Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of Empire 1901903990, 9781901903997

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KITA IKKI AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN

KITA IKKI AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN A VISION OF EMPIRE

by

BRIJ TANKHA University of Delhi with an English translation by Brij Tankha of

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE REORGANIZATION OF JAPAN (Kaizo hoan taiko)

KITA IKKI AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN A VISION OF EMPIRE

Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan by Brij Tankha was first published by Sampark in India in 2003. This edition has been published by arrangement with Sampark, and is for sale in all countries of the world except the countries of South Asia and South-east Asia. © A Vision of Empire – Brij Tankha © English translation of Kaizo hoan taiko by Kita Ikki – Brij Tankha This edition first published 2006 by GLOBAL ORIENTAL Ltd PO Box 219 Folkestone Kent CT20 2WP UK www.globaloriental.co.uk ISBN 1-901903-99-0 978-1-901903-99-7 [13-digit] All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the Publishers, except for the use of short extracts in criticism. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library

Set in 9/10.5pt Stone Serif by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester Printed and bound in England by Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wilts.

Contents

Acknowledgements Introduction Part I: Defining the Nation Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3

Kita Ikki: The Sado Years Kokutairon: The Constitution and the Emperor Kokutairon: Socialism and Society

Part II: Nationalism and Revolution Chapter 4 Chapter 5

The Xinhai Revolution: A View of China Japanese Nationalism and Chinese Revolution

vii viii 1 3 25 44 75 77 106

Part III: Ideology for an Empire

127

Chapter 6 Chapter 7

129 142

A Vision of the Future Ideals of the Nation

Conclusion

154

Fundamental Principles for the Reorganization of Japan

161

Preface Introduction

163 167

Chapter I Chapter II Chapter III

169 177

The People’s Emperor Limit on Private Wealth Three Principles of Land Distribution Limit to Private Land Holdings Chapter IV Unification of Big Capital by the State Chapter V Rights of Workers Chapter VI People’s Right to a Livelihood Chapter VII Reorganization Plan for Korea and Other Present and Future Possessions Chapter VIII The Powers of the State

180 184 191 196 208 216

vi Conclusion Endnotes Bibliography Index

Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan 228 230 257 267

Acknowledgements

T

his book began as a doctoral dissertation but since then has been substantially rewritten. I would like to take this opportunity to thank a number of people who have, over the years, helped not just in the writing of this book, but in broadening and deepening my knowledge of Japan. The late Professor P.A. Narsimha Murthy of Jawaharlal Nehru University under whom I began my research; my doctoral supervisor at Delhi University, and later colleague, Savitri Vishwanathan; Nagasaki Nobuko, who first suggested the idea of exploring the writings of Kita Ikki, and who has always been generous with her friendship and time; Hiraishi Naoaki, who helped me in my initial reading of Kita Ikki; and Miyamoto Moritaro who made many useful suggestions on my dissertation; Fujiwara Akira, Nakamura Heiji, Oshikawa Fumiko, Oshikawa Noriaki, Hitoshi and Nina Raj, Rick Emmert, Narusawa Akira, Kaneko Masaru, Nakamura Hisashi, Mitani Hiroshi, Banno Junji, Miyachi Masato, Hamashita Takeshi, Yamamuro Shinichi, who have, over the years, provided friendship as well as shaped my understanding of Japan. I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues in the Department, as well as at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Centre for the study of Developing Societies for their encouragement and support. It would not have been possible to do this work without the generous help of the library staff of the Tokyo University libraries, particularly of the Centre for Modern Japanese Legal and Political Documents, (Meiji shinbun zasshi bunko), the Institute of Historiographical Studies and the Faculty of Literature; the Kyoto University libraries, particularly of the Institute of Humanities; and of the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, Delhi University. I would like to thank the Japan Foundation for the fellowship given in 1984–85 that allowed me to do the research for the dissertation. I used the opportunity provided by subsequent research trips to get material not available here. I am grateful to Adil Tyabji for finding the time to edit the manuscript and Sunandan Roy Chowdhury for thinking that it should be published; and as always to Kamini and to Ishan and Akshaya for their love; and to my mother and father for making all this possible. Brij Tankha July 2003

Introduction

R

elations of affinity that bind communities and serve to galvanize them have a long genealogy that predates modern nationalism. The sense of being Japanese traces its origins to diverse sources but it is in the modern period, under the onslaught of Western colonialism that the Japanese built on, and reformed, this sense of identity to craft a modern nation that could meet the challenges of the modern world. The late-nineteenth century saw diverse debates on what it meant to be Japanese, and what shape and form the nation should take. These issues were fought over in the pages of newspapers and journals, as well as on the streets, as contending groups battled for their vision of Japan. It is the purpose of this work to examine one such vision, that of Kita Ikki (1883–1937), a late-Meiji ideologue, and through his writings see how he sought to answer the questions: What is Japan and what should its role be in Asia, and in the world? The project that Kita Ikki embarked upon grew out of his involvement with questions of the day and broadened into a wide-ranging analysis, which came up against fundamental issues with far-reaching implications. The twin poles of nationalism and socialism overarch the questions that Kita’s analysis addresses, and while reflecting on the one I hope to illuminate the other. As two clearly-defined doctrines, they are seen as diametrically opposed and in constant conflict. Nationalism gives rise to statist theories that seek to subjugate the individual to an artificially-created grouping, but it is not enough to consider only the homogenization of pre-modern diversity but also to note the new liberationist, as well as developmental possibilities, that the nation state offered to societies in Asia. Socialism, its ‘other’, as an ideology provided an institutional structure for the liberation of mankind by removing artificially created and historically contingent barriers of repression and division. However, given that its Eurocentric agenda appeared to be at odds with indigenous reality, it was pilloried as a foreign import and its adherents criticized as following alien gods. In this climate ideological projects – the new ‘isms’ found relatively few adherents compared to the mass followings that attracted religious groups.

Introduction

ix

I argue that far from being constant givens, the ideas cohering around the concepts of nationalism and socialism have been historically shaped and act as umbrella terms that overarch often conflicting concerns. To better comprehend this diversity it is necessary to go beyond the boundaries of intellectual history, and outside the theoretical productions of a thinker and an analysis and dissection of the specific processes of his thought. It becomes necessary to consider Kita Ikki’s ideas in the context of his times; as part of a continuing process of interlocution. It is an attempt to combine the breadth of intellectual history with the particularistic concerns expressed in the distress of his contemporaries. Rather than positing an unchanging and perennial set of ideas, I see them in a process of continuing development within an evolving framework of common concerns. The structure of the work is organized so that Kita’s ideas are considered in relation to the community of discourse within which these ideas were generated. The first chapters locate Kita Ikki in the context of Sado and the intellectual and political milieu within which he grew up. I examine his early writings that laid the core concerns that were to dominate his intellectual life and link these to the influences of his teachers and contemporaries. I then proceed to an examination of his central work The National Polity and Pure Socialism (Kokutairon oyobi junsei shakai shugi) in which Kita sought to define the nature of the modern Japanese state and its characteristics. In confronting this problem, Kita formulated a view of the process of historical evolution and the changing nature of political institutions, and from these postulates he proceeded to advance an argument that came into conflict with the emerging orthodox view expressed by the state. Kita attempted to delineate the lineaments of a modern state and saw it as an institution that grew with the ‘consciousness’ of the people. The internal problems of his intellectual constructs will only be considered to the extent that they are germane to my discussion. The emphasis is on the achievement of Kita in providing a general characterization of the modern Japanese state which is grounded in a historical understanding. Kita is quick to see the changes the Meiji settlement initiated that culminated in the establishment of a constitutional system. To Kita these events reflect the qualitative changes brought about in the various components of the political structure, nation, emperor and people. These changes created a new set of relationships and it is the understanding of these new relationships that lie at the core of Kita’s appreciation of modern Japan. The second set of chapters revolve around the relationship with China. Kita himself became friendly with, and was an active participant in, the activities of the various groups in Japan working with Chinese revolutionaries, and pursuing the dream of a regenerated

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China. Kita visited that country. Out of this extended stay and close involvement with events there emerged the Unofficial History of the Chinese Revolution (Shina kakumei gaishi). In this work, written for a Japanese audience and with an eye to providing policy-makers with an assessment of the political situation, Kita considered not only the guiding principles of the Chinese revolution but also the urgent necessity of reformulating Japanese policy to actively help and hasten the emergence of a new order in East Asia. This was a policy paper. The book, though it deals with the specific events of the 1911 republican revolution and attempts to evaluate individuals and policies, also touches upon larger questions concerning the nature of social transformation and the basis upon which relations between the two countries can and should be built. This work, therefore, supplements and advances the analysis of the Kokutairon regarding the characteristics of the modern state and brings into focus problems addressed in the analysis of nationalism and socialism. By concentrating on the relationship of these two countries the differences in the approach to their problems by nationalists and socialists can help to clarify our understanding of both these positions. It is with this purpose that the positions of Kotoku Shusui and other socialists is examined. To more precisely locate Kita Ikki’s views in the context of Japanese society, a broad survey of how different social and political groupings considered the ‘China problem’ is undertaken. The emphasis is on the prevailing intellectual perceptions, and therefore the analysis is based on a selection from a range of widely-read and highly-respected journals of various political persuasions. This survey, together with a consideration of the positions taken by a number of leading intellectuals provides the ‘context’ within which Kita formulated his position, and it is in relation to this community that Kita’s ideas can be appreciated. Here the arguments, and particularly the lack of concern among the socialists for certain issues like the Chinese revolution, is considered, for in contrast they highlight the problems we are concerned with and to which we return in the conclusion. The republican revolution in China serves as a focus for the questions that Kita and his contemporaries were grappling with, and provides us an occasion to consider the question of nationalism and socialism not as a set of ideas but as clusters of ideas that evolve and reflect the problems of the day. It also enables us to consider these ideas, not in relation to some European ideal, but within the Asian context. Japan had yet to become a fully-fledged colonial power in China but it was well set on the road to dominance after the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–5. The third part of the book examines Kita Ikki’s Fundamental Principles for the Reorganization of Japan (Nihon kaizo hoan taiko) and the vision that this embodied. This was his last major work and was

Introduction

xi

said to have exercised an influence on the young officers who attempted the February 1936 coup to bring about direct imperial rule. This was written in Shanghai in 1919. This tract was written against the backdrop of the Russian revolution and the rice riots in Japan and sought to provide a road map for the reconstruction and rebuilding of Japan as well as laying down the principles on which Japan could build its empire. According to Kita, many Chinese read this book and the leaders of the February 1936 were said to have been influenced by it. Kita Ikki came to maturity and wrote his major works that form the basis of our study during this period of change and these ideas, because they are unorthodox and differ from those he called the ‘socalled socialists and nationalists’, provide an opportunity to focus sharply on the evolving concerns of the time. Kita was born on 15 April 1883 in a family that had been well off in the past but because of his father’s unsuccessful efforts at saké brewing was in straitened financial circumstances. He grew up in the relatively remote island of Sado where he attended primary and secondary school. He was fortunate in having very competent and inspiring teachers from his early days. While still in school he began to take an interest in the questions of the day. Kita developed both as an avid reader and writer. He wrote poetry influenced by the poets Yosano Akiko and Tekkan, and essays for local magazines and newspapers, and these articles, as we shall subsequently see, were influenced by the tradition of the people’s rights movement as well as by a sense of personal involvement that was so characteristic of Meiji society. The public good was a very real and engrossing concern for the people. Involvement and participation for the improvement of the nation was a widely-accepted and relativelyunquestioned postulate. Kita, as he himself acknowledged, was also exposed to the growing influence of emperor-centred loyalism, the increasingly aggressive, if not self-confident, nationalism that grew with the successes of war against the Chinese and the building of the economy. These influences were balanced by the democratic ideas that had been espoused by the advocates of the people’s rights movement and were advocated by various socialist and Christian thinkers. As industry grew and the people were exposed to the unsettling pressure of capitalist development, they began to organize themselves to try and alleviate their miseries through legislation and collective bargaining. The major characteristic of these limited movements was, as elsewhere, that they attempted to work within the framework of capitalist development. There were some socialists, like Kotoku Shusui and Katayama Sen, who from their study of the European classics, formulated a more rigorous and scientific understanding of the functioning of society. They saw society and social behaviour as governed by laws

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that once understood could be used to bring about revolutionary change and to create a just and equitable society. Kita spent his formative years in Sado, and it was only when he was twenty-three, after his father had died and moral and financial responsibility as the eldest son fell on him, that he came to Tokyo to carve out a career. Kita had been to Tokyo earlier because of problems with his eyes but now he enrolled himself as a casual student (chokosei) at Waseda University where his younger brother was studying. After coming to Tokyo he returned just once to Sado, when his mother died. Kita spent the life of a financially hard-pressed but serious student, and came into contact with the proliferating socialist groups. From his extensive reading and discussions Kita produced what he hoped would be his magnum opus. In March 1906 he published a thousandpage book, The National Polity and Pure Socialism (Kokutairon oyobi junsei shakaishugi). In privately publishing what he knew would be a controversial book, Kita demonstrated both determination and confidence. He used up his meagre inheritance, and his expectations were justified by the lavish praise with which the book was greeted by the leading intellectuals of the day. Yet, within ten days of the publication, a Tokyo newspaper, sponsored by Kato Takaaki, carried a critical review, ‘A Disquieting Argument’ (Fuon no Genron) and this led to a ban on the book. The despair that followed this blow left the young Kita griefstricken and deeply disconsolate. His friends, such as Kotoku Shusui and Sakae Toshihiko, rallied around and tried to find him work that would relieve his financial plight and mental despair. He worked briefly for the well-known socialist Commoners Newspaper (Heimin Shinbun). It was during this stage of his life that Kita began to meet Chinese revolutionaries. Chinese students had started coming to Japan in large numbers, in quest of the techniques of modernity. Japan was close and it shared, so it was thought, a common culture. It was an Asian country which had successfully ‘modernized’. The Chinese students not only wished to learn the techniques of modern civilization but avidly studied political theory to determine how China could overthrow its moribund monarchy and institute a constitutional government. Many of the revolutionaries, whose prescriptions for change ran the gamut of political ideas from constitutionalism to anarchism, found help and encouragement from Japanese sympathizers. Kita became friends with the epitome of romantic Japanese adventurers, Miyazaki Toten, with Wada Saburo, private secretary to Itagaki Taisuke and Sun Yat-sen’s private secretary, and gravitated towards the Revolutionary Review Society (Kakumei hyoron sha) and also become a member of the Chinese Alliance (Chugoku domei kai). The

Introduction

xiii

Chinese students were perhaps more active in forming societies and publishing newspapers to rally supporters for their cause than in attending classes. In this exhilarating environment, as Kotoku was to write, Kita forgot about the failure of the Kokutarion and in this new milieu, wrote with energy and enthusiasm about anything that had to do with ‘freedom’. His friendship with Song Jiaoren also developed during this period, as also with Hsuan Xing, both of whom were students and members of the Revolutionary Alliance. The Alliance had been established with the help of the nationalist Amur River Society (Kokuryukai), then under the direction of Uchida Ryohei and set up at his house. The connection between these nationalist groups and the government was even at this time very clear and strong. Uchida, a typical right-wing nationalist figure, was a close friend of Yamagata Aritomo. Kita, on the other hand, is more representative of the entry of socialist influence. The financial burden of maintaining his mother was relieved when Kita’s younger brother Reikichi, became a teacher at a middle school and Kita began to live as a guest of Kurosawa Jiro, a man with whom he shared many ideas. Kita could now devote himself wholeheartedly to revolution. In 1910 the socialists were faced with increasing repression. Kita was arrested in the wake of the arrest of Kotoku Shusui, but was released soon after. The Chinese revolutionaries were returning to China as political turbulence increased, and they were hopeful that the time to act would soon come. Song Jiaoren returned to China in 1911 and Kita soon followed in October with the financial help of the Amur River Society. Kita arrived in a China in revolutionary ferment. He went to Nanking with Song. On 3 November 1911 the fall of Shanghai dealt a blow to the revolution, and in December a meeting of the revolutionaries elected Li Yuanhong as the leader of the revolutionary forces. On his return to Shanghai, Kita, then twenty-eight, married Suzuko who was a year younger than him. Kita had already begun to criticize, not only Sun Yat-sen for his failure to understand the difference between war and revolution, but also increasingly the China adventurers gathered under the protective umbrella of the Amur River Society. The Japanese army and the government were at this stage still thinking in terms of establishing a constitutional monarchy, and were working largely through people like Uchida Ryohei and the China adventurers. On 11 February 1912 Yuan Shihkai retired and on 14 February Sun declared Nanking as the capital. Yuan Shihkai was appointed president. While the Japanese government did not see Sun as indispensable, the Kokuryukai thought that Japanese aims could be fulfilled with greater ease if they worked through Sun Yat-sen. Kita, with Song

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

Jiaoren, took the position that revolution had to be carried out without foreign help. Song was killed by an assassin of Yuan’s at the age of thirty-two. Kita went so far as to accuse Sun Yat-sen of the crime. He planned to revenge the murder but Yuan Shihkai requested the Japanese government and on 8 April 1913 Kita was ordered to leave China for three years. He was thirty at the time. In Japan, just prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the Okuma cabinet had been established and it showed a greater and more sympathetic understanding of the Chinese situation than the Yamamoto cabinet backed by the Seiyukai. Okuma was backed by the anti-Seiyukai forces the Doshikai, Inukai’s Kokuminto, and Kita took the opportunity to write position papers to introduce the Chinese situation to Okuma. He wrote the Unofficial History of the Chinese Revolution (shina kakumei gaishi) in 1915–16. The focus of this study is on these early works, other factors come into play in Kita’s life and thinking in the later years after he returns from China. In the concluding section of the book the vision embodied in the Fundamental Principles for the Reorganization of Japan, the last major piece of writing by Kita, is examined. It was during this period of his life that he gradually became increasingly interested in religion and distanced himself from political activities though he seems to have continued to take some interest. He continued to get financial assistance from Mitsui and a number of political figures and this would suggest that he was seen to have a role to play. This is not a biography of Kita Ikki but it would be an important issue to consider the reasons why he was supported and what he could offer in return. After the death of Huang Xing anti-Japanese feeling became widespread, fuelled by the anger against the Nishihara loans and even more by the Twenty-one Demands. These policies led to Kita’s disillusionment with Japanese foreign policy, and this prompted him to turn his eyes back to the internal reformation of Japan. This vision was encapsulated in the kaizo hoan. His subsequent journey through the social turmoil that Japan underwent (the Ashio Copper Mine case, the Rice Riots, etc.) and his participation with Okawa Shumei and his appeal to the young military officers who led the attempted coup in February 1936 is an engrossing story, and needs to be recounted separately. His life, which I do not deal with, would also raise questions about the groups that he worked with, how he supported himself and the influence he exercised. It is known that Mitsui, as well as influential political figures, supplied him with funds. Why and what they got in return are questions that need to be explored. It should be noted here that the importance of Kita Ikki lies in the questions that he raised about the nature of modern Japan and the manner that he sought to answer them.

Introduction

xv

Since George Wilson’s study of Kita Ikki, no work on him has appeared in English, (and before that there was one unpublished doctoral dissertation by Harris Innwood Martin) though there have been studies by Japanese scholars that have deepened our knowledge of the man and his ideas. Tanaka Sogoro, an early biographer and Matsumoto Kenichi, who first examined Kita Ikki’s earlier writings, were the most influential but subsequent work by Watanabe Kyoji and Miyamoto Moritaro provided an exhaustive analysis of Kita’s ideas. In all, there have been, twenty-six books dealing with some aspects of his life and philosophy, as a check on the Kyoto university online catalogue shows, and a majority of them were written in the 1970s. Only two books were written in the fifties and sixties in Japanese, so George Wilson’s and Martin’s works were thus published well before the boom. However, there have been few in the subsequent decades partly because much of the work was done but also reflecting a decline in the questions that Kita raised. George Wilson sought to locate Kita Ikki firmly in the framework of the Tokugawa intellectual heritage, arguing that there were continuities, such as his organic approach, the stress on an enlightened elite, and the urging of national unity in the face of external trouble. This framework is limiting and closed to the departures and new formulations that Kita and his contemporaries were articulating as they sought to chart their way across the troubled terrain of modern civilization. I think that Kita Ikki needs to be located in the context of the dominance of Western imperialism and how in that environment Japanese intellectuals sought to confront the West and in doing so became supporters of a Japanese imperial mission. This was not an inevitable route that they were forced to take but one that influenced many. Many of the questions that Kita and his contemporaries confronted are still of relevance and speak to the problems of today’s world. Utilizing the material available from Japanese sources, I have sought to construct a framework of his thoughts so that this can be used to see how his ideas and attempts to define Japanese identity mark a departure. For this purpose, I have used the writings of his contemporaries, particularly from magazines and journals, to reconstruct the intellectual milieu within which Kita operated. These sources have hardly been used even by Japanese scholars; they have constructed their works only on the basis of Kita’s writings as well as those of his better known contemporaries. Kita’s work on China is invaluable both as source material, and as an example of the intermeshing of political and social processes in Japan and China. I have used it extensively to analyse his ideas, as well as to show his style of dealing with particular issues. In this manner, through Kita’s ideas, I hope to look at the different strategies that were being adopted to chart a course in the modern world;

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strategies that often differed from the agenda set by the political and economic establishment. Political groupings and individuals were grappling with a new world and forging new links that bound them together in bonds of affinity or tension. By following Kita Ikki’s writings I hope to chart the contours of this search for a modern Japan.

PART I

Defining the Nation

1

Kita Ikki: The Sado Years

T

he story of the formation of modern Japan in its many variants has a strong underlying motif: the acuity and performance of a centralized leadership and the institutional structure that they created. This supports a variety of analytical positions suggesting an inevitability to the shape of Japan’s development and these new configurations are in turn used to construe the pre-history of modern Japan. The origins of the formation of the nation-state of Japan must be sought in the developments that took place from the end of the eighteenth century, as the Tokugawa Bakufu sought to deal with demands for diplomatic and trade relations, and with pressures that threatened the basis of its rule. The framework that was crafted in these unsettling times was sustained by policies revolving around the centralization of power in Tokyo and the elevation of the emperor and the use of imperial myths as the defining features of an eternal and unchanging Japanese identity. The Meiji ishin, in turn, redefined the framework, but it was under the Meiji oligarchy that the features defining modern Japan were essayed with a certain success; policies that defined and underlined the primacy of this Japanese nation as having existed from the time of creation. It is necessary to break out of this mould to rethink the history of the people who worked to create and shape modern Japan as their voices are subsumed in the inexorable march of the nation. Pre-modern Japan, under the Tokugawa, was held in constant tension, both politically and culturally, between the demands of the centre and the regions. The concentration on events and people in Tokyo reduces the processes underway in the various parts of Japan to peripheral significance. An uncritical acceptance of the homogeneity of Japanese society obscures the regional differences that were sustained by powerful local structures and homogenized in the process of creating a Japanese nation and defining a Japanese identity. That the elements of this identity also varied with time must be noted.

4

Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

Kita Ikki was born and grew up in Sado, a small but important island off the western coast of Japan thirty-five kilometres from the city of Niigata. His intellectual formation and growth took place within the tradition of this island, once a place of exile for the nobility.1 The island of Sado occupied a special position during the Tokugawa period, and this relationship was shaped both by its geographical location as well as by its administrative status. The peculiar ties that history and geography had created gave to the island people a sense of local pride and determined the way they perceived the overthrow of the Tokugawa Bakufu and the Meiji ishin. SADO: IKKOKU TENRYO

The island of Sado first emerges as an independent province in 702, when it had a capital city and a state temple (kokubunji) but it was only in the medieval period that the island really became famous as a place of exile: Emperor Jintoku was exiled here in 1221, Nichiren in 1271, Fujiwara no Tamekane in 1298 and Zeami in 1434. These exiles and their entourages helped to introduce high culture that blended with the local culture to produce a rich and vibrant popular culture in this remote island. The island also became important in 1601 when gold and silver mines were established there. Tokugawa Ieyasu brought the island under his direct control as tenryo and the post of Sado commissioner (bugyo) was occupied by a person of hatamoto status. Gradually, as the output of the mines declined (they were finally exhausted only in 1889) during the Tokugawa period, so did the importance of Sado to Edo. The idea of a special status however, continued and was a matter of pride, expressed in the phrase ‘the whole country under the shogun’ (ikkoku tenryo), but stemming from this special position was a sense of identification and closeness with the Tokugawa house that continued to form an important element in the island’s social life. However, as the Bakufu began to face financial difficulties and sought to increase taxes, anti-Bakufu feelings also began to strengthen. The 1756 famine (Horeki 6) was caused in part by the heavier tax burden that alienated the people who felt that the Sado commissioner, rather than looking after their welfare, was blindly following Edo’s directives. The tax burden also helped to widen internal differences between independent cultivators and marginal peasants who were dependent on leasing land. These internal tensions were visible in the large uprising of the peasantry in 1834 when the independent cultivators refused to join the peasantry. These developments created fissures in the sense of community as well as strengthened anti-Bakufu sentiments.2 Thus, during the time of the Meiji ishin Sado’s loyalties were unclear; its community divided. Many hoped for beneficial

Kita Ikki: The Sado Years

5

change but these expectations of change were coupled with apprehensions about the future. The ambiguity of the island community’s identification with the Bakufu was best exemplified by Maruyama Meiboku (1818–92), head of the Bakufu school on the island, the Shukyokan, and a key figure in the intellectual life of the island. Maruyama expressed the sense of loyalty to the Bakufu when he wrote: ‘We may be insignificant but as long as we are alive we are subjects of the Tokugawa and when we die it will be enough if we become the spirit of the Tokugawa . . .’3 This identification with the Bakufu did not stop Maruyama from accepting the position of teacher in the government middle school set up under the new dispensation. The new Meiji government ushered in changes that further exacerbated existing tensions and divisions, and also created new ones. Along with the break in emotional attachments, the institutional changes ushered in by the Meiji government laid the basis for further alienation. The institutional sources of early-Meiji dissatisfaction were particularly felt at two levels. One, the reorganization of the old boundaries and the establishment of a prefectural system that made Sado, first in 1869, a part of Aikawa-ken and subsequently in 1878 a part of Niigata-ku. This process of reorganization brought home to the islanders that they formed part of the vanquished group (haibokusha) and that it was the alliance of han led by the Satsuma-Choshu group that had triumphed. The islanders saw the administrative changes as part of a game of reshuffling that would submerge their identity and make them subservient to the mainland.4 The redrawing of administrative boundaries, coupled with the governments’ adherence to a strict tax-collection policy, even during bad harvests, further aggravated the feeling of being treated indifferently. In 1869 the harvest was poor but the authorities refused pleas that tax be waived. The Meiji bureaucrat suffered in comparison with the benevolent lord. Dissatisfaction at these two levels gave rise to and fuelled protest against the nation-building efforts and centralization of power that the Meiji government was pursuing. The intellectual society of Sado was centred on the Shukyokan and the disciples of Maruyama Meiboku. His students, such as Yamamoto Kei, Ukai Ikujiro, Wakabayashi Ieki (1841–?), Ikeno Monpei, Maruoka Shinjiro played a crucial role both in articulating a political agenda and in regenerating the economic life of the island.5 The Bakufu school had only been open to samurai and children of doctors (rangakusha), but with the new government its doors were thrown open to all and this gave an opportunity for people from all walks of life to study and participate in public affairs. This provided the impetus for popular participation in the demands for a representative government that spread across the country.

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

The first decade of the Meiji period saw changes at various levels. Economic development was accompanied by the spread of new ideas. The late-Tokugawa period had exposed the Japanese to a wide variety of Western ideas. Many found sympathetic echoes and new ways of thinking in the writings of liberal democratic thinkers. The people’s rights movement (jiyuminken undo) led by rich farmers and wealthy merchants (gono and gosho) was broadly representative of this way of thinking.6 These leaders of the community held positions of importance in the local administrative structure, and they helped to build support for the new political groupings. The Jiyuto (Liberal Party) which had been established in 1881 to press for a system of representative government, opened a branch office in Sado in November 1882. The movement for constitutional government also brought many national leaders to western Japan and some, such as Takahashi Kiichi, Takeuchi Musashi, and even Katsuyama Koichi, came to Sado. In 1880, when a meeting of the Society of Patriots (Aikokusha), established in February 1875, was held Ukai Ikujiro from Sado participated as a delegate representing over three hundred people. Ukai was actively involved in the debates and objected to the majority position advocating that petitioning for a representative government should happen the following year, for he favoured an immediate petition. Undeterred by the rejection of his views, he drafted and submitted his own petition to the emperor.7 Economic development was also changing the aspirations of the people and opening new avenues. In 1884, some wealthy notables, such as Wakabayashi Ieki and Ukai Ikujiro, formed the Echigo-Sado Shipping Company (Essakisen).8 This company was a matter of local pride for the whole island, and had five ships by 1890. However, Niigata investors held over ninety per cent of the shares in the company and so they profited more than the Sado islanders did. This led Hoshino Wajiro, a Sado islander, to set up a rival company that was soon caught in a bitter price war to win over business. He was however unable to match the sustaining power of Essakisen. He, and many of the islanders who invested in the company, including Kita Ikki’s family, lost their money but Hoshino was widely supported reflecting the solidarity of the islanders against the outsiders.9 Thus, within the first decade of the Meiji government, Sado witnessed new challenges that created divisions and differences, but what emerges clearly is the ability of the islanders to deal with this new situation. This reflected the strength of earlier institutions and structures of thought that had created a group of people who were capable of responding to the opportunities presented by this new world. The Sado mines had been central to the economic life of the island, and under the new government they were removed from the control of the ministry of industries and brought under the imperial house-

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hold ministry. Under the ministry they had enjoyed access to funds and support, and a large measure of benevolence. In 1889, the new government, headed by Ito Hirobumi, had begun to invest heavily to develop the mines. They allocated Y300,000 in 1886, an amount that exceeded the annual income of the mines at that time. This massive investment transformed the economic life of the island as these new flows of money widened the gap between the rich and poor. This situation changed when in 1896 the mines were sold to Mitsubishi. The company sought to rationalize the management of the mines and began a series of cuts in wages, benefits, and employees, and this led to discontent among the miners and agitation for better working conditions. In 1900, six hundred out of a total workforce of 1,300 formed a strike association and fought for better working conditions. These miners had learned from their earlier experience in 1899 when they fought for shorter working hours and were now better organized and organizationally better prepared. They elected office-bearers and exercised wide social control over their members: thus drinking was prohibited as the organizers feared it could lead to violence, which could be exploited by the authorities.10 The groups who benefited were centred largely in the city of Aikawa, and they gravitated to the Progressive Party (Kaishinto) established by Okuma Shigenobu in 1882.11 One of the leading figures in this group was Habano Tokuzo, who was among the greatest beneficiaries of the policy to develop the mines. One of the biggest landlords in Aikawa in 1883, he was the third-highest income-tax payer on the island. The importance of the city of Aikawa in the ecoomic and political life of the island is underlined by the fact that all the top six income-tax payers were from Aikawa.12 The uneven distribution of benefits helped to undermine the sense of solidarity among the islanders. The benefits of these new flows was uneven but even as those left out of the development process were marginalized, others were inexorably tied to the policies and goals of the Meiji government. These beneficiaries became crucial in ensuring the success of fukoku kyohei and in helping to recreate new solidarities and weave the fabric of a new society. In the Sado branch of the Kaishinto people like Akita Tojuro, a landlord of Aikawa and the highest taxpayer on the island, played a crucial role in opposing and criticizing the policies of the Jiyuto.13 The opposition, led by people like Ukai Ikujiro, was concentrated in areas such as Kuninaka and Minatomachi. Their position was based on a critical understanding of Meiji policies, so that while they welcomed revision of the unequal treaties they argued that this could not be used as an excuse to undermine the freedom of the people. They opposed the specious argument of limiting natural rights to preserve the integrity of the nation in a crisis situation. The activities of these sub-national leaders are a neglected but vital area of enquiry.

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

The two groups used the columns of newspapers and journals as well as public meetings to debate their ideas about the form that government should take. Sado shinbun supported the Jiyuto group, arguing for the necessity of establishing a constitutional form of government and urged the political establishment to do this, arguing that not to do otherwise would be a dereliction of its duties. The Kaishinto brought out Sado Mainichi shinbun to advocate its more gradualist position. One outcome of these intense political debates was to help increase the number and circulation of the newspapers. Up until 1877, Niigata shinbun was the only newspaper in this region, but within five years three others had been established (Niigata nichi nichi, Esa mainichi, Hokuetsu shinbun) reflecting this increasing interest in public affairs. The process of development thus began to create new divisions and tensions. In 1890, for instance, a very serious rice riot occurred in Ryotsu and Aikawa. The riot is illustrative of the lines that the new divisions were taking. The price of rice more than doubled in 1890, partly because of the crop failure of the previous year, but it was alleged that hoarding and rice exports caused the rise. The two areas were socially different, consequently so were their responses to the situation. In Ryotsu the participants were largely peasants who not only wanted the price of rice kept firmly down but also wanted to ban its export from the island. In Aikawa, the participants were largely workers and they were mostly concerned to stop the price rise but were not critical of government policies. It is interesting that at no time did they seek an increase in wages. KITA IKKI: FORMATIVE INFLUENCES

Kita Ikki was born on 3 April 1883 in a family that was experiencing financial difficulties.14 His father had tried, unsuccessfully, to brew saké but the business did not do well. The family, though plagued by financial problems, was a typical middle-class family of the time. Kita had access to a very well-developed educational system. In primary and secondary school Kita was fortunate in having good teachers, and during these formative years he was exposed to both traditional scholarship as well as to the new ideas coming from the Western world. As part of the educational and public philosophy, concern with public affairs was given great importance. Kita wrote in local magazines and newspapers, influenced by the tradition of the people’s rights movement as well as a sense of personal involvement, a sense so characteristic of Meiji society. The public good was a significant preoccupation, influenced by earlier notions of social good and imbued with contemporary notions of social action. The Meiji ishin reinforced the need and

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desirability to create a social order rather than to accept a natural order. The actions of the Meiji oligarchy had overturned the earlier notions of self and society and allowed individuals to take measures to create what they saw as a just and moral order. Kita was, as he himself acknowledged, also exposed to the growing influence of emperor-centred loyalism. The increasing self-confident and sometimes strident sense of nationalism that grew with the success of the war against China in 1894–95 and the building of a national economy helped to redefine the prevailing ethos. The earlier decade had been dominated by the democratic alternatives posed by the people’s rights movement and its alternative agenda to the programme of the Meiji oligarchy, and these ideas, though politically defeated, continued to play an influential role within society. These issues of political participation and social equity became the currency of everyday thought as the dynamic pressures of capitalist development unsettled lives and disrupted social traditions. Modern techniques of organization and political pressure groups helped to define the way these issues would be articulated and addressed. The strength of the political system ensured that these problems would be alleviated through legislative action. Socialists and Christian thinkers, drawing on the earlier work of the ideologues of the people’s rights movements, as well as the works of Western thinkers, worked to formulate a more rigorous understanding of social processes. Their early work, however, called for organization and revolution more out of a sense of moral outrage and the need to alleviate social miseries than because of any supposed theoretical understanding of the laws governing social behaviour. The major influence on Kita in school was that of his teachers, Osawa Teisei and Hatta Miki, both of whom had been brought up in the traditional educational system and had been involved in the movement demanding popular government.15 Hatta, who taught Kita in middle school from 1897 to 1901, was a graduate of the Tokyo Imperial University where he had come under the influence of social Darwinism. Social Darwinism found a highly receptive audience in Japan, as the rapacity of the powerful Western nations was clearly visible. (Sartre writes about the colonial situation to say: ‘In the colonies truth stood naked; at home they preferred it with clothes on.’) The actions of the Western powers, as they expanded their control and domination, confirmed for many that expansion was necessary for survival. These ideas buttressed the drive to establish Japan’s power in the region. Saito Shinkichi, who was nine years older than Kita, was also an influential teacher. Saito was a Christian, too, but he also had close connections through relatives to the conservative The Great Eastern School (Daito juku).16 Even later in life Kita remained in touch with

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

Saito and his family. After the Meiji ishin, many of the students from Sado who had gone to Tokyo, such as Mori, Takahashi, Nozawa, and Hasegawa, began by the mid-1870s to return to the island. These people were actively involved in the issues of the day, and their writings and speeches as well as their teaching helped to shape the contours of the intellectual life of the island as well as to define the way Kita looked at social and political issues. Wakabayashi came from a doctor’s family and spent his early years studying medicine, classics, and other subjects in Kyoto. He returned to the island and became an active business leader. He was a major partner in the Echizen-Sado Shipping Company but continued to pursue his classical interests and found time to teach the Chinese classics. Kita studied with him for two years. Hasegawa Kiyoshi, another of Kita’s teachers, was well informed about Europe and the West, and he passed this knowledge on to Kita. Kita read Dickens, Marx’s Theory of Surplus Value, and Thomas Kidd on evolution as well as George’s Land Nationalization. Hasegawa went on to become a journalist in Tokyo and then in Hokkaido where he came into conflict with the authorities over an article he wrote on women (July and August 1910 in Hokai shinbun) which was banned for insulting the emperor. Again, in 1919, he was charged for writing on Trotsky in Hakodate shinbun. Through another teacher, Ishizuka Terasu, Kita learned about Eastern history, particularly Chinese history and Chinese (kanbun).17 Mori Tomoki (1864–?) was another major influence.18 Mori Tomoki had been a student of the Shukyokan and went for further study to Tokyo, returning in 1890 to Sado. From his studies at Shukyokan he had been influenced by the ideals of keisei saimin, and in Tokyo he had studied a wide range of subjects including law, science and marine engineering, and done a teachers’ training course. His interest in working to establish a party for the poor had brought him into contact with some of the leading intellectuals of the day such as the Christian thinker Uchimura Kanzo (1861–1930). Mori returned to Sado and became the editor of Hokumei zasshi as well as setting up a night school, Meiji gakko. His concerns revolved around ending the class divisions in society and realizing the aims of ‘commonerism’ (heiminshugi). He remained neutral in Sado politics but wrote on a variety of issues ranging from analysis of social movements to arguing against party politics. Mori Tomoki argued that while elections were the fundamental way of reforming society and that universal suffrage was absolutely vital, he was against party cabinets and favoured oligarchic control. This was part of the old Jiyuto-Seiyukai position. Hasegawa, unlike Mori however, advocated a republican government that would be compatible with the imperial institution. He argued that the kokutai of Japan was based on the fact that the

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‘emperor was coeval with heaven and earth’ but the political system or seitai was based on a constitutional government and therefore, party cabinets were fully justified. Hasegawa argued that Japanese feudalism was different from its European counterpart because the emperor occupied a transcendental position, so state power lay with him. Under the feudal system because they feared this power, they kept the emperor out of politics but now he could be used to bring about the distribution of power (shuken bunpai) so that while state power lay with him local autonomy could be increased. This position was in striking contrast to the Meiji assertion of the centralization of authority around the emperor. Hasegawa was also sympathetic to the arguments of socialism and, according to Matsumoto Kenichi, his views are the starting point for Kita Ikki’s Kokutairon.19 Kita also had a serious interest in poetry and wrote regularly for the Sado magazines. Poetry in Sado was centred around a literary group, the Kyorakusha, formed by the last commissioner of Sado, Suzuki Juryo, who introduced the shin waka or new waka movement to Sado when he returned to the island in 1876.20 This was the intellectual background and context within which Kita’s ideas were shaped and developed. His early writings display concerns and revolve around themes that continued to preoccupy him and which formed the focus of his growing interest in the political and social structure of Japan. The articles written between 1901 and 1903 are marked by an understanding that the Meiji government is a modern government, comparable to that of Western nations, so that its national political structure or kokutai is similar to that of other nations. The Meiji State has instituted the rule of law, so change can be effected through the electoral process rather than through violence. However, economic inequalities remain and can only be eradicated through the realization of socialism. Kita Ikki’s understanding of socialism differs from most other contemporary socialists in Japan for he stresses the primacy of the state and the need to ensure its preservation in an unequal world. It is because of this that Kita proceeds to engage in debate what he calls the ‘so-called kokutai theory’ and the ‘so-called socialists’. Kita was forced to leave school because of an eye problem, and was hospitalized in 1900–1901 for a period of seven months in Niigata. He went briefly to Tokyo but returned to Sado. Around that time many of his teachers also went to Tokyo. Hatta became the principal of a school in Tokyo and Hasegawa joined the Odo magazine there. Kita was also friendly with a lawyer Makino who was a legal advisor to the Kokuryukai, which had been established in January 1901 and was also secretary of the Sado Association (Sado seisuikai). This association provided a meeting ground for people from Sado and was similar to other such regional organizations that worked to ameliorate the social problems and isolation that people faced when they

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

moved to Tokyo. Makino published a bulletin in which Kita occasionally published poetry. The Socialist Party was also established that year and the influence of the declaration on Kita’s Jindo no taigi is very clear. Kita returned the following year to Sado but exactly when is unclear.21 It was during this year that he began to publish both poetry as well as articles on the issues of the day. PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITY: ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIETY

The central issue during the second half of the nineteenth century was the carving up of the globe, particularly Africa and Asia, by a handful of European powers. Nearly a quarter of the globe was redistributed leaving only the Americas largely untouched. Britain increased its territory by over four million square miles and the USA by one hundred thousand. Japan too gained an equivalent area in China, Russia and Korea. This expansion created a global economy linked by an expanded transport system. In the dominant countries, economic growth created an expanding class of people who benefited economically and who in turn began demanding greater participation in the political system. This led to changes in the nature of the state and introduced new ways of forging legitimacy.22 Kita and his contemporaries were acutely aware of these developments, and their debates were directed both at how to ensure the integrity of the nation and at defining the nature of political participation. The Great Principles of Humanity (Jindo no taigi) written in November 1901 for Sado Shinbun in five instalments poses the issues central to Kita and his contemporaries.23 The major objective that social morality demands, argues Kita, is how to build a strong country and help the other countries of the world. Western civilization, he says, has certainly introduced material benefits and made the world more accessible (bunmei no iki ni chikazuki kotsu itaru tokoro hirakete), but it has also led to the suppression and domination of countries such as Korea, China and the Transvaal. Interestingly Kita makes no mention here of the other Asian countries, notably India which were under colonial rule. He goes on to argue that countries that are under the yoke of foreign oppression can hardly think about the welfare of their people. The victors, those who dominate are also faced with the problems of their people for, even while they seem to be better off, they bear an increasing tax burden to finance foreign aggression. This in turn, Kita writes, skews the economy leading to a decline in production and to a drop in employment; in short it culminates in a tragedy for the workers (rodosha no hiun to nari). From the individuals’ standpoint, Kita argues, there are no winners and losers. Kita understands that aggression not only affects the oppressed but distorts the

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nature of the aggressor as well and he tries to assess its impact on different social strata. Power, for Kita, is not an abstract concept but is inextricably linked with social morality. He sees conflict arising from a Darwinian struggle for survival not just between groups but within groups as well. This struggle, he argues, while beneficial for the intelligent, as it strengthens their sound traits, is not wholly good for it does not nurture and support proper feelings: self interest rather than principle becomes the prime force of motivation. It is this underdevelopment, he writes of feeling and exclusive focus on self-interest that has led to nihilism in Russia or socialism in Germany. Both these doctrines are reflections, Kita writes, of the frustrations faced by the people. In Japan, too, Kita argues, increasing differences between the rich and the poor are creating social imbalances and the leaders of society must seek to increase the welfare of the people if the world is to be raised to the level of civilization. Protecting the nation, he says, cannot exclude the welfare of the people. For Kita, echoing the people’s rights ideologues, the strength of the nation is the wellbeing of its people. Kita next considers how a world government would help the process of moving towards a higher level of civilization. He writes that the best morality (taigi) is that which seeks to purify one’s own house while also looking after the interests of one’s companions. Therefore, he writes, the first step towards a world government is to ‘expand the power of your country’ (jika no kokuryoku o yosei), and that can only be done by eliminating differences between the upper and lower classes. When there is equality then people will aspire to (kokorozashi) an ideal where they are in harmony between themselves and with the emperor (kunmin sowakoku). Kita then advances five concrete proposals to bring this about. First, he argues that the traditions of Japan are different from those of Western countries and the emperor has always been seen as a father to the people and the people have always had respect and loyalty for him. Policies should not create a distance between the emperor, who has always been seen as a father figure, and the people but bring them closer together. The emperor could give audiences not only to the titled but also to ordinary people. This was of course in complete contrast to the Meiji government’s policy of elevating the emperor above the clouds and creating a distance between him and the people. Second, by abolishing class divisions it would be possible to increase the people’s welfare and advance towards a civilized state. For instance, Kita suggests that the nobility, comprising some 3,845 people or 706 households, should be abolished as it is of no use to society. The equal distribution of knowledge is the third proposal, and Kita argues that it is an absolute obligation of the state

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to provide free education, not just to the children of the upper classes but for all. The state should develop and improve the facilities for workers and establish adult education centres, not just in Tokyo but all over Japan. He urges the building of public libraries in every ward and prefecture, and writes that it is absurd that we spend Y100 million on an unproductive army but only Y50 million on education.24 Fourth, Kita argues that the existing system is iniquitous as it is based on the possession of property that creates social inequalities that in turn promotes oligarchic despotism, that is emperor absolutism (kato sensei seitai nari sono kunshu sensei to). To end this, a broad-based electoral law must be enacted and an electoral system must be established that allows the people to publicly discuss the affairs of state. He writes: There are two reasons for establishing the Imperial Diet and bringing together the elected representatives of the people to carry out the work of government. First, to realize equality among the common people, and second, that there is no better way for ensuring happiness in equal measure than by accepting the fundamental principle of the public debate of state affairs. However, the present election law, based on the relative importance of wealth, builds a strange system and calls it civil rights.

Kita argues that the roots of internal discord lie in the contradiction between a law limiting franchise and the public advocacy by the government of a representative assembly. The government is in essence a monarchic absolutism and its commitment to representative institutions is merely formal. This position was taken against a background of intense debate around the nature of political participation both in Japan and abroad. In Europe, while universal male suffrage had been accepted in theory by the mid-nineteenth century the electorate was still restricted by property qualifications. The British Reform Acts of 1867 and 1883 expanded the electorate from 3 to 29 per cent. Pressure also increased as the socialist movement gathered momentum from the 1890s and the first Russian revolution in 1905 gave a further fillip to this trend.25 Kita would have been aware of these trends through his readings. THE POLITICS OF CONTROL AND ELECTIONS

The Meiji constitution granted to the people in 1889 had defined the nature of the political game by exclusions. Power was firmly retained by the oligarchy and vast sections of society were excluded from par-

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ticipation. The need to have an electoral system to satisfy the formal need for democracy and the pressure from the people’s rights movement helped to create the space for political parties to emerge. Within five years, the oligarchy had to work out ways to accommodate the political parties. The Ito cabinet of 1895 was formed with the support of Jiyuto, in return for which Itagaki Taisuke, the president of the party, was appointed home minister, much to the chagrin of the group under Yamagata Aritomo, who supported ‘transcendental government’, i.e. disinterested government by an enlightened elite . The Ito cabinet barely lasted six months faced as it was with the difficult question of raising taxes. The agitation against tax increases to finance military expansion and infrastructure development caused opposition from a coalition of the Jiyuto and Shinpoto, who merged to frm Kenseito in June 1898. Kenseito formed the first party cabinet in June 1898 as it had won an absolute majority in the elections (244 seats out of a total of 300). This cabinet too did not last, collapsing within four months over internal differences. However, Hoshi Toru, ex-Jiyuto member, and leader of the Tokyo area or Kanto faction, split the party in October 1898 as he favoured a policy of allying with the hanbatsu to implement the tax increases. Hoshi argued that the future of the political parties lay in building their base on the urban mercantile and manufacturing classes, and therefore an increase in land tax was inevitable. To this end, he was willing to work with Yamagata and the Meiji leadership. Hoshi supported the November 1898 bill to increase the land tax in return for nationalization of the railroads. The Bill was passed in December 1898. The Kenseihonto (the former Shimpoto) opposed the Bill. In January 1899 a League to Revise the House of Representatives Election Law was formed with Shibusawa Eiichi as president and it included as its office holders Okura Kihachiro and Yasuda Zenjiro. The membership of the League overlapped with the League to Increase Taxes and it worked with the National Chambers of Commerce. In 1900 Yamagata and the Kenseito revised the house of representatives election law by lowering the tax qualification for voters from Y15 in direct national taxes to Y10, thus increasing the electorate from 502,000 to 982,000. The electoral districts were changed from small electoral districts to prefecture-sized rural districts and independent urban districts for cities with a population of over 50,000. The new system favoured the urban electorate as they could elect a Diet representative with 30,000 votes while for a rural district the minimum required was 130,000 votes. This resulted in an increase in urban Diet members from 17 (5.7 per cent) out of 300 seats to 61 (15.5 per cent) out of 369 seats. In Sado, the new electoral law expanded the electorate from 616 voters to 1,922.26

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

The seventh general elections in 1902 pitted the old Jiyuto and Shimpoto supporters against each other, though the political formations were now Kenseihonto and Rikken Seiyukai, formed by Ito Hirobumi in 1900 to represent the urban electorate. Sado shinbun supported Seiyukai while Sado Mainichi backed Kenseihonto. Yamamoto Teijiro, an old Jiyuto member who had studied with Maruyama along with Hasegawa, stood for Seiyukai opposed by the Kensihonto candidate Nakayama Koshiro. The voter turnout was 90 per cent and Nakayama won. Kita wrote after the elections arguing that it was not just the candidates but the entire political system that needed to be reformed. The Diet did not last long and was dissolved in March 1903. In the election campaign both parties decided to ally, and Kita supported this compromize though he leaned towards the Seiyukai, arguing that the old Shimpoto followers were only interested in gaining power but here again he was critical of the lack of ideals in politics. This article made Kita known in the island.27 The election had given the Seiyukai 193 seats in the Diet but its rivals Kenseihonto with 91 and Teikoku with 18 seats created an unstable situation. Moreover, Ito, without consulting the leadership of Seiyukai accepted the Genro’s proposal for the revision of the land tax leading to a split with Kataoka, Hayashi and Ozaki Yukio walking out of the party. Ito resigned in July 1903 and Yamagata then appointed Katsura Taro the prime minister and Ito the head of the privy council, while Saionji Kinmochi became the president of Seiyukai. Until the Taisho crisis of 1912–13, power alternated between Yamagata’s protégé, Katsura Taro and Saionji Kinmochi. The understanding did not end very real differences between the two groupings, but though tensions continued a precarious balance was maintained till Katsura Taro formed the Rikken Doshikai. Electoral reforms had helped to involve a greater number of the people in choosing their leaders, but while it broke the hold of a select group of notables it did not usher in politics of popular participation. Organizations, committees, party notables and activists became the arbiters of the peoples’ future. Other ways of controlling popularly elected bodies and limiting rights continued. The repressive arm of the law and the police together with other forms of manipulation, continued to act as a check on the democratic process. Universal suffrage came only in 1925, and even then women and all those who ‘received public or private relief or help for living on account of poverty’ were excluded. Yet, even for these restricted measures, the finance minister Wakatsuki had to reassure the Diet that, though the electorate had increased from 3 million to 12.5 million, ‘the suffrage bill was not designed to promote democracy’.28 The fifth proposal revolves around ways to control the capitalist class and restrict their monopoly profits. Kita urges the need to build

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workers’ organizations or unions and create a basis for mutual relief just as is done in Europe and America. Along with this, the government must enact laws to control the activities of the capitalists. Workers’ unions were still very restricted. The first one had been formed in 1883 by rickshawmen protesting against horse-drawn carriages. The government had enacted as a palliative the Factory Act of 1898 as unionization increased. Factory owners obstinately resisted the implementation of its proposals. The government also enacted the revised Peace Preservation Law which banned trade union activity (but not trade unions), so that unions could only function as mutual benefit societies (yuai kai) up to the First World War. KOKUTAI: A FANCIFUL FICTION

The concept of kokutai, the body politic, has been central to political formulations in Japan though most commonly it is associated with the idea that Japan and the Japanese are distinguished by their divinity from other nations. Kita, reading the historian and journalist Takekoshi Yosaburo (1865–1950) and Uchimura Kanzo, advanced arguments against the prevalent kokutai thesis.29 He examined the relationship binding the people and the emperor, and argued that it is a delusion to think, as the education system inculcates, that the ties of loyalty are based on the eternal and unbroken lineage of the emperor. Even though apprehensive about charges of lese-majesty (fukei), Kita says that this false version of kokutai infringes the freedom of learning and corrupts the education of the people. He calls it a ‘fanciful fiction’ (meimo kyogi). The ties that bind the emperor and the people are no different, he writes, than those in China or even in Western countries. Kita focuses his criticism on the question of the unbroken genealogy of the imperial line and examines Japanese history to argue that the imperial institution has developed and evolved over a long period of time. Kita, like Takekoshi Yosaburo, argues that the Taika reforms of 645 were a decisive turning point in Japanese history but these reforms did not usher in a state in the strict sense of the term but only a society, and the imperial family was merely a major family. In this position it was accorded some respect but it was still too early to talk of the relations between the emperor and the people. For the next thousand years the emperor, he writes, hardly counted for much in terms of political power and the imperial lineage, because of intermarriage with the Fujiwara, cannot be described as unique. He writes: During the one thousand and three hundred years from the establishment of Japan to the Taika reforms, if it is considered that Japan had any rigorous significance then it was in that it did not appear

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as a state but as a society. The imperial house did not exist as the holders of sovereignty (shukensha) but was given respect in the small Kyoto-Osaka region (kinki) and this respect was mainly as a family. During this period there was absolutely no feeling of concern between the people and the Imperial House and I have always felt that this was most natural. To the people who mistakenly believe that the hearts of millions were skilfully united and made loyal, I ask them why then has the Imperial House been thrown into darkness for over a thousand years? 30

In 1903, his article on the historical relationship between the people and the Imperial House argued that Japan was just a new nation and that the emperor had really carried out a coup to establish power. The article was immediately singled out by the Sado Mainichi and was attacked in a series of articles by Suiraku, the editor, who wrote, ‘if Kita is a Japanese then aside from protecting the Imperial House he should be careful in what he says about it’. Note the ‘if Kita is a Japanese’. Suiraku compared Kita’s writing to the logic of Bakunin and Herzen, arguing that it was the nihilism of bankrupt thinkers and a line of argument that would lead to war, revolution, and coup d’état. Suiraku reminded his readers that twenty years earlier Arita Shinpei, a people’s rights advocate, had written an article describing Empress Suiko as ‘weak and ignorant’ (senjaku muchi) and for this act of lese-majesty (fukei) was fined Y40 and imprisoned for ten months. He recommended that the police and the authorities take immediate action.31 AN ASIAN BULWARK AGAINST THE WEST

The question of Japan’s relations with its neighbours was inextricably bound with how to secure its position against the Western powers, and this the Meiji oligarchy sought to accomplish through expansion and control over the Asian mainland. The Sino-Japanese War had given a fillip to these sentiments as it increased Japanese prestige in the international community and secured it an indemnity crucial in fuelling economic growth. However, the Triple Intervention following a bare week after the victory turned public jubilation into hurt and indignation. The return of the Liaotung Peninsula and the subsequent gains by the three nations, Russia, France and Germany, in China deeply imbedded in Japanese thinking a profound sense of resentment and fuelled the drive to strengthen and expand its military programme. Japanese policy-makers sought to secure their interests in Korea and Manchuria as they now faced Russia directly. The agreements of 1896 and 1898 with Russia were one step in the direction of estab-

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lishing dominance in Korea. Russia, meanwhile, continued her push in this direction by arranging for further loans and signing a secret treaty in 1896 with China and finally leasing a part of the Liaotung Peninsula which included Port Arthur and Dairen. The Boxer rebellion provided the occasion for stationing a Russian garrison in Manchuria, and despite protests by Japan, England and the USA it was not until the Anglo–Japanese Alliance was signed in 1902 that Russia agreed to the gradual withdrawal of her troops. However, this troop withdrawal, which was to be accomplished in three stages, stopped after the first stage in October 1902. Prime Minister Katsura Taro, a protégé of Yamagata and thus intellectually prepared for war, attempted to negotiate. The negotiations failed because of Russian obstinacy in refusing to accept territorial guarantees for China and wanting Japan to declare Korea outside the Japanese sphere of interest and public clamour. Discussions were eventually terminated on 10 February 1904. Port Arthur was attacked by Japan in a successful night raid and war declared the following day. THE COMING SOCIAL WAR

Kita, in his second article, argues that Japan must prepare for the coming war between the white and yellow races.24 The only way this is possible, in this period of economic imperialism, is to develop a country’s economic strength. Wars in this period are fought for trade and the Western countries even as they offer various reasons, such as truth and justice, to justify their expansionist drive are actually seeking to acquire territory and all their institutions are subordinated to this objective. Therefore, Japan, too, must acquire Siberia, as its present land is an insufficient base to combat the Western powers. He writes: As I am concerned with saving the people from decline, it is necessary to thoroughly prepare against the Russian military, to challenge imperialism in the coming years and to be ready for the social war. To ensure the expansion of the race (minzoku) the state must turn towards the continent and for this I underline the need to go to war with Russia.33

Kita took the position that as he was a socialist he had to meet the objections of the socialists, such as Kotoku Shusui, Sakai Toshihiko and Uchimura Kanzo (Kita had earlier written that the four characters of his name electrified him), as they were opposed to the war. Kita argues that the scientific principles of socialism are based on the

20

Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

understanding that the state is fundamental in effecting policies to ensure economic equality through public ownership of land and capital. Socialism, he writes, is not based on emotion and therefore the concept of a stateless society (museifu) is Utopian. Socialism can only be realized by a unifying power (danketsuteki kenryoku) and disseminated, he writes, through the electoral system and not imposed by force. At each historical stage the state will play a different role and therefore to protect the state in the international context, where it is threatened by far larger and more powerful states, it becomes necessary to support the war against Russia.34 Kita argues that his support for both socialism and imperialism is determined by the conditions that Japan faces. In Russia, Europe and the USA socialists oppose imperialism because their objectives are different. Russian imperialism has a barbaric history from the time of Peter the Great and therefore, people like Tolstoy, have opposed it and have advocated absolute peace. In the USA, the socialists oppose imperialism because it works in the interests of the rich capitalists, whose economic armies (trusts and syndicates) plunder the wealth of the world, exploit workers through low wages and long working hours. Socialists, he says, must therefore fight economic imperialism and ensure the welfare of the workers. In Europe, the long-term trend is towards a unified state of Europe and as this is hindered by the imperialist policies of individual countries, socialists are anti-imperialist. The situation of Japan, Kita writes, makes it necessary for socialists to support imperialism because Japan is caught in an international scenario where it faces the Russian armies protecting Siberia and the tariff barriers of the USA. He argues that Japanese desire for territory is only to ensure that her poor can emigrate to Manchuria and Korea peacefully and there is no rapacious intent nor is Japanese imperialism barbaric. Japanese imperialism, he writes is to ensure the territorial integrity of the nation; it is ‘for truth and justice, the very quality the West uses for acquiring territory. I say war, that is the only way is to fight imperialism.’35 It is, he also notes, a fight against Slav imperialism, and this fight can only be compared to the battle of Salamis or Bunker Hill in its significance as a battle for a just cause and for liberty. The names, he says are different but they represent the same urge and therefore socialists cannot oppose these policies. He writes ‘I am a socialist and for the cause of socialism cry out a heartfelt pledge to fight a war against Russia.’36 The corruption of the political system had become a major source of concern, and Kita considers how to bring about a purification of the political environment through general elections. He argues that a society where bribery and chicanery flourish and politics has become a matter of cliques rather than principles and where foreign

Kita Ikki: The Sado Years

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policy is conducted as a business has destroyed patriotism.37 In such an environment, inevitably the interests of the common man are neglected. Kita writes that although constitutional government is dependent on the diffusion of political ideas through education, this has not been realized in practice and not withstanding the formation of eighteen Diets politicians are not sincere but only concerned with personal gain and seeking office. They are unlike those who took part in the people’s rights movement. Then the parties had one major principle, that the people must be able to participate in politics, and for this they would endure hardships, let their families suffer to ensure that this principle was realized and that freedom was not crushed. Parties, such as the Seiyukai and the Kaishinto, do not follow these principles and therefore, he argues, should disband. The problem of cliques, whether in government or politics, was of immediate concern. Kita argued that the hanbatsu or cliques were happy with the revival of imperial government because they profit from it. This however, is what constricts the political parties, because as they derive their right to political participation from the hanbatsu, they are unable to articulate an independent political agenda. Their politics becomes one of personal gain and private profit. The Katsura cabinet is supported by these cliques and so can survive. The political parties can find their justification only on the principle of popular political participation, argues Kita, and till they do this they will lack an independent basis for their existence and are headed, he presciently remarks, for destruction (shometsu). The prevalence of bribery is another indication of the moral bankruptcy of the political system. The hanbatsu does not derive its legitimacy from any principle for the Satcho alliance overthrew the established order for private profit. Similarly the political parties represent the selfish interest of the rich. The sabre was the weapon of the hanbatsu and bribery is that of the political parties, writes Kita. In this, there is no difference between the Seiyukai or the Kenseihonto. The control of the empire is in the hands of a small upper class, who rule on the basis of their wealth and therefore, Kita writes, the government is oligarchic and absolutist. So long as wealth remains the basis of political participation bribery and corruption will naturally arise. If the people are to be denied political participation then, he argues, they should equally not be liable to conscription. To effect change in this situation the electoral law needs to be revised on the basis of popular political participation. Moreover, Kita also rejects the gradualist argument that the people are still politically immature and incapable of exercising their rights. It would be mistaken to assume that the hanbatsu are all intelligent and the people foolish. He argues that the participation of the people will ensure a truly vigorous, just and patriotic Diet. Only on this basis will it be able to

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

ensure the welfare of the people and rid the system of corruption and venality. THE INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION

Kita Ikki’s understanding of the changes brought about in Japan hinged upon his perception that the Meiji ishin-kakumei created in law a modern nation state but economic inequalities continued to exist just as they had in earlier feudal times. The function of socialism is not to oppose the idea of kokutai but rather to bring about a change in the thinking of the people and it can do this by supporting a movement for enlightenment (keimo undo).38 The creation of a modern legal system has not freed man from inequalities and so while he has the characteristics of man (jinkaku) he has not become a man but remains an object (kamotsu), a thing (bukkaku). In economic terms he is still not a citizen (shimin) but is still a private chattel or serf of the rich. The state, for socialists, according to Kita, is not just a geographical entity but one that has common goals but the rich capitalists (the modern daimyo) merely use the state for their personal interests. Therefore, when they say ‘for the state’ it is really no different from the feudal concept of ‘for the king’. He writes that what they have done is to appropriate ‘nationalism’ for their own private interests. These are not the interests of the public. A socialist party, by ending economic inequalities, can realize these common goals. The Meiji ishin-kakumei, because it brought in the rule of law, has permitted a degree of freedom so that even though the ruling class restricts speech the educational system is not fully controlled. Hozumi Yatsuka’s views on constitutional law are taught but no mention is made of republicanism in Greece and Rome, Martin Luther’s Declaration or the French Revolution. By restricting speech the ruling class controls the people and instigates violence writes Kita. However, this cannot be justified in Japan because of its historical stage of development. Here, socialist practice must depend on the historical situation of the country and because of the achievement of legal rights it is possible to achieve socialism through law and the electoral system. In Russia, on the other hand, an absolutist imperial state that is not patriarchal controls the country and the emperor treats the nation as his private domain so the people are justified in treating him as a criminal. In Japan, however, even the right of self-defence against the violence of the state is not justified. The principal objective of socialism should be to raise the ‘level of consciousness’ (Keimo undo) of the people. Kita argues that it was with the development of a consciousness of equality among the people that a ‘people’s state’ (komin kokka) with

Kita Ikki: The Sado Years

23

a ‘character’ (jinkaku) was established with the Meiji ishin-kakumei. Similarly, socialism cannot be established by fiat or by the domainal cliques or by political parties like the Seiyukai. Even if socialists were to form a cabinet, he writes, they could not bring about socialism. State socialists have not grasped the fact that historical progress and the upward movement of lower classes has occurred through the engine of class war. The state socialists mistakenly think that just as the daimyo returned power to the emperor, so will the capitalists return power to the state. Kita writes, that it must be clearly understood that no class willingly gives up its power and that values are also conditioned by one’s class. Thus, even ideas of good and evil or right and wrong are different amongst the classes. The dissatisfied lower samurai had brought about the Meiji ishin using the Kokutairon to criticize the Bakufu as usurpers of imperial power and call for a restoration. Now, he writes, an economic revolution is needed, for the rich (daimyo) exploit the workers (lower samurai) and it is futile to hope that some day the rich will willingly return this power to the people of their own accord. The first ishin was political but the second will be economic and be brought about, Kita writes, through the ballot. Revolution, is not violence and death but rather the birth of a new society, and now that the legal system is in place the movement to civilize the people (keimo undo) should aim to establish a general election law to allow for popular political participation. Kita considers the meaning of suicide and assassination, which he says are both born out of anguish.39 He condemns assassination as he says it arises out of a mistaken understanding of the theory of a unique (kokutai) while anguish is the revolt of an individual against outside authority, an internal war of revolution. He writes, ‘Anguish is an internal revolutionary war where the individual on the basis of the autonomy of the self plans opposition to external sovereign powers (gairaiteki shuken). Under the feudal system the people accepted the rule of the emperor and the daimyo as they had no concept of individuality, of self or freedom of the self.’ They had, in this sense, he writes, no ‘character’ (jinkaku) based on social thought and historical tradition. ‘They had no sense of the self and no idea of the rights (jinshuken) of the self (jiko) and a character built on the basis of a criticism of social philosophy and historical customs.’ It is here that Japan’s true uniqueness rests, for unlike Greece and Rome, Cromwell’s England or France during the Revolution, in Japan the emperor occupies a place without parallel. The emperor not only issues decrees, declares wars, and controls the outer life of the people, but also controls the inner life, that is, the thoughts, arts, morality and religion; his power is limitless. This is unacceptable for Kita and he states that he only recognizes the emperor’s position in law and not over the internal life of the people.40

24

Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan DEFINING A SOCIAL MORALITY

The underlying objective of Kita Ikki’s writings, as well as those of many of his contemporaries was framed in terms of a moral project. The issues that confronted them, whether of political corruption or economic inequality and of colonial domination, were addressed in moral terms. To regain a just and moral order it was necessary to effect change. Change that emerged from the modernity introduced by the Western powers was itself not denied. Kita saw the gains of modernity in the introduction of law into Japanese society. The Meiji ishin-kakumei had brought legal equality to a feudal society and by making all equal had initiated the process of transforming serf and chattel or objects into people or citizens. His concept of citizenship in the modern state presumed that it entailed both legal and economic equality. The one without the other left the project incomplete and society dangerously divided and socially unstable. The legal equality and constitutional government that were realized in the 1890s brought a system of formal democracy because the ruling groups were not interested in sharing power. Kita recognizes the conflicting interests of classes but argues that a constitutional government has made change achievable through electoral struggles. The law can be made to operate for the general good and help realize what yet remains an empty structure. This realization needs the organization of workers and other groups, and it needs the spread of enlightenment; that is, the consciousness of the people of their rights has to be raised. In his conception then the right of people to govern themselves and participate in determining their future is central to his project of realizing a socially moral order. kita’s analysis of the meiji structure of rule focuses on the crucial position of the emperor as defined by the establishment. He argues that the central idea of this position is that the ties between the emperor and the people have their origin in a mythic bond of eternal loyalty springing from a divine origin. This, he argues, is in fact a fanciful fiction that even a cursory glance at history will disprove. He is arguing that the law places the emperor as a symbolic head of state and he is nothing more nor less than that. The emperor is, however, in this fanciful fiction being projected as the regulator of both the internal and external life of the people. By linking these myths of divine origin to the bonds of present loyalty, and making these bonds the definition of citizenship and nationality, debate is removed from history and the japanese are projected as different from other nations. Any opposition invites the charge of being non-japanese. Kita’s arguments, as those of some of his contemporaries, are in opposition to this emperor-centred nationalism that is emerging as the dominant ideological frame that will govern all debates.

