Knowledge, Science, and Values: A Program for Scientific Philosophy 9789004457683, 9004457682

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KNOWLEDGE, SCIENCE, AND VALUES

POZNAN STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES VOLUME 6X

f:D!TORS Krzysztof Bnedtczyn (aS>istant editor)

Krzysztof btstowski

.Jeny Bnezhiski

L is a good for z. although there is no such v in respect of which x, is and x 1 is not a good for z. For example. if one of two books is a good for z because it is instructive and entertaining and the other book. while equally instructive. does not amuse or being equally amusing is not instructive. the former is a greater good for z than the latter. Since if the latter is a good for z in respect of one of the parameters (being infonnative or entertaining) then the former is a good as 'vvell. but not rewrsely. A tool that can serye many purposes is a greater good than a tool whose applications are limited to a single one. The appliance that is practical and beautiful is a greater good than the one which is only beautiful or only practical. Whenever the good x 1 is greater than the good x> x, can be replaced by X 1 • This kind of sup p 1anti n g of smaller goods by greater ones seems to be characteristic of goods. contrary to quantities. w·here a similar substitution of greater for smaller usually cannot take place. It is common with regard to goods: after all. we prefer what is better to what is \YOrse. and choose a lesser evil whenever possible. T\\0 different absolute goods X 1 and x, arc nc\'er in relation of equality. majority or minority. as it is impossible to build a set of parameters so that the expressions D, (x,. x 1 • z) and D,(-,,. x,. z). which define the goods x, and x> would be in relation of implication in one or the other direction.

Hmr to Cons/mel the Log1c o(Croods''

171

This may seem to run counter some commonly held views. e.g. when a piano prelude and a symphony arc compared as absolute goods. Acknowledging the perfect beauty of the two pieces in respect of themselves. we would be inclined to take into account its scale. its powerful sounds and the richness of the harmonic structure. to consider the symphony as a greater good. however such an evaluat10n refers to goods not on their own account but with respect to their significance "ithin the sphere of culture. Goods that are absolute in one aspect can be referred to a parameter in another aspect in which they may be compared \Yith other goods. In the cases where the expressions D 1 (x 1 • y. z) and D2 (x:- y. z) are logically independent. goods x 1 and x 2 are i nco m par a b I e. For example. in many cases health and prosperity are such goods. Yet it may well be that someone abandons his property in order to save his health. while someone else may lose his health in pursuit of wealth: seemingly. those people value one of these goods higher than the other. Incomparable goods cease to be such when the range of parameters is narrowed down. i.e. when a part instead of the whole of the value-forming relation is taken into consideration. Depending on how this is done either one or the other of the two originally incomparable goods will be regarded as major, or else they \Yill be considered to be of equal value. For instance. brilliance and persistence are incomparable goods in respect of prosperity in life: both are a means to reaching it although each serves this end differently. If a person tries to gain prosperity through a brilliant success. his brilliance becomes the major good for him. On the other hand. a person who is more concerned with a sound basis for his success will ascribe a higher value to persistence. Let two goods. x 1 determined by /) 1 (x 1 •• v. z) and xc determined by D 2 (x 2 • y. z). be incomparable. They can be made comparable if for either of them. e.g. x 1 • there exists such D 1'(x 1 , v. z) that \\Ould imply D 1 (x 1 • y, z) and at the same time would not be logically independent of the valueforming relation for x 2 . 3. We assume that among comparable goods there exist the greatest and the s m a II est ones. The greatest good in respect of parameters y for a person z will be defined as good x determined by the value-fanning relation D(x, .v. z), which is implied in respect of parameters y by any other value relation Dn(Xn, y. z) determining good Xn comparable with good x 1 . The greatest good is the good that satisfies the most needs of the evaluating subject in respect of given parameters. An example of such a good would be a handbook containing the most accurate information on a particular branch of knowledge, or an architectural design fully specifying the process of building, or a model of a car that is perfectly suitable for the purpose. the demands of the country and the requirements of economy. On the other hand. the smallest good in respect of parameters y is a good x'.

172

II. The lf'orld o(Hwnan f ·a lues ond .Vonns

determined by the value-forming relation D'(x'. y. z) which implies any other value-forming relation D 11 (X11 • y. z) determining good x" comparable to good x'. The smallest among the comparable goods is the one that satisfies the least of the needs and is supplanted by other comparable goods: the torch in comparison with any other lightening implements. the club in comparison with any other "·capon. or \Vicker shoes as the most primitive kind of shoe. 4. Two alternative goods. x 1 and x:> constitute a sum of goods "hich is determined by the alternative of their value-forming relations. When appearing together they constitute a product of goods which is determined by the conjunction of value relations. If a doctor can remedy an illness by means of either two medicines. he has a smn of goods at his disposaL if he applies a series of treatments. this series is a product of the constituent goods. The logical I a" s of a b sorption for the alternative and conjunction according to "hich if p implies q then the alternative p or q is equivalent to q and the conjunction p and q is equivalent to p. apply to a sum and a product of goods in such a way that the stun of two goods. one of which is smaller than the other. is equal to the greater one. while their product is equal to the smaller one. This apparent paradox can be explained by examples. If places .I and f3 are connected by t\\0 roads. one of" hich is better than the other. and either can be used. then the two roads together as a stun of goods are in no way superior in this respect to the better one. Let a set of means necessary to achieve a certain effect be the product of goods The efficacy of these means and. at the same time. the degree of the achieved effect is determined by that part of the set which is the smallest good. If both bricks and mortar are needed to build a wall and if the bricks arc scarce then as much wall will be built as there are bricks. despite a surplus of mortar: likewise if the mortar is scarce then as much of the "all will be raised as there is mortar. e'en if there arc spare bricks. This is the cause of the so-called .. bottlenecks .. in industry. Even if we hm e the greatest of goods in particular domain at our disposaL i .c. one that satisfies all the needs. then. according to the i1ctual materiaL on which our knowledg~. or rather ideas. about the ~C\1crnal world arc based is made up solely of our impressions.' Poincar~ says: "Nothing can really make us acquainted \\ith rcalitv. and if some God knew the heart of the matkr. He would not lind \1 ords to e.,press it. i\ot only can we not

.\ Op. Cit .. pp. 12. n: after"-· A.jdukic\\icz Polish translation. • C\J. Smoluchowski !'oradmk dla swno11kow [Advis~r for .-\utodidactsj. vol. II: Phys1cs (Warszawa 1917). '"Wst~p ogolny"" [General Introduction]. 'Up. Cit .• p. 13.

III. Reahty -l,."n01rledge- ff'orhh·Ie\r

230

tind the answer but if we were given it. we would not be able to understand it.· Similarly. it is impossible to explain the ditleren1ith. having nothing to do with physics But if we really arc to bdicw in something. then let it be the svstcm just advanced by science. StilL one thing should be remembered: let us beware of the stubborn conservatism which usuallv accompanies such !>lith. Y ct if one theorv turns out to be inaccurate. we should not hcsitak to supplant it 11\ another. and ld us not complain about sci~ncc·s bankruptcy b~caus~ sci~nc~ docs not force us to bdicYc in the gcnuincn~ss of its VIC\\

s

The last of three standpoints resolves the doubts concerning the relation between sensory cognition and reality by denying any connection between them. and limiting the scope of natural cognition only to sensory data. Yet in this way it conflicts with the realistic attitude adopted by the vast majority of people. The question arises \Yhether there is a way of avoiding this consequence without making hypothetical assumptions which would be sufficiently convincing. The crucial point in the argumentation against the realistic solution (in spite of im oking the argument of illusiveness and relati\ ity which undermine the reliability of sensory cognitions) is the dependence of impressions on the specific energy of sense organs. established in Muller's law. This dependence should thus be analyzed m the first place.

