Labor Politics American Style: The California State Federation of Labor [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674335646, 9780674335622

Citation preview

Labor Politics American Style

Wertheim Publications in Industrial Relations Established in 1923 by the family of the late Jacob Wertheim "for the support of original research in the field of industrial cooperation . . James J. Healy

Derek C. Bok

E. R. Livernash

John T. Dunlop,

George C. Homans

Chairman

Labor Politics American Style: The California State Federation of Labor Philip Taft Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968

© 1968 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 68-15644 Printed in the United States of America

Foreword

Professor Taft tells us, "Over time, the federations, as well as local central unions, are likely to become more influential within the labor movement." He foresees this development as a consequence of the growing role of legislation, administrative decisions, and political developments at local and state levels in affecting the welfare of workers as well as the expansion of union membership among government employees. If Professor Taft's prognosis is valid, and it would be hard to fault, then more studies of these federations within the labor movement are long overdue. It is particularly appropriate that Professor Taft's volume should provide an account of the California federation, one of the most active and effective over many years. It was essential that the studies in Labor-Management History, in this Wertheim series, include a volume devoted to one of these federations. Ideally, we should have detailed studies of a sufficient number of state federations and city bodies so that it would be possible to assess the influence of a variety of factors upon their operations and performance: the industry and labor organization mix within the federation, the cohesiveness of labor, the level of economic development of the area, the attitudes of the established political parties and local leaders toward labor, the factionalism within the parties, and the like. A comparative and analytical study, building upon a number of more descriptive and historical accounts of particular federations, would enhance our understanding of the labor movement in neglected sectors. The leadership of a federation is a different process, and it requires somewhat different talents from those needed by the leadership of a local or an international union. The leader of a federation typically seeks the support and cooperation of officers of constituent unions who more directly control the policies of their own organizations, cer-

vi

Foreword

tainly in "foreign policy" toward a federation. T h e federation leader typically seeks a viable compromise on a few matters among relative equals. He has little, if any, authority to direct or to compel, and withdrawal or nonparticipation or even pursuit of a contrary position by a constituent union is relatively easy. In federations, influence and capacity to persuade are often more important than formal authority. The federation level of labor organization deserves more study — in part, because it is likely to be the arena of a good deal of interaction in this country between the labor movement and the community. T h e federations have a contribution to make in the further socialization of trade unions, in the sense of making them more sensitive and responsive to the larger community. In the absence of a labor party to serve, in a sense as a curb, and to discipline the occupational interests of unions, the federations at all levels in the United States may be expected to take on some of these functions. The pursuit of common legislative objectives in a community by a federation may result in effective pressures on some unions in the area to modify some practices and policies. This history of the California State Federation of Labor affords Professor Taft, the outstanding historian of the American labor movement, an opportunity to formulate his views on the relations of labor organizations to politics. T h e main title, Labor Politics American Style, reflects this theme. March 1968

John T . Dunlop

Author's Preface

This study was undertaken during a semester I spent at the Institute of Industrial Relations at the University of California, in Berkeley. T h e project was suggested by Dr. Arthur Ross and Dr. Margaret Gordon, the director and associate director of the institute. A number of colleagues and friends have provided criticism and assistance. May I thank Dr. J. C. Schneider and Marie-Ann Seaburg for their suggestions and editorial aid; Dr. John Hutchinson for spending considerable time in obtaining materials on the subject and introducing me to leaders of the California labor movement. Among others, Don Vial and Joan London were kind enough to read a version of the manuscript and suggested a number of improvements and corrections. Paul and the late Mrs. Scharrenberg generously made available a number of scarce documents. The late Mary Gallagher spent several evenings explaining phases of the Mooney case. My greatest debt is to C. J. (Neil) Haggerty, former secretarytreasurer of the California Federation of Labor and the California Labor Federation, and his successor, Thomas L. Pitts, both of whom gave me unrestricted access to their files and allowed me to quote from Scharrenberg's letters. I am also grateful to Mr. and Mrs. George Johns for allowing me to examine documents in the archives of the San Francisco Labor Council. Francis Gates, a knowledgeable student of the Mooney case, discussed the issues involved and allowed me to examine some material. Thanks are due to the Bancroft Library for permission to quote from the letters of Governor Hiram Johnson and Thomas J. Mooney and for the use of other documentary material. Ann Rand of the library of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, at San Francisco, allowed me the use of information on the California labor movement. As in the past, the collective bargaining librarian of the Littauer

viii

Author's Preface

Center in Harvard University, Clare Brown, was helpful. I am glad to acknowledge the continuing help of Margaret Bricket and her staff at the library of the United States Department of Labor in Washington, and of Helen Kurtz and Eva Frankfort of the Rockefeller Library at Brown University. Marion Anthony, Dorothy Heselwood and Sally Deslauriers typed the manuscript. Professor Philip Ross read the manuscript at several stages and offered helpful advice. It is a pleasure to thank all of them. I also wish to thank the Ford Foundation for its financial support of the research. Finally, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Professor John T. Dunlop without whose encouragement and suggestions the manuscript would not have been finished. As always, I have found him an exemplary colleague, patient and helpful and unsparing of his energies. Philip Taft Providence, Rhode Island January 1968

Contents

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Introduction Beginnings Migratory Workers Advances and Retreats The Open Shop and the Mooney Case World War I and Postwar Unemployment, the San Francisco General Strike, and Its Aftermath Effects and Influence of the CIO Tasks and Problems: Depression and World War II In Search of a Wartime Truce Legislative Gains and Losses Minority Groups and Civil Rights General and Limited Strikes Internal Differences Expanding Political Action Policies in Times of National Crisis Right to Work Summing Up Notes Index

1 11 34 41 57 75 87 111 127 141 157 166 189 198 206 217 232 247 256 281

Labor Politics American Style

Introduction

The history of the California State Federation of Labor is, of course, a chronicle of the growth and activities of a specific organization — with its own particular kinds of problems, its own particular cast of characters, and its own specific relationship to California labor history. But there is a wider framework which cannot be ignored: the federation is embedded inextricably in the events of the twentieth century; it cannot be understood unless it is seen within the broader framework of modern American history generally, with special reference to the growth structure and function of the labor movement in the United States. Unions and their members in other states had established these institutions, beginning with the formation of the New York State Trades Assembly in 1865. New Jersey and Massachusetts followed in 1879, and Illinois in 1884. Their number increased through the 1890's, and many other states joined at the turn of the century when California was added to the list. The establishment of a federation was stimulated in some states — New York, for example — by the threat of antilabor legislation, and in others by recognition of the need to strengthen the political force exerted by labor. In California, leadership was assumed by the San Francisco Labor Council, which represented the majority of unionists in the state. For the first two decades, the California labor movement was dominated by the unions in the area of San Francisco — the industrial center of the state where the labor movement reflected its industrial and geographical characteristics. Isolated from the international unions and the American Federation of Labor, the San Francisco labor movement, although divided by ambition and rivalry among its leaders, was independent and militant. Employers in the city showed the same freedom from restraint and were equally aggressive.

2

California State Federation of Labor

At the turn of the century, the California economy was tied up in agriculture, mining, lumbering and shipping. California, in 1900, contributed only 2 per cent to the country's manufacturing production. About four fifths of the state's manufacturing was located in the Bay area and produced mainly for the local and regional markets. Flour and lumber mills, food processing, apparel, textile, and the metal trades — mostly foundries, machine shops, and nonferrous metals — provided 22 per cent of the over 72,000 jobs in manufacturing. Heavy industry was unimportant. T h e insulation of the state against the direct flow of European immigrants made it a comparatively high-wage area, and Chinese restriction limited potential competition. T h e seafaring unions contributed a number of outstanding leaders, several of whom became closely affiliated with the state federation. The need for legal protection was generally recognized, and there was no division among unions on this issue, even when they did not — like the building trades organizations — support the new venture. Tolerance for heterodox views veiled the essentially conservative outlook of the majority of unions. In an important sense, the California State Federation was a prototype of all state federations. Its leaders through the years faced and solved problems similar to those of other labor organizations and other labor leaders. Some issues have been peculiar to this state — such as those involving Oriental and Mexican workers; some have been significant nationally — such as right-to-work, war mobilization, unemployment, or fair employment. The two world wars, the great depression, and the Korean W a r all presented new problems, created new controversies, and shaped the face of labor history. The kinds of resolutions made at the annual federation conventions, for example, present an interesting capsule view of what was going on in America and in the world in any particular period of time; the attitudes of federation leaders toward such problems as radicalism and one of its variants — communism — immigration, public education, racial minorities, and a host of other issues are interesting in themselves, but also mirror public opinion of other Americans on such subjects. The growth of the federation itself through the years — along with some rather dry statistics as to its size and its financial condition — illustrates the growing power of labor, and the growing

Introduction

3

appeal of unions and central labor groups to the long-exploited workers of California and the United States. But the California State Federation of Labor was like state federations elsewhere, the political arm of the workers of the state; a special kind of American grass-roots institution, a kind not found anywhere else in the world. It was a voluntary organization which unions and central bodies directly chartered by the American Federation of Labor or indirectly chartered through their national or international bodies were eligible to join. The state federation could exercise little pressure upon local unions. A few internationals required their locals to belong to their respective state federations, but such requirements were seldom if ever enforced. The state federation had no power over its affiliates — it could neither discipline nor reward, and it did not administer or supervise collective agreements. Moreover, the California State Federation of Labor throughout much of its history operated with strikingly small sums of money. Per capita at the time the federation was organized was set at one cent per member per month, and, in the 1950's, it was four cents. Of course, the federation could, on occasion, raise funds for special purposes, but this was unusual, and not until the 1940's did it have fairly large amounts of money at its disposal. Its regular annual income in the early decades seldom exceeded $5000 and was frequently below this amount. Not until 1936 did it go beyond $15,000. Through most of its history it operated on a very small budget. Yet, from its beginning in 1901, it served the organized and unorganized workers of the state, and sought to gain concessions and protection not only for special groups in the labor force but for all the workers. The California State Federation of Labor, like its counterparts in other states, carried on a variety of tasks. At the beginning it concentrated most of its efforts on lobbying for or against legislation. This has remained its primary duty (and that of all state labor bodies). Defense of labor and welfare legislation before the courts and administrative agencies has been another early and permanent duty. From the beginning, endorsements of candidates were based upon their behavior in the legislative halls of the state capitol, or on their commitments and promises. Organizing was attempted, but it never became, because of limited funds and staff, a major assignment. With the expansion of the

4

California State Federation of Labor

labor movement and the growing importance of government, the state federations have enlarged their mission. They scrutinize a greater volume of bills, and are a major agency for handling complaints by union members against inequitable administration of laws directly affecting workers of the state. In addition, the state federations are more active in mobilizing support for endorsed candidates, in registration drives, circulating campaign literature, and providing other forms of political assistance. All leaders of California labor have not always accepted the endorsements made by the political conferences and conventions of the state federation, and, on occasion, rival committees have been active in California campaigns. Nevertheless, candidates and leaders of political parties have regarded endorsements by the federation as a boon, even though it might not be sufficient to rally all labor or even all unionists behind the endorsee. Its existence explains more about American labor political behavior than the debates on independent political action and pressure politics which were a staple of the early AFL conventions. In fact, it would have made little difference in the political tactics pursued if the Socialist resolutions on the floor of the American Federation of Labor conventions had been endorsed instead of defeated. Nor have the international unions had much influence in shaping the political programs and policies of their locals. Local unions, especially in California, where control by the international was never too firm, could engage in any kind of political activity they believed would advance their interests. The leaders of the AFL seldom tried directly to steer the political actvities of the central bodies they chartered. While not enthusiastic about the occasional attempts of local unions and central labor bodies to launch labor parties, the most drastic step normally taken against such ventures was persuasion; such activities were not placed under the ban, and the Indiana Federation of Labor and the Chicago Federation of Labor both sponsored labor parties in the 1920's. The decision on political tactics was always made at the local level, and maximum freedom existed for local organizations to follow the policy their leaders believed would serve the interests of the movement and its members. Like the AFL, the international unions normally followed a "hands off" policy in political matters. In fact, the heads of internationals were not usually acquainted with local conditions and were not much concerned

Introduction

5

as long as the political policies of a chartered local did not create difficulties among its members. This does not mean that support of an extreme party would have been accepted, but the Socialist and Labor parties were not so regarded. Therefore, debates over ideology or forming a third party, usually subjects eloquently discussed at AFL conventions, were largely absent in the political discussions of the California State Federation of Labor. The behavior of workers and their organizations at the grass roots in their communities is a much better key to understanding American labor politics than the forensic efforts of Gompers and his coworkers or of his ideological opponents. It cannot be overstressed that the decisions of the AFL and even the international unions on the kind of political policies the workers of the United States should follow were not significant in shaping the decisions of the labor organizations in their own "backyards." The California State Federation of Labor became the political arm of the workers of the state not because of any ideological commitments or because of the opposition to an independent political program on principle, but because the tactics used were the only ones that could gain results. The failure of European and American writers to recognize the significance of the state federation of labor as a political institution is perhaps the chief reason for their inability to understand American labor's political behavior. Proponents of an independent labor party have customarily regarded the failure of American organized workers to embrace such a cause as a sign of the social backwardness of the leadership. But American organized labor has been very active in politics since its beginnings. It has been forced to direct its efforts for reform to the legislature. The California State Federation of Labor and its sister federations concentrated their political efforts in the state capitols, where they were largely successful. The codes of labor and welfare legislation on the statute books of the state governments are largely, if not wholly, attributable to the persistent efforts of the state federations of labor. The method gained results from the beginning and was effective despite the numerical weaknesses of organized labor. The founders and continuators of the federation did not concern themselves with the ultimate purposes of labor politics. They were not interested in promoting programs designed to reorganize society. Most of the heads of the state federations were "home-grown" lead-

6

California State Federation of Labor

ers who played little if any role on the national labor scene. The California State Federation was created by organized workers, largely in the Bay area. The federation was set up without the order or guidance of the national leaders of organized labor, and the same was true in virtually every other state. American political conditions, such as the absence of feudalism and the existence of a right to the franchise created the basis for the political policies and practices of organized labor, but in themselves they did not determine or even greatly influence the form of political action. Had the American worker been attracted to general principles and to programs of fundamental reform, and had the old parties been completely deaf to his appeal for remedial measures, the working people would have been forced to establish a labor party. The state federation of labor is a special kind of political organization designed by workers organized into unions to promote their legislative interests. When the California State Federation of Labor was established in 1901, state legislative bodies exercised more influence upon the welfare of the wage earner than they do today; the shift in the locus of power from the state house to the capitol in Washington had barely started. Despite the increased power of Congress in regulating many aspects of the worker's activity in industry, the state legislatures are today by no means without importance. In fact, in many areas vital to the welfare of labor, the state legislature retains its predominant position. The state federation was needed for another important purpose — to watch and influence the enforcement of laws affecting labor welfare. Enactment of a specific piece of legislation is frequently only a first step. Effectiveness of legislation depends upon the willingness of police and other administrators to interpret enactments so that they serve the purposes intended by the legislature. The state federation of labor served from the beginning as an agency which presented complaints, and was also the means by which these complaints could be funneled to elected heads of agencies of the state, state representatives and the governor. Presentation of labor's case before temporary and permanent commissions set up to investigate or enforce general and specific legislation was another task performed by the state federation. Throughout its history, the federation guarded the interests of labor before ad hoc commissions and permanent agencies administering a specific

Introduction

7

state program affecting labor interests. In some instances, the state federation assigned a representative as a permanent observer at deliberations of quasi-judicial agencies dealing with problems of vital importance to the workers. Such assignments were usually in response to complaints of improper and harsh decisions, and the reports would be used as a basis for demanding remedial measures. Mass meetings in favor of some proposal were occasionally held, and in some instances heads of central labor bodies and rank-andfile members would be invited to call on legislators in Sacramento in support of or in opposition to some proposal. But the task o' permanently guarding the legislative interests of California labor normally required different tactics. Holding lukewarm supporters in line and softening the opposition of hostile legislators usually required less flamboyant tactics. The federation leadership always hacl to be on guard against alienating legislators who were occasional supporters of labor bills. Work in Sacramento required intelligence and sympathetic understanding, and the California State Federation was indeed fortunate in the caliber of its personnel. Until the late 1930's, the federation directly represented only a small minority of the state's workers, and it depended upon the justice of its appeal as much as upon its power at the ballot box for its success. Workers and their leaders recognized quite early that corrections of evils affecting all or part of the state's labor could only be overcome by methods analogous to "collective bargaining" with the legislators. The record of the California State Federation of Labor is impressive, and a large body of legislation assuring the collection of wages, safety, days of rest, and a multitude of regulations affecting the worker in virtually all phases of his working life have been directly due to its efforts. The leaders followed the directions given to them by the delegates at conventions. Until another rule was enacted in the 1950's, the secretary-treasurer and legislative agents were bound by the votes of conventions, and bills were sponsored, supported or opposed in accordance with these decisions. Between conventions, the federation might summon a conference of representatives of the central bodies to decide on the program and policy to be pursued by the representatives of labor before the legislature. Assistance might be sought from other labor groups such as large local unions. The leaders knew their way around the legislative corridors, and they ap-

8

California State Federation of Labor

proached their tasks realistically. They were aware that labor could not gain acceptance of its entire legislative "package" in one session. They also realized that compromises and even trades might be necessary if maximum benefits were to be achieved for the workers of the state. As in collective bargaining with employers, the labor representatives seldom won their full meed of concessions. In fact, in some years the losses might outweigh the gains. But federation leaders knew that future legislative sessions would probably be more favorable. Federation leaders learned to know many legislators personally. They understood that in a democracy the legislator must return to his constituents for reelection. Therefore, he could only support certain labor measures; but an experienced legislator might provide assistance which would not be obvious from examining his record. The California State Federation of Labor did not neglect the unorganized. It sponsored the wage-collection laws, safety laws, child labor laws, protection of women and children, and it retained counsel to defend these enactments in the courts. It fought for the direct primary law, the initiative and referendum, opposed the poll tax, and sought to broaden the civic and political rights of workers by removing property qualification for serving on juries. It always supported improved educational facilities and appropriations, and fought for teachers' tenure and their right to free speech. The California Federation was effective because it closely reflected the needs and demands of its membership and other workers. It followed the American political custom of compromising, but it usually came back far more after its first efforts had yielded only a "half a loaf." A resolution expressing support of or opposition to a particular piece of legislation was a command which the secretarytreasurer and the legislative agents carried out. Only when the number of convention-endorsed bills became too great did the leaders request the right to screen the affirmative proposals of conventions expressed in resolutions. The state federation was effective because it avoided sponsoring issues upon which the membership was divided. If the leaders had sponsored programs at variance with the wishes of the majority of the members, or even a substantial minority, they would have been actively opposed or ignored. The issues which aroused the widest support were those related to employment and civil rights. Even the

Introduction

9

anti-Oriental sentiment was largely confined to the San Francisco Bay area. In fact, President George A. Tracy, a San Francisco printer and leading restrictionist complained that "many unions affiliated with our Federation have not seen fit to lend assistance to the work of the [Japanese and Korean Exclusion] League." Because it limited itself to issues which had wide support or which could be justified on trade union grounds — bills directly affecting a particular group of workers — the state federation could generally gain assistance from workers and other sympathetic citizens. On the other hand, the federation could not sponsor controversial legislation or programs. Because the membership, as well as other workers, faced different problems and needs, the federation always had to present a program to the legislature; it could not concentrate upon a single piece of legislation or waste its efforts in promoting noble but unrealistic projects. The difference in approach between the state federation and the Socialist Party is shown in their attitudes toward legislation. A Socialist member of the California legislature introduced, in 1913, a bill establishing a universal eight-hour day, which the state federation supported. The efforts of Assemblyman Kingsley, the sponsor of the bill, were praised and supported. However, Secretary-Treasurer Paul Scharrenberg noted: "The Socialists of the State considered this bill the only important measure before the Legislature." The state federation came to the legislature with a long list of proposals, and it could not concentrate all its energies in behalf of one measure no matter how important it might be. The state federation supported measures in every session which directly affected the lives of thousands of workers. It cooperated in supporting measures which would rally the sympathy and support of a large majority of those affiliated with the federation and others as well. Its success in repelling the right-to-work campaigns and other efforts to restrict union activity proved that the confidence of the workers and nonworkers in the state federation was not misplaced. From the beginning the federation submitted a list of questions to candidates for public office to serve as the basis for endorsement. The answers and voting were published as a guide to subsequent policy. The aim of the federation was to seek concessions and prevent any encroachment upon labor rights or deterioration of standards set by law. Its accomplishments are the statutes and regu-

10

California State Federation of Labor

lations which protect labor as well as the unenacted bills which without the state federation's vigilance would have been written into law. As one reads the narrative, it becomes clear that the California State Federation of Labor made eight distinctive contributions: (1) It rapidly emerged as the spokesman of the organized and unorganized workers of the state. (2) Its representative in Sacramento became the chief legislative representative of the labor movement, supporting legislation favored by labor and opposing measures aimed to restrict worker activities. (3) It defended legislation favored by labor whenever it was challenged in the courts. ( 4 ) It financed legal attacks upon laws and court decisions which restricted labor activities such as strikes, boycotts and picketing. (5) It provided support for workers charged with law violations arising out of labor disputes or campaigns to organize. (6) It attempted to improve the administration of laws dealing with conditions of labor or with benefit programs by calling shortcomings and complaints to the attention of administrators and heads of the state government. (7) It supported the enlargement of public education at all levels and for all citizens. (8) It has fought for greater democracy such as the initiative and referendum, and the enlarging of the rights of citizens by the removal of property qualifications for certain offices.

1 - Beginnings

The successful launching of the California State Federation of Labor was the cumulation of several decades of effort by the unions of the state to establish a representative state central body. Such an agency was needed to mobilize statewide support for labor's organizational and political objectives; to rally public sentiment behind progressive causes; to muster backing for fledgling unions or strikes; to sponsor favorable labor and welfare legislation, and to oppose laws which might hamper union growth. Despite its awareness of the need, the California labor movement failed for years to establish a permanent organization and only succeeded at the turn of the century. At last, it had the beginning of a central body which in time was to become the permanent legislative watchdog at the state capital, and the principal spokesman for the organized workers of the state, as well as the defender and promoter of the interests of the unorganized worker. T h e state federation, in California, as in other states, was not given great power or even adequate financial support. Emphasis was placed on organizing, at least in the early years, more than in the other states, perhaps because of its isolation and neglect by the internationals and the American Federation of Labor. For example, in San Francisco, where the major part of the labor movement was concentrated at the turn of the century, local unions planning to strike had to gain the approval of the central labor council (a function usually performed by the internationals). Financial support for many San Francisco labor disputes was provided by local organizations and their members. Central bodies operated in the building trades, the iron trades, and on the waterfront until 1906. T h e delegates to the first convention failed to provide the federa-

12

California State Federation of Labor

tion with ample finances. A per capita tax of two cents per member per quarter was not sufficient for initiating many new programs. The modest income did not allow for the employment of a large staff. In fact, the secretary was a part-time employee. For a number of years, a fraction of his salary as secretary was paid by the Coast Seamen's Journal where he was employed in another capacity. In politics, the federation followed the principle of nonpartisanship, as interpreted by the leaders of the American Federation of Labor. Unsuccessful efforts were made in the early years to tie the federation to the Union Labor Party which operated in San Francisco and whose graft and corruption were exposed by an investigation headed by Francis Heney. Supporters of various parties were active in the federation, but the federation judged governors and legislators on the basis of performance, rather than party affiliation. The second convention, for example, thanked Governor Henry T. Gage "for his eminently fair and unbiased attitude during the industrial struggle [on the waterfront] and its final adjustment." 1 It subsequently attacked another governor for not signing legislation protecting seamen against crimps (those who force or lure sailors into service against their will). From the beginning, the federation sought the adoption of laws regulating the employment of minors and women, increasing standards of safety in industry, the enlargement of the franchise, and the protection of government employees. Despite the preemption of many areas by the federal government, state government power and influence remain of crucial importance to thousands of workers. State legislatures still determine the power of their courts to restrict certain labor activities; they can regulate the internal affairs of unions, the size and duration of benefits to be paid under programs of unemployment and workmen's compensation, and are influential in many areas. They can decide on taxes, the kinds of schools in which the workers' as well as others' children are to be educated. State employment has been rising as has local employment, the terms of which can be determined by state legislation. In addition, programs partially and completely financed by the federal government are being more increasingly turned over to state administration. The federations are thus headed for power and influence. Labor organizations in California appeared early in its history. The Amalgamated Society of Engineers, organized in 1850, was

Beginnings

13

still active at the turn of the century. Several other unions which had their beginnings in the same decade were functioning actively in 1900 — the Shipcalkers' Association, founded in 1853; the Ship and Steamboat Joiners' Union in 1857; and Typographical Union No. 46 of Sacramento. There is, of course, no record of all the local unions which had been established over the early years, but before the turn of the century "not more than eight or ten organizations have come into existence in any one year, and while the rule has not been more than four or five, we find the record for 1899 to have suddenly increased to twenty-five." 2 The rise and decline of California labor organizations (as in other parts of the country) was affected by the movement of business; hard times inevitably made the position of the embryonic organizations difficult. The majority of California unions organized before the Civil War lacked staying power; employer opposition and a low propensity for remaining cohesive frequently shortened the life of these pioneer groups. Exceptions to the general trend were unions in the printing trades and organizations of stevedores and riggers.3 The California labor movement has been dominated almost up to the present by the unions of San Francisco which, early in their history, achieved a level of permanence and solidarity unmatched in any other locality. It was through San Francisco that settlers from eastern parts of the United States and foreign countries usually entered the state. Its population growth made it the inevitable market for farm produce; and the concentration of people provided a labor supply for manufacturing industries organized by ambitious, farsighted entrepreneurs. Isolation from the great metropolitan and industrial centers gave labor an advantage which it did not enjoy in other parts of the United States. Labor was frequently in short supply, and replacement of workers on strike was not as easily managed as in the industrial centers of the east. The elan and freedom which surrounded all activities also affected the labor movement; as a consequence, it developed early in its history a confidence which labor did not possess in many other parts of America. The feeling of assurance was based not upon a philosophy of eventual moral triumph, but on a recognition of its favored position in the market. A tailors' strike in 1863 led to the first attempt to form a central labor union in San Francisco. Organized to assist the strikers, the San Francisco Trades Union survived for less than three years. In-

14

California State Federation of Labor

ternal dissension, the bane of early labor organizations, appears to have been the principal cause for its disintegration. San Francisco labor leaders nevertheless tried to widen the movement from their city to the state. By 1865, a leading issue was the shorter workday, introduced by Alexander M . Kennaday, a printer, and president of the San Francisco Trades Union. Meetings on the eight-hour workday were held in San Francisco, Sacramento, and Marysville; a bill actually passed the House in 1866, but the legislation was smothered in the Senate. Failure on the legislative front induced the unions to use economic pressure. The Morning Call noted that even though the bill had failed, the eight-hour workday was more likely to succeed in San Francisco than in any other part of the world. Opposition by the steamship companies sparked the effort to form a statewide labor organization. Employers in the industry tried to establish a nine-hour workday by importing eastern replacements for their striking workers. A conference, attended by representatives from twenty-four unions, was called, and it resulted in the first statewide labor organization, the Mechanics' State Council, organized on November 2, 1867. A. M . Winn, a leading San Francisco unionist and a carpenter by trade, was elected president. T h e council was largely a San Francisco affair, although it tried to set up relations with labor groups in other parts of California. It began to decline in 1870 when politicians vied for its support in local elections. This marked the beginning of the dissension which was to sap its strength and destroy its influence. As activities were steadily reduced, the Mechanics' State Council slowly expired. In 1878, another series of efforts to establish a central labor union began in San Francisco. On the initiative of the tailors' and printers' unions, the Representative Assembly of Trades and Labor Unions was established. In early 1885, another step toward wider solidarity among San Francisco trade unionists was taken when the Iron Trades Council of San Francisco was organized by the metal trades unions to resist a wage cut. James A. Johnson, a pattern-maker, was elected its president. The desire for unity did not stop with the formation of the trades council in the iron trades.4 In December 1885, an initial meeting of a number of union representatives led to the permanent organization of the Council of Federated Trades in February 1886. Local unions and Knights of Labor assemblies were allowed to affiliate. Three years later, the council began forming subcouncils in

Beginnings

15

many localities of California; they were established in San Jose, Sacramento, and Oakland. Alfred Fuhrman was the council's president, and Frank Rooney, its secretary. Later the organization became the Federated Trades of the Pacific Coast. 5 The labor organizations of California were generally described as being "in an immature state." Also they were not far-flung; of the estimated 25,000 union members, over 19,000 were in the San Francisco area. There was considerable bickering among leaders, and objections to the action of the Federated Trades Council during a strike caused the waterfront unions to withdraw and form the Wharf and Wave Federation. Despite internecine conflict, labor unions in the San Francisco area were able to pursue their demands aggressively. To counterbalance the solidarity of labor, in 1891 a group of employers established the Board of Manufacturers and Employers of California. Its declared intention was to promote peaceful methods and arrangements, but it announced also that it was necessary for employers to combine against the aggression of trade unions.® The Federated Trades of the Pacific Coast lasted for almost six years, during which time it helped many unions financially and with advice. The council was also active in promoting union labels. With the onset of the depression in the early 1890's, the influence and power of this organization was undermined. A new campaign to establish a central labor body began almost immediately. The San Francisco Labor Council, one of the more influential city centrals in the United States, was reorganized in 1895; in the following year, the San Francisco Building Trades Council, a power in the building construction industry of northern California for more than six decades, was established. Almost 4000 craftsmen were represented, and the council adopted a working card to replace those issued by the individual crafts affiliated with it. The San Francisco Building Trades Council was to become an important center of labor power; for a time, it rivaled the San Francisco Labor Council and, subsequently, the California Federation of Labor. One of the unique powers exercised by the San Francisco Labor Council was the approval of strikes of affiliates. This violated in theory the principle of the American Federation of Labor that the power to approve or disapprove strikes was a function of national and international unions and not of central labor bodies. Perhaps the distance which separated the local unions in San Francisco from the headquarters of their

16

California State Federation of Labor

internationals justified this in practice, and made it acceptable to the international unions. Growing unity within the labor movement of San Francisco and sharp increases in membership in the last years of the century were chiefly responsible for a mounting interest in a state labor organization. T h e San Francisco unions supported each other morally and financially, and the organizations in the rest of the state looked to San Francisco for inspiration and aid. Trade councils functioned in a number of industries, and wider geographical unity was the normal aim for a movement growing both in numbers and cohesion. T h e benefits of mutual support were evident to the leaders of the movement in San Francisco. In one year, for example, between April 1901 and April 1902, the San Francisco Labor Council raised over $45,000 7 in support of several strikes. T h e awakening interest in labor organization by the workers also stimulated formation of a state federation. T h e California Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that 217 labor unions were operating at the turn of the century. 8 T h e launching of the state federation came at a time when California and the rest of the country had largely recovered from the crippling depression of the 1890's. W i t h a population of 1,500,000 it was already one of the great states in the union. Its abundant resources and favorable climate continued to attract those in search of work, investment opportunities and relief from harsh winters. Its birth rate was one of the lowest in the country, but the constant stream of migrants in search of work, fortune and restful retirement more than made up the deficit. California's labor force in 1900 had reached 642,000, about 19 per cent of which were women. 9 It was inevitable that the San Francisco labor movement would sponsor the federation. T h e city was the economic and political hub of the state with a population of almost 350,000. Its great port and beautiful harbor drew thousands of visitors annually. Yet, this bustling and beautiful metropolis was often governed on the level of a frontier community. Its open brothels on the Barbary Coast were world famous and a lucrative source of income for corrupt office holders. Corruption did not stop at the red light district's edge, but infected many outwardly respectable businesses which secretly bought franchises and other favors from debauched politicians. Labor relations were generally peaceful, and a fair degree of cooperation existed among the city's unions, although there was the

Beginnings

17

normal amount of rivalry, clashing ambition, and difference in philosophy. Periodically a labor dispute would break through the calm industrial surface, but the labor movement of the city managed to ride out these occasional challenges. For years, the local unions had carried the main burden for sponsoring legislation, and it was hoped that a statewide central body would lure the organizations beyond the Bay area into permanent cooperation. San Francisco's labor organizations were militant, and their leaders and members held a wide variety of views ranging from philosophical anarchism to pure and simple trade unionism. Differences were tolerated, but the pure trade unionists were in command. In the latter camp were Andrew Furuseth, Walter Macarthur, Michael Casey and P. H. McCarthy, and others who gave the turn-of-thecentury San Francisco labor movement its special character. While political nonpartisanship was the official policy, some of its tenets were not uniformly interpreted. Furuseth and Macarthur mistrusted political deals and feared that the labor movement would be used for the aggrandizement of unprincipled political bosses. Both understood the importance of legislation for the protection and advancement of labor. As leaders of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, they had pleaded for years with Congress and the legislature to free the seafarer from the legal shackles which chained him to his job for long periods and led to his exploitation. However, they also knew the labor movement of San Francisco and its leading personalities. They were not unaware of alliances and deals. They, and many others, wanted the state federation to protect and promote labor's legislative interests, but without lasting commitments to party or person — a hope and program which could not always be realized. The great majority of San Francisco trade unionists supported the new venture, but the building trades abstained until 1910; presumably, they felt that a statewide labor federation would strengthen their rival, the San Francisco Labor Council. The formation of a statewide California organization may have also been influenced by the attempt then being made to set up a western labor movement. Among labor leaders in the Rocky Mountain area, there was dissatisfaction with what they regarded as neglect of their interests by the American Federation of Labor. When the Western Federation of Miners launched a dual or competing labor movement — the Western Labor Union — it hoped to win over

18

California State Federation of Labor

some of the California labor organizations, but the influence of Andrew Furuseth and Walter Macarthur — leaders of the maritime workers as well as influential spokesmen for the San Francisco labor organizations — was against dualism. As a result, there were few defections to the Western Labor Union or to its successors, the American Labor Union and the Industrial Workers of the World in San Francisco. The leaders of the American Federation of Labor were aware of the dangers; several members of the executive council, including Samuel Gompers, visited the Pacific Coast in 1902, and addressed mass meetings in San Francisco and other Bay communities. During this tour, Gompers expounded his philosophy of "more and more" to an enthusiastic labor audience in San Francisco.10 The large gains in union membership and the increase in the number of functioning local unions undoubtedly convinced the leaders of the movement for greater unity and cooperation that the time was right. A committee to organize a state federation was set up in December 1900 by the San Francisco Labor Council with Walter Macarthur as chairman. Of the approximately 217 unions in the state, only 61 sent delegates; the majority were in the area around San Francisco. Only two locals from Los Angeles and three from Sacramento were represented. It would seem from the lack of representatives from the Bay area that the new venture had far from unanimous support. The low attendance might partly be explained by the boycott of the meeting by the building trades, and by the fact that newly organized and even older unions were not at the time likely to have abundant surpluses, and the formation of a state federation was evidently not given a high priority.11 The First Years of the Federation Walter Macarthur, from the Sailors' Union of the Pacific — a leading and somewhat conservative trade unionist — opened the meeting. Macarthur, who was articulate and editor of the Coast Seaman's Journal, had been selected as chairman of the arrangements' committee by the San Francisco Labor Council. Not much business was conducted by the convention aside from setting up the state federation of labor. The executive council was directed to maintain a watch over legislative matters directly affecting the interests of the working people and to take appropriate steps, but it was to initiate

Beginnings

19

legislation only with the approval of the members. Discussion of party politics on the floor of the conventions was prohibited, b u t this did n o t bar the endorsement of friends of labor, nor the disapproval of candidacies of those who opposed legislation supported by organized working people. 1 2 T h e "Declaration of Purposes" set forth the reasons for formation of the new body. [It called attention to] the fact that the labor organizations of this State, located as they are in widely separated localities, and lacking any systematic means of communication and recognizing the consequent necessity of the establishment of a central body which shall form a bond of connection between the labor organizations in every section of the State have formed the California State Federation of Labor. W e declare our purposes to be to devise a means for the complete organization of labor in California; to establish better communications between the labor unions of the State; to secure unified and harmonious action in all matters affecting our welfare; to circulate labor literature and promote economic intelligence; to create public sentiment more favorable to trade unions; to prevent unfavorable legislation and make known the enemies of organized labor; to collect statistics concerning California labor for the better information of our lawmakers; to seek the enforcement of all laws calculated to benefit the laboring people; to prevent the growth of child labor; to prevent the practice of blacklisting; to unite our efforts for the universal eight-hour work-day; to secure safety and sanitary conditions in the mines, shops and factories; to maintain just and equitable wage schedules; to conduct a system of agitation for all union labels; to give scope and power to all authorized boycotts, and to endorse or protest, whenever our interests may be involved, in the name of the whole body of laboring people of California. A n assessment of $1.00 from each delegate raised $161, and the federation was launched. G u y Lathrop, a San Francisco carpenter, was elected secretary, a n d C . D . Rodgers, a printer from Oakland, was chosen president. L a t h r o p was then sent to Sacramento to testify on behalf of several bills favored by organized labor. Soon after the federation's establishment, San Francisco labor faced a severe trial resulting from conflict between teamsters and their employers which eventually involved all the unions on the waterfront. In 1900, the Sailors' Union of the Pacific invited the teamsters, longshore, and other maritime unions to a conference to devise methods of cooperation. A year later, in February 1901, the conference set u p the City F r o n t Federation with which fourteen

20

California State Federation of Labor

unions affiliated. The new alliance (of which Mike Casey's Teamsters' Union Local No. 85 was a guiding spirit) was soon tested; an employing drayman was compelled to rehire a union driver who had been discharged. The show of strength was not lost on the carting employers who immediately organized the Draymen's Association and signed an agreement with the Teamsters' Union with a provision that union members were to work only for members of the association. In July 1901, during the convention of the Epworth League, the Teamsters' Union became involved in a dispute with the association over the refusal of union members to do certain work. The contract for the hauling of the baggage of the delegates of the Epworth League had been given to a nonunion firm, which — upon finding its facilities not equal to the job — subcontracted part of the work to a union hauler. The Teamsters' Union then held that the entire job was nonunion and that its members would not perform any part of it. The members of the Draymen's Association retaliated by a general lockout of the teamsters; this in turn caused the City Front Federation to call out its members on a sympathy strike. On July 20, 1901, the federation withdrew members from the docks in San Francisco, Oakland, Port Costa, and Mission Park. The walkout lasted nine weeks and resulted in five deaths and 336 assaults, ending with the intervention of Governor Henry Gage. The agreement called for a return to work with no reprisals.13 The Union-Labor Party. One of the less fortunate results of the waterfront strike was the formation of the Union-Labor Party. Supported by a section of the San Francisco labor movement, the venture had the endorsement of the Coast Seamen's Journal, a conservative and respected labor magazine not given to quixotic undertakings. As if he were forecasting the party's future, Walter Macarthur noted that "Persons gifted with political prescience may see in this party the fine Italian hand of an old party boss, but those who judge it, as they must judge all other parties, by the mettle of its standard bearers, are free to admit that it is in better tune with public sentiment than either of its competitors." 14 Unfortunately for the labor movement, Eugene Schmitz, an orchestra leader who was elected mayor, had little ability and even less integrity. The Coast Seamen's Journal seemed less than overjoyed at the victory and assured its readers that the City Front Federation departed from tradition, "because of the unanimous re-

Beginnings

21

quest of the people who reside in, and do the work of the port." Nevertheless, a prediction was made that the results of the election "will redound to the best interests of the city." Honest labor leaders, as well as the rank and file, were cruelly disappointed with Mayor Schmitz. His administration was controlled by a slick machine politician, Abe Ruef, who sold franchises to the highest bidders.16 Before the corrupt character of Schmitz and his hirelings had been fully revealed, the third convention considered a resolution extolling Schmitz's "honest and upright administration of the political affairs of San Francisco," as well as "his fair and just treatment of labor and capital." Schmitz also was described as a "worthy representative of the conservative American wage earner." 16 The resolution lauding Schmitz and his administration was defeated by a close margin of 8085 to 7815. This would indicate, in view of the large vote in favor of independent political action, that many delegates were not particularly anxious to extol the conservative policies of trade unionism, and showed their feeling by voting against the resolution. There is, of course, the additional possibility that some delegates may have already been aware that all was not well with the labor municipal administration in San Francisco. Though it was not exposed until the fall of 1906, Schmitz's administration had been accused of being thoroughly debased and corrupt almost from its beginnings in 1901. Dominated by one of the more malodorous municipal bosses, Abe Ruef, the administration was to go down in disgrace in the end.17 Conflict within the labor movement. The usual problems confronted the newly formed state federation of labor. Since lack of funds prevented the employment of a full-time officer, few results could be shown after one year. Opposition to the powerful San Francisco Building Trades Council posed a serious threat to progress. Moreover, its boycott was a visible sign of the absence of the labor unity which the state federation had been formed to promote. In its war, the building trades council adopted a rule that "no union which holds membership in any central body or council, foreign to the building industry, shall be eligible to membership in the Building Trades Council and which affiliates with any central body or council not an integral part of the building trades, shall by such affiliation or action forfeit its membership in this Council and shall stand sus-

22

California State Federation of Labor

pended without any further trial." 18 In view of the powerful position of the council and the ability of its leader, P. H. McCarthy, to deal with recalcitrants, local unions of building tradesmen shied away from affiliation. The hostility of the building trades unions seriously weakened the California State Federation of Labor, for they were the most stable and powerful labor organizations in the state. While the federation could not, at the end of its first year, point to any spectacular achievements, it might be said that its very ability to survive was a minor accomplishment. As soon as the federation was launched, its secretary was directed to proceed to Sacramento to aid in the enactment of the modest program of the founding convention. One of the more important bills presented by the federation was one to amend the child labor law, reducing labor to nine hours per day and raising the age of employment from ten to fourteen years. The bill was passed, but the age of employment was set at twelve years, and a maximum of nine hours per day for all minors under eighteen. Penalties for violations were written into the law. The federation was also able to gain the enactment of laws requiring ventilating systems in factories and workshops, the regulation of admission to the barber's trade, the inspection of scaffolding and tackle used by painters, and at least an hour for a midday meal for loggers. The anti-injunction bill and one to regulate fees of private employment offices were defeated.19 Commenting on the federation's first efforts at Sacramento, the Coast Seamen's Journal found it "unfortunate that the California State Federation, having been organized subsequent to the opening of the legislature, went to the task of furthering labor bills without adequate preparation. The fact that the state federation secured as much as it did is an earnest of the great power is destined to wield in the future. The accomplishment of legislation in behalf of the working class is at best a slow process as slow as thought itself." 2 0 Second convention. Seventy local unions and nine central labor councils sent 178 delegates to the second convention. The delegates represented about 14,000 members. In addition to raising per capita from two to three cents per quarter, the delegates called for the reenactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act by the federal government, enforcement of the eight-hour work day on government public

Beginnings

23

works, prohibition on interstate shipment of prison-made goods, use of the Allied Printing Trades Council label on government printing, improvement and enlargement of the state Schoolbook system, raising the minimum age of employment of minors to fourteen years, and enactment of the anti-injunction law. One of the major achievements of the federation was the enactment by the legislature in 1903 of an anti-injunction law. It was rendered ineffective by the decision of the California Supreme Court — Goldberg Boweti Co. vs. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760, 194 Cal. 429. President C. D. Rodgers recommended that more emphasis be placed on organizing the workers of California. That continual and systematic work was necessary to achieve progress was the verdict of the officers after their first year of experience. The advice was heeded, and the secretary-treasurer was placed on a regular salary; though inadequate, in that time of great hope and scant resources, it was the best the federation could do. An office was opened in San Francisco, and the range of activity was enlarged. The second year saw an increase in its achievements. President John Davidson, who had been elected without opposition in 1902, helped to settle a number of labor-management disputes and also organized several local unions. Limited income inevitably restricted the activities of the federation, but the $1612.63 collected in 1902 was more than 70 per cent above the income of the first year. It was nevertheless too modest an amount for large-scale organizing and educational work. The low income reflected the refusal of most unions to affiliate with the federation. Assuming that total income came from the payment of per capita of one cent per member 21 per month, the affiliated membership would have been, in 1902, under 14,000. On the other hand, the California Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated union membership for that year at 67,500 indicating that only about one fourth of all unionists in California belonged to the state federation of labor. 22 The federation's first two years coincided with a general and spectacular growth in California labor organizations. Similar expansion was taking place in other parts of the United States. An estimate of a 75 per cent increase in the state's union membership was made by the California Bureau of Labor Statistics. Even more important was the fact that this rate "of growth has been exceeded in several localities, notably in Los Angeles and Sacramento." The number of

24

California State Federation of Labor

unions in Los Angeles increased from 26 in 1900 to 68 in 1902, and in Sacramento from 20 to 45. There was also a notable increase in the size of organized labor groups in San Francisco. 23 Despite this, President Davidson did not believe that the state federation had been sufficiently active in organizing. He blamed the lack of funds. He also criticized the withdrawal of a number of affiliates, which evidently expected miracles from the new alignment, and deplored the failure of some unions to pay their per capita taxes. Davidson reported with some satisfaction, however, that, at the direction of the executive council, an organizing drive had been launched in Napa County which had netted favorable results. Ten unions, he reported, had been established at Vallejo — teamsters, plumbers, stationary firemen, butchers, and barbers had been recruited and assigned to their regular organizations. 24 Third convention. Factional differences arose at the third convention; the dispute was over politics. Should the federation favor independent political action or follow the established policy of the American Federation of Labor — to endorse candidates favorable to labor, irrespective of party affiliation? The fight for the endorsement of independent labor politics was led by G. S. Brower, the head of the Fresno Labor Council. Walter Macarthur led the opposition. The resolution was defeated, but the proponents of independent political action polled a sizable vote, losing by the comparatively narrow margin of 10,718 to 9285 25 Soon after the adjournment of the third convention, the executive council appointed F. C. Wheeler as organizer. He was to devote two weeks monthly and to urge American Federation of Labor unions in California to affiliate with the state federation. Wheeler reported after several weeks' work that he had established three carpenters' locals in the southern parts of the state. T h e executive council also appointed P. B. Preble as its legislative agent in Sacramento. Preble criticized the procedure in presenting labor bills to the legislature; objecting to the slipshod methods, he urged that bills be drawn by those experienced in drafting legislation. In addition, he advised that successful legislative work required the state federation to appoint persons to watch all bills of interest to the workers through both houses of the legislature. Preble also sponsored a plumbing inspection bill, a seamen's bill, and the streetcar air brake bill — all of which were defeated. 26

Beginnings

25

Throughout its history, the views of the federation changed, and its interests broadened. Rapid growth of population, much of it through in-migration and industrial expansion, created problems. They were serious, but of a lesser dimension than those facing the eastern and middle-western unions. T h e in-migrants to California were mainly American or Americanized workers, and California labor did not have to face a continuing stream from undeveloped areas of Europe. It was a high-wage area, and one in which replacements for those on strike could not be too easily recruited. Yet, the movement was not without problems. T h e southern area was an unorganized wasteland, and agriculture was a conservative force. T h e open-shop movement in Los Angeles under the leadership of General Harrison Gray Otis gave sustenance to anti-union forces outside the state and in other parts of California. The labor movement and the federation steadily increased membership and influence, although progress was not steady. T h e federation improved the methods of putting labor's case before the legislature and government officials, increased the staff and improved staff work. In time, the views of the leadership underwent change. A t the beginning, the federation sought to limit the activities of government, and it believed in largely protective legislation. It sponsored workmen's compensation laws, but expressed opposition, over the protests of a loud minority, to regulations of wages and other systems of social insurance. Later these opinions were changed, and the federation became an active proponent of social insurance legislation. T h e growth of laws regulating working conditions placed greater burdens on the federation since this meant a larger staff, a change the affiliates were not always eager to support. T h e federation inherited the anti-Oriental bias which was held by California labor leaders for many years. A number of labor leaders were active in the formation and direction of the Anti-Japanese League whose president was Olaf Tveitmoe, an official of the building trades unions, Will }. French of the printers' union, Walter Macarthur of the sailors' union, and a number of others. From violent opposition, the federation finally became an exponent of fair employment and equal treatment for all races. T h e influence of the federation upon legislation depended upon the views of the legislature and the executive. Powerful forces always existed to counter the claims of organized labor. While the

26

California State Federation of Labor

state government has been dominated over the years by men such as Hiram Johnson and Earl Warren, there have been others who were conservative and reactionary. In fact, there has always been a strong conservative sentiment in the state which has fought labor's legislative program and has sponsored a variety of measures to restrict labor activity. From 1938 to the merger, three "right-to-work" referendums were mounted. In addition, other attempts at restriction were initiated but did not gain sufficient support for placement on the ballot. California workers are employed, on the whole, under favorable conditions. The high growth rate is chiefly responsible, but the favorable corpus of legislation has also contributed. Federation lobbyists have been skillful, and have known how to work with the state government and to place their case before the people. In contrast to many states, the California federation has always had vigorous minorities in its ranks. Issues have been heatedly debated, and substantial votes cast against the proposals sponsored by the administration. It reached its lowest level in the 1920's, but its meetings through the 1930's and 1940's were assemblies where issues were sharply debated and differences exposed. Nevertheless, the California federation has converged toward the others. T h e San Francisco labor movement has lost its predominance. Moreover, it has also undergone change. T h e colorful characters have vanished — even Harry Bridges has become a house iconoclast. Industry has diversified, and, since the departure of Harry Lundeberg, the sailors' leaders are interchangeable with those of other unions. T h e problems facing California workers are not different from those facing other states, and the California federation had, long before the merger, begun to reflect those changes. Between 1902 and 1904 the number of local unions reporting to the California Bureau of Labor Statistics had risen from 495 to 805. The membership, according to the same source, had grown in a like ratio. " T h e average increase in unions in San Francisco, Oakland and Sacramento has been 60.9 per cent, and the gain throughout the State 111.1 per c e n t . " 2 7 The spread in membership and in locals showed itself also in the greater number of workers affiliated with the federation. In 1903, an income of $2966.52, substantially above that of the preceding year, was collected; this would represent an average of about 25,000 members. 28 T h e state federation tried to assist workers to organize and to

Beginnings

27

help locals in negotiating with their employers, but inadequate funds limited the amount of aid the federation could provide. At this time, no organizer from the American Federation of Labor was stationed in California, and, although leaders of local labor movements could aid workers in their locality seeking organization, assistance was not readily available in smaller and less well-organized population centers. Consequently, efforts of the state federation were important in promoting and expanding new unions. Organizer F. C. Wheeler reported that he had established 22 local unions in various parts of California during 1903, organizing such groups as carpenters, farm laborers, teamsters, wood workers, butchers, shinglers, barbers, and painters. Four federal labor unions had been formed under his direction, and, in addition, Wheeler 29 was instrumental in persuading many locals to affiliate with the state federation. FouHh convention. Attempts to eliminate the influence of nonlabor political groups in the affairs of the state federation brought on a heated controversy at the fourth convention. The majority believed that anyone who held elective or appointive office in government should not simultaneously be an officer of the federation; a large minority, however, felt that adoption of this kind of restriction would inevitably exclude capable and devoted trade unionists. The proponents of restriction believed that unless political officeholders were denied the right to hold office simultaneously, they might use their positions for the advancement of their political parties rather than in the interest of the worker. In addition, the restrictionists did not want the labor movement of the state to become too closely connected with any political party. The restrictionists lacked the needed two thirds for incorporating the prohibition in the constitution. In a sense, the debate 30 or even presentation of such a proposal showed fear of the influence of officeholders — a fear which time has eliminated. Of course, it meant also that the labor movement in California did not believe it could gain the adherence of large numbers of government employees. The convention recommended that the unions in California seek to establish Saturday as a half-holiday, and the executive council was directed to draw up bills for limiting the hours of labor for women to nine a day. The convention of 1904 also appointed an organizing committee, headed by President Henry A. Knox; the other members were the vice-presidents located in San Francisco and

28

California State Federation of Labor

Oakland. Limited funds inevitably restricted the amount of organizing, but the mere establishing of such a committee indicated that the federation wanted to play an active role in recruiting workers for the unions of the state. In 1904, the federation employed two organizers, F. C. Wheeler and G. S. Brower, who served under the direction of a committee established for this purpose by the convention. Wheeler and Brower aided a number of unions engaged in strikes as well as helping to organize a number of locals in the southern part of the state. In addition, the federation intervened occasionally in an effort to settle disputes between local unions and their employers. At Stockton, it directed a strike against the Holt Manufacturing Company in April 1904; and, in Los Angeles, it brought about settlement of a dispute between organized brewery workers and their employers.31 Increasingly, unions were joining the federation, although the building trades were not to relax their opposition until several years later. Federation activities between 1905 and 1909. In 1905, the federation appointed W . L. Owen to organize woodsmen, and he reported that he had been able to enroll 1300 workers in this industry in a federal labor union. In addition, the federation supported several part-time organizers who were enlisted for short spells of service or to assist in special situations. These organizers were assigned to areas where the labor movement was not strong or active, and they frequently succeeded in establishing a number of local unions in outof-the-way sections. The executive council, in reporting to the convention of 1906, declared that the "State Organizer is the most important officer of the Federation . . . During the year, at the request of the unions in several localities, special organizers were employed in Eureka, Humboldt County, Napa and Santa Rosa." 32 A move to elect the general organizer by the convention was opposed by the executive council and defeated. Representing the interests of California labor became increasingly the task of the state federation. From the 1890's the San Francisco Labor Council normally had assigned a representative to watch bills introduced in Sacramento and to explain the viewpoint of organized labor to members of the legislature. As the federation acquired prestige, its views began to carry increasing weight with lawmakers. D. D. Sullivan, who was appointed legislative agent in 1905, sought to unite all labor groups with representatives at the legislative session

Beginnings

29

to work on a common program. It was hoped thereby to present a solid front on bills affecting workers in the state. Organizer G. S. Brower was elected president, but he soon became involved in a controversy and was forced to resign. Vice-President Elmer Holmquist had been sent to Santa Rosa to help in the adjustment of differences between several unions and their employers after the Santa Rosa Labor Council had placed a local draying company and all business dealing with it on the unfair list. When the Santa Rosa unions called the attention of the convention of 1906 to the situation, President Brower was sent to the community. He made an agreement with the employers in which he accepted the open shop for one month, remittance of fines for those workers who had violated the directions of their unions, and the ending of the boycott against unfair employers. The strikers in Santa Rosa were deeply resentful of the agreement and charged that Brower had exceeded his authority and had threatened those who opposed his tactics. The state federation of labor accepted the charges. After a trial, Brower resigned his office and was succeeded by Thomas F. Gallagher who served out his term. The federation supported the strike and collected about $500 for aid to the strikers.33 The federation suffered a serious but not fatal blow in the San Francisco earthquake of April 16, 1906. All its books, records, and accounts were destroyed. The 1907 convention favored liberalizing the employers' liability law by making firms responsible for the orders and conduct of supervisors in the event of an industrial injury sustained by a worker as a result of directives given by supervisory personnel — the vice-principal rule. Abolition of the fellow-servant rule and contributorynegligence defenses in common law suits for injuries sustained in the course of employment were also sought. In addition, the convention favored a law to penalize discrimination against a union member in employment; it recommended that those charged with violating such a statute be subject to fines and imprisonment. The convention severely criticized President Theodore Roosevelt because he had in a message to Congress sharply attacked the San Francisco Board of Education for setting up separate schools for Oriental children. A resolution by Walter Macarthur criticized President Roosevelt and declared that the "action of the San Francisco Board of Education, in providing separate school-houses for Cauca-

30

California State Federation of Labor

sian and Mongolian pupils . . . is endorsed and supported by practically unanimous sentiment of the State . . . That we insist upon our right . . . and as a matter of practical necessity to the moral and mental well-being of our people, to segregate the pupils in the common schools." 34 Another resolution by Macarthur defended the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League. President Roosevelt characterized such action as a "wicked absurdity" and a "confession of inferiority in our civilization." According to one of his visitors, Roosevelt insisted that Japanese be treated as equals, and that they be allowed naturalization. His views, unfortunately, had no influence upon the leaders of the California labor movement. 35 The convention endorsed a proposal prohibiting the employment of children under fourteen years of age, of any minor under the age of eighteen, and of women in manufacturing in a mechanical establishment, office, laundry, workshop, restaurant, hotel, or other place of employment "which may be deemed unhealthful or dangerous, for a greater number than eight hours in the twenty-four hour day." The federation suggested that the law regulating the employment of children in industry should be written in order to prohibit the hiring of children under sixteen who were unable to read and write simple English. In addition, the federation proposed that children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen were not to be employed without the possession of work certificates issued by their school authorities. The convention also voted "to have a representative at Sacramento during the entire session of the state legislature." A resolution on the prosecution of Moyer, Haywood, and Pettibone (awaiting trial for murder in Idaho) came before the convention. William Haywood and Charles Moyer, who were officers of the Western Federation of Miners, and George Pettibone, a Denver businessman, had been kidnapped in Denver, Colorado, and brought to Idaho, where they had been indicted for the murder of Governor Steuenberg, who had been governor of Idaho during the violence in the Coeur d'Alene copper strike in 1899. Steuenberg had been held responsible for the imprisonment of several hundred strikers in the bull pen and for their harsh treatment by guards. While opening the gate of his house, he had been killed by a time bomb, placed, it was charged, by agents of the Western Federation of Miners. The kidnapping of the heads of a union aroused universal anger among labor people, even though the Western Federation of Miners was, at the

Beginnings

31

time, promoting a dual labor federation, the Industrial Workers of the World. The resolution submitted to the convention of 1907 contained a warning to the Citizens' Alliance and Manufacturers' Association in inflammatory language. The resolutions committee deleted the provocative statements, and substituted instead an arraignment of the kidnapping as a violation of constitutional rights of the accused and the result of conspiracy among antilabor employers. The substitute (as well as the original) statement pledged financial assistance to the imprisoned so that they might secure a fair trial. A debate on the proposals took place with Macarthur and Will French, a leader of the San Francisco printing union, supporting the more moderate statement which — after some debate — was adopted. In February 1907, the executive council appointed Z. W . Craig as organizer. Though he was active in several communities, his chief assignment was the sugar workers at Crockett. This campaign resulted in controversy within the state federation. Employees joining the union were dismissed as soon as the employers found out. The newly organized immediately demanded the reinstatement of their fellow workers; and sentiment for a strike to enforce the demand became widespread. But the cautious leaders of the state federation opposed the walkout on the ground that the workers lacked the resources for a protracted struggle. Opposing this view, organizer Craig resigned, and was replaced by L. D. Biddle of Los Angeles, and Second Vice-President Thompson of Oakland. In his report to the eighth annual convention, President George A. Tracy, a San Francisco printer, defined the purpose of the state federation of labor as "essentially that of organization and education." Tracy thought that the chief mission of the federation was to spread the "gospel of organization." He also declared he would like to see work extended in other directions, but he pleaded that limited finances foreclosed the possibility of new tasks. He urged local unions to assume major responsibility for their own welfare and urged them not to look toward the state federation of labor for support.38 The incoming executive council was directed to send an organizer to Los Angeles to aid the unions in that area in their recruiting drives. Organized labor had been making steady progress in Los Angeles, and during 1907 there had been, according to Vice-President L. W . Butler, an increase in the militancy of the workers. Strikes of

32

California State Federation of Labor

upholsterers, cigarmakers, teamsters, commercial telegraphers, printers, boilermaker's helpers, and tailors were called during that year, with a total of over 1600 workers striking. In terms of today, the number of those involved in walkouts might not seem high, but the willingness of workers in several trades to leave their jobs on principle was an even more significant index of the awakening of labor in Los Angeles than the actual numbers involved. Political disappointments. From the beginning, a primary function of the state federation of labor was to represent the workers of California before the legislature and the executive agencies. T h e policy of the federation was then, as now, to support candidates who would be willing to give sympathetic attention to bills affecting labor. Governor Gillett had assured President George A. Tracy that, in the event of his election, labor would receive fair consideration in all enactments coming before him. "But it seemed to be evident that organized capital, through a systematic lobby, has demonstrated its complete control of the executive, judicial, and legislative departments of this State." Tracy urged greater political awareness by labor, for he was far from certain that the workers of California would have fared any better if Gillett's opponent had been chosen. Tracy believed that it was "imperative that we elect to public office men who are in sympathy with the wealth producer as well as the successful wealth-accumulator." Another suggestion made by President Tracy was that the federation employ a lawyer to prepare the bills sponsored by the California State Federation of Labor. H e pointed to the desperate need for reform and improvement in many areas affecting the worker of the state. Tracy felt it imperative for the federation, through its lawyer, to draft an adequate law which would prohibit the discounting of wages by employers, would require that workers be paid at least semimonthly, and would provide laws for proper ventilation and efficient inspection of factories. Tracy also urged the federation to support a bill for regulating private employment agencies, and to seek adequate appropriation for the California Bureau of Labor Statistics. At the request of the federation, a bill limiting the fees and regulating other activities of private employment agencies was introduced in the legislature, but it failed to pass. The federation also was unsuccessful in its proposal for a law establishing minimum wages for all public workers,37 A more severe defeat was suffered when Gov-

Beginnings

33

ernor Gillett refused to approve a bill abolishing the penalty for deserting a ship in home waters. The Sailors' Union of the Pacific, one of the pioneer unions in the area and a strong supporter of the California federation, had eagerly sought this legislation, and the executive council felt that the failure of the governor to approve it was an uncalled for and unnecessary exercise of his veto power which was strongly condemned by the labor movement of the state.