2

Kokutairon: The Constitution and the Emperor

A

mong the major works written in modern Japan, Kita Ikki’s The National Polity and Pure Socialism (Kokutairon oyobi junsei shakaishugi) is perhaps the least read.1 It was published in March 1906, when Kita was twenty-three years old, and received with interest but the government banned the book within ten days. In this long and polemical tract Kita addressed the question of the nature of modern Japan. He sought, through a critical examination of existing theories, to offer alternative ways of realizing the possibilities of a just society. It was an ambitious project for a young man not in the university, in indifferent health and with financial difficulties. Kita had to borrow money from his family, at a time when they themselves were short of it, to publish the book at his own expense. Though his brother felt that the money was being ill-spent Kita was adamant about publishing the book and the initial reviews justified his confidence in the importance of his work.2 Some of the brightest intellectuals of the time, Fukuda Tokuzo, Kawakami Hajime and Katayama Sen, wrote effusively of this unknown writer’s work and hailed him as the ‘Rousseau of the East’ but, after a critical piece appeared in Tokyo nichi nichi shinbun, the authorities banned the book.3 This was a shock to Kita and he writes that on hearing the news he cried like a child.4 Financially he could ill afford the loss, but with the help of his friends Kotoku Shusui and Sakae Toshihiko, he found a job with Heimin shinbun, the newspaper of the Socialist Party, that enabled him to keep body and soul together. Kotoku says that Kita stopped thinking about the banning of his book and was full of energy and ready to do anything for the cause of freedom.5 It was during this period that he became friendly with Miyazaki Toten, Wada Saburo (Itagaki Taisuke’s private secretary) and Ike Ryokichi (Sun Zhongshan’s private secretary). Miyazaki introduced him to

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

Sun, and Kita began to develop an interest in China and the Chinese revolution. He joined the Chinese Alliance (Chugoku domeikai).6 In mapping the intellectual terrain that Kita traversed the Kokutairon forms a clearly demarcated period even while it represents an integral part of his project of redefining the Japanese state. The issue was of crucial concern as the imperial state was strengthening its control through an ideological and institutional apparatus that aimed at homogenizing social and political life. Kita, in attempting to redefine the character of the state, had to examine the nature and process of Japan’s historical development and locate this within a theory of social organizations and human society. The tract, in the sense that it was written as part of a debate with prevailing views, displayed, not withstanding its ramblings, repetitions and hyperbole, a remarkable breadth of reading, a fervent passion, and an acute understanding of social institutions and intellectual positions. Above all, it points to the continuing strength of the older systems of education and the successful adoption of the new learning by people educated in it. KOKUTAIRON

In the Kokutairon, Kita seeks to confront the central questions which he and his contemporaries were grappling with and on the basis of, what he calls scientific understanding, formulate an understanding of Japan’s history and plot the direction and substance of an agenda for future change.7 His theory of change and revolution flows from his understanding of Japan’s past and not, he writes, from an uncritical use of currently fashionable ‘foreign’ ideas. In critically analyzing the works of his contemporaries, Kita displayed a breadth of learning that led many to argue that the book was actually written by someone else.8 The broad theme of the book, Kita writes in the introduction, is to demolish the arguments of the ‘dogmatic socialists’ and their understanding of the state and individualism. The ideas of these ‘dogmatic socialists’ are severely criticized as derivative and barren, and Kita finds them of little relevance.9 Secondly, Kita wants to offer an argument for the origins of poverty. Poverty, he writes, is explained by many as a product of the industrial revolution, though logically it should have diminished as man’s productivity increased. The wide use of machinery to replace human power has led not to the reduction of labour time, he writes, but rather to the reduction of labour. The system that has emerged has created an economic nobility, to replace the old, which plunders the wealth of the people. Poverty, for Kita, is an integral part of industrial civilization. The intellectual support for this iniquitous system was provided by the old concepts of individualism which were necessary in the early

Kokutairon: The Constitution and the Emperor

27

stages when production was carried out at an individual level, but now as the conditions have changed, so too ideas about individualism must change. Kita argues that Adam Smith advocated ‘free competition’ and said that the best government is the least government while in Japan today, the power of the bureaucracy has become entrenched and is expanding. The nature of government has changed. Competition, Kita writes, is of two types, one among capitalists and the other, among workers. For him, capitalism is plunder, but he ignores the dynamic aspects of the system that ushered in a period of unprecedented economic expansion and which was eloquently noted by Karl Marx. For Kita, the capitalists invest not to expand and increase their productive capacity but rather to destroy their rivals, and are motivated by a desire for money. The ‘feudal economic system’ is representative of a certain stage of development. In the USA, Kita notes, this stage has passed and trusts and syndicates have replaced the ‘economic nobility’. The contradictory nature of capitalism, where growth and dynamism were coupled with new forms of misery and exploitation was well captured by Marx when he wrote, ‘In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some weird spell are turned into sources of want.’10 Capitalism, for Kita, has brought in change, but only at the political level while a new economic nobility continues to economically exploit, dominate and oppress. The brunt of his analysis is aimed at breaking this control. Strikes and rebellions are an expression of the people’s resentment of this oppressive system and they turn, Kita writes, to socialism to provide an answer. He bases his arguments on a stage theory of development. Social evolution goes through different stages, and just as individualism was necessary at the period of individual production, now that production has assumed social character such ideas need to be replaced. Economic development, for Kita, brings about the necessity of socialism where land and capital will be publicly owned and used for the benefit of society. As an example of the change this would usher in, Kita writes that a conscript army of labour under socialism would fight for the whole world, performing a very different function from the present army that fights for nationalist objectives. The army is also constituted along a class and a hierarchic system that grows out of the absolutist character of the state. In the introduction, Kita attacks Kanai Noboru, professor at the Tokyo Imperial University, and Tajima Kinji as ‘state-socialists’ because they see socialism as a doctrine that will end class exploitation

28

Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

and transform every worker into an owner.11 This, he argues, is not the objective of socialism; this is a sort of ‘workerism’. Socialism, does not confuse capital and capitalists; it is against capitalists but not capital, against landlords but not against nature (shizen-tochi).12 Kita sets out to understand the changes effected by the promulgation of the Meiji constitution and for this he must come to grips with the function and character of the emperor and the nature of the Japanese body politic or kokutai. KOKUTAI – PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

An understanding of kokutai is beset with problems as it has come to be identified with an ‘eternal and immutable national polity’, as advocated in the Kokutai no hongi and so inextricably linked with the sacred origins of the uniqueness of Japan and the Japanese, ideas which fuelled militarism at home and expansion abroad.13 This ignores the variety of intellectual currents that formed and shaped the nebulous concept of kokutai. The word appears as early as the eighth century in the mythical histories, the Nihongi and Nihon shoki, but its modern origins are bound with the rediscovery of the Japanese past in the eighteenth century by Motoori Norinaga, and later with the assertions of Hirata Atsutane, and with the blend of Shinto and neo-Confucian ideas of Yamazaki Ansai, and Yamaga Soko. However, the transformation of these ideas after the Meiji ishin was crucial in creating the ideological apparatus of the emperor system. The evolution of these ideas into what Irokawa Daikichi has called ‘the heart of the illusion, the illusion of a national community generated by the emperor system’ has defined the contours of modern Japan.14 At the time of the Meiji ishin, kokutai was viewed in a variety of ways. Thus, Kato Hiroyuki was critical of the view that saw the land and people as private possessions of the emperor.15 Fukuzawa Yukichi, representative of the Japanese enlightenment, sought to equate kokutai with the concept of nationality. He saw each nation as trying to preserve its own existence and therefore ‘ultimately the existence of a kokutai depends on whether a nation loses its political sovereignty or not’, he writes.16 Unlike Fukuzawa, the Confucian scholar and educational theorist Motooda Nagazane (1818–91) propounded an ‘internal’ view of kokutai. Motooda argued that the kokutai was an internal value that could be secured from jeopardy by direct imperial rule.17 The Meiji oligarch and key figure in drafting the Meiji constitution, Ito Hirobumi, initially saw Japan’s kokutai as a historically changing concept but by 1908 he had come to accept, like many of his contemporaries, that the kokutai of the nation did not change historically. He wrote, ‘I maintain that constitutional government could never change the kokutai, only

Kokutairon: The Constitution and the Emperor

29

the political structure [seital].’18 The evolution of these views marks the expansion of the emperor-system ideology which gradually established its hegemony and, in the words of Takeuchi Yoshimi, became ‘something not solid, but a miasma that enveloped both itself and others’.19 Kita Ikki’s argument about the nature and function of kokutai, in the opening decades of the new century, was an important element in the critical debates that centred on this concept. His intervention was of more than academic interest because it attacked the ‘heart of the illusion’ and aimed to destroy its theoretical scaffolding provoking the state to ban his book. Kita attacks the concept from the sanctuary of the Meiji constitution, even while recognizing that these ideas are grounded in what he calls the Ptolemaic view of the Educational Rescript. The Educational Rescript, he notes, not only speaks of our imperial ancestors from Amaterasu and her grandson, the first emperor Jimmu through the unbroken line of historical emperors but also of the glory of our kokutai (kokutai no seika).20 Kita is critical of using lineage and loyalty as intellectual struts of kokutai arguing that such arguments are untenable. His views are closer to that of the early views of Ito Hirobumi who defined kokutai while replying to a question of Kaneko Kentaro by saying that it ‘was a general name for the land, people, language, clothing, shelter, and institutions of a state and as such it was only natural that it change with the times’.21 Kita’s view is more in line with the liberals who in the period of the people’s rights movement attempted to separate kokutai from oligarchic appropriation. In a period when the oligarchic view was achieving dominance Kita’s approach was critical in attempting to demolish the ideological fictions of the rulers that the people constituted one family (kunmin itchi) and that Japan was therefore a family state (kazoku kokka). DEBATES ON THE MEIJI CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

The Meiji constitutional system was created partly in response to the demands for representative government within the country and the need to present a modern image to the Western nations. The task that the Meiji oligarchy faced in drafting a constitutional proposal was to satisfy these demands without relinquishing power and control. The government was divided in 1873 over the question of invading Korea and these divisions were evident in the placatory 1880 Genro draft. However, as the opposition weakened the middle echelons began to prevail and the Prussian model found increasing favour and support till it was finally accepted as the base on which to build the proposal. This was clearly stated in the Iwakura principles of August 1881.23

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

In 1882 the focus of the debate was around the question of sovereignty (shuken), and whether it lay with the Diet or the emperor. To this was linked the question of whether the constitution was to be a contract entered into with the people or granted by the emperor to the people.24 A similar debate on the underlying assumptions of the Meiji constitution took place in 1911, just as the Meiji era came to an end with the death of the emperor. This debate was initiated with the publication of Uesugi Shinkichi’s Teachings for Citizens: Lectures on the Imperial Constitution (Kokumin kyoiku – teikoku kempo kogi). Uesugi Shinkichi, a disciple of Hozumi Yatsuka, was at Tokyo Imperial University and had written on the fundamental principles of the constitution.25 On this occasion, too, the debate centred on the question of the ‘subject of control’ (toji no shutai) or in other words, who exercises the right to control. The participants were agreed on the principle that the emperor was the ‘person who controls’ (soransha) or the emperor is the principle of control (tenno tochi no taigi).26 The other major constitutional scholars involved in the debate were Minobe Tatsukichi, Ichiki Kitokuro and Ariga Nagao but at the core of their thinking lay the principles advocated by Hozumi Yatsuka. Minobe as well as Uesugi, even though they differed, claimed to be following his ideas. Hozumi Yatsuka was a well-connected student of Tokyo Imperial University. His elder brother, Hozumi Nobushige, was head of the law faculty and the president of Tokyo University, and therefore it was not surprising that Ito Hirobumi sent Hozumi Yatsuka to Germany for further studies. Hozumi Yatsuka returned to hold several important posts and was later appointed to the House of Peers and appointed adviser to the Imperial Household Ministry.27 Hozumi Yatsuka sought to build a theory which was based not on Western legal ideals but rather on the ‘kokutai of our ancestors’ (waga senko no kokutai) and his methodology was grounded in a social organic theory that had arisen in the West as a reaction to natural law on which was based the freedom of the individual within the state. Hozumi was, therefore, critical of both Rousseau’s social contract as well as democratic theory.28 His intellectual preoccupations and style of thinking drew their inspiration from Kato Hiroyuki, who had introduced the ideas of J.C. Bluntschelli in the translation Kokuho hanron. In that, Kato attempted to advance a general theory of the state on which he hoped to build a legal theory suitable for Japan.29 Hozumi Yatsuka’s view of the state is grounded in evolutionary theory. It neither develops from below nor is it based on contract. The state is, for Hozumi, ‘a group formed by a specific race governing a specific territory by means of independent sovereignty’.30 He argues that even though the constitution is established by the people, it does not restrict the power of the emperor for it ‘orders the

Kokutairon: The Constitution and the Emperor

31

various institutions of government and the citizens have also to follow its orders’31 so the constitution is ‘subordinate to the command of the emperor’ (kunshu no meirei shitaru mono).32 Hozumi rejected as legalism (hochishugi) any concept of modern law on which to base the functioning of the emperor and the government.33 Hozumi Yatsuka’s concept of the legal position of the emperor was ambiguous, for even as he placed him above the law and made him the repository of sovereignty, he differentiated between ‘control’ (tochi) and ‘possession’ (shoyu). He writes that ‘control’ ‘is that the holders of sovereignty rule the country. It is not rule of the people and the land’.34 Hozumi clearly distinguishes between the state as the personal possession of the emperor (kasan kokka ron) which he clearly rejects, and in accordance with this position, he argues in support of a public law (koho) rather than a private law (shiho).35 In defining the emperor as sovereign and not as an organ of the state, Hozumi retained an element of ambiguity. He used the term ‘equal’ (sunawachi) as in the ‘emperor equals the state’ not so much to indicate that the two were independent and equal entities but rather that the sovereign’s natural thought became law. That is, the sovereign, in relation to the state, exercises the intentions of natural law but in his relations with the other organs of government the sovereign carries out the intent of the law. In this conception the emperor has two aspects: of the ‘natural man’ as well as that of a ‘legal character’. Hozumi by trying to combine the ideas of Aristotle and Grotius within a Hobbesian framework is left with an inherent ambiguity which he cannot resolve.36 The relations between an individual and the emperor are based, according to Hozumi, not on law but on domination through power (kenryoku fukujyu no kankei).37 The emperor can exercise power without any restraint or limit and citizens ‘who are eternally subordinate to the power of the state’ (mugen ni kokken ni fukuju suru shimmin).38 In this theoretical construct there is no room for a concept of right. Therefore, Hozumi talks of the ‘capacity for rights’. The individual can enjoy these rights and the protection of the state only when he gives total obedience to the state. ‘Without obedience there is no protection; and without protection there is no capacity.’39 Hozumi, in searching for the basis on which to build a legal theory, gradually came to the belief that law must be based on religion and in Japan this was ‘ancestor worship’. Ichiki Kitokuro advocated a position that did not attempt to classify political forms but sought to justify the powers of the emperor even while recognizing the rule of law. Ichiki, unlike Hozumi, argued that under the law the emperor had no responsibility but politically and morally he bore responsibility.40 Ichiki had studied in Germany

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from 1890 to 1893 and his view of the state reflected much the same duality as that in the theories of Jellenick. Ichiki returned to Japan and worked in the Ministry of the Interior where he was part of the Yamagata clique. He was clearly in support of emperor absolutism, arguing for the unlimited authority of the state and against the Diet system and responsible cabinets. Ichiki Kitokuro argued that the state in law is ‘a collection of people’ (hito no shugotai), and to that extent it can be called an organic body (yukitai).41 The ruling group (tochisha) is an organ of the state as it works in the interests of the state and the people. However, he argued, that it is not necessary that the state’s right of control represents the highest authority (shuken). The state, for Ichiki, was ‘rule according to eternal law’ (tennen no hosoku ni yori shihai). Ichiki rejected any division of political forms on the basis of ‘the subject of the right to rule’ (tochi ken no shutai), but rather advanced the view that political forms are determined by the institutions which control the right to rule (tochi ken o soran suru kikan no kubetsu). He rejected the distinction between the right to rule that lies with the sovereign and the execution of this right which resides with the Diet. He drew a distinction between the rules governing the internal powers of the state and those governing the people, arguing that the Diet can press its revisions on the emperor but not on the people. The people, Ichiki argues, are governed by the emperor. Minobe Tatsukichi became a full professor at Tokyo Imperial University in 1902, and through his writings and talks he had begun to exercise an important influence. His view of the state is most clearly expressed in Nihon kokuho gakui published in 1907. It was written as a textbook for teachers of special (shihan) and middle schools and therefore, expresses ideas in consonance with official ideas. Minobe regards the state as the highest organ ‘which has the highest power for the good of the group’ (saiko no kenryoku o yusuru ryodo dantai). He defined a group as a body that had common objectives. In a parliamentary monarchy, Minobe argued the ruler and the people together carry out the prerogatives of the state.42 Minobe Tatsukichi argued that sovereignty lay with the emperor, but as he does not exercise it for his personal benefit, the emperor is an ’organ’ (kikan) of the state. Minobe’s argument was that in the past the emperor exercised power for his personal advantage or profit out of which emerged the idea that the emperor’s welfare is the welfare of the people but this is no longer the case. This distinction between right and advantage was rare in those days but the problem of what or how a common objective is constituted was not adequately considered. It was easy to turn a conception of the state

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as that which expresses a common objective to arguing that the acts of the state were expressive of a common objective. His ideas could be, and were, used to justify the transcendental character of state ideology.43 One of the rare constitutional scholars who supported constitutionalism and rejected the divinity of the emperor even while arguing that the emperor was the repository of soverignty was Inoue Mitsu.44 Inoue argued that according to Article 4 of the Meiji constitution the right of control lies with the emperor, and this also implies that the emperor is an organ of the state. As the Meiji period drew to a close, arguments against the divinity of the emperor were marginalized. The process by which these elements became part of the official ideology of the Meiji state involved not only the elevation of the emperor to a position of divine authority but also one of suppressing ideas that were in conflict with this position. The concentration of authority in Tokyo also meant that it became increasingly difficult for heterodox views to be tolerated. The debate in the late-1890s needs to be considered along with the development of the emperor system that is discussed below, but here we shall turn to Kita Ikki’s views expressed in Kokutairon (1906). This book approached the same fundamental questions about the relationship between the emperor and the people and where sovereignty lay. The questions that divided the Meiji intelligentsia were as much a product of theoretical differences as of the compulsions of the immediate. Uesugi feared the growing strength of the political parties and his advocacy of a theory of the division of powers and support of the hanbatsu grew as much out of the need to meet this danger as out of his search for a general theory of the state. In reviewing the ideas of the constitutional scholars, the general acceptance of a framework within which debate was conducted is striking. They largely accepted the framework of the Meiji constitution but within that they differed on a number of points. Hozumi, Uesugi, and Ichiki take a broadly similar position as they see the emperor as a sovereign body. Inoue differs from the above three insofar as he does not fully accept the constitution while Ariga’s ideas about the constitution are somewhat unclear and vague. Minobe is the clearest advocate of the emperor as an organ of the state but, as Ienaga Saburo has argued in his study of Minobe, it is a mistake to see these two ideas, of the emperor as the locus of sovereignty and as an organ of state, as mutually exclusive and in opposition to each other. The Meiji practice certainly bears this out for Hozumi’s books were used in schools while Minobe’s books were indispensable for the civil service examinations for the elite.

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan KITA IKKI: KOKUTAI AND THE STATE

Kita Ikki discusses the concept of kokutai and its modern interpretations in the fourth, and some would say most important, section of the book.45 He is concerned in this section to analyse the character of the modern Japanese state, and he does this by detailing the inadequacies in the theoretical framework of contemporary constitutional scholars. He is however, also concerned to deal with the concept in the context of socialism as he feels that socialists have shied away from coming to grips with what, Kita argues, is a concept central to an understanding of the contemporary situation in Japan. He writes that the silence of the socialists or even their arguments that there is no conflict between their thinking and the ideas propagated as part of the kokutai of Japan is tantamount to the assassination of socialism.46 Vivid imagery and the use of unexpected comparisons to drive home his point mark Kita Ikki’s style. He compares, for instance, the use of the kokutai theory to a mikoshi or a portable shrine carried in processions. He writes that, just as monks in earlier times used religion (mikoshi) to control the people, arguing that any deviation from accepted practices would lead to sin, and thus kept the people in fear and awe, so too was the case with the concept of kokutai which is nothing but a Shinto fabrication; a mere superstition with no basis in history. The present-day theories of kokutai, he writes, have nothing to do either with earlier historical theories or with today’s Japan.47 The Japanese state, according to Kita, is a people’s state (komin kokka) because sovereignty resides in the state. Such a state can have any type of government. Kita classifies governments according to the interests that they serve. Thus socialism is juxtaposed with individualism, monarchy and democracy. Individualism, for Kita, is where relationships, as defined by law, are based on contract. This, he argues, was meaningful and relevant for pre-industrial societies but in present society, as legally at least no classes exist this is no longer relevant. The present kokutai is, therefore, that of the ‘people’s state’ and not a ‘thing’ (bukkaku) that can be used by the emperor as he desires. The emperor does not stand outside the state but is part of it. These two aspects, the kokutai and the seitai, or form of government, therefore, have to be understood dynamically.48 Having taken this position, Kita then proceeds to examine the arguments of scholars who uphold the view that sovereignty rests with the emperor, focusing on the arguments advanced by Hozumi Yatsuka. He takes the argument advanced by Hozumi and reiterated by Ariga that the kokutai of each country is different and ‘the locus of sovereignty is determined by historical conditions’ (shuken no

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shozai wa rekishi ni yotte sadamaru).49 Kita argues that such an understanding is mechanical and untenable, for even while it is true that Japan’s kokutai has been determined by certain historical conditions, both Hozumi and Ariga ignore that it too has changed over time. Kita writes, that they see the horizontal, that is between countries, but ignore the vertical, that is, in history, in space but not in time.50 Kita takes the use by Ariga of the character for ruler as an example. Ariga, he writes, instantly imputes to the character for ‘ruler’ or for ‘to rule’ a contemporary content that is anachronistic. Both these concepts have changed over time as have ideas about the emperor. This is reflected in the fact that while these very scholars are very rational when studying European history, when it comes to talking about Japan they explain everything by imputing it to the uniqueness of Japan which lies in its having an imperial dynasty with an unbroken lineage (bansei ikkei no koto). The argument is tautological: the emperor possesses sovereignty because sovereignty lies with the emperor. This line of argument, he writes, seems to have dulled their wits and made idiots out of them.51 Hozumi’s theory, argues Kita, has a further problem as it consists of two conflicting ideas. Hozumi argues that the three elements of the state are the ruler, the people and the land. He, however, also advocates that sovereignty lies with the monarch but the ruler stands apart from the state and is the owner of both the land and the people. Kita argues that this contradiction can be resolved only by either changing his theory of the state or his interpretation of Article 1 of the Meiji constitution that places sovereignty with the emperor.52 Hozumi’s arguments are not based on a clear line of reasoning, sometimes he sees the authority of the emperor emanating from his divinity and his descent from Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess and at other times, from a position that he occupies on the basis of law. On the basis of this argument, Kita argues that those who advocate that sovereignty lies with the emperor because of his direct and unbroken lineage from the Sun goddess are mistaken. Kita examines the status of the ruler (kuni no genshu) on the basis of Article 4 of the constitution to ascertain whether there is a ruler at all, and if so, his nature. Kita bases his arguments on an organic view of the state, taking issue with the concept of the state as an ‘artificial creation’, a product, he says, of the ideas of the French Revolution; ideas representative of an extreme individualism and no longer valid. Even so, he also does not subscribe to views that see the state in terms of the human body and that is why he finds the term genshu inappropriate and misleading, as it implies that the emperor is the ‘head’ of the body politic. Hozumi equates the ‘ruler’ with the country while Inoue argues that soveregnty resides where the spirit of god resides (kokka shinshoku no tomaru tokoro nari) but Kita argues

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that the emperor is not the ‘ruler’ and does not control (soran) the right to rule. Japan is a constitutional monarchy where both the emperor and the Diet together form the highest body and this power is clear in that they can revise the constitution. Therefore, Kita argues, the manner in which statists (kokkashugisha) differentiate between political forms is untenable. Ichiki Kitokuro, for instance, argues that, on the basis of a division of powers, sovereignty resides in the state but the form of government is that of a monarchy. The notion of the highest organ of government is also only applicable, he writes, to the monarchy and the republic but not to a constitutional monarchy.53 Kita is in agreement with Minobe’s rejection of the organic view of the state but disagrees with Minobe regarding the emperor as the highest body because he feels that both Minobe and Ichiki confuse the difference between kokutai and seitai. For Kita, the kokutai is the essential body of the state (kokka no hontai) while the seitai is how the right to rule is exercised and on this basis three types of political bodies can be defined. A monarchy where one person is the highest organ, for instance Russia after the liberation of the serfs, constitutional monarchy, as in England and Japan after 1890, and finally, a republic, as in the USA. On the basis of these categories the kokutai of China, Korea and Japan differ, but he argues that similarities exist between the kokutai of ancient Greece and modern Japan because in both cases people worked for the state.54 The people’s state is defined by Kita as possessing a dual nature: it has an actual character (jitsuzai no jinkakau) and also a legal character (horitsu no jinkakau).55 Social evolution leads to progress in law, and the state acquires a character. It is possible to build a proper theory of state sovereignty on such a basis and not incorrectly and illogically, as Kita says, on the idea that the ‘state is a fabrication of law’ (gisei ni yotte jinkakau o fuyo).56 The power of the state for Kita lies in its social organization, for even in the Middle Ages, under the most absolutist rulers, the state never existed in one person. Hozumi Yatsuka’s arguments are therefore, mistaken, according to Kita for they confuse the power of society that lies behind the emperor for the power of the emperor. The power of the emperor, for Kita, is really the power of the people as unified by the state. In a manner of speaking, then, the ideas of the Taika reforms were realized in the Meiji constitution for it was then that a unified state was created.57 Kita argues against the view that societies are based on contract. They are, in the first instance, organized for survival and therefore, power lies with a unified or co-operative body. These bodies, he writes, evolve historically developing and changing to meet new needs. Kita is therefore critical of the Aristotlean divisions as being

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mechanistic and finds Hozumi or Inoue’s arguments flawed. Power resides, Kita writes, in the unified body and not in the person of the emperor.58 Having defined the state as representing a unified social body where power lies with the people and is not held by one of its elements, the emperor, Kita goes on to argue that it is on this basis that socialism and democracy are brought together. Thus democratic socialism cannot then be injurious to the body politic (kokutai) nor is it a revolutionary innovation, but here Kita turns the argument, to urge that it becomes the real supporter of the present kokutai. That is why he calls Hozumi and others who follow his arguments, revivalist revolutionaries (fukkoteki kakumei shugisha).59 Socialism, Kita writes, operates within the ambit of the seitai and therefore is not in any conflict with the interests of the state. Article 73 of the Meiji constitution allows institutions to be changed as and when necessary.60 However, Kita also opposes what he terms the ‘all pervasive statism’ (kokka bannoshugi) and is opposed to the entry of the state into the private lives of the people.61 Kita’s arguments are based on the acceptance of the idea of kokutai, but his definition is different from the prevalent conceptions. He argues that there are two major components to the concept of kokutai: a patriarchal state and the idea of an unbroken imperial lineage. The idea of the patriarchal state is best represented by the use of such ‘amuletic phrases’ as sovereign and subject (kunshin ikka), loyalty and filial piety (chuko ichi), and loyalty and patriotism (chukun aikoku).62 These concepts are, according to Kita, merely a collection of Shinto superstitions and the second component of an unbroken lineage is ahistorical. The Japanese people are presumed to have been loyal throughout history and this loyalty supports bansei ikkei but this, Kita argues, is unsubstantiated by an examination of the past. Examining the idea of the patriarchal state, Kita finds that the arguments advanced by Hozumi and others like him are grounded in religious belief, Shinto in their case. This, he says, is their right as the Meiji constitution permits freedom of religion and thought but there is no ground for them to impose it on others by viewing any contrary view as matter of lese-majesty (fukei). The state, he notes, is not based on religion and only a transgression of duty towards the state should be treated as a crime. To call the emperor (tenno) a master of religious ceremonies (saishu) makes no sense in modern Japan.63 Kita Ikki attacks the arguments of Hozumi and his supporters both from a constitutional and an anthropological position. He finds the arguments unsound in law as the origin of the state does not arise from the expansion of one family. He finds little evidence to support this movement from family to state. Historically, he finds no evidence to support the contention that Japan was created by the

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goddess Amaterasu. Moreover, Kita argues, to consider the connection between the emperor–people as a familial link with everyone included in one large family is really the beginning of collective madness. Were such an argument to be acceptable then the emperor himself is the destroyer of kokutai for he forcibly brought Koreans and others to work in Japan and they are not part of the ‘family’. Japan, Kita writes, has Ainu and people who came from China, in earlier times and these people are not bound together by ties of blood. Therefore, the idea of a patriarchal state is unacceptable.64 The question of an unbroken lineage within the kokutai argument that Kita sought to dismantle was important because it was based on the premise of the loyalty of the people to the emperor. This Kita opposed and argued that while both ancestor worship and loyalism were important in Japanese history, it did not follow that all Japanese had always been loyal to the emperor; rather many had opposed him. This anti-loyalist view (jungyaku ron) is, Kita argues, a Ptolemaic view that underlies the philosophy of the Imperial Rescript on Education. He opposes this mistaken view on the basis of the constitution. The kokutai argument of Ariga Nagao, for instance, Kita argues, views the tenno as being unchanged through the ages and is representative of ahistorical arguments for it would indicate that Japanese society has remained unchanged throught the ages. Kita argues that these supporters of the kokutai argument are guilty of ‘retrogressive criticism’ (gyakushinteki hihan). They harness modern concepts to analyse ancient history while what is necessary is an ‘evolutionary analysis’ (shinkateki) to oppose such methods. However, he concedes that there is yet no truly historical philosophy in Japan that investigates the progress of and evolution of society.65 THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION

The process through which the emperor system was created and the lineaments of this system have been extensively written about and there is little need to restate these arguments except to provide a background to examine Kita Ikki’s conception of the imperial institution and its role in society. His analysis and interpretation mark a radical departure, propounded in earlier arguments, which distinguish him as a modern thinker. The direction and thrust of the Meiji establishment and influential ideologues that articulated the Meiji agenda were to eradicate the more emancipatory and libertarian arguments to stifle dissent and difference to meet the demands of a homogenizing nationalism. The emperor, brought to centre stage with the Meiji ishin, was, together with the nobility, the modest possessor of a mere 120 koku, but through the adroit use by the Meiji establishment of existing

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beliefs and ideas and a systematic policy and using the full authority of the state, the emperor was elevated as the tenno to a position above the clouds.66 This emperor system, a structure of rule, was less dependent on the authority of a person than on the institutional apparatus that supported it. The two crucial supports of this system were the bureaucracy and the military, but at various times and on particular occasions other arms of the state also exercised crucial influence. The bureaucratic structure was formed over a period of years, but by 1872 the mature system had emerged with the bureaucracy divided into a hierarchic division of fifteen categories separated into three major divisions. There were three major ranks of bureaucrats: (a) direct-imperial appointment (chokunin), (b) emperor-approved appointment (sonon) and (c) junior officials (hannin). The first two groups were privileged not only in terms of position but were treated differently in law. The bureaucratic structure not only created a class differentiated from the ordinary people but one that also excluded a large part of the nobility and former samurai. Thus, in 1874, out of the 21,486 bureaucrats an overwhelming number were from the nobility and samurai but they formed only 4 per cent of all the nobles and samurai. The ruling classes had lost the right to rule because of their class now they functioned as imperial bureaucrats and therefore as employees of the emperor.67 In 1873, after the expulsion of Saigo Takamori (1827–77) Itagaki Taisuke (1837–1919) and Goto Shinpei (1857–1929), a further qualitative change occurred. The administrative divisions were reorganized as was the financial system. The ‘three new laws’ (sanshin ho) linked the structure of bureaucratic rule with the village level organizations.68 The other two characteristics that mark the emperor system were the treatment of the emperor as a divine being and the process of expansion.69 The military expanded its control, but the bureaucracy was crucial in controlling the functions of the state because the bourgeoizie was multilayered and divided by its relationship with the state. The bureaucracy exercised control through consultative bodies which brought the financial houses and bureaucrats together, as with the Currency System Investigation Committee (1893–5) and through organizations such as the Japan Economic Society (1897), the Yuraku Club (1900), and finally through informal, private relations, marriages, and social clubs. Mitsui’s linkages with the genro Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915) and Sumitomo to Saionji Kinmochi (1850–1940) are well known.70 Landlords, as a group, became an important element in the political establishment. As suffrage was limited to those who paid over Y5 yen in taxes and eligibility to stand for elections was limited to taxpayers who paid over Y10, the large landlords dominated the

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House of Peers and the Lower House was controlled by the middle and small landlords.71 In this structure of rule the ‘pre-modern’ idea of the community (kyodotai) provided the cementing glue. The modern was presented in the garb of an eternal and unchanging artefact handed down from time immemorial and therefore beyond the private and personal. The Meiji constitution was, because of these factors, not only drafted in secrecy but it sought to ground the political edifice on the divinity of the imperial institution. R. Stein, the German legal advisor to Ito Hirobumi, is said to have told Ito that there was nothing better than Shinto to support the state, and therefore, no need to borrow from the outside. ‘Shinto is necessary to support the national polity of your country’ he is quoted as having said.72 In Article 3 of the constitution the emperor was described as divine.73 In the very year that the constitution was published Hozumi Yatsuka wrote an article ‘Legalism (hoijishugi)’. Curiously, for one of the first constitutional scholars, he was opposed to the rule of law and advocated instead rule by morality.74 In particular, he used the idea of ancestor worship to link and bind the state and the people. The concept was based on the understanding that the emperor’s sovereignty was not legitimized by power but rather drew its authority from morality. All early imperial edicts used words such as ancestor (soso), canonization (ressei), deceased father (senko) or, as in the case of the Educational Rescript, ancestors of the subjects (shimin no sosen).75 The idea of a patriarchal state was, by 1910, clearly part of the official view and reflected in statements such as: Our country will build itself on the basis of a familial system and become like one big family. The Imperial House is like our main House. We people of this country have reverent affection (keiai no sei) for our father and will give this love eternally (bansei keiai no koi). And with this we will always be above all loyal.76

The state was seen as a great family, and the relationship between emperor and people as between father and child, and thus the Imperial House functioned as the focus of a state-sponsored religious system. The emperor as a religious figure, though grounded in early mythology and a part of existing belief systems, was made an integral part of the modernizing state’s ideological policies. The rites and rituals of the imperial house became national celebrations; through managed processions around the country, and carefully composed pictures and photographs, the emperor projected as a modern monarch. Suppressive laws and penal actions backed these measures,

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till transgression against the emperor became equated with being non-Japanese. Modernity allowed him to simultaneously show the face of a Western and modern nation while making the divine descent from the Sun goddess a living reality for the people and an integral part of being Japanese. The earlier dress and status signs were internalized as a belief in the emperor. Administrative fiats and criminal codes enforced this with growing severity. On 11 February 1889, when the Meiji constitution was promulgated a ukiyo-e print showing the emperor presenting the constitution to Ito Hirobumi was widely disseminated. Miyatake Gaikotsu parodied the picture, replacing the emperor with a skeleton, he put himself in place of Ito Hirobumi, receiving the rules of his society. He was sentenced on 15 April 1889 to three years rigorous imprisonment and one year probation and fined Y100.77 In 1900, Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880–1958) who became a leading Marxist theoretician was accused of commenting adversely on an imperial prince’s marriage and sentenced to three-and-a-half-years’ imprisionment and a fine of Y110. The bookseller and publisher of the magazine The Sounds of Youth (Seinen no fukuon) was sentenced to one year’s observation. The case was quickly decided, and within twenty days not only did they lose the appeal but the presiding judge in addition, in his official judgement, commented that they were mentally disturbed. The logic behind his view was that no normal, sane Japanese would ever think of criticizing the imperial family.78 The chief features of the emerging emperor system indicate that it combined modern elements of the head of a constitutional monarchy, an enlightened ruler leading his country forward like the monarchs of Europe and also earlier beliefs and values. The emperor, as a living god (arahitogami) became the source and protector of what was isolated as the core of Japanese beliefs and values. Therefore, even as Japan became modern it preserved and strengthened its central beliefs and values, and these separated it from not only the Western nations but also from the Sinic zone. In combining these elements, the emperor was not comparable to other monarchs and heads of state, just as Japan would soon become, by virtue of this genealogy, a country apart. The emperor became ruler of both the public and private realms to a degree that had little resemblance to any traditional position that his forebears had occupied in earlier times. These ideas about the emperor were not just being diffused through government fiat but were also being argued in the public press. For instance, Sato Tetsutaro, a captain in the Japanese navy, wrote that the kokutai of Japan was not like that of other countries, that had developed over time from among the people, but rather had been handed down from Amaterasu, the Sun goddess and founder of

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the imperial line through her grandson who was sent down to rule the islands. Consequently, the position and function of the imperial house had nothing to do with either power or wealth. It was not defined by these attributes and so could never be defeated or suppressed by greater power or wealth. It was an absolute value. He went on to urge his readers that it should be spread throughout the world for, under the absolute kokutai of Japan, it would be possible to bring about world peace.79 Ancestor worship linked the people to the emperor. Hozumi Nobushige (1856–1926), elder brother of Hozumi Yatsuka, wrote a book on ancestor worship in 1901. The book, originally written in English, was premised on the idea that the essential qualities that defined Japan were as important in differentiating it from other nations and cultures as in binding its own populace. The Western image of Japan was equally defined and fleshed out by such local initiatives. In the book, based on a lecture delivered to the International Congress of Orientalists in Rome, Hozumi argued that ancestor worship was the binding force that held Japanese society together.80 Japan, he wrote, was a patriarchal state where the emperor was head of a vast family and, as the emperor held his position because of his divine descent from the Sun goddess, sovereignty was not inherent in the imperial house; rather the imperial house inherited sovereignty. The Japanese state, according to Hozumi, also combined the features of a modern constitutional system as the emperor exercised his power through the constitution. Hozumi illustrated the position of the emperor as the religious head of the Japanese through the function of the Grand Shrine at Ise. Ise was a site of pilgrimage from all over Japan, and this was because, according to Hozumi, the people regarded the imperial ancestors as ancestors of the entire nation. Emperor worship was, therefore, he said national worship.81 In this milieu, the alacrity with which Kita Ikki’s Kokutairon was banned is understandable even while many better-known socialist works continued to be sold openly well into the so-called fascist period. It also helps to underline the harsh sentences meted out in the lese-majesty case in 1911 against Kotoku Shusui and others.82 The case was fabricated and the severe penalties were intended to crush the socialist movement but the fact that this could be done under cover of the imperial house points to the strong roots and firm grip that the emperor system had gained by the opening decades of the twentieth century in Japanese social and political life. Yanagida Kunio was among the first to note that with the collapse of the village community (kyodotai) the state had begun to stress the kyodotai spirit as a way of binding the modern citizen to the nation state. This it did through edicts such as the Boshin Rescript or through civil

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associations such as the Movement of Youth Associations that began to meet from 1910 or through the Reservists Association that was also formed the same year.83 The position and function of the emperor in modern Japan was at the head of a complex ideological structure that served to mould and guide public and private life. The emperor system served as a device to reconstruct the Japanese world by nullifying all other values.84 The emperor could become the focus of all loyalty and responsibility within what Maruyama Masao has called the ‘structureless tradition’ (mukozo dento). The emperor’s position as the spiritual axis of religious life was rebuilt within the nation state to create ideological homogeneity. This new structure was grounded in the ideal of the village community that effectively blocked the emergence of autonomous individuals (shutaiteki ningen) and these ideal village communities were linked to the nation state. Takeuchi Yoshimi writes: ‘In kyodotai at the base, as in kokutai at the apex of society all ideologies whether “modern totalitarian”, “parliamentary democracy” or “harmonious pacifism” – are necessarily subsumed. Thus liberated from the spell of “abstract theory” the kyodotai is enveloped in a world of perfect oneness.’85 He identifies the linkage between these two concepts, a linkage that was realized around the years of the Russo-Japanese War.86 During the first two decades of the Meiji period neither the kyodotai ideal nor the kokutai system had taken their mature form. Kita’s intervention comes when these two elements have taken mature form, and in that sense his ideas have their roots in earlier intellectual currents and they voice intellectual concerns that are on their way to be being marginalized or erased. The emperor system changed and adapted both to the demands of popular pressure as much as to state policy.

3

Kokutairon: Socialism and Society

MEIJI SOCIALISM

W

hat did it mean to be a socialist in turn-of-the-century Japan and how did Kita Ikki see himself, in relation to his contemporaries, as he sought to articulate an agenda for change and a vision for the future? What were the intellectual contours of Meiji socialism and the currents that fed into it? It is possible to go back in a neverending search for the origins of social concern, but the late Meiji intellectual world was formed in a large measure by the churning of the social and political world in the people’s rights movement. Varying in regional intensity, it is really an umbrella term that bonded together gradualist and radical elements. This was in combination with the powerful currents of thought sweeping Japan from the Western world and, by some, experienced directly in their sojourns in the countries of the West. These two sources combined with earlier notions of moral action to ameliorate the conditions of the poor and protect the rights of those suffering servitude and misgovernment. Meiji intellectual concerns were also shaped and affected by government policies that sought to contain demands for political suffrage through bureaucratic control. The Meiji leadership was equally aware of the efforts of the European political class to contain the increasing demands for political participation and social equality. The attraction of the Prussian example to the Meiji leadership is well known. The government had carefully built a system of bureaucratic control under imperial authority that brought all areas of public and private life within its ever-widening ambit.1 This helped to narrow the frame within which alternatives could be posed and it helped to strengthen the control of the central government, reducing the power, authority and finances of local and regional groupings.

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Economic development through state-supported industrialization fuelled economic growth that created an expanding demand for educated and trained labour, but also quickened social tensions and economic inequality. Particularly, after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), the economy, given a fillip by the war reparations, expanded rapidly exacerbating social problems and focusing attention on poverty as the central concern. As Abe Iso said while talking of social problems to a group of US scholars, the stability of society really depends on eliminating differences between rich and poor, and this is ‘The Social Problem’.2 The concern with the question of poverty and the elimination of economic inequality are also reflected in the various societies and journals established to discuss debate and plan strategies to tackle these problems. Thus in 1896 the Social Policy Study Group (Shakai seisaku gakkai) was established and from the following year it began to publish journals such as Society (Shakai zasshi) and Labour World (Rodo sekai). An Association of the League of Labour Unions (Rodo kumiai kiseikai soshiki) was established that year and students of Tokyo University established the Research Group on Sociology (Shakaigaku kenkyukai). Not only were the socialists united in their concerns but also in their suppositions, particularly on the Meiji ishin-kakumei and the Meiji state. They saw the ishin-kakumei as a progressive revolution which had overthrown feudalism and established freedom and equality. Thus Kotoku wrote: ‘The restoration – revolution of our Japan truly has the spirit of freedom, equality and altruism.’3 The character of the ishin lay, for them, not in the imperial restoration nor in the opening of Japan to Western trade, but in the impact of nineteenth-century liberal ideas of freedom and popular government which led to the establishment of a constitutional government. Therefore, when they talked of resistance and change, it was to restore the true aims of the ishin and to end the distortions that had taken place. While there may be lexical similarities there was a difference in their ideas and prognosis and that of the Meiji leadership. Late-Meiji socialist thinkers were the inheritors of a radically new way of looking at the society and the state. The influence of the struggle for constitutional government, fought at various levels by the movement for people’s rights, marked a radically new stage in the intellectual history of Japan. The Meiji constitution itself, famously gifted by the emperor to his people was, for the socialists, a point of departure. It created the legal basis for ending social divisions and building a society of equals. Kita Ikki evaluated this as a radical break with the past, and in this he was supported by many of his contemporaries.

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We tend to summarize the myriad influences that came from the countries of the West but it is important to bear in mind the variety of ideas that came to Japan borne by books and returning students. The Japanese delved into an immense reservoir and used ideas, depending on their proclivities, spanning German constitutional theory, the French Enlightenment, British liberal and utilitarian thought, Christianity in its many and varied forms and later varieties of socialism. The Christian influence was strong in Japan, particularly on the intelligentsia, because of its social concerns, and in this it meshed easily with the Meiji ideal of humanitarian concern for those crushed in the inexorable drive to industrialize and build a modern state. Among the Christian sects, the Unitarian were almost Narodnik in their focus on the people. Traditions of peasant revolt and petitioning the lords for succour and justice worked within this new environment and encouraged political responses that pressured the Meiji government with demands for amelioration of the condition of the populace and for broadening political participation. The socialists could appeal to the ideals of the Meiji constitution or even use the rhetoric of another ishin, a renovation to displace the corrupt and oppressive officials and restore just rule. Socialism, in the years before the Russian revolution, was social reformism and its ideas were taken largely from Claude Henri Saint Simon, Charles Fourier, Proudhon, and the early Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels of the Communist Manifesto and Socialism Utopian and Scientific. These ideas were woven together with social Darwinism, influential across East Asia. Marx and his ideas came to be seen as the result of a long process of evolution, and the notion of class struggle was linked to the idea of the survival of the fittest. The socialist project saw its work as realizing the ideals of the Meiji constitution and protecting it from the distortions of the establishment that sought to continue older and more despotic forms of rule. In this sense, a socialist nationalism would be the only way to realise the aims of the goishin. Japanese socialism exerted a major influence on Chinese republicans and socialists. Japanese interpretations were taken to China either through translations or through Chinese students who came in large numbers to study in Japan. Therefore, the similarities in the interpretative strategies of Japanese and Chinese socialism were no accident (e.g. in the years 1905–7 between 8,000 and 14,000 Chinese came to Japan). Many Japanese socialists born around the Meiji ishin experienced socialism in the USA, which was undergoing a period of a rapid economic and social change.4 In the 1880s American socialism moved from social welfare to the scientific socialism of R.T. Ely and the Christian socialism of Edward Bellamy, and from 1886 the American

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Federation of Labour (AFL) became an influential force. Ely, a major economist, was also a Christian and an advocate of public control of resources and a supporter of the right of workers to establish trade unions. Edward Bellamy set his utopian Looking Backwards (1888) in the year 2000 under state socialism. A bestseller, it sold a million copies and sparked off the formation of nationalist clubs. He himself founded a nationalist monthly (1888–91) and founded and edited the New Nation (1891–94). State socialism and nationalism were the common currency of ideas, and these found sympathetic echoes among the Japanese intelligentsia such as in Katayama Sen (b. 1859).5 Those who were active in the 1890s, such as Tokutomi Shoo (b. 1868)6 Kinoshita Naoe (b. 1869)7 and Sakae Toshihiko (b. 1870)8, grew up under the influence of the people’s rights movement and sought careers outside the government system. Many of them became journalists writing for a growing class of urban readers, and they helped to bring out a new type of journal such as Yorozu choho (1892)9 and Rikugo zasshi (Cosmos Journal) (1900).10 It was also during this period that the circulation of major dailies and the burgeoning local papers increased. Newspapers and journals, though frequently banned, were yet to come under the complete control of the government and therefore journalists exercised a certain degree of freedom. The subsequent generation of people, such as Matsuoka Kason (b. 1879), Otsuka Kozan, Nagai Ryutaro (b. 1881),11 Kita Ikki (b. 1883), Osugi Sakae,12 Ishikawa Takuboku (b. 1885),13 Takabatake Motoyuki,14 Okawa Shumei (b. 1886),15 and Arahata Kanson (b. 1887)16 entered the ‘regional’ socialist movements before coming to Tokyo as students, and in common with the earlier group, most of them were déclassé intellectuals, dropping out of school midway. Sakae, for instance, left the prestigious Tokyo High School No. I (Ichiko) without finishing, Takabatake dropped out of Doshisha University, Osugi, out of a school for army children, and Arahata didn’t get beyond upper primary school. None of them were from an imperial university and, lastly, most of them were influential journalists or writers. Thus Sakae’s The Flowers of a Snake Gourd (Hechima no hana) and Arahata’s Modern Ideas (Kindai shiso) were critically influential and widely read.17 KOTOKU SHUSUI AND KATAYAMA SEN

The two most representative socialist works of this period were both written in 1903. They were Kotoku Shusui’s The Quintessence of Socialism (Shakai shugi shinzui), published from July 1903 to November 1903, and Katayama Sen’s Our Socialism (Waga shakaishugi).18 It would, therefore, be useful to compare these with what Kita wrote in Kokutairon, published in May 1906, as they were all written within a few years of one another.

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Kotoku Shusui’s purpose, as he says in the introduction, was to provide a reliable account of socialism, as most works till then had been written by those opposed to socialism and therefore either distorted its ideas, or were factually wrong. His work was based on Richard Ely’s Socialism and Social Reforms, the Communist Manifesto, Das Kapital, and On Utopian and Scientific Socialism by K. Marx and F. Engels. He also consulted the works of Bryan, Thomas Kirkup’s An Inquiry into Socialism (1888), and William Morris to give, what he calls, a bird’s-eye view of socialism.19 The book is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. Kotoku explains the development of productive forces with the industrial revolution and the rise of modern civilization, arguing that in a capitalist system, while there is development and accumulation of wealth there is also growth in poverty and the destruction of middle and small businesses. As capitalism develops, he writes, so morality, correctness and truth are also destroyed. 20 Kotoku then treats the question of the origin of poverty and shows that the crux of the problem lies in the ownership of production by a small number of capitalists, and therefore the key to resolving the problem lies in social ownership.21 He then discusses the evolution of the industrial system, using Marx’s categories.22 He analyses capitalist society and discusses the concept of class struggle between capitalists and workers, and sees that the fundamental contradiction of capitalist society is that a few capitalists possess socially-produced capital. Having outlined the problems of capitalism, he then proceeds to lay out the four defining characteristics of socialism, taken from Ely: (1) public possession of the means of production e.g. land and capital, (2) public management of production, (3) social distribution of earnings (the ideal he says is according to need), and (4) a limit on the earnings of the wealthy.23 He also treats a number of misunderstandings regarding socialism.24 He then briefly discusses the history of socialism and finally the role of the party, concluding by reiterating the necessity of realizing socialism.25 Kotoku Shusui’s work, though based largely on the writings of Ely, Marx and Engels, is a pioneering effort, along with Morichika Unpei’s The Socialist Programme (Shakai shugi koryo) for it does show that socialist ideas had been understood, and, therefore, to dismiss it merely as a derivative work is not justified.26 One form an evaluation can take is to question how far he understood Marx’s ideas. This is an open question. Scholars have noted that like his contemporaries he also mistranslates surplus value (kachi) as price (kakaku), but Kotoku understood the state and the forces at work in society. His use of the word is in contexts that show that he understands the concept, that value (kakaku) is created. He quotes Marx to show that the movement

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of capital and goods are nothing but labour power and the owners of capital receive the surplus value created by labour (joyo kakaku).27 Kotoku’s use of the concept of class struggle cannot be reduced to an evolutionary concept and linked to the struggle of the fittest. He sees society as progressing (shinka) but his analysis of class domination is both in economic and moral terms.28 He, perhaps because of the influence of anarcho–syndicalist ideas but also because of his understanding of the debates within socialism, sees the contradictory positions taken by adherents on the question of the power of the state. There are those who uphold the power of the state and its expansion and those who argue for the reduction of state power. This, however, is said to explain that when the German socialists call for the abolition of the state they are using the word in a technical sense (gakujitsuteki imi, which he glosses as technical), that is, they are calling for the abolition of the class state.29 Contemporary reviews of Kotoku’s book position his ideas in contemporary circumstances and give a sense of the meaning they in carried. In general, the reviews are fulsome in their praise of Kotoku’s understanding even though they recognize the debt to the works of R.T. Ely. The reviews note that the writer, Kotoku Shusui’s definition and objective of socialism is aimed at replacing a class-divided society by one where the means of production (bushitsuteki seisan kikan) are owned publicly, socially-produced wealth is distributed equally and conflict between landlord capitalists and tenant workers ended. It is also noted that socialism is grounded in the ‘idea of progress’ (shinka no riso). Socialism will end differences in wealth, and a socialist revolution is seen as a historical necessity based on the principle of progress (shinka no riho). Ultimately socialism is based on morality and justice (dori to seigi).30 This understanding of socialism clearly sees the need to differentiate between the interests of the state and society. Thus, in Yamato shinbun, the reviewer writes ‘society is for society and not society for the State’.31 Katayama Sen’s Our Socialism (Waga shakaishugi) is a slightly longer work which starts by defining the meaning of socialism and then proceeds to an analysis of capitalist society, offering criticism from the point of view of workers. He then deals with the development of socialism within capitalist society and the socialist party movement, and then examines the economy, politics and culture. Katayama explains the meaning of socialist revolution and argues that capitalist wealth will be appropriated without compensation as it does not belong to the capitalists but is produced by the workers. He concludes by writing that the socialist ideal is the ideal of humankind. Both these works were influential in spreading an understanding of socialism and they reflect the level at which socialism was understood. Kotoku and Katayama are, at best, in these

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works summarizing European texts rather than reflecting on and developing the methodology represented by these works. In Meiji socialism it was the principle of economic organization that was fundamental to what was considered socialism; politics, however was not just a conditional element (jokenteki). The socialists recognized the importance of the political system in providing the framework to realize their ideals. Kotoku’s writings on the electoral system indicate this understanding, and his use of categories and stages to mark the dominant characteristics of a period were part of the accepted framework that history moved from a period of ‘free competition’ to one of ‘trusts and syndicates’ (shihongodo shugi) and finally to world socialism. This did not suggest that he saw economic and political processes as separate and compartmentalized or reduced the idea of socialism to merely a matter of hunger and its solution.32 Kotoku worked on an understanding grounded in a class analysis of society and the recognition that while the state was a collection of people (jinrui), in effect it was a collection of one part of the people only. In that sense, to understand the Japanese state, it was necessary to understand the position of the emperor and the nobility, the big capitalists and landlords and above all the forty million who were not represented within this structure. The state, he argued, needed to be restructured to bring about a people’s state.33 Second, the question of individualism needs to be addressed. Kotoku, it is argued, equates individualism with selfishness (rikoshugi), writing ‘when there is an individual and no state, when there is a state but no society then it is just a matter of trying to improve society on the basis of just an individual’s interests’.34 Kotoku and the socialists drew from the early concerns for justice, morality and righteousness but they put these objectives within a new framework. Their moral concerns were directed against the political control exercised by a few as well as ideas that defined society in terms of competition. The emphasis on struggle and battling for success was a style that fitted well with the Meiji ideal of ‘success in life’ (risshin shussei), a phrase that gave form to the newly-released social energies. From the 1890s, however, socialists began to criticize these ideas. They argued that Darwin’s struggle for survival was not the only principle that motivated action in both the world of nature and that of man. Co-operation or, borrowing Kropotkin’s term, mutual aid was an equally important principle. It was the Meiji establishment’s reduction of these ideas that robbed individualism of any sense of internal independence or struggle or hard work and reduced it to just plain success. Socialism was not unscientific, Kotoku argued, and Darwinian ideas also pointed to the gradual improvement of society so that the number sacrificed in the struggle for survival was reduced, and in that sense society advanced from individualism to socialism.35

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Kotoku clearly writes that critics always argue, mistakenly, that socialism restricts the freedom of the individual. Individual freedom is man’s destiny, it is society’s life (ningen no seimei de aru, shakai no seimei de aru). Socialism, he says, is only for making the ownership of capital and machinery public but does not restrict individual competition that is the basis of progress.36 In this context the socialist handling of the arguments around the concept of kokutai is germane to this view. Kotoku’s understanding of socialism is not opposed to individualism but rather is opposed to the trampling of the freedom and authority of the individual in present-day society.37 It is important to read the argument correctly and place statements in their context. Kotoku Shusui is not glorifying the kokutai position in Socialism and Kokutai when he writes ‘that in Japan socialism is not in conflict with the sanctity of the emperor and the people’s wealth is his wealth’.38 In that essay he starts with the argument that anything can be opposed by saying that it harms our kokutai and that it is commonly used by critics of socialism. There are various definitions of kokutai, according to Kotoku, but they share the fundamental idea that Japan has an emperor with an unbroken lineage of 2,500 years, and this is unique to the world. He then argues that socialism seeks to bring about peace, progress and equality, and so does not really contradict this position. After all, he says, the Meiji ishin brought about equality among the people and changed a feudal society, and therefore just as the samurai were overthrown, socialism seeks to overthrow the domination of the rich and bring about economic equality. Next, Kotoku tries to show that monarchs and rulers can also work for the people, but he is careful to argue that socialism is fundamentally a doctrine that works for the people and not for a monarch, the extreme individualism represented by Louis XIV, ‘I am the State’, is opposed to socialism. In Japan, Kotoku argues, the tradition is different: Emperor Nintoku had said that the wealth of the emperor is the wealth of the people. This is the pride of what Kotoku defines as Eastern socialism (toyo no shakaishugi), and it is in this context that he says there is no contradiction between kokutai and socialism.39 In another context he had written that a socialist empire ‘served by capable officials, like the present and supported by a people’s army inspired with enthusiasm for a better social order, might find its strength and stability immeasurably increased’.40 However, this must be read in the context of his argument where he is at pains to differentiate between the interests of a monarch and of socialism. For Kotoku, such a position did not lead to theorising on the supremacy of the state. He was clear about the class character of the state and indeed argued for greater local autonomy, opposing the concentration of power in the central government. He writes that ‘It is natural to stress decentralization of

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power’ (Chiho bunken o shucho suru ni itaru wa shizen nari) and that the state should become ‘a frequently changing union of a congregation of assemblies’ (jijiteki shugodantai no rengo).41 The understanding of ‘people’ in Meiji socialism is a very important issue. Tokutomi Soho, the founder of ‘commonerism’ (heiminshugi), referred to those who were not nobility or samurai by the word heimin. In Kotoku’s understanding too the core of this group constituted the ‘people’, for him, that is, it encompassed those who own land and can vote.42 Sakae Toshihiko differs, in that when he refers to the middle-class, he is talking of the lower middle-class, the petty officials, teachers, police, some landlords merchants, etc. For Sakae the concept is really closer to ‘worker’.43 Thus, when socialists are talking of ‘people’ they have the middle class in mind and their ideal of society is to make it a middle-class state in which the struggle for survival would come to an end. By the turn of the century most socialists were agreed upon the content of socialism. Their ideas centred on (a) public ownership of production facilities and (b) equal distribution. To bring about these changes they argued that given the level of development in Japan, violence was unnecessary. These changes could be brought about peacefully through parliamentary institutions and that is why they supported a universal suffrage law that would, they argued, enable them to win power. Therefore, they were also active supporters of general education that would create awareness among workers and tenants, who formed a large part of the population.44 Finally, socialists had to debate within the context of the pervasive influence of Darwinian social evolution, or rather one aspect of it, the struggle for survival. The perception of history as a process of continuous evolution where any stopping meant death and defeat had become pervasive. The idea of the struggle for survival and free competition came to be seen as socially disruptive, and this in turn meant that total unity was a necessary prerequisite.45 This helped to mould an intellectual climate where the latest was deemed to be the best, with the obverse of it also being true, that is, that the old was bad, useless. The popularity of such phrases as ‘spirit of evolution’ (shinka no ikioi) or ‘the state of the world’ (sekai no taisei) reflect this style of thinking.46 It was against the background of the perceived decline in morality, the increasing corruption and the prevalence of a philosophy emphasizing an incessant struggle for survival that a search for a new 0ethic, a public morality compatible with the ideas of freedom, equality and fraternity, became widespread. It was in this context that Kotoku Shusui rejected what he saw as the extremes of individualism.47 The development of these intellectual positions must not be divorced from the political processes, for while Kotoku was forming the Risodan48 and calling for a new ethic, Japan was facing the problem of

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environmental destruction caused by ill-considered industrialization – the Ashio copper mine pollution case.49 The mines in Tochigi prefecture polluted the Watarase River, and this pollution spread to a larger area, affecting Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba prefectures. Farmers’ protests in February 1900 led to 1,000 of their representatives going to Tokyo to petition that the mines be closed and tax relief provided. They were, however, arrested as they left Gunma prefecture. Japanese troops were also sent to China to help quell the Boxer or Yihetuan movement which led Kotoku to protest, and it was in this situation that he wrote in April 1901, I am a Socialist and his book, Imperialism – The Monster of the 20th Century.50 He firmly rejected the ideals of Meiji expansionism and argued that such aggressive nationalism is based on sub-human qualities like hatred and scorn; values that serve to enslave the individual. The government, he argued, used the cry of ‘national emergency’ to extend the empire and labelled as ‘unpatriotic’ anyone who opposed or questioned such views. Kotoku was thus very clear in linking domestic reform with changes in Japan’s foreign policy. It is, therefore, in this context that his rejection of nationalism should be seen.51 Abe Isoo is mentioned in the preface to Kokutairon and therefore it is necessary to consider what Abe understood socialism to be, for his views influenced Kita. Abe, along with Kotoku and Uchimura Kanzo, is one of the leading figures of Meiji socialism, but unlike them he was a lacklustre figure and increasingly worked within the system and compromised.52 Born in Fukuoka, Abe was influenced by the Meiji educator Niijima Jo while he was at Doshisha, and it was there that the three ideas of Niijima moral training, self reliance and altruism (hakuai) made a lasting impression on him.53 This influence was further reinforced by the importance that his economics teacher Dwight Learned placed on the role of economics in bettering society. Abe combined these influences to argue that while the salvation of the individual depended on religion, society could only be saved by economics.54 Like Kotoku, Abe too recognized the corelation between freedom within the country and an aggressive expansionist policy. He was a firm opponent of war and in the first socialist manifesto of 1901, which he wrote, the second ideal is ‘the total abolition of armaments as a first step toward the establishment of peace among nations’. He went on to write: Democracy is stubbornly opposed to militarism. It is opposed on three counts: because arms actually protect capitalist class interest at the expense of the common people; because war aids in the exploitation of weak countries by strong powers as arms are used to open up markets by force, and because militarism always grows into despotism, a retrogression from civilisation to barbarism.55

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Second, Abe argued that ‘rampant individualism’ was behind aggressive policies; trade barriers pitted nation against nation. Therefore, removing such obstacles and providing equal opportunity and the enjoyment of benefits for all would ensure peace. It is wrong, he argues to justify war by referring to social Darwinism.56 Finally, Abe argued that the basis of the despotism of the emperor system lay in the despotic family system (kazoku shugi). He said that to establish peace it is vital to end ancestor worship, ensure the freedom of women, change attitudes toward minority groups, and carry out educational reform.57 Matsuda Michio argues that the failure of Meiji socialism lay in the fact that it lacked a genuine native tradition and its proponents merely borrowed ideas. Second, it had failed to develop a public morality different from that of the ruling class which put forward one based on the need for self-defence. From the end of the 1890s this bureaucratic morality, such as that represented by the philosopher Inoue Tetsujiro (1855–1944), who allied morality with law (represented by the Educational Rescript), was opposed, according to Matsuda, in three ways: one, by Christians, like Uchimura Kanzo; two, from within the framework of Confucian morality, as by Kotoku and Sakae Toshihiko; and three, in literature by the naturalist school. Matsuda fails to appreciate the link that people like Kotoku made between domestic suppression and foreign aggression, and their opposition to it, and from this standpoint they would have provided a basis for a morality independent of state power. Where the socialists ‘failed’ is not so much in their understanding but in their policies. Even taking into account the lack of a sizeable working class and the preparedness of the ruling groups, the socialists were not able to establish working-class organizations to counter state power.58 The difficulties that Kotoku faced, both financial and political, are illustrative of this constraint, and it is significant that before he was arraigned and executed in the treason trial he had agreed to compromise and remain silent.59 The Christian–socialist unity to oppose the war was not only based on a moral repugnance but also on the understanding that an expansionist policy was not in the social interests of the common man. Hence their emphasis also on active measures to reform society. The split after the Russo-Japanese War arose out of the reluctance of the socialists to take political steps to realize their goals. Thus Uchimura Kanzo became disillusioned with the Risodan for its virtually total preoccupation with social problems. If one looks at Kotoku’s writing, for instance in Rikugo zasshi, it is very clear that Kotoku, morally outraged though he may be, grasps the political and economic system that has allowed the corruption of society and domination by capitalists and argues that only through socialism can equality be brought about.60

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KITA IKKI: SOCIALISM AND SOCIETY

Meiji socialism, for all its inadequacies, was moving towards a sophisticated analysis of state and society. Translations had made available a wide range of Western literature, including the works of major socialist thinkers, to the growing intelligentsia. However, more than just imported ideas the Meiji socialists built on the work of earlier generations of protest and criticism, and brought to bear on their reading their own lived experience of the problems of the day. Kita Ikki also approached these problems from within this intellectual milieu. His concern was to define the nature of the nation and society after the Meiji ishin: the function of political and social institutions and ideas; the distribution of political and economic power, the nature of modern society; and the origins of poverty. His objective in covering this wide-ranging agenda was to chart a course that differed from many of his intellectual contemporaries and from the Meiji establishment; a course grounded in the history and traditions of Japan and yet alive to their changing historical character. Many of these questions were being debated in the government, press, and other more informal gatherings. The Meiji government alive to the dangers of socialism, having learnt from Bismarckian Germany and the experience of Europe, was systematically crafting a political structure that would severely limit and constrain the search for an equitable society.61 Kita Ikki had examined first the constitutional debates and sought to define the nature of the state and the locus of authority. Next, he approached the economy and society. Here his endeavour is to understand the mechanisms that shape the distribution of power and to understand the possibilities opened up by modern society. He considers the question of labour and the division of work and the nature of individualism, and all these enquires are directed to understanding the origins of poverty, why poverty continues to exist even when the technologies of production have expanded. Kita writes that economists say that modern society is the result of a mechanical revolution, but he would argue that this is a mistaken understanding. Greater use of machines will not wipe out poverty; for what actually happens, he says, is that there is a reduction not in labour time but merely in the number of workers. Poverty, he says, existed because capitalists and landlords, who are the economic kings and nobility, rule an ‘aristocratic state’. All power is economic power and these ‘nobles’ plunder the people. This rule is supported by the doctrines of the old economic school that, though it claimed to base itself on individualism, really advocated an aristocratic slave system.62 Therefore, the question of individualism is central to Kita’s argument but rather than jettison the idea he seeks to redefine it to fit the idea of socialism that he is formulating. Socialism, he felt, while in