11. How is the reality of'sensorv qualities recognized? The problem of the objectivity of sense impressions and perceptions in which impressions are included is connected with the question of" hether what we percel\ e is an actual object of perception. or just a reflection. a 6

Op.

Cit ..

p. 16.

Op. ell .. p. 16. sop. elf .. p. 17pp.

SensOIJ' Cogmt/(/11 and Reality

231

representative. a sign produced in the perceiving subject under the influence of the object perceived. The traditional view. the roots of which go back to ancient times and which will now be called a represent a t ion is tic theory of perception. advocates the second of the hvo answers. It is based on the assumption that what we perceive is a reflection of the object of cognition. produced by the object's affect on cognitive organs. The cognitive relation is understood to be a causal relation in which the object of cognition is an operating cause. the perceived image - its effect. This is what Locke claims. writing that ideas are created in the mind "according to those various ways. wherein those Objects do affect our Senses" 9 So does Kant claim in his J.:Titik der reinen T·ernunn[t 111 writing that an impression arises as a result of the action of an object on the sense organs. As \Ye have just seen. this view was adopted by Johannes Miiller and it became one of the premises of the law of the specific eneq,'y of sense organs. The opposite view. willingly admitted to be in accordance with popular understanding. favours the first component of the mentioned alternative. It claims that we get acquainted immediately with the proper object of cognition. Its first advocate was George Berkeley. whose epistemological standpoint should be separated from the metaphysical one. Thomas Reid is most often mentioned as a representative of this type of realism: among the later followers are Franz Brentano. Ernst Mach and Tadeusz Kotarbi1'1ski. All of them maintain that the cognitive relation is a specific relation. different from causal relations. lt is also direct in the sense that it is the object that is cognized by a knowing subject. and not the product of the acting of the object on the cognitive organs. Follo\ving W. Hamilton. this view will be referred to as the intuitionist i c theory of perception. Miiller's hypothesis is usually formulated as the law of the specific energy of sense organs. claiming that the type of sense impression depends on the organ being affected and not on the type of the stimulus. This law contains two different statements: the first one refers to an undeniable fact that \\C see \Yith an eye and only with an eye. we hear with an car and only with an car. and that. generally speaking. all sense organs have their specific cognitive functions. The second statement explains this fact with a hypothesis that each sense organ reacts to various stimuli affecting it by producing sense impressions characteristic to this organ - it seems to transform the stimulus into a specific sensation. The second statement includes a causal approach to the cognitive relation. In particular. it assumes that the process of perception takes the form of successive causes "An Essay Concermng Human Understandi1~g. 10 J.:n t1k der remen J ·ermmnfi (1787). p. 34.

book II. chapter I. ~3.

232

and effects: a) physical stimulus: b) neryc process imokcd by the stimulus in the peripheral nerYous system: c) nern process in the centre: and d) perception. Elements a) to c) are physical phenomena: finding a causal connection bct\Yeen them does not pose serious difficulties. On the other hand. the connection bct\\-ccn c) and d). i.e. bct\\een a physical phenomenon in the cerebrum and a psychological phenomenon of perception. is a proper cognitiYe connection. and incorporating it into the above causal chain makes an assumption which goes beyond the domain of a natural theory. The chain a) through c) is a chain of physical causes and effects: according to Mi.illcr·s theory. only the last clement is psychophysically related to perception and. thus. only this last clement. i.e. the changes in the central ner\'ous system. is the proper object of cognition. The changes \Yithin this system. c:-.:pcricnced in the form of sensory qualities. are transferred to the c:-.:ternal \\Orld only due to some improper manner. This consequence. as \\ell as the difficulties connected \Yith it. could be a\'oidcd on the grounds of intuitiYe theory. Within this theory it is possible to reinterpret the results of physiological studies. by assuming causal relations bct\Yeen physical and physiological processes a) through c). and by rejecting the claim which equates the appearance of a cognitive psychic phenomenon. i.e. sense impression. \\ith the causal relation bct\\een c) and d). it means by denying the psychic phenomenon d) to be produced by a physiological stimulus. The rejected statement takes for granted that the psychological cognitive process is directly linked only with the central nen ous system. whereas the results of physiological studies justify only the statement that the functions of the central ncn ous SYstem are a necessarY. . condition for the creation of a psychological phenomenon. Disregarding this presumption. let us assume that the cognitiYe process is connected not only \\ ith the central neryous system but with the whole of a liYing organism \\·ith the nen·ous system of this organism and its functions in particular. The consequence of adopting such an integral approach to the cognizing subject is that the cognitive act can no longer refer only to the last element of the causal chain a) through c). The "hole chain has to be regarded as a preparation of this act. "hereas the act proper should be viewed as a function of the subject as a whole. We tend to renounce the view that the process of creating the cognitiYe act is a causal process. Instead. \Ye put forward a hypothesis that a physical stimulus is a kind of a signal preparing the subject for the act of perception. and that the physiological chain a) through c) is the preparation of this act. This preparation may be illustrated by the subject's preparation to perception. made in the same way as when \\ e strain our ears to the strange rustle. or \\hen a shooter prepares his gun to fire a shot. or \\hen a photographer

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233

prepares his camera to take a photograph. To make this comparison more accurate. let us stress that it is a gun together with a shooter which form a whole that fires a shot: similarly. it is not a photographer that takes a photograph. but it is the whole comprising both the photographer and the camera. According to the proposed hypothesis. the psychological phenomenon d). which is prepared in this way. should be understood as an act of the specific psychological actiYity of a cognizing subject. This act is based on the intuitive apprehension of the object which affects the peripheral nervous system: the action of this object on the peripheral organ is an externaL i.e. physicaL stimulus. 0\\ing to the preparation. the act of perception selects this property of the object. from "hich the signal is received by the sense organ - the colour and shape if an eye is the organ to which the signal was sent. and sound in the case of an car. Thus. the specific energy of the sense organ is understood not as an ability to transform the stimulus. but as a selecti,·c ability which enables us to grasp a giycn property of the object. among the 'ariety of all others which it is assigncd 11 In this way. colours. sounds. etc .. belong to the external world. Perceptions and the sense impressions which they include are acts of an intentional apprehension of these objective properties and of incorporating them in this \\ay into the psychological life of a cognizing subject. The differences between sense impressions of yarious hYing creatures which arc provided with different sense organs arc explained on the grounds of the differences in the sclecti\e capacities of these organs. The act of perception docs not produce any sensory properties but it incorporates objecti\e sensory qualities into the sphere of consciousness "·here they become a psychological content: the psychological content is a product of perception. not its object. The act of perception contains !\YO complementary elements. The first element is the act of representating sensory quality. in \Vhich this quality is changed into the content of consciousness. The second element is the act of judging. in which the existence of a giYcn sensory quality as the object of perception is asserted. e.g. it is cold. it is red. it is dark in the sense that it is so. and not in the sense that I feel cold. etc. In the act of representation. the sensory quality is Yie\Yed as immanent. in judgement it is transcendent. The psychological content ceases to exist \\ith the act of perception. though it leaves the trace of dispositional nature. \Yhich enables us to 11 C.D. Broad. ScJenll(ic Jhoughr (London: Routkdge & 1\.cgan Paul 1927). pp. 523ti distinguishes bdwecn thc thcorics of the crcatilln of sensorY conknts by sdection and by generation ..-\s purdY sdcdiYistic thcor.ics. he mentions H. !3crgson ·s .\ lu!Jere et menwtre and S. Akxamkr's Space. Tune und Uetl)'. \\hereas he regards B. Russell's .-Inu!Jsts o(.\!tnd as a mostly sckdi,·ist theorY with an admixturc of some gcneratiYist ckmcnts.

