Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites 9781793609717, 9781793609724

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Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

Korean Communities across the World Series Editor: Joong-Hwan Oh, Hunter College, CUNY Korean Communities across the World publishes works that address aspects of (a) the Korean American community, (b) Korean society, (c) the Korean communities in other foreign lands, or (d) transnational Korean communities. In the feld of (a) the Korean American community, this series welcomes contributions involving concepts such as Americanization, pluralism, social mobility, migration/immigration, social networks, social institutions, social capital, racism/discrimination, settlement, identity, or politics, as well as a specifc topic related to family/marriage, gender roles, generations, work, education, culture, citizenship, health, ethnic community, housing, ethnic identity, racial relations, social justice, social policy, and political views, among others. In the feld of (b) Korean society, this series embraces scholarship on current issues such as gender roles, age/aging, low fertility, immigration, urbanization, gentrifcation, economic inequality, high youth unemployment, sexuality, democracy, political power, social injustice, the nation’s educational problems, social welfare, capitalism, consumerism, labor, health, housing, crime, environmental degradation, and the social life in the digital age and its impacts, among others. Contributors in the feld of (c) Korean communities in other foreign lands are encouraged to submit works that expand our understanding about the formation, vicissitudes, and major issues of an ethnic Korean community outside of South Korea and the Unites States, such as cultural or linguistic retention, ethnic identity, assimilation, settlement patterns, citizenship, economic activities, family relations, social mobility, and racism/discrimination. Lastly, contributions relating to (d) transnational Korean communities may touch upon transnational connectivity in family, economy/fnance, politics, culture, technology, social institutions, and people.

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Titles in this Series Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, by Sung-Choon Park Transnational Mobility and Identity in and out of Korea, edited by Yonson Ahn Korean Diaspora across the World: Homeland in History, Memory, Imagination, Media and Reality, edited by Eun-Jeong Han, Min Wha Han, and JongHwa Lee Mediatized Transient Migrants: Korean Visa-Status Migrants’ Transnational Everyday Lives and Media Use, by Claire Shinhea Lee LA Rising: Korean Relations with Blacks and Latinos after Civil Unrest, by Kyeyoung Park Medical Transnationalism: Korean Immigrants’ Medical Tourism to Home Country, by Sou Hyun Jang Transnational Return Migration of 1.5 Generation Korean New Zealanders: A Quest for Home, by Jane Yeonjae Lee Transnational Communities in the Smartphone Age: The Korean Community in the Nation’s Capital, edited by Dae Young Kim

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites

Copyright © 2020. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Sung-Choon Park

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefeld Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL, United Kingdom Copyright © 2020 The Rowman & Littlefeld Publishing Group, Inc.

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Chapter 4 of this book is revised and adapted from an article previously published in: Sung-Choon Park, “Conficts Over Knowledge Transfer across the Border: Korean International Students and the Conversion of Cultural Capital,” Global Networks 19, 1 (2019): 101–118. Copyright by John Wiley and Sons Ltd. Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available ISBN 978-1-7936-0971-7 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-7936-0972-4 (electronic) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

Copyright © 2020. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

For my parents, Soon-Young Lee and Kyun-Hyung Park, and my partner, Haeyoung Yoon.

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

Copyright © 2020. Lexington Books. All rights reserved. Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

Contents

List of Figures

ix

Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1

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1 Global Academic Hierarchy and Transnational Social Reproduction 21 2 Imperialist Racial Formation and English Language

43

3 A Balancing Act of Ethnic Dis/Identification Intersecting Class and Race

71

4 Conflicts over Conversion of Cultural Capital and Transfer of Knowledge

89

5 International Students’ Cross-Border Transmission and Translation about Race and Racism

113

6 New Diasporic Nationalism as the Politics of Racialized Transnational Elites

133

7 Digitally Mediated Transnational Lives and Tactical Uses of New Media

163

Conclusion 189 References 197 Index 209 About the Author

215 vii

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

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List of Figures

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Figure 2.1 Seoul—An Advertisement on a Bus in Downtown Seoul in 2013 Figure 6.1 New York—Korean Student Drumming Groups from Various Colleges of the State University of New York Performing in Manhattan in the 2014 Korean Day Parade Figure 6.2 New Jersey—A Press Conference in 2012 about an Installment on Japanese Colonial Legacy and a Banner that States: “Rising Sun Flag = Hakenkreuz” Figure 6.3 California—Protesting Google to Change the Name of the Sea between Korea and Japan from “Sea of Japan” to “East Sea” in the Google Map in 2012 Figure 6.4 Paris—A 2016 “Candlelight Protest” Demanding a Resignation of Then South Korean President Park

ix

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

53 148 149 149 150

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Acknowledgments

I would not have been able to write this book if it had not been for the support and help of many individuals. This book has evolved from my doctoral dissertation at The New School for Social Research. I had the great fortune of working with Jeffrey Goldfarb, my dissertation chair, who skillfully guided me to the completion of my doctoral project with his generous mentoring and concise and penetratingly thoughtful feedback. Paolo Carpignano broadened my theoretical perspective with his erudition and passion for critical theories. Rachel Sherman was a sharp and down-to-earth reader whose feedback pushed me to strive for clarity overall, particularly providing guidance on method and research design. Nadia Y. Kim’s scholarship on Korean diaspora, Asia America, and race was integral to my work from its initial conception. She gave me both incisive comments and tremendous encouragements, which were all indispensible. I thank the Donnelley Fund for Dissertation Fellowship at The New School for Social Research for supporting my dissertation writing. I am deeply grateful to Joong-Hwan Oh, the book series editor for Korean Communities across the World and Courtney Morales of Lexington Books, for taking interest in my work and supporting me through this process. I thank Shelby Russell for checking formatting and permissions. I thank John Wiley and Sons Ltd for permission to use an earlier version of chapter 4: “Conficts over Knowledge Transfer across the Border: Korean International Students and the Conversion of Cultural Capital,” Global Networks 19, 1 (2019): 101– 118. I thank the anonymous reviewers for this book and the Global Networks article. I also thank the news agencies for permissions to use their pictures. I thank the undergraduate and graduate students whom I had the privilege to teach at the New School. Discussions with those students from diverse immigration backgrounds helped me develop some of the core ideas for my xi

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

xii

Acknowledgments

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project. I thank those who attended my presentations and gave me productive and encouraging feedback in the meetings of Association for Asian American Studies, American Sociological Association, Eastern Sociological Society, the National Conference on Race and Ethnicity in American Higher Education and other venues. I thank my friends, particularly Quan, Ji-un (RIP, Ji-un), Ramsey, and Elaine, who read and commented on an earlier draft of my work. I appreciate many conversations we had over dinner tables, and their persistent encouragement helped me to maintain my sanity throughout the writing process. And I thank and salute to all other individuals both inside and outside of academia who have intellectual integrity to support a project on a politically charged issue. I thank my parents, Soon-Young Lee and Kyun-Hyung Park for their enduring love and support even against their own expectation that I chose a different path in life. I wish my father, who has recently passed away of cancer, was alive to see the publication of this book. I know that he would have been proud in his quiet ways. I hope that dedicating this book to my parents can be, at least, a small gesture of my humbled appreciation for everything they have done for me. Lastly, my deepest gratitude is to my partner, Haeyoung. She supported me in every possible way and each step of this project, including sharing her expertise on U.S. immigration law by patiently and clearly answering all of my questions. At times I jokingly threatened her that I would not dedicate my book to her if she were not nice to me. Joking about my dedication of a book to her, a promise that I did not know whether I would be able to fulfll or not, was my way of coping with my anxiety of fnishing this project and an overwhelming feeling of indebtedness to her. I thank her from the bottom of my heart for all that she has been.

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

Introduction

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During their conversations, there were some moments on-air when Trump and Bannon disagreed. Though not many. Last November, for instance, Trump said he was concerned that foreign students attending Ivy League schools have to return home because of U.S. immigration laws. “We have to be careful of that, Steve. You know, we have to keep our talented people in this country,” Trump said. He paused. Bannon said, “Um.” “I think you agree with that,” Trump said. “Do you agree with that?” Bannon was hesitant. “When two-thirds or threequarters of the CEOs in Silicon Valley are from South Asia or from Asia, I think . . .” Bannon said, not fnishing the sentence. “A country is more than an economy. We’re a civic society.” (Fahrenthold and Sellers 2016)

The excerpt above, published in an article in The Washington Post soon after the 2016 election of President Donald J. Trump, highlights a disagreement between Trump and Stephen K. Bannon, a former White House chief strategist, then a host of Breitbart News Daily during a 2015 radio show. Their disagreement exemplifes general ambivalent attitudes toward international students. On the one hand, Trump who campaigned on vitriolic antiimmigrant and nativist sentiments and is advancing policies to exclude and limit the entry of immigrants and refugees and to expedite the deportation of immigrants saw international students as “talented people” and a valuable asset to the country. It refects the common perception of many policy makers and stakeholders in global education markets that international students are a source of high-skilled labor and a conduit of knowledge transfer that is important to economic development and competitiveness (Vertovec 2002; Xiang 2016). On the other hand, Bannon’s infammatory and ungrounded remark1 singles out Asians among all international students who are in the United States as unsuitable for “a civic society.” His statement unmistakably revokes the old trope of Yellow Peril (Lake and Reynolds 2008). It shows that 1

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2

Introduction

Asian international students, despite their wealth and talents, are not exempt from racism that has dogged Asian Americans for centuries as “unassimilable aliens” in the United States (Espiritu 2008; Tuan 1999). The two seemingly contradictory attitudes may be two sides of a continuum in which Asian international students transition from one end to the other, mirroring the two stereotypes of Asians and Asian Americans as “model minority” and Yellow Peril: when the “model minority” excels too much, it begins to be threatening Yellow Peril (Okihiro 1994, 141). The disagreement between Trump and Bannon shines a spotlight on this peculiar position of Asian international students, which I explore in this book. In the recent decades, the number of international students around the world has drastically increased to an unprecedented level. This number is expected to rise further as countries, both established and emerging players in the global education market, implement new initiatives and policies to attract more international students with aggressive enrollment targets (IIE 2018a). In the United State, the top destination country hosting about one-quarter of the total international students in the world, about 1.1 million or 5.5 percent of the total students in higher education were international students in the 2017–2018 academic year (IIE 2018b). The global mobility of international students is uneven. Asian international students mainly from newly industrialized countries such as China, India, South Korea, and Vietnam account for the majority of international students in the world while countries in the Global North2 are the destinations of study for the vast majority of international students (OECD 2013).3 In the United States, the number of Asian students defned as “nonimmigrant students” who hold a F-1 or M-1 visa in 2015 is over three times larger than that of all other students combined from other regions including Europe, Americas, and Africa (U.S. ICE 2015). The top fve source countries of Asian international students—China, India, South Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan—account for as many as 60.4 percent of the total international students in higher education in the United States (IIE 2018b). International students are not simply temporary sojourners and customers in the American higher education market. Many international students take up legal residency in the United States after completing their education as the U.S. immigration law prioritizes high-skilled and specialty-occupation immigrants over family-sponsored immigrants (Min 2015). Between 2000 and 2013, the proportion of Asian immigrants to the total immigrants in the United States jumped from 30–35 percent to 39–41 percent, and this surge is mainly due to the entry of international students (Min 2015). As a result, since 2010, Asia has surpassed Latin America as the largest source of new immigrants, and Asians have been projected to become the largest immigrant group by 2055 (Pew Research Center 2018). Former international students

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Introduction

3

who adjust their immigration status are more mobile and transnational than previous generations of immigrants who were more oriented to assimilation: even after their status adjustment, former international students are inclined to hop around different labor markets for best economic opportunities and political climates or family needs, taking a “fexible” approach to citizenship (Ong 1999). The emergence of Asian international students has also changed the face of emigration from other leading Asian source countries. For instance, international students and middle-class migrants have started dominating Chinese emigration while the emigration of low-skilled migrants is stagnant (Xiang 2016). Adapting to this trend, major source countries of international students, like China, have shifted their emigration and diaspora policies from remittance from low-wage immigrants to high-skilled migrants’ transfer of technology (Xiang 2016), as they are seen as a conduit of knowledge transfer important to economic development and competitiveness. Despite this historical novelty, scholars on globalization, immigration, migration, and transnational studies have not paid enough attention to the rise of international students and elite transnational migrants of color who are former international students. The recent surge of white nationalism and the backlash against globalization, as manifested most notably in Brexit and the election of President Trump, compel us to address this theoretical defciency with a growing sense of urgency. Some leading fgures of white nationalism or right-wing populist movements such as Bannon who, as mentioned above, regards Asian international students as unft for a “civic” society explicitly name “global elites” as a source of white resentment with the rallying cry, “The global elite is brutalizing the little guy” (Sullivan 2018). In a way it is a riff on the same old theme that fear-mongered Yellow Peril to restrict Asian immigration in white settler colonies in North America, Australia, and other regions since the late nineteenth century (Lake and Reynolds 2008). There is an important difference today, in that it is imagined less as a horde of lowwage immigrants—derogatively called “coolies” then—but more as an army of elites taking over prestigious university campuses and Silicon Valley. Yet, privileged elite migrants of color such as Asian international students have been largely absent in this debate on white nationalism or right-wing populist movements thus far. This omission seriously distorts or clouds our analytic lens of the current political conjuncture. I argue that Asian international students occupy a strategic locus to understand globalization and to examine the ongoing social transformation under globalization in both the sending Global South and host Global North countries. I further argue that we should examine the rise of Asian and other international students of color in the United States and other Global North countries from a perspective of fundamental transformation of the nation-state and capitalism under globalization.4 We should theoretically register them as a transnational fgure, indicating a new

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

4

Introduction

development in history involving transnational formations and a reconfguration of class, race, nation, and colonialism. In this book, I register and trace Asian international students and highskilled migrants who are former international students as a new transnational fgure, terming them “racialized transnational elites.” With a transnational case study of South Korean international students in New York City and nonmigrant Koreans in South Korea, my work examines how Asian international students’ social statuses can be different in the country of origin and in the country of residence due to specifc local social dynamics, how their multiple social statuses can shape their transnational lives and daily practices, and what its social consequences are. My main argument is that, while Korean international students are part of transnational elite social groups in the making, they occupy disparate and incongruent social statuses of being a racialized other in the United States and being a cosmopolitan elite in South Korea simultaneously as they are entangled in social dynamics in both societies and that these two incongruent simultaneous statuses shape their transnational lives and practices, such as transfer of knowledge, transmission of messages on race, diaspora-building, and daily uses of transnational media among others, generating new social dynamics and inequalities in both societies. In so doing, this book illuminates how Asian international students and elite migrants can be trapped in, and strive to overcome, the double marginalization or backlash from both sides of the border—racism and racialization in the Global North and class and nationalist resentment in their country of origin. Their peculiar predicament over the border reveals that they are at a frontline of ongoing struggles over globalization that will determine the future reconfguration of class, race, ethnicity, and coloniality.

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REGISTERING A NEW TRANSNATIONAL FIGURE: RACIALIZED TRANSNATIONAL ELITES By registering racialized transnational elites, my work theoretically contributes to, frst, addressing a conceptual blockage that may be one of the reasons that scholars have not paid enough attention to the rise of international students and elite transnational migrants of color, leaving it in a theoretical interstice. Two types of transnational fgures have been dominant in the felds of globalization, immigration, migration, and transnational studies, shaping our analytic perspectives: “a rich person from a rich country” and “a poor person from a poor country,” to use Etienne Balibar’s language (2002, 83).5 The frst type is the privileged migrants who are part of emergent transnational elite social groups. Scholars have observed their emergence as one of the most characteristic aspects of social transformation under globalization,

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Introduction

5

calling them “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair 2001), “trans-Pacifc professional-managerial class” (Dirlik 2001), “transnational managerial elites” (Beaverstock 2005), “global class” (Sassen 2007), or “globals” (Urry 2007). These studies, however, ignore the racial difference within the social groups, and thus neglect to examine the particularities of wealthy elite migrants from newly industrialized countries in the Global South. The second type is the underprivileged migrants from the Global South who are low-wage, low-skilled, or undocumented immigrants or refugees. Studies on migration and immigration from the Global South, including studies on transnationalism, diasporas, and immigration and race, foreground this type of transnational fgure. International students from newly industrialized regions in the Global South are largely, although people of color, socioeconomically different from the underprivileged migrant prototype. As a burgeoning body of literature on social reproduction of international students reports (Koo 2007; Waters 2012), they, largely due to academic credentials they acquire in the Global North, tend to be well positioned to join their home countries’ ruling class as managerial elites or high-skilled return migrants, in addition to often already being part of established upper-class families. It is true that their success in social reproduction is far from being guaranteed. This book shows that their credentials can be devalued and that international students can even face formidable resentment and systematic resistance from non-migrant coethnics in the home country. Despite such challenges, it is apparent that armed with economic resources, Global North’s cultural capital, cosmopolitan lifestyles, and global mobility, the international students are the “future transnational elites” (Bilecen and Faist 2015) who are being groomed to join the professional and managerial class serving transnational corporations and supranational organizations like the United Nations and global nonproft groups. In the frst part of the book, I discuss my research fndings that show that studying in the United States is a strategy of Korean international students for transnational social reproduction by acquiring cultural capital from the Global North in the forms of college degrees from the United States, English profciency, and cosmopolitan culture. My work builds upon Johanna L. Waters’ works (2005, 2006, 2012) that most systematically theorize transnational social reproduction of international students. With my research, I contribute to the studies on transnational social reproduction by showing that the hegemony of the United States and Global North academia in a local society plays a pivotal role in undergirding the system of transnational social reproduction of international students. While American undergraduate degrees have been recently devalued in South Korean society, American graduate degrees are still frmly deemed superior to the ones from South Korean universities, which leads to competition among Korean international students to

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6

Introduction

step up their cultural capital by acquiring graduate degrees. I further show that, as international students adopt the host society’s lifestyles in addition to acquiring academic credentials and often legal permanent residency status, many remain in the United States after completing their education and become high-skilled transnational migrants, temporarily or permanently postponing their initial plan to return to the country of origin. Asian international students are part of transnational elite social groups in the making as their privilege clearly exhibits, compared to non-migrant coethnics in the country of origin and undocumented coethnics in the host society. That international students are different from their coethnics in terms of not only wealth and class but also rights and mobility illustrates the nature of these new transnational groups and social inequalities under globalization. My research, on the other hand, shows that, despite their privilege, Korean international students are racialized within racial dynamics in the United States, following the pattern of anti-Asian racism, and often derogated as “FOB” (Fresh Off the Boat) even by Korean Americans. Building on studies on immigration and race and Asian American studies, I contribute to expanding the limited literature on racialization of Asian international students by analyzing how Korean international students experience and respond to race and racism in New York City. I examine the racialization of Korean international students by focusing on English profciency, which is one of the most important forms of cultural capital that Korean international students aspire to acquire in the United States and one of the best status markers of a transnational elite. My research shows that desiring to speak, learn, and practice to be profcient in English is a transnational process always fraught with colonial and racial dynamics both in South Korea and in the United States. With a close look at the internalized racism Korean international students face, I also analyze their strategic responses to racism and racialization and examine how their class, race, and ethnicity intersect on school campuses and in the broader American society. I identify two seemingly contradictory modes of responses to racialization: ethnic identifcation as a way to avoid racialization and ethnic dis-identifcation as a way to distance themselves from racialized ethnic stigma. I report that Korean international students maneuver a balancing act between ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation, which are respectively mediated by their class status, and thus create a specifc local intersection of class, race, and ethnicity on campuses and in the broader American society. The racialization of Korean international students who are a constituent of transnational elite groups challenges the notion that there is a unifed “class” as implied in terms such as “transnational capitalist class” or “global class.” Rather, it suggests a racial stratifcation within transnational elite social groups. Furthermore, the geographical variability of their status implies

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Introduction

7

that their “transnational” status cannot simply transcend the border either. “Racialized transnational elites,” the term I use to refer to Asian international students is a term of tension and oxymoron that connotes and indicates that problem. For this reason, tracing and analyzing racialized transnational elites calls for conceptualizing the border in transnational social felds and the simultaneity of multiple statuses across the border.

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CONCEPTUALIZING SIMULTANEOUS MULTIPLE SOCIAL STATUSES ACROSS THE BORDER My work also contributes to empirical fndings and conceptual innovation to advance a social inquiry on globalization, immigration, and migration. I provide an analysis that incorporates incongruent social statuses that transnational migrants occupy simultaneously in multiple societies into one coherent framework. As my own work confrms, studies point out that immigrants or migrants can occupy very different social statuses in the sending and receiving countries (e.g., Espiritu 2003; Kim 2008; Waters 2001), and that a “migrant behavior is the product of these simultaneous multiple statuses of race, class, and gender” (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, 1015). The concept of simultaneity or simultaneous embeddedness is at the core of innovation in conceptualization on globalization and transnational studies (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Tsuda 2012). This concept is, however, still understudied and under-theorized (Tsuda 2012). As I discuss in detail in chapter 5, while being acutely aware of social dynamics when it comes to the host society, most studies are fxated on merely registering the transnational linkages of immigrants or migrants to the home society as an alternative to the traditional assimilation theory. Levitt and Glick Schiller’s (2004) theorization of the concept of simultaneity is, though a pioneering attempt, an example of this preoccupation: their goal of theorizing the concept of simultaneity is to reconcile assimilation and transnational ties by arguing that immigrants can “belong” to their country of origin on a level of consciousness simultaneously while they are “being” in the host society. This theorization of simultaneity as “being/belonging” comes short of the kind of conceptual innovation that is in need and illustrates how this preoccupation with the assimilation theory paradoxically tends to confne the analytic potentials of the simultaneity concept within the scope or parameter set by the assimilation theory. Corresponding with this under-theorization that relatively disregards social dynamics—and thus the agency of non-migrant coethnics—in the home society, there have been few empirical studies on structural conficts between migrants and non-migrants who are entangled in local social dynamics in

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8

Introduction

the home society thus far. I enrich empirical fndings in the felds with my studies on antagonistic social interactions, manifesting domestic class conficts—which take place because the transnational social reproduction of Korean international students involves a redistribution of power, prestige, and wealth in South Korea—between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans who wage a formidable class-based campaign against Korean international students’ social reproduction. Furthermore, based on my fndings, I break loose the concept’s fxed ties to the assimilation theory for its analytic potentials and advance the concept further by theorizing simultaneity as “being/being” to conceptualize the presence/interference in a migrant behavior of the other scene that remains invisible. To be more specifc, I analyze Korean international students’ simultaneous struggles within local social dynamics in both the United States and South Korea that shape their transnational practices such as the transfer of knowledge, diaspora-building, and uses of media, and that the social dynamics in the other social scene there always interfere with, are present in, and constitutive of Korean international students’ everyday practices here—and vice versa—although the other scene remains invisible, heterogeneous, and incommensurable. In the second part of the book, I examine Korean international students’ transmission of messages on race, diaspora-building, and uses of media through the lens of simultaneity I develop. My work shows that Korean international students’ multiple statuses simultaneously mediate their transmission of messages on race because their incongruent status as racialized others experiencing structural injustice in the United States interferes with and contradicts their status claim as cosmopolitan/transnational elites endorsing the presumed superiority of the United States in South Korea. Despite their racialization, Korean international students often become agents of neoliberal globalization and make status claims to enhance the value of their cultural capital and endorse the presumed superiority of the United States for their pursuit of power and privileges in South Korea. For the purpose of impression management, to use Goffman’s (1959) theory of presentation of self, Korean international students keep their racial reality as a “FOB” (Fresh Off the Boat) in the back stage for their presentation of self as a transnational elite in the front stage while at the same time using their associations with whites as a transnational status symbol. Consequently, across the border a systemic obscuring and misrepresentation of race and racism occurs while race appears as a hyper-visible status symbol. My research also shows that Korean international students are actively involved in diaspora-building in the United States as they are trapped in a double backlash from both sides of the border. I argue that Korean international students’ active participation in diaspora-building is a strategic response to social dynamics in both societies that enables them to at once

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Introduction

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avoid racialization in the United States and counter class resentment in South Korea to varying degrees of success. Studies on immigration and race point out that immigrants seek to avoid being placed into the racial categorization that exists in the United States by adopting an ethnic identity (Foner and Fredrickson 2004). Likewise, by articulating diasporic nationalism and organizing diaspora-building events, Korean international students tend to embrace their ethnic identity to avoid racialization. At the same time, through their participation in diaspora-building, Korean international students can pose as transnational and yet nationalist elites, presenting their study abroad not as an individual’s pursuit of a personal interest for social reproduction but of a general interest for the nation as a whole. I have observed that this approach effectively countered the resentment of non-migrant Koreans. Beyond the well-charted nativist and nationalist backlash against globalization in the Global North, this analysis of racialized transnational elites’ diasporic nationalism helps us to understand why and how ethnic nationalism is rising today when the nation-state, a historical form of political community with the nation as a people/demos being its sovereign, is undergoing a fundamental transformation in globalization (Sassen 2006). Lastly, I analyze Korean international students’ daily tactical uses of transnational new digital media such as Facebook to selectively localize or compartmentalize their transnational social relationships to deal with problems they encounter within local social dynamics in the United States and South Korea. Korean international students’ presentation of self as transnational elites already started in the United States through transnational media. New media used with such maneuvers can create an illusion of transparency across the border, making non-migrant Koreans falsely believe that they know Korean international students’ lives in the United States. BEYOND THE FLOW: INSCRIBING THE BORDER IN KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER, DIASPORA, AND CULTURAL CAPITAL Another contribution that I aim to make with this research is inscribing the border in transnational processes such as transfer of knowledge, diasporic public sphere, and conversion of cultural capital. Many scholars point out that earlier globalization studies have popularized the mystifying imaginary of transnational processes as unmediated, unbound, and disembedded “free fows” of people, information, goods, and capital across the border (e.g., Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Smith 2005; Guarnizo and Smith 1998). There have been endeavors to ground the transnational processes and move the social inquiry on globalization “beyond global fows” (Smith 2005), employing

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Introduction

such concepts as “emplacement,” “embodiment,” or “border struggle” (Dunn 2010; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Smith 2000). We now have a more grounded and realistic understanding of how the global movement of people can be regulated at the border based on class, race, and gender. However, we lack relatively comparable theoretical endeavors with regard to knowledge and information. Public imaginaries and even researches about cross-border knowledge transfer are not completely free of the myth of benign, innocuous, and neutral fow. I provide a corrective to the myth of “free fow.” By inscribing the border in Bourdieu’s (1986) theory of cultural capital, I examine in chapter 4 how structural conficts between international students and non-migrant Koreans can mediate the transfer of knowledge. My work shows that when Korean international students make status claims to enhance the value of their cultural capital by endorsing the presumed superiority of the United States, non-migrant Koreans in South Korea, in turn, reject such status claims and put down their cultural capital with class and nationalist resentments, for the transnational social reproduction of Korean international students redistributes power, prestige, and wealth in South Korea. I conceptualize the conficts as a struggle over cross-border reconversion of cultural capital into local power and wealth, reworking Bourdieu’s (1986) theory on cultural capital for transnational social felds. I demonstrate that the struggle mediates international students’ transfer of knowledge in general as the knowledge to be transferred constitutes their cultural capital. It shows that the transfer of knowledge is far from being a smooth process but rather a messy struggle over domination. In addition, in the second part of the book where I employ the lens of simultaneity, I analyze the transnational practices of Korean international students that create opaqueness, distortion, and illusion over the border for the purpose of impression management to pose as transnational elites. These practices include Korean international students’ tactical uses of transnational media to obscure their racial reality, and digitally mediated diasporic public events and ethnic performances that render American and South Korean societies a back stage to each other, that is, the other scene remaining invisible: South Korean society cannot see that such diasporic public events and ethnic performances are a response to avoid racialization in the United States while American society cannot see that these activities are a response to class resentments in South Korea. Research Method and Sites To collect the data for this research, I have used in-depth interviews complemented with ethnographic observations and content/discourse analyses.

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Between June 2013 and October 2014, I conducted a total of 121 interviews in New York City and in Seoul, South Korea (for about three months of stay altogether in summer and winter months in 2013). The breakdown of the 121 interviews are (a) 51 Korean international students studying in the United States (30 women and 21 men; 31 undergraduates and 20 graduates), who are mostly enrolled in schools in New York City and diverse in age, degree, and feld of study; (b) 38 non-migrant Koreans in South Korea (19 women and 19 men), who are college students, homemakers, or in the corporate sector, with most of them having friends or acquaintances who are studying or have studied in the United States; (c) 17 Koreans (8 women and 9 men), who are former international students, with 13 of them having completed their academic studies in the United States and the rest in another Global North country and are now mostly living and working in Seoul; and (d) 15 Korean American students and other relevant individuals to learn about their perspectives of Korean international students. My categorization of respondents is not strictly based on their legal status. I also consider divisions among on-campus social groups in terms of socialization and assimilation levels. The “international students” category includes not only those who are on nonimmigrant visas (e.g., F-1 visa) but also fve U.S. citizen students, for although they were born in the United States when their parents were studying here, they grew up in South Korea and mostly socialize with other Korean international students. Likewise, I exclude three students who are on F-1 visas from the category because they live with their immediate families who are more integrated into Korean American society. Modeling on successful researches that examine migrants or immigrant communities (e.g., Abelmann and Lie 1995; Kim 2008; Levitt 2001), I have taken a transnational and multisited approach that is considered to be proper in studying globalization and transnational processes (Burawoy et al. 2000) and to obtain disparate perspectives of migrants and non-migrants. Answering my research question requires examining two different scenes of Korean international students’ lives in the United States and South Korea and connections between them: their lives as a person of color in the United States and their lives as a transnational elite in South Korea and diasporic public sphere through transnational media. My research method is designed mainly to: (a) investigate the ways in which Korean international students become racialized and othered in New York City as a person of color and (b) examine the ways in which Korean international students interact and communicate with non-migrant Koreans either in their face-to-face interaction or through new media across the border. The interview questions for the Korean international student respondents include their experiences prior to coming to the United States, how their ideas about the United States and their initial plans may or may not have

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Introduction

altered as a result of their experience of race or racial discrimination, what language or ideological forms they use to make sense of and theorize about racialization and racial discrimination, and what tactics they use to ft in and to overcome isolation and marginalization. As communication counterparts to Korean international students, I interviewed non-migrant Koreans in South Korea who have international student friends or acquaintances to gather data primarily on what they actually hear from Korean international students and their own perceptions of race and their friends or acquaintances’ lives in the United States. The interview questions for the non-migrant Korean respondents cover their conversations with their Korean international friends or acquaintances about American society, race and racialization, and their lives; what they perceive about them; and what they think about the social status of Korean international students in Korean society. The interviews of non-migrant Koreans were critical to understanding what Korean international students say to their non-migrant Korean friends and analyzing what has been actually transmitted, translated, or silenced about race across the border. Moreover, their interviews yielded unexpected fndings about the existence of class and nationalist tensions toward study abroad and their perspectives on it. These fndings deepened my understanding about Korean international students’ negative interactions with non-migrant Koreans and the agency of non-migrants who engage in everyday practices of a class-based campaign against Korean international students’ social reproduction. This, in turn, led me to modify my initial framework that implicitly took the social reproduction of Korean international students for granted and recalibrated the focus of my investigation and analysis to have a closer look at the antagonistic social interaction. Additionally, my interviews of Korean American students elicited their perspectives and observations of Korean international students as well as their interactions with them at school. I identifed my respondents through personal networks, advertisements, and snowballing. I identifed current and former Korean international students mostly through my personal networks, advertisements in websites and social media, Korean international student organizations, and Korean churches in New York City. I identifed non-migrant Koreans in South Korea mostly through advertisements on websites of major universities located in Seoul and my personal and community networks. I identifed the Korean American students enrolled in institutions in New York City with a large Korean international student presence through my personal networks, including my engagement with New York City–based community groups that work on Asian immigrant and Asian American issues and by asking participants in events organized by student associations. The interviews were open-ended, and each interview lasted between one hour and a half and two hours. I explained my research and tape-recorded

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the interviews with their permission. The interviews were usually conducted in coffee shops, classrooms, or university lounges where it was not crowded and noisy. All of the interviews with Korean international students were primarily conducted in Korean although some responded in English for their convenience. The interviews with Korean American students were primarily conducted in English. I transcribed and translated all the interviews. The translation of Korean words and sources to English throughout the book is my own. I have used the McCune–Reischauer romanization system for the translation. The names of all respondents are pseudonyms used to protect their identities. Throughout the period of collecting interviews, I also conducted online ethnographic observations and content/discourse analyses of Korean international students’ use of media such as Facebook, student associations’ online postings, and news articles or popular cultural products that are relevant to Korean international students. I coded and sorted the interviews into categories that are developed throughout the research based on existing theories and on-the-go analysis of interviews and integrated them into a coherent theory, following the analytic process that Robert S. Weiss (1994) suggested.

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THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY There have been strong political, military, and economic ties between the United States and South Korea (Abelmann and Lie 1995; Kim 2008). South Korea is one of the leading places of origin for international students in higher education in the United States. From 2001 to 2015, South Korea has been, after China and India, the third source country for each academic year, reaching about 75,000 students at its peak in the 2008–2009 academic year (IIE 2018c). South Korea is a good case study for analysis because, notwithstanding its relatively small population compared to China and India, the ratio of international students to its total population exceeds the other two Asian countries by far. The impact of international students’ migration pattern will be more substantial in South Korea and Korean American society than in most other countries and their respective community in the United States. The shift in the Korean American community is already dramatic. Those who have entered the United States on a nonimmigrant visa and subsequently adjusted their status to legal permanent residency now take up as much as over 80 percent of Korean immigration mainly due to international students, in contrast to the 1980s when they made up less than 20 percent, reversing the post-1965 pattern of Korean immigration in the United States (Min 2013). South Korea is also a major source country of undocumented immigrants with a 2012 estimate of 230,000 undocumented Koreans living in the country (U.S. DHS 2013).

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Introduction

New York City was a strategic site for my research largely due to its large population and diversity of Korean international students and its reputation as one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the United States. After California, New York is the second largest destination state for international students in the United States. As New York City has an extensive Korean immigrant labor market, where students in need of employment could fnd it relatively easy, the city draws Korean international students with diverse socioeconomic backgrounds from very wealthy to working class. Five undergraduates of the ffty-one Korean international students I interviewed work full time in low-wage jobs off-campus to support themselves while taking full credits because their families in South Korea do not have the fnancial resources to support them. Their economic situation suggests that these fve students are from low-income families. Additional three undergraduates and one graduate work part-time off-campus to partly support themselves or earn extra spending money. It is often believed that race and racism is “less salient” in New York City as it is one of the most diverse and cosmopolitan American cities. Thus, an examination of the breadth and depth in which racial discrimination and racialization affect Korean international students in the city can better illustrate both the pervasiveness and signifcance of race and racism as a pivotal social issue in the United States than other American cities.

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Outline of the Book This book, following this introduction, consists of two parts. In the frst part, which consists of chapters 1 through 4, I identify and discuss Korean international students’ social reproduction endeavors to become transnational elites and their struggles within social dynamics in the United States and in South Korea. In chapter 1, I report my fndings that Korean international students come to study in the United States as their family strategy for transnational social reproduction in globalization. In chapters 2 and 3, I discuss the racialization and marginalization of Korean international students in New York City by examining various aspects of their everyday life, focusing on coloniality and power dynamics with regard to English language skills among Koreans. I also analyze the intersection of class, race, and ethnicity on campuses and broader American society as Korean international students seek to balance between ethnic identifcation as a way to avoid racialization and ethnic dis-identifcation as a result of the racialized ethnic stigma. In chapter 4, I report my fndings of class and nationalist conficts in South Korea over Korean international students’ transnational social reproduction via study abroad that take a form of struggle over reconversion of cultural capital that they have acquired into local power and wealth, which mediates transfer of knowledge in general.

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In the second part of the book, which consists of chapters 5 through 7, I put Korean international students’ incongruent multiple statuses as a “FOB”cum-elite into one framework with a lens of simultaneity and show how the other scene is constitutive of Korean international students’ practices such as the transmission of messages on race, diaspora-building, and uses of media. In chapter 5, I examine how the incongruent statuses interfere with their status claims, and how Korean international students put in the back stage and obscure their racial reality in their cross-border transmission of messages on race to manage their impression as transnational elites while at the same time use their associations with whites as a transnational status marker. In chapter 6, I report my fndings that, as they are trapped in double backlash from both sides of the border, Korean international students are actively involved in diaspora-building in the United States as an adaptive response to simultaneously avoid racialization here and counter class resentment in South Korea. I argue that understanding the politics of racialized transnational elites through a lens of simultaneity is crucial in advancing our perspective on globalization and new social inequalities. Lastly, in chapter 7, I analyze Korean international students’ daily tactical uses of transnational new digital media such as Facebook to selectively localize or compartmentalize their transnational social relationships to deal with problems they encounter within local social dynamics in the United States and South Korea. This chapter is also my contribution to the advancement of sociology of media as I show how the agency of new media enables a qualitatively new transnational life through a new economy of cross-border communication, even though it is prone to generating an illusion of transparency across the border, as it is strategically used within social relations.

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In Lieu of a Conclusion: Toward Transnational Solidarity I attended college in South Korea in the 1990s, where I engaged in student activism for social change and was inspired to be part of South Korea’s robust social movements. As it was common for many student activists, I studied political ideologies against imperialism and capitalism and critical theories largely associated with European thinkers such as Althusser, Foucault, and Habermas. I came to the United States to attend a graduate school. Despite my literacy in social movements and critical theory, I did not know how to make sense of my racial experience in the United States: I did not see myself as an Asian and a person of color before I came to the United States. I eventually gained a critical racial consciousness after many years of being involved with community groups that work with immigrants, Koreans, and Asian Americans, studying critical literature about race and racism as well as rereading of critical social theories I had studied in South Korea. This

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Introduction

transnational journey fundamentally transformed my worldview. At that point I had to ask, why as a student aspiring to be a critical intellectual I had such an inadequate understanding of a critical social issue like race and racism in South Korea although there had been long historical and political connections and extensive cultural exchanges between the two countries. This question began my research, and the signifcance of the inquiry has far reaching consequences beyond my own personal pursuit. I argue that this social inquiry is indispensable to building a transnational social movement against social inequalities under globalization. My book traces the making of racialized transnational elites by linking the micro and macro levels through Korean international students’ everyday practices to respond to social structures and forces which engender social consequences in both societies. My work sheds light on a transnational crossing of race, class, nation, and coloniality by identifying a mechanism in which the multiple processes—transnational class reproduction, the colonial hierarchy between the Global North and South, diasporic nationalism, and cross-border communication on race—are interlocked with and generative of one another. Racialized transnational elites like Korean international students are a subject occupying a strategic locus to examine the ongoing social transformation under globalization. Their peculiar predicament of being trapped in the double marginalization or backlash from both sides of the border—racialization in the United States and class and nationalist resentment in South Korea—shows that they are at a frontline of ongoing struggles over globalization to determine the future reconfguration of race, class, nation, and coloniality. Their transnational social reproduction is not an easy task. Rather, it requires demanding endeavors to achieve it and overcome challenges within social dynamics. The making of racialized transnational elites is likewise a process open to struggles and historical contingencies. The recent political upheavals and backlash against globalization such as Brexit and the election of President Trump which occurred after the data collection of this research, for example, may or may not turn out to be a major setback to the making of transnational elite groups, intensifying the predicament of Korean international students and disrupting some of their transnational practices I discuss in this research. It remains to be seen how Korean and other Asian international students make sense of their recently intensifed predicament and how successfully they organize to respond to it, whether it is in Silicon Valley that has been galvanized by the Trump administration’s immigration policies or on college campuses across the country. International students are ambiguous beings as they can be a new progressive political subject bridging social movements across the border or a reactionary actor that translates their experience of racism into essentialist ethnic nationalism in their country of origin. That should be a topic of future research. Whether

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Introduction

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the current backlash around the world leads to a resurgence of the nation-state or to an emergence of alternative globalization, the ongoing tracing of the making or unmaking of racialized transnational elites as a new transnational social group can be a bellwether that points in the direction of history. Lastly, let me briefy discuss what is at stake politically and theoretically in tracing transnational actors and analyzing dynamic transnational processes such as transnational social reproduction, transfer of knowledge, and diaspora-building by employing a lens of simultaneity. Social inequalities under globalization have created a fundamental crisis in the modern form of democracy and citizenship (Held 1995), the nature of which this book illustrates with an analysis of the new transnational fgure. This historical development has profoundly disoriented and arguably rendered obsolete the modern political projects of emancipation such as anti-colonial national liberation or a project led under the “workers of the world, unite!” slogan. However, the social problems these modern political projects sought to address persist, and we do not have a new robust political program for a more democratic and egalitarian society to replace the outdated ones. With this void, discontents with social inequalities under globalization have led to, even more problematically, the recent nativist backlash against globalization around the world. In both public discourse and academia, as I discuss in details in chapter 6, we are still largely at an impasse between the two opposing normative stances regarding globalization that are rooted in the modern political projects: “beyond the nation-state” and “nations matter.” Each stance tends to reduce race to class or nation and implicitly take a local perspective of the Global North as global and universal. The inadequacy of each stance that aggravates rather than solves persistent problems from globalization is becoming increasingly apparent. It is urgent to defy the lures of an easy answer that each of the two stances promises and to move beyond the false dichotomy of the two. We need to build a new adequate normative program that is based on informed conversations among societies across the border that face connected yet heterogeneous local consequences of globalization, instead of imposing a provincial perspective of the Global North. Registering and tracing racialized transnational elites to analyze dynamic transnational processes, my work enables us to see that one and the same transnational process can cause heterogeneous social consequences simultaneously in multiple societies. That is, to understand the complexity of problems in globalization as synchronously multisited, multifaceted, and multivalent and, thus, to understand why and how the modern political projects are obsolete and inadequate in addressing social inequalities today. This new perspective can help societies across the border develop a shared understanding of the complexity of problems in globalization by underscoring the systematic misunderstandings over the border, which I argue is, though far from being suffcient, integral to formulating a

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Introduction

new robust normative program and building a genuinely democratic transnational solidarity.

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NOTES 1. A 2015 article in the Los Angeles Times reports that Asians and Asian Americans are actually “severely underrepresented at the executive levels” (Lien 2015) in Silicon Valley, accounting for less than 14 percent of executive positions while constituting about a third of the work force. 2. The Global North/South is a term used to refer to countries in the world that are divided into relatively richer and poorer countries as most of the richer countries were located in the Northern Hemisphere and the poorer ones in the Southern Hemisphere. Although the division is made in terms of wealth and development, because the division is closely connected to the global history of European colonization and largely corresponds with that between the former empires and colonies, it has come to be practically a euphemistic term to connote the former empires and colonies, replacing the term of the frst and third worlds. Following this common usage, I use the Global North/South to largely refer to the former empires and colonies and to denote the colonial hierarchy between the two, recognizing that it is somewhat politically and conceptually problematic. It has political effects to gloss over and sanitize the colonial history like the innocuously termed “countries of origin/residence” or “sending/ receiving countries” of immigrants who mostly come from the former colonies and migrate to the former empires. I prefer to use the frst/third world if it had currency in academia today. Even though some attempt to revitalize the term (e.g., Prashad 2003), it seems that the term of the Global North/South has gained currency in academia. In fact, one theoretical implication of this book is precisely that it is itself becoming increasingly problematic to put a country as a whole into a certain global category, due to the growing cross-border mobility differences among classes from one and the same country and the formation of transnational social groups cutting across the nation-state in globalization. I have determined that, despite its problematic political effects and conceptual inadequacy, the effciency and clarity the Global North/South term can lend for scholarly conversations due to its currency gained in academia outweighs the need for using or coining another term. That said, it is true that, in terms of economy and industrialization, some of the former colonies such as East Asian countries in particular have achieved a spectacular economic success, called “the East Asian economic renaissance” (Arrighi 2007), even triggering debates on whether these countries are new empires or not. This legitimately raises the question of whether or not these countries still belong to the Global South. Recognizing this historical development, I qualify these countries as “newly industrialized countries” in the Global South. When it comes to cultural and intellectual dimensions, however, coloniality is still alive and well in these countries, which constitutes the global academic hierarchy undergirding the study abroad as a means of transnational social reproduction for those wealthy families in the newly industrialized countries as shown in this book.

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3. In 2017 the six major destination countries in the Global North—the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, France, Canada, and Germany—account for 62 percent of the total international students in the world although China and Russia recently emerged as the third and seventh major destination countries respectively (IIE 2018a). 4. By globalization I understand not just the growing interconnectedness from economic and technological developments but primarily a current global process involving both the neoliberalization of global capitalism and the transformation of the nation-state resulting from the breakdown of the Westphalian interstate system under the European hegemony and the Cold War (Harvey 2007; Sassen 2006; Balibar 2002; Schmitt 2006). Understanding globalization only in terms of the development of communication and transportation or economic interdependence seems not only complicit with the Eurocentric, evolutionary, and developmentalist narrative of history as a linear progress driven by technology and science, but also inadequate in defning what is qualitatively new about the present, even if one seeks to qualify it by emphasizing an “unprecedented” level of development: A global economic system has existed, at least since the fourteenth century with the cycle of its global capital accumulation being renewed over and over again on an “unprecedented” scale with numerous technological innovations that were as much revolutionary as new technology is today (Arrighi 1994; Wallerstine 1976). To make the concept operational and adequate, therefore, it seems more proper to understand globalization as primarily referring to the ongoing structural transformation of global order resulting from the breakdown of over 400 year-old global European colonial system, the enormous subsequent social changes and displacements of which were temporarily frozen by the Cold War. Many authors also recognize that globalization involves a signifcant transformation of the nation-state by using concepts such as “postnational” (Habermas 1998), “post-Westphalian” (Fraser 2007), “disaggregated state” (Slaughter 2004), “network state” (Castells 2000), “empire” (Hardt and Negri 2001) and many others. The making of the racialized transnational managerial class and other social groups from former colonies such as Asian international students should be situated in this historical perspective. This perspective is also integral to understanding the recent ethno-nationalist backlash against globalization around the world such as Brexit and the election of President Donald J. Trump. 5. Balibar (2002, 83) observes in his infuential essay: For a rich person from a rich country, a person who tends towards the cosmopolitan (and whose passport increasingly signifes not just mere national belonging, protection and a right of citizenship, but a surplus of rights—in particular, a world right to circulate unhindered), the border has become an embarkation formality, a point of symbolic acknowledgement of his social status, to be passed at a jogtrot. For a poor person from a poor country, however, the border tends to be quite different: not only is it an obstacle that is very diffcult to surmount, but it is a place he runs up against repeatedly, passing and repassing through it. When he is expelled or allowed to rejoin his family, it becomes, in the end, a place where he resides. It is an extraordinarily viscous spatio-temporal zone, almost a home—a home in which to live a life which is a waiting-to-live, a non-life.

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Chapter 1

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Global Academic Hierarchy and Transnational Social Reproduction

In this chapter, I report my research fndings that South Korean international students largely come to study in the United States and other Global North countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom as their family strategy to preserve and maximize their power and wealth in globalization. Their study abroad is a transnational strategy for social reproduction through the acquisition of Global North academic credentials. I situate the rise of the transnational family strategy as a response to structural changes in South Korea’s domestic class competition for education and the neoliberal globalization of its society. My research further fnds that an undergraduate degree from the United States has been recently devalued in South Korea, due to ferce local competition over transnational social reproduction through study abroad and, as I focus in chapter 4, a systemic resistance of resentful non-migrant Koreans to put down the value of the Global North academic credentials. By contrast, a graduate degree remains highly esteemed because of established hegemony of the U.S. academia in South Korea that legitimates and undergirds study abroad as a viable strategy for class reproduction. Although Korean international students usually embark on their study abroad with a goal of entering and rising to prominent positions in the South Korean labor market, many adjust their immigration status to live and work in North America, as they acculturate and transnationalize themselves during their prolonged stays overseas. As a result, Korean international students have constituted the majority of Korean immigration in the United States in recent decades (Min 2013) and a signifcant portion of an emergent transnational elite social group.