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contradiction with capitalism, could not neglect the ideal of individualism as it had contributed to the development of civilization. The feudal nobility system was transformed by three revolutionary ideas, he writes: the ‘right to work’, argued by Adam Smith, the ‘right to religion’ as expounded by Luther, and finally, ‘a philosophy of political freedom’ defined by Locke.63 However, at that time the ‘right to work’ had still not been realized because of the existence of an economic nobility, which dominated and controlled society. In effect, Kita felt that Adam Smith’s individualism was formulated at a time when what he calls the economic nobility still dominated and controlled society and so it was not possible to realize the ‘right to work’. Hence, Kita writes, Adam Smith’s understanding of individualism would lead to anarchism.64 To understand the historical position of this economic nobility, Kita found it necessary to discard the thinking of the old economists who sought to explain land and capital using the ideas of an earlier period. These economists, he wrote, argued that capital was the product of hard labour and according to them this explained the dominance of the ‘economic nobility’.65 However, we must, Kita argues, understand that subsequent to the industrial revolution the origins of social capital and capital accumulation had to be understood in a very different way. It was no longer just a question of hard work. Capital accumulation was plunder, and on this point he felt Marx was correct.66 The question of individualism was tied up with the idea of competition so that free individuals competed for resources and used their labour to achieve success. However, Kita defines two types of free competition: one was the competition between wage labour and the capitalist, and the other was between capitalists. Any doctrine of socialism had to understand this difference. Economists, Kita said, saw this competition as production, but capitalists did not produce to increase production; rather they competed to increase their wealth and to destroy other capitalists. Therefore, one had to see that the cost of production was really the cost of destruction. This, he felt, was why depressions occurred: because the capitalists were concerned only with waging this war, while the effects of the consequent instability were borne by the workers.67 This conflict between capitalists, according to Kita, led to the creation of ‘trusts’ and the establishment of an economic feudal system. In such a system the workers have to organize into unions. The trusts, while they maintain lower prices, were absolutist organizations without any limit to their power and they made life difficult for the middle classes. This was a situation, writes Kita, that was conducive to revolts and revolutions as, while the political form of the state had changed, the economic form continued to remain feudal.68

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The increasing tension and opposition, according to Kita, reflected a changing conception of authority among the people, and socialism he defined as a theory of authority. Socialism, he argued, put forward a theory to oppose the theory of individualism based on the right to possession, and possession, it had to be remembered, was originally a form of plunder. Historically, writes Kita, the period when an individual could, through his labour, create possessions was over and the ideal of individualism that the producer has the right to possess could no longer function. Now only society had the right to possess, as all labour is social and is produced by society.69 Kita argues against the idea of ‘natural rights’, saying that all rights are social: society produces and, therefore, not the individual but only society can claim the right to ownership. These ideas, according to Kita, developed over a period of time as society progressed and the new thinking that emerged was that society created profit and therefore, had the right to this profit.70 Socialism, he felt, would be realized only when wealth was created by socialist economic principles. These principles were based on the public ownership of land and of production facilities to develop society. Society had proceeded in the following economic stages, he wrote: (1) a period of warring stages, (2) a feudal state, and (3) a people’s state (Komin kokka). During the first two periods the people worked for a ruler (kunshu) but under the third state people have economic power. Thus, in such a state, for instance, the role and function of the army would be different in a people’s state (komin kokka). The army worked to keep out foreign powers, but with the establishment of socialism, a socialist army would work for world peace and social production. Unlike the absolutist slave system, a socialist labour army would protect individual liberties and freedom, so then, according to Kita, just as the political form of the state had evolved from a family to a people’s state (komin kokka), so then an economic people’s state (komin kokka) would emerge.71 Kita then proceeds to critically examine the ideas of two economists, Kanai Noboru (1865–1933) and Tajima Kinji who, he says, are critical of such thinking.72 Kanai argues that capital is created by labour and hence labour is entitled to the profit, but, according to Kita, the aim of socialism is to destroy the class system of capitalists and workers so that the right of ownership belongs to society. It is not just a matter of assigning the profit to the working class. Kanai’s ideas he feels, are really a form of workerism.73 Kita examined the question of poverty in modern society from an economic point of view and in Ethical Ideals of Socialism he is concerned with the problem of crime and how it is caused by poverty.74 His principal argument is once again directed against those who argue from a standpoint of individualism. He argues that, as they look only at the

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individual, they neglect the social circumstances and hence fail to really understand the nature and origin of crime. Crime differs according to class, Kita argues, for while the lower classes are led to crime for sustenance and survival, the upper classes, again motivated by economic compulsions, indulge in crimes like bribery. Hence, although the scale and form of the crimes committed by the two classes differ they are committed for the same reasons. Thus, according to him we must not seek to explain crime in terms of the increase in population or wealth or even due to an increased awareness because of better policing methods, but ascribe them to social institutions.75 In this discussion Kita examines Higuchi Kanjiro’s (1871–1917) views on crime.76 Higuchi puts forward the argument that the socialist dream, that crime will disappear in a socialist society, is a utopian one and that crime is necessary for society. Higuchi quotes Durkheim’s view that crime is indicative, a symptom of some sickness in society, and uses this to argue that the very existence of crime is necessary and good, as it enables us to understand what is wrong with society.77 Kita while agreeing with Durkheim that crime is a symptom of some sickness in society, disagrees with Higuchi’s conclusions, but rather argues that what is, therefore, necessary is a change of the political structure (seitai).78 Kita’s argument is based on the understanding that as society or social forms change and evolve, so do crimes and punishments. Thus, in the early stages of social evolution, crimes were barbaric and the punishments meted out were equally barbaric in his view, but once a socialist revolution takes place and the capitalist state is transformed, crimes for economic reasons will end. Here he takes issue with Higuchi who argued that man is not merely an economic animal and crimes are also caused by non-economic factors.79 Kita’s understanding is that society is divided into classes and each class has its ideals and its morality and these differing value systems are in conflict with the state system of law and morality of the state. A socialist revolution, Kita writes would bring about a unified moral system. In such an evolving situation Kita argues that, to say as Higuchi does, that crimes will continue is to overlook the fact that just as society evolves and just as punishments have become more humane so will crime gradually end. Socialism, he feels, will actually unify the state, which though legally one, is divided economically, with each class pursuing its own morality.80 The question of loyalty was central to debates on the nature of nation and self in Meiji Japan. Loyalty provided the link between emperor and people and Kita sought to intervene in this debate to argue against developing notions of an emperor-centred loyalty. He approached this question historically but framed his answers polem-

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ically. Thus, he begins by asserting the opposite that, far from being loyal, the Japanese have always been rebels, as any people’s history would show for they have tried to overthrow the emperor. The explanations of the supporters of ‘All Under One Roof’ (Bansei ikkaron), that is supporters of Japan’s divine mission to rule the world, have inverted this and argue falsely that the people have always been loyal to the emperor. Ancestor worship and loyalty to the ruler that are factors are a part of social evolution and occur in most countries. However, as factors stressed by the rulers, it would be more appropriate to call it loyalty (chu).81 As society evolves, families are gradually established and with the formation of a family system the idea of loyalty (chukoshugi) begins to develop. However, it is not inevitable that such ideas need to develop, they can just as well fail to take root. During this period the imperial family was like other families, and like them, they too worshipped Amaterasu. Social consciousness was based on blood ties and people were loyal first to their family heads rather than to the imperial family. Thus, Omi or Muraji (uji, clans), who were distant relations of the emperor, were more loyal to their clan heads and in this sense can be considered ‘rebels’. In the struggle for survival the unit was the family, like the Heike or the Hojo.82 In the middle ages, the idea of the lineage of the emperor and of loyalty underwent further changes. The nobility had considered the emperor as part of their family and so felt equal to him. Therefore, to change or replace the emperor was not impossible to consider. The conception of loyalty, which had been based earlier on blood ties, now underwent change as families increased in size. Loyalty (chu) became an independent moral principle. Loyalty was still a moral obligation towards those who were close to one, rather than to a distant emperor. This was also further reinforced by the fact that people were bound economically to those close to them. So during this period they were also, in fact, ‘rebels’.83 The arguments put forward by the supporters of the emperor do not take into account how the word Tenno has also evolved historically.84 In the first period, the tenno was the head of a family and acted as a chief priest during religious festivals and, therefore, exercised unlimited power. The second period was marked by the power of the monarchy. Power rested with a strong ruler (saijo or saikyo) and the state was used to display the power of the emperor.85 There are two contradictory characteristics present in the relations with the Imperial House, for while on the one hand, the nobility were rebels, on the other hand they supported the Imperial House. This can be understood to mean that the emperor’s powers combined those of the Pope and of Caesar. In terms of actual power the emperor was overthrown but he continued to exist precisely because he could

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not exercise power and the rebels to retain the tenno used the ideas of lineage and loyalty.86 The language of loyalty screened the lineaments of power. Kita, therefore, says he rejects the view of Ariga Nagao, who argues in On the Delegation of Authority (Tochiken ininron) that the emperor delegated or entrusted authority to various rulers, like the Tokugawa.87 Similarly, Hozumi’s arguments are rejected because his arguments are not clear, as sometimes he argues that the emperor has power and sometimes he says that he entrusts it to others, for example, the Bakufu.88 Kita argues that from the middle ages the meaning of tenno changes as he had no power, or rather power only in name. During this period power depended on the control of large territories and there were, in effect, many rulers.89 Thus, to understand the position of the emperor we must consider the idea of the tenno as monarch (kunshu) and of sovereignty (shuken) separately. According to Kita, Ariga by placing sovereignty (shuken) with the emperor, who is actually powerless, creates a fundamentallyflawed argument.90 The two concepts can only be correctly understood separately. Sovereignty (shuken) represents the power of the winner, it is fought over by many clan heads (katcho kunshu) and this power may be lost to another later. In this respect everyone tries to emulate the emperor.91 The Meiji ishin-kakumei, according to Kita was not aimed at strengthening loyalty to the emperor but rather at overthrowing the idea of loyalty to the nobility. Up to the Meiji ishin-kakumei the idea of equality was limited between the emperor and the nobility for only the nobility could participate in politics. The objective of the Meiji ishin-kakumei was to spread this power to the people and the nobility were rebels and traitors, as they opposed the aim of the true Kokutairon. Those who carried out the Meiji ishin-kakumei were in essence aiming to bring about democracy (minshushugi). The Meiji ishin-kakumei was not a return to the past (osei fukko) but rather the most important and fundamental change in Japan since the Taika reforms, for with the ishin-kakumei a people’s state (komin kokka) was created and Japan evolved from a paternal state to a new stage and consequently a new kokutai.92 A people’s state (komin kokka) is one where the members and institutions function in the interests not of one individual or family but in the interests of the state.93 In law, sovereignty (shuken) lies with the state and this means that socialists who reject the state are really basing their arguments on individualism. The aim of statism (kokkashugi) is to create a world state (daikokkashugi) and only then will socialism be truly realized, for now it is confined to one state.94 The evolution of society consists in the progress of the idea of equality and its spread. During the first stage the emperor is the state

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and in the next stage a small number of nobles are the state. Gradually their numbers expand to include all the nobility and finally in the fourth stage all the people form the state, a people’s state (komin kokka). Thus social evolution expands the consciousness of the state. Thus it is wrong to think that the Meiji ishin-kakumei has created a monarchy, as what it has done is to create a democratic system in which the tenno and the people are equal. The meaning of tenno, or the substance of the concept, has evolved historically.95 Kita argues that the Meiji ishin-kakumei was a point of departure from the earlier system as it broke the monopoly of the nobility but it was limited and incomplete as it failed to follow it up with what he calls a ‘constructive policy’. Here he indicates that while the Meiji ishin-kakumei ushered in democracy its leaders became the suppressors of democratic sentiment. The true inheritors of the spirit of the Meiji ishin-kakumei, he writes, the socialists, ended up in the opposition and not as bureaucrats.96 The position and function of the emperor was a crucial question for Kita and his contemporaries and their debates reflect the way the institution was being moulded and used in shaping the contours of national policy. Kita too, discusses the imperial institution but he subverts the dominant argument to argue not for an unbroken lineage (Article 1 of the Meiji Constitution mentions an unbroken imperial line (Bansei ikkei)) that binds the emperor and the people but for a revolutionary-ends ideal. He writes that now it is possible to realize this ideal, for the emperor has so far been only a decorative figure with no power. Now he can function as a major ‘organ’ of the State.97 On the basis of his differentiation between kokutai and seitai, Kita’s view is that Meiji Japan, up to the promulgation of the constitution in 1890, was a state where the kokutai and the seitai were one so that sovereignty (shuken) lay with the state and the political organization (seitai) was with the tenno as the highest ruling body. The second period began after 1890 when the Meiji Constitution was granted and with it, while the kokutai remained the same as before, the political organization (seitai) changed to one comprising the tenno and the Diet.98 Kita then determines that under the constitution the emperor and the Diet together form the highest body. They are the ones that can revise the constitution so he must be respected for this position and not because of any blood relationship.99 It is also for this reason, as the highest body of the state, that he must be respected and not because of any blood relationship or other such arguments.100 Kita argues that the state and the emperor are not one, as Hozumi says, but that there are two types of states – a legal state and a political state. The Meiji ishin-kakumei created a legal state, that is a people’s state, (komin kokka) but a political state has yet to be created

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because economic imbalances remain in society and until these are removed equality of political power cannot be achieved. This is the objective of socialism: to bring about an economic ishin-kakumei by bringing land and capital under public control.101 While legally a people’s state (komin kokka) has been established, economically it is really a paternalist state (katcho kokka), a state where capitalists are omnipotent (shihonka banno).102 This is why state sovereignty (kokka shuken) and monarchism (kunshushugi), though contradictory continue to exist together.103 As Kita’s earlier writing also indicated, with constitutional government the nature and form of class conflict changed so that, as he emphasized, the aim of any socialist movement would have to reject violence and advocate a pure enlightenment (keimo) movement.104 In Japan, he argues class conflict occurs in the electoral system and is carried out by voting; consequently, the electoral system must be strengthened to legally bring about the second economic ishin peacefully. The revolutionary nature of socialism lies, Kita writes, in that it seeks to bring about a fundamental change, to peacefully create a society in which an individual, as a member of society has an equal right to the wealth of the nation.105 The people are mature and the time is right to establish general suffrage. The Russo-Japanese War has united the people. The war was for the state and not fought in the interests of the upper classes. In times of peace the phrase ‘for the state’ really means ‘for the capitalists’, but in times of war this is different.106 Given this mood, it is wrong to argue that it is too early; rather, it illustrates the corruption and decline of the political parties who have joined the government. The very people who had fought the government to establish a Diet are now in the same camp.107 The people, united during the war, put up with privation, heavier taxes; and the positive gain of this experience was that it showed them the power of unity. Now this feeling can be brought about by carrying out a legal war to establish general suffrage.108 Once a system of general suffrage is established then the class war will shift to the Diet. Class war does not mean that one class overthrows another but rather it is defined by evolution. A lower class advances to the level of the upper.109 ‘Dogmatic socialists’ do not properly understand this and do not base themselves on ‘right’. Thus, for example the upper classes give charity to satisfy their self but this charity does not affect the problem of poverty. The sense of right should be strengthened among the people. The Christians, who ignore poverty by arguing that matters spiritual are more important are propounding a very harsh view.110 Dogmatic socialists also misunderstand, for they argue that (a) between labour and capital there should be harmony and (b) cap-

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italists should distribute the profits. They are wrong, because relations are fundamentally that of master and servant. Further, they hope to redress problems by raising wage levels. This is a limited view, as merely improving economic levels will not solve the fundamental problem of rights.111 Finally, the so-called socialists are much like the dogmatic socialists for they also talk of increasing wage levels, an eight-hour workday, a government pension plan and so on. This type of understanding is insufficient. Commonerism (Heiminshugi) is really nothing other than a tool of agitators to create an industrial uprising (kojo ikki).112 Real change can only be brought about through an enlightenment (keimo) movement as a society’s political power is based on co-operation.113 European socialism based itself on the ideal of Plato’s Republic and similarly Japanese socialism must also find its roots in the Confucian ideal of the state. Mencius is the Plato of the East, as both were concerned with the fusion of ethics and politics, and therefore in Mencius’s ‘way of the emperor’ can be found an ethical basis for scientific socialism.114 Kita is seeking to take the methodology from his readings of Western socialism but to try and use it to look at his own history and tradition. He puts forward Mencius rather than Confucius who has gained popularity in current debates about Asian development and Asian values. In that sense, drawing parallels between Plato and Mencius allows Kita to work within the framework of modernity taken from the ‘West’ and yet underline the specificity of his historical situation. This allows him to distance and differentiate himself from the ‘dogmatic socialists’ who, according to him, merely take the form and do not understand the method. Here again Kita is emphasizing the importance of an ethical basis for a political system. Kita, however, says that his view differs in certain aspects from that of Mencius. Mencius’s argument is based on the concept of man as inherently good while Kita’s ideas are grounded in the logic that man is socially conditioned. Further, while Kita uses Mencius’s arguments to reject reformist ideas of society, he points out that many of his ideas are incompatible with his thinking. Thus, for instance, Mencius’s understanding of the public ownership of land is based on a backward-looking idea of an old village system (buraku kyoyou) while Kita says he is arguing for modern agriculture using modern technology.115 Second, Mencius is to be rejected because he lacks any critique of class society and accepts the exploitative character of the upper classes.116 Third, he does not have any conception of a movement for civilization (keimo undo). Mencius was limited by his time and had to function within the framework of thinking at that time. Thus, his theories centred on the idea of a ruler, an acceptance of upper-class rule

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and inability, therefore, to consider the lower classes. This, therefore, is very different from modern socialism.117 Fourth, Mencius argues that sovereignty resides in the state, yet he also endows one person with the highest power. This was true of Japan only for the period 1868–90 when the constitution was promulgated.118 Social democracy, Kita writes, recognizes the state and the importance of preserving it in the struggle for survival. Therefore, the so-called statism (kokka shugi) has nothing to do with socialism because it is based on individualism and does not really realize the importance of the state.119 Kita goes on to castigate the opposition of the Socialist Party (Shakaito) to the Russo–Japanese War, comparing it with religious views of non-violence, of which he is equally critical. He writes that society cannot accept those who do not recognize the importance of the state.120 Kita returns at the end to a theme he has frequently stressed throughout the book, that the ideas of Karl Marx were the product of a time when modern technology was changing the world and therefore are very important but form part of a very small period of history and therefore to accept his ideas as final is limiting. The ideas of people like Plato and Mencius also have much of value and have a longer history, and therefore they, too, must be studied.121 From such a position, Kita says, it can be seen that only one aspect of the Russo–Japanese War can be explained with the argument that it benefited the capitalists. The more important motive for the conflict lay in the idea of state sovereignty which has developed out of the ‘revere the emperor and expel the barbarian’ (sonno-joi) tradition. If it was merely for capitalist profit, then just the liberation of Manchuria would have sufficed and the people would not have rioted in Hibiya after the conclusion of the treaty. Their anger was an expression of rage at the world that the sovereignty of the state has suffered.122 In the present stage of world history imperialism is necessary to realize the creation of a world state. Just as socialists oppose private property because it leads to inequality in wealth, so also, without imperialism the world will continue to be divided into many conflicting states.123 Kita next takes up the criticism advanced against socialism by biological evolutionists who are critical of socialism because they claim it seeks to end the struggle for survival which is the basis for social evolution. He takes Oka Asajiro (1868–1944) as a representative figure and argues that such ideas are mistaken because of two major reasons. One, they start from an individualist position and two, they equate humans and animals. Kita, while using Oka Asajiro as a representative, argues that really the mistaken view is inherent in Darwin’s position which Oka and others have adopted.124

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Kita summarizes Oka’s arguments that it is impossible to change human beings whatever the system and therefore inequality of wealth and other such issues will continue to exist. Further, as long as different races exist, war is inevitable which makes it necessary for struggle within one race in order to improve that race. Finally, Oka would argue that war and struggle are necessary, as it is only through a process of selection through the survival of the fittest that the best elements survive, and only that which hinders this process should be stopped.125 Kita argues that these epigones have taken Darwin literally and what was necessary when Darwin wrote is no longer necessary. When Darwin wrote, he was faced with the largely accepted view that Man was created by God, the Christian view, and sought to counter this claim with the scientific view of man as descended from animals through a process of evolution. However, Kita writes, to equate the two is to advance as unscientific a view as that proposed by the Christians.126 Next, the question of what constitutes an ‘individual unit’ is hard to decide and starting from an individualist position scholars really take the position of Haeckle of the ‘individual unit as class’. This leads to a false dichotomy between self-interest and public interest, individuality and social character. Both are really a part of the whole and it would be more appropriate to use terms like ‘large self’ (daiga) and ‘small self’ (shoga).127 The process of evolution has two broad phases. One is the process where man evolves from animal, and at this level the struggle for survival is between individual units. The second phase is the period of man’s historical existence, and here the unit of struggle is society. Thus, as animals evolve to higher forms, the level at which struggles take place also evolves and changes.128 Here, Kita argues that Kropotkin’s ideas of mutual aid are necessary to modify Darwinian theories. Mutual aid, according to Kita, is an important and necessary ingredient because the struggle for survival does not take place at the level of the individual but at that of the group. Competition between groups is important, but within groups mutual aid can help to increase the prospects for the groups’ survival. This positive element should be used as the basis for a world federation.129 Kita’s view is that Oka confuses socialism and imperialism, for socialism really seeks to abolish war and create a world federation while imperialism, though it has the same end, would do this by forcibly annexing countries. Socialism thus seeks to preserve the integrity and independence of countries while peacefully uniting them. Once united, the state would continue to exist, as would rivalry between states. However, the difference would be that this rivalry would not lead to war but would be decided peacefully.130

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Oka’s views on the relationship between barbarian and civilized people is also criticized. Kita’s view is that to see the two as opposing types makes no sense, as human beings are and exist as human beings in society. Therefore, rather than the civilized killing barbarians, as Oka argues, what really happens, according to Kita, is that the barbarians will progress and evolve to civilization and there will be no barbarians. Therefore, it is a very unreasonable position to argue, as Oka does, that killing for progress is justified.131 Scholars like Oka, who themselves adopt a position of extreme individualism, really only look at struggles between individual units and fail to understand the evolving nature of the process in which both assimilation and disintegration takes place and also fail to understand that the nature of the struggle differs according to the state. Thus, at earlier stages, individualism opposed a class state dominated by the nobility and therefore stressed values such as individual freedom, but in doing this it neglected society.132 Kita’s criticism of Oka and his understanding of the problems of social Darwinism are acute and they confront some fundamental problems. Theories of evolution and natural selection go back further than Darwin; they can be traced back even to Erasmus in the eighteenth century, and the concept of ‘survival of the fittest’ was actually coined in 1864 by Herbert Spencer.133 The essential components of social Darwinism prefigured the work of Charles Darwin. The idea of competition, that all life is war, is vividly and forcefully present in Thomas Hobbes, and the concept of character being determined by environment or a historical, progressive development, which are the constituent elements of Social Darwinism, have their roots in earlier evolutionary theory; but their coming together and their appeal arose from the harsh struggles of individualism. Thus, by the 1880s John D. Rockefeller, among others, would talk of the growth of large business as merely the survival of the fittest.134 Kita quite rightly is critical of epigones like Oka Asajiro who view the perpetuation of inequality as arising from the unchanging character of man. Much in the manner of the present-day revival of such doctrines, such a view arises from the inability of theory to face the lack of order and progress promised in the advance of capitalism. Rather than seeking for the origins of the problem in the principles of the organization of society, they seek to universalize these problems into nature and therefore make them permanent and incapable of solution. This neglect of society is a major fault of such positions, and here Social Democracy (shakaiminshu shugi) advances a theory based both on individual rights and social interests (setchu).135 Thus, socialism would neglect neither the position of the state nor over-

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look the rights of the individual. It is precisely from this position that, just as an individual’s actions against the state constitutes a crime, so a state’s actions against other states (imperialism) are crimes.136 Kita argues from a standpoint of social evolution, and therefore, having rejected various forms of struggle – individual fights, war, the death penalty, economic struggle etc. – he needs to define what brings about the process of struggle. He sees two fundamental forms of struggle. One is the struggle for food that takes place between groups, the second between man and woman, which occurs within groups.137 The first struggle, over food, is the more fundamental, according to Kita, for on the basis of stronger economic strength it is possible to, say, acquire many wives or for women to buy lovers. Thus, in the man–woman struggle what is important is the economic strength of the person and not the gender. From this, Kita argues for equal rights for man and woman, not on the basis of earlier ideas but on the new basis of equal rights, regardless of wealth.138 The man–woman struggle is also the basis from which the idea of beauty is born, as the male seeks to attract the female.139 Kita quotes Kanae Noboru, who says, as socialism is opposed to private property this will destroy the family system which is based on private property. Kita is critical of Kanae, arguing that such criticism is unfounded, as only the upper classes have proper families and private property.140 The lower classes have neither and the basis for selecting partners should be, not that all individuals are the same, as the individualists would argue, but rather that everyone should have the same prospect of deciding. This freedom to choose will lead people to raise good children: good, in the sense of good for society.141 Next, Kita takes up the theories of Malthus, which have been propagated by scholars like Kanae. Kita argues that people like Kanae are using Malthus’s argument to argue against socialism. Malthus, according to Kita, because he based his theory on an individualist position, is arguing that to stem the tide of population growth, the poor should not have children. His statistics are totally unreliable and have been doctored to substantiate the inapplicable ideas of the geometrical growth of population while food resources grow arithmetically.142 Kanae shows the absurdity of Malthus’s argument, pointing out that it is absurd to say that as the poor bear the burden of society any improvement of their lot would really harm all of society, as there would be no one to bear the burden. First, according to Kita, it is absurd to argue against something which will take place hundreds of years from now, as if it is going to take place immediately.143 Second, while Malthus, who wrote a hundred years ago, may be forgiven for

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not seeing it, it is not excusable now to underestimate the improvement in the production of food. History shows that with the evolution of society there has been a change in the manner and efficiency with which man produces food. Thus, early man moves gradually from fishing, to raising livestock and then to agriculture. Progress has made it possible to use a plot of land more productively, and more people can now live off the produce of a smaller area. Not only does productivity increase but methods of cooking that enable man to extract great benefit from similar quantities, also improve. Finally, the increase in technical and scientific expertise will probably enable man to reconstruct organic food from inorganic matter.144 While biological evolution is an accepted scientific principle, Darwin unfortunately based himself on individualism and thus his use of Malthus is mistaken, for he applied it to all, man and animals. Darwin saw the struggle for food as within groups, e.g. frogs fight over the same insects.145 Kita argues that struggle for food is between groups, and in this struggle groups can even help one another. Therefore, at some stage, it is possible that this struggle will end.146 Thus biologists have mistakenly defined the ‘enemy’ as other individuals within a group whereas it is actually different groups.147 Thus, when groups struggle internally unsuccessful or unhelpful traits of individuals lose out or die out, not because they are defeated by other individuals within the group but because those traits or individuals are not helpful to the group in its struggles. Once socialism is established, then Man, under a World Federation, will become the unit. Would then population increase as the biologists contend? Kita thinks it would not. He argues that such a view is mistaken. He quotes Darwin to say that each group’s population is dependent upon what is necessary for the survival or well-being of the group. Therefore, the poor produce many children not because they are poor or ignorant but because of economic reasons and because adults die at an early age and the survival rate of children is low. Actually, if they did not produce many children they might have died out by now. Similarly, as war exists between countries, population is affected. This, according to Kita is a natural law (tensoku).148 Kita thus concludes that we need to transcend personal interests to achieve a scientific understanding. Socialism, therefore, is necessary for the progress of society and needs to be realized and supported for these reasons and not because one merely has sympathy for the poor. Similarly, the individual capitalist is not responsible but rather society is, and when this is understood a scientific understanding of socialism will be truly possible.149 Kita then proceeds to look at how the struggle for survival will take place under socialism. He says that there are two possible views. One view would argue that under socialism, those who fail in the strug-

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gle for survival would decrease and therefore the population would increase. The second possibility is that under socialism the population would witness a rapid increase, not because children are necessary for production and therefore to increase wealth people have more children, but because of a general well being. For Kita, the first view is what is happening in the present period, and under socialism the second will occur.150 Kita argues from a historical perspective, and while he recognizes that institutions and ideas change over time, he says that man’s instinct can only change gradually, slowly. Thus, the idea of happiness, beauty and truth will not change overnight but will take a great deal of time: a hundred years at least after socialism is established. Happiness, Kita defines as morality, and for this to become an integral, institutional aspect of man so that his interests and the society’s interests become one, will take considerable time. Similarly, truth (shin) will prevail and increase gradually, as education becomes widespread. Ideas of beauty have been conditioned by the struggle for survival and under socialism will be determined by the male–female conflict.151 KOKUTAIRON: SOME INTERPRETATIONS

Kita’s analysis in Kokutairon received considerable interest after the Second World War, and while in the classic work on him by Tanaka Sogoro he is analysed as a fascist, many analyses, particularly after the influential work of Kuno Osamu, began to see Kita’s early work as a revolutionary attempt to create an indigenous theory of social change and to theoretically confront the emperor system which was being established during that period with extreme rigour.152 Kuno saw in Kita the last chance for a democratic movement. It is significant that the radical movement at the end of the 1960s saw a spate of analyses of Kita from this viewpoint.153 One recent author who sees the Kita of the Kokutairon as at least in part a ‘modernizer’ (Wilson’s meaning), or a bourgeois democrat, is Watanabe Kyoji. Watanabe argues that Kita’s attempt was to provide an analysis of the character of the Meiji state created by the Meiji ishin. He was very much a part of the communitarian (Kyodoshugi) heritage, as represented by the left-wing followers of Saigo Takamori. While others could not go beyond this tradition, Kita advanced a refined argument calling for a ‘second revolution’. The Meiji ishinkakumei had created a people’s state (komin kokka) and the second revolution would create a socialist revolution.154 Kita provides a layered analysis of the Meiji state. He argues that according to the imperial constitution, legally a socialist state exists. However, the present government, dominated by cliques, has created

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a structure with an absolutist emperor. The Educational Rescript is illustrative of this aspect. Finally, in terms of economic relations it is still a capitalist state governed by the bourgeoisie and the landlords. Kita’s analysis is that the constitution places a limit on imperial rights and the state, as a people’s state (komin kokka), is not the possession of the emperor, as it was earlier. Therefore, it has changed from an object (bukkaku) to a personal character (jinkaku). The state reflects the ideals of the people and therefore the people too have become people.155 Kita categorizes state structures as progressing in two stages – from a patriarchal to a people’s state. His subdivision of the patriarchal state is into (a) ancient imperial absolutism and (b) aristocratic–feudal. The people’s state is similarly subdivided into, (a) legally a people’s state e.g. bourgeois and (b) economically a people’s state, e.g. socialist. Kita sees the Meiji state as bourgeois but its major weakness lay in that it established the supremacy of the bourgeoisie, for it had the possibility of establishing a perfect socialist state. Thus the Meiji ishin was a betrayed revolution (uragirareta kakumei).156 Kita, according to Watanabe, is part of the Saigo tradition, and wanted to establish a commune-type state which was, and still is, being disrupted by Western ideas. It is, therefore, because of this that he recommended Bushido which, even though it is a class ideology of the samurai, still has much to recommend it as it is publicdirected, unlike the morality of the merchants (shonin) which strives for individual profit. Bushido, therefore, provides a link to rejoin the individual to the state to form a single organ, a commune. This commune ideal that later ideologues found in Saigo Takamori led them to see that his defeat at the hands of the Meiji elite was because of his opposition to the Meiji establishment rather than his support for the invasion of Korea (Seikan-ron). Saigo advocated a farmer–soldier community which, even if it might not be as productive as the present state, would be a moral state (dogiteki). Saigo was also against private ownership. This allowed two di ferent genealogies. The ‘left’ took the commune and anti-bureaucratic ideas while the ‘right’ opposition picked up the anti-Western elements from Saigo and did not concern themselves with the internal reform of Japan.157 Kita, like Saigo, had an ideal of a moral state, and though he recognized the feudal aspects of Saigo’s samurai rebellion, he nevertheless saw his death as the failure of a ‘commune’ ideal and his defeat as a Thermidor, which resulted in the usurpation of the revolution and its fall from a people’s state to an economic nobility state (keizai kizoku kokka). (Thermidor refers to the coup of 9 Thermidor (27 July 1794) in which Robespierre was guillotined and the Reign of Terror ended. Consequently, Thermidor has

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come to mean the phase in some revolutions when power slips from the hands of the original revolutionary leadership.) Watanabe argues that Kita’s mistake is not in his repeated failure to distinguish between state and society, but rather in making the individual equal to society, which is equal to the state. A people’s state for Kita, is not an organization of the ruling class but rather an organization of equal people (komin). Thus, he drops the idea of domination (shihai). The state, somewhat like Rosseau’s General Will, was an absolute thing (sentai teki na mono), and its ‘discovery’ (hakken) freed Japan from the restrictions of a status system (mibunsei).158 Normally, the usage of the ‘nation-state’ concept indicates the creation of a citizenry freed from feudal shackles, but for Kita however it is the state that is freed from feudalism. That is why it is till then merely an ‘object’ (bukkaku). Therefore, it can be said that Kita ‘reread’ the Meiji constitution, not to say, as Kuno Osamu writes, people’s emperor (kokumin no tenno) from emperor’s people (tenno no kokumin) but rather to say the state’s emperor (kokka no tenno) and the state’s people (kokka no kokumin).159 Finally, Watanabe points out that unlike Yamaji Aizan or Higuchi Kanjiro, Kita never advocated an emperor-system (tennosei) socialism but rather, he very clearly wrote, ‘That which is state socialism is neither statism nor socialism but is absolute and eternal monarchism’.160 Inextricably linked with his analysis of the state was a view of revolution and of change. For Kita, the Meiji ishin was a bourgeois revolution just like the French Revolution, and represented the victory of the lower classes who overthrew the feudal rule of the samurai. He says, therefore, that even though the role of the emperor and lower samurai was important, the role of movements for world renewal, yonaoshi and peasant revolution cannot be ignored.161 The legal establishment of a classless state in 1868 was followed by a reverse course from the Satsuma rebellion of 1877, during which Japan entered an economic period of warring states (sengoku). That is, the capitalists were the economic samurai (e.g. bureaucrats, intellectuals) and the people the economic peasants. To end this distortion of the true objectives of the Meiji ishin a second ishin was required. The continuation of two classes, capitalists and landlords on one side and labour and peasants on the other, and their exploitation and the essential continuation of feudal oppression, is characteristic of this period. The exploiters were in the position of the medieval nobility in that they would buy and possess and the exploited were like a commodity, with a price and therefore like objects. ‘They did not appear as people but could only be seen as commodities . . .

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speaking legally they possessed no character (jinkaku) but were objects (bukkaku).’162 Therefore, Kita argued that the present system is a modern slave system and the economic aristocracy is indulging in orderly plunder (chitsujo ryakudatsu).163 He blamed this partly on the use of modern machinery which caused a rise in unemployment. Given such a situation, of an economically privileged class exploiting a large section of the country’s institutions, the institutions could not function in the interests of the state but rather were used to further the interests of politicians and ministers who were manipulated by capitalists.164 It is to break this hold of the capitalists that leads Kita to work out a way to destroy the economic control of those political processes, for society is supported by the sweat and labour of some who have the ‘freedom’ to work, suffer, and die.165 The social order was supported by the police and army who worked to maintain what those in authority and power called ‘order’. Therefore, to speak of cooperation and harmony, as Yamaji Aizan did, was totally wrong and displayed a lack of knowledge of what Marx said, i.e. that capital is plunder of the working class.166 How this change was to be brought about is for Kita a problem of historical situations. Thus, he argued, that given Japan’s position, the revolution would be carried out through elections. He writes that history’s pages are not written in blood.167 The basis of this revolution will be in the change in the thinking of the people. The feudal order was overthrown by the ideas of individualism, but this by itself is an insufficient condition and incapable of forming a modern state. Individualism provides the basis of class conflict, and as it does not consider the welfare of the state and society it has to be transcended and the individual’s interest allied with the state. Marx, therefore, is outdated as a guide for future change, as his ideas are based on individualism, and because of this he neglects the state. Marx’s greatness lay in explaining the role of capital and how the process of industrialization progresses economically and socially through class war. However, once you enter a state of civilisation, then, more than Marx, the Platonic ideal or the ideas of Mencius are more appropriate as a source of inspiration.168 Historical materialism, for Kita, is useful only to explain economic process and is not valid or unable to offer an explanation of other facets of society. Kita’s understanding of revolution was further developed with his experience of the Chinese revolution of 1911. Here he argues for the necessity of, initially carrying out a military revolution, which he argues starts first with the upper classes. To ensure the success of the revolution in China it is necessary to build connections with battalion commanders, for they can help the revolution as, one, they are not bound by daily necessities, and two, they can win the support of

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the lower ranks.169 Of course, for Kita, in China the revolution would have to be violent, but unlike Sun Yat-sen, Kita argued that it had to be brought about without foreign help and it must also overthrow the old society.170 Kita’s understanding of revolution is that it does not occur because the middle classes are aspiring to freedom, but rather that consciousness of freedom as an ideal is formed and thus they are the product of the revolution. Kita’s understanding of the lower classes and their role in the revolution is extremely limited, for while he sees them as providing the cause of the revolution, he emphasizes only their lumpen character. Thus, he uses words like labouring and suffering people (kurii kyumin), unlettered class (mumoji kaikyu) lower class (kaso kaikyu) and subjugated class (zoku min kaikyu). For Kita, the Meiji ishin is the ideal, and therefore when he is talking about the Chinese revolution he visualizes intellectuals as providing the leadership while the lower classes are the mass base and the young officers contribute the military strength. The upper classes were decadent and moribund and nothing could be expected from them, neither could anything be hoped for from the political parties which are well fed and well clothed and cannot be expected to support the revolution. The leadership of the revolution had to be provided by people who were ‘close to the life of the ordinary people’ (heimin seikatsu ni chikaki) but while ‘there is no great gulf between the urban and rural people’ (shimin nomin to taisa nai), he never saw it coming from the commoners (heimin). Rather, he argues, it is a historical law that the lower classes never ally with new ideals. The lower classes would provide the energy of the revolution but he was contemptuous of their ability to provide any leadership. Thus, he writes that the participation of the lower classes in the Meiji ishin-kakumei ‘was without understanding; they accepted as the last word, the judgement of heaven’ (ishkinaki ten no ketsuron o hito no josei nite saiko seru mono nariki). The people without consciousness accept new ideas. ‘They accept the judgement of heaven with no explanation’ (setsumei o nozoki taru ketsuron nomi o ten ni ataerareta). However, the energy of the people is vital for the revolution, and once the agitators have ignited this then it is up to heaven, ‘kakumei to wa jungyaku funino homon de ari, sono riron wa furitsu moji de aru’.171 Finally, Kita stresses the need for a hero to lead the revolution. Thus, France had its Napoleon and Japan the Meiji emperor. Therefore, to establish an Eastern-type republic in China a heroic leader is essential.

PART II

Nationalism and Revolution

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he movement for social and political reform that convulsed Chinese society in the wake of foreign intrusion into the territorial and intellectual world of Chinese civilization led to the overthrow of the moribund Manchu dynasty and the establishment of a Republic of China in Nanking on 1 January, 1911. This revolution marked an important and crucial juncture when the forces working for change found fortuitous circumstances that enabled them to realize their plans. However, the republican revolution was beset with hesitations that arose from the often contradictory aspirations of its flag-bearers – a motley group cobbled together as much by selfinterest as revolutionary ideals. Fuelled by the growing discontent from the ‘modern’ sectors of society – the new army, students and businessmen and the groundswell of anger represented by the secret societies – the movement for change found its expression in the increasing influence of republican societies that overthrew the Manchus. The Xinhai or 1911 revolution refers to the period from 10 October 1911, when an uprising in Wuchang set in motion the events which culminated in the termination of Manchu rule in February 1912 and includes the republican period from 1911, to the second revolution of 1913.1 Historical explanations of the events are marked by a variety of opinions as were contemporary views. Cynical voices at the time saw the events as a passing and inconsequential phase: ‘The dregs rose and became scum and lashed themselves into foam, but when all was over they sank once more to the bottom.’2 The orthodox historiography of the republican revolution of 1911, built around Sun Yat-sen divides the events into five stages; each stage represented by an organization established by Sun Yatsen. The first stage was 1894–1905 when the dominant republican organization was the Revive China Society (Xing Zhong Hui) and

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this was followed in 1905–12 when the United League (Tong Meng Hui) played a major role and from 1912 to 1914 when the Guomindang came to the forefront. This was followed during 1914–19 when the major vehicle for change was the reorganized Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhong Guo Gemingdang). Finally, from 1919 onwards the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhong-Guo Guomindang) came to the forefront.3 The central role of Sun Yat-sen is a creation of later hagiography for while he was an important and above all visible face of the revolution there were other major actors who played a decisive role in furthering and strengthening the republican movement and in bringing about the changes of 1911. Huang Xing certainly deserves an equal place. Huang Xing, a Hunanese, was one of the the students who went to Japan where they were exposed to a new world. It was only when Sun joined with Huang after 1905 in the League that the following expanded outside the Kwangtung supporters of Sun Yatsen. Huang was also involved in personally leading many of the military revolts, including the revered 29 March revolt. Huang also handled civil and military matters after the Wuchang uprising when Sun Yat-sen was abroad.4 The revolution of 1911 has never enjoyed any popularity as a significant marker over-shadowed as it is by later events from the May 4th Movement to the heroic struggle and success of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. Yet it did mark the end of the long ruling Manchu dynasty and it ushered in a moment of democratic government short lived though this period was. Scholars like Jerome Chen argue that the revolution was a sham, others like Chuzo Ichiko, say that the ruling class maintained its control, yet most agree that it needs to be seen as an event in a process of change. A political revolution occurred, but rather than a culminating act, it was just the beginning of a series of changes and adjustments.5 Kita Ikki was a participant and like other Japanese who were involved in Chinese affairs, he had initially come into contact with Chinese revolutionaries in Tokyo, where many came to study and learn from the Japanese experience. Chinese students had started coming to Japan from late-1890, and in 1896 the first school had been established for them in Kanda, Tokyo.6 Kita Ikki’s book deals with the political revolution and attempts to evaluate the role of the participants. He also seeks to extract from a reading of this event a theory of change and, finally based on this, he puts forward arguments for a change in Japanese foreign policy. The fundamental argument he constructs is centred on the problem of how to bring about revolutionary change in China and in consonance with this, the manner in which Japanese foreign policy needs to be revolutionized. In this chapter we will

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examine Kita’s analysis and in the following chapter consider the views expressed by the Japanese intelligentsia and sections of Japanese society in order to provide the context in which Kita’s ideas can be understood. KITA IKKI: HISTORY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Kita Ikki went to Shanghai, China, as the representative of the Black Dragon Society (Kokuryukai) in October 1912 where he helped to edit their bulletin the Monthly Reports (Jiji gekka) and then returned to Japan in 1913 along with many Chinese revolutionaries. An Unofficial History of the Chinese Revolution (Shina kakumei gaishi), was written by Kita Ikki in a little over a half a year but the introduction was written five years later. Chapters I to VIII were started in November 1915 and Chapters IX–XX were completed between April and May 1916. The introduction was written in 1921.7 The book can be read in many ways. It is an invaluable source for this period of Chinese history and the role of leaders such as Song Jiaoren (1882–1913) or Tan Renfeng (1860–1920) or for the role of organizations such as the central Tong Meng Hui. It is also a proposal to Japanese foreign policy makers to craft a new and revolutionary foreign policy to support and help the revolutionary process in China. As in his earlier writings, Kita addresses himself to immediate problems but his views are informed and integrated by a general theoretical understanding which surfaces explicitly on occasion but is always implicit. Kita argues that there is an urgent need to understand the theoretical principles of the revolution and the future of China. It is only by understanding this that Japan can formulate an appropriate foreign policy. He is critical of the Twenty-one Demands and finds them objectionable, as he is also vehemently critical of Japan’s alliance with England. He argues that Japan’s interests are fundamentally opposed to England’s and the United States would be a far more suitable ally.8 In the introduction, written ten years after the revolution, Kita bemoans the fact that the intervening years have seen no change in Japanese policies towards China. Japanese policy makers, he writes, have forgotten their true objectives and their policies are ‘unethical’ (fugi). China, too, he says has unfortunately not progressed.9 In Japan both policy makers and the people have an insufficient knowledge about the events in China, even though it is a neighbouring country. The sources through which the government acquires information – Sinophiles, bureaucrats and the army in China – have a very superficial understanding.10 Okuma Shigenobu, Kita argues, carried out a flawed policy after the failure of the second revolution

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because he sought to spread Japanese control using English capital. This displayed an insufficient understanding of the realities of the situation. It is also impossible, he writes, to get an objective and reliable account from the actual participants, whether they belong to the revolutionary party or to the Chinese people. The only way to acquire a real understanding is to look at the revolutionary leaders: (1) Sun Yat-sen and his groundless theories, (2) Tan Renfeng and his dogmatic nativism (kokusui shugi),11 and (3) Song Jiaoren and his extremely legalistic ideas. Kita does not place as much importance on Huang Xing. Here Kita, rather than examining the historical roots of China’s problems analyses the political platform and practice of the leaders. He does not, however, jettison history; rather his historical understanding informs his assessment. Kita’s general understanding is premised on the two suppositions that China needs a unified military force and north and south Manchuria and Siberia are vital for Japan. When democratic socialism is brought about in Japan, he writes, then it will become a truly revolutionary imperialist country.13 Kita seeks to defend in the course of his analysis, this contradictory view, and from this position the ambiguities of his thinking, which were present in his contemporaries too, are reflected all too clearly. The brunt of Kita’s argument is directed against the position adopted by Sun Yat-sen and he argues that Sun’s position, that the republic can be established on the basis of an imported republicanism, is untenable and an unmitigated disaster for China. He sees, in brief, Sun as a mindless borrower of ideas from the United States and that his ideas will prove unworkable in China because they do not answer China’s needs. To Kita, Song Jiaoren represents a more viable and historically consistent position that takes into account Chinese history and tradition and, therefore, Kita is an insistent supporter of these views. Kita writes that people have unnecessarily placed Dr Sun Yat-sen in the centre of events in China. This is a mistake he acknowledges that he also made initially, but now he understands that this distorts the picture of Chinese reality, for China does not need what Sun Yat-sen is offering. Sun Yat-sen is not just to be seen as a supporter of republicanism against the monarchical Yuan Shikai, but rather as an advocate of an American type of republic which has no relevance to China.14 Dr Frank Goodnow (1859–1939), adviser to Yuan Shikai, Kita quotes, is also critical of Sun’s attempts to transplant an alien system. Goodnow argues, according to Kita, that the Pilgrim Fathers brought American republicanism but in China, where there is a long tradition of philosophical systems in which people are subservient to an emperor, it is impossible to effectively use this system. As China has no tradition of freedom, which explains why

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Yuan Shikai came to power after the 1911 revolution, it needs an absolutist government.15 This view that China lacks an indigenous tradition of freedom, is a distorted view, just like that expressed by the Japanese doyen of China scholars, Naito Konan (1866–1934). Naito Konan advocated a federation for China which, according to Kita, arose from a confusion similar to that of Dr Frank Goodnow’s.16 Naito Konan’s scholarship grew out of, and was influenced by, the need to see what Japan should do in East Asia. He placed great emphasis on Chinese cultural developments and was extremely critical of attempts to bring about change in China through Western methods. From an analysis of Chinese history, he argued that modern China had become a collection of self-governing rural solidarities (xiang tuan), which managed public and private economic affairs and these small autonomous states preserved an egalitarian ethos. Naito argued that power should be with these bodies and that there was no need for a strong central power. Actually, in November 1911 he had ruled out a federal system (remposei) and advocated a republican system, though subsequently he argued that China would continue on an indigenous basis (shina nihon no bunka) under an abnormal republican system (henkei shita rempo seido).17 Kita argues that these views are mistaken and so are the ideas of Sun Yat-sen. China needs, according to Kita, a unified, central government. Secondly, it needs to establish this without foreign help. Sun mistakenly thinks that, just as US independence was brought about with foreign aid, China, too, can be aided by Japan. A revolution, according to Kita, is an internal rebellion and help from outside, whether it is good or bad, is interference. Sun’s seeking aid is comparable to the moribund French nobility welcoming the anti-revolutionary armies. It is a mistaken view, Kita writes, to quote the example of other countries because the kokutai of countries differ and therefore policies will also differ from country to country.18 The prominent position of Sun Yat-sen obscures the way Chinese society is changing and the influences which bear upon it. Ideas and doctrines from the United States seem to play an important role in China, but in fact this is only because Sun Yat-sen is given such a prominent role. More than the United States, the influence of Japan on Chinese awareness is crucial. Just as Englishmen, Kita writes, were not aware that English ideas were influencing the French Revolution, so too most Japanese are unaware of the influence they have exerted on the Chinese.19 Kita sees the similarity of the Meiji ishin, where the ideas of the school of national learning (kokugaku) played an important role, to events in China, where the rising awareness is linked to a growing interest in pure Chinese literature.20 Japanese influence

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exercised through the returned students is a powerful factor, and even though these students are relatively few in numbers, the people, who attribute revolution to heaven (ten), respect them. If Japan does not properly appreciate this she will decline.21 THE MEANING OF REVOLUTION

Kita then enters into an exposition of what a revolution is and what the people are attempting in China. He argues that the purpose of the revolution is not merely to unite the people of China, for even Yuan Shikai is capable of doing this, but rather to change society. To understand this aspect it is necessary to examine the various components of the revolutionary process. The Chinese revolution, Kita writes, has three aspects; it is anti-Manchu, it calls for the revival of the Han race and finally it is opposed to Yuan Shikai. China is witnessing the confrontation between a declining class and a class on the ascendant, a confrontation necessary to bring about a modern organic stage. While Yuan Shikai’s position is a temporary, patchwork affair, necessary to prevent the dissolution of the country, a revolution is necessary to protect the independence of China.22 A revolution is very different from a war and can occur any time and any place; it is really a philosophical war. The Utopian ideals of the United States have no meaning for China; but what is urgently required is revolutionary thinking that emphasizes no dependence on foreign aid or on foreign armies.23 It is a common misconception, because many of the Chinese revolutionaries have studied in Japan, to think that they are favourably inclined towards Japan. In truth, they have truly imbibed the ideals of Japanese thought and think in terms of not only a revolutionary China, but also a changed Japan. They want to bring about a revolutionary change that rejects Japanese military aid. This is the motive force behind the anti-Japanese movement, but since this strong undercurrent has not clearly emerged, the Japanese have yet to fully realize this.24 Sun Yat-sen and Song Jiaoren should be considered together, for while the former emphasized foreign aid, the latter relied on internal strength. Sun, moreover, had no role in the Xinhai revolution as he was away in China, and given the lack of a strong organization, it was impossible for him to have exerted any influence.25 The people of Sichuan are very proud that the revolution started there but it could have started anywhere as China was ready for it, and the people prepared. They joined the revolution not because they followed like sheep but because conditions were ripe. The revolution, Kita writes, was brought about by the young, that is, the unknown and ordinary people and not by those classes which would destroy the nation, that is, the famous and well known people

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such as the continental adventurers (tairiku ronin), for example Miyazaki Toten (1871–1922).26 THE CHINA ADVENTURERS

The growing imperial ambitions of Japan were accompanied and fuelled by the Japanese presence in China. Traders, shopkeepers and spies began arriving in China first in the treaty ports and then spread throughout the provinces. The members of the Japanese elite were fewer than their European counterparts but what they lacked in glamour and style they made up in being a less hostile presence. The anti-Japanese sentiments really gathers momentum after the Twentyone Demands. Those Japanese who developed an interest in working for and supporting the Chinese revolutionaries have been characterized by many names: ‘men of high purpose’ (shishi) harking back to the late-Tokugawa loyalists, or ‘continental adventurers’ (tairiku ronin) or ‘China experts’ (shinatsu) a name that could often be used derisively.27 Miyazaki Toten is perhaps the best representative, for he became a firm supporter of Sun Yat-sen and his autobiography is, as it were, the pre-history of the Chinese revolution. The book, first published in the Ni-roku shinpo from 30 January 1902 in over a hundred instalments, has long been regarded in Japan as a major autobiographical work. Miyazaki Toten came from a Kyushu family intimately connected with political movements. His elder brother had died in the abortive rebellion of Saigo Takamori in 1877. Another brother, Yazo, introduced the restless Miyazaki to China. Chinese students had started coming to Japan from the 1890s and in 1896 had set up a school in Kanda, Tokyo. The signs of Japanese strength and economic dynamism inspired these students. They wanted to emulate the positive character of Japanese nationalism to bring about change in China.28 Miyazaki was motivated by two factors. The first was to do something worthwhile, and the other was to protect the rights of the people. These two aims he argued, depended on the fate of China. In his autobiography he writes: Every man must have some major direction in his life. I have been devoting my thoughts to this for many years, and recently I’ve come to think that I have found a solution. The present situation of the world is a battlefield in which the strong devour the weak. The strong use force as it pleases them and the rights and freedoms of the weak are being devoured and overrun day by day and month by month. How can we overlook this state of affairs? Surely those who prize human rights and revere freedom have to develop a plan to overturn this state of affairs. If we do not work out some defence,

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I believe the yellow race will be oppressed by the white for years to come. The upshot of this, the ways this destiny plays itself out, will depend entirely upon the rise or fall of China.29

This desire to do something, anything, to achieve not only personal fame but serve a noble cause, is the chief characteristic which is prominent in Miyazaki’s autobiography, and this burning zeal found an ideal worth pursuing in Sun Yat-sen. Miyazaki found that China had both the natural resources as well as the people to control the world and extend the way of morality to all countries, but first it needed to reform itself.30 To bring about this reformation: All that is needed is for a great man to rise and implement this programme . . . and if I can find him and persuade him, I shall serve him in any way I can. If I cannot find such a person, I myself will be that hero.31

In this rather extended quotation can be seen all the elements which are to be found in the shina ronin at their most idealistic level: a keen desire to do something about oppression, the linking, if vaguely, of this oppression to the reform of China and the creation of a strong and independent Asia. These reforms would invigorate Asia and prevent the Western white powers from strengthening and extending their domination and depredations. The lines drawn are both cultural and racial. It is a battle between the White West and a Yellow Asia. Further, reform does not necessarily mean socialism. In Miyazaki’s case he is firmly opposed to socialism. He wrote: I was an advocate of freedom and rights for the individual, and consequently I did not like the doctrines about equality of property and I did not approve of socialism.32

Miyazaki argued only that land should not be monopolized by a few as it was a gift of god and not produced by men and this would alleviate the misery and hardship the poor suffered. The equalization of land ownership was necessary and ‘. . . it seemed to me that there was no way this could be done through debate, but that it would require direct action to get it done’.33 In short, Miyazaki’s political programme was based on an extremely limited understanding and found its raison d’étre in action rather than in a well-thought-out plan based on a sustained critique of a social system. Moreover, this reform was not merely to benefit the people but, as quoted above, ‘to control the world and extend the way of morality’. In retrospect it seems to signpost the way to the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere but it bears keeping in mind

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the environment that Miyazaki functioned in and the overriding concern with morality not just as a style of speech. As Takeuchi Yoshimi argues, if you look back from the CoProsperity Sphere, then everything seems to lead to it.34 However, the more serious lack is the limited political programme that laid stress on a ‘leader’. In Sun Yat-sen he found one who was ‘rational and righteous, fervent and discerning; he burned with inner passion and enthusiasm. He was eloquent but he also spoke with spontaneity. Through all this flow of discourse his true nature sparkled, and it seemed a nature full of the music of the spheres and the rhythm of the revolution.35 Miyazaki found in Sun a worthy leader and his commitment to him and the Chinese revolution led him to sacrifice home and family to this enterprise.36 His participation in this also led him to seek the patronage and support of those in power and this led inevitably to compromise and, in the case of many shina ronin to sometimes functioning as government agents.37 Not only did most of the shina ronin function as government agents, their view of Chinese reality was extremely limited. Uchida Ryohei (1874–1937), for instance, the most representative of the orthodox proponents of expansionism, argues against Western imperialism gobbling up Asia, but when he talks of China he sees it as a deformed state (kikei koku).38 Kita Ikki downplays the role of the tairiku ronin and says that though they are reputed to have led the Chinese revolution, in fact they played no part in it, rather the Chinese people brought it about. Even leaders like Song Jiaoren (1882–1913), Huang Xing (1874–1916) and Tan Renfeng had no influence, according to Kita. Therefore, it is wrong to accuse the Japanese government of having helped in bringing about the revolution because it offered no actual material help. Kita says he, too, unsuccessfully attempted, much like the other ronin, to bring in guns. Therefore, it is a mistake on the part of some ronin who think they deserve the gratitude of China for having helped in the revolution. Japanese help was effective only in supporting the morale of the people and in providing ideas like state nationalism (kokka minzokushugi). The Japanese should take pride in the fact that Chinese students learnt state nationalism from Japan and these returned students played such a major role in the revolution. Such was the reputation of the students that the student uniform was identified as the uniform of revolution.39 It is because of this that Kita sees the occupation by the Chinese students of the Chinese embassy in Japan as very symbolic of the revolution.

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In a revolution, Kita writes, there is a great deal of confusion in thinking, as there are many contradictory ideas, and, therefore, leaders and symbols are very important, as they direct and focus energies. Thus, though the revolution started in Wuchang, the Party suffered a great defeat there as the local leader, Li Yuanhong, was a disastrous choice; he was associated with the old government and to have appointed him to a revolutionary post was self-defeating. It was incompetents like him that led to the failure of the revolution.40 Tan Renfeng, Kita feels, was a representative of the old morality and in a period of revolutionary change his influence was damaging, as he was responsible for appointing vagrants like Li Yuanhong (1864–1928) to their posts.41 Huang Xing, Kita writes in his inimitable manner, was also a fool, and though passionate and persuasive, he lacked the clear judgement of Song Jiaoren. Song wanted to form a military junta after the revolutionary rising in Wuchang to unite the people as they were confused, but Huang merely wanted to win small battles before forming a military government.42 He let Li Yuanhong occupy an important post that he should have taken himself. In a revolution what is important is not how famous someone is, writes Kita, but that people with the proper philosophy occupy crucial and important positions.43 The fact that the Chinese brought about their revolution with no foreign aid or help, writes Kita, should lead one to consider the Chinese situation more optimistically. Kita returns to his criticism of the China adventurers and writes that the Japanese have still not rid themselves of feudal thinking, a fact which is quite apparent in the shina ronin, who bear a great responsibility for the failure of the revolution. It was the ronin who misled Huang into thinking that, as there were plenty of arms, the revolution could not fail. He, therefore, instead of staying in Hanyang, returned to Shanghai to ensure the supply of weapons and the revolution was defeated in Hanyang.44 Song Jiaoren understood the meaning of the defeat of Hanyang and realized clearly that to make up for this loss Nanjing would have to be captured to recover the lost ground and to construct a base for a central military government. However, the promised weapons for Nanjing never materialized and the weapons that they had were outdated and ineffective. The shina ronin spent their time drinking and talking.45 In this situation the return of Zhang Taiyan (Zhang Binglin, 1869–1936), a Chinese revolutionary, from Japan created a difficult situation for Song Jiaren. Zhang’s public opposition to Huang Xing as leader combined with Huang’s own hesitancy led people to believe that Huang was not a suitable leader. It was also at this time, prob-

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ably at the suggestion of a Japanese, that the word president Daigensui or generalissimo was used for Sun Yat-sen and this expression, according to Kita raised him to a very high level in the eyes of the Chinese.46 As we have seen earlier, the shina ronin were active in supporting Sun Yat-sen after he returned from the USA via Europe. They bore him, Kita writes, like a portable shrine (mikoshi). Miyazaki Toten mediated between Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing, which led to the isolation of Song Jiaoren. Song had originally planned to put Huang in the position of leader but this proved difficult because of Huang’s vacillation.47 At this time Zhang Ji, Minister of Industries in the republican government, who earlier had opposed Sun, became a supporter after Sun returned from Paris. Kita says that he was also influenced by this and felt that as Sun Yat-sen’s name was not associated with any failure, he was a good choice as President. Zhang Ji played the role of mediator between Song and Sun.48 Song Jiaoren, through the mediation of Zhang Ji, came around to accept the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, though in Tokyo he had not liked him. Song felt those aspects that he had disliked no longer counted for much. Since the people liked Sun he was good for the revolution. Song was willing to work as Interior Minister, a practical job to bring about the unity of China.49 Kita Ikki argued that Song Jiaoren made a major strategic error, for in effect he accepted to work with Sun not on the basis of his own ideas which were influenced by French republicanism, but on the basis of Sun’s American ideas. Sun however, continued to exercise all the powers and responsibilities. Song, according to Kita’s analysis, saw the need of the hour as unity to overthrow Beijing, and it was because of this that he did not reply to criticism against him in the Assembly where he was accused of being a reactionary. Kita then compares Song to the French revolutionaries writing that just as the defenders of liberty were guillotined during the French Revolution, so in the Chinese revolution, people like Song were reviled. What Song had worked for when it was brought about had no place for him. Huang became daigen and Sun Yat-sen became daigensui.50 The Nanjing government, established in January 1912, lasted only one month and the foreign powers saw its failure as a cause for alarm but according to Kita, Song remained unperturbed. He was appointed Chief of the Legislative Bureau (Hoseinin) and he chose to work there, according to Kita, to change the underlying philosophy of the constitution, which was based on American ideas. To carry out his plan and revamp the very basis of the structure this department was extremely important. He chose as his assistant Tang Hualong, who was from Wuchang.51 The people from Wuchang had become alienated because Huang, though he was from there, ran off to Nanjing.