2 - Migratory Workers

Several industries depended upon migratory workers for their entire or partial labor supply. T h e construction, lumbering, and agricultural industries used a large complement of nomadic labor. Paid low wages and living in badly built unsanitary camps, they were an easy target for the overreaching employer.1 T h e Industrial Workers of the World — I W W — tried to gain recruits among these workers but was not very successful. At the convention of 1909 a resolution calling for an organizer to be appointed for the migratory workers was submitted; the officers agreed with the aim of the proposal, but argued that an organizer could be employed only if the delegates were willing to increase per capita paid to the federation. Moreover, they also felt that migratory workers were not the only ones who needed to be mustered into unions; all workers should be organized, and campaigns could be instituted only by making funds available through raising the per capita tax. In October 1909, the executive council appointed a committee to meet with representatives of the San Francisco Labor Council and the San Francisco Building Trades Council to devise a program.2 A Joint Committee on Migratory Labor was set up, with four representatives from each organization; the San Francisco Labor Council, the San Francisco Building Trades Council, the California State Federation of Labor, and the state building trades council. J. B. Dale and Edward Thompson were appointed organizers of unskilled and migratory workers. It was decided to begin the campaign among the unskilled in larger cities in Alameda County. One organization, the United Laborers (directly chartered by the American

Migratory Workers

35

Federation of Labor), was established, and members were allowed to transfer from one branch to another. Organizer Thompson reported: Work is difficult and slow, for the class to which my effort is directed has so long been considered as industrial and to some extent social jetsam that a psychological effect has been produced. They are heterogeneous as to language, intelligence, experience and standards of life; they are hard to approach, suspicious of my notices, heartsore at the failures of the past along lines of organization and doubtful of the efficiency of Unions from the standpoint of the unskilled; and last, and saddest, in many instances they appear satisßed with their sphere and estate.3 Though a number of local unions of unskilled workers were organized and affiliated with the United Laborers, only meager success was achieved. Andrew Furuseth and Olaf Tveitmoe, a leader in the California building trades, appealed to the executive council of the American Federation of Labor to aid in "organizing and affiliating these wandering workers with the American labor movement, but the American Federation of Labor had neither the funds nor personnel to give the top priority to the recruiting of California's migrants into organizations of labor." 4 Nevertheless, the federation did not believe that it could neglect these workers. Conditions were extremely bad, as investigations by the state soon disclosed, and California labor leaders felt that mustering the workers into unions would make possible an organized insistence upon improvements in working conditions. In 1911, the federation hired an organizer for the migratory workers, but he reported little success. Another one was appointed for Greek workers. He lamented the employment of Chinese and Japanese laborers on the farms around Fresno and described the efforts he had made to establish unions of Mexican and Greek workers who he hoped would eventually supersede Orientals. T h e Joint Committee for Organizing Migratory Workers was able to report to the convention of 1911 the formation of eight local unions with a total membership of more than 3000. T h e joint committee "prevailed upon these unions to keep their initiation fees at a nominal figure and we have insisted that all members of other organizations of a like nature must be admitted upon presentation of their membership card, without payment of any fee whatsoever."

36

California State Federation of Labor

A statewide organization embracing all unskilled and wandering unskilled laborers was finally established in 1913 in San Francisco. Additional locals were formed later in Oakland, Richmond, Sacramento, San Jose, Stockton, Fresno, Bakersfield, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Eureka. The initiation fee for the unskilled-worker unions was set at $1.00, with the right of members to transfer freely between locals without additional charges for initiation fees. On the other hand, federation leaders were discouraged by the insistence of one of the United Laborers' unions upon setting the initiation fee at $2.50. No amount of effort by the leaders could convince these "shortsighted men that they were acting against their own interest. They honestly believed that by raising the fee they would be able to keep all the jobs for themselves." 6 The campaign was only partially successful. While thousands joined a union, other "thousands have disappeared after joining, leaving no trace of their whereabouts." The heads of the federation were convinced "that the undertaking would have been more successful if more funds had been available for organizing . . . That the organized craftsmen did not show an extraordinary interest in the venture is another certainty. Yet the greatest obstacle to success has been indifference to the migratory worker himself." Almost from the beginning, California agriculture was conducted on a larger scale than in the eastern part of the United States. Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, Filipinos, and a variety of Europeans and Americans provided the manpower for the giant farms. The obstacles were virtually insuperable. Not only was there a low propensity for organizing, but an even lower one for remaining organized. Also, the opposition of employers who normally hired migrants made unionizing them a Herculean task which neither human resources nor the finances of the federation could adequately meet. Migrant workers were used for harvesting and also in sheds and processing plants connected with industrialized agriculture. Stoop labor was hard work, and growers were not averse to attracting a large supply of workers before harvest time. The distribution of agricultural labor was imperfect, and ranchers might face an abundant labor supply or a scarcity. The men, women, and children who followed the crops were without many financial resources and depended upon their sporadic and uncertain employment. The Industrial Workers of the World had tried to organize them,

Migratory Workers

37

but had little success. It had established halls in Fresno, Sacramento, San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles. These were essentially propaganda centers, and some of the halls were used for sleeping. Carleton Parker estimated I W W agricultural membership at 3 per cent. The problem of organizing and retaining the worker was explained by George Speed, who had been the general organizer and member of the I W W executive board. He noted that "while the sentiment of the great bulk and number of the migration workers is still with the I W W , it is a difficult proposition to organize that class of laborers because of the shifting tendency." According to Speed, the I W W had organized in six to eight years "10 or 12 thousand, but they necessarily drift here and there." The Ford and Suhr Case. A clash between hop pickers and the owner of the Durst ranch at Wheatland highlighted some of the problems facing a campaign to bring such workers into a labor organization. Although the state federation was not directly involved in the strike and the bloody aftermath which followed the demands for improved living conditions, federation leaders tried to aid the hop field workers who had been arrested as a result of an armed clash in Wheatland. Several thousand men, women, and children who responded to the advertisements for pickers at the Durst Brothers ranch at Wheatland found living and working there unbearable. Lack of adequate drinking water or toilet facilities, and low wages sparked a revolt among the Syrian, Mexican, Italian, Puerto Rican, Polish, Hindu, Japanese, and Americans who made up the army who had appeared for work. Carleton Parker in his study of the migrant worker said that he believed Durst had used "state-wide advertising to bring more pickers to his ranch than he could possibly employ in the field. Some of the pickers state in their affidavits that after they found only occasional opportunities to pick they became disgusted with the work and the increasing filth of the camp and left." 6 The pickers rented tents from the ranch owner, and many who could not afford them slept on straw in the open fields. An organization campaign was started by the more militant members of the group, and leadership of the movement was assumed by Richard (Blackie) Ford and Herman Suhr; both these men were members of the Industrial Workers of the World. Suhr was elected secretary of the pickers' organization, and Ford was chosen as chair-

38

California State Federation of Labor

man of a committee appointed to confer with Ralph Durst, one of the owners and manager of the ranch. Demands were presented for the payment of $1.00 per hundred pounds for picking, the furnishing of pole-men for women pickers, the supplying of crews with adequate amounts of fresh water, an increase in the number of toilets, and the right of pickers to trade with the independent stores in Wheatland. Despite a threatening atmosphere, it appeared that the issue would be resolved peacefully. The ranchers agreed to several of the demands, although they refused to increase the price paid for picking. The pickers went on strike, and, when a constable came with the sheriff of Yuba County, several deputies, and District Attorney Ε. T. Manwell, to arrest Ford, there was a dispute which resulted in the deaths of District Attorney Manwell, the sheriff, a deputy, and three hop pickers. A number of those present, including Ford and Suhr, were arrested. The militia arrived on August 4, 1913, the day after the riot, and order was restored. Feeling against the hop pickers was very strong in the area, and it was feared that they might be denied a fair trial. Soon after the riots, the governor appointed a Committee on Housing and Immigration, of which Secretary Scharrenberg was a member. He fully supported the scathing indictment made by Carleton Η. Parker, appointed by Governor Johnson to investigate the riot. Scharrenberg did not, however, support Parker's suggestion to enforce the Labor Inspection Law (enacted by the 1913 session of the legislature at the urging of the state federation). Instead, Scharrenberg advocated the establishment of information bureaus under the control of the workers themselves, through which agricultural workers would be informed of the labor conditions prevailing in different agricultural localities in the state, the supply of labor, the wages offered, and, in general, the hours of work and working conditions. Since the workers would have personal control of these centers, he felt that they would regard the information as reliable and would act in accordance with their own interest.7 Even though the leaders in the Wheatland troubles were I W W members, the California Federation of Labor made the cause of Ford and Suhr its own. At the convention of 1913, the Durst Brothers were denounced, and the police methods used against the arrested hop pickers, castigated. The convention attributed the trouble and

Migratory Workers

39

its consequences to the Dursts. Local unions were urged to contribute as liberally as possible to the defense of workers who had been arrested, and to see that every effort was made on the part of organized labor to assure that the victims would be liberated as rapidly as possible. Four defendants, including Ford and Suhr, were tried for the murder of District Attorney Manwell. Two were acquitted, but Ford and Suhr were sentenced to life imprisonment. 8 After their conviction the fifteenth convention of the federation declared that their "only crime was their attempt to improve conditions of labor in the hop fields," and insisted that "the fatalities resulting from the attempt of the hop barons to suppress the right of free assemblage, and to suppress organization, should properly be charged to said hop barons and their official hirelings." The officers of the federation were instructed to "use all influence to the end that the cases may be reopened, so that new evidence may be introduced, and future attempts to convict men because of their connection with any labor struggle for better conditions shall be blocked." The California State Federation of Labor joined the San Francisco Labor Council in retaining Attorney Maxwell McNutt to appeal the convictions and, when they were rejected, authorized an appeal to Governor Johnson for a pardon. 9 In the meantime, the I W W started an independent campaign for the release of Ford and Suhr, threatening to burn down the hop fields unless they were liberated. A delegation called on the governor and pleaded for a pardon. Governor Johnson reviewed the facts in the case and described the conditions in the "hop fields where the hop pickers were encamped" as "unsanitary, disgusting and revolting." But the governor denied that the Wheatland riot had resulted in a cleanup in California labor camps. On the contrary, he claimed that the state had been investigating conditions and had prepared laws and orders for the improvement of these camps. The governor then reviewed the history of the riot, and declared that Ford was a man who was "violent, truculent and considered himself bound by none of the rules of human action that make it possible for men and women to live in organized society." 10 He then excoriated the tactics of the I W W , citing an inflammatory sticker spread through the state by the I W W . "As long as Ford and Suhr are in prison, don't stick copper tacks in fruit trees or grape vines. It

40

California State Federation of Labor

hurts them," and Johnson denied the pardon. This sticker issued by the I W W Ford and Suhr Defense Committee was regarded as a thinly disguised appeal for sabotage. Despite its friendship for Governor Johnson, the sixteenth convention deplored his denial of a pardon. It called on the governor, as "soon as the threats of sabotage and incendiarism cease, to reopen the case, and render a decision on the merits thereof, regardless of any threats of irresponsible persons, who in no way represent organized labor, who are disavowed by the California State Federation of Labor and by the real friends of Ford and Suhr, who are unknown personally to the citizens of California, and who may have been employed by those responsible for their conviction and incarceration." 11 The interest of the state federation continued, and Scharrenberg wrote to Johnson that upon all available information it appeared that the "bullying campaign of the I.W.W. had collapsed." Therefore, Johnson was requested to "set a day to listen to appeals for executive clemency in behalf of these men." 1 2 The California State Federation of Labor never slackened its efforts to have the two convicted men released. Ford was finally granted parole in 1925 and was immediately arrested on another murder charge by the son of the slain district attorney, Ray Manwell, who had been elected to fill his father's old post. A committee was organized to secure funds for Ford's defense, and pleas for assistance were sent to the state unions. Upon being asked for advice on what action to take on the appeals, the executive council of the state federation declared that it would not cooperate in the raising of funds as the monies might be used to promote I W W propaganda.13 The hop field riot led to an investigation by the Commission of Immigration and Housing. Recommendations for better enforcement of the sanitary laws in migrant worker camps were made, and it was the opinion of Carleton Parker "that the improvement of living conditions in the labor camps will have the immediate effect of making the recurrence of impassioned, violent strikes and riots not only improbable, but impossible." 14 A campaign of education and warning was conducted among large employers of migratory workers, and, among the workers themselves, an improvement in housing and sanitation was introduced.

3 - Advances and Retreats

Legislative Activity Most of the federation's activity was on the legislative front, where it struggled continuously to have what might now be regarded as elementary labor legislation enacted. With limited influence and funds, the movement found it hard to get expert guidance. President D. D. Sullivan, who served in 1910, wanted the federation to confine its efforts to a "limited number of bills of primary importance to our cause. Too often, in the past, has a multiplicity of bills resulted in the passage of measures of little value to the labor movement, while the laws of vital importance have been allowed to die in committee or on file." 1 Noting that Governor Gillett had twice vetoed bills to make desertion by seamen in American ports a noncriminal offense, the convention called for the reenactment of this legislation. The state federation instituted the legislative conference which included committees, agents or special representatives of state and local labor bodies interested in promoting labor measures. At the invitation of Secretary Paul Scharrenberg, representatives of the state federation of labor, the San Francisco Labor Council, the state building trades council, and the Joint Legislative Board of Railroad Brotherhoods of California met on May 12, 1912, and formally organized by electing Scharrenberg as chairman and Theodore Johnson of the San Francisco Labor Council as secretary. The function of the conference was to publish the records of candidates for legislative office, to prepare bills advocated by labor, and to prevent the enactment of laws that might adversely affect unions and working people. For the first time, the state federation circulated the recorded stands taken by state senators and assemblymen upon labor legislation

42

California State Federation of Labor

among the affiliates. A questionnaire also was issued; replies from more than 300 candidates for federal and state office were received.2 Johnson's election represented the triumph of progressivism then sweeping the western and middle-western states. California progressives also gained substantial strength from the rising opposition to the domination of corrupt city bosses of the Abe Ruef type, and the Union Pacific Railroad. Hiram Johnson had served as attorney in the San Francisco graft prosecutions after Francis J. Heney, the prosecutor, had been badly hurt by an attempt on his life. Johnson was a fighting progressive from the Theodore Roosevelt school, who during his tenure as governor always showed sympathy and understanding for labor's problems. In addition to a virile progressive movement, a faction largely active in the Republican Party, California also had an active Socialist and anarchist movement, the latter centered mainly around San Francisco. The Socialist movement was divided between the rights and lefts, who fought for the control of the party. At the time of Johnson's election, it appeared that the Socialists would play an important role in California politics. J. Stitt Wilson was elected mayor of Berkeley in 1911, and Job Harriman almost became mayor of Los Angeles. He had been retained as counsel for the McNamaras who were charged with dynamiting the Los Angeles Times building, and their confession on the eve of the election sealed his fate. However, he polled more than 50,000 votes out of a total of almost 138,000.3 Socialist influence continued into the 1912 presidential election. Its candidate for president, Eugene Debs, polled more than 10 per cent of the vote. The party was not Marxist and had strong traces of populist influence as well as the nonideological radicalism endemic to many western parts of the United States. Socialists maintained some influence in the state until World War I, and elected two members to the assembly in 1914. However, the party never exercised a strong influence on the federation. It had novelists, Jack London and Upton Sinclair, and the poet George Stirling, in its ranks; but none of the top spokesmen for organized labor were active political Socialists. In its first decade, it was dominated by men of the Furuseth-McArthur type who were opposed to socialism on practical and philosophical grounds. The "violent" wing of California labor was made up of anarchists and "natural" rebels who

Advances and Retreats

43

believed in and practiced violence. While approving neither the espousal of a revolutionary doctrine nor its practice, the federation showed sympathy and understanding for radical manifestations. As was noted, the federation did support Ford and Suhr morally and financially in their efforts to regain their freedom, and were not at first generally hostile to the I W W . The dualism of the I W W was not approved, but that did not become a problem until the early 1920's when the I W W challenged the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, and incited a revolt within the union. It tried some organizing in lumber and agricultural districts, but AFL unions had left those areas alone. Johnson's election to the governorship in 1910 placed a chief executive sympathetic to labor at the head of the state government. Coordination of legislative activity made it possible among the several labor organizations for them to become more effective in the pursuit of the legislative program. With the increase in the number and experience of the labor representatives in Sacramento, it was possible, through the legislative conference, to allocate jobs and, through division of labor, to exercise more effective pressure upon pending legislation. The division of tasks made it possible to have a labor representative at every meeting of committees of both houses. One complaint made by the labor representatives was that the legislators favorable to labor were, with several exceptions, not very adroit on the floor, and thus were frequently unable to deal effectively with their opponents. 4 Although the gains were regarded as merely a beginning, it was the opinion of the federation that the first session of the legislature under Hiram Johnson's administration had "laid the foundation for the regeneration of the State government in the interest of the people at large." 5 Two constitutional amendments were passed, one providing for the initiative and referendum, and the other for the recall of all elective officers. These proposals had long been favored by organized labor in California, and their enactment was regarded as a great victory. An amendment which sought to include judges among those subject to recall faced the greatest attack on the ground that it might influence judicial decisions. In contrast, there was little opposition to the proposal for the initiative and referendum, a measure also sponsored by organized labor for many years. It was largely the influence of Governor Johnson which overcame op-

California State Federation of Labor position to these proposals. According to John I. Nolan, who represented the San Francisco Labor Council in Sacramento and who was subsequently elected to Congress, what "little assistance the representatives of labor could give to the Governor on these important measures was given gladly." β T h e California labor movement made a determined effort to have woman suffrage legislation approved; the constitutional amendment to grant women the vote was bitterly fought in both houses. Nolan was of the opinion that organized "labor is entitled to [its] full share of credit for the passage of this amendment. If it were not for the fact that this measure had the unqualified support of the labor movement of the State of California, there is no question in the minds of your representative but that this measure would have failed of passage." A workmen's compensation law was one of the leading demands of the labor movement, and bills to abrogate all the common-law defenses — assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule — were introduced. Strong opposition to the proposal appeared in the Senate; it was, in fact, argued that the defense based upon contributory negligence could not be eliminated without a constitutional amendment. The legislative conference committee was unwilling to accept this argument until Walter Macarthur arrived in Sacramento, and convinced the labor people that a constitutional amendment would be necessary. As a result, the proposal was accepted by the legislature and submitted to a referendum for approval. As a temporary measure, labor representatives agreed to accept an employers' liability bill which wiped out two of the common-law defenses which the employer could use — assumption of risk, and fellow servant. It was hoped that the passage of the constitutional amendment would allow for the enactment of a broader law, one which would be compulsory and not elective. Nevertheless, the labor representatives did feel that the California workmen's compensation law was the best enacted thus far in any state. In addition, the first Johnson legislature enacted a number of other laws sought by the state labor movement. Employment of minors under eighteen was prohibited between the hours of ten o'clock in the evening and five o'clock in the morning. Another law — successfully fought for by labor — abolished the pay-check and

Advances and Retreats

45

time-check system under which contractors and other employers were able to withhold wages earned by some of their workers, and impose a discount for immediate payment. This system did not normally affect organized jobs, but workers who were not in unions and who had no one to defend their interests had suffered both inconvenience and loss of income. The California Federation of Labor also threw its support behind the railway brotherhoods' proposal for a "full crew" law. A similar bill had been enacted at the 1909 session of the legislature, but, like many other labor bills, it had been vetoed by Governor Gillett. California labor eagerly sought repeal of the law which made it a misdemeanor to entice a seaman to desert his vessel. For years, the Sailors' Union of the Pacific had sought to have this legislation enacted, and — in view of the importance and activity of Walter Macarthur, Andrew Furuseth, and Paul Scharrenberg, in the California labor movement — there was naturally a widespread desire in the ranks for its passage. In fact, such a bill had been adopted by both the 1907 and 1909 sessions, but the shipowners' lobby had been able to persuade the governor to veto the legislation. To the great satisfaction of the federation, Governor Johnson approved the bill. Johnson rallied to the support of the unions on the even more vital question of whether union members exclusively would be employed in the construction of the Panama-Pacific Exposition. Five million dollars had been appropriated for constructing the grounds and buildings, and southern California legislators wanted to have an open-shop provision incorporated in the measure authorizing the expenditure. Governor Johnson disagreed; he took the position that since organized labor was firmly established in San Francisco, the unions had a right to expect employment in the construction trades, even if the work was financed by the state. Passage of a bill providing that no female should be employed more than eight hours in any one day, or forty-eight hours during any week, was regarded by the federation as one of the more important pieces of legislation adopted during the session. Almost every industry was affected. Legislators opposed to this measure resorted to every parliamentary trick to defeat it; seven separate roll calls were required for passage. Labor-legislative representatives were sharply criticized for agreeing to amendments which allowed the exemptions

46

California State Federation of Labor

in favor of the farmer and cannery; many persons believed that this left a group of workers unprotected who were in an unfavorable position to compel changes in their work schedules. John Nolan defended the compromise because the "friends of this measure in both Houses found it absolutely essential to stand for this amendment to insure its passage." He added, furthermore, the hope that time would "demonstrate not only to the legislature of the State of California, but to the fruit grower and canneries the necessity of giving their women workers the benefits of this eight-hour law." 7 The bill aroused vehement opposition which continued despite its passage through both houses of the legislature. Delegations of businessmen were mobilized from all corners of the state to urge a veto on the governor. The delegations were reenforced by telegrams and petitions predicting serious economic consequences to the economy of California if the measure became law. In the end, Governor Johnson approved on the ground "that business conditions will adjust themselves to this new law, and ultimately, if it entails increased cost, the cost will be paid by the consumer. This has been the story of every law of like character whether of our own country or of another." 8 Enactment of regulatory legislation is often challenged in the courts, and in California, as elsewhere, the eight-hour law was no exception. The task of financing a defense of labor and welfare legislation normally fell upon the California Federation of Labor. In the eight-hour litigation, it had assistance from the state and San Francisco Building Trades councils and from the San Francisco Labor Council; all three agreed to share the expenses. On the legislative level, the federation worked actively for laws to protect groups of workers against a particular abuse or special hazard. Over the years, for example, the federation had sponsored a law for the inspection of mines, but not until Hiram Johnson's administration was it able to win approval. The building trades favored a law requiring that temporary floors be provided for buildings under construction above a certain height. Isolated groups, especially those with few members in the state, would normally have met with difficulty, especially if there were active opposition to the bills they sponsored. But the California Federation of Labor threw the weight of all of its affiliates behind certain bills. The importance of the federation in promoting legislation of spe-

Advances and Retreats

47

cial interest to one group of workers is shown by the activity of the labor representatives in behalf of the electrical workers. For several years the organized electrical workers of California had sought laws regulating the construction of subways and manholes which would insure better protection. Two bills sponsored by the federation were introduced, and they drew vigorous opposition from the power companies, street railways, and telephone companies. In fact, all groups interested in electrical construction in California strongly opposed the measure and sent representatives to plead the opposition's case before committees of the legislature. After long hearings, the members of the legislature proposed that a compromise be worked out between labor and the interested employers. Some of the companies were willing to accept this, but others put up a last-ditch defense. With the help of the California Federation of Labor, bills satisfactory to the electricians were adopted.® Bills of more general interest were also sponsored. One required that advertisements for labor in plants engaged in a strike or lockout must make known the existence of a dispute; another called for the establishment of free employment offices under the control of the commissioner of labor statistics in Los Angeles and San Francisco. These employment offices were to be set up on an experimental basis, and the commissioner was to report back to the legislature on the contributions made by them toward a more efficient distribution of labor. The labor movement was especially concerned with this problem because of the building of the Panama Canal. Some California labor leaders believed that thousands of migrants would land in California, and that a public system of labor exchanges would be necessary to avoid chaos in the labor market and the breakdown of labor standards. The labor movement also mobilized its strength against a bill that would have set up boards of public inquiry in public service industries to investigate labor differences which threatened a strike or lockout. Under the bill introduced at the 1913 session of the legislature, the parties to a dispute would have had to submit the issues to a public inquiry board, and — until such time as the board convened, held hearings, and rendered an opinion — no strike or lockout could take place. All labor in California was vigorously opposed to the legislation. In opposition, the regular members of the federation's legislative committee were reenforced by Scharrenberg, Furuseth,

48

California State Federation of Labor

Macarthur, and Andrew Gallagher, a leader of San Francisco labor and member of the Photoengravers' Union; their efforts were successful. While organized labor was more than usually successful in gaining adoption of most of its legislative program, it failed to get an antiinjunction bill passed. Reported out of the Senate judiciary committee after a long argument, the bill passed the Senate, but in the House it faced a long series of hostile parliamentary maneuvers and, in the end, failed to leave the House judiciary committee. Despite a favorable state administration and a friendly governor, the labor movement found that the forces marshaled against the anti-injunction bill could not be overcome. The McNamara Case. The gains made by labor during the first Johnson administration followed the dynamiting of the Los Angeles Times building. In contrast to northern California, the southern section of the state was, in the first decades of the century, dominated by open-shop employers who strenuously opposed the expansion of union organization. General H. G. Otis, who controlled the Los Angeles Times, was the leading spokesman for the opposition to organized labor which was centered in the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association. General Otis — who had been a member of Columbia Typographical Union in Washington, D. C., the oldest local printers' union in the United States — broke with his organization in 1890 when he refused to go along with a settlement of a lockout of printers at the plants of the four daily Los Angeles papers. He became a relentless and tireless foe of organized labor and its works, and one whose colorful denunciations added spice and zest to Los Angeles journalism. General Otis was a fighter who thrived on controversy and neither gave nor asked quarter. In his view, the direction of the plant and the allocation of labor within it was the exclusive prerogative of the employer. He was a determined foe of all union rules and restrictions.10 Employers in southern California generally supported the views of General Otis, and the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association was a powerful exponent of his philosophy. Naturally, the Los Angeles Times had no dealings with unions and, in accordance with its policy, employed no union labor in its building construction. Los Angeles industry faced several serious walkouts during 1910. The breweries of the city, inspired by the Merchants' and Manu-

Advances and Retreats

49

facturers' Association had locked out their employees. A group of metal trades unions struck for the eight-hour day on June 1, 1910. The general labor movement regarded the situation in Los Angeles as sufficiently serious to organize a General Campaign Strike Committee to help the workers.11 On October 1, 1910, the Los Angeles Times building was dynamited, killing twenty people and causing damage of more than a half million dollars. The dynamiting was part of a nationwide campaign of destruction initiated against nonunion employers by the International Bridge and Iron Workers, which was directed by John J. McNamara, the secretary-treasurer of the union. The California Federation of Labor (which opened its convention in Los Angeles two days later) immediately expressed sympathy with the victims of the tragedy, but resentment at the charges of guilt leveled against labor. 12 A committee to investigate the disaster was appointed. Headed by H. Bartley, the seven-man committee sought to ascertain the cause of the blast. Mayor George Alexander allowed the committee to pass through the police lines to examine the area of the explosion, including the damaged building; afterwards, the committee discussed its findings in executive session. The report of the committee denied any responsibility of organized labor for the explosion. The report charged the Times with laying the foundation for another Haymarket case, and it denounced the publication "as a hostile and unscrupulous enemy, not only to unionism, but to progress generally." It insisted that the strikes against General Otis had been peacefully conducted, and questioned — on the ground that the committee was made up of businessmen — the veracity of the report of the committee appointed by the mayor that nitroglycerine and infernal machines had been discovered near the scene of the explosion. The labor committee then concluded that "dynamite could not have wrecked the Times," and that the explosion was caused by gas leaks, and charged that this fact had been presumably suppressed by the police. Finally, the committee reported that it was convinced the explosion was a plot to discredit organized labor. 13 The McNamara case, as it was called, after the arrest of James B. and his brother John for the Times dynamiting, was the outgrowth of a national struggle between the Iron Workers' International Union and the nonunionized steel industry. It is in a sense only an accident

50

California State Federation of Labor

that the explosion took place in Los Angeles; there were several dozen union-directed dynamitings elsewhere. After the arrest of John }. McNamara and his literal abduction from the headquarters of the union in Indianapolis, the labor movement rallied to his defense and that of his brother. It appears that District Attorney John D. Fredericks feared that the evidence in Indianapolis would become available to the defense, and thus impede the prosecution's case.14 In common with the rest of the labor movement, the California federation was "firmly convinced of [the] innocence" of the McNamara brothers and urged all unionists to support their defense financially.15 When the McNamaras were brought to trial, their chief counsel, Clarence Darrow, to the surprise and consternation of the labor movement of the country, offered pleas of guilty which were accepted by the trial judge. While there was much anger and disillusionment at the guilty plea, it does not seem to have affected the labor movement. In fact the 1911 convention heard that "unionism has made remarkable progress" in Los Angeles. Federation membership was higher in 1912 than it had been in 1911, despite the McNamara confessions. It is, however, not possible to determine whether the increase in membership came from the affiliation of existing organizations or whether it represented newly organized workers. It is possible that the attack upon the unions in Los Angeles and the dramatizing of the open-shop struggle by the McNamara case may have convinced some organizations of the necessity for closing ranks. In any event, at no time did the California labor movement try to separate itself from the defendants, and the 1912 convention of the federation expressed its confidence in Clarence Darrow's "integrity and . . . belief that he will be able to again demonstrate his innocence and will triumph in defiance of the false charges, false witnesses and faked testimony of his oppressors." 16 Darrow had been indicted, after the McNamara pleas, on charges that he had tried to bribe several of the jurors. He also faced considerable criticism for agreeing to the confessions of the McNamaras, and there were many who believed that he had betrayed the movement to its enemies. The California Federation of Labor did not share these views, even though it did not — very likely for lack of

Advances and Retreats

51

means — provide any financial help for Darrow's defense. Yet, publicly it went on record in his favor. Following the McNamara confessions, a federal jury indicted a group of leaders of the Bridge and Iron Workers' Union for conspiracy to transport dynamite illegally in interstate commerce. Two Californians — Olaf Tveitmoe and E. A. Clancy, leaders of the building trades unions in the state — were among the indicted. Both were convicted, but only Clancy served a term in prison; Tveitmoe's conviction was reversed on appeal. The federation also supported Matthew Schmidt and David Kaplan, who were charged with complicity in the Times dynamiting. Both were finally arrested in February 1915. Schmidt was convicted of murder and sentenced to life, and Kaplan of voluntary manslaughter and given ten years' imprisonment. Periodically, demands for the release of the two were made by the conventions of the California Federation of Labor. Kaplan served his sentence, and Schmidt was paroled in 1939; at his release he had served 22 years in San Quentin. 17 Anti-Japanese legislation. In 1911, legislation to prohibit land ownership by Orientals was introduced. Governor Johnson, recognizing the possible repercussions of such a measure upon our international relations, notified the state department. Secretary of State Philander Knox, although not questioning the right of the California legislature to consider such a proposal, said, "Both the President [of the United States] and myself believe it would be most inexpedient and detrimental to the interests of the United States as a whole to have the bills passed or even debated at the present time, because of important diplomatic negotiations now pending between this government and Japan." 1 8 Johnson, it appears, was not anxious to have such legislation introduced, but he found it politically inadvisable to oppose measures which had widespread public support. T h e labor movement of California remained, as it had for many years, aggressively in favor of Oriental restriction. A refusal, possibly by Johnson, to endorse such legislation would have helped to reduce some of the pressure. Several labor leaders, including Secretary-Treasurer Paul Scharrenberg, were friendly to Johnson; others appreciated his espousal of measures supported by organized labor. There appears to have been a behind-the-scenes effort by the leadership to prevent an en-

52

California State Federation of Labor

dorsement of the legislation by the federation, although the eleventh convention instructed the officers "to use all honorable means within [its] power to have enacted a statute providing for the segregation of Mongolian pupils in the public schools of California." 19 The refusal of the resolutions committee to endorse a proposal for restriction of land ownership by Orientals was overruled by the convention, which shows the depth of feeling the issue aroused in the ranks. The same convention backed a program for university education courses for labor to be conducted by the University of California, hoping that it would help workers to understand the crucial issues of the time. More ambitious was the attempt made, with the endorsement of the federation, to place on the ballot a proposal to set up a produce exchange commission which would establish a series of exchanges or warehouses to which farmers could send their produce. Retailers and consumers would be able to purchase directly from the farmers at such warehouse markets — which would be established in the principal cities. An initial appropriation of $200,000 was hoped for, and it was assumed that the program thereafter would be self-sustaining. This measure, despite federation sponsorship, never secured sufficient signatures to be placed on the ballot. A bill to set up employment offices operated by the state was also sponsored. The federation believed that such a system of labor exchanges was especially important for handling the job needs of migratory and unskilled workers who were normally without union protection. A bill setting up this program under the state labor commissioner was prepared by the federation, which was convinced that "the great good expected from this measure will outweigh any risk assumed by the employer with the State; these risks, by the way, are the same when an employer deals with the private employment agent." The unions regarded the California Federation of Labor as essentially an instrument for gaining legislative concessions, and the means by which laws harmful to labor might be prevented. At the same time, the unions complained that the federation was not sufficiently active in expanding unionization. Lack of means, a factor usually ignored, could be regarded as the chief reason for failure to do more on the organizing front. (As a matter of fact, part of

Advances and Retreats

53

Secretary Paul Scharrenberg's salary came from the Sailors' Union of the Pacific. Since it could not furnish funds for organizing, the convention of 1913 directed the secretary to approach the various international unions and seek their cooperation in a joint drive in Los Angeles. Not much came of this program, and the results of the campaign did not reach expectations.20 In 1913, California labor became involved in the dispute between two factions within the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. On one side were the regulars headed by Frank J. McNulty and recognized as the official union by the conventions of the American Federation of Labor. The other faction was led by John Reid and Patrick Murphy who claimed they were the rightfully elected officers. The latter faction was the more radical, and it won the adherence of the San Francisco locals. In San Francisco, a light and power council, organized in February 1912, was dominated by followers of the Reid-Murphy group which was not officially recognized by the American Federation of Labor. Unions of machinists, boilermakers, firemen, gas workers, and a Reid-Murphy local of electricians sought recognition from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company through the light and power council. Claiming that it had signed a contract with the Electricians' Union belonging to the faction headed by President F. J. McNulty, the Pacific Gas and Power Company rejected the council's request. California labor leaders, including President Daniel P. Haggerty of the state federation of labor, supported the demands of the council. Continued refusal by the company led to a strike which was supported by all branches of the labor movement, including the executive council of the California Federation of Labor. The state federation did "not believe that decision [support of the AF of L] carried with it the right of said McNulty faction to go into the business of supplying strikebearers to any firm or corporation, a business of despicable detective agencies." 21 At the convention of 1913, the support of the light and power council by the California Federation of Labor was attacked by a number of conservative delegates. Scharrenberg defended the council as a body structurally similar to groups of unions operating in the building trades; he denied that it intended to secede from the AFL. Financial support for the council was then voted despite opposition, and the delegate to the AFL convention in Seattle was instructed to inform the AFL of

54

California State Federation of Labor

the position of the California labor movement on the dispute among the electrical workers and the reasons the insurgents were supported. The differences were subsequently settled with the aid of Gompers and several other members of the AFL Executive Council, but for a time the conflict threatened to disrupt the friendly feelings between the state federation and the AFL. The most important labor victory in the 1913 session was the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance, and Safety Act which made compensation compulsory except for farming and domestic service. It set up a state system of insurance for liability under the act, and provided for a safety division under the Industrial Accident Board, which administered the law, to promote safety and reduce industrial accidents. Minimum wages. The question of whether the state federation should support a minimum-wage law for women aroused some difference of opinion, and led to Gompers' intervention on the side of the opponents. The United Garment Workers' Union submitted a resolution to the 1912 convention opposing it; the convention referred this to the executive council authorizing it to take the action it believed desirable. Proponents and opponents within the labor movement began to debate the issue. Gompers then entered the lists and informed John I. Nolan, " W e want a minimum wage but we want it established by the solidarity of the working men themselves through the economic forces of their trade unions, rather than by any legal enactment." Despite the indifference of the state federation, a minimum-wage bill for men was enacted at the 1913 session of the legislature. Secretary Scharrenberg declared that the labor movement "did not welcome this kind of legislation with the degree of enthusiasm displayed by many of our well-meaning friends higher up . . . And if this 'reform from above' should prove successful it will be the first time in history that anything worthwhile mentioning has been obtained by the workers through other than their own efforts." 2 2 Another debate on minimum wages for women highlighted the convention of 1914. A constitutional amendment had been submitted to the voters, and when a resolution attacking the proposal was submitted to the convention, it occasioned both minority and majority reports. A heated debate followed, with several delegates

Advances and Retreats

55

declaring that minimum-wage legislation constituted a threat to the labor movement. In the end, its opponents carried the day. Once again the convention favored the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act and the inclusion of Japanese and other Orientals under its provisions.23 Although the Stockton lockout (discussed in the next chapter) absorbed much of the energies of the labor leadership in the state, normal efforts to gain legislative concessions continued. Those who appeared before the legislature at the 1915 session found the results "not as fruitful for labor as were the sessions of 1911 and 1913." 24 On the other hand, by comparison with results for the years preceding 1911, the gains in labor legislation were regarded as satisfactory. The state federation was able to gain improvements in the workmen's compensation law by having occupational diseases covered, and by eliminating the 90-day limit on medical expenses upon competent proof of added need for treatment. A law removing property qualifications for serving on juries was also adopted — legislation which had been long on the agenda of the state federation. In addition, standards for the employment of minors were raised, an improved camp-inspection law passed, and a $100,000 appropriation made for enforcing the provisions made by the Immigration and Housing Commission. Important gains of the 1915 state federation legislative session included: nonpayment of wages a misdemeanor; provision for better inspection of tenements and lodging houses; creation of the office of public defender; prohibition of the payment of wages in scrip, coupons, non-negotiable paper, or checks; misrepresentation of union labels a misdemeanor; a start toward regulating private detective agencies; and additional power for the labor commissioner so that he could regulate private employment agencies. A warning note was also sounded. It appeared that some legislators were anxious to settle scores with the labor movement because "friends of theirs had [been charged] exorbitant initiation fees [or had been victimized by] arbitrary trade rules. Let us hope that some of the organizations in the labor movement will change their initiation fees and trade rules so as to encourage membership rather than drive workers into the fold of union haters." The 1916 convention showed little progress. The committee on

56

California State Federation of Labor

legislation felt that the legislative program of the state federation should be limited, rather than comprehensive, if any success was to be achieved. It urged concentration upon an anti-injunction law to restrain the power of judges to interfere with peaceful strikes and picketing. The convention became involved in a controversy over social insurance. Dr. I. M. Rubinow, a leading expert, had addressed the committee on pertinent law and legislation. The resolutions committee recommended approval of the proposal of a delegate from the San Francisco Molders' Union that "a system of social health insurance . . . by means of which out of contributions made jointly by workers, their employers, and the State, ample sick benefits should be paid and all necessary aid to recovery be provided to the worker." But an attack upon the proposal was begun by a number of delegates, and the proponents of the resolution wanted Dr. Rubinow to explain the issue. The delegates refused to allow an outsider to participate in their debates, instead referring the question to the executive council for study. But the executive council unanimously endorsed the amendment to the state constitution authorizing the legislature to enact laws providing for old age, unemployment, and sickness insurance. The resolution was in support of an amendment of the social insurance commission which had been appointed by Governor Johnson to consider the desirability of such a program and to draft the necessary legislation for its enactment. 25 Despite the approval of the state federation, many powerful groups, including the San Francisco Labor Council, were opposed to compulsory social insurance, except for workmen's compensation; consequently, until the 1930's, efforts made in behalf of such legislation were not many.

4 - T h e Open Shop and the Mooney Case

The Stockton and San Francisco open-shop campaigns were indicators of rising anti-union sentiment. The fact that a well-financed campaign could be waged in San Francisco, one of the prime centers of union power, was an omen of things to come. It is true that organized labor was successful in repelling the attack in Stockton, but the anti-union forces represented a danger signal. The Stockton open-shop campaign. Stockton had been — for a number of years prior to 1915 — a fairly well unionized town in which labor and employers were cooperative. Difficulties began in June 1913, when the Sperry Flour Company refused to compel its engineers to join the union. Demands for a closed shop were also made by the Flour and Cereal Employees' Union. Soon thereafter, the Merchants', Manufacturers' and Employers' Association was organized, and took charge of the anti-union offensive. The retail Clothiers' Association refused, in March 1914, to renew its contract with the Clerks' Union, claiming that the matter had been placed in the hands of the Merchants', Manufacturers' and Employers' Association. Inspired by this, the restaurant keepers removed the union cards on display on their premises, and a lockout of 105 cooks, waiters, waitresses, helpers, and bartenders followed. When members of the local building trades unions boycotted nonunion mercantile and service establishments, the employers' association called on the head of the building trades council to end the boycott. A lockout followed refusal. By June 1914, virtually every business in Stockton had joined the employers' association, and the unions were forced to take official notice of the activities of the organized employers.1 At a meeting on June 12, the unions denounced the attempt by the employers' association to establish the open shop.2

58

California State Federation of Labor

On June 25, the Merchants', Manufacturers' and Employers' Association sent a letter to the Stockton Labor Council and its affiliates, which stated that since certain labor unions, acting under the "sanction and authority of central body or bodies, are boycotting or picketing various individuals and firms who are members of this Association, and threatening to fine or otherwise penalize those members of the unions who patronize the boycotted individuals and firms," employees of firms belonging to the association would be compelled to withdraw from labor unions affiliated with the council unless the boycotts and the levying of fines upon union members violating council orders were ended by June 28, 1914. This demand followed the refusal of union members to handle 3 nonunion lumber, a refusal eventually supported by the local building trades council. On June 29, the employers' association unanimously pledged its members "to stand firmly for the open shop and to lend our entire united and undivided support without reservation to the maintenance of the same. W e understand the open shop consists of the elimination of the union label, union stamp and union display card by ourselves or our employees and the elimination of the signing or making of agreements between ourselves and labor organizations." The Stockton Labor Council rejected the ultimatum. It expressed its readiness to submit disputes to arbitration but refused to accept the conditions laid down by the association. The employers' association proceeded with its lockout; and the unions of Stockton then set up a general committee to meet the employer threat. Soon local leaders found that they lacked the resources to continue the struggle, so they appealed to the state labor movement for assistance. The state federation of labor sent organizers to Stockton and established a general committee headed by the president of the state building trades council to direct the campaign. Mike Casey of the Teamsters' Union, William Hannon of the Machinists' Union, and William Atkinson of the Boiler Maker's International, all of whom were already known in national labor circles, served on the committee, which appointed a smaller executive group to direct the strike and lockout. Twelve local unions of building tradesmen, locals of teamsters, lumber handlers, barbers, bartenders, bootblacks, hotel and restaurant workers, garment workers, tailors, molders, foundry employees, and machinists were finally involved. Both the state building trades council and the state federation

The Open Shop and the Mooney Case

59

levied assessments of five cents per member per week to help support the strike. Picket lines were set up, and special watchmen and guards were brought in by the employers' association. Efforts to end the walkout were fruitless until the San Francisco negotiations in December 1914. A committee of three from each side met, and, although both sides were adamant at first, it was finally agreed on December 17 that: (1) the unions would stop boycotting and picketing, and the boycotted parties would be notified that the unions had abrogated their actions against them. (2) The association agreed to withdraw the letter it had sent to the central labor council on June 25 (this had been the impetus for the general lockout). (3) Wages and hours would remain the same as those in force on July 8, 1914. (4) A joint committee would consider disputes over wages and hours and would settle all differences. The general relief committee unanimously approved the agreement negotiated by its subcommittee, and the unions were ordered back to work. The committee declared that the agreement gave "the Trade Unionists complete recognition of their organization, which can only be interpreted as a complete victory of Labor's forces." 4 The California State Federation of Labor and its affiliated unions collected over $55,000 for the relief of the strikers and for legal expenses. Slightly more than $26,000 was collected by the federation, over $25,000 by the building trades of the state, and the remainder from miscellaneous groups.5 Open shop in San Francisco. In 1916 and 1917, the unions of San Francisco faced a concerted employer attack. Some observers believed it had been planned over a long period of time but had been postponed because leading businessmen thought it would be better to wait until after the San Francisco Exposition of 1915. A strike of waterfront workers in 1916 encouraged the employers to act, since they believed that the strike would create sympathy for the open shop among the public.6 The first sign of a change in labor relations came in the middle of May when the culinary workers demanded new contract terms. Union cooks, waiters, waitresses were not asking for a wage increase, but they wanted the establishment of an eight-hour workday without a reduction in pay. In addition, the new scale called for "a straight watch for the Cooks and Cooks' Helpers — eight hours within twelve for the waiters, and the same pay for girls working in cafeterias . . . as for waiters in restaurants." 7 The proposals were

60

California State Federation of Labor

approved by the local joint executive board of the international union and the San Francisco Labor Council, but were rejected at once by restaurant employers. Numerous efforts to compromise the differences were unsuccessful. Arbitration was suggested, but the employers would agree only if the terms ultimately accepted were not superior to those in cities comparable in size to San Francisco — in effect, a rejection of the union's demand. No agreement could be reached; and the chamber of commerce intervened and offered its aid to the Restaurant Men's Association. What started as a dispute over wages and hours was soon transformed into a bitter duel between labor and capital. Injunctions and violence followed; in the end, the unhappy unions and their supporters were defeated. The strike ended on December 15, 1916. Longshore strike. More serious was the walkout of longshoremen in San Francisco on June 1, 1916. It was started by the Pacific Coast District of the International Longshoremen's Association and resulted in a strike in all Pacific Coast ports. The Waterfront Workers' Federation, made up of 14 unions in the port of San Francisco, was naturally affected by the walkout. Under the constitution, the federation was not authorized to call strikes, but would offer advice to affiliates. The longshoremen in San Francisco considered the proposal of the Riggers' and Stevedores' Union that the longshoremen withdraw from the Waterfront Workers' Federation. Although the proposal was passed by a large majority, the federation warned that serious consequences would follow such secession; the warning was heeded by the more radical members, and the local remained. The Riggers' and Stevedores' Union sent 30 delegates to the convention of the ILA Pacific Coast District in Seattle. Demands for changes in wages and hours were drawn up for the entire coast, and the convention directed that the schedule be put into effect on June 1, 1916. On May 22, all Pacific Coast locals were informed that "employers have been furnished with copies of our new District wage scale and working rules and have been notified that the new conditions are the only ones under which our members are willing to work [and] will go into effect at 6 a.m., June 1, 1916." 8 In accordance with its rules, the Riggers' and Stevedores' Union of San Francisco submitted the new schedule to the Waterfront Workers' Federation for endorsement on May 29, four days after it had been submitted to the employers, even though the existing con-

The Open Shop and the Mooney Case

61

tract called for 60 days' notice. The federation endorsed the schedule on condition that a satisfactory arrangement be reached between the district executive board of the International Longshoremen's Union and the federation which would conserve the jurisdictional rights of the other affiliated unions. It also requested participation in negotiations with employers over the strike which had been called. In the discussions, the federation questioned the desirability of the Riggers' and Stevedores' Union surrendering the right to make local settlements, and deplored the entrance of the district executive of the Pacific Coast International Longshoremen's Union into the situation. It strongly opposed the repudiation of the agreement by the Riggers' and Stevedores' Union when it failed to offer its employers 60 days' notice to make requested changes. Instead, the Stevedores' Union had given employers only six days' notice and refused to confer. Secretary J. A. Madsen of the Pacific Coast District of the International Longshoremen's Association answered the association's request for a conference by saying "that the convention recently held in Seattle, instructed the elected officers to present the wage-scale and working rules referred to in your communication, to all Pacific Coast employers, and enforce same June 1, 1916, 6 a.m. Consequently the said officers will not be able to confer with any employer prior to June 1 on this matter." 9 The apparently sought-for strike took place on schedule, but the Waterfront Workers' Federation instructed its unions to continue on the job. Instead of joining formally in the walkout, the Teamsters' Union instructed its members not to work under police protection; however, this order placed the teamsters on strike. The strike was temporarily halted when the Waterfront Employers' Association accepted union terms, pending a final settlement. However, the slaying of a union man by a strikebreaker resulted in a demand for immediate discharge of all strikebreakers; when the demand was rejected, the strike resumed. It continued until July 20, 1916, when the union agreed to return to work pending a settlement of the issues in dispute. An agreement was worked out giving the longshoremen a substantial raise, but the strike created considerable antagonism and suspicion of organized labor in the city.10 In May 1919, the Riggers and Stevedores notified the employers of a desire to reopen the contract. An agreement was reached by the end of August and accepted by a majority, but a minority refused to accept the terms. New

62

California State Federation of Labor

efforts to reach an agreement were unsuccessful, and a secession movement led to the formation of the Longshoremen of San Francisco and Bay District which held an agreement until 1933. The Mooney Case and the California Federation of Labor The culinary and longshore strikes were signs that labor relations in San Francisco were deteriorating. The breach of the agreement by the longshoremen had aroused considerable anger in the ranks of business. Ostensibly outraged by the irresponsible action of the longshoremen, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce organized (on July 10, 1916) the Law and Order League not only to combat the irregular actions of unions, but also to fight all labor organization. Using the excuse of the repudiated agreement, the board of directors, led by its president, Frank J. Köster, declared agreements were mere scraps of paper. He then pledged a fund of a million dollars to finance a fight for the open shop.11 Leaders of the state federation of labor regarded Koster's speech "as the keynote of the organized employers who recently raised a million dollars to establish 'Law and Order' and the so-called 'open shop,' etc." 12 Feelings between organized labor and organized management in San Francisco became increasingly strained. Also, labor showed little enthusiasm for the preparedness propaganda which had been launched throughout the United States during World War I. Many Americans were anxious about America's lack of preparation and believed that if the Kaiser succeeded in conquering Europe, the United States would be next on the list. Committees to promote an expansion of the armed services were formed in many communities, and parades in favor of military preparedness were sponsored. San Francisco scheduled such a demonstration for July 22, 1916. The local labor movement expressed no opposition to the plans, but there was a division of sentiment when Andrew Gallagher, a San Francisco labor council leader, came out in favor of the parade and was denounced by Thomas Mooney in The Blast, an anarchist monthly published in San Francisco under the direction of Alexander Berkman. 13 As the Preparedness Parade reached Market and Steuart Streets, a suitcase containing a bomb exploded, killing nine marchers and spectators. Thomas J. Mooney, his wife Rena, Edward D. Nolan, Israel Weinberg and Warren K. Billings were arrested and charged

The Open Shop and the Mooney Case

63

with the crime. Billings was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Mooney, in a separate trial, was found guilty and ordered to hang on May 17, 1917. The other three were subsequently released. Anger naturally mounted against the accused, but doubt that the actual guilty parties had been arrested was expressed from the outset. None of the arrested was among the top leaders of the San Francisco labor movement, although all five were active minor officers in a labor union. Edward D. Nolan had been a delegate to the convention of the International Association of Machinists; Israel Weinberg was a member of the Jitney Bus Operators' Union; Warren K. Billings had been president of the Shoe Workers' Union; and Mooney, a molder by trade, had served for a short time as an organizer of the Amalgamated Street Carmen's Union, and had been militantly active in a number of strikes. From the beginning, Mooney's efforts to bring the street railway carmen on the United Railroads into the union was given by his supporters as the reason he had been singled out.14 The carmen had organized a union in 1901, but the United Railroads resisted and sought to destroy it by refusing to negotiate. In the end, an agreement was reached that strikers would be rehired and that no discrimination would be practiced by the company. Patrick Calhoun, one of the city's more colorful characters, took over the presidency of United Railroads in 1902. His imperious temper did not easily tolerate opposition, and constant attempts, obviously at his direction, were made to undermine the influence of the union on the railways.15 In 1907, negotiations between the United Railroads and the union broke down, and a strike was called on May 5. It was a bitter struggle; the San Francisco and California labor movements rallied to the strikers, but the victory went to the company.16 Several later organizing attempts were made, but none went very far. In June 1916, Thomas J. Mooney called the attention of the San Francisco Labor Council to the fact that 2000 street carmen on the United Railroad were unorganized and sought support for a campaign to win them for the union. Division 518 of the San Francisco Street Carmen's Union offered its support and requested that Tom Mooney, "organizer for our Association be given every assistance and encouragement . . . to accomplish the reorganization of the carmen on the United Railroads." 17 Although leaders of the San Francisco Labor Council formally

64

California State Federation of Labor

endorsed the appeal, they were far from pleased when the walkout was called. First, Mooney had failed to ask the council for permission to call the walkout. Secondly, he obviously had not consulted the men who were to do the striking. The Labor Clarion, official organ of the council, called the strike, in its issue dated one day before the Preparedness Parade, "Mooney's Morbid Move." It charged that he had been guilty of lack of preparation in calling a strike of unorganized workers, and that his faulty tactics were reflected in the response of only one carman to his call.18 According to President Wilson's Mediation Commission, "there can be no doubt that Mooney was regarded as a labor agitator of malevolence by the utilities of San Francisco, and he was the special object of their opposition . . . The utilities against which Mooney directed his agitation . . . undoubtedly sought 'to get' Mooney. Their activity against him was directed by [Martin] Swanson, a private detective. It was Swanson who had engineered the investigation which had resulted in Mooney's prosecution." 19 Mooney had aroused the suspicion of Swanson, who was convinced that he had been guilty of dynamiting the towers of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company in 1913, for which Mooney was tried (and not convicted) three times in Contra Costa County. Swanson also held Mooney responsible for the dynamiting of a tower at San Bruno on June 11, 1916, and sought, according to Billings and Weinberg, to pay them $5000 if they would identify Mooney as the dynamiter. When they refused the offer, Swanson allegedly threatened them. 20 Arrest and conviction of Billings and Mooney. Mooney's connection with the general labor movement of San Francisco had never been close. Affiliated with the radical side, to which he dedicated his adult life, he had joined the Industrial Workers of the World, abandoned it for the Syndicalist League of San Francisco, became secretary of the International Workers' Defense League, and was active in the defense of Richard Ford and Herman Suhr. In 1916, he was closely associated with The Blast, of San Francisco, to which he contributed. Attempts by the city newspapers to place the blame for the bombing on radicals were decried. "Those who have in the last few months," the Labor Clarion declared, "either sought to bring about industrial strife or prolong it . . . have more than once suggested

The Open Shop and the Mooney Case

65

that strikers and malcontents among the labor unions might have had a hand in the outrage. This thought is even more heinous than the suggestion that the bomb was exploded by one or more I . W . W . members. Until the real criminals are apprehended, it is as criminal as the deed itself, to accuse those who may be entirely innocent. Notwithstanding all the crimes charged against the I.W.W., there is no case on record in which such dastardly assassination of innocent onlookers was ever proven against an I . W . W . " 21 The California labor movement was not enthusiastic at first about being connected with the case. The defendants were not leading labor organizers; and they were known as opponents of those who headed the movement. Consequently, when a resolution sponsored by District No. 68 of the International Association of Machinists at the 1916 convention of the state federation of labor charged that the prosecution of those arrested in the Preparedness Day dynamiting was "based entirely on conspiracy evidence of past labor wars centering in and about San Francisco, such as the Pacific General and Electric Strike, and an attempted strike on the United Railroads," it was challenged by the resolutions committee. The committee declared "that no one at this time is attempting to connect labor with the bomb outrage." Instead of charging that Mooney and his codefendants were the victims of an antilabor conspiracy, the resolution blamed the inadequacy of the jury system. There was a long debate, and Hugo Ernst, later the president of the Hotel and Restaurant Union, led the fight against the report, which was defended by Mike Casey of the San Francisco teamsters, Thomas Tracy of the printers, and Paul Scharrenberg, secretary of the state federation. The report was overwhelmingly adopted, and the federation finally pledged its "aid in . . . efforts to secure justice." 22 After Mooney's conviction, the Labor Clarion attempted to place the case in perspective so that the labor movement would not suffer from association. The delegates to the Council who had followed the case in the newspapers were almost unanimous in expressing the opinion that the guilt had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that grave danger existed that innocent men might be sent to the gallows if something were not done to avoid the carrying out of the verdict returned by the jury in the Mooney case. While the delegates felt that the defendants had no claim upon organized labor as such for assistance and that some of them had been

66

California State Federation of Labor

a nuisance and hindrance to the advancement of the labor movement because of their foolish ideas and activities, still the interest of the movement in humanity and justice and civilization forbade it to remain silent when the probability was . . . that human life might be wrongfully taken . . . The ridiculous contention of some of those connected with the trials to the effect that the prosecution of these defendants was a scheme hatched by the Chamber of Commerce in order to strike a blow at organized labor was treated with contempt because of the possibility of that body injuring the labor movement through any of the defendants was fully appreciated, owing to the fact that none of them is a representative of the organized workers of the city.23 After Mooney's conviction, the San Francisco Labor Council, which had been until then lukewarm, called for an investigation.24 It became more and more widely felt that the men had not received a fair trial; demands for a congressional investigation were made by their friends. Among those seeking congressional action were Edward Nockles, secretary of the Chicago Federation of Labor, and Andrew Furuseth. 25 President Daniel C. Murphy and Secretary Scharrenberg requested Congressman John I. Nolan from San Francisco, a trade unionist with a long record of activity in the San Francisco labor movement, to sponsor a resolution to that effect. Nolan feared an investigation might backfire "for the reasons we are all aware of that know Mooney's activities prior to the Preparedness Day explosion. I have reference to his radical action both in and out of the labor movement; also his trial at Martinez and Sacramento [for dynamiting, for which he was acquitted] as well as the conviction of Billings . . . I have gone into this matter also with Brother Furuseth who agrees with me in my position. He figures that all that is necessary can be accomplished through a hearing on the bill." 2 6 The bill was drawn up by Frank P. Walsh and introduced by Nolan. An appeal for funds to aid the defense was made by the state federation at about the same time. T h e letter emphasized contradictions in the testimony of one of the chief witnesses, Fred Oxman, and the opinion of the trial judge, Franklin P. Griffin, that new evidence threw doubt upon the guilt of the two defendants. Members of organized labor were requested to appeal to the attorney general of California to help Mooney and Billings gain a new trial. Failing in their efforts, Murphy and Scharrenberg sought the aid of the American Federation of Labor. 27 It happened that during the

The Open Shop and the Mooney Case

67

visit of the President's Mediation Commission (a commission appointed by President Wilson, in 1917, to investigate labor discontent), its chairman, Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, examined the facts in the Mooney case. In his letter to Congress, the secretary noted that "Diplomatic correspondence indicated that the Mooney case was being used in foreign countries, particularly in Russia, as a means of destroying the friendly relations existing between this people and the people of Russia, and was affecting the conduct of the war." 28 John B. Densmore, the solicitor for the department of labor, was instructed by Wilson to gather additional information. Densmore became convinced that Mooney and Billings had been wrongfully convicted, and reported this in detail. Densmore was appalled "at the general flimsiness and improbability of the testimony adduced, together with a total absence of anything that looks like a genuine effort to arrive at the facts in the case." He was convinced that "Billings' conviction was based on the testimony of discredited witnesses." At the request of leaders of the California Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers appealed to President Woodrow Wilson for intervention in the Mooney case. At the same time, the council urged the governor of California to accept Densmore's report, which concluded that Mooney had been a victim of perjured testimony. The executive council and especially Gompers believed that the execution of Mooney would inevitably be used to poison the minds of the European wage earner against this country. The AFL hoped that Mooney and Billings would be pardoned, and then indicted and tried for the killing of one of the other victims. In the new trial, they believed the defense would be able to protect itself against manufactured evidence.29 In the meantime, the mediation commission, appointed by President Wilson, investigated and expressed serious concern about the verdict. It found in "the atmosphere surrounding the prosecution and trial of the case ground for disquietude . . . This feeling is reenforced by one factor of controlling importance. The most damaging testimony produced against Mooney came from a witness named Oxman. After Mooney's conviction there came to light letters confessedly written by Oxman prior to his having been called to testify.