II!. Heality. !.:nmrledge

Worldviell·

reproduce the content in an act of reminiscence 'vithout an action of a physical stimulus on the sense organ. Yet. there is a significant difference in intensity between the content perceived and the one that is reproduced the former contains real. objective sensory elements. \rhereas the latter includes only their mental reproduction. We are dazzled by the blaze which we perceive because it is a real blaze: the unreal one. the one which is reminisced, lacks this intensity. The perception of a sensory quality is al\\ays true, since in its judgement the existence is asserted of only those things which have been directly apprehended through representation and incorporated into the content of consciousness. Yet there are some contradictory instances, those in which sense impression is produced without a physical phenomenon functioning as a proper stimulus, i.e. \rhen the impression is produced as a counterpart of an improper external stimulus or an internal impulse. An underpalpebral flash, perceived under the influence of hitting or pressing an eyebalL is an example of such an impression. The impression of light is created, though there is no light in the physical sense. So. are we not wrong, being deceived by mere illusion when we claim in a perceptual judgement that this underpalpebral flash does exist? Miiller's law accounts for the appearance of the flash with the specific energy of the eye which produces the impression of the flash, which is nonexistent objectively. This explanation incorrectly identifies the stimulus of sense impression with its object. The object of visual sensation is a coloured surface, the stimulus its action on the eye, which involves sending a beam of light. In the case of an improper stimulus, the operating cause is not the emission of light but of mechanical pressure. In both cases, however. there is some object of impression to which the stimuli prepare the eyes, and it is this particular object which is apprehended in visual sensation. The differences in stimuli only influence the way in which the object is apprehended: "·hen a proper stimulus operates. the eyes are normally stimulated to produce a clear impression: when an improper stimulus operates. the sense organ is stimulated abnormally and the produced impression. i.e. this livid nash. presents the blurred shape of an object which is taken. as it were. from a neutral nocturnal sight.

Ill. ffoll' is a picture of the ll'orld created?

Particular sensory data are not perceived separately, but form a turbulent. chaotic stream. full of constantly changing qualities which appear and vanish. The surface of this stream - using Spinoza- s comparison - is

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arranged into waves and wrinkles. The cognitive process. aiming at the apprehension of this stream. takes a number or steps encompassing larger and larger areas at the cost of more and more impoverished sensory content. At every stage two joint cognitive acts may be distinguished. i.e. presentation and judgement. The former is a foundation and a motive for the other as it is the act of choice and arrangement of sensory data: whereas the latter asserts the existence of \\hat has become the content of consciousness through presentation. At the first. initial stage the cognitive process mentioned is simultaneous with sense impressions: from the mass of simultaneous. successive qualities it chooses some of them. out of which wholes or figures are formed. and it substantiates them. by changing particular qualities into a thin g. into it. which has these qualities. Separated in this way from their context. individualized and substantiated. the systems of sensory contents are at first assigned indexical names. e.g. demonstrative pronouns. The objects given at this stage of the cognitive process \viii now be termed moment a r y objects. The discussed stage of the selection and arrangement of sensory qualities takes place in perceptual images. I arrange a series of points lying on a given segment of a straight line or a cun·e into the shape of this segment. but they can also be grouped into twos or threes. if they are to be counted. A sleepy traveller arranges the monotonous clatter of the wheels on the railway joints into rhythms - binary. ternary. quaternary: it is possible to switch from one rhythm to the other. In the sequence of sounds melody is perceived. All of these instances are well known examples pointing to the fact that perceptual image contains a structural element along with sensory ones. This clement. called figural quality. may vary under the same sensory contents. as in the above examples. or it may remain unchanged under different sensory qualities as is the case with a melody transposed into another key or instrument. or with the print of a colourful landscape. Although the figural quality may vary for the same sensory contents. it is not free since it is restricted by temporal and spatial properties of the contents which it includes. Selected wholes are those waves mentioned in the stream of reality. the ones which mutually intersect and intermingle. Perceptional image is a basis and a motive for a perceptional judgement in which the existence of a momentary object is asserted. This judgement is sensorily obvious in the same way as perceptional judgements referring to particular sensory qualities are. because in every perception it does not go beyond the direct experimental data. Undoubtedly. the visual image of a teaspoon put into a glass of tea is refracted. yet it is another matter that the teaspoon itself is not broken.

236

Iff. Reality

f,:n01riedge

Iroridl'le\1·

The next step in our analysis exceeds the limits of what is perceived at a given moment: it is an act of selection and arrangement which unites the content of what is being perceived with the contents of bygone perceptions. accessible in recollections. This stage is attained through the comparison. identification and differentiation of sensory contents in which t\\o momentary objects arc. or have been. given and may be referred to as the first degree of abstraction. What is identical in different momentary objects -particular contents or their arrangements - is given a general term. i.e. white. smooth. rounded. etc. A language is created which transforms subjective perceptual judgements expressed in it into objectified observational sentences. Observational sentences. in which perceptual judgements are formulated. are created by means of general terms \Yhile not embracing the" hole of the content of perception. If. for instance. pointing to the bird \Yhich 1 observe. 1 assert ··The gull is flying··. then only those elements specifying the flying bird as a gulL and concerning its bchmiour are. in most general terms. chosen among the variety· of the contents of perception. There is no mention of the background against \Yhich the bird is observed such as the lighting. the direction of the flight. its height and speed. etc. Generally. in observational sentences as in the one mentioned above. a single connection between particular sensory clements which arc distinguished in the perception as a \Yhole is asserted. The sentence expressing someone· s true judgement is true. if its meaning has been assigned by the person \\hose true judgement is expressed in it. Nevertheless. the sentences with identical phonetic form or shape may have different meanings. and the sentence true in one sense may actually be false if it is ascribed some other meaning. The sentence ""This is \Yhite ... in which my true perceptional judgement is expressed. is true if .. white .. has the meaning which I hm·e assigned to it. It is possible. however. that someone else will refer to this shade of \\hite ""light cream .. and not ··white.. : the term ··white.. will. thus. gain narrower meaning and in this meaning the sentence ··This is \\hite .. about the same object will be false. Since the truth of sentences expressing true perceptional judgements depends on the meaning assigned to these sentences. it can be challenged unless the mcamng of the sentences in question is properly fixed. The meaning of scientific sentences. for instance. is fixed \Yithin the language of a theory into which they have been incorporated. Thus. \\hat has to be settled is \Yhether the observational sentence provided by the observer is true in its meaning which it gained in the language of the theory it sprang from. This solution is sought by confronting the obscrvcr·s language with that of a theory- the greater compatibility between both languages. i.e. the more instances of compatibility in judging sentences \Yith a given phonetic