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The alienation could lead to a rift, with Li Yuanhong joining Yuan Shikai. Sun Yat-sen was not too concerned and paid no attention to it but Song was extremely concerned.52 Kita rates Song’s draft constitution very highly arguing that its conception marked a radical break as it sought to ground itself on indigenous ideas. He ridiculed the shina ronin, who were pleased with it on the mistaken assumption that it was based on Japanese ideas. In fact Kita writes that it was actually based on the ideal of an Eastern republic, a much wider concept which is Asian (toyoteki) and which incorporated the better and worthwhile aspects of the West.53 Kita Ikki helped Song to go to Japan with a delegation to get aid from the Japanese government and during that time there was a rumour that the genro wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy in China as they felt a republic would be harmful to Japanese interests.54 Uchida Ryohei, who had earlier helped the Chinese revolutionaries now came as a messenger of Yamagata Aritomo and Katsura and was working to bring about a compromise with the genro. This disappointed Song. The shina ronin, Kita writes, have forgotten their role as advisers and continue to praise Sun Yat-sen even though the people no longer praise him. Though now, Kita says, praise from the ronin is a mixed blessing (arigatai meiwaku). Thus Miyazaki Toten’s telegram against Song to Sun Yat-sen, though it was meant to praise Sun, was unwelcome.55 The shina ronin, such as Toyama, as well as supporters like Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932), party politician and close associate of Okuma, really have no understanding of diplomacy because of their closed country (sakoku) background, wrote Kita. He argued that they mixed up domestic and foreign policies. Thus they mistakenly interpreted Song’s trip to Japan as an attempt to link up with the Choshu faction and therefore are critical of him. Song’s trip to Japan was a valuable and necessary job and people who see it as running away are also mistaken. Unfortunately, according to Kita, Sino-Japanese relations are dominated by people like Sun Yat-sen and the shina ronin.56 The people have gradually begun to understand Sun, though he does not understand them. The people according to Kita have begun to see that though the revolution was meant to throw out foreign influence, Sun was bringing it in through the back door. Thus he accepted the loan from Mitsui which was not necessary and though the people had objected to the Four Power loan he was now turning to Japan.57 The shina ronin mix up capitalist profit and expansion of state power and this leads the Chinese people to condemn even the pure and honest Japanese, like Toyama and Inukai. The Okuma group sought Kita’s help in influencing Song to accept the loans that he was refusing. However, Kita writes, he refused, even though he

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was called unpatriotic because he felt that Japanese policy should be to exclude all foreign loans, as they are instrumental in furthering economic imperialism. This should be, Kita wrote, the policy of the state.58 SUN YAT-SEN, YUAN SHIKAI AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

Kita Ikki’s appraisal of Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shikai is argued within his understanding of the changing relationship between Japan, England and Russia and the need to realign the objectives of Japanese foreign policy. In Kita’s understanding the fundamental problem is the undue importance given to Sun Yat-san from which springs a misreading of the Chinese situation. Sun Yat-sen, cannot, Kita argues, hold the intellectual centre of the revolution because his theoretical understanding is incorrect. That is why he has compromised with Yuan.59 In fact he could have come to an understanding with Song Jiaoren when they disagreed over whether China needs a presidential system or a cabinet system, but Sun Yat-sen mistakenly saw this as an attempt to curtail his powers.60 The ascendancy of Yuan Shikai has been made possible because of the weakness of Sun Yat-sen’s position and because of Japanese support. This course has been taken because of the faulty assumptions of the shina ronin who have failed to understand that the Chinese having completed a revolution and overthrown Manchu hegemony even though they have accepted Japanese help will not acquiesce to a Japanese protectorate status (hogo koku).61 Or that the comprador Yuan Shikai, is working in the interests of the British and support for Yuan will mean the suppression of the revolutionary movement.62 Kita argues that Yuan Shikai was able to exploit the weakness of Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionary leaders as well as the misguided policy of the Japanese government to secure British support. Yuan Shikai is neither loyal to the Qing nor to the new revolutionary morality and Li Yuanhong and Sun Yat-sen were not successful. Though he is part of the Qing system he has no loyalty to the system and neither does he have a new or revolutionary morality.63 His proposals to save the Qing were not based on a far-sighted plan, such as to (1) establish an assembly the following year, (2) a responsible cabinet, (3) permit the Revolutionary Party to function, and (4) permit political parties to function,64 but measures dictated by immediate circumstances. For instance when on 1 November 1911 he established his cabinet he was still afraid to join the revolutionary forces till his safety was assured.65 This plan, according to Kita showed no comprehension of the meaning of the Wuchang uprising and it was only on the advice of

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Cen Chun Xuan that he compromised with the revolutionary forces to preserve the Court and the emperor on 15 November 1911.66 Yuan’s initial reaction to the Wuchang uprising was that it was only a riot (bodo) and it was only by the end of October that he began to understand the gravity of the situation and from merely trying to suppress it he sought to bring the various forces together. By midNovember, according to Kita, Yuan was in Beijing and had met the emperor and was acting as a supporter of the revolutionary forces. Yuan therefore, far from being a great leader, was really an opportunist (jidaishugisha).67 Yuan also saw the need for England’s protection and used the offices of Morrisson to win their support. This would also act as a check on Japan.68 When in January 1912 Sun was put forward as the leader of the revolutionary forces there was conflict once again with Yuan. The English put pressure on China through Japan to halt the revolutionary movement. Thus, the Chinese revolutionaries thought that the shina ronin and the Japanese government were working together. In fact, as the government began supporting a constitutional monarchy their aims diverged and they found themselves working at crosspurposes.69 The attempted assassination of Yuan on 16 January, according to Kita a totally Chinese effort with no outside help, was carried out by young revolutionaries and marked a new upsurge in the process of revolution. It broke the negotiations between Yuan Shikai and Sun Yat-sen. The only influence it had on Yuan was that what little support he had for the old morality was finished and he was worried for his life.70 An explosion on 26 January 1912, which succeeded in killing Yuan’s friend and firm supporter, General Liang Bi, leader of the Ancestral Party (Zongshedang), led Yuan to finally give up his plan to instal a constitutional monarchy. Kita writes that since Yuan was lacking in principles, this was easy for him. In early-1912, one reason why Yuan Shikai could fool so many people in spite of being incompetent was because Sun treated Yuan as a great man. The major responsibility for this mistake lies with Sun Yat-sen for he failed to establish a revolutionary government and within this framework use the defeated forces for new ends. It was therefore because of Sun’s incompetence that Yuan became the President.71 Kita sees that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is totally unnecessary as it has served its purpose and its continuation is contradictory to Japan’s aim of preserving China. The alliance was first formed to combat Russia but now that Japan has defeated Russia there is no need for the alliance. Kita argues that the Russo-Japanese War was really fought to preserve China and not to partition it into spheres controlled by Britain and Russia. Kita, while disapproving of the division of China, yet defends the division of Manchuria. He argues that even

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though it may appear contradictory to support the division of Manchuria between Russia and Japan it is not so because South Manchuria does not belong to China; it belongs to Russia and therefore it has not been taken from China.72 Japan, he then says, by its presence in Manchuria is in effect protecting China and it will be in a more positive position to protect China when it moves towards Lake Baikal. Kita finds his justification in the larger interest of Asia, that is if the motive is to protect Asia, then acquiring territory necessary for this is justifiable.73 In Kita’s understanding China, at the moment, faces its real danger not from Russia but from England, which seeks to control the economy of China and therefore, Japanese diplomacy should be directed against this objective. The fact that Japanese diplomacy, Kita argues, does not recognize this and pursues policies of greater cooperation with Britain endangers the Chinese revolutionaries. Kita writes that the earlier trust of the Chinese could just as easily turn to extreme distrust.74 Kita’s analysis of the changing strength of the political groups in China is argued through an analysis of the regional focus of the revolutionary forces. The changing centres of power, Wuchang, Nanjing and Beijing, reflect the strength of these forces. Kita writes that these cities were in turn at the centre of events and behind them the forces of revolution and counter-revolution. Sun Yat-sen was insistent that Yuan must come to Nanjing, for the revolutionary strength was dominant in the South. Nanjing, near the industrial centre of Shanghai, as a capital suited the revolutionaries, for the nascent bourgeoisie, who were supporters of a republican China, were firmly entrenched there. But it was the Japanese, according to Kita, that made Beijing once again become the centre of power. When Li Yuanhong was at the helm of affairs, the centre was at Wuchang, with Sun Yat-sen it shifted to Nanjing and with Yuan Shikai it moved to Beijing. These changes in location are not, Kita writes, accidental but represent the waves of history. These people became leaders not because of their great intelligence, but because they were the right people at the right time.75 However, Kita goes on to argue that Japanese policy is fatally flawed because it seeks to work in co-operation with Russia and, thereby, is alienating China. Kita states that Japan acquired South Manchuria from Russia and, therefore, this is correct and is not against the interests of China. However, Japan by signing agreements (negotiations had begun in January 1912 and concluded by 8 July 1912) with Russia became a potential threat to China and this is the cause of the Chinese distrust of Japan. The English have exploited this to create anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese and Japan has become the Indian policeman of England (eikokau no indo junsa). In this situation the position of Beijing, which is advantageously

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located to protect China in the north, has become crucial and Yuan Shikai’s success is attributable to neither the degeneration of the Chinese nor to his use of bribes, but rather the responsibility lies wholly with the Japanese.76 The critique of Japanese policies towards China and the failure to recognize the real enemy is directed perhaps more to the shina ronin than the government. Kita writes that they are real fools who do not know their foolishness and as they cannot criticize the government they merely criticize the Chinese and then go back to Japan. Unfortunately, he says that the resentment in China created by this is directed against Song who was close to the Japanese and not against Sun who was in the USA.77 Kita’s critique is directed both at the weakness of Sun Yat-sen’s theoretical position and Japan’s misreading of the situation. This has allowed Yuan Shihkai to exploit these weaknesses and entrench himself in power. Japanese foreign policy, Kita advises, needs to understand the contradiction of allying with both Russia in the north and with England which, with its naval base in Hong Kong, seeks to control the south of China. Japan cannot be allied with both and yet hope to act as a protector of China against Western interests.78 INFLUENCES ON THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The question of the economic development of China and the emergence of Japan as a leader in the region are intimately linked in Kita’s view. Chinese economic development has become for many within China as well as among the foreign powers a matter of advancing loans to China but how these actually affect development is a questionable proposition. In Kita’s view it is vital for the Japanese to oppose those who support loans and support those patriots who oppose these foreign loans, for these are not merely financial transactions but really a preparation for dividing the country.79 The crisis that the Qing dynasty faced in the opening years of the twentieth century was reflected in the onerous financial burden of debts. By 1914, both the export of capital and direct foreign investment had been used as methods of establishing dominance as well as extracting wealth. China’s external debt had grown to $835 million (58% of this was the Boxer indemnity and the loans taken to pay Japan the reparations after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95) and foreign loans by the end of 1913 were $526 million (63% of these were for military and administrative needs and 37% for railway construction).80 While Britain was still the predominant figure, Japanese investment began to increase after 1905 and increased significantly after

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Japan acquired control of Southern Manchuria when the South Manchurian Railway Company began to play a major role. Kita took the position that the loans being offered to China were destructive and that Japan was acting like a middleman, a running dog. He wrote that the Four Power Consortium for building railroads became the spark that ignited the Xinhai revolution and that Japan should not participate in the Six Power Consortium.81 By allying with the West Japan is deceiving China. This is the same logic that England has used in Egypt and India but is not using in the East as it is too far for her to transport troops to, so it has allied with Japan to use her military power. Lord Grey, Kita writes, has a long tongue (that is, he is a liar).82 Kita Ikki seems to suggest that his views influenced the Chinese for he says he talked to Tan Renfeng, who was also not in favour of the loans, and Tan conveyed these ideas to Yuan Shikai. Yuan subsequently, in a talk with a Shanxi journalist, agreed that foreign loans were not in the interests of China. This shows, according to Kita, that the political consciousness of the people has increased and the time for an Asian Monroe doctrine is not so far off. The effect of this was that the USA dropped out, which was a serious blow for the syndicate.83 The Prime Minister, Tang Shao Yi (1860–1938), a former bureaucrat and Yuan Shikai’s negotiator with the revolutionaries during 1911–12, objected to the loans and resigned his post.84 Song Jiaoren replaced him and therefore the whole cabinet came to oppose the loans. Japan’s inaction is a crime and resulted in the anti-Japanese movement. Japan should have followed the example of the US whose policy was in the best interest of China.85 Kita argues that the cabinet, too, is also not to blame, neither the Okuma cabinet nor the earlier Yamamoto Gonnohyoei cabinet (1913–14), for in the last few years the cabinets have not run the country and real power now lies with stupid and arrogant idiots (guho to kyoman). The stupid ones are those who think that the loans are the first step in developing the country and do not think it is going to lead to the division of the country. The arrogant are those who, to control China, want arms and money.86 In Kita Ikki’s argument, development is premised on the need to change the collapsing financial organization for the financial and economic collapse of a country gives rise to a new spirit and to revolution which in turn creates a new organization. The loans can only contribute to China’s development if they can bring about such a change. At present the ‘outside’ is all confusion, writes Kita, but inside a new spirit is being created. The English merely seeing surface developments consider China a dying nation.87 Kita writes that the English understanding of the situation in China is faulty, as they

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mistakenly think that the situation is the same as in Egypt or India. Egypt and India are, according to Kita, dying cultures with no revolutionary possibilities, hence they could control them. The English, he writes, only have experience of dying cultures and do not understand the situation in China, just as their Minister Parkes failed to see the new spirit during the Meiji ishin in Japan. White people make the mistake of thinking that there is never any change in all non-white countries, writes Kita and they fail to make comparisons with their own country.88 A revolution is like a bridge between a dying and a rising nation and this period in China is comparable to what happened at the end of Tokugawa Japan and in France during the revolution. Thus what is happening in China, writes Kita, is not because it is an Eastern country but rather that it is experiencing a period of social and economic turmoil.89 The question of loans to China is crucial to Kita’s argument and he stresses that it is necessary to see their effect historically. He cites the example of pre-revolutionary France writing that its finances were in a worse state than present day China, and if it managed the transition, then China, which is in the middle of this process, will too, and Japan should understand this and not take advantage of the present confusion. He sees the two factions in the struggle as representatives of different world views: Yuan, who is supporting the loans, represents the old order and Tan Renfeng, who, because he opposes them, represents the new order. History, writes Kita is the same for the white and yellow races.90 Kita points out that the crucial question is whether Japan will emerge as the leader of Asia. He argues that the so-called ‘China experts’ (shina tsu – and here he points particularly to the shina ronin) confuse cause and effect, mistakenly thinking that the revolution has brought about a financial collapse. It is rather the objective of the revolution to rebuild China’s finances and this cannot be done by cosmetic policies, like borrowing foreign capital but only by building new organizations. For Japan then, according to Kita, it is, therefore, a very important period and whether it will become a bailiff of the Western powers or the leader of Asia is a question that remains unanswered.91 The confusion in China, according to Kita, is comparable to the situation in Japan during the Meiji ishin when new structures were put into place only after the old had been dismantled. The land was taken away from the daimyo and then the reforms carried out. Similarly in China, Kita argues, the old reactionary structures are collapsing and can no longer function to support the old financial system.92 Kita Ikki’s analysis of the situation in China and his evaluation of Yuan Shikai is based on his understanding of the Chinese situation. The country was earlier unified under a strong

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monarchical institution and ruled through the magistrates (daikan). Their role as the main instrument of suppression is, he writes, comparable to the nobility in pre-revolutionary France or the samurai Japan: all exercised the power of life and death over the people.93 However, where Japan differed, according to Kita, was that the daimyo were hereditary and developed an attachment to the people while the daikan, with no attachment had to be held in check by a strong government and once that went, and the Qing rulers weakened, they plundered the people. The present revolution is thus really aimed, he concludes, at overthrowing the rule of the daikan, and returning the wealth they have plundered to the state and the retirement of the emperor is but a prologue in this process. The destruction of the daikan class can only be done through the appropriation of their wealth to build a new China.94 In this agenda for carrying forward the Chinese revolution Kita finds that Huang Xing and Tan Renfeng have a proper understanding of the future of China. They consider the well-being of China, unlike the white people (and this for Kita includes the Japanese), as they see the necessity of overthrowing the daikan class.95 Again citing the example of the French Revolution and the intervention by the other European powers Kita compares the situation with China and argues that the European powers during the French Revolution had been monarchies and therefore feared that they, too, would face revolutionary upheaval. However, Kita writes, in Japan there is no daikan class and Japan need not fear revolution in China.96 Also, he writes it was foreign intervention that led to the rein of terror during the French Revolution but during the Meiji ishinkakumei, because there was no interference, Japan did not experience such a reign of terror. Therefore, the course of the Chinese revolution will depend on whether Japan intervenes or not. Accepting the need for Japanese intervention in support of the revolution, Kita argues that the real danger that Japan will face will be from Russia and England, foreign powers who have extended the loans to China, and not from the 400 million Chinese.97 REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND SUN YAT-SEN

Kita again reverts to examining the question of revolutionary change and grounded in his understanding is his assessment of Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shikai. He is critical of both, as they do not answer what Kita sees to be the needs of new China. Heaven has created two evils, he writes, Yuan Shikai and Sun Yat-sen. Though the former with the support of the bureaucracy tried to buttress a monarchical system and the later, with the aid of the shina ronin worked for the creation of a republic, they are both similar in their

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unsuitability for China; Yuan because he is not modern and Sun Yat-sen because his American inspired ideas do not answer the needs of the new China.98 Revolution, writes Kita, has two aspects: one, the bringing about of a new order organized around a new unity and two, that authority becomes representative of the people’s interests. Kita sees the substance of freedom and unity as one. Therefore, change involves both a new unity but equally a crucial change in its content and that is the participation of the people. Kita then, is not dismissive or blind to the role of the people in history.99 Kita examines Sun Yat-sen’s understanding of the idea of freedom. He writes that Sun’s misunderstanding arises from his belief that the concept of freedom has always existed in China. The uprisings and violence are signs of the old order crumbling rather than of a modern idea of freedom. At present, China lacks the modern idea of freedom that can form the base for a modern monarchy or a republic. In a revolution, the idea of freedom is necessary both at the level of ideas and as a way to criticize the old and bring about the new. Thus, a revolution is not carried out to realize freedom, but because there is an understanding of freedom, a revolution occurs.100 Freedom brings about revolution, Kita writes, and this in turn brings about what he calls an authoritarian unification (sensei teki toitsu). For example, Napoleon unified France and the Meiji Emperor, Japan. The preservation of the unity of the state is the lesson clearly shown in the success of the Meiji government and revolutionary government, he urges, should establish a sensible unification and not pursue a suicidal policy to preserve freedom which will end up in destroying other freedoms.101 The objective of revolution, whether in the East or the West, is not freedom, writes Kita, but a sensible unity and the way this unity is realized depends on historical factors. The Chinese revolution is different from the French Revolution, for while the French were reluctant to overthrow the King, the Chinese people have no such reluctance, as the rulers are different – they are Manchus. Therefore, the process of the Chinese revolution resembles in its smoothness the Meiji ishin-kakumei, and not the French, which followed a more confused pattern. In a sense then ‘yellow races’ are, Kita writes, cleverer than the white.102 In judging a revolution we must consider how the awakening takes place and who is awakened. In France, the serfs became conscious of their rights, while in Japan the process involved taking authority and rights from the samurai. Now, in China, the people want to change their animal-like magisterial government (daikan seiji) and are anti-Manchu and antiYuan.103 Kita argues that the middle classes do not bring about a revolution but are in fact created by the revolution. It is therefore wrong of

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Japanese critics to argue that there is no true middle class in China and because of this that it is not possible to carry out a democratic revolution. For once a revolution has started, a middle class aspiring to democracy will come into existence.104 The USA is a different case because it was a country created by immigrants who were more adventurous, and the more medieval type of people were left in Europe so that the process of building systems started after the revolutionary period. In France, China and Japan, while elements of the middle classes existed, the middle class was created during the period of revolution.105 Continuing his analysis of the nature of revolution, Kita considers the question of leadership and the role of a heroic leader. He is also concerned with stressing the need for establishing and maintaining the unity of China. His argument, again based on the existing reality of China are that an authoritarian unity (sensei toitsu) is far more urgent than the need for freedom.106 A heroic leader has to have both the aspects of kindness and severity. All great leaders have been authoritarian (sensei teki) whether it is Christ, Buddha or Robespierre, Napoleon or the Meiji tenno. Thus, the Meiji tenno, though he had a heart like the Buddha, did not hesitate in killing Saigo Takamori when it became necessary. That is what China needs now, someone who will dispose of its enemies. Kita writes that it is not the time to debate the type of government China needs but to dispose of the enemies of the revolution.107 The people who are caught up in this debate about the form of government are merely translating foreign ideas, according to Kita. They do not understand that during a revolutionary period a republic is wrong, as representatives in the Assembly will not be truly representative of the new order but will form the old, repressive order. In China this means they will be from the camp of magisterial government (daikan seiji) just as in revolutionary France the largest party were supporters of the King.108 Kita does not see a necessary contradiction between freedom and absolutist government. Thus, the Meiji tenno, he argues was progressive whereas if a Diet had been established then it would have been dominated by the representatives of the samurai, who would have opposed the reorganization of prefectures, the ban on the wearing of swords and conscription. The tenno, far from suppressing freedom, actually protected it.109 Similarly, Kita writes, in China the members of the magisterial government (daikan seiji), though few in number are well educated and these reactionary forces hope to use the Assembly to preserve their powers. They are not only educated but possess money and land and are powerful and respected leaders, hence it is the duty of revolutionaries to destroy them.110 At present, to establish a republic, as Sun Yat-sen and the shina ronin would want, is like releasing the tiger from

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his cage, while what is required is to kill him. The daikan class seek to escape to Japan, just as the French nobility sought refuge in Austria, to ally with like-minded people to work against the revolution. Japan should prevent this and not play the role of Austria, writes Kita, for its destiny is to help China to avoid the chaos that France went through. Therefore, the leaders should follow the will of Heaven (ten no shimmei) and not work through assemblies and other such institutions.111 Kita, argues that China should seek its models from within Asia and not slavishly copy Europe or the United States and while it should establish a republic, elections, as remarked earlier, may not necessarily serve revolutionary ends. An elected assembly will spend its time talking a great deal and the leader will listen only to it and not hear the voice of Heaven.112 Rather Kita suggests that the leading revolutionaries select assistants (genkun), who will not be elected but rather elect themselves to help the leader. These people will form the upper house of the new society, and the lower house can only be formed after the old ruling class has been killed and when a proper law for registration (koseki) can be enacted to identify voters. This is the reason, Kita cites, to defend the argument that revolutionaries must elect themselves.113 In short, being dogmatic about the value of votes is really being unscientific and comes from an attitude which is dependent on importing foreign ideas. Just as the Meiji ishin-kakumei took the best elements from the white countries and carried out an Eastern revolution, similarly China, too, must do the same.114 In China, the influence of Confucian thought has been pernicious, Kita writes, for it is concerned only with externals and not with substance. The poisonous influence of Confucian thought has led the Chinese to concern themselves only with external borrowing. The difference between China and Japan is that while in China the sway of Confucianism has led to a weak civil government, in Japan because of the influence of Buddhism, military government, which brings out the strength of the country, has held sway.115 Kita, because of his stress on unity, now begins to argue that military strength is essential. What China has to do, he writes, is to carry out a military revolution because Confucianism and republicanism are contradictory. Just as in France a degenerated Christianity was thrown out, so too China has to throw out Confucianism. Militarism argues Kita, can provide the basis for both uniting the people and driving out the foreigners. Militarism will spiritually unite the people. There is no need to revere people like Confucius or Mencius. Their disciples need to be killed and their books burned.116 Necessity is everything, writes Kita. The first revolution rejected the teachings of Confucius and threw out the bureaucratic system. This was possible as it had moved

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away from the needs of the people and, therefore, they were not interested in supporting it.117 Regional demands and preoccupation with local interests, Kita writes, were behind the lack of success of the first and second revolution as each province was fighting for its independence. This, he points out, posed a danger for China’s unity. Hence now they will welcome a leader for military power is essential for unity.118 This is where Kita sees Sun’s failure in his inability to use military power and he writes that even Yuan Shikai failed to use it effectively. Kita cites the example of the success of Bismarck’s ‘iron and blood’ policy, for without the proper use of military power Germany would probably have been wiped off the map.119 In the context of the very real foreign danger that confronts China, Kita argues that ideas of a loose federation with large doses of local autonomy are dangerous. His understanding is grounded in the necessity of a creating a strong state for that is the only way to confront the foreign danger. The only way that China can emerge as a large unified country, he says, is with the help of the army.120 Yet Kita does not place his hopes on the army as it is, but only on those elements of it that will play their proper role when it is revolutionized. The change must still be brought about among the people. He elaborates on this necessity of inculcating a new spirit. In China revolutionary change has to be brought about and this, he writes, has to involve a change of heart among the people. New training methods and employing foreign advisers alone will not be very effective, he writes, in reforming the army. The army is merely a collection of thieves who pay the daikan and these people cannot be taught anything. They need to be infused with a new spirit, the same spirit that made the Japanese army successful against Saigo Takamori and in the wars against China and Russia.121 CHINA AFTER THE REVOLUTION

Once the revolution is successful, Kita argues, then China will inevitably have to fight England and Russia. England has colonial holdings and seeks under the guise of protecting China to make it into a colony like India. Japan’s interests lie in helping China, he writes, and it must terminate its alliance with England. Here he feels that Germany is the natural ally as together with Japan it can help to fight England and maintain a balance in the Pacific and Atlantic and even help to free India and take over some of the British colonies.122 Kita sees Germany as playing a positive role even though it had earlier participated in the Triple Intervention, for now, he writes it is in confrontation with Russia and England and, therefore, it will protect the Chinese revolution. Its position can be compared with

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that of Russia during the French Revolution. China too, therefore, is at the moment sympathetic towards Germany (shindoku shugi).123 The Chinese must, he writes fight the Russian bear in the north on their own, for they have been enemies since time immemorial. Japan can aid China for here too the same principle of justice (seigi) is involved, as it was during the Russo-Japanese War. If Russia is driven out, he argues, then Japan’s trade in Korea will benefit and Japan can control the area east of Baikal.124 Kita goes on to blame the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the RussoJapanese agreements as the root cause of the anti-Japanese movement in China. He feels that both these links threaten China and if corrections are made in Japan’s foreign policy then anti-Japanese movements will die out. He even asserts that the Chinese are not afraid of being dominated by Japan. In fact, he proceeds to write that they would probably not even object to being ruled by Japan.125 There was a strong case being made for the impossibility of a unified China, that it was too diverse and large and many Japanese specialists on China were arguing that it would make sense to concentrate on the central provinces and let the outlying provinces go their own way. Kita argued against this to stress that both Mongolia and Sichuan were extremely important for they serve to hold back threats from Russia and England. Once Russia takes over Mongolia, he argued, then the process of dismantling China would begin with the British in the Yangtze and the French in southern China. So the idea that by concentrating attention on the central areas China can be unified is like trying to revive the body after cutting the limbs. This is a silly argument, writes Kita, that no Chinese will accept.126 Kita Ikki blames the policy-makers in Tokyo, marking the decline of Japanese diplomacy from Okuma’s policy of an economic alliance between Japan and England. This despite the advice of the Japanese Minister in China, Yamaza who, Kita felt, truly understood the situation.127 Kita’s argument expands to a vision of Japan moving across the globe to control it with the aim of opposing Russia. Thus Kita urges that Japan must take over the area from Vladivostok to Amur as well as Hong Kong, Singapore and French Indochina when China fights Russia. With these in its possession it can help India to gain independence. Finally, it should go down to Australia and once it has control of this area then it will be in a position to deal with the invasion of Russia. These territories can be acquired only if there is an independent China and, he writes, that Japan has to change from a ‘little’ Japan to a ‘big’ Japan.128 Japan’s revolutionary foreign policy to ensure the political integrity of China and the success of the republican revolution are used to lay the basis for a greater Japanese sphere, that differs from the later Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere.

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The argument oscillates between linking the acquisition of the territory of Outer and Inner Mongolia, and north and south Manchuria to helping China. This is justified on the grounds that their territory had been originally captured from the Russians and it was only England that forced Japan to give up these gains. Therefore, Japan needs to be clear about the opposition to Russia and along with an alliance with China, she needs to form an economic alliance with the USA.129 Once China has won a war with Russia, says Kita, then it will be able to carry out revolutionary changes, eliminate magisterial government (daikan seiji), carry out a financial revolution, reform her military administration and establish an administrative structure (gunken) to unify China. After China is unified by the military it can enter into the joint production of weapons or, with the help of US capital, build up the railway system and establish a modern state.130 US capital in China, Kita writes, will be good for China’s development. Japan’s relations with the USA are unfortunately not very good, he says, and this is because of Japan’s mistaken diplomacy which not only has given rise to anti-Japanese movements in China but Japan’s anti-German stand during the First World War has alienated people of German origin in the USA. These are the people who form the anti-Japanese movement in the USA. If Japanese diplomacy is changed this movement will end.131 Kita is careful to distinguish the policy interests of the United States and England arguing that since the US has been formed largely by European immigrants dissatisfied with the conditions in Europe, therefore, they do not necessarily see eye to eye.132 The United States policy in China, Kita argues, has the objective of protecting its market from the incursions of European countries (ryodo hozenshugi o kaiho sareta shijo) and displays less interest in territorial conquest. The United States will not try to take over China by extending loans, as it did Cuba and Mexico because it is too far away, he reasons. And he notes that the United States supported Japan as it fought to push back Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. If Russia invades China then the USA will support China.133 Kita takes a position against Okuma’s policy of aligning with England arguing that Japan and the United States have complementary interests in China and can develop a co-operative and equal relationship. He sees Japan’s weakness lying in a lack of investible capital while the United States needs Japan to protect its interests in China. Therefore, he feels that the two countries can come together. The weakness of the USA lies in the fact that it has to rely on Japan to protect China so that it can invest safely. Moreover, he says, if the USA invests in China, particularly in railways, then industries will develop and trade with Japan will increase and consequently Japan will benefit.134

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Kita is critical of Japan’s China experts who cannot differentiate between the destruction of the old China in the 1911 revolution and the process of building a new China. How will this new China be awakened he asks (ika ni minkoku ga okoran to suru ka)? To understand the new China it is necessary to realize the necessity of a revolution in Japan’s foreign policy and to understand why it is also necessary to take over railways from England, France and Belgium.135 Kita having built up his case for a revolutionary change in Japanese foreign policy then proceeds to suggest a division of spheres of control of the world, oblivious to the people and their wishes. After the revolution has been completed, China will develop into a great country and England will be destroyed just as the Eastern Roman Empire or Poland was destroyed, he writes.136 He suggests that Germany, an industrious and intelligent nation, should not expand beyond Turkey in Asia though it should take over Africa from England and France. Japan will take over Indo-China and liberate India from the British. He is careful to say that neither Japan nor Germany should try to take over India. Japan, Kita writes, should be responsible for the liberation of India. The USA should expand to include Canada to balance Japan’s taking over Australia and the Pacific islands from Britain. While China will take over Mongolia, Japan will occupy north and south Manchuria up to the Amur River.137 RECONSIDERING THE SHINA GAISHI

The brunt of Kita’s analysis regarding the Chinese revolution rests on the view that change should be brought about with the support of indigenous elements and that institutions and structures too must be in consonance with Chinese tradition and reality. He sees Sun Yat-sen as a shallow copier of the West and, therefore, as someone to be condemned, and in opposition to him, he exalts the figure of Song Jiaoren as one who was attuned to the needs of China. Kita’s view is extremely simplistic and yet, it has coloured later views or rather, is part of a common, shared perception in Japan. On the one hand, Sun Yat-sen was considered an impractical visionary, a gradualist and one who imported republican ideas from the USA, while Song Jiaoren was seen as a radical who supported, even though limited in character, a democratic movement in which the peasantry would also play a role.138 However, this is to underestimate the complexities of Sun Yat-sen’s political programme. Sun was familiar with the problems that capitalist development engendered, and, therefore, advocated the necessity of social revolution together with a political revolution. In the Manifesto of the Military Government of the Revolutionary Chinese

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Brotherhood, written in 1911, he outlined the broad steps by which constitutional government would be established in China.139 The main features were to be an initial three-year period of military government. The second phase would be for six years and would be a period of political apprenticeship during which citizens could learn about local government through their participation in the government of the administrative districts. The centre would continue to handle military affairs. The third phase would be when a written constitution, a popularly elected parliament and a popularly elected president would be introduced. Sun Yat-sen was therefore, aware of various political institutional arrangements, their limitations and the need to cultivate political awareness among the people. Kita, as a member of the United League (Tung Meng Hui) should have known this. Moreover, the above ideas about a gradual process of political education and excluding non-party members initially from political participation is closer to Kita Ikki’s own ideas. The book’s internal logic is also split between the two halves. The first half of the book sees Kita arguing the merits of a Presidential system of the French Third Republic variety but in Chapter XVI he puts forward the necessity of a president for life (shushin daitoryo) given the dangerous situation that China is in. He argues that to protect the revolution and for unity it is essential that authority be concentrated (sensei teki toitsu).140 This prescription was considerably stronger than that put forward by Sun Yat-sen. Kita in the second half of the book is more concerned about the establishment of an Eastern type republic. While earlier he had argued that as China lacked the tradition of freedom a presidential system would become oppressive, now he looks for a Genghis Khan, who like Napoleon or the Meiji Emperor will provide the leadership for protecting the unity and freedom of the people. Kita argues that the few revolutionaries who are aware, (Kakumei no genro) will establish an upper house. These representatives will be selected not through elections but will be put forward by the will of Heaven and the people (tenmei to min i no ue ni tattashimeru).141 Concerning the question of foreign aid and Kita Ikki’s criticism of Sun Yat-sen for accepting foreign aid, the argument is rather convoluted. Kita has no objection to a country seeking aid to separate and establish itself independently as the United States did, in part with French help.142 Kita’s understanding of Song Jiaoren is also limited. Song’s political career spans the years from 1903 to 1913 when he was assassinated. Kita even suggests that Sun Yat-sen was behind the deed.143 Song, part of the nationalist upsurge among the Chinese intelligentsia, extolled the power and greatness of the Chinese past and argued that it was the equal of the West.144 Song was a nationalist, classically educated before he went to Japan, and like Huang Xing

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was more representative of the landowners and the emerging industrialists.145 However, he was not as indifferent to foreign ideas as Kita would imagine. As he could not go to Wuchang his ideas are not apparent in the Structural Outline of the Provisional Government of the Republic of China. He wanted a Cabinet system of government based on the British model.146 He was also, like many of his contemporaries, influenced by his reading, not only of people like Rousseau but by the lives of leaders like Washington and Napoleon.147 Kita Ikki’s hero, Song Jiaoren, had by 1911 come to see Japan as a major source of trouble for China. Japanese economic expansion was, he argued, a way for them to acquire control and domination.148 He perceived Russia as the other major worry and from this perceived foreign threat he put forward criticisms of the Manchu rulers as incompetent and unable to meet the foreign threat.149 Song had pinned his hopes on a popular uprising and as part of this attempt to broaden the base of participation, early in his career, he tried to bring a Manchurian outlaw into the movement.150 However, gradually he had come to place emphasis on insurrection within the military but with the reservation that the revolutionary process should end quickly so that a civilian government could be established. Here it was lessons from the Japanese model that served as a lesson for Song Jiaoren. The earlier fascination with Japan had been replaced and Song attributed the growing authoritarianism in Japan to the preponderance of the military from the time of the Meiji Restoration.151 Thus, Song’s ideas differed in many ways from the way Kita Ikki understood them. Not only were these ideas different, but Song hardly refers to Kita Ikki, except once, and that too in a derogatory manner. In his memoirs Song mentions Kita Ikki as one of the people who physically assaulted Zhang Ji Cheng, who suffered severe bodily injuries and impairment of memory.152 Kita Ikki’s understanding of Song’s position appears limited. As a participant’s record it has problems as it is being written to support a thesis. Arguments are marshalled to project Kita’s vision of what is necessary to successfully complete the Chinese revolution rather than present a comprehensive picture of the events. If Song’s statement is to be accepted, his role seems to have been, at times, rather sordid. In Kita’s favour it can be said that he did attempt to understand and explain how change could be brought about in China. His emphasis on the role of the military might even have been an effect of the influence of the success of the 1910 Portuguese revolution in which the army and navy played a crucial role.153 His understanding centres around the emphasis on indigenous development and, therefore, his use of Mongolia and Mencius to outline the contours of

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a possible Eastern Republic needs to be read symbolically too. Kita brings a vision and understanding of history to bear on his analysis. He writes that, ‘History does not flow separately for the white races and the yellow races . . . In the end China must follow the road taken by the French Revolution and the Japanese.’154 This is far removed from Miyazaki Toten’s emotional attachment to the cause of Chinese republicanism. Kita’s strength lies in his understanding of the force of nationalism but his failure lies in not understanding the role of the movement for democracy. Kita, while writing that the people must bring about the revolution, does not display any understanding of their role.155

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n the last chapter Kita Ikki’s writings on the Xinhai revolution were examined and discussed. Here the focus will be on the view prevalent among his contemporaries. The aim will be to present a wide sample of opinion taken from books and magazines of the way contemporaries thought about China and its condition. This chapter is not a detailed critique of the opinions and arguments of select intellectuals or of a particular group (e.g. the army), but rather an attempt to map the contours of common perceptions and shared concerns within a social group that helped to shape the ideological terrain. From this mapping it is hoped that the nature of the questions that the Japanese were posing will highlight the way they considered their situation, and in turn will give background for the manner in which Kita formulated his ideas about the ‘China Problem’. Words such as ‘nationalist’ and ‘socialist’ are used to identify people who are usually grouped under one or the other category. This is done merely for convenience but it does gloss over the complexities inherent in classifying those who do not fit neatly into one or the other category. The convenience of classification is, however, not merely stylistic but points to boundaries within which groupings are possible. Yet, it is equally important to bear in mind that these were fluid groupings, for as individuals and groups grappled with the complexities of a changing situation their prescriptions often lacked clarity, order, or even consistency. Their prescriptions were formed using this dense weave of ideas. Subsumed under the rubric of East Asia, Japan and China, while sharing many elements of their cultural heritage, are very different civilizations and their tense relationship, particularly in the modern period, has been fraught with distrust, acrimony and hate. Even so, it has at times and in some people shown the possibilities and hope of a common unity of purpose and endeavour. Unfortunately, within

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the terms of the mainstream conception of history these missed opportunities and unfulfilled hopes have not received the attention they deserve. The Japanese who sought to liberate China from the heavy yoke of imperial domination; who sought to work with China for an Asia united against the pervasive encroachment of European civilization are indiscriminately linked together. They are seen either as harbingers of Japanese imperialism, advocates of a resurgent Japan, or as misguided idealists, cat’s-paws for the militarists who wished to further expand and strengthen their control in China. Our present understanding of Japan-China relations has of course been refined by detailed studies but it is still necessary to readdress ourselves to this area, not with the objective of explaining the subsequent unhappy history but to reconsider the ambiguities that were present in this many-layered relationship. In so doing, it might be possible to attempt a history of inter-regional relations in Asia and also confront larger questions concerning social change in Asia and even the very meaning of Asia.1 An examination of the views of the Japanese intelligentsia of a single historical event, the republican revolution of 1911 in China, can serve as a focus for several related questions.2 It is possible to consider the late-Meiji period not just in terms of a prelude to later expansion but in its own right, as one filled with various possibilities. The question to be posed then would be what Japanese attitudes were rather than what elements show incipient imperial ambitions. By confining my attention to one specific historical event I would like to reconsider questions within the larger one of the reactions of the Japanese intelligentsia to the 1911 revolution. Why was concern for China dominated by so-called ‘nationalists’ even though liberal and progressives had been concerned about the fate of Korea and China earlier? The socialists appear to have taken Fukuzawa Yukichi’s dicta to heart and turned their eyes away from Asia. This is a question that has rarely been addressed in considering questions of nationalism and socialism. Recent history has vividly shown that the two are not necessarily in conflict and nationalism, far from dying, grows in strength and vigour. The ties that bind have roots that go further back than modern imaginings. The rising consciousness of separateness raises far larger questions then I can attempt to tackle here from a reconsideration of how Japanese nationalists and socialists responded to revolution at their doorstep, but it could provide some fruitful suggestions. BACKGROUND

China and Japan are seen, and at times both have seen themselves, as part of the same cultural family, teeth and lips presenting a common face to the world. That, however, has more often than not seemed

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more of a literary flourish than an expression of unbreakable bonds. Relations between the two have historically been one-sided, with Japan a distant island on the fringes of Chinese culture and the flow of influence has been accordingly one way, mediated mostly by Korea. A difficult sea and the consequent dangers of travel made China a distant, if respectful, neighbour. China, from a metaphorical ideal, began to impinge on Japanese consciousness more concretly with the Meiji ishin of 1868, and a period marked by contradictory emotions began, complicated in part by the reversal of roles, with Japan an increasingly confident and evidently more successful country, and in part by the great power rivalry in this region, of which Japan had become an active and important card-carrying member. In the pre-Tokugawa period, Japanese understanding of the world was limited to its immediate neighbours and expressed in the phrase three-country world-view (sankoku sekai kan). The three countries, Japan (honcho) the continent including China and Korea (shintan or kara) and countries beyond, including India (tenjiku). While there was trade and cultural exchange with China, India seemed to represent a region somewhere out there from where Buddhism originated. The transformation of Japan’s world-view and the exclusion of tenjiku from its place of privilege reflects the growing understanding of the world that began around the midsixteenth century as Japan came into contact with European nations. The early contacts with the Europeans were framed within the three-country world-view and the Portuguese were seen as coming from India or tenjiku, a view that they actively encouraged. The three-country world-view, whether from a Buddhist or Confucian position, placed Japan at the borders of geography and civilization. Paradoxically, this helped to strengthen the idea of Japan as a sacred land (shinkoku). These two, even contradictory, ideas were dealt a serious blow with the defeat of Hideyoshi’s Korean campaign. Japan’s meddling in continental affairs was severely tempered, and the need to ensure stability became an important issue for Ieyasu as he set about establishing Tokugawa rule. The collapse of the three-country world-view was further eroded with the introduction of Mateo Ricci’s map (1602). Restrictions on travel and trade ensured that changes took time, but by the end of the seventeenth century the Japanese view of the world had become relatively reliable and sophisticated. Nishikawa Joken writes of forty-two nationalities with drawings to illustrate their dress and appearance.3 There are brief descriptions of the location and climate. He divides the world into China (chugoku), foreign countries (gaikoku) and barbarians in the outer world (gaii). The Chinese world order was defined by the use of Chinese characters, kanji, and the practice of the three teachings (kyo). Foreign countries

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or gaikoku included Korea, the Ryukyu’s, Taiwan and Tonkin. Tenjiku was excluded into the outer barbarians’ (gaii). Japan, China and south-east Asia now formed the core of the Japanese international world, a view not very different from that today. The exclusion of China, while never complete, began in the later years of Tokugawa rule and took full momentum during the Meiji period till the demands of empire necessitated more inclusive ideologies. The geographical separation of Tenjiku was also marked by the increasing cultural distance. In the records of shipwrecked sailors and other references Tenjiku is seen as culturally less developed and different; its people not human. Words like korombo (black man) appear. Whatever appears to be praiseworthy is seen as actually Chinese, much as elements in Ainu culture were traced to the tradition of Yoshitsune seeking refuge there.4 This went together with an increasing sense of being Japanese. Earlier references attest to a sense of Japan distinguishable from China (kara) and India (tenjiku), but as Ezo and the Ryukyu islands were brought under the authority of the Bakufu, the Bakufu strengthened both its political borders as well as brought these former foreigner’s (ijin) within the wajin (people of Yamato) framework.5 The word for East or toyo originally referred to Japan and the surrounding seas, but during the Meiji period it came to be associated geographically with Japan, China and India, and then with Asia or the Orient. Japan was indisputably a geographical part of the East, but whether it was part of Asia was open to debate and question. The restrictions on trade and movement within Japan meant that the foreign population within Japan was limited. The Chinese trading community was confined, as were the Dutch. Koreans or Ryukyuan embassies were occasional and seem to provide more spectacle than any sustained contact. Early illustrations of foreigners show people from the Asian region, such as the servants brought in by the Dutch, but the basis of difference is seen in dress, custom and language (fuzoku) rather than any racial qualities.6 It was the modern world that transformed this way of looking. Japan established treaty relations with China in 1871, but intellectually the process of disestablishing the Middle Kingdom and treating China as another country had begun during the Tokugawa period, when Okuni Takamasa (1792–1871) in Shinshin kohoran (1866–67), with the understanding gained from the works of Hugo Grotius on international law, had argued against the idea of China as the Middle Kingdom surrounded by barbarians. In Gakuunron he used the word shina instead of chugoku or chuka to show that while China was different it was not in any way superior.7 Thus, the idealization of China when far removed was replaced by a critical appreciation of Chinese limitations, and the realization that

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Japan need not, indeed must not, take the path that China seemed to be set on. The importance of preserving national sovereignty was the most obvious lesson to be learned from a Chinese reality now increasingly familiar to the Japanese. Japanese thinking on Asia in general (and for Japan this really means China), is generally categorized into two groups. The first is ‘transcend Asia’ (or Datsu-A), from Fukuzawa Yukichi’s famous essay of the same name. In it he argued that Japan must ‘transcend Asia’ for Asia represented the old and the decrepit, and if it did not then it too would be sucked into torpor and overtaken by the Western powers. The other group, ‘Revive Asia’ (or Koa) sought to link the survival and success of Japan with a revived China. The Bakufu had sent a huge delegation to China, and Takasugi Shinsaku (1839–67), who has left a diary of his voyage, shows his contempt for the state of China whose own citizens are shabbily treated. The dominant lesson that Takasugi drew was the danger of being colonized. He also found Shanghai dirty and disease-ridden, and its political class venal and sycophantic. Around the same time Kishida Ginko (1833–1905) wrote in much the same way after a trip calling it ‘that damn country’ (baka na kuni).8 The initial encounters laid bare the distance between the two countries, and though there remained an enormous respect for the culture and civilization of China it was tempered by a healthy distaste for the reality of present-day China. This understanding underpinned the call to help China. Japan’s economic interests were in the early-Meiji period directed towards Europe and the USA, and it was only gradually and hesitantly that business and other interests gathered momentum. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 galvanized the nation. Among those involved in China, Arao Sei was one of the few who voiced objections. His view as expressed in a summary report to the general staff of the army, dated 10 May 1889, argues that a war with China is not in Japanese interests; rather that Japan should work for the economic revival of China and Asia to prevent Western penetration into the region. He advocated the building of a commercial intelligence network to recover ‘our commercial rights’ (shoken o kaifuku).9 The activities of these early supporters of an active involvement in China gained strength with the Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany in 1895 that deprived Japan of her territorial gains. These concerns allowed the building up of close connections between the government and various societies formed to assist in the revival of Asia and ensure Japan’s role in that enterprise. Earlier, in March 1880, Sone Toshitoru, an ex-samurai from Yonezawa, and other prominent leaders, had organized the Revive Asia Society (koa kai) with 153 members to train people in Chinese. Miyajima Suehiro (1879–1963), a businessman who worked with Sumitomo and closely associated

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with Okubo Toshimichi (1830–78), was an active supporter of this society which was also given an annual imperial grant.10 The Revive Asia Society was eventually absorbed in 1900 into the East Asian Brotherhood Institute (toa dobunkai) which had been established in November 1898 with the help of Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904). The Institute was given ¥40,000 from secret foreign ministry funds by the Yamagata government and played a major role as a front for the foreign ministry in Japan’s cultural imperialism in China.11 There were two major opinions regarding Japanese policy towards China. The group of the former Institute were in support of helping the Chinese revolutionaries K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Chi’-ch’ao while Konoe and others around him advocated protecting China from Western aggression which, though it had the same objective of protecting China, revealed a difference in approach and objectives. These approaches were within a larger context of the international situation where the Western powers exercised political and cultural domination. In an article in the magazine Taiyo, Konoe Atsumaro wrote, ‘we must ally with those of the same race, and we must study the China problem’.12 Konoe’s vision of the future was one of racial conflict between the ‘white’ and the ‘yellow’ races, and he argued that to effectively exclude the Western powers from East Asia, it was imperative that China and Japan come together and co-operate. Sugita Teiichi (1851–1929), an ideologue of the Institute, who also saw the countries of Asia linked by a common destiny, argued from much the same fears, that is, how should Japan preserve and strengthen herself. After a visit to China in 1884, he wrote: ‘I wonder whether Japan will be served up as the main dish in the coming feast, or whether it should join the guests at the table. Surely it would be better to sit at the table than to be part of the menu.’13 The political concerns of this period were dominated by the demands of the people’s rights movement whose adherents were arguing and fighting for the establishment of constitutional government and their concern with China was negligible. Ideologues, who saw the principal threat stemming from the alien ideas and institutions of the Western world, looked to an alliance for Japan. These ideas were not wholly inimical to the bureaucracy, who was concerned also with the task of maintaining and nurturing Japanese national strength. To a large extent, the difference between the so-called Datsu-A and Ko-A positions is negligible when compared to the common understanding that both adopted, namely of Japanese superiority. The idea of alliance (rentai) was, by and large, under the direction or leadership of Japan and not considered as an alliance of equals. Thus, for instance, the liberal-imperialist Ozaki Yukio (1858–1954), in Arguments for Preserving China writes, ‘The annexation of China is

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both in the interest of the Japanese Empire and for the welfare of the people of China’, and if the Western powers oppose this then they are ‘opposing the happiness of humanity. Further, they are opposing the interests of the world.’14 It becomes difficult to distinguish between the motivations of Oi Kentaro who wrote that ‘The Japanese are in a position and have the duty to provide the leadership of an Asian revolution’ and Tokutomi Soho, an avowed supporter of Japan’s expansionist policies.15 Soho argued, in essence, for social democracy at home and imperialism abroad. He wrote: ‘There are two courses open for our country – self-reliance or dependency. The first course required imperialism as our aim, whereas the second means that we will have to be prepared to accept the fate of annexation.’ It is, he goes on, a policy, ‘not based on momentary whims; it is neither a pleasurable pastime, nor something to be undertaken casually. It is a policy born out of necessity if we are to survive as a modern nation and as a race.’16 The above statement by Tokutomi Soho was written at the beginning of the Taisho period (1912–26) but is widely representative of views prevalent in Meiji Japan. These views were centred in a belief that saw the very real possibility of Western domination, in all spheres of individual and national life, as the principal threat facing Japan and, therefore, advanced the argument that for Japan to effectively oppose this threat it was imperative to follow a policy of expansion. This formed the background for the popularity and ready acceptance of social Darwinism, that Spencerian amalgam with its stress on the idea of the strong devouring the weak or the survival of the fittest.17 Nevertheless, it remains difficult to explain the inability of thinkers to link internal reform and the spread of egalitarian ideas with the liberation of subjugated people. Those who sought to reform their society rarely, if ever, looked beyond it, and those who sought to aid the nascent struggles for freedom did so with little concern for reform and change at home. Perhaps their commonly-shared elitist concerns blinkered them to the possibilities in a truly egalitarian methodology. Within this framework it is possible to consider the views of the Japanese intelligentsia towards these questions. Having considered the analysis of events in China by Kita Ikki it becomes necessary to locate this in the context of contemporary Japan. While the views of some of the major commentators are fairly well and widely known, relatively little attention has been paid to what was being said by the middle rung of the intelligentsia in magazines, journals and newspapers during the unfolding of these events. It was, after all, from the pages of these magazines that the majority of the people learnt and constructed their idea of China and formed a view of Japan’s relationship to that country. The views formulated by commentators of

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varying degrees of competence and fame, therefore, represent a substratum on which people built up a many-layered picture of China.18 NIHON OYOBI NIHONJIN

In the magazine Japan and the Japanese (Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin), a commentator named Inagaki Shintaro wrote a series of articles analysing the conditions prevailing in China both before and during the revolution of 1911. His writings are contemporaneous with the events and therefore valuable as a source for understanding prevailing attitudes.19 Inagaki begins his discussion with the question of the desirability of constitutional government as an idea, but feels it is still too early to bring about its implementation and finds that the Chinese are too excitable to effectively use constitutional systems. The excitability of the Chinese, moreover, has been further aroused by this movement and, therefore, the goal of constitutional government should be pursued slowly, because at present the social and political organizations and institutions are in a state of disruption and the consciousness of the people is still in its infancy.20 At the end of the article he reaffirms that constitutional government is the most progressive form and that China must reform its corrupt government and strengthen itself so as to bring about a social transformation. Constitutional government can only be established, he goes on to say, by the will of the people (kokumin no doryoku ni ari).21 They are however, he would argue unable to do this because they were lacking in effort (doryoku) given their still corrupt and excitable nature. In subsequent articles, written after the revolution, he considers the strengths and weaknesses of the revolution and the reasons why it has occurred. Inagaki writes that the revolution occurred not because of Sun Yat-sen or Huang Xing of the People’s Revolutionary Party (kakumeito). These people provided the leadership, but the revolution occurred because the Kakumeito effectively exploited the situation created by unrest among the military together with an agitation against the possession of railroads by foreigners. Inagaki argues that from this perspective the roots of revolution are weak and therefore it will fail.22 Though he confidently asserts that unlike other commentators he doesn’t expect the revolution to succeed, he can see that Qing troops are inadequately trained and have ineffective leadership that places the revolutionary forces in a very strong position. Inagaki argues that there are only three possibilities: either the revolutionaries win or the Qing win or there is a deadlock. In the event of a deadlock or if the revolutionaries win then it will be possible for the revolution to spread out to the provinces. Therefore, he says, what happens in China is important both for Japan and the world, and on this understanding he constructs his argument that

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Japan and the powers have the right to intervene, as their interests are intimately involved and it is not just an internal matter for China.23 To justify intervention, Inagaki really places the possibilities of revolution spreading as very high and this notwithstanding his clearly written pessimism about the prospects of the revolution. The underlying note is one of a fear of the consequences of the deepening of revolutionary ferment and a vision of a possible opportunity that prolonged disruption would provide to Japan. Corresponding with the three possibilities, Inagaki argues that different political systems might be created. If the Qing win then it is possible that China will split into smaller principalities loosely unified under a German-type federal system. The revolutionaries would create a political system comparable to that of the USA, that is, a federal republic. In the event of a deadlock he feels that China will split into north and south with the Qing ruling a Manchu empire in the north and a Han state will be established in the south. However, he concludes this train of thought with the eminently laudable suggestion that whatever the system adopted in China, the need of the hour is peace.24 Inagaki’s evaluation of Chinese leadership is pessimistic, and he, like many of his contemporaries, is not hopeful of Yuan Shikai. His gloomy picture of Chinese leaders is founded on his conception of the Chinese character. Inagaki says that since time immemorial, the Chinese character has been to follow blindly (shina kokumin wa yurai raido shin ni tomu) and this may cause the revolution to be aborted without fulfilling its objective of establishing a republic.25 Inagaki reverts to a more pessimistic view, that it would be difficult to revive China even after the revolution because of its internal weaknesses. The revolution’s successes are largely because of the weaknesses of the Qing, Yuan Shikai’s defection, and finally because of the power of the press. The newspapers played up the events, and this led the Qing to overreact and in their panic they had to seek the help of Yuan Shikai. A more careful and studied response might have shown them that it was possible to control and suppress the events. The revolutionaries used the press to project greater strength than they possessed in reality.26 Beset by internal weaknesses, the revolutionaries cannot hope to succeed in building a united China because the people lack spirit and righteousness (seiki and seigi).27 He compares the present situation of China to that of a morphine addict that is, the energy is false and ephemeral; China, in fact, is really dying. He expresses hope in China’s future, but does not, in reality, expect any positive developments.28 Inagaki looks at China’s resources and argues that while it seems a large and prosperous country this is a false image. China’s finances are meagre and its resources, like gold and silver, limited, and there-

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fore it is not in a position to carry out sustained revolutionary policies. Inagaki compares changes in China with the Taisho change (Taisho seihen),29 and while noticing certain similarities, for instance in both countries bureaucratic control of politics met with opposition and the majority of people supported constitutional governments. But he argues that while the Qing state is on the decline the Japanese state is flourishing.30 Inagaki is critical of the cliques in Japan who are using the emperor to intervene in politics for their partisan ends. However, he points out that in China, because the emperor rules directly, the anger of the people is directed against him, while in Japan, he says it is different. The imperial house is above politics and therefore, the people can remain loyal and they desire no change.31 Inagaki, unlike Kita Ikki, bases his understanding on a contemptuous view of Chinese character. He dismisses the revolutionary upsurge as illusory and argues that the Qing are in decline. Kita, on the other hand, while critical of some leaders and equally concerned about the danger of China splintering into a number of smaller units was able to differentiate between a decrepit Qing government and the groups representing a resurgent China. He was also able to analyse weakness and vacillation, based on a historical understanding of the situation, and was able to dismiss arguments like Inagaki’s which saw the Chinese character as fatally flawed. The Japanese were also faced with the obvious comparison of monarchical institutions, and Inagaki uses the example of the Qing emperor to argue against the political use of the emperor precisely because involvement would sully his image and endanger the imperial institution. In considering the differences in function and role of the emperor in the two countries, another writer, Nagashima Yu, who had visited China in 1902, wrote after the 1911 revolution, that in China the people nurtured no love for the emperor. Illustrative of this was that when people heard of the illness of Emperor Kang-shi there was a spate of marriages, for once he died it would be impossible to conduct any marriage during the period of mourning.32 Nagashima’s argument is that a republican government is not possible in China because the ‘people’ are excluded from power and all change takes place at the level of the court. To establish a republic, the people must join together, but the Chinese, he argues, also lack awareness of ‘the true relationship between sovereign and subject’ (taigi meibun). Unlike Japan, where the emperor initiated changes, in China it is the people who have exerted power against the emperor.33 Nagashima’s reaction to the overthrow of a monarchical system is apparent in his contradictory stand. He deprecates the Chinese people as actors in their history but also condemns them when they do act.

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Nakano Seigo (1886–1943), a radical journalist who in 1920 was elected as a member of the Minseito, argues that the Chinese are incapable of establishing a republic and the country will in all probability collapse.34 Similarly, the philosopher Inoue Tetsujiro writes that the Chinese, though they have an idea of revolution, do not have any understanding of a republican government as they have always had a monarchical one. It is, he argues, very difficult to institute a system with no historical basis and the destruction of history, he writes, will create confusion. Somewhat like Kita, though his criticism is grounded in a different understanding, Inoue argues that the Chinese seem to think along the lines of the USA, but as their history is totally different they cannot succeed in this endeavour.35 Inoue, unlike Kita, uses history to constrain movement, whereas Kita’s arguments rest on the assumption that states develop and they must use their history to create forms suitable to their needs. This is what Kita, as discussed earlier, was pointing to when he called for an Eastern republic. On the other hand, there were a few voices, like that of the writer and politician Yano Ryukei (1850–1931 Yano Fumio), who argued that a constitutional government would be beneficial, as people’s rights would be established and the economy would develop. China, he wrote, has great resources and cheap labour, and will therefore rival Japan. These countries will make it difficult for Japan as she will not be able to export what she exports now. His solution, which has a touch of prescience, is that Japanese businessmen should go to China and produce goods there using technologies developed in Japan.36 Takahashi Tokugo, an Osaka businessman and in the leadership of Seiyukai (he served as education minister in the Hara cabinet) argued that it was necessary to preserve China’s territorial integrity, and this could be done by helping to develop railroads, for instance, and also by encouraging trade. However, he goes on to say that if China does not develop herself despite this help, then Japan can, together with the Western powers, take over the country.37 Dealing with the problem of rising anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese, one type of argument that is developed is that, because the Japanese government is close to the Qing, the Chinese people are moving away from the government. Therefore, the people of China are in confrontation with Japan and see her policies as inimical to their interests.38 Other arguments place the onus on the policies of Yuan Shikai and his suppression of the people, and say that if these are changed then Japanese policy, too, will change for the better.39 A Chinese commentator, Mu He, bemoans the fact that after the revolution relations between the Chinese and Japanese people have deteriorated, but unlike other writers he puts the blame on Japan’s Manchuria policy as well as its annexation of Korea.40

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CHUO KORON AND TAIYO

The views in Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin were by and large pessimistic about the Chinese revolution. Central Review (Chuo Koron) carried articles that were comparatively more optimistic. The articles, largely on foreign policy, expressed the fear of Balkanization. The articles in general argued that as the Chinese have no aptitude for government, left to their inclinations the law and order structure will break down completely and foreigners will be massacred, so it will be impossible to conduct any business. In such a situation, Russia and England will divide China. To prevent this, China should either ally with Japan or develop a strong army.41 Naito Konan was to put it more crudely: even while supporting the revolution, he wrote that the Chinese should stick to learning (gakumon) and Japanese chess (shogi) and leave government to foreigners.42 Particularly after the RussoJapanese War such views began to gain currency, denigrating Chinese reality while praising its culture. Naito Konan started his work on the assumption that both China and Japan were similar civilizations but gradually came to the view that while there was no sense of politics, China still had a great culture.43 Ukita Kazutani (1859–1946), liberal Christian, in The Sun (Taiyo), which he edited, argued that China was too large in size and population to be effectively administered. To accomplish this, an efficient transport system and greater local autonomy were needed, and these the Qing could not provide. Ukita saw the country splitting into a central core and a periphery. Ukita did not support the idea of a republican government, for that would lead to foreign intervention. Ukita’s argument is that as China is too large to govern, eighteen provinces should be kept and the rest given independence, or retained as colonies, just as England retains links with Australia and Canada. He, however, also realizes that given the international situation this is not a possible solution. Therefore, to prevent foreign powers from interfering he suggests Belgium as a model to emulate, for it is a country with a monarchical institution, yet all power rests with parliament.44 Ukita distinguishes between the form of government (seitai) and the essence (kokutai). He argues that the essence should be a national republic and the form a constitutional monarchy.45 Ukita is not certain whether a constitutional monarchy is possible, but he writes that a monarchy is needed to control China, and if the kokutai is republican then the seitai will remain democratic. He was clear that Japan should not interfere with the revolution, as were other writers in Taiyo like Asada Koson, who added the caveat that Japan should support Manchuria if anything should happen to split the country.46 The writers in Chuo Koron were more hopeful of the success of the revolution and recognized its anti-Manchu character. Kume

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Kunitake, for instance, saw that it was the turn of the Han to rule but he too, like Ukita, saw the struggle between outlying provinces and the interior as central to Chinese history.47 EASTERN ECONOMIST (TOYO KEIZAI) AND THE THIRD EMPIRE (DAI SAN TEIKOKU)

The magazine Eastern Economist (Toyo Keizai) had supported Japanese policy concerning Japan’s rights in Manchuria and the suppression of the movement to control taxes in China but in 1910 its position changed. Toyo Keizai became a sharp opponent of the unconstitutional aspect of the emperor system and of the policy of expansion of the army and navy. This change in the magazine’s views regarding China was due in large measure to the influence of Katayama Sen who began working for the paper in 1909. Miura Tetsutaro, the editor of Toyo Keizai, reasoned that a policy of expansion would endanger the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the burden of military expansion would threaten industrial development. In his view, economic benefits to be gained from colonies were minimal, while a protective trade policy would lead to the domination of a few capitalists, which would in turn affect wages and prices, and ultimately trade.48 Toyo Keizai, on the question of China argued that the Chinese have wonderful qualities and are bound to become a great nation, but the division of China would be a great blow to Asian and Japanese civilizations.49 They compared the revolution of 1911 to its Meiji counterpart, calling it a people’s revolution and argued that its success would open a large market for Japanese capital and therefore the rights of the people should be respected and Japan should not interfere.50 Thus, the position in Toyo Keizai was based on the argument that a properly-functioning, liberal, democratic system would ensure greater development for both Japan and the region. Japan needed to develop her internal market, and with the parallel development of China the possibilities of development for both countries would increase. Expansionist policies promoted the growth of a war machine that restricted development and promoted the growth of the restrictive emperor system. However liberal the views of Toyo Keizai may sound, they were limited, in that they never critically mentioned for instance, Japan’s expansion in Korea and Taiwan. In comparison to Ukita Kazutani’s Taiyo articles, the positions taken in Toyo Keizai were however, far more sympathetic. They were also, it should be noted, strong advocates of universal suffrage within Japan.51 The magazine, Third Empire (Dai san teikoku), in a number of articles, dealt with the question of why the Japanese were hated by the Chinese and argued that enmity arose because the Japanese thought of the Chinese as brothers and when feelings of friend-

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ship die, hatred arises.52 China must reform and for that it needs Japan’s help.53 The name Dai san teikoku was taken from an Ibsen play to indicate the fusion of the materialist grounding of Hellenism and the spiritual vision of the Hebrew civilization. The magazine, published from October 1913 to 1919 went through a total of one hundred issues after which it changed its name to Cultural Movement (Bunka undo). In January 1915 its circulation was 6,000 copies and its image, as Sakae Toshihiko wrote in 1915, was that of a symbol of democracy fighting imperialism and militarism. Its readership was primarily among the intelligentsia in the villages: graduates of primary and upper schools, independent cultivators, i.e. precisely those who supported the emperor system This illustrates that these new political ideas had penetrated down to the village level.54 This is the recurrent leitmotif of the articles. For instance, Nagai Ryutaro (1881–1944), educationist and politician, (the father of Nagai Michio, scholar, educationist, and sometime minister of education) went to China and on his return wrote that while people talk of China as a brother (dobun doshu), they are, in fact, completely different. China is a very different country and quite unlike Japan. In China a great hero becomes a ruler but then suppresses the people. The people have borne this historical burden and have become inured to oppression. Consequently, they are now only concerned with themselves and with money and are totally untrustworthy liars. It is only if fundamental reform is carried out that there will be a change in the existing situation.55 Many of the articles dealing with the question of anti-Japanese feelings in China were more clearly critical of Japanese policies. Thus, Ukita Kazutani wrote that as Japan was responsible for creating ill feelings in China, she must change and rather than acting like a strong country must act like a brother. Japan, he argued, must gain the confidence of China, aid it economically and help it to fight the Western powers.56 An anonymous article argued that anti-Japanese policies arose from a failure of continental policies and from the contemptuous attitude of the Japanese towards the Chinese.57 It was with such a view that Aijima Kanjiro argued that for Japan to create a common bond it must be done at the level of the people. Only a people’s diplomacy would build the basis of understanding, and he went on to say that for Japan to show sincerity (makoto), a truly representative cabinet was necessary.58 THE SOCIALIST PRESS

In the socialist press, the Commoners Newspaper (Heimin shinbun), Light (Hikari), Labour World (Rodo sekai), there is a thunderous silence

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regarding the 1911 revolution.59 The silence is curious, to say the least, for an event hailed by most of the contemporary press as a revolution; and the lack of socialist comment needs careful consideration. This silence can only be partially explained by saying that the trial of Kotoku Shusui and others (the Great Treason Trial) had left the progressive groups in shock and disarray.60 Kotoku Shusui, till his execution, was among the leading socialists of Japan and, therefore, his writing on China provides a representative view of what socialists were thinking. Kotoku had written in 1901 (a year before J. Hobson wrote Imperialism), a critique of imperialism entitled Imperialism: The Monster of the Twentieth Century (Nijusseki no kaibutsu teikokushugi).61 His early concern was with the relationship between aggressive nationalism and expansionism, and how this variety of nationalism affected domestic reform. He rejected the ideological positions of late-Meiji nationalism, because he argued that it was instrumental in enslaving and suppressing the individual rather than freeing him. He clearly saw the carrot of empire alternated with the stick of national emergency.62 Kotoku, in much the same manner as Hobson and Lenin later, argues that imperialism is unproductive. Hobson reflecting on the wasted expenditure in the Boer War and Lenin reflecting on the First World War had both noted the diversion of capital into unproductive uses. Similarly, Kotoku argued that this diversion was accompanied by a neglect of social reform, as the people’s minds were filled with the hollow litanies of foreign wars. In other words, imperialism was used by the ruling class to divert a people’s attention away from attempting reforms at home. The imperialist goals were inimical to civilization and reduced a nation to barbarism. Given this, he rejected nationalism and went on to proclaim that he was a socialist. He wrote the tract ‘I am a Socialist’ the same year. Kotoku’s identification of the link between imperialism and an aggressive nationalism is illustrated in his clear opposition to the Russo-Japanese War. He was critical of many supporters who saw Japan’s victory as the assertion of an Asian nation. He argued that it was the capitalist class and politicians who said it would be beneficial to take Korea, Manchuria and Siberia. The working class, which had nothing, would get nothing.63 Given these views, Kotoku expressed an interest and a hope in China and the Chinese. He was associated with such revolutionaries as Zhang Binglin and Zhang Ji, and was instrumental in establishing the East Asia New Harmony Society (Toa washin kai). This was a society of Asian revolutionaries and its first meeting was held in India House, Aoyama, Tokyo.64 Kotoku, both here and in various other articles, stressed the fact that the Chinese, far from being a decrepit and dying race, were awakening to modern civilization and to truly develop they must

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establish socialism. Not only the Chinese but all Asians, Indians, Filipinos, Annamese and Koreans, must realize that it is not just independence that has to be gained but rather, they must establish socialism, for if they place their trust in the present social system then their hopes will be frustrated.65 It was from this position that Kotoku’s difference with the Asian revolutionaries arose, for they were, above all, concerned with national independence. Kotoku had rejected the idea of country. It was a similar understanding that made it difficult for Osugi Sakae to understand the movement among many Asian revolutionaries to buy only locally-produced goods. He said ‘it’s a pity their thinking hasn’t got very far yet’. Osugi meant that as socialists, which capitalist produced the goods should make no difference.66 This gulf between revolutionaries and Japanese socialists led to the break-up of Toa washin kai, with the Korean members refusing to participate as long as Japanese were involved in the society.67 Here we confront the failure of Japanese socialists to deal adequately with anti-colonial independence struggles, and therefore their lack of interest in the 1911 revolution stems from a failure to deal with such events within the framework of their theory. This is the type of argument Ishimoda Sho advanced in 1953, but he was attempting to show that Kotoku, because of the weakness of his political ideas, was led to anarchism just prior to an untimely end. Kotoku, in rejecting expansionism, also rejected the necessity of independence.68 However, Ishimoda’s argument provides an insufficient explanation because, if we consider that Kotoku, in Imperialism, Chapter II, clearly distinguishes between true patriotism (aikokushin) and mere anti-foreignism then it is abundantly clear that he did consider the question of national independence. It would be more appropriate to see Kotoku’s failure in the historical experience of Meiji nationalism. It was his clear analysis of the policies of the Meiji state that enabled Kotoku to write on imperialism, which became a contribution to socialist theory, whereas most of the other socialist literature produced in Japan at the time at best comprised translations or summaries. Kotoku was addressing different questions and his overriding concern was the distortions that a system founded on subhuman qualities produces. His failure lies in his inability, and this is true also of his contemporaries, to perceive the necessity of building a popular organizational base among the workers and other social classes to realize these goals. The earlier split between Kotoku Shusui and Katayama Sen in 1903 is illustrative of this, for Katayama argued that it would only be possible to build a socialist movement if the workers were organized while a movement confined to the intelligentsia would fade away.69 The failure to confront concrete problems of

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organization affected the theoretical understanding of the world around them. The socialists were able to offer critical commentaries on social inequalities and the capitalist system, but were yet unable to deal with questions of popular consciousness or even give them sufficient weight in their analysis. They thought that with the realisation of socialism, capitalist rivalries would be eliminated and it would then be possible, on the basis of the common bonds of humanity, to override inter-state differences. The nationalists were motivated, not by a theoretical grievance against the system of relations prevalent within the country, but against Western domination and all that this implied for self and country. Miyazaki Toten, as we have seen earlier, perhaps the quintessential representative of the men of high purpose (shishi) or continental adventurers (shina ronin), wrote in his Autobiography in 1903, ‘I believe the yellow race will be oppressed by the white race for years to come. The upshot of this the way destiny plays itself out, will depend entirely upon the rise or fall of China.’70 Miyazaki, like others, sacrificed home and family to work for China, but in effect what help he offered was as an intermediary, a go-between for the Chinese and Japanese, arranging for guns and money. Miyazaki retained his idealism and still does the respect of the Chinese, but other such men of high purpose became mere conduits, agents for the aspirations of the Japanese government and the expansionists. CONFRONTING THE WEST: OKAKURA AND TAGORE

Non-Western societies faced the problem of developing, changing and confronting the modern world within the framework of Western expansion and domination. Directly-colonized countries, or semi-colonial countries such as China, found deep fissures sundering their societies, but this process is also visible and complements the movement of societal change even in non-colonial societies such as that of Japan. One area where the complicating effect is very apparent is in the strategies of confronting the modern. The so-called nationalists, a grab bag title that held a wide variety of people, were, in their concern to protect the independence and integrity of Japan, driven to ‘tradition’ to oppose the West. They perceived the cultural depredation of their society as the fundamental axiom around which they built their agenda, but their inability to link understanding to the nature of the political organization of society led them to social Darwinism, and more specifically the notion propagated by Herbert Spencer of the idea of struggle and expansionism. They found strength in growth but ironically their defence against the ‘West’ blinded them to questions of content.