68

California State Federation of Labor

The plain import of these letters is an attempt by Oxman to suborn perjury in corroboration of the vital testimony which he was to give and which, in fact, he did give against Mooney." T h e commission did not regard Oxman's trial and acquittal of perjury as vitiating its opinion. 30 Nevertheless, the state supreme court decided that it could not "find that he [Mooney] was deprived of any right, constitutional or statutory, or that material error of law was committed calling for a reversal of judgement or an abrogation of the order denying his application for a new trial." T h e court's decision was unanimous, and it announced that its view was guided solely by the trial record made in the lower court. 31 W h e n the California State Federation convention met in October 1918, the leaders were convinced that another appeal to Governor William D. Stephens would be of no avail. The officers reported "that labor bodies in many parts of the country threatened to strike and were only held in check by Mooney himself, on May first, through a strong appeal to the workers not to interfere with essential war industries." The convention voted to have the secretary present the Mooney case to the W a r Labor Board as a "war issue". 32 Though California labor leaders were willing to fight for the release of men whose views and activities they opposed, but whom they honestly believed to be innocent, they would not participate in a Mooney Congress, sponsored by the Chicago Federation of Labor. T h e congress met in Chicago in January 1919 and was dominated by leftwing groups. Although the congress adopted a number of stirring resolutions, no practical steps were taken, unless the call for a general strike for May 1 might be so defined. T h e executive council of the American Federation of Labor was severely critical of this demonstration, feeling that it might actually hinder the campaign being waged for the freedom of the two men. 33 Mooney was finally reprieved by Governor Stephens on July 27, 1918; subsequently the reprieve was made permanent, with the sentence commuted to life imprisonment. Later, the governor explained that he commuted Mooney's sentence because he believed that both defendants should be "punished alike . . . and because I do not think Mooney [should be] hanged when there were a million or more people — good citizens — in the United States who sincerely but mistakenly believed him innocent." 3 4 An A F L committee sought to

The Open Shop and the Mooney Case

69

visit Governor Stephens, but he refused to see anyone on the case who did not have new evidence. On May 20, 1920, E. D. Nolan, one of those arrested for the bombing, resigned as a secretary of the International Workers' Defense League, and notified the California State Federation of Labor that the defense league had been dissolved.35 T h e Mooney campaign was now taken over by several groups, most important of which was the T o m Mooney Molders' Defense Committee. Paul Scharrenberg, a delegate from the California State Federation of Labor to the convention of the A F L in 1923, attacked the loose methods of collecting funds followed by those working in behalf of T o m Mooney as well as the propaganda material being issued. 36 As the Mooney case gained national attention, the labor movement became more involved. In 1920, President Samuel Gompers appointed a committee of five California trade unionists to plead, on behalf of the labor movement of the United States, for the release of Mooney and Billings, but the committee was unsuccessful. Neither appeals from foreign labor organizations nor from prominent men both in the United States and abroad could move the head of the state government to change his mind. The Mooney case (Billings' name was usually omitted) became nationally known. Annually, the state federation demanded Mooney's release; regularly, it was denied. Unofficial efforts were made periodically by California labor leaders, but labor could not neglect its other responsibilities. Since labor leaders believed that he was innocent of the crime, Mooney was rightfully supported by the labor movement of California, but his demand that the movement give up all its activities to concentrate upon his release does seem unreasonable. In 1927, President Daniel C. Murphy of the California State Federation of Labor proposed that the A F L convention ask Governor C. Young for an unconditional pardon for Mooney and Billings.37 T h e resolution reopened the Mooney case for the labor movement, and it was broad enough for the president and executive council to concentrate upon seeking the release of Mooney and Billings without concerning themselves particularly with the terms of release. Mooney, upon learning of the resolution, wrote to William Green that he would "not under any circumstances accept a parole which

70

California State Federation of Labor

precludes guilt in all cases. Parole to me would be far worse than imprisonment in San Quentin prison . . . I have not asked for a parole and would not accept one if it were tendered to me." 3 8 In the same letter, Mooney unjustly charged that "the Labor Leaders of California, with a few exceptions not only did not want us out, but secretly did everything in their power to bring about our downfall and now are hoping and working for our continual imprisonment." Paul Scharrenberg actually was active behind the scenes in behalf of Mooney's release, and in July 1928 Governor Young wrote to him saying that he felt the matter should be presented to the parole board in the ordinary course. Despite the governor's known views, a delegation headed by Scharrenberg and Daniel Regan of the Los Angeles Molders' Union 174 called on him to plead for Mooney's release.39 After his visit, Governor Young again wrote Scharrenberg and reexplained his position in some detail.40 In the meantime, criticisms of the various Mooney defense committees came before the convention of the California State Federation of Labor. 41 The appeal for a pardon went to the California Supreme Court, but Justice Matt Sullivan, speaking for the majority, placed little value upon the repudiation of testimony given by witnesses at the trails of Mooney and Billings. In his opinion, he declared that the court had "examined the evidence and had reached the conclusion that both had been fairly convicted and did not deserve clemency." 42 Following rejection of the appeal, the executive council of the California State Federation of Labor "strongly [urged] the Governor of California to immediately reopen the case and use every means at his disposal to have all the discredited witnesses brought before competent authorities so that the flimsy excuses for the continued incarceration of these innocent men may be swept away." 43 Mooney never was satisfied with the activity of the California State Federation of Labor on his behalf, and he was not pleased by their efforts at this time. He was especially angered at a pardon petition filed by Billings after the governor had made his decision, and held Scharrenberg responsible for this action. Scharrenberg denied the charge, but he pleaded guilty to having been instrumental in obtaining letters "in behalf of Billings," and declared that he had

T h e Open Shop and the Mooney Case

71

always tried to be helpful on behalf of both men. "But it has been a thankless job so far as Mooney was concerned." 4 4 In the meantime, Mooney's friends and supporters outside California published a sharp denunciation of the leaders of the A F L and the state federation. Billings disavowed the pamphlet. According to Mooney the "fiftieth convention of the A. F . of L. . . . clearly demonstrated not only that California labor leaders are corrupt and treacherous, but the whole A. F. of L. leadership is bankrupt." 4 5 Mooney was especially angered at the leaders of California labor because they had campaigned on behalf of Governor Young, after the governor had rejected Mooney's plea for a pardon. Edward Nockles and John Fitzpatrick, long active in Mooney's behalf, labeled the brochure "as a regulation communist tactic." 4 6 Irked by the constant attacks upon him, Scharrenberg, in a letter to President William Green admitted that he had disregarded the following orders issued by Mooney: Calling a general strike, boycotting California products, "any and all instructions relative to labor's conduct with respect to the political affairs of the State, and finally we still insist, although Mooney considers this an unforgiveable assault upon his character, that he should account for the hundreds of thousands of dollars collected by his self-appointed Molders' Defense Committee." 4 7 Despite Mooney's unimportant position in the labor movement at the beginning of his case, he succeeded in dramatizing the list of issues the federation had to consider and explain. Mooney's talents in public relations, his doggedness, his supreme confidence forced his case upon the attention of the entire organized labor movement of the country. The California State Federation was constantly besieged by complaints and directives on his behalf, with Billings usually given no role, or a subordinate one. Mooney used tactics of sheer genius in view of the fact that his trial and conviction had no direct relation to violence arising in the course of a labor dispute, nor was his conviction even remotely related to any normal labor issue. He had won the support of intellectuals, editors, and lawyers outside the state; and Mooney was obsessed with his fight for freedom and had no interest in the responsibilities of the state federation of labor to its own members. T h e California State Federation of Labor was always "forced" to press for a pardon for Mooney, even if the leaders had sought to avoid the issue. Whatever sentiment might have

72

California State Federation of Labor

existed among some California labor leaders, Scharrenberg and others were convinced of Mooney's and Billings' innocence and sought from the time of their conviction until their release to have them pardoned. 48 On April 21, 1932, Governor Rolph formally denied a pardon to both men. 49 Billings then asked whether it would be proper for him to seek parole in view of the collapse of Mooney's effort to obtain a pardon. Scharrenberg was sympathetic to his suggestion, and informed the board of prison terms and pardons that he would guarantee transportation for Billings to New York if he were released.50 In May 1933, another tack was tried. Mooney was tried on one of the indictments which had been handed against him, and the state's case collapsed. The acquittal confirmed the view of the state federation of labor that Mooney and Billings "were convicted on the flimsiest evidence and largely because certain interests demanded their conviction." In 1936, the San Francisco Bay Area AFL Committee for the Freedom of Mooney and Billings was organized, and it held a number of mass meetings for which it obtained the support of the state federation of labor. 51 The committee stressed the need for financial assistance to enable Mooney and Billings to finance their habeas corpus proceedings in the state supreme court. W h e n Mooney's appeal for a writ of habeas corpus was rejected by the California Supreme Court, it was taken to the United States Supreme Court. Affiliated unions were again urged to give generously. At the convention of 1938 a resolution, presented by Jack B. Tenney of Los Angeles Musicians' Union No. 47 and signed by 11 other delegates, reiterated the belief of the California State Federation of Labor in the innocence of the imprisoned, but a suggestion that the federation donate funds to the Mooney and Billings defense was not accepted. Instead, an appeal for financial support was voted. During the discussion of the resolution, Harry Lundeberg of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific sharply attacked the tactics of the Mooney and Billings defense committees. Lundeberg claimed that his union had donated about fifty thousand dollars over the years for the defense, and he wanted to know what portion of the money had been expended on propaganda harmful to the labor movement. George Kidwell of the San Francisco Bakery Wagon Drivers' Union regretted the criticisms and pointed to the years of unjust imprison-

The Open Shop and the Mooney Case

73

ment suffered by the two prisoners. This argument drew a sharp answer from J. W . Buzzell of the Los Angeles Labor Council, who charged that there had not been a fair handling of finances. He recalled that as long ago as 1922 and 1924, he, as chairman of a committee of the conventions of the federation, had demanded, on behalf of his committee, an unequivocal pardon for both men. Buzzell insisted "that had it not been for the desire of certain people to make a living off Tom Mooney's incarceration he would have been released before now. It is not Tom Mooney's liberty that some people want, it is the continuation of his incarceration so that they can carry on the campaign; and I want to say to the man who wrote the statement in that pamphlet that when they make the threat it contained on the second page they did not want to free Tom Mooney but they wanted to keep him in the penitentiary until he comes out feet first." 5 2 When Mooney's plea for a writ of habeas corpus was refused by the state supreme court, it was denounced by the executive council of the state federation as a "miscarriage of justice." 53 With the election of Culbert L. Olson as governor, Mooney's appeal received sympathetic attention. After a hearing in January 1939, Governor Olson declared: "I now instruct Warden Smith to release you to freedom which I expect you to exercise with the high ideals I have tried to indicate." Olson regretted his lack of authority to pardon Billings; approval of the state supreme court would be required in his case because of his previous conviction. At the convention of 1939, the state federation of labor went on record that the "fight to secure a pardon for Warren K. Billings is one in which every trade unionist should enlist." 5 4 The federation was anxious to aid in gaining Billings' release, but it saw no need for elaborate organization. At the recommendation of the state supreme court in October 1939, Governor Olson commuted Billings' sentence to time served. In freeing Billings, Olson said, " I believe you have served a prison sentence for a crime you did not commit. I wish it were a pardon instead of a commutation and I hope I can issue a pardon at a later date." 5 5 A resolution sponsored by Jack Shelley and Jack Leonard of the hod carriers of Modesto called on the state federation of labor to aid Tom Mooney whose resources "were entirely exhausted." Shelley was active on a committee trying to raise funds for Mooney, who by then was ill. The convention refused to help; it endorsed the views

74

California State Federation of Labor

of its resolutions committee that "the American Federation of Labor has fully discharged its obligation to Tom Mooney, and, judging from his utterances after his pardon by Governor Olson, he also considered his obligations to the American Federation of Labor at an end." 58 The convention refused to allow the use of its name to solicit funds.

5 - World War I and Postwar

In general, 1917 was not a period in which the unions of the state were very active; nor was the federation very successful in procuring legislation. However, it did win a victory in the legislature, with the enactment of an anti-injunction law (although it was later pocketvetoed by Governor Stephens). An important step initiated by the convention was a program of cooperation with farmers. A committee, headed by President Daniel C. Murphy, was appointed to meet with representatives from the Farmers' Union, the Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union, and the Pacific Co-operative League. The joint committee agreed upon a common program. No political party would be organized, nor would any attempt be made to duplicate the organization of the old parties. Instead, a statewide campaign would be undertaken to have candidates for political office on the regular party tickets pledge themselves to carry out the joint program of workers and farmers. The California Union of Producers and Consumers was set up as the vehicle for the campaign. Its economic and political platform included: tax on idle land to force it into use; "public ownership of public utilities, including terminal warehouses and packing plants . . . permanent Federal retention of the railroad"; encouragement of the cooperative movement; the appointment of farmer and labor representatives upon all state boards and commissions, including the board of regents of the state university; prohibition of the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes by the state courts; enactment of an adequate health insurance program; maintenance of free public employment bureaus by the state; development of irrigation systems

76

California State Federation of Labor

under state auspices; and arrangements for facilities to operate and manufacture electric power jointly. Although the 1917 federation convention supported the war effort, it also came out in support of Senator Robert La Follette, then under attack for his pacifist views. It was undoubtedly the influence of members of the seamen's unions (including Furuseth, MacArthur and Scharrenberg) who remembered his championing of the seaman in the United States Senate. For years seamen had fought for legislation that would accord them full rights as workers and protect them against competition of foreign seafarers. After two decades of effort, the legislation sponsored by Senator Robert La Follette was enacted by Congress and signed by President Woodrow Wilson in March 1915. T h e law abolished imprisonment for desertion by American seamen in foreign ports and for foreign seamen leaving their vessels in the United States. Seamen could demand payment of half their earned wages at every port visited for loading and unloading cargo. Allotments and advances of wages to any person, except close relatives, were forbidden. Two watches for sailors, and three for firemen, oilers, and watertenders were specified, and a maximum nine-hour day was to be worked in safe harbors. Seamen could leave with full wages when these provisions were violated. A majority could request an inspection in a foreign port to determine the seaworthiness of the ship. Ventilation, space, berths, water and drainage in the focsle were regulated, and owner and master made liable for violations. 1 It was a great victory, and the seamen never forgot the unrelenting efforts of Senator La Follette in their behalf. World W a r I stimulated the expansion of manufacturing. Manufacturing employment of production workers after World W a r I was over 215,000, an increase of 113,000 since 1909. The labor force reached 1,511,000 out of a population of 2,660,000. A large growth in ship repair and ship-building industries accounted for an important part of this expansion. Increased production and employment in steel production and nonferrous metals were significant, as was the expansion in the food industry. T h e federation was concerned with a bill providing for the compulsory investigation of labor disputes in industries defined as public utilities and prohibition of strikes during the inquiry. T h e federation believed that this bill was the beginning of an attack on the use of

World W a r I and Postwar

77

the strike weapon. Local unions and central bodies were told to interview legislators and to urge them to vote against the measure. 2 Postwar Reconstruction A number of proposals dealing with postwar reconstruction came before the convention of 1918. One called for the establishment of a six-hour day in order to provide employment for demobilized soldiers. Another presented an elaborate program obviously copied from the plan of the British Labour Party, including a minimum-wage guarantee, control of national finance, and use of surplus wealth for the common good. The convention was also asked to endorse socialization of large and basic industries; opening land controlled by the national government for settlement of demobilized servicemen; imposition of a tax to pay for the war; and demobilization of the armed services at a rate which would make for orderly absorption of ex-servicemen in industry. The convention then appointed a reconstruction committee to report a program. T h e committee concluded that the great expansion in the productive power of industry made demands for postwar wage reductions unnecessary. Returning soldiers were promised "full cooperation in the proper readjustment of industrial conditions to conform to the newly established democracy." Organizing the unorganized was urged upon all unions. Also advocated were consumers' cooperatives, a land colonization program which would make land available at easy terms to returning soldiers, public ownership of public utilities and properties needed for their operation, and the continuance of an active humanitarian program by the government of the state. 3 In 1919, the heads of the state federation came up with a legislative program which they believed had a chance of at least partial adoption. T o p priority was given to the proposal for limiting the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes by judges in the state courts. Legislation seeking this objective had been submitted in several sessions, but the state federation was usually unable to get such bills through both houses. High on the list was a proposal to improve the workmen's compensation law by extending coverage to agricultural workers, reducing the waiting period, and introducing a program of rehabilitation for those with permanent industrial disability. T h e federation proposed limitation of child labor; increases in the license fees of private employment agencies as a means of

78

California State Federation of Labor

discouraging their operation and, at the same time, compulsory reduction in their charges to clients; regulation of wage payment to compel at least bimonthly payment; exemption of wage-attachment of workers in Alaskan canneries up to $300; limitation of the hours of domestic help to ten a day; one day's rest in seven for all employees; and an eight-hour day for miners from portal to portal. The state federation refused to urge the withdrawal of troops from Russia, and defeated a proposal to support the One Big Union, an industrial type of labor federation resembling the Industrial Workers of the World which had arisen in Canada after World W a r I and had spread to parts of the United States, especially the northwest. The defeated resolution would have also endorsed a program for amalgamating the several separate unions existing in an industry into one organization. In contrast to the Industrial Workers of the World, the proponents of this program wanted to work within the American Federation of Labor; they opposed dual unions. The resolution was defeated by a vote of 29,196 to 9539.4 On the other hand, the convention of 1918 did endorse the rather radical Plumb Plan under which the federal government would retain control of the railroads, with the properties managed by directors, some of whom were to be appointed by the railway unions. The Plumb Plan, while not endorsed by the American Federation of Labor, had considerable support for a short time from the railroad labor organizations. The amalgamation program, on the other hand, was sponsored mainly by left-wing trade unionists who sought to upset the established order. Although the state federation opposed amalgamation, it would not deny the right of its members or affiliates to favor industrial organization.5 Opposition to the criminal syndicalist laws was expressed, but the convention refused to endorse collecting funds for anyone prosecuted under this statute until such time as a member of a labor union had been convicted of advocating the views of the American Federation of Labor. Of course, such a stand meant that the state federation would not endorse the solicitation of funds in behalf of anyone prosecuted or convicted of advocating doctrines under the particular statute. The criminal syndicalist law of California had been enacted in 1917, and it was never used to prosecute members of AFL unions. Its main targets were members of the Industrial Workers of the World, and, in the late 1920's, the Communists. In fact, Paul Schar-

World War I and Postwar

79

renberg recognized that the anti-syndicalist law was the result of red hysteria.6 The hostility toward radicalism was shown by the action of the executive council in regard to the Labor Defense League of California. This group had been set up to provide defense for the victims of the criminal syndicalist laws. In the past, pleas for assistance always received a sympathetic hearing, even if the requests for funds were not answered. But the federation turned a deaf ear, and made it clear that it did not endorse the soliciting of funds by this group or "similar dual societies." Labor on the Defensive Beginning in 1921 all labor was on the defensive. The American Plan of Employment under which employers sought to establish the open shop had many active adherents in California. While the stronghold of the anti-union forces centered around Los Angeles, San Francisco was the scene of a vigorous and determined attack upon the building trades. The employers had not chosen a weak or irresolute organization. Founded in 1896, the building trades council immediately introduced the council work card as a substitute for those issued by the affiliated craft unions. Whenever necessary, the council enforced its rules by strikes and picketing. "By 1899 virtually every building trades job in San Francisco had been unionized, and in 1901 every building trades worker found it necessary to cany the working card of the council. The council announced at that time that it controlled the building industry from the foundation to the roof." 7 The San Francisco Building Trades Council protected the interests of its members, and it was a major power within the California labor movement. Under the leadership of P. H. McCarthy, it helped in the organization of unions and councils in many communities in northern California, and the San Francisco council was influential in the formation of the state building trades council in 1901.8 In order to prevent a broader movement for wage increases, in an inactive building market, the building trades council and the employers agreed, in February 1920, that increases of fifty cents a day would be granted to the crafts earning less than nine dollars a day, and wage revisions would be made, up or down, on the basis of changes in the cost of living. At the same time, the Building Industries Association merged with the Builders' Exchange. The Exchange

80

California State Federation of Labor

assumed, in September 1920, control over wage contracts in the industry, and announced that cutbacks in wages to the February level would be put into effect. Several crafts struck, and the Builders' Exchange threatened a lockout of all building tradesmen if the strikes continued. The industrial relations committee of the chamber of commerce suggested the submission of differences to arbitration. Archbishop Edward J. Hanna, Max C. Sloss and George L. Bell were selected as arbitrators. Hours, wages, and working conditions were made subject to their judgement. However, the board did not, because of lack of time, investigate work rules. On March 31, 1921, it held, that based upon changes in the cost of living, a 7.5 per cent reduction in wages was to be introduced. The award was to remain in effect for six months, beginning May 9,1921. Efforts of the building trades council to have the award reconsidered were of no avail.9 The building trades council rejected the award, and the Builders' Exchange countered with a lockout. The Exchange, unlike its predecessors, had allowed material dealers and supply houses to affiliate. Supported by the chamber of commerce and leading banking and industrial enterprises in the community, the Builders' Exchange set up a permit system under which contractors would only obtain materials if they agreed to operate under the open shop. P. H. McCarthy decided, on June 10, 1921, that a retreat was necessary and, on behalf of the council, accepted the award. Now confident of substantial support in the community, the Builders' Exchange would not recede from its open-shop policy. To promote the program, the chamber of commerce established the citizen's committee, and collected a large sum to support its campaign. A proposal to settle the lockout was suggested by the industrial relations committee of the chamber of commerce, but on the old terms. It was rejected by the building trades unions. Dissatisfaction with the conduct and policies of the leadership of the building trades council spread among the rank and file as their inability to surmount the crisis was revealed. A conference of allied building trades unions was established, and a general strike was called for August 3,1921. The San Francisco Building Trades Council proposed that the San Francisco Labor Council submit a general strike proposal to a referendum vote of all affiliated unions. Instead, the executive com-

World War I and Postwar

81

mittee of the labor council called upon the "General Conference of Building Trades of the Bay District . . . to explain . . . the authority of said general conference to call a general strike of unions outside of the Building Trades Department, the purposes to be served by such a general strike, the means to be used to secure a full legal vote and compliance with any such general strike order, and the benefits under all eventualities to be derived from such general strike movement. The fact that no committee appeared, and the further fact that the General Conference Committee immediately after . . . proceeded to take steps to ascertain the sentiments of the unions affiliated to this Council, convinced your Executive Committee that the said General Conference intends to ignore this Council, its laws and authority and appeal directly to the affiliated unions." 10 Quoting Section 5, Article X I of the constitution of the American Federation of Labor, the council, in its answer, declared "that neither this Council, nor the Building Trades Council, or any other chartered body within the Building Trades Department, much less a temporary charted and unchartered committee like the General Conference of Building Trades of the Bay District, has the power to call a strike or decide the taking of a strike vote in a single union affiliated directly or indirectly to the American Federation of Labor, and that in every instance a local union undertakes to take a strike vote, it must conform to the laws of its national or international union, and the American Federation of Labor. This law is the organic law established for the protection of the membership, to aid every union in the time of crisis against intemperate and ill considered action." This San Francisco Labor Council statement pointed to the failure of general strikes to achieve their objectives. The request for a strike was filed, and each union in the Bay District was advised not to have any "connection whatever with the General Conference of the Building Trades of the Bay District, if it assumes to act as a central body and in defiance of the laws of the American Federation of Labor." The strong position taken by the San Francisco Labor Council ended any thought of a general strike. In the end, the building trades unions accepted the decision rendered by the arbitrators. 11 The Industrial Association of San Francisco was one of the permanent results of the building trades dispute of the early 1920's. Established in July 1921, its purpose was to aid in enforcing the open

82

California State Federation of Labor

shop in the building construction industry. It aided employers in labor difficulties, and it imported strikebreakers for those employers facing a picket line. It was also charged with using spies to infiltrate labor unions. 12 T h e state federation also blamed the American Plan for other troubles. Almost 8000 oil workers were forced to strike because of the refusal of operators to renew an agreement with the union which they had recognized for almost four years. The convention of 1921 had pledged support to the strikers, but only about $1500 was collected. At the request of the secretary of labor of the United States, the strike was called off, but the workers lost their bid for recognition. In two communities, Vallejo and San Jose, strikes of building tradesmen were directly traceable to the propaganda of employer organizations sponsoring the American Plan. In Vallejo, a settlement was eventually reached, but the unions were not able to overcome the opposition in San Jose. At the 1921 convention, differences among the delegates arose over the question developing the state's water power. It was this issue which led to the withdrawal of P. H. McCarthy from the labor movement. McCarthy had been a power in the San Francisco building trades unions, mayor of the city, and a leader in the state building trades council. For a time, he was opposed to the San Francisco Labor Council and the state federation of labor, but eventually made peace with his opponents. T h e labor movement of California had favored state development of water resources, but McCarthy had opposed such legislation. W h e n it was discovered during an investigation that McCarthy had been paid $10,000 to lobby against the program, he faced expulsion. Instead of waiting for the decision, McCarthy resigned.13 His defense was that he had acted as an individual and not officially. Throughout the 1920's, the state federation of labor tried to hold the line rather than advance to new ground. It refused to hear Upton Sinclair when the latter sought to address the convention. It also refused to endorse a resolution urging a new trial for Sacco and Vanzetti. It rejected a resolution protesting the arrest of William Z. Foster on charges of criminal syndicalism in Michigan. Foster, who had been actively identified with the steel strike of 1919, launched his Trade Union Educational League to carry on a campaign (within the American Federation of Labor and its affiliates) for industrial

World War I and Postwar

83

unionism which was to be achieved through amalgamating the separate organizations in an industry into one industrial union. With the success of such a program, the promoters reasoned, the American labor movement would be organized on a more rational basis. When Foster first launched his program, it gained the support of many trade unionists who believed the structure of the American Federation of Labor should be modernized. Samuel Gompers and other AFL leaders were completely opposed to the plan. Foster, however, had secretly joined the Communist Party — then making its first active effort to infiltrate the American labor movement — and his membership was discovered. When he was indicted on charges of criminal syndicalism, efforts to gain sympathy and support from organized labor were made on his behalf. Only 51 of the 236 votes favored protesting his arrest; this rejection of the protest for an individual subject to legal prosecution was an unusual action for the California labor movement. The refusal to ask a new trial for Sacco and Vanzetti spoke more significantly of the depth and extent of antiradical feeling within the California Federation of Labor. Although Sacco and Vanzetti had no active association with organized labor, their emotional anarchism would have, in the past, evoked sympathy and support. Even less backing could be summoned for a resolution endorsing the Trade Union Educational League — 25 out of 186 votes.14 But the state federation of labor did carry on its traditional activities, and tried to protect the legal right of California workers, organized and unorganized. During October 1922, the Industrial Welfare Commission, charged with administering the minimum-wage laws in the state, decided to lower the minimum wage for women workers in industry from sixteen dollars to fifteen dollars a week. The federation attacked this decision. With the cooperation of the San Francisco Labor Council, it hired Attorney Harry Heideberg to argue and submit a comprehensive brief against the proposal. Despite the federation's efforts, the order was put into effect. Through its attorney, the federation appealed to the courts for a stay, and, after the request was granted, the commission withdraw and restored the old minimum. 15 The fight of the state federation is especially interesting in view of the fact that when the law had been enacted, federation leaders began to question its wisdom. Most of the suggestions for legislation were mild by federation

84

California State Federation of Labor

standards. Improved work camps and regulation of private employment offices were called for; both suggestions, if adopted, would have chiefly benefited the unorganized, unskilled workers. Another legislative request was the placing of state credit behind municipalities and local subdivisions in order to enable them to develop minimum-cost waterworks for storage, irrigation, and industrial use.16 Legislative and political activity. The state federation of labor pointed with pride in 1923 to its legislative achievements of the previous ten years. To a large extent its self-congratulation was justified, but perhaps it should have noted present difficulties, while emphasizing past successes. Seeking the enactment of legislation favorable to labor is only one of the federation's tasks. Bills are introduced in every session which are designed to restrict or limit the activities of organized workers or other citizens. The federation, which has always used its influence to enlarge the democratic rights and the participation in government by all citizens regardless of income or property holding, successfully supported the abolition of property qualification for jurors and the appointment of all citizens as deputy sheriffs; federation efforts led also to the abolition of the poll tax by referendum after the legislature had refused to repeal this voting requirement. As was noted, however, the gains had been gathered chiefly in the past. The harvest in the early 1920's was quite skimpy. The state government of 1923 was dominated by Governor Richardson, who favored sharp cutbacks in expenditures and generally more conservative policies than his immediate predecessors.17 In 1924, the state committee of the California Conference for Progressive Political Action was organized, with the Railway Brotherhoods' Federation and the Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of California as members. The conference declared it would follow the direction of the American Federation of Labor on political matters.18 It was active in the presidential campaign of 1924, and supported the labor-endorsed candidacies of Robert M. La Follette and Burton K. Wheeler. 19 On the whole, however, the labor movement remained on the defensive throughout the 1920's. In 1925, Secretary Scharrenberg reported that a number of anti-union employer associations were active in the state, and that they had spent several hundred thousand dollars in promoting the open-shop campaign.20 The labor

World W a r I and Postwar

85

movement was especially irked by the conduct of Governor Richardson; it found him nearly always unsympathetic to its pleas, reflecting, instead, the complacency of the time. Labor sharply criticized the governor's vetoing of funds to meet the federal grants-in-aid for rehabilitating injured workers. In 1923, Governor Richardson had denounced the sponsors of such proposals as "reactionary spendthrifts," but in 1925 he sought to have the sum restored by a deficiency appropriation. W h a t irked California labor leaders was the failure of the governor's budget to allow adequate amounts for administering workmen's compensation, immigration and housing laws, and the labor department. "Two years ago," the state federation informed its members, "the Governor slashed every teachers' college fund and denounced schools as inefficient. Now he makes substantial increases and boasts that they are the best in the nation, although the management is unchanged." 2 1 The convention of 1925 reiterated its views on the governor, again denouncing him as a reactionary who vetoed bills for improving labor and welfare services and opposed adequate appropriations for educational purposes. 22 In 1926, the executive council criticized the Fresno Labor and Building Trades councils for their attempt to determine policies which the council regarded as within its own province. Representatives from the two bodies met with representatives from the farm bureaus and chambers of commerce of seven valley counties and agreed to a plan for importing Mexican nationals to work on farms. None was to be brought in unless domestic workers were unavailable; and at the end of the harvest the Mexican workers were to be returned to their own country. The program was to be carried out under government supervision. T h e executive council, deploring the action of the Fresno labor groups, declared that the importation of labor could not be the exclusive prerogative of the people of the San Joaquin Valley. If workers would have to be returned to Mexico at the end of the season, it would "necessarily mean that the workers will be held in force to prevent their escape and their acceptance of more desirable and remunerative employment." 23 Affiliates were asked to reject the plan. Resolutions suggesting control of Mexican immigration came before the conventions on a number of occasions. The state federation began to approve proposals to place natives of Mexico and the Philippines under the immigration quota, and sought the support

86

California State Federation of Labor

of the AFL. "Largely through the influence of this Federation the California legislature was prevailed upon to adopt three resolutions memorializing Congress to restrict Filipino and Mexican immigrants and keep intact existing statutes providing for the exclusion of Asiatic laborers." 24 In 1927, the state federation found the legislative situation reversed. Although the new governor was favorable to labor's program, the legislature was dominated by a reactionary coalition. Labor representatives in Sacramento believed that "antilabor lobbyists frequently combined their forces and worked in harmony to beat down every progressive and humane measure before both houses. The consolidated big business lobby was bigger in personnel and more unscrupulous than ever in the State's history." 25 The conventions of 1928, 1929 and 1930 handled routine matters in the usual way. The reports of the officers showed little new activity and no progress. The state federation of labor, like the rest of the movement, was in a conservative mood. The proposals that it endorsed were the standard types. An attack upon Secretary Scharrenberg highlighted the 1928 convention. He had been appointed harbor commissioner — a salaried post — by the governor. A resolution by W . Lyle Slocum of San Francisco Typographical Union No. 21 declared: "The acceptance of a paid political appointment by the Secretary-Treasurer places the representative in a position of serving various interests, which may have the effect of defeating beneficial legislation on behalf of the Federation." The resolution then declared: "The amount paid to the Secretary-Treasurer is deemed adequate to obtain full and free services of the officer, unhampered by other alignments, so as to permit greater activity on behalf of the California State Federation of Labor." 26 The proposal aroused a heated debate, and Scharrenberg requested a roll-call vote. He announced that if a substantial minority favored the resolution he would accept it as a mandate to act. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 42,746 to 7364.

6 - Unemployment, the San Francisco General Strike, and Its Aftermath

Unemployment California suffered severely from unemployment. Estimates by the state unemployment commission were that 228,126 workers were without work in April 1930; and 398,308 in January 1931; 700,000, or 28 per cent of the total gainful workers in 1932. The estimated percentages of union members out of work were 31 in Los Angeles and 24 in San Francisco. However, the heavily organized building trades suffered appreciably more. Fifty-two per cent of unionized building tradesmen in Los Angeles and 62 per cent in San Francisco were without work. Index numbers of employment had dropped steadily from 105 in August 1930 to 60 in June 1932, and payrolls from 103 to 48 in the same period, the latter reflecting the reduction of wages which accompanied the contraction in work.1 In 1931 the state building trades council lacked sufficient funds to continue supporting labor's legislative headquarters in Sacramento. An appeal was made to other central bodies to take up the burden. Secretary J. W . Buzzell of the Los Angeles Central Labor Council agreed to assume one-fourth the cost of maintaining the headquarters at the state capital; this was a hopeful sign, since Los Angeles had always been the heart of opposition to labor organization in southern California. Naturally, unemployment and the methods for its solution were the great issues for labor and for the country. Concepts which are accepted standards today — such as government responsibility for maintaining full, or at least high levels of employment and income

88

California State Federation of Labor

— were controversial then. In fact, even the American Federation of Labor found something sinister and dangerous in a program of government-supported unemployment insurance. In 1931, after a somewhat heated debate, the AFL convention rejected such a program, and, not until the following year, when the unemployed numbered by conservative estimate more than 12 million and when the government's hope for a return of prosperity had proved to be a political mirage, did the AFL change its mind. T h e state federation recognized the need for unemployment insurance a bit earlier. After studying the problem, it sponsored a bill which was introduced in the legislature but not enacted during the 1931 session. In addition, the federation favored the reduction of hours of labor in industry and a program for stabilizing employment. 2 An appeal for assistance to the unemployed — who had exhausted their savings and were facing destitution — was also made, but Governor James Rolph rejected it. 3 T h e jobless migrants inevitably became a problem. Labor leaders petitioned the governor to call a special session to consider their plight. Instead, he called a meeting of mayors of cities of California (to which the state federation was not invited). On November 21, 1931, the meeting proposed that itinerant, nonresident citizens with acceptable medical ratings should be lodged in work camps and allowed to work for their board. In answer to the complaint that labor representatives had not been invited, the governor claimed that some labor people had been present. But the state federation denied that any representatives had been "authorized to vote for the establishment of labor camps where 'physically fit' workers are required to toil for meals and shelter only." 4 Liberal appropriations for public works and an unemployment insurance law were important issues of the 1932 campaign, and unions were asked to question candidates on their positions. 5 In December 1932, unemployment and unemployment relief continued to be urgent problems. In addition to the demand for the enactment of a compulsory system of unemployment insurance, the council called for an appropriation of at least $20,000,000 for relief, a five-day week and six-hour day, and the creation of a state council to study the continuing unemployment problem. Widespread unemployment in the building trades led to an attack upon the wage law on public works enacted in the 1931 session of the legislature.

Unemployment and the General Strike

89

The executive council retained attorneys to defend the measure and financed the costs of the case through the supreme court. In a unanimous decision the law was sustained. The state federation was also mainly concerned with finding some means for relieving the desperate needs of the unemployed. With unemployment widespread, many local unions found their modest per capita contributions to the federation a burden they could not carry, and 71 locals were suspended because of nonpayment in 1933. In the legislative field, the federation enthusiastically favored the National Industrial Recovery Act, and supported a bill for a similar measure in the state. An anti-injunction bill and a measure to repeal the criminal syndicalist law, both sponsored by the federation, failed to pass in 1933.8 A request for endorsement by the "State Committee for the Repeal of the Criminal Syndicalism Law" was refused, "after attention had been called to the fact that this is the fourth time since the enactment of the law in 1919 that more or less irresponsible committees have solicited funds from local unions and carried on abortive campaigns to repeal the law by the Initiative." 7 A proposal to aid a group of defendants charged with violating the criminal syndicalist law was rejected. San Francisco Cloakmakers' Union No. 9, sponsoring the proposal, was notified that, although the federation opposed the statute, it would not undertake to defend those on trial (a stand it had made clear earlier). The federation became directly involved in the strike of metal miners around Jackson in Amador County. On October 1, 1934, about 500 miners walked off their jobs in the Argonaut, Kennedy, Central Eureka, and Little Amador mines. A newly organized local of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' International Union had been organized, and demands for improvement in safety standards and a wage increase were made. President Vandeleur visited the strikers and recommended that a vice-president of the state federation proceed to the area and remain as long as his assistanec was needed. The companies refused any concessions. The Mother Lode Vigilante Committee was organized to combat the strike; and the state federation, aided by the San Francisco Labor Council and the Stockton and Sacramento labor councils, tried to rally labor to help the strikers. The owners announced that they would flood the mines before they would capitulate. An appeal for financial assist-

90

California State Federation of Labor

ance was issued by the federation, and almost $20,000 collected. In the end, however, the walkout was unsuccessful and had to be suspended. 8 Membership gains and the establishment of many small-sized local unions placed added responsibilities upon the state federation. Legislative work in Sacramento increased and became more complicated, and the demand for assistance in organization campaigns and for legal aid to members and locals became more insistent. As a result, the per capita taxes were increased to two cents a month in 1935, and to three cents in 1936. One cent was set aside for financing organization work, and the remainder for legislative work and for providing legal services to affiliates. T h e attorneys for the state federation of labor were available for advising unions on legal problems before the courts, the National Labor Relations Board, or for consultation upon other administrative questions which came before government bodies and which affected the organizations or their members. In 1938, the attorneys handled a number of cases testing the constitutionality of antipicketing regulations adopted by local California communities. Injunction suits, actions pending before the NLRB, and defense of criminal prosecutions that were in the interests of labor organizations were handled by attorneys from the state federation, and the service was provided to affiliates without cost. They also defended workers injured in industry whenever such suits were needed to collect claims under the workmen's compensation law. T h e federation leaders believed that many injured workers had in the past been denied rights under the laws because of their inability to obtain the services of attorneys adequately trained in this phase of legal work. Federation attorneys, in addition to defending the workers, examined all proposed legislation in this area. W h e n the federation received complaints that the state compensation insurance fund was shifting cases to a small group of doctors, it protested the practice as being against the interests of the injured workers. T h e federation also called attention to the custom of sending a worker to several doctors for examination. It was believed that such a course of examinations was made in order to justify his termination of payments. The federation advocated the forming of physicians' and surgeons' panels in a number of cites. "Every physician qualified and willing to accept industrial compensation practice

Unemployment and the General Strike

91

should be included." 9 It also suggested a number of administrative changes which would protect the injured worker and assure him of his rights. In 1938, the attorneys handled 12 suits involving the rights of unions to picket and to carry on other activities. They succeeded in having an ordinance of the city of Antioch prohibiting picketing declared unconstitutional, and the fine imposed upon a picket refunded. Judge Thomas D. Johnston held that "such an ordinance contravenes the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America and the State of California guaranteeing the right of freedom of speech." 10 San Francisco General Strike and Its Aftermath In 1934 the San Francisco general strike, one of the more important events in the history of the California labor movement, tied up the city. While the federation played no direct role in the walkout, the leader of the strike, Edward D. Vandeleur, was elected president of the state federation two months after the strike had ended. Moreover, Daniel Haggerty, a former president, and Anthony Noriega, a vice-president, were members of the strike strategy committee. The strike was the outcome of policies pursued by shipping interests in the port of San Francisco. When the agreement which had ended the 1916 strike expired in May 1919, a bitter struggle followed. The Longshoremen's Association of San Francisco and the Bay Area became bargaining agent instead of the International Longshoremen's Association. This independent organization, which had been formed during the 1919 strike, signed a five-year contract with the Waterfront Employers' Association. Known as the "blue book" union, it periodically renewed its agreement — the last time in 1933 — and carried on without incident. The status of the blue book union was unclear, and for a time it was a member of the San Francisco Labor Council. A protest from the International Longshoremen's Association led to its ousting. A change in the situation took place immediately after the enactment of the National Recovery Act. Organizers of the International Longshoremen's Union were sent to the Pacific Coast and succeeded in reviving their organizations in all the ports. San Francisco Local 38-79 was established, with Lee J. Holman as president, while William J. Lewis became president

92

California State Federation of Labor

of the Pacific Coast District. In September 1933, the local officials of the National Industrial Recovery Act agreed that the blue book union was discriminating against members of the Longshoremen's Association in the allotment of jobs, but no action was taken. In 1934, San Francisco was the only important Pacific Coast port which had not decasualized. Its longshoremen were divided into "star gangs" and casuals. Of the approximately 5000 men registered with the Longshoremen's Association of San Francisco and the Bay District, 3000 paid regular dues. Some of them were permanently employed by stevedore companies. Others looked for work along the entire waterfront. Longshoremen "shaped up" once a day where hiring bosses selected their crews.11 The longshoremen were customarily employed by stevedoring contractors, although in a minority of instances the stevedore company was a subsidiary of a steamship company. Whoever the employer might be, he was concerned with rapid loading or discharge of cargo since the rapidity with which these tasks were completed influenced the earning power of the vessel. T h e objective was to load or discharge cargo so that the vessel could "get going" in order to avoid wharf charges. After 1919, the stevedores and shipowners in San Francisco adopted a hostile attitude toward the longshore and seagoing unions. Men such as Captain Robert Dollar were relentless foes of unionism. Nevertheless, the "blue book" union enjoyed a closed shop. It allowed discriminatory hiring practices, kickbacks and usurers to prey on the longshoremen, and tolerated all the evils which normally accompany the "shape up." In contrast to the decasualization programs in other Pacific Coast ports, San Francisco employers introduced no plans for regularizing employment. One of the leaders of the San Francisco Waterfront Employers' Association blamed the unions for the absence of any decasualization program. He evidently forgot that for 15 years the only union that operated on the docks was one which employers controlled. 13 Conditions aboard ships had steadily deteriorated after the strike of 1921. Membership had been decimated, and there was no job control. Seafarers were exposed to a series of forays by radical groups seeking to gain a foothold. Little success was achieved by the Marine Transport Workers' Union of the Industrial Workers of the World, or by the Communists during the 1920's. T h e agitation may have

Unemployment and the General Strike

93

received attention, b u t no important organizing successes were achieved. N o force existed on the waterfront to halt the steadily worsening conditions. T h e industry was far from prosperous. Hiring of seamen on the Pacific Coast, after 1921, was through service bureaus controlled by employers. Long hours, low wages, poor food and inadequate quarters were the lot of the American seaman. A study by the United States Maritime Commission found that in the 1920's "wages fell and working conditions grew steadily worse until, at the depth of the depression, some American seamen were receiving as little as $25.00 a month, living under wretched conditions, eating unpalatable food, and working 12 or more hours a day." 13 T h e Pacific Coast longshore and seafaring unions were new in the sense that the old leaders lacked any real prestige or authority. T h e absence of organization for more than a decade, the recruitment of many workers without union experience and the effect of the depression upon attitudes introduced an uncertainty into the situation which employers accustomed to strong methods and absolute rule were unable to appreciate. In the meantime, union organization was reviving among the seagoing workers on the Pacific Coast. O n August 31, 1933, the Pacific Coast District, International Seamen's Union, and the employees of the stewards' departments, sought to bargain for the unlicensed personnel, b u t the shipowners refused. In February 1934, the convention of the Pacific Coast Longshoremen's Association, representing the longshoremen, agreed to take a strike vote in all its ports. W h e n the vote was approved, the association prepared to call a walkout for February 25, 1934; this was halted, however, when President Roosevelt appointed a mediation board. A temporary agreement was reached, and a strike was averted, b u t the basic issues (wages, and control of the hiring hall) were unresolved. 14 O n May 9, the longshoremen left their jobs all along the Pacific Coast. A leader of the strike was quoted in the San Francisco News on the day before the walkout: " N o one, not even President Roosevelt, can stop the strike now except employers who conform to our demands." Violence started in the first hour. 1 5 Recruiting of strikebreakers began immediately, and the News described the dispersal of 200 longshoremen by the police "where shipowners were recruiting additional nonunion workers to replace those on strike." At first the

94

California State Federation of Labor

teamsters agreed to haul merchandise to and from the piers but later, at a special meeting, revoked the decision. This was an important resolution — obviously taken in spite of the leaders who favored less antagonistic action. On May 16, the seagoing licensed and unlicensed personnel joined the strike; later a joint strike committee, on which all the unions involved were represented, was set up. The seamen demanded recognition of the Pacific Coast District of the International Seamen's Union as their bargaining agent, and submission to arbitration for all issues upon which no agreement could be reached. The ship operators were willing to bargain, but only on a company-by-company basis.16 The joint strike committee decided on June 19 that none of the organizations would return to work until settlements were reached with all unions. Efforts to work out an agreement failed. In mid-May, there were signs that some members of the business community were becoming restive and were demanding a more aggressive policy. It was believed by some that the Waterfront Employers' Association was not showing sufficient militancy, and the Industrial Association "which had been organized in 1921 for the purpose of handling problems affecting the community as a whole, was brought into the picture from that time on, until the conclusion of the strike. It played a more and more prominent part in connection with all activities relating to the controversy." 17 On June 1 and 5, the Industrial Association held meetings with leading businessmen, during which plans for breaking the strike were formulated. They decided "to place full responsibility for the conduct of the waterfront strike in the hands of the Industrial Association in cooperation with the shipowners. This decision was not made public . . . as the plans which were later developed had not matured and the procedure for announcing those plans had not been decided upon." 18 In the meantime, business interests became more adamant about opening the port. An agreement had been reached by May 28, but the terms were not acceptable to longshoremen. Negotiated by President Joseph P. Ryan, of the International Longshoremen's Association and a committee from the Pacific Coast ports, it proposed arbitration of all issues and recognition of the union in all ports except Los Angeles. It was opposed by Harry Bridges, who had emerged as the San Francisco leader of the strike. Ryan tried again,

Unemployment and the General Strike

95

and a tentative agreement was reached on June 16 by the formal leaders of the strike. The union was to be recognized in all ports; wages and other conditions of employment were to be set on a local basis; and permanent nonunion longshoremen were to remain on the job. This offer was rejected and Ryan disassociated himself from negotiations. Three days later the Joint Marine Strike Committee was established. Paul Eliel of the Industrial Association was convinced "that the problem of the Waterfront Employers' Association and of the ship operators in the community was never one of whether ships, after landing here, could be properly serviced from the standpoint of loading and unloading of freight . . . but rather the problem of getting freight to and from the docks. The action of the Teamsters' Union in May and the definite boycotting of the waterfront and final refusal by that organization in June to handle waterfront freight were the critical factors in the entire San Francisco strike situation." The Industrial Association had been preparing to move freight through the picket lines and had rented trucks and warehouses. After the refusal of the longshoremen to accept the agreement of June 17, a trucking company was organized, and, at a meeting on the following day, pledges of financial support were obtained. Reports of meetings of various groups of businessmen and government officials appeared daily in the press. In the meantime, President Roosevelt, in response to appeals from the business community, appointed the National Longshoremen's Board to settle the dispute. Archbishop Edward J. Hanna headed the board, and Assistant Secretary of Labor Edward F. McGrady and A. K. Cushing served with him. At the same time, the Industrial Association notified the police that it planned to begin trucking operations on July 2. The first offer by the longshoremen's board was rejected by the strikers, and plans for beginning trucking operations went on, but a postponement of three days was agreed to. The employers were now ready to arbitrate all issues, but, as the Labor Clarion observed, the "offer of the employers to arbitrate appears to have come too late." On July 3, trucking operations began. Five trucks loaded with merchandise were dispatched to the warehouse of the Atlas Trucking Company. On the next day, pickets attacked a train of cars on the Belt Line Railway, a state-owned operation, which was moving cars to the docks of the Matson Navigation Company. Learning of this,

96

California State Federation of Labor

Governor Frank Merriam asked that trains be allowed to pass without interference — a demand refused by the strikers. Thereupon the governor called out the national guard. 19 On July 5, the worst riot of the strike occurred when masses of pickets, fighting to prevent the movement of trucks from Pier 38, were attacked by the police. Two were killed, and many injured. The Labor Clarion charged: "The Industrial Association deliberately precipitated the crisis by an insincere gesture to remove goods from docks to a warehouse a few blocks away, knowing in advance that the move would be countered by strikers and sympathizers and that bloodshed was inevitable. It savored of premeditation and deliberate and planned provocation of strife." 2 0 Instead of terrorizing the strikers, these actions won them the virtually united support of the city's labor movement. A resolution, framed by Edward Vandeleur and John A. O'Connell, secretary of the San Francisco Labor Council, denounced the governor and declared: "No inordinate danger to life and property justifying such extraordinary action existed during the entire course of nearly two months' strike that could not be handled by the City Government and its police force within the bounds of law and reason." The resolution charged that the governor's action had been responsible for bloodshed and rioting, and called for a resumption of negotiations "with a view of working out justice to all concerned." 21 On the day following the riot, John A. O'Connell informed President William Green that the council had been "compelled to act on its own initiative, in order to prevent the breaking out of a disordered and disorganized general strike. If that eventually should be forced on us, it should be done on a unified and intelligent basis, instead of a haphazard and totally uncontrolled direction." 22 Green also denounced the sending of troops, but he told O'Connell that the laws of the American Federation of Labor forbade central bodies from calling general strikes. Such power, O'Connell was reminded, rests with the international and national unions. 23 Evidently the leaders of the council were convinced that a general strike could not be averted. They, therefore, sought to retain control of the movement even though their sponsorship violated the constitution and practices of the AFL. On July 11, 1934, the waterfront employers, in response to the pleas of the National Longshoremen's Board, announced that 42

Unemployment and the General Strike

97

steamship companies had agreed to meet with representatives of their seafaring employees for the purpose of collective bargaining; such representatives were to be chosen in an election under the direction of the board. 24 The most important step was the adoption by the council of a resolution for the appointment of a strike strategy committee of seven "for the purpose of investigating in any manner deemed proper and expedient the status and general situation of the strike and further directed to consult and advise the responsible officers of the striking unions in order that such steps as it may deem proper and necessary to effectuate a joint program for the guidance and advice of the labor movement of San Francisco be formulated." Though the resolution was debated for some time, it passed by the overwhelming majority of 165 to 8. Vandclcur, D. P. Haggerty, M. S. Maxwell, Frank Brown, J. A. O'Connell, George Kidwell, and Charles A. Deery were appointed, and they selected Vandeleur as chairman. Vandeleur assured the community that the San Francisco labor movement wanted "to give the shipowners and the National Longshoremen's Board every chance to settle this crisis peacefully and we want to act peacefully and not violently." A reversal of the trend toward a strike was now, of course, virtually impossible. The disregard of human life and the failure to sense changes that had taken place in the climate of opinion were major reasons for the fast-developing crisis. The stalemate could not be broken. The steamship companies were ready, in the first week of July, to meet with the representatives of the seafaring employees; the unions requested, in the event direct negotiations failed, that the companies agree to submit the dispute to arbitration. The International Longshoremen's Association informed the National Longshoremen's Board that it would not submit the stevedore's offer to a referendum vote of its members until (1) agreement was reached on the management and administration of the hiring halls, and (2) the maritime unions and the shipowners had reached a satisfactory agreement. The strike strategy committee called a meeting for a report on developments for July 13.25 Before the meeting, Edward Vandeleur declared that "the general strike can still be avoided if the Waterfront Employees' Union will grant the Longshoremen's Union the right to conduct its own union headquarters in the same manner in which every other Union is

98

California State Federation of Labor

conducting it, and if the shipowners will agree to submit to the President's Board all grievances in dispute for arbitration. If they refuse this responsibility for a general strike will rest on their shoulders." 26 Each local union affiliated with the San Francisco Labor Council and the San Francisco Building Trades Council was asked to send five delegates to the special meeting. As soon as the meeting convened, discussion began on the objectives of the strike. Harry Bridges, head of the San Francisco longshoremen's strike committee, wanted no limit placed on the general walkout. On July 15, the Market Street Railway workers left their jobs; they announced that the move was not an incident in the general strike, but was an attempt to settle numerous grievances of their own. Mayor Angelo Rossi of San Francisco declared an emergency and pleaded for the maintenance of peace and order. The general strike committee appointed a permit committee so that food trucks would be allowed to operate and food stores continue in business. Governor Merriam, in turn, dispatched additional troops to the Bay area. The strike continued, with the National Longshoremen's Board trying to settle the issues. Each day of the general strike, a compromise, in the form of allowing some operation to begin, was made. On July 19, the general strike committee voted by 191 to 174 to terminate the walkout and asked all workers, except those having specific grievances of their own (which included the longshoremen, the maritime unions, and the Market Street Railway workers) to return to their jobs. The closeness of the vote, which was preceded by an angry debate, reveals the confusion of mind and lack of unanimity within the committee. In a statement, the general strike committee denied that the strike had been led by Communists; it also declared that at no time had the movement been out of control. On July 29 an announcement was made that the shipowners would recognize the International Seamen's Union; the longshoremen and the two striking licensed officers thereupon voted to return to work on Tuesday, July 31.27 The ward of the board, handed down on October 12, was generally greeted with favor, although Bridges was disappointed at the failure to grant the union full control of the hiring hall. The San Francisco general strike resulted directly from policies pursued by anti-union employers over the years. Though the movement in the area had always had its militant left wing, there were

Unemployment and the General Strike

99

conservative leaders in strategic posts who could hold the membership to a moderate course. Anti-union employers, following the tactics popularized in the past by Calhoun and Köster, failed to recognize the changed situation and the shift in power that had taken place. Reluctantly they yielded each point only after the propitious time for accepting such concessions by the strikers had already passed. T h e final act of folly, of course, was the attempt to open the port. Running armed trucks through the picket lines angered the entire movement, and killing pickets destroyed the last resistance to the general strike — which some had wanted and many had feared. T o be sure, under the most favorable circumstances, it would have been difficult to reduce the influence of Harry Bridges, who proved himself an intelligent, articulate, and resourceful leader. But certainly at this time he and the longshoremen had not yet consolidated their power and were dependent upon the support of the general labor movement, especially the teamsters. Moreover, it is not at all certain that appropriate concessions given in time would have aborted the influence of the radical elements. But the anti-union business leaders seemed determined to pursue a course which simply confirmed the charges of radical leadership. The attack on Scharrenberg. The effect of the expansion of union organizations manifested itself in another direction. Secretary-Treasurer Paul Scharrenberg, who belonged to the Sailors' Union of the Pacific (SUP) and had served as secretary-treasurer of the state federation of labor since 1909, was expelled from the SUP. Scharrenberg, who had been active in the San Francisco and California Labor movements from the day he joined the union, was closely associated with Andrew Furuseth, Walter MacArthur, and other leaders of the maritime labor organizations then coming under attack. His policy views were not shared by the new leaders who had risen to influence and power on the wave of discontent generated by the Great Depression. The successful maritime strike in 1934 had led to the formation of the Pacific Coast Maritime Federation — from the beginning Communist-dominated, and destined to last only a few years. Harry Lundeberg of the SUP, who was chosen as its first president, was, according to Scharrenberg, prosecuting charges against him for having called an "illegal" strike. Scharrenberg, in addition to being expelled, was charged with having supported the blue-book union on

100

California State Federation of Labor

the San Francisco waterfront. In his defense, Scharrenberg claimed he had done his best to prevent the strike. "However, the membership unanimously endorsed the recommendations of the International District Committee to withdraw union members from the tankers because the tanker operators refused to do what all other shipowners had already done, namely to grant 'preference of employment to union m e n . ' " A resolution proposed by President Vandeleur defended Scharfenberg against "communist character assassins." 2 8 Nevertheless, he found the hostility of the Pacific Coast maritime unions an impediment to his effectiveness as secretary-treasurer of the federation and resigned the following April. In addition to his service in that position since 1909, he had served as legislative representative for the International Seamen's Union of America, of which the Sailors' Union of the Pacific was a branch, and as a legislative representative for the AFL. 2 9 The executive council expressed its appreciation for "the faithful and efficient service he has rendered to the workers of California," and elected Edward D. Vandeleur, then serving his second term as president of the state federation, to the vacant post. Vandeleur had had a distinguished career as a labor leader. He was born at Yountville, California, on July 15, 1886, and learned the mason's trade from his father. He came to San Francisco and was hired as carman for the United Railroads Company. He soon joined the Amalgamated Association of Street, Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, was elected president of the union, and led the 1917 strike against the United Railroad. In 1919, he was employed on the Municipal Railway Company as a conductor, became active in the affairs of Local 518, and was chosen president of the local. As president of the central labor council in 1933, he was responsible for the calling of the general strike in 1934. Convinced that an attempt was on foot to destroy the labor movement of San Francisco, he had not hesitated to exercise his influence in favor of the general walkout. Vandeleur was annually reelected until his death — several times against considerable opposition. In 1935, the state federation of labor became involved in a dispute affecting the San Diego Federated Trades and Labor Council. Under the leadership of Professor Harry Steinmetz, an elected delegate from the Teachers' Union of San Diego State College, a movement was launched to support the Communist-dominated American Youth

Unemployment and the General Strike

101

Congress. In July 1935, Steinmetz was elected president of the council, although he had only belonged to the Teachers' Union for three months. A number of unions became greatly concerned when he threatened to start legal action against the opening of the International Exposition in San Diego unless its directors entered an agreement covering all organized and unorganized workers. A protest from the San Diego Theatrical Federation (comprising organized musicians, projectionists, and stage employees) was not long in coming. Sensing a job threat in what they believed was an irresponsible action, they insisted that the federated trades council had no such authority and was in fact usurping the right of the three crafts to negotiate their own contracts; moreover, they held that such negotiations were not within the province of a federated body. 30 T h e San Diego Council stood firm and reiterated, on December 11, 1936, its plan to close the exposition unless council demands were met. The amusement trades were now joined by the culinary workers. T h e state federation, whose power was limited in these matters, called on the AFL, which had chartered the San Diego Labor Council. President William Green dispatched Joseph M. Casey to prevent the council from carrying out its plans, and also to compel it to conform to the rules of the AFL. President Steinmetz and Secretary A. C. Rogers of the council were removed, and a group of officers loyal to the AFL were installed. T h e suspended officers appealed to the courts for an injunction, but failed. 31 A direct attack upon the Communist-inspired left wing was made at the 1935 convention, when it was charged that there was "an insidious effort by Communists and allied organizations to capture the trade unions." T h e Sacramento Federated Trades Council declared that this group was "acting under orders from Moscow . . . to undermine the confidence of working men and women who are organized under the banner of the A. F. of L." The resolution then called upon "all citizens and loyal members of the American Federation of Labor energetically [to] use all means at our command to purge our membership of proven Red termites who are endeavoring to destroy our government and the American Federation of Labor." Central labor councils were advised not to seat delegates proved to be members of the Communist Party, or its active supporters. The proposal carried by a vote of 55,113 to 16,328. Although those op-

102

California State Federation of Labor

posed to the declaration were not all under Communist influence, the vote shows indirectly the significance of left-wing opinion. In fact, despite much vocal opposition to Communist activity, left-wing influence did seem to be on the rise. In 1935, for example, Harry Bridges polled only 19,202 votes as a candidate for vice-president, but in the following year he was able to win with a vote of 50,989. To some extent, of course, Bridges' victory may not have been an accurate reflection of the growth of left-wing sentiment within the state federation of labor; it may have shown the desire to recognize the achievements of one who had already made his mark upon the northern California labor movement. Despite its basic inhospitality to left-wing views, the state federation had had a long history of tolerance toward heterodox opinion. In the political sphere, the executive council would endorse only Hiram Johnson for reelection to the United States Senate in 1934. By a vote of 7 to 4, it refused to endorse any candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, or other state offices.32 Although there was some support for the incumbent state officers, it would have been difficult for the federation to endorse Governor Frank Merriam. Legislation. The results of the 1935 session of the legislature were "bitterly disappointing." Scharrenberg reported that there were a few progressive-minded members of the assembly, but that in the senate "the cause of progress was hopeless." He complained especially of the legislature's failure to provide adequate relief funds.33 Although traditionally conservative views were endorsed, the large number of minority votes for more heterodox proposals reflected the influence of membership increases and of the formation of new unions in California during the early 1930's. The depression, with its unemployment and destitution, was undoubtedly another factor which influenced many labor groups to take a more radical position on many issues. One resolution, unanimously supported, called upon affiliated unions to boycott German-made goods, and asked the Amateur Athletic Union to rescind its acceptance of the invitation to participate in the Berlin Olympic games.34 The fight against Franco Spain was approved. On the other hand, the 1936 federation convention rejected a resolution calling for a referendum of the American people before a war declaration by Congress would become effective.