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Chapter 1

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STUDY ABROAD AS A TRANSNATIONAL STRATEGY IN GLOBALIZATION Since Bourdieu’s seminal discussion on the “forms of capital” (1984, 1986), it is widely accepted that education as “cultural capital” is a primary means of class reproduction for bourgeois families in a capitalist society. Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory, in her infuential book Flexible Citizenship (1999), Aihwa Ong uses a case study of overseas Chinese to argue that, because American college degrees are “the ultimate symbolic capital necessary for global mobility” (90), the study abroad in the United States or in other Global North countries is to acquire cultural capital that is central for overseas Chinese in their “fexible strategies of accumulation” to cross borders to constantly reposition, responding to changing local political and economic climates in order to maximize benefts—to get better jobs, educate children, make investments, evade taxes, escape government control, retire comfortably, or acquire passports of multiple countries. The recent unprecedented rise of Asian international students in the Global North indicates that Ong’s theory on the study abroad as a family reproduction strategy is not limited to minorities such as overseas Chinese, who have long lived a diasporic life as middlemen minority merchants in the South East Asia even before current globalization, but it may also apply generally to local ruling elites of Asian countries that have emerged as newly industrialized countries. Johanna L. Waters’ works (2006, 2012) provide an important theorization on local ruling elites’ transnational class reproduction through study abroad. By examining how Hong Kong international students in Canada employ their study abroad as a strategy to acquire cultural capital for their class reproduction in Hong Kong, Waters forcefully argues that there are new “geographies of cultural capital” (2006) in which a confguration of transnational access to education by the local middle class and the growing international higher education market can entrench or even actively generate social inequalities in the emergent Asian economies and beyond. In a similar vein, by examining the recent domination of international students and wealthy migrants in emigration and policy changes to facilitate their transnational mobility in China, Biao Xiang (2016) argues that “emigration from China is increasingly a means of reinforcing and reproducing social inequality rather than a means of mitigating it” (17). This perspective is also consistent with the studies on mobility that point out a correlation or causation between the widening gap in spatial mobility and social stratifcation (Kaufman et al. 2007; Urry 2007). If globalization is not an innocuous or neutral process but “advantages some and disadvantages others” (Calhoun 2007, 17), causing social inequalities in a fundamental way that involves the transformation of the nation-state and the formation of transnational social groups, the connection between

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globalization of higher education and the local middle class’s transnational social reproduction through it may be one of the central areas to examine today’s social inequalities. Similarly, I fnd that many South Koreans come to the United States or go to other English-speaking countries in the Global North to study because it is a strategy that wealthy Korean families use to preserve and maximize their power and wealth in globalization. In South Korea, an American college degree is highly valued, as it is widely accepted to signify English profciency, “advanced” knowledge, and cultural exposure to a cosmopolitan society in the Global North, as earlier studies on Korean international students confrm (Kang and Abelmann 2011; Lee and Koo 2006; Lo and Kim 2012; Park and Lo 2012). Koreans who complete their education in the Global North and return home are often called the “study abroad clan” in South Korea, as opposed to locally educated elites who are called the “domestic clan,” as a distinctive cultural group that holds privileges and social capital for mutual recognition, similar to Hong Kong international students who are called the “overseas club” by locals in Hong Kong (Waters 2006). An American college degree is highly valued in South Korean society because the country has been under its hegemonic infuence ever since the Pacifc war that ended its colonization by Japan (Abelmann and Lie 1995; Armstrong 2013; Kim 2008) with many South Korean elites, including its frst president having been educated in the United States (Kim 2011). It is notable that “the strong military, political, and economic linkages between the United States and Korea served as important structural factors that signifcantly contributed to Koreans’ mass migration to the United States” (Min 2015, 4). However, it was not until the 1990s that study abroad became a popular strategy for wealthy South Korean families. We can understand this development in the context of both domestic and global changes. Externally, it is the neoliberal globalization that swept the country beginning with the fnancial crisis in the region in 1997, “a major disruption in the South Korean economy and in the livelihood of the Korean people” (Koo 2007, 2) causing massive business failures, a sharp increase in unemployment and a havoc with its middle class. The International Monetary Fund demanded a structural adjustment program in South Korea for its bailout fund that introduced neoliberal restructuring and the fexibilization of labor in the corporate sector that replaced the norm of job security and lifetime employment with layoffs and contingent workers. It has also introduced and normalized the transnational capital corporate culture in the country with U.S.-educated Koreans being one of the major agents of that change. This neoliberal globalization of the society created a labor market that preferred those educated in the United States and fuent in English (Abelmann et al. 2015; Koo 2007; Park and Lo 2012).

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Domestically, a primary development has been intense class competition for education as a result of democratization of higher education that gave the Korean working class an unprecedented access to academic credentials in the 1990s. Waters (2006) points out that one of the reasons why middle-class families in Hong Kong adopted study abroad as a strategy for class reproduction was because of a growing local competition for academic credentials “just as local educational opportunities for the children of working-class families have signifcantly expanded” (182). Drawing on Bourdieu’s insight on class competition for education,1 Waters (2006) argues that study abroad is a strategy of Hong Kong’s middle-class families to “step up their investments so as to maintain the relative scarcity of their qualifcations” (Bourdieu qtd, 182) in order to distinguish themselves from working-class families in the neoliberalized labor market. A similar trend took place in South Korea. There was a drastic expansion of higher education and a rapid increase of universities, reaching a total saturation of higher education market in South Korea. This democratization of domestic higher education, combined with the neoliberal globalization of the society, ironically resulted in a strict hierarchy of academic credentials among Korean universities, which South Koreans often call “a degree-caste system” (Kim 2012). Korean universities struggle to excel in its evaluation and rankings by including lectures and publications of papers by its faculty in English, which are crucial for receiving government funding and high enrollment in order to survive in the globalizing higher education market. Fierce competition to attend top-tier universities has brought an intense level of pressure to perform well in school among Korean high school students, a factor widely believed to contribute to high rates of suicides among them. In this domestic context, study abroad can be both an option available to Korean children of wealthy families to step out of the ferce competition and a strategy to step up their investment to acquire academic credentials and qualifcations to better leverage the neoliberal labor market. This is the context that some frame the study abroad of Korean international students as “South Korea’s education exodus” (Lo et al. 2015) in which Korean international students exit the domestic competition. For this reason, Korean precollege international students are often labeled as “escapees” in South Korean society. However, we should not see South Koreans’ study abroad as just an exit strategy from competition. It is primarily a strategy for a reentry into or a detour to the long-term competition of class reproduction. With soaring unemployment in the South Korean economy, we can clearly see the signifcance of study abroad from the perspective of class competition between those trying to step up qualifcations and those trying to catch-up in the neoliberal labor market. In a nutshell, these local and global developments constitute the historical context in which South Korean middle-class families

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started to send their children in mass to the United States or other Global North countries for education since the 1990s. In middle-class South Korean families’ strategic thinking, any foreign college degree is considered to be worth more than a degree from South Korean universities, except a degree from top-tier South Korean universities. An American college degree allows an entry into the South Korean labor market with certain privileges for children of wealthy Korean families who don’t have good enough grades to be admitted into one of the top universities in South Korea, which is critical for economic prosperity (Kim 2011). Because of the recent devaluation of undergraduate degrees from the United States in South Korean society, which I shall discuss below, those degrees have lost the premium they once had and can no longer guarantee an economically prosperous future. Yet, study abroad is still a lesser of two evils for children of wealthy Korean families who don’t excel in school because the other option of going to a less prestigious Korean university is practically considered a sure path to failure in social reproduction in South Korean society. Hyunjin, a female high school graduate who has lived in New York for three years reports her reason for coming to the United States:

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When I entered 10th grade, I started to do poorly in school. I was not a strong athlete nor did I have artistic talents that could get me into a good college in Korea. I was always attracted to studying in the United States because I had heard that math was easier to excel here. I knew that I was going to work in South Korea, so I wanted to go to a university with an “English” name rather than a Korean university that was not prestigious. Any English-named university sounds better than a non-prestigious Korean university, right? That’s why I came to the United States.

For those who perform well in school in South Korea, study abroad is a way to step up their investment in academic credentials. A college degree from a prestigious American university can provide a competitive edge over those with a degree from a South Korean university, including a degree from one of the highly esteemed South Korean universities, and thus ensure a more prosperous future. Sooja, a South Korean mother in mid-forties who has been thinking about sending her teenage daughter to study abroad for college reports: If a child gets good grades [in South Korea] and you can afford fnancially, wouldn’t you want to send the child to Harvard or Columbia from a parent’s perspective? Korean kids are smart. If a kid were smart enough to get into the Seoul National University (a top-tier South Korean university) . . . if the parents can fnancially afford, wouldn’t they want to send their child to Harvard? It doesn’t make sense to say that a kid should go to a South Korean university

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because the kid has good grades . . . in this era where everyone is talking about “going global.” These days, even if you graduate from the Seoul National University, there is no guarantee that you will get a job. But things are different with a degree from Harvard or Yale.

The study abroad strategy requires a delicate calculation of costs and benefts in the long term. South Korean families undertake a complicated assessment of many factors when they plan their children’s study abroad. These factors include fnancial resources, allocation of resources among their children, an optimum combination of domestic and international education, and the market value of universities in different labor markets, among others. Jisun, a non-migrant Korean woman in early twenties provides a good snapshot of how Korean families plan out such transnational social reproduction. Jisun goes to a top university in South Korea. Her parents sent her brother to New Zealand when he was in middle school because he was interested in fne arts and was not getting good grades in school. They chose New Zealand because they thought that it was less expensive than the United States and had heard that New Zealanders were generally less discriminatory than Australians. Jisun also wanted to study abroad. However, her parents didn’t have enough money to send her as well. And unlike her brother, Jisun was getting good grades in school. Her parents wanted her brother to return and attend college in South Korea because they thought that his English was profcient enough. However, her brother ended up going to college in New Zealand because he didn’t get into a top-tier university in South Korea. Like many other families in South Korea, Jisun’s family determined that any foreign college degree would be worth more than a South Korean college degree, unless it was from one of the top-tier South Korean universities. Now Jisun’s parents want her brother to stay in New Zealand until he earns his legal permanent residency. Depending on their conditions, families devise vastly different transnational strategies and itineraries that often involve fnancial investments, marriage, and reproduction as Ong (1999) shows with overseas Chinese families. Accordingly, my Korean international student subjects are very diverse. One student I interviewed has obtained legal permanent residency (a green card) as a result of her parents’ fnancial investment in the United States. South Korea has been one of the major source countries for the U.S. Immigrant Investor Program.2 South Korea was the top source country of those accepted in the program from 2005 when the number of precollege Korean international students was at its peak, until 2008 when China soared and took the top position (U.S. Department of State 2008). This shows a close connection between study abroad and fnancial investment as family strategies.3 Many Korean international students are those that Koreans call “early study abroad” because they have spent their primary and/or secondary education years in the United States or in another country. Twenty-fve out

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of the ffty-one Korean international student respondents I interviewed went to a middle or high school in the United States or another English-speaking country prior to coming to New York City for college. Some have Canadian or New Zealand residency. Some are U.S. citizens, although they grew up in South Korea, because they were born while their parents were studying in the United States. This diversity defes a simple legal defnition of international students as F-1 or M-1 visa holders. Minkyung, a female graduate in early thirties who has lived in the United States for one year reports her observation about international students’ reproduction strategy:

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My friend who studies in another school also thinks that he will have his second child in the United States no matter what because he thinks that it is the best option. I hear that Latin Americans say that MBA stands for “Making Babies in America.” They think that is the best option. No reason not to, if you can . . . though it is unfair. If you are at an age to have children, it is natural to think that. My friend had his frst child in South Korea, but he told me that he would have had the baby in the United States if he had gotten into a business school that year. If a child is a U.S. citizen, there are more options . . . so there is no reason not to, if you can.

A controversial common strategy that Koreans call “wild geese families” (e.g., Lee and Koo 2006, Park and Lo 2012) illustrates how far Korean families are willing to go for their transnational social reproduction through study abroad. The wild geese family consists of a father who works and lives in South Korea to fnancially support his wife and their children who live in the United States or another English-speaking country for several years for the purpose of achieving English profciency. The sensational controversy of sending young kids abroad alone or the “wild geese family” has drawn scholarly attention, disproportionally more so than other types of Korean international students. Korean parents’ strong commitment to invest in their children’s study abroad often comes from their own experience of job insecurity from the emergence of neoliberal market that demands English profciency in workplaces, globally standardized corporate culture, and other job qualifcations in South Korea. Hyunja, a non-migrant Korean woman in late thirties with a teenage daughter and a husband who works at a Korean branch of a transnational corporation in Seoul reports her husband’s anxiety about his job: My husband works at a foreign corporation in Seoul. His co-workers are usually wild geese families, or send their children to a foreign language high school in South Korea. So my husband got anxious and said to me, “Would it be enough for our child to just read English books? We might ruin our kid’s education.” I guess he became anxious because he saw those who speak English well got promoted at work. He works in the IT industry. People there don’t speak English

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very well. They used to be lenient about limited English profciency in the past, but things have changed. Like what happened yesterday. . . . It is an American company, and my husband’s boss is Irish. He told me that his boss said, referring to a person who doesn’t speak English well, “What’s the matter with the person? How can he have that job title? We should fre him.” So, my husband thought: “There is really no place anymore for those who cannot speak English.” The boss is a foreigner, so he is not even sympathetic. It is really a global society now. In the corporate world, there will be more global corporations in the future. To get a job, it is necessary to speak English. So parents want their children to speak English like natives do.

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Korean parents observe and compare different strategies of study abroad that their friends or coworkers employ to fnd the most effcient one for themselves and their children. Minkyung, a female graduate in early thirties who worked for years in a company in Seoul before she came to the United States a year ago reports her observation at work: I saw many wild geese families. I don’t think it is a good idea. Fathers left behind in South Korea suffer physically and mentally. I think that is the worst scenario because children, left alone, can have problems and get into troubles unless they have a support network. I think the best scenario is when a father is transferred to an overseas branch of his company. Then the entire family can go abroad together. That is the best . . . although it is funny to rank them. When I was a student, it was rare to see younger kids studying abroad, but it looks like it is becoming the norm to send their children overseas to study English for a year or two during their middle or high school years. I was surprised to see my director send his kid overseas. I felt that sending their children is no longer limited to wealthy families. So, when there is a position available at an overseas branch, there is ferce competition for it. My friends at other companies have told me that, too. They make a lot of efforts to be transferred to an overseas position, and once they get there, they try to not come back. If they have to come back, they leave their family there to learn English to be profcient. My cousin did that, too. Any family with children in elementary schools wants so badly to do that.

Studying in the United States can also be a vehicle for social and economic mobility for low-income Korean families even though they may not have the fnancial resources to support their children. In New York City, there are Korean international students who rely on their Korean American relatives for fnancial support and work in the Korean immigrant ethnic labor market to support themselves. Five undergraduate respondents work full time in low-wage jobs off-campus to earn money to cover their tuition and living costs while carrying full-time course load because their families in South Korea do not have the fnancial resources to support them. Their economic situation suggests that these fve students are from low-income families. Additionally, three undergraduates and one graduate work part-time

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off-campus to partly support themselves or earn extra spending money. For example, Heejoon, a male undergraduate in late twenties dropped out of college in South Korea because he wasn’t satisfed with it. Although his family had no resources to send him to the United States, Heejoon came anyway to live with and work for his uncle who owns and operates a deli. He initially enrolled in a community college, and subsequently transferred to a university. Urban cities like New York City or Los Angeles draw low-income Korean international students because there is a sizeable Korean immigrant economy where they can fnd jobs to support themselves during their study abroad. Jichul, a male undergraduate in early thirties who works full time in a Korean restaurant reports how he decided to come to New York:

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I didn’t know that much about other countries, and many people had gone to the United States to study . . . and I heard that there were many jobs in New York, so I thought I could work on weekends. There are a lot of jobs in L.A. as well, but there are more opportunities here. That is the most important reason why I decided to come to New York. I learned that through the Internet. And a friend was studying in the United States. Although he is rich and lives in Gangnam (an affuent neighborhood in Seoul), he told me that there are many jobs in the Korean American community, and that I could make decent money as a cashier . . . enough to support myself.

Korean international students from low-income families seem to be driven by a strong determination to climb up the class ladder from their disadvantaged position. For example, Hyungjin, a male undergraduate in his late twenties works forty-fve hours a week at a Korean-owned jewelry business while taking a full course load as an undergraduate in a community college. As foreign degrees, English profciency, and acculturation to cosmopolitan culture in the Global North grant advantages in the South Korean labor market and privileges and status in all other quarters of the society, many South Korean college students seek to catch up with their international student counterparts and compensate for their respective disadvantage by coming to the United States or going to other English-speaking countries to learn English as exchange students or enroll in English as Second Language (ESL) programs for relatively short periods of time.4 HEGEMONY OF THE U.S. ACADEMIA: THE DIFFERENTIATION OF DEGREE VALUES There has been a recent devaluation of American undergraduate degrees in South Korea, which has changed the pattern and demography of Korean study abroad. We can see the devaluation in the context of competition and non-migrant Koreans’ resistance to put down the values of the Global North

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cultural capital. The devaluation is partly because too many Korean families, including low and middle-class families for whom sending their children abroad may be beyond their means, regardless have participated in study abroad, particularly during the height of its popularity, thereby oversupplying the South Korean labor market with American college degree holders. A lingering perception of Korean international undergraduate students as mostly “escapees” from ferce domestic competition (Kang and Abelmann 2011; Lo and Kim 2012; Park and Lo 2012), unlike international graduate students most of whom have acquired their undergraduate degree in South Korea, further contributes to the devaluation in South Korea. The domestic competition intensifed as Koreans tried to catch up with Korean international students by enrolling in short-term ESL programs or other means, such as working holidays, a student guest worker program in Australia or New Zealand. In addition, the fervor for learning English and the demand for democratizing access to English language education in South Korea led to what Kang and Abelmann (2011) call the “domestication” of early study abroad which engendered a large private education market in South Korea to teach English and help students prepare for study abroad, which signifcantly weakened the public education system and prompted public policies to adapt to the trend: providing fnancial and institutional supports, national and local government agencies recommended that public schools in secondary education hire “native English speakers,” established affordable spaces such as an “English village”—a theme park like space, where kids can practice speaking English in a simulated everyday life with mostly white English language instructors who act as residents of the village—around the country, and hosted an international school or a local branch of a private school or university from the United States, the United Kingdom, or Canada in special economic zones such as Incheon or Jeju island.5 Small enclaves of mostly white or Korean American English language instructors have mushroomed all over the country. This domestication internalized not only the cost but also addressed the risks and concerns of sending young kids abroad without proper guidance and support.6 One South Korean government statistics of precollege Korea international students shows that the domestication has successfully absorbed a signifcant portion of the demand for study abroad: The number of precollege Korean international students in 2006, at its height, was over 27,000 compared to about a half of that fgure in 2012 (Ministry of Education 2018), whereas the number of Korean international students in graduate and undergraduate programs has remained steady with a small decrease since 2006. This domestication of study abroad and, to a certain degree, the democratization of English profciency that Korean international students

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once monopolized enabled non-migrant Koreans to catch up to Korean international students in the academic credential arms race and contributed to the devaluation of study abroad for undergraduate degrees. If there were a public declaration of the devaluation of study abroad, it would be the special report that The Chosunilbo, South Korea’s most infuential newspaper with a conservative bent, published in June 2009 (Yeom et al. 2009). The special report that consisted of a series of articles can be regarded as an in-depth evaluation of study abroad as a social reproduction strategy for the major constituent of its readership—Korean middle-class families who consider sending their children abroad. The report was based on interviews of (1) one hundred Koreans who started studying abroad as precollege students from 1994 to 2000 and returned to South Korea, which the report referred to as “the frst generation of early study abroad students” and (2) additional one hundred individuals from various businesses and the human resources feld. The report concluded that study abroad was only “half successful” because the social success of those interviewed had not met their own expectations and that of their families. The interviewees were not earning as much income as their families had expected, and their acquisition of English profciency was far from being that of a “native speaker.” They were having trouble integrating back into society, even though they spent “satisfying” youth period and acquired confdence and good “personality” abroad. The special report’s message was clear: While study abroad as a strategy is still doable, it is not very cost-effcient, and thus Korean middle-class families should lower their expectations on the benefts they can reap from study abroad despite the level of investment it requires. On the other hand, the situation is quite different for graduate degrees from American universities. My research fnds that the strategy of gaining prestige and social statuses in South Korean society through a U.S. degree equally applies to Korean students who come to the United States seeking master’s or PhD degrees. As opposed to the recently devalued U.S. undergraduate degrees, the value of U.S. graduate degrees remains stable, as they are still perceived to be superior to domestic graduate degrees because of U.S. academic hegemony in South Korean society. The hegemony is nowhere more visible than in the domination of U.S. PhD holders in recent faculty hires in the South Korean academia (Kim 2015). Most of the PhD students I interviewed reported that they were compelled to come to the United States because of the prevalence of those with U.S. PhD degrees in recent faculty hires in major Korean universities across various disciplines. It is becoming increasingly hard to compete for an academic position in South Korea with just a PhD degree from a Korean university as Korean universities strive to survive neoliberal globalization and excel in the evaluation for university

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rankings with “the current expansion of the global network in Korean universities, where evaluation centers on the publication of papers in English and on increasing the number of lectures delivered in English” (Kim 2012, 473). For many Korean international students who come to the United States for PhD programs for the purpose of becoming a scholar despite their lack of English profciency, studying abroad is not the best option. Rather, it is like selecting the lesser of two evils in that the other option—getting a domestic PhD in South Korea—is hard to accept, just as the option of going to a less prestigious Korean university is so for Korean high school students. Today, the South Korean academic job market is saturated with too many PhD holders. However, the competition for a position is almost exclusively among Korean international students who have studied in the United States and not with non-migrant Koreans. A female student in early thirties, working toward a PhD degree in social science reports this situation in talking about how she decided to come to study in the United States: When I frst started my master’s program in South Korea, I was going to continue on with a PhD. I decided to pursue my PhD in the United States because, otherwise, it would be hard to make a living. It became obvious when I saw the faculty hires at my university. My family would have discouraged me to pursue a PhD if it was in South Korea. If you look at the professors [at my school], who has a PhD from a Korean school? They all have PhD’s from the United States. All of some 20 tenured professors have PhD’s from the United States, except for one. That one professor has a PhD from a European country. Even though my department is one of the largest departments, there is not a single person with a PhD from a domestic school! Looking at that structure, I had to come to the United States. Whether you can teach classes in English is also a big factor in faculty hires.

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Another Korean international PhD student in the humanities reports: All the professors in my department got their PhDs abroad. Hundred percent! It looks like the architecture department in particular has many who studied abroad. I wanted to become a professor since I was young, so I was curious about where and what schools I need to attend to become one. Because it is not written in any book, I needed to see how it is done. I frst checked the CVs of the professors at my college to fnd out where they earned their MA and PhD, and then those at other schools, because that information is all available in the Internet . . . trying to fgure out what areas I should focus on to get a job at my college . . . even though this sounds opportunistic, but checking professors’ ages to fgure out which departments would have vacancy with their retirements. . . . It is not that there are a lot of benefts for studying abroad, but there are too many disadvantages of studying in South Korea. I came to the United States not

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because I wanted to, but as the second best option because you cannot become a professor with a domestic PhD. There is less of high premium for a U.S degree anymore because there are too many Koreans with U.S. degrees now.

Another PhD student in engineering reports:

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People studying mechanical engineering come to study in the United States because English is important; there are more personal connections; and companies prefer those with U.S. degrees. I saw someone who advanced nicely in a company. I chose the United States over Germany most importantly because of English. There are so many more benefts in speaking English than speaking German, including publications and networking in the academia because it is the lingua franca. And there is a big community of those with U.S. degrees in South Korea. . . . And professors in my department are mostly U.S. PhD holders. Students come to the United States because they admire American universities where their professors studied. The trend is that less and less students go to study in Europe.

Korean international students in graduate programs represent 28.5 percent of the total Korean international students in the United States with those in undergraduate programs accounted for 50.7 percent in the academic year of 2017–2018 (IIE 2018c).7 Despite their smaller percentage out of the total international student population, U.S. graduate-degree holders can have greater infuence than those with undergraduate degrees in South Korean society because more senior positions with power in many quarters of the society require advanced degrees. With a case study of Korean international graduate students in a Midwest university, Jongyoung Kim (2011, 2012, 2015) criticizes the role that Korean international graduate students play in reproducing the hegemony of the U.S. academia and the South Korean academia’s dependency on it. Kim argues that Korean international graduate students become “academic subalterns” (2012) who internalize and embody the hegemony of the U.S. academia and beneft from brokering knowledge to South Korea as “middlemen minority” (2015) who are strategically located in the structural interstice of global academia hierarchy. In addition to Kim’s (2012) argument, the hegemony of U.S. academia that commands knowledge production in South Korea and that keeps the perceived superiority of U.S. graduate degrees untouchable to non-migrant Koreans’ vigorous efforts to catch up undergirds and spearheads study abroad as a viable strategy for social reproduction in the country. It is, in the last instance, none other than the intellectual hegemony of the Global North that legitimates and naturalizes the study abroad strategy as acquiring and bringing back “advanced” knowledge for the sake of South Koreans. To

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understand the emergence of and conditions under which international students from the Global South are here, we should situate it in the context of global colonial history (Madge et al. 2009). Without looking at global hierarchy, we cannot even understand why a U.S. college degree and profciency in English constitute such coveted cultural capital for class reproduction that induces international students to come in the frst place. We need to bring a perspective Espiritu (2004) calls a “critical transnational perspective” to international students as well as to other migrants: it is empires that frst crossed the border and caused displacements before migrants came to the former metropolises. For Korean international graduate students, it takes in the form of South Korean academia’s dependency on the academia in the Global North, while it is economic hardship or political crisis for underprivileged immigrants. Regardless of whether they intend to or not, Korean international graduate students help reproduce the global hierarchy of academia that undergirds study abroad as a strategy for class reproduction for affuent Korean families to the extent that they take part in and beneft from “the academic industrial complex within which U.S. scholars work [that] has trained many Asian scholars and is also being adopted by Asian countries” (Nguyen and Hoskins 2014, 17) instead of challenging it. We can sense in their apologetic tone that Korean international students are self-conscious about their participation in the creation of social inequality and their conformism. A male PhD student in the humanities who came to the United States as a graduate student said:

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I just did not want to study in South Korea because people think that a U.S. degree is better. . . . They used to think that England was good with Cambridge and other schools, but England is less popular now. Although I don’t want to jump on the study abroad bandwagon, it is South Koreans’ perception. I am studying to become a professor, so I cannot ignore that perception. . . . I’ve decided that, if I can’t change the system, it is not wise to go against the grain.

In the face of intense competition with the devaluation of undergraduate degrees and the democratization of English profciency, the relatively stable value of graduate degrees based on the hegemony of the U.S. academia can be a way to step up on the academic credential arms race, once again to distinguish themselves not only from non-migrant Koreans but also from other Korean international undergraduate students to maintain an edge in the labor market. A master’s degree from an American university can facilitate achieving success in the South Korean corporate sector. Some of my subjects quit their good paying jobs with major corporations in South Korea to come to study in the United States. Minkyung, a female graduate student who worked in a Korean company for fve years before coming to the United States said:

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Q: Were there others in your company who had gone to study abroad like you? A: Many. In fact, everyone wants to. But, because of fnancial constraints and family obligations, not many actually go. Everyone seems to want to study abroad. Q: How does studying abroad help people generally in a company? A: It will be different on a case-to-case basis, but generally speaking English helps. Because the society is becoming more global, even in a Korean company you can use and apply American systems and practices. . . . English profciency is very important. If you study abroad in a good university, it is like a badge of honor that gives you advantage over others in the company in terms of promotion, among others.

Many Korean international students who initially came to acquire only an undergraduate degree change their plan and extend their study abroad to pursue a graduate degree because they feel that their undergraduate degree has been devalued. A female undergraduate in early twenties studying design said: “I am going to either go to a graduate school to become a museum curator, or go into fashion industry. One or the other. Either way, you should go to a graduate school. I want to work, but a BA alone is not enough. So, to build up my resume, I will go to a graduate school.”

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BECOMING TRANSNATIONAL MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL ELITES The majority of Korean international students initially embark on their journey of study abroad with the goal of eventually entering the South Korean labor market. However, during their prolonged study abroad that usually takes several years to complete and during a time when they are more impressionable, their initial goal is often displaced: Korean international students become transnational migrants who are open to working in different labor markets as they acquire cosmopolitan habits, tastes, and lifestyles as well as transnational social ties of alumni, friends, and job networks and sometimes legal statuses. In other words, not only their path but also their destination tends to become transnational in the process of transnational social reproduction. As a result, the transnational social reproduction of middle-class Korean families through study abroad transitions from the reproduction of the local class via a transnational path into the production of a transnational elite social group that some scholars call the “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair 2001) or “global classes” (Sassen 2007). These transnational elites are a co-emergent fgure along with undocumented and low-income migrants and refugees from the Global South.

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The fact that Korean international students have drastically changed the face of Korean immigration in the United States in the last several decades underscores this transition. Many Korean international students, particularly those in STEM felds (Min 2015), work in the United States after they complete their education, or marry Americans, adjusting their status to legal permanent residency. The majority of earlier Korean immigrants came to the United States through family-based immigration, following the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, a landmark policy that repealed race-based restriction thinly veiled as a national origin-based quota system. This post-1965 wave of immigrants largely ended up owning and operating or working for Korean-owned small businesses, such as deli shops or green grocers often in poor African American or Latino dominant neighborhoods, because they were excluded from the mainstream labor market regardless of their job skills or academic credentials from South Korea (Kim and Kim 1999). The percentage of those who come on a nonimmigrant status, such as international students or managerial elite migrants, and subsequently obtain legal permanent residency started to soar from only about 10 percent of the total Korean immigrants in the late 1980s, to reach as high as 80.5 percent in 2009 (Min 2013). The radical change is “due mainly to the fact that many Korean international students changed their status after completion of their education in the United States” (Min 2013, 24). In the meantime, there are about 230,000 undocumented Koreans in the United States, according to a 2012 Department of Homeland Security estimate (U.S. DHS 2013). Global remittances to South Korea via formal channels increased nearly fourfold since 1990, reaching $ 8.8 billion in 2013 (MPI 2019). Korean international students adjust their status mostly through employersponsored visas in managerial and professional occupations, aided by policy changes like the 1990 immigration law that “tripled the number of professional and managerial immigrants” including other Asian international students (Min 2013, 24). They become part of the managerial class in American corporations in industries such as fnance or information technology. As discussed above, the diverse transnational strategies of South Korean families make the boundary between Korean international students and Korean American students blurry. The large-scale status adjustment of Korean international students further blurs the boundary, rendering it problematic to see Korean international students as “others” to the Korean American community. At the same time, the new Korean immigrants mostly through status adjustment are very different from earlier immigrants in many ways. Even if they adjust their status, Korean international students are far from being like the earlier Asian immigrant communities with a goal of assimilation, at least nominally, in spite of sustained transnational ties. Rather, they are more like the transnational subject that Ong (1999) describes who takes a “fexible”

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approach to citizenship and are willing to jump from one labor market to another across the border to reposition, reacting to changing local political and economic climates. Korean international students are very fexible about their future. They often shift their thinking on careers, the country of ultimate residency, and any future transnational itinerary, as they take into account labor market trends, the value of their degrees, and familial arrangements for marriage and reproduction. As I discuss in the following chapters, they also taken into consideration political tensions and social conficts they encounter, such as racialization in the United States and class resentment to their privilege and power in South Korea: After I graduate, my goal is to work in the United States for two or three years, and then go to Hong Kong or Singapore. I won’t stay in the United States. (A male undergraduate studying business management)

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Frankly, I came to the United States clueless as a kid. When I was in high school, I thought I was going to live in the United States after I complete my education. But, I became more realistic after my military service in South Korea, thinking that I could live in the United States or South Korea. . . . I am also looking into the South East Asian market, because I think the region will be developed. So, I can go there after working in South Korea for a while. I am thinking about different options. I changed my major to graphics because I thought it would give me more options. . . . South Korea is the best place to live, but I think anywhere I can lie down comfortably will be my home. (A male undergraduate studying design)

In short, armed with top-notch academic credentials from the Global North, a propensity for transnational and mobile life, and access to local societies, Korean and other Asian international students are “future transnational elites” (Bilecen and Faist 2015), constituting what Arif Dirlik (2001) calls “trans-Pacifc professional-managerial class” along with Asian professional immigrants in the United States that newly industrialized Asian countries lure back for transfer of technology (Ong et al. 1994; Xiang 2016). This is a regional formation of the global rise of “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair 2001) or “transnational managerial elites” (Beaverstock 2005) that serve transnational corporations and global capitalism, which are characterized by managerial innovation and the rise of managerial class (Dumenil and Levy 2004) in achieving the “vertical integration” (Arrighi 1994) of globally scattered corporate units by means of communication and information technology that internalized the majority of the global trade by the late twentieth century (Hobsbawm 1996). These Asian transnational elites who are educated in the Global North are agents serving the transpacifc circuit of capital connecting Asian global cities such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, Seoul, Singapore, and Tokyo with fnancial centers in North America.

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Here is a snapshot of Korean transnational managerial and professional elites on both sides of the Pacifc, serving transnational corporations and facing different challenges in each locality. U.S.-educated Koreans can, among others, serve transnational corporations to adapt to South Korean society, bridging the top management located in the Global North and Korean employees in its branch offce in Korea and playing the role of agents in innovation of corporate culture and globalization of South Korean society. Heejin, a non-migrant Korean woman in her late thirties who works in the Seoul branch offce of a global pharmaceutical company reported her observation of how her company had changed in the last few years with the transnational managerial class. A few years ago, a newly named president of the Seoul branch offce who was a non-Korean took an initiative to change the company culture to make it more “global,” innovative, and effcient. To “fast track” the initiative, the president interviewed candidates over the Internet and hired about ffteen people, most of whom were Korean international students completing their degrees in the United States or the United Kingdom. He gave these newly hired individuals unconventional positions and leeway to change the company. In one instance, the president assigned one of the newly hired, who had no work experience at all, to lead a special project team, which consisted of managers and other senior staff of the company, because the person was perceived to “tackle problems logically and speak English well” due to her education abroad. The president’s initiative was met with resistance and resentment from other Korean employees, and most of those who were hired by the president left the company, being dissatisfed with the tension in the company. However, the initiative changed the company culture signifcantly. Korean employees became acclimated to and more comfortable with working with an increasing number of English-speaking non-Koreans whom the top management in the Global North assigned to middle management positions in the Seoul branch offce. On the general culture of the company, Heejin said: If the goal was to change the company environment and culture, it was successful. Changes like younger employees getting promoted more quickly, decisions being made more rapidly. And those who can manage that kind of people [with foreign degrees] get promoted and succeed. . . . Because there are more people like that, there are also more projects that are suitable for them. The company got better as such.

On the other side of the Pacifc, the following story of one of the early waves of Korean international students illustrates how the Korean transnational managerial class stay attentive to different markets while struggling with and pushing the glass ceiling or “bamboo ceiling” in the mainstream

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U.S. labor market. I interviewed Hansam, a Korean man in his mid-forties who works in a major accounting frm in the United States and lives in the suburbs. Hansam came to the United States as a graduate student in the mid1990s. After he completed his program, he had two job offers, one from a major South Korean company and the second from an American company. He took the job with the American frm in order to have work experience in the United States, which is highly valued in the South Korean labor market. A few years into working at the company, he saw that all the other Korean international students who were hired around the same time as he was returned to South Korea. However, Hansam decided to stay in the United States mainly because he was performing exceptionally well at work and thought that he would eventually rise in the frm and become a partner, despite the fact that he was a minority. His former coworkers who returned to South Korea have now become partners or senior managers in major accounting frms in South Korea, while he struggles with a sense of limitation because he has reached a level where, in order to get promoted, he needs to bring in new businesses. To do that, he realizes that he needs to build more relationship with his clients who are mostly white and engage in certain social activities, such as playing golf. However, he often feels that he is not ft for the task. He believes that it is largely because of his lack of acculturation. Hansam carries around a book to learn phrases and idioms that his clients use and regrets his decision to remain in the United States. When he feels frustrated with meetings with clients, he questions what he is doing in America. He feels that it has become harder to return to South Korea because he has reached a level of seniority that it may be harder to fnd the right ft in South Korea. He maintains his transnational ties with friends in South Korea, talking about their respective working conditions and at times feels a sense of relief when he hears about their employment-related challenges. Hansam also stays attentive to the job market and opportunities in South Korea. The co-emergence of starkly contrasting two transnational fgures— Korean international students and undocumented Koreans—from one nation who are different not only in terms of wealth and class but also in terms of rights and mobility illustrates the nature of new social inequalities that are coterminous with the transformation of the nation-state in globalization. The transnational class reproduction of middle-class Korean families in such a large scale cannot take place without any conficts and resistance, inasmuch as it involves distribution and redistribution of wealth, power, and rights in the society. My research fnds that there is a strong nationalist and class resentment and resistance among non-migrant Koreans against the power and privileges held by Korean international students, which is one of the main focuses in the second part of this book.

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CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have argued that Korean international students largely come to study in the United States as a strategy for transnational social reproduction, situating it as a response to structural changes in South Korea’s domestic class dynamics and neoliberal globalization. I have also argued that the frmly established hegemony of the U.S. academia in South Korean society undergirds study abroad as a viable strategy for social reproduction, even though an undergraduate degree from the United States has been devalued due to ferce competition over transnational social reproduction. Lastly, I have reported that many Korean international students eventually adjust their immigration status and become transnational migrants, as they transnationalize themselves during their prolonged stay overseas, constituting a signifcant portion of an emergent transnational elite social group, who are an understudied co-emergent transnational fgure along with undocumented and low-income migrants and refugees.

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NOTES 1. “When class fractions who previously made little use of the school system enter the race for academic qualifcations, the effect is to force the groups whose reproduction was mainly or exclusively achieved through education [i.e. middle class] to step up their investments so as to maintain the relative scarcity of their qualifcations and, consequently, their position in the class structure,” as Waters (2006) cites Bourdieu (1984, 133). 2. The immigrant investors program requires investing over $1 million in general and creating at least ten full-time jobs for qualifying U.S. workers. It issues a temporary visa (EB-5) and grants permanent residency upon completion of the requirements. 3. See Xiang (2016) for looking at a correlation among the number of Chinese international students, the number of Chinese Immigrant Investor visa (EB-5) holders, and the amount of Chinese real estate investment in the United States. 4. In 2014, the number of Korean college students studying English abroad for over six months is approximately half that of Korean international students seeking a college degree abroad, according to an estimate of the Korean Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education 2018). 5. For example, Incheon, a city near Seoul, currently hosts a local campus of two American universities, the State University of New York at Stony Brook and George Mason University. 6. For example, a serious bullying incident involving several young Chinese precollege international students called “parachute kids” recently made sensational news in California and in China (Ceasar and Chang 2016). It was reported that the teens

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made one of them naked and beat and burn one student with a cigarette in a park. Similar stories on substance abuse or sexual activities that are nightmarish to Korean parents have been common coverage in South Korean news media. This fear is one of driving forces behind the domestication of study abroad. 7. The remaining percentage of students are those enrolled in nondegree programs like English as second language programs or Optional Practical Training. Precollege international students are not included in the statistics of Institute of International Education.

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Chapter 2

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Imperialist Racial Formation and English Language

In this and the next chapter, I examine how race and racism in the United States affects Korean international students in New York City who are grooming themselves to be transnational managerial or professional elites. Although a signifcant body of literature on Asian international students has been published in recent years, only a few studies take race and racism seriously as a central issue in Asian international students’ migration experiences. Jenny J. Lee (2007) observes that unlike white European international students, international students of color experience signifcant racial discrimination in the United States. Nancy Abelmann (2009, 2012) fnds that Korean international undergraduate students in the Midwest experience internalized racism and rejection by Korean American students. Sohyun An (2015) conducted a case study of precollege Korean international students in a mid-size American city to ascertain the ways they make sense of racism and downplay their racial experiences. Hyunjung Shin (2012) examines precollege Korean international students in Canada and their tactics to overcome racial stigma by hybridizing their identity and “indexing globality” with certain resources like Korean pop culture. While these studies have provided insights to build upon for my research, they have not investigated the full gamut of racialization of Asian international students and have primarily focused on one subgroup, that is, precollege or undergraduate international students. With this research, I contribute to this body of studies by providing a more comprehensive investigation that situates Korean international students in a historical perspective of colonialism and imperialism and maps out various dimensions of their racialization synchronically and diachronically, covering all constituents of Korean international students in higher education. Drawing on theories 43

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from sociology of race and ethnicity, studies on immigration and race, Asian American Studies, and more recent innovative transnational approaches on race that I review below, I examine the racialization of Korean international students across the border from a historical perspective, and argue that Korean international students studying in New York City are racialized1 and marginalized. This research illuminates an important instance of socialization of Korean international students as future transnational elites. I demonstrate the racialization and marginalization of Korean international students by weaving various dimensions of their everyday lives through the common threads of language and class differences, for they are the two major characteristics that distinguish them from Asian American students and traditional low-wage Asian immigrants. I focus on English language in this chapter and the intersection of class, race, and ethnicity in the following chapter. In this chapter, I examine the racialization of Korean international students by looking at how they desire, learn, and speak English in a process that is fraught with colonial and racial dynamics as they journey from South Korea to the United States. English profciency is one of the most important forms of cultural capital they aspire to acquire in the United States and one of the best status markers of a transnational elite. As such, it is ftting and proper to look at English language to illustrate their racialization experiences. It may be easy to regard and misunderstand Korean international students’ social isolation and marginalization merely as a consequence of their lack of English profciency. I dispel such misunderstanding by showing that racial and colonial relations of power are inextricably intertwined with English language throughout Korean international students’ entire process of desiring to speak, acquiring, and speaking English. Building on Kim’s (2008) framework of “imperialist racial formation,” I situate Korean international students’ racialization in the process of desiring and learning to speak English in a historical perspective of colonialism and imperialism. I frst argue that in South Korea, English profciency is a source of power and status not just because of its practical value in a globalized labor market. More signifcantly, because of South Koreans’ colonial sense of inferiority to the United States and desire for whiteness, English profciency determines social hierarchy. Secondly, I demonstrate that Korean international students, including those with higher levels of English profciency, are racialized and marginalized in New York City and that their racialization and marginalization shape the ways in which they learn and speak English and engender different levels of discomfort, depending on the racial composition of their listeners. Thus, speaking English is an extremely self-conscious act for Korean international students, colored by colonial desire in South Korea and the racial dynamics they encounter in the United States.

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THE COLONIAL HISTORY AND THE IMPERIAL BORDER Studies in social science show that race is a major social category along with class and gender. By connecting globalization to colonial history, Etienne Balibar (2002) points out the imperial nature of the border between the Global North and Global South that functions “actively to differentiate between individuals” (82), which many studies on globalization often ignore as if the cross-border movement of information, human beings, and goods took place among equal nation-states. By inscribing the border in globalization studies, Balibar (1991a) provides a historical perspective to situate the rise of the contemporary form of racism in the Global North, which he calls “cultural racism,” in the context of decolonization and the infux of immigrants from former colonies to former metropolises.2 Balibar forcefully argues that the current form of racism is “cultural,” in that it constructs races and legitimizes racism no longer on the basis of biological heredity, as it was the case in the colonial era through racial sciences such as eugenics; that it is now based on the essentialist idea of culture that regards cultural differences as insurmountable and thus futile or even harmful to try to surmount; and that the dominant discourse of cultural differences and multiculturalism that initially had an anti-racist effect has been “attacked from the rear” (21) and reappropriated by contemporary racism.3 In the United States, in particular, social scientists have analyzed and identifed such a racial social order that leads to social exclusions of people of color and immigrants from the Global South, resonating with Balibar’s analysis of the new type of racism in the postcolonial era. For example, Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s (1994) seminal work on race and racism in the United States identifes “the centrality of race in American politics and American life” (2) by tracing the historical transformation of America and its social movements through political contestations on race since the civil rights movement in the 1960s. Criticizing race theories that reduce race to class, ethnicity, or nation, Omi and Winant (1994) propose an analytic framework that they call “racial formation,” defned as “the socio-historical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed” (55) to conceptualize historical regimes of racism and construction of “races” as an outcome of social conficts and political projects in a non-reductionist and non-essentialist way. More signifcantly, Omi and Winant (1994) provide a powerful analysis of contemporary racism in the United States in a historically grounded theoretical perspective by explaining how the anti-racist elements of the civil rights movement have been reappropriated by neoconservatives in its backlash

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to civil rights, resulting in the current form of racism. According to Omi and Winant, the civil rights movement as a democratic insurgency, along with the anti-colonial struggles around the world, decisively ended the old regime of racism based on biological heredity and established the new “rules of the game” for contemporary racial politics by irrevocably creating both the “fairly general agreement that race is not a biological given, but rather a socially constructed way of differentiating human beings” (55) and the political ideal of racial equality that “[has] to be acknowledged as a desirable goal” (117). They argue that, however, neoconservatives, led by the Reagan administration under the slogan of “colorblind society,” initiated a successful counterattack to the civil rights movement, the welfare state, and affrmative action by popularizing the belief that the means of achieving racial equality is not through collective rights but through individual rights and merits while being completely blind to individuals’ skin colors. This belief has enabled conservatives to claim that collectively demanding rights and remedies for racial equality is rather “racist” and “reverse discrimination.” In short, this artful ideological maneuver reappropriated the anti-racist movement of the civil rights era and “stood on its head” (131), leading to the current “colorblind” society that remains silent about racial inequalities (e.g., Alexander 2012; Massey and Denton 1993). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva is another infuential critique of contemporary racism in the United States. Criticizing the “idealist” tendency of other theories on race that reduce racial phenomenon merely to ideas and beliefs, Bonilla-Silva (1997) argues that there is a materialist and structural foundation of racism that he calls “racialized social systems.” Bonilla-Silva further argues that “economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories or races” (469) within racialized social systems, and thus that racism should be only seen as the ideological component of such social systems. If racism is anchored structurally, in turn, creating racial hierarchy and allocating social resources unequally, Bonilla-Silva powerfully argues, we should regard racism not as individual, anachronistic, irrational, or as the remnant of the ugly past but as a manifestation of the ongoing rational and normal workings and contestations of a racialized social system. Building on this theorization, Bonilla-Silva (2010) delivers a critique of contemporary racism in the United States in the post–civil rights era that no longer operates through explicit discrimination based on biological heredity, straightforwardly calling it “colorblind racism” that “explains contemporary racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics” (2) such as market dynamics and cultural traits of racial groups and thus rationalizes, naturalizes, and trivializes racial inequality.

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BEYOND THE BLACK AND WHITE BINARY AND THE U.S. NATIONAL BOUNDARY A recent body of scholarship on race seeks to address two tendencies that are present in earlier studies: a tendency to reduce racial dynamics to the black and white binary and a tendency to confne the scope of its research to the U.S. national boundary. Moving beyond the black and white binary and the national framing, recent scholarship on migration, race, and ethnicity has provided a rich and insightful body of studies that expound on the identity of migrants and the social construction of race as relational and situational. These studies show that immigration “continue[s] to alter the construction of race and ethnicity in the United States and the contour of intergroup relations” (Foner and Fredrickson 2004, 17) while immigrants react to the whiteover-black racism they encounter in the United States by forming an ethnic or racial identity to actively adapt to its racial landscape. A conversation between critical studies on the construction of whiteness and Asian American studies—the two contrasting and complementary perspectives that examine two groups of immigrants who crossed the border from different shores—can illuminate the relationship between immigration and race. The former body of studies provides a valuable and historically grounded perspective to denaturalize race and understand the social construction of races within relations of power by investigating how European immigrants became “whites” in the United States: To put it more precisely, under what conditions did European immigrants (e.g., Irish, Italian and Jews) from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century who were initially discriminated against and othered by the existing Anglo-Saxon establishment be invented and manufactured as “whites” or “Caucasian” and eventually integrated into the white mainstream within American racial and ethnic dynamics (e.g., Jacobson 1998; Lipsitz 1998; Roediger 2005). Guglielmo (2003) provides a nuance to this body of studies by claiming that, even though considered relatively inferior and discriminated against, some European immigrants such as Italians were accepted and privileged as whites from the beginning of their immigration to the United States by the federal government and institutions within the preexisting racial categorization in the United States. If they became white, it is in the sense that they eventually learned and actively embraced whiteness given to them by the U.S. racial categorization as their most important asset. Guglielmo (2003) argues that this becomes evident when one compares the immigration experiences of these immigrants with that of other immigrants such as black or Asian immigrants. Asian American studies provide the other important perspective in understanding the construction of whiteness in the United States. “Until the

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1880s, migration was unregulated: anyone who could afford the ocean passage could come to seek a new life in America” (Castles and Miller 1998, 55). During the period of massive infux of European immigrants to the United States with 30 million coming during the peak period from 1861 to 1920 (Castles and Miller 1998), Asians were excluded by a series of laws beginning with the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act to the 1924 Immigration Act that “denied entry to virtually all Asians” (Espritu 2008, 18). It was not until the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, where the race-based exclusion in the form of national quotas was fnally abolished (Chan 1991; Jung 2006; Lowe 1996; Ngai 2004). U.S. courts declared Asians “unassimilable aliens” in naturalization cases, allegedly based on “scientifc” grounds of eugenics and other racial sciences that designated Asians as “Mongolian.” The court rulings were in effect, as Jacobson (1998) eloquently puts it, “defending both the border of national belonging and the border of certifable racial whiteness” (225). These immigration laws were driven by the fear of “Yellow Peril” and supported by the white working class, particularly new European immigrants who demanded the “wages of whiteness” (Roediger 1991) by excluding Asians from the labor market, thereby forcing them to retreat and create ethnic enclaves like Chinatowns as well as into feminized jobs in low-wage industries, such as domestic and laundry (Espiritu 2008). Asian Americans have repeatedly experienced racialization as “forever foreigner” (Tuan 1999) throughout American history, whether it was the internment of 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry with about 60 percent of them being U.S.-born citizens (Espiritu 2008, 50) during World War II4 or the 1992 LA riot in the aftermath of the acquittal of four white police offcers for beating Rodney King, an African American man, where Korean businesses were abandoned to looting and portrayed by the mainstream media as responsible for the riot because of their anti-black prejudices (Abelmann and Lie 1995; Kim and Kim 1999; Kwong 1992). Asians have also been racialized in American pop culture, represented as either menacing Yellow Peril—the old trope deployed since the late nineteenth century to restrict Asian immigrants in white settler colonies around the world (Lake and Reynolds 2008)— such as Dr. Fu Manch (Eng 2001; Espiritu 2008) or the “model minority” embodied in an Asian math whiz. The model minority is a myth that is seemingly fattering. But, in fact, it is equally othering and dehumanizing to both Asians and other communities of color who are compared to Asians and subsequently implied as “problem minorities,” justifying discrimination against them. Yellow Peril and the model minority are two opposite sides of a continuum after all because, when the model minority excels too much, it begins to be threatening Yellow Peril (Okihiro 1994, 141). We understand the term “Asian America” itself in this historical perspective: college activists

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of Asian descendants coined the term during the civil rights movement to fght against racism by reappropriating a category of discrimination that was established through immigration laws and imposed upon heterogeneous immigrants (Espiritu 1992). In short, we cannot adequately understand the construction of races in the United States only by looking at the enslavement, segregation, and mass incarceration of African Americans (Alexander 2012; Massey and Denton 1993) in the black and white binary. We should also look at the exclusion and racialization of Asians—and Latino communities—in the historical complex of laws and scientifc discourses as “Mongolian” and “unassimilable aliens,” that is, as what some may call the “constitutive outside” (Derrida 1981; Hall 1996)5of whiteness constructed as the criterion of normal and normative citizenship. “Understanding Asian immigration to the United States is fundamental to understanding the racialized foundations of both the emergence of the United States as a nation and the development of American capitalism” (Lowe 1996, ix). Asian Americans Studies have presciently and persistently drawn our attention to “margins,” “shores,” and “borders” as a vantage point to understand America as a state and society. A recent innovative body of scholarship expands the scope of research on race beyond the U.S. national boundary and the U.S.-centric perspectives to understand racialization from a transnational and global perspective with case studies of immigrants from Brazil, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and South Korea (Joseph 2015; Kim 2008; Roth 2012; Zamora 2016). In her acclaimed work, Imperial Citizens (2008), Nadia Y. Kim provides a groundbreaking theorization of “imperialist racial formation” to conceptualize immigrants’ “racialization across borders” (3, emphasis in original) from a historical perspective of colonialism and imperialism. Focusing on frst-generation Korean immigrants in the United States, Kim (2008) argues that Korean immigrants develop a racial and ethnic selfunderstanding as being inferior and partially present in their own country due to Korean modern history of colonialism and imperialism from the Japanese colonization to the post-war U.S. imperialist presence in the country. Kim (2008) investigates how Korean immigrants are educated about the white-over-black racial hierarchy in the United States and their place in that hierarchy even prior to coming to the United States, as they are inculcated with such racial ideology through Hollywood images and their experiences with the U.S. military stationed in South Korea. As a result, Korean immigrants are not devoid of any prior racial thinking like a tabula rasa when they come to the United States. Rather, they come with racial preconceptions that include a sense of inferiority to whites, desire for whiteness, and prejudices and fear against other people of color, particularly, African Americans and blacks.