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Thus, they accepted that in the struggle for survival it was necessary to become like the West or become imperialist. They did not see the emancipatory possibilities of popular participation and decentralization that would build a far firmer base to confront outside aggression or cultural inundation that was argued for among the early-Meiji intellectuals such as Nakae Chomin (1847–1901) or Ueki Emori (1857–92).71 Their emancipatory agenda was distorted in the false dichotomy of preserving cultural and political integrity against a powerful West. Where do we look then for the disintegration of these ideals and answer the question of what Asia meant to Japan. Certainly, Asia for Japan was only China, and even when Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913), friend of Rabindranath Tagore, wrote that Asia is one, and talked of a shared ‘love for the ultimate and universal’ as a uniting bond, he still went on to say that these ideas were best preserved in Japan because she remained independent and so was eminently qualified to lead Asia.72 Okakura’s work is directed against Western cultural hegemony which, as he writes so vividly, has taken over the world: ‘Steam and electricity in encircling the globe impose the London tailor and the Paris milliner on every continent – symbolic of the single garment which their genius of combination weaves for all their race.’73 He rightly saw that it was mental isolation that prevented Asian countries from comprehending their common plight, ‘It is wonderful how little we know of each other.’74 Okakura has no illusions that progress is easily achieved. He writes that ‘civilization in its progress often climbs over the bodies of the slain’.75 For him, as for many other nationalists, ‘Japan stood alone against the world,’ and any assertion of Asian identity would have to be under Japan’s guidance because she alone had preserved the best of Asia.76 Unlike the socialists, who were critical of nationalist, military expansion and loyalty to the emperor, Okakura praised these very ideas and saw in them not the distorted present of Japan but the longed for future of Asia. Okakura, like other nationalists, was using the ideas of expansionism and nationalism against the fact of Western domination rather than offering a critique of a social system and proposing to replace it with an alternative vision.77 This very quality was appreciated by Rabindranath Tagore, who went to Japan in 1916. He admired the facility with which the Japanese had acquired ‘the intricate instruments which belong to European civilization’, and he imputed this to the mobility of their minds, which enabled them to ‘merge their own movement with the strong current of modernity so easily’.78 He was, however, also critical of Japanese civilization as he perceived it to be limited, ‘The palace of Japanese civilization is one storeyed, there is a condition on

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its ability and a limit to its strength.’79 Tagore saw the basis of Indian and European civilization to be founded on spiritual principles, ‘an attitude of devotion that admits a religious possibility in man and proceeds to realize it, is not inherent in any social structure: it is an attitude that transcends worldly necessities and national self interests and establishes its own ideals’.80 It would not be too long a road to travel to compare these ideas with the establishment of the ideals that Kotoku Shusui was pursuing beyond the narrow confines of nationalism. Tagore’s reception in Japan and the failure of his message are frankly illustrative of the diametrically-opposed viewpoints of the mainstream opinion in the two countries during this period.81 Another sympathetic observer, Bertrand Russell, has a very similar complaint against the Japanese. He writes: ‘One single purpose has animated leaders and followers alone, the strengthening and extension of the Empire.’82 The sympathy that the two, Tagore and Russell, showed for the struggle of the Chinese, though they did not write on the revolution of 1911, raises the question why these transient visitors could perceive these problems while the Japanese, by and large, could not. A modern scholar, Takeuchi Yoshimi, whose work has been concerned with this failure of the Japanese intelligentsia which led to the rapacious plunder of China, argued that Japan and China form a cultural tradition, and to consider Asia as separate and autonomous from Japan (shutaiteki) would be a loss for Japan. He tried to argue that the Japanese road to modernization is not the only way; there is a Chinese way and it was Japan’s failure to understand this that has caused so much suffering in their relationship.83 The essence of this failure lies in the inability of Japanese nationalists to understand the dual nature of nationalism. The nationalists, concerned overwhelmingly with Western hegemony, particularly cultural, and the political independence of Japan, ignored the aspiration of the Chinese even while paying obeisance to it. Their guiding light was a larger concern, or at times their own, that is, Japan’s interests. The socialists, particularly Kotoku Shusui, could appreciate the pathological aspects of nationalism but could not give sufficient weight to the bonds that bind nations for they sought a solution in systemic changes without considering that in the East Asian region Japan was an independent power whereas China and Korea were struggling for independence and together with that working for the establishment of a just political order.84 THE XINHAI REVOLUTION: INDIAN REACTIONS

The question of whether Asia existed as an entity is a large question, but considering the Japanese reactions to the 1911 revolution in

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China some possible lines of enquiry are suggested. However, to highlight Japanese perceptions let us consider very briefly Indian reactions to the 1911 revolution.85 It is surprising how little was said by Indian leaders about the establishment of the first republic in Asia. The English language press carried Reuters dispatches and quotations from the dispatches of The Times (London) correspondent but there is scarcely any editorial of note. The vernacular press has more to say and is quick to recognize the similarities with the Indian situation. A cartoon in the paper the Zemindar (Lahore) shows a crippled Persian asking a crippled Chinese about how to care for his affliction. The Chinese replies: ‘Dear Brother, I am also a cripple like you but thank God the doctor under whose treatment I have been placed is my countryman, and not a foreigner who secures fees and at the same time crushes those bones that are left. If you wish to recover, get the help of a Persian Physician.’ Persian: ‘I see none but Russian doctors. God alone can help me.’86 While other papers do mention the importance of the Chinese revolution, there is no extensive debate or discussion, and none that I could find by any leader of note. An eyewitness to the events in China, Dr R.L. Sircar, writes in a Calcutta journal Modern Review: ‘The Republican flag was everywhere in existence and a new spirit had come upon the people which was manifest even in their gait and conversation. Everyone seemed to be breathing the freer atmosphere of liberty.’87 Unfortunately, however this spirit somehow did not manage to cross the Himalayas. Asia then was more a rhetorical device, a metaphor against the West, in Japanese thinking. Their Asia extended up to China only. For India, it would seem that Asia had yet to come into existence. Perhaps India was metaphorically still self-sufficient for only from the mid-1920s did the Indian National Congress begin to formulate a foreign policy. Initial interest in foreign affairs during 1911 was largely Muslim interest in the fate of the Turkish Empire. The pages of another paper, the Comrade, for instance, contain nothing else. In conclusion, I would like to suggest that the failure of the nationalists and socialists to confront these questions was not merely a problem of theory or the lack of it, but rather influenced by the period of imperialism when preserving national independence or ways of living were of vital importance. Second, that Asia had yet to come into existence, for judging from the reactions to the 1911 revolution, all Asia was not moved. It is significant that it was not a movement for political liberation that stirred Asia but a military victory, Japan’s over Russia, in 1905. The question of the preservation of China was central to and linked with the question of Japan’s role in East Asia. Some, like Okuma Shigenobu, advocates of a syncretism of East and West with Japan as mediator, visualized Japan as a teacher

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to China. Japan had successfully utilized the techniques of Western civilization and Okuma argued that, as the country that could best represent Asian culture, it could aid China. Preserving China, therefore, did not lead to any conflict over the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for him, as it did for Kita Ikki. Kita’s argument was quite different, for he saw England and Russia as enemies of China and, therefore, Japan’s alliance, or cordiality with either power posed a potential threat to China. Even more crucial was the fact that Kita’s analysis did not begin from a view of Chinese culture as flawed or degraded. For instance, Uchida Ryohei saw China as a deformed state (henkei koku), where political and normal society are divided. Uchida, like many of the shina ronin was a critic of Western imperialism but was blind to Chinese reality and Kita’s difference lies precisely in providing a historical explanation. He is not guilty of positing ideal types.88 Naito Konan, mentioned briefly in an earlier chapter, is the most scholarly representative of views such as Uchida Ryohei’s for he disassociates politics and culture. For Naito Konan, the Chinese are cultural animals incapable of politics. His logic could provide the basis for effusive praise of the glories of Chinese culture while, because of the collapse of political society, it could also justify the necessity of Japanese intervention.89 Yoshino Sakuzo, who was well informed and sympathetic towards the republican revolution, argued that only a raising of the consciousness of the people could overthrow the ‘formalism’ (keishiki shugi) of the old system. He could, however, also advance the argument that British intervention might be good if it eliminated the power of the warlords (he is writing in 1926) as it could be beneficial to the Chinese people.90 There was, then, a variety of opinion that had taken hold which was dismissive of the political aptitude of the Chinese, arguing that they were a culturally great nation but incapable of governing. The Japanese, as their success at home amply demonstrated, could aid the Chinese. Closely allied with this was the great interest in Chinese culture accompanied by an equally great indifference towards Chinese politics. Akutagawa Ryunosuke, the famous novelist, went to China as the correspondent of a newspaper in March 1922 and wrote of his experiences in Diary of Travels in China. The diary is eloquent on Chinese poetry, but after listening to Zhang Binglin discuss the political situation in China, all Akutagawa can write is, ‘I was just cold’ (Watakushi was tada samukatta).91

PART III

Ideology for an Empire

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he Reorganization plan, with its comprehensive and detailed agenda for the transformation of Japan flows out of Kita Ikki’s analysis of the nature of modern Japan in Kokutairon and of revolutionary China in Shina gaishi. The terse and legal style of the tract and careful concern for detail gives way in the end to an apocalyptic vision of a coming conflict, a conflagration that he calls a second world war. Japan, he argues must be in a position to utilise the opportunities that this situation presents by assuming the role of leader and establishing an eastern republic. The movement between these two modes, from legal analysis and evaluation of diplomatic positions to a greater concern with the creation of a new citizen, is an inextricable part of the shape that intellectual and social explorations were taking in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Kita saw the end of the Great War as a crucial departure, as important as the Napoleonic wars that divided the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Meiji Japan, he argued, under the leadership of a heroic emperor, was in a position to spread the Meiji revolution throughout the east just as Napoleon had created a French empire based on the principles of revolutionary France. This vision of a Japanese empire differed from, but also fed into shaping, the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere that emerged. How was this transition from a nation-state to an empire to be made? What were the principles that would define this empire and differentiate it from that of Western colonies? Kita Ikki is not a modernizer but an integral part of the movement of modernity confronted with the task of writing his history in a world where imperialism shapes the conceptual language and institutional forms that are available to him. He addresses what he saw as the crucial task of overturning the authority of the European theories of revolution and advancing a theory founded on indigenous ideas. On the basis of these, Japan could aid the independence of China and India and the rest of Asia. Reflecting on his writings he recalls that the Kaizo hoan could have more appropriately

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been entitled the General Principles for the Establishment of the Great Empire (Dai teikoku kensetsu an taiko).1 Kita Ikki recalls in his interrogation that he wrote the Kaizo hoan at a time when Japan was in turmoil, its social fabric pulled apart by the rice riots and newspaper strikes;the government dominated by corrupt and venal politicians driven by sectional interests rather than the national good. In an intense forty-day period he dashed off the proposal. Its principal objective was to carry out another restorationrevolution under the emperor rather than under any group of revolutionaries. It is a charter for an industrial society seeking to end social and economic divisions and create new bonds of community. That its programme did not appeal to the establishment is clear from Kita’s arrest and execution for his inspiring the leaders of the February 1936 coup. ARTICULATING THE PEOPLE’S WILL

The first heavily-censored opening chapter deals with the role and function of a people’s emperor, the abolition of the peerage, establishment of a Reorganization Diet and the restoration of the freedom of the people. The emperor above all sectional interests could represent the people’s will. This appeal to the people for validation is similar to the call given by Wu Tingfan (1844–1922), a Chinese intellectual, soon after the 1911 revolution that the new republican government should be based on jen-min-i-chih the people’s will. This call, as Joseph Levenson notes, far from deriving from classical ideals denied them.2 The emperor, precisely because he was an unmediated presence, could represent not just the nation but multiple nations within the empire. The emperor, for Kita, here is not the emperor of Ito Hirobumi, for Kita is clearly critical of the baggage of myths and ceremonies that have been cobbled together by ransacking the Japanese past as well as the monarchies of Europe. Kita, as he had earlier in the Kokutairon, defines four major stages in the nature of the imperial institution: from the Fujiwara period to the Taira when there was an absolutist monarchy, the second from the Genji up to the Tokugawa, a period of aristocratic dominance during which the emperor’s position was comparable to the Pope, the focus of traditional religious beliefs, and then the third stage during the Tokugawa period. It is significant that Kita argues that the process of a growing sense of individuality among the samurai and people began during the Tokugawa period and which allowed them to free themselves ‘from being the private possessions of the shogun and daimyo.’3 This sense of individuality laid the basis for the democratic revolution of the Meiji. Kita, as noted earlier always characterizes the events of 1868 as a revolutionary restoration (ishin-kakumei) because

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while they restored an emperor to power the events brought in a new political order and, therefore, the nature of imperial authority was fundamentally different from the earlier periods. The emperor now is, as Kita states quite clearly, ‘the leader of the national movement and representative of the democratic state, he represents the nation’.4 Kita argues for a monarchy that would divest itself of its properties and be granted an annual stipend. The peerage would be abolished and universal male suffrage and the right of representation instituted. The abolition of the peerage points to the modern use of the emperor as symbol of a new political order rather than a restored classical institution. The role of the emperor is linked to Kita’s critique of electoral democracy and the notion of its superiority. Kita Ikki’s critique of the nature and form of democracy is based on the historical differences between Japan and Europe and the United States. In Western nations the notion of a social contract has a long historical genealogy missing in Japan and therefore, to define the relationship between emperor and people in Japan as a contractual one would, he argues, be unhistorical and untenable. Moreover, the Meiji ishin-kakumei, according to Kita was a more radical change in the dissolution of aristocratic power than what occurred in many countries and comparable only to the French Revolution in its success in dispossessing the aristocracy of its land holdings. Japan, he says, has ‘advanced much further as a democratic country’ than many other Western nations.5 It is in this context that he is critical of the imperial court for not only restoring medieval customs but for adding ‘survivals of practices from European courts’. This has corrupted the spirit of the founder of the nation, that is the Meiji emperor, a spirit that visualised the emperor as ‘the supreme commander above an equal citizenry’.6 The question of representation is an important political issue and whether a democracy can be defined exclusively on the practice of electoral politics is brought into question. Kita bases the right to participate in elections not on the basis of a tax-paying capacity but as the right of citizens and equates it to their duty to protect the nation. Just as military service is the duty of citizens so also they have the right to participate in elections. Moreover, he calls for abolishing all laws that infringe or restrict the freedom of citizens such as the peace preservation and police laws.7 In Kita’s view the nation is now composed of an equal citizenry, under the command of the emperor, but the two together represent the nation. The emperor, he writes, ‘is the commander under martial law and the people the principle force’ and this is because ‘the emperor and people together represent the nation’.8 The opposition to elections as the sole democratic means arises also because of the corruption and venality of the elected and their

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failure to represent the true interests of the people. He sees no intrinsic merit in an equal right to decide, seeing this as empty formalism and, in effect, a way of justifying the continuance of the existing order. Change, he notes can come about through the agency of imaginative leaders, such as Napoleon or Lenin, who carry out the popular will and can overturn this order and, precisely because they have this ability, they cannot be answerable to the old laws. In a period when change is required the assemblies would be dominated by conservative elements resistant to change and therefore these bodies even if the members are elected do not represent the forces that are calling for change. He uses this to justify an appointment system and the need for an elite group that has the capacity to visualize and bring about change. Kita argues that such conservative assemblies should be dissolved and quotes the examples of Napoleon and Lenin to write that a coup d’état is not the act of conservative forces but ‘is the direct exercise of national power that is the social will’.9 He notes that democracy or an electoral system is not necessarily better than a dictatorship, and the historical processes through which the spirit of the people is shaped condition national forms. Therefore, importing ideas such as democracy, without examining local histories and conditions is a deeply flawed enterprise just as the arguments based on a sacred kokutai are flawed because they ignore the historical changes that have taken place. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND NATIONALIZATION

The next three chapters are based on two principles, one the acceptance of the idea of private property and two the nationalization and regulation of all wealth in the interests of the state, that is, the people. The limits on property are at such a high level that they target only the big industrialists, and they are fixed with the family as the unit and not the individual. Thus a family is allowed to own up to a limit of three million yen.10 Wealth is recognized as socially generated even when there is private entrepreneurial effort involved, and this gives the state the right to regulate and limit. Similarly, a ceiling is fixed for private enterprises, and in their case, as for the individual, detailed systems and regulations are enunciated for appropriation and management of amounts in excess of these limits. The principle that Kita enunciates is one based on the changing nature of property. Kita argues that while medieval property was based on the right of the strong, the principle of ownership, after the Meiji revolution is based on labour, ‘thus the strong lost their power and right to ownership’.11 On the basis of this principle, Kita argues for the right of fixing limits and redistributing property as this is done in

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the interests of the nation and the freedom of all. That is the existence of disparities in ownership leads to social divisions and undermines the freedom of groups placing them in an unequal situation. The nation, as it is composed of an equal citizenry, must ensure that equality is maintained. There are details of how excess land will be appropriated through the Army Reservists Associations. Similarly, there is a limit placed on private enterprises (10 million yen), and the nationalization of enterprises exceeding this limit. Kita recognizes the importance of private enterprise and the need for small capital to function effectively. There are again details about how compensation should be given (through government bonds much as the Meiji government had compensated the daimyo and samurai). Kita sees the need to curb the private interests of the capitalists as these are in conflict with the national interest. The rational organization of capital, and its regulation will lead, Kita argues, to a more rational organization of production that will allow private initiative and increase the productive powers of the state.12 He lists an administrative system that is based on the productive organizations and consuming ministries where the large revenues generated by the productive ministries can finance the work of the consuming ministries, such as providing protection for the people’s livelihood. Under the Reorganization Kita envisions the end of the class nature of the state and therefore, he does not see the need to allow industrial action by workers rather he expressly forbids such actions once the Reorganization has been implemented. The ministry of labour is empowered to settle labour disputes. Wages, he notes will be based on the principle of a free contract, as he recognizes differences in ability, but he distinguishes between a free contract within capitalism and under the Reorganization. Under capitalism, he argues, the negotiating power of workers is limited and therefore, their freedom restricted.13 Kita includes regulations for an eight-hour working day and a profit-sharing system. In private enterprises workers would receive half the net profit as well as participate in management but in government enterprises they would get payments in lieu of this right. There is also a system of stockholding for workers and similar proposals are made for tenant farmers. Finally there is a section on prohibiting child labour.14 Writing in a period when the uneven benefits of economic development were all too visible, Kita seeks to define a system that will bring social stability and ensure financial security. This he finds not in an increased social-welfare function of the state but in the establishment of boundaries for the rich and powerful. Kita is not against property but seeks to ensure property for all. Recognizing the right of free contract and an economy based on free trade he details rules for

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ensuring proper working conditions, hours of work as well as a share in the profits, worker participation in management and so on. MOTHERS AND SOLDIERS

In the early-twentieth century along with economic development and rapid urbanisation, there was a growing recognition of social inequalities. Organizations among workers and tenant farmers, among the socially excluded groups such as the burakumin, as well as women’s groups, sought to end discriminatory policies. Women had formed an important element of the labour force right from the inception of industrialization in the early-Meiji period and with access to education, they began to play an important role in demanding social and political equality. The tensions these demands created were reflected in the debates about the nature of the family, about free love, controversies over the legalization of prostitution, and the demand for universal suffrage, and other similar issues. The shaping of women’s lives to fit into the ‘good wife, wise mother’ (ryosai kenbo) mould was linked to the nature of Meiji nationalism. The section on the protection of the fundamental rights of women seeks to address problems that women face in society. Kita’s premise is not extending equal status but one based on the inherent differences between men and women and the need to create a system where women are allowed to function within their allotted sphere. In this respect, Kita’s arguments essentially stem from the Meijiestablishment framework, for while he recognizes that at present women have to work he argues that their mission is to become mothers. He sees them as suited for certain types of work (music, literature, art, education and scholarship) that will allow them to support their husbands and children.15 Therefore, the state should guarantee their livelihood as mothers and wives. It is only then, he argues, that an undesirable (imubeki) women’s movement can be prevented.16 By this he means a women’s movement based on Western influence which would extend to them equal political and legal rights. His prescription is that the role and function of women are conditioned by a historical situation. In Europe, medieval knights worshipped women while in medieval Japan women were required to worship men. This past has affected the way women have developed and a proper women’s movement can only emerge if women learn to become good wives and mothers of the nation (ryosai kenbo). Kita accepts the idea of a one husband, one wife family system, but while he is against women participating in political activity he sees a role for them outside the family and so they have the right to work.17 This categorization of women and their work isinextric bly linked to the way Kita views the family and the care

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of children, seeing this as an important element of the people’s lives. A family for Kita is complete when there are two parents, but while the father can act as a guardian to a child this is not possible for a mother in the absence of a father. A child without a father will be treated, in Kita’s plan, as an orphan because ‘of the principle that the mother cannot function as the father’ and, therefore, the child like all orphans should be protected by the state.18 Women will be given protection within the family – for instance, legal redress if a husband maintains a concubine or commits adultery. The idea of a nuclear family was, at the turn of the century, still being debated as is shown by the controversies surrounding the anti-prostitution law. Kita is critical of the laws against prostitution not because he supports prostitution but because engaging in it is a crime for the woman but not for the man who buys her. EDUCATION FOR THE NEW CITIZEN

A considerable amount of space is devoted to concepts of education, nature, quality, function and language of education for both men and women. Thought is also given to the nature of physical education, as he feels this is an integral part of building the new citizen. This new educational system has to be grounded in the new principles that underlie the Reorganization plan. Language, Kita writes, becomes thought, and thought becomes domination, and so he addresses the problem of education and the language of instruction.19 Education, an inextricable part of the people’s right, will be based on the essence of Japanese culture and some types of schools will be abolished to bring about uniformity in the schools system. The curriculum will be the same for boys and girls, and physical education will be an integral part of the system till the age of sixteen. Sports in school will be built around Japanese games, rather than something imported, or what he refers to as literally translated sports. He also writes of providing midday meals and abolishing Western-school uniforms. In the treatment of the language of instruction there are two elements in Kita’s arguments about language. One is based on the notion that the very structure of Japanese is irrational, and that the burden of memorizing a large number of Chinese characters or kanji is a hindrance to mental development. He writes: ‘The use of the Roman alphabet has come about because of the inferiority of the Japanese language,20 which is the source of suffering.’ Later he again describes Japanese as an ‘inconvenient language’.21 He therefore recommends that the structure of the language be revolutionised. However, alive to the needs of empire, he also argues that Japan needs a language that can be used by the different nationalities that now, and in the

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future will, live in the Japanese Empire. Here he suggests the abolition of English and the introduction of Esperanto as the influence of English on Japanese thought, he notes is comparable to that of opium on China. English has brought what he calls the shallow ideas of democracy and ‘that hollow church building’ Christianity.22 As Japanese is irrational, he notes that it will not be possible to force it on Siberians or Australians, even though the Koreans and Chinese have been forced to learn it, as their languages are better developed, and, therefore, Esperanto, which is easy to learn, will find easier acceptablity. Kita also suggests the only way of mitigating the ‘poisonous influence of English’ is through German.23 The quest for an international language is to provide a language of communication within a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual empire that Kita envisions, as much as it is to create a new spirit for the ‘British are building a class of frivolous and irresponsible intellectuals, who will . . . introduce English words in shops, books, conversations and so there is no pride and self-independence left among the people’. It is only by banning English and using it only for specialized purposes that the ‘lively revival of the fundamental principles of the spirit of the people’ is possible.24 Along with these, the question of physical education is another important component of the people’s right to a livelihood. Kita is critical of borrowing gymnastics from abroad as well as being against exercises that impose a formal, physical order such as military gymnastics. Physical education should be imparted equally to girls and boys to create the fundamentals of health.25 The section on the right to a livelihood also discusses the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizen, the need to reward meritorious persons, and concludes with a defence of the right to private property. Kita argues that it is precisely the rapid progress of socialist revolutionary theory, a theory based on demands for real reforms that calls for a defence of this right.26 He also advocates an end to inheritance by the eldest as a corrupt medieval practice, and for equal distribution of inherited property to male and female heirs.27 BONDS OF EMPIRE

In the chapter on Japanese overseas possessions and how the Reorganization plan will be implemented in these areas Kita has to first deal with the position of Korea. Korea, he argues, is not a colony or a subjugated nation but will become an integral part of Japan through a common administrative system. The policy towards Korea, for Kita, is the crucial benchmark distinguishing Japan’s relations with its overseas territories and the colonialism of Britain and the other Western powers. It is Kita’s vision of a supra-national entity

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that will unite the area around Japan, stretching from Manchuria and Korea in the northeast down to Southeast Asia and Australia, under the leadership of Japan, but this entity, he argues, will not be like the colonial possessions of the Western powers. This will unite the people in an equal relationship and ensure the development, economically as well as culturally, of this region. He compares this empire with the Great Roman Empire suggesting a federative administrative element and a community of interests.28 It is for this reason that his vision is neither grounded in cultural nor racial ties though he does take occasional recourse to them to advance or support his contentions. The racial and cultural links serve as a starting point for building this community. The Japanese, particularly the emperor and the nobility, he argues, as many were doing then, trace their ancestry in large measure from the Koreans so that the nobility and those involved in the cultural exchange are particularly closely linked together and, therefore, the emperor too has, by implication Korean blood. The Japanese for Kita are a mixture of Koreans, Chinese and South Seas people, including aboriginal populations.29 He also notes that Korea’s geographical position makes it a vital area for the security of Japan. Thus he defines Korea, based on these different reasons, as an integral part of Japan. He calls Korea Seikaido, a western maritime province, similar to Hokkaido. To cement this relationship he suggests a marriage alliance between the two imperial houses. The extension of legal and administrative rights to these areas also raises the question of self-determination. Kita argues that people are at different levels of consciousness and that the Koreans are at a stage where they still need to be educated and made aware before they reach a stage when they can exercise their right to selfdetermination. He writes: ‘Koreans with a real nationalist awareness have no other way but to wait and develop through education as for over a hundred years of history the half dead country has corrupted and exhausted the life and ideas of the people.’30 This he feels will take about twenty-five years and so till then the Koreans should be given local self-government so that they can be trained to participate in politics.31 Kita noting the importance of not following the rapacious policies or instituting the harmful institutions of the West, says that all other rights and measures are extended to these possessions. The world, in Kita’s view, is unequally divided into national classes of rich and poor, landlords and small farmers and workers. Japan must therefore create a great empire that will provide the requisite territory, population and resources to confront the rich nations, the great landlords of the globe. Japan will be able to build this empire if

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it can unite and galvanize its people on the basis of the principles of the Reorganization plan but the empire that Japan builds must be of small farmers and workers.32 A great empire is vital for Japan and equally so to enforce the principles of Reorganization as the basis of this empire. Problems, such as in Korea, where people are discontented, giving rise to rebellions or rebels, arise, Kita argues, because of the rapacious behaviour of Japanese capitalists. This view is based on Kita’s understanding that while the state has become modern in the political sphere, in the economic and social spheres earlier forms of domination continue creating inequalities and divisions that are harmful for the nation. Therefore an equal basis should be created to bring diverse groups together under the emperor, and this requires that all should be granted citizenship. The longest section is the last chapter that deals with the rights of the nation. Just as the role of women is to become mothers, so the role of citizens is to protect the nation through military service: the one by producing future protectors and the other through their lives. The right of conscription becomes the central focus of the power of the nation because, Kita argues, the Japanese empire is not founded on a contractual basis but is an indivisible family. Conscription, he writes is integral to the nation’s powers and will always be in force.33 The basis for conscription is different from that of the United States or Britain because the Japanese political system is not based on contract. The Japanese state is ‘an organic, indivisible great family . . .’.34 Here, in his conception of the family, while he is critical of basing the authority of the emperor on mythical relationships, his underlying arguments rest on the very same basis as that of some of the very people he has criticized. Each group generates ideas and beliefs that are integral to the spirit of the people, and these cannot be taken from their natural environment and grafted on to another people’s culture. Cultures and histories are comparable and even more important it is possible to judge and evaluate beliefs and practices. There are ideas and beliefs, Kita argues, that are successful and those that are not, and it is necessary to ‘stand like God and judge them worthless . . .’.35 He advances arguments showing the inconsistencies in Islam or the Quakers and their religious ideals, and these arguments are marshalled to counter any opposition to conscription and anti-war ideas. The position that Kita enunciates is that it is necessary to judge and evaluate on the basis of the principles at work rather then accept the existing hierarchies of power that have made certain ideas dominant. It is important for him to understand the process of history and the way underlying principles are changed and transformed. The nation, Kita argues, not only has the right to protect itself but can initiate a war to protect nations and races that have been

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suppressed or subjugated. For example, he notes, Japan can fight for the independence of India or the protection of China.36 The right to initiate war from a principled and just position is stressed and this, according to Kita means changing the prevailing unjust order. His examples, for instance are, ‘Australia which is blocked from the 700 million people of Japan and Asia’ or he writes that the Russian Tsar and Lenin’s government have been unjust in trying to ‘monopolize the wide and barren spaces of Siberia’. These are instances of an unequal political situation and Japan is entitled to take steps to change this situation.37 An idea not far removed from concepts of a just war that have now achieved respectability. The limitations of Kita’s reasoning can be seen in the way he looks at the movement for Indian independence. His reasoning is that India is militarily weak and so, it is not in a position to overthrow British rule. Britain must be fought on the seas and here Japan’s alliance with Britain, during the First World War, worked to prevent India from achieving independence. There is no assessment of what is happening in India or what its people want. Kita’s direct experience of China lets him talk in some detail about Chinese positions but he is surprisingly silent on Korean or Indian names and views. The absence of the voices of those who would be freed is missing, whether Kita is writing about the Koreans or the Indians. Kita’s arguments are based on his understanding that the war with Russia in 1904–5 was necessary and vital for Japan. Japanese cabinets, he argues, have been against the spirit of the Russo-Japanese War because they have followed a policy of working with Britain and therefore their policy is one of rebellion (taigyaku seisaku) comparable to Kotoku Shusui’s lese-majesty (taigyakuzai).38 Looking back and assessing his earlier views, during his interrogation by the Kempeitai, he notes that he still thinks that he was absolutely right in supporting the war when many opposed the government. In line with this thinking, it is his contention that Japan needs to secure the Sea of Japan, Korea and Siberia against Russia. Further, he argues, as China will soon come into conflict with Britain, which is establishing its hold on central and southern China, Japan must not continue its alliance with Britain. It must work to protect China, and for this it needs to expand its territories but above all, according to Kita, the need of the hour is for a hero to implement the Reorganization plan, and this means going beyond the boundaries of existing law (chohoritsuteki), and removing the privileged classes who control the political and economic system.39 An empire will give Japan, Kita argues, the ability to assist in the independence of India and secure other parts of Asia, and then it can build a great empire that will stretch from Russia in the north to Australia in the south. Kita sees his programme as offering a theory

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of revolution, but one that goes beyond the limited theoretical formulations of Karl Marx or Peter Kropotkin, for these thinkers had a limited European perspective. Just as ideas have come from Europe, and the United States, so it is natural that they will flow the other way as well. Japan has preserved ideas and philosophies that have disappeared in India, or have left mere traces in China. In Japan, they have become ‘Japanized, and later modernized and now universalized’.40 Japan then provides the possibility of a synthesis of Eastern and Western ideas and practices. In the realm of international politics Kita sees the emergence of a strong power that will establish a ‘feudal peace’, using the analogy of the Tokugawa rule, and he uses this to argue that this power, that is Japan, can rule over a federal world system. The coming of Christ, he says, is ‘actually the Japanese people’s scripture and sword in the shape of Mohammad’.41 In this programme both Germany and the United States can be allies against Britain. Kita sees the United States as a close ally in the long run for its interests and policies match that of Japan. To realize the goals of a revolutionary empire Japan needs a hero, a great leader like the Emperor Meiji, who will take Japan beyond the boundaries of law, and under whose leadership Japan will build a cohesive society by excising sectional privileges within society. The urge to kaizo or reorganize, reconstruct, or rebuild allied with the demand for an ishin or renewal underlies the vision expressed in this utopian plan, and is part of an intellectual climate in Japan that saw the promise of the first ishin, the inauguration of the Meiji government, mired in sectional interests and venal politics. The vision is flawed as it grows out of a narrow view of historical change. Kita does not carry forward his understanding of the need to locate the process of change in a historical context rather then accept established views, and then to universalize from that basis. Kita Ikki’s own reading of Japanese history that began by deconstructing the established ideas of the kokutai, through an examination of the past, was by the end restricted to a cursory use of history as analogy, to give weight to opinions that he holds. The plan does not build on a social base but sees change as the product of a small elite group. His views of a society where private enterprise and initiative works within limits, and where the state controls and regulates social and political life, is really a view aimed at realizing the ambitions of the small farmer and worker. The plan was an attempt to define and justify Japan’s growing empire based not just on an ideal of pan-Asianism, but on opposition to the colonial empire of Britain. Japan could rule over a world federation, and to achieve this goal it had to ground its empire on the principle of equality and development. The empire needed a common language to oppose

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English and for Kita it was not Japanese but Esperanto that could serve this purpose. Kita Ikki’s vision differed above all from the mainstream nationalist and conservative views because it was not grounded in a mythical past but it could not build on, or extend the early radical understanding of Japan’s historical development to an anti-imperialist agenda.

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A SCIENTIFIC RELIGION FOR THE MODERN WORLD

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n 1920 Kita Ikki began reading the Lotus Sutra regularly and from 1926 it became a central aspect of his daily life. He and his wife prayed at an alter that combined Shinto and Buddhist elements, with a portrait of the Meiji emperor in the middle. The diary record of his daily prayers between 1929 and 1936 is replete with illustrations and references to Nichiren (1222–82) but also to a range of other religious practices and to figures such as Shotoku Taishi, Saigo Takamori and Tokugawa Yoshinobu pointing to a syncretic religious view that grew out of a notion of Japan that represented an Asian ideal and could successfully confront the power of Western imperialism in all its forms.1 How is one to understand his turn to religion, in particular Nichiren Buddhism where the recitation of the Lotus sutra is the main ritual practice, and to his withdrawal from public life? Even though he was implicated in the 2 February 1936 young officers revolt and executed, in fact he had little do with their actions. Kita’s engagement with Nichiren and other religious ideas needs to be understood in the larger social context as it points to the way religious ideas helped to shape and define social and political agendas and mark the trajectory of Japan’s formation as a modern nationstate. In that sense the influence of Nichiren Buddhism on Kita is part and parcel of a broader social and intellectual world and its significance needs to be understood both at the individual level, as well as at the social level as a set of ideas that provided an ideal to be realized. These Buddhist ideals were articulated by individuals of whom many were prominent nationalists and supporters of Japan’s colonial expansion and they provided the language and marked the contours of debate in early-twentieth-century Japan.2 One way of understanding Kita and his religious view is to seek for its roots in his early life. His brother points to an early interest in the supernatural and a proclivity to visions. These, the brother

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suggests, may have been a by-product of the cocaine in the medicines that were used to treat Kita’s eye from a young age. Linked to this physical explanation is the appeal to the popular traditions of Sado where shamanism played an important role while Kita was growing up there. These influences further reinforced Kita’s own inclinations which found in Nichiren an anti-establishment thinker, a rebel whose ideas could be used to support a state centred nationalism. I would argue that it is important to look at Kita’s religious ideas as both central to defining his vision of the future, as well as to locate them within the debates on restructuring religious ideas and institutions to meet the challenges of the modern world. Religious organizations and their lay followers were also caught up in coping with these challenges and finding ways to spread their ideas and win converts while fending off government efforts to control and regulate them. They worked within a framework where global influences, either directly or indirectly, were shaping their ideas even as they tried to articulate alternative agendas. To locate Kita’s ideas within this evolving framework it is necessary to see the broad developments within Buddhism and the way these shaped intellectual debates. What are the components of Kita’s religious beliefs and how do they fit in within the larger social trends? First of all, the idea of social evolution led Kita to articulate the need for defining a new scientific religion to answer to the needs of modern society. In that respect, like many of his contemporaries from across the intellectual spectrum, Kita used the language of social Darwinism to argue that struggle and progress had to be seen at two levels, the individual and the group. The state became the vital institution to preserve the group, or the race, and therefore, the state had the right to take whatever measures it needed to carry out this function including going to war. It is for this reason that Kita supported Japan’s war against Russia and was critical of intellectuals who opposed the war. Socialists, according to Kita had to protect the state – ‘the sword is the only defence against the sword’ (katan ni taishite wa katana o motte fusegu no hoka nashi), a statement echoing a common feeling prevalent of that time.3 This is further developed in the Kokutairon where Kita is critical of both Buddhism and Christianity from the standpoint of social progress arguing that pure socialism seeks heaven not in the next world but in this one. These religions, that is Buddhism and Christianity, are ‘false religions’ (guzokyo) because they had succumbed to the false kokutai arguments.4 Here his argument rests on an understanding that man is between god and animal and is progressing towards becoming a god (ruishin jin) and in this progress a philosophical religion that will underpin socialism is necessary. In this context the notion of the ‘small self’ (shoga) and the ‘large self’ (daiga) that Kita

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uses are concepts that owe their origin to the Buddhist debates of that period. His understanding of socialism was supported by religious principles and from these Kita was led to articulating a notion of self that was borrowed from within contemporary Buddhism.5 However, it is not just the debates on a notion of self that need to be understood but equally, the concept of religion which provides both a way to define the nation as well as acts as a force to protect it. This process of defining the meaning and organizational structure of religion can be seen in the post-Meiji period as the state sought to articulate a programme that would define its central tenets and bring religious bodies under its control even while upholding the modern, Western concept of religious freedom. REAFFIRMING LOYALTY AND WINNING BACK THE FAITHFUL

The link between Buddhist priests and loyalists and their role in the political movements in the last years of the Bakufu also testify to the fact that that the foreign origin of Buddhism was not a significant problem but they had to fight the initial persecution by the state, as well as the large indifference of the population to this persecution, to revive Buddhism both as a religious force as well as a supporter of state policies. These measures helped to push for a unification of sects as well as led to the emergence of a variety of responses that strengthened their position as loyal supporters of the state. The early links with the loyalist groups (Shimaji Mokurai, Ozu Tetsunen, Akamatsu Renyo of the Nishi Honganji were part of the sonno-joi group) or with the dominant political groups (Gessho (1817–58) from Suo and Utsunomiya Mokurin (1824–97) from Aki had connections with the Choshu group of Kido, Yamagata, Ito), as well as the connections that clerics had with the lowest social strata created both a link with the elite leadership, as well as helped to shape new political imaginings within a Buddhist frame. Given this background the persecution of Buddhism did not drive the Buddhists into an irreconcilable opposition but rather worked to ensure that they declared their loyalty to the state and its policies. The Alliance of United Sects for Ethical Standards (Shoshu dotoku kaimei) that brought together various Buddhist sects clarified the fact that the law of the Buddha (obo buppo furi) in no way contradicted respect for the imperial law (obo ihon). These efforts to ally with the state and stress the commonality of interests transformed them from heretics to ambassadors of the culture of Japan.6 The 1889 Meiji constitution recognized in Article 28 the freedom of religions as long as they did not affect the duties of citizens but Article 3 also recognized the emperor as having the power of the chief priest (saishidaiken). Ancestor worship was one measure to link the

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loyalty of the people to the emperor and the state.7 Writings by Buddhists such as Jiun Sonja Onko, Fukuda Gyokai and Shaku Onsho reaffirmed their loyalty to the state but together with this they also stressed that Buddhist precepts must be followed with greater care.8 This was not just a strategy for survival but rather a way of winning back the faith of the people that seemed to have been lost; in that sense there was a tension between the two demands, as faith carried an element of resistance to state pressure. A concerted effort was made, as part of this reconstruction, to build ties with other sects and work for a syncretic Buddhism that would reduce doctrinal contention and provide a united front against Christianity. Murakami Sensei, an academic from the Soto Zen Otani group, played an influential role in arguing for a unified Buddhism and reducing sectarian differences. Murakami’s book The Unification of Buddhism (Bukkyo toitsu) (1901) made a major impact on current debates and exerted a far-reaching influence on movements within Japanese Buddhism as well as on the larger intellectual life of the country.9 The writings of Inoue Enryo, Shimaji Mokurai and others who used the language of Western liberalism to echo the call of the Meiji Enlightenment for natural rights, freedom and progress helped to bring about this revitalization of Buddhism.10 Kiyozawa Manshi was a central figure in using devotion to the Amida Buddha to call for salvation through faith to launch a movement emphasizing the importance of spiritualism (seishinshugi). Kiyozawa Manshi edited a journal, The Spiritual Society (Seishinkai), which played a vital role in shaping an understanding of an idea of the self which probably influenced Kita Ikki’s understanding. His views were important influences as well on the various Buddhist movements such as Selfless Love (mugaai), the Buddhist Youth Movement, and thinkers such as Inoue Tetsujiro who found justification for their idea of an ‘Oriental philosophy’ in these views. This notion of the self, it should be noted, was also being framed within a growing influence of Hegelian ideas about the state. Ernest Fenellosa had introduced Hegelian philosophy as a teacher in Tokyo Imperial University between 1878 and 1885.11 It is worth recalling that Okakura Tenshin, the thinker who based his notion of Asia on the common heritage of Buddhism and who articulated a role for Japan as the leader of Asia precisely because it preserved this heritage, first wrote a dissertation on the role of the state and only when it was lost did he switch to writing one on art. NATION AND SELF: TANAKA CHIGAKU AND THE MODERN USES OF NICHIREN

The linking of Buddhism to the project of the nation-state involved harnessing what had been the ideals of spiritual salvation to work for

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a modern nationalism. In this, the role of thinkers such as Tanaka Chigaku was crucial for even as they sought to reform society they simultaneously attempted to answer to the spiritual needs of the people and linked this to serve the interests of the state creating a strong self-reinforcing bond between the two. The activities of such thinkers points the way to understanding the manner in which religious ideas were transformed by the pressures of modern nationalism, and in turn shaped the forms that nationalism took.12 Tanaka Chigaku took up the theme of family life in a significant essay, On Buddhist Marriage (Bukkyo fufu ron). Initially given as a lecture in 1886 and subsequently revised and presented to the emperor Meiji and his consort on their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary in 1894.13 This is an important essay in many ways as it articulates a reformist agenda based on the reform of the family, and the central role played by the woman as wife and mother. The essay marks the creation of a modern marriage ceremony that is influenced by Western conceptions. The transformation of Buddhism from a religion of the house (ie) to that of the individual demanded that need to think of the husband-wife partnership as the major axis of the family and consequently of the state.14 Tanaka is faced with the problem of rescuing Buddhism from being just a ritualistic religion to one that serves the people. In answer he holds up the ideal of a ‘one-husband one-wife’ family as the core around which change can be effected but argues that far from being a Western or Christian ideal it was one that was present in Japan.15 It is only because of the influence of Chinese Confucianism, he argues, that women have come to acquire a low position. Women had, he says, always been respected in Buddhism as well. Tanaka also stresses the role of education and it is because of this function, he argues, that the role of women in the modern world has become important as they serve to educate the young within the family. The strength of the secular power of the Church in Western societies was, according to Tanaka, founded on the control over the chief secular rite, the marriage ceremony. Here even civil law acknowledged the power of the Church. Tanaka, therefore, saw the family and the wife/mother as the key that would enable Buddhism to play a role in secular life and spread its teachings. It is within the family that ideas of equality and the individual are taught and transmitted. It is for this reason that Tanaka sees marriage and the couple as the core of the project of national transformation.16 Tanaka’s Buddhism was based on the teachings of Nichiren and he taught that domestic happiness could be founded on the teachings of Nichiren, who came to earth and established his church for the sake of Japan. This was, for Tanaka, the first step to world unification. The two, Nichiren and Japan, were inextricably linked and

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inseparable, and brought together they could ensure the spread of Buddhism to the whole world. In concluding the talk Tanaka ended with Namu myoho renge kyo and Nippon teikoku banzai. Here, we have, in the transformation of religious principles, along with the introduction of a new civil ceremony, and the linking of religious ideals and state policy, an early indication of what would become the apologetics of an imperial mission. Tanaka went on to work out the form of reorganization that the church could take. In Reform of Religion (Shumon no ishin) (1901) he called for the unification of Japanese Buddhism into one Nichiren organization which he saw as the storm troopers of the state.17 ‘Nichiren is the general of the army that will unite the world. Japan is his headquarters. The people of Japan are his troops; teachers and scholars of Nichiren are his officers. The Nichiren creed is a declaration of war, and shakubuku is the plan of attack.’ For Tanaka the war had began as far back as 1253. The influence of the idea of the struggle for survival is quite apparent in his formulations that aggression is the way of the world but Tanaka differentiated between good and bad aggression. For him the Lotus Sutra aggression was good, spiritual aggression. These ideas were supported by detailed charts and diagrams to show how Buddhism could be spread around the world in a fifty-year timetable. Tanaka had set up a Rissho Ankokukai in August 1894, shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, to be used for patriotic assemblies. The style of propagation changed and developed over time. In the period between 1880 and 1900 the meetings were small in scale and focused on priests and lay followers, but after 1900 Tanaka began to use his writings as well as the magazines brought out by the different organizations to spread his teachings. In 1905 during the RussoJapanese War he sent 84,000 copies of his interpretation of the Educational Rescript, according to Nichirens-ism (Nichirenshugi Chokugo gengi) to politicians, educators, intellectuals and army officers. The strategy began to change from spreading a religious belief to a strategy of spreading nationalism.18 Tanaka also began, after the start of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904, a special three-week period of prayer. He said the war was ‘divinely inspired to make Japanese citizens aware of the heavenly task of their country’. In an earlier speech in November 1903, after a special study session of the Lotus Sutra, he took the participants to the mausoleum of Jimmu Tenno. Here he delivered a four-hour lecture on the Founding of the Nation by the Imperial Ancestors and the Great Teachings of Nichiren (Koso no kenkoku to honge no taikyo). Tanaka, using the Nihongi, argued that Jimmu had been appointed by heaven to unify the world. He used the expression to put the universe under one roof (tenchi-ichiu) and later changed it to hakko-ichiu in lectures

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delivered in 1912–13. This became the standard expression of government documents and pan-Asian writings about Japan’s mission in Asia. By 1910 then Tanaka was talking of spreading not just the religious principles of Nichiren Buddhism but felt the necessity of spreading Nichiren-ism (Nichirenshugi) as part of a policy of preaching to make citizens (kokuminteki dendo).19 Just after he wrote this (April 1910) in the middle of May, twenty-six socialists and anarchists were arrested, accused of plotting to kill the Meiji emperor (Taigyaku jiken), and in the next year on 24–25 January 1912 Kotoku Shusui and twelve others were executed for their alleged part in this plot. This incident had a massive intellectual as well as political impact; particularly as the second Katsura Cabinet (July 1908 to August 1911) sought to use education to restructure the state system around the authority of the emperor. Tanaka’s response to this incident was one of great shock and he began a campaign to raise support for the country and the emperorcentred kokutai. The major objective of the campaign, carried out in the period 1910–30, was to spread an understanding of the kokutai through spiritual education among the Japanese.20 This campaign began with a ceremony to launch a book written on the subject. The book sold widely as members of his group, from all over Japan, had ordered some 40,000 copies. After an open air lecture meeting in Ueno Park, Tokyo, the speech was published in the group’s magazine and later as a pamphlet. The scale of the readership of this book can be gauged from this as well as the fact that religious groups were employing modern methods to spread their ideas reaching an audience far greater than just its followers. Tanaka’s analysis of the Taigyaku jiken is that this event was surprising and painful because the emperor, the Imperial House and the kokutai were imbued with a deep religious significance for the people of Japan. The reason for the occurrence of such an incident he imputed to ‘evil people’ and ‘evil times’ (jin shin aku, jidai aku), and these immoral and unethical acts were due to the influence of the West and the loss of the idea of kokutai; that is why he wanted people to reflect on kokutai. To further this process of reflection he suggested concrete steps that the government could take through the school system. He categorized Kotoku shusui and his ideas as anti-kokutai ideas (hankokutai shiso). To fight this Tanaka argued that people must join Rissho Ankokukai, for the society represented the force of the Lotus Sutra (Hokkekyo), which was inextricably linked with Japan. The Rissho Ankokukai’s activities to spread its ideas (fukkyo katsudo) began in Osaka in June and then went on to Kyoto, Wakayama, Okayama, Nagoya and other places. These meetings were attended by large groups of people, the number varying from a few hundred to a few thousand, but all together perhaps some 30,000 people

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attended these meetings. In the 1910s and 1920s Tanaka Chigaku’s lectures and arguments attracted an increasing number of intellectuals, educators and students. It should be possible to understand the social image of this religious movement by examining the process through which its ideas were propagated and through the dynamic interaction between members and non-members. Tanaka, even while talking of aggression and a heaven-ordained mission, also wrote that the mission of Japan was to unify the world through righteousness, and the most suitable faith for accomplishing this was not just Nichiren Buddhism but Nichiren-ism (Nichirenshugi) which implied a combination of Nichiren Buddhism and Japanese nationalism. The word Nichirenshugi appears in his writings after 1906 and for him this was a way of positioning the religious quest firmly within the nationalist project. He went on to link Nichirenshugi with kokutai which for him was represented by three components: happiness (national blessing accumulated by ancestors), wisdom (national wisdom amassed by ancestors) and right (national loyalty cultivated by imperial descendents). The process of expansion involved, according to Tanaka first, spiritual absorption (extending the kokutai to enlighten the mind), and second, military pacification (to control the lawless and disobedient). Tanaka accepted the sacred nature of the state and he attempted to produce a syncretism of Shinto and Buddhism. His support for the Japanese-controlled state of Manchuko and his lecture to the Pu Yi, the emperor installed by the Japanese, needs to be noted, as does the fact that his disciples included Ishihara Kanji, Inoue Nissho, as well as Miyazaki Kenji, Anesaki Masaharu and Takeyama Chogyu. This transformation of a religious idea into a modern ideology, the transformation of a sense of nation into nationalism provides the context within which to see one component of Kita’s own understanding of social and political transformation and its links with religion. His concern, as dealt with in earlier chapters, is with how to preserve the state against aggression but he also sees the heroic role of the Meiji emperor and his religious function. The images that he saw every day as he recited the Lotus Sutra also included the Meiji emperor. In his earlier writings, as we have seen, he was critical of the bansei ikkei argument but even then he recognized the emperor as a religious figure and he saw the Meiji emperor as a hero who brought about the Meiji transformation. This view, as seen in the Kokutairon, is developed in the Gaishi where the emperor as a disinterested and enlightened figure gains greater importance and his power is linked to the compassion and power of Amida Nyorai.21 The importance given to the emperor as a shamanistic figure, as well as a symbol of modern transformation perhaps has its roots in popular religions of the time. The state through its religious policies had tried to control

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and regulate religious groups and activities and while it was successful in incorporating the established churches, popular sects and charismatic leaders continued to function outside this framework and often came into conflict with the state as well as with the established groups.22 While in the Kokutairon Kita had argued that a liberal revolution had been brought about to transform a state controlled by the nobility into a people’s state, by the time of the Kaizo hoan he is arguing for a way to establish a new state that can break the imperial domination of the Western powers, and for this he is in search of an intellectual basis to oppose the West. In this fight Kita then searches for a way to position his argument for an Eastern republic and his approach is an integral part of the debates that were being conducted within Buddhism, and among people who sought to locate modernity within a different framework, to give it an alternative genealogy. These debates found the basis for Japan’s drive to become modern not in the West but from within Japanese history, in the ideas of Nichiren and Shinran. SEEKING FOR MODERNITY IN BUDDHISM

The First World War had a major impact in leading people to question materialism and war and re-examine history and traditions. In Europe, Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West was an influential work and it was quickly translated into Japanese where it exercised an important influence that helped to give form to many of these debates, and his notions helped to shape ideas of civilization, as they worked with and reinforced ideas of singularity that had been put forward in Japan ever since the time of Motoori Norinaga and so helped to shape a notion of an Eastern culture. Spengler examined the past to show that while cultures share a common pattern of development, which he defined analogically by seasons, they each have different underlying principles. All cultures are formed on the basis of a religion. In the springtime of culture the principles are articulated, and are at their peak in the summer but in the autumnal phase, which he defined as civilization, the cultural principles break down and a period of confusion is inaugurated till the next renewal. The idea of religion as an underlying principle and the notion that the permanent elements of a culture lie in the classical past became an important element in defining the concept of civilization. These European debates worked with ideas in Asian countries to set the global agenda where the spirituality of the East could temper the materialism of the West. These ideas of an alternative civilization shaped the form and nature of debates within Japan. From the Taisho period people such as Kimura Shigeyuki, Mitsui Kosei and Minoda Kyozen, a group of German-educated Japanese, were active in

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articulating an ideology that sought the roots of modernity in Buddhism. They sought to provide an alternative legitimacy for modern ideas, one based not on accepting the superiority of the West as the creator of modernity, arguing that all that the West had to offer was already available in the teachings of Shinran. Kimura Shigeyuki, representative of this strain of thought articulated Japan’s special position in a series of books to argue that the strength of Japan’s past traditions provided the basis for dealing with the modern world rather than a blind acceptance of European institutions, ideas, and practices. Kimura found in Buddhism, as developed by Shinran, a philosophy to define the character of Japan and of the Eastern world, as well as a method to critically understand European ideas.23 Culture, for Kimura, was by definition complex and always in a state of confusion but along with this, he noted, that there was always a desire to fix its boundaries. The situation after the First World War had left many countries in Europe, particularly the defeated ones like Germany, trying to find economic as well as intellectual unity. The world trend, he argued, was towards statism (kokkashugi). Restoration of the state would inevitably lead to the restoration of culture. The First World War provided a breathing space for the countries of the East because Western culture, which was based on Christianity had lost its attraction and this gave a fillip to Eastern culture based on Buddhism. This opportunity, Kimura felt, should be used to build a firmer basis for Japanese modernity and as a first step towards rejecting Western models he advocated the uncritical acceptance of Japanese culture. Uncritical acceptance would be a passive criticism of the West and lay the basis for the growth of love for Japanese culture and tradition. It would then be possible to build a basis for a more vigorous criticism later. Eastern culture for him was represented by India, China and Japan but he argued that Japan alone had synthesized the contemplative power of Indian culture and the practicality of Chinese culture. A revitalized Eastern culture would provide the basis for a world culture. Spiritual life would be based on a synthesis of art, philosophy and religion and a historical understanding of culture. Each country had its own historical traditions and these found expression in not just ideas and practices but in the very language. Japan had an eternal, unchanging character that found expression through its language, writing, poetry and music. In Japan Shinran’s Buddhism was represented by the waka while Dogen’s by the haiku and both, that is Shinshu and Zenshu provide the basis for popular literary art. By bringing two very different streams Kimura is building a modern intellectual basis for modernity in Japan rather than critically dealing with different intellectual traditions. Japan’s cultural efforts, he argued, provided a model for other countries of the East to emulate

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because they too realized that, after the First World War there was a need to resist the West and for this they had begun to look to Japan to form an alliance. As an illustration of this common search he holds up Tagore and Okakura Tenshin as thinkers who understood this search at a very early stage. Tagore, despite coming from a subjugated country, Kimura argues, was an early exponent of spreading Eastern civilization and, he adds, Gandhi added to this project the drive for national independence. Kimura sees the way ahead as difficult as he recognizes that the Anglo-Saxon world still holds a powerful attraction and offers benefits but it is, he feels, possible to work towards an alternative.. The example of Germany, which has opposed AngloSaxon culture, is instructive, according to Kimura, for the Germans have also been influenced by Eastern culture. Alongside this movement there was a parallel movement where initially Kita understands social change as having been brought about by large social groups so that the Meiji restoration-revolution is a product of peasant rebellions and lower samurai. But he gradually moves to a position that social change can be brought about only by a small minority of enlightened people. This emerges from the Gaishi, probably influenced by his experiences in China, and finds full expression in the Kaizo hoan. This reliance on small groups translates with greater ease into a support for terrorism and this is reinforced by the chiliastic vision of a grand conflagration. It is this movement that leads Kita into a disengagement from the wider social sphere and a withdrawal into himself, to seeking refuge within the Lotus Sutra and a reliance on the inevitability of that which is ordained. It must be borne in mind that while Nishida and the other officers involved in the February coup may have been moved by their reading of the Kaizo hoan they were not influenced by Kita’s mysticism and he was not responsible for their actions. In fact unlike them he never made any political claims in jail but rather continued to deny any role in their actions. In his statement to the military tribunal he denied any hand in their plan and his last statement, a note he wrote to his guard, neither shows the resistance that the young officers displayed nor does it show the belief in the Lotus Sutra that Nichiren displayed before he was sentenced.24 If we consider Nichiren’s ideas then they are far from being disengaged. Nichiren himself taught the necessity of establishing peace and realising an ideal society to build the land of the Buddha here in this world. His teachings were engaged with how to achieve this objective in Japan during the age of mappo, the Latter Age of Dharma.25 The belief in a transcendent power above all authority that could challenge political authority (tariki) was inherited by the movement known as Lotus Sutra uprisings (hokke ikki) but under the Tokugawa this became a heretical position and was suppressed,

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the Fujefuse group was put down along with Christian adherents with particular severity. More than the philosophy and religious ideas of Nichiren it is, as discussed earlier, Tanaka Chigaku who transforms Nichiren’s ideas into an ideological support for the power of the tenno, who becomes ‘The Most Holy Tenno, descendent of the kami, . . . the embodiment of the right path, and is the very truth of the Lotus Sutra itself’ but for Nichiren the Tenno was merely the means to realize the ‘peace of the nation’. Yet to see these ideas as Buddhist would be to reduce the complexity of Kita’s thinking. They were, in fact, linked to the ideological production of a new Japanese nationalism that would support an imperialist role and these ideas suffered all the contradictions and conflicts that this burden placed. Equality and a distributive justice went hand in hand with domination and subordination. Kita’s diary is full of references not just to Nichiren but also to the worship of the Kannon deity, to Shinto practices, as well as historical figures. Kita was articulating a genealogy for the Japanese state and religious and philosophical ideas were used to frame this vision and define the nature and character of Japan’s civilization.

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n the early years of a nation, history is not just the business of historians, and Kita Ikki’s intellectual project, though a historical analysis, was part of the contemporary debates that arose as he, and his contemporaries, grappled with what it meant to be Japanese and to define the nature of their state and society. In considering his formulations as part of a larger process of interlocution with his contemporaries, it is possible to move away from the lexical ambiguities of the texts and glimpse the contemporary voice, often submerged under layers of later interpretations. Kita Ikki, in formulating a radically modern view of kokutai, placed the Japanese nation in the process of history, making it a political creation amenable to change and development. The state was, for him, the principal organization through whose agency change was effected.1 The state modified through its agency the elements that form the state: economic unity, territory and tradition. In the new framework, which is created with the nation-state both the exchangers of commodities and the owners of capital become formally-free and politically-equal individuals. These new relationships qualitatively affect and alter conceptions of language, territory and history. The territory of a nation-state, which had earlier been segmented and discontinuous, is now homogenized and its frontiers clearly demarcated. Yet, while the frontiers of the nation-state are clearly demarcated, it at the same time seeks to continually consolidate and at times even expand its market, capital and territory. In the creation of the modern nation-state, a striking aspect has been the concentration of rights in the sovereign, rather than the expansion of these rights among the constituent members. This process concurrently entailed the destruction of those rights that lay outside the domain of the state. On the basis of this political structure, the homogenization of the nation-state was a process of forging a community with a common, shared history. This process also involved ‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules’.2

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Of course, this process of creating a ‘community of recollections’ has rarely been effected without tenacious and widespread resistance.3 Just as the Tudors in Britain quelled a series of rebellions challenging their authority, so too the Meiji oligarchy systematically brought the people under its systems of control. Kita Ikki’s project of writing a ‘history’ of post-Meiji Japan and his glorification of the state are inseparably linked, a link to which Hegel referred: ‘It is the State which first presents a subject-matter that is not only adapted to the prose of History, but involves the production of such History in the very progress of its own being.’4 While defining the conceptual basis of Japan, Kita seeks to build the basis for a supra-national organization that will bind the region into an empire under Japan’s leadership. Considered within the contemporary milieu of historical scholarship, Kita Ikki’s understanding of the state itself as a political creation was arguably more acute than that of many professional historians. The period that saw the ascendancy of Meiji absolutism, also saw the divide between a ‘history’ that supported the absolutist government and one that sought to focus on the agency of the people. From this time, ‘cultural history’ (bunka shi) became prominent, (the work of Tsuda Sokichi being the most representative) for its ambit covered all aspects of the life of the ‘people’ and it also freed itself from the confines of official domination.5 Yet, in doing so it tended to separate ‘politics’ from ‘history’, the former being regarded as the exclusive domain of the elite. This led to a neglect of important and crucial areas, a neglect that had serious consequences for an understanding of the state. To practitioners of cultural history the state was reduced to a non-political entity, not the product of the Meiji ishin-kakumei, but something which was ‘natural’ ‘transcendental’ (shizenteki, choetsuteki).6 The non-political characterization of the state and its elevation to an ethical universality was reflected also in the treatment of the Imperial House and the emperor. The emperor, it was argued, was brought to power by a political revolution but any substantive ‘political’ role was denied him. The imperial house was elevated, just as the state had been raised to a ‘natural existence’ (shizenteki sonzai).7 These two postulates, by defining the areas of debate, excluded many important questions. First, from these postulates it began to be argued that it was not possible to examine or explain Japanese society because it was not the product of a historical process and political creation, but rather that the organizing principle of Japanese society lay in the ‘people’ (minzoku). One major argument was that the Japanese were one people – with one language, one history and common customs and rights – and in consequence, they have achieved great political power and enjoy unprecedented peace.8

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Kita Ikki, unlike the cultural historians, recognized that post-Meiji Japan was the creation of a complicated political process that could only be understood historically. As we have seen in Kokutairon, he systematically considers all the aspects, political, economic, ethical and social in constructing his argument. His understanding that the Meiji ishin-kakumei created juridical equality but had yet to achieve economic equality is linked to his argument that the absolutist political structure needed to be changed. Change, in Japan could now take place through the electoral system, and it required an aware and educated population. Kita then begins to stress the need for the spread of enlightenment to transform a formal democracy into a real functioning system that worked in all spheres of human life. This was the project of creating an equitable society, not just within the boundaries of Japan but internationally. The conception, that people have the right to govern themselves and participate in determining their future is central to his project of realizing a sociallymoral order. Kita Ikki’s critique centred on the fulcrum of kokutai, for to him and many of his contemporaries, this concept encapsulated the essence of the system. By offering a historically based, nonreligious conception of kokutai, Kita Ikki was arguing for an active role for the Japanese in evolving a modern community. His appeal was not formulated in a-historical terms, an appeal which nationalists in the tradition of Herder or the Showa ultra-nationalists for instance exploited, to create a mythic nationalism. Kita Ikki’s analysis of the economic and political structure of society and the way he understood capital, wage labour and class were well within the Japanese socialist tradition. However, his emphasis on the nation led him to oppose most socialists, and to support the war with Russia, which according to him was in the best interests of the Japanese people. This defence of the war, as also his later calls for expansion into the Asian continent, arose from his conception of the requirements of the nation in the context of his times. Coupled with this was an appreciation of the dangers posed by the incursion of the ‘West’ not merely in political but also in cultural terms. Kita Ikki believed Japan had to prepare for the coming conflagration. Thus, he was attempting to formulate a policy to build the strength of the people and the country, and this could only be effected, as he saw it, around a nation where all were equal. In that sense he combined the socialist and nationalist project but to challenge the power of the Western nations, he argued that this would not be possible at the national level. The challenge had to be met not just at the military level but in the realm of culture and ideas. To meet this challenge Kita argues for a revolutionary ideology that would bind the region under the leadership of Japan but which would create

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a sense of equality and participation through a common language and equal citizenship rights. This revolutionary empire would be in a position to challenge imperialism and the racial wars that would be fought in the near future.9 This desire to locate the unification of Asia as an exercise in emancipation prefigures the philosophers of the Kyoto school who sought to conceptualize the ‘region’ as the mediator between the nation-sate as the individual and the world as the universal. It is important to note that he was not against allying with western powers, thus he suggested that the United States and Japan could be natural allies. It is because of this framework of analysis that Kita Ikki could, unlike Kotoku Shusui and other socialists, see the Xinhai revolution as an important event not to be lightly dismissed. Kita’s analysis was not grounded in a view of Chinese culture as flawed or degraded as for instance that of Uchida Ryohei who described China as a deformed state (henkei koku), where political and normal society are divided. Kita’s difference lies precisely in providing a historical explanation. He is not guilty of positing ideal types. Even more crucial was the fact that Kita saw the creation of a republican China as a major advance that freed China from the shackles of bureaucratic government (daikan seiji), but as we have seen, unlike the China adventurers or many of the Japanese intelligentsia, Kita’s views were grounded in a conception of historical change. He neither romanticized the Chinese, nor did he argue that the Japanese must show them the way to modernity, nor was he contemptuous of their character. Just as Kita had dismissed such arguments about Japan, so in relation to China he developed the view that the Chinese must themselves carry out the transformation of their own society. Kita Ikki did not, because of the uniting presence of Western imperialism, look at changes in China in isolation, but rather as intimately linked to events in Japan; and change in the one necessitated change in the other. In stating the project of Shina gaishi, Kita writes: This book, make no mistake does not have the objective of being a history of the Chinese revolution. It is a theoretical explanation of events before and after the revolution at the end of the Qing period and an argument for the future guidance of Revolutionary China. At the same time, in parallel with the Chinese revolution it is a forceful argument for the revolutionary change of Japan’s China policy and its international policy. Namely, it has taken the two elements, ‘Revolutionary China’ and, ‘Revolutionary foreign policy’ and inextricably linked them together in the text.

