Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345-1547 0804713405, 9780804713405

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KINSHIP AND POLITICS

KINSHIP AND POLITICS The Making o f the Muscovite Political System, 1345-1547

Nancy Shields Kollmann

Ф

Stanford University Press 198J Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1987 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America Published with the assistance of the Center for Research in International Studies, Stanford University CIP data appear at the end of the book

To Jack

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I t is a g r e a t p l e a s u r e to thank the many people who have aided me in the research and writing of this book. Financial aid supplied by several institutions facilitated my work. Grants from the National De­ fense Foreign Language Fellowship Program, the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Re­ search Abroad Program, the Russian Research Center at Harvard Univer­ sity, and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University supported the dissertation research on which it is based. The Center for Russian and East European Studies and the Center for Research in Inter­ national Studies at Stanford provided assistance in the preparation of the manuscript. I am most appreciative for all this institutional support. I am extremely fortunate to have been given access to numerous ar­ chives and manuscript divisions in Moscow and Leningrad: in Moscow, the Manuscript Division of the Lenin Library, the Central State Archive of Old Documents and the Manuscript Division of the State Historical Mu­ seum; in Leningrad, the Manuscript Division of the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library, the Archive of the Leningrad Section of the Institute of History, and the Manuscript Division of the Library of the Academy of Sciences. I am most beholden for the advice given to me and for the hos­ pitality extended by Soviet scholars and by the staffs of these institutions. The Russian Research Center at Harvard provided me a stimulating and professional research environment, and I am thankful to it for that and particularly for the office I occupied at the Center over several years. In it I wrote and began to revise my dissertation on boyar succession pat­ terns. The weekly Seminar on Ukrainian History and Literature at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute was similarly formative because it exposed me to a wide range of scholars engaged in research, analysis, and criticism. I find the Department of History at Stanford University to be an equally collegial community; it provides me with ample material support and a rigorous intellectual challenge. I am fortunate and appreciative that I have been affiliated with these fine institutions.

viii

Acknowledgments

Most of all, 1 thank the many people who encouraged and helped me in this project. Their advice improved my work; however, the responsibility for any shortcomings is, of course, mine. My good friends Frank Sysyn and Dan Rowland shared their expertise and were generous with their counsel. During the two years I spent as Allston Burr Senior Tutor in Mather House at Harvard, Co-Masters David and Patricia Herlihy strongly encouraged me in my research and writing while we labored to­ gether at more mundane tasks. Each of them provided a peerless example of scholarly dedication. An early teacher, Richard Pipes, set a standard of scholarly dedication that I try to emulate. My intellectual debt to Omeljan Pritsak is great: his erudition and his ability to penetrate to the heart of every issue stand as ideals I strive for. Several scholars - Charles Halperin, Ann M. Kleimola, Robert O. Crummey, Brenda MeehanWaters, and Joan Afferica - read the dissertation and offered astute criti­ cism. Gustave Alef gave a near-to-final draft of the manuscript a close reading and offered helpful suggestions; I greatly appreciate his gener­ osity. A colleague at Stanford, Terence Emmons, gave me the benefit of his broad knowledge of Russian history and historiography and offered an insightful critique of the work. Finally, two people oversaw the project from beginning to end. My hus­ band, Jack Kollmann, was a constant source of encouragement and help; he maintained his enthusiasm when mine waned and gave generously of himself as he does in all the activities that are part of our life together. I am, as always, inexpressibly grateful for his presence and support. And I must acknowledge the debt that I owe Edward L. Keenan. He started me on this quest with a simple remark. For my dissertation I had proposed to examine how Polish influence might have changed the Muscovite political system in the Time of Troubles and its aftermath. He parried my sugges­ tion with a characteristic “back-to-basics” question: “But do we really know how the political system worked before the Poles arrived?” Upon reflection I decided we did not, and from that point on he encouraged and advised me unstintingly. Not only did he answer queries as specific as those regarding translations of single words and the identification of watermarks, but he helped me solve the broadest interpretive problems. 1 hope this book lives up to his standard of erudition by bringing a fresh perspective to, and by rigorously reexamining, an important problem in Muscovite political history. N.S.K.

CONTENTS

Figures and Tables

xi

Introduction: Court Politics and the Political System

i

The Muscovite Political System The Historiography of Muscovite Court Politics Methodology

4 8 18

chapter

I

The Formative Fourteenth Century

The Setting j Boyars and Their Roles Other Political Forces

chapter

2 Becoming a Boyar

I Collateral Succession Collateral Succession and Precedence Norms Mortality, Age, and Politics I The System in Practice

chapter

3 Continuity and Change in the Boyar Elite

( Service The Okol’nichii Rank Continuity and Change Competence and Change

24 24 37 46

55

59 67 70 78

90

9° 97 104 115

x

Contents

c h a p ter 4 Marriage Politics 1 Hierarchy and the Primacy of Marriage

The VePiaminov Ascendancy, 1345-1433 The Rise of the Patrikeevy, 1433-99 The Post-Patrikeev Settlement

c h a p ter 5 Consensus and Conflict The Façade of Autocracy Mechanisms to Maintain Stability The Grand Prince and Primogeniture Political Association: Faction or Class? The Minority of Ivan IV, 1533-47

j Conclusion Appendix I The Calculation o f Boyars* Ages Appendix 2 Clan Biographies Notes Bibliography Index

121 121 128 133 140

146 146 151 155 159 161

181 191 199

243

289 309

FIGURES AND TABLES

FIG U RES

1. The Vel’iaminov Clan with Vorontsov and VePiaminov Lines 2. The Akinfovich Clan with Khromoi, Buturlin, and Cheliadnin Lines 3. Genealogical Seniority Rankings 4. The Patrikeev Princes with Kurakin Line 5. The Shuiskii Princes 6. The Akinfovich Clan with Osteev, Chebotov, and Zhulebin Lines 7. The Koshkin Clan with Iur’ev and Iakovlev Lines 8. Kinship and Marriage Alliances, 1520V50’s: Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy 9. Kinship and Marriage Alliances, i52o’s-5o’s: Bel’skii and Telepnevy-Obolenskii Princes, Cheliadniny 10. Kinship and Marriage Alliances, i52o’s-5o’s: Shuiskii Princes

62 63 68 79 82 86 101 163 164 166

TABLES

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. A i.i.

Number of Boyars, Selected Years, 1371-1555 Composition of the Boyar Elite, 1320V1407 Composition of the Boyar Elite, 1407-62 Composition of the Boyar Elite, 1462-1525 Status of Elite Families, 1462-1525 Composition of the Boyar Elite, 1525-55 Status of Elite Families, 1525-55 Vital Statistics of Daniilovich Males A1.2. Careers of 16 Men in Boyar Lines A1.3. Careers of 35 Men in Boyar or Boyar-Okol’nichii Lines

76 104 105 106 112 114 116 192 194 196

KINSHIP AND POLITICS

Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi to his boyars: You know my habits and my customs, for I was bom and grew up before you, and I have ruled with you. . . . With you I have fought valiantly in many lands. . . . 1 have maintained honor and love towards you; I have given you to rule cities and great lands; I have held your children in love; to none of you have I done evil, nor have I seized you by force nor abused you nor reproached you nor plundered you nor dishonored you but I have loved you all and I have held you in honor. I have rejoiced with you and 1 have despaired [with you]. . . . To me you are not “boyars” but princes of my land. PSRL, 25: 216.

