Kwame Nkrumah 1909–1972: A Controversial African Visionary 3515115722, 9783515115728

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Geschichte Franz Steiner Verlag

h i s to r i s ch e m it te i lu ng en – b e i h e f t 9 6

Kwame Nkrumah 1909–1972 A Controversial African Visionary Edited by Bea Lundt and Christoph Marx

Kwame Nkrumah 1909–1972 Edited by Bea Lundt and Christoph Marx

h i s to r i s c h e m it t e i lu n g e n – b e i h e f te Im Auftrage der Ranke-Gesellschaft. Vereinigung für Geschichte im öffentlichen Leben e.V. herausgegeben von Jürgen Elvert

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat: Winfried Baumgart, Michael Kißener, Ulrich Lappenküper, Ursula Lehmkuhl, Bea Lundt, Christoph Marx, Jutta Nowosadtko, Johannes Paulmann, Wolfram Pyta, Wolfgang Schmale, Reinhard Zöllner

Band 96

Kwame Nkrumah 1909–1972 A Controversial African Visionary Edited by Bea Lundt and Christoph Marx

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagabbildung: Standbild von Kwame Nkrumah vor seinem Mausoleum (im Hintergrund) in Accra (Ghana). Foto: Nina Paarmann. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2016 Druck: Laupp & Göbel GmbH, Gomaringen Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-11572-8 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-11575-9 (E-Book)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Bea Lundt/Christoph Marx Introduction .............................................................................................................. 7 VISIONS AND POLITICS Arno Sonderegger How the Empire Wrote Back: Notes on the Struggle of George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah ............................................................................. 19 Kofi Darkwah Nkrumah and his ‘Ideological Institute’ at Winneba ............................................. 39 Cyrelene Amoah–Boampong Women During the Nkrumah Era .......................................................................... 49 OPPOSITION AND COUP Kwame Osei Kwarteng/Mary Owusu Opposition to Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party 1951–1960 .................................................................................................... 67 Nana Yaw B. Sapong Framing Contentious Politics in the Gold Coast: The Nkrumah Contingency 1948–1951 ........................................................................................ 89 Samuel Aniegye Ntewusu Kwame Nkrumah and the Agricultural Development of Northern Ghana .......... 109 Jonathan Otto Pohl Nkrumah, the Cold War, the ‘Third World’, and the US Role in the 24 February 1966 Coup ....................................................................................... 119 EVALUATION AND MEMORY Felix Müller Ghanaian Intellectuals and the Nkrumah Controversy 1970–2007/8 .................. 137

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Carola Lentz A Lasting Memory: The Contested History of the Nkrumah Statue ................... 153 Harcourt Fuller Atomic Africa: Modernization, Technological Nationalism, and ‘Scientific Standstill’ in Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana and Beyond 1957–Present .................. 185 About the Authors ................................................................................................ 205

INTRODUCTION Bea Lundt, Christoph Marx In 2016, it will have been fifty years since Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972), the first president of an independent Ghana, was removed from power by a military coup. This anniversary is an occasion to look into the political biography and the impact of one of the most influential and controversial politicians on the African continent in the 20th century. It is also an opportunity to appreciate the academic work and document the discussions, by both historians and the wider public, concerning Ghana’s first ruler. LIFE OF NKRUMAH - A SHORT OVERVIEW Kwame Nkrumah was born in 1909 into a polygamous family in Nkroful, a small village in the southwest of the British crown colony of the Gold Coast.1 His father, a goldsmith, died while Nkrumah was still attending school. Nkrumah was raised by his mother, a market woman and trader, and he received his early education in a Roman Catholic mission school. After finishing school he went to Achimota College, an elite boarding school near Accra, where he trained to become a teacher. In 1935, he travelled to the United States to continue his studies and stayed there for ten years, becoming involved in a variety of political and cultural activities. From there, he moved to London, where he lived for another two years before sailing back to the Gold Coast. On his return to Africa, his political career commenced, leading him quickly to prominence. His newly founded Convention People’s Party (CPP) used the slogan ‘Independence now!’ and steered a course for confrontation with the British colonial power. This brought Nkrumah in conflict with the British authorities, who finally sent him to prison, but when he won the election in 1950, he was released and became head of government. He started reforms to industrialise and modernise the country on the basis of a moderate African socialism. When the Gold Coast assumed its independence under the name ‘Ghana’, he turned to radical socialist politics. This brought him into conflict with the western world during the Cold War. Nkrumah transformed Ghana into a republic in July 1960 and became its first President. His increasingly authoritarian rule, along with an economic crisis, led to confrontation with various social forces in his own country. On his way to a state visit in Hanoi in 1966, he 1

Nkrumah himself published an autobiography: Ghana. Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, Edinburgh 1957.

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was deposed by a military coup. Nkrumah remained in exile for the rest of his life and died in Bucharest in 1972. A prolonged history of military dictatorships followed – interrupted briefly by an intermezzo of civilian governments. It was Jerry Rawlings (born 1947), first himself a military dictator, who stabilised the economy and became the democratically elected President of Ghana in 1992. CONTROVERSAL STATESMAN The years of Nkrumah’s rule are still a bone of contention. The controversy was not so much due to the fact that he was the first head of government of an independent African country south of the Sahara, but rather because of the multitude of his activities, the radicalism of his ideological convictions, and the contradictions in his politics. Nevertheless, Nkrumah was something of a role model for a number of his colleagues. He was a major protagonist of African liberation and economic independence. When he led the Gold Coast as the first sub-Saharan African country to win independence and international recognition, he certainly fulfilled a dream for many Africans. As a pioneer of decolonisation, he taught his people to confront the colonial powers with demands for independence. Nkrumah used the opportunities colonialism offered to gain power and fight against foreign domination. As the first political leader of the Gold Coast, he refused to cooperate with the British rulers within the colonial framework and broke out of the gradualism and complacency of the colonial powers. He ended the cooperation of his country’s elite with the colonial government. Instead, he mobilised the population, especially in the cities, to flex his political muscle and to show the colonial powers that the people of the Gold Coast were no longer content with British rule. Developing the tools of power politics and the strategies of social mobilisation, he succeeded in wrestling the initiative from the colonial rulers. He pushed them into a defensive role, even when they arrested and imprisoned him. It was a triumph for him and a humiliation for Great Britain when the governor had to appoint him chief minister while he was serving a prison sentence, and he emerged from custody as the new ruler of his country. Many others, like Guinea’s Sekou Touré (1922–1984) just one year later, followed in his footsteps. Even when Nigeria developed an alternate way to decolonisation, which at the time was regarded as more ‘orderly’, it was Nkrumah who cleared the way. But this liberator of Ghana, who was an example for others in Africa, transformed himself within a short time into an authoritarian president. He became a tyrant who killed the goose that laid the golden egg when he fought against the economic power of the prosperous cocoa farmers and crushed the entrepreneurs the country needed. He inspired others with his vision of African unity, but his own ambitions for leadership of the continent were so obvious that he aroused the suspicions of other African leaders. It is not easy to view a politician like him clearly, because he always combined personal aggrandisement with the legitimate aspirations of the African peo-

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Introduction

ple. Nkrumah wanted to unite the different African population groups into nations and develop a Pan-African identity. At the same time, he polarised public opinion. To the present day, his image remains ambiguous, and he provokes contention: should he be remembered as an unscrupulous dictator or as a great visionary and hero of independence? There are good arguments for both sides; one or the other tendency was dominant in different phases of Nkrumah’s life. For these reasons, it is worthwhile to pay attention to the life of Kwame Nkrumah, to study his ideology and political philosophy in different contexts. Whereas it is important to analyse his politics in a Ghanaian context, he should also be seen as a role model for other African independence movements. The narrative on Nkrumah is part of colonial history and decolonisation in a globalised world and is also part of the current discussion on cultural memory. This volume includes articles written by scholars from Africa, Europe, and America and represents current trends in the research on Nkrumah. But most importantly, it documents the discussions about Nkrumah in Ghana. The book is divided into three main sections, representing major trends in the discourse on Nkrumah: ‘Vision and Politics’; ‘Opposition and Coup’; and ‘Memory and Place in History’. VISION AND POLITICS In 2009, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Wangari Maathai (1940–2011), praised Kwame Nkrumah as one of those five Africans, who ‘live their lives for something larger than themselves ... who had a vision for their continent’.2 Nkrumah studied in the US and Great Britain. These years deeply influenced his visionary political thought. As a young man, Nkrumah had already been exposed to the ideas of Marcus Garvey (1887–1940) and W. E. B. du Bois (1868–1963), both of whom were active in the United States. This fact, as well as his contact with Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904–1996) from Nigeria, induced him to study in the USA. Many future African leaders studied overseas, but most went to European capitals such as London or Paris. These ten years (1935–1945) had a profound impact on his later policies. Beyond his academic success with two bachelor’s and two master’s degrees, there were at least two major experiences that influenced Nkrumah. The first was racism; in the southern states, Jim Crow laws ruled, but there was also a great deal of racism in everyday life in the northern states since the great exodus of African Americans from the Deep South after World War I. Nkrumah does not dwell extensively on his experiences with racism, but he was certainly more often and more intensively confronted with racist practices than would have been the case had he studied in Europe. The second impact was the United States as a new world power after World War I. The US certainly was the inspiration and model for Nkrumah’s ideas and plans for a United States of Africa, since he had seen how a former colony could develop to become a great power when it grew 2

Wangari Maathai, The Challenge for Africa. A New Vision, London 2009, 286f.

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into a continental state and had access to the mineral and agricultural resources of a vast country. From early on, notably during his stay in the US, Nkrumah thought in terms of a Pan-African movement. He wanted to overcome existing colonial boundaries and made several attempts to transform his visions into practical policies. He was part of the international network of Pan-Africanist and anti-colonial activists; in this context, he attended the Pan-African Conference in New York in 1944 and was involved in organising the Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945. During the 1940s, he made the acquaintance of C. L. R. James (1901–1989) and George Padmore (1903–1959). The dynamism of his personality and the pose of political prophet made him one of the leading Pan-Africanists, which enabled him to actually take Pan-Africanism from the diaspora back to Africa. Even a passionate Pan-Africanist like Nkrumah had to confine himself to colonial boundaries when he became the leading politician in the first sub-Saharan African nation-state. When he returned to Ghana at the invitation of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) to become their full-time secretary, he established himself as the most dynamic political leader in the territory. Nkrumah worked within the colonial political system using the chances and methods available to him. The techniques of gaining power, which Nkrumah developed very quickly and with great dynamism as soon as he returned to the Gold Coast, are of interest not only to students of Ghanaian history. They give insights to anyone who wants to study the history of African decolonisation, because Nkrumah gave the model, the ‘script’ that was later used in different local variations in other African countries. Nkrumah developed a feeling for political situations; he gained popularity by using the media and presenting himself skilfully as the most radical anti-colonial politician in the country, which made him very popular with the many people who were discontented under colonial rule: cocoa farmers, war veterans, students, and jobless people, not only in the urban areas but also in the rural regions and the country at large. During his years of political activism, he made political power very much the centre of his endeavours, seeing it as the precondition for any further move. After his fall from power and exile in Guinea, Nkrumah published a number of influential books and articles.3 He tried to interpret his own deposition within a broader framework, which he called ‘neocolonialism’. This word captured the continuation of colonial influence through economic dependency and, especially, by cultural means.4 His own analysis made apparent that his most famous slogan ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom’ was insufficient. The recognition of lingering eco3

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Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism. The Last Stage of Imperialism, London/Edinburgh 1965; id., Africa Must Unite, New York 1970; id., Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare. A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution, New York 1969; id., Revolutionary Path, London 1973. Bea Lundt, ‘Colonial Mentality in the Post-Colonial Era. On the Genesis, Manifestations and Development of a Form of Consciousness between Europe and Africa’, in: id./Sophie Wulk (eds.), Global Perspectives on Europe. Critical Spotlights from Five Continents, Berlin 2016, 69–104.

Introduction

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nomic dependency was nothing completely new for Nkrumah, but it received an added urgency and emphasis in his later writings. Economic independence and self-sufficiency were the preconditions for true independence and Africa’s future place in world politics, as he proclaimed the need for a united Africa in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (founded in 1963) and on numerous other occasions. On the one hand, the OAU with its headquarters in Addis Ababa was much inspired by Nkrumah’s call for African unity, but at the same time, it was an organisation of states and as such cemented national boundaries. In this broad network and under these influences, Nkrumah developed his ideology. As ARNO SONDEREGGER (Vienna) shows, the period from the 1930s to the 1970s, often described as a ‘development era’, was even more characterised by the ‘shadow of colonialism’. It challenged the young Nkrumah to understand the ‘modernisation of exploitation’. George Padmore (1902–1959), six years older than Nkrumah and working in anti-imperialist circles in London, became an ideological mentor and a lifelong friend to the younger man, whom he met in 1945. He followed Nkrumah in 1957 to live in independent Ghana and gave a Marxist tinge to Pan-Africanism. Sonderegger argues that Padmore’s perspective of PanAfricanism remained broader, while Nkrumah, the politician, was forced to reduce Pan-Africanism’s outreach to meet the specific needs of his country. Nkrumah regarded the members of the CPP as politically unsophisticated and lacking in ideological finesse. To change this, he founded the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Winneba in 1961. Here, future political leaders and administrators for Ghana were to be educated in two-year courses in socialist ideology and ‘Nkrumahism’, which Nkrumah described as ‘scientific socialism applied to countries emerging from colonialism’. But politicians from other parts of the continent also attended the institute in order to study and spread Nkrumah’s ideal of African liberation and unity. KOFI DARKWAH (Winneba/Accra) reconstructs the history of the Institute from what remained of the records after a great deal of material was destroyed during and after the military takeover. His paper is based on interviews with some of the scholars who worked at the Institute. During the five years of its existence, the centre succeeded in providing cadres from liberation movements of different African colonies with the necessary training and logistical support. We can get an impression of Nkrumahism’s influence by the fact that even a conservative like Malawi’s Kamuzu Banda (1896–1947) spent some time in Ghana before returning to his home country to take up the political leadership there. Robert Mugabe (born 1924), who in 1980 became Prime Minister and in 1987 President of independent Zimbabwe, lived for a couple of years in Ghana, where he met his wife and studied for a period at the Institute. Nkrumah certainly had an influence on party officials and freedom fighters from other countries. His political machinations were effective especially because of his impact on the broader population. He convinced people by his anticolonialist perspectives as well as his personal charisma. He succeeded in broadening the popular movement for independence and opening it to a greater political role for women. Nkrumah not only used their potential in the independence movement but also contributed to a more equitable gender balance during his

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years in office, as CYRELENE AMOAH-BOAMPONG (Legon) argues. In the context of African research on gender, she argues that European influence established ‘western norms of male superiority’ during the colonial period. In contrast, the influential market women in Ghana played a particularly decisive role in the mass mobilisation, and during the Nkrumah era, the state supported the development towards more egalitarian gender roles. The use of pre-colonial history as a cultural resource was an important aspect of Nkrumah’s ideology. When he applied Ghana, the name of a precolonial kingdom located northwest of the existing nation, to the new country, he was attempting to invoke a historical tradition of African political structures. His concept of an ‘African personality’ was adopted especially in the fields of cultural studies, arts, and theatre. In 1963, Nkrumah founded an Institute of African Studies as part of the University of Ghana in Legon near Accra. In his inauguration speech, Nkrumah emphasised the mediaeval tradition of African culture and demanded research on ‘the depth of the African soul’.5 It was during this phase of emerging and promising success that the protest against and criticism of Nkrumah began. OPPOSITION AND COUP There is also a darker side of decolonisation, which can be seen in Nkrumah’s interest in securing his own power base. KWAME OSEI KWARTENG and MARY OWUSU (Cape Coast) analyse the heterogeneous opposition movement that began in 1951. British indirect rule was based on cooperation with traditional authorities, who opposed the new situation. But also the small Europeanised educated elite, the ‘intelligentsia’, were soon estranged from the movement. After World War II, they felt neglected by Nkrumah’s populist approach and collaborated with the colonial administration. Religious groups suspected him of being a Marxist and an atheist; the Ashanti opted for a federal government and feared being dominated by the southern part of the country, as of Accra, a southern city, was chosen as the national capital. Kwarteng and Owusu give a periodisation of the opposition against Nkrumah in different phases and explain why all attempts to form a united front within one opposition party failed. NANA YAW B. SAPONG (Legon) takes a closer look at the crucial years from 1948 to 1951 and the forces that brought about political change. He tells the story of Nkrumah and the opposition against him in a slightly different way. He does not emphasise the splintered and uncoordinated forms of protest but addresses opposing forces as ‘social movements’, referring to the approach of Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow. If we concentrate only on the person of Nkrumah, we overlook the history of organised forms of collective action against foreign domination 5

Nkrumah, The African Genius, Reedited in: Takyiwaa Manuh/Esi Sutherland-Addy (eds.), Africa in contemporary Perspective. A Textbook for Undergraduate Students, Accra 2013, VI–XII, here: X.

Introduction

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long before Nkrumah appeared on the scene. Looking back to the 1830s, Sapong describes chiefs as the ‘Old Guard’, who rejected British intervention in their affairs. After the 1920s, resistance was taken over by the ‘New Guard’ and later on by the ‘Verandah Boys’, young urban people, who often worked as houseboys or secretaries and had no other place to sleep than their masters’ verandas. Nkrumah mobilised these people through the CPP from 1949 onwards, culminating in a 1950 strike. Nkrumah was found guilty as the organiser of this illegal strike and, as a prisoner, was elevated to the status of ‘political martyr’. SAMUEL ANIEGYE NTEWUSU (Legon/Leiden) analyses why Nkrumah’s attempts at developing the agricultural potential of Northern Ghana eventually failed. Cooperation between the British and the chiefs was regulated in treaties, and the chiefs were represented in the Legislative Council. In 1900, the northern territories were integrated into the Gold Coast. Traditional cultivation methods were much improved during the following decades. The production of cotton was mechanised with the use of cotton bales and presses. But Nkrumah’s plans for mechanisation and installing big state farms were unfitted to a situation still marked by traditional farming methods. Although programmes to train people in modern agriculture were initiated, these courses were as unsuccessful, as were other government endeavours in the Northern Region. Ntewusu analyses how the misunderstandings between the political concepts and traditional forms of agricultural work ended in confusion, mismanagement, and crop failures. Nkrumah tried to abolish, or at least demote, chiefs using the argument that there was no place for an aristocracy within a modern democracy. Revolutionary ideology, his own brand of socialism, and radical anti-colonialism were also used in another case of eliminating potential challenges to his rule. Nkrumah used all means at his disposal to bring the agricultural entrepreneurs, the cocoa farmers, under government control and destroy any economic power that was independent of the state. So Ghana was, on the one hand, a shining model of decolonisation, but on the other, it became an example of abuse of power by an ambitious politician. Was this self-aggrandisement or, as he claimed, a precondition for a policy of revolutionary change? The sometimes brutal way he pushed rivals aside and later even had them arrested and incarcerated gives evidence that a pluralistic democracy with a broader party system and open discussion of different positions was not part of Nkrumah’s vision for Africa’s future. He transformed Ghana with astonishing speed into a dictatorship. After a number of assassination attempts against his person, Nkrumah further entrenched himself in power. Whether these attempts were really the cause or just a welcome pretence for a crackdown on the opposition cannot be decided. But it is obvious that Nkrumah quite quickly ended democratic competition and free speech. This transformation into an authoritarian form of rule culminated in the establishment of a one-party state in 1964 through a doubtful referendum. Arguments in favour of the one-party state insist that only this political framework makes it possible to integrate a multitude of different ethnic groups. OTTO POHL (Legon) sheds new light on the army coup that removed Nkrumah from power in 1966. He uses American sources that were declassified in 1999 and

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published in Ghana in 2005. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union watched developments in the new state of Ghana because of its model function for other African states. The CIA in particular observed the growing friendship between Ghana and the Soviet Union with deep suspicion and distrust. This was the ideological context of the CIA’s support of anti-Nkrumah forces in Ghana and its activities to destabilise Nkrumah’s government. American politicians regarded Nkrumah’s book Neo-Colonialism. The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965) as an attempt ‘to undermine our interests’. The military junta that overthrew Nkrumah was supported by the USA, and the coup itself was ‘directly linked’ to the one against Sukarno in Indonesia. Pohl comes to the conclusion that Nkrumah’s fall from power was planned at least one year before it actually happened by various partners in cooperation with the CIA. MEMORY AND PLACE IN HISTORY Cultural memory and the politics of memory have been intensely discussed in the last several years. The images of historical persons are not only based on political facts and events but are complex constructions involving discourse, imagination, symbols, and places of memory, thereby changing and adapting to different perspectives and attitudes. It is significant that opinions on Nkrumah and his rule oscillate between extremes; he is seen as either a dictator or a hero. Sometimes, the historical perspective shows a shift from the more positive first phase of the struggle for independence to a condemnation of his authoritarian rule after 1957. FELIX MÜLLER (Berlin) gives a historiographical overview of the changing assessments of Nkrumah’s rule during the last four decades. The period of the 1969–1975 liberal–conservative parliament, led by Kofi Busia’s Progress Party, was characterised by a complete condemnation of Nkrumah’s reign. The accusations against Nkrumah included attacks against his person: that he was opportunistic and became a politician only because his intellectual career had run into a dead end. Some historians criticised him as an egotist interested only in personal glory. This tendency changed during the 1980s, when Nkrumah was historically rehabilitated. The reason for this reassessment, in Müller’s view, was the new political stability in Ghana, which allowed for a new approach to the early years of the post-colonial state. As an exemplary study of Ghana’s historiography this contribution traces historians’ changing perspectives. CAROLA LENTZ (Mainz) uses different material but comes to similar conclusions. She describes the statues of Nkrumah and their fate after his downfall and explores their symbolic meaning in the context of nation-building. Nkrumah’s government encouraged a personality cult which found expression in a number of statues that were displayed in public spaces. Lentz characterises the controversies surrounding these statues as ‘monument wars’. After the military coup, these statues disappeared; some were even publicly damaged or destroyed. This antiNkrumah attitude changed after 1972, when Nkrumah received a state funeral in Accra. A mausoleum was built in the capital, and in 2007, one of the statues was

Introduction

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recovered and placed there. Discussions about Nkrumah will continue, but the Memorial Park in the capital will remain a place of lasting memory within a stabilised society. Nkrumah proved to be an energetic moderniser after assuming the office of chief minister. Although he was educated mainly in the cultural sciences, he nevertheless developed a profound interest in technical issues. Ghana invested heavily in infrastructure projects such as roads, electrical grids, and dams and also in the extension of education and health services. HARCOURT FULLER (Atlanta) analyses Nkrumah’s attempts to modernise Ghana with the help of science and technology. Part of this programme was the construction of a nuclear reactor intended to improve energy generation, a plan that made Eastern and Western powers equally nervous. It also stood in contrast to Nkrumah’s proclaimed repudiation of nuclear power and was responsible for the erosion of his credibility. Industrialisation was accompanied by educational measures intended to give the people a better understanding of technical processes. Fuller describes Nkrumah’s efforts to win experts, hold exhibitions, and build museums for technology. Nkrumah relied on the financial support of the United States for the Volta River (Akosombo) Dam, even as he negotiated with Eastern powers to realise his dream of Ghana’s becoming a nuclear power. Fuller concludes that Nkrumah’s ‘white elephant’ projects failed and, therefore, industrialisation remains incomplete. Although an ambiguous figure, Nkrumah remains an ever-present memory in Ghana today. His birthday is celebrated every year as a bank holiday. As a highly educated man, he serves as a role model for pupils. His portrait is on the exercise books that are distributed for free to schoolchildren. Although his political interventions in academia are criticised at the University of Ghana Legon near Accra,6 the country’s second university in Kumasi is named after him: the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) and proudly builds on the ideas of its patron. Nkrumah enjoys even greater prestige at the University in Cape Coast: ‘Nkrumah accorded education a top priority in his scheme of national development’,7 concludes the History of the University of Cape Coast in 2012. The book is dedicated to him, calling him ‘Osagyefo’, ‘Redeemer’, the honorific used during his time as president. In the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana, his Pan-African visions are still of central importance. He is important for identity politics within the arts and still looms large as a moderniser. He supported the Ghana Medical School, which allowed the first qualified Ghanaian surgeon, Charles Odamtten Easmon (1913–1994), to perform the first openheart surgery in Accra in1964. Nkrumah’s ambiguous legacy is aptly expressed by two African intellectuals. Wole Soyinka criticised Nkrumah’s reign in 2008 as a ‘false mystical, romantic 6

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Francis Agbodeka, A History of University of Ghana. Half a Century of Higher Education (1948–1998), Accra 1998. Nkrumah is criticised because of his authoritarian interventions in ignoring the traditions of the house and the preferences of the academic staff, 138ff. K. Osei Kwarteng/S. Y. Boadi-Siaw/Da. A. Dwarko, A History of the University of Cape Coast. Fifty Years of Excellence in Tertiary Education (1962–2012), Cape Coast 2012, 3.

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way, we felt we were the generation to produce this. I often refer to my generation as the “wasted generation” because of that disparity between vision, aspiration, and achievement.’8 Similarly, Wangari Maathai writes on Nkrumah: ‘Today, many Ghanaians and other Africans realise he was a wasted talent.’ 9 But in history, is anything wasted? In our interconnected world, it is more important than ever to exchange knowledge and research among scholars from different parts of the world. This book intends to improve the cooperation and to deepen the discussion between African and European researchers on a challenging and current topic in postcolonial African history. A great deal of cooperation between Ghana and Europe was necessary to finalise this volume. First of all, we want to thank our authors who entrusted their research results to us and communicated with the editors in a sympathetic manner. Prof Jürgen Elvert, (University of Cologne) Head of the Ranke Society and the Advisory Council (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat) were kind enough to include this volume in the Society’s publication series. We are also thankful to Kelly Thompson (Flensburg), who edited the English texts. Ingo Löppenberg did the formatting, together with Şahin Mavili. We say thank you very much to all of them. Bea Lundt/Christoph Marx September 2016

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Wole Soyinka, Foreword in: Ivor Agyeman-Duah (ed.), An Economic History of Ghana. Reflections on a Half-Century of Challenges and Progress, Banbury 2008, 1. Wangari Maathai, The Challenge for Africa. A New Vision, London 2009, 32.

VISIONS AND POLITICS

HOW THE EMPIRE WROTE BACK Notes on the Struggle of George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah Arno Sonderegger Abstract: In the history of Pan-Africanism, the relationship between George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah – both outstanding agents and symbols of the anti-imperialist and anticolonial struggle – has a special place. From their first meeting in1945 until Padmore’s death in 1959, theirs was a close friendship and working alliance concerning the political effectiveness of Pan-Africanism. They shared a common vision and a common cause. Focusing on the double issue of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, this paper looks at that history from various angles and stresses the validity of important parts of their analyses.

In recent years, historians of Africa have increasingly come to consider ‘development’ the dominant catchword of the decades from the 1930s to the 1970s, subsequently broadening its semantic reach to include not only economics (planned investments to foster economic growth) but also society (investments in educational and health facilities), and, lastly, politics (limited African participation in decision-making processes). Frederick Cooper, for instance, called the years from 1940 to 1973 ‘the development era’.1 This allows for taking into account the fact that the African decolonisation that started in the 1950s was actually not the radical breaking point that it was imagined to be back then. Indeed, the ‘shadow of colonialism’ loomed large over much of the 20th century.2 However, the emphasis on development must not lead us to consider the events of the times in terms of a progressive story. This would be a severe misreading of the past, not only on theoretical grounds (teleology, normativity, anachronism),3 but because it contradicts what is known about the concrete events of the time in question. French historian Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch aptly named the beginnings of the ‘development era’, when colonial authorities started thinking about how to capitalise on their colonial possessions, ‘the modernisation of exploitation’.4 This is quite to the point. It resulted in growing resistance on behalf of colonial peoples and the claims to decolonisation that reached a first peak in the wake of World War II. 1 2 3 4

See Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940. The Past of the Present, Cambridge 2002, 85ff., 91ff. See Arno Sonderegger et al. (eds.), Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Vienna 2011, 9ff., 231ff. See Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History, Berkeley 2005, 12–22. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Petite histoire de l’Afrique, Paris 2011, 178ff.

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The two men who are at the centre of my text played important roles in the struggles that relate to colonialism, development, and decolonisation. Early on, they grasped the limitations of imperialism and colonial rule and did everything open to them to challenge foreign rule. Both of them sought to seize the opportunities for African emancipation that arose in course of their lifetimes. George Padmore (1903–1959) and Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972) belonged to almost the same generation, but in other respects, they were remarkably different. One came from Africa, the other from the Caribbean. Padmore had already built a distinguished career as political activist when they first met, while Nkrumah was not a political factor at all.5 But Padmore instantly recognised something in Nkrumah, and, according to his biographer, ‘he seems to have transferred his hopes for a united free Africa from [Nigerian Nnamdi] Azikiwe to Nkrumah, though at times he grew impatient even with the latter.’6 There is some truth to this statement as well as in the following: ‘he [Padmore] was immensely more experienced and cosmopolitan, but, unlike the younger man, Padmore was too sophisticated, too prone to doubt, too humorous to match Nkrumah’s single-mindedness. … Nkrumah, by any standard, was no commonplace anti-colonialist; he was a revolutionary.’7

My text is loosely structured in two parts. The first two chapters give the context in which the close relationship between the two men developed and highlight the great emphasis both of them placed on African liberation and Pan-Africanism. The next two chapters focus on one crucial matter, which was sharply criticised by both but with distinctively different emphases: colonial rule and global imperialism. I. KWAME NKRUMAH’S POLITICAL CAREER AND RELEVANCE Seventy years ago, in 1945, the political star of Kwame Nkrumah started to rise. In less than a decade, he would gain in both regional and international influence and was to grace the cover of Time Magazine, which aptly titled him ‘Gold Coast’s Kwame Nkrumah’.8 Not long after, with Ghana’s declaration of independence on 6th March 1957, Nkrumah was given the title Osagyefo, meaning

5

6 7 8

On Padmore’s political career in the 1920s and 1930s, see Jonathan Derrick, Africa’s ‘Agitators’. Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918–1939, London 2008; Susan D. Pennybacker, From Scottsboro to Munich. Race and Political Culture in 1930s Britain, Princeton 2009. James R. Hooker, Black Revolutionary. George Padmore’s Path from Communism to PanAfricanism, New York 1967, 91. Hooker, Black Revolutionary, 91–92. Time Magazine 9th February 1953, front cover.

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‘victor in war’ in Akan, by his compatriots.9 Born in Nkroful, a small fishing village in the south-west of the Gold Coast and nursed by a loving mother, Kwame Nkrumah attended a Catholic school, where teachers became aware of his outstanding gift for learning. Nkrumah acquired a solid education and served as teacher at Achimota College in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Inspired by Nigerian journalist and activist Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had just returned from studying abroad and now recommended that young Africans not go to the British metropole but to the United States, Nkrumah decided to set sail in 1935. In the next ten years, which he described as hard but worthwhile, he earned academic qualifications in the US.10 He became much more politically conscious there as well.11 And this awareness, exacerbated by the growing feeling of homesickness, was probably the main reason for Nkrumah’s decision to leave the United States and enter the realm of the British Empire again in 1945. For the next two and a half years, Nkrumah would live in London. His subsequent rise to power in Ghana was surprisingly rapid. When Nkrumah returned home in 1947, after a dozen years abroad, he was not very well known among his compatriots, but that changed rapidly. The appointment to the party secretariat of the newly founded United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was Nkrumah’s return ticket to the Gold Coast. Due to the nature of this party, consisting of men with a middle class background and liberal or conservative political views, as well as Nkrumah’s own political vision, there were tensions from the very beginning. But Nkrumah’s success in appealing to the masses was sufficient, at least for some time, to hold the party together. When the rupture became too deep, Nkrumah split off from the UGCC in 1949 and named the body of his supporters the Convention People’s Party (CPP). He launched a campaign of nonviolent resistance called Positive Action to challenge colonial rule and pressure for African participation in politics. The broad support that he and the CPP activists, who were touring the cities as well as rural areas, were winning made Nkru9

Basil Davidson, Black Star. A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah, Oxford 2007 [1973], 192. On Nkrumah: ‘His title of Osagyefo meant “victor in war”. Some of his sycophants translated this as “redeemer”, and this translation was eagerly repeated by hostile newspapers as another proof of his madness. But nobody in Ghana thought it meant redeemer, and few would have cared if they had. Osagyefo was just another of Ghana’s titles of tradition.’ 10 According to his autobiography: ‘Those years in America [1935–45] and England [1945–47] were years of sorrow and loneliness, poverty and hard work. But I have never regretted them because the background that they provided has helped me to formulate my philosophy of life and politics.’ See Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, Edinburgh 1957, vii; see ibid., 24–63. 11 This process of learning politics was not directed in any strict ideological sense, as is made obvious by the influences Nkrumah mentioned in his reminiscences: ‘At this time I devoted much energy to the study of revolutionaries and their methods. Those who interested me most were Hannibal, Cromwell, Napoleon, Lenin, Mazzini, Gandhi, Mussolini and Hitler. I found much of value to be gleaned and many ideas that were useful to me later in my own campaign against imperialism.’ See Nkrumah, Autobiography, vii–viii. Indeed, an illustrious potpourri.

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mah a true challenge to the colonial authorities. Consequently, in an attempt to crush that mass movement, the authorities jailed him and several other leading members of the party. This, however, could not prevent the CPP victory in the first elections held in the Gold Coast in 1951. Nkrumah was freed and appointed to office by British governor Charles Arden-Clarke. With Nkrumah in a guiding capacity, the Gold Coast was then on its way to self-government and independence.12 Organiser of several Pan-African conferences after 1958, which were attended by leaders of ‘new states’ such as Ghana and Guinea as well as by nationalist movement leaders from the many still existing African colonies, Nkrumah became the main symbol for the efforts of establishing a United Africa. This effort did not come to fruition, as the Organisation of African Unity, founded in 1963, did not correspond to his vision, which was based on a longing for ‘a common political basis for the integration of our [African] policies in economic planning, defence, foreign and diplomatic relations’.13 According to him: a united Africa – that is, the political and economic unification of the African continent – should seek three objectives: Firstly, we should have an over-all economic planning on a continental basis. … Secondly, we should aim at the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy. … The third objective … [is] to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy to give political direction to our joint efforts for the protection and economic development of our continent.14

The newly-won political independence in Ghana posed a number of challenges to Nkrumah’s rule, and the ‘nine-year period after 1957 was one of deepening drama as new problems took the place of old’.15 Basil Davidson speaks of the years from 1957 to 1960 as ‘the period of “continued compromise”’,16 when political independence took over the legacy of colonial times. The legacy was to prove heaviest of all in the field of economic policy. And it was to be economic policy that would increasingly dominate the years of Nkrumah’s Republic from 1960 to 1966. Repeatedly, then it was found that the economic system taken over from the past could not afford a vast expansion of the country’s welfare.17

12 For a detailed account of the course of events, see Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946– 1960, London 1970. 13 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, London 1963, 218. 14 Nkrumah, Africa Unite, 218–220. 15 Davidson, Black Star, 158. 16 Ibid., 159. 17 Ibid., 163 and 171. This ‘economic system taken over from the past’, of course, was a typical colonial one. It was based on the export-orientated production of cash crops – in Ghana predominantly Cocoa – and the extraction of mineral resources. As Paul Nugent put it, ‘even the most prosperous [African] countries were dependent upon the export of primary commodities … The problem was that the range of commodities which most countries could export was limited, while international markets were highly vulnerable to price fluctuations. … The possible solutions to monocrop dependency included the promotion of indigenous manufacturing (including domestic processing of primary products), export diversification and a concentra-

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As Nkrumah’s goal was economic development and his model that of a socialist welfare state, this had to mean a sharp break with the close Western ties of the past. Nkrumah would soon coin the term ‘neo-colonialism’ to clarify his point of view concerning the danger of continuing to act compliantly within the asymmetrical frames set by international world order.18 Opposition to Nkrumah’s rule increased within the country in course of time, in particular after 1960, when ‘[t]he gap in living standards, between “the top” of the CPP [the ruling party] and the majority of voters, was already wide and bitterly resented’,19 when corruption among several party members grew to disgusting proportions, and the government decided to increase taxes on ordinary people.20 Moreover, his earnest efforts in controlling foreign investment and directing its impact towards projects seen as relevant to the country’s sustainable development earned Nkrumah a negative image in parts of the Western press, where he was now again denounced as ‘Communist’, as had been the case in his early agitating days. Nkrumah’s vision ultimately failed in political and economic terms, both on the continental level and domestically. In February 1966, while Nkrumah was on a trip to China and Vietnam, the military staged a coup d’état.21 Nkrumah was forced to live in exile for the rest of his life. II. GEORGE PADMORE AND KWAME NKRUMAH: FRIENDSHIP AND WORKING ALLIANCE In early 1945, Kwame Nkrumah, then a student émigré to the US, had come to London, the vibrant capital of the British Empire, which was still visibly suffering the hardships of the war. There he met George Padmore, ex-communist since 1933–34 and henceforth leading organiser of Pan-Africanist networks throughout the Anglophone world. Padmore contributed crucially to helping Nkrumah make

18 19 20 21

tion on maximisation of agricultural output.’ See Paul Nugent, Africa since Independence. A Comparative History, Basingstoke 2004, 70. Note, however, that Nugent’s ‘problem’ diagnosis and his proposed ‘solutions’, correspond to the liberal-capitalist point of view and differ starkly from the radical systemic stance taken by Nkrumah. For the latter point of view the problem already starts with the fact of dependency, which means that several different possibilities for action open up. Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism. The Last Stage of Imperialism, London 1971 [1965]. Davidson, Black Star, 175. Ibid., 175f. and 179ff. Nkrumah said this about it: ‘The word “coup” should not be used to describe what took place in Ghana on 24th February 1966. On that day, Ghana was captured by traitors among the army and police who were inspired and helped by neo-colonialists and certain reactionary elements among our own population. It was an act of aggression, an “invasion”, planned to take place in my absence and to be maintained by force. … The cowards who seized power by force of arms behind my back, knew they did not have the support of the people of Ghana, and therefore thought it safer to wait until I was not only out of the country, but well beyond the range of a quick return.’ See Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, London 1976 [1968], 9.

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his impact on anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist circles in London. He also facilitated contacts between Nkrumah and fellow Africans from different parts of the continent. George Padmore was born Malcolm Ivan Meredith Nurse in Trinidad, into a middle class background. Eager to study, he went to the US in 1924 where he soon got into student politics and entered the Communist Party. From 1927, his career within the organisation quickly took off, and he was sent to Europe to promote solidarity between white and black workers. When Padmore settled permanently in London in 1935, he wrote and organised on a scale and with an energy almost unparalleled in anti-imperialist circles, supporting struggles against racial discrimination, colonialism, and other forms of authoritarianism. Almost immediately after Nkrumah’s arrival in London, the two men developed a tight friendship and working alliance. Together they prepared the Fifth Pan-African Congress, to be held in Manchester in October 1945, forging an alliance under the banner of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and demanding immediate independence.22 Before the end of World War II, Padmore had already written several original books on the problem of imperialism and meticulously described particular colonial situations in Africa.23 After his break with the Communist Party, Padmore made a living from journalism, writing for papers produced in various parts of the world – from Britain to the US and from the Caribbean to the African colonies.24 His ideas, as well as his practices, were transnational at their core. Nkrumah’s career as a writer lay still before him, but he, too, wrote a pamphlet in 1945, in order to organise his thoughts on colonialism and self-determination. At first, he passed the manuscript from hand to hand, but it was ultimately published in 1962 under the apt title, Towards Colonial Freedom.25 During Padmore’s lifetime, Nkrumah published only one other publication, his autobiography of 1957. Nkrumah’s writing career took off only after Padmore’s death, with a rapid sequence of books on Pan-Africanism and neocolonialism, and experienced a further boost after he was forced into exile. Living then under the auspices of Sékou Touré,

22 The literature on the congress is rich. See for instance Imanuel Geiss, Panafrikanismus. Zur Geschichte der Dekolonisation, Frankfurt am Main 1968, 299–325; Hakim Adi /Marika Sherwood, The 1945 Pan-African Congress Revisited, London 1995. 23 Padmore’s books will be discussed below in Sections II and IV. 24 See Leslie James’s impressive list of articles written by Padmore for colonial journals alone in Leslie Elaine James, ‘What we put in black and white’. George Padmore and the Practice of Anti-imperial Politics, MA thesis (LSE), London 2012, 263–313. Besides this work, he wrote regularly for several American and British newspapers. All in all, Padmore published some thousand journalistic articles and correspondences in course of three decades. Besides all this, he was in steady correspondence with hundreds of people from all around the world; see Holger Weiss, Framing a Radical African Atlantic. African American Agency, West African Intellectuals and the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, Leiden 2014, in particular his map of Padmore’s transnational network, 567. 25 Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom. Africa in the Struggle against World Imperialism, London 1979 [1962/1945].

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who, in honouring Nkrumah’s relevance for Pan-African affairs, appointed him co-president of Guinea, Nkrumah put a great deal of effort and time in reanalysing the anti-colonial struggle, in order to understand both the failure of what in 1953 Padmore had called ‘The Gold Coast Revolution’ (and, in 1977, his fellow Trinidadian C.L.R. James would call ‘The Ghana Revolution’)26 and his inability to bring about the United States of Africa he had envisioned. Notwithstanding the problematic heritage of his rule, Kwame Nkrumah is still remembered in a positive light among many, both in Ghana and internationally, in particular among advocates of Pan-Africanism.27 This is due not only to the pioneering character of his politics in the Gold Coast, which forced the British to coopt Nkrumah and his party, the CPP, into the colonial government in 1951 and ultimately led to the declaration of Ghana’s independence in 1957. Nkrumah was the first black African to achieve this, and – even more importantly – he boldly declared Ghanaian independence to be only the first step in an ongoing process of African liberation. His pan-African vision was crucial to making Nkrumah the ‘Black Star’, as he is still remembered and revered. This vision was shared, and indeed, to a great extent, prepared by George Padmore, who in 1945 became a mentor and friend to Nkrumah and, subsequently, a loyal ally in Nkrumah’s political struggle for independence.28 In order to press ahead with the pan-African liberation agenda, Padmore settled permanently in Ghana in 1957 and served as Nkrumah’s special Advisor on African Affairs.29 George Padmore, who was called the ‘father of African liberation’ and ‘the father of African emancipation’ when he died prematurely in 1959, was more or less soon forgotten.30 James Hooker put it correctly, when he stated:

26 See George Padmore, The Gold Coast Revolution, London 1953; C.L.R. James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution, London 1981 [1977]. Nkrumah himself reacted immediately by frequent radio speeches broadcast by Guinean radio during the remainder of 1966 (Kwame Nkrumah, Voice from Conakry, London 1967). In 1968, he published a more elaborate account, Dark Days in Ghana. A short adequate summary of the factors that led to the coup, including Nkrumah’s increasing estrangement ‘from the reality on the ground’, can be found in Emmanuel Kwaku Akyeampong, Foreword, in: Davidson, Black Star, ii–iii. 27 On Nkrumah’s changing image in post-colonial Ghana and among historians, see Felix Müller, Ghanaian Intellectuals and the Nkrumah Controversy, 1970–2008, MA thesis, Vienna 2012. 28 See Marika Sherwood, ‘George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah. A Tentative Outline of their Relationship’, in: Fitzroy Baptiste/Rupert Lewis (eds.), George Padmore. Pan-African Revolutionary, Kingston 2009, 162–182. 29 See Leslie James, George Padmore and Decolonization from Below. Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, and the End of Empire, Basingstoke 2015, 164–183; Hooker, Black Revolutionary, 131–138. 30 Almost none of his works has been reprinted since the early 1970s. For many years, James Hooker’s Black Revolutionary was the single book-length biography dedicated to Padmore. This has changed now, thanks to Leslie James’ meticulously researched biographical works: What we put in, and Decolonization from Below.

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Arno Sonderegger Padmore, the appealing young man, the international revolutionary, the bookish activist, the elder of the anti-colonial family, had become in death the principal follower of those who recognised and proclaimed Osagyefo’s genius. The man himself was quickly forgotten; indeed, his entire pre-1957 career was shelved by friends and enemies alike, who wished to concentrate on the glamorous-seeming last years in Ghanaian employment. 31

Padmore’s politics and viewpoints seemed to rapidly fall out of sync with the nationalist style of decolonisation, which experienced its peak immediately following his death, when the dissolution of the French African Empire produced a great many new, so-called ‘nation-states’. At that point, the realisation of Padmore’s vision of an United States of Africa, which he shared with Nkrumah, faced more and more resistance. As a gap developed between African nationalism and PanAfricanism – which had coexisted perfectly well since the 1940s – several African leaders, who formerly adhered to both at the same time, now opted for the nationstate.32 And when Padmore started serving as Nkrumah’s political adviser in 1957, he found himself personally frustrated by a second level of difficulty: the issue of tribalism, the handling of politics based on regional and ethnic-cultural affinities, which played a regular role in multicultural Ghana.33 Although Nkrumah adhered to his vision of pan-African unity, the decolonisation process as it unfolded, supported as it was by the interests of the old empires, international capital, and several African elites – old and new, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, worked against its realisation. For Padmore, perhaps even more than for Nkrumah, the ‘national’ liberation of colonial territories was hardly more than a necessary evil. Leslie James puts it well: Padmore recognized that bourgeois nationalism was dangerous but necessary … in a colonial society nationalism – whether bourgeois or not – was a useful weapon for stirring anticolonial resistance and thus hurrying self-determination. … nationalism was a “means, rather than an ultimate end”. It was a phase, rather than a goal.34

31 Hooker, Black Revolutionary, 140. An interesting reading of Padmore’s memorialisation in Ghana and internationally immediately after his death is contained in James, What we put in, 237–245. 32 For a short discussion, see Arno Sonderegger, Der Panafrikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Sonderegger et al. (eds.), Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert, 98–116, especially 108ff. See Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation. Remaking France and French Africa, 1945– 1960, Princeton 2014 for an intriguing reading of the arguments and strategies discussed among leading African politicians of French West Africa. 33 South African writer Peter Abrahams devoted an interesting novel to the decolonisation processes as they unfolded in London and on the Gold Coast: Peter Abrahams, A Wreath for Udomo, London 1979 [1956]. The central character is a stand-in for Nkrumah, and his relationship with Padmore (called Tom Lanwood in the novel) plays a certain role in course of the events. Lanwood appears as a tragic figure unable to cope with ‘this tribal business’ (241), while Udomo, becoming increasingly paranoid, ultimately falls prey to the tribalists and is killed. Padmore’s anti-tribalism is discussed in James, What we put in, 207–216, James, Decolonization from Below, 151–163. See also Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah & the Chiefs. The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951–60, Oxford 2000. 34 James, Decolonization from Below, 160.

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For Padmore, then, the freeing of colonies from imperial rule was not the end but only one important step on the way towards an Africa that was free to develop according to her own will. Nkrumah’s view was, in essence, quite similar. But there was a crucial difference in emphasis: Nkrumah visualised Pan-Africa in much more decidedly nationalist terms than Padmore would ever have done. Nkrumah’s was an effectively continental African nationalism. The relation between Padmore and Nkrumah was particularly close in the latter’s London years (1945–47), but even after that period, it never really faded. ‘Padmore and Nkrumah were instantly attracted to each other: they felt like brothers. A fourteen-year collaboration had begun.’35 After Nkrumah’s return to the Gold Coast, the two maintained a regular correspondence, and Padmore acted as ‘Nkrumah’s personal representative in London’.36 In 1951, when Lincoln University bestowed an honorary doctorate upon Padmore, its now-famous graduate, Nkrumah took the chance to meet the honouree en route. ‘In the reception hall’ of London airport, recalled Nkrumah, who was on his ‘first long flight’, a familiar figure walked up towards us – George Padmore. It was a happy reunion … Together we went to George’s flat where, seated around the old kitchen table, we related our activities since our last meeting. Hours later, when each of us had exhausted his store of information, we sat back and relaxed.37

Theirs was a friendship indeed. Padmore visited the Gold Coast several times in the early 1950s because Nkrumah ‘wanted Padmore to chronicle the remarkable history of postwar events’ there.38 When the position of special advisor on African affairs was offered to Padmore after Ghana’s independence in 1957, this brought them spatially close together again, even if for no more than two years. C.L.R. James, Padmore’s Trinidadian childhood friend, allied activist in the London-affairs of the 1930s, and famous historian of the Haitian Revolution, was the one who recommended Nkrumah to Padmore by letter from the US. In retrospect, James assessed their relation and relevance as follows: ‘The first and everto-be-remembered name in the history of the body of political ideas which went to the making of Nkrumah is that of George Padmore …’39 But Nkrumah not only took. He gave. … Nkrumah brought to this work [of anti-colonial activity] what had never been done before. To theoretical study, propaganda and agitation, the building and maintaining contacts abroad, he added the organization politically of Africans and people of African descent in London. He helped to found a West African National Secretariat in London for the purpose of organizing the struggle in West Africa. … he was the leading spirit in the formation of the Coloured Workers’ Association of Great Britain. Through this organi-

35 36 37 38

Hooker, Black Revolutionary, 91. James, Ghana Revolution, 9. Nkrumah, Autobiography, 157–158. Hooker, Black Revolutionary, 114. Besides journalist articles, Padmore’s chronicles included the book Gold Coast Revolution. 39 James, Ghana Revolution, 62–63.

28

Arno Sonderegger zation he linked together the students and the workers from Africa and the people of African descent living in England, organized them and carried on political work among them. 40

Nkrumah himself recalled their first meeting as follows: The only person I knew of in England was George Padmore, a West Indian journalist who lived in London and was the author of several articles which had aroused my interest and sympathy. I was so impressed by his writings that I wrote a letter to him from the States introducing myself and asking whether he would be able to meet me at Euston Station when I arrived. (…) I got out of the train and searched anxiously up and down the platform. We saw each other at about the same time and from the first moment I liked him. He did much to help me during my early days in London and the more I knew him and talked with him, the more I respected his integrity and his knowledge of the colonial question. 41

III. CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM It is in regard to colonialism and imperialism that Padmore’s influence on Nkrumah proved decisive and powerful. Therefore, a closer look at these issues promises to be worthwhile. It will allow us to better understand how they perceived their time and imagined the future, how they came to do what they did and what drove them to do it the way they did. George Padmore’s first book was called The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers,42 and it set both tone and structure of his many subsequent writings. It opens: ‘The oppression of Negroes assumes two distinct forms: on the one hand they are oppressed as a class, and on the other as a nation.’ Immediately, Padmore equated ‘nation’ with ‘race’ and qualified what causes the oppression of African ‘workers and peasants’ and men of African descent, namely capitalism: This national (race) oppression has its basis in the social-economic relation of the Negro under capitalism. .… The general conditions under which Negroes live, either as a national (racial) group or as a class, form one of the most degrading spectacles of bourgeois civilisation.

In this book, as in most of his later books, Padmore pursued a threefold purpose: (1) describing ‘the conditions of life of the Negro workers and peasants in different parts of the world’; (2) adverting to anti-imperial and anti-colonial struggles of 40 Ibid., 77. 41 Nkrumah, Autobiography, 49. In his autobiography, Nkrumah recounts one event in one of ‘the lower-class restaurants’ they frequented to ‘discuss politics’ (and escape the miseries of poverty), which gives a hint to the problem of ‘race’ and racism in metropolitan London: ‘One day Padmore and I were sitting in one of these cafes discussing some problem or other. All of a sudden I became conscious that we were being carefully scrutinised. I raised my eyes and there, peering at us with most profound interest, was a small girl. Suddenly she screamed with excitement as she said: “Mummy! It talks!” The poor mother was crimson with shame as she came across and tried to snatch her awkward child away. But we laughed and told her not to mind.’ Ibid., 60. 42 George Padmore, The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers, London, 1931. Available at www.marxists.org/archive/padmore/1931/negro-toilers/index.htm [30.08.2016].

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the past; and (3) phrasing effective strategies for the present struggle. Padmore was addressing both blacks and whites, for he wanted the millions of black toilers … [to] be better prepared to carry on the struggles against their white imperialist oppressors and native (race) exploiters, and join forces with their white brothers against the common enemy – World Capitalism.43

Even though he broke with the Soviet-led Comintern in 1933 and was officially expulsed from the Communist Party in 1934, Padmore stayed true to the Marxist interpretation of history, which emphasised the role of capitalism and hierarchical class relations. ‘Race’ was a matter of importance because of the existence of colonial empires and the exploitation of people of colour practiced there, not because of itself or its doubtful conceptual merit;44 ‘race’ was a matter to deal with simply because racism dominated the colonial situation and pervaded the imperial sphere. In 1936, Padmore characterised colonial Africa in the following terms: ‘stark imperial oppression and exploitation, allied with racial ignorance and arrogance, swaggering about without the least sign of shame’.45 Due to omnipresent racism – the belief in racial theories of difference and hierarchy and the discriminatory practice justified on such grounds – the Blacks carry a twofold burden – class and race. Their class exploitation, that is, their exploitation as workers, is even more brutal than that of the proletariat in England and other metropolitan countries, because of their colonial status. … their racial subjugation assumes the most barbarous forms of oppression.46

In the last analysis, colonialism, informed by racism, was rooted in capitalism. Padmore perceived capitalism less in terms of individual greed but as a collective, systemic failure. At the heart of it was the will to dominate others and make a profit from someone else’s work. ‘Empire’ was the power system that had made for capitalism’s expansion all over the world and brought it to the edge of destruction. Warning against the threat of global destabilisation and new international wars, he wrote in typical vein in 1937: [M]odern wars are not the result of the depravity of human nature, but are the outcome of specific socio-economic causes, the roots of which are to be found in the present social system, Imperialism. In order to carry on an effective struggle against war, it is essential to examine the nature of capitalist society and to understand the mechanism of the social and economic forces which give rise to the conflicts between nations … 47

43 All quotes stem from Padmore, Negro Toilers, Introduction. 44 From early on, Padmore was well aware of the dubiousness of the ‘race’ category, and he observed the scientists’ debates on the ‘race issue’ eagerly and critically. For instance, ‘He made extensive notes on his copy of M.F. Ashley Montagu’s books Man’s Most Dangerous Myth. The Fallacy of Race. See James, Decolonization from Below, 214/en.26. This classic of scientifically informed anti-racism appeared in 1942. 45 George Padmore, How Britain Rules Africa, New York 1969 [1936], 3. 46 Padmore, How Britain, 7. 47 George Padmore, Africa and World Peace, London 1972 [1937], 2.

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‘Empire’ and imperial domination are, according to this analysis, intrinsic components of capitalism. They are closely linked and neatly interwoven, and Africa plays a particular role in that global connection. Padmore described it as follows: Economically speaking, Africa serves as an agrarian hinterland for the industrialized West, a source of supply for raw materials, a market for manufactured commodities, an outlet for the investment of surplus finance-capital in exploiting mineral resources, building railways, harbours, factories, public utility services, etc., etc., and last but not least, Africa provides an outlet for European settlers.48

This is echoed in Kwame Nkrumah’s early pamphlet that speaks of the yoke of colonialism and exploitation and continues: The aim of all colonial governments in Africa and elsewhere has been the struggle for raw materials; and not only this, but the colonies have become the dumping ground, and colonial peoples the false recipients, of manufactured goods of the industrialists and capitalists (…) of colonial powers who turn to the dependent territories which feed their industrial plants. This is colonialism in a nutshell.49

In this way, Padmore’s analysis leads back to Africa’s colonial situation, which he saw as structurally connected with the international disorder of his time. [T]he fundamental problem of to-day, like yesterday, is still the Colonial Question. That is to say, a renewed struggle for the re-division of the world has once more become the main objective of certain great Powers who are at present dissatisfied with the status quo. (…) World Imperialism can be divided into two main camps: ‘The Haves’, those who possess colonies, and the ‘Have-Nots’, those who seek to possess. The distinction, however, is not a new manifestation. It is merely a continuation of the pre-war relation of forces, and reflects the unequal development of capitalism.50

Padmore did not distinguish – that is, not on principle – between Western European empires such as Britain or France on the one hand, and the fascist regimes in most of Europe (including Hitler’s Germany) on the other. He considered fascism and imperialism to be twins.51 Essentially, they longed for the same thing: domination, ‘empire’. Above all, Padmore put forward the case that European rule in its colonies was itself fascist. … The link between colonialism and fascism, for Padmore, was not simply that fascist countries aimed to acquire colonies. Rather, he argued that British and French colonial governments behaved in their colonies in a manner similar to Germany and Italy in their own territory.52

48 49 50 51

Padmore, How Britain, 1. Nkrumah, Towards Freedom, xv. Padmore, World Peace, 3–4. This said, he spoke out clearly against ‘Nazism, the German variant of Fascism’. Padmore, World Peace, 70; ‘Hitler dares not make the smallest concession to peace, for his whole régime is staked upon aggression, to offset his inability to solve the burning social problems at home.’ ibid., 71. 52 James, Decolonization from Below, 43–44. This point of view explains why Padmore held the opinion that neither colonials nor socialists should support the British war effort: Given his analysis, this war on behalf of imperialists was simply not in their interest, ibid., 49f. He came

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Imperialism, in all its manifestations, was the foe to be fought. Again, an echo of this can be heard in Towards Colonial Freedom. There, Nkrumah distinguishes between ‘three fundamental doctrines … of imperialism’: (a) the doctrine of exploitation; (b) the doctrine of ‘trustee-ship’ or ‘partnership’ …; (c) the doctrine of ‘assimilation’53 which were to have great impact in the era of decolonisation and upon development discourse up to today.54 Nkrumah provides a characteristic definition of the common thread binding together these different strands of imperialist thought, once again evocative of Padmore: The exponents of these doctrines believe implicitly and explicitly in the right of stronger peoples to exploit weaker ones to develop world resources, and ‘civilize’ backward peoples against their will. 55

In general, according to Nkrumah, imperialism is the policy which aims at creating, organising and maintaining an empire. IV. WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH: FROM COLONIALISM TO NEO-COLONIALISM World War II signalled a decisive break in at least two long-lasting respects. Firstly, it created a new international order, dominated by the US and structured by the logic of the Cold War. As Noam Chomsky recently put it: At the end of the Second World War, the United States was absolutely at the peak of its power. It had half of the world’s wealth and every one of its competitors was seriously damaged or destroyed. It had a position of unimaginable security and developed plans to essentially rule the world …56

Part of the outcome was the extremist propaganda for ‘anti-communism’ and the global policies of ‘containment’, so characteristic of the Cold War logic implemented since 1947. Secondly, it became more and more apparent that the old empires were in decline. Decolonisation in Asia had already begun during the war

53 54

55 56

to see, however, that the effects of war might be used for the benefit of anti-colonial and antiimperial forces — if they effectively use the opportunities thus created. See ibid., 51–58. Nkrumah, Towards Freedom, 1. See, for instance, Joseph M. Hodge/Gerald Hödl/Martina Kopf (eds.), Developing Africa. Concepts and Practices in Twentieth Century Colonialism, Manchester 2014; Frederick Cooper, Writing the History of Development, in: The Journal of Modern European History 8 (2010), 5–23; Walter Schicho (ed.), Kolonialismus und Entwicklung. Paternalistische Kontrolle und ‘zivilisatorische Mission’, Stichproben: Vienna Journal of African Studies 26 (2014). Nkrumah, Towards Freedom, 1. Noam Chomsky, Power Systems. Conversations on Global Democratic Uprisings and the New Challenges to U.S. Empire, New York, 2013, 56.