The question of the preservation of China was central to and linked with the question of Japan’s role in East Asia in contrast to Okuma

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Shigenobu, who argued that Japan could help to preserve China as it was the country that could best represent Asian culture. Okuma saw no conflict in continuing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance but Kita Ikki viewed Britain and Russia as enemies of China and, therefore, believed Japan’s alliance, with either power would pose a potential threat to China. The central burden of Kita’s concern with affairs in China was to underline the importance of the nation-state in providing an organization that could prepare societies like China and Japan to face the aggression of the West. What is ironic, however, is that in the interests of Japan he ignores the resistance of the Chinese to Japanese intrusion into Korea, conveniently glossing over the strength of what M. Barre called the soil and the dead (la terre et la morte). The line of reasoning that Kita Ikki followed regarding the role of the people and their transformation from ‘objects’ to ‘subjects’ was marked by certain elitist presuppositions rather than with any concern with organizational systems. He saw certain sections of the intelligentsia as the true agents of change, for, to Kita, the ignorant rabble were incapable of transformative action. He, therefore, saw a crucial role for the military commanders, and of military action, to effect republican ideals, and showed little concern for the need to evolve organizational systems that could involve people in the process of social change. Though Kita Ikki was critical of SunYat-sen, many of his ideas, as elaborated later in Kaizo hoan, were very similar to those advanced by the latter. This study of Kita Ikki has focused on the twists and turns of his arguments in an attempt to suggest that it is necessary to go beyond an academic exercise of labelling and categorizing that excises the lived experience that these ideas were grappling with. It is also for this reason as well that the question of whether he was a socialist and then became a fascist has not been central to this inquiry. What has been of central concern is how his writings offered a way of understanding and changing his world in the intellectual environment of contemporary debates. This frame of reference highlights the shared concerns but often differing answers that were thrown up. Kita Ikki and his contemporaries were not traditional intellectuals grappling with the problems of modernity but were themselves a creation of the modern world. The problems they faced were not reducible to either the simple binaries of Western and indigenous, traditional and modern or the question of assimilating or rejecting Western ideas but need to be understood in the context of the precise interactions between Western powers and of the relationships within the region. These relations were in a continuing process of change so that local changes were inextricably linked to international processes. Kita united his search for a Japan built on new

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and modern lines with his concern for similar developments in the neighbouring countries of Asia. These concerns were further developed and elaborated in his final major work, the Kaizo hoan, where he enunciates the principles on which the Japanese empire could be built, an empire that would be different from the colonial empires built by the West. His understanding centres around the emphasis on indigenous development, and, therefore, his use of Mongolia and Mencius to outline the contours of a possible Eastern Republic needs also to be read symbolically. Kita brings a vision and understanding of history to bear on his analysis. He writes that, ‘History does not flow separately for the white races and the yellow races, . . . In the end China must follow the road taken by the French Revolution and the Japanese.’ It was a vision of a transnational empire that could resist the onslaught of Western dominance. A Japanese hero would spread these revolutionary ideas just as Kita claimed Napoleon had spread the ideas of revolutionary France to the rest of Europe. This vision of the future was framed within Nichiren Buddhism as Kita lost interest in public affairs and became an ardent devotee of the Lotus Sutra. The history of this process is an integral part of the formation of modern Japan and requires separate treatment but here some broad trends need to be indicated. Reformers seeking to revitalize their religious practice found inspiration in organizational forms and intellectual concepts from both the West and Asia. These ideas then became part of the increasingly important argument that sought to distinguish Japan and Asia from the West by distinguishing notions of religion and culture. Japan, for thinkers such as Okakura Tenshin, and repeated in Kita’s writings, became the repository for all that was best in Asia because Japan alone had preserved its independence, and transformed itself into a modern nation. The other parts of Asia were colonized and cut off from their rich past. These new ideas also worked together with the quest for an alternative to the modern nation-state that would bring together countries in Asia to confront Western hegemony, a confrontation that was not possible for nations on their own. This project found in the religious leader Nichiren a religious past that was linked to the state, and provided a source for all that was modern. Buddhism also provided a link that could bind Japan and China, and yet was not Chinese in origin. It was also a doctrine that had found acceptance within groups in the West, and so while modern it was not Western. Kita’s ideas about nation and culture were grounded in a quest to realize the possibilities of a modern democratic system but they were formulated in an environment where inequalities existed, internally within Japan, and externally in the dominance of the West. In seeking to overturn this situation Kita identified the modern nation,

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located in history, and the democratic system as the political organization within which these potentials could best be realized. Grounded in local history and experience this empire would be based on the principles of social and political equality and provide for the economic development of all its citizens. The tension between nationalism, as a force to unify Japan, and the need to build a supraregional power to oppose the cultural and political domination of the West shaped Kita Ikki’s project as it continues today to shape movements and ideologies in the non-Western world.

Fundamental Principles for the Reorganization of Japan

KITA IKKI Translated by Brij Tankha

Translation of the Kaizo hoan taiko: ‘Fundamental Principles for the Reorganization of Japan’ Note on translation: The translation is based on the text published 9 May 1923 by the Kaizosha (KICS 2 pp. 287–351) and supplemented with the August 1919 manuscript (KICS 2 pp. 215–281) as well as the Nishida Mitsugu editions of 11 February 1926 and 10 May 1926 (KICS 2 pp. 253–396). Nishida Mitsugu (Zei) a former army officer became an ardent disciple of Kita and worked in Okawa Shumei’s academy. The ‘lines deleted’ in brackets refers to the number of lines deleted in the original text. I have tried to keep, as far as possible, to the original style and length of sentences rather than aim for greater readability. I would like to thank Narusawa Akira, Hosei University, who helped in improving an early draft.

Preface

1.

2.

3.

4.

The draft of this reorganization plan was completed after the First World War in August 1919 in Shanghai. It was confidentially mimeographed and not published until now; but in January 1920 its sale and distribution was banned. In the text ‘lines deleted’ indicate the lines that have been deleted by official order and the number of lines is from the mimeographed text. There is no question but that I disapprove of the deletions in the original as these statements do not violate Japanese law. I believe that this has been done because of some administrative reasons. The drafter of the proposal would like to make certain issues clear as there is a feeling that immoderate and radical ideas lie concealed in this proposal. The First World War, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, truly marks the end of a stage, just as the Napoleonic wars divide the eighteenth and nineteenth. (The renewal of the century will probably be in ten odd years.) It is thanks to the order of Heaven that in the first year of the twentieth century this draft of the plan was made. However, the continuation of the revolutionary theories of the old philosophers of the previous century, which have many mistakes, have been taken as standard and I cannot be happy with their criticism of this plan. This is the failure of this age. Older people thought that daughters would support their mothers but this is not so now. In the twentieth century it is not possible to believe the revolutionary theories that failed in the nineteenth century. Originally the ‘Note’ was intended to be an explanation, written clearly and simply, and at times in some notes the conclusion has merely been repeated. In the twentieth century, the wisdom and will of the races and people have to be satisfied with a clear yes or a clear no. It is still a long way for the human race to be destroyed by the combustibility (chukayaku) of the three great inventions that have led to the development of the present world: the poison of publishing technology has corrupted all the intellectuals of the world. That is why it is not possible to destroy each and every stupid and corrupt theory for the situation is as

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Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan if a half-wit is trying to explain to an opium addict. The drafter of the Plan to Reorganize Japan is a person who is naturally a supporter of the establishment of a revolutionary empire. However, I would not like to answer the question of whether this will be to the left or to the right as the intellectuals of the previous century judge good and bad. Perhaps I don’t have the time.

Contents

Introduction

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Chapter I. The People’s Emperor

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Suspension of the Constitution – The True Significance of the Emperor – Abolition of the Peerage System – General Elections – Restoration of Freedom to the People – The National Reorganization Cabinet – The National Reorganization Diet – Granting of Imperial Property to the Nation Chapter II. Limit on Private Wealth

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Government Appropriation of Private Property Exceeding the Limit – Assembly of the Army Reservists Association Chapter III. Three Principles of Land Distribution Limit to Private Land Holdings

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Appropriation by the Government of Private Land in Excess of the Limit – Organizations for the Collection of Land – People who Exceed the Ceiling on Private Land Holdings – Ownership of Acquired Land by the People – Ownership of City Land by the City – Land that Should be under State Ownership Chapter IV. Unification of Big Capital by the State

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Limit on Privately-owned Enterprises – Nationalization of Enterprises that Exceed the Ceiling – Organizations for Collecting Capital – Private Enterprises that Exceed the Ceiling after the Reorganization – Productive Organizations of the State – Increased Public Revenues Chapter V. Rights of Workers

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The Duty of a Workers’ Ministry – Wages of Workers – Working Hours – Workers’ Share in the Profits – Law for a Stockholding System for Workers – Protection of Tenant Farmers – Prohibition of Child Labour

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Chapter VI. People’s Right to a Livelihood

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The Rights of Children – Duty of the State to Provide Maintenance – Right to a People’s Education – Protection of the Fundamental Rights of Women – Protection of the Fundamental Rights of Citizens – Rights of Meritorious Persons – The Right to Private Property – Equal Distribution of Inherited Property Chapter VII. Reorganization Plan for Korea and Other Present and Future Possessions

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A System of Counties and Prefectures for Korea – The Right of Koreans to Participate in Politics – Extension of the Three Principles – Procedure for the Reform of Present Possessions. Chapter VIII. The Powers of the State

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Support for the Conscription system – The Right to Initiate a War. Conclusion

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Introduction

T

he great empire of Japan is at a national turning point as it confronts internal troubles and foreign danger. A majority of the citizens face an uncertain future and seek to learn from the collapse of European states while those who control political, military and financial power for their private ends bury their heads in their sleeves and timidly try and sustain their illegitimate authority. Abroad, be it Britain, the United States, Germany, Russia, there is not a single power that has not violated its word; even our neighbour China, to whom we have provided protection since the Russo-Japanese War, has rewarded us with contempt. Truly, we are a small island isolated in the Eastern Sea. There is a danger that the country established by our ancestors will disappear if we make one miscalculation for we see again the danger of internal troubles and foreign danger that our country faced at the end of the Tokugawa period and the Meiji Restoration. The only light that brightens this picture is from the sixty million countrymen that heaven has given us. It is necessary for the citizens of Japan to firmly grasp the fundamental principles of the existence of the nation and of the human right of the equality of citizens and to be able to discriminate and select without confusing the pure and impure elements of domestic and foreign ideas. The First World War was like a punishment from heaven for the arrogant behaviour of European nations comparable to Noah’s Flood. We certainly cannot expect plans to rebuild from those who are in a frenzied and confused state after the great destruction, but for our Japan the situation has been the opposite, and these five years have been of blessings. Europe should talk of reconstruction while we need to proceed with reorganization. All the citizens of Japan should think with a cool heart of the fundamental reasons for the difference in heaven’s rewards and punishment, how the basis for the reorganization of Japan that is desired can be established, decide on a national policy that the whole country unanimously agrees upon, and on the basis of this unity of all the Japanese citizens petition the emperor to exercise his authority so that while giving homage to the emperor the foundations for the reorganization of the nation can forthwith be established.

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Our seven hundred million brethren in China and India have no way of establishing their independence without our aid and help. In our Japan the population has doubled in the last fifty years, and based on the rate of population growth there is no doubt that we will need territory in the next hundred years to sustain a population of at least two hundred and forty or fifty million. A hundred years for a country are comparable to a hundred days for an individual. How can those who are concerned about this inevitable future, or saddened by the wretched state of neighbouring countries, find comfort in the pacifist ideas of doctrinaire socialism. I can positively say that there is no denying that a society progresses through class war, but what is this so-called social science that closes its eyes to wars between people and wars between nations that have taken place since the beginning of mankind. The authority of the European theory of revolution is based on such a shallow and superficial philosophy so that when it is necessary to comprehend this philosophy of the ‘gospel of the sword’ then the noble Greece of Asian civilization itself must take the initiative for the reorganization of the nation, and waving the flag for an Asian alliance and a world alliance, spread the teachings of the Way of Heaven to the Four Seas that all people are children of the Buddha.

I

The People’s Emperor

(THREE LINES DELETED) SUSPENSION OF THE CONSTITUTION

F

or the emperor and all the Japanese people to determine the basis for the national reorganization on the basis of imperial authority the constitution will be suspended for three years and both houses dissolved and the entire nation brought under martial law. Note 1: (Eleven lines deleted) There is no doubt that in extraordinary times harmful views and votes should be ignored. To regard an assembly or constitution as an absolute ideal is to accept a literal translation of a hallowed idea of (kyokenteki) Western democracy. Those who think in this way are obdurate conservatives hiding the real principles of ‘democracy’. They resemble the ludicrous arguments of those who explain Japan’s kokutai on the basis of [Shinto mythical] theories of the High Plain of Heaven. It cannot be said that in debating a bill on naval expansion one vote of Admiral Togo is not worth more than the three votes of the disgraceful Diet members, or that in voting on social programmes one vote by Karl Marx is not worth more than seven cast by Okura Kihachiro.1 The effect of giving an absolute value to the present form of a government elected by votes ignores those people that have value and is nothing but support for the old order. Note 2: (eight lines deleted) People who think that a coup d’état is an abuse of power for a conservative autocracy are people who ignore history. Napoleon did not compromise with conservative elements even when a large majority of the assembly and the newspapers were full of elements seeking to restore monarchical government and, so, ushered in a pure revolutionary period. As can be seen in the example of the present Russian revolution even though Lenin dissolved the assembly, which was full of harmful elements armed with machine guns, popular opinion still sees a coup d’état as the act of conservative forces.

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Note 3: (Five lines deleted) A coup d’état should be seen as the direct exercise of national power that is the social will. If we look at the progress of people then they, too, have come from popular groups. Political leaders such as Napoleon and Lenin give rise to such people. With the reorganization of Japan there will certainly be a coalition of popular groups and the leader, leading to the development of power. Note 4: (Seven lines deleted) The necessity of dissolving the two houses is that the nobility and the rich classes who support these houses cannot support the emperor and the people in carrying out the reorganization. The reason for the necessity of suspending the constitution is that these people seek the protection of the present laws enacted under this constitution. The necessity of promulgating martial law is in order that the freedom of the country to suppress their resistance is not restricted in any way. However, those who in ignorance transplant a semi-revolutionary theory from abroad to argue for reorganization must also be suppressed. THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EMPEROR

The fundamental principles of the emperor as the representative of the people and pillar of the nation must be made clear. (Four lines deleted) To make this principle clear a complete reform of the imperial court will be carried out on the basis of the spirit of the founder of the nation, Emperor Jimmu, and the revolution under the great Emperor Meiji and the present privy councillors and other officials will be dismissed and talent to assist the emperor will be sought from the realm. (Two lines deleted) An advisory council to assist the emperor will be established. The members of this council will be appointed by the emperor and the council will consist of fifty members. (Three lines deleted) A member of the advisory council must tender his resignation to the emperor when the cabinet committee takes action against him or the Diet passes a vote of no-confidence against him. However, they will not be responsible to either the cabinet or the Diet. Note 1: The kokutai of Japan has progressed through three stages, and the significance of the emperor has changed through these three stages. The first stage, from the Fujiwara to the turning point of the Taira period, was of absolutist monarchy. During this period, in theory, the emperor possessed all the lands and all the people as his private property and had the power of life and death and to give or confiscate. The second stage, from the Genji up to the Tokugawa, was a period of an aristocratic state. During this period leaders or lords in the different regions controlled the lands and people as their private

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property, and from this base functioned as so many small states and small rulers, some times fighting, at others allying with one another. The significance of the emperor changed from the first period as, by recognizing the leadership of the Bakufu over an alliance of these small rulers, he became, like the Pope, the traditional focus of popular religious beliefs. This process was similar to that of European medieval history where various lords gave allegiance to the Holy Roman Emperor. In the third stage, the bushi and the people, as a consciousness of individuality developed amongst them sought to free themselves from being the private possessions of the Shogun and Daimyo, and finally, with the Meiji ishin-kakumei began the period of a democratic state. From this period the emperor becomes purely and simply the political centre, and as the leader of the national movement and representative of the democratic state, he represents the nation. Since the Meiji ishin-kakumei, Japan has been a modern democracy with the emperor as the political centre. Why do we have these poor people who continue to think within the confines of literal translations of an imported idea, ‘democracy’. This history and the contemporary situation must be understood, for the debate between the bigoted kokutai ideologues and the worshippers of the West is really inauspicious and has created an explosive situation between the emperor and the people. Note 2: There is absolutely no scientific basis for the thinking that a ‘democracy’, that is, a state system in which the representatives of the people are selected by an electoral system is better than a system where the state is represented by a single person. The nation differs according to the spirit of the peoples of each nation and the history of the formation of the nation. One cannot say that China, which has had a republican government for eight years is more rational than Belgium where one person represents the nation. The American idea of ‘democracy’ is based on the idea of a society formed through the free will of individuals who enter into a free contract and the extremely crude ideas of the time that individuals broke away from the original countries of Europe and formed village communities and these became nations. The theory of the divine right of voters was a feeble philosophy, merely the obverse of the divine right of kings. This did not happen with the establishment of Japan, and neither was there a period when such a feeble philosophy was dominant. A system where the head of the state has to manipulate views by selling his name, refining his mannerisms like a low-class actor to fight elections, is for the Japanese race who have been brought up to believe that silence is golden and modesty a virtue, invitation enough to remain a mute spectator to this strange custom. Note 3: The present imperial court has not only restored medieval customs but has added survivals of practices from European courts.

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So it is extremely difficult to ignore the fact that it has moved far from the spirit of the founder of the nation as the supreme commander above an equal citizenry. The revolution of the great Meiji emperor sought to modernize by reviving this spirit, but at the same time the imperial court was purified. It is necessary to undertake this again because, when the whole national structure is being fundamentally reorganized, the imperial court alone cannot be left in its present decrepit state. Note 4: (Five lines deleted) The necessity of a system of censure for members of the advisory committee by a decision of the cabinet or the Diet is necessary so that as at present this responsibility of the emperor is not used as an excuse for arbitrary actions by people. ABOLITION OF THE PEERAGE SYSTEM

The true character of the Meiji ishin-kakumei will become apparent once the peerage system is abolished, and by removing this superficial curtain the estrangement between the emperor and the citizens will end. The House of Peers will be abolished and a deliberative assembly formed that will deliberate the decisions of the House of Representatives. The powers of deliberative assembly will be limited to rejecting the decisions of the House of Representatives only once. The members of the deliberative assembly will be elected from among a group of distinguished men from various fields who have been selected by imperial appointment. Note 1: The Meiji ishin-kakumei, by overthrowing aristocratic politics and determinedly carrying forward the dissolution of aristocratic landholdings went much further than most European countries, with the lone exception of France as they could not dispose the earlier medieval landholdings. However, with the death of people like the Great Saigo, their revolutionary spirit was replaced by people like Ito Hirobumi, mere followers who, without understanding our progress, imported as models the remnant backward, medieval, aristocratic privileges of Europe. Abolishing the peerage system would mean discarding the literal transplantation of a European system and returning to the basic principles of the ishin-kakumei. Do not draw the hasty conclusion that there are shortcomings that we have to learn to correct. In many ways we have advanced much further as a democratic country than they have. Note 2: The reason a bicameral assembly will make fewer mistakes than a unicameral assembly is that public opinion when aroused is emotional, uncritical and fickle. This is why the upper house should

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not be composed of medeival relics but of distinguished men from different fields. GENERAL ELECTIONS

Any male above twenty-five years, as a citizen of the great Japanese nation, has the equal right to stand as a representative of the house of representatives or of the deliberative assembly and to vote. The same rules will apply to bodies of local self-government. Women will not have the right to participate in politics. Note 1: The system in a number of countries where electoral rights are dependent on whether tax is paid or not, even though it originated in Britain where parliament was originally established to manage the taxes collected for the crown, the principle arising from within the Japanese nation is that it is based on their rights as Japanese. By saying that all Japanese indirectly pay taxes is not to reduce the qualifications of tax payers but to see general elections as a duty. Just as conscripts have the ‘duty of military service’ so elections are ‘the right of citizens’. Note 2: The duty of citizens to protect the nation is an integral part of the right of citizens to participate in politics. Given the true character and the human rights of the citizens of Japan, there is no reason for them to be like the slaves of Rome, or the dogs and horses of the imperial period who were permitted imperial audiences, but as they were ruled over they had to entrust their lives to the ruling class. This authority and this duty cannot be violated under any circumstances. For instance, soldiers, even if they are fighting abroad, should have the right to vote and be elected without any restrictions. Note 3: The reason for not allowing women the right to participate in politics is because the present-day women of Japan have not reached that stage of consciousness. The knights of medieval European history worshipped women and sought their favour but the bushi of medieval Japanese history, while they respected the character of women as much as they did their own, at that stage of development required women to worship men and seek their favour. This repressive development affected all elements of social life and continues to do so in contemporary times. Therefore, while abroad there has been a movement towards women participating in politics, here we have ‘good wife, wise mother’ (ryosai kenbo). If we can, through Reorganization, improve the system where the right of women to be wives and mothers of the nation will be protected, then the women’s problem will be completely solved. To involve women in verbal warfare is to waste their natural talents, and even worse, to use these talents on the battlefield. People who are familiar with the meaningless chatter of Western women or the

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shrill quarrelling of Chinese women will be grateful that Japanese women have developed along the correct path. Those who have developed along the right path should teach those who have developed along a bad path. That is why today one says that the time has come for a synthesis of Eastern and Western civilizations. (Rf. The Right of Livelihood of the People) RESTORATION OF FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE

All laws that restrict the past freedom of the people and which violate the spirit of the constitution must be abolished. The Civil Service Appointment Ordinance, The Peace Preservation Police Law, The Press Act, The Publication Law. Note 1: These are known principles. These laws only serve to support a variety of cliques. (THREE LINES DELETED) THE NATIONAL REORGANIZATION CABINET

Under martial law, apart from the existing ministries, there will be production-oriented ministries, as given below, and in addition a number of ministers without portfolio will be appointed and a reorganized cabinet formed. (Two lines deleted) The members of the reorganized cabinet will reject people from the former military, bureaucratic, financial and party cliques, and select talented people from the nation for these positions. (Two lines deleted) All prefectural governors will be uniformly dismissed and national reorganization governors appointed. Their selection will be the same as above. Note 1: (Eight lines deleted) This was exactly why the ishin-kakumei could not have been carried out by the Tokugawa sovereign and his vassals. The value of a revolution, however, cannot be determined by the extent of bloodshed. This is the same as judging an operation by the quantity of blood lost and saying that if there was a small loss then the operation was not thorough. It all depends on the ability of the surgeon and the physical condition of the patient to be operated upon. Japan today is in good health like a man in his prime. Russia and China are like old patients whose bodies are in decay and bones rotting. If there was a surgeon who looked at the past and the present and took wisely from East and West, then the reorganization of Japan could be carried out in the course of a pleasant conversation.

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(TWO LINES DELETED) THE NATIONAL REORGANIZATION DIET

While martial law is in effect, a national, reorganized Diet will be convened through a general election and the reorganization debated. (Two lines deleted) The emperor will, by the third period of the reorganization Diet, submit the reformed constitutional proposal and proclaim the reformed constitution and at the same time dissolve the reorganization Diet. Note 1: The reason why it is not an abuse of power or a coup d’état if the emperor is the commander under martial law and the people the principal force is because the emperor and people together represent the nation.2 Note 2: This is not a problem of legal philosophy but a real problem. It is not an academic argument whether the Russian and German emperors have these powers but it is the Japanese people who alone put their spiritual trust in his majesty the emperor of Japan.3 Note 3: This is because, within the absolutist bureaucracy which sees capital as the answer to everything, stress is not only laid in conducting general elections but also because there is opposition to the reorganization both among the majority and within the smaller groups in the Diet; members or those who oppose reorganization provide election funds to candidates. There is no doubt that during elections to the Diet in martial law period, the rights of voters will be protected and capacity of Diet members to harm the system will be restricted. Note 4: The only reason that the Meiji ishin-kakumei did not result in such a wretched upheaval as the French Revolution but yet completely fulfilled its aims is because of the divine character (shinkakuteki) of the emperor. Once again, because of the divine character of the emperor the reorganization of Japan will not lead to the killing and rebellion of soldiers as happened during the Russian revolution nor will it experience the absurdities of the German revolution but be completed under proper order.4 (TWO LINES DELETED) GRANTING OF IMPERIAL PROPERTY TO THE NATION

The emperor will personally set an example by granting land, forests, stocks, etc. owned by the imperial house to the nation. The expenses of the imperial house will be set at 30 million yen annually to be provided by the national treasury. If the situation necessitates it, this amount can be increased with the permission of the Diet. (Four lines deleted) Note 1: The present imperial property has its origins in the property taken over from the Tokugawa family and it

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would be contradictory if this medieval idea of property were to continue for the light of the true meaning of the emperor to shine forth. It is self-evident that the nation should bear all the expenses of the people’s emperor.

II

Limit on Private Wealth

A

Japanese citizen will be allowed to own property up to a limit of Yen 3,000,000 per family. The same ceiling will apply to Japanese nationals owning property abroad. Violations of this limit by donating the property to blood relatives or others, and attempts to transfer ownership in any other manner, will not be permitted. Note: Though establishing a ceiling and permitting private wealth below Yen 3 million, I recognize the various theories of social revolution which totally reject private wealth as a final objective and seek to fundamentally transform the understanding of man and society. The individual’s freedom to act and seek enjoyment should not be dependent on private wealth. It is a different and an unimportant problem that some people in reaction to the theories arising from a view of society as all powerful, disregard differences in wealth and urge a uniform equality. I, however, argue that as individuals’ abilities differ, the system must recognize these differences. Man cannot be equal in the desire for physical enjoyment and physical activity. Note: It is natural that the law will extend to the wealth held by citizens outside the country. The reason for making this clear is because people who hope to evade this limit will clearly see that it is not permitted. Examples are the moribund nobility during the French Revolution, and in present-day China, of bureaucrats seeking to escape taxes who find security for their wealth in the concession settlements. GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY EXCEEDING THE LIMIT

The state will take over all property exceeding the ceiling without paying compensation. The existing law cannot be used to justify refusal to hand over such property. If there is someone who seeks to violate this law, he will be seen as bringing into contempt the authority of the emperor and

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endangering the fundamental principles of the Reorganization of the nation. The crime of endangering the emperor and that of rebellion against the nation will be enforced during the period of martial law, and for such crimes the death sentence administered. Note 1: The present state, seen from the point of economic organization, is not a unified state but in its economic system it is at the stage of the ‘warring states’, that is it is a feudal state. In America the political rule of the daimyo was eventually established. The state has, progressed from a period when the bushi or warriors as a family, raised private armies, to fight aggressive wars of subjugation, to the present state of unity. Similarly, only by ending the economic feudal structure with its private economic armies will it be possible to bring about the internal economic unity of the state. Note 2: The reason for not giving compensation to the present big capitalists and big landlords for the appropriation is that these few people have been able to accumulate this wealth, which is actually the product of common social progress and common production, because of an iniquitous system. The second reason is that if they are compensated from the public debt then they will, as earlier, have the wealth to injure the economic unity of the country. The third reason is that the state cannot spread this compensation to this illogical ownership of capital which is actually the capital of the state and which, for the first time in history, can be directly administered by the state. Note 3: The death penalty is not something that is desirable. It is also surely not necessary to consider the vengeful uprisings of the propertyless. Actually, in collecting the land of the nobility, we shall learn from the prudent foresight of the ancient wisdom of Saigo Takamori,5 who said that if there are any dissenting domains (han) they should be subjugated. Seeing the death of one or two people everyone will obey. In the future, after the reorganization, those who acquire wealth exceeding the ceiling on private property will deliver that amount to the state. The state will regard this as rational labour and accept this payment as a donation and will adopt a policy of clearly regarding this as meritorious labour. It will not be possible, with the intention of avoiding this objective, to distribute or donate to blood relatives or others. The penalty for violators will be decided under the law. It should be understood that the origin of wealth at present and after the Reorganization will be different. ASSEMBLY OF THE ARMY RESERVISTS ASSOCIATION

The Army Reservists Association: The emperor will use the Army Reservists Association as an organ under the Reorganization cabinet

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during the period of martial law to maintain law and order and to conduct a survey in all areas of those who exceed the ceiling on private property and to appropriate this excess. The Assembly of the Army Reservists Association will be convened by mutual election on the basis of equality and it will function as a permanent body for this survey and appropriation. Note: The Army Reservists Association members, as soldiers, not only carry out national duties but also spread patriotism among the people. Further, as most of them are farmers and workers, they at the same time constitute the sound working class that determines the health of the state. (Note deleted) 1: It should be noted that the Army Reservists Association is very rational in comparison to the labour army of Russia and that of other countries such as Germany which modelled themselves on the Russian example. It is sad and unfortunate that the present conscription system brings together workers and pits them against one another. Note 2: The character of the soldiers of the Army Reservists Association would make them ideal members of a labour army. Further, the Japanese army would prepare to fight foreign enemies and not be used to suppress its own people. Note 3: One reason for the participation of different government offices in the collection of wealth and other taxes from the people is to prevent collusion between rich families to cheat the state of taxes. The second is that this is not a reorganization affected by the authority of the bureaucracy but fundamentally one carried out by the people for their own benefit. (Note 4: There can be no argument that depending on the situation that the concerned government office should assist so that there is no error or injustice in the survey and recruitment for the Army Reservists Association.)

III

Three Principles of Land Distribution Limit to Private Land Holdings

T

he ceiling on private land holding in the ownership of a single family in Japan should be of the present value of Yen 100,000. It will not be possible to gift private land with the intention of violating this limit to retain ownership. Note 1: The freedom of the people is protected by the state and it can also limit this freedom. The people can have private land because the state protects them from invasion or other forms of violence. The state can limit the freedom of those who accumulate a great deal of property. Note 2: The reason for putting a limit is that, unlike in socialism, we recognize the existence of landlords and tenants. It is a baseless argument that land holding is a right given by God. People are not equal and each individual is different economically and in his wellbeing. The existence of landlords and tenants can be seen as the will of God and also as a necessary stage in the development of a society. APPROPRIATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIVATE LAND IN EXCESS OF THE LIMIT

The government will appropriate land in excess of the ceiling on private land holdings. The government will give 3 per cent interest-bearing bonds in compensation. However, this will not exceed the ceiling on private wealth. In those cases where private wealth plus compensatory public bonds exceed the ceiling on private wealth, the amount in excess will not be given in compensatory public bonds. (the following line deleted) The penalty for a violation under martial law will be the same as stated earlier.

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Note 1: The large existing landlords take the form of the medieval nobility but in essence they are modern in their right to private property. Ownership in medieval property does not concern itself with how it was acquired but only with the right of the strong. Consequently, because of the concept of the Meiji ishin-kakumei, ownership was no longer based on strength but on labour, thus the strong lost their power and right to ownership. This is reflected in the concept of not acquiring property over a certain ceiling and is not a change arising from modern ideas. It is only to protect the unity of the nation and the freedom of the people to limit the right of ownership of a few. Therefore, if the excess owned is within the limits then compensation will be awarded. Note 2: There is a great difference in the concept and reality of private property between Ireland, which is medieval and hence the social upheaval, and Japan, where it is modern. The present-day confiscation of land in the Russian revolution is nothing other than an inferior repetition of what took place in the Meiji ishin-kakumei fifty years earlier. Russia, on many counts, literary, political, academic and so on. is beyond doubt a late developer. The direct import of English ideas on land problems or the worship of Lenin is comparable to a beautiful woman praising an ugly one. (THREE LINES DELETED) ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE COLLECTION OF LAND

The Assembly of the Army Reservists Association will, under the supervision of the Army Reservists Association, evaluate the price and collect the land that exceeds the limit on private land holding. Note 1: The same as above. PEOPLE WHO EXCEED THE CEILING ON PRIVATE LAND HOLDINGS

In future, people who exceed the ceiling on private land holding will hand over the excess land to the state and receive compensation. They cannot gift it to blood relatives or, in any other manner, attempt to retain ownership illegally. The penal regulations for offenders who seek to violate the fundamental law of the nation, will be based on the spirit of the law against such actions. OWNERSHIP OF ACQUIRED LAND BY THE PEOPLE

The state will divide the land handed over by the imperial household and by those who hold land in excess of the limit on private land holdings and give it to landless cultivators who will pay an annual

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instalment for ownership. A separate law will determine the amount of the yearly instalment, the instalment period, etc. Note 1: There is no gainsaying that in socialism the state becomes a big landlord, in place of the private individual, and then all are equal tenants borrowing land for cultivation. In Russia they opposed these ideas and many revolutionary thinkers argued for an alternative concept, of the ownership of land by the people through equal distribution. However, problems in daily material life cannot be solved by one principle. As the state protects it makes possible the ownership of private property by individuals and the state. As the supreme proprietor it can, therefore, decide whether the state or the people will possess property. In Russia it is right for the people to possess land, while in Ireland it is possible for the state to possess the land of the aristocracy. Whichever of these two is followed, the state decides in accordance with the condition in the country and what is beneficial for it. In Japan the right of the state is to request land from big landlords and adopt this form of national ownership. In Japan, given the small farm system, ownership by the people who cultivate is also possible. A fundamental principle is that agricultural land is different from residential land in the city, and it is comparable to capital as a basic resource of economic life, and therefore, in the same manner, just as there is a limit on capital there should be a limit on agricultural land. This is a fundamental right of the people. Note 2: The principle of the Reorganization is not to reject private ownership but to protect it for all people. Just as a musician cannot be satisfied with a borrowed instrument, so a farmer cannot be happy tilling borrowed land. Looking at man as only a public animal, as in the extreme arguments of revolutionaries, is as bad as the old economic ideas of seeing only self-interest as an incentive in economic life. Both are extremes and mistaken. Man has both public and selfinterests. Therefore, the society to be reorganized should not be guided by the two extremes. OWNERSHIP OF CITY LAND BY THE CITY

All land in the city will belong to the city. The latter will furnish as compensation 3 per cent interest-bearing city bonds. The maximum amount of compensation plus the amount of private wealth will be added, and where the amount exceeds the limit on private wealth, the previously mentioned rules will apply. The organization of acquired land is as mentioned earlier. (One line deleted) The organizations for collecting the land are the same as mentioned above. Note 1: This is limited to cities because the towns and villages do not have the basis to build such a system and so have been left out.

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Note 2: Land prices in cities rise not because of the labour of owners, as in the case of agricultural land, but because cities develop. An occupier cannot profit from the general development of the city. Therefore, the city acquires the land. Note 3: A city can finance itself, without any problems, with the large revenues from land rental. Therefore, the city can develop without any constraints and with development rental values will rise and this will lead cyclically to an increase in land rent which will enrich the city’s finances. Note 4: Houses, like clothes, are based on an individual’s tastes and needs. Some are satisfied with a house on three tsubo while others want to build very large houses. Socialists at some period had the wild idea that people could live their lives together in similar houses; just like wearing a military uniform. Note 5: The profit from a rented house is different from the profit from land ownership. Therefore, the city will reassess the rental price of land every five years. LAND THAT SHOULD BE UNDER STATE OWNERSHIP

The state will nationalize large forests or virgin land requiring largescale capital and itself manage land requiring large-scale farming techniques. Note 1: According to the principle of the unification of capital by the state given below. Note 2: Land is the basis of life in Japan and therefore, in the future, it is destined to acquire large tracts of land from international redistribution. Japan must think of increasing the land under state management. The basic principle is that there should be both public and private ownership. Note 3. Japan’s land problem is not merely settling landlord/tenant problems. There is no value in ideas unless revolutionary ideas are spread in those areas that possess, in the international distribution, an unreasonable amount of land of land. (See The Authority of the State)

IV

Unification of Big Capital by the State

LIMITS ON PRIVATELY-OWNED ENTERPRISES

T

he capital of privately-owned enterprises will be limited to Yen 10 million. The same will be applicable to privately-owned Japanese enterprises abroad. Note 1: The ceiling on private property and on private enterprises will not be considered in the same way. The ceiling on those who own private enterprises, whether limited or unlimited, and conduct business using loans will be completely different from the former. Note 2: There are many reasons, as is clear from earlier notes, why we permit limited private enterprise. One reason is that one of the motives of man’s economic activity is governed by self-interest. A second reason is that when trying a new experiment it is not possible to wait for everyone to initiate it and therefore, it is always necessary to use the creative powers of certain individuals. A third reason is that no matter how much a public production system develops it cannot fulfil all the needs of the people, and therefore, in the future, in real terms it will, as before, be dependent largely on the private economic activity of small capital. The fourth reason is that the government must support and develop freedom of economic activity because freedom and the human rights of people are dependent on this. These reasons show that as a constructive theory, the fundamental ideas of socialism are wrong and that is why it has not been able to win support worldwide. Thus Marx and Kropotkin should be considered as leading thinkers of the underdeveloped nineteenth century. NATIONALIZATION OF ENTERPRISES THAT EXCEED THE CEILING

Those enterprises that exceed the ceiling on private enterprises, will be consolidated and managed by the state.

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Compensation will be made by public bonds bearing 3 per cent interest. Compensation and its relation to private wealth will be based entirely on the limit on private wealth. (Following line deleted) Under martial law the penal regulations for offenders are the same as stated earlier. Note 1: There is no need to explain that according to socialism big capital is the product of the accumulation of social capital. It is also natural that society, that is the state, receives what it accumulates. Note 2: Currently, big capital works for its own private benefit and under its private management, just as the daimyo used soldiers to kill and control the lives of people for their own, individual purposes. Within China, at present, where private armies are fighting for their own interests it is unimaginable that any political unification can take place. It is comparable to the state in the USA which allows railways, telegraph and other social amenities to be controlled by private capital and therefore is like China, in that capitalists are fighting among themselves. If the sole purpose of the state is to ensure peace and order among the people then the capitalists who continually threaten the people must be curbed by the state, and if it does not do this then it is tantamount to there being no state. There is no reason to fear anarchists but it is very dangerous if a state itself neglects its own duties and functions. Note 3: Looked at positively, it is a more rational form (of governance) when the state takes the initiative for the unification of ‘big capital’ than the US ‘trusts’ and the German ‘cartels’. You can presume that the future productive powers of the state will be far greater than in the earlier period of confiscations, as there is a far more reasonable match between theory and practice. Note 4: The very rich will be left with only Yen l million, as the state will acquire enterprises and land in excess of this. At the same time, those with stock or capital of less than Yen l million will be compensated, without injury, when the state acquires the companies in excess of this. The middle and lower classes will not be inconvenienced in the least; only the upper will be affected. (TWO LINES DELETED) ORGANIZATIONS FOR COLLECTING CAPITAL

The organizations for the collection of capital that exceeds the limit for private industry will be done through the assembly of the Army Reservists Association as mentioned above. Note 5: (Four lines deleted) The survey and collection from those who exceed the limit on private wealth is a fundamental rule that applies to the excess holdings of land and capital, and therefore once the principle is formulated then the rest is a matter of minor detail.

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If it is effected through the Army Reservists Association then it is not necessary that it will take three years of martial law to accomplish. PRIVATE ENTERPRISES THAT EXCEED THE CEILING AFTER THE REORGANIZATION

In future, after the Reorganization, when, because of the development of industry or for any other reason, private enterprises exceed the limit, they will be brought totally under state management. The state will give public bonds in compensation and, in principle, the said enterprise’s owner will be employed as a manager. The penal law for offenders, who seek to disrupt the fundamental law of the state, will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the law. Even though a particular enterprise does not exceed the capital limit on private enterprises, when it essentially benefits from big capital or the owners recognize that state management would be more rational then, through joint consultation, the state can be requested to take over management. Note 1: It is a possible cause for worry that the managers of enterprises will be frustrated by the country managing enterprises of Yen 10 million and above. As everyone knows, the view of life of the communists that man is a public animal reveals the other side of this problem. Further, when analysing the desire for profit, weight must be given to the motive to show their ability in the public domain. Managers are themselves satisfied with a display of their efforts. Consider the motives of generals, who acted not only for patriotism but also for honour and self-satisfaction in their ability. Their motives are no less than that of the period of warring states (sengoku) period when the shogun fought for provinces and castles for personal economic gain. You do not need to rely only on the fact that managers have public motives but that they work for private gain as well. Personal egoism incorporates many motives, and these can be channelled to work in a beneficial manner for the state, so when the state takes over the managers will be encouraged to exceed the limit. After the Reorganization it is certainly reasonable to expect that being a public animal means good nature will logically govern the thought and behaviour of people, as there will be no bad motives. Note 2: Once the limit of Yen 1 million is reached the desire for personal profit must be extinguished and work done for society and the state. Once the limit of Yen 10 million for private enterprises is reached, on the basis and scale of the enterprise, it will not be possible to think in terms of any private motive but only of social profit and welfare. Therefore, the two limits are part of the neglected morality of the state and all that now needs to be done is to make them into law.

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PRODUCTIVE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE STATE

No. 1: Ministry of Banks: The capital accumulated from various large banks, which exceed the ceiling on private enterprises, and the wealth collected from people who have exceeded the limit on private wealth, will form the capital for the ministry. For foreign investment, abundant capital and a unified policy are necessary. Money will be lent to other productive ministries. Money will be lent to private banks. There will be rational regulation of currency and commodity prices. Absolute safety will be guaranteed for the people’s deposits. Note 1: The foreign activity of the present-day banks and that of the ministry of banks is as different as that of private soldiers in China and the unified army of Japan. Japan would certainly be defeated if it assembled private troops to fight; similarly, because of the lack of capital, a ministry of banks becomes necessary. Note 2: When trade is good and foreign money flows in then it is feared that prices will rise. The ministry of banks can keep gold bars for an emergency situation for the state and exercise a rational control on prices. The state’s lack of control over money is one of the reasons underlying the contradictory situation where the people’s livelihood is bad even though the economic conditions are good. Note 3: One of the major worries for the people is that if a bank goes bankrupt then their hard-earned saving and deposits, which are crucial to the fate of business, will be wiped out. Thus, Iwashita Seishu6 can be heavily punished but for the thousand of sufferers this is small consolation. With a ministry of banks, as long as the Great Japan Empire and her people are not destroyed, there will be no worry about savings. No. 2: Navigation Ministry: The capital for this ministry will be collected from private owners of shipping industries, exceeding the limit on private enterprises, and using this shipping capital the major objective will be to fight for superiority, principally for control of the sea lanes. Also to manage shipbuilding and war vessels, etc. Note: This is just like the nationalization of the railroad service. The ability to compete with foreigners can be inferred from the case of trusts and cartels. No. 3: Ministry for Mining: The various large mines whose capital and value exceed the ceiling on private production will be integrated and managed by the ministry of banks, and the wealth gathered from private enterprises and people who exceed the limit imposed on private wealth will form the capital for this ministry. For abundant foreign and internal capital, a unified policy is necessary. Money will be advanced to other ministries concerned with

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production. Money will be advanced to private banks. There will be rational regulation of currency and commodity prices, and guarantee of complete safety of people’s deposits. Note 1: The reason why the value of a mine, as well as its capital is specified is because while everyone thinks of equipment and machinery, the mines themselves are also a part of capital so this mistake should be avoided. Note 2: Present-day politics is really bad as a few people own the mines which have been won by the blood and lives of so many (e.g. the Bujun mines in China). The state has brought about this decline in patriotism and the rise of anarchist parties. No. 4: Ministry of Agriculture: Management of National Land. Management of the Taiwan sugar industry and forests. Cultivation of new land in Taiwan, Hokkaido, Karafuto and Korea. Cultivation of land in north and south Manchuria and other acquired lands; the management of all acquired large-scale farming land. Note: Neither the people nor the state should suspect that the crimes committed by the rich, as in Taiwan in the sugar industry and in forest products, are allegedly because the state is immoral and unjust. In the future when Japan has north and south Manchuria and eastern Siberia, an area over ten times the size of Taiwan, then such crimes, allegedly the responsibility of the state and the people, will reflect unfavourably on the honour of Japan. For a fair international division of land, particularly in order to expand Japan’s possessions, this will damage Japan’s right and we will not be able to build a great empire even in a hundred years. No. 5: Ministry of Industries: Regulation and control of various large industries that have been taken over; supporting their expansion and creating an organization of large industries to make them the equal of foreign industries; the management of industries that have not been privately set up to fulfil a national deficiency; the management of naval ironworks and arms workshops of the army that have till now been under the management of the navy and the army. Note: Japan is wanting in capital in comparison to the Powers and so it must quickly establish economic organizations such as trusts and cartels. As shown in the past war, there are many factories in Japan that cannot depend on self-management and self-supply. Japan cannot depend thoughtlessly on capitalism, which has as its objective personal profit, within the present critical international period or even in the future. No. 6: Ministry of Commerce: Will manage agricultural and industrial goods produced by the government and private production, will control internal prices, and carry out an active foreign trade policy. All tariffs determined by the ministry for carrying out this objective will be presented to the cabinet.

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Note 1: There is an absolute limit on personal property, personal land and personal business. As big capital will be under the state private individuals will not be able to do evil things like opposing government regulation of prices by hoarding and other such acts. Therefore, the state will be able to control prices without any problems. Look at the way the price of rice has risen these days because of the big landlords and speculative merchants using big capital to hoard. All price problems start from here. To try and control prices without controlling big capital is laughable and mindless politics. Note 2: When internal prices rise because of a rise in world prices, as they did during the war, the state can regulate the difference between the buying power of the people and world prices by taxes on exports. Public and private goods can be governed by a tax system based on a uniform rule, thus preventing a sudden escalation of prices within the country and at the same time getting revenue for the state from the profits of the trade. However, this is not a principle but measures to be used only in extreme situations. How can Japan fulfil its destiny with economic organizations that cause the people to feel uneasy and rise up? It cannot. If you think that a great war is inevitable in the future then Reorganization is necessary for stability in these special times. No 7: Ministry of Railways: Replacing the present railway institution will unify the Korean railway and the South Manchurian Railway.7 It will take possession of all railways in future colonies and, further, will be actively involved in managing future construction, and other activities. Branch lines that are below the limit imposed on private industry will be left under private management Note 1: I have already written about the problems of the few rich who own the South Manchurian Railway, built with blood, in the note on ministry of mines. If in the future, a railway like the South Manchurian Railway is built then it will be clear that there is no fighting spirit among the people. Note 2: Private railway construction acts as a check on publiclyowned railways and leads to problems, like trampling the economic rights of the people and reduction of profits of public railways. It is most unreasonable to think of nationalizing railway lines that go to even small mountain villages and leave the sea lanes, which are major lines, to private ownership. Which railways will be under public and which under private ownership should be determined on the basis of the principles of the limit on private capital and the unification of big capital by the state. A state must have only one basic principle.

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The large revenues from productive ministries will match the expenditure of the consuming ministries, and expenses for the protection of the people’s livelihood as written below. Therefore, all unjust taxes, except for the basic tax, should be completely abolished. Needless to say, the productive ministries will pay the same taxes as the private producers. The monopoly sale system for salt and cigarettes will be stopped and according to the principle of recognizing national and private production as equal, private production below the permissible limit will be permitted and both private and national production will be uniformly taxed. The tax on inherited property violates the right of parent and child, and therefore it should be limited to a commission. Note 1: Although the total capital collected by the state can be calculated to arrive at the real amount a survey needs to be carried out. Note 2: As state production increases, not only unjust taxes but many taxes can be withdrawn. Such a day can easily be visualized. Note 3: Social reformers who believe that the state can obtain revenue from inherited property do not properly consider human rights.

V

Rights of Workers

THE DUTY OF A WORKERS’ MINISTRY

T

he cabinet will establish a ministry of labour whose duty will be to protect the rights of all workers in national and private industry. The ministry of labour will judge labour disputes on the basis of relevant laws. The productive ministries, private producers and labour will all equally obey this decision. Note 1: A worker is a person who, using his strength or intellect, is employed in a private or public enterprise. The military, bureaucrats, teachers, etc. will not be considered workers. For instance, when a policeman wants to exercise his right to a livelihood the ministry of interior, to which he is attached, will decide and when teachers demand action to increase salaries then the ministry of education will decide. The ministry of workers will have no jurisdiction. Note 2: Workers’ strikes and lockouts have, up to the enactment of this law, been a temporary phenomena of the period of class war. Not only can it not be recognized forever, as the special right of workers, but once the Reorganized institutions are established the state will completely prohibit such actions. However, if the Reorganization is not carried out and strikes are suppressed, then the right of selfprotection of the majority of the people will be trampled and this will constitute a grave tyranny. WAGES OF WORKERS

Wages will be based on the principle of free contract. Disputes will be settled on the basis of the previously-mentioned laws of the ministry of labour. Note 1: The reason for a free contract is that the fundamental principle on which all the freedoms of the people are based is that it is absurd for the state to intervene. Truth is not the exclusive possession

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of socialism but lies in the ideals of free-trade economics. While all are workers, there are differences in individual capabilities. Particularly, in the future when a large number of people residing in Japanese colonies desire the rights of citizenship the state cannot deal with each individual immigrant’s abilities and wages. At present, with the suppression of the capitalist system, under the name of free contract, a very restricted wage contract is in operation. However, workers after the Reorganization will maintain true freedom and obviously do nothing to damage this freedom. Note 2: The socialist thinkers, when they forget freedom (namely the idea of distinction), and base themselves on an idealistic equality really think of people as a conscript army and want to establish a system of forced labour. Man does not live for labour alone. Besides, an individual genius is not something that becomes apparent when he has time free from labour. Who will become a great statesman or great inventor or great philosopher or great artist cannot be determined before they accomplish something, and a society cannot exclude them from work before they achieve something. WORKING HOURS

The working hours for labour will be based on the eight-hour system, with Sundays and festivals as holidays, and wages will be paid for these days. Agricultural workers should be paid additional wages during the busy agricultural season when their working hours are extended. Note: An explanation is not required. However, whether free time is spent in moral training or pleasure, for work, at home, or in some other business, is an individual’s freedom of choice. WORKERS’ SHARE IN THE PROFIT

Those workers employed in private enterprises will be allotted one half of the net profits. This allotment will be for mental and manual workers and will be distributed in proportion to their salaries and wages. Private enterprise workers will elect representatives and participate in the management plan of the enterprise and in maintenance of accounts. Further, the same principle will be applied to agricultural workers and landlords. Workers employed in the national industries can be paid on a half-yearly basis in lieu of a share of the profit given to private enterprise workers in the form of participation in management. Besides, maintaining of accounts as workers in private industry, they should, through the Lower House, as citizens of the state, express their views on all aspects of production by the state.

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Note 1: That the worker sells his labour was the mistaken explanation of the old school of economics. Just as businessmen make a profit by combining their business talents with capital, such as machinery, mines, land, etc., similarly, workers add their labour to capital and make a profit. Machinery itself is the result of man’s intelligence and inheritance from his ancestors, and is the cooperative product of society. Mines, land and other such factors are all completely products of nature and only the state has the power to own them, and to obtain profit from them, while with capital, it is necessary to exert oneself in many ways. Businessmen bring their business acumen while workers bring their mental abilities and physical attributes. A worker’s monthly salary or daily wage is the same as a businessman’s annual salary, both constituting living expenses while working. On the one hand, to one of the participants you only give their living expenses and do not offer any of the profit arising from their participation and, on the other hand, to the other participant, aside from the money for their livelihood, they receive all the profit. Such an illogical and ill-thought-out system is really a social institution fit only for animals. Workers, as one of the participants, have the right to participate in management planning. Note 2: The state will not apportion the profit from its enterprises to its employees because it functions on the principle that it manages all production in perpetuity. In the interests of this total production, on occasion, a ministry might take a loss to support the international competitiveness of another ministry and may sell cheaply. To distribute profits according to individual units could then lead to extreme unfairness, as ministry A’s profits would go to ministry B. Therefore, the lower house, which oversees the results of the total production of the state, has the right to participate in the planning of production. LAW FOR A STOCKHOLDING SYSTEM FOR WORKERS

Enterprises, which have general stocks, should allow both skilled and manual workers to own stocks. Note 1: Individual capital and individual labour function together. The system will be established based on the rights of those who are in partial charge of the enterprise. It is also possible to consider individual productivity and efficiency. Note 2: It is presumed that for the next half to one century, enterprises for private production within the established limits will be faced with concern over decline and financial ruin. However, to unite by having workers become stockholders is fundamentally supportive of the health of a particular enterprise.

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Note 3: The right of expression by workers with stock will mean that industrial disputes will be decided at a stockholders’ meeting and there will not be the slightest social unrest. PROTECTION OF TENANT FARMERS

To protect small cultivators who lease land from small landlords who have land below the limit on private land holding, the government should establish a special law based on the fundamental rights of a citizen. Note 1: The fundamental principle for dividing the ownership of land in excess of the limit is different. The old revolutionary theories of the last century, which called for abolition of all landlords, cannot be allowed to exist in the interaction between small landlords and tenants within the limit on private wealth. In all the places where the inertia of the old society exists, the old revolutionary theories flourish. PROHIBITION OF CHILD LABOUR

The labour of those who are not fully sixteen years of age will be prohibited. Those who contravene this prohibition and employ such persons will be fined heavily and also sentenced. Note 1: There is no need for further explanation beyond that of the human rights of the people, i.e. until the age of sixteen children will be educated as mentioned below. The reason why punishment is retained is to strictly protect the lives of the children of the state. Actually, from the point of view of the profit from state production, it will be a hundred times more productive to make children work after the children’s natural abilities are developed through education rather than using them so cruelly and unnaturally. What morality will Japan, which seeks to spread the universal principles of brotherhood throughout the world, have developed if within the country it uses children cruelly. Note 2: At the present level of agricultural development it is unavoidable that women have to work under a hot sun and lose their beauty, and in the near future poor women will continue to work in factories, with little free time. This is an unavoidable fact of life. However, the mission of most women is to be mothers. A woman is someone who helps man as a wife, with the running of a house and as a mother, brings up a child and acts as a primary teacher for the child and therefore she should be educated enough to carry out these duties. A woman was born to carry all the burden of work, which a man cannot do. Therefore, if this natural work is ended and women made to do work for which they are not naturally suited it will be

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cruel not only for women themselves but also for their husbands and their children. According to the Reorganization, if the income of a male worker is sufficient to guarantee the livelihood of his wife and children then, according to the people’s belief of a good wife and a worthy mother (ryosaikenboshugi), women workers will gradually leave the workplace. Note 3: This shows, just as does the right of women to participate in politics, that Japan’s direction of development up to now has been different from that of America and Europe and will also be so in the future. It is not a necessary assumption that Japanese women should fight with men over their jobs as in Europe. It is clear that the state institutions, as written below, guarantee the livelihood of women as wives and mothers, and women receive a people’s education equal to that of men and their work as wives and mothers will be respected as human beings. Note 4: A woman is the light of a home and the flower of life. If women work only as wives and mothers, then the value of male workers will increase and the next generation of citizens will improve, and the state, which is a collection of families, will become a bright and warm place. A woman’s area of social activity is in the uncultivated fields of music, literature, art, education, scholarship and the like. These have been, from the point of women, left uncultivated and unseeded for six thousand years. If women were meant to work like cows and horses then heaven would not have made them slim, beautiful and weak.

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THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN

C

hildren under fifteen years of age who are without parents or a father will qualify as children of the state and be brought up and educated by the state. The state will furnish the child’s expenses through a guardian. The same applies to the child whose father, though alive, has abandoned the child. In this case, however, the state will order the father to pay compensation; the person so ordered can meet the demand through labour. In the event of children inheriting a considerable amount of property from their parents or if they can be brought up well at the expense of their mothers or their mother’s relatives, who are well off or are qualified professionals, then they will have to relinquish their right to state support. Note 1: Man is always worried about his children growing up safely. Just as the samurai, during the feudal period, had nothing to worry about and could live on the basis of a morality that suppressed feelings and take part in dangerous activities, so today the citizens need not worry for their children, who will be protected by the state, and they can go to war, or in peace-time, work. The right of children, is their right as children and whoever their fathers may be, as they will be the citizens of the next generation they have the rights of full citizens. Note 2: The reason why a child without a father will be treated just like an orphan is because of the principle that the mother cannot function as the father. Throwing a gentle, intelligent mother into the agony of labour and a faithful wife into the dirty business of a mistress is something that a husband or a child, who are citizens, cannot bear. The state must assume this responsibility for the husband, children and wives. However, the mother as a person must look after herself. Note 3: The same principle will apply to an abandoned child whose father is alive. There will be no difference between those legally married and those who are not. The reason why the government will

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only ensure that the father pays compensation and will not force him to live with the child is that it cannot decide whether the abandonment of the child is morally wrong or has some positive reason. Note 4: The reason for not putting a child without a father and a mother in an orphanage is that the disadvantages are great and the best way is to entrust him to the care of a blood relation. There can be nothing better than this. Of course when there is no such person then the state will take the child under its care. Note 5: The above rights of children become a protection for the rights of mothers at the same time. THE DUTY OF THE STATE TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE

The state will bear the expenses for the maintenance of the men and women who are above sixty and poor, and do not have a real or adopted son, and those crippled or deformed who lose a father or son and are poor and unfit to work. Note 1: The reason that an unrelated woman does not have the duty to bring up a child is that she cannot work for the livelihood of others but only has the capacity to support herself. After she goes, as a bride, to another house she should not expect her husband to support her parents, as this will give rise to servitude and anxiety on the part of her parents, as well as hurt her personal dignity in her husband’s eyes. Therefore, the principle of not burdening a wife with her parents is based on an old principle in Japan, and at the same time it serves to protect the rights of a woman as a human being. Note 2: There is a great difference from the false individualism of the West as to whether a real or adopted child will look after his parents if they are poor. The famous old age pension law of Mr Llyod George is, in Japan, of no relevance, as aside from some unfortunate cases, most people will have male children who will look after them. Note 3: It is cruel to make the disabled suffer cold treatment from distant relatives and in charity homes. The reason for not burdening the mother or the daughter is that even while there is love, the economic ability is not there with the result that brothers and sisters or the daughters’ husbands bear the burden and this destroys the spirit of the law. Note 4: The state will have to perform its duties under a separate law towards those who are disabled in the service of the state. That is fundamentally a different problem. THE RIGHT TO A PEOPLE’S EDUCATION

People’s education will be from six to sixteen years, and boys and girls will receive the same education. The school system will be fun-

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damentally reorganized to provide consistency over the years to provide a general understanding of the world based on the essence of Japanese culture, and to perfect the mind and body of every individual and build a foundation to enable them to realize their talents. English will be stopped and Esperanto introduced as a second language. Special and formal subjects for women will be abolished and, moreover, middle and high schools abolished. Those schools that duplicate lower, middle and high schools will be abolished and a consistent system implemented. Physical education will be provided equally to boys and girls, and because it’s given to them together, it will lead to the perfection of their hearts and minds. Therefore, the existing mechanical and mindlessly-imported (chokuyaku) sports and military training should be completely abolished. Girls and boys should be encouraged to develop an interest in sports like Japanese fencing, judo, Japanese archery, martial arts (naginata), and sword and chain (kusarigama) both individually as well as collectively, and the existing, mindlessly-borrowed sports banned. People’s education, as the people can receive it as a matter of right, should be so planned that there is no monthly tuition fee, textbooks are provided and meals served during school hours. No stress will be laid on the unnecessary uniformity of dress for male students. In the initial period, primary schools in villages and districts and subsequently higher primary schools will be used. All wastage in physical equipment will be completely stopped. Note 1: Both boys and girls, once they have graduated from middle school, will have learnt common sense. It will be a loss for the individual, as well as weaken the state if the people’s education is ended at primary school when it is not clear whether they understand the meaning of characters or not. The reason for this is that the state cannot provide education because of poverty and the people who would like to be educated cannot afford it. Once this ten-year period of education is over, then both men and women should equally be able, on that basis, to fulfil their destinies and move forward. Note 2: The reason for having a uniform education for girls and boys is that a people’s education is general education and it does not allow for the compartmentalized specialization necessary for seniors, and up to sixteen years there is no reason to differentiate between girls and boys. Therefore, special subjects for girls’ schools like etiquette, the tea ceremony, flower arrangement (ikebana), or subjects in which women specialize, like sewing, cooking, the care of children, etc. should be completely done away with. To force the former subjects is useless and results in harm. The latter should be learnt while helping to look after their own homes. If the principles of etiquette are required subjects for girls then these should be necessary subjects for boys, and if the tea ceremony and ikebana are necessary for girls then it is necessary that boys should learn No chanting.

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Women’s education is unreasonable, stupid and in a truly chaotic state, with the daughter of a jinrickshaw man being taught how to make beefsteaks and the daughter of a foreign ministry official how to sew a hakama, and a girl who has yet to menstruate is lectured on how to bring up children. A school is not the only place to learn. There are many things that should be learned by following the wishes of each person and by conforming to the conditions of each person’s home. Note 3: The reason for completely abolishing English is that neither is it necessary nor required for a people’s education nor is it a duty. Given the progress made by modern Japan, the Englishspeaking people are no longer the only suppliers of knowledge in the world. Further, Japan is not India, a British colony where English is forced on the people. The poisonous influence of English on Japanese thought is comparable to the import of opium, with which the British destroyed the Chinese. However, the only way of mitigating the poisonous influence of English, with the help of heaven, is through German, which though it has not spread as much as English has had a greater influence than British thought. Following the shallow thought of the British people, Christianity, that hollow church building, was imported. Democracy, a product of the historical awareness of man’s rights, is imported without its philosophical basis as ‘minponshugi’.8 These empty cultural ideas are imported but the British and the Americans, who want to continue their special international rights, are propagandizing the principles of peace and anti-militarism, and are against Japanese military preparations and its fighting spirit which seeks to destroy these special privileges. Quite simply, it’s enough to remember the import of opium by China to see that the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages. Language becomes thought and thought becomes domination. The British are building a class of frivolous and irresponsible intellectuals, who will proudly and without shame introduce English for words in shops, books and conversation, and so there is no pride and self-independence left among the people. Certainly, English education should be totally abolished for a people’s education. Aside from those who need it as a specialization, English should be completely banished from the country on the principle that the particularly urgent business of the Reorganization is the lively revival of the fundamental principles of the spirit of the people. Note 4: Reasons for using an international language as a second language. The fact is that you don’t find arguments such as occur here in the countries of America and Europe, innumerable arguments around the question of improving kanji, abolishing kanji, making the written language the same as the spoken. The use of the Roman

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alphabet (romaji) has come about because of the inferiority of the language of Japan, which is the source of the greatest suffering of all the people. When a radical proposal for using romaji is decided upon you can avoid the inconvenience of some letters but, because of the structure of the language itself, the order and expression of ideas is completely contrary to psychological principles, therefore to translate English or Chinese into Japanese you would need to reverse the Japanese arrangement. This should be borne in mind. The national language problem is not merely of script and words but the basic structure of the language must be revolutionized. However, the blessing from this misfortune is that because of the habit that has come down of teaching English in middle schools, those who have received education to that level are firmly convinced of the necessity of acquiring some of the language. It is known that for an international language that can be acquired in a brief period a rational, simple and exact structure is necessary. Everyone is aware of this necessity. An international language, which can be acquired by an adult in three months to half a year and which a twelve-year-old middle-school child can hope to master in one or two years cannot be a language like English, which even after five years of absorption still cannot be actually used properly. Children can hope to acquire an understanding of the world, using the international language in the period of a people’s education. The revolutionary parties of America and Europe understood this much before the First World War and decided to promote it as the international language. Japan needs to end the pain and suffering from an inconvenient language. It can then spread the international language, which, because of the law of natural selection, the people themselves should in about fifty years be able to use as their first language. At that stage special researchers would use today’s Japanese much as Sanskrit and Latin are now used. Note 5: A forceful reason, and a particularly urgent necessity at present, exists for using an international language. As explained below in the ‘Rights of the State’, when Japan, in the very near future, brings under its control the Far East, Siberia, Australia, etc., then almost all the languages of the world will be used within our territories, as aside from people who speak the present Western languages, we will receive immigrants from India, China and Korea. We have forced the Koreans to use Japanese, under which, we suffer, we cannot force the Europeans to learn Japanese as they have a comparatively better national language. We can certainly not say that the national languages of the Chinese and Indian are worse than Japanese. This difficult problem will really become urgent in the next three to five years. We cannot go in a different direction as the sovereign people of Siberia speak Russian, in Australia English, so

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within the territories of Japan a uniform public language must be used when talking to a Japanese. Just as that which is bad dies and that which is good remains, so the natural law of selection will decide the survival and death of the Japanese national language. Therefore, within a hundred years the various European languages, the languages of China, India, Korea will completely die out and be replaced by an international language. To possess a large territory without a unified language is like the glory of the rose of Sharon for but one morning. Note 6: The reason for imparting physical education to both sexes is that, even if you look only at one aspect of the body, it is of fundamental importance. It has already been proved from the evidence provided by pioneers emerging in succession all over Japan. As is shown in all this, Asian culture, which was born in India has been preserved in Japan, sealed from the world and chosen by heaven for protection. Merely moving your hands and feet, depending on instruments, and going on walks and excursions with the desire to improve the body is a literal type of physical education and forgets the true basis for the branches and leaves and is therefore an evil and false model. There can be no other way for women to develop their health while retaining grace and beauty than to harmonize with men. Literally borrowed ideas of gymnastics, such as when degenerate men develop unsightly bodies but fail to cultivate the fundamentals of health, will be expressly forbidden. Note 7: One of the reasons for prohibiting military gymnastics is that it merely creates a formal order, a fact that people who are captives of outward forms have forgotten. Further, as written below, the people of Japan will always be duty bound to perform their military service. Exercises of this nature for soldiers who have volunteered for one year should be prohibited. What needs to be done in the military service should be performed in the military barracks. Another reason is that as Japan’s future depends even more on the seas than on the continent therefore, it would be contradictory to merely implement a people’s education modelled on the army and neglect naval training. The real strength of a people’s education lies in realizing it in its fullness. If within ten years, once a real general education system is established, then it can be used in the navy or in the army to forge the mind and body on the basis of the principles of training. The quality of a soldier, even a second-class soldier, will not be less than that of today’s lieutenant class. Note 8: Easy sports for boys can be kendo, and judo, and for women, sword and chain (naginata), which as sports are much less interesting than baseball and football. You cannot hurt the true principles of sport by offering spiritual values, etc. This should be left to the freedom of the pupil. You cannot expect to find military value in

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these sports given the nature of modern weapons. To assign such literally translated sports, which have no relation to the daily life of the people, is as ridiculous as supporting a pillar on your back while kneeling like a little monkey in Western attire. Note 9: The reason why a people’s education will support schools for children with free tuition, provision for textbooks and a midday meal is because the state must, as a parent for its children, fulfil its duties. Currently the tuition and textbooks costs close the door to the common people. The burden on cities, towns and villages of providing the textbooks should be borne by the national treasury distributing textbooks to schools in the whole country. The reason for providing a midday meal at school is that, first, to send the child to school every morning means hard work for the mother. The second reason is that we must overthrow the scientific superstition that a simple meal of a loaf of bread, Satsuma potatoes and a bowl of boiled barley is of no consequence because it does not provide true nourishment to realize the human potential. The third reason is to end the evil effect that is widely prevalent caused by physical desires that arise from seeing material differences that cloud a child’s pure mind and make it see everything as either lower or higher. It is a simple service for the school. If in the child’s home, because of some ill feeling, they do not consent to the meals then the teacher has the right to warn the guardian. Note 10: One of the principled reasons why middle schools are obstacles to the common people is that Western-style school uniforms and shoes are compulsory. This is illogical, just as if in presentday Europe and America the kimono were to become widespread, and it was made compulsory within the classroom. It is quite another problem that Japanese clothes are inconvenient to make. Where is the convenience if clothes worn at home cannot be used in school, the inconvenience is really to the parents in economic forms. Actually, today in Japan education is not really education; just a formal imitation of education. Note 11: Wasting a great deal of money on school buildings is another example of the worst ways in which models are slavishly copied. The fundamental revolution in people’s education will take place during the period of martial law when the proper use of the present school will be clearly shown. Even for subjects that require equipment, like science, given the present level of middle schools, building separate classrooms is an example of waste through imitation. Note 13: According to the above explanation of the principles of a people’s education, it is possible to visualize the principles of university and university preparatory schools in which students pay fees. The buildings of such middle and women schools are not needed and

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can either be pulled down or used to house university preparatory schools and colleges. PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN

Husbands or sons who insult the work of women by giving greater importance to their jobs will be seen as violating the fundamental rights of women. The law will specifically protect a woman’s right to work. There will be a law for protecting her rights to complain. A wife can charge her husband, on the basis of a complaint, if he keeps a concubine or seduces another women. Penal regulations against prostitutes will be prohibited and married men who buy them will be arrested and have to pay a penalty. Note 1: It is not the same as maltreatment or other such acts, which are treated as reasons for divorce under the present law. Further, such a lawsuit will not necessarily be for divorce. Actually, it is for the prohibition of violence caused by the misunderstanding that a woman lives off a man’s earnings, forgetting the fact that a man’s labour is really dependent on a woman’s specialized work. An undesirable (imubeki) woman’s labour movement and a movement for women’s participation in politics will occur if a law to specifically protect women is based on male morality. Note 2: Adultery by a male will be recognized as a crime, first to make clear the main principle of people’s morality of one husband and one wife. The development of the state lies completely in the purity of the principles of men and women. If you consider the present European countries you will see why ‘Noah’s’ flood occurred, or consider Russia, where the cruelties perpetrated have brought hell on earth. Look how quickly the basic principles become so completely corrupted. If the people have the great destiny of being the leader (meishu) of all of Asia then a law to strictly enforce the main principle of human morality cannot be really forgotten for even a day. The second reason is that the state is the Great Parent, and the parents who give birth merely carry out their duty of caretakers as the kindergarten teachers. If one of the protectors inflicts cruel pain on the other then the great parent should make such cruelty a crime. The third reason is to protect the rights of women. Note 3: The strict enforcement of this system of one wife and one husband is fundamentally different in the understanding of human character from the literal revolutionaries who advocate the doctrine of free love. If you follow these revolutionaries, then, according to them, it is enough that instead of making a law which makes adultery a crime for men you abolish the present law which makes adultery a crime for women. The value of the free-love argument lies in overthrowing those who at present restrict love, politically, economically and

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religiously. If you think the preposterous idea that this is a reaction to the system of one husband and one wife then it is, like calling out to those who have political power to disrupt the political freedom that exists equally among the people, and when the people trample these individual freedoms to say, like confused fools, that this is the same as political freedom. As the freedom of the people is not visible in special privileges, so a system of one husband, one wife has no special privileges. Freedom must restrict those who would damage this freedom. In the one husband, one wife system, freedom of love must be restricted because it is misused by the husband. Their confusion about the interpretation of freedom arises because they conclude that the freedom to start a fire, the freedom to kill are also freedoms. Just as all freedom is limited by the interests of society and the individual it is obvious that the freedom of love will also be restricted in the interests of the people’s morality and its protectors. This one husband, one wife system is the fulfilment of the view of the doctrine of free love. However, the time to explain this has not come. Note 4: The present law makes prostitution a crime for women but not for men, and it makes adultery a crime for women but not for men which is comparable to one-sided violence. While believing the sale of chastity will gradually die out after the Reorganized institutions are established for a time, in the future for such people the state must have a law that can deal with both the people. However, if a husband with a wife buys a prostitute this clearly disrupts the basic principle of one husband and one wife and should be punished from a different point of view. The reason why there will only be an arrest and a fine is because of the principle that unless a wife brings about a lawsuit there will be no charge of adultery. When a light judgement is given by the state, the male loses his authority in the family and he loses the trust of his friends and is humbled which is a heavy pain and so he will be discreet in his actions, and further it must be considered that it serves to protect the human rights of the wife and the life of the home. Note 5: The reason for excluding a bachelor are not because of the correctness of his sexual desires. Just as the woman upholds purity, so it is in the nature of things for the man to keep his chastity and marry, and both are bound by this moral obligation. The reason for not punishing this as a crime is that just as when an unmarried woman destroys purity the law does not intervene because they will be punished within the framework of the restraints imposed by morality. PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS

The fundamental rights of the Japanese people, which give them freedom and equality, will be protected. If various types of govern-

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ment officials try to harm these fundamental rights then under the relevant laws they will receive imprisonment for half a year to three years. A system to prevent injury to the fundamental rights of a defendant under detention in prison should be formulated. Further, a defendant has the absolute right to call his friends or others (aside from his lawyer) to give evidence for him and to defend him. Note 1: In other countries there are not as many bureaucrats who are proud to trample on the rights of the people as there are in ours. This is a serious corruption of society and treachery of the people, whose consciousness tries to go one step beyond that of the European countries. Unless it is clear that corporal punishment will be enforced it will not be possible to sweep away these bad customs and this country will suffer from the violence of bureaucrats. The lesson learnt from this fear will be like the call of a bell. Note 2: Treating a defendant in a detention centre as a criminal is a pure feudal inheritance. If, as opposed to this, you presume him to be without guilt then it will not be insulting as it is now. The police are the same. It is clear if you presume the person to be guilty then the days spent in the detention centre should be added to the period of detention. This should be viewed as the basic principle, and then the trampling of human rights during the period of detention will end by itself leaving no trace. Note 3: A defendant is not a criminal and the freedom of a lawyer cannot be ignored, nor is there any reason to restrict it. In particular, as this is limited to a professional lawyer, the defendant cannot call a person who knows all the facts about an incident and cannot deal directly with the court. Because of this, after an incident, there are many problems in investigation arising from the ruling of the court, the disadvantages of the defendant, and wrong judgements by the court, and thus the dignity of the court suffers great injury. This is the present situation. Note 4: To expect, like some socialists, a Utopia one day after the Reorganization is an idle daydream. Fundamentally, most of the crimes that arise from the present political and economic structure will disappear straightaway. The Reorganization of the nation is concerned with the outward physical aspect of life. The fundamental character of the Reorganization is that it should provide ten years education to the people. RIGHTS OF MERITORIOUS PERSONS

People who have rendered meritorious service to the country or to the world, in war, politics, scholarship, invention, industry or art should without distinction be awarded an order of merit and should qualify as candidates for the deliberative assembly. They should be

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given a considerably large annual pension. Women have the same right. However, according to the principle that women do not take part in politics, the requirements for mutual election to the deliberative assembly do not apply. Note 1: The people become free as they become equal. Freedom is based on discrimination (sabetsu). Once the government protects the people equally the freedom of the people will gradually increase and their skills will develop. Intellectual revolutionaries who dislike medals and reject the upper-house system and put forward demands like theologians are too optimistic about the progress of man. Note 2: It is very bad if the pension that comes with the award is low, as it is at present. Physical support is very necessary for the maintenance of all honour. THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY

It is the right of the people to have property within the limit imposed, and this right cannot be violated by the government nor by any person. The government must, in the futrure, gradually increase the private property of the majority of the people. This should be the basic aim of national policy. Note 1: Socialism and communism are misunderstood by some as calling for the distribution of private property or that people will live from hand to mouth, but they do not understand the present rapid progress of socialist revolutionary theory which is based on demands for real reform; they do not comprehend this energy. Therefore, after the Reorganization, whatever ideas the people follow, those who trespass on the people’s right to property while human society exists will be treated according to law, as thieves and burglars and punished or treated as beggars. Note 2: The limit on private wealth will be exceeded very soon when there is a large annual income. However, while the state cannot permit this excess to be retained, the people have the right to consume their income as they please while it is within the limit. This right will be protected by the state, as the exercise of this right is a right, and whether the money is spent in a morally correct way or in debauchery and dissipation, there is no reason to question it. Each individual is the centre or nucleus of a small society within the state, and together with others transcends the national boundaries to form the nucleus of a large society. The state will not intervene to see where people spend their money or from where they receive it. The limit on private wealth is not to harm the state or the people. People who misunderstand this say that they will be forced to pay the excess amount or that free spending by the people will be restricted.