Introduction: Court Politics and the Political System

is a book about politics, power, and autocracy. In it I examine how political power was achieved, distributed, and contested at the Mus­ covite grand-princely court from its fourteenth-century founding to the watershed reign of Ivan IV in the middle of the sixteenth century. Muscovy was an autocratic polity: no social groups and no political institutions shared sovereignty with the Muscovite ruler. But the absence of political pluralism did not preclude political dynamism. The grand prince, his counselors the boyars, and other court personnel participated in a lively political order; analyzing that system and how it developed over time is my aim in this book. This work is part of a tradition observed by numerous scholars, in­ asmuch as it depicts Muscovite politics as autocratic and patrimonial. The Muscovite autocracy was a political system unlike those that readily come to mind for comparison. It was different from the later Imperial Russian system of central control in that it lacked that system’s extensive bureaucratic apparatus; it was also different from the systems existing in early modern West and Central European states in that it allowed a multi­ plicity of interests to be represented without tolerating social pluralism in politics. In Muscovy through the sixteenth century, power was the private possession of the sovereign; he shared it in friendship, not by obligation, with his comrades and chosen counselors. The political system that devel­ oped from such presumptions, despite this façade of autocracy, was re­ markably complex. That complexity is the focus of this work. Since about the 1950’s, scholars have concentrated their attention on the sovereign’s half of Muscovite autocracy and have analyzed why Moscow’s landed servitors failed to unite in opposition to Russia’s cen­ tralizing monarchs. The answer has been found in the forceful leadership of rulers from Ivan III (1462-1505) to Ivan IV (1533-84) and in their methods of subjugating the elite, including disgrace, confiscation of prop­ erty, abolition of a servitor’s right to move freely to a new place of service, the use of informers, and the taking of loyalty oaths that imposed collec­ tive responsibility on the elite. Scholars have also analyzed the factors

T his

2

Introduction

that atomized the elite beginning in the fifteenth century: partible inheri­ tance, a postulated impoverishment of the landed service class, the rav­ ages of warfare, and the system of precedence (mestnichestvo).’ This ap­ proach provides a vivid picture of the means by which Muscovy’s rulers gained immense power over the servitor classes, but it tends to under­ emphasize the boyars* half of the political relationship. To focus on the monarch creates an unbalanced view, since, in Muscovy as elsewhere, no sovereign could be a literal autocrat. He depended upon men to carry out his will and to maintain a social consensus supporting his power. One historian, discussing medieval European politics, echoes this line of think­ ing: “The complete dependence of the king on the nobility . . . needs to be stressed. . . . The ruler was dependent on those who were prepared to obey him.” 2 Individuals drawn from the servitor classes—Moscow’s boyars—wielded real power, which was subsumed patrimonially under the ruler’s sovereignty. The growth of Muscovite autocracy is the story not just of the sovereign’s power, but of his interaction with his boyars and of the boyars with one another. I propose, then, to look at autocracy from the inside out, that is, from the point of view of the men who ruled Moscow, who devised, executed, and benefited from the aforementioned policies of oppression. It is appropriate to emphasize the uniqueness of the Muscovite political system, since comparisons with the development of West European politi­ cal systems are implicit in much historical writing about Muscovy and have shaped the dominant interpretations of Muscovite politics. The model is only superficially apt. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, ambitious rulers throughout Europe faced the problem of winning the support of leading social groups necessary to centralize their states. Monarchs in England, France, the Germanies, Poland, and Bohemia solved the problem by sharing sovereignty with parliaments and by giving privileges to corporate estates. When circumstances permitted, some rulers re­ gained their dispersed authority; they circumvented representative in­ stitutions to create bureaucratically centralized, absolutist regimes. Many scholars have seen in Muscovite centralization the hand of a progressive monarch; they have looked in turn for representative institutions, a bu­ reaucracy, and emerging social classes. These they have found in the ad­ ministrative reforms of the 1530’s and 1550’s (the gubnaia and zemskaia reforms), the Councils of the Land (zemskie sobory), and the broadening of court ranks to include the gentry. Dramatic conflicts such as the dynas­ tic crises of the i43o’s-4o’s, the 1490’s, and the period of the minority of Ivan IV —as well as the Oprichnina —have been construed as victories ei­ ther for centralizing autocrats or for emergent social classes in a political world defined in class terms.3

Introduction

з

But the comparison to European “new monarchs” is imperfect: Mos­ cow’s administrative reforms did not confer local autonomy and the Councils of the Land were not representative institutions.4 Actors in court politics did not define themselves as West and Central European nobilities did: they did not constitute a privileged corporate class, and their political struggles were not expressions of class-based antagonisms. Struggles at court were not over policies and rights, but over personal power as defined in terms of kinship and personal alliances.5 Muscovite sovereigns followed a different path to centralized rule. Muscovite political development lacked the sources of feudalism that helped generate demands for representative institutions or privileges by corporate estates in Europe.6 Muscovy had no vestigial Roman aristocra­ cies, no Germanic kings and tribal elites, no politicized Roman Catholic papacy and church hierarchy. It lacked the legal traditions bequeathed to Europe as a result of Roman occupation and Germanic invasion and de­ veloped by secular and ecclesiastical cultural establishments. Muscovy’s political development was also influenced by its social situation: as late as the sixteenth century, Muscovy’s military, bureaucratic, and urban classes were too small to demand enfranchisement as their counterparts in the West did. And Muscovy had no cause to complicate its political ar­ rangements, since neither social pressure nor governmental inadequacies prompted it to do so. Muscovy’s political system —socially exclusive though it was —adequately served the needs perceived by its rulers and was tolerated by society. That the Muscovite political order was characterized not so much by conflict as by cooperation and integrity is a dominant theme of the analy­ sis presented here. The Muscovite system might be likened not to its protoparliamentary European contemporaries but to medieval European monarchies —in the maintenance of a personal relationship between sov­ ereign and men, in the monarch’s reliance on personal loyalties as a basis for forging political relationships, and in the simplicity of the governing institutions and social structures. The Weberian “ideal type” of patri­ monial rule also seems to reflect Muscovy’s political principles.7 Such a revised interpretation of sixteenth-century political life has the virtue of explaining the “failure” of boyars to act as an aristocracy. Perceiving the boyars as having a unity of interest with the sovereign helps to explain certain phenomena such as the continuity in power of boyar families, including the clan that spawned the Romanov dynasty as well as the Obolenskii, Bel’skii, Glinskii, Mstislavskii, and Shuiskii princely clans. It also helps to explain why the boyars did not voice aristocratic selfconsciousness during the sixteenth century and why other classes did not win political power to a significant degree until after the mid-sixteenth

4

Introduction

century. This interpretation implies the need for a new conceptual vo­ cabulary for Muscovite politics, one that recognizes the mutual depen­ dence and complex interaction of the men in power.