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form and those logically related to them as true in both languages. the more likely it is that a true sentence in the observer's language will also be true in the language of the theory (provided that no counter-examples are found). This probability can never be supplanted by certitude. since it can never be excluded beforehand that in some new situation the existing compatibility will not be maintained. A colour-blind person. for instance, assigns a different meaning to the term "red" than the person who sees things normally, but learns to use it as others do by making use of the differences in the intensity of light between different colours. Consequently, only tests which are well-designed and relevant enable us to discover those instances in which this compatibility is no longer obsencd, and to determine the differences irlmeaning. The process of abstraction as discussed takes place spontaneously. At the same time it results in momentary objects displaying strong similarities and satisfying relevant criteria to be arranged into temporary strings and to be combined into the unity of the object existing and changing in time. This object will now be called a tempo r a I i n d i v i d u a L momentary objects belonging to the sequence which we hm·e just called a temporal individual will now be referred to as the phases of this individual. 12 The presentation of a temporal individual is no longer a perceptive image but it is the concept whose content is an abstraction from its momentary phases given in perceptive images. The notion of a temporal individual is the basis and the motive for the judgements in which this individual is discussed. In contrast to perceptual judgements. they are not intuitively obvious and they arc formulated in the sentences which are generalizations of observational sentences dealing with the phases of a temporary individual. The Tatra Mountains' tarn Morskie Oko, knmm from a series of observations made from different observation posts in different \\Cather conditions and at various time of a day and season of a year. is an example of a temporal individual. Various observed phases of Morskie Oko provide the data for the creation of the notion of Morskie Oko. The judgements concerning this Tatra tarn may be expressed in descriptive sentences with an implicit or explicit quantifier - either universal ("'always") or existential ('"sometimes"). All of these sentences arc justified by observational sentences, both old and new. which function as the premises. The tendency to combine momentary objects into temporal individuals gives rise to the creation of images in which currently perceived sensory elements are supplemented with both productive and reproductive clements 1' For various mdhods of analysis of temporal individuals. s~~ my ··Identycznosc a indywiduum i jego trwani~·· [Identity and the Individual in Its Persistence]. in this volume.

p. 218.

238

Ill. Heu/Jt1· -- f.:nmt·!edge

Worlch·Jclr

derived from the former acquaintance with the same temporal individual or with similar ones. and which appear under inaccurate circumstances. In psychological studies. such instances are known as assimilation (Wundt). Like ordinary perceptual judgements. these images become the basis for the judgements asserting the existence of an object. but since these judgements are false they are a source of mistakes in the witnesses· reports of an event or in sworn testimonies. On the other hand. in hallucinations it is the remembered or fancy contents that become an immediate basis for the fallacious assertions about reality. These instances make it necessary to seck the criterion distinguishing true perceptual judgements from the false ones which arc formulated without a sufficient perceptual basis. This criterion cannot be derived from perceptual judgements because there seems to be no subjective difference between an ordinary perceptual judgement and a hallucinatory one. though it can be established by the ensuing analysis of these perceptions. In this analysis. greater wholes of sensory cognition arc subsumed under the laws of dependence. In its more advanced phase. the cognitive process generalizes some single connections asserted in observational sentences and determines general deppendences between individual objects and temporal events with respect to their various properties. The general lvorld. In formulating these laws. one makes another choice among sensory elements forming temporal individuals. and organizes chosen clements into the relations of dependence. The choice specifics some of the elements to be generic features. which are subsequently combined into the systems of genetic. causaL functional and conditional dependencies. to name but a fe\v. The string· s disposition to vibrate with a given frequency and its property of emitting sound with a given pitch forms a structure. in which the pitch of a sound depends on the frequency of the 'ibration of the source. Physicalchemical properties of natural environment. as well as the whole of flora and fauna of this environment. are the clements of the interdependent systems studied by biologists. Similar to assertions about temporal individuals. laws of various scientific theories. which assert these dependencies. arc generalizations which take observational sentences for their elementary premises. The lavYS of dependence and observational sentences are logically connected in such a way that the obscn ational sentences are subordinate to the lm\s of dependence. Each observational sentence endmvs the lmv which it is subordinate to with some degree of probability. Connections asserted in obsen·ational sentences and the laws of dependence provide the criteria of truth for perceptual judgements already discussed by making them verifiable. at least indirectly and partially.

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Indirectly. because what is verified is not a perceptual judgement but an observational sentence in \Yhich it is expressed: partially. because such a sentence does not encompass the whole of the content of perception. In order to verify a perceptual judgement. perception has to be repeated and a new perceptual judgement in a new observational sentence. serving as a premise of verification (as a verifying sentence). has to be expressed. But perception as a whole is unrepealable in the sense that there is no guarantee that a nc\\ perception will be an identical repetition of the former one. What can only be repeated are the instances of coexistence of certain selected sensory elements. and only those which arc subject to verification. The Yerification of a perceptual judgement by means of a new obsen a tiona! sentence does not encompass the \Yhole of perception but only those elements which have been included into the expressed observational sentence. and which are subsumed under the new obsen·ational sentence. The verification yields positive or negatiYe results. depending on whether the dependences asserted in a verifying sentence. i.e. in the new obsen·ational sentence. agree or disagree with those of a verified sentence. that is the original obsen·ational sentence. PositiYc Ycrification increases the degree of probability of the verified obsen·ational sentence. whereas negative verification lessens it to a minimum. Under fa.-ourable conditions. in both cases. this probability approaches some positive or negative certitude. This. however. will always differ from absolute certitude because it can ahvays be doubted whether the analogy between the verifying sentence and the verified one is sufficientlY accurate and. additionallY. none of the verifying sentences have absolute .ccrtitudeu . The transition from subjective perceptions to objectified obsen·ational sentences requires crossing a boundary that separates two types of knowledge. i.e. the intuitive personal knowledge and the discoursive scientific knowledge. The former draws directly on reality. though tends to grasp only what is momentary and directly given to the senses. The latter is based on the former. though it comprises vast domains in time and space as if in perspective. By abstraction. it departs from what is directly given. goes beyond observational data through hypotheses. and transforms perceptual contents into the symbols of language. The knowledge of both types docs not have absolute certitude as neither excludes the possibility of error within its scope. First. due to the fact that it cannot reliably separate assimilated elements from hallucinatory elements in perceptions: and second. because its language does not reflect reality univocally. and

13 Cf. ·'O sprawdzaniu w naukach empirycznych .. [On Verification in Empirical Sciences]. in: T. Czczowski. Odc::yty.filo::o(ic::ne [Philosophical Lectures] (Tonni: PWN 1958). p. 59.

2-1-0

!If. Reality

f:nO\rledge - ll'orhll-'Je\1'

because its generalizations and hypotheses are related to observational sentences only through probability connections. The uncertainty of knowledge is not of static character as maintained by the Sceptics. Probability connections interrelate the set of all sentences forming discoursive knowledge in such a way that ''hen newer obsen ational sentences are added. some of the older ones are eliminated \Yhile others gain a higher degree of probability. The progress of knowledge is based on the fact that the scope of observational sentences is constantly being enlarged. and the dubious components gain a higher level of probability. 1955

Translated by Hanna Swietlik

PHILOSOPHY AT THE CROSSROADS

The development of science in the last century resembles in certain respects the end of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both periods share the same impetus. similar changes in particular sciences and an equally critical attitude towards philosophical theories and problems handed down by tradition: however. there is a difference resulting from the high level of specialization in science of today. In those times particular sciences were still closely related to and respected the assumption of philosophy. as was the case with Descartes. Nowadays particular sciences have separated while at the same time turned away from philosophy. The positivistic and scientist epoch of XIX century left behind its durable trace in distrusting philosophy which. allegedly cannot be scientific. In particular. antinomies and arbitrariness are pointed out in metaphysics as well as pseudo-problems in the theory of knowledge. Viewed from today·s perspective. the realm of investigations traditionally considered philosophical reveals a clear differentiation of two lines of interests. which have in fact characterized philosophical investigations for a long time. The object of one is reality while the object of the other is kno·wledge. The former is the traditional domain of metaphysics and ethics while the latter comprises the problems contained in logic. epistemology.