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EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF INHERITED PROPERTY

Unless a will specifically provides otherwise, a father’s property should be distributed equally to male and female heirs in succession. The same applies to the mother. The wife’s total property should be passed down to the husband. Note 1: It can be seen in establishing a correct rule for conveyance of an inheritance that a rational Reorganization should understand that the one basis for it is the demand of modern individualism. Note 2: It is only in modern Japan that a system of inheritance by the eldest continues, and this is the corrupt corpse of the paternal medieval period. The love and interest of the eldest is not, in comparison, an iota of the love of the parents, and to blindly subserve the fate of the younger brothers and sisters for this shows no real affection. It must not be forgotten that real affection is the basis of law and morality. (note deleted) Note 3: For the continuation of inherited property there is no reason for the state to levy an inheritance tax because the state must serve to ensure the physical continuation of the inheritor as well as of those who do not inherit.

VII

Reorganization Plan for Korea and Other Present and Future Possessions

A SYSTEM OF COUNTIES AND PREFECTURES FOR KOREA

K

orea should be placed under the same administrative law in order to make it conform to that of Japan. Korea is neither a vassal nation nor a colony of the Japanese. The basic principle will be shown in the merger of Korea and Japan when it becomes a part of the Japanese empire under the same administrative system. Note 1: If Korea becomes the Ireland of Japan then it will be proof that Japan, which seeks to establish a Great Roman Empire, does not have the ability to take the first step. Koreans and Japanese, from earliest times, unlike the relationship between whites and blacks in America, have never shown any racial discrimination against each other. The Koreans are the closest among all the races to the Japanese. Therefore, the recent violence, if it is compared with the conflicts between whites and blacks in American cities, must make Japan feel the degree of disgrace some hundred times more. As the Korean problem is one between people of the same race it cannot be included in the so-called problem of ending racial discrimination. In brief, it is only a problem of sovereign Japan’s ability, responsibility and morality. Note 2: That the Koreans are a different race with a different language and customs is just one aspect of the problem. However, the fundamental intellectual tradition of the people’s life since earlyhistorical times has been that they are totally part of the same lineage. This is abundantly clear, as Japan’s cultural exchange has passed through Korea. Furthermore, at present our blood is in a large part mixed with that of Koreans, and anthropologists clearly state

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that the Japanese are the ‘fruit of the mixture’ (kagakuteki kessho or chemical crystallization) of Koreans, Chinese, people from the South Seas and aboriginal people. In particular, the blood of pure Koreans has come down in descendants of people who were closely involved during the imperial period in the cultural exchange and in most of the nobility, and today many of the nobles and peers bear a physical resemblance to Koreans. If one says that the dynastic nobility has Korean blood in large measures, then actually the blood of this nobility, as a special privileged class, entered the blood of the imperial line and then one cannot say that the ruler (genshu) himself is not connected with Korea. In the future, we will have to attempt the union of Japan and Korea through an alliance of a Korean prince with a Japanese princess. This is in no way a racial problem. Note 3: All things considered, all the problems stem from the fact that Korea stands between three large countries, China, Japan and Russia, and cannot remain independent because of the ‘destiny’ of its geography and because of moral corruption, as all politics, industry, knowledge and thought are decaying and it has declined because of the internal and external situation. As the history of Korea itself shows, China brought about the Sino-Japanese War to make it into a dependency and Russia entered Manchuria to allow it to invade Korea but was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War. These external and internal attempts to destroy the country would have succeeded if Japan were not there as it is in the interests of both Russia and China to destroy the country. For the defence of Japan, if Korea becomes either a possession or an ally of a strong country, which is a threat to Japan, it is a matter of life and death, just as it is for Britain, whether Belgium becomes a possession or an ally of Germany. If in the present war Belgium joins hands with Germany, then British troops will attack and occupy Belgium. They will do this even while stressing its independence. They clearly stress their ownership without reservations in the Peace Conference. The destructive corruption of Korea is apparent in the toadying national policy: they succumbed to China in the Sino-Japanese War and in the Russo-Japanese War turned towards Russia. If you re-examine the origins of the war it will be clear that it more than resembles the complicity between England and Belgium. During this period only their Revolutionary Party took a far-sighted view, joined with Japan, and even though it worked indefatigably for independence by the end of the Russo-Japanese War it could not capture national power and carry out its resolve. However, during the war, Japan’s position in Korea was not the same as England’s position in Belgium and it exerted its strength to take over Korea in its entirety. The Revolutionary Party was unable to carry out its earlier resolve. Russia, as before, supported a strong policy and the peace treaty was

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signed simply as a break from the war pact. It was unable to establish either its independence or make a real pact because of its geographical destiny and its destructive corruption, and the truth of the matter is that Japan, out of necessity to protect itself from a war of revenge by Russia, broke its promise to support independence. This is not expansionism nor is it so-called militarism. If you look at it from the results of the occupation of Korea, it is as if, by saving Yen 1 million you slander a miser without examining whether the money comes from a moneylender or honest labour. To refer to this as expansionism will be a serious crime like a confused person trying to do an imitation of a farce (kyogen). If you know the history of the decline of Korea and re-examine its fear from the danger of Russia there is no reason to literally argue in terms of the Irish independence problem with regard to Korea. Groundless conservative theories, weak will, vanity which is satisfied by the applause of a stupid public are characteristic of these so-called scholars who are proud of acting as interpreters of Wilson, an example of a traditional politician who should reflect on these words. Note 4: Korea cannot long expect to think about independence if the independent existence of Japan is not protected. To think that the danger of Russia will end once the Tsar dies is shallow thinking without any substance. Whether the Tsar launches an invasion or Lenin, who believes in the Social Revolutionary Party which is responsible for a number of errors, will rush in or not, Japan will fight to protect itself in Korea, as that is the international right of a nation. The threat of Russia is not apparent in the turning point of Lenin’s time but ten years from now when he is not there it will rise again. While learning from the revolution in the medieval-period Russia, which is still backward and undeveloped, will have to calculate on the possibility of an attack by reactionaries or the reappearance of the great emperor ‘Peter’, as hoped for by patriotic nationalists, more than imagining its modern reconstruction. Note 5: Not giving Korea independence to protect the independence of Japan is a completely different matter from the British not granting independence to India and to the African colonies. The reason for this is that India is a British dependency and England’s African possessions are colonies but Korea is clearly not a vassal of Japan nor is it a colony. As for the fact that the people of India and Africa are a completely different people from the British, not only has there been a mixture of blood from early times between the Japanese and Koreans but among all the races they are the closest races and therefore Korea cannot be a dependency nor a colony. Korea is like a part of Japan just as Hokkaido is and should really be a Seikaido (Western Maritime Prefecture). The union of the Japanese imperial house and the Korean ruling family will really be the last concrete

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step in the great principle of making them into one race. This would not be the same as sending off an Imperial Princess, even though with regret, to marry a common Hun for tactical reasons. Actually, because Japan’s present Korea policy is largely modelled on British colonial policy, in its fundamental spirit it is opposed to the correct (tendo) policy of the unification of Korea and Japan. When, to make evident the reason why Korea should be Japan’s ‘seikaido’, many institutional arrangements are made to bring about this unification, then problems like independence will never arise even if people expect them. Note 6: The emperor of the island people of ‘Corsica’ was brought up in the camp of those fighting for Corsican independence, and espousing that nationalist anger he studied in the enemies’ military school. When revolutionary France treated Corsica as an equal part of France and liberated the people of Corsica, as French, the patriotism of the young officer of the military school did not change until he was buried in Elba. When Japan builds a great revolutionary empire, with the Japan Sea as a garden lake of north and south Manchuria and far-eastern Siberia then Korea, particularly, should become a vital part, like the heart, the lungs and the liver. The essence of the Korean policy should consist of the equal treatment of Korea as a part of Japan and they should enjoy freedom as Japanese. THE RIGHT OF KOREANS TO PARTICIPATE IN POLITICS

Within about a twenty-year period Koreans should have the same right to participate in politics as the Japanese. To prepare for this, after about ten years, a local self-government system should be enforced so as to accustom the Koreans to participation in politics. Note 1: This has nothing to do with the popular idea of the socalled right of self-determination of people. As Korea is the seikaido of Japan and there is no great difference between the peoples of Korea and Japan so, as they are citizens of Japan, from the outset they clearly have the full right of citizens. Note 2: It goes without saying that nationalism rising against Napoleon’s one world ideas is a major current in the history of the modern world. However, Wilson’s transformation of this ambiguous idea into that of people’s self-determination is idealistic and laughable. What really is self-determination? The reason a people lose their national organization is because of outside pressure and internal corruption, and therefore it is because they have lost the strength of selfdetermination. It is unnecessary to call a people who are self-conscious and active when they reject outside pressure as demanding self-determination, in fact this is what from earlier times has been called nationalism. If

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there are among many races some who are conscious enough to self determine, and some who are not, it is just as among human beings there are some eighty-year-old men and some ten-year-old girls who cannot decide for themselves. It will be rational to say that the basic principle of nationalism is humanism (jindoshugi). If you go as far as to call this people’s self-determination then, in terms of humanism, it would be like calling it human self-determination, a laughable idea. Making a joke of humanism, which recognizes human character whether one is old or young, male or female, is like accepting that an old man of eighty has the same right for determining his life as a young girl of ten has the right to decide who she will love. Some races are like old men and others like a young girl. Humanism is the ultimate ideal of nationalism and it should not suppress the ageing and immaturity of peoples in the international world and end maltreatment. The existence of various nations of old and young among the powers is just as in homes there are both young and old. If you press self-determination on these people, just as homes will break up, so too a very strong power will break up. If you argue a strong country is not necessary, so Wilson, without going to Versailles, could have been present at the Socialist Party General Meeting at Switzerland. Then they with clear emphasis on anti-nationalist unification of the world should have welcomed him and his proposal and its formulation. Koreans with a real nationalist awareness have no other way but to wait and develop through education as for over a hundred years of history the half-dead country has corrupted and exhausted the life and ideas of the people. It is not necessary to use force to educate. Education is not only in Japanese textbooks. On reflection, the awakening of patriotic violence is material for an important political education. Just as no perfect medicine existed in medical science, so also in politics to see the right to political participation as a divine right is a Western superstition. Getting involved in their divine right of the ballot argument and first giving Koreans the right to political participation on the assumption that this will give them political training is mistaken for if the basis of the right, the growth in consciousness, is forgotten then it is merely an idea of fools. Japan, with true kindred love, will, in a short period, carry out its moral destiny and for this it must destroy the policy of the white people who want to profit from other races through the so-called colonial policy. EXTENSION OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES

The three great principles of the limit on private wealth, the limit on private property, and the limit on private industry form the fundamental framework of Great Imperial Japan, and therefore these principles should be extended to the future imperial possessions.

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Note 1: It would be a great crime if the Eastern Development Company sought to learn violence from the earlier East India Company. Japan’s destiny in Asia cannot be allowed to repeat the evil crimes of the British. The land of the Eastern Development Company that exceeds the ceiling on private holdings, will first be brought under national control and the Koreans in Korea, on the basis of equal rights, should share in its distribution. We should be proud that, according to the principles of the establishment of Japan, justice is not different for those within and without Japan. In Korea, in undertaking the so-called policy of colonization there are really many harmful institutions of the West that have been mechanically borrowed (chokuyaku). Note 2: Japan should abandon the shell of these evil models and return to its true principles. In future, within the possessions of the empire, if among the peoples who have been living there, there are very rich landlords who control large areas of land or those who occupy big businesses of their own, and if there is a need to recognize them, then the Japanese nation will have to bear the burden of protecting their unjust wealth. The citizens of Japan should not be more than small farmers and workers. Sovereign citizens, with their self-confidence and desires, cannot bear this. In consequence, the laws of the nation are transgressed and only one’s own countrymen protected, and there are frequent illegal attempts to take over their property. Then the nation will be characterized as an unjust nation. Therefore, for mainland Japan, first the three main principles should be established so that when it is desirable to expand territorial possessions a true fairness can be established. Those who think of the Great Japan Empire with extensive possessions should understand that an indispensable preparation for this future construction is to establish these three principles for Japan’s Reorganization. PROCEDURE FOR THE REFORM OF PRESENT POSSESSIONS

The reform of Korea, Taiwan, Karafuto and the other territories will first be limited to establishing the three great principles and then to gradually implementing the remaining Reorganization plan so that within ten or twenty years the same conditions and the right to existence will prevail as in Japan. However, once the internal reform of Japan is over and martial law completed, then at the same time the three great principles will be enforced. It will be the duty of the Reorganizing organization appointed by the state to carry out a survey and collection of land, capital and wealth in those possessions which do not have Army Reservists’ Associations. The organization for implementing the Reorganization will use the experience of the government officers of Reorganization within

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Japan and similarly appoint such officers from within the Army Reservists’ Association. Note 1: The reason why the Reorganization in Japan should be carried out first in Japan, after the three principles have been established, is because of ignorance or lack of information; a misinformed clamour within the country could brew discontent and rebellion if the Reorganization commences at the same time as in Japan. The second reason is that if this important duty is entrusted to the viceroy of the colonialist thinkers where there are no Reservists’ Associations, then it will clearly be unrighteous and unjust and not only injure the spirit of the Reorganization but perhaps bring about an unexpected disturbance. The third reason is that as the period of three years is sufficient to popularize the orderly institutions of the Reorganization, and as they will convey the happiness of a large number of people so most of the people will, it is expected, support them. Note 2: One of the reasons for the present rebellion in Korea is because of the viceroy’s policy and the fundamental cause it should be known lies in the invasion of Japanese capitalists and their working with the bureaucrats to take over the land of the Koreans and plunder their property, bringing unrest into their lives and adding enmity to a bare existence. That fellow Wilson, what effect does his proclamation have! It must not be forgotten that with the poisoning of the nation, internally and externally, what eventually brought about the destruction of Great Rome was the politics of money. It is desirable to implement all the reorganization organizations in the new territories. If the people of territories acquired in the future are at a cultural level equal to the Japanese then when the territories are acquired the complete Reorganization plan will have to be implemented. However, Reorganization organizations sent from mainland Japan will carry out this reorganization. After having acquired the territories, other races and peoples who migrate (ijinshu imin zoku) to these territories will have the right to acquire citizenship if they have lived for more than ten years, and will have all the rights, without any discrimination, as Japanese citizens. Even though Koreans and Taiwanese have reached a stage when they should be given the same citizens’ rights as the Japanese, those of them who migrate to these new territories should, after three-years residence have the same rights as set out above. Note 1: For instance, if Australia acquires the level of the people’s culture, it will, it is hoped, really continue to thrive under the Reorganized institutions. Given the level of development of Far Eastern Siberia, for example, first the three great principles will be implemented and then others in an orderly manner and the remaining regulations.

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Note 2: Japan must show the ideal to the West in the new possessions by taking measures to completely stop any discrimination between races and peoples. In Australia, the Indian race, the people of China, and far-eastern Siberia, and Korea will be welcomed and united together with the white people who have been there from before. Thus, in the whole world, only the Empire of Japan will govern a union of Western and Eastern civilizations. In the territories, if the Reorganized institutions are enforced and the sovereign people themselves control the violence of private interests and sweep away the original rich white settlers then it will become possible to lay the foundations of a true paradise for world brotherhood. It is mere child’s play to spread colour on a map. The Japanese people who have been selected to spread the message of heaven (tendo senpu) should not, it is evident, become a second England, which is collapsing because of heaven’s rebuke. Note 3: The reason why Koreans and Taiwanese, who are in their place of birth and have up to now not reached the expected level to get citizen’s rights in these territories, will acquire them after three years. This is because, by and large, the person who is an immigrant is usually superior to a person who stays at home. Secondly, if new white immigrants and Indian and Chinese immigrants, acquire these rights then those who have been Japanese from before will have no reason to be rejected. The third reason is that to further the fusion of Western and Eastern civilization, it is particularly vital to get those immigrants who have already been taught the principles. Note 4: The reason why the Japanese organization for instituting the Reorganization will not affect the local people lies, needless to say, in the character of sovereignty.

VIII

The Powers of the State

SUPPORT FOR THE CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM

T

he present system of conscription, as it is integral to the nation’s powers to preserve its existence and development within international society, will always be in force. Requests for postponement of conscription for one year and other similar requests will not be allowed. The state will pay the salaries of the present soldiers. There will be no class differences, aside from ranks, within an army unit or battleship and in the material quality of their lives. In the present and future territories, for other races, a voluntary army system should be adopted. Note 1: What in China are called mercenary soldiers the British and Americans call volunteer soldiers. That is, they become soldiers by an employment contract. This is the system by which they conform to the spirit of the people. The United States, it is explained, was established on the ideal of the social contract theory, and this is used to explain the contractual unity of the colonies. England is really the place where this mistaken explanation was born, as even now the John Bull society looks upon the British Empire as a union, a company, and all law is based on the theory of social contract. Therefore, even for the defence of the country an employment contract is agreed between the union and the union members, which is not wrong for the United States and British state institutions. However, because of this, British and American pressure through the Versailles Conference to force Japan to have a volunteer army was really a delusion. Japan, from the spirit of its foundation and even more from the thinking of its people today, is such that there is not a single person today who thinks that the Empire of Japan was instituted by contract. The view of the Japanese people is that a nation is an organic, indivisible, great family; a modern social organism theory; an idea that is consonant with

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earlier ideas of philosophical and religious beliefs. The form of the conscript army was learned from Germany and France but the spirit of the conscript system, that the people have a duty of serving as soldiers, was, with the exception of the feudal period, revealed from the beginning of the history of the establishment of the nation, and now once again has been revived and is the major belief popular among the people. What was the reason that the Peace Conference representative did not point out the fundamental difference between Japan and America and Britain in the spirit of the people and the national structure and did not teach them that the people of Japan really have a belief in the nation as an organism? A conscript army is in itself not a sign of militarism; it is as if France with a conscript system was fortunately able to protect itself from Germany and was not attacked for being militarist by members of the assembly. Why did the Japanese representatives to the Peace Conference not teach those who were ignorant and confused ‘Kaiserism’ with Japan’s belief in an organic state which forms the basis for the idea that all citizens are soldiers. Whether it is militarism or not, is not something that is to be decided by whether there are volunteer or conscript soldiers. If annexing (heidon) weak countries and carrying out all of one’s desires through arms is militarism then on the continent Germany is an example, while on the seas no other country but England is an absolute militarist. Those who, with their conscript army, seek to protect themselves from invasion by such militarists have the cap of militarism put on them even though the mercenary army system is irrelevant to the problems. They should be regarded as evil. Their good but stupid people are used by the trumpeting army of the devil and their hectoring Japan is an unprecedented insult to Japan. Note 2: Therefore, it is not a useful discussion to debate the strength and weakness of a mercenary army and a conscript army. In the nation-states of England and America a mercenary army is necessarily strong, while it is evident that given the idea of Japan’s establishment a mercenary army will necessarily be weak. This is why the conscription system will have to remain in perpetuity. However, as Germany was finally defeated, to question the value of a conscript army would be a grave mistake. If one person fights five but after defeating three of them is overpowered by the remaining two then, seeing this, one cannot say that such a person is weak. In particular, the conscripted German soldiers fought the French and Russian soldiers with a conscript system and so what should be said is that the conscript soldiers of country A defeated those of country B. In the present war, England and America will work to control food and military goods through a naval blockade. The superiority or inferiority of mercenary soldiers of America and England and the conscript

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army of Germany has not been proven in actual combat. However, as the literary stylist General Haig writes, from time immemorial the valour and bravery of the English mercenary troops has been well recognized in the surrender documents. Note 3: As in America, on the basis of a certain ideals and beliefs many rejected a conscript army, and there are some who argue against Japan’s claim of conscription as a right of the nation. However, based on the ideas of the freedom of politics, economic freedom, the freedom to love that does not violate the social life of others, it is unarguable that the freedom of thought and of belief are not absolute freedoms. This idea of freedom has arisen from a mistaken interpretation of the idea of the freedom of thought and belief, and needs to be explained immediately for, when considering ideas or beliefs, it is necessary to stand like God to judge them as worthless and noxious. Indians wear the ‘lingam’, a representation of the reproductive organ, around the neck and a widow herself hugs the firewood to follow her husband in death in the belief that this is the road to heaven, and Tibetans and the Mongols believe that by worshipping sculptured images of the act of procreation by the gods and animals they will go to paradise (kyokuraku), and among the Christians, the old sect believes that a married person, if he divorces, will burn in the fires of hell but by recognizing this freedom just because this is what they believe is at the same level as saying that because of free love freedom exists. The value of beliefs and ideas can only be recognized when they confront the spirit of the people or the ideas of the world, and raise a song of victory then they can be recognized. To raise a sigh of freedom of belief when the fight is given up midway or there is a retreat or surrender is like raising the cross of ‘We have won’ for a belief that is of no value either to the nation or the world. The Quaker religion makes a major point of evading military service and blindly observes the commandment not to kill as a shield even though Christ, as a Hinayanist, talked of the battle of Heaven and having come on this earth to use the sword and in the end called down heavenly wrath to destroy Rome. In another religion, with one god did not Mohammad clearly say he had come on this earth to use the sword and teach that we should kill? If you want to let these two beliefs, one with the Koran showing the sword and saying ‘should kill’ and the other saying ‘cannot kill’ then it is a really shallow idea when hope is placed only in the seven letters of liberty. The value of the Quaker religion is far below that of Tenrikyo9 and somewhat above that of the worship of the lingam. If you argue that the Quaker religion is strong and put forward the example that it submits itself to martyrdom, then countless such examples can be found in the lower class of religions and finally we must answer those who will not

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budge from their bigotry with the belief in Islam that one ‘should kill’. Because God is omniscient and all-powerful, in ancient times with the flood, Noah carried out a great slaughter and there were mountains of corpses and rivers of blood in the five-year period that began on 28 June and ended on 28 June. The Quaker religion, which believes in God and yet rejects killing, is based on a fundamental contradiction that an all powerful and omniscient God did nothing to prevent this great massacre. Christ himself turned to his disciples and clearly said, ‘Our God’ and ‘Thy God’, thus discriminating even in the idea of God in terms of mine, yours, ours, theirs, big, small and low. The god of the Japanese people can only use the sword of Amida against the God of the Quaker religion. To fight with lesser beliefs seeking solace for the anguish of life and death in the sky, like Hinayana, against the great belief of the Japanese people, seeking to open with the unlocked treasures of the Indian civilization, in the twentieth century, is like trying to defeat the dragon with the claws of a praying mantis. This is what belief is. How much more is the freedom of the over-produced ideas of scholars and men of culture. The firmest punishment should be meted out in the future to people who seek to import, as in the Quaker religion, shallow antiwar ideas to evade conscription. Note 4: The temporary exemption from conscription for one year and other such problems of the voluntary system are produced by today’s unequal educational system but after ten years of a unified people’s education all good or bad reasons for their continuation will disappear. The quality of the soldiers, as explained in the earlier note, is particularly important, and the idea of limiting actual combat duty at the second lieutenant level is so that, whatever a person’s speciality, he should receive training as a soldier or on a warship, for a year and a half to develop his heart and body right from the roots in preparation for achieving great success in his professional mission. At present, conscription has been postponed because, in the present economic institutions, the bureaucracy and the company want to buy university graduates who have a facile mastery. Most of them enter higher technical preparatory schools, which are like universities, and they can be considered a privileged class but deep in their hearts their real desire is to evade conscription and so they want it postponed. To be lenient about this will cause confusion of the basic principles of the nation. Even if you imagine that there are a hundred benefits it cannot be made an exception and continued. Note 5: It is a natural duty of the nation to provide a salary to the soldiers in active service. Needless to say, their salary is a completely different thing from that of mercenaries. Even if it is the duty of the people, if the nation robs the labour of a man, who has to support

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his parents, his wife, and children, without any compensation then it is misusing the authority of the nation. We can see right in front of us the labour armies of Russia, suffering immensely and protesting violently against the misuse of these powers. Even the Military Affairs Bureau, which is concerned with increasing the strength of the army, does not advocate strengthening the army from the roots; it is only when all the people realize the idea of the duty of citizens and forget this source then, on that day the dissatisfaction of the soldier will burst out violently and their union with workers to form a worker-soldier society will be realized. There is no reason to forget this duty which made the Bolsheviks necessary just because the Bolsheviks claim it as their own. Or you may argue that the burden on the national treasury will be unbearable, but look at England and America which maintain mercenaries to fight. There is sufficient income with the Ministry of Industry. Note 6: There are clear reasons why the material life of the officers and soldiers on ships and in the army should be equal. As was said in the old days, the officers ate only after the men in the ranks had eaten. If differences have set in about what is nothing but the needs of the body then in normal times there will be antipathy in the ranks and this will continue unaltered in times of war; consequently, the army as an organization will not have a unified spirit. It is a historical fact, without exception, that in a country defeated in war or a dying nation the officers are usually unconcerned with the poor food and hunger of the soldiers while they alone indulge themselves with good wine and rare delicacies. This is reflected in that, before he became emperor, the spiritual origin of the continuing victories of the armies of Napoleon lay in that he did not have any selfish desires and because he stood by the principle of equality; of there being no great difference in the material life of officers and soldiers. In Japan the armies of Napoleon will be necessary in the future. General Nogi considered matters from the army’s viewpoint, even though he made a great mistake, and in spite of his great sacrifice this mistake was still overlooked by the besieging army at Lushun (Port Arthur) because he ate what they ate and worked hand in hand with them. In the near future there can never be enough generals like this, generals who even when they are responsible for the death of their soldiers are yet forgiven by them. I would never dream that there could be an officer who would complain that he cannot bear the war while he eats as an equal with the soldiers. You cannot say that a soldier who shares meals like this will not be able to fight. When upper-class officers are occupied with such abhorrent ideas then their country’s road will be either down to revolution or destruction. Influential retainers of the court and corrupt officers, who would seek to make a worker-soldier society are really secret allies for the spread of Lenin’s propaganda in

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Japan. Soldiers have freedom regardless of the differences in wealth, for just as in their family life outside the army there are material differences. THE RIGHT TO INITIATE A WAR

The nation has the right to initiate a war, not just for self-defence but also for the other nations and races who are suppressed by an unprincipled power. (To give a concrete example, it is the right of a nation to launch a war for the independence of India or the protection of China.) The nation also has the right to launch a war against a nation that, for its own development, illegally occupies another territory and ignores the Way of Heaven (tendo) of the mutual coexistence of races. (To give a concrete example, it is the right of a nation to launch a war against the occupiers of Manchuria and Far-Eastern Siberia.) Note 1: The world powers, when they seek to start a war today only deceive themselves and others when they use the old moral justifications, and moreover they use these excuses for self-protection not really understanding the right of a nation to exist; this is really a form of cowardice. If they genuinely understood this then they would confidently proclaim war. Japan, to develop vigorously, cannot go to war simply for private profit and selfish desires but only for justice. It must be seen as equally just when other races change the status quo by actively raising their own awareness and try and expel occupiers and invaders. Personal gain is not an evil crime, just as suicide is not a moral issue. Therefore, profit in itself is not unjust but correct gain is transformed into an offence and in trying to gain this advantage you miss justice. Unarguably, the present situation is not just. Just like the situation in which England used India as a beast of burden for its interest is not justice, in the same manner the condition in which Australia is blockaded from the 700 million people of neighbouring Japan and Asia is also not a just one. Just as the self-interest of the Tsar in trying to annex China and colonize Korea is unjust in the present time, so the present policy of the ‘Lenin’ government is unjust if it is seeking to monopolize the wide and barren spaces of Siberia and ignoring the interests of other countries. Just as the class war within a nation is fought because a line of division is drawn against justice, so also in international relations, in the case of a just war it seeks to redraw an unjust line of division fairly. Britain, astride the whole world, is like a very rich man and Russia is landlord of half the northern world. Doesn’t Japan, which is like a propertyless person in international society confined to these small islands, have the right to go to war to overthrow their domination in the name of justice. The Western socialists have a fundamental contradiction in their thinking when

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they criticize Japan’s war as an invasion and militarism, for they accept the war of the proletariat within a nation and Japan in international society is in the position of the proletariat. Even while ‘Hughes’ is of working class origins and Lenin is a person respected by fellow socialists, looking at them from the point of international conflict, they are big landlords, just as in olden times, Okura Kihachi started as a fish seller and Kato Komei was a poor student, but from the point of the proletariat they are rich people.10 Within the country the proletariat is organizing itself institutionally and preparing to seek power, and if they seek to emphasize that they will change this unjust condition violently then Japan, which internationally is the proletariat, should strengthen its army and navy which are the institutions within which power is concentrated, and then start a war to change the unjust line of division and have this unconditionally accepted. If this is expansionism and militarism, then with the encouragement of the world proletariat, Japan should wear it as a crown of gold. Even under the rationalization of democratic socialism, Japan can demand Australia and eastern Siberia. Even with abundant harvests, after several years there won’t be enough land to provide food. Even with greater distribution within the country, without international distribution, Japan will not resolve problems in an eternity. However, you should be careful of the fact that in German socialism there is no understanding of this international division, as it is ruled by the medieval institution of the Kaiser’s government, which is why it received as unjust the rational claims for the redistribution of English possessions, and because of this these medieval institutions will collapse. Therefore, if the Japan of military and financial cliques raises these demands it would follow the footsteps of Germany, a fact that is clear as light. All explanations support the argument that a reformed and rational state: a revolutionary empire must fight for international justice. Note 2: Be prepared for the problem of Indian independence, which will be like ‘Sarajevo’ for the coming Second World War. However, Japan’s mission should naturally be demonstrated in efficient aid. Even if Britain permits them the so-called autonomy and does not expel them from the ‘John Bull Society’ they will rise in rebellion as fundamentally they want independence. The defeat of the Indian independence movement during the First World War is solely due to the loyalty of Japan to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and, therefore, because England has so far had an invincible army they are now lying low for a while. The major principle behind Japan’s aid must be that their independence can only be aided efficiently on the seas. Indian independence, moreover, is like the independence of America. The thirteen states of America, when they began their war of independence, were initially defeated continually by British troops and only

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later was victory possible when the really effective aid of the French navy off the Cape of Maine destroyed the British navy and made the transport of troops impossible. As without the aid of foreign armies, colonial Americans did not have weapons, so Indian independence fighters, whose arms have been completely captured and so troops can be sent at will to suppress them, and therefore their independence will be in the far future. As the decisive factor in the independence of America was the French navy, so also the decisive factor in the success or failure of Indian independence will depend on what the navy of Japan or those countries which would ally with Japan, will do to destroy the British navy. There is not a great deal of use in having the aid of the Japanese army. Rather, after the war, the establishment of concessions will sow troubles, and it should be clearly stated that any compensation from India will quickly foul the proclamation of the principles of the Heavenly Way. Even if you suppose the government of Lenin will continue and render assistance, the decisive power for success or failure does not lie with Russia which has lost her naval might. Japan, based on this Reorganization and with the wealth of the nation, should with great speed, develop its naval power. Japan and Britain cannot maintain neutral relations, and there are only two ways, either to support the present dependent status or as its conqueror to seek its break-up. There will be no need for Japan in the future to seek to make India a dependent country, politically, culturally, and intellectually, and slaughter its patriots. If all the people in Japan desire as apostles of the Heavenly Way to follow the road, then it is necessary to have a militarist organization, which is capable of destroying British militarism on the seas. The ‘Kaiser’ is on the seas. That is why France did not abandon plans to build a militarist organization on this earth against the British. Militarism will be a title for Japan and she will be the Jehovah of Indian independence. The pacifists who profane and falsely slander the Jehovah of the thousands of soldiers, are really using the conciliatory language of the Devil who fears the anger of Jehovah and seeks to continue violence and evil. Those who imitate the Britain are a hundred times worse than those who propagate Lenin. Note 3: China will, as a result of the First World War, change rapidly, just as India will seek to change. Just as Japan wishes for India’s independence, if it prayed for the preservation of China then the confrontation between China and Britain which will happen in the very near future, will not permit the existence of the AngloJapanese Alliance. There is no need to explain that England seeks to make China into an economic quasi-dependency. As for instance, the Heike flourished just before their destruction, so England in the last war was not afraid of Germany, which threatened it, and Russia, which threatened India because England removed the threat to

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China in Mongolia and Tsingtao by both countries. England does not see the threat in China except in Japan, and slavish retainers of Japan, during the First World War and the Peace Conference, made the British position secure. Namely, England could during the negotiations for the independence of Tibet, add the demand for the possession of a part of Tsinghai, Shandong and Kansu. This is because, after the Russo-Japanese War, Russia was prevented from expanding south because of Japan in Manchuria, and England sought to succeed to the big routes which Russia was trying to push directly from Central Asia into Central China. It is unarguable that Britain, with India as a base, and through Afghanistan and Persia will invade central Asia, and it is clear that in connection with Hong Kong as a base for the far-eastern sea they are thinking of dividing the area south of central China. This is the greatest danger faced by China, even more than the earlier invasion of Manchuria by Russia. Therefore, to Japan, which supports the idea of protecting China by confronting England, the importance of Hong Kong in the plan to invade China is no less then the role of Port Arthur and Vladivostock during the Russo-Japanese War. England does not even consider the merely verbal resistance of Japan as it has an army that has defeated all its enemies and desires China. This is not a mere conjecture. It can be proved with facts, for at the time the two countries, Japan and England, went to war on the seas. The time to debate about whether to go to war with England to protect China has long passed. Note 4: Japan should accept the criticism of the international community in its dealings with China that it is an ambitious country and hopes to learn to be a Germany of the East, but it should also manfully reflect on it and want to change. As is commonly known the British-German entente is a compromise, with Hong Kong as Britain’s base and Shandong as Germany’s, and this entente hopes to realize the division of China, just as the African continent was divided, with north China going to Germany and central and south China to Britain. If in this division their Tientsin to Pukou railroad line is divided then it will not be possible for a train to go directly from north to south. If German investment capital acts earlier in the north before British capital in the south then this will complicate matters.11 Just as during the present First World War Japan has completely followed Germany, particularly in what should be learnt about investment expansionism, for it is planning not to return German Shandong, which it has occupied and hopes to succeed to German investments in China. The Heavenly Way does not call country A’s evil acts a crime and the same acts by country B aid. If Japan is called the Germany of the East then equally, like Germany, it will be a militarist expansionist country and it is the will of Heaven that Japan will be abashed and sweat profusely with shame when it

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listens to Wilson’s lecture in front of the eyes of the concerned Western powers. I would venture to suggest that there is no need to differentiate between a militarist cabinet and a party cabinet. After the Meiji emperor, the successive cabinets have all been rebels (hangaku) against the spirit of the Russo-Japanese War. It is not Kotoku Shusui alone who committed lese-majesty (taigyakuzai). Their crime is a policy of rebellion (taigyaku seisaku) comparable to opening the grave of the emperor, and despite anger at the antiJapanese movement in China and distress about the anti-Japanese movement in America they are still just vaguely dreaming of a divine wind (tenyu). They have congratulated themselves that the troubles of the country have ended when in the Peace Conference they acknowledged the continuation of German rights thanks to the patronage of England. This is not so. As Japan became a partner of the British in place of Germany in the British-German entente, in order to realize control of south China which was the objective of the said entente, particularly linking demands for the independence of Tibet with Tsinghai, Szechuan and Kansu. These days when England completely controls the Yangtze and is trying to deal with China by converting the British-German entente into a Japanese-British entente the reason why the Great Meiji emperor fought the JapanRussia War is not properly understood. Would you argue that Japan should be grateful to the British because of their friendship in Versailles? The reason why anti-Japanese voices have been raised all over China and America is that Japan was forced to protect China even though China thought she was being protected in the RussoJapanese War and the United States also backed the war. These protests are a warning for the protectors from Heaven of the pitfalls ahead of them. The ‘arrogant child Kaiser’ did not reflect on this worldwide rejection and fell into a trap. Reflecting on the antiJapanese feeling in China and America, as the first priority and reconsidering the divine declaration of the Russo-Japanese War Japan should realize that in this anti-Japanese feeling is the limitless love of Heaven: instead of acquiring concessions in Tsingtao with the blessings of England, Japan should capture her Hong Kong and make it a base for the Japanese Navy. If Hong Kong is made a base then places like Tsingtao will be of no use. Instead of a difficult intervention in the peripheral area of Shandong, a poor part of China, and using a force that will have to be specially sent out there, let us annex Australia which is larger than China and fertile. As far as Japan is concerned, it will suffice if China is not divided. How can the cowardly people who desire China where people have lived for four thousand years build a worldwide empire? When Japan raises its head and looks directly at the British possessions then all traces of China’s antiJapanese feelings will fundamentally and forever be eradicated.

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Note 5: Japan has the right, based on a comprehensive theory for protecting China, to control far-eastern Siberia and this acquisition will also work to counter traditional Russian policy which poses a danger to China from the north. After Japan obtains the Chinese Eastern Railway (Toshin)12 rail line and links far-eastern Siberia, China on its own strength should be able to defend Inner and Outer Mongolia from Russian invasion. In this manner Japan will draw a large circle in the north and protect China, and China will be Japan’s forward base. The China policy of the militarists, which seeks to build defences to invade Inner Mongolia after the Russian invasion of Outer Mongolia, has protected China up to a certain point but will end up in dividing it. This unplanned and incomplete policy will never become an instrument for the leader (meishu) of the Asian Federation, particularly as planning the independence of Inner and Outer Mongolia on the basis of the ‘Seminov’ line is really just a petty piece of trickery. If you believe that the nation has the right to publicly declare war, then it is desirable to emphasize the necessity of Japan and China demanding that Lenin cede far-eastern Siberia. Because the normal right of a nation is kept secret under the pretext of a ‘Czechoslovak aid’ plan, Japan is suspected by friends and foes of hiding bad ambitions. Japan’s actions abroad should be that not an inch of land should be taken unnecessarily but should the need arise then it should be in the healthy spirit done openly, under the light of Heaven and the sun, taking the whole world and yet finding it small. Note 6: In order to ensure the safety of the Sea of Japan, Korea and China, that is, for the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War against Russia, Japan who wants to possess far-eastern Siberia should not lack for a big army. Moreover, in accordance with the destiny of the three principles of national polity, Japan should assist Indian independence and secure the protection of China by acquiring the southern parts of Asia. Japan, because it must fully oppose England, needs to urgently acquire a large navy. If during the present war the Great Saigo or the Meiji emperor had been here they would have acted in concert with German troops to subdue Russia with our navy dividing the British navy’s preparations between the home country and India and Australia, so creating a very favourable situation to defeat each wing separately; rapidly building, within a year, an empire from Russia in the north to Australia in the south. The real reason for the defeat of Germany was that in the beginning, because of the fear of Russian troops in the rear they missed a favourable opportunity to occupy Paris. This enabled all the British ships to gather in the mother country, so the German’s could not have in one action massacred them but instead the fleet blocked the military harbour of Kiel. This resulted in shortages in Germany and in the end it could only

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respond by deploying a few submarines. This made the Americans fearful and they became the enemy of the Germans. From the beginning of the war the Russian Army and British Navy should have been divided and the attitude of one country, Japan, could actually have decided the victory or defeat in this great world war. Japan clearly had the ‘casting vote’ between England and Germany and could with its strength have destroyed Germany and helped England. However, our country completely reversed this heavenly blessing and Japan played the role of a dog or a horse to those who should have been its enemy, and going against national salvation prostrated itself in front of these powers and pleaded for the valueless possession of Tsingtao and some small islands. It is regrettable that there is no law against lese-majesty for those who would plan national policy in a manner that would destroy the country. Note 7: I will only mention one important vital fact. The signing in Versailles united the powers against Germany, and it will be a divine gift of a great turning point if another attempt is made to make England another Germany by creating a new federal army organization built by uniting America, Germany and others which seeks to decide by the principle of a world war its demands from England. The peace conference should use as a ‘table’ the billowing waves of the Indian Ocean. America is afraid of Japanese immigrants. The American possession of the Philippines is a concern for Japan. The conflict between Japan and America is over capital investments in China. At first glance, there seems to be incompatibility but actually it is not the ‘time’ to say which way the two countries, Japan and America, will be guided to an alliance by the wondrous plan of Heaven. There is just one thing to do: wait for a great hero to appear after the fundamental Reorganization. The first urgent matter for a movement by the Japanese beyond the boundaries of law (chohoritsuteki undo), under the leadership of the emperor, will be to completely excise the privileged classes, both economically and politically, because of the worry within and the distress outside; the cause of all these troubles comes out of this tumour. Japan is at the moment standing on the precipice of whether it will take nothing or everything, The urgent need of a national Reorganization exceeds that of the Meiji ishin-kakumei. However, the benevolence of Heaven will, depending on the excision of this tumour, determine the health of Japan.

Conclusion

T

hose who strictly follow Marx and Kropotkin are self-contradictory for they would reverently accept a Pope of revolutionary theory. As liberalism is the result of the joining of the people’s thought of America and England to the German Marx’s socialism and the Russian Kropotkin’s mutual aid-ism, a number of incompatible theories coexist as a consequence of the flow of their people’s thought. The value of these theories is relative and cannot become absolute. Therefore, if someone calls the General Principles of the Reorganization of Japan a social revolutionary theory it would not be wrong. However, if there is a person who sees that the principles shown in the General Principles for the Reorganization of Japan are designed to revive the authority of the nation and opposes it on the basis of Marx’s explanation of class struggle, or uses Kropotkin’s mistaken theory of mutual aid to criticize the just right of an individual to private property, then, without any doubt, such critics must reexamine the ideas of Marx and Kropotkin. These thinkers were born not only in an earlier time but their vision was limited to the little world of Europe. To look at their ideas, based on a shallow and doctrinaire philosophy conceived from far-off present-day Japan, they represent nothing other than a philosophy of little value. In the past the waves of ideas from Europe and America washed over Japan, but to deny that the wave of Japanese civilization will wash over America is really unscientific. The civilizations of Egypt and Babylon were followed by the Greek civilization and in turn was replaced by Roman civilization. After the Roman civilization came that of individual nation-states. To accept the advance of civilization only in the past of European history but when eventually in the twentieth century a syncretic unified world history becomes a possibility do we then say that it is only in the future that such a world history can be considered? A narrow-minded theory from Indian civilization became the basis of Western religious philosophy but all traces of this in India itself were wiped out and its passage in China left only the bare bones. Only in a tiny island in the Eastern Sea was it closely treasured as a Great Way. Here it became Japanized, and later modernized, and now

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universalized and, after the coming of the Second World War, its revival will brighten the whole world. The renaissance of olden times will be nothing in comparison. The Western-Eastern culture will be of Asian thought Japanized and universalized, which will enlighten the vulgar, so-called civilized peoples. The universe moves in a proper way, countries advance and decline. Just as for a few hundred years the countries of Europe did not allow people like Genghis Khan of the Mongol people to rule them, now how many years will the Anglo-Saxon tribe trample the world? History progresses. There are steps to advance. Historical progress in the East and West has gone through a ‘warring states’ (sengoku) period and after that followed what can be called the collective unification of feudal states, and so on up to the present international ‘warring states’ period and now the next stage is reached when world peace is made possible because a very powerful nation appears which will reign over the small and the big nations of the world, and establish a feudal peace (hokenteki heiwa). The various theories of world peace that seek to do away with national frontiers, based on the establishment of their ideals, ignore the conditions that make this possible, namely the realization of the great scientific inventions and the spiritual surge. The reality of ideals in all parts of the world is that there is always only one Toyotomi, Tokugawa, or one sacred emperor. The Japanese people should consider that the older meaning of sovereignty, the supreme right, above the right to control, will be revived internationally and that the Supreme State, which controls various states, will be realized. The Land of the Gods is narrated in myths. Turkey boldly unfurls the crescent-moon flag. That the star flag of America presided over the meeting at the Versailles palace implicitly reveals that it was a dark night for the world. The Japanese rising sun flag after defeating England, reviving Turkey, making India independent and China selfreliant will shed the light of Heaven on all the people of the world. The coming again of Christ, prophesied all over the world, is actually the Japanese people’s scripture and sword in the shape of Mohammed. The Japanese people should face the historically unprecedented national difficulties that are coming by reforming the political and economic organizations based on the Fundamental Principles for the Reorganization of Japan. Japan, as the Greece of Asian civilization, destroyed a strong Russia, as Persia was in the sea battle of Salamis. It will only be then that the real awakening of the 700 million people of China and India begins. On the road to Heaven there is no peace without war. KITA IKKI August 1919 Shanghai

Endnotes

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The material for the events in Sado is taken from Tanaka Keiichi, Sado kinzan to shima shakai, Nihon hoso shuppan kai, 1974, pp. 186–9, and from Matsumoto Kenichi, Kita Ikki - ai to shiika to kakumei to, Gendai hyoronsha, 1975, pp. 2–15. Tanaka Keiichi, op. cit., pp. 180–1. Quoted in Matsumoto, op. cit., p. 15 ‘warera tosho no mi to iedomo ikite tokugawa shi no omi to nari, shi shite wa tokugawa shi no oni to naraba tariru’. See Tanaka Keiichi, op. cit., p. 187. Matsumoto Kenichi, p. 12–14. The people’s rights movement has been extensively studied. In English, see Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and Party Movements in Pre-War Japan, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1953, and Roger Bowen, Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A Study of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1980. On the Jiyuto, see Irokawa Daikichi Jiyuminken, Iwanami, 1981, pp. 63–5. See Irokawa Daikichi, Jiyuminken, pp. 28–51 for the character of these organizations. Matsumoto Kenichi, pp. 31–4. See Matsumoto, op. cit., p. 31. Interestingly out of the nineteen disputes in the Niigata Prefecture during the Meiji period only in two, the Sado miners strike and one in Niigata City in the shipbuilding yard, were strike organizations formed. Till 1890 workers at the mines were also distinguished between those from ‘another country’ (takoku) and ‘sons of the soil’ (chi). The later were employed directly while the former through labour contractors. This system was abolished only in 1908. See Niigata Ken (ed.), Niigata kenshi tsushi 6 kindai 1, 1988, pp. 37–380 as well as ‘Sado kinginzan shiwa’ in Kinsei Echigo- Sado shi no kenkyu, 1973. See Irokawa, Jiyuminken, pp. 67–8. See Tanaka Keiichi, op. cit., pp. 191–2. Ibid., p. 192.

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For Kita’s early life, see Tanaka Sogoro, Kita Ikki – nihonteki fashisuto no shocho, Sanichi shobo, 1975, and Matsumoto Kenichi, op. cit., particularly pp. 152–224. Matsumoto Kenichi, op. cit., pp. 49–53 on the influence of Hatta. Kita later presented him with a copy of Kokutairon. Ibid., pp. 38–40. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. 55–7. Matsumoto Kenichi, pp. 62–3. Ibid., pp. 61–6. Mori wrote ‘Waga kokutai ga seito naikaku o kyohi suru’ and that party cabinets were against the constitution. Hasegawa’s views were expressed in ‘Seidan’ serialized in Sado shinbun 7–29 April 1900, barely a year before Kita wrote Jindo no taigi. See Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. 240–54. See Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. 69–94. For the role of prefectural associations in Tokyo in maintaining regional links and providing support see Sofue Takao, Kenminsei bunka jinruiteki kosatsu, Chuko shinsho 265, 1971. See E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1887–1914, London, 1987, particularly pp. 58–70. The article was published in five instalments from 21–29 November 1901. See Kita Ikki, Kita Ikki chosakushu. However, Fukui feels that Kita may not have written this article, even though the views expressed are Kita’s. See Fukui Naohide ‘Shoki Kita Ikki no henkaku ron’ in Matsuzawa Tetsunari (ed.) Hito to shiso – Kita Ikki, Sanichi Shobo, 1977, p. 158. Military expenditure in 1901 was Y117 million while on education it was only Y48 million. See Kazushi Ohkawa and Miyohei Shinohara (ed.), Patterns of Economic Development A Quantitative Appraisal, Yale: Yale University Press, 1979, p. 375 for the former figure and for the latter Koichi Emi and Yuichi Shionoya, Government Expenditure in Kazushi Ohkawa, et al. (ed.), Estimates of Long Term Economic Stattistics of Japan Since 1868, Vol.7, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1966, pp. 16–197. See Hobsawn, op. cit., pp. 85–7. See Matsumoto, op. cit., p. 95. See Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. 107–13 for ‘Sekai kakusei saku to futsu senkyo’. Kita saw the general elections as a way of breaking the hold of the rich and uniting the people. Some however claimed that Mori was the real author of the article. Quoted in Jon Halliday, A Political History of Japanese Capitalism, New York: Monthly Review Press 1975, p. 119. For the influence of Takekoshi’s views of Japanese history see, Takeda Kyoko, ‘Takekoshi Yosaburo no shin nihon shikan’, Rekishi to shakai, 2 May 1983, pp. 62–80. and Matsumoto, op. cit., p. 162. KICS 3, op. cit., p. 37. See Matsumoto, op. cit., ‘moshi Kita (senjo) ga nihonjin naraba kuni no koshitsu ni taisuru yogo no ue tashikani chui o kaite iru’. pp. 165–84. KICS 3, op. cit., pp. 76–84. This was published in six parts from 16–22 September 1903. KICS 3, p. 75.

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Published in nine parts from 27 Oct.–8 Nov. 1903 in Sado Shinbun See KICS 3, pp. 85–98. Oi Kentaro also represents an early trend in the socialist tradition that favoured a strong foreign policy and overseas expansion. See Hirano Yoshitaro, Bajo Oi Kentaro, 1938. KICS 3, p. 81. KICS 3, p. 86. The following paragraphs are based on Kita Ikki’s article Seikai kakuseisaku to futsu senkyo, published in three parts, 28–30 August in Sado Shinbun in KICS 3, pp. 67–72. See Shakaishugi no keimo undo published in seven parts 13–21 October 1905 in Sado Shinbun KICS 3, pp. 99–110. See Jissatsu to ansatsu, Kakumei Hyoron, 10 Nov. 1906 in KICS 3, pp. 137–40. Kita Ikki’s argument predates the central arguments of Maruyama Masao, Nihon no shiso, Iwanami, 1975, pp. 29–52.

CHAPTER 2 1 2

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Kokutairon oyobi junsui shakaishugi is in KICS 1. Hereinafter Kokutairon. Kita was confident that the book would meet with success and wrote, ‘Doshite mo dasu. Daseba kanarazu seiko suru’. For this and the opposition from his brother see Tanaka Sogoro, pp. 75–6. Reviews are in KICS 3: Fukuda Tokuzo, p. 553; Kawakami Hajime, p. 571, Katayama Sen, p. 572. See also Tanaka Sogoro, pp. 77–85. See Iwase Masato, Kita Ikki to chokokkashugi, Yusankaku, 1974, pp. 9–11. Quoted in Iwase Masato, p. 10. For Kita’s participation in the activities of Chinese revolutionary groups, see Tanaka Sogoro, pp. 97–120. Watanabe Kyoji, ‘Kita Ikki’, Asahi shinbunsha, 1978, pp. 194–217; Miyamoto Moritaro, Kita Ikki kenkyu, Yuhikaku, 1975, pp. 115–24. See Takeuchi Yoshimi’s evaluation in his ‘Kita Ikki’ in Matsuzawa Tetsunari (ed.), Kita Ikki – hito to shiso, Sanichi shobo, 1977, pp. 48–50. See Tanaka Sogoro, op. cit., p. 78. It was conjectured that as Kita was much too young, just a little over twenty, to have written such a mature and sophisticated book the real author was probably Kotoku Shusui. The following is from the introduction to Kokutairon KICS 1, pp. 1–6. Quoted in Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity, London: Verso, 1983. Kanai Noboru (1865–1933) graduate and later professor at Tokyo Imperial University, studied in Germany 1886–90. He was associated with the government’s attempt to formulate factory legislation to help stem the spread of socialist ideas by ameliorating working conditions. He came into conflict with Katayama Sen. See Shioda Shoichi (ed.) Nihon shakai undo jinmei jiten, Aoki Shoten, 1979, pp. 170–1. Contrast Karl Marx, ‘To be a capitalist is to have not only a purely personal but a social status in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.

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Capital is, therefore not a personal, it is a social power’, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels Communist Manifesto, With an introduction by A.J.P.Taylor, London, 1967, p. 97. See for R.K.Hall (ed.), Cardinal Principles of the National Polity (Kokutai no hongi), translated by John O. Gauntlet, Newton, Mass.: Crofton Publishing Corp., 1949, 1974. Irokawa Daikichi, The Culture of Meiji Japan, p. 245. See Uete Michiari, Nihon kindai no shiso keisei, Iwanami, pp. 162–85, and Matsumoto Sannosuke, Tennosei kokka to seiji shiso, Miraisha, 1968, p. 258 for the influence that Kato exercised on Hozumi Yatsuka. Quoted in Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 144. On Motooda Eifu see Arthur Niveson and A.F. Wright, Confucianism in Action, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. Gluck, op. cit., p. 146. Irokawa Daikichi, op. cit., p. 270. Gluck, op. cit., p. 146. Ibid., p. 146. Irokawa Daikichi, op. cit., p. 259. Nagai Ryuichi, Nihon ho shisoshi kenkyu, Sobunsha, 1981, p. 85. Matsumoto Sannosuke, op. cit., p. 255. Uesugi Shinkichi was, in his youth, rebellious and unconventional in his thinking and associations. He had been friendly with Russian anarchists while in Geneva and for this had been briefly jailed, but in the period 1906–9 had become a confirmed supporter of an emperor-centred kokutai (national polity). His early life was then seen as eccentric. See Nagai Ryuichi, op. cit., pp. 105–6. Ibid., p. 256. See Nagai Ryuichi, op. cit., pp. 85–6. Matsumoto Sannosuke, op. cit., p. 259. Ibid., p. 258. Quoted in Richard H. Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 57. Matsumoto, Ibid., p. 267. Matsumoto Sannosuke, op. cit., p. 264, ‘ippo ni wa seifu no shokikan ni taishite meirei shi, ippo ni wa shimmin ni taishi meirei shitaru mono’. Ibid., p. 267. Ibid., p. 267, ‘tochi to iu moji wa shiken sha ga kuni o shihai suru koto de gozaimasu. Tochi jinmin o shihai suru koto wa arimasenu’. Ibid., p. 266. Nagai Ryuichi, op. cit., p. 90–1. Ibid., p. 268. Quoted in Minear, op. cit., p. 81. Ibid., p. 82. This is an aspect that Ienaga Saburo evaluated highly, undoubtedly bearing in mind the question of the emperor’s responsibility during the Second World War. See Irokawa Daikichi, op. cit., p. 247.

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The following account of Ichiki’s ideas is based on Nagai Ryuichi, op. cit., pp. 93–8. Minobe Tatsukichi, Kempo kowa, quoted in Ibid., p. 100. Nagao Ryuichi, op. cit., p. 102. Ienaga Saburo, Minobe Tatsukichi no shiso shiteki kenkyu, Iwanami shoten, 1964, p. 179. KICS 2, pp. 207–371. Kita’s concept of kokutai is discussed in Miyamoto Moritaro, Kita Ikki kenkyu, pp. 74–96, Tanaka Sogoro, pp. 66–74, Takimura Ryuichi, Kita Ikki – Nihon no kokka shakaishugisha, pp. 164–77, Watanabe Kyoji, pp. 144–54, Kuno Osamu, ‘Chokokkashugi no ichi gensoku’, In Matsuzawa Tetsunari (ed.), particularly pp. 57–9 and pp. 75–82. KICS 2, p. 299. KICS 2, p. 210. KICS 2, pp. 211–5. KICS 2, pp. 216–17. KICS 2, p. 211. KICS 2, pp. 217–20. KICS 2, pp. 221–2. KICS 2, pp. 227–32. KICS 2, pp. 233–7. KICS 2, p. 241. KICS 2, p. 240. KICS 2, pp. 241–2. KICS 2, p. 243. KICS 2, pp. 246–7. KICS 2, p. 248. Article 73 states ‘when it becomes necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present constitution, a project to the effect will be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order. In the above case neither House can open the debate unless a minimum of two-thirds of the members are present, and no amendments can be passed unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present is obtained. Quoted in Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics An Introductory Study, London, 1932, p. 343. KICS 2, p. 249 for the idea of ‘all-pervasive statism’. KICS 2, p. 250. KICS 2, pp. 250–1. KICS 2, pp. 256–9. KICS 2, pp. 268–76. See Goto Yasushi, Kindai tennoseiron in Koza nihon shi vol.9, Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1971, particularly pp. 111–13 and pp. 117–18. Goto Yasushi, pp. 122–3. Goto Yasushi, pp. 123–8.The three new laws refer to: (1) Gunka choson henseiho: the law reorganizing the ward (gun), district (ku), town (cho), and village (son); (2) Fukenkai kisoku: Rules for the Prefecture and County Meetings; and (3) Chihozei kisoku: Rules for the Land tax. See Kano Masanao, ‘“Mikado worship” no teichaku,’ in Kita Ikki ronshu, pp. 225–32.

Endnotes 70

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79 80

81 82

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Nakamura Masanori, Nihon kindai to minshu – kobetsu shi to zentaishi, 1984, p. 7. Nakamura Masanori, p. 9. Kano Masanao, ‘Shinto wa gokoku ni iite kokutai o iji suru ni hitsuyo naru o motte’, p. 229. Kano Masanao, ‘Tenno wa shinsei ni shite okasu bekarazu’, p. 229. The article appeared in Kokugaku gakkai zasshi. Quoted in Kano Masanao, p. 230. Morioka Kyomi, Ie no henkon to senso no matsuri, Shakai kagaku no gyoso, 1984, p. 110. Morioka Kyomi, pp. 112–13. The picture was published in the 28 February 1889 issue of the Tonchi kyokai zasshi and showed Miyatake receiving the rules (tonchi kenpo) of the society. The rules were also written in a parody of the Meiji constitution. See Yoshino Takao, Yo wa kiken na jinbutsu nari Miyatake gaikotsu no ue banashi, Chikuma bunko, 1992, pp. 77–8. Kano Masanao, p. 23. Similarly, Kita had been criticized as sounding nonJapanese in a 1903 article on the historical relationship between the emperor and the people. Arita Shinpei, a people’s rights advocate, was fined Y40 and ten months imprisonment for writing of Empress Suiko (592–628) as ‘weak and ignorant’ and Hasegawa Kiyoshi’s article on women in the issue of July–Aug. 1910 Hokai shinbun was banned because it was found insulting to the emperor. See Ch. 1, p. 9. Nihon oyobi nihonjin, no. 553. Hozumi Nobushige, Ancestor Worship and Japanese Law, Maruzen, 1912. The lecture in Rome was delivered in Oct. 1899. Hozumi Nobushige, p. 88. I deal in greater detail with Kotoku Shusui later in Chapter 3. See Itoya Hisao, Kotoku Shusuiden, Sanichi shobo, Kyoto, 1950, and F.G. Notehelfer, Kotoku Shusui Potrait of a Japanese Radical, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. See Yanagida Kunio, Saishin sangyo kumiai tsukai, in Yanagida kunio zenshu, Vol. 28, Chikuma shobo, 1985, pp. 7–85. Takeuchi Yoshimi, quoted in Irokawa, p. 264. Irokawa, pp. 270–1. Miyachi Masato, Niciro sengo seijishi no kenkyu, Tokyo shuppankai, 1982.

CHAPTER 3 1

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For example, the Primary School Law in 1886 was an important step in this direction. Matsuzawa Hiroaki, p. 22. Ibid., p. 19, ‘Waga nihon ishin no kakumei wa jitsu ni jiyu, byodo, hakuai no seishun o motte nareru mono ni shite’. Matsuzawa Hiroaki, Meiji shakaishugi no shiso, Nihon seiji gaku nenpo, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 10–14.

236 5

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9.

10.