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and accelerated thereafter. Educated Africans too were increasingly looking for ways ‘out of Empire’.57 World War II marked a decisive watershed in the ways in which Empire was henceforth perceived. Africa became an area of vital importance to both France and Britain, even if for different reasons. France, which had been rapidly occupied by German troops, was divided. The collaborating Vichy regime still had Algeria and French West Africa until the Allied troops conquered North Africa. French Equatorial Africa, which under the leadership of Guyanese Félix Éboué had never bowed to Vichy, stood on the opposing side, and Brazzaville became the capital of La France libre, where General Charles de Gaulle held his famous speech of 1944 promising independence in return for support in the war effort. He would try to forget and renege on that promise in the postwar years, as Winston Churchill did in his effort to explain away the implications of the Atlantic Charter concerning African self-determination. For France, the war meant a shock, and in order to sustain the illusion of remaining a great power, the leadership of La Grande Nation was driven to stubbornly cling to its colonies at all costs.58 ‘From the colonial perspective, the war was a catalyst for rapid and unprecedented change in how labour was organized, what economies were focused upon producing, and how political futures were imagined.’59 Especially for Britain, ‘the vital importance of Africa as a relatively safe and strategic trade route, a labour source, and a provider of primary resources such as rubber, iron, tin, timber, and food increased significantly.’60 International power relations were also rapidly changing. The balance of power shifted visibly away from the old European empires to the USSR and the USA. Padmore devoted books to issues strongly associated with both of these global players. His book on the history of Russia, How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire, could not be published until 1946, although he had started to write it several years earlier, in 1942.61 The motif for his second book was the declaration of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, when the American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt forced upon Britain’s prime minister Winston Churchill several concessions concerning the opening-up of the Empire – in return for

57 Frederick Cooper, Out of Empire. Redefining Africa’s Place in the World, Göttingen 2013, 6f. It was, however, altogether unclear what would be the ultimate outcome of such efforts. As Frederick Cooper reminds us, there was ‘the acute uncertainty of the post-war moment, in Europe as well as in Africa. … the uncertainty of those times, when people realized the world was about to change but did not know in what direction it would move.’ Ibid., 5–6. 58 See Cooper, Citizenship Empire Nation, 26ff. 59 James, Decolonization from Below, 47. 60 Ibid., 47. 61 See ibid., 105. George Padmore in collaboration with Dorothy Pizer, How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire, London 1946. Although they never legally married, Dorothy Pizer was Padmore’s wife and close friend. It is said, she ‘legally changed her name to Padmore’ ‘somewhere in the 1950s’ and is accordingly referred to as Dorothy Padmore in some of the secondary literature, see James, Decolonization from Below, 214/en.20.

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material and financial support by the US. Together with fellow anti-imperialist and co-writer Nancy Cunard, Padmore ‘aimed to contextualize the Atlantic Charter and to press the case for its application to colonial peoples as well.’62 The result was called The White Man’s Duty. An Analysis of the Colonial Question in Light of the Atlantic Charter and was published in early 1943.63 It was a big success. ‘The first printing in January 1943 of 12,500 copies sold out by April of that year, and a second printing of 5,880 also sold out in subsequent months. Cunard’s request for a third printing was turned down owing to ‘paper difficulties’, as the publisher’s representative described the shortage of paper during the second world war.’64 Although Padmore’s activities during the war years were very wide in scope, his interest in Africa never waned. At the end of the war, he returned with full energy to reflect on the African scene – on the challenges and opportunities for anti-imperialism to prosper. This is evidenced not only by his role as organiser of congresses and conferences and his prolific journalistic writings, but also by his postwar books. In 1947, Padmore released the first historical account on the PanAfrican Congress movement.65 Two years later he published Africa. Britain’s Third Empire in response to that imperial propaganda that was ‘assuring the British people that what they have lost in Asia they will recover in Africa.’66 Describing the colonial situations in each British territory in Africa one by one, the book is in some ways an updated version of How Britain Rules Africa. But here, Padmore also gives a detailed account of anti-colonial ‘nationalist’ activities and organisations across the continent.67 With Nkrumah’s success in mobilising masses of people and launching his nonviolent strategy of ‘Positive Action’ sometime after 1948, Padmore focused more and more on events and developments in the Gold Coast colony. Consequently he wrote The Gold Coast Revolution (1953) to support the political case for Kwame Nkrumah, explaining to both white and black readership what was happening. According to Padmore’s analysis, everything had changed after the war. The cards in the game of global affairs were about to be mixed anew. At last, Africans had to make a decisive choice – for a radical ideological commitment to PanAfricanism. In order to realise African liberation and African social democracy, Africa and Africans had to decide what developmental path to take. The options available then were at issue in Padmore’s best-known book, Pan-Africanism or

62 Ibid., 51. 63 Nancy Cunard and George Padmore, The White Man’s Duty. An Analysis of the Colonial Question in Light of the Atlantic Charter [1943], in: Maureen Moynagh (ed.), Essays on Race and Empire, Peterborough 2002, 127–177. 64 Maureen Moynagh, A Note on the Text, in: Moynagh (ed.), Essays on Race, 70. 65 George Padmore, Colonial and Coloured Unity. A programme of Action. History of the PanAfrican Congress, London 1963 [1947]. 66 George Padmore, Africa. Britain’s Third Empire, London 1949, 9. 67 Ibid., 193–261.

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Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa.68 Padmore ruled out on principle the Western capitalist nation-state as model for Africa’s development. He recognised right from the start what Basil Davidson would call, almost four decades later, ‘the curse of the nation-state’ upon Africa.69 As it is heir to the colonial legacy and modelled upon the basic structures of the dominant world-system, itself imperial to the core, it could not reasonably offer a way out. Ethno-regional ‘tribalism’ was no option either. It was, to Padmore, hardly different from what he frequently called ‘bourgeois nationalism’, for both these ‘-isms’ worked in the interests of the already powerful, against the interests of the many.70 Padmore also argued elaborately against Communism as a suitable way for Africa and launched a heavy attack against ‘doctrinaire Communism’. He repudiated ‘the pretentious claims of doctrinaire Communism, that it alone has the solution to all the complex racial, tribal, and socio-economic problems facing Africa’.71 And he excoriated the Communist intolerance of those who do not subscribe to its ever-changing party line even to the point of liquidating them ‘… Democracy and brotherhood cannot be built upon intolerance and violence.’72 As said before, however, the West was no better model than the East. For that reason, Padmore attacked Western anti-communist propaganda in the same vein, pointing to the fact that ‘[a]t the moment none of the African independence movements is

68 George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism. The Coming Struggle for Africa, New York 1972 [1956]. Interestingly, the re-edition of 1972 (to which I refer hereafter) omitted the question mark of the original title; the first edition appeared in London under the title PanAfricanism or Communism? 69 Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden. Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, London 1992. 70 See Padmore, Pan-Africanism, 307. His sceptical outlook on politics based on ethnic and/or regional affinities was due to his understanding of modern politics as well as his cosmopolitan goals: Padmore longed for universal solidarity. His stance against narrow-minded tribalism antedated the disappointments he would experience after his permanent settlement in Ghana in 1957, see James, Decolonization from Below, 151ff., 166–190. In general, see Arno Sonderegger, Which Way Africa? Re-Reading George Padmore’s Pan-Africanism or Communism, in: Arno Sonderegger (ed.), African Thoughts on Colonial and Neo-Colonial Worlds. Facets of an Intellectual History of Africa, Berlin 2015, 191–202. 71 Padmore, Pan-Africanism, xvi. See ibid., 317, 322f. 72 Ibid.,, xvi.

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influenced by Communism’73 and warning that ‘Africans only lend ear to Communist propaganda when they feel betrayed and frustrated …’74 For if there is one thing which events in Africa, no less than in Asia, have demonstrated in the post-war years, it is that colonial peoples are resentful of the attitude of Europeans, of both Communist and anti-Communist persuasion, that they alone possess the knowledge and experience necessary to guide the advancement of dependent peoples.75

Navigating his own Pan-African agenda, Padmore told his readers that If the Western Powers are really afraid of Communism and want to defeat it, the remedy lies in their own hands. First, it is necessary to keep one step ahead of the Communists by removing the grievances of the so-called backward peoples, which the Communists everywhere seek to exploit for their own ends. Secondly, there must be a revolutionary change in the outlook of the colonizing Powers, who must be prepared to fix a date for the complete transfer of power … and to give every technical and administrative assistance to the emerging colonial nations during the period of transition from internal self-government to complete selfdetermination.76

Complete self-determination was the goal and prerequisite for Africa’s improvement. The sole way to achieve this, according to Padmore, is Pan-Africanism, of which he gave a significant definition at the end of his last book: In our struggle for national freedom, human dignity and social redemption, Pan-Africanism offers an ideological alternative to Communism on the one side and Tribalism on the other. It rejects both white racialism and black chauvinism. It stands for racial co-existence on the basis of absolute equality and respect for human personality. Pan-Africanism looks above the narrow confines of class, race, tribe and religion. In other words, it wants equal opportunity for all. Talent to be rewarded on the basis of merit. Its vision stretches beyond the limited frontiers of the nation-state. Its perspective embraces the federation of regional self-governing countries and their ultimate amalgamation into a United States of Africa.77

Here again, the influence on Nkrumah is obvious. It is by no means accidental that Nkrumah dedicated his pan-African statement Africa Must Unite ‘to George Pad-

73 Ibid.,, xiii. ‘Again I repeat, Communism is no immediate threat to Africa. … What the majority of Africans know about Communism is what their imperialist rulers have told them on the red bogey. Even the handful of West African intellectuals claiming to be Communists are of a kind that orthodox Marxists would find it difficult to recognize as true disciples of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The term “Communist” is just a term of abuse, used loosely by Europeans and reactionary Black politicians to smear militant nationalists whose views they dislike. There is hardly a colonial leader worth his salt who at some time or another has not been branded a “dangerous Communist agitator”. … As long as the African leaders remain true to the people, they have nothing to fear but fear. Destiny is in their own hands.’ Ibid., 355. 74 Ibid., 317. 75 Ibid., xv. 76 Padmore, Pan-Africanism, 317. 77 Ibid.,, 355–356.

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more (1900–1959) and to the African Nation that must be’.78 Padmore’s way of dealing with cold war propaganda foreshadowed Nkrumah’s conceptualisation of what he would call ‘neo-colonialism’ and what became an influential slogan in context of the non-alignment movement. The neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage. In the past it was possible to convert a country … into a colonial territory. Today this process is no longer feasible. Old-fashioned colonialism is by no means entirely abolished. It still constitutes an African problem, but it is everywhere on the retreat. Once a territory has become nominally independent it is no longer possible, as it was in the last century, to reverse the process. Existing colonies may linger on, but no new colonies will be created. In place of colonialism as the main instrument of imperialism we have today neo-colonialism. The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. … The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world. 79

It is important to see that Nkrumah’s analysis of global inequality and dependencies has nothing xenophobic about it. It was not directed against foreigners or foreign investments but rather pointed toward a particular systemic problem – to ‘the extreme asymmetry in global economic relations’80 as well as to the ‘extraversion’ of African ruling elites, who look to the outside for support instead of turning in-

78 Nkrumah, Africa Unite, 1963, v. The wrong date of birth given in the dedication is typical of the obscurity surrounding Padmore. Today’s accepted date is 1903, because ‘Padmore’s official death certificate states that he was 56 years old at the time of his death in 1959’, see James, What we put in, 35/fn.2. However, his first biographer wrote that he was born ‘probably in the year 1902’ and commented: ‘He claimed 1903, which is the date accepted by his inlaws and wife. But the marriage register differs and the birth records long since were consumed by ants and stained by water.’ Hooker, Black Revolutionary, 2/fn.* However, 1900 is indeed significant in the context of pan-African history, for it was the year when the first PanAfrican Conference took place in London, organised by another Trinidadian emigrant, Henry Sylvester Williams, and attended by W.E.B. Du Bois, later leading figure of the Pan-African Congress Movement. On the ‘triumvirate’ that played such a significant symbolic role in the Manchester Pan-African Congress of 1945 and since, see Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore and W.E.B. Du Bois, in: Research Review NS 7 (1991), 1–10. 79 Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, ix–x. Basically, this corresponds to the picture drawn by experts on African contemporary history, although many of them try hard to clearly distinguish what they consider the overtly political discourse of ‘neo-colonialism’. See, for instance, Patrick Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling, London 2009; Walter Schicho, Geschichte Afrikas, Stuttgart 2010; Stephen Ellis, Season of Rains. Africa in the World, London 2011; Frederick Cooper, Africa in the World. Capitalism, Empire, Nation-State, Cambridge MA (USA) 2014. 80 Cooper, Africa World, 98.

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side, practicing ‘gate keeping’ of the state instead of working for the recovery of their countries.81 Nkrumah was very critical of many of his compatriots, and he welcomed any support from outside as long as it corresponded to his developmental and political ideals. Foreign influence therefore marks only one side of Nkrumah’s understanding of neo-colonialism; the other side rested with Africa herself. That is the reason why the struggle against neocolonial structures also had to be fought on the home front, for they rest on the existence of nominally independent African states run by Africans willing to cooperate with each other. Nkrumah was quite frank on this point: [T]he rulers of neo-colonial States derive their authority to govern, not from the will of the people, but from the support which they obtain from their neo-colonialist masters. … ‘Aid’, therefore, to a neo-colonial State is merely a revolving credit, paid by the neo-colonial master, passing through the neo-colonial State and returning to the neo-colonial master in the form of increased profits.82

In the posthumously published selection of articles and speeches, Revolutionary Path, Nkrumah rendered the following comment: Neocolonialism is more insidious, complex and dangerous than the old colonialism. It not only prevents its victims from developing their economic potential for their own use, but it controls the political life of the country, and supports the indigenous bourgeoisie in perpetuating the oppression and exploitation of the masses. Under neocolonialism, the economic systems and political policies of independent territories are managed and manipulated from outside, by international monopoly finance capital in league with the indigenous bourgeoisie. The policy of balkanization pursued by the imperialist powers when forced to concede political independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, reflects the strategy of neocolonialism – the intention being to ensure their continued exploitation and oppression. In Africa, most of the independent states are economically unviable, and still have the artificial frontiers of colonialism. They are easy prey for the voracious appetites of neocolonial empire builders. 83

Here we come full circle. Empire is back, or, more to the point, it never was absent. Recalling Nkrumah’s and Padmore’s arguments about colonialism and imperialism, which were developed and used to critical political ends during the era of ‘development’ and decolonisation, shows with which clarity and effectivity the

81 ‘Extraversion’ is the term coined by Jean-François Bayart, Africa in the World. A History of Extraversion, in: The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly, Cambridge, 2010, x–lxxiv. The concept of the ‘gate keeper state’ has been developed by Cooper, Africa since 1940, 156ff. to explain the miseries of postcolonial African states. See also Frederick Cooper, Decolonization in Africa. An Interpretation, in: Kwame Anthony Appiah/ Henry Louis Gates Jr. (eds.), Africana. An Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience, New York 1999, 571–582. 82 Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, xv. 83 Kwame Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, London 1973, 313.

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Empire wrote back long before academic post-colonials invented that striking and apt slogan.84 CONCLUSION Anti-imperialism, ending empire and imperial rule everywhere, was paramount to George Padmore for all his life because he longed for a self-determined life. ‘Padmore’s life was spent attacking the purported liberalism of empire as a sham.’ All other aspects that are considered important and even crucial – his support for African nationalist movements and his push for Pan-Africanism and social democracy – follow from this primary motive. With his friend Kwame Nkrumah, the case is only slightly, but characteristically, different. For him, the struggle against colonial rule and, later, neo-colonial domination was paramount. The overcoming of particular colonial situations and their legacies, that is anti-colonialism, informed almost all of his political ideas and strategies. His pan-African vision corresponded to one of an empire. In a nutshell, Padmore’s approach was more global, while Nkrumah’s focus was more limited – on one country, the Gold Coast, and on one continent, Africa. Sure enough, even these limitations proved too broad as to be acceptable to most other African contemporary leaders, not to speak of the big global players in East and West. Nkrumah’s narrower focus might explain to a certain degree why his actual policies have been much more effective than Padmore’s, bringing him to power in Ghana and making him the enduring symbol of pan-African unity. It might be argued that it was exactly Nkrumah’s analytical shortcomings – his concentration on the African scene – that made his policies successful. However, his success was only fragmentary, because he could not convince other African leaders to realise the strong, centralised African union he had in mind. Nkrumah’s envisioned forward march towards political and economic independence stalled during the first half of his rule. The obstacles of neo-colonialism – that is, foreign interests in symbiosis with home-grown allies – could not be overcome. Nkrumah’s analysis of colonialism and neo-colonialism much resembles Padmore’s stance on imperialism. In many of its dimensions, their critique still stands firm. However, now as then, it is not clear how to translate their analytical insights into effective means for abolishing imperial rule and foreign domination or for making the world a better place.

84 The allusion is, of course, to Bill Ashcroft, Garreth Griffith and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back. Theory and Practice in post-colonial Literatures, London 1989.

KWAME NKRUMAH AND HIS ‘IDEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE’ AT WINNEBA Kofi Darkwah Abstract (by Bea Lundt): This paper concerns itself with the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, which was founded in Winneba in 1961. After Nkrumah became the first president and prime minister of the independent nation of Ghana, he began to actively pursue his goal of forming the former British colony of the Gold Coast according to his convictions. While he himself possessed a sound education in and comprehensive knowledge of Marxist-Leninist political theory, the ideological background of his party followers and their knowledge of the fundamentals of the Marxist-Socialist and Pan-African ideals which he pursued, were rather meagre. The purpose of the Institute was, in two-year courses, to convey Nkrumah’s teachings. The training was directed especially towards regular members and political activists in Nkrumah’s party – but also towards freedom fighters from the remaining colonies in Africa. After Nkrumah’s overthrow, the Institute was closed, and numerous writings on its work were destroyed. This article is based on the examination of the still-available documents as well as interviews with contemporaries who were involved with or who bore witness to the Institute’s work during its active phase. It will also discuss the circumstances surrounding the Institute’s foundation and the profiles of the people who studied there. It also outlines the content that was taught and describes the teaching staff along with the rooms and facilities. It refutes the often-held view that the Ideological Institute in Winneba stands in direct competition to the University of Ghana in Legon near Accra, which had a more colonial orientation. It will be shown that the Ideological Institute was not a university and did not aspire to be one. In conclusion, this paper will highlight the international influence of the Institute, in particular in passing on the experiences of the liberation movements in other African countries. The Lumumba Institute in Kenya follows Nkrumah’s example.

INTRODUCTION In the euphoria that followed the overthrow of Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, in February 1966, a great deal of valuable historical material – books, files, and other documents – relating to the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba were destroyed. According to some surviving individuals, who were workers at the Institute at the time, anyone found in possession of any books, files, or other documents belonging to the Institute or bearing on its work was either arrested or beaten up by soldiers and the material retrieved and destroyed. As a result, valuable information on, or direct evidence of, the work of the Ideological Institute has been lost to researchers. Unfortunately, such naiveté and myopia continue to characterise the attitude and behaviour of societies which have no sense of the historical value of books and documents, nor of some of the old buildings and sites in their communities.

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That is why in Ghana, for example, old buildings in Accra, Cape Coast, and other historic places are increasingly being destroyed in the name of redevelopment or urban renewal. This essay on the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba has therefore, been put together from both direct and indirect information derived from three main sources: (a) files of the Bureau of African Affairs at the Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD), formerly Ghana National Archives, (b) interviews with carefully selected surviving individuals and (c) secondary sources. I have tried to deal with the weaknesses and problems associated with such sources as best as I could. PREPARATION FOR POLITICAL CAREER A good deal of literature, produced by both admirers and critics, exists on the life and work of Kwame Nkrumah, and Nkrumah himself has contributed in no small measure to this body of work. From all this material one gets a picture of a man who spent ten of his youthful years (1935–1945) studying in the USA and preparing himself for a future political career. During these years he read a wide array of radical literature, especially of the Marxist-Leninist type. His understanding of the nature and problems of colonialism in Africa began to be shaped by what he read. In 1945, he moved from the United States to London, intending to continue his education there, but he soon became actively involved in the organisation of the Pan African Congress held in Manchester that year. His stay in the United Kingdom also brought him into contact with the political ferment that was developing there among students from different parts of colonial Africa. These experiences in the UK helped to sharpen and reinforce his theoretical perspectives on the problems of colonialism and imperialism in dependent Africa and on the solution to those problems. Nkrumah believed strongly that, colonialism, along with its associated capitalism and balkanisation was the bane of Africa; for Africa to progress as a continent, therefore, it had to free itself from colonialism. For him socialism and a united continent were the solutions to Africa’s problems. Ideologically, therefore, Kwame Nkrumah saw himself as a Marxist-Socialist and Pan Africanist.1 STRATEGIES TO REALISE NKRUMAH’S VISION When Ghana became independent in 1957, Nkrumah, as Prime Minister, now had a territorial and political base from where to put into practice his socialist and Pan-Africanist ideology to realise his vision for Ghana and the rest of Africa. 1

Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana. The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, London 1957, 12.

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Whatever else Nkrumah was, he may also be seen as a man of ideas, an organiser, a planner, and a strategist who, as much as possible, left little or nothing to chance in the pursuit of his political objectives. Over the years, Nkrumah set up a number of structures, institutions, organisations, and agencies, whose operations he expected would help to facilitate the realisation of his vision for Ghana and the rest of Africa. Among these were a political party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP) (1949); newspapers and other publications for propaganda purposes, for example the Accra Evening News (1949) and The Spark (1962); the National Association of Socialist Students’ Organizations (NASSO) in London (1956); the Bureau of African Affairs in Accra (BAA) (1959); and the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba (KNII) (1961). In its own way, each of these organisations worked to further Nkrumah’s political and ideological objectives. The CPP was, of course, the political party that spearheaded and over-arched Kwame Nkrumah’s nationalist, socialist, and Pan-Africanist activities. The NASSO was a tool for educating Ghanaian students in the UK and elsewhere in socialist ideology. The BAA was the operational agency by which Nkrumah’s Pan African policy was put into practice. The KNII, which is the focus of our discussion in this paper, was the centre for socialist ideological education for the CPP in Nkrumah’s Ghana. As such, it supplemented and complemented the work of the other organisations. ESTABLISHING THE KNII On 18 February 1961, the foundation stone was laid for an educational centre which became known officially as the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute. This Ideological Institute was established at Winneba, a pleasant coastal town of considerable antiquity, some 64 kilometres west of Accra. As a Marxist, Nkrumah appreciated the need to set up an institute to educate people in the ideas and principles of socialism. Now that he was the Prime Minister of an independent West African nation, Ghana, Nkrumah intended to establish a socialist state. He is reported to have said, at a welcome ceremony in Accra for President Tito of Yugoslavia on 1 March 1961. ‘I am determined to build a socialist state in Ghana entirely Ghanaian in character and African in outlook, and based on a Marxist Socialist philosophy…’2 Much as he may have wanted to do this, he was also acutely aware of the fact that there were very few seriously committed socialists in his vanguard party, the CPP, not to mention Ghana as a whole. To be sure, there were a handful of committed Marxists and radical Socialists in the party, including Kodwo Addison, Kofi Batsa, Eric Heymann, Anthony Kobina-Woode, John Tettegah, Tawia Adamafio, and a few others,3 but Nkrumah realised that he could not 2 3

David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, Accra 2007, 225. Each one of the named individuals and many of the other ‘socialist boys’ came to hold high political position(s) and played important roles in Nkrumah’s Ghana. For example, Tawia

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build socialism in the country with so few socialists. He therefore needed to start socialist ideological education, first of the members of his CPP and then any others who might require such education. As indicated by Nkrumah himself, the aim of the Institute was to give educational ideological training to Party activists, trade union officials and our cooperators of the National Co-operative Council. In addition it will train freedom fighters from all over Africa who wish to come to Ghana for ideological and educational orientation. 4

Thus, the aims of the Institute reflected Nkrumah’s two major concerns at this time – firstly, to provide the socialist ideological education of his party members with a view to creating the critical number of committed socialists needed for successful implementation of his planned socialist reforms, or revolution, in Ghana; secondly, to train freedom fighters from all over Africa by giving them the ideological and educational training that would advance Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist vision of all of the dependent states of Africa liberated from colonial rule and united politically into one continental government strong enough to make its voice heard and be taken seriously in world affairs. To facilitate the realisation of its mandate, the Institute was organised into two sections, or centres, for operational purposes: namely, the Positive Action Training Centre and the Ideological Training Centre. Although technically an educational facility, the Institute was operationally independent and was not ‘subject to any regulations of the Education Department or the Ghana Education Trust’,5 government bodies that regulated curriculum instruction and superintended the operations of educational establishments in Ghana at the time. This operational

4 5

Adamafio helped to organise the NASSO in London while studying law there between 1956 and 1960; on his return to Ghana he successively became General Secretary of the CPP, Minister of Presidential Affairs, and Minister of Information and Broadcasting. An expert propagandist, Adamafio is believed to have initiated the campaign for Nkrumah’s personality cult. After a bomb attack on Nkrumah in August 1962, Adamafio and others were accused of the crime, arrested, and tried; though found not guilty, Adamafio was put under preventive detention until Nkrumah’s overthrow in February 1966. (2) John K Tettegah became active in Labour Union activities at a young age, and at the age of 24 became the Secretary-General of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress (TUC) in 1954 and a member of the Central Committee of the CPP. He went on to hold one powerful position after another – he became head of the Workers Brigade (1959) and a year later was appointed a roving ambassador with the official title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. He continued his association with the TUC, even while working for the government, and in 1964, he was appointed the first Secretary-General of the All-African Trade Union Federation, one of the Pan-African organisations spearheaded by Nkrumah as a means to achieve African political union, which he favoured. (3) Anthony Kobina Woode was a member of the Legislative Assembly in 1951, Parliamentary and Personal Secretary to Dr Nkrumah, and later became the first Chief Executive Officer of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). E. A. Haizel, Education in Ghana 1951–1966, in: Kwame Arhin (ed.), The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah, Trenton NJ (USA) 1993, 73. Haizel, Education in Ghana, 73.

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independence was considered necessary in view of the type of curriculum and instructions given at the Institute. STUDENTS AND PROGRAMMES Who then, were the people who enrolled at the Institute as students, what was their educational background or qualification, and where did they come from? David Rooney states in his book that ‘the institute’s priority was to train CPP party workers in socialist ideology.’6 This implies that the students were mostly members of the CPP, presumably the rank and file, whose academic qualifications were not necessarily the most important credentials for entering the Institute, but rather their status or rank within the party. There is, of course, evidence indicating clearly that students at the Institute comprised not only Ghanaians but also students from other parts of Africa, including present-day Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Files at the PRAAD7 provide interesting information on the students and help us to answer the questions raised at the beginning of this paragraph. The information covers the period 1962–66. Analysis of the information reveals the following: The programme of study was normally two years at the end of which one graduated and was awarded a certificate to that effect. In 1962, 190 students entered as first years students; of this number 72 completed their two year programme and graduated in 1964. In 1963, 126 students entered first year and were expected to graduate in 1965. In 1964 a total of 72 students entered first year to graduate in 1966.

The names of all the Ghanaian students are provided for each year of entry, together with their towns of origin, ages, academic qualifications, and party status or status in the CPP. The names of the towns showed that the students came from all regions of Ghana. The qualifications listed for each first-year group ranged from Teacher’s Certificate ‘A’ (post-secondary or post ‘B’) and Secondary School Certificate to Middle School Leaving Certificate (MSLC) and Standard 7 Certificate. There were a few other miscellaneous qualifications, such as certificates from the London Chamber of Commerce and the City and Guilds of London, as well as degrees in Agricultural Training, Commercial Education, Draughting, and Technical Education. The ages listed in the records also cover a range for which the following analysis is provided: 1962 cohort of 190 students, 21–48 years. 1963 cohort of 126 students, 21–42 years. 1964 cohort of 72 students, 21–51 years.

6 7

Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, 240. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana, RG. 17/2/30. PRAAD is the acronym for Public Records and Archives Administration Department, formerly Ghana National Archives.

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In all the groups, the majority were in their twenties and thirties, with only a few in their forties and only one person in his or her fifties. On party status, the positions listed include member; voluntary organiser; education secretary; secretary convenor; district organiser; branch party secretary; party education secretary; ward party secretary; propaganda secretary; assistant party secretary; district organisers of Ghana Young Pioneers (GYP), the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the National Council of Ghana Women (NCGW), and the United Ghana Farmers Council; regional organiser of the TUC; and farmer. It must be explained that the GYP, the TUC, the NCGW, and the Farmers Council were all organisations separate from the CPP but which, by government policy, were over time made to become integral wings of the CPP. Also listed are a total of 7 non-Ghanaian students in the 1963–1965 final-year group; their names are listed, and their countries of origin are given as Kenya and Nigeria; their ages range from 23–27 years, and their statuses are given as private trader, farmer, teacher (3), Kenya TUC member, and Nigeria TUC member.8 Besides the figures from the PRAAD, there are also enrolment figures, whose origin and authenticity I am unable to confirm but which are reproduced here for comparative purposes. … 1962 – 100 students of whom 72 graduated in 1964 including three Somalis; 1963 – 210 students (five Kenyans, two Nigerians). 1964 – 475 students (five Kenyans, two Nigerians – second year – four Senegalese – first year and an unidentified number of Malawians). 9

Apart from the regular students, the Institute received, from time to time, groups of persons who may be described as ‘occasional students’ for short-term courses in ideological orientation, lasting from a few days up to about one month at a time. These ‘occasional students’ included high-ranking CPP officials such as government ministers, regional and district Commissioners, other senior officials in the Ghana Civil and Public service, as well as Ghanaian ambassadors to foreign countries. The ambassadors were usually required to go to the Ideological Institute for briefing before taking up their posts.10 The Bureau of African Affairs also sent people to the Institute for training. Such persons would usually come from radical or revolutionary organisations in other parts of Africa.11 There is also evidence to indicate that the campus of the Ideological Institute was, on occasion, used for activities and functions other than straightforward education. Such activities and functions included national and international conferences; for example, party workshops and conferences. In June 1962, the AllAfrican Freedom Fighters’ Conference, a meeting of the leaders of the various liberation movements and organisations of freedom fighters from those parts of

8 9 10 11

See footnote 7 above. www.kokorokoo.com/Ideology.aspx [30.08.2016]. Interview with Ambassador K. B. Asante, La, Accra, 25 June 2014. K. B. Asante, interview cited; see also PRAAD, Accra, RG. 17/1/7, Kwame Nkrumah to A. K. Barden, Director of the BAA, 4 June 1965.

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Africa still under colonial rule, was held at the Institute.12 This conference lasted over two weeks, and indeed all the conference work was actually done at Winneba, ostensibly to elude spies parading as reporters. Courses offered at the Institute were generally labelled as either ‘Economics’, ‘History’, ‘Government’, or ‘Philosophy’, but considering the focus of the Institute, there is little doubt that the actual contents were Marxist-Leninist ideology, together with ‘Nkrumahism’, which was the description given to Nkrumah’s concept of African socialism. As defined by Nkrumah himself, ‘Nkrumahism’ was ‘scientific socialism’ applied to countries emerging from colonialism.13 TEACHING STAFF Not only did the students represent several other African countries as well as Ghana, but the teachers, radical socialists all, came from a number of countries all over the world. They included two Nigerian communists, Bankole Akpata and Samuel G. Ikoku, two British communist writers, Pat Sloan and Idris Cox, a Hungarian, Tibor Szamuelly, a Senegalese, Mohammed Diop, and a fluctuating number of Ghanaian full-time and part-time teachers, among whom were J. K. Nsarko, Kwesi Gabson, Kofi Batsa, Eric Heymann, T. D. Baffo, and a Mr. Halm.14 Nkrumah himself gave a few lectures now and again on his ideas; this was especially the case whenever there was a conference of party faithfuls, including ministers and or senior civil servants. The Director of the Institute was Kodwo Addison, and his deputy was J. Kwesi Nsarko. Kofi Batsa, Eric Heymann, and T. D. Baffo were the editors of The Spark, the Accra Evening News, and the Ghanaian Times respectively, the CPP’s publications, which articulated the views of the party and its leader. They did their job so well that these editors, together with Kodwo Addison, John Tettegah, Tawia Adamafio and a few others, the radical wing of the CPP, were described as the ‘socialist boys’. This radical group within the CPP had an ongoing battle with the conservative faction, described as the ‘old guards’, for the ear of the ‘old man’

12 See footnote 9 above. 13 Trevor Jones, Ghana’s first Republic 1960–1966, London 1976, 63 and 304, n. 5. 14 Ibid.,, 303, n. 2; Interview with K. B. Asante cited; interview with Kofi Boadi and George Tetteh, Winneba, 22 July 2014. John Kofi Boadi was employed at the Institute in June 1962 as Steward and served the Director till the end of the life of the Institute; he continued to serve the different Directors of the Advanced Teacher Training College (ATTC), which took over the campus of the Ideological Institute, and also served the Principals and Vice Chancellors of the University College when the ATTC was amalgamated with other institutions to become the University (College) of Education in 1992. He retired as Chief Steward in 2002. George Tetteh was originally employed as a gardener at Flagstaff House and transferred to the Ideological Institute in July 1963. He too continued to work for the successor institutions until 2003.

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(Nkrumah) and, through him, for power and influence in the party and in Ghana. It was generally believed that the ‘old guards’ were pro-West and the ‘socialist boys’ pro-Eastern Block. With the latter group in charge of the party’s structures, and as teachers at the Ideological Institute, the odds appeared to be in their favour. Kofi Batsa’s activities seem to exemplify the indirect functional or operational relationship that existed between the Bureau of African Affairs and the Ideological Institute, hinted at earlier in this paper. Officially employed at the BAA as a journalist and editor of the Bureau’s publication, The Spark, he was also responsible for certain other aspects of the Bureau’s work. Kofi Batsa edited The Spark with S. G. Ikoku as co-editor; so these two were not only editors of The Spark but also lecturers at the Institute. ‘[O]ur job on The Spark’, wrote Kofi Batsa, ‘was to crystallize Nkrumah’s thinking in terms of specific policies and to describe the issues of each week in ways which reflected his thinking...’15 There was an effective network by which The Spark and its sister publication, Voice of Africa, were distributed to other parts of Africa. In 1965, there were even plans to publish The Spark in Portuguese so as to target Portuguese African colonies.16 Would one be wrong in assuming that these ideas expressed in The Spark and also the Voice of Africa, together with those other aspects of Batsa’s work at the Bureau were part of the curriculum taught to students at the Institute? In this way the ideological education at the Institute complemented the work at the BAA. THE PHYSICAL FACILITIES AT KNII Both David Rooney and Trevor Jones have suggested that Nkrumah may have considered the Institute as the Party’s university for training its workers because most of Ghana’s university students at the time ‘stood aloof from the party’.17 Be that as it may, between February 1961, when the foundation stone was laid, and February 1966, when Nkrumah was overthrown, several million pounds were channelled into the Institute to provide adequate physical facilities. The first structures to be erected were six staff houses and two three-storey buildings; the lower floor of one of the three-storey buildings housed classrooms, and the top floors were used as a student residential hall; the lower floor of the other threestorey building contained offices, an assembly hall, a dining hall, and a kitchen, 15 Kofi Batsa, The Spark: times behind me. From Kwame Nkrumah to Hilla Limann, London 1985, 15. Kofi Batsa was one of the socialist radicals within the CPP. Trained as a journalist, he worked officially in that capacity at the BAA but combined that role with that of an underground political agent, pursuing the liberation agenda of the BAA. Samuel G. Ikoku was a Nigerian Marxist exile in Ghana employed by the BAA as co-editor of the Bureau’s publication, The Spark; he was also one of lecturers in Marxism at the KNII. 16 Batsa, The Spark, 14; PRAAD, Accra, RG. 17/1/7, Kofi Batsa to Osagyefo, 6 April 1965; Kwame Nkrumah to Kofi Batsa, 8 April 1965. 17 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, 240; Jones, Ghana’s first Republic, 60.

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while its upper floors provided more residential rooms for students. In 1962, two million pounds were made available for further development, and the following year, an additional £1,100,000 was spent on the expansion of facilities. The new buildings developed with these moneys included thirty staff houses, a main hall, a library, a forty-bed hospital, a bell tower and a twenty-foot high granite statute of Nkrumah. Additional buildings, which went up the following year, included two large residential halls, a swimming pool and an amphitheatre. Such phenomenal growth within four years of its existence reflects the importance attached to the Institute by ‘Nkrumah and his … (socialist) advisers’.18 Indeed, so many infrastructural facilities were provided for the Institute that, after the fall of Nkrumah in February 1966, the campus could be turned into an Advanced Teacher Training College with virtually no addition to the physical facilities then existing. SUCCESS OR FAILURE? With all these investments in the Ideological Institute at Winneba, how well did it serve Nkrumah’s purpose or meet his aspiration? Some existing comments on the Institute tend to be negative: ‘a disappointing failure’, ‘a disappointment to Nkrumah who had had such high hopes for it’.19 These judgements appear to derive from a somewhat erroneous perception of the Institute as the CPP’s rival institution to the University of Ghana. The Institute was not a university; unlike either of the universities then in Ghana, it had a clearly defined political agenda, and it was focused on the pursuit of that agenda. It may be difficult to quantify the extent of success, but as Rooney admits ‘it certainly gave useful training to active party workers and some of its graduates achieved rapid promotion in the party hierarchy or in the state corporations. ’20 Despite this achievement, the CPP’s own newspaper, the Accra Evening News, expressed dissatisfaction with the work ethics of some of the Institute’s graduates.21 It may even be argued that the achievement indicated by Rooney was not commensurate with the funds and efforts invested in the Institute and its work. Nevertheless, we ought not overlook the successes achieved by the Institute in the not-easy-to quantify areas of inspiring, training, and, together with the BAA, providing logistical support for cadres of several liberation organisations and movements in eastern, central, and southern parts of Africa, then under colonial rule. Perhaps one of the best, but least known, pieces of evidence for the success of the Institute in these areas is the inspiration

18 This section of the paper on physical facilities and infrastructural development at the KNII is based mainly on information from www.niica/ghana/ideology.aspx [04.02.2015]. 19 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, 240; Jones, Ghana’s first Republic, 61. 20 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, 240. 21 Jones, Ghana’s first Republic, 61, quotation from Evening News, 1 October 1965.

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that its work gave to Kenya in establishing the Lumumba Institute, an ideological institute along the lines of Kwame Nkrumah’s Ideological Institute at Winneba.22 CONCLUSION In Kwame Nkrumah’s political scheme of things the Ideological Institute at Winneba was an important centre for not only socialist ideological education in Ghana but also for the prosecution and realisation of his African policy, the aim of which was twofold: (a) the liberation of those parts of Africa still under colonial rule and (b) political unification of an independent Africa under one government. To achieve this aim, resources were provided to the Institute to enable it carry out its mandate. While it existed (February 1961–February 1966), the Institute actively pursued its mandate. How much success it achieved may be a subject of disagreement among scholars, but there is little doubt that together with other agencies, such as the Bureau of African Affairs, the Institute educated, inspired, trained, and provided logistical support for cadres of several liberation movements and organisations in all parts of Africa.

22 PRAAD, Ghana, RG. 17/1/7, B.F.F. Oluande K’Oduol, Secretary, Lumumba Trust, to H.E. Mr. David Busumtwi-Sam, High Commissioner for Ghana, Nairobi, 2 February, 65.

WOMEN DURING THE NKRUMAH ERA Cyrelene Amoah-Boampong Abstract: Historical scholarship on Ghanaian women has focused on gender relations during the colonial period and its impact on the status of women. Recent publications by Jean Allman emphasise ‘women’s modes of adjustment, negotiation and resistance’ to colonial rule. Looking beyond colonialism, this chapter explores the immediate postcolonial era in Ghana under Dr Kwame Nkrumah. It examines the role that women played during this key period of political transformation from 1951 to 1966. It argues that in contrast to the colonial state’s hegemony and political marginalisation of women, the Nkrumah regime, exploited and improved gender equality and equity. The Convention People’s Party (CPP) took the formative steps in redressing the gender imbalance of the colonial period and created space for female agency and empowerment in Ghana.

INTRODUCTION Kwame Nkrumah, the pioneer of Ghana’s independence, was a political leader extraordinaire. Awarded the title ‘Africa’s Man of the Millennium’ by a 2000 BBC World Service listeners’ poll and celebrated by Eric Walberg as ‘the Greatest African,’ Nkrumah contributed to the decolonisation process, Pan-Africanism, and world politics much that is enduring and transformative. Scholars have studied and written extensively about Nkrumah’s transformative contributions, especially with respect to politics.1 However, in the realm of gender relations, scholarly work is limited.2 This chapter examines Kwame Nkrumah and his administra1

2

Some works beyond Kwame Nkrumah’s monographs include T. Peter Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship, London 1970; Cyril LR James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution, London 1977; Tawia Adamafio, By Nkrumah’s Side. The Labour and the Wounds, Accra 1982; Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs. The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951–1960, Oxford 1988; Kwame Arhin, The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah, Accra 1991; Kwame Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-cultural Thought and Politics. An African-Centered Paradigm for the Second Phase of the African Revolution, London 2004; Ama Biney, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, New York 2011 and Harcourt Fuller, Building the Ghanaian Nation-State. Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism, New York 2014. The seminal works on Nkrumah and women are Takyiwaa Manuh, ‘Women and their Organisations during the Convention Peoples Party’, in: Kwame Arhin (ed.), The Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah, Accra 1991, 108–130; Dzodzi Tsikata, ‘Women’s Organizing in Ghana since the 1990s. From Individual Organizations to Three Coalitions’, in: Development, 52 (2009), 185–192; Jean Allman, Susan Grieger and Nakanyike Musise (eds.), Women in African Colonial Histories, Bloomington 2002.

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tion’s relations with Ghanaian women from 1951 to 1966. It argues that in contrast to the colonial state’s hegemony and political marginalisation of women, the Nkrumah regime, exploited and improved gender equality and equity. The Convention People’s Party (CPP) took the formative steps in redressing the gender imbalance of the colonial period and created space for female agency and empowerment in Ghana. The idea of women’s empowerment is not a phenomenon exclusive to the twenty-first century. Multiple perspectives and definitions abound. However, this study adopts Srilatha Batliwala’s notion that empowerment is manifested as a redistribution of power between nations, classes, races, castes, and genders.3 Through the process of empowerment, women become conscious of power disparities between the sexes and social classes and are enabled to act to rectify this variance. This definition highlights the role of existing economic, political, and cultural processes in the subordination of Ghanaian women. Indeed, women’s inferior status and unequal gender relations are deeply and firmly embedded within the existing sociopolitical structures of patriarchal Ghanaian society and in the minds of men and women. This internalised perception, strengthened and protected by sociocultural norms, caused Ghanaian women to believe that their inferior position was normal and natural. Through the process of empowerment, enabled by the Nkrumah government, Ghanaian women gained a broader social understanding of their ‘powerlessness’ and transformed their limited personal boundaries to the expanse of collective possibilities manifested in the key role women played during the nationalist phase in Ghana’s history. The contemporary situation of marginalisation and subordination that Ghanaian women experience is ironic. During the precolonial era, relations between the sexes, in traditional society did not follow a linear path of female subjugation. They rather followed one of gender complementarity. This complementarity, according to Kwame Arhin, was evident in the dual-gendered system of political authority. Men and women occupied leadership positions that were analogous and balanced each other.4 For example, in the Volta region, a female monarch, who contributed to community leadership and decision-making, reigned alongside a male king. In Northern Ghana, despite the influence of Islam and the high level of patriarchy, women had political space to operate in society. In Dagbon, three chieftaincy positions – Kukulogu, Kpatuya, and Gundogu – were reserved for the daughters of the Ya-Na (king of the Dagbon).5 This dual-gendered system prevented any wielder of traditional political authority from monopolising power. Furthermore, the Akan (the largest ethnic group in the Gold Coast region) had no gender or age restraint to their concept of power. Power was available to anybody 3 4 5

Srilatha Batliwala, ‘Taking the Power out of Empowerment. An Experiential Account’, in: Development in Practice, 17 (2007), 557–565. Kwame Arhin, ‘The Political and Military Roles of Akan Women’, in: Christine Oppong (ed.), Female and Male in West Africa, London 1983, 91–98. Irene Odotei, ‘Women in Male Corridors of Power’, in: Irene Odotei and Albert Awedoba (eds.), Chieftaincy in Ghana. Culture, Governance and Development, Accra 2006, 81–100.

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with the knowledge and ability to bring about social and political change. Thus, philosophically, the Akan made ample room for female agency in Ghanaian traditional leadership.6 Beyond philosophical thought, the institution of the queen mother, ohemaa (Akan), manye (Ga-Dangme), and mamao (Ewe), was also an important avenue for women’s political activism. Among the matrilineal Akan, the ohemaa was the co-ruler with the omanhene (king). The ohemaa’s role in Asante and other Akan communities was crucial to governance. For instance, it was the prerogative of the Asantehemaa (queen mother of Asante), in consultation with the abusuapanin (head of the lineage), to select or nominate a candidate to be made Asantehene (king of Asante) from eligible male successors. As the repository of her peoples’ heritage and royal genealogy, the Asantehemaa knew which candidates were pure royals with good character to succeed to the throne.7 Beyond her function as kingmaker, the Asantehemaa was present at court with the Asantehene and his Council of Elders. She deliberated on key issues such as the death penalty, declarations of war, and the distribution of land. Only the Asantehemaa could commence impeachment proceedings against the Asantehene. If she spoke, her word was final. A classic example of this female authority and agency was in 1900 when Yaa Asantewaa, a female monarch of the Ejisu-Asante, was able to galvanise the Asante people to declare war against the British without question. She played on the machismo of Asante men and stated: How can a proud and brave people like the Asante sit back and look while the white men took away their king and chiefs, and humiliated them with a demand for the Golden Stool…. If you, the chiefs of Asante, are going to behave like cowards and not fight, you should exchange your loincloths for my undergarments…8

With this challenge to Asante masculinity, Yaa Asantewaa expanded the authority of the ohemaa and usurped that of the omanhene, who had the sole responsibility for commanding the Asante armed forces. Beyond Yaa Asantewaa, another important Asante female leader was Nana Dwaben Ama Serwaa. She ruled the citystate of Dwaben from 1841 to 1850. In her capacity as female monarch, Nana Ama Serwaa successfully negotiated the return of her people from exile and rebuilt Dwaben’s capital. Clearly, indigenous complementary gender relations in precolonial Ghana underpinned leadership positions for women, notwithstanding the patriarchal nature of Ghanaian society. Many of the women who held leadership positions were of regal status. However, these royal women did not exercise their political power solely through their relationship with men. The existence of parallel leadership positions in precolonial Ghana clearly points to the fact that egalitarian gender relation applied to the traditional social framework. 6 7 8

Emmanuel Akyeampong/Pashington Obeng, ‘Spirituality, Gender and Power in Asante History’, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies 28 (1995), 401–508. Arhin, Political and Military Roles of Akan Women, 91–98. Agnes Aidoo, ‘Women in History and Culture in Ghana’, in: Research Review 1 (1985), 14– 51.

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From the glorious heights of the precolonial era, women’s political power and agency began to diminish by the eighteenth century. Irene Odotei blames this erosion on the effects of European and African trade relations dominated by the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The slave trade created insecurity and led to rampant warfare, militarising precolonial polities. As states became more aggressive, power became skewed in favour of men. European–African cultural interaction ultimately led to the introduction of western norms of male superiority at the expense of the precolonial system of gender complementarity and robbed women of their traditional space and power in governance. GENDER AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER The colonial period in Ghana was relatively short-lived. However, the sociopolitical impact of the colonial era was tremendous. The historical controversy over the impact of colonialism on the status of women stems from what Oyeronke Oyewumi calls ‘gender logic’. Oyewumi maintains that colonialism must be blamed for reducing women’s status because the system introduced rigid gender categories linked to biology, sex, and women’s subordination. She contends that, in the context of Nigeria, gender did not exist in precolonial Yoruba culture. It was invented and imposed onto the culture by the West based on an ideology of biological determinism. Thus, for women, colonisation was a twofold process of ‘racial inferiorisation and gender marginalization’.9 The colonial powers refashioned gender relations through ‘material power’ (by introducing new land policies) and ‘discursive power’ (by reinventing tradition for the colonised people). Takyiwaa Manuh extends this argument further with an example from Ghana. She asserts that Victorian values that defined men as breadwinners accounted for the situation in which Ghanaian women received little or no remuneration from colonial administrators for their labour. Women’s subordination was evident in the public service, as women received lower salaries than their male counterparts.10 The alliance between the colonial administration, traditional male elites, and Christian missionaries worsened the situation in gender relations that favoured male domination of decision-making structures. The patriarchal assumptions of British colonial authorities and missionaries were based on Victorian notions that emphasised motherhood, domesticity, and purity. These values prevented Ghanaian women’s active participation in the public sphere, as women were expected to stay home while men occupied salaried positions. Women’s marginalisation was further reinforced by the Ghanaian males’ attempt to exert control over women in their households and societies through customary laws. However, customary law was not the embodiment of ‘traditional’ culture but a product of the relationship between male traditional elders and a colonial state eager to avoid turmoil and 9 Oyeronke Oyewumi (ed.), African Gender Studies, New York 2005, 62. 10 Manuh, Women and their Organisations, 108–130.

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curb the activities of women who were finding ways under colonialism to avoid male domination. Sandra E. Greene’s work on the Anlo-Ewe society in Ghana explores how colonialism simultaneously advantaged and disadvantaged women. Greene contends that prior to the seventeenth century, Anlo women inherited land from their parents and could bequeath land to their children. However, by the nineteenth century, while older women actively participated in decision-making processes, younger women, influenced by Victorian notions, lost their access and rights to participate in decision-making, especially with respect to marriage.11 In his study on aspects of elite women’s activism, Kwabena AkurangParry also provides evidence to support women’s agency and assertiveness. He argues that as members of voluntary and charity organisations, elite women were not passive but sought to reform both indigenous and colonial patriarchies. Exploring the contributions of the Native Ladies of the Cape Coast to the British war with Ashanti in 1874, Akurang-Parry asserts that the activism of elite women should be seen within the context of their ability to mobilise funds to reduce their vulnerability and dependence. It also shows how social change and acculturation remoulded women’s indigenous organisations, as women grafted aspects of the colonial system onto their indigenous patriarchal systems to define and shape their status as well as improve the conditions of other women.12 Gender relations during the colonial era were not static. Emmanuel Akyeampong attributes changes in gender relations prior to the sixteenth century to social upheavals. He contends that the early colonial period provided opportunity for women to define their autonomy outside male authority. Women had opportunities to acquire wealth and gain social and economic autonomy in villages and towns as a result of colonial initiatives in rural cash crop cultivation and urban capital production.13 Comparably, Jean Allman points to trading and cash crop farming as initiating a period of gender crisis in Ashanti by the 1930s. She argues that marriage, divorce, and maternal/paternal responsibilities towards children were challenged, contested, and redefined due to the widespread economic changes. This development affected future economic autonomy and security for Ashanti women who, until the supremacy of cocoa as cash crop, grew food crops that fed their families and provided them with personal income. In another study, Allman and Victoria Tashjian explored the complex interactions and responses of women to the changes in the colonial economy. The authors argued that despite efforts of colonial authorities to gain control over women’s productive and reproductive labour, women created new opportunities for themselves, and these empowered them to challenge ‘the shifting terrain of patriarchal power’. In all these socioeconomic changes, women were not hapless victims of colonialism. In many ways 11 Sandra E. Greene, Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change. A History of the Anlo-Ewe, London 1996. 12 Kwabena Akurang-Parry, ‘Aspects of Elite Women’s Activism in the Gold Coast 1874– 1890’, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies 37 (2004), 463–482. 13 Akyeampong/Obeng, Spirituality, Gender and Power, 401–508.

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and through their daily rituals in society, Ghanaian women negotiated institutional norms of exclusion that restricted their mobility and efforts to be part of the public sphere. Beyond the introduction of Victorian moral values that systemised the subordination of women, colonisation became detrimental to Ghanaian women through its institutions. The British established colonial structures, which included a judiciary, a capitalist economy, and a political system. None of these structures took cognisance of the power that Ghanaian women welded in their indigenous political structures during the precolonial era. Even the esteemed position of the queen mother was relegated. Women lacked any representation on the Native Authority Council or in the courts. The colonisers basically overlooked women and effectively encroached on the political space accorded women by precolonial polities. Indeed, the colonial political institutions simply enhanced men’s gendered positions by according men more privileges than women in the political, judicial, economic, and social domains. As such, the gendered-based dual political authority of traditional societies slowly gave way to patriarchal forms of political authority under British colonialism. European formal education further exacerbated the plight of Ghanaian women during the colonial era. Colonial schools were created to train indigenous men to support the administrative colonial structures. Female education emphasised ‘good behaviour and feminine skills as needlework, crochet and cookery’.14 It also focused on housekeeping, hygiene, and nutrition. These duties were supposed to make African women into good wives and mothers befitting their ‘westernised’ African husbands in the public sphere; they ignored the social realities and practices of Ghanaian women. Formal education led to the further marginalisation of women in public life, as it imposed Eurocentric notions of domesticity and morality on Ghanaian women and put women on the margins of social and public discourse. Women’s political activism was discouraged and virtually extinguished, as the colonial social order was more advantageous to men than women. Nevertheless, women formed voluntary associations during the latter part of the colonial era. One of the most prominent women’s associations was the National Federation of Gold Coast Women. This association worked through established voluntary groups in churches and markets to improve the livelihood of women and their progeny. In this regard, the National Federation of Gold Coast Women ‘sent petitions to the Governor and the Joint Provincial Council on discriminatory practices in employment, marriage, inheritance and social life affecting women’.15 However, this women’s advocacy group faced legitimacy issues, as the colonial establishment supported the status quo. Thus, its influence was narrow and did not extend to the broad masses of women. Undoubtedly, the emergence of the colonial state in Ghana transformed gender relations, and Holly Hanson summed it up best 14 Manuh, Women and their Organizations, 111. 15 Ibid., 112.