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FROM SEOUL TO NEW YORK To analyze the racialization of Korean international students through the angle of English language, my research begins with what English profciency means in South Korea within Kim’s (2008) framework of imperialist racial formation. We cannot adequately understand why English profciency is a core cultural capital Korean international students strive to acquire in the United States without seeing the U.S. hegemonic infuence in the country. Studies have examined the value of English language skills in South Korea’s neoliberal labor market as a lingua franca of globally networked businesses and academia in the world (Abelmann et al. 2015; Koo 2007; Park and Lo 2012). The practical value of English profciency alone cannot fully explain Koreans’ frantic desire for it. In South Korean society, English profciency is an enormous source of power and superiority, a status symbol, and an object of desire, which we should understand in terms of South Koreans’ colonial sense of inferiority to the United States and desire for whiteness. As such, I demonstrate that English profciency, as a source of power, determines social hierarchy among Koreans and is a vehicle of racial ideology that inspires imaginary scripts in South Korea to study abroad.

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Colonial Inferiority and Desire for Whiteness and English Proficiency in Seoul To begin with, language is not a neutral instrument for communication. It is also a vehicle of cultures, ideas, and ideologies. For Koreans, learning to speak English is at the same time a major instance of internalizing the whiteover-black racial ideology that Kim (2008) observes engenders desire for whiteness and prejudices against other people of color. Materials used for English language education in South Korea such as English textbooks, Hollywood movies, and American soap operas mostly tend to depict and glamorize social settings of white middle class. Particularly, American pop culture, including music, movies, and TV shows, has been enormously infuential in forming imaginaries about the United States and races in South Korea as the representation of races in American pop culture often reproduces the dominant and dominating ideologies of white mainstream (Collins 1990). It is very common among Korean international students to intensively consume American pop culture prior to coming to the United States for the purpose of learning English and cultural acculturation. Jungmin, a male graduate student in late twenties working on a PhD in humanities and who has lived in the United States for one year, reports how he watched American TV shows as he prepared to come to the United States:

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Do you know the show, Friends? I liked it very much. I watched all 250 episodes of all of its seasons as many as fve times very attentively and focused. It was even more entertaining when I saw them for the second time because I understood more. I learned English a lot that way. Using my iPad, watching it while going to sleep and waking up with it to study English. I felt a lot of pressure to learn English. I watched other American shows too, but Friends is the one I watched with a lot of attention. I thought, “They live a fun life in the United States. Koreans living in a dorm do not even talk to one another.” I formed my images of the United States by watching that show.

Being inspired by Hollywood movies and American TV shows like Friends or Sex and the City that were very popular in South Korea, South Koreans often express racialized romantic fantasies, imagined metonymically as “blond” and “blue eyes.” Mija, a female undergraduate in early twenties studying biology and who has lived in the United States for two years, reports conversations she had with her Korean friends when she visited Seoul during a school break: My friends have a lot of fantasies about dating foreigners. Maybe because they read a lot of romance novels (chuckle). They think that if you go out with a foreigner, you could become fuent in English, and may even have a cute biracial baby . . . a fantasy like that, saying that “it would be a cool relationship.” Mostly about whites. They don’t like blacks that much, except those who are into hip hop. Whites with blonde hair and blue eye . . . that standard, you know (chuckle).

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Inkyung, a female undergraduate in early twenties studying international relation who has lived in the United States for one year, shares conversations she had with her Korean friends before she came to the United States: When you hear my friends, you can tell they all have a fantasy that all white men are good looking and tall. When I frst told them about my plan to go to the United States to study, they joked that I should date there because there will be a lot of tall and good-looking men. My friends were really envious of me. Korean women want to live in New York City, at least once. I think that is the image of New York. In the TV show, Sex and the City, the protagonist Carrie is portrayed as a very independent and confdent woman. I think everyone dreams about that sort of life.

Pyŏgan (or blue eyes, Korean phonetics of Chinese characters, 碧眼) is also a common trope used by South Korean media. For years, South Korean newspapers would interview random white tourists, referring to them as “foreigners with blue eyes,” and report their views on the country as if they

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were the appropriate judge of Korean society—a tactic to make South Korean readers feel proud of traditional Korean culture or, in contrast, ashamed as “premodern” and in need of fxing. It reveals the coloniality (Fanon 1963) of the society in which South Koreans feel inferior to, constantly seek recognition from and judge themselves by the imagined blue eyes of “Westerners.” As a result of U.S. imperial education on race, while Korean international students come to the United States with liberal ideals and dreams of becoming transnational elites in a cosmopolitan society of “world citizens,”6 their cosmopolitan desires are orientalized and racialized at the same time. The most common trope my respondents have used to express their cosmopolitan aspiration about studying in the United States includes that the United States is a “land of opportunity,” is “free,” “relaxed,” and “open-minded,” implicitly othering South Korea as “authoritarian,” “closed,” and “hierarchical” in the orientalist binary (Said 1979). Due to racial ideology from U.S. imperial education, when Koreans say miguksaram (or Americans), they generally mean whites only, as some respondents noted the distinction between “Americans and black people.” Accordingly, when Koreans talk about assimilation into the United States and having “foreign friends,” they often mean having associations with whites only. The racial ideology and fantasies from South Korea, in turn, become an inadequate interpretive lens through which Korean international students make sense of and navigate the racial landscape in the United States, as they try to associate with whites and avoid other people of color in social circles and residential areas. Eugene, a graduate in midtwenties who came to the United States at the age of eight, recalls his idea of assimilation in his earlier years of living in the United States: “I frst thought that I should be an American when I was a kid. What is an American? . . . a white person. I think I wanted to be white. So I was very embarrassed about being an Asian, about my family in public spaces, and about language.” A desire for profciency in English is an extension of desire for whiteness and the empire (see fgure 2.1). The white-over-black racial ideology, combined with racialized cosmopolitan dreams and fantasies, writes the imaginary scripts of successful study abroad that Korean international students try to live up to meet non-migrant Koreans’ expectations while presenting themselves as transnational elites, which I explore in depth in chapter 5. In the eyes of Koreans, having white friends, in addition to a degree from the United States and English profciency, is considered a successful outcome of study abroad toward becoming a transnational elite. One can readily fnd the script Korean international students try to live up to in South Korean pop cultural products. One of the most infuential is Ch’ilmak ch’iljang (Seven Acts and Seven Chapters), a memoir published in 1993 by a Korean international student in his early twenties. The author narrates how he successfully attended a boarding school in the East

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Figure 2.1  Seoul—An Advertisement on a Bus in Downtown Seoul in 2013. This advertisement promises from a male perspective that learning English language will give access to Wall Street and parties with young beautiful white women. This is one of the common images reproducing the white-over-black racial ideology in South Korea that inspires cosmopolitan and yet colonial and racialized dreams of study in the United States and other Global North countries. Source: Photo taken by Sung-Choon Park.

Coast and then went to Harvard. Using anecdotes of romantic moments with a “blonde beauty” and attractive girls as a badge of honor to prove his success, the author frames his study abroad as an endeavor to become a “world citizen” and presents himself as a member of the transnational elite who has, through his transnational journey, come to develop and embrace a more “open” nationalism that fts with globalization. His book was a huge hit in South Korea, and many Korean students and parents idolized him “as a model to emulate” as the book “captured the South Korean cosmopolitan imagination” (Abelmann and Kang 2014, 2). Some of the international students I interviewed reported imitating his formula in exact details such as attending a boarding school in the East Coast, joining a sport team, and running for school president. Korean international students have emerged as a common character in Korean TV shows and movies, depicted as a glamorous fgure living an imaginary script of a transnational elite. For example, in Sangsokcha (or The Heirs), one of the most popular Korean drama shows in 2013 which was also

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hugely popular in China and other Asian countries, the male protagonist is a Korean international student who lives and attends a private high school in Southern California before he returns home. He lives an imaginary script of a transnational elite—he lives in a two-story mansion by the beach equipped with a beautiful pool overlooking the water and shows off his muscular body and perfect English language skills, as he surfs and socializes, as the only person of color, with a group of young and attractive white men and women with blonde hair. A “Clash of Egos”: An English Proficiency Hierarchy among Korean Students in New York City

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Profciency in English is a source of status and power that South Koreans zealously want to obtain, stemming from their colonial inferiority and desire in addition to its practical economic value in the labor market. Therefore, English profciency establishes hierarchy among Koreans in South Korea and further among Korean international students in New York City. A nonmigrant Korean college student in early twenties who attends a top-tier South Korean university said in a half-joking manner that he is dazzled by and very envious of his Korean international student friends’ English profciency and that he would exchange his degree from a top university for their English profciency. Kyunghee, a female non-migrant Korean college student in midtwenties, has a Korean international student friend studying in the United States whom she has known since they were young. Kyunghee talked about how “proud” she felt of being associated with her international student friend to a point that she would exclude herself from a conversation by encouraging her friend to speak English in public: My international student’s Japanese friend visited her while she was home in Seoul. Three of us went to the downtown area in Seoul. Because the Japanese friend could speak some Korean, we spoke in Korean initially. But, I told them to speak English as we walked around and went to a bar for drinks. I felt good and proud because I fnd Koreans who speak English in public spaces very cool. At the moment, I felt I was somebody who has foreign friends.

This level of envy is also a fertile ground for breeding resentment against speaking English in public in South Korea. That topic is examined in chapter 4. My research fnds that colonial dynamics over English profciency as a status marker brings tension among Korean international students in the United States. Some of the Korean international students I interviewed reported that they tend to be more embarrassed about making mistakes in speaking English in front of other Korean international students than in front of other racial groups or Korean Americans (see also Shin 2012). This points to the reality

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that these students are more concerned and conscious about how they are seen in the eyes of other Koreans than other racial and ethnic communities in the United States. One Korean international student called this a “clash of egos” where English profciency determines social hierarchy. This makes speaking English an extremely self-conscious act among Koreans, even with close friends and spouses. Jinyoung, a female undergraduate in early twenties studying design, who attended an international school in another Asian country before coming to college in the United States, reports her observation of the tension among Korean international students at her school: They (other Korean international students) are not immature like being in high school. They don’t brag about their English profciency. But those who don’t speak English well seem embarrassed. I am also embarrassed sometimes. It is more so with other Koreans than with foreigners. It’s more embarrassing to make mistakes in front of other Koreans. I am not embarrassed to make mistakes when I speak to Americans because I have to communicate any way. But if I make a mistake in front of Koreans, it bothers me a lot, and makes me think, “Shit, it was wrong.” . . . If I make a mistake, I feel like Koreans would think, “That’s it? That’s your English profciency?” On the other hand, I feel like Americans would think, “She speaks English as a second language, so she can make mistakes.”

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Joonmin, a male undergraduate in late twenties studying design and who has lived in the United States for twelve years, talked about his Korean ex-girlfriend: My ex-girlfriend studied in China for a long-time. She never spoke English in front of me because she was embarrassed. If she had to speak English, she told me to walk away from her earshot, saying she was embarrassed. That wasn’t good even though I understood. She was not in an elementary school, but a college student, an adult at least on paper. It was immature of her. So, even though she was my girlfriend, it didn’t look good. I told her to stop it. I asked her, “Would you not speak English in front of me for the rest of your life?” She responded, “Yes, I won’t speak English in front of you for the rest of my life.”

Younghee, a female undergraduate in mid-twenties who came to the United States six years ago with her family and works in a Korean restaurant to earn money for her college tuition and other living costs, reports of an incident with her Korean American friend. They both like Korean pop songs and soap operas and usually communicate in Korean. Younghee said: My friend is a 1.5 generation Korean American who speaks both English and Korean well. She once asked me to buy advance movie tickets by calling a service. I hated it. We were in a car together, and silent. If it were a simple

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conversation, I wouldn’t have minded it. But I didn’t like it because we were inside a car together. So, I didn’t do it (laugh). Considering things like that, I think I shrink in front of Koreans who speak English well.

These interviews reveal the ever-present existence of the South Korean context that shapes Korean international students’ everyday practices in the United States, including learning and speaking English. One could not see and understand this tension among Korean international students in New York without examining the South Korean context across the Pacifc through the frame of imperialist racial formation.

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RACIALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE While colonial dynamics of inferiority and desire for English profciency in South Korea determines social hierarchy among Koreans, racial dynamics in New York City shapes the ways in which Korean international students learn and speak English. My research fnds that Korean international students are racialized and marginalized in New York City, consistent with studies in other regions in North America (Abelmann 2013; An 2015; Shin 2012). It may be easy to dismiss Korean international students’ social isolation and marginalization merely as a result of their language barriers or lower cultural literacy. These factors unquestionably contribute to their isolation. However, to ignore the impact of racism and racialization on their marginalization and limited English profciency and, to the contrary, to assume that limited English profciency and lower cultural literacy alone explain their marginalization would be naïve at best. In effect, it masks racism. In this section, my research shows that even those students who came to the United States at an early age and are thus fuent in English experience social segregation. Twenty-fve of my respondents are those that Koreans call “early study abroad” who have spent their primary and/or secondary education years in the United States or in another country prior to coming to the United States for higher education, refecting fexible transnational family strategies of social reproduction (Ong 1999). My respondents reported that the social segregation and isolation they experience which they call a “small pool” (meaning limited circle of social relationships) have become worse in college. Furthermore, my research shows that the racialization and racial social segregation that Korean international student encounter in New York City signifcantly affect their process of learning English and achieving English profciency and cause different levels of discomfort about speaking English, depending on the racial composition of listeners.

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A Struggle to Learn to Speak English For Korean international students, as for most learners of English as second language, learning and speaking English is not merely a technical and neutral process that takes place in a vacuum of social relations. Rather, it is a process fraught with racial tensions and power dynamics. For starters, in the beginning of their study abroad, Korean international students usually distance themselves from other Korean international students, out of an urgent need to achieve English profciency and integrate into American society, one of the very reasons why they come to study in the frst place. When the primary purpose of study abroad is English profciency and not an academic degree, South Korean students often decide on their destination based on the size of South Korean student population in a prospective location and program to limit speaking in Korean with fellow Korean students. Furthermore, as most of my respondents reported, Korean international students come to the United States with their racialized cosmopolitan desire to make “foreign friends” or “American friends” and acculturate into American society. As such, they often push beyond their comfort level to meet non-Koreans in the initial period of their study abroad. Mija, an undergraduate in early twenties studying biology, reports:

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To avoid Koreans, I went to a small city on the West Coast for an ESL program. There were still too many Korean students. I tried to hang out with foreigners, and became friends with Taiwanese students. But there were limitations to learning English because we were all ESL students. So, I went to church. I wanted to make friends with Americans. Even though my ESL program was part of a large university, I had no connections with Americans.

The South Korean racial ideology that discriminates against other people of color tends to guide Korean international students’ endeavor to learn to speak English. Joonyoung, a senior in late twenties, majoring in economics and who has lived in the United States for fve years, shows how his racialized cosmopolitan desire directed his action. Joonyoung came to the United States because he was not satisfed with a Korean college to which he was admitted. He initially attended a community college with predominantly students of color and later transferred to his current prestigious American university. Joonyoung reported that he did not try to make friends with black students at the community college because they spoke “unoffcial” English, homogenizing and stereotyping black students with his South Korean racial ideology and prejudices: I didn’t want to learn “Black English.” I frst lived in Harlem. Blacks in the community just called me “Chinese.” I didn’t have much liking for them. It was

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hard to be approving of them in school as well even though they didn’t harm me. They didn’t pay attention in class. So, I tried not to interact with them. In addition, I wanted to learn “offcial English.” My father told me to do so. I was planning to transfer to another university, so I didn’t think it was worth making friends with them. They didn’t do well in school, and I didn’t have much respect for them.

At his current school, which has predominantly white and Asian students, Joonyoung attempted to broaden his social circle to socialize with white students: I tried not to hang out with Koreans, but we ended up sticking together. My friends are one or two Korean international students and one Chinese international student in the department, and a few from a Korean church. I have a study group with a few white students. It is hard to call them my friends. It is just a study group. We don’t talk to each other during school breaks. I want to be friends with them, but they drew a boundary. I have asked them to get together and have dinner numerous times, but they keep saying no, saying that they have other plans.

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Social inclusion or exclusion the Korean international students experience directly affects their opportunities to practice and improve speaking English. Myungil, an undergraduate in late twenties studying flm and who has lived three years in the United States observes how his isolation and marginalization hindered his ability to learn and practice speaking English: I am optimistic and have a thick skin. There are only a few things that I am embarrassed about. I don’t mind making mistakes. My English speaking skills improved a lot while I was in an ESL program. Then, it stagnated because you use the same expressions all the time, like ordering food or asking for directions. The biggest problem is the limited environment to practice speaking. When I went to college, my English started to improve rapidly again because I had to do homework and make presentations. But the problem is, I guess, as with most other Korean international students, . . . because nobody ever talks to you even if you are in school all day, you can’t improve speaking English.

On the other hand, Jihye, an undergraduate in early twenties who came to the United States as a tenth grader to attend high school in New York, shows how social inclusion and kindness can dramatically improve the international students’ school life as well as their English profciency, particularly at a young age: I became friends with my best friend [in high school] because we both didn’t speak English well. She is from Colombia and came to the United States later than I did. She kept smiling at me during recess because I think she wanted

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to be friends with me. She asked for my cell phone number and we had lunch together. We hung out after school. Then, a boy who had a crush on her became friends with us. And then his friends joined us. They were popular at school. So, other girls who liked them joined us, too. I made many friends. It was the best time. I learned English fast then. There was no stress of memorizing English vocabulary. I could learn English just by listening. It was amazing.

However, as my other respondents’ experiences attest, Jihye’s experience of inclusion as a young adult is not common. A “Small Pool”: Social Segregation and Racialization Korean international students encounter both overt and covert forms of racism and racial social segregation in New York City, and such experiences shape their whole process of learning and speaking English. Some of my respondents experienced explicit and interpersonal forms of discrimination that breach today’s colorblind and multicultural sensibility, such as being made fun of over the smell of kimchi (fermented cabbage that is a staple of Korean food) or other Korean food. Jihye, an undergraduate in early twenties who has lived in the United States for six years recalls such an incident when she was in high school: A kid in class [in high school] mocked me, whispering about kimchi smell even though I put on perfume after I ate kimchi for breakfast. That student was male. Other students were freaked out, saying “Are you crazy?” to the male student. A female student talked to the teacher about it, and I blushed because of all the attention I got. The male student was called into the principal’s offce. I didn’t even talk to my mom about it because it was embarrassing, and I thought she would be hurt. I just started eating cereal for breakfast instead.

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Imguil, a male undergraduate studying marketing in late twenties, recalls being a target of xenophobic and racial slurs on his college campus: I experienced this when I was at Binghamton. When my friend and I were walking on school campus, two white students passed by us and said a weird Japanese slur. There are occurrences of racism like that more often than I thought I’d experience. I am sure it was a slur for us because they pointed at us with their fngers. I am a little bit hurt from such experiences.

Joonmin, a male undergraduate in late twenties studying design, reports of being excluded from school activities: For example, they exclude Korean international students from group projects by meeting without them. Invisible exclusion. I heard of a few incidents like that, including from my ex-girlfriend. In her frst year, there was a required project

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for her class, with about 20 students, divided into four groups of fve members. Her group got together to work on the group project but didn’t let her know about the group meeting. She never met with other members of her group, nor did she ever get notifed of group meetings. But her group presented the group project without her. It was not an accident because, if they didn’t have her contact information, they would have asked her. But they didn’t even try. She told me how hurt she was. I said, “There is nothing I can do about it. You should take care of it on your own.”

Although such overt and explicit forms of racism are not uncommon, covert and subtle forms of racism that do not irritate the colorblind sensibility and have become normative in the United States in the last several decades (Omi and Winant 2015) largely shape Korean international students’ racial experiences and daily lives. One of the most apparent manifestations of covert racism is their limited social relationships and networks and social isolation. Confrming other studies (Abelmann 2013; Shin 2012), most of my respondents reported that they could only befriend a few other Korean international students and international students from China or other countries while some of the most assimilated students could befriend Asian Americans as well. Agencies that assist families to plan and organize study abroad in South Korea and pundits on the issue often emphasize extroverted personality as one of the key ingredients to successful study abroad. However, faced with persistent social segregation, Korean international students realize sooner or later that being an extrovert has limited effect in enlarging their social circle and fnd themselves with other Korean international students. It was common to hear the following statement from my respondents: “[t]here are no opportunities to make friends except for Chinese international students.” My respondents often referred to their limited circle of social relationships as a “small pool.” Minkyung, a female graduate in early thirties studying international relation and who has lived in the United States for one year, reports how she experiences segregation and tries to make sense of it, wondering whether it is due to language or cultural differences, or something else: When you meet new people at school events, I think there is a little bit of cultural difference. I frst ask, “What do you study? Where do you live?” Then there is little else to talk about. Conversations stop there. But when I talk to foreign [read: non-Korean] international students, we go beyond the introduction, and talk about different topics. We can have in-depth conversations. I don’t know whether it is because we share similar cultures as Asians, or because of language.

Her thinking shows her lack of adequate language to express her racial experiences because of the normative colorblindness and the dominant

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multicultural discourse (Omi and Winant 2015). Most of my respondents had diffculty naming race and racism, using the term “cultural difference” or “it” to refer to race or racism with a degree of discomfort and anxiety. Counterintuitively, English profciency, the length of residence in the United States, or the level of acculturation do not signifcantly alter the social segregation Korean international students experience, except for befriending Asian Americans. Some respondents who have spent signifcant period of their early childhood in an English-speaking country and are fuent in English with a slight accent have expanded their social circle to befriend Asian Americans. Most of my twenty-fve respondents who came to the United States or went to another English-speaking country before college, whom Koreans label “early study abroad” students reported their frustration that their social segregation got worse when they entered college. Hoon, a male graduate in late twenties who studied in Canada since he was twelve and came to the United States to attend college said: I found this really amazing. I was not friends with Koreans in high school, but in college, my friends are almost all Koreans. . . . I think the situation is not limited to just us. It is also the case for blacks, whites, and Latinos. They all socialize with other racial groups in middle and high schools. But in college, my observation is that, there is a strong tendency to stick with their own racial group. I am not a social scientist, but my observation is that it is natural to hang out with Koreans. So, I thought, “this is just the way things are.”

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A staff member of a Korean international student association, Kisuk is a male undergraduate in early twenties studying political science and has lived in the United States for seven years. He reports: Up to high school, I integrated well into society because I had a crew of people to socialize, as I was on a golf team and soccer team in a predominantly white school. But here in college, I am confused sometimes whether I go to an American college or a Korean one. I have meetings with staff of a Korean international association, and play video games with my [Korean] roommate at home. Because I eat and meet with Koreans at school and at home, I don’t feel like I live in the United States.

As discussed in the introduction, because of fexible and diverse transnational strategies of upbringing and educating children, some respondents have lived in the United States or other English-speaking countries when they were younger, went back to South Korea with fuency in English to fnish their secondary education and came to the United States for college. They reported that their positive memories of socializing with non-Korean friends when they were younger formed their expectations about their college life in

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the United States. Some even saw the United States as their home to which to return. They feel betrayed and bitter about the social segregation they experience in college as young adults. Jiyeon, a nineteen-year-old female undergraduate studying psychology, lived in the West Coast for four years when she was younger. She returned to South Korea and came back to the United States to attend college a year and a half ago. Jiyeon said:

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It was really fun. It was a public school. I was in second and third grade. There was no boundary or a wall among kids. I was even closer to foreign kids. I was friends with other Korean kids just because our parents were friends. My best friends were white. All I remember is having fun. When I went back to South Korea, I didn’t like studying there and thought, “I will go to college in the United States.” I never thought of going to a Korean college. My parents thought the same. That’s how I came. But, now when I came back as an adult, there is a wall, particularly over race. I have come to be friends with Koreans, Chinese or other Asian students, unbeknownst to me. I have white friends as well, but it is unconsciously more comfortable with Asian students. At some point I found myself being with a crowd that was different from the one I expected. I thought I would be different than other Korean international students because I thought the United States was my real home. But it turned out to be false. At the end of the day, I am an Asian (a bitter smile).

Some Korean international students reported that they had tried to overcome their social segregation at an earlier stage of their lives and that they eventually gave up because of emotional and psychological fatigue they experienced from trying to ft in. As Korean international students’ sense of assimilation and acculturation is shaped by the South Korean racial ideology, assimilation often translates into associations with whites and becoming like whites. This involves continued effort of “proving” that they are different than other Koreans or Asians, essentially a process of self-negation. Mikyung is a nineteen-year-old female undergraduate studying international relation who attended an international school in an Asian country and came to attend a boarding school in the United States fve years ago. She said: I had a cool roommate in the boarding school [in the East Coast]. She was from California and part of a popular white crowd. We did not talk outside of our room. For her birthday, I got her sexy lingerie for fun. When her friends came by, I hid the lingerie because I felt shy about giving it to her in front of others. Then, I got courage all of sudden, and gave it her in front of others. They were all amused and said “You are small and reserved, but you are fun.” From then on, they became interested in me, asking about my clothes and borrowing things from me. I didn’t do well in school when I was in 9th grade. They even saw that as cool. They thought I was not like other Asians, unlike the Asian stereotype. They told me repeatedly that I was cool. I tried hard, too, thinking “I will be

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different.” But when I entered 10th grade, I became mentally tired. I didn’t want to make efforts to make friends. I felt like I was making too much effort when I was with white friends. . . . Amazingly, when I hung out with them, I felt like I achieved something.

These respondents’ experiences reveal that it would be inadequate to attribute the social isolation and marginalization of international students merely to limited English profciency and lack of acculturation and not take their racialization within racial dynamics in United States into account. A stark contrast between Korean international students in New York City and white international students in Asia further illustrates this. Joyoung, a male nonmigrant Korean college student in late twenties in Seoul, has studied abroad only in China to attend a short-term language school. Joyoung notes that white international students studying in South Korea and China generally do not experience marginalization. Joyoung commented: “It is rare to see white students together on campus [in Seoul]. They are always with a Korean or two, or just alone. In China, Chinese prefer whites as well. Westerners make friends quickly while Korean or Japanese students rarely make friends with Chinese.” I had similar observations during my feldwork in Seoul in the summer and winter of 2013. In the downtown area of Seoul, near colleges or on subways, it was very common to see young whites accompanied with young Koreans while almost none of non-Asian young people of color were with Koreans. The latter were either alone or with other non-Asian people of color. One may say that it is a form of privilege that white international students have in South Korea from Koreans’ desire for whiteness and prejudices against other people of color.

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RACIALIZED ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND ITS IMPACT ON ACADEMIC LIFE AND BEYOND My research fnds that Korean international students’ encounter with racism and social segregation in New York City shapes and racializes the ways in which they speak and feel about speaking English, signifcantly affecting their academic performances and their lives beyond campus. First, an open and explicit ridicule about their limited English profciency can lead Korean international students to withdraw, retreat, and become hesitant about speaking English. Joohyun, a female graduate in late twenties studying engineering and who has lived in the United States for two years, said: In class, some students laughed at me when I asked a question in English, even though they didn’t know me. The professor asked me to clarify my question, but I couldn’t understand him. That situation. I felt that people laughing at me was

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mocking me. I felt small and thought, “If I spoke English well, I wouldn’t be in such a situation.” It is very depressing and hurtful.

Secondly, the sustained segregation Korean international students experience in social relationships can lead to various degrees of uneasiness and discomfort about speaking English, depending on the racial composition of audiences. Discomfort can affect their ability to or a confdence level to speak English. Unpleasant and hurtful experiences of social segregation can alter their colonial desire and affection for learning and speaking English and their plans related to study abroad and future residence. Mija, a female undergraduate in early twenties studying biology and who has lived in the United States for two years, said:

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I used to like speaking English. I liked the sound of it. It felt like singing. I initially had no fear. When I attended an ESL program, I made friends with everyone. It was so fun to speak English, so I only spoke English. As I learned English more and became aware of my mistakes, I became conscious and became afraid to speak English. And I hate when Americans make facial expressions when I speak, as if they are saying “I don’t understand what you are saying.” Then, the silence. . . . I hate it so much that now I think I should just fnish my education here ASAP and go back to South Korea. I grew to have fear of speaking English and foreigners.

Yeonjoo, a female undergraduate studying design in mid-twenties and who has lived in the United States for six years, said: “Learning and speaking English is not diffcult. But I am scared of Americans. I don’t know. . . . I can’t fgure out what they are thinking.” One may say that racial othering eventually becomes mutual and reciprocal somehow as Korean international students’ experiences of social segregation intensifes. Consequently, colonial dynamics from South Korea and racial dynamics in the United States provoke different levels of discomfort in Korean international students as they affect their confdence level to speak English, depending on situations. Colonial dynamics from South Korea forms the axis of inferiority and superiority, which determines social hierarchy among Koreans. Racial dynamics in New York City creates another axis of comfort and discomfort with individuals from other racial groups. Some students are more concerned about the former than the latter while others think the opposite. Some of my respondents, as discussed above, show that they are most anxious of speaking English in front of fellow Korean international students, for they are more concerned about perception of other Koreans and the hierarchy among Koreans. Other respondents feel more uncomfortable speaking with whites and more preoccupied with racial discomfort than competition with other Koreans in terms of their place in the hierarchy in relation to other

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Koreans. Generally, Korean international students feel most comfortable speaking to non-Korean Asian international students such as Chinese because they do not have any competitive stake in the hierarchy of English profciency and are also exempt from racial discomfort. Whatever they may each decide individually to be the focus of their concern, Korean international students are nonetheless conscious of the twin sets of colonial and racial dynamics, and thus speaking English is an act flled with tension, where they internally process these dynamics. Mija, an undergraduate in early twenties studying biology, articulates the range of her thoughts and emotions when she speaks English: “When I speak English with other international students, I think, ‘We both don’t speak English well, so it is okay [to make mistakes].’ When I speak to Korean Americans in English, I tend to be inarticulate, but I can still talk. But in front of whites . . . I can’t open my mouth.” Imguil, a male undergraduate studying marketing in late twenties and who has lived in the United States six years, said:

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It is more comfortable to speak to other international students than to native speakers. We understand each other when we make mistakes. I feel like white people may think that, “Why is he speaking like this?” Chinese or Japanese students are particularly comfortable. We look alike as well. And because I was hurt by incidents of being targeted by white students’ racial slurs on the streets, I have become more conscious of speaking English at times. When I frst came to the United States, I was enthusiastic about talking to people, so I can learn English—asking for directions and going to parties. Blacks are a little bit more comfortable to speak with. They are playful and pleasant, cracking jokes. I meet them at my gym. Whites are serious and use diffcult words.

The specifc racialization of Asian Americans as “forever foreigner” (Tuan 1999) throughout U.S. history also shapes how some Korean international students use English profciency to address their racialization. Korean international students’ path to assimilation into American society can lead them to distinguish and distance themselves from other Asians, and thereby creating a specifc form of internalized racism within Asian and Asian American communities that Pyke and Dang (2003) call “intra-ethnic othering.” English profciency plays a central role in that act of distinction and distancing. Eugene, a male graduate in mid-twenties studying media production who came to the United States when he was eight years old, reports how he used his profciency in English to distance himself from other Asians as a way to “prove” his level of assimilation, and how it often put him in a more uncomfortable situation: I think I have tried to show that I can speak English fuently as a way to prove that I am different from other Asians. But, because I tried too hard and became

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conscious of my language skills, I made more mistakes in speaking and became more embarrassed . . . trying to use diffcult expressions, slangs and lingos to show that I know those expressions. Whenever Americans talk about Asia, I switch the subject to something like football to show that I know a lot about American culture and society. I noticed that their facial expressions changed, as if they were saying, “He is different from other Asians. We can talk.” When I proved myself to them in that manner, I felt proud.

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Just as English language is not merely a neutral tool for communication, speaking English is not a benign act of communicating. It can also be a tactical practice of asserting supremacy over or distinguishing from coethnics within colonial and racial dynamics. Accents alone are such a source of frustration and embarrassment for Korean international students. Speaking English without Korean accents is an object of colonial desire in South Korea. Furthermore, accents are a particularly racialized issue for Asians and Asian Americans because accents are one of the highly visible markers of the stigma of being a “FOB” (Fresh Off the Boat), a term with which Asian international students are often labeled as a product of internalized racism among Asians and Asian Americans (Pyke and Dang 2003). The shame attached to accents alone can be paralyzing for some students. Inkyung, a female undergraduate in early twenties who lived in the United States when she was younger, noted of other Korean international students: “Koreans are self-conscious of their accents. But I don’t have an accent. When we order food, my friends ask me to do it because they are conscious of their accents.” Joonmin, a male undergraduate in late twenties studying design, observes: Korean students don’t speak in class, I guess, because they are embarrassed to speak even though class participation is important for their grades. I guess there is a little bit of shame. It looks like they cannot stand the embarrassment when people can’t understand what they are saying because of their accents. Female students tend to be more embarrassed than male students, but male students are not so different either.

Lack of English profciency is such a debilitating and racialized experience that it can even affect their self-perception, particularly for graduate students who come to the United States as adults. It shapes the ways in which they interact with people and place their bodies in school spaces, looking for comfort zones and wishing to be “invisible” by abstaining from class participations or from more public spaces in school. Imguil, a male undergraduate studying marketing, said: “I feel more uncomfortable speaking English in school. I withdraw. So, I usually spend my time in the library, working on homework and listening to music. I feel comfortable when I am in the

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library.” Eunjee, a female graduate in early thirties studying political science and who has been in the United States for fve years, shared the following experience: I was presenting a proposal in class. My proposal was not very clear, and because of my limited English, I couldn’t respond to students’ questions properly. In South Korea, I was confdent, performed well in class, and was the president of an organization. In South Korea, I could distinguish my public self from my private self. But I don’t have a public self when I speak in English. In class, I felt that my private self came out. I cried when I was telling my friend [another international student] about what happened in class because I felt so humiliated. I felt like I was talking like a baby. . . . Here, in class, I sit where I can be seen the least . . . in a corner to keep distance from a professor. In a larger class, I usually sit in the back row because I want to be “invisible” (said in English).

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Abelmann (2009) makes an insightful observation about anti-Asian racism and its irony: the skin color of Asian American students makes them hypervisible while they remain invisible at the same time as an anti-Asian trope, “They look all the same” indicates. Seen from such irony, one’s utterance in hope to be “invisible” can be seen as both an awareness of and an indictment of anti-Asian racism. After all, one’s wish to be invisible is most likely not a preference for marginalized state but an expression of pain and anger. Korean international students’ marginalization and opting to be invisible in school can be detrimental to their academic performances by, for example, making them vulnerable to more explicit discriminations and exclusions, where they are unduly presumed to be incompetent. Myungil, a male undergraduate studying flm, said: In a group project I am part of, I am not really present because I can’t speak English well. It is not diffcult to understand what they say and doing. But I just sit in the group silently because of my limited English. I am naturally excluded. I have also experienced in other incidents where people exclude me once they realize that I don’t speak English well. They just talk to each other even though I am sitting right there. It is interesting that it is less the case with smaller classes and where we know each other.

Minkyung, a female graduate studying international relation, said: You know, they think you are stupid if you don’t say anything. I didn’t participate actively in class and group project meetings. I realized that they presumed that I was stupid. I once talked to a student from my group project in class about international policy. The student was surprised and said to me, “You know that, too.”

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It can further hinder their ability to access certain critical information related to their academic work and performances, particularly when students are in departments with only few other Korean international students. Kohoon, a male undergraduate in late twenties studying computer programming who has lived in the United States for eight years, said: I feel lonely a lot. I feel most lonely when I don’t have other Korean international students in my department with whom I can talk about my problems. Bangladeshi international students share information amongst themselves, like which professors give good grades and which ones to avoid. But I didn’t have that kind of information, so I took a class once that turned out to be very diffcult. I got a really bad grade. After that, I tried to make friends with Bangladeshi international students. That is what’s most diffcult.

Social segregation and its impact on their ability to learn, practice, and speak English can have lingering infuence on Korean international students as they groom themselves as transnational managerial elites. Joonyoung who wanted to learn the “offcial” English but was unable to befriend anyone other than other Korea international students at his current school is now looking for a job. Joonyoung acutely recognizes the importance of learning and speaking colloquial English and has regrets of his past decisions:

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The priority is to socialize with Americans. English profciency is most important. Now that I am trying to fnd a job, I have regrets. I just had a job interview with the VISA card company over the phone, and I was asked a question about the Federal Reserve Bank and its policies. Because I didn’t understand the question initially and fully, I asked them to repeat it. I guess I lost some points there. I still don’t speak English very well. So, I regret that I didn’t work on improving conversational English because I focused on getting a high TOEFL score and good grades. I should’ve tried to socialize even with black students in the community college instead of focusing on grades only.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, through Korean international students’ relationship with English language, I have examined a critical instance of their racialization and marginalization in New York City. I have located their desire for English profciency within the framework of imperial racial formation and analyzed its impact on their process of learning, practicing, and speaking English. In so doing, my research defes the more simplistic understanding of learning and speaking English as just a technical process of acquisition and debunks the common fallacy that their isolation and marginalization is simply due to

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their limited English profciency and lack of assimilation. Tracing colonial inferiority and desire for English profciency in Seoul to racial dynamics in New York City, I have shown that the colonial and racial dynamics here and there are intertwined with and constitutive of the entire spectrum of Korean international students’ desire to speak and process of learning, practicing, and speaking English. Speaking English is an act that involves processing and negotiating of both colonial dynamics of inferiority in South Korea and racial discomfort in the United States. Therefore, depending on the situation and the composition of listeners, speaking English can be an experience with a range of emotions from being stressful to paralyzing. In addition, as I report in chapter 4, English profciency is also considered to be a class issue by nonmigrant Koreans in South Korea who are resentful of Korean international students’ transnational social reproduction. To Korean international students, there is not a single utterance of English that happens devoid of social dynamics. Being fraught with relations of power, tension, and emotion, speaking English is a major instance of racialization of Korean international students.

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NOTES 1. I use Omi and Winant’s (2015) defnition of racialization as “the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassifed relationship, social practice, or group” (13). 2. See also Castles and Davidson (2000), Glenn (2015), Mezzadra and Neilson (2013), and Winant (2001) for discussions connecting the surge of migration to racialized social conficts in the Global North today and situating racial inequalities in the United States in a historical perspective of the global structure. 3. See also Hardt and Negri (2000), Gilroy (1991), and Prashad (2003) for a critique of how the essentialist notion of culture reproduces contemporary racism. 4. “The evil deeds of Hitler’s Germany were the deeds of bad men; the evil deeds of Tojo and Hirohito’s Japan were the deeds of a bad race,” wrote Roger Daniels (1972, 34), pointing out the racialization of Japanese Americans in the United States. 5. Stuart Hall (1996) masterfully explains that it is only through the constitutive outside that any positive meaning of identity can be constructed since “identities can function as points of identifcation and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside,’ abjected” (5, emphasis in original). 6. Park and Abelmann (2004) interestingly frame these aspirations as “cosmopolitan striving” and argue that this is a central motivation of study abroad that Korean students report, which is not surprising. It would be, rather, surprising and extraordinary if these students operated with a clear understanding of the strategic signifcance and instrumentality of their study abroad for social reproduction. As Bourdieu (1986, 254) points out, the effcacy of education as cultural capital lies precisely in its being “capable of disguising its own function” in reproducing social class and economic capital.

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Chapter 3

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A Balancing Act of Ethnic Dis/Identification Intersecting Class and Race

In this chapter, I continue the examination that started in the previous chapter by looking at how race and racism in the United States affects Korean international students in New York City with a focus on their class differences. Unlike low-wage immigrants that studies on migration and race have focused on, Asian international students are largely from affuent families. This begs the question: How does Asian international students’ class affect their experiences of and responses to race and racism? I argue that while Korean international students’ class status does not immunize them from racialization, it shapes and mediates their racialization and responses to it. My research fnds that Korean international students in New York City maneuver a delicate balancing act between two seemingly contradictory modes of responses to the racism they encounter. On the one hand, they take ethnic identifcation and solidarity as the primary strategy to avoid racialization. On the other hand, Korean international students have a tendency of ethnic dis-identifcation to distance themselves from their own ethnic group because of the racial stigma attached to it, reproducing what Pyke and Dang (2003) call “intra-ethnic othering.” Meanwhile, the class differences among the students mediate their ethnic identifcation and ethnic dis-identifcation respectively, as they build ethnic social capital through Korean alumni and occupational networks, or mark their elite class status through conspicuous consumption. Oscillating between ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation, most Korean international students seek to strike an elusive balance between distancing from the racial stigma of coethnics and tapping into ethnic social capital that is crucial for social class reproduction in order to simultaneously avoid racialization and achieve social reproduction.

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ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION AS THE PRIMARY STRATEGY TO AVOID RACIALIZATION My research fnds that the most important and prevalent tactic Korean international students use to cope with racialization and marginalization is ethnic identifcation and solidarity, similar to earlier immigrants. It is essentially a strategy to avoid being a nonwhite and to distance themselves from other stigmatized people of color. My fndings support the social constructionist approach on ethnicity (e.g., Espiritu 1992; Nagel 1994; Tsuda 2007) in showing that ethnic identity of Korean international students is less about lingering blind emotional attachments to primordial myths, national culture, and shared descent that manufacture “fctive ethnicity” (Balibar 1991b) or an “imagined community” of nation (Anderson 1991). Rather it is a situational, relational, and strategic construction in response to racial dynamics in the host society. The national culture and myths tend to be a cultural toolkit from which Korean international students selectively choose materials to construct their ethnic identity in the host society (Omi and Winant 1994) with Korean culture being what is available in their cultural toolkit to construct their ethnicity. Victoria Hattam (2004) shows that even the coinage of the term “ethnicity” itself should be understood in relational dynamics between immigration and race. Hattam genealogically traces the origin and institutionalization of the concept of ethnicity in the endeavors of Jewish intellectuals in the early twentieth century to resist assimilation while at the same time avoiding racialization—that is, being a nonwhite—and staying out of the white and black binary by inventing the categories of “ethnicity” and “cultural pluralism” that have the effect of silencing race and distancing immigrants from African Americans. In the aftermath of the civil rights movement in the 1970s, ethnicity as a category was adopted and institutionalized by the U.S. Census and governmental agencies in relation to political access and resources distribution. In short, ethnic identifcation is a tactic to avoid racialization in so far as the effect of categorizing along ethnic lines is to replace or displace racial categorizations and thus defect the ascription of race by society: “One is an ethnic, in the American context, to the extent that one’s difference is not confgured in racial terms” (Hattam 2004, 52). In other words, “the concept of ethnicity would seem to be understandable only in the context of differences defned as racial and efforts to avoid racialization” (Foner and Fredrickson 2004, 5). Korean international students, for whom the option of integrating into the white majority is unavailable like other migrants of color and Asian Americans, assume the Korean ethnic identity in the United States as the primary strategy to cope with racialization. Scholars have argued with a broad agreement that, unlike European immigrants who could integrate into the white

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mainstream and elect ethnic options, non-European immigrants have been given a restricted array of identity choices, being racialized as others in the United States (e.g., Espiritu 1992; Gans 1979; Waters 1990). Although some argue that Asian Americans as the “model minority” are in the process of becoming “honorary whites” to help reproduce the white over black racial hierarchy in American society (Bonilla-Silva 2010; Ong 2006), Asian American scholars point out that Asian Americans are no exception to this restriction and social exclusion because they have been racialized by racebased exclusionary immigrant laws and continually stereotyped as “forever foreigner” in American pop culture (Kim 2008; Tuan 1999; Zhou 2007). My research fnds Korean international students’ strategic investment in ethnic identity in three areas: (1) distancing from other Asian international students such as Chinese students, (2) self-organizing through ethnic mobilization in the form of student associations and occupational networks, and (3) public ethnic performances of diasporic nationalist activities in the United States. Ethnic identifcation is at the same time dis-identifcation from other ethnic groups that enables distancing from the racialized stigma. Korean international students often distinguish themselves from the racially stigmatized Chinese or other Asian students by reinforcing the stereotype of Asians as “being dirty” or “showing off money” even though they make up the limited circle of non-Koreans with whom they socialize. Hyunjin, a female high school graduate who has lived in New York for three years said: “A guy who broke up with my friend dated a Chinese international student. We were shocked, ‘Really?’ Even though we disliked him . . . you know, there is a negative perception about Chinese international students, like ‘Chinese women are violent,’ or ‘Chinese are dirty.’” It is an effort to defect both the stereotype of earlier and low-income Asian immigrants that Ong (1999, 101) calls “the coolie stigma” and that of Korean international students being “spoiled kids” to other Asian students. Mikyung, an undergraduate who has lived in the United States for fve years, illustrates that ethnic identity is a situational strategy to avoid the racial stigma. She has a Korean and a Japanese parent and thus has two ethnic options to choose from. Mikyung takes the Japanese identity outside of school, although she is more versed in Korean language and culture and socializes mostly with Korean international students at her college because she found that her Japanese identity is more “benefcial” to her: There are lots of benefts to holding onto Japanese nationality. . . . Small things. People respond differently when I say I am from Korea versus Japan. I guess it is not intentional, but when I say “I am from Japan,” people often respond “Oh yeah? I like Japan.” It is not about me, but an American perception of Japan is that it is an advanced country. For example, I once took a cab in New

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York. The cab driver asked me where I was from. I said, “a half Japanese, and a half Korean.” I think he only heard the frst part of what I said. He said that he thought I was Korean, that there were too many Koreans here, and that Koreans are rude, and so on.

Ethnic identifcation is an explicit or implicit call for ethnic solidarity and mobilization against discrimination because an identity is, in the last instance, to draw a boundary of an inclusive community against the outside (Hall 1996). We see Korean international students’ ethnic mobilization in various activities to build their social capital along the ethnic line, such as Korean international student groups and Korean alumni or occupation-based networks. Well-organized Korean international student associations exist in almost all the major universities in New York City. These associations engage in various activities: support students to adapt to the new environment, share information relevant about school and life on campus, throw parties, host job fairs with Korean companies, organize public events on Korean culture, and connect with their alumni in the United States and South Korea. Hoon identifes the potential power of Korean international student groups as social capital to counter the social exclusion he experiences in the United States—which he understands as “cronyism,” exposing his lack of adequate language to express his racial experiences like most of my respondents—as the main motivation for his participation:

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Personal connections matter. I am not deeply involved in a Korean student association. But I think it will be benefcial to get acquainted with it. I used to think that the United States is fair, but I now think it is, if any, worse than South Korea. Cronyism is the same. It is just subtler and more sophisticated here.

Occupation-based networks, like in STEM felds, are particularly well organized. The most notable network is the Korean American Scientists and Engineers Association (KSEA) that was founded by former Korean international students who are now professors and researchers in corporations. KSEA claims to have over 6000 members and 70 local chapters across the United States. All New York-based schools with STEM programs have a Korean student organization that serves its students and works with KSEA to organize annual meetings and social events. Sungjin, a PhD student in engineering and an active organizer of such a student group in his university, reported that what he also regards as “cronyism” in the United States compelled him to participate in ethnic mobilization. He said: Connecting with KSEA will be helpful in getting a job because there are people working in universities and corporations. If you can have a recommendation

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from those who work there when you apply for a job, it will help for sure. For example, I met some people at an event, including an alumnus who works at IBM. . . . Personal connections are important anywhere. What’s funny is that, I think, cronyism is stronger in the United States than in South Korea.

There is also a signifcant participation of Korean American students in ethnic mobilization in STEM felds because of KSEA’s resources. Because Koreans who have come as international students and adjusted their immigration status have led the ethnic mobilization in STEM felds in the United States, unlike other felds, stronger ethnic solidarity and greater interactions between Korean international students and Korean American students exist in STEM felds. Mike is a 1.51 Korean American student who is active in a STEM student organization along with Korean international students. His motivation in participating in the organization is the same as that of Korean international students. However, Mike articulates what Korean international students call “cronyism” as ethnic solidarity and mobilization, showing that Korean Americans have a better understanding of race and ethnicity than international students:

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I found KSEA when I was looking for connections two years ago. So, a friend and I formed a student association at our university. I also saw Chinese and Indian students form their own groups. It looks like job networks are also formed along the racial and ethnic lines. It (KSEA) is for networking, which is huge. We are a student chapter of KSEA. It is an international organization. I found my internship through the Facebook space of KSEA. I think ethnic networks matter.

There is a broad consensus that diaspora-building of immigrants is a reaction to discrimination and social exclusion they have experienced (e.g., Espiritu 2003; Ignacio 2005; Levitt 2001; Hall 1990). Korean international students also actively participate in diaspora-building, confrming the consensus that diaspora-building of immigrants is a reaction to discrimination in the host society. Hyunjin, a female high school graduate who is interested in a career in the hospitality industry, expressed a diasporic nationalist view based on her racial experiences: I was very upset when they called me “Chinese” because we look down on Chinese. I thought, “I don’t get treated like this in my country. But I am treated badly in other countries.” I think that our country should be stronger, so we don’t get called Chinese any more. I want to help make South Korea a strong country while I live in the United States. For example, if I work at a hotel, I will provide top service, so customers can see that “Koreans are kind.” It can enhance the reputation of South Korea.

