Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece 9781501732133

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MYTH AND POETICS

A series edited by GREGORY NAGY

Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece by Lisa Raphals Also in the series The Ravenous Hyenas and the Wounded Sun: Myth and Ritual in Ancient India by Stephanie W. Jamison Poetry and Prophecy: The Beginnings cif a Literary Tradition edited by James Kugel The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics by Leslie Kurke

cif Social Economy

Epic Singers and Oral Tradition by Albert Bates Lord The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad by Richard P. Martin Heroic Sagas and Ballads by Stephen A. Mitchell Greek Mythology and Poetics by Gregory Nagy Myth and the Polis edited by Dora C. Pozzi and John M. Wickersham Homer and the Sacred City by Stephen Scully

KNOWING WORDS Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece LISA RAPHALS

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright© 1992 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1992 by Cornell University Press.

International Standard Book Number o-8014-2619-7 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 91-55554 Printed in the United States of America Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book.

@) The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information SciencesPermanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

To Victor Raphals 1911-1982

Contents

Foreword, by Gregory Nagy Preface Abbreviations Introduction I Chinese Accounts of Wisdom and Knowledge 2 Wisdom in Classical Confucianism 3 Mohist Knowledge 4 Taoist Wisdom 5 Cunning in Rhetoric and Strategy Interlude 6 The Strategies of Zhuge Liang 7 The Journey to the West 8 Heroes, Kings, and Kingmakers 9 Skillful Means IO Conclusions Appendixes Character List Selected Bibliography Index

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xvii I

9

26

50 70 IOI

I29 I33 I67 I88 208

226 233 236

246 26I

Foreword

My goal as editor of the Myth and Poetics series is to encourage work that helps to integrate the critical study of literature with the approaches of anthropology and pays special attention to problems concerning the nexus of ritual and myth. Early volumes in the series set the groundwork for a broadened understanding of the very concepts of myth and ritual as reflected in the specific cultural context of ancient Greek poetics. Later volumes extended the field of vision from the Greek perspective to linguistically related realms such as ancient Indic ritual syntax and medieval Scandinavian heroic sagas and ballads. Lisa Raphals's Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions if China and Greece extends the field even further, drawing on the philosophical and literary traditions of China to explore the semantics of wisdom and cunning, and, through them, the broader problem of intelligence. In the area of Greek intellectual history, an anthropological approach to this problem, most clearly articulated in Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant's Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, has proved to be particularly successful. Raphals's book offers a reexamination of this approach in terms of Chinese traditions, arriving at a powerful new formulation that will interest sinologists, classicists, and scholars of philosophy and comparative literature. GREGORY NAGY

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Preface

For the past two or more millennia, the operation of a set of mental capacities defined variously as knowledge, wisdom, rationality, and more generally as intelligence, has tended to dominate not only the Western intellectual landscape but many general considerations of the human condition. Attempts to defme an essence of humanity have focused on intelligence; in name at least, homo sapiens is taxonomically distinguished from the other hominids by the capacity to know. 1 This book is about a mode of intelligence or way of knowing that is easier to recognize than to talk about-a mode of knowing that falls into the lacuna between the kinds of knowledge we formally acknowledge and those we recognize in social practice and everyday language. This mode of intelligence embraces a set of skills and men1 In both etymology and general usage, the terms knowledge, wisdom, and intelligence describe a complex set of faculties: the ability to recognize, discriminate, or perceive significant differences and think, learn, or reason about them. Knowledge often refers to a particular domain of expertise, and in this sense intelligence is more general and refers to broader capacities, which include having knowledge, sagacity, and the ability to know. It is in this sense that we make a distinction between stupidity as lacking intelligence and ignorance as lacking knowledge. But the broader meaning of knowing refers to wisdom, the exercise of sound judgment, discernment, and the ability to perceive. Wisdom entails skill (which may include skill in magic or the occult arts), expertise, knowledge, and learning. In this broad sense, to know means to be aware, cognizant, versed, or skilled. The English root know of knowledge is cognate with the Greek *gno. Wisdom and wit derive from the Indo-European roots *woid- and *weid(to know) and *wid- (to see). Thus wit is the seat of consciousness, thinking, and the faculty of reasoning. Cognates include Greek oida (to know), Latin videre (to see) and German wissen.

xi

xii

Preface

tal attitudes that range from wisdom, forethought, keen attention, and resourcefulness to subtle indirection, craft, deception, and cunning. It relies on skill, strategy, and a general knack for handling whatever comes along. It is the intelligence not of Apollo but of Athena, an intelligence best associated in the Western tradition with the wily and resourceful Odysseus. The importance of practical wisdom, sagacity, and cunning are widely acknowledged in practice, but we must move from philosophical discourse to everyday language to fmd a nonpejorative language in which to talk about them. Even so, English has no equivalent for what the Greeks called mitis. The range of English words for wisdom and cunning provides an example of this tension. In positive t~rms, we say someone is wise, knowledgeable, sagacious, subtle, prescient, foresighted, or expert. The same individual may be negatively described as cunning, crafty, slippery, underhanded, or devious. Several terms are ambiguous in their moral weighting, for example, clever, canny, wily, and sharp. Yet for all their different nuances, these terms may all be applied to the same type of individual. This lacuna between the knowledge we recognize in official discourse and that which we recognize in ordinary language and day-to-day activities is reflected in linguistic practice as a tension between "wisdom" and "cunning," virtuous and vicious intelligence. In a germinal study, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, in which they investigate what they call "practical and cunning intelligence," Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant argue that there is a polarity in Greek culture between two modes of knowing: speculative reason and mitis. Suggesting that mitis operates as an independent mode of intelligence with its own logic and methods, they describe it as a way of knowing, with complex but coherent mental attitudes and characteristic intellectual behavior, typically applied to shifting, ambiguous situations that are not amenable to rigorous logic or calculation. They argue that the principal types of individual within Greek society relied on mitis. Their investigation not only demonstrates the nature and importance of mitis within Greek society but also suggests its importance as a universal type ofhuman intelligence. In this book I examine the applicability of what I call metic intelligence (from the Greek word mitis) to the culture and language of early China.2 By using indigenous issues within the Chinese intellec2The word metis is related to the verbs metiao, "to consider, meditate, plan," and

Preface

xn1

tual tradition, I examine the provenance of metic intelligence in classical Chinese culture and society. As in the Greek case, metic intelligence tacitly informed many aspects of early Chinese society, including both personal and social morality, military strategy, and statecraft. I draw upon representative Warring States philosophical, historical, and military texts and late Ming historical-fictional texts to establish the continuing importance of metic intelligence in China, and I then compare the problems of metic intelligence in China and Greece. In the first part of the book I examine early Chinese understandings of wisdom, knowledge, craft, and cunning from the viewpoint of early Chinese theories of language. Within the domain of Chinese studies, I argue that Chinese views of the nature of language and knowledge were fundamental to other considerations not usually associated with the question of language and its relation to thought. These include statecraft, warfare, and a variety of questions of personal and social morality. Chapter 1 concerns the problem of Chinese textual sources for the investigation of metic intelligence. In chapters 2 through 5, I examine the key word zhi in representative texts from the Warring States period of early China (403-222 B.C. E.) by using groups of significant and representative philosophical, historical, and military texts to illustrate Warring States period reflections on the nature of wisdom and intelligence. In chapter 2, I describe the uses of zhi in two pre-Confucian texts, the Shu jing and three classical Confucian works, the Lunyu, or Analects, of Confucius (551-479 B.C.E) and the works of Mencius (380?-305? B.C.E.) and Xunzi (340?-245? B.C.E.). In chapter 3, I examine the epistemology of the Mohist canon; in chapter 4, the Taoist texts attributed to Laozi and Zhuangzi; and in chapter 5, two works on military strategy and persuasion, the Sunzi bingfa, or Sunzi 's Art of ~r, and the Zhanguo ce, or Strategies of the Warring States. The second part of the book shows the centrality of metic intelligence to the construction of two novels from the Ming dynasty (1368-1644 c.E.), the Romance of Three Kingdoms, or Sanguo yanyi, (fourteenth century) and the Journey to the West, or Xi you ji (sixteenth century). Both works combine elements of history, fiction, legend, metioomai, "to contrive." The term metic intelligence is totally unrelated to the word metic, which refers to the metoikoi, foreign-born, "second-class citizens" of Athens, who paid a tax (metoikion) for the privilege of residing there but enjoyed no civil rights.

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Preface

religion, and philosophy and deal with prominent figures within Chinese history. Both novels feature metic characters and illustrate characteristic modes of action of metic individuals. Each work draws on the history and the rich philosophical debates of the Warring States period. In chapter 6, I look at the role of metic intelligence in the Romance of Three Kingdoms, where it is the modus operandi of the historical strategist-general Zhuge Liang, probably the locus classicus for the person of zhi within the Chinese tradition. In chapter 7, I examine metic intelligence as a central element in the quest of the Journey, especially in the fictional construction of the historical figure Xuan Zang (probably the most famous Buddhist cleric in Chinese history) and his wily double, best known as Monkey. Chapters 6 and 7 provide evidence of the construction of metic characters and the preservation of the semantic field of consistent usages of zhi in Ming works. In chapters 8 and 9, I compare the Iliad and the Odyssey to the Romance of the Three Kingdoms and the Journey to the West and argue that metic intelligence informs five broad themes common to all these texts: force and guile, kings and kingmakers, representation of the hero, designing women, and like-mindedness. A broader goal of the book is to show the relevance and importance of the Chinese philosophical tradition to contemporary issues in philosophy of language, linguistics, anthropology, and poetics. I argue for the relevance of early Chinese debates about knowledge and language to a variety of questions of contemporary interest and for the importance of comparative inquiry. The first half of the book may be of particular interest to philosophers and specialists in the intellectual history of early China. In these chapters I seek to reposition and clarify the relation of knowledge and language within early Chinese philosophical inquiry and to argue that metic intelligence is not only discernible in the culture and philosophy of early China but is actually central to several issues vexing that philosophical tradition. In the second half of the book, I include material of specific interest to students of classics and comparative literature, and I use a comparison between certain aspects of the Chinese historical-fictional tradition and the Iliad and the Odyssey to address broad themes ofheroism and recognition that are more typically addressed only in the context of epics composed in Indo-European languages. In cases where I use my own translations, I have tried to provide references to alternate translations of Chinese works. The bibliogra-

Preface

xv

phy contains a list of a variety of translations of classical works. The Pinyin system of romanization is used, except where a Westernized name (for example, Confucius) or a Wade-Giles romanization (for example, Taoism) is already in general use. Direct quotations preserve the transliteration system used by the author or translator. In one particularly difficult case, Tao and dao, I use both forms. I am indebted to more people than it is possible to acknowledge here for the help they have given me. I am especially grateful to Anthony Yu both for early guidance in the formulation of this project and for insights, details, and generosity over the years. The timely interventions of Gregory Nagy and Stephen Toulmin have shaped this book in diverse ways. Angus Graham, Anne McLaren, Victor Mair, Andrew Plaks, Kidder Smith, and Lothar Von Falkenhausen have read various versions of this work and have generously provided detailed comments and corrections. Roger Ames, Francisca Cho Bantly, David Keightley, Lee Yearley, and Yu Chun-fang have generously provided access to unpublished materials. Finally, I am grateful to Alison Johnson for meticulous and intelligent editing of my manuscript. Part of the research for this project was conducted with financial support from the Committee on Asian Studies of the University of Chicago. LISA RAPHALS

Cambridge, Massachusetts

Abbreviations

Major editions for primary sources are indicated liere. Full citations for all primary sources appear in the Bibliography. References to commentary that appears in works of translation are listed as secondary sources, by year of publication.

Editions, Reference Works, and Journals HY SPTK ZZ]C

Harvard- Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series Ssu Pu Ts'ung K'an Zhuzi jicheng

Texts An. EY HF HN

HS Lao

Lie

LJ

LSCQ M

Analects (Lunyu) (HY) Er ya (HY) Hanfeizi Huai nanzi (ZZJC) Han shu Laozi (ZZ]C) Liezi (ZZJC) Liji (HY) Lu shi chun qiu (ZZJC) Mengzi (Mencius) (HY)

xviii

Abbreviations

Mao Mo SBBF SGC SGTSYY SGYY SGYYPH SGYYPP SGZ SJ SMF SSZY Sun

sw

SZBF TGLT TPYL WLZ X XYJ YJ YWLJ

z

ZGC ZLL

Mao shi (HY) Mozi jiangu (ZZJC) Sun Bin bingfa Sanguo ce Sanguo tong su yanyi Sanguo (zhi) yanyi Sanguo yanyi pinghua Pi ping Sanguo yanyi (ed. Li Jowu) Sanguo zhi Shiji Sima fa (SPTK) Shang shu zhengyi Sunzi Shuo wen Sunzi bingfa Taigong liu tao zhijie (SPTK) Taiping yulan ~i liaozi (SPTK) Xunzi (ZZJC) Xiyou ji Yijing (HY) Yiwen leiju Zhuangzi Zhanguo ce Zhuge liang lun

KNOWING WORDS

Introduction

The problem of metic intelligence in the Western tradition begins, in a sense, with Plato, the first of the Greek philosophers to attempt a systematic philosophical inquiry into the nature of knowledge. In the Theaetetus he attempts to define knowledge, t in the Republic to determine its proper objects.2 Aristotle preserves the Platonic distinction between universal objects of knowledge and ephemeral objects of belief but introduces the notion of phronesis, or practical intelligence, as a means to induce theoretical knowledge from concrete particulars. For Aristotle, to know was to be able to demonstrate, one aspect of which was the intuitive grasp (nous) of the premises of knowledge. Since Plato, two broad dispositions have dominated the problem of knowledge; both tend to exclude metic intelligence because it does not fit easily into their conceptual categories. The first is a "scientific" 1 The Theaetetus proposes and rejects three definitions of knowledge: that is, perception (151d-186e), true opinion (187a-201c), and true opinion justified by an account or logos (201c-210a). For an excellent analysis of the arguments in the Theaetetus, see Levett 1928. v-xi and Burnyeat 1990.251-55. 2In the Republic (5.477b) Plato argues that knowledge and belief are different faculties and therefore must have different objects, the Forms and opinion. It is unclear whether this argument identifies episteme with propositional knowledge or with acquaintance. Cross and Woozley (1971.74-78) have argued that a failure to distinguish clearly between propositional knowledge and acquaintance may have led Plato to search inappropriately for objects of knowledge, which would be reasonable for acquaintance but not for propositional knowledge.

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Knowing Words

tendency to take episteme as knowledge,3 to reduce knowledge to propositional knowledge, and to reduce intelligence to the abilities connected with propositional knowledge. 4 Although Plato does not reach any final account of knowledge, the Christian Neoplatonism of the Middle Ages is concerned with theoretical knowledge and abstract universals. The skeptics of the seventeenth century question medieval claims to knowledge and methods of discussing it but do not challenge its definition. The legacy of Locke, Descartes, and Kant privileges theoretical over practical knowledge and associates true knowledge with essences that can be described and defined in words. Thus in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant equates humanity with rationality and views pure reason as the wellspring of both practical reason and moral knowledge. This tendency pervades the empirical sciences, which have increasingly displaced philosophy as a primary source of cultural identity and value.s It is an unexpressed corollary to empiricism and positivism. (The positivist view that genuine knowledge concerns the observable world presupposes the ability to describe such "positive" knowledge.) Examples of this tendency include the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget and, more recently, the "multiple intelligences" of Howard Gardner and the entire field of "artificial intelligence. "6 Anthropologists like Claude Levi-Strauss and Clifford 3 1 take this sense of the term from R. G. Collingwood's critique of "scientific" thinking in his Essay on Philosophical Method (I933.26-3I), in which he questions the validity of mathematics as an apt model for philosophical reflection. He argues that science concerns universals; its concepts conform to exclusive rules of classification, which in the exact sciences derive from logic. By contrast, the concerns of historical thinking are individual, and the concepts of philosophy are overlapping, rather than exclusive. 4Gilbert Ryle makes a similar argument in his "Knowing How and Knowing That" chapter in The Concept of Mind. See Ryle I949.25-62, especially 27-28. He ascribes some of the range of qualities I associate with metic intelligence to intelligence itself

(I949-25).

Sfor discussion of the ascendancy of the social sciences, see Berlin I978. I-I I and Rorty I979 and I982. 6Piaget addresses the issues that Kant deems central to human intelligence in a model ofhuman cognition which focuses on the development oflogical and rational thought; this view still largely informs the field of developmental psychology. Gardner provisionally defmes six "intelligences": (I) linguistic, (2) musical, (3) logical-mathematical, (4) spatial, (5) bodily-kinesthetic, and (6) personal. He draws on evidence from experimental psychology, psychometry, biology, and neurobiology to extend Piaget's paradigm to a broader model of human intelligence. Although the last three ofhis "intelligences" may describe skills that are not directly related to the development oflogical and rational thought, none of them accounts for the skills ofmetis. See Gardner I983. I7-22.

Introduction

3

Geertz provide other examples of the view that if we really know something, we can provide a conceptual articulation of it and, further, that if the articulation is a good one, it will stand up to transposition into another system of analysis. 7 Ironically, Geertz's dilemma about the nature of anthropology as an "interpretive science" arises out of an attempt to emphasize the importance of "practical knowledge" to ethnography without compromising the latter's status as a science. The concerns of abstraction, propositional knowledge, logocentric formulation, and "objective" bases of knowledge all tend to make metic intelligence invisible, precisely because it cannot be formulated in terms of a definition or essence and because its "objects" are changing, ambiguous situations that are not amenable to rigorous logical demonstration. While the scientific tendency may make metic intelligence invisible, a second "moralist" tendency makes it vicious. Metic intelligence is morally and ethically problematic because the abilities we recognize and approve as wisdom may be the same abilities we disparage as cunning and cleverness. This tendency is concerned with the relation of knowledge and virtue. The view that virtue (arete) is a branch ofknowledge (episteme) begins with Socrates, who opposes Protagoras's view that virtue is a "knack" or a set of patterns of conduct that are tacitly learned (Protagoras 3 19a-320c). Socrates enjoins self-knowledge through the somewhat paradoxical assertion that no one who knows the Good wittingly does ill. Unlike the Socrates of the middle and late dialogues, the Socrates of the early dialogues is "a moral philosopher, pure and simple,"8 and Plato never 7Levi-Strauss (1969. I) describes The Raw and the Cooked as an attempt to use empirical categories to formulate abstract ideas and propositions. Although his categories are based on ethnographic observation and particular cultural standpoints, their intent is to develop conceptual tools to "elaborate abstract ideas and combine them in the form of propositions." According to Clifford Geertz's (1973. 24) now classic essay on thick description: "The bes~tting sin of interpretive approaches to anythingliterature, dreams, symptoms, culture-is that they tend to resist, or to be permitted to resist, conceptual articulation and thus to escape systematic modes of assessment" (italics mine). BSee Vlastos 1988.91, who articulates ten fundamental contrasts in the philosophies ascribed to Socrates in the early and middle dialogues. The early Socrates makes no ironclad distinction between what we would now call propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance. The definitions in the early dialogues establish a model of propositional or logocentric knowledge; Socrates considers giving the logos to be sufficient for both knowledge and virtue. By contrast, the self-knowledge of the later dialogues may be nonpropositional knowledge by acquaintance. This tension within the figure of Socrates may mirror a larger tension within Plato between metis and the

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decisively abandons this strongest statement of the moralist position.9 Christian adaptations of Platonism "moralize" the ethical orientation of the Socratic philosophy of the early dialogues. When Saint Augustine locates intelligence as the first cause of the universe, he is referring both to an intellectual virtue and to a moral capacity. The tradition that Machiavelli was diabolically inspired, a legend already established by the time of the first English translation of The Prince in 1640, is an indication of the dubious reception that could be accorded to reflections on the amoral exercise of a practical intelligence.10 It is noteworthy that in the The Prince, Machiavelli used practice (as evidenced by history), rather than abstract considerations and principles, to draw conclusions about politics and the art of government. -Metic intelligence does not fit into this moralizing tendency, because it presents us with a continuum of wisdom and cunning. In contrast to the Greek distinction between theoretical and practical intelligence, the Buddhist distinction between prajiiii, "theoretical knowledge," and upiiya, "skill in means," recognizes the oblique and devious, as well as the practical, aspects of knowledge and wisdom. Despite recent challenges from both philosophy and the social sciences, these scientific and moralist dispositions remain key elements in the construction and representation of Western culture. 11 These two tendencies do not accommodate metic intelligence, which too easily appears both arational and amoral, if not irrational and immorlogocentric view of knowledge generally ascribed to Plato. As in the case of Confucius and "Confucians," the possibility that Plato's views of knowledge may have differed from those of his later interpreters raises important questions beyond the scope of the present work. For a fuller discussion of Plato's view(s) of(moral) knowledge, see Dodds 1951.183-85 and Vlastos 1988.97-98. 9 Plato repeatedly reaffirms this view. See his Timaeus 86b, Protagoras 345d, Gorgias 509e, Republic 351 a and c, and Laws 862. For discussion of the problem of virtue as knowledge in Plato, see Grube I935-2I6ni. tOSee Machiavelli, The Prince 9 and 23-24. 11 To cite a few out of many possible examples, Richard Rorty (1979) attacks Lockean-Cartesian-Kantian notions of philosophy of mind, theory of knowledge, and foundations of philosophy, in short, the very notion of epistemology. We can see philosophical opposition to the scientific tendency in the works ofR. G. Collingwood (1933, discussed briefly on page 2), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958), and J. L. Austin (1961). Within the disciplines of anthropology, history, and sociology, explorations of broad problems of human and social agency and their roles in the constitution of self-knowledge have also challenged the tacit epistemology of the scientific tendency. Examples include the works of Volosinov (1929), Gramsci (1957), Giddens (1983), Rosaldo (1989), and Inden (1990). This entire issue calls for fuller discussion than these few examples.

Introduction

5

al. By contrast, the Chinese tradition is overwhelmingly concerned with practical knowledge. As such, it stands to offer a fresh perspective on an area of inquiry that in the West has for centuries been overwhelmed by our cultural emphasis on abstraction.12 As Christoph Harbsmeier observes, both transformational grammar and analytical philosophy tend to downplay serious structural differences between languages; by contrast, Classical Chinese presents important evidence to such diverse fields as the history of ideas, the history of science, historiography, lyric poetry, and the philosophy oflanguage precisely because of its differences from the Western tradition. 13 Classical Chinese provides an alternative grammar and semantics in which to examine many of the preoccupations of contemporary philosophy and linguistics. An immediate obstacle to a preliminary description of metic intelligence is the overt resemblance between mitis and phronesis, the "practical intelligence" of Aristotle. Yet metic intelligence operates with a peculiar twist, the unexpressed premise that both reality and language cannot be understood (or manipulated) in straightforward "rational" terms but must be approached by subtlety, indirection, and even cunning. By contrast, phronesis is practical but not inherently oblique, devious, or indirect. 14 In more contemporary terms, it is tempting, but misleading, to reduce metic intelligence to "know-how knowledge."ts

t2Several recent studies have moved in this direction. Herbert Fingarette's Confocius: the Secular as Sacred (I 972) addresses the contribution of the Chinese tradition to modern Western philosophical discourse. More recently, Ames and Hall's Thinking through Confocius (1987) addresses the role of practical intelligence in Confucian thought and is a pioneering work in comparative philosophical inquiry. Angus Graham's Disputes of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (1989) focuses on the role of modes of argumentation in the philosophical development of early China. In an even more ambitious vein, Graham (1985) attempts to ground a contemporary consideration of moral philosophy in the thought of the Zhuangzi. t3Harbsmeier 1981.2. See also Lloyd 1990.Io-I2 and 105-35. t4In Plato and Aristotle, the term metis only appears in reference to polumetis Odysseus. Aristotle uses phronesis for the practical aspects of metic intelligence but not its indirect and devious aspect. I am indebted to Stephen Toulmin for raising the question of the relationship of metis and phronesis, to Martha Nussbaum for her discussion of this point, and to Theodore Brunner for access to the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, which answered it. tSThis term is one of a group of epistemological distinctions introduced by Bertrand Russell and modified by Gilbert Ryle. For Russell's distinction between acquaintance ("know-of' knowledge of things) and description ("know-that" knowledge of truths), see Russell 1912, chapters 5 and 13. For Ryle's threefold distinc-

6

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In their investigation, Detienne and Vernant stress that mitis cannot be treated as a concept or idea because of its complex range of actions and attitudes. This "mode of action" or "attitude of mind" falls outside the purview of the history of ideas because it was never explicitly formulated, analyzed, or discussed and can only be studied indirectly. Detienne and Vernant used philological methods to show that mitis was associated with a well-defined and coherent semantic field of words and images. A semantic field refers to a consistent association of a group of words over a long period of time and their consistent distinction from other words of different usage. The word mitis, for example, is consistently used to describe uncertain situations governed by the use of guile, rather than force, and by the exercise of "knack," rather than the knowledge of epistimi. Individuals of mitis are typically never at a loss or without expedient; they are polumitis, polutropos, and polumikhanos. They are diverse in their arts and tricks, doloi pantoioi and tikhni pantoii. Their mitis is poikili, variegated and multicolored; pantoii, multiple; and aiole, shifting and swift as the wind. 16 The consistent presence of a semantic field allowed Detienne and Vernant to claim that mitis was a permanent feature of the Greek world and that it was consistently used and understood in texts as different in time and subject matter as the works of Homer and Oppian. For more than ten centuries, a consistent, if tacit, notion of metic intelligence was applied to dorriains as diverse as weaving, navigation, and medicine. If Detienne and Vernant are correct in their identification of metic intelligence as a universal mode of intelligence, we should see its operation in cultural traditions and languages that are as independent as possible of Greek and European linguistic and conceptual categories. In particular, we should find both specific equivalents for mitis and broad equivalents for the semantic field of mitis in classical Chinese, the literary language that evolved in China between the years 500 and 200 B.C.E. Classical Chinese has set the standard for philosophical and intellectual discourse in both China and much of Asia; its role in Asia has been similar to that of Classical Greek in Western Europe. It was the vehicle for the expression of philosophical, litertion between knowing how, knowing that (propositional knowledge), and acquaintance, see Ryle 1949.25-62. For a general discussion of these issues, see Quinton 1967·4-350. 16 Detienne and Vernant 1978.18-20.

Introduction

7

ary, and historical works that were the textual foundations of both Chinese society and many other Asian societies. Several issues complicate such an undertaking. First, the investigation of a non theoretical mode of intelligence presents methodological difficulties that do not apply to explicitly formulated philosophies and systems of knowledge. Because of the diversity of its manifestations and the lack of systematic or self-reflective accounts of metis, Detienne and Vernant rely on indirect "archaeological" methods in their examination of a wide variety of mythological and historical sources.17 In this book I apply the philological methods ofDetienne and Vernant to representative Chinese texts separated by long periods of time in order to establish consistent semantic fields for metic intelligence within Chinese culture and society. To locate equivalents for metis, I focus on the semantic range of the term zhi, which has a wide variety of meanings from wisdom, knowledge, and intelligence to skill, craft, cleverness, or cunning. Following the general method of Detienne and Vernant's investigation of metis, I examine the operation of zhi in representative texts from two periods of Chinese history separated by some sixteen centuries: the Warring States period (403-222 B.C.E.) and the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Not all usages of zhi correspond to metis, however. There is also a general tendency within Chinese philosophical works for rival schools to use the same vocabulary to advance very different ideas. The same locution may express three entirely different notions in Confucian, Taoist, and Militarist works; a considerable variety of metaphysical assumptions may underlie one word.lB A second caveat involves cross-cultural study. The richness of the Classical Chinese language and textual tradition, its importance in Asia, and its independence of Greece all invite cross-comparison. Yet any such comparison must address the Chinese intellectual tradition on its own terms. To do otherwise would be merely to import a 17 For a different and more general description of such archaeological methods of historical investigation, see Foucault 1972. 18Roger Ames addresses this issue with his method of" conceptual reconstruction." He traces the origins and development of "crucial concepts" in the growth of early Chinese philosophy and disentangles Confucian, Mohist, and Taoist elements and usages by making explicit the implicit metaphysical foundations underlying these terms. Since there is no exact mapping between concept and locution, the multiplicity of concepts described by the same word must be disentangled and clarified. He thus reconstructs a field of concepts associated with a given locution. See Ames 1983.xixii.

8

Knowing Words

Greek problem into China and effect a Greek solution. In this sense, cross-cultural comparison has had a dubious past, insofar as it has been used to privilege implicitly the Western perspective.19 To avoid the risk of simply importing a Greek conceptual category into China and making it fit, I examine usages of zhi in the context of two issues that are articulated in the Chinese intellectual tradition: the question of the respective roles of wen and wu-the civil and the martial spheres of society-and the "language crisis," a debate about the nature and limits of language that was of great concern to the Chinese speculative thinkers of the late Warring States period. The problem of the relation of wisdom and morality maps approximately onto the "wen-wu conflict." The problem of whether true knowledge can be expressed directly in words is expressed in the "language crisis." t9Historically, such comparisons have tended to portray China as a mythical, mystical, timeless, inftnitely homeostatic "Other." See, for example, Foucault's description of Borges's "Chinese encyclopedia" as the inspiration for The Order of Things (1973.xv-xxiv). For an excellent summary of historical and literary treatments of China in the West, see Zhang 1988.108-31. For a discussion of the relation of language to thought, especially the Greek language, see Bernal 1987.

CHAPTER

I

Chinese Accounts of Wisdom and Knowledge

The Chinese reflective thinkers of the first millennium B.C.E. did not describe metic intelligence in treatises or explicitly formulated philosophical systems. Nevertheless, practical intelligence, wisdom, or savoir faire pervades the thought of texts as diverse (and in some cases, as mutually antagonistic) as those attributed to Confucius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Sunzi, and Mencius and haunts their peripheries like a sort of after-image. Normative Confucianism dominated China in much the same way that rationalistic and ethical Platonism dominated first Greece and then Europe. In China, as in ancient Greece, philosophies that recognized the importance of metic intelligence existed side-by-side with their more normative counterparts. These alternative views differ in their concepts of both language and morality. The Militarist tradition (Bing jia), in strong contrast with Confucianism, presents a martial (wu) and relatively amoral view of intellectual capability as the crucial capability of the sage-general. The Taoist tradition (Dao jia) also attacks Confucian accounts of knowledge and language and illustrates, rather than describes, wisdom indirectly through aphoristic accounts of the character and actions of "sages" (sheng). Several sources, arid in particular Han redactions of late Zhou and Warring States texts, provide direct and indirect information about early Chinese views of wisdom and cunning. Han dictionaries and compendia give important information about key terms and categories, but they also incorporate Han interpretations and interpolations. It was these very interpretations and classificatory schemata that were 9

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to set the tone for the subsequent interpretation of Warring States period works.

Texts of Pre-Confucian Origin I use the Shi jing, or Book of Poetry, and the Shu jing, or Book of History, to examine the treatment of knowledge, cunning, and informed prudence in texts of pre-Confucian origin. The Shu jing, however, is not a homogeneous text and can by no means be presented as uniformly "pre-Confucian." Parts of the Shu jing date from the late Eastern Zhou, and others are later Han forgeries. Karlgren translates only the undeniably authentic parts of the Shu jing, and I have used his translation to select verifiably pre-Confucian passages. 1 The Shu jing typically describes intelligence and wisdom with the terms ming and zhe, rather than zhi. The preface to the Shujing (a later interpolation attributed to Confucius) describes Yao as "intelligent and enlightened, accomplished and sincere" (cong ming wen si) (SSZY Yao 2.2b).2 Another passage explains that the ruler of a well-run state must have two key qualities: wisdom and kindness. Wisdom (zhe) is described as "knowing others" (zhi ren). A wise ruler can nominate the right people for office. A ruler who possesses the second quality brings peace to the people (an min), and the people cherish him (SSZY Yu 4.1ob). The one use of zhi in the Shu jing (Zhou I 5. 4a) is synonymous with zhe and describes a badly run state.3 In these accounts, the ruler who is ming is discerning and enlightened by the ability to understand, perceive, and appreciate; Henri Maspero argues that the true meaning 1 For translations of the Shu jing, see Karlgren 1950. The translations of this and other texts discussed in this book are my own unless otherwise indicated. I indicate a translation other than my own by citing the translator's name following the primary source citation, for example, (SSZY Yao 2.4a, Karlgren 1). 2'fhe Shu jing itself describes the emperor Yao as "reverent, enlightened, accomplished, sincere and peaceful" (qin ming wen sian an) (SSZY Yao 2.4a, Karlgren 1). A similar passage of more questionable authenticity (SSZY Shun 3· u) describes Yao's successor, Shun, as "wise, accomplished, and intelligent" (zhe wen ming). 3 This passage refers to the demise of the state of Yin and contrasts the wise (zhe) former kings ofYin with the last Yin ruler, who brought misery on the wise (zh1) and good (SSZY Zhou 15.4a). For translation, see Karlgren 49·

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of ming is not simply intelligence but sacred intelligence. 4 Another important quality of the ruler is the ability to use the talents of others appropriately. According to Gao Yao, a ruler can attract enlightened (ming) and harmonious counsels (mou) by cultivating his own virtue (de) (SSZYYu 4.9b). One of the measures of a true ruler is the ability to attract wise ministers. The episode in the Romance where the sagegeneral Zhuge Liang agrees to advise the Han heir, Liu Bei, is an illustration of this principle. A counterpart appears in a purely martial context in considerations of the respective roles of rulers and generals. This skill in recognition has an opposite in the skills of concealment and hiddenness. Warring States concern with these negative metic abilities may underlie the notion of interiority that pervades large areas of Chinese poetic discourse. s Thus the Shu jing explicitly describes two attributes of virtuous (de) rulers: (1) enlightened (or sacred) intelligence (ming), wisdom (zhe), and the ability to understand others (zhi ren) and (2) the ability to bring peace to the people (an min) through counsel (mou). Unstated but implied is a third attribute: the capacity to recognize and use the abilities of others. These descriptions of the illuminating knowledge of virtuous rulers contrast with another group of terms that describe individuals of artifice and deceptive speech, whose words do not conform to their actions. The wisdom and skill of rulers and their counselors-ming, zhi, zhe, and mou-are contrasted with cleverness and artifice (qiao), deceit (yin), and trickery (jian). Virtuous rulers are not only wise and kind; they protect the people against "clever language" (qiao yan) and beguiling appearance (SSZY Yu 4· 10b). Confucius quotes this passage (An. 1. 3), and its sentiment appears in a similar Shu jing passage of questionable authenticity, which warns against employing men of "artful language" (qiao yan) and insinuating looks (SSZY Zhou I9.8b). The emperor Yao's search for a worthy successor to whom he can hand over the empire exemplifies this antithesis between wisdom and deceit. Presented with someone who has accumulated and exhibited merit everywhere, Yao replies that the man speaks smoothly, but his 4The traditional etymology for ming, "bright," is from "sun" and "moon." For this argument, see Maspero 1933.249-96. SI am grateful to Stephen Owen for suggesting this possibility.

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actions are perverse (SSZY Yao 2. ub). A second passage contrasts the wisdom of the emperor Shun with his family's negative qualities: his father was blind and stupid, his mother deceitful (yin), and his brother arrogant. Nevertheless, Shun remained filial and self-controlled and did not become wicked (jian) (SSZY Yao 2. 14b). Unlike later Confucian works, which do not ascribe any of the qualities of wisdom to cunning individuals, the Shu jing presents a striking case of a person who is described as both wise and deceptive. When the emperor Yao seeks a worthy heir, his ministers suggest that his own son is enlightened (ming). The emperor responds that he is deceitful (yin) and quarrelsome and bypasses him in favor of the commoner Shun (SSZY Yao 2.11b). The Shu jing thus presents a semantic field of intelligence and wisdom that portrays the ruler as zhe, ming, and only incidentally zhi. This wisdom is also associated with wen, "cultivation," si, "sincerity" or "the ability to reflect," and mou, "the felicitous counsels of ministers." Ren, Confucian "benevolence," is conspicuously absent.6 These qualities are contrasted with qiao, yin, and jian- "cunning," "deceit," and "treachery." In contrast to later Confucian discussions of wisdom (zht), in Shu jing semantics a person can be both enlightened (ming) and deceptive. In the Shi jing, or Classic of Poetry, the graph zhi, "knowledge," is replaced by its near equivalent, zhi, "to know." This graph appears thirty-nine times, usually in its verbal sense of "to know" and once in the nominal sense of "knowledge." The King of Heaven (shang dt) praises the legendary King Wen because he is naturally law-abiding without knowledge or wisdom (bu shi bu zht) (Mao 241. 7). In fact, Karlgren glosses this passage: "but by nature, without effort" (Karlgren 196). Its description of zhi as implicit and inarticulate is far closer to the Laozi description of the sage than to the Confucian understanding of zhi as discursive and practical. It also suggests the Er ya definition of zhi as intuitive understanding. The Shi jing typically uses ming in its literal meaning "to be bright" for the purpose of describing the stars, sun, and moon and in the more abstract meaning "to brighten virtue" (ming de). 7 In a number of passages, ming seems to mean intelligence, rather than literal bright6Ren occurs only five times in the Shujing and is not a significant concept therein. For a discussion of the concept of ren as a Confucian innovation, see Schwartz 1986.76. 7 See Mao 241.2, 241.4, 241.7, 255.4, 262.6, and 299·4·

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3

ness. For example, the Shi jing ascribes intelligence (ming) and clairvoyance to heaven because of its ability to observe the conduct of men (Mao 254. 8) and describes Zhong Shanfu as enlightened (ming) and wise (zhe) (Mao 260.4). As in the hierarchies of psychological types described later in the chapter, wisdom (ming, zhe) is contrasted to stupidity or foolishness (yu). Individuals of wisdom are responsible for their own knowledge and their own ignorance. The Shi jing quotes a saying: "There is no wise [zhe] man who has no folly [yu]; the folly of the common people is simply a natural fault; but the folly of the wise man is a (deliberate) offense" (Mao 256.I, Karlgren 2I7). Similarly, Mao I81.3 employs a contrast between the perceptions of "wise men" (zhe), who recognize toil and suffering, and stupid men (yu), who see only bravado. The breadth and ambivalence of words for wisdom, cleverness, and cunning in the Shi jing is especially noteworthy. The ostensibly positive words for wisdom and foresight, zhe and sheng, have a semantic range from wise to clever; similarly, mou and you, terms for planning and counsel, are used ambivalently over a semantic span from wise counsel and foresight to deception and craft. The ostensibly negative term qiao is used to mean, on the one hand, "deceitful" and "cunning," on the other, "artful," "agile," or "graceful." The use of zhe and mou in the Shi jing is ambivalent. In some cases, zhe refers to the august and ethical wisdom ofkings, for example, the "all-embracing wisdom" (xuan zhe) (Mao 282) of "wise kings" (zhe wang) (Mao 243. I) an~ the wisdom (zhe) of the emperor Shang (Mao 304. I). In other cases, these terms refer to cleverness verging on trickery; it would appear that zhe is a term of praise for a man but of blame for a woman. Mao 264 contrasts a clever (zhe) man, who builds a city wall, to a clever woman, who overthrows it. This passage names women, not the action of heaven, as the source of disorder in the world and goes so far as to claim that only women and eunuchs are incapable of instruction. Mou, like zhe, has a range of meaning in the Shi jing. In its positive or neutral sense, mou is the foresight of kings and good ministers (as in the Shu jing). Negatively, mou is the scheming of crafty and wicked ministers. s A poem that laments dest"ructive counsel in a degenerate state makes it clear that the same ability-foresight-can be used for sAn exception occurs at Mao 58. 1, where mou refers to the craftiness of a man scheming to approach a woman.

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good or ill by ministers and rulers (Mao 195). The poem deplores the state of the country's counsels and plans (mou you) as crooked and awry. Good counsels (mou) are ignored or opposed; bad counsels are followed. The poet further laments that the plans (you) are pitiful, because they no longer take the ancient people or the great counsels (da you) as a standard but merely compete in uttering shallow words. The poet ends by stating that although the state is disordered and its people few, "some are wise (sheng), some are not ... some are clever (zhe), some are plotting" (mou) (Mao 195-4-5, Karlgren 142-43). This poem describes a situation in which rulers lack the ability to recognize foresight, and ministers either lack the ability to exercise foresight or pervert that ability to selfish ends. In its positive sense, the term mou is used of the ancient prince Dan Fu, who "plans" (mou) for the future of his people by building houses and making boundaries and divisions (Mao 237). Similarly, King Wu hands down plans (mou) to his descendants (Mao 244· 8). Mou and its synonym yu are also used in connection with "the old ways," for example, in describing sacrifice, where grain is prepared, followed by "laying plans" (mou) and the subsequent preparation of sacrificial meats (Mao 245. 7). Similarly, yu, like mou, is used in lamentation for political disorder (where no king or sage is present to plan adequately) and in general, in admonitions from old men to younger ones. Mao 254 remonstrates with makers of untrue speeches and short-sighted plans (you), men who are not wise (sheng) or sincere, men whose plans (you) are not far-seeing (Mao 2 54. 1 ). 9 In its negative sense of scheming foresight, mou is typically associated with clever language: "Tattling and glib-tongued, you plan [mou] and would slander people; be careful about your words, one will say that you are not reliable" (Mao 200.3, Karlgren 151). Sheng, "wisdom," can also be used in the derogatory sense of "cleverness," as in Mao 193, where the term is applied to the "clever" prime minister Huang Fu. The poet claims that Huang Fu has perverted the foresight proper to a minister by seleCting avaricious ministers and is "not even willing to leave a single old man, whom he could let guard our king" (Mao 193.5-6, Karlgren 139). In another 9Similar passages occur elsewhere in the Shijing: "Oh, you youngsters, I tell you the old ways; if you listen to my counsels [mou] you will have no cause for great regret" (Mao 256.12, Karlgren 219) and "I plan [mou] for you, I caution you: if the disorder increases, it will destroy you" (Mao 257.5, Karlgren 221).

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double contrast at Mao 195-5, individuals who are sage (sheng) and wise (zhe) are contrasted with wrongdoers (pi) and schemers (mou). Another Shi jing remonstrance contrasts the unthinking and unplanned destructiveness of heaven with the negligent destructiveness of degenerate ministers. Heaven does not prolong its grace (de), but sends down death and famine. It does not ponder (sl) or plan (tu). The words of rulers are not reliable; their "artful words" (qiao yan) are like a flow (Mao 194. 5). Artful language refers not to verbal facility per se but to a discontinuity between words and actions. Qiao yan, clever language, is the title and subject of Mao 198: "Vast and grand the ancestral temple, a lord [iunzi] made it. Well made the great plan [da you], a sage [sheng] laid it; others have their (own) minds [xin], but even I can guess them; leap, leap crafty [chan] hare, but a stupid [yu] dog can catch him" (Mao 198.4). As Karlgren points out in his translation (147-48), this passage suggests that if even a simple-minded subordinate such as the speaker can see through these falsehoods, how much more so should the lord, who represents power and wisdom. Qiao occurs in the Shi jing six times, three in the phrase qiao yan, clever language. But elsewhere in the Shi jing, qiao is a term of praise. Two instances praise the artful make-up of a beautiful woman. One, Mao 57.2, contrasts the red of her artful (qiao) smile with the black and white of her beautiful eyes. The other praises the fresh white gleam of her artful (qiao) smile and the richness of her girdle gems (Mao 59· 3). A third instance describes the beauty and smooth grace of an athlete whose shooting is skillful and whose running is agile (qiao) and stately (Mao 106. 1). Qiao has entirely separate meanings in the realms of speech and action. In the context of language, "clever talk," the connotations of qiao are negative from the Shi jing through the works of late Warring States period philosophers. In the context of action, however, qiao is "skill," and lacks the negative connotations of "cunning talk." Thus the terms in which these texts describe intelligence, knowledge, and wisdom, even in the earliest representative examples, present a complex and ambiguous view. On the one hand, they praise the power of wisdom, intelligence, and foresight to bring about social well-being and also praise the individuals who wield power in this way. Yet the same descriptions of wisdom admit, however grudgingly, its capacity for deception and disorder. The words that describe the enlightened wisdom and civilizing activities of the three

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legendary sage-emperors Yao, Shun, and Yu also describe the socially destructive activities of cunning ministers, deceptive language, and clever women. The descriptions of wisdom and intelligence in early Chinese texts present a spectrum, out of which Confucius uses zhi to describe the wisdom of his ideal sage-ruler. Confucian zhi is a moral virtue that involves not only the perception of ming but also the ability to transform and regulate the social order. In the remainder of this chapter I shall describe the Confucian recension of the wisdom-cunning ambiguity, as expressed in the Analects of Confucius and in the transmission and elaboration of the thought of Confucius in the works of Mencius and Xunzi.

Zhi and Its Semantic Field Metic intelligence is best represented in Chinese by certain aspects of zhi: wisdom, knowledge, intelligence, skill, cleverness, or cunning. In this nominal sense, zhi is derived from and cognate with zhi-to know, be aware, understand, be acquainted with or appreciate. These two graphs are often used interchangeably in pre-Qin texts. Definitions and etymologies of zhi first occur in two ancient dictionaries, the Er ya and the Shuo wen. The Er ya is a late Zhou text that glosses the meanings of words used in the Confucian classics; thus the inclusion of terms in this text indicates their usage and significance at approximately the time of Confucius. The Er ya mentions zhi three times; there is already a polarization between two views of wisdom, one as propositional and explicit, the other as practical or intuitive. One mention (EY 2. 196) identifies zhi with zhe, wisdom; another (EY 3.2) defines zhi as "every principle ranged in proper order" (tiao tiao zhi zhi). These two definitions, a chapter apart, suggest very different understandings of how zhi is acquired. The former suggests that zhi is not taught or learned but intuitively or directly perceived. The latter implies that zhi is the fruit of an orderly progression of study. Etymologically, zhi is connected with speech. The great Han etymological dictionary, the Shuo wen, gives no entry for the nominal form zhi (knowledge) but glosses the verbal form zhi (to know) as deriving in meaning from "mouth" (kou) and "arrow" (shi): "to speak so as to hit the mark" (SW 2262). This traditional etymology is probably incorrect. Bernhard Karlgren suggests that the signific is

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not "arrow" but "man" and that the "speech" (yue) and "mind" (xin) signifies were added subsequently to distinguish the verbal and nominal usages. to Mozi, for example, uses all three graphs and elucidates three different meanings. The Shuo wen gives entries for several other terms for intelligence, cleverness, and knowledge. The term hui, which is also used for wisdom in the sense of intuitively obtained knowledge or wisdom, derives its meaning from the "mind" signific (SW 4667). This term is used, along with zhi; as a Chinese translation for Sanskrit prajfiii, the wisdom that is the correlative of upiiya, "skillful means." Mou takes its meaning from the "word" signific yan (SW 977). Its meanings range from "strategy," "plans," and "counsel" to "cunning" and "crafty counsel." In the former sense, mou can be used almost interchangeably with zhi. (Examples are found in the Shi ji and Sunzi.) The Confucian philosopher Xunzi uses mou in its strongly derogatory sense. In both senses, mou refers to the ability to plan, predict, and order knowledge. Qiao, "craft" or "skill," is also associated with zhi. Confucius contrasts cleverness with wisdom; Laozi reduces Confucian "wisdom" to mere cleverness. Qiao appears as part of the phrase qiao fang bian, one standard translation of the Mahayana Buddhist term upiiya, skillful means. According to the Shuo wen, the signific for qiao is gong, "work" (SW 2018). Finally, ji, "a plan or calculation" (a term that will be extensively associated with zhi in the Romance), is glossed as "wisdom" (hui) or "to plan" (suan). Derived from the graphs for word and ten, it refers to the ability to use language to create (numeric) order (SW 1003). Even this small sample of terms associated with zhi indicates the extent to which these terms are associated etymologically with mind(fullness) (xin) and speech (kou, yue, and yan). The Appendixes include tentative semantic fields for the Warring States period and Ming works and provisional groupings of Chinese terms for wisdom and cunning according to their signifies.

Chinese Discussions about Wisdom and Cunning Two problems of early Chinese intellectual history correspond fairly closely to the ancient Greek problem of metis. The question of 1°Karlgren

1923-346.

1957.228. For an account of the traditional etymology, see Karlgren

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whether true knowledge can be expressed directly in words was of great concern to the Chinese speculative thinkers of the late Warring States period and was articulated in the "language crisis" debates over the nature and limits of language.11 The problem of the relation of wisdom and morality corresponds approximately to the "wen-wu conflict," the debate over the respective roles of wen and wu, the civil and the martial spheres of society. The "language crisis" of the fourth and third centuries B. c. E. is associated with the sophists and logicians of the "School of Names" (Ming jia), but a debate about the nature, limits, and uses oflanguage also pervades earlier philosophical works of the Warring States period. 12 Both Confucians and Mohists believed in the possibility of an objective language that could and should provide a true view of reality. Later Mohists sought to create it; Confucians believed it already existed. For both, language had the power to establish and maintain the social order. These views were attacked by Sophists and by Taoists, who considered language totally incapable of providing an accurate view of reality or expressing true knowledge. Chinese native accounts of the imperial order make a division into two spheres, the civil, or wen, and the martial, or wu. From Western Zhou times onward, there are varying accounts of the proper relations and rectitude of these two spheres of activity. 13 This transforHThis debate was part of a larger Warring States period debate over how to conduct both political and personal life, a debate driven by the breakdown of the moral and political order during the Warring States period. As Graham (1989.3) points out in his recent history of philosophical argument in ancient China, the problem of the 'Way' dao, rather than the problem of 'Truth', was the central concern of Warring States period philosophical reflection. For another view of the status of 'Truth' in early Chinese thought, see Hansen 1985. 12For further discussion of the language crisis, see Schwartz 1986.166-69 and 222. For a discussion of"sophism" in China, see Kou 1951.130-41. For further discussion of the works of Gongsun Longzi, see Graham 1965.128-52 and Perleberg 1952. 13See Rand 1977 and Lewis 1985. Both Rand and Lewis agree in viewing wen and wu as complementary aspects of the Chinese ideal of government in the pre-Imperial period, which were in equal balance during the Western Zhou and reciprocal but mutually supporting in the Spring and Autumn period. Rand traces the opposition between wen and wu to the Western Zhou and the Shang, however, whereas Lewis notes the transformation of the role of wu in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. The source for the earliest meanings of the characters wen and wu is the Shi jing, or Book of Songs, where these characters are most frequently used as the proper names of the legendary founder of the Zhou dynasty (King Wu) and his father (King Wen). As Lewis points out, wen was at this time not linked to either an explicit ideal of civility or of peaceful rule, since King Wen is as much praised for his military prowess as for any more pacific accomplishments. The term wen was instead identi-

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mation of the concept of imperial potency into civil and explicitly nommartial realms is first formulated in the Lunyu, or Analects, of Confucius. Confucian ideas of the nature of imperial power are intimately connected with the understanding of knowledge (zhi) and benevolence (ren) articulated in the Analects. Alternatively, the figure of the sage-general emerges in the bingfa literature of the Warring States period as a martial, or wu, counterpart of the wen ruler. Nor is the concern over wen and wu limited to the early period. During the Song and Ming dynasties, considerations of practical intelligence arise again in a renewed concern over the respective roles of wen and wu and renewed interest in military strategy.14 This division of the Chinese political realm into the two complementary spheres of wen and wu has a counterpart in two very different interpretations of the nature of zhi (and its cognates) as wisdom in its wen and wu aspects. One locution-zhi-came to represent a wide span of very different concepts and attitudes.

Encyclopedias and Compendia When we turn from philological to philosophical texts, we see that Confucians dominate the field. In the writings of Confucius and Mencius, zhi is typically discussed in subordinate complementarity to ren, or humane benevolence, perhaps the most important quality of the Confucian sovereign or sage. Wisdom is thus an important aspect of discussions of the art of rulership. The writings of the Militarist school explore intellectual competence from the radically different viewpoint of the art of war. In these military manuals on the conduct of warfare, the competence and skills of the general, as distinct from the sovereign, provide an important model for the mode of operation fied with the characters lie and huang, whose meanings include "brilliant," "blazing," and "august or sovereign." Lewis also notes that this sense of "patterned or ornamented" is linked directly with the patterning and splendor of battle paraphernalia. In short, both wen and wu are attributes of a monarch, as is de. This "virtue" of the true ruler is also etymologically connected with "blazing" and is associated-especially during the Warring States period-with force (li) and punishment (xing). The later understanding of de as being in opposition to force and punishments in the Zuo Zhuan commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals is indicative of the beginning of the transformation of the complementary view of wen and wu found in the Western Zhou toward a more polarized view. J4See Boodberg r930.

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of zhi. Here the individual of zhi frequently appears as a sage-general, whose mastery of the art of deception allows him to prevail over an opponent of stronger physical force, a mode of operation strongly reminiscent of that associated with the individual possessing metis. Taoist texts, on the other hand, deride "small knowledge" (Zhuangzi), or even all knowledge (Laozi), but provide a description of the sage that corresponds in many particulars to Detienne and Vernant's description of the metic individual. Since the Han dynasty, the rationalistic and moralistic world view of Confucianism has dominated the Chinese intellectual, social, and political tradition in much the same way as Platonism came to represent the Greek world view. And Confucianism, like Platonism, carries its own metaphysical assumptions about wisdom and knowledge. These assumptions surface in a variety of compendia. Encyclopedias present the Confucian view in their selection of passages from the philosophical and historical tradition. A second source is the categorical classifications of "types of individuals" in dynastic histories, which set up a hierarchy of psychological types reflecting Confucian values. The view of zhi that was generally read and available was found not in dictionaries, but in lei shu, encyclopedias. The Confucian view of knowledge and morality found expression in "classified books," such as the Tang Yiwen leiju, or Categorized Collection of Literary Writings. Encyclopedias of this kind, the main source of general knowledge, reflected Confucian understandings of zhi in their selection of sources, which all but excluded Taoist and Militarist thought. These encyclopedias provided the sort of compendium that informed large numbers of the (literate) population on many subjects. They "exerted great influence in shaping education, the intellectual climate, and literature by making available a particular selection of materials to a large number of readers from a vast canon of existing texts not readily available to them. "15 The Yiwen leiju demonstrates both the centrality of Confucianism and the range of alternative views to the orthodox. Its entry on knowledge (YWLJ 1.381-84) begins with a citation from the Er ya that associates wisdom (zht) with the Vermilion Void (dan kong). 16 tSNienhauser 1986.526. passage does not explain the context of the discussion of geography or the other qualities associated with geographical and astronomical influences. See also EY 9·7· 16 The

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The next citation is from the Yi jing and refers to the individual of zhi, of whom the Yijing says: "his wisdom [zhi] circumscribes the myriad creatures, and thus his Way [dao] [can] bring order to the Universe" (Yi 48n9). Next the text turns to Confucius and the relationship between knowledge and morality, the wise (zhi) and the benevolent (ren). It offers abbreviated quotations from Lao 6.23: "the wise love water" and "the wise are energetic." The context is a comparison of zhi and ren-the wise love water while the benevolent love mountains; the wise are active, the ren, still; the wise are joyful, the benevolent, long of life. The remaining three quotations from Confucius tell us: (I) Ning Wuzi was intelligent (zhi) when dao prevailed and stupid (yu) when it did not (An. 5.2I), (2) the wise are never perplexed (about discriminating right from wrong) (An. 9.29 and I4.28),17 and (3) love of study (xue) is knowledge (zhi)-an inversion of Analects I7-7· Other references of a Confucian tone come from the Li ji, or Book of Rites, the Zhou shu, or Book of Zhou, and the Shang jun shu, or Book of Lord Shang. Chapter 3 I of the Li ji comments on the great wisdom of Shun, the secondary legendary sage-emperor, as painstaking in its concern to preserve the good. The Book of Zhou describes harmony with the people as a necessary part of great wisdom. By contrast, the Legalist Book of Lord Shang describes wisdom in terms of prediction: "The stupid person remains mystified by what has already happened; the wise person can perceive what has not yet happened." Together these passages express the importance of foresight, but in the specifically moralistic sense of the ability to discriminate the good. Having established a moralistic context for zhi, the Yiwen leiju cites the Taoist Zhuangzi: "The clever may wear themselves out, but the wise will always surpass them" (Z 32.27I) and "Great wisdom is leisurely and easygoing; small wisdom is inquisitive" (Z 2. I2). This Confucian context provides no hint that, in Zhuangzi's view, knowledge does not imply ren.ts The explicitly Confucian viewpoint then reemerges with two quotations from Xunzi: "Speech must be knowledge, but silence must also be knowledge" (X 6.6I) and "To approve the good and to reject the bad constitutes [the] knowledge [of t7This translation is based on Lau 100 and 128. For a very different rendering of 9.29, see Hall and Ames 1987.55-56. tBSee Zhuangzi 8.78 (Graham 201), which criticizes ren and yi as not part of essential nature.

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the ancients]; to reject the good and approve the bad constitutes stupidity" (X 2. 14). These statements, which reaffirm the connection between wisdom and morality, are followed by a single quotation from the Zhanguo ce, or Strategies of the ~rring States, the largest collection of historical anecdotes from the late pre-Han era (30o-221 B.C.E.). Latter-day Confucians suppressed this work as immoral because of its alleged advocacy of warfare and deception.t9 The quotation states: "At the present time, the Six Kingdoms are attacking each other. They are just at the point of being powerful enough to destroy Qin. The Empire is making Qin frightened of it. Qin knows enough to not emerge from the grasses. How can Qin be so wise, and the rulers east of the mountains be so stupid!"20 Because of the accounts of battles and strategies it presents, the Strategies is an important source for the view of zhi during the Warring States period. Yet this passage gives no indication of the controversial status of either the Strategies of the ~rring States or the wily characters that populate its pages. The next text quoted is the Huainanzi, a Han encyclopedia of Warring States period learning. These sections reaffirm a view of knowledge as foresighted, efficacious, and implicitly moral. The first passage states: "Now as for the wisdom of a sage, it is already considerable by nature.... But the wisdom of a stupid man is already and inevitably slight by nature" (HN 9.150).21 According to another quotation: "Ifhe helps the sincere and performs the sacrifices to Heaven, then he is wise" and "Therefore, Shun ordered the younger brother Zhou Gong to kill his elder brother. He was truly benevolent nonetheless. King Wen planted grain; Huizi raised sheep. They were indeed wise nonetheless!" (HN, 20.359). The context of this passage is a contrast between the violent deaths of such "stupid" militarists as Zhang Yi and Wu Qi and the wisdom (and survival) of Confucius. These passages make three statements about wisdom: intelligence characterizes the sage and stupidity, the moron; wisdom 19 For a discussion of the dubious reputation of this text following the fall of the Han Dynasty, see Crump 1979.2-7. 20This is a paraphrase of ZGC 18.628-29. For a translation see Crump 1979-308-9. 21 For discussion, see Ames 1983.254n275· As he points out, Zhang Yi did not meet a violent death, and this passage may actually refer to Shang Yang.

Chinese Accounts of Wisdom and Knowledge

23

consists in sincerity and the correct observance of ritual; and the actions of a true sage may be, rather than seem, benevolent (ren). The Yiwen leiju quotes twenty-seven Han or pre-Han entries under the heading of zhi, nearly half of which are clearly Confucian in tone (seven citations of Confucius himself; two of Xunzi; and one each from historical works associated with Confucianism, the Yi jing, the Li ji, and the Shu jing). Sources that omit or deny that wisdom is implicitly moral are either omitted, quoted infrequently, quoted out of context, or quoted in ways that are not representative of the texts as a whole. Thus Zhuangzi is cited only twice, and the Strategies and the Shi ji-works of dubious Confucian orthodoxy-receive only a single citation each. Neither the Laozi, the Mohist canon, nor the bingfa literature is mentioned at all.

Categorical Thinking Chinese categorizations of types of people provide a second general source for Chinese views of zhi.22 These classifications are of two overlapping kinds. One, which probably originated with Confucius, classes (and ranks) individuals according to mental and moral qualities. A second type of classification groups people according to their type ofbehavior or according to their appropriateness for different occupations. Confucius classes individuals into four types. The highest are people born with knowledge. Next come those who acquire knowledge by study. Third are individuals of limited ability who can learn nevertheless. Fourth and least are those of limited ability who cannot learn (An. 16.9). This classification works by personality type, and knowledge (zhi) appears to be the measure by which these four types of individual are distinguished. This knowledge, however, is implicitly connected to morality; the model has no place for people of knowledge who use it to evil ends. Figures of great ability who do not learn according to Confucius's definition of learning fall outside the classification. Elsewhere in the Analects, Confucius refers to four 22See Bodde 1981.141-60, to which the following discussion is indebted.

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slightly different personality types: sage (sheng), benevolent (ren), wise (zh1), and stupid (yu).23 In another Confucian work, the Shuo yuan of Liu Xiang (79?-6? B.C.E.), categories are based on a combination of occupation and activity. The chapter headings of this collection of moralistic anecdotes provide an incidental classification of human types by behavior. The twenty chapter headings include: (I) the Way of the Ruler, (2) the Arts (shu) of the Minister, (5) Honoring Virtue, (8) Honoring the Worthy (xian), (9) Straightforward (zheng) Remonstrance, (u) Deep Counsels (shuo), (I3) Wily Plots (quan mou), (IS) Pointers on the Martial (wu), (I8) Discrimination between Things (bian wu), and (I9) the Cultivation of Form (wen).24 Here intelligence or knowledge is listed neither as a category nor as the basis for the classification. Like the classification of Confucius, however, this work implicitly conflates moral and intellectual qualities. Included among classifications of a clearly moralistic nature are two abilities that clearly refer to the intellect: discriminating things (bian wu) and wily plots (quan mou). In a third classificatory work, the Ren wu zhi of Liu Shao (240?250? c.E.), statesmen are categorized according to both their abilities and personality types.25 It contains a description of twelve types of ability, which, like the classification of the Shuo yuan, freely mixes intellectual and moral qualities. The categories type by a combination of personality, vocation, ability, and behavior: the man of sublime behavior, the man of instrumental ability, the statesman, the strategist, the leader of a state, the critic, the military hero, the practical person, the astute, the literary, the learned, and the dialectician. Liu Shao gives historical examples of each type and an assessment of the most suitable occupation for each. A final and more comprehensive example of moral-intellectual classification is the "Table of Ancient and Modern Men," the twentieth chapter of the Qian han shu, the History of the Former Han Dynasty. This table applies a ninefold classification by moral and intellectual ability to I,955 individuals from legendary times to the Qin dynasty (22I-206 B.C.E.). Ban Gu's introduction to the table contains quotations from Confucius, who is clearly the source for the four types that form the basis of the ninefold system: the sage, the benevolent, the 23For the sage, see An. 5. 18, 6.28, and 7-33· For wisdom, see An. 16.9, quoted above. For the contrast of wisdom and stupidity, see An. 17.3. 2 4See Bodde 1981.144-45. 2 5See Shryock 1937.68, 105-6.