Unemployment and the General Strike

103

T h e federation submitted its proposals to the 1936 Governor's Conference on Revenue and Taxation. Joined by the labor councils of San Francisco and Los Angeles, the federation called for adequate provision for the unemployed, the aged, and dependent minors. Revenue, in the view of the federation, could be raised by taxes based upon ability to pay, income, and inheritances. On these grounds, the federation vehemently opposed the 1933 sales tax, its extension and increase, as regressive and burdensome to those least able to bear any added taxes.35 Organizing Political Activity Fear that Labor's Non-Partisan League, formed by the Committee for Industrial Organization, might usurp the political influence of the state federation led to the establishment of the American Federation of Labor Political League of California. Meeting in special session in San Francisco, on January 30, 1938, the executive council announced that a conference would be held in Santa Barbara on March 20, to which each AFL union could send two delegates. "The aims and objects of the A. F. of L. Political League of California will be to give the entire membership an opportunity to consider qualifications of candidates for the various elective offices of the State government, from Governor down to the Senate and Assembly." 36 The league was to consider endorsements for candidates before the primaries. The federation also found it "necessary that all A. F. of L. organizations and their members be fully protected against political machinations of various groups that seek to convey to the worker and the public the idea that they represent the Organized Workers, when they are in fact working against the interests of the workers and to the detriment of Organized Labor." Representatives from 238 affiliates assembled at Santa Barbara and declared that in "keeping with the longstanding policy of the American Federation of Labor, the League will not participate in partisan politics, but, through cooperative effort on the part of local unions chartered by national and international unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and local labor unions chartered directly by the American Federation of Labor," would seek to support known friends of labor. T h e primary function of the new league was to coordinate labor's strength in state elections so that progressive candidates would be chosen for state office. It described the Ameri-

104

California State Federation of Labor

can Federation of Labor Political League of California as the instrument for achieving progressive and honest government. 37 A resolution denounced Labor's Non-Partisan League as a C I O agency and urged AFL central bodies and local unions to withdraw from it and to deny it financial support. One delegate from the studio carpenters of Los Angeles stated that he felt cooperation with the C I O on some issues and candidates was desirable; his was the only dissenting voice, and the resolution was approved. Delegates voted to meet again in July to decide on endorsements. The league urged the immediate creation in each political subdivision of a committee whose duty it would be to prepare a list of known candidates and their qualifications. In the districts where there were no candidates favorable to labor, district committees were advised to seek someone to meet such specifications. The committees were asked to prepare separate recommendations for each office.38 T h e Santa Barbara conference was attended by 597 delegates representing more than 300 affiliates. T h e benchmarks by which candidates' attitudes were to be judged included their answers and opinions on laws for a shorter workweek, collective bargaining, antipicketing, provision for more assistance to the industrial accident commission, improvements in the workmen's compensation law, clarification of the unemployment reserves legislation, old age pensions, improved enforcement of the minimum wage law, relief for unemployed on work projects, more humane and efficient handling of the migratory labor problem, support of education, improvement in industrial safety laws, limit of the number of cars on trains, the setting up of a state labor relations board, opposition to use of the highway patrol in industrial disputes, opposition to the creation of a state police system, repeal of the criminal syndicalist law, payment of wages on public works, making corporations legally responsible for any action performed by special officers in their employ, and appointment of labor members on all boards or commissions handling questions affecting wage earners. 39 Before the second conference opened on July 9, Culbert L. Olson, a member of the California Senate and chairman of the senate's committee on labor and capital (and future governor who released T o m Mooney) wrote that he was "entitled to the endorsement and support of the A. F. of L. Political League [as a candidate for

Unemployment and the General Strike

105

governor]." Olson called attention to his activity on behalf of organized labor during his membership in the state senate in Utah and during his tenure in California, and also the numerous labor endorsements he had already received.40 Olson failed to gain the league's endorsement. William G. McAdoo, a Democrat, was endorsed for reelection to the United States Senate; Ray L. Riley was the Republican approved for the same office. Those seeking approval for the governorship were the most carefully scrutinized. A number of local unions and central labor councils submitted letters of approval which were reviewed by the committee on endorsements. Several of the gubernatorial candidates were on hand and were interviewed. Among the questions asked was whether, if a study case convinced the candidate of the innocence of Mooney and Billings, he would be willing to release the two from prison. Uniformly, the answer was "yes." After comparing the records of all candidates for governor, the committee recommended Daniel C. Murphy, a former president of the state federation. However, the committee proposed that instead of having delegates vote on its recommendations, each delegate should be allowed to rise and call the name of the candidate he preferred. On the roll-call vote, Murphy polled 304; and his endorsement was then made unanimous. When the names of congressional candidates were considered, the committee refused to recommend support for John F. Shelley, an officer of the San Francisco Bakery Drivers' Union. After the conference adjourned, an appeal was sent to all vice-presidents of the state federation of labor, and the heads of central labor bodies, requesting them to mobilize all the strength of their organizations behind endorsed candidates. It was believed that a successful showing in the primaries would increase the political stature of the AFL segment of the California labor movement. The federation candidate failed to win the nomination in the primary, and Olson polled the largest vote on the Democratic side. His prolabor record led most labor leaders to work in his behalf. In the midst of the campaign, William Green announced his endorsement of Governor Frank Merriam, who was a candidate for reelection on the Republican ticket.41 An immediate demand for retraction was made by President C. J. Haggerty, J. W . Buzzell, of the Los Angeles Central Labor Council, and Alexander Watchman, president of the San

106

California State Federation of Labor

Francisco Building Trades Council.42 Though it was not withdrawn, it did not affect the outcome, since Olson was elected. The labor league disbanded at this time. In the meantime, the California labor movement faced a serious attack on the legislative front, and all its strength had to be mustered to ward off the unexpected offensive. Right to work. The Women of the Pacific, a front organization for antilabor employer groups, sponsored an initiative proposal which in very tricky language would have made picketing "unlawful." Section 4 of the proposal declared that picketing designed to induce anyone to refrain from seeking or obtaining employment or to refrain from purchasing, selling, using or delivering any goods or services would be forbidden. Picketing by employees in a primary strike would have been seriously restricted in that the strikers would be compelled to designate in writing certain of their number as pickets, and those pickets would be compelled to carry and present such written designation upon request. The number of pickets would have been limited to one at each entrance to a place of business, and they would have been compelled to wear arm bands giving the names of the organization represented, and to carry signs announcing that a strike was in progress. The state federation immediately launched a campaign against the measure. Largely through the efforts of the federation, it was unable to qualify on the ballot. But the federation immediately faced another and more serious threat from a "farmers'" initiative, sponsored by the California Committee for Peace in Employment Relations, which sought to regulate picketing, boycotts, strikes, and to impose other restrictions upon organized labor. The state federation warned that the new attack was even more dangerous and that if the proposal were placed on the ballot, it would mean a bitter and expensive campaign for labor.43 The federation claimed that under the farmers' proposals, a union could not order a strike of its members unless every single member of the union was directly affected by the demand or demands regarding wages, hours, or (physical) conditions of employment. If only a segment of the members were engaged in a labor dispute, this group would be required to form a separate union. As union action must be for all members, an employer could, by granting concessions to a minority, prevent demands by a majority. No strike would be legal unless it were on behalf of a demand for changes in

Unemployment and the General Strike

107

wages, hours, or physical conditions. Strikes for union security or to prevent discharge or layoffs in a given manner would therefore be illegal, and all types of boycotts would be outlawed. As a first move, the state federation sought to have the initiative proposal removed from the ballot on the ground that its title was misleading and that many of the acts forbidden by the measure, such as illegal picketing, were already unlawful. When the state supreme court denied the petition, the federation called upon labor unions throughout California to create committees immediately in order to bring the issues to the voters. An executive committee was appointed by the federation to direct the campaign. The federation charged that the committee sponsoring Initiative Proposition No. 1, as the proposal was named, had always fought against industrial peace, that the measure would prohibit effective picketing by forbidding pickets to inform passersby of the reasons for the strike, and by prohibiting a union from distributing or announcing information describing the cause of the strike. The proposal also made it unlawful for a union to advise its members to strike, and gave the employer the right to sue for any loss of business suffered as a result of a strike. The labor movement also objected to the provision prohibiting the threat of any monetary loss, injury to business or reduction in earnings or profits, and to another which would outlaw any expression of views hostile to an employer whose workers were on strike by those who did not have an interest in the dispute. The campaign against this initiative proposal contributed to the large turnout of delegates to the state federation of labor convention at Santa Barbara. President C. J. Haggerty announced that not only would there be more delegates than had ever before assembled for a convention, but also that more workers would be represented than at previous meetings. He was convinced that it was the largest convention held by any state federation of labor in the country.44 To aid in unifying labor, the convention voted to concentrate all of its energies on defeating the measure. Professor John B. Canning headed the Citizens' Committee Against Proposition 1, and Paul O. Gaffeney led the Voters' Coalition Committee Against Proposition No. 1. Labor organizations rallied to campaign. Organized workers throughout the state were urged to attend rallies, register, and to vote against the antilabor measure. Organized workers were

108

California State Federation of Labor

urged to confine their activities to the defeat of the proposition.45 That the aggressive campaign conducted by the state labor movement was successful was clear when the proposal was defeated by over 409,000 votes. When the outcome was known, Vandeleur declared: "The vote shows that the people of California will not tolerate the propaganda of would-be dictators, and cannot be influenced by their propaganda. It is regrettable to think that many of our citizens allowed themselves to be used in this malicious attempt. The answer of the people is clear. Those who sought to ham-string liberty and the right of free speech and freedom of the press should take the decision of the people to mean that if they don't like our particular form of government they should go to Europe where they can find a dictatorship to their liking." Endorsements in 1940. The federation convention of 1940 considered several resolutions endorsing the third-term candidacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The resolutions committee recommended approval, but went on to declare "that in making such endorsement . . . it should be distinctly understood that the California State Federation of Labor is a close adherent of the non-partisan policy of the American Federation of Labor, and that such an endorsement is in no way to be construed as an endorsement of any political party." At the same time, the resolutions committee criticized the "so-called 'Labor Roosevelt Committees' that spring up overnight," and urged the federation "to see to it that the name of Labor and the names of responsible Labor officials should only be used in connection with Labor activities in this campaign, sponsored by bona fide unions of the American Federation of Labor." 46 Some objection was registered on the ground that it was not sufficiently specific, and an amendment that the "California State Federation of Labor go on record as endorsing the candidacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt for president and no other candidate for public office" was adopted. Since the executive council had earlier supported the reelection of Senator Hiram Johnson, that issue did not arise at the convention. The resolutions committee of the 1941 convention, considering several resolutions dealing with the Olson administration, declared that the "State Federation of Labor has been critical of the Governor on some . . . subjects . . . and the American Federation of Labor would be ingrates indeed if they did not wipe the slate

Unemployment and the General Strike

109

clean and [indicate] to Governor Olsen that they would support him." The resolutions committee, although extrolling the governor's veto of a bill outlawing the secondary boycott, criticized his conduct in the Westwood lumber strike in which he had used state troopers. Secretary Vandeleur took exception to the committee's report and insisted that delegates should take a definite "stand on this subject and proposed an amendment that the Federation unequivocally endorse the policies of President Roosevelt and this Federation stand squarely behind Governor Culbert Olson's liberal policies." 47 The issue again came before the convention in 1942, and the convention "unqualifiedly endorsed Culbert Olson as Governor . . . Too much stress cannot be laid upon the subject of an energetic campaign. W e believe that this is not a question of electing certain persons, but rather that the fortunes of the Labor Movement are up in these campaigns in such a manner that the fate of the entire Labor Movement will favorably or adversely affect the results of the election." At the March 1944 meeting of the executive council, the proposal to endorse a presidential candidate had been postponed to the September meeting. Vice-President Albert Gruhn called for a consideration of this issue. Lundeberg objected and argued that the state federation of labor had "already given Roosevelt a vote of confidence. This [the endorsement] is not in line with the statement of [President] Green on Labor Day." Haggerty immediately responded that there was "nothing in the motion [to endorse Roosevelt] which is in conflict with Green's address. W e are not endorsing a party, we are endorsing an individual. It is my opinion that if you take a tally of your people at least 90 per cent would want you to endorse the President, the Vice President and the Senator now in office. If you had a convention [none was held in 1944 because of the war] you would have a complete endorsement of Roosevelt and his running mate. You are acting as the policy body in between conventions." The motion to endorse Roosevelt and the amendment to include an endorsement of the Democratic candidate for vice president, Harry Truman, and for senator, Sheridan Downey, was carried; Vice-Presidents C. F. May, Harry Lundeberg, Charles W . Real, and C. T. Lehmann voted against it. 48 At the beginning of 1946, the executive council interviewed the

110

California State Federation of Labor

candidates for state offices, and endorsed Earl Warren, a Republican, for reelection as governor, John Shelley, a Democrat, for Lieutenant governor, and Edward Brown, a Democrat, and Frederick W . Howser, a Republican, for attorney general.49 Subsequently, Will Rogers, Jr. was endorsed as candidate for the United States Senate.

7-Effects and Influence of the CIO

The California Federation of Labor grew rapidly during the first years of the New Deal. From 1918 until 1933 its membership had remained at around 83,000 but reached 235,000 in 1937. The formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization did not at first appreciably affect relations between those who favored the craft type of union and those who believed that the mass-production industries could be unionized more rapidly and effectively through industrial unions. Without showing favor toward the Committee for Industrial Organization, the California Federation of Labor went on record, at its 1936 convention, as "opposing the action of the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor in suspending or expelling the ten International Unions comprising the Committee for Industrial Organization." 1 The invasion of organized jurisdictions and the raiding of existing unions soon dispelled any friendly feeling toward the CIO. Another factor influencing the change in view was the radical leadership of some of the CIO unions, both on a national and state level. By 1937, the federation denounced it as a group of "communists, marauders and misleaders." 2 In 1938, the state federation charged that the CIO had signed contracts inferior to those obtained by non-CIO unions, and that some of the picketing was aimed at breaking AFL contracts rather than winning favorable terms of employment for CIO members.3 Hostility toward the CIO was also shown at the 1938 convention, which rejected several resolutions urging unity in the labor movement. At the 1940 convention, in a detailed statement, SecretaryTreasurer Vandeleur charged that the "major threat to the American

112

California State Federation of Labor

Federation of Labor in California . . . came not from the employer, but from the CIO. It embarked upon a large-scale program of raiding established American Federation of Labor unions, which reached high tide in the attempt of the CIO warehousemen to pirate the membership of Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union No. 24, at the Euclid Candy Company plant in San Francisco. The affair had a significance all out of proportion to the number of workers involved . . . Through the CIO Warehousemen, the dual unionists reached into many plants where the production workers were members of the American Federation of Labor. These CIO warehousemen were instructed to agitate continually among the production workers for a change of affiliation from the American Federation of Labor to the CIO . . . At the request of Candy and Confectionery Workers Union No. 24, this office entered the fight. The result was a smashing victory for the American Federation of Labor; and a setback for the CIO from which it has never recovered." 4 It was the position of the AFL leadership that its affiliate, Candy and Confectionery Local No. 24, had a legitimate closed-shop contract with the Euclid Candy Company. Agricultural workers. The federation had since 1910 shown sporadic interests in the organization of the farm workers of the state. Lack of funds, hostility of the growers and the local governments, and the low response of the agricultural workers to union appeals prevented the federation from embarking on any large-scale organizing effort. However, fear of a successful invasion of California agriculture by the CIO was at least partly responsible for the renewed organizing activity of the federation among the workers of the farms and canneries of the state. In June 1936, the executive council of the state federation set up a state committee for agricultural organization under the direction of one of its vice-presidents, Walter Cowan, following a program mapped out at a conference of agricultural workers in Stockton. President William Green was informed that "there had never been a stable and responsible organization of farm workers in California, and as a result, we have had twenty-five years of intermittent turmoil and bloodshed as symptoms of a bad condition. The California State Federation of Labor's participation in organizing the agricultural workers means that the conservative and responsible labor movement

Effects and Influence of the C I O

113

is at last moving into a field that heretofore has been left to left wing agitation." 5 Some progress was made. Demands were made and rejected by the growers; a strike of agricultural workers in Salinas and Watsonville was called; almost immediately local authorities attempted to intimidate the strikers. The state federation charged that the communities were dominated by the Shippers'-Growers' Vegetable Association, and that the use of violence and intimidation against the strikers was a violation of the strikers' constitutional rights. The strikers, who were virtually without funds, needed immediate help. An appeal for financial assistance was issued, and more than $11,000 was collected by the federation.® After Joseph Casey gave an account of the Salinas strike to the 1936 convention, the delegates marched around the state capitol as a protest against the conduct of the state police. 7 In September, a committee of four from the federation's executive council, headed by President James E. Hopkins and Vandeleur, met with a committee from the Shippers'-Growers' Vegetable Association in the office of Governor Frank Merriam, with the governor acting as mediator. The union committee offered to submit all issues to arbitration or future negotiation if the growers would agree to a preferential hiring program for union members. No agreement was reached, and the labor delegation felt that the employer group showed an "arbitrary attitude, and unquestionably did not desire to reach an adjustment . . . If we are to be met by employers who assume the attitude of this Employer group, there is nothing left but to throw the entire strength of organized labor behind the workers now locked out or on strike at Salinas and Watsonville." 8 T h e state federation sought the aid of the AFL, but the AFL provided little assistance. A meeting of federal labor unions of agricultural workers, in February 1937, decided to seek a statewide charter. The federal locals would give up their independent existence, and then join the statewide group. An office for agricultural workers would be established; Secretary-Treasurer Vandeleur would be placed in charge of it, and would direct the campaign of organization. 9 Agricultural and cannery workers were difficult to organize and even more difficult to hold in a union once they joined. Migrating from job to job, they were likely to allow their dues to lapse because of carelessness or lack of funds. Despite these obstacles, the state

114

California State Federation of Labor

federation felt obligated to muster these workers into a union. It also wanted to prevent the CIO Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America from gaining a foothold in agriculture, since a successful campaign by the CIO would give it considerable prestige, and a base from which to operate in the state. The efforts of the federation gained more than a modest success. Locals were established in the Sacramento, Stockton, northern Alameda, southern Alameda, San Francisco, and Santa Clara Valley areas. Strong opposition developed in these and other areas invaded by the unions of agricultural workers. Sonoma County workers were organized 100 per cent, but the union nevertheless encountered serious opposition. Around Modesto and Stanislaus County, as well as in Kings County and Burbank, strong unions were established. In all the campaigns the federation provided direction, funds, and organizers; in the space of less than three years, more agricultural and cannery workers were entered into labor organizations than in the entire history of the state.10 At the request of the state federation, the AFL allowed the formation of a National Council of Agricultural Workers. Each local was entitled to one delegate to the council, which met once a month. Reporting on the workers' conditions to the 1938 convention, Secretary-Treasurer Vandeleur claimed that wages in California were ten to fifteen cents an hour higher than in Oregon. "For the first time in the history of the industry," Vandeleur claimed, "canneries are closed on Sunday, or the workers receive time and one-half." In January 1939, lumber workers of the Westwood area went out on strike when employers refused to restore a wage cut made in July 1938. The CIO entered the controversy by challenging the right of the AFL Carpenters' Union to represent these workers. Following clashes on the picket line, Governor Olson sent in a detachment of highway police to restore order. The governor's action aroused the anger of federation leaders, and the executive council "placed [itself] on record as condemning Governor Olson for his failure to keep his promise to bring about settlement of the Westwood situation . . . If Governor Olson will give the majority his sincere and fair cooperation, the situation in Westwood can be settled within fortyeight hours. This can be accomplished if our Governor — who is the Governor of all the people of California and should not permit himself to be used by a few — will stop listening to the suggestions or

Effects and Influence of the C I O

115

dictates of the radical minority who are attempting to create chaos within the State." 1 1 T h e heads of the state federation believed that dispatching highway troops to the Westwood and Redding areas was a response to pressure of C I O leaders, then seeking a foothold in the northwest and California lumbering areas. Canning industry. T h e fishing and canning industry was subjected to one of the more dedicated campaigns of the CIO, which was determined to break A F L influence in this area. In addition, recent formation of unions by the A F L in industries such as fish canning, which had been traditionally unorganized, placed constant pressure upon the leadership to gain concessions for its members, as well as to demonstrate to the new unionists the importance and advantage of retaining their affiliation with the AFL. T h e California Federation of Labor started a campaign in the fish cannery and reduction plants in and around Monterey in 1937, and Fish Canning Workers' Local Union No. 20986 signed contracts for wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment separately with eleven companies engaged in cannery and fish reduction operations. T h e contract was for a year, and was to be automatically renewed unless terminated by notice by either party prior to May 1. O n September 28, 1938, the United Fishermen's Union of the Pacific was chartered by the C I O . It began a campaign to win over the fish cannery workers in the Monterey area. O n November 14, 1938, the companies were asked to recognize the C I O union, and, when they failed, a strike was called. During the strike, the C I O union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board for an election to determine bargaining representation. T h e board rejected the argument of Local 20986 that its contract was a bar to an election on the ground that the "present season will terminate on February 15, 1939, when a substantial number of the employees will leave Monterey to seek employment elsewhere until the beginning of the next season . . . It is therefore apparent that for all practical purposes the contract relied upon by Local 20986 will cease to be effective after February 15 unless renewed for the next season." 12 In determining the bargaining unit, the board excluded clerical office workers, and supervisors, b u t also watchmen and teamsters, even though "teamsters were covered by the August 1937 agreement between the Companies and Local 20986 . . . Since

116

California State Federation of Labor

the teamsters constitute a separate and well defined craft and since there is a labor organization available through which they may exercise their rights under the Act, we shall exclude them from the appropriate units." Despite the action of the board, Local 20986 carried the election at each of the eleven companies. However, the California Federation protested the board's reasoning. In February 1938, the federation sponsored a meeting of local unions in the fish reduction, fish canning, and fishing industries in San Francisco, at which the state council of the fish industry was established. Delegates from Oregon and Washington were present as observers. The California State Council of Fish Industry Workers aimed to develop uniform agreements for various work classifications.13 The first meeting among 12 unions representing a claimed 60,000 northern and central California cannery workers, on February 8, 1938, agreed that the California Federation of Labor would be accepted as the bargaining agency for all workers represented. One difficult issue was the working out of a satisfactory seniority list. Speaking for the unions involved, Secretary-Treasurer Vandeleur announced on February 28 that a satisfactory arrangement had been accepted. The agreement on seniority provided for one master list, with brackets for permanent employees, residential and nonresident seasonal workers; seniority arrangements were designed to protect union members. A dispute arose over the length of the workday, union negotiators insisting that the canneries establish an eight-hour day. After ten weeks of negotiations, an agreement covering most northern and central California cannery workers was reached and all issues, including the length of the workday, were settled. The agreement recognized the state federation, and the AFL unions it represented, as sole bargaining agent for workers in canneries operated by the California Processors and Growers. A basic ten-hour day was agreed upon; unions were especially pleased with the elimination of what they regarded as the abused practice of working "unlimited" hours. Sunday was not to be a working day, except when highly perishable crops, such as asparagus and peas were being processed. A seniority system in each plant would protect the rights to employment of steady workers and seasonal employees working consecutive seasons. Wages were not increased, but it was believed that the limitation of hours, with Sunday off, and seniority rating represented significant gains.14

Effects and Influence of the C I O

117

Soon the state federation's attempt to organize packing-shed and cannery workers of the state was challenged by the CIO. W h e n the National Labor Board allowed the C I O to seek representation elections, the federation denounced this seeming favoritism to its rival. Joseph Padway, chief counsel of the American Federation of Labor, was sent to California by the AFL to investigate and to provide necessary legal assistance. The California federation resented charges by the C I O that cannery workers' unions were company-dominated. Vandeleur pointed to the increase in wages from 20 cents to S2Vi cents an hour for 60,000 California cannery workers, the limited hourly schedules, and Sunday-off won by the cannery unions. "These victories, obtained with the aid of the California State Federation of Labor," Vandeleur declared, "are innovations in the industry. It is ridiculous to even consider charges that the unions which have cost the employers these increases and concessions are company controlled. And that is the very thing the National Labor Relations Board is attempting to help the C. I. O. prove. This unusual situation is the principal reason why Mr. Padway has been assigned to California." Subsequently, the California State Federation of Labor charged an examiner, holding a hearing on the issues in the cannery dispute between unions of the AFL and CIO, with intimidation. Vandeleur demanded an apology from the trial examiner of the NLRB, Charles A. Wood, and announced that the federation would "send the entire transcript of [the] farcical and disgraceful proceeding to Washington with a strong protest against such a type of government official." 15 Demands were made that an investigation of collusion between the twentieth regional office of the National Labor Board and the C I O be conducted. Convinced that the hearing was unfair and prejudicial, the state federation of labor withdrew as an intervener. Declaring that he had intended to call a large number of witnesses to refute charges that the AFL unions were guilty of unfair labor practices, Ο. H. Hamlin, attorney for the AFL, insisted that the attitude of the agents of the N L R B toward the AFL rendered impossible a fair and impartial hearing. The humiliating examination of witnesses, the rulings of the trial examiner, and the general bias and hostility displayed, all caused the attorney to withdraw from the hearings. T h e full board found in June 1934, "that several witnesses were

118

California State Federation of Labor

examined by the Trial Examiner after counsel had concluded their examination. While most of the evidence elicited in this manner consisted of expatiation and clarification of testimony given in direct and cross-examination by counsel, in some cases the evidence dealt with new phases of testimony not gone into by counsel in the course of their examination. The Trial Examiner denied counsel the right to examine further on these phases of the testimony after he had concluded his examination . . . These rulings prevented the respondents and intervenors from introducing evidence which was competent, relevant, and material to the issues." As a result, the record, with technical exceptions, was set aside, and a new hearing ordered.16 A consent decree was issued on March 29, 1940, in which the association and the cannery companies separately agreed not to discourage membership in any labor organization of its employees, or commit any other act which would tend to discourage their free decision. They also agreed to take the necessary steps to effectuate the decree. The board also held that "Nothing in this Order shall in any way affect the operation of that certain contract, dated April 4, 1939, now in force and effect between the California State Federation of Labor, Cannery Workers' Union Local 20324, A. F. of L., and California Processors and Growers." Internal conflict. The federation fought the CIO invasions, but the CIO retained sympathy and support among some of the liberal groups within the California AFL. Edward Vandeleur, Scharrenberg's successor, led the fight both within and without the federation. Although he was a militant trade unionist and a believer in organizing the unorganized, much of his time was devoted to countering the first attempts of the CIO to gain adherents in California. His strong opposition did not gain universal support within the federation, and, in 1938, Vandeleur was opposed for reelection as secretary-treasurer by George Kidwell. Tom Mooney joined in attacking him from his cell in San Quentin. Vandeleur carried the election handsomely, however, by 145,714 to 43,187. Three vice-presidents were also opposed for reelection, and there were contests for the four posts in the San Francisco district. At the 1939 convention, the administration forces took the offensive and challenged the right of George Kidwell and Jack Shelley to their seats as delegates to the convention. Both of them represented

Effects and Influence of the CIO

119

the San Francisco Bakery Wagon Drivers' Union. Shelley was charged with belonging to Labor's Non-Partisan League, and being antagonistic to the AFL, but the credentials' committee held that such accusations were too indefinite, and he was seated. Kidwell's right was challenged because he had testified in behalf of a CIO union which sought to gain bargaining rights in the Westwood lumber area. In the end, Kidwell was denied a seat by a vote of 92,420 to 74,870." That this could happen to a respected trade unionist was an incident in the broader conflict between conservatives and liberal groups at the convention. J. W . Buzzell, secretary of the Los Angeles Labor Council, proposed that Senator Jack T. Tenney be invited to address the convention, and an amendment was made that Jack Shelley (who was also a member of the state senate) be given the same privilege, but the convention rejected that amendment. 18 The differences again reflected dissatisfaction on the part of some groups with the conservative views of Secretary-Treasurer Vandeleur. Alexander Watchman, president of the San Francisco Building and Construction Trades Council, had announced his candidacy against Vandeleur, and a committee, with John F. Shelley as chairman, was organized to promote his campaign. The Bay District Council of Carpenters endorsed Watchman by a vote of 71 to 4 and resolved that "the executive administration of the California State Federation of Labor has been handled injudiciously and to the great disadvantage of the labor movement as a whole and particularly to the membership of the Federation." In addition, the resolution claimed that Vandeleur had failed to promote the state federation's legislative program in Sacramento. Watchman picked up considerable support and campaigned actively but failed to secure a majority of the votes. Although Watchman made a creditable showing, Vandeleur was reelected by 100,851 votes to 70,645 (a much smaller majority than he had had in 1938). At the same convention, a proposal was made to change the basis on which vice-presidents were chosen. While vice-presidents are nominated from specific districts, their election is by all the delegates present at the vote in the convention. Such a rule means that the dominant group in the convention can elect its members; minority elements are thus automatically denied a voice in the executive council, which consists of the president, the vice-presidents, and the

120

California State Federation of Labor

secretary-treasurer. In opposition to the argument that all segments of opinion ought to be represented in the executive council, the administration took the position that a vice-president represented the entire federation rather than a section of it, and that the election to such posts on the basis of geographical districts gave every section a chance to be represented. In addition, it was felt that the council should be united on policy, and, although the divisions were more numerous than might be indicated by the unanimous facade, the executive council did present to the outside world agreement among members on crucial issues, usually sufficiently close so that serious differences seldom appeared obvious. The proposal to change the method of election of vice-presidents was defeated. In 1940, Vandeleur was opposed for the third time for reelection; he faced G. A. Silverthorn of Oakland, nominated by Joseph Casey, and Alexander Watchman. Vandeleur was elected, but a substantial vote was cast for the other two candidates. Silverthorn polled 44,558; Watchman, 31,983; and Vandeleur 94,919. One of the administration candidates for vice-president, Frank T. Shipman, was defeated by Albin J. Gruhn of the Eureka Federated Trades Council. This opposition to the "old guard" displayed dissatisfaction with the tactics pursued in organizing and failure in the promotion of what some regarded as an adequate legislative program; in part it showed also the desire of many among the newly organized for different faces and policies. A resolution adopted in 1940 requested the AFL to remove its western representative for his failure to cooperate adequately with the California State Federation of Labor.19 Lively electioneering for the secretary-treasurer's post characterized the 1941 convention. John L. Spaulding, a San Francisco plumber, announced his candidacy. Several incumbent vice-presidents also faced opposition. Three slates were presented to the delegates; one promoted by the Teamsters' Union, an administration list, and a ticket supporting Vice-President Spaulding. Some candidates appeared on both or on all three lists. Opposition to Vandeleur came largely from the San Francisco building trades, which actively supported Spaulding's bid. In the end, Vandeleur was returned to office again — by a margin of more than 3 to l. 20 During the early 1940's, the state federation was still greatly concerned with the threat from the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Although the CIO did not manage to win a large following

Effects and Influence of the C I O

121

among the organized workers of the state, its control of the docks in San Francisco and other California ports, and its invasion of canneries and shipyards had been posing a threat to the older organizations. During the executive council meeting in June 1940, a long discussion of methods to meet possible C I O invasion took place. A suggestion to raise the per capita tax was made, and, although some favored this step, in the end nothing was done except to note the seriousness of the attack and the possible consequences. Unions were urged to remain alert to the threat to their jurisdictions. 21 Influenced by the campaign of the CIO, the state federation of labor joined in the attempt by A F L unions to organize the Standard Oil Company employees at the Richmond, California plant. A company union, the Standard Oil Employees' Association ( S O E A ) had been operating at the plant, and the C I O sought to displace it. Attorney Charles J. Janigan believed that the National Labor Relations Board would remove the company union from the ballot, and consequently clear the field for the CIO, which would thus be able to win a foothold in the oil industry of California. Upon learning of these developments, Haggerty called a meeting of the unions with jurisdictions in the oil industry and urged them to devise an organization plan. He "advised them we were prepared to step in if they would carry their load too." 2 2 A conference of the unions involved was called in July 1944, and it was decided that it would be preferable for A F L unions to hold their organizing activity in abeyance until the election requested by the C I O had been decided. In the subsequent National Labor Relations Board election, the C I O was defeated by 877 votes to the Standard Oil Employees' Association's 1155. But the National Labor Relations Board, in a preliminary opinion, declared that the SOEA was in effect a company dominated union and therefore could not be accorded recognition. Although the A F L unions covered only a small fraction of the work force, their victories gave the federation confidence that it would gain bargaining rights at these plants. With the elimination of the CIO, and the exclusion of the Standard Oil Employees' Association, A F L organizations were given a favorable opportunity to organize the three California plants of the Standard Oil Company. One factor favorable to the A F L was the victory of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific in an election conducted among the workers on the tanker fleet of the Standard Oil Company; another was the favorable

122

California State Federation of Labor

position of the Boilermakers' Union which had had a verbal agreement with the Standard Oil Company covering the Richmond and the El Segundo plants for almost 20 years, and a written agreement covering its members in the two plants for the previous eight months. The unions agreed to reduce their initiation fees and dues and enter a joint organizing campaign.23 At the next meeting of representatives of unions with jurisdiction in Standard Oil Company plants, Secretary Haggerty "spoke of the efforts of his office . . . to achieve a united front among the several unions in the Standard Oil program at Richmond. He stated that up to the present time it had not been possible to achieve this objective and that if this meeting could not develop a united program, the only alternative would be to have each union go on its own insofar as the Standard Oil setup was concerned." The unions failed to devise a workable program, but it was not from lack of effort by the state federation. Raiding by the CIO became serious. The focal point of the controversy was the canning industry. Einar Mohn, international representative of the teamsters, urged the executive council to take steps to resist the encroachments of CIO organizations. After a discussion at the meeting of the executive council on September 21, 1945, the council pledged its "entire resources and the resources of its affiliated unions to move as one united force to crush the disruption and jurisdictional invasion attempts by CIO unions." 24 In a lengthy statement, the executive council excoriated the CIO as "insincere and hypocritical in its oft-repeated declaration of purpose — to organize the unorganized workers. Instead of tackling the unorganized industries — what few remain in California — they centered their full attention on the AFL." 25 The fight between the AFL and the CIO in California centered around the organization and control of cannery workers. During the controversy, Einar Mohn requested that Albert E. Bilger, a vicepresident of the federation, be removed from office because he had already been suspended as an officer of the Cannery Workers' Union Local 20324 by President William Green of the American Federation of Labor (the local was at the time a direct affiliate of the AFL). Bilger's suspension followed his setting up of a dual organization, Cannery Workers' Union 20324. He was also accused of obstructing the efforts of Daniel Flannagan, western representative of the AFL,

Effects and Influence of the CIO

123

to preserve the funds of the AFL local. At the meeting of the executive council of the federation, in June 1945, Vice-President Thomas Small proposed the appointment of a committee to hear the charges. Bilger announced on June 15, 1945, that he welcomed the investigation. After the adoption of the resolution, Vice-Presidents Thomas A. Small, James Blackburn, F. M. Engle, Earl Miller, and Ken Bitter were appointed to examine Bilger's activities. Hearings were scheduled for June 19 and 20. Bilger was present at the hearings on the first day but would not attend those planned on June 20, and informed Secretary Haggerty that he intended to resign as a vice-president of the California State Federation because the union of which he was a member and officer had voted to affiliate with the CIO. Haggerty announced that Bilger would resign by September 21, 1945. The committee recommended that in view of Bilger's loyalties and further because he had maligned the officers and unions of the state federation of labor, he should be immediately removed from office. However, before action could be taken, Bilger decided to tender his resignation. A special committee with Vice-President Harry Lundeberg as chairman was set up to coordinate the activities of AFL unions and plan the defense against invasion by the CIO. Major responsibility for the cannery campaign fell on the Teamsters' Union, but the state federation played an important role. Dave Beck, who was directing the teamsters' strategy, asked the federation to donate $25,000; the federation agreed, and also offered the services of its attorneys.26 The federation tried to set up joint committees of the local building trades, the central labor council, the teamsters, and cannery workers wherever canneries were operating. Through these joint committees, it was hoped to rally the entire AFL in each region to aid in the campaign. In the meantime, the AFL union signed a contract with a number of canneries which the CIO sought to invalidate. The United States Circuit Court refused to set it aside. The state federation of labor charged that not a single unorganized plant had been won by the CIO. Instead of organizing, the CIO concentrated upon trying to win plants already operating under favorable union agreements. In contrast to the CIO's failure, the AFL pointed to its own organizing of 20 local unions since the beginning of the CIO campaign.27 Despite protests from the AFL, the National Labor Relations Board ordered a

124

California State Federation of Labor

representative election for October 1945. T h e C I O carried the election by a small plurality, but a protest by the Teamsters' Union and the AFL led to its cancellation by the NLRB by a vote of 2 to 1. After the decision, the AFL Council of Cannery Workers began negotiating a new agreement with the California Processors' and Growers' Association. T h e C I O effort to have the agreement (subsequently negotiated) set aside by the federal courts failed. In the National Labor Board election in August 1946, the AFL polled 16,262 to the CIO's 14,896, with 67 voting for no union. 28 T h e "State Federation played an active role in the campaign to stave off the jurisdictional raid of the C I O in the fruit and vegetable canning industry. T h e AFL cannery union was made a principal target of the CIO, not only to establish itself in that industry, but to spearhead a campaign to penetrate the interior of California. Workers employed in this industry were low-paid and not normally a target of union organizers. Consequently, the C I O believed it would enlarge its influence by winning this industry to its banner. It was the most serious challenge to the A F L by the C I O in California since the waterfront dispute. "The C I O mobilized its full resources to win the bargaining designation for the workers . . . Fortunately, as a result of the splendid cooperation between the various A. F. of L. unions and the leadership provided by the Teamsters, we were successful in defeating the C. I. O. in this raid." 29 Roy M. Brown, a vice-president of the International Association of Machinists, approved several bills authorizing removal of Communists from industry, because his union had "suffered severely in many parts of the United States and especially in California and the State of Washington because of the boring from within tactics of the Communist Party and its followers in their efforts to take over and disrupt our local and district lodges." 30 Haggerty acknowledged the injury sustained by the Machinists' Union, but he did not think the bills introduced by Assemblymen Kraft, Tenney, and Burns would meet the problem. He told Brown: [I am] fearful that the above-mentioned bills will not cure this problem as the provisions . . . place a tremendous power in the hands of the employers and place the burden of approval of affiliation and nonaffiliation of the subversive element upon the employee, rather than the employer, and I am reluctant to cast a shadow of suspicion over every worker and place this burden of approval upon him to show that he is

Effects and Influence of the C I O

125

not a member of a subversive non-American group because a small percentage of workers are in that category . . . In view of the traditional policy of the American Federation of Labor which has always been in opposition to the placing of unreasonably broad powers into the hands of employers, plus our own experience here in California, and particularly looking ahead to the post-war period when these powers can be so greatly misused to the detriment of organized labor, I am still of the opinion that the State Federation of Labor would not approve and support a measure of this type or similar measures introduced by Senator Tenney. 31 The Machinists' Union, especially San Francisco District Lodge 68, frequently followed a more radical line than the official labor movement. In the late 1930's, there was pressure against the affiliation of several Pacific Coast machinists' unions with the Maritime Federation of the Pacific Coast, with the president of the International Association of Machinists, Harvey Brown, strongly opposed. 32 In accordance with their customary position, machinists' lodges in California and in other parts of the Coast resisted the efforts of their international and the American Federation to align them actively against the Congress of Industrial Organizations and its unions. District Lodge 68 continued to follow its own course. It was one of the oldest labor organizations in California, having been founded in 1885. The defense and war periods in the 1940's did not deter the members and leaders from carrying on their own policies. In 1941, the district called a strike at 11 plants repairing and constructing ships. It required the intervention of President Franklin Roosevelt and the head of the international. Sporadic labor disputes continued in District 68's jurisdiction throughout World W a r II. Repeated warnings from the international were ignored by the district and its business manager, Harry Hook. In September 1944, Hook announced that his members would not work overtime in 109 "uptown shops" which were taken over and operated by the United States Navy. Thirteen months later, the district called a strike in the "uptown fringe" shops without a vote of the employees as required by the W a r Labor Disputes Act and the rules of the international. T h e request for strike sanction was refused by the international. T h e rejection was based upon the district's failure to comply with the law, the continued violation of contracts by the members, and the close cooperation of the leaders with groups in the CIO.

126

California State Federation of Labor

Following the calling of the unauthorized strike, the international executive council came to San Francisco and investigated the affairs and conduct of the district. A hearing was scheduled for March 11, 1946, to determine whether the district's charter would be revoked. Anticipating the result, the leaders called a membership meeting which withdrew from the international and established Machinists' Union No. 68. The international sued to recover the funds and other property held by the local, and its request was supported by Judge Edward J. Murphy, of the California Superior Court. It was upheld by the Court of Appeals — Brown v. Hook 179 C.A. 2d 781; 180P. 2d 982; and review was denied by the California Supreme Court.

8-Tasks and Problems: Depression and World War II

The successful organizing drives of the 1930's came immediately before the defense and war periods in which the federation had to devote itself to different problems while carrying on its customary activities. The experience with a number of CIO affiliates in California made the federation suspicious of ideological positions. In 1938 (contrary to its 1935 stand), the federation rejected a resolution favoring the Spanish loyalists on the ground "that the American Labor Movement ought to keep its nose out of international warfare in European countries and particularly since war in Spain is a war between the Communists on one side and the Fascists on the other — both enemies of Labor for control and enslavement of the Spanish people." 1 It was oversensitivity to the Communist problem within the American labor movement which induced the federation to take this view, rather than an analysis of international relations. In 1940, the convention hoped that the United States could remain out of an active war, but it recognized the "gravity of the present situation in the world. It realizes that the two oceans offer no defense against military might. It realizes that the only language which the dictators understand is force, and while it hopes that this country may never have to use force, it believes that the protection of our American principles requires a defense machinery strong enough to stop the dictators from destroying our American way of life." The 1940 convention also took occasion to denounce Communists, Fascists, and other subversives. It demanded that they — as well as their subsidiary front groups2 — be outlawed and repressed.

128

California State Federation of Labor

Wage board. In 1942 Attorney Janigian represented the federation before the Impartial Wage Board on the Manufacturing Industry Wage Order. The hearings resulted in a wage order raising minimum hourly rates for women employed in manufacturing industries. The federation also represented AFL unions before the minimum wage board to establish new minimum-wage and working conditions for women and minors employed in the canneries of California. It argued for minimum wages of 65 cents an hour for women, with time and a half for overtime for certain hours, and double time if the hours were prolonged beyond a given number. The federation also pleaded for a guaranteed wage to all pieceworkers, and sharply attacked the "audit system" whereby the specifications of the minimum wage law are met if 50 per cent of the women employed earn the minimum rate. The wage board found the federation's rates too high. Instead, it recommended a minimum wage of 42Vi cents an hour for hourly workers, a guarantee of 40 cents for pieceworkers, and retained the audit system.3 At the same time, the federation protested the order allowing the employment of women on night work at the Consolidated Aircraft plant. A number of resolutions dealing with the war effort were presented to the convention of 1942. The Conference of Studio Unions, a Communist-tinged group in Los Angeles, called for labor unity; this aroused the anger of Secretary Vandeleur. This group of unions had sent a resolution to the most reactionary employer groups in the state pleading for the repeal of the "hot cargo" law (discussed later in this chapter) as a means for promoting labor-management unity and thereby aiding the war effort. Vandeleur could not understand "the urgency that so suddenly impelled these unions to address these labor-hating organizations over the heads of the State Federation without any preliminary discussion or even notice of the action they were planning to take . . . The resolution asks that we appeal to the Associated Farmers, the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association and Mr. Almon E. Roth to urge upon the state legislature the repeal of Slave Bill 877. Even if these racketeering organizations consented to comply with this request — and only a man completely out of his senses would entertain such a fantastic thought even for the moment — the legislature would do nothing about it until it meets in 1943, which will be after the citizens of California have voted on Slave Bill 877 in the November elec-

Depression and World War II

129

tion." 4 The action of the Studio Conference Unions was regarded as part of the ultrapatriotic united-front policy advocated by the Communist Party and followed by the organization and its affiliates. Vandeleur did not characterize this as a Communist maneuver, although he must have been aware of its origin. Actually his anger was aroused by the usurpation by a subordinate group of a function of the federation. In 1939, a resolution was introduced which charged that the "reactionary ruling classes of the present so-called democracy . . . have used the pretext of war to crush the Labor Movement and institute a dictatorship." The resolution was obviously Communistinspired, and it reflected the temporary friendship pact that had been signed by Hitler and Stalin. The resolution proposed a referendum which should be held before Congress could declare war on a foreign power. In reporting on the proposal, the resolutions committee noted that, while German and Nazi imperialism were censured by the proposal, no mention of the attack upon Poland by the Soviet Government was mentioned. The convention refused to approve. The convention of 1941 came when the United States was not yet engaged in war. Hitler had already attacked the Soviet Union, and several resolutions endorsing the heroic efforts of the Soviet people were introduced. The resolutions committee found a number of statements submitted by local unions and delegates on defense and preparedness questions misleading. For instance, No. 104, captioned "Indorsing United Service Organizations for Service men": "That in the Judgment of your Committee is not the purpose of that resolution, and the same principle applies to several of the others. . . . W e call attention to the fact that there is a constant thread through all of these resolutions to indorse and support the Soviet Union in Russia. This seems to be the main purpose in all of them, and one or two of them completely carry out a Communist line on this subject since Russia has entered into World War, proof of which can be found in the daily policy of the Communist Party." The resolutions committee found "no difference between the Communist dictatorship government of Russia and the Nazi dictatorship government of Germany or the Fascist dictatorship government of Italy and Japan." 5 The committee, moreover, pointed to the cooperation of Hitler and Stalin in the destruction of Poland,

130

California State Federation of Labor

and charged that the Communist Party was still intent upon destroying the democratic labor movement of the United States. The convention of 1942 refused to endorse a united front with the Soviet labor unions, and, to avoid debate on the issue, the delegates approved the proposal to allow the American Federation of Labor to deal with this question. A similar attitude was taken on the second-front issue. Instead of arguing over the proposal, the convention declared: "Win or lose, a nation must depend upon the leaders it has chosen, and upon the military talent that it has developed, to conduct the fighting of its wars, and we are convinced that there are none in America who can sincerely say that as a whole the President of the United States is not possessed of a clear vision of all the problems of this war." 8 War Labor Board. T h e federation was also faced with pressure from affiliates dissatisfied with federation apathy toward the W a r Labor Board's wage policies. The council of retail clerks called on the state federation to summon a mass meeting of labor representatives to review the policies of the board, but Secretary Haggerty disagreed. He did not believe that a large mass meeting would compel any modification of the criteria used for setting wage rates. The inclination of War Labor Board panels to reject wage claims presented by unions posed a problem which went beyond the borders of the state. The executive council and the union representatives were especially irked by the refusal of the Regional W a r Labor Board to approve voluntary wage increases. The federation felt that it had to provide AFL panel members with assistance so that they would not be dependent upon employer representatives or agents of the War Labor Board for information. Research Director Barney Mayes reminded the council that public and industry members of the panel were likely to follow board policy irrespective of the wishes or votes of labor panel members. Haggerty agreed, but believed that AFL panel members still would profit from technical assistance. He advised unions to call on the federation staff for help. T h e federation presented a 65-page brief attacking the wage brackets used by the board. The subject was opened "when the Tenth Regional Board was considering methods for the administration of clerical brackets. These brackets, which were to apply to office workers, were not only out of line and below anything that

Depression and World W a r II

131

might resemble tested and stable going wage rates, but how they were established was and remains a mystery to the unions affected, as well as to the labor members of the W a r Labor Board." 7 Haggerty warned that great restlessness was developing in the ranks of organized workers and that the little procedure followed by the Tenth Regional W a r Labor Board was contributing to the growing unrest. He also accused the board of undue delay in processing thousands of applications for wage changes. In his view, "unless some immediate drastic steps are taken to eliminate the bottle-necks clogging the channels of the W a r Labor Board in order to expedite procedure and place it on a more democratic basis so that all applicants before it understood fully just what it means, a serious situation will develop. The federation is deeply concerned in this whole question . . . W e are hopeful that the Tenth Regional W a r Labor Board will view them with the gravity that they deserve and (introduce) the needed reforms." Back in the thirties, increases in union activity sometimes led to countermeasures by local communities and the legislature, which the federation resisted. In addition, the federation joined in the defense of the principle that government public works' projects were required to maintain prevailing wage scales. This was threatened by the Federal Works Progress Administration which handled an extensive program of work relief financed by the federal government and which sought rates of pay far below the prevailing wages. An extraordinary conference of central and building trades councils was called by the federation to oppose this program. Edward D. Vandeleur headed a committee on which Frank McDonald, head of the California Building Trades Council, Scharrenberg, Mike Casey, J. F . Cambiano of the Carpenter's Union, and several others served. Vandeleur, Scharrenberg, and McDonald were appointed as an executive committee to deal with the prevailing-wage issue. As a result of the protest, the W P A administrator for California, Frank Y. McLaughlin, was authorized to issue an order permitting a reduction "in the working hours and an adjustment of earnings for skilled and semi-skilled workers on construction projects, so as to result in the payment of wages equivalent approximately to the prevailing wages in the locality. The total number of persons thus exempted from the standard schedule of monthly hours and earnings cannot exceed 10 per cent of the total workers employed on projects in

132

California State Federation of Labor

the state but may exceed 10 per cent of the number of persons employed in any locality or on an individual project. The provisions of this order shall apply only to those skilled and semi-skilled trades, including building and construction laborers, for which a prevailing wage has been well established." 8 The order, issued on December 14, 1935, represented, at least in part, a victory for the organized building tradesmen, and it was also an example of the kind of activity the state federation could effectively perform on behalf of its affiliates, even the more powerful ones. Similar problems arose during the defense period of 1939-1941. As the country began expanding its defense establishment in 1940, labor employed by the W P A was sometimes used in the construction of defense installations. The wages were substantially below prevailing rates, and the labor was frequently unorganized; the unions saw this as a threat to the union rate principle. In contrast to the Works Projects Administration, the activities of the Public Works Administration were by definition the kind the community needed and was willing to finance in part out of its taxes or through loans. Public Works Administration projects did pay prevailing wage rates and maintained the customary practices of the area. The difference between the programs of the two bodies was that the PWA was engaged in promoting and financing local projects which communities ordinarily would develop out of their own resources, while the W P A designed primarily as a work-relief agency to provide employment for those unable to find jobs in private industry. Encroachments of the W P A upon the projects which would normally be administered by the P W A were opposed by the building trades unions. In the first year of the expanded defense programs, some installations were constructed by W P A workers; such actions aroused the concern and anger of the building trades unions. The issue came before the convention of the state federation in 1940 when one of its affiliates complained that work was being diverted to the WPA which properly belonged to other government agencies. It was felt that the financing and management of W P A projects involving local sponsors and the federal government had led to an improper combination of relief with construction of public works. The convention also objected to mingling public revenues with revenues designed to finance work relief. Finally the resolution declared that the purpose

Depression and World W a r II

133

of the W P A was to provide and administer unemployment relief only, but not to take over the construction of public works requiring architects and skilled workers. T h e activities of the W P A were described as unfair competition, and the government was urged to transfer all construction projects to the Public Works Administration. 9 W i t h unemployment continuing at high levels, California labor was fearful that the national defense emergency might be used as an excuse for breaking down standards already diminished by the long depression. Consequently, when reports of government plans to train large numbers of apprentices became known, unions of skilled craftsmen voiced fear and concern that the program was merely a device to lower work and wage standards. Responding to the complaints of a number of its locals, the convention of 1940 called attention to the programs of apprentice training in which organized craftsmen played a role. Under these programs an apprentice was defined as "a person at least 16 years of age who is covered by a written agreement with an employer, or with an association of employers or employees acting as agent for an employer, and approved by the State Apprenticeship Council, or other established authority, which apprentice agreement provides for not less than 4,000 hours or reasonably continuous employment for such person, for his participation in an approved schedule of work experience through employment and for at least 144 hours per year of related supplemental instruction." T h e convention then called on various government agencies to adhere to the standard definition of apprenticeship, and to insist that public works and defense contracts which call for the employment of apprentices incorporate a like definition. Unless such steps were taken, the convention feared, the labor market would be flooded by ill-trained workmen. In addition, the convention was anxious that temporary shortages of skilled workers, caused by the sudden expansion of defense industries, should not lead to a marked increase in training; this, it believed, would only result in the creation of permanent surpluses of skilled workers. " T h e Federation [was] of the opinion that the apprenticeship program, over a period of time [would] furnish industry all the workers needed." Instead of training new workers, the convention suggested that individuals formerly employed in various crafts be urged to return, and that they be

134

California State Federation of Labor

given refresher courses by the National Defense Training Program. While urging all unions to remain alert against the use of the defense program as a cover for the enactment of antilabor legislation, the convention of 1940 took the position also that laws, once enacted, had to be obeyed. Noting its historical opposition to conscription in peacetime, the convention now accepted the system as necessary for national defense. It urged draft boards to follow a fair, nondiscriminatory policy in selection, and called on the government to enforce adequate health facilities before conscripts were called to serve. Protection of draftees and their families against foreclosures and evictions was suggested, and a warning was issued that the conscription law must not be used to injure the position of organized labor.10 The convention also called for protection of seniority in industry of all those drafted into the armed services. Workmen's compensation. By 1940, the state federation of labor had attained a membership of almost 275,000. It had grown from slightly above 100,000 in 1931 to 291,000 in 1938, although the expulsion of a number of CIO unions reduced its membership a bit. But the movement was on the eve of spectacular growth. The California State Federation of Labor, like other state branches, was organized primarily to protect and promote the legislative interests of the organized workers. Its principal activity was representing the organized and unorganized workers before the legislature. In addition, it concerned itself with the administration of the laws, always seeking generous and humane interpretation of statutes governing liability in industrial accidents and benefits in workmen's compensation. For example, the federation regarded the insistence of the Industrial Accident Commission that injured workers either accept light work or face the cancellation of their benefits as inequitable. Normally, a worker could, of course, challenge such rulings, but such challenges were costly. When such a ruling was promulgated, the attorneys for the state federation protested, and, after conferences with Secretary Edward Vandeleur, the commission changed its ruling so that an "injured worker receives full compensation unless it is proved that he can return to his former occupation." During 1940, the state federation of labor presented a program to the Industrial Accident Commission. It urged that workers covered by the state compensation insurance fund be given the right to select their own physicians. Such a rule would eliminate the

Depression and World War II

135

doctor's panel; eliminate unnecessary delay in deciding cases; and make possible an upward revision of disability schedules. The federation also urged an increase in the number of commissioners administering the workmen's compensation law to five, two to be located in Los Angeles, as a means of expediting decisions.11 Early in January 1942 the state federation of labor became concerned with the spread of eye infections in the shipyards. In general, the federation was dissatisfied with the medical treatment of workers suffering industrial injuries or occupational diseases in some of the hastily erected war plants, and it became aroused when an investigation revealed widespread eye infections among workers in the shipyards of the Bay area. According to Secretary Vandeleur, thousands of workers in the Bay area shipyards and war industries were affected by "Kerato conjunctivitis." The state federation of labor insisted that this was an occupational illness and was therefore compensable. Its attorneys and officers appeared before a hearing of the Industrial Accident Commission and pleaded for compensation for 14 workers. A request for the appearance of a representative was made to the surgeon general's office as well as to the Office of Production Management. The Industrial Accident Commission accepted the federation's view that the infections were compensable, a view rejected by the employer (the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation). 12 In the meantime, Secretary Vandeleur, a member of the Industrial Accident Commission, and a company physician agreed that the company should provide an ambulance, replace its untrained personnel by registered nurses and qualified first-aid attendants under the supervision of a physician. In an effort to improve health and sanitary conditions on war jobs, the federation urged government agencies dealing with production and labor issues in war industries to install proper ventilators whenever necessary.13 The eye infection controversy occupied the officers and attorneys of the state federation of labor for several months. When the awards were upheld by the appellate court, the company carried the cases to the California State Supreme Court, which held with the attorneys for the state federation of labor. Moreover, the court, in its decision, "clarified a phase of compensation that has hitherto been obscure and sets a valuable precedent. While holding that the eye maladies were not cases of occupational disease, the Court ruled that they, nevertheless, were compensable because contagion had

136

California State Federation of Labor

occurred in the course of these workers' employment." 14 It was largely the campaign of the state federation of labor, carried on without charge to the union or the workers involved, which was responsible for the improvements introduced. As membership increased, the federation was asked to intervene increasingly in issues affecting the rights of union members under contracts or under the law. During 1942, Clarence J. Janigian represented union members in 170 hearings before the Industrial Accident Commission. In addition, attorneys for the federation were asked for advice and assistance in matters involving the National Labor Relations and the W a r Labor boards, activities which were becoming of increasing importance with the growth of employment and the war effort. 15 T h e unemployment compensation program, inaugurated in the late 1930's, became another area to which the state federation was compelled to devote considerable attention. Labor representatives at Sacramento sought to block the incorporation of merit-rating provisions in the original unemployment insurance law. At the 1940 session, Vandeleur argued that no emergency requiring the enactment of a merit-rating existed, and that the issue should be considered at a regular session rather than at the special meeting of the legislature. His view was rejected. 16 The federation was more successful, however, in gaining reversal of a decision which classified dredgemen as agricultural workers and thereby ineligible for benefits. Upon the pleas of federation attorneys, the decision in this instance was reversed, and the claimants allowed compensation. 17 The increase in the number of affiliates, many of them small organizations with limited funds, placed added burdens on the state federation. In some instances, officers and staff members were called to assist in contract negotiations. A number of smaller unions were also without experience in dealing with employers, and the help they received enabled them to use the services of persons trained to negotiate with employers. This assistance was given without charge. In addition, the federation increasingly aided unions with legal advice. Federation attorneys appeared in behalf of affiliates before the National Labor Relations Board, usually in representation cases. Law cases involving picketing or the right of workers to carry on activities in connection with labor disputes were handled by Clarence E. Todd on behalf of the federation, which either participated

Depression and World W a r II

137

exclusively or in combination with attorneys for a specific union in such cases. In the early 1940's, fear was expressed that attacks upon the rights of unions and the attempt to curtail their activities in California were forerunners of a more widespread, better organized campaign to restrict the organizing and collective bargaining activities of organized labor. In 1941, the federation represented 27 unions and trade and labor councils in court proceedings. Hot cargo. The most serious legislation enacted in 1941, according to the view of the federation, was the "hot cargo" law. This bill was designed to prohibit secondary boycotts, defined as "any combination or agreement to cease performing services for an employer or to cause losses or injury to such employer or to his employees, for the purpose of inducing or compelling such employer to refrain from doing business with, or handling the products of any other employer, because of a dispute between the latter and his employees or a labor organization." Immediately after its introduction, the bill was denounced by Vandeleur as "class legislation aimed at depriving the workers of California of the right to help each other against unfair employers while expressly making it compulsory for employers to help each other against unions." T h e bill was limited to national defense emergencies. An opinion by Attorney-General Earl Warren and by the legislative counsel, Colonel Fred B. Wood, that the bill was unconstitutional did not deter the legislature from overriding Governor Olson's veto. The Associated Farmers and other antilabor groups carried the day, and the executive council met with representatives of the building trades and central labor councils to devise strategy for meeting the new threat. The meeting denounced the law as a "slave bill" and decided to place it on the referendum ballot for action by the voters. T h e decision to seek a referendum vote on the anti-secondary boycott legislation made it necessary to have 132,000 signatures by August 15, 1941. T h e state federation inherited the task of financing the campaign and organizing the collection of petitions. T h e necessary signatures were procured by August 15, and the meeting of delegates from the building and central labor councils authorized the executive council to seek a voluntary assessment of fifty cents per member to finance the campaign. 18 An important ally, the Payroll Guarantee Association (Ham and Eggs), advocating old-age pensions to retired persons over 50, sup-

138

California State Federation of Labor

ported labor's campaign against the measures. Willis L. Allen, director of the association, urged rejection of the hot cargo law after the convention of the state federation of labor had unanimously endorsed the association program paying $20 weekly to all retired persons fifty years old and over, and $7.00 weekly for all between the ages of twenty-one and fifty who are unemployed. Allen believed such a program could be supported by a 3 per cent gross monthly income tax. 19 The 1939 convention, earlier, had refused to approve the Ham and Eggs program. The federation conducted a vigorous campaign for the referendum. Its officers toured the state, meetings were held, and leaflets issued, to combat the propaganda of employer groups favoring Proposition No. 1 (as the hot cargo bill was listed on the referendum). In the end, the labor position was defeated by a small margin, and the executive council announced that it would challenge the laws in the courts. To finance its campaign, the federation collected $142,566.63, and spent $171,139.70.20 In the meantime, the state federation had to fight against a series of local laws which sought in various ways to limit or prevent activities of labor organizations. W h e n the hot cargo law went into effect, a conference of California labor attorneys met with Attorney Joseph Padway to consider the steps to be taken to challenge the law. A policy of waiting was agreed upon. In 1947, the law was reenacted, because the original legislation had applied only to defense emergencies. It passed without the signature of Earl Warren (by then governor). Although he doubted the law's constitutionality, he justified his refusal to veto the bill with the argument that the people had approved the measure by referendum in 1942. Secretary Haggerty reiterated labor's readiness to challenge any use of the statute to limit the activity of the unions of the state. 21 Little slave bills. "Little slave bills," as restrictive local ordinances were described by the labor unions, were enacted in Stanislaus, Santa Rosa, Modesto, and Tulare. "In not one place where a Little Slave Bill was passed was it permitted to remain an ordinance after the Federation entered into the fight. This involved the use of our attorneys and the issuance of considerable publicity in combating and exposing the tactics employed by the advocates of the Slave Bill." 22 A number of local ordinances outlawing the secondary boycott and requiring licenses for labor organizers for carrying on their

Depression and World War II

139

activities were enacted by several towns. Such ordinances were passed in Redding, San Gabriel, and Palm Springs. In Redding, the city council was given exclusive and arbitrary power to grant or deny licenses to union organizers or to any other union official engaged in soliciting members. In San Gabriel and Palm Springs, licenses were required for picketing. Another type of restraint was tried in Susanville and Pasadena, and in both communities ordinances prohibiting picketing for the closed shop were passed. As a rule, the state federation cooperated with local labor leaders in opposing all such legal restrictions to the point of fighting the measures in the courts. The first test of the hot cargo law in the Los Angeles Superior Court involved Wesley R. Beer, a contractor, who had refused to sign a union agreement with the building crafts. His jobs were picketed by the building trades council, and union subcontractors and material men were directed not to furnish labor and materials for the picketed jobs or face a boycott. Beer asked the court for $23,000 in damages together with an injunction against interference with his nonunion projects. Judge Emmet L. Wilson, of the Los Angeles Superior Court, refused to grant the restraining order and held that the right of peaceful picketing was guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and could not be abridged by court or statute. The right to picket included the right to picket subcontractors, and consequently the secondary boycott within lawful limitations was a proper weapon according to this decision. Even though the federation succeeded in having other hot cargo cases thrown out, no cases were for a time taken to the California Supreme Court. In 1946, the supreme court finally decided the issue. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of W . T . Blaney of the Teamsters' Union was presented. Blaney had been sent to jail by the superior court for violating the hot cargo law in a labor dispute with the Upholstery Supply Company. Blaney, speaking for the union, had announced that the products of the struck plant were unfair, advising purchasers that they would be picketed even if the products were already in their possession. He was also charged with advising suppliers of the company that any of the company's materials which they might sell and deliver would also be picketed. There was no violence charged nor was any claim made that anyone connected with the dispute had been threatened. Another case involving the same general issues in which an officer of the Teamsters'

140

California State Federation of Labor

Union, Kenneth Weston, was ordered to pay a fine was also argued. In the Blaney case, the state supreme court ruled by a vote of six to one, with the majority opinion prepared by Judge Carter, that all provisions of the hot cargo law were unconstitutional, as the publicizing of a labor dispute was a constitutional right which could not be abridged.23

9 - In Search of a Wartime Truce

As the war continued, the federation sought to establish a truce with employers. In December 1942, the executive council appointed a legislative committee made up of the president, four vice-presidents and the secretary-treasurer. The council announced that it stood ready to cooperate with all groups in the community and in industry, and that it was eager to make the session of the legislature as uncontroversial and constructive as possible. It warned, however, that this patriotic motive should not be taken as a sign of weakness, for the federation well understood "how to make its strength felt in the protection of its interests and that it will not hesitate to use such strength if the occasion warrants." 1 The federation's conciliatory policy was in harmony with an earlier statement issued by all labor groups in California. Soon after Pearl Harbor, the state federation of labor, the state congress of industrial organizations, and the railway brotherhoods met and urged cooperation of all groups in furthering the war effort. But the federation took a different view toward a resolution advocating organic unity of the labor movement. Endorsing the AFL position on this issue, the convention said: "History shows us the greatest opportunity that Labor ever had, came to us during the past six years, and that had it not been for this secession movement, the trade union movement in America would be standing in the most powerful position, and at the same time would have the admiration of all of the American people." 2 The declaration in support of the federation was not mere propaganda, but was on expression of a desire to avoid serious differences between labor and management that might hamper the war effort. A committee made up of Secretary-Treasurer Haggerty, J. W . Buzzell, of the Los Angeles Labor Council, Jack Shelley, of the San

142

California State Federation of Labor

Francisco Labor Council, and Frank McDonald, of the state building trades council met with a group of representatives from employer groups and members of the state legislature. Haggerty assured those present that labor was anxious to reach an "honorable agreement so that labor and capital can both be free to devote their full time to defeat of the enemy." 3 Labor representatives, including those from the railway brotherhoods, agreed that they would be willing to postpone the submission of all controversial issues to the legislature during the war. A subsequent meeting between employer groups and the labor delegation, to which Ken Bitter of the San Diego Central Labor Council had been added, explored the possibility of a legislative truce. The San Francisco Employers' Association, the Farm Bureau, Associated Farmers, Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association, California Manufacturers' Association and the Agricultural Council of California were represented on the employers' delegation. While the employer delegates assured the labor group that they had no labor bills to submit, they declared their inability to determine in advance the kinds that would be introduced. Several employer members requested a relaxation of labor laws which were affecting the supply of labor. T h e issue was discussed, but no agreement was reached, because the labor representatives were not willing to agree to legislation which would have modified the restrictions upon the employment of women and minors or would have weakened the limits upon the hours of labor in certain industries. Failure to reach agreement was a portent of attacks to come, although some of the regular employer groups refrained from joining in the antiunion campaigns. Subject to the call of the chairman, the meeting was adjourned, and the attempt at a formal wartime labor truce ended in failure. Although prepared to call a truce on new legislation, the state federation of labor was unwilling to allow any interpretations of existing statutes which would deprive workers of their rights. At the direction of Vandeleur, federation attorneys opposed the modifications of rules of the California Employment Commission which would have allowed a denial of benefits to certain unemployed workers. Under the rules of the commission, a person who refused suitable employment was disqualified for four weeks' benefits in addition to other penalties sustained as a result of quitting or being discharged for cause. Employers on occasion would repeatedly offer the

