputs today. Secondly, there was throughout the period the attempts to use an "integrated" model of settlement, including the provision of land, housing, tools, seeds, and other facilities. Thus, for instance, when we look at the Dutch 58

See Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, The First Five Year Development Plan (Repelita I) (1969/70-1973/74} and Second Five Year Development Plan (Repelita II) (1974/751978/79) .

59

For a detailed description of the Dutch colonization programme, seeK. Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement in the Asitltic Tropics (New York: American Geographical Society, 1948}, pp. 192-231. Figures and dates quoted in thiaaection are taken from Pelzer, unless otherwise stated.

60

The bawon system is the traditional J avaneae system of employing labourers in return for a &1-.are of the crop. f..s utilized by the Dutch, the new settlers were brougi1t in to help existing migrants juat before the harvest in return for accommodation, food and part of the harvest. This stimulated greater flows of transmigrant• and cut the cost for the government. See Pelzer, ibid., p. 203.

24

colonial reports for the period 1907-11 of Heyring and his successors, we see that the colonial officers saw themselves as "social engineers", who were actively involved with helping the Javanese in these first resettlements to adapt to their new conditions. 61 They recommended for instance that a whole range of prerequisites was necessary for the successful development of these schemes ranging from the careful selection of the settlers who must be strong and have an agricultural background to the making of careful surveys of the sites;62 the provision of adequate health services; the establishment of the first colonies near existing villages so that they can provide a market and possible additional employment in the early years for the settlers; and finally the opening up of enough space for future inflows of migrants as well as providing specialized irrigation advice that was regarded to be vital to the success of the colonies. 63 These early recommendations were later to be condensed into Maassen's famous "ten commandments of the colonists" resulting from the Commission set up by the Dutch Government in 193 7 to investigate ways of stimulating more migration. 64 During the first six years of the colonization programme, the Dutch paid a premium and the cost of transportation to the migrant, and provided a house or the cost of building materials and living expenses for the first two years until the settlers cleared their land and built their houses. ·Unlike in Malaysia, these were outright subsidies until a change of policy in 1911 when the government decided to continue with free transportation and an initial cash payment, but to provide a loan for the rest from a specially created People's Credit Bank. Once the land was under cultivation the settlers were allowed to borrow additional money to buy livestock, seeds, tools, and for home improvements. With Independence, Indonesia started what is termed the "national" programme of transmigration. This began in 1950 when some seventy-seven people were moved and again distinct stages of development can be seen. In the initial period from 1950 to 1965 there was a rapid build up in the annual total of transmigrants to around 27,000 persons a year (see Table 3). Then, with the attempted coup of 1965 and its aftermath, there 61

H.G. Heyring was the Assistant President authorized by the Dutch Government in 1902 to investigate possibilities of the question of Javanese migrating to the outer islands and, after a three-month visit to Sumatra in 1903, he submitted his report in December 1903, on which the Dutch colonization programmes were based.

62

See, for a summary of the recommendations of the Dutch annual reports from 1907-11 , Pelzer, op.cit., pp. 120-121.

63

Good irrigation was seen as essential to these schemes' success and thus particular emphasis was laid on providing irrigation specialists and also choosing the area that could provide adequate irrigation.

64

For a list of Maassen's suggestions as well as very similar criteria for Malaysia and Indonesia today, see Appendix B.

25

Participants in the Indonesian Transmigration Programme, 1905-74

Table 3:

The Colonial Programme,! 1905-41

Period

Numbers

1905-11 1912-22 1923-31 1932-41

6,500 116,838 c. 4,000 162,600

Total moved 1905-41:

Annual Average 860 1,531 440 16,260

Phase of Official Programme Experimental Financed by bank loan Financed by bank loan Large scale bawon system

189,938

Tne Indonesian National Programme,2 1950-75

Period

Number

Average

1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-69 1970-74

111,595 134,371 141,844 27,712 182,404

22,319 26,874 28,369 6,928 36,481

Total moved 1905-41 1950-74 Total

189,938 597,926 787,864

Source: 1 McNichoU {1968: 2) 2 Departemen Tenaga Kerja, Tranamigraai dan Koperaai, Direktorat J endral Tranamigrasi [Department of Manpower, Tranamigration and Cooperativea, Directorate General of Tranamigration], Realisasi Penempatan Transmigrasi Kolonisasi {1905) sampai Repelita I {1969/70 s/d 1973/74) [The Reaulta of the Transmigration Settlement from Colonial Timea (1905) to Repelita I (1969/70-1973/74)) ,jakarta, 1975.