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wise, and the stupid. This system of numerical ranks makes explicit the Confucian preference for moral virtue over intellectual knowledge because the sage, who combines both, holds the first rank, followed by the benevolent and only then the wise. Thus wisdom ranks only in third place. Finally, at the bottom of the nine levels is the stupid person. The classification ofBan Zhao, which is representative of the views of the intelligentsia in China circa 1 oo c. E., values moral over intellectual qualities and accords the rank of sage to Confucius alone among the representatives of the chief philosophical schools, followed by Mencius and Xunzi, who are ranked in the second category. Among the chief representatives of these schools, the third rank is accorded only to Zengzi, the favorite disciple of Confucius. Laozi, Mozi (Mo Di), and Han Fei are ranked in the fourth place, and Zhuangzi is not included at all.

CHAPTER 2

Wisdom 1n Classical Confucianism

Toward the end of the second century B.C.E., Han Confucianism, largely based on its systematization by Xunzi, was declared the official creed of the Han state. Since then, until the very recent past, Confucianism has been the dominant social and political philosophy of China and the official system of thought, determining not only the content but the form of education. t The Confucian sage-ruler, or junzi, provides the view of zhi that came to dominate Chinese culture. As an explicit value, zhi is one of the four virtues that characterize the junzi, the individual of wen.2 In addition, Confucian attitudes toward teaching wisdom contain an implicit view of zhi; the Confucian reliance on learning (xue) and rites (li) in education and on regulation of language (zheng ming) in government imply a view of the nature of knowledge and wisdom. A set of basic concerns and priorities distinguishes Confucian thought from the other schools. These lines of thought, which were first articulated by Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) and later formalized, modified, and systematized by Mencius (390?-305? B.C.E.) and Xunzi (340?-245? B.C.E.), begin with a paramount concern with the prob1 See Watson I963. I I and Mote I971.38 and 67. Fung Yu-lan bases his periodization of Chinese intellectual history upon the role of Confucian thought, distinguishing a "Period of the Philosophers," characterized by the presence of many rival schools of thought, from a "Period of Classical Learning," characterized by the orthodox position of Confucian learning. See Fung I937.xix and 2. 2 The four virtues were the humane power of ren; the wisdom of zhi; li, or rites; and the righteousness, duty, and compassion of yi.

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lem of government, a concern shared by the Confucians and the Mohists. Confucianism is unique in the belief that all government proceeds from the "superior man," the sage-ruler, or junzi, whose ethical virtue (de) can exert a transforming influence on society.3 Confucius establishes two tools that can be applied by the junzi to the problem of correct government. The first is the repository of thought and learning that forms the textual basis for teaching and education along Confucian lines. The second is the principle of zheng ming, "rectification of names," as a means of establishing or restoring Zhou values as the basis for correct government. 4

Confucius Benjamin Schwartz argues that the innovations of Confucius as a moral and introspective philosopher are based on an already predefined world view inherited by Confucius from the Shi jing, Shu jing, and Zuo Zhuan. Confucius himself claims not to be an innovator, but a transmitter (An. 7.28). According to Schwartz, in the Confucian view ren is the summum bonum of all other virtues.s The question naturally arises whether Confucius's treatment of zhi in terms of ren is an innovation or whether it has precedents in earlier sources. This question is of more than historical interest because of a related question-whether Confucius imposes on zhi a normative "moralistic" meaning that is absent from (or even inconsistent with) earlier views. Confucius discusses the term zhi in two fairly different ways: as the specifically moral virtue of wisdom, an attribute of the sage-ruler that is correlative with and underlies his ren, or realized humanity, and in the general sense oflearning or study, in discussions of its importance (in this sense, zhi is sometimes replaced by xue, "learning"). In the 3Hsiao (1979.1.39) cites Liang Qichao (1873-1929): "All government proceeds from the superior man; this was the unique hallmark of the Confucians. Evidence of it is to be found throughout all of the Confucian writings and it is a point that is undeniably correct." 4 "Following the Zhou" was the starting point of Confucian political thought; it was to be carried out by rectification of names, whereby the powers and responsibilities of the relationships between individuals that constituted society were to be rectified according to the hierarchical institutions of the Zhou at its height. For a discussion of Zhou values, see Hsiao 1979.1.93-99. 5 See Schwartz 1986.76.

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former sense, zhi is also associated with true courage (yong) and contrasted with clever or facile speech (qiao yan). Zhi is explicitly described in three passages. The first stresses the discursive quality of true knowledge: "To say you know when you know, and to say you do not know when you do not" (An. 2. 17, Lau 65}; true knowledge can be put into words. The second emphasizes that wisdom is essentially moral. In response to his disciple Fan Chi's questions about benevolence (ren) and knowledge (zh1), Confucius defines benevolence as "Love others," and knowledge as "Know others." When Fan Chi fails to understand his meaning, he adds the injunction to "raise the straight and set them over the crooked. This can make the crooked straight" (An. 12.22, Lau 116-17). The third passage indicates the importance of prudence and balance. Here Confucius describes wisdom as working on behalf of the common people while keeping a reverent distance from gods and spirits and describes benevolence as reaping benefits only after overcoming difficulties (An. 6.22). These definitions stress three different aspects of knowledge. A wise person has both understanding and the ability to articulate it; in other words, knowledge is discursive. Knowledge is also both moral and practical. For Confucius, the importance of zhi is subordinated to that of ren-the realized humanity of the sage-king which is the summum bonum of Confucian virtue. If any quality defines thejunzi, it is ren, a term variously translated as "benevolence," "love," "humaneness," and "magnanimity." Confucius defines it as a "return to the observance of the rites [li] through overcoming the self' (An. 12. 1, Lau 112).6 In this definition, Confucius may be an innovator, rather than a transmitter. Above all, Confucius attempts to teach ren as the basis of the virtues of the junzi. Confucius frequently portrays the two qualities of ren and zhi as mutually complementary. He first describes benevolence as the most beautiful of neighborhoods and then adds that anyone truly wise could not but choose to settle here (An. 4· 1). Confucius thus creates a context in which zhi is a hierarchically inferior complement to ren: "The benevolent man is attracted to benevolence because he feels at home in it. The wise man is attracted to benevolence because he finds 6 For

a discussion of this passage, see Schwartz 1986.76-77, 82 and Mote 1971.47.

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it to his advantage" (An. 4.2, Lau 72).? Zhi without ren is not a topic of consideration. The scope of operation of zhi is also restricted by the constraining pattern of the li, which are a matter of practice and not a result oflearning (xue). Thus ren, the moral quality, and li, the active practice, both constrain what can in Confucian terms be called zhi. The status of zhi as a moral quality is reinforced in passages where three virtues-wisdom, humanity, and courage-are given apparently parallel status. For example, a true lord is described in terms of the three qualities of benevolence, wisdom, and courage (An. 9.29).8 In the final analysis, zhi is unattainable without ren: What is within the reach of a man's understanding but beyond the power of his benevolence to keep is something he will lose even if he acquires it. A man may be wise enough to attain it and benevolent enough to keep it, but if he does not rule over them with dignity, then the common people will not be reverent. A man may be wise enough to attain it, benevolent enough to keep it, and may govern the people with dignity, but if he does not set them to work in accordance with the rites, he is still short of perfection. (An. 15.33, Lau 136)

This view of knowledge and language as straightforward and practical is reflected in didactic terms by the Confucian view of education and learning (xu e) and in political terms by the doctrine of zheng ming, rectification of names, the practical means proposed for the reestablishment of the Zhou values that are the object of Confucian education. On the political level, the rectification of names readjusts the behavior of individuals to correspond correctly to their places in society: "Let the ruler rule, the subject be subject, the father be a father, the son be a son" (An. 12.II). 9 7 For

a discussion of this passage, see Schwartz 1986.95. also An. 14.28. At An. r. 10 (Lau 6o), Confucius is described as getting information about the government of a foreign state by being "cordial, good, respectful, frugal, and deferential." This is practically word-for-word the terms in which Liu Bei contrasts himself to Cao Cao in the Romance (discussed in chapter 6). 9 1 do not propose to take up here the question of whether the doctrine of zheng ming is properly Confucian. Because this passage and An. 13.3 are the only instances in the Analects that can be directly associated with zheng ming, certain scholars have argued that this doctrine is not of Confucian origin. In particular, Herrlee Creel associates zheng ming with the thought of the Legalist Shen Buhai. For a discussion of this position, see Creel 1974.106, r 1o-19. 8 See

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Implied in this political manifesto is the belief that there is a correspondence between language and reality, that language can express the actual relationship between words and things. Such a correspondence would make language a powerful political force. In a political system where the names of things correspond with their realities, it would be impossible for contriving ministers to manipulate the perceptions of rulers, and deception and wrongdoing could not be hidden by the cloak oflanguage. Confucius therefore assigns to rectification of names a high priority in the administration of government: When names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not fit the crimes; when punishments do not fit the crimes, the common people will not know where to put hand and foot. Thus when the gentleman names something, the name is sure to be usable in speech, and when he says something this is sure to be practicable. The thing about the gentleman is that he is anything but casual where speech is concerned. (An. 13.3, Lau uS) Thus one normative and practical aspect of correct Confucian education and correct behavior is linguistic practice, in the sense of parole, rather than of langue. Just as the disconnection of language from reality is a result of the moral abuse of language, the moral use of language can reestablish the connection between words and things which has been sundered by "clever speech," the self-interested use of intelligence and language to disguise real feelings and ulterior motives. to On the educational level, the acquisition of knowledge (zht) is an active, not a passive, process that has two components, learning and thinking. Learning (xue) is often used as a synonym for zhi. As Confucius indicates in the discussion of "six qualities and six attendant faults," learning forms the basis without which knowledge, otherwise desirable, is worse than useless: To love benevolence [ren] without loving learning [xue] is liable to lead to foolishness [yu]. To love cleverness [zhi] without loving learning is 10See Schwartz 1986.91-93. For a discussion of the normative role oflanguage in Chinese thought, see Hansen 1983.59-61.

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liable to lead to deviation from the right path. To love trustworthiness in word [xin] without loving learning is liable to lead to harmful behavior. To love forthrightness without loving learning is liable to lead to intolerance. To love courage [yong] without loving learning is liable to lead to insubordination [luan]. To love unbending strength without loving learning is liable to lead to indiscipline. (An. 17.7, Lau 17.8, 144-45) 11

Confucius distinguishes learning (xue) from thinking (st) in the sense of pure contemplation. In stressing the need to learn the rituals (li), poetry, and music, he bases education both in textual knowledge that can be articulated and in skills and cultural practices that cannot be mastered in abstract form. 12 Thus one aspect of learning is based on example and enaction; a second aspect requires reflection. Reflection that is not channeled by these standards oflanguage and conduct, however, is dangerous and undesirable: "If one learns from others but does not think, one will be bewildered. If, on the other hand, one thinks but does not learn from others, one will be in peril" (An. 2. 15, Lau 65). Similarly: "I once spent all day thinking [si] without taking food and all night thinking without going to bed, but I found that I gained nothing from it. It would have been better for me to have spent the time in learning [xue]" (An. 15.31, Lau 136). The operative distinction here between this Confucian learning (xue) and thinking is that the former can ultimately be described, if not mastered, in words; and the latter cannot. The first passage indicates that it is necessary to reflect on learning (xue) in order to absorb it fully, but that to reflect without the articulated rules and principles of xue is dangerous. The second passage, which is at least suggestive of meditation, reiterates the notion that knowledge can always be either verbalized or encoded into sets of rules and procedures, for example, rites and ritual observances. Confucius states that he gained nothing by pure reflection (si); there was no discursive "content" upon which to reflect. The aspects of education that are matters of practice, rather than of textual knowledge, are embodied in the active exemplar, the sage11Here, Lau translates zhi as "cleverness," displaying in situ, as it were, the ambivalence about this term, which he elsewhere translates as "wisdom" or "intelligence." The term he translates as "deviation from the right path" is dang, "licentiousness," which properly refers here to intellectual dissipation. t2See Schwartz 1986.87.

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ruler, or junzi, who can literally "transform the people" (hua min).13 According to Confucius, all people contain the dormant capacity for moral rightness (yi). They are similar by nature (xing) but diverge through practice and habit (An. 17.2). The potential for ren and yi is activated through participation in the social and political order and is attained through the li. Only two kinds of people cannot change (An. 17.3): the most intelligent (zh1) and the most stupid (yu). 14 Finally, although the capacity for learning and knowledge may be universal in the Confucian view, it is by no means egalitarian. It is Confucius who initiates the hierarchy of types of people described in chapter 1. Confucius sets up the following descending rank: (1) those born with knowledge, (2) those who attain knowledge through study, (3) those who turn to study to overcome difficulties, and finally (4) the common people, whom not even difficulties motivate to the effort of study (An. 16.9). If one were to judge by the rather regulatory attitude of the Analects toward the power of zhi, it would appear that Confucius does not take as optimistic a view of human nature as does Mencius in later Confucianist thought. For all his emphasis on the necessity of wisdom to the junzi, Confucius takes an ambivalent view of the power of this dangerous virtue, which he subordinates so carefully to the ethical force of ren. Nowhere is this suspicion of the power of knowledge more evident than in Confucius's attitude toward qiao yan, "cunning language." On the one hand, the wise are described as being masters of speech: "To fail to speak to a man who is capable ofbenefiting is to let a man go to waste. To speak to a man who is incapable ofbenefiting is to let one's words go to waste. A wise man lets neither men nor words go to waste" (An. 15.8, Lau 133). Yet this speech is of a particular kind. In another account of ren and zhi in the Analects, it is noteworthy that the wisdom of the junzi is described by the metaphor of straightness, which is set over against crookedness (An. 12.22). l3for a discussion of how this term is variously understood by the Confucian, Taoist, and Legalist traditions, see Ames 1983.99--105, 117-18. 14This antithesis between intelligence and stupidity occurs again at An. 5.21, one of the Analects passages quoted in the Yiwen leiju. It is interesting that the graph for yu, stupidity, the opposite of zhi, means "monkey" when it appears without the heart/ mind signific. The antithesis between stupidity and the capacity for intelligence seems to be one element of the distinction between animal and human.

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In general in the Analects Confucius opposes the tripartite virtues of the sage (benevolence, wisdom, and courage) to cunning, qiao. This opposition between qiao and ren becomes explicit at Analects 1. 3, which quotes Mao 2. 3. 2 to the effect that a man of cunning words and ingratiating face is rarely benevolent. Similarly, craft (jue) is opposed to straightforwardness or integrity (zheng). Duke Wen of Jin is contrasted to Duke Han of Chi: the former was crafty (jue) and lacked integrity (zheng), the latter had integrity and lacked craft (An. 14. 15). This interpretation of "clever language" is more than a matter of verbal fluency. Given the assumption that there is an inherent correspondence between the categories of "right language" (zheng ming) and reality itself, one can interpret qiao yan, cunning words, as the deliberate distortion of this mapping. Thus in the Confucian view, the intelligence and wisdom of zhi are linked with ren and, through it, indirectly opposed to all forms of"crookedness." The wisdom of the Confucian junzi may-and must-be practical, but it is in no sense cunning.ts According to the model presented by the Analects, knowledge or wisdom (zhr) thus consists of (1) the mastery of a set of ideas, expressed as rules for appropriate conduct (It), contained in a body of written texts; (2) the acquisition of a moral or ethical outlook (ren, yt), embodied in a set of practices described in the texts; and (3) the ability to recognize (zhi), and at times predict, situations in life and conform one's conduct to the guidance of those texts-in other words, to act appropriately. Hence Confucian knowledge concerns both ideas and modes of action. This knowledge is acquired through learning (xue) to such an extent that it is identified with learning and is transmitted and maintained through example (hua min) and through the regulation of language (zheng ming). This knowledge is identified with selfcultivation (xiu) and is inherently moral and disciplined, unlike mere skill (qiao), which is unprincipled and expedient. The life of Confucius himself presents a striking model of a prototype of the teacher, which contrasts with the earlier model of the warrior as the prototypical hero. In their active promulgation of the ideal of wen, the writings of Confucius present zhi as a paramount tSThis insistence on straightforwardness emerges in later literature in the figure of the knight-errant, a Confucian martial hero who is entirely distinct from the Warring States period sage-general, whom he might appear to resemble, in the absolute insistence of the former upon not only straightforwardness in its broad sense, but upon the most literal adherence to one's word. See Liu 1967.4-6.

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attribute of the wen sage-ruler; this view persists through the Mencius and Xunzi strains of Confucian thought. Confucius himself, however, does not articulate a separation between wen and wu, and such biographical information as exists indicates that, despite his emphasis on learning (xue), he was trained as both a scholar and a warrior. 16 Confucius as a teacher, however, is the prototype of the individual for whom the mastery of texts, rather than martial prowess, is the means to power. As such, he becomes a pivotal figure for later accounts of the political order which make an explicit separation between wen and wu, the civil and the martial. For these same reasons, his ideas and representations of the acquisition and transmission of knowledge are the foundation for Chinese accounts of the nature of knowledge, wisdom, and intelligence.

Mencius In the generations following the death of Confucius, the Confucian school came under a multidirectional attack, both from revisionist interpreters within the fold, such as Xunzi, and from external critics without. These included Mozi, Zhuangzi, and Han Feizi, himself a student of Xunzi. Both Mencius and Xunzi, the major defenders of the thought of Confucius, preserved and transmitted the Confucian model ofknowledge as a set of ideas and practices. Both believed that there were inborn capacities in all people that could be developed, including zhi. They incorporated zhi into two very different views of human nature, however, and thus produced two different attitudes toward knowledge, education, morality, and language. Whatever the status of Confucius as an innovator, Mencius (372?289? B.C.E.) is a defender who rearticulates Confucian premises in response to the political and intellectual world of the fourth century B.C.E., a world in which the Confucian views of statecraft, ethics, warfare, and language were widely disputed. In order to respond to the utilitarianism of both Mohists and military theorists, Mencius formulates an explicit view of the ontological source of morality; he thus extends (and modifies) the Confucian notion of ren into an explicit and optimistic theory of human nature and a theory of benevl6for a fuller discussion of the role of Confucius in the polarization of wen and wu as separate spheres, see Lewis 1985.275-80.

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olent government based upon it (ren zheng).17 One effect of this redefinition of and focus on ren is a representation of zhi that is even more moralistic than that of Confucius. Mencius gives a new slant to the Confucian understanding of knowledge by incorporating it into a view that human nature is innately good, and moral capability, in the form of the starting points of the cardinal virtues, is inborn. Confucius suggests that people are born with an inherent moral capacity but does not expand this into a theory of human nature. Mencius uses the case of a child who has fallen into a well to illustrate the innately human tendency to feel compassion at the suffering of others: My reason for saying that no man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others is this. Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get into the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human. The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence [ren]; the heart of shame, of dutifulness [yi]; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites [li]; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom [zhi]. (M 2.1.6, Lau 79)

This compassion is one of four "beginnings" (duan) that, when properly cultivated, give rise to the four cardinal virtues: benevolence, dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom (ren, yi, li, and zhi). Mencius believes that these beginnings are inherent, not acquired (M 6.1.6).18 Rooted in human nature, they are what distinguishes human beings from animals: "Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it. Shun understood [ming] the way of things and had a keen insight into human relationships. He followed the path of morality [ren yi]" (M 4.2.19, Lau 131). 17 For further discussion, see Schwartz 1986.255-60, Mote 1971.53-55, and La1,1 12 and 37-42. 18For a translation of this passage, see Lau 163. A similar passage occurs at M 2. 1.6, Lau 82-83.

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Although these four potentials are inherent in everyone, they can be lost if not cultivated. Mencius does not specify how or at what point the "window" closes because too much has been lost for initial potentiality to develop into moral virtue. It is the gentleman, orjunzi, however, in whom the four beginnings are fully developed into the four cardinal virtues. He alone is truly human: "A gentleman differs from other men in that he retains his heart [xin]. A gentleman retains his heart by means of benevolence [ren] and the rites [li]. The benevolent man loves others, and the courteous man respects others. He who loves others is always loved by them; he who respects others is always respected by them" (M 4.2.28, Lau 133-34). Wisdom or knowledge (zh1) is one of the four cardinal virtues of the junzi. In general, Mencius follows the Confucian paradigm of describing zhi in subordinate complementarity to ren.l9 However, in defming the starting point of knowledge as the intuitive ability to distinguish right and wrong (shi Jei), rather than a generalized intellectual or rational capacity, Mencius both explicitly defines knowledge as a moral quality and sets up a hierarchy among the cardinal virtues.2o Although a junzi has all four virtues, his true humanity rests in ren and yi; the highest form of zhi is to recognize the primacy of ren (M 7. 1. 21 ). Several other passages also affirm the primacy of ren over zhi. One passage identifies ren with serving one's parents, yi with obedience to elder brothers, and zhi with understanding and holding to ren and yi (M 4· 1.27). Another passage states: "Not to tire oflearning is wisdom [zhi]; not to weary of teaching is benevolence [ren]. You must be a sage to be both wise and benevolent" (M 2. 1.2, Lau 79). Taken together, these passages establish the descending hierarchy of sageness, benevolence, and wisdom (sheng, ren, zhi) that emerges in latter-day typological classifications such as those found in the Han shu, described in the previous chapter. Like his views on the nature of knowledge, Mencius's political philosophy is based on the view of human nature as innately good. This view is implicit in his assertion that all men are inherently senl9for examples, seeM 2.2.9, 4.1.4, and 5.2.1. 20In the words of D. C. Lau: "For Mencius, intellectual thinking forms an insignificant part of thinking. This was a feature common to all ancient Chinese thought." See Lau IS and also Schwartz r986.267. Although I would raise questions regarding the generalization from Mencius and the Confucian view to all ancient Chinese thought, the emphasis with which D. C. Lau makes this point itself indicates both the moralistic quality of the thought of Mencius and the strength of its subsequent influence.

Wisdom in Classical Confucianism

37

sitive to the sufferings of others.zt Mencius is so committed to ren as the foundation of both good government and personal morality that he defines humanity not by the rational capacity but by the moral capacity. He makes his notion of ren explicit in the principle of "humane government" (ren zheng). The distinction between a ruler (wang) and a hegemon (ba) is that the ruler serves the interests of the people with benevolent government. Mencius (2. I. 6) ascribes this attitude to the sage-kings of the distant past, whose hearts were attuned to the suffering of others. This sensitivity and compassionate government put the governance of the empire "in the palms of their hands." This notion of ren zheng does not appear in Confucius.22 For Confucius, political and social institutions exist for the benefit of the aristocracy; for Mencius, government exists for the people. He ascribes this attitude to the wisdom of the ancient sage-kings and considers it both the basis of their mandate to rule (M 4· 1. 1)23 and the basis of good government: "If others do not respond to your love with love, look into your own benevolence; if others fail to respond to your attempts to govern them with order, look into your own wisdom" (M 4· 1.4, Lau I 19). An important aspect of Mencius's advocacy of humane government in the interests of the people, rather than the aristocracy, is an unequivocal condemnation of warfare, which is all the more radical in the context of the political turbulence of his time. For Mencius, there are no "just wars": "In the Spring and Autumn Annals there were no just wars; there were only cases of one war not being quite as bad as another" (M 7.2.2, Lau I94). According to a second passage: "There are people who say, 'I am expert at military formations; I am expert at waging war.' This is a grave crime. If the ruler of a state is drawn to benevolence he will have no match in the Empire" (M 7.2.4 Lau I9495). Because there are no just wars, even the Shu jing should be read with caution, since it contains passages that appear to advocate warfare: "If one believed everything in the Book of History, it would have been better for the Book not to have existed at all" (M 7.2. 3, Lau I94). At the political and public level no less than the personal and private, the model for humane government (ren zheng) is the nurturing relation of parent to child. This paternalistic attitude is consistent with Mencius's emphasis on ren rather than zhi: 21 See also M 6.1.6-7 and 6.1.15. 22 See Lau 41-42 and Fung I937-I.III. 23See also M 7. 1. 30.

38

Knowing Words Only a benevolent [ren] man can submit to a state smaller than his own. This accounts for the submission of Tang to Ge and King Wen to the Kun tribes. Only a wise [zhi] man can submit to a state bigger than his own. This accounts for the submission ofTai Wang to the Xun Yu and Go Jian to Wu. He who submits to a state smaller than his own delights in Heaven; he who submits to a state bigger than his own is in awe of Heaven. He who delights in Heaven will continue to enjoy the possession of the Empire while he who is in awe of Heaven will continue to enjoy the possession of his own state. (M 1.2.3, Lau 62)

By analogy, the superiority of ren to zhi is as great as the superiority of the empire to one's own state. In sum, since benevolent government is to be achieved by means of the rulers perfecting their own moral natures, which in tum will exert a transforming influence upon those they govern, we see zhi subordinated to renin both the private and public spheres. Thus zhi, insofar as it is used in the service of ren, is as crucial to effective rulership as it is to individual self-cultivation. Given this view of zhi as an inherently moral quality, it is not surprising that Mencius seems to bear a certain distrust for wisdom, which, left to its own devices, can degenerate into mere cleverness: In talking about human nature people in the world merely follow former theories. They do so because these theories can be explained with ease. What they dislike in clever [zhi] men is that they bore their way through. If clever men could act as Yu did in guiding the flood waters, then there would be nothing to dislike in them. Yu guided the water by imposing nothing on it that was against its natural tendency. If clever men can also do this, then great indeed will their cleverness be. In spite of the height of the heavens and the distance of the heavenly bodies, if one seeks out former instances, one can calculate the solstices of a thousand years hence without stirring from one's seat. (M 4.2.26, Lau 133)

For all this distrust of cleverness, Mencius, unlike Confucius, does not attack artfulness as such. In three of the four uses of qiao, the word means simply "skill" in the positive sense of the skills of craftsmen or archers. In one case, wisdom (zhi) and skill (qiao) are favorably compared to sageness or worthiness (sheng) and strength: "Wisdom [zhi] is like skill [qiao], shall I say, while sageness is like strength. It is like shooting from beyond a hundred paces. It is due to your strength that

Wisdom in Classical Confucianism

39

the arrow reaches the target, but it is not due to your strength that it hits the mark" (M 5.2. I, Lau I5D-5I).24 In only one case is skill associated with craft and cunning: "The sense of shame is a great thing. Those who make use of devices Ui] and versatile craftiness [bian qiao] have no wherewithal for the sense of shame" (M7.1.7).2s Although zhi is moral knowledge as one of the cardinal virtues, it also has a more technical sense associated with skill. Mencius asks whether one who does not follow the ways of the ancient sage-kings can be called wise (zhl}, but describes their civilizing efforts in technical rather than moral terms, citing the competence of Yao in controlling floods, Shun in the use of fire, Yu in irrigation, and Hou Ji in agriculture (M 4. 1. I and 3. 1.4). As Benjamin Schwartz points out, the Mencian account of the civilizing activities of the early sage-kings puts less emphasis on their "heart of goodness" than on what might almost be called technical intelligence.26 There is a curious inconsistency between this description of the civilizing technologies of Yao, Shun, and Yu and the moralistic description of zhi as a virtue that arises from the ability to distinguish intuitively right from wrong. Mencius resolves this difficulty by classifying only the moral exercise of skill as zhi; his "four beginnings" and "four virtues" do not acknowledge that the same capability may have many applications. Had Mencius cast zhi in less moralistic terms, he might have made this discrimination between ability and application, between the faculty for intelligence (which includes cunning) and its application as either virtuous or vicious intelligence. Mencius thus extends the Confucian paradigm of wen-as-virtue by his reinterpretation of ren into both an optimistic view of human nature and a doctrine of humane government. In doing so, he deemphasizes the role of both wisdom and education and, especially, the rationalistic or predictive sides of wisdom. Xunzi, the second great transmitter of Confucianism during the late Warring States period, disagrees with both of these moves. Although Mencius and Xunzi are 24EJsewhere, Mencius quotes a saying of Qi that contrasts wisdom with skill, in the sense of timeliness: "A man may have zhi, but that is not as good as rising to the occasion. A man may have farming tools, but that is not as good as awaiting the correct season" (M 2. r. r). For other examples of qiao as skill, seeM 4· r. r and 7.2. s. 2Sfor an alternative translation of this passage, see Lau r83. 26See Schwartz r986.286-87.

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in ultimate agreement about a core of Confucian ethical beliefs, which includes the notion that all individuals are potentially capable of becoming sages, they disagree strongly about how this development is to occur, how this intelligence is to be cultivated. Xunzi's differences with Mencius, which include a strongly pessimistic view of human nature, a corresponding emphasis on the importance of education, and an epistemology that is substantially influenced by the Mohist canon, lead him to a different, and more analytical, attitude toward both knowledge and morality and their roles in bringing about the Confucian (and Mencian) ethical ideals of self-cultivation and government.

Xunzi Xunzi (298?-238? B.C.E.) stands in contrast to the idealism ofMencius at both the individual and sociopolitical level. Unlike Mencius, whose approach to the mind follows from his belief that a tendency toward righteousness or humanity is inborn, Xunzi considers human nature vicious and thus does not approach the mind from an orientation toward innate moral propensities. Unlike Mencius, who be~ieves that the presence of a righteous ruler who adheres to the four cardinal virtues is sufficient to bring about social order, Xunzi provides a philosophically sophisticated Confucian rebuttal to the amoral attitude towards political control that characterizes late Warring Statesperiod Legalist thought.27 Finally, Xunzi, unlike either Confucius or Mencius, had access to the panorama ofWarring States period philosophical thought, which included the epistemological speculations of the Mohists and Sophists. Rebutting them from an entirely Confucian ethical perspective, he moves away from consideration of the Mencian "heart" to a view of the mind and intelligence as a morally neutral capacity that can and must be cultivated if order is to be brought about at either the individual or social level. Both Xunzi and Mencius are thus moralists about knowledge; both agree that knowledge must be guided by moral virtue, but they disagree about the ontology of this "moral knowledge." Mencius starts from the notion of innate moral propensities, however slight. Xunzi's 27See Ames 1983.84.

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41

belief that moral capability is not inborn has two consequences. First, if knowledge itself is morally neutral, it can be studied neutrally; second, if no intuitive capacity for moral discrimination is presupposed and the ethical imperatives of Confucianism are to be maintained, morally oriented education in self-cultivation assumes a far greater importance than for Mencius. This combined position permits Xunzi to accept and to adapt morally neutral Mohist epistemology to a Confucian educational program where the content is dictated by moral imperatives. On the one hand, Xunzi describes knowledge in moralistic terms that correspond to Mencius's definition of the root of wisdom as the ability to discriminate right from wrong: "To regard right as right and wrong as wrong [shi shifeifei] is called wisdom [zhi]. To regard wrong as right and right as wrong lfti shi shi Jei] is called stupidity [yu ]" (X 2. 14). His vision of the sage is, first and foremost, ethical: "Those of intelligence and sage wisdom [cong ming sheng zhi] do not impoverish others" (X 6.62). Furthermore, the sage "explains with a benevolent mind [ren xin], listens with a learned mind [xue xin], and makes distinctions with an impartial mind fgong xin]" (X 22.282). On the other hand, Xunzi attempts a logical analysis of the origins of knowledge and reasons that knowledge arises from sensation but that consciousness also depends upon the mind's ability to classify these perceptions: And how does one go about distinguishing between things that are the same and things that are different? One relies upon the senses . . . . In addition, the mind possesses an over-all understanding [shu zhi]. Because of this over-all understanding, it may rely upon the data of the ear and understand sounds correctly or rely upon the data of the eye and understand forms correctly. But this over-all understanding must always wait until it has received new data from the senses and matched it with the data already recorded in the mind concerning a particular class of objects, before it can arrive at a correct understanding of the object. If a man simply allows his senses to record data but does not attempt to understand what they have recorded, or if he reaches an over-all understanding of the phenomenon but cannot put it into words, then everyone will call him an ignorant [bu zhi] man. (X 22.276-78, Watson 14243)

Xunzi differs from Mencius not only in his analytically oriented examination of the nature of knowledge but also in the emphasis he

42

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puts upon the importance of study (xue) in the sense of self-cultivation: "In broadening his learning, the gentleman each day examines himself so that his awareness will be discerning [zhi ming] and his actions without excess" (X 1. 1, Knoblock 1. 135). For Xunzi, this kind of self-refinement was necessary because human nature was not inherently good, a point upon which he took specific issue with Mencius. For Xunzi, "human nature is evil; goodness is a matter of nurture [wei]" (X 23.289). He refutes Mencius's claim that human nature is good and describes human nature as categorically perverse and vicious (wei) (X 23.290). Yet for Xunzi, as for Mencius, the sense of morality, rather than intelligence, is what distinguishes humans from animals: "I~ fire and water there is energy [qi] but no life. In grass and trees there is life but no intelligence [zhi]. Birds and beasts have intelligence but no sense of duty [yi]. In humankind there is energy, life, intelligence, and moreover a sense of duty" (X 9. 104). Starting with this presupposition that the capacity for knowledge must be educated, Xunzi defines a model of classical education that is to have a constitutive role, through its adoption as the basis for the Han education system: "Learning-where should it begin and where should it end? I say: Its proper method is to start with the recitation of the Classics and conclude with the reading of the Rituals. Its real purpose is first to create a scholar and in the end to create a sage" (X 1. 7, Knoblock 1. 139). In this program of education, learning is defined (as by Confucius) as the mastery of a series of texts and the mastery of a corresponding set of practices at the social and private levels. These include both virtuous conduct and the correct use of language. This process is facilitated by associating with the learned. The final result is that correct knowledge will establish correct morality. An important aspect of this correct knowledge is Xunzi's notion of zheng ming, the rectification of names, a morally oriented, Confucian version of the techniques of discrimination (bian). Xunzi expands the Confucian notion of zheng ming into a full-fledged epistemology. "The Rectification of Names" (X 22), a discussion of the nature of knowledge, consists of analytic, rather than ethical, definitions of intellectual capacities. This extensive (and very Mohist-sounding) exposition of "common names" (san ming) includes definitions of such concepts as human nature (xing), emotion or sensibility (qing), thought or reflection (lu), consciousness (wei), action or conduct

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(xing), capability (neng), understanding or knowledge (zht), and knowledge or wisdom (zhi)-all "common names that pertain to the human" (X 22.275). Now as to the various names which have to do with man (for example) the essential feature which man receives at his birth is called human nature [xing], the congruity of the psychic faculties (with reality) and the response (to reality) of emotions, which are produced by human nature when in a state of balance and which exist spontaneously without any exertion, are called natural [xing]; love and hatred, pleasure and anger, sorrow and joy, which are proper to human nature, are called sensations [qing]; when the mind chooses among the stirring of the sensations, it is called reflection [lu]; when the reflection of the mind results in action, it is called artificial [wei]; when the reflection is accumulated, so that by constant practice it becomes a habit, it is called nurture [wei]. (X 22.274, Duyvendak 225) That in a man whereby he knows [zhi] is called knowledge [zhi]; the knowledge which corresponds to reality is called wisdom [zhi]. That in a man by which he is able [to act] is called ability [neng]; the ability which corresponds [to reality] is called proficiency [neng]. (X 22.275, Duyvendak 226)

This model of knowledge involves four elements: sensation (qing), reflection (lu), knowledge (zht), and wisdom (zhi). For Xunzi, the ultimate purpose of this kind of epistemological inquiry is zheng ming.zs In Chapter 22 he next considers the importance and means of rectifying terminology: "Nowadays, however, the sages and true kings have all passed away. Men are careless in abiding by established names, strange words come into use, names and realities [ming shi] become confused, and the distinction between right and wrong has become unclear" (X 22.276, Watson 141). The cure for this situation rests in the wise (zht), who are "careful to set up the proper distinctions and to regulate names so that they will apply correctly to the realities they designate" (X 22.276, Watson 142). Thus the purpose of both epistemology and the regulation of names is didactic and practical: "For one, on hearing the name, to understand the reality is the [correct] use of names" (X 22.281 ). This 28for a discussion of the adaptation of the techniques of Mohist disputation to Confucian purposes, see Graham 1978.63. Mohist epistemology will he discussed in more detail in chapter 3·

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concept or regulation of names presupposes the view that names and language are conventional, and Xunzi is explicit on this point: Names have no intrinsic appropriateness. One agrees to use a certain name and issues an order to that effect, and if the agreement is abided by and becomes a matter of custom, then the name may be said to be appropriate, but if people do not abide by the agreement, then the name ceases to be appropriate. Names have no intrinsic reality. One agrees to use a certain name and issues an order that it shall be applied to a certain reality, and if the agreement is abided by and becomes a matter of custom, then it may be said to be a real name. There are, however, names which are intrinsically good. Names which are clear, simple, and not at odds with the thing they designate may be said to be good names. (X 22.279, Watson 144) What Xunzi is articulating here is a notion, held in common with Confucius and Mencius, of the regulative function of language. Xunzi departs from them, however, in stressing that names are conventional and without inherent reality. Xunzi is careful to avoid the Taoist extreme of this position-the "strong conventionalist" view that not only the sounds oflanguage, but its distinctions and divisions of reality, are arbitrary and conventional. He asserts an idea of "correct distinctions," which, though ultimately conventional, are still inherently more applicable to reality than a purely arbitrary system of naming and language.29 Taken together, Xunzi's moralism and his conventionalist attitude toward language make it inevitable that he takes a stern view of any unorthodox use of language: When the king sets about regulating names, if the names and the realities to which they apply are made fixed and clear, so that he can carry out the Way and communicate his intentions to others, then he may guide the people with circumspection and unify them. Hence, to 29 See Hansen I98J.s8-6J. Just as Confucian philosophy (and thence Chinese philosophy in general) tended to focus on ethics, it was typically more preoccupied by the normative than the descriptive function of language. Philosophical claims were thus typically described as "assertible" or "acceptable" (ke), rather than as semantically true; and both Confucians and Taoists expressed the view that language had no inherent correspondence to reality. It was entirely possible to assert this position, as Xunzi did, without going to the more extreme forms of Taoist relativism. Taoist views of the nature oflanguage will be discussed in chapter J.

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split words and recklessly make up new names, throwing the names that have already been established into confusion [luan zheng ming], leading the people into doubt and delusion, and causing men to argue and contend with each other, is a terrible evil [da }ian] and should be punished in the same way that one punishes those who tamper with tallies or weights and measures. If so, then the people will not dare to think up pretexts for using strange [qi] words and throwing the established names into disorder, but will become simple and honest. (X 22.275, Watson 140)

Hand-in-hand with Xunzi's attitude toward zheng ming and the correct use of language is an attack on the attitude of "scheming and plotting" (quan mou) directed against the Militarist school and their amoral attitude toward both the use of arms and deceptive practices in general, including deceptive speech. For Xunzi, scheming and plotting is the thoroughgoing evil in comparison to which even hegemons and the Legalism of Lord Shang are preferable. As for the military, Xunzi considers unity between the ruler and the people, rather than strategy, to be the basis of sound military policy (X II. IJI.)30

Xunzi's attack on deception is based on the assertion that ren, expressed as the combined moral will of the ruler and the people, is both more efficacious and more ethical than strategy (mou). Such strict regulation can reform "even persons of dissolute language Uian yan ], dissolute theories Uian shuo], dissolute undertakings Uian shi] and dissolute abilities Uian neng]" (X 9-94, Knoblock 2.94). On the level of government, the claim is that competence and wisdom will surface of themselves once the scum of schemers and plotters is removed: "If those who scheme after power and revolution [quan mou] are forced to withdraw, then scholars who are worthy, virtuous and sagely [xian liang zhi sheng] will come forward of their own accord" (X 9. I IO, Knoblock 2. I09). Finally, in a debate on military operations, Xunzi argues that ren is more powerful than mou, strategy: "The army of a humane [ren] man cannot be dissembled. Dissimulation [zha] can be practiced only with those who are indolent and negligent or are weakened and suffering distress, and when there is alienation between lord and minister, ruler and subject, so that there is an estrangement from his moral force" (X 30 See

also Schwartz 1986.]03 and Ames 1983.84-85.

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IS. I77, Knoblock 2.2I9). Xunzi defmes the view that the support of the people is the essential factor in military undertakings and the ultimate source of skill at arms. His opponent, the lord of Lin Wu, articulates a Militarist position that strategy determines the outcome of battle. He stresses the importance of circumstantial advantage (sht), stealth and deception (bian zha), and sudden and secret movement of troops (X I5.I76).31 This leads Xunzi to the notion of a "just war" -the conclusion that soldiers who are truly ren fight in order to end violence. He answers the question of why a person who is truly ren should ever fight: "The military principles of which I spoke are just the means whereby to prohibit violent and offensive behavior and to prevent harm to others; they are not the means to contention and confiscation" (X IS. I85, Knoblock 2.228). In purely military terms, the means to victory is the power of the transforming influence of education in li and yi, which unifies the people, rather than the power of skill or cleverness (qiao), which has no firm base: "When deception meets deception, the victory may go either way; only the artfulness [qiao] of the combatants will determine the outcome" (X I5.I82). In line with this view of military operations, Xunzi also has a description of the good general: "In knowing, nothing is more important than rejecting the dubious. In acting, nothing is more important than not going too far. In the execution of one's duties, nothing is more important than having no cause for regrets. One can go no farther than having no cause for regrets, for success cannot be guaranteed" (X IS. I83, Knoblock 2.225). The passage then deals with such topics as regulations, rewards and punishments, encampments, troop movements, and meeting the enemy in battle. The use of deception is completely absent from this account, in strong contrast to the manuals of Sunzi and Sun Bin, where "the art of war is the art of deception." This antipathy to deception is so strong that Xunzi includes deceiving the people among the three extremities in which a general, even though threatened with death, should refuse to obey a ruler (X I 5. I 84). Xunzi thus reinterprets Confucian philosophy so that it can stand against a spectrum of conflicting philosophies of the Warring States 3 1Zhu

jr).

Xi glosses "stealth and deception" (bian zha) as "using oblique strategy" (qi

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period: Mohist, Militarist, Sophist, Taoist, and Legalist. Xunzi differs from Mencius in his pessimistic attitude toward human nature but also in his willingness to borrow Mohist and Sophist techniques for disputation and his incorporation of the Taoistic notion of wu-wei or "nonaction" into his epistemology.32 Xunzi remains a true Confucian, however, both in his general ethical orientation and specifically in his ethically driven view of knowledge, which includes a condemnation of the use of cunning. His criticism of "scheming and plotting" is explicitly an attack against the Militarist philosophy of Sunzi; it is also an implicit attack upon cunning intelligence in the most general sense-a mode of intelligence, cast of mind, or mode of action that includes in its skills the unpredictability, cleverness, and deceptiveness of what corresponds to ancient Greek metis.

Classical Confucianism The combined thought of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi provides the Confucian core of the dominant Chinese intellectual world view. This world view includes a specific understanding of zhi, knowledge and wisdom, as a moral virtue, which reveals itself both linguistically and historically. The linguistic aspects appear in shifts in the semantic field of intelligence and cunning and in the emergence of a consistent, Confucian semantic field of terms for knowledge, intelligence, foresight, and cunning. Historically, the Confucian understanding of zhi became part of the more general notion of wen, civilization or culture. The Shi jing and Shu jing use terms for knowledge and intelligence ambivalently: positively, to mean planning, foresight, and wise counsel, and negatively, to mean wily, glib, and crafty behavior. These words include mou, qiao, zhe, and you, none of which is used in an exclusively negative fashion. In these pre-Confucian texts, the semantic field of terms for intelligence, wisdom, cleverness, and capability emphasizes positive characteristics. The Confucian semantic field of terms for intelligence and cunning shifts to separate groups of unambiguous terms: an explicitly positive description of wisdom and an 32See X 17.206: "Though it is deep, he does not apply his thoughtfulness [lu] [to the work of heaven]; though it is great, he does not put forward his ability. Though it is refined, he does not apply his perceptiveness."

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explicitly pejorative description of cunning in morally weighted terms for deception and underhandedness. It is not that these terms never occur in the Shi jing or Shu jing, but in Confucian usage they acquire an importance that they do not have in the earlier texts. At a broader level, we find the Confucian exemplar of civilization, the figure of the junzi, identified with the concept of wen. The extent to which wen in its sense of "civilization" is specifically identified with writing and book-knowledge is the subject of some dispute.33 Although the graph for wen, a man with a tattooed chest, was originally identified with "adornment," wen came to mean-through extension-crossed lines or patterns and then writing culture and civilization generally. Whatever its origins, wen became identified with the literary culture and literary knowledge of the Confucian tradition. The Confucian understanding of wen also embodies an implicit understanding of the nature of knowledge and intelligence, an understanding that differs both from its usage in the Shi jing and Shu jing and from the views of other schools during the Warring States period. A prevailing idea that Confucianism should be regarded as the most representative Chinese ideology is based in part on the assumption that its outlook and concerns are all-encompassing. Confucian moral imperatives, however, restrict the scope of what, in Confucian terms, can be called wisdom. This restriction emerges both in the semantic field of Confucian zhi and in psychological typologies that originate in Confucian values. These classifications admit of practical intelligence but deny by exclusion that it can be wily. The more theoretical Confucianism of both Mencius and Xunzi expands on the Analects in important ways but fails to provide a comprehensive point of view because of the important questions it leaves unanswered. Intelligence, the capacity, is not distinguished from knowledge, the "content" of a Confucian education in texts, principles, practice, and ritual. Mencius, by taking a moralistic view of knowledge and locating the potential for morality in human nature, fails to recognize the possibility of a vicious intelligence. Xunzi takes a more tabula rasa view of the potential for knowledge but gives no ontology for the educational process that transforms inherently vicious people into sages. Xunzi and Mencius draw upon Confucius. Confucius emphasizes "following the Zhou," which in turn draws upon the civilizing 33For

9.

a variety of views, see Lewis 1985.261, Waley 196o.346, and Creel 1970.164-

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sage-emperors Yu, Shun, and Yao. Xunzi's insistence that the human potential for morality cannot develop of itself but must be cultivated places the Confucian tradition between the Scylla of a moral knowledge without any ultimate source and the Charybdis of an ethic that explicitly rejects any form of moral relativism.

CHAPTER

3

Mohist Knowledge

Although the Mohist School did not survive beyond the Han dynasty, Mohism both provided the original critique of Confucianism and complemented its views of knowledge, language, and morality. Mohism presents a counterpoint to the Confucian intellectual mainstream in regard to the question of how opinion on the nature and role of zhi affected early Chinese understanding of both personal and social philosophy. Like the Confucians, Mohists take an ambivalent view of the ambiguous virtue of zhi. They recognize both its great power and its equally great capacity for mischief, and, like the Confucians, they ultimately place the ethical will in a position of supremacy over it. Mohists and Confucians share two central concerns: first, ethics and the role and character of the ideal ruler and, second, knowledge and the nature and use of language.t Although the Mohists, like the Confucians, believe that knowledge is moral and language is discursive, they launch a strong critique of Confucianism on ethical and epistemological grounds. In contrast to the Confucian emphasis on ritual (l1), Mohists view the exercise of a rationalistic, discursive, and purposive intelligence as the true source of morality. They also attack lThe exact relation of Mohism to Confucianism remains a topic of some dispute. Some scholars take Mohism as an offshoot of Confucianism. For example, Kungchuan Hsiao considers Mozi a "common-man Confucius" and Mohist doctrines a "common-man Confucianism"; Confucius and Mozi may differ in words and deeds, but they agree in basic spirit. See Hsiao 1979.1.222, Mote 1971.85, and Schwartz 1986.138, 173, 19o-91, and 23o-3 1.

so

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Confucian zheng ming and the one-word-one-thing view of language upon which it is based. Mohism and Confucianism in turn differ from the more "Nietzschean" views of Taoists and Militarists, who allow (if tacitly) the exercise of zhi to supersede moral considerations. Both are criticized by Laozi and Zhuangzi, for whom knowledge is neither moral nor expressible in language. The former urges that "knowledge" be abandoned entirely. The latter posits a "greater knowledge" (da zhi), a sort of meta-knowledge that transcends the categories of language. These three "knowledges" in turn are all wen (to use the Confucian distinction), since they are all concerned with self-cultivation on the individual level and rulership on the socio-political level. Together they stand in contrast to the martial (wu) orientation of the Militarists, who interpret early Taoist approaches to knowledge in their own pragmatic terms, which include the tolerance of deception as an acceptable and necessary aspect of military strategy. Although the Mohists and Confucians agree that all knowledge is ultimately ethical and moral, they disagree about the nature of ethics and morality. Like Confucius, Mozi believes that the social order depends upon the character of the ruler and that correct rulership can bring about peace and order in society. Mozi, however, reinterprets Confucian political and moral imperatives and attacks the ideals of wen and ren. The Mohist ideal of "benefiting the people" (li min) differs substantially from Confucian ren; the Mohist conception of the character of the transforming individual, the xian ren, differs substantially from that of the Confucianjunzi. Despite their critique of Confucian ethics and Confucian praxis, Mohist attitudes toward knowledge, cunning, ethics, and language resemble Confucianism in their practical and ethical orientation, in their explicit rejection of the use of cunning, and in their general distrust of the more subtle and deceptive capabilities of metic intelligence. In the case of the later Mohism of the third century B. c. E., ethical concerns give rise to the most comprehensive epistemology in the Chinese tradition.2 The later Mohists turn toward a descriptive, rather than a normative, account of knowledge and seek to achieve their ethical knowledge by refinement of the categories of language through which knowledge is articulated. These refinements included 2 For

a discussion of differences between earlier and later Mohism, see Graham

1978.3-25.

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the use of philosophically sophisticated definitions and the replacement of the relatively simplistic Confucian technique of zheng ming with a new notion of bian, the techniques of dialectics, which the later Mohists view as a tool for gaining knowledge. Their rejection of an overly simplistic, one-word-one-thing model oflanguage, in particular, represents a departure from Confucian attitudes about the role of language in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge.

Mozi's Ethical Critique of Confucius The texts of Confucius's later contemporaries reveal a very different picture of ren, the epitome of Confucian virtue, from that given by the master himself. In the generations following the death of Confucius, Confucianism was first criticized by the historical Mozi. Both Zhuangzi (370?-301? B.C.E.) and Han Feizi (?-233 B.C.E.) present Confucius in a less than flattering light, but Mozi delivers a particularly blistering critique of the Confucian sage and Confucian ren.3 Early Mohism is moralistic in tone and disparages Confucian zhi within the context of a broad but philosophically unsophisticated attack on Confucius, Confucians, and the values of the Zhou aristocracy they advocate. The historical Mozi is known to have been a critical student of Confucian doctrine. According to the Huainanzi, Mozi was educated in the doctrines of Confucius but disapproved of the rites (li), elaborate funerals, and extensive mourning. He considered the li troublesome and incomprehensible; elaborate funerals impoverished the people; extended mourning was destructive of health and work. "Therefore he turned his back on the ways of the Zhou and made use ofXia [governmental] institutions" (HN 21.375). The Confucian doctrine of zheng ming follows directly from his advocacy of a return to Zhou values. Whether or not Mozi upheld Xia values as the 3Han Fei criticizes both Mohists and Confucians as being less valuable than farmers. He considers "upholders of sageliness" to be one of the six causes of disorder in a state (HF 18.47.6b and 48. 10b, Liao 2.251 and 2.261). He criticizes Confucian funeral rites, which "break up the household property and give sons in pawn to compensate for the losses, observe three years' mourning till they break down in health and have to walk with the aid of canes" (HF 19.50, Liao 2.299). Finally, he criticizes Confucius himself for his lack ofjudgment in accepting disciples whose deeds did not match their looks and whose wisdom did not match their eloquence (HF 19.50, Liao 2.303).

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Huainanzi maintains, he clearly opposed the Zhou system of hereditary position and was associated with craftsmen, rather than the aristocracy, in the values and style of life he advocated. One side of Mozi's attack is unambiguously ethical; it includes charges of hypocrisy in the matter of rites, parasitism upon society, and, finally, ren, for which Mozi substitutes the notion of "benefiting the people" (li min). Mohism also attaches far more importance to zhi than does Confucianism and construes it in a different way. On the one hand, Mohists attack Confucian wisdom because of the Confucian resistance to innovation; on the other, they attack Confucian fatalism as a vicious doctrine that vitiates the virtue of the wisdom (zhi). Ultimately, the entire attack is on ethical grounds: Confucian zhi and Confucian ren do not benefit the people. According to Mozi, the Confucian doctrine of fatalism leads to neglectfulness and thence political disorder: Further, Confucians hold firmly to the existence of fate and say: "Old age or early death, wealth or poverty, safety or danger, order or chaos are all decreed by the will of Heaven and cannot be modified. Failure and success, reward and punishment, luck and adversity are all fixed. Human wisdom [zhi] and strength cannot act [on them]." (Mo 39.180, based on Mei 404) This attitude leads government and populace to negligence, which leads in turn to chaos and poverty. Poverty is the root of chaos and insurrection. Yet Confucians make this doctrine their dao, and thus are destroyers of the people of the world! (Mo 39· 180)

The doctrine of fate vitiates the power of existing knowledge to benefit others, and the Confucian resistance to innovation prevents the acquisition of new knowledge. Confucius claims at Analects 7. r to "transmit, but not innovate," an attitude that follows naturally from the assertion that Zhou values are superior and must be reconstituted. Mozi is skeptical about the logical implications of this claim: They [Confucians] say too: "The gentleman Uunzi] follows, and does not originate." We answer: "In ancient times, Yi originated the bow, Zhu armor, Xi Zhong the carriage, and Qiao Chui invented the boat. Does it follow that the armorers and wheelwrights of today arc all gentlemen, and the four originators all vulgar [xiao ren ]? Moreover, whatever they now follow, someone must have originated, so every-

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Thus Zhou technological innovations present the Confucian with a dilemma. If the craftsman who invents, rather than transmits, is the realjunzi, the result is an unacceptable inversion of Confucian class values. If Zhou technological innovators are inferior men because they invent rather than transmit knowledge, then the ultimate inventor of Confucianism must, for the same reasons, be an inferior man. Either way, the Confucian is left transmitting an inferior dao by his own reasoning. In sum, Mozi disparages Confucian zhi as powerless, claiming that Confucius undercuts the practical efficacy of Confucian wisdom by the pernicious doctrines of fatalism and resistance to innovation. If intelligence and knowledge are the source of morality, a flawed or passive intelligence inevitably leads to a flawed morality. Mozi attacks Confucian ren as misdirected; it is hypocritical and its practices impoverish, rather than benefit, the people: "When their parents die, they [Confucians] let them lie there without dressing them for burial. They climb onto the roof, look into the well, poke into the rat holes, and search in the washbasins to look for the dead. Assuming that the dead still exist, this procedure is certainly stupid. If they do not exist, this insistent search is the height of hypocrisy [wei]" (Mo 39· 178-79, modified from Mei 402). Whereas funerary rites are to be condemned for their manifest stupidity, marriage rites are "the height of perversity" (jian) because they subvert normal human relationships. They falsely (wet) place the spouse in a superior position to the parents and operate on the basis of partiality, rather than respect (Mo 39.179, Watson 126). Finally, in a direct attack on Confucius himself, Mozi criticizes the Confucian assertion that "the Confucian is like a bell," which sounds only when struck: "Now if one sounds only when struck and remains silent otherwise, then one will be concealing his knowledge [zhi] and sparing his strength, waiting in dumb silence until he has been questioned. Though he may know of some way to bring benefit to his lord or parents, he will not mention it unless asked" (Mo 39.182-83, Watson 129). According to Mozi, such conduct is "the most perverse kind of treason." It results in men who are unfaithful in their dealings with others-disloyal subjects, unfilial sons, and disrespectful younger

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brothers. Mozi considers the conduct of Confucius to be the opposite of the way of the superior man (junzi) because he neither works to promote what is beneficial to the world nor avoids what is of no benefit. This is an example of the Mohist view of knowledge as praxis, which is articulated by the Neo-Mohists as the fourth branch of knowledge, (correct) action (wei). Both Mozi and the Neo-Mohists reject the wu wei aspects of Confucian (and Taoist) thought and criticize its tendencies toward passivity and nonintervention. A second aspect of Mohist deliberativeness is the stress on external, "objective" standards (fa) for government. Mozi rejects ren as an adequate basis for government and replaces it with consistent standards (fa): "What, then, should be taken as the proper standard [fa] in government? How will it do for everybody to imitate his parents? There are numerous parents in the world but few are magnanimous [ren]. For everybody to imitate his parents is to imitate the unmagnanimous. Imitating the unmagnanimous cannot be taken as following the proper standard" (Mo 4· 12, Mei 26-28). Mozi then applies this argument to teachers and rulers and concludes that neither parent, teacher, nor ruler can provide an adequate standard for government. Mozi's attack on Confucian wisdom (zhi) and morality (ren) is moral in nature. It remained for the Neo-Mohists to take up the specific problem of language as a vehicle for moral judgment and to refine Mozi's ethical attack on Confucius into a more philosophically sophisticated exegesis of the relation of knowledge and language. Next Mozi argues that Confucian learning (xue) is as inefficacious as Confucian wisdom and as vicious and deceptive as Confucian benevolence. Confucius "conceived deep plans [lu] and far-reaching schemes [mou] in the service of rebels. He belabored his thoughts [si] and exhausted his wisdom [zhi] in the practice of perversity" (Mo 39. 1 84). Although "several lifetimes would not suffice to exhaust his learning [xue], Confucius could not rectify his own times or make use of his thoughts to aid the people" (Mo 39.18 5). By contrast, the Mohist sage, because he is lucid in both words and action, is truly capable of helping others: "His words are intelligent [ming] and thus easy to understand. His conduct is intelligible [ming] and thus easy to follow. His conduct and righteousness can enlighten [ming] the people; his plans and schemes [mou lu] can bring understanding to the lord and his ministers" (Mo 39· 184).

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Thus the Mohists insist on clarity and simplicity of speech and reject both the ornamentation of Confucian wen and the sophistry of those who engage in disputation for its own sake. "The wise [hui] make distinctions [bian) in their minds but do not multiply explanations. In the use of words, the aim is not that they be many but that they be wise, not that they. be elegant (wen) but that they be perspicacious (cha)" (Mo 2.6). 4 Mozi's ethical critique of Confucius begins with Confucian wisdom (zhl), which is merely powerless. It proceeds to Confucian benevolence, which is misapplied and thence hypocritical. It culminates with a rejection of Confucian learning (xue), which suffers from both these faults. Underlying this attack on Confucian wisdom and praxis is the Mohist assumption that action and conduct can be reliable in a way that language cannot. Thus Mozi rejects clever language as a form of underhanded conduct. Like Confucius, Mozi appears to value correct conduct above wisdom or learning. In a warrior he places courage (yong) above tactics (chen); in a scholar he values good conduct (xing) above wide learning (xue) (Mo 2.4-5, Mei 12). In his emphasis on straightforwardness as an element of correct conduct, Mozi is at least as virulent as Confucius in his rejection of the deceptive capabilities of wisdom and cunning, especially of deceptive language. At issue is a view about language that takes a philosophically more sophisticated form in the later Mohists' attacks on the amoral disputations of the Sophists. For the Confucian, who is committed to a one-to-one mapping between words and things, there is a real and important possibility that language can correspond to action, and the Confucian disparagement of "clever language" is applied when they do not correspond. For the Mohist, the mapping between words and things is inherently ambiguous, and the possibility of clever and deceptive language correspondingly great. Mozi thus rejects Confucian wisdom, Confucian learning, and Confucian morality on moral grounds. Confucian benevolence is not benevolent, Confucian wisdom is not efficacious, and Confucian learning is treacherous and deceptive. Mozi ultimately attacks Confucius with a paradigmatically Confucian criticism, the charge of 4 For an alternative translation of this passage, see Mei 14-15. As Angus Graham has pointed out, chapter 2 may not be Mohist, as it does not contain specifically Mohist doctrines. See Graham I989.35-36.

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cunning and deception. The force of these attacks is negative; Mozi presents no alternative understanding of the capacities associated with knowledge, wisdom, and intelligence. This investigation remained for the later Mohists of the third century B.C. E.

Neo-Mohist Knowledge By 300 B.C.E., the terms of the discourse on knowledge and wisdom had shifted considerably. The teachings of the individualist Yang Zhu called into question the moral foundations ofboth Mohism and Confucianism. The arguments of Mencius and Xunzi in a new discourse on human nature made the philosophical naivete of the Analects all too apparent. Late in the fourth century B. c. E., the School of Names (Ming jia) raised dialectics to a high art in the paradoxes of Hui Shi and Gongsun Long. Both the methods of dialectics and the metaphysical crisis caused by the implications of Yang Zhu's philosophy affected all the schools of the third century B.C.E.s The later Mohists undertook a reexamination of the canons of the original Mohist school, which was preserved in epistemological chapters of the Mohist canon. 6 The differences between the Mohists and Confucians were ultimately of two kinds: differences about ethics and morality and different views of the nature oflanguage. These in turn led to significantly different views of the nature of knowledge. Despite its origins in Mozi's ethics, the Mohist-Confucian debate became increasingly concerned with epistemological issues during the third century B.C.E. One aspect of the Mohist side of the argument was a new account of knowledge, which was primarily descriptive and only secondarily normative. Its other aspect was bian, the new art of dialectics, especially evident in an extended debate about the nature of language and logical inference. The term bian, argue (which is cognate with 5 For a summary of these developments, see Graham I978. I 5-22 and Graham I989. 75-76. 6The six epistemological chapters of the Mozi are the Jing, or Canons (chapters 40 and 4I), thejing shuo, or Explanation of the Canons (chapters 42 and 43), the Da qu, or Greater Pick (chapter 44), and the Xiao qu, or Lesser Pick (chapter 45). Graham has brilliantly reconstructed the Mo jing and ]ing shuo. Unless otherwise indicated, I follow his translation and numbering system for those chapters. For an earlier translation of the Xiao qu, see Graham I964. I-54·

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bian, distinguish) is specifically associated with the Mohists in the Zhuangzi, which attacks "the argumentation (bian) ofYang and Mo" (Z 8.6, Graham 200). An earlier name for what Han exegetes called the School of Names (Ming jia) was the sophists or dialecticians, bian zhe, "those who argue out."7 The Mohist Canons make three kinds of discrimination about

knowledge: its three sources, its four branches or objects, and its four components. The three sources from which knowledge is acquired are report or hearsay (wen), explanation (shuo), and personal observation or experience (qin). The four branches or objects of Mohist knowledge are names (ming), objects (shi), how to relate (he) names to objects, and how to act (wet) (Mo 40.193, Graham A8o). These four branches entail four "intelligences" or abilities. The first is the ability to sort out and grade names as objects ofknowledge; it involves systematic definition. The second branch of knowledge and its corresponding ability involves the investigation of extramental reality and results in Mohist optics and mechanics. The third aspect, dialectics, concerns the ability to relate names to objects and to articulate these distinctions and relations by arranging them in coherent discourse (lun). It includes logic and epistemology, since knowledge itself is an object ofMohist investigation. The fourth and most important aspect of Mohist intelligence is the ability to apply the discursive knowledge gained by dialectics (bian) to action (wei). Descriptions of the Mohist xian or "man of worth" deal with the fourth branch, how to act. The Canons uses three forms of the word zhi to distinguish contrasting aspects of knowledge, which it defines by analogy to four objects. The first definition is to know (zhi); the third and fourth are wisdom, distinguished by the speech and heart radicals respectively. A3 (Canons) The "wits" [zhi) are the faculty. (Explanation) The "wits": being the means by which one knows, one necessarily does know. (Like the eyesight.) A4 (Canons) "Thinking" [lu] is the seeking. (Explanation) "Thinking": by means of one's intelligence one seeks something, but does not necessarily fmd it. (Like peering.)