psychology and the sociology of science. Investigations within the latter sphere have become so specialized that their philosophical character is questionable while the branch of philosophy concerned with reality has been for two centuries the object of criticism with the most serious objections that have ultimately crystallized into the positivistic position. The positivistic position denies philosophy an object. for the investigation of reality has entirely been comprehended by particular sciences in addition to denying philosophy authority. for it has no specific method of investigation. Attacked from both sides. philosophy has found itself undoubtedly in a critical situation. yet it remains alive and is developing. thanks not only to the inertia and the habit of those who deal with philosophy but chiefly because there are problems that particular sciences are unable to master and solve. Therefore. it is \vorth realizing what philosophy. retaining its academic character. may be in today·s situation. Let us stipulate at the

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onset that \Ve have in mind philosophy as science and not as a worldview or literary product. Undeniably. in philosophy. like anywhere else. greater specialization occurs. As a rule. no one constructs philosophical systems any more: scholars specialize in a particular chosen branch. In the event that they go beyond their domain. they do so because of their teaching duties as university lecturers or in cases related to their specialized research. Specialization of this kind divides philosophers into those who are concerned with one of the lines of scholarly interest cited above and those concerned "ith the other. i.e. theoreticians of science (we take this term in a broad meaning. comprising all studies related to knowledge. including logic. methodology and the history of sciences) and metaphysicians. also in a very broad sense of the word. It may well be. however. that one domain plays a subsidiary role with respect to the other. A question arises whether a logician. for instance. who pursues his specialized inquires is a philosopher or not. In my opinion. logic as a science containing a set of problems concerning the structure of kno\\ ledge remains a philosophical science and there is no reason why it should be denied this characteristic. These problems. however. have become specialized to a great extent and a scholar who is thoroughly immersed in a field of very specific problems. e.g. axiomatization of a logical theory, and who thus loses sight of logic as a whole and its relation to other branches of philosophical investigations ceases to be a philosopher and becomes instead a specialist logician. Nevertheless. these general problems of logic. \Yith the development of science. need to be elaborated: and alongside specialist logicians there is room for logician-philosopher s. Jan Lukasiewicz in his various works clearly changed his standpoint from philosophical to logical position. Supposedly. a similar situation takes place in psychology and other specialized branches of philosophy. The fundamental controversy is not in realm of investigations concerning the theory of science but in the domain of philosophical inquiry about reality. There arc. as I have already mentioned. at least two objections denying philosophy the right to existence. First. the whole world is included in the investigations of particular sciences and. therefore. no part of it is the domain of philosophy: in its farthest-reaching generalizations physics has taken the place of the former metaphysics and. within it. other natural sciences study the specific features of cosmic. chemicaL biological and psychical phenomena. Secondly. there is no peculiar method of philosophical investigations in that respect. for everything that may be an object of investigation can only be investigated \\ith the methods of particular sciences. The method of rationalistic speculation. with which the

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pre-Kantian metaphysics tried to reach beyond the limits of particular sciences. failed to stand up to scientific criticism. Let us determine the point of departure for considering the above arguments. It is hardly deniable that the whole range of natural experience is the object of investigation of particular sciences and that the empirical method is the only one to investigate reality. Statements about existence cannot be deduced from definitions and analytical sentences. Let us repeat once again that we are going to deal only with academic philosophy. i.e. philosophy which recognizes the principles of the scientific methods. Therefore. the question arises how the problems concerning the investigation of reality. for which philosophy deals with. are different from those determined by particular sciences. The answer must refer to the statement that the scope of human knowledge is always limited and. that is. in two ways: experience has access only to a finite fragment of the infinite spacetime, which is additionally limited qualitatively by the range of human cognitive faculties. This fragment has been expanding in the course of the progress of sciences but it can never possibly exhaust the whole of that which exists. Let us. consequently. mentally divide all that which exists into the part which lies within the reach of experience. which is the domain of particular sciences. and the extraempirical one which particular sciences are not concerned with. but which have been of interest to metaphysicians on a par with the empirical world for a long time. There can be little doubt that existence transcends human experience: no reasonable man will pretend to know everything. That extraempirical part of existence is not cognizable and those who tried to attain it through metaphysical speculation were deluded. We can make conjectures attempting to extrapolate the qualities of the empirical world onto it: this is what did all those who. like Lotze or Fechner. constructed the so-called inductive metaphysics modelled on the hypotheses of the natural sciences. These constructions are not hypotheses acceptable to science for not only are they undecidable which would not be a matter of primary importance since in a strict sense no statement about nature is decidable. but what is more they are not liable to probabilization which differentiates them from the hypotheses of empirical sciences. In the empirical sciences one may obtain increasingly higher degrees of probability by means of subsequent empirical verifications. No correct metaphysical construction can contradict the statements of empirical sciences or. in other words. each should in its own way account for or provide an interpretation of empirical knowledge. On the other hand. no such construction has a priority over others. The concept of probability. which is determined by the relation of the hypothesis to

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f,."noll'!edge - ll"or/dvJe\1·

obsen·ational sentences within the empirical realm only. cannot be transferred into that realm at all. Is the world material or spiritual'7 Can we transfer these categories into the extraempirical realm'7 Maybe we can ascribe an infinite multitude of attributes to it? Is it a unity. as Spinoza claimed. or a plurality in the sense of Lcibnizian monadology? If it is a plurality. arc its elements mutually connected. as in democratic society. or do they form a hierarchical system resembling the feudal ladder') The value of such metaphysical constructions consists not in that they give a more or less probable insight into that which is concealed from human sight. Their value must be sought elsevvherc. Every such construction presents a certain possibility of an answer to the questions which arise on the ground of the knowledge. of the empirical world but which go beyond the limits of this knowledge. for they relate to the whole of existence both empirical and extracmpirical. These possibilities become an object of scientific interest for their own sake. although \VC take them only as a set of possible propositions without ascribing to any of these constructions actual precedence over others: the richer and more uniYersal this set is. the greater the cognitive Yalue it presents. Consequently. this value is increased by every new metaphysical construction which satisfies the requirement of correctness. Various metaphysical systems constitute the object of studies for the history of philosophy or. more specifically. the history of metaphysical systems. However. analogous to normative ethics \Yhich constructs ethical systems and ethicology which analyzes and classifies them and which develops alongside the history of ethics. there is room alongside the history of metaphysical systems for both metaphysics. in the strict sense. "hich competently creates metaphysical constructions. and for a theory "hich analyzes and classifies them. There are two types of sentences in science: to the first a logical Yalue such are assertions and negations: the second. called is ascribed~ suppositions. have no ascribed logical value and exist only as segments of implication. alternative or another complex sentence. As \Ve know. in stating that an implication or an alternative is true we do not state that its segments are true. Only when we infer the truth of the consequent from the truth of the antecedent these sentences arc asserted. In a system of science which also comprises the sentences that make up a metaphysical construction. these sentences function as suppositions. At least since the time of Galileo and Descartes metaphysical sentences have not been used as premises for obtaining the statements of physics and biology. i.e. they have not been assumed to be assertions.