In Search of a Wartime Truce

143

same job to the same claimant and insist that each refusal merited the imposition of a new penalty. The state federation, becoming aware of this practice, challenged the right of the commission to impose repeated penalties under these conditions. It was the position of the federation that "Neither the refusal by an individual to return to his last employment which such individual left either voluntarily or was discharged therefrom by his employer, nor the refusal by such individual to accept employment which he has on previous occasion refused to accept, even though such employment were found by Department of Employment to be suitable, shall be deemed a refusal to apply or accept suitable work so as to subject such individual to the disqualification." 4 After a hearing on July 7, 1942, at which the federation presented its views, the department of employment security accepted the federation's view. At the opening of the legislature in 1943, the federation found itself confronted by a number of bills which sought to curb some of labor's traditional activities. Bills requiring incorporation of labor unions, submission of financial reports, and limits on picketing were introduced. Reiterating that it took the initiative in supporting the governor's declared intention to limit the legislative session to matters affecting the war effort, the federation declared that the principal industry groups in the state were willing to go along with the truce. However, in the opinion of the federation heads, "certain unenlightened diehards in the State Legislature are determined to attempt to obstruct the war effort by disregarding this constructive appeal, as well as the proposals made to industry by the California State Federation of Labor for the declaration of a truce on all ignominious class legislation by refraining from introducing bills which would flagrantly tear wide open the seams of unity on the home front." 5 The federation was nevertheless concerned with the demonstration of hostility, for it was not certain whether the efforts to continue the war on labor in the legislature was the work of a group of unthinking extremists who wanted to use the war as a means of restricting labor activity or whether it represented the decision of important employer groups. In the meantime, the federation became involved in a dispute between the metal trades unions and the NLRB over which unions were to be recognized at plants of the Kaiser Shipbuilding Company. In December 1940, Sidney Hillman, cochairman of the Office of

144

California State Federation of Labor

Production Management, expressed the desire of the government to hold a meeting of metal trades union officers and management, for eliminating or at least reducing the migration of shipyard workers and the avoidance of strikes and lockouts. John Frey, president of the AFL Metal Trades Department was appointed on a subcommittee to work out a program. He suggested that inasmuch as the Pacific Coast Metal Trades Council, since 1938, had sought to devise uniform standards of wages and working conditions for the yards on the Pacific Coast, the first conference ought to be held in that area. A coastwide agreement was drafted by the Metal Trades District Council of the Pacific Coast in December 1940, and submitted to the shipyards in January 1941. A master pact, setting wages and working conditions, was devised on April 3, 1941, and approved by President Roosevelt on April 19. Endorsed by government and industry, the contract was signed on April 21, 1941. Thereupon, the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, a CIO affiliate, intervened to nullify the arrangement and appealed to the NLRB to set it aside. To the surprise of the metal trades unions and the state federation of labor, the case was accepted. It was charged by the federation that at the time the contract between the Pacific Coast shipyards and the metal trades unions was signed, the CIO union had no locals on the Pacific Coast.® The contest created a great deal of bitterness, and finally, in September 1943, the NLRB dismissed the CIO charges. The federation also participated actively in the campaign to establish AFL unions in the shipbuilding industry of the Pacific Coast area. At the same time, the federation was being called upon for increased aid by other unions in California. Interpretation of presidential orders affecting wages and working conditions, of rules for wage changes promulgated by the War Labor Board, and the greater need for technical assistance induced the federation to set up a library and research bureau. In his report to the executive council in March 1943, Secretary-Treasurer Vandeleur reported on the increased need of local unions for technical services which justified the establishment of such a bureau. He explained that from the beginning the research bureau had been providing local unions with assistance for which the federation made no charge.7 The expanded services necessitated an increase in per capita taxes

In Search of a Wartime Truce

145

which were raised in 1942 to four cents per member per month, with minimum fees of two dollars paid by locals with less than fifty members. In addition, the federation continued its interest in legal and legislative matters, seeking to prevent enactment of legislation harmful to the workers and their unions, and to gain enforcement of laws already enacted. For example, the federation intervened in a case in which a worker sought to recover monies he had transferred to his employer in the form of "kickbacks" — a violation of the collective agreement. The federation was successful in the first decision, but the district court of appeals overruled this decision on the ground that the worker and employer were legally free to modify a collective agreement to their own interests. In fact, the appellate court held that a kickback was not against public policy, and workers could modify a collective agreement to their own satisfaction through a subsequent oral arrangement. 8 Despite the wartime truce, the federation had to be on guard against attempts to weaken various labor laws and regulations. The unemployment compensation program was continually under attack. In 1943, a number of bills dealing with suitable work and the definition of work in agriculture were introduced. Vandeleur, believing that these were attempts to weaken the law, opposed them. One of the bills would have defined suitable employment to mean work performed in any month of the last twelve months, and the federation feared that the revised definition would require the acceptance of a job, or disqualification for cause, even if the benefit claimant could not at the time perform the offered work. The federation also opposed a bill to widen the definition of agricultural work which would have led to the exclusion of many thousands of workers employed in packing sheds, hospitals and on golf courses. When the legislature approved the bill over federation protests, Governor Earl Warren was asked to veto the legislation. The governor, after considering the issues, vetoed all bills revising the unemployment insurance law opposed by the federation. The federation also played a primary role in gaining compensation for construction workers on Wake Island, Guam, and in the Phillipines imprisoned by the Japanese during their occupation of the Pacific Islands. It was largely the intervention of the state federation which, with the help of the AFL, proposed and supported legislation which allowed the imprisoned workers to receive pay-

146

California State Federation of Labor

ments equal to the average weekly wage received by them at the time their imprisonment began. Seventy per cent of benefits were to be disbursed to dependents, and the remaining 30 per cent retained to the credit of the imprisoned payable upon their return to the United States. Because of difficulties in securing hotel accommodations for delegates, the convention of 1943 was postponed. The same steps were taken during the remainder of the war, and, as a result, the question of the right of the officers to represent the federation was raised by Ε. V. Vernon, state treasurer of the California Conference of Machinists. Vernon cited the resolution of the state conference protesting the failure of the federation to hold its regular convention as provided by its constitution. He intimated that unless a convention were held, the locals of the Machinists' Union would withdraw from the state body. Haggerty, who was at the time confronted with a right-to-work petition, which qualified for a place on the ballot in November 1944, pointed to the difficulty of holding a convention with the wartime shortage of hotel rooms. "Our number one concern now is to lick No. 12 [the right-to-work petition]; if we divide our shot, and stop much of the work now being done on No. 12, it will weaken our campaign . . . Immediately following the defeat or passage of No. 12, we will try to hold one [a convention] which will be done in the early part of the year." 9 Haggerty also called attention to the campaign for a convention being waged by the People's World, a Communist paper published in San Francisco. Secretary Haggerty told the executive council that the People's World had charged that he was a Republican working closely with Governor Warren and that it was wasteful to concentrate upon defeating Proposition No. 12. Resolutions demanding a convention had been received, according to Haggerty, from a number of unions in the state, and copies of these resolutions invariably appeared in the People's World. Harry Lundeberg expressed the view that the unions sending in these resolutions were, with the exception of the machinists, Communist-dominated. During 1943, the federation faced attacks made in the legislature upon long-established labor standards. Manpower shortages in war industries provided an occasion for introducing legislation to eliminate the eight-hour day and 48-hour week. The bill would have established a ten-hour day and a 60-hour week as limits. The federation fought

In Search of a Wartime Truce

147

these changes and succeeded in amending the provisions so that the governor was empowered, upon the presentation of proof of manpower shortages in a war industry, to relax the eight-hour day and forty-eight hour week provisions. The law as it was finally enacted did not contain a provision prohibiting the industrial welfare commission from establishing rules or regulations for fewer hours than 60 in a week and 10 in a day.10 The federation felt that certain industrialists and their legislative agents had disregarded the spirit of the agreement made between labor and industry representatives not to introduce controversial issues during the war. One principal demand of the federation — the reapportionment of the state senate — was continually and vigorously promoted on the ground that underrepresentation of the cities made for an unjustifiably large contingent of senators unsympathetic to the needs of workers, and hostile to their organizations. The federation also objected to the use of the West Coast as an experiment station to test the labor draft. It charged that the proposed plan of compulsory labor recruitment would victimize every worker, and it consequently objected to the creation of the area production urgency committee. Not only did the federation object to the failure to appoint labor representatives on various committees dealing with manpower in the area, but it charged that improper methods of recruitment and faulty use of labor resources were chiefly responsible for shortages of personnel.11 Illness and death of Secretary Vandeleur. The illness of SecretaryTreasurer Vandeleur necessitated a temporary replacement, and in November 1942 President C. J. Haggerty was appointed. Vandeleur returned to his job but suffered a relapse and died on October 6, 1943. Vandeleur had been an aggressive organizer, and had launched the campaign to recruit cannery workers into the AFL. He led the Salinas strike of agricultural workers in 1936, and also directed the campaign against the restrictive labor petition in 1938 and the unsuccessful drive to defeat the hot cargo bill in 1942. Vandeleur died without funds, and the council voted to aid his family in meeting medical and funeral expenses. Obviously, President Haggerty, who had served during Vandeleur's illness, was his logical successor. Some members of the council wanted Haggerty to continue without election until the next regular meeting of the executive council in December. Lundeberg objected and declared,

148

California State Federation of Labor

"the secretarial job is a full-time job. W e should elect a man today. If Brother Haggerty runs I will vote for him but what is this business of waiting until the December meeting?" Haggerty wanted to consult with the leaders of the Los Angeles Building Trades Council of which he was secretary. He also asked the executive council to canvass the state and suggested that perhaps there might be someone available who was more suitable for the job. When Haggerty refused to accept immediately, Lundeberg nominated Vice-President C. T. Lehmann, who declined and urged that Haggerty be given time to make up his mind. Haggerty was nominated, and elected on October 31, 1943. Anthony L. Noriega, a teamster, was elected president at the same time.12 Cornelius J. (Neil) Haggerty was a member of the Lathers' Union which he had joined in his native city, Boston, in 1915. He came to California in 1921 and transferred to Lathers' Union Local 42, Los Angeles, of which he was elected business manager in 1928. A year later he was elected vice-president of the International Union of Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers. He was subsequently elected secretary of the Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council in 1933, vice-president of the California State Federation of Labor in 1936, and became president of the state federation of labor in 1936. He helped to steer the federation through a period of great expansion and mounting problems. In Haggerty the federation had an astute and energetic leader, one who was politically adroit and who knew his way around the legislative corridors in Sacramento. An organizer of great talent, a reasonable and patient negotiator, he combined the abilities essential for successful defense of the movement. He was no innovator, but his reasonableness and tolerance were qualities enabling him to work with most individuals and organizations desirous of promoting welfare and labor legislation. He knew how to take care of the interests of the federation, but never was one to engage in vendettas. In December 1943, Haggerty wired acting Governor Frederick W . Houser protesting mob violence against members of the Teamsters' Union in the Imperial Valley. The violence flared up as a result of a strike started on November 18, when officers of the Imperial Valley irrigation district refused to deal with representatives of the workers employed. Acting Governor Houser intervened, and suggested that

In Search of a Wartime Truce

149

the strike be suspended, that the irrigation district negotiate with its workers' representatives, that guards be immediately removed, and finally that no discrimination be practiced against strikers. Upon his return to the state, Governor Warren endorsed the views of the acting governor, but the district irrigation officers were adamant in their refusal to deal with the union. The dispute between the Imperial Valley district and the workers involved was eventually submitted to the W a r Labor Board. 13 Political and legislative programs. Secretary Haggerty also suggested that a program be devised to coordinate political activities of federation affiliates: "An A. F. of L. committee should be set up to register [its] people and get them to vote and have a program of their own under A. F. of L. guidance and leadership." 1 4 He referred to his experience in Sacramento with the legislature, and the absence of coordination among labor groups. Lundeberg wanted to know if one political party would dominate the program. He was assured that it would be "an A. F. of L. committee and will endorse good incumbents regardless of their political affiliations." As the political organization which the A F L planned to create would cooperate with other labor groups, Lundeberg wanted safeguards set up to prevent domination by the C I O . T h e proposal was adopted, after Lundeberg was assured that the A F L planned to carry out its own program, and endorse worthy candidates and issues. The executive council also voted to support the farmer-labor promotion committee which had for its purpose the developing of closer ties between farmers and the organized labor movement. At Haggerty's suggestion, the council donated $500 to help the group. The right-to-work petition was by far the major issue confronting the labor movement of the state in 1944, but other questions could not be neglected. Secretary-Treasurer Haggerty and representatives of a number of unions met with Governor Warren in January 1944 to review the legislative agenda for the coming year. Haggerty reported that he was presenting labor's views on the industrial compensation fund, the unemployment insurance fund, and the employment stabilization commission. He emphasized the desirability of the governor's consulting labor organizations before making appointments of labor members on government boards and commissions, and assigning a representative of labor to the state personnel board. He also

150

California State Federation of Labor

urged that some action be taken to reduce the number of industrial accidents in California by compelling better safety practices, and to improve enforcement by increasing the number of inspectors.15 The growth in membership and the increased influence of government regulations compelled the federation to enlarge the services it provided to its affiliates and their members. During the war, questions of wages and fringe benefits affecting the unions inevitably came before the National War Labor Board. Wage inequities and wage brackets set up by the War Labor Board might be regarded as inequitable and thereby contested by a union. A research staff had been organized by the federation in 1943, and this agency assisted affiliates without charge. The research department made the argument and presented briefs for an increase in the wage brackets subsequently granted to clerical workers in San Francisco. In June 1944, Haggerty reported that 58 cases had been handled by the department in the preceding three months. 16 Prior to 1943, the administration of the California unemployment compensation was in the hands of a five-man commission, on which labor was represented by two members. The 1943 session of the legislature abolished the commission, creating instead a full-time board of three to hear appeals, and two administrators to direct the operations of the program. The federation then became concerned with the course of decisions— an overwhelming number of contested cases was being decided against the claimants — and hired Charles P. Scully, an expert in the field of unemployment compensation law, to examine the legal issues involved. Scully prepared a detailed criticism of the decisions of the board which was transmitted to Governor Warren by the secretary. He also prepared a pamphlet outlining the rights of claimants and the procedure for challenging the denial of benefits. In addition, Scully represented the federation weekly before the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and, even when not arguing a case, was present to observe the operations of the board and the decisions it handed down.17 He presented lists of decisions in cases to Secretary Haggerty and to the executive council indicating those which he believed to be decisions in opposition to precedents or to sound interpretations of the law. In one of the early analyses of appeals board decisions, Scully insisted that the appeals board had acted unfairly in disqualifying a woman fruit packer who,

In Search of a Wartime Truce

151

unable to find work at her customary occupation, was unwilling to accept work as a waitress or salesgirl. Scully argued that the test used by the board was the availability of the claimant's usual work rather than the availability of the claimant for suitable work, which was the proper guide in such cases. In Scully's opinion, this interpretation would have deprived many claimants of benefits, and he advised that such decisions be appealed. At the same time he showed that the board, in other cases, had disqualified claimants who refused other than their usual work on the ground that they had rejected suitable work without good cause. Secretary Haggerty believed that aside from indicating a readiness of the federation to contest decisions of the appeals board it regarded as improper, the presence of a federation attorney at the hearings had a liberalizing effect on the members of the board. The federation, feeling that decisions in this area had to be closely observed, was especially irked at the attitude of the board members who, it was charged, reached different conclusions in cases on the same facts. Haggerty told of having discussed unemployment compensation problems with Governor Warren, and informed the council that locals had been urged to send cases of denials of unemployment compensation benefits to the federation office where they would be examined and if necessary appealed.18 Reconversion As the end of the war approached, the federation leaders became increasingly concerned with the possible problems that the conversion to a peacetime economy would generate. In common with labor groups elsewhere, the California State Federation of Labor was anxious about employment prospects for its members and other workers. Unemployment had virtually disappeared during the war, but the California labor leaders had not forgotten the long lists of unemployed in the 1930's. Consequently, when the war ended, Secretary Haggerty requested Governor Warren to call a special session of the legislature to consider matters which the federation regarded as vital to the interests of the state. Haggerty suggested that the state coordinate its program with the federal government so that employment would be available for all those able and willing to work. He advised that "prompt action should be undertaken to commence much needed public works projects . . . at a time when

152

California State Federation of Labor

they will most effectively relieve unemployment. Such projects should not be in competition with privately financed industry and . . . would not interfere with the resumption of private building operations and reconversion of industry generally." 19 In addition, the federation advocated raising maximum benefits and lengthening duration for claimants, both for unemployment and for workmen's compensation. The federation reiterated support of a program for the payment of benefits to persons unemployed because of disability caused by nonindustrial illness or injuries, and strongly urged its adoption by the legislature. The executive council adopted a detailed program for reconversion at its meeting on September 21. [In] California, the tasks of resuming a peacetime economy are peculiar and infinitely more complex than anywhere else in the country. Elsewhere the problem is one of reconversion; here, it is one of conversion. This difference is explained by the fact that the war industries which were added to the economy of California were entirely new to its structure. In other words, her huge war industries, principally aircraft and shipbuilding, were not the result of the conversion of other industries, but were, in the main, newly created. This changed the whole face of California's industry and accounts for the phenomenal growth of the state's population, building and construction, as well as the acute housing situation that resulted, and the general social problems that have reflected her violent growing pains.20 The federation joined with the AFL in supporting the several fullemployment bills introduced into Congress. In addition, the federation believed that to manage an orderly reconversion of industry, tripartite collaboration among labor, industry, and government would be essential, and it was necessary that the state government coordinate its efforts with the nation. T h e federation advocated a program of urban development, amending the state housing act to give preference to families of servicemen and veterans in public low-rent housing projects, including members of the coast guard and sailors in the merchant marine. It proposed immediate release of a mass of public-works projects to take up any slack in employment, regularizing wartime amendments increasing the maximum payments of $30.00 a week for temporary disability in workmen's compensation cases, providing the same rate of benefits for permanent disability thereby increasing weekly benefits for permanent disability, and increasing weekly death benefits from $25.00

In Search of a Wartime Truce

153

to $30.00 a week. The federation also proposed amending the unemployment insurance law to provide for a maximum benefit of $25.00 a week, and for a duration of 26 weeks for all claimants (this would mean uniform duration), irrespective of the rate of benefits paid. The federation urged that the waiting period for unemployment benefits be abolished so that eligible claimants could draw benefits as soon as they were idle. The executive council declared its intention to mobilize the labor movement of the state in behalf of its program, since it was convinced that its proposals represented the minimum changes necessary to assure a reasonably easy transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. The council by no means regarded this program as the final answer to the problems confronting the workers and the economy of the state, but it believed that, if its recommendations were adopted, they would allow for the development of broader and more detailed answers to those problems. Finally the council declared: "Without recognition of the need to maintain high purchasing power, which can be achieved only through increasing the income of the wage earners of this state and the nation, any concept of prosperity is an illusion. The organized labor movement is the best guarantee that wages will increase commensurate with the phenomenal increase in the productivity of labor." In 1945, the federation's legislative committee — made up of President Anthony Noreiga, Vice-Presidents Kenneth B. Bitter, A. E. Bilger, D. T. Wayne, and Charles W . Real, and Secretary-Treasurer C. J. Haggerty — prepared bills on legislation endorsed by conventions. In order to learn the wishes of affiliates, a meeting of representatives (from the trades and labor councils, the executive council, and the legislative committee) was called for February 23. A number of bills in which various unions were especially interested were discussed, but chief interest was shown in the measure for establishing a program of prepaid medicine suggested by Governor Earl Warren. The conference urged that workers in public and private enterprises and their dependents be covered, and that the administration of the plan be placed under a representative board with labor, management, the medical profession, and the public represented. SecretaryTreasurer Haggerty, in commenting upon the work of the legislative meeting, emphasized the importance of labor councils expressing their views on the various proposals.21

154

California State Federation of Labor

As usual, the main job of the federation was to observe the work of the legislature and to promote bills favorable to labor. Equally important was the careful examination of bills which might curtail the right or diminish the benefits of the workers of California. In the unemployment compensation program, the federation continually sought coverage for agricultural and domestic workers and nonexemption for persons employed by exclusively religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or education organizations. It also sought protection against wage losses from involuntary idleness for all workers irrespective of the employing unit. Interpretation and administration of labor and welfare laws have always been a concern for the federation. Too narrow decisions which deprive workers of benefits have been taken to the courts by federation lawyers and have also been challenged before the administrative agencies by Secretary-Treasurer Haggerty or by the federation's legal representative. For example, a cannery worker had been seasonally employed from April to November about ten miles from her home for eleven years. At the end of the season she filed for benefits which were granted. On January 10, 1944, she was offered a job in an equally distant cannery, but, having no transportation, she refused the job offer. Thereupon, she was ruled ineligible for continuing benefits on the ground that she was unavailable for work. This view was challenged by the state federation of labor, and an appeal was taken to the courts, which held that the unemployment compensation act had to be liberally interpreted to serve its purpose, and that availability for work should be defined as suitable work which a claimant cannot in good cause reject. The claimant was restored to the compensation rolls. The federation regarded the reversal as an important milestone in behalf of a fairer and more realistic interpretation of refusal to accept suitable employment. The federation also took the offensive against several bills which made collection of benefits in workmen's compensation awards more difficult. It charged that the sponsors of the bills were "evidently laboring under the illusion that the workmen's compensation laws were enacted for the benefit of insurance companies and their lawyers." 22 These laws, if adopted, would, according to Haggerty, make workmen's compensation proceedings so cumbersome and complicated

In Search of a Wartime Truce

155

"that workmen will be utterly unable to obtain speedy justice before the industrial accident commission." T h e federation was disturbed by the fact that some of the proposed measures would whittle away benefits which organized labor had gained only after years of effort and struggle. Another objectionable bill aimed to overrule a recent decision of the state supreme court. T h e court had held that a widow or dependent could file a claim for a death benefit within one year of the death or within two years of the injury, whichever offered the dependents the longest time period in which to file a claim. Several bills were introduced to overrule the decision. Bills were also presented to change some of the administrative rules, which would have given lawyers a more important place in the administration of the program. This seemed an effort to wrap the program in greater technicalities, thus making it more difficult for the injured worker to collect his benefits. While opposing the attempts of insurance companies and employers to weaken the workmen's compensation program through legislative amendment, the federation tried to gain substantive improvements by sponsoring amendments of its own, and by insisting that fair procedures be followed in the administration of the program. The federation called Governor Warren's attention to the imputed interest of 6 per cent on lump-sum settlements, and insisted that such a rate was excessive in view of the availability of loans at lower rates. The federation wanted a more realistic rate because this would lead to savings by workers receiving lump-sum settlements who had to accept high-interest loans. 23 At the same time, the federation advised Governor Warren that it had reached an agreement with employers and insurance companies on payments for permanent disability, and asked the governor to support this legislation. As a result of the efforts of the federation, the 1945 legislature amended the workmen's compensation law so that where "an injury causes both temporary and permanent disability payment, but only to the greater of the two, except that where the temporary disability payment exceeds 25 per cent of the permanent disability payment in addition to the temporary disability payment." The dispute between the insurance carriers and several employers was over whether workers who had been injured in the course of their work prior to September 1, 1945, were eligible to the benefits under the law, and

156

California State Federation of Labor

the federation joined in the legal appeal in behalf of the contention that all workers subject to workmen's compensation were covered by the amended provision — that is, the law applied to all cases pending before the industrial accident commission. However, the Supreme Court of California refused to accept the view of the federation, holding that the legislature would have provided for retrospective operation of the measure had it so intended. 24

10 - Legislative Gains and Losses

California's industrial growth was greatly accelerated by World W a r II. T h e average number of workers in manufacturing had increased from over 357,000 in 1939 to 663,872 in 1947, or by over 85 per cent. Payrolls in manufacturing had risen from $533,000,000 to $1,123,000,000 in the same period. Value-added increased from $1,122,545,000 to $3,994,981,000. By 1947, California produced 5.4 per cent of the manufactured goods in the United States. 1 It had been noted that "the impact of World W a r II on California started earlier, was more intense, lasted longer and had greater effect than in any other state." Between 1940 and 1944, the federal government invested $1,006,000,000 in aircraft plants, shipyards, steel, synthetic rubber plants and other facilities. Private investment reached over $475,000,000 in this period. California, like some of her neighbors, did not convert to war production, but expanded old plants and built new ones. California's economy shifted from a predominant producer of consumer goods to a manufacturer of iron and steel and plants for refining of ores and production of aluminum. Many of the earlier problems became accentuated. It is an industrial state, with multiple regions, and the predominance of San Francisco and the Bay region has ceased. A greater number and variety of issues now confront organized labor. Housing, fair employment, support of education, improvements in the social security programs as well as their humane and enlightened administration require increasing attention. Nor can local and state laws which regulate picketing and union security be neglected. The federation is given more funds and staff with which to perform its duties, but its responsibilities appear to expand at a greater rate. From one point of view, California labor and the federation found

158

California State Federation of Labor

the post-World War II period easier than the one which followed World War I. No campaigns resembling the open-shop campaign of the 1920's which severely hurt some unions, were launched, although a "right-to-work" proposal was brought to the voters for approval. Not only was it repelled, but the unions expanded. The losses of the sailors and the building tradesmen in the 1920's were not duplicated after World War II. One of the more satisfactory results of the 1946 legislative session was the adoption of a bill authorizing a system of temporary-disability insurance under which eligible applicants whose wage losses resulted from illnesses and accidents not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act were to receive benefits. Sponsored by Senator Jack Shelley and a number of other legislators, the bill ran into a series of objections from employers and insurance carriers. Conferences among those interested in devising an acceptable measure were effective in overcoming criticism, although the federation charged that if the last-minute CIO amendments had been accepted by the legislature, they would have killed the bill. "The organization [CIO] appeared more interested in effecting the defeat of a measure for which Governor Warren would naturally gain political prestige than in getting increased social benefits for their members. The attempted sabotage by the C. I. O. was even less understandable than the tactics of the California Medical Association, which also tried to inject amendments, which if adopted in the closing days of the session would have meant delay and the probable defeat of the bill." 2 After the committee on finance and insurance had rejected the amendments of both the CIO and the California Medical Association, the proposals were submitted on the floor. As the bill finally emerged, it provided that 1 per cent, collected in 1946 as the employees' contribution for unemployment insurance, be segregated in a special fund and used as compensation for eligible applicants. Individuals eligible for compensation would in case of illness also be eligible for disability benefits. The plan was to go into effect on December 1, 1946, or earlier, if the funds accumulated in the unemployment trust fund could be transferred to the disability fund. An important part of the background of this bill was that the unemployment insurance system had previously called for employer and employee contributions, but since unemployment had been minimal during the war, funds had been accumulating beyond the

Legislative Gains and Losses

159

needs of the system. Administration of the disability-insurance program was placed under the department of employment which also administered the California unemployment-compensation program. In addition to insuring for disability with the state fund, the law provided that employers, with the consent of their employees, could insure with private carriers, or that the risks could also be carried by the employer. Employees covered by private plans were exempt from the state tax. As soon as the program was enacted, Secretary Haggerty asked insurance companies seeking to write voluntary policies to submit the programs for examination by the federation. He assured the carriers that there was no opposition to private plans fairly administered. Only a small number of insurance companies were willing to submit plans for review by the federation — an omen for future relations. According to Secretary Haggerty, the insurance companies were largely interested in contracting with employers, which they had a right to do under the law, providing a majority of workers agreed. Since the workers financed the program through their contributions, the federation believed that the contract between a private carrier and a disability-insurance program should be with the employees. Union members and their unions were therefore advised to be cautious in accepting plans offered by the private insurance companies, "as all employees heretofore subject to unemployment insurance tax will be protected under the state plan and if disabled as of December 1, 1946, will be eligible to receive payment of disability benefits." At the legislative session of 1947, the federation also tried to prevent exclusion from coverage under the unemployment compensation program of a large number of workers engaged in fruit and vegetable packing. T h e federation argued that these workers had, until the enactment of the disability-insurance law, paid contributions into the unemployment-insurance fund. The federation denied that their coverage placed California agriculture at a disadvantage with Florida and Texas. It argued that the California farm was characteristically the "factory farm," on which employment relations resemble in essential respects those existing in industry. Consequently, to incorporate the federal definition of agricultural labor into the California Unemployment Insurance Act, the federation declared, was to ignore the basic economic relations prevailing in California agriculture. Moreover, the federation showed that the

160

California State Federation of Labor

federal definition which eliminated dried-fruit packers had been invalidated by the federal courts, and that these workers now were covered in California. Finally, the federation declared that it was "inconceivable that wage earners, whose status in every essential detail is similar to those of other workers who would remain covered by the Act, should now be deprived of the same benefits." Boycott of private carriers. In 1949, the state federation was concerned largely with defending the state social security programs, and as a consequence became involved in a serious dispute with the private insurance carriers. Under the unemployment-compensation law, enacted in the 1930's, California workers covered by its provisions were required to make a contribution to the fund for payment of benefits. When the disability-compensation law was enacted in 1946, an attempt was made to have the $107,000,000 contributed by employees used as a basis for merit-rating of employer accounts. Lobbyists for insurance carriers and employers introduced a bill which would make employee contributions available for additional merit-rating; according to the state federation, this meant that the contributions of employees would be used as a basis for reducing employers' contributions to the unemployment-insurance program. Characterizing this measure as "an attempted hijacking," the federation charged that the bill completely disregarded the rights of workers to use their own contributions for disability benefits. Despite opposition, the federation was able to obtain legislation providing for the payment of a hospital benefit of $8.00 for a maximum of 12 days beginning January 1, 1950. Eligible claimants were, under the law, entitled to hospital benefits immediately upon admission. The legislation was regarded as the most important enactment (from the labor point of view) of the 1949 session, and was brought about through amending, on the floor of the senate, a federation-sponsored assembly bill. Severe opposition to the bill came from what the federation described as the insurance lobby. The federation believed that insurance lobbyists were working closely with some groups of employers and that they jointly sought to prevent any liberalizing of unemployment and workmen's compensation programs or of the system of disability insurance. The federation repeated that it did not, nor did the AFL, ever challenge the right of private insurance carriers to function and prosper, but it warned that "devotion to a free economy does not mean, however, that labor

Legislative Gains and Losses

161

must contribute to its own destruction . . . Through the means of the disability insurance system, the working people of this State have brought profit and wealth to the private insurance carriers. The voluntary insurance plan serves those who would exploit and degrade all who toil for a living." California labor leaders were angered by the campaign of the insurance lobbyists to prevent liberalization of the unemploymentcompensation system by the legislature. The insurance carriers themselves had no direct interest in the unemployment-insurance program since it was operated under the federal-state arrangement without the participation of private carriers, but they did, according to the federation, use influence over employer-clients to prevent improvements in the welfare programs. As a result, the federation's executive council recommended a boycott of private companies writing disability-insurance plans. When the issue came before the 1949 convention of the state federation, Haggerty took the floor to urge endorsement of the boycott. He charged that "every insurance company in California . . . every employer in California . . . and all associations of employers in California . . . were opposed to the [health insurance] plan," when it was first presented to the legislature. "The same companies who had spent so much time, effort and money to defeat the measure at its inception then devised an amendment . . . providing for voluntary plans, giving the employee . . . his preference in being covered by a voluntary plan, by an outside insurance company, or by the state plan within the state fund itself." 3 The amended program was accepted. Unanimously, the 1949 convention voted to boycott all private disability plans offered under the Unemployment Insurance Act. In a letter to the members, attention was called to the adverse effect which refusal of the insurance companies to agree to the liberalization of benefits had on measures to liberalize the program. Moreover, the negative attitude of the private carriers meant that workers covered by the state plan would be equally debarred from higher benefits. Since employees, under the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act, were entitled to withdraw at the beginning of a calendar quarter from a private plan providing the required notice prior to the quarter is given, it was the view of the state federation of labor that unions should urge their members to cancel all private arrangements.4

162

California State Federation of Labor

This boycott continued through 1950. In that year the convention authorized the executive council to appoint a committee to meet with private insurance carriers to discuss methods for improving disability provisions of the unemployment-insurance law. It was agreed to support a number of improvements in the several programs. This included an increase in maximum payments; benefits eligibility for strikers whose illness or injury was not connected with the labor dispute; a tax credit to be granted to the insurance carriers, which would relieve them of a required contribution; and a promise for a joint request for increased benefits from the legislature whenever current income was sufficiently high to permit added outlays.5 Workers were to receive regular benefits if such benefits plus remuneration received from employers did not exceed 70 per cent of their regular weekly wage. Workers confined to a hospital would be eligible for full hospitalization benefits when in addition to 100 per cent of remuneration received from employers. Following the agreement, the executive council lifted the boycott on the private carriers. In 1949, the federation reminded affiliates that gains had been made in a favorable labor market — with available jobs almost greater than the number of workers seeking employment. Though satisfied with progress made, the executive council was anxious about the future. It raised the question of the effect of a surplus labor market upon hundreds of unions, many of them recently organized, if they were to be faced with widespread unemployment. These issues were not speculative, but were a warning to the affiliates that they must be prepared for more stormy weather. Unions were told to be on guard to meet new situations — which might be less favorable to increasing membership and winning concessions from employers. For its own part, the federation pledged itself to mobilize its maximum strength to repel any attack upon weaker organizations and their collective bargaining agreements. In its report to the 1949 convention, the executive council reiterated many of its older views on improved social security and on the need for a national system of medical care. It also endorsed rent control and urged that labor representatives be appointed on rent advisory boards. Additional low-rent public housing for urban and rural communities, including permanent provision for public ownership and operation of farm-labor camps, was advocated. Federal aid

Legislative Gains and Losses

163

to education was approved with the proviso that the needs of the various states would be considered whenever such aid was allocated. Legislative activity. T h e legislative activity of the federation was, as in the past, varied, and the 1949 session was typical. First, the federation concerned itself with legislation that affected all workers — organized and unorganized. Social insurance programs, minimum and prevailing wage legislation, regulation of employment offices, of working hours, and of overtime fell into this group. Other bills affected union members only — such as regulation of internal affairs of labor disputes, picketing, notices of strikes, boycotts and injunctions, and so forth. It also sponsored and supported various bills affecting special groups of workers. At the 1949 session the federation supported legislation for 18 special crafts, although usually the union of the workers affected carried major responsibility for guiding the measure. Examples included: a bill sponsored by the building trades unions prohibiting discharge of an employee for refusing to work where there was real danger, and where the work would have to be done in violation of the safety regulations; exemption from the state sales tax of material and products used in ship construction; regulation of the fishing season in the sardine industry; amendment of the teachers' retirement system, and changing tenure laws. T h e significance of the state federation in the legislative area is that its agents are on the job throughout the legislative session. A legislator might introduce bills at the behest of special constituents which would change the hours of business or the provisions of a safety code, or the rules to be used in determining prevailing rates. Unless some agency (such as the federation) were on guard to protect labor interests, many such bills might be enacted — not because of deliberate desire of the legislature to injure, b u t because legislators might wish to aid or promote some special interest without regard to the general welfare. Even a large union might not by itself have appreciable influence in the legislature. For example, members from Los Angeles or San Francisco were not likely to be greatly influenced by the problems of workers in Humboldt County; the opposite also was true. T h e state federation, because it represented a statewide constituency, was able to influence legislation on behalf of local groups which would by themselves be powerless.

164

California State Federation of Labor

Early in 1950, the state federation of labor requested Governor Earl Warren to call a special session for the relief of the unemployed. The governor called a session of the legislature to ran concurrently with the regular (budget) session, and the executive council submitted a number of proposals urging extended coverage for workers not included in the Unemployment Compensation Act, increased benefits, and the elimination of any waiting period for all those subject to the provisions of this law. The council also suggested a revision of the state pension law so that monthly payments would be increased to $75.00 for the aged and $85.00 for the blind as well as removal of the relative's responsibility to support aged dependents. During the same session, the executive council advocated legislation for the continuance of child-care centers for working mothers. The child-care centers had been established and supported with federal funds; when federal funds ceased to be available, the federation proposed that these centers be financed by the state. In the opinion of the federation, the state was also obligated to replace the federal Rent-Control Act (when it expired on June 30, 1950) by a state law. The executive council urged the governor to sponsor "a strong and effective rent control act to protect the health and welfare of the lower income families living in rented dwellings." During December 1949 and January 1950 the federation held statewide meetings in San Francisco on revisions of the permanent disability schedule under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The meetings were called so that affiliates could present their views to the Industrial Accident Commission. The federation criticized the apathy of the commission and its tendency to yield to the carriers of workmen's compensation insurance. The federation held that carriers were engaged in a campaign to prevent the revision of workmen's compensation permanent and partial disability schedules on a realistic basis, and to limit the discretion of the commission in determining the extent of disability. In response to the mandates of the 1950 convention, in 1951 the federation supported 24 bills on unemployment insurance, 21 bills on disability insurance, 36 bills on workmen's compensation, 18 bills on general changes in the provisions on the labor code, and 17 bills on miscellaneous subjects. The major effort was directed to raising maximum benefits under the unemployment-insurance program, and the extension to full coverage of workers employed in

Legislative Gains and Losses

165

agriculture, domestic service, and nonprofit institutions. Abolition of merit-rating of employers under the unemployment-compensation law, increases in dependency allowances, and the repeal of the waiting period for all those unemployed beyond one week were other measures urged. In addition to requesting increases in benefits, the council recommended that the waiting period should be compensated in all disability spells lasting more than one week. Similar proposals were made for improving the workmen's compensation program. Suggestions on housing were the standard improvements supported by the state federation over the years. An enlarged public program was advocated, and the need for housing for middle-income families emphasized. The federation also reiterated long-held views on education, its disfavor with consumer taxes and its traditional advocacy of income taxes. Additional federal minimum standards which state unemployment insurance laws would be required to meet were called for, and Congress was urged to repeal the amendment sponsored by Senator William Knowland which lessened the power of the federal government in setting standards which states had to meet to be eligible for federal tax offsets under unemployment provisions of the social security law. The executive council advocated raising maximum benefits, and expressed the view that additional public revenues be raised through federal corporate and personal income taxes.

11-Minority Groups and Civil Rights

Chinese workers began immigrating to California in the late 1840's. Their number increased after the negotiation of the Burlingame Treaty in 1868, and by 1876 it was estimated that more than 139,000 lived in the state. 1 The congressional investigation of 1877 found that approximately 35,000 Chinese workers either monopolized or were an important source of labor for about twenty trades. "This evidence shows that the Chinese have reduced wages to what would be starvation prices for white men and women, and engrossed so much of the labor in the various callings that there is lack of employment for whites." The evidence against the Chinese was by no means one-sided. Against those who claimed Chinese labor was degraded and servile, there were others who insisted that Chinese workers had made an important contribution to California agriculture and industry, that they had helped to build railroads and irrigation systems, and that there was no cheap labor in California. Finally, it was called to the attention of a committee that the Chinese were almost always sober and did not belong to labor unions. In terms of economic development, Chinese immigration was a great boon to California. However, "Chinese laborers, because of their low standard of living, had greatly reduced the level of wages and caused much unemployment. These conditions had aroused great hostility against the Chinese. The only way out was to restrict their coming," according to opponents of Chinese immigration. 2 The Sand Lot riots. Competition of Chinese workers inevitably aroused the fear and hostility of white workers whom they displaced. Undoubtedly, differences in the culture and backgrounds made it easier for demogogues to arouse hatred and suspicion. Not only

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

167

could appeals be made to self-interest, but differences in appearance and habits could be exploited. But principally the white workers felt that their jobs were threatened, a fear which enabled Dennis Kearney to transform a meeting on the sand lot of San Francisco on July 23, 1877, demanding reform of labor conditions, into a howling antiChinese mob bent on the forcible expulsion of all Chinese workers from employment. The riots lasted five days, and only stern action by the police and citizen deputies prevented its spread through the city. The aim of the rioters was to force dismissal of all Chinese workers, an objective in many instances temporarily achieved, although most of the dismissed were rehired after the restoration of order.3 From the time of the riots, the labor movement of California became determined to restrict Chinese and other Oriental immigrants, regarding them as a threat to the wages, working conditions and general welfare of all workers. In fact, California labor, because it needed support for its anti-Oriental policy, asked and received the assistance of organized labor in other parts of the country. In 1881, C. F. Burgman, a cigar maker and a delegate from the Representative Assembly of Trade and Labor Unions of San Francisco to the founding meeting of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada, presented an anti-Chinese resolution which the convention (the direct predecessor of the American Federation of Labor) adopted with one dissenting vote. The resolution called "for the use of our best efforts to get rid of this monstrous immigration." Opposition to Chinese immigration became an article of faith of the American Federation of Labor, in part because white labor leaders could sympathize with their fellow workers facing severe competition from a strange people, and partly because Samuel Gompers, a cigar maker by trade, was directly aware of the disastrous effect the competition of Chinese cigar makers had upon the jobs and income of white members of the union. In fact, the cigar makers of San Francisco had, in their defense, devised the first union label in 1874. They introduced the white label on cigars to show that the cigar had been manufactured by white, union cigar makers.4 Soon after the establishment of the California State Federation of Labor, the renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Act was before Congress, and the state federation spoke out firmly for its reenactment. At its

168

California State Federation of Labor

Convention in 1902, the federation charged the Chinese immigrants with having been "detrimental to the general welfare of our country," and entered the lists against the Japanese immigrant who, according to the convention, was "a willing worker for wages less than a Chinese worker . . . and being more favored is a greater menace to our laboring population than the Chinese." The convention promised to "demand the enactment of legislation restricting immigration of that race to the United States." 5 The memorial calling upon Congress to reenact the restrictions upon Chinese immigration was approved by 149 California labor unions, 88 of them in San Francisco. The Santa Clara Socialist Party also signed.6 The American Federation of Labor issued a pamphlet, Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion: Meat vs. Rice, in which Chinese civilization and other aspects of Chinese life were assailed, and the demand for exclusion repeated. The pamphlet was republished as a United State Senate Document. 7 The state federation also supported general anti-Oriental propaganda and, in 1905, urged its affiliates to join and aid the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League. The appeal, according to the federation, "resulted in a great many unions affiliating with that body." 8 However, the federation was opposed to the revival of the violent methods of Dennis Kearney's sand lot agitation. When the delegation of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific called for adopting the boycott tactics used in Humboldt County against Chinese and Korean business establishments, the convention rejected the resolution. This did not mean that the federation had in any sense softened in its opposition. In 1909, Olaf Tveitmoe, the secretary of the state building trades council and a Norwegian immigrant, called a conference which formed the Asiatic Exclusion League. The eleventh annual convention advised "all affiliated central labor bodies to organize branches of the Asiatic Exclusion League of California," headed by Tveitmoe, "to the end that a statewide movement for the exclusion of Asiatics may be perfected, and the incoming executive council is hereby instructed to communicate and cooperate with all central bodies." 9 Tveitmoe was a militant trade unionist and a supporter of Anarchist-tainted causes. A firm believer in direct action, he was indicted in 1911 for participating in the dynamite ac-

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

169

tivities of the Iron Workers' Union, although his subsequent conviction was reversed in the appellate courts. European workers. The state federation was also much concerned with the effect of the completion of the Panama Canal on the labor supply. It feared that California, and other Pacific Coast communities, would be inundated by European immigrants, and that California would lose the "privileged sanctuary" it had enjoyed in the past. In September 1913, the California Federation appealed to national and international labor organizations of Europe for cooperation so that proper "regulation and distribution of European immigration to the Pacific Coast might be effected after the opening of the Panama Canal." 1 0 It called upon European labor organizations to disseminate reliable and careful information regarding economic conditions in California. In the plea to organized workers of Europe, the state federation declared: Protected by our comparatively isolated position, labor organizations here have been able to settle their economic problems with comparatively little interference from the outside world. Thus a feeling of permanency and security has been built up among most classes of workers, expressing itself in the general participation by labor in the affairs of the State and the different municipalities. On the whole, fairly satisfactory wages, hours and general working conditions have been obtained through the ordinary activities of labor organizations for nearly all classes of labor that were willing to organize for self-protection. In addition, organized labor has taken an important part in the legislative and political fields, and gained for itself many advantages and security. With the opening of the Panama Canal, however, and the threatening aspects of an enormous immigration of foreign and to a large extent unorganized labor, the situation becomes materially changed and calls for careful consideration and action. T h e statement pointed to the long, gradual immigration of European workers to the eastern seaboard, and the federation held that: the increase was so gradual and extended for such a length of time that American industries were able to adapt themselves and expand each year at the same time, thus resulting in practically perfect absorption without undue disturbance of economic conditions, except in particular instances where employers for sake of greater exploitation and often revenge have displaced one class of labor by an entirely new one. But with the completion of the Canal, it is believed the stream of European

170

California State Federation of Labor

immigration will in a large part be diverted to the sparsely settled West. This means that while in former years immigration amounted to an addition of a certain small percentage each year to the existing population, on the Pacific Coast the coming immigration will probably within a few years double or treble the population. T h e majority of labor organizations of the country — including the American Federation of Labor — favored restrictions upon European immigration, but they found it difficult to rally the community to their point of view. After all, the United States had been settled by European immigrants, the country was a refuge for those suffering political oppression and economic exploitation, and the manufacturing groups and other industrialists had an interest in continuing a steady flow of labor from Europe. The rise of a European immigrant to financial or industrial eminence merely confirmed the American dream. It was not until the end of World W a r I, with the aftermath of fear and suspicion of European revolutionary ideologies, that it became possible to introduce such restrictions. California labor had an easier task. Largely isolated from the flow of European immigration, it won support from influential groups in the remainder of the community in its aim to restrict the inflow of Oriental workers. In fact, when the labor movement of California showed sympathy for an attempt to organize Japanese workers in Japan, its conduct was criticized by politicians. Representatives of the Laborers' Friendly Society of Japan, visiting California and seeking to familiarize themselves with the working of American trade unionism, called on the executive council of the California State Federation of Labor. One of the representatives, B. Suziki, addressed the council and later was a fraternal delegate to the 1915 convention. 11 The courtesy to a guest aroused the concern of Senator James D. Phelan, who chided the executive council. "I wish to respectfully call your attention to the fact," Phelan wrote, "that anything which weakens the hands of your representatives in Washington, weakens the cause in which we are all concerned — the prevention of the displacement of the whole population of California by the Japanese." 12 A rather conservative Democrat and a former mayor of San Francisco, Phelan was, like many other Californians, bitterly opposed to Oriental immigration. He feared that willingness of a representative California labor group to hear the views of Japanese

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

171

union officials might make it appear "that our working men are not sincere in their opposition, and have been won over to the 'Brotherhood of Man' sentimentality, skillfully preached by Japanese proponents and carried on in various forms by the Japanese propaganda in this country, then Washington may be confronted with the serious problem, which for the time being, is held in abeyance by the 'Gentlemen's Agreement' existing between the United States and Japan." Phelan was convinced, as were many others, "that the State Federation of Labor has been trapped into a false position. It is something that cannot now be undone. With unlimited Japanese immigration which hangs on a thread, the fate of our workers in shop and field would be ultimate extinction." The senator wanted the convention of the state federation to remove the "false impression that has gone abroad — that the workers of California are indifferent to this matter and are yielding under one guise or another, to the insidious campaign, which, if successful, be California's undoing." Coming from a United States Senator from California, the message could not be ignored. The credentials committee of the convention of 1915, which considered whether two Japanese delegates would be seated as fraternal delegates, found no basis for the charges made by Phelan and others. It emphasized that recommending the seating of the two Japanese trade unionists in "no way affects our attitude or modifies our demand for the exclusion of Asiatic laborers from our shores." 13 In addition, the committee "believed the seating of the Japanese delegates was in accordance with the spirit of International Unionism." The very gathering which protested Senator Phelan's views also reiterated the state federation's long-held demand for the exclusion of Japanese, and again expressed opposition to the "patronizing or employing of Asiatics in any manner and . . . extension of the Chinese exclusion laws so as to bar all Asiatics." The Japanese delegates were seated and seated again at the 1916 convention over the protests of the delegates from the San Francisco Laundry Workers' Union. The convention was invited to send a delegation on a visit to Japan to bring the labor movements of the two countries closer. In response, the convention declared: "The organized labor movement of California and of America stands ever ready to assist the workers of every country, color and creed, to

172

California State Federation of Labor

emancipate themselves from exploitation . . . It has been necessary at times for the working class of this country to protect their standard of living by favoring the exclusion of foreign competition, in the spirit alone of imperative necessity and self-protection . . . W e have learned with interest and gratification, that the workers of Japan are organizing into industrial unions for their own welfare; a movement we can endorse." The convention expressed its "good will and a message of hope and encouragement for a brighter future to the working classes" of Japan. However, "in assuming this position of a greater friendship between the workers of the East and the West, we must continue our unswerving stand upon exclusion until such time as immigration will not prove a menace to our own unions, our working people and the standard of living." 14 The Oriental problem. The economic basis of anti-Oriental feeling, at least among organized workers, is obvious from the resolution of the Laundry Workers' Union of San Francisco at the fifteenth annual convention of the state federation of labor. Charging that Asiatic competition had "become a serious menace to our people . . . it is the duty of all Caucasians to protect and assist our own men and women engaged in the great struggle for subsistence, by refusing to employ or patronize Asiatics in any manner, as well as demanding strict exclusion legislation and positive enforcement of the same." 1 5 The laundry workers' unions had organized the AntiJapanese Laundry League which aimed to discourage patronage of Oriental laundries, and the same resolution asked that the state federation again extend "to the Anti-Japanese Laundry League its moral support and endorsement; and be it further Resolved, That the delegates sitting in this Convention pledge themselves to assist in the work of discouraging Oriental competition of any nature against our own people." As it had in the past, the convention endorsed the resolution, but, for the first time, two delegates expressed opposition to the anti-Oriental dogmas. Hugo Ernst (who was to become head of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees' and Bartenders' International Union) and delegate S. W . Sullivan both opposed exclusion or boycott of Oriental workers. In 1916, the Anti-Japanese Laundry League offered the same proposal; Hugo Ernst again objected, and was joined in his opposition by James Malone, a delegate from W e b Pressmen No. 12 of Los Angeles.16

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

173

Despite the anti-Oriental sentiment of the state federation of labor, recognition that such a policy was neither practicable nor desirable did begin to appear. At the 1916 convention, Delegate George Keeling of the Oakland Typographical Union submitted a resolution which called attention to the unsatisfactory results of the state federation's exclusion resolutions; this resolution called for common ownership of the nation's industries which, according to its sponsors, would make possible the removal of all immigration barriers. The resolutions committee recommended defeating it, but the proposal's inferential criticism of the anti-Oriental position of California labor gained the votes of two delegates — Hugo Ernst, sponsor of the resolution, and Harry Möhr of the Oakland Street Car Men's Union. While the overwhelming majority continued to favor exclusion, the opposing group represented progress toward more tolerance and understanding. Even more important was a resolution by Möhr which declared that the "matter of organizing Asiatic workers of California is at present demanding the action of labor organizations of the State; and . . . experience has shown that we cannot hope to remove the difficulties experienced by organized labor of California in the past, following competition continually precipitated by the presence of Asiatic workers, except to launch a movement to organize said workers; therefore be it Resolved That the California State Federation of Labor in seventeenth annual convention assembled, do hereby instruct its incoming Executive Board to take immediate steps having for its object the organizing of all Asiatics in the State of California." T h e resolution was referred to the incoming executive council. It was obvious at least to some observers that the old policy of exclusion did not meet the situation, but the opposition of organized laundry workers and other unionists inhibited the leaders from taking another position. The convention took a hesitant step toward understanding the problem when it adopted a resolution which declared: The futility of the policy of ignoring the economic fact that the Asiatic workers now established on the Pacific Coast is a problem impossible of solution by the Exclusion Act alone; and, Whereas, Many of these people have shown by their action a close consciousness and adherence to cooperative principles admirable in any race, and

174

California State Federation of Labor

Whereas, The recognition of the fact that capitalism, knowing no creed and no color is more than willing to beat down white labor with the club of Asiatic competition, with its lower standard of living; therefore be it Resolved, That the incoming Executive Council be instructed to gather data relative to the feasibility of organizing labor unions of the citizens of the United States of Asiatic origins and report upon the same at the next convention. However, the executive council did not make any specific recommendations for organizing the workers, and the 1917 convention found the issue of "growing insistence and importance. The Executive Council, charged by the [1916] convention with investigation in this connection, while not recommending the use of Federation's funds for organizing work among Orientals, counsels that the attitude of organized labor upon this subject should be clearly understood, that the organized labor movement continues its unqualified advocacy of the exclusion of Orientals and looks with favor upon such organization of wage working Orientals as will tend to raise the standard of living of such workers to that of our own white wage workers." 17 However, the council would allot no resources for organizing Oriental workers, but in 1918 it commended Japanese workers in California for refusing to "be used as striker-breakers." While the view of the 1917 convention shows no mitigation of anti-Oriental feeling, there is at least a glimmer of recognition that those living in the United States would have to be drawn into some kind of union, if only to raise their standard of living so that they would not have an adverse effect upon the wages and working standards of white workers. In 1918, the convention lapsed back into its old fiercely anti-Oriental position without mentioning Oriental workers who lived in the United States. A resolution introduced by George A. Tracy, of the San Francisco Typographical Union No. 21 and a former president of the state federation, requested immediate passage of a law which would exclude all Asiatics from the mainland and from possessions. Among the reasons given for this request, that by "their low standard of living, immoral surroundings and cheap labor, they constitute a formidable and fierce competition against our American system, the pride and glory of our civilization, and unless prohibited by effective legislation, will result in irreparable deterioration of American labor." 18 T h e resolution was approved.