As (Canons) "Knowing" [zhi] is the contact. 7 Graham (1989.36) argues that it is in the Mozi that the word bian first acquires this technical meaning as a term for rational discourse. For additional discussion of the history of the term, see Graham 1989.36, 55, and 75·

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(Explanation) "Knowing": by means of one's wits, having passed the thing one is able to describe it. (Like seeing.)

A6 (Canons) "Understanding" [zhi] is the clarity.

(Explanation) "Understanding": by means of one's wits, in discourse about the thing one's knowledge of it is apparent. (Like clear sight.) (Mo, 40.190 and 42.203, Graham 1989. 140)8

In other words, there are four progressive levels of knowledge: (I) intelligence in the sense of capability or consciousness, (2) the intelligence that looks ahead, that actively seeks what it does not know, (3) the intelligence that has the knowledge to recognize parts and perceive their relations as wholes, and (4) the lucid intelligence that perceives both wholes and relations and can describe them. The visual analogy involves (I) the faculty of eyesight, which does not necessarily see anything, (2) the active use of the eyesight, but without necessarily recognizing anything, (3) seeing something, and finally, (4) understanding what one has seen. The contrasts in these four definitions are emphasized by the four illustrations for the definitions, analogies between knowing and seeing. The Mohist distinguishes knowing from seeing but views the two as analogous processes. Only the last form ofknowledge remains after the perception is over; it differs from seeing, which ends with the object. This intelligence is a special faculty that goes beyond the senses and persists even in sleep. 9 By analogy, this last zhi is a special faculty over and above the other forms of zhi. This fourth form of knowledge, the understanding, is implicitly moral and explicitly discursive. The fourth branch of Neo-Mohist knowledge, action (wei), consists in mastery of the other three: (I) neutral description in the realm of names (ming), (2) objective standards (fa) in the realm of objects (shi), and finally, (3) correct discourse (bian) in relating the two, mcluding correct use of inference. to 8 An older translation appears in Graham 1978.266-67. Graham has combined the definitions in chapter 40 with the commentaries in chapter 42. Later standardization did away with and combined some of the radicals that the Mohists employed in order to discriminate between kinds and faculties of knowledge. For further discussion of this passage, see Graham 1989. I 39-41. 9 Elsewhere, sheng, "life," is defined as "the body being located with the intelligence" (zhi lu); and "sleep" is defined as "the intelligence not knowing of anything" (Mo 40.193, Graham A22 and A23). 10Similar (and possibly Mohist-derived) descriptions of the knowledge of the man

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What is the link between the moral orientation of early Mohism and the later Mohist discourse on knowledge? For Mozi (as for Confucius), intelligence is not merely having knowledge but being able to use it. Defmitions of different kinds of knowledge give the NeoMohist a philosophical basis from which to claim a special status for the illuminatory (ming) knowledge that results from the other threethe "knowledges" of capacity, perception, and connection. This is the special knowledge of the Mohist xian or "man of worth." It is manifested in discourse (bian) and action (wer) and is informed by a model of knowledge that is at the same time ethical, discursive, and practical. At first, Mohist praxis appears full of contradictions. As Angus Graham remarks: "The Mohists, who puzzle us by being at once the most religious and the most logical of the ancient thinkers, also contrive to be both the most pacifistic and the most martial. One of their 10 doctrines was the condemnation of all military aggression, a corollary of their principle of universal love. But they did not merely allow defensive war, they specialized in it; they were a military as much as a religious and philosophical community. "11 These apparently contradictory attitudes toward warfare, morality, rulership, and rationalism may be coherently described by the term wei-a mode of thought oriented toward deliberative, conscious, and purposive action. This mode of thought, which Schwartz calls you wei consciousness, contrasts with the wu wei consciousness that characterizes the Taoism of Laozi and Zhuangzi, who attack Mohism both directly and obliquely. Schwartz compares the mentality of the Mohist to that of the good craftsman, who is "an active, goal-oriented individual bent on realizing his project in the world," an individual who must know or find out any laws or necessary relations that pertain to his tools and materials.12 of wisdom are given by both Zhuangzi and Xunzi. According to Xunzi, "the means of knowing which is within man is called the 'intelligence'; his intelligence tallying with something is called 'knowing'. The means ofbeing able which is within man is called 'ability'; his ability in tallying with something is called 'being able'" (X 22.275, Graham [Mo] 269). And, according to Zhuangzi, "knowing is the connecting, knowledge is the representation, what knowledge does not know is as though peered at" (Z 23.208, Graham (Mo] 268). For a considerably different translation of this passage, see Watson I968.259. 11 See Graham 4· 12In particular, Schwartz argues that the Laozi and Zhuangzi strains of Taoism incorporate a sharp reaction against the Mohist idea of wei. See Schwartz I 986. I 9o-9 I and 208-10.

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The complexities of Neo-Mohist wei reflect the more general tension between wisdom and cunning in language and action. The challenge to Neo-Mohist discourse was to develop a language (bian) that could employ subtlety (including logical argument) without compromising an ethic that, on the whole, rejected oversubtle language as either sophistry or treachery. This dilemma presented two challenges to Neo-Mohist praxis. The first was to develop a mode of action (wet} that was entirely straightforward and thus morally correct but still efficacious in the way Mohists claimed Confucian zhi was not. The second was to respond to change and unpredictable events without compromising a commitment to the idea of an objective standard (fa). In other words, the Neo-Mohist program of action called for the acquisition of most of the capabilities associated with metic intelligence, in particular, the ability to respond to shifting and ambiguous circumstances, but eschewed the powerful and devious capabilities of unbridled intelligence. Unlike Confucius, who always uses the word qiao in the derogatory sense of "deceptively clever," the Neo-Mohist frequently uses qiao both in the positive sense of "skilled" or "subtle" and in the negative sense of "trick." Like Confucians, however, Neo-Mohists emphasize correct action and reject skill that shades into trickery and cleverness. The Explanation for the definition of conduct (xing) as "doing" adds that "giving a good name to what one does [for example, robbery] is trickery [qiao]" (Mo 42.203, Graham A10). Skill (qiao) is identified not with deception, as in the Analects, but with mastery of all four branches of Mohist knowledge. The result of bian is the correct correspondence between language and conduct. Mozi describes the skilled (qiao) artisan as being more discriminating (bian) than the governor, because the artisan uses consistent standards (fa) (Mo 4· 1 1).13 Skill involves competence at what is difficult: "to shave wood along the grain is not a test of skill [qiao]" (Mo 43.217, Graham B 10). In military matters as in the skills of artisans, it is essential to discriminate the individual of real skill: "In defense and attack, if the maladroit is deemed skillful [qiao], you will be cut off'' (Mo 70.357). The Mohist canon distinguishes the military capability of several types of person: the strategist (mou), the officer with courage (yong), 13for a translation of this passage, see Mei 26. See also Mo 36.169 (Mei 378): "Even skilled artisans could not get results in that way [by failing to apply standards]."

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the officer with skill (qiao), and the officer with initiative (sht) (Mo 71.373). In the final analysis, skill (qiao) is the capacity to benefit others: "any achievement that is beneficial to man [li ren] is to be said to be skillful [qiao], and any thing not beneficial is said to be clumsy" (Mo 49.292, Mei 512). This skill is linked not only to benefit (lt) but to forethought (lu) and love. Skill is the capacity to understand a reality in constant flux: The sage's fostering care is benevolent but without the loving which involves benefiting. The loving which involves benefiting is born of thinking [lu]. Yesterday's thinking is not today's thinking, yesterday's love of man is not today's love of man (Mo 44.248, Graham EC 2). Yesterday's "walls of the intelligence" [zhi] are not today's "walls of the intelligence." Only when the three things ["love," "thought," and "benefit") are present together are they sufficient to generate the enjoyment of benefit in the world. The sage has love but does not have pronouncements about the transient (Mo 44.248, Graham EC 2; see also Graham 223).

Graham points out that the image of a wall signifies that we cannot know by direct observation what is on the other side. The NeoMohists stress, however, that technical knowledge and planning (mou) based on the existence and knowledge of objective standards (fa) permit knowledge that is unavailable to direct perception, including knowledge of events that change through time. Accurate foresight is a result of applying knowledge about what is spatially or temporally remote to what is spatially or temporally immediate. "When one is not successful in making out plans [mou ], then predict the future by the past and learn about the absent from what is present. When one plans [mou] like this then one can be intelligent [zhi]" (Mo 18.82, Mei 202). The precondition to such an ability is the determination and knowledge of objective standards. These, in turn, both admit of changing circumstances and permit knowledge that transcends them. Here, the scope of the notion of an objective standard (fa) has been considerably extended from its use as a purely moral concept by Mozi's definition. Mohists share the Confucian belief that the character of the ruler is crucial to the social order, but they lay a very un-Confucian stress on the importance of standards or principles of government (fa) and a

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concomitant technical competence. "However, if there is only the principle [fo] while the technique [shu] of its application is not known, then it would seem to be still incomplete" (Mo 9. 30, Mei 76). Because of the importance of both technical knowledge and moral rectitude, only the wise can govern: "How do we know that elevation of worth is the foundation of government? Because when the eminent and wise [zhi] govern the stupid [yu] and humble, there is order, but when the stupid and humble govern the eminent and wise, there is chaos" (Mo 9-29). In the Mohist conception of the state, the "wisest and most able" is simply "chosen" as the Son of Heaven. Part of his wisdom is the perception that benefiting oneself ultimately consists in benefiting others. The Mohist defines righteousness (yi) as li, or "benefiting" (Mo 11.44 and IJ.s6).14

Dialectics The Neo-Mohist attitude toward language, and specifically toward semantics, falls between that of the Taoist and the Confucian. NeoMohists are less skeptical about language than Taoists, and less confident about its reliability than Confucians. Like Taoists, Neo-Mohists believe that naming is conventional; like Confucians, they claim that there is some real basis for the distinctions marked by names. By positing an approximate correspondence between names and things, Neo-Mohists can deny any drastic side effects of an occasional disjunction between the two. In considerably refming the Confucian doctrine of zheng ming, they take a first step in releasing the Confucian stranglehold that indissolubly binds knowledge to language. The Confucian doctrine of zheng ming provides the Confucian with an "objective" language by postulating a one-to-one mapping of names and objects, that is, a correspondence between objects and signs. The Neo-Mohist rejects the original one-to-one name-thing mapping of zheng ming on pragmatic grounds. Rejecting with it the Confucian view that an objective language already exists within the tradition, the later Mohist dialecticians attempt to create one. In contrast to both Confucians and such dialectician allies as 14for an excellent discussion of intelligence, ethics, and the early Mohist view of the human social order, see Schwartz 1986.142-48.

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Gongsun Longzi, the Neo-Mohists are in a posttlon to distinguish clearly knowledge of names from knowledge of things, and they care more about the latter than the former. Mohism assumes that ability to distinguish things precedes the ability to distinguish names. Therefore, stuff-knowledge can be used to check on name-knowledge. The distinction here is between name-knowledge, which is changeable and conventional, and stuff-knowledge, which is reliable. They use this distinction to resolve language paradoxes.15 The later Mohists refine the unsophisticated world picture of zheng ming into a complex vision of a cosmos in which necessary interconnections among objects parallel logical interconnections among their names. 16 Essentially, they generalize the idea of a correspondence between language and extramental reality from individual entities (names and objects) to a correspondence of structural relationships. This move enables them to use dialectics-in the sense of making accurate discriminations-as the means to true (and describable) knowledge, which in turn leads to practical and ethical knowledge expressed in action. The Mohists make claims for the validity and value of argumentation as a means to ethical knowledge, and they commit themselves to dialectics in the belief that logic can articulate the relationships between names and objects. The Xiao qu, or "lesser pick," restructures the logic of the onename-one-thing tendencies of Confucian zheng ming. The purpose of bian (dialectics) is to resolve questions in morals, politics, semantics, ontology, and science and to "clarify the distinction between right and wrong, inquire into successions of good government and misrule, clarify points of sameness and difference, and scrutinize the ordering of names and objects" (Mo 45~250, Graham 1964.2). In this chapter I focus on the analysis of statements of equivalence (of the form A B ye) and of two kinds of complex terms, which are conventionally referred to by the paradigms of ox-horse and hardwhite. 17 I examine and reject a form of inference that Hansen calls 15 For an interpretation ofNeo-Mohist semantics within the context of a mass-noun syntax for Classical Chinese, see Hansen 1983. IOo-14o, to whom this discussion is indebted. t6See Schwartz 1986. 167. 1 70x-horse is the paradigm for discriminating between different kinds of stuffs, for example, between oxen and horses. The hard-white paradigm was used to discuss attributes of stuffs; for example, a stone may be both hard and white. For a discussion of the use of these paradigms by Mohists and Logicians, see Hansen 1983.149-60.

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"algebraic argument." The problem is whether a new valid sentence is generated when the same term is added to both sides of a statement of the form A-is-B. The point of the analysis is to show the limitations of this form of inference. The Mohist asks whether the algebraic technique always generates a ran sentence from a shi sentence and a bu ran sentence from a Jei sentence. 18 Name rectification theory (zheng ming) attempts to preserve both the rule-based moral judgments of Confucianism and this algebraic technique. Neo-Mohists consider the latter an unattainable goal and instead explore different levels of language through the investigation of complex terms. Confucians consider all names to be of the form ox-horse with mutually exclusive elements like oxen and horses. The Neo-Mohist distinguishes a second form of complex term-hardwhite-whose elements are mutually interpenetrable, as in the case of a white stone. The point of these arguments and techniques is to establish dialectics as the basis for evaluative judgments. Because these judgments are based on an objective, discursive language that incorporates objective ethical standards (fa), they provide a concrete means to harmonize linguistic practice with action. In other words, consistent evaluation leads to social harmony. A language for discourse based on ethical, consistent, and objective evaluative judgment provides a safeguard against the use of language that is cunning and deceptive or that falsely contrives to accord with action. These arguments are anti-Confucian in that they reject a zhengming-like, rectified, one-name-one-thing language for moral judgment. The Mohists are equally anti-Taoist in that they use semantic paradoxes to reject Taoist skepticism about the value of dialectics and language in general. Neo-Mohists argue against the claim that language is perverse but tend to regard it as unreliable. The Mohists also reject the late fourth century School of Names, which includes the Sophists Hui Shi and Gongsun Long, on the grounds that they practice dialectics for its own sake, rather than as a moral endeavor. Dialectics is viewed as a means to bring about a political order of ISSee Hansen 1983. 124-38. In his exegesis of this chapter, Hansen makes a distinction between four kinds of sentence. The original sentence is negative, or "signed," if it containsfei, and positive (sh1), or "unsigned," if it does not. A generated sentence is either "so" (ran) or "not so" (bu ran). In Hansen's terms, the Mohist is asking whether the sign is preserved when new sentences are generated.

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rule by the wise, who can use it for political suasion and the conversion of the views of ignorant rulers. Nowhere does the Mohist xian, or man of worth, stand more in contrast to the Confucianjunzi than in the Mohist understanding of the function of the intellect. The Mohist xian is an intellectual warrior "ardent in the practice of virtue, skilled in discourse [bian yan tan), and broad in learning [bo dao shu]," for whom argument is a mode of combat, with the potential to conquer and convert wrong-minded rulers and thereby transform society (Mo 8.25, Watson 19).19 By contrast, Confucius stresses the importance of learning (xue) and reflection (si), but attaches little importance to argument beyond disparaging references to qiao yan, clever speech.

The Semantic Field The Neo-Mohists are more explicitly concerned with definition than any other Chinese philosophical school. Although Neo-Mohist epistemological terminology was probably adapted by Xunzi to Confucian purposes, the Mohist usage of three graphs for knowledge was collapsed into a more simplified distinction between the verbal and nominal uses of zhi. These correspond to "the intelligence," the first Mohist definition of knowledge, and "knowing," the third definition.2o In the Mohist canon there emerges a clear semantic field of both laudatory and pejorative terms associated with wisdom and cunning. The disparity that these works establish between laudatory and derogatory words for knowledge and cunning establishes a terminus ante quem for a semantic field of metic intelligence, which will still be consistently maintained in the descriptions of such wily characters as the fictional Zhuge Liang and Cao Cao of the Romance and Pilgrim Sun of the Journey to the l#st, some two millennia later. The early Mohist descriptions of "vicious intelligence" are, in general, applied to Confucians. Confucians are not qiao, which is not a 19For a discussion of argumentation as a form of combat, see Schwartz 1986.15758. 20Graham reads chapter 22 of the Xunzi as a simplified Confucian adaptation of the Mohist technique of disputation and points out that its flow follows the Mohist fourfold classification of knowledge into four branches: knowledge of names, of objects, of relations between the two, and of action. See Graham (Mo) 63 and 233.

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pejorative term in Mozi, but are false (wei) and underhanded (jian). These terms are part of the Confucian pejorative description of cunning behavior. Mohists also make negative use of terms which, in Confucianism, are strongly positive. Thus in Mohist usage, xue is less the exemplary learning of the Confucian than the false or destructive learning of a poseur. Similarly, Confucian ren and wen, because of their inefficacy, become ambiguous virtues at best. In addition to defining four contrasting aspects of knowledge, the Mohist Canon positively associates knowledge and wisdom with a variety of capabilities of the kind we should today call know-how knowledge: talent or capability (cai), clear vision (ming), forethought (lu), planning (mou, ji), and skill (qiao). The use of qiao, craft, in its positive sense of "skill," rather than in its derogatory sense of "trick," marks a real departure from Confucian usage but resembles the preConfucian use of the term in Shi jing.

Knowledge, Ethics, Language, and Action Hsiao's view that the Mohist and Confucian schools "share the same basic spirit" is certainly correct in that both schools view knowledge, language, and ethics as a continuum. Nevertheless, the two schools subscribe to very different ethical particulars and disagree about the status of knowledge. The Mohist ethical critique of Confucianism rejects Confucian zhi, Confucian ren, and Confucian wen. The Confucian believes that ethics is the source of knowledge; the Mohist believes that knowledge is the source of ethics. Thus for the Confucian, ren is the summum bonum, and for the Mohist, zhi is the source, rather than the means, of ethical conduct. In general, Mohists view the power of zhi with somewhat less suspicion than does the Confucian tradition. They define knowledge as prior to ethics and do not mediate the power of knowledge through the restraining power of heaven. This difference becomes manifest in the attitudes of the Mohists and Confucians toward indirection and cunning as an aspect of intelligence. Both reject cunning, deceptive language, and deceptive conduct. The Mohist attitude toward cleverness (qiao), however, is more pragmatic than the Confucian wholesale rejection of artful language. The Mohist makes a fine distinction between verbal warfare, which may require subtlety but is morally

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correct, and argumentation for its own sake, which is mere sophistry and is morally reprehensible.zt An important aspect of the relation of knowledge and morality for both Mohists and Confucians was the existence or development of an adequate language for moral judgment. The Confucians believed that one already existed; they sought to reinstitute it through the rectification of names. The Mohists believed that it did not exist yet, but was possible. They therefore sought to develop it by dialectics. For Mozi, as much as for Confucius, a theory of knowledge and language is the key to the transformation of society and the institution of good government. For Confucians, social disorder arises when names and realities do not correspond; the rectification of names is a practical technique for the maintenance or restoration of political order. For the Neo-Mohists, dialectics is a means both of gaining accurate and practical knowledge and of persuading ignorant rulers of its value. Angus Graham goes so far as to look at the Mohist canon as a practical manual: "In order to find our way around the summa, we must put ourselves in the position of the Mohist who is consulting it as a manual. To become a fully educated Mohist I must learn how to apply names consistently, how to choose between courses of action, how to investigate the causes of physical phenomena, how to deduce 'a priori' from the definitions of names."22 The Laozi and Zhuangzi strains of Taoism in turn oppose the Mohist commitment to dialectics and hold that such an "accurate" language is impossible a priori. The Laozi bypasses the problem by rejecting the "knowledge" of Mohists and Confucians. The belief that language cannot provide a true account of reality takes a philosophically more sophisticated form in the thought of Zhuangzi, who distinguishes (in good Mohist fashion) between "great knowledge" (da zhi) and the "little knowledge" (xiao zhi) of discriminations and categorizations, which arises from language and which cuts people off 21 The Mo jing contains several statements to the effect that subtle arguments must be assessed and evaluated, rather than rejected out-of-hand; for example: "When someone devotes himself to a commitment, if the description takes a subtle (qiao) tum, seek his reasons" (Mo 40. 194, Graham A94). A similar injunction occurs in chapter 42 in a discussion of standards: "Choose what is the same, and examine the subtle [qiao] turns" (Mo 42.213, Graham A95). 22 See Graham 3 r. From this point of view, the Mohist canon can be seen a sort of epistemological bingfo for the art of argumentation- "verbal warfare." This is precisely the phrase that will be used of Zhuge Liang's methods in the Romance of Three Kingdoms.

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from real knowledge. For Zhuangzi, as for the Neo-Mohists, "real knowledge" is skill. Skilled individuals such as the angler, the carpenter, and the swimmer are those who have "great knowledge" (da zhi), the ability to respond immediately, effectively, and, it would appear, intuitively to rapidly changing situations.

CHAPTER

4

Taoist Wisdom

The term Taoism represents a wide variety of texts, beliefs, personalities, and tendencies. Of these, two texts in particular disparage the Confucian-Mohist continuum of knowledge, ethics, and language; these texts are associated with the names of Laozi and Zhuangzi. The Laozi and Zhuangzi are no less concerned with epistemology than the Mozi, but the view of knowledge found in these works alters the form of their inquiry. Both reject the Mohist-Confucian assumption that there is a continuum between knowledge, language, and ethics. Both also reject Confucian and Mohist ethics as a product of this vicious circle and make a radical separation of knowledge from language. Finally, they insist on the possibility of a more elusive "metaknowledge" that is bound by neither language nor languagebased ethics. This rejection of Mohist and Confucian ethics as artifacts of language is a corollary of the view expressed in these works that knowledge is not, by nature, discursive. The extralinguistic intelligence they describe is metic intelligence. Recent scholarship on early Taoist thought has raised important questions about classification as well as authorship and dating of key texts. Although the dating and authorship of the Laozi and Zhuangzi remain obscure, the contents of the Laozi appear to be more recent than the works of Confucius and Mozi and to antedate Zhuangzi and the Huang-Lao Taoism of the third and fourth centuries B.C.E.1 1 For

dating of the Laozi, see "The Origins of the Legend of Lao Tan" (Graham

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The Laozi and the Zhuangzi repudiate both Confucian ethics and Mohist dialectics. They replace the Confucian vision of humanism with a vision of nature and reject Confucian textual and ritual knowledge in favor of a form of knowledge that is not expressible in or bound by the arbitrary and restrictive divisions of language. The Laozi calls it abandoning knowledge; the Zhuangzi calls it great knowledge. Both contrast it with the small knowledge of Mohists and Confucians. The works of the Legalist Han Fei include commentaries on chapters of the Laozi. These "Huang-Lao" commentaries are the main source for "Instrumentalist" readings of the Laozi, which interpret the text as a work of subtle statecraft, strategy, and political control.2 Han Fei's commentary is not primarily concerned with the problems of knowledge, ethics, and language on which I focus in this study. Nevertheless, his commentaries provide a useful demonstration of how even an "Instrumentalist" reading of the Laozi depicts metic intelligence, albeit negatively as cunning and deception. The view that the categories of language cannot adequately represent reality puts a special burden upon these Taoist texts. Confucian wisdom is practical, rather than abstract, but it assumes the possibility of a straightforward language in which to describe and transmit Confucian values. By contrast, the Laozi relies on aphorism, wit, simile, and symbolism; and poetic vision takes the place of reasoned argument. The Zhuangzi combines philosophically sophisticated argument with allegory, poetry, and humor and balances illustrative I986.11I-24). Here, Graham argues that, although the Laozi may predate the Zhuangzi, it is first attested not in the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi but in the Xunzi and Lushi chunqiu. He has also used the work of Guan Feng to identify six separate strata within the Zhuangzi (Graham I986.283-32I). Schwartz views Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Huang-Lao as three separate currents of Taoist philosophical thought. The Laozi and Zhuangzi (especially the "inner chapters") are early strata of Taoist ideas and modes of thought. A later Huang-Lao stratum is represented by texts such as the Han Feizi and the Han encyclopedia, the Huainanzi (Schwartz I986. I86-87 and 237-40). Harold Roth situates the so-called Syncretist portions of the Zhuangzi in a common "Huang-Lao" lineage that also contains the Huainanzi and three "Legalist" chapters of the Guanzi (Roth I99Ib) and places the compilation of the Zhuangzi at the court of Liu An between ISO and I22 B.C.E. (Roth I99Ia.8o-84, 95, and 118-23). 2Huang-Lao interpretations of the Laozi have been of renewed interest since the finding of what is probably the oldest extant version of the text on silk scrolls at Mawangdui. For translations and facing Chinese text for both the Wang Bi and Mawangdui editions, see Lau I982. For a discussion of the Mawangdui Laozi, see Tu I979· For a useful synopsis of the differences between the Wang Bi and Mawangdui Laozis, see Henricks I979 and Lin I977· I 57-76.

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sketches of the acts and character of sages with caricatures of Confucian and Mohist ethics and linguistic distinctions.

Laozi The Laozi, or Dao de jing, is generally regarded as an aphoristic collection and is conventionally attributed to Laozi. Most interpretive theories of the Laozi as a work of philosophical (rather than religious) Taoism diverge over whether it is the product of a reflective or a political strain ofTaoism.3 Adherents of the former view interpret the Laozi as a philosophical and mystical work. 4 According to the latter view, the Laozi is "an esoteric handbook of wily statecraft. "s Neither interpretation adequately explains the Laozi's unique combination of aphorism, humor, practicality, and diversity of subject matter. A persuasive alternative is to interpret the philosophical core of the 3Herrlee Creel makes a categorical distinction between philosophical Taoism and religious, or xian, Taoism, which was concerned with the achievement of literal, physical immortality. This discussion considers only the former (Creel 1970). Creel considers xian Taoism to have arisen originally as a cult of immortality that in the mid-Former Han took over the jargon of purposive Taoism without embracing its philosophy. Henri Maspero, on the other hand, considers xian Taoism both antecedent and in some sense central to philosophical Taoism. See Maspero 1950.211. Similarly, Anna Seidel points out that there is little basis to the traditional idea that religious Taoism (dao jiao) was a later misunderstanding of the metaphors of philosophical Taoism (dao jia). Rather, the mystical practices of religious Taoism were consistent with the trances and spirit journeys of early magicians and shamans. See Seidel and Strickmann 1988.394-95. 4 Creel terms these two varieties of philosophical Taoism "contemplative" and "purposive." He takes the original core of philosophical Taoism to be contemplative, an impractical source of inner strength and refuge from vicissitude. He considers purposive Taoism a later and secondary development, which was all but contradictory to the essence of the original. Creel attributes the rise of purposive Taoism during the Warring States period to the attraction, without much real appreciation, of Taoist thought for men who wanted to exercise for personal and political ends the power that they believed Taoist practices conveyed. Schwartz separates the "mystical Taoism" of the Laozi, which he calls the Laozi current of philosophical Taoism, from the Instrumentalist, or Huang-Lao current, which reinterprets the Laozi in political and strategic terms. See Schwartz 1986.187, 213, and 237. Roth (1991a and 1991b) implicitly questions the validity of these classificatory categories. 5 For example, Ames takes the Laozi as a political treatise directed at a ruler already in power. In his view, it articulates no positive conception but rather shows internal contradictions in the prevailing (authoritarian) position. See Ames 1983.39. He also assumes that the text was edited in its current form approximately 25o-150 B.C.E. According to a stronger version of the "Instrumentalist" view of Huang-Lao Taoism, the text is the work of "a cunning and canny would-be statesman who wraps his Machiavellian political advice in mystical verbiage." See Schwartz 1986.213.

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Laozi as a theory about names, language, knowledge, learning, and action with the following assumptions: language (understood as a system of names) establishes distinctions; these distinctions involve action, in the form of attitudes, desires, choices, and purposes; and these names, along with their attached values and learning, are entirely matters of convention. Thus names mark distinctions that actually result from (and perpetuate) social practices. These distinctions of language and practice do not correspond to any constant reality. In this position of linguistic skepticism, the Taoist skeptic assumes we have knowledge but disparages its value. A strong proponent of this view is Chad Hansen, who repeatedly describes early Chinese attitudes toward knowledge as skill in applying names. He thus describes Chinese "propositional knowledge" (zhi) as the skill of knowing how to apply predicates to things. 6 In this view, Confucian wisdom is the mastery of a linguistic practice. The set of distinctions implicit in language causes and corresponds to the conventional modes of action that make up Confucian virtue. To escape from this mentality and mode of action, the Taoist must modify or abandon the Confucian linguistic practice and the "knowledge" that goes with it. Taoists, like Confucians, are preoccupied with the regulative (rather than the descriptive) function of language. The first lines of the Laozi make a distinction between what can be known (real daos and real names) and what can be said. The daos we can speak about (dao) are ephemeral daos; the names we can name are ephemeral names (Lao I). This is the beginning of a Taoist attack on conventionalism, the view that the arbitrary symbols (or meanings) oflanguage can be properly used as social conventions. The argument of the Laozi runs as follows: (I) The distinctions marked by language are not real; as recommendations for behavior and action, they are not invariably sound. (2) Moral distinctions (Confucian and Mohist) arise out of a misapprehension of natural order that in turn perpetuates the breakdown of the natural order. (3) A better course would be to return to the natural order by abandoning the destructive distinctions of language. 7 6 See Hansen 1983.55-99, especially 65-70. Hansen distinguishes propositional knowledge from propositional belief (yi wet}, the disposition to behave according to the application of propositional knowledge. This chapter contains an excellent synopsis of theories of language in ancient China. 7for a discussion of arguments about language in the Laozi, see Hansen 1983.57-63

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This idea that what can be named or talked about is not what is constant seems to frame the text, which repeatedly states that language is not an adequate means of transmitting true knowledge: "the one who knows does not speak; the one who speaks does not know" (Lao 56). The Laozi makes the point that it is language, not accurate perception of reality, which gives rise to the categories in which we think (Lao 2). As a result, what the world recognizes as "beautiful" may in reality be ugly; what the world knows as "good" may actually be bad. The assumption here is that language by its nature distorts perception, or at least conveys it inadequately. Thus language can be untrustworthy without being specifically cunning or malicious. "Trustworthy words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not trustworthy. Those that are good do not persuade [bian]; those that persuade are not good" (Lao 81). The point is not that beautiful or persuasive language is deliberately untruthful or bad but that Confucian learning (xue) and Mohist dialectic (bian) are simply inadequate. All these are contrasted with "true discernment" (ming). The Laozi thus sets up a contrast between knowledge that derives from language, including Confucian and Mohist zhi, and real knowledge, or metaknowledge, which is extralinguistic and cannot be described directly. The Laozi claims that genuine morality, like genuine knowledge, arises from the natural, rather than the social, order; the Taoist thus divorces ethics from language. According to the Laozi, ethics based on the linguistic categories of ren, yi, and zhi are false ethics and false knowledge. It thus attacks Confucian and Mohist zhi in favor of a different kind of knowledge. The Laozi attacks the ethical-linguistic determinism of Confucians and Mohists indirectly through its distinctly pejorative use of Confucian and Mohist ethical and linguistic terminology. s and 70. I am also indebted to Hansen for his observation that nothing in the use of the term dao, in Laozi 1 or elsewhere, requires capitalization or the use of the definite article, as in "the Tao" or "the Way." 8 Schwartz points out that it is permissible to ascribe strong rhetorical overtones to terminology that would only later be specifically associated with formal schools of thought. (The term "Taoist school" and the codification of Confucian terminology date from the Han dynasty.) Language that in the Han had become codified as Mohist or Confucian terminology must have carried strong overtones of usage as typically Mohist or Confucian rhetoric in the Warring States period, even if it was not yet dogmatically associated with the philosophical lexicon of a well-defined "school."

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Although the influence of the sage is described as being generally benign (for example, preserving and nurturing the people), ethical conduct per se is not a stated goal of the Taoist program, nor is instilling ethical and moral practices into social institutions. The Laozi takes particular pains, however, to describe both heaven and the sage as "unbenevolent" (bu ren): "Heaven and earth are 'unbenevolent' and treat the myriad things as straw dogs. The sage is 'unbenevolent', and treats the people as straw dogs" (Lao 5). If we assume that the Laozi mentions ren as a quoted term, we arrive at a reading that stresses not the sage's contempt for the people but his rejection of the Confucian language-based moral categories of ren. (In other words, we read bu ren with quotation marks as "unbenevolent. ") In a similar vein, the Laozi opposes its dao to the Confucian virtues of ren, yi, and zhi: "When the great way declines, there are benevolence and rectitude [ren yi]. When intelligence and wisdom [hui zhi] emerge, there is great artifice [wei]" (Lao 18). Another problematical passage begins with the assertion that "not elevating worth makes the people contentious" and claims that the rulership of a sage will "empty their minds, fill their stomachs, weaken their intentions, strengthen their bones. Constantly he makes sure that the people are without knowledge [wu zhi], without desire, and constantly makes sure that those who know [zhi] never dare to act [wei]. Act by doing nothing [wu wei], and nothing will be unregulated" (Lao 3).9 This passage can be read as a rejection of the three Mohist values of knowledge, ethics, and action: "exalting men of worth," purposive action (wei), and its associated mode of intelligence (zhi), if we read these terms as being mentioned, rather then used. 10 Read thus, the text recommends not a Machiavellian misleading of the people, but rather their protection from a destructive language that results in false consciousness and political disorder. Wu wei is advocated in lieu of Mohist wei-(Mohist) moral action. There is no term, however, which can be brought forward in lieu of zhi. Similarly: Thus it is not reasoning ex post facto to read the terms bian and wei as Mohist and ren, zhi, and yi as Confucian. For Schwartz's discussion of this problem, see Schwartz I 986. I 86-87.

9This translation is indebted to Graham I989.233. IOThree chapters of the Mozi are titled "Exalting the worthy" (Mo 8-10). For a discussion of the rejection of Mohist principles in the Laozi, see Schwartz I986. I9o9I.

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Knowing Words Eliminate sagehood [sheng], discard wisdom [zhi]; the people will profit [li] one hundred times over. Eliminate benevolence [ren], discard rectitude [yi]; the people will return to tender flliality. Eliminate artfulness [qiao], discard profit [li], and there will not be thieves and robbers. (Lao 19)

This passage rejects both Confucian sageness (sheng), Confucian benevolence and rectitude (ren and yt), and Mohist skill (qiao) and benefit (It). In fact, this passage makes little sense if we do not distinguish the Confucian "sage" from the Taoist sage. In the Laozi, the Confucian junzi and the Mohist xian appear as interfering meddlers. The Laozi rejects the respective moral orientations of the Analects and the Mencius, along with Confucian and Mohist approaches to ethics, government, and language, which hinder genuine morality. The Laozi sets up an antithesis between two radically different forms of intelligence: the conventional knowledge of Confucians and Mohists, and metaknowledge, an unmediated and "natural" perception unimpeded by the normative categories of language. The Laozi urges the abandonment of "knowledge," which encompasses wisdom, cunning, learning, and sageness, in favor of metaknowledge. Its skepticism thus consists not in denying the existence or possibility of knowledge but in denying its value. The interpretation of both knowledge and metaknowledge is subject to disagreement, especially since, as Benjamin Schwartz points out, "the Laozi is serious about leaving the unnameable unnamed."tt For example, Joseph Needham understands conventional knowledge as the Confucian scholastic knowledge of the ranks and observances of feudal society, which he opposes to knowledge ofthe dao of nature. Schwartz sees no interest in investigation of nature behind this rejection of Confucian values.12 Chad Hansen understands conventional knowledge in terms of the mastery of a naming system and its associated desires and moral values, in short, as the acquisition of a llSee Schwartz 1986. 198. Needham 1954.2.J3. For Schwartz's discussion of this view, see Schwartz 1986.204. 12See

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culture.n In his commentary to the Laozi, Wang Bi considers two intelligences that he calls "wisdom" and the "mysterious mirror." The Laozi asks: "In loving the people and ruling the state, can you be without wisdom [zhi)?" Wang Bi's commentary reads: "To use art [shu] to achieve the end and to employ destiny to uncover the hidden things is wisdom [zhi). To discern the mysterious mirror clear and pure is to abandon sagacity. To govern the state without wisdom means to abandon wisdom. Can one do without wisdom? Then the people will not deviate and the state will be governed" (Lao 10, modified from Lin 1 8n4). Hansen's exegesis focuses on the Laozi's critique of "knowledge." Yet the Laozi does far more than disparage knowledge; it presents an alternative-the extralinguistic metaknowledge of the Taoist sage. An interpretive theory of the Laozi that focuses on the differences between the two can use the disjunction between the two forms of knowledge to address aspects of the text that are generally described as mystical. It can also provide alternative explanations of passages that appear to advocate misleading or manipulating the people. In the Laozi, conventional knowledge is zhi, which is associated with learning (xue) and sageness (sheng). In the sphere of language, conventional knowledge is associated with names (ming) and distinctions (bian). On the moral level, it is associated with desires (yu) and the moral virtues (ren, yt). Finally, on the level of praxis, it is described as action (wet), which resulted from all of the above. The Laozi, like the Xunzi, uses zhi in two ways. In its nominal sense of wisdom or knowledge, it refers to conventional knowledge. Its verbal sense-to know or recognize-is applied to both conven13See Hansen 1983.20, 56, 64-68. Hansen distinguishes three, rather than two, kinds of knowledge in Laozi: conventional, negative, and mystical. The negative knowledge is the skill of refraining from the cultural-linguistic practices of conventional knowledge. Hansen describes mystical knowledge as "mystical identity with extra-linguistic reality" and argues that Legalist interpretations of the Laozi stop at the second form. He applies the Western philosophical distinction between propositional (know-that) knowledge, skill (know-how), and knowledge by acquaintance. He denies the existence of propositional "warranted true" knowledge in Chinese philosophical texts and thus restricts his interpretation of knowledge in Laozi to knowhow knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance. Although this threefold division of knowledge in the Laozi provides a convenient way to bracket off instrumentalist interpretations of the text, it runs counter to the Laozi's assertion that mystical and unmediated knowledge arises of itself when false categorical knowledge is abandoned.

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tional knowledge and mystical vision. The graph for zhi/know is often substituted for the graph for zhi/knowledge. The Laozi totally lacks the Confucian-Mohist distinction between "wisdom" and "cunning." Conventional knowledge includes both virtuous and vicious intelligence and makes no distinction between the two; it includes the full range of wisdom, sageness, knowledge, cleverness, skill, and cunning. For the Taoist, all knowledge and wisdom themselves are cunning and cleverness. The Laozi associates intelligence and knowledge (hui zh1) with hypocrisy or artifice (wei) (Lao 18) and an alert government with a cunning populace (Lao 58). According to the exegesis of Wang Bi, this means that when people use art (shu) and discernment (ming) to recognize treachery (jian) and artifice (wei), they are attending to the level of appearances. 14 In this disjunction between false appearance and underlying reality, there is no distinction at all between wisdom and cunning. The moral and linguistic distinction is simply not made; either the two are identical or they lie on the continuum of false appearance. Chapter 19 of the Laozi argues, without distinction, for the elimination of three attitudes: (1) sagacity and wisdom (sheng and zhi), (2) the Confucian moral virtues ofbenevolence and rectitude (ren and yi), and (3) the Mohist practical virtues of ingenuity and profit (qiao and li), rejecting all three as "artificial adornments" (wei wen). (Wang Bi distinguishes these three areas as talent or ability [cai], human qualities [ren], and utility [yong].) Such a statement would be unimaginable in a Confucian or Mohist text. In another inversion of Confucian and Mohist usage, zhi is associated with cleverness, deception, and misleading the people: "As for the ancients who excelled at following dao, they used it not to enlighten [ming] the people but to stupefy [yu] them. The difficulty in governing the people is that they know too much [zhi]. Therefore, to use knowledge [zhi] to rule a state is to rob the state. Not to use knowledge to rule a state is to benefit the state" (Lao 65).1s A Legalist-inspired or "Instrumentalist" interpretation of the Laozi can read this passage as a statement of the need to confound the a translation of Wang Bi's commentary, see Lin 32. thrust of this passage is even stronger in the Mawangdui version: "Thus to understand [zhi] a state through knowledge [zhi] is to rob the state, and to understand [zhi] a state through ignorance [bu zhi] is to benefit the state." Translations of these passages are indebted to Lin r2r and Lau 97 and 236-37. 14 For

15 The

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people in order to dominate them. 16 A different picture emerges if "knowledge" is understood as Confucian-Mohist "knowledge," which is detrimental to ruler and people. In this reading, knowledge is not a means to social order; "stupidity" is preferable to "knowledge," which is, in reality, confusion. "Stupidity" is stupid in the context of conventional knowledge-the "hypocritical" knowledge of Confucians and Mohists. Chapter 20 of the Laozi emphasizes this inversion of conventional knowledge and unconventional stupidity: My mind is that of a fool [yu]-how blank! Vulgar people are clear. I alone am drowsy. Vulgar people are alert. I alone am muddled. Calm like the sea; Like a high wind that never ceases. The multitude all have a purpose. I alone am foolish and uncouth. (Lao 20, Lau 3 1)

This redefined polarity between intelligence and stupidity, zhi and yu, reverses their meanings. This "stupidity" consists in not making conventional linguistic distinctions that result in the conventional knowledge. Finally, the Laozi associates conventional knowledge with learning (xue), which it considers destructive: "Eliminate learning [xue] and there is no cause for sadness" (Lao 20). Learning, which is textual, is specifically opposed to metaknowledge. The Laozi contrasts "learning" something with "doing nothing" (wu wei): "Practising learning [xue] progresses every day; practising dao diminishes every day. It diminishes every day until it arrives at doing nothing [wu wei], and by doing nothing, nothing is not done" (Lao 48). The Laozi uses no one term to denote metaknowledge. It is associated with dao, discernment (ming), and nonbeing (wu). It has no Confucian or Mohist equivalent. On the linguistic level, metaknowledge is associated with the nameless (wu ming). On the moral level, it is associated with the absence of desire (wu yu) and a virtue that is hidden and mysterious (xuan de). Finally, on the level of praxis, it is described as nonpurposive action (wu wei), which operates by reversal and indirection. 16 Schwartz uses this term for what Creel calls "purposive Taoism," to refer to a variety of viewpoints associated with Legalism and Huang-Lao Taoism. See Schwartz 1986.237 and 445n139. For discussion of purposive Taoism, see Creel 1974.170.

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The Laozi denotes metaknowledge not as zhi but as ming, discemment or illumination. In keeping with its critique of conventional knowledge, the Laozi uses indirect methods to illustrate the workings of this metaknowledge. These methods include pervasive metaphors that are woven throughout the text, a wide variety of practical contexts that illustrate the attitudes and behavior of the Taoist sage, and, finally, the form of the text itself. Several passages contrast the perception of ming to the conventional knowledge of zhi; for example: "The one who knows others is wise [zhi]; the one who knows himself is illumined [ming]." The Wang Bi commentary makes it clear that the latter is the higher form of knowledge. This passage recalls the Analects (12.22), where Confucius defines benevolence as loving others and knowledge as knowing others. Confucius defines knowledge as knowledge of others; Laozi complements, and subordinates, this kind of knowledge to ming, self-knowledge (Lao 33).17 Ming is also associated with knowledge of the constancy that underlies phenomenal change: "To know harmony is called the constant; to know the constant is called discemment [ming]" (Lao 55).18 This passage also states that only the individual who knows the constant can innovate without misfortune, while action based on knowledge of the constant leads to impartiality (gong). Again, this passage seems to be an indirect attack on both Mohist and Confucian zhi. The claim that it is possible to innovate without misfortune criticizes ConfuCian wisdom. The suggestion that efficacious innovation and objectivity (gong) arise from discemment (ming) of the constant (chang) is a rejection of Mohist wisdom (zht) and the impartiality of the Mohist "standard" (fa). The passage also rejects Mohist dialectic (bian), since discemment does not lend itself to verbal formulation and "conceals itself in being nameless" (wu ming). Thus: "Bright [ming] daos seem dull. Daos that advance seem to retreat" (Lao 41). In short, the metaknowledge that results from Taoist ming cannot be mapped logically onto the polarities oflanguage. Nor can it fit into the logic of common-sense. For this reason, the Taoist rejects not only the specific linguistic practices of Mohist dialectic and Confucian 1 7In Han Fei's commentary, a sovereign is cautioned against observing the weakness and disorder of his neighbor state and being unaware ofhis own state's condition (HF 7.21.5b, Liao 1.225-26). 1BSimilarly, "Returning to one's destiny is called constant [chang]. Knowing [zhi] constancy is called discernment [ming]" (Lao 16).

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name rectification but also the entire cognitive apparatus that goes with them: "When your discernment [ming] penetrates the four quarters, are you capable of not knowing anything?" The phraseology of the Mawangdui version is even more emphatic that "knowledge" is to be avoided in both public and private life. Of both the exercise of government and of discernment it asks: "are you capable of not resorting to knowledge [zhi]?" (Lao 10).19 Apparent self-contradiction is the hallmark of the portrayal of the Taoist sage in the Laozi. On the one hand, he is described as a passive and benighted near-idiot. On the other, he is portrayed as both discerning and efficacious. His efficacy arises from the same skills and temperament that are in the Greek world associated with mitis: action by contraries and an ability to respond spontaneously to changing circumstances. If you wish to shrink it, Be sure to stretch it. If you wish to weaken it, Be sure to strengthen it. If you wish to cast it aside, Be sure to raise it up. If you wish to take from it, Be sure to give to it. This is called the "subtlest illumination" [wei ming]. (Lao 36, Graham 1989.229) The praxis of the Taoist sage seems to consist in performing the opposite of the action that results from the performance. Thus the sage "puts himself behind and comes out ahead, puts himself outside and remains" (Lao 7). To do so, he must have the ability to see through, and bypass, appearances: "To see [what is] small is called discernment [ming]; to protect [what is] weak is called strength" (Lao 52). One aspect of Taoist metaknowledge is to refrain from the practices that result in Confucian and Mohist conventional knowledge, in particular, to refrain from the futile purposiveness of Mohist wei. The nonpurposive action of wu wei is a kind of "knack" acquired not by study, knowledge, planning, or reflection but by an informed and spontaneous skill: 19for the Mawangdui version of chapter

10,

see Lau 278-79.

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Knowing Words Without going out the door he knows the world. Without looking out the window, he sees the way of heaven. The further you go the less you know. Therefore the sage does not bestir himself but stills knows, does not see but still distinguishes, does not act but still accomplishes. (Lao 47)

The Laozi's apotheosis of a form of action which is spontaneous and nonpurposive as the hallmark of the conduct of the Taoist sage stands in complete contradistinction to the Mohist exaltation, of wei, the "making" and "doing" of purposive, goal-directed, deliberate activity, such as perfecting a trade, ruling a country, or, in the more slippery context of the relation oflanguage to thought, of" deeming" something to be so, or assertible. The text also uses several pervasive metaphors to illustrate the nature of dao and of Taoist metaknowledge. The ethics, knowledge, and praxis of the sage are variously likened to water, a mirror, an infant, the feminine, and the uncarved block. Water benefits without contention (Lao 8) and overcomes the hard and strong by weakness and submissiveness (Lao 78).20 Similarly, the open and uncategorical knowledge of the sage is compared to the clarity of a mirror, which reflects accurately only when there is no interference (Lao 10); to a baby in whom linguistic-cultural "knowledge" has not yet awakened (Lao 10, 20, and 28); and to the block that is as yet uncarved and without specialized function (Lao 28).21 This metaknowledge is also compared to that of someone who is free of "knowledge" (Lao 10) and to the feminine.22 Finally, the form of the Laozi is itself consistent with its argument. The text sets up oppositions between words and their conventional meanings. Its philosophy and even its subject matter are subjects of constant commentary and interpretation. The text touches on topics as diverse as ethics, cosmology, science, technology, military art, statecraft, hygienics, medicine, and agriculture. Yet, despite its brevity, cryptic literary style, varied subject matter, and paradoxical contents, it remains among the most influential of Chinese texts. 20The themes of yielding and submissiveness also occur in chapters 10, 22, 36, 40, 43, 52, and 76. 21 The Laozi compares the empire to a sacred vessel, to which nothing should be done (Lao 29). 22 "Know the male but keep to the role of the female" (Lao 28, Lau 41-43). References to the feminine or mother also occur in chapters 10, 20, 25, 52, 55, and 59.

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Han Fei on Laozi

An interpretation of the Laozi that focuses on the separation of true knowledge from both language and language-derived ethics provides a coherent and alternative reading of controversial passages that have frequently been subject to Instrumentalist interpretations, such as that of Han Fei: "Indeed, the sage, in ruling the state, does not count on people's doing him good, but utilizes their inability to do him wrong. If he counts on people's doing him good, within the boundary there will never be enough such persons to count by tens. But if he utilizes people's inability to do him wrong, an entire state can be uniformed [put under military control]. Therefore, the administrator of the state affairs ought to consider the many but disregard the few. Hence his devotion not to virtue but to law" (HF 19.50.IIb, Liao 2.306-7). Han Fei gives a Machiavellian shift to the Laozi's rejection of conventional knowledge. Unlike the Laozi, which itself makes no distinction between wisdom and cunning, Han Fei specifically associates wisdom with cunning, in the person of deceptive and treacherous ministers. According to Han Fei, the astute (zhi) are not trustworthy, and a ruler may be deceived by the plans (ji) of wise (zhi) men bent on private gain at public expense (HF 18.47·5b-6a, Liao 2.249). An "enlightened ruler" (ming jun) neither entrusts stupid (yu) men with affairs of state nor permits wise (zh1) men to practice deceit (zha) (HF 18.47.6a, Liao 2.249-50). Like Laozi, Han Fei rejects the Mohist idea of exalting the worthy and employing the able, but for Han Fei, this suspicion of individual talent is a corollary of his advocacy of impersonal law (fa) as the basis for correct government. He argues that, just as the strength of one man is necessarily less than that of a multitude, no one intelligence can be omniscient. Therefore, it is better to use the strength and wisdom of an entire state-to "utilize the people" (yong zhong). In this way, he can harness the "treacherous wisdom and strength" (jian zhi li) ofhis ministers to his own purposes (HF I8.48.9b-1oa).23 Han Fei interprets the dao as the basis of the absolute authority of the ruler and wu wei as his mysterious and secret modus operandi. In Han Fei's interpretation, it is by means of wu wei that the Taoist sageruler utilizes the abilities of others. Han Fei interprets this term not as 23for a translation of this passage, see Liao 2.258-60. For a discussion ofHan Feizi's concept of yong zhong, see Ames 1983.143-45.

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nonpurposive action but as secrecy. Han Fei's sovereign is devoted to secrecy. His words are "blockaded in such wise that they are not communicable outwards and are kept in such secrecy that they are unknowable" (HF 18.48. 12a, Liao 2.268).24 In Han Fei's interpretation of Laozi 36, the wu wei "softness" of the sage is the paradoxical "softness" of the martial artist, who turns an opponent's own energy against him by reversing its direction: strengthen an opponent in order to weaken him; prop him up to lay him aside; give in order to take. Here it is in the sense of strategy and military technique that the submissive and weak overcome the hard and strong. Han Fei gives illustrations of these precepts; in one of his examples the king of Yue surrenders to Wu and shows him how to invade Qi in order to exhaust Wu. This stratagem exemplifies the principle of strengthening an enemy in order to weaken him. Presenting conciliatory gifts to an enemy on the eve of an invasion is an example of giving in order to take. For Han Fei, "subtle discernment" consists in carrying out plans before they take shape. Similarly, "the weak conquer the strong" by the (deceptive) appearance of humility (HF 7.21. 1b-2a, Liao 1.210-12). Han Fei's interpretation of the Laozi seems almost pointedly to ignore the problem of the relation of knowledge to language. His commentary to Laozi 1 discusses the constancy of the dao in terms of principles (l1), not names (ming), and he makes no comment on chapters of the Laozi that deal explicitly with the problem of knowledge and the categories oflanguage, for example, chapters 2, 56, and 81. Similarly, he ignores chapters concerned with the relation of ethics to knowledge and the need to abandon the categories of conventional knowledge (for example, chapters 5, 10, 18, and 19). His interpretations, both of metaphors and of paradoxical passages, tend toward the literal and the commonsensical. Thus the sage's paradoxical metaknowledge in Laozi 47 is merely undivided concentration (HF 7.21.4b-5a). Dao is described in political terms as the "mother of the state" in Laozi 59 (HF 6.20. 5b). Semantic Field

The entire description of knowledge in the Laozi is negative. Taoist "conventional knowledge" is described by the full range of the se24This view of the Laozi provided a mystique of authority to underlie the Legalist notions of law (fa) and bureaucratic organization (shu).

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mantic field associated with zhi in other texts. With the exception of ming, discernment, the usage is entirely pejorative; there is no polarity between terms applied to virtuous and vicious intelligence. The Laozi contains no semantic polarity between wisdom and cunning, but the antithesis it sets up between two forms of knowledge is reflected in its lexicon of terms for perception and action. On the one hand, zhi and the semantic field usually associated with it-mou, qiao, and hui-are all taken as similar terms that describe the individual of conventional knowledge. On the other, the Taoist sage is described not as wise but as discerning (ming), not as directed but a quiescent (wu wei). The pervasive term for Taoist metaknowledge is dao, which pervades the Laozi in the same way that heaven (tian) pervades the Analects of Confucius and the writings of Mozi. Although the Laozi explicitly disparages "knowledge," whether as wisdom or as cunning, the characterization of the Taoist sage, the description of his abilities, and the account of how he behaves reflect what elsewhere is explicitly described as supreme knowledge or wisdom. Three sources clarify this analogy between the behavior of the Taoist sage and what is, in other texts, described as wisdom and subtle foresight: (r) Han Fei's interpretation of the Laozi, (2) the analogy between metaknowledge in the Laozi and greater knowledge (da zhi) in the Zhuangzi, and (3) the Sunzi characterization of the strategist-general, who is reminiscent of the Han Fei portrayal of the Taoist sage. Han Fei's "lord" (jun), Zhuangzi's collection of sages, and Sunzi's strategist-general all use the modus operandi that in the Laozi is indirectly represented as metaknowledge. The Laozi thus denies the value of conventional, textual, and discursive knowledge and the language and ethics that go with it, including names, categories, distinctions, and all desires, perceptions, ethics, and modes of action based on them. It presents an entirely negative and critical account of "knowledge" as it defines it, that is, Mohist and Confucian "knowledge," and the semantic field for zhi in the Laozi is almost entirely pejorative. It makes no distinction between morally virtuous wisdom and morally vicious cunning. The Laozi uses pervasive metaphors and aphoristic, paradoxical characterizations of the Taoist sage in action to present an alternative to the limitations of conventional knowledge. This metaknowledge is a form of perception that is elusive and beyond direct description. The mode of conduct associated with it conforms to an implicit morality that is not an artifact of the categories of language.

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This metaknowledge entails a protean suppleness, the ability to see through artificial distinctions and respond directly, quickly, and accurately to change, the very characteristics that in Greek civilization are among the hallmarks of metic intelligence. In its rejection of "wisdom," the Laozi paradoxically dispenses with the ethical tension between wisdom and cunning. One effect of this move is the possibility of a description of the operation of metic intelligence outside the polarity of wisdom and cunning and the value judgments they imply.

Zhuangzi The Zhuangzi, like the Laozi, is generally considered to be a composite text whose contents may date from the period of the fourth through the third centuries B.C.E.2s Its thirty-three chapters may represent as many as four strains of "Taoist" thought. The major concern of the remainder of this chapter is the first seven "inner chapters," which are attributed to the historical Zhuang Zhou (Zhuangzi). Parts of the Zhuangzi are also reminiscent of chapters 8 through I I of the Laozi. In general, the Zhuangzi echoes and amplifies certain elements in the Laozi, especially in its attempts at description of dao as obscure, hidden, and formless and in its affirmation of the natural, as opposed to the social, order. Concurrent with the Zhuangzi's acceptance of the natural world is an explicit rejection of the categories that are imposed upon perception by the activities of language and predication. The Zhuangzi differs from the naturalism of the Laozi in its value-free attitude toward the natural world and in its articulated concern with dialectics and logical paradox. The Zhuangzi carries the linguistic skepticism of the Laozi to a new height. The Zhuangzi presents its own version of Taoist metaknowledge, ethics, and language. Its techniques include sudden shifts of perspec25This view is held by Fung Yu-lan and Angus C. Graham, among others. See Schwartz I986.215-I6. The Historical Records, or Shi ji, of Sima Tan (d. IIO B.C. E.) date the historical Zhuangzi in the fourth century, within the reigns of King Hui of Liang or Wei (37o-3I9 B.C.E.) and King Xuan ofQi (319-30I B.C.E.). Sima Tan is also the source for the retrospective description of Taoism as one of the "Six Schools," as the early Taoists were not themselves formally organized into a school.

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tive and style; extended and interweaving webs of metaphor; logical argumentation, within the context of a humorous but sustained and sophisticated attack on the logic and ethics of Confucians, Mohists, and Logicians; and illustrative stories of the character and actions of sages. Four areas of focus characterize the dialogues and anecdotes in the Zhuangzi: (1) the relativity of human perception, which it stresses through sudden shifts of perspective and style and through witty and ecstatic descriptions that include a humorous emphasis on the roles of disease, decay, and death as part of the process of nature; (2) logically skilled caricatures of logic, usually in the form of debates with Zhuangzi's elder contemporary, the logician Hui Shi; (3) attacks on Confucian values, with their emphasis on the social order, through stories that scorn office and wealth and feature social outcasts, such as men who have been branded or crippled as judicial punishment; and (4) stories that present specific accounts of "great knowledge" (da zhi) in operation. The Zhuangzi begins with three powerful metaphors that illustrate the relativity of time, space, and mind. Kun and Peng represent the perspective of near-infinite space; the gigantic fish Kun transforms into the immeasurable Peng, who can traverse the breadth of the universe. The Peng's "great knowledge" of space is contrasted with the viewpoint of the cicada and the dove, who take their own small perspective as true reality. The text similarly asserts the relativity of the temporal by contrasting the perceptions of the short-lived cricket and "morning mushroom" with those of Methuselah Pengzi and two near-immortal trees whose lives span thousands of years (Z 1. 1-4, Graham 43-44). Continuing in this vein, the Zhuangzi states: "those who are clever [zhi] enough to do well in one office or efficient enough to protect one district, whose powers suit one prince and are put to the test in one state, are seeing themselves as the little birds did" (Z 1.4, Graham 44). The analogy continues with the daemonic man of Guyi, who lives on wind and is soft like a girl but has the power to yoke flying dragons, ride beyond the world, and nurture crops, animals, and men (Z 1.6). His mentality and powers are contrasted with the viewpoint of ordinary consciousness. These analogies frame the text and form a background for the discussion of ordinary language, knowledge, and morality as artifacts of limited point of view. Chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi makes the argu-

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ment that both the categories oflanguage and moral judgments based on them arise from the "small knowledge" of a limited point of view. Whatever the provenance in early Chinese thought of the idea that the relation of names to objects is conventional, the Zhuangzi appears to be the first to make the point in emphatic terms.26 Chapter 2 of the Laozi suggests that human value judgments such as beauty and goodness are conventional and arbitrary; the Zhuangzi is much more emphatic: "Gibbons are sought by baboons as mates, elaphures like the company of deer, loaches play with fish. Maoch'iang and Lady Li were beautiful in the eyes of men; but when the fish saw them they plunged deep, when the birds saw them they flew high, when the deer saw them they broke into a run. Which of these four knows what is truly beautiful in the world?" (Z 2.25, Graham 58). The Zhuangzi shares the linguistic skepticism of the Laozi: (1) language is conventional-words do not intrinsically correspond to things, (2) the categories imposed on perception by the conventions of language do not correspond to the structure of the natural world and as a result impede real knowledge, and (3) real knowledge thus cannot be expressed directly in words. In the Zhuangzi, linguistic skepticism takes the form of a sustained attack on both Confucian name rectification theory and Mohist dialectic. This attack takes two forms: at the level of language itself, it is an attack on the way the categories oflanguage are applied to things and, at the level of cognition, it is a demonstration of the relative and arbitrary nature of the "small knowledge" (xiao zht) of human perception that is conditioned by the categories of language. Chapter 2, "The Sorting Which Evens Things Out," is an extended argument about the arbitrariness of categories of language and discriminatory judgments based upon them. This argument about language is the basis upon which Zhuangzi will make assertions about both knowledge and morality. The chapter begins with an analogy between language and knowledge that separates each into great and small: "Great wisdom [da zhi] is effortless, Small wits [xiao zhi] pick holes. Great speech [da yan] is 26 Although Xunzi does maintain that language is conventional, it is not as central to his philosophical oudook. Nivison (1991) has suggested that the Xunzi contains a critique of Zhuangzi, of which his discussion of language as conventional may be an example.

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flavorless, Petty speech [xiao yan] strings words" (Z 2.12-13, modified from Graham so). The Zhuangzi denies any a priori existence to shi fei moral judgments in an argument that questions the Mencian claim that correctly cultivated heart-minds are sources of moral authority. Who, it asks, is without such authority? Fools (yu) are as sure of the authority of their judgments as those with understanding. "For shi and fei to exist before a completed mind [cheng xin] would be to 'go to Yue today and arrive yesterday.' This would be to take as existing what doesn't exist [wu you]. Take as existing what doesn't exist, and not even daemonic Yu could understand, how much less so myselfl" (Z 2. 16).27 Zhuangzi is contrasting the moral and categorical judgments of Confucians and Mohists with a more unmediated flow from experience to language. These "affirm and deny" shi fei judgments are both cognitive and moral. On the one hand, they affirm and deny the existence of what they say "Is so" and "Isn't so.'' Zhuangzi thinks that such cognitive judgments put the cart before the horse. It is important to note that these categories are implicitly moral ones. To shi means to affirm both in the sense that something is so and in the sense that something is morally right. Similarly, to fei means both to deny existence ("It's not so") and to judge as wrong.zs The Zhuangzi proceeds to question whether there is such a thing as fixed meaning and to claim that there is no means of externally verifying whether any given statement means anything or not: "Speech [yan] is not [merely] blowing breath. When we say something, there is something said, but its signification is never fixed. Is something truly said? Or have we never really said anything? [As to] the difference between it [speech] and the sounds made by fledgling birds, is there a distinction [between them] or is there no distinction [bian]?" (Z 2. 16, modified from Graham 52). Zhuangzi goes on to ask what "darkens language" and gives rise to artificial notions of real and false, "is" and "isn't" (shi fei). His answer is the "small" (xiao), both petty speech and small knowledge. The 27for another translation of this passage, see Graham 51-52. "To go to Yue today and have arrived yesterday" is one of the paradoxes ofHui Shi. For further discussion, see Graham 283. 28Thus when chapter 2 of the Laozi speaks of shi fti as "recognizing the good as good" being in reality not good, Wang Bi's commentary likens "good" and "not good" (shan and bu shan) to "right" and "wrong" (shi and fei) (Lao 2, Lin 5).