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when she stated, ‘[The] British colonial establishment could only see and comprehend the political power of men.’16 The historical patterns established by the British colonisers were contested by Dr Kwame Nkrumah’s administration, which sought to incorporate women into the postcolonial state. NKRUMAH AND GOLD COAST WOMEN Kwame Nkrumah was ushered into the political spotlight of the Gold Coast as a result of discontent with colonial rule. Transformations in the socioeconomic and political situation in the Gold Coast following World War II engendered a militant atmosphere in the colony. This was due to frustrations of ex-soldiers with postwar conditions and to public disapproval of the concentration of commerce in the hands Syrians and Lebanese, with its concomitant shortages and high prices for imported goods. These problems were aggravated by Gold Coasters’ agitating for a greater say in the political affairs of the colony. In the midst of these social upheavals, Kwame Nkrumah was invited and a one-hundred-pound passage from Britain (where he had been studying and organising Pan-African conferences) to Ghana paid for by the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) to take up the position of general secretary. However, Nkrumah’s political outlook differed from the elitist views of the UGCC, which limited its mobilisation efforts to the urban proletariat and chiefs. Nkrumah believed in a more broad-based approach that reached out to the Gold Coast masses. In 1949, Kwame Nkrumah broke away from the UGCC to form the Convention Peoples’ Party (CPP). Gold Coasters were now reignited with the goal of self-government, rather than taking the gradualist approach of the UGCC. Interestingly, Kwame Nkrumah personally admitted that he was not very comfortable around women.17 He wrote, I have never wanted to become too entangled with a woman because I know that I would never be able to devote enough attention to her, that sooner or later … she would begin to wander away from me. I was afraid too, that if I allowed a woman to play too important a part in my life I would gradually lose sight of my goal.18

Nkrumah elaborated on his apprehension in when he stated that, I have never outgrown that feeling towards women. It is not a fear to-day but something deeper. Perhaps it is dread of being trapped, of having my freedom taken away or being in

16 Holly Hanson, ‘Queen Mothers and Good Government in Buganda. The Loss of Women’s Political Power in Nineteenth Century East Africa’, in: Jean Allman/Susan Grieger/Nakanyike Musise (eds.), Women in African Colonial Histories, Bloomington 2002, 220. 17 The literature reveals that there were three influential women in Nkrumah’s life: his mother; his personal secretary, Erica Powell; and Genoveva Kanu. After his marriage to Fathia Rizk, she became Nkrumah’s closest female companion. 18 Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, London 1957, 10.

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Men’s attitudes towards women, and Nkrumah’s in particular, were socially constructed. Nkrumah was influenced by the dominant mood of the culture in which he lived, which glorified passivity and stereotyped sex roles for women, handicapping their elevation in society. Nkrumah also expressed a certain uneasiness when attempting to conceptualise women’s roles, especially faced with independently organised women such as Mrs Evelyn Amarteifio and her non-political Federation of Gold Coast Women, which also aimed at uplifting womanhood physically, morally, and spiritually. Notwithstanding his doubts and personal apprehension towards women, Nkrumah’s judgment was not clouded. He was clear that women were a vital component in the revolutionary cause. He enjoyed the accolades he received on the campaign trail from women. They enthusiastically flagged him and threw their kente cloths on the ground for him to walk on. While Nkrumah was riding through towns and villages, women stopped their chores and came out of their homes to greet him. Mothers danced joyfully for catching the slightest glimpse of him. Nkrumah, popularly known as ‘the show boy’, did not disappoint his fans. He charmed women with his warm smile and contagious laughter and transformed the political podium into a theatrical stage captivating his audience. Indeed, all over the country, Kwame Nkrumah invited Gold Coast women to actively participate in and contribute to the nationalist cause at a time when women’s suffrage was new to Africa. Women heeded his clarion call and mobilised support for the CPP and sold its ideology, particularly the ‘Positive Action’ campaign. This campaign reacted to the British Governor’s refusal to summon a constituent assembly and involved the destabilisation of British imperialism based on the principles of civil disobedience and non-violence and manifested through strikes, boycotts and non-co-operation with the colonial government.20 Mabel Dove, the editor of the Evening News tabloid established by Nkrumah, carried the Positive Action campaign in the press. She ‘furnished readers with a steady diet of political propaganda in which… they were supportive of the progressive CPP and defiant of colonialism’.21 Madame Akua Asabea Ayisi, a colleague at the Evening News and Ms Leticia Quaye were arrested and jailed for participating in the Positive Action campaign. Ultimately, the Evening News was banned and its office raided and closed down by the colonial police. This colonial show of force did not deter women from associating with the campaign of civil disobedience. Ordinary women such as Madam Elisabeth Naryea Mensah contributed their widow’s mite to the political struggle for independence by feeding political detainees, including Kwame Nkrumah. So appreciative was Nkrumah to the efforts of women like 19 Ibid., 12. 20 Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom. A Statement of African Unity, London 1961, 18. 21 Stephanie Newell/Audrey Gadzekpo (eds.) Selected Writings of a Pioneer West African Feminist, Mabel Dove, Nottingham 2004, ix.

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Madam Mensah that on his release, he visited Madam Mensah at her home, where she sprinkled talcum powder on him and poured libations thanking the ancestral spirits for his release.22 It was within this renewed awakening of women’s political activism from its precolonial slumber that the CPP women’s wing was born. Membership was open to women of all ethnicities and social classes. This reflected the varied socioeconomic backgrounds of Gold Coasters. Elite women and female monarchs, some of the core constituents of the UGCC, were not marginalised. For example, Nana Juaben Serwaa, Omanhene of Juaben, and Madam Mary Annan, Queen Mother of Jamestown were prominent public figures who actively and openly supported the CPP and attended rallies.23 The participation of these elite women among the staunch supporters of the CPP sent a clear message to political sceptics that the CPP was a party that embraced all Ghanaians. In addition, the CPP appointed Mrs Hanna Kudjoe, Madame Sophia Doku, Mrs Alice Appiah, Madam Ama Nkrumah and Mrs Leticia Quaye as propaganda secretaries in 1951.24 These women toured the length and breadth of the country and established women and youth wings in all the regions. They organised women in the various regions to disseminate Nkrumah’s message and canvassed massive votes for the party. The propaganda secretaries accompanied Nkrumah on the campaign trail and performed a plethora of functions including the composition of campaign songs, feeding and housing party leaders and appealing to Gold Coasters to participate in the nationalist struggle. Beyond the CPP’s women wing, Kwame Nkrumah exploited the network of association established by grassroots women, especially market women. Hardest hit by the socioeconomic hardships in the colony and at the forefront of agitations in 1948, the market women, who dominated the trade in imported commodities and local food crops in Accra and Kumasi central markets, were courted by the CPP for leadership positions.25 These market women had a well-established network of commodity distribution that served as a goldmine for the CPP to spread its politics and canvass for votes. The leadership of the market women also possessed absolute authority over its members, whose loyalty was unquestionable.26 Thus, the CPP’s strategic alliance with market women enabled Nkrumah to tap into an enormous social organisation with massive reach into the most remote parts of the Gold Coast. Nkrumah got to know each day what was happening in 22 Madam Elisabeth Naryea Mensah was the grandmother of Nana Oye Lithur, Minister of Gender, Children and Social Protection of the Republic of Ghana. See ‘Women’s Leadership and Gendered Role of Africa. Some Reflections’, Daily Graphic, 24 February 2014. 23 On 4 April 1959, Nana Juaben Serwaa was elevated to the position of paramount chief of Juaben in recognition of her immense service to Ghana. Public Archives and Administration Department (PRAAD), ADM 13/2/75. 24 Ghana Year Book 1961, 210. 25 Gracia Clark, Onions Are My Husband. Survival and Accumulation by West African Market Women, Chicago 1994, 248–282. 26 ‘Mother of Accra’s Market Women-Tribute to a Notable Ghanaian Trader’, The Ghanaian, 1958.

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villages in the country and he learned a great deal about business conditions and public sentiments from these women. Moreover, market women mobilised funds to help the nationalist efforts. Many of these women organised rallies, fundraisers and provided material support for the party from income generated through trading and cocoa farming. In recognition of their invaluable contribution to the nationalist cause, Kwame Nkrumah kept a close friendship with these women and invited them to state functions and to meet visiting dignitaries to the Gold Coast. Women were essential to Nkrumah’s vision and political agenda. He stated: [W]omen … must participate fully in the work of political education and organization. The influence of women over the youth of the country, and the fact that they are wives, sisters, and mothers of future freedom fighters must be utilized to the full by the revolutionary cadres.27

Thus, when appointed Leader of Government Business in the newly constituted Legislative Assembly, Nkrumah took positive steps to ensure the equality of men and women, especially through his educational policies. He believed education was the key to the elevation of women in the Gold Coast society, and with the help of education, women would have a global impact. Consequently, he approved an Accelerated Development Plan for Education in 1951 that was implemented in January 1952.28 This policy introduced free primary education for all boys and girls, which led to a tremendous increase in the number of pupils enrolled in the Colony, Ashanti and Trans-Volta Togoland to more than 122,000.29 By 1953, over 80 new schools opened throughout the colony with 12 situated in the Northern Territories.30 In addition, Takyiwaa Manuh notes, ‘many elderly women participated actively in the mass education campaigns of the period.’31 Through the educational policy, primary education for girls became accessible. Although secondary education was not free, the CPP government provided scholarships to enable needy but brilliant students to continue their education. At the level of higher education, Ama Biney points out that ‘more young women also entered higher institutions of learning and were sent abroad with men to train in the professions.’32 Nkrumah’s exposure of women to diverse employment opportunities was a stark contrast to the colonial era where the only profession open to women was teaching. Women within and outside the CPP took advantage of the changes under the Nkrumah administration to articulate their interests and challenge patriarchal perceptions of gender roles, especially in the press. Mabel Dove, the ex-wife of J.B. Danquah, wrote

27 Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare. A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution, New York 1968, 91. 28 Report on the Gold Coast for the Year 1952, 46. 29 Ibid. 30 Report on the Gold Coast for the Year 1953, 56. 31 Manuh, Women and their Organizations, 110. 32 Biney, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, 101.

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Gold Coast women have played a glorious part in the struggle and it is time the men showed some appreciation. The time is past when the male swaggers in front and the female with a baby on her back, a bundle on her head … walk timidly behind her lord and master. 33

Dove’s comments in the Daily Graphic on 5 September 1952 resonated with women throughout the Gold Coast. They had proven themselves capable of standing shoulder to shoulder in the male world of politics. Politics was an essential tool of self-empowerment for women who saw in the CPP the expansion of opportunities for their advancement. Clearly, Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP provided the context and organisation within which women could articulate their concerns, and expectations were high when the CPP took the helm of affairs from the colonial government on 6 March 1957. CONTESTING THE COLONIAL GENDER IMPERATIVE On 6 March 1957, the Gold Coast swept away the era of colonialism. Kwame Nkrumah took the lead in introducing a new order of things to Ghana and the African continent as a whole. Expressing the task ahead for the new nation, Nkrumah noted: The emphasis of the struggle has now shifted from the anti-imperialist phase to the internal one of struggle against the enemies of social progress; that is, against poverty, hunger, ignorance, squalor …Therefore every citizen must mobilise himself for the next phase of the struggle.34

This call to arms was gender neutral. Nkrumah sought to bring new life to all the people of Ghana and lead them to ‘the New Jerusalem, the golden city of our heart’s desire’.35 Women were an integral part of this new vision, and he stressed, ‘the degree of a country’s revolutionary awareness, may be measured by the political maturity of its women.’36 Clearly, Ghanaian women would not be taking the back seat. A year after independence, Nkrumah appointed three women ministers to his cabinet. There were also ten female Members of Parliament (MPs) in the first parliament of the First Republic of Ghana. The MPs were elected on the basis of a cabinet suggestion for the creation of special parliamentary electoral districts, which only women could contest. In May 1960, the Representation of the People (Women Members) Bill was introduced to cabinet and the National Assembly, ultimately leading to the appointment of the ten female MPs in June 1960. Through these appointments, Takyiwaa Manuh states, ‘Nkrumah catapulted women onto the political scene in a way that was new to both Ghana and Africa.’ Manuh contends that ‘for him [Nkrumah], this was part of the attempt at project-

33 Daily Graphic, 5 September 1952. 34 Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, 92. 35 Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, London, 1957, 196. 36 Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare, 91.

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ing the African Personality and at raising the status of African Womanhood’37 in order to further the task of nation-building and African unity. The African personality, in Nkrumah’s view, was the manifestation of Africa’s uniqueness as reflected in all aspects of life, and women had a critical role in this endeavour. Thus there was the ‘need for a new woman – one of virtue, vision and courage’ to reflect Africa’s uniqueness embodied in its values, system of thought, and statecraft as well as to project African agency. Mrs Annie Jiagge, a circuit judge was appointed the first woman high court judge, and Miss Margaret Sophia Darkwa became the first woman Assistant Superintendent of Police. Even in the entertainment industry, especially the Miss Ghana pageant, the African ideal of womanhood was key. Monica Amekoafia won the title of Miss Ghana 1957 based on a criterion of African aesthetics. The CPP administration undertook radical reforms with respect to the employment and retention of women in the civil service. During the colonial period, professional women in the Ministry of Health were asked to resign upon marriage. This was considered a degrading requirement, and at a meeting on 19 February 1959, the CPP cabinet decided ‘married female government employees, particularly those with professional qualifications in medicine, nursing, … were posted to the same stations as their husbands and … such officers should not be requested to leave the service upon marriage.’38 The Cabinet further proposed that pregnant married women should be given the option to resign or to stay in the service instead of being forced to leave their positions. The CPP introduced new measures such as the provision and expansion of health facilities in a bid to reduce the rate of maternal mortality. Facilities for training midwives were expanded. There was also the provision of maternity services at health centres and hospitals. All these measures held tremendous appeal to women. Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP government contested social norms and practices that impeded the advancement of Ghanaian women and posed a hindrance to the agenda of women’s empowerment. Nudity was one such obstacle. Earlier in 1957, Nkrumah had declared his foreign policy was based on three words: ‘Dignity, Peace and Friendship’.39 Nudity did not uphold the dignity of Ghanaian women and reflected badly on Ghana’s global reputation. By 1960, the anti-nudity campaign was in full swing. Nkrumah proposed that the wearing of footwear for children be made mandatory by law. The Cabinet further decided that legislative action be taken to abolish nudity in the northern and upper regions and in all other areas of the country. By the end of 1960, the Ministry of Social Welfare had initiated an intensive campaign against nudity, followed by mass education and health extension programmes. Bylaws were enacted by local authorities to sensitise Ghanaians and put an end to the practice of public nudity. 37 Manuh, Women and their Organizations, 109. 38 PRAAD ADM 13/1/28. Cabinet Minutes, ‘Women Employees in the Civil Service’, 19 February 1959. 39 Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, 97.

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Beyond nudity, the CPP government tackled other outmoded practices inimical to the progress of women, notably the status of native customary marriages, inheritance practices, and the maintenance of children. The Gold Coast colony had recognised marriages performed according to ordinance, customary, and Islamic criteria. The Marriage Ordinance of 1884 stipulated ‘any person who is married under this Ordinance shall be incapable during the continuance of such marriage of contracting valid marriage under any native law or custom…’40 The ordinance strictly recognised only monogamous unions. This was a problem, as polygamy was an accepted local practice, and numerous representations made to the colonial government to effect reforms fell on deaf ears. The Nkrumah administration inherited this situation, which placed women married under customary law in a tenuous position. In an attempt to empower women and guarantee a respectable position for wives and children in customary unions, the CPP government issued a White Paper in 1961. It set out proposals for a marriage, divorce and inheritance bill. Manuh states: The White Paper proposed a marriage law for all citizens of Ghana which would preserve the essence of customary law marriage instead of the two parallel systems of marriage then operating … It provided for the registration of one wife who would be the publicly recognized wife. Where the man subsequently married or had issue with another women, this would not constitute an offence and a ground for divorce … On the death intestate of the husband, only the registered wife would be entitled to a share of the property … but, his children by other women would be entitled in the same way as the children of the registered wife. 41

The White Paper sparked a great deal of controversy throughout Ghana. Many women were of the opinion that if this law passed, women could not contract a legally binding monogamous marriage. Other women felt the provision for registration of one wife was unfair and preferred none of the wives to be registered. The inheritance provision generated the greatest uproar because it was diametrically opposed to the inheritance provisions of customary law. In contrast, in its 1962 ‘Party Programme for Work and Happiness’, the CPP stated that it stood for complete equality between the sexes. The practice of polygamy was viewed as being at odds with that equality. Interestingly, this was the position reflected in the proposed Marriage Bill of 1961. Ultimately, this Bill was never passed due to massive opposition to the attempt to amend the Criminal Code so that bigamy became a civil offence. However, the Maintenance of Children Act was passed in 1965 in response to women’s demands for fathers to take financial responsibility for their children. According to a memorandum signed by the Minister of Social Welfare, Mr. Osei Owusu-Afriyie, the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development dealt each year with more than one thousand cases of child neglect by fathers who failed to provide for the maintenance of their children. The Maintenance of Children Act stipulated that such fathers be fined 100 pounds or face a term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve months.42 40 Laws of the Gold Coast, Marriage Ordinance, 1951. Vol. 111, 410. 41 Manuh, Women and their Organizations, 115. 42 ‘Runaway Fathers May Be Jailed’, Daily Graphic, 13 March 1963.

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After independence, African liberation, unity and emancipation remained a key vision for Kwame Nkrumah and his administration. Ghana’s independence was only the first stage in the process towards the liberation of Africa from foreign domination. Thus, the main aim of the CPP government was to collaborate with other independent nations to achieve an African personality in international affairs.43 Ghanaian women were integral to this vision on both the national and international stage, for they provided a window through which the western world could see African agency. The vision of African unity required a new political order, which consisted of consolidation of power. Therefore, for the first time in Ghanaian political organisation, Nkrumah became the head of state and the military and the ‘Life Chairman’ of the CPP. Women did not escape this process of centralisation. The dominant women’s groups in operation in Ghana, notably the Ghana Women’s League and the Federation of Gold Coast Women were forced to merge to form the National Council of Ghana Women (NCGW). The CPP supported the activities of the NCGW and provided financial assistance for the Conference of Women of Africa and African Descent in July 1960. The conference was an opportunity for Ghanaian women to join the international struggle for equal rights for women and marginalised groups, to exchange ideas with their counterparts on the socio-economic issues confronting women in Africa, and to share views on women’s contributions towards the independence movements of their respective countries. For the CPP, the conference provided Nkrumah with the opportunity to reiterate his aspirations for a United States of Africa and women’s responsibilities in the realisation of this dream. Addressing delegates at the opening session of the conference, President Kwame Nkrumah stated: There is great responsibility resting on the shoulders of women of Africa and African descent. They must realize that the men alone cannot complete the gigantic task we have set ourselves. The time has come when the women of Africa and of African descent must rise up in their millions to join the African crusade for freedom …44

Reflecting on the duty of women in the global fight against colonialism and imperialism, Nkrumah declared to the delegates, Women of Africa, yours is the duty and privilege of hoisting high the nationalist banner of redemption; yours is the glory of answering the call of our beloved Africa … yours is the honour to fight relentlessly for the total emancipation of this great continent; yours is the task of projecting the African personality to the world of today. 45

With this call, Nkrumah encouraged women to participate in safeguarding the ‘hard-won independence and sovereignty’ of Africa and to carry back the message of African unity to their respective countries and persuade their brothers, hus43 Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, 98. 44 Samuel Obeng, Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, Accra 1997, 110–116. 45 Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, 249.

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bands and friends of the importance of unity for the salvation of Africa.46 Nkrumah’s pursuit of the dream of African unity never became a reality. Less than a decade later, he was overthrown in a coup d’état. This halted the steady progress made in creating space for female agency and moved women a step back under the control of patriarchy.

CONCLUSION Scholarship on Ghanaian women has for the most part focused on the colonial period, exploring the social, economic, and political impact of the whole colonial enterprise on the status of women. As noted by Audrey Gadzekpo, these works have been successful ‘in illustrating a fuller history of colonial societies’,47 in which women’s roles and status degenerated from their precolonial position. The imposition of Victorian values by colonialists stressed male superiority in work and undermined the roles of women. The advent of self-rule under the CPP witnessed the mobilisation of women under the charisma of Kwame Nkrumah to galvanise the population towards the eradication of colonialism. On 6 March 1957, Ghana attained independence, and the CPP administration continued its elevation of women until February 1966, when its rule came to an abrupt end through a coup d’état. The coup ushered in a political atmosphere in Ghana filled with tension and arbitrary arrests. Nkrumah’s formative steps in redressing the gender imbalance of the colonial period and creating space for female agency and empowerment were shattered. The expectation that the consolidation of independence would lead to progression in the empowerment of Ghanaian women did not materialise. Nkrumah’s vision of a modern state where women were free of custom and gender roles did not become a reality. The NCGW was disbanded, and many women functionaries were imprisoned and disqualified from voting for a decade. This sounded the death knell for women’s empowerment on the national and international stage until the 1980s. The transition to a democratic Fourth Republic in 1993 further emboldened women as they recognised the change in political structure and the opportunity that democratisation created to assert their voices and engage the state.

46 Ibid. 47 Audrey Gadzekpo, Women’s Engagement with Gold Coast Print Culture from 1857 to 1957, Ph.D. Diss., University of Birmingham 2001, 5.

OPPOSITION AND COUP

OPPOSITION TO KWAME NKRUMAH AND THE CONVENTION PEOPLES PARTY 1951–19601 Kwame Osei Kwarteng, Mary Owusu Abstract: This chapter, which employs multiple sources – archival, journalistic, and secondary – examines the political opposition Kwame Nkrumah and his associates, who won the 1951, 1954, and 1956 elections, encountered from their political opponents between 1951 and 1957 and beyond. The paper delineates the political opposition to Nkrumah and his associates into two separate movements, the initial single opposition and later ubiquitous opposition, and proffers reasons for their existence. It also demonstrates how the initial single opposition Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP) faced from his former colleagues in the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), expanded to engulf the Trans Volta Togoland, the Northern Territories, and Ashanti. Finally, this paper shows the strategy Nkrumah and the CPP government adopted to curb the widespread opposition and consolidate CPP government rule in Ghana.

INTRODUCTION By the end of the Second World War, all nationalist activities in Africa were directed at liberation from colonial domination. The expectation, therefore, was that in order to achieve this, a united force would be presented to oppose the imperialists who had curtailed the freedom of Africans through colonisation. In the Gold Coast, the struggle for independence was not so much a conflict between the British and the people but rather, in the main, a struggle among the people for the prized position of leader. Kwame Nkrumah, the first Gold Coaster to win the title Leader of Government Business, and his political party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP), were faced with the greatest opposition. This paper, therefore, focuses its discussions on the nature of the opposition that Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP faced during the struggle for independence. The Gold Coast had always been considered by the British to be a model colony in Africa, because it had order and constitutional progress. In official circles, the country directly steered itself towards self-government. Other criteria that 1

Here in this work ‘Asante’ or ‘the Asante’ refers to the people who occupy the Territory the British referred to as ‘Ashanti’ during the colonial era and is now called ‘Ashanti Region’ in official records. The British who colonised the Gold Coast and its three dependencies of ‘Ashanti’, the Northern Territories’ and Trans Volta Togoland spelt or wrote ‘Asante’ as ‘Ashanti’ which has become the official spelling of the Territory and the Region where the Asante are located. ‘Ashanti’ refers to the Territory or Region.

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qualified a colony for self-government – such as political consciousness, education, urbanisation, social amenities, infrastructure, and trade – were partly met. The most important feature of the inter-war period in the Gold Coast was a rise in nationalist activities. By the end of the Second World War, there was a heightened growth in the political consciousness of the middle class and the youth. Another important political feature during this period was the collaboration between the middle class of traders and other semi-educated people on the one hand and the chiefly class, the elderly, and the well-educated intelligentsia on the other. Before this period, government, both central and local, was under the control of the British officials, the chiefs, and a few highly educated people. Commoners or members of the semi-educated middle class did not have a definite place, even in their own village politics. Their customary rights2 to traditional participation in state politics had been ignored by the British and the traditional rulers. 3 The various constitutions, ordinances, and orders-in-council did not clearly define their role and participation in government. The various state councils, the Provincial Council of Chiefs, the Asanteman Council, and the Northern Territories Council left little or no room for their participation. Even participation in the Municipal Council election was limited to people with property. As a result, youth associations, literary and debating clubs, Asafo groups, trade unions, farmers’ associations, and other social groups were formed, and these flourished in the inter-war period and beyond. These associations, clubs, and groups were usually limited to their territorial settings: Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti, Northern Territories, or Trans Volta Togoland. At their social gatherings, they discussed ideas on politics. For instance, in 1947, the Apowa Youth Club and the Asante Youth Club, which were formed that year, advocated for self-government under the control of ordinary men. In the postwar period, these social groups provided fertile ground for the seeds of the anti-colonial movement to germinate, leading to the formation of the first organised group to demand for self-government: The United Gold Coast Convention.

2

3

That is the time-honoured traditional political role which young men or the common people who did not occupy any political office played in the society prior to European colonisation. These commoners, who were always in the majority and were mostly the youth who in precolonial times were used by the state to fight during wars and could even de-stool an unpopular chief, were denied participation in politics following the establishment of colonial rule. See Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century. The structure and evolution of a political order, Cambridge 1975, 535. Due to the diminishing position the British government gave to the commoners, they assumed an unofficial position as the main instrument of checks and balances against autocracy. It became a common practice for chiefs to be deposed for inappropriate behaviour or for displeasing the commoners. From 1900 to 1926, 109 chiefs were deposed in the Colony. F. M. Bourret, The Gold Coast. A Survey of the Gold Coast and British Togoland 1919–1946, London 1946, 50; Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs. The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951–1960, Athens OH 2000, 13.

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THE FORMATION OF THE UGCC The increase in nationalist activities between 1947 and independence in 1957 was due to two major objects of contention: the scramble for power among the political leaders and the failure of the competing parties – educated elite, commoners, and the chiefs – to come to a compromise. The commoners as well as the educated elite felt neglected in government because from the onset of colonial rule, the chiefs were the instruments through whom the people were ruled. The educated elite felt they were better qualified than the chiefs to represent the interest of the people. This caused contention between the two groups. The relationship between the two groups was not cordial, as can be seen in the case of Joseph E. CaselyHayford and Nana William Ofori Atta of Akyem Abuakwa. Casely-Hayford believed that leadership in the country should not be inherited but acquired through hard work and education. This brought him into confrontation with Nana Ofori Atta, who insisted that leadership was inherited and not acquired – the question was who qualified to lead the people. Was it the natural rulers (chiefs) or the educated elite? Casely-Hayford argued that because of the social changes that had occurred in the Gold Coast and the advances made in education, educated Africans should naturally become the leaders of their people. But Nana Ofori Atta insisted that an ordinary person could not become a leader of the community simply because he or she had gained an education. Casely-Hayford’s position was that leadership should be achieved by merit. Nana Ofori Atta’s view was that leaders are born, not made, and so only chiefs could rule.4 In the early 1940s, J. B. Danquah tried but failed to unite the two groups. Due to his dual affiliation to the Kyebi stool and to the Gold Coast intelligentsia, he managed to facilitate an agreement between the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs (JPCC) and the Asanteman Council to elect non-chiefs to represent the territorial councils on the Legislative Council.5 Despite this agreement, the JPCC elected only two non-chiefs to the Legislative Council. With this development, the intelligentsia concluded that the chiefs were not prepared for change. This was part of the reason why George Alfred Grant, R. S. Blay, J. B. Danquah, and F. Awoonor Williams decided to form a new political party. Consequently, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was inaugurated at Saltpond on 4 August, 1947 with the motto: ‘service of all for each and of each for all’. George Alfred Grant, affectionately referred to as Paa Grant by peers and juniors alike, ensured from the onset that he had the backing of the two most important powerhouses – the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society (ARPS) and the chiefs. They had history to guide them. The conflict that arose between Casely-Hayford and Nana Ofori Atta

4

5

David Kimble, A political History of Ghana. The rise of Gold Coast nationalism 1850–1928, Oxford 1963, 389–396; see also D. E. K. Amenumey, Ghana. A Concise History from PreColonial Times to the 20th Century, Accra 2008, 192; see also A. A. Boahen, Ghana. Evolution and change in the nineteenth centuries, Accra 2000, 132–133. Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana. 1946–1960, London 1964, 51.

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caused the latter to oppose the National Congress of British West Africa (NCWA) to the extent that he was able to rally the chiefs in the Eastern Province to oppose the Congress deputation to London by suggesting to the chiefs that the educated people were usurping their rights and that the chiefs should protect themselves. Donkoh Fordwor records that Danquah insisted and the other members agreed that the UGCC constitution should include two principles: 1. Upon the attainment of self-government, the destiny of the country should pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs. This was to ensure that the politicians, who were predominantly educated men, did not marginalise the chiefs in the new dispensation and also to avert any opposition from the chiefs, as happened in the 1920s between Casely-Hayford and Nana Ofori Atta. 2. Self-government, as understood and accepted in the Statute of Westminster (i.e. independence as a member of the Commonwealth, with a government based on democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and civil liberties and the rule of law) would be instituted.6 This development was very important in the history of the Gold Coast because, it opened the gateway for post-world war militant nationalism, the struggle amongst Africans for power, and the introduction of ideological politicking in Ghana. Since the core members of this party comprised businesspeople, lawyers, and other highly educated people, there was the need for a full time secretary. Based on the recommendations of Ako Adjei, the Working Committee invited Kwame Nkrumah to become the UGCC’s full-time secretary. Nkrumah’s hard work and readiness to involve the youth caused an increase in the party’s popularity. By 1948, the party had about 13 branches and 1,767 members. Their popularity increased further due to the arrest of the six central committee members after the February 1948 riots. On 28 February 1948, a group of unarmed ex-soldiers, who were marching to the Christiansburg Castle Osu, the seat of colonial government to present a statement of grievance,7 were shot and killed by the Police at the castle. The former soldiers were Sergeant Adjetey, Corporal Attipoe, and Private Odartey-Lamptey. The incident sparked a riot in Accra, which included looting of stores owned by foreigners (mainly Europeans, Syrians, and Lebanese) and led to further rioting in Nsawam Koforidua, Nkawkaw and Kumasi.8 The British colonial government falsely accused and detained the leaders of the UGCC for being responsible for the riot as well as a boycott of imported goods organised earlier by Nii Kobina Bonnie III, Osu Alata Mantse (Chief). The arrest and subsequent detention earned the UGCC leaders, to wit, J. B. Danquah, E. Akuffo Addo, William Ofori Atta, Obetsebi Lamptey, Kwame Nkrumah, and

6 7 8

Kantinka K. Donkoh Fordwor, The Danquah-Busia Tradition in the Politics of Ghana. The Origins, Missions and Achievements of the New Patriotic Party, Accra 2010, 11–13. Arhin Brempong, Transformations in Traditional Rule in Ghana. 1951–1996, Accra 2001, 13. Adu Boahen, Ghana, 163; see also Amenumey, Ghana, 205–206.

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Ako Adjei the nickname, ‘the Big Six’. Without any evidence, the government blamed them for masterminding the disturbances. Right from the time of Nkrumah’s arrival, evidence of differences in ideology between himself and the Working Committee emerged. This internal conflict heightened after the arrest of the ‘Big Six’. Dennis Austin, writing in 1964, states: ‘The Committee never quite overcame their ambivalence towards Nkrumah – hoping to use him, ready to accept him (ready also to deny) what he might be doing in their name but possessed a fear of what he might do without them.’9 Austin reports that the other members of the central committee turned on Nkrumah and blamed him for igniting the youth to resort to violence in their political demands. To Austin, at the end of 1947, a new factor appeared on the scene who was destined not only to dominate the events of the years that followed … but to destroy the UGCC as an active political force: Kwame Nkrumah. The irony of the situation was that the members of the Working Committee were the authors of their own downfall. 10

To all intents and purposes, had the leadership of the UGCC, who set the anticolonial ball rolling, known that the invitation given to Nkrumah would cost them their political aspiration of leading the Gold Coast to independence, they would not have agreed to Ako Adjei’s request.11 It became increasingly clear to both the founding members of the UGCC and Nkrumah that there was a definite difference of opinion among them and also that they had differing ideas on best practices with regards to the method the struggle for freedom had to take. The ideological differences, stemming from deeply rooted convictions, divided the anticolonial struggle into two ideological factions: one, led by Nkrumah, based on radical antiimperialism modernist nationalism and the other, led by Danquah, which followed liberal Africanist cultural nationalism. The Convention sided with Danquah by calling for an independence agenda that was inclusive and respectful of the established institution of chieftaincy. For the Convention, an independent Gold Coast had to follow libertarian democratic best practices established in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Nkrumah faction advocated for an independent Gold Coast that was modern in constitution and which eliminated the encumbrances of chieftaincy, which, to them, was tainted with undesirable colonial vestiges. Nkrumah, whose aficionados were commoners and youth from across the country, were against the chiefs because of the autocratic and monopolistic tendencies exhibited under the Native Authorities, which were perceived as an extension of colonial rule. Furthermore, the chiefs were disliked by the CPP because they were seen as having become agents of the colonial authorities in 9 Austin, Politics in Ghana, 51. 10 Ibid. 11 The UGCC leadership was looking to agitate for independence in the ‘shortest possible time’, whilst Nkrumah wanted independence ‘now’. Both groups were in fact looking for independence; it was their approach and demands that differed. UGCC leadership who were reactionary lawyers and middle-class merchants wanted a gradualist approach, whilst Nkrumah as a radical wanted independence immediately without further delay.

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both the delay and suppression of the political aspirations of the people. Finally, the CPP were disaffected by the chiefs who opposed them in elections.12 The radicalism expressed in the ideological make-up of Nkrumah, and indeed a majority of the youth who followed him, led to Nkrumah’s suspension from the Working Committee of the UGCC. NKRUMAH’S SUSPENSION AND THE FORMATION OF THE CPP Following his suspension from the UGCC, Nkrumah subsequently resigned and set up a rival party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP), on 12 June, 1949. Right from the onset, Nkrumah attracted the commoner class: primary school teachers, clerks, court registrars, messengers, microbusiness owners, transport owners, market women, and drivers.13 His strategy, which made it easier to build a people’s party of a national character, was his use of the existing clubs and associations. He drew support from members he had acquired from the UGCC and from clubs, such as the Asante Youth Association and the Bekwai Youth Movement, trade unions, such as the Trade Union Congress (TUC), and farmers’ associations, such as the Farmers Committee of British West Africa, the Ghana Farmers Union, and the Asante Farmers Union.14 Nkrumah indoctrinated the new members with the idea that they ‘have the right to live as men’ therefore they were to ‘seek … first the political kingdom and all things will be added unto it’.15 Due to education and the common interest of overthrowing the old regime of the British, chiefs, and intelligentsia, Nkrumah successfully united these people from diverse cultural and language backgrounds into one party. His success in the Colony was due to his ability to embrace persons – literate and non-literate, rural and urban – from all walks of life. Let us now examine the administrative structure of the Gold Coast. By 1920, the Gold Coast was constituted into four territorial divisions: Ashanti, the Colony, the Northern Territories, and British Mandated Togoland. These territories were administered separately by different legislative instruments. In 1946, Danquah orchestrated collaborative efforts between the JPCC and the Asantehene, leading to the chiefs’ formally requesting a union of Ashanti and the Colony. The two territories were united under a single Legislative Council and Executive Council, effectively excluding the Northern Territory and British Togoland. By 1950, the colonial administration had resigned itself to self-government in the Gold Coast.

12 Brempong, Transformations, 14–15. 13 The first central committee of the CPP was made up of two graduates, three secondary school leavers, and four elementary school leavers. Kwame Nkrumah completed Achimota College and Lincoln College in Pennsylvania. Kojo Botsio attended Achimota College in Accra, Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, and Oxford University. Ibid, 16. 14 Ibid, 116. 15 Ibid, 17.

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This opened the way for the two feuding ideologies to sell their messages to the Gold Coast as a nation and contest the impending elections. Owing to the fact that, the UGCC had suspended the ‘star’ of its organisation, Kwame Nkrumah, they found themselves in the unenviable position of ‘opposition’ to Nkrumah and his party, the CPP. INITIAL SINGLE OPPOSITION AGAINST NKRUMAH 1949–1951 Due to the fact that it was through the UGCC platform and political machinery that Nkrumah entered into Gold Coast politics, the initial opposition Nkrumah faced after he had broken away from the UGCC to form the CPP came from the leadership of the UGCC. Led by J. B. Danquah, the Central Committee made frantic efforts to hinder the progress of the CPP. They attempted to cut Nkrumah off from his source of power, the youth. In January 1949, the British government invited the key members of the UGCC to be part of the Coussey Committee, which had been set up to examine proposals for constitutional and political reforms; however, Nkrumah was excluded. Through the influence of the UGCC, the Coussey Committee limited the voting age for the Legislative Assembly elections to twenty five.16 If this had been implemented, it would have affected the CPP greatly, since the majority of its members were below 25 years of age. This decision was rejected by Kwesi Plange, the CPP member for the Cape Coast Municipal Council, with the argument that if the voting age was pegged at 25, then all those who were under 25 should not be required to pay taxes. Eventually, his argument gained ground, and the voting age was set at 21 years. Through this electoral reform, Nkrumah succeeded in comfortably winning the 1951 election. In 1951, for the first time in Gold Coast history, seats were allocated in the Legislative Assembly, to be filled by direct ballot. During the 8 February election, the CPP won twenty-nine out of the thirty-three assembly seats and five municipal seats, making it the majority group in the Legislative Assembly.17 Nkrumah was therefore made the Leader of Government Business and asked to form a government. By 1951, a highly centralised government was created, and all components of the local government were subjected to the control of the central government. After assuming office as the Prime Minister of the Gold Cost in 1952, Nkrumah began to adjust to the colonial framework of government and the nature of colonial authority established during the late colonial period. This created conflict because the other territorial councils, especially those from Asante, the Northern territories, and British Togoland, preferred a decentralised government, where

16 Ibid, 110, see Boahen, Ghana, 165. Adu Boahen provides detailed information on the composition of the Coussey Committee: its composition, recommendations and the government response to the recommendations of the Committee’s report. 17 Austin, Politics in Ghana, 154. See also Adu Boahen, Ghana, 171.

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they would control their own affairs.18 It was this readjustment of authority which caused the upsurge of regional politics. Due to the activities of the early nationalist groups, by 1951, the Gold Coast had undergone a transformation. Power was transferred from the British officials, the chiefs and a few of the intelligentsia to the educated elite and the commoners, with executive power remaining in the hands of the British. This can be considered a revolution in the political history of the Gold Coast, and Nkrumah was the pacesetter for Westminster-style self-government. His victory, instead of creating unity among the people of the Gold Coast, brought about a regional consciousness of the need to protect territorial and religious interests. This led to the formation of diverse political parties in opposition to Nkrumah. Nkrumah was faced with opposition for diverse reasons: his personality, style of leadership, and policies as well as contention for power and the desire to protect regional or religious interests, which was expressed through strikes, the formation of rival political parties, and even violence. Between 1950 and 1957, about eight opposition parties were formed to oppose Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party. They were the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Northern People’s Party (NPP), the Togoland Congress Party (TCP), the Gold Coast Muslim Association Party (MAP), the Ghana National Party, the Gold Coast Action Party, the Ghana Congress Party, the Ghana Freedom Party, and the National Liberation Movement. For the sake of a proper examination of the ubiquitous opposition he faced from 1951, in his nationalist struggle, this article has categorised the opposition into two: initial ubiquitous opposition, which lasted from 1951 to 1954, and the later militant opposition from 1954 to 1957.

18 Until 1951, the Northern Territory was represented in the Legislative Council by the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories. This was a deliberate colonial policy to prevent the development of militant politics in the north. Even in 1951, when the Coussey Committee recommended the territory to be allowed to send representatives to the Legislative Council, the nineteen allocated seats were filled through appointment instead of direct election. This caused the people to be inexperienced in party politics. By 1951, there was no active political party in the area. J. A. Braimah stated that ‘we do not belong to any party and we are not bound to follow any party line of action … so when we support or reject any party motion tabled by a member of a party, we do so clearly on the merits of the motion and not for party reason.’ In addition, local government and colonial administration in the north was designed such that it absorbed school leavers into the various village politics. This prevented them from actively involving themselves in nationalist movements, as in the Colony and Ashanti, as members of the communities did not feel left out in socioeconomic and political developments. This prevented the north from producing socially volatile groups. Jeff D. Grischow, Shaping Tradition. Civil Society, Community and Development in Colonial Northern Ghana, 1899–1957, Leiden 2006, 187–189; Ibrahim Mahama, A Colonial History of Northern Ghana, Tamale 2009, 102; Paul Andre Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians. The Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana, London 1979, 75; Austin, Politics in Ghana, 155.

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INITIAL UBIQUITOUS OPPOSITION TO NKRUMAH 1952–1954 By the end of 1950, it became obvious to the Central Committee members of the UGCC, that they could not defeat Nkrumah using the UGCC organisation. Danquah allied with some Kumasi chiefs to unite all the opposition parties on 19 December 1950 and proposed the formation of a single opposition party. This arrangement was not successful because the Asante Youth Association demanded that the Asantehene be in charge of all appointments. It was not until May 1952, that the Ghana Congress Party (GCP) was formed with the aim of providing ‘an effective opposition to the CPP government in order, one day, to offer the country an alternative government’.19 K. A. Busia was selected as its Chairman, N. A. Ollennu as its Vice Chairman, and Kwesi Lamptey as the General Secretary.20This party comprised a combination of chiefs, dissatisfied CPP members, and UGCC leadership. Disgruntled CPP members such as Dzenkle Dzenwu, A. P. Nyemetei, Ashei Nikoi, Mate Korle, B. F. Kusi, Saki Scheck, and Kwesi Lamptey, joined the GCP.21 With Danquah’s encouragement, the UGCC members joined the GCP in order to successfully fight Nkrumah’s CPP.22 The GCP accused Nkrumah of failing to achieve independence in the ‘shortest possible time’, as he had promised, because he compromised with the colonial powers once he had acquired political power. The GCP criticised Nkrumah’s unsuccessful housing policy of importing prefabricated Dutch and Swedish houses. Despite this criticism, the GCP policy on health, education, trade, transport, and agriculture was almost identical to that of the CPP. Thus, the GCP could not provide an alternative programme from that of the CPP. The only difference was that they promised to increase the prices paid to cocoa farmers, who were also qualified voters in the elections. The party’s organisation was not different from that of the UGCC, as it comprised mainly the intelligentsia without fully embracing the commoners or the youth. The GCP, like the UGCC, failed to achieve any significant success because its support base revolved mainly around its leaders. Unlike the CPP, the GCP did not have the support of the youth or the masses. Electoral victory at that time in the Gold Coast and even beyond that period had always been based on the support of the youth. Therefore, Nkrumah, who had founded a mass political party chalked up victories everywhere.23 His party was strong even in Wenchi and Kyebi, where Busia and Danquah, respectively, were dominant. Individuals with19 20 21 22

Austin, Politics in Ghana, 181. Kwaku Danso-Boafo, The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia, Accra 1996, 31. Austin, Politics in Ghana, 167–168; Danso-Boafo, Political Biography of Busia, 32. H. B. Martinson, Ghana, the UP/NPP Tradition in the NLM Struggle. The True Story, Accra 2010, 29. 23 Adu Boahen, Ghana, 171. Adu Boahen explains that the electoral victories of the CPP was due to the reduction of voting age from twenty-five, as recommended by the Coussey Committee, to twenty-one, on the motion of Kwesi Plange. This secured the enfranchisement of thousands of those young men and women with whom the CPP was popular.

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in the party pursued their own interest without concentrating on the corporate interest of the party. This disunity, coupled with financial constraints, prevented the party from achieving its objective of providing a better alternative to Nkrumah. Danquah noted that ‘until our party became identified with a popular and general cause which would appeal to considerable sections of the people, any expenditure of money and energy would result in a stalemate of negative results.’ 24 Eventually, a dispute about the slogan and, indeed, the principle of self-government in the near future broke out within the party, leading to the suspension of Kwesi Lamptey, who rejoined the CPP,25 and the expulsion of Obetsebi Lamptey, who subsequently formed the Ghana Nationalist Party.26 Since its main focus was tarnishing Nkrumah’s image, it could not accomplish any major political achievement. The most formidable opposition Nkrumah was faced with came from the north. Unlike in the south, it was difficult for Nkrumah to influence the northerners with his political ideology, due to the entrenched cultural and colonial systems in the Northern Territories. The chiefs and the colonial officials were held in higher esteem in the north than in the south. Nkrumah’s speech and activities against the chiefs created fear in the northerners that associating themselves with the CPP would adulterate their culture and socio-political institutions, as it had done to the southern institutions. Due to the loyalty the people gave to their chiefs, only a few, such as A. Asumadu, D. S. Iddrisu, and Eben Adam, initially associated themselves with Nkrumah. However, they could not firmly establish the party in the north. Mrs. Hannah Cudjoe also tried to promote the interest of Nkrumah in the north but could not leave any lasting impact.27 Nkrumah did not focus his energy on the north. He indicated that it was only when he heard about the formation of the NPP that he dashed up to the north. However, ‘it was too late to do very much.’28 By 1954, the CPP was not firmly rooted in the Northern Territories, unlike in Ashanti and the Colony. The Accra Evening News described the area as ‘a potential sleeper in the race of man who were (sic) not encouraged to ride in cars but flattered to use the old-fashioned horse for travelling.’29 Eventually, the CPP managed to penetrate into the Northern Territories because it was able to win the support of some members of the NPP, including J. H. Allasani, L. R. Abavana, Imoro Egala, Ayana Imoro, and A. Asumadu.30 Though by 1951, people in the Northern Territories were adjusting to the nature of southern politics, they did not desire to associate themselves with southern political parties. Two members of the Legislative Assembly, S. D. Dombo and

24 25 26 27

Donkoh Fordwor, The Danquah-Busia Tradition, 64. Ibid. David Apter, Ghana in Transition, Princeton NJ 1972, 226. In her project to abolish nudity from the Northern Territories, she helped to advocate the cause of the CPP. Donkoh Fordwor, The Danquah-Busia Tradition, 41. 28 Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, London 1957, 209. 29 Austin, Politics in Ghana, 129 footnotes. 30 Mahama, A Colonial History, 124.

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Mumuni Bawumia, who believed that with a united front the north could influence national policies, inaugurated the Northern People’s Party (NPP) on 11 April 1954.31 With the slogan ‘the north for the Northerners’, the party aimed to ensure that the socio-political and cultural institutions of the Northern Territories were respected and honoured by the southerners.32 Other prominent northern politicians such as J. A. Braimah joined the party. The party was successful because it had the backing of the chiefs, the Northern Territorial Council, and the people. It is important to note that not all chiefs supported the NPP. Whereas the paramount chiefs and potential paramount chiefs joined the NPP to strengthen their position, the sub-chiefs joined the CPP in order to gain government backing to depose the paramount chiefs. Therefore, in the north, initial opposition against Nkrumah was a result of local disputes instead of rival political ideologies, though this changed after 1954. As indicated earlier, Nkrumah’s position as Prime Minister created anxiety among the regional groups because they did not trust his motives towards them. They preferred power to be controlled by the British or their own people. One of such anxious groups was the Ewe. Nkrumah’s stand on Ewe unification created opposition.33 Initially, Nkrumah’s stance on this issue was not clear due to the fear that it could create conflict. Eventually, he indicated clearly that he preferred the unification of only British Togoland with the Gold Coast. Though his party sympathised with the aspiration of the Ewe to remove all colonial barriers and unite as one ethnic group, he asserted that the best solution to the problem was the independence of the Gold Coast, since it would cause the British and French to will-

31 This was formed out of the Northern Territorial Council to serve as a training ground for the upcoming elite in Tamale. It was meant to be a nationalist movement and not a political party. Grischow, Shaping Traditions, 187. 32 Mahama, A Colonial History, 122. 33 Colonial conquest and the First World War resulted in the division of the Ewe tribe into three: the Ewe in the Colony, the Ewe in British-Mandated Togoland, and the Ewe in FrenchMandated Togoland. As the Gold Coast advanced towards self-government and independence, there was the question of the state of the Ewe territory. Some section of the Ewe, especially the Southern Colony, preferred unification of all Ewe territories. The Ewe in French and British Togoland opposed this for fear of domination by the southern Ewe group, particularly Anlo and Peki, who were well educated. The northern section of Togoland was generally indifferent towards unification, as they preferred the integration of northern Togoland into the Gold Coast. Associations such as the Togoland Union and All Ewe Conference (AEC) were formed to safeguard the interests of the Ewe. Whereas AEC demanded the unification of all Ewe groups, both in the Colony and in British and French Togoland, the Togoland Union demanded the unification of only the Togoland territory. They demanded a unification of all three sections of Ewe divisions into one. D. E. K. Amenumey, The Ewe Unification Movement. A Political History, Accra 1989, 139; Wilson K. Yayoh, What is a Flag? The Swastika and Togoland Nationalism, in: Contemporary Journal of African Studies, 1/1 (2013), 6–7; F. K. Buah, A History of Ghana, Oxford 1998, 163–165; Austin, Politics in Ghana, 189–190.

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ingly or forcefully relinquish their hold on Togoland.34 Nkrumah had the overarching goal of decolonising the entire African continent so that he could foster his Pan-Africanist agenda of continental union government. It was probably for these reasons that he wanted the colonial boundaries to be removed and did not want the Ewes in British Mandated Togoland to be united with those in French Togoland. This policy of Nkrumah’s created the impression among the unionists who were in favour of the unification of the British and French Togoland that Nkrumah did not have their best interest at heart. Nkrumah’s stance on the Ewe unification led to the formation of the Togoland Congress, aimed at fighting Nkrumah and all other elements that sought to unify the British Togoland with the Gold Coast Ewe group rather with French Togoland. The party tried to rally support from youth associations in the north such as the B’Moba Youth Association in Mamprusi, Gonja, and other non-Ewe states in the southern part of the colony. The party could not achieve much because it did not have the support of various Ewe and non-Ewe groups in the area. Nkrumah exploited this lack of unity. He preached that casting one’s vote for the Togoland Congress would mean the transfer of territory to the French colony. Further, Nkrumah was opposed due to his style of leadership. He was accused of attempting to impose a corrupt and dictatorial government on the Gold Coast. He did not tolerate contrary opinions from either party or non-party members. J. W. K. Dumoga stated in the Ashanti Pioneer that accepting Nkrumah was ‘an invitation to the people of the Gold Coast to accept the dictatorship of a führer whose will should become law, and thus prove to the world that we do not understand the democracy we have been talking about.’35 Dzenwu, Nyemetei, Ashei Nikoi, and Kwesi Lamptey revolted against Nkrumah’s authority due to their dislike of his leadership style. Kurankyi Taylor and J. de Graft Johnson, who also broke away in 1953 stated that more recently, it has become obvious that the leadership of the party is not only looking forward to but also consciously planning towards a regime of dictatorship for this country with the party leaders in the privileged position of dictators, who could at the slightest sign of opposition show their unfortunate opponents “where the power lies”. 36

The forceful nature of Nkrumah and his executives caused several disagreements within the CPP in the 1954 elections. The Central Committee and the district committee disagreed over the choice of candidates because the latter refused to allow the former to impose candidates on them. In the end, several members of

34 Due to his industrialisation policy, acquiring British Togoland was key to the accomplishment of the Volta River project, a hydroelectric power project which required the use of the Volta River. The Volta River penetrated into British Togoland. Therefore if the Gold Coast boundary was limited to the southern coastal Ewe then it would affect the feasibility of the project. Amenumey, The Ewe Unification, 171; Yayoh, What is a Flag?, 15. 35 Austin, Politics in Ghana, 226. 36 ‘Two More Resign From the C.P.P.’ in: Daily Graphic, 8 February 1953, 1.

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the CPP stood as independent candidates as against Nkrumah-approved candidates. Nkrumah stated: I discovered that eighty-one party members had put themselves up to stand against official candidates. I call these people “rebels”. Firm action had to be taken. It was vital that the party should not be allowed to become disorganised or to be weakened by the split that this would ultimately bring about.37

This was an indication that even members of the CPP who disapproved of Nkrumah’s personality and leadership style opposed him. Even Nkrumah’s choice of cabinet members created suspicion among the regional groups. He was accused of choosing a predominantly southern cabinet in 1951 and 1954. Out of eight African members of the 1951 cabinet, only two, Asafu Adjaye and J.A. Braimah were from Asante and the North, respectively. These regional groups, especially those from the Northern Territories and Asante, believed that Nkrumah represented the interest of the Colony to the neglect of the rest of the territorial divisions. In addition, Nkrumah was accused of bribery and corruption. He was accused of receiving a salary of £3,500 per annum, a £50 allowance for the maintenance of his two cars, and £2 and £3 as travelling allowance within the Gold Coast and abroad, respectively. He was also accused of receiving a bribe of £1,882 to buy his car.38 Opposition parties in the Legislative Assembly demanded the establishment of a Committee of Enquiry to investigate the allegations of bribery and corruption against him and some of his ministers. Though the accusation against Nkrumah could not be proven, two ministerial secretaries, including Krobo Edusei, were convicted of bribery and corruption.39 Krobo Edusei’s position as a Ministerial secretary was revoked. Nkrumah and his CPP were accused of using funds from the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC) to finance the party. 40 The CPP was accused of manipulating the CPC to give loans only to farmers who openly supported the party as a means of exploiting the support of those farmers. The Ashanti Pioneer stated: ‘some ignorant Togolanders are deceived… that in order to get the loan they must agree unwhole-heartedly (sic) to favour the CPP with its policy Togoland.’41 This could have partly influenced the people of British Togoland to vote in favour of unification with the Gold Coast during the 1956 plebiscite. Nkrumah’s opponents used this as propaganda material against him. The Jibowu Commission was set up by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to investigate these allegations. Though in its findings, Nkrumah was not convicted of bribery and corruption, it was discovered that the CPP used the CPC to facilitate its political ambitions. 37 Austin, Politics in Ghana, 209; Nkrumah, Autobiography, 208. 38 It was proven that he received a salary of £3,500, a travelling allowance of £1, two cars, and a house. ‘The Korsah Commission Report’ in: The Ghana Daily Express, 27 April 1954, 1. 39 Legislative Assembly Debates, Issue No. 1, 2 February–12 March 1954, 225. 40 Austin, Politics in Ghana, 341; ‘The Korsah Commission Report’, 1. 41 Ashanti Pioneer, 11 June 1954, mentioned in Amenumey, The Ewe Unification, 174.

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An unexpected but key area of opposition Nkrumah faced was from religious groups. Describing himself as a ‘non-denominational Christian and Marxist’,42 Nkrumah indirectly attacked the church because he considered it to be a canopy of secrecy under which the colonial government suppressed the people. Consequently, he was opposed by the Christian Council, originally established by Sir Gordon Guggisberg in 1929. Nkrumah and the Christian Council clashed over issues relating to the traditional, cultural, and national consciousness of the people. The church considered these traditions to be repugnant, yet Nkrumah saw the need for the nation to embrace its cultural and traditional past. For instance, during the independence celebration there was the pouring of libations and the slaughter of sheep. The Christian Council vehemently opposed this. In addition, the Christian Council, though not actively involved in politics, indirectly denounced Nkrumah’s activities.43 C. V. Dovlo, a tutor of Trinity College in Kumasi, stated: ‘we do not want self-government just for pride of it… Those so called leaders who are seeking power just for their own selfish ends… must be blind to emotional slogans.’44 This was a direct attack on the personality of Nkrumah and the CPP. The major religious groups which openly challenged the authority of Nkrumah included a section of Muslims, who formed the Muslim Association Party (MAP) in 1954. This party operated mainly in the Muslim communities of the South for the purpose of protecting the welfare and interest of Muslims in the Gold Coast. Alhaji Amadu Baba from Kumasi stated that ‘true Moslems can never be friends of the C.P.P. The Moslem Association is prepared to hold the devil [Nkrumah] by the throat until everybody is free in this country.’ 45 The MAP accused the CPP of sponsoring the Muslim Youth Congress, a pro-CPP Muslim movement, to oppose the party and of restricting Muslim traders in the Gold Coast. This party, like most opposition parties, could not present an effective barricade against Nkrumah. The Muslim communities in the Gold Coast were too scattered to gain effective influence. There was also conflict between the Hausa and Gao communities and between the MAP and the Muslim Youth Congress. The conflict between members of the MAP and Nkrumah led Nkrumah to deport Amadu Baba together with Alhaji Othman Larden Laramie to Nigeria in 1958. Though the Christian Council objected to this, Nkrumah did nothing to change the situation. In reply, Nkrumah stated that ‘freedom of worship was embodied in the Ghana Constitution but there were certain religious bodies whose activities the Government would not tolerate.’46 Nkrumah preferred the creation of a secular state which was above all religious denominations.

42 Ebenezer Obiri Addo, Kwame Nkrumah. A Case Study of Religion and Politics in Ghana, New York 1997, 123; John S. Pobee, Kwame Nkrumah and the Church in Ghana. 1949– 1966, Accra 1988, 39. 43 Obiri Addo, Religion and Politics in Ghana, 137. 44 Ibid., 138. 45 Ibid., 139. 46 Ibid., 140.