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Korean international students participate in diaspora-building activities through their student organizations, often in conjunction with the Korean consulate and Korean American associations in their regions. These activities include cultural events to introduce Korean food or Korean pop culture on school campuses, performing Korean drumming in a Korean day parade in New York City, and volunteering to teach Korean language to Korean adoptees or care for low-income Korean elderly. These activities are publicly visible, as they take place in parks, streets, or campuses, and are organized and announced through social media. It is an important instance in performing and constructing their ethnic identity in American society.

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“THEY ARE JUST LIKE WHITES, ONLY WITH A KOREAN FACE”: INTRA-ETHNIC OTHERING Despite their efforts, ethnic identifcation as a response to racialization has only limited success because ethnic solidarity is repeatedly frustrated by the opposite tendency of ethnic dis-identifcation. Distinction from the racial stigma does not stop at the ethnic boundary vis-à-vis other ethnic groups like Chinese. Rather, it easily crosses the ethnic boundary and affects relationships among coethnics, undoing ethnic group formation. The tension from these two opposing tendencies—ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation— that are essentially two different modes of response to racism is one of the sites where we can see most clearly the racialization of Korean international students and the strategic nature of their ethnicity. Pyke and Dang (2003) analyze internalized racial dynamics within the Asian American community with a case study of mostly Korean and Vietnamese Americans and aptly term the dis-identifcation among coethnics “intra-ethnic othering.”2 Pyke and Dang identify two derogatory terms that Asian Americans use to label and otherize coethnics: “FOB” (Fresh Off the Boat) and “whitewashed.” The latter term has variations such as “Twinkie” or “banana” to signify “white inside and yellow outside.” The term “FOB” is used to label “those who display any of several ethnic identifers such as speaking English with accents, speaking Korean or Vietnamese with peers, engaging in behavior and leisure pursuits associated with newer arrivals or ethnic traditionalists, dressing in styles associated with homeland or ethnic enclaves, or socializing with recently immigrated coethnics or ethnic traditionalists.” The term “whitewashed” is for “those who have assimilated to the white mainstream and retain few ethnic practices” (156). Pyke and Dang (2003) report that most of their respondents sought to defect racial stigma and construct the “bicultural middle” as a non-stigmatized zone of “normals” to which they claimed they belonged by othering coethnics who are less assimilated as “FOB” and those

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more assimilated as “whitewashed.” Because the “middle” is only relative and arbitrary, one can be labeled at once “whitewashed” by some and “FOB” by others. Therefore, “[t]hese othering dynamics create a divide within the racial/ethnic group that falls along the acculturation continuum” (152). Pyke and Dang argue that the intra-ethnic othering is an adaptive response to racism and a form of internalized racism, though enabling defection of stigma, as it does not confront but rather reproduces the mainstream racism and the absolutist and essentialist concept of culture. Scholars also report similar internalized racism in other communities of color such as othering of coethnics as “wetback” in the Hispanic community (Bedolla 2005) or “colorism” that benefts the lighter-skinned Latinos and blacks (Waters 1990). As Abelmann eloquently put it, “race is often spoken through these sorts of distinctions made among coethnics” (2009, 38). This is why internalized racism is an important area to study racism even though this subject “causes discomfort because it suggests that the effects of racism are deeper and broader than many would like to admit” (Pyke and Dang 2003, 151). My research fnds that distancing from the racial stigma of coethnics also creates divisions between Korean international and Korean American students although the boundary between the two sub-ethnic groups is blurry with a growing number of individuals who fnd it diffcult to decide whether they are one or the other (see also Abelmann 2013; Shin 2012). The more acculturated Korean international students are, the more familiar they are with the term, “FOB.” Some of my respondents labeled Korean Americans as “whitewashed,” and its variations including “Twinkie,” “banana,” or “too Americanized.” In referring to Korean American students, Sunyoung, an undergraduate in early twenties studying design and who has lived in Canada for fve years and three years in the United States, said: “They are totally whitewashed. They are just like whites, only with a Korean face. That’s how I felt, feeling like I talk to a white person, and not to a Korean.” Korean international students often express subdued anger toward Korean American students while they readily accept the social segregation from other racial groups as “natural.” Mimi is a female graduate in mid-twenties who studied in an international school in another country for six years before college and has lived in the United States for fve years attending two universities. Mimi said: I was close to second generation Korean Americans. It was “un-cool” to hang out with Korean international students, “FOBs.” We regarded those who had friends of different skin color as having high social ability, and looked down upon Asians sticking together with each other. I think the terms, “Twinkie” and “FOB” are everywhere and here to stay. They won’t disappear. “FOB” is derogatory: very uptight, very low adaptability. On the other hand, I rarely saw kids offended for being called a “banana” or a “Twinkie.” I’d rather be called a

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“Twinkie,” if I have to choose (laugh). I was once called a FOB, when I didn’t know about Super Bowl and some jokes. I was like, “What’s a FOB?” I was upset when I found out what it meant.

Inhye, a graduate in mid-twenties who lived in the United Kingdom for two years when she was younger and seven years in the United States, said:

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I just don’t want to be called a FOB. We can call each other FOB’s for fun just as blacks call each other the n-word. But if someone calls me a “FOB” . . . I came to study abroad older, so I am a FOB, but you don’t want to be seen as provincial, unable to adjust to this society. . . . I think “She is totally a banana” when I see someone who is different in appearance, makeup, and very tanned . . . not having any Asian friends. I think to myself, “Are you insecure? Do you hate being an Asian?”

The representation of Asians and Asian Americans in American pop culture has contributed to the internal racial dynamics. One of the most infamous and iconic portrayal is Long Duk Dong, a Chinese international student in Sixteen Candles, a hugely successful romantic comedy movie released in 1984. With his strong accent and clownish behaviors, Long Duk Dong epitomizes the demeaning stereotypes of Asian Americans, particularly that of an asexual and emasculated Asian man (Eng 2001; Espiritu 2008).3 It is not an accident that this character embodying the stereotypes of Asian Americans is an international student. It, in fact, refects the U.S. racial formation in which Asians have been racialized not so much as “inferior” like African Americans but rather as “outsiders.” Some scholars theorize the racial triangulation to conceptualize this specifcity of the racialization of Asians in the United States that is not irreducible to the black and white binary (Kim 1999; Kim 2008). The foreigner status of Long Duk Dong is a convenient device in the movie to enact and amplify the racial stereotypes of Asians as “forever foreigner” with impunity. To Asian Americans, however, it is unmistakable that the demeaning representation of Long Duk Dong as an Asian international student is actually domestic, that is, it is rooted in antiAsian discrimination in the United States (Espiritu 2008) and reproduces the ways in which Asian Americans are perceived by the mainstream. Given the constant racist portrayal of Asians as “forever foreigner” (Tuan 1999) in mainstream media, the infux of Asian international students can engender a greater impetus for Asian Americans to distinguish themselves from international students than other racial groups do from their counterparts. Minjee, a female undergraduate who came to the United States at a young age, reported how she had gone through the cycle of being distanced as a “FOB” to distancing herself from others:

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They treated me really nicely at frst because they thought I had disability, preventing me from speaking English well. As I learned English, I started speaking about a month later. Then the kids started mocking me, calling me a FOB or stupid, and hitting me as they passed by. So, I hung out with Hispanic kids who understood cultural differences. The school administrator introduced me to another Korean student in school. I wanted to be close to him because he was the only one I could speak Korean with. But he kept avoiding me. I realized later that he was embarrassed by me because when he saw me he would just pass by as if I were not there, and he avoided making eye contacts with me. That hurt me a lot. I guess he hated looking different. He only hung out with white kids. You know, that’s what Korean parents say, “Hang out with white kids.”

Minjee discusses how she herself had gone to distance herself from other Koreans, though feeling guilty, which points to the psychological mechanism of distancing from stigma, which Osajima (1993) calls “hidden injuries of race”:

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Some time had passed. A kid who I knew from my elementary school in South Korea came to my school. Our moms were friends. I heard that the kid was coming to my school to get my help. I was worried, “Am I going to be outcast again?” I would have to speak Korean with her, and then other kids would look at me differently. I had just started to adjust and made some friends. I could understand the guy who avoided me, realizing how he might have felt about me. I was worried, but also felt guilty. In the end, she went to a private school, so we were not at the same school. But I still avoided her calls, for fear that she might come to my school (laughs).

We should understand such emotion as expressed by Korean international students in terms of their ethnic identifcation that calls for ethnic solidarity. From Korean international students’ perspectives, Korean American students’ othering of them as “FOB” constitutes a betrayal of ethnic solidarity against racism. Otherwise, we could not understand why Korean international students’ anger from racialization is directed none other than Korean American students or other Korean international students and why the anger toward their coethnics is expressed not in ethno-national terms such as “national traitor”—as non-migrant Koreans in South Korea otherize Korean Americans (Kim 2008)—but in racial terms such as “whitewashed” or “Twinkie.” Just as racism is displaced and misplaced to intra-ethnic space as internalized racism, anger toward racism is misplaced on coethnics. More signifcantly, Korean international students reproduce intra-ethnic othering even among themselves, distancing themselves from the newly arrived and less acculturated students, or from international student groups that are accused of self-segregation and stigmatized as a “clique.” This

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division throughout the entire acculturation continuum is the most signifcant factor in Korean international students experiencing social isolation, even on campuses with large numbers of Korean international students. Many Korean international students do not want to join Korean international student groups, even though such groups are often the only community with which they can connect unless they go to Korean church, an established infuential institution in the Korean American community. Hyunjoo, a graduate in early thirties studying humanities and who has lived in the United States for eight years said: There is a Korean international student association at school. But I don’t participate in it. In my second year, I decided to go to their meeting. When I approached the meeting room, I saw a few older Korean men in it, watching a Korean TV show and eating Korean-Chinese noodles. When I saw them, I said to myself “no way.” I ran away and never went back. They looked so isolated and pathetic. Even though I was isolated and lonely as well, I didn’t want to belong there.

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Hoon, a male graduate in mid-twenties reports how in high school he avoided socializing with more recently arrived Korean students: “More recent Korean international students didn’t study hard. . . . I am not a selfsh person, but I felt it would be harmful for me to hang out with them because they were uncomfortable with speaking English unlike us. . . . I think they had a strong bond among them. It was very tight, creating a sort of clique.” Goeun, a female graduate in mid-twenties studying public health, reports: I realized that people talk disapprovingly of Korean international students. For example, we were called, “KKK” meaning “Korean Kurve Killers,” because we did homework together and got materials for class from older Korean international students who have taken the class before, so we had excellent grades. . . . My Filipino American friend said, “I went into a room in the library. And it was Korea.” It is because some Korean international students occupy rooms for 24 hours. So, although I interact with other Korean international students to get materials for class, I came to keep my distance from other Korean international students.

Korean international students who distance themselves from other Korean international students also risk being called “bananas.” Jonghee, an undergraduate in late twenties studying music and who has lived in the United States for four years, responded to my interview questions as follows: Interviewer: How did you come to be friends with European international students?

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Jonghee: Because we took classes together. Other Korean international students often asked me the same question. They called me a “Yankee” because I had more non-Korean friends than Korean friends. They meant a “banana,” white inside, yellow outside. . . . They were joking, but it was hurtful (chuckle). I didn’t mean to be not close with other Koreans.

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CLASS MEDIATING BALANCING ACTS OF ETHNIC DIS/IDENTIFICATION Korean international students negotiate and oscillate between ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation while class mediates the two tendencies respectively because wealth–or lack of it–determines consumption, school, mobility, employment, and residential area, among others. There are signifcant class differences among Korean international students. Just as there are students from wealthy families, there are those whose families do not have the fnancial resources to support them through schooling. Class can differentiate racialization of Korean international students through residential areas and employment. Wealthier Korean international students tend to live farther away from communities of color, including the Korean ethnic enclave. This is in fact the pattern that Korean immigrants have established since the 1980s when they created, for example, an “ethnoburb” in Bergen County, New Jersey, a wealthy white suburb with easy access to mid-town Manhattan, causing a white fight (Min 2012). On the other hand, working-class students tend to live predominantly in communities of color neighborhoods because of more affordable rents or in the Korean ethnic enclave with Korean immigrants and close proximity to their workplaces. Korean international students from lowincome families who work off-campus are exposed to and educated about the Korean American society and the broader society through their work experiences. Korean international students account for a signifcant portion of the contingent and undocumented labor force in the Korean ethnic labor market in New York City. The working-class Korean international students that I observed and interviewed all work for Korean-owned businesses that constitute leading industries in New York City’s Korean ethnic economy, such as restaurants, delis, green grocers, nail salons, or jewelry wholesale businesses. As low-wage workers, they are vulnerable to harsher treatments of the broader society unlike the more protective environment of school campuses. Yoonjin, a female undergraduate in mid-twenties who has lived in the United States for three years and works for a Korean-owned business of selling party goods in a predominantly white neighborhood, reported seeing the discrimination of the larger society through the eyes of her Korean American store owner, and from the perspective of her coworkers who are people of color:

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I have been working at Korean-owned party supplies store for over one year. Customers are mostly white. The owner’s two daughters come to the store once in a while to help. They told me that they fght with customers sometimes, and it always becomes racial. The Korean owner has a lot of money and is well educated. But white customers look down upon him. Customers say, “You are Asian. Go back to your country.” Customers also stereotype me as Chinese. . . . Other employees are blacks or Hispanics. I have heard a lot about race from them. It was my frst time to hear about race. I realized that they have their own racial problems. A black employee told me then when she goes shopping in shopping malls, storeowners always are suspicious of her for shop-lifting. I never experienced something like that. So, I realized that they experience racism in different ways.

Hyungjin, a male undergraduate works full time for a Korean-owned company that distributes jewelry or other accessories to largely immigrant-run wholesale businesses in Manhattan, while attending a community college. Through his interactions with business owners of different racial and ethnic groups, Hyungjin refected that “peoples are not so different” after all, even though each group has different style and preferences for design. Jichul, a male undergraduate in early thirties who works full time in a Korean restaurant reported his exposure to people at work that most wealthy Korean international students know little of. His coworkers are generally other Korean international students or Korean Chinese immigrants from Yanbian, China whom South Koreans call chosŏnjok.4 With increased popularity of Korean popular culture in Asia, Korean foods and products have become popular among affuent Chinese immigrants and international students in the United States. As such, Korean restaurants and businesses that sell Korean products see the benefts of hiring Korean Chinese who can speak both Korean and Chinese, to meet the needs of their consumer base. Jichul reported his observation of a turf war between the Korean international student and Korean Chinese wait staff at the restaurants he worked at—a tension that has major impact on his life but a situation that barely touches the lives of wealthy Korean international students. Class can differentiate and shape forms of ethnic dis-identifcation, creating a racialized class tension among Korean international students. For wealthy students, marking elite class status through conspicuous consumption is a common strategy to cope with racism in the United States. Ong (1999) observes that overseas Chinese’s acquiring cultural capital such as taking violin lessons is a process of consumption to dissociate with the “coolie stigma.” Pu (2014) observes that Chinese international students talk about consumption such as their trips to Europe as a way of distancing themselves from their marginal status in the United States. Shin (2012, 186) observes that Korean international students in Canada use consumption to “negotiate

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their social positions as modern, cosmopolitan citizens” in the host society by living in a wealthy neighborhood, following up-to-date fashion trends, golfng, skiing, or horse-back riding to mark their class status. Joonyoung’s view of other Asian international students betrays his consciousness about the importance of conspicuous consumption for social status: I looked down upon Chinese students somewhat when I attended a community college. But, here (in the current university), the tuition is high. Wealthy kids come. They dress up. Though they are Chinese, they are very rich, so I cannot look down upon or ignore them. They drive a Bentley or a similarly expensive car.

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Minjoo, a sophomore studying design in a private school, noted the consumption pattern of her fellow students at her school: “The amount of money one spends naturally divides Korean international students. If you cannot spend as much, you cannot hang out with those who do. They go to expensive restaurants. If some students go to Zara or H&M to buy clothes, they go to SOHO to shop designer brands.” As wealthy students defect the coolie stigma to working-class Asians through consumption, it engenders a racialized tension among Korea international students with different class backgrounds. Jichul, an undergraduate in early thirties has worked in Korean restaurants for over fve years in Flushing to earn his tuition and living costs, the largest Korean and Chinese enclave in New York City. He also lives in Flushing. Jichul discussed how he was offended by what he called the “class consciousness” of some wealthy Korean international students whom he had served as customers in restaurants. He felt that they bragged about attending private school and living in Manhattan by exoticizing and othering Flushing: The frst thing they say is, “Is Flushing like this?” It is an implicit way to boast that they live in Manhattan. I play along, and say, “Do you live in Manhattan? I don’t know Manhattan well because I haven’t been there often.” They also brag about attending private school in a tone that looks down on people like me attending a community college. Chinese international students also come to the restaurant, driving a Mercedes Benz. But they dress modestly and don’t brag the way Korean international students do. Korean international students know Flushing, but they pretend not to. I think it is their class consciousness. Always . . . the frst thing they say is, “This is my frst time in Flushing.” I ask, “Are you from another state?” They respond, “No, I am from Manhattan.” Come on, it is just Manhattan! Some of their friends may commute from Flushing. Koreans are like that.

As a response to the wealthy students othering him, Jichul counter-others them by criticizing their “Korean” tendency to boast about their wealth and

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by praising the commendable traits of Chinese students, whom Jichul negatively stereotypes in other parts of his interview. Jichul’s counter-othering of wealthy Korean students by implying that they are “spoiled kids” is also a way to defect the racial stigma of international students while showing his pride as a diligent working person and assuming moral superiority (Sherman 2007). Furthermore, wealthy Korean international students’ efforts to mark class through consumption can backfre and breed resentment and intra-ethnic othering of students from low-income Korean American families. It creates a cycle of class and race feeding each other, generating tension among Koreans on campus and in the broader community: The racial stigma feeds the conspicuous consumption of Korean international students while the class resentment of Korean American students with limited economic means, in turn, feeds the intra-ethnic othering. Grace, a Korean American undergraduate in mid-twenties, studying design reported her impression of and conversation with non-Asian friends about Facebook postings of pictures of designer brand clothes and a loft in Manhattan by Korean and other Asian international students from her school: “We joke about how wealthy they are, and how Asians are in social media. But, it really bothers me. Why do they think it is okay to show off their wealth?” Grace took the online display of conspicuous consumption of her Korean international student classmates as offensive and intending to threaten her: “They won’t threaten me!” Mimi is a female graduate in mid-twenties who has both Korean international student and Asian American friends, and works part-time to support herself. Mimi expressed disapproval of fellow Korean international students’ display of consumption and global mobility and noted the tension that arises from it between Korean American and Korean international students: “FOB’s” and “Twinkies”? I think they are everywhere, because . . . Korean Americans have a sense of entitlement about living here for a long time and know more about the United States. On the other hand, Korean international students think of Korean Americans as, “You have lived here only. But we have lived in other countries,” thinking it is cool to go to South Korea during summer and winter breaks. I guess there is the luxury of fying. You can sense pride in the way they talk about going to South Korea because it reveals their wealth. They take pictures of boarding tickets and airports and post them on Facebook. That’s what people who work on MAs and PhDs do (chuckles).

Korean international students are aware that conspicuous consumption can be a fodder for stereotyping them as “spoiled kids.” Joonho, an undergraduate studying communication and active in a Korean international student association in a private university, said, “There is a perception that international

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students are spoiled children, that they are spoiled and rude. I think it is true even if I am one of them.” Between the coolie stigma and the stereotype of “spoiled kids,” wealthy Korean international students fnd that they are damned if they mark their class difference through consumption and damned if they don’t. The primacy of ethnic identifcation and solidarity as a strategic response to racism internalizes and contains class differences among Korean international students, for marking class can harm ethnic solidarity and potentially backlash. Class can, however, still differentiate and shape the intensity and forms of their ethnic identifcation. While Korean international student associations are stigmatized as “cliques” on one hand, for instance, they are a valuable resource on the other hand for the students. They are a source of valuable information on school life and offer socializing opportunities during their tenure at school. They are even more important after graduation as social capital because they constitute networks of mutual recognition of their academic credentials, particularly in the sending country (Waters 2006), and connect the students to transnational alumni networks that consist of well-connected, powerful, and successful individuals in the corporate sector, academia, and other sectors of society. The infuence and reach of alumni in South Korean society is even one of critical factors that Korean international students consider in selecting universities to attend in the United States. The more prestigious a university is known in South Korea, the more valuable the social capital of their alumni network becomes, thus increasing the incentive for ethnic identifcation. Joonyoung reported that he felt superior to and didn’t try to make friends with other Koreans when he was in a community college while he saw Korean friends in his current prestigious university as equals and valuable assets for his future pursuits. These networks overlap with larger trans-regional and transnational personal connections to include fellow wealthy friends who are studying in similarly prestigious universities in other states of the United States, or in other countries. Some respondents claimed that Korean international students in major universities in the East Coast are all connected “with one degree of separation.” The students cultivate these transnational relationships through social media and through inperson get-togethers, as they live mobile lives visiting South Korea or another country to see their family and friends, do internships in other cities, or attend summer schools in other cities. Therefore, Korean international students are torn and maneuver the delicate balancing acts between distancing from the racial stigma of coethnics and tapping into valuable ethnic social capital. Almost all Korean international students I interviewed, except those who are staff of Korean international student groups, reported their balancing acts and tensions that arise

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from such acts. My respondents have used a Korean cliché to describe this balancing act, saying that their relationship to a student association is like “keeping one foot in the water,” meaning an ambiguous state where they are neither jumping into nor getting out of the water altogether. Minjoo, a sophomore studying design, who initially avoided socializing with other Koreans, reported how she tries to fnd an elusive balance: Networking with other Korean international students is benefcial, particularly if you are planning to go back to South Korea. It helps a lot for sure. Here, people tend to fnd jobs on their own. But in South Korea, people make connections on behalf of others. I hear that there is an alumni association in Korea. I talked to my father about this. He said, “Shouldn’t you go to Korean student meetings?” After I talked to my father, I started hanging out with Korean international students, eating and studying together. But because I also have American friends, socializing takes more time. My American friends complained, commenting that it is hard to see me.

Korean international students live their lives as such by oscillating and negotiating between class-mediated ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation to simultaneously respond to the racial dynamics in the United States and to the condition of social reproduction in South Korea.

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CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have examined a specifc way in which class, race, and ethnicity intersect in the lives of emerging racialized transnational elites. I have frst demonstrated that Korean international students in New York City take ethnic identifcation and solidarity as the primary strategy to avoid racialization, constructing ethnicity through distinctions from other ethnic groups like Chinese, building ethnic social capital, and engaging in diasporabuilding activities. I also identify and discuss a counter tendency of ethnic dis-identifcation in the form of intra-ethnic othering among Korean students to distance themselves from coethnics because of the racial stigma attached to it. Thus, Korean international students negotiate and oscillate between ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation that are two modes of response to racism. At the same time, class mediates and shapes ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation respectively in the form of ethnic social capital such as Korean alumni and occupation-based networks or conspicuous consumption. All these dynamics culminate in Korean international students’ delicate balancing acts between tapping into ethnic social capital that is crucial for social reproduction and distancing themselves from the racial stigma of coethnics

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through consumption to simultaneously avoid racialization and achieve social reproduction. NOTES 1. “1.5 Korean American” refers to Korean Americans who immigrated to the United States at an earlier age and have acclimated to American society to large extent. 2. Pyke and Dang (151–152) explain the mechanism:

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As Goffman (1963, 44) explained, those who face stigmatization can resist by relying on “disidentifers” that cast doubt on the validity of their stigmatized status. Hence Asian Americans can oppose being seen as perpetual foreigners and vie for acceptance by whites by expending much energy on the display of an assimilated status via language usage (e.g., speaking without an accent), clothing, attitudes, and behavior. In other words, Asian Americans face immense pressure to assimilate in order to distance themselves from the stigma associated with their racial group. Dis-identifcation and the display of an assimilated status also entail the distancing of oneself from coethnics. By displaying an assimilated status and denigrating “other” coethnics as “too ethnic” or too stereotypical, some Asian Americans can carve out a positive self-identity.

3. The representation of Long Duk Dong exposes an intersection of race, gender, and sexuality. The scenes with Long Duk Dong in the movie that are meant to be funny include the ones in which Long Duk Dong is portrayed as having a white girlfriend and loving her breasts and parties. The funniness is supposed to come from the counterpoise of “asexuality” of racially “castrated” Asian men (Eng 2001) to the exaggerated sexual drive of young heterosexual adult men. The othering and queering of Asian men and other men of color is an integral instance in the construction of white heteronormative masculinity in the United States (Eng 2001; Robinson 2015). My research fnds that race tends to be the most visible but also confusing to my Korean international student respondents when it intersects with gender and sexuality. Scholars have argued that the intersection of race and gender has been crucial in the construction of Asian America in which Asian women are stereotyped as “hypersexual” while Asian men as “emasculated” or “asexual” (Eng 2001; Espiritu 2009; Ignacio 2005). For male Korean international students, race is visible through their frustration with a lack of romantic interests in them by women in the United States, in contrast to female Korean international students. Male students reported that gender disparity among racially mixed couples is one of the most visible sites, commonly observing: “There are many western [referring to white] men and Asian women couples. But it is hard to see western women and Asian men couples.” The intersection of race, class, and gender shapes choices of fashion and style, particularly as Korean male international students become conscious of the stereotype of emasculated Asian men. For female students, it takes in the form of unwanted sexual advances on the street, on campuses, or in social settings. Almost all of the female students I interviewed, regardless of their age, class, and where they live, reported experiencing

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harassment such as being catcalled on a daily basis that they rarely experienced in South Korea. They commonly said: “I experience street harassment everyday everywhere. I didn’t talk with my friends about such experiences of harassments because every Asian woman knows and experiences it. It is nothing to talk about.” 4. Korean Chinese are Korean immigrants who migrated to China before the liberation of Korea from the imperial Japan. They have constituted the largest group of immigrant workers in South Korea since the 1990s who are commonly referred as “foreigner workers” and have been discriminated against in South Korea.

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Chapter 4

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Conflicts over Conversion of Cultural Capital and Transfer of Knowledge

Many1 international students become highly skilled migrants and transnational managerial and professional elites (Bilecen and Faist 2015); in fact, policy makers often look to them as a major conduit of knowledge transfer and skilled labor (Vertovec 2002). The shift in emigration and diaspora policies away from remittances and towards knowledge transfer in the major source countries of international students such as China refects this fact (Xiang 2016). While a growing body of literature examines study abroad as a strategy that middle-class families deploy to acquire cultural capital in the Global North for purposes of social reproduction (Koo 2007; Ong 1999; Waters 2005, 2012), few studies examine how current and former international students who become managerial elites and skilled migrants transfer knowledge to their home countries. In this chapter, I examine how international students transfer knowledge across borders by developing a framework that links knowledge transfer to transnational social reproduction. Through addressing two theoretical and empirical lacunae, I seek to contribute to the literature on international knowledge transfer and transnational social reproduction. In the feld of international knowledge transfer, there is an implicit assumption that the relationship between the knowledge transferor and the knowledge recipient is conducive to knowledge transmission, as few scholars have examined the structural social conficts that mediate knowledge transfer. The literature on transnational social reproduction seems to assume that cultural capital transcends borders, but without analyzing how international students convert acquired cultural capital into local wealth and power. I contend that social conficts over the conversion of cultural capital that occur between former and current Korean international students and their non-migrant counterparts in South Korea mediate the cross-border transfers 89

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of knowledge. In South Korea, in particular, there is considerable class and nationalist resentment directed towards Korean international students because studying abroad is largely limited to upper- and middle-class families due to its prohibitive cost; and because their social reproduction by means of cultural capital in the Global North inevitably involves a distribution and redistribution of power and wealth that gives rise to inequalities (Koo 2007; Waters 2012). The knowledge that current and former Korean international students transfer as skilled migrants is far from an innocuous fow, since the knowledge and skills they acquire and transfer to their country of origin simultaneously constitute the cultural capital for their social reproduction in South Korea. These class conficts arise in interactions between international students’ status claims for privileges as transnational elites and non-migrants’ class and nationalist resentment and rejection of such claims. Korean international students ground their status claims in their acquired cultural capital in the form of degrees from American universities, employment experiences in the United States, English profciency, and exposure to cosmopolitan culture, all of which represent the power and prestige of the Global North. In so doing, Korean international students, in effect, endorse the presumed superiority of the Global North. On the other hand, non-migrant Koreans who are not equally privileged, often resent, reject, or disparage their claims and cultural capital while affrming local culture, practices and knowledge. I argue that we can conceptualize this antagonistic interaction as a struggle over the cross-border conversion of acquired cultural capital from the Global North into local economic capital, power and privilege in the home society. This conception inscribes the border in Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital, reworking and adapting it to transnational social felds. Knowledge transfer between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans takes place through struggle, and thus a success in knowledge transfer is at the same time a success in the conversion of cultural capital for transnational social reproduction. BEYOND GLOBAL FLOWS OF KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION Many scholars point out that by privileging concepts such as “global fows,” “space of fow,” or “de-territorialisation,” earlier globalization studies have popularized the mystifying imaginary of transnational processes as unmediated, unbound and disembedded free fows of people, information, goods and capital across the border, as if they could transcend local social relations, contexts, and confgurations (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Smith 2005;

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Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Scholars have sought to move the social inquiry on globalization “beyond global fows” (Smith 2005) to remedy the mystifying imaginary, employing such concepts as “emplacement,” “embodiment,” or “border struggle” that help us pay closer attention to local social relations and practices of social actors (e.g., Dunn 2010; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Smith 2000). As a result, we now have a more grounded and realistic understanding of how governments use class, race and gender to regulate global movements of people on their borders. However, we still lack comparable theoretical work on knowledge and information, which are often fraught with the imaginary of benign and innocuous free fows across the border, accentuated by the rise of new transnational media. To date, few studies on global migration/mobility and knowledge transfer have examined knowledge transfer mediated by structural social conficts. Instead, there is an implicit assumption that the relationship between the knowledge transferor (migrant) and the knowledge recipient (non-migrant) is somehow conducive to knowledge transfer. In an extensive review of studies on mobility and knowledge transfer among skilled migrants in management and organizational studies, Wang (2015, 136) points out that few studies take knowledge transfer itself as an important problem to examine, thus “leading researchers to confate mobility and knowledge spillover.” Here, we understand knowledge as “a repeated and observable practice” (Wang 2015, 135) that is procedural and expressed on executing a task. Wang (2015) argues that knowledge transfer always occurs through an interpersonal interaction between the transferor and the recipient in two stages—the transferor’s communication of the worth of knowledge to transfer and the recipient’s evaluation and acceptance of it. In other words, for knowledge transfer to occur successfully, recipients must evaluate positively and accept the knowledge. Yet, what if structural conficts and social antagonism shape the interpersonal relationship between the transferor and the recipient? While Wang (2015) conceptualizes contingent factors that hinder or facilitate knowledge transfer at each stage, such as the presence of other skilled migrants, he leaves social dynamics out of the purview. The same issue persists in other studies on migration (or mobility) and knowledge transfer. Research on the transfer of “tacit knowledge” in urban studies and geography raises the question of the transferability of knowledge across borders as it seeks to explain the paradox of spatial clusters of economic activities despite global standardization (Burgers and Touburg 2013; Williams 2007). These studies do so by making a distinction between codifed and tacit knowledge. The former is a highly formalized and systematized type of knowledge and, as such, is easy to transfer across borders even by means of transnational media. The latter, however, is non-codifed and specifc to situations, contexts or local cultures, so requires a shared epistemic

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and cognitive dimension as a condition of transfer. Thus, tacit knowledge is “sticky,” not easily transferable, and tends to put limits on knowledge transfer. While these studies insightfully look at epistemic or cognitive barriers between the transferor and the recipient, they do not interrogate any barriers that arise from social conficts between them. Another strand of research in global migration and transnational studies builds on Levitt’s (2001) celebrated theorization of “social remittances.” The concept mostly refers to what low-wage immigrant workers transmit to non-migrant coethnics in their country of origin in terms of perceptions about and experiences in the host society, as well as other topics such as gender, racial and ethnic relations in the host society. One can see the infuence of the concept in its varied uses: these range from the transfer of ideas by elite return migrants that contribute to the development of the home country (Kapur 2010) to a modifed concept such as “racial remittances” (Zamora 2016) to refer to cross-border transmission of messages on race and racism in the United States. While these studies are generally astute about the social dynamics of class, race and gender in the host society, few explore the structural conficts between migrants and non-migrants that mediate “social remittances” in the country of origin. In chapter 5, I revisit and discuss this body of studies in greater details by addressing its implicit analytic class bias and reframing it. The knowledge transferor (migrant) and the knowledge recipient (nonmigrant) are entangled in complex social dynamics and thus have diverse motivations and interests in transmitting or receiving knowledge. In this article, I provide a case study of Korean international students as knowledge transferors entangled in social conficts. Few studies examine how international students transfer knowledge, even though their function as transferors of knowledge plays a key role in their social reproduction. For instance, building on the literature on brokerage, Bilecen and Faist (2015) examine international doctoral students in Germany as privileged cross-border “knowledge brokers” who occupy a strategic in-between position between countries. Bilecen and Faist (2015) identify mutual friendship, trust and solidarity among international students as a social condition of their knowledge transfer and collective knowledge production. However, they do not explore the relationship between international students and non-migrants who are not equally privileged although they acknowledge and call for future research on the topic. This book is a response to such a call and in it I identify structural conficts between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans over transnational social reproduction that mediate knowledge transfer across different sectors of South Korean society. It shows that knowledge transfer of Korean international students is not an innocuous fow, but a process of messy struggle over domination.

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INSCRIBING THE BORDER IN INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS’ CULTURAL CAPITAL Observing differences in academic achievements among children from different social classes, Bourdieu (1986) conceptualizes and defnes “cultural capital” as one of the three forms of capital, along with “economic” and “social capital,” that can strategically convert into one another for the social reproduction of families. Bourdieu (1986) argues that cultural capital can exist as “embodied” dispositions of mind and body, “objectifed” in material things like books, or “institutionalized” as in academic credentials. Building on Bourdieu’s (1986) seminal theory, as discussed in chapter 1, there is a growing body of studies that examine the recent infux of international students—particularly Asians who account for the majority of international students studying in the Global North—as a strategy of acquiring cultural capital for social reproduction (e.g., Fong 2011; Kim 2011; Lee and Koo 2006; Ong 1999; Waters 2006). However, although there are studies that look at the challenges returning students face, such as readjustment, negative stereotyping (Lo and Kim 2015; Tse and Waters 2013), or domestic media discourses on the controversy surrounding studying abroad (Abelmann and Kang 2013, 2014), little attention is paid to how non-migrant coethnics in the country of origin react to transnational social reproduction and how this can lead to class tensions. There is a theoretical lacuna connected to this absence in scholarship. While existing studies provide rich ethnographies of diverse family strategies to convert their local economic capital into cultural capital from the Global North, few have examined how international students convert the cultural capital they have acquired in the Global North back into local power and wealth to complete the cycle of transnational social reproduction. Even Waters (2006, 2012) who provides one of the most powerful and systematic theorizations of transnational social reproduction is incomplete on this matter although she takes the issue of return as a problem to examine, aptly calling it international students’ “strategy of return.” Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of social capital, Waters (2006, 185) argues that “the value of the overseas education resides in the particular networks (or ‘social felds’) of mutual recognition.” In her case study, this network consists of an exclusive elite group of international students in a so-called “overseas club” in Hong Kong, which upholds the value of overseas education, and whose members are in positions of power that enable them to open doors to one another and provide networking connections. Waters’ argument is insightful because it identifes an important mechanism with which international students establish and re-establish their power and boundaries as an exclusive group in their home society. It also helps us understand why international students organize

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themselves through ethnic mobilization and solidarity in the forms of student associations and alumni networks, in the same way as Korean international students do on campuses across North America, as discussed in chapter 3. Waters still leaves out the question of how international students can make non-migrant co-ethnics in the home society outside the privileged network of mutual recognition recognize the value of their cultural capital across the border from the Global North. We should not take this process for granted, unless we presuppose that cultural capital transcends the border as some seem to with the use of concepts such as “transnational” or “global” cultural capital (Kim 2011). Bourdieu (1986) points out that there should be an established convertibility among forms of capital as the basis for strategies for social reproduction. What constitutes and undergirds the convertibility in a transnational social feld across the border between the Global North and South? How can international students convert the cultural capital that they have acquired in study abroad into local currency of social and economic capital that they need to complete social reproduction in their country of origin? How and under what conditions can cultural capital cross the border? To apply and extend Bourdieu’s theory to transnational social felds faithfully without reworking it is to ignore the border. To tackle this issue adequately, we should frst point out that the knowledge and skills that international students acquire and transfer to their country of origin simultaneously constitute the very cultural capital for their social reproduction. It is true that knowledge and cultural capital are two different categories that belong to the distinct sets of literature discussed above: knowledge refers to observable practices, skills or ideas that can be transferred and repeated, and that is potentially seen as worthy by prospective recipients, while cultural capital is understood as a form of capital for its possessor’s social reproduction. When knowledge to be transferred is believed to have been acquired and embodied through education or experiences by an individual who occupies an in-between position to broker it, one can say that the knowledge is also at the same time the individual’s cultural capital. If the knowledge, now believed to be embodied by the individual, is successfully evaluated and accepted by knowledge recipients, thus yielding rewards to the individual, one can consider that cultural capital has successfully converted into economic capital. Accordingly, transfer of knowledge and skills by Korean international students is a process of converting their cultural capital back into local power and wealth, and thus completing their social reproduction. We should also point out the structural connection between transnational social reproduction and the hierarchy between the Global North and South: the higher the status of the country from which international students have

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acquired academic degrees and knowledge is in the country of origin, the more valuable their cultural capital is in local labor markets. I argue that what constitutes convertibility in transnational social felds can be nothing but messy struggles over actually-claimed and accepted superiority or value of cultural capital from the Global North in a local context. In other words, the local value of international students’ cultural capital depends on how effectively and effciently they claim the superiority of their acquired degrees, knowledge and skills over local ones, and how non-migrants in the home society accept or dismiss their claims. Therefore, the re-conversion of cultural capital across the border involves conficting endeavors: on the one side international students enhance and mark up the local value of their cultural capital from the Global North by valorizing the presumed superiority of the Global North, and on the other side non-migrants dismiss or reject their claims. As I demonstrate below, this struggle over the cross-border conversion of cultural capital manifests in everyday conficts in social interactions that mediate knowledge transfer of Korean international students to South Korea. This inscribing of the border in cultural capital is a necessary reworking of Bourdieu’s theory to apply it adequately to transnational social felds and enable it constructively to engage the literature on knowledge transfer.

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Transnational Social Reproduction and Local Class Conflicts My research found that social conficts emerge between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans because transnational social reproduction through studying abroad inevitably distributes and redistributes power, prestige and wealth in South Korean society; the less-privileged non-migrants strongly resent this and react to it accordingly. In the South Korean labor market, an American college degree bestows certain privileges, in much the same way as a degree from a Canadian school does in the Hong Kong labor market (Waters 2006) although it has been devalued and lost the premium it once had, as discussed in chapter 1. Many Korean international students become skilled return migrants or transnational managerial and professional elites who work in transnational corporations to bridge the gap between senior management in the Global North and Korean employees in branch offces in Korea. South Korean society sees them as agents of globalization and innovators of corporate culture. Whereas locally-educated Korean elites, the kungnaep’a (or domestic clan) exist, those educated in the Global North who return home, the yuhakp’a (or study abroad clan), form a distinctive cultural group that holds privileges and social capital for mutual recognition. In this way, South Korea is like Hong Kong in that Hong Kong locals refer to their international students as the “overseas club” (Waters 2006). The conficts between the “study abroad clan” and the “domestic clan” affect social

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interactions in many areas of South Korean society, even within the realm of close relationships. Sungmin is a non-migrant Korean graduate student in his late twenties who grew up alongside many students who had gone abroad to study and with whom he remains in regular communication. He reported: I wish that Korean international students would disappear from South Korean society. They love America too much, and they don’t care about Koreans and South Korean society although their parents made all their money in South Korea in order for them to have a very comfortable life. I think it is because they studied in the United States. What they care about is how to succeed in the United States and be part of the U.S. mainstream. They probably don’t care even if the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement sells the souls of Korea to the United States. . . . But I think it is good to stay in touch with Korean international students. It is funny. I think I can connect with any famous architect in the world by only three degrees of separation. Koreans are in every good company.

Sungmin resents his international student friends on class and nationalist grounds, but simultaneously wants the benefts of the social capital he can derive from being friends with them. A non-migrant Korean woman in her early twenties has a Korean international student boyfriend whom she met when he was doing his mandatory military service in South Korea. She reported her resentment towards her boyfriend:

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I feel both envious of and inferior to my boyfriend when he hangs out with his friends. They hang out on a different scale, like having a cruiser party. I think, “You can enjoy like that because you have rich parents, unlike me.” They drink expensive alcohol. They are fnancially carefree about making trips overseas. They go to expensive restaurants. . . . Once, I hung out with his friends. I was sitting there like a wallfower. I am shy . . . and they were talking about the United States . . . so I felt very marginalized.

The military service is mandatory for all able-bodied men in South Korea. That sons of rich families and powerful politicians dodge the military service is one of the most common and controversial issues in South Korea. As it is commonly believed that many Korean international students renounce their Korean citizenship to avoid serving in the military, non-migrant Koreans are resentful of it as well. A non-migrant Korean man in late twenties expressed the following sentiment: It is ridiculous, but I don’t say that in front of them [referring to international students] because they are my friends. But I feel indignant when I read news articles about international students trying to dodge the military service. They have enjoyed all the benefts as Korean nationals, such as affordable health care,

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but they try to avoid their duty by exploiting loopholes. It is ridiculous. Koreans who have never lived abroad would feel very indignant about it.

As South Koreans’ strong thirst and envy for English profciency can be a fertile ground for resentment, English profciency could also become the most visible target of non-migrant Koreans’ resentment or mockery on the streets, in classrooms, or on college campuses. A non-migrant Korean woman in early twenties who attends a top university in Korea reported a tension around English language in a classroom, regarding it as an issue of wealth: In a class offered in English in the university’s International Affairs department, there were two male students who had limited English profciency. They failed to provide appropriate answers when a professor asked questions because they couldn’t understand English very well. People felt bad and sorry for them. But a woman student who studied abroad giggled, visibly making fun of them. A total a-hole! If the woman student didn’t have the money to study abroad, her English would be bad like the rest of us.

Heejin, a non-migrant Korean woman in late thirties, works at the Korean branch offce of a global pharmaceutical company in Seoul. She reported:

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People think it is arrogant [for the study abroad clan] to speak English often. If they speak English without an accent, which is unfamiliar to Koreans, people dislike it while they are envious of it at the same time. If they say English words, for example, like “Singapore” without an accent, it becomes such an eye sore to people. It looks like they cannot stop doing it. Even if they went abroad only for college, some don’t seem to be able to.

Being acutely aware of Korean nationals’ resentment over English profciency, many Korean international students reported that they are cautious to not speak English in front of their non-migrant Korean friends. Mija, a female undergraduate in early twenties who has been in the United States for two years said: I didn’t know this. My friends were feeling disgusted about me posting in English in Facebook. When I met them in Seoul, they said, “Do not act like you can speak English if your English is not so good.” I heard horrible things (laughs). Such envy, jealousy . . . (shaking her head). You should NEVER roll your tongue to pronounce English words correctly in front of Koreans. NEVER!

Korean international students have emerged as a common character in Korean TV shows and movies, depicted as a glamorous fgure living the imaginary script of a transnational elite or as an object of non-migrant Koreans’

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class and nationalist resentment, refecting the society’s ambivalence of envy and resentment. For instance, Misaeng, one of the most popular TV shows in 2014 for its realistic portrayal of the South Korean corporate sector, depicts non-migrant Koreans’ resentment toward international students. In one episode, a protagonist, middle management in a trading company, fnds out that his high school friend studied abroad in the United States and now manages a company with which the protagonist’s company is trying to do business. The friend character is depicted as physically unattractive and portrayed as morally unprincipled, engaging in shady behavior and intentionally misleading the protagonist into thinking that he will enter into a business deal with the protagonist’s company. The friend reveals that he had never intended to enter into any business deal with the protagonist and admits that he deliberately misled the protagonist to seek revenge for the way he felt inferior to the protagonist because the protagonist excelled academically while they were in high school. This friend character embodies non-migrant Koreans’ resentment towards Korean international students by depicting the character as morally shady and untrustworthy who, although did not do well in school in South Korea, got a degree from the United States that enabled him to reach a prominent and higher economic position than a Korean who did not go abroad to study. My research fnds that such resentment is prevalent in various areas in South Korean society, including corporate and academic circles, as discussed below, and that the resentment mediates the knowledge transfer of Korean international students.

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STATUS CLAIM VERSUS REJECTION: SOUTH KOREAN CORPORATE SCENE The social conficts between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans in South Korea take the form of struggles over the conversion of cultural capital mediating knowledge transfer. Current Korean international students and former students who have returned to South Korea commonly enhance the local value of their acquired cultural capital from the Global North by valorizing the presumed superiority of the Global North; nonmigrant Koreans, however, resent these acts, and often dismiss or mock them. I label this conduct by Korean international students a “status claim,” which is the term that Espiritu (2003) used in her case study of Filipino Americans. Espiritu (2003, 86–89) astutely observed how low-waged Filipino immigrant workers, who have limited social status in the United States, tend to seek recognition and claim status on their trips to the Philippines, which is “in effect a claim about the superiority of the United States.” While the status claim of low-waged immigrants may be mostly for psychological rewards, the status

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claim of Korean international students is essential for completing their transnational social reproduction. Korean international students systematically ground their claims for a transnational elite status on the power and prestige of the Global North as represented in their acquired cultural capital. Any enunciation they make based on the validity or authority of their Global North cultural capital, such as an American college degree, knowledge, or cosmopolitan experiences, can constitute an act of status claim in South Korean society. Such status claims incite strong class and nationalist resistance and resentment from non-migrant Koreans because they are, in the last instance, claims for privilege and power based on the hegemony of the Global North. Almost all my respondents reported tensions between the “study abroad clan” and the “domestic clan” at workplaces. Jaeyong is a Korean male in his mid-thirties who acquired a master’s degree in the United States and now works in a construction company in Seoul. His work experience illustrates the social dynamics of status claims. As Jaeyong explained:

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The frst thing they (his co-workers in the company) told me was not to refer to how things are done [in the construction industry] in the United States. When I talked about how things are done in [the] construction industry in America, my co-workers reacted, “Then, go back to your country” [meaning the United States]. The United States is not my country (chuckles) . . . so I thought “why did they hire me?” In South Korea, they draw a lot of unnecessary things in a foorplan because they think the more drawing there is, the better the foorplan is. All you need to draw in a foorplan is your intention, as they do in the United States. But, in South Korea, they draw everything in a foorplan. This is because our construction industry is not yet open to the global market. So, I raised the issue in the company. There was an uproar: “Go back to your country.” . . . I still believe that what I learned in the United States is more advanced . . . consciously or unconsciously. I cannot give it up. I think that if I give it up, I would be just like them. Someday they will change. Why should I regress to accommodate them?

Although he seemingly innocuously tries to share his knowledge and skills with his co-workers, Jaeyong is in fact challenging the industry’s existing practices in South Korea with what he believes to be the “more advanced” practices he had learned in the United States. This act, in effect, constitutes a status claim of superiority over his co-workers to whom he would have to “regress” if he wanted to accommodate them. At the same time, he is marking up the local value of the American practices he intends to transfer by claiming that they are “more advanced” than those in South Korea. His co-workers, who feel threatened, resent Jaeyong’s status claim on nationalist grounds by telling him to “go back to [the United States],” and by rejecting the American practices he wants to introduce. Despite the strong resentment of his

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co-workers, Jaeyong cannot give up his status claim because he would then be no different from his co-workers, as well as have no grounds for expecting privileges and rewards for the cultural capital he had acquired in the United States and in which he had invested so many resources. Jongwook, a Korean man in his mid-thirties who received a B.A. in the United States and works in a communications company in Seoul, reports how he sees himself and other “study abroad clan” co-workers as superior to his “domestic clan” co-workers because of the cultural capital he has acquired from the Global North:

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You can clearly see the differences between the study abroad and the domestic clan, particularly in meetings. Generally, only a few from the domestic clan make their opinions known to their superiors at work. I express my opinions directly. Those who studied in South Korea usually take notes in meetings as if they are in a class. In the United States, people are culturally more comfortable with debates. But Korean culture is not like that. That’s where I feel most frustrated, thinking “I make a lot of suggestions, but they just sit there listening.” I don’t know what they are thinking. They just follow what their superiors say. It is really frustrating. Not that everyone who studied in South Korea is like that. But I think where you got your college education makes a difference. About a third of the employees in my company studied aboard. You can see the differences most clearly in meetings. Those who try to come up with better ideas, and those who just go with the fow.

Using a dichotomy that is reminiscent of the Orientalist othering (Said 1979) of the rational West and the irrational East, Jongwook makes a status claim by portraying himself and other international students as more innovative and non-conformist because of their education in the United States, and thus superior to his co-workers in “domestic clan” who are conformist and act like a teacher’s pet by taking notes of what their employer says. In his discourse, he is implying that the value of American culture that is “more comfortable with debates,” which he thinks he is practicing at work, is superior to that of local culture. Jongwook also makes a status claim in terms of his English profciency and work-related skills, some of which he means to share with his non-migrant co-workers, marking them up as “more effective” and superior: When Koreans conduct the internet search, people just use Naver (a Koreanbased search engine). You know, Naver is a closed system. They process data for users, so you end up with the same search results. But those who studied in the United States or speak English use Google. You can see the difference when you search both engines using the same search words. New information you get [by using Google] is quite a lot. So, I say to my co-workers, “Please stop using Naver, and try Google.” It’s important to get different and more effective information and materials.