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

175

In its report to the 1920 convention the executive council declared that in "harmony with the intent of several resolutions adopted at the last convention the Executive Council took an active part in the formation of the California Oriental Exclusion League. Active assistance was rendered in circulating the Initiative Petition [to prohibit the leasing of land ineligible to American citizenship — evidently Orientals] . . . which . . . will appear on the ballot at the November elections." 19 The executive council added that "in a large measure their efforts were responsible for the formation of the California Oriental Exclusion League and they also actively assisted in circulating the petitions which placed 'Alien Land Law' on the ballot." Despite his opposition to Oriental immigration, Secretary-Treasurer Scharrenberg reported favorably to the 1929 convention that a "significant event took place during the year at one of the regular meetings of the San Francisco Labor Council, when a representative of the newly organized Chinese Laundry Workers' Union told in graphic terms of their successful strike against intolerable conditions prevailing in the Chinese laundries of the San Francisco Bay cities." 20 Scharrenberg described the 15-hour workdays and harsh conditions which the Chinese worker endured. "This incident," he declared, "is of real historic significance — first, because never before had a duly accredited delegate of organized Chinese workers appeared on the floor of the San Francisco Labor Council; second, because the strike illustrates forcibly the terrible contrast in working conditions of white and yellow laundry workers." For a time, the attitude of the state federation underwent no significant change on the racial question. However, beginning in the 1930's, resolutions protesting racial discrimination appeared on the floor of the convention. In 1933, the federation still favored "rigid exclusion of Oriental labor" and cooperated with other state organizations to make such exclusion laws effective,21 but four years later a somewhat different note was struck. The resolutions committee was "of the opinion that the Convention cannot very well tell private interests how they may conduct their business [but] your committee is of the opinion that in the Organized Labor movement there should be no race lines drawn, but that Labor must, and does recognize that workers are competitiors in the field of industry

176

California State Federation of Labor

whether they be black or white and that this Federation and its officers should do all in their power to organize Negroes on an equal basis with other workers." 22 It is true that the resolution did not refer to equality of treatment of Oriental workers, which might have sounded many alarm bells in the minds of some veterans, but the failure of any of the speakers to challenge a proposal for racial equality was in itself a measure of progress. The resolution of the executive council to support organization work among Oriental workers, adopted at the June 1938 meeting, was another milestone.23 Another sign of lessening antagonism toward racial minorities, including Orientals, was the adoption of a resolution by the 1940 convention reiterating "the traditional position of the Labor Movement against any form of racial discrimination, and for the complete equality of all in the Trade Union Movement, regardless of race, creed or color." 24 General resolutions had now been adopted; but the efforts of racial minorities to gain employment in California industries were regarded by some leaders as a problem. Representing the Los Angeles Pattern Makers' Union, J. W . Buzzell, secretary of the Los Angeles Labor Council, submitted a resolution which called attention to the presence of several hundred thousand Negro citizens in California. The resolution declared that it was a "natural thing that [they] should be attempting to learn trades and occupations by means of which they may improve their standard of living. This is rapidly bringing into our industrial and trade field competition which should not exist as such." 25 The resolution declared that competition between Negro and white workers would continue as long as employers attempt to take advantage of the Negro by paying him a lesser wage than would be paid for the same job to white workers, and as long as there was "a continued opposition to the employment of Negroes by labor unions. However, as this federation realizes, it has no authority over its component and affiliated unions in the conduct of their internal affairs." The resolution called for the appointment of a committee to investigate the situation and report back to the next convention. Officially, the California State Federation favored nondiscrimination in job employment. Lack of power over its affiliates, however, made such views somewhat academic whenever a local union refused to admit Negroes to membership. Yet, the views had some influence

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

177

over labor opinion. In 1943, the state federation was one of the sponsors of a bill (A.B. 485) to eliminate racial discrimination in employment which would inevitably include all workers.28 While, in 1943, the state federation still opposed repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, there was at the same time opposition within the executive council 27 against the extreme anti-Oriental positions which would have gained unchallenged support in earlier periods. In fact, the federation never denied its role in the anti-Oriental agitation which was part of the California social landscape for many decades. When a resolution at the 1942 convention advocating Japanese exclusion gave credit to the Native Sons of the Golden West for leading the fight against Oriental immigration, the resolutions committee did not desire "to detract any credit from that organization," but declared, "The true credit for the agitation against Oriental immigration should go where it belongs — to the pioneers of the trade union movement in San Francisco, Dennis Kearney, Frank Roney, John O. Walsh, John I. Nolan and many others of that day who in and out of season preached the gospel of exclusion of Orientals." The same convention refused, however, to approve a resolution which would have recommended amending the United States Constitution to revoke the citizenship of native-born of Japanese origin and to demand that "all such persons together with all alien Japanese be deported to their Mother Country, upon the termination of the war." 2 8 This harsh proposal, suggested when feelings against the Japanese were bitterly aroused, was rejected. Fair employment. On fair-employment practices, the convention of 1942 announced that it had in the past taken an unequivocal position in its favor, but it recognized the "right of every International Union to make its own laws and regulations, and therefore we believe that it is unwise, and beyond the power of this Federation, to, in any way, order unions to take any action upon the subject of race discrimination. The Committee believes that this is an important matter, but that the condition complained of can only be remedied by constant educational work." The federation claimed that it had cooperated with the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices and other governmental agencies in charge of the training of workers, and that it had tried to gain cooperation for the executive order barring discrimination. "The Federation has

178

California State Federation of Labor

taken a long step toward the establishment of harmonious relations with the Negroes in this State." On fair-housing legislation, the federation at first took the position that the renting and sale of private housing and the matter of restrictive covenants should be left outside legislative regulation, although it did declare, at the 1947 convention, "that as long as public funds are expended without discrimination and public facilities are made available equally," the purposes of nondiscrimination are sound. 29 The 1946 convention endorsed a Fair Employment Practices Act which was on the ballot as Proposition No. 11, but it failed to pass. This initiative declared it to be "State Policy that all persons have the right of equal opportunity to secure employment. To effect such policy, it makes it unlawful to refuse to hire, to discharge, or to discriminate in conditions of employment against any person because of race, religion, color, national origin or ancestry, establishes a commission to prevent such unlawful practices by conciliation or order and by education, provides for judicial review of the commission's orders, and appropriates a sum for the commission." 30 Although favoring equal employment opportunities for all, the convention, the following year, refused to endorse a resolution against discrimination in private housing. When the resolutions committee reported on the proposal to the convention, it recommended that the resolve demanding an end to restrictive covenants be deleted. It was the opinion of the committee that an individual had the right to decide where and with whom he shall live. The report aroused considerable debate, but in the end was adopted by the convention. 31 Although the federation's views on racial issues underwent continual change in response to the shifting attitude of the community and organized labor, the convention of 1948 did reject a proposal to choose a Negro as a vice-president. Opponents of this measure argued that Negroes, like whites, should be selected for office within the labor movement on the basis of ability and experience alone, and not on racial grounds.32 The federation subsequently approved governmental protection of civil rights, and nondiscrimination in employment and housing. In 1948, the executive council appointed a committee on racial intolerance which urged strengthening civil rights legislation and the enactment of state and federal fair employment practices laws.33

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

179

In 1949, the council recommended the continuation of its standing committee on racial intolerance and bigotry, and advised that such committees should also be formed at the local level. It favored abolition of the poll tax, and establishment of a federal Fair Employment Practices Commission; the council declared that discrimination must be eliminated "in the armed services, education, housing, recreation, property ownership and the use of public places, and . . . in civic and professional organizations." 34 Since removal of all types of discrimination was necessary for a democratic society, the federation called on its affiliates to avoid prejudice and discrimination in their activities. A statement favoring an extensive program for the protection of the civil and economic rights of minorities was included. 35 In 1952, the convention favored Proposition No. 14 on the state ballot, which called for repeal of constitutional restrictions upon Chinese in the state, and urged its members to vote for it. 36 Representatives of the state federation testified in behalf of fair employment practices legislation, and the 1955 convention congratulated Secretary Haggerty for his efforts on behalf of such legislation. 37 Resolutions endorsing civil rights and fair employment practices for minorities were enacted at all conventions during the 1950's. At the 1956 convention, the resolutions committee approved the sentiments expressed in one such resolution. However, it called attention to the problem of the labor movement when some unions "give mere lip service and no effective support to our enunciated program in the field of freedom from discrimination." 3 8 As one surveys the history of the California State Federation of Labor one notes the growth of tolerance and understanding of racial minorities. Labor organizations are made up of the working population of the community. A labor group, of course, is first to feel the competition from workers with lower standards, and reacts against the foreigner and immigrant out of fear. Difficulties and tensions originating at the place of employment can then be exploited for ulterior ends by the racist demagogue. One cannot defend the brutal discrimination and ugly intolerance against the Oriental worker which is an ineradicable part of the history of California labor, but one can point to the growth of understanding and sympathy and the eventual championing of equal rights for all. Originally a supporter of legislation against the Oriental, the

180

California State Federation of Labor

California Federation finally became a champion of equal rights. While not extenuating its past attitudes, one can say that the federation accepted the doctrine of equal treatment much sooner than did many others in California. The change in view on this question is perhaps the best illustration of the capacity of the labor movement to grow and develop. Mexican, West Indian, and Japanese Workers The federation showed a continuing interest in the organization of farm workers, but it was not able, for a long period, to maintain viable local unions among agricultural workers. During World War I, the restrictions upon the importation of Mexican farm workers were raised on the ground that a shortage of labor existed, and agricultural workers from Mexico were allowed to seek employment in the United States without payment of a head tax or meeting the literacy test.39 Throughout the next decades, California agriculture used substantial numbers of workers of Mexican origin. Estimates of the number and significance of Mexican workers differed, and they ranged from more than 20 to about 80 per cent, but it was generally assumed they constituted an important part of the labor supply especially among migrant workers. Agricultural employers fought against restrictions upon entry of Mexican agricultural laborers. "Generally the position was taken that employers could not obtain any other type of labor to perform the menial tasks of agriculture which required working in uncomfortable positions, that if Mexicans were not readily available for these tasks, agricultural production would stagnate and result in the ruination of many farming enterprises." 40 As labor shortages appeared in other industries, employers sought to hire Mexican workers to fill their manpower needs. The federation would have cooperated fully in the program of recruiting Mexican labor for the farms, but opposed use of workers in nonagricultural employments. The federation demanded a halt in attempts to employ them in hotel and culinary occupations, and opposed the "promiscuous importation of cheap labor power in order to undermine and destroy the high wage levels established by American labor." These workers legally authorized by the United States govern-

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

181

ment were joined by thousands of "wetbacks" (illegal Mexican entrants). T h e unregulated flow of "wetback" labor not only exposed the worker to exploitation because he risked deportation if his presence were reported to the immigration authorities, but also the large number of "wetback" entrants tended to depress wages of both the legally entered Mexican laborers and of native farm workers. The California Federation of Labor — always deeply concerned for the welfare of migrant agricultural workers — was anxious that the flow of Mexican workers be regularized so that they would be adequately paid and provided with decent living conditions on the corporation farms where many of them were employed. W h e n Secretary-Treasurer Haggerty learned that there were plans for negotiating an agreement between the United States and Mexico designed to regulate the entrance of Mexican farm workers into the United States, he objected to the state department giving only ten days' notice to the National Farm Labor Union of the draft proposals the United States delegation would present. Haggerty further explained that in a cursory reading the proposals were found to be objectionable. The United States government could be made an agent for the Associated farmers and other employers of agricultural labor to confirm wages fixed by them; that wages were to be handed over to the employers under certain onerous liens; that only the employer would have the right to discuss grievances with the Mexican counsel. The so-called "prevailing" wage is again resorted [to] as the basis for the hiring of these nationals. The employer alone would have the right to terminate the contract of employment in advance of the term for which the national signs up. The nationals will be massed at three border points for contracting, thereby creating the possibility of . . . illegal mass crossing into this country . . . Employers' bonds are eliminated from the agreement; no provision made for labor inspectors. Further, the Mexican government has stated that [it] will agree to a ceiling of 60 cents an hour for all types of agricultural labor as regards the nationals. We wish to protest most vigorously the submission of such proposals to the Mexican Government by the United States delegation, and oppose uncompromisingly the incorporation of such proposals into the pending agreement.41 Haggerty strongly urged that agreement be postponed until the representatives of the state federation of labor were allowed to pre-

182

California State Federation of Labor

sent their objections. T h e federation's views went unheeded. T h e International Executive Agreement signed by Mexico and the United States in 1949 contained the objectionable clause. In January 1951, the federation initiated an organizing campaign in the Imperial Valley, gateway for the supply of illegal contract labor. The federation sought to recruit the resident workers, largely of Mexican origin, who normally faced competition from migrants south of the border. A headquarters was opened in the El Centro Labor Temple, and organizing committees were set up at Heber, Holtville, Calipatrick, Westmoreland, Imperial, Niland, and Seeley. On May 24, 1951, the National Farm Labor Union, directing the campaign with federation assistance, called a strike and posted a picket line along the Mexican border to prevent infiltration of "wetbacks." On June 8, Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin ordered removal of contract laborers from all California farms against which a strike had been called. However, the order was not put into immediate effect, and the union was forced to cancel the strike on June 25. 42 The federation was convinced — as it had been in the past — that improvement in the conidtion of California farm labor was not possible until the importation of foreign workers was stopped. " T h e Federation continues to oppose the importation of foreign labor until it has been proven that no domestic labor is available in specific areas, and until adequate safeguards have been provided to protect both foreign and domestic workers. T h e Federation is convinced that the only way to eliminate the hazard of 'wetbacks,' or illegal entrants in agriculture is by legislative action making it a crime to employ 'wetbacks.'" T h e Fresno Labor Council requested, in 1951, the federation's continued cooperation toward securing assistance of state unions in a campaign against illegally entered aliens, calling on them to refuse "wetbacks" admission to union ranks; the federation endorsed these views. Illegal Mexican entrants continued to bedevil the California labor movement, which found them an insurmountable obstacle to improving standards of native farm labor in California. The state federation was strongly opposed to fixing wages for these workers on the basis of prevailing rates in the agricultural areas, on the ground that such a method would enable large growers to fix

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

183

rates without public hearings. Testifying on behalf of the federation before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization in 1952, Secretary Haggerty called for "effective remedies" against the exploitation of "wetbacks," the volume of which he claimed had reached "alarming proportions" in recent years. In his opinion, "employers' requests for contract nationals are granted in a perfunctory manner without reasonable effort on the part of employers or employment officers to attract or obtain domestic workers. Once a request for importing Mexican nationals is granted, the contracted 'prevailing wage' is frequently allowed to be determined unilaterally by associations of large-scale farmers at rates far below those customarily paid domestic workers." 43 In the fall of 1953, a committee from the California State Federation of Labor discussed with a group of Mexican trade union officials the importation and treatment of Mexican farm laborers, in the light of impending expiration of the migrant labor agreement between the United States and Mexican governments. The committees concluded that the joint agreement "should be revised in the interest of protecting the migrant worker who will be furnished to the American farmer. While there are several revisions we believe are necessary in the present agreement, it is our feeling that these revisions could be obtained only through the participation of representatives of Mexican labor organizations and representatives of United States labor organizations . . . Among the many matters discussed . . . we recall that one of the major items was the necessity of having representatives of the Mexican unions as part of every group of workers certified to the American farmer under the terms of the agreement." 44 When the agreement between the United States and Mexico expired in January 1954, a stop-gap arrangement was instituted under which Mexican workers were recruited at border stations by representatives of the United States Department of Labor, in contrast to the old arrangement which provided that all recruiting be done by the Mexican government in the interior. When the Mexican government closed the border to those looking for work in the United States, clashes between soldiers and workers followed. Denouncing the failure of the government to make adequate

184

California State Federation of Labor

provision for handling these workers, Secretary Haggerty, on behalf of the state federation of labor, declared: [For] many months the American Federation of Labor in this state [California] has warned that our federal government was blundering its way into an international crisis of sorts . . . The present situation could have been avoided by mutual agreement binding upon both the United States and Mexico. No such agreement now protects the workers of either country. And more, the United States Department of Labor and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service are lending their efficiency and prestige to practices which cannot help but aggravate an already acute situation. Our federal government has been hiring Mexican farm hands at border recruiting stations in defiance of Mexican government policy and in defiance of the American labor movement which knows such conduct serves only a powerful bloc of growers bent upon wrecking the concept of bilateral responsibility for decent working conditions . . . However, the developments of recent days prove beyond doubt that if the United States Government spent the same energy in recruiting domestic labor as it does in hauling Mexican workers from border posts to American farms, there would be little need for any foreign labor. The American Federation of Labor is under moral obligation to protect the living standards of all who work in our soil regardless of race, color, creed or national origin. W e will continue our historic policy of cooperation with fair business and fair government for the welfare of the nation, but we must protest the deplorable indifference of the United States Government to any extension of a mutual agreement pact with Mexico. 45 The state federation of labor continued to urge reopening negotiations for writing a contract labor agreement, and asked that spokesmen for American and Mexican labor be invited to participate in the negotiations. 4 ® Illegal entrants engaged the attention of the executive council at its meeting in June 1954. Vice-President M a x J. Osslo reported on the meeting of the Trade Union Labor Committee of Mexico and the United States, and was of the opinion that the labor movement of Mexico held the same attitude towards the recruitment of migrant workers as the state federation. He alluded to the low wages paid by the growers to Mexican nationals, and called attention to their employment on a construction project which he held was a threat to the building trades unions which the California Federation must protect. Osslo praised the organization of Mexican labor, which was aware of the effect of an unregulated inflow upon workers of the

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

185

United States, and regarded reasonable restraints favorably. T h e council agreed to request the passage of legislation which would penalize farmers for employment of illegal entrants and would give the right to inspectors to enter private property in search for illegal entrants. 47 The agitation of American and Mexican organized labor finally brought results in the signing of the Mexican Labor Work Agreement on April 15, 1955. It specifically required that preference in employment be given to United States workers, and that Mexican workers be employed only when domestic labor was unavailable. "Those seeking employment in agriculture in the United States must assemble at reception centers in the interior of Mexico, and these workers constitute a pool from which farmers in the United States can draw if their needs are certified by the state agency responsible for providing agricultural labor. T h e certification is presented by the farmer or his agent to an employment office operated by the United States Department of Labor at the border which arranges with the Mexican government for the needed workers. Standard work contracts must be signed by the worker and the employer, and these provide for transportation, levels of subsistence, rate of pay and lodgings." T h e labor movement strongly supported the agreement, as it meant regularizing the employment of Mexican workers and the beginning of the elimination of the more flagrant abuses which the workers endured. But the federation and the general labor movement believed that only unionization of the Mexican workers would begin to solve the problems confronting both the domestic and foreign farm laborer. "Once a Mexican farm laborer — the bracero — has become a member of a United States union he shall enjoy fully the rights and services established by the union for its members in good standing. At the same time, he shall assume all the responsibilities of such membership." 4 8 The unions in the United States would, under the arrangement, report all grievances or other issues affecting Mexican workers involving braceros to the Confederation de Trabajadores de Mexico. West Indian workers. The state federation's attitude toward plans for importing foreign agricultural workers was always cautious. It protested the plans of citrus growers from Kern, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, Tulare and Ventura counties to import West Indian workers to work in the fields, objecting to the terms under which

186

California State Federation of Labor

these workers were being brought to the United States. Under the contract between southern California citrus growers and the British West Indian government, money was to be deducted from workers' pay checks to pay transportation to the United States. If the workers found labor conditions unsatisfactory and returned home they would have to pay their entire transportation. West Indian workers found incompetent would have their return transportation paid from a fund raised through a regular 15 per cent deduction from their pay. The federation also objected to the low-pay guarantee that would be given these workers.49 Japanese workers. When plans for importing Japanese workers for employment in California agriculture was proposed, the state federation interposed. Haggerty insisted that there was no need for such a step, and that unemployed Americans could supply all the necessary labor for the farms of California. In common with the rest of the California labor movement, he took the view that importing foreign workers for the agriculture of the state was merely a disguised means of depressing the wages of native workers. Increased wages, in Haggerty's opinion, would soon solve the labor shortage, and he strongly advocated this remedy.60 During 1957, the federation again objected to the suggestion that Japanese farm workers be imported to the United States to aid in agricultural work. Pointing out that they would work under great burdens and were unfamiliar with collective bargaining, the council declared that such workers, unacquainted as they were with American customs and practice, might be used as strikebreakers, and that they would be required to contribute part of their wages to a welfare fund which they did not control and which could be used to finance the normal expenses of the Japanese government. The federation believed that such programs would not benefit the Japanese workers and could seriously injure the American farm laborer.51 Strike of farm workers. The federation did not take major responsibility for organizing farm labor in California, but normally it cooperated in campaigns to recruit agricultural workers into unions. Following a strike of farm workers in Fresno County, led by the National Farm Union, the county supervisors enacted an antinoise ordinance designed to prevent the use of sound trucks and other voice-amplifying devices by pickets. When informed of this, the state federation sent its lawyer to Fresno to oppose passage. The

Minority Groups and Civil Rights

187

argument of Attorney Clarence E. Todd, on behalf of the federation, that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it interfered with freedom of speech was unheeded, and it was enacted. It was immediately used to suppress the picketing which had been carried on by agents of the National Farm Union; and they were now prevented from attracting the attention of workers in the field. This, of course, destroyed the effectiveness of the organizing campaign of the National Farm Union. The state federation thereupon decided to challenge in the courts the constitutionality of the legislation. At the direction of the federation, Clarence E. Todd brought suit in the district court; the superior court granted the petition to enjoin enforcement. The decision was upheld in the district court of appeal, whereupon the county carried the issue to the California State Supreme Court, which reversed the decisions of the lower courts. By a majority of 4 to 2, the supreme court held that the "county in the exercise of the police power of the state has a legitimate interest in the preservation of the safety and tranquility of its citizens." It is important to realize that the attitude of the federation was not founded on narrow chauvinism, but largely on a desire to protect the native workers. When plans for importing Oriental workers for agricultural labor on California farms were proposed, the Joint United States-Mexican Trade Union Committee (on which the unions of the United States and Mexico were equally represented) was incensed. [It decried] the persistent maneuvers by agricultural employers, particularly big corporation farmers on the W e s t Coast, to evade the minimum protective labor provisions for both domestic and foreign labor under the Mexican contract program through using loopholes provided by the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act and the Refugee Relief Act to set up new, inferior programs for the importation of foreign farm workers. Under present circumstances, the current proposals by these employers for the establishment of new programs for the importation of agricultural labor from the Far East are clearly intended to flood the farm labor morket of the United States with foreign workers willing to work for wages and under conditions impossible for United States citizens to accept. The sole purpose of these programs is to bring in what the employers regard as an even cheaper and more docile supply of labor to pit

188

California State Federation of Labor

against American and Mexican farm workers and thereby force both of the latter into even more degraded conditions . . . W h e n foreign labor must be brought in to meet bona fide labor shortages, we favor the bilateral approach of an international agreement along the principles which govern the Mexican Contract Labor Program . . . It is, however, our firm conviction that it is both unwise and unnecessary at the present time for our nation to recruit foreign agricultural workers outside the Western hemisphere, and we reiterate our belief that greater emphasis must be given to the placement and protection of United States farm workers, including Puerto Ricans, in preference to bringing labor from other countries. 62

12-General and Limited Strikes

Oakland. The federation played an important role in two strikes — the general strike in Oakland, which followed an attack upon the clerical workers, and the strike against the DiGiorgio ranch, which was an unsuccessful effort to establish collective bargaining in agriculture. In 1946, a series of events eventually led to the dramatic strike in Oakland — the greatest labor demonstration in a decade. It developed as a result of a conflict in the mercantile trades. Department and Specialty Store Employees' Local No. 2165 organized a majority of employees at the Kress store in Oakland. When the store management was requested to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement covering union members, it referred the local union to the Retail Merchants' Association to which the Kress store belonged. The association refused to negotiate an arrangement for a single store, on the ground that there were about thirty in the bargaining unit and that an agreement should be made with all of them. Kress thereupon withdrew from the association and signed a contract with the union. In June 1946, when the union sought to renew its contract with a group of shoe stores with which it had bargained collectively for eleven years, the stores refused to enter into direct negotiations. Instead, they informed the union that they had joined the Retail Merchants' Association. Since no agreement was reached with the association, a strike was called; following this, the union was able to settle on favorable terms. While this controversy was going on, Kahn's and Hastings' stores were organized, and an agreement was sought with their owners. Instead of dealing with the union, the two stores also insisted that they were represented by the Retail Merchants' Association. The association's position was that it

190

California State Federation of Labor

represented 27 stores which employed about 7500 workers; the union would have to gain a majority of the total labor force, claimed the association, before it could again gain recognition. It was obvious that acceptance of such conditions would inevitably mean exclusion from the recently organized stores because the union had few workers in the other stores which belonged to the Retail Merchants' Association. W h e n the local was unable to reach an agreement, the central labor council appointed a committee to aid the Department and Specialty Store Clerks' Local Union in its negotiations. Since the managements remained adamant, a strike was called in October 1946 at the Hastings' and Kahn's stores. Teamsters' Local Union No. 70 and the Teamsters' Joint Council of Alameda County supported the walkout, and no deliveries were made to stores whose workers were on strike.1 On November 30, 1946, Oakland labor leaders were informed that deliveries would be made at the two stores sometime after 2:00 A.M. the following morning. The police arrived and found 65 pickets covering six entrances at Kahn's and six covering the one entrance to Hastings'. Pickets were forced to remove their parked cars from the area, which was then isolated, and only trucks making deliveries under police escort were allowed to enter the area. T h e central labor council charged the city governments of Berkeley and Oakland with abuse of their authority; a meeting of paid officials and executive boards of the unions affiliated with the central labor council and the building trades council was called for December 2, 1946, to discuss the situation. T h e union officers voted to declare a general labor holiday on December 3, 1946. Vice-President Robert Ash, who headed the Oakland labor movement and was the director of the walkout, thanked Harry Lundeberg and Charles Real "for their help and assistance during the two days of the general strike. The county was tied up so completely that there were no inter-urban lines running between the various communities in the East Bay or to San Francisco. No newspapers were delivered or even published in Alameda County during the two days." 2 The strike committee was in continuous session with city officials and representatives of the Retail Merchants' Association. The labor side was directed by committees from the building trades council and from the central labor council of Alameda County, with Ash acting as spokesman. Einar Mohn

General and Limited Strikes

191

was added to the committee representing the two labor councils of Alameda County. The community was informed that organized labor would "immediately call off the general walkout on the following conditions, viz.: that the city government of Oakland officially states that they will not in the future use the police department as escorts to guard professional strikebreakers in and out of the city for the purpose of breaking legal strikes; that they refrain from taking side in any issues between labor and management and that they strictly confine themselves to their duties as prescribed by law." The terms were accepted, and the strike was called off. Five months later (the strike at Hastings' and Kahn's had lasted for seven months), an agreement, negotiated by the committee from the central labor council, ended the original walkout. As an aftermath, charges were brought against President Charles W . Real, president of the California State Federation of Labor, and secretary-treasurer and business manager of Teamsters' Union Local No. 70 of Alameda County. Ten local unions, the Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, and three central labor councils presented identical resolutions, although the Alameda County Central Labor Council, which includes Oakland and the scene of the strike, did not join in the criticism of President Real. After the strike negotiations between Clerks' Union Local 1265 and the Retail Merchants' Association over the terms of settlement at the two struck stores continued. The stumbling block to an agreement was the union's demand for a closed shop; this, the association refused to grant. It was charged that beginning January 17, 1947, Real had informed the strike committee that he had received orders from the International Teamsters' Union to make deliveries through the picket lines; that he t a d told the strike committee that the acceptance of the open shop at the two stores on strike would assure the closed shop in all others controlled by the Merchants' Association; that he had announced on January 27, 1947, that, since employers' proposals to the striking clerks had been rejected, the teamsters would be compelled to make deliveries through the picket line; and, finally, that the actions of President Real "caused confusion and uncertainty in the ranks of labor, and gave aid and comfort to the employers, and almost broke the strike, and jeopardized and delayed any possible satisfactory settlement." Therefore, the resolu-

192

California State Federation of Labor

tion asked that the executive council of the California State Federation of Labor condemn President Real as "a strikebreaker and tool of the employers, and as unfit officer of the California State Federation of Labor." 3 The resolution, moreover, declared that President Real had violated his duties as an officer of the federation, and therefore "should be prohibited from holding office in the Labor Movement in which he has responsibility to protect the rights and principles of organized labor, and its membership, and particularly, should be removed from the office of President of the California State Federation of Labor." When the charges came before the executive council, VicePresident Harry Lundeberg moved that the council reject the resolutions and give Real a standing vote of confidence. This proposal was unanimously adopted. 4 In view of Lundeberg's crucial activity in the strike, which drew praise from Vice-President Ash, his sponsorship of the motion to reject the resolution left the council no other decision. Moreover, Vice-President Robert Ash was a member of the council which voted to exonerate President Real. After the vote, Secretary Haggerty was authorized to release a statement pointing out that "the Alameda Central Labor Council, the parent body having jurisdiction in this area, had not seen fit to submit charges against Real. Since no evidence had been presented to substantiate the allegations made, the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor rejected implication of wrong-doing on the part of President Real, and unanimously gave him a vote of confidence." Strike at DiGiorgio ranch. One of the more dramatic strikes in California between 1947 and 1950 took place at the DiGiorgio ranch near Bakersfield in Kern County. The strike was conducted by the National Farm Labor Union, and the .state federation voted full support for the walkout. Secretary Haggerty reported that for some time the state federation of labor had been sending $500 a month to the National Farm Labor Union, and that the funds were used for organization. He told the council that the farm union wanted to avoid a strike until it was well established, but that the walkout started in October 1947 in spite of the desires of the leadership. There were about 1500 organized farm workers on the DiGiorgio ranch who struck for recognition. Immediately the federation sent $1000 for relief and cooperated with the strike committees

General and Limited Strikes

193

and the representatives of the central labor council. In hope of ending the dispute, President Shelley sought help from officers of the Bank of America, and from Senator Sheridan Downey, but the head of the DiGiorgio ranch was adamant in his refusal to deal with the strikers.5 There was some difference of opinion, and considerable discussion of the state federation's role in the strike. Shelley favored active participation, at least so far as raising funds was concerned, but other council members did not want the federation responsible for handling finances unless there was someone from the federation in charge. It was finally agreed that the federation would send out an appeal for aid: funds received would be funneled to the international union in charge of the strike, which would be authorized to distribute the money among the strikers. T h e DiGiorgio strike was accompanied by the heartbreak and drama that frequently surrounds the struggles of workers with few resources who face a powerful employer. Contributions of money and food poured in from many units of the California labor movement, and the strike became known to labor throughout the United States. T h e company, despite pressure, remained unyielding. In the winter of 1948, President John Shelley appealed for more aid; caravans were organized in both northern and southern California, and each local union was asked to donate funds for food. Despite their determination, the strikers were fighting a losing battle. Court injunctions, evictions from company houses, and violence against pickets were difficult to resist and overcome. James Price, a leader of the strike, was shot, and a number of pickets were arrested and held at high bail — which was furnished. In June 1950, the strikers were forced to yield.® Jurisdictional strike law. The failure to win the right to bargain collectively in agriculture might be regarded as the loss of a minor skirmish. Normally the federation conducted few strikes, and the inability to win recognition from a powerful agricultural corporation was painful but not serious. In contrast, the enactment of the jurisdictional strike law in 1947 could be regarded as a severe setback for organized labor in the state. Under this statute, jurisdictional strikes were prohibited. They were defined as a concerted refusal to perform work, or to interfere in any other way with an employer's business because of a controversy between two or more

194

California State Federation of Labor

labor organizations as to which organization had or should have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer (rival union disputes); or a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which has or should have the exclusive right to have its members perform work for an employer (work assignment disputes). When the bill was being discussed, the state federation of labor argued that it was objectionable, not because it would prohibit real and proper jurisdictional disputes which harm a neutral party, but because provisions might be interpreted by the courts as a restriction of traditional and proper labor activity. When it reached the California Supreme Court, the statute was upheld in Seven-up Bottling Company v. Grocery Drivers Union, 40 Cal. (2) 368, the court holding that jurisdictional strikes were against the policy of the state. The fears of organized labor that the statute might be used to aid the employer during legitimate strikes was soon realized. The problem was highlighted in a dispute between bakery wagon drivers of Los Angeles and the Voeltz Bakery. Having failed to reach a satisfactory agreement, the union called a strike. Eleven months after the strike began, an independent union was formed which demanded recognition from the company, whereupon the employer secured an injunction against the striking union on the ground that it was engaged in a jurisdictional strike. The fact that the independent union had not been in existence when the strike was called and appeared to be a device to fight the strike was ignored by the superior court, which granted the injunction. When the issue came before the state supreme court in Voeltz v. Bakery Union, 40 Cal. (2) 382, the court held that although the second union was not in existence when the strike was called, and even though the picketing of the union would otherwise be proper, the appearance of the independent union created a jurisdictional dispute which could be enjoined. The state federation found such employer tactics difficult to combat, since, procedurally, it was not easy to demonstrate to a court that a union was company-dominated. The 1947 convention showed the federation clearly aware of the significance of this legislation; widespread sentiment existed among the delegates for placing the law in an initiative referendum for repeal. The executive council had to consider the money and resources that would be necessary for such an undertaking; an exposure of undue weakness surely would serve as an invitation to its

General and Limited Strikes

195

opponents to belabor the federation with even more serious restrictions. The convention did not press for a hasty decision, and a discussion of proposals was joined by several of the members of the executive council. When public discussion ended, the executive council considered the proposal for an initiative referendum in executive session. No difference of principle divided those favoring and those opposing the support of the referendum; the differences reflected disagreement over the chances of success. After considering all the subsidiary issues and the climate of opinion, the council concluded that the time allowed for the collection of signatures on the petition, the titling of the petition, and the energy and expense needed to gain an affirmative vote made it inadvisable to venture on a campaign of repeal through the initiative. The convention supported the decision.7 One consideration influencing the executive council's decision was the importance of concentrating upon an initiative petition for reapportionment of the state senate. Federation leadership did not believe that the labor movement possessed sufficient resources and manpower to embark upon both campaigns simultaneously.8 In 1955, the efforts of the state federation of labor to have the jurisdictional strike law at least amended were successful. This amendment excluded from the definition of a "labor organization," any association found to be or to have been wholly or partly financed, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer or any employers' association within one year previous to bringing the action. The burden of proving the bona fide character of a labor organization would rest upon the employer seeking redress under the law. Suits for damages by those injured by the organizer of a company union were also authorized. It was by no means regarded as satisfactory, but the amendment met what was regarded as the most serious problem under the law. Sebastopol strike. The attempt of the Western Cannery Council, an affiliate of the Teamsters' Union, to organize workers in Sebastopol led to violence against organizers of the union and the eventual involvement of the state federation of labor. Refusal of the employers to bargain precipitated a strike against 11 canneries. Soon after the walkout, Joseph Grami, an organizer for the Teamsters' Union, was forced into a car by armed men, driven to a deserted spot where he was chain-whipped by the kidnappers. These

196

California State Federation of Labor

vigilante methods aroused the entire California labor movement. At the same time, W . M. Caldwell of the California Employers' Association denied the responsibility of his organization for the outrage, and offered a reward of one thousand dollars for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the kidnappers. State federation leaders called Caldwell's offer a "gimmick," designed to ward off suspicion.® The attack upon Grami came two days before the meeting of the 1955 convention, at which the delegates adopted a strong resolution condemning the antilabor activities of a group of apple canners and processors in the Sebastopol area against which Local 980 of the AFL Teamsters' Union was striking for union recognition. The employers included the Sebastopol Cooperative Canners, the Sebastopol Apple Growers' Union, O. A. Hallberg and Sons, and the Manzana Products Company. The state federation of labor called upon its members to boycott the products of these companies.10 The brand names for which the striking canneries produced were also included. As the strike continued, an appeal for financial assistance was made to the state federation. Haggerty immediately sent a check for $15,000 to the strikers.11 The state federation also supported the strikers' protest against the conduct of Philip R. Rodgers, acting chairman of the National Labor Relations Board. When Rodgers arrived in San Francisco to address the Commonwealth Club, he was the guest of Winston Caldwell, president of the California Employers' Association, and a most interested party in the cannery dispute.12 Unlike the strikers, Rodgers did not see any impropriety in his action; he claimed he had known Caldwell for many years and doubted whether he would be influenced in his decision on the Sebastopol strike (which was before the NLRB) by any hospitality accorded him. The California State Federation did not share this view, and the executive council, in a telegram to Senator Lister Hill, head of the Labor and Education Committee of the United States Senate, requested "a thorough investigation of the relationship between Mr. Philip Rodgers, acting chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, and the California Association of Employers. . . . It has come to our attention that Mr. Rodgers has publicly admitted accepting traveling expenses from the California Association of Employers for his recent speaking engagement in San Francisco. This same employers' body is currently engaged

General and Limited Strikes

197

in a dispute with the AFL cannery workers in Sebastopol, California. The NLRB, which Mr. Rodgers heads, has now on file 30 unfair labor practices charges growing out of the Sebastopol strike." 13 The strike continued until May 1956, during which time retail stores handling products of the struck canneries were picketed — with success. The Sebastopol strike ended with the unions gaining recognition. To finance the walkout, the Western Cannery and Food Processing Council collected $191,975.54 and spent $189,361.15, of which $136,287.97 was for picketing.14

13 - Internal Differences

In addition to proposals dealing with legislation, a number of resolutions touching on general and ideological questions are sometimes submitted to the conventions. The executive council frequently expresses its own views on such matters, and they may arouse debate among the delegates. Differences in views may also be reflected in contests for office. The 1947 convention witnessed sharper debates over issues and candidates than were customary at federation gatherings. Although a liberal candidate for president was chosen, the traditional views of the federation were reaffirmed at the 1947 and subsequent conventions. The renewed concern with communism and Communists was in part due to the launching of the Progressive Party. The important role Communists exercised in the California CIO was another factor influencing the attention given to the question. Nor were AFL unions completely divorced from Communist pressure. VicePresident Ken G. Bitter reported that in San Diego, where he headed the central labor council, it had been necessary to oust five delegates who, because of their slavish adherence to the Communist Party line, were a continual cause of dissension.1 The council had also warned the state board of education that the California Labor School — a new name for the Tom Mooney Labor School — was a Communist propaganda mill. However, a resolution at the 1947 convention to expose Communist machinations ran into considerable opposition. After several speakers had attacked the proposal, Secretary Haggerty rose and informed the delegates that the sentiments expressed in the resolution only reiterated a position always held by the federation. After Haggerty's remarks, the recommendation of the resolutions' committee that Communists be exposed was adopted.

Internal Differences

199

The more radical temper of the convention of 1947 was also shown in the debate on unity with the CIO. Several resolutions urging that the two labor federations merge had been submitted to the convention. In considering these proposals, the resolutions committee pointed to the efforts of the AFL, over the years, to achieve a united organization. "As far as statewide unity was concerned," the resolutions committee declared, "not only would it be impossible in view of the facts just mentioned, but in addition the leaders of the C. I. O. in the State of California have demonstrated that they are imbued with the principles of Communism and are guided exclusively by the party line and are devoid of fundamental basic union principles; and, in fact, because of their continued course of conduct, have been a serious detriment to the cause of labor in this state. It accordingly appears obvious that unity on a state basis is inherently impossible." There was a long debate on the recommendations of the resolutions committee, but the recommendations were eventually adopted. When the merger of the AFL and CIO was discussed at the meeting of the executive council on August 24, after the adjournment of the convention, President Shelley believed some expression in favor of a united labor movement was desirable. Lundeberg would not agree. He felt that the AFL had made every possible concession to the CIO. Haggerty thought it was a fundamental error to blame the AFL for the absence of unity. The views expressed in the convention resolutions were reiterated, and no expression or action to promote cooperation with the CIO taken. 2 The convention of 1947 also witnessed a division on foreign policy. A resolution endorsing the foreign policy of the United States government and attacking "certain influences in the United States [which] are following the party line as laid down by Moscow and as a result have continually attacked the foreign policy of our Government and by their lack of attack of any phase of the Soviet foreign policy must be considered in full accord therewith," aroused the opposition of a number of delegates. Several speakers on each side presented their views, but sentiments critical of the Soviet government and the sponsors of the resolution were adopted by the convention.3 Election of John F. Shelley. President Real did not stand for reelection in 1947, and an angry contest developed for the post.

200

California State Federation of Labor

Ken G. Bitter, a vice-president from District No. 1 (comprising San Diego and the Valley counties) was a candidate of the more conservative groups. John Shelley was supported by the liberal wing and had a large following among the unions and members in the Bay area. He had been successful in politics and had served in the state senate where he sponsored a great deal of labor and welfare legislation, including the disability-insurance law. "The Federation administration had backed Bitter for president but Shelley's personal popularity was overwhelming. Demonstrations on the floor for Shelley, in the first of several days of the convention, were marked by long applause, cheering and parades through the hall." 4 Even though factional differences within the labor movement were certainly not unknown, the acrimonious feeling generated by the Bitter-Shelley campaign — a reflection of deep divisions within the movement — were unusual. After his victory, Shelley declared that "at times, into the labor movement there comes a disease — the desire of some to dominate groups, conventions by terror. I think that the delegates of this convention had become aware of the danger of that disease and have expressed their dislike and their disgust. I say that it is well that we are aware that terrorizing in any form, by any group . . . is dangerous to society and the well-being of the human individual . . . W e must dedicate ourselves again, yes: to an opposition to communism without being reactionary." 5 Sensing the deep animosity that had been generated, and the danger it held for the unity of the federation, Haggerty tried to smooth the ruffled feelings of the defeated and at the same time restrain the victors. He told the delegates that whatever may have displeased them at the convention, to remember that "it is in the family. None of us are perfect; we all make errors, we all make mistakes. I know of no complaints that have come to my office from unions entitled to service, either legal, financial or otherwise, who have failed to receive assistance. W e have a pretty good record of success in our campaigns. This is because our people cooperated, because they gave us . . . their time and their money. This year we are probably going to have to ask for a double load of money." He then advised the delegates to forget their differences and cooperate for the benefit of the California labor movement and for the members who support it and who are its constituent parts. Anticommunism. In contrast to the preceding year, the conven-

Internal Differences

201

tion of 1948 had a distinctly anti-Communist atmosphere; the opposition was less evident than it had been at the previous annual meeting. In part, it reflected annoyance and anger at the plan of Communists and their allies to launch a third party which many regarded as a threat to labor's political position. President Shelley, whose support at the 1947 convention came primarily from the more liberal elements, denounced, in his report, "Red totalitarians [who] have attempted to establish control over the international labor movement. They sought to sabotage the Marshall Plan by their control over the labor movement through their predominance in the World Federation of Trade Unions." 6 The Korean W a r aroused widespread fear of Communist aggression within the ranks of labor as well as in the rest of the community. Charges of Communist infiltration of labor and educational institutions were made by committees of Congress and the California legislature. Jack Tenney, who had been a union officer and delegate to conventions of the federation, headed the California committee investigating subversives. In the end, the excesses of this committee led to its termination, but for a time the charge that a Communist conspiracy existed to seize control of labor and educational groups was accepted by many. The federation had always taken an antiCommunist position, but it also had a long record of opposing suppression of free speech. It had opposed teachers' oaths and repressive legislation as a means of combatting subversion. At the 1952 convention, a proposal to endorse a constitutional amendment to outlaw affiliation with subversive organizations was rejected. A second resolution to prohibit the holding of state office, including membership on the faculty of the University of California of persons holding subversive views was also submitted. Both amendments, the convention believed, would outlaw advocacy of unpopular views rather than subversive conduct, and the convention repeated the opposition to all such proposals which it had expressed in 1950J A recommendation advising dissolution of the Un-American Activities Committee of the United States House of Representatives did meet opposition; however, the view of the resolutions committee, adopted by the convention, stressed "that we must at all times be vigilant to defend against infiltration by individuals aligned with foreign powers desirous of ultimately overthrowing our demo-

202

California State Federation of Labor

cratic government . . . but our position is clear to the effect that we condemn the political purposes to which the present committee has directed most of its efforts with little if any regard to the pursuit of the democratic processes, the very protection of which purportedly is the objective of such un-American committees." 8 Harry Lundeberg led the opposition to communism and its sympathizers within the California labor movement. Lundeberg was outspoken in his attacks upon anyone he suspected of having the slightest sympathy for Communist-tinged causes. His charges against his rival, Harry Bridges, the head of the Pacific Coast longshoremen, were used as evidence in the latter's deportation proceedings. T h e executive council gave Vice-President Lundeberg a standing vote of confidence. T h e council and the entire California A F L reaffirmed their trust in him and commended "the Sailors' Union of the Pacific [his organization] for the determined fight it has always made against communists." 9 T h e 1955 convention refused to seat Anthony Salgado, whose credentials had been protested on the ground that he had been active in Communist organizations. Salgado, it was charged, had signed a sponsor's certificate supporting the candidacy of Sam Darcy, the Communist candidate, for governor of California in 1934. Sponsors are required to affirm their membership in the party of the candidate. The delegate stated, however, that he had severed his connection with the Communist Party in 1942. A number of witnesses testified that Salgado was a good union man, but admitted that they had not been aware of his previous affiliations.10 Opposition to oaths and suppression of free speech did not mean that the federation had softened its views on communism or the Soviet Union. A suggestion that it modify its views on these issues was submitted to the 1953 convention. It was the death of Joseph Stalin, which, according to the proposal, changed the character of the Soviet Union. Consequently, a friendlier attitude by the federation was suggested. T h e convention reiterated its objection to communism, criticised the Soviet Union, and urged the United States to seize leadership in the fight against colonialism. 11 It remained suspicious of Soviet intentions, describing Soviet policy under Nikita Khrushchev as a change "in tactics rather than a change in its historic objective of a world enslavement." 1 2 T h e foreign policy of the A F L was, in the view of the convention, the

Internal Differences

203

one needed in the present world. It opposed, however, efforts of United States employer groups to end United States participation in the International Labor Office because the Soviet Union had been given representation. Inevitably, the assault by the Soviet Union upon Hungary was noted and denounced, and the council also took a more positive step. At its meeting in December 1956, it appealed to its affiliates to provide every possible service in finding jobs for Hungarian political refugees then entering California. The council pleaded for financial donations to aid those in need; it called upon the United Nations to demand immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, and to send a U.N. police force to that country as it had to Egypt. The council also demanded the release of political prisoners and the cessation of their deportation to Soviet labor camps.13 In addition, the state federation urged the United States government to liberalize its immigration policies so that greater numbers of Hungarian refugees could be admitted to this country. Federation policy on the Middle East called for continuing efforts by the United Nations to secure peace. The federation urged the United States government to seek the acceptance of Israel as an independent state; it recommended continued occupation of areas evacuated by England, France and Israel until the Israeli-Egyptian war was formally ended and continuous operation of the Suez canal was assured by an international authority. Finally, it advised the development of a program to raise living standards in the Middle East as one means of reducing tension. The conventions, furthermore, showed no friendship for Communist China. Resolutions proposing recognition of Communist China, as well as United States withdrawal from the United Nations, came before the 1954 convention. Both were rejected. The recorded opinion of the convention was that "democracies must give full support to the aspirations of the people of the underdeveloped areas of the world for independence, equality and a better life, if we are to preserve those areas from the menace of Communist imperialism." 14 Continued support of Point Four was advocated, and expansion of foreign trade was approved as a means of helping to develop better economic and political relations, and to encourage growth in the economies of the nations of the free world. Concern with communism led the state federation to recede at

204

California State Federation of Labor

its 1948 convention from its historical opposition to armaments and to approve a limited program as necessary for the safety of the United States and the free world. On issues touching defense and foreign policy, the convention endorsed the American Federation of Labor program. Approval of national AFL policy was the typical attitude of conventions of the state federations of labor, though the California branch at times strongly deviated from the views of the parent body. Moreover, endorsement of increased armaments was at variance with the pacifist position of American labor. Yet, the anti-Communist feeling was sufficiently strong for the resolutions on armaments and foreign policy to pass with almost no opposition. Organizing Metal trades. Organizing the unorganized was never a major activity of the state federation. At best it could, because of limited finances, provide only token assistance to unions seeking to expand their memberships. In the 1950's the federation participated in several joint campaigns, one of them an effort to dislodge a Communist-dominated seafaring union of cooks and stewards. In the winter of 1950, the metal trades of southern California decided on a recruiting campaign in that part of the state. A number of international unions and the American Federation of Labor agreed on a monthly contribution to finance the venture, and the state federation was not only called upon to furnish advice but also to give monetary assistance. The state federation agreed to contribute $250 a month; this continued through April 1954, by which time the federation had spent $11,000. It donated the same amount per month as did the American Federation of Labor and the metal trades department.15 At the same time, the state federation sought to eliminate conflicts in the campaign of the metal trades unions in southern California. Curt Hyans was assigned as organizer, and the federation was instrumental in helping the several unions eliminate jurisdictional differences and devise a mutual organizing program. Federation officers believed that assistance to the metal trades unions was valuable, but that the major program must rest with the unions themselves.16 Cooks and stewards. During 1951, the state federation joined the

Internal Differences

205

maritime unions in a campaign to dislodge the Communist-dominated Marine Cooks' and Stewards' Union from Pacific Coast ships. Unlicensed seagoing personnel on the Pacific Coast had been organized in three unions — the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, the Firemen, Oilers' and Wipers' Union, and the Marine Cooks and Stewards — the latter dominated by followers of the Communist Party line. Bitter feeling had been generated between the members and officers of these three organizations, but it was not possible to drive the Communists from control. Edward Burke, and later Hugh Bryson, who led the organized Pacific Coast cooks and stewards aboard ships, was able to dominate the union and maintain control on behalf of Communist leadership. Finally, in 1951, the Seafarers' International Union of the American Federation of Labor chartered the marine cooks and stewards, and, with the aid of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, attempted to rid the waterfront of the Communist-dominated organization. An appeal to the state federation of labor was made for financial aid, and the executive council agreed to provide money and organizing assistance for the campaign. By May 1953, the federation had donated $9000 for organization work among marine cooks and stewards on the Pacific Coast. When victory was finally achieved by the AFL union, Ed Turner, marine cooks' and stewards' international organizer, praised the "fine assistance which we have received in our organizing drive; not only financially but we have also gone to the State Federation of Labor with many problems which, at times, seemed difficult for us." 17 It was fitting that the state federation should join the Seafarers' International Union, Pacific District, in a joint statement celebrating the victory. "The California State Federation of Labor," the statement declared, "which stood shoulder to shoulder with the SIU unions during the long fight, is proud to congratulate the brothers of maritime labor in this historic hour. Traditionally, our maritime unions have achieved the best wages, hours and working conditions of any seamen in the world. W e shall continue that forward drive with new strength." 18

14-Expanding Political Action

Unions in California — as well as American labor groups, generally— were deeply concerned with the possible effect of the TaftHartley law. When the issue came before the convention of 1947, the delegates hoped that they could defeat every congressman in California who voted for this legislation. Similar intentions were aimed at state legislators who supported antilabor bills. The convention endorsed the formation of a California League for Political Education to represent the state federation of labor and its affiliates in the political arena. 1 The state federation — though favoring a program of more aggressive political activity — regarded the third-party movement as a Communist maneuver to weaken the defense efforts of the United States government. The federation issued a statement charging that Communists were "prime instigators" of the plan to nominate Henry Wallace as a third-party candidate, and that the move was dictated by the interests of Soviet foreign policy rather than concern for domestic problems. The federation also charged that the principal aim of the Soviet Union was to destroy the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan. The federation's statement on the third party recognized that in the eightieth Congress neither party had adopted a broad, progressive program. It charged that the Communists, ever alert to manipulating discontent, were using the failures of Congress as a basis for initiating a third-party movement. The third party, it maintained, had no program for dealing with the problems of the American people. While some of its proposals appear reasonable, the federation argued, "most of them are demagogic, and the practical ones are the same ones which had been proposed by President Harry

Expanding Political Action

207

Truman to the Congress of the United States." The third party, the federation believed, only added confusion, and was "weakening American solidarity." The California Labor Political League endorsed Harry Truman and Alben Barkley in 1948. At the meeting of the executive council of the federation on August 5, approval of candidates for national office was under discussion. Vice-President Harry Lundeberg, who was abroad at the time, wired the council: "Should Executive Board endorse a political party or candidate at its meetings I reserve the right not to abide by same." 2 At a subsequent meeting on September 26, at which Lundeberg was present, the endorsements were again considered. Lundeberg was against any endorsement. He told the council that he was present as a trade unionist, and did not wish to engage in political action of any kind. Haggerty argued that the state federation had always been active politically. The executive council announced that the California State Federation would establish Labor's Educational and Political League of California, with the primary task of acquainting members of organized labor and their friends with the platform and purposes of the labor movement. The league would be directed by a statewide executive committee, consisting of all executive council members, with the secretary-treasurer of the federation serving as executive secretary. The various central labor councils, metal trades, building trades, and printing trades would subsequently establish areawide committees for the league. The councils would determine the scope of their work, and, wherever feasible, the committees would parallel congressional districts. They would establish a number of subordinate committees to carry on various league activities at the local level. Each local union was urged to establish a campaign committee on the same basis as the area committees; the council stressed that it was important for the local committees to cooperate with those from their congressional districts, and to elect state legislators. More than 300 delegates assembled in Fresno on February 26, 1948 and voted a voluntary assessment of three cents per member per month to finance the activities of the California League. The platform and structure recommended by the executive council were accepted by the delegates. At a later meeting, the league was authorized to endorse candidates for all state offices. Names of candidates for endorsement could be submitted from the floor, or

208

California State Federation of Labor

placed before the convention by written request of any central labor council or by any affiliated union in good standing in the American Federation of Labor, providing that the candidate had approved submission of his name. The records of public officials, having held any political offices, were to be compiled by the executive council and distributed to the delegates before a vote was taken on endorsements. Objections to candidates could be made in writing by a duly authorized central labor council, and delegates were to be allowed to object from the floor. Plans for securing a fair and unprejudiced vote were provided. "In endorsing candidates political party affiliation shall be disregarded; this League shall concern itself only with the records and character of candidates; measures, principles, and services affecting Labor's welfare." 3 T h e executive council drew up the platform and program for Labor's Educational and Political League. T h e platform favored reapportionment of the state senate, repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, establishment of price control with a rollback of prices, complete support of the Marshall Plan in line with the action taken by the A F L convention, and enactment of state legislation providing for the development of the Central Valley Project under the control of the Bureau of Reclamation. The California Labor League was active in the 1948 campaign, and aroused considerable opposition. It was charged with being reactionary by followers of the Communist Party line and supporters of the third-party candidacy of Henry Wallace and Glen H. Taylor. On the other hand, claims were made by trade unionists sympathetic to the Republican cause, that the labor league was only an appendage of the Democratic Party. Both charges were denied, and the league insisted that it was "strictly nonpartisan." Because the majority of those endorsed were Democratic Party candidates, the league felt it necessary to explain that the candidates' stands on issues were in harmony with those favored by organized labor. T h e Labor League for Political Education voiced the view that its formation had circumvented "the plans of the Communists to infiltrate in the political field by establishing bridge organizations to capture the antireactionary vote. One movement the Communists did succeed in penetrating [was] the California Legislative Conference, [which] supported the candidacy of Henry Wallace." 4 In April 1949, the state federation prepared a lengthy analysis of

Expanding Political Action

209

the California Legislative Conference, "a self-acclaimed organization in which have infiltrated many Communist and fellow-traveler elements, and it lends itself to becoming an effective weapon of the Communist party on the political field." 5 The first statewide legislative conference was held in Sacramento on January 5 and 6, 1946; the call for this meeting had been issued by former Attorney-General Robert W . Kenny and Bartley Crum — though Crum severed his relations with the conference soon after the issuance of the call. Kenny was a leading sponsor of the candidacy of Henry Wallace in California, and continued to be associated with left-wing causes for several years after the campaign. The second statewide meeting organized a California-wide caravan in behalf of a state housing law, which the state federation was convinced hindered federation efforts on behalf of its own housing program. TTie federation found that participants in the third and fourth meetings of the California Legislative Conference were predominantly persons with known left-wing affiliations. "There is no question that a number of legitimate trade unions sent representatives, and that these organizations were used as the respectable facade to entice other legitimate elements into participating in this Conference, a common maneuver that has been consistently followed by the fellow-travelers. Over two-thirds of the non-labor organizations participating in the Conference can be considered suspect insofar as Communist Party domination or influence is concerned." The federation called attention to the failure of the California Legislative Conference to take a position on the Marshall Plan, which, it charged, was tantamount to supporting the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The federation felt that the establishment of the California Labor League for Political Education eliminated all reasons for the existence of any other political groups seeking and claiming to represent the interests of organized labor. "Because of these considerations, the California State Federation of Labor believes that affiliation with such an organization by the unions, or participation in its activities will run counter to the best interests of the A. F. of L. in California." After the election of 1948, the California Legislative Conference sought to continue its activity, and it was denounced as a "front for the old third party movement so decisively discredited in the last

210

California State Federation of Labor

election." 6 T h e state federation appealed to its affiliates to avoid entangling themselves with the conference "which would discredit our movement and expose us to attack." W h e n criticism of the conference was repeated in the executive council's report to the 1949 convention, Delegate Williams of the Pile Drivers' Union No. 34 of San Francisco challenged it. Haggerty told the delegates that it was his responsibility to keep the membership and affiliates informed, and that he had called the attention of the executive council to efforts of the conference to use the labor movement for advancing policies which the organizations of labor did not sponsor. The position of the executive council was approved by the convention of 19497 Meeting after the 1948 presidential campaign in January 1949, the executive council of the California State Federation decided that it was necessary to continue the California Labor's League for Political Education on a permanent basis. It was to be the political arm of the state federation — to endorse and oppose candidates for political office on the basis of their records. A voluntary assessment of three cents per member per month was voted for support of its activities.8 T h e response of A F L affiliates, however, was less favorable than had been expected. Secretary Haggerty reported to the executive council at its meeting on November 19, 1949, that per capita tax payments to the league had been small, that many unions had failed to affiliate, and as a result they would be denied representation at the convention in the spring of 1950. 9 Beginning in 1950, the league considered candidates for political office at two conventions — a pre-primary convention held in April and a pre-election convention in August. An advisory committee of fifteen, made up of officers of some of the more important central bodies in the state, aided the executive council in making recommendations. In 1950, a number of delegates objected to the exclusive endorsement of Edmund Brown for attorney general, and the failure to include Fred Howser, the Republican candidate. However, Brown was given the endorsement by a vote of 76,961 to 40,296. 10 James Roosevelt was unanimously supported for governor, George Miller for lieutenant governor, and Helen Gahagan Douglas for United States senator. W h e n the endorsements were discussed at the convention of the federation, a resolution strongly criticizing

Expanding Political Action

211

the administration of Governor Earl Warren was submitted. Slightly mollified by the resolutions committee, the convention did declare that the governor had failed to carry on a program favorable to labor, and "in fact [his support of] certain laws detrimental to labor . . . will be brought to the attention of the voters by the committee for James Roosevelt." 1 1 Not much controversy was aroused by these endorsements. Local unions were urged to establish committees to conduct registration drives among their members. 12 Of the candidates chosen for major state offices, only Edmund Brown was elected. In 1952, California labor followed the national federations and backed Adlai Stevenson for president and John Sparkman for vicepresident. Endorsements for Congress and the state legislature were also made. In 1954, the political arm of the state federation became involved in a heated dispute with a number of trade unionists who were opposed to endorsements by the California Labor League for Political Education. Under the constitution of the league, the executive council has the exclusive right to endorse for national and statewide offices. [It shall be] however, the exclusive right of the Political League established by the various central labor bodies of the American Federation of Labor in each area to recommend to the Executive Council for endorsement by the convention candidates for the Congress of the United States, the State Board of Equalization, and for the State Senate and State Assembly in such area: provided, however, if any such candidate is running for office from an area embracing at least in part an area covered by more than one local league, it shall be the exclusive right of the area or district league in such area, as the case may be, to recommend to the Executive Council for endorsement by the convention, and no recommendation as to any such candidate may be made to the Executive Council in such case by any of the local leagues involved. All recommendations as to any such candidate shall be concurred in by the Executive Council and recommended to the convention for endorsement, unless two-thirds of the membership of said Executive Council reject such recommendation. In the event of such rejection, the Executive Council shall have the exclusive right to recommend a candidate for endorsement for such office to the convention. 13

Endorsements begin on the local level, and the secretary usually sends out to local areas "a list of labor campaign issues which might be related to federal and state legislative candidates in your territorial

212

California State Federation of Labor

jurisdiction. T h e enclosed listings are merely suggestive, but they do feature the key issues about which candidates could be questioned to the end of revealing their attitude toward the political program of the American Federation of Labor . . . Since the time for interviews of such candidates by local units of the California Labor League for Political Education is approaching, it is particularly important that we be prepared and analyze the concepts of those who would represent the people of California in either Sacramento or Washington." 1 4 T h e suggested questions were divided into those addressed to candidates for federal office and those who were campaigning for state posts. In 1956, the first issue suggested for federal candidates was: "Support of effective international policies aimed at the mobilization of all our moral and material resources for the development of international relationships to maintain peace, protect freedom and national security, and enable all the world's growing population to enjoy a rising standard of living." Also these candidates were asked if they would give "full and uncompromising" support of the United Nations and its agencies; expansion of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped areas; categoric rejection of any idea of imposing our form of government or economic system on any other nation, and vice versa; support of colonial peoples in their fight for freedom; opposition to all forms of totalitarianism; and recognition of the vital role of organized labor, internationally and nationally, in the defense of the free world against communism." T h e federation was also concerned with attitudes of federal candidates on the support of the federal government for a program of economic growth; assistance to areas of high unemployment; changes in the Taft-Hartley law; "correction of inequities in the federal tax structure: by eliminating income splitting; preferential treatment of dividends; excessive mineral depletion allowances; and capital-gains treatment of ordinary income." Other questions dealt with liberalization of the Fair Labor Standards Act, improvements in the federal Social Security Act, and the development of federal minimum standards for state unemployment insurance to protect all workers regardless of their state of residence. In connection with unemployment insurance, candidates were to state their position on a requirement "that state unemployment insurance laws provide for a maximum weekly benefit amount equal

Expanding Political Action

213

to not less than two-thirds of the average weekly wage in covered employment within individual states, and mandatory coverage of all wage earners." Other issues were views on supporting a housing program; federal aid to school construction, and an increase in public school teachers' salaries; a comprehensive federal program to improve the nation's health; support of farm workers; and a comprehensive program for water-resource development. A series of different questions were presented to candidates for state office, which covered the candidate's attitude on right-to-work laws, benefits under the unemployment-compensation laws, and other social security programs. Local endorsements were then presented to the pre-primary conventions unless overruled by a twothirds vote of the executive council. For example, endorsements of local candidates were made by the Committee on Political Education of San Diego; the Labor League for Political Education of San Joaquin County; and by the Central Labor Council of San Pedro and Wilmington, at the recommendation of its law and legislative committee. In 1954, Republican Governor Goodwin J. Knight was endorsed by the executive council by a vote of 18 to 4, although there was considerable opposition, especially from Alameda County. In the debate, Secretary Haggerty declared: "I am a lifelong Democrat, but first, last and always, I'm a trade unionist. I've always subjugated my feelings for those of my own people and I subjugate that feeling now. My conclusion was not reached hastily. I have been acquainted for years with both candidates." 15 Richard Graves was the Democratic candidate for governor. Haggerty argued that Knight had been instrumental in getting an increase in unemployment benefits through the legislature, the first increase in six years. After about an hour of debate, Knight was endorsed by a vote of 100,582 to 67,941. Samuel Yorty, a Democrat, was endorsed for the United States Senate. 16 The anti-Knight minority immediately formed the Northern California AFL Committee "for Graves and in the South . . . the Southern California Committee for Graves-Roybal. These two committees were active in the primaries, and on June 26, after the primaries, they held a meeting at Fresno where they set up the California A F L Committee for Graves-Roybal. Wendell Phillips, an officer of the San Francisco Bakery Drivers' Union who presided

214

California State Federation of Labor

at the meeting, claimed the California LLPE represented only a minority." 17 Organized labor thus was divided in this campaign, and the California Labor League for Political Education sharply criticized its rival and called on local unions to deny support for the opposing group. It claimed to be "the official political arm of the American Federation of Labor and [the league's] endorsement carries with it the approval of the state A F L Organization." 18 Toward the end of the campaign, the president of the California State Federation of Labor, Thomas L. Pitts, cautioned members "to be on the lookout for an unofficial labor group claiming to speak politically for the California AFL. The AFL in California has endorsed Governor Knight in next month's election on the basis of his long and continuing friendship and proven record in behalf of the interests of the working men and women of our state. W e in organized labor have learned that the will of the majority is the democratic way to resolve issues." 19 Because of these differences, the league reaffirmed the endorsements made at the pre-primary and pre-election conventions. 20 Statewide candidates endorsed by the league were, in general, successful in the 1954 election. Success did not allay the opposition of labor leaders who believed the league was dominated by Republicans. Many of those who supported Richard Graves for governor in 1954 were registered Democrats and held that the Democratic Party was the more effective vehicle of progressive legislation. But the league pointed to its own effectiveness in endorsing and helping candidates for governor, lieutenant governor and attorney general. It was the feeling among many federation leaders that the AFL Committee for Democrats was a dual organization and that its attacks upon the league were unfair. At the meeting of the executive council in October 1955, Robert Ash explained the role of the AFL Committee for Democrats. He declared that the purpose of the committee was "to have something to say about the selection of Democratic candidates for statewide office." 2 1 Ash, who was a vicepresident of the state federation and a highly respected leader of the California labor movement, denied the charge of the AFL Committee for Democrats that "for many years a real organized political program by AFL labor has been sorely needed. W e have watched our unions operating without any defined program or policy

Expanding Political Action

215

and coordination, which has resulted in the election of people to the various offices of Congress, Senate and our State Legislature, who do not agree with the program of the American Federation of Labor." Ash declared that such a condemnation was not justified. The executive council of the California Labor League for Political Education then voted to condemn "the AFL Committee for Democrats as a dual and divisive organization using the name of the American Federation of Labor for partisan political purposes. All AFL unions are urged to reject financial appeals coming from the AFL Committee for Democrats or any similar partisan political organization." In 1956, when Adlai Stevenson was endorsed, the bitter differences which divided California labor leaders were absent. Not only was there greater agreement, but the absence of a contest for governor inevitably softened differences. Both Thomas H. Kuchel, the incumbent United States Senator, and Richard Richards, his opponent, were interviewed on a variety of topics, after which the advisory committee made its recommendation that Democrat Richards be endorsed. T h e endorsement of Richards was challenged by several delegates, but, by a vote of 91,740 to 51,770 the political views of the executive council were confirmed. 22 In most instances, the council's objects go unchallenged because it is likely to transmit the opinions of the local leagues for political education in its own endorsements. A challenge to the council's endorsement may be successful if the local group can demonstrate its reasons to the convention. For example, in the pre-primary convention of 1958, the council recommended that endorsements in the 46th and 74th assembly districts be left open. This meant that the council did not believe adequate information for a decision was available. The council has power to decide all open endorsements if additional evidence for a decision is provided. Both recommendations were challenged from the floor, and the convention voted to endorse the Democratic candidate in the 74th district while upholding the view of the council in the other instances. 23 A more serious challenge to the recommendations of the council was made over its endorsement of A. Ronald Burton, a Republican, for state treasurer; the council's views were upheld by the narrow vote of 96 to 77. T h e endorsement for United States Senator in 1958 split the executive council of the league as well as the delegates to its pre-

216

California State Federation of Labor

primary convention. By a vote of 12 to 11, the council recommended the exclusive endorsement of Governor Goodwin J. Knight, a Republican, rather than Democrat Clair Engle, for United States Senator. W . J. Basset, secretary of the Los Angeles Labor Council and a member of the advisory committee, called for the rejection of the exclusive endorsement of Governor Knight. He urged a dual endorsement. His proposal was supported, by several members, but Haggerty and others urged exclusive endorsement of Knight. When the council's recommendation was rejected, R. C. Bartalini offered the motion that the convention endorse: "Goodwin J. Knight on the Republican ticket and Clair Engle on the Democratic ticket in the primary election." The motion was adopted. 24 There were no challenges to the other endorsements, all of which (except the candidate for state treasurer, A. Ronald Burton) were Democrats. With Senator Knowland the Republican candidate for governor, the support of Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, the Democratic candidate for governor was a foregone conclusion. He was enthusiastically supported. No Republican was backed for the United States House of Representatives, but a few were endorsed for the state senate and assembly.