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Another important element of opposition to Nkrumah was from a section of the chiefs. Right from its assumption of power, Nkrumah’s government clearly indicated that it would not tolerate any chief that vacillated between Nkrumah’s authority and that of the British. The Accra Evening News stated that those of them [the chiefs who will] be reasonable and willing to be emancipated [and] will come to our side we will bring home with honour … [but] those of them who…choose to remain stooges…[would] run away fast and leave their sandals behind them.47

After the three paramount chiefs, Nana Tsibu Darko IX of Asen Atandaso, Nana Akompi Firim II of Kadjebi, and Nana Agyeman Badu of Dormaa, lost the 1951 elections, the chiefs no longer openly opposed Nkrumah and the CPP through contested elections. Rather, they supported opposition parties. Key Gold Coast chiefs, such as those of the Asantehene and the Okyehene, openly supported opposition parties such as the GCP, the NPP, and the NLM. This contention for power also took the form of conflict between the chiefs and the democratically elected local councils, which were predominantly CPP. Timothy Bankole noted that ‘the childish level to which… politics has deteriorated… where a Local Council… is CPP dominated and a town or village in the area has a strong NLM following, projects designed for such a village or town are shelved by the District Council.’48 Thus a chief who opposed Nkrumah was deprived of development projects. Due to this situation, some chiefs openly supported the CPP as a guarantee of their access to development funds. For instance, the Akwamuhene of Anwomaso supported the CPP due to the fear that if he did not, the government would withdraw the help provided for the town’s development.49 Similarly, the Brong Kyempim, made up of states such as Dormaa, Takyiman, Drobo, Odumasi, Wenchi, and Abease supported Nkrumah due to their demand for secession from the Asanteman Council.50 In October 1954, the Dormaahene stated that any move against Nkrumah and the CPP government is the greatest political blunder any ungrateful could commit for never in the history of this country has any person or body been able to unite the whole country for a common purpose as has been done by Nkrumah and the CPP government.51

Apart from these groups, other movements and individuals such as the Anlo Youth Association, the Wassa Youth Association, an independent Party started by 47 Accra Evening News, 5 January 1950, mentioned in Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, 22– 25. Nkrumah warned the chiefs to support the CPP government, so that they would be treated with dignity and honour, or risk being deposed by the CPP government. Indeed, Nkrumah carried through this threat as he deposed all chiefs who opposed his government and supported the opposition parties and replaced them with non-royals who were CPP members. 48 Daily Graphic, 11 April 1956; Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, 89. 49 Ibid., 78. 50 ‘Brong Chiefs’ in: Ghana Evening News, 5 January 1956, 1. 51 Daily Graphic, 28 October, 1954, mentioned in Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, 78.

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Dr. Ansah Koi and the Ghana Freedom Party by the ex-soldiers, all opposed Nkrumah because of diverse grievances. The effectiveness of these opposition parties against Nkrumah was tested in the 1954 elections. Out of 104 Legislative Assembly seats, the CPP won 71 seats, the GCP 1, and the NPP 12; 16 seats went to independent candidates. Other parties that won seats were the Moslem Association Party (MAP) 1, the Anlo Youth Organisation (AYO) 1, and the Togoland Congress Party (TCP) 2. In an analysis of these parties’ performance, it can be said that the opposition groups, with the exception of the NPP, were too illorganised to present a proper opposition to the well-entrenched authority of Nkrumah and the CPP. In fact, Danquah, a leading figure of the only opposition party that was national in composition, the GCP, lost his seat in Akyem Abuakwa to his nephew, Aaron Kofi Asante Ofori Atta of the CPP. LATER OPPOSITION AGAINST NKRUMAH 1954–1960 After the massive victory Nkrumah and the CPP won in the 1954 election, the British government was convinced that Nkrumah was prepared to lead the country to independence. In April 1954, an Order-in-Council granted the Gold Coast full internal self-government. This was the final stage to independence. It reduced some of the governor’s authority and transferred his discretionary powers to the Prime Minister, the Gold Coast Public Service Commission, and the Judicial Service Commission.52 This implied that most of the limitations placed on Nkrumah’s authority were removed. He was given room to operate with little interference from the British government. The impact of this change was that it created militant opposition to Nkrumah, with the introduction of violence. From the previous sections, we have seen that the initial opposition was directed against Nkrumah, but its ultimate goal was to move the colonial authorities to take decisions that would prevent Nkrumah from realising his goals. However, after 1954, opposition was directed not against the British government but against Nkrumah’s government and his policies of independence, unitary government, and his cocoa policy. Immediately after the 1954 elections, the Asante provided stiff opposition against Nkrumah. Their dissatisfaction was triggered by K. A. Gbedemah, the Minister of Finance, who introduced the Cocoa Duty and Development Fund Ordinance, which sought to fix the price of cocoa at 72 shillings for every 60 pounds for a period of four years. Cocoa was a sensitive issue for Asante farmers and traders because it was their greatest source of income. The various farmers’ associations boycotted the ordinance because the price of cocoa was continually increasing on the world market. They believed Nkrumah wanted to cheat them out of their profit. As a result, they formed the Council for Higher Cocoa Prices,

52 Austin, Politics in Ghana, 201.

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which eventually led to the formation of the National Liberation Movement on 7 September 1954 for the purpose of addressing the grievances of the people of Asante against Nkrumah.53 Other factors, such as the 1953 Van Lare Commission’s Electoral Reform, also triggered an Asante rebellion against Nkrumah. In their report, the Commission divided the Gold Coast into 103 electoral districts, which included seven municipal districts and 93 rural electoral districts.54 The Commission allocated 21 seats in the Legislative Assembly, instead of the expected 30 seats, to the Asante. The Asante believed that since they produced half of the country’s cocoa and a substantial amount of minerals such as gold and bauxite, in addition to timber and other cash crops, it should be well represented in the Legislative Assembly. Nkrumah’s acceptance of the Van Lare Commission report was considered by some sections of the Asante as a betrayal. Further, there was the argument that the people of Asante needed to safeguard their own socioeconomic and political development before independence. The NLM convinced the cocoa farmers that the money acquired from cocoa was used for the development of the coastal states to the neglect of Asante. Nkrumah, in reply to this accusation, stated that though cocoa came from the Asante, the labour was mainly from the north, and it was exported through the colony; therefore, cocoa revenue could not be used to develop only Ashanti. Similarly, distinguished CPP members such as Victor Owusu, Joe Appiah, R. R. Amponsah, and Kurankyi Taylor all left the CPP to join the NLM due to discontentment with Nkrumah’s leadership. The NLM was meant to be a national movement that would preserve the traditional integrity and power of chiefs, rather than a political party. It is important to note that not all chiefs in Asante completely supported the NLM. Some chiefs joined under duress for fear of being deposed by the Asanteman Council.55 The nature of the NLM caused certain chiefs to disassociate themselves from the association. In September, 1954, the Atebubu State Council openly declared opposition to the NLM.56 Similarly, the Kumawu State Council accused the NLM of using violence to achieve its objectives Due to this dissatisfaction against Nkrumah’s policies and style of government, the NLM and NPP demanded the establishment of a federal government and a bicameral legislature as proposed by the Coussey Committee Report. They advocated for a decentralised government based on territorial organisation. When Nkrumah tabled a motion for the a establishment of a unitary government, the NPP saw this as ‘an insidious attempt by the government under the guise of democratic procedure to arrogate to itself power to force a constitution of its own liking and making on the people of this country.’57 Whereas Nkrumah focused on the

53 Donkoh Fordwor, The Danquah-Busia Tradition, 65; Austin, Politics in Ghana, 180; Nkrumah, Autobiography, 217. 54 Austin, Politics in Ghana, 202. 55 PRAAD, Kumasi, ARG 2/31/16, ‘National Liberation Movement’, 25 October, 1954, 1. 56 Daily Graphic, 11 April 1956; Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, 89. 57 Mahama, A Colonial History of Northern Ghana, 127.

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maintenance of a national outlook, these opposing groups preferred a breakdown of the Gold Coast into its colonial territorial components. A Committee on Federal System of Government was subsequently set up to examine the merits of the federal or decentralised government as well as the bicameral form of government proposed by the two opposition parties. Cobina Kesse, an Asante lawyer and member of the NLM told the committee that ‘federation is a form of constitutional organisation which unites a group of states without depriving them entirely of their separate identity and self-government.’58 To him, the CPP had to respect the request of the other sections of the Gold Coast, such as the Northern Territories and British Togoland, who preferred some sort of regional administration. On the other hand, the anti-federalists argued that in the Gold Coast, with its population of 4.5 million and size of 91,843 square miles, it was more suitable to establish unitary state with a strong central government.59 Eventually, the Committee rejected the demand for federal government because it was seen as an Asante grab for power. The committee indicated that if Ashanti lacked economic resources like the north, it would not have made such a demand. Further, the Committee concluded that the Ashanti demand for federal government was due to their dissatisfaction with Nkrumah’s policies and government. The answer to these in extreme circumstances was a change of government and not a change in the system of government.60 The findings of this report failed to satisfy the Ashanti elements, and agitation continued. Therefore, a constitutional advisor, Sir Frederick Bourne, a former governor of India, was appointed to examine the demand for federal constitution. He also recommended the establishment of a unitary government, with five Regional Assemblies with wide powers, such as approval of local authority estimates and control over local authorities, education, roads, rural housing, hospitals, and all statutory boards and committees.61 To Nkrumah, the NLM ‘seem[ed] to be behaving like a lot of spoilt children, screaming for something then when it is offered them, they push it away and scream for something else’.62 His private secretary Erica Powell shared this view. She stated that ‘this small disgruntled minority [NLM] began to appear in the eyes of the outside world as brave little group of patriots making a last ditch attempt to save their people from a despotic ruler.’63 This demand for a constitution, however, was due to the fear that Nkrumah might establish a dictatorial government that would ignore the needs of the regional groups. Similarly, the NPP opposed Nkrumah’s ideology of independence. The NPP was concerned about the impact of total independence on the north. To them, for

58 Colonial Office, Report from the Select Committee on Federal System of Government and Second Chamber for the Gold Coast, Accra 1955, vi. 59 Ibid., viii. 60 Ibid., xiii. 61 Colonial Office, Report of the Constitutional Adviser, Accra 1955, 7–8. 62 Erica Powell, Erica Powell, Private Secretary (Female)/Gold Coast, London 1984, 95. 63 Ibid, 94–95.

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over a century, the south had been exposed to the western political system and had been adequately prepared for self-government. The north, on the other hand, had been given this exposure only from the 1940s. Therefore, granting independence to both territories would deprive the north of this political experience. Braimah stated: the people of the northern Territories desire, most fervently, political and economic equality with the south. By political equality I mean the assurance that in a truly democratic legislature there shall be a fair proportional representation for the Northern Territories. By economic equality I mean that the resources of the Gold Coast, however localised in origin, should be used for the good of the country as a whole. 64

This was an indication that the greatest fear of the north was southern domination in all affairs. Erica Powell stated that ‘it was incredible to me that in a nationalist struggle for the independence of a country there should exist people of that country, determined to delay, impede, obstruct and by fair or foul, plot for the failure of that struggle.’ To her all this opposition was as a result of enemies who were deeply jealous of Nkrumah’s rise to power, immense popularity, and ability to lead the nation at its critical stage of history.65 This was clearly not the case for the Northern Territories, who had a genuine concern for the impact of independence on a territory which lacked experience in western democracy. The NPP and NLM sent a delegation to London to the Secretary of State to demand a separate independence for the Northern Territories and Ashanti and to have the assets and liabilities of the Gold Coast divided among the territories. The Secretary of State responded that ‘the partition of the Gold Coast was not in the interest of the country as a whole or indeed, of many of the component parts which during the past-half century have grown steadily and strongly into a single nation’.66 Therefore, though the concerns of the NPP were genuine, it was overruled. In pressing for the demands mentioned above, some of the opposition parties, particularly the NLM and the NPP, engaged in violent clashes with CPP supporters. A case in point is the murder of the NLM’s E. Y. Baffoe by the CPP’s Twumasi Ankrah at a bar in the Asante capital of Kumase. Owusu argues that this singular incident introduced violent politicking into the Ghanaian political machinery. With a majority NLM sympathiser base, CPP activists and supporters in Kumase found themselves outnumbered and endangered.67 There were several cases of clashes between Nkrumah supporters and opposition parties throughout the country in the Gold Coast, Asante, Northern Territories, and Trans-Volta Togoland. Nkrumah and the CPP also faced a formidable ethnic-based opposition in the heart of the country – the capital. While some territorial leaders decried the tyran64 G. E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana. Documents of Ghana History 1807–1957, Hampshire 1994, 717. 65 Powell, Private Secretary, 94. 66 Mahama, A Colonial History of Northern Ghana, 131. 67 Mary Owusu, Prempeh II and the Making of Modern Asante, Accra 2009.

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ny of Accra the capital, the people of Accra, the Ga, also opposed the takeover of their territory by other ethnic groups. They were alarmed at the increasing control, mostly through purchase of Accra lands, by other ethnic groups, notably the Akan. The loss of Ga lands culminated in the formation of the Ga Shifemo Kpe to protect Ga Shikpon, lands. The Ga Shifemo Kpe opposed the CPP government visibly through political-party-style rallies, picketing and scattered mass violence. For fear that these parties were gaining grounds in the Gold Coast, the CPP members of the Legislative Assembly tabled a motion in the Legislative Assembly to ban all political parties with a tribal or religious basis. A. J. DowuonaHammond, a CPP member of the Legislative Assembly emphatically stated that ‘such parties should only qualify for Town Council elections.’68 On the other hand, Bawumia, an NPP member of the Legislative Assembly, stated that since the CPP, through malpractice, had been able to overthrow all political parties in the south, ‘now they feel that if they are able to do away with regional parties they will stand alone as the only political party in the Gold Coast… regional parties are not tribal parties. There is a difference between a tribe and a region. The Northern Territories is a national territory and not a regional territory… It should be understood that the Northern Territories is a nation by itself.’69 The greatest opposition Nkrumah faced was from the north because this was the area where his policies were least accepted and understood. The NPP successfully combined tribal authority and educated leadership. The other opposition parties were unable to transcend sectional interests and acquire a national base that was firmly rooted in the attainment of a common goal. No matter how genuine the concerns of these parties were, they could not amass a large following because they were organised solely on regional or religious bases. Their slogans, manifestos, propaganda, and promises were narrowed to the needs of that particular group. Using slogans such as ‘the north for northerners’ or ‘Togoland for the Togolanders’, was never a sure means of winning the support of the entire Gold Coast. The CPP successfully outlawed regional- and religious-based political parties because they were said to be discriminatory. The bill to pass this law was introduced in the legislative assembly in 1957 by none other than Danquah’s nephew, Aaron Ofori Atta, who successfully unseated his uncle in the 1956 elections. Titled the Avoidance of Discrimination Act, it was passed into law that same year, and by December of that year, the opposition parties had amalgamated to form the United Party (UP). In one respect, Nkrumah and the CPP gave the opposition parties a raison d’être. The opposition parties, numbering eight: GCP, NPP, NLM, TCP, MAP, ARPS, AYO and Ga Shifemo Kpe, forcibly thrown together by measures taken by the CPP, was once again faced with imminent disintegration by 1959. A day after the formation of the UP, on 2 December 1957 the CPP government introduced the Emergency Powers Bill to forestall violent acts by individu68 Legislative Assembly Debate, Issue No. 2, 2 February–12 March, 1954, 290. 69 Legislative Assembly Debate, Issue No. 2, 2 February–12 March, 1954, 304.

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als or groups. The opposition UP saw this law as a direct assault against its members. On 28 September, a planned rally by the opposition in Kumase was banned. On 20 December, the general secretary of the UP, R. R. Amponsah and an executive member, Modesto Apaloo were arrested for plotting to assassinate the Prime Minister. Feeling threatened, the leader of the opposition in the legislative assembly, K. A. Busia, who was also the parliamentary leader of the UP, went into selfimposed exile in June 1959. The United Party tried to keep itself afloat by electing new leaders. On 11 November 1959, detention orders were issued out for nine senior members of the UP under the Preventive Detention Act. This Act empowered the CPP government to arrest and detain citizens for up to five years without trial on suspicion of subversion acts against the state. By 1960, Nkrumah had successfully crushed all opposition to the CPP and transformed Ghana into a oneparty state. CONCLUSION The opposition political parties failed in their quest for power mainly because they lost the ideological battle and were poorly organised and out of tune with the times. At a time when modernist anti-imperial nationalists were calling for change and wholesale rejection of European imperialism, the opposition led by Danquah was demanding a replacement of British colonial government with an African one. Danquah, the son of a village evangelist, brother of one of the most influential indirect rule chiefs (Nana Sir Ofori Atta), and a John Stuart Mill scholar was, along with his compatriots, a follower of the Blyden-ARPS school, which advocated ‘sankofaism’ – a return to established African culture, embodied in the institution of chieftaincy. They imagined a free Gold Coast which could successfully marry traditional rule with libertarian ideals of democracy, rule of law, free enterprise, and guaranteed human rights. Through their battle cry of freedom for ‘the chiefs and peoples’ of the Gold Coast, they alienated the vast majority of the electorate, especially residents of the Colony, most of whom were decidedly completely anti-chief. The lack of a cohesive message was also a cause of the opposition’s undoing. The opposition parties mushroomed because most of them championed regional and religious grievances, which made them appear selfish and divisive on the national stage. As a group, they did not have a single, clear-cut message, as opposed to the CPP, which was championing an unequivocal message – freedom from colonialism. Again, the opposition failed in the battle to capture the hearts and minds of 1950s Ghana because they were fighting a war on two fronts. From 1951, by virtue of the fact that Kwame Nkrumah became leader of Government Business and later Prime Minister, the opposition had to demand freedom from both British colonial rule and Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP. For the teeming masses and supporters of the CPP, freedom could mean only one thing – the shedding off of imperialism, which was embodied in British colonial rule. The two-sided message of the opposition appeared two-faced and, therefore, self-serving and, in this respect, easily dismissible. Danquah, as nominal leader of

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the opposition, became symbolic of unattractive and unwanted news. Although some of his ideas were appropriated and incorporated into subsequent constitutions and other institutions of state, he remained effectively, until his death in Nkrumah’s prison in 1965, a rejected statesman. The CPP successfully styled itself as the people’s party and never lost that outlook. Nkrumah’s political scheme of a ‘combination of ideological purity and pure political opportunism’70 for the Gold Cast worked well for him. While most of these politicians pursued politics on a part-time basis, Nkrumah was fully consumed by politics. The various opposition parties did not present a united front. All attempts at forming a united opposition party failed. Despite ubiquitous territorial nationalism and allegations against Nkrumah, he won the hearts of the masses due to the fact that he projected the concept of ‘freedom’, which guaranteed a complete break from the past. The youth and the masses of the 1950s happily declared with Nkrumah that they preferred adventure and would rather venture into uncharted territory than stick to the known or better still a reshuffle of the known. In this they famously agreed with Nkrumah that they preferred ‘selfgovernment in danger to servitude in tranquility’.

70 Apter, Ghana in Transition, 214.

FRAMING CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN THE GOLD COAST The Nkrumah Contingency 1948–19511 Nana Yaw B. Sapong Abstract: The historiography on the independence movement in the Gold Coast in the 1940s is impressive and voluminous. Most of it focuses on individuals such as Kwame Nkrumah and J. B. Danquah and their contributions to and roles within emergent political parties, such as the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and Convention Peoples Party (CPP). Scholarly attention on Nkrumah is particularly overwhelming. Some works are awash with praises for Nkrumah for grasping the necessity for political organisation and having the ability to use it ‘to maximum effect’. This work will refer to this kind of adulation as the ‘Nkrumah contingency’ in the ‘fight for independence’ narrative of Gold Coast politics. This work takes a second look at the ‘Nkrumah contingency’ and the ‘fight for independence’ narratives, and conceptualises them within Tilly and Tarrow’s ‘contentious politics’ framework. In the case of Nkrumah, the contentious politics framework involves his making claims on the colonial government through both inherited and invented forms of collective action, how these claims were framed, the movement they generated, and how he took advantage of existing political opportunities in the colonial regime to make these claims. This interdisciplinary approach is crucial to understanding the options available to political actors such as Nkrumah, the choices made, the risks involved, and the rewards gained. On a global scale, we come to appreciate the complex nature of the ‘fight for independence’ narrative in colonial histories, and identify them as part of the wave of social forces for social change, sweeping across European empires in Africa and Asia.

INTRODUCTION: LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK In the immediate years following the Second World War, the British Empire entered a period of social upheaval and political agitation. The initial plan of gradually introducing self-government into its vast overseas territories was abandoned as centrifugal forces of change swept across its wide-flung parts. British Africa was not left out of this unfolding drama, as it experienced a fair share of bloody, chaotic, and sometimes nonviolent upheavals. In the comparatively small British colony of the Gold Coast, the upheaval was sudden and dramatic but relatively orderly. The historiography on the independence movement in the Gold Coast in 1

This work is a re-conceptualised version of a chapter from my Ph.D. dissertation. See Nana Yaw B. Sapong, Aluta Continua. Social Movements and the Making of Ghana’s Fourth Republic, 1978–1993, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale 2009. The discussion on conceptualising social movements in Ghana initially appeared in my manuscript, Modeling for Democracy in Africa. Unpacking Ghana’s Fourth Republic.

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the 1940s is impressive and voluminous. Most of it focuses on individuals such as Kwame Nkrumah and J.B. Danquah, and their contributions to and roles within emergent political parties, such as the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and Convention People’s Party (CPP). Scholarly attention on Nkrumah is particularly overwhelming. Authors such as Rooney praise Nkrumah for grasping the necessity for political organisation and having the ability to use it effectively. This work will refer to this kind of adulation as the ‘Nkrumah contingency’ in the ‘fight for independence’ narrative of Gold Coast politics. Others, such as Omari portray Nkrumah as an unscrupulous opportunist, who upstaged his ‘betters’ through political chicanery and gamesmanship.2 This work takes a second look at the ‘Nkrumah contingency’ and the ‘fight for independence’ narratives, and conceptualises them within Tilly and Tarrow’s ‘contentious politics’ framework. Contentious politics ‘involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.’3 Within the contentious politics framework, Nkrumah made claims on the colonial government through both inherited and invented forms of collective action. Also, these claims were framed on a shared history of European encroachment and Gold Coast resistance, along with the hovering spectre of prolonged alien rule. Again, the movement that these claims generated took advantage of existing political opportunities in the colonial regime, such as its unwillingness to repress dissent and its desire to dialogue. This interdisciplinary approach is crucial to understanding the options available to political actors such as Nkrumah, the choices made, the risks involved, and the rewards gained. On a global scale, we come to appreciate the entangled histories of empire and the complex nature of the ‘fight for independence’ narrative in colonial histories and identify them as part of the wave of social forces for social change, sweeping across European empires in Africa and Asia. The chosen framework engenders an engagement with social movement theory and its application to the Gold Coast situation. A social movement is ‘a sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.’4 At the heart of the public demonstration of support lies the idea of contentious collective action. Collective action becomes contentious, when people who have no regular access to the corridors of power and governing institutions employ it. Studies in social movements began in the 1960s when Olson 2 3 4

See David Rooney’s Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy, Accra 2010; and T. P. Omari, Kwame Nkrumah. The Anatomy of an African Dictator, Accra 2009. Charles Tilly/Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics, New York 2007, 4. Charles Tilly, ‘Social Movements and National Politics’, in: Charles Bright/Susan Harding (eds.), Statemaking and Social Movement. Essays in History and Theory, Ann Arbor 1984, 306.

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attempted to expound on the reasons why people engage in collective action, or the ‘logic of collective action’. Subsequent decades spawned other social movement theories that focused on frameworks such as ‘resource mobilisation’ and ‘political structures’. The resource mobilisation approach focuses on the availability and harnessing of material, ideological, and human resources for collective action. On the other hand, the political structures approach moves away from mobilising resources to rather emphasise the role of formal political institutions and structures in accommodating or repressing dissent.5 This study adopts the ‘political structures’ approach, as popularised by Tilly and Tarrow, in analysing the independence movement and contentious politics in the Gold Coast in the late 1940s. The historiography on social movements in Africa does not do justice to this large, diverse, and dynamic continent, a veritable laboratory where social movement theories could be tested over and over again. Mamdani’s edited work on social movements and democracy in Africa is commendable and makes the case for similar studies. The main thrust of this edited volume maps out how and why social movements have contributed to the nature of African civil society and democracy.6 Most studies of social movements on the African continent mainly focus on South Africa, given that nation’s contentious history, especially the apartheid era and transition to multiracial governance.7 Equally telling is the paucity of studies on social movements in West Africa, especially in Ghana. Recent studies include Sapong’s study on the role of social movements in the making of Ghana’s democratic Fourth Republic, and Amoah-Boampong’s study on the need for agricultural producers and farmers to engage and contest the state, through unions, in the marketing of their produce.8 Social movements are not a new phenomenon in the history of Gold Coast. Social and political protest existed during its contact and encounter with Europe and the eras of scramble, partition, pacification, and colonial rule. During the encounter with Europe, the chiefs and people of the Gold Coast actively resisted European manoeuvring to assert their authority over economic and political activities on the coast. The coming of colonial rule did not extinguish resistance to alien rule. For the purpose of this work, the Gold Coast peoples’ response to British domination and colonial rule at different times in its history may be categorised into three phases. These are the era of the Old Guard (1830s onwards), the era of 5

6

7 8

For more explanation on resource mobilisation and political structures theories, see John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements. A Partial Theory’ in: American Journal of Sociology 82 (1976/77) 1212–1241; and Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, MA 1978. Mahmood Mamdani/Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba (eds.), African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy, Dakar 1995. Also see Stephen Ellis/Ineke van Kessel (eds.), Movers and Shakers. Social Movements in Africa, Leiden 2009. A notable example is Richard Ballard et al. (eds.), Voices of Protest. Social Movements in post-apartheid South Africa, Pietermaritzburg 2006. See Sapong, Aluta Continua; and C. Amoah-Boampong, Contesting the State in Ghana’s Cocoa Trade. The Case of Kuapa Kooko Farmers’ Union, 1957–2004, Carbondale 2011.

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the New Guard (1920s onwards), and the era of the Verandah Boys 9 (late 1940s onwards). These phases, however, are not rigid categorisations, since activities of each phase often overlapped the next. ORIGINS OF BRITISH POWER IN THE GOLD COAST The origins of British power and jurisdiction in the Gold Coast may be traced to the nineteenth century. From 1830 to 1847, George Maclean, President of the Committee of British Merchants and later Judicial Assessor, worked to extend British jurisdiction on the coast by interfering in local affairs. This gradual encroachment finally led to the official recognition of pre-existing British jurisdiction on the Gold Coast on March 6, 1844.10 The resultant paperwork, known as the Bond of 1844, was a short declaration signed by some coastal kings and witnessed by Commander Hill, Lieutenant-Governor of Cape Coast Castle.11 The British, however, had to contend with Asante hegemony and claims to tribute over the coastal states. This situation heightened existing tensions between the British and Asante, leading to a continuation of military confrontations between the British and Asante, known as the Anglo-Asante wars of 1863 and 1869–1874. After the defeat of the Asante, the British Crown finally ‘pacified’ the Gold Coast colony in 1901.12 Henry C. Morris pointed out that the Crown’s ultimate aim was to develop the colonies’ ‘scheme of government as rapidly as possible, and eventually to elevate it from the position of inferiority to that of association’.13 Colonialism was thus part of an elaborate process in which Gold Coast people had to go through a period of political tutelage to appreciate the benefits of civil society. The Colonial Office, sometimes referred to as Whitehall, administered the Gold Coast through the system of indirect rule. A Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Thomas Lloyd, paternalistically described the relationship between the Colonial Office and the colonies as ‘once likened to a grandmother burdened with 9

10 11

12

13

‘Verandah Boys’ is a term that was consciously adopted by members of the CPP to distinguish themselves from the highly educated, aloof and bourgeois members of the UGCC. These young and politically active Ghanaians identified with Nkrumah, who frequently mingled with them and partook in their ordinary ways. Albert Adu Boahen, Ghana. Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Accra 2000, 40–44. The Bond of 1844 ‘put the British foot in the door’ but was not the defining document which propped eventual British colonial rule in the Gold Coast. Initial signatories included the Kings of Denkyira, Abora, Anomabu, Cape Coast and Dominase. Prior to 1901, the British Crown controlled only the coastal stretch, which was known as the Gold Coast Colony. It later added the Asante Kingdom and the Northern Territories and, in 1919, a portion of German Togoland as a mandated territory. Together, these territories became known as the Gold Coast colony (emphasis on lower case ‘c’). Henry C. Morris, The History of Colonization. From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, New York/London 1900, 80. Also see Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Office, London 1956, 38–39.

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the care and rearing of a brood of young children’.14 Frederick Lugard agreed that such ‘liberty and self-development can be best secured to the native population by leaving them free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, proportionately to their degree of advancement, under the guidance of the British staff, and subject to the laws and policy of the administration.’15 The British colonial administrators sought alliances with traditional rulers to initiate this dual responsibility. In areas where there were no rulers, chiefs were created. Thus, the colonial government ruled through already established or artificially created native political structures and governing institutions. A peculiar feature of this British system of local government was the complete elimination of all people who were not privileged by birth to be kings or elders.16 The colonial administration in the Gold Coast comprised an Executive Council, a Legislative Council, and a Civil Service. The affairs of the Gold Coast were directed by the Governor, who was advised by an Executive Council on important matters, such as the passing and implementation of bills. The Governor was vested with veto powers and was subject to no one but the home government. The constitution of the Executive Council was regulated by ‘His Majesty’s Instructions or appointed by the Governor in pursuance of instructions received from the Secretary of State for the Colonies’.17 The Legislative Council was a representative law-making body composed of both official and unofficial members. The Governor appointed the official members, while the people of the Gold Coast elected the unofficial members. The Civil Service provided the skilled personnel for administering the Gold Coast. In addition to the above responsibilities of the various arms of government in the administration of colonial affairs, the colonial administration had to ‘preserve law and order, to develop the trade and communications of the country, and to protect the interests of the merchants and others who are engaged in the development of its commercial and mineral resources’.18 In light of the above ‘civilising mission’ assumed by colonial administrators, it was just a matter of time before the people of the Gold Coast started feeling alienated from the government. EARLY AND LATER FORMS OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS The earliest forms of protests were carried out single-handedly or in concert by chiefs (Old Guard), who felt the yoke of foreign interference grow heavy. As early as the 1830s, various individual attempts were made by chiefs to curb the growing 14 Sir Thomas Lloyd in: Foreword to The Colonial Office, 6. 15 Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 5th Edition, London 1965, 94. 16 Albert Adu Boahen, Topics in West African History, London 1966, 135–136. 17 Governor Alan Burns, ‘Speech in Legislative Council’, 29 September, 1942 in: G. E. Metcalfe (ed.), Great Britain and Ghana. Documents of Ghana History, 1807–1957, Legon, Accra 1964, 666. 18 Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 94.

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British interference in native affairs. In 1834, Kojo Tsibu, the king of Denkyira, protested the interference of George Maclean19 in native customs. And in 1865, King John Aggrey of Cape Coast challenged British jurisdiction on his lands. The rise of protest movements against the gradual strengthening of British power and jurisdiction in the Gold Coast culminated in the creation of the Fante Confederation in 1868. The Fante Confederation was an attempt by Fante kings to support and protect themselves against Asante invasion, regardless of British interests or patronage; to renounce British sovereignty over the Fante peoples; to oppose the Anglo-Dutch exchange of forts; and to protest the bombardment of Komenda.20 This movement heralded the early intent of Ghanaians, especially the chiefs and educated elite, to be politically active by encouraging and participating in associational life. The Fante Confederacy declared itself independent of the British and drew up a constitution which urged unity between the Fante kings against a common enemy and called for improvements in education, agriculture and trade. Despite its lofty objectives, the Fante Confederacy had collapsed by 1873.21 The resistance of the chiefs, however, was doomed from the beginning to be ineffectual because of the prescribed roles that British rule gave them. The very nature of the policy of indirect rule demanded that the chiefs play the middleman role in perpetuating British colonialism. Thus, from the role of defending the interests of their subjects and equals, the Gold Coast chiefs found themselves being used as pawns in an imperial chess game. Nkrumah was of the opinion that ‘the chiefs found strength in the Government and so they naturally leaned towards it… They could pack up and follow the Europeans out of the Gold Coast.’22 The stage was thus set for a collision between the chiefs and the actors of the next phase of nationalist agitation, who thought that the Old Guard had compromised the fight for self-rule. In a moment of paradox, Sir Frederick Lugard, the main exponent of the policy of indirect rule, and therefore a staunch promoter of the Old Guard, touted the educated native elite, rather than the chiefs, as the heirs of the colonisers. He was of the view that self-government could be realised only through a representative government in which a minority-educated elite were recognised as the ‘natural spokesmen’ for the majority. He argued further that the ‘fundamental essential … is that the educated few shall at least be representative of the feelings and desires of the many – well known to them, speaking their language, and versed in their customs and prejudices.’23 A decade after The Dual Mandate was published, the Gold Coast started stirring with the concerted activities of an educated elite to whom Lugard would have 19 George Maclean was president of a council appointed by a committee of British merchants in 1829 to oversee British trade and properties on the Gold Coast. 20 Boahen, Ghana, 48–50. 21 Ibid., 54–55. 22 Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom. A Statement of African Ideology, London 1961, 5. Also see Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs. The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951–60, Athens, OH 2000. 23 Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 194.

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eventually entrusted self-rule. From the 1870s, the British systematically initiated administrative, judicial, and financial measures which eroded the powers of native institutions. These measures precipitated the founding of protest movements typically led by the educated. From the 1890s into the 1920s, an increase in the number of European-educated West Africans led to the formation of several protest and pressure groups who sought to influence the political economy of West Africa. Of special note were the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society (ARPS), the National Congress of British West Africa, the West African Students Union, the Gold Coast Youth Conference, and the West African Youth League. The Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society (ARPS) was formed in Cape Coast in 1897 to protest direct taxation and the lack of African representation in the colonial administration, the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, and the Land Bills of 1894 and 1897.24 The Land Bills would have given the colonial government unfettered access to native lands, rendering the peoples of the Gold Coast landless and making them squatters on their own ancestral lands. Scholars such as Boahen point out that, although the Land Bills of 1894 and 1897 were key in the formation of the ARPS, credit should also be given to protests which ‘had been raging since the 1880s over the question of constitutional reforms, taxation and representation’.25 The establishment of the ARPS publication the Gold Coast Aborigines in early 1898 gave this movement the wider audience it needed. This medium explained the detrimental policies of the colonial administration to the people and elicited their response and support for the ARPS. In May 1898, the ARPS sent a delegation to Britain to meet with Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies. Although he denied their request for constitutional reforms, Chamberlain agreed to address the issues of land and taxation. The London trip was deemed successful, and the ARPS became a spearhead of native rights in the Gold Coast until its expiration in the 1950s. In 1913 J. E. Casely Hayford, a Gold Coast intellectual and pan-Africanist, proposed the idea of organising a conference of British West African intellectuals. In March 1920, a congress of West African intellectuals was convened in the Gold Coast to call for a government of peoples of African descent in the British territories of West Africa. Those present included T. Hutton Mills, J. E. Casely Hayford, F. V. Nanka-Bruce and A. B. Quartey-Papafio. At this conference, the name National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) was adopted. This gathering pointed to a new development in native intellectual thinking: the broadening of the scope of protest movements towards a pan-African thinking. The main grievances of the gathering included constitutional and judicial reforms, educational and healthcare reforms, and the cessation of discriminatory practices against Africans by the British. In September of 1920, a delegation from the NCBWA was 24 The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 was one of the British attempts at consolidating power and ending so-called archaic and savage customs. It permitted limited judicial powers to the traditional rulers, but the final authority lay with the governor. In fact, this ordinance enabled the governor to dismiss or suspend native rulers who overstepped their jurisdiction. 25 Boahen, Ghana, 63.

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sent to London with a petition to the King, but the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Milner, refused to grant them audience. This incident was a mortal blow from which the NCBWA never recovered. In a poignant observation, Boahen stated that the main reason for the relative ineffectiveness and eventual disintegration of the NCBWA was the threefold opposition it encountered from the Gold Coast native rulers, the conservative intellectuals, and the colonial administration. By the 1930s, the NCBWA was defunct.26 The fading fire of the independence movement from the mid-1920s to the 1930s, due to internal strife between traditional elite and the intelligentsia, was given the needed resuscitation by three youth movements, the West African Students’ Union (WASU), the Gold Coast Youth Conference (GCYC), and the West African Youth League (WAYL). The founding of these student and youth movements was augmented by the drive of certain individuals, the return of professionals from Europe and North America, and the emergence of voluntary associations and unions in the 1920s and 1930s. The formation of the WASU was particularly fortuitous for the independence movement in Ghana and the whole of Africa because of the added urgency it gave to the fight for self-rule by providing leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah. The WASU was very important to the survival and sustenance of the independence movement in Ghana and other African countries because of its emphasis on African liberation through the efforts of the westerneducated African elite.27 In the case of the Gold Coast Youth Conference (GCYC), which was founded in 1929, Ghanaian intellectuals such as J. B. Danquah, K. A. Korsah, F. V. Nanka-Bruce and E. Asafu-Adjaye thought that the youth conference was a good way to harness the human resources of Ghana for the common good of the country. They also used this conference to try mending the rift between the Gold Coast intellectuals and the chiefs. The Ghana branch of the West African Youth League, on the other hand, was founded by I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson with the assistance of Bankole Renner in 1934 to radically champion the cause of the masses and overthrow with whatever means necessary the colonial yoke on West Africa. Despite its appeal to the youth of the Gold Coast, the conservative elite and chiefs worked to undermine the League because of its radical posture. Kwame Nkrumah was to capitalise on the resultant feeling of ‘betrayal’ of the independence agenda by the chiefs and conservative intellectuals in the late 1940s by launching the CPP. In 1938, the colonial administration, with the tacit approval of the chiefs and conservative intellectuals, deported Wallace-Johnson from the Gold Coast. Thus, by 1940 the League was non-operational. Not to be outdone by the intellectuals, Gold Coast farmers and entrepreneurs entered the fray and generated their own protest movements, which employed economic weapons to protest and fight against colonial economic policies. These movements led to boycotts and the cocoa hold-ups of the 1930s. In 1937, John 26 Boahen, Ghana, 132–133. 27 Kwame Nkrumah, J. B. Danquah, and other nationalists were at some point members of the WASU.

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Kwame Ayew of Akuapem in the eastern part of Ghana organised a rural boycott on the sale of cocoa to expatriate firms such as the United African Company because of unilateral price-fixing and the high cost of imported goods. The economic consequences of the boycott were so significant that the colonial administration appointed a commission to investigate the boycott. The commission recommended the sale of cocoa through farmers’ cooperatives, thereby eliminating corrupt and dishonest middlemen. THE NEW GUARD In view of the changing dynamics of the composition of social movements, the colonial administration in the Gold Coast realigned its political support from the native chieftaincy to the educated and merchant elite from the 1930s onwards. These educated Africans, whose worldview had been broadened by years of study in the United Kingdom and the United States, along with the middle-class merchants, ushered in the era of the New Guard. The New Guard came to believe that they would become the de facto heirs to the British colonial administration when the twilight of British colonialism drew near. In this era, ethnic and kinship groups, as well as individuals bound together by education, occupation, and commercial interests, sought a more centralised institution within which they could seek their common interests. In Ghana, this organisational institution was the political party. This is not to say that the various ethnic, civic and voluntary associations disappeared after the formation of political parties. They continued to function side by side with the parties, sometimes for and sometimes against the parties. In 1947, surviving elements of the GCYC came together to found the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) ‘to ensure that by all legitimate and constitutional means the control and direction of Government shall within the shortest time possible pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs’.28 The UGCC was regarded as a moderate party of Gold Coast lawyers and merchants and therefore became the focus of the colonial administration’s political mentorship program for gradual self-rule. The gradual approach to political independence, however, did not sit well with certain elements in the United Gold Coast Convention who wanted immediate political independence. The mouthpiece of the dissenting elements was Nkrumah. According to him, imperialism ‘knows no law beyond its own interests’, so to imagine that Britain would hand over power to the Gold Coast ‘without compulsion is the height of folly’.29 Nkrumah later led the disaffected faction to break away from the United Gold Coast Convention to form their own political party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP). According to Nkrumah, the sponsors of the UGCC ‘were men whose political philosophy was contrary to the political aspira28 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana. The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, New York 1957, 70. 29 Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom. Africa in the Struggle Against World Imperialism, London 1962, xiv–xvii.

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tions of the people of Gold Coast…It was quite useless to associate myself with a movement backed almost entirely by reactionaries, middle-class lawyers and merchants, for my revolutionary background and ideas would make it impossible for me to work with them.’30 THE VERANDAH BOYS The era of the ‘Verandah Boys’ began with the formation of the Convention Peoples Party on Sunday, June 12, 1949. The CPP was formed out of a youth wing of the UGCC, the Committee on Youth Organisation. According to Nkrumah, a ‘policy of collaboration and appeasement would get us nowhere in our struggle for immediate self-government’,31 thus the need for the formation of a party that will ‘carry on the struggle for the liberation of our dear Ghana in the recognised party system, until full self-government was won…’32 The formation of the CPP, according to Nkrumah, marked the parting of ways of the independence movement in the Gold Coast. Adu Boahen concurs that ‘while the UGCC remained basically a party of the intelligentsia and the professional elite, the CPP was clearly a party of the youth, the commoners or as they preferred to call themselves “the verandah boys.”’33 The struggle from then on involved three centripetal forces: an amalgamation of the Old Guard and New Guard on one side, the colonial government in the middle, and the ‘politically awakened masses’ on the other. To the intelligentsia and contentious actors like Nkrumah, the ‘privileged’ role of the chiefs was untenable because they would be obliged to do the colonial administration’s bidding and not the people’s will. The role of the chiefs in the colonial government continued to be a source of friction between the colonial administration and the chiefs, on one hand, and the Gold Coast intelligentsia, on the other, through the 1930s to the 1950s. In the 1940s and 1950s, after consistent criticism from Gold Coast intelligentsia and some chiefs, the colonial administration embarked on constitutional reforms to give the Gold Coast an all-inclusive government. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE: THE ‘MAN ON THE SPOT’ AND COLONIAL POLICY The change in policy from the Lugardian system of administering a colony through chiefs to that of aligning with the emerging intelligentsia in the Gold Coast was based on a localised policy shift, which took cognisance of the political and economic realities unfolding in the Gold Coast. This assertion is founded on the premises that the colonial administration in the Gold Coast was an autono30 31 32 33

Nkrumah, Ghana, 62. Ibid., 103. Ibid., 105. Boahen, Ghana, 170.

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mous and independent institution that had little interference from Whitehall. In the Gold Coast, British policy and impact were influenced by local circumstances and the tenacity of the colonial administration. The British tenacity most often referred to the governor’s ability to read into local situations and take the initiative, with or without Whitehall’s blessing. Referring to the governor as ‘the man on the spot’, David McIntyre stated: ‘his influence can scarcely be overestimated… A governor could always be censured, even recalled. But once in Government House he, in fact, exercised the widest discretion.’34 In most cases, the Colonial Office ended up defending a particular governor’s own policy, although it might not have agreed with it in the beginning. This was what made the governor or the ‘man on the spot’ the key influence in the formulation and implementation of colonial policy. This situation was crucial for the independence movement in the Gold Coast because the colonial administration developed a character of its own based on local political, social and economic realities, and because it became responsive to these realities. From the 1940s onwards, the colonial administration in the Gold Coast showed a renewed commitment to the general political, economic, and social development of the Gold Coast. According to F. M. Bourret, this renewed commitment began when British trade began to decline in the 1920s. Because of the Depression, the British Parliament ‘took its first step toward a new policy of developing the colonial empire. By the Colonial Development Act of 1929 it agreed to give financial aid for certain capital expenditures which would promote commerce … in the United Kingdom.’35 This act became the precursor of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, which followed in the 1940s. In 1940, the British Parliament passed the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which provided an annual expenditure of up to 5 million pounds over a period of ten years for the development and welfare of colonies. In 1945, the second Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed which provided 30 million pounds to West Africa, of which 3.5 million pounds went towards development and welfare in the Gold Coast. This renewed commitment on the part of the British government would have, however, come to naught had it not been for the ‘man on the spot’ and his administration. One such governor was Sir Alan Burns, who served from 1941 to 1947. Bourret maintained that while ‘Britain’s new colonial policy and the progress incident to the war set the stage for marked Gold Coast development, Governor Burns’ broad outlook, his steady purpose, and his confidence in the Gold Coast 34 David McIntyre, The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865–75. A Study of British Colonial Policy in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, New York 1967, 42. According to Frederick Madden, the final delivery of colonial policy was always blurred by distance and economy, making it a hybrid of the original from Whitehall. See Frederick Madden, ‘Some Origins and Purposes in the Formation of British Colonial Government’, in: Kenneth Robinson/Frederick Madden (ed.), Essays in Imperial Government, Oxford 1963, 1–2. 35 F. M. Bourret, The Gold Coast. A Survey of the Gold Coast and British Togoland 1919–1946, Stanford 1949, 165.

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African’s splendid qualities were in no small degree responsible for the achievements of the 1942–1947 period.’36 Governor Burns began his term of office on an unprecedented note by appointing two Africans in October 1942 to his Executive Council as unofficial members in a bid to strengthen his advisory team, as he put it.37 One cannot, however, shake off the thought that Governor Burns read into the growing agitation of the Gold Coast people for self-rule and thus wanted to create a semblance of an all-inclusive government. According to Nkrumah, there was at this point a ‘considerable political awakening in the gold Coast’, and to the politically educated, this act was a ‘half-hearted gesture’.38 In 1946, Governor Burns announced in the Legislative Council that it now had an elected majority. He regarded this as a ‘considerable political advance, and it afford[ed] an opportunity for the Gold Coast people to prove to the world that they have deserved the confidence placed in them…’39 FRAMING CONTENTIOUS CLAIMS: THE NKRUMAH CONTINGENCY Nkrumah’s working-class background may have been one of the many irreconcilable differences that he had with both the traditional royal class and the capitalist bourgeois class.40 The young Nkrumah grew up in a traditional setting where community placed itself above individualism. Nkrumah remembered his home always swarming with extended family members because it was custom to maintain an ‘open-door policy’ to all kinspeople.41 The African communal idea was to greatly influence the formulation of his political ideology on Pan-Africanism, African unity, and mass mobilisation in the Gold Coast. On the attainment of Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah remarked that ‘its independence will be incomplete…unless it is linked up with the liberation of other territories in Africa.’42 When questioned by his personal secretary, Genoveva Marais, on whether he was a Communist or not, he had this to say; ‘Yes I am…Yet I believe in God.’ This apparent contradiction later became comprehensible to the bemused Marais.

36 Ibid., 171. 37 Burns, ‘Speech in Legislative Council’, 29 September, 1942 in: Metcalfe (ed.), Great Britain and Ghana, 666. The two Africans were the Honourable Nana Sir Ofori Atta, K. B. E., and Mr. K.A. Korsah, O. B. E. 38 Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, 1–2. 39 Sir Alan Burns, ‘Address of the Governor (Sir A.C.M. Burns) to Legislative Council’, 23 July, 1946 in G. E. Metcalfe (ed.), Great Britain and Ghana, 681. 40 During the 1940s and 1950s, there was a rift between the chiefs and educated Africans as to who would play a greater role in the Africanisation of the colonial administration. One main reason for this animosity was the social gap between these two groups. A considerable number of the educated Africans were from the working class. The situation became complex because some of the bourgeois-class people who were allies of Nkrumah in the independence movement also belonged to the traditional royal class. 41 Nkrumah, Ghana, 8–9. 42 Ibid., xvi.

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Nkrumah meant communist with a lower case ‘c’, because he believed in the essence of community.43 Kwame Nkrumah was influenced by not only traditional African values but Western values as well. Invigorated by a ‘lively national consciousness’, Nkrumah ‘sought knowledge as instrument of national emancipation and integrity’.44 Although he admitted that his sojourn in the United States of America and the United Kingdom were difficult and lonely times, he never looked back with remorse to those days. This is because those were the formative years that helped him to formulate his philosophy of life and politics. Nkrumah revealed that he chose to go to the United States because ‘America came to appeal to me as a Western country which stood refreshingly untainted by territorial colonialism in Africa.’ Thus, this ten-year academic stint in America ‘represents a crucial period in the development of my philosophical conscience’.45 Nkrumah put his ideas into practice by helping to set up an African Studies Section and to organise the African Students’ Association of America and Canada, of which he became president. To Nkrumah, ‘this was actually the beginning of my political activities in the United States.’46 With the help of other African students, especially Ako Adjei and Jones Quartey, Nkrumah arranged for the publication of the Association’s official newspaper, the African Interpreter. Through this newspaper, the Association tried to build and revive a spirit of nationalism among the African students. The aim of these African students was to return to their respective territories after graduation to organise political agitation against colonial authorities and also to present a unified front in their struggle for political independence in the different African territories.47 The various political organisations in the United States, especially the Communists and Trotskyites, were also of interest to Nkrumah. He admits that ‘it was in connection with the latter movement that I met one of its leading members, Mr. C. L. R. James, and through him I learned how an underground movement worked.’48 Apart from learning organisational techniques, Nkrumah sought theoretical ways by which the colonial question and imperialism might be solved. This led him to closely study Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mazzini, and Garvey. Their writings greatly influence him in fashioning his revolutionary ideas and activities, especially Marx, Lenin, and Garvey’s political philosophies.49 Nkrumah’s intellectual indebtedness and emotional attachment to the United States were evident on his departure from New York to London in May 1945, when he said to the 43 Genoveva Marais, Kwame Nkrumah. As I Knew Him, Chichester 1972, 14. 44 Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism. Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization, New York 1970, 4. 45 Ibid., 2. 46 Nkrumah, Ghana, 43. 47 Ibid., 44. 48 Ibid., 45. 49 Nkrumah was particularly enthusiastic about Marcus Garvey’s The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey. He later on however criticised Garvey’s ideology for not being born of ‘indigenous African consciousness’. See Nkrumah, Ghana, 54.

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Statue of Liberty ‘You have opened my eyes to the true meaning of liberty…I shall never rest until I have carried your message to Africa.’50 On his sojourn in the United Kingdom, Nkrumah met a group of people who deepened his understanding of the experiences of the colonised. It was when he arrived in London in 1945 that he really started grappling with the colonial question. This was because he experienced at first hand the ‘determination of student bodies fighting and agitating for colonial freedom in the very heart of a country that possessed a vast colonial empire…’51 While in London, Nkrumah joined the West African Students’ Union, of which he became the vice president. He also met George Padmore, a West Indian journalist who later became his close friend and advisor, and Dr W. E. B. DuBois. Soon, Nkrumah found himself planning together with George Padmore for the Fifth Pan-African Congress, which was scheduled to take place in October of 1945. At this congress, jointly chaired with Dr DuBois, they ‘unanimously endorsed the doctrine of African socialism based upon the tactics of positive action without violence’52 as a solution to the colonial problem. African socialism may be described as a hybrid capitalist-scientific-socialist system, a kind of middle-ground position, which claimed nonalignment in the Cold War divide between the Eastern and Western Blocs. It involved an attempt by African intellectuals like Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Leopold Sedar Senghor to adapt Marxist socialism to African colonial realities. This concept involved an organised revolution by the colonial masses, led by the proletariat against the capitalist coloniser. Leopold Senghor attempted to define an ‘African socialism’ built on national values and starting from national realities. This was necessary because he believed that after independence, the native people should not import without modification political, economic, social, and cultural institutions.53 Senghor’s position is not surprising because of his concept of Negro pride or Negritude, which is having pride in one’s African cultural heritage. Senghor’s approach to African socialism is, however, conciliatory because he intended for Africans to be ‘freely associated with’ the colonial powers in a ‘Confederation’.54 Nkrumah was, however, less conciliatory towards the colonial powers. As a replacement for colonialism, Nkrumah demanded immediate political independence from Britain, and he proposed the adoption of African socialism. According to Steven Metz, African socialism is ‘an attempt to blend what are perceived as the dominant ethics of pre-colonial society with the productive power of modern capitalism’. In Metz’s view, Nkrumah realised the huge impact of capitalism on the Gold Coast and therefore decided to work alongside it towards socialism.55 In a 50 51 52 53

Ibid., 49. Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom, ix. Nkrumah, Ghana, 53. Leopold Sedar Senghor, Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism, trans. by Mercer Cook, Paris 1962, 7–16. 54 Ibid., 15. 55 Steven Metz, ‘In Lieu of Orthodoxy. The Socialist Theories of Nkrumah and Nyerere’, in: The Journal of Modern African Studies, 20(3) (1982), 378–379.

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different shade of opinion, Ali Mazrui was of the view that Nkrumah saw himself as an African Lenin. He asserted that Nkrumah wanted to enter into history books as the proponent of ‘Nkrumahism’, a convolution of Marxist ideology and Nkrumah’s philosophy of life and politics. Mazrui stated further that although Marxism was the progenitor of Leninism and Nkrumahism, both were unique in their own right.56 Despite Nkrumah’s ‘Africanisation’ of the Marxist-Leninist point of view, both theorists heavily influenced his theory on colonial economics. He adopted the Marxist-Leninist socialist theory as a framework for analysing colonial economics. According to Nkrumah, colonial economics may be divided into three main phases corresponding to its history: the merchant capitalist period, the laissez faire period and the period of economic imperialism. The focus of his analysis was the last phase, ‘economic imperialism with its dominance of finance capital’.57 Like Marx and Lenin, Nkrumah believed that wages were a necessary evil to capitalist–producers but capitalist–producers found ways to keep wages below the fringes of profit, limiting the purchasing power of wage earners. The result was that supply superseded demand and resulted in overproduction. This situation was further compounded by the keen competition among capitalist–producers. In a bid to find a remedy to this problem, capitalists championed the creation of colonies. Nkrumah maintained that the inner contradictions and inconsistencies of economic imperialism led to colonialism. These overseas markets became an outlet for the surplus goods. The economic development of these colonies was stalled because capitalist–producers sought to eliminate competition and established monopolies, killing off native competition in the process.58 In arguing for immediate self-rule, which became his motto in several political speeches, Nkrumah pointed out that certain scholars and colonial writers ‘apparently ignore the fact that such steps as they propose in asking for gradual withdrawal of the political administration are in effect asking the “mother country” to expropriate herself’.59 Based on this conviction, Nkrumah believed that the colonial administration should not be given time to consolidate its exploitation of the Gold Coast. Nkrumah’s theory and the urgency infused in his message gave Ghana’s independence movement the needed ideological grounding to launch rationalised attacks at the colonial administration. NKRUMAH’S REPERTOIRE: POSITIVE ACTION Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast to take up the position of General Secretary of the UGCC. He immediately went to work and identified two courses of action to take in order for the Gold Coast to achieve political independence. These were 56 57 58 59

Ali A. Mazrui, ‘Nkrumah: The Leninist Czar’, in: Transition, 75/76 (1997), 106. Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom, 11. Ibid., 11–14. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, 30–31.

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‘positive action’ and ‘tactical action’.60 The positive action phase tentatively lasted from 1948 to 1951. Nkrumah saw positive action as the legitimate and constitutional means by which political independence may be achieved. This included the use of the news media and educational campaigns as well as nonviolent acts of civil disobedience such as workers’ strikes and trade boycotts. On Saturday, 28 February 1948, a string of incidents took place that thrust Nkrumah into the Gold Coast political foray and brought him in direct confrontation with the colonial administration. On that day, a group of ex-soldiers had decided to walk to the Christianborg Castle, the seat of the governor, to petition him to alleviate their harsh economic situation. At the crossroads to the castle, a colonial police officer ordered his African men to open fire on the unarmed ex-soldiers. When they hesitated, he opened fire himself, resulting in two fatalities and mob reaction throughout Accra. There was chaos, rioting, and looting of European shops, continuing into the next day. The executive members of the UGCC, including Nkrumah, were consequently arrested and detained because the colonial government felt that they had a hand in the ensuing civil disorder.61 A closer observation of Kwame Nkrumah’s political ideology and philosophy of life reveals an imminent conflict with the leadership of the UGCC. He was a radical intellectual from a humble background, who abhorred foot-dragging on the issue of self-government. The leadership of the UGCC, on the other hand, consisted of property-owning chiefs and middle-class lawyers, doctors, intellectuals, and businessmen, who were relatively content with life and acquiesced to gradual decolonisation. It was not surprising then that Nkrumah founded the CPP on 12 June 1949, and resigned as the organising secretary of the UGCC on 30 July 1949. The CPP, unlike the UGCC, was a grassroots party of people of all social classes and backgrounds. In line with his positive action ideology, Nkrumah set up several newspapers to keep the people of the Gold Coast politically conscious. These were the Accra Evening News, the Sekondi Morning Telegraph, and the Cape Coast Daily Mail. To Nkrumah, the Accra Evening News ‘became the vanguard of the movement and its chief propagandist, agitator, mobiliser and political educationist … In its pages the people were reminded of their struggle for freedom … and of the grim horrors of imperialism.’62 He also established the Ghana National College, which originally catered to the educational needs of a group of students who were dismissed from school for supporting the UGCC leaders during their arrest and detention. Nkrumah was of the view that ‘it was the task of the Ghana National College to liberate the minds of our youth so that they should be ready to tackle the

60 Nkrumah, Ghana, xv. 61 The executive members of the UGCC were J.B. Danquah, Nana Ofori Atta, Akuffo Addo, Ako Adjei, Obetsebi Lamptey, and Nkrumah. These nationalists were later known as the ‘Big Six’. 62 Nkrumah, Ghana, 93.