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result is that the shi of the Confucian is the fei of the Mohist and vice versa. Instead, Zhuangzi recommends ming, illumination or true discernment: "Dao is obscured [shadowed] by small completion, and speech [yan] is obscured by elegance and flower. Thus we have the shi fei of Confucians and Mohists; by which what is shi for one is fei for the other, and what isfei for one is shi for the other. You may wish to shi what they fei andfei what they shi, but this is not as good as using illumination [ming]" (Z 2. 16). The argument continues that, depending on point of view, "This" (shi) is always "That" (na) and "That" is always "This." The effect of these arguments is to erode away the discriminations of language. Zhuangzi almost imperceptibly passes from a contrast between shi andfei, "so" and "not so," to a discrimination between shi, "this one here" and na, "that one there." Anyone can agree that "here" and "there" are relative. By using the double sense of shi as a pivot, the argument switches the claim of relativity from "here and there" to "so and no so" and "right and wrong." Zhuangzi, however, is not trying to argue that there is no difference between A and not A or between right and wrong. He is claiming that the real differences between things cannot be illuminated or discriminated by the boundaries of language, which is a false substitute for real discriminatory ability or illumination (ming). Just as you cannot use a horse to demonstrate that "a white horse is not a horse," you cannot used fixed notions of meaning or signification (ji) to demonstrate the meaninglessness of meaning or that signification does not signify (Z 2. 18, Graham 53). Zhuangzi also ascribes false distinctions to an intermediary stage in the history of knowledge. At first the ancients did not recognize that there had begun to be things. Next they recognized things but not the borders between them, and then they recognized the existence of borders between things but not of shi fei judgments. According to Zhuangzi, it was at the point that shi fei judgments became allowable-and this point is the intrusion of Confucian and Mohist philosophy-that daos became inaccessible (Z 2.20, Graham 54). Put differently, articulated philosophies lack the freshness of unsystematizedjudgments. It would be better to use the "illumination" of unconditioned judgment. In order to illustrate this point, Zhuangzi attempts to "say" a series of discriminations in order to illustrate the inadequacy of discrimination. The result is a classic tangle of wit and language that makes two

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entirely reasonable linguistic distinctions and then attempts to conflate them. The first discrimination involves the idea of "beginning," from which arise the categories of(1) beginning, (2) before the beginning of beginning, and (3) before the beginning of the aforementioned before the beginning of beginning. Similarly, we can posit the existence of (4) something and (5) nothing. Combining these two discriminations produces (6) before the beginning of something and nothing (before the beginning of there being no something) and (7) before the beginning of the aforementioned before the beginning of something and nothing (before the beginning of there being no something) (Z 2.22, Graham 55). From here, Zhuangzi continues: "Suddenly there is nothing, yet we never know of something and nothing which is truly something and which is truly nothing. And now that we have deemed [wei] [there to be] something, we still do not know of it: have we really deemed something, or have we deemed nothing?" (Z 2.22).29 Having argued that the categories of something and nothing are meaningless because they are both mutually pervasive and mutually contradictory and that, in any event, it is impossible to use the categories of something and nothing to make discriminatory judgments (wei), Zhuangzi applies these arguments by stating several paradoxes: (1) There is nothing in the universe bigger than the tip of an autumn hair, but Mount Tai is small. The infinitely fine tip of an autumn hair is bigger than Mount Tai because of the arbitrariness of the categories we use to measure space-large and small. (2) No one outlives a doomed child, and Pengzi died young. The "Methuselah" Pengzi is more short-lived than a child who dies in youth because of the arbitrariness of the categories we use to measure time. (3) I was born together with heaven and earth, and the myriad things and I are one. Eliminating false discriminations based on the arbitrary measurement of space and time, Zhuangzi next asserts that he as an individual is coextensive with the universe as a whole-heaven and earth and the myriad things (another paradox of Hui Shi). From this position, he returns to the problem of language: Now that we are one, can I still say something? Already, having called us one, did I succeed in not saying something? One and the saying makes two, two and one makes three. Proceeding from here even an 29For

another translation of this passage, see Graham

ss-s6.

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Knowing Words expert calculator cannot get to the end of it, much less a plain man. Therefore if we take the step from nothing to something we arrive at three, and how much worse if we take the step from something to something! Take no step at all, and the "It's so" which goes by circumstances will come to an end. (Z 2.22, modified from Graham 56)

He rejects the discriminations of petty language: "Great daos are not cited as authorities; great discriminations [bian] are not spoken. Great ren is not ren; great integrity does not hold itself in, great courage does not overreach itself (Z 2.23). Chapter 2 thus emphasizes the following points: First, both speech and knowledge come in great and small forms. The dialectics of Mohists and Logicians, of whom Hui Shi is the chosen representative, are an example of lesser discourse, which can be turned upon itself to show its own paradoxical nature.30 Second, when there is recourse to lesser language, things are really the opposite of their names. True discourse is unspoken; true courage is not thrasonical. After the long argument about the logic of language and morality, the chapter ends with a question in the mouth of"Gaptooth," the first of many quasi-"idiotic" characters who specifically raise or exemplify questions about knowledge. Gaptooth asks: "How do I know that what I call knowing is not ignorance? How do I know that what I call ignorance is not knowing?" (Z 2.24-25, Graham 58-59).31 The response is: "While we dream we do not know that we are dreaming, and in the middle of a dream interpret a dream within it; not until we wake do we know that we were dreaming. Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream. Yet fools 30Schwartz (1986.222-25) points out that Zhuangzi's use ofHui Shi as a straw man may itself be problematic. It is Hui Shi who helps show the inadequacy of ordinary language to provide any ultimate account of the world. The ten paradoxes ofHui Shi, which are only extant in chapter 33 of the Zhuangzi, seem to deny the absolute reality of many of the categories, predicates, and attributes that we customarily assign to objects. They focus in particular upon spatial, temporal, and classificatory attributes and seem to suggest the meaninglessness of attributes such as high, low, large, and small within an infinite space. Zhuangzi seems to be using these paradoxes to argue that it is the tendency oflanguage to absolutize the relative that leads us astray. In this view, the need is for language to respond to things more as they are and less as we categorize them to be. 31Gaptooth raises the same question at the beginning of chapter 7, where he avers that the dynasty of the sage-emperor Yu is benighted by conventional knowledge and morality (Z 7.70, Graham 94-95). Chapter 12 indicates that Gaptooth was the teacher of Yu, who was the teacher of Yao. Gaptooth's teachers were Wang Ni and Pi Yi (Reedcoat). See Z 12.103, Watson 129-30 and Z 22.186-87, Graham 160-61.

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think they are awake, so confident that they know what they are, princes, herdsmen, incorrigible! You and Confucius are both dreams, and I who call you a dream am also a dream" (Z 2.27, Graham 596o}. Finally, the chapter poses this question of how and whether we know what we think we know in an anecdote about Zhuangzi himself, in which he dreams he is a butterfly and does not know about Zhuangzi. Awake again, and manifestly Zhuangzi, does he know whether he is Zhuangzi dreaming he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming it is Zhuangzi? (Z 2.29, Graham 61). This transformation story seems to suggest that the ordinary consciousness of petty language (xiao yan) and small knowledge (xiao zht) are like dreams, because the perception and knowledge upon which they rely are as variable and as illusory as dream perceptions, which shift upon awakening. Like dreamers, people imprisoned within ordinary knowledge cannot see the framework that renders them incapable of perceiving other possibilities. In my analysis, I have focused on the Zhuangzi's distinction between small and great language. Angus Graham distinguishes three modes of language in the Zhuangzi: "saying from a lodging place," "weighted saying," and "spillover saying." The first is a mode of persuasion by ad hominem argument. It involves taking on the opponent's standpoint temporarily and demonstrating the inconsistencies of this point of view. Anecdote is its typical form of expression. The second mode appeals to the authority of direct experience, for which aphorism is the usual expression. Zhuangzi typically employs the third mode, which is compared to a kind of vessel that, when filled to the brim, begins to tip over and then spontaneously rights itself. If the speaker has the knack of language, the meaning fluctuates but eventually stabilizes, despite the lack of fixed meanings in language.32 Zhuangzi's variable use of the word "know" illustrates this technique: "All men honor what knowledge knows, but no one knows how to depend on what knowledge does not know to know; can this not be called the great uncertainty?" (Z 25.233).33 In this admonition "to know by depending on what knowledge does not know," the word know refers alternately to know-how, or great knowledge, and to know-that, or small knowledge. 32C£ 33For

Graham 25-26. other translations of this passage, see Graham

102

and Watson

288.

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Just as the Taoist accepts his opponent's point of view in the first mode, here he accepts his opponent's definitions and then proceeds from them to show their lack of internal consistency or meaningfulness. Zhuangzi is all too easily accused of moral relativism. The Zhuangzi lacks the Laozi's quasi-moral preferences: for the feminine over the masculine, the soft over the hard, the submissive over the forceful. Zhuangzi attacks Confucian moral precepts and the Confucian emphasis on the social order and rejects office and wealth in a series of anecdotes in which Confucius is outdone by "sages" of conventionally dubious credentials. As was the case with the Laozi, the Taoist rejection of Confucian and Mohist linguistic categories leads to an attack on Confucian and Mohist ethics. This attack takes two forms: first, arguments about the relative and arbitrary nature of shi Jei (affirmation/ denial) moral judgments and, second, sardonic attacks on the practice of Confucian morality and virtue. The Zhuangzi argues that real virtue is not "virtuous." Supreme discrimination is silent; supreme ren is cruel (Z 2.23, Graham 57). It is because true virtues cannot be named or categorized that moral judgments based on false moral categories miss the mark. This argument about the arbitrary nature of shi Jei judgments has three steps: (1) there is nothing a priori about shi fei judgments, (2) there is such a thing as real knowledge, which does not rely on shi fei judgments, and (3) Confucians and Mohists, by relying on shi Jei categories, exclude themselves from the possibility of real knowledge. The argument begins with a challenge to the Mencian claim of a priori authority for shi fei judgments. To illustrate his point, Zhuangzi borrows one of the paradoxes ofHui Shi-"Going to Yue today and arriving yesterday" (Z 2. 16). The argument's second claim is that true knowledge is possible but knowledge and language work in opposite directions. Dao knowledge leads to perception of true reality; knowledge of the categories of language leads to conditioned perception. Thus "saying says something, but what it says is never fixed" (Z 2. 16). The argument continues that language, not true perception, is the source of the shi fei judgments of Confucians and Mohists. As a result, Mohist shi becomes Confucian Jei and Confucian fei becomes Mohist shi (Z 2. 17).

The argument concludes: "The lighting up of 'That's it, that's not' [shifei] is the reason why the Way [dao] is flawed. The reason why the

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Way is flawed is the reason why love becomes complete" (Z 2.20, Graham 54). Zhuangzi has now reached the opposite of the Confucian claim that dao is completed by love and by shi fti. After the logical argument about Confucian morality in chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi, later chapters introduce a series of anecdotes that caricature the wisdom and morality of Confucius himself. The incidents in chapter 4, "Worldly Business among Men," are concerned with everyday judgments about what is useful and valuable. Chapter 5, "The Signs of Fullness of Power," moves from common sense judgments to the judgments of sages about the manifestation of power [de] in others. Chapter 6, "The Teacher Who is the Ultimate Ancestor," is concerned, not with a human sage or teacher, but with the spontaneous "knack" that is for the Taoist the source of both ethics and knowledge and constitutes the ultimate authority. These character sketches begin with a benign "Confucius," who gives curiously Taoist-sounding advice to his students. The series of anecdotes about Confucius shows, however, that in Zhuangzi's opinion, Confucius does not know how to follow his own advice. The series begins and ends with a dialogue between Confucius and his favorite disciple, Yan Hui. In the first dialogue Yan Hui wants to use political persuasion on the ruler of Wei. In good Taoist fashion, Confucius warns Yan Hui against the potential for discord, competition, and danger inherent in the purposive exercise of knowledge. Zhuangzi puts a familiar injunction into the voice of Confucius: "You have heard about using knowledge (zht) to know; you have never heard about using ignorance (wu zhi) to know" (Z 4.39, Graham 69). In the next dialogue Confucius advises Zigao, duke of She, that destiny and duty are the two supreme commandments of the world and urges him to safeguard himself by avoiding exaggerated language: "Words are wind and waves, deeds fulfill or discredit them" (Z 4.41, Graham 71). In the stories that follow, Confucius is bested in one form or another by a series of social undesirables: the madman of Chu, the cripple Wang Tai, "Chopped Foot," Shentu Jia, and Shu Shan, "Choptoes." In the incident that concludes chapter 4, Confucius meets the madman of Chu, a reference to Analects 18, where the "madman" laments the decline of virtue and the dangers of taking office. The madman of the Zhuangzi gives the opposite advice and laments the fate of everything "useful." He upbraids Confucius with having the wrong kind of knowledge: everyone knows how to use

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what is useful, but no one knows how to use what is useless" (Z 4·4546, Graham 75). Chapter 5 continues with the incident of Confucius and the cripple Wang Tai. Wang Tai, despite his obvious mutilation (his foot was chopped off as punishment for a crime), has as many disciples as Confucius. Confucius acknowledges that he himself has been putting off becoming a student of Wang Tai (Z 5-47, Graham 76-77). Another mutilated sage, Shu Shan, "Choptoes," goes to see Confucius, who upbraids him for getting into trouble and proceeds to give him instruction. Shu Shan then describes the encounter to Lao Dan (the apocryphal Laozi) and berates Confucius for assuming that his power was impaired by his mutilation and in general for being beguiled by appearances (Z 5.50-51, Graham 78-79). The next dialogue, with Duke Ai ofLu (c. 505-479 B.C.E.), is also concerned with the problem of recognition-how people recognize things as being alike and different. Confucius notes again and again how remarkable it is that power can be realized in individuals who are cripples and outcasts. Zhuangzi ridicules Confucius's operating assumption that an individual in whom dao and power (de) are whole is outwardly whole (Z 5.51-52). In chapter 6 Zhuangzi criticizes Confucius for preoccupation with external form. Two sages, in violation of mourning ritual, sing songs before the corpse of their dead friend because they view life and death as part of the same universal process. Finally, Yan Hui and Confucius meet again at the end of chapter 6. Yan Hui has "made progress." He has forgotten about rites and music, ren and yi, and fmally ''just sits and forgets." Confucius now asks Yan Hui to accept him as his disciple (Z 6.69, Graham 92). At this point, Zhuangzi's fictionalized quasiTaoist "Confucius" is shown to be less able than his own student. Zhuangzi thus draws a composite portrait of Confucius as a paradigm of Confucian language, ethics, and knowledge in action and contrasts this composite with a variety of individuals of "great knowledge," who rely on a different, and anterior, faculty of intellectual and moral judgment. Zhuangzi can only justify this claim to a spontaneous and unmediated moral perception by claiming access to a greater kind of knowledge. Unlike Laozi, who is equivocal about his metaknowledge, Zhuangzi clearly distinguishes two types of intelligence or knowledge and two corresponding types of individual who use them. "Little wits cannot keep up with great, or few years with many" (Z 1.3, Graham 44). (Small) knowledge is a curse for the sage; the sage does

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not plan (mou), and thus does not need such "knowledge" (Z 5· 54, Graham 82). The exercise of "small knowledge" is only destructive: Shu ["Swift" discernment] was emperor of the South Sea; Hu ["Hasty" discernment] was emperor of the North Sea. The emperor of the center was Hun Tun [neither with nor without discernment]. Shu and Hu often met in the land of Hun Tun, and he treated them extremely well. Shu and Hu made a plan [mou] to repay Hun Tun for his power and virtue [de]: "People all have seven apertures: to see, hear, eat and breathe, and he alone is without any. We could try to bore him some." Each day they drilled one. On the seventh day, Hun Tun died. (Z 7·75)34

This anecdote, which concludes the last chapter generally ascribed to the historical Zhuangzi, demonstrates again the harmfulness of the indiscriminate use of the "small knowledge" of ordinary reason. By contrast, Zhuangzi describes "great knowledge" as being without limitation: "My life flows between confines, but knowledge has no confines. If we use the confmed to follow after the unconfined, there is danger that the flow will cease; and when it ceases, to exercise knowledge is purest danger" (Z 3.30, Graham 62). Zhuangzi describes the skills associated with great knowledge as a spontaneous perception that can be "transmitted but not appropriated, grasped but not seen" (Z 6.62). This perception frustrates the conventional understanding of physical dimension, by offering images like "storing the world within the world" (Z 6.62, Graham 86). Thus Chef Ding can carve an ox effortlessly and without error because he has "left skill behind him" and cares only about the Way. Chef Ding describes three stages in the development of his perceptions as he learned to carve oxen: (I) seeing (imaginary) oxen everywhere, (2) seeing real and particular oxen, but as parts, not as wholes, and finally, (3) perceiving the oxen through the "daemonic" rather than with the eye (Z 3. 3 I, Graham 63-64). "Small knowledge" would, no doubt, estimate the width of the cleaver against the width of the space into which it must be inserted. The "great knowledge" of Chef Ding is of a different kind. He visualizes the edge of his cleaver as being without thickness and inserts it into what he visualizes as a space when he perceives the parts of the ox as two discrete objects he 34for an alternative translation of this passage, see Graham 98.

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intends to separate.35 In other words, his "knack" is to insert an object of no thickness into a finite space. This is not perception that measures and categorizes; it attempts to use what cannot be measured in an entirely practical way. Great knowledge also entails the unimpeded perception of transformation. What great knowledge recognizes as a continuous process of transformation, small knowledge and language mistakenly perceive as polar opposites: death and life, survival and ruin, success and failure, poverty and riches, competence and incompetence, slander and praise, hunger and thirst (Z 5· 52, Graham 8o). Another aspect of the perception of transformation is neutrality in the face of disfigurement, disease, and death, which, properly understood, are part of the process of nature (Z 6.64, Graham 88-89). In the second dialogue between Yan Hui and Confucius, Yan Hui asks about a certain Mengsun Cai, who was the best mourner in the state ofLu but who could mourn and conduct a funeral without grief. Confucius replies that Cai has taken "the step beyond knowledge," the recognition that everyday consciousness is a dream-like construct and one from which Confucius admits he has not yet begun to awake. "You dream that you are a bird and fly away in the sky, dream that you are a fish and plunge into the deep. There's no telling whether the man who speaks now is the waker or the dreamer" (Z 6.67, Graham 90-91). By contrast, the Zhuangzi sketches several characters who have taken this step. These characterizations include anecdotes about the sage-emperor Yao offering his throne to Yu and stories about the sage Ziqi. The sage-emperor Yao offers Yu the throne when he perceives Yu as the emperor in reality and himself as the emperor in appearance (Z 1. 5-6 Graham 45). Later, Yu rejects Yi Erzi as a disciple because Yao has tainted him with the gifts ofren, yi, and shiftijudgments (Z 6.68, Graham 91). At the beginning of chapter 2, the sage Ziqi reclines on a cushion, sighs, loses "his own self'' in trance, and declares that "the reclining 35See Nagy 1990b. 190 on the Indo-European verb-root *per- in the sense of "go to the end point, go over to the other side, arrive at the other side" with special reference to the successfol piercing through or cutting through of the body's joints in the context of sacrifice. Nagy provides further bibliography and also a citation of Rig- Veda I .61. 12, a passage referring to the severing of the joints of an ox.

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man here now is not the reclining man of yesterday" (Z 2. 10, Graham 48-49). The disjunction he thus resolves occurs in chapter 24, where Ziqi successively laments first himself as a man who had lost himself (himself at one remove), then the lamenter of the man who had lost himself (himself at two removes), and, finally, the lamenter of the lamenter of the man who had lost himself (himself at three removes) (Z 24.218, Graham 105). In a move typical of Zhuangzi, the Taoist detaches himself from a given action enough to be able to apply recursively the action to the action itself, in this case, lamentation over detachment. He is able, however, to disentangle himself adroitly from the resulting paradox or inconvenience by an act of vision. Ziqi is also portrayed as possessing the practical skills of the craftsman. Confronted by a great tree of apparently noble timber, Ziqi perceives that its branches are too crooked and its grain too twisted for it to be of any use. Only its inherent uselessness permitted it to reach such a great age (Z 4-44, Graham 73-74). Similarly, Cripple Shu may be bent double, but he can support himself because his illness spares him from military conscription and he receives charity for the sick (Z 4-45, Graham 74). In "Knowledge Roamed North" (chapter 22), anyone who can talk about a dao does not understand it. When Knowledge seeks advice about daos from Donothing Saynothing, he refuses to talk to him. Scatterbrain knows and is willing to say but forgets midway through. Finally, the Yellow Emperor advises Knowledge that to know the dao he must cease to ponder (si), think ahead (lu), abide in anything, work for anyone, be a disciple, or follow any dao. Huang Di tells Knowledge that it is Donothing Saynothing and Scatterbrain who truly understand daos. "The knower does not say, the sayer does not know, so the sage conducts a wordless teaching" (Z 22.185, Graham 159).36 36This passage refers to Laozi 56. In addition to these accounts within the Inner chapters, several stories in the Outer chapters deal specifically with the interrelated themes of knowledge and language. Several Outer chapters stories portray Huang Di as ignorant of the Way. In one, Huang Di loses his Dark Pearl and sends Knowledge to look for it. It is found not by Knowledge but by Shapeless (Z 12.103, Watson 129). Huang Di appears in two other stories in the Outer chapters, which deal with the themes of music and statecraft. In chapter 14, he is questioned by Cheng of North Gate about his three performances of the same piece of music. He plays the piece in the Confucian-inspired terms of ren and yi, in the spontaneous and natural terms of yin and yang, and, finally, according to the spontaneous course of destiny, beyond rational and moraljudgment (Z 14.124, Graham 164-66). In chapter 24, he sets out to

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An entirely pejorative description of knowledge appears in the Laozi1 but Zhuangzi gives both a negative description of "conventional knowledge" and a positive description of metaknowledge. There is little explicit semantic polarity, however, between virtuous and vicious intelligence. As in the Laozi1 Zhuangzi's Taoist sage is described less as wise than as discerning (ming), not as directed but as quiescent (wu wei). Several terms for cleverness that elsewhere are strongly pejorative are curiously neutral in the Zhuangzi; these include jue1 "cunning," and guai 1 "perverse." Great knowledge is a "knack" that frustrates conventional knowledge of physical dimension ("storing the world within the world") and of time ("going to Yue today and arriving yesterday"). Skilled individuals such as the angler and carpenter know how to respond immediately, effectively, and intuitively to rapidly changing situations. For Zhuangzi, real ethics, like real knowledge, can be apprehended but not described because knowledge and language work in opposite directions. Dao knowledge leads to perception of reality; knowledge of the categories oflanguage leads to the conditioned perception of shi fei judgments. The textual strategies of the Laozi and Zhuangzi are very different than those of Confucian Mohist works. The former tend to rely on discussion of principles, illustrated by moral anecdotes; the latter, on definitions. (As the next chapter will indicate, the Sunzi is similarly straightforward in its construction, however much it may advocate indirect strategies.) By contrast, the form of the texts ascribed to Laozi and Zhuangzi is as roundabout as their contents. These texts rely on pervasive metaphors and aphorisms, paradoxes, thumbnail sketches, humor, poetry, and sudden shifts of perspective. seek the Great Clod and is directed by a young boy who advises him how to govern the empire (Z 24.214, Watson 264-66).

CHAPTER

5

Cunning in Rhetoric and Strategy

Confucians, Mohists, and Taoists disagree over the nature of wisdom, how it relates to ethics, how it should be taught, and how (if at all) to talk about it. Mohists and Confucians diverge over what knowledge is and how to teach and talk about it but agree on the paramount importance of ethics. Taoists question whether true wisdom can be talked about at all. Yet all these texts, and the schools subsequently associated with them, are in agreement in their rejection of cunning as an aspect of true wisdom. There is, however, a point of view for which cunning is not only acceptable but necessary to wisdom; this is an attitude toward intelligence most readily associated with wu, the martial sphere.l This viewpoint appears in two representative texts from two genres that admit and admire craft per se: military strategy manuals (bingfa) and works of persuasion and rhetoric (zong heng), specifically the Sunzi and the Strategies of the Warring States. In the Sunzi, the martial skills of the general are presented in a highly abstract form and rely on deception in no small part. In the Zhanguo ce or Strategies of the Warring States, the emphasis shifts from the ability to fabricate illusions and deception in action to skill in persuasive language. These texts represent two approaches to the transformation of apparent reality through deception: one, by creating misleading circumstances or perceptions, the other, by using lan1 This classification is necessarily approximate. In a certain sense, the Taoist rejection of public life takes it out of either sphere, but I include it under wen on the basis of the descriptions of statecraft in the Laozi.

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guage to create a desired impression.2 Both texts are associated with the wu, or martial, sphere of the political realm. Zhou China did not distinguish separate civil and martial spheres within the-.political realm. The new political order of the Warring States period witnessed this division, along with the development of complementary military and administrative specialists with separate skills and values.3 Although the idea of separating the minister from the general was still incipient in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, these periods saw the rise of a new breed of military specialist and a new martial philosophy. This new outlook both reinterpreted the qualities of the Confucian sage and opposed the traditional heroic values of the old aristocracy. Confucius himself did not make a separation between administration and warfare, nor did he advocate the elimination of violence and warfare. It was only in the third century B.C.E. that institutional divisions between wen and wu officers were observed and the military's specialization became clear-cut. The life work of Confucius, the first professional teacher, would, however, eventually give rise to a new emphasis on textual transmission. As such, it marks a watershed in the emergence of the wen service elite, who sought power and prominence through literary wisdom and its specialized techmques. As specialist of wu, the strategist-general differs in abilities and mentality from both his martial predecessors and his Confucian and Mohist counterparts, who themselves disagree on details of government, statecraft, and education. The Confucianjunzi, a specialist of wen, and the Mohist xian, a specialist in defensive warfare, agree on a view of wisdom that is first and foremost normative. Contrasted with his military predecessor, the heroic and forceful general of the Spring and Autumn Period, the strategist-general marks a transition to an intellectual, rather than heroic, view of military affairs. Despite the differences in skills and values of the strategist-general and his count2 In the pre-Qin period, there was only a minimal distinction between persuasion and strategy. The reason for this identification of the rhetor and the strategus was that the ultimate aims of both techniques were political. Warfare was regarded as a matter oflast resort; political domination was the goal whether the means were rhetorical or military. See Lewis 1985.297. 3 For a fuller discussion of this subject, see Lewis 1985.259-80 and 1990.97-135· For a discussion of pre-Warring States period views on warfare as a natural activity that was not a separate sphere of political or social life, see Rand 1977.7-30.

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erpart, the minister, both are concerned with the transmission of texts as a means to knowledge and power. The texts of the generals are known as strategy manuals (bingfa); Han exegetes accord the texts of the specialists of wen the status of classics (jing). The genre of bingfa, or military manuals, covers both strategy and tactics and the overall position of wu in society. The Militarists (bing jia) are listed as a school in early bibliographic classifications. These texts indicate both the presence of a military philosophy and the increasingly intellectual character of warfare. The existence of a military philosophy, transmitted in texts, makes war an act of mind, insofar as its principles can be formulated and taught. Such manuals as the Sunzi, the Sun Bin bingfa, the ~i Liaozi, the Wuzi, the Liu Tao, and the Sima Fa describe not only the conduct of war but also the character and abilities of the general. 4 In this philosophy of warfare, victory depends on the skills and abilities of the commander, or strategist-general. These include the comprehension of order underlying apparent chaos (whether by foresight or on the battlefield itself) and the ability to anticipate events with appropriate strategy and tactics. The latter includes the perception of crucial moments in the course of actual events and the ability to act decisively upon one's knowledge. These abilities correspond closely to those of the sage, who can recognize meaningful patterns within the flux of ephemeral circumstances and use these patterns in order to establish both power and order. Like the abilities of the Taoist sage, the ~bilities of the sage-commander are strikingly similar to those of the Greek individual of metis, as we shall see later. Taoist texts do not, however, clearly articulate the nature of these abilities, if only because of their repeated insistence that the knowledge of the dao is beyond the scope of linguistic formulation. In this chapter I will show that in their detailed discussion of the skills of the sage-general, military strategy manuals emphasize the qualities of what I have been calling the individual of metic intelligence. 4Several bingfa texts are among those excavated from Western Han graves at Yinqueshan in Shandong; these include versions of the Sun Bin bingfa, Sun Wu bingfa, Liu Tao, and Wei Liaozi. These texts suggest new evidence concerning the authorship of the Sunzi and its traditional attribution to Sun Wu. It now appears that the Sunzi may have been originally compiled by Sun Wu and later completed by Sun Bin. For a discussion of these issues and a list of interpretive articles, see Loewe 1977.133-34.

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Sunzi's Art of War The zhi of the strategist-general is portrayed in a representative text for the Militarist school, the Sunzi bingfa, a military strategy manual ascribed to Sun Wu.s As a work of martial philosophy, the Sunzi places special emphasis on the following_points: (1) the importance of war to the state; (2) the intellectual character of war; (3) the importance of the general (and his peculiar abilities) to the conduct of war, and thus to the state; and (4) the principle of the undesirability of warfare, and hence, the need to minimize conflict and conserve energy. This text, like other bingfa, presents a philosophy of warfare that emphasizes the abilities of the general, as both distinct and independent from those of the ruler. In its portrayal of the wisdom, courage, and heroism of the general, it prefers the efficacious use of strategy and tactics to the use of force and violence. 6 It also formulates a number of principles of both strategy and tactics. Most important for the purposes of this discussion are an advocacy of the use of deceit and an insistence on the need to understand the enemy as a prerequisite for the effective use of deceit. The Sunzi bingfa begins with the statement of a philosophical view of warfare: the art of war is of vital importance to the survival of any state and thus is a field of inquiry which must not be neglected (Sun 1. 1). Having emphasized the importance of war, the Sunzi next stresses its intellectual character. This emphasis takes two forms: war is subject to knowledge (analysis and calculation) and victory in war arises from moral and intellectual faculties, rather than pure physical strength and the expenditure of energy. These views form the basis for a new calculus of power, which emphasizes the role and skills of the general as the protector of the state, rather than the number and forcefulness of his troops. The strength of the state is identified with the skills of the general (Sun 3-45. Griffith 81). This emphasis on the intellectual nature of warfare leads to a corresponding disparagement of unnecessary force or violence. The conSThe strategist-general of the Warring States period is the source for the heroic model of Zhuge Liang in the Romance. Both he and Cao Cao are specifically cited in the Romance as students of the Sunzi bingfo, of which Cao Cao is one of the commentators. Cao Cao will be discussed in chapter 6. 6Cf. the Greek traditions of contrasting metis, "cunning intelligence," with hie, "force, violence," for example, in Homeric poetry. See Nagy 1979-317-47-

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servation of energy is the main topic of chapter 2 of the Sunzi, a chapter on waging war. It focuses on two points: the importance of speed and the conservation of energy by using the resources of the enemy. Speed is so crucial to the successful conduct of war that without it, even a wise (zhi) man is powerless to act. He will be unable to avert the negative consequences of prolonged warfare: dissipation of energy; exhaustion of strength, morale, and resources; and the danger of rebellion by subordinates. Thus cleverness (qiao) is never associated with delay. Energy and resources can be conserved by appropriating the energy of the enemy. The wise general lives on the enemy; the energy of a small amount of enemy resources is equivalent to twenty times the value of one's own provisions. Similarly, the wise general augments his own resources by treating captured soldiers kindly and retaining them and maintains the energy of his own soldiers by rewarding them generously and quickly. The Sunzi accords special roles and abilities to the martial-specialist general; these differ from the skills of both the administrative specialist and the ruler. It associates five virtues with the commander: wisdom (zhi), sincerity or trustworthiness (xin), benevolence (ren), courage (yong), and strictness (yan) (Sun 1. 7-8). On the surface, these are the very virtues of the Confucian junzi; the Sunzi, however, provides its own interpretation of what they mean. In particular, courage is not necessarily thrasonical, and wisdom is not necessarily straightforward. Unlike his heroic predecessor of the Spring and Autumn period, the general eschews needless violence and rejects the ideals of personal heroism. Unlike the Confucian ruler or administrative specialist, the general may use deception but must be trustworthy (xin) if he is to command the loyalty of his own men. This ability to use deceit effectively is crucial to his success at both strategy and tactics. This tension surrounding the use of cunning is resolved by separating the functions of the general from those of the ruler in a well-run state. For example, in chapter 3 of the Sunzi there is an explanation that a junzi can bring misfortune upon his army in three ways: "hobbling the army" by ordering it to advance or retreat when it should not; perplexing its officers by ignorant participation in the administration of military affairs; and sharing in the exercise of responsibilities when ignorant of command problems, which engenders doubts in the minds of the officers. In all three situations, the ruler's ignorance of military affairs interferes with military command; Jia Lin's commentary emphasizes the danger of a sovereign's meddling in a general's

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proper sphere: "The advance and retirement of the army can be controlled by the general in accordance with prevailing circumstances. No evil is greater than commands of the sovereign from the court" (Sun 3.46, Griffith 81). The text then asserts five essentials for victory; the fifth accords victory to the able general who is free of interference from the sovereign (Sun 3.50). The commentaries on this passage also reiterate the importance of the proper separation of the roles of sovereign and general. Du You quotes Master (Taigong) Wang as saying: "To make appointments is the province of the sovereign; to decide on battle, that of the general." According to Wang Xi: "A sovereign of high character and intelligence [xian ming] must be able to know the right man, should place the responsibility on him, and expect results" (Sun 3. 50, Griffiths 83). In all these passages and commentaries, the need for the separation of the responsibility of the general from that of the ruler is expressed in terms of specialist knowledge, never in terms of the propriety of the use of deceit, a quality which, in the sphere of wen, is condemned by Confucians, Mohists, and Taoists alike. Chapter 3, a consideration of strategy (mou) in offensive warfare, completely rejects the value of physical heroism. The means of winning victory without battle is strategy (mou): "It is best to preserve one's own state intact; to crush the enemy's state is only second best. It is best to preserve one's own army, battalion, company, or five-man squad intact; to crush the enemy's army, battalion, company, or fiveman squad intact is only a second best. For to win a hundred times in a hundred engagements is not the very best; the very best is to subdue an enemy's army without fighting at all" (italics mine) (Sun 3. 33-34).7 The text continues: "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy [mou]" (italics mine). Li Quan's commentary stresses the point that they conquer by means of strategy (Sun 3-343 5). s This skill makes it possible to subdue enemy armies without 7 See also Lau 1965.335· The portrayal of Zhuge Liang as a man of true couragenot in spite of, but because of, his avoidance of violence-follows this principle. 8 0ther military strategy manuals also reflect this attitude. The Wuzi criticizes personal heroism in the form of bellicosity ( 1. r Sa). According to the Sun Bin bingfa, the source of victory is not weapons or courage, but the commander's knowledge of the way of combat (SBBF 97, roo, and 104). The Wei Liaozi attacks heroism as destructive recklessness (WLZ I.5b-6a, I. I5b-r6a, I. I7a, 2.27b-28a, 2.30b). For further discussion see Lewis 1985.332-34.

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battle, capture cities without assaults, and overthrow states without protracted operations (Sun 3.39-40). According to this view of warfare, victory depends heavily upon the personal and intellectual skills of the general, which include the strategic manipulation of deceit. These skills differ from the more normative intelligence of the sovereign. It is in turning to wisdom (zhl) that the intelligence of the strategist-general differs most from the virtues of his Confucian counterpart. On the level of strategy, the Sunzi emphasizes that the grand strategy of the commander rests on calculation or foreknowledge. Calculation before battle, both qualitative and quantitative, can predict victory or defeat. Associated with calculation are several other forms of knowledge: the ability to recognize order underlying apparent chaos, the recognition of cycles, the ability to recognize and respond to crucial moments, and the manipulation of tactics based on strategy. After the statement of the importance of war, the Sunzi proceeds to a discussion of the importance of calculation. Qualitatively, calculation refers to the comparison of the two sides in terms of five fundamental factors governing warfare. Quantitatively, it refers to arithmetical calculation to tally the relative strengths of the two sides. The art of war is governed by five constant factors [calculations {it)], to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. (Sun 1.2, Giles 40) It is by scoring many points [suan] that one wins a war before the event in a rehearsal in the temple; it is by scoring few points that one loses a war before the event in a rehearsal in the temple. The side which scores many points will win; the side which scores few points will not win, let alone the side which scores no points at all. When I make observations on the basis of this, the outcome of a war becomes apparent. (Sun 1.19-20, Lau 1965.332) 9

The five factors are dao, heaven, earth, the general, and fa, or laws, methods and procedures. Dao causes the people to be in harmony with their leader, at one with him. Heaven is described as yin and yang, cold and warm, timeliness in governance. The earth factor is concerned with whether distances are easy or difficult of access, open or constricted, or leading to life or death. The general is a crucial 9for a translation of this passage with which Lau disagrees, see Giles 43.

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factor. To be victorious, he must possess the five qualities of wisdom, trustworthiness, benevolence, courage, and strictness. Finally, the category ofja includes the proper ranking of both army and officers, the maintenance of roads, and the control of costs. Sunzi claims that these five factors form a basis for accurate assessment of military situations and the prediction of victory and defeat in war. Sunzi asks which sovereign has dao, which general has ability (neng), where the factors of heaven and earth promise success, where discipline is most rigorously enforced, which army is more forceful, which side has the best training of both officers and ranks, and, finally, which side is most clear and consistent in the enforcement of rewards and punishments. In addition to these principles, he recommends the exploitation of advantageous configurations (shi) that arise unexpectedly and the opportunistic modification of plans. Two things are noteworthy about this description of the virtues of the general. Qualities that are ascribed to the sage, or junzi, by Confucius in the Analects are here ascribed to the general, the specialist of wu, rather than wen. In this description, zhi is given higher priority than ren, in sharp contrast to Confucius's view of the relative priority of zhi and ren as expressed in the Analects. That these qualities are the virtues (de) associated specifically with the general is stressed in the commentaries of both Cao Cao and Li Quan, although Du Mu associates them with "the way of the first kings" (Sun 1.2-7). The Sunzi repeatedly stresses that prediction is itself a means to victory. The general who knows the five factors will be victorious; the one who does not will fail (Sun 1. 8). To predict Uian] victory without surpassing the foresight of ordinary people is not the height of skill. (Sun 4· 56} Those who, in the past, have been called skilled in battle conquered enemies who were easy to conquer. (Sun 4-57) As for the victories of those [truly] skilled in battle, they bring neither a reputation for their wisdom [zhi ming] nor merit because of their courage [yong gong]. (Sun 4.58) Therefore those who are skillful in battle establish themselves in positions that cannot be defeated and lose no opportunity to defeat [their enemies]. (Sun 4.58}

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As Du Mu comments on this passage: "A victory gained before the situation has crystallized is one the common man does not comprehend. Thus its author gains no reputation for sagacity. Before he has bloodied his blade the enemy state has already submitted" (Sun 4· 58, Griffith 87). Another characteristic of the strategist-general is his ability to recognize the order underlying apparent chaos. The successful general is not misled by the apparent chaos ofbattle; on the contrary, he can use it to advantage: "In the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there is not disorder, the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannot be defeated. . . . Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength" (Sun 5. 72-74, Griffith 92-93). Put another way, this is the ability to see through illusion, not to be beguiled by appearances. As a faculty of mind, it is comparable to the Taoist sage's freedom from the bonds of appearance. The Sunzi approach to strategy is informed by the idea of the cycle as the principle of natural process, by the idea that everything naturally reaches an extreme and then reverses itself. The general can avoid this tendency by knowing when to withdraw, how not to overreach himself. At the level of tactics, this idea also encompasses the tactic of striking the enemy when he is weak and avoiding him when he is strong. At the more abstract level, there are cycles that "end and recommence; cyclical, as are the movements of the sun and moon. They die away and are reborn; recurrent, as are the passing seasons" (Sun 5.68-69, Griffith 91). Within these cycles, circumstances change: "Of the five elements, none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some short, and the moon waxes and wanes" (Sun 6. 104, Griffith 101). At this point the strategic knowledge of the general shades into tactics-the recognition of crucial moments and the manipulation of tactics based on strategy. Once calculation indicates the likelihood of benefit, tactics are manipulated to bring about victory. Calculation alone is not sufficient for victory; it must be bolstered by the aggressive actions of tactics, the subject of the next section. The area of tactics deals with decisive action based on the correct comprehension of circumstances. Under this broad rubric come a number of topics: dispositions (xing) and situational advantage (sht) (chapters 4 and 5); the concept of the empty and the substantial (xu

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sht) (chapter 6); the use of the crafty and straightforward (qi zheng) in

battle (chapter 6); the use of deception in maneuver (chapter 7); flexible response to circumstances (ying bian) (chapter 8); the judgment of terrain and the comprehension of the enemy's actions by judging causes from effects (chapter 9); general considerations of terrain (chapter 10); types of ground (chapter I I); the use of fire attack (chapter I2); and the use of spies (chapter IJ). The term shi refers generally to configurations and to the advantages afforded by situation and circumstance. 10 A somewhat synonymous term, xing, refers more specifically to the disposition of armies. Situational advantage lies in the variable and dynamic factors of battle: the season, the terrain, and the specific enemy. The expedient assessment of these factors is quan; this term refers to the commander's mental abilities in battle, his judgment of circumstances, and the balance of forces. Quan is associated with change (bian) and with the use of crafty (qt), as opposed to st~aightforward (zheng), activity. 11 The assessments associated with quan involve a number of factors that are discussed as pairs of polar opposites: near and far, empty and full (xu shi), crafty and straightforward (qi zheng). The general principle by which one uses quan is to determine for each pair which pole the enemy is using and to oppose him with the complementary pole. That is, the hard oppose the soft, the near oppose the far, etc. This skill is the hallmark of the commander. In addition to the general recognition of cycles, the general must recognize the trigger or pivot (ji), the moment of change. This is the moment before a shift from one pole to its opposite becomes manifest. The general who can recognize this moment can act before it occurs.12 In order to be able to act on the general recognition of the principle of cyclical action, and the particular recognition of triggers or pivots, the general must be capable of responding flexibly to circumstances: "Therefore, when they are victorious, they do not repeat themselves, but are without limit in responding to circumstances [ying xing]" (Sun 6. IOJ). The Sunzi next likens an army to water. ''Just as water is without !Ofor a discussion of shi, including its use as a military technical term, see Ames 1983.65-108. 11 See Simafa 1.3b. Quan is also identified with zha, deception (Wuzi I.IIb). 12This notion of the pivot occurs in the Yi jing. See YJ 3.5n3 and Xi ci [Great Commentary] 6.41, 7.42n3, and 9.43n4.

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constant form, war is without constant circumstances" (Sun 6. I03). The passage concludes: "Those who can respond to the changing circumstances [bian hua] of the enemy and thereby win victory are called divine [shen]" (Sun 6. I03). The Sunzi refers to two uses of military force, the roundabout, or qi, and the straightforward, or zheng: In the circumstances of war, there are no more than the "crafty" and the "straightforward," yet these are capable of inexhaustible change. The "crafty" and the "straightforward" produce each other endlessly like a ring and who is there that can exhaust the possibilities? Generally, in battle, use straightforwardness to engage; use craftiness to attain victory. (Sun s.69, Lau I96S.J30-3I) 1 3

An important tactical component of success in warfare is the ability to create the circumstances that will lead to victory by decisive action based on the perception of crucial moments. This decisive action involves the use of theoretical principles of strategy (mou), the effective use of deception, and thorough knowledge of the enemy: "And therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him . . . . One able to make the enemy come of his own accord does so by offering him some advantage. And one able to prevent him from coming does so by hurting him" (Sun 6.83-84, Griffith 96). In a similar vein, one of the commentators, Tu Mu, cites as an example the apocryphal "empty city" story of how Zhuge Liang defended an empty city by opening it to his opponent, who thereupon suspected an ambush and retired (Sun 6.92-93). Knowledge of the enemy is the prerequisite for decisive action; at a more general level, it determines victory and defeat. Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril. (Sun 3-SI, Griffith 84) 13! follow Lau's translations of zheng and qi, which Griffith translates as "the normal and extraordinary forces." As Lau points out, nothing is of itself either inherently qi or inherently zheng. Context and one's assessment of the enemy's expectations determine what is crafty and what straightforward.

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Thus I say that victory can be created. For even if the enemy is numerous, I can prevent him from engaging .... Therefore, determine the enemy's plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will not. (Sun 6.98, Griffiths 100) Thus it is by knowledge-of oneself and of the enemy-not by force, that victory is attained. Knowledge and ignorance are specified as the determinants of victory and defeat. Defensive strategy is a special case of the importance of knowing one's enemy: Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends on one's self; the enemy's vulnerability on him. It follows that those skilled in war can make themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable. Therefore it is said that one may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so. Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant. The experts in defense conceal themselves as under the ninefold earth; those skilled in attack move as from above the ninefold heavens. (Sun 4.53-55, Griffith 85}

One of the most striking qualities of the sage-general, both in Sunzi and in other bingfa, is the extent to which his use of deception is considered not only licit, but crucial to the conduct of war. This ability to mislead an opponent is one facet of the psychological skills of the general. All warfare is based on deception fgui]. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you. These are the strategist's keys to victory. It is not possible to discuss them beforehand. (Sun I. 12-18, Griffith 66-71) The commentaries, as well as the text itself, are unequivocal about the permissibility and, indeed, the necessity of deception to the exer-

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cise of the intelligence of the general. The commentaries reiterate the importance and permissibility of deception: Cao Cao: In warfare there is no fixed pattern [for action]. Rather, it is the way of deception and dissimulation [wei zha]. Li Quan: In war deceit [zha] is not despicable. Mei Yao-chen: If you are not crafty Uue], you will be incapable of exercising strategic initiative [xing quan ]; if you cannot exercise strategic initiative, you will be unable to manipulate the enemy [zhi di]. Wang Xi: As for deception, it is the appropriate means to seek victory over an enemy. To control one's own troops you must use trustworthiness [xin]. Zhang Yu: Although the basis of warfare is in ren and yi, still the necessary means for obtaining victory lie in deceit and dissimulation [gui zuo]. To raise dust with bundles of twigs is the craftiness of a Luan Zhi; to loose a swarm of ten thousand darts is the wiliness [qi] of Sun Bin; to drive forward a herd of a thousand cattle is the power of a Tian Shan. To dam a river with sacks of sand is the dissimulation of a Huai Yin. All these used the way of deception and thus were able to seek victory. (Sun I. 12)14

One aspect of deception is out-and-out secrecy, which is deemed crucial to both offensive and defensive strategy: The general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend, and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is master ofhis enemy's fate. (Sun 6.89, Griffith 96-97) Ifl am able to determine the enemy's dispositions [xing] while at the same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to 14Sun Bin was a strategist of Qi and the reputed author of another military manual, the Sun Bin bingfo. Tian Shan, a general ofQi during the Warring States period, won a victory by driving a herd of cattle against the enemy by lighting fires behind them; in this battle he recovered over seventy cities. Huai Yin won a victory by damming a river with sandbags.

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attack a fraction of his .... The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. (Sun 6.93-94, Griffith 98) The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise [zhi] lay plans against you. (Sun 6. 101, Griffith 100)

Thus at the center of the philosophy of warfare advocated by the Sunzi are the unique abilities of the strategist-general, whose efficacious courage comes not from his martial qualities but from his knowledge. This knowledge is ethical insofar as it allows him to win the victories associated with force not by recourse to violence but by means of strategy based on skills associated with calculation, foresight, and perception. The knowledge of the general is ethically problematical insofar as a crucial component ofhis strategy is the substitution of guile for force, which admits a mode of action that in the civil sphere is considered illicit.

Myths about Bingfa Bingfa present warfare as an intellectual discipline based upon philosophical principles and transmitted as texts. A variety of myths about the origin and the transmission of bingfa centers on the theme of warfare as an intellectual endeavor based upon the correct application of philosophical principles. In these legends, the divine origin of the texts indicates the divine origin of the principles. 15 Transmission of a bingfa is part of the story of the defeat of Chi You by Huang Di, the Yellow Emperor. In Warring States period writings, myths are classified not as fiction or poetry but as history. Like the Strategies of the Warring States and other legendary accounts of the distant past, these stories of the experiences of the original sage kings and the abilities ascribed to them were transmitted as historical fact. In these myths, two originators of violence and warfare express the twofold nature oflicit and illicit social violence. The beast-figure, Chi You, characterizes battle among beasts, which is won by strength only. The sage-commander figure of the Yellow Emperor incorporates warfare into the cosmomoral order and the realm of the human. Unable to defeat Chi You, the Yellow Emperor is visited by a ISSee Lewis 1985.38-r69 and I990.98-ro3 for a fuller discussion of these myths.

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divine woman who gives him a text or tally that is magically potent; the text's transmission of information is only a secondary concern. 16 The story of the Yellow Emperor's defeat of Chi You with the aid of a magical military manual is representative of the organization of political violence within the newly emerging dynastic, territorial state. In subsequent stories of the same general form, emphasis switches from the heroic agon to the explicit identification of military power with social order, exemplified by the sage-general. Taigong was the strategist-minister who enabled King Wu to defeat the Shang. He, along with the Yellow Emperor, was seen as a transmitter of secret texts of military strategy. Texts attributed to him include the Six Strategies, a Warring States period bingfo, and the books obtained by Zhang Liang and Su Qin.t7 A similar story involves the presentation of the Taigong bingfo to Zhang Liang, the strategist-minister of Liu Bang, the founder of the Han dynasty. As a young man, Zhang Liang repeatedly gives courteous treatment to an old man in a coarse gown. This man presents him with a book and predicts that it will make him a teacher of kings and ensure his future (SJ 55.2033-49).18 Like Huang Di, Zhang Liang defeats a nearly invincible foe (in this case Xiang Yu) by means of superior knowledge from the bingfo. Neither Huang Di nor Zhang Liang are ofheroic cast or martial prowess. The Shiji account stresses Zhang Liang's study of ritual (li) in his youth; it is precisely because of his ability to accept the old man's rude treatment that he receives the text. In another account, Taigong's text (or tally) is transmitted to Su Qin, the heroic and wily figure of the Strategies of the ~rring States. Su Qin, after rejection and failure, finds the Secret Talisman of Taigong and studies it for a year, whereupon he is able to argue effectively for the Vertical Alliance. Unlike Zhang Liang and the Yellow Emperor, Su Qin uses his text to master the art of persuasion rather than the art of battle (ZGC 3.78-92 and SJ 69.2241-61).19 16Several stories in the Song dynasty encyclopedia, the Taiping Yulan, associate the Yellow Emperor with bingfa. See TPYL 15.9b and 79.3b. Other variations occur at TPYL 872. IIb, 736.6a-b, and 694.4a, all as cited in Lewis 1990.195-210. 17 For a fuller discussion, see Lewis 1990.99--103. The Taigong text is of especial interest because it represents an explicit link between persuasion and strategy !Sfor a translation of this passage, see Watson 1.134-51. 1 9I take up the Su Qin story in more detail in the following section on the Strategies of the Warring States o

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According to the Shiji {65.2162-65), Sun Bin, a descendant of Sun Wu (Sunzi), becomes a strategic advisor to the Lord of Qi although his legs have been cut off and his face tattooed through the duplicity of his old teacher, Pang Juan, a general of Wei, whom Sun Bin is eventually able to defeat. Sun Bin's mutilation makes him the strongest example of the commander who, although a master strategist, is not a conventional heroic figure. Popular versions of this story make both Sun Bin and Pang Juan students of the Master of Ghost Valley, the putative teacher of Su Qin (SJ 69.2241), who in these accounts secretly bestows a copy of Sun Wu's bingfa upon Sun Bin.2o Several common points emerge from this constellation of myths that are absent from the texts themselves. Military strategy manuals have distinct associations with magic, Taoism, and, in some cases, the feminine. Magic is not a topic that appears in the Sunzi, yet in the stories of the transmissions of bingfa, these texts or talismans are imbued with magical power. In all these myths, the texts are of divine origin and are transmitted either by a Taoist or by a woman. Huang Di receives his bingfa from a celestial female. All the other texts are associated with Taoists. One is the Master of Ghost Valley (the apocryphal teacher of Sun Bin and Pang Juan), who bestows a copy of the Sunzi. Another is Taigong, the reputed author of the texts transmitted to both Zhang Liang and Su Qin. The Sunzi, like other strategy manuals of the period, thus articulates a view of warfare that minimizes the importance of the skills associated with personal heroism and brute force and maximizes the importance of a set of skills associated with knowledge and calculation and, apocryphally, with magic, Taoism, and the use of wily wisdom to overcome a more forceful foe. This knowledge is both practical and abstract. It encompasses general principles at the respective levels of philosophy, strategy, tactics, and calculation and also includes the ability to be receptive and flexible, without relying only on the use of fixed rules. This receptivity allows the strategistgeneral to respond advantageously to unpredictable circumstances. Finally, in complete contradistinction to his civil and administrative counterpart, the sage-minister, the general is a master of deceit and illusion. 20for further discussion of the Sun Bin, see Lewis 1985.300-301.

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The Zhanguo Ce As we move from the literature of military strategy manuals to the Zhanguo Ce, or Strategies of the mzrring States, we see a shift in the portrayal of the central figure from the martial strategist-general of the Sunzi to the mou-shi, or strategist-persuader. Perhaps the best and most popular representation of the mou-shi in the Strategies of the Warring States is Su Qin; he is fully as foresighted, canny, and efficacious as his bingfa strategist-general counterparts, but he is portrayed less in terms of his military actions and more in terms of his ability to use his planning and foresight in giving counsel. Whereas the skills of the wu-oriented specialist in military strategy dominate the Sunzi, the skills of the councillor as politician and rhetor are central to the Strategies ofthe mzrring States. The ostensible concern of the text may be strategy, but its real issue is rhetoric and persuasion, "verbal warfare." The Strategies first circulated during the latter Han Dynasty; at this time it acquired what was to be a long-standing reputation as a "wicked book," a dubious honor that was originally shared by the Shi ji.21 The Strategies were read as straightforward history and also acquired some of the "magical" reputation of the Seven Books, which included the Secret Talisman of Taigong; by popular repute, they were keys to great and secret power. In the Han shu, the Strategies of the Warring States is classified as history, along with the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chun Qiu) and its commentaries and the Shi ji. On the other hand, the stories of Suzi (Su Qin) and Zhangzi (Zhang Yi) are classified not as history but as zong-heng, or "persuasions," elsewhere in the text.22 Despite the tendency of the Chinese critical tradition to take the Strategies of the Warring States as a work of history, the Strategies is now 21 See Crump 1979.2-7, to which the following discussion is largely indebted. 22The literal meanings of the terms zong and heng are "north-south" and "eastwest." Together, they refer to the type of alliances formed during the Warring States. In the context of the Strategies of the Warring States, he zong refers to joining "the Alliance," Su Qin's alliance of the Zhou states against Qin. To !ian heng, on the other hand, meant to go with "the Syndicate," Qin's network masterminded by Zhang Yi, the sinister counterpart of the Alliance. Given the more general meaning of zong heng, alliances subsequent to the Strategies of the Warring States could be incorporated in this section of the Han shu. For further discussion of these terms, see Crump 1964.93. I am grateful to Professor Victor Mair for comments on this discussion.

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believed to contain both the text of a fictionalized Romance of Su Qin, or Suzi, and a series of persuasions-rhetorical exercises designed to persuade a sophistic opponent.23 The fictionality of much of the Strategies of the Warring States was first demonstrated by Henri Maspero in I925.24 Although the lack of an explicit Chinese rhetorical teaching tradition forestalls easy comparison between Greek and Chinese "sophists," James Crump has suggested that the Strategies of the Uilrring States should be regarded not only as fiction but as suasoriae.25 All philosophers of the Warring States period were in a sense persuaders, including Confucius himself. The arguments of Confucius, however, differed ,from those of most of his counterparts both by virtue of their clearly articulated moral basis and by their use of arguments that were not based on direct appeals to self-interest. The Confucian approach was further modified by Mencius, who emphasized the importance of intention. Mohist persuaders made specific study of rhetoric and persuasion. Taoists, on the whole, had nothing but contempt for rhetoric, though Taoist views of change could be pressed into service. Rhetoric was an indispensable tool for both Legalists and Sophists. 26 Despite the relative dispute of these schools, which conspicuously lacked an ethical basis (Confucian or otherwise), the skills of the persuaders remained far more admired than those of the Greek sophists.27 An incident in which Cai Ze persuades Ying Hou to retire as minister of Qin provides an example of a Strategies ofthe Uilrring States persuasion (ZGC 5.211-33, Crump I964.20-26). When Cai Ze claims that he will replace Ying Hou, the current minister of Qin, 23ft has been suggested that ce is used in the title of the Zhanguo ce in its later meaning of "examination essays on current affairs," a reading that would support a translation of the title as "Imaginary Speeches on Warring States Themes." See Crump 1964.29-46, Crump 1979.2, and Hawkes 1966.63. 24See Maspero 1925. 2 5This term from Greek and Roman rhetoric refers to themes given to students on set subjects and historical or legendary situations, in which they are to give advice or urge a course of action as if they were actually there. A Chinese "private-speaking" or persuasive rhetorical tradition could be compared to the Greek public-speaking sophistical tradition of Gorgias and Prodicus. This approach to the Strategies of the Warring States would explain many inconsistencies and also the use of such rhetorical devices as rhythm, rhyme, antithesis (chiasmus), and symmetry (parisosis). See Crump 1964. loo-103. 26for a discussion of the importance of rhetoric, see Crump 1964.4-7. 27Witness Plato's criticism ofProtagoras. In the late fifth century in Greece, "wise" became transformed into "clever."

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Ying Hou grants him an audience and asks an explanation. Cai Ze first cites the mutability of things: nothing is permanent; ability, like anything else, must wax and then wane and give way. Then he alludes to the precedent of ill-fortuned ministers. Why should one emulate Lord Shang of Qin, Wu Qi of Chu, or Taifu Zhong ofYue? His third point is that even a sage minister needs a perspicacious ruler in order to be effective. Finally, Cai Ze gives examples of ministers who were both faithful and fortunate. All this culminates in the argument that one should retire at the peak of accomplishment. Ying Hou answers the second argument by saying that these ministers were all faithful, and their fates, although personally unfortunate, were nevertheless worthy of emulation. This response sets up a contrast between the qualities of intelligence and those of simplicity: "Did not [Lord Shang] manifest pureness and simplicity [qing su] while using his intelligence and abilities [zhi neng] to the utmost?" (ZGC 5.212)28 In his third argument Cai Ze discusses the principle that it should not take death to establish one's good faith. "When a ruler is a sage [sheng] and his minister a worthy man [xian] the world benefits; when a king is intelligent [ming] and his officer faithful [zhong] the country benefits; when a father is kindly, a son filial, a husband trustworthy [xin], and a wife chaste the family benefits" (ZGC 5.212-13, modified from Crump 1964.23). He claims this principle can only be brought to bear by the combined talents of an appropriate minister and a suitable ruler. Hong Yao was such a minister to King Wen, and the duke of Zhou to King Cheng. Finally, Cai Ze argues that Ying Hou should retire because, since he is no better than the unfortunate ministers Lord Shang and Wu Qi, his ruler may be no better than theirs. The achievements of Lord Shang, Wu Qi, and others culminated in their deaths. They met calamity because they reached the peak of their merits and lacked the wisdom to retreat. Ying Hou agrees to step down and engineers Cai Ze's appointment. In the case of this persuasion, Cai Ze wins by an appeal to Ying Hou's long-term self interest. Not long afterward, when Cai Ze foresees his own danger, he similarly engineers his own retirement.29 28 For an alternative translation of this passage, see Crump 1964.22. 29This technique of the use of historical examples of ministers is used by Zhuge Liang in chapter 43 of the Romance in his "verbal warfare" with the ministers of Sun Quan.

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A similar rhetorical technique used in the Strategies of the Warring States is the creation and solution of a dilemma as a means of persuasion. An example of this type of argumentation is the incident involving two concubines, Yin and Jiang, who both strive to become queen of Zhong Shan (ZGC 33.1179, Crump 1964.118-19). Here, the counsellor Sima Xi uses persuasion to elevate Yin, whom he praises to the king of Zhao. When the king of Zhao covets her, the king of Zhong Shan makes her queen. 30 Yet another technique is the appeal to double desiderata. In general, the persuader's art consists of first devising a plan that is doubly compelling and then maximizing its advantages and minimizing the disadvantages. At the center of the conflict between the Vertical and Horizontal Alliances in the Strategies of the J%rring States is Su Qin, a semilegendary figure of long-standing popularity and controversy. Several elements are noteworthy in the legend ofSu Qin. He is ofhumble birth but rises to great fortune and falls to great defeat. He is of exemplary studiousness and is the recipient of a magical book, in fact a bingfa. Finally, rather than advocating traditional values, he puts his talents at the service of wealth, ability, and power. The Strategies ofthe J%rring States account of Su Qin begins with his attempts to promulgate the Vertical Alliance. Echoing the Sunzi, Su Qin argues for the necessity of war. He argues both that war is inherently acceptable and that it is the only means to power in a world where "statute bred ordinance and the people learned deceit [wei]; edicts multiplied and became murky till the populace knew not what they stood by. Graceful phrases [ming yan] and elegant words kept troops in armor, hands on swords; arguments grew more specious, robes more impressive, and wars more frequent. More clever became the sayings and less controlled the land.... Finally rulers rejected the literate [wen] and cosseted the warrior [wu]" (ZGC 3.81, Crump 1964-32-33)-

He cites the martial expeditions of the sage emperors- "Indeed, who has not gone to war?" (ZGC 3.81). Su Qin's initial career is marked by despair and adversity when he unsuccessfully seeks a position as a strategist, or mou shi, with King Hui of Qin. He then studies the schemes (mou) in The Secret Talisman 30This is the same technique that Zhuge Liang will try in the Romance in the episode in chapter 44 where he uses jealousy to arouse Zhou Yu to action against Cao Cao.