11

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Richard Ely, Socialism and Social Reform, 1894 and French and German Socialism, New York, 1887, Edward Beward Bellamy, Looking Backward, Cambridge, Mass, 1886 is an influential socialist novel; Hyman Kubin, Asian Revolutionary The Life of Katayama Sen, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964, particularly pp. 129–83 for Katayama during this period. Tokutoni Soho (1863–1957) prolific and widely read journalist who published Japan’s first general magazine, Kokumin no Tomo from 1887 to 1898 John D. Pierson, Tokutoni Soho, 1663–1957 A Journalist for Modern Japan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980. Kinoshita Naoe (1869–1937) novelist and social critic, who, in 1904, wrote Hi no hashira and was active in the Ashio Copper Mine case. However, by 1910 he turned to Christianity and Buddhism. Sakai Toshihiko (1871–1933), a socialist, collaborated with Kotoku Shusui on the translation of the Communist Manifesto and was also one of the founders, in 1906 of the Japan Communist Party (Nihon kyosanto). Yorozu choho an influential journal founded in in 1892 by Kuroikawa Ruiko dealt with contemporary social issues as well as introduced translations of Western novels to Japanese readers. Kuroikawa’s support for Japan’s war against Russia led Uchimura Kanzo, Sakae Toshihiko, Kotoku Shusui and others to move away from the journal which gradually began to lose its influence. It finally merged with the Tokyo maiyu shinbun in 1940. See Kodansha Encyclopaedia of Japan, Vol 8, Kodansha, 1983, p. 351. Rikogo zasshi was published from 1893, and until 1897 was at the centre of debate on social problems and socialism. From 1897 to 1900 it worked with Rodo Sekai. The early period was dominated by the work of Abe Isoo See Sasaki, Shakai shugi keimo shi to shite no Rikugo zasshi, and ‘Rikugo Zasshi no kenkyu’, Shakai kagaku kenkyujo, Doshisha daigaku, XVII, pp. 57–92. Peter Duus, ‘Nagai Ryutaro: The Tactical Dilemmas of Reform’, in A.M. Craig and D.N. Shively (eds) Personality in Japanese History, Berkeley, California, 1970. Osugi Sakai, Osugi Sakae zenshu, 14 vols., Gendai Shnicho sha, 1963–5. Ishikawa Takuboku (1886–1912), poet and novelist who introduced the everyday into the realm of Japanese poetry. After the High Treason Incident of 1910 began to take an interest in the socialist movement. See Ishikawa Takuboku, Jidai heisoku no genjo, kuu beki shi, Iwanami, Tokyo, 1984, particularly the comments by Matsuda Michio, pp. 191–205. Takebatake Motoyuki (1886–1928), an early socialist, translated KarlMarx’s Das Kapital as well as Karl Kautsky, together with Sakai Toshihiko, but by 1919 began to turn away from socialism. See Germaine A. Hoston, ‘Marxism and National Socialism in Taisho Japan: The Thoughts of Takabatake Motoyuki’, Journal of Asian Studies, 44, no.1 Nov. 1984. Okawa Shumei (1886–1957) conservative who worked closely with government agencies. After meeting Rash Bihari Bose, took a close interest in the Indian National movement. See Takeuchi Yoshimi, ‘Profile of Asian Minded Man: Okawa Shumei’, Developing Economics, vol. 7, no. 3, 1969.

Endnotes 16 17 18

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Arahata Kanson, Kanson jiden, 1965. Mitani Taiichiro, Taisho demokurashiron, Chuo Koron, 1974, p. 52. Kotoku Shusui, Shakai shugi shinzui to shakai shugi, in Gendai nihon shiso taikei vol. 1.5 Chikuma, Tokyo, 1975 pp. 187–227. Katayama Sen, Waga shakaishugi in ibid., pp. 228–310. Kotoku Shusui, op. cit., pp. 187–8. Ibid., pp. 188–92. Ibid., pp. 192–6. Ibid., pp. 196–205. Ibid., pp. 205–13. Ibid., pp. 214–21. Ibid., pp. 221–7. Morichika Unpei (1881–1911) from Okayama became a socialist by 1902 and worked with the Heimin Shinbun and also for newspapers published by Miyatake Gaikotsu. He was one of the founders of the Japan Socialist Party and was executed along with Kotoku Shusui in 1911. Shakai shugi shinzui, in Kotoku Shusui zenshu, vol. 4., p. 480. See Germaine Hoston, The State, Identity and the National Question in China and Japan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. See Kotoku Shusui zenshu, vol. 4, Shakaishugi to kokka, pp. 522–3. Kotoku Shusui zenshu, vol. 4, pp. 229–53 for the reviews and particularly pp. 229–31, 241, and 248. Kotoku Shusui zenshu, ibid., p. 229. Mitani Taiichiro, op. cit., pp. 57. Kotoku Shusui zenshu, vol. 1, pp. 137–41. Mitani Taichiro, op. cit., Kojin atte kokka naku kokka atte shakai naku tada ishin no rigai o motte shakai no fukushi o sayu sen to suru ni ari, p. 58. For instance Shinka setsu to shakai shugi, in Kotoku Shusui zenshu bekkan, 2, pp. 76–81. Kotoku Shusui zenshu, bekkan, 2, pp. 119–21. Kotoku Shusui zenshu, bekkan, 2, p. 121 and vol. 4, p. 523, where he argues that socialism and democracy work together to expand the power of the people. Mitani Taiichiro, ibid., pp. 59. See Kotoku Shusui zenshu, vol. 4, pp. 531–5. This was written in reply to Kinoshita, who called for the total rejection of the emperor, arguing that loyalty belonged to God. See Notehelfer, op. cit., pp. 86–7. Mitani Taiichiro, op. cit., p. 60, suggesting the idea of a continuous plebiscite. Ibid., p. 65. Ibid., p. 67. Matsuzawa Hiroaki, op. cit., p. 30. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., p. 32. Kotoku Shusui in Kotoku Shusui zenshu, vol.1, 1977, pp. 71–81.

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The Risodan was formed together with Uchimura Kanzo with the declared aim of, ‘Let us first reform ourselves and then the Society’. Within three months thirty branches were established and over 20,000 people had enrolled as members. However, the political context of its demands eventually led Uchimura to distance himself. For a contrary view, see Masamichi Asukai, Kotoku Shusui: His Socialism and Pacifism, in Nobuya Bamba and J.F. Howes (eds) Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition, Kyoto: Minerva Press, 1978, pp. 138–9. Notehelfer too stresses the individualism of Kotoku which, because it remained in the substratum of his thinking, made, in times of stress, the will of the individual an important factor. Notehelfer, op. cit., p. 60. On the Ashio Copper Mine and the role of Tanaka Shozo, see Yui Masami, Tanaka Shozo, Iwanami shoten, 1984, particularly pp. 131–74. Kotoku Shusui zenshu, Vol 3, pp. 105–96 for Nijuseiki no kaibutsu teikokushugi and pp. 220–2 for Ware shakaishugisha nari. Notehelfer, op. cit., pp. 82–5. For a comprehensive list of Abe Isoo’s works. see Matsuda Michio (ed.), ‘Abe Isoo chosaku mokuroku (1) 1887–1918’ in Waseda daigaku henshubu kiyo, Rekishi, Vol XVII, No. 21, January, 1985, and Cyril H. Powles, ‘Abe Isoo the Utility Man’, pp. 143–67, in Nobuya Bamba and J.F. Howes, op. cit., pp. 143–67. Niijima Jo (1843–1890) the first ordained Japanese Protestant. He founded Doshisha university in Kyoto in 1875 to build ‘talented men of consciousness’. His dedication and ideas attracted people such as the Kumamoto Band. See M.B.Jamsen (ed.) Cambridge History of Japan Vol.5 The Nineteenth Century, London: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 479–80. Powles, op. cit., pp. 144–6. Ibid., p. 151. Ibid., p. 156. Ibid., p. 160. Matsuda Michio, Zaiya no Shisotachi, 1977, p. 20. See Notehelfer, op. cit., pp. 177–9. See ‘Genkon no seiji shihai to shakaishugi’, Rikugo zasshi no. 223, July, 1899. KICS, ‘Shakai shugi no keizai teki seigi’, pp. 1–67. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., pp. 12–14. Ibid., pp. 15–16. Ibid., pp. 16–21. Ibid., pp. 22–3. Ibid., p. 25. For instance the public possession of machinery was not against the right to possession. Otherwise the steam engine should belong to the descendants of James Watt. Ibid., pp. 26–9. Ibid., pp. 31–3.

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Ibid., p. 34. On Kanai Noboru, see above p. 58. Ibid., pp. 37–8. 74 Ibid., p. 69. 75 Ibid., p. 73. 76 Ibid., p. 76. 77 Ibid., p. 76. 78 Ibid., p. 76. 79 Ibid., p. 79–81. 80 Ibid., p. 81–2. 81 KICS 1, p. 268. 82 Ibid., p. 229–99. 83 Ibid., p. 300–4. 84 Ibid., p. 315. 85 Ibid., p. 324. 86 Ibid., p. 324–6. 87 Ibid., p. 329. 88 Ibid., p. 333–6. 89 Ibid., p. 337. 90 Ibid., p. 340. 91 Ibid., p. 340. 92 Ibid., pp. 343–50. 93 Ibid., p. 345. 94 Ibid., p. 348. Consider the Trotsky–Stalin debate on the issue of socialism in one country. 95 Ibid., p. 349. 96 Ibid., p. 353–6. 97 Ibid., p. 360. 98 Ibid., p. 361. 99 Ibid., p. 362. Kita says Hozumi’s argument that as the emperor has granted he constitution he is the sole authority and can revise or change it as he desired, is wrong, for now the highest body is the emperor and the Diet, and only the highest body has the authority to revise the constitution. 100 Ibid., p. 364. 101 Ibid., pp. 377–8. 102 Ibid., p. 378. 103 Ibid., p. 380–4. Kita notes this contradiction that the Meiji government suppresses socialism by measures like obstructing the freedom of speech; on the other hand, it is spreading education which provides a base for the spread of socialism. See also Richard H Mitchell, Censorship in Pre-War Japan, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976. 104 Ibid., p. 385. 105 Ibid., p. 389–90. 106 Ibid., p. 391. 107 Ibid., p. 391. Here Kita is referring to the Seiyukai and the Shinpoto. 108 Ibid., p. 392. 109 Ibid., p. 393. 110 Ibid., p. 396. 73

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Ibid., p. 398. Kita is arguing that the Meiji ishin is not like the peasant uprisings (hyakusho ikki) of the Tokugawa period. 112 Ibid., p. 405. 113 Ibid., p. 411. 114 Ibid., p. 411. 115 Ibid., p. 413–6. 116 Ibid., p. 417. 117 Ibid., p. 418. 118 Ibid., p. 419. 119 Ibid., p. 421. 120 Ibid., p. 421. 121 Ibid., p. 431. 122 Ibid., p. 433. 123 Ibid., p. 434. 124 KICS 1. p. 97. On Oka Asajiro see, Introduction, Tsuhaba Hisaharu (ed.), Oka Asajiro shu, Kindai nihon shiso taikei, vol. 9, Chikuma shobo, 1974; and Osugi Sakae, ‘Oka hakushi no seibutsugaku teki ningen shakaikan o ronzu’, Chuo koron, May 1917; and Fukui, ‘Asajiro to Kita Ikki ni okeru shinka ron to kyoiku shiso’ in Paiede A5, 1971, p. 121. KICS 1, op. cit., pp. 97–100. 125 KICS 1. op. cit., pp. 97–100. 126 Ibid., p. 101. 127 Ibid., pp. 102–4. 128 Ibid., p. 108. 129 Ibid., p. 107. 130 Ibid., p. 109. 131 Ibid., p. 112. 132 Ibid., pp. 119–20. 133 R. Williams, op. cit., p. 90. 134 R. Williams, op. cit., p. 90 for Rockefeller’s statement and the idea in the subsequent paragraph. 135 KICS 1, op. cit., p. 120. 136 Ibid., p. 122. 137 Ibid., p. 128. 138 Ibid., pp. 131–4. 139 Ibid., p. 134. 140 Ibid., p. 140. 141 Ibid., pp. 141–2. 142 Ibid., p. 145. 143 Ibid., p. 146. 144 Ibid., pp. 146–7. 145 Ibid., pp. 153–4. 146 See W. Bagehot, Physics and Politics – Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of Natural Selection and Inheritance to Political Society (1876) where he sees progress in well ordered stages so that now conflict can be resolved by discussion. Quoted in R. Williams, op. cit., pp. 89–90. 147 KICS 1, op. cit., pp. 155–6. 148 Ibid., pp. 160–1.

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Ibid., pp. 162–3. Ibid., p. 167. 151 Ibid., p. 168. 152 Tanaka Sogoro, op. cit. See for instance, Kuno Osamu in Matsuzawa Tessei, op. cit., pp. 554–8. 153 See bibliography. 154 Watanabe Kyoji, op. cit., p. 92. Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote in ‘A fair Public Opinion’ (written 1877 but published 1901) that Saigo Takamori emodied the ‘spirit of resistance’ and ‘Mr Saigo has used the armed forces in resisting the government. In this he is somewhat different from me. But spiritually nothing intervenes to separate us.’ Fukuzawa saw the failure of Saigo’s resistance as the failure to establish a popular government. See Kimitada Miwa, ‘Fukuzawa Yukichi: Essays on Division of Powers’ Research Papers, Institute of International Relations, A-44, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan. pp. 14–15. 155 Ibid., p. 109. 156 Ibid., p. 134. 157 Ibid., pp. 138–9. 158 Ibid., pp. 146–50. 159 Ibid., p. 151. 160 Ibid., p. 156. ‘Kokka shakaishugi naru mono kaku no gotokunba, kokkashugi ni mo arazu shakaishugi ni mo arazu shitte zettai mugen no kunshu shugi to naru’. 161 KICS 2, op. cit., p. 5. 162 Ibid., p. 7. ‘Karera wa hito ni arazu shohin to shite miraru shika o yusu . . . horiteki ni ieba karera wa jinkaku ni arazu shite bukkaku nari’. 163 Ibid., p. 379. 164 Ibid., p. 379. 165 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 166 Ibid., pp. 398–9. 167 Ibid., p. 377. 168 Ibid., p. 431. 169 KICS 2, op. cit., pp. 33–4. 170 Ibid., p. 10. 171 In Igarashi Akio (ed.) op. cit., p. 256. 150

CHAPTER 4 1

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K.S. Liew, Struggle for Democracy – Sung Chiao–Jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution, California, 1971 see also V.P. Dutt, ‘The First Week of Revolution: The Wuchang Uprising’ in Mary Clabaugh Wright (ed.), China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900–1913, Yale: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 383–416. K.S. Liew, ibid., quoted from a comment of a contemporary observer in an article ‘Confucianism and the Republic’, The Times (London), 24 September, 1912, p. 194. Winston Hsieh, Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911 – A Critical

242

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5

6

7

8

9 10 11

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Survey and a Selected Bibliography, Hoover Institution Studies 34, 1975, pp. 5–8. See Chen-tu Hsueh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961 Michael Gasster, ‘The Republican Revolutionary Movement’, in J.K. Fairbank and Kwang Ching Liu, Cambridge History of China, Vol. II, Late Ching, 1800–1911, Part 2, p. 463, London: Cambridge University Press. Marius Jansen, ‘Japan and the Chinese Revolution of 1911’ in Denis Twitchett and J.K. Fairbanks (General Editors), Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12 Republican China 1912–1949, Part I, London: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 348. KICS 2, see Preface p. 1. For brevity the book will be referred to as Shina gaishi in the text. Ibid., p. 2. The Twenty One demands secretly presented by Japan in 1915 to President Yüan Shikai were divided into five sections: Japan assumes Germany’s position in Kiaochow; that Manchuria and Mongolia be reserved to Japan for exploitation and colonization; that Japan control the main coal deposits of China; that the other powers be excluded from further territorial concessions; and that Japan guide China’s military, commercial and financial affairs. The fifth set of demands were dropped, partly at the insistence of the United States but Yuan signed a treaty accepting the remainder of the demands but this treaty was never ratified. Japan used further agreements to wrest concessions in 1917 and in 1918 and at the Versailles Conference, Japan, by reason of secret treaties signed in 1917, was awarded the German possessions in Shandong. China refused to sign the Versailles treaty, and this event led directly to the May Fourth Movement of 1919. It was only at the Washington Conference (1921–22) that Japan agreed to withdraw its troops from Shandong and restore full sovereignty to China. Ibid., Preface, p. 1. Ibid., Introduction, pp. 1–2. Tan Renfeng, (1860–1920) a right wing republican leader from Hunan was opposed to the secret societies (huidang) and favoured an orderly revolution. He met Kita when he was fifty and became a good friend. See Shimizu Minoru, ‘The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and the Popular Movement’ in Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin (eds), The 1911 Revolution in China – Interpretative Essays, University of Tokyo Press, 1984, p. 205. and Watanabe Kyoji, Kita Ikki, Asahi hyoden sen 22, Asahi shinbunsha, 1978, p. 204. Ibid., pp. 9–11. Song Jiaoren (1882–1913) from Hunan was more influenced by anti-Manchu ideas in his early life then by the ideas of Kang Youwei (1858–1927) or Yan Fu. Huang Xing introduced him to revolutionary politics. See Don Price, ‘Revolutionary Thought of Song Jiaoren’ in Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin (eds), The 1911 Revolution in China Interpretative Essay particularly pp. 62–3. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 5.

Endnotes 15

16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35

36

37

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Ibid., pp. 7–8. Dr Frank Goodnow, adviser on constitutional systems to Yuan Shikai later became the President of John Hopkins University. Goodnow wrote an article on ‘Reform in China’ in 1915 in the American Political Science Review that representative democracy could not work in China because of its cultural values. His views were criticized by Sudhindra Bose, Iowa University, for their implication that representative government could not function in non-Western societies. Samuel J. Paterson, Political Science and Politics, December 2001 and Marius B. Jansenc Japan and China from War to Peace 1894–1972, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975, p. 185. KICS 2, pp. 9–11. Yue-Him Tam, ‘An Intellectual’s Response to Western Intrusion: Naito Konan’s View of Republican China’, in Akira Iriye (ed.), The Chinese and the Japanese – Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 166–8. KICS 2, pp. 9–11. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., pp. 15–16. Ibid., pp. 17–18. Ibid. pp. 21–2. Ibid. p. 23. Ibid. p. 28. Ibid. p. 29. Sun Yat-sen was actually in Denver, Colorado, when the revolution occurred. See Fredric Wakeman Jr., The Fall of Imperial China, London, 1975, p. 228. KICS 2, pp. 38–9. See particularly Kitaoka Shinichi, ‘China Experts in the Army’, in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark K. Peattie (eds), The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 330–68, for an analysis of the influence of these experts on foreign policy. Marius B Jansen, op. cit., p. 348. Miyazaki Toten, op. cit, pp. 29–30. Ibid. p. 30. Ibid. p. 30. Ibid. p. 285, author’s Preface. Ibid. p. 285. Takeuchi Yoshimi, (ed.), Asiashuzi, Chikuma Shobo, 1975, see his Preface. Also Azia no Naka no Nihon, Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu Vol. 5, Chikuma shobo, 1980, p. 175. Miyazaki Toten, p. 137. The meeting with Sun Yat-sen is described in pp. 130–8. It would be fruitful to compare the activities of people like Miyazaki Toten in China and their actions in Japan. For instance the East Asian Association (Toa Dobunkai) which was established earlier under a different name in June 1898 was a Japanese foreign ministry front. Not only did the Yamagata government fund it (¥40,000)

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45 46

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but its formation was approved by the Kenseikai Cabinet. See M.B. Jansen, ‘Konoe Atsumaro’ in Akira Iriye (ed.), The Chinese and Japanese: Political Interaction, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 107–23. Uchida Ryohei founded the Amur River Society (Kokuryukai or Black Dragon Society) in 1901. He was a disciple of Toyama Mitsuuru who established the Genyosha. See Nomura Koichi, Kindai nihon no chugoka shiniski, 1981, pp. 53–8. See also Hatsuse Ryuhei, Uchida Ryohei no kenkyu. dentoteki uyoku, Kyushu University Press, Kyushu, 1980, particularly pp. 128–56. KICS 2, pp. 39–42. Ibid., p. 42–3. Ibid., p. 43. Li Yuanhong was the military governor of Hupei, leader of the Association of the People (Min She) and reluctant Vice-President of the republican government. He was to betray the revolutionaries to Yuan Shikai during the so-called second revolution. Huang sought to work with the legal and political means available to control Yuan Shikai and his demands. See Chen-tu Hsueh, op. cit., p. 185. Ibid., pp. 43–4. Ibid., pp. 50–1. However, Chen-tu Hsueh says that the battles of Hankow and Hanyang were major conflicts that ensured that large parts of China came over to the revolutionary side and Huang Xing played a major role in these battles. See Chen-te Hsueh op. cit., p. 108. Ibid., pp. 52–3. Ibid., p. 54. Zhang Binglin was from Zhejiang province. He went to Japan where he joined the Tong Meng hui and became editor of MinBao. He worked in Yuan’s government but was arrested and joined the Movement to Protect the Constitution and became its Secretary General. Ibid., pp. 54–5. Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., p. 59. Ibid., pp. 60–1. Ibid., p. 62. See also K.S. Liew, op. cit., p. 126. Subsequently Song was appointed Minister for Agriculture and Forestry. Ibid., p. 63. Ibid., p. 63. Song was responsible for reorganizing the party in March 1912 and his programme included the unification of the country, development of local government, developing the unity of the five races, national socialist policies, gender equality, etc. Song advocated a cabinet system of government based on the British model. See K. S. Liew, op. cit., pp. 127–8, 131–7 and Chun-tu Hsueh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961 p. 148. Ibid., p. 64. Ibid., p. 65. Ibid., p. 65. Ibid., p. 55. The Four Power loan grew out of the discussions at the Versailles Conference in May 1919 between representatives of the United States, Britain, France and Japan to create a consortium that would finance all future railway construction in China. This multilateral approach would

Endnotes

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prevent any one power from using its financial leverage to influence Yuan Shikai’s government. See Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak, The Making of Japanese Manchuria 1904–1932, Harvard, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 236–7. Ibid., p. 67. Ibid., pp. 69–70. See also Ernest P. Young, ‘Politics in the Aftermath of Revolution : The Era of Yuan Shih-kai, 1912–1916’, In Denis Twitchett and J.K. Fairbanks (General Editors), Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12 Republican China 1912–1949, Part I, London: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 218. Actually both Song Jiaoren and Huang Xing joined Yuan’s Government, Song in the spring of 1912 and Huang, as resident-general (liu-shou) of the southern armies. Ibid., pp. 68–9. Ibid., pp. 70–3. Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 79. The Court-Bakufu unity reference is to the last years of the Tokugawa rule when an attempt was made to evolve a compromise by sharing power between the Imperial Court and the Tokugawa Bakufu. See Conrad Totman, The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu 1862–1868, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980. Ibid., p. 80. Ibid., p. 81. Cen Chun Xuan, former Governor-General of Liang-Kwang and rival of Yuan Shikai had advocated supporting Japan against Russia to recover Manchuria in the debates in China before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. In 1915 he was patron of Lung Chi-huang, the military governor of Kwangtung whom the Japanese were trying to influence to take a position against Yuan to help the Yunan uprising. Cen was invited to Tokyo in March 1915 and loans negotiated for the Yunan Army. See Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, op. cit. The Cambridge History of China Vol. 11 Late Ch’ing 1800–1911, Part 2, p. 139 and Kitaoka Shinichi, op. cit., p. 357. Ibid., p. 82. Ibid., pp. 84 and 64. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 86. See Ikei Masaru, ‘Nihon no tai-En gaiko shingai kaku mei ki’, Hogaku kenkyu, 35, 1962, p. 83. Ibid., pp. 87–9. Ibid., pp. 89–90. Ibid., p. 91. Ibid., pp. 93–5. Ibid., p. 100. See also S.C. Tikhvinsky (General Editor), Modern History of China, Moscow, 1972, pp. 569–70. Ibid., pp. 102–4. Ibid., p. 104. Ibid., p. 106. Thus after the conclusion of the agreement Katsura told the Russian Foreign Minister Sazanoff that, ‘From now on Japan’s actions in China will be in accordance with the policy of the Russo-Japanese treaty

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and the obligations of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’ precisely what Kita saw as contradictory. Quoted in Masaru Ikei, op. cit., p. 227. 79 KICS 2, p 108–109. 80 Tikhvinsky, op. cit. pp. 505–506. 81 KICS 2, pp. 108. 82 Ibid., pp. 109. Grey is the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. 83 Ibid., p. 109. A popular movement with Huang Xing and the Unity League vehemently denounced the loans and began to raise an internal loan from the people. Their stand also influenced Tang Shao Yi educated in the United States and former governor of Fengtian province. See Tikvinsky, op. cit., p. 574. 84 See Winston Hsieh, op. cit., p. 33. 85 Actually President Woodrow Wilson withdrew the united consortium’s enforced boycott against large-scale lending to China. See Ernest P., Young, op. cit., pp. 231–2. 86 KICS 2, p. 111. 87 Ibid., p. 112. 88 Ibid., p. 112. Sir Harry Parkes was the chief British representative during the late-Tokugawa period. In fact his role was neutral in the Bakufu-Court struggle which culminated in the Meiji ishin. However, Kita is right on the question of how the Western world perceived change in non-Western countries. 89 Ibid., pp. 112–13. 90 Ibid., p. 115. 91 Ibid., pp. 116–17. 92 Ibid., pp. 119–21. 93 Ibid., p. 121. 94 Ibid., pp. 124–6 95 Ibid., pp. 125–6. 96 Ibid., pp. 131. 97 Ibid., pp. 131–4. 98 Ibid., pp. 142–3. 99 Ibid., p. 143. 100 Ibid., p. 144. 101 Ibid., p. 144. 102 Ibid., p. 147. 103 Ibid., pp. 147–8. 104 Ibid., pp. 148–9. ‘. . . this new bourgeois class still far from homogeneous at the outbreak of Revolution; its members were drawn from a number of diverse groups – compradors, merchants, bankers, industrialists and Overseas Chinese – . . . .’, in Marie-Claire Bergere, ‘The role of the Bourgeoisie’ in Mary C. Wright (ed.), China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900–1913, Yale: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 237. This is an excellent study of the characteristics and ideology of the emerging bourgeoisie. 105 Ibid., p. 149. 106 Ibid., p. 153. 107 Ibid., p. 154.

Endnotes 108

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Ibid., p. 155. Ibid., p. 155. 110 Ibid., p. 155. 111 Ibid., p. 115–58. 112 Ibid., p. 159. 113 Ibid., p. 159. 114 Ibid., p. 159. 115 Ibid., pp. 162–3. Here is an example of the growing influence of Nichiren Buddhism that began to exercise a great hold on Kita. See, for instance Takahashi Yasuo, Kita Ikki to hokkekyo, 1976, particularly, pp. 152–7. 116 Ibid., pp. 152–7. Recall his elevation of Mencius as the Plato of the East in Kokutairon. 117 Ibid., pp. 162–3. 118 Ibid., pp. 167–8. 119 Ibid., p. 168. 120 Ibid., p. 168. 121 Ibid., pp. 170–2. 122 Ibid., pp. 179–80. 123 Ibid., pp. 181. 124 Ibid., pp. 178–9. 125 Ibid., pp. 179–80 126 Ibid., pp. 180. 127 Ibid., pp. 181. 128 Ibid., pp. 182. 129 Ibid., pp. 184. 130 Ibid., pp. 187–8. 131 Ibid., p. 192. 132 Ibid., p. 193. 133 Ibid., p. 193. 134 Ibid., p. 193. 135 Ibid., p. 196. 136 Ibid., p. 201. 137 Ibid., p. 202. 138 See for instance Nomura Koichi, Ando Ryutaro, Matsumoto Kenichi for such views. Quoted in Kubota Bunji, ‘Shina kakumei gaishi’, Shiso, Tokyo, 1978. 139 Quoted in Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Meaning A Critical Biography, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 1975, pp. 293–4. 140 Kubota Bunji, op. cit., pp. 17–18. 141 Ibid., p. 17. 142 Ibid., p. 6. 143 KICS 2, pp. 138–40. For a life of Song Jiaoren see K.S. Liew, op. cit. 144 K.S. Liew, op. cit., p. 38. Song wrote a book called, History of Chinese Expansionism published in the magazine, Twentieth Century China which was established in January 1906 but by the second issue it was banned and changed its name to People’s Journal (Min pao). 145 Ibid., p. 69. 109

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146

Ibid., p. 137. Kubota Bunji, op. cit., p. 10. 148 Don Price, ‘Revolutionary Thought of Song Jiaoran’, in Eto Shinkichi and Harold Schiffrin (eds), The 1911 Revolution in China, Interpretative Essays, University of Tokyo Press, 1984, p. 75. 149 Ibid., pp. 75–6. 150 K.S. Liew, op. cit., p. 62. 151 Don Price, op. cit., pp. 75–6. 152 Song Jiaoren, The Collected Works of Song Jiaoran, 2 Vols. People’s Republic of China, 1971, p. 314. I am grateful to Mr Ebina of Tokyo University for translating the Chinese text. 153 K.S. Liew, op. cit., p. 61 for the influence on Chinese intellectuals of the Portuguese revolution. 154 KICS 2, Chapter 6. 155 Yoshino Sakuzo was one commentator who saw the growth of democratic sentiment since the 1911 Revolution to the May 4th Movement as a positive force. 147

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I have dealt with this in ‘The Asian Construction of Asia’ in M. William Steele and Masayoshi Uozumi (eds), Asia in Transition, Mentality of Popular Rebellion, Asian Cultural Studies Special Issue No. 9, 40th Anniversary Issue, International Christian University, Tokyo, pp. 43–56. See Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, particularly pp. 131–53. See Nishikawa Joken, Yonjyuni koku jinbutsu enzetsu ,Tokyo iinsei kabushigaisha, 1898. Op. cit., Arano, p. 56. See Brij Tankha, ‘Japan: Defining a Modern Identity’, Germinal (New Delhi), vol. I, 1994. See for instance Ronald Toby, ‘“Kettojin” no tojo o megutte – kinsei nihon no taigai ishiki. Tashakan no ichi sokumen’, in Murai Shokai, Sato Shin, Yoshida Shinno (eds), Gyokai no nihon shi, Yamakawa Shuppan, 1997. Harootunian in Akira Iriye (ed.), The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 26–7. Douglas R. Renyolds, ‘Training Young China Hands: Toa Dobun Shoin and its Precursors, 1865–1945’ in Peter Duus et al. (eds), The Japanese Informal Empire, op. cit., p. 212. Renyolds, op. cit., pp. 216–7 and pp. 222–3. Kamachi Noriko, Reform in China: Huang Tsun-hsien and the Japanese Model, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 120. Jansen, M., ‘Konoe Atsumaro’, in Iriye, op. cit., p. 115. Taiyo, 1 January 1898. Hashikawa Bunzo, ‘Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dis-association to Coprosperity’ in Iriye, op. cit., p. 331.

Endnotes 14 15 16

17

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35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

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Ando Mikitaro, Nihonjin no Chugokukan, p. 59. Ibid., p. 61. Quoted in Marius, Jansen, ‘Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives’ in Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie (eds), The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895–1945, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 66. For the influence of Darwin see, for instance, Uete Michiari, Nihon Kindai Shiso no Keisei, Iwanami, 1973. The material has been collected from a survey of widely-read journals ranging over a wide political spectrum. The writings of Yoshino Sakuzo and Naito Konan, for instance, are very well known so here I have selected the views of relatively lesser known people and then compared their views with those of Kita Ikki and Kotoku Shusui. Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin, Tokio, No. 5453, p. 23. I was not able to locate any material identifying Inagaki Shintaro. Ibid., No. 543, 15 October 1910, p. 24. Ibid., No. 544, p. 28. Ibid., No. 569, 5 November 1911. Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., No. 570, 15 November 1911, p. 34. Ibid., No. 571, 1 December 1911, p. 25. Ibid., No. 577, 1 March 1912, pp. 21–2. Ibid., No. 579, 1 April 1912, p. 22. Ibid., No. 579, p. 23. On the political changes in the Taisho period see Banno Junji, Taisho seihen, Minerva, 1982. Nihon oyobi Nihonjin, op. cit., No. 598, 5 January 1913. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., No. 635, 1 August, 1919, p. 27. Ibid., No. 640, 1 October, 1914, pp. 30–7. Ibid., No. 608, 15 June 1913 On Nakano Seigo see, Inomata Keitaro, Nakano Seigo, 1960. Ibid., No. 575, 1 February 1912. Ibid., No. 573, 1 January 1912. Ibid., No. 625, 1 March 1914. Ibid., No. 594, 15 November 1912. Ibid., No. 618, 15 November 1913. Ibid., No. 594, 15 November 1912. Chuo Koron, 8 January 1912. Ibid., 3 May 1912. Naito Konan’s views have been dealt with in the previous chapter. See also Nomura Koichi, op. cit., p. 64. Taiyo, April 1912 and December 1911. Consider Eto Shinkichi’s story that, according to Yoshikawa Kojiro, professor of Chinese literature, the leitmotif of literature in China was politics while in Japan it was love. Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin (eds), The 1911 Revolution in China Interpretaive Essays, Tokyo University Press, 1984. pp. xiii (Intro). Taiyo, December 1911.

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Taiyo, December 1911. Ibid., January 1911. On the question of the struggle between interior and outlying provinces, consider the view of Fredric Wakeman Jr, who writes, ‘The overthrow of the Ching Dynasty was not a coherent, radically planned coup at all. Rather, the Revolution of 1911 can be seen as a series of provincial secessions from the Empire.’ In Fredric Wakeman Jr, The Fall of Imperial China, London: Free Press, 1975, p. 228. Inoue Kiyoshi and Watanabe Toru, Taisho ki no kyushin teki jiyushugi Toyo Keizai Shinpo o chushin to shite, Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha, 1972, pp. 77–8. Toyo Keizai, 5 June 1911. Ibid., 15 April 1911, also quoted in Inoue Kiyoshi, op. cit., p. 68. Inoue Kiyoshi, op. cit., p. 68. The name of the magazine was taken from Ibsen’s play Emperor and Galilian (1870). In the play a pagan mystic Maximus tells the Emperor Julian that he will be the founder of the ‘third empire’, following the pagan Roman empire and the Christian empire of the Galilean, Jesus. This new order would supersede the old beauty of paganism and the new truths of Christianity. ‘Dai tai nichhu’, in Dai san teikoku, 1915. He stressed the fact that precisely because the Chinese saw the Japanese as brothers their enmity was greater than towards Westerners. See MatsuoTakayoshi, Taisho demokurash, Iwanami shoten, 1974, pp. 119–33. Dai san teikoku 1915. Ibid., 1915. Ibid., 1915. Ibid., 1915. Research Association for the History of the Labour Movement (ed.), Rodo undo shi kenkyu kai hen, Meiji shakaishugi shiryo shu, 20 vols, 1960–1963. Ishikawa writes ironically, ‘Socialism is totally bankrupt, the well-being of mankind can only be achieved by the social policies of a strong state and Japan is a country which is carrying out one social policy after another – at least this is what the supporters of the government (goyosha) writes.’ See Itoya Hisao, Kotoku Shusui den, Kyoto, 1950. F.G. Nothehelfer, Kotoku Shusui – Portrait of a Japanese Radical, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 84. Heimin Shinbun, 1.24.1906. Ito Toshio, Nihon shakai shugi undo shiso shi 1853–1922, Hosei University, 1979, p. 99. Ishimoda Sho, Zoku rekishi to minzoku no hakken, Tokyo Shuppan kai, 1974, pp. 321–2. Ibid., pp. 321–2. Ibid., p. 331. Itoya, op. cit., p. 200. See for instance Totten, George O., The Social Democratic Movement in PreWar Japan, Yale: Yale University Press, 1966.

Endnotes 70

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Miyazaki Toten, My Thirty Three Years Dream – The Biography of Miyazaki Toten, trans. and introduction by Eto Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 30. See for instance Ueki Emori’s constitutional proposal in Ienaga Saburo (ed.), Gendai nihon shiso taikei 3 minshushugi, Chikuma Shobo, 1965, pp. 74–90. Okakura Tenshin, (Kakuzo), Ideals of the East (1903), in Okakura Tenshin Collected English Writings, Heibonsha, 1984, pp. 14–16. Okakura, Tenshin, Awakening of the East, in ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 247. Ibid., p. 254. See, for instance, the views of Nakae Chomin. Rabindranath Tagore, A Visit to Japan, New York, 1961, p. 93. Ibid., p. 98. Ibid., p. 98. On Tagore’s reception in Japan see, Stephen Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and his Critics in Japan, China and India, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1922, pp. 97. Takeuchi Yoshimi, Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu, Chikuma shobo, 1980 Vol. 5, particularly Hoho to shite no azia, pp. 111–15. Tom Nairn, ‘The Modern Janus’, New Left Review, No. 94, November – December 1975, pp. 3–29 and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London: Verso, 1983. For a consideration of these aspects of nationalist thought as well as the limitations of socialists in dealing with these positions. The papers surveyed were Amrit Bazar Patrika, Comrade, Dawn, Indian Social Reformer, Leader, Pioneer, Tribune and the Native Newspaper Reports from Madras, Bengal and Punjab. Zamindar (Lahore), 7 February 1912 in Native Newspaper Reports (Punjab). Dr Ram Lal Sircar, ‘The Revolution in China’, Modern Review, Ramananda Chatterjee (ed.), vol. XII, No. 7–12, p. 352. Nomura Koichi, op. cit., pp. 53–5. On Naito Konan, see Joshua A. Fogel, Politics and Sinology – The Case of Naito Konan (1866–1934), Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1984. See, for instance, Nomura Koichi, op. cit., p. 78 and Mitani Taiichiro, op. cit, pp. 188–97 particularly, p. 189. Quoted in Muramatsu Sadako, Kindai Nihon no bungaku no okeru chugoku zo, Yuhikaku, 197.

CHAPTER 6 1

KICS 3, p. 446. This is in the statement to the Kempeitai in the seventh interrogation on 17 April 1936.

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Joseph Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate, Vol 2 The Problem of Monarchical Decay, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964, p. 11. Kaizo hoan, p. 205. The page numbers refer to my translation in the appendix. Kaizo hoan, p. 206. Kaizo hoan, p. 208. Kaizo hoan, pp. 206–7. Kaizo hoan, pp. 209–10. Kaizo hoan, p. 211. Kaizo hoan, p. 204. Kaizo hoan, p. 213. Kaizo hoan, p. 218. Kaizo hoan, p. 224. Kaizo hoan, p. 232. Kaizo hoan, p. 236. Kaizo hoan, p. 236. Kaizo hoan, p. 247. The changes in the notion of a family and the idea of a woman’s role in preserving and strengthening values and beliefs was argued by many social thinkers such as the Buddhist reformer Tanaka Chigaku. Kaizo hoan, p. 237. Kaizo hoan, p. 242. Kaizo hoan, p. 242. Kaizo hoan, p. 243. Kaizo hoan, p. 241. Kaizo hoan, p. 241. Kaizo hoan, p. 242. Kaizo hoan, p. 244. Kaizo hoan, p. 251. Kaizo hoan, p. 252. Kaizo hoan, p. 253. Kaizo hoan, p. 254. Kaizo hoan, p. 259. Kaizo hoan, p. 257. Kaizo hoan, p. 260. Kaizo hoan, p. 264. Kaizo hoan, p. 265. Kaizo hoan, p. 267. Kaizo hoan, p. 271. Kaizo hoan, p. 271. Kaizo hoan, p. 276. Kaizo hoan, p. 280. Kaizo hoan, p. 282. Kaizo hoan, p. 283.

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Nichiren (1222–82) founded an influential school of Buddhism that stressed the recitation of the Lotus Sutra (Namu myoho renge kyo or I take refuge in the Lotus Sutra) rather than the invocation of the name of Amida Buddha as the key to enlightenment. His life and teachings found favour among nationalists in the modern period though, in many ways, they altered and transformed his orginal teachings for their own purposes. See Philip B. Yamplosky (ed.), Burton Watson et al., (trans) Selected Writings of Nichiren, Columbia University Press, 1990. Selected Writings of Nichiren. Matsuoka Mikio, Kindai nichirenshugi no shakai shisoteki tenkai -sono hihanteki kosatsup., Tokyo University, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, pp. 95–6. Also Kita Ikki’s diary, Kita Reikichi, ‘Ani Kita ikki o kataru’, in Miyamoto Moritaro, Kita Ikki no ningenzo Kita nikki o chushin ni, Yuhikaku 1976 and Matsumoto Kenichi, Kita Ikki – Reikichi nikki, Daisan bunmeisha, 1987. The discussion on developments is based on my current research on religion in modern Japan. A good introduction is Yoshida Kuichi, Nihon no kindai shakai to bukkyo: Nihon no kodo to shiso, 6, Hyoronsha, 1972. Matsuoka Mikio, p. 74. Matsuoka Mikio, p. 75. Matsuoka Mikio, p. 79. Winston Davis, Japanese Religion and Society-Paradigms of Structure and Change, New York: State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. 161–2. The law separating Buddhism and Shinto (shinbutsu bunri rei) of 6 April 1868 laid out the context within which the policies of ‘unity of religion and government’ (saiseiitchi) initiated in 1868 would be played out. The draft was prepared by Kamei Korei (1824–85), daimyo of Tsuwano and Fukuba Bisei (1831–1907) and represents the first denial of premodern religious culture. It sought to provide the basis for a religion of the imperial realm but even at this stage Meiji bureaucrats were more interested in not just separation but creating a new Shinto that would underpin the modern state structure. See, John Breen, ‘Ideologues, Bureaucrats and Priests’ in John Breen and Mark Teruween (eds), Shinto in History – Ways of the Kami, London: Curzon, 2000, pp. 233–5. See in particular, Yoshida Kuichi, Nihon Kindai Bukkyo shi kenkyu, Yoshikawa Hiromi, 1944. as well as Sakamoto Koremaru, ‘Religion and the State in the Early Meiji Period (1868–1912)’, Acta Asiatica 51 Studies on Shinto, 1987, pp. 42–61 and p. 51 for Shimaji’s memorial urging the unification of Buddhism and Shinto to check the spread of Christianity. Matsuoka Mikio writes Murakami and Kiyozawa were the first to talk of the small and large self and possibly influenced Kita, p. 81. Winston Davis, pp. 163–4. Matsuoka Mikio also notes that Yoshino Sakuzo allied the Hegelian notion of liberty with the ‘large self’. The account of Tanaka Chigaku is based largely on my, ‘Making Heroes

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and Martyrs in pre-war Japan’, paper read at the conference on War and Representation, Chiba University, 19–20 December 2004. See Miyazaki Gentaro, ‘Bukkyo kakushin undo no sezokuteki aidentiti Tanaka Chigaku no “kokutairon” wo megutte’ in Aoki Tamotsu, et al., Syukyo to seisaku, Kindai nihon bunkaron, 9, Iwanami, 1999, pp. 26–54, on fufuron see pp. 31–4 and Tanaka Chigaku, Bukkyo fufuron, Rissho ankokukai, 1894. Ikeda p. 28 for the relationship between house (ie) and individual (kojin) Mizugaki Gentaro, p. 31. Mizugaki Gentaro, pp. 33–4. The account is based largely on the following – Otani Eichi, Kindai Nihon no nichirenshugi undo, Kyoto, Hozokan, 2001, Sueki Fumio, ‘Nichiren’s View of Nation and Emperor’, Special Issue ‘Revisiting Nichiren’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, autumn, 1999, Vol. 26 No. 3–4, and Edwin B. Lee, ‘Nichiren and Nationalism: The Religious Patriotism of Tanaka Chigaku’, Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 20, 1990, pp. 35–84. Otani Eiichi, p. 69. Otani Eichi, p. 75. Otani Eichi, p. 75. Matsuoka Mikio, p. 92. The influence of these popular religions is important from the time of the Russo-Japanese War as many of them were brought under state control. Omtokyo continued to face state suppression attesting to its attraction not just among farmers and petty traders but intellectuals as well. See Fujitani Toshio, ‘Tennosei to shukyo’ in Togoro Shigeki and Maruyama Teruo (eds), Tennosei to Nihon shukyo, Dento to gendai, 1980, pp. 200–14. The following is based on Kimura Shigeyuki, Shinran to oshu shoshiso, Kyoto, Seijinkusa, 1927, and his Geijitsu ni okeru nihonshugi, Kyoto, Seijinkusa 1929. Matsuoka Mikio, p. 96. Sato Hiroo, ‘Nichiren‘s View of Nation and Religion‘, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3–4, autumn, 1999, pp. 320–3.

CONCLUSION 1

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3

The subsequent argument is based on Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, London: New Left Books, 1978, particularly, pp. 93–120. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Quinten Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (ed. and trans), Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971, pp. 244. J.S. Mill, Collected Works John Stuart Mill Vol. XIX Essays on Politics and Society, J.M. Robson (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. 546–52. Fukuzawa Yukichi translated this as ‘omoide no kyodotai’ in Gakumon no susume, defining it as, ‘the people of one race, experiencing together the development of social conditions have the same emotional memory’, See Maruyama Masao, Bummei ron no gairyaku’ o yomu, Vol. 1 Iwanami Shinsho, Tokyo, 1988, p. 165.

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The Tudors put down serious rebellions from 1489 in Yorkshire to 1553 Wyatts Rebellion in 1553. See Charles Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History of European State-Making’ in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 21–2. Hegel quoted in Hayden White, ‘The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory’, History and Theory, XXII, 1954, p. 4. On Tsuda Sokichi see Ishimoda Sho, Rekishi to minzoku no hakken Tokyo Shuppan Kai, Tokyo, 1974, pp. 53–84. Ibid., p. 246. Ibid., p. 248. KICS 1, p. 75. Nomura Koichi, op. cit., pp. 53–5. KICS 2, p. 2. Quoted in J.J. Schwarzmantel, ‘Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism’, Political Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2, June 1987, p. 244. Compare Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National Reconstruction China Cultural Service, Taipei, 1953, p. 3 for example, ‘In other words, without military rule the destructive side of the revolution cannot be accomplished thoroughly; without political tutelage its conservative work cannot be pushed forward’. KICS 2, Chapter 6.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF JAPAN 1

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Okura Kihachiro (1837–1928) established the business that developed into the Okura zaibatsu in 1873 through dealing in military goods for the loyalist forces in the Boshin war as well as later wars that Japan fought with China and Russia. He was also involved in the loans to China in 1902. Okura also established a business school that is now the Tokyo University of Economics. The underlined phrase is deleted in the Nishida Mitsugu edition. See KICS 2, p. 378. The underlined phrase is deleted in the Nishida edition. See KICS 2, p. 378. In the underlined phrases in the Nishida edition divine (shinkaku) is replaced with human (jinkaku) more in line with Kita’s position of the human character of the emperor. Saigo Takamori (1828–77), Japanese soldier and opponent of the Tokugawa shogunate, an important member of the Meiji oligarchy and conservative statesman known for his advocacy of war with Korea and opposition to the Westernization of Japan. He led an abortive revolt against the government in 1877, the Satsuma rebellion and committed suicide after its failure. He became a symbol of devotion to principle. Iwashita Seishu (1857–1928) a businessman who began his career in 1878 with Mitsui General Trading Company and rose in the world of finance and banking. He was a close friend of politicians such as Hara Kei.

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The South Manchurian Railway Company a semi-official company established 1906 by imperial ordinance to manage railways and mines acquired from Russia. It became the largest economic enterprise in Manchuria constructing railway lines and managing the Railway Zone but its real purpose was the colonization of North-east China. It was a core institution of the Japanese colonial apparatus and was responsible for staging the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the establishment of the state of Manchukuo in 1932. The company was appropriated by China after the Second World War. Yoshino Sakuzo (1878–1933), professor in Tokyo Imperial University, played an important public role in articulating a conceptual position for indigenous notions of democracy. His term minponshugi or people as the base-ism was posed in opposition to Western notions of democracy (minshushugi). He argued that while formal sovereignty lay with the emperor representative government was possible because of the institutions of representative government such as an electoral system. He stressed the need for limiting the role of non-constitutional entities such as the Privy Council or the army. He briefly served as tutor to Yuan Shikai’s son Yuan Keiming in 1906. Tenrikyo is a religious group founded by Nakayama Miki (1788–1887) in Nara prefecture. Adherents were attracted by Miki’s charismatic personality and her following grew. The Meiji government classified it as sect Shinto. In the post-war period it has further expanded and now has over two and half million followers in Japan and other parts of the world. Kato Komei (1860–1926) served the government as ambassador to Great Britain (1909) and Foreign Minister (1914–15) until he was forced to resign over the Twenty-One Demands that he presented to the Chinese. He helped to organize the conservative Keiseikai Party and was Prime Minister 1924–25. The Tientsin-Pukou line was built by an Anglo-German contract in 1908 in which the Chinese were given extremely favourable terms so that they could retain control over the line. See Matsusaka Yoshihisa Tak, The Making of Japanese Manchuria 1904–1932, p. 209. It was concessions obtained by Russia for their help to China against Japan that allowed them to build the Chinese Eastern Railway, a system linking the Lake Baikal region in Siberia on the Trans-Siberian line and Vladivostock in Russia’s Maritime Province through northern Manchuria. A north-south line connected Harbin and Dalien and Port Arthur (Lushun). It also planned another line to Korea’s Yalu river border ‘a situation nearly as dangerous as an outright occupation of the peninsula’ See Yoshihisa Taku Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria 1904–1932, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. pp. 28–9.

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Index

Abe Isoo, 53 Adultery, 135, 203, 204 Aikawa, 5, 7, 8 Akita Tojuro, 7 Akutagawa Ryonosuke, 126 Alliance of United Sects for Ethical Standards, 144 All Under One Roof (Bansei ikkaron), 59 Amida Buddha, 145, 219 Ancestor worship, 38, 40, 42, 54, 59, 160 Hozumi Nobushige on, 31 Ancestral party (Zongshedang), 90 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 90, 99, 100, 118, 126, 158, 222, 223 Anti-colonial independence struggles, 121 Anti-militarism, 199 Arahata Kanson, 47 Ariga Nagao, 30, 33, 34, 35, 38, 60 Arita Shinpei, 18 Asian Federation, 226 Asian revolutionaries, 120, 121 Assassination, 23, 90 Association of the League of Labour Unions (Rodo kumiai kiseikai soshiki), 45 Authority, changing conceptions of, 57 Bakufu school, 5 Bellamy, Edward, 46, 47 Bertrand Russell, 124 Buddhist Youth Movement, 145 Biological evolutionists, 64 Black Dragon Society (Kokuryukai), 79 Bluntschelli, J.C., 30 Boxer indemnity, 92 Boxer rebellion, 19

Britain, 12, 90, 91, 92, 102, 136, 138, 139, 140, 155, 158, 167, 173, 209, 217, 221, 222, 223, 224 British Reform Acts, 14 Cabinet system of government, 89, 104 Cen Chun Xuan, 90 Central Review (Chuo Koron), 117 Child labour, 133, 194 China (chugoku), 108 China Adventurers, 83, 86, 157 China and Korea, 108, 124, 200 Anti-Japanese sentiments, 83 Communist Party, 78 ‘continental adventurers’ (tairiku ronin), 83, 85 daikan class, 95, 98 deformed state (henkei koku), as a, 85, 126, 157 external debt, 92 Japanese policy towards, 79, 111, 116 loans to, 92, 94, 95 magisterial government (daikan seiji), 96, 97, 101, 157 protection of, 139 Republic of, 77, 104 shina ronin, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, 122, 126 socialist press on 1911, 135–6 treaty relations with, 109 US capital investments, 101, 113 China experts, 83, 94, 102 China policy, 157, 226 China Problem, 106, 111 Chinese Alliance (Chugoku domeikai), 26

268

Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan

Chinese Eastern Railway (Toshin), 226 Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhong-Guo Guomindang), 78 Chinese Revolution, 26, 72, 73, 79–82, 83, 85, 92, 95, 96, 99, 102, 104, 117 Chinese revolutionaries, 78, 79, 82, 83, 88, 90, 91, 111 Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhong Guo Gemingdang), 78 Chinese students, 46, 78, 83, 85 Christian influence, 46 Citizens, duty of, 131, 173, 220 Cliques, 20, 21, 23, 69, 115, 174, 222 Commonerism (heiminshugi), 10, 52, 63 Commoners Newspaper (Heimin shinbun), 119 Communism, 206 Community (kyodotai), 40, 42 Confucian thought, influence of, 98 Confucianism, 98, 146 Conscription system, 179, 216, 217 Constitution, suspension of, 169 Corruption, 20, 21, 22, 24, 52, 54, 62, 131, 205, 209, 210, 211 Coup d’état, 18, 132, 169, 170, 175 Darwinian social evolution, 52 Death penalty, 67, 178 Dr Frank Goodnow, 80, 81 East (toyo), 109 East Asia New Harmony Society (Toa washin kai), 120 East Asian Brotherhood Institute (Toa dobunkai), 111 Eastern culture, 150, 151, 152 Eastern Economist (Toyo keizai), 118 Eastern socialism (Toyo no shakaishugi), 51 Eastern type republic, 73, 103 Echigo-Sado Shipping Company, 6 Education language of instruction, 135 people’s, 195, 197–202, 219 physical education, 135, 136 role of, 146 Educational Rescript, 29, 40, 54, 70, 147 Ely, R.T., 46, 47, 48, 49 Emperor (tenno), 37 divine being, as a, 39 divinity of, 33, 35, 40 emperor system, 28, 29, 33, 38–43, 54, 69, 71, 118, 119

legal position of, 31 living god (arahitogami), as a, 41 loyalty to, 60, 123 monarch (kunshu), as, 57, 60 people’s, 71, 130, 169–76 position of, 24, 42, 50, 60 religious figure, as, 40, 149 sanctity of, 51 significance of, 170, 171 status of ruler (kuni no genshu), 35 unbroken lineage, 17, 35, 37, 38, 51, 61 England, 19, 23, 36, 79, 90, 91, 92, 93, 100, 101, 102, 117, 209, 215, 216, 217, 220ff. and Russia, 89, 91, 95, 99, 100, 117, 126 understanding of the situation in China, 93, 224 Enlightenment (keimo) movement, 22, 62, 63 Equality, consciousness of, 22 Family, conception of the, 138 February 1936 coup, 130, 142 Feudal peace (hokenteki heiwa), 140, 229 Foreign aid, 81, 82, 86, 103 Four Power Consortium, 93 Four Power loan, 88 French Revolution, 35, 71, 81, 87, 95, 96, 100, 105, 131, 159, 175, 177 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 28, 107 ‘transcend Asia’ (Datsu-A), 110 Gaishi, 149, 152 General elections, 16, 20, 173, 175 General suffrage, 62 Germany, 13, 18, 30, 31, 55, 99, 100, 102, 110, 140, 151, 152, 167, 179, 209, 217, 218, 222ff. Goto Shinpei, 39 Great Principles of Humanity (see also Jindo no taigi), 12 Great Treason Trial, 120 Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, 84, 85, 100, 129 Guomindang, 78 Habano Tokuzo, 7 Hasegawa Kiyoshi, 10, 11, 16 Hatta Miki, 9, 11 Higuchi Kanjiro, 58, 71 views on crime, 58 Hirata Atsutane, 28

Index Hobson, J. , 120 Hokumei zasshi, 10 Hoshi Toru, 15 Hozumi Nobushige, 30, 42 Hozumi Yatsuka, 22, 30, 31, 33, 36, 37, 40, 42 Huang Xing, 78, 80, 85, 86, 87, 95, 103, 113 Humanism (jindoshugi), 212 Ichiki Kitokuro, 31, 32, 36 Imperial House, practices from European courts, 131, 171 Imperial Rescript on Education, 38 Inagaki Shintaro, 113, 114, 115 India (tenjiku), 108, 109 Individualism, 50, 55, 56 theory of, 57 Inoue Mitsu, 33 Inoue Tetsujiro, 54, 116, 145 Inukai Tsuyoshi, 88 Irokawa Daikichi, 28 Ishikawa Takuboku, 47 Ishimoda Sho, 121 Ishizuka Terasu, 10 Itagaki Taisuke, 15, 25, 39 Japan and the Japanese (Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin), 113 Japanese Buddhism, unification of, 147 Japanese diplomacy, decline of, 100 Japanese empire, overseas possessions, 136 extension of legal and administrative rights, 137 Japanese foreign policy, 78, 79, 89, 92, 102 loans to China, 92, 94, 95 Japanese investment, 92 Japanese socialism, 46, 63 Japan’s China experts, 102 Jimmu Tenno, 29, 147, 170 Jindo no taigi (Great Principles of Humanity), 12 Jiyuto, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16 Kaiserism, 217 Kaizo (reorganize/reconstruct), 140 Kaizo hoan, 129, 130, 150, 152, 158, 159 Kanai Noboru, 27, 57 Katayama Sen, 25, 47, 49, 118, 121 Our Socialism (Waga shakaishugi), 47, 49 Kato Hiroyuki, 28, 30

269

Katsura Taro, 16, 19 Keimo undo, 22, 23, 63 Kimura Shigeyuki, 150, 151, 152 Kinoshita Naoe, 47 Kishida Ginko, 110 Kita Ikki categorizes state structures, 70 concept of citizenship, 24 corruption, on, 20–1 critique of constitutional scholars, 30, 33, 40 critique of democracy, 131 dogmatic socialists, on, 26, 62, 63 early life and influences, 8–12 emperor, on, 38–9 kokutai, on, 17–18 meaning of Chinese revolution, 82–3 Meiji ishin-kakumei, 22–3 Mencius, on, 63 National Polity and Pure Socialism (Kokutairon oyobi junsei shakaishugi), The, 25 nature of loyalty, 58–60 nature of Meiji state, 34–8 racial war, 19 right to work, 56 socialism and imperialism, 20 Song Jiaren, on, 87–8 suicide and assassination, on, 23 SunYat-sen, on, 77–8 Unoffcial History of China (Shina gaishi), 102–105 Kiyozawa Manshi, 145 Kokutai, 11, 22, 23, 28, 29, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 60, 81, 132, 140, 143, 148, 149, 156, 169, 170, 171 concept of kokutai, 10, 17, 28, 34 difference between seitai and, 34, 36, 61, 117 Kita Ikki on, 17–18 kokutai and socialism, 51 kokutai of our ancestors, 30 mikoshi, as, 34 modern view of, 34, 170 Kokutai no hongi, 28 Kokutairon, 11, 23, 33, 42, 47, 53, 60, 129, 130, 143, 149, 150, 156 Komin kokka, (people’s state), 22, 34, 57, 60, 61, 62, 69, 70 Konoe Atsumaro, Prince, 111 Korea, 12, 18, 19, 20, 29, 36, 70, 100, 107, 108, 109, 116, 118, 120, 124, 136, 137, 138, 139, 158, 188, 200, 201, 208ff.

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Kotoku Shusui, 19, 25, 42, 48, 49, 51, 52, 120, 121, 124, 139, 148, 157, 225 China, on, 120–1 imperialism and nationalism, on, 120 Quintessence of Socialism, The, 47 Kuno Osamu, 69, 71 K’ang Yu-wei, 111 Labour World (Rodo sekai), 45, 119 Land Distribution, 180 Large self (daiga), 65, 143 Lenin, 120, 132, 139, 169, 170, 181, 220, 221, 222, 223, 226 Lese-majesty (fukei), 17, 18, 37, 42 Liang Bi, General, 90 Liang Chi’-ch’ao, 111 Liberal Party, 6; see also Jiyuto Light (Hikari), 119 Lotus Sutra (Hokkekyo), 142, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 159 Loyalty, 58 Malthus, 68 theories of, 67 Manchu dynasty, 77, 78 Manchuko, 149 Manchuria, 18, 19, 20, 64, 80, 90, 91, 93, 101, 102, 117, 120, 137, 188, 209, 211, 221, 224 Japan’s policy, 116, 118 Marriage ceremony, ideas of, 146 Maruyama Meiboku, 5 Marx and Kropotkin, 228 Marx’s Theory of Surplus Value, 10 Matsuda Michio on failure of socialism, 54 Matsuoka Kason, 47 Meiji Constitution debates on sovereignty, 29–33 oligarchy and elections, 14–17 Meiji Emperor, 73, 96, 103, 131, 142, 148, 149, 172, 225, 226 Meiji ishin, (ishin-kakumei), 3, 4, 8, 10, 23, 28, 38, 46, 51, 55, 69, 70, 71, 73, 81, 94, 108 character of, 41, 45 Mencius, 63–4, 72, 98, 104, 159 Militarism, 28, 53, 98, 119, 210, 217, 222, 223 Minobe Tatsukichi, 30, 32, 33, 36 Minponshugi, 199 Minseito, 116 Miyajima Suehiro, 110

Miyatake Gaikotusu, 41 Miyazaki Toten, 25, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 105, 122 Mongolia, 100, 101, 102, 104, 159, 224, 226 Mori Tomoki, 10 Morichika Unpei, 48 Motooda Nagazane, 28 Motoori Norinaga, 28, 150 Murakami Sensei, 145 Mutual aid, 50, 65, 228 Nagai Michio, 119 Nagai Ryutaro, 47, 119 Nagashima Yu, 115 Naito Konan, 81, 117, 126 Nakano Seigo, 116 Nanjing government, 87 Napoleon, 73, 96, 97, 103, 104, 129, 132, 159, 169, 170, 211, 220 Napoleonic wars, 129, 163 Nation, rights of, 138 Nativism, dogmatic (kokusui shugi), 80 Nichiren Buddhism, 142, 148, 149, 159 Nichiren-ism, 147, 149 Nihongi, 28, 147 Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin, 117 Nihon shoki, 28 Niigata shinbun, 8 Niijima Jo, 53 Nishikawa Joken, 108 Oka Asajiro, 64–6 Okakura Tenshin, 123, 145, 152, 159 Okawa Shumei, 47 Okuma Shigenobu, 7, 79, 125, 157–8 Okuma’s policy, 100, 101 On Buddhist Marriage, 146 Osawa Teisei, 9 Osugi Sakae, 47, 121 Otsuka Kozan, 47 Ozaki Yukio, 16, 111 Plato of the East, 63 Port Arthur, 19, 220, 224 Poverty, 16, 26, 45, 48, 55, 57, 62, 198 origin of, 26, 48, 55 Prince Konoe Atsumaro, 111 Progressive Party (Kaishinto), 7 Property, nationalization of private, 132–4 Prostitution, 134, 135, 204

Index Qing dynasty, 89, 92, 95, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 157 Quaker religion, 138, 218–19 Rabindranath Tagore, 123 Racial wars, 19, 157 Reform of Religion (Shumon no ishin), 147 Religion, freedom of, 37, 144 Research Group on Sociology (Shakaigaku kenkyukai), 45 Retrogressive criticism, 38 Revivalist revolutionaries (fukkoteki kakumei shugi), 37 Revive Asia Society (Koa kai), 110, 111 Revive China Society (Xing Zhong Hui), 77 Revolution, 22, 23, 82, 95, 99 Rice riots, 130 Rights (jinshuken), 23 Rikken Doshikai, 16 Rikugo zasshi (Cosmos Journal), 47, 54 Risshin shussei, 50 Rissho Ankokukai, 147, 148 Russia, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 22, 36, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 99, 100, 101, 104, 110, 117, 125, 126, 139, 143, 156, 158, 167, 174, 179, 181, 182, 203, 209, 210, 220ff. Russian revolution, 14, 46, 169, 175, 181 Russo-Japanese agreements, 100 Russo-Japanese War, 43, 54, 62, 90, 100, 101, 117, 120, 139, 147, 167, 209, 224, 225, 226 Ryotsu, 8 Sado, 3–8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 143 mines, 6 new waka movement, 11 newspapers, 8 role of Kaishinto, 7–8 Sado Association, 11 Sado shinbun, 8 Saigo Takamori, 39, 69, 70, 83, 97, 142, 178 Saionji Kinmochi, 16, 39 Saito Shinkichi, 9 Sakae Toshihiko, 25, 43, 52, 54, 119 Sanshin ho, 39 Sato Tetsutaro, 41 Seitai, 11, 34, 36, 37, 58, 61, 117 Selfishness (rikoshugi), 50 Selfless Love, 145 Shamanism, 143

271

Shinran, 150, 151 Shinto, 28, 34, 37, 40, 142, 149, 153, 169 Shukyokan, 5, 10 Sino-Japanese War, 18, 45, 92, 110, 147, 209 Six Power Consortium, 93 Small self (shoga), 65, 143 Social Darwinism, 9, 46, 54, 66, 112, 122 ‘spirit of evolution’ (shinka no ikioi), 52 struggle for survival, 46, 143 Social Policy Study Group (Shakai seisaku gakkai), 45 Socialism anti-colonialism and, 121 concept of people, 52 democracy, and, 37 democratic socialism, 37, 80, 222 doctrinaire, 168 dogmatic socialists, 26, 62, 63 ethical basis of, 63 failure of japanese socialists, 121 German, 228 influence of American ideas, 46 Katayama Sen, and, 47–8 Kotoku Shusui, 48–52 meaning of, 49 Meiji socialism, 44, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55 socialists views of Meiji ishin, 45 support to imperialism, 20 scientific, 46, 48, 63 Utopian and Scientific, 46 Western, 63 Society (Shakai zasshi), 45 Society of Patriots (Aikokusha), 6 Sone Toshitoru, 110 Song Jiaoren, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87, 89, 93, 102, 103, 104 draft constitution, 88 Soto Zen Otani, 145 Sovereignty, locus of, 33, 34 State ‘all pervasive statism’ (kokka bannoshugi), 37 body of the state (kokka no hontai), 36 class character of, 51 distribution of power (shuken bunpai); 11 ‘Legalism (hoijishugi)’, 40 non-political characterization, 155 organ theory of, 32

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State (continued) paternalist state (katcho kokka), 62 patriarchal state, 37, 38, 40, 42, 70 powers of, 216 socialists, for, 22 sovereignty, 36, 62, 64 Statism, 37, 60, 64, 71, 151 Sugita Teiichi, 111 Suicide, 23, 221 Sun Yat-sen, 73, 77ff., 96, 97, 113 criticism of, 89, 95, 102 ideas of 96, 102 political programme, 102, 103 weakness of, 89, 92 Taisho political change (Taisho seihen), 115 Taisho period, 112, 150 Taiyo, 111, 117, 118 Tajima Kinji, 27, 57 Takabatake Motoyuki, 47 Takahashi Tokugo, 116 Takasugi Shinsaku, 110 Takeuchi Yoshimi, 29, 43, 85, 124 Tan Renfeng, 79, 80, 85, 86, 93, 94, 95 Tanaka Chigaku, 145–7, 153 Tang Shao Yi, 93 Tenant farmers, 133, 134, 194 Tenrikyo, 218 The Great Eastern School (Daito juku), 9 The Spiritual Society, 145 Third Empire (Dai san teikoku), 118 Three-country world view (sankoku sekai kan), 108 Tokutomi Soho, 47, 52, 112 Toyo Keizai, 118 Tradition, ‘structureless tradition’ (mukozo dento), 43 Triple Intervention, 18, 99, 110 Twenty-one Demands, 79

USA, 12, 19, 20, 27, 36, 46, 87, 92, 93, 97, 101, 102, 110, 114, 116, 185 Uchida Ryohei, 85, 88, 126, 157 Uchimura Kanzo, 10, 17, 19, 53, 54 Uesugi Shinkichi, 30 Ukai Ikujiro, 5, 6, 7 Ukita Kazutani, 117, 118, 119 United League (Tong Meng Hui), 78, 103 Watanabe Kyoji, 69 on kokutairon, 69–71 Western cultural hegemony, 123 Western-Eastern culture, 229 Western-style school uniforms, 202 Women, fundamental rights of, 134, 203 Women, ‘good wife, wise mother’ (ryosai kenbo), 134, 173, 195 Wuchang uprising, 78, 89, 90 Xinhai or 1911 revolution, 77, 82, 93, 106, 157 Indian reactions to, 124–5 historiography of 1911 revolution, 77–8 Yamaga Soko, 28 Yamamoto Gonnohyoei cabinet, 93 Yamazaki Ansai, 28 Yano Ryukei, 116 Yihetnan (Boxer) movement, 53 Yorozu choho, 47 Yoshino Sakuzo, 126 Yuan Shikai, 80, 81, 82, 88ff., 114, 116 ascendancy of, 89 Zhang Ji, 87, 104, 120 Zhang Taiyan, 86