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many problems of our time.’63 The Ghana National College became one of the premier secondary schools in Ghana from the 1960s onwards. In 1950, Nkrumah decided to call for a nationwide strike action in Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi, and Tarkwa to crown his ideology of positive action. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. R. H. Saloway, invited Nkrumah in to convince him to rescind his decision and call off the strike, but Nkrumah was adamant. Saloway then decided that Nkrumah would be responsible for any disaster that occurred because of positive action. Also, he would be subject to prosecution. From 17 to 21 January, Nkrumah’s comrades, including his right hand man, Kojo Botsio, were arrested and detained. On 22 January 1950, Nkrumah was finally arrested and charged with inciting others to take part in an illegal strike. He was found guilty and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively in the James Fort prison. The trial and imprisonment of Nkrumah for inciting civil disobedience and political unrest increased the resolve of the CPP members to work towards ending colonial rule in the Gold Coast. To them, Nkrumah became a political martyr, whose cause had to be carried out be he in prison or not. According to Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, the governor of the Gold Coast in 1949, the UGCC, a moderate and gradualist party, proved incapable of assuming the leadership role in native politics despite the power vacuum created by Nkrumah’s imprisonment.64 While in prison, Nkrumah stood for election in Accra Central. On 8 February 1951, the day of the election, the prison superintendent arranged for hourly updates on the vote-counting. At about 4 am the next day, word got to Nkrumah that he had been elected for Accra Central. Interestingly, he ‘received the largest individual poll so far recorded in the history of the Gold Coast – 22,780 votes out of a possible 23,122’.65 His party, the CPP, also won a majority in the Legislative Assembly. Consequently, on the morning of 12 February 1951, Governor ArdenClarke secretly agreed to release Nkrumah from prison, and he was made Leader of Government Business. Nkrumah met the governor the next day to discuss how to set up an African government. Thus began the tactical action phase in the fight for independence. Nkrumah maintained that it had always been his ‘conviction that after any political revolution … the new government should … clear out from the civil service all its old leaders … By failing to do so, a revolutionary government risks its own destruction.’66 He thus sought to tactfully increase the number of Africans in the Gold Coast government by keeping the experienced British civil servants who would guide and train the emerging African civil service. A fundamental problem with Nkrumah’s desire to Africanise the civil service was the lack of Gold Coast experts to fill the vacuum which would be left by the removal of British civil 63 Ibid., 91. 64 Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, ‘Gold Coast Into Ghana. Some Problems of Transition’; in: International Affairs, 34(1) (1958), 51. 65 Nkrumah, Ghana, 133. 66 Ibid., 146.

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servants. By 1951, the proportion of native Gold Coast employees was twenty percent, and those held only minor positions. Nkrumah therefore assured ‘the overseas officers that a fully self-governing Gold Coast will need and want their services and that their interests will be fully safeguarded’.67 Nkrumah was to later on renege on this assurance after 1960, when he became increasingly dictatorial and sought to silence expatriate voices of disagreement to CPP policies. After a year as Leader of Government Business, Nkrumah and the CPP called for the abolition of that office in favour of that of Prime Minister. After much political and constitutional deliberation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the House of Commons about constitutional changes in the Gold Coast. On 5 March 1952, the governor addressed the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly and informed them of the creation of the office of Prime Minster and the removal of that of Leader of Government Business. This development technically made Kwame Nkrumah the Prime Minister. Now serving as Prime Minister and Minister of Development, Nkrumah embarked on what he called ‘the final struggle for complete independence’. He regarded this period onwards as the probationary period when they must prove that Gold Coasters were capable of managing their own affairs.68 CONCLUSION On 23 August 1956, Nkrumah requested that the governor ask the British government to declare a firm date for the declaration of independence for the Gold Coast. In September 1956, Governor Charles Arden-Clark invited Nkrumah to his office and handed him a dispatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies granting the Gold Coast political independence. In the evening of 6 March 1957 at the old Polo Grounds, Nkrumah announced the political independence of Ghana amidst wild cheers and tears of joy. The whole world had its eyes fixed on this small West African nation, the first in sub-Saharan Africa to attain the status of self-rule. The Ghanaian story became a source of inspiration to the colonised peoples of Africa and a symbol of pride to African consciousness in the black diaspora. In telling this story, scholars of African history lay bare the intricacies involved in reconstructing watershed moments in the continent’s histories. It has been the aim of this chapter to revisit the contention that Nkrumah made claims on the colonial government through both inherited and invented forms of collective action. Also, these claims were framed on a shared history of European encroachment and Gold Coast resistance, and the hovering spectre of prolonged alien rule. Again, the movement that these claims generated took advantage of existing political opportunities in the colonial regime, such as its unwillingness to repress dissent and its desire to dialogue. Similarly, scholars should

67 Ibid., 149. 68 Nkrumah, Ghana, 170.

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appreciate the fact that the Gold Coast theatre was a microcosm of contentious politics unfolding across the Empire.

KWAME NKRUMAH AND THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF NORTHERN GHANA Samuel Aniegye Ntewusu Abstract: This paper discusses the contribution of Kwame Nkrumah to the development of northern Ghana. It focuses on Nkrumah’s agricultural development programme initiated from 1951–1966. Such a discussion is important in understanding why the northern part of Ghana – which is abundant in agriculture – both crop and animals was not able to achieve the desired agricultural development under Nkrumah.

INTRODUCTION A few years ago, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was voted as the man of the millennium by African listeners of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). He topped other personalities, such as Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Emperor Hailey Selassy of Ethiopia, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and others. Factors considered in this selection was the fact that Nkrumah fought against colonialism and brought independence to Ghana, one of the first countries in Africa to achieve it. Secondly he laid the foundation for the unity of Africa. Among other projects, he was credited with the building of the Akosombo dam and the Tema harbour and township, with its excellent road connecting the port city to Accra. This highway was popularly referred to as the Tema Motorway. He also established primary, secondary, and tertiary institutions of learning. One other critical thing that distinguished Nkrumah was the development of agricultural projects. It is this aspect of development in the context of northern Ghana that this paper intends to discuss. In order to fully appreciate agriculture under Nkrumah, it is important to give a brief appraisal of agricultural initiatives in the north prior to Nkrumah’s reign. AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS IN NORTHERN GHANA BEFORE KWAME NKRUMAH The present-day Northern Region of Ghana, comprising the three northern Regions – the Northern Region proper, the Upper East, and, later, the Upper West – was referred to as the Northern Territories before independence was attained in 1957. The Northern Territories were annexed to the Gold Coast colony in 1900. The annexation was preceded by an exploration of the political situation and the economic possibilities of the north. Central to these explorations was a trip made by George Ekem Ferguson, a Fante geologist employed by the Gold Coast gov-

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ernment to visit and make treaties in the area. In addition to political manoeuvring, Ferguson noted the possible resources of the north. Gold and ivory figured on his list, but the major possibilities appeared to be agricultural. His report indicated the shea butter tree was widespread, rice and millet grew well in the plains, and the development of cotton, tobacco, and indigo industries was projected.1 By the first and second decades of the 1900s, there was a policy to include plantation economy (especially cotton) with the indigenous mode of subsistence production of yams, millet, groundnuts, and other crops. In 1909, the British Cotton Growing Association sent to northern Ghana a cotton expert, Mr. Cornish, who reported favourably on the cotton already cultivated by the farmers there, particularly in the Dagomba and Gonja districts. He also laid out an experimental farm at Tamale for purposes of instructing the local farmers in the scientific methods of cotton cultivation and announced that the British Cotton Growing Association was prepared to purchase all the cotton the farmers could bring down to Tamale. Lastly, a cotton gin and a press were installed at Tamale, and a public demonstration was given; this reportedly created quite a sensation and greatly stimulated cotton cultivation. By 1911, more permanent buildings had been completed at Tamale to house new cotton gins, and at Tamale Port, the town created specially in 1908 to serve as the river port for Tamale, a cotton gin was erected, along with a hydraulic press to further compress the cotton bales for transport down the Volta. In subsequent years, the British Cotton Growing Association continued to distribute improved cotton seeds to farmers throughout northern Ghana, especially in Dagomba; it also installed new cotton gins at Wa and Gambaga in order to save farmers in these districts the high cost involved in transporting their cotton to Tamale, which was, before then, the only purchasing station.2 From 1948 to 1957, the colonial state of the Gold Coast attempted to implement a major agricultural mechanisation project in a vast, unoccupied region of the colony's Northern Territories. Based on several Colonial Office missions to West Africa, the project began in 1950 with the creation of the Gonja Development Company.3 In 1951 the Gonja Development Company began a pilot settlement scheme in an area of about 30,000 acres near the small settlement of Damongo in the sparsely populated belt of Western Gonja. The farmers encouraged to participate in the scheme came mostly from among the Frafra, who faced the serious problem of decreasing crop yields in the home area. Each immigrant was to farm a thirty-acre holding under the supervision of the Company, which also undertook responsibility for at least part of the main agricultural operations of

1 2 3

Kwame Arhin (ed.), The Papers of George Ekem Ferguson, Leiden/Cambridge 1974. K. B. Dickson, Background to the Problem of Economic Development in Northern Ghana, in: Annals of the Association of American Geographers 58 (1968), 686–696. Jeff D. Grischow, Late Colonial Development in British West Africa. The Gonja Development Project in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1948–57 in: Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 35 (2001), 282–312.

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tractor ploughing, fertilising, planting, and probably early inter-row cultivation and harvesting. In addition to plantation economy, the British also pursued the growth, harvest, preservation, and processing of natural products such as the shea nuts and dawadada products. The interest in shea nuts was triggered by Britain's desperate need for oilseeds and proteins in the context of the sterling crisis after World War II.4 Markets were sought overseas for cotton and shea nuts and internally for rice, maize, and dawadawa, among others. Every attempt was made to cut out so called ‘exploitative middlemen’ who offered lower prices for products that were marketed in northern Ghana, especially the shea nut products, which were considered the most important export product of the north. It was in the midst of all these agricultural development programmes and projects that Ghana, then the Gold Coast, began to fight for independence. Judging from the way the colonial administration was investing in the developmental projects in the north, most northerners did not subscribe to the idea of an immediate independence. This argument against self-rule would influence Kwame Nkrumah’s developmental policies for the north, including agriculture. DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES ON NORTHERN GHANA’S DEVELOPMENT UNDER NKRUMAH Following the formation of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) by Kwame Nkrumah and the political crises that arose in 1949, it was evident that Ghana was moving towards eventual self-rule. Nkrumah moved throughout the length and breadth of Ghana galvanising support for his party and fighting for the attainment of independence. In February of that year Kwame Nkrumah visited Tamale. In his words: I went to Tamale and chose for my subject ‘Poverty Versus plenty’. The Northern Territories people were particularly receptive to economic arguments. They looked forward to a higher standard of living once independence had been achieved. Economic freedom I told them would follow political freedom. 5

Nkrumah’s message of economic freedom and development was very well received, but northerners were still sceptical about accelerated development under an independent Ghana. It was proposed by the Northern Territorial Council that independence should be delayed until such a time that the north was on equal social, economic, and infrastructural developmental footing with the south. In the Council’s opinion, independence was important, but economic development was necessary, since at that stage, both Ashanti and the Colony had progressed much further economically than the north.

4 5

Grischow, Late Colonial Development. Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, London 1961, 16.

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Besides, there were developmental projects, which included the agriculturally focused Gonja Development Company and the cotton projects and road constructions that the British had initiated, whose outcome was uncertain for the northerners should Kwame Nkrumah take over under a new government. Indeed, northern elites and chiefs indicated the extent to which they were still for all intents and purposes ‘protected persons’, whose relationship with the British was defined by the treaties signed by their chiefs in the closing years of the nineteenth century. To them, as far as they were aware, these treaties had not been abrogated or denounced by either party, nor had the development projects been stopped by Britain, even in the midst of accelerated movement towards independence. It was emphasised that the British government had certain developmental responsibilities towards the chiefs and people of the area.6 Despite these arguments against immediate self-rule, Nkrumah persevered, assuring northerners of his intentions. In February 1951, the first elections based on the new constitution were held. Nkrumah with his CPP had the mass of the people behind him; therefore, he won a landslide victory. But the affairs of the country were still in the hands of Britain, as self-government had not been declared. Sir Charles Arden-Clarke still remained governor, but Nkrumah was appointed Leader of Government Business.7 It is important to note that the status of the north as an ‘underdeveloped entity’ and in need of development was still very much at the discussion stage. Therefore, in 1953, Nkrumah and Arden-Clarke recognised the need for a special programme to ensure the accelerated development of the north. In May of that year, they met with the Standing Committee of the Northern Territorial Council and traditional rulers of the north in Tamale to discuss constitutional reform and progress for independence. Northerners still emphasised the need for development before independence could be attained. Nkrumah promised northern leadership that a special development organisation would be established that would take care of the north’s developmental needs. On the basis of this promise, the northern elite and chiefs agreed to the proposal for independence. In order to show his willingness to implement development projects, Nkrumah moved around the north visiting some of the important chiefs in the area, among whom was the Yabun-Wura, Paramount Chief of the Gonja, and some district councils. Such visits offered him the opportunity to explain the developmental projects, including agriculture, which he intended to carry out. The end to discussions and debates finally came in December 1954, when a report containing a proposed development plan which covered 1956–1961 was made available to the government and the people of northern Ghana. The fiveyear development plan had, as its focus, social services, economic and social services, communications, public utility services, and other miscellaneous services. 6 7

N. J. K. Brukum, The Northern Territories of the Gold Coast under British Colonial Rule, 1897–1956. A study in Political Change, PhD Thesis, University of Toronto 1997. F. K. Buah, A History of Ghana, London 1980.

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The comprehensive nature of the report convinced northerners that independence could indeed guarantee the needed development.8 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER NKRUMAH Beginning from 1951, there were enough representatives from northern Ghana in the Legislative Assembly that their voices were heard and taken seriously. But nothing pushed Nkrumah into action and his government towards agricultural development of the north before a letter was written by the Honourable Member from the Gonja district, J. A. Braimah to the Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources. A portion of the letter reads as follows: Future development of Northern Territories must depend primarily on agricultural development and the institutionalization of enthusiasm for improved farming methods amongst the rising generations is certainly to be encouraged. Many of the boys who leave school at the Standard III stage could with advantage be given special agricultural training so that they may learn improved systems of husbandry of benefits to themselves and the country. Such training, chiefly by practice is, envisaged in the ten year development plan. Organization would present difficulties but by no means insurmountable ones. The boys on completion of their training would be set up in co-operative group farms.9

For Nkrumah, the proposal by J. A. Braimah, a son of the north, fell perfectly into his ideology of social revolution, which included agricultural and industrial development. Nkrumah had already nursed the idea of ‘state farms’. The government’s plans were to use the state farms to relieve the pressure on overpopulated land in the north by resettling people into the more sparsely populated areas. In line with this policy, state farms and Workers’ Brigades were established in Katanga and other places in northern Ghana. The state farms operated under two methods. Individuals who received training had their own holdings, comprising a few hectares, which enabled them to grow crops such as rice, maize, and groundnuts, which they supplied to the market. With the second method, trainees went back to their native areas and reintroduced their acquired knowledge into their communities.10 In addition to state farms, co-operative schemes were established. It was recommended that in a democratic community, cooperation must be voluntary and not forced on members. Voluntary association, it was explained, would encourage more agricultural productivity in the settlement areas. Plans for executing agricultural schemes based on cooperation and settlement were supposed to be done in three phases. The first was a period of training, which involved the provision of

8 9

Buah, History. Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD), Tamale, NRG 8/6/7, Agricultural Department, 1951–1954. 10 PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/11/79, Settlement Farms for Tenure Farmers, 1962–1972.

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subsistence from the government’s public funds, the second phase comprised three to four years of training with less assistance but still with some control and discipline. The third phase required hard work and good farming practices, which were considered as the criteria for progressing into the third and final phase. In the final phase, trainees were set up on family holdings and were responsible for taking their fair share in their own cultivations. As sound as this project was for the success of agricultural production, it was beset with a number of problems, and by 1966, it was a failure. Below are some of the reasons for the failures. First, facilities for training at district agricultural stations were very limited. The work at such stations was largely experimental, trying out techniques, some of which were unsuccessful. Most of the stations had only thirty acres of cultivation land, largely split up into small experimental plots, whereas what was required was a straightforward farm run on ‘commercial lines’. Indeed, there were only a few stations that could boast of such commercial lands, among which was the Central Station in Nyankpala. But this station was set aside as a special area for training farmers. The next place which could support large commercial agriculture was in Wiaga in the Builsa district, but that, too, was meant for training courses. Hence, beyond training centres, these centres did not have large model farms that could produce crops in the vast commercial quantities that could lead to the total transformation of agricultural systems and promote the desired agriculture-led economic development of the north.11 Secondly, literate youth of between fifteen and eighteen years did not always take kindly to discipline or hard work. Furthermore, as people who were not yet settled in life, with wives and children of their own, their loyalty was always to and their thoughts with their areas of origin. They still had peers, friends, and parents back home to whom could better relate than to the people in their host communities. The constant temptation to relocate led to a partial change in policy: were trainee farmers unwilling to stay in the field, they were allowed to return home to apply their knowledge. In most cases, they served as volunteers in their new communities, where they were supposed to offer training on new farming techniques. However, they were not too successful, as they did not have the required modern machinery of production and had to resort to the old rudimentary tools, especially hoes. With time, the knowledge acquired became moribund or was not considered necessary, making the whole aim of training or returning home a total fiasco. A third setback to the programme was the introduction of a one-year programme, which came about as a result of the constant failure of the three- to fouryear programmes. The short programme was meant to turn out as many trainees as possible, who could quickly return to their places of origin and implement the knowledge in agriculture that they had acquired. Twelve months, it was realised

11 PRAAD, Tamale, NRG 8/11/51, The Ghana Development Plan: Agriculture, 1954–1958.

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much later, was just too short. Trainees could not master all aspects of agriculture that they were required to. Besides, as a programme that was short in focus, it attracted people from different ethnic groups, who were trained together instead of in separate groups put together by village or ethnicity. This led to a lack of cooperation in certain places. Chiefly groups who were part of the programme felt they could not be trained together with members coming from non-chiefly groups. The end result was a lack of cooperation among trainees, with some preferring to be alone. The fourth and final attempt at ensuring the success of the resettlement programme was allowing those close to the project site to stay with their parents and those from afar to stay with friends and relatives. This last-minute model was chosen to prevent group friction as well as to reduce expenses on accommodation and food. Staying off of the project site also had some flaws because it affected discipline, as trainees sometimes arrived late, making it much more difficult for the day’s work to be completed on time. From the discussions above, it is evident that encouraging the establishment of settlement farms under the Nkrumah regime was not very successful. The failure was not so much due to the policy or programme itself but rather based on a number of internal factors that worked against the intended agricultural development based on trainee and settlement schemes. Besides the attempt at establishing state farms and cooperatives, Kwame Nkrumah was also interested in the marketing of shea nuts. His interest was influenced by observations made by earlier colonial administrators. Earlier, Ferguson saw the economic possibilities of the north largely in terms of trade and, in particular, the shea butter trade, which to him was valuable not only in terms of exports but also for generating internal revenue for the colonial administration. Governor Guggisberg was of the view that shea nuts held an important key to the security and prosperity of the north, since shea nuts could render the Northern Territories self-supporting and generate revenue for further development. Because of the encouragement the colonial administration gave to shea nut production, foreign expatriate firms expressed an interest in it. They asked for concessions from London to introduce ‘modern’ techniques to the industry by putting up factories for shea oil extraction. Among them were John Walkden & Company, African Merchants, W. Bartholomew and Company, and Millers of Kumasi. Indeed, Millers bought 60 tons of shea nuts in Tamale between April and June 1923. The agent reported that although the amount of shea nuts purchased was small, the London buyers were impressed with the quality of the nuts, which produced ten per cent more oil than shea nuts purchased in other countries. Hence, Swanzy Ltd. a European firm, started shipment of shea nuts to Liverpool.12

12 Samuel Aniegye Ntewusu, Settling in and holding on. A socio-economic history of northern traders and transporters in Accra’s Tudu, 1908–2008, Leiden 2012.

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However, after the attainment of independence, the companies were all discouraged by Nkrumah’s policy of nationalisation. Nkrumah established the ‘Bulk Purchase Organisation’ under the Ministry of Trade and Labour to buy shea nuts. This scheme worked against the profits that could be generated through shea nut sales, since members of the organisation could not reach farmers. Later, the Ghana Agricultural Development Corporation, through its marketing section, took over the purchase of shea nuts from the Bulk Purchase Organization. The Agricultural Development Corporation devised a marketing scheme, where buying agents such as Parker Kassadjan, based in Tamale; Joseph Quashie and Co. Ltd, based in Kumasi; Yaw Agyarko, also based in Kumasi; Philip Quashei, based in Prestea; Alhaji Shaibu, based in Bawku; and several others took over the buying of shea nuts. The exploitation of farmers, which the colonial administration was able to avoid through its agents, could not be avoided under the new system. The local buying agents were able to exploit the farmers by determining the price paid for the nuts. Hence, shea nuts could not earn their rightful place as a cash crop under Nkrumah and remained a subsistence crop. As with crops, livestock rearing was also fully endorsed by Nkrumah. He was already quite aware of the north as a major supplier of cattle to the south. The cattle trade with southern communities prompted the establishment of some of the northern migrant communities in some of the major settlements in the south, such as Accra, Kumasi, and Kintampo. Informants in Accra’s Tudu suburb narrate how Nkrumah visited cattle traders at night to galvanise their support for his CPP. When he stood on the Accra Central ticket, some of the northerners who lived in the districts of Accra Central, particularly Tudu, Zongo Lane, Cow Lane, and Adabraka, voted for him.13 It was therefore not surprising that Nkrumah saw cattle raising and meat production as an important programme that could aid in the development of the north. Besides his personal interest, what interested Nkrumah in the cattle industry were earlier colonial reports which gave favourable reviews about cattle farming in the north. There were comments regarding the presence of cattle as well as the suitability of the northern climate and environment for cattle raising. The quality of northern cattle – their meat, breeding, hardiness, docility, immunity from tsetse sickness, and good feeding habits were attested to by administrators. Beai, principal veterinary officer of the North, remarked that cattle breeding in Northern Ghana was better than in some areas of Argentina, India, and South Africa.14 When Nkrumah came into power, he encouraged the growth of the cattle industry and

13 Interview with Abbass, in Accra, Tudu, on July 15, 2009. 14 N. J. K. Brukum, Studied Neglect or Lack of Resources? The Socio-Economic Underdevelopment of Northern Ghana under British Colonial Rule, in: Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana 2 (1998), 117–131, 122; Nii-K. Plange, Underdevelopment in Northern Ghana. Natural Causes or Colonial Capitalism? in: The Roots of Famine. Review of African Political Economy 15 (1979), 4–14.

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was even instrumental in establishing the Bolgatanga meat factory as a way of ensuring meat security in the country. Also, the Veterinary Services and the Ministry of Agriculture were charged with the responsibility of ensuring an adequate supply of meat. The colonial veterinary station in Tamale was given a greater mandate to ensure an increase in animal production. Despite his interest in the production of meat from the north, there were certain policies that Nkrumah brought about that actually worked against the prospects of meat production in the region. For example, there were no clear-cut policies or policy implementation on increasing the number of cattle. There were conflicts between the director of veterinary services and the director of agriculture over control and production of cattle. What worked even more against meat production was the introduction of fish from the south into the northern markets. In 1961, the Ghana Fishing Corporation started the distribution of fish from the coast to the north. The chairman of the corporation indicated that It is the government’s intention that fresh fish should be made available to all the regions and to as many towns as possible within the region. The most important limiting factor for the execution of this policy is the now (sic) availability of cold storage facilities. The Ghana fishing corporation has arranged for the supply of these cold rooms as soon as the first consignment arrives. The needs of the northern region would be catered for. 15

In December of 1962, fish was sent to Tamale for distribution and sale within the city and surrounding areas. By May 1963, a special Fish Shop was inaugurated there. Mr. Krobo Edusei, then Minister for Agriculture, gave a speech, the contents of which are repeated below: Today, Tamale in particular and Northern Ghana in general should be proud to claim one other chapter in the history of this area. The inherent colonial practice of keeping fresh fish from the people of Northern Ghana has been broken forever. The recent census figures shows the rapidity with which our population is growing and the government has therefore decided that every available means must be explored to produce abundant food to feed the rising population. To achieve this objective, Osagyefo has directed the creation of several agencies, e.g. the Ghana Fishing Corporation, the State Farms Corporation and other Corporations, all geared towards producing sufficient food to feed the nation … I as the minister take the opportunity to assure you in the name of our dynamic Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah that you will never be hungry or under-nourished.16

Edusei indicated the extent to which the government was concerned about stopping the importation of fish and conserving foreign exchange by encouraging the harvest and nationwide sale of local fish from the sea. The unintended consequence of fish sales was that they undermined meat sales and dwarfed the cattle

15 PRAAD, Tamale, NRG8/6/123, Ghana Fishing Corporation: Fish Sales in the Northern Region, 1961–1972. 16 PRAAD, Tamale, NRG8/6/123, Ghana Fishing Corporation: Fish Sales in the Northern Region, 1961–1972.

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industry. Following the opening of the shop, it became much easier for fish to be brought into Tamale in large quantities and then distributed to towns and villages. It became clear that by extending the sale of fish to the north, a network of fish markets was well positioned throughout the country to ensure a regular supply of fresh and smoked fish at reasonable prices, which instantly worked against the cattle industry, as farmers and government workers in towns and countryside quickly switched their tastes to fish. There were reports of workers complaining that by the time they finished work, the fish shops were closed, a complaint which led to an extension from 5pm to 7pm of the closing time for shops selling fish, which clearly shows the popularity of fish over meat. To supplement the fish supply from the sea, the government also posted teams of expert fishermen near and around fish ponds and rivers in northern Ghana to train ‘local men’ in modern fishing techniques. The purpose of such training was to ensure that, in the future, fisherfolk in northern Ghana would not only be equal to their counterparts in the south in modern fishing techniques but would be contributing their ‘comparative quota’ of fish production towards the national target. CONCLUSION Kwame Nkrumah’s agricultural schemes sought economic progress in opening up the Northern Territories to agricultural production. This was reflected in the establishment of state farms and co-operatives as well as the encouragement of cattle production. However, the agriculture- oriented development schemes did not work due to a number of problems. For example, the whole project was influenced by politics. Besides, there were no clear-cut instructions regarding how agricultural projects should be managed, leading in most cases to confusion among and between departments and groups in agricultural schemes. It is important to draw a final conclusion by pointing out that Kwame Nkrumah’s agricultural project failed due largely to the fact that there was an emphasis on mechanisation and collectivisation on large state farms, which led to the relative neglect of small-holding peasant agriculture and research and extension services, which meant that apart from the few state farms dotted around the northern part of Ghana, agriculture was still very much based on primitive methods and schemes at the time of his overthrow.

NKRUMAH, THE COLD WAR, ‘THE THIRD WORLD’, AND THE US ROLE IN THE 24 FEBRUARY 1966 COUP Jonathan Otto Pohl Abstract: Under Kwame Nkrumah’s leadership Ghana became a prominent international player in the various movements created in the ideological space between the US and USSR during the Cold War. Among these movements were those dedicated to Afro-Asian solidarity, Pan-Africanism, and Non-Alignment. The Ghanaian government from 1957 to 1966 under Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) also occupied a shifting political position in its relationships with the US and the USSR. The relative position of the Ghanaian government to the two superpowers was intimately related to its position in the larger ‘Third-World’ politics as represented by its participation in various Afro-Asian solidarity, Pan-African, and Non-Aligned events and organisations. Mostly coming out of a history of colonial rule, the members of these movements tended to focus on issues of European colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism in places like South Africa. This put them at odds with the US, which supported its European NATO allies such as France, Belgium, and Portugal, and on the same side as the Soviet bloc on many important international issues. By the early 1960s, such issues as Algeria and, above all, Congo had shifted Ghana from a position quite close to the US and Great Britain to one much closer to the Soviet Union. This greatly alarmed the US government. Under the Johnson administration, the US government became quite concerned about the Ghanaian government’s shifting position away from the US towards the USSR. During the Cold War, influence in the ‘Third World’ was viewed by the US government as a zerosum game. The increase in Soviet influence in Ghana during the 1960s thus greatly worried the US. Added to this was the fear that the Ghanaian government might nationalise the Kaiser Aluminum smelter, which was being built at the time. These three factors, increased hostility to the US, increased influence of the USSR, and the threat of a major US corporate project’s being nationalised, led the Johnson administration to welcome and support the military coup that overthrew Nkrumah on 24 February 1966. This paper will examine the US role in the 1966 coup and how it fits into the larger pattern of Ghana and other countries’ in Africa, Asia, and Latin America moving politically closer to the USSR and away from the US during the 1960s. It will treat the Ghanaian coup as a case study in the US use of covert action to reverse this general trend in a number of countries during the Cold War. In particular it will examine the declassified documents from the US CIA and State Department surrounding the 1966 coup in Ghana in order to examine how it fits into the larger Cold War strategy of the US towards Africa and other regions of the Third World.

In the late 1950s, following independence from Great Britain, Ghana maintained fairly good relations with its former colonial ruler as well as with the US and other Western countries. As the first sub-Saharan African colony to achieve independence, Ghana represented an important state in US foreign policy in countering Soviet influence in Africa. By the 1960s, however, Ghana had lost its position as the only newly independent former colony in black Africa. It had also shifted

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away from its former close alignment with the US, Great Britain, and Western Europe towards a non-aligned position that lined up more closely with the Soviet Union than the US on a number of key issues, including Congo, Algeria, Vietnam, the Portuguese colonies in Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Non-alignment did not mean neutrality, as in the case of Switzerland. Instead, it meant being independent, rather than controlled by either of the two major world powers, the US and the USSR. The founding meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) took place in Belgrade in 1961 and included states such as Cuba under Castro.1 The leaders of a number of the newly emerging independent states in Asia and Africa did not desire to be pawns of either Washington DC or Moscow. These leaders included not only Nkrumah in Ghana, but Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Sékou Touré in Guinea, Mobido Keita in Mali, Jawaharlal Nehru in India, U Nu in Burma, and Sukarno in Indonesia. At the same time, Moscow decided to support the positions of these states on issues, of importance to them, such as colonialism and apartheid. So from the US government’s position, ‘non-alignment’ was often viewed as ‘being aligned with the Soviet Union’. Nkrumah strongly opposed colonialism, neocolonialism, big power military intervention, and apartheid. The intervention of the Belgians in Congo, continued French rule in Algeria, US involvement in Vietnam, Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, and white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa were all strongly opposed by the ruling CPP in Ghana. Nkrumah sought to liberate all of the African continent from European rule and South Africa from apartheid.2 The USSR also opposed European colonialism and apartheid, since the ruling regimes were closely allied with the US and staunchly anti-communist. Thus there was a confluence of Ghanaian and Soviet foreign policy positions on a number of issues. Nevertheless, the Ghanaian government generally sought to maintain good political and economic relations with the US despite differences over issues. Moscow exploited African opposition to European colonialism and South African apartheid in order to win support among newly emerging postcolonial states.3 As Samir Amin noted regarding non-alignment in the Arab states: ‘its ambition was to impose recognition of the independence of the Arab world by the superpowers. This was the meaning of the “non-alignment” supported by the Soviets.’4 This meaning of non-alignment also held true for a number of sub-Saharan African states as well as the Arab world. These states included not only Ghana but Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, and Zambia.

1 2 3 4

Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations. A People’s History of the Third World, New York 2007, 95–104. E.K. Dumor, Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa. An African Response to Apartheid, Accra 1991, 67–90. Allison Blakely, Russia and the Negro. Blacks in Russian History and Thought, Washington DC 1986, 123–143. Samir Amin and Ali El Kenz, Europe and the Arab World. Patterns and Prospects for the New Relationship, London 2005, 39.

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In Cold War geopolitics, the division of the world between a US bloc, a Soviet bloc, and a non-aligned bloc of Asian and African states appeared, in the eyes of the US government, to favour Moscow. The attempt by former colonies in Asia and Africa to create a viable third non-aligned power bloc in the world largely failed despite the efforts of Nkrumah in the 1960s.5 US relations with a number of countries in this bloc became strained during this time. In particular, US relations with Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia worsened. Where possible, the US government sought to remove non-aligned governments that were perceived to be moving in anti-US and pro-communist directions. During the mid-1960s, the Johnson administration was instrumental in aiding coups in both Ghana and Indonesia in replacing such governments with ones that were more supportive of US policies. Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup in 1966, and although Nkrumah suspected that the CIA had played a part, he did not have any concrete evidence. Since Nkrumah’s overthrow, there had been speculations, conjectures, and rumours that the US government had facilitated the coup. In 1999, the US government declassified some of the relevant documents from the CIA and other US agencies involved in supporting the coup against Nkrumah. A number of primary source documents taken from the National Archives and Records Administration of the US and the Johnson Presidential Library have since been published by the US government in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa. It is the main source for the section of this chapter dealing with the coup and the US role in it. Unfortunately, archives in Ghana regarding the event still remain classified and will undoubtedly remain off limits to historical researchers for quite some time to come. When the Gold Coast became the independent state of Ghana on 6 March 1957, US President Eisenhower sent Vice President Richard Nixon to represent the US at the celebrations. The ambitious agenda of its first president, Kwame Nkrumah, not only domestically but also on a greater African and, indeed, even global stage, gave Ghana a role in the new post-war world, considerably greater than its small size and population would seem to merit. Nkrumah’s important role in the Casablanca Group (a group of ‘radical’ African states that met in 1961 in Morocco) and the Non-Aligned Movement put Ghana, along with states like Egypt, Indonesia, and India, into the middle of the Cold War as states seeking to carve out their own political space, independent of the US or USSR. During the Johnson administration, military coups were successful in removing not only Nkrumah in Ghana, but also Sukarno in Indonesia, and replacing them with proUS and anti-communist governments. The connection between these two coups is in fact mentioned by Robert Komer, the Special Assistant for National Security.6 The Cold War put considerable pressure on non-aligned governments in how they

5 6

Prashad, The Darker Nations, 276–281. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 260.

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balanced their relationship with the US and the USSR. A tilt too far towards the USSR could result in a US-supported military coup. Nkrumah’s move away from a purely Western orientation towards one that was non-aligned and Pan-Africanist officially began in 1958. In that year, Nkrumah publicly announced the outlines of a new foreign policy that moved towards one that the US government would later find confrontational. This new policy stressed non-alignment, Pan-Africanism, and strong opposition to colonialism and neocolonialism. This policy first received expression in a speech by Nkrumah in front of the National Assembly on 15 July 1958.7 It was only in 1960, however, when this policy was vigorously pursued by Nkrumah in Congo, that the relationship between the US and Ghana became strained. Nkrumah not only was strongly opposed to the Belgian presence in Congo but was also a strong supporter of Patrice Lumumba, whom he saw as a kindred spirit. The Ghanaian government even sent a contingent of 2,340 soldiers and 370 police to assist the Congolese government of Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu. In contrast, the US strongly opposed Lumumba, whom they saw as pro-Soviet and did not want him to consolidate a power base in the Congo.8 Later, the US government would collaborate with the Belgians and anti-Lumumba forces in the Congo to kill Lumumba.9 Nkrumah’s 23 September 1960 speech in front of the UN General Assembly marked a number of issues in which the new Ghanaian foreign policy was strongly at odds with the US. Foremost was the Congo, where Nkrumah clearly supported Lumumba’s return to power as Prime Minister and named Belgium as the chief cause of all the problems and instability in Congo. He strongly opposed Mobutu Sese Seko and the Katangan secession under Moise Tshombe. While the speech focused on the Congo, it also dealt with other cases of colonialism in Africa involving US allies, such as South Africa’s rule over Namibia, Portugal’s colonies in Angola and Mozambique, and French rule in Algeria. Nkrumah’s position was strongly and consistently anti-colonial and anti-imperial. On all of these issues, Ghana’s position was similar to that of the USSR and at odds with that of the US.10 Ghana’s position on the Congo was strongly supported by other non-aligned African states, including Egypt and Guinea.11 In the context of Africa, non-alignment and neutralism in practice meant siding with the USSR, since Moscow, like the African states, had an official policy of strongly opposing imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, and neocolonialism on the continent. After 1960, a large number of African states gained independence. In particular, Nigeria, which was also English-speaking but much larger in terms of popula-

7

Ebere Nwaubani, Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis, in: Journal of Contemporary History 36/4 (2001), 599–622, 602. 8 Ibid., 610–613. 9 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost. A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa, New York 1998, 312. 10 Ebere Nwaubani, Eisenhower, 616. 11 Ibid.,, 618–619.

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tion and economic potential than Ghana, had gained independence under a government much more favourable to the US than Nkrumah’s. This greatly reduced the importance to the US of having good relations with Accra.12 The US had other, more attractive options for partners and allies in Africa than Nkrumah’s Ghana after 1960. In the 1960s, the relationship between Ghana and the US in particular became more and more strained within the context of the Cold War. Already by the end of 1960, when Eisenhower was still president, there was a notable chilling of US– Ghanaian relations. The trigger for this was a growing closeness in relations between Ghana and the socialist bloc in the summer of 1960. Among the US’s concerns were the opening of an embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Accra and negotiations with the USSR over funding for the Volta dam, a steel mill, and the purchase of Soviet aircraft by Ghana.13 By the end of the year, disagreement between the governments of Ghana and the US over the situation in the Congo and, to a lesser extent, Algeria had added to these concerns.14 In fact, it had been the conflicting views of Nkrumah and the Eisenhower administration over the Congo that set in motion the events that would eventually lead to the 1966 coup. During the Kennedy administration, US hostility towards Nkrumah continued on a track that would lead to the Johnson administration’s supporting his overthrow in a military coup. The Kennedy administration supported Togo in its border dispute with Ghana, and anti-Nkrumahist exiles established their base of operations in Lomé. Among these were K. A. Gbedemah and Kofi Busia. Some of the anti-Nkrumah oppositionists were engaged in terrorist activities, and the Ghanaian government at the time believed that their enemies had the active support of the CIA. In particular, the Ghanaian press accused the US of being involved in the 1 August 1962 bombing at Kulungugu.15 This was an attempt by domestic political opponents of the CPP to kill Nkrumah by sending a man with a grenade against him. The assassination attempt against Nkrumah failed. After the death of Kennedy, the Johnson administration maintained a hostile attitude towards Nkrumah and the CPP government in Ghana. US–Ghanaian relations continued to deteriorate after 1963. During the mid1960s, Nkrumah and the Ghanaian press became more and more critical of US policy in Africa. The Johnson administration’s policy in Africa included active diplomatic and economic pressure against Nkrumah’s Ghana (from 1963 to 1966), constant contact with members of the Ghanaian army and police plotting to overthrow Nkrumah (from 1965 to 1966), and strong diplomatic and economic backing of the NLC (National Liberation Council) junta that replaced Nkrumah. Declassified CIA and State Department documents show that the US government

12 13 14 15

Ebere Nwaubani, Eisenhower, 621–622. Ibid., 604. Ibid., 604. Socialist Forum of Ghana, The Great Deception, Accra 2005, 6–9.

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was kept well informed of the coup plotters’ actions for over a year before the actual overthrow of Nkrumah. The US support for the overthrow of non-aligned governments deemed to be moving too close to communism and away from the US was not limited to Ghana or even Africa. A similar dynamic governed US policy towards Indonesia in the mid-1960s. First of all, as was the case in Ghana, US conflict with the non-aligned government of Indonesia under Sukarno dated back to the Eisenhower administration, even though the actual coup occurred under Johnson.16 Also, the Johnson administration used the instrument of withholding economic aid as a tool to put pressure on the Sukarno regime to undermine it in the run-up to the coup.17 The involvement of the CIA with the coup leaders in Indonesia also preceded that coup by many months.18 Finally, while the exact extent of CIA assistance to Suharto during the actual coup is still unclear, its active support of the coup is clearly attested to by the available sources. One major difference is that, as brutal as the NLC junta was in Ghana, compared to Nkrumah’s administration, it was rather mild as far as military dictatorships go. The same cannot be said of Indonesia, where the newly installed military regime under Suharto is estimated to have been responsible for the violent death of over half a million people. Later, under the Nixon administration, the pattern established under Johnson would continue with Chile and the overthrow of Allende by Pinochet with CIA support.19 While a considerable amount has been written on both the Indonesian and, particularly, the Chilean coups and the role of the CIA in supporting them, comparatively little has been published on the Ghanaian coup. The Johnson administration was on hostile footing with Nkrumah almost from the beginning. This was a continuation of Kennedy administration policy. As soon as 3 January 1964, William H. Brubeck of the NSC Staff suggested that the US retaliate against Nkrumah for claiming CIA involvement in an assassination attempt against him. Among the suggestions were the recall of the US ambassador in Accra and a review of funding for the Volta River Hydroelectric Project. The NSC was very angry at Nkrumah for suggesting CIA participation, but never in this document do any of the relevant players ever deny involvement. Rather, the anger was a result of Nkrumah and the Ghanaian press’s pointing fingers at the CIA, not that they were in fact wrong in their accusations. The document stresses that Nkrumah’s accusations were a problem for the administration with the Democrats in Congress, particularly Senator Dodd (D) from Connecticut, who were hostile to the Ghanaian president. They had opposed US funding of the dam project from the start, due to an ‘animus against Nkrumah’.20 The CIA Director John

16 Peter Dale Scott, The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno. 1965–1967, in: Pacific Affairs 58 (1985), 245–246. 17 Ibid., 252–253. 18 Ibid., 255–257. 19 Ibid., 258. 20 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 235.

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McCone, in a memorandum addressed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 11 February 1964, mentioned the issue of backing a military coup in cooperation with the British against Nkrumah to replace him with General Joseph A. Ankrah. McCone noted that Nkrumah was becoming increasingly anti-American. According to a memorandum addressed to Director of the Office of West African Affairs William C. Trimble, the issue of backing a coup by Ankrah had been discussed earlier by McCone and Rusk on 6 February 1964.21 The decision to back a coup by Ankrah against Nkrumah appears to have already been made by this time. Also on 11 February 1964, Trimble sent a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Mennen G. Williams with a comprehensive plan of action to undermine the government of Kwame Nkrumah. This memorandum stressed the impression by the US government that Nkrumah was becoming increasingly anti-American and left-wing. The memorandum also mentions concerns about growing Soviet influence in Ghana and the rest of Africa should US influence be forced out of Ghana.22 The memorandum therefore proposes a series of actions against Nkrumah that would ‘induce a chain reaction eventually leading to Nkrumah’s downfall’.23 The following actions were suggested to destabilise the government of Nkrumah. First, Ambassador Mahoney’s return to Accra should be postponed. Second, the Medal of Freedom or Legion of Merit should be awarded to Adger E. Player for preventing the desecration of the US flag during a demonstration in front of the embassy. Third, the US ambassador should verbally remonstrate President Nkrumah on the demonstrations in front of the embassy. Fourth, Edgar Kaiser of Kaiser Aluminum should warn Nkrumah that ‘recent events in Ghana’ were threatening the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO) project. Fifth, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) should conduct a review to consider whether to continue funding of the Volta dam project. Sixth, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the ExportImport Bank of Washington DC (Eximbank) should delay further funds for the project. Seventh, the National Institute of Health (NIH) facility in Accra should be shut down and moved to Sierra Leone.24 In conclusion, the memorandum proposed thirteen measures it described as ‘psychological warfare’ with the aim to ‘diminish support for Nkrumah within Ghana and nurture the conviction among the Ghanaian people that their country’s welfare and independence necessitate his removal’.25 The psychological warfare measures stressed, among other things, the presence of non-Ghanaian communists among Nkrumah’s advisors, the Preventive Detention Act, Soviet security aid, problems between Nkrumah and other African leaders, and the decline of Ghana’s finances. Other themes of US sponsored anti-Nkrumah propaganda were the purge of the Civil Service, the dismissal

21 22 23 24 25

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 236. Ibid., Document 237. Ibid., Document 237. Ibid., Document 237. Ibid., Document 237.

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of American professors from Legon, and the solidification of the political power of the CPP over that of the trade unions, parliament, and other institutions.26 The memorandum ends with a note that Nkrumah was to serve as an example to other African leaders, ‘We must bring home to other African leaders that Nkrumah is a problem which they must face up to in their own national interest.’27 Clearly Nkrumah’s outspoken positions that were independent of the US were seen as a problem that could spread to other African states. The non-aligned positions espoused by Nkrumah and some others, which moved post-colonial African states away from the western camp in the direction of the USSR, were viewed by the Johnson administration as most unwelcome. The planning and coordination of pressure against Nkrumah by the US government continued, and it received backing from its British ally as the year progressed. On 12 February 1964, a meeting took place at the White House between the British Prime Minister and the US President regarding Ghana. Also present was Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Harriman expressed concern over Nkrumah’s growing hostility towards the US and the possibility that the Volta Dam project could be nationalised. The British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, also noted with worry the increasingly close relations between Ghana and the USSR. Both the US and British governments agreed to use the US funding of the Volta River project as an instrument to influence the Ghanaian government. Among options discussed were stopping or slowing down the funding of the project. President Johnson stated that US public opinion was hostile towards Ghana and that continuing funding was thus difficult. His main concern, however, was to prevent the USSR from establishing a base in Ghana.28 There was general agreement between the US and Great Britain on the need for a coordinated policy against Nkrumah. From that point on, the US funding of the Volta Dam project became a tool for putting pressure on the CPP government in Ghana. On 13 February 1964, Rusk sent another memorandum to President Johnson on the situation in Ghana. He recommended a plan of action consisting of seven steps to put pressure on Nkrumah to change his policies to ones more favourable to the US. These steps included a letter of warning from the British Prime Minister, verbal face to face warnings to Nkrumah from Edgar Kaiser and Ambassador Mahoney, ending the NIH tropical disease research project in Accra, initiating an IBRD review of funding of the Volta Dam Project, sending a letter from Johnson to Nkrumah, and, finally, sending a Presidential Emissary to Nkrumah. Specifically, the US government objected to negative articles in the Ghanaian press about the US and the removal of six lecturers from Legon, including four US citizens.29 The next day at a meeting at the White House, which included President Johnson, Under Secretary 26 27 28 29

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 238. Ibid., Document 237. Ibid., Document 238. Ibid., Document 239.

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Harriman, Ambassador Mahoney, and William Brubeck among others, the president approved all seven suggested points of action contained in the previous day’s memorandum.30 Diplomatic pressure from the highest levels of the US and British governments was to be decisively applied to Nkrumah. By 26 February 1964, Kaiser met with Nkrumah and was debriefed by CIA Director McCone, and President Johnson. Kaiser reported that he had informed Nkrumah that anti-American activities in Ghana had to cease if funding for the Volta Dam Project was to continue. He also expressed concern that the CPP government might nationalise the project. He also believed that Nkrumah would extract a confession from one of the men involved in the recent assassination attempt against him that would reveal ties with the CIA.31 Kaiser also stressed that Ghana under Nkrumah had grown much closer to the communist bloc in the last three years.32 The growing relations between Ghana and the USSR and its allies was one of the primary concerns of the US government. They desired to limit Soviet influence in Ghana and other African states as much as possible. On 2 March 1964, Ambassador Mahoney reported on his meeting with Nkrumah. Here it becomes apparent that the US government had three main problems with the CPP government. The first was the hostility towards the US and its allies, including apartheid South Africa and the white minority government of Rhodesia, then still a British dominion, expressed in the Ghanaian press. The second was the increasingly closer relations between Ghana and the USSR and China. The third was domestic policy in Ghana, described by Nkrumah as ‘African socialism’. Ambassador Mahoney suggested that the US continue to apply diplomatic pressure on Nkrumah to bring him away from these policies and back towards greater agreement with the US and Great Britain.33 A few weeks later, on 23 March 1964, Ambassador Mahoney reiterated in a report to the State Department his concerns over domestic shifts leftward and favourable Ghanaian press coverage of the communist bloc.34 The coverage of the USSR and its allies with regards to Africa was something that was probably inevitable once the US had firmly decided to support NATO allies, such as Portugal, with colonies on the continent and to not press hard against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The socialist states had always been on the side of the independent African states on these issues, and, historically, Russia was free from both the taint of colonialism in Africa and anti-black racism. Russian colonial expansion had been confined to the Eurasian landmass, and there was never any significant importation of slaves from Africa into this territory. This allowed the USSR to credibly pose as a champion of self-determination and equality for black Africans.35 The US was thus at a

30 31 32 33 34 35

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 240. Ibid., Document 241. Ibid., Document 242. Ibid., Document 244. Ibid., Document 247. Blakely, Russia and the Negro, 123–143.

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distinct political disadvantage against the USSR in seeking to increase its influence in Africa as long as it was linked to European colonialism and white minority rule. Averell Harriman’s report to President Johnson came on 3 April 1964. Harriman’s critique of Ghana under Nkrumah was more nuanced than those of Kaiser or Mahoney. He noted that many Ghanaian state institutions, including the Army and the Civil Service, remained pro-Western, and there was opposition to the CPP at Legon. He also noted that Nkrumah was not about to eliminate the role of private capital in the Ghanaian economy any time soon. Insofar as he was following a socialist model domestically, it was closer to the mixed economy of Tito’s Yugoslavia than one completely state-controlled like that of the USSR or China. Averell Harriman’s report rehashed the major complaints against Nkrumah as well as the strategies earlier reported by Kaiser and Ambassador Mahoney to be adopted by the US to shift Nkrumah to a more pro-US position. 36 A final memorandum in 1964 from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Williams to Harriman, dated 9 April, also endorsed keeping up diplomatic pressure on Nkrumah.37 During the first four months of 1964, a clear strategy of using diplomatic pressure and threats over the funding of the Volta River Project to influence Nkrumah towards a more pro-US and less pro-Soviet position emerged in the Johnson Administration. This pressure appears to have aimed at a deliberate softening up of Ghana in preparation for later more extreme action. By spring 1965, CIA Director McCone, Ambassador Mahoney, and representatives of the State Department were openly discussing the inevitability of a coup against Nkrumah in the next year. Planning for a military coup against Nkrumah was discussed by McCone and Ambassador Mahoney on 11 March 1965. At this time, Mahoney expressed the opinion that Nkrumah would be out of power within the year. One possible scenario was a coup by Police Commissioner John Harlley and Generals S. J. A. Otu and J. A. Ankrah of the army.38 These men opposed Nkrumah’s policies of exerting CPP control over all Ghanaian institutions and creating parallel security organs not under their control with Soviet assistance.39 These men were already planning a coup, and Mahoney predicted that if successful they would form a military junta. Mahoney further stated that the US should deny any additional economic assistance to Ghana in order to further weaken Nkrumah’s position. Interestingly, Mahoney stated here that he believed Nkrumah was ideologically closer to the Chinese than to the Soviets,40 while Nkrumah himself had gone out of his way when meeting with Mahoney to stress his distrust of the Chinese.41

36 37 38 39 40 41

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 249. Ibid., Document 250. Ibid., Document 251. Ibid., Document 261. Ibid., Document 251. Ibid., Document 247.

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Mahoney’s statement also conflicts with the previous year’s assessment by Harriman that Nkrumah was moving Ghana towards a Yugoslav brand of socialism. The next day, Mahoney met with President Johnson, but there are no known surviving records of this meeting.42 The CIA, the State Department, and President Johnson were thus all aware of the conspiratorial plans against Nkrumah within the Ghanaian police and army at this time. How much material support they rendered to this conspiracy in addition to using diplomatic and economic pressure to weaken Nkrumah is unknown. But, they certainly were in favour of regime change in Ghana and did provide aid to bring it about. A 22 March 1965 speech by Nkrumah criticising US support for Tschombe’s return to power in the Congo greatly upset Ambassador Mahoney. In particular, the ambassador was upset with Nkrumah’s association of the US with Belgian actions in the Congo and the white minority regimes in southern Africa.43 It appears that the Johnson administration was upset not because Nkrumah’s accusations were untrue, but because the very real US support of these unpopular powers in Africa was an embarrassment they wished to keep muted. The close relations between the coup plotters in Ghana and the intelligence services of the US were again revealed in a memorandum, dated 27 May 1965, from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council (NSC) to McGeorge Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. This memorandum noted that the US government was being regularly updated by the coup plotters. It also noted that the US, Great Britain, and France had been deliberately coordinating diplomatic and economic pressure against Nkrumah to prepare the way for his overthrow.44 This memorandum pretty much confirms that the US and its European allies had thrown their support to the anti-Nkrumah forces in the Ghanaian army and police many months before the actual coup took place. Nkrumah’s 1965 book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism was particularly unpopular with the Johnson-era State Department. Its publication prompted a telegram, dated 23 November 1965, from the US embassy staff in Accra, which was circulated among other US embassies in Africa. The condemnation of the CIA and other US state institutions was especially singled out in the telegram as an example of anti-Americanism on the part of Nkrumah. In retaliation, the US denied Ghana $100 million in food aid that it had long been expecting.45 This is the last declassified US government document before the actual coup. The coup itself took place on 24 February 1966 while Nkrumah was on his way to Hanoi via Peking (Beijing). The CIA memorandum on the coup sent to Deputy Director of the CIA, Richard Helms on 25 February 1966 made it apparent that the CIA had known about various coup plots against Nkrumah for over a 42 43 44 45

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 251. Ibid., Document 252. Ibid., Document 253. Ibid., Document 256.

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year. The coup was postponed a number of times, to the disappointment of a number of younger Ghanaian military officers. It was apparent to the US government as early as 10 February 1965, however, that an actual coup attempt against Nkrumah was going to be made sometime in the next year or so. Pressure for such a coup built up in the ranks of the officer corps during the summer of 1965. Nkrumah’s retirement of Generals Otu and Ankrah in July 1965 further delayed the execution of the planned coup. By January 1966, the success of coups elsewhere in Africa had inspired the plotters and they were only waiting for Nkrumah to leave the country to overthrow his rule. By 17 February 1966, it was definitely known to the US government that a ‘number of important military and police officers were involved’ in preparing for a coup against Nkrumah as soon as he left the country.46 The close relationship between the CIA and the plotters of the coup in the army and police, as far as providing information, is beyond dispute. So is the general hostility and pressure applied by the US, Great Britain, and France against the CPP government under Nkrumah in an attempt to facilitate the success of a coup. What is more ambiguous is what direct assistance the US gave to the coup leaders during the actual military operation itself. It is known that the US government very rapidly provided diplomatic support and economic assistance to the new regime to stabilise its power in the wake of the coup. The US government’s attitude towards the National Liberation Council (NLC), which ruled in Ghana following the coup, was a huge improvement over its relations with the CPP government under Nkrumah. As early as 25 February 1966, a telegram to the State Department from the US Embassy in Accra expressed support for the new military regime. Among the measures suggested in the telegram to support the NLC were providing economic assistance to the new government and rapid formal recognition by the US. On this last point, the US did not desire to be the first foreign power to recognise the NLC’s legitimacy, which might have led to accusations that the US was behind the coup. Instead the embassy thought it best if the US waited until a few African governments had recognised the NLC before publicly endorsing it as the legitimate government of Ghana.47 On 3 March 1966, the issue of recognition was the subject of a second telegram from the embassy to Washington DC. This telegram contained the results of discussions with General Ankrah, the head of the NLC junta, on the matter. Ankrah claimed he had already received recognition from Liberia, the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), and West Germany and was waiting for Nigeria to extend recognition shortly. The general also noted that his government was orientating Ghana away from the USSR and PRC back towards the US and Great Britain.48 A memorandum from Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Komer to President Johnson on 12 March 1966 expressed strong support for the coup in Ghana. He called it ‘a fortuitous windfall’. This memorandum claimed that 46 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 257. 47 Ibid., Document 258. 48 Ibid., Document 259.

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Nkrumah had done ‘more to undermine our interests than any other black African’. It also claimed that he had been strongly pro-Communist and that the new government was extremely pro-Western. He suggested that the US provide immediate support for the new regime in the form of food aid and directly linked the coup in Ghana with the one in Indonesia as successes for the US that needed to be exploited.49 The linking in this telegram of the coup in Ghana with the one in Indonesia, where another non-aligned leader, Sukarno, who was perceived as proCommunist was replaced with a pro-US and anti-Communist military regime, is telling. While the coup in Ghana was far less bloody than the one in Indonesia, in both cases, the US provided strong support for the newly installed military dictatorships on the basis of their movement away from a non-aligned geopolitical stance towards one that was increasingly closer to that of the socialist bloc on many issues. That the new NLC junta under General Ankrah was very pro-US in its political orientation became evident very early on. General Ankrah sent a letter to President Johnson on 24 March 1966. This letter emphasised that Nkrumah had become increasingly friendly with the Soviet bloc and China, a course that the new government would reverse in favour of better relations with the US and other Western countries. This letter also asked for economic and food aid from the US.50 Johnson replied on 14 April 1966. He praised Ankrah for eliminating communist subversion in Ghana. His letter promised emergency food assistance and noted that 25 tons of canned milk had already been airlifted to Ghana that month.51 One of the things provided by the new Ghanaian government to the US, in addition to general diplomatic and political support in Africa, were Soviet antiaircraft guns and munitions of the same type used by the North Vietnamese against the US.52 In particular, they gave the US government a ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun built in the USSR.53 Friendly relations between the NLC government and the US would continue until 1968. Between 1966 and 1968, the US provided assistance to the NLC government in the form of bilateral and international loans, food assistance, and technical advice. Most notably, Ghana received a $20 million loan and $15 million in food aid from the US in 1967.54 The US, however, did not at this time provide military assistance to Ghana, despite requests from General Ankrah. In exchange for US assistance, the NLC government provided diplomatic support to the US in the UN and other forums on such issues as Mobutu’s rise to power in the Congo and the latest crises there, as well as the Vietnam War and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.55

49 50 51 52 53 54 55

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 260. Ibid., Document 261. Ibid., Document 262. Ibid., Document 263. Ibid., Document 263. Ibid., Documents 264–268. Ibid., Document 269.