The Muscovite Political System One logically consults the sources when attempting to build a new vo­ cabulary of political relations. Muscovite sources provide information about politics, but they do not describe political relations. The sources fall into two broad categories: (i) documents and court records, such as diplomatic records, land transaction deeds, wills and charters, and genea­ logical and military service books; and (2) narrative sources, predomi­ nantly chronicles. Both types provide information on events and charac­ ters at court, but not explicit information about the principles underlying political activity. The sources do not use terminology that would reveal the existence of corporate or institutional bodies, nor do they include constitutions or charters of corporate estates’ rights. These deficiencies force the historian to devise his or her own conceptual framework of poli­ tics, based on a considered understanding of the society as it presents it­ self. For most historians, this has meant taking the narrative sources at face value when assessing the autocratic power of the sovereign and ana­ lyzing political groups and struggles in terms of the social classes to which the members and participants belonged. But this means filling in the gaps with an implicit comparison of Muscovite political relations to contemporaneous European politics, and such an approach has led to conflicting and unsatisfactory historiography. A more serviceable frame­ work can be built by following the lead of the sources, with their empha­ sis on family and on harmony at court, and by reading narrative sources with a sensitivity to their implicit meanings. Muscovite sources were written in a patrimonial vein. To their per­ sistent emphasis on family, loyalty, and personal relations we can trace some historians’ awareness of affinitive principles in Muscovite politics. The court’s records of the elite were structured by family: genealogical books, which recorded the male membership of the military elite, were kept at court, side by side with records of military service. Narrative sources often identified factions as families —for example, “the Shuiskie” or “the Kubenskie.” Sources also direct our attention to marriages among boyar families and between boyar families and the grand-princely clan. Significantly, the court stored its records of attendants at royal weddings in a prominent place in the important books of military service records.8 Such evidence suggests that family and personal alliances were dynamic

Introduction

5

forces in politics; an analysis of political crises and boyar succession pat­ terns confirms such a conclusion. The source record also draws our attention to other sorts of personal relations in politics. Personal loyalty, rather than legalistic obligation, is highlighted in narrative tales that define the good boyar as one who “wishes well” for his sovereign; that some testators called their executors “my lord” suggests dependency and personal, not formal, links in politi­ cal associations.9 One might describe these networks of loyalty and de­ pendence as “vertical.” Narrative sources and court rituals suggest a more ambiguous ideology of political relations. Churchmen - and by the sixteenth century the grand prince’s scribes as well —wrote chronicles according to an official ideology of Christian autocracy: rulers possessed undivided sovereignty and total power, metropolitans gave moral advice and interceded for mercy, boyars were “good” or “bad” counselors, and grand princes were “virtuous” or “evil.” Grand princes were omnipotent, but the boyars were their true comrades.10This ideology is idealized in comparison with reality, but it intimated the bounds of proper political behavior. It demon­ strated the sovereign’s exclusive autocratic power, as well as the existence of real prohibitions against any boyar’s challenging the ruler; at the same time it provided ample justification for the boyars’ presence in politics. Politics upheld the ideals of this ideology, such as the requirement for a cooperative relationship between all boyars and the grand prince, or the toleration of an inequitable division of power and status among the boyars themselves. Muscovite chronicles also illuminate political rela­ tions in that they situate such relations in the realm of the personal and moral. They make no provision for constitutional institutions, enfran­ chised political classes, or corporate privileges, and this gap paralleled the absence of such entities in real life. The sources suggest rather that politics was the personal interplay of the elite men, women, and families, and was shaped by factors such as self-interest, personal charisma, re­ spect for tradition, loyalty to family, and the obligations of honor and of dependency. It is this insight about the personal nature of Muscovite court politics that informs my analysis, summarized in the remainder of this section. Court politics governed relations between the grand prince and the boyars (including the okol’nichie from the late fifteenth century11). It encom­ passed customs determining political recruitment (how men became boyars, or advisers to the sovereign and the sole political actors with him), the hierarchy of status (how boyars distributed power among them­ selves), association (on the basis of what principles men grouped in politi-

6

Introduction

cal struggles), conflict and its resolution (what issues provoked boyars to disrupt stability and how those conflicts were ended). Although these customs resulted in the creation of a complex political order for grand princes and boyars, they also led to the establishment of a potent govern­ ment that acted as one toward the outside world. Just as the grand prince and the boyars worked out patterns to govern their relationships at court, so also did they establish norms of interaction within the broader political system. From the beginning the boyars and the grand prince were not alone at the Kremlin court. Even in the four­ teenth century, the court used a few scribes to keep records. The boyars and the grand prince also depended upon men to lead parts of the army, to collect taxes, and to carry out minimal functions of local administra­ tion. These military servitors were drawn from the larger social class of landed cavalrymen from which the boyars themselves had come. Members of that class owned land worked by peasants and they served Riurikid princes; the wealthiest and most politically astute of them supported their own retinues and constituted a pool from which regional princes chose boyars. In the fifteenth century, the Muscovite court also used the services of a few financiers; as the state apparatus expanded with the in­ crease in Moscow’s territory and the size of its army, more central admin­ istrators and scribal cadres were required as well. All these groups —scribal and administrative bureaucracies, financiers, military servitors —consti­ tuted the executive arms of grand-princely and boyar decision making; they also represented a potential challenge to the boyars’ monopoly on effective political power and were a potential catalyst for change in Moscow’s court politics. As the state, army, and administration grew, the grand prince and the political elite were forced to devise ever more complex ways of organizing government and maintaining social stability. In doing so, however, they adhered to traditions established in the fourteenth century. Emerging so­ cial classes were excluded from politics. Members of eminent princely clans and untitled lesser families were made boyars. Those from other classes - servitors, merchants, and scribes-were bought off with social concessions, including status distinctions, position within the system of precedence, landholding and judicial privileges, reforms of local govern­ ment, increase in the number of court ranks and of the number of men who held them, and eventually even restrictions on the mobility of peas­ ants that benefited the landed service class. Muscovy was thus able to en­ dure into the sixteenth century with a decision-making elite that was in­ stitutionally and socially simple. The Muscovite political system was grounded in affinitive relations; kinship ties, marriage alliances, and patronage provided a basic stability.

Introduction

7

But it also tolerated dynamic change. The problem of political recruit­ ment, for example, was solved by passing boyar status within families ac­ cording to established norms. But the composition of the elite was also determined by more dynamic events. Immigrant princes, cadet branches of old Muscovite clans, and new servitor families struggled bitterly for the right to become hereditary boyars. Some succeeded, having been chosen because of their talents, their close relationship with the grand prince, their wealth, or their foreign connections. These new boyars com­ peted for status by engaging in shrewd politicking and forming alliances. Stability was assured even in competition, however, since boyars main­ tained their eminence by marriage alliances that lasted for generations. Marriage by no means created inviolable political alliances, but ties by marriage and kinship provided ambitious men with several overlapping kinship groups, giving them maximum flexibility when opportunities for advancement arose at court.12 The political order was characterized by both stability and dynamism. The fact that some members of the inner circle were related to the grand prince meant that the tenure of the most powerful boyars was longlasting, since the kinship link of boyar family to sovereign dynasty en­ dured from generation to generation. Yet this organizing principle meant that marriages in the grand-princely family became the focus of fierce competition that often erupted into disruptive political struggles. Most conflict at court up to the mid-sixteenth century concerned succession and marriage problems in the Daniilovich dynasty. Political conflict, in turn, could change the paths defined by such marriages: shrewd politick­ ing, the influence of the grand prince, and expedient coalitions of boyars could break the power of factions that would otherwise have been en­ sured by heredity. Kinship and politics interacted to shape the system, but neither influence was dominant. Heredity and marriage, as has been suggested, constituted one source of stability in the elite. Boyars were assured that their power and status could be passed on to their sons from generation to generation. Men in the inner circle could count on their kinship with the grand prince to last at least a generation, and all men could assume that marriage alliances would endure for generations. A second source of stability in court poli­ tics appears to have been the boyars’ commitment to avoid conflict in the interest of preserving and furthering a strong, stable government. This consensus is suggested by symbolic representations in the chronicles of the boyars’ harmonious relation with the grand prince, by the relatively infrequent internecine conflict among boyars, and by the hereditary con­ tinuity of the boyars. In addition to agreeing to limit competition among themselves, the boyars agreed to respect the sovereignty of the grand