15-Policies in Times of National Crisis

On the whole, the convention of 1950, which took place in the early months of the Korean War, was uneventful, and proposals went unchallenged. The convention did declare: "In times of emergency and actual warfare, circumstances may require that the rights of labor may be subject to restriction in accordance with the voluntary position limiting this right taken by the American Federation of Labor in previous conflicts. If it is absolutely necessary in order to safeguard the safety and security of our Nation, it may well be desirable for the American Federation of Labor once again to give the no-strike pledge." 1 At its meeting in February 1951, the executive council of the state federation was sharply critical of the government's wage and price policy. It charged that the wage-price structure imposed by the government under its control program imposed "a cruel and staggering burden on the American wage earners who are now facing the highest price levels in . . . national history." The council regarded the lenient regulation of food and rent prices as farcical, and argued that inevitably the government's price and wage control system would break down if the food and rent sectors were left unregulated.2 In addition, the council complained that labor people were excluded from agencies dealing with defense planning, and urged President Harry Truman to appoint labor representatives. In August 1951, the executive council issued a statement of policy to the convention which called for full support of the mobilization program, and endorsed the United Policy Committee as the spokesman for organized labor. It criticized the wage-stabilization program, however, and declared that government wage regulations should always allow extension of fringe benefits, wage increases to

218

California State Federation of Labor

cover the full rise in the cost of living, and that additional increases should be permitted for low-wage industries. The federation believed that nonunion wage rates should not be criteria for wage setting. Strong and effective rent controls were endorsed; the federation sought this continuance as long as the defense program stayed at high levels. Recruitment of manpower for defense industries by voluntary means was advocated. Existing employment offices, military defense deferments, wage incentives, training programs, and material priorities were methods which the federation believed could be used to allocate labor. Higher excess-profit and corporation taxes were means by which the council believed financial burdens of the war could be more justly distributed. Increasing sales and excise taxes to raise revenue for financing the war effort were held to be inequitable, as they placed an undue burden upon low-income groups. In its report to the convention of 1952, the executive council criticized the amendments to the Defense Production Act, and charged that they seriously weakened the government's fight against inflation. In the view of the council, the amendments violated the principle of equal sacrifice. A major complaint was directed at the make-up and authority of the Wage Stabilization Board, which had been established at the beginning of the Korean War. In the federation's opinion, the board had no authority to determine interand intra-industry wage inequities and fringe benefits. Unless such powers were granted to the board, the council felt that its rulings would not be sufficiently flexible to consider changing needs and circumstances. It was also of the opinion that wage-fixing boards could not operate successfully by pursuing rigid formulas. Instead the council believed that the needs of the defense establishment as well as changes in industrial relations should be the basis upon which decisions were made. On the wage question, the convention of 1952 advised its affiliates to seek the best bargain possible with employers, even if the union believed such arrangements would not pass the scrutiny of wagestabilization authorities. It directed its fire against employer arguments that concessions would not be approved. In the opinion of the convention, far too many employers had resisted wage adjustments on the ground that such changes would not pass tests set up by the

Policies in National Crisis

219

authorities. Employers, in the opinion of the convention, were incorrect, and unions were told that "the policies of the Wage Stabilization Board are continually changing and hundreds of cases are continually being approved even though they do not fall within the limits of the self-administering provisions of the Board's regulations." 3 Domestic Issues Even during the Korean War, the federation continued to concentrate most of its attention on domestic issues which affected the direct interests of the workers of the state. At the beginning of the legislative session in 1953, Secretary Haggerty was anxious about the unusually large number of antilabor bills which appeared in the legislature. He feared that the introduction of these measures presaged an attempt to narrow existing coverage under the unemployment and workmen's compensation laws. He warned the executive council that there were active antilabor forces in Sacramento which were determined to turn back the clock ten years, and that these activities had to be watched and opposed. 4 By early February 1953, it had become evident that a more extensive drive against organized labor was in the making. In a communication to the affiliates, Secretary Haggerty listed 14 bills that he held were designed to reduce the bargaining strength of labor. Among these were bills supporting the open shop, restrictions on secondary picketing, and requirement of financial reporting by labor unions; Haggerty warned of a potentially serious onslaught against the labor movement. In response, a statewide emergency meeting was held in late February to which more than 200 delegates came. They were urged to be on guard, to consult with their legislative representatives on the antiunion measures, and also to rally support in their communities against the bills.5 In accordance with its usual custom, the federation sponsored a number of bills calling for improvement in the social security programs operated or regulated by the state. In a letter to members, the federation announced, in March 1953, that the assembly finance and insurance committee had turned a deaf ear to its appeals to improve protection for the injured worker. Virtually all bills designed to strengthen the workmen's compensation system were rejected.® T h e same committee subsequently approved a bill which, if enacted,

220

California State Federation of Labor

would have removed 150,000 workers from coverage under the unemployment-insurance program. Both Secretary Haggerty and Charles P. Scully, federation attorney, opposed the reported measure, and in the end it failed to gain sufficient support for adoption. Most of the workers who would have been excluded were casual workers, many of whom were not affiliated with a union. The federation had always taken the position that it spoke for all workers, skilled or unskilled, organized or unorganized, and that it represented the interests of all labor before the legislature. T h e federation, at this time, became involved in a dispute with the medical societies, after it had received complaints from unions and their members that a number of physicians and surgeons were charging excessive fees. The tendency to raise fees seemed to be encouraged when they were paid out of employer-worker health and welfare plans; a number of instances were presented in which charges were increased for patients covered by labor-management medical plans. The federation sought to avoid protracted controversy with the medical profession, but was anxious for some assurance that workers and their health and welfare programs would not be mulcted by unscrupulous doctors. Haggerty and Attorney Scully met with representatives of the medical service commission of the California Medical Association and urged that a more equitable method of charges be devised. They argued that uniform fees would be the perfect solution to any tendency to overcharge, as medical service would under such a rule provide for all at the same price; but the California Medical Association would not agree. Instead, assurances were given to the labor representatives that action would be taken to meet the complaints. 7 In 1953, the unions became concerned with changes contemplated in the system of clearing unemployed union members for eligibility requirements under the state's unemployment-insurance program. Under an agreement worked out by the federation and the department of employment in 1948, it was possible for members to meet the "seek work requirements" by applying for work at the union hall. A system — the blue card, union member identification for employment — was jointly developed which noted the time the holder applied for employment. This was proof that the claimant had met the requirement, but allegations of fraudulent claims and improper payments

Policies in National Crisis

221

had led the department of employment to seek a revision of this system.8 Upon learning of the proposed changes, Haggerty informed the unions of the state, and the federation held conferences of union representatives in both San Francisco and Los Angeles. Under the proposal of the department of employment, unions seeking eligibility were required to sign an agreement with the department. It would be necessary for the union to control approximately 75 per cent of the employed workers in its jurisdiction, operate a central office or hiring hall, and provide union-placement facilities which were operated throughout the year and were available to all unemployed on a fair and equitable basis. The unions found the proposals highly objectionable. Denying any intent to protect or to defend fraudulent claims, they maintained that the standards proposed by the department of employment security were rigid and unrealistic. Some union representatives argued that their organizations might represent less than 75 per cent of an industry and still operate an effective job-referral system. Others thought that the 75 per cent industrial requirement failed to take cognizance of the nature of union organization, and that some unions might represent many workers scattered over a number of industries. Finally, a compromise was reached. The federation succeeded in having most of the unsatisfactory rules rescinded, and a system comparable "to the Blue Card system originally in effect" 9 was adopted. The federation during this time participated in the discussions of the Industrial Welfare Commission and other boards which were, in accordance with their statutory power, holding hearings on revising the minimum wage. Representatives of the federation appeared before the commission in January 1952 and argued that changes in the cost of living since 1947 justified the setting of a minimum wage of $1.25 an hour in all industries subject to minimum-wage regulation. They emphasized the fact that this minimum now was needed to support a single woman, and pointed out that the increase would be of advantage to both labor and management. 10 Federation aid was also provided to the butchers and retail clerks in Fresno. At the request of the unions, the city council specified

222

California State Federation of Labor

that retail butcher shops could be opened for public business from 7:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M., a schedule opposed by the proprietors. The city ordinance was challenged in the courts by the retail outlets. The state federation of labor was asked to aid in the defense of this regulation, and an attorney was assigned to assist in the case. T h e courts found the rule as coming within the powers of the city council. Legislative Work The 1953 convention became involved in a serious controversy over giving the executive council authority to determine which bills it would support in the legislature. It had been an established rule that the directions of conventions and decisions of the executive council were guides to legislative agents in Sacramento. Under this rule neither legislative agents nor officers could determine which convention-approved bills the federation would sponsor. Increases in membership and in the number of local unions inevitably multiplied the number of questions considered at annual meetings. A proposal sponsored by an affiliate which did not arouse ideological or philosophical opposition, or run counter to the interests of an affiliated body, or violate historic practice had a good chance of being adopted. Adoption of a proposal carried with it an implied or expressed order to the executive council to draft a bill for submission to the legislature which carried out the purposes sought in the resolution. Inevitably the growth of the organization meant that the volume of proposals increased, and, since some bills were more important to the labor movement of the state than others, the council faced a difficult task in lending active support to all convention-sponsored measures. Finding the large number of bills a hindrance in achieving maximum legislative results, the council requested the 1953 convention to authorize its members to screen resolutions adopted at conventions, and confine action to the more crucial measures. W h e n the recommendations were submitted to the convention, a long debate followed. One might, with a certain amount of license, describe it as a debate between proponents of pure democracy and proponents of practical results. An insistent argument of opponents to the suggestion was that the change would violate the democratic rights of affiliates. According to them, all convention-approved legislation should receive equal priority.

Policies in National Crisis

223

Those interested in practical results saw no danger in giving the officers such power. As the officer with the responsibility for placing labor's program before the legislature, Haggerty argued forcefully for the proposal. The council's recommendation stated that "any resolution adopted at State Federation conventions calling for the introduction of legislation sponsored by the Federation . . . shall first be submitted to the legislative committee of the Executive Council of the Federation for consideration, and that the Secretary-Treasurer shall prepare and cause to be introduced only such legislation as such legislative committee believes desirable and proper at the time the legislature commences." W h e n the vote was taken, the recommendation of the resolutions committee that the executive council be denied authority was adopted by a show of hands. Thereupon, a roll-call vote was requested, and the position of the resolutions committee was rejected by 257,135 to 139,442." W i t h the rise in unemployment in the spring of 1954, the federation offered a program for changes in the unemployment-benefit formula and in the use of reserves in the unemployment-compensation fund. Believing that current reserves should not be allowed to remain idle, the state federation suggested that such funds be used to launch a program of useful public works which would prevent an added increase in unemployment. The federal and state governments were both urged "to begin construction of necessary reservoirs, canals, and water-power distribution systems, both within and without the framework of the Central Valley Project." In addition, an increase in the maximum weekly unemployment benefit and extension of coverage to all employed workers were advocated. Also approved were an expanded housing program (which would raise annual construction of low-rent housing units to at least 200,000 and low-interest, long-term loans for rental and cooperative housing, as well as a construction program for middle-income groups. Federal financial aid for local school construction and a public housing program to provide for the number of units approved in the Housing Act of 1949 were also recommended. Improvement in teachers' salaries was urged, as well as "intensified activity on the part of local unions and labor councils in assuming greater responsibility in the day-to-day operation of our

224

California State Federation of Labor

public school system to prevent big business domination and to assure adequate and unbiased treatment of organized labor's role in modern society." 12 The council regarded the existing "hard-core" unemployment, despite accelerated economic activity, an ominous warning that the government should take a more aggressive policy against depressions. It held high and continuing expansion in wages — which increases purchasing power — as the most effective means for avoiding depressions and continuing unemployment. The federation reiterated its earlier views on all forms of social security, including support of a comprehensive program of health insurance on national and state levels. A fair share of naval ship construction was asked for West Coast yards, and the federal government was urged to mobilize its resources to meet the growing idleness, in accordance with the requirements of the Employment Act of 1946. A revision of the relief laws was recommended, as well as abolition of the pauper oath as a basis for relief of county indigents. Raising the federal and state minimum-wage laws to $1.25 an hour was held necessary to protect the purchasing power and help to shore up the economy of the country and the state, along with an extension of the California minimum-wage law to all workers instead of only to women and minors. At its meeting on December 2, 1954, the executive council undertook a lengthy examination of all action taken by the federation's 1953 and 1954 conventions. It voted to sponsor the introduction of legislation for raising maximum benefits in the unemployment-compensation program, increasing the amounts for dependency benefits, and abolishing the system of merit-rating, but refused to approve legislation for payments of benefits to fishermen during periods of partial unemployment. That issue, it was felt, was not one which could be solved through legislation. The council also approved the introduction of legislation for improving unemployment-disability insurance and workmen's compensation programs. It hoped to win increases in maximum benefits, reduction of the waiting period, and more liberal dependence allowances. The council also sought compulsory filing of proof of compliance with the workmen's compensation law, but voted to hold a resolution that injured workmen were to receive compensa-

Policies in National Crisis

225

tion until employed "for future consideration as circumstances during the session might dictate." 13 To promote greater acceptance by legislators of bills submitted by the federation, the secretary was authorized to take action whenever feasible. In a number of instances the council voted to withhold approval of the introduction of legislation because, in its view, the time was not propitious or the problem could be solved by other means. At the beginning of the 1955 session the federation was pleased with the absence of a right-to-work bill among the 5942 introduced; warnings were nevertheless issued that some of the bills could be amended to include such provisions. Because of the system of screening legislation, the secretary had to notify unions whose bills were rejected; the positive program of the federation that year included about 90 pieces of legislation.14 At the end of the 1955 session, the executive council expressed satisfaction. It pointed to increases in benefits under the three social security programs — unemployment, disability insurance, and workmen's compensation. It was pleased over liberalization of the jurisdictional-strike law, which provided that if an employer had been guilty of forming a company union within one year of the beginning of a strike, such action would prevent him from obtaining injunctive relief against a regular labor organization. The burden of proof for showing lack of association with a company union rested upon the employer. The federation was also active in helping defeat a resolution calling for a federal constitutional amendment limiting the tax on income to 25 per cent. One of the bills sponsored by the federation which went down to defeat was to regulate the operation of health and welfare funds. Supported by a large part of the insurance industry, the legislation ran into employer opposition and, after passing the assembly, failed in the senate. In addition, the federation sought to work out, in conference with the California State Chamber of Commerce, general principles governing operation of the Division of Industrial Accidents and the rules and procedures of the Industrial Accident Commission. It was agreed by the two organizations that no changes in practice and procedure of the Industrial Accident Commission should be adopted without public hearings. In addition, it was agreed that a manual governing the internal operations of the Division of Industrial Accidents should be worked out by the com-

226

California State Federation of Labor

mission, indicating lines of responsibility and giving particular attention to methods for handling litigation. It was believed that such a program would expedite hearings and lead to more prompt decisions.15 Not only did the state federation act as the official labor representative in connection with changes in the administration of laws affecting workers, but it was the main funnel for directing complaints against interpretations of social insurance and other statutes. The federation also insisted that workers drawing compensation benefits be treated courteously by those charged with administering the program. Complaints were forwarded to administrators, and Haggerty wrote the head of the Department of Employment that "many employees in the local offices . . . have apparently adopted the unwarranted philosophy and unfair attitude that every applicant for unemployment compensation benefits is a cheat and a chiseler per se. He [the business agent] also verifies his statements with definite examples by specifically setting forth the names of at least five persons, which he points out as 'typical' of what seems to be happening. The statements contained in Brother Worley's communication, following my own discussion of similar episodes occurring at the local level, certainly warrants your immediate action in correcting this unfair, unjust condition wherever and whenever it exists in your Department." At the same time, Haggerty asked for "any comment you have to make with respect to the findings as set forth . . . Likewise I would appreciate your comments on the findings of the Department . . . in regard to the complaint." 1 6 Handling complaints on disqualification or failure to obtain proper benefits can be regarded as a normal activity of the federation. The complaint must be regarded as valid and will then be appealed by the federation. In one ruling, the Department of Employment denied benefits to a claimant for marital reasons, and it was further held that benefits would be withheld until the claimant who had subsequently worked in agriculture had again worked in covered employment. This interpretation was challenged by the federation on the ground that it denied benefits to claimants who had adequate reasons for leaving their jobs, voluntarily, but who subsequently found work not covered by the unemployment-compensation law. In other

Policies in National Crisis

227

words, such an interpretation penalized a worker, not because he had not found additional work after his resignation from an earlier job but because his subsequent employment was not covered by the law. The federation carried the issue to the appeals board, and the decision of the claims examiners was reversed. In other instances the federation protested the disqualification of a claimant who had been required to attend court proceedings. The Department of Employment held that this had constituted unavailability for work and the claimant was thereby disqualified. Upon appeal, the decision was reversed as unreasonable, and benefits were allowed. 17 These are only two examples of the kind of dayto-day activity which the federation carried on — unspectacular, and scarcely likely to attract attention, but of great importance to the workers. T h e federation is also compelled to work out satisfactory agreements among labor organizations on pending legislation which may have different effects upon certain labor groups. Unemploymentand disability-insurance legislation presents this problem in clearest form. Higher-paid workers sometimes feel that their payments are being kept at low levels because of the benefit formula favoring the lower-paid workers. As the representatives of all workers in the state, the federation cannot favor one group. At the 1955 session of the legislature, organized labor sought a compromise. At the same time, employer groups were demanding the stiffening of qualifications so that some workers with low earnings, especially those employed only part time, would actually be disqualified or have their benefits reduced. The federation called a meeting of a number of unions, and it was reported that pressure existed in the legislature for increasing the earnings requirement or for requiring earnings in more than one quarter as a condition of eligibility. Cannery workers, of course, would be particularly — and adversely — affected. Their representatives strongly objected to placing the burden upon their members, but one of the teamsters' delegates was of the opinion that "the general labor movement should not be backed into the position of defending 'rocking chair' money for a few people at the expense of the rest of the movement." It was agreed that concessions would have to be made, and the understanding was to give as little as possible. 18 Such meetings are not official, nor do they take votes on particular propositions, but the exchange

228

California State Federation of Labor

of views gives the secretary some indication of the attitudes of individual unions. The opinions of the federation are not always supported by all the unions in the state, and, on the floor of the 1956 convention, Haggerty had argued that when a proposal was endorsed by a convention of the federation, it should not be opposed before the legislature by an affiliated union. His remarks reflected his annoyance at the firemen's unions which had opposed placing state employees under the federal system of social security. The organized firemen had opposed this measure because they had an established pension system.19 In December 1955, the state Industrial Welfare Commission notified the federation that it was preparing to rewrite the rules and regulations under which women and minors were employed. Under consideration was the appointment of wage boards to review minimum wages, maximum hours, and working conditions. Secretary Haggerty asked all affiliated unions desiring to have their representatives serve on these boards to submit names to the federation. Representatives of the federation were present at all hearings; they argued that the minimum budget compiled by the Industrial Welfare Commission supported the federation's contention that minimum rates in all industries should be set at $1.25 an hour. However, the recommendations were not accepted. At the same time, the state federation worked hard to obtain an extension of coverage to women and minors employed in agriculture. Pleading that such workers should not be denied protection accorded to others, the federation urged the Industrial Welfare Commission to extend its wage order to agriculture. As a first step, the commission sent labor-management committees which held hearings in the farm areas, beginning at El Centro, followed by others in northern communities, and finally by a hearing in Fresno. A large amount of information on wages, working conditions, housing, and the ratio of migrants to local workers was collected, but no order setting minimum wages was issued. In January 1957, Secretary Haggerty again asked that the Industrial Welfare Commission extend minimum-wage coverage to agricultural workers. On the advice of Assistant Attorney General Richard H. Perry, the commission refused to agree, saying it lacked the data to make a ruling. Haggerty criticized the decision as "unwar-

Policies in National Crisis

229

ranted and erroneous" and insisted that it was the commission's continuing task to have data available. Haggerty filed a formal complaint with Attorney General Edmund Brown on Perry's conduct, claiming that the assistant attorney general had been giving wrong advice to the commission. 20 The federation was mainly concerned with laws and their administration affecting the workers of the state, but it also took positions on other subjects. In some instances these were only expressions of opinion, but it was vitally concerned with certain nonlabor issues and used its political influence to the fullest. Two resolutions on water power were submitted to the 1957 convention, and the matter was left in abeyance until the issues could be explored more thoroughly. At its meeting in August 1957, the executive council found that the resolutions did not express the views of labor on water power clearly, and a substitute, prepared by Secretary Haggerty, was adopted. It emphasized (1) the need for unity in the Central Valley water development, pointing to flood control, irrigation, and the generation of power which a water system could provide, along with the need for a single agency to carry out these purposes effectively and (2) the principle that power for production, employment, and convenience should reach consumers at the lowest cost — through full and rapid development of public power plants and transmission lines. The people of California "who voted their approval of a full public power program and their opposition to private monopoly . . . ought not to have to face repeatedly the obstacles which special interests continue to place in the way of achieving the public's own power program." 21 (3) T h e council reiterated its opposition to water monopoly and land speculation based upon receipt of publicly financed Central Valley water. Limiting reclamation water to an amount sufficient for 160 acres per family farm would, it argued, be the means of checking monopoly and speculation. "The principal means by which special interests seek to monopolize water and to monopolize power are the same means — namely, use of the Army Engineers — by which labor and the people are robbed of a unified project. T h e California State Federation of Labor stands, as it always has stood, for development of the entire water resources of the Valley under reclamation law, administered solely by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, because that is the only way to secure widespread

230

California State Federation of Labor

distribution of the benefits from water development and to attain the maximum resource development needed to secure the future of California." Subsequently, the state federation vigorously opposed the exemption of farms in the Central Valley development from the 160 acre limit and criticized Senators William Knowland and Sheridan Downey for supporting this proposal. 22 The federation always opposed excise and sales taxes, on the ground that such taxes were regressive and fell heavily upon lowincome groups. Instead, it favored use of the progressive income tax, both personal and corporate, to raise adequate revenue. In several conventions the federation called for a government fiscal policy which would promote a stable economy, through a program of debt reduction in periods of inflation and deficit financing in periods of recession. The state federation's main efforts, however, were taken up with legal problems. It had to be alert to the attacks on the local and state levels directed against labor activity, and also provide information to its affiliated unions on laws and administrative regulations. In every report submitted to the membership, the federation recorded numerous cases in which its lawyers had participated. In small towns the federation found that the few unorganized workers were harassed and hampered in their activities. Prohibitions upon picketing, boycotting, the union shop and even the right to strike were regularly enacted in an effort to prevent organization and collective bargaining. The 1957 convention favored the extension of the protections enjoyed by other workers to farm labor, feeling that social security programs and protection of the right to organize should also be granted to these workers. T h e convention opposed "the importation of foreign agricultural workers under conditions which depress domestic labor standards, drive the domestic farm workers from the field, and make the agricultural economy more and more dependent on cheap foreign labor." 2 3 T h e federation's influence in the legislature had been increasing; so also had its workload. Secretary Haggerty reported that the 1957 session of the legislature was "one of the most trying" in his 18 years as legislative agent of the federation, since more than 3000 bills had to be examined. He was able to report increases in benefits under the various social insurance programs, but even more significant was his report of

Policies in National Crisis

231

defeat of all "major employer or insurance lobby sponsored measures to emasculate worker social insurance programs, including measures to destroy the purpose of workmen's compensation by establishing precise and narrow definitions of terms and otherwise creating a legislative jungle for the application of courtroom procedures to deny benefits to injured workmen; render ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits most workers in seasonal crafts, trades and industries by imposition of hard two quarter earnings and weeks of work eligibility tests; and destroy state unemployment disability insurance programs by conversion to premium for risk law." Even more satisfactory from the labor point of view was the failure of the legislature to enact right-to-work laws or any other laborrestrictive measures.

1 6 - R i g h t to Work

T h e federation had led the successful campaign against the rightto-work law in 1938. But this was only the first of a series of attempts to outlaw union-security provisions in collective-bargaining agreements and restrict picketing and other labor activities. Over a number of years, combating the campaigns of organized antilabor groups was an important, if not the principal, task of the state federation. At the March 1944 meeting, the executive council discussed the right-to-work petition which was to be circularized, and Secretary Haggerty reported that he had been aware of the plan since the February meeting of the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association. He immediately warned all affiliates of the oncoming attack and urged that no union member or friend of the movement sign the petition. Haggerty outlined a line of defense. He warned that if the petition should become law it would annul every union-shop contract in California, and he feared that it had a good chance of passing. He suggested the argument that the measure was divisive and an attack upon the unity of the country and the war effort. A number of vice-presidents, including Harry Lundeberg, Mae Stoneman, and John Blackburn expressed willingness to help finance the campaign. W h e n the discussion shifted away from the main problem, Lundeberg spoke against mixing this issue with local political candidates for political offices. "It won't work if [we] split in different factions with other interests. This is distinctly an issue dealing with the union movement itself — our right to function as unions." It was finally decided that the secretary would select a small committee of vice-presidents who would act with him against the petition. Haggerty was authorized to draw $20,000 for the initial

Right to Work

233

part of the campaign. It was agreed that the federation would direct the fight — first, to invalidate the petition, and then in a more extended campaign, if the proposal gained sufficient signatures to qualify on the ballot. Lundeberg, Charles W . Real, Charles F. May, Thomas A. Small, and Kelley were appointed to the finance committee. 1 Sufficient signatures were obtained. The proposal declared that every "person has the right to work, and to seek, obtain and hold employment without interference with or impairment or abridgement of said right because he does or does not belong to or pay money to a labor organization. Anything done or threatened to be done which interferes with, impairs, or abridges, or which is intended to interfere with, impair or abridge said right, is unlawful. Relief against or on account of anything so done or threatened to be done shall be granted in a civil action, legal or equitable, initiated in the superior court of any county in which anything so done or threatened to be done shall occur, upon the complaint of any person or upon the complaint of the district attorney of such county." 2 Every local union and central labor council was asked to establish a campaign committee that would begin to coordinate efforts and plans to defeat the measure. "Every local union must see to it that each of its members who is qualified to vote becomes a registered voter. The deadline is September 28th, and no local union should tolerate a slacker on its rolls." The federation leadership was afraid that the petition would gain the support of a majority of voters. In a confidential memorandum, Haggerty told the executive council that if the vote on the right-to-work petition were taken within thirty days, it would pass overwhelmingly. He warned that only hard work by the labor movement itself would overcome the opposition. "The outsiders," he told the executive council, "will let us use their names but they will not get out and work . . . whether they like you or me is not important. All petty quarrels should be set aside. W e have everything in our favor. It is just a question of work. The one thing against us is the apathy of our movement. Our union people have become executives and cannot be bothered . . . A few cannot do the job alone. The most important thing is to rouse the people to get outside help we need — church groups, civic groups, etc." 3 The federation was able to rally many groups to its side. Governor

234

California State Federation of Labor

Earl Warren, Mayors Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles and Roger Lapham of San Francisco, and State Attorney General Robert W . Kenny registered their opposition. Warren declared "that a campaign on a measure of this kind would be a bitter one that [will] cause disruption rather than unity . . . during this war period." 4 Even more impressive was the declaration of the state chamber of commerce against Proposition No. 12 (as the right-to-work petition was called). When rumors became current that the chamber of commerce would reverse its position, its president, Harrison R. Robinson, reiterated the earlier view. Robinson declared: "Our position is that in the interest of national unity, the uninterrupted prosecution of the war and maintenance of our vital production schedules at this time of crisis, and because we feel that the proposed amendment if adopted will cause rather than allay confusion and controversy, we are opposed to the initiative proposal entitled 'right of employment.'" Robinson agreed that the chamber was opposed to compulsory union membership as a condition of employment, but recognized "the right of employers and employees to contract voluntarily as they see fit." The manager of United Employers, Inc., of Oakland also came out against the proposal, as did the Roman Catholic Bishop of the San Diego diocese and the Presbyterian Synod of California. The latter called the proposal "vicious and disruptive to present contractual agreements between organized labor and industry and in opposition to the present state and national policy, and further it creates chaos in war production, and threatens the present good will and harmonious relationships between labor and industry in post-war planning, and further since it is condemned by our Governor or Senator, by the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, by Chambers of Commerce of our leading cities, by farm groups, veterans groups, civic bodies, and by the leading editorials of the state; we therefore add our condemnation and call upon our people to work against and vote against this proposition at the November election." In addition, citizens' committees were organized in both northern and southern California. Radio time was purchased, and speakers and advertisements in local journals spread the gospel of unhampered unionism. While he received substantial assistance from his staff and the executive council, Secretary Haggerty bore the main burden of repelling the attack.

Right to Work

235

In the election, Proposition No. 12 was defeated by a vote of 1,893,589 to 1,304,418. Haggerty expressed the gratitude of organized labor to the citizens of the state for defeating it. Even before a vote had been held, California labor faced another threat of restrictive legislation. T h e W o m e n of the Pacific, a satellite and front organization for the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association, started a drive for another petition — described as "The California Protective Law." W h e n the proposal was submitted to the attorney general for titling, he called it the "Regulation of Labor Relations and Labor Organizations." This affected virtually all the collective-bargaining activities of labor unions in the state. It proposed to void collective-bargaining contracts which denied employment to any worker because of membership or nonmembership in a labor union, or required payment of dues or fees as a condition of employment. It defined and prohibited unlawful strikes and boycotts; regulated membership, accounting, election procedures, and political contributions; required registration of union organizers; and outlawed sit-down strikes. Every member of a union would be considered an agent of the union; and consequently every member of a union who participated in activity defined as unlawful would be liable to penalties, civil and criminal. The attorney general and the district attorneys would enforce the law through the criminal courts, and suits for damages and injunctions could also be brought by parties injured by illicit labor activity. Unable to obtain the required number of signatures by January 8, 1945, this attempt also ended in failure. 5 But California labor almost immediately faced yet another effort to curtail its power, this time for more limited restriction. T h e new campaign was a direct outgrowth of labor's defense against Proposition No. 12. At its meeting on July 21, 1944, the Los Angeles local of the American Federation of Radio Artists voted an assessment of $1.00 upon each member to aid the federation's efforts against the "right-to-work" proposal. A notice of the assessment was issued on August 14, 1944, and on September 22 the local voted to send all money to the California State Federation of Labor. Noting that some members had failed to meet their contribution, the local voted on October 23 that the assessment had to be satisfied at the same time the October dues were paid or delinquents would be automatically sus-

236

California State Federation of Labor

pended. In conforming with this declaration, the board of directors, meeting on November 10, 1944, held that those who had failed to pay the assessment had become delinquent and that the board would decide the penalties to be enforced at the end of thirty days. Consequently, the regular meeting of the board of directors, on December 1, 1944, voted that "all members delinquent in any payments owing the local are automatically suspended effective five o'clock P.M., December 11, unless such delinquent payments have been made prior to that date and hour." Despite the action of the board of directors, motion picture producer Cecil B. DeMille refused to pay the assessment; he felt that it was improper for a labor organization to assess its members for political purposes. Inevitably he was suspended, and he challenged this suspension in the courts. Charging that his valuable contract for broadcasting had been destroyed because of his refusal to pay the assessment, DeMille asked the Los Angeles Superior Court to set his suspension aside. T h e court was "unable to find a sustainable ground upon which it could be held that a union may not expend its funds for the purposes which its officers consider for the betterment of the condition of its members, as long as it is not used in political activities, and [the court felt this did not include] . . . the support of legislative measures that advance their lawful aims or the opposition to those that frustrate them." 6 It found that the rules requiring the filing of charges did not apply in the case of expulsion for nonpayment of obligations. At the same time that the suspension of DeMille was contested in the courts, Assembly Bill No. 1953 sought to make it "unlawful for a labor organization to levy an assessment upon any of its members, associate members, or permit members, for the purpose of raising funds to participate in a political campaign of urging or opposing legislation or any initiative or referendum measure, and to prescribe any penalty for the nonpayment of such assessment, or to suspend, expel or discriminate against any such member in any manner for refusing to pay such assessment." It was the opinion of Attorney General Robert W . Kenny that the bill was aimed exclusively at labor organizations, to prevent them from raising money for promoting or opposing legislation they regarded as harm-

Right to Work

237

ful to their interests. He was of the opinion that the DeMille bill, as it was called, if enacted, "Would constitute special legislation and would be an infringement on the fundamental rights of the people and therefore unconstitutional." 7 The bill failed of enactment when the assembly, upon the motion of Assemblyman Philip Davis, voted by 50 to 27 to table it. The next step, on May 4, 1945, was to draw an initiative measure with the same purpose, called the "California Political Freedom Law." It was largely patterned after the DeMille bill, but its sponsors failed to get sufficient signatures to qualify the petition for a place on the ballot. 8 In August an attempt was made by the W o m e n of the Pacific to substitute another measure with virtually the same wording and intent as the first under the name of the "California Political Liberty Act." Attorney General Robert W . Kenny found that the second and the original measuers were, in fact, the same, except that a section on political contributions was absent from the second. He therefore held that the two measures were not separate and distinct, and refused to prepare a circulation of the second measure. He informed the sponsors of the proposal that they could appeal to the courts and seek an order compelling the attorney general's office to give a circulating title to the second proposal. It was not obtained. Subsequently DeMille shifted his campaign against the assessment to the lecture platform and to the use of other propaganda devices. In view of the close relations that had developed between some California labor leaders and Governor Goodwin Knight, an interesting controversy developed over whether, or to what extent, labor would criticize his appointment of Mrs. Harry Chandler, wife of the owner of the Los Angeles Times to the board of regents of the University of California. The Chandler family had been known for several generations as bitter and unrelenting opponents of organized labor. It was inevitable that her appointment would arouse the antagonism of some union members, especially those employed in the printing industry. The Los Angeles Typographical Union, which had felt the lash of the Times over the years, brought a resolution protesting Mrs. Chandler's appointment to the federation convention; in an obvious effort to avoid embarrassing the governor, the resolutions committee reported:

238

California State Federation of Labor

Under our American system, it is proper and right for all groups in our community to seek representation on governmental boards and agencies. This holds true for pro-labor as well as anti-labor groups. The only other alternative would be totalitarianism in which one group or the other would eliminate its opposition. The appointment of a person from the ranks of the anti-labor forces to a non-labor governmental body does not make the appointing power a stooge of these anti-labor forces any more than the appointment of a person from pro-labor forces would make the appointing power a stooge for pro-labor forces. Opposition forces, however drastically apart, must be accepted if we are to maintain our American way of life. 9 W i t h an election for state officers scheduled for later in 1954, state federation leaders did not believe that the interests of the labor movement would be well served by attacking a governor who had been friendly to the demands of labor and who had supported a great amount of labor-sponsored legislation. Being politically knowledgeable, they realized that candidates for public office had to gain the support of many groups, and that the appointment to a nonpolitical office of a lady whose strong antilabor views were certainly no secret in the state would not seriously harm the organized workers of California. It was the view of the resolutions committee, moreover, "that the most constructive approach to labor's ultimate goal of having an equal voice in all governmental bodies or agencies is to request the Governor, or other appointing power to appoint additional labor representatives to these bodies or agencies commensurate with the governmental bodies' or agencies' influence on the community as a whole." T h e resolutions committee did recommend that a measure criticizing the appointment of Mrs. Chandler be filed, b u t its views were overridden. T h e willingness of the 1954 convention to criticize Mrs. Chandler openly, despite the pleas of the leaders, may have been due to the knowledge that an attack upon organized labor was being hatched by groups to which she and the Los Angeles Times were closely tied. Secretary Haggerty summoned a special meeting of a number of unions when he became aware of the threat. T h e program of the antiunion group was discussed in San Francisco on April 14, and a plan to meet it was formulated. T h e presumed areas in which the campaign was mounted extended, according to Haggerty, from San Diego to Redding; h e believed, however, that cooperation

Right to Work

239

among unions had, for a time, spiked the guns of the initial antiunion offensive. Haggerty mentioned other areas which were likely to seek restrictions upon the activities of organized labor, such as San Jose, Monterey, Salinas, Visalia, San Diego, San Bernardino, and Barstow. Whenever an antilabor campaign was launched, the federation immediately offered help. However, the convention of 1954 rejected a federation proposal for setting up a special fund for the repeal of right-to-work laws in states where they were already effective. Several resolutions also suggested that the federation seek contributions from international unions in support of a fund for meeting attempts to enact right-towork laws throughout the country. Such resolutions usually had a strong emotional appeal, and always aroused support among a number of delegates. The state federation regarded such proposals as impractical and burdensome, in that the funds donated by unions in the state might be more effective in promoting organization and legislation within California. Consequently, the resolutions committee approved the purposes of the proposals, but thought it "would be somewhat presumptuous for a state federation to instruct [an international union] on the nature and extent of a contribution which should be made for such a program." The committee also believed that raising funds for an attack upon adverse legislation was a task which devolved primarily upon international unions rather than upon those in the state federation, and, after a lengthy debate, the views of the resolutions committee were endorsed. The federation was still fearful that a right-to-work petition would be initiated, and Secretary-Treasurer Haggerty "kept his ears to the ground." In August 1955, Haggerty again reported concern to the executive council over rumors that a campaign would be organized in the immediate future. Meetings, according to Haggerty, had been going on in Los Angeles among leading employers. He warned that the proposal was only in a state of suspended animation. He cautioned against undue fear and assured the council that the federation would be ready to meet any attack.10 Federation leaders concluded at this meeting that they would face an initiative petition in the near future, because the opponents of right-towork appeared certain that Governor Knight would not sign such legislation even if it got through the legislature.11 The fears of the state federation were not groundless, but were influenced by re-

240

California State Federation of Labor

ports that were coming into the office, such as a letter of April 16, 1956, indicating that a "Right-to-Work bill would be initiated." 12 The 1956 convention took notice of the unfolding campaign and recommended "to each central labor body that it make this program one of its major activities and ascertain that this resolution is actively carried out by its delegates by requiring reports from delegates to the central labor body." 13 The federation was soon confronted with a number of right-to-work ordinances. When the culinary workers and bartenders of Palm Springs launched an organizing campaign, a right-to-work ordinance appeared before the city council. At the hearing, President Thomas L. Pitts represented the federation, but, despite opposition from labor and some civic groups, it was eventually adopted. At the meeting of the executive council in December 1956, Robert Wolsey, secretary of the building trades council, and Sam Williams of the painters' district council appeared and presented a resumd of conditions surrounding the enactment — the actual and possible effect it might have on labor organizations in the area and the possibility that similar ones might be passed in other communities. The federation pledged its "full resources . . . to achieve abolition of this destructive ordinance." 14 Sparked by the Committee for Voluntary Unionism, legislation of this kind was introduced in a number of cities, and counties such as Tehama, San Benito, Lake, Yuba, and Sutter. At its meeting in June 1957, the executive council decided upon the following policies: (1) to centralize all legal actions in the office of the federation under the direction of the chief counsel; (2) to clear all appeals for financial aid with the executive council; (3) to offer full resources to local unions and central bodies in their attempts to nullify the effect of these ordinances.15 Revelation of corruption in a number of national labor unions encouraged advocates of right-to-work laws to redouble their efforts, and California was one of the states in which a campaign was planned. It was widely believed, at least by the promoters of this legislation, that the evidence of malfeasance had aroused deep fear and suspicion of organized labor and that the public in California would be more receptive to such restrictions. Senator William Knowland seemed to feel that the time was propitious for curbing union security, and that the enactment of antilabor legislation was not only possible but would give a de·

Right to Work

241

cided political advantage to its promoters. It was assumed that in surrendering the high office of minority leader of the United States Senate and sponsoring the right-to-work initiative, Senator Knowland believed that the issue could catapult him into the governor's office which would in turn provide a favorable "launching pad" for his candidacy for the presidency of the United States. Speaking before a businessmen's audience in September 1957, Knowland announced his support for right-to-work legislation and attacked compulsory unionism. The labor movement of California was not taken by complete surprise; the official journal announced: "Not since GOP Governor Frank Merriam was defeated in 1938 has a candidate of either major party run openly against labor." It pointedly reminded the Republican Party that "Governor Culbert L. Olson became California's only Democratic governor of the century by whipping Merriam when the GOP incumbent sought reelection in 1938." 16 The convention of 1957 took note of Knowland's position. Republican Governor Goodwin J. Knight, whose office Knowland sought, addressed the meeting and lamented the attempt to transform the Republican Party into an antilabor party. When Knowland formally announced his candidacy for the governorship, Secretary Haggerty regretted his entry on a program destructive to labor. Haggerty charged that Knowland was pledged to "punitive and extremist action against the working people of California . . . It is apparent that Mr. Knowland doesn't know his own state. He has spent too much time out of California and not enough in it. Only a man ignorant of the state's magnificent industrial progress would now promise to destroy responsible labor-management relations developed through decades of mutual patience and understanding. Only a man without administrative experience in government would loan himself to the narrow, provocative pronouncements which identified his most recent political ambition. Mr. Knowland has absolutely no background in working with people. He has demonstrated a certain facility for partisan political action on the floor of the United States Senate. But he is not qualified to serve as governor of all the people — labor and management alike." An antilabor committee for democracy in unions was then organized for the purpose of circulating petitions for placing an

242

California State Federation of Labor

initiative on the ballot which would outlaw all forms of union security. A right-to-work petition was presented for titling to the attorney general's office on January 8, 1958, by Attorney Samuel Holmes of the San Francisco law firm, Brobeck, Phleger and Harrison. Following its titling and certification by the secretary of state, it needed 322,429 signatures to qualify for a place on the ballot. On January 9, Haggerty informed the unions and councils that "it is imperative that the Federation proceed without loss of time in getting underway with . . . preliminary essential activities." He emphasized the urgent need for funds to finance a campaign to prevent endorsement of the measure, and urged the establishment of local campaign committees to coordinate all activities on a local level, including a drive to register all voters.17 A meeting of representatives of central and building trades councils was summoned for January 25, 1958, to decide on what strategy to follow. The strategy meeting declared that the "real sponsors paying the large sums of money to propagandize and qualify the initiative are hiding behind a 'front' organization calling itself the 'Citizens Committee for Democracy in Labor Unions,' which itself is a 'front' for another 'front' calling itself the 'Citizens Committee for Voluntary Unionism,' both of which are located in the 'hotbeds of reaction' in the Southern part of the state." 18 The federation was authorized to direct the campaign of defense. Central labor bodies began establishing anti-"right-to-work" policy committees; a program for organizing a speakers' bureau and speakers' committees for talks to union members and the general public were set up; a get-out-the-vote committee to mobilize the voting strength of organized labor was formed; and a series of publications were issued. As soon as the right-to-work petition became Proposition No. 18, Secretary Haggerty again called the attention of affiliates to its dangers for the unions in the state. As a countermeasure, and federation supported a petition to change the tax laws. This would have reduced the sales tax and increased the income tax on personal incomes to a much higher rate.19 The federation believed that a petition to change the tax laws might compel antilabor business groups to concentrate some of their pressures in preventing the enactment of the tax petition. In June, Curtis Roberts (of the public relations firm of Gross and Roberts) was appointed director of the Citizens' Committee

Right to Work

243

Against Proposition 18, and the political research firm of Hal Dunleavy and Associates was hired to make periodic samplings of public responses to the conflicting propaganda on the proposal. It was a remarkable campaign, and upon the state federation of labor rested the chief responsibility for defeating the proposal forbidding "any person, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, to pay any dues, fees or any other charges of any kind to any labor organization." Three polls were conducted by Dunleavy Associates. The first one, in August, showed the yes votes for the opponents slightly ahead — 51 to 49 per cent. As soon as the campaign started, sentiment began to shift, and the second poll, in September, revealed that anti-right-to-work had taken the lead, with 53 per cent of the straw vote. It was the opinion of the Dunleavy people at this time that the proposition would lose unless the labor movement made a serious blunder or unless supporters of Proposition No. 18 discovered some new and effective method for reversing the trend. By October 24, the polling organization found that the trend against the right-to-work proposal had continued, and that it would be defeated by over 600,000 votes. 20 It was an underestimate of the labor victory to come. T h e right-to-work petition was rejected by a vote of 2,903,309 to 1,934,911, and along with it almost the entire Republican ticket went down to defeat. T h e shift in the vote was influenced by the campaign waged by the state federation of labor. Although the occasion chosen might have appeared propitious for the right-to-work proponents, because of the shocking revelations of the McClellan Committee, the scandal did not involve a single California organization — a record in keeping with the past history of the movement. Of course, Eugene Schmitz and others had besmirched trade unions in the past, but, over the years, the California labor movement had been virtually free from scandal; it had been a militant, hard-fighting movement, but not corrupt. After the overwhelming defeat of Proposition No. 18, Haggerty declared: "In this hour of triumph, labor looks to the future, not to the past. W e must think now in terms of continued progress for the working people, as we struggle for a more democratic and more secure society." 2 1 Voting on the right-to-work petition influenced the outcome of the election for state offices, for the Dunleavy polls showed Re-

244

California State Federation of Labor

publicans overwhelmingly in favor of the proposal to prohibit unionsecurity arrangements, and Democratic voters giving the opposition a substantial majority. It was an expensive campaign for the labor movement. Eighteen organizations reported to the secretary of state as having collected $2,603,332.59 and spent $2,491,537.30 — the largest sum, $828,107.42, by the California State Federation of Labor. Those favoring the proposal collected $936,126.67 and spent $907,5 36.26.22 More than half the money collected by the state federation was spent on radio, television, billboards, and other advertising. The Merger and New Division The split in the American Federation of Labor in 1936 was followed by regional divisions within the family of labor. Locals of international unions affiliated with the CIO were either expelled or withdrew from the state federation. After the CIO local unions in California had organized the state industrial union council, two state federations were functioning within the state, reflecting the division of the general labor movement into two separate, and sometimes, warring segments. Under the national merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955, state federations of labor, including the one in California, were required to unite into one state body. On January 26, 1956, President Thomas L. Pitts announced the appointment of a merger committee to meet with the CIO representatives made up of Vice-Presidents Max J. Osslo, Robert J. O'Hare, Jack Goldberger, Lowell Nelson, Harry Finks, Albin J. Gruhn, Pat Somerset, President Thomas L. Pitts, and SecretaryTreasurer Haggerty. The CIO appointed a committee, and the two groups held a series of meetings, the first of which was on April 12. An agreement was reached on the amount of per capita tax that was to be paid to the merged state body — the CIO's proposal of five cents per member per month being accepted — but no agreement on any other issues could be reached. In an effort to speed agreement, President George Meany participated in a meeting of the two committees on May 25, 1957, but the conference was not successful.23 Opposition to the merger on terms acceptable to the CIO was especially strong among the building trades unions; Lundeberg was

Right to Work

245

hostile to the whole idea. Haggerty, on the other hand, tried to keep the issues in perspective. At the 1957 convention, the state building trades council offered a resolution which charged that "certain industrial unions have in the past,24 and are continuing to intrude upon and violate the jurisdiction of the building construction craft unions; thereby ignoring the spirit and intent of the merger agreement and the constitution of the AFL-CIO." 25 The resolution recommended that any merger agreement entered into by the state federation of labor must "clearly and unmistakably recognize the full jurisdictional rights of the Building and Construction Trades craft unions in California." The resolutions committee faced a dilemma. It could not reasonably oppose the policies of the national AFL-CIO, and yet it was aware of a strong feeling in a powerful group within the federation. It tried to avoid taking a position by declaring that the state federation had no authority to decide jurisdictional differences among unions, and recommended filing of the resolution. Immediately the convention was plunged into a lively debate with many representatives of the building trades unions charging that their interests were now being neglected and surrendered, despite their long loyalty and support of the California labor movement. Their pleas were sufficiently effective to defeat the recommendation of the resolutions committee by a vote of 398 to 327. A number of meetings between the AFL and CIO merger committees were held. On August 23, 1958, the joint committee representing the state federation of labor and the California Industrial Union Council approved the principles of the merger and authorized drafting of the merger documents. On August 24, 1958, the executive council was informed that the California Industrial Union Council had approved the agreement and the rules of order for the merger, but had rejected the constitution. When it appeared that new delays would thus face the union of the two federations, the California Industrial Union Council informed Secretary Haggerty on September 9 that they would approve all merger documents.26 The merger convention was held on December 9, 1958, and the two federations combined. The AFL unions had by far the largest number of members, and the principal posts of president and secretary-treasurer were given to federation officers Thomas L. Pitts and C. J. Haggerty.

246

California State Federation of Labor

Expulsion of the Teamsters' Union from the national AFL-CIO proved another serious problem for the state federation. Locals and district councils of the Teamsters' Union could not retain their membership with state or city central bodies when their international was denied affiliation. Appearing before the executive council of the state federation of labor, Vice-President Joseph Diviny of the teamsters' organization, announced the withdrawal of his union from the federation. The executive council accepted the resignation with deep regret, and noted the "heroic part" played by the teamsters in building the California labor movement. The names of Michael Casey and John McLaughlin, two teamsters among many who did so much to aid the unions in the state were mentioned.27 Moreover, the president of the state federation at the time of the withdrawal of teamsters' locals was himself a member of the teamsters. The statement expressed "particular appreciation" for the fact that the teamsters "have now created coordinating committees throughout the state to work in harmony with our affiliated unions and councils." Secretary-Treasurer Haggerty noted the departure of the teamsters and declared them to have been for "more than a half a century" a "stabilizing force within our movement . . . Indeed, it was largely the vision and dedication of pioneer teamsters which led to the formation of the state federation of labor in 1901. W e shall never forget the heroic assistance extended to our affiliates during the past 57 years. Nor should the people of California forget the enormous contribution for good which they made to the economic and industrial progress of the state." 28 As a parting gesture, the Teamsters' Union donated $20,000 to the fund established by the state federation of labor to fight the rightto-work initiative.

17-Summing Up

In general, the California State Federation of Labor was typical of those functioning in other states, and resembled those in the merged federation. Throughout its history, the California Federation has had the benefit of able leaders. From Paul Scharrenberg, the second secretary-treasurer, to Thomas L. Pitts, its leaders have been aware of the limits under which the federation operated, and realized the necessity for establishing friendly relations with the heads of the legislative and executive branches of the state government. The successful achievement of goals was dependent upon the attitudes and sympathy of the public, the views of the governor and the make-up of the legislature. The political environment was subject to change, and the pendulum might swing over to the right and bring with it, as it did with Governor William Stephens during World War I and the years immediately following, a chief executive hostile to the aims and efforts of organized labor. During such periods, the gains would be few, and, on balance, some ground might be lost. Yet, the state federations do not have many practical options. Politically, labor seldom controls a majority in the state legislative halls, and the possibility of going it alone does not offer an enticing alternative. Even when the results are scanty, the federation has to muster its supporters, seek to cut its losses, and to prepare for a better day. There is always a danger that an unsympathetic legislature might undo earlier gains and impose new restrictions upon vital activities. Over the years, the state federations and the more vigorous city central bodies have been primarily institutions promoting the political interests of labor, and this role is acquiring greater importance. At times, organizing and bargaining might be added to

248

California State Federation of Labor

the tasks of the state bodies, and city centrals. Bargaining has only been performed by the state federations occasionally, since they have always been, first of all, agencies promoting the political interests of labor. The direction and range of activity were largely influenced by the needs and expectations of the affiliated unions and their members. As horizons enlarged, and new needs and problems arose, the state federations communicated the desires of their constituents to their state governments. The expanding role of state governments in welfare, social security, education, industrial safety and location automatically enlarged the areas in which the federations were active. In addition, the federations have always had to concern themselves with the needs and problems of special labor groups. While the protection of labor's legislative interests was their main concern, the state bodies did not customarily limit themselves. They sponsored welfare legislation which benefited the less skilled and unorganized, and were active in promoting laws and regulations protecting community interests and enlarging educational opportunities. Annually or biannually, depending upon the frequency of the meetings of the legislature, the federations prepared programs based upon the directives of conventions. As a rule, these activities did not attract too much public attention, as only on occasion were public meetings or "mass lobbying" used to rally legislative support. An anti-injunction law, which usually aroused counter efforts by employer groups, or a new kind of social legislation might require a display of grass-roots sentiment to rally lukewarm or hesitant members of the legislature behind the new program. Similar methods are followed today, although, with fifty functioning state federations, differences in emphasis and strategies are inevitable. The complete autonomy which state federations enjoy allows each to devise tactics suitable for its own needs. The political climate is not uniform throughout the United States; organized workers do not make up the same fraction of the electorate in every state; and their experiences are not always the same. Workers in some states may be enjoying a bountiful harvest of new legislation, while others are experiencing a severe drought or may even be losing ground. In the latter case, leaders may dream of a new alignment on the theory that the worse now the better in the long run. Such tactics are a variant of independent party politics, and it is doubtful if they

Summing Up

249

will work more effectively than long-tried methods. A conservative legislator in an essentially liberal party may in committee or on the floor be responsive to party pressure, while a conservative in a conservative party would normally have to overcome his own inclinations and the opposition of his party to support controversial labor measures. A realignment of parties on an ideological or logical basis is likely to take a long time, during which labor will find itself in a serious position with fewer supporters for some of its proposals than it might have attracted if it had followed a more flexible policy. All proposals that are sponsored by state federations do not inevitably arouse all-out opposition, although resistance may come from special employer groups. A state federation which shows hostility to all those who are not fully in its camp and do not support it 100 per cent will incur greater resistance to some of its programs than would otherwise follow. The long record of the state federations, as well as groups such as the Railway Labor Executives Association, shows they have never been too choosy about occasional allies. Groups engaged in lobbying cannot act as an exclusive political club. It is true that officers representing a group such as the railway unions inevitably have narrower goals than a federation which directly and indirectly speaks for the working people of a state. Yet, each must decide upon the tactics which will yield maximum results, and no evidence supports the view that a program of realigning the liberal cohorts in a solid phalanx for a campaign against the conservatives has paid off in substantial political dividends. Over time, the federations, as well as local central labor unions, are likely to become more influential within the labor movement. With the increasing economic importance of government on all levels, and the rise in employment by local and state governments, the influence of the state federations should continue to grow. Such expansion should in no way diminish the importance of the bargaining organizations in the labor movement. It is, however, not likely that the national federation will in the near future again seek its leader in the ranks of the state labor bodies. The mere fact that George Meany initially came from a state federation indicates that they may have among them men of outstanding talent which the national labor movement could well use. However, Meany

250

California State Federation of Labor

did not directly reach the presidency from his post as head of the New York State Federation of Labor. He was first elected as secretary-treasurer of the AFL and displayed, in that post, the qualities which made him the successor to William Green. Although there are many able men serving the state federations, few are widely known or could muster sufficient support among the national and international unions which control large blocks of votes at conventions. There are few instances of the head of a state federation or a city central body acquiring a national following. John Fitzpatrick, a long-time president of the Chicago Federation of Labor, was perhaps the only one who gained national attention while heading a city central body, although John Walker of Illinois and James Maurer of Pennsylvania were known beyond the borders of their state. However, during Fitzpatrick's tenure, Chicago was one of the strongest centers of organized labor, and Fitzpatrick was, in addition to his duties as president, active in organizing. The drives to unionize the Chicago stockyard workers in 1916 and the iron and steel industry in 1919, which Fitzpatrick headed, brought him to the attention of thousands of union members and scores of local and regional officers. Had the 1919 iron and steel campaign succeeded in establishing collective-bargaining systems, Fitzpatrick might have aspired to national office in the AFL, but he would still have had to surmount the hurdle of voting power being lodged in the national and international unions. However, the alignments that may emerge at the time a head of the national federation is chosen cannot be completely foreseen, and the possibility of an officer of a state federation achieving the highest post cannot be entirely ruled out, although its likelihood must be regarded as remote. The difficulty of a head of a state federation becoming the leader of the labor movement comes from his restricted geographical field of action, and the overwhelming power of selection which is wielded by the national and international unions. Nevertheless, the importance of the state federations has steadily increased even during the time when power of the states was being slowly eroded and when some states were becoming pallid copies of their former selves. The trend appears to have been reversed, and the next decades are likely to witness a strong revival of the states as bases of govern-

Summing Up

251

ment power. In addition to their historic role, the states are likely to become partners and administrators of federal programs. Central direction of nationwide projects from Washington does not always lead to maximum efficiency, and the states appear to be ready to take over part of the job. If the influence of the states revives, importance and power of the state federations is likely to be accelerated. Such a development will probably be independent of the quality of the leadership which the federations generate. The states have remained powerful political entities. T h e preemption by the federal government of many aspects of labormanagement relations, for example, has by no means extinguished the influence of state governments in the areas of collective bargaining and union administration. T h e Landrum-Griffin Act permits suits under some of its provisions in state courts for an accounting of union funds or to secure appropriate relief for the benefit of a union. State courts may also be appropriate forums for suits involving picketing, violations of collective-bargaining contracts, denial of rights within a union, failure to provide fair representation and other causes. Many areas of union administration and relationship to an employer can be made subjects of state regulatory procedures. States can determine the kinds of union security arrangements which can be incorporated in labor-management contracts, as well as a host of other conditions which govern labor relations. Some states regulate health, welfare and pension programs devised under collective bargaining. States also can regulate union fiduciary behavior and internal government. In addition, states administer and prescribe the coverage and benefit schedules for several social security programs — unemployment, workmen's compensation and medical aid among them. A large part of the wage and salary receivers are covered by these programs, and the job of state federations is to prevent the dilution of benefits and the imposition of unjustifiable restrictions upon eligibility. State federations have not only been concerned with benefit schedules, but with the administration of these programs. Application of severe eligibility requirements may deny benefits to claimants who are unemployed through no fault of their own or remove from the rolls workers injured in industry who have not fully recovered. W i t h the enlarging of the benefit programs for the work force, the state federations have the basic responsibility of

252

California State Federation of Labor

preventing unreasonable restrictions upon their operations as well as keeping the benefits in line with rising labor income. In contrast to the periods before the 1930's, the state federations must be aware of day-to-day administration of these programs, and they frequently funnel complaints to the executive and administrators. Further growth in the importance of the state federations will also be influenced by the sharp expansion in state and local government employment. Since the end of World War II, employment in these areas rose from 3,582,000 in 1947 to 7,667,000 in 1965. In fact, local and state governments form one of the leading growth industries in the United States. From an average of 8.2 per cent of nonfarm employment provided by local and state governments in 1947, the rate jumped to 12.7 per cent in 1965. There are no signs that the trend is likely to be reversed in the immediate future. Such a forecast appears reasonable in the light of the increased duties, which state and local governments are undertaking, and the expectations of the community. Half the growth in state and local employment is accountable by increases in personnel in all fields of education. Substantial increases have also taken place in other areas — public service including hospitals, administration of welfare, housing and urban renewal have experienced the greatest percentage gains. As employment in state and local government expands, the level of wages, fringe benefits, working conditions and right to collective bargaining come to the forefront. Policies which might have been acceptable to small numbers of employees may face opposition when large numbers are engaged. As the legislature has a direct and indirect voice in the setting of wage and salary scales, deciding working conditions, retirement and other rights for state employees as well as discretionary power to regulate the employment behavior of local governmental units, larger numbers of workers have become dependent upon the state federations for advice and support. Not only do these organizations have to perform the traditional lobbying before the legislature and representation before wage-fixing and other boards dealing with problems of state employees, but they may have to assist in collective-bargaining negotiations where it is permissible. Because the leaders of the state federations and their staffs are experienced in dealing with the heads of governmental departments, the growth of employment in the state and local

Summing Up

253

sectors is likely to increase the importance of the leadership's activities. State federations have always fought for the principle of prevailing wages on public works and the purchase of union-made products by state and local governmental units. As state and local governments become increasingly active in the operation of municipal and suburban transportation systems, urban renewal and housing construction, the need for defining the terms of employment and purchase becomes of crucial interest to larger groups of organized workers. Even when the state encourages the construction of housing through tax subsidies, the labor policies to be followed by the builders are of considerable importance to certain union groups. State federations have the obligation of seeking protection for the organized worker when the enabling legislation is written, and also when the regulations are administered. To the extent that the state and local governments become involved in activities which were at one time largely matters for the private sector of the economy, the more important it becomes in seeking statutory or administrative protection for union members which cannot be provided by collective bargaining. While the effort to place union members in government jobs available at their trade is not new, the vastly expanded, direct and indirect employment by government requires much greater alertness, effort and continuing attention. As has already been noted, the sharing of fiscal and administrative responsibility between the federal and the state governments enhances the influence and the power of the states, and thus affects the duties and the services of the state federations of labor. The unemployment-compensation systems and the government employment service are administered by the states, but the costs of administration are borne by the federal government. Within wide limits, the rules governing operations are devised by the states. Similarly, 90 per cent of the financing of the building of the interstate highways system comes from the federal government, but the actual construction has been largely directed by the states. A number of federal welfare programs have been lodged with the states, and this trend appears to be increasing. The control over such activities by the state governments means that the state federations have, in addition to their historical duties, the task of representing large numbers who are employed by the state or by contractors on state

254

California State Federation of Labor

projects. In either case, the rules and, in some instances, pay scales may be subject to the discretion of the state governments. Because their jobs were primarily political, leaders of state federations have always been aware of the importance of state legislative bodies in protecting and promoting the welfare of the organized and unorganized within their jurisdiction. The greater dependence of labor upon government has modified the general labor movement's political posture, not only of the AFL-CIO, but of many of the national affiliates. Even the building trades unions, which have been among the least inclined to support government intervention in economic affairs, have approved of government-financed housing and liberal monetary and fiscal policies for keeping the costs of mortgage money at low levels. Establishment of the Committee for Political Education at the merger convention is one of the manifestations of the increased interest of labor in politics. While the AFL-CIO and many of the internationals have established political departments, the work in the field must be carried out by local and state officers. State federations of labor have participated in registration drives and in the making of endorsements of candidates for office. The state leaders are aware of the political problem areas in their jurisdictions where support should be offered or withheld. This type of activity by state federations and city central bodies has greatly expanded in the last two decades, as have the other services connected with getting voter approval. For effective political performance, the general labor movement must rely upon the state federations and the city centrals, for they are likely to be closest to the voters and aware of issues and needs in their areas. Distribution of campaign literature, and helping voters to the polls must be organized by state and local leaders. Since this type of activity is likely to increase, the state federations should gain in importance in the future. Important links of the labor movement to local and state communities are largely maintained by local and state leaders. They serve on public and quasi-public committees, whether they are appointed to investigate particular problems or are established by such agencies as the Community Fund or Blue Cross. Heads of state federations seldom achieve the attention of leaders of unions because their work is less spectacular. Yet, the state federations have been the guardians, over the years, against dilution of, as well as

Summing Up

255

improvement in, the laws which vitally affect the working population and the community in many political and economic areas. In hearings dealing with labor, education, business regulation and consumer problems, the state federations are likely to be represented as witnesses, members of commissions or both. The heads of these bodies are not as visible to the public as labor leaders helping to set terms of employment, but they perform functions which are of great importance to workers and the community — functions which are multiplying in number and extent.