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The new Ghanaian government also provided pilots to the new Congolese government under Mobutu to counter the presence of Cubans in Brazzaville.56 The time between 24 February 1966 and October 1967 was the honeymoon period between the NLC junta under Ankrah and the Johnson administration. In the fall of 1967, relations between the US and Ghana started to worsen. The Ghanaian government made it clear at that time that it had expected more material assistance from the US than it had received to date.57 By early 1968, differences between the US and Ghana had grown. These differences included not only the low level of assistance to Ghana, but also the issues of South Africa, Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies in Africa, and the failure of Ghana and the US to reach a cocoa agreement.58 Nonetheless, the NLC government continued to be overtly pro-US in diplomatic forums, including on the issue of Vietnam throughout its existence. On 1 October 1969, the NLC turned over power to an elected civilian government. CONCLUSION While relations between the US and Ghana started off well, they came under considerable strain in 1960 as a result of serious differences over the crisis in the Congo. As the 1960s progressed, relations worsened. The Ghanaian government and press accused the US of supporting the terrorist bombings and other assassination attempts against Nkrumah. Official relations also cooled as the US government established closer relations with neighbouring Togo, a state with which Ghana had a number of conflicts, the most notable being the use of its territory by Nkrumah oppositionists involved in the bombing campaign of the early 1960s. This tension developed into outright hostility on the part of the US government under Johnson against the CPP government of Nkrumah. This translated into US diplomatic pressure and economic threats against Nkrumah’s government to undermine it at the same time that the CIA and US embassy kept in close contact with military and police officers plotting Nkrumah’s overthrow. After over two years of such policies, a military and police coup against Nkrumah and the CPP succeeded. The newly established NLC junta under General Ankrah was strongly pro-US in diplomatic forums such as the UN and received food and economic aid that had been denied to Ghana under Nkrumah. Both the US government under Johnson and the new military government in Ghana benefitted from the new arrangement. The exact role of the CIA in the actual coup is still not fully known. However, the documentation currently available makes it clear that the US knew about and desired the coup at least a year before it succeeded. During this time the US actively pursued policies to weaken the CPP government under Nkrumah. The 56 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 270. 57 Ibid., Document 272. 58 Ibid., Document 273.

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CIA and other US government bodies had also been involved in the coup against Sukarno in Indonesia at the time. There was a general policy by the Johnson administration to oppose non-aligned leaders viewed as having too close relations with the USSR or other communist states and to forcibly remove them from power if possible.

EVALUATION AND MEMORY

GHANAIAN INTELLECTUALS AND THE NKRUMAH CONTROVERSY 1970–2007/08 Felix Müller Abstract: The end of Kwame Nkrumah’s rule in 1966 was the starting point of a transnational debate about its merits and demerits. Western contributions to this debate have received more international attention than their Ghanaian counterparts, which are the subject of this paper. The chapter examines the writings of Ghanaian intellectuals on Nkrumah’s rule, philosophy, and personality. Methodologically, it is based on the premises of intellectual history and takes a biographical approach. The positions in the Nkrumah controversy have moved from complete condemnation to rehabilitation to unconditional worship and have been connected to competing myths of nation-founding.

INTRODUCTION1 In late February of 1966, Kwame Nkrumah, the first head of the independent Ghanaian state, was overthrown in a military-police coup.2 With the end of his rule came a transnational debate about its merits and demerits, which was initially dominated by Marxist scholars from Western countries. Their interpretations of Nkrumah’s policies were influenced by what, in their view, would have been the optimal economic strategy.3 Regarding a wider discussion of Nkrumah’s political 1

2 3

This chapter is based on my master’s thesis in Global Studies, which I submitted at the University of Vienna’s Department of African Studies in September 2012. I am grateful for the insightful comments I received from my supervisor Arno Sonderegger and from Philip S. Zachernuk. I also wish to thank the editors of this volume for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. All errors are, of course, my own. Albert Adu Boahen, Ghana. Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, London 1975, 222; Roger Gocking, The History of Ghana, Westport 2005, 138. Robert Fitch/Mary Oppenheimer, Ghana. End of an Illusion, New York 1966; Roger Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana, New York 1969; Reginald H. Green, ‘Reflections on Economic Strategy, Structure, Implementation, and Necessity. Ghana and the Ivory Coast, 1957–67’, in: Philip Foster/Aristide R. Zolberg (eds.), Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Perspectives on Modernization, Chicago 1971, 231–264; Roger Murray, Second Thoughts on Ghana, in: New Left Review 42 (1967), 25–39. The original debate is summarised in Björn Beckman, Organising the Farmers. Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana, Uppsala 1976, 19–29. Numerous other contributions have since been added, prominent examples from outside Ghana being Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action. A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana, London 1978; Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana’s Political Economy, 1950–1990, Oxford 1992.

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and personal qualities, prominent contributions were written by Basil Davidson, David Birmingham, and Richard Rathbone.4 Against this background, this chapter sets out to examine how Ghanaian intellectuals debated Nkrumah’s rule, philosophy, and personality between 1970 and the fiftieth anniversary of Ghana’s independence. The guiding research questions are: What major positions have been established in the controversy surrounding Nkrumah? Why did some positions prevail in certain phases, and how are they influenced by the authors’ personal backgrounds? How have publications on the Nkrumah controversy been related to political changes in Ghana? Engaging with these questions requires some conceptual considerations. To start with, history, as an academic discipline, involves the creation of historical narratives and thus cannot be separated from historiography. Academic texts are historiography; their authors interpret phenomena and give meaning to them. Methodologically, this implies the necessity of a thorough contextualisation of (all sorts of) texts as suggested by the discipline of intellectual history. Among many other things, intellectual history is about revealing the implicit ideas and perceptions that underlie explicit formulations. This might be achieved by relating a text to contemporary discourse(s) by which its author was surrounded and to the sociopolitical environment in which a text was written. Furthermore, intellectual history encourages the question of under which conditions certain conceptualisations of the world appear and, by implication, continue or cease to be attractive. 5 Based on these deliberations, the analysis of Ghanaians’ contributions to the Nkrumah controversy will be enriched here through a consideration of the authors’ biographies, their ideological affiliations, class backgrounds, and professions. CONDEMNATIONS OF NKRUMAH DURING THE POST-NLC PERIOD, C. 1969–75 In August 1969, a general election was held in Ghana. One month later, the National Liberation Council (NLC) – the military force which had toppled Nkrumah – handed over power to the newly elected government. The new administration was led by Kofi Abrefa Busia’s Progress Party, representing Ghana’s liberal– conservative tradition.6 Both the liberal and pan-African/socialist traditions go

4

5

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Basil Davidson, Black Star. A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah, Oxford 2007 [1973]; David Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah. The Father of African Nationalism, Athens, OH 1998; Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah & the Chiefs. The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951–60, Oxford 2000. Peter E. Gordon, ‘What is Intellectual History? A Frankly Partisan Introduction to a Frequently Misunderstood Field’, 2012, http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/history/files/what_is_in tell_history_pgordon_mar2012.pdf, [31.08.2016]; Christian Simon, Historiographie. Eine Einführung, Stuttgart 1996, 13–17, 256, 263. Boahen, Ghana, 222–240; Francis K. Buah, A History of Ghana, London 1980, 194–200.

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back to disputes within Ghana’s nationalist movement in the 1930s.7 Nkrumah’s split from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), which led to the formation of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) in 1949, institutionalised this dualism. Nkrumah, inspired by Marxism-Leninism and pan-Africanism, called for a radical abolishment of colonial rule, whereas the UGCC, led by Joseph Kwame Kyeretwie Boakye Danquah, advocated gradualism.8 Initially, the post-NLC period was characterised by careful optimism, especially on the part of Progress Party supporters who were looking forward to a democratic future devoid of military rule and, as they saw it, Nkrumahist authoritarianism. But for this to happen in a sustainable way, Thompson Peter Omari and Albert Adu Boahen felt it was necessary to preserve the memory of what they considered the evils of Nkrumah’s rule. Let me start the discussion of the condemnations of Nkrumah’s rule with Omari’s contribution. T. Peter Omari was born in 1930 in Mpraeso. After he had studied and completed a PhD in the United States, he returned to the Gold Coast in 1956 and worked for the government as a mass education officer in the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development in Accra. From 1958 to 1963, he lectured in sociology at the University College of the Gold Coast (University of Ghana since 1961) and then opted for a career in the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).9 His book Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship was published in 1970. The Anatomy is ‘dedicated to the memory of Dr. J. B. Danquah’,10 whom Omari praised for opposing Nkrumah at a time when most others had given in to bribery and corruption. Omari’s admiration for Danquah indicates his affiliation with Ghana’s liberal tradition. He considered Nkrumah’s authoritarian measures, such as the Preventive Detention Act, unjustified and stressed the importance of liberal democracy, the rule of law, and a free press throughout the entire book. Regarding his motivation for writing it, Omari held that Nkrumah reflected the ‘Ghanaian personality’ with all its good and bad aspects and that the totalitarian tendencies in the later Nkrumah years might repeat themselves if Ghanaians allowed the legend of a positive rule by Nkrumah to live on. Omari aimed at demonstrating that except for Nkrumah’s belief in the need for African unity, there was nothing genuine or admirable about him – and even this ambition was linked to a more selfish goal in Omari’s view, namely becoming the leader of the entire African continent. In order for Ghana to prosper, it had to change its nation7

For the sake of brevity, I will use the term Ghana to refer also to the applicable colonial territories. 8 Cf. Boahen, Ghana, 136–143; Gocking, History, 79. 9 Contemporary Authors Online, ‘T(hompson) Peter Omari’, 2001, http://ic.galegroup.com/ic /bic1/ReferenceDetailsPage/DocumentToolsPortletWindow?displayGrouName=Reference&j sid=7ff0b674a4f6967c58b7c24539a931a6&action=2&catId=&documentId=GALE%7CH100 0074716&u=43wien&zid=e0ae76a78a6bf8cc6fc30ed08ef3388c, [31.08.2016]. 10 T. Peter Omari, Kwame Nkrumah. The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship, Accra 2009 [1970], XIII.

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al character, which, according to Omari, made a complete disillusionment concerning Nkrumah’s rule indispensable.11 For this purpose, Omari attacked not only Nkrumah’s politics, but also his personality, claiming that he was opportunistic. In Omari’s opinion, Nkrumah only became a politician because he realised that he could not achieve greatness as an intellectual. Arguing that Nkrumah could only absorb the significance of ideas to which he could relate personally, the author emphasised that Nkrumah had not received a PhD degree during his overseas studies (1935–1947) and that a doctorate was conferred to him only later, in 1951.12 He described Nkrumah as a ‘psychologically unstable’ chronic underachiever who became a megalomaniac after he had become the leader of independent Ghana by chance. 13 The only area in which Nkrumah was truly talented, in Omari’s view, was politics; however, according to Omari, Nkrumah did not use this talent for Ghana’s benefit but neglected domestic needs, as he was more interested in international affairs.14 Probably anticipating potential objections to his negative view of Nkrumah’s management of national affairs, Omari listed several things which Nkrumah might be credited with: the Volta River Project, a road building program, and educational improvements, among others.15 Yet, considering that Ghana was resourceabundant and had already been prosperous prior to Nkrumah’s rule, Omari countered that Nkrumah had achieved much less than he could and should have. Worst of all, in Omari’s view, was the spread of patronage and corruption under Nkrumah. Apart from the moral damage which he associated with corruption, Omari thought it constituted a drain on Ghana’s resources, as Nkrumah (and others) used public money for buying political support.16 According to Omari, there was a connection between Nkrumah’s attitude towards corruption and his megalomania: like other successful independence leaders after him, Nkrumah thought that he alone had created modern Ghana and that he owned ‘his’ country. Thus, Omari contradicted Nkrumah’s already existing image as the founder of the nation.17 He also presented Nkrumah as inconsistent, as ‘he financed [the CPP] out of deals with crooked “capitalists” and industrialists, for whom he often publicly declared his contempt.’18 Thus, in Omari’s opinion, Nkrumah was not an intellectual, nor a real nationalist, nor a real socialist –

11 12 13 14 15

Omari, Anatomy, 1–14, 135–154. Ibid., 140–141. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 2, 135–151. The project on the Volta River consisted of two parts: a dam which would make it possible to produce hydroelectric energy, and an aluminium smelter supposed to create immediate demand for the harnessed power. It was completed in September 1965 (Boahen, Ghana, 177; Gocking, History, 101, 118–120, 134). 16 Omari, Anatomy, 1–13, 148. 17 Ibid., 148–154. 18 Omari, Anatomy, 3.

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he was essentially an opportunist interested in power and prestige, and even his pan-African ambitions were in the end due to his appetite for power. Let me highlight two aspects which are crucial for making sense of Omari’s positions. I will take the concept of the ‘Ghanaian personality’ first. Omari argued that not only Nkrumah himself was responsible for what happened under his rule. Nkrumah was an ‘evil genius’ in his view, but ‘given a more sophisticated and demanding citizenry, [he] could have been contained.’19 Thus, it seems that Omari’s emphasis on the negative aspects of an allegedly opportunistic, or at least fatalistic, ‘Ghanaian personality’ was an attempt to contribute to a more alert attitude among the people towards the actions of politicians. Omari wanted to persuade the Ghanaian public to safeguard (his) liberal values more effectively in the future. Secondly, a remark on Omari’s methodology is required. The evidence which he provided for his attack on Nkrumah’s personality consists mainly of statements of former high-ranking CPP members, who ‘chose to deny [Nkrumah] as soon as he was overthrown’.20 Thus, many sources which Omari relied on were probably trying to save their skins after political tides had turned. Omari, who wrote the book ‘not as a historian but as a social commentator’,21 was most likely aware of this, but apparently stuck to his main goal: the demonstration of Nkrumah’s bad character in order to avoid history’s repeating itself. Another author who interpreted Nkrumah’s rule in a primarily negative light is the historian and political activist Albert Kwadwo Adu Boahen, who was born in 1932 in Oseim. After he had finished a PhD in African History at the London University School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 1959, he returned to Ghana in October that year and became a history lecturer at University College, where he rose to the rank of professor in 1971. The book which I will discuss here – Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries – was published in 1975, but Boahen had already finished it in December 1971, about two weeks before Ignatius Kutu Acheampong seized power in a military coup against the Progress Party government. Boahen was a member of the Progress Party.22

19 20 21 22

Ibid., 8. Ibid., 154. Ibid., IX. Ivor Agyeman-Duah, 'Obituary. Albert Adu Boahen. Historian who Broke Ghanaian Dictator’s Culture of Silence, The Guardian 2006; Kwabena Akurang-Parry, ‘In Memoriam. An Appreciation of Professor A. Adu Boahen (1932–2006)’, http://h-net.msu.edu 2006, [31.08.2016]; Contemporary Authors Online, A. Adu Boahen, 2008, http://ic.galegroup.com, [31.08.2016]; Kwame Donkoh Fordwor, ‘Tribute to Prof. Albert Kwadwo Adu Boahen’, 2006, http://www.ghanaweb.com, [31.08.2016]. Three years after the book under review here had been published, Boahen intensified his political activism. Among many other things, he opposed the military dictatorships of both Ignatius Kutu Acheampong (1972–1978) and Jerry John Rawlings (1982–1993) and was the candidate of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the 1992 presidential election. This party emerged out of the Danquah Busia Club. Boahen died

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Boahen’s main agenda regarding Nkrumah was similar to Omari’s in many respects. He directly addressed the Ghanaian people and recalled the dangers of Nkrumah’s authoritarian socialism. Boahen justified the military–police coup in which Nkrumah was overthrown, arguing that it was the only alternative to assassinating the dictator. The two chapters dealing with Nkrumah were, most of all, an attempt to convince his audience of the importance of liberal–democratic values. At the beginning of his first chapter on Nkrumah, Boahen – like Omari – pointed out that at independence, ‘Ghanaians … looked forward to an era of economic prosperity, full employment, social justice and individual liberty.’23 On this basis, he held that Ghanaians’ reasonably high expectations were later crushed, not because this was inevitable, but because of Nkrumah’s introduction of authoritarianism and socialism. In order to strengthen his political message, Boahen drew a sharp distinction between two periods of Nkrumah’s rule: a first one between March 1957 and July 1960, in which Nkrumah’s policies had been informed by Western democracy, free trade, and capitalism; and a second one from July 1960, characterised by Nkrumah’s shift towards socialism, economic control, and stateowned means of production.24 In the first period, ‘Nkrumah’s internal political activities … were aimed primarily at strengthening his own positions as well as that of his government.’25 Boahen found that Nkrumah’s authoritarian measures paralysed the opposition and democracy but also mentioned that there were reports in mid-1958 based on which the government had reason to be afraid of subversive activities. Considering the establishment of order and stability in combination with the CPP’s restrained application of the Preventive Detention Act before 1960, Nkrumah’s domestic politics in the first period were, all in all, beneficial to Ghana in Boahen’s view.26 Boahen claimed that even though Nkrumah’s foreign policy was informed mainly by the principle of non-alignment, it initially turned out to be a rather Western-friendly strategy. Contrary to Omari, he took Nkrumah seriously as a socialist and pan-Africanist and highlighted the success of his practical steps towards African unity up until 1960. In terms of Nkrumah’s initially liberal economic policy, Boahen found that it helped to finance the Volta River Project, but on the whole, there was no real economic development in his view.27 Against the background of a severe reduction of foreign reserves, due to a negative capital account and falling world market prices for cocoa, Boahen held ‘that, sooner or

23 24 25 26 27

in Accra in 2006. (In addition to the sources indicated above, see Gocking, History, 207–212, 287.) Boahen, Ghana, 191. Ibid., 191–192. Ibid., 192. Ibid., 192–196. Ibid., 196–205.

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later, such an economic policy would have to be altered or abandoned’.28 This insight, however, is absent in his subsequent interpretation of Nkrumah’s second period. His rather indulgent presentation of Nkrumah’s first period served Boahen’s intention to cast a dark shadow on the second one. According to Boahen, Nkrumah’s character and personality changed during the second period, and he became more obsessed with ambition and power and with a personality cult revolving around him, bearing witness to his megalomania. Worst of all, ‘he became superstitious, corrupt and immoral.’29 Like Omari, Boahen held that Nkrumah became increasingly convinced that he owned both the CPP and Ghana, and Boahen also based these points on testimonies of Nkrumah’s former political followers.30 The morally upright counterpart to Nkrumah was, not surprisingly, the ‘[s]incere, honest, dedicated’ leader of the liberal Progress Party, Busia.31 Most importantly, Boahen drew a direct connection between Nkrumah’s decision to transform Ghana into a one-party state and his turn towards the actual implementation of socialism once foreign capital for the Volta River Project had been secured. He considered the socialist turn – marked by ‘active state control of and participation in all sectors of the economy’32 – the most crucial difference between the first and second periods and argued that its negative effects outweighed the positive ones. Even though Boahen had hinted at the necessity to ‘close’ the economy in the previous chapter, he now de-emphasised this aspect, presenting the introduction of measures like import restrictions as wrong and primarily a question of ideology, which corresponds to his personal opposition to socialism.33 Thus, Boahen’s clear distinction between a positive, liberal and Western-oriented first period, as compared to a negative, socialist, and Easternoriented second one, should foremost be read as a political statement. His interpretation of Nkrumah’s rule and personality can be fully grasped only by taking into account his own political stance. A third author who wrote within the liberal paradigm during the post-NLC period was John Kofi Fynn, who was born on 21 September 1935 in the Abura Dunkwa area. Like Boahen, he held a PhD in African History from SOAS and followed an academic career at the University of Ghana and achieved a professorship. His support for the Progress Party government was even more pronounced than Boahen’s: from November 1969 until January 1971, Fynn served as Deputy Minister for Local Government Administration and then as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports until the Busia government was over-

28 29 30 31 32 33

Boahen, Ghana, 200. Ibid., 209. Ibid., 209–210. Ibid., 236. Ibid., 212. Ibid., 206–217. According to Killick, Nkrumah both had to and wanted to break with private enterprise-friendly policies by the early 1960s, see Killick, Development Economics, 34, 42.

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thrown by Acheampong on January 13, 1972. On his return to politics in 1985, he became the chief of the Abura area and led the ‘traditional Right Wing’ of the region. He died in Accra on 25 August 2005.34 When A Junior History of Ghana was published in 1975, the liberals’ hopes for a democratic future had already been crushed by Acheampong’s military coup. Fynn’s overarching agenda in the book and his criticism of Nkrumah are familiar from the discussion of Omari’s and Boahen’s books. In addition, however, Fynn used the Nkrumah period, which, in his view, had been a dictatorship in its last years,35 as an indirect critique of the new military government. The lesson of his chapter on Ghana since independence is that ‘[f]uture politicians will have to show more respect for the views of the electorate.’36 Corresponding to Fynn’s personal background, the Junior History, which served as a textbook in Ghanaian schools, provides an elite-centred and elitefriendly account of the Ghanaian anti-colonial struggle and the Nkrumah era. In Fynn’s view, African and Ghanaian culture had foremost been defended by the educated elite, which had successfully agitated for a new constitution that came into effect in 1946 under colonial rule.37 In combination with Omari’s attack on Nkrumah’s role as the founder of modern Ghana, this indicates that the longestablished opposition between the Danquah-Busia tradition and the Nkrumahists also constituted a struggle of competing myths of nation-founding. To Fynn, the question of who may take credit for Ghana’s formation was an important one, and in his view, it should be ‘Dr Danquah’, not ‘Mr Nkrumah’.38 He disprised Nkrumah by calling him ‘Mr’, based on the fact that Nkrumah carried an honorary doctoral title, as opposed to Danquah’s, which had been earned for academic achievements. Omari used a similar rhetorical strategy (see above). The three books examined so far were written by authors who have experienced Nkrumah’s rule personally, and share the political ideology of the Danquah-Busia tradition. While their negative interpretations of Nkrumah’s rule and life dominated the post-NLC period, they would not remain unchallenged. THE ELECTION VICTORY OF THE NKRUMAHISTS AND THE REHABILITATION OF NKRUMAH, 1979–81 In July 1978, Acheampong was overthrown in a counter-coup, which eventually led to elections that were won by Hilla Limann’s People’s National Party (PNP),

34 Akwasi B. Assensoh and Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh, ‘An Obituary/Appreciation. University of Ghana History Professor (Emeritus) J. K. Fynn (September 21, 1935–August 25, 2005)’, Date unknown, http://www.utexas.edu, [31.08.2016]. 35 John Kofi Fynn, A Junior History of Ghana, Accra 1999 [1975], 89. 36 Ibid., 91. 37 Ibid., 81–82. 38 Ibid., 82.

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which presented itself as the ideological successor to Nkrumah’s CPP. However, after the PNP had formed the government in September 1979, Jerry J. Rawlings staged a successful coup in December 1981 and ruled Ghana dictatorially until January 1993.39 Francis Kwamina Buah’s book A History of Ghana (1980) was written and published during the short period of PNP rule. Buah was born in 1922. He opened Tema Secondary School (Temasco) in September 1961 and served as its first headmaster until 1975/76. He held a PhD and produced several books on African and world history, some of which were used for schools and colleges. In 2005, Buah passed away. When he wrote A History of Ghana, he was serving as Minister of Education for the Limann administration.40 The book’s direct agenda was clearly stated: ‘A re-appraisal is necessary for a proper understanding of Nkrumah’s post-independence political achievement, both at home and in the African and the wider international scene.’41 In fact, Buah’s sympathetic interpretation of Nkrumah’s rule was already evident in a book first published in 1967. West Africa and Europe was the second of two books intended for use in West African secondary schools and training institutions for teachers.42 Buah argued that ‘like most great leaders in history whose revolutionary moves were misunderstood, [Nkrumah] was overthrown and could not complete his good work.’43 However, Buah’s appreciation of Nkrumah in this book is overall rather restrained and not as comprehensive as in A History of Ghana, which the author dedicated to his ‘teacher – Kwame Nkrumah – Founder of modern Ghana’.44 Nkrumah’s role as the father of the nation is a dominant theme running through the entire book. According to Buah, the UGCC’s ‘enlistment of Kwame Nkrumah brought a new lease of life into the country and was the turning point in its fight for independence.’45 The UGCC served as the platform on which Nkrumah returned to Ghana, but in Buah’s view, the main credit for the country’s in39 Buah, History, 202–207; Gocking, History, 178–217. Jerry John Rawlings, born in 1947, first seized power in Ghana through a military coup in June 1979 but handed it over to the PNP government the same year. He staged a second coup on 31 December 1981, after which he ruled Ghana as a military dictator until he became the first elected president of the Fourth Republic in January 1993. His second and final term as president ended in 2001 (Gocking, History, Chapters. 10–12). He is still an active public figure and regularly comments on Ghanaian politics. 40 Evelyn Appiah-Donyina, ‘A Tribute in Honour of the Late FK Buah’, 2006, http://www.modernghana.com, [31.08.2016]; Modern Ghana, ‘“His Excellency” is not Necessary’, 2005, http://www.modernghana.com, [31.08.2016]; Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, ‘Touche! Dr. Buah’, 2005, http://www.ghanaweb.com, [31.08.2016]; Temasco, ‘Our History’, 2012, http://www.temasco.com, [31.08.2016]. 41 Buah, History, 182. 42 Francis K. Buah, West Africa and Europe. A New History for Schools and Colleges, Book II, London 1977 [1967], iii. 43 Ibid., 230. 44 Buah, History, iii. 45 Ibid., 153.

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dependence is due to Nkrumah.46 According to Buah, CPP leaders were genuinely dedicated to the nationalist cause in a selfless way, which set them apart from the elitist and conservative UGCC. Buah’s characterisation of Nkrumah also differed from the view that had dominated publications during the post-NLC period. Due to his ‘humble parentage and beginnings’,47 Nkrumah had a popular touch. In contrast to the liberal authors, he presented Nkrumah as a learned man who had studied seriously in the US and in the United Kingdom.48 Not unlike the liberal authors, Buah held that Ghana’s economic situation after independence was highly favourable. However, he asserted that ‘the tremendous developments in Ghana up to 1966 owed very much to the vision, dynamism and courage of the first leader.’49 Thus, Buah treated the entire CPP term as one consistent and successful block of policies. He described Nkrumah as ‘an enlightened economist’;50 praising him especially for realising both the importance of attracting foreign investment, and of being economically independent. Domestic control of financial institutions was proof for the achievement of the latter goal.51 Even though some people in key positions may have been responsible for mismanagement and fraudulent practices, Nkrumah himself had not wasted Ghana’s reserves. Answering directly to Boahen’s point that Nkrumah’s rule unfortunately did not end after the first three years, Buah emphasised Nkrumah’s post-1960 achievements, such as the completion of the Volta River Project. In reaction to Boahen’s opinion that Nkrumah had failed as a Ghanaian leader, Buah held that given his non-elitist background, Nkrumah had in fact been very successful.52 In terms of Buah’s positive interpretation of Nkrumah’s role as a panAfricanist, he did not have to write against a strong opposing position, Omari aside. With regard to criticism in the national political sphere, Buah conceded that there was indeed a gradual increase in measures which were considered harsh by Nkrumah’s opponents but countered that his seemingly dictatorial practices were ‘largely dictated by the circumstances of the time including nefarious activities of his opponents’.53 Ghana’s republican transformation in July 1960 was, in Buah’s view, not about concentrating power in the hands of Nkrumah, but about finally breaking political ties with Britain, and he explained the 1964 referendum that turned Ghana into a one-party state with opposition violence and attempts to assassinate Nkrumah.54 Regarding the involuntary end of Nkrumah’s rule, Buah argued that to some extent, Nkrumah was overthrown because he was misunderstood. Most notably, 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Buah, History, 154. Ibid., 153. Ibid., 153–157. Ibid., 168. Ibid., 169. Ibid., 173–174. Ibid., 190–191. Ibid., 180. Ibid., 182–186.

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his pan-African commitment was mistaken for neglect of domestic affairs. Another reason for the coup was, in Buah’s view, that many of Nkrumah’s controversial but necessary Acts had the unintended effect of paralysing the opposition. When the Preventive Detention Act was applied indiscriminately, Nkrumah was not always aware of this, and as nobody dared to contradict him, he was often insufficiently informed about state affairs. Buah also held that Nkrumah’s policies had offended Western actors, who supported the coup probably for this reason. The celebrations in Ghana which followed Nkrumah’s overthrow are not addressed.55 Linking his interpretations of Nkrumah’s rule and of post-1966 Ghanaian history, Buah argued that ‘[e]vents in Ghana since his overthrow … have amply demonstrated that it has been easier to criticise President Nkrumah than to replace him’56 and claimed that ‘[a]s time wore on, the people became disillusioned and began to revive the memory of Kwame Nkrumah.’57 These assertions point to the connection between A History of Ghana and the contemporary Ghana of 1979/80. After Nkrumah’s death in 1972, sympathetic reexaminations of Nkrumah’s rule had already become more feasible. In the general election of 1979, the Nkrumahists were able to contrast the first president’s achievements, and Ghana’s prominent role in African politics under Nkrumah, with several military coups and nearly a decade of military rule which had followed Busia’s rather short period in office.58 Buah had been an admirer of Nkrumah all along, but A History of Ghana framed the country’s past in ways which were also intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the Limann government, of which Buah was a high-ranking part. A NEW GENERATION OF PAN-AFRICANISTS: FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO REHABILITATE NKRUMAH, 2007/08 After the academic debate about Nkrumah had become increasingly polarised, Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah’s The Vampire State in Africa. The Political Economy of Decline in Ghana (1992) was of a more balanced nature. Frimpong-Ansah, who had started working for the Bank of Ghana and for marketing boards under Nkrumah,59 identified both negative and positive effects of Nkrumah’s economic policies and argued that many decisions had been reasonable in their historical context, despite their unintended adverse effects on the economy.60 At the time of the fiftieth anniversary of Ghana’s independence from colonial rule, however,

55 56 57 58 59

Buah, History, 189–190. Ibid., 192. Ibid., 200. Gocking, History, 170, 180. Kwadwo Frimpong-Ansah/Amma Frimpong-Ansah, ‘Jonathan Frimpong-Ansah’, date unknown, http://jh frimpong.ansah.com, [31.08.2016]. 60 Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa. The Political Economy of Decline in Ghana, Trenton NJ 1992, 74–75.

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extreme positions situated on the pro-Nkrumah side of the spectrum boomed again. Contemporary pan-Africanists from Ghana took the celebrations as an opportunity to further rehabilitate the first Ghanaian head of state. I will discuss the work of Boni Yao Gebe, Ama Biney, and Charles Quist-Adade here. Boni Yao Gebe holds a PhD in Political Science from Queen’s University (Canada). From December 2002 until November 2003, he was a Fulbright scholar at both the US National Defense University’s Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) in Washington DC and at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs. Currently, Gebe works as a senior research fellow at the University of Ghana’s Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD). 61 In 2008, Gebe’s article ‘Ghana’s Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D’état’ was published. The main part of this article is about the role of the US government in Nkrumah’s overthrow. Gebe asserts that the CIA played a role in financing the coup and that Western governments conspired in order to deny Ghanaian aid requests, so that Nkrumah’s regime would be financially strangulated.62 Gebe mentions himself that internal factors also contributed to Nkrumah’s overthrow, but he is convinced that ‘[t]he main reason for the putsch was American disenchantment for the socialist orientation of the Nkrumah regime and his anti-Western radicalism’,63 thus developing further the already established thesis of US involvement in the coup.64 Generally, Gebe aims at a deeper appreciation of Nkrumah’s foreign and pan-African policy, argues that it was foremost external forces which prevented African unity, and emphasises the never-ending relevance of Nkrumah’s ideas for African unity and development.65 Another contemporary admirer of Nkrumah, Ama Biney, left Ghana to study African Studies at the University of Birmingham in the UK. She also completed a Master’s in Government and Politics of West and Southern Africa at SOAS, and the University of London awarded her a PhD for a thesis entitled Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual History. She has lectured at several UK universities and, apart from being an academic, has been described as a pan-Africanist, an activist, and a journalist.66 In 2008, Biney’s article The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect was published. In her view, Nkrumah, ‘the Nelson Mandela of the 1950s and 1960s’,67 61 Foreign Policy Journal, ‘Stories Written by Boni Yao Gebe’, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal .com, [31.08.2016]; LECIAD, ‘Dr. Boni Yao Gebe’, 2013, http://leciad.ug.edu/gh, [31.08.2016]. 62 Boni Yao Gebe, ‘Ghana’s Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D’etat’, in: Journal of Pan African Studies, 2/3 (2008), 173. 63 Ibid., 173. 64 Buah, History, 190. 65 Gebe, Foreign Policy, 160–181. 66 Tlaxcala, ‘Ama Biney’, date unknown, http://www.tlaxcala-int.org, [31.08.2016]. 67 Ama Biney, The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect, in: Journal of Pan African Studies, 2/3 (2008), 129.

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has fallen into oblivion, which is why ‘it is essential that the achievements, relevance and a reassessment of Kwame Nkrumah’s role and contribution to African history are acknowledged.’68 She criticises the fact that ‘Nkrumah’s historical reputation is shrouded in considerable ambivalence and controversy’ and claims that Nkrumah’s motivations can be understood only against the background of the colonial era and racist ideas of white supremacy.69 Biney argues that even though Nkrumah was motivated primarily by an ideology of radical socialist transformation, he also had to make pragmatic policy decisions. In her view – probably in reaction to Omari’s criticism of Nkrumah – inconsistency between ideology and practice should be rationalised as a temporary and unavoidable departure from Nkrumah’s true convictions, and in no case does it negate the overall importance of his worldview. Thus, she infers, examining Nkrumah’s ideological vision is essential. In this regard, she stresses the impact of Marcus Garvey’s ideas on Nkrumah.70 Explicitly answering Omari’s accusation that Nkrumah wasted Ghanaian money trying to achieve his pan-African goals, she argues that to Nkrumah, there was no difference between Ghanaian and African money.71 Based on the premise that the bulk of the literature on Nkrumah agrees that his ‘legacy for African political practice was largely a negative one’,72 Biney sets out to re-interpret Nkrumah’s authoritarianism from a sympathetic point of view. She argues that other leaders of African states – Ahmed Sékou Touré (Guinea), Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal), and Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire) – resorted to authoritarianism earlier, and performed worse than Nkrumah.73 Regarding the reasons for Nkrumah’s authoritarian measures, Biney holds that he was forced to employ them due to the oppositional National Liberation Movement’s (NLM) unwillingness ‘to accept the political rules of the game’.74 In her view, developments such as ‘disturbances among the Gas’ (meaning the formation of the Ga Standfast Association in 1957) and several attacks on Nkrumah’s life 68 Ibid., 129. 69 Ibid., 130. 70 Marcus Garvey was an early-20th century pan-Africanist from Jamaica. His populist version of pan-Africanism states that Africa is the natural home of the black ‘race’ and that all black people in the world should return to their continent of racial origin. The goal was the establishment of an all-African nation. See Marcus A. Garvey, Appeal to the Soul of White America [1923], in: Amy Jacques Garvey, Garvey and Garveyism, Kingston 1963, 16–24; Marcus Garvey, ‘Africa for the Africans’ [1919], in: Nathan Irvin Huggins (ed.), Voices from the Harlem Renaissance, New York 1976, 35–38; Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940. The Past of the Present, Cambridge 2002, 24. Garvey never was in Africa. 71 Biney, Legacy, 134–135. 72 Ibid., 139. 73 Ibid., 139–143. 74 Biney, Legacy, 144. The NLM had emerged in 1954 out of the cooperation of the Ewe-based Anlo Youth Organisation (AYO), the UGCC-related Ghana Congress Party (GCP), and Ashanti farmers opposed to what they considered the centralisation of government under Nkrumah (Boahen, Ghana, 183–85; Gocking, History, 105).

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provided him ‘with the justification to suppress [his] political enemies and safeguard the security of the state and its citizens’.75 Biney’s final part on African unity after Nkrumah’s death is dedicated mostly to demonstrating the long-lasting, in fact increasing, impact and importance of his ideas, exemplified in her view, among other things, in the OAU’s transformation into the African Union.76 All things considered, Biney’s arguments appear to be compromised by her readiness to make the evidence fit her cause to rehabilitate Nkrumah at any cost. For example, she mentions that Nkrumah was influenced by Garvey, but leaves the reader uninformed about the fact that Nkrumah later distanced himself from Garvey’s racialist ideas. In his autobiography from 1957, Nkrumah argued that Garveyism was ‘not born of indigenous African consciousness. Garvey’s ideology was concerned with black nationalism as opposed to African nationalism’.77 Considering that Biney wrote a doctoral thesis on Nkrumah, she was most likely aware of this. Her text thus seems to be a deliberate distortion of Nkrumah’s opinion(s) on Garvey, presenting the image of a homogeneous, non-factional history of pan-African thought. A further point of criticism might be raised concerning the rationalisation of any dissonance between Nkrumah’s ideas and his actions as a necessary and temporary departure from his true intentions. In my understanding, this is tantamount to rendering Nkrumah’s actions irrelevant, which in the end denies his importance in African history instead of fully acknowledging it. Finally, let me turn to Charles Quist-Adade, who has a background in journalism (Ghanaian and international media) and holds a PhD in Sociology from Saint Petersburg State University (Russia). Presently, he lectures at the Sociology department of Kwantlen Polytechnic University in British Columbia (Canada).78 Quist-Adade puts the contemporary revisionist agenda most explicitly into the broader context of revitalised hope for African unity. He shares Biney’s fascination for Marcus Garvey, ‘the most ardent and consistent advocate of the unity of the Black race [sic]’.79 Nkrumah, he claims, borrowed many ideas from Garvey and brought ‘Pan-Africanism to its natural home when he returned to the Gold Coast’.80 Quist-Adade mentions Garvey in one line with George Padmore and W.E.B. Du Bois, leaving it unconsidered that the views of the latter two on panAfricanism were quite different from Garvey’s.81 For example, Du Bois argued against Garvey that it was ‘absurd to talk of a return to Africa, merely because

75 76 77 78

Biney, Legacy, 144. Ibid., 145–148. Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, London 1979a [1957], 44. Irene Moore, ‘Dr. Charles Quist-Adade’, 2012, http://www.windsor-communities.com, [31.08.2016]; Charles Quist-Adade, ‘About Dr. Charles Quist-Adade’, 2012, http://www.qu ist-adade.com, [31.08.2016]. 79 Charles Quist-Adade, ‘Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana and Africa’s Global Destiny’, in: Journal of Pan African Studies, 1/9 (2007), 247. 80 Quist-Adade, Nkrumah, 248. 81 Ibid., 247–248.

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that was our home 300 years ago’.82 Like Biney, Quist-Adade invents a nonfactional pan-African intellectual history. In his interpretation of the February 1966 coup, he goes further than Gebe, claiming that it was Western forces which overthrew Nkrumah.83 Even though Nkrumah died of cancer in 1972,84 QuistAdade asserts that he died for his ideal of African liberation.85 Finally, based on the generalisation that all African countries today are ‘desperate’, ‘dispirited’, and ‘non-viable’, Quist-Adade argues that Nkrumah was wise to call for a United States of Africa. During the era of Cold-War-bloc policies, this plan could not work, but, according to Quist-Adade, it might indeed work in the post-1991 world.86 In the United States of Africa, as Quist-Adade envisions them, the continent’s resources could be pooled for the collective benefit of all of its citizens, economies of scale could be utilised, and a common African bargaining position in the globalised economy would be reached. In his view, African states are not real states anyway – they have only flags and anthems and some ‘have their only source of foreign currency earning a perishable and dispensable crop’.87 This perspective seems informed by a Euro- and America-centric interpretation of African statehood. Ironically, it can hardly be reconciled with one of Nkrumah’s central arguments, namely that pan-African unity depends on the successful establishment of independent African states.88 CONCLUSION The major positions in the ongoing Nkrumah controversy have moved from complete condemnation to rehabilitation to unconditional worship. Throughout the entire debate, Nkrumah’s memory has served as a means of making sense not only of the past but also of the present and future.89 Liberals writing during the postNLC period put forward negative interpretations of Nkrumah’s rule and personality in order to pave the way for a democratic and more market-oriented future. 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, ‘Not “Separatism”’, in: The Crisis, 17(4) (1919), 166. Quist-Adade, Nkrumah, 249. Gocking, History, 139. Quist-Adade, Nkrumah, 249. Ibid., 249. Ibid., 250. Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo, London 1974 [1967], xi–xii; Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom. Africa in the Struggle against World Imperialism, London 1979b [1962, written 1945], 33; Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism. The Last Stage of Imperialism, New York 1984 [1965], 36. 89 For further information on the connections between memory and sense-making see Marion Gymnich, ‘Individuelle Identität und Erinnerung aus Sicht von Identitätstheorie und Gedächtnisforschung sowie als Gegenstand literarischer Inszenierung’, in: Astrid Erll/Marion Gymnich/Ansgar Nünning (eds.), Literatur – Erinnerung – Identität. Theoriekonzeptionen und Fallstudien, Trier 2003, 35; Maurice Halbwachs, Das kollektive Gedächtnis, Frankfurt a. M. 1991 [1950], 55.

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Francis K. Buah’s rehabilitation of Nkrumah stressed the achievements of modern Ghana’s first ruler, which in 1980 could be portrayed as unmatched, thus attempting to strengthen the legitimacy of the newly elected Nkrumahist government. Between 1970 and 1980, when the polarised positions were established, the main agenda behind the texts was the improvement of Ghana along the ideological lines of the respective authors. This implied a positioning as to which political party should (continue to) rule the country. Revisionist articles published in 2007/08 also address Nkrumah’s domestic politics, but their authors see Nkrumah mainly as a source of inspiration for contemporary Africa as a whole. In the later twentieth century, Ghanaian academics used the memory of Nkrumah primarily to convey messages of national improvement, whereas in the 21st century, international, predominantly African, affairs have moved to the fore. At the risk of retelling the simplified success story of the ‘donor darling’, this change may be connected to Ghana’s relative political stability since its return to constitutional rule in 1993. The Nkrumah controversy has also been connected to competing narratives of nation-founding. Ghana’s liberal Danquah-Busia tradition and the Nkrumahists have been engaged in a longstanding dispute over who should take credit for the formation of independent Ghana: Danquah and the UGCC, or Nkrumah. Even though today the CPP is marginalised in Ghanaian politics, it seems that the Nkrumahists have, at least officially, won this struggle.90 In 2009, causing much debate in Ghana, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government designated Nkrumah’s birthday as the national Founder’s Day. The NDC was formed by former military ruler Jerry Rawlings; representatives of the party have often claimed a connection to the Nkrumahist tradition. In 2013, after the parliament had approved Founder’s Day, representatives of the liberal tradition protested again that all of Ghana’s Big Six anti-colonial heroes, including both Danquah and Nkrumah, should be honoured on the statutory Founder’s (or Founders’?) Day.91 And two days after Ghanaians celebrated Nkrumah as the founder of modern Ghana in 2014, the question was brought up as to whether Rawlings should be celebrated as the founder of democratic Ghana.92 Clearly, the Nkrumah controversy continues.

90 Depending on whom one talks to in Ghana, there are also Nkrumahists in other Ghanaian parties today, including the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC). Representatives of the CPP tend, however, to regard these individuals as traitors to the Nkrumahist cause. 91 Akwasi Agyeman-Dua, ‘Nkrumah’s Birthday as Founder’s Day …To Celebrate or Not to Celebrate?’, 2013, http://www.modernghana.com, [31.08.2016]; GhanaWeb, ‘Why Dilute Mills’ Founder’s Day with Founders’ Day?’, 2009, http://www.ghanaweb.com, [31.08.2016]; GhanaWeb, ‘Government Urged to Make Founders’ Day Celebration More Meaningful’, 2012, http://www.ghanaweb.com, [31.08.2016]; Modern Ghana, ‘Founders’ Day to be Placed on Ghana’s Holiday Calendar’, 2012, http://www.modernghana.com, [31.08.2016]. 92 Amenga-Etego Akaabitono SaCut, ‘Founder’s Day – Celebrating Nkrumah the “Dead Legend” … or Rawlings the “Living Legend”?’, 2014, http://www.ghanaweb.com, [31.08.2016].

A LASTING MEMORY The contested history of the Nkrumah statue Carola Lentz1 Abstract: The statue of Kwame Nkrumah that stands today in Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park in Ghana’s capital Accra has a conflict-ridden history. Commissioned in 1956 and unveiled at the first anniversary of independence in 1958, the statue has been the object of intense debate and contestation from the very beginning, mainly with regard to its political message. In 1961, the original statue suffered from a bomb attack by militant opponents of the Nkrumah regime, and was toppled immediately after the coup against Nkrumah in 1966. A decade later, the damaged monument was put up in the garden of the National Museum without undergoing any repairs, thus reminding visitors of the downfall of this contested national hero. Nkrumah died in 1972, but it was not until 1992, under a relatively Nkrumahfriendly government, that the mausoleum and a new statue were constructed at the very spot where Nkrumah had once declared independence. However, contestations continued, and for the Ghana@50 celebrations, the then ruling ‘anti-Nkrumah’ government erected the original beheaded statue behind the mausoleum – an act that Nkrumahists regarded as denigration of the nation’s founding father. The history of the Nkrumah statue(s) in Ghana bears out the paradox that generally characterises monuments: built as lasting memories, they remain embedded in social and political conflict. Ever since monuments have been constructed, their destruction or renovation (whether by annexation, resiting, modification, or renaming) are common means of resignifying the past in light of changing contemporary agendas.

In January 2012, Ghana’s President John Evans Atta Mills, accompanied by other Ghanaian dignitaries and two of Nkrumah’s children, unveiled an imposing statue of ‘Osagyefo [Redeemer] Kwame Nkrumah’, as the inscription reads, at the forecourt of the new African Union building in Addis Ababa. The three-and-a-half metre high bronze statue was cast in Ghana, as the presidential staffer and architect Dr. Don Arthur who oversaw the production explained.2 It was modelled on the very first Nkrumah statue which had been created by the Italian sculptor Nicola Cataudella and inaugurated, in front of the Old Parliament House in Accra, at the eve of the first anniversary of independence in 1958. The statue shows Nkru1

2

The fieldwork and archival research on which this article draws were carried out in 2014 for a research project on the symbolic and performative dimensions of nation-building, which was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in the context of Research Group 1939, ‘Un/doing differences: practices in human differentiation’ at Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz. The write-up was greatly facilitated by a fellowship at the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg in Delmenhorst in the spring of 2015. Interview with Dr. Don Arthur, 12 March 2014, Accra.

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mah dressed in his famous fugu, the popular Northern Ghanaian smock in which he had declared independence, his right hand lifted in greeting, his left hand holding a walking stick, and his eyes gazing into the distant future.

Figure 1: Nkrumah statue in Addis Ababa, unveiled Jan. 2012. Source: http://ayyaantuu.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/Kwame-Nkrumah-Statue-in-Addis-Ababa.jpg

The dedication at the base of the Addis Ababa monument quotes a pronouncement that Nkrumah made during the opening conference of the Organisation of African Unity in May 1963: ‘Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands unto God, Africa must unite’. Not all Ethiopians, however, were as content with the monumental recognition of Nkrumah’s ‘greatness’ and ‘leading role in the African liberation struggle’ as the Ghanaian delegation.3 Politicians from the opposition and a group of Ethiopian elders petitioned that a statue of the late emperor Haile Selassie, the ‘longer-standing supporter of African liberation’, and thus true ‘father of Africa’, should join the Nkrumah monument or that the latter should be removed. But Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi countered that Selassie had been a ‘feudal dictator’ and that it was ‘crass’ to question the choice of Nkrumah as the appropriate African symbol for the new AU headquarters.4

3

4

Ghana News Agency (GNA), ‘Kwame Nkrumah statue unveiled in Addis Ababa’, 29 Jan. 2012; http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=228808 [31.08.2016]. The Independent, ‘Ethiopians give lacklustre welcome to Kwame Nkrumah statue’, 14 Feb. 2012.

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Just as the debate on the Nkrumah statue in Addis Ababa has reflected, and further intensified, political conflicts between the Ethiopian government and the opposition, the Nkrumah monument in Ghana has, since the very beginning, been surrounded by controversy. In the run-up to independence, Nkrumah’s political opponents denounced the Prime Minister as ‘dictator’, and condemned plans to erect his statue as a ‘presumptuous gesture of self-aggrandizement’.5 Before the 1957 Avoidance of Discrimination Act and the Preventive Detention Act severely curtailed oppositional activities, the anti-Nkrumahist newspapers Ashanti Pioneer and Liberator regularly published editorials that criticised putting Nkrumah’s portrait on coins, banknotes, and stamps and printed cartoons on Stalin’s fate after the twentieth congress of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, insinuating that monuments of Nkrumah would experience a similar destiny.6 And indeed, like many Stalin statues, Nkrumah’s effigy in Accra did not last nearly as long as its sponsors would have hoped. It was severely damaged by a bomb attack in 1961 and beheaded and deposed in the wake of the 1966 coup d’état. A decade later, under the Nkrumah-friendlier government of Acheampong, the damaged sculpture was re-erected in the garden of the National Museum, and a new statue, to be put up at the Old Polo Grounds, the very site where Nkrumah had declared independence, was commissioned in Italy. This monument was finally unveiled by President Rawlings in 1992 in the course of the inauguration of the newly built Nkrumah mausoleum. However, this did not put an end to the debates and contestations. On the contrary, the ‘monument wars’, as Kirk Savage7 fittingly called them, carried on with every new turn, as I will show in this article. As in the 1950s, they continue to be closely entangled with international developments in monumental commemoration, and they reflect Ghanaian political struggles between the ruling and the oppositional parties which still tend to portray themselves as successors to the Nkrumahist project or to Nkrumah’s opponents. The history of the Nkrumah statue(s) in Ghana bears out the typical paradox that generally characterises monuments. ‘Nearly always are the reasons that bring about their construction deeply enmeshed in social and political conflicts’, Dietrich Erben observes, ‘but they compel the observer, according to the intention of the founders, to identify positively with the past’.8 In contrast to what the unsuspecting spectator may assume, monuments are usually not affirmative expressions of a well-established order but rather instruments for legitimising and stabilising

5

6

7 8

Ashanti Pioneer, 18 Feb. 1957; quoted in Janet Hess and Nii O. Quarcoopome, Spectacular Nation: Nkrumahist Art and Resistance Iconography in the Ghanaian Independence Era, in: African Arts 39/1 (2006), 23. For examples, see the references quoted in Harcourt Fuller, Building the Ghanaian NationState: Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism, London 2014, 73−79, 129; and Hess/ Quarcoopome, Spectacular Nation, 23. Kirk Savage, Monument Wars. Washington D.C., the National Mall, and the Transformation of the Memorial Landscape, Berkeley 2009. Dietrich Erben, Denkmal, in: Uwe Fleckner, Martin Warnke and Hendrik Ziegler (eds.), Handbuch der politischen Ikonographie. Vol. 1, Munich 2011, 235. (Author’s translation.)

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precarious claims to power. They are built as lasting memories but remain embedded in a history of social and political conflict. Ever since monuments have been constructed, their destruction or renovation, whether by annexation into new monuments, resiting, modification, or renaming, are common means of resignifying the past in light of changing contemporary agendas.9 In this article, I will discuss the Nkrumah statue as an object of intense debate and conflict surrounding Nkrumah’s political programme and his legacy for Ghana’s social and political order. At the same time, the statue was, and continues to be, a material object with an intangible aesthetic as well as tangible physical qualities that played an important role in the process of designing, commissioning, financing, transporting, siting, maintaining, and later destroying and restoring, the monument. The article will, therefore, also look at the construction of the statue as a process of administrative activities, including struggles between different governmental bodies over their respective responsibilities. Finally, monuments do not speak for themselves; public perceptions of the statue depended, and continue to depend, on the co-creation of meaning through a variety of other media. These include iconographic representations of Nkrumah on stamps, coins, banknotes, calendars, and posters, as well as pictures of the actual monument, in millions of copies. Furthermore, newspapers reported and commented on the entire process of construction, inauguration, destruction, and restoration of the statue, offering competing readings on the monument. And lastly, the statue was, and still is, regularly immortalised through performances, such as wreath layings or the reenactments of the declaration of independence that Ghana’s Guild of Actors stages every year on the eve of Independence Day. I cannot deal with all of these aspects in great detail, but I do hope to demonstrate that the making and remaking of monuments such as the Nkrumah statue are multifaceted processes with sometimes unexpected outcomes, in which multiple actors with different and often conflicting intentions participate. A few remarks, finally, regarding the sources on which this article relies are important. Reconstructing the history of the Nkrumah monument meant piecing together fragmentary and contradictory evidence from my own inspection of the monuments and participant observation of various ceremonies as well as reading documents in the national archives, newspapers, and some secondary literature; viewing the photographic collection of the Information Services Department; and conducting interviews with architects, town planners, and a member of Nkrumah’s ministry of foreign affairs. The nature of the sources at my disposal, and the density and detail with which they cover different periods and aspects of the monument’s history, are somewhat uneven. For the time between 1956 and 1963, when the first statue of the Prime Minister was erected, the national archives in Accra hold an impressive stock of documents from the Ministry of Works and the Public Works Department. Together with the minutes of cabinet meetings, these 9

Erben, Denkmal, 239; see also Wilfried Speitkamp (ed.), Denkmalsturz. Zur Konfliktgeschichte politischer Symbolik, Göttingen 1997.

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files convey a sense of the intricate, and often conflict-ridden, administrative procedures involved in the planning of the monument. The political controversies surrounding the statue, however, are not reflected in these bureaucratic documents but have to be culled from newspaper commentaries and reminiscences narrated in interviews. For the entire post-1966 history of the monument, unfortunately, I could not find any pertinent original documents in the archives10 and had to rely mainly on newspaper reports as well as information from various interviews. Clearly, the making and remaking of the statue have all involved both bureaucratic and political processes throughout, but the uneven coverage of these dimensions in my sources means that for the early history of the monument, I pay more attention to administrative activities, while for later developments, the focus is more on the political aspects of the ‘monument wars’. CONSTRUCTING THE PRIME MINISTER’S STATUE: AN EXERCISE IN BUREAUCRATIC (MIS)COMMUNICATION As soon as the British government considered awarding the country its independence, Gold Coast government officials started thinking about how to celebrate this grand event appropriately. They set up a large Independence Celebrations Committee with numerous sub-committees and appointed a responsible Independence Celebrations Officer.11 The idea of using Nkrumah’s portrait as a central symbol of the soon-to-be nation-state apparently first came up in October 1955, in the course of the Postage Stamps Committee’s deliberations on the issue of Ghana’s new stamps. The committee chairman suggested that the first commemorative stamp was to feature a map of Africa with Ghana marked on it, a rising eagle, and a vignette with Nkrumah’s face. Nkrumah initially opposed the idea of having his portrait on a stamp but was eventually persuaded by the committee chairman.12 With regard to subsequent plans to commission a statue of Nkrumah as the ‘Founder of the Nation’, as the inscription of the monument was to read, no further hesitations are on record. On the contrary, the Prime Minister’s office and Nkrumah himself, supported by his close friend and long-standing political ally, the Minister of Trade and Labour Kojo Botsio, seem to have pursued the monu-

10 Original documents related to the erection of the damaged statue(s) in the National Museum in the mid-1970s have been preserved by the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (for a list of these sources, see Harcourt Fuller, Building the Ghanaian Nation-State: Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism, Ontario 2014, 231−233); for a variety of reasons, I could not access these documents and therefore have to rely on Fuller’s account. 11 See Gold Coast Gazette, 28 Jan. 1956, Public Records and Archives Administration, Accra, Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD), RG 5/1/94. 12 On the Postage Stamp Committee’s discussions, pertinent cabinet meetings, and opposition to Nkrumah’s portrait on the stamps, see Fuller, Building, 39−53. More generally on postagestamp portraits of West African political leaders, see Agbenyenga Adedze, Commemorating the chief: the politics of postage stamps in West Africa, in: African Arts 37/2 (2004), 68−73.