26

was a considerable drop in numbers and the programme suffered from the internal dislocation and the overall ineffectiveness of government in the 1966-69 period. However, from 1970, there has been a steady growth with as many as 72,018 people moving in 1973. Plans for the new Third Five Year National Plan period (Repelita III) for 1979-84, are ambitious, aimed at moving some 500,000 people a year. 65 In terms of overall figures, the official government transmigration programme has moved some 790,000 people with at least the same number moving independently and not being officially recorded, giving an overall total today of around two million people. 6 6 Throughout the whole period, there have been wide gaps between the targets set at various times for the programme and the actual numbers moved -- a disparity due to overenthusiasm as well as political and administrative problems. The programme has had two principal aims. From the earliest days of colonization to the present day, the main objective has been population redistribution. This until the rnid-1960s was seen principally as decreasing the population pressure in the overcrowded central island of Java. Then in the mid-1960s, we find a shift in emphasis with transmigration being seen as a means for the redistribution of human resources to aid the development of the outer islands. Additional benefits of the programme often referred to include the raising of living standards, the increase in national agricultural production, national security and national integration. Transmigration in Indonesia is administratively organized with a central government level Directorate General of Transmigration and Cooperatives 6 7 down through various levels of government to the subdistrict (Kecamatan) levels. Thus transmigration officers can be found at all levels of the government structure throughout Indonesia and also in the resettlement areas, which have each a local office as well as officials placed in the individual transmigration villages. 68 This has proved in practice an unwieldly administrative setup, and to try to overcome what were clear administrative

65

Quoted inAntara, 15 February 1977, p. 5. Estimates such as these are usually inflated in Indonesia and are inevitably scaled down during actual implementation.

66

For an analysis of this total flow, see Colin MacAndrews, "Transmigration in Indonesia: Problems and Prospects," inAsian Survey, Vol.18, No.5, May 1978.

67

This was set up under the Basic Transmigration Act 1972 and with its functions further defined by the Regulations for the Implementation of Transmigration (no. 42 of 1973), Jakarta.

68

In a new transmigration area composed today of 10 units (villages) of 500 families, there is a local transmigration office with a transmigration officer (Kepala Unit Transmigrasi) in charge of each project village until it is handed over to the local administration after some 7 to 10 years.

27

conflicts between various agencies involved in the overall programme an interdepartmental co-ordinating committee, the Badan Pengembangan Pembangunan Daerah Transmigrasi (BPPDT) 69 was introduced in 1977 at the central, provincial and district levels to strengthen the programme's administrative process. It is useful, in examining the Indonesian transmigration programme, to distinguish between the various categories of transmigrants. Although there have been considerable variations over the years, 7 0 these fall today into two main types of government-sponsored transmigrants distinguished by the amount of aid given to them by the government. The first are the "general" transmigrants who are fully supported from the time of despatch from Java through the initial settlement period until the village is finally handed over to the local marga. 71 The second type are known as spontan or spontaneous transmigrants who move entirely of their own accord but, who can, on arrival in an outer island settle on a government project.12 Apart from these government types of fully or partially supported migrants, there are also a large and uncharted flow of spontaneous migrants who move individually and settle independently either on empty land or land they rent from the local marga. This is a large scale and important type of movement representing perhaps an equal number to the total number moved under the government programme.

A quick overview of where the transmigrants in Indonesia have been sent since the programme first began in 1905 shows that, in the colonization period ( 1905-40), the predominant area was Sumatra. This pattern continued in the 1951-68/89 period with the continued dominance of Sumatra where 83.4% of all government-sponsored transmigrants were sent. However, in the first Five Year National Plan (Repelita I) (1969/70-73/74) period there was a marked change in line with the new focus of transmigration being directly linked with regional development. Consequently, there was a decrease in the number of transmigrants to Sumatra and a marked increase to the

69

The BPPDT was set up by Presidential Decree No. 29, 1974, but was only activated in 1976/77. See Antara, 17 July 1977, p. 7.

70

See, for a good summary of the variations in title and also for the present qualifications for joining the programme, jones, op.cit., p. 1, footnote 1. Other groups of transmigrants today apart from these two main categories include those moved under ABRI (armed forces programme) and due to natural disasters.

71

Marga refers to an area of land occupied by a group of people under traditional law.

72

This group, depending on the year, varied between 50% and 10% of the fully supported .;c vemmcnt transmigrants in the 1969/70-73/74 period. See Statistical vear Book 1975, op.cit., p. 119, Table IV. I. 7.