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oJTaigong for a year and seeks an audience with the king of Zhao. On this second occasion, he is well received and is given considerable power and authority. "And in these times the vastness of the empire, the multitude of its people, the authority of powers and princes, and the skill [quan] of its advisers [mou] all were devoted to the plans [ce] of Su Qin" (ZGC 3.88, Crump 1964.34). His efforts result in peace in Zhao. Formally, this account is marked by prominent, continuous, and polished narrative far beyond the requirements of historical transmission. Its portrayal of Su Qin both conforms to and diverges from the character of the strategist-general in several interesting ways. Like the general described in the Sunzi, Su Qin is an apparent advocate of war, not words. Like the Warring States period strategist-general, he advocates martial prowess but eschews needless violence and in fact brings peace to Zhao. Su Qin is not, however, merely a latter-day re-creation of a bingfa general; he departs from his strategist predecessors in the extent of his expertise in persuasion, "verbal warfare." As described in the Sunzi, the strategist-general can immediately apprehend the strategic configuration (shi) of a tactical situation and decisively act upon it. Similarly, Su Qin is able to understand the potential situational advantage inherent in the political realities that underlie verbal exchanges and to act efficaciously to ensure an outcome of his own choosing. An example of this combination of astuteness, adaptability, and decisiveness is the Strategies of the Warring States story of an attempt to discredit Su Qin in the eyes of the king of Yan (ZGC 29.1046, Crump 1964.36-38). Someone slanders Su Qin and he is received coldly. He immediately deduces the reason for this reception and reinstates himself with the following argument: (1) he can best serve his lord by faithfulness; (2) a faithful minister would not truly serve, because acts of faithfulness are done for oneself, not others; and (3) loyalty and faith offend the ruler. Here, Su Qin compares himself to the concubine who spills wine prepared by her mistress to poison her master. Although she successfully preserves the life of the one and the reputation of the other, she still gets a whipping for her clumsiness. In all these stories, Su Qin is characterized by a combination of the ambivalent virtues of cunning intelligence. He is portrayed as both willing and capable of deception and trickery toward an enemy and is thereby already beyond the pale of Confucian virtue, and all the more so because if his unabashed advocacy of warfare. These sides of his

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character contrast, however, with unshakable loyalty to his own lord, persistence, studiousness, and courage-all attributes of a Confucian junzi. Finally, although he argues for war, he engineers peace, even though his attempts to prevent the rise of Qin are ultimately unsuccessful. A strong point of evidence for viewing the Strategies of the Warring States as consisting of, at least in part, rhetorical exercises is a Su Qin story in which a situation is described, followed by a list and then an elucidation of nine possible courses of action (ZGC 10.365-72, Crump 1964. 104-8). Here, the king of Chu has died, leaving his heir hostage in Qi. Su Qin speaks to the duke ofXue and suggests that the Chu heir be confined and used as a bargaining chip. Xue disagrees. At this point, ten possible actions by Su Qin are listed, followed by short narratives for nine of the ten. We can thus view Su Qin as part of a broadening picture of the strategist-rhetor. His persuasions for the Vertical Alliance against Qin include the analysis of such military factors (addressed in the Sunzt) as troop numbers and geographic configuration.3t It is noteworthy that the acquisition of the bingfa is critical to Su Qin's rhetorical success.

Conclusions Both the Sunzi and the Strategies of the Warring States use the conventional descriptive terms for knowledge and wisdom, but they differ from the texts in the previous chapters in that both use terms for deception in a descriptive, nondisparaging, and at times even laudatory way. For example, quan mou, a term of castigation and rebuke in Xunzi, is a compliment in the Strategies. The Sunzi, in its description of the wisdom of the general, addresses different issues and uses a somewhat different lexicon of wisdom than that of the philosophers. In its emphasis on technical skill-prediction of terrain, weather, and so on-it bears something in common with the descriptions of knowledge within the Mozi. In its emphasis on deception and cunning, however, it resembles far more the Strategies, which emphasizes the skills associated with knowledge, strategy, and foresight: zhi, 3 1 See

Lewis 1985.298 and Rand 1977·72-74, 90.

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mou, andji. Correspondingly, terms that are derogatory in Confucian and Taoist usage are laudatory here, for example, qiao and qi. The importance and permissibility of deceit in bingfa texts present a problem that is dealt with in different ways by various philosophers. Essentially two solutions are adopted. One is to relegate the use of deceit to the separate realm of wu. This is the approach taken by most bingfa and to a certain extent by the Laozi.32 In this view, deception in its proper sphere is both necessary and admirable, and the general who uses it is not amoral. This is the view taken explicitly by Militarists and implicitly by Taoists. The other alternative is to condemn deceit outright; this is the solution taken by Confucians both during and after the Warring States period. In both strategy and persuasion, deceit is relegated to a separate realm. Thus both wisdom and cunning are proper concerns of military planning. In this, the Militarists follow the lead of Taoist philosophical texts, which tend to focus on principles of statecraft and to subsume strategy and tactics under this rubric. Bingfa, on the other hand, adhere to the idea of the cosmological basis of military action but do not explicitly consider how the actions of the general are modeled on the way of heaven. Nevertheless, the Sunzi shows the cosmological and philosophical influence of both the Taoism of the Laozi and the later Huang-Lao Taoism associated with the Yellow Emperor. In addition to the general association with Taoism which adheres to bingfa texts, the Sunzi very particularly echoes the Laozi's emphasis on the falsehood and deceptiveness of appearances. In the Sunzi this assertion takes the form of advocacy of deceit as crucial to warfare. In the Laozi it takes the form of the repeated assertion that appearances, and the language that describes them, are false and that the sage is not fooled by them.33 Water is used as a metaphor to describe properties of dao in one case and the tactics of the general in the other. 34 The Confucian approach to the problem of deceit is that in war, as elsewhere, deceit is avoidable and impermissible. This attitude is tan32See Lao I and 2 and Sima fa Ia-2b. Within the context of bingfo, this view stands in contrast to that of the Wuzi, which regards deceit and quan as lesser forms of warfare that are inferior to harmony and social righteousness (yi bing) as the highest form of war. See chapters I-3 of the Wuzi. For further discussion, see Lewis I985.359-7I. 33See Lao I, 2, 45, and 69. 34See Sun 6. ro2 (Griffith IOI) and Lao 8 and 78.

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tamount to a denial of the need for a separate realm (wu) with a separate set of values that can encompass and separate the use of deceit. Mencius and Xunzi both argue that the unified will of the people and the ruler suffice for military victory. Mencius maintains that ren is sufficient to unify the will of the people behind the ruler. Xunzi (chapter 19) is more concise in his statement of the quarrel between military theorists and the advocates of strictly moral kingship. At issue is whether a separate sphere of purely military activity, values, and wisdom should exist. Xunzi denies such a possibility outright. Put in terms of the Sunzi, Mencius and Xunzi advocate the use of zheng, straightforwardness, in all circumstances and dismiss the need for use of qi, craftiness. Mencius and Xunzi began an attack on the skills of strategy and persuasion that was to be carried on and amplified by the Confucian school from the Han dynasty onwards. This view of deceit and strategy extends in later periods to the Strategies of the Warring States. The Sanguo zhi biography ofQin Fu (c. 230 c. E.) provides an interesting account of the dubious reputation the Strategies enjoyed even at this relatively early date (SGZ 38, 4·971-77, Crump 3). The biography recounts a discussion between Qin Fu and Li Quan, who requests a copy of the Strategies. The sea, he argues, becomes great by uniting the flows of all rivers, and the gentleman, or junzi, becomes great by the widest possible understanding (shi). Qin Fu responds: "The junzi widens his understanding, but if it is not according to the rites [/i], he does not look at it. Now the Zhanguo ce rehearses again and again the arts [shu] [Zhang] Yi and [Su] Qin used to preserve themselves and kill others. This destruction of others for self-preservation is exactly what the [Confucian] Canon abominates. Therefore Confucius, in his struggles to come out with the Chunqiu, placed the greatest emphasis on rectitude [zheng]" (SGZ 38, 4·97374). The preface of Zeng Gong, who reconstructed and established the text that has been known as the Zhanguo ce since the eleventh century, is typical of the orthodox Confucian attitude toward this work, an attitude that was to prevail for the next nine centuries: After the Zhou, when schemes and deceit [zha mou] were in vogue and the path to benevolence and righteousness was obstructed, Great Disharmony was the result. But the persuaders of the Warring States were not of the same stamp [as Confucius and Mencius]. They recognized

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[zhi] no Way in which to have faith and took delight in changing one argument to fit any circumstance; they bent their hearts and minds to only one thing-devising the comprehensive scheme [ji]! For this reason they argued only the convenience of treachery [zha] and concealed its perils, they spoke only of the goodness of warfare and hid its grief so that all who did as they bade profited from it-but it never equalled the loss. In the end Su Qin, Shang Yang, Sun Bin, Wu Qi, Li Si and their ilk lost their lives, while Qin and the other Feudal Lords who employed them lost their states. Clearly they were a catastrophe to their times-and yet their age never awakened to this fact. (ZGC I I99I200, Crump s-6)

Now, some may object that heretical theories harm what is proper [zheng] and must be acted against and ended. Therefore, must we not destroy this book? The reply should be that if a ruler wishes to suppress pernicious doctrine he will first cause it to be made clear [ming] to the empire so that men of his time may understand why it cannot be used-then suppression will be achieved properly. He will also cause men of future generations to understand that such a doctrine could not be used-then the avoidance of it will be done with understanding [ming]. (ZGC I20Q-I20I, Crump 1964.42) This listing of the heterodox includes the Sunzi and the Sun Bin, as well as the work of Mozi; the rhetorical skill of of the "Warring States persuaders" is singled out for special attack-all totally consistent with the Confucian aversion to qiao yan, clever speech, and a view of humanity and wisdom, ren and zhi, that brooks no deviousnesswhere everything is "proper" (zheng), according to the li. Whether the Strategies are an account of a historical period characterized by the political use of cunning and intrigue or a collection of exercises in persuasion, orthodox Confucianism rejects wholesale the idea that the ability to exercise deception is of value to military or rhetorical strategy. Deception is simply inimical to the Confucian, wen-oriented view of zhi. Liu Xiang, in the original preface to the text, is more charitable: "But they were officials of the highest talent [cai]. Looking at their own age, they took into account the actual abilities [neng] of their rulers, and came out with truly uncanny plans [qi ce] and extraordinary intelligence [zhi]. They transformed danger into peace, death into life, in a manner both delightful and worthwhile" (ZGC 1198, modified from Crump 1964.41-42). What Liu Xiang notes is the same transformative ability that Zeng Gong so descries. Yet even the

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more liberal Liu gives a negative evaluation of the tone of the age. Like Zeng Gong, he laments the decline of the Confucian virtues promulgated by Confucius and Mencius: rites (lt), benevolence (ren), and rectitude (yt) have been abandoned in favor of the practice of deception and cunning (zha,jue). He also cites disorder in fundamental human relat~onships: between father and son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife, and emperor and subjects. This disorder in turn eclipses the power and virtue of dao. There is constant warfare, and deception (zuo wei) is rife, with the result that power and virtue (dao de) have no efficacy (ZGC I I96, Crump 12).35 The charge of misuse of wisdom by these individuals involves their advocacy of warfare-they exaggerate its benefits and understate its costs. Yet this condemnatory evaluation ignores a view that runs through the "Militarist" literature from Sunzi and Sun Bin all the way to Zhuge Liang-that the true sage does not fight if at all possible and does not waste resources, whether human lives or material. Although these strategies and persuaders argue for the necessity of war, their emphasis on avoiding violence makes it possible to call their arguments for warfare weak ones. The main proponent of a strong argument for warfare in the Warring States period was the Legalist Lord Shang of Qin, but Legalist philosophers were by no means uniform in the advocacy ofwarfare.36 In fact, Huang-Lao Taoist texts such as the Jing fa (the Canonical Law text of the Four Canons of the Yellow Emperor) combined Legalist and Taoist beliefs into a naturalistic cosmology. The Canonical Law articulates a more complex view of deceit than is the case with either its wholesale rejection by Confucians or its wholesale acceptance by Militarists. This text maintains that although deceit is permissible within the separate realm of wu, the general is by no means amoral. The Canonical Law claims that the actions of the general, no less than those of the ruler, must be grounded in cosmological principles of government. The argument may be summarized as follows: (I) Dao is the cosmological basis for statecraft; it produces the law and is the source of both disaster and good fortune. (2) Emptiness is the means of perception and knowledge; therefore, 35 Similarly disparaging sentiments are also echoed by Wangjue (c. ro6s), Li Gofei (c. rogo), Bao Biao in the Song dynasty, and Wu Shidao in the Yuan. The consensus was that readers should admire the effectiveness of the persuasions but overlook the baseness of the subject matter. 36for a discussion of the Legalist position, see Rand I977-3I-34·

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the sage does not cling to things. (3) Dao is also the source of principles that affect human life; its mastery reveals the hidden principles that govern life and death, survival and ruin.37 (4) There exist constant regularities that affect heaven and earth. These texts deny the efficacy of tactics alone; they claim that the moral precepts of social order are the key to military victory. The section of the Canons entitled "Discourse on Perishing" states that those who defy the cosmomoral order perish and that the key to survival is obedience to cosmic principles. (5) The sage, by holding fast to dao, can attain the reality of names and principles.38 Sima Qian's view of the period, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of strategy in the Strategies of the Uilrring States. He describes the Vertical Alliance against Qin as a response to the strategies (ce) of Duke Xiao and his successors, who seized Hanzhong in the south, Ba and Shu in the west, and other strategic territory in the east. Sima Qian describes the four lords who laid plans (mou) against Qin as intelligent (ming zhi) and loyal-minded (zhong xin) men who honored the worthy and cared for their followers. He distinguishes three separate groups for praise: the creators of the strategy, its implementors, and the commanders of troops. The first group notably includes Su Qin; the third includes two figures associated with strategy manuals: Wu Qi and Sun Bin (SJ 48.1962-63, Watson 1.30-3 1). The Strategies of the Warring States thus provides a view of the Warring States period which differs both from the philosophical debates of the Confucians and their opponents and from the abstract strategy of the Sunzi and other manuals of the bingfa category. Confucian orthodoxy has both praised the text for the elegance of its prose and condemned it as morally incorrect. Several points about Sima Qian's analysis are noteworthy. First, it distinguishes strategists both from rulers and from the followers and commanders who carry out their plans. Second, the object of strategy and persuasion has shifted from martial maneuver to political action. Just as the bingfa represent a transition from the Spring and Autumn period to the Warring States period, the strategist as persuader marks yet another transition. This metastrategy at the level of the vertical and horizontal alliance is what Zhuge Liang provides to Liu Bei and 37 This is the same association of survival and destruction with the commander that we find in the first chapter of Sunzi. 3Bfor more extensive discussion and translations of excerpts from these texts, see Lewis 1985.304-12.

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what Cao Cao provides for Wu in the Romance, and also what Su Qin offers to Zhao and Zhang Yi offers to Qin in the Strategies of the Warring States. Finally, it is of interest that virtuous rulers are characterized by the ability to "make use of people" (yong ren). This new orientation is a shift from the Warring States period heritage of courtiers who were selected by influence or family, rather than ability; the new class of shi, both martial and civil, are administrative specialists. 39 The separation of the political realm into wen and wu is problematical for the consideration of the abilities and psychological and intellectual faculties embodied in the early Chinese understanding of zhi. Are the zhi of the minister and the zhi of the general two different manifestations of the same ability, or are they two entirely separate faculties, one brought to a high point in the civic sphere, the other cultivated and refined within the martial sphere? I suggest that both these two "knowledges" or "wisdoms" are not separate faculties but involve two different orientations or uses of one common ability. On the one hand, the abilities of the sage-general closely parallel those of the sage-minister. I further suggest that the common ground of the two approaches can be summed up by the term ming-clearsightedness, or the ability to perceive realities and circumstances impartially and accurately. This ability is valued as an essential ingredient of true wisdom across the philosophical spectrum of the Warring States period. A second point of agreement in all these early accounts of knowledge and wisdom is the attribution of a transforming power to the actions of the person of real wisdom. This power is described in very different ways. The indirect wu wei of the Taoist sage has the power to transform reality; the ren and zhi (benevolence and knowledge) of the Confucian sage-ruler have an almost magical power to "transform the people" (hua min); and, mutatis mutandis, the Mohist worthy man, or xian, also uses the wisdom of efficacious intelligence to "benefit the people" (li min). 40 The major difference between the strategist and the persuader with their wu-oriented wily wisdom and their Confucian, Taoist, and Mohist counterparts is the former individuals' advocacy of the use of guile and craft. This orientation is a matter of ethics, not one of psychology or cognition. 39See Crump 1964.1 for further discussion. 40For discussion of hua min and /i min as technical terms, see Ames 1983.99-105: 117-18 for hua min and 153-64 for /i min.

Interlude

In the preceding chapters I have examined the tension between wisdom and cunning in major representative texts of the Chinese philosophical tradition from the Warring States period. These texts show a consistent separation between two approaches to the relationship between knowledge and language, approaches that I shall venture to call "face facts" and "distrust appearances."! Adherents of the "face facts" viewpoint take language as some kind of index of reality. The "distrust appearances" approach construes language as an impediment to the accurate perception of reality. "Face facts" approaches assume that the categories of language reflect inherent and knowable reality-that there is some correspondence between words and the things or practices that they represent in human discourse. They agree about ends to the extent that they view straightforward language as a means of apprehending reality; they disagree about means insofar as they debate how to use language as a moral and political tool and have very different moral and political programs. Confucius and Mencius emphasize the constructive role of language in establishing political order (zheng ming); the Neo-Mohists and Xunzi emphasize the importance of discourse (bian) in analysis of the external world. Thus the Confucians and Mohists "face facts" to clarify the moral foundations of knowledge and to formulate terms, definitions, rituals, and rules for conduct. For Confucius and his followers, the stan1 This

term is suggested by the discussion at Graham 1985.6-7. 129

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dard of correctness is the Zhou values that they attempt to represent directly in a language of canonical text (jing) and ritual (II) in the political and moral context of the Warring States period. Mozi refutes their system with the ten central doctrines of the Mohist school, as expressed in the thirty core chapters of the Mohist canon (Mo, chapters 8-37). The later Mohists pursue the notion of a linguistic standard through logical discrimination and the exact use of terms in definition and argumentation. It should be emphasized that for both, knowledge is a matter of practice. The view that language can mediate knowledge without distortion never results in the reification of an abstract, as opposed to a practical, view of knowledge. Both Confucians and Mohists view the exercise of this p.ractical knowledge as indissoluble from appropriately defined moral aims. As a result, both reject amoral knowledge and distrust subtlety in language and action. The "face facts" view thus offers neither scope nor place for the practice or description of the abilities I associate with mitis, since these abilities do not presuppose a moral foundation. Commitment to a "rule-based" approach to knowledge and language in tum affects Confucian and Mohist ethics in the insistence upon the possibility of generalized descriptions of morally correct conduct. The pre-Han Confucian solution to the problem of metic intelligence is to relegate it to the realm of military affairs (wu). This makes it possible to use Militarist knowledge and capability while admitting its value-free ethics. Thus Huang Di can use a magical strategy manual (bingfa) to defeat Chi You and still be a sage-king; King Wu can rely on the skills of the strategist Taigong Wang to bring down the Shang dynasty and still remain sage-king. Finally, later Han Confucians can admire the style of Strategies of the Warring States and still reject it as a "wicked book." As Part II will demonstrate, the alternative, latter-day Nee-Confucian solution is to moralize what I call metic intelligence. Fictional works like the Romance use pre-Han topoi to moralize metic figures like Zhuge Liang into sage-ministers in the Taigong mode. On the other hand, they reject the unpredictable and uncontrollable aspects of "metis" as cunning and deception, witness the distorted calumniation of Cao Cao into an unscrupulous, cunning usurper. Among the philosophers, distrusters of appearance include the Taoists Laozi and Zhuangzi, the Militarists, and those Legalists who were influenced by the Lao, notably Han Fei. Although these thinkers agree on the need to manipulate language to overcome the barriers to

Interlude

I

3I

perception 1t 1mposes, they disagree deeply about ends. The Laozi strain eschews the false consciousness of language for moral reasons. The Militarists emphasize the need to use language instrumentally for opportunistic reasons, as does Han Fei in his application of the Taoist notion of wu wei to the foundation of an efficient, if self-interested, state. Zhuangzi and his teacher, the logician Hui Shi, emphasize the limits of language from the relatively value-free perspective of philosophical skepticism and literary invention. The Taoist and Militarist rejection of linguistic categories as the basis for practical action or real knowledge permits different kinds of description and different attitudes toward metic abilities. Militarist strategy manuals include general descriptions of the principles of warfare and emphasize the need for calculation, but these descriptions and calculations imply no confidence in the categories of language as a guide to conduct. On the contrary, they emphasize the need to use language instrumentally to mislead an enemy. The Taoist rejection of knowledge based on language is more interesting in that it suggests an entirely different kind of knowledge and a different means of using language to suggest it. Examples include the paradoxical, self-referential descriptions of the sage in the Lao and the subtle logic of the Zhuangzi. The Taoists claim to reject ethics along with knowledge, but they actually reject the linguistic foundation that determines Mohist and Confucian descriptive knowledge and ethics. Taoist spontaneous ethics deny the possibility of ethics only in the sense of a discursive system that can be expressed in definitions, rituals, and rules. In summary, I have attempted to demonstrate in the foregoing chapters that the problem of the role of what I call metic intelligence divides Warring States period philosophical thought into two broad camps based on two views of the relation of knowledge to language and morality. Positions on these issues effectively determine what kind ofknowledge the early Warring States period philosophers consider possible and desirable. These polarizations over the complex of knowledge, language, and ethics find expression some two millennia later in the works of Ming fiction. In the second half of the book I continue the adaptation of Detienne and Vernant's method of using semantic fields to provide evidence for the provenance of metic intelligence that is unavailable from direct textual sources. Moving from the pre-imperial period to the Ming dynasty, I examine the place of metic intelligence in the construction

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of two quasi-epic novels: the Romance (chapter 6) and the journey to the West (chapter 7). An inevitable consequence of this transition is to understate and underrepresent two crucial intellectual movements that become successively dominant during the intervening period, Buddhism and Nco-Confucianism. I discuss both briefly as the bases for allegorical readings of the Journey to the ~st, and in chapter 7, I also take up the specifically Buddhist notion of skillful means, or upaya, because of its similarities to metic intelligence. Unfortunately, the plan of the book simply does not leave room for any adequate discussion of Nco-Confucianism. In chapters 8 and 9, I present a thematically oriented comparison of the role of metic intelligence in the Romance of Three Kingdoms and the Iliad, as well as in the Journey to the ~stand the Odyssey. Although the comparison of Greek texts from approximately the eighth century B.C.E. and Chinese novels of the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries C. E. is anachronistic, all four works feature characters of metic ability whose character and actions are crucial to issues of statecraft, personal and social morality, homecoming and attainment. The theme of metic intelligence reveals comparable textual features, episodes, and characters; and the importance of metic intelligence as an interpretive key to all four works is the basis for the comparison.

CHAPTER

6

The Strategies of Zhuge Liang

The characters and themes of the Sanguo zhi yanyi, or the sixteenth-century Romance of the Three Kingdoms, are centrally concerned with metic intelligence. This Ming work has traditionally been considered semifictional history, and criticism of the novel has focused on its degree of adherence to the historical tradition. Recent scholarship, however, has increasingly treated the Romance as historical fiction. In this chapter I employ textual exegesis to consider the role of metic intelligence in the Romance, and I examine the problem of wisdom and cunning within the narrative as a key aspect of the construction of the Romance as a work of fiction. Metic intelligence is of particular importance to the character, abilities, and conduct of the work's strategist-hero, Zhuge Liang (181-234 c. E.), who may be the single character most classically associated with zhi in all of Chinese literature. I In the Romance, an extremely fictionalized Zhuge Liang maintains an uneasy balance between Machiavellian sangfroid and Confucian virtue. The explicit themes of the Romance reflect Confucian orientations toward the obligations of honor, especially Liu Bei's relations to his two sworn oath-brothers Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, and the basis for legitimacy in government, including the relationship between kingship and kinship and the relationship between ruler and minister. I For example, when the sagacious and adroit Taoist Wu Y ong is introduced in the Shuihu zhuan, or Outlaws of the Marsh, he is described as "surpassing even Zhugc Liang." See Shuihu zhuan 1.208, Shapiro 1.215.

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These themes reflect the Confucian belief in the supremacy of wen over wu that had marked Chinese intellectual history since the Han Dynasty. Zhuge Liang is a strategist-general out of the bingfa tradition, but he is also an acceptable Confucian heroic figure whom the Romance seems to use to moralize the Militarist tradition and its associated problem of practical and cunning intelligence. Within this struggle for the rulership of three kingdoms is embedded a second struggle. Three generals of superior wiles contend in an aristeia of guile. This struggle centers around foresight (ji) and strategy (mou) and relies on abstract principles of strategy from the Sunzi. Detailed, if fictitious, accounts of Zhuge Liang's actions and methods focus on the indirect approach of the Sunzi as a basis for statecraft and warfare.

The Sanguo Yanyi Set in the third century c.E., just after the collapse of the Han Dynasty, the Romance chronicles the struggle of three contenders for power and sovereignty: Cao Cao, the usurper Han chancellor who later rules the kingdom of Wei; Sun Quan of Wu, who controls the area south of the Yangtze River; and Liu Bei of Shu, a minor scion of the Han, whose Shu Han dynasty unsuccessfully attempts to restore the Han. The narrative centers around Liu Bei's struggle to found a government on moral legitimacy, rather than martial force, through the aid of the sage-general Zhuge Liang (also known as Kong Ming, "limitless illumination"). Liu Bei, an obscure member of the imperial clan, responds to a call to help suppress the "Yellow Turban" rebels. He swears an oath of brotherhood with the heroic Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, distinguishes himself in the imperial cause, and is advanced, only to reject favor when he realizes that the powerful official Cao Cao is plotting to overthrow the emperor. Zhuge Liang becomes the adviser to Liu Bei at a point when Liu is at the nadir of his fortunes and powers. Pursued by Cao Cao, Liu is without resources, save his own character, the strength of his oath-brothers, and a small but loyal army of followers. Zhuge Liang arranges an alliance between Liu Bei and Sun Quan, head of the area south of the Yangtze. These allied forces defeat Cao's attempted invasion of the South, and Cao escapes northward with the remains of his army, only to encounter Zhuge Liang's ambush, head-

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ed by Guan Yu, who honorably spares Cao Cao because of his past kindnesses. Zhuge Liang establishes Liu Bei at Nanjun in strategically located Jingzhou, only to have it claimed by the South. Zhuge Liang, anxious to preserve the alliance, puts them off. Sun Quan then tries unsuccessfully to take Liu Bei hostage under the guise of a marriage to his sister. Finally, Sun Quan allies with Cao Cao for a successful invasion of the contested territory. Cao Cao captures Guan Yu and repays his previous generosity by executing him. Liu Bei, bound by his oath of brotherhood to Guan Yu, rejects Zhuge Liang's advice and attempts an unsuccessful attack against the South. In the end, he fails in his goal of reestablishing the house of Han. · The earliest extant edition of the Romance is the "Jia jing," or I 522 edition (SGTSYY), attributed to Luo Guanzhong. It has two prefaces, dated I494 and I 522, and its own dating remains problematic. This discussion relies on the later and more widely read edition (SGZYY) of Mao Lun and his son Mao Zonggang (circa I66o), which became the model for subsequent Ming and Qing novels based on history. The Mao edition was a deliberate reaction against popular editions (su ben). It introduced significant critical terminology and differed from earlier versions in six areas: (I) an overall stricter adherence to the historical record, (2) the insertion of episodes for their interest or suspense value, (3) the insertion and deletion of poetry, (4) the insertion of prose from Sanguo zhi memorials, (5) retention of the 120-chapter format, and (6) general stylistic refinement of the text.2 Any examination of the Romance is complicated by the obscurity and complexity of its origins in both historical and popular traditions. There are three well-recognized sources for the Romance: the official historiography of the Sanguo zhi, or Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms, the source for later yanyi, or popularizations; the Yuan dynasty San2for a synopsis of the Mao revisions, see Nienhauser I986.6r7-r8. The Mao version tends to follow the historical record more closely than its antecedents, but with the bias of upholding Shu and condemning Wei. See SGYY So and 84. Specifically pro-Shu material includes the deletion of Zhuge Liang's burning out of Sima Yi in chapter IOJ. Added fictitious incidents include the stutter ofDeng Ai in chapter 107 and, more significantly, the largely fictitious account of the Battle of the Red Cliffs. Poems by such Tang and Song masters as Du Fu are incorporated into the text, and poems of Zhou Jingxuan are deleted. Excerpts from the memorials of Kong Rong, Chou Lin, and others are added. The text abandons the 24o-chapter format and recasts the earlier chapter titles into parallel couplets.

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guo zhi pinghua, which is the earliest extant printed version of the Sanguo story within the popular tradition;3 and a variety of semiofficial, unofficial, and popular pseudohistorical and poetic materials.4 The Romance has been criticized as "seven parts history and three parts fiction," and its significant divergences from the historical tradition have been widely noted. 5 The presence of the word yanyi in the title of both the 1 522 and Mao editions indicates that they are "elaborations of meaning" of the Sanguo zhi, the official dynastic history. Most prefaces proceed from the assumption that elaboration is indeed the aim of the book, and much critical discussion focuses on the faithfulness, or lack of it, of the novel to the history. 6 Yet the veracity of the yanyi is undercut by a kind of "myth-making," both historiographical and literary. Revisionist Song historians attempted to legitimize the Shu Han dynasty by rewriting the Sanguo zhi.7 Literary myth-making took the form of characterization and inaccurate portrayal or outright invention of incidents. s In the next sections I shall consider Zhuge Liang and his strategies in relation to the principles of the Sunzi, metic intelligence, and the historical record.

The Legendary Strategies of Zhuge Liang From Ming times to the present, we find examples of the Romance being used as a practical illustration of the teachings of the Sunzi. Yu 3 For

discussion of the Ping hua, see Crump 1951.249-56 and Plaks 1987.369. sources of pseudohistorical works include the Pei Songzhi commentary on the Sanguo zhi and the pseudohistorical works Ying xiong ji and Cao man zhuan. Popularized historical verse includes the yong shi poetry ofHu Zeng and Zhou Jingxuan (Zhou Li) and Yang Shen's tan ci collection of historical poems. For further discussion, see Yang 1980.47-84 and Plaks 1987.373. 5 For a discussion of Zhang Xuecheng's famous line, see Plaks 1977-74· See also Plaks 1987.361-75. 6 For additional bibliography, see Plaks 1987.372n39· 7 For example, in works such as the Xiu hou Han shu, a history not of the Han but of the Three Kingdoms, the Shu dynastic biographies appear at the beginning of the work under the heading of Han, and Liu Bei is accorded the status of an emperor. 8 Examples of distorted incidents include the Battle of the Red Cliff and the "borrowing arrows" and "empty city" stratagems. The Battle of the Red Cliff was entirely a myth. Cao Cao burned his own boats and left because his troops were wiped out by illness. The false attributions of strategies to Zhuge Liang is discussed in detail on pages 162 and 169. 4 Semiofficial

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Xiangdou's Ming edition of the SGYY, which is among the least studied editions of the novel, includes illustrations that depict points of strategy. 9 The Romance was also translated into Manchu for use as a military test emphasizing the loyalty of Zhuge and the villainy of Cao. It was also told to thieves and bandits to invoke remorse. to Finally, a recent conference on the the role of Chinese cultural materials in economic management was devoted entirely to a consideration of the Sunzi and the Romance .11 The methods of Zhuge Liang, like those of the efficacious strategist-general described abstractly in the Sunzi, use a strategy whose bases are foreknowledge and deception. A crucial aspect of both is psychological knowledge, which enables both the prediction of an enemy's likely actions and a knowledge of how to mislead him effectively.12 The Romance differs from the Sunzi, however, in its emphasis on detailed psychological understanding of an individual enemy. This strand in the Romance seems to represent an evolution in military thought over that of the Sunzi. The incidents surrounding Liu Bei's marriage to Sun Quan's sister and the "empty city" stratagem illustrate Zhuge Liang's use of highly individual understanding of character and temperament. A second complex of abilities involves the ability to predict events, to respond flexibly and swiftly to changing circumstances, and to use the energy of the enemy against himself. These abilities echo the Sunzi emphasis on the importance of speed and flexibility to victory.13 Finally, as a master of "verbal warfare" and persuasion, Zhuge Liang relies on instrumental, rather than descriptive, use oflanguage. He avoids conflict and prefers persuasion to guile and guile to force. In the Romance, his nonviolent heroism often prevails over the forceful 9 See Walravens 1982.3-7. In contrast to the SGTSYY, which is not illustrated, and the Li Jowu edition, which illustrates the two incidents summarized in each chapter heading, this edition has illustrations on almost every page, and many of these figures depict points of strategy. tOSee Kong 1982.56. 11"Zhanguo gudai wenhua he xiandajingji guangli," Guangzhou Qiantong, 1986. A. E. McLaren, personal communication. t2For war as the art of deception, see Sun r. 12. For the need to attack the enemy's strategy, see Sun 3·35· For the importance of psychological knowledge, see Sun 3· 51: "Therefore I say, know your enemy and yourself." 1 3For speed, see Sun 2.23-24, Griffith 73. For the need to feed on the strength of the enemy, see Sun 2.28, Griffith 74·

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heroism of Liu Bei's oath-brothers and illustrates the Sunzi principle that the greatest general wins without fighting.14 As in the case of the Warring States period strategist-general, Zhuge Liang's skills and strategies rely on the mentality of metic intelligence. His characteristic attitudes within the sphere of military activity are nonviolence, efficacious flexibility, deceit, and psychological savoir faire. His general avoidance of violence takes the form of "verbal warfare" and, if persuasion is ineffective, a preference for guile over force. Zhuge Liang characteristically uses the strength of his enemies against themselves through his ability to act swiftly and decisively to take advantage of the diversity and multipliciW of circumstances. When necessary, he relies on out-and-out deceit. Finally, he is a masterful psychologist and can predict the behavior of both his allies and enemies. These skills establish Zhuge Liang as a metic hero, as illustrated here by several incidents in the Romance: the master plan he proposes to Liu Bei (chapters 38-39), his "verbal warfare" on the ministers of Sun Quan (chapter 43), the "borrowing arrows" stratagem (chapter 46), the fire ambush (chapter 50), the marriage of Liu Bei (chapters 52-55), his setting of the eightfold maze (chapter 84), his repeated capture of the Man chieftain Meng Huo (chapter 89), and the "empty city" stratagem (chapter 95). In his initial meeting with Liu Bei (chapters 38 and 39), Zhuge Liang outlines a master plan (dajt) based on three strategic concepts of the Sunzi: the importance of ji, advance planning, as a means of engineering the victory of a smaller force against a greater; gui, deception of the enemy, in this case by simulated flight; and use of terrain and weather conditions. Underlying these are the use of zhi and mou, knowledge and strategy, to overcome Cao Cao's situational advantage (sht). Zhuge Liang predicts that Cao Cao will bring down a major force on Liu Bei's small one and calculates that pretended flight from the more numerous foe could draw Cao Cao's troops into difficult terrain on a narrow road constricted by dense foliage, streams, and hills, where favorable wind would provide the opportunity for a fire ambush (SGYY 39, 1.506).15 Zhuge Liang argues that although Cao 14 "To conquer an enemy without fighting is the epitome of skill." See Sun 3. 34· Similarly, the Sunzi states that those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle (3.39) and that it is best to take a state intact, rather than ruined (3.33). As Li Quan's commentary on this passage remarks, it places no priority on killing. 15The account of this broad and extraordinary strategy prompts a rare interruption of the narrative: "in one session, although Kong Ming [Zhuge Liang] had not yet

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Cao possesses the key factor of situational advantage (shi), the combination of cunning (mou) and recognition (zhi) of the timely moment can overcome even so important a strategic factor. He remarks that Cao Cao defeated Yuan Shao even though his situational advantage was inferior to Yuan Shao's, because he took account of timeliness and used cunning (mou) (SGYY 38, 1.487).16 This retelling highlights Zhuge Liang's reliance on the conceptual categories of the Sunzi, in whichji, mou, and shi are major topics.17 Zhuge Liang is far more favorably disposed to persuasion, "verbal warfare," than to physical combat. This emphasis on the avoidance of violence is typical of the intellectual, wu-oriented, military specialists of the Warring States period. In chapter 43, he makes "verbal warfare" on the Confucian scholars, and we see his first verbal battle, a defense of his own methodology of zhi. Before he can forge the necessary alliance with Sun Quan, he must convince Sun Quan's selfinterested strategists that his "master plan" (da jt) can prevail against Cao Cao's superior force of arms (SGYY 43, 2. 546). Zhuge Liang's technique is to turn his opponents' own arguments against them. When they claim that he has actually weakened Liu Bei's position, he turns that "weakness" into a strength: first, by citing it as evidence for the moral rectitude that makes Liu Bei unwilling to seize territory from a kinsman and next by using the analogy of the Peng bird (which is inscrutable to lesser fowl) to claim that the intentions of an extraordinary individual are not perceptible to the generality of men. The analogy comes directly from Zhuangzi's account of the great perception of the Peng bird (SGYY 43, 2.548).18 His third argument makes an analogy to the practice of medicine, where apparently weak and useless means may be necessary preliminaries to strong ones; the internal organs must be brought into harmony with weak food and drugs before strong ones can be used. The efficacious medicines of the doctor are like the great compassion of Liu Bei toward his depleted supporters, whom he must strengthen in small doses (SGYY 43, 2.548). Zhi thus requires a special mode of emerged from his rustic hut, he already knew about the threefold division of the empire-truly in ten thousand generations this man was nonpareil!" See SGYY 38, 1.488.

16for an excellent discussion of shi as situational advantage or political purchase, see Ames 1983.65-67. 17 See Sun 1.1-12 Ui), 3-33-51 (mou), and s.6s-8I (shi). tBThis passage quotes Z 1. 1-2.

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perception. What the person of zhi can perceive (guan) from the higher position of a bird's-eye view is s~mply imperceptible to lesser birds, who must take it on trust. Similarly, the efficacious doctor's apparently trivial remedies may have invisible and far-reaching effects-and the ordinary man should not interfere with the doctor's doing his work. Zhuge Liang compares Liu Bei, rather than himself, to the Peng bird and physician, but Liu Bei is only able to see (guan) through "using" the zhi of Zhuge Liang. The thrust of the argument is that although under normal circumstances the few cannot successfully oppose the many, it can be done with a da ji, a master plan of grand strategy. Zhuge Liang presents the historical analogy of Han Xin's victory over Xiang Yu and contrasts the masterful craft (zhu mou) of a master plan with sophisticated rhetoric (kua bian) (SGYY 43, 2.548). Mere reputation does not give one the ability to respond adeptly to changing circumstances (ying bian), which is the essence of sound strategy. It is the strategic counsel (mou) of individuals like Zhang Yi and Su Qin which enables them to be reformers and guides (SGYY 43, 2.548-49). Here Zhuge Liang links the Sunzi notion of strategy (mou) with the Zhuangzi notion of responding flexibly to change (ying bian). Sun Quan's advisers can only ask what classics Zhuge Liang has read, almost the identical response given by the Tang monk Tripitaka in the Journey to the ~st when Monkey claims to know medicine (XYJ 68, 2.782, Yu 3.304). Zhuge Liang argues that citing chapter and verse in argument is the work of "putrid Confucians" and will not cause a country's affairs to flourish. He cites Jiang Ziya, Chen Ping, and Deng You, whose talent (cai) reformed and helped the empire. No one, he points out, asks what classics they studied (SGYY 43, 2.550). This verbal victory admits Zhuge Liang to an audience with Sun Quan, a man who-he immediately perceives-cannot be persuaded and must be provoked. He thereupon decides to bide his time, await the right moment, and incite his man-with words (SGYY 43, 2.552). Here he calls upon another ability that Detienne and Vernant associate with metis: the ability to work within a shifting and uncertain temporal framework and use the diversity and multiplicity of circumstances. As an example of Zhuge Liang's frequent use of cunning, misleading, or deceitful language, the persuasion of Sun Quan illustrates the problem of knowledge and language in the Romance. Zhuge Liang rarely articulates the results of his knowledge directly. Instead, he

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typically capitalizes upon most people's tendency to misinterpret information according to their own preconceptions and desires, a trait from which he himself is altogether free. His language is often deceptive in that he anticipates how it will be interpreted and incorporates the results into his own planning. In sum, he often speaks in a manner that seems, rather than is, devious. Zhuge Liang uses the "borrowing arrows" stratagem to turn the destructive energy of his ostensive ally Zhou Yu against his real enemy, Cao Cao, to the detriment ofboth and to his own advantage. Zhou Yu's envious hatred of Zhuge Liang is stronger than his hatred for Cao Cao, his declared enemy. Zhou Yu tries to engineer Zhuge Liang's execution for treason by preventing him from keeping a promise to provision the army with ten thousand arrows within three days; to achieve this goal Zhou Yu secretly instructs the arrow-makers to delay their work. Zhuge Liang, however, never approaches the arrow-makers. Instead, during the last night of the allotted time, he proceeds west in twenty boats readied beforehand, each lined on both sides with black curtains over bales of hay. Through deep fog, he takes the boats single file toward Cao Cao's camp, with the crew shouting and beating gongs. Cao Cao, unwilling to risk troops against an invisible ambush, fires volleys of arrows toward the sound, which lodge in the hay. Zhuge Liang gets his arrows, defeats a plot against his life, provisions the army at no cost, and makes a fool of Cao Cao before his own troops (each departing boat salutes Cao Cao in thanks for the arrows, which they promise to return). In sum, Zhuge Liang transforms Zhou Yu's unsuccessful trap for him into his own successful trap for Cao Cao, all without recourse to violence. Zhuge Liang's explanation for this victory is that the cai of a general includes "knowing the patterns of sky." At that season of the year, there would inevitably be fog on the river at some time within any given three-day period. He adds on two of the three days for the sake of caution. For all Zhuge Liang's modesty about his "trifling calculation" (xiao ji), its effect is to rouse Zhou Yu to terror and hatred: "Kong Ming's [Zhuge Liang's] immortal device [shenji] is a marvellous prognostication [miao suan]! I cannot come up to him" (SGYY 46, 2.589). When Zhou Yu is taken ill, Zhuge Liang immediately diagnoses the cause and promises to use magic to raise the east wind necessary to ambush Cao Cao. When Zhuge Liang raises an east wind entirely out of season, Zhou Yu is terrified: "This man has such mastery of the

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creative forces of heaven and earth that neither immortal nor ghost can outguess him! As long as this man is allowed to remain alive, Wu is in danger. By killing him early on, we will avert future ruin" (SGYY 49, 2.622}.19 Zhou Yu escalates the conflict from guile to force. But the ambush he sends against Zhuge Liang's apparently defenceless boat fails when Zhao Yun splits the rope of the pursuers' sail with an arrow in a "demonstration of skill." As the pursuers' sail collapses, Zhuge Liang raises his own and departs. This incident stresses the productive complementarity ofzhi and yong, physical courage. In the words ofZhou Yu's "hit man," stranded on the riverbank, "Zhuge Liang is such an immortal strategist that no one can match him, and Zhao Yun has the courage of ten thousand men." Zhou Yu's opinion is less charitable: "This man is so multi wiled [duo mou] that I shall not have a day or night of peace as long as he lives!" (SGYY 49, 2.623-24). The status of out-and-out deception as an attribute of zhi is a topic on which the text shows some ambivalence. The Sunzi is quite clear: "war is the way of deception" (gui dao) (Sunzi 1, 1. 12). Yet in this Confucian text, even the "barbarian" Meng Yu will not stoop to use it; on the other hand, as Zhuge Liang explains to the honest but imperceptive Lu Su (who frequently acts as Dr. Watson to Zhuge's Holmes): "I smile because you do not recognize [shi] that the general [Zhou Yu] is himself using a stratagem [yong ji] ... the general is meeting one plot with another [jiang ji jiu ji]; he wants them [Cao Cao's spies] to report news. In war we do not condemn [the use of] deceit [zha]; his plan [mou] is [morally] acceptable [shi]" (SGYY 46, 2.591). The principle of "meeting plot with plot" is also used effectively by Zhou Yu against Cao Cao in an exchange of spies. When Cao Cao sends Zhou Yu's old friend Jiang Ganas a spy, Zhou Yu receives him, feasts him, shares his couch, and feigns drunkenness, allowing Jiang Gan to find a letter that compromises two of Cao Cao's trusted generals. As a result, Cao Cao executes two able and entirely loyal generals, and Zhou Yu removes two opponents without even stirring from his bed.2o In chapter so, Zhuge Liang accurately predicts Cao Cao's applica19for a full translation of SGYY, see Brewitt-Taylor 1925. 20Wine is frequently used as a means to shen zhi hun-confuse the intelligence. For example, in chapter 47, Cao Cao uses wine to avail himself of the counsel of Pang Tong, who feigns drunkenness in order to suggest a plan that lays the groundwork for the fire ambush against Cao Cao at the Battle of the Red Cliff (SGYY 47, 2.6o3).

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tion of the Sunzi principle of "the vacuous and the solid," which, in his own commentary on the Sunzi, Cao Cao interprets to mean: "Use the perfectly solid to attack the perfectly empty. "21 The chapter begins with Cao Cao fleeing from the successful fire ambush of Zhuge Liang, Pang Tong, and Zhou Yu. He laughs at his successful escape and Zhuge Liang's false reputation for strategy and cunning, until he encounters Zhao Yun's ambush, prepared by Zhuge Liang. He escapes again, but with spent forces and in heavy rain. He calls a halt and resumes his mockery; Zhuge Liang lacks the zhi mou to ambush them then and there. At this point, Zhuge Liang's second ambush emerges, led by Zhang Fei. Cao Cao escapes a third time and reaches a fork, where he must choose between a longer, level high road and a shorter, but narrow and difficult, byroad. When he sees smoke along the byroad, he chooses it. His generals question him, believing that where there is smoke, there must be soldiers. Cao Cao explains: "Have you not heard it said in the book of war: 'If it is hollow [xu] regard it as solid [shi]; if solid, then take it as hollow'? That Zhuge Liang is so full of craft [duo mou] that he has sent men to prepare fires on the byroad so that I would not dare to take it. Therefore, he has set his ambush for me on the main road" (SGYY so, 2.636). Cao Cao refuses to walk into Zhuge Liang's trap (zhong ta jt) and laughs a third time at his opponent's false reputation for cunning, only to encounter a third ambush, led by Guan Yu. As Zhuge Liang predicted, Guan Yu shows pity for past favors done and lets Cao Cao pass (SGYY so, 2.636-37). Earlier in the chapter, Zhuge Liang uses the same principle to predict Cao Cao's actions accurately. As he explains to Guan Yu: "Have you not heard of the method of warfare of '[attacking] the empty with the empty and the solid with the solid [xu xu shi shi]'? Although Cao Cao is capable in using soldiery [yong bing, in both the human and material senses], this time it is possible to surpass him by the use of dissimulation [man]. When he sees the smoke rising, he will take it as an empty bluff of situational advantage [shi], so he will consider that road trustworthy and proceed" (SGYY 49, 2.626). Cao Cao, for all his expertise in the principles of strategy, applies a flexible principle in an inflexible way. Zhuge Liang, on the other hand, has studied both Sunzi and Cao Cao. Thus he is able to anticipate accurately the reactions ofboth his enemy Cao Cao and his ally Guan Yu. 2t This phrase occurs at Sun 5. 67. For another translation of this passage, see Griffith 91. The phrase is also the title of chapter 6 (Sun 6.82).

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Zhuge Liang's foresight extends to both physical events and human behavior. At times, it effectively determines the course of events in that it gives him the ability to alter the outcome of an opponent's plan in such a way that the events envisioned in the original plan take place, but with a different overall outcome than the original planner intended. In the episodes surrounding Liu Bei's marriage, Zhuge Liang is able to influence, as well as predict, the course of events. At issue are both the conflict between Zhou Yu and Zhuge Liang and the city of Nanjun, a key stronghold of Jingzhou. In chapter 52, Zhou Yu sends Lu Su to regain Nanjun, claiming that Liu Bei holds Jingzhou by "strategic fraud" (yong gui ji) and that the territory belongs to the South as recompense for help against Cao Cao (SGYY 52, 2.656). Zhuge Liang successfully puts off Lu Su twice. Zhou Yu berates him for walking right into Zhuge Liang's plots and proposes a scheme to marry Liu Bei to Sun Quan's sister, a martial woman who will make Liu Bei a prisoner and a ransom for Jingzhou. Zhuge Liang advises Liu Bei to accede to the marriage proposal and laughs at the suggestion that it is a calculation (j1) of Zhou Yu: "Although Zhou Yu is capable of using calculations, do you really think his plots could surpass Zhuge Liang? Foresight [lue] based on such a trifling plan [mou] will make Zhou Yu's half-calculations [ban chou] come to nothing" (SGYY 54, 2.683). Zhuge Liang prepares three plans ( ji ce) to be carried out by Zhao Yun, whom he instructs in the use of "three stratagems [miao ji] in three silk bags" (SGYY 54, 2.683).22 The first contains instructions that transform the false marriage into a real one. On its direction, Liu Bei visits a certain Qiao Guolao (Zhou Yu's father-in-law), who informs Sun Quan's mother of the marriage plans for her daughter. When she reproaches Sun Quan for not consulting her, he claims it is not a real marriage, but she insists on seeing Liu Bei. Sun Quan is too filial to refuse, his mother is delighted with Liu Bei, and as a result, the false marriage becomes real and the fiction a reality, all in accordance with the predictions and designs of Zhuge Liang. The second bag defeats Zhou Yu's second plot, to use pleasure to lure Liu Bei into forgetting Jingzhou. This bag simply instructs Zhao 22Anthony C. Yuhas suggested that the silk bag Uin nang) may relate to the hulu, the gourd or calabash of the astrologer, the source from which he takes his predictions and calculations. They emerge from this source, and are hidden in it.

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Yun to remind Liu Bei of his original intentions. Liu Bei plans to escape from Sun Quan, aided by his wife. The third bag is used when the fleeing Liu Bei is caught between Sun Quan's pursuit and Zhou Yu's ambush. On its direction, Liu Bei tells his wife the whole truth and asks her aid. She puts off the double pursuit, shaming the generals with the claim that brother would never slay sister. The generals believe Sun Quan's appearance of filiality and let the party pass. Again Zhuge Liang's timely instructions turn a fiction into reality. Zhuge Liang awaits them in a boat, clothed as a Taoist priest, and mocks the pursuers- "I foresaw [suan ding] this long ago." Zhou Yu pursues the boat on foot, straight into Guan Yu's ambush, from which he barely escapes. Zhou Yu is jeered by his own soldiers: his "marvellous plan [miao ji] for pacification and stability" has merely given his enemy a bride and caused casualties (SGYY 55, 2.698-99). This series of incidents also illustrates a number of strategies that are personal and characteristic of Zhuge Liang, which include using brocade bags, taking a conspicuous position to anger an enemy, and using Taoist garb.23 Knowledge of weather and terrain and the ability to make accurate predictions of the weather on the river are an important aspect of Zhuge Liang's success in such incidents as the "borrowing arrows" stratagem (chapter 46), the river ambush and deployment of fire at Xinye (chapter 40), and the fire ambush against Cao Cao (chapter so). Another aspect of the flexibility of his approach is his knowledge of what can and cannot be predicted, and his skill at dealing with unpredictable events. His setting of the eightfold maze demonstrates his ability to deal with uncertain or shifting circumstances and to take them into account in his predictions and activities. The eightfold maze is based on the idea of unpredictable transformation. In chapter 84, Lu Xun and his troops wander into this formation of stones previously set by Zhuge Liang. The stones seem to exude mist, and when the men try to leave the formation, they are confronted by a tempest and realize that they have fallen into Zhuge Liang's trap (zhong ji) (SGYY 84, ].1071). They are released by the misplaced kindness of Zhuge Liang's father-in-law, who disregards Zhuge's warning against permitting the escape of a great general of East Wu. 23Brocade bags appear in chapters 50, 99, and 105. Zhuge Liang takes a conspicuous position to anger an enemy in chapters 25, 30, J2, 40, 65, and 98. He appears in the garb of a Taoist immortal in chapters 64-65, 83, 89-90, 92-93, 97-IOI, and !04-5· For further discussion, see Plaks 1987. 393n109.

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The father-in-law explains that the eight gates transform into each other without a point of reference. Although he can recognize the gate by which to release them, he does not understand the system of transformations (bian dat) as a whole because they are without limit (wu qiang) and impossible to study (xue) (SGYY 84, 3· I072). Zhuge Liang himself does not try to predict the unpredictable. In his arguments for the northern campaign (chapter 9I), he counters the astrologers by maintaining that "the transformations of the courses of the heavens are not constant. We must not cling too closely to such things" (SGYY 9I, 3. II67 and Sun 1.2-10). This argument is a negative illustration of the Sunzi principle of knowledge of weather and terrain. Chapter 89 illustrates persuasion as a second aspect' of Zhuge Liang's avoidance of violence. In this case, he is able to transform a captured enemy into an ally. When he captures Meng Huo, the king of the Mans, for the fourth time, he persuades many of the captured soldiers to yield and then releases them, including the king's brother Meng Yu, whom Zhuge Liang persuades to remonstrate with Meng Huo for his stupidity (yu). Meng Huo admits that he has again fallen into Zhuge Liang's "cunning trap" (gui jt). "Kong Ming [Zhuge Liang] replied: 'Four times now I have [captured you and] treated you according to the rites [yi li]; but you will not pay allegiance-why?' Meng Huo said, 'Uncivilized though I may be, I will not be seen to resort to your specialty of cunning tricks fguiji]" (SGYY 89, 3· I I32). Meng Huo agrees to yield if Zhuge Liang can capture him once more and is released, only to lure Zhuge Liang's troops into a cul-de-sac with four poisonous springs from which even his "immortal devices and marvellous plans" (shenji miao suan) will not save him (SGYY 89, 3· I I33). Here even the resourceful Zhuge Liang seems to be at the end of his devices. As he explains to an old man he encounters in a temple in the mountains: "As things are, the Man lands cannot be pacified. If the Man lands are not pacified, how can we oppose Wu and Wei successfully and reestablish the Han? I fail in the task the Emperor [Liu Bei] confided to me; would that I might die!" (SGYY 89, 3· II35). The old man instructs Zhuge Liang how to remedy the effects of the magically poisonous waters his men have drunk by using the water of a spring and the leaf of an herb that grows at the house of a recluse nearby. When Liang asks the name of his benefactor, he says that he is the spirit of the mountain and disappears into the rocks.

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This incident is reminiscent of a group of legends in which an individual whose heroism is intellectual, rather than physical, is given magical aid, typically in the form of a bingfa or military strategy manual, by a Taoist or spirit, either a woman or an old man. Heroes of this kind include Taigong Wang, Su Qin, Zhang Liang, and Sun Bin, as I have discussed in chapter 5. It is also reminiscent ofHermes' gift of the herb moly to Odysseus to protect him against Circe's magic (Odyssey 10.275-301). This incident ironically puts the articulation of a typically Confucian distrust of cunning and cunning language into the mouth of a barbarian. It also reveals Zhuge Liang's magical aspects and, again, his avoidance of direct violence and his ability to transform a situation from opposition into alliance. In chapter 95, Zhuge Liang uses accurate prediction of an opponent's reaction to escape the consequences of a general's disastrous disobedience of his orders. Heavily outnumbered by Wei forces, he uses the ruse of an undefended "empty city" to repulse the formidable strategist-general Sima Yi. Sheltering his scant troops within the city, he appears alone on the city wall, playing a zither. Taken in by Zhuge Liang's reputation for caution, Sima Yi anticipates an ambush and retreats. Zhuge Liang is thus portrayed as a heroic character who steers a fine line between Confucian values and strategic efficacy. He shifts Liu Bei's campaign from reliance on force toward reliance on persuasion and verbal warfare. Yet from his first meeting with Liu Bei, it is clear that Zhuge Liang knows that he cannot prevail by either force or persuasion. When these fail he turns to guile; his strategies are based on the military principles of the Sunzi rarefied by a highly individual psychological knowledge of his particular enemies and allies. In general, his grand strategy relies on the use of craft (mou), and his methods work to defeat a more powerful foe with that foe's own strength. Several of the skills specifically mentioned in the Sunzi inform the Romance: (1) deception (gui), exemplified by the fire ambush and the "empty city" stratagem; (2) responding flexibly to circumstances (ying bian), exemplified by the eightfold maze, Guan Yu and the seven cities, and Zhuge Liang's prediction of his own death; (3) knowledge of conditions of weather and terrain (tian dt), illustrated by the episodes of "borrowing arrows," raising the east wind, and setting the eightfold maze; (4) knowledge ofboth the enemy and human nature; and finally, (5) knowledge of the theoretical principles of strategy, in particular, of the Sunzi. Zhuge Liang also possesses other strategic

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skills, however, that are not specific to the Sunzi but are consistent with legendary traditions surrounding master strategist-generals of the past: his mastery of verbal warfare and persuasion is shown by his persuasion ofSun Quan and his ministers and his conversion ofMeng Huo, king of the Mans, and his mastery of out-and-out Taoist magic (dao shu) is demonstrated by his raising the east wind and his setting of the eightfold maze. In addition, the Romance mentions a number of specific kinds of stratagems that are not spelled out as such in the Sunzi. These include capture by guile or ambush in chapters I2 and 98; false surrenders (zha xiang) in chapters 97 and I 14; voluntary submission to punishment to gain the confidence of an enemy (ku rou ji) in chapters 3 I, 79, 82, and I07; the use of a beautiful woman to lure the enemy (mei renji) in chapters 5, 8, 9, 53, 55, 85, and 105; and the fabrication of a wedge of suspicion to undermine confidence between allies (fan jian j1) in chapters 59, 65, 87, 9I, and 114.24 The Sunzi advocates knowledge of human nature in general; the Romance extends the idea of "knowing others" (zhi ren) from general knowledge to the detailed knowledge of the characteristics and behavior of people as individuals. Zhuge Liang's individualized psychological knowledge affects his actions toward characters as diverse as Cao Cao, Guan Yu, Zhou Yu, Sun Quan, and Sima Yi. Zhuge Liang leads Cao Cao first into the fire ambush and then into the three subsequent ambushes because the former's understanding of Cao Cao's understanding of strategy allows him to place Pang Tong as Cao Cao's adviser and to anticipate his thinking and reactions. Similarly, Zhuge Liang predicts that Guan Yu will ultimately release Cao Cao despite his oath, that Sun Quan can be stirred but not talked to, that Zhou Yu can be moved by jealousy, that Sima Yi will base his actions on Zhuge Liang's reputation for caution, and that Sima Yi's men will credit and fear a wooden image of the dead Zhuge Liang. These diverse predictions rely on knowledge of the psychology of very different individuals, not merely on understanding of human nature in general, and this seems to represent an evolution of the strategy of the Romance over that of the Sunzi. Many of Zhuge Liang's exploits as described in the Romance have no basis in the historical record. Zhuge Liang in fact played no part in the Battle of the Red Cliffs, nor is the fire ambush even mentioned in the Sanguo zhi. The Romance attributes the "borrowing arrows" strat24See Plaks 1987.393nii I.

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agem to Zhuge Liang against Cao Cao (and Zhou Yu). The Wei lue and the Sanguo zhi attribute it to Sun Quan against Cao Cao, and the Ping hua attributes it to Zhou Yu against Cao Cao.25 Ling Ying notes that a variant of the "borrowing arrows" strategy is used by Sun Jian, Sun Quan's father. In chapter 7 of the Romance, Sun Jian begins a punitive expedition against Fancheng by sending out boats to draw the arrow fire of the defenders. He collects the arrows and shoots them back at his enemies.26 The Romance disregards historical sources in re-creating Zhuge Liang as a metic hero; he was not originally esteemed as a great strategist but rather as an able and just administrator. Despite serious anomalies with the historical record, at least as early as the Tang dynasty, both the historical and popular traditions considered Zhuge Liang to be a great strategist. Chen Shou's official biography of Zhuge Liang in the Sanguo zhi emphasizes his administrative skills as minister of state for the Shu nation. Chen Shou records that knowledge and establishing order were Zhuge Liang's true talents: he comforted the hundred peoples, established laws and ordinances, set up ranks of public office, governed the provisional regime, put in practice a sincere mind, and promulgated justice: one who exhausted his loyalty in timely aid, although an enemy, was necessarily recompensed; one who violated the law and was negligent, although an intimate, was necessarily punished; one who accepted guilt for transmitting information [to an enemy], although [it was] grave, was necessarily released; one who made unfounded statements that were skillful and ornate, although adroit, was necessarily killed. He considered it good to be without subtlety, but did not honor it; he considered it bad to be without delicacy, but did not criticize it. (SGZ 3 5, 4-934)

The biography concludes that "he never had complete merit; 1t 1s probable that adapting to changing circumstance [ying bian] and the planning of a general were not [the qualities] wherein he excelled!" (SGZ 4-934). As early as the Tang dynasty, Zhuge Liang was considered a great 25 See SGZ 47, s.rrr8-19. The Sanguo zhi and the Wei lue passage quoted in the Sanguo zhi commentary both attribute the stratagem to Sun Quan. The Ping hua tradition attributes it to Zhou Yu. See Qiu 1983.95-97· 26 See SGYY 7, r.87, Brewitt-Taylor r.68-69 and Ling 1976.I.15-22.