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ment project vigorously, to the extent of bypassing all the usual bureaucratic procedures and making their own arrangements without previously informing the relevant ministries. The documents on the execution of the plans to erect the Prime Minister’s statue thus read like an exercise in bureaucratic (mis)communication and document struggles over who was to shoulder the responsibility (and potential blame) for the statue project. In August 1956, the Independence Celebrations Officer asked the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works to ‘investigate the possibility of erecting a statue of the Prime Minister in Accra’ – the first mention of the monument that I could identify in the Ministry’s files. The Secretary was to provide information on the cost of a ‘one-third larger than life’ sized statue, either of bronze or stone, and an estimate of how long it would take for the monument to be completed. 13 Three weeks later, the Director of Public Works, whom the Secretary had ordered to take up the project, reported that according to information from the Crown Agents in London ‘a comparable statue of sculptural merit in bronze’ would cost approximately £13,000 with an additional £3,000 for packing, shipment, provision of a pedestal, and erection. The completion of the project would take at least twelve months – which would put it far beyond the independence celebrations in March 1957, during which the Prime Minister’s Office had planned to unveil the statue. The Crown Agents suggested contacting the Royal Society of British Sculptors for further details, but the Director of Public Works first wanted approval from his superior to go ahead with the project.14 The Ministry of Works, however, also considered commissioning the statue from an African sculptor and requested the Gold Coast Arts Council, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, to share its opinion. The secretary of the Arts Council, for his part, responded that ‘the fabrication of the Prime Minister’s Statue as a public monument should not be sculptured in haste’, and that the council would invite African sculptors to ‘submit specimen of their art for judgement’ before recommending who should be commissioned to create the statue.15 Before any of these plans could be taken much further, however, the Prime Minister’s Office, pressured by the Minister of Trade and Labour, the Honourable Kojo Botsio, made its own arrangements. As Botsio later explained, the statue was to be erected ‘in commemoration of [Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s] unique services to the new nation’, and ‘an Italian sculptor, Professor Nicola Cataudella, was ... invited to this country at Government’s expense for discussions and directions on

13 Independence Celebrations Officer, Prime Minister’s Office, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, 20 Aug. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 14 Director of Public Works to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, 11 Sep. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. That the statue was originally to be unveiled on March 6, 1957 becomes clear from a letter of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to the Independence Celebrations Officer, 31 Dec. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 15 Organising Secretary, Arts Council of the Gold Coast, to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, 8 Oct. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97.

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the execution of this project’.16 The contact with Cataudella was apparently made through the mediation of the Director of Public Works in Monrovia, Dr. Eng. Sergio Barbeski, and the Italian Vice-Consul in Accra, A. Michelletti, himself a building contractor who was later involved in the construction of the statue’s pedestal. It is not on record whether cost considerations also played a role in the decision to engage Cataudella, but, stipulated at 15,000 US dollars (the equivalent of £5,360), the Italian sculptor’s fee was considerably lower than what the Crown Agents in London thought a British sculptor would demand.17 In mid-November 1956, the contract between Cataudella and Minister Botsio was signed. As the former later explained to the Director of Public Works, he immediately set out to work on the statue, produced a clay model, and responded enthusiastically to the invitation to go to Accra ‘to execute a study from nature of the portrait of Prime Minister Nkrumah’, because this would be ‘very useful for a better result of the work’. Cataudella also claimed to have left no doubt that he could not deliver the statue before the independence celebrations as originally demanded in the contract, and that Nkrumah, Botsio, and Michelletti themselves suggested ‘postpon[ing] the date of completion since the artistic issue of the work was more important’.18 In July 1957, Botsio eventually travelled to Rome to inspect the mould before the statue was cast, and only towards the end of October 1957 was the statue finally shipped to Takoradi. It was not until several weeks after the contract had been signed that the Minister of Works and the Director of Public Works were officially informed about

16 Memorandum of the Minister of Trade and Labour on the Statue of the Prime Minister, no date (probably shortly before 12 March 1957), PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 17 For the estimate of the entire project prepared by the Director of Public Works, see Draft by Standing Development Committee, Memorandum on Statue of the Prime Minister, no date, probably mid-November 1957, PRAAD RG5/1/98. The total cost of the project, including the sculptor’s fee; the transport of the statue within Italy, then to Takoradi, Ghana, and from there to Accra; the erection of the pedestal; the horticultural work; and the unveiling ceremony, was estimated at £7,678 – a little more than 1% of the suggested budget for the ‘Accra improvement’ part of the independence building programme (see Standing Development Committee Memorandum by the Ministry of Works, 28 Feb. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/84). Critics of the Nkrumah government apparently circulated grossly exaggerated figures: as the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works noted in a letter to the Director of Information Services, an ‘intemperate article on Ghana’ in the London newspaper Sunday Express stated the cost of the statue project as £65,000 (letter dated 26 March 1959, PRAAD, RG 5/1/99). 18 Nicola Cataudella, Rome, to Director of Public Works, Accra, no date, but probably between 10 and 22 Sep. 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. According to Cataudella’s report, the contract had been signed before his visit to Accra, while Minister Botsio’s memorandum insinuated that the contract resulted from the discussions with the sculptor while he was in Accra. Both apparently sought to justify their actions (or delay of actions) retrospectively. Interestingly enough, I could not find a copy of the agreement between Botsio and Cataudella in the Ministry of Works files.

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the arrangements with Cataudella.19 When the Independence Celebrations Officer approached the Ministry of Works to find out about its plans for the reception and erection of the statue, the Permanent Secretary responded sourly that the project ‘appears to have been removed from this Ministry’s responsibility’. Since he had not been ‘consulted over the change of plan’, he could not ‘interfere in arrangements which appear to have been concluded already’. Since normally ‘the architect in charge’ was responsible for the erection of the statue, the Celebrations Officer should have consulted with Cataudella to find out the contents of the agreement. In any case, ‘in view of the way in which this matter had been handled’, his ministry and the Public Works Department ‘could not assist’.20 Similar resentful exchanges between the Ministry of Works and the Prime Minister’s Office as well as the Ministry of Trade and Labour continued for several months. The Director of Public Works expressed his ‘surprise’ that his ministry had not been consulted before being ‘committed’ by the Ministry of Trade and Labour to ‘tak[ing] delivery of the Statue as government property’. If so ‘instructed’, he conceded, his department was willing to examine the statue’s ‘condition for breakages’, but not ‘to certify if it is a “powerful, vigorous” statue’, as was requested, ‘nor are we prepared to certify if it is being “first quality bronze” as the term is unknown to us’.21 The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works complained that it remained unclear who was ‘responsible for the layout of the site, the erection of the pedestal and the placing thereon of the statue’, where the ‘money [is] coming from’, and who was to transport the statue from Takoradi to Accra. The Independence Celebrations Officer was asked to ‘tactfully convey’ to Minister Botsio that ‘the Director of Public Works or other Head of Department [should not be] committed in the future to similar undertakings without his knowledge’.22 In February 1957, the Permanent Secretary wrote directly to the Ministry of Trade and Labour, stating that neither he nor the Director of Public Works could ‘accept responsibility for any failure to carry through the project satisfactorily and in time’. He had only learnt from the newspapers that the ‘deadline for delivery ... appears to have been put forward from February [1957] to August’. Furthermore, the Secretary remarked, a ‘recent press photograph’ suggested that ‘Messrs Michelletti [& Sons] may have some contractual obligations’ in the construction of the monument site, but his ministry had not been properly in-

19 This becomes clear from letters to the Crown Agents and the Arts Council; see, for instance, Director of Public Works, Accra, to Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations, London, 6 Dec. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 20 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Independence Celebrations Officer, 28 and 29 Nov. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 21 Director of Public Works to Permanent Secretary Ministry of Works, 14 Dec. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 22 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Independence Celebrations Officer, 31 Dec. 1956 and 8 Jan. 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97.

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formed.23 It took more than a month until the Ministry of Trade and Labour confirmed that Michelletti & Sons had indeed been commissioned to construct the pedestal. However, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Labour also insisted that ‘the responsibility for the statue lies with the Ministry of Works and the Public Works Department’.24 Minister Botsio finally clarified that he had ‘personally been in charge of directing the execution of the project’ in order ‘to avoid delay’. The statue project had not been ‘specifically assigned to any Ministry’, but now the Ministry of Works should officially take over – a proposal that was confirmed by the cabinet in mid-March 1957, after the frantic activities of the independence celebrations gradually subsided.25 After the issue of the overall responsibility for the statue project was settled further unresolved questions surfaced, among others the site of the monument. In August 1956, the Independence Celebrations Officer had only declared that the statue should not be placed on or near the ‘National Monument of Independence’ that was to be unveiled on the eve of independence.26 This imposing triumphal arc, crowned by the Black Star of African Freedom, was erected on Christiansborg road, ‘a perfectly adequate ceremonial drive’, linking the legislative assembly building (after independence: Parliament House) and Christiansborg (Osu) Castle, the residence of the British Governor (after independence: of the Ghanaian Prime Minister).27 Three alternative locations had been suggested for the Nkrumah statue: at the Old Polo Grounds across from Parliament House, at ‘the top of the drive to the State House’, or ‘at the triangle at Christiansborg Crossroads’.28 All three were highly symbolic sites: at the Old Polo Grounds, a colonial club once reserved for whites, Nkrumah was to declare Ghana’s independence; State House was the seat of the executive branch of government; and the Crossroads site reminded of the February 1948 shooting of protesting war veterans that had set off the political processes leading to independence. However, no definite decision where the statue should be placed had been taken, at least not to the knowledge of the Ministry of Works.

23 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Labour, 7 Feb. 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 24 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Labour, to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, 11 March 1957, PRAAD, 5/1/97. 25 Memorandum of the Minister of Trade and Labour on the Statue of the Prime Minister, no date (probably shortly before 12 March 1957), PRAAD, RG 5/1/97; Minutes of Cabinet Meeting on 12 March 1957, Item 7, PRAAD, ADM 13/1/26. 26 Independence Celebrations Officer, Prime Minister’s Office, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, 20 Aug. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 27 Draft Cabinet Memorandum by the Minister of Works, Independence Building Programme, Dec. 1955, PRAAD, RG 5/1/84. 28 Independence Celebrations Officer, Prime Minister’s Office, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, 20 Aug. 1956, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. I could not clarify whether the ‘State House’ was identical with the Castle into which Nkrumah moved after independence or with the government building that he occupied before 1957.

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In July 1957, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works noted that Minister Botsio had apparently decided to erect the statue at Post Office Square, in the midst of the congested central business district. Later, however, ‘doubts were expressed as to the suitability of the site’. The Secretary also observed that the ‘procedure laid down by the Cabinet for selecting sites for Government works’ had not been followed.29 Indeed, it was not even clear whether the proposed site was ‘Government land’, and none of the relevant authorities had been involved – the Accra Region Site Board, the Commissioner of Lands, and the Town Planning Adviser of the Ministry of Housing.30 Furthermore, there was confusion about whether the memorial fountain that the Liberian government had donated for Ghana’s independence was to be placed next to the monument or elsewhere.31 After a series of consultations, the cabinet decided against the post office site, ‘where traffic was heavy’ and ‘passers-by might be involved in motor accidents whilst viewing the statue’ and set up a committee to examine alternative sites.32 In August and September, the committee members inspected various locations, and finally concluded that the statue should be placed in front of Parliament House.33 A location at the Old Polo Grounds would have been ideal, the Minister of Works explained, since this would have allowed the statue to be surrounded by ‘a park, with terraces and ponds and an ornamental fountain’ which would ‘greatly improve this part of Accra, making it, indeed, of notable architectural and aesthetic appeal’. But unfortunately, the requisite funds were not available. With regard to the location at Parliament House, the cabinet members themselves were to decide whether the statue was to be erected in the centre of the pathway leading to the main gate or, as the committee preferred, on the lawn east of the pathway.34 The cabinet endorsed the committee’s suggestion. Although no explicit reasons for this decision were recorded, it is likely that cabinet members wanted to avoid potential accusations by the opposition that the Prime Minister, by having his statue placed symbolically in front of the main gate, wanted to set himself above parliamentary procedure (see below). Further issues, such as the inscriptions on the monument’s pedestal, awaited clarification. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works asked Cataudella for suggestions and advised that the Garibaldi monument in Rome might serve as 29 Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works to Minister of Works, 15 July 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 30 Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works, Ministry of Works Circular, 18 April 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 31 See, for instance, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Housing and others, 6 May 1957; and notes of a meeting on 22 May 1957, ‘on the Prime Minister’s Statue and the Independence Memorial Fountain’, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 32 Extract from the minutes of a meeting of cabinet held on 30 July 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 33 See Cabinet Committee for the Selection of a Site for the Erection of the Prime Minister’s Statue, notes of meetings on 12 Aug., 28 Aug. and 21 Sept. 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97. 34 Minister of Works, Cabinet Memorandum, no date (early Oct. 1957), PRAAD, RG 5/1/98; see also Permanent Secretary to Minister of Works, concerning the draft of the cabinet memorandum, 3 Oct. 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/97.

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a source of inspiration.35 Since the sculptor did not speak English, his friend Sergio Barbeski, the Liberian public works official, who was in Rome at the time, served as intermediary and informed his Ghanaian colleague that the Garibaldi monument carried only brief inscriptions: ‘Giuseppe Garibaldi’ on the front, ‘Il Governo Italiano’ on the right, ‘Roma o Morte’ on the left, and ‘XX septembre 1895’, the date of the monument’s dedication, at the rear. Barbeski suggested that in the case of Nkrumah’s statue, too, only the name should be placed on the front, with brief quotations from speeches, such as ‘Give us a freedom [sic] and we will do the rest’ on the sides.36 The Prime Minister’s Office did not quite follow this advice and decided on wordier inscriptions, celebrating Nkrumah as ‘Founder of the Nation’ and quoting two of his famous slogans as well as a few lines from the independence speech. The lettering was to be fabricated by Cataudella and ‘forwarded by air freight, as soon as possible’.37 Only a week before the statue was to be unveiled, however, the Prime Minister himself demanded a final correction of one of the inscriptions, and the Director of Public Works rushed to ask Cataudella to send the required additional lettering38 – which he apparently managed to do just in time. In February 1958, a press release about the monument was published, and invitations for the unveiling ceremony were sent out, among others to Cataudella and the Liberian ambassador, whom the Minister of Works thanked for his assistance in obtaining a statue that ‘will be acclaimed as a notable work of art and will be a source of pride to the citizens of Accra and the people of Ghana as a whole’.39 The protocol arrangements for the monument’s inauguration gave rise to another incident of bureaucratic miscommunication, when the Official Functions Officer at the Ministry of External Affairs finalised the programme before having consulted the chairman of the function, either Botsio or the Minister of Works, and, most importantly, the Chief Justice, Sir Arku Korsah, who was to unveil the statue.40 But last-minute adjustments were made, and on 5 March 1958, from four thirty to five o’clock in the afternoon, the ceremony took place as scheduled. The Chief Justice arrived at Parliament House, inspected a guard of honour formed by 35 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Nicola Cataudella, 27 Nov. 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/98. 36 Sergio Barbeski, Rome, to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, 26 Dec. 1957, PRAAD, RG 5/1/98. 37 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Sergio Barbeski, Rome, 8 Jan. 1958, PRAAD, RG 5/1/98. 38 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Director of Public Works, 26 Feb. 1958, PRAAD, RG 5/1/98. 39 Minister of Works to Ambassador of Liberia, 19 Feb. 1958, PRAAD, RG 5/1/98. 40 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Parliamentary Secretary and others, 31 Jan. 1958; Official Functions Officer, Ministry of External Relations, to Chief Justice, 27 Feb. 1958; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, to Official Functions Officer, 3 March 1958, PRAAD, RG 5/1/98. Interestingly, the original plan had been to let the British GovernorGeneral unveil the statue, but in February 1958 the cabinet decided that this should be done by the Chief Justice; minutes of a meeting of cabinet, 4 Feb. 1958, PRAAD, ADM 13/1/27.

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the Naval Volunteer Force from Takoradi, was greeted by Minister Botsio, and, after a brief address by the Minister of Works, unveiled the statue. At six o’clock, Prime Minister Nkrumah gave a broadcast talk. This was followed by bonfires at the Old Polo Grounds, opposite Parliament House, and by a torchlight procession of ‘voluntary and national organisations’, which proceeded from the Old Polo Grounds along Christiansborg Road to the National Monument of Independence, where the evening was concluded by a display of fireworks.41 Thus, although the personalised statue that commemorated Kwame Nkrumah’s leading role in the achievement of independence was not to be placed near the impersonal, triumphal, and overpowering Independence Monument, the ceremonial procession connected the two memorial sites, demonstrating the indivisibility of the nation from her founder, Kwame Nkrumah. PROTESTING THE PRIME MINISTER’S STATUE: FROM WRITTEN PROTESTS TO VANDALISM Quite unlike the considerably larger, gold-coloured sculpture of Nkrumah, majestically clad in an Ashanti kente cloth, that was later commissioned for the mausoleum, the original Nkrumah statue can be described as almost modest and of human dimensions.42 Nkrumah is dressed not in royal attire, but a worker’s or farmer’s smock. He stands, one foot forward with his right arm raised in greeting, the palm facing forward and his left hand holding a walking stick.

41 Ghana Independence Anniversary Celebrations, Official Programme, March 1958, PRAAD, ADM 14/6/90. Without having consulted the relevant documents, Hess, and subsequently Fuller, erroneously date the inauguration of the Nkrumah statue to 1956, i.e. even before independence; see Janet Hess, Imagining architecture. The structure of nationalism in Accra, Ghana, in: Africa Today 47/2 (2000), 35–58, 48; and also Fuller, Building, 126. 42 The characterisation of the statue as ‘monumental’ by Hess (Imagining, 35) or ‘giant’ by Fuller (Building, 126) is misleading. The museum at the Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park exhibits a revealing photograph taken in 1964 of the former boxing world champion Cassius Clay, admiring, as the inscription explains, ‘the statue of his heroe [sic], Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’; the photo shows that the statue’s pedestal barely reaches up to Clay’s chest, and the sculpture itself is only a little bigger than his admirer’s body. Other ‘uses’ to which the monument was put, for instance by delegates of the CPP women’s organisation, who placed garlands of roses around Nkrumah’s neck (Hess, Imagining, 48), also suggest that the statue was not that overwhelming.

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For the stance, Cataudella employed the contrapposto (‘counterpose’), a timehonoured convention in European sculpture which was first developed in classical Greek statues, to give the figure a dynamic and, at the same time relaxed, appearance. The Garibaldi monument on Janiculum hill in Rome, a huge equestrian statue, was consulted for the inscription but certainly did not serve as a model for the Nkrumah sculpture. Cataudella may have drawn some inspiration from the Augustus of Primaporta statue in the Vatican museum, which shows the Roman emperor making a similar gesture, raising the right hand in salute. Quite clearly, however, the pose that Cataudella chose for the statue reproduces the one that Nkrumah adopted when he declared, ‘Ghana, your beloved country is free forever.’

Figure 2: Nkrumah statue, sculptured by N. Cataudella in 1958, originally in front of Parliament House, in the National Museum, Accra since 1975. Photo: Carola Lentz, March 2014.

This moment was captured in a press photograph that rapidly developed into the icon of independence and has been reproduced innumerable times – on posters, calendars, and stamps. It is very likely that, contrary to his declarations that were supposed to reassure his clients, Cataudella produced the final model of the statue

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after March 1957 and had seen this image. That the statue was meant to immortalise the very moment of declaring independence was also borne out in the inscription on the rear of the pedestal that quoted Nkrumah’s independence speech: ‘To me the liberation of Ghana will be meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa’.43 Significantly, the protest against the monument never concerned the aesthetics of the statue, but rather the very fact that Nkrumah should be commemorated by such a lasting work of art. First critiques that Nkrumah’s portrait was to be placed on stamps, coins, and bills arose in late 1955 but gained momentum only in 1957, in the run-up to independence.44 In this context, the statue project, too, was heavily attacked as a sign of Nkrumah’s tendencies of ‘self-aggrandizement and dictatorial leanings’.45 Joe Appiah, for instance, a renowned Asante lawyer and opposition politician, was outraged that Nkrumah ‘wants his statue erected, so that all in the independent Gold Coast will swear by it as the Great Oath after he has seen to it that Chieftaincy ... has been uprooted’..46 Appiah alluded to the Asantehene Ntamkesie (‘Great Oath’), an oath sworn before a court of chiefs and introduced by a famous Ashanti king, as well as to Nkrumah’s critical stance towards Ghana’s traditional authorities, which many in the opposition condemned. Appiah also insinuated that Nkrumah’s statue ‘would suffer the same fate as “Joe Stalin’s statue in Hungary, where the people with an insatiable desire to free themselves from the thralldom [sic] of the Kremlin are today on the warpath”’.47 Editorials in oppositional Asante newspapers regularly abused Nkrumah with ethnic slurs, for instance, a ‘Nzima born with dictatorial tendencies’ or a ‘CPP tin god’ demanding ‘sycophantic adultation [sic] and idolatry’.48 Contesting government plans to replace the Queen’s portrait with Nkrumah’s head, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), the major opposition party, argued in a parliamentary debate in early 1957 that ‘in no country is the leader of the ruling party placed on the currency or a stamp’.49 The opposition gleefully reproduced a letter to London’s Daily Telegraph by a British Conservative Member of Parliament who attacked Nkrumah’s decision to change the Ghanaian currency and stamps as ‘gross abuse of political power’ ‘that must be unique in the annals of the British Commonwealth, of which the new State of Ghana aspires to

43 The other quotations were: on the right side of the pedestal, ‘We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquillity’, the slogan which the newly formed Convention People’s Party adopted in 1948; and on the left side ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto it’, another motto coined by Nkrumah in the run-up to independence. The front read ‘Kwame Nkrumah Founder of the Nation’. 44 See Fuller, Building, 48−53, 71−80. 45 Ibid., 128. 46 Liberator, 15 Jan. 1957, quoted in Fuller, Building, 128. 47 Fuller, Building, 128; quoting from Liberator, 15 Jan. 1957. 48 Liberator, 10 Aug. 1956; quoted in Hess/Quarcoopome, Spectacular Nation, 23. 49 Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 18 June 1957; https://news.google.com/newspapers?id= aX5AAAAAIBAJ&sjid=tKMMAAAAIBAJ&hl=de&pg=3197%2C6214080, [31.08.2016].

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be a member’.50 The scandal was not so much that a living statesman was honoured by a statue,51 but rather that Nkrumah was, in the British tradition, Prime Minister (an eminently political position, inextricably connected to membership in a political party) and not Head of State (an office regarded as representing the entire nation, removed from the daily trivia of political business). Until Ghana became a republic in 1960, its Head of State was the Queen, represented by the resident Governor, and in all countries that were members of the Commonwealth, the official paraphernalia were decorated with the Queen’s portrait. The only exception thus far was Ceylon (Sri Lanka), which had become independent in 1948 and had also printed commemorative stamps showing Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake as the new nation’s founding father. And it was indeed to Ceylon that Nkrumah pointed when justifying his government’s policy concerning Ghana’s new stamps and coins. Nkrumah defended his stance in an article that a British newspaper had invited him to write when he attended a Commonwealth conference in London in June 1957. Under the headline ‘Why the Queen’s head is coming off our coins’, he explained that he was neither ‘power-drunk with success’, nor becoming a ‘budding dictator’, nor planning ‘sedition against the Queen’. Rather, putting his portrait on stamps and coins, erecting the statue in front of Parliament, and moving into the Castle, the former seat of the British governor, was necessary ‘because many of my people cannot read or write’ and have to be ‘shown that they are now really independent. And they can only be shown by signs’.52 The opposition in Ghana, however, was convinced by neither these explanations nor by the CPP government’s politics and continued to accuse Nkrumah of dictatorial leanings. Some critics went beyond verbal and written protests and took to violent measures. Since the end of 1958, Nkrumah became an almost regular target of bomb attacks and other assassination attempts. One bomb attack that received worldwide publicity targeted not Nkrumah himself, but his statue in

50 Ashanti Pioneer, 18 Feb. 1957, quoted in Fuller, Building, 48−49. 51 Fuller (ibid., 12−13) argues that Third-World rulers and Eastern European dictators erected statues to themselves, while in ‘Western capitalist democracies’, only ‘powerful and long dead’ politicians, ‘with the exception of reigning monarchs’, would be commemorated in this way. However, this is not quite accurate. There are Western European national ‘founding fathers’ who were honoured by a plethora of statues erected during their lifetimes, Germany’s Bismarck being a particularly prominent example. On the other hand, there were monarchs such as the Prussian kings who expressly prohibited the erection of statues of living members of the royal family, while other European royals like Louis XIV, the emperor Napoleon, or the English kings authorised the circulation of their portraits during their reign. Similarly, not all dictators were as fond as Stalin of having their statues erected. For instance, there were virtually no statues of Hitler and very few of Lenin erected before his death. In short: the pattern of monumental commemoration does not obey any simple Third World vs. First World, or democracy vs. dictatorship dichotomy. For a brief overview, see Elisabeth von Hagenow, Bildniseinsatz, in: Uwe Fleckner et al (eds.), Handbuch der politischen Ikonographie. Vol. 1, München 2011, 170−178. 52 Daily Sketch, 20 June 1957, quoted in Fuller, Building, 76−7.

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front of Parliament as well as the Independence Monument. It happened on 5 November 1961, shortly before Queen Elizabeth II and her husband were to visit Ghana. Clearly, the persons behind the attack, ‘certain unpatriotic elements’, as the Minister of Constructions and Communications called them,53 aimed to prevent the royal visit and show the world that Ghanaians did not respect Nkrumah as a legitimate head of state. However, after a British inspection of the security situation gave the green light, the Queen’s eleven-day visit, with parades on the newly built Black Star Square, visits to many public institutions, garden parties, and a tour through various of Ghana’s regions, took place as scheduled.54 While the damage to the Independence Monument was minimal, the statue was affected more severely, with its feet having been blown off. After the grand ceremonial event was over, the Division of Public Construction, as the Public Works Department was now called, drew attention to the fact that the provisional repairs that had been undertaken for the Queen’s visit could not guarantee ‘the stability of the statue’ and that ‘the remoulded portions of the feet and ankles cannot be expected to stand up to the climate for very long’.55 A series of meetings between the responsible engineers and members of cabinet were held, and it was decided to invite Cataudella to Accra to inspect the damage and propose what should be done. In the course of these consultations the cabinet also adopted an ambitious plan to erect statues ‘of Osagyefo the President’ across the entire country56 – as if the bomb attack had made the government even more determined to make Nkrumah’s image an inescapable presence. A cabinet committee was set up which invited all regional commissioners and urban councils to forward suggestions of suitable sites for the new monuments, which they eagerly did. The Commissioner of the Eastern Region, for instance, proposed placing a statue not only in the regional capital but also in every bigger town or, better still, in each district, which would have amounted to as many as eighteen statues. The Commissioner of the Upper Region suggested six possible sites for his region, and the Accra City Council proposed twelve further statues for Accra, in addition to the one in front 53 Minister of Construction and Communications, Draft Cabinet Memorandum on Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s Statue, no date, probably early Dec. 1961, PRAAD, 5/1/99. The attack was immediately blamed on NLM activists because of nature of the explosives that were used; see Daily Graphic, 6 Nov. 1961, ‘Massive Police Hunt for Statue Bombers’. For an example of international reports, see Glasgow Herald, 6 Nov. 1961; https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2507&dat=19611106&id=Rd09AAAAIBAJ&sjid= LUgMAAAAIBAJ&pg=1630,7 65691&hl=de, [31.08.2016]. 54 For a short film on the damaged statue, and the replacement of the feet, as well as further preparations and security checks for the Queen’s visit, see the BBC news clip ‘Queen goes to Ghana: despite recent bombing the royal trip to Ghana goes ahead’, broadcast probably shortly before 9 November 1961, the date of the royal couple’s arrival in Accra; http://www.britishpathe.com/video/queen-goes-to-Ghana, [31.08.2016]. 55 District Architect East to Chief Architect, Division of Public Construction, Ministry of Construction and Communications, 13 Dec. 1961, PRAAD, RG 5/1/99. 56 Extract from the minutes of a meeting of the cabinet held on 26 Jan. 1962, PRAAD, RG 5/1/99.

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of Parliament House.57 Eventually, however, the cabinet decided to restrict the erection of additional statues at the regional headquarters ‘as well as important industrial and nationally significant centres’ and to put up only one new statue in Accra, in the area of Black Star Square.58 Cataudella went to Accra in January 1963, inspected the damaged statue, and advised that it was more effective and economical to replace it with a fresh cast from the original mould than to attempt further repairs. He would charge only £1,000 for the new cast – a pleasant surprise for the statue committee, which had expected much higher charges and now proposed that it would be best to order the additional statues for the regional headquarters as copies from the existing mould. Furthermore, the Italian sculptor willingly agreed to submit plans for the new statue for the Black Star Square, a work of art which should, according to the cabinet committee’s wishes, not only show Nkrumah’s effigy but also ‘portray the contribution of the masses in the struggle for the independence of Ghana’.59 A few months later, Cataudella informed the committee that the replacement for the original Nkrumah statue was nearly ready to be shipped to Ghana. He also sent sketches and photographs of models as well as cost estimates, ranging from £13,500 to £33,460, for the Black Star Square project for four alternative arrangements of a new bronze statue and relief with mass scenes. The committee favoured the most elaborate and costly proposal. The cabinet agreed but asked for an adjustment of an important artistic detail: the statue ‘should depict Osagyefo in a dynamic attitude pointing forward to the future, and not skywards as in the designs’, and the figures on the relief ‘should also look forward in the direction pointed by Osagyefo’.60 The ‘dynamic attitude’ of the new sculpture obviously so

57 Committee on the selection of sites for Osagyefo’s statues, minutes of first meeting, 12 Feb. 1962; Regional Commissioner Eastern Region to Minister of Construction and Communications, 15 Feb. 1962; Regional Commissioner Upper Region to Minister of Construction and Communications, 20 Feb. 1962; Town Clerk, Accra Municipal Council to Principal Secretary, to Ministry of Construction and Communications, 12 March 1962, PRAAD, RG 5/1/99. 58 Minister of Communications and Works, Memorandum on Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s statues, no date (probably early 1963), PRAAD, RG 5/1/99 (the relevant cabinet meeting took place 17 April 1962). 59 Secretary to the Cabinet to Permanent Secretary Ministry of Communications and Works, 8 Feb. 1963, PRAAD, RG 5/1/99. At some point, it was also considered to surround the President’s image by a ‘relief portraying typical scenes of Ghanaian life, some aspects of the principal activities of the people of Ghana (occupational and cultural), e.g. farming, fishing, national festival with dancing etc. etc.’ (L. K. Apaloo, Ministry of Communications and Works, to Secretary to the Cabinet, 12 Feb. 1963, PRAAD, RG 5/1/99). However, as a response from cabinet made clear, the relief should rather be related to the struggle for independence (Secretary to the Cabinet to Principal Secretary, Ministry of Communications and Works, 15 Feb. 1963, PRAAD, RG 5/1/99). 60 Excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of cabinet held on 23 July 1963, PRAAD, 5/1/99. For more details on the proposals and cost estimates, see Cataudella to Minister of Communications and Works, 9 June 1963; and Minister of Communications and Works, Draft Cabinet Memorandum on Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s statues, no date (probably July 1963),

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pleased cabinet members that they decided to have all statues for the regional headquarters also cast from that mould instead of from the one for the original statue at Parliament House. In October 1963, Cataudella informed the Minister of Communications and Works that he had started working on the new statue but was still waiting for a contract and a decision regarding his estimates. At the end of November 1963, the fresh cast of the bomb-damaged statue was reported to be on board the ‘Elmina Palm’ and was expected to arrive at the new Tema harbour very soon. 61 I could not find any records on the further course of events, but it is likely that the new cast indeed replaced, as planned, the original one in front of Parliament House. The statue was even immortalised on a five-cedi banknote issued in 1965. The expanded project with the additional monuments, however, was apparently a long time in coming. There was no further mention of the Black Star Square project and probably none, or only very few, of the statues intended for the regional headquarters were actually delivered.62 But the regime’s monumental ambitions must have continued until the very end. The cabinet committee enlisted the support of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, whose director proposed to expand the ‘national statues project’, creating not only Nkrumah effigies, but also ‘small statues of prominent citizens of this country and of Africa’.63 Cataudella was invited to become chief consultant for the entire project and organise a training programme for Ghanaian sculptors and artisans to be sent to Rome to learn about modern foundry techniques.64 In February 1966, before any of these plans materialised, however, the Nkrumah regime was overthrown. One of the first measures of the new military government was to ban all images of the former president from the public sphere. Newspaper reports suggested that an angry mob attacked and pulled down the statue in front of Parliament House, and a press photograph showed a group of children standing around the decapitated sculpture.65 In the autobiography that he wrote from his Guinean exile, however, Nkrumah insisted that the alleged sponta-

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PRAAD, 5/1/99. Unfortunately, I could not find copies of the sketches or photographs of models in the PRAAD files. Cataudella to Minister of Communications and Works, 5 Oct. 1963; Managing Director, Ghana National Construction Corporation, to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Communications and Works, 25 Nov. 1963, PRAAD 5/1/99. One statue was erected in front of the CPP offices in Kumasi, but it is not clear whether it had been made by Cataudella. The statue put up at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Winneba was created by the Polish sculptor Alina Slesinka in 1965. On these statues, see Fuller, Building, 126−127 and 130. Director of Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB) to Cataudella, 14 March 1963; GMMB Statues File No. 0244; quoted in Fuller, Building, 129. See ibid., 130−131, for references. Photo by Harry Dempster, Express, March 6, 1966, Getty Images; the photograph can be viewed on, for instance, http://ghanarising.blogspot.de/2010/05/ghanas-history-in-black-andwhite-from.html, [31.08.2016]; see also Fuller, Building, 155−7 for further references.

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neity of the effigy’s destruction was a propaganda ploy of the coup makers who wanted to convince the world of his regime’s unpopularity.66 Indeed, the large hole in the right leg of the headless statue, which now stands behind the Nkrumah mausoleum, suggests that explosives were used to bring the statue down, and experts to whom I spoke confirmed that it would be difficult to bring down, much less decapitate, a sturdy bronze statue without suitable tools.67 Be that as it may, the statue ‘disappeared’ from the public eye, but only for a little more than a decade.

Figure 3: Nkrumah statue, toppled during coup d’état, 1 March 1966. Information Services Department, Photographic Section (used with permission).

RESCUING THE ORIGINAL STATUE: NKRUMAH’S MEMORY UNDER THE ACHEAMPONG REGIME Nkrumah died on 27 April 1972 in Bucharest, and two weeks later was mourned in an impressive state funeral in Conakry that attracted thousands of friends, followers, and supporters from all over Africa. In Ghana, the anti-Nkrumahist government of Busia had been overthrown in January 1972 by another military coup 66 Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, New York 1968, 130 (quoted in Fuller, Building, 156). 67 Interviews with Dr. Don Arthur, 12 March 2014, Accra; and with Prof. Henry Wellington, 4 March 2014, Accra.

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led by Colonel I. K. Acheampong. The new Ghanaian government sent a small delegation to Nkrumah’s funeral and eventually agreed to the Guinean president’s entreaty to bury Nkrumah in Ghana. In July 1972, Nkrumah was thus given a second state funeral in Accra, before being buried in his hometown Nkroful, an arrangement that, according to June Milne, ‘suited the Acheampong government as well as successive regimes which felt threatened by a revival of Nkrumahism’.68 According to retrospective accounts of the history of the Nkrumah mausoleum, it was the steadfastly Nkrumahist African Students Union in London which first brought up the idea of re-erecting the destroyed statue. As Dr. Don Arthur, who was later to become the mausoleum’s architect, explained: he met the African Students Union’s leaders while he was on a visit to London, and they jointly drafted a petition to President Sekou Touré in Guinea to release the mortal remains of Nkrumah only if the Ghanaian military government promised to denounce the coup against the former president and to rehabilitate his statue.69 Don Arthur further recalled that in the mid-1970s, after he had returned to Ghana upon completing his doctorate in Moscow, President Acheampong contacted him in order to discuss the possibility of creating a mausoleum for Nkrumah on the Old Polo Grounds, where the ex-president had declared independence. The project was to be completed for Ghana’s silver jubilee independence anniversary. Actually, the Military Council not only contacted Dr. Arthur but appointed a ten-member committee, headed by the former CPP minister Archie Casely-Hayford, which was to recommend appropriate measures ‘to honour the memory of the late Dr. Nkrumah, Ghana’s First President and the torchbearer of Africa’s freedom and unity’.70 The committee proposed, among other measures, the construction of a new monument, and a new bronze statue was indeed commissioned and produced in Italy, arriving at Takoradi harbour in November 1976.71 However, the statue was not immediately erected, and before any further steps with regard to the mausoleum project could be taken, Acheampong himself was toppled in a military coup by Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings. In addition, the continued economic crisis militated against any large-scale investment in monuments. One gesture of ‘symbolic resurrection’ of the original Nkrumah statue, however, was realised under the Acheampong regime, as Harcourt Fuller reconstructs from newspaper reports and records of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board.72 In June 1975, the Commissioner of Police, J. E. Tibiru, informed the Director of the Museums and Monuments Board that the ex-President’s statue, removed in the wake of the 1966 coup, had been placed on the backyard lawn of 68 June Milne, Kwame Nkrumah. A Biography, London 2006, 266; quoted in Fuller, Building, 169. 69 Interview with Dr. Don Arthur, 12 March 2014; see also Mike Summerton, Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park, in: On Site Review: Archives and Museums, 20 (2008), 16−19; and ‘Reliving Accra: Old Polo Grounds − Now Nkrumah Mausoleum’, Daily Graphic, 11 July 2013. 70 ‘Nkrumah Statue Sent to Museum’, Ghanaian Times, 19 Sept. 1975. 71 ‘Nkrumah’s statue in’, Daily Graphic, 19 Nov. 1976. 72 Fuller, Building, 169−173.

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the central police station in Accra. He advised that the board may want to arrange to transfer it to the National Museum for preservation. As the board’s chief engineer later explained, not only one but two damaged statues had been kept at the police barracks and were now, in September 1975, transported to the National Museum.73 According to the Custodian Superintendent of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, one of the statues had stood in front of Parliament House and the second one at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Winneba.74 However, it is possible that he erred, since both statues – the armless one still at the National Museum, and the headless one later transferred to Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park – seem to have been cast from the same mould, while the Winneba statue had not been produced by Cataudella, but by Alina Slesinka. My own hypothesis is that the armless statue may have been the one damaged in the 1961 bomb attack and, perhaps, first kept at the Public Works Department and then further damaged and transported to police barracks in 1966, while the headless one was probably its replacement, mounted at Parliament House in 1963 and then toppled in 1966. This would explain why both monuments can legitimately claim to be ‘the original statue ... which stood in front of Parliament House’, as their inscriptions read. Be that as it may, towards the mid-1970s, the political environment had obviously changed considerably, making it possible to consider commemorating the late president in public. As Fuller observes, there was even a certain competition between government plans to erect a new Nkrumah monument at the Old Polo Grounds and the National Museum’s project to exhibit the rescued original statues. However, the government project was not pursued further until the early 1990s, while the museum managed to realise its plans much earlier. In the context of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Week in March 1977, organised on the occasion of Ghana’s twentieth anniversary of independence, one of the statues, the armless one, was erected and ceremonially inaugurated in the museum’s garden. This is where it still stands today, on a renewed pedestal, but with the initial plaque: ‘The original statue of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah which stood in front of Parliament House, Accra, attacked by a mob in the wake of a military and police coup d’état on 24th February, 1966, recovered for the National Museum in 1975, mounted by the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, and unveiled on Thursday, March 3, 1977, by Mr. E. Owusu Fordwor, Commissioner for Education and Culture’.75 The headless statue, on the other hand, was apparently put inside the museum76 until it was finally re-erected behind the Nkrumah mausoleum in 2007. 73 Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Memorandum 0739/16, ‘Mounting of Nkrumah’s Statue’, 28 Feb. 1977; quoted in Fuller, Building, 170. 74 ‘Nkrumah Statue Sent to Museum’, Ghanaian Times, 19 Sept. 1975; see also the caption of the photo of the headless statue reproduced in Fuller, Building, 110−111, Plate 8.3.; if the headless statue is indeed the Winneba monument, the current inscription at Memorial Park is wrong. 75 Ironically, a statue of Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Kotoka, who had participated in the 1966 coup against Nkrumah and in 1967 was killed in a Nkrumahist counter coup attempt at

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Since the statue was exhibited in a museum, as the then Acting Director of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board explained, it was important to present it with all its historical scars, ‘as it was when it was retrieved from the Central Police Station in Accra’, without ‘any repairs [that] will make it lose its historical importance’.77 Staunch admirers of Nkrumah, however, took this attitude as an intolerable attack on Ghana’s first president and requested that the statue be fully restored. Professor R. B. Nunoo, the Director of the Museums and Monuments Board, responded to such critiques tactfully, conceding that some restoration would be carried out, but also maintaining that it was crucial to ‘uphold the historical facts relating to the statue’.78 However, this may not have been as politically innocent as Nunoo wanted his critics to believe. Fuller argues that the director was probably rather critical of Nkrumah’s regime and that this ‘may have contributed to the decision ... to leave the statue in its macerated state to serve as proof of the fall of Nkrumah’.79 A similar controversy, with one side arguing that commemorative installations have the duty to document history, while the other side believes that this is only a pretext for debasing Nkrumah’s political heritage, was to break out in 2007 and 2009 with regard to the Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park. RESURRECTING THE STATUE(S): THE KWAME NKRUMAH MEMORIAL PARK AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE ‘MONUMENT WARS’ The Nkrumah memorial project at the Old Polo Grounds was finally realised in the early 1990s under the Rawlings regime and was financed by the Chinese government with a subsidy of twenty million US dollars and based on an architectural design by Don Arthur. Its heart is the mausoleum, surrounded by water basins, with fountains and figures of Asante mmenson (elephant horn) blowers that traditionally accompany royal processions, and standing in a landscaped park that is greened by commemorative trees planted by important international visitors. The mausoleum is complemented by a small museum and decorated with an Egyptianstyle frieze that exhibits memorabilia of Nkrumah, such as the famous smock in which he declared independence, his desk at Flagstaff House, and numerous photographs. The mausoleum itself, made of Italian marble, evokes a gigantic tree

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Accra’s international airport, was placed behind the Nkrumah statue in the museum garden. After Kotoka’s death, the military government renamed the airport Kotoka International Airport, and erected a statue right where their colleague had been killed. In the course of the airport’s modernisation in 2000, the statue was removed and kept at the museum from where it was never returned, as originally planned, to the airport (see Fuller, Building, 164−165). According to Janet Hess, who visited the National Museum in 1995; see Hess/Quarcoopome, Spectacular Nation, 19 (explanation in caption of photograph of the armless statue). ‘Nkrumah’s Statue to be on Show’, Ghanaian Times, 5 Jan. 1977. Nunoo to Ghana Broadcasting Company, 5 Aug. 1980, Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Statues File No. 0244; quoted in Fuller, Building, 172. Ibid., 173.

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stump but also draws on the imagery of Egyptian pyramids, the Taj Mahal, and the Eiffel Tower. It is an ‘eclectical synthesis’, as the architect explained, that uses an ‘African vocabulary’, while its ‘language is universal’.80

Figure 4: Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park, the mausoleum. Photo: Carola Lentz, March 2014.

The architecture of the whole ensemble celebrates Nkrumah as a kind of chief, an allusion that is continued by the bronze statue erected in front of the mausoleum which shows Nkrumah clad in royal kente cloth, pointing forward, as if symbolising the CPP slogan, ‘We face neither East nor West, we face forward. Forward ever, backward never.’ The pose very much resembles the ‘dynamic attitude’ of the sculpture which Cataudella had proposed for the Black Star Square monument. Dr. Arthur claimed that it was indeed one of the sculptures cast by Cataudella in the 1960s, which had been shipped to Ghana and stored in a warehouse, where faithful Nkrumah followers salvaged it from the iconoclastic attacks in the wake of the 1966 coup. There is no evidence to support this assertion, but it is likely that the statue was produced according to Cataudella’s earlier designs or even in his workshop. It could be the one commissioned by the Acheampong government and shipped to Takoradi in 1976. In any case, as Dr. Arthur asserted, the statue was ‘found’, polished, and varnished and integrated into the mausoleum complex. Since then, this portrait of a triumphant and energetic Nkrumah has been reproduced over and over again on postcards, posters, calendars, T-shirts, and coffee mugs as well as on thousands of photographs which Ghanaians and foreign visitors shoot in front of the monument. 80 Interview with Dr. Don Arthur, 12 March 2014, Accra.

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Figure 5: Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park, Nkrumah statue, probably designed in 1963, cast in 1976, mounted in 1992. Photo: Carola Lentz, March 2014.

Figure 6: Example of memorabilia using the image of the ‘new’ Nkrumah statue Post card, Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park shop. Photo: Carola Lentz, March 2014.

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It has become the new icon of the national hero and of Ghana’s independence. It seems as if, with the increasing temporal distance from the original events, this much larger statesmanlike statue has eventually supplanted, in the public imagination, the more modest populist statue of 1958, despite the fact that the new statue was erected on the very spot where Nkrumah declared independence, a moment and posture that was immortalised by the older sculpture. Nkrumah’s reburial and the inauguration of Memorial Park were celebrated, befittingly, twenty years after Nkrumah’s death, on 1 July 1992, Republic Day, which commemorates Ghana’s transformation into a republic in 1960. Ghana continued to be a member of the British Commonwealth, but the transition converted the prime minister into an executive president and replaced the Governor-General, the Queen’s representative, with Nkrumah as head of state. This may be one of the reasons why, under the Nkrumah regime, Republic Day became a more important celebration than Independence Day. The 1992 reburial celebration incorporated elements of both chieftain funeral ritual and state protocol with its military ceremonial. The chief state linguist poured a traditional libation, and the Asante royal fontomfrom drums were beaten and mmenson horns blown. The casket, draped in the national colours, was driven on a gun carriage by a group of marines; military fanfares were sounded and the national anthem sung. The inauguration also marked the transition between the leftist military government under the ‘Leader of the Revolution’, as Jerry Rawlings, Chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council, was then still called, and the subsequent civilian regime with a multiparty democracy whose new constitution was ratified in a May referendum. Ghana’s guest of honour for the occasion was President Sam Nujoma of Namibia, which had just won its independence after a long war. He praised Nkrumah as the champion of ‘the struggle for the liberation of the African peoples’ and urged the ‘present generation’ to complete his ‘unfinished work ... building the economic and political might of Africa’. Rawlings, too, emphasised the revolutionary ‘battle’ that Nkrumah had fought ‘to restore the historical destiny of the continent’ and commended Nkrumah’s capacity ‘to rouse the people into action to transform their condition’. Dr. Francis Nkrumah, by contrast, was much less combative and pleaded with Ghanaians to regard his father’s re-interment ‘as a forum of reconciliation’. He asked ‘those who harbour any ill-feelings against the late President because he might have wronged them to forgive him’, and assured them that his father’s spirit, in turn, ‘bears no one any grudge’. The Graphic’s editorial underscored this appeal, asking ‘that we all have to forget about the past, forgive one another, tolerate ourselves and live as a nation’.81 This was actually the first time since his overthrow that Nkrumah was publicly commemorated with such splendour. Shortly after the ceremony, the 1966 decree that had banned all things Nkrumah from the public sphere was finally re-

81 All quotations from reports in People’s Daily Graphic, 13 June 1992; for brief descriptions of the ceremony, see also Fuller, Building, 176−7, and Hess/Quarcoopome, Spectacular Nation, 25.

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pealed. Official statements reminded Ghanaians that it was necessary to no longer ‘obliterate the greatness of our leaders as we only do so at the peril of distorting our history and our reality’, as the Graphic’s editorial summarised,82 even calling Nkrumah by his long-suppressed ‘praise name’ Osagyefo. Rawlings’ opponents, both among those who regarded themselves as the true Nkrumahists and among the heirs of the Nkrumah opposition, interpreted the mausoleum and reburial project as an astute, but problematic strategy for tapping into the growing nostalgia for the Nkrumah regime, and Rawlings’ ‘glowing tribute to the late President’83 was regarded as part of his campaign for the upcoming presidential elections. Many speculated as to ‘whether it was opportunism, from strength, or from weakness that the NDC [National Democratic Congress, Rawlings’ newly founded party] regime had decided to respond to Nkrumahist pressures from Ghanaians and from PanAfricanists [sic] to accord Nkrumah the long overdue recognition of his greatness’.84 Such criticism notwithstanding, the reburial of Nkrumah, inauguration of the memorial park, and erection of the statue conferred on Nkrumah an incontestable place in the dominant national narrative. Intense controversies surrounding his regime and political legacy continued, but even when the NPP (New Patriotic Party), a party that regards itself as legitimate successor of the Nkrumah opposition, won the elections in 2000, the new government, unlike the 1966 coup makers, no longer attempted to raze the Nkrumah monuments. However, the NPP government found other ways to leave a lasting imprint on Ghana’s commemorative landscape, which can be interpreted as an attempt to correct, or at least complement, a Nkrumah-centred nationalist narrative. In the course of preparing for the golden jubilee celebration of Ghana’s independence in 2007, the Kufuor administration created a series of monuments that commemorate United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) politicians who had later become opponents of and were persecuted by Nkrumah. Most prominently, J. B. Danquah, an opposition leader who died in prison in 1965, was honoured by a renovated, and more elevated, sculpture at a lively traffic roundabout85; a new statue was erected for the cofounder of the UGCC, Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey, who had also died in prison86; and, at a circle near the international airport, bronze-coloured busts of the

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‘Comment: They Live’, People’s Daily Graphic, 13 June 1992. ‘Rawlings Urges All to Continue Nkrumah’s Battle’, People’s Daily Graphic, 13 June 1992. Milne, Kwame Nkrumah, 270; quoted in Fuller, Building, 179. Plans to erect a statue in Danquah’s honour date back to the Busia government (1969−1972), but the first monument was erected under Rawlings in the 1990s; see Fuller, Building, 178−180. However, this statue was deliberately placed low because Rawlings ‘did not want this man … for all the bad things that he did … to be exalted so high’, as the responsible architect Dr. Don Arthur explained (interview on 12 March 2014). 86 Significantly, this statue stands in the same pose, with the right hand lifted in greeting, as the original Nkrumah statue; for photographs of this and other new statues erected by the NPP, see http://africanurbanism.net/nationalism-iconography-history-big-six-monuments [31.08.2016].

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‘Big Six’, the six UGCC leaders who had been imprisoned in 1948 by the colonial government, were inaugurated. Further sculptures were constructed in honour of Busia and Akuffo-Addo. In short, ‘the Kufuor group decided that they were also going to build monuments to celebrate their heroes’, as the architect and former mayor of Accra, Nat Nuno-Amarteifio explained.87 This proliferation of historical monuments can be read as an attempt to neutralise the commemoration of Nkrumah by commemorating others instead of by eliminating Nkrumah’s own statues. Increasing the number of national heroes was also the aim of NPP attempts to turn Founder’s Day, celebrated on 21 September in honour of Nkrumah’s birthday and declared a national holiday by the NDC government in 2009, into Founders’ Day, honouring all of the important UGCC politicians who, in the eyes of the heirs of the Danquah-Busia tradition, had contributed significantly towards independence.88

Figure 7: Nkrumah statue, sculptured by N. Cataudella in 1958, originally in front of Parliament House, in the National Museum after 1975, mounted in Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park 2007. Photo: Carola Lentz, March 2014.

87 Interview on 3 March 2014, Accra. 88 Generally on controversies surrounding the Ghana@50 celebrations, see Carola Lentz, Ghana@50: Celebrating the nation, debating the nation, in: Cahiers d’Études Africaines 211 (2013), 519−546. For the Founder’s versus Founders’ Day controversy that broke out on the occasion of the centenary celebrations of Nkrumah’s birthday in 2009, see, for instance, the Ghanaian Journal, ‘NPP to crash Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s Founder’s Day Initiative’, 22 Feb. 2009, https://www.modernghana.com/news/203528/npp-to-crash-dr-kwame-nkrumahfounders-day-initiative.html, [31.08.2016]; and Gabby Asare Otchere-Darko, ‘Founders’ Day should be August 4’, 26 Feb. 2009; http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage /features/artikel.php? ID=158179, [31.08.2016]. See also ‘Nkrumah’s birthday declared a holiday’, Daily Graphic, 4 Sep. 2009.

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A more direct intervention in the commemoration of Nkrumah was the NPP government’s support for plans of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board to transfer the original 1958 Nkrumah statue from the National Museum to Memorial Park and erect it behind the mausoleum, close to the museum. This statue, showing Nkrumah without his head and left arm, was inaugurated in June 2007, in the course of the ‘Heroes of Ghana Month’, as the organising secretariat of the Ghana@50 celebrations had designated it.89 In May, the Bank of Ghana presented new bank notes with portraits of the ‘Big Six’; the June programme opened with a special biopic on the ‘Big Six’ and the unveiling of their busts, which were to be mounted on the airport traffic roundabout. Furthermore, a presidential gala dinner was held to honour ‘distinguished statesmen and citizens of the land who have given selfless and meritorious service to the nation’. The museum at Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park launched a multimedia and photographic exhibition ‘of the 50 heroes of 50 years of Ghana’.90 The original Nkrumah statue was unveiled just before the interment of the body of Madam Fathia Nkrumah, the first president’s Egyptian wife, in the mausoleum. Fathia Nkrumah died in May 2007 in Cairo, but her wish was to be buried next to her husband, and the Kufuor government, ‘regarded by some as the traditional rival of the Nkrumahist socialist ideology’, agreed to organise a state funeral for her, as her son, Dr. Gamel Nkrumah, gratefully acknowledged in his tribute.91 The newly erected headless statue was not explicitly mentioned by the newspaper reports on Fathia Nkrumah’s burial, but it must have caught the attention of those attending the ceremony. Unlike the statue that remains at the National Museum, the inscription on the pedestal uses the epithet Osagyefo and makes an even more explicit claim to authenticity: Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (1909−1972). The original statue of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah which stood in front of Parliament House opposite Old Polo Grounds, Accra, attacked by a mob, vandalised as it stands now in the wake of a military with police coup d’état on 24th February, 1966, recovered for the National Museum in 1975. This is on loan to KNMP [Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park] from Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, mounted on 11th June 2007.

89 For more information on the programme, see Lentz, Ghana@50; unfortunately, the Ghana Government Ghana@50 website that listed all monthly themes and events is no longer accessible. The report by the chief executive of the secretariat, Charles Wereko-Brobby of all activities, of The Ghana@50 Celebrations, Accra, October 2009 circulates in a few copies (of which I hold one) but is not publicly available. 90 Wereko-Brobby, Ghana@50, 23−24. 91 ‘Fathia’s Wish Is Sealed’, Daily Graphic, 13 June 2007. Interestingly, while Nkrumah’s marble sarcophagus in the mausoleum only carries the inscription ‘Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, 1909−1972’, the inscription for his wife is more elaborate: Dr. Francis Nkrumah had engraved ‘Beloved wife of a great man, she faced adversity with courage’, alluding to the harassment that she, too, suffered after the 1966 coup, while Fathia’s son Gamal put the line ‘Our mother, the spirit of Pan-Africanism’.

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Opinions on the placement of this statue next to the mausoleum have been mixed. Nat Nuno-Amarteifio, like many others to whom I spoke, felt that this was ‘very clever’ and in keeping with new, internationally accepted forms of commemorating a contested past. Nkrumahists like Don Arthur, on the other hand, were adamant that it was ‘morally wrong’ and amounted to ‘insisting on what we did wrong’, that is, continuing the destruction of the original statue. While it was in order to keep the destroyed statue in the museum, ‘in the heritage of our history’, inserting it into the celebratory context of Memorial Park undermined the commemorative intentions of the new bronze sculpture in front of the mausoleum.92 Dr. Arthur was even more appalled when, two years later, in honour of Nkrumah’s hundredth birthday, the rediscovered bronze head was mounted next to the headless statue, on an extra pedestal decorated with bronze reliefs of crossed state swords and Asante adinkra, the symbols for peace and mortality.

Figure 8: Original head of Nkrumah statue (1958), mounted in Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park 2009. Photo: Carola Lentz, March 2014.