8

Introduction

prince and to divide benefits and power among themselves satisfactorily, if inequitably. Consensus might be offered as a useful alternative to con­ flict in characterizing Muscovite court politics. If consensus was achieved by boyars’ self-limiting practices, it was also cultivated by mediating forces at the court-namely, by the metropolitan and by the grand prince himself. The grand prince played two roles in Muscovite court politics. He could be a mediator, enabled by his charismatic sovereignty to stand above the fray and to intercede in disputes if necessary. But he could also be a dynamic political actor, a partisan participant in a faction-m ost likely in the group here called the inner circle, since that group was, in part, composed of his affines. As Presniakov remarked, “In his ties with the boyars was found the main source of the grand prince’s personal so­ cial power.” 13 When the grand prince appears to have forcefully pursued a policy, such as a diplomatic initiative, a marriage alliance, or the pun­ ishment of a boyar, some or all of the boyars stood behind him and the boyar elite as a whole acquiesced. Because they cooperated in the general running of the government, saving conflicts for issues that were within the defined limits of court politics, Muscovy’s sovereigns and boyars com­ manded a nearly invincible state and military machine.

The Historiography of Muscovite Court Politics This study of the political traditions of the Muscovite court is war­ ranted for three reasons. First, the theoretical problem of how political activity was reconciled with autocratic power has received scant atten­ tion. Many historians have assumed the sovereign power in Muscovy to have been so great that they could see no political interplay; for other historians, class conflict took precedence over autocratic power. But to admit that Muscovy was an autocracy does not preclude the possibility that the ruler required political and administrative support, nor that the ruler and his supporters generated a dynamic political system. In develop­ ing a mutually acceptable system of relationships with men “who were prepared to obey” them, Moscow’s grand princes in fact forged a dy­ namic political system without abandoning their claim to patrimonial authority. Second, this study is justified because of the intricate relationship be­ tween ideology and reality in court politics: a highly articulated politi­ cal infrastructure was concealed beneath a deliberate claim of literal autocracy. The persistent emphasis in Muscovite sources on the sover­ eign’s exclusive autocratic power is striking, given that the boyars also

Introduction

9

held real, albeit not institutionalized, power. Moscow’s sovereigns and boyars consistently upheld the façade that the sovereign, and the sovereign alone, made all government decisions and formulated all policy. They did so because the notion had both symbolic and real utility for them. The conflicting traditions of historiography regarding Muscovite poli­ tics provide a third justification for this study of Muscovite court politics. Scholars have described Muscovite politics using concepts ranging from Oriental despotism to protoparliamentarianism. Opinions abound on issues relevant to court politics, such as how to explain particular court crises, or how to characterize political relations at court. Some of the interpretation presented here can be found in previous scholarship, but it also conflicts with a great deal of written opinion on Muscovy, particu­ larly with the approaches typically employed in Soviet historical writing. One can identify two approaches in the historiography on the subject of Muscovite politics: the “rational” and the “patrimonial,” to borrow Weber’s terms.14 According to the rational approach, which has a decid­ edly Western orientation, political activities involved abstract entities that were impersonally defined, were safeguarded by law, and were ac­ corded a share in public authority. Such entities in early Russia are said to include the “Boyar Duma,” the state, and corporate estates such as the high aristocracy and lesser gentry. Relations among these groups are con­ sidered fundamentally antagonistic: estates struggled for a share of the king’s power, the state tried to increase its control, and one’s gain was the other’s loss. This approach was dominant in prerevolutionary Russian and Soviet historical writing; it is exhibited in works as different as those of some of the prerevolutionary “statist” and liberal scholars and those of most Soviet Marxist historians. The patrimonial, or nonlegalistic approach is based on the assumption that premodern political relationships were not grounded in formalized law and that groups were not organized as constitutional or corporate entities. Rather politics is viewed in personal terms: political relation­ ships were structured by tradition, self-interest, and loyalty; groups were formed around principles of kinship, friendship, and dependence. Such an approach has inspired two different historiographical interpretations of Muscovite politics. One interpretation stresses the absolute personal power of the sovereign and thus denies the real political interaction of other political groups. This, in brief, is the extreme statist and Slavophile position. The other interpretation is the one adopted in part by A. E. Presniakov and by S. B. Veselovskii and is the one found in this book. According to this approach, dynamic political interaction took place within the framework of autocracy in Muscovy, groups were formed as a

io

Introduction

result of personal loyalties, tradition was a strong force in political orga­ nization and behavior, and self-interest was an overriding force in politi­ cal conflict. Such distinctions may be familiar to students of premodern European politics, for they echo recent trends in research. Influenced by anthropol­ ogy, collective biographical method, and social history, scholars are mov­ ing away from interpreting premodem political systems as constitutional, and premodern politics as class struggles; they are paying more attention to dynastic concerns, as well as to patronage, family strategies, and simi­ lar means of accomplishing the functions of government.15In Russian his­ torical writing, these two interpretive approaches have coexisted since the nineteenth century, when historians, influenced by their extensive training in European history, confronted the evidence of continued autoc­ racy in Russia with a constitutionalist predilection to find seeds of politi­ cal pluralism and enfranchised classes. As a result, few Russian historians have consistently used either approach: the work of almost every histo­ rian includes aspects of both a rationalist and a patrimonial approach. N. M. Karamzin, in his romanticized Istoriia rossiiskogo gosudarstva (History o f the Russian State), first published from 1818 to 1829, rarely raised issues of political structure since he focused on dynastic history. Karamzin’s goal, in part patriotic and literary, was to tell a good story. He painted Russian history as the nation’s heroic struggle to throw off the Mongol yoke, and in this struggle he considered Ivan Ill’s era (1462-1505) a turning point: Ivan III consolidated autocracy externally by defeating the Mongols and internally by subordinating other political forces —neigh­ boring principalities, his kinsmen settled in semiindependent principali­ ties (appanages), and the boyar aristocracy - to his control. Politically, Karamzin supported the idea of a responsible aristocracy in a framework of autocracy, and he presented relations between state and elite in the fif­ teenth and sixteenth centuries in a similar Westernized framework: he saw political groups as corporate classes locked in competition at court.16 It is worth pointing out, however, that Karamzin was like numerous his­ torians who followed him in that his implicit theory of political power contradicted his overall conceptual framework. Although he depicted boyars as a powerful aristocracy whose political rights the autocracy had to destroy, he also implied that the sovereign totally controlled appoint­ ments to boyar rank. Thus he implied the existence of an independent po­ litical class at court, yet made it the creature of the autocrat.17 S. M. Solov’ev brought a metahistorical interpretation to the study of Russian history.18 In his Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen (History o f Russia from Earliest Times), published from 1851 to 1879, Solov’ev adopted a historicist framework of organic social evolution to explain