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The following question may be asked: "Why create metaphysical constructions if they are neither useful in the deYelopment of science. nor are they fertile within particular sciencesT. The answer is: "Metaphysical constructions seem to be necessary because they continually emerge often on the basis of empirical sciences themseh cs ... They are necessary as a complement to the theory of particular sciences \Yhich unites the variety of laws formulated in particular sciences into a generalization constituting the unity of scientific outlook. One must consider. however. that cyery metaphysical construction presents only one of the possibilities of such a generalization. for in order to set limits to experience these limits must be transgressed and. consequently. any claims to obtaining a single scientifically grounded Yiew arc futile. Thus far. we have only discussed one line along which metaphysics can participate. in addition to particular sciences. in the discourse on reality. The other one is no less important. We have spoken so far of metaphysical investigations which transcend the limits of the empirical world: there is. however. an area of investigations for philosophy also within the realm of experience which differs from that of particular sciences and. as a result. philosophy expands the range of experience beyond natural experience. Natural sciences recognize only a type of experience i.e. sensory experience. but philosophers have recognized for a long time other types of experience. which are referred to in Yarious ways. The common feature of all of them is that the cognitive act captures the object of whatever type it may be directly. i.e. in its own form. and not through any sign and in its wholeness. exactly as an object in visual perception is perceived. That is why this type of cognition is called intuitive. extending the original sense of the world (intuitin =visual) to all direct and entire cognition. All such cognition also has other features in common \Yith sensory experience: being direct. it is self-evident. It should be added that there are various kinds of self-evidence depending on the various kinds of intuition. It is unprovable. for it is factual and not apodeictical. that is impossible to prove to anyone that a thing is as I see it otherwise than by showing this thing to him. Nevertheless. it is verifiable. i.e. it may be repeated and compared by various persons in various circumstances. All intuitive cognition requires assuming an appropriate attitude. Attention is the attitude for sensory experience. reflection for introspective cognition. a characteristic moral or aesthetic attitude is the condition of evaluation of this or another kind. Platonian noesis is one of the variants of intuitive cognition in the sense adopted here. and it also requires adopting an appropriate attitude in order to elicit from the observed individual case its generic element. The existentialist attitude and intuition with their

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endeavour to cognize the aspects of reality neglected in everyday life seem also very interesting. It seems that for the last fe\v decades philosophy has been attaching a gro\\ing importance to the long known but neglected means of cognizing reality in those various perspectives which evade any natural cognition. These diverse kinds of experience which are different from sensory experience are not as elaborated from the methodological standpoint as natural experience: they must not however. be dismissed as unscientific providing that they satisfy the fundamental condition of scientific correctness. i.e. the criterion of intersubjectivc verifiability. \vhich allows distinguishing that which is objective from subjective illusions in addition to nuious kinds of intuitive cognition "hich undoubtedly satisfy this criterion. Accurate judgment in various realms of intuitive extrasensory cognition may be a subject of learning just like operating a microscope or detecting a rale or heart murmurs in auscultation. I stress the fact that those various kinds of intuition which are discovered by philosophy constitute ex peri en c e in the broad sense of the word: they provide empiric a I knowledge in the sense that I have spoken of abm·e: they give singular knmYicdgc. albeit one concerning the objects of various logical types. such as numbers or geometrical figures. When I cogni1.e intuitively that two non-parallel straight lines meet at one point I cognize it as a fact concerning the crossing of two lines. although they arc abstract lines and not empirical lines in a drawing. All intuitive cognition is. to use still another opposition. synthetic rather than analytic. However. when the same theorem of geometry is deduced without referring to intuition it becomes analytic though intuition usually underlies the accepted axioms. I believe therefore that. contrary to the opposing views. philosophical inquiries concerning reality possess a specific object: this object is identical \\ith the world in its wholeness. both in the part contained in empirical cognition and in the part which lies beyond the reach of natural experience: these inquiries. however. relate to their object not in the \\ay which would allow transcending the border between the cognizable and the uncognizable. as former rationalist speculation attempted to do. but through considering the p o s sib i I it y of various metaphysical constructions. These inquiries also have a method specific to them by employing various kinds of intuitive cognition which differ from sensory cognition. Besides. they usc the same methods of description and analysis as all other sciences including the method of analytical description which seems to be the most important for philosophy.

l'hilosophy u/ the Crossroads

2.J.7

I would not like to attach a label to any of the ideas which I have presented here nor would I like to place myself into a philosophical school or trend. However. to avoid any misunderstanding I want to stress that I agree with many statements of positivism in its modern variant while I am also inclined towards the maximalistic tendencies of modern metaphysics. renouncing. however. without any kind of dogmatism in the classical sense of the word as the opposite of scepticism. What I have attempted to do is to reconcile one with the other. 1960

Translated by Marek Kozurno

ON INDIVIDlJALS AND EXISTENCE

There arc two reasons why a sentence asserting the existence of the individual seems to be circular. First. in order to predicate anything of an indi\ idual \Ye must give it a proper name: and in order to give it a name we must point at it and we can only point at things that we have pcrcei\ cd. I.e. those \\hose existence has already been asserted in perception. Secondly. in order to predicate anything true of an individual (e.g. its existence) \\C must presuppose that this individual exists since true assertions can be made only about that what exists. The problem that emerges here has a long history. dating back to the Middle Ages. It \\as initiated by Anselm of Canterbury·s argument. in which he tried to prove the existence of God on the ground of the definition of God as the most perfect being. In fact. the name "'the most perfect being·· is a description in Russcllian sense (i.e. a description designating the object by an individual term) rather than a proper name. but the sentence the subject of '' hich contains a description implies that there exists a designate of the description. Thus. in Anselm· s reasoning. \\ e can sec the same Yicious circle that appears \Yhene\ er the existence of an indiYidual is asserted. The problem requires an analysis. Let us ask hO\\ it presents itself from the point of vic\\ of modern logic. Sentences about indi\ iduals arc singular sentences formalized as propositional functions ji (of one or more argument) of an individual variable x: fi can be presented in an expanded form as ··x is v·. where P is a predicate. Let us disregard for the moment the definition of the individual. Different indiYiduals are objects of different sciences: it is the man for the anthropologist. the organic cell for the histologist. the atom for the chemist and the hem cnly body for the astronomer. In introducing the propositional function of the individual \ ariablc x it is assumed that the range of the variability of x is non-empty. since any theory \Yithin an empty range of the variability of a variable is contradictory. In an empty range of variables any sentence \Yith the particular quantifier (Ex)fx or (Ex).\fx is false: therefore. their negations (x).\'f¥ and (x)f¥. \\ hich predicate contradictory qualities of all x arc true. 1 1 In r.::garding th~.-· gcn~ral ~cnkncc (x)/.r as true in an ~1npty rang~ of the Yariability of a \·;utabk x. \\L' acl't:pt. contrary to .\ristotk·s logic. that a g~ncral scnkncc docs not assume th!.! non-c1nptincss of the subjecL in other \\Ords. it is a \\'cak general scnt..:-nc.:. lf\\t: were to ta~.e th~ oppo,itc 1·1~11 and regard th~ gcn~ral '~nkn~"' (x)(x and (.\}\(x a' fi1b~. in th~ 'am~ 11 a\ '"

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The statement that the range of x is non-empty is a mctatheoretical sentence. This statement is accepted in all sciences ,,hich assume the existence of the objects of their investigations. It differs. however. from the assumption of the ontological or epistemological realism. which oppose idealism in its various forms. Both the realist and the idealist assume the existence of the objects of investigation: they differ in that the idealist understands them as intentionaL \Yhile the realist acknowledges that they exist independently of the subject. The notion of existence contained in this metatheoretical assumption must be recognized as a primary one: it appears in the particular quantifier. and its function is to define the nonemptiness of the general name. which is the predicate in the scheme of the elementary sentence "x is r·. This is to say. "There are v· means the same as ''There exists such x that xis p-· or. in other words. --p exists always and only if something is p-·. In the sentence "x is v·. P is a property of the individual x: the existence of P is therefore the existence of a quality. or in Aristotle· s terms - the existence of secondary substances which (to put it figuratively) exist in primary substances. We must therefore distinguish between t\\O notions of existence: one. i.e. the existence of individuals. is introduced as the primary one: and the other. i.e. the existence of a property. is defined by the former. In order to differentiate between these two meanings in Peano-Russell"s symbolism "There is p·· is represented as ••Jrutest tn a Pust-coJJJJnllnJsf Democrac_r: Ta.\·I f)rn~er.'l' · Demonsrrutton 111 Hungary~ Z. Bauman. 1J1.mwntltng Putronuge State~ E. 1\lokrzycki. Between Re(orm and Revolutwn: Fasten? Furopq 7\ro Years u(ier the Fall o(Commumsm~ J. Frentzel-Zagorska. 7'he Road to DemocratiC l'oltflcal System 111 Post-commumst Eastern Europe. Part III: The Case of Yugoslavia - R.F. 1\liller. Yugoslavia: The End of' the Expenment.