28 outer islands. 73 This pattern has continued in the Second Five Year Plan period {Repelita II), and an even distribution between the three areas is now envisaged. A final aspect in this short overview of the programme is its costs. Overall, the Indonesian transmigration programme has been a low funded operation having direct funding of only US$193,236 in 1969/70 rising to US$3.6 million in 1975/76.74 The cost of moving a fully subsidized migrant family (usually numbering five persons) including transport, land, housing materials, tools, seeds and initial food supplies in 1977 was US$1,200. The infrastructure costs have depended on the location of the various projects. Those opened up adjacent to older transmigration villages particularly in Sumatra have been able to utilize existing infrastructure facilities while those opened up in the more isolated areas, particularly in Sulawesi and Kalimantan, need greater and thus more expensive input of facilities. A recent fully serviced project, for instance, opened up for disaster victims cost an estimated US$4,200 a settler owing to the high infrastructure costs. 7 5

Case Studies -- Indonesia Introduction. Before looking at case studies of land settlements in Indonesia, three points should be emphasized. The first is that, although there are similarities in the approach to land settlement in Indonesia and Malaysia in that both countries use integrated schemes, the factors of distance and isolation are much greater in Indonesia than in Malaysia and thus the integrated services are usually slow in being provided. Secondly, while in the case of Malaysia we have a highly centralized government structure in which the main beneficiary of the land settlement, the rural Malay, has certain clear expectations of services from the government, this special relationship does not exist in Indonesia and consequently the Indonesian settler has far fewer expectations of the government's programme than his counterpart in Malaysia. A third factor is the relative importance placed on the policy by the two governments. In Malaysia, land schemes have played a prominent role in the country's overall rural

73

In the colonization period 79.6% went to Sumatra, 18.1% to Sulawesi and 2.3% to Kalimantan. This pattern continued in the 1951-69 period but with the focus on regional development in Repelita I (1969/70-73/74) there was a more even distribution with 58.4% going to Sumatra, 22.3% to Sulawesi, and 17.0% to Kalimantan. See jones, op.cit., pp. 3 and 4, Tables 1 and 2.

74

See G. Beddoes, Report on Transmigration Budgetary and Accounting rrocedures Oakarta: Department of Transmigration, 1976).

75

See Suratnam and Patrick Guiness, "The Changing Focus of Transmigration," in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 2,July 1977, p. 89, footnote 18.

29

development policy and have taken on greater significance as a national planning mechanism to meet specific political and economic goals as they -- particularly in the case of the extensive FELDA schemes-- have proved increasingly effective. This kind of integrated planning and utilization of land schemes as a major policy mechanism does not exist in Indonesia. Thus the Indonesian transmigration programme is a visble but not a particularly important programme in Indonesia's overall rural development policy. Consequently any direct comparison between the policies and their effects in the two countries must take these factors into account. In examining the case studies which follow, the same criteria as that applied in the Malaysian case to evaluate levels of development on these schemes are used, namely those of economic well being and development, organizational participation including the degree that the settlers have been able to take over the running of the schemes, and attitudinal change. The Belitang Area. 7 6 The Belitang area in South Sumatra offers a particularly interesting area for the analysis of the transmigration and settlement in Indonesia by 19 7 7 it had seen forty years of settlement starting with the first village being opened up in 193 7 and with settlement continuing to the present day. Throughout this period integrated services have been provided to the schemes initially by the Dutch authorities in colonization times and then after 19 50 under the Indonesian national transmigration programme. However, in common with many such settlements throughout Indonesia, these services have varied in the degree and timing that they have actually been implemented. Scheduled to be built in from the start of a project, they are usually delayed and we find that there is much greater need for initiative on the part of the settlers here than in Malaysia to make these settlements viable. Altogether the Belitang area by 1977 had over 100,000 transmigrants settled in forty settlements, but for the purpose of this analysis 2 villages are taken, opened up in different years in the 21 year period from 1953 to 1974. The first, Sukanegara, was opened in 1953 when the Indonesian national programme had just started, while the second Hcujomulyo (1974) is an example of one of the present day schemes having been opened only three years at the time of the research. Two other points are of particular interest in the analysis of these two villages. One is that the time period and design of the research allowed an examination of up to three generations of settlers in

76

Research was carried out by the author in Belitang between J Wle and November 19 7 7 as a member of a joint team from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, and the University of Sriwijaya, Palembang. This included a socio-economic survey, a series of indepth village reports and life histories of selected transmigrants over a forty-year period. The study is reported in the Belitang Reports Nos. 1 to 8, Institute for Rural and Regional Studies, University of Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 197 8.