Introduction

il

Russian development; he asserted that from the twelfth through the six­ teenth centuries Russia underwent a transition from a society ordered by the “kinship principle” (rodovoe nachalo) to one based on the principle of an impersonal “state” (gosudarstvennoe nachalo). His was an evolu­ tionary view; he did not emphasize Ivan Ill’s reign as a major turning point, but postulated steady evolution toward “state” relations from the time of Andrei Bogoliubskii (grand prince of Vladimir from 1157 until 1174) to the time of Ivan IV’s Oprichnina (1564-72). Despite his gradu­ alist understanding of political change, Solov’ev, like Karamzin, im­ plicitly adopted a rational approach in describing political structure: he depicted the rise of autocracy as a struggle between the state and social groups (boyars, appanage princes) and explicitly posited that Russian his­ tory paralleled Western political and social development, albeit lagging in time.19 In his attention to kinship principles (remnants of which he claimed to exist even in the system of precedence in sixteenth-century Muscovy), Solov’ev demonstrated aspects of a patrimonial approach to politics. Other adherents to the “statist” school that Solov’ev represents took that approach to an extreme. They emphasized the sovereign’s autocratic power so strongly that they conceded little possibility of political inter­ action. K. D. Kavelin’s and B. N. Chicherin’s essays on Muscovite autoc­ racy, for example, represent that position. Slavophiles similarly stressed the personal nature of political relations in Muscovy, but they positively appraised Muscovy’s lack of corporate classes and bureaucratic institu­ tions, stressing the harmonious unity of people and autocrat.20 A similar division between the rational and patrimonial approaches was also evidenced in the works of historians belonging to the “juridi­ cal” school of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Authors of text­ books on Russian law, including V. I. Sergeevich, I. D. Beliaev, and M. F. Vladimirskii-Budanov, mechanically divided Russian history into eras defined only by chronology —the Kievan (tenth to thirteenth centuries) and Muscovite (fourteenth to seventeenth centuries) periods. Some juridi­ cal scholars favored a rational explanation of politics, focusing on legal norms and political institutions. For example, Vladimirskii-Budanov, in his recounting of Muscovite legal history, depicted Moscow’s boyars as constituting a pseudoparliamentary institution, the Boyar Duma. He pointed to its broad judicial and administrative competence, its regular meeting times, and its members’ high social status as evidence of its institutional independence. He argued that its power was like that of a parliament since the grand prince by tradition had to heed his boyars.21 Because Vladimirskii-Budanov based his interpretation primarily on data from seventeenth-century Muscovy - when the Duma was indeed a

12

Introduction

more formalized, although not a parliamentary, institution-his argu­ ment seemed well founded and has endured. Muscovy, in VladimirskiiBudanov’s view, looked and acted much like a European “new monarchy.” Vladimirskii-Budanov’s contemporary and fellow juridical scholar, V. I. Sergeevich, adopted the opposite approach: he argued that the sovereign was virtually omnipotent and that the Boyar Duma was not an “institu­ tion” of any permanence. Sergeevich noted that the term “Boyar Duma” was not used in Muscovite times but had been adopted by nineteenthcentury historians. He called the boyars’ activity simply “the act of coun­ seling”; their advice was not binding on the sovereign.22 The contrast be­ tween the views of Vladimirskii-Budanov and Sergeevich exemplifies a tension in much of prerevolutionary scholarship on the subject of Mus­ covy. Many Russian scholars spoke of institutions and corporate estates, suggesting that incipient political pluralism was emerging by the six­ teenth century in Muscovy. Other scholars emphasized the power of the autocracy to a degree that seemed to contradict their suggestion of politi­ cal pluralism conveyed by the use of terms as “Boyar Duma” and “aris­ tocracy.” V. O. Kliuchevskii’s definition of the Boyar Duma is a tortured attempt to resolve the dichotomy between literal autocracy and implied rule by law: By its nature [the Boyar Duma] was a legislative institution that created gen­ eral rules, permanent norms; but before us [remain] only the practical re­ sults of its legislative work. . . . For each such institution as our Boyar Duma we are used to considering the issue of whether it was obligatory for the leadership or only an advisory board; but people of those centuries did not distinguish such subtle understandings. . . . Hidden from society by the sov­ ereign above and the clerk below, [the Duma] was a constitutional institu­ tion with broad influence but without a constitutional charter, a government seat with a broad circle of affairs but without a chancery or archive.23

Kliuchevskii, a scholar too sensitive to the sources to be dogmatic, combined in his works on Muscovite politics aspects of both the rational and patrimonial approaches. Kliuchevskii was attracted to VladimirskiiBudanov’s view that the Boyar Duma represented a force for political plu­ ralism in Muscovy. In his Boiarskaia duma drevnei Rusi (Boyar Duma o f Ancient Rus*)y first published in 1882, Kliuchevskii called the boyars an “aristocracy,” thus drawing a parallel with the politically privileged es­ tates of some early modern European countries. He posited that Mos­ cow’s boyar class should have won corporate rights in the sixteenth cen­ tury and lamented that it had “failed” as an aristocracy. Kliuchevskii presented the boyar aristocracy’s political activities in institutional terms: he argued that men became boyars by working their way up a ladder of ranks, a hierarchy reminiscent of the later Petrine Table of Ranks and

Introduction

13

indeed of bureaucracies contemporary with that great historian. But Kliuchevskii was also attentive to evidence that supported a more patri­ monial view of political relations: he argued that until the time of Ivan III, sovereign princes and their boyars in Northeast Rus’ cooperated harmo­ niously and patterned their political activities after those of a private household economy. He spoke knowledgeably of the “genealogical layers” of the families in the elite, of the importance of family and precedence in politics, and of the ultimate power of the sovereign to appoint boyars. In Kliuchevskii’s view, impersonal state relations and conflict between the boyar aristocracy and the sovereign developed only in the time of Ivan III, with the biological extinction of some old boyar families and the influx of once-sovereign princely clans whose ideas turned a traditional elite into a corporate class. In sum, Kliuchevskii straddled the fence, presenting a polity affected by conflicts among sovereign, aristocracy, and Boyar Duma, yet also influenced by the autocracy, the continuity of boyar families in power, and a kinship- and service-based system of status determination.24 Many of the scholars writing at the turn of the century followed a ra­ tional, Westernized approach, evidencing less sensitivity to its ambiguities than Kliuchevskii had shown. Authors of textbooks, for example, de­ scribed the sixteenth century in terms of the struggles of the state, social classes, and representative institutions —a clear comparison with contem­ porary understanding of the development of early modern Europe.25 Of the major historians, N. R Pavlov-Sil’vanskii argued that early Muscovy was feudal on a Western model; he emphasized juridical over socio­ economic aspects.26 S. F. Platonov, despite his renowned knowledge of the sources, also adopted a rational approach: he described sixteenthand early-seventeenth-century political crises as struggles of progressive forces - Councils of the Land, monarchs, “gentry” - against a retro­ gressive princely “aristocracy” and Boyar Duma. Like virtually all of his predecessors, Platonov did not clearly explain how boyars won their roles; he deferred to the power of autocracy in implying that the sovereign appointed them.27 In Platonov’s day monographic research also illuminated Muscovy in ways more consistent with a patrimonial understanding of politics. Among these works were studies on the system of precedence that high­ lighted family solidarity, not aristocratic corporatism, in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century politics.28 S. V. Rozhdestvenskii, in his monograph on sixteenth-century service landholding, published in 1897, rejected the theory that Ivan III used the distribution of service land grants to create a new political class that would rival the aristocracy. He showed that the state favored with such grants the old, established families that also owned patrimonial land.29 Even the early Russian Marxist historians,