VOLUME 33 ( 1993) SOCL\L SYSTEM. RATIOJ\.-\LITY ..-\ND REVOU'TION (Edited by 1\larcin Paprzycki and Leszek Nowak)

Introduction. On tht· Natun• of Social System l'. Preuss. 1-'olillca/ Order and Democracy Carl Schnntt and his Influence: f.:. Paprzycka, -~ Paradox 111 Hohbes · l'hJ/osophy of /.mr: S. EsquitlL Democratic i'o!Jilcol /)w/ogue: E. Jditiski. /)emocrucy in Polish Retomnsf .'-;ocwlist Thought: f.:. Paprzvcka. The.\ faster und Slave C'on(igurofion 1n Hegel's System: tv!. Goddicr. Levi-Strauss. :\lurx and .lfier . . 1 R.eapprwsol of Stmcfuru!Jsr and .\far.usf Tools for .\ocw/ !.ogic.,: f.:. :\icdzwiadek. IJn the Stmcrwe o(Socwl S~nrem: \\'. Cza_1kowski. Socwl Bemg und Irs Reproducnon. On Rationalit~· and Capti\'it~· !\1. Ziolkowski. /'01t·a und 1-:nO\r/edge. L. Nm,aL ?ll·o Inrer-J:wnun L11111ts /o !he Ra!Jonolily of .\fun: :-.1. Paprz);cki. The \'onChnsf10n :\lode/ of :\fan: An Allempr or l'sychologJcol E\planulion: R. Egi.:rt. Tmwrd the Sophisficared Ratwna!JstJc .\lode/ o(.\!an. On Social Rnolution L. Nowak. R.evolulwn 1s an Opwf1Je Progres.\ hut u Progress .Vonefhe/ess: f.:. Paprzvcka. :-.1. Paprzvcki. !loll' do Enslaved l'eople :\!a~e Rei-'Oi11tJOns'': G. Tomczak. Is 11 ll'orlh II'J1'1111ng a Revolurwn'': f.:. BrzcclJCZ)'tL Civil Loups and the Ahsorplron of Fhres: R. 1\kCkan. iihar A!akes ,\/urxJst l!isloncal :\lofeno!Js/11 ObjecfJve'': G. f.:otlarski. Classes und .\lasses 1n Soc10/ Ph1/osophy o( Rosa Luxemhurg. On Real Socialism E. Gellner. The C'n.-J! and the Sacred: W. Marcisz~wsk i. Economics and the Ideo of In(ormatwn. lf'hy Socw!Jsm must have Co/lopsed?: I Nm\.\k. f.: Paprzvcka. ~l. Paprzycki. On .\fulfll111eanty o( Socw!JsJn: . \. Si.;gcL the Uverreprnswn Cycle 1n !he Soviel Cmon . .-In UperofJOJw!c.afion of a Theoreflca/ A/ode/: f.:. I3rzechczyn. The State o( the l'e/ltomc Order us a Socw!Jsr Soc1ety. Discussions R. i\kClcary. Socwonoly.l'iS and l'hilosophy: W. Heller. .\fefhodologJca/ Remarks on the Public and the Pnvate 1n I !unnah .·I rend! 's PoilfJco/ Philosophy: K. Brzcchczyn. On Uns/lccess{ill C'onqJW\'l and Sllccess(u/ SubordmafJon.

VOLUME 3..J- ( 199..J-)

WF.IU/..1 '//0\ f ': THE DYN.\MJCS OF IDE.\LIZ.-\TJONS

lnrroduc/Jon: Chapter 1: !deu/curwn and Theone.,· of C'orrespondence: Chapter II: IJwlec/Jcul C'orrespo•1dence o( ScwntJ(Ic Lu1rs: Chapter III: !Jwlec:/Jcol Correspondence 111 SCJence: Some Fxomples: Chapter I\·: /)w/ecficol Correspondence o( Scien!J.fic Theone.,·: Chapter V: Creneru/catwns o( rhe Rule o( Correspondence: Chapter VI: Exlenswns of the Rule o(Correspondence: Chapter VII: Correspondence and the r.'mprncal!o'nVJronment o(a The01y: Chapter \'Ill: Some Methodological Prohlems ofDwlecflca/ ( 'orrespondence.

VOLUME 35 (1993) E\IPIRIC.-\L LOCiiC .-\ND P\TBLIC DEH.HE. ESSAYS IN HONrwm T·n,ekananda. Pat·t \': Indian Religion, Past ami Pt·esent ,\/.!faro . .4 .Vote on dhamwsya s1lksma gaflh: A. WezleL The Story o(Ani-:\!andavya as told mthe :\fahahharata: Its slgm(icancefor !ndwn

Legal and Reilg1011s H1sto1y: Y. Grinshpon. Expenence ond ObservatiOn 1n Tradl/wnal and Modern Patw?rulo Yoga: F . .T. Korom. !_ungHc;ge Bel1e( and lo\penence 111 Bengali Folk ReiTgwn: \\'. Ilalbfitss. Research and ReflectiOn: /(esponses to Ill}' Respondents. Developments and A If/tildes 111 !Veo-1!mdwsm: Indwn rel1g10n, Post and !'resent.

VOLUME 60 ( 1998) 1\IARX'S THEORIES TODAY (Edited by Ryszard Panasiuk and Leszek Nowak) R. Panasiuk. Jntrodllct/On: Part I: On Dialectics and Ontology S.-E. Liedman. t.'ngels and the /.mrs o( IJwlecllcs: R. Panasiuk. On Dwlect1cs 1n ;\[ur.nsm ,Jgam: R. Albritton. The Umq11e Ontology o(Capllal: R. Washner. It is not Smgulanty that Governs the Nature o(Th111gs. The Pnnc1p!e o(fsolated Jndlvldllal and Its ,\'egatwn 111 Harx 's Doctoral Thes1s: Pat·t II: On Histori•·al JV!atel'ialism and Social Theol'ies - Z. Cackowski. The Cont111wng l'ulnhty o( the A!orxwn Thought: P. CasaL From Umlmea/ to [.'mversul f!lstoncal :\latena/1sm: I. Hunt. A Dwlecncal InterpretatiOn and Resurrect/On of' H1stoncol .\fotenaiTsm: W. Krajewski. The Trnunph o( H1stonca/ :\!atenailsm: L. Nowak. The Adapt1ve InterpretatiOn o( Iflstonca/ Afateriailsm: A Survey. On a Contnlmtwn to Polish Analyt1cal :\larx/S/11: 1\L Kozlowski. A Ne>r Look o( :\farx's and the Ddeudalisation of' Hegel's Tls1ons o( at Capitalism. Between the D~onununisation Cap1tahsm: F. !vlosele)·. An Empmcal Apprmsal o(;\[arx's Economic Theo1~L Ch. Bertram and A. Carling. Stwnhlmg mto Revoillllon..·lnalytlca/ :\hi"XIsm. Ratwnahty and Collective Act10n: K. Graham. Collectives. Classes and Revolllt/Onmy ?otentwl 111 :\larx: ll. Hinunelstrand. J!mr to Become and Remmn a ;\[arxlc/smg Socwlog/St. A1~ Egocentnc Report: Part III: On Axiology and the Socialist Project - P. Kamolnick. I'ISioas o(Socwl 111sf1ce 1n Marx: An Assessment o(Recent Dehates 1n Normative P/11/osophy: W. Schmied-Kowarzik. J:arl ;\Jarx as a l'hliosopher o( Human Emane1patwn: H. J. Sandkiihler. ,\[arx lT'elche f(ot/Onolltsac. Why Do ;\femmes Dze'i W. 1\.alaga, Threshold o(Sigm(icatzon, A. Podgorecki. Do Soczal Sciences Evoporate.?