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military strategist, despite the Sanguo zhi statement that his real preeminence lay in government and administration (wen), not in strategy and military affairs (wu). We find Zhuge Liang mentioned as a great strategist in a Tang version of the Buddhist canon, the Xiu cang, which relates how anxious Liu Bei was to secure the services of Zhuge Liang and states that "Zhuge Liang was a great general; he excelled at plans and strategy [mou ce], and the house of Wei feared only Kong Ming [Zhuge Liang], and did not dare to draw near him."27 In his essay "On Zhuge Liang," Su Shi (1036-IIoi) disparages the admixture of deceit (zha) in Zhuge's pursuit ofjustice.28 Mao Zonggang himself generally follows the Sanguo zhi in viewing Zhuge Liang as a sage adviser (xian) and a paragon of wisdom.29 He uses the Sanguo zhi's account of Liu Bei's three visits to Zhuge Liang and quotes its version of their conversation. 30 In his preface to the Ming dynasty "Fire Drake Manual," a treatise on gunpowder, Jiao Yu praises Zhuge Liang as the kingdom of Shu's main advantage over its rivals: [It was mainly due to his efforts that] people were prevented from forgetting the Han [Dynasty] completely. If it had not been for the will ofHeaven that the empire should be divided into three [kingdoms], he could easily have marched his army right through, and brought about a reunification of the Empire. At that time, if it had not been for the fireweapons of Khung-Ming [Zhuge Liang], even though the Shu Kingdom had the famous Five Tiger Generals, the Wu and Wei Kingdoms, each with their own strengths, might not necessarily have feared the Shu Kingdom as a veritable tiger. Hence to be invincible, nothing excels the expertise of using fire-weapons.3t

Another interesting side of Zhuge Liang's popular image is this association with gunpowder weapons in the popular tradition. The "Fire Drake Manual" is anachronistically attributed to him, and its preface even claims that he used gunpowder to make land-mines and asserts that there were no firearms in the Han until Zhuge Liang met an 27 See

Yi Su 1962. u8-19, citing Xiu Cang (626 c. E.). SuShi, "Zhuge Liang lun," as cited in Plaks 1987.441. 2 9See Plaks 1987.442n289. 30 See SGZ 35, 5.913-17. This treatment is in considerable contrast with the portrayal of Cao Cao, whose good qualities are largely omitted. 3 1See Needham 1954.5.29, which quotes the preface to the "Fire Drake Manual," or Huo long jing chuan ji, attributed to Zhuge Liang. 2 8See

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extraordinary man who revealed these secrets to him. This anachronistic attribution of gunpowder technology and a Ming dynasty work to Zhuge Liang indicates the strength ofhis reputation for mastery of the use of fire as a strategic technique. In modern scholarship, Zheng Zhenduo considers the novel to be primarily a biography of Zhuge Liang, whose character conforms to some aspects of the Shuihu zhuan-type military adviser.32 By contrast, Hu Shi considers him a "villainous, treacherous scoundrel," an unsuccessful depiction of a sage adviser. 33 The main traditional criticism of Zhuge Liang is of his means, specifically, his use of deceit. As Andrew Plaks points out, however, "one can hardly take a sworn Machiavellian to task for acting as if the endjustified the means."34 Plaks adds the more far-reaching criticism that Zhuge Liang fails in his ends as much as in his means and, like the other major characters in the Romance, suffers from a fundamental sense of excess-in his case, the excessive pursuit of basically justifiable ends. 35 In this view, the Romance portrays Zhuge Liang ironically as arrogant, psychologically manipulative, ruthless, ambitious, and hypocritical.36 The arrogance is apparent in Xu Shu's original recommendation and is also displayed in Zhuge's behavior toward Liu Bei 32See Zheng 1930.204. 33See Hu 1922.474. For commentaries on Hu's view, see Dong 1956.9. 34Cf. Plaks 1987.448. 35This negative assessment of Zhuge Liang is part of a broader argument that the Romance should be read, not as a popular novel, but as a serious and ironic revision of its sources. Plaks uses the perceived ambiguity between the author's pro-Shu viewpoint and his use of irony to read the Romance as an example of the "literati novel," a genre of sophisticated vernacular novel that emerged as an identifiable literary genre by the early sixteenth century. He argues that irony is the main rhetorical principle in the Romance and that the author uses a range of devices to signal a radical disjunction between appearance and reality within the text. These include plot reversals and figural reflections generated by the ironic representation of similarities and differences between repeated figures. According to Plaks, the Romance deflates the popular images of its heroes; the central issue is the consequences of rigid preconceptions of the nature and requisites of honorable relations between individuals. Like Zhuge Liang, the other major heroes of the novel suffer from various excesses; they hubristically adopt the impossible standards of the idealized kings, sages, and ministers of the past and thus fail to meet the real needs of honor: Guan Yu suffers from an excessive sense of valor, Zhang Fei of bravery, and Liu Bei of moral fiber. Their ultimate failures to regulate their own self-images are a failure of the ability "to know others and to know oneself' (zhi bi zhiji), a reference to Sun 3· 51-52. For a discussion of this allusion, see Plaks 1987.490n469. For a discussion of the overall argument, see Plaks 1987.364-75, 399-405, 408-35, 447, and 487-91. 36See Plaks 1987.442-48.

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during his third visit. (The novel considerably enlarges both incidents from the historical sources.) Zhuge Liang's arrogance also appears in displays of haughty laughter, in his studied nonchalance on the battlefield, and in his relations with the other key players in Liu Bei's camp, especially Guan Yu and Zhang Fei. His psychological manipulations of his ostensive allies include the encouragement of open rivalry, the extraction of pledges with death as the condition of failure, and a patronizing control over Liu Bei. His manipulations of his enemies include the protracted psychological defeat of Zhou Yu and a variety of acts of individual ruthlessness.37 His ambition becomes manifest in his successive and coy "borrowings" ofYizhou and Jingzhou and in his establishing of Liu Bei first as king (wang) of Hanzhong and finally as emperor of Han in Shu. Furthermore, Zhuge Liang suffers significant strategic defeats (chapter 41 and 42) and exhibits enormous failures of judgment.38 His reputation for wizardry is as questionable as his reputation for strategy. The novel also provides counterexamples of other characters who have the abilities Zhuge Liang lacks and instances where the signs prove wrong.39 Evaluations of Zhuge Liang's strategic prowess and moral stature thus run the gamut from the veneration of the popular tradition to the mixed evaluation of the scholarly tradition. Even given these critical caveats, we can view the fictional Zhuge Liang as a legendary heroic figure. Within the Romance, he repeatedly upstages two other heroic figures, Guan Yu and Zhang Fei. He is a morally acceptable hero of guile; the Romance repeatedly contrasts the metic intelligence of its fictionalized Zhuge Liang with the crafty ruthlessness of an equally fictionalized Cao Cao. Moreover, Zhuge Liang is introduced and described in terms of paradigmatic Warring States period legends about lowborn but talented strategists who become founding ministers through their merit. (These legends are described in chapter 5.) 37These include the frame-up of Jiang Wei (chapter 93), the death of Zhang Ren (chapter 64), and threats toward the entire population of Ling Ling (chapter 52), discussed in Plaks 1987.447· 38These include his permitting the release ofCao Cao (chapter so), his overestimation of Ma Su (chapter 95), the six reunification campaigns, and defeats by Sima Yi (chapters 101 and 102). 39Examples of the abilities of other individuals include the magic of the Yellow Turban rebels in chapter 1 and of Meng Huo in chapter 90. Zhuge Liang fails to heed signs predicting the failure of the first (chapter 91) and second (chapter 92) campaigns against Wei. Although fire strategies are Zhuge Liang's avowed personal trademark (chapter 98), they fail in chapters 97 and 103. These incidents are discussed in Plaks 1987-449-51.

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Zhuge Liang's entrance into Liu Bei's futile cause ultimately establishes him as a hero of tragic proportions.

Zhuge Liang as a Metic Hero The Romance's concern with strategy is not limited to Zhuge Liang; ji, or calculation, is a preoccupation of the novel as a whole. On the

one hand, it is pervaded by an aristeia of strategy between Zhuge Liang, Cao Cao, Zhou Yu, Pang Tong, and Sima Yi. On the other hand, Zhuge Liang as a hero of guile has contrasting and complementary relationships with several heroes of force: Guan Yu, Zhang Fei, and Zhao Yun. The introduction of Zhuge Liang as Liu Bei's chief adviser focuses attention on Zhuge's methods of strategy and warfare. Liu Bei's choice of Zhuge Liang effectively represents a choice of guile over force, and this policy results in a series of oppositions between Zhuge Liang and Liu Bei's oath-brothers Guan Yu and Zhang Fei: "Sage and warrior never agree" (SGYY 37, 1.481). Zhuge Liang in his methods and orientation is a hero in the model of the Warring States period strategist-general. By contrast, Zhang Fei and Guan Yu are figures of force whose prestige as heroic figures derives from the popular tradition, which venerates Guan Yu as the incarnation of valor or gallantry and Zhang Fei as that of courage. The Romance differs from the Sanguo zhi and Ping hua traditions by introducing incidents in which Zhuge Liang undercuts these figures. Guan Yu is loyal, righteous, powerful, generous, and courageous; he is also stubborn and arrogant and dies through his failure to heed Zhuge Liang's advice. Zhang Fei is brave, if hot-tempered, but his stature in the popular tradition is eclipsed in the Romance by his noticeable inferiority to Zhuge Liang. This opposition toward Zhuge Liang begins with Liu Bei's initial attempts to recruit him, incidents that simply do not appear in the Sanguo zhi version. The Romance elaborates the Sanguo zhi account of Liu Bei's threefold "courtship" of Zhuge Liang, both by expanding the length and circumstances of the meeting and by introducing repeated opposition to Zhuge Liang from Zhang Fei and, in some accounts, Guan Yu. The Sanguo zhi account is brief and makes no mention of circumstances or personalities: "Xu Shu said to the first ruler [Liu Bei],

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'Zhuge Kong Ming [Zhuge Liang] is the Reclining Dragon. Does not your Honor wish to grant him an audience?' The first ruler said, 'Will you please have him come to me?' [Xu] Shu said, 'This man will not condescend to visit you; you must go to him. Perhaps you, Sir, would condescend to visit him?'" (SGZ 35, 4.912). The Sanguo zhi then says that Liu Bei went to Zhuge Liang three times, whereupon he had an audience with him, and it recounts in full Liu Bei's speech to Zhuge Liang. Longer and more elaborate accounts appear in the SGTSYY, the Mao edition, and in a later work, the Sanguo ce, or Strategies of the Three Kingdoms.40 All three expand the account ofLiu Bei's_recruitment of Zhuge Liang in two ways. First, they emphasize Xu Shu's recommendation of Zhuge Liang by setting it in the dramatic context of his forced departure to serve Cao Cao. Secondly, they expand the account of Liu Bei's three visits to include repeated accounts of opposition by Liu Bei's two oath-brothers. In these accounts, Zhang Fei's objections become louder, ruder, and funnier with each visit, and even Guan Yu questions the wisdom of seeking out so reclusive a sage. These accounts raise the issue of force and guile by emphasizing Zhang Fei's and Guan Yu's distrust of Zhuge Liang as a "mere lowbom scholar." In other words, he is not a warrior in the heroic mold they recognize. In his first action (chapter 39), Zhuge Liang prevails by strategy and eclipses Guan Yu and Zhang Fei. They resent his new authority as master strategist, consider him too young, despite his reputation for learning, and doubt his skill. When Zhang Fei makes a suggestion for the upcoming retributive campaign against Sun Quan, Liu Bei says that he relies on Zhuge Liang for strategy (zhi) and his oath-brothers for force (yong) (SGYY 39, 1.503, Brewitt-Taylor 1.413). Zhuge Liang asks for and receives Liu Bei's seal and sword in order to compel Guan Yu's and Zhang Fei's obedience. Their resentment grows both because they do not understand Zhuge Liang's strategy and because he sends them out to battle but remains behind to defend the city at Bowang. The strategy entails a feigned rout of Zhao Yun's forces and a feigned ambush by Liu Bei to bring the enemy into close terrain where fire can be employed in the real ambush by Zhao Yun. Guan Yu blocks off the enemy's escape back toward Bowang, the plan 40J am grateful to A. E. McLaren for calling my attention to this text.

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succeeds, and the resentment of the two oath-brothers appears to abate. The Mao edition emphasizes the contrast between Guan Yu and Zhuge Liang. It puts the Sanguo zhi assessment of Guan Yu as arrogant into the mouth of Zhuge Liang and has Guan Yu die for not heeding his advice. 41 Guan Yu's excessive overrating of personal honor causes him to spare Cao Cao in chapter 50, with disastrous consequences, a fictional incident that appears in neither the Sanguo zhi nor the Ping hua, which mention Cao Cao's escape only in passing. 42 Guan Yu and Zhang Fei's excessive sense of honor raises the conflict between public and private standards of morality, a conflict that is also raised in the person of Achilles in the Iliad. 43 Constructed fictional incidents in the Romance thus create a tension between two heroic types and two approaches to warfare. In these incidents, Zhuge Liang, the Warring States period hero of strategy and persuasion, opposes and eclipses the popular heroes Guan Yu and Zhang Fei. By contrast with Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, Zhao Yun represents a balance between force and guile. He assists Zhuge Liang in several episodes that require both heroic bravery and a perspicacious understanding of what is required. He leads the final attack at Xinye (SGYY 40), stands in Zhuge Liang's stead as Liu Bei's protector, saving him and his child (chapter 41), aids Zhuge Liang in the final escape from Zhou Yu's plots (chapter 49), leads the initial ambush against the escaping Cao Cao (chapter 50), and carries out Zhuge Liang's "silk bags" stratagems in Wu after Liu Bei's marriage to Lady Sun (chapter 52-55). The Romance thus seems to exalt heroes of guile over their more forceful counterparts. 44 Much as it praises Zhuge Liang's strategy and resourcefulness, the Romance is careful to limit the acceptability of the ambiguous virtues 41Guan Yu's arrogance is reflected in both the Sanguo zhi biography and the 1522 edition. See SGYY 78, Plaks 1987.408-10 and Dong 1956.76-77. Hu Shi comments that the Romance has turned Guan Yu into an arrogant warrior who is wu mou, without a sense of strategy. See Hu 1953-473· 42 See Plaks 1987.412ni75, citing SGZ 1.31 and 4.915, Pinghua 429, and Zizhi tongjian 2093. 43Dong Meikan calls Guan Yu "the incarnation of a sense of valor." See Dong 1956.76. 441n his comparison of Zhou dynasty Chinese heroes and Homeric heroes, David N. Keightley sees Chinese heroes as primarily intellectual in contrast to their more forceful Greek counterparts. See Keightley 1990.

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of metic intelligence. The conflict between Zhuge Liang and Cao Cao exemplifies this tension between wisdom and cunning in specifically moralized Confucian terms. Both the popular tradition and to a lesser extent the Romance present Zhuge Liang as a wise and virtuous hero and Cao Cao as a cunning and ruthless villain. In the popular tradition, Cao Cao's negative image dates to the Song dynasty.4S The Romance maligns the "cunning" of Cao Cao, but portrays Zhuge Liang's "uncanny strategies" and Liu Bei's ambition in a flattering light. By contrast, the historiographical image of Cao Cao is that of a great but flawed statesman. He enjoyed a more consistent reputation as a strategist than did Zhuge Liang and was the author of an important commentary on the Sunzi. The Sanguo zhi describes him as "temperate and frugal by nature" and emphasizes both his knowledge of others and perspicacity as a commander: Ever since Taizu [Cao Cao] assumed governance of the Empire, he has gotten rid of all kinds of villains. In the conduct of the army and the use of generals, he put great reliance on the methods of Sun and Wu [the Sunzi and Wuzi], and so he responded to situations with uncanny provision. He prevailed over enemies by cunning Uue]; his transformations and variations were as if immortal. He himself composed a book on warfare of some hundred thousand characters; whenever any ofhis generals went on campaign, they all followed the precepts of this new book. On each occasion he gave them individual directions, and all those who followed his orders met with victory while those who opposed them met with ruin. With captives and on the field of battle, his attitude was calm and peaceful, as if he had no desire for conflict, but would seize the opportune means and strike victoriously at fullest energy and advantage. Therefore, he was necessarily victorious in every battle, and there was no victory the army won by [mere] luck. Since he understood people well, and was a superior judge of people, it was difficult to dazzle him with artifice and counterfeit [wei] . ... He was cultivated in both the civil and the martial arts, and during the thirty-odd years of military command, his hands were never without books. During the day he deliberated military strategy; at night he reflected on classics and commentaries. Whenever he climbed heights, he composedfo [poems]; when he composed new shi [verses], he set 45 Su Shi considers Cao Cao a model of political ruthlessness. See Dong 1956.19 and Plaks 1987.4S6n341, quoting SuShi, Hu Shi, and Dong Meikan.

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them to pipes and strings, and the music was all excellent. In talent and strength he was nonpareil; he could shoot down birds from flight with his hands and catch wild beasts alive. (SGZ I, 1.54-55)46

This description reveals that Zhuge Liang and Cao Cao share several metic qualities. Both possess acute and particular knowledge of others. Both are skilled in the use of strategy, transformation, and deceit. Despite the novel's professed admiration of his military skill, however, Cao Cao's career is marked by overconfidence followed by strategic defeat. He boasts to the captured double agent Kan Ze that he is a student of bingfa: "In my youth I read everything on the art of war, and I have deep knowledge [shen zhi] of all the paths of deception Uian wei zhi dao]. This subterfuge [tiao ji] would have succeeded with others, but not with me!" Kan Ze simply laughs at him: "You do not recognize [shi] how to contrive strategy [zhi mou]; you have no understanding [ming] nor do you speak according to reason and principle. How could you not be ignorant [wu xue]?" (SGYY 47, 2.598-99). The most telling example of this failure is the Battle of the Red Cliffs. Cao Cao frequently appears in dire straits and at the mercy of his enemies; he is often rescued at the last minute by the appearance of his men and is frequently wounded. 47 Thus, Cao Cao, like Zhuge Liang, is portrayed as a highly fallible character. Zhuge Liang, however, fails in his ends, whereas Cao Cao fails in his means. Cao Cao's image as an antihero is both reinforced and undercut by contrast to Liu Bei. Several parallels between Liu Bei and Cao Cao help define the characters of both. Liu Bei claims that he himself is temperate and tolerant (kuan), humane (ren), and trustworthy (zhong), whereas Cao Cao is hasty (ji), violent and thrasonical (bao), and cunning (jue) (SGYY 6o, 2.765).48 But both are called "unscrupulous heroes" (jian xiong). 49 Cao Cao is initially Liu Bei's protector and 46This passage is the basis for the assessment of Cao Cao in Sima Kuang's widely read Zizhi tongjian. For a partial translation, see Fang 1952.15-18, to which this translation is indebted. 47Last minute rescues occur in chapters II, 12, 49, so, and 72. Woundings occur in chapters 6, 12, 16, 32, 42, 58, and 72. See Plaks 1987.462n362 and 463n363. 48According to Plaks (I987.456-S7), the Romance treats Cao Cao fairly, despite its sympathy to the Shu Han cause. Mao changes the titles of chapters 23, 24, 69, and 78 at Cao's expense in deference to popular tradition but cites him as a paragon and recognizes his virtues. For further citations, see Plaks 1987.456. 49 For the term )ian xiong, see SGYYPP I 1. 14b and 78.4a as cited in Plaks 1987.469n388. For a discussion of Mao's comparison of the qualities of the three rulers, see Plaks 1987.457n346.

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recognizes him as a threat precisely because of their similarities. According to Cao Cao, he and Liu Bei are the only men alive with the qualities of a true hero: ambition, strategic ability, and resourcefulness. Cao Cao says that the hero must cherish great aspirations (da zhi), plan accurately (liang mou) to achieve them, and have all-embracing devices (jt) such that the whole world is at the mercy of his aspirations (SGYY 21, 1.276).SO Both Cao Cao and Liu Bei are introduced in formulaic phrases and capsule biographies as men who were self-made, descended in some sense from a noble line, precocious as children to the dismay of their parents, and more inclined to martiality than to formallearning.sl Both are vulnerable to sexual temptation. The popular tradition, in particular, portrays Cao Cao as lecherous. 52 There are also important differences between Liu Bei and Cao Cao, and some of them involve Cao Cao's superiority in metic intelligence. In many cases, Cao Cao is superior to Liu Bei, or else his weaknesses cast an ironic reflection on Liu Bei. He is able to attract worthy followers; he can judge (zhi ren) and use (yong ren) the abilities of others. Although Liu Bei tends toward depression and despair in the face of defeat (chapters 31 and 41), Cao Cao's characteristic stance toward adversity is laughter in the face of defeat; this is his response when he is captured after the Battle of the Red Cliffs (chapter so). Self-knowledge is perhaps the area of their greatest difference. Cao Cao is clear about his own mistakes and, unlike Liu Bei, he does not indulge in self-justification. He remarks to Chen Gong that "I would rather have myself betray the trust of the entire world, than have anyone else in the world betray me" (SGYY 4, 1.51). This statement contrasts strongly with Liu Bei's remark that "As long as I treat people with compassion and justice, they will not betray my trust" (SGYY 62, 2.794).53 Unfortunately, Liu Bei's conduct does not measure up to this statement. The novel does not bear out the contrast Liu Bei believes exists between his own benevolence (ren) and Cao Cao's violent temperament (bao). Although Liu Bei has the self-image of a righteous ruler sosee also Dong 1956.68. 51 For the biography of Cao Cao, see SGZ 1, 1.2-56. For Liu Bei see SGZ 32, 4.871. The 1522 edition follows these biographies closely. 52 See Plaks 1987.465. S3These passages are discussed in Plaks 1987.466-67. See also Plaks 1987.457 and 46J.

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who rules by compassion rather than force, the novel consistently raises the question of whether he is really trying to restore the Han or to consolidate his own power. He successively "borrows" power in Xuzhou (ch;tpter 12), Jingzhou (chapter 54), Yizhou (chapter 65), and finally installs himself first as king ofHanzhong (chapter 73) and then as emperor of Han in Shu (chapter 8o).54 The Romance follows at least some of the popular tradition's tendency to vilify Cao Cao as both general and ruler, in contrast to both Zhuge Liang and Liu Bei. In its differing portrayals of Cao Cao and Liu Bei, the Romance pointedly distinguishes the capabilities (cai) of a strategist or general from those of a ruler. In the Shu Han kingdom, the realms of wu and wen are correctly separated. The talent or cai of the ruler and the cai of the strategist-general are portrayed as the two distinct and complementary virtues of ren (benevolence) and zhi (wisdom). The ruler must be able to use zhi but need not be zhi. Liu Bei is ren but not zhi, and his initial misfortunes occur because he lacks the complementary wisdom of a general. Cao Cao, on the other hand, inappropriately applies the wu abilities of the strategist to the wen sphere of rulership. He has the cleverness of zhi but lacks ren, the moral prerequisite for kingship. A crucial aspect of the plot of the Romance is the mutual recognition between Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang. This trope of recognition is expressed by zhi in its verbal sense, to know or recognize, and has played an important role in Chinese literature since the Warring States period. 55 This capacity for mutual appreciation of worth is the conceptual core of a set of recurrent ideals that pervade the significant episodes of the novel. 56 In the case of Zhuge Liang, it takes the form of seeking a lord (qiu zhu); in the case of Liu Bei (and Cao Cao), it takes the form of using the abilities of others (yong ren). Zhuge Liang is inescapably drawn to Liu Bei's service by the knowledge that his abilities have been truly recognized by a potential ruler of sufficient political and moral stature to put them to use. Liu Bei in turn recognizes the abilities of Zhuge Liang and is able to attract him to his service. Despite his failure to bring peace or establish a Shu Han dynasty, 54A reference to "borrowingJingzhou" occurs in SGZ 32, 4.879. As Mao remarks: "Whoever heard of'borrowing' a city?" For discussion, see Plaks 1987.427. For other examples of Liu Bei's pattern of failure and indecision, see Plaks 1987.421-29. sssee Henry 1987. s-JO. 56See Plaks 1987.486.

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the Romance depicts Liu Bei in the role of a Confucian sage-ruler. 57 As a scion of the house of Han, he has political legitimacy; as a man of surpassing ren and yi, he enjoys moral legitimacy. Like Cao Cao, he has the ability to recognize worth and the power to attract the services of sages. Thus Liu Bei has the central abilities (cal) and hereditary and moral requisites of a ruler, but he cannot establish his kingship without the complementary and equally necessary abilities of a founding minister. The episodes that introduce Zhuge Liang portray him in no uncertain terms as the potential founding minister ofLiu Bei's dynasty. Liu Bei first hears of Zhuge Liang from the Taoist recluse Sima Hui, whose eponym is ShuiJing, "Water Mirror."ss Sima Hui advises Liu Bei that, although he has both wen and wu, civilian and military, officials, he lacks cai, talent. He has invincible warriors but lacks someone who knows how to use (yong) them, because the civilian officials are "mere white-face scholars!" Shui Jing recommends Zhuge Liang as the "uncanny talent" (qi cm) of the empire (SGYY 35, 1.452).59 In chapter 36, this recommendation is elaborated and refined. Zhuge Liang is again recommended to Liu Bei by his own military adviser Xu Shu, whom the "crafty wiles" (jian jt) of Cao Cao have forced to leave Liu Bei's service. Xu Shu reveals that Zhuge Liang is a Taoist adept and compares him to Taigong Wang and Zhang Liang. Of Xu Shu's four companions in the study of the Taoist way, only Zhuge Liang understands it in its entirety (SGYY 36, 1.474). In parting, Xu Shu can only vow that he will never plot for Cao Cao so much as a single plan (mou). His recommendation is thus a strong one because it specifically compares Zhuge Liang to the founding ministers of the Zhou and Han dynasties and establishes him as a Taoist and magical figure. 571n this view, the ruler exists for the benefit of the people and is the transforming model who "is" rather than does, providing a virtuous example by emulation of which the people are rectified. For a discussion of wu-wei in pre-Han thought, see Ames 1983.28-64. 58 A water mirror, like the mind, reflects accurately because it is calm and still; Shui Jing is able to perceive accurately (guan) and is immediately aware of the surreptitious presence and influence of a person of courage. When Liu Bei comes forward, Shui Jing instantly perceives that he is in desperate straits. 59Qi has a range of meanings including "uncanny," "extraordinary," and "unexpected," for example, "to attain victory by unleashing the absolutely unexpected" (chu qi zhi sheng). For its meaning as a technical term in the context of military strategy, see Lau 1965.

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When Liu Bei is finally admitted to see the reluctant Zhuge Liang, he reveals the great aspirations which he is, as yet, incapable of effecting: "The House of Han is collapsing; treacherous Uian] ministers are stealing its mandate. I lack the necessary measure of strength, but I want to restore great rectitude throughout the empire. But my knowledge [zhi] is too shallow and my art [shu] too short" (SGYY 38, 1.487).60 Liu Bei seeks Zhuge Liang's arts and wisdom (zhi shu) and asks for a plan (ji) to help realize these aspirations. Zhuge Liang responds that a powerful foe such as Cao Cao can only be defeated by strategy (mou). Liu Bei's recruitment of Zhuge Liang reflects a series of parallel legends in which a ruler is able to recognize and acquire the services of a sage "founding minister." This figure is typically not of the royal line and is distinguished by merit, rather than hereditary prerogative. In these legends, the ruler raises up the minister from poverty, lowly origins, and an occupation as some kind of craftsman and gives him the power of government. The minister, who is typically associated with military strategy, brings about a period of peace and justice within his influence. Thus Shun (variously a farmer, potter, or fisherman) is raised up by Yao. Yi Yin (a cook or recluse) is attracted by Tang and helps him establish the Shang dynasty. Taigong Wang (a fisherman, boatman, or recluse) is found by Wen Wang and helps his son Wu Wang defeat the Shang and establish the Zhou dynasty. 61 Zhuge Liang is presented as a farmer. Taigong Wang and Zhuge Liang in particular are associated with the use of strategy (mou). In the legends associated with strategy, the hero typically owes his remarkable abilities to esoteric instruction by an "extraordinary individual," often a Taoist. 62 Such figures include the Yellow Emperor, Zhang Liang, Su Qin, and Taigong Wang. In most cases, this instruction is in the form of a magical text, usually a 60This passage is a direct quotation from SGZ 35.912. It is noteworthy that the Romance consistently takes its assessment of Zhuge Liang from this text, yet all but ignores the Sanguo zhi's positive assessment of Cao Cao, for which see also SGZ 1.54-55· 61 See Allan 1981.45-46 and Henry 1987. SGYY 65, 2.827 presents a contrasting example of the importance of being able to use something: "Although the plan UiJ is malevolent, Liu Zhang will not be able to put it to use [yong]." 62It is noteworthy that many of the strategists mentioned by the Romance are explicitly described as Taoist adepts. These include Zhuge Liang, Pang Tong, Xu Shu, and Shui Jing. Sun Quan's strategus, the envious and scheming Zhou Yu, is notably not one.

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bingfa, or work of military strategy. In the case of Zhuge Liang, a legend associates him with the use of gunpowder:

When it came to the time of the Three Kingdoms we saw the rise of many tactician-advisors and great soldiers. Tshao Tshao [Cao Cao] with villainous might controlled the central part of the empire, while Sun Chhtlan [Sun Quan], inheriting from his father and elder brother, firmly occupied the eastern part of the empire around the Yangtze River. No one else could match their power. At that time, when the 'Crouching Dragon' (i.e., Chuko Liang [Zhuge Liang]) was farming in Nanyang, without any desire to seek fame, he met an extraordinary man who secretly taught him the use of fire in warfare and the tac_tics of battle formations. Then, touched by the sincerity of the First Ruler (of the Shu Han Kingdom, i.e., Liu Bei), who thrice visited him, he exerted every ounce of his strength to serve him. 63 Zhuge Liang's sudden commitment to Liu Bei bridges Confucian public and Taoist private world views through the idea that any sage must follow a worthy ruler in the rare event one should emerge. 64 Zhuge Liang's complete lack of personal ambition is quintessentially Taoist, but he has the Confucian devotion to public duty, loyalty, and commitment to a true ruler. Before leaving Nanyang (chapter 38), Zhuge Liang instructs his brother to keep the farm and not let it go to ruin. He clearly indicates that he intends to return after the war when his work is fmished. This attitude is reminiscent of the arguments and behavior of the Strategies ofthe Warring States minister Cai Ze, who ended a successful career by knowing when to withdraw from power and how not to overstep the bounds ofprudence (ZGC 5.211-21, Crump 131-36). But when Zhou Yu sends Zhuge Liang's brother, Zhuge Jin, to persuade him to leave Liu Bei and come over to Sun Quan, Zhuge Liang affirms his duty (yr) as a follower of Han to serve the rightful Han scion. He puts his obligations within the public sphere above every private interest and rejects his brother's appeals to fraternal love (SGYY 44, 2. 567). Although Zhuge Liang initially acts correctly in remaining in seclusion at Nanyang and refraining from using his talents in the service of 63Cf. Needham I954·5-28, quoting the Fire Drake Manual. 64Mao Zonggang explains Zhuge Liang's behavior in terms of the conventional distinction between seclusion (chu) and emergence (chu). See Plaks I987.454n337·

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an unacceptable lord, he pays a high existential and moral price in that his substantial talents and loyalty go unused. Liu Bei represents a solution to this twofold dilemma by requesting his services. Liu Bei has the ability to recognize and use talent; he is also portrayed, however equivocally, as having the moral qualifications for rulership. For a Zhuge Liang, the prospect of finding his enlightened lord (ming zhu) outweighs even foreknowledge of certain defeat. Zhuge Liang's entrance into Liu Dei's futile cause is what ultimately establishes him as a tragic hero. Between his acute understanding of the personal weaknesses of his allies and his quasi-mythical magical and divinatory abilities, he can have no doubt of the outcome. In his own words: "the prediction of deeds lies in human hands; their accomplishment lies in the hands ofHeaven" (mou shi zai ren, cheng shi zai tian) (SGYY 103, 3.1329).65 The sense of tragedy that accompanies the novel results from this sense of significant human striving; Liu Bei in his doomed cause and Zhuge Liang in his fruitless commitment both emerge as tragic heroes of grandeur and futility. 66 Is Zhuge Liang's popular image of infallibility incommensurate with his successive defeats and ultimate collapse? A certain fallibility may in fact be part of what makes a metic hero. Pilgrim Sun, the metic monkey of the journey to the J#st, is as full of faults as of virtues. Another metic hero, Odysseus, makes terrible errors of judgment. It is interesting that arrogance is a character weakness of more than one metic hero; wily Odysseus owes many of his pains to his own arrogant revelation of his real name to the Cyclops. Yet we do not read the Odyssey as ironic. Like Zhuge Liang, Odysseus has no small streak of ruthlessness; it is he who brings about the slaughter at Troy (Odyssey 8.493-94). His opportunistic treatment of both Calypso (Odyssey 5.160-268) and Nausicaa (6.139-315 and 7.287-316) is open to criticism. Finally, in the punishment of the suitors and their collaborators in his household, he makes no attempt to distinguish greater and lesser guilt, despite the efforts of some of the suitors to curtail the abuse of his property and family (Odyssey 22, especially 3 1o-29 and 417-78). Odysseus's mistakes and weaknesses make him a humanly believable hero. 6 5 See Plaks I987.494. For an alternate translation of these lines, see Brewitt-Taylor 2.46I. 66Yet, as Plaks points out, we can read in the relationship of Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang an ironic discrepancy between the alleged total commitment and actualities. See Plaks I987·43 sn266.

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Semantic Field In the Romance, zhi is specifically associated both with talent (cai) and with the ability to use people, words, and objects. In phrases such as Liu Bei's "my talent is paltry and my wisdom shallow" (cai wei zhi qian) (SGYY 36, 1.466) the word learning (xue) is notably absent.67 Given the necessary brevity of chapter titles, it is noteworthy how many titles in the Romance accurately reflect the importance of zhi and its semantic field.68 These chapter titles include: chapter 32, "Xu Yu's Scheme [ji]"; chapter 33, "A Plan Ui] to Stabilize Liaodong"; chapter 36, "Liu Bei Uses a Ruse Ui) to Capture Fanzheng"; chapter 38, "Establishing a Plan [ce) for Three Kingdoms"; chapter 39, "AtJingzhou, Cheng Gongci's Son Seeks Strategic Aid [ji) Three Times"; chapter 44, "Kong Ming [Zhuge Liang) Uses Cunning [zhi] to Incite Zhou Yu; Sun Quan Provides a Plan [ji) to Oppose Cao Cao"; chapter 45, "Jiang Gan Goes into a Trap [ji]"; chapter 46, "With Ultimate Cunning [yong qi mou ], Kong Ming [Zhuge Liang) Borrows Arrows; Offering a Secret Plan Ui], Huang Gai Accepts a Punishment"; chapter 47, "Gan Ce Secretly Presents the Treacherous Letter; Pang Tong Ingeniously [qiao) Proffers the Linked Ships Strategy Ui]"; chapter so, "Zhuge Liang Foresees [zhi suan) Huayong"; chapter 52, "Zhuge Liang Cunningly [zhi] Talks to Lu Su; Zhao Yun Uses Pang Tong's Ruse Ui] to Capture Guiyang"; chapter 55, "Xuan De [Liu Bei] Cunningly [zhi] Rouses His Wife"; chapter 64, "Kong Ming [Zhuge Liang) Sets a Plan Ui] to Capture Zhangren"; chapter 70, "Fierce Zhang Fei Cunningly [zhi] Captures a Position; Old Huang Zhong Captures Tianyang Mountain by Stratagem Ui]"; chapter 72, "Zhuge Liang Captures Hanzhong by Cunning [zhi]"; chapter 84, "Kong Ming [Zhuge Liang] Ingeniously (qiao) Sets the Eightfold Maze"; chapter 89, "Kong Ming's [Zhuge Liang's] Fourth Success Using a Ruse [yong ji]"; chapter 92, "Zhuge Liang Captures Three Cities by Cunning [zhi]"; chapter IOI, "Going towardJiange, Zhang Ho Falls into a Trap [zhong ji]"; chapter ros, "Zhuge Liang's Brocade Bag Plan UiJ''; chapter 108, "Sun Xun Exercises a Secret [murderous) Plan 67 A

similar phrase (cai shu zhi qian) occurs at SGYY 85, 3.I085, Brewitt-Taylor

2.264. 68 By accurate, I mean chapter titles that reflect the material within the text and thus provide an accurate indication of the importance of the title to the entire chapter. For a discussion of the need to disregard chapter titles that do not accurately reflect content, see Lau 1965.322-25.

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at a Banquet"; chapter 109, "The Han General Uses Indirect Strategy [qi mou) to Surround Sima Yi"; chapter 113, "Ding Feng Makes a Plan UiJ to Kill Sun Chen"; chapter 119, "A Subtle Scheme [qiao ji]"; chapter 120, "An Old Man Offers a New Plan [mou)" (SGYY I-9). Both the chapter titles cited above and the quotations from the text itself abound in a variety of words for various aspects of prudent foresightedness, practical intelligence, and cunning. Etymologically, these words fall into two rough groups. A first group is the positive semantic field of metic intelligence. It consists of laudatory expressions for wisdom, cunning, or foresightedness. Their etymologies involve the notions of language, ordering, connecting, binding, and clear-sightedness. Several signifies are typical of the graphs for this group oflaudatory terms. Under the "word" (yan) and "mouth" (kou) radicals, we find: zhi (wisdom, knowledge), mou (plan, strategy), ji (plan, calculation), and shi (to recognize). Other terms in this group use weaving as an ordering metaphor: wei (to plan or arrange), zhang (to calculate or plan), chou (to bind, connect, or plan), and tiao (to harmonize or adjust). Other expressions within this positive semantic field are ce (plan), chou (calculate, combine), qiao (artful), suan (plan), guan (discern), and qi (uncanny). A second group of entirely derogatory words for cunning stand in strong contrast to the semantic field of zhi. Their emphasis is on animality, underhandedness, deceit, and cunning in its most negative aspects. Under "woman" (nu), we findjiao (clever, cunning) andjian (treacherous); under "dog" (quan), we find hua (cunning); and under "ape" (yuan), we have wei (false, counterfeit). The semantic field of the Romance offers a curious combination of Confucian terminology and the technical terminology of the Sunzi. It uses such Confucian terms as zhi, ren, and yi, but also the valueneutral military terminology of the Sunzi. Thus Zhuge Liang is described on the one hand as wise (zhi), on the other as wily (duo mou). He is committed to duty (yi) but also to strategy (ji). He is learned (xue) but crafty (jue), talented (cai) but deceptive (gui). These etymologies are treated at further length in the Appendix. In its repeated contrasts between heroes of force and heroes of guile, the Romance both examines the respective roles of force and guile and implicitly raises the question of whether straightforwardness is a necessary part of honor. As the varied assessments of

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Zhuge Liang make all too clear, this question has not ceased to vex commentators. Despite its depiction of the hybrid figure of Zhuge Liang, the Romance does not present a conceptual category that embraces Confucian zhi, Taoist zhi, and Militarist zhi. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that metic intelligence is an important factor in the construction of the fictionalized characters that distinguish the Romance from its historical sources. The perspective of metic intelligence offers two explanations of the traditional critiques as artifacts of the tradition's perceived need either to moralize cunning or to condemn it through its respective characterization of two metic figures, Zhuge Liang and Cao Cao, as hero and villain. As Su Shi remarks, the difference between Zhuge Liang and Cao Cao is actually negligible. 69 To those commentators for whom it is possible to moralize cunning and to incorporate its abilities into the social order, Zhuge Liang emerges as the moralized metic hero, with Cao Cao as his opposite number, the cunning villain. For those, on the other hand, who make no compromises with qiao yan, even Zhuge Liang is unacceptable. Both positions more-or-less take Zhuge Liang's efficacy for granted, however. The text is centrally concerned with strategy, specifically the strategic principles of the Sunzi. Although it represents Zhuge Liang in the image of a legendary Warring States period strategist-general, the Romance differs from the Sunzi in its highly concrete treatment of principles that in the Sunzi are abstract and in its more developed concern with particular psychological knowledge as an aspect of strategy. In the next chapter I shall consider the question of whether the Buddhist notion of "skillful means" (fang bian) provides a conceptual category related to metic intelligence that can reconcile Confucian moral imperatives with the Taoist and Militarist emphasis on illusion, adaptation, and flexibility. 69 See

ZLL 18.72, as cited in Plaks 1987.447ll313.

CHAPTER

7

The Journey to the West

The problem of metic intelligence bears implicitly on the characters, themes, and narrative structure of the Xiyou ji or the Journey to the J#st. This account of a pilgrimage to India to bring Buddhist scriptures back to China centers around the exploits of a pointedly metic character, the monkey~pilgrim Sun Wukong, who enjoys a special, privileged, and humorous relationship with the bodhisattva Guan Yin, whose strategies and designs ultimately direct the pilgrimage. Sun Wukong, also known simply as "Monkey," provides a strong figural contrast to the Buddhist monk Xuan Zang, also called Tripitaka, who is the ostensive leader of the scripture pilgrims. Metic ability figures prominently in both the character and interventions of Monkey and in the pattern of the narrative as a whole. The themes of deceit, reversal, and illusion recur both in the stratagems Monkey and Guan Yin employ to deliver the scripture pilgrims from a variety of demons that repeatedly beset them and in the accounts of the natures of these demons. The abilities associated with metic intelligence are crucial to both the broader and narrower notions of attainment within the work, regardless of whether we read the Journey to the West simply as a profoundly humorous work or read it as a Buddhist, Taoist, or NeoConfucian allegory of quest and self-cultivation. The text demonstrates a repeated pattern of action in which their lack of metic characteristics catches the scripture pilgrims in a series of traps. The metic interventions of Monkey or spirits summoned by him rescue the pilgrims from trial after trial.

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On the Buddhist side of the allegory, the qualities of metic intelligence are particularly pertinent to the notion of upaya or "skillful means." This Sanskrit term conveys an unambiguously positive view of the appropriate use of metic qualities. This view stands in contrast both to the Greek tradition, which presents some ambivalence about metis in its more cunning aspects, and to the Chinese tradition, which is extremely ambivalent about the exercise of cunning intelligence per se and has no one word to denote the qualities that in Greek are defined by metis. As Bernard Faure observes, the stress on "skillful means" (upaya) of early Chan and later Zen Buddhism "reminds us of something that the Western tradition has neglected since it chose Platonician idealism against the practical wisdom or metis of the early Greeks. The Zen ideal type (Han-shan, Pu-tai), like Odysseus, is a kind of trickster, fond of riddles and always ready to seize the opportunity."!

The XiyouJi Written in the late sixteenth century, probably by Wu Chengen, the Xiyou ji, or the Journey to the West, is considered one of the classic novels of Chinese literature. Loosely based on the seventh-century scripture pilgrimage to India of the Buddhist monk Xuan Zang (586664 C. E.), it avails itself of long-standing literary and popular traditions. Historical sources for the Journey to the West include Xuan Zang's own Great Tang Record of the Western Territories (Da Tang xi yu ji) and biographical sections in the Tang dynastic histories (Jiu Tang shu xuan zang zhuan). Unlike the Romance, where the author at least appears to try to construct his characters on some basis in attested fact, the Journey to the West seems to disregard history almost completely. The hero of the Journey to the West is not the historical Tripi taka but a totally mythical character, Pilgrim Sun Wukong, the monkey-king. This protagonist is wily, willful, and ingenious. The Journey to the West chronicles both the development and humanization of Sun Wukong and the methods by which the bodhisattva Guan Yin wins over this master of both Taoist magic and all the arts of cunning.

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These two characters, both antagonists and foils to each other, indicate the broad spectrum of action possible to this cast of mind. Sun Wukong treats the reader to a vivid picture of perverse wisdom at its nastiest. Guan Yin, on the other hand, employs both insight and guile in the service of the highest compassion. For all their differences, the use of practical and cunning intelligence is an important factor in the curious relationship between the all-powerful bodhisattva and the rebellious monkey spirit. It is especially noteworthy that the Journey to the West portrayal of Tripitaka deviates significantly from the historical account of an especially resourceful and famous Buddhist cleric. This mythicized Tang monk is almost the exact opposite of the historical Xuan Zang; the character is generally uncomprehending, weak, and full of doubt. It is Pilgrim Sun who emerges as the teacher and guide to Tripitaka. In this discussion I rely solely upon the hundred-chapter version of the text. First published in 1592, it bears only a tenuous relationship to the historical version. It is usually attributed to Wu Chengen on the basis of a bibliographical entry in a gazetteer from Huaian prefecture dated 1648, but this attribution is not without question. There is also some scholarly controversy over the relationship of the hundredchapter Xi you ji and two shorter accounts, the forty-chapter Complete Biography of San Zang's Career, attributed to Yang Zhihe (San zang chu shen quan zhuan), and the Chronicle of Deliverances in Tripitaka Tang's Journey to the West, attributed to Zhu Dingchen (Tang san zang xi you shi ni zhuan).2 Whatever its relation to its antecedents, several important features put the hundred-chapter narrative in a different literary and philosophical class than any preceding redactions. A variety of incidental verse and philosophical terminology has been added to the text, including Taoist terminology and sixteenth century Nco-Confucian critical terminology.3 There are also a number of important formal aspects to the hundred-chapter version, which include symmetrical composition, puns, irony, and what Andrew Plaks calls figural densi2For an excellent discussion of the origins of the Xiyou ji, see Yu 1977 r. 1-36. For the textual history of the narrative, see Dudbridge 1970. For a critical discussion of the conventional dating and attribution of the text, see Plaks 1987.183-199. 3Plaks points out that the Taoist terminology in the Xiyouji conforms to that oflate Song-Yuan Taoism and the school of Qiu Chuji. See Plaks 1987.183-202. For a discussion of the importance of incidental verse in the one hundred chapter version, see Yu 1972.879-97.

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ty-the contrasting recurrence of characters and landscapes. A significant restructuring of the narrative puts the story of the monkey king at the beginning of the book. The miniature odyssey of Monkey within the first eight chapters of the book creates a structural model for its remainder, and the work divides neatly into two parts. The overall effect is a contrived symmetry that links the beginning and end of the work. 4 Traditional Chinese scholarship has interpreted the Journey to the ~st as a manual for self-cultivation in Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian terms. These readings stress respectively the text's explicit associations with Buddhism; its extensive use of Taoist yin-yang and FivePhase (wu-xing) alchemical language; and its allegorical repres.entation of such Confucian doctrines as self-cultivation (xiu sheng), the study of mind (xin xu e), the manifestation of virtue (ming de), and rectification of mind (zheng xin). Other scholars, notably Hu Shi, have preferred to reject an allegorical reading and read the Journey to the West as a "book of ... profound nonsense," centered around the efforts of the "Mind-Monkey" who, as the Buddhist Pilgrim Sun Wukong, uses Taoist magic, infinite cunning, and the special protection of the bodhisattva Guan Yin to guide the scripture pilgrimage of the monk Tripitaka to India. s Other recent scholarship has focused on the Journey to the West as an allegory of the process of enlightenment, or as a quest for homecoming and personal salvation. Plaks has described it as an attempt to allegorize the process of enlightenment in Neo-Confucian terms in which the quest is essentially one of the mind and the locus of the mind is the monkey-king.6 Alternatively, Anthony Yu has stressed the complex alchemical symbolism that permeates the novel, wherein physiological Taoist alchemy can be viewed as a process of returnretracing one's physiological and temporal steps to reverse the process of physical decay. 7 Allegorical readings are supported by the presence of both philosophical terminology and allegorical figures in the names and epithets attached to fictional characters, especially the use of the term "monkey of the mind" (xin yuan) to refer to Monkey. Plaks 1987.202-16. Hu Shi's preface to Waley 1943.5. 6See Plaks 1987 and Plaks 1977.175 and r8r. 7 See Yu 1987.126-3 r, Lao r6, and Needham 1954·5·57-58. Since Tripitaka and his disciples have all fallen away from previous, superior celestial existences, their journey to the Buddha is a return home on a literal level. 4 See

5 See

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Monkey Monkey is a creature of nature who becomes assimilated into the human world, in which he undertakes a quest wherein he battles other nonhuman creatures (demons) and realizes great attainments in ways that differ profoundly from the ostensive purpose of the quest. Monkey's nonhuman origins and mentality provide strong figural contrasts with Tripitaka, Guan Yin, and the demons he battles. These contrasts expressed through fictional characters provide a fictional portrait of Monkey's unmoralized metic intelligence undergoing transformation. The first eight chapters present the monkey-king in his original and unrefined state, a stone monkey born from an immortal embryo. Immediately able to walk, run, and leap about, he associates with animals and eats wild fruits (Yu 1.68). He first distinguishes himself from the other monkeys by discovering the Water-Curtain Cave, whereupon he becomes the Handsome Monkey King. Entirely a product of natural forces, he initiates a harmonious, if insouciant, reign. It is noteworthy that Monkey embodies, seemingly without effort, many of the qualities ascribed to the sage-ruler by both Confucius and Laozi. He benefits (li min) and transforms (hua min) his people by the force of his example. a In establishing the "utopian" kingdom at Flower Fruit Mountain, he seems to meet goals of both Taoist and Confucian views of the ideal ruler who "acts without acting" (wu wei). His subjects live in a state of unregulated happiness and harmony with nature that corresponds closely to the view of the ideal government and human nature expressed in the Laozi, yet it is monkeys, not humans, who effortlessly live in this exemplary state. Monkey's extraordinary abilities include indirection, mastery of illusion, cunning, flexibility, and speed, and mark him as a metic character, but other qualities make him a most unlikely exemplar of zhi. From a Confucian perspective, he lacks the moral sensibility of the sage; he is deceitful, dishonest, amoral, and too devoted to cunning tricks. The emphasis of the Journey to the West upon Monkey, rather than Tripitaka, implicitly underscores the metic intelligence that is his hallmark. Monkey's character and interventions are marked by the 8for a discussion of these concepts, see Ames 1983.99-I05.

I

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special perceptiveness, ingenuity, adaptability, and cunning that Detienne and Vernant associate prominently with the figures of mitis. As Monkey remarks of his own special gifts of perception, "I, old Monkey, can with this pair of fiery eyes and diamond pupils discern good and evil" (XY] 1.465, Yu 2.242).9 On the one hand, he is not deceived by illusions; on the other, he is expert at perpetrating them. His perspicacity includes two abilities: discerning perception (guan) and the spontaneous use (yong) of its results. This efficacious clearsightedness helps him to see through the illusions that beguile others and to act effectively and quickly where others cannot. Some of Monkey's perceptions are matters of simple observation; he typically remarks on what others fail to notice. For example, in chapter I, he notices the woodcutter who leads him to the Taoist hermitage by "looking about carefully" (XYJ I. 8, Yu I. 77). By coincidence, Monkey's "fiery eyes and diamond pupils" are described as gold or "metal-colored" (XYJ 1. I66, Yu 1. 3 I6). to Metal colored eyes are the stock epithet of another cunning character, "Athena of the glinting [metal-colored] eyes fglaukopis Athena]" (Iliad 1.206, 2. I65, and I0.482). Throughout the narrative, Pilgrim Sun displays this ability to create illusions but not be taken in by them. A more important aspect of his perspicacity is his ability to ferret out the true identity of the demons who beset the scripture pilgrimage at every turn. It is he who typically reveals the true identity of a demon, which in turn permits its eventual mastery. These abilities combine in chapter 65, when the pilgrims arrive at what seems to be Thunderclap Monastery, the abode of the Buddha. Pilgrim Sun makes the ordinary observation that the characters above the gate say "Small Thunderclap Monastery." In addition, he perceives an "aura of violence" about the place and recognizes that the Buddha seated at the head of its meditation hall is in reality a demon. Monkey also has special perception in a deeper sense that is reminiscent of the "great knowledge" of the Taoist sage. It is he who realizes that the pilgrims have reached their goal: '"Master,' said Pilgrim, 'you insisted on bowing down even in a specious region, before false images of Buddha. Today you have arrived at a true region with real images of Buddha, and you still haven't dismounted. What's your 9 0ther references to "having perception" occur at XYJ 1.459, Yu 2.233 and XY] 1.461, Yu 2.236. tOThis phrase also appears at XYJ 1.465, Yu 2.242.

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excuse?'" (Yu 98, 4.380). It is also Pilgrim Sun who reveals the significance of the journey to his companions. When Tripitaka asks Monkey the cause of a storm that has lasted all night, he replies, panting heavily: "Master, you don't seem to understand ... that when we escorted you to acquire these scriptures, we had, in fact, robbed Heaven and Earth of their creative powers. For our success meant that we could share the age of the universe; like the light of the sun and moon, we would enjoy life everlasting for we had put on an incorruptible body. Our success, however, had also incurred the envy of Heaven and Earth, the jealousy of both demons and gods, who wanted to snatch away the scriptures from us" (Yu 99, 4.406). In addition to his perspicacity, Pilgrim Sun is generously endowed with magical powers, for the most part stolen from Taoist heaven. These qualities frequently come into play in the context of conflict, usually with a stronger agent. Monkey displays a penchant for deception and a remarkable adroitness in his use of vision and magic. It is this combination that defines him as a character of metis. As Detienne and Vernant remark of the figure of metis: "confronted with a multiple, changing reality whose limitless polymorphic powers render it almost impossible to seize, he can only dominate it ... if he proves himself to be even more multiple, more mobile, more polyvalent than his adversary."11 In this sense, metis is an absolute weapon, because it can ensure victory under any circumstances, even (especially) in a confrontation with a stronger foe. 12 Pilgrim Sun's use of magic is marked more by ingenuity than by brute force. For example, transformation magic is a stock-in-trade of the demons that beset the pilgrimage, but Pilgrim Sun displays a special ingenuity in its use. In a typical incident in chapter 65, the false Buddha demon imprisons him in a pair of golden cymbals that themselves use transformation magic to accommodate Monkey's attempts to escape by changing size and are impenetrable by either his own magic or that of the deities he summons to his aid: the Guardians of Five Quarters, the Six Gods of Light and Six Gods of Darkness, the Eighteen Guardians of Monasteries. These appeal to the Jade Emperor, who sends the Twenty-Eight Constellations to Monkey's aid. When the tip of the horn of the dragon constellation proves able to penetrate the cymbals, Monkey transforms his rod into a drill, drills a 11 Detienne and Vernant 1978.5. 12for a discussion of this point, see Detienne and Vemant 1978.13.

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hole in the horn, transforms himself to the size of a mustard seed, and escapes by embedding himself in the dragon's horn (Yu 3.24346).13 In the ensuing battles with the false Buddha demon, Pilgrim Sun escapes the demon's all-encompassing wrap through efficacious perception, not magic. His keen eyes and mind discern the demon's wrap and perceive its threat; his speed and adroitness vault him away in time. Yet when he proves unable to best this opponent by force or ordinary methods, Pilgrim Sun resorts again to magic and guile. He transforms himself into a delicious melon and overcomes the monster by causing indigestion. In short, he accomplishes by polymorphism and trickery what he could not do in open battle. In the Cobra Monster episode (chapter 67), Pilgrim Sun again uses guile where he cannot prevail by sheer force. Observing that the creature he and Idiot are fighting cannot speak, he realizes it must be strongly yin, and so deliberately draws out the battle until dawn in order to weaken it by exposure to the yang energy of the rising sun. Feigning defeat, Pilgrim Sun then allows himself to be eaten, again destroying the demon from within and delivering a grateful village. Like Zhuge Liang, Pilgrim Sun excels in "meeting plot with plot." Three episodes illustrate this quality in Pilgrim: the Bear Monster in chapter 17, the magic gourd in chapter 33, and the dharma-destroying king in chapter 84. In the Bear Monster episode, the first trial in which Guan Yin appears as the pilgrims' deliverer, she holds Monkey responsible for the pilgrims' difficulty: "It was all because you had the presumption, you wretched ape, to show off your treasure to sinister people. Moreover, you had your share of evildoing when you called for the wind to intensify the fire" (Yu 17, 1.361). She proceeds, however, to become his partner in deception when he proposes a clever plan that avoids violent combat: "I, Wukong have a saying: plot should be met with plot Uiangjijiuji]. I don't know whether you will listen to me or not." "If you will listen to me, I'll give you a plan which will dispense with weapons and do away with combat." . . . "This monkey is pretty clever with his tongue!" said the Bodhisattva laughing. "Hardly!" said Pilgrim. (Yu 17, 1.362) 13for an opposing view of Monkey as a character ofbrute force, see Lin and Schulz 1978.15-16.

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Guan Yin proceeds to take the form of the Taoist, and Monkey turns into one of his two magic pills in order to be eaten by, and then vanquish, the demon. In chapter 33, Monkey deceives the demons who have stolen Laozi's treasures and disguised them as a magic gourd and a jade vase. Pilgrim Sun creates yet another illusory gourd, even more powerful than theirs, and uses their own trick to trick them into a trade. In chapter 84, he bests the dharma-destroying king, who has sworn to kill ten thousand Buddhist priests, by shaving both ruler and subjects bald during the night. By transforming the king into an apparent object of his own violence, Pilgrim turns the false consciousness of the king against itself. These incidents illustrate principles of strategy similar to those used by Zhuge Liang, who relies on superior perception, magic, strategy, speed, and ingenuity rather than force or physical heroism. In particular, the incidents are reminiscent of Zhuge Liang's use of the strategic principles of the empty and the solid (xu xu shi sh1), meeting plot with plot (jiang ji jiu ji), and, more generally, turning the energy of an enemy against itself. A curious turn to his characteristic swiftness is Monkey's inability to be still. In the Cart-slow Kingdom episode (chapter 46), he demurs from a contest of meditation: I'm quite capable of performing such difficult feats as kicking down Heaven or overturning wells, stirring up oceans or upending rivers, carrying mountains or chasing the moon, and altering the course of stars and planets. I'm not afraid, in fact, of even having my head split open or cut off, of having my stomach ripped open and my heart gorged out, or of any such strange manipulations. But if you ask me to sit and meditate, I'll lose the contest even before I begin! Where could I, tell me, acquire the nature to sit still? Even if you were to chain me to an iron pillar, I would still try to climb up and down. I can never manage to sit quietly and unmoved. (Yu 2.337)14

Unlike Zhuge Liang, Monkey is fonny. He disrupts most of staid Taoist heaven and finally steals Laozi's elixir. He urinates on Buddha's finger, pawns urine off as "holy water," and gives a king a medical t4The image of Odysseus bound to the mast of his ship and struggling under the influence of the Sirens' song comes readily to mind here, as do the opening lines of Odyssey.

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compound containing horse urine. The Journey to the ~st emphasizes this irreverence by its complete contrast to the behavior of Tripitaka, whose Confucian-like solemnity only offsets the humor of the other characters. An innately humorous aspect of cunning intelligence seems to be one of the broad sources of the humor in the Journey to the ~st. This possibility is best explored by comparing Pilgrim Sun with his more serious-minded counterpart, the Tang Monk. Xuan Zang-perhaps the most famous Buddhist cleric in Chinese history-was intelligent, brave, and resolute. His knowledge oflndian languages and geography, his defiance of the imperial prohibition against his journey, and his endurance of appalling hardships in order to reach his goal all testify to a rare combination of intelligence, resilience, and determination. In the novel, however, Xuan Zang is weak, benighted, irresolute, and incapable. Monkey, by contrast, retains the perceptiveness, ingenuity, and adaptability of the original Tripitaka, magnified to the point of caricature and oddly combined with an amoral selfishness.ts This image of the historical Xuan Zang reinforces the difference between Tripitaka's mental sluggishness and single-minded piety and Monkey's perceptiveness and acumen. Unlike Monkey, who possesses extraordinary gifts of perception, Tripitaka is obtuse. His complete inability to discern the false identities of demons and spirits brings about many of the trials of the quest. He fails to recognize the spirit ofPotalaka mountain (chapter 15), the deadly Red Child (chapter 40), and the demon of the false "Thunderclap Monastery" (chapter 65), where "The green-eyed Monkey knew both false and real. But Zen Spirit [Tripitaka] bowed, eyeing a golden form" (Yu 3.234). Tripitaka's obtuseness is an important source for the humor of the novel. For example, in chapter 1 5 he is completely nonplussed at the sudden disappearance of an old man, who is actually the local spirit of Potalaka Mountain. Even the narrator comments on his maladroitness. "Look at him! All he could do was to kowtow toward the sky without bothering to count how many times! By the side of the road the Great Sage Sun reeled with laughter, the Handsome Monkey King broke up with hilarity. He came up and tugged at his master, 15 As Anthony Yuhas pointed out, this deviation from the details of history in an account of so famous a chapter of Chinese religious history is an inventive design of the author, which invests his work with a more intricate network of religious significance. See Yu 1987.1I8-25.

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saying, 'Master, get up! He is long gone! He can't hear you, nor can he see your kowtowing' " (Yu 1. 328). Tripitaka's failure to observe accurately comes in part from an attitude of mind that prefers the abstract and general knowledge of texts to actual observation of events. He is aghast when, in the Scarlet Purple Kingdom episode (chapter 68), Monkey passes himself off as a physician and undertakes to cure an ailing king. Tripitaka protests that Monkey is ignorant of the classics of medicine. Monkey argues that medicine begins with "looking and asking." His diagnosis from the emperor's pulse and his seemingly outrageous prescription of a compound including charcoal and horse-urine accord with the principles of acupuncture and traditional medicine. Not content with a cure for the immediate symptoms, he determines and attempts to cure the ultimate cause of the emperor's illness by bringing back the abducted empress. He uses cunning illusions to enter the monster's dwelling, to enlist the cooperation of the lady, and to substitute impotent copies for the demon's magic weapons. A figural contrast between Monkey and Tripitaka thus pervades the Journey to the West. It is Monkey, not Tripitaka, who comes to act with real discernment and real compassion; Tripitaka bears the name "Zen Spirit," but Monkey is Zen Spirit in action. Monkey, not Tripitaka, emerges as teacher and guide. He invokes the Heart Sutra to recall the quest to the benighted Tripitaka, vanquishes demons, works cures, and repeatedly rescues both his own companions and others they meet along the way. The first fifty chapters of the Journey to the ~st show the humanization and transformation of a character whose main initial quality is zhi. Monkey successively becomes a quasi-human, a Taoist adept, a Buddhist pilgrim, and finally "the great sage equal to heaven." At first, however, his zhi is not integrated into the moral order and he literally rises against heaven. Monkey and Guan Yin use their gifts in very different ways. Guan Yin's wisdom, for all its opportunistic use of cunning and deceit, is ultimately compassionate; Monkey's equally adroit intellect is used in the service of self-interest. Pilgrim Sun typically uses his formidable powers of observation in the service of thievery. In chapter 5, he wants to sample the fruits of the Garden of Immortal Peaches but finds himself too well attended by its other stewards. He "devises a plan" (she yi ji) on the spur of the moment to distract their attention and steal the fruit (XYJ 1.49, Yu 5,

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1. 136). He uses cunning and deception to acquire knowledge and power by illicit means, such as his theft of the elixir from Laozi's furnace. Beguiling the Great Immortal of Naked Feet, the monkeyking takes his form and disrupts the Peach Festival in heaven; fleeing from his own mayhem he comes upon the elixir of Laozi and cannot help stealing it too (Yu 1. 139-41). Another key relationship in the Journey to the ~st is the uneasy alliance between Monkey and Guan Yin. It is not surprising for Guan Yin to excel in extraordinary perception, but in the Journey to the ~st she presents an uncharacteristically wily and even martial aspect that corresponds to Monkey's qualities of cunning and resourcefulness.t6 She uses upaya, skillful means, to transform Pilgrim Sun and prevails against his selfish and amoral cunning by turning it against him. Like Monkey, Guan Yin makes ample use of a combination of foresight and legerdemain, however tempered by her infinite compassion. The master strategist for the scripture pilgrimage, she deploys Tripitaka's four companions-to-be well in advance of the journey (chapters 7-8), and (if chapter 9 is authentic) also arranges for the birth and preservation of Xuan Zang, the eventual Tripitaka (Yu 1.203). Relying on the inability of people to discern illusion from reality, she uses the guise of a ftlthy old monk to gain an imperial audience and test the intentions and piety of both the emperor and Tripi taka so that she can introduce the issue of the Great Vehicle and the need for the scripture pilgrimage (see Yu, 1.268-72 and 276). Only after accomplishing all this as a beggar-monk does she reveal herself in the epiphany of Guan Yin, in which form she receives the homage of the people. When Tripitaka cannot control Monkey, Guan Yin disguises herself as an old woman, presents Tripitaka with a cap for his errant disciple, and teaches him the use of "true words for controlling the mind" with which to compel Monkey's obedience. Unable to remove the magical cap, Monkey is controlled by pain whenever Tripitaka secretly recites the "tight fillet spell." When Tripi taka first uses the spell (chapter 14), Monkey is quick to guess the truth: "You needn't say anything more! The old woman had to be that Kuan-shih-yin! Why did she want me to suffer like this? I'm going to South Sea to beat her up!" (Yu 1.313-14). When they meet in chapter 15: 16For

the imagery and iconography of Guan Yin, see Yu 1988 and 1990.