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Non-migrant Koreans react to such status claims by criticizing and devaluing Korean international student returnees as arrogant opportunists “who only speak English well.” In other words, they dismiss, belittle or mock their status claims and cultural capital while affrming local culture, practices and knowledge. Heejin, a non-migrant Korean woman in late thirties, works at the Korean branch offce of a global pharmaceutical company, where a newlynamed non-Korean president of the Seoul branch offce hired about ffteen Korean international students who are completing their degrees in the United States or the United Kingdom in an effort to convert the company culture to be more “global.” Heejin describes the resentful and disapproving attitude expressed at her pharmaceutical company towards Korean international student returnees: People talk behind [the study abroad clan] at work. People say, “They are arrogant and rude,” or “All they are good at is English,” or “They don’t perform well. They just try to look good to foreign bosses.” You need to read between the lines of what Koreans say . . . [but they cannot]. And they just try to make themselves look good, for example, by taking an opportunity to present. It is also, in our culture, to be respectful and listen carefully when supervisors talk. But they don’t do that. They don’t know the protocols and are disruptive. So, people think, “They are just trying to look good.”

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At Heejin’s company, the president’s initiative was met with resistance and resentment from other Korean employees, and most of those whom the president hired left the company, dissatisfed with the tension in the company. Minkyung, a Korean woman in early thirties who worked in a bank in South Korea reports how such tensions played out at her work: People (employees in the bank) resented that employees with U.S. degrees received preferential treatments just because they speak English. I don’t know if employees with U.S. degrees got paid higher salary, but they were placed in better departments and received different trainings while we (those without U.S. degrees) were placed in departments with limited opportunities for advancement. In other words, the bank was grooming them! We resented the bank’s policies and joked that “this is why you should go study abroad.” Our department had someone with a U.S. degree, too. We saw him as a special person for both good and bad. On the one hand, we were envious. Even senior staff made jokes sarcastically, “Treat him well because he will be a board member one day.” Senior staff from the domestic clan who gained their expertise by working in the industry are also resentful and dismissive of the study abroad clan—“What do they know?”

By rhetorically asking “what do they know?” the senior staff members who belong to the “domestic clan” are disparaging the knowledge and skills that

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international student returnees bring from the Global North to Minkyung’s bank, while affrming the importance of years of local experience in South Korea. When she left the company to study in New York City, Minkyung faced similar resentments from her co-workers: I heard horrible things from people at work when I quit. They said “Are you out of your mind?” “Is your family that wealthy?” I even heard, “You won’t have many people attending your parents’ funeral. You are not being good to your parents.” I didn’t expect my co-workers to encourage me, but didn’t expect them to be offensive either. So, I left, thinking that I worked with such immature and pathetic people. . . . That is the reality of South Korean society.

In short, the structural social conficts that take the form of status claims and rejections of such claims across the South Korean corporate sector mediate transfer of knowledge, practices, skills, and culture.

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STATUS CLAIM VERSUS REJECTION: SOUTH KOREAN ACADEMIC SCENE My research fndings show that the struggle over the re-conversion of cultural capital also mediates knowledge transfer in South Korea’s academic circles. Korean universities strive to survive the neoliberal globalization and excel in the evaluation for university rankings (Kim 2012). Korean universities are steadily increasing the number of classes they offer in English merely to receive higher accreditation rankings, which are crucial for student enrollment or to secure government funding. English profciency alone gives Korean international students a strong competitive edge when it comes to appointing faculty for South Korean universities. It is becoming increasingly diffcult in the social science, humanities and STEM felds to compete for an academic position in South Korea with just a Ph.D. degree from a Korean university. Therefore, study abroad has become even more important for social reproduction for Koreans who want a career in South Korean academia compared with those in the corporate sector. The United States has become the most desired destination for aspiring academics because of its hegemonic infuence in South Korean society, due to political, economic and military links between the two countries (Kim 2008; Min 2013). Korean international students often make status claims to their non-migrant Korean friends by endorsing the superiority of academic life and education in the United States. Hana, a non-migrant Korean woman in early thirties who studies social science in a Korean graduate program reports what she heard from her friend who was working on his PhD in the United States:

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He said many times that it was a good environment to study, saying “You should come soon, too.” He said he could study all he wanted freely. You have to stick together, having meals together here, but he said that you can just study all you want by yourself there because nobody bothers you. He said that they teach you from the foundation, more in-depth than here. It looks like he thinks that teachers there teach better.

Hana’s friend endorses the U.S. academia to Hana as having a “good environment” and being “more in-depth” than the South Korean academia, encouraging him to study abroad as well. Youngjoo, a non-migrant Korean woman in late thirties who has an international student friend who is working on a PhD in a graduate school in the United States reports:

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She [referring to her international student friend] said that she respected her professors in the United States because they were much better than professors in Korea in terms of scholarship and everything. For example, she found out that what she learned about early cinema in a South Korean school was incorrect. Even though it was trivial, it proves that American professors are “masters” (said in English). Studying directly with masters is certainly different than studying with those [referring to South Korean professors] who merely convey what they have learned under the masters. She said that it was a great experience, and she felt honored. . . . This is the most impressive and envious part of my friend’s life in the United States.

Youngjoo’s Korean international student friend endorses the presumed intellectual superiority of the U.S. academia over the South Korean academia by characterizing American professors as “masters.” By doing so, international students in effect assert the superiority of their own education and knowledge over that of Korean national students who learn from Korean professors. Students who study in a Korean university often observe that their professors who have earned degrees from abroad endorse the superiority of the Global North. This is an important factor in their decision to study abroad. Hana reports: I think that professors think that the U.S. academia is a little bit better than South Korea. A professor who studied abroad praised a student’s dissertation, saying “This is a great dissertation because it shows that you can produce such a dissertation without going to study abroad.” When I heard it, I thought to myself, “Is there a perception that dissertations written in South Korea are not as good as the ones written abroad?”

A male graduate in early thirties studying philosophy who came to the United States for a graduate program reports:

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It looks like Korean professors think that the South Korean academia doesn’t have frm foundation . . . where they still spend time and energy on translating basic concepts from European and American thinkers. So, unfortunately they don’t seem to believe that they can produce good scholars there. That is why they suggest their students to study abroad, thinking that studying abroad is still important to getting an academic position in South Korea.

A non-migrant Korean man studying economics in a top Korean university discusses of student complaints in his school:

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I don’t know much because I am an undergraduate. But I saw a lot of students’ postings in the school intra-net complaining that “all professors say you should study abroad.” I guess there is a perception that the United States is the place to go because professors are all educated in the United States. In the intra-net, some postings indicate that if you want to study economics [for a PhD], you should go to even a low-ranked American university over a Korean university because the feld in South Korea is lagging behind the United States more so than other disciplines.

My research fnds that, as in the corporate sector, non-migrant Koreans undertaking Korean graduate programs strongly resent the international Korean students and the domination of those with doctorates from the United States. Soojin, an international Korean social science student in her early thirties, who had returned to South Korea for a summer break, noticed tension between herself and her friends pursuing doctoral work in South Korea. When Soojin told a friend that she studies a lot because she found the work in the United States diffcult, her friend responded bluntly that she also studies a lot in South Korea. Soojin heard later from a third party that her friend had regretted being so blunt with Soojin, but that she had acted that way because she felt that Soojin was bragging about her study abroad. In other words, Soojin’s friend took even Soojin’s complaint as a status claim implying that American universities demand harder work from their students than South Korean ones, so expressed her resentment by defantly saying that she studied as hard, thus implying that they are intellectual equals. Jongbum, a male PhD student studying social science in a Korean university reports: In the past, there used to be PhD students [in Korean graduate programs] aspiring to be tenured professors. A quite a lot. But those individuals are now research professors, which are contract positions that are subject to renewals every three or eight years. That is the reality [for domestic PhD holders] even if you have great academic achievements. They must be enormously angry, frustrated, and feel disempowered. Our generation came to [Korean] graduate programs after witnessing it, so we take the obstacle for granted.

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South Korean professors often recommend their students to study abroad. It is not just an endorsement of the presumed superiority of the U.S. academia, but also a well-intended and genuine recommendation for students’ future given the situation where domestic PhD holders have become marginalized in the academia. However, that does not deter some resentful Korean students from holding professors irresponsible. An op-ed published in May 2013 in The Seoul National University News, a university newspaper, by a PhD student in social science at the Seoul National University indicts the irresponsibility of professors at her school for recommending study abroad:

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Most professors in prestigious Korean graduate programs are those who have acquired their PhD’s abroad. These days it is a trend to have teaching experiences from abroad before returning to South Korea. Then, is what these professors teach in South Korea different from what they teach abroad? To be harsh, their advice to study abroad, even if it is well-intended, is irresponsible because it cannot help but send a message to students: “We cannot produce good scholars in our graduate program; therefore, we don’t recognize those with a degree from our program.” Why did Korean graduate schools develop strong PhD programs but give up on developing talents domestically? Why transfer such work to foreign institutions? Is Seoul National University that produces many Korean international students an agency for a study abroad program? Is Seoul National University in particular a prep school for American graduate programs? (Song 2013)

In contrast to the South Korean corporate sector, the resentment in the South Korean academia tends to be silenced. In the corporate sector, the collective power of the “study abroad clan” is relatively weak, for the number of those who studied abroad is small. As such, the resentment towards their privilege is often expressed in workplaces with in-your-face derisions and sarcasms as seen in the interviews above. Jaeyoung reports that many other international student returnees at his construction company have left the company, fatigued by experiencing resentment and tension on a daily basis, and concludes that in the current power dynamics, it is wise for international student returnees to “wait for a time to come when they can freely exercise their ability.” That is, a future yet to come in South Korea that Jaeyoung believes he and other international students belong to with “more advanced” knowledge and skills, namely a further globalization of South Korean society. Jaeyoung himself is waiting for his company to have more overseas contracts, so he can become more valuable. This shows, as discussed in chapter 1, how internationals students can become active agents of globalization because their own market value tends to increase in proportion to the intensifcation of globalization of South Korea. By contrast, in South Korean academia where the power of those with American PhD degrees has been frmly cemented since the early

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2000s, the resentment against them tends to be silenced because those who voice the resentment are mostly students while the recipient of such resentment are professors who belong to the “study abroad clan.” Hana reported the resentment simmering below the surface among students in a Korean graduate program with the majority of U.S.-degree holding faculty members:

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We don’t talk about this topic when we are with those who have completed their study abroad or are planning to study abroad. But when those who work on their PhDs in South Korea are together, we talk about it sometimes . . . about what it means to work on a PhD in South Korea, or how they get enraged about being discriminated against for a job. . . . We cannot talk about this publicly . . . because the department tries to create a family-like community . . . also for some people, those who study in South Korea and those abroad were good friends when they were in college . . . and because it is not a personal problem but a structural one. But it is an important issue for those who work on a PhD domestically.

This tension between the “study abroad clan” and “domestic clan” mediates knowledge transfer in South Korean academia. Such resentment affects the local receptivity of the knowledge that Korean international students intend to transfer, as non-migrant Koreans fnd ways to reject or discount the value of cultural capital from the Global North. Hyejin, who has a social science Ph.D. from a Korean university discussed the appointment committees’ differential evaluations of publications in English and Korean, which is something she learned when applying for an academic position. She spoke disapprovingly of this hiring practice, disparaging education in the United States as overrated and “not very different” from education in South Korea except for English language skills: “I think it is a bit unfair because I think there is not much difference between studying here and there. But, as they say ‘global,’ language is the big obstacle . . . that is requiring lectures in English and publications in English for faculty appointments.” Non-migrant Koreans in South Korean academic circles tend to direct their resentment specifcally towards U.S. academe because of the dominance of U.S. Ph.D. holders in Korean universities and other academic institutions. They often manifest their discontent by deriding the South Korean academic bias towards the United States. Sulhyun, a non-migrant Korean woman in her early thirties studying on a Korean graduate program in which most of the faculty members have doctorates from the United States, expressed her misgivings about her professors. She recalls how refreshing it was for her and other fellow graduate students when her department had the rare opportunity to have a visiting scholar from Europe who offered an unfamiliar perspective:

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Korean professors [with doctorates from the United States] don’t seem to know Durkheim or Weber well even though classical theories are from Europe. As I saw them talk generally about these thinkers in class, I felt they didn’t know these thinkers well. I wondered if it was not biased. . . . We once had a visiting scholar from Europe teach a class, who emphasized the importance of classical thinkers. That class was very different. We felt like our thirst was quenched. We felt that there was more than the United States. There were even students saying, “I want to go study in Europe.”

Sulhyun’s misgivings about her professors are, in effect, questioning the value of U.S. education even though she does so by favoring Europe, another source of power in the Global North. Some non-migrant Koreans reject the presumed superiority of U.S. academe in a more fundamental manner. Jongbum, a male Ph.D. student studying social science in a Korean university, questioned the applicability of “American” theories to South Korean society:

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For example, they analyze domestic cases with American theories. That’s why people talk about coloniality. Those who study in the United States also write their dissertations about cases in South Korea. A scholar once raised the question of whether those who study abroad can have the same perspective as those who study in South Korea. Those who study in South Korea can investigate South Korean cases in greater details and from an original perspective. Then, why should we keep reading works produced in the United States? Can those who merely apply theoretical frameworks circulated in the United States to domestic cases come up with a better explanation?

In affrming that locally-produced knowledge is “original,” Jongbum rejects the presumed superiority of U.S. academe by challenging its implicit claim to the universality of theories and instead localizing them as “American” theories. Rather than seeing this merely as a critique of Euro-North American hegemony, Jongbum’s critique transforms the value of Global North cultural capital from positive to negative by framing the knowledge transfer of Korean international students as a “colonial” practice. Out of a critical view about the hegemony of the U.S. academia, Jongbum reported his thinking and dilemma on how to overcome Korean academia’s scholarly dependency on the United States. While he is skeptical of a group of Korean scholars who try to tap into Korean indigenous thoughts as an alternative to the Euro-North American academic hegemony, he is cynical about another group of Korean scholars who, he thinks, fall prey to “voluntary dependency” in trying to catch up with the “study abroad clan”: It looks like the domestic clan develops voluntary academic dependency as they try to compete with and catch up to the study abroad clan. They feel like you

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have to read and learn whatever theories the study abroad clan studies. Even if you can’t meet in person [with famous scholars] like the study abroad clan can, you should at least read their books like Žižek or other popular thinkers. . . . If you don’t read them, you feel like you are “a frog in a well” [means a babe in the woods], meaning that “the well” is South Korea. That’s why the domestic clan is so desperately trying to catch up to and end up with voluntary dependency. A person I met recently cynically commented that he never saw any scholar who convincingly explained events in South Korea using Deleuze’s theories or other thinkers, but people talk a lot about those thinkers. I really agree with him.

Radical European philosophers like Gille Deleuze and Žižek are oddly very popular among Korean “domestic clan” leftist intellectuals who try to form an alternative voice against the hegemony of the U.S. academia. The odd popularity of such arcane European philosophers who have no particular relevance to South Korean society may be partly understood as a strategy of locals to at once catch up to and distinguish from U.S. PhD holders by tapping into another source of intellectual hegemony in the Global North, that is, Europe. Also, because the future of domestic PhD holders is limited, being practically excluded from university faculty hires, their area of study can be determined by professors who push them to study something more “practical” that can create a job opportunity outside of universities. Hyejin reports:

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I don’t know if this is desirable. There are many students in my department who study theory and history because there are many professors who study them. But professors don’t recommend students to pursue these felds because they may not be able to get academic jobs in these felds. But students come to the program because they want to study these disciplines anyway. Professors keep pressuring students to change their major to more practical felds because they cannot become professors. So, students complain, “We can’t even study what we want.” I don’t know if it is desirable.

The hegemony of the U.S. academia has shaped the intellectual ecology in South Korea as such. The dynamics show that subjugating and subalternizing local knowledge, which creates colonial differences (Mignolo 2000), is a sociological process involving local struggles over the conversion of cultural capital between knowledge transferors and knowledge recipients that are under progress in the current globalization of higher education.2 In sum, knowledge transfer in South Korean academe, as in the corporate sector, occurs through structural conficts between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans. Knowledge mediated and transmitted through such local conficts and uses are likely to go through transmutations itself. One may theorize the transmutation of knowledge mediated through actual local uses and conficts, for uses

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of texts are also a process of production: “A different world (the reader’s) slips into the author’s place” as a reader—or a broker, we may add—poaches on it (de Certeau 1984, xxi). That would be beyond the scope of this research. It suffces for this research to demonstrate that there are no innocuous free “fows” of knowledge, skills and information across the border, but rather social struggles over transmission of knowledge and domination.

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INDIVIDUAL COMPETITION WITHIN: A NOTE In this study, I examine the collective dynamics between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans as two distinctive groups to illustrate a social confict that mediates knowledge transfer. The collective dynamics can take an interpersonal or non-interpersonal form of interaction. I focus on interpersonal interaction because it is a primary way, if not the only one as Wang (2015) claims, in which knowledge transfer occurs. Antagonistic interpersonal interactions between international students and non-migrant Koreans refect broader group dynamics. International students make status claims, and get resented, as members of the “study abroad clan” who uphold the value of overseas education collectively as a privileged group. Social conficts can also take non-interpersonal forms such as organizational mobilization. For instance, in 2015, the South Korean Ministry of Personal Management announced a controversial plan to hold job fairs in North American and European cities to recruit Korean international students for government employment, stating that the government needs “excellent” talent with “global sensibility.” Mobilizing non-migrant Koreans against the controversial plan, a public sector union condemned it as unfair and unconstitutional, asserting that overseas education cannot be a standard for government employment or excellence (Chosun 2015). This act is, in effect, reasserting the value of domestic cultural capital as equal to that of the Global North. It is noteworthy that there is also individual competition among Korean international students over the conversion of cultural capital because the value of cultural capital and its yielding profts hinge on its scarcity, thus creating rivalry among possessors of similar cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986). Korean international students compete individually in the competitive labor market that already has an abundance of foreign degrees by marking up their own cultural capital as superior to other international students’. Heejong, a male graduate student studying music who has lived in the United States for two years, reports: No teacher ever says, “don’t study abroad.” They all tend to think that where they studied is the best, so they recommend it to their students. My adviser in

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South Korea studied in Italy. Because I liked him, I was going to go to Italy frst. Everyone’s the same. Between 80 and 90 per cent of students who work with a teacher who studied in the United States go to the United States. Those who work with a teacher who studied in Germany go to Germany. Italy to Italy. . . . They even go to the same institution where their teacher studied.

Heejong’s teachers, as former international students themselves, participate in the collective endorsement of the superiority of overseas education in general. At the same time, they individually mark up their cultural capital over that of others by distinguishing their country of study, university, knowledge, skill, theory, method, or “master” as more superior to that of other international students. Future research can explore how individual competition affects knowledge transfer.

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CONCLUSION With a case study of Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans, I have examined a conjuncture between international student mobility, knowledge transfer, and inequalities under globalization. I have argued that as transnational social reproduction involves a redistribution of power and wealth in Korean society, social conficts emerge between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans, and that these conficts mediate cross-border knowledge transfer in different areas of society. Focusing on the South Korean corporate and academic scenes, I have shown that social conficts take the form of messy struggles in daily social interactions over crossborder conversion of cultural capital between current and former international students who make status claims to enhance the local value of their cultural capital by valorizing the presumed superiority of the Global North, and their non-migrant co-ethnics who resent, dismiss, or mock the claims. Resentment towards status claims for privilege affects the local receptivity of transferred knowledge and skills as non-migrant Koreans dismiss cultural capital from the Global North in various manners, ranging from a blunt xenophobic reaction (“go back to the United States!”) in the corporate sector to skepticism and critiques of education from the United States in Korean academia. I have focused on the corporate and academic scenes because many Korean international students pursue their careers in these sectors and because academia plays a particularly pivotal role in producing and disseminating knowledge. The social confict discussed here is likely to be present in other sectors of Korean society and other countries in which international students claim privileges based on their acquired cultural capital, although each sector and country has its specifc manifestation of these dynamics.

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This study contributes to the literature on knowledge transfer and transnational social reproduction by developing a framework to link the two. As highly skilled migrants, international students are a major conduit of international knowledge transmission. By examining how they actually transfer knowledge I have identifed social conficts between privileged migrants and their non-migrant co-ethnics in the country of origin that mediate such transmission. In doing so, I have addressed the implicit assumption in the literature on knowledge transfer that the interpersonal relationship between the transferor and the recipient is conducive to knowledge transmission. I have also addressed an implicit assumption in the literature on transnational social reproduction that cultural capital transcends the border. By conceptualizing a struggle over cross-border conversion of cultural capital, this research inscribes the border in Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital to make it adequate for studying transnational social felds. I have paid due attention to the agency of less-privileged non-migrants in the home society that is often missing in the existing literature on transnational social reproduction. A successful completion of transnational social reproduction is an outcome of endeavors to overcome a formidable campaign that less-privileged nonmigrant Koreans wage against Korean international students.

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NOTES 1. This chapter was previously published in Park, Sung-Choon. 2019. “Conficts Over Knowledge Transfer across the Border: Korean International Students and the Conversion of Cultural Capital.” Global Networks, 19: 101–118. doi:10.1111/ glob.12195. 2. See Kim (2011, 2012, 2015) for a discussion relevant to this point. Kim claims that Korean international students become “academic subalterns” who “internalize” and reproduce the global hegemony of American universities and thus take a part in domination despite their own subordination. However, as he assumes that cultural capital transcends borders, there is no discussion in his work about conficts over conversion of cultural capital between knowledge transferors and recipients, leaving one to wonder how subjugation of local knowledge by international students actually happens. As demonstrated in this chapter, I argue that endorsing the superiority of the United States is not just merely an “internalization” through exposure but also, more importantly, a tactical practice in their struggle over the conversion of cultural capital with non-migrant co-ethnics, and that such struggles are the actual social process of subjugation of local knowledge. In fact, some international students I interviewed reported their internal doubts about the superiority of the U.S. academia as a result of their exposure to it.

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Chapter 5

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International Students’ Cross-Border Transmission and Translation about Race and Racism

In the previous chapters, I discuss the social dynamics in which Korean international students are embedded in the United States and in South Korea. In chapters 1 and 4, I discuss that study abroad is a strategy of wealthy South Korean families for transnational social reproduction and that the class conficts that ensue from their transnational social reproduction mediate knowledge transfer in the form of struggles over conversion of cultural capital. In chapters 2 and 3, I discuss the racialization of Korean international students in the United States. In this chapter and the next two chapters, I draw on the concept of simultaneity (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) to analyze Korean international students’ transnational lives that span American and South Korean societies across the border. I provide an analysis of how migrants who are embedded in multiple societies and occupy disparate social statuses simultaneously can shape dynamic transnational processes, such as transmission of messages on race, diaspora-building, and daily uses of transnational media. With my analysis, I contribute to advancing the conception of migrants’ simultaneity or simultaneous embeddedness in multiple societies with different social statuses that is considered to be central in global migration and transnational studies (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Tsuda 2012). Through such lens of simultaneity, I seek to conceptualize one and the same transnational social process affecting both sending and receiving societies simultaneously across borders, which leads to specifc local social consequences. In this chapter, I examine Korean international students’ cross-border transmission of knowledge and messages on race and racism from the United States to South Korea. I contend that Korean international students being simultaneously in South Korean and American social dynamics shape the ways in which they communicate and/or not communicate with non-migrant 113

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Koreans about their experiences of race and racism in the United States. While the class conficts in the form of struggles over conversion of cultural capital in South Korea mediate knowledge transfer in general, the transfer of knowledge on race and racism in particular poses a special problem for Korean international students. In South Korean society, Korean international students make status claims for privileges as transnational and cosmopolitan elites based on their acquired cultural capital, and thereby endorse the presumed superiority of the Global North. However, Korean international students’ incongruent status as a racialized other in the United States can interfere with and contradict their status claims in South Korea: unless they successfully present themselves as living a cosmopolitan script of a “world citizen” integrated into the host society with white friends, they risk being casted as a failure in the eyes of non-migrant Koreans. For impression management, to use Erving Goffman’s (1959) theory, Korean international students need to keep their racial reality as a “FOB” (Fresh Off the Boat)—a derogatory term used often against Asian international students as discussed in chapters 2 and 3—in the backstage for their presentation of self as a transnational elite in the front stage. In addition, the class and nationalist resentments that non-migrant Koreans hold against Korean international students for their transnational social reproduction and privileges compel a poor reception of messages, even if Korean international students talk candidly about race and racism. In short, through Korean international students’ practices for transnational social reproduction, a systemic obscuring and misrecognition of race and racism occurs across the border that aids the reproduction of the presumed superiority of the Global North.

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ADVANCING THE CONCEPTION OF SIMULTANEOUS MULTIPLE STATUSES As many studies point out and my work corroborates, it is now commonplace that immigrants or migrants can occupy very different social statuses in terms of class, race, and gender in the sending and receiving countries (e.g., Levitt 2001; Espiritu 2003; Kim 2008; Waters 2001). Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004, 1015) forcefully argue that a “migrant behavior is the product of these simultaneous multiple statuses of race, class, and gender.” Claiming that “[o]ur analytic lens must necessarily broaden and deepen because migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social felds, encompassing those who move and those who stay behind,” Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004, 1003) theorize simultaneity or simultaneous embeddedness to conceptualize social lives of migrants that span across borders as a social feld.1 I agree that simultaneity is at the core of conceptual innovations

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and the future directions for studies on globalization, migration, immigration, and transnational studies (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Tsuda 2012). As Takeyuki Tsuda (2012) points out, however, the concept of simultaneity is still relatively understudied and under-theorized. Tsuda (2012) argues that one of its reasons is that most studies still largely centers on registering the transnational linkages of immigrants as an alternative to the traditional assimilation theory from the perspective and academic context of the host society—particularly that of the United States—as its main architects of transnationalism themselves acknowledge (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). This seems to be the case despite the fact that the concept of simultaneity is precisely aimed at responding to “an emerging consensus among scholars that we can no longer study migration solely from a host-country perspective” (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 142).2 The obverse of the centrality of a Global North host country perspective is a relative oversimplifcation of the sending country in the Global South, that is, a relative disregard of social relations and conficts—and thus also the agency of non-migrant coethnics—in the sending country that are as complex as those in the host country. While being attentive to social relations of class, race, and gender in the host country in which migrants are embedded and are often marginalized, many studies tend to romanticize and reduce the sending country to a monolithic ethnic entity or a nostalgic space with regards to which migrants’ sole concern is their identity and belonging, not struggles and strategies within social conficts and relations of power as in the host country. Levitt and Glick Schiller’s (2004) pioneering theorization of simultaneity illustrates this issue. By distinguishing between a “way of being” and a “way of belonging,” Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004, 1010) explain how migrants can live physically in the country of residence while at the same time living consciously embedded in the country of origin through “practices that signal or enact an identity that demonstrates a conscious connection” to it. This distinction enables Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) to reconcile the assimilation of immigrants in the host society with their enduring transnational ties to be not incompatible. In this way, Levitt and Glick Schiller’s theory captures not only being embedded in a specifc local context but also being simultaneously in more than one country. However, a close look at the distinction of a “way of being” versus a “way of belonging” exposes the problem coming from the preoccupation with the assimilation theory: whereas the country of residence is a place for immigrants to “be” within complex social relations, the country of origin is reduced to a monolithic ethnic entity to “belong” to with its internal social antagonisms and fractures being abstracted. Consequently, Levitt and Glick Schiller’s (2004) theorization of simultaneity in “being/belonging” comes short of their own innovative formulation that a “migrant behavior is

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the product of these simultaneous multiple statuses.” This shows that the preoccupation with the assimilation theory paradoxically confnes the analytic potentials of the simultaneity concept within the scope or parameter set by the assimilation theory. Adding to Tsuda’s (2012) point, I argue that the under-theorization of simultaneity and the relative oversimplifcation of the sending country is not unrelated to the dominance of the two transnational fgures—“a rich person from a rich country” and “a poor person from a poor country” (Balibar 2002, 83)—that have an effect of shaping analytic perspectives in the felds. Social conficts and antagonism that the two transnational fgures may have with non-migrant coethnics in the home society are relatively inconspicuous and insignifcant, as opposed to the new transnational fgure this research registers in the felds, that is, Korean international students who are entangled in messy class conficts in South Korea. Corresponding to the under-theorization, empirical studies have been uneven. On the one hand, there are many studies that, being attentive to social relations in the host country, examine disempowering experiences of immigrants being relegated to the position of minority, having their academic and professional credentials from home countries undervalued and racially gendered (e.g., Abelmann and Lie 1995; Kim and Kim 1999; Kim 2008; Levitt 2001). There are also studies that examine exogenous nationalist tensions between immigrants and non-migrants in the home society, tinged with antiAmerican and anti-imperialist sentiments which non-migrants hold against immigrants, regarding them as traitors who have deserted their country (e.g., Espiritu 2003; FitzGerald 2009; Kim 2008; Levitt 2001). However, there are fewer studies that examine endogenous structural social conficts between migrants and non-migrants in the country of origin like the domestic class conficts that Korean international students have with non-migrant Koreans in South Korea. As I have identifed in chapter 4, the dearth of studies on how international students reconvert their acquired Global North cultural capital or actually transfer their knowledge in the home society is another manifestation of this general disregard for social dynamics and the agency of non-migrant coethnics in the home society in the felds. With a case study of Korean international students as a new transnational fgure who are entangled in specifc social dynamics as a “FOB”-cum-elite here and there, my work contributes to new empirical fndings and helps loosen the fxed ties between the concept of simultaneity and the assimilation theory for its analytic potentials. I advance the concept beyond explaining the static states of a reconciled coexistence of assimilation and transnational ties and employ it to analyze dynamic transnational processes affecting, and being affected by, local social relations in multiple societies simultaneously. Unless we reduce socially “being” to merely a physical corporeal presence

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in a place at a specifc time, which would be particularly problematic with the current regime of new media and heightened spatial mobility (Urry 2007) that produces spaces with “no sense of place” (Meyrowitz 1985), we should not conceptualize a “way of being” in the host country and a “way of belonging” in the country of origin as Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) do. Instead, we should conceptualize a way of socially being simultaneously in both countries. Employing the concept of simultaneity in such manner, I analyze how Korean international students’ transnational practices are a simultaneous strategic response to socially being within social dynamics of both the United States and South Korea, focusing on their transmission of messages on race, diaspora-building, and uses of media. I examine how Korean international students’ being a racialized other here and a transnational elite there shapes their cross-border transmission of messages on race in this chapter. In chapter 6, I analyze Korean international students’ active participation in diasporabuilding as an adaptive response to simultaneously avoid racialization in the United States and counter class resentment in South Korea as they are trapped in double backlash from both sides of the border. In other words, I demonstrate that Korean international students’ ethnic identifcation through diaspora-building is not merely about “belonging” to the home society, as Levitt and Glick Schiller’s (2004) theorization would limit our perspective. But, it is also an instance of long-distance bourgeois class struggle responding to their being within social dynamics in the home society. In chapter 7, I analyze Korean international students’ strategic uses of transnational new digital media to selectively localize or compartmentalize their transnational social relationships to deal with problems they encounter within local social dynamics in both the United States and South Korea. The following three chapters show that the two discordant social scenes and social dynamics are always present in and actively constitutive of Korean international students’ everyday transnational practices though they remain the other scene that is invisible, heterogeneous, and incommensurable vis-à-vis each other. In doing so, I imbue its full weight to the concept of simultaneity, measuring up to Levitt and Glick Schiller’s (2004) own innovative formulation and today’s new regime of media and mobility (Urry 2007). REFRAMING “SOCIAL REMITTANCE” ON RACE THROUGH A LENS OF SIMULTANEITY A recent innovative body of studies expands the scope of research on race beyond the national boundary and U.S.-centric perspectives to understand racialization from a transnational and global perspective with case studies of

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immigrants from countries in the Global South (Joseph 2015; Kim 2008; Roth 2012; Zamora 2016). An important component in transnational racialization is migrants or immigrants’ cross-border transmission of knowledge, information, and messages on race and racism in the host society to non-migrant coethnics in their country of origin. Peggy Levitt’s (2001, 54) celebrated concept of “social remittance” is one of the most infuential theorizations regarding this topic in global migration and transnational studies. Levitt (2001, 54) defnes the concept as “the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that fow from host- to sending-country communities.” The concept mostly refers to immigrants’ or migrants’ communications, usually taking place in face-toface social interactions, with non-migrant coethnics in their country of origin about their experiences and various topics such as gender, racial, and ethnic relations in the host society. The concept has gained such currency that its infuence is visible in various other uses. For instance, Zamora (2016) has coined “racial remittance,” a modifed concept to refer to cross-border transmission of messages on race and racism in the United States to non-migrants in their home country as a transnational process that affects local conceptions about race in both the host and home societies. “Social remittance” is also listed as a keyword and subheading of a renowned peer-review journal on transnational studies. However, in global migration and transnational studies, an implicit analytic class bias exists that privileges low-skilled, low-wage immigrants whose primary concern is earning a living in the United States to support their families back home by sending remittance to their countries of origin. The concept of “social remittance” itself registers a dominant fgure and an orientation in the feld of transnational studies: the subject of transmission that is implied in the term “social remittance” is a low-wage immigrant worker who sends ideas and behaviors only secondarily along with remittances to their country of origin. This implicit analytic class bias is another example that the dominance of the two transnational fgures has an effect of shaping analytic perspectives in the felds. By contrast, for rapidly increasing international students and other transnational elites such as managerial employees for transnational corporations, scholars or skilled return-migrants (Beaverstock 2005; Bilecen and Faist 2015; Castel 2000; Sklair 2001; Vertovec 2002), cross-border transmission of knowledge, information, and ideas is not a secondary aspect but the raison d’être of their existence. For international students in particular, the purpose of crossing the border to study abroad is not to send remittance but, at least nominally, to acquire and send new knowledge, culture, and information back to their country of origin. Thus, the concept of “social remittance” is inadequate to capture the transmission by all types of migrants, for it leaves out

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elites migrants. In the meantime, transfer of knowledge by elites and highly skilled migrants has been a topic that business, management, and organizational studies have dominated. Yet, these studies tend to comfortably neglect the social dynamics of class, race, gender, and imperialism and reproduce the myth of free fow across borders as discussed in chapter 4. Partly due to the implicit analytic class bias, the migrants’ cross-border transmission of knowledge, culture, and ideas has occupied a relatively marginal position within global migration and transnational studies thus far. Discussions on the cross-border transmission of knowledge, ideas, and cultures and its local social consequences deserve a central stage in global migration and transnational studies, particularly considering the current new transnational and global media environment of the Internet. Furthermore, these discussions need to be reframed to facilitate a theoretical entry of international students and other elite migrants. If the vocation of international students and other transnational elites is transmission of knowledge, examining their cross-border transmission of messages on race is at least as much signifcant and desirable as examining that of low-wage immigrants. Elite transnational migrants’ infuence on nonmigrants’ understanding of societies in the Global North and race relations within it may have more profound impacts on future migration patterns, racial and ethnic identities, or international relations than that of low-wage migrants. Far too few studies, however, examine this group of migrants’ communication on race and racism across borders. We should incorporate this group of migrants in studies on cross-border transmission of knowledge and messages on race and racism. Furthermore, migrants can be entangled with structural conficts with non-migrants in the country of origin, like Korean international students, which affects how they transfer knowledge. Then, we should employ a lens of simultaneity to examine transmission of messages on race. DIS/APPEARANCE OF RACE OVER THE BORDER Studies show that immigrants’ communication about their racial experiences in the host society with non-migrant coethnics in the home society is often not honest and transparent. Kim (2008, 223–241) observes that the frstgeneration Korean American immigrants tend to depict a rosy portrait of their American lives in their “transnational feedback” on race to South Korea to counter any negative images that non-migrant Koreans in South Korea may hold against them. Espiritu (2003, 86–89) observes, as discussed in chapter 4, that when Filipino low-wage immigrant workers with limited social statuses

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in the United States seek recognition and claim status on trips to their country of origin, they tend to hide their racial reality as a racialized minority from their non-migrant coethnics because exposing it would be “devaluing” themselves. While these studies are very insightful, they largely focus on low-wage immigrants and leave structural conficts between migrants and non-migrants unexamined. Drawing on insights from these studies, I examine cross-border transmission of messages on race by Korean international students who are socioeconomically different from low-wage immigrants and entangled in class conficts with non-migrants in their country of origin through a lens of simultaneity.

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A Script of “Cosmopolitan Striving” and the Presentation of Self My research fnds that Korean international students’ being simultaneously in social dynamics in both the United States and South Korea shapes the ways in which they communicate and/or not communicate with non-migrant Koreans about their experiences of race and racism in the United States. Most of the Korean international students I interviewed use the Internet and digital media on a daily basis to connect with their family and friends in South Korea for emotional support, to consume Korean pop culture products and to follow current events in South Korea across the Pacifc. The students also go to South Korea at least once a year to see their family and friends, with most undergraduates going twice a year, “living one fourth of a year in South Korea,” as one undergraduate respondent puts it. Despite the daily connections across the border via digital media and frequent trips to the country, which can create an illusion of transparency across the border, the class conficts in South Korea and Korean international students’ practices systematically obscure their experience of racialization to South Koreans. It is imperative for Korean international students to make status claims as transnational elites in South Korea to complete their transnational social reproduction. They make status claims to enhance the local value of the cultural capital they have acquired from the Global North, despite the strong class and nationalist resentments it breeds among non-migrant Koreans and the local class conficts that ensue as a result. Their transnational class reproduction shapes not only the intensity but also the contents of their status claims because they are seen as striving to become knowledge workers and managerial elites whose nominal purpose is obtaining “advanced” knowledge from the Global North. While such local conficts mediate Korean international students’ transfer of knowledge in general, transfer of knowledge on race and racism in particular poses a problem for them, for being simultaneously treated as a “FOB” in American society threatens to interfere with and

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contradict their status claims as a transnational elite. An important part of Korean international students’ status claims lies in posing as a transnational elite, in the eyes of non-migrant Koreans, who lives up to an imaginary script of their transnational journey depicted as “cosmopolitan strivings” (Park and Abelmann 2004) in which they grow to be “world citizens” who are acculturated and integrated to the Global North society with many “foreign friends.” The script, whatever the specifcs may be, cannot include being a stigmatized and marginalized racial minority often distanced by even Asian American students as a “FOB.” Rather, the script is informed and written by the whiteover-black racial ideology in South Korea that the U.S. hegemonic presence and imperial education inculcates in South Koreans, and as such consists of racialized and self-orientalized “cosmopolitan” dreams and fantasies. My respondents’ reference of the United States as a “land of opportunity,” “free,” “relaxed,” and “open-minded” exemplifes the script. As a result, Korean international students come to the United States with romanticized desire for whiteness and prejudices and fear against blacks and other people of color that direct their adaptation and assimilation efforts in the United States. South Koreans consider living out the script to be an integral part of cultural capital that Korean international students should acquire in addition to a degree from the United States and English profciency. Korean international students strive to live up to the imaginary script to meet non-migrant Koreans’ expectations of themselves as transnational elites. When Koreans talk about assimilation into American society, they often mean having associations with whites only, as they also mean whites when they say “Americans.” Joyoung, a male non-migrant Korean college student in late twenties and who lives in Seoul, provides his sense of what an association with foreign, particularly white, friends means: Making friends with foreigners is a bit of a show to other people. It is making a statement “I am this much open and competent.” This is my subjective feeling. It basically shows that you can speak English. You look more outgoing because it takes efforts. And it tells that you can adapt to an advanced and more open Western culture.

My interviews of non-migrants show that Korean international students can garner recognition that borders on veneration from non-migrant Koreans if they can indeed present themselves as successfully living the script, which, in effect, reinforces South Korean racial ideology. Jinsook, a non-migrant Korean college student in her early twenties, reports how her group of friends treated their international student friend from middle school like a hero when he brought his “American” girlfriend to South Korea during a summer break, revealing their desire for whiteness:

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A friend studying in New York took his American girlfriend to South Korea. She really liked him. Why? He is not even good-looking (laughs). So we were all like, “How did you get to date a blonde?” It is unimaginable in South Korea. We were like, “There must be really no good-looking Korean in your school. Hahaha.” Everyone who knew him from middle school was surprised that he was going out with a blonde beauty. She may not be considered beautiful in the United States, but in our eyes, she is because we think a blonde woman is a beauty. So, we were like, “How did YOU get such a beauty” (laughs).

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Driven by desire for whiteness, having white friends is one of the most visible markers of the transnational elite status in South Korean society. Thus, in the eye of non-migrant Koreans in South Korea, in addition to a degree from the United States and English profciency, having white friends is one of the most important criteria for a successful study abroad—quite ironic given Korean international students’ racialization and marginalization in the United States. One aspect of the lives of their friends studying abroad that nonmigrant Koreans are most curious about is whether they have made “foreign friends” or “American friends” (read: white friends). Jihyun, a non-migrant Korean in mid-twenties, compares two of her Korean international student friends in the United States and considers one a success, the other a failure: One friend says it is fun to hang out with other students from college. Judging by her Facebook, she has adjusted well. Another friend, I don’t know about her because I only saw her pictures. But, she is only with Koreans. Her boyfriend is Korean, too. But my other friend hangs out with diverse group of people even though she has her Korean community as well. Racially diverse, not just Koreans. She went to the United States with a clear goal and determination while the second friend went just because her parents decided that she was not well prepared to take the college entrance exam in South Korea. The two are so different both in their motivations and in their adaptability. So, I feel like the frst friend is doing really well while I question about the second friend, “Why did she go?” because she only hangs out with Koreans. The frst friend has her dream while the second one is an escapee. I guess there are many Korean international students who have gone to study just because they are lucky enough to have wealthy parents.

Jihyun thinks that one friend is “doing well,” in contrast to the second friend, partly because the former has a clear career goal for studying abroad while the latter lacks a similar goal and is studying abroad merely to “escape” the competitiveness of college admission in South Korea. The presence of non-Korean friends is also a major criterion in her evaluation of her friends. Jihyun even reveals her resentment, invoking a negative stereotype of Korean international students, toward her international student friend whom she sees as a failure in her study abroad.

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As foreign degrees are devalued due to their increasing abundance in the South Korean labor market, the importance of “cosmopolitan” experiences as cultural capital increases relatively. Jinsook compares her two Korean international student friends studying in the United States, revealing a South Korean perception that assimilation and associations with white Americans are key components of cultural capital Korean international students are expected to acquire in the United States:

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The female friend’s Facebook is flled with Asians. Those who are tagged in her Facebook all have Korean names. On the other hand, the male friend hangs out with foreigners. He is always tagged in pictures he took with foreign women at parties while she [referring to the female friend] takes only selfes, chilling in cafés just as in South Korea. When I talk to them, the male friend talks about having gone away somewhere fun while the female friend sounds like she just studies by herself. . . . So, I have to ask, “Why did you go if you study by yourself?” because American degrees are not so important these days, unless it is from an IVY league school, right? So, if you are going to study by yourself, I wonder why they go to study there, wasting lots of money.

Many of the non-migrant Korean respondents similarly commented in the beginning of their interviews that their Korean international student friends are “doing well” in the United States. A more in-depth inquiry revealed that they formed their opinions merely on the basis of the presence of non-Asian, particularly white, friends in their international friends’ social network sites like Facebook. Korean international students are well aware of the signifcance of having white and non-Asian friends in the eyes of non-migrant Koreans. Thus, although they are largely perplexed and confused about race and racism in the United States, the racialized script of a successful study abroad directs Korean international students to make status claims in South Korea. As their reality of being racialized and marginalized in the United States contradicts their status claims, Korean international students tend to translate race in a way that is conducive of their status claims as a transnational elite, or refrain from talking about it altogether with non-migrant Koreans in South Korea. We can understand this interference of an incongruent social status to the status claims of Korean international students in Goffman’s (1959) theory of presentation of self. Goffman (1959) points out that it is integral for daily impression management to create a region of performance in the presentation of self that is kept hidden from the audience, calling it the “backstage” where people keep what may contradict the impression they create and maintain in the “front stage.” He defnes regions or stages of performance as “any place that is bounded to some degree by barriers to perception” (1959, 106). Goffman analyzes everyday practices to create and maintain such barriers

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to perception to bound or partition the backstage in the presentation of self. Korean international students’ status claim is at the same time their presentation of self as a transnational elite to South Korean society. Therefore, it also requires practices over creating barriers to perception to partition the front and backstages and keep what may contradict and disturb their impression management in the backstage. In other words, Korean international students need to keep their racial reality as a “FOB” in the backstage for their presentation of self as a transnational elite in the front stage. We can regard Korean international students’ practices to obscure and selectively transmit knowledge or messages on race as a stage partitioning for the purpose of impression management, regardless of whether they are aware of the strategic signifcance of their behaviors or not. Minjee, a female undergraduate student in early twenties who has been in the United States for ten years, reports what she did in order to live up to the imaginary script of her friends in South Korea: I don’t know why I did this. I guess I wanted to show that I was living well abroad because others were really envious of me going to the United States and I was so proud. My ego would not allow me to tell them honestly about my life in the United States. I was actually alone in school, usually with a headset on. I lied to my friends in Korea that I made a lot of American friends. They insisted that I take pictures of my American friends. So, one day . . . this is so embarrassing (laughs) . . . I took pictures of random white students, posted them on my blog, and told my Korean friends that they were my new American friends. My friends were very envious. I guess people think that, if you are friends with whites, it means that you are . . . I don’t know how to put it . . . very competent? Later I deleted all the pictures, but I never told my friends it was a lie. I will never (laughs).

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Midan, a non-migrant Korean in mid-twenties, reports what she heard from her international student friend and why she thinks her friend is doing well in the United States: My friend is doing well in the United States. I keep in touch with him through Facebook. He goes to a lot of parties and hangs out with people. I met up with him during the last winter break [in Seoul]. I told him: “I didn’t know that you would be doing so well in the United States.” He said that he was shy in South Korea because he was short and had bad complexion. But, in the United States he exercised to build up his body. He said, “Even if I am an Asian, I have a good body and am confdent, so women like me. People are also less prejudiced in the United States than in South Korea.” He also said that Korean women don’t look attractive to him because they don’t exercise. He said he likes women with muscles, so he likes white women because they work out. This is improper to say, but he also said that it felt better to have sex with women with muscles, so he slept with women of different nationalities . . . German, French, and Russian.

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The status claim or presentation of self by Korean international students starts before they return home to South Korea. It begins in the United States through their digitally mediated cross-border social interactions and in diasporic public spheres which are enabled by new media. The South Korean scene and its audience, even though far away and invisible to the American scene, are always present in and constitutive of Korean international students’ lives and behaviors in the United States. For example, a thirty-year-old graduate from a top fashion design school in New York City reported that she quit three good jobs in the United States largely because non-migrant Koreans would not recognize the names of those companies, which made it diffcult for her to be enthusiastic and motivated about her jobs. A man who graduated from a school in the United States and now works here confessed that although he wants to go back to South Korea, he can’t because he is embarrassed about not living the imaginary script of working on Wall Street and earning a six-fgure salary. Korean international students also manage this impression through tactical uses of new transnational media as I discuss in greater detail in chapter 7. Mija, a female undergraduate in early twenties who has lived in the United States for two years, reports how she created her Facebook account, self-consciously calling it “a space to show off”: “I joined Facebook when I came to the United States to connect with Korean friends. . . . I also need a space to show off, to show off that ‘I am a New Yorker,’ to put up pictures. Am I too honest? (laughs). Doesn’t everyone do it? Is it just me?” Midan, a non-migrant Korean in mid-twenties, reports how her international student friend and other non-migrant Koreans interact in Facebook:

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He has a white girlfriend, so posted many pictures of them on dates . . . at a party, at a restaurant, or at a house. . . . He installed a camera in front of his car to videotape him and his girlfriend. He edits and posts it [in Facebook] with “my sweet honey” like that. Then, Korean friends write comments like, “I am envious.”

In Korean international students’ practices to live up to the imaginary script and to deal with the interference of their incongruent statuses, race appears as a hyper-visible transnational status symbol across the border while, at the same time, the reality of structural racism in which they are racialized as a “FOB” disappears. Poor Receptivity: Resentment of Non-migrants Some Korean international students attempt to speak candidly, as they understand it, about race and racism in the United States. Some try to appease non-migrant Koreans’ envy and resentment by talking disapprovingly about

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the United States and racism, though often limited to overt forms. Hyunjin, a female high school graduate who has lived in New York for three years, reports how she tried to appease her non-migrant Korean friends’ envy: My friends still imagine that I am living in New York like in a movie, reading in a nice coffee shop, with my laptop open during the day and going to a party every night. Things they see on TV. I say that the reality is not like that. There is even racism. Then they realize, “Not everything is good there.”

Out of indignation, others want to expose and indict the racialization and discrimination they experience in the United States. Midan, a non-migrant Korean in her mid-twenties, reports what she heard from another international student friend studying in an American medical school who was critical about discrimination in the United States:

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The reason she went to a medical school in the United States is because it is not only scholarly more advanced than South Korea, but also she hated the South Korean academia for its discrimination against women and its tendency to be authoritarian. But she told me that there wasn’t that much difference between the two countries. She acknowledges that people are more mindful of discrimination in the United States because there are regulations, so they try to provide equal opportunity in practice and other ways. But it can still be different a patient-by-patient, right? She said that American professors gave challenging assignments to white male students. She said that she felt that female students were assigned to patients with less challenging cases, so it was meaningless because women couldn’t develop and improve their skills. She said this was the limitation in the United States. She said that white men are the ones who are supported the most.

And the candid conversations, though mostly based on impressions and far from being refective of the racial dynamics in the United States, disturb the racial ideology in South Korean society to some extent as Joongmin, a nonmigrant Korean college student in his mid-twenties, reports: My friend said that Asians are below blacks in the United States. He didn’t experience any discrimination personally, but he said that when there is racial discrimination, Asians are not above blacks after all. Koreans can’t discriminate against blacks because we are more discriminated against in the United States . . . below the blacks. When I heard it, I felt a little bit bitter.