14

Introduction

mindful of Russia’s difference from the West, used the concept of “Asiatic despotism” to explain the absence in Muscovy of key aspects of the West­ ern heritage, including feudalism, political pluralism, rule by law, corpo­ rate estates, and parliamentary development.30 A patrimonial interpretation of Muscovite politics is evident in the studies of Moscow’s fifteenth-century dynastic war and the survey essay on Muscovy by the eminent St. Petersburg scholar A. E. Presniakov (both published in 1918).31 Presniakov extended into the sixteenth century Solov’ev’s view of the Muscovite polity as a reflection of the Daniilovichi’s kinship principle (rodovoe nachalo). Presniakov argued that, as a result of the Muscovite dynastic war of the fifteenth century, the basis of the dy­ nasty’s rule was changed from an appanage (udel’noe) principle to a pat­ rimonial (votchinnoe) principle. But he denied that the war transformed Muscovy into a more impersonal, constitutional polity. Presniakov thus rejected the Westernizing implicit in Solov’ev’s scheme of evolution. In Moskovskoe tsarstvo (The Tsardom o f Muscovy), Presniakov depicted the boyars’ role in politics as based on Rus’ traditions, not on aristocratic pretensions or the institutional rights of the Boyar Duma. Presniakov did not explore how men became boyars but, like Kliuchevskii, he com­ mented on the tenacity of families in politics and the power of family tra­ ditions as exemplified by the system of precedence. Presniakov thus offered a compelling alternative to conflict-based. Westernized, rational concepts of the early Russian state and society. But that rational approach found strong adherents among some early Marxist historians at the beginning of the twentieth century. Rational concepts, rather than concepts consistent with Asiatic despotism, became the official canon in Soviet historical circles in the 1930’s. Since then Soviet historians writing on Russian history have followed different approaches, and their interpretations have often been the subject of controversy, but because the interpretive framework for Russian history established in the 1930’s has endured as the scholarly point of reference, a distinct Soviet approach to Muscovite politics can be identified. It is essen­ tially a mid-nineteenth-century view, having roots in the same Hegelian stage theory on which Solov’ev’s organic description of Russian historical evolution was based. It analyzes political groups rationally, according to their members’ class interests; it assumes that history evolves in stages propelled by class struggle and that Russia followed approximately the same stages of development that Western Europe did, in approximately the same order and at approximately the same time. Unlike prerevolution­ ary proponents of a state theory, however, Soviet scholars perceive class struggle between the state and society as occurring in all periods, even during the appanage era (approximately the thirteenth and fourteenth

Introduction

15

centuries), which was considered politically harmonious by Kliuchevskii and others. Muscovite history, however, poses many problems for the Soviet Marx­ ist interpretation, and Soviet scholars have labored to resolve them.32L. V. Cherepnin’s Obrazovanie Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV-XV vekakh (The Formation o f the Centralized Russian State in the i4 th -ijth Centuries), published in 1960, was a comprehensive statement of the current Soviet approach. Cherepnin argued that Muscovy’s early modern centralization was feudal, but was accomplished without the emergence of bourgeoisie and the development of representative political institutions that occurred during that stage in the West. He explained the anomaly by reference to Russia’s geopolitical situation: Tatar occupation and military threats from all sides required central state power. Appropri­ ately, Cherepnin also argued that a national market was developing that demanded political unification.33 Cherepnin’s work on the fifteenth century established a specific inter­ pretation of political struggle of the period of interest to us. He argued that the fifteenth century witnessed the weakening of appanage decentral­ ization and the transition to national unity; the catalyst for change was class struggle between forces of autocratic centralization. On one side stood Muscovite grand princes, untitled boyars, and, under Ivan III, the gentry supported by service land grants (pomes?e); on the other stood forces for appanage separatism (the church, appanage princes, princely boyars, and service princes).34 Cherepnin’s work established a model that was elaborated upon by his successors, including 1. 1. Smirnov and S. M. Kashtanov; they saw the same political groupings in sixteenth-century political struggles.35 Conforming further to a Marxist stage theory, Soviet scholars in general characterize the sixteenth century as one in which the various social estates won representative institutions in government, just as their European counterparts did.36 A younger generation of Soviet scholars that included N. E. Nosov and A. A. Zimin, and that is currently represented by R. G. Skrynnikov and I. Ia. Froianov, has modified this argument somewhat, without changing its “rational” approach. These historians suggest that fifteenth- and sixteenth-century political struggles were not concerned with the issue of centralization, but rather were class conflicts over control of the appa­ ratus of government. Skrynnikov claims that Ivan IV’s personal motiva­ tions and his Oprichnina are inexplicable in terms of class analysis, and he characterizes the basic tension of this reign as the struggle between aristocracy and gentry.37 In his discussion of how men became boyars, Zimin initially noted that family heritage, marriage alliances, cronyism, and extraordinary talent helped a man to become a boyar, but ultimately

16

Introduction

he presented an argument that is more rational than patrimonial, in the terms used here. He suggested that men worked their way up ladders of service, finally achieving boyar rank by merit and as a result of the con­ firming favor of the sovereign; affinitive factors were supplementary.38 Froianov, in his works on early Kievan politics, goes further in shifting to a new paradigm: he depicts Kiev Rus’ as a prefeudal society in which family and community were more important organizing principles than were state institutions and class antagonisms. V. B. Kobrin has explic­ itly attacked the class struggle interpretation of fifteenth- and sixteenthcentury Muscovite politics, and several other works have introduced a new approach by presenting conflict at court as “internal class struggle” engaged in by family factions, not rival classes. But Froianov’s views have been criticized by Soviet scholars.39 Soviet historians have extended the Marxist paradigm to its extreme, but it remains to be seen if they will officially abandon a class and institutional approach.40 Soviet scholars are nevertheless presenting Muscovy less legalistically, echoing the views of turn-of-the-century scholars like Presniakov. There is good reason for this: a direct historical connection can be found in the works of S. B. Veselovskii. Veselovskii advocated a prosopographical ap­ proach to Muscovite history, as well as a complementary interpretation that stressed family and personal networks over class and institutions. Veselovskii reached the peak of his career in 1917, when he was made a professor at Moscow University. His views and writings found little favor in Soviet historical circles, however, and Veselovskii was allowed to pub­ lish relatively few works in the Soviet period. He died in 1952, and his unpublished works began to appear beginning in the mid-1960’s; his ar­ chive is still being mined for source publications and essays.41 Veselovskii’s work points the way to a new synthesis of interpretations of Muscovite court politics, although he neither envisaged nor accom­ plished that goal. He was convinced that a knowledge of the history of Muscovite boyar families and of their landholdings was crucial to an understanding of the rise of Muscovite autocracy. To this end he prepared exhaustive monographs on boyar family histories and their landholdings. Veselovskii demonstrated the continuity of families in boyar rank over time, but without systematically examining how one became a boyar. He also noted kinship relations among actors in political crises without gener­ alizing about political conflict. He rejected an analysis of Ivan’s Oprichnina as a movement by or against classes and presented it merely as a power struggle among leading boyar families.42Thus he implied that the continu­ ity of boyar family development was a force behind historical change-a view presaged by Kliuchevskii’s attention to the genealogical evolution of the landed elite as a whole. Veselovskii’s work, once published, drew at-