VOLUME 63 (1998) IDEALIZATIONIX: IDEALIZATION IN CONTE~IPORARY (Edited by Niall Shanks)

PHYSICS

N. Shanks. introductiOn; l\1. Bishop. An Eptstemologtcal Role f(Jr Thought E.xpemnents: I. Nowak & L. Nowak. "Models .. and "t.\penments" as Homogeneous Families o( Notwns: S. French & J. Ladyman. A Semanttc Penpecttve on Ideali::atton 111 Quantum Afechamcs; Ch. Liu, Decoherence and IdealizatiOn 111 Quantum Afeasurement: S. Hartmann. Idealcatwn zn Quantum Fzeld Theory; R. F. Hendry. Models and Approx111zatzons in Quantum Chemzstry; D. Howard, Astride the Divzded Lme: Platonzsm. Empzncism. ond Emstem's Eptstemological Opportunism: G. Gale. Idealization zn Cosmology: A Case Study: A. Maidens. Ideali::.atzon. Heurzstics and the PrinCiple of' Equivalence; .-\. Rueger & D. Sharp. Idealcatwn and Stabtlzty:A Perspective fi'om Nonl111ear Dynarwcs; D. L. Holt & R. G. Holt Towards a I ery Old Account or Rationality in Experzment: Occult Pruclices 111 Chaottc Sonolwmnescence.

VOLUME 64 ( 1998) PRAGMATIC IDEALISM. CRITICAL ESSAYS ON NICHOLAS RESCHER 'S SYSTEM OF PRAGMATIC IDEALISM (Edited by A.xel Wiistelmbe and Michael Quank) Introductwn: A. Wiistehube, Is Systemulic Phzlosophy still 1-'os.nble?: T. Airaksinen. :\.fora/ Facts and Obtectzve 1'alues: L Rodriguez Dupla, T'alues and Reasons; G. Gale, Rescher on Evolution and the Intellzgibility o(Nature: J !\.ekes. The Nature o(Phzlosophy: P. Machamer. lndzVJdtwl and Other-Person Moralzty: A Plea for an Emotional Response to Ethzcal Problems; D. Marconi. Opus Incertum; M. 1\larsonet Scienttfic Realism and Pragmatzc Idealtsm; R. Martin. fVas Spmoca a Person''; H. Pape. !3mte Facts. Real Afznds and the PostulatiOn o( Reality: Resher on Idealism and the Ontologtcul .\ieutrahty o( Expenence: J. C. Pitt. Domg Phtlosophy: Rescher 's :\'ormuttve :\lethodology: I .. B. PunteL Is Truth "Ideczl Coherence"?; M. Quante. Understandmg Conceptual Schemes: Rescher 's Quarrel with DaVJdson; A. Siitonen. The Ontology o(Facts and f'alzzes; M. Willaschek. Skeptical Challenge and the Burden o(Proo( On Rescher 's Cnttque o(Skepttcism: N. Rescher. Responses.

VOLUME 65 (1999) THE TO'LUXIARIAN PARAD!Gh! AFTER THE E>JD OF COt\Hv!UNIS!IL _-\THEORETICAL RK-\SSESSMENT. TOW.~DS (Edited by Achim Siegel) A SiegeL Introduction: The Changmg Fortunes o( the Totalltanan Paradigm m Commllmst Studies. On Recent Controversies Over The Concept Of Totalitarianism - K. von Beyme, The Concept o(Totalitanamsm ·A Reassessment ajler the End ofCommumst Rule; K. Mueller. }.'ast European Studies. Neo-Totahtariamsm and Social Science Them)·; L. \'owak, A Conception that IS Supposed to Corre.spond to the Tota/itanan Approach to Realsocwlism; E. Nolte, The Three Verswns o(the Theot}' o(Totabtanamsm and the Sigmficance o(the Historical-Genetic l'erswn; E. Jesse, The Two ;\fa/Or Instances o( Totalitanamsm: Observations on the InterconnectiOn between Soviet Conummis/11 and National Socwlism. Classic Concept Of Totalitarianism: Reassessment J.P. Amason, Totahtananwn and i\!odermty: Fran::: Borkenw1 's And Reinterpt·etation "Totalitcman Enemy" as a Source o( Socwlog1cal Theon:::mg on Totalitanamsm; .-\. Solner_ Sigmund 1Vewnann 's "Permanent Revolution": A Forgotten Classic of Comparative Research 111to lvfodern Dictatorship; F. Pohlmmm, The "Seeds o( Destruction" in Totalitarian Systems. An Inter's Political Philosophy; W.J. Patzelt Reality Construction pretatiOn o(the Umty 111 Hannah .~rend! under l'otalitanamsm: An Ethnomethodologtcal Elahoratwn o( Martm Draht 's Concept o( Totalilanamsm; A SiegeL Carl Joachim Friedrich's Concept o(Totalitanamsm: A Re111terpretatwn; M.R. Thompson, i'./either Totalitarian nor Allthontanan: Post-Totalitanamsm in Eastern E7irope.

VOLUME 66 ( 1999) Leon Gumatiski TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS THAT THE Ql_iESTION'' AND OTHER SHiDJES IN ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY _\ND LOGIC

Preface; The Elements of a Judgment and Enstence; Tmdllwnal Logic and Eustential Presuppositions; To Be Ur Not To Be? Is That The Questwn?; Some Remarks On De(zmtions: Logische und semant1sche Antinon11en; A New Approach to Realistic Epistemology; Ausgewahlte Probleme der deontischen Logik; An Attempt at the Defimtion o(the Biological Concept o(Homology; Similanty.

VOLUME 67 (1999) Kazimierz Twardowski ON ACTIONS, PRODUCTS ,"\ND OTHER TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHY (Edited by Johannes Brandl and Jan Wolet\ski)

(I 926"9 1;: Biographical Notes. I. On Mind, Introduction: Translator's Note: Sel(~Portrmt Psychology, and Language: Psychology vs. Physiology and Phtlosophy (189 7 ); On the Cla.w(icatwn o( Mental Phenomena (1898); The Essence of Concepts (1903/24); On !clio- and Actions and Products (I YI 2); The Hwnamlies and Allogenetic Theones of Judgment (1 90 !'sycholog}· (i 9/2 -6); On the Log1c o(Ad/eclives 11923 2-). II. On Truth and Knowledge: On SoCalled Relat1w Truths (1 900); A priori. or Ratwnal (Deductive) Sciences and a posteriori. or Course !1925 -5). III. On Empmcal (Inductive) Sciences !1923); Theo1y o(Knowledge..~Lecture Philosophy: Fi·anz Rrentuno and the HisiOI)' o(Philosophy (1895); The HISionca/ Conception o( Philosoph)' (19 I 2); On Clear and Unclear Phtlosoph1cal Style (i 920); Symbolomamu and Pragmatophobw (1921); Address at the 25th Anmverswy Se.\·swn of the Pohsh Phi/osopl11cal Society ( 1929•31 ); On 1he D1gmty of' the Umversity (1933). Bibliogmphy. 7

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