However, Korean international students’ honesty is often not received well as the resentment brought on by their status claims for privilege affects the receptivity of communication on race as well as knowledge in general as

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discussed in chapter 4. Instead of being sympathetic, non-migrant Koreans, out of their own envy and resentment, largely interpret the situation using a nationalist and class framework and often dismiss it as “whining” by spoiled rich kids. Mija, a female Korean international student studying biology in early twenties, who has lived in the United States for two years, reports her conversation with non-migrant Koreans in Seoul over a summer break:

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I met my friends . . . (exhaling). It was impossible to talk to them. They were too jealous of me. I said that it was hard to study in the United States and that I am dying from studying. Their responses were, “What’s so hard about it? You shouldn’t feel that way. You are better than us.” I talked about my life in the United States because it was just my everyday life. They took it as if I was showing off, and found it disgusting. They didn’t understand. When I said “Sometimes I feel like I am a foreign worker (who is discriminated in South Korea),” then they were dismissive of it with a response “Why? Isn’t America open to diverse races because it is a country of immigrants? South Korea is closed-minded because we are a country of one nation. But the United States is a land of immigrants. Then, why?” I didn’t know what else to say.

Being acutely aware of non-migrant Koreans’ envy and resentment that cause their poor receptivity, many international students I interviewed report that they are very cautious in talking about their everyday life and prefer not to discuss their challenges and hardship, including their own experiences of racism, with their friends in South Korea. Korean international students fnd that they are damned either way: They are resented as “showing off” their wealth if they draw rosy pictures of their American lives, and they are derided as “whining spoiled kids” if they talk about their experience of discrimination and marginalization in the United States. This tension and dilemma often silences Korean international students and leads to dwindling communication and growing apart with their friends in South Korea. This shows the risks involved in the transnational social reproduction of Korean international students who are doubly marginalized in both societies instead of being a hegemonic transnational elite. Yoonhee, a female graduate in mid-twenties studying music and who has lived in the United States for three years, reports: I was not trying to show off. I was just talking about what I eat and diffculties I have. But, even when I talk about harassments I have experienced on the streets in New York City, my Korean friends automatically imagine that cool and sexy foreign men are approaching me (laughs). So, I avoid talking about my life here in the United States because I worry that it would sound like I am trying to show off, because I feel that even my complaints become a show-off to them. I just try to talk about Korean celebrities, Korean foods, and our old memories . . . things that we have in common.

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Joohyun, a female PhD student in late twenties studying engineering and who has lived in the United States for two years, reports why she is in touch with only one non-migrant Korean friend in South Korea: I don’t keep in touch with anyone except my best friend from elementary school because I am afraid to hear people say, “Why are you whining when you get to study abroad, something everyone is envious of?” So, I only contact those who would not say such things, but not others.

Joonyoung, a male undergraduate in late twenties studying economics and who has lived in the United States for fve years, reports: If I say it is hard to study here (the United States), my Korean friends think that I am just whining like a child when I should feel lucky to have rich parents who allowed me to study abroad. So there is not much to talk about. We talk about other people. In the beginning, I talked a lot about my everyday life here, but I felt that they were so envious, so, we have little in common now.

Non-migrant Koreans can only hear a mixed message when Korean international students talk disapprovingly about American society while making status claims for privilege by endorsing the presumed superiority of the Global North at the same time. After all, actions speak louder than words: In the last instance, it is Korean international students’ acts of valorizing the presumed superiority of the United States in their status claim that spoke more loudly to non-migrant Koreans than whatever they may verbalize disapprovingly about American society and race. Thus, talking disapprovingly about the United States has only limited effect in appeasing non-migrant Koreans’ resentment.

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It’s “Embarrassing”: Perceptive Misrecognition One of the most interesting and revealing fndings from the interviews of non-migrant Koreans is that, despite Korean international students’ impression management for status claims, some non-migrant Koreans perceptively see the racialization and marginalization of their friends in the United States through the absence of any mentioning of individuals of different racial backgrounds, particularly whites, in their conversations and social media. Sungmin, a non-migrant Korean man in his late twenties, said: “If you take all the pictures of my international friends in Facebook, and calculate the percentage of skin color of people, I am sure that 90 percent of them are yellow.” Another non-migrant Korean woman in her mid-twenties who has an acquaintance studying in England said: “In most of the pictures in his Facebook, he is with Arabs or other non-white friends. I didn’t ask him, but

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it looks like he doesn’t have any white friends. So I thought to myself, ‘Why? Is it impossible to make friends with white people?’” Hyunsoo, a non-migrant Korean man in his mid-twenties who has several Korean international student friends from middle school and high school studying in the United States, said: “I don’t hear anything concrete about other races. They just talk about other races in general terms and abstractly. If they have friends from other racial backgrounds, they would say: ‘my black friend’s name is Ben Johnson, and he is. . . .’” However, their perceptiveness does not lead them to an adequate understanding of the structural nature of race and racism. Rather, adhering to association with whiteness as a criterion for successful study abroad, non-migrant Koreans equate the lack of white friends as evidence of failed study abroad and do not talk to their international student friends about it, for they think that their friends would be embarrassed. Minjong, a non-migrant Korean woman in early twenties has a group of friends from a church in Seoul, and one of them is studying in the United States. Minjong reports a conversation she had with other church friends about the international student friend:

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I guess that she is shy. She is picky about people, so maybe shy about meeting foreigners. When she wasn’t with us, two other friends and I talked about her: “It looks like she is only hanging out with Koreans. Why is she not hanging out with Americans when she has gone as far as to the United States?” We couldn’t talk about it in front of her because she could be upset. But we talked about it when she wasn’t with us (laughs).

Another non-migrant Korean woman in mid-twenties who has a high school friend studying in the United States reports: “Yes, from her Facebook, it looks like she doesn’t have any foreign friends. She is always hanging out and eating with Koreans. Just by Facebook . . . because I can’t ask her ‘Why don’t you have foreign friends?’ Because it is private . . . really personal. It is none of my business.” That non-migrant Koreans see race as a criterion of a successful study abroad and regard the absence of other races in the lives of international student friends as something embarrassing reveals that, despite their perceptiveness, non-migrant Koreans systematically misrecognize race and racialization. They do not see it as a structural social problem. Instead, they see it as a personal or multicultural issue, that is, a barrier of cultural difference that individuals can overcome through determination and efforts, which corresponds with the script of “cosmopolitan strivings” to become a “world citizen.” In the end, non-migrant Koreans dismiss Korean international students’ marginalization and hardship as evidence of whining, being spoiled “escapees” who lack determination and strong personal traits, and express resentful disdain instead of empathy. Hyunsoo said:

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Isn’t one of the goals of studying abroad is to meet other people, be exposed to other cultures and other societies? I think they should have determination to achieve that goal. . . . If they were going to just stick with other Koreans. . . . Wasting all the money. . . . You know, you could do so many things in South Korea with that money. So, I think it is important to ask the question of who is qualifed to study abroad.

These non-migrant Koreans’ mistaken belief that they know what is “embarrassing” of their international student friends’ lives in the United States and its causes and solutions shows that their discerning observation merely leads to an illusion of transparency3 across the border, instead of rupturing the existing South Korean racial ideology and desire. Ironically, this systemic misunderstanding on race and racism across the border is partly, after all, a product of Korean international students’ own acts of status claims for social reproduction, endorsing, and valorizing the presumed superiority of the Global North, which reproduces the existing South Korean racial ideology and desire.

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TRANSLATING IN NATIONAL AND MULTICULTURAL LANGUAGE: A NOTE Some Korean international students simultaneously reveal and hide race and racism by mentioning the topic yet translating it into a national and multicultural language that is compatible with the script. This, in effect, reduces race to nation or ethnicity, a tendency in both social science and public discourse (Omi and Winant 2015). Embracing ethnic identity to avoid racialization, which studies identify as a common practice of immigrants (Foner and Fredrickson 2004), is a primary coping mechanism of Korean international students as well. Minjee, an undergraduate student in her early twenties who has been in the United States for ten years, reports how she embraces “Korean pride” from her racial awareness: I formed a Korean student club (in her high school). The purpose of the club is to teach Korean history and Korean culture. . . . I started feeling funny about acting like white, thinking “No matter how hard I try, I will look Asian to them.” There was no reason to deny being Korean. I thought that to deny it was to be embarrassed about it. I became patriotic suddenly.

As discussed in chapters 3 and 6, many Korean international students are involved in diasporic nationalist activities that include cultural events to introduce Korean food or Korean culture on school campuses, performing Korean drumming in a Korean day parade in New York City, or

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volunteering to teach Korean language to Korean adoptees. In their communication with non-migrants, likewise, reducing race to nation or ethnicity is common. For example, an article in Hankyoreh, a major South Korean newspaper with progressive readership, features a Korean woman who worked as an actress before she earned her master’s degree in New York and now runs a nonproft organization in South Korea that serves marginalized children from “multicultural families,” which usually means a lowincome family consisting of an older low-skilled Korean man and a young wife from one of the poor Asian countries (Lee 2013). The woman said that she opened her eyes to a “multicultural society” while she was studying in New York “as a stranger or foreigner” and saw when she returned home that “multicultural families” was becoming an important issue in South Korea. In her statement, race disappears behind multicultural language as she touches upon yet reduces her experiences in the United States to what a “stranger or foreigner” would experience, similar to that of “multicultural families” which consist of Asian parents, though ethnically different. This translation enables Korean international students to present themselves as “world citizens” who embrace a more “open” and diasporic nationalism that fts with globalization.

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CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have discussed how my research can contribute to the conception of simultaneity that is considered to be vital to innovating the global migration and transnational studies. I have employed a lens of simultaneity to investigate Korean international students’ cross-border transmission of knowledge and messages on race and racism in the United States. My research shows that the incongruent social statuses of Korean international students who are simultaneously embedded in racial dynamics in the United States and class dynamics in South Korea interfere with each other and shape their communication on race with non-migrant Koreans in South Korea. Korean international students hide their racial reality in the backstage for impression management to aid their status claim, for their incongruent status as a racialized other who experiences structural injustices in the United States contradicts their status claims as a transnational elite living up to the imaginary script of South Koreans. Furthermore, even when they talk candidly about race, the class conficts and resentments in South Korea from their transnational social reproduction provoke a poor reception by non-migrant Koreans. In their transnational practices, therefore, there is a systemic obscuring of race and racism in the United States across the border that further reproduces the presumed superiority of the country although most Korean

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international students use the Internet and social media on a daily basis to connect with non-migrant Koreans in South Korea. This research is not to single out Korean international students as solely responsible for the reproduction of racial ideology and colonial hierarchy in South Korea. Korean international students are not the only transnational actors, though probably the most infuential, who shape the perception on race in South Korea. There are other transnational actors, including Korean Americans and Korean adoptees that transmit messages on race with very different interests and motivations (Kim 2008). Particularly, a campaign led by Korean adoptees to change government policies and educate South Koreans on racism and colonialism has been signifcant. Furthermore, non-migrant Koreans in South Korea are also coauthors of the racialized scripts for status claims of Korean international students, as they share the white-over-black racial ideology and colonial desire for whiteness. This research is to analyze the mechanism in which Korean international students are caught up that they produce and reproduce themselves through their daily practices, regardless of whether they are aware of it or not. Korean international students need to understand this mechanism if they hope to make change.

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NOTES 1. See also Smith (2005, 239–240) for an insightful discussion of the simultaneity of living here and there, particularly emphasizing the role of new media. However, Smith (2005) does not theorize the concept as systematically as Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004). 2. FitzGerald (2009) and Kapur (2010) also point out that, while there is substantial transnationalism literature on the impact of immigration on receiving countries, there is little on its consequences on sending countries. However, their investigation into the domestic changes of sending countries also mainly focuses on policy changes or social regulation, largely overlooking social dynamics and antagonism within the sending country. 3. For example, Sungmin, a non-migrant Korean man in his late twenties believed that he knew all about the lives of his international student friends in the United States, despite his inadequate understanding of their lives: “What’s the goal of this interview? . . . I was curious why you set this research question because it is not like you have to go there in person to learn about their lives these days due to new media.”

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Chapter 6

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New Diasporic Nationalism as the Politics of Racialized Transnational Elites

In this chapter, I discuss how Korean international students participate in diaspora-building while living their transnational lives that are simultaneously embedded in multiple societies. I examine the ways in which Korean international students actively participate in various nationalist activities and diaspora-building in the country of residence. Examples of such activities include Korean pop culture events, teaching Korean adoptees Korean language, and supporting campaigns to restore the rights and dignity of communities that suffered from the Japanese colonization of Korea. I argue that we should employ the lens of simultaneity that I discuss in the previous chapter to adequately understand the diaspora-building of Korean international students. Seeing their diaspora-building through the lens of simultaneity, we can understand it as their tactical practice to simultaneously solve twin problems they encounter in their transnational lives as a racialized other in the United States and a privileged elite in South Korea, that is, discrimination and racialization in the United States and class conficts in South Korea. To put it more precisely, it is an adaptive response to simultaneously avoid racialization in the United States and subdue class and nationalist resentment in South Korea, reacting to double marginalization or backlash they face from the two sides of the border. This analysis reveals the constant presence of the other scene and its audience that is, though invisible, constitutive of migrants’ practices. We can characterize the diaspora-building of Korean international students and Korean transnational migrants who are former international students as a major vehicle of politics for racialized constituents among the emerging transnational managerial and professional elites (Beaverstock 2005; Sassen 2007; Sklair 2001) to inhabit and navigate troublesome transnational social felds. We can see the nature of the politics of racialized transnational elites’ diasporic nationalism 133

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in the way in which it readily bashes a dead empire, that is, the imperial Japan while remaining silent about the current power structures that hinder bringing justice to its colonial legacies. Bashing the imperial Japan in diasporic nationalist events while granting the Global North the moral authority to judge on its colonial legacies, in effect, decontextualizes and compartmentalizes the Japanese colonialism from the global colonization of the European empires. My analysis will illustrate that Korean international students’ diaspora-building is distinct from the time-honored Korean Americans’ diasporic nationalism that is largely rooted in anti-colonial national liberation struggles in terms of motivations, ideologies, and political effects. Lastly, this analysis of diasporic nationalism can help us understand why ethnic nationalism is rising today when the nation-state is, though not simply declining, undergoing a fundamental transformation in globalization (Sassen 2006).

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BEYOND THE DICHOTOMY OF “BEYOND THE NATION STATE” AND “NATIONS MATTER” In this section, I explain the current theoretical gaps that an analysis of diasporas through the lens of simultaneity can fll, and what is at stake in doing so. The initial utopian enthusiasm on globalization that tends to be generally celebratory has largely passed. On the conservative side, it was triumphantly declared as “the end of history” with the fnal victory of capitalism and liberal democracy in a Hegelian teleological view of history. On the liberal side, it was seen as liberating possibilities of moving beyond the nation-states toward a “post-national” cosmopolitan society (Habermas 1998) with the hope that “[i]n these postnational spaces, the incapacity of the nation state to tolerate diversity . . . may, perhaps, be overcome” (Appadurai 1996, 177). Above all, major political events with global repercussions, such as 9/11 attacks, the 2008 Great Recession, and the ongoing systemic crisis in the Middle East, may call for a more sober perspective of globalization. It now seems to be a turn to resist dystopian pessimism. A major problem that has defnitely contributed to the demise of enthusiasm is the rise of undocumented migrants or refugees worldwide who have no or limited access to citizenship and thus are often deprived of basic human rights, let alone social rights. Alas, the announcement of the coming of “postnational citizenship” (Soysal 1994) where nationality is no longer the basis of citizenship. History has rather seen the rise of right-wing populism, ethnic nationalism, and xenophobic and racist refusals of basic rights to the growing numbers of immigrants, refugees, and foreigners around the world (Castles and Davidson 2000), as most notably exemplifed in Brexit and the election of President Trump. This massive disenfranchised population leads us immediately to the core of the problem of globalization: a fundamental crisis of the

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modern form of democracy and citizenship. In his infuential discussion on the challenges of globalization to democracy, David Held (1995) points out that the practice and theories of democracy presuppose that there be “symmetry” and “congruence” between political decision-makers and recipients of political decision. The problems with current globalization, Held claims, “go to the heart of democratic thought and practice” (17) by creating disjuncture between the formal form of democracy that is national and territorial, on one hand, and real political, social, and economic processes that are increasingly becoming global and transnational, on the other hand. In this context, we can understand the explosion of the public and scholarly discourse on citizenship, nationality and human rights, and the keen academic attention on undocumented low-wage migrants, refugees, and other underprivileged migrants. Prominent liberal thinkers have made theoretical endeavors to address the problem of globalization through the question of how to give effective universal rights to increasing migrants who remain disenfranchised and excluded from the political community of the host society and vulnerable to inhumane conditions. For example, Ulrich Beck (2000) who calls globalization “the second age of modernity” asserts that “[in] the second age of modernity . . . , the question to be asked is . . . how solidarity with strangers, among non-equals can be made possible” (92–93). Jurgen Habermas (1998) is also preoccupied with the same question in his efforts to articulate “world citizenship” beyond nationality: “[European states] must not circle their wagons and use a chauvinism of affuence as cover against the onrush of immigrants and asylum seekers. . . . Only a democratic citizenship that does not close itself off in a particularistic fashion can pave the way for a world citizenship” (514). These thinkers’ theoretical thrust comes down to seeking to reformulate citizenship and democracy beyond the nation-state by prying apart the historical link between citizenship and nationality and taking a normative stance that there should be a cosmopolitan global or regional political system to ft into the new “post-national” era. On the other hand, there are thinkers who assert the importance of nations against the liberal and cosmopolitan thrust of “beyond the nation-state.” In his book entitled as a slogan, Nations Matter (2007), for example, Craig Calhoun criticizes that liberal thinkers calling for a post-national order tend to reduce the nation-state to nothing more than a “moral mistake” for “smart people to move beyond” by unduly ascribing all the evils of the contemporary world, such as discrimination against migrants, fascism, ethnic cleansing, and war to nations and nationalism. Calhoun forcefully argues that it is the nation-state that has realized the “most successful projects of economic redistribution” in history and that the blind thrust for a post-national order can contribute to social inequalities from globalization that “advantages some and disadvantages others” because social actors are “not equally prepared and equipped, culturally and economically” (17) in the social organization of a

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larger scale like globalization. This impasse from the opposition of “beyond the nation-state” and “nations matter”—normative stances that are associated with the modern political ideologies—has structured a major part of the current theoretical terrain of studies on globalization and migration as well as citizenship and nationality. Some point out that the opposition of the two normative stances is inadequate as they are both generated from a local or provincial perspective—the perspective of intellectuals in the Global North—that is unduly valorized as global and universal. It is furthermore inadequate in that there is glaring absence of the categories of colonialism and race even though the political problem driving the theoretical endeavors is engendered precisely by the infux of undocumented migrants and refugees from former colonies to former metropolises and racism and social exclusion they experience in the Global North. Balibar (2002, 2004), for example, makes a powerful intervention in the theoretical terrain by inscribing the imperial border that is fundamentally antidemocratic institution discriminating human beings based on personal traits including race, class, and gender (see also Mezzadra and Neilson 2013), and by reframing the current political problem of globalization with Hannah Arendt’s seminal formulation of “a right to have rights” from another dark moment of history.1 This inscription of the border and colonial racism in studies on globalization and migration enables us to understand globalization in a historical perspective of global European colonization and global structural transformation from decolonization, instead of falling prey to the evolutionary and sanitizing narrative of globalization as a linear historical progress of growing interconnectedness driven by technology and the global market economy. However, while this intervention tackles and makes visible the provinciality of the debates by providing a historical perspective of the relationship between globalization and colonialism, its concern is still preoccupied with the political problem within the Global North, disregarding social consequences in the Global South. It is also mainly preoccupied with just one transnational fgure, that is, “a poor person from a poor country”—that is, low-wage and undocumented migrants and refugees—and neglect the emergent racialized transnational managerial and professional elite migrants. We should understand the core problem of globalization—a fundamental crisis of the modern form of democracy and citizenship—not only from the vantage point of the emergence of those without “a right to have rights” but also from that of the co-emerging racialized transnational elites, that is, those with “a surplus of rights” from the Global South. The fundamental transformation of the nationstate in globalization has to be coterminous with the co-emergence of the starkly contrasting transnational social groups that involves the redistribution of power, wealth, and rights across the political community territorialized in

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the nation-state. My research on Korean international students seeks to fll that gap and address this implicit analytic class bias by registering the new transnational fgure in the felds. Through the lens of simultaneity, studies on transnationalism2 and diasporas can address the aforementioned provinciality of globalization and migration felds, helping us move beyond the unproductive impasse of the two normative stances, for these studies seek to incorporate the sending and receiving countries into one coherent theoretical framework by focusing on the agency and everyday practices of migrants who are simultaneously embedded in the social relations of class, race, and gender in multiple societies. However, the analytical potential tends to be hampered by not only the host society/Global North-centric perspective (Tsuda 2012) and the implicit analytic class bias in the feld, as already discussed in chapter 5, but also the confation with the normative stance of “beyond the nation-state,” as indicated in the affx “-ism” of transnationalism that signals an ideological thrust (Faist 2010; Kearney 1995; Lucassen 2006). It is the same tendency about which transnationalism criticizes the assimilation theory: Conceiving itself as an alternative to the assimilationist approach on migration studies, transnationalism criticizes that the assimilation theory is not just a value-neutral analytic endeavor but rather is confated with the political project of assimilation driven by the nationalist zeal during the war period (e.g., Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc 1995; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). An overview of studies on diasporas that are “emblems of transnationalism” as the other of the nation-state (Tololyan 1991) shows us well how the dichotomy of the two normative stances tends to be reproduced in the feld, unduly centering one local perspective respectively. In recent decades, diasporas, a term once used to refer generally to Jewish, Armenian, or Chinese communities, have acquired a new sense to refer to diverse transnational social entities and is dissociated with its old notions that imply a return to a homeland or is incompatible with assimilation (Faist 2010; Lie 2001; Ong 1999). Studies on diaspora to date are largely divided into two contrasting approaches. The frst approach, which is the overwhelming majority, is approving of diasporas, throwing its weight toward the normative stance of “beyond the nation-state.” Aligned with cultural and ethnic studies that is critical of assimilation, many studies on diaspora largely discusses immigrants’ participation in diaspora-building or transnational civic engagements in the country of origin in an amicable tone, as an alternative to hegemonic nationalist assimilation (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). This political sensibility is understandable considering, as many scholars argue and my research also corroborates, that ethnic identifcation and diaspora-building of migrants have historically been a response—or even “resistance,” some argue—to racism and social exclusion they experience in

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the host society (Espiritu 2003; Ignacio 2005; Kastoryan 2007; Levitt 2001; Hall 1990). In a broader historical perspective, one may even include in this category the transnational movements of expatriates living in metropolises for anti-colonial national liberation struggles of decolonization, and the postcolonial nation-building, which show the international or diasporic origin of homeland nationalism (Appadurai 1996; Duara 2008; Lie 2001; Kim 2011; Manela 2009). While these studies are an insightful critique of the hegemonic project of nation-building in the host society and an important corrective to the “methodological nationalism” in social science (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003), this approach largely leaves out any examination of social consequences diasporas engender in the country of origin, which can have different political effects. These studies largely center on the host-society perspective and the racial and ethnic dynamics within a host society, focusing on underprivileged migrants. In a stark contrast, the second approach takes a critical view of diasporas by centering on the sending country perspective and focusing on the relative power and privilege that migrants in the Global North have over their coethnics in their country of origin. Benedict Anderson (1998) provides one of the most scathing views with his critique of what he calls “long-distance nationalism.” Anderson condemns the long-distance nationalism in which migrants from the Global South who are “safely positioned in the First World” incite political violence in their country of origin over the Internet with “incalculable consequences,” but remain “radically unaccountable” (74). Rey Chow (1993) and Aihwa Ong (2006) add their critical voices “against the lures of diaspora” in which migrants who are emboldened by their newly acquired status as residents of the Global North over their coethnics engage in irresponsible and hegemonic diasporic activities. Ong (2006) analyzes how the hegemonic involvement and the cultural absolutism of the Chinese diaspora who live in the Global North put Chinese immigrants who seek to assimilate in the South East Asia in danger. Chow (1993) criticizes intellectuals from the Global South who enjoy certain privileges and build their career in the Global North by speaking about the sufferings of their coethnics far away in the Global South, which becomes “a mask that conceals the hegemony of these intellectuals over those who are stuck at home” (118). Arif Dirlik (2001) warns against a tendency in which the cultural absolutism of diasporas and the East Asian triumphalism are joining forces with the transpacifc circuit of capital in the making of “transpacifc professional-managerial class.” While they provide a valuable perspective, these studies share the same problem of privileging one local perspective, reproducing the dichotomy. In contrast to the frst approach, the second approach does not pay enough attention to the host society in the Global North and racial discrimination in it that drives migrants’ diaspora-building.

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Analyzing the simultaneous embeddedness of racialized transnational elites’ diaspora-building in both the country of origin and the country of residence can be key to moving beyond the false dichotomy of “beyond the nation-state” and “nations matter.” In one of the important texts on global migration and transnational studies, Levitt and Jaworsky (2007) call for, as one of future research directions, studies on “variable consequences of transnationalism” that “specify under what conditions and in what contexts transnational migration has positive and/or negative consequences, in what combinations, and for whom?” (144–145). We should add that one and the same transnational process can cause such variable consequences simultaneously in multiple societies, and that they should be traced and connected through a lens of simultaneity. As I demonstrate below, freed from the host society/Global North-centric perspective, the implicit analytic class bias, and the grip of the two normative stances, a lens of simultaneity can tackle such tasks and illuminate the complexity of problems in globalization as synchronously multi-sited, multifaceted, and multivalent. It will show that prescribing either of the two normative stances simplistically can be as much part of the problem as part of the solution. It will also, in turn, facilitate informed conversations among societies that face heterogeneous yet connected local consequences of globalization to eventually formulate a more adequate normative program that can be commensurate to the complexity of problem in globalization today. My research on Korean international students’ diaspora-building provides an analysis that can reconcile and synthesize the two approaches on diasporas into one coherent theoretical framework by illuminating its heterogeneous yet connected social consequences in the United States and South Korea.

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DIASPORA-BUILDING OF RACIAIZED TRANSNATIONAL ELITES Being Trapped in the Double Backlash on Both Sides of the Border Transnational social felds are far from being borderless land, allowing smooth and free movement even for privileged migrants, let alone low-skilled or undocumented migrants. As privileged migrants, Korean international students’ transnational social felds are constituted by heterogeneous social relations and conficts respectively on both sides of the border that simultaneously shape their transnational lives, giving rise to problems that they have to handle with everyday tactical practices. Korean international students often change their initial plan regarding careers and their ultimate country

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of residence, as they feel trapped between racialization in the United States and class conficts in South Korea. In redrawing their future transnational itinerary, they take these social dynamics into account as well as family obligations, marriage prospects, reproduction, economic climate, and changing market values of their cultural capital. Believing that they could become a transnational elite, Korean international students often embark on their study abroad, considering a possible career in the United States. Some even think that they ft in better in the United States than in South Korea. But many Korean international student subjects reported that encountering racialization in the United States as an adult altered their thinking and that they want to return to South Korea. Kijong, a female undergraduate in early twenties who has been in the United States for six years said:

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It depends on where I would fnd a job, but I want to go back to South Korea. I decided it when I worked as an intern in South Korea. I felt like I was in the right place. In the United States, I always feel like I am adapting to the American way and wearing clothes that don’t ft me. In South Korea, I felt that: “I am a Korean for sure.” I have a strong ego, but I always feel a little bit small in front of Americans even though I speak English well, work hard, and do well in school. I don’t know why, but I always feel that way. I liked the fact that I don’t feel that way when I am in South Korea.

Changing their future plans can be costly as the market value of their academic credentials can be different in different societies. One respondent reported that her friend who went to study in Canada thinking that she would eventually live in Canada regretted her decision. When she decided to return and work in South Korea, she realized that she should have gone to a Canadian university that is more well known to Koreans than the one she attended. The situation is not easy in South Korea either because of the social conficts with non-migrant Koreans, as discussed in chapters 1 and 4. Some respondents decided that living as a racial minority in the United States is better than dealing with the cut-throat competition and devaluation3 of U.S. degrees in the South Korean labor market, in addition to the explicit nationalist and class resentments toward them in the South Korean corporate sector. The domestic competition is one of motivating factors for leaving the country in the frst place. Joonyoung, a male undergraduate in late twenties majoring in economics is one such person. He said: People have been talking a lot about the infation of foreign degrees in South Korea for years now. . . . I don’t know exactly, but I talk with other international students often about the fact that there are too many of us, and that it is not easy

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to fnd a job. So, I am discouraged to go back to South Korea. It is not that I don’t want to go back even if there is a good job.

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As competition intensifes among them, both graduate and undergraduate Korean international students try to step up their transnational cultural capital to have a competitive leverage in the South Korean labor market by having work experiences from the United States. Many respondents reported their intent of starting their career in the United States by working here a few years and use their work experience to secure a job in South Korea. Despite the experiences of racialization in the United States, some Korean international students decide that the prestige of an established career or an opportunity to reach their full potential in their career in the country is worth enduring experiences as a racial minority. Dara, a female graduate student who worked in a Korean company for fve years and has lived in the United States for two years expressed her sentiment: “I would have to live with a ‘handicap’ for the rest of my life if I live in the United States. Yet, the United States is a major league. There’s opportunity, career, environment.” The most interesting plan that many of my respondents reported is to opt out of both countries and go to another Asian global city like Hong Kong or Singapore. It is a good compromise, where they are sheltered from both racialization in the United States and resentment and devaluation in South Korea, while maintaining their cosmopolitan life style. Joonho, a male undergraduate who has been studying humanities for three years in the United States, reports how he takes stock of racial relations for his future destination, though confating it with issues of cultural difference: I think a lot about what to do after I graduate. I will surely do the OPT (Optional Practical Training), and work for one year in the United States. Then I am thinking about going to South Korea, Hong Kong or China. Because there are so many races particularly in Hong Kong and Singapore, I won’t have too much problem living there. . . . When I frst came to the United States, I thought a lot about working here. But, my thinking has changed because of cultural differences and the English language barrier. In Hong Kong or Singapore, Koreans seem to be treated better than in the United States because we are of the same race, and also Korean pop culture is popular there.

In short, regardless of whether they decide to go back to South Korea, live in the United States, or go to a third country, Korean international students take account of their experiences of racialization in the United States and class conficts in South Korea among others. As such, their transnational lives are shaped by both racial dynamics in the United States and class conficts in South Korea.

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DIASPORIC NATIONALISM AS A SIMULTANEOUS RESPONSE TO RACE AND CLASS My research fnds that Korean international students employ diasporic nationalism or diaspora-building as a tactical practice to resolve problems arising in their transnational lives as they are trapped between racialization in the United States and class conficts in South Korea. Through diasporic nationalism, Korean international students can achieve several outcomes at once. With diaspora-building, they can avoid racialization in the United States, as other immigrants have, and counter South Koreans’ class and nationalist resentments effectively while, at the same time, continuing to make status claims as a transnational yet nationalist elite. In doing so, their diasporic nationalism, in effect, endorses the presumed superiority of the Global North and masks and translates race in a national term to non-migrant Koreans, just as they have done so through their status claims. Korean international students in the United States are active participants in diaspora-building and diasporic nationalism through various activities of their student organizations, often in conjunction with the Korean consulate and a Korean American Association in their region. These activities range from organizing Korean cultural events on school campuses to volunteering to teach Korean adoptees Korean language, to attending a Korean pop star concert, and to supporting campaigns for reparations for Korean “comfort women” who were traffcked into sex slavery by Japanese during the Pacifc War. For example, for the 2014 Korean Day Parade in New York City, which is annually organized by the Korean American Association of Greater New York, Korean drumming groups from various colleges of the SUNY system formed one contingent of drummers that consisted of Korean international students, Korean Americans, and a few white students, and performed in the Korean parade through Manhattan. After the offcial parade was over, the drummers continued to perform in Manhattan’s Korean town, taking turns playing, demonstrating their skills and talents, and networking with each other. One could see the pride in the students’ faces in introducing traditional Korean music to non-Koreans in Manhattan. Korean international students’ ethnic identity and diasporic nationalism can be seen as an endeavor to avoid racialization, as discussed in chapter 3. However, Korean international students’ motivations in diasporic nationalism cannot be exhausted by just looking at the racial dynamics in the host society. It is at the same time a response to the class and nationalist resentment they face in South Korea. Sungjin is a male graduate in late twenties working on his PhD in engineering who has lived in the United States for ten years and is very active in a Korean international student organization at his university. Sungjin wants to become a U.S. citizen through employment sponsorship

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and to renounce his South Korean citizenship because of mandatory military service in South Korea. He discusses his decision at length and explains why South Koreans should not see people like him as a “traitor,” being keenly aware of the nationalist resentment against Korean international students in South Korea. Sungjin articulates a good argument for diasporic nationalism:

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Of course, it would be very opportunistic and selfsh if you only acquire legal permanent residency for the purpose of dodging the (mandatory) military service, even if you plan to return later [to South Korea]. But, I am going to stay in the United States to continue my research because there are more opportunities here. I don’t know why I should be held back by the military service just for patriotism when I plan on working and living in the United States. South Koreans may see this as treachery in a way. I used to think that way, too. But, I now think it is fne. The notion of citizenship is fading, as more countries are open to migration. And the time has come for Koreans to be able to study abroad anywhere because of globalization. I think it is an anachronism to try to institutionally bind and stop people from getting legal permanent residency abroad. This may be a self-centered perspective but . . . to be honest, I think it is not desirable for Koreans to think, “You are a traitor because you have acquired U.S. citizenship and didn’t participate in the military service.” You know, the power of the Korean community in the United States is growing because there are many Koreans here. As they say, “blood is thicker than water.” Wouldn’t it beneft South Korea if the Korean American community becomes powerful? For example, look at the comfort women statue in New Jersey. If Korean Americans didn’t care about their roots, they wouldn’t have built that statue. But they can petition American legislators as American citizens if Japan does something bad to Koreans because they care about their roots. So, in a way, because of their U.S. citizenship, there are things that they can do for South Korea.

Claiming that he could engage in activities to advance the interest of South Korea more effectively with U.S. citizenship than with South Korean citizenship, Sungjin counters South Koreans’ nationalist resentment by framing it as an outdated nationalism in the era of globalization. He fashions himself as a transnational elite who leads a new form of nationalism4 that better serves South Korea in the current milieu. It is noteworthy that his argument presupposes and thereby reinforces the unquestionable superiority of the United States. After he made a powerful case for diasporic nationalism, Sungjin becomes embarrassed and apologetic about limited diasporic activities of his student organization and comments that his ideas are to engage in more activities that “are good to be done as Koreans”: Events on comfort women? We haven’t done anything yet . . . because I have been busy with research. But, I do want to have an event about it before I graduate. Our events have mostly been Korean drumming or a joint party with Korean

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international student associations in other universities or others. It is true that we have not focused on issues like Korean culture or comfort women (in an apologetic tone). We should care more. We try to fnd a balance in our own way between having fun and doing things we should do as Koreans.

Kijoon is a male undergraduate in early twenties studying economics and who is active in a Korean international student organization at his university; he has lived in the United States for fve years. Kijoon presents himself to his Korean friends as a transnational yet nationalist elite who has learned in his study abroad how to better frame issues related to the legacy of the Japanese colonization to Western society. This appears to be a good subject for him to talk about as other aspects of his everyday life in the United States are uncomfortable because of resentment:

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You learn one page of Korean history in a high school history class here. In high school, I once had a debate over the controversy of naming [the sea between Korea and Japan] “East Sea” versus “Sea of Japan” in class. Korean students were losing their cool and couldn’t articulate the basis of their claim. People were dismissive of the controversy just as a dispute between the two countries. In college, I realized that people here embrace certain issues, like the comfort women and other issues [on the legacy of the Japanese colonization] from the perspective of universal human rights. When I talk to my friends [in South Korea], I sometimes feel like Koreans are too much, taken by patriotism when they talk about comfort women and other similar issues, saying “Perpetuators should all be punished.” I say “That’s right, but you cannot convince foreigners that way.” We talked about the subject because many friends were curious about issues like that, about lives abroad. Some friends are curious and ask questions about how foreigners responded to and think about events on comfort women and other topics like that.

Korean international students’ activities are visible to the broader South Korean public. Because students often organize their events through social media, like Facebook, their non-migrant Korean friends see them. The South Korean news media often covers these events as well. The non-migrant Koreans I interviewed in South Korea commonly commented: “I saw a school event in Facebook. I don’t know exactly, but it was an event that their Korean international student association organized to promote Korean culture,” or “I saw postings seeking donations of Korean textbooks for a Korean language school in Facebook.” The effcacy of Korean international students’ diasporic nationalist activities as a transnational tactic is nowhere more visible than in effcient ways they can subdue the strong nationalist and class resentments against them in South Korea. These activities were the only topic related to Korean international students that generated favorable views from almost

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all the non-migrant Koreans I interviewed. These responses are in a stark contrast with the resentment many of the same interviewees expressed about Korean international students. The non-migrant Korean respondents commonly reported their positive sentiments about the nationalist activities that are organized by Korean international students that they saw in Facebook or news media: “I saw in a TV show that international students promoted Bi-bib-bob (a Korean rice dish) in New York. I felt proud,” or “I saw some campaigns on Dokdo (an island in a territorial dispute between Korea and Japan). I was very proud of them (Korean international students) being good models for others,” or “I feel like ‘Koreans are still Koreans even they are abroad.’ You know, they say ‘You become patriotic when you are abroad.’ I guess that is true.” This sentiment that Korean international students are “still Koreans” and not that different from nonmigrant Koreans after all can restore a sense of kinship and effectively soften their resentment. Even those who have strong resentment toward Korean international students reluctantly recognize and appreciate their nationalist activities, interestingly making the same argument as Sungjin, the PhD international student above, and thus validating his case for diasporic nationalism of Korean transnational migrants, that is, that he could advance the national interest more effectively with U.S. citizenship than with Korean citizenship. Sungmin, a nonmigrant Korean in late twenties who has a strong resentment toward Korean international students to the point of saying that he wishes Korean international students to “disappear from the Korean society,” for example, said:

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Their activities on Dokdo and the comfort women? They are not doing anything bad because it is an issue of justice. If you are a U.S. citizen, you can pressure the federal government and Congress. They can do that at least from places where there are many Koreans. It would not be possible to do it as Korean citizens, right? So, as far as national issues are concerned, I am okay with what they do.

This testifes to the power of diasporic nationalist discourse in South Korean society. Nationalism is such a strong and dominant ideology for the nationstate to naturalize the nation that some non-migrant Koreans entirely misunderstood my interview question when asked whether they thought these activities were desirable or not. Instead, they responded by talking about their thoughts on the effciency of the activities. The desirability or correctness of nationalist activities is taken for granted and not questioned that they could not hear the question as it was intended. Responding to an interview question, “What do you think about Korean international students’ activities to promote Korean language abroad?,” many non-migrant Koreans had similar responses: “It is good because it is more effcient to do it abroad (than from

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South Korea),” or “I think it is important to use the networks overseas,” or “In fact, it is not effcient to do it from South Korea because we should let foreigners know, right? It helps a lot to do it from abroad.” Whenever Korean news media cover Korean international students’ various activities, non-migrant Koreans often express their opinions of such activities in the comments section of news articles. The contrasting comments to the two online news articles published around the same time about Korean international students show the effcacy of diasporic activities in South Korean society. In April 2015, The Chosunilbo, a Korean newspaper with the largest circulation that targets conservative Koreans, covered a protest led by a Harvard Korean international undergraduate student and participated by over hundred others against the prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe’s public speech at Harvard University on April 27, 2015 (Na 2015). The protest was reported as demanding an offcial apology from the Japanese government about Korean “comfort women” who were traffcked into sex slavery for the Japanese army during World War II. The article reports how the Korean international student worked hard to organize the protest that involved participation of individuals from other racial groups despite the fact that fnals were approaching and how happy the student was with the success of the protest, more so than when she received an acceptance letter from Harvard. With a picture of the student shaking her hands with one of the former comfort women, the student was quoted saying “I was naturally very interested in the issue of comfort women because I am Korean, and I have acquired a more objective perspective on the issue after I came to Harvard.” This student, in effect, presented herself as a transnational yet nationalist elite who has learned how to better frame this nationalist issue during her study abroad. The comments to this article were overwhelmingly favorable. The comment that was most recommended by other readers of the article read as follows, appropriating the event in a patriarchal nationalist discourse: “A healthy daughter of South Korea! She will grow up to be a leader of the world with passion for righteous spirits.” The second mostly recommended comment read: “This one student is a patriot, better than 100 legislators or 100 ambassadors. The future of South Korea is bright because there are active young adults like her.” In contrast to The Chosunilbo article, the second article is an essay written by a Korean international undergraduate at Yale University about her daily school life (Im 2015). It was published in May 2015 in Woman Chosun, a sister magazine of The Chosunilbo that targets conservative middle-class women and was cross-posted in The Chosunilbo newspaper website. The essay included a picture of the student looking stylish. In the essay, the student wrote about her school life describing the campus, parties and sorority on campus, school examinations, and others. This article can be seen as part

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of “memoir genre” (Ablemann and Kang 2014) produced by Korean international students and their parents to share their experiences with other prospective Korean international students. There have been publications of such memoir genre in books, blog, and news articles since the 1990s. The publication of such an essay in a major news outlet testifes to the glamorous, though now fading, status of international students, particularly attending prestigious American universities, as transnational elites. In a stark contrast to the comments to the frst article, the comments to the second article show the growing resentment and shifting sentiment to derision. The most recommended comments show a strong derision with a misogynic tone refecting the resentment, questioning whether the student had plastic surgery on her face, which has generated a perennial controversy of Westernization in Asian communities: “This is beyond being absurd. . . . Who is this person who is worth reporting like this? I don’t understand. Just because she goes to Yale? Or because, in addition to going to Yale, she got plastic surgery? What the hell.” It’s a clear message to Korean international students. My research fnds that Korean international students monitor opinions and responses to their activities by South Koreans. Kisuk, a male undergraduate in early twenties who is active in his Korean international student organization that engaged in a nationalist activity together with a Korean celebrity reports how he tried to read into South Koreans’ opinions about such activity. Kisuk reports how he realized that South Koreans generally approve nationalist activities engaged by international students: I felt that the attitude was very different in South Korea. We once had an event to promote Korean culture and language when Kim Janghoon (a Korean singer known for nationalist activities) came to New York. We gave away shirts with printed Korean characters, among other things. There were internal conficts among the participating student groups and within our student association about who was going to host and lead the event. I was worried initially, but was surprised to fnd out that comments on the South Korean online media coverage of the event were all positive. Though I am not sure if it refects the general sentiment [of South Korean society], I thought, “Judging by the responses, Koreans certainly like this kind of activities no matter what.” . . . It looks like other Korean international students look at comments a lot as well because they show me comments like the ones making fun of former or current presidents, saying, “You ever saw this? This is so funny.” They post links to comments in Facebook. I think the power of comments is big, particularly for news on the Internet.

This shows that under the current regime of new media, diasporic activities become a transnational media event where receptions to such events are transnationally monitored instantaneously, shaping the behavior of migrants (see fgures 6.1–6.4).

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Figure 6.1  New York—Korean Student Drumming Groups from Various Colleges of the State University of New York Performing in Manhattan in the 2014 Korean Day Parade. Source: Photo taken by Sung-Choon Park.

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Figure 6.2  New Jersey—A Press Conference in 2012 about an Installment on Japanese Colonial Legacy and a Banner that States: “Rising Sun Flag = Hakenkreuz.” Source: YONHAPNEWS. Reprinted with permission.

Figure 6.3  California—Protesting Google to Change the Name of the Sea between Korea and Japan from “Sea of Japan” to “East Sea” in the Google Map in 2012. Source: YONHAPNEWS. Reprinted with permission.

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Figure 6.4  Paris—A 2016 “Candlelight Protest” Demanding a Resignation of Then South Korean President Park. Source: FranceZone. Reprinted with permission.