Introduction

17

tendon away from an institutional and class analysis of Muscovite politi­ cal life, and focused it on the individuals in power and their personal relationships. The current generation of Soviet scholars has borrowed its methodol­ ogy for studying political groups from Veselovskii, although, as has been suggested, application of that methodology has resulted in contradictions between the evidence garnered and the historians’ rationalist and Marxist approaches. Zimin used a prosopographical approach before most of Veselovskii’s publications appeared,43 and in the wake of their publication in the 1960’s, many other Soviet scholars, including V. B. Kobrin and M. E. Bychkova, adopted it as well.44 Veselovskii’s work —appearing, as it did, simultaneously with a change in emphasis in Western historical writing toward social history and col­ lective biographical methods—has influenced Western historians of Mus­ covy to shift away from class analysis and implicit Western comparisons.45 Numerous American scholars have questioned the use of class analysis as a tool for interpreting Muscovite political struggles.46 Gustave Alef and Ann Kleimola have discussed the problem of the evolution of autoc­ racy, providing valuable empirical information on social class evolution and patterns of military service. Alef, following Veselovskii and Zimin, argues that men advanced to political power by progressing up a “cursus honorum” of military or court ranks, and he has tried to establish the duration of service careers. Nevertheless, both he and Kleimola have stressed that service was only one of the factors contributing to the ac­ quisition of boyar rank; the others were marriage, favor, politicking, and “good luck.” 47 In Germany, Hartmut Russ has written a masterful analy­ sis of political relations between Moscow’s sovereigns and boyars during most of the period covered here; his view of those relations as character­ ized by cooperation and his analysis of the Muscovite political system as a “retinue” (druzhina) state strongly complement the interpretation of this book.48 Robert Crummey and Brenda Meehan-Waters, in their work on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Russia, have used methodology similar to Alef’s and Kleimola’s and have developed interpretations that complement Russ’s work. Influenced more likely by Western trends in po­ litical analysis than by the involuted history of these ideas in Russian his­ torical writing, Crummey and Meehan-Waters have rejected a class and institutional approach toward the study of politics in favor of one focused on family, marriage, friendship, and patronage.49 Their work reveals a marked continuity in patrimonial political relations from the early Mus­ covite period to the seventeenth and even the eighteenth centuries. For example, both describe political groups as “vertical,” cutting across class

18

Introduction

lines and encompassing boyars, bureaucrats, and lesser servitors; both hold that patronage, loyalty, and kinship, not class consciousness or ideo­ logical conviction, united groups and sparked conflict. They see what could be considered a vestigial survival of factors like heredity in political advancement, combined with length of service and talent. As Kleimola demonstrates for the sixteenth century, Crummey argues for the seven­ teenth century that advancement to boyar rank depended on a multi­ plicity of factors including service, favor, and family. Not surprisingly, Meehan-Waters considers service to have been a far stronger determinant of political power during the reign of Peter the Great, but she nevertheless discerns a strong continuity of leading families. Perhaps the most interpretatively innovative work of all is that of Edward L. Keenan, Jr., who has used a structural and anthropological approach to argue that family was the most important factor in Muscovite political life, that political groups were affinitive, and that political history was shaped by a pursuit of consensus, not conflict.S0Keenan’s brief and stimulating essays on court politics are among the first efforts toward a theoretical analysis of the topic, but they do not use the diachronic approach used here. This historiography concerning Muscovite politics from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries in many ways sets the stage for this study because it shifts emphasis toward family and affinitive relations in public life. Fur­ thermore, the evidence of the sources would seem to suggest the prefer­ ability of a modified patrimonial approach, one that allows for dynamic political interaction. Publications of documents, source studies, and mono­ graphs since the 1950’s make it increasingly possible to develop a system­ atic analysis of political relations in early Muscovy.51

Methodology A few remarks on the methodology and source criticism used in this study are in order. The method of research was designed to facilitate at­ tainment of the goal of defining the Muscovite political system by concen­ trating on principles of advancement, association, conflict, and ideology. The subject and process of investigation narrowed the area of concern to the families of boyars and the sovereign. A working goal, therefore, was to identify the boyars at any given time, and to ascertain their family’s membership and their marriage and political alliances as revealed by the sources.52 A master list of boyars was compiled from documentary sources (lists of signatories on charters and lists of boyar representatives at diplomatic negotiations) and from military service records.53 A. A. Zimin’s list of boyars from 1462 to 1584 and Gustave Alef’s and Ann Kleimola’s supple-

Introduction

19

ments were consulted,54 but ultimately the list used for this study had to be reestablished on the basis of primary sources. Appendix 2 provides not a list of boyars, but rather a list of families within clans that possessed hereditary boyar status; a list of boyars alone would give a misleading im­ pression about court politics. Men were boyars as family leaders, not as individuals, and the timing of their receipt of boyar rank depended as much on their situation in their family as on their own efforts. Boyars are therefore listed in families and the list is intended to be comprehensive. Men have been identified as boyars in Appendix 2 if official documents refer to them as such; uncorroborated references in genealogical books and chronicles have not been credited, since these were not official rec­ ords, nor were they generally contemporary. Family trees of boyars have been constructed on the basis of late-fifteenth- and sixteenth-century genealogical books. (Nineteenth-century compendiums of noble genealo­ gies are replete with errors and have not been relied on.)55 Strictures of space prevent the inclusion of genealogical charts for the over 90 families in about 60 clans considered here. Evidence pertaining to boyar family economy and patronage networks is incomplete; for only a few boyars can one trace the growth or decline of wealth and correlate that with the individual’s political success. The economic interests that boyars brought to political interaction can therefore be described only generally.56 A chronology of court politics was compiled from fifteenth- and sixteenth-century chronicles, as well as documentary and diplomatic sources; then the changing composition of the boyar elite was correlated with important political developments. The growth of boyar clans and their relationships were also traced over time. Men were grouped in po­ litical alliances when several types of evidence - kinship, marriage al­ liances, direct chronicle references, shared political fates - corroborated each other. Information on marriage alliances was compiled from genea­ logical books, land deeds, and other occasional sources, but it is ex­ tremely incomplete. From all of this research some consistent themes emerged: the importance of family and personal loyalties, the continuity in politics of great clans over time, and the real power of the boyar elite despite the façade of autocracy. With regard to the specific principles of political activity, however, sources were less revealing. Politics was the affair of so small and personally intimate a group of families that they did not need to set down the rules of their interaction. Some sources - genealogical books, precedence cases, and military ser­ vice books-directly reveal the affinitive world of court politics. Other sources are the most misleading of guides. Chronicles and tales can be inaccurate and, far worse, they depict the political world monochromatically: an omnipotent sovereign rules with the aid of a slavish