92 Interviews with Nat Nuno-Amarteifio, 3 March 2014, and Dr. Don Arthur, 12 March 2014.

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The inscription explains that this is the original head of the statue that was ‘recovered and presented by a patriotic citizen to the Information Services Department which in turn released it to the Park on May 28, 2009. Mounted on the Park on Sept. 1, 2009’.93 For Dr. Arthur, this amounted to a second decapitation of the statue, and, according to newspaper reports, he even went to the park personally and used his authority as presidential staffer to stop the workers from mounting the head.94 This time, however, the documentary project was not initiated by an anti-Nkrumahist regime, but by the director of Memorial Park, who operated under the NDC government that had been voted into power in 2008. Still, Dr. Arthur felt that exhibiting the decapitated head, rather than mounting it on the mutilated body, was a political statement that supported the cause of Nkrumah’s detractors. For him and other Nkrumahists, the deconstructivist documentation of the statue’s fate was, like the attempt to reconfigure Founder’s day as Founders’ Day, ‘a matter of trying to falsify history, forcing yourself onto the history’. In sum then, as a newspaper report on the new national holiday put it, ‘Nkrumah’s celebration renews age-old debate’, between the two political traditions of the country that have opposed, and sometimes relentlessly persecuted, each other since the late 1940s.95 And as long as the political competitors boost their ambitions with rival understandings of the past, the ‘monument wars’ will continue. CONCLUSION At the time of writing, the inauguration in Addis Ababa in January 2012 of the huge bronze copy of the original sculpture, in the presence of Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama and, among others, Dr. Don Arthur, has been the hitherto last chapter in the history of the Nkrumah statue. In 2013, President Mahama announced that a replica of the Addis Ababa statue would be mounted at the renovated Kwame Nkrumah Circle in Accra, in order to ‘further incise the memory of Nkrumah which the centenary had helped “to put Nkrumah in his proper perspective”’.96 By mid-2015, however, the construction of a three-tier interchange at 93 According to the director of Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park, the head had been kept secretly by ‘somebody’ as a ‘personal trophy’, and released to the Information Services Department on occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Ghana’s independence in 1997. See ‘Nkrumah’s Head found; arm still missing’; 2 June 2009, http://www.modernghana.com/news/219607/1 /nkrumahs-head-found-arm-still-missing.html, [31.08.2016]. See also ‘Nkrumah’s head and arm wanted’, 26 May 2009; http://www.modernghana.com/news/ 218301/1/nkrumahs-headand-arm-wanted.html, [31.08.2016]. 94 ‘Mill’s Man Goes on Rampage’, Daily Searchlight, 7 Feb. 2010; http://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=176315, [31.08.2016]. From this report, it appears that the head was actually not mounted in September 2009, as the inscription claims, but a few months later. 95 ‘Nkrumah’s celebration renews age-old debate’, Daily Graphic, 21 Sep. 2009. 96 ‘Gov’t to Mount Giant Nkrumah Statue at Nkrumah Circle − Prez Mahama’, 19 Feb. 2013; http://m.peacefmonline.com/pages/politics/politics/201302/156715.php, [31.08.2016].

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Kwame Nkrumah Circle has not yet been completed, and there has been no further mention of the new statue project. Meanwhile, the gleaming gold statue with the ‘dynamic attitude’, which stands at the mausoleum, continues to be the site of the annual re-enactment by members of the Actors’ Guild of the declaration of independence on the eve of 6 March, a very popular event to which hundreds of people flock in Memorial Park.

Figure 9: Reenactment of the declaration of independence in front of the Nkrumah statue, Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park, 5 March 2014. Photo: Carola Lentz, March 2014.

Many state visitors are taken to the mausoleum; schoolchildren from all over the country visit the park with its museum; and tourists come from far and wide to view the memorial installations in Accra. The ‘monument wars’ will certainly continue, but, as I have shown, the issues at stake and the measures which opponents take to make their commemorative claims have changed considerably over the past six decades. The statue(s) at Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park have become a lasting memory. New political changes are not likely to result in further destruction but rather in more subtle forms of annexation, amplification, re-inscription, or modifications of the existing monuments in order to transform their meaning so as to respond to changing contemporary agendas. The Nkrumah statues and the national hero that they com-

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memorate97 have become a ‘lieu de mémoire’, a site of memory, to use Nora’s term,98 in which memory of historical events crystallises and on which remembrance can focus. The statues have attracted controversial interpretations and become sites of debate that host a ‘maximum of meanings in a minimum of signs’.99 They have become symbols for conflicting readings of the past and different projects for Ghana’s future – ranging from admonitions that the country’s democracy must be protected from dictatorial tendencies like those that Nkrumah developed, to celebrations of Ghana’s progress and the necessity to ‘look forward’, embodied in Nkrumah’s gesture with his arm stretched out. The history of the Nkrumah statue(s) clearly shows that, although monuments are apparently built for eternity, they remain vulnerable and are open to continuous redefinition and reapropriation.

97 For an interesting study of a similar continuous reinterpretation and recent positive revaluation of a ‘national hero’, see the case study on Julius Nyerere by Marie-Aude Fouéré, Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa, and political morality in contemporary Tanzania, in: African Studies Review 57/1 (2014), 1−24. 98 Pierre Nora, Between memory and history: les lieux de mémoire, in: Representations 26 (1989), 7−25. 99 Anne Rigney, Plenitude, scarcity and the circulation of cultural memory, in: Journal of European Studies 35/1 (2005), 18.

ATOMIC AFRICA Modernisation, Technological Nationalism and ‘Scientific Standstill’ in Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana & Beyond, 1957–Present Harcourt Fuller Abstract: In order for post-colonial nation-states in Africa to have real independence and economic prosperity, Ghana’s first prime minister and president Dr Kwame Nkrumah reasoned, countries like Ghana needed a technological and scientific Great Leap Forward to develop their own societies and escape the grips of Western neocolonialism. This modernity could be rapidly achieved only through advanced research and education in technology and the sciences as well as the training of a skilled labour force. To these ends, the ruling Convention People’s Party (CPP) founded the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) in Kumasi and later began work on the Ghana National Science Museum (GNSM). The latter would display and promote exhibits on Ghana’s natural resources, such as its rivers, which could be tapped to generate hydro-electric power. The GNSM also showcased the nation’s technological achievements and ambitions, which included plans to build a Sovietbacked atomic power-generating station in a proposed Science City. In addition to archival documents and secondary sources, this paper incorporates alternative historical evidence. This includes museological material, as well as iconographical information depicted on Ghana’s postage stamps, which showcased Nkrumah’s modernisation and industrialisation projects in industries such as transport, electricity generation and telecommunications. Fifty years after Nkrumah’s ouster from power, his dreams of Ghana becoming a technological and scientific powerhouse in Africa still remain unfulfilled.

INTRODUCTION ‘Under these Plans the foundations were to be laid for the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana. A skilled labour force was to be trained and an adequate complement of public service built up such as transport, electricity, water and telecommunications.’ 1

In the post-World War II post-colonial world, new nation-states in Asia and Africa saw the embracement of science and technology as a way to rapidly industrialise and therefore modernise their nation-states – with the ultimate goal of achieving economic development and real political sovereignty. As Cerulo notes, scholars refer to the process of ‘political modernization’ as an important phase in the unification and homogenisation of nations, which is also a pertinent precursor to economic development. She states, ‘In modernizing nations, leaders must con-

1

Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, New York 1968 (new ed., New York, 1969), 76.

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vince a heterogeneous citizenry that they are now a part of a larger, more cohesive unit – one that transcends old tribal, group, or regional loyalties.’2 Ghana achieved its independence from Britain on 6 March 1957. Its first prime minister and president, Kwame Nkrumah, was determined to utilise science and technology to achieve rapid industrialisation and economic growth to advance the standard of living of the Ghanaian nation-state. In the 1960s, Nkrumah embarked on an ambitious plan to rapidly modernise Ghana, even proceeding with Soviet-backed plans to build a nuclear reactor as part of Ghana’s energygeneration strategy. In addition to the usual ways of selling government schemes to the people, such as using the state-controlled media of radio, newspapers, informational film screenings and travelling exhibitions, Nkrumah found alternative ways to market and promote these modernisation dreams to the Ghanaian populace. Following the European and North American examples, he saw the establishment of a national science museum, as well as the tried and proven use of postage stamps as miniature billboards, as ways in which to popularise science and technology in Ghana. One of the dominant themes on European postage stamps and currency, particularly in Britain, France and Germany, has been the portrayal of prominent scientists.3 As Child asserts, ‘Postal themes stressing industrialisation and modernisation can also carry a message of the economic pride a country has in its status as an emerging developed country.’4 THE GHANA NATIONAL SCIENCE MUSEUM Political independence was also a technological turning point in the history of the Ghanaian nation-state. For example, prior to independence, Ghanaian blacksmiths manufactured basic farm tools such as hoes and cutlasses for farmers to cultivate their crops. In the immediate post-independence era, Ghanaian engineers embarked on an ambitious programme to cultivate indigenous scientific and technological innovations. However, these efforts needed to be promoted nationally. Since ‘classical’ museums such as the National Museum were generally dedicated to exhibiting the ancient history and culture of the nation-state,5 other kinds of 2 3

4 5

Karen A. Cerulo, ‘Symbols and the World System. National Anthems and Flags’, Sociological Forum 8/2 (1993), 243–271, 249. See Robert A. Jones, Heroes of the Nation? The Celebration of Scientists on the Postage Stamps of Great Britain, France and West Germany, Journal of Contemporary History 36/3 (2001), 403–422; Robert A. Jones, Science in National Cultures. The Message of Postage Stamps, Public Understanding of Science (2004), 75–81; and Aileen Fyfe, ‘Our Obsession With Scientists on Bank Notes is Wearing Thin,’ The Conversation, 12 February 2016, https://theconversation.com/our-obsession-with-scientists-on-bank-notes-is-wearing-thin54619, [31.08.2016]. Jack Child, The Politics and Semiotics of the Smallest Icons of Popular Culture. Latin American Postage Stamps, Latin American Research Review 40/1 (2005), 108–137, 123. See Harcourt Fuller, Building the Ghanaian Nation-State: Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism, New York 2014, Chapter 5, ‘Exhibiting the Nation’.

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museums were needed to emphasise the scientific past, present, and future direction of the country. This need for a modern perspective of the nation-state was especially pertinent given the rapid pace of industrialisation and scientific innovations that characterised the developing world of the twentieth century. Just as Nkrumah acknowledged the importance of material culture to fomenting national and Pan-African unity (by establishing a National Museum), he also thought that Ghana could join the family of advanced nation-states by embracing science and technology. To this end, the Nkrumah government established a variety of science-related museums in the 1960s. These included the Geology Museum, a national research museum based in the Department of Geology at the University of Ghana in1964, which exhibited a collection of fossils, minerals, and rocks found in Ghana and other countries. The Convention People’s Party (CPP) also constructed the Museum of Ethnography, which displayed ethnographic and archaeological items, as part of the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana, also in 1964.6 Kwame Nkrumah also collaborated with British experts to construct the Ghana National Science Museum (GNSM), which opened its doors to the public in late 1965 with an exhibition on electrical power in Ghana which coincided with the inauguration of the Volta River Hydroelectric Plant. The president intended for the GNSM to be an inspiration to Ghanaian youths to become interested in pursuing studies in science and technology (particularly agricultural, medical and engineering sciences) and for the general public to appreciate the importance of these fields to Ghana’s past, present, and future. The museum therefore housed objects – such as the first Firestone rubber tyre produced, the first car driven, and the Ghanaian-manufactured vehicles ‘Boafo’ and ‘Adom’ – that showed Ghana’s arrival on the technological and scientific scenes.7 Officially, there were three major objectives in establishing the National Science Museum: (1) To acquire, display and preserve objects that demonstrated the world’s and Ghana’s historical and contemporaneous achievements in the areas of science and technology; (2) to educate the public and demonstrate to them the application of science and technology in the industrial and social life of the nation; and (3) to stimulate interest in science and technology in the nation, especially among the youth, who would hopefully be inspired to pursue careers in these areas for the future benefit of the nation.8 Coupled with library holdings on the biographies and discoveries of major world scientists and technological advances in history and contemporary society, the museum would serve to demystify science and present it in a palatable, accessible way to the youths who would control the future. There was general agreement that the science museum’s primary goal 6 7 8

International Council of Museums (ICOM), Ghana, http://ghana.icom.museum/24016_e.html, [31.08.2016]. See Think Ghana, ‘Ghana at a Scientific Standstill’, 22 November 2007, http://news.thinkghana.com/science/200711/12125.php, [31.08.2016]. Gilbert Boyefio, ‘Does Ghana Need a Museum of Science and Technology?’, The Statesman, 27 July 2006, http://www.thestatesmanonline.com/pages/news_detail.php?section=7&news id=103, 1–2, [31.08.2016].

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was to show young boys and girls that science is fun, which would hopefully entice them into careers as engineers and scientists instead of pursuing courses perceived to be easy. ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GHANA NATIONAL SCIENCE MUSEUM The Ghana National Science Museum was built on Liberia Road in Accra as an extension of and in close proximity to the National Museum, and was likewise governed by the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB). The idea to construct a National Science Museum in Ghana began around 1961/1962 in the Physics Department of the University of Ghana, where Professors Alan N. May and Wright (both lecturers at the University) discussed the project. May and Wright subsequently presented the proposal for the museum to Nkrumah as well as to the Ghana Academy of Arts and Science. Professor May served as Chairman of the Interim Executive Committee of the GNSM in 1964. The Committee comprised authorities from governmental, educational, scientific, and research institutions, including the Ministry of Education, the Ghana Academy of Sciences, the University of Ghana, the University of Science and Technology, the University College of Cape Coast, and others.9 In 1963, the Nkrumah administration invited a British scientist, Dr Frank Greenaway – Deputy Keeper of the Department of Chemistry at the Science Museum in London – to conduct a feasibility study for the National Science Museum.10 Greenaway recommended that the GNSM should establish branches and outreach operations all over the country, providing permanent (or fixed) and mobile (or travelling) exhibitions and educational displays on the physical and life sciences, focusing on their real-life applications to human welfare. He proposed that the fixed exhibitions represent about fifty different science and technology topics and that a similar number of travelling exhibitions (based on the permanent ones) visit secondary schools and other places across the country. In addition to international exhibitions, the Ghanaian National Collections would display the historical and contemporary developments in science and technology in Ghana. This would also include a collection of instruments and apparatus; a national history collection; exhibitions highlighting the climatic and geophysical aspects of equatorial Africa; a lake in which to conduct hydro-mechanical and marine experiments; and a planetarium. The last had increasingly become a popular feature of science museums around the world. In addition to the central science museum, and in order to make the GNSM truly national in scope, branch museums were to be built in the major centres: at the University of Cape Coast and at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) in Kumasi as well as 9

E.S. Strandh, Ghana. The National Science Museum (Paris: UNESCO, 597/BMS.RD/CLT, May 1968), 4. 10 Ibid., 3–4. See also Boyefio, Does Ghana.

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in Tamale in the north. The branch museums would be dedicated to specific aspects of science and technology, such as science teaching, engineering, and the history of technology.11 In the summer of 1963, following the recommendations outlined in the Greenaway Report, the CPP government allocated eight acres of land in Accra to serve as the site for the GNSM. The architectural firm of Kenneth Scott Associates was hired to undertake a two-phase plan to design and construct the multimillion cedi museum, which was to include a sixty-thousand-square-foot exhibition hall, two lecture theatres – with a combined capacity to seat over eight hundred persons – and other spaces for stores, workshops, and offices. However, because of the slow pace of the appropriations process, a temporary edifice, with a much-reduced indoor exhibition area of three thousand square feet, outdoor exhibition space, and a small open-air cinema, was built in 1964. Despite these setbacks, the GNSM opened its space to the public in December 1965. The collections consisted mainly of objects related to the advancement of science and technology, especially those produced or utilised by the nation. These objects included biological and natural history specimens, including metals, to showcase the nation’s bio-environmental and mineral wealth and resources. Moreover, the museum housed a library of science-related books and sponsored activities for children to partake in in order to learn about scientific and technological topics.12 EXHIBITING ENERGY: THE AKOSOMBO/VOLTA RIVER HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT The first exhibition was entitled, ‘Electric Power in Africa’.13 Clearly, the theme was chosen to coincide with and publicise the upcoming 23 January 1966 inauguration of Nkrumah’s most important, ambitious and symbolic industrial endeavour, the Akosombo/Volta River Hydroelectric Project (see Figures 1 and 2). The centrepiece of Ghana’s Industrial Revolution was also its most expensive (to date), at an estimated cost of GBP 70 million at the time. Although it was started by the British during the colonial era, it was finished using American capital and engineering after independence.14 However, the Nkrumah government modelled 11 See Frank Greenaway, ‘Proposed Ghana National Science Museum’, May 1963, 4–5, 10. See also Strandh, Ghana. The National Science Museum, 9–13. 12 ICOM Ghana, http://ghana.icom.museum/24016_e.html, [31.08.2016]. 13 Strandh, Ghana. The National Science Museum, 4. 14 For the history of the Volta River/Akosombo Dam Project, see Kwamina Barnes, Economics of the Volta River Project, Accra, 1966; Adam Curtis, Pandora’s Box (DVD), Wyandotte, MI 2009; David Hart, The Volta River Project. A Case Study in Politics and Technology, Edinburgh 1980; Stephan Miescher, Building the City of the Future. Visions and Experiences of Modernity in Ghana’s Akosombo Township, Journal of African History 53/3 (2012), 367– 390; Stephan Miescher, ”Nkrumah’s Baby”. The Akosombo Dam and the Dream of Development in Ghana, Water History 6/4 (2014), 341–366; Stephan Miescher and Dzozi Tsikata, Hydro-Power and the Promise of Modernity and Development in Ghana. Comparing the

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the Volta Project, like his other nation-building endeavours, on the industrialisation and modernisation practices of communist countries, most notably the Soviet Union and China. In these states, a vanguard party (the CPP in this case) directed the policies of the economy with set temporal goals, such as five-year plans, during which time rapid industrialisation and/or labour-intensive agricultural outputs should be achieved. An example of these ideological borrowings can be seen in the imagery of the stamp in Figure 2, in which the image of the Volta River Project is designed in the letters of ‘GHANA’. The CPP flag (which became the national flag from January 1964 until after Nkrumah’s ouster from power in February 1966) is quite visible on the side of the image and shows the importance the Nkrumah administration gave to state-led industrialisation. The Ghana Postal Agency, a New York-based philatelic company that marketed Ghanaian postage stamps globally, lobbied the American government to invest in Nkrumah’s modernisation schemes, including the Volta River Dam. One of their newsletters stated: The stage is set for real progress in our position in Africa. This government may soon also extend financial help towards the improvement of economic and social conditions there. Such help is not only idealistic but can pay back handsome dividends – take the case of the huge Volta River Project in Ghana, which, if we help realize it, will give the Free World an almost unlimited source of aluminum and its by-products.15

At the opening ceremony of the completed Volta River Hydroelectric dam on 22 January 1966, Nkrumah acknowledged the critical assistance that both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy gave to his government in order to bring the project to life. Reminiscing about this moment during his years in exile in Guinea-Conakry (1966–1972), Nkrumah wrote: On that day at Akosombo … when I switched on illuminating lights signifying the official opening of hydro-electric power from the Volta, one of my greatest dreams had come true. I had witnessed the wide-scale electrification of Ghana and the breakthrough into a new era of economic and social advance.16

With an initial output of 512,000 to 588,000 kW of power, an ultimate output of 768,000 to 882,000 kW, 500 miles of transmission lines, and 161,000 volts of electricity on the main grid, Volta was to increase the electrical capacity of Ghana by almost 600 percent, thereby significantly increasing the potential for national

Akosombo and Bui Dam Projects, Ghana Studies 12/13 (2009/2010), 55–75; James Moxon, Volta. Man’s Greatest Lake, London 1969; Dzodzi Tsikata, Living in the Shadow of the Large Dams. Long Term Responses of Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana Volta River Project, Leiden/Boston 2006; Dzodzi Tsikata, Downstream Rural Communities and the Volta River Project: Long Term Responses to Environmental Changes and State Neglect, Ghana Social Science Journal 3/1&2 (2005), 1–32; and Dzodzi Tsikata, The Volta River Project and Tongu Ewe Migrant Communities Along the Volta Lake. A Case of Development Unintended Consequences?, Research Review 20/2 (2004), 33–51. 15 Ghana Postal Agency Information Bulletin 3 (1958), 5–6. 16 Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, 83.

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economic growth, according to Nkrumah.17 Half of its electricity would directly power the bauxite-producing aluminium plant smelter in New Town and Tema Harbour, which was commissioned in 1962 (see Figure 3). In the spirit of encouraging Pan-Africanism and economic development, Nkrumah also offered to share the electricity reserves from the plant with neighbouring countries Togo, Dahomey (Benin), Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). With the power provided for electricity and crop irrigation, Nkrumah believed that ‘Ghana was all set for a tremendous march forward into a new industrial era, and a great expansion in our food growing capacity.’18 The dam was also designed to demonstrate that Nkrumah was ready, willing, and able to embrace and utilise modern technology for the socio-economic development of the Ghanaian nation-state and its neighbours in West Africa. In addition to providing electricity to the nation and its neighbours, the dam would form a lake stocked with fish to be caught with fishing trawlers bought in the Soviet Union and later processed for national consumption. The development of a modern, national system of transportation by land, sea and air was an integral part of Nkrumah’s industrialisation schemes. As Wilburn asserts: Nkrumah also sought to develop Ghana's economy quickly by establishing both aviation and shipping industries. The semiotics of Ghana Airways [Figure 4] and the Black Star Line [Figure 5] support his efforts. Ghana Airways is flying directly into the technologically advanced world, suggesting with its waving flag partly revealed that Ghana has taken flight from colonialism and is now an equal in international diplomacy. The Black Star Line, whose name was taken from Marcus Garvey's defunct shipping line, is also a remarkable issue. Ghana, apparently symbolized by the nimble flying fish, is flying above Ghana's country name and appears to welcome the arrival of Ghana's shipping industry. The shipping issue may demonstrate that innovative nature and advanced industry can thrive together under the light of the black star.19

The technological development in railway transportation from the early colonial to the early independence periods was also commemorated on postage stamps, as Figure 6 shows. The Science Museum’s first exhibition, ‘Electric Power in Africa’ was therefore an integral and symbolic aspect of Nkrumah’s programmes for a larger technological great leap forward, as represented by the Volta River Project. It was followed by a biological display titled ‘How Your Body Works’ in early 1966. Despite the coup against Nkrumah in the first months of that year, the GNSM continued to carry out its functions. With the assistance of UNESCO, as well as the involvement of university and secondary school science teachers and the private sector, plans were put forth for the museum to engage in extramural activities, including the coordination of science clubs, special exhibitions, scientific film screenings, and industrial and scientific conferences.20 17 Ibid., 83. 18 Ibid., 52. 19 Kenneth Wilburn, Africa to the World! Nkrumah-Era Philatelic Images of Emerging Ghana and Pan-Africanism, 1957–1966, African Studies Quarterly 13/1–2 (2012), 23–54, 28–29. 20 Strandh, Ghana. The National Science Museum, 4.

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However, there was disagreement about what kind of science-related exhibitions the museum should house. While Greenaway proposed displays that stressed both pure and applied sciences, E. S. Strandh felt that only the more hands-on applied sciences exhibits lent themselves ‘to lively and thought-provoking demonstrations ... [than] the often…more static exhibits of pure science’.21 On the other hand, Greenaway wanted the executive committee of the science museum to be restricted to faculty of the universities and academies of science, while Strandh argued for a more popular and inclusive advisory council that also included members of the Science Teachers Association, the Trade Union Congress, and the Association of Ghanaian Private Businessmen. This approach, Strandh thought, ‘will most certainly spread the idea of the G.N.S.M. into circles where important practical and financial support will be found. It is an obvious advantage if as many elements possible in society consider the GNSM as “Our Museum”’.22 Strandh also suggested an amateur radio station, a small botanical garden planted with the most common Ghanaian bushes, plants and trees to landscape the museum, and science clubs (modelled on the systems in the US and Western Europe) to be attached to the main branch of the GNSM. He also recommended a special exhibition called ‘Communications in Ghana, Past, Present and in the Future’. The Communications in Ghana exhibition would have displays on land, sea, and air transportation systems in Ghana, including the Gold Coast’s first railway, first aeroplane, first telegraph and telephone, and first radio station, as well as samples of Gold Coast/ Ghanaian stamps. 23 As Figures 7–9 illustrate, communication technology was seen as integral to the socio-cultural and economic advancement of Ghana. ASSESSING NKRUMAH’S EMBRACEMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY The founding of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology and the establishment of a science and technology museum demonstrate the significance that the president placed on scientific development and his belief that Africans could compete with the West on equal footing. What is significant about the science museum and its collections is how they related to Nkrumah’s larger project of incorporating scientific training and development into Ghana’s educational system so that youths could go out and engage in literal and figurative scientific nation-building, although this vision was fraught with problems in practice.24 21 22 23 24

Ibid., 8. See also Greenaway, Proposed Ghana National Science Museum, 3. Strandh, Ghana. The National Science Museum, 6. See ibid., 16–17. For a comprehensive analysis of the nature, scope and challenges of Ghana’s postindependence educational system, including the role of science or scientific teaching and ideology, see Jonathan Zimmerman, “Money, Materials, and Manpower”: Ghanaian In-Service Teacher Education and the Political Economy of Failure, 1961 – 1971, History of Education Quarterly 51/1 (2011), 1 – 27.

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Nkrumah’s embracement of science and technology was a familiar one amongst anti-colonial nationalists in Africa; they argued that decades of colonialism and exploitation by foreign firms in Africa had drained the natural resources, stunted the training and growth of a local working class and technocrats in favour of European expatriates, and caused stagnation in the economy. Therefore, a scientific and technological revolution would be necessary to level the playing field. According to Nkrumah, scientific knowledge and technological know-how could be harnessed for industrial innovation and an economic great leap forward for the economy. New schools (from primary to tertiary), technical training centres, and laboratories would be built to inculcate the youth with an appreciation for science and technology at an early age and to give the proletariat the tools necessary to yield maximum production from Ghana’s natural and human resources. According to Nkrumah, the number of new factories, roads, hospitals, and schools, as well as the New Town and Tema Harbour, the Volta and Teffle Bridges, and the Volta River Dam, were ‘obvious evidence of the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana’ under his administration.25 These schemes were part and parcel of his fast-track, socialist model of development as embodied in the Five Year Development Plans (1951–1956 and 1959–1964) and the Consolidation Plan (1957– 1959). As Nkrumah later reflects in exile in Guinea-Conakry, ‘Under these Plans the foundations were to be laid for the modernisation and industrialisation of Ghana. A skilled labour force was to be trained and an adequate complement of public services built up such as transport, electricity, water and telecommunications.’26 Technology would reverse the colonial orientation of Ghana’s economy, which was anchored to a single cash crop (cocoa), and deliver concrete fruits of independence and development. Amongst the modernisation projects that Nkrumah claimed to his government’s credit by his last years in office were the building of a railway link between Accra and the major port of Takoradi and the expansion of the latter; the construction of the new, man-made Tema harbour; the construction of ‘one of the most modern network of roads in Africa’ and the development of a public transportation system interlinking the regions of the country; the construction of schools, clinics, and hospitals; the expansion of potable water supplies; the development of a modern network of telecommunications; the diversification and mechanisation of the agricultural sector; and – the most significant technological and industrial prize of them all – the Volta River Hydroelectric Project, ‘which was designed to provide the electrical power for our great social, agricultural and industrialisation programme’.27 During the first ten years of Nkrumah’s leadership, from 1951 to 1961 (which spans the period when Nkrumah joined the colonial administration as Leader of Government Business to the year after Ghana was declared a republic), there was a significant increase in both the number of educational facilities built and student 25 Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, 75. 26 Ibid., 76. 27 Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, 76-77.

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enrolment from primary to tertiary schools. During this first decade, there was also a significant increase in the number of hospitals and clinics, doctors and nurses, post offices, telephones, and homes and businesses with electricity, although, over the next decade, the Ghanaian educational system proved to be a failure, as Zimmerman argues.28 With the declaration of a single party state in 1964, the Government of Ghana also ramped up its programmes of scientific and technological awareness and development to achieve rapid socio-economic development. A 1964 UNESCO Week commemorative postage stamp series depicting world famous scientists was issued in various countries.29 In addition to the better-known European or American scientists, the Ghana Cabinet instructed the Academy of Science and the national stamp designers that stamp ‘designs featuring the portraits of some eminent scientists of African descent should be submitted for consideration.’30 The approved Ghanaian issue included the German-born physicist Albert Einstein (1879–1955), the symbol of the atom as well as his revolutionary theory of relativity as expressed in the mass and energy equation, ‘E = mc2’ (see Figure 10). It also featured the prominent African-American botanist/agricultural chemist George Washington Carver (1864–1943) and the peanut plant from which his scientific research yielded more than three hundred products (see Figure 11). Carver was the son of slaves from the American South, and his career as a scientist brought him and his family fame and fortune and also benefited poor black southern farmers. His story resonated well with the Nkrumah government’s programme to inspire the Ghanaian youth to pursue careers in the sciences. While Carver was of African descent, he was not African born. This was nonetheless in line with Nkrumah’s record of forging complicated alliances with blacks from the United States and the Caribbean as well as Africa and reflected his Pan-Africanist and Diasporic rhetoric.31 It also sent a message to Ghanaian youth that the realm of high scientific achievements was not the domain of just whites but also of blacks. Therefore, the premise of adding a Museum of Science and Technology to the National Museum system was that Ghanaian society, especially the youth, would go there and witness the advancements that Ghana was undertaking in these fields. They would leave with an inspiration to become engineers, mechanics, scientists, etc. The socialist state would pay for the pupils to enrol in schools and training centres to prepare a new generation of nationalists versed in the sciences and with the technological know-how to run the engines of the nation. There was also another reason for the establishment of the science museum. It was a form of ‘show and tell’ to display to the nation and the world that Ghana was an industri28 See ibid., 78–79, and Zimmerman, “Money, Materials, and Manpower”. 29 Ghana Postal Archive (GPA): S4/61, Manfred R. Lehmann, Ghana Philatelic Agency to Ministry of Communications & Works, letter, ‘UNESCO Week 1964, 24 September 1964. 30 GPA: S4/61, GB.28/SF.6/15 (UNESCO Week 1964), Ministry of Communications & Works to Director of Posts and Telecommunications, memorandum, ‘UNESCO Week Commemorative Issue’, 8 October 1964. 31 See, for example, Kevin Gaines, American Africans in Ghana. Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era, Chapel Hill NC 2008.

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alising nation-state and to display the achievements of Nkrumah’s premiership as a moderniser and, ultimately, to legitimate his power. While the use of science and technology was promoted as a means of achieving social and economic progress for the nation, the technology and the funds for development were largely acquired from foreign sources. NUCLEAR NATION Depicting Albert Einstein on a Ghanaian stamp also had symbolic significance. Although the Nkrumah cabinet and the Academy of Science could have chosen to depict any European or American scientist, their choice of the man whose theory led to the invention of the atomic bomb symbolises Nkrumah’s plan to convert Ghana into the first nuclear nation in West Africa. By 1964, the CPP government was already in the advanced stages of developing nuclear capabilities. The dawning of the nuclear age in the developed world also had a tremendous impact on Nkrumah’s visions for Ghana’s future. Furthermore, the future propulsion of Ghana’s social and scientific revolution, as Nkrumah saw it, lay not only with the capacity to generate hydroelectric energy, but also in its ability to harness the power of the atom. In addition to the public school system, which offered basic theoretical introductions to the world of science, the GNSM was to be the main ‘hands-on’ conduit for Ghana’s future scientists. The young Ghanaian boy or girl who visited the GNSM and became fascinated by the power of science and technology to change human society, would be an ideal candidate for state sponsorship and training to become a future Ghanaian nuclear scientist. One of the most important and controversial demonstrations of Nkrumah’s power and embracement of science and technology was therefore his active quest to construct an atomic reactor in Ghana. Ironically, Nkrumah initially resisted the development of nuclear energy in Africa, especially as a weapon of war for the colonial powers. In 1959, along with an alliance of Western pacifists, Ghana embarked on a campaign to stop France from detonating its first nuclear bomb in Algeria (its North African colony) the following year. When this alliance failed, Nkrumah financed and hosted a disarmament assembly in 1962, set in Accra and dubbed ‘The World Without the Bomb,’ issuing a postage stamp to commemorate the event, as Figure 12 graphically shows.32 Nkrumah also promised to ‘support wholeheartedly the efforts of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations to make Africa a Nuclear Free Zone’.33 However, concurrently with the 32 See Jean Allman, Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom Ghana, 1959 – 1962, Souls 10/2 (2008), 83–102; Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970. Vol. 2 of The Struggle Against the Bomb, Stanford CA 1997, 265–271; Lawrence S. Wittner, ‘The Forgotten Alliance of African Nationalists and Western Pacifists,’ History News Network, 19 March 2007, http://hnn.us/articles/36279.html, [31.08.2016]. 33 Linda Asante Agyei, ‘Nkrumah Lays Foundation for Atomic Reactor ... in 1964,’ Ghana Home Page, 11 April 2007, http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive

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disarmament campaign, he embarked on a nationwide campaign to harness nuclear power. The failure to prevent the French military from imposing its power on African soil might have turned Nkrumah from nuclear peacemaker to nuclear nonpacifist. Nkrumah’s commitment to follow the Western model of development, underscored by the promotion of research and practice in science and technology, began in earnest in 1959. In that year, the Nkrumah government founded the Ghana Academy of Learning, the first such organisation in postcolonial ‘black’ Africa. The main objective of this organisation was to organise and coordinate scientific research for national development. In 1961, the Ghana Academy of Learning was renamed the Ghana Academy of Sciences.34 The Nkrumah government also established the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) in 1961. This was perhaps to counter the march forward of his archenemy – Apartheid South Africa – which, after World War II, embarked on a clandestine nuclear weapons programme and which had established an Atomic Energy Board (AEB) in 1959 to achieve that end. In the 1960s, South Africa experimented with the development of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs), supposedly only for mining and engineering, but in the early 1970s, Prime Minister Johannes Vorster authorised the construction of a limited nuclear deterrent programme.35 The African nuclear arms race had begun in earnest. Nkrumah understood that the very notion of a (black) African country experimenting with nuclear energy would make the Western powers nervous. He acknowledged, ‘Science can be applied for good ends, for the betterment of the human race, or for bad ends, for the making of weapons of [mass] destruction. In no field of science is the contrast between these two aspects so great as it is in atomic energy.’36 With regard to the West’s worries of the West, he added, ‘We were fully aware then that our motives might be misconstrued, for the setting up of an Atomic Reactor is the first practical step to building an atomic bomb. We have always stood for the use of fissionable material exclusively for peaceful ends. We have consistently stood against the unnecessary proliferation of weapons of mass destructions [sic], and with equal consistency for the abolition of such weapons.’37 Despite opposition from his detractors, in November 1964, Nkrumah

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36 37

/artikel.php?ID=122255&comment=2779732#com, [31.08.2016]. Originally published in Ghana Review International 120 (2007). After the 1966 coup, the organization was once again renamed. In 1968, it became two entities – the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences (GAAS) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). While retaining its broad philosophical objectives of promoting science and technology, references to its more nationalist goals were abandoned by the NLC. See Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, http://www.gaas-gh.org/, [31.08.2016]. David Albright, ‘South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,’ Institute for Science and International Security, 14 March 2001, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_ 01spring/albright.htm, 1, [31.08.2016]; Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www. nti.org/e_research/profiles/SAfrica/, [31.08.2016]. Agyei, Nkrumah Lays Foundation. Ibid. Capitalisation in original.

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laid the foundation stone for the construction of the Ghana Atomic Reactor Centre at Kwabenya.38 At the project’s inauguration, Nkrumah gave a speech in which he touted how ‘Science City’ would place Ghana at the forefront of modernity by utilising atomic science, technology, research and development as a means to solve development problems and provide material benefits to the people of Africa. This scientific revolution and technological great leap forward was envisioned to allow Ghana and Africa ‘to break even with more advanced economies’ and to achieve the utopian goal of constructing an ‘industrialised socialist society’.39 During this period, Ghana was caught in the crossfire of the Cold War rivalry between the USSR and the United States to gain spheres of influence in the newly-independent African states and to win the nuclear arms race. On the one hand, the Americans had funded Nkrumah’s Volta River Hydroelectric power station, as previously shown. To build an atomic reactor, however, Nkrumah turned to the Soviet Union. Although the atomic reactor, monitoring station and radio-chemical laboratories were still under construction, a cohort of Ghanaian scientists and engineers had already been trained in the Soviet Union and re-dispatched to Ghana where housing facilities had been constructed for these ‘skilled specialists in nuclear science’.40 Several educational, scientific, and governmental organisations, including the Ghana Academy of Sciences, the University College of Science and Education, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), the Nuclear Research Reactor, the Radio Chemical Laboratory, and the Radio Isotope Centre were to be involved in research on nuclear and atomic sciences as well as the development of ‘peaceful uses of nuclear explosives’.41 These institutions were also responsible for inculcating an appreciation for science and technology in the general population, especially among the youths, and training them in scientific and technological applications. The Ghana National Science Museum was to be an important centre of scientific learning in this endeavour. In addition to the Soviet Union, the Nkrumah administration signed several reciprocal agreements of friendship and cooperation with other communist states in Eastern Europe and Asia, to assist with the training of Ghanaian scientists and technicians. Three such treaties were signed with the Hungarian People’s Republic, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Polish People’s Republic in 1964. The 1964-65 Hungarian-Ghanaian agreement on cultural exchanges reinforced the Agreement on Cultural Co-operation and the Scientific, Technical and 38 Ibid. In order to build the reactor at that location, the government appropriated lands from the Ga and Akan people in and around Kwabenya village. To date, the chiefs, other community leaders and people of Kwabenya assert that they have not benefited socially or economically from the atomic activities that have taken place in their territories, and that their very lives may be in peril due to the dangers associated with living in close proximity to a nuclear reactor. See Abena Dove Osseo-Asare, Atomic Junction: Nuclear Science in an African Suburb, HDV documentary film, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nWJXWVeHTHM&fea ture, [31.08.2016]. 39 Agyei, Nkrumah Lays Foundation. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.

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Cultural Aid Plan signed between the two countries in 1961. In addition to reciprocal sharing of socio-cultural and political information, Ghana would benefit from a Hungarian commitment to share its scientific knowledge and practices with the Ghana Academy of Science, the National Museum of Science and the National Library. Hungary promised that up to twenty Ghanaian students would be given one-year and longer university scholarships to study science, technology and culture-related topics (including museology), which were to be determined by Ghana. A team of Hungarian scientists would also visit Ghana for advising and training purposes. In addition, ‘Exhibition and Propaganda Materials’ relating to life and development in both countries were also to be displayed.42 Similarly, the 1964-65 Working Plan of Cultural Co-operation between Ghana and the PRC would involve cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries. It also provided for five to seven Ghanaian scientists to visit China for several weeks after the 1964 Peking Science Symposium had concluded.43 The Peking Science Symposium was held in Peking (Beijing), China from 21-31 August 1964. It was attended by 367 delegates from 44 Asian, African, Latin American and Oceanic countries. Several Western scientists attended the Symposium in the capacity of observers. The symposium was sponsored by the Chinese Association for Science and Technology and the Peking Centre of the World Federation of Scientific Workers. The Peking Symposium was preceded by the International Conference on the Organisation of Research and Training in Africa in Relation to the Study, Conservation and Utilisation of Natural Resources. Convened in Lagos, Nigeria from 28 July to 6 August 1964 and sponsored by the Economic Commission in Africa and UNESCO, the conference aimed to organise the scientific resources (both human and material) of African governments and the training of African scientists, technologists, and researchers. The Lagos Conference was attended by delegates from 29 African and 10 non-African countries, and the way forward for scientific and technological cooperation among African states led to the Commission for Scientific Research, an arm of the Organisation of African Unity. The Chinese government also offered to sponsor Ghanaian students to study technical subjects in Chinese institutions, as well as to exchange books and periodicals between the Peking Library of China and the Accra Central Library of Ghana.44 A similar Agreement on Cultural Co-operation, designed to promote bilateral educational and scientific and cultural relations, was also realised between Ghana and the Polish People’s Republic in 1964. Ghanaian students and professionals would be given one- to two-year funding to conduct educational, scien42 Public Records and Archives Administration (PRAAD)/Ghana National Archives, ‘Protocol for the Realization of the Cultural Agreement Between the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Republic of Ghana’, 11 July 1964, 1–4. 43 See ‘Chronicle’, Minerva 3/1 (1964), 131; and UNESCO, Final Report of the Lagos Conference. 28 July–6 August, 1964, Paris, 1964. 44 PRAAD, ‘1964–5 Working Plan to the Agreement of Cultural Co-Operation Between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the Government of People’s Republic of China’, 17 July 1964.

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tific, or cultural studies and research in Warsaw, while Polish delegates would be likewise accommodated in Accra.45 With this line up of communist and other leftist allies, things seems to have been going well for Nkrumah’s scientific and technological ambitions for Ghana. CONCLUSION Notwithstanding the Soviet and Eastern support, Kwame Nkrumah’s goal of utilising science and technology for political ends (to realise his dream of creating a United States of Africa) never came true. As previously noted, in 1966, when the nuclear reactor and research centre were expected to be operational, he was ousted by a US-endorsed military and police coup while on his way to Vietnam with the professed goal of brokering a peace treaty the between Hanoi and Washington. While there are many domestic and international factors that explain the causes and consequences of the coup against Nkrumah,46 his nuclear ambitions could be factored as one of them. Washington and Whitehall officials may have had suspicions that Nkrumah was perhaps covertly pursuing a nuclear programme for militaristic purposes or that the Soviet Union was using Ghana as a gateway for the spread of communism in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as for developing a nuclear arsenal to pre-empt the West. According to Dr. John Amuasi, a GAEC research scientist who has served the agency for several decades, and who was director of GAEC from 1993 to 2003, the Soviet Union had sent a shipment of enriched uranium to Ghana between late 1965 to early 1966, which had to be turned back on the high seas in the wake of the coup.47 In 1974, the Acheampong government changed the name of the National Science Museum to the Museum of Science and Technology. By that time, the museum had on exhibit samples of the first automobile, locomotive, and airplane that were used in Ghana. Nonetheless, the science museum has become an abandoned relict of the Nkrumah regime that inaugurated it in 1965. It has neither kept pace with the promises of its founders nor has it fulfilled the primarily goal of enticing young Ghanaians to become interested in the study and application of science and technology. Although successive governments have pledged funding to reconstruct the museum and build on the collections, those promises were frequently unfulfilled, and construction work to finally finish the museum has been haphazard or non-existent at best. This has left the museum in a dilapidated state and rendered it all but invisible to the passing public, except for societal outcasts and squatters who have made it their home.48 45 PRAAD, ‘Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the Government of the Polish People’s Republic on Cultural Co-operation’, 17 July 1964. 46 See Fuller, Building the Ghanaian Nation-State, chapter 8, ‘The Downfall of Kwame Nkrumah’. 47 See Osseo-Asare, Atomic Junction. 48 Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Science and Technology Museum abandoned’, 26 May 2009, http://gbcghana.com/news/26214detail.html, [31.08.2016].

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The current museum’s official website gives an indication of how far Nkrumah’s grandiose dreams of Ghana’s being the hub of an African scientific revolution the country have fallen. In addition to giving very basic historical facts about its origins, as well as admissions pricing, opening hours, and contact information, the museum’s one-page link on the GMMB’s website simply states that ‘Exhibits include a human heart and a piece of stone from the moon. The museum incorporates a library, and provides educational activities for children.’49 Other items currently on display in the museum include the made-in-Ghana Firestone tyre previously mentioned; samples of rocks containing economically important commodities, such as crude oil deposits; a concave mirror, which distorts the viewer’s image; a wooden motor bicycle made by a Ghanaian student; a space suit; a replica of a ship; a preserved human kidney; and the skull of an elephant. Museum officials acknowledge that very few people visit the space: school children in the first place and non-Ghanaian visitors in the second. They lament that: The culture of visiting museums … has not been inculcated in us … That is one of the major challenges we have is trying to convince Ghanaians that … [the museum] … is a place for inspiration, it’s a place to learn, and it’s a place … [where] people can be educated and they can reengineer themselves as individuals … there’s so much room for improvement because we have so many things to show.50

Notwithstanding, this optimism, the evidence of scientific stagnation that the museum has witnessed since its inception, suggests that the revival of Nkrumah’s vision of Ghana’s being a mecca of modern African science and technology will take a moon-shot to be achieved. The current status and future of Ghana’s nuclear programme, however, are not so static. Osseo-Asare has researched the changes that have occurred with the country’s atomic programme since the Nkrumah era. Her work reveals that, to some degree, Nkrumah’s utopian vision for Science City is still a goal being pursued by Ghana fifty years after his ouster from power in light of the socioeconomic and industrial needs of the country. This return to the Nkrumah blueprint to develop nuclear power in Ghana to support the country’s industries is now being given serious consideration, in light of the unreliability of another of Nkrumah’s white elephant projects, namely, the Volta River hydroelectric plant. As a result of the frequent and sustained electricity blackouts across the country, which hamper economic development and social mobility, nuclear technology is increasingly being touted as a more reliable alternative source of energy. To manage the aforementioned goals, GAEC has included among its several hundred employees many scientists from across West Africa, in line with Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist philosophy.51 49 Museum of Science and Technology, Accra, Ghana, http://www.ghanamuseums.org/sciencetech-museum.php, [31.08.2016]. 50 Derrick Ekow Sam, ‘Ghana Month Series on the Museum of Science and Technology’, Joy News, 30 March 2016, www.facebook.com/JoyNewsOnTV/videos/1078773415527897/, [31.08.2016]. 51 Osseo-Asare, Atomic Junction.

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Before its renaissance, Atomic Junction was a ghost town that had fallen into disrepair, with an atomic reactor overgrown with tropical vegetation. However, Atomic Road, the main thoroughfare in the neighbourhood, has seen a resurgence of new life in recent years, including a variety of new enterprises such as gas stations, supermarkets, boutiques, hostels, rental housing, and eateries. Old abandoned buildings have been renovated and reoccupied. Many of these new businesses have embraced the area’s theme, with names such ‘Atomic Road Pharmacy’. A roadside billboard for the joint GAEC and University of Ghana (supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency) Graduate School of Nuclear and Allied Sciences (SNAS), which was inaugurated in 2006, reads, ‘…Promoting postgraduate university level education and training for preservation, maintenance and enhancement of nuclear knowledge in Ghana and Africa’. Nuclear science is now being used to address many of Ghana’s contemporary challenges, including the energy crisis, tropical diseases, healthcare, and education. For example, GAEC uses nuclear energy to control insect-borne illnesses such as human and animal trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), which is spread by the tsetse fly. The agency also started a radiotherapy programme at SNAS, providing modern diagnostic and imaging equipment. These gains notwithstanding, GAEC has not escaped the debilitating problems associated with budget shortfalls as a result of the global recession, as well as public scrutiny of and scepticism over the nature of its mandates and operations.52 What this combination of setbacks, stagnation, and success in the country’s scientific experiments illustrates is that, after fifty years of independence, the challenging work of counting Ghana and most other African countries among the scientifically and technologically advanced nation-states, remains a work in progress.

52 Ibid.

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FIGURES

Figure 1: ‘Volta River Project’ Postage Stamp

Figure 3: ‘New Town and Harbour Tema’ Postage Stamp

Figure 5: ‘Inauguration of the Black Star Line 1957’ Postage Stamp

Figure 2: ‘Volta River Project’ Postage Stamp

Figure 4: ‘Inauguration of Ghana Airways July 1958’

Figure 6: ‘Ghana Railway 1903 – 1963’ Postage Stamp

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Figure 7: ‘The Telegraph School, Accra. Trying to reach 20 words a minute.’ Source: British Postal Museum and Archive

Figure 9: ‘Centenary of the International Telecommunications Union 1865 – 1965’ Postage Stamp

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Figure 8: ‘Testing Telephone lines, Accra.’ Source: British Postal Museum and Archive

Figure 10: ‘Albert Einstein E=mc2’ Postage Stamp

Figure 11: ‘G. Washington Carver’ Postage Stamp Figure 12: ‘The Accra Assembly – The World Without the Bomb 21–28 June 1962’ Postage Stamp

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Cyrelene Amoah-Boampong has been a lecturer in the Department of History, University of Ghana since 2011. She holds a Ph.D. in Historical Studies from Southern Illinois University, Carbondale with an emphasis on African History and Gender History. She is the author of ‘Politics of the Guest List and Ghana’s Independence Day Celebration’, in Legon. Journal of International Affairs and Diplomacy; 7/1 (2013). Kofi Darkwah is Professor of History at the University of Education, Winneba, Ghana (2005–2015). He was educated at the University of Ghana, Legon and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London, where he obtained a Ph.D. in African History with a specialisation in 19th Century Ethiopian History. He has held many Visiting Scholar appointments at universities in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Lesotho, Botswana, Denmark, and the USA. In November 2010, he visited Germany and gave a public lecture at Hamburg University and also at Flensburg University. Kofi Darkwah has several peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters to his name; his major books include Menelik of Ethiopia (Heinemann, London 1972) Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire 1813– 1889 (Heinemann 1975), A History of GNAT. Ghana National Association of Teachers (Woeli Publishing Services, Accra 2014). His latest book, titled History of a Unique Institution. University of Education Since 1992, is expected to be published in 2016. Harcourt Fuller, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of History at Georgia State University in Atlanta. His research and teaching expertise include the history of West Africa (Ghana in particular), and the African Diaspora in the Americas, with a special interest in slavery, resistance, Maroon nations, and ethno-national identity formation in Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. His publications include Building the Ghanaian Nation-State. Kwame Nkrumah’s Symbolic Nationalism (New York 2014), the volume Money in Africa (coeditor, London 2009), and articles in African Studies Quarterly, Nations and Nationalism, and African Arts. He is also a producer and writer for the documentary film Queen Nanny. Legendary Maroon Chieftainess (Union NJ, 2015). Kwame Osei Kwarteng is an Associate Professor in Ghanaian History and current the Head of the Department of History, University of Cape Coast, Ghana. Prof. Kwarteng attended the University of Birmingham’s Centre of West African Studies, where he obtained his Doctor of Philosophy Degree in June 2008. He obtained his Master of Philosophy (History) and Bachelor of Arts (Hon) as well as a Diploma in Education from the University of Cape Coast, Ghana in 1999 and 1991 respectively. He has researched extensively and jointly and individually

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published articles and books with his senior and junior colleagues and students. In all, he has jointly published three books on institutional history, two of which are History of the University of Cape Coast and History of Conference of Heads of Assisted Secondary Schools (CHASS) to commemorate the fortieth and fiftieth anniversaries of those institutions. Individually, he has published two books on the history of Ahafo and on the African elephant in Ghana in the twentieth century. Additionally, he has published a number of articles in refereed journals on Ahafo and the African elephant. In one of his articles, titled Ahafo. Big Men, Small Boys, and the Politics of Regionalism in Ghana 1954–1986 he devotes ten pages to discussing Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) government’s policy on Ahafo from 1954 to 1966. Further, his book on Ahafo also makes similar allusions to Nkrumah’s government policy on Ahafo. Carola Lentz is a Professor in the Department of Anthropology and African Studies, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz. She was a Fellow of the HanseWissenschaftkolleg Institute for Advanced Study, Delmenhorst (2015); the International Research Centre ‘Work and Human Life Cycle in Global History’, Humboldt University, Berlin (2012/2013); the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute of African and African American Research, Harvard University (2008/2009); and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (2000/2001). She is member of the research group ‘Un/Doing differences: practices of differentiation’ at Mainz University (FG 1939). In June 2014, she joined the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Her research focusses on West Africa (Ghana, Burkina Faso), and she is particularly interested in ethnicity and nationalism; the politics of memory; the history of chieftaincy and colonial history; labour migration and mobility; land rights; social stratification; and the emergence of a middle class. Her latest book, Land, Mobility and Belonging in West Africa (Indiana University Press 2013), was given the Melville Herskovits Award by the African Studies Association of the US. Bea Lundt is a Professor of History of the Middle Ages and Didactics of History at the European University of Flensburg (1998–2015) and also taught at the Humboldt University in Berlin. She studied social sciences, German literature and language, and history at the Universities of Cologne and Bochum and holds a Ph.D. and a post-doctorate qualification in History. She stays in West Africa three months a year and was a guest professor at the University of Education, Winneba (Ghana) in 2012 and 2013. Her fields of teaching and research are: Pre-Colonial and Post-Colonial Studies, Gender and Diversity, West African Culture and History, and Narrations of Europe and Africa. Her publications include Germany and its West African Colonies (edited with Wazi Apoh, Berlin 2013) and Narrating (Hi)stories in West Africa (edited with Ulrich Marzolph, Berlin 2015). Together with Yaw Ofosu-Kusi, she is editing the series, Narrating (Hi)stories. Culture and History in Africa.

About the Authors

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Christoph Marx is a Professor of Extra-European History at the Historical Institute, University of Duisburg-Essen. He has written on different topics in colonial history and historiography – on settler colonies and postcolonial history. In 2004, he published Geschichte Afrikas. Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart (Paderborn/Munich/Vienna/Zurich 2004). His post-doctoral thesis was on right-wing extremism among the white population in South Africa during Second World War: Oxwagon Sentinel. Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the history of the Ossewa Brandwag (Pretoria/Munster 2008). His main research focus is on southern Africa and the history of apartheid. Felix Müller studied African Studies (BA) in Leipzig (2007–2010), and Global Studies (MA) in London, Halifax, and Vienna (2010–2012). He also holds a M.Sc. in Global History from the London School of Economics and Political Science (2010–11). From 2013 to 2016, he was a research fellow at the Centre for Area Studies, Leipzig University, as part of the project ‘Changing Stateness in Africa – Cameroon, Ethiopia and Ghana Compared’, which is part of the DFG Priority Programme 1448 on ‘Adaptation and Creativity in Africa – Technologies and Significations in the Production of Order and Disorder’. Currently, Felix Müller is working on a Ph.D. thesis on Ghanaian intellectual and political history, with a special emphasis on the early 1990s. In 2015, he contributed the chapter ‘Ethiopian and Ghanaian Thoughts on Asia’s Rise – Development Strategies in Question’ to the volume African Thoughts on Colonial and Neo-Colonial Worlds – Facets of an Intellectual History of Africa (edited by Arno Sonderegger). Samuel Aniegye Ntewusu holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Leiden, The Netherlands and an Mphil in African Studies from the University of Ghana. Since August 2011, Ntewusu has worked as a Research Fellow at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana. He teaches the undergraduate course, Chieftaincy and Development in Africa. He also teaches the following postgraduate courses in collaboration with other lecturers: The Slave Trade and Africa, African Historiography and Colonial Rule, and African Responses. His publications include Settling in and holding on, a socio-historical study of northern traders and transporters in Accra’s Tudu. 1908–2008 (African Studies Centre, Leiden 2012) and Chieftaincy, Culture and Development in Africa: An undergraduate course book (Institute of Adult and Distance Education, University of Ghana, Accra 2014). Jonathan Otto Pohl has been a lecturer in the History Department of the University of Ghana, Legon since 2011. He completed his BA in history at Grinnell College in Iowa in 1992, his MA in history at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London in 2002, and his Ph.D. in history at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London in 2004. Before starting work at the University of Ghana, he taught in the International and Comparative Politics Department of the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan from 2007 to 2010. He is the author of Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949

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About the Authors

(Westport CT 1999) and The Stalinist Penal System. A Statistical History of Soviet Repression and Terror, 1930–1953 (Jefferson NC 1997). Nana Yaw B. Sapong is a lecturer in African History at the Department of History, University of Ghana Legon. He earned a Ph.D. in Historical Studies at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale and is an alumnus of the Institute of Humane Studies, George Mason University. Sapong’s recent publications include a volume on the state of historical research in Ghana, titled Replenishing History (editor). He is currently working on Modeling for Democracy in Africa: Unpacking Ghana's Fourth Republic, a book that explores the complex question of democratic transition in Africa. Mary Seiwaa Owusu is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of History, University of Cape Coast, Ghana. Currently she is pursuing her Ph.D. degree at Dalhousie University, Halifax. She had both her first degree and Master of Philosophy degree in History from the University of Cape Coast, Ghana. She has individually and jointly published a number of articles in refereed journals. In addition, she has two books, one co–authored and the other single-authored, to her credit. In her book: Prempeh II and the Making of Modern Asante (2009), she devotes several chapters to discussing Nkrumah and the CPP government’s policy on Asante during the reign of Prempeh II. Arno Sonderegger is currently a Senior Lecturer in the Department of African Studies, University of Vienna, Austria. His fields of study include African Studies and Cultural Anthropology (MA, 2000), African Studies/History (Ph.D., 2005), University of Vienna. He has been a Doctoral Researcher at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (2002–2004), a lecturer in Development Studies and African Studies at the University of Vienna (2004–2010), a visiting professor in the Department of African Studies at Humboldt University in Berlin (2012–2013), a Senior Lecturer at the Department of African Studies at the University of Vienna (since 2010), and Deputy Head of Department (2011–2014). His publications include African Thoughts on Colonial and Neo-Colonial Worlds. Facets of an Intellectual History of Africa. (editor, Berlin, 2015) and Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert. Geschichte und Gesellschaft (edited with Ingeborg Grau and Birgit Englert, Vienna 2011).

In 1957, Ghana was the first sub-Saharan country in Africa to achieve independence. The key African figure in this process was Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of the new state. Having studied in the USA and in London he was influenced by socialist and pan-African ideals. His ambitious projects in the fields of education and scientific as well as technological development provided an example for other former colonies. But in 1966 he was overthrown by a military coup supported by the USA and died in exile in 1972. Fifty years later, his memory is omnipresent in Ghanaian society and in other African countries. Still, his achievements are a subject of controversy. Was he a hero of the anti-colonial struggle or an authoritarian dictator? This volume presents chapters by researchers from Ghana, Austria, Germany, and the USA. They analyse the visionary politics of Nkrumah, investigate the reasons for the growing protest against his rule and shed new light on the background of the coup. The last part is dedicated to questions of evaluation and memory. Fifty years after his fall from power, new research and distance from the events allow for a more balanced judgment of Nkrumah.

www.steiner-verlag.de Franz Steiner Verlag

ISBN 978-3-515-11572-8