Notes

1 - Beginnings 1. Coast Seamen's Journal, January 5, 1902. 2. Ninth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1899-1900, p. 114. 3. Ira B. Cross, A History of the Labor Movement in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935), pp. 19-28, 41, 48-51. 4. Frank Roney, "The First Industrial Body," Labor Clarion, June 3, 1917. 5. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 1, 1890; Third Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 18871888, pp. 39-40 (testimony of Alfred Fuhrman). 6. Lucille Eaves, A History of California Labor Legislation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1910), p. 53. 7. Labor Clarion (San Francisco), April 11, 1902. 8. Ninety, or 41 per cent, was in San Francisco, and another 23, or 10 per cent, in Oakland; 20 functioned in Sacramento; 26, or 12 per cent, in Los Angeles; 6 in San Diego; 5 in Vallejo; and the same number in San Jose. The rest were scattered through the state. Ninth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1899-1900, p. 92. 9. Davis McEntire, The Labor Force in California (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952), pp. 5-12. 10. Labor Clarion, July 25, 1902. "There is no limit to the demand of labor. You may try appealing to us by saying we received more last year or more this year and we answer, 'We shall want more tomorrow; we shall want more the next year. After we have received that, we will want more. We will struggle for more and continue to struggle for more.'" 11. Proceedings of the California State Labor Convention, Jan. 7, 8, and 9, 1901. 12. Labor Clarion, Feb. 28, 1902. 13. Labor Clarion, April 2, 1902; Nov. 21, 1904; The San Francisco Chronicle, June and July, 1901.

Notes to Pages 20-29

257

14. Coast Seamen's Journal, Oct. 30, 1901, Nov. 6, 1901, p. 2. 15. Franklin Hichborn, The System As Uncovered by The San Francisco Graft Prosecutions (San Francisco: James H. Barry, 1915), is a good source. P. H. McCarthy, who had opposed the launching of the Labor Party, in 1901, was its successful candidate for mayor in 1909. Charles M. Fickert, who was to prosecute Mooney and Billings for throwing the bomb during the 1917 Preparedness Parade in 1917, was elected district attorney with McCarthy. 16. Labor Clarion, Jan. 16, 1903. 17. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1903, pp. 20-21, 36-49, 52-54, 56-57. 18. Labor Clarion, March 11, 1902. 19. Lucille Eaves, A History of California Labor Legislation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1910), pp. 298-299. 20. Coast Seamen's Journal, April 3, 1901, p. 6; Jan. 15, 1902, p. 6. 21. No breakdown of income is given. 22. Secretary's Report in Labor Clarion, Jan. 8, 1903; Tenth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1901-1902, pp. 76-79. 23. Tenth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1901-1902, pp. 76-79. 24. Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1903, p. 20. 25. Labor Clarion, Jan. 16, 1903. 26. "Meeting of the Executive Council," Labor Clarion, Jan. 30, 1903; "Report of Legislative Agent," Oct. 23, 1903. 27. Eleventh Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1903-1904, p. 48. 28. Labor Clarion, Jan. 8, 1904; Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1905, p. 86. 29. Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 1904, p. 86. 30. Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1903, p. 17. 31. "Executive Council Minutes," Labor Clarion, April 7, 1905; Jan. 6, 1906. 32. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1906, pp. 11, 29; The Labor News (Eureka), April 28, 1906. 33. Labor Clarion, Feb. 10, 1906; March 2, 1906; Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1907, pp. 85-87.

258

Notes to Pages 30-40

34. Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1907, pp. 12-13. 35. Paul Scharrenberg, "Memories and Prophecies," The Kern County Labor Journal, Sept. 4, 1942. 36. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1908, pp. 56, 58, 61-62. 37. Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1908, p. 84.

2-Migratory Workers 1. Final Report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, vol. V, pp. 4932, 4936, 4945, 4960. 2. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1909, p. 46. 3. Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1910, p. 52. 4. Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1911, p. 67. 5. Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1913, p. 78. 6. "A Report to his Excellency Hiram W . Johnson, Governor of California, By the Commission of Immigration and Housing of California on the Causes of All Matters Pertaining to the So-Called Wheatland Hop Fields' Riot and Killing of August 13, 1913, and Containing Certain Recommendations as a Solution for the Problem Disclosed," in Carleton Η. Parker, The Casual Laborer and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), p. 178. 7. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1914, pp. 72-73. 8. The International Workers' Defense League raised the funds to finance the trial. Tom Mooney, who was secretary of that organization, claimed that labor organizations and individuals had donated over $8000 for the defense of Ford and Suhr. Tom Mooney to John A. O'Connell, Sept. 27, 1915; International Workers' Defense League, Receipts and Expenditures, Feb. 14, 1915, p. 35. 9. Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 10, 1913. 10. Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1915, pp. 97-98 reprints of Governor Johnson's statement denying a pardon for Ford and Suhr. 11. Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1915, p. 30.

Notes to Pages 4 0 - 4 9

259

12. Paul Scharrenberg to Governor Johnson, May 23, 1916, in Johnson Papers in the Bancroft Library of the University of California in Berkeley. 13. Labor Clarion, Jan. 1, 1925. 14. "A Report to his Excellency Hiram W . Johnson, Governor of California," in Parker, The Casual Laborer and Other Essays, Appendix.

3 - A d v a n c e s and Retreats 1. Report of President D. D. Sullivan, Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1910, pp. 45-46. 2. Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1912, pp. 88-89. 3. David A. Shannon, The Socialist Party of America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), p. 41. 4. Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1911, p. 93. 5. Report on Labor Legislation, Fortieth Session of the California Legislature, California State Federation of Labor, 1913, p. 3, for quote; Report of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1911, p. 57. 6. Report of John I. Nolan to the San Francisco Labor Council, March 31, 1911, p. 94. 7. Report of John I. Nolan to the San Francisco Labor Council for quotation; Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1911, p. 80. 8. Hiram Johnson to H. W . Brundage, March 23, 1911, in the Johnson Collection of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California. 9. Report of John I. Nolan to the San Francisco Labor Council, p. 8. 10. Mr. Otis and the Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles: Committee from Typographical Union No. 174, 1915). See also testimony of Gen. Harrison Gray Otis in Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial Relations, 1916, vol. VI, pp. 5520-5521, and of F. J. Zeehadelaar, pp. 5493ff. 11. Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1910, p. 54; Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1911, p. 72. 12. Grace Heilman Stimson, The Rise of the Labor Movement in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 366.

260

Notes to Pages 49-58

13. "Final Report of the Special Investigating Committee on 'Times' Explosion," Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1910, pp. 91-99. 14. John D. Fredricks to Governor Hiram Johnson, Oct. 14, 1911, in Johnson Papers, Bancroft Library. 15. Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1911, p. 71. 16. Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1912, p. 48. 17. Stimson, The Rise of the Labor Movement in Los Angeles, pp. 413-415. 18. Philander C. Knox to Hiram Johnson, Jan. 14, 1911, in Johnson Papers, Bancroft Library. 19. Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1912, pp. 22, 31, 90. 20. Letter from California State Federation of Labor to International Unions of the American Federation of Labor, Oct. 3, 1913; Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, July 12, 1914. 21. Samuel Gompers to John I. Nolan, Feb. 1, 1913. 22. Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1913, p. 89. 23. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1914, pp. 22-23. 24. Report of A. W . Brouillet to the Officers and Members of the San Francisco Labor Council, May 28, 1915, in archives of San Francisco Labor Council 25. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1916, p. 40; Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 14, 1917; Labor Clarion, Oct. 13, 1917.

4-The Open Shop and the Mooney Case 1. To the Officers and Members of Organized Labor from the Executive Committee, from Daniel D. Haggerty and Paul Scharrenberg, July 23, 1914. Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress By The Commission on Industrial Relations, 1916, vol. VI, p. 4478. 2. Evening Μαζί (Stockton), June 13, 1914. 3. The Evening Mail, June 26, 1915, contains the letter of C. G. Bird, president of the Merchants', Manufacturers', and Employers' Association to the Central Labor Council; June 26, 1915; June 24, 1914; June 30, 1914.

Notes to Pages 59-66

261

4. Financial Report on the Stockton Lockout (San Francisco: California State Federation of Labor, 1915), pp. 17-18, in archives of San Francisco Labor Council, pp. 19-38. 5. Letter from California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 15, 1915. 6. Henry F. Grady, "The Open Shop in San Francisco," The Survey, Nov. 1916, pp. 192-193. 7. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1916, p. 80; Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1918, p. 77. 8. Letter to Pacific Coast District Locals of the International Longshoremen's Association from Pacific Coast District Executive Board, May 22, 1916, in archives of San Francisco Labor Council. 9. J. A. Madsen to W . C. Dawson, May 26, 1916, in The Longshoremen's Strike (no place or publisher, 1916). 10. The Longshoremen's Strike, pp. 27-30. 11. Law and Order in San Francisco: A Beginning (San Francisco: Law and Order League, 1916), pp. 19, 25. 12. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1916. 13. The Blast (San Francisco), April 1, 1916. 14. Robert Minor, The Frame-up System: The Story of the San Francisco Bomb (San Francisco: International Workers Defense League, 1916). 15. Labor Clarion, April 1 and 15, 1904, discusses Calhoun and his hostility to organized labor. 16. Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1908, pp. 67-68. 17. Resolution submitted by Division 518 of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America, signed by Edward D. Vandeleur, president, and John J. Dyer, secretary, in archives of San Francisco Labor Council. 18. Labor Clarion, July 21, 1917. 19. "Report on the Mooney Dynamite Case in San Francisco Submitted by President Wilson's Mediation Commission," Official Bulletin, Jan. 28, 1918, p. 14. 20. The Mooney-Billings Report: Suppressed by the Wickersham Committee (New York: Gotham House, 1932), pp. 37-41. 21. Labor Clarion, July 28, 1916. 22. The World (Oakland), Feb. 23, 1917. 23. Labor Clarion, Feb. 23, 1917. 24. Coast Seamen's Journal, April 25, 1917.

262

Notes to Pages 66-71

25. Edward Nockles and Andrew Furuseth to Fremont Older, May 30, 1917. 26. John I. Nolan to Daniel C. Murphy, June 4, 1917. 27. Daniel C. Murphy to Samuel Gompers, Sept. 19, 1917. 28. Letter from the Secretary of Labor Transmitting Information Relative to the Connection of Certain of the Department's Employees With the Case of Thomas J. Mooney, H.R. 157, 66th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 1. 29. Philip Taft, The AFL in the Time of Gompers (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957), pp. 377-379. 30. Report of President Wilson's Mediation Commission, p. 15. 31. The Sacramento Bee, March 1, 1918. 32. Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1918, pp. 35-37. 33. Taft, The AFL in the Time of Gompers, p. 377; Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 12, 1919. 34. William D. Stephens in a letter to the Sacramento Bee, May 27, 1931. 35. Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1920; Paul Scharrenberg to William Green, June 10, 1931. 36. Remarks of Paul Scharrenberg in the files of the California State Federation of Labor. 37. Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 1927, p. 364. 38. Tom Mooney to William Green, Jan. 2, 1928. 39. San Francisco Call, July 21, 1928. 40. Governor C. C. Young to Scharrenberg, Sept. 19, 1928. 41. Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1930, pp. 31-32. 42. In the Matter of Application Made in Behalf of Thomas ]. Mooney for a Pardon (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1930). 43. "Reports of Officers, California State Federation of Labor," Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1930, p. 30. 44. Warren Billings to Paul Scharrenberg, Oct. 8, 1929 in Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, p. 31. 45. Labor Leaders Betray Tom Mooney (no publisher, 1931), pp. 5, 29. 46. Victor Olander to Scharrenberg, Feb. 26, 1931. 47. Scharrenberg to William Green, Feb. 24, 1931.

Notes to Pages 72-80

263

48. Scharrenberg to Governor James Rolph, June 10, 1931. 49. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, April 21, 1932. 50. Billings to Scharrenberg, June 11, 1933; Scharrenberg to Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, June 16, 1933. 51. E. D. Vandeleur (secretary of the California State Federation of Labor) to California Labor Bodies, Dec. 6, 1936. 52. Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention of the Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1938, pp. 131-134. 53. Labor Clarion, Jan. 15, 1939; Feb. 4, 1938. 54. Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1939, pp. 75, 135, 145. 55. The C.I.O. News, Oct. 23, 1939, p. 7. 56. Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1941, pp. 135, 155.

5 - W o r l d W a r I and Postwar 1. Joseph Goldberg, The Maritime Story (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 43-67. 2. Daniel C. Murphy, President, Paul Scharrenberg, Secretary-Treasurer, and T. J. Vitaich, Legislative Representative of the Federation to Local Unions, and Central Bodies, Feb. 9, 1917. 3. Resolutions on Demobilization, Reconstruction and After-the-War Problems Introduced at the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1918. 4. Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1919, p. 42. 5. Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1920, p. 42. 6. Paul Scharrenberg to Chester Rowell, March 11, 1920. 7. Ira B. Cross, A History of the Labor Movement in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935), pp. 223, 234. 8. McCarthy followed his own rules, and the council announced wages and working conditions to the industry. Only in cases of arbitration were contracts signed. In his testimony before the Commission on Industrial Relations, McCarthy noted: " W e do not believe in these signed agreements that have possession of your eastern gentlemen." Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial Relations, 1916, vol. VI, p. 5212. 9. Frederick L. Ryan, Industrial Relations in the San Francisco Building Trades (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), pp. 134-135.

264

Notes to Pages 81-86

10. To the Building Trades Unions of the San Francisco Bay Region from the San Francisco Labor Council, Aug. 4, 1921, in archives of the San Francisco Labor Council. 11. "Officers' Report," Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1921, p. 15. 12. Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, Report of the Committee on Education and Labor Pursuant to S. Res. 266, Employers' Associations and Collective Bargaining in California, Senate Report No. 1150, part 2, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 93-98. 13. Walter Macarthur to Ira B. Cross, March 19, 1933; Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1921, p. 26. 14. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1922, pp. 41, 44, 47. 15. Labor Clarion, Aug. 4, 1922. 16. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Labor Clarion, Aug. 4, 1922. 17. Ten Years' Achievements (San Francisco: California State Federation of Labor, 1923). 18. Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor to Central Labor Councils and Local Unions, April 17, 1924. 19. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, June 7, 1923. 20. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1925, p. 79. 21. To the Central Labor Councils and Local Labor Unions of California from the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 6, 1925. 22. Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1925, p. 45. 23. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, March 28, 1926"; Labor Clarion, April 9, 1926. 24. "Report of the Secretary-Treasurer," Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1929, p. 30. 25. Report on Labor Legislation and Labor Record of Senators and Members of Assembly, Forty-Seventh Session of the California Legislature (San Francisco: California State Federation of Labor, 1927), p. 3. 26. Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1928, p. 75.

Notes to Pages 87-93

265

6-Unemployment, the San Francisco General Strike and Its Aftermath 1. Report and Recommendations of the California State Unemployment Commission (San Francisco: State Building, 1932), pp. 3233. 2. "Officers' Report," Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1931, p. 14. 3. W . A. Hoch and Paul Scharrenberg to James Rolph (governor), Dec. 21, 1931. 4. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, June 22, 1932. 5. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, June 12, 1932. 6. Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1933, pp. 76-77. 7. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, June 4, 1933. 8. Edward D. Vandeleur and Paul Scharrenberg to the Central Labor Councils and Local Unions of California, Dec. 3, 1934; Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 3, 1934; Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1936, p. 11. 9. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 1939, p. 5. 10. The People of the State of California vs. Watson. In the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the county of Contra Costa, July 9, 1939. 11. Boris Stern, Cargo Handling and Longshore Labor Conditions, Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 550, pp. 96-97. 12. "Oral Argument of Herman Phleger," Arbitration Before National Longshoremen's Board, 1934, p. 45. 13. Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine (United States Maritime Commission, 1937), p. 46 for quotation. 14. Paul Eliel, The Waterfront and General Strikes, San Francisco, 1934 (San Francisco: Industrial Association of San Francisco, 1934) gives a step-by-step summary of developments in these disputes. Mr. Eliel was on the staff of the Industrial Association which participated on the employer side in the controversy, but, in checking against the San Francisco newspapers of the period, including the Labor Clarion, his narrative of events appears reliable, although inevitably he shows a lack of sympathy for the strikers and some bias.

266

Notes to Pages 93-104

15. San Francisco News, May 8, 1934; May 10, 1934. 16. Report of the National Longshoremen's Board, pp. 4-5. 17. Quote from Eliel, The Waterfront and General Strikes, p. 43; San Francisco News, July 1-4, 1934. 18. Eliel, The Waterfront and General Strikes, pp. 33, 43-44, 50. 19. San Francisco Examiner, July 5, 1934. 20. Labor Clarion, July 13, 1934; San Francisco News, July 5, 1934. 21. Resolution adopted by the San Francisco Labor Council, July 6, 1934, in archives of the council. 22. John A. O'Connell to William Green, July 7, 1934. 23. Telegram from William Green to John A. O'Connell, July 9, 1934, and letter from Green to O'Connell of the same date in archives of the San Francisco Labor Council. 24. Report of the National Longshoremen's Board, p. 10; Seamen's Journal, July 13, 1934; August 1, 1934. 25. To All Unions Affiliated with the San Francisco Labor Council and Building Trades Council from Strike Strategy Committee, July 12, 1934, in archives of SFLC. 26. Statement in the archives of San Francisco Labor Council. 27. Seamen's Journal, Aug. 1, 1934, pp. 113-114. 28. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, June 16, 1935. 29. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, April 1936, p. 4. 30. Letter from John L. Donnelly (secretary of the San Diego Theatrical Federation) to Joseph Casey, Dec. 15, 1935, in archives of state federation of labor. 31. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, July 1936. 32. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, July 8, 1934. 33. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, June 16, 1935. 34. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor," Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1935, p. 92; Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1936, pp. 71, 109, 125, 145. 35. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, April 1936, p. 4. 36. Press Release, California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 1, 1938. 37. Proceedings of the First Conference of the American Federation of Labor Political League of California, March 20, 1938, pp. 10, 17.

Notes to Pages 104-113

267

38. American Federation of Labor Political League of California to All Central Labor Councils and Local Unions Affiliated with the American Federation of Labor of California, May 14, 1938. 39. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the American Federation of Labor Political League of California, July 9-10, 1938, p. 7. 40. Culbert L. Olson to C. J. Haggerty and Edward D. Vandeleur, June 24, 1938. 41. William Green to Joseph Casey, Oct. 21, 1938. 42. California Labor Review, Oct. 21, 1938. 43. Edward D. Vandeleur to All Affiliated Bodies, July 30, 1938. 44. Press Release, California State Federation of Labor, Sept. 17, 1938. 45. California State Federation of Labor, Bulletin No. 3, Nov. 8, 1938. 46. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1940, p. 157. 47. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1941, pp. 154— 155. 48. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1942, p. 211. 49. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, March 27, 1946.

7-Effects and Influence of the C I O 1. Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Convention of the California Federation of Labor, 1936, p. 147. 2. Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1937, p. 111. 3. Labor Clarion, Sept. 13, 1938, p. 25. 4. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1940, pp. 27-28. 5. Letter in Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, July 1936, p. 4. 6. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 1936, p. 3. 7. Labor Clarion, Oct. 30, 1936. 8. Quote from To All Members of Organized Labor from James Hopkins and Edward D. Vandeleur, November 25, 1936; Conference Salinas-Watsonville Strike Situation. Mimeographed record of meeting of labor and employer representatives, Sept. 22-23, 1936. 9. State Conference of Agricultural Unions (California State Federation of Labor, 1937), pp. 3-5.

Notes to Pages 114-125

268

10. "Officers' Report," Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention of the California Federation of Labor, 1939, pp. 28-29. 11. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, March 1939, P . 2. 12. Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, 1939, vol. X, p. 1496. 13. Press release from the California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 7, 1938. 14. Press release by California State Federation of Labor, April 18, 1938; Tri-County Labor News, May 20, 1938. 15. Press Release, California Federation of Labor, July 16, 1938; Aug. 27, 1938. 16. Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, 1939, p. 104; 1941, vol. 22, p. 262. 17. California Labor Review, Sept. 29, 1939; Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1939, pp. 124-125. 18. California Labor Review, Sept. 29, 1939; June 9, 1939; Oct. 6, 1939. 19. California Labor Review, Nov. 8, 1940. 20. Los Angeles Citizen, Oct. 3, 1941. 21. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, July 1940, p. 1.

22. Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, June 25, 1945. 23. Meeting of AFL unions on organizing program for Standard Oil employees in California, Jan. 12, 1945; meeting of Feb. 28, 1945. 24. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Sept. 1945, p. 1.

25. Statement on the CIO in California by the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor issued in Nov. 1945. 26. Dave Beck to C. J. Haggerty, July 12, 1946; Haggerty to Beck, July 18, 1946. 27. Weekly AFL Cannery Release from California State Federation of Labor, Aug. 19, 1946. 28. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Sept. 24, 1946. 29. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1947, p. 85. 30. Roy M. Brown to C. J. Haggerty, March 21, 1945. 31. C. J. Haggerty to Roy M. Brown, March 27, 1945.

Notes to Pages 125-136

269

32. Η. W . Brown, president of the International Association of Machinists to William Green, president of the AFL, June 10, 1941, in files of AFL-CIO.

8-Tasks and Problems: Depression and World War II 1. Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1938, pp. 95, 145. 2. Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1939, pp. 6, 168. 3. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1942, p. 61. 4. Vandeleur to J. A. Edwards, Dec. 31, 1941. 5. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1941, pp. 146148. 6. "Officers' Reports," Proceeding of the Forty-Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1942, pp. 187, 219-220. 7. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, May 10, 1944. 8. Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1936, p. 8; Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 1936, p. 4. 9. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1940, pp. 119— 120, 163, 167. 10. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1940, pp. 10, 168. 11. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, April 1940, p. 3. 12. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 20, 1942. 13. "Minutes of the Executive Council California State Federation of Labor," Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, May 1942. 14. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, March 30, 1943; Jan. 5, 1943. 15. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1942, pp. 58, 61. 16. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 3, 1940.

270

Notes to Pages 136-150

17. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1941, pp. 3334, 36. 18. Contra Costa Labor Journal, June 13, July 4, 25, 1941. 19. Los Angeles Citizen, April 24, 1942. 20. Report on Special Campaign Fund, June 1, 1941 to Nov. 30, 1942, State Referendum Proportion, p. 4. 21. Labor Clarion, May 23, 1947. 22. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1942, p. 39. 23. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1947, p. 103.

9 - In Search of a Wartime Truce 1. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 23, 1942. 2. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the California State Federation of Labor, 1942, pp. 49, 321. 3. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 12, 1943; Jan. 19, 1943. 4. Contra Costa Labor Journal, Dec. 18, 1942. 5. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 26, 1943; Feb. 23, 1943. 6. Contra Costa Labor Journal, April 9, 1943; East Bay Labor Journal, Jan. 3, 1943; May 30, 1943. 7. Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, March 1943, p. 3. 8. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 5, 1943; Jan. 19, 1943; April 20, 1943; May 25, 1943. 9. Minutes of Executive Council, Sept. 9, 1944. 10. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 9, 1943; Oct. 12, 1943; Dec. 18, 1943. 11. Minutes of Executive Council, June 28, 1944. 12. Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive Council, Oct. 31, 1943. The Minutes are in the archives of the federation. 13. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 8, 1943; Dec. 15, 1943. 14. Minutes of Executive Council, Dec. 18, 1943. 15. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 2, 1944.

Notes to Pages 150-167 16. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, June p. 3. 17. Charles P. Scully to C. J. Haggerty, May 2, 1944. 18. Analysis of cases by Charles P. Scully in Minutes of Executive cil, June 24, 1944. 19. C. J. Haggerty to Governor Earl Warren, Aug. 23, 1945. 20. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Sept. p. 3. 21. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Jan. 17, 1945; Feb. 21, 1945. 22. C. J. Haggerty to All Labor Publications, May 5, 1945. 23. C. J. Haggerty to Governor Earl Warren, June 26, 1945. 24. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of July 2, 1947.

271 1941,

Coun-

1945, Labor,

Labor,

10-Legislative Gains and Losses 1. Special Report on Senate Fact Finding on Bay Ports (State of California, 1951, pp. 68-69. 2. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, March 6, 1946; June 22, 1949; July 13, 1949. 3. Extemporaneous speech on boycott of private disability insurance plans by C. J. Haggerty at the 1949 convention. Mimeographed in the archives. 4. C. J. Haggerty to All Unions and Councils, Sept. 30, 1949. 5. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, July 3, 1951; Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 1951, p. 1; Jan. 1949, pp. 8-9; Feb. 1950, p. 4.

1 1 - M i n o r i t y Groups and Civil Rights 1. Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration. 44th Cong., 2nd Sess., S.R. No. 689. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1877), p. 1196. Ping Chiu, Chinese Labor in California (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1963), especially chap. VIII. 2. Elmer Clarence Sandemeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California (Urbana: University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences XXIV, 1939), p. 87. 3. Ira B. Cross, A History of the Labor Movement in California. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935), pp. 88-93. 4. Report of the Joint Special Committee, p. 320; Walter MacArthur, The Union Label: Its History and Aims (Washington: American Federation of Labor, n.d.).

272

Notes to Pages 168-176

5. Proceedings of the California State Federation of Labor, 1902, p. 74. 6. For the Reenactment of the Chinese Exclusion Law, California's Memorial to the President and the Congress of the United States. S. Doc. No. 191, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902). 7. S. Doc. No. 137; 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902). 8. Seventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1907, pp. 34, 62. 9. Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1910, p. 21. 10. "To All National and International Labor Organizations of Europe, from Daniel P. Murphy, President, and Paul Scharrenberg, Secretary, Sept. 1, 1913," A printed leaflet issued by the federation. 11. Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 18, 1915; Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1915, pp. 1516. 12. James D. Phelan to Paul Scharrenberg, Oct. 14, 1915. 13. T. A. Lucas, G. W . McDonald and Thomas Ellis to James D. Phelan, Oct. 15, 1915. 14. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1916, pp. 41-42; Paul Scharrenberg, "Pursued by the Truth," Labor Clarion, Feb. 7, 1917. 15. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1914, pp. 10-11, 20-22. 16. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1916, pp. 19, 36-37. 17. Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1917, pp. 40, 47. 18. Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1918, p. 42. 19. Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1920, pp. 37, 58. 21. Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Convention of the CaliforState Federation of Labor, 1929, p. 29. 21. Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1933, p. 633. 22. Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1937, pp. 72, 98. 23. "Minutes of the Executive Council," Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, July 1938, p. 3.

Notes to Pages 176-183

273

24. Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1940, p. 108. 25. Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1941, p. 121, 122. 26. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, March 16, 1943. 27. Edward Vandeleur to William Green, June 16, 1943. 28. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1942, pp. 49, 211, 221. 29. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1947, p. 355. 30. C. }. Haggerty to All Affiliates, October 24, 1946. 31. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1947, p. 355. 32. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Oct. 6, 1948. 33. Minutes of the Executive Council, California State Federation of Labor, Sept. 26, 1948. 34. Statement of Policy Submitted by the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Sept. 26, 1948, in archives of federation. 35. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fiftieth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1952, p. 213. 36. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1955, p. 209. 37. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1956, p. 209. 38. Monthly Labor Review, Nov. 1920, pp. 221-223. 39. Report of the Committee on Education and Labor, R. No. 1150, part 3, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 257. 40. C. J. Haggerty to Dean Acheson, Jan. 19, 1949. 41. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1951, p. 80. 42. "Officers' Reports," and Proceedings of the California State Federation of Labor, 1952, p. 7. 43. Statement on Entrance and Employment of Illegal Aliens Presented to the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization by C. J. Haggerty, Oct. 15, 1952 in archives of the federation. 44. C. J. Haggerty, M. J. Osslo, J. W . Quimby and Tony Randall to Hon. Lie. Braulio Maldonado Sandex, Nov. 4, 1953.

274

Notes to Pages 184-196

45. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 3, 1954. 46. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, April 1954, p. 2. 47. Minutes of the Executive Council California Federation of Labor, June 3, 1954. 48. Declaration of the United States-Mexican Trade Union Committee on the Mexican Braceros in the United States, May 28, 1954. 49. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 9, 1953. 50. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1957, pp. 94-97. 51. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, April 26, 1957. 52. Joint United States-Mexican Trade Union Committee. Statement on the Importation of Japanese, Chinese, Ρhilipino, and other Foreign Agricultural Workers into Areas Supplied by the Mexican Contract Labor Program, July 15, 1956.

12-General and Limited Strikes 1. East Bay Labor Journal, Oct. 26, 1946; Nov. 1, 1946; Dec. 6, 1946. 2. "Statement Issued by Steering Committee of the Central Labor Council and Building Trades Council of Alameda County," Contra Costa Journal, Dec. 6, 1946, May 16, 1947; Aug. 29, 1947. 3. Printed resolution in the archives of the federation. The resolution was circulated and a number of affiliates endorsed it. 4. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, April 1947, p. 3. 5. Minutes of Executive Council, Oct. 25, 1947, in archives of the federation. 6. Contra Costa Labor Journal, Jan. 28, 1948; Feb. 13, 1948; Feb. 27, 1948; March, 1948; "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the FortyEighth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1950, p. 58. 7. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Aug. 1947, p. 1.

8. Long Beach Labor News, April 16, 1948. 9. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Aug. 19, 1955. 10. To All Locals and Councils in California from C. J. Haggerty, Sept. 2, 1955.

Notes to Pages 196-205

275

11. C. J. Haggerty to Peter A. Andrade and Joseph J. Diviny, Nov. 22, 1955. 12. San Francisco Call, Oct. 20, 1955. 13. Haggerty to Hon. Lister Hill, Nov. 3, 1955. 14. Peter A. Andrade to Haggerty, May 29, 1956. Financial statement was in the files of the federation.

13-Internal Differences 1. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1947, pp. 7, 81, 255, 371, 345. 2. Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive Council, Aug. 23, 1947. 3. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1947, pp. 262, 330. 4. Contra Costa County Labor Journal, Aug. 15, 1947. 5. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1947, pp. 361, 362. 6. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1948, p. 3. 7. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fiftieth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1952, p. 168. 8. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1948, p. 300. 9. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Nov. 1949, p. 7. 10. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1955, p. 147. 11. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-First Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1953, pp. 153-154. 12. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1955, p. 192. 13. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1957, p. 92. 14. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Second Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1950, pp. 149-150, 179180, 307. 15. Memorandum in the files of the federation. 16. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Nov. 1951, p. 6. 17. Ed Turner to C. J. Haggerty, May 20, 1953; quote is in Turner to Haggerty, Aug. 30, 1953.

276

Notes to Pages 205-214

18. Joint Victory Statement Issued by Seafarers' International Union, Pacific Coast District and California State Federation of Labor, April 7, 1955.

14-Expanding Political Action 1. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1947, pp. 71-72, 191. 2. Cablegram from Harry Lundeberg to C. J. Haggerty, Aug. 5, 1948, in archives of the federation. 3. Rules of Procedure, American Federation of Labor Political League of California, sec. 1 of Political Party Affiliation, in federation archives. 4. Statement of California Labor League of Political Education (n.d.) in archives of the federation. 5. Statement of California Legislative Conference by California State Federation of Labor, April 1, 1949 in archives. 6. C. J. Haggerty to All Affiliated Unions, March 8, 1949. 7. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1949, pp. 234-235. 8. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor. 9. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 1949, p. 6. 10. Proceedings and Secretary-Treasurer's Report to the 19 SO Pre-Election Convention, p. 18. 11. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1950, p. 259. 12. C. J. Haggerty to All Unions, Councils and Political Leagues, July 7, 1950. 13. Constitution and Rules of Order, California Labor League for Political Education, 1950, pp. 13-14. 14. C. J. Haggerty to All Political Leagues, March 1, 1956. 15. East Bay Labor Journal, April 16, 1954. 16. Proceedings and Secretary Treasurer's Report, 1954, Pre-Primary Convention California Labor League for Political Education, 1954, p. 11. 17. Minutes of the AFL Committee for Graves-Roybal, June 26, 1954, in federation archives. 18. C. J. Haggerty to All Unions, Councils and Leagues, April 30, 1954. 19. News Release from Southern California Committee to Elect Governor Goodwin J. Knight, Oct. 12, 1954.

Notes to Pages 214-225

277

20. Recommendations of the Executive Council of the California Labor League for Political Education for the General Election, Nov. 2, 1954 (n.d.). 21. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 1955, p. 10. 22. Proceedings and Secretary Treasurer's Report, 1956, Pre-Primary Convention California Labor League for Political Action, p. 11. 23. Proceedings of Pre-General Election Convention, pp. 9-10. 24. Proceedings and Secretary-Treasurer's Report, 1958, Pre-Primary Convention San Francisco, April 14, 1958; California Labor League for Political Education, pp. 12-14.

15-Policies in Times of National Crisis 1. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1950, pp. 254, 258. 2. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 21, 1951. 3. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fiftieth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1948, pp. 200-201. 4. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 1952, P . 2. 5. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-First Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1953, p. 69; Contra Costa Labor Journal, March 19, 1953. 6. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, March 25, 1953; May 13, 1953. 7. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, April, 1953, p. 3. 8. William Burkett (director of state department of employment) to C. J. Haggerty, Sept. 2, 1953. 9. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-First Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1953, p. 184. 10. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 30, 1952; Aug. 1, 1951. 11. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-First Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1953, pp. 215-216. 12. Statement of Policy Submitted by the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor to the 1955 Convention, in archives. 13. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 1954, p. 5.

278

Notes to Pages 225-237

14. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Feb. 1955, p. 4. 15. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 9, 1954; March 3, 1954. 16. Brice Worley to Haggerty, May 10, 1955. Quote in Haggerty to William A. Burkett, May 16, 1955; Burkett to Haggerty, June 28, 1955; July 16, 1955; June 11, 1955. 17. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Aug. 4, 1954. 18. Brief Summary of Conclusions and Positions Assumed at Meeting of Union Representatives Regarding Unemployment Insurance Qualifications Requirements at Office of C. J. Haggerty, Jan. 17, 1955. 19. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1956, pp. 64-65, 68-69, 194. 20. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Jan. 18, 1957. 21. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Aug. 1, 1957. 22. Contra Costa Labor Journal, Jan. 28, 1958. 23. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1957, pp. 102, 225.

1 6 - R i g h t to W o r k 1. Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, in federation archives, Sept. 1944. 2. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, March 1, 1944. 3. Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Sept. 1944. 4. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, May 17, 1944; Sept. 13, 1944; Oct. 11, 1944. 5. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Nov. 10, 1945; Contra Costa Labor Journal, Dec. 1, 1944. 6. Cecil B. De Mille vs. American Federation of Radio Artists, etc., et al Opinion No. 498,033 in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles. 7. Robert W . Kenny to John F. Shelley, April 12, 1945. 8. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, May 9, 1945; May 16, 1945; Oct. 10, 1945.

Notes to Pages 238-246

279

9. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Second Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1954, pp. 219-220, 183, 187, 356-357. 10. Minutes of the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor, Aug. 5, 1955 in archives of federation. 11. Memorandum in archives. 12. Letter from a legislator, April 16, 1956. 13. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1957, pp. 171, 407. 14. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Dec. 1956, p. 5. 15. C. J. Haggerty to All Unions and Councils, July 3, 1957. 16. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Sept. 6, 1957; Sept. 19, 1957; Oct. 11, 1957. 17. To All Unions and Councils, Jan. 9, 1958. 18. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1958, p. 108. 19. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, April 25, 1958. 20. Hal Dunleavy and Associates, Special Reports for C. J. Haggerty, Aug. 17, 1958; Oct. 6, 1958. 21. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, Nov. 9, 1958. 22. From reports to secretary of state. 23. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1957, pp. 67, 74; Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, May 31, 1957. 24. Report on the Merger Meeting, May 11, 1956, in the federation archives. 25. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1957, pp. 259, 266-267. 26. Quarterly Bulletin, California State Federation of Labor, Aug. 1958, p. 12. 27. Weekly News Letter of the California State Federation of Labor, May 30, 1958. 28. "Officers' Reports," Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Convention of the California State Federation of Labor, 1958, p. 60.

Index

Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (CIO), 114 Agricultural Council of California, 142 Agricultural workers, 111-114; organizing of, 182; strike of, 192-193 Agricultural Workers, National Council of, 114 Agriculture: employment, 180-181 Alexander, Mayor George, 49 Amalgamation of unions, 78 American Federation of Labor, 12, 17, 45, 53; and Chinese immigration, 67; and immigration, 170; and unity with Congress of Industrial Organizations; opposition to Mooney Congress, 68 American Plan of Employment, 79-82 Apprenticeship, 133 Apprenticeship Council, State, 133-134 Armaments, 204 Ash, Robert: and federation endorsements, 214-215; leader of general strike in Oakland, 190 Asiatic Exclusion League, 168-169 Associated Farmen, 142 Atkinson, William, 58

Blast, The, 62 Bowron, Mayor Fletcher, 234 Bracero, 185 Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, International Association of, 49 Bridges, Harry, 26, 94-95; and the San Francisco general strike, 98; election as vice-president, state federation, 102; influence of, 99 Brower, G. S„ 24, 28, 29 Brown, Edmund, 210 Brown, Frank, 97 Brown, Roy M., 124 Brown ν Hook, 126 Builders' exchange, 79 Building construction industry: dispute in San Francisco, 80-82 Building Industries' Association, 79-80 Building Trades Council, California, 132-133 Building Trades Council, San Francisco, 79-80 Building Trades Council of the Bay District, General Conference of, 81 Burgman, C. F., 167 Buzzell, J. W., 73, 87, 105, 119, 141

Bartley, Hi, 49 Beck, Dave, 123 Bell, George L.: arbitrator in building trades, 80 Berkman, Alexander, 62 Bilger, Albert E., 122-123, 153 Billings, Warren K., 62-63, 64, 73 Bitter, Ken G., 141,153,198 Bitter-Shelley campaign, 200 Blaney, W . T., 139-140

Calhoun, Patrick, 63 California: agriculture, 36; economy, 2; labor force, 70, 157; labor movement, 13,42-43 California Conference for Progressive Political Action, 84 California Employment Commission, 142 California Industrial Union Council, 245

282

Index

California League for Political Education, 206-208, 210 California Legislative Conference: as communist front, 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 California Manufacturers' Association: approval of wartime truce, 142 California State Council of Fish Industry Workers, 116 California State Federation of Labor, 39; and dynamiting of Los Angeles Times building, 49; and Ford and Suhr, 38-40; and legislative leaders, 8; attitude toward Committee for Industrial Organization, 111; changing views, 25; Declaration of Principles, 19; dispute over political endorsements, 213-215; founders of, 6; growth of, 111, 157; income of, 3, 4, 11-12, 23; legislation sponsored, 9 - 1 0 ; membership of, 50; organizing by, 23-24, 28; support of cannery workers, 196 California Supreme Court: conviction of T o m Mooney, 68 California Unemployment Insurance Board, 150-157 California Union of Producers and Consumers, 75 Cannery Workers, American Federation of Labor Council of, 123-124 Cannery workers, 117 Canning, Professor John B., 107 Canning industry, 115 Casey, Michael, 17, 20, 58, 65, 101, 124 Central Valley Project, 223, 229 Chandler, Mrs. Harry, 2 3 7 - 2 3 8 Chicago Federation of Labor, 4 - 5 , 66; sponsors of Mooney Congress, 68 Chinese Exclusion Act, 2, 22, 55, 167— 168,177 Chinese Laundry Workers' Union, 175 Chinese workers: effect on wages, 166; federation support for removal of restrictions on, 179; immigration, 166; opposition to, 168 Citizens' Alliance and Manufacturers' Association, 31 Citizens' Committee Against Petition 18 ("right-to-work l a w " ) , 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 Citizens' Committee for Democracy in Labor Unions, 242

Citizens' Committee for Voluntary Unionism, 242 City Front Federation, 19-20 Clancy, Ε . Α., 51 Committee for Industrial Organization,

111

Committee for Political Education, 254 Committee for Voluntary Unionism, 240 Communism, 101, 198, 200-201 Communist Party, 202 Communist China, 203 Compulsory investigation of labor disputes, 7 6 - 7 7 Conference of Studio Unions, 128 Congress of Industrial Organizations, 120-121; raiding by, 122 Cooks and stewards: aid to campaign, 204-205 Council of Federated Trades, 14-15 Cowan, Walter, 112-113 Craig, Z. W „ 31 Criminal syndicalist laws, 7 8 - 7 9 Culinary workers: strike in San Francisco, 59-60 Cushing, A. K., 90 Dale, J. B , 34-35 Darrow, Clarence, 50 Davidson, John, 2 3 - 2 4 Debs, Eugene, 42 Deery, Charles Α., 96 DeMille, Cecil Β . : and union assessments, 2 3 6 - 2 3 7 Densmore, John B., 67 Diviny, Joseph, 240 Disability insurance: temporary, 152, 158-159 Discrimination: housing, 178 Dollar, Captain Robert, 92 Douglas, Helen Gahagan, 210 Downey, Senator Sheridan, 109 Dunleavy and Associates, Hal, 243 Durst Brothers, 38 Eight-hour working day for women, 45-46 Electrical Workers, International Brotherhood of, 53 Eliel, Paul, 95 Employers, Inc., United, 234 Employers' liability law, 29, 4 4

Index Employment: fair, 176-177; of minors, 44 Employment offices: free, 47, 252 Engineers, Amalgamated Society of, 12-13 Engle, Clair, 216 Ernst, Hugo: opposition to anti-Oriental views, 172-173; defense of Tom Mooney, 65 European immigration, 169 Eye infections, 135 Fair Employment Practices Act, 177178 Farm Bureau, 142 Farm Labor Union, National, 181 Farm Union, National, 187 Farm workers: protection of, 230; strike of, 186-187 Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of California, 75, 84 Federated Trades of the Pacific Coast, 15 Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada, 167 Fitzpatrick, John, 71, 150 Ford and Suhr case, 37-40 Foster, William Z., 82-83 Fredricks, District Attorney John D., 50 French, Will, 25, 31 Frey, John, 144 Fuhrman, Alfred, 15 "Full crew" law, 45 Furuseth, Andrew, 17, 35, 45, 47 Gage, Governor Henry T., 12 Gallagher, Andrew, 48, 62 Gallagher, Thomas F., 29 Garment Workers, United, 54 General strikes: San Francisco, 97-98; Oakland, 190-191 German-made goods: boycott of, 102 Gillett, Governor, 32-33, 41 Goldberg Brown Co. ν Stablemen's Union Local No. 8760, 23 Gompers, Samuel, 5; and Chinese immigration, 167, on "more & more," 18, 256n; on minimum wages, 54; opposition to execution of Tom Mooney, 671; opposition to program of amalgamation of unions, 83

283

Governor's Conference on Revenue and Taxation, 103 Grami, Joseph: attack on, 196 Graves, Richard, 213-214 Graves-Roybal, California AFL Committee for, 213-214 Green, William, 69, 71, 250; endorsement of Governor Frank Merriam, 105; criticism of general strike, 96 Griffin, Judge Franklin P., 66 Grohn, Albin J., 120 Haggerty, C. J. (Neil), 107, 141, 153, 179, 183, 210, 245; part in recruitment of agricultural workers, 182; attack on Senator Knowland's "rightto-work" proposals, 241; criticism of lack of coordination of labor's political effort, 149; defense of failure to call convention, 146; demand for retraction of endorsement of Governor Merriam, 105-106; denouncement of recruiting Mexican workers, 184; election as secretary-treasurer of federation, 148; election as secretarytreasurer of merged federation, 245; leader of organizing campaign in oil industry, 121-122; objection to changes in job-referral system, 221; opposition to anti-Communist legislation, 124-125; protest on disqualification of unemployment compensation claimants, 226-227; protest on increased medical fees, 220; protest on violence against teamsters, 148— 149; warning on right-to-work campaign, 232, 238-239; request for minimum wage coverage for agricultural workers, 228-229; request for special session on postwar problems, 151-153; attempt to conciliate opposition, 200 Haggerty, Daniel, 53, 91, 97 Hamlin, Ο. H , 117-118 Hanna, Archbishop Edward J., 80, 95 Hannon, William, 58 Harriman, Job, 42 Haywood, William D., 30 Health & welfare funds: regulation of, 225 Heideberg, Harry, 83 Heney, Francis J., 42

284

Index

Holman, Lee J., 91 Holmes, Samuel, 242 Holmquist, Elmer, 29 Hook, Harry, 125 Hopkins, James E., 113 "Hot cargo," 137-138 Houser, Fred, 148-149, 210 Housing program, 152, 223 Hillman, Sidney, 143 Immigration: restriction of, 170 Immigration and Naturalization, President's Commission on, 183 Independent political action, 4 - 5 , 24 Indiana Federation of Labor, 4 - 5 Industrial Accident Commission, 134— 135 Industrial Association in San Francisco, 8 1 - 8 2 ; and bloody riot, 96; attempt to break longshore strike, 94—95 Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, 144 Industrial Welfare Commission, 221, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 ; and lowering of minimum wages, 83 Industrial Workers of the World ( I W W ) : campaigns for release of Ford and Suhr, 3 9 - 4 0 ; in agriculture, 34, 3 6 - 3 7 Initiative and referendum, 43 Injunction law, anti-, 2 2 - 2 3 , 48, 75, 89 Janigan, Charles J., 121, 128, 136 Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, 9, 30, 168 Japanese immigration, 168 Japanese labor delegation, 170-172 Japanese Laundry League, Anti-, 172 Japanese League, Anti-, 25 Japanese legislation, anti-, 51-52 Jananese unions: endorsed, 172 Japanese workers, 186 Johnson, Governor Hiram W . , 26, 3 9 40, 4 2 - 4 4 , 51-52; endorsement for United States Senate, 102 Johnson, Theodore, 41 Johnston, James Α., 14 Jurisdictional strike law, 193-195 Kaiser Shipbuilding Co., 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 Kaplan, David, 51 Kearney, Dennis: leader in Sand Lot riots, 167-168

Keeling, George, 173 Kennady, Alexander, 14 Kenny, R . W . , 234 "Kickbacks," 145 Kidwell, George, 72-73; on general strike committee, 97; denied seat at convention, 118-119 Knight, Governor Goodwin, Jr., 2 1 3 216, 237 Knights of Labor, 14 Knox, Henry Α., 27 Knox, Secretary of State Philander, 51 Knowland, Senator William, 165; "right-to-work" law, 240-241 Köster, Frank J., 62 Kuchel, Thomas, 215 Labor Defence League of California, 79 Labor force, 76 Labor laws: administration of, 226-227 Labor parties, 4 - 5 Labor Political League of California, 103 Labor Relations Board, National, 115 "Labor Roosevelt Committees," 108 Labor's Educational and Political League of California, 287 Labor's Friendly Society of Japan, 170— 171 Labor's League for Political Education, 212-213 Labor's Non-Partisan League, 103, 105, 119 La Follette, Robert, 76; supported for presidency, 84 Lapham, Roger, 234 Lathrop, Guy, 19 Law and Order League, 62 Legislation, 102; effect on different groups, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 ; postponement of controversial issues in wartime, 141— 142; screening of bills, 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 Legislative activity, 163 Legislative committee, 153 Legislative conference, 41 Legislative program, 7 7 - 7 8 Legislative truce, 141-142 Leonard, Jack, 73 Lewis, William J., 91 Light and power council, 53-54 "Little slave bills," 138-139 London, Jack, 42

Index Longshore agreement: rejection of, 94-95 Longshore strike in San Francisco: 1916, 60; 1934, 93-97 Longshoremen, 92 Longshoremen's Association, International, 60; on Pacific Coast, 91-92 Longshoremen's Association of San Francisco and Bay Area, 62, 91 Longshoremen's Board, National, 95 Laundry Workers' Union, San Francisco, 172-173 Los Angeles Times, 48, 49 Lundeberg, Harry, 26, 192; attack on demand for convention, 146; as head of committee to organize cannery workers, 123; attack on tactics of friends of Tom Mooney, 72; leader in Oakland general strike, 190-191; on committee to oppose right-towork law, 233; opposition to endorsements for president, 207; opposition to merger with CIO, 199, 244245 McAdoo, William G„ 105 MacArthur, Walter, 17, 20, 45, 48; chairman of founding convention, 18; and support for anti-Oriental views, 25 McCarthy, P. H., 17, 22, 79; on arbitration, 263; resignation of, 82 McDonald, Frank, 142 McGrady, Edward J., 95 McLaughlin John, 246 McNamara case, 48-51 McNamara, James B., 49 McNamara, John J., 49, 50 McNulty, Frank J., 53 McNutt, Maxwell, 39 Machinists' Union, San Francisco District Lodge 68, 125-126 Madsen, J. Α., 61 Malone, James, 172 Manufacturers and Employers of California, Board of, 15 Manwell, Ε. T., 38 Marine Cooks and Stewards of the Pacific Coast, 205 Marine Strike Committee, Joint, 95 Marine Transport Workers' Industrial Union, 93

285

Maurer, James, 250 Maxwell, M. S., 97 Meany, George, 244, 249-250 Mechanics' State Council, 14 Mediation Commission, President Wilson's, 64, 67-68 Medical societies, 220 Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association, 48-49; and right-to-work law, 235; and wartime truce, 142 Merchants' and Manufacturers' Employers' Association, 57 Merger with CIO, 244-246 Merriam, Governor Frank: as candidate for reelection, 102; participation in negotiations of agricultural workers, 113; sending of National Guard to San Francisco, 113 Metal trades: organizing of, 204; and dispute with National Labor Relations Board, 143 Metal Trades Department, 144 Mexican labor, illegal, 182-183 Mexican Labor Work Agreement, 183185 Mexican workers, 185; importation of, 85-86 Migrants: problems of, 88; labor camps for, 88 Migratory Labor, Joint Council on, 34 Migratory workers: organizing of, 3436 Militancy: increase of, 31-32 Military conscription, 134 Minimum wage, 54; protection of, 83; revision of, 221-222 Mob violence, 148-149 Mohn, Einar, 122, 190-191 Möhr, Harry: opposition to anti-Oriental views, 173 Mooney case, 62-74; and the California labor movement, 65-66; leaders seek congressional investigation of, 66 Mooney Congress, 68 Mooney, Rena, 62 Mooney, Thomas J.: and the California labor movement, 65; and attack on California labor leaders, 70-71; as secretary of International Workers' Defense League, 64, 258; opposition to Preparedness Day parade, 62

286

Index

Mooney Molders' Defense Committee, 69 Moyer, Charles, 30 Murphy, Daniel C„ 66, 69, 75 Murphy, Judge Edward, 126 Murphy, Patrick, 53 National Defense Training Program, 134 National Industrial Recovery Board, 92 National Labor Relations Board, 118, 121, 123-124, 143-144 Native Sons of the Golden West, 177 New York State Trades Assembly, 1 Nockles, Edward, 71; support of Congressional investigation of Mooney case, 66 Nolan, E. D„ 62, 69 Nolan, John I., 44, 54, 66 Noreiga, Anthony, 153 Oakland general strike, 189 Office of Production Management, 144 Olson, Governor Culbert L., 105, 109; and intervention in Westwood strike, 114; and pardon of Mooney, 73; and "hot-cargo" bill, 137 One Big Union, 78 Open shop, 82; campaign in Stockton, 57-59; campaign in San Francisco, 59-62; movement, 25 Opposition to entry into World War II, 127 Organizing committee, state federation, 27-28 Organizing Migratory Workers, Joint Committee for, 34 Oriental Exclusion League, California, 175 Oriental legislation, anti-, 51-52 Oriental sentiment, anti-, 9 Oriental workers: organizing of, 174 Osslo, Max J., 184-185 Otis, Harrison Gray, 25, 48 Oxman, Frank: and false testimony charge, 66 Pacific Coast Maritime Federation, 99100 Pacific Cooperative League, 75 Pacific Gas and Power Co., 53

Padway, Joseph, 117; and "hot cargo" cases, 138; and cannery dispute, 117 Parker, Carleton, 37, 40 Payroll Guarantee Association (Ham & Eggs), 137-138 Peace in Employment, California Committee for, 106 Pettibone, George, 30 Phelan, Senator James D., 170-172 Phillips, Wendell, 213-214 Pitts, Thomas L., 244, 245, 247; endorsement of Governor Knight, 214; opposition to right-to-work ordinances, 240 Plumb Plan, 78 Political activity, 4, 6, 32-33, 103 Political Freedom Law, California, 237 Political Liberty Act, California, 237 Political parties: realignment of, 249 Postwar reconstruction, 77-79 Preble, P. B„ 24 Preparedness Day bombing President Wilson's Mediation Commission. See Mediation Commission, President Wilson's Prevailing wages, 253 Private employment offices: regulation of, 32 Private insurance carriers: boycott of, 160-162

Processors and Growers, California, 116 Produce exchanges, publicly owned, 52 Progressive movement, 42 Progressive Party, 198 Public works, 151-152, 223 Racial discrimination, 175-176 Radio Artists, American Federation of, 235 Railroads Brotherhoods, Joint Legislative Board of, 41 Railway Brotherhoods' Federation, 84 Railway Labor Executives' Association, 249 Real, Charles W „ 153, 191-192 Reconversion: postwar, 151-152 Regulation of Labor Relations and Labor Organizations, 235 Reid, John, 53 Reid-Murphy group, 53

Index Relief laws: revision of, 224 Rent control, 164 Representative Assembly of Trade and Labor Unions, 14 Representative Assembly of Trade and Labor Unions of San Francisco, 167 Restaurant Men's Association, 60 Retail Merchants' Association, 189-191 Richards, Richard, 215 Richardson, Governor, 84-85 Riggers' and Stevedores' Union, 60 Right-to-work, 106-108; petition for, 233-234; opposing committees, 242; polls on, 243; campaign expenditures, 244 Riley, Ray L., 105 Roberts, Curt, 243 Robinson, Harrison, 234 Rodgers, C. D„ 19, 23 Rodgers, Philip R., 196-197 Rolph, Governor James, 72, 88 Rooney, Frank, 177 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 108, 109 Roosevelt, James, 210 Roosevelt, President Theodore, 29 Rossi, Mayor Angelo, 98 Rubinow, Dr. I. M., 56 Ruef, Abe, 21, 42 Ryan, Joseph, 94-95 Sacco and Vanzetti, 82 Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 17,19-20, 202; part in campaign to win over cooks and stewards, 205 Sales tax, 229 Salgado, Anthony: denied seat at convention, 202 San Diego Federated Trades and Labor Council, 100-102 San Francisco Bay Area Committee for the Freedom of Mooney and Billings, 72 San Francisco Board of Education, 2021 San Francisco Building Trades Council, 15, 21-22, 34, 98; proposal for general strike, 81 San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, 62 San Francisco Cloakmakers' Union No. 9, 89

287

San Francisco Employers' Association, 142 San Francisco Labor Council, 1, 15-16, 18, 34, 39, 41, 44, 46, 60, 63-64, 98 San Francisco labor movement, 16, 17 San Francisco Longshoremen's Local Union, 38-79, 91 San Francisco Molders' Union, 56 Sand Lot riots, 166-167 Scharrenberg, Paul, 9, 38, 41, 45, 47, 51, 53, 247; attack on, 86, 99; and criticism of handling of finances, 69 Schmidt, Matthew, 51 Schmitz, Eugene, 20-21 Schools, separate for Oriental children, 29-30 Scully, Charles, P., 150-151, 220 Seamen's law, 76 Seamen's Union, International, 93, 100 Sebastopol strike, 195-196 Seven-up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers Union, 194 Shelley, John F., 105, 199-200; appeal for agricultural workers, 193; appeal for Tom Mooney, 73-74; challenged as convention delegate, 119; sponsor of temporary disability insurance law, 158 Ship and Steamboat Joiners' Union, 13 Shipcalkers' Association, 13 Shippers'-Growers' Vegetable Association, 113 Shorter hours, 14 Sinclair, Upton, 42, 82 Silverthorn, G. Α., 119 "Slave bills, little." See "Little slave bills" Slocum, W . Lyle, 86 Sloss, Max C., 80 Social insurance, 56 Socialist Party, 9, 42 Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion: Meat vs. Rice, 168 Soviet Union, 129-130, 203 Spaulding, John L., 120 Speed, George, 37 Standard Oil Employees' Association (SOEA), 121 Steinmetz, Harry, 101 Stephens, Governor William, 68-69, 75, 247 Sterling, George, 42

288

Index

Stevenson, Adlai, 215 Stockton lockout, 55-59 Strike strategy committee, general, 97 Strikes: agricultural workers, 113, 186— 187, 192-193; breweries, 48; canneries, 195-196; lumber workers, 114-115; metal workers, 49; metal miners, 89; retail clerks, 190; street carmen, 63; tailors, 1 3 - 1 4 Subversive views, 173 Suhr, Herman, 37-38 Sullivan, D. D., 2 8 - 2 9 , 41 Sullivan, Judge Matt, 70 Sullivan, S. W „ 173 Suziki, B „ 170-171 Swanson, Martin, 64 Taft-Hartley Act, 206 Teachers: salaries, 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 Teamsters' Union, 20, 246 Tenney, Jack B „ 72, 119, 201 Third party, 206 Thompson, Edward, 34-35 Todd, Clarence E., 136, 182, 186-187 Tracey, George Α., 9, 31, 32; anti-Oriental views, 174-175 Trade Union Educational League, 8 2 83 Truman, Harry, 207, 218-219 Tveitmoe, Olaf, 25, 35, 51; in antiOriental campaigns, 168-169 Un-American Activities Committee, 202 Unemployment: "hard core," 224; statistics, 87 Unemployment compensation, 88; denial of benefits, 142-143; eligibility for, 220-221; increase in benefits, 152, 225; objection to changes in eligibility, 227-228; programs of, 136 Union Labor Party, 12 Union membership, 26 Union Pacific Railroad, 42 United front, 129-130 United Policy Committee, 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 United States-Mexican Trade Union Committee, Joint, 187-188 Unskilled workers: unions of, 34-35 Urban development, 152 Vandeleur, Edward, 89, 91, 96; attack on Conference of Studio Unions, 128-129; attitude on more assistance

for unions, 144; chairman of general strike committee, 97; as secretarytreasurer, 100; head of campaign, to organize cannery workers, 116-117; part in negotiations with agricultural workers, 113-114; sponsor of endorsement of Governor Olson, 109 Vigilante Committee, Mother Lode, 89 Voters' Coalition Committee, 107 Wage Board, 128 Wage Stabilization Board, 218 Walker, John, 250 Wallace, Henry, 206, 209-210 Walsh, Frank P., 66 W a r Labor Board, 130-131, 144 W a r Labor Disputes Act, 125 Warren, Governor Earl, 26, 109, 137, 148, 155, 164, 211; opposition to "right-to-work" referendum, 233234; sponsor of temporary disability insurance program, 158 Watchman, Alexander, 105, 119, 120 Water power: Central Valley development, 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 Waterfront Employers' Association, 6 0 - 6 1 , 92, 95, 97 Wayne, D. T . , 153 Weinberg, Israel, 62 West Indian workers, 185-186 Western Cannery and Food Processing Council, 197 Western Federation of Miners, 30 Western Labor Union, 17-18 "Wetbacks," 181-183 Wharf and Wave Federation, 15 Wheatland riot, 38-39 Wheeler, C. F . , 24, 27 Wilson, Judge Emmet L., 139 Wilson, J. Stitt, 42 Wilson, Secretary of Labor William B „ 67 Winn, A. M., 14 Women of the Pacific, 106, 235, 237 Woman suffrage, 4 4 Wood, Charles A , 117-118 Wood, Fred B „ 137 Workers' Defense League, 64 Workmen's compensation, 44, 54, 134, 145, 152, 154, 155, 164 World W a r II, 157-158 Yorty, Samuel, 213 Young, Governor C., 6 9 - 7 0

Wertheim Publications in Industrial Relations Published by Harvard University Press J. D. Houser, What the Employer Thinks, 1927 Wertheim Lectures on Industrial Relations, 1929 William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry, 1930 Johnson O'Connor, Psychometrics, 1934 Paul H. Norgren, The Swedish Collective Bargaining System, 1941 Leo C. Brown, S. J., Union Policies in the Leather Industry, 1947 Walter Galenson, Labor in Norway, 1949 Dorothea de Schweinitz, Labor and Management in a Common Enterprise, 1949 Ralph Altman, Availability for Work: A Study in Unemployment Compensation, 1950 John T. Dunlop and Arthur D. Hill, The Wage Adjustment Board: Wartime Stabilization in the Building and Construction Industry, 1950 Walter Galenson, The Danish System of Labor Relations: A Study in Industrial Peace, 1952 Lloyd H. Fisher, The Harvest Labor Market in California, 1953 Donald J. White, The New England Fishing Industry, 1954 Val R. Lorwin, The French Labor Movement, 1954 Philip Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions, 1954 George B. Baldwin, Beyond Nationalization: The Labor Problems of British Coal, 1955 Kenneth F. Walker, Industrial Relations in Australia, 1956 Charles A. Myers, Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India, 1958 Herbert J. Spiro, The Politics of German Codetermination, 1958 Mark W . Leiserson, Wages and Economic Control in Norway, 1945-1957, 1959 J. Pen, The Wage Rate Under Collective Bargaining, 1959 Jack Stieber, The Steel Industry Wage Structure, 1959 Theodore V. Purcell, S. J., Blue Collar Man: Patterns of Dual Allegiance in Industry, 1960 Carl Erik Knoellinger, Labor in Finland, 1960 Sumner H. Slichter, Potentials of the American Economy: Selected Essays edited by John T. Dunlop, 1961

C. L. Christenson, Economic Redevelopment in Bituminous Codi: The Special Case of Technological Advance in United States Coal Mines, 1930-1960, 1962 Daniel L. Horowitz, The Italian Labor Movement, 1963 Adolf Sturmthal, Workers Councils: A Study of Workplace Organization on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain, 1964 Vernon H. Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles, 1964 John L. Blackman, Jr., Presidential Seizures in Labor Disputes, 1967 Mary Lee Ingbar and Lester D. Taylor, Hospital Costs in Massachusetts: An Econometric Survey, 1968 Studies in Labor-Management History Lloyd Ulman, The Rise of the National Trade Union: The Development and Significance of Its Structure, Governing Institutions, and Economic Policies, 1955 Joseph P. Goldberg, The Maritime Story: A Study in Labor-Management Relations, 1957, 1958 Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement, 1935-1941, 1960 Morris A. Horowitz, The New York Hotel Industry: A Labor Relations Study, 1960 Mark Perlman, The Machinists: A New Study in Trade Unionism, 1961 Fred C. Munson, Labor Relations in the Lithographic Industry, 1963 Garth L. Mangum, The Operating Engineers: The Economic History of a Trade Union, 1964 David Brody, The Butcher Workmen: A Study of Unionization, 1964 F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South, 1967 Philip Taft, Labor Politics American Style: The California State Federation of Labor, 1968 Published by McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1961 Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations, 1963 John T. Dunlop and Vasilii P. Diatchenko, Labor Productivity, 1964