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[Pilgrim] jumped quickly into the air and yelled at her: "You so-called Teacher of the Seven Buddhas and the Founder of the Faith of Mercy! Why did you have to use your tricks to harm me?" "You impudent stableman, ignorant red-buttocks!" said the Bodhisattva. "I went to considerable effort to fmd a scripture pilgrim, whom I carefully instructed to save your life. Instead of thanking me, you are finding fault with me. You even taught him this so-called 'Tight-Fillet Spell' which he recites again and again, causing endless pain in my head! You haven't harmed me indeed!" The Bodhisattva laughed and said, "Oh, Monkey! You are neither attentive to admonition nor willing to seek the fruit of truth." (Yu 1.321-22) Guan Yin uses cunning and deception to contain Monkey but also to transform his personality. His unconcealed resentment gives way to the camaraderie of like-minded allies as he recognizes and responds to her use of his own bag of tricks. For all the humor in the arguments between Guan Yin and Monkey, she rarely misses the opportunity for a serious lesson. For example, when she transforms herself into the false Bear Monster in chapter 17, Monkey cries, "Marvelous, Marvelous! Is the monster the Bodhisattva or is the Bodhisattva the monster?" She laughs and replies: "the Bodhisattva, and the monster-they all exist in a single thought, for originally they are nothing" (Yu 1. 362-63). The "Red Boy" episode (chapters 40-42) presents a more martial example of Guan Yin's capacity for cunning and strategy. The Red Boy, like both Monkey and Guan Yin, is both discerning and deceptive. Red Boy is able to deceive Zhu Bajie with the form of a false Guan Yin (chapter 41) because he lacks the ability to "distinguish the true from the false; like foolish men of the world, he regarded all images as real Buddhas!" (Yu 2.260). Guan Yin turns his own trick against him and persuades him to sit on her "Lotus Platform," which is in reality the swords of the Twelve Constellations. As she did Monkey, she wins Red Boy over by beating him at his own game; it is by outwitting him that she converts him into her disciple, the Boy of Goodly Wealth. Thus we find in Guan Yin the same use of transformation, illusion, and outright deception that is Monkey's modus operandi. In Monkey, it is both his greatest strength and most serious weakness. In Guan Yin, it is entirely efficacious. Although Monkey needs no instruction from anyone in the arts of deception and guile, Guan Yin is able to

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teach him the compassionate and truly humane (as opposed to merely human) use ofhis cunning intelligence, and she can do so because she herself shares Monkey's mode of action. She is also his ideal teacher, and he her ideal student, because they both share the same freedom from the fetters of illusion. This allows them to approach each other very directly, and, given Monkey's personality, we can expect this straightforwardness to be not a little amusing. In short, the role that Guan Yin assumes toward Pilgrim Sun is didactic. Incidents that are on the surface simply funny are often examples of Guan Yin's pedagogical technique, directed toward Monkey but also toward the reader. Her direct interventions, with one exception, occur in the first fifty chapters: the Bear Monster episode (chapters 16-17), the ginseng episode (chapters 24-26), the subjugation of Red Boy (chapters 40-42), the Heaven-Reaching River episode (chapters 47-49), and finally the Scarlet Purple Kingdom episode (chapters 68-71). In the last case, she appears in order to save not the pilgrims but her delinquent wolf The second half of the book, marked by the crossing of the Heaven-Reaching River, is marked by the relative self-sufficiency of the pilgrimage, and especially by Pilgrim Sun's increased competence and responsibility. As Pilgrim Sun painfully learns the exercise of the compassion, efficacy, and mercy that characterize Guan Yin in the divine realm, he slowly emerges as her counterpart in this world, the active exemplar of what Tripitaka merely talks about. Guan Yin uses an opportunistic measure of guile, argument, and coercion based upon cunning traps to convert the selfish Monkey into a Buddhist saint. Her methods of thinking and acting are in complete contrast to the attitudes of the pious Tripitaka and illustrate the Buddhist dual concept of wisdom and skillful means-prajfiii (zhi) and upiiya. Guan Yin's upiiya provides an alternative to Monkey's cunning as a representation of the wily aspects of zhi. Guan Yin first subdues and then transforms Monkey by means of upiiya, because metic intelligence can be bested only by greater cunning; she thereby brings his unruly zhi into accord with the precepts of Buddhist doctrine. The notion of upiiya enlarges the conceptual vocabulary of wisdom and cunning. Here the relation between the two is more one of distinction than one of the opposition that so marks the classical Confucian and, to a lesser extent, Taoist attitudes to metic intelligence.

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The Quest The pilgrimage displays a repeated pattern of obstacle and conflict in which inattention or negligence on the part of the scripture pilgrims leads to their capture, except for Monkey, by a demon in the false form of a human, deity, half-human, or half-animal; one or more rescue attempts by Monkey, sometimes with other divine aid, and usually including a plot or trick; revelation of the true nature of the demon, and the means to its mastery; and finally the return of the pilgrims and the continuance of the journey.17 Sometimes inattention is a matter of general carelessness or lack of vigilance. At other times, the pilgrims fail to follow specific instructions correctly. Examples include the failure to obey the injunction to remain within the circle drawn by Pilgrim Sun in chapter 50 and the failure to guard specific objects adequately, for example, the monk's cassock in chapter 16 or the weapons in chapter 88. A related cause of misfortune is blindness in the face of danger. The pilgrims are repeatedly confronted with trickery through false versions of people and objects. Demons take the false forms of members of the pilgrimage (Monkey) and of deities (Guan Yin). They also manifest true and false versions of objects, such as weapons and temples. The pilgrims' blindness results in their premature bid for enlightenment in chapter 36 and in many other misfortunes. Even Monkey has a particular visual vulnerability to demonic fire, despite his overall superior vision. The demon typically exemplifies some aspect of false consciousness. It initially stalemates or defeats the scripture pilgrims, who can only prevail by discovering its true identity. When its real identity is known, its "master" can be determined and its power neutralized. The demon typically traps the pilgrims within an enclosing object from which they must escape. These traps include snares (chapters 6, 34, 50, 52, 59), girdles (chapter 22), gourds (chapters 22 and 33), sacks (chapters 25, 41, 65-66), vases or bottles (chapters 12, 26, 33, 42, 74), cymbals or bells (chapters 65, 70), boxes (chapter 84), 17Examples include chapters 27-3 I, 32-35, 40-43, 5o-52, 56-58, 59-61, 65-66, 72-73, 74-77, and 80-83. My discussion of repeating patterns in the Journey to the West is significantly indebted to the detailed analyses in Plaks 1987.245-53. For additional discussion of repeating patterns, see Campany 1986.88.

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and ingestion by the demon itself (chapters 41, 74, 77). Additional obstacles to the pilgrimage arise from attachment and disunity among the pilgrims. The pilgrims are repeatedly beset by temptations to attachment, including greed, emotional attachment, and sexual desire. In particular, Xuan Zang and the more comic Zhu Bajie display repeated vulnerability to sexual temptation; examples include the web of desire in chapter 23, and episodes in chapters 53-55, 72-73, 80-83, and 93-95. The most obvious manifestation of apathy leading to disunity (fang xin) is the two exiles of Monkey. The narrative presents several other creatures, however, who express disunity and multiplicity through an abnormal number of perceptive organs: eyes, ears, or heads. These include the six-eared macaque in chapter 58, the nineheaded son-in-law in chapter 62, and the many-eyed monster in chapter 73. When we look for common points in the pattern of obstacles the pilgrims encounter, it is noteworthy how many of these failings reduce to blindness and failure of perception, precisely a lack of metic intelligence. Its importance becomes even more apparent when we examine in detail how these obstacles are overcome. It is Monkey, the exemplar of metic intelligence in the Journey to the ~st, who directly or indirectly rescues the pilgrims from repeated obstacles to their quest. His rescues rely on the two methods of trickery and reversal. Monkey uses trickery and deception both to insinuate himself into the demon's interior and to trick it into revealing its true form. An example of the latter is his use of a mirror to reflect the true form of the six-eared macaque in chapter 58, an incident that also emphasizes the need to see through illusions. The sixeared macaque is a false double of Monkey himself; only the Buddha can tell the two apart (XYJ 2. 672, Yu 3. 128). ts Monkey's other major strategy is to reverse the demons' entrapments of the pilgrims by using their own methods against them. Demons entrap the pilgrims by taking innocent or seductive false forms; Monkey, too, assumes false forms, wherein the demons engulf him. The demons thus put Monkey in a position to attack from within. He attacks demons in such forms as a cinnabar pill (chapter 17), a peach (chapter 82), and a melon (chapters 65-66).19 Just as the 181n this passage, the true Pilgrim Sun accuses his demonic counterpart of using "crafty words" (qiao yan) to mislead his companions. 19 Note that the melon, like the gourd (hu lu), has symbolic power to encompass the

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engulfment of Monkey results in a reversal of the entrapment of the pilgrims, the revelation of the true nature of the demon is a reversal of the former blindness of the pilgrims. These two methods of deception and reversal are already familiar from the strategic principles of the Sunzi and the wily methods of Zhuge Liang.

The "Monkey-of-the-Mind" Allegory Metic intelligence figures prominently in a reading of the Journey to the West as an allegory of self-cultivation. From this viewpoint, both Monkey and the demons he battles are representations of aspects of the mind. The allegorical use of Monkey is one of the most striking features of the novel. Both chapter title couplets and other references to Monkey as the "mind-monkey" (xin yuan) identify him with the human mind as the central metaphor of the text.2o This term also appears in the phrase "the monkey of the mind and the horse of the will" (xin yuan yi ma) and occurs as both a Buddhist and late Taoist term.21 It is consistently used of the Monkey-king once he has been subdued in chapter 7, beginning with this testimonial poem.22 A monkey's transformed body weds the human mind. Mind is a monkey-this, the truth profound. The Great Sage, Equal to Heaven, is no idle thought. For how could the post of pi-ma justly show his gifts? The Horse works with the Monkey-this means both Mind and Will Must firmly be harnessed and not be ruled without. (Yu 1.168) universe. Girardot mentions the prevalence of "magic egg" stories, in which marvellous or demonic things issue from eggs or egg-shaped vessels, especially the hu lu or calabash gourd-vase. See Girardot 1983.24-26 and r8o. 20'J'he phrase xin yuan occurs in the titles of chapters 7, 14, 15, 30, 36, 41, 46, 51, 54, 75, 8r, 83, 85, and 88. See Yu r. 59f and Plaks 1987.236. 21for sources of this expression see Yu L504n109 and the Vimalakirti Sutra (translated by Kumarajiva). 220ther examples of this usage include the titles of chapter 14 ("The Monkey of the Mind Returns to the Right"), chapter 30 ("The Horse of the Will Recalls the Monkey of the Mind"), chapter 34.("The Demon King's Crafty Scheme [qiao suan] Entraps the Mind Monkey"), chapter 35 ("The Mind Monkey, Bagging Treasures, Conquers Evil Demons"), chapter 36 ("When the Mind Monkey Is Rectified, the Nidanas Cease"), and chapter 41 ("Monkey of the Mind Is Defeated by Fire").

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There are interesting resonances between the Neo-Confucian view of the personality as consisting of mind (xin), spirit (shen), and will (yt) and the Platonic view of the soul as a chariot of the will guided by the charioteer of the mind (Phaedrus 246f and 253c). Monkey is also identified with and vulnerable to the element fire. He is called the "fire monkey" (huo hou) but has a particular vulnerability to fire, as evidence by the title of chapter 41: "The Monkey of the Mind is Defeated by Fire."23 It may be a coincidence that both Monkey and Zhuge Liang share this association with fire. Nevertheless, the association of metic individuals with fire in these Chinese legends presents an interesting contrast to the ancient Greek tradition where fire is associated with the raging strength of might (hie) rather than with artifice (mitis). Gregory Nagy has shown that the association of Achilles with fire in the Iliad reflects a longer IndoEuropean tradition that includes the fires of Hephaistus, the Hundred-Hander, Zeus, and the Indian deities Vayu and Indra.24 Perhaps Monkey parallels this tradition of an antinomy between artifice and might. An allegorical reading of the Journey to the West as an account of the development of the mind reads not only Monkey, but also the demons that assail him, as representations of the mind. In the narrative pattern of the pilgrims' repeated engagements with demons, each demon typically exemplifies some aspect of false consciousness. Each escape or revelation thus becomes an account of an aspect of the mind that must be revealed, transformed, or overcome for true development to take place. Some demons make repeated appearances within the narrative; these recurring demons include Manjusri's wayward lion, the Bull Demon King, Red Boy, and the Jade Hare.zs In other cases, we see a recurring pattern of activity exemplified by a series of demons; thus demon after demon assumes an illusory identity to entrap the pilgrims, often in order to devour or otherwise incorporate them. Some demons assume false forms that appeal to desire or other forms of attachment, for example, the temptresses Baigu foren (chapter 27) and Diyongforen (chapters 82-83). The power of these demons is broken by freedom from attachment. Other demons assume the 23 For the phrase "fire monkey," see Plaks 1987.23 r. 24 See "Achilles beyond the Iliad" in Nagy 1979.321-43· 2Sfor a discussion of the reappearance of demons as an example of figural density within the journey to the West, see Plaks 1987.216-18.

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false forms of animals.26 These demons use illusions to trap the pilgrims; the key to their defeat is the discovery of their true identities either through perspicacity or through "skillful means." These cases bring into play the particularly metic skills of the mind-monkey. Or, in the terms of the analogy, metic intelligence, correctly harnessed, provides a necessary means to overcome otherwise impenetrable obstacles to self-cultivation. It is worth noting that, in this psychomachia, both the powers of "metis" and the powers of the demons are derivative. In the case of the demons, each is revealed to have a "master," for example, Manjusri, who can neutralize its power. In the case of Monkey himself, the narrative presents his powers as largely destructive until they are harnessed in the quest for self-development. This allegory of the Journey to the West as a psychomachia of the development of "mind" (xin) can be read in Confucian, Buddhist, or Taoist terms. For example, the general notion of meditation can be read as Confucian "stilling the mind" (ding xin), Buddhist "meditation" (Chan xin), or Taoist internal cinnabar (nei dan). Plaks, for example, reads the allegory as a psychomachia expressed in the terms of Ming Neo-Confucian syncretism. This reading emphasizes a common focus on self-cultivation (xiu xin) understood as the cultivation of mind (xin xue) and views cultivation of mind as the key to an interpretation of the novel as an allegory of self-cultivation.27 In this view of the ostensible quest for salvation as an actual process of cultivation of mind (xiu xin), the pilgrims meet and overcome certain obstacles. A more Taoist reading would emphasize alchemical speculations, the notion of the cultivation of internal cinnabar (nei dan) as a metaphor for a return to the root of the true self (interestingly comparable to Greek nostos),28 the prevalent use of Five-phase (wu xing) terminology, and the quest as an allegorical homecoming of return to the true inner self. On the other hand, the novel is full of Buddhist references to the problem of mind. These include the emphasis on Guan Yin, the 26These animals include foxes (chapters 34, 70), deer (chapters 45, 70, 79), tigers (chapters 13, 29, 45, and 90), lions (chapters 52 and 89-90), apes (chapters 58, 83), spiders (chapter 73), centipedes (chapter 93), a hare (chapter 95), a rhinoceros (chapter so), a panther (chapter 86), and a python (chapter 67). See Plaks 1987.217n94. 27 See Plaks 1987.228-29 and 258-73. Numerous references to Yi jing numerology reinforce this interpretation. 28Qn the ancient Greek concept of nostos "return" in the sense of "return to self," see Frame 1978.

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Heart Sutra, meditation (Chan xin), and enlightenment (ming xin). As Plaks points out, these are all terms from the Ming Taoism of the Dao zang and are traceable to the Southern Taoism oflate Song, Yuan, and to the writings of Qiu Chuji.29 The "Monkey of the Mind" is presented in Buddhist terms as a negative model ofhuman intelligence.30 According to Chan Buddhism, the mind is the source of both illusion and illumination. Thus, illusion is central both to the operation of metic intelligence and to the Buddhist view of the mind. lf the mind is the source ofboth illusion and illumination, the ability of figures of cunning intelligence to penetrate illusions-as exemplified by Pilgrim Sun, but made explicit by Guan Yin-gives a central, if tacit, role to cunning intelligence in Buddhist thought. In the journey .to the West, the expression of upaya comes through the character and interventions of Guan Yin. She uses a variety of stratagems to subdue and refine the spirit of the rebellious Monkey that are at some variance with the traditional image of Guan Yin. Both Pilgrim Sun and Guan Yin conform to the model of sage as trickster. At the same time, deceitful language is one of the dasakusala, or "ten evil things" (Yu 1.510ni8).

Conclusions Although the "Monkey of the Mind" is a negative model ofhuman intelligence in Buddhist terms, Monkey's skills are crucial to both broader and narrower notions of attainment within the work. These abilities repeatedly rescue the pilgrims and bring about the successful completion of the quest. The qualities of metic intelligence are also central to broader notions of attainment as expressed in the text by the recurring themes of illusion and reversal. In many instances of the penetration of illusion and the discovery of true nature, there is repeated use of the theme of reversal. Monkey bests literal demons and figurative illusions by means of perspicacious deceit; Guan Yin bests Monkey by the same means. What is in effect the fmal reversal occurs when the pilgrims reach their ostensive goal. They discover that the scriptures they struggled so hard to acquire are blank and that their journey has been an end 29See Plaks 1987.232. 30See Yu I.6o-6I and Dudbridge 1970.168-69. See also Plaks 1987.241.

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rather than a means to an end. Put in the language of this inquiry, the texts they seek can not contain the knowledge they seek; they attain the knowledge but at the price of belief in the efficacy of the text. We can assess the Journey to the West on a continuum that extends from myth to history by asking about the accuracy of the pattern of events it selects from the undifferentiated mass of actual or possible occurrences. As Peter Munz argues in his examination of this continuum: "When history is telescoped into myth, the myth-maker always has the object of bringing out certain features deeply characteristic of human behavior. The myth-maker feels free to select his facts from a wide sphere; he is not concerned with the literal truth of his story; but with linking facts chosen from a vast field of events into a significant whole, a concrete universal story. "31 This conception of myth as a concrete universal is especially germane to the Journey to the West, which is neither a historical novel (as are the Romance and the Shuihu zhuan) nor a purely invented one (as is theJin Ping Mei). Metic intelligence appears to be a "concrete universal" of manifest concern to the author of the Journey to the West, who centers his novel not around the illustrious and historical Xuan Zang but around Monkey. Insofar as we deem a myth to be true if it accurately portrays patterns of behavior and psychology, we can read the Journey to the West both as an allegory of self-cultivation and as a true myth of upaya. 31Munz claims that history, myths (which, undifferentiated mass of res gestae), and their patterns of events and can all be called true or inaccurate accounts of the patterns and events

like histories, select events from the modem equivalent, novels, all select false in the sense of being accurate or they select. See Munz 1956. 7·

CHAPTER 8

Heroes, Kings, and Kingmakers

In this chapter I will focus on two thematic comparisons: the theme of the hero and the relationship of two figures discernible in both the Chinese and the Greek traditions as king and kingmaker or crown-bestower. Both Greek and Chinese mythicized history record a special kind of heroism that is based on wily intelligence or metis, rather than reliance on force or physical courage. This metic intelligence entails distinctive traits of personality, modes of operation, and types of relationship. I will suggest that metic intelligence is a constitutive factor in the relations of heroes, kings, and kingmakers in both the Chinese and the Greek traditions. In the first section of the chapter, I introduce methodological problems attendant upon a comparison of two historically separate and apparently dissimilar genres: Greek epics and Chinese novels. In the second section, I review the characteristic personality traits and modes of operation associated with metic figures in the Romance and in Homeric poetry. I compare Zhuge Liang and Odysseus as heroic figures and examine their common modus operandi as heroes of metis in their respective traditions. In the third section, I examine the role of metic heroes in the establishment of kingship, specifically, the role of metic intelligence in relationships between rulers and the crownbestowers who empower them. In the Chinese case, I examine sageseeking stories and the respective fictionalized roles of ruler and minister as historical types. In the case of Greek epic, I examine the roles of ruler and warrior as epic figures.

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1 89

Tragedy in Novel and Epic The existence or nonexistence of a Chinese epic form, comparable to Homeric epic, has been a subject of some debate. t The thematic constraints of this study preclude a detailed theoretical consideration of genre issues and restrict its concerns to the more narrow problem of metic characters and metic intelligence. In this chapter, I make the heuristic proposal that the Chinese counterpart of Greek epic is the Chinese novel and its antecedents. Both the Romance and the Iliad are centrally preoccupied with kingship and statecraft, important issues in the Chinese and Greek world views. Each of these widely known and widely esteemed works embodies and transmits fundamental cultural values and gives particular emphasis to the nature and definition of heroism. In the Iliad, this emphasis takes the form of the aristeia, to be "the best of the Achaeans." As in the Romance, the problem ofheroism centers around the use of force. At issue is the Sunzi principle that the greatest general wins without fighting; the wily heroism of Zhuge Liang is continually pitted against the martial prowess of Guan Yu and Zhang Fei. Both the Romance and the Iliad are fundamentally concerned with the difficulties that arise from conflicting claims upon honor and feature significant conflicts between public and private life. Zhuge Liang and Achilles each must choose whether to retreat into private life or die in the service of public obligations. Both are centrally concerned with the effects of human weaknesses and failings. The arrogance of Agamemnon and the wrath of Achilles bring about the conflict at the core of the Iliad. The various weaknesses ofLiu Bei and his followers foredoom his attempt to reestablish the Han. A second common concern with the demands of honor is the role of oaths. The plots of both texts are driven by the fulfillment or 1 Scholarship on this subject divides broadly into those who find genuine or comparably epic elements in Chinese literature, whether or not an epic genre can be precisely defined, and those who deny the existence of Chinese epic in any form. Adherents to the former viewpoint seem to include Hu Shi, Anthony Yu, C. H. Wang, and, as may almost go without saying, this author. Wang Kuo-wei, Ch'ien Chung-shu, Jaroslav Prusek, and the classicist Sir Maurice Bowra seem to adhere to the latter approach. For discussion of this question, see Wang 1975.25-35, especially 25, which contains references to Wang Kuo-wei, Ch'ien Chung-shu, and Jaroslav Prusek. See also Yu 1972.879-97, Bowra 1952, and Johnson 1981.255-71.

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breach of oaths and obligations. The Trojan War arises from the treachery of Paris against the obligations of the host-guest relationship. The Argive kings enter the war to fulfill oaths they have contracted as former suitors of Helen. Similarly, the oath of brotherhood between Liu Bei, Guan Yu, and Zhang Fei is crucial to the outcome of the Romance, since Liu Bei essentially loses the war through his attempts to fulfill his oath to the dead Guan Yu. These two texts establish an ethically acceptable role for certain aspects of cunning and deceit. Thus Odysseus implicitly contends with Achilles over the use of guile to take Troy;2 Zhuge Liang contends with Guan Yu and Zhang Fei over the use of strategy. The Romance and the Iliad both conform to story patterns that combine historical and nonhistorical elements. Each uses the heroic figures or historical stereotypes of an earlier period, in particular, the figures of the king and the hero, and explores the difficult relations between them. In both Greek epic and Chinese historical fiction, there is an apparent tension between the presence of historical elements in epic and epic elements in history. Yet, as Albert Lord and others have shown, the mythopoetic patterns of oral poetry can absorb and reshape historical patterns.3 Finally, both works contain a strong ironic element in the form of foreknowledge of death or defeat. Achilles foresees his own death if he enters the conflict, but is powerless to avoid it once the choice is made. Similarly, Zhuge Liang foresees, but cannot avert, the tragic end of Liu Bei's cause. These thematic considerations have motivated me to use a comparative approach that differs from important recent work by contemporary scholars. David N. Keightley has taken a comparative approach to the problem of the hero by comparing the epic hero with his counterpart in the Western Zhou. My approach also contrasts with comparisons of the Western and Chinese novel qua novel, of which Plaks's Four Masterworks is the preeminent example. His focus is on irony and other rhetorical devices that are specific to the novel as a genre.4 2 This

58.

underlying theme in the Iliad (and the Odyssey) is explored in Nagy 1979.42-

3 See Lord 1960, 1968, and 1975. The problem of historicity in epic has impeded the acceptance of Dumezil's work in some quarters, for example, among Iranists. See Davidson 1985.61-148. 4 See Plaks 1987 and Keightley 1990.

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Metic Heroes of Guile The Romance accords a central place to the strategies of Zhuge Liang and to the prudent and moralized deception that constitutes his modus operandi. In Homeric epic, Odysseus and his characteristic modes of action are crucial to the denouement. These two metic figures are comparable in their use of strategy or design; foresight and cautjon; special gifts of perception; technology; flexibility, vulnerability, and reversal; illusions and deceit, including the skilled use oflanguage to manipulate the perceptions or behavior of others; and a metis that is moralized by contrast to the cunning of negative figures. Both the Romance and Homeric poetry emphasize these qualities in their respective characterizations of Zhuge Liang and Odysseus, who are, in turn, contrasted with other characters. Famous Zhuge Liang strategies such as "borrowing arrows" and the "empty city" illustrate both his expertise and his justified reputation for caution and foresight. The Romance emphasizes his psychological acumen and predictive abilities in such episodes as Liu Bei's three visits and Zhuge's prediction, and clever deployment, of his own death. Knowledge of magic gives him special gifts of perception and action, including the ability to call up the east wind and accurately anticipate both his own death and other events. The apocryphal figure of Zhuge Liang is associated not only with military strategy but also with the technologies of gunpowder and firearms. Zhuge Liang, like the abstract strategist general of the Sunzi, relies on strategies based on foreknowledge and deception. These include the prediction of an enemy's probable actions and the ability to manipulate his likely reactions. These predictive abilities echo the Sunzi emphasis on the importance of speed and flexibility to victory and include predictive skills about people and events, the ability to respond flexibly and swiftly to changing circumstances, and knowledge of how to use the energy of the enemy against itself. Zhuge Liang's outwitting of Cao Cao in chapter 50 demonstrates another aspect of zhi, the ability to incorporate self-reference or recursion into one's actions.s In this episode, Cao Cao applies the Sunzi SBy recursion, I mean a procedure that refers to itself as part of its definition. For an interesting modern treatment of the odd effects of recursion on language, see Hofstadter 1986. The same author touches upon the importance of self-reference and recursion in modern philosophical thought in Godel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid (Hofstadter 1979). For a discussion of the power of recursive techniques in computer science, see Wilensky 1984.61.

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principle that things are the opposite of what they seem to the problem of the probable location of the ambush. But where Cao Cao applies a Sunzi principle to a situation, Zhuge Liang turns the principle back on itself by applying the principle to the application of the principle. This second aspect of metic intelligence goes beyond the one-upmanship of one's opponent in the art of prediction. It is not simply that Zhuge Liang is more skilled than Cao Cao in prediction; Zhuge Liang's actions, like Odysseus's tales, turn back on themselves and establish recursive "loops" of self-reference. Zhuge Liang's complex applications of reversal and recursion to the principles of the Sunzi allow him to defeat repeatedly even a master strategist and authority on the Sunzi. In this case, although Zhuge Liang's complex applications of the principles of Sunzi allow him to predict accurately even the behavior of an expert on the principles of the Sunzi, he is still unable to alter the course of events, in that Guan Yu does break his oath, and, as a result, Cao Cao does escape the ambush. Finally, as a master of "verbal warfare" and persuasion, Zhuge Liang relies on instrumental, rather than descriptive, uses of language. He avoids conflict and prefers persuasion to guile and guile to force. In the Romance, his nonviolent heroism often prevails over the forceful heroism of Liu Bei's oath-brothers and illustrates the Sunzi principle that the greatest general wins without fighting. The Romance contrasts Zhuge Liang to both Cao Cao and to the heroic but inferior Guan Yu and Zhang Fei. The novel portrays him as a morally acceptable hero of guile through repeated contrasts between his wily but justified strategies and Cao Cao's crafty ruthlessness. It paints Zhuge Liang in the Warring States period image of the low-born but meritorious founding minister. Cao Cao's image as an antihero is both reinforced and undercut by comparison to Liu Bei, and several parallels between Liu Bei and Cao Cao help define the character of each. In the end, the Romance portrays Cao Cao as having the cleverness of zhi without the moral prerequisite for kingship. Odysseus is known among the Achaeans for his good counsel and for his skill in arranging battle formations (Iliad 2.270-73). Like Zhuge Liang, Odysseus devises his strategies on an individual basis and relies on his perception of the psychological characteristics of each opponent. It is Odysseus who reveals Achilles' ruse to avoid the Trojan War.6 Nestor, another Iliadic figure associated with metis, de6 Achilles

disguises himself as a girl; Odysseus disguises himself as a merchant and

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vises the ruse of sending Patroclus out in Achilles' armor (Iliad I 1. 789-800), a stratagem that is uncannily similar to Zhuge Liang's use of a wooden image to terrify his opponents after his death. Finally, Odysseus devises the Trojan horse, to this day a symbol of deceptive strategy (Odyssey 8.493-494). Odysseus's special gifts of perception include the ability to recognize disguised divinities, particularly Athena, with whom he has a unique rapport; she makes herself visible to him and adds her own metis to his (Iliad 23.768-83, Odyssey I3.22I-25, 29I-99). This ability allows him to descry both friend and foe on the field ofbattle, where he can perceive the interventions of the gods in a way unavailable to his fellows. Odysseus is portrayed as a skilled carpenter and connected directly with Athena on two occasions that suggest the specifically technological aspects of metis: his building a raft to leave the isle of Calypso (Odyssey 5.234-57) and his construction of the Trojan Horse (Odyssey 8.493-94). Like the construction of its physical instrument, the construction of a crafty plot or device is a matter of metis. The navigator and the shipbuilder are both endowed with metis and, like the skilled archer, possess the ability of "following straight (ithunein) along a line," a technical term in both arts (Iliad 23.3I6-I7 [navigation]; Iliad I5-4IO-I3 and Odyssey 5.245 [carpentry and shipbuilding]), which also bears on the instrument of Odysseus's revenge-a contest in sighting a straight line and shooting arrows along it to win the hand of Penelope (Odyssey I9. 572-75, 21. I2I).7 Odysseus's strategies in the Iliad are all influenced by flexibility, vulnerability, and reversal. It is not for nothing that he is called polutropos, "a man of many ways" (Odyssey 1. I); he tries to win over Achilles by appeals to his strength (Iliad 9.23I); he uses the Greeks' vulnerability to the wrath and fire of Hector in his attempt to woo Achilles back to the Argive ranks (Iliad 9.230-43 and 30I-6). He overcomes differences, and supports Agamemnon (Iliad 2. I88-2IO offers a sword among a collection of feminine wares. Since the armor of Achilles was designed by Hephaestus himself, Odysseus knows Achilles will be unable to hide his appreciation of a fine weapon. See the scholia to the Iliad 19.326; Philostratos, Imagines 28r; and Ovid, Metamorphoses IJ.I62. This psychological acuity is reminiscent of Zhuge Liang's "empty city" stratagem; to succeed, it requires certainty that Sima Yi suspect an ambush and retreat at the sight of the always cautious, and apparently defenseless, Zhuge Liang. 7 0ther examples of carpentry occur at Odyssey I7.J40-4I, 21.44, and 23.197. For a detailed discussion of the relation of carpentry, shipbuilding, and navigation, see Detienne and Vernant 1978.236-37·

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and 243-77, 9. 165-80). Finally he devises the Trojan Horse, a ruse whereby the Achaeans are incorporated into Troy and feasted by the Trojans in a celebration of premature victory. That night, the Argive warriors reverse the situation and waste Troy from within. Odysseus is well known in both the Iliad and the Odyssey for his skill at speaking and for his deceptiveness. The Iliad emphasizes each by contrasting him with two other figures, Menelaus and Achilles. In Book 3 of the Iliad, Helen describes Odysseus to the elders ofTroy as "knowing every manner of trickery and crafty counsel" (Iliad 3.202). Comparing him and Menelaus, she describes Menelaus as being lucid, rapid, and concise in his speech. Odysseus, by contrast, would look sullen and nervous and stand awkwardly in silence (Iliad 3.21220). But when he spoke, it was with a great voice in "words that drift like winter snows, and then there was no other mortal who could contend with Odysseus" (Iliad 3.221-23). In Book 9 of the Iliad, Odysseus leads the embassy to Achilles through the agency of Achilles' old mentor Phoenix. Odysseus's speech and Achilles' response show the difference in their ways of thinking. Odysseus is organized and pointed in his speech; Achilles' reply by contrast is forceful, spontaneous, and rough, although he responds to every point brought forward by Odysseus. s As for deceptions, Odysseus feigns madness to avoid the expedition to Troy.9 He personally acts as a spy against Troy (Iliad 10.46953 1) and finally devises the Trojan Horse. Yet the Iliad and Odyssey both portray Odysseus as morally correct in his fulfillment of two oaths that are central to their plots. In the Iliad, he fulfills his oath to defend the husband ofHelen (Hesiod frag. 198.1-3 and 204.79-85). Although he is one among many kings who fulfill this oath, it is his strategy that finally brings it to effective fruition through the sack of Troy. In the Odyssey, he fulfills his marriage oaths to Penelope by his successful homecoming (nostos) and his destruction of the suitors. The embassy to Achilles in Book 9 of the Iliad provides an example of the socially constructive nature of Odysseus's deceptions. When Nestor devises the plan, he specifies Phoenix as the leader of the embassy but makes special signs to Odysseus with his eyes (Iliad ssee Redfield I975-79Qdysseus dresses as a peasant, sows salt with his plough, and pretends not to recognize Agamemnon, who establishes Odysseus's sanity by placing his infant son Telemachus in the plough's path. See Apollodorus, Epitome 3-7 and Hyginus, Fabula 95-

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9. I79-8I). It is Odysseus who takes the initiative to lead the embassy and delivers the first speech (9.223, 225-306). Odysseus's intervention skillfully amends and compromises Agamemnon's terms (9. I2o-58) by omitting all reference to Agamemnon's social superiority (9.26099). Achilles responds with suspicion and claims to hate anyone who

"hides one thing in his thoughts and says another" (9. 3 I 2- I 3). As one who strives to be "the best of the Achaeans" (Odyssey I5.52I-34 and I7-4I5-I6), Odysseus has a clear opposite number in Thersites, "the worst of the Achaeans" (Iliad 2.2I6 and 2.248-49). The eloquence of Odysseus is contrasted to the empty rhetoric of Thersites (Iliad 2.211-77). Thersites is described as "the most base," aiskhistos (Iliad 2.2I6); the word aiskhos is conventionally connected with baseness in blame poetry. 10 Odysseus forcefully silences this illspoken man who tries to persuade the Achaeans to return home. Thersites is described as a provoker of disorder, a man "of measureless speech" (ametroepes), who knows many words but is vain, has no decency, and quarrels with the Achaean leaders in order to amuse the Argives (Iliad 2.2I2-I5). He is ugly and is an especial object of hatred to both Achilles and Odysseus (Iliad 2.220), whom he loses no opportunity to abuse. Nagy notes that these latter two figures are "the best of the Achaeans" in the Iliad and the Odyssey respectively. 11 Odysseus calls Thersites' speech fluent but ill-considered and calls him the worst of the Argives (Iliad 2.246-49). The Argive host praise Odysseus as a giver of counsel and as an expert at ordering armed encounters, and they applaud his humiliation of Thersites. The figures of Odysseus and Zhuge Liang are central to the implicit preoccupation of the Iliad and the Romance with the respective roles of force and guile in warfare and statecraft. In the Romance, Zhuge Liang and Cao Cao are depicted as Warring States period strategist-generals who use and rely on deceit. As we have seen, the philosophical debates of the pre-Qin period are implicitly concerned with the problem of wily wisdom (zhi mou) in statecraft. Confucians 10See

Nagy 1979.255-57, 259-60, and 262. HTwo passages in particular set up Odysseus as the best of the Achaeans in the Odyssey. An omen shows that the family of Odysseus is the more kingly when Telemachus misapplies the epithet "best" to the suitor Eurymakhos (Odyssey 15.51834). Odysseus himself, disguised as the beggar, addresses the vile Antinoos as if he were not the worst, but the best, of the Achaeans (Odyssey 17.415-16). Odysseus derives more glory, it seems, from his revenge than from the conquest of Troy, for which he is ultimately responsible. The story of the Trojan Horse occurs only in the songs ofDemodokos (Odyssey 8.499-520).

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privilege the wen-oriented skills of the administrative ruler, which include zhi but exclude mou, and correspondingly disapprove of wu-oriented skills, which include deceit and strategy as much as overt warfare and the use of force. Mohists specialize in defensive strategy but condemn offensive warfare. Taoists (and some Legalists} advocate "nonaction" or wu wei as a basis for statecraft. The most explicit opposition between the virtues of might (hie) and artifice (metis) appears in Book 23 of the Iliad, where Nestor praises the unique advantages of metis over hie in certain skills and crafts: "It is with metis rather than hie that a woodcutter is better. It is with metis that a helmsman over the wine-dark sea steers his swift ship buffeted by winds. It is with metis that charioteer is better than charioteer (Iliad 2J.JIJ-I8; Nagy I979-47). More generally, the issue of the respective roles of force and guile emerges in the tradition of a conflict between Odysseus and Achilles that takes two forms: the quarrel over whether Troy should be taken by might or by artifice and a quarrel at a feast over the title "best of the Achaeans" [aristos Akhaion) (Odyssey 8. 78). In Homeric diction, this phrase expresses a hero's superiority within a given field of heroic endeavor. Homeric narrative applies this title to both Odysseus and Achilles, and both men contend for this title. Achilles' claim to this superiority comes from his hie or force; Odysseus excels in metis or guile. 12 Achilles is the Iliadic paragon of hie; for example, he is described as superior to Patroclus in hie (Iliad I I. 787). Odysseus is the paragon of metis in both the Iliad and the Odyssey. He is described as polumetis, "of many wiles," poikilometis, "of manifold artifice," and Dii metin atalantos, "equal to Zeus in artifice."13 The implicit conflict over Troy appears in Book 9 of the Iliad, where Achilles rejects Odysseus's plea that he rescue the hard-pressed Achaeans and virtually challenges the Achaeans to solve their problems by artifice because they have rejected his might: "they should devise [phrazomai) in their thoughts another metis that is better and that will rescue their ships and the host of the Achaeans who are at the hollow ships. For this one which they now devised during the time of my anger does not suffice" (Iliad 9.423-26, Nagy I979-48).14 1 2For references to force and guile, see Iliad 15.165 and 17.171, respectively. For the claim-word eukhomai, see Nagy 1979.44 and 46, and Muellner 1976. t3for a discussion of relevant passages, see Nagy 1979.47-48. 14As Nagy notes, the verb phrazomai is associated with metis. The scholia (A) to Iliad 9-347 suggest that Aristarchus believed in the existence of this conflict. See also Detienne and Verriant 1978.25n32.

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The tradition of a quarrel at a feast over the title "best of the Achaeans" is elaborated in the scholia to Odyssey 8.75 and 77.1s The general question of who is the "best of the Achaeans" first appears in the Catalogue of Ships, which ends with the words: "Who, then, was by the best [aristos)? Tell me, Muse!" (Iliad 2.761). Similarly Hector's challenge to combat (Iliad 7. 50) is directed to "whoever is best of the Achaeans" and is clearly meant for Achilles. Hector eventually fights Ajax, whom he compliments for his excellence in both might (hie) and artifice (metis). 16 Hector, however, eventually proves to be inferior to Achilles in might and to Odysseus in artifice. In the Iliad, Achilles is aristos Akhaion, "best of the Achaeans," but the Iliad also applies the epithet to three other figures: Agamemnon, Diomedes, and Ajax.17 Odysseus demurs from the title aristos when Diomedes names him as the "best" companion with whom to spy on the Trojan camp because he "excels at thinking" (noesai) (Iliad 10.247). Odysseus thereby removes himself from the competition for "best of the Achaeans" in the Iliad; he is "best of the Achaeans" in the Odyssey, however. When he addresses Achilles' shade with the title (Odyssey 1 1. 4 78), Achilles seems ready to trade fates with him and regrets that he has traded his homecoming (nostos) for immortal glory (kleos); he would, effectively, trade an Iliad for an Odyssey. Both the metis of Odysseus and the hie of Achilles are vindicated in Homeric narrative: the former by the capture ofTroy and the latter by Achilles' victory over Hector. Achilles achieves kleos for his hie in the Iliad because the Greeks are doomed without him; Odysseus achieves kleos for his metis in the Odyssey, but also for his hie. It is by hie that he strings the bow, kills the suitors, and wins Penelope (Odyssey 21.185, 253-54, and 314-16). Although Odysseus is the primary figure of metis in Homeric narrative, he has a subtle counterpart in Hector, the overt antagonist of Achilles. Like Odysseus, Hector is a figure of metis. He is the only Trojan in the Iliad described as "equal to Zeus in metis" (Dii metin atalantos), an epithet that is usually reserved for Odysseus (Iliad 7-47 15 For an extended discussion of the evidence pointing to such an epic tradition, see Nagy 1979.45-46. 1 6See Iliad 7.288-89, where Hector compliments Ajax, and 7· 197-98, where Ajax himself boasts of this excellence. 17 This epithet is applied to Achilles at Iliad 1.244, 412 and 16.271, 274; to Agamemnon at Iliad 1.91 and 2.82, 580; to Ajax at Iliad 2.768-69. The Catalogue applies the title to Agamemnon and to Ajax during Achilles' absence. See Nagy 1979.26-32, to whom this entire discussion is indebted.

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and 11.200). Agamemnon describes him as the Trojan who has used the most mitis (mitisasthai) against the Achaeans (Iliad 10.48). Like Odysseus, Hector has a special relationship to Athena, which in his case is antagonistic. The Trojans worship Athena as the special protector of Troy (Iliad 6. 286-3 12); similarly they revere Hector as the mortal protector of the city (Iliad 6.402-3 and 24.729-30). Yet Athena lets down both Hector and Troy. She deludes Hector and "takes away his mitis" twice: first when he advocates offensive, rather than defensive, strategy at the Council of the Trojans (Iliad 18.2433 14) and second when she tricks him by assuming the guise of Deiphobos (Iliad 22.226-27). Thus Hector is killed through the treachery of Athena, who uses an illusory form to lure him onto the field. The Iliad is clear about Athena's responsibility for Hector's death; it names her along with Achilles as his killer (Iliad 22.21618).18

Metis and Kingship Heroes of mitis bear a crucial but problematic role in the establishment and maintenance of kingship in both the Greek and Chinese traditions. On the one hand, metic figures appear as crown-bestowers, who empower and guide rulers; on the other, the relations between these heroes and the rulers they empower is fraught with tension and conflict. In this section I will review the role of mitis as a necessary adjunct to rulership and examine the relevance of mitis and metic intelligence to a variety of contemporary analyses of myths of kingship. I will suggest that mitis is a crucial aspect of the methods and personality of the king-maker but is conspicuously lacking from those of the king himself, who is thus dependent, in widely varying senses, on the mitis of his adviser for the means to institute and maintain his rule. In this analysis I will question certain details of the 18Just as Athena is the ritual opponent of Hector, Apollo is the ritual antagonist of Achilles (Iliad 7· 17-61); the Iliad names Apollo along with Paris as the killer of Achilles (19.416-17). As preparations for the battle between Hector and the Achaean champion unfold, Athena and Apollo perch as two birds on the Tree of Zeus. Nagy also notes that pain (algea) results from both the wrath (menis) of Apollo (causing pain for the Greeks) and the wrath of Achilles (causing pain for the Greeks and the Trojans). See Nagy 1979. 142-50.

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representation, in Indo-European languages, of the three "functions" of society as originally formulated in the work of Georges Dumezil. Detienne and Vernant examine parallel accounts of the origins of the kingship of Zeus. One account of his mitis centers on Metis, his first wife and the mother of Athena. Metis, the partner and power behind Zeus's rule, provides him with the drug by which he overthrows his father Kronos. Fearing a prophecy that she will bear a son who will, like Zeus himself, overthrow his father, Zeus swallows her, only to have the fully grown Athena born from his head. The midwife of this birth is Prometheus, himself well-endowed with mitis. Even within Zeus's belly, Metis continues to counsel him.19 In this account, Zeus quite literally incorporates Metis by swallowing her. He can only halt the endless cycle of son overthrowing father and establish an enduring kingship among the gods by incorporating both force (bie) and mitis into his rule. Metis is necessary to the rule of Zeus because she "knows more things than anyone else about everything" (Hesiod, Theogony 887): In an alternative account, Prometheus represents the abilities of mitis, abilities that Zeus cannot do without and which alone can challenge his power (Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 907-1 8). Given the fundamental importance of mitis to kingship, how do kings acquire it? A possible answer comes from Dumezil's account of the hero as an "outsider," who empowers a less gifted ruler and thus functions in the role of a kingmaker. In his monumental Mythe et epopee, Dumezil attempts to demonstrate the existence of recurring story patterns within a common mythopoetic heritage in Indo-European languages.20 This relationship of ruler and warrior-hero is one such pattern. The warrior-hero is an outsider, usually because of the enmity of a powerful divinty whom he resembles in name, character, or method of operation. Although clearly destined for kingship by both birth and abilities, he is prevented from fulfilling this destiny by some contrivance of the antagonistic divinity. As a result of this antagonism, the hero can only function as a kingmaker to a ruler whose abilities are markedly inferior to his own. Just as the hero is an outsider, the ruler is an "insider," often under the protection of the same t9for this version of the story, see Apollodorus 1.3.6 and Hesiod, Theogony 897900. For further discussion, see Detienne and Vemant 1978.rii-I3. 20See Dumezil 1982, 1983, and 1986.

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divinity. In this scenario, the personal weaknesses of the king account for the difficulties, or the failure, of the ultimate goal of the establishment of his rule. The servitude of Herakles to Eurystheus is typical of this relationship. Herakles, as the son of Zeus by a mortal, incurs the enmity of Hera, who contrives that the cousin Eurystheus be born first and so inherit the crown. Because of Hera, Herakles must perform his labors at the behest of Eurystheus. Yet Herakles' name means "glory of Hera," and he is eventually reconciled to and adopted by her (Diodorus Siculus 4·39.2-3).21 Similarly, Achilles and Odysseus function as kingmakers to Agamemnon. All three figures are in fact kings, but in the Iliad, Achilles and Odysseus are primarily heroes and only secondarily kings, while Agamemnon is primarily a king. The relationship between the king Eurystheus and the hero Herakles is explicitly used in the Iliad as a parallel to describe the relationship between the king Agamemnon and the hero Achilles (Iliad 19.95-133).22 The mythopoetic theme of king and crown-bestower also appears in the Iranian epic hero Rostam. Rostam, like Achilles, is a king in his own right but in a remote region of the Iranian empire. Both Rostam and Achilles function primarily as heroes and secondarily as kings toward individuals who function primarily as kings and secondarily as heroes, the Keyanid kings and Agamemnon, respectively.23 This theme of the kingmaker also applies to Odysseus. Like Achilles and Rostam, Odysseus functions primarily as a hero and secondarily as a king. The remoteness oflthaca both makes Odysseus an outsider and diminishes the power of his own kingship. Among the Argives, Odysseus serves as a kingmaker to Agamemnon. In Dumezil's terms, the activity of the hero pertains especially to the second of three "functions" or realms within the traditions of Indo-European languages. The first function, which concerns sov21 See Dumezil 1982. n8-24 and Nagy 1979.303 and 318-19. 22See Detienne and Vemant 1978.81 and Davidson 1980.197-202. 23In her study of the "crown-bestower" in the Iranian Book of Kings, Davidson extends the range of Dumezil's work on heroic figures by applying it to the relationship between Iranian kings and heroes. According to Davidson, the exploits of the Iranian hero Rostam are comparable to the exploits of other epic heroes in the literatures of other cultures. As a tiij bakhsh, or "crown bestower," Rostam is often at odds with kingship, and he is "other" insofar as he is simultaneously an insider and an outsider to the power of the Keyanids. See Davidson 1985.63, and 68-69.

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ereignty, magic, law, and religion, is exemplified by the ruler. The second function, the function of the hero, is concerned with physical force and warfare. A third function concerns fertility, wealth, sexuality, and domesticity.24 In Dumezil's analysis, rulers operate in the domain of the first function, and warrior-heroes in that of the second. Characters of metis create a problem insofar as they bridge the first and second functions. In his development ofDumezil's work on heroes in the Indo-European textual tradition, Nagy describes hie as a characteristic quality of the Homeric hero. Yet Nagy's association of heroism with hie poses an interesting problem: crown-bestowing heroes may be associated with metis as well. The hero of the Iliad, as Nagy points out, is Achilles, yet Agamemnon's victory at Troy required both the hie of Achilles and the metis of Odysseus. In emphasizing the dimension of hie, Nagy does not take full account of metis as a heroic quality. Odysseus is a hero precisely because his field of excellence is metis, rather than hie. Similarly, Hector is a crown-bestower and protector of Troy and its king, but he is a figure of metis as well as hie. He is also an outsider insofar as he opposes the conduct ofParis and is overruled by the council of elders about the strategy of the conduct of the war. The problem of metic intelligence, then, raises basic questions about the qualities of heroic figures in Indo-European poetic traditions. In the Greek tradition, are such heroes best represented by figures of hie, such as Herakles and Achilles, or by figures of metis, such as Odysseus and Hector? Metic intelligence simply does not fit into a strict reading of Dumezil's categories.25 Turning back to the Chinese tradition, I stress that the evidence reinforces the importance of the qualities associated with metic intelligence. The founding ministers of dynasties may be generals, but they rely more on the metis of zhi mou than on the hie of yong, physical force and courage. Examples include Zhuge Liang, Su Qin, and Taigong. Thus, cross-cultural evidence outside the traditions of IndoEuropean languages suggests the importance of metic intelligence as a fundamental quality of at least some heroes. These traditions display a broad pattern wherein a hero or founding minister whose major characteristic is wisdom, or metis, institutes an 24See Dumezil 1982.7. 25See Nagy 1990h.7-17.

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inferior figure as ruler. Traditions of tension between ruler and crown-bestower have an interesting parallel in a pattern of conflict in Chinese legends between rulers and their founding ministers. Sarah Allan has noted that legends about rulers and ministers in crucial periods of Chinese "history" repeatedly express and mediate a conflict that arises out of the contradiction between rule by hereditary right and rule by virtue. The conflict appears in the texts in various transformations between such figures as heir and sage, king and minister, minister and recluse, regent and rebel.26 Allan argues that the opposition between the imperatives of heredity and virtue, between "the heir and the sage," is the key theme of ancient Chinese dynastic legends. In later historical fiction, these relationships between- rulers and ministers function as "signs" of conflict following the earlier pattern of the Warring States period. In particular, the relationship between Zhuge Liang and Liu Bei is an instance of this type of conflict between figures that function as historical types in fiction. Historical fiction such as the Romance uses these relationships as a patterning technique and exaggerates them for effect. Thus Liu Bei's claim to legitimacy is strengthened by his ability to attract the services of Zhuge Liang, who is described to Liu Bei by comparison with Taigong Wang and Zhang Liang. Allan emphasizes tbat these associations give the novel added depth and imbue the fall of Han with a tragic sense that transcends the stories of its individual characters.27 From the very different viewpoint of a typology of traditional heroes in Chinese popular fiction, Robert Ruhlmann has noted three types of heroic figures in Chinese traditional fiction, which he illustrates by three figures from the Romance: the "scholar," exemplified by Zhuge Liang; the swordsman, of whom Guan Yu is the paramount example; and the prince, exemplified by Liu Bei. The scholar is an Odyssean figure, a master of diplomacy, military strategy, and magic, gifted with the unerring ability to foresee, if not always to determine, the future course of events. Scholar-heroes are characterized by psychological acuity, knowledge of natural forces, concentration, and infinite patience. Heroes of this type include Su Qin and the sages, generals, and founding ministers of the Warring States period bingfa legends. Heroes of the second type, swordsmen, excel in bodily strength and physical courage. They are masters of various 26Allan

27Allan

1981.9. 1981.145. For Allan's use of the term "signs," see Levi-Strauss 1969. r8-2o.

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martial arts and often possess individual abilities or techniques. They are "good fellows": impulsive, blunt, funny, and generous, but are not always particularly bright. The last type ofhero, the prince, may lack any particular skill beyond the ability to use the talents of the sages and heroes that his ethical merit and hereditary prestige attracts to his service.2B Three typical descriptions correspond to the three types of hero described by Ruhlmann: (1) "strange" (qi) or "extraordinary talent" (qi cai), an epithet of Zhuge Liang (and his wife); (2) "outstanding man" (ying xiong), better translated as "hero," typically applied to Guan Yu and Zhang Fei; and (3) "able to use others" (yong ren), a description applied to Liu Bei, but also to Cao Cao. As in the case of Allan's analysis of heir and sage legends, Ruhlmann's heroes partially correspond to Dumezil's tripartite classifications. The swordsman corresponds almost point by point to Dumezil's warrior-hero; his excellence is might (hie; li or yong) and he is impulsive and easily angered. Likewise, the prince is strongly reminiscent of some aspects of the Homeric king. The scholar, however, does not fit. Like the sage of Allan's analysis, the scholar-hero shares some aspects of the Homeric kingmaker but is ;~.lso involved in a fundamental tension with that figure. The theme of recognition [zhi] in a Chinese narrative tradition that dates from the Warring States period provides an interesting parallel to the role of metis in the establishment of kingship in Homeric epic. Eric Henry has shown that the verbal sense of zhi, "to know, per..; ceive, recognize, appreciate, discern, grasp or pierce through disguises," is linked to the theme of recognition in a variety of stories that begin in the late Spring and Autumn and early Warring States periods. In early Chinese narrative, the greatest good is to be "known" in the sense of being valued at one's true worth. The greatest ill is to be "unknown," that is, misunderstood, unappreciated, or falsely blamed.29 Recognition stories seem to be of Warring States period vintage and have three elements: the recognition of hidden worth, the elevation of a low-born sage, and the Taoist notion that human qualities lie hidden in their opposites. The paradigmatic recognition story is the story of Bo Ya, a skillful zither player, and Zhong Ziqi, the skillful listener who recognizes his talent (LSCQ 28See Ruhlmann 1964.122-57. 29See Henry 1987.8-9, to whom this entire discussion is indebted.

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14.143-46 and Lie 5.61, Graham 109-10). Zhong could tell what Bo was thinking whenever Bo played the zither. When Zhong died, Bo smashed his zither and refused to play any more.30 This story is the source of the expression zhi yin, literally "to know the sound," for a uniquely perceptive friend. A similar expression in modem Chinese, zhi ji, means to know the mind of another.31 Recognition motifs are rare or absent in verifiably Spring and Autumn portions of the Shu jing and even when present do not indicate a sense of the hidden quality of human talent or a sense of inherent obstacles to "knowing" others. In the Shu jing, Yao employs Shun as his successor and Shun chooses Yu as his. Everyone knows his talents and virtues. The circumstances of Confucius, by contrast, exemplify the negative recognition story; he is neither recognized by a ruler nor succeeded by a worthy disciple. The relevance of recognition stories to the establishment of kingship lies in sage-seeking stories, which begin to appear during the Warring States period. Here rulers seek, recognize, and employ people whose virtues are hidden and known only to themselves. In these legends, dynasty-founding rulers seek out low-born individuals of talent to be their ministers.32 Personal skill is unnecessary and detrimental to a ruler, who needs only the ability to recognize a sage, to induce him to become a minister, and to continue to listen to his counsel. The height of these stories of sage30This story is the basis for the Ming vernacular story, "Yu Boya Smashes his Zither in Recognition of a Sound-knower" (Yu boya shuai qin xie zhi yin) in Feng Menglong, Jing shi tong yan r. r-12, both as cited in Henry 1987.9-10. 31 It comes from the saying: "A gentleman dies for one who knows him [zhiji] as a woman adorns herself for one who delights in her." This saying is attributed to Bi Yurang (c. fifth century B.C.E.), who left the service of the lords Fan and Zhong Hang for that of the earl Zhi, who vanquished them. After an unsuccessful attempt to avenge the death of Earl Zhi at the hands of the viscount Xiang, Bi refused to enter Xiang's service, stating: "When I served Fan and Zhong Hang, they treated me like a common man. When they were killed, I treated their revenge as a common man would. When I served Earl Zhi, he treated me as a hero, and I treat his revenge as a hero should" (ZGC 18.585-93 and 597-600, modified from Crump 285-87). For a discussion of these passages, see Henry 1987.1 I. 32In addition to bingfo stories of the type described in chapters 5 and 6, these tales also include the Taoist sense of paradox in which everything is the opposite of what it seems. In the Yijing, zhi is used to recognize objects, not people (ren). The Shijing, like the Yijing, has many instances of zhi applied to an object, or to impersonal conditions or qualities. Zhi also is applied to people, however, whether in the form of personal or social recognition. Recognition tropes occur in the Shi jing at Mao 60, 65, and 199. These blend personal understanding with social recognition. See Henry 1987. r 5- r6 and 24-25. For Greek parallels, see Nagy 1990b.202-22.

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seeking and recognition is the story ofLiu Bei's recruitment ofZhuge Liang. Other variants of the recognition story involve women who save the state and instances of negative recognition. As Henry points out, stories of ugly but wise women who bring about the salvation of a state are the structural inverse of another group offemme fatale stories of the downfalls of the Xia, Shang, and Western Zhou dynasties. The theme of the negative recognition story is that worthy men never realize their aims. This theme first appears in the Shi jing in the "no one knows me" lament of the unrecognized individual, of which the most celebrated example is the Li sao, or "Encountering Sorrow," the first poem in the Chu ci, or Elegies if Chu. In these stories, known and knower do not enjoy an equal relationship. The known has a quasi-filial obligation to knower. As Guan Zhong says of his constant friend, Bao Shuya, "My father and mother were the ones who bore me, but the one who knew me was Bao Shuya" (Lie 6. 70, italics mine).33 Recognition may be linked to potential employment, although individuals who are "recognized" do not always benefit from the recognition.

Conclusions Both the Greek and the Chinese traditions feature significant conflicts between contextually inferior heroic figures of metis who establish kingship and the rulers they empower, who typically combine superior birth and social position with inferior ability. In both cases, inevitable tensions arise because of the inferiority, incompetence, or viciousness of the ruler. Zhuge Liang follows Liu Bei because of duty and the imperative force of recognition by a ruler who can utilize his unique talent. Liu Bei can attract Zhuge Liang's services but is ultimately unable to use them effectively. Odysseus supports the rule of Agamemnon both directly and indirectly. He reiterates Agamemnon's position as king of the Argives (Iliad 2.203-6) and rebukes Thersites when he rails against Agamem33 For further discussion of this passage, see Henry 1987.6n2-5. He cites references to the problematic behavior ofGuan Zhong in the Analects (3.22, 14.10, and 14.1718) and Zhanguo ce (13.451-6o, item 3).

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non (Iliad 2.246-69). In the embassy to Achilles, Odysseus reports Agamemnon's offer in such a way as to make it acceptable to Achilles (Iliad 9.260-99). Agamemnon, in turn, equateshis own sovereignty with the victory (or defeat) of the Achaeans (Iliad 2.343-52). Thus we can infer that, in the Homeric tradition, Odysseus's victory at Troy, by way of the Trojan horse, undermines Agamemnon's sovereignty in the broadest possible terms. Agamemnon provides a telling example of the limitations of such a ruler. And Agamemnon suffers a terrible homecoming in which he is murdered by his wife Clytemnestra (Odyssey 24.95-200). The empowering heroes, Odysseus and Achilles, fare considerably better. In the Iliad, Achilles chooses to die at Troy. In doing so, he trades his homecoming, or nostos, for immortal glory, or kleos (Iliad 9.413), a choice his ghost questions in bitter retrospection in the Odyssey (11.489-91). In the Odyssey, Odysseus achieves the best of both worlds. He is described as a city-destroyer [ptoliporthos] (Iliad 2.278) who gains kleos as the destroyer of Troy (Odyssey 1. 1) and wins the nostos of his reunion with Penelope. Agamemnon's ghost is all too aware of the virtues of Odysseus, and ofPenelope, when he contrasts his own evil homecoming and unheroic death with the kleos of Odysseus's (or Penelope's) virtue, or arete (Odyssey 24. 192-202). As Anthony Edwards notes, the kleos of Odysseus and Penelope are mutually dependent. Odysseus's return from Troy is the condition of Penelope's kleos, and Penelope's faithfulness is the condition for Odysseus's homecoming.34 The metis of Odysseus and Zhuge Liang conforms to what Martha Nussbaum has called the metis of the hunter in her critique of Detienne and Vernant's study.35 As she points out, Detienne and Vernant's account of metis emphasizes the skills of the trapper, rhetor, politician, or strategus; their clear aim is domination and the control of chance and external circumstance (tukhe). Both Confucians, who distrust the skills of metic intelligence, and Militarists, who rely on them, share two central concerns, the creation and maintenance of order and the skills of foresight and prediction. In the case of the Militarists, these skills include strategy and knowledge of natural conditions. Confucians preserve these skills by 34 See Edwards 1985.87. For the vexed question of whether Agamemnon is referring to Odysseus or to Penelope, see Edwards 1985.88n36. For discussion of the nostos and kleos of Odysseus and Achilles, see Nagy 1979-36-39· 3 5See Nussbaum 1986.!8-21, 216, 310 and 473n36.

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derogating them to the inferior realm of wu. We may ask how to relate the wu wei activity of the Taoist to the deliberative you wei activity of the Mohist. Can we conform the Taoist sage to a figure of Odyssean cunning? Just as the Chinese "distrust appearances" orientation accommodates the very different aims and means ofTaoists and Militarists, we may perhaps extend the view of metis beyond the hunter I strategus-turn from the hunter to the weaver, from the trapper to the designer-and reassess the abilities of metis through the modes of operation of three experts: Guan Yin, Athena, and Penelope.

CHAPTER

9

Skillful Means

In this chapter I examine the role of metic intelligence in Chinese and Greek epic treatments of the themes of quest, return, and likemindedness in the Journey to the West and the Odyssey and argue that the quests depicted in the Journey to the West and the Odyssey tum on the interventions of metic women in special relationships with metic heroes based on like-mindedness, natural or contrived, and the common use of metic qualities. The metis of these "designing women" differs in important ways from the explicitly goal-directed cunning of their male counterparts. I will extend the depiction of metis from the directly controlling activities that are the focus of Detienne and Vernant's investigation and show that the scope of metis also includes such responsive and noncontrolling images as the growing plant.