30

Sukanegara village 7 7 and that in both villages we have transmigrants who have moved entirely of their own accord and are living outside the village area. 78 A. Sukanegara {1953 ). This transmigration village was opened in 1953 with the majority of the settlers (totalling 386 in 1977) coming fromjava. They had been attracted mainly (89%) by the promise of more land and although they in fact never received the full allocation of 2 hectares, 7 9 they had in 1977 an average of 1.6 7 hectares of land from the government. Conditions in Sukanegara, as in many similar villages in the early years, were difficult as the land on arrival was unopened, and the supplies of tools slow in being distributed. Thus in the initial phases of settlement the transmigrants had to clear the forest, build their own houses, and it was clear from our research that life was generally difficult with a high incidence of illness and some deaths. However, once that initial phase passed --a period of about 18 months-- the transmigrants began to settle in and adapt. (It should be noted that this settlement occurred at a difficult period in Indonesian history being opened up three years after Independence and when the transmigration service itself was stm becoming effectively organized.) The village developed rapidly and was handed over by the transmigration authorities to the administration of the local marga after only seven years. When we look at the signs of development in this particular village and also in Hatjomulyo (the later 1974 village) it is clear that in comparison to the Malaysian FELDA type of settlement the transmigrants in these Indonesian villages live in a far less structured and more independent situation, depending to a far greater extent on their own hard work and initiative to succeed. 1n these Indonesian settlements, for instance, there is no loan repayment involved that necessitated strict accounting of the settlers' income or the close supervision of their work that is characteristic of FELDA schemes. Again, while government services exist and where possible are extended to the settlers, they are not part of the highly organized approach that we find in FELDA. One consequence of this type of organization is that one docs not find the same level of statistical data to measure development that exists in a FELDA scheme although, as one looks at these two villages, there are clear signs that development has occurred. In terms of economic indicators, the survey showed that the Sukanegara transmigrants were better off than they had been in Java. 80 Their harvests were better 71

These three generations of government-assisted transmigrants are occasionally referred to as Gl (f1rst generation), G2 (second generation) and G3 (third generation).

78

These are referred to as "spontaneous" transmigrants.

79

1 hectare = 2.90 acres.

80

See Belitang Seminar Report No. 2, Socio-Economic Survey, Institute for Rural and Regional Studies and the Faculty of Agriculture, Sriwijaya University, Palembang, 31 March 19 78.

31

with higher yields; they had bigger and better houses, savings to fall back on to utilize for business enterprises and other purposes, and had in many cases been able to return to Java, having saved enough in the new area to finance such trips. Some figures from the socio-economic survey substantiate these general patterns. The average a11nual income for instance from farming in Sukanegara was 52,238 rupiahs with an additional side income of some 100,000 rupiahs giving the individual settler a total of about twice what he had earned injava,81 the houses were larger (5.4 m x 7.6 m injava, 9.8 m x 9.2 min Sumatra), and that, when asked where they would raise money for business activities, 75% said they could by selling possessions. 82 Their eating patterns had also changed, reflecting the better conditions in the new settlement in comparison to Java. In Java, for instance, the majority ( 77%) had eaten only once a day but in Sukanegara they are now eating thrice a day. At the same time, while the availability of rice as a staple food was lower than in Java, it was high in comparison to other later transmigrant villages where transmigrants must usually subsist on substitute foods for a number of years indicating slower development. 83 In terms of organizations, there were a large number of activities in Sukanegara reflecting the development of the village. There was a farmer's club, a sport's club and other similar organizations. Gotong royong was frequently practised and it was interesting that the transmigrants had a widespread awareness of, and were using, the Indonesian Government's agricultural extension services such as BUUD (Badan Urusan Unit Desa or the Unit for Village Activity), BIMAS (Bimbingan Massa or Mass Guidance) and KUD (Kooperasi Unit Desa or Village Cooperative Unit) --all introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Finally in terms of adaptability and attitudinal responses, the survey provided some interesting results. Unlike later and newer villages, the settlers in Sukanegara had high aspirations for their children with some 75% aspiring for them to become civil servants and only 12% wanting them to remain as farmers. 84 Of particular note in Sukanegara was the close relationship of the second generation transmigrants with the local indigenous people in the area. Within this group, 18% had married local people and not surprisingly 40% of the group favoured the learning 81

This is by the settler's own estimate. There are no reliable national figures for

comparison.

82

It would not be unusual for a villager to save money by investing in household possessions (such as a radio) which could be sold when necessary. The significance of this level of possessions is underlined by the fact that in the nearest village, Harjomulyo (1974), the villagers reported that, as they had "nothing to sell", they would have to use "savings" for investing in business enterprises.

83

Sec Heli'