Analyzing the ways in which recent Korean diasporic activities are ritualized as visible transnational media events shows the simultaneity, in a literal sense, of their diasporic activities, addressed to both the countries of residence and South Korea. Recent diasporic political activities have been spectacular media-conscious performances involving organizing events through social media, holding rallies at iconic locations in the Global North, like Times Square in New York City or the Eiffel tower in Paris, and uploading pictures or videos of their demonstrations in social media and blog sphere. The transnational political engagement of Korean diaspora in the Global North through new media addresses two different audiences—the civil society in the host country and South Korean society—simultaneously with two distinct signifcances. By holding a rally or event in a prominent public space in the host country, this performance is apparently intended to address the frst audience, the civil society in the country of residence. The performance of a rally is ostentatiously an act of invitation to the civil society to learn about a given issue affecting South Koreans and therefore granting the civil society the moral authority to form and hold an opinion on the given issue. In so doing, Korean international students pose to speak on behalf of South Korea in the host society. This public ethnic performance is in effect an instance of constructing their ethnic identity to avoid racialization in the host society. Furthermore, as this type of public event is instantly relayed and circulated across the border through new media, this act of addressing the host

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society doubles and becomes another performance at the same time for the second audience, South Korean society with different signifcance. To South Koreans, through their performance, Korean international students present themselves as transnational yet nationalist elites who can reach Western societies on behalf of the country and its people. It, in effect, tackles and subdues the class and nationalist resentment against them in South Korea. In short, we can see the spectacular diasporic activities as a simultaneous performance with two disparate messages addressed to two audiences embedded in two heterogeneous contexts. This analysis of Korean diasporic activities shows that the other scene, though remain invisible, is present in and constitutive of the migrant’s practices, particularly in the current new regime of media with an unprecedented degree of cross-border communication. The signifcance of one and the same action that is embedded and thus comprehensible in one scene remains largely obscured to the audience in the other scene. To use Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical language, we can illustrate the societies of sending and receiving countries that have a degree of opacity or obscurity to each other, despite the illusion of transparency across the border that new media generates, as “front/backstages” that can be partitioned by barriers to perception (Goffman 1959). American and South Korean societies constitute the two front stages for the transnationally mediated performance of Korean diasporic activities, while at the same time being the backstage partitioned from each other to the extent that social contexts remain incomprehensible to the other side: South Korean society is not aware that the spectacular diasporic events are not just a patriotic act, but also an ethnic performance to avoid racialization and social exclusion in the United States. On the other hand, there are barriers to perception for American society to understand that the spectacular diasporic events are not just about racial and ethnic dynamics in the United States, but also a response to the class and nationalist resentment in South Korea. One can get the whole picture of diaspora-building by looking at social dynamics within both societies. Therefore, it is crucial for us to employ a lens of simultaneity to understand heterogeneous social consequences of one and the same transnational process in multiple societies. In the eyes of non-migrant Koreans in South Korea, this digitally mediated public performance across the border unmistakably grounds international students’ voices on the basis of power and prestige of the place of their residence in the Global North and thus constitutes another form of status claim that hides their racial reality while valorizing the superiority of the Global North. It is noteworthy that there is also a signifcant imbalance within the Korean diaspora community between those living in the Global North and those in the Global South5 in terms of visibility and infuences on the diaspora as well as in domestic politics. Whereas Koreans residing in North America or Europe

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have been visible and vocal in South Korea through new media-mediated activities, Koreans in countries in the Global South, such as South America and other parts of Asia have been barely visible. Moreover, in the United States, there is an imbalance among Koreans in accessing public activities. Any public performance that requires permits from government agencies and that draws a lot of attention also virtually excludes undocumented Koreans to whom the border eventually becomes “a home in which to live a life which is a waiting-to-live, a non-life” (Balibar 2002, 83).6

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THE POLITICS OF RACIALIZED TRANSNATIONAL ELITES In the context of South Korean society, we can regard Korean international students’ strategic diasporic nationalism to appease and subdue the resentment of their class reproduction as a form of class struggle in the same sense as Marx (1978) criticizes the dominant ideologies of the bourgeois society in which the ruling class seeks to “represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society” (174) to suppress the working class’s resistance to exploitation. In light of this critique of nationalism, Marxian scholars have provided insightful and infuential analyses to demystify and denaturalize nation as a historical product manufactured from above by the bourgeois class as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), “fctive ethnicity” (Balibar 1991b), or “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm 1984) to mask class domination and exploitation of working class. In relation to resentful non-migrant Koreans, Korean international students’ diasporic nationalism, in effect, masks and represents their particular interest in study abroad for transnational social reproduction as serving the common interest of the nation as a transnational and yet nationalist elite in the global society. Being accentuated with vengeance as a way to avoid racialization they experience in the host society, the diasporic nationalism of Korean international students produces and reproduces the nation as an imagined community in transnational social felds that, in effect, covers up the class and status differences of transnational and mobile elites with a surplus of rights such as Korean international students from underprivileged Koreans such as non-migrant Koreans who are stuck in South Korea, Koreans who are undocumented and stuck in ethnic enclaves in the Global North, and Koreans who reside in the Global South. Then, we can see this new strain of diasporic nationalism as a cross-border spillover of class struggle in globalization, accompanying the emergent transnational social groups. This diasporic nationalism is also a colonial one in the sense that it endorses and reinforces the presumed superiority of the Global North

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by granting it moral authority and grounding its voice on the superiority of the Global North while remaining silent on race and racialization. In decolonization, nation-building with the support of anti-colonial diasporic nationalism (Kim 2011; Lie 2001) was the adequate political project of the colonized to emancipate themselves by constructing a nation that was the only legitimate political subject in the global political system created by the European colonization of the world (Arendt 1958; Duara 2008; Fanon 1963).7 It is irreducible to the bourgeois class politics to mask class domination and exploitation of working class as some imply by merely focusing on the nation being manufactured from above by the national bourgeoisie without looking at the imperative of the colonized for the construction of nation from below for their emancipation in the context of global European colonization. The nation constructed through national liberation struggles in the context of decolonization was not merely an ethnic entity or ethnos but also a form of a people or demos constituting a republic of equal citizens who collectively acquire and democratically share “a right to have rights” (Arendt 1958). That the political project of decolonization has been largely in disarray and can now be considered aborted (Prashad 2007), as it took a developmentalist path to global capitalism (Escobar 1995) in an endeavor to catch up with the frst world despite the prescient warnings of the likes of Fanon (1963), does not diminish its historical signifcance. There was also a genuine sacrifce in the anti-colonial diasporic nationalism: Korean Americans sent a signifcant portion of their hard-earned money from working on farms in Hawaii and California as remittance to fund the armed resistance and the Korean provisional government fghting against the imperial Japan and were even willing to abandon their lives if need be (Kim 2011; Lie 2001). In globalization, however, what is being currently constructed through the diasporic nationalism of racialized transnational elites is merely the nation as an ethnic entity while the nation as a demos is disappearing as the political community in the nation form is disintegrating into individuals with different statuses.8 Thus, the congruence between political decision-makers and recipients of political decision, which is the foundation of democracy, as Held (1995) points out, is in growing disjuncture. Compared to sacrifce made by previous generations of overseas Koreans, the diasporic nationalism of today’s racialized transnational elites is closer to chauvinism, being based on privileged residence in the Global North and an absolutist and essentialist concept of culture (Dirlik 2001; Ong 2006), which is simultaneously status claim in South Korea and escapism from racialization in the United States. This is a proper moment to cite the famous Marx’s quote: “History repeats itself, the frst time as a tragedy, the second time as a farce.” We can see this new strain of diasporic nationalism as a vehicle of the politics of racialized

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transnational managerial and professional elites. This illuminates one mechanism in which ethnic nationalism is rising while the nation-state is transforming (Sassen 2006), generating new inequalities. We should not confuse the cross-border spillover of class struggle with cross-border political participation of various constituents of diasporas in diverse domestic political issues in their country of origin which Lyons and Mandaville (2012) call “politics from afar.” Engaging in domestic issues can be adequately called “globalization of domestic politics” (3) in which individuals with different political orientations in diaspora participate in domestic issues that are recognized as “political” in the country of origin such as dual citizenship or overseas voting rights. On the contrary, the whole point of the politics of racialized transnational elites in their diasporic national activities lies in being perceived precisely as nonpolitical in the country of origin as it is presented as serving the common interest of the nation and transcending any particular interests. The political activities of racialized transnational elites is by no means limited to the politics of “nonpolitical” in the form of diasporic nationalism but includes transnational participation in domestic political issues. If we broaden our purview beyond Korean international students, activities that can be considered as participation in domestic political issues are as common as those seen as nationalist activities in the Korean diaspora. One of the few notable activities that drew signifcant attention in South Korea includes a massive demonstration in 2008 that Koreans call the “candle light demonstration.” It was a historic demonstration triggered by the United States government’s request to the South Korean government to lift its ban on the import of U.S. beef due to concern of mad cow disease as a precondition for a free trade agreement between the two countries (the U.S.-Korean FTA). Initially started by a small group of girls and stay home moms who held candle light vigils in downtown Seoul to protest the lifting of the ban, the demonstration soon grew nation-wide, and it became South Koreans’ expression of discontent on various social issues, including the drastic neoliberalization of the country since its 1997 economic crisis. The vigil was held every night for about two months and drew as many as a half a million demonstrators in Seoul alone. It was one of the earliest political events in South Korea where transnational participation of Koreans overseas started to become visible through the Internet as well as media coverage. Many Koreans in overseas symbolically participated in the demonstration by holding their own rallies to mostly support demonstrators in South Korea and issued public statements of support online and in purchased advertisement in South Korean newspapers. On one occasion, overseas Koreans coordinated and held their solidarity rallies through social media in major cities in the Global North including New York, Los Angeles, Vancouver, Paris, Berlin, and Tokyo, calling it a

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“global wave” of candle light vigils. Both the South Korean government and demonstrators approached Korean Americans to engage the beef controversy. Presidents of Korean American Associations in New York, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., attested to the safety of beef from the United States in press conferences or on TV shows while one Korean woman who came to be known as a “housewife in Atlanta” called into a popular live Korean TV show to criticize the meat industry in the United States and the health hazard of beef that is tied to mad cow disease. Other notable transnational political events include a demonstration organized by Koreans in Paris in 2013 against the then newly elected South Korean president Park Geun-hye who was visiting France over the South Korean government agency’s involvement in rigging the presidential election in her favor. A protest against the sexual harassment of a Korean American intern by President Park’s presidential spokesperson during her offcial visit to the United States in 2013 is another example. The news of sexual harassment frst broke in South Korea by Missy USA, an online platform used mostly by Korean-speaking Korean women living in the United States to share lifestyle related information such as cooking and child-raising. The spokesperson was criminally charged in the United States and President Park made a formal apology and terminated the spokesperson. Considering that the number of those who adjust their immigration status has brought about a sea change to Korean immigration in the United States, skyrocketing from about 10 percent of the total Korean immigrants in the late 1980s to over 80 percent in 2009 (Min 2013), many Korean Americans who have organized and participated in transnational participation in domestic politics across the political spectrum are those who came as international students and have adjusted their immigration status, rejuvenating the Korean diaspora with their fresh transnational ties and elite status. We should note that transnational participation of racialized transnational elites in domestic politics, whether they support the ruling or opposition party, also constitutes their status claim valorizing the presumed superiority of the Global North based on their privileged residence and cultural capital as well as public performance of ethnicity in the host society. However, transnational participation in domestic politics, unlike diasporic nationalist activities, tends to draw mixed responses from South Koreans because it cannot present itself as representing the common interest of the nation. As opposed to the almost unanimously favorable view on diasporic nationalist activities, the non-migrant Koreans I interviewed were clearly divided over the participation of overseas Koreans in sensitive domestic political issues, often being particularly critical of it if it is a position they disagree with. The obvious partiality toward participation in domestic issues can even make the privilege of Koreans residing in the Global North visible to South Koreans, spurring class resentment. This

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Korean college student pointed out the “privilege” of residing in the Global North based on which Korean diasporic individuals participate in domestic politics, including Korean Americans. Joyoung, a non-migrant Korean man in late twenties, said:

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Participation in politics is good no matter where one engages from it. No doubt it is their right. But it was privileged the way they participated in the candle light demonstration. Korean American mothers’ critique [of the South Korean government’s lift of the ban on the import of U.S. beef] was powerful because they spoke as Americans. Korean mothers and housewives in South Korea would not have been as infuential. It was also a little bit privileged the way Missy USA exposed the sexual harassment of an intern by Yoon Chang-Jung (President Park Geun-Hye’s spokesman) in the United States. I think it could’ve been easily silenced if the intern was a Korean student. But the harassment was brought to public attention because it involved a Korean American student.

My research fnds that Korean international students largely refrain from taking on sensitive domestic political issues and instead focus on nationalist activities such as organizing Korean culture nights, even though some do participate in activities related to domestic issues individually. For example, I saw Korean international students organizing a rally for the 2008 candle light demonstration in Korea town on 32nd street in Manhattan. Sungjin, a male graduate who is active in a student association that hosted a North Korean defector to talk about human rights issues in North Korea, a politically charged activity in South Korea, told me in an apologetic tone that the student association hosted the event because it tends to draw a large American audience, suggesting that the group was not motivated by any political ideology. It would be indiscreet to do otherwise considering that Korean student associations often include individuals with diverse political spectrums on Korean domestic issues. South Koreans’ mixed responses to Korean international students’ transnational participation in domestic issues also make it sensible for them to abstain from it. The relative boldness of those who have adjusted their status to permanent residency to participate in domestic issues, on the other hand, shows that they are less vulnerable or sensitive to class and nationalist resentment in South Korea than Korean international students are. We can see the nature of the politics of racialized transnational elites through diasporic nationalism clearly in the ways in which it is silent about the current power structures while being vocal and critical of a dead empire, that is, campaigns to address the legacies of the imperial Japan such as the territorial disputes with Japan. It is relatively easy to bash a dead empire. What costs dearly and even requires a sacrifce is being vocal about the current power structures that hinder bringing justice to the colonial legacies of the

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imperial Japan, that is, the Cold War regime and the military dictatorship that the U.S. military power established in East Asia and South Korea immediately after its emancipation from the imperial Japan at the end of the Pacifc War (Arrighi 1994; Cumings 1984; Smith 2004). The U.S. military government that inherited a colony from the defeated imperial Japan along with the USSR did not recognize the constitutional committee that Koreans spontaneously formed around the country with the departure of Japanese colonizers. Instead it kept the Japanese colonial system of control and Korean collaborators virtually intact with Syngman Rhee, one of the frst generation of U.S.-educated Koreans, as the frst president of South Korea. Although Rhee was active in anti-Japanese activities in the United States until the end of the Pacifc War (Kim 2011), his bureaucracy and military were “trained almost entirely by the Japanese” as “American Occupation authorities usually required that Koreans have experiences in the colonial apparatus before employing them” (Cumings 1984, 479). The United States has stationed about 30,000 troops in South Korea since the Korean War to advance its cold war strategy to rebuild East Asia under its political and military hegemony that took Japan as a regional sub-partner (Armstrong 2013; Arrighi 1994; Smith 2004). The hereditary, institutional, and political roots of the contemporary South Korean ruling power bloc and apparatuses in the Japanese colonization have since been sources of anti-government movements, dissidence, and challenges against the legitimacy of the South Korean regime which the ruling power bloc can counter only with a very strong anti-communist ideology and oppression. By contrast, the North Korean regime has used the national liberation struggles of its founders in Manchuria against the imperial Japan as the biggest source of its legitimacy while condemning the South Korean government as a puppet regime of the United States run by Korean collaborators of the imperial Japan. The anti-American and pro-North Korean sentiments of many workers, peasants, and student activists who led the pro-democracy and anti-government movements in South Korea during the late 1980s come from this ideological terrain as they were radicalized by studying a radical revisionist version of the Korean modern history and radical ideologies of the Marx-Leninist tradition and creating a counter public sphere (Koo 2001; Lee 2009). We also see such dynamics even today in ongoing controversies, including the debates on whether the former military dictator Park Chung Hee was a collaborator of the imperial Japan, who remains the most respected fgure of Korean conservatives and the father of impeached South Korean president Park Geun-hye; 2015 demonstrations against the South Korean government’s decision to rewrite a history textbook used in schools, which many South Koreans see as the government’s attempt to cover up the ruling party’s connection to the Japanese colonization; or a research institute’s

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publication of a report that exposes a list of Korean collaborators of the imperial Japan. One can acutely feel the silence about the current power structures in what Grace Cho (2008) calls a ghostly fgure “haunting the Korean diaspora”— that is, the South Korean government has supervised under its control over a million Korean women who worked in prostitution in service of American soldiers stationed across the country often under horrible conditions and violence. Many of them were reported to be Korean “comfort women” or their daughters. Over 100,000 of Korean sex workers are estimated to have married American soldiers (Cho 2008) and emigrated to the United States since even before the liberalization of the immigration law in 1965 under the “War Bride” laws (Espiritu 2008), beginning the chain migration of relatives in the post-1965 era. They are major roots of the Korean American society:

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The Korean diaspora in the United States has been haunted by the traumatic effects of what we are not allowed to know—the terror and devastation inficted by the Korean War, the failure to resolve it, and the multiple silences surrounding this violent history. . . . The tensions produced by this vexed relationship are nowhere more palpable than in the diaspora’s uncertain kinship to the yanggongju [Korean sex workers] and the unacknowledged traumas that she has come to embody. (Cho 2008, 12–13)

The racialized transnational elites remain silent about such group of Korean women who are brutalized by the current power structures. By contrast, they often organize and participate in diasporic nationalist events to raise awareness about another group of Korean women who have been brutalized by the dead empire, namely Korean “comfort women,” and to expose the brutality of the imperial Japan, a campaign that is important and valuable but not risky and costly. The former group is still stigmatized as yanggongju (translated as “Western princess”), a term often used in South Korea to refer to Korean women who date non-Asian men as a way to shame them. Moreover, the politics of the racialized transnational elites in bashing the dead empire, in effect, decontextualizes and compartmentalizes the Japanese colonialism from the global colonization of the European empires by granting the Global North the moral authority to judge on the legacies of the imperial Japan in its spectacular transnational ethnic performance of hailing the Western society. This granting of moral authority to the Global North that helps reproduce the hegemony of the Global North is consummated by the racialized transnational elites’ overall indifference to and silence about the colonial legacies of European empires and the ongoing struggles of other people of color in the Global North such as Black Lives Matter.9 This politics can ultimately

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get in the way of building a global solidarity to bring justice to all colonial legacies. The new diasporic nationalism of racialized transnational elites contrasts with the existing diasporic nationalism of Korean Americans in terms of motivations, ideologies, and political effects. The latter is rooted in the anticolonial national liberation movement against the imperial Japan (Kim 2011; Lie 2001), renewed by its support for the pro-democracy movement against the South Korean dictatorship in the 1980s, and repeatedly rejuvenated by second-generation Korean Americans who are politicized from their racial experiences and aspire to “go back to their roots” (Ignacio 2005). Because of the South Korean ruling power’s connection to the Japanese colonialism, nationalist issues tend to become contentious in South Korea when one takes nationalism very seriously. On the contrary to Korean international students’ abstaining from engaging domestic issues, the diasporic nationalism of Korean Americans who take anti-colonial nationalism very seriously has led them to an active involvement in South Korean domestic issues, supporting the anti-government movements in South Korea, while at the same time seeking to build a coalition with other communities of color in the United States. For example, for over a decade, a group of Korean Americans have been organizing an educational and exposure program—called “Korean Education and Exposure Program (KEEP)”—where a small group of Korean American organizers, scholars, and artists from across the country visit South Korea for a few weeks to learn the modern Korean history and the South Korean social movements, meeting with various social justice organizations. Those who participate in the KEEP program are often working in the Korean or Asian immigrant communities and actively work to build coalitions with other communities of color. After each trip, the participants hold a report-back event to share out their experiences with the broader social justice community. In so doing, they create transnational activist networks. Through the relationship they develop with the South Korean social justice movement during the KEEP program, many Korean Americans remain engaged with issues emerging from the South Korean social movement. Examples of their engagement include supporting petitions from South Korean organizations by circulating to their networks here to garner support of U.S-based organizations or hosting events when South Korean activists visit the United States. Some of the Korean American community organizations today such as Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance (KIWA) in Los Angles and Minkwon Center and Nodutdol in New York City that are working on voting registration and organizing low-wage workers among others are a product of this history of activist transnationalism, with some of them being founded by South Korean activists who dodged the murderous South Korean

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military dictatorship.10 The diasporic nationalism of Korean Americans has signifcantly shaped the formation of Korean American society (Kim 2011). Despite its sacrifce, achievements, and historic role, the anti-colonial diasporic nationalism has become anachronistic today to the extent that the nation-building as a universalist political project in decolonization has become outdated and inadequate in globalization. Yet, this diasporic nationalism still brings in a valuable perspective of anti-colonialism and anti-racism to the Korean diaspora, willing to criticize the current power structures. As such, this strain of diasporic nationalism is a far cry from the politics of racialized transnational elites that employs diasporic nationalism as a means of status claim valorizing the presumed superiority of the Global North and a simultaneous tactic against the class resentment in South Korea and racialization in the United States. However, the distinction between the two strands of diasporic nationalism is only conceptual or, to use the Weberian parlance, idea-typical. In reality, there may be a growing convergence of the two along the lines of political ideologies not only because the boundary between Korean international students and Korean American students is already blurry, but also because many Korean international students eventually join Korean American society as they adjust their immigration status to become legal permanent residents. The new fusions and divisions will shape the future of Korean diasporic nationalism.

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CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have contended that, seen through the lens of simultaneity, we can understand Korean international students’ diaspora-building as an adaptive strategic response to simultaneously avoid racialization in the United States and subdue class and nationalist resentment in South Korea. I have examined how their various diaspora-building activities in the United States, such as campaigns relating to the legacy of the Japanese colonization of Korea can be digitally mediated transnational public performances that address two different audiences simultaneously here and there with two different signifcances. I have argued that it is a new strain of diasporic nationalism distinct from existing Korean Americans’ diasporic nationalism that is largely rooted in anti-colonial national liberation struggles in terms of motivations, ideologies, and political effects. I have criticized the diasporabuilding of Korean international students as a major vehicle of politics of racialized transnational elites that reproduce social inequalities, arguing that this helps us better understand the rising ethnic nationalism in globalization. This research sheds light on an ongoing transnational reconfguration of race, class, and nation.

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NOTES 1. Balibar (2004, 120–121) argues:

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[W]e should ask what the claim of “a right to have rights” could become in today’s politics. This question becomes acute when we observe that, although the nation-form has not simply been withering away, the conditions of politics, the economy, and culture, the material distribution of power and the possibilities of controlling it, have become increasingly transnational. . . . I take it to be a crucial issue to acknowledge that, along with the development of a formal “European citizenship,” a real “European apartheid” has emerged. . . . For this term to be justifed, there must be something qualitatively new. This is indeed the case with the new developments of the construction of Europe since the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht. In each and every one of the European nation-states, there exist structures of discrimination that command uneven access to citizenship or nationality, particularly those inherited from the colonial past.

2. Basch et al. (1994, 6) famously defne transnationalism as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” in their seminal work. 3. The value of cultural capital from the Global North in the South Korean labor market is not merely a result of supply and demand of foreign degrees in the job market, as my respondents suggest, but also a dependent variable to the level of globalization and class struggles. That is, how effciently Korean international students can globalize the South Korean society and collectively defend and enhance the local value of cultural capital they have acquired. 4. See Riva Kastoryano (2007) for a discussion of this new kind of diasporic nationalism that she calls “transnational nationalism.” 5. Korea is one of the most diasporic nations in the world, with about 10 percent of its population being dispersed to China, Japan, Russia, Europe, and North and South Americas through the political upheavals of the Japanese colonization, the Korean War, and the division of North and South Koreas (Armstrong 2013; Lie 2001). 6. For example, New York City residents were subjected to police stops and street interrogations over 5 million times between 2002 and 2014, reaching over 1,800 per day on average during its peak period in 2011. Nearly nine out of ten were innocent. Even though the police tactic targets black and Latino communities overwhelmingly, it creates space that is far from being a welcoming one for any undocumented immigrant (NYCLU 2019). 7. “The notion of the ‘nation-people’ as the bearer of rights served as spurs for self-determination and fueled the spread of nationalist movements in the territories of the Napoleonic, Spanish, Habsburg, Ottoman and Czarist empires in the 19th century and to Qing China by the early 20th century,” writes Prasenjit Duara (2008). 8. See Balibar (1991b) for an insightful discussion on the nation form and the distinction between the nation as an ethnos and the nation as a demos. 9. A recent controversy in the Asian American community about an Asian police offcer in New York City, Peter Liang, who has been convicted for the killing of an unarmed black man, Akai Gurley, points to intensifying tensions from this

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development. In a rally in February 2016, thousands of mostly Chinese Americans participated in a protest against the conviction of Liang and chanted “All lives matter,” in effect undermining the Black Lives Matter movement, and threatening Asian American community organizations that have supported the Akai Gurley’s family and advocated for police violence (Rojas 2016). Dr. OiYan Poon noted on a recent panel that those Chinese Americans who organize the campaign in support of Liang are mostly recent middle-class Chinese immigrants. 10. For example, Yoon Han Bong who founded multiple Korean American community organizations, including the Korean Resource Center, Young Koreans United (YKU), and the National Korean American Service and Education Consortium (NAKASEC), was a college student activist who was blacklisted and escaped the military dictatorship after the 1980 Kwangju massacre.

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Chapter 7

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Digitally Mediated Transnational Lives and Tactical Uses of New Media

With the advent of the Internet and digital media, we have a new regime of media that is characterized by a new economy of cross-border communication where the distinction between local and global or here and there is hard to see. In this chapter, I investigate Korean international students’ daily uses of new media in their transnational lives as they navigate class and racial dynamics they face in transnational social felds through a lens of simultaneity. In so doing, I seek to contribute to advancing a sociology of media that takes information and communication technology seriously while, at the same time, being attentive to the actual uses of technology within social relations. I demonstrate that new media has engendered a qualitatively new transnational life by examining how Korean international students maintain social relationships with their family and friends across the Pacifc, while keeping detached and aloof like a tourist from their host society. On the other hand, my research shows that we cannot truly understand the uses of media without looking at the social relations in which Korean international students use media tactically to deal with class and racial dynamics they face in their transnational lives. Some recent studies that are inspired by the novelty of new media-enabled transnational civic engagement of diasporas, calling it “politics from afar” (Lyons and Mandaville 2012) or “digital diaspora” (Everett 2009; Brinkerhoff 2009), seem to implicitly assume transparency across the border. I analyze various media tactics that Korean international students employ through new media to selectively localize and compartmentalize their social relationships and create opaqueness across the border for the purpose of impression management, as they make their status claims in the United States as transnational elites to South Korean society. Understanding the maneuvers of transnational migrants, who are embedded in multiple social dynamics, in mediating information across the border through a lens of 163

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simultaneity warns us that new media does not simply lead to straightforward transparency across the border.

TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF MEDIA There is a growing scholarly interest in studying media as we intuitively know that new media has played an integral role in recent historical events and upheavals, such as the election of President Obama, the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and Black Lives Matter, to name a few. On the one hand, there has been an explosion of popular utopian or dystopian discourse on new media that media futurologists have produced since the onset of the Internet through newspapers or magazines (Castels 2000). In the more traditional social science disciplines, on the other hand, there is a lack of theorization in conceptualizing the impact of new media. In sociology, a sociology of media proper that takes as its theoretical object not the political economy of media industry nor the semiotic or semantic analysis of media contents and text1—although no doubt they are all important in their own rights—but the specifc technological and material attributes of old or new media itself and actual uses of it in social relations has been elusive. We can understand Saskia Sassen’s (2002, 2006) passionate call for “a sociology of information technology” in this situation:

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As social scientists we need to avoid focusing exclusively on the technical capabilities; we cannot overlook the social environments in which they get used. Neither can we disregard the specifcity of these technical capabilities which enable the formation of whole new interactive domain. (Sassen 2006, 342)

My research is an answer to this call. A sociology of media that pays attention to both specifc attributes of technology and social environments needs to facilitate constructive interdisciplinary conversations. Joshua Meyrowitz’s work on electronic media entitled No Sense of Place (1985) is an excellent example of a constructive conversation between sociology and media studies generating innovative theories and approaches, where he interweaves sociology of symbolic interaction and media studies. Meyrowitz inventively brings together the theories of Erving Goffman and Marshall McLuhan to complement each other to explore the impact of electronic media on social behavior. Meyrowitz argues that McLuhan correctly pointed out that electronic media brings about social change, but Goffman’s theory of social interaction can better explain how it happens. Meyrowitz claims that electronic media, such as television, has led to “the overlapping of many social spheres that were once distinct” (5), disturbing the preexisting divisions of private and public

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on which social institutions, including school, family, and the state, are based. It creates a new situation and social reality to which social behavior has to adapt just as breaking the walls among rooms or between the front/back stages would. In other words, Meyrowitz explains how new media can lead to new behaviors by illustrating the ways in which a redistribution of information by new media creates a new social situation that induces new behaviors and changes the relations among places. There can be numerous inventive ways of interweaving sociology and media studies as such. Through such conversations, we ought to develop a sociology of media that recognizes the specifcity of technical capabilities of media while, at the same time, understanding that, precisely because of its specifc technical capabilities, there are always already contested, heterogeneous, and tactical uses of technology within social antagonism and relations of power; that technology can partake of history only used as such while producing unintended consequences; and that such actual uses and struggles transform technology itself. In this chapter, I put forth an analysis of Korean international students’ daily uses of new media that contributes to advancing such sociology of media. I shall frst discuss the technical capability of new media to enable an unprecedented and qualitatively new transnational life, tie, and social relationship that substantively constitute a microlevel process of diaspora-building, that is, a new social reality and transnational formation. In the second part, I shall analyze Korean international students’ actual tactical uses of new media to selectively localize social relationships as a way to navigate the class and racial dynamics they experience in the United States and South Korea.

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DIGITALLY MEDIATED TRANSNATIONAL LIVES The uses of transnational media by immigrants and migrants and their diaspora-building through its use are certainly nothing new. Diasporic public spheres already existed in the pre-Internet era through electronic media and migration, which has been one of the major topics of studies on migration (Appadurai 1996; Cunningham and Sinclair 2001). Even prior to electronic media, print-based media such as letters, pictures, and newspapers were transnational and integral to maintaining transnational ties of immigrants and the construction of diaspora, including diasporic nationalism (Kim 2011). Earlier immigrants also used media tactically to live their transnational lives. For example, many Asian immigrant men living in a “bachelor society” in the early twentieth century found their brides from their country of origin through a practice called “mail-order bride.” The men often sent home a picture of a much younger self. When their brides arrived in America, the women were often very disappointed about how their husband-to-be physically looked, to

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a point where some women even returned home (Espiritu 2008).2With the rise of new communication and information technology or digital media represented by the Internet, however, we have a qualitatively new transnational social reality. In the new regime of media characterized by a new economy of cross-border communication where the distinction between the local and the global or here and there is just a click away or none existent, diasporic individuals can interact daily with one another across the border, exchanging pictures and videos that they take with mobile devices through emails, Skype, Internet Messenger, Facebook, and other mechanisms. For this specifc capability of new media, some social scientists call it “transnational media,” registering the awareness that some media is intrinsically more transnational than others. In the current regime of media, coethnics who are dispersed all over the globe can connect with one another in real time, in two ways, and constantly, and thus can interact with one another and maintain social relationships at a distance and across borders in an unprecedented way, creating what some even calls “digital diasporas” (Everett 2009; Brinkerhoff 2009). However, there has not yet been adequate scholarly attention to understand how this historic development has transformed the transnational lives of immigrants and migrants. Although a fedgling body of studies examines the historic development (e.g., Madianou and Miller 2012), studies on transnationalism of immigrants and migrants thus far tend to privilege face-to-face interactions immigrants had during their visits to or resettling in their country of origin. I shall contribute to a social inquiry on this novelty with an analysis of Korean international students’ daily uses of new media that enables transnational lives. Their transnational lives are at the same time a microlevel process of constructing diasporic publics as they organize themselves through ethnic solidarity and participate in recent transnational political incidents. My research fnds that new media enables Korean international students to live transnational lives in an unprecedented way, maintaining long-distance relationships with family and friends across the Pacifc and consuming Korean pop culture and news on a daily basis. Korean international students’ daily uses of digital media are an integral part of their transnational lives. All of the Korean international students I interviewed own a laptop. All of them except for two have a mobile digital device commonly referred to as a “smartphone.” Many of them also have a tablet PC. They carry these mobile devices around at school or when they are sitting in coffee shops to do their school work, watch downloaded videos, listen to music, or access the Internet through mobile or wireless networks that are almost ubiquitous today. Almost all of them also use what is commonly called “social media” such as Facebook with their mobile devices. They all use at least two social media platforms specifcally, Facebook and “Kakao Talk” which is the most popular Korean messenger application and a Korean equivalent of WhatsApp

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in the United States.3 In addition to these two, many of them also use Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and other social media applications. Many of the students I interviewed dedicate signifcant time on a daily basis using social media to communicate with their friends in the United States, South Korea, or another country and to see what their friends uploaded. They view these social media multiple times a day, virtually anywhere and anytime, including in class, obsessively, as one student put it self-consciously, “to the extent that it affects school work.” Korean international students’ use of new media is integral to their global mobility which is a characteristic of transnational elites (e.g., Urry 2007). Although transportation costs, marital status, having children, and other factors affect their mobility, Korea international students largely live very mobile lives as they visit South Korea or another country frequently to see their family and friends, do internships, or go to summer schools. One student reported that she has visited South Korea as many as four times a year: summer, winter, spring breaks, and over the Thanksgiving weekend. They also often visit their siblings or friends who may live and study in other cities in America or another country. Their mobile lives are facilitated by new media as they coordinate their trips through Facebook and Kakao Talk. As such, their cross-border communication tends to increase before and after their visits. For example, to save transnational shipping costs, family and friends often ask Korean international students to transport to South Korea U.S. goods they have purchased online. And this kind of interactions strengthens long-distance relationships. I will discuss below the novelty of these digitally mediated transnational lives by looking at how Korean international students maintain social relationships with their family, their Korean friends in South Korea, and other Korean international friends through new media.

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Transnational Family Effortless communication through new media across the Pacifc is one of the deciding factors in Korean parents’ decision to have their children study abroad for years or to let them work overseas after they complete their school. One Korean parent said: “Even in South Korea you see your children only a few times a year. [Having children live in South Korea] is not so important today.” My research fnds that Korean international students actively use the instant and constant connection new media enables to maintain their family bond and compensate for the absence of physical proximity. Almost all of the students I interviewed use Kakao Talk, Skype, or other Internet-based media to connect with their parents or siblings in South Korea or another country on a regular basis, sharing their everyday lives as well as asking them to send over goods from South Korea. Many of them have a space in Kakao Talk,

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commonly referred to as “Kakao Talk group,” dedicated to their family, where family members can exclusively share texts and pictures and access the space with mobile devices anywhere and anytime. Yoonah, a female undergraduate who has lived in the United States for a year reports: I talk to my parents through Kakao Talk once every two or three days, and video-call through Skype at least once a week. While I can talk to only one parent over Kakao Talk, with Skype, I can talk to and see both of my parents before my father goes to work. It is nice to see their faces. It feels like they are with me although they are not here. I send pictures of good things I eat, and say “I am eating well like this, so don’t worry about me,” or I recently sent pictures I took in Central Park. They like my pictures, and text “pretty.” My parents also send me pictures of their trips or something funny. When I see their pictures, sometimes I think “hmm, they have fun even without me,” and other times, I miss them. . . . I connect with my grandparents over emails. I heard that they learned how to use emails for me. When my parents are with them, we use Skype. But we usually exchange emails, sending pictures. I heard that my grandparents really like my pictures.

Kisuk, a male undergraduate who has lived in the United States for seven years reports:

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I used to talk to my family over the phone making international calls, but now, we text through Kakao Talk. We have a Kakao Talk group with my parents in Seoul and my younger brother in Boston. There are about 50 traffcs a day, including pictures and texts in the group. I put up pictures of food. I talk [to my parents] over the phone when I talk about something serious like tuitions, but . . . I certainly feel less lonely when I can see [pictures of] my parents’ lives in South Korea than when I talk over the phone.

Despite their physical absence, Korean parents continue parenting of their children studying abroad with help of new media. Many students reported of a popular parenting measure: their parents regularly send via email or Kakao Talk news articles or excerpts from literature, religious texts, or biographies they think will inspire and encourage their children to study harder. One graduate student who came to the United States when he was in sixth grade reported that his father in South Korea emails him twenty news articles in Korean about Korean politics and society every week to groom him into a bilingual and bicultural elite. He has to read all the articles because his father wants to discuss them when they talk over the phone. Other examples of Korean parents’ long-distance parenting through new media include helping their children get ready for job interviews in South Korea by researching and sending information relevant to positions, or sharing tips of taking care of

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young babies for those who have children of their own.4 Korean international students who have parents, older siblings, or relatives who have also studied abroad seek out their help on school work or preparing resumes, among other things. Korean families with international students use new media to maintain their family bond among family members scattered in multiple countries through constant and instant connections and exchanges of pictures, videos, audio, texts, and writings, and thereby create a new transnational form of family.

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A Long-Distance Relationship Through the social media platforms like Facebook or Kakao Talk, Korean international students stay connected daily across the border with their friends as well as others who are in South Korea, another state in the United States, or another country. Korean international students tend to differentiate the uses of Facebook and Kakao Talk for different social circles of people. They tend to use Facebook to manage the broadest network in which they get connected with all of those they know, including their Korean friends, non-Korean friends, and other acquaintances while they use Kakao Talk to maintain more personal and intimate relationships. Most of them have multiple exclusive “Kakao Talk groups” that are dedicated for each social group like family, high or middle school alumni, or neighborhood friends. Through these virtual transnational communities, Korean international students share their frustrations or worries instantly and receive emotional support from their friends far away. These Korean international students report how they communicate their feelings instantly, seeking emotional support from their friends over Kakao Talk. Yeonjoo, a female undergraduate who has lived in the United States for six years reports: “I was scared on the subway once. I talked to a friend through Kakao Talk whenever I can get signal on my phone. I said ‘a crazy guy is following.’ The friend responded, ‘Just ignore them.’ I contacted a person that was available at that time. She was in Virginia.” With a captured image on his smartphone, one non-migrant respondent shared a Kakao Talk group exchange among one Korean international student in the United States and his high school friends in South Korea that include the respondent. The international student is a male undergraduate in early twenties who has lived in the United States for less than a year. The exchange shows the level of the integration of digitally mediated transnational communication in their everyday lives. It is the frst day of school for the international student. He sent a text full of anxiety about introducing himself in class. His friends in South Korea, being good friends, instantly responded in minutes and relieved his

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anxiety by making fun of him and his Korean accent in an affectionate way. The captured Kakao Talk exchange reads:

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An international student in the United States (sent at 10:27am EST/11:27pm Seoul time): LOL, fuck. The frst day of the semester surely makes me nervous. I feel like I am going crazy, LOL. Fuck, they are going to ask me to introduce myself, LOL. His friend #1 in South Korea (sent at 10:30am EST/11:30pm Seoul time): kkkkkkkk. Self-introduction, kkkkkkkkkk. His friend #2 in South Korea (sent at 10:30am EST/11:30pm Seoul time): I am a dwarf (written in Korean, mocking Korean accent). His friend #3 in South Korea (sent at 10:41am EST/11:41pm Seoul time): I am from Korea (written in Korean, mocking Korean accent).

Korean international students also use new media to get their friends’ help on more practical aspects of their life such as getting advice on cover letters for job applications in South Korea. One Korean college student reported that he helped his Korean international student friend in the United States with an economics class and even helped him get ready for tests because his friend was having a hard time studying in English. Thanks to his help, the friend in the United States got a good grade in the economics class. Global mobility complements and strengthens the digitally mediated longdistance friendship. Friends in South Korea ship or bring in person when they visit the United States any goods Korean international students requested; Korean international students transport to South Korea any American products their friends purchased online to defray the transnational shipping costs. My research fnds that wealthy Korean international students who can afford the frequent air travels can often nurture and maintain close relationships with those far away easily. A female undergraduate who has lived in New York for about fve years, for example, notes that four out of her fve closest friends live in South Korea, Australia, Boston, and California, and reports that she maintains her long-distance friendship with them through a combination of uses of new media and visits with each other. New media, combined with global mobility, enables Korean international students to maintain longdistance friendships, allowing them to turn to their friends for emotional and practical supports which are vital for their study abroad and integral to their transnational lives, creating enduring transnational personal connections. A Transnational Mobile Community of the “Study Abroad Clan” Korean international students form a digitally mediated transnational mobile community of their own through new media, by seeing each other on their

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frequent visits to South Korea and by visiting each other in America. Through it, they share the identity of “study abroad clan” as a distinctive cultural group in South Korea that mutually recognizes one another. It is primarily formed through their connection to alumni networks of schools they attended in Korea and the United States or friends from their neighborhoods in South Korea. It grows into a broader network as they make new friends in shared social spaces; it is a network that can last for one’s lifetime as his or her social capital. Some students who went to a prestigious elementary, middle or high school in a wealthy neighborhood in South Korea often have enough alumni studying in the United States that they can even have a reunion in New York City. Meejin, a female undergraduate in early twenties reports of another international student who studies in another state coming to New York for a visit:

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He went to DH middle school (a school in Gangnam). Many students from that school went to study abroad. When he came to New York, his middle school friends got together to hang out over the Thanksgiving weekend. They got all connected somehow. He initially talked to a girl in another university about his visit to New York. She talked to other students from DH middle school at NYU. So, about twenty people got together.

In particular, many “early study abroad” students who prepare to study abroad for undergraduate college form a group that calls themselves “Apgujeong international student community.” Apgujeong is a neighborhood in Gangnam where after-school programs for SAT are clustered, and Gangnam is the wealthiest borough in Seoul that has become famous because of Psy’s famous You Tube video, “Gangnam Style.”5 Early study abroad students who prepare to attend American universities as well as those who study in other countries like England, New Zealand, or China, go to South Korea every summer or winter to attend the SAT after-school programs. These students strike up friendship while they study for the SAT during the day and socialize at night, drinking or dancing in clubs. Kisuk reports: Those who went to boarding schools in the United States have a lot of connections among themselves because they go to the same SAT after-school program [in Seoul], or . . . even if you don’t go to the after-school program. They drink a lot and go to clubs although they are minors (smirks). Quite a lot of them do so. So, they become friends by drinking together. They have many mutual friends. When they meet new people, they exchange contacts and get connected over Facebook; then they fnd out they have mutual friends, “do you know him?” “Yes, he is a friend from my after-school program,” “I went to an elementary school with him.” Connections like that. It is hard to fnd an international student in my university who didn’t go to an SAT after-school program.

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Korean international students stay connected over social media through and after their study abroad. They share important information regarding study abroad and expand their Korean international student community by introducing new friends to one another. Many students pointed out that “there is only one degree of separation” among Korean international students, particularly those studying in prestigious boarding schools and universities on the East Coast in the United States, which tend to draw the most affuent Korean families, revealing that there is an internal stratifcation of wealth and region among Korean international students. The more prestigious a university they go to, the more valuable the alumni network becomes. The social capital from an elite alumni network of students from wealthiest Korean families is one of the factors Korean parents consider in deciding the destination of their children’s study abroad. Korean international students living in different cities often visit each other, take trips to another country together or synchronize their stay in South Korea over summer or winter breaks to hang out together, take summer classes, or do internships. During the breaks, many undergraduate students take summer classes at major universities in Seoul to get exposure to Korean college life while earning relatively easy credits, or they may work as interns in South Korean companies to familiarize themselves with the Korean corporate culture and to network with those in South Korea to build what they call a “Korean personal connection” in the interest of their careers and life back in South Korea after they complete their study abroad. Taking advantage of new media and global mobility as such, Korean international students cultivate social relationships among individuals who are globally dispersed and form a community of “study abroad clan” throughout their study abroad period. The members of this community mutually deem one another as social capital which is crucial for their respective lives after they complete their education. In a nutshell, this examination of Korean international students’ daily uses of media shows that new media enables a qualitatively new transnational life and social reality through the new economy of communication which makes possible, among others, instant social interactions of everyday life, including intimate moments and feeting emotions across the border. This emergence of transnational social relationship enabled by new media and constant and instant social interaction indicates that there may be a growing disjuncture between a physical place of residence and a social life space, that is, a new reconfguration of space and place in progress in globalization. To put it another way, if it is true that globalization is a social organization on a larger spatial scale (Held 1995; Calhoun 2007), it must involve a transnational process in which the spatial scale of social life of—at least some—individuals is more expansive, enabled by new media, than those in previous eras, which at the same time changes the way in which they perceive, relate to, and dwell

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in their physical place of residence. This development calls for a systemic scholarly attention and interdisciplinary approach, which is beyond the scope of this research, making it all the more imperative to broaden our analytic perspective to take information and communication technology seriously.

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USES OF MEDIA WITHIN RACIAL AND CLASS DYNAMICS As discussed above, the new economy of cross-border communication enabled by new media has engendered a new social reality. However, we would fall prey to technological determinism if we ignore social relations and the agency of migrants who are embedded in dynamics of class, race, and gender. The burgeoning literature inspired by the novelty of the digitally mediated transnational civic and political engagement of diasporas in their country of origin, called “politics from afar” or “digital diaspora,” has not paid enough attention to such maneuvers of migrants to create opaqueness across the border, implicitly assuming straightforward cross-border transparency between diasporic individuals and their coethnics in their country of origin. There is no direct transparency across the border as I have demonstrated in the previous chapters by analyzing Korean international students’ mediation of knowledge. Yet, the non-migrant Koreans I interviewed hold an illusion of such transparency as shown in their belief that they know about their international student friends’ lives in the United States, when they think their friends are “doing well” in the United States based on pictures posted in Facebook and even when they are embarrassed for their friends about their marginalization, which reveals their systemic misrecognition. This illusion of transparency is the fip side of the same coin, that is, the non-migrant Korean nationals’ systemic misrecognition which is itself a product of the practices of Korean international students who make status claims in South Korea by presenting themselves as transnational elites. Korean international students’ status claims do not start when they return to South Korea. Rather they begin here in the United States in the daily transnational social interactions enabled by new media. Korean international students can achieve this maneuver of backstage partitioning for the purpose of impression management through tactical uses of media in everyday life because transnational communication happens not metaphysically through some telepathy but only materially, that is, through the technical capabilities of media.6 In other words, precisely because of the technical capabilities of technology, there are always already tactical uses of it within social antagonism and relations of power. We cannot truly understand why Korean international students use or do not use new media the ways they do without looking at both the specifc capabilities of

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technology and social relations within which they use it. I will demonstrate this by examining Korean international students’ uses of new media to create opaqueness for backstage partitioning and selectively localize and compartmentalize their social relationships with various tactics employing multiple devices, media platforms, languages, and others in order to deal with issues rising from the racial and class dynamics they experience in transnational social felds simultaneously as a racialized other and a transnational elite.

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Racialization and Self-Organizing Since their social relationships are limited or fractured by racial, ethnic, and intra-ethnic social segregations, Korean international students only have a small social circle in the United States with their friends being mostly other Korean international students or other international students from other countries like China. My research fnds that their social circle forms a racially and ethnically divided pattern in Korean international students’ local uses of new media. This pattern is shown more clearly in text-based media platforms such as Kakao Talk than in Facebook as individuals differentiate the uses of media platforms. Many use Facebook to manage a wider social circle and to just keep in touch with others in that wider circle, that is, as one student says, just to “let them know that I have not forgotten you.” Another student uses Facebook as a directory in case she loses her other contact information. When it comes to more private and personal text-based media platforms such as Kakao Talk in which they interact with immediate responses to coordinate activities, Korean international students tend to assign different applications or channels for different ethnic groups: They tend to use Kakao Talk almost exclusively to communicate with other Koreans. Some use WeChat, a messenger app popular in China to communicate with Chinese international students. In contacting non-Asian students, Korean international students tend to use SMS texting, which indicates that they are not integrated enough to share a social media platform in common. This pattern of using different social media platforms for different groups refects their racialized and marginalized social circles. New media does not enable them to transcend the local social border although it enables them to connect easily across the border. Racial dynamics shape their uses of media not just passively, but rather tactically as Korean international students actively use new media to organize themselves in the form of student associations, alumni, or occupational connections embodying ethnic identifcation and solidarity as a way to avoid and counter their racialization and marginalization. In most major academic institutions in New York with a large number of Korean international students, Korean international students have formed school-sponsored student associations. Some of them even have affliated subgroups on campus such

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as a Korean drumming troupe or a Korean community service group. These student associations acquire contact information of newly accepted Korean international students and reach out to them to organize an orientation or meeting of new students in Seoul even before they come to America. Otherwise, Korean international students who are accepted into the same American institution personally identify one another through social media, and have meetings in South Korea that is commonly called a “departure meeting.” Heesun, a female undergraduate who has lived in the United States for six years reports:

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When I was accepted into NYU, I was reached out from here and there over Facebook. So we met in South Korea frst. It looks like the president of the student association has access to students’ contact information. Or they just fnd each other by “NYU Korean meeting” [as a search word]. I didn’t go to the freshman welcome party, but I went to a meeting with a few of them one week before I came to the United States. We all became close. It was all freshmen, about 20 of us.

One male undergraduate who is a staff member of a Korean international student association in a university in New York reported: “When freshmen come to school at the beginning of the school year and say hi, then 300 new people appear in my Kakao Talk (smirks).” Most Korea international students seek to fnd a fne balance between distancing themselves from the racial stigma attached to a student association as a “clique” and tapping into the social capital the association provides. Many students report that they receive useful information like job fairs on school campus that the school’s Korean international student association circulates to its members through emails although they don’t go to events the association organizes. Korean international student associations mostly maintain social media spaces to connect all of Korean international students on a campus to share information about classes or school affairs, fnd a housemate, or sell their used goods. They also have media outlet such as Facebook pages or a website to announce their social events like an end-of-semester party, alumni gatherings, job fairs with Korean companies, or events related to South Korean politics or culture. As such, they use new media as an integral tool to organize themselves in response to racialization and marginalization. Belonging to and Staying Oriented to a Public Far Away My research surprisingly fnds that with the exception of most recently arrived students who seek to minimize their exposure to the Korean language, most of the Korean international students I interviewed, including those who

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have high English profciency, spend signifcant time reading Korean news outlets, watching Korean shows, and consuming other forms of Korean pop culture with their mobile devices on a daily basis. Almost all of the Korean international students I interviewed follow Korean news on a daily basis by reading websites of major Korean newspapers or through two most popular “portal sites,” Daum and Naver that are Korean equivalents of Yahoo and Google and provides a search engine, free email accounts, and news. Many of them have an app of these sites on their smartphones or set these sites as the home page of their web browser which they open multiple times a day to check emails, do online research for school work, or see Korean cartoons online called “webtoon,” a popular pastime activity for young Koreans. By contrast, only a very few of them follow current events and other news in the United States in any signifcant or consistent measure, other than what they see come through their Facebook newsfeed. Students who work for Korean-owned businesses, go to a Korean church or live with their Korean American relatives follow news about the Korean American community somewhat either through Korean community newspapers they fnd at work or through random engagement with the community. Except for these measures, most of my respondents, including those who plan to adjust their immigration status to live and work in the United States are relatively indifferent to following current events and news about the United States and the Korean American community. Even when they learn of these current events, it is often through Facebook postings, Korean language news sources, or their family in South Korea. Almost all of my respondents, except for those who came to the United States recently and a very few who prefer to play videogames or watch sports for leisure, heavily watch Korean soap operas, shows, or movies either through online streaming or by downloading them on their mobile devices. They watch these shows as a pastime activity while they are engaging in other activities, including being on the subway, having dinner, blow drying their hair, doing house chores, or before they go to sleep. Some watch Korean shows on a daily basis while others binge-watch over weekends or after they are done with exams in schools. Their consumption pattern of Korean news and pop culture is not unrelated to their experience of racialization and marginalization in the United States. Their social circle is limited to other Korean international students or their friends in South Korea with whom they can talk about current Korean news and television shows while having very limited opportunities to talk similarly about happenings in the United States. Jungjae, a male graduate in early thirties studying philosophy who has lived in the United States for two years reports: “I don’t know that much about NYC’s Korean American community because I have no ties to it. It is not like I go to a Korean church. I have never read those free Korean American tabloid

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papers, either. I just don’t have much interest.” Goeun, a female graduate in mid-twenties who has lived in the United States for fve years reports: All other students seem to watch Korean shows, too. We all watched “My Love from the Star” (a Korean soap opera that was televised in the winter of 20142015) and talked a lot about it recently. If one student asks “did you see My Love from the Star?,” another says, “Don’t spoil it.” If another asks “Do I have to watch it?,” another responds “You need to see only this and that [episodes].” From the conversation I thought that most international students watch it, so I watched it, too.

Korean international students bond with one another or non-migrant Koreans by talking about and recommending Korean shows to each other and gossiping about Korean celebrities. One student refers to watching and talking about Korean shows as a “bonding culture” among Korean international students. On the other hand, only a very few of them watch American TV shows on a regular basis. In contrast to those who watch Korean shows because of other Korean international students’ infuence, Minjoo, a female undergraduate studying design who has lived in the United States for two years spends more time with her “American” friends and watch American TV shows because that is what she and her friends talk about. Minjoo said:

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The problem is that I have little to talk about with Koreans in Kakao Talk now because I need to watch American TV shows to talk with my American friends. So, I don’t know new phrases or idioms Koreans use and get frustrated. I used to watch Korean shows a lot when I had a Korean boyfriend. But as I hang out more with American friends, I watch what they watch. I watch all of them, including the older shows, Modern Family, Nikita . . . because they talk about them, I think, “I need to catch up.”

Korean international students’ consumption of Korean news and pop culture through new media is not just a passive adaptation to their racialization and marginalization experiences. Consumption can be also production (de Certeau 1984). One of Benedict Anderson’s insightful points in his hugely infuential work Imagined Community is his discussion on the role of reading newspaper—“this extraordinary mass ceremony: the almost precisely simultaneous consumption (‘imagining’) of the newspaper-as-fction” (35)—in constructing the nation as an imagined community.7 Anderson argues that the form of newspaper along with novels, the two most important media of print capitalism, works as a temporal container of simultaneously transpiring activities in the nation that are juxtaposed in its daily cover and marked by the date at the top of the newspaper, and thus creates the fctive chronological continuity of a national community which he calls “homogeneous, empty

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time” (24) in which all members of a national community can simultaneously participate in the linear and chronological progression of national history. We can also regard Korean international students’ consumption of Korean news and contemporary pop culture as an act of seeking out, belonging to, and imagining a community across the border that shares topics, opinions, imaginations, and sensibilities in common which is also integral to their ethnic identifcation and self-organizing as these following interviews show. Heejong, a male graduate in early thirties who has lived in the United States for two years reports: “I watch [Korean] television only when I am in the United States. I realized it when I went to South Korea last time because I found myself not watching it. Why? I guess it is because from here, I miss South Korea. In South Korea, I am busy because I have many friends and many people to meet up with, with a lot of things to do.” Hyunjoo, a female graduate in early thirties who has lived in the United States for eight years reports:

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I watch Korean comedy or other genres more than soap operas. Four or fve hours a week. Many times, I watch more than that. When I frst came to New York, I was so lonely that I watched almost all day. I was a little depressed. I didn’t even go out. I couldn’t work on papers [for school] although I had to. I guess I needed to laugh. I wanted to feel like I belong to and have fun with a group of people because I didn’t have a community. Even when I hung out with Americans, the conversation was shallow. . . . I think I needed a false impression that I belong to a community then.