Comedy in Novel and Epic Just as the Romance is thematically comparable to the Iliad as an epic of tragedy, the Journey to the West is comparable to the Odyssey as an epic of comedy. Although other Chinese texts might fill this role, the Journey to the West is particularly suitable for my purposes because of the central role of another paradigmatically metic character, the monkey-pilgrim Sun Wukong. The hero of both texts is a king whose kingship is temporarily removed while he is on a difficult quest. During this period, his authority is subsumed to the will of another figure far less able than 208

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himself. He must use his own superior abilities, which include a metis completely lacking in the figure he serves, to establish and preserve the rule of a person to whom he is fundamentally antagonistic. The "Handsome Monkey King" is the beloved ruler of an obscure and distant realm, the Flower-Fruit Mountain. He leaves this miniature utopia to seek deliverance from death. Although he is the chief guide and protector of the quest, Pilgrim Sun is a disciple of the monk Tripitaka, and Guan Yin provides Tripitaka with a "tight fillet spell" to ensure that his control over Monkey will be absolute. Odysseus's kingdom is remote and rocky Ithaca. He is so unwilling to go to Troy that he feigns madness to avoid this obligation. 1 Each narrative recounts an arduous journey of quest and homecoming, fated to succeed but beset by danger and difficulty. Both voyages revolve around the related themes of attainment and immortality. In the Journey to the West, attainment may mean Confucian selfcultivation (xiu sheng), Buddhist enlightenment (ming), or the mastery ofTaoist alchemy, depending on the interpretation of the allegory. In the tradition of the Homeric epic, attainment is the demonstration of excellence, aristeia. In the journey to the West, immortality occurs literally through the return to a previous immortal existence and Buddhist enlightenment, and indirectly through Taoist alchemy; attamment and immortality result from the mastery of the world of appearances. For Odysseus, immortality comes implicitly through "undying glory," kleos, achieved through homecoming, and specifically through his reunion with Penelope, who is the source of his heroic status. In the Odyssey, the superior metis and abilities of Odysseus are the means to homecoming but also to immortality through kleos, the undying glory that makes him immortal as "the best of the Achaeans" in the epic tradition of the Odyssey. Unlike the literal immortality conferred on such heroes as Herakles (Diodorus Siculus 4.38.4-4-39· 1) the immortality of the epic tradition takes the form of everlasting memory in human song.2 In the Iliadic tradition of Achilles, there is 1For Odysseus's reluctance to go to Troy, see Odyssey 24. I 15-19. For his feigned madness, see chapter 8, note 9 of this book. 2 The Iliad is the epic of Achilles; in the Odyssey, Odysseus wins the coveted title of "the best of the Achaeans." In contrast to the subsequent opposition between the terms "true" (alethes) and "false" (pseudes), the salient opposition within Homeric diction is between what is true, or alethes, through remembrance and what is forgotten (leth-). For a full discussion of Odysseus as the best of the Achaeans, see Nagy

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an antithesis between homecoming, or nostos, and glory, or kleos. Achilles gives up the former in order to attain the latter (Iliad 9.413). Odysseus is the more complete hero in that he wins both. 3 For Tripitaka, who is most concerned with literal attainment, the scripture pilgrimage represents both a literal goal, the acquisition of Mahayana scriptures, and a return-to his blood-brother, the Tang emperor in China, and to his original identity as Gold Cicada in Heaven. With the exception of Monkey, the scripture pilgrims all seek to return to earlier, divine identities. The wily intelligence of the "mind monkey" realizes what is in fact a serious Buddhist message of the text, the interpenetration of emptiness and form. He attains his original quest for literal immortality in that his enlightenment is a release from death, but he realizes that the true meaning of this enlightenment exceeds his original goals. In both texts, the trials that beset these journeys are overcome not so much by strength of force as by the canny guile of metis: resourcefulness, attention, and presence of mind to the point of trickery. This acuity is not restricted to the keen use of ordinary faculties. Both Odysseus and Monkey enjoy special gifts of perception and privileged information, primarily through the patronage of a female divinity who confers special foreknowledge or magical ability, either directly or through the aid of other friendly divinities. The metis of Athena augments the metis of Odysseus, and the other deities who help him, Hermes and Leukothea, have strong affinities with her. Their aid enables Odysseus to prevail over Circe and Calypso and to win their assistance also. Athena engineers his favorable reception by Alkinoos as well as his reentry into Ithaca. Similarly, the special partnership between the bodhisattva Guan Yin and the rebellious monkey spirit Sun Wukong arises out of a common mode of operation, which provides much of the humor of the Journey to the West. The Journey to the West and the Odyssey take far more liberties with their historical antecedents than do the Romance and the Iliad. The Journey to the West and the Odyssey combine actual geography and the description of known locations with geographical description that clearly belongs to the realm of the imagination. Neither journey is limited to earthly life. The Odyssey describes Odysseus's journey to 1979. For a discussion of the Homeric background of the word alethes, see Detienne 1973 and Nagy 1990a.s8-7o. 3See Nagy 1979.26-58.

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2II

the world of the dead, and the hundred-chapter version of the Journey to the West records journeys to the other world by the Tang emperor and by Monkey and his false double. The Journey to the ~st and the Odyssey also share a number of curious parallels of diction and detail. Odysseus's epithets in Homeric diction reflect his associations with metis: he is full of twists and turns (polutropos) (Odyssey 1. I), and he is described by epithets that point to many contrivances (polumekhanos) and many wiles (polumetis). The epithets of Pilgrim Sun are nearly typological parallels with these; he is described as the monkey of the mind (xin yuan) and as being full of cunning plans (duo mou). Despite the differences between Homeric moira as Fate and Buddhist karma, surprisingly similar turns of phrase tdl that Odysseus is predestined to return home or that Tripitaka (and with him Monkey and the other pilgrims) is not yet fated to die. On three occasions, the Odyssey features the phrase moir' esti-that Odysseus is fated (moira) to see his people and return home (Odyssey 5.4I, 5. 114, 9. 532). Similarly, the Odyssey (5.436) declares that wretched Odysseus would have perished beyond his fate (huper moiran), but for the forethought of Athena. Similarly, the Journey to the West tells us several times that the Tang monk was not yet destined to die (XYJ 1.323, 1.326, and 1.340).4 Both the Journey to the ~st and the Odyssey end with a surprise twist. In the Journey to the West, the meaning of the quest evaporates before our eyes, as the pilgrims bring back "wordless scriptures" (wu zi jing). The reunion of Odysseus and Penelope ends not with faithful and rejoicing Penelope falling into the arms of triumphant Odysseus but with her final and unassailable test of his identity. Odysseus comes to the surprising and happy realization that Penelope's metis exceeds even his own and that his own attainment is not quite what he thought it was. AsJohnJ. Winkler has observed, the Odyssey features two kinds of craft: the metis of its central characters and Homer's metis, directed upon the audience of the Odyssey.s For example, Odysseus gives his name to the Cyclops as outis-"Noman." When, blinded by Odysseus and in agony, Polyphemus calls to his friends for help against "outis," they respond, "if no one is using violence against you, alone as you are, there is no way to avoid the sickness 4for translations of these passages, see Yu 2.45, 2.48, and 2.70. The second of these goes so far as to declare that Tripitaka's followers could only count on divine assistance because the Tang monk was not yet fated to die. ssee Winkler 1990, especially 156-61.

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sent by great Zeus. So pray you to your father, Lord Poseidon" (Odyssey 9-410-12). Here, Homeric poetry engages in an explicit wordplay on the noun metis by way of the pronoun metis, meaning "no one." Both texts ensnare the reader, but how are we to interpret these twists? Hu Shi sees them as humor, Plaks, as irony.6 Winkler argues for the metis of Homeric poetry itself. Whatever philosophical reading of the Journey to the West we privilege, there seems to be at least a little upiiya in this text. Skillful means-upaya-seems to characterize the Journey to the J.test itself, not just its characters. 7

Metic Heroes of Quest In Chapter 7, I compared the metic intelligence of Odysseus and Zhuge Liang. In this chapter, I will show that Odysseus is comparable to Monkey with respect to the use of strategy or design; foresight and caution; special gifts of perception; medical technology; flexibility, vulnerability, and reversal; illusions, deceit, and instrumental language; and, finally, portrayal by means of figural contrasts that depict and moralize metis. Monkey combines magic with ingenuity in a variety of stratagems to overcome the many obstacles to the pilgrimage. He typically vanquishes a stronger opponent by exploiting the circumstances of the moment to optimize the effect of natural forces; exposing the true identity of a demon, in order to master it or invoke its true master; 6 Plaks reads the Journey to the West ironically on the grounds that the text questions and undermines the nature and value of its ostensive quest just as the goal is achieved. He points out that the structure of the Journey to the West calls for a grand finale, but, by undercutting the value of the scriptures that were the explicit object of the quest, the author indicates that the literal-minded pursuit of an end is not what is really at issue. Instead of the grand finale of a quest narrative, the Journey to the West disparages the misguided pursuit of excessively literal ends. In the end, the goal of enlightenment becomes an obstacle to enlightenment. See Plaks 1987.211 and 273-76. 7for an excellent argument advocating a serious Buddhist, rather than a syncretist or Neo-Confucian, reading of the Journey to the West, see Bandy 1989. Bandy presents salient arguments for a Buddhist interpretation of the Journey and proposes, in part from the prevalence of upiiya in its form and content, that the Journey to the West be read as a Buddhist text, not merely as a story about Buddhism. To this I would add that the Zhuangzi and the Laozi already furnish precedents as Taoist texts in which their philosophical stature derives in part from the extent to which their form reflects their content.

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2 13

feigning defeat or taking a false form in order to be captured or engulfed and then attack from within; and meeting plot with plot. Like Zhuge Liang, Monkey relies on artifice aided by perception, magic, speed, and ingenuity rather than brute force. The "mind monkey" is a keen observer of ordinary events, from which he learns by imitation and diligence. Examples include his imitations of human behavior, his acquisition of the skills of Taoist magic and alchemy, and his knowledge of medicine. In particular, he can perceive the true identity of demons and thereby master them. During the pilgrimage, he learns to perceive the true meaning of events, including the realization of the real attainment of the pilgrimage. A mode of action based on flexibility, vulnerability, and reversal is most apparent in the pattern of Monkey's overcoming demons by speed, the assumption of a false form, and a reversal from engulfment to conquest, which is his typical mode of action, a mode entirely based on deceit and the ability to perceive and perpetrate illusions. Like Odysseus and Zhuge Liang, Monkey is contrasted and moralized by means of figural oppositions. On the one hand, he is set off by demonic equivalents. These include Red Boy, the six-eared macaque, and his false-monkey double. He is also pointedly contrasted with Tripitaka through repeated portrayals of Monkey's flexibility, intelligence, and ingenuity and Tripitaka's obtuseness, cowardice, and high-handed behavior. Finally, Monkey resembles other characters of metis in that he is an outsider; he disrupts Taoist heaven and is neither human nor, like the other pilgrims, a fallen Buddhist deity. Odysseus uses stratagems to escape the cave ofPolyphemus (Odyssey 9.298-470), to effect an entrance into his own home (17.264-347), to alert Penelope to his arrival (Book 19), and to slay the suitors by the ruse of the arrow contest (Book 21). His caution and foresight make him wary of the land of the Lotus eaters (9.82-104), the magic of Circe (10.244-306), and the perfidy of the lawless Cyclops. In addition, he attains special foreknowledge of events through the advice and intervention of several divinities but especially through the favor and patronage of Athena. Odysseus uses drugs on two occasions: he deploys the herb moly as a charm against Circe's magic (10.302-29), and he uses wine to render the Cyclops helpless and blind him (9.204-15 and 345-63). The Odyssey abounds with incidents in which Odysseus cannot prevail by power but must resort to patience, persuasion, or help-

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lessness. Against Calypso, Nausicaa, and even Penelope, he cannot prevail by any kind of force but must use persuasion or even patience. He regains his former life by a voyage to the land of the dead; he survives the Sirens' song only by rendering himself helpless beforehand. Odysseus, like Pilgrim Sun, characteristically uses craft to win out against more forceful or numerous foes. A mortal pitted against gods, he slays the Cyclops "by cunning (dolos}, not by strength (bie)" (9. 406-8}. He uses Hermes' magic on Circe by pretending to be overcome by her magic. Like Monkey, Odysseus typically allows himself to be enclosed-in the cave of Polyphemus, the palace of Circe, or the wooden horse-in order to defeat an enemy by guile, from the inside. Odysseus is as famous for his eloquence as for his deceptivenes:;. He is a notorious liar who tells partial truths to Nausicaa and h(·r family (7.240-97) and only reveals his identity when pressured by Alkinoos, who perceives his grief when the bard Demodokos sings the story of the sack of Troy (8.548-9.20). Odysseus even tries to convince Athena that he is a Cretan in exile but with little success: "enduring and brilliant Odysseus was happy and rejoiced in the land of his fathers when Pallas Athena, daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, spoke to him thus, and he replied to her speaking with winged words-but he did not speak the truth, but held himselfback, always using to advantage the crafty intelligence [noos polukerdes] within him" (13.250-55). Odysseus tells his faithful swineherd Eumaios the half-truth that he is a Cretan veteran of Troy and has heard news that Odysseus is returning home (14. 187-234). Finally, he tells a similar story to Penelope herself. Although it is a fabrication, he manages to inform her of the real state of affairs, despite the presence of overhearing ears (19. 104-600). In the Odyssey, the operative moral contrast is between Odysseus and Agamemnon. Odysseus's homecoming makes possible the fulfillment of his marriage oaths and his happy reunion with Penelope. Agamemnon betrays his marriage in his love for Cassandra and suffers an ignominious death at the hands ofhis wife, Clytemnestra. His ghost recounts his tragic homecoming to Odysseus (24. 192-202) and praises both Odysseus and Penelope. s Odysseus has enough virtue (arete) to win a Penelope; Agamemnon merits only a Clytemnestra. 8 See

Nagy 1979.37 and chapter 8, note 35, of the present hook.

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21 5

Viewed in Dumezil's framework (described in chapter 8), the difference between the moral figural contrasts in the Iliad and the Odyssey has to do with differences between the three functional roles of heroes in epics of Indo-European linguistic provenance. The Iliad is concerned with an oath to a king, which is representative of Dumezil's first function of kingship and religion. The story of Odysseus's homecoming is, in effect, his fulfillment of the oaths of marriage, which represent the third function of sexuality, wealth, and domesticity. Yet the real moral contrast is not between Odysseus and Agamemnon but rather between the virtuous metis of Penelope and the evil cunning of Clytemnestra.

Designing Women In fundamental ways, men control the Iliad and the Romance, while women control the Odyssey and the Journey to the West. Guan Yin is the ultimate designer of both the scripture pilgrimage and the enlightenment of the pilgrims. Odysseus's homecoming is designed by Athena on the divine level and by Penelope on the mortal level. The portrayal of three female metic characters, Guan Yin, Athena, and Penelope, is of underlying importance to the Journey to the ~st and the Odyssey. The Iliad and the Odyssey play the metis of Odysseus off against that of Athena and Penelope. Guan Yin becomes prominent in Buddhist scripture and iconography during the Sui (581-618 c.E.) and Tang (618-907 c.E.) dynasties. This protean figure is associated with over eighty Buddhist scriptures and can take as many as thirty-three forms. Depending on the needs of those she addresses, Guan Yin can appear as a man or woman, old or young, monk or lay, human or divine. She can assume the form of a Buddha, Brahma deva, king, elder or elder's wife, citizen or official, monk or nun, layman or laywoman, young man or maiden. Guan Yin protects travelers, saves people from danger, and grants beautiful children. 9 Some ambiguities surrounding Guan Yin result from the incorrect identification of her with the male bodhisattva Ava9These texts include the Lotus sutra, the Avatamsaka siitra, the Siirangama siitra, and the Heart Sutra. As early as 308 c.E., Zhu Fahu translated the twenty-fifth chapter of the Lotus sutra from Sanskrit separately as the Guan Yin siitra. Most of the scriptures related to Guan Yin were copied as she became increasingly popular. See Yu 1988.1-J.

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lokitesvara.to The many faces of Guan Yin are connected to different Buddhist schools and have a variety of iconographical expressions. She is one of the three holy figures of the Pure Land (along with Amitabha and Mahasthamaprapta}, and Guan Yin of the Thousand Ears or Thousand Eyes occurs prominently in the frescoes at Dun Huang. The Guan Yin of the Journey to the J#st is the female Nan Hai Guan Yin or Guan Yin of the South Sea, who is associated with Potalaka Island and the Tidal Sound Cave. This Guan Yin is actively omniscient, humorous, agonistic, and cunning. In the first half of the journey to the West, Guan Yin designs and controls the scripture pilgrimage. She engineers the literal pilgrimage and creates a context in which the pilgrims can fulfill broader, as well as narrower, notions of attainment. Thus she motivates the Tang emperor to authorize the scripture pilgrimage. She brings about the participation of Monkey, Tripitaka, and the others in the journey, based on their earlier existences and potential, and perspicaciously exploits the strengths and weaknesses of all the pilgrims. She intervenes directly in only five episodes: the Bear Monster (chapters 1617), ginseng (chapters 24-26}, Red Boy (chapters 40-42), the HeavenReaching River (chapters 47-49), and the Scarlet Purple Kingdom (chapters 68-71), but her magical control of Monkey, vested in Tripitaka, and the oaths she has exacted from all the pilgrims, establish and maintain her control of the expedition. As Pilgrim Sun adds to his own skills the compassion and moral responsibility that characterize Guan Yin, however, her control decreases correspondingly. Like Monkey, Guan Yin uses an opportunistic measure of guile, argument, coercion, and cunning traps, but her guile is fundamentally different from Monkey's. His cunning is self-serving, while hers exemplifies the Buddhist notion of wisdom (prajfia) and skillful means (upaya) working hand in hand. The Sanskrit term prajfia is sometimes translated as zhi; upaya is translated as fang bian. These methods of thought and action contrast dramatically with the behavior of Tripitaka, who is more pious than wise. Guan Yin first subdues and then transforms Monkey by means of upaya, because metis can be bested only by greater cunning, and she brings his unruly zhi into accord with the precepts of Buddhist doctrine. The notion of upaya enlarges the conceptual vocabulary of wisdom and cunning. toSee Eitel 1888.23-25.

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In the Homeric tradition, Athena is metis incarnate; she boasts of a kleos conferred by way ofher metis (Odyssey 13.298-99), and she is the daughter of Zeus and Metis. Metis provides Athena with characteristic foreknowledge and technical eminence in such areas as military technology, navigation, carpentry, weaving, and medicine. 11 In the Iliad, Athena is a designer of the victory of the Argives and the ultimate opponent of Hector; in the Odyssey she, along with Penelope, is the architect of Odysseus's homecoming (nostos). 12 The association of Athena with shipbuilding clarifies the cult of Athena of the Sea, an association that seems to overlap the domain of Poseidon. Athena's interventions in the realm of navigation and shipbuilding are associated with metis and establish her as a marine deity with a different mode of action from that of Poseidon. Athena is identifiable as a deity of the sea by virtue of her connection with the sea-bird aithuia and her interventions in the Odyssey.n These interventions take the form ofher aid to Odysseus and ofher masterminding of the Telemachy (Odyssey 2.262-433). The invention of the first ship is yet another example of her connection with handicraft and technology. The relevance of the "sea-crow" to navigation is confirmed in the Odyssey (5.288-462) in the episode where Ino Leukothea appears to Odysseus in the guise of a sea-crow, or aithuia, and saves him from drowning by loaning him her veil. Here Athena's powers are directly opposed to those of Poseidon, the source of the storm, since the scholia link Leukothea Aithuia with an Athena Aithuia, explaining that she is called aithuia because she has, like the sea-crow, taught men to navigate in ships. The quality that connects Athena with the arts of navigation is metic intelligence; this is the preeminent quality of the skillful pilot, which allows him to recognize from happenstance (tukhi) the opportune moment (kairos) and to guide a ship by-means of his foresight and vigilance. 14 Metis provides an explanation for several otherwise 11 For the connections of Athena with metis and Metis, see Odyssey 13.299 and Theogony 886-goo. Metis is associated with the knowledge of pharmaka, which include both medically efficacious drugs and poisons. According to Apollodorus (1.1.7), Zeus "took as his partner Metis the daughter of Ocean, and she gave to Kronos the drug (pharmakon) to drink." 12Another example of Athena's cunning in helping a hero to prevail against a more powerful opponent is her aid to Herakles in defeating Periklymenos, the son of Neleus (Hesiod frag. 33a). As in the death ofHector, Athena prevails by trickery. See Detienne and Vernant 1978. I 10. 13for further discussion, see Detienne and Vernant 1978.215-58, especially 218. t4See Detienne and Vernant 1978.148-53. Nestor praises the metis of the navigator

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puzzling cults of Athena. In her possible ongms as a goddess of fertility, her domain of action is the use of the plow and the crafts associated with agriculture, whereas Demeter is a deity of grain itself. Even as a fertility deity, Athena's domain is crafts and technology.1s In the Iliad, Athena has special relationships to both her protege, Odysseus, and her own antagonist, Hector. She also uses a variety of disguises and transformations to deceive her enemies and protect her friends. She assumes the guise of Deiphobos to vanquish Hector, employing feigned flight to lure him into the presence of Achilles (Iliad 22.222-47). She takes on a variety offorms to counsel Odysseus while remaining invisible to others. She also uses transformations on him: she changes him into a beggar to protect him when he returns to Ithaca (Odyssey 13.429-440), and enhances his appearance when he encounters Nausicaa (Odyssey 6.229-37) and when he meets Penelope in his true form (Odyssey 23.IS6). She appears as Mentor to Telemachus (Odyssey 2.267, 22.2os), as a beautiful woman, skilled in handiwork, to Penelope (16. ISS), and as a youth to Odysseus (13.221-SS), who not only recognizes her but tries to beguile her in tum. Athena's special patronage of Odysseus is well known. For example, Ajax reproaches Odysseus during the funeral games for Patroclus: "Ah now! That goddess made me slip on my feet, who has always stood over Odysseus like a mother, and taken good care of him" (Iliad 23.782-83). The aid of Athena and Hermes forearms Odysseus against the magic of Circe, and her advice in tum directs him to Hades and the counsel of the dead seer Teiresias. In Hades he gains the necessary foreknowledge to beware of the cattle of the sun, return home, and placate Poseidon; he also gains foreknowledge of the fate ofhis wife and son (Odyssey 11.90-137). Circe also forewarns him about the Sirens, Symplegades, Scylla and Charybdis, and the cattle of the sun (Odyssey I2.3S-I4I). Athena's warning saves him from being murdered by the suitors in his palace, a fate that is explicitly compared to the death of Agamemnon at the hands of the treacherous Clytemnestra (Odyssey 13.374-91). The combination of strategy, foresight, and privileged information through divine aid thus gives Odysseus a unique foreknowledge of events that allows him to survive alone the ordeals of the trip home. at Iliad 23.316-17. For Odysseus's skill as a navigator, see Odyssey 5.270. For Athena's ability to plan out or plot a way (poros), see Odyssey 5.382. 1 5For further discussion, see Detienne and Vernant 1978.177-85.

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2I9

Athena makes plain the basis of their affinity in metis when Odysseus tries to best her disguise with a lie of his own: It would take a sharp fellow [kerdaleos], and a stealthy one indeed [epiklopos] to get past you in any kind of cunning [dolos], even if a god should go against you. You hard man, and devious, you never have enough trickery [dolos], nor even in your own country will you give up the language of deception and thievery that has always been dear to you. But come, enough of this talk, for we two think alike [eidotes ampho kerde'], since you for your part are far and away the best among mortals for shrewdness (boule) and the power of words, while I of all the gods am famous for my cleverness [metis] and trickery [kerde].

(Odyssey 13.291-99)

But it is Penelope who is the key to the kleos, as well as the nostos, of Odysseus. In the Odyssey, the expression "whoever is best of the Achaeans" occurs only in answer to the question of who will marry Penelope. 16 Odysseus's revenge is the heroic theme of the Odyssey; it is worthy of kleos. In the Odyssey, his prime heroic act is the killing of the Achaean suitors; its stimulus is Penelope, and it is she who thus defines his heroic identity. Penelope is renowned for both virtue and metis. Her ruse of weaving the shroud of Laertes by day and unweaving it by night protects her household until it is discovered by the treacherous maids (Odyssey 19. 137-56), with whom she contrasts in the strongest terms. In her interview with the beggar-Odysseus, she creates a code in which they can exchange information before hostile ears (19. 121-22 and 154-55) and devises and communicates a means for his homecoming, the contest of the arrows (19.570-81). The Odyssey ends on Odysseus's realization of the true extent of her metis, as a result of her ultimate test of Odysseus himself Odysseus is polumetis; Penelope is ekhephron, "having good sense," or periphron, "very sensible." In the Odyssey the term ekhephron is applied once to Odysseus (13.332) and frequently to Penelope (4.III and 24. 198). Its close synonyms periphron and epiphron are also used of Penelope (16.435 and 19.326), the latter word occurring in the phrase epiphrona metin, circumspect metis. Periphron is also used of other famous women, for example, of Alkinoos's wife, Arete (II.344), and 16See

Odyssey r6.76, r8.289, 19.528, 20.335 and Nagy 1979-36-39.

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of Odysseus's nurse, Eurykleia (19.357, 21.381). Its one occurrence in the Iliad is applied to Aigialeia, the daughter of Adrastos (Iliad 5.412). Like Odysseus, Penelope is not easily swayed by appearances; she maintains an indifferent and skeptical attitude toward a variety of portents ofhis arrival. She benefits from Athena's protection, but her perspicacity and her devices are her own. Like Athena, she excels in weaving. She acts without acting by unweaving what she has designed and thereby preserves her design intact. Just as Homer is the master bard, Penelope is the master weaver, whose designs preserve the future life of Odysseus in a simulacrum of the death of Laertes. All this she achieves by skillful dissimulation: to the suitors, her own maids, and, even to Odysseus. As Winkler has pointed out, the interview between Odysseus and Penelope (Odyssey 19) is not a twobut a three-way transaction: between Odysseus, Penelope, and the maids, personified by Melantho.17 In the interview, Odysseus and ~nelope cooperate to an extraordinary degree in imparting information to each other without alerting the hostile maids of his arrival. Penelope conveys to Odysseus the information that she still loves him (Odyssey 19. 136) and that she has run out of designs [mitis] (19.157-58). She tests the beggar because she suspects that he is Odysseus. It is she who controls the dialogue; her outer behaviorweeping (19.249-55)-mimics his inner behavior, and her cleverness and faithfulness are not lost on her husband. In his disguise as a beggar, Odysseus in tum conveys the information that he has heard that Odysseus is a beggar, which she appears to disbelieve. Then, in an apparent digression, she asks Odysseus to interpret a dream in which an eagle swoops down and kills the geese that feed in her house (19.535-53). This is an odd request insofar as the dream provides its own clear interpretation, when the eagle announces that the dream is not a dream, that the geese are the suitors, and that the eagle itself is Odysseus, come to take vengeance on the suitors (19.547-50). Odysseus affirms the content of the dream by answering that "Odysseus" has told her its meaning (19.555-57). These deceptions in no way impair Penelope's reputation for virtue. Not only does she remain to this day a poetic image of the faithful wife, but within the Homeric tradition, the mitis of Penelope is contrasted with the cunning of Clytemnestra. Winning Penelope as his wife (again) is at the heart of Odysseus's status as the hero of the 1 7See

Winkler 1990, especially 148-56.

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Odyssey. Her strongest praise is spoken by Agamemmon himself, in the second Nekyia.ts 0 Fortunate son of Laertes, Odysseus of many wiles! It is truly with great merit [arete] that you got a wife. For the mind of blameless Penelope, daughter of Ikarios, was sound. She kept her lawful husband, Odysseus, well in mind. Thus the kleos of his arete shall never perish, and the immortals shall fashion for humans a song that is pleasing for sensible Penelope, unlike the daughter of Tyndareos, who devised evil deeds, killing her lawful husband; and among humans, she will be a hateful song. She will make for women an evil reputation, females that they are-even for the kind of woman who does noble things. (Odyssey 24. 192-203) Penelope's efficacious wisdom and her affinity with Odysseus in the quality of metis are unique in Greek literature. Penelope may be the best representative of a "feminine" metis, a metis of design, rather than control, whose actions and modalities are complementary and of equal value to the "masculine" metis of Odysseus. Individuals possessing either of these two aspects of metis share a certain like-mindedness (homophron) and recognize each other. In emphasizing this aspect of the marriage of Odysseus and Penelope, the Odyssey cunningly demonstrates that metis is not sex-specific. Beneath the convention of the domestic wife, Penelope is fully the metic equal of her husband. The realization that metis is a quality in which a woman may excel, and even surpass, a man becomes fully apparent in Odysseus's response to Penelope's final test of his identity. In the last lines of the Odyssey, with her impossible request that he move their marriage bed, Odysseus, and with him the Homeric audience, comes to the final realization that the mitis of Penelope is as great as his own. This realization is the long-delayed answer to the question Penelope poses to the beggar-Odysseus: "For how, guest-friend, shall you learn whether I surpass other women in my mind [noos] and in my thoughtful metis?" (Odyssey 19.325-26). tBSee Edwards 198s.88n36 and Nagy 1979.36-37 and 255-56, especially notes 1 and 2. Nagy proposes that this passage reflects the existence of formal traditions of praise and blame poetry, which respectively center on the themes of Penelope and Clytemnestra.

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Like-mindedness The Greek word homophron, "like-minded," appears seven times in the Homeric corpus, three in the phrase homophrona thumon ekhousai, "having a like-minded spirit."t9 In the Odyssey, the term is used of relations of intimacy; in the Iliad it is used of the oaths concluded between opponents. Odysseus describes homophrosune, "like-mindedness," as the harmony of husband and wife, which he praises to Nausicaa: "may they [the gods] grant you a husband and a house and sweet agreement [homophrosunein] in all things, for nothing is better than this, more steadfast, than when two people, a man and his wife, keep a harmonious household [homophroneonte]" (Odyssey 6. 181-84). Similarly, the term is used to describe the harmony of mother and daughter in the reunion of Demeter and Persephone.2o In this view, marriage is ideally the union of people who are "like-minded." In relations between men, the term homophron is used both of oneness of spirit between friends and of oaths and agreements concluded between opponents. Telemachus suggests to Peisistratus that they take an oath of friendship, based both on their early association as children and on their oneness of mind (Odyssey 15. 198). The occurrence of this term in the dual form homophroneonte, rather than the plural, emphasizes that this like-mindedness is a relation between two individuals. Polyphemus applies the term "like-minded" to the old ram that is his favorite (9.456). He interprets the animal's sudden slowness as grief for his own blinding at the hands of Odysseus and wishes that the animal were homophron enough to speak and tell him where Odysseus is hiding. In the Iliad and the Homeric hymns, the term homophron is also used to describe the harmony brought about by opponents' oaths and the like-mindedness of fellows on a quest. Achilles uses an analogy to justify his refusal to forgive Hector for the killing of Patroclus: "As there are no trustworthy oaths between men and lions, nor do wolves and lambs have spirits that can be brought to agreement [homophrona thumon ekhousai] but forever hold feelings ofhate for each other" (Iliad t9See Iliad 22.263, Hymn to Hermes 391, and Hymn to Demeter 434 . . 20See Hymn to Demeter 434, whic4 describes the reunion of Demeter and Persephone, how they embraced many times and rejoiced in spirit (thumos) all day "with their spirits as one" (homophron thumos).

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22.263). Zeus uses the term to urge Hermes and Apollo to come to an agreement and to search together for Apollo's missing cattle.21 The pattern of a man who excels in metis and seeks a partnership of like-mindedness with a wife whom he seeks for her wisdom and treats as an equal characterizes not only Odysseus, but Zhuge Liang. The one (possible interpolated) reference to Zhuge Liang's wife in chapter 117 describes her as woman of no beauty whom Zhuge seeks and marries because of her reputation for sageness (xian). She is no less than his female counterpart. Like him, she is described as an "extraordinary talent" (qi cat}; her learning extends to strategy and magic, and she shares in his studies (SG YY 117, 3. 1494, BrewittTaylor 2.585). Although there are no accounts of women warriors in the Han, several women warriors, strategists, and other female heroic figures appear in the Romance. Specifically martial women include Lady Sun, Liu Bei's wife (chapters 54-55, 61, and 84) and Meng Huo's wife, the woman warrior Lady Zhu Rong (chapter 90). Other women who perform heroic actions of sacrifice or strategy include Diao Chan (chapter 8), Lady Gan and Lady Mi (chapters 25-26, 4041), and the mother of Xu Shu (chapter 36). It is interesting that on the whole the heroines of the Romance, even those who resort to strategy and deception, are portrayed without the irony or ambivalence that attaches to their male counterparts, and Mao himself remarks that the women in the narrative are superior to the men.22 Given the traditional roles of women and the separation of the sexes in Greece and China, it is intriguing that both Odysseus and Zhuge Liang take pains to marry women renowned for wisdom, whom they seem to treat as equals and counterparts.23

Conclusions Monkey and Odysseus each fulfill a quest, largely through the use of metic abilities and through a partnership with a metic deity which 2 1 See Hymn to Hermes 389-94: "But Zeus laughed aloud when he saw his evilplotting child well and knowingly (epistamenos) denying guilt with regard to the cattle. And he bid both of them to be of one mind [homophron thumos] and to search for them." Similarly, at Hymn to Hermes 195, Apollo says that in pursuit of the stolen cattle, his hounds were "like humans, all of one mind (homophrones)." 22 Plaks 1987.484-85, quoting SGYY Mao 55, 9.23; 118, 19.27; and dufa item 16, p.

10.

23See Guisso 1981 for a discussion of the role of women in early China as described in the Five Classics.

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Knowing Words

is based on a mixture of guidance, camaraderie, and trickery. The two heroes and the two goddesses use stratagems, deceits, versatility, speed, and expertise of various kinds. All four have special perceptual abilities, which emphasize knowledge of the future or the ability to make accurate predictions. However much the two metic goddesses Athena and Guan Yin may seem to agree in their means, they differ considerably in their ends. Athena guides and protects out of a common predisposition toward metis that she shares with Odysseus. The "metis" of Guan Yin is actually fang bian, the "skillful means" of the Buddhist sage. The bodhisattva controls Monkey and transforms him from a trickster into a sage by means of the cunning intelligence that is his own dominant quality. Guan Yin herself presents no moral ambiguity to the reader. Athena, on the other hand, has a double role. The bearer of the aegis of Zeus, she is his daughter and representative of his authority. She is also a trickster when she lures Hector to his death. There is an interesting confluence between the verbal meaning of zhi, "to recognize," as a trope within the Chinese historical tradition and the notion of "like-mindedness," or homophrosunein, within the Greek tradition. The former is preeminently represented by Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang, the latter by Odysseus and Penelope. Both the like-mindedness of Odysseus and Penelope in a common metis and the differences between the two are well described by the respective terms: metis and polumetis, for Odysseus; phrenes, "sensibility" for Penelope. The combination of wisdom, foresight, intricacy, virtue, and a certain hard-headedness characterizes not only Penelope and other wise women of the Homeric tradition, but also Guan Yin. Penelope and Guan Yin, perhaps even more than Odysseus and Monkey, illustrate the comparability of metis and fang bian, as pointed out by Bernard Faure.24 There is, in both the journey to the West and the Odyssey, a significant opposition between being known or recognized and being unknown, unrecognized, or forgotten. In Chinese, the distinction is between wu ren zhi, or "nobody knows me," and zhi, recognition. In Greek, the distinction is between lethe, or "forgetfulness," and alethes, in its Ho24 For a discussion of the Homeric epithets for metic women, see page 219 of this chapter. Faure's reflections on metis and the Buddhist tradition are discussed in chapter

7·

Skillful Means

22 5

meric sense of "true" as remembered or un-forgotten. 25 It may be noteworthy, however, that in the Chinese tradition, the "knower" is an individual. In Greek usage, the "knower" is the tradition itself. This emphasis on the individuality of knowledge in Chinese "recognition" stories presents an interesting counterexample to the view that the Chinese tradition is generalizing and abstract, in contrast to certain individualizing tendencies in the Greek tradition. 25for an excellent and detailed discussion of the evolution of the meaning of truth from the opposition true vs. forgotten (leth-) to the opposition true vs. false (pseudes), see Detienne 1973, especially 76-77, IIS, 124, and 142. Cf. also Nagy 1990a.s8-70.

CHAPTER

10

Conclusions

The goal of this study has been twofold. First, I have attempted to establish the philosophical and interpretive importance of a conceptual category of "metic intelligence," or zhi, within the Chinese philosophical tradition. Second, I have used existing scholarship on metis in the Greek tradition to assay a tentative comparison of the instances of metic intelligence in the intellectual traditions of early Greece and China. By using representative Warring States period philosophical texts and late Ming texts that reflect on their historical sources, I have established a continuous concern with, and vocabulary for, a conceptual category of metic intelligence. I have adapted the orientation and methodology of Detienne and Vernant's investigation of metis to the Chinese tradition by locating indigenous questions of the Chinese philosophical tradition that can serve as focal points for an investigation of metic intelligence and by modifying their philological methods to account for differences in philosophical discourse. This study began with Detienne and Vernant's argument that Greek thought is polarized into two distinct and opposed notions of human reason: the speculative reason of the philosophical tradition and the practical (and cunning) reason of an extraphilosophical textual tradition that begins with Homer and pervades ten centuries of Greek thought. 1 They use the delineation of semantic fields to help reveal 1 See Detienne and Vernant 1978. For a discussion of the disparagement of metis in the thought of Plato and Aristotle, see Detienne and Vernant 1978.Jo8-16. For a possible counterargument based on Plato's Phaedrus, see Nussbaum 1986.218-21 and 310.

226

Conclusions

227

the scope and characteristics of a view that often expresses itself indirectly, and they find that certain terms, divinities, and images are consistently associated with metis. The problem of wisdom and cunning in Chinese views of zhi partially corresponds to the antithesis proposed by Detienne and Vernant. There does appear to be a fundamental tension between two different understandings of knowledge and a corresponding tension between two views of the relationship of knowledge to both language and morality. This division appears both in early philosophical works and in novels of a much later period. The aspect of the Chinese world view that best corresponds to the work of Detienne and Vernant is its division into two attitudes toward the relationship oflanguage and knowledge. Like the speculative philosophers of the Greek tradition, Confucian and Mohist thinkers rely on the possibility that language operates as a straightforward reflection of extramental reality. In both traditions, this attitude toward language takes the form of concern with ordering and quantitative measurement. In addition to their attempts to formulate a precise language for moral reasoning, the Neo-Mohists investigate optics, geometry, and mechanics and are particularly concerned with the notion of fa as an objective measure. There is also a deep connection between the notions of numbering and knowing in Greek thought about human cognition.2 In particular, the new science of Socrates, developed in the Protagoras, seeks to establish tekhne as a science of deliberative measurement. Aristotle describes tekhne in terms of the qualities of universal applicability, teachability, and concern with explanation to others (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1. 1, especially 98 1a5-7, 981a28-30, and 981b7-8). These four qualities are precisely those that metis eludes. In both Greece and China, a second viewpoint, the "distrust appearances" view, holds that the categories of language impede, rather than facilitate, the acquisition of true knowledge. Taoist and Militarist texts and the Greek extraphilosophical tradition on metis are all concerned with a realm of shifting particulars that can be apprehended and described only indirectly and with skill and cunning. This division into two attitudes toward language is related to a similar bifurcation in attitudes toward knowledge and morality. Con2Prometheus

calls numbering "chiefof all the stratagems" (Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound

459-60). According to Nussbaum, Pythagorean epistemology argues that something is graspable only insofar as it was numerically expressible. See Nussbaum 1986. 106-8.

228

Knowing Words

fucians, Mohists, and Platonists condemn the "clever language" of Taoists, Militarists, and Sophists of both traditions. Plato exiles the poets from the Republic and in the Laws condemns fishing and hunting with traps because they foster the qualities of cunning and duplicity, rather than the courage of the chase. 3 In a similar vein, Han Confucians revile the sophistries of the Strategies of the Warring States. By contrast, the Taoists, especially Zhuangzi, emphasize the importance of a morally neutral awareness that sometimes requires cunmng. Yet the abilities of metis are not so much ignored as appropriated by the dominant philosophical viewpoints of Han Confucianism and Greek philosophy. Confucians and Legalists adapt wu wei to their own programs, and Xunzi may have adapted the arguments of Zhuangzi to his own purposes. 4 In the later fictional tradition, Zhuge Liang may rely on the abilities of metis, but he has been transformed into an acceptable Confucian hero. Plato redefmes certain qualities associated with metis to suit his own epistemological priorities, and Socrates compares himself to Odysseus and Prometheus, both devisers oflife-saving stratagems.s Each philosopher is developing what he considers to be "great knowledge." In Plato's case, the soteriological activity is the development of the abstract, active intellect through tekhnai, which includes the ability to quantify and describe things precisely in words.6 By contrast, Taoist views suggest that true knowledge (da zhi) eludes language and can be expressed only by indirection. Plato may distrust the language of the poets, but he quotes it wholesale. In addition to his frequent quotation of Homer, he appro3Plato condemns sea fishing, line fishing, and all forms of hunting with nets and traps. See Laws 823d-824a and Detienne and Vemant 1978.33· 4See Nivison 1991. 5 In describing his debates with the Sophists in the Protagoras, Socrates compares himself to Odysseus indirectly by quoting the phrase "then I recognized," which Odysseus uses in Hades when he recognizes the might (bie) of Herakles (Odyssey 11.601), whom he likens to Hippias (315b). See Nussbaum 1986.105-6, 131, and 448n41. Earlier in the dialogue, Socrates attributes the origin of tekhne to Prometheus. When Epimetheus prematurely squandered all his life-saving gifts on the animals, Prometheus stole wisdom (sophia) from Athena and fire from Hephaistos in order to provide for humankind (322d-e). Towards the end of the dialogue, Socrates states explicitly his appropriation of "Promethean thought" (promethoumenos) for his own (361d). For a discussion of Prometheus as an exemplar of mitis, see Detienne and Vemant 1978.58. 6 For a detailed discussion of tekhne in the Protagoras, see Nussbaum 1986.89-121.

Conclusions

229

priates Pindar's image of the growing plant to represent the soul and recasts Hesiod's battle of the giants or gigantomakhia in his own voice (Sophist 246a-c). In this account, the Olympians represent the "Lovers of Forms," who use mitis and tekhni to triumph over the brute force of the Titans, the materialists. 7 To this point, the Chinese evidence seems to support Detienne and Vernant's suggestion that metic intelligence is a universal mode of intelligence, but their view of mitis fails to address several important points. As Nussbaum has pointed out, the metic hunter-trapper and the Platonic philosopher share common goals and beliefs. Both strive for self-sufficiency and both believe in at least the possibility of invulnerability to circumstance and accident. s Nussbaum contrasts these attitudes with the view that human life and human excellence are inevitably subject to chance or tukhi, which cannot by controlled by reason or cunning, a view she associates with Greek tragedy and with the thought of Aristotle. Her analysis, then, turns on two fundamentally different attitudes to tekhne and tukhe and their relation to human excellence, not on metis. Some Chinese metic characters seem to conform to Nussbaum's view of the Greek "hunter-trapper." Both Confucians, who distrust metic intelligence, and Militarists, who rely on it, share central concerns with the creation and maintenance of order and the skills of foresight and prediction. Confucians preserve these skills by derogating them to the inferior realm of wu. A second strand of the "distrust appearances" viewpoint relies less on cunning than on a subtle, apparently quiescent, understanding. This is the ming of Laozi and Zhuangzi, to which we might add the subtlety of Penelope and the skillful means of Guan Yin. These abilities are associated with perception and light: far-seeing eyes, acute ears, the ability to guan, look down from a bird's-eye view. The Chinese tradition represents them by the Taoist metaphors of water, the feminine, darkness, the unworked block, and the unformed infant. In sum, we seem to be confronted by two kinds of metis. Detienne and Vernant have focused on the controlling metis of the hunter, the same metis that Socrates appropriates in identifying himself with Pro7See Plato, Sophist 236a-c. For further discussion, see Nussbaum 1986.473-74n36. For the terms ankhinoia (quick-wittedness) and iiskeptos (too short to be observable), see Detienne and Vemant 1978.308-9. BSee Nussbaum 1986.18-21 and 310.

230

Knowing Words

methean tekhne. A second metis relies on flexible response to change (ying bian), rather than on the manipulation of events. We find it in the designs of Penelope, the upaya of Guan Yin, and, more generally, in the wu wei attitude of Taoism, as contrasted to the "you wei" approach of Plato. We could describe it as organic rather than artifactual, "feminine" rather than "masculine," yin rather than yang. Both Nussbaum's arguments and the treatment of zhi in the Chinese tradition appear to modify Detienne and Vernant's argument for metis as a mode of human reasoning. On the other hand, there seems to be a broad polarization between two modes of thought in both the Chinese and the Greek tradition. The introduction of two conceptual models may help redefine the issue in a way that will sustain the objections both Nussbaum and I raise to Detienne and Vernant's original claims for metis The first schema is the Buddhist distinction between wisdom (prajnti) and skillful means (upaya). The second adapts the Militarist notion of straightforward (zheng) and indirect (qr) approach. 9 In both schemas, the relation between the two modes of reasoning and action is one of distinction and complementarity, rather than opposition. Both schemas have the advantage of addressing means independently of ends. We can account for both the you wei plots of Odysseus and the wu wei designs of Penelope as oblique means toward similar ends. Both "distrust appearances"; both are oblique; both rely on skillful means more than on discursive wisdom. By contrast, the Greek philosopher and the Confucian junzi "face facts" resolutely in linguistic practice and moral orientation. Their means follow lines, rather than twists. In this view, the metic hunter and the speculative philosopher, Chinese or Greek, are alike in their quest for control. Their means, however, are different; the hunter relies on upaya and the philosopher on prajna. Both Antigone and Zhuangzi are alike in their disbelief in the possibility of such control. Each is in this sense wu wei, but Sophocles' Antigone uses straightforward speech and actions, while Zhuangzi is all twists, turns, reversals, and recursions. A second endeavor of this book was to determine a continuous semantic field for metic intelligence in the Chinese context. The method of establishing a semantic field for metic intelligence proved 9'fhe latter has been taken up as an organizing principle in modern military strategy. See Hart I968.I5-18.

Conclusions

23 I

unworkable in Chinese philosophical texts because of the widespread tendency of individual Warring States period philosophers to adapt conceptual categories to their own discourse. A possible alternative for future study might be to apply a context-sensitive approach to philosophical terminology in the study of Greek, as well as Chinese, texts. The Appendix demonstrates a tentative Chinese semantic field for "wisdom" and "cunning" within the context of general cultural and philosophical knowledge of the philosophical schools of the Warring States period. The first table displays semantic fields for a variety of words for wisdom and cunning. The columns indicate the laudatory (+ + ), pejorative (--), or ambivalent ( +-) usage of these terms in these texts. There is clearly a major divide between the ConfucianMohist "face facts" view (columns 3-6) and the Taoist-Militarist "distrust appearances" view (columns 7-10). Even in the Greek case, we find that semantic usages are not consistent over time and context, especially if we apply Ferdinand de Saussure's concept of significant opposition within parole. to Examples include the changes in meaning, through significant oppositions, of such terms as aletheia, "truth," and episteme, "knowledge." Aletheia changes in meaning from "remembrance" to "truth."ll Episteme refers to practical knowledge in Homeric diction and is associated with metis; Hermes is described as being "knowing" (epistamenos) in his denial of guilt for the theft of Apollo's cattle. In the same line, he is described as "evil-plotting" or kakomedes (Hymn to Hermes 390-9I). The term medea, "plots," is associated with metis in such phrases as dolous kai medea, for example, at Iliad 3.202. Socrates appropriates the term episteme for deductive, scientific knowledge of universals and uses it in close association with tekhne (Plato, Protagoras 3 57b-c). Aristotle uses it to mean "abstract knowledge," in contrast to doxa, "opinion" (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I I42a23-30). In this book I have raised, but not resolved, a number of important issues germane to metic intelligence. What can we learn by relocating the old problem of "theoretical versus practical intelligence" from Greece to China? How do our notions of essence and nature accommodate a protean foe that eludes them, like a hero of artifice? What does metic intelligence teach us about "know-how" and "know-that" tOSee Benveniste 1966.49-56, with reference to Saussure 1916. llfor changes in the meaning of aletheia, see Detienne 1973.

232

Knowing Words

knowledge? The shifts of Zhuangzi, the metis of Homer, and the uptiya of the Journey to the ~st not only talk about metic intelligence, they use it. The oblique strategies of these texts, which often stand on the border of philosophy and poetry, challenge and broaden established notions of genre and discourse. Such techniques may extend our understanding of both the artifices of philosophical texts and the philosophical content of texts and genres we habitually do not admit into the province of philosophical discourse.

Appendixes

233

Appendix 1. Warring States Terms for Wisdom and Cunning ;?!J

:§., ::t

Term (Meaning) ~

..:: VJ

~

::;:..

t3

::t

;:-:.

:i

-..l

.N

.N

~

~

~

~

::

::

-- --

gui (deception)

It hui (wisdom) :tl ji (device) it ji (plan) li, !If jian (treachery) ~

.N

.N

::t

c

++

Q

::t ...::t~ .N:: ...~ ::t

~

ce (strategy)

fj cha (discerning) ~

.....

-~

VJ

~~

++

++

++

++

++ ++

++ ++

++++ ++ ++

++ ++ ++ ++

++

++

++ ++

++ ++

++

jue (craft)

Ia lu (forethought) ming (enlighten[ed]) ~ mou (counsel) fit qi (oblique) "Pj qiao (clever) :M quan (power) ~ sheng (sage) ~shu (art) ,'&. si (ponder) j$: suan (devise) Ill tu (plan) 1A wei (artifice, perverse) ¥ xue Oeaming) II yin (deceit) U! ~ ying bian (response to change) ~you (plan) ftt't yu (stupidity) l!f zhe (wisdom) 1E zheng (straight) ~ zhi (know) til zhi (wisdom)

++

~

++

++ +

++ ++

--

+-

+-

+-

++

++

++

++

++

++ ++

+--

++ ++

++

+

++

++

-- -++

+

++

-- -++

+-

++ ++

++ ++

+-

++

++

++ ++ ++

++ ++ ++

++ ++ ++

++ ++

++

++ +-

++ ++ ++

++ ++

Note: The symbols here and in Appendix 2 indicate laudatory(+), pejorative(-), or ambivalent(+-) usage of terms for wisdom and cunning.

234

Appendixes

Appendix 2. Terms for Wisdom and Cunning in Two Ming Novels Tenn (Meaning)

til! fang bian (skillful means) il: gui (deception) II hui (wisdom) ll ji (device) it ji (plan) Ji, ff jian (treachery) iS jue (craft) rtl lu (forethought) l!ij ming (enlighten(ed]) !¥ mou (counsel) if qi (oblique) "flj qiao (clever) quan (power) !I sheng (sage)

e

~shu ~

(art)

si (ponder)

JJ suan (devise) Ill tu (plan) fa wei (artifice, perverse) !J xue (learning) II yin (deceit) 1111! ying bian (response to change) It you (plan) ll yu (stupidity) !f zhe (wisdom) ~ zhi (know) tv zhi (wisdom)

Sanguo yanyi

Xiyouji ++

++-++ ++

++ ++ ++ ++ ++-++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++

++ ++ ++

++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++

++-++ ++

++ ++

++

++ ++ ++

Appendixes

Appendix 3. Semantic Range Signific

Laudatory

D speak

~

Ambivalent Derogatory

zhi

""9: woman I work •C.' mind

~.

qiao It hui

iijian

l1j

Q! cong

miyu

EEl" Sl

IC.\

~zhang

B light El speech *wood

I.llu ~ ming W zhi :t cai

"}t dog

§ eye

!f zhe llji • quan ~yu

liJ suan ltlyu

~monkey

]§}ear

ll!! cong

1:8 tiger

lu IDt shuo

"B" speech

fE bird

msheng

ra

ilit mou it ji • quan

gui fF zha ~

23 5

236

Character List

Character List ~ffi;

a

*•

&

~ ~ft ~ff

ffl

m

m~ m~ m~~ m~

:A:

:A:1* :A:*

twmf,ij ::fiil ::f?& ::ft. ::f*

::f~::f~ ::f~

-;J

-;Jf,ij~M!

-tlt~M!

WW!

lf!Wif$

m

• ~

jfjl{,,

m' ~

An min Ba Ban chou Bao Bian (transformation) Bian dai Bian zha Bian (distinguish) Bian (dialectic) Bian qiao Bian wu Bian yan tan Bian zhe Bing Bing fa Bingjia Bo dao shu Bu li Buran Buren Bu shan Bu shi bu zhi Buzhi Cai Cai shu zhi qian Cai wei zhi qian Cao Cao Cao man zhuan Ce Cha Chan Chan xin Chang Chen

Character List

•

RlG•C.' kM tfj

tfj~tfJMi

1& Jf!IJ)3 II.!IJJ3i!i11!Jil

*

II.! IJ)3 )(: '~ *.rr

7dff

-J\.1& *~

*.til: *.1!Jil

ft~

~

m

mtt! mtt!~

m*

m:fJ( mfiij 1.! ~!If

!iE•C.' Yiiij

~ll¥ ~

~* &rmm1i!I:·C.' 15~

:11: :11:~~:11: ~

~

Cheng xin Chou (plan) Chou (bind, plan) Chu (emergence) Chu qi zhi sheng Chu (seclusion) Congming Cong ming sheng zhi Cong ming wen si Da Daji Dajian Daqu Dayan Dayou Da zhi Dan kong Dang Dao Dao de Dao dejing Daojia Daojiao Dao shu De Dijian Ding xin Duan Duo mou Fa Fajia Fanjianji Fang xin Fang bian Fei Fei shi shi fei Fu Gan

237

238

Character List

i}

il,C., I

3fE I[ I[ 'If ~ ~Bm

m'Bit

• ~

~f:E

imiil ~ {~~

• • ~

r!lW !k.~

~

at

tt-fill tt-iil

~.!If

!!fit ~H~

~~ilt

!tffilzm ;tiii" !Iftil

fffW.tJ Jt

~ ~ttittt-

•• ~ ~ilt

Gong (impartial) Gong xin Gong (work) Guai Guan Guan Yin Gui Gui dao Guiji Heng He He zong Hulu Hua Huamin Huang Hui Hui zhi Huo hou Ji (device) Ji (hasty) Ji (plan) Ji ce Jimou (treachery) Jian Jianji Jianneng Jian shi Jian shuo Jian wei zhi dao Jian yan Jian xiong Jian zhi li Jian (see) Jiang Jiang ji jiu ji Jinnang Jing Jing shuo

Character List ~ ~-r

PI

1L 1!13 1LTD 1!f~~

~m ~ ~-r

~flj flj~

tJ lm iii

fiJA.

~.lltlll

r.u

jljit

r.l It IL1E~ ~

Blii Mi ~A.~

•-r

1&~

1&. ~

~*

1fP ~1!13

1!13~ 1!13~

1!13 ,L, 1!13~

Jue Junzi Ke KongMing Kongzi Kou Ku rouji Kua bian Kuan Laozi Lei shu Li (profit) Limin Li ren Li (force) Li (principle) Li (rites) Lian heng Liangmou Lie Liu Bei Lu Luan Luan zheng ming Lue Lun Man Mei renji Mengzi Miaoji Miao suan Ming (names) Mingjia Mingshi Ming (fate) Ming (enlighten[ed], discerning) Mingde Mingjun Mingxin Mingzhi

239

Character List

240

l!fl.:t

.fQ

•• •.:r ~

a~

alJa

it±

••:a:.A. fflG4J:tE7\:

ms ·~ pg:PJ-

fjg

f;I: [!!: zp:~

-fit

-fif:t -fifm: -ittt ltil -it IE

~

115 11515~

115ft 115~

YjJJ

}:5"i" ~ ~l!fl::>c!,

m

'9:'9:

fit

fFIJ$ >JJJ *f!W-1' ~w ~

~

II! A ~

±

• !k:

:J£

:Ji!:~F :Ji!:~~F~F

~

ilt

~ ~w ~

~~

** **~ a.:r

•

j!J,g ~m~ ~.:;-

5fllf.!J

Renren Renxin Renyi Renzheng Sanming Shan Shang Shang di She yiji Shen Shenji Shen ji miao suan Shen zhi hun Shen zhi Sheng (produce) Sheng (sage) Shengren Shi (strategic advantage) Shi (administrator) Shi (arrow) Shi (substantial) Shi (this) Shi fei Shi shi fei fei Shi {poem) Shi (recognize) Shu Shu zhi Shuo Si Su ben SuQin Suzi Suan Suan ding SunWukong Sunzi Tanci

241

Character List

242

7C

•t¥it SR~

9d. --~~ Ill

• .:E.

S::>c Sin=

lt!Jij

••

~f.i

::>c ::>c:iit nil

1i.ff

:iit

• •• ••

1M I!:! 1M .A.~ fM::fS

fMf.i

1Mif

-~ fMW 1' 1]\

-~1]\fl" 1N& I]\

.A.

1]\'i!t

fill Jf

1J'W

Tian Tian di Tiao Tiaoji Tiao tiao zhi zhi Tu (crafty) Tu (plan) Wang Wei (perverse) Wei wen Wei zha Weiming Wei (deem) Wei (plan) Wei (consciousness) Wen Wenwu Wen (hearsay) Wuxing Wu Wu Wu qiang Wu renzhi Wuming Wumou Wuwei Wuxue Wuyou Wuyu Wuzhi Wu zijing Xia Xiao Xiaoji Xiao qu Xiao ren Xiao yan Xiao zhi Xian (divine) Xian (worth)

Character List JllilW~

Jlijl] lit Ic.\

tl.A.

IC.\¥ lc.\~

lc.\~~~

~

tt ~~ ~!r

a

~lc.\

aw

ll!R!!IU!Jf 3?:

J?:tt! 3?:~

¥ ¥1C.\

107II&

1t IIJ.JJ

~~

t!1 PJ

PJiil PJ~ ~

~~

II ~ ~IIJ.JJ

.!!!~ .!!!~ ~bt ~

Xian liang zhi sheng Xian ming Xian ren Xin (sincere, trustworthy) Xin (mind, heart) Xin xue Xin yuan Xin yuan yi rna Xing (conduct, configuration) Xing quan Xing (nature) Xiu Xiu sheng Xiu xin Xu Xu shi Xu xu shi shi Xuan XuanDe Xuanzhe Xue Xue xin Xunzi Yan (strictness) Yan (speech) Yang Yanyi Ye Yi (use) Yi li Yi wei Yi (righteous) Yi bing Yin (deceit) Yin (yin) Yin yang Ying bian Ying xing Yingxiong Yong (courage)

243

244

Character List

~~

m

m~

JIHt m~rr

mA.

JIB~~ ffl~ ~~

1'I :tff.£ It fi

!!tA.

~

m El

i'F :N:

i'F\il i'FII*

~

!f !f.:E !f)'(!Jij i!&Jm .IE .IE;g .IE•C.'

w w.ra W~!ij

w~

wng

Wf,ij WJJ:

~ ~ ~~~B

~-

Yang gong Yang (use) Yang bing Yongji Yang guiji Yongren Yang xingji Yongzhong Yang shi You You wei You (plan) Yu (stupidity) Yuren Yu (desires) Yuan Yue Zha Zhajue Zha xiang Zhang Zhang (plan) Zhe Zhe wang Zhe wen ming Zheng li Zheng Zhengming Zheng xin Zhi (knowledge, wisdom) Zhi lu Zhiming Zhi mou Zhi neng Zhi shu Zhi suan Zhi (understanding) Zhi (know) Zhi hi zhiji Zhi di

Character List Zhi ren Zhi yin Zhongji Zhong Zhong·xin Zhu mou Zhuan Zhuge Liang Zong Zongheng Zong hengjia

245

Selected Bibliography

Chinese Primary Sources The following abbreviations are used for major editions of primary sources:

HY SPTK ZZJC

Harvard- Yenching Sinological Index Series Ssu Pu Ts'ung K'an lm$&fiJ Zhuzi]icheng ~T-fflG

Chun qiu jing zhuan yinde ff.tx~ {$51 t!. Annotated by Kong Yingda it ¥Jj • et al. 2 vols. Shanghai: Guji chuban she, 1983. Er ya flft (EY). HY. Feng Meng-long ?!&~ft. Zhi nang Wli (The Wisdom Sack). N.p., 1626. Feng Meng-long ?.1¥- ft. Zhi nang bu Wfifilj (Additions to the Wisdom Sack). 1634. 2 vols. Heilongjiang: Ren min, 1987. Guji tushujicheng ti4-lil • • n!G. Compiled by Chen Menglei !!J!i~tf et al. Presented to the emperor in 1725. Taipei: Wenxing shudian, 1964. Han Feizi -~~T (HF). Edited by Gu Shiche D!t:lfi. Taipei: Zhonghua, 1966. Han shu. if {HS). Compiled by Ban Gu fl.£ li!il. Commentary by Yan Shigu Mli!iti. Beijing, Zhonghua, 1962. Huainanzi $M!-T (HN). ZZJC. Huang Di suwen zhijie Ji'.W rR, mr IW. Annotated by Gao Shizong f.fj ± Shanghai: Kexue jishu wenxian, 1980. ]ingfa it~~. Annotated by Mawangdui Han mu boshu zhengli xiaozu JEE jfE•&IiHff!&J!ltJ,il. Beijing: Wenwu, 1976. Laozi dao dejing ~.:rm~~ (Lao). ZZ]C. Liji iii~ (LJ). HY. Liezi ~U-T (Lie). ZZ]C. Liu Shao ~BB. Ren we zhi A.~~- In Ren wu zhi yin de A.~~51~ (A Concordance to the Ren wu zhi). Compiled by Wolfgang Bauer. Tai pei: World Book Co., 1958. Reprint, San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1974. Lu shih chun qiu 8 .!!:;fft'c (LSQC). ZZ]C. Lun yu ~im (An.). HY. Mao shi ~~ (Mao). HY. Mengzi zhengyi ~-TlEft (M). HY.

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Selected Bibliography

247

Mozijiangu 1!-T-Mt.!i (Mo). ZZ]C. Sanguo ce =. ill m {SGC). Compiled by Liu Xuanhua 1!11r ft. 20 vols. Ming edition, edited by Deng Yizan BIJPJ.fl. N.p., 1594. Sanguo za shi =.ll§ $. Compiled by Tang Geng MH1t (1071-1121). 2 vols. In Li tiao yuan bian lu 'f:a!:7G~:l!C. 6755-99. N.p.: Han mu boshu zhengli xiaozu, 1968. Sanguo zhi =.m;& (SGZ). Compiled by Chen Shou lflW (233-297 c.E.). Commentary by Pei Songzhi fl~Z. Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959. Sanguo zhi pinghua =.m;&2li~ (SGZPH). Circa 1321. Facsimile reprint in Li shi tong su yanyi .If!~ 31-#} if 8\. Taipei: National Central Library, 1871. Sanguo zhi tong su yanyi .=.m~3i-#}j{f!l. (SGTSYY). Attributed to Luo Guanzhong &:R"ifl (c. 1364). Edited by Mao Lun .=§~and Mao Zonggang .=f.*lli!l· Hong Kong: Guangzhi, n.d. [Sanguo zhi yanyi]. "Li Jowu" commentary section. Li ]owu xian sheng pi ping sanguo zhi yanyi 'f:.$:B-9G~m~.=.m~iifl. Prefatory piece dated 1687. N.p., n.d. Shang shu zhengyi f.iliiJEft {SSZY). Commentary by Kong Anguo :fl.~ iU. Annotated by Kong Yinda :JUn~ et al. Taipei: Zhonghua, 1968. Shi ji ~ ia {SJ). Sima Tan a] J;. {?-112 B.C.E.) and Sima Qian a] J; it {145?-86? B.C.E.). Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959. Shuihu zhuan 7.1