Joonyoung, a male undergraduate in late twenties who has lived in the United States for fve years reports: “I feel comforted when I watch Korean shows or watch Koreans talk. When I see Real Men (a show about soldiers in the Korean army), I think of the hardship I had in the army. When I hear stories in Witch Hunting (a show about romantic relationships), I think, ‘I had the same worries.’” In his seminal work, Jurgen Habermas (1991) argues that a public sphere is a sphere where “private people come together as a public” (27) and engage in rational debates as “public use of their reason” to subject and restrain public authority to the standards of reason. We can see the far-reaching infuence of his discussion in many felds including transnational studies as testifed by celebrated concepts such as “diasporic public sphere” (Appadurai 1996). However, these theorizations of a public sphere in transnational social felds have not paid enough attention to racism in the country of residence and, in conjunction to that, have missed one of the most insightful moments in Habermas’ theory. Habermas (1991) argues that there is a specifc subjectivity that corresponds to such a public sphere: “Subjectivity, as the innermost core of the private, was always already oriented to an audience (Publikum)”

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(49). Such a subjectivity that is always—even when they are in their most private and solitary moments such as writing diary or letters—oriented to an audience guides the public use of reason in the public sphere. Where can immigrants or migrants fnd such an audience to which they are oriented, if they are excluded from the public sphere in the host society, for they are racially othered and marginalized? My research fnds that Korean international students in the United States stay constantly oriented and attuned to an audience in South Korean society to which they seek out to belong across the Pacifc through new media, while keeping detached and aloof like a tourist from the local society in which they physically reside. To the extent that they are marginalized and excluded as a racial other, and thus cannot develop meaningful social relationships in the United States, Korean international students keep aloof from both American and Korean American societies despite the length of their residence. This undergraduate student’s account of her boarding school life reveals where she and her Korean international student friends fnd their real audience to which they stay oriented. Hwasook, a female undergraduate in late twenties who has lived in the United States for thirteen years recalls how she and her friends took extreme measures to lose weight as part of their preparation to return to South Korea during summer breaks to attend SAT after-school programs. Their behavior appears as if they were grooming themselves in the backstage to appear to an audience. Meanwhile, Hwasook noted that she and her friends “didn’t care” how they lived and were seen in the United States: The biggest problem for female Korean international students is losing weight. We did everything to lose weight. I fainted twice because I didn’t eat. We did it because we didn’t care how we live in America, but we thought that we have to live a cool life for three months in the summer in South Korea. In the summer, we went to a SAT prep school and went to night clubs. We had to lose weight. It must’ve been weird to Americans to see already skinny girls trying desperately to lose weight. We started to work out 100 days before our departure date for South Korea. When there was only 30 days left, there was no other ways than to fast.

These student’s accounts also show where they fnd their real audience when they seek recognition for their achievements and for being a glamorous transnational elite and how seeking recognition from the real audience they are oriented to, in turn, orients their behavior and decisions in the United States as they learn English, decide on which school, or choose a place to work. Hoon, a male graduate in mid-twenties who studied in Canada since he was in sixth grade reports: “I applied only to American universities because they have ‘name values’ (in English) in South Korea and other places. I was

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accepted into Michigan, Johns Hopkins, and Cornell. My parents ‘nudged’ (in English) me to choose Cornell, taking it for granted because they could talk proudly to my grandparents and other Koreans.” Hyoyeon, a female graduate in mid-twenties who has lived in the United States for two years reports:

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When I frst came, I was passionate about learning English, trying to meet people and everything. Then, I lost steam gradually. About a year later, I really wanted to go back to South Korea, thinking “why am I here?” Then, this summer I went to South Korea for three months. Two months before I went back, maybe because I wanted to live up to expectations, I suddenly became passionate again about learning English, watching American shows, going to free English language classes and doing language exchanges.

Some students hope to work and live in America despite their “handicap” because they consider the United States a “major league.” Even when they aim at social achievements and recognition in American society, it can eventually be to seek recognition from the real audience in South Korean society. A cliché Koreans often use to express this effort is kŭmŭihwanhyang (or returning to hometown wearing golden clothes), where golden clothes signify high social status. Another saying that is less known but is much more revealing is kŭmŭiyahaeng (or walking around at night wearing golden clothes). A non-migrant Korean woman in early forties who works in the legal profession reported that Korean judges who have studied in the United States often use this saying to talk disapprovingly of their experiences of living in America. The saying implies that, just as one could not see and notice nice clothes worn at night in darkness, it would be futile to gain social status in American society since there is no audience to recognize it. These sayings register where Korean international students fnd their real audience. Likewise, Korean international students hide their shame from the real audience if they cannot meet the expectations and live up to the script of a successful study abroad. Some students choose to live here because they are less concerned with how they are perceived by Americans and rather not face the shame of failure in South Korea. Myungil, a male undergraduate in late twenties who met other students in an ESL program before he went college reports: It is better to make the decision quickly and go back to South Korea than extending your stay here for nothing. There are many who don’t go back because they are embarrassed . . . because, when they leave South Korea, they talk big to their parents, friends and others about their success. But it turns out that nothing is easy, English, TOEFL, school . . . I saw many people who don’t go back, being embarrassed.

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The other scene is always present in and constitutive of Korean international students’ lives and behavior as they stay oriented to the real audience. The real audience is constitutive of their uses of media as further discussed below.

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A Mediated Presentation of Self and Class Resentment Korean international students seek recognition for being a transnational elite from the real audience in South Korea at the same time making status claims for privilege and power for the purpose of class reproduction. Korean international students begin making status claims in the United States through new media by presenting themselves as transnational elites to Korean nationals in their digitally mediated cross-border social interactions and diasporic public spheres. I shall call this a “mediated presentation of self” as Jeffrey Goldfarb (2006) aptly terms it, though in a different theoretical context. Goldfarb (2006) uses the concept to provide an innovative framework to explain how people can create power for social change in the current new regime of media by synthesizing the theories of Hannah Arendt and Erving Goffman: Individuals who are connected through new media construct public spaces by interacting with one another as equals in their mediated presentation of self in everyday life, debate and defne social situations collectively, and “develop a capacity to act together.” While Goldfarb focuses on the front stage of mediated presentation of self in which individuals appear as democratic citizens forming a public, my research draws attention to the tactical practices to partition the front and backstages in Korean international students’ mediated presentation of self as transnational elites to their real audience in South Korea. Korean international students present themselves as a transnational elite who lives up to the imaginary script of having a successful study abroad in the eyes of Korean nationals. They manage this impression through tactical uses of media in mediated presentation of self. As non-migrant Koreans judge their friends’ lives in the United States by the presence of whites and other racial groups in social media, as discussed in chapter 5, Korean international students use associations with non-Koreans, and particularly with whites, as a transnational status symbol in their mediated presentation of self. As they ground their claim for transnational status on the power and prestige of the Global North, the Korean international students’ primary way of making a mediated presentation of self to Korean nationals is uploading in Facebook their pictures—taken in iconic places such as Time Square in New York City—which some of my interview subjects call “American-feeling pictures.” Inkyung, a female undergraduate who has lived in the United States for one year reports: “The Empire State building, the Statue of Liberty, Central park . . . I uploaded [pictures of] them in Facebook. For example, if I go

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to the Metropolitan museum, I pick a day to upload all the pictures, about 20 pictures, at once in Facebook.” Minkyung, a female graduate in early thirties who has lived in the United States for a year reports: “I am not on Facebook much. Once a week I upload pictures of places I visit. If I go to a restaurant downtown, I upload its pictures. Then, many click ‘Like’ crazily. One commented, ‘Is that a place from Sex and the City [referring to the popular TV show]?’ It wasn’t (smirks).” In selecting these types of pictures to advance their mediated presentation of self as transnational elites, in effect, keep their racial reality on the backstage while it produces an illusion of transparency. In this mechanism of systemic misrecognition across the border that is created in the last instance by the very act of status claim, even when Korean international students share their everyday life without intending to make status claims, their Korean national friends tend to take it as a status claim and become envious. Jungjae, a male graduate studying philosophy reports:

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I chatted with Korean friends over an instant messenger. We said that people in South Korea discuss Žižek (a world-renowned European philosopher) a lot, so I said “He came to my school once. When you see him in person, he is just an average scholar.” My friends got envious, and commented, “Wow, you can see somebody like him in front of a school building.”

On the other hand, the growing nationalist and class tension in South Korea between Korean international students and non-migrant Korean nationals about study aboard also infuences Korean international students’ uses of media, for they become aware of the resentment of non-migrant Korean nationals against them and abstain from exposing their privileged lives to Koreans. A non-migrant Korean woman in mid-twenties reports how nonmigrant Koreans can be very envious of Korean international students’ lives presented through Facebook: “She [referring to an international student] posts a lot of things like ‘I am eating something’ or ‘I am happy.’ One of my friends who is especially envious of it said, ‘I am so envious that I don’t want to see her Facebook anymore.’” Many Korean international students report that they are very cautious about communicating about their everyday life even with their friends in South Korea, because they worried that their friends would think that they are showing off their wealth and status. Meejin, a female undergraduate studying biology who has lived in the United States for three years said: “It is more comfortable to contact other international students than Korean friends because they have prejudices against international students, thinking that we live an easy life. So, I am worried that, if I contact them often in Kakao Talk, they would think I am not working hard.” Responding to the resentment, some seek to incorporate alternative images in their mediated presentation of self about themselves as international

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students who are often seen as a “spoiled child,” “escapee,” or “national traitor” in South Korean society. Heejoon, a male undergraduate in mid-twenties who has lived in the United States for four years reports: I do not talk to my Korean friends about my loneliness and diffculties in the United States because they think that I am just whining like a kid when I should feel lucky to study abroad. I hear that all other Korean international students get the same response as well. So, I post a lot in Facebook pictures of myself studying, to show how hard I study, like a selfe with an open book and a Red Bull drink in the library, and write “This is too hard. If I am good in English, I would get this done fast.”

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Other alternative images to counter the resentment include presenting themselves as transnational nationalist elites through spectacular diasporic nationalist events, as discussed in chapter 6. Some others report that they have stopped updating their status and uploading pictures in Facebook altogether as they became conscious of Korean nationals’ critique and resentful disapproval. Heejong, a male graduate in early thirties studying music who has lived in the United States for two years reports: “I was on Facebook a lot before, but almost stopped since coming to the United States because I am worried that, if I put up something, it could create misunderstandings even with those Koreans I know well.” Dara, a female graduate in early thirties who has lived in the United States for two years reports: I don’t do Facebook these days because of what people talk about. I hear all are worried that Koreans gossip about international students’ life. Even an international student’s having coffee can be something to gossip about among Koreans. It is likely that they talk negatively about it. Although I believe I am not targeted, I think that Koreans can see it as bragging, “show-off” (in English), or inconsiderate. I heard about one incident. One student posted a picture of having brunch after studying for a while, but Koreans were jealous and called it a show-off, and commented, “why do you put up pictures like that?”

Jungmin, a male graduate in late twenties who has lived in the United States for one year reports: I am not on Facebook much nowadays. I am cautious. I don’t think this way, but some people think studying abroad is a privileged life. I am worried that friends may think, “I am working so hard, but he is just having fun.” . . . I was actually envious before I became an international student. I know how Koreans feel. I was also envious, jealous and annoyed when I saw international student friends upload pictures of nice places in Boston and good food while I was working so hard in South Korea.

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Without seeing the presence of the social dynamics in the other scene in behavior, we cannot understand why Korean international students do or do not use new media the way they do. Media Tactics to Localize and Compartmentalize Social Circles

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Because of the racial and class dynamics that they experience simultaneously as a transnational elite and a racial other, transnational virtual spaces created by new media—particularly such widely used transnational social media spaces like Facebook which one student likens to “broadcasting to everyone”—can create a situation that is fraught with tension and discomfort for Korean international students. To address such tension and discomfort, Korean international students seek to selectively localize and compartmentalize their social relationships in the virtual space by using diverse tactics employing multiple media platforms, devices, languages, and others. Some students report getting the Facebook settings in such a way that different social circles have different levels of access to their Facebook. Others migrate to another social media platform like Instagram to upload pictures and share their everyday lives with, as one student puts, “a more familiar audience” only who mainly consists of their family, other Korean international students, and close friends who wouldn’t resent their privileged lives. This media migration practically aims at dividing their social circles largely into two groups: resentful Koreans who are mostly non-migrant Korean national friends and others who are mostly other Korean international student friends. It is, in effect, to erect digital walls among the virtual audience that is engendered by new media and new visibility across the border. To assign different social circles to different platforms is a tactic to deal with the class tension by compartmentalizing and localizing their social relationships and audience. Dara reports: These days I use Instagram a lot. It is related to what I said before. The reason I do social media is not to show off. It is about recording my life. In Facebook, even if all I want to do is to record my life, I also end up doing the other thing. But with Instagram I can just record my life because there are not many Korean users, and because it is not so open to everyone like Facebook. Unlike Facebook, a friend’s comment to my postings does not show up in others’ Instagram account. So, you can upload a picture of having brunch without broadcasting it to everyone as it is the case in Facebook. I do Instagram everyday as I used to do Facebook before. Someone asked why I stopped doing Facebook suddenly. They can think it is weird. I just said “I am busy.”

Many Korean international students use two phones, one for their uses in each country. They do so because they can afford them fnancially and to

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avoid the hassle of changing carrier and app settings whenever they cross the border. They can maintain two different accounts of the same social media platform such as Kakao Talk for each device and phone number, which allows them to connect with different groups of people with different devices. Meejin, a female undergraduate studying biology who has lived in the United States for three years, reports that she turns off the phone she uses in South Korea with her Kakao Talk account that connects with her Korean national friends when she leaves the country, and turns it on when she goes to South Korea over summer and winter breaks. By using two devices she achieves the effect of localizing and compartmentalizing her social circles:

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Really close international student friends belong to both my Kakao Talk accounts, but those I meet and see in South Korea are only in the Kakao Talk account in my Korean phone because they are not that close. Only really close friends know my [Kakao Talk] account with the phone I use in the United States because I don’t like contacting and texting a lot. I just click “Like” in Facebook with those who are not so close to me. So, those who are in Facebook only are those I contact and meet only when I go to South Korea. Other international students all have two phones and two phone numbers.

Choosing a language in social media is far from being natural or neutral for Korean international students. Rather, it is a very delicate tactical decision within the class and racial dynamics. While using English in Facebook is an important transnational elite status symbol as well as often a necessity in interacting with non-Korean speakers, many students abstain from using English in Facebook because they are aware of the class and nationalist resentment in South Korea. Even Minjoo, a female undergraduate studying design who is one of the very few who spends more time with non-Korean friends could not ignore the resentful eyes of Korean nationals though she has to use English to interact with her non-Korean friends and to avoid accentuating foreignness in Facebook. Minjoo chooses silence in Facebook because of the dilemma from being literally caught in between the class and racial dynamics, a situation created by new media: I write in Korean because I am embarrassed about using English. I thought, “Do I have to write in English just because I came to the United States?” I started feeling like I should write in English though because my friends complained, “I cannot understand you.” But I feel like I would be seen as showing off that I am in the United States because . . . when I saw others write in English [before I came to the United States], I thought, “Why is she using English which she is not good at any way?,” so . . . I just do not do Facebook (smirks).

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Korean international students’ choice of language between English, Korean, and another language in Facebook and other social media platforms is also a tactic to compartmentalize audience because choosing a language is choosing an addressee of enunciation that is limited by language barrier which one student calls a “target audience.” Korean international students abstain from complaining about American society or their school life in English in Facebook for fear that it would accentuate their foreignness and racialization in the eyes of Americans. Some students report seeing other Korean international students complain about their professors and non-Korean classmates in Korean in Facebook, although they say that they themselves would not do it for fear that non-Koreans could use apps to translate Korean. By using Korean, they erect a wall between Korean speakers and others. Jinyoung, a female undergraduate who is fuent in English reports: “I write in Korean [in Facebook] when I lament, and in English, when I talk about something good. I don’t know why.” Jiyoung, a female graduate in mid-twenties who has lived in the United States for seven years reports:

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I write half in Korean and half in English. I try to write mostly in English, but I write in Korean when I need to convey something delicate that can only be done in Korean, or things I shouldn’t say in English, like . . . complaints about New York, the subway, or something like that. If you complain about those things, people here would not like it, and frankly you would totally look like a foreigner. That’s why.

In short, the racial and class dynamics that Korean international students experience simultaneously as a transnational elite and a racial other shape their uses of media, but not passively. They actively respond to these dynamics by tactically deploying multiple social media platforms, devices, accounts, settings, languages, choices of images, and others. My respondents reported numerous personalized confgurations or combinations in deploying multiple devices and platforms. However, regardless of differences in confgurations, Korean international students aim at achieving a common goal, that is, to manage their journey of transnational class reproduction in transnational social felds fraught with racial and class dynamics by selectively localizing and compartmentalizing social relationships and make presentation of self as transnational elites. In so doing, regardless of whether they intended or not, they create opaqueness and the illusion of transparency across the border. CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have investigated Korean international students’ uses of new media in their transnational lives through a lens of simultaneity, contributing

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to a sociology of media that recognizes specifc capabilities of technology while, at the same time, being attentive to the actual uses of technology within social relations. I have demonstrated that new media has engendered a qualitatively new transnational life by showing Korean international students’ transnational families, long-distance relationships, and mobile communities of “study abroad clan.” On the other hand, I have analyzed how Korean international students use media tactically to deal with class and racial dynamics they face in their transnational lives. I have identifed various media tactics they employ to create opaqueness across the border for impression management and selectively localize and compartmentalize their social relationships to navigate social dynamics here and there simultaneously.

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NOTES 1. See Debray’s (1996) astute discussion on this confusion. 2. I thank Dr. Ruth H. Chung who was a discussant on my panel at the 2015 Association for Asian American Studies annual conference for bringing this to my attention. 3. Kakao Talk was frst introduced in March, 2010 in South Korea. It has quickly become very popular and surpassed SMS uses in South Korea. Most young Koreans use the application. In the frst quarter of 2014, the number of active users of Kakao Talk in South Korea was reported to be 36,350,000 (Kakao Corp. 2015), while the South Korean population is 50,801,000 in 2016. 4. See Madianou and Miller (2012) for a study that looks at how parents who are migrants seek to do such long-distance parenting for their kids they have left in the country of origin through media. 5. Psy himself was a Korean international student who is from a wealthy family and studied in Boston. As such, he can have been easily labeled as “spoiled kid” and “escapee.” In fact, the Korean drinking and party culture that he both proudly depicts and mocks in his Gangnam Style and other subsequent music videos targeting the global audience reveal a glimpse of the party culture of Korean international students’ community in Gangnam. 6. Although it is obvious, this point has not frmly inscribed in social science beyond media studies yet. Rather, communication is, though an important concept in social science, often captured by an idealistic and transcendental tendency with the materiality of communication being abstracted as if people communicate with telepathy. It is, in effect, unduly privileging and limiting agency to the category of subject and reproducing the dichotomy of subject and object as seen in such concepts as “inter-subjectivity.” See John Durham Peters (1999) for a genealogy and critique of the concept of communication. 7. “The signifcance of this mass ceremony—Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers—is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or

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millions) of others of whose existence he is confdent, yet of whose identities he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid fgure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?” (35), writes Anderson (1991). The subjectivity of the public sphere which is “always and already oriented to an audience” in Habermas’ conception is also shaped by none other than the practice of reading and discussing journals, newsletters, pamphlets and other print media in coffee shops and salons that address and hail a “reading public” (23) into existence.

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Conclusion

In May 2017, The Guardian ran a story about a controversy involving a Chinese international student. Yang Shuping, a female Chinese international undergraduate student, suddenly became a target of nationalist backlash in China because of her speech at the University of Maryland’s commencement, where she celebrated fresh air and “the fresh air of free speech” in the United States, in contrast to polluted air and, implicitly, the political state in China (Phillips 2017). While it is the common trope of international students to characterize the United States as a “land of opportunity” or “free,” implicitly othering their country of origin as “authoritarian” and “closed” in the Orientalist binary, Yang Shuping’s use of the trope as a sharp political critique of the Chinese government backfred, triggering Chinese nationalist sentiment. In response, Yang Shuping made a public apology for her comments and asked for forgiveness via her social media. Some angry Chinese were quoted in the article to have notably commented on social media, “Studying in the United States costs a lot of money, so where is the money coming from? She must come from a rich family. What on earth does her family do?” (Phillips 2017). Similar to South Korean society, this comment reveals class resentment of non-migrant Chinese against Chinese international students studying in the United States, and such sentiment feeds their nationalist backlash and creates a poor receptivity of Yang Shuping’s critique of the Chinese government. By contrast, in May 2012, the New York Times ran a story about Yang Rui, an English-speaking talk show host on China Central Television, who obtained a master’s degree in the United Kingdom and has a daughter studying in the United States, tweeted a nationalist and xenophobic message to his 820,000 followers: “The Ministry of Public Security must clean out foreign trash, arrest foreign thugs and protect innocent girls. . . . Behead the 189

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snakeheads, the unemployed Americans and Europeans who come to China to make money, traffc in people and mislead the public by encouraging them to emigrate” (Jacobs 2012). As a public fgure, Rui expressed his support for the Chinese government policy. His tweet transpired amid the growing nationalism and the government’s crackdown on undocumented residents in China. Considering that the ethnic identifcation of migrants including international students is an adaptive response to racism, it is not surprising that Rui has expressed his nationalist disdain for “Americans and Europeans.” His vociferous stance may also help avert any nationalist critique in China of his own education in Europe and his decision to send his daughter to study in the United States. Ironically, in the eyes of Chinese, it may be Rui’s degree from and experiences in the United Kingdom that give him credibility to talk about “Americans and Europeans who come to China” in a xenophobic nationalist manner. It may be easy to understand such incidents merely in terms of nationalist tension among countries without looking at specifc social dynamics of class, race, ethnicity, and gender within each local society that condition behaviors of transnational actors. Such a superfcial understanding is becoming increasingly problematic especially given the recent surge of nativist right-wing populisms and white nationalism against globalization that point at “global elites” as a source of resentment. It calls for analyses of the transnational interlocking of class, race, ethnicity, and nation in the current conjuncture. This research provides a perspective to move beyond this oversight with a case study of South Korean international students in the United States. Based on in-depth interviews of Korean international students, non-migrant Koreans, and other relevant individuals in South Korea and in New York City, this research has examined how international students’ social statuses can be different in the United States and in the country of origin and the ways in which international students’ multiple social statuses can simultaneously shape their transnational lives and practices. My main argument is that Korean international students are part of transnational elite social groups in the making. Korean international students occupy disparate and incongruent social statuses simultaneously as they are entangled in social dynamics in South Korea and in the United States. They are a racialized other in the United States while being a bearer of Global North cultural capital who tends to be well positioned to become ruling elites in South Korea, although acquiring that elite status is far from being guaranteed, and it depends on bitter social struggles. These two incongruent simultaneous statuses shape their transnational lives and practices such as transfer of knowledge, transmission of messages on race, diaspora-building, and daily uses of transnational media among others, generating new dynamics and inequalities in both societies.

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More specifcally, I have reported in chapter 1 that Korean international students come to study in the United States to acquire cultural capital as a strategy for transnational social reproduction, responding to structural changes in South Korea’s domestic class dynamics and neoliberal globalization: Many South Korean middle-class families seek to step up their investments as a response to intense class competition for education, largely due to democratization of higher education that gave the Korean working class an unprecedented access to academic credentials in the 1990s, and neoliberal globalization of the economy that demanded and preferred those educated in the United States and fuent in English in its labor market. While the value of undergraduate degrees from American schools has recently declined in South Korea, the strong hegemony of American academia still propels and undergirds study abroad as a strategy for social reproduction, where the superiority of a graduate degree from American universities over a graduate degree from Korean universities is frmly maintained. As far as students who come to the United States as undergraduates are concerned, they are often those who could not attend a top-tier Korean university, and they come to study despite the stereotype of “escapees” because going to a less prestigious Korean university is practically considered a sure path to failure in social reproduction in South Korean society. For the very same reason, some students come to study primarily to avoid being seen as a failure and bringing shame to their family in South Korea. For them, coming to the United States is less a strategy for social reproduction but a strategy to exit South Korean society. I have also observed that many Korean international students eventually adjust their immigration status, become transnational migrants, and—though depending on labor market demands and immigration policy—constitute a signifcant portion of an emergent transnational elite social group, blurring the boundary between the transnational reproduction of domestic classes and the production of transnational social groups. In chapters 2 and 3, I have demonstrated that Korean international students are racialized and marginalized and often derogated as “FOBs” even by Korean Americans in the United States. In chapter 2, I have examined the racialization and marginalization of Korean international students in New York City, focusing on their relationship with English language. My research militates against a simplistic understanding of learning and speaking English as just a technical process of acquisition and debunks the common fallacy that Korean international students’ isolation and marginalization are simply due to their limited English profciency. I have traced colonial inferiority and desire for English profciency in Seoul to racial dynamics in New York City, drawing on Kim’s (2008) framework of imperial racial formation. I have shown that the colonial and racial dynamics here and there are intertwined with and constitutive of the entire spectrum of Korean international students’ desiring

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to speak, to learn, and to practice the English language. Being fraught with relations of power, tension, and emotion, their relationship with English is a major instance of racialization of Korean international students. In chapter 3, I have examined the racialization of Korean international students by analyzing a specifc way in which class, race, and ethnicity intersect in their lives in the United States. Korean international students negotiate and oscillate between ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation as their two response modes to racism. In the United States, Korean international students take ethnic identifcation and solidarity as the primary strategy to avoid racialization, constructing ethnicity through distinctions from other ethnic groups like Chinese, building ethnic social capital, and engaging in diaspora-building activities. I have also identifed a counter tendency of ethnic dis-identifcation in the form of intra-ethnic othering among Korean students to distance themselves from “FOBs” because of the racial stigma attached to it. At the same time, the Korean international students’ class privilege mediates and shapes ethnic identifcation and dis-identifcation respectively in the form of ethnic social capital such as Korean alumni and occupation-based networks or conspicuous consumption. All these dynamics culminate in Korean international students’ delicate balancing acts between tapping into ethnic social capital that is crucial for social reproduction and distancing from the racial stigma of coethnics through conspicuous consumption to simultaneously avoid racialization and achieve social reproduction. Following up on the discussion of transnational social reproduction in chapter 1, I have reported in chapter 4 that there are class conficts between Korean international students and non-migrant Koreans in South Korea because their transnational social reproduction redistributes power and wealth. I have conceptualized the conficts as struggles over cross-border conversion of cultural capital from the Global North into local power and wealth, challenging an implicit assumption that cultural capital transcends the border in literature on transnational social reproduction. I have also argued that the class conficts mediate transfer of knowledge in general, providing a corrective to the myth of “free fow” in the literature on knowledge transfer. Focusing on the South Korean corporate and academic scenes, I have shown that the class conficts take a form of messy struggles in social interactions between current and former international students who seek to enhance the local value of their cultural capital by valorizing the presumed superiority of the Global North and their non-migrant coethnics who dismiss, put down, or mock such claims. Having identifed the incongruent multiple statuses of Korean international students in the United States and in South Korea, in the second part of the book I have found that these two social statuses shape their transnational lives and practices simultaneously. In chapter 5, I have investigated how Korean

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international students communicate with non-migrant Koreans about race and racism in the United States. I have shown that Korean international students tend to hide their racial reality in the backstage for impression management to aid their status claim, for their incongruent status as a racialized other who experiences structural injustices in the United States contradicts their status claims as a transnational elite living up to the racialized imaginary script of South Koreans. In chapter 6, through a lens of simultaneity I have examined that, strategically responding to their multiple statuses, Korean international students actively participate in diaspora-building to simultaneously avoid racialization in the United States and subdue class and nationalist resentment in South Korea. Looking at their various diaspora-building activities, such as campaigns relating to the legacy of the Japanese colonization of Korea, I have criticized the diaspora-building of Korean international students as a major vehicle of politics of racialized transnational elites that reproduce social inequalities. Consequently, despite their racialization in the United States, Korean international students often end up becoming agents of neoliberal globalization while obscuring their racial reality and endorsing the presumed superiority of the United States. Lastly, in chapter 7, I have investigated how the multiple statuses shape Korean international students’ uses of new media in living their transnational lives, contributing to sociology of media. I have reported that new media has enabled a qualitatively new transnational life as demonstrated by Korean international students’ transnational families, long-distance relationships, and mobile communities of “study abroad clan.” Furthermore, I have analyzed various media tactics Korean international students employ to create opaqueness and an illusion of transparency across the border for impression management and selectively localize and compartmentalize their social relationships to navigate social dynamics here and there simultaneously. In short, this book theoretically registers the racialized transnational elites who are neglected in a conceptual interstice by both studies on immigration and global migration that focus on underprivileged migrants and studies on emergent transnational elite groups that ignore racial difference within. Tracing the making of the racialized transnational elites, this book illuminates a mechanism in which the multiple processes across the border—transnational social reproduction, knowledge transfer, the colonial hierarchy between the Global North and South, diasporic nationalism, and cross-border communication on race—are interlocked with and constitutive of one another. I contend that this is an important vantage point to understand the ongoing social transformation and reconfgurations of class, race, ethnicity, and nation under globalization, and thus to analyze social inequalities under globalization and the more problematic nativist backlash against it. This work inscribes the

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border in transnational processes such as transfer of knowledge, conversion of cultural capital and diasporic public sphere, the discussions of which often seem to fall prey to the myth of “free fow” or cross-border transparency through transnational media. In so doing, this research contributes to advancing the concept of immigrants and migrants’ simultaneity or simultaneous embeddedness in multiple societies which is considered crucial for conceptual innovation for globalization and transnational studies, as discussed in chapter 5. As Levitt and Glick Schiller’s (2004) theorization that employs the concept merely to reconcile assimilation and transnational ties exemplifes, the preoccupation with the assimilation theory tends to confne the simultaneity concept’s analytic potentials. I break loose the concept’s fxed ties to the assimilation theory for its analytic potentials to analyze migrants’ dynamic transnational processes. Advancing the conception of simultaneity entails overcoming a tendency to romanticize and reduce the sending country to a monolithic ethnic entity with regards to which migrants’ sole concern is their identity while being keenly attentive to social dynamics of class, race, and gender when it comes to the host country. We should point out that this tendency is partly because the Global North is still the center of global knowledge production and because the majority of scholars on globalization, immigration, and transnational studies who are active in the Global North are less familiar with societies in the Global South. Then, the limit of this analytical perspective—and probably Euro-centrism in general—is not just an epistemological problem that could be easily corrected, for example, by adopting a transnational lens. Rather, it is fundamentally a political and material one that requires a more democratic global institutional and scholarly reconfguration to address the global hegemony of the Global North in knowledge production to give an equal say to scholars in the Global South. An in-depth discussion in academia on this institutional and historical aspect of the theoretical limitation in social inquiry is much in order. Taking a critical perspective of social science, the main fgure of Korean international students that this research has portrayed is a political subject that one may call “today’s comprador” who takes a part in inequalities and domination despite one’s own subordination or a reactionary actor that translates their experience of racism into essentialist ethnic nationalism in their country of origin. However, international students are ambiguous beings as they can also be a new emancipatory and transformative political subject bridging social movements across the border. As Yang Shuping’s trouble that began with a commencement speech and ended with a nationalist backlash in China illustrates, the predicament of being trapped in the double backlash from both sides of the border—racialization in the United States and class and nationalist resentment in their country of origin—may be intensifying, pushing Asian

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international students and high-skilled migrants to the frontline of ongoing struggles over globalization to determine the future global and transnational reconfguration of race, class, ethnicity, nation, and coloniality. To continuously trace the making or unmaking of racialized transnational elites as a transnational social group will be a bellwether that points in the direction of history. Asian international students and other racialized transnational elites have choices. If Asian international students want to change the conditions for themselves and toward a more democratic and egalitarian society, it would be important to understand the mechanism I have examined in this research in which they are caught up and that they reproduce through their own daily practices, regardless of whether they intended to or not. Notably, many Korean international students study in other Asian countries such as China, Singapore, and the Philippines although this work focuses on students in the Global North, as represented by the United States, because the region still commands intellectual hegemony in South Korea. While North America and Europe are the primary destinations for those seeking graduate degrees, many Korean students from working- and/or middle-class families select countries like Singapore or the Philippines and the Asian satellites of American or British international schools as relatively affordable options for language programs, secondary education, or undergraduate degrees (Kim 2010). Demonstrating fexible family strategies for social reproduction, some of my respondents fnished their secondary education in international schools in Asia before coming to the United States for their advanced degree in the Global North. Future research can explore how the intellectual hegemony of the Global North shapes the relationship among international students who have studied in different regions or whether the fexible strategies that combine intra-regional and extra-regional study abroad reproduce or challenge such intellectual hegemony. There is a lot at stake politically in taking the vantage point of racialized transnational elites who are left out in the conceptual interstice and tracing their lives across the border through a lens of simultaneity, which is to move beyond the home society/Global North-centric perspective and take the irreducibility of race, class, and ethnicity seriously. Registering theoretically this transnational fgure that has brought an enormous change, for one, to the U.S. immigration yet has been seriously understudied thus far redresses the conceptual defciency that clouds our analytic lens to yield an adequate understanding of the current conjuncture characterized by social inequalities under globalization and the more problematic nativist backlash. Moreover, it enables us to see that one and the same transnational process can cause heterogeneous social consequences simultaneously in multiple societies. This new perspective is crucial to moving beyond the impasse and false dichotomy of “beyond the nation-state” and “nations matter,” the two normative stances

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on globalization that are rooted in the obsolete modern political projects of emancipations and becoming increasingly inadequate today with a new project yet to come. It creates a void in which the discontents from social inequalities under globalization have degenerated into the nativist backlash. There should be a new robust political project to replace the outdated ones. A shared understanding of the complexity of problems in globalization as synchronously multisited, multifaceted, and multivalent is, though far from being suffcient, indispensable for informed conversations among societies across the border that face connected and yet heterogeneous local consequences of globalization. It is, in turn, integral to formulating an adequate normative program to build a democratic transnational solidarity against social inequalities under globalization and harness and organize the discontents in globalization to the right side of history. I hope that this book can initiate such conversations in the academia and social movements on both sides of the border to engage, dialogue about, and develop a shared understanding.

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Index

Abelmann, Nancy, 30, 43, 67, 69n6, 77 accents, signifcance of, 66 acculturation, 21, 29, 57, 62, 121; Fresh Off the Boat (FOB) and, 77; intraethnic othering and, 79–80; lack of, 39, 63; othering dynamics and, 77 Aihwa Ong, 22, 26, 36, 73, 82, 138 American colleges: degree in, signifcance of, 5–6, 21–23, 25–26, 31; PhD programs and signifcance in, 31–33; See also study abroad Anderson, Benedict, 138, 177, 188n7 anti-Asian racism, 67 anti-colonial nationalism, 159, 160 Arendt, Hannah, 136, 181 Asian Americans, 48, 61, 87n2; racialization, as “forever foreigner,” 65, 73, 78 assimilation, 3, 36, 123; criticism from transnationalism, 137; preoccupation with, 115–16, 194; sense of, 62; and simultaneity, relationship between, 7–8; status of, 87n2; transnationalism criticizing, 137; into United States, 52, 65, 121; “whitewashed” and, 76–77 Australia, 19n3 Balibar, Etienne, 4, 19n5, 45, 136, 161nn1, 8

“bananas,” 80–81 Bannon, Stephen K., 1, 3 Basch, Linda, 161n2 Beck, Ulrich, 135 Biao Xiang, 22, 40n3 Bilecen, Basak, 92 bonding culture, of Korean international students, 175–81 Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, 46 Bourdieu, Pierre, 10, 22, 69n6, 93, 94 Calhoun, Craig, 135 Canada, 19n3, 21, 22 candle light demonstration, 154 Castles, Stephen, 69n2 Ch’ilmak ch’iljang (Seven Acts and Seven Chapters), 52–53 China, 13; emigration as means of social inequality in, 22 Cho, Grace M., 158 The Chosunilbo (South Korean newspaper), 31, 146 Chung Hee, Park, 157 class consciousness, 83 class fractions, 40n1 colonial history and imperial border, 45–46 colonialism, 6, 14, 16, 18n2, 34, 107, 108, 132, 193; history, and imperial

209

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border, 45–46, 49; imperialist racial formation and, 43, 44, 50, 56, 64–66; inferiority, and desire for whiteness and English profciency, 50–54, 69, 191; new diasporic nationalism and, 134, 136, 152, 156–59 colorblind racism, 46 colorblind society slogan, 46 communication, signifcance of, 187n6 consumption, 82; conspicuous, 82–84 coolie stigma, 73, 82, 83, 85 cosmopolitan striving, 69n6; and presentation of self, 120–25 covert racism, 60 critical transnational perspective, need for, 34 cronyism, 74–75 cross-border transmission and translation, about race and racism, 113–14; dis/appearance of race over border and, 119–30; in national and multicultural language, 130–31; simultaneous multiple statuses and, 114–17; social remittance reframing through simultaneity and, 117–19 cultural capital, 10, 22, 89; conversion to economic capital, 94, 109; cosmopolitan experiences as, 123; education effcacy as, 69n6; globalization and, 161n3; individual competition within and, 109–10; of international students, inscribing border in, 93–98; overseas Chinese and, 82; status claim versus rejection and, 98–109 cultural differences, signifcance of, 141 cultural racism, 45 Daniels, Roger, 69n4 Dan Wang, 91, 109 Davidson, Alastair, 69n2 Debray, Régis, 187n1 decolonization, 45, 136, 138, 153, 160 “degree-caste system,” 24 departure meeting, 175

diaspora-building, 8–9, 75–76, 133–39; approving of, 137–38; critical view of, 138; and nationalism, as simultaneous response to race and class, 142–52; of racialized transnational elites, 139–42, 152–56 digital diasporas, 163, 166, 173 Dirlik, Arif, 37, 138 discrimination, 12, 14, 26, 106, 126–27; anti-Asian, 78; ethnic dis/ identifcation and, 74, 75, 81, 88n4; imperialist racial formation and, 43, 46–49, 59, 67; new diasporic nationalism and, 133, 136, 138, 161n1; reverse, 46; South Korean racial ideology and, 57; against women, 126 domestication, of study abroad, 30–31 domestic competition, 140–41 Duara, Prasenjit, 161n7 electronic media, impact on social behavior, 164–65 English profciency: colonialism and, 50–54, 69, 191; hierarchy, among Korean students in New York City, 54–56; importance of, 27–28, 35; resentment over, 97–98, 101, 102 escapee, 24, 30, 122, 129, 183, 187n5, 191 Espiritu, Yen Le, 34, 98, 119 ethnic identifcation, 71; class mediating balancing acts of ethnic disidentifcation and, 81–86; intra-ethnic othering and, 76–81; as primary strategy to avoid racialization, 72–76 ethnic identity, embracing, 130–31 ethnic solidarity, 71, 72, 74–76, 79; and ethnic identifcation, 85 European apartheid, 161n1 Facebook, 169, 174, 184–86 Faist, Thomas, 92 Fanon, Frantz, 153 fctive ethnicity, 72, 152

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FitzGerald, David, 132n2 Flexible Citizenship (Ong), 22 FOB. See Fresh Off the Boat (FOB) France, 19n3 Fresh Off the Boat (FOB), 6, 8, 15, 66, 76–79, 114, 120–21; presentation of self and, 124

hegemony, of U.S. academia, 29–35 Held, David, 134–35, 153 “hidden injuries of race,” 79 Hong Kong, 22, 95, 141; study abroad as strategy for class reproduction in, 23, 24 Hyunjung Shin, 43, 82

Germany, 19n3 Geun-hye, Park, 157 Gilroy, Paul, 69n3 Glenn, Evelyn Nakano, 69n2 Glick Schiller, Nina, 7, 114, 115, 117, 132n1, 194 global class, 35 globalization, 19n4, 105, 143; challenges, to democracy, 134–35; colonialism and, 45, 136; cultural capital and, 161n3; diasporic nationalism and, 153; of domestic politics, 154; nation-state and, 135–36; as second age of modernity, 135; studies, 9–10; study abroad as transnational strategy in, 22–29 Global North, 5, 9, 17, 18n2, 19n3, 45; cultural capital and, 90, 93–95, 98, 99, 107; moral authority granting to, 158; presumed superiority of, 103– 105, 107, 114, 128, 130, 142, 143, 152–53, 155; privilege of residing in, 156 Global South, 3, 5, 18n2, 34, 35, 45, 115, 118, 136, 138, 151, 152, 194 Goffman, Erving, 8, 87n2, 114, 123, 151, 164, 181 Goldfarb, Jeffrey, 181 The Guardian (newspaper), 189 Guglielmo, Thomas A., 47 Gurley, Akai, 161n9

imagined community, 72, 152, 177, 188n7 Imagined Community (Anderson), 177 immigrant investor program, 26, 40n2 Immigration and Nationality Act (1965), 36, 48 immigration and race, relationship between, 47 Imperial Citizens (Kim), 49 imperialist racist formation and English language, 43–44; beyond black and white binary and U.S. national boundary and, 47–49; colonial inferiority and desire for whiteness and, 50–54; impact on academic life, 63–68; in New York City, 54–56; social segregation and racialization and, 59–63; struggle to speak English and, 57–59 Incheon, 40n5 India, 13 Instagram, 184 internalized racism, 6, 43, 65, 66, 76, 77 intra-ethnic othering, 65, 71; ethnic dis/ identifcation and, 76–81 isolation, 12, 44, 56, 58, 60, 63, 68, 80, 191; social, 63, 80

Habermas, Jurgen, 135, 178 Hall, Stuart, 69n5 Hankyoreh (Korean newspaper), 131 Hardt, Michael, 69n3 Hattam, Victoria, 72

Jacobson, Matthew Frye, 48 Japanese identity, perception on, 73–74 Jaworsky, Nadya, 139 Jiyeon Kang, 30 Jongyoung Kim, 33, 111n2 Kakao Talk, 167–70, 174, 185, 187n3 Kapur, Devesh, 132n2 Kastoryano, Riva, 161n4

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KEEP. See Korean Education and Exposure Program (KEEP) Kim, Nadia Y., 44, 49, 50, 119 KIWA. See Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance (KIWA) knowledge transfer, 10, 91–92; See also cross-border transmission and translation, about race and racism; cultural capital Korean American Scientists and Engineers Association (KSEA), 74–75 Korean American society, 6, 11–13, 29, 36, 119, 176, 179, 191; ethnic dis/ identifcation and, 75–77, 79–81, 84, 87n1; imperialist racial formation and, 43, 54, 55, 65; new diasporic nationalism and, 132, 134, 142, 143, 153, 155, 156, 158–60, 162n10; roots of, 158 Korean Chinese, 82, 88n4 Korean Education and Exposure Program (KEEP), 159 Korean pride, from racial awareness, 130–31 Korean Resource Center, 162n10 Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance (KIWA), 159 KSEA. See Korean American Scientists and Engineers Association (KSEA) Lee, Jenny J., 43 Levitt, Peggy, 7, 92, 114, 115, 117, 118, 132n1, 139, 194 Liang, Peter, 161n9 long-distance nationalism, 138 long-distance parenting, through new media, 168–69, 187n4 long-distance relationship, 169–70 Lyons, Terrence, 154 Madianou, Mirca, 187n4 “mail-order bride,” 165 Mandaville, Peter, 154 marginalization, 56, 58, 63, 123, 179; class confict and, 96; as detrimental

to academic performances, 67; ethnic identifcation to cope with, 72 Marx, Karl, 152 McLuhan, Marshall, 164 memoir genre, 147 Meyrowitz, Joshua, 164–65 Mezzadra, Sandro, 69n2 Miller, Daniel, 187n4 Minkwon Center and Nodutdol, 159 Misaeng (TV show), 98 Missy USA (online platform), 155 model minority, 48, 73 NAKASEC. See National Korean American Service and Education Consortium (NAKASEC) nationalist activities, of Korean international students, 146; views on, 147 National Korean American Service and Education Consortium (NAKASEC), 162n10 nation-people, 161n7 Nations Matter (Calhoun), 135 nation-state, 9, 45, 134, 154; globalization and, 135–36 Negri, Antonio, 69n3 Neilson, Brett, 69n2 neoliberal globalization, 23–24 new media, 163–64; digitally mediated transnational lives and, 165–73; toward sociology of media and, 164–65; uses, within racial and class dynamics, 173–87 newspaper, reading of, 177–78, 187– 88n7 New York City, 14, 28, 161n6; English profciency hierarchy among Korean students in, 54–56; racial dynamics in, 64 New York Times (newspaper), 189 New Zealand, 26 non-migrants, 5–12, 79, 189, 190, 192–93; cross-border transmission and translation and, 113–16, 118–25, 129–31, 132n3; cultural capital and

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Index

knowledge transfer conficts and, 89–104, 106–10, 111n2; imperialist racial formation and, 52, 54; new diasporic nationalism and, 140, 142, 144–46, 151, 152, 155, 156; new media and, 169, 173, 177, 180–82, 184; resentment of, 125–28; transnational social reproduction and, 21, 26, 27, 29, 31– 34, 38, 39 No Sense of Place (Meyrowitz), 164 OiYan Poon, 162n9 Omi, Michael, 45, 46, 69n1

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Park, So Jin, 69n6 perceptive misrecognition, 128–30 Peters, John Durham, 187n6 “politics from afar”. See digital diasporas post-national citizenship, 134 Prashad, Vijay, 69n3 presentation of self, theory of, 123–25 privileged migrants, 4–5 Psy, 171, 187n5 Pu, Sylvia Shi, 82 public sphere, signifcance of, 178–79 Pyke, Karen, 65, 71, 76–77, 87n2 racial discomfort, 64–65 racial formation, defnition of, 45 racialization: defnition of, 69n1; of Korean international students. See imperialist racist formation and English language; and selforganizing, 174–75 racialized social systems, 46 racialized transnational elites, 4–7; politics of, 152–60 racial/racialized other, 4, 8, 64, 114, 117, 131, 133, 174, 179, 184, 186, 190, 193 racial remittance, 92, 118 real audience, of Korean International students, 178–81 resentment, 3–5, 9, 15, 16, 54, 84, 189, 190, 193, 194; cross-border

213

transmission and translation and, 117, 122; cultural capital and knowledge transfer conficts and, 90, 95–99, 101, 104–106, 110; and mediated presentation of self, 183; new diasporic nationalism and, 133, 141–45, 147, 151, 152, 155, 156, 160; new media and, 182, 185; of non-migrants, 125–30; transnational social reproduction and, 37–39 Rey Chow, 138 Sangsokcha (The Heirs) (Korean drama), 53–54 Sassen, Saskia, 164 self, mediated presentation of, 181–82 self-negation, 62 simultaneity, 113, 132n1; assimilation and, 7–8; as being/being, 8; as being/ belonging, 7; civil society in host country and South Korean society and, 150–51; diasporic nationalism and, 133, 142–52; of multiple statuses, 114–17; social remittance reframing through, 117–19; See also new media Singapore, 141 Sixteen Candles (flm), 78 Smith, Michael Peter, 132n1 social capital, 23, 71, 74, 85, 86, 93, 95, 96, 118, 171, 172, 175, 192 social circles, localizing and compartmentalizing, 184–86 social exclusion, 45, 59–60, 73–75, 136, 137; international student groups to counter, 74 social inclusion, 58; and kindness, 58 social inequalities, 6, 15–17, 22–23, 34, 39, 135, 160, 193 socializing/socialization, 11, 44, 54, 58, 61, 73, 76, 80, 85, 86, 171; with Americans, signifcance of, 68 socially being and simultaneity, 117 social media, use of, 166–67 social remittances, 92; reframing, through simultaneity, 117–19

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Index

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social segregation, 56; and impact on English language, 68; as natural, 77; and racialization, 59–63; unpleasant and hurtful experiences of, 64 sociology, of information technology, 164 Sohyun An, 43 South Korean Ministry of Personal Management, 109 spoiled kid, 73, 84–85, 127, 183, 187n5 status claim versus rejection: in South Korean academic circles, 102–109; in South Korean corporate circles, 98–102 study abroad: domestication of, 30–31; public declaration of devaluation of, 31; signifcance of, 34–35; as transnational strategy in globalization, 22–29; See also American colleges study abroad clan: and domestic clan, conficts between, 95–96, 99–100, 106–108; transnational mobile community of, 170–73 subjectivity and public sphere, 178–79, 188n7 Syngman Rhee, 157 tacit knowledge, 91–92 Takeyuki Tsuda, 115, 116 Tran Dang, 65, 71, 76–77, 87n2 transnational capitalist class, 35 transnational family, 167–69 transnationalism, defnition of, 161n2 transnational managerial and professional elites, becoming, 35–39 transnational nationalism, 161n4 transnational social felds, 139–41 transnational social reproduction, 94–95, 111; local class conficts and, 95–98

transnational solidarity, 15–18 transpacifc professional-managerial class, 138 Trump, Donald, 1 underprivileged migrants, 5 United Kingdom, 19n3, 21 United States, 19n3; citizenship, views on, 142–43, 145 Waters, Johanna L., 5, 22, 24, 40n1, 93–94 way of being and way of belonging, distinction between, 115, 117 WeChat, 174 Weiss, Robert S., 13 whining, 127–29, 183 whiteness, 129; colonial inferiority and desire for, 50–54; constitutive outside of, 49, 69n5; desire for, 121– 22; in United States, construction of, 47–48 white-over-black racial ideology, 49, 52–53, 73 “whitewashed,” 76, 77 “wild geese families” strategy, 27, 28 Winant, Howard, 45, 46, 69nn1–2 Woman Chosun (Korean magazine), 146 Yang Rui, 189–90 Yang Shuping, 189 Yellow Peril, fear of, 1– 3, 48 YKU. See Young Koreans United (YKU) Yoon Han Bong, 162n10 Young Koreans United (YKU), 162n10 Zamora, Sylvia, 118

Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

About the Author

Copyright © 2020. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Sung-Choon Park currently teaches sociology at New York City College of Technology, City University of New York (CUNY).

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Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.

Copyright © 2020. Lexington Books. All rights reserved. Park, Sung-Choon. Korean International Students and the Making of Racialized Transnational Elites, Lexington Books, 2020.