20

Introduction

elite. The discovery that such different sources do permit a consistent interpretation has been perhaps the most intellectually exciting part of this work. The least of the problems with chronicles and other narrative sources is inaccuracy; since they were edited over generations, they occasionally omit accounts, alter information, garble proper names, and so on, but most fac­ tual errors can be corrected. As a general rule, in this work those chron­ icles were preferred that were written closest in time to the events de­ scribed. Thus, for fourteenth-century information, the sixteenth-century Nikon chronicle is here considered less reliable than corresponding en­ tries in Priselkov’s reconstruction of the earlier Trinity chronicle; the vari­ ous fifteenth-century compendiums are also favored over the Nikon. However, because some chronicles, including the Nikon, are the sole source of some information, all relevant chronicles have been consulted, if not necessarily accepted. The politicization of chronicle writing is more challenging to the histo­ rian than the determination of factual flaws. Each chronicle had at least two purposes underlying its writing. The first was to depict events with the “proper” political interpretation. Thus, the Nikon chronicle version of a fourteenth-century event may be of interest not for its accuracy but to the extent that it reveals sixteenth-century attitudes. It has been well dem­ onstrated, for example, that the Voskresenie chronicle, edited in the i54o’s, is sympathetic to certain boyar groups in its depiction of the con­ flicts during the minority of Ivan IV in the 1530’s and 1540’s, whereas the “Brief Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom,” edited in the 1560’s, castigates all boyars for “boyar misrule” and glorifies autocratic power.57 To uncover the biases of the chronicles is to illuminate political thought and reality at the time of their composition. A second purpose underlying chronicle writing was to render a didac­ tic model of moral behavior in political as well as private life —to transmit a political theory.58 Muscovite political ideology did not directly reflect the situation at court, primarily because the authors of narrative sources were not participants in court politics. Nevertheless, such sources reveal the principles that shaped court relations. For this study, then, chronicles and court ritual were investigated for what they reveal of political interac­ tion and ideology, and court crises were analyzed to try to extrapolate political principles.59 There are few other narrative sources that can be utilized for the analy­ sis of Muscovite political reality or ideology. The bias in foreign travelers* accounts limits their usefulness, but occasionally foreigners identified key aspects of Muscovite politics, even if they themselves did not realize their importance. Narrative sources such as the early chapters of the protocols

Introduction

zi

of the 1551 Stoglav Church Council complement the ideology of the chronicles. With caution one may also go beyond the sixteenth century for sources on political ideology and on customs of those at the pinnacle of power. For example, the political ideology inherent in the earlyseventeenth-century tales of the Time of Troubles, in Kotoshikhin’s testi­ mony on court ceremonial around the 1660’s, and in seventeenth-century descriptions of political customs involving the inner circle as analyzed by Robert Crummey, reveal apparent vestiges of earlier practices.60 Crummey’s study of seventeenth-century boyar politics underscores the finding of this study that the political customs of those at the pinnacle of power changed with excruciating slowness. The way in which power was dispersed at the top of the elite in the seventeenth century parallels earlier traditions, including the custom of according central importance to the dynastic wedding in the determination of the status hierarchy among the boyars and the custom of presenting an idealized harmony among sover­ eign and boyars in ideological writings. Thus, the sometimes more dis­ cursive seventeenth-century sources will be cited for their explication of certain traditions of high court politics. The problem of the Kurbskii sources would seem to loom large for this study. For generations, the correspondence attributed to Ivan IV and Prince Andrei Kurbskii, plus a history of Ivan IV’s reign attributed to the prince, have influenced scholars’ interpretations of sixteenth-century Kremlin politics. The authenticity of these writings, however, has been questioned by Edward L. Keenan on the basis of analysis of the manu­ script survival pattern, of the “convoy,” or compositions with which these texts were frequently bound in miscellanies, of the language and struc­ ture of the texts, and of their anomalous position among other primary sources on sixteenth-century politics.61 The research presented here tends to confirm Keenan’s doubts. The writings attributed to Kurbskii and Ivan IV alternately harmonize and conflict with other primary source evidence on politics at the Mus­ covite court in the period prior to Ivan’s wedding in 1547. At times the writings provide information on boyars and marriage alliances of the mid-sixteenth century that can be corroborated by other evidence. Their authors seem to have been privy to chronicle accounts of the years of Ivan’s minority. At other times the correspondence and history are in­ accurate, suggesting either the writer’s faulty memory or later writers* flawed falsifications. Should Keenan be right, it is not unreasonable that a seventeenth-century author might be cognizant of boyar family histories. The precedence system, the maintenance of genealogical books into the Romanov restoration, and Robert Crummey’s work on the seventeenthcentury boyar elite all prove that family heritage and marriage alliances

22

Introduction

remained important in politics. Thus, the relative accuracy of the corre­ spondence and history may support Keenan’s position. No matter what one’s conclusions, a skeptical treatment of their contents is mandated. Such caution about the contents of the correspondence and the Kurbskii history is also called for because these works conform so well to the con­ ventions of Muscovite political ideology.62 Ivan’s goodness is explained in terms of his moral virtue and his having good advisers; his degradation stems from his having rejected good advisers for evil ones. Detail is heaped on detail to establish Ivan’s depravity as a child and as a mature adult. Kurbskii’s (or the pseudo-Kurbskii’s) compositions echo so well the formulaic ideology of Muscovite politics that one cannot rely on the lit­ eral accuracy of these descriptions of Ivan’s personality or of his motiva­ tions. As Keenan has cogently observed, much about these works differs in form and spirit from other sixteenth-century sources, including their genres (personal correspondence and a narrative history), the Polonized and Grecified language of the later letters and the History, and their pre­ sumption of open political discussion. No other sixteenth-century per­ sonal letters are known to exist, save a few brief communications from Vasilii III to his wife inquiring about the health of their son. No such secular description of secular events survives from the sixteenth century, nor do other narrative disquisitions by boyars exist. (Neither Peresvetov nor Bersen Beklemyshev, both of whom commented on court politics, was a participant in them.) Authentic or not, these sources do not offer much new information for this study and, because of their questioned au­ thenticity, they have been used with a liberal grain of salt: their character­ izations of Ivan’s personality have been discounted, and specific facts have generally not been accepted without corroboration. Proceeding in this manner deprives us of the sole narrative sources for Ivan’s political philosophy; it leaves only formulaic and secondhand chronicle and Stoglav sources to testify to the characteristics of his per­ sonality through the 1550’s. Such a method also discredits the concept of “the Chosen Council” and diminishes the roles of Syl’vestr and Adashev in the 1550’s. When we are deprived of the anomalous Kurbskii-Ivan IV correspondence and the Kurbskii history, we see Ivan less as a real person­ ality; but sixteenth-century documents, chronicles, and other sources, if read sensitively, nonetheless constitute a rich and consistent record of Moscow’s political ideology and court political system. This book is concerned with the period beginning with the founding of the Muscovite grand principality of the Daniilovichi in the early four­ teenth century. I take the arrangement of power relations created by the marriage in 1345 of Prince Ivan Ivanovich, soon to be grand prince, to

Introduction

23

symbolize the founding of the system of Muscovite court politics. The period extends to the resolution of the crisis precipitated by Ivan IV’s minority; Ivan IV’s marriage in 1547 was the first of several steps, includ­ ing further marriages in the sovereign family, that reconciled competing boyars after a generation of strife. Within these chronological bounds, represented by Chapters 1 and 5, I trace the development of Muscovy’s political traditions. Chapter 1 presents the circumstances that shaped Muscovite politics in the court’s founding century. In subsequent chap­ ters, the evolution of Moscow’s court politics is explained more themati­ cally than chronologically. Political recruitment is the subject of Chapters 2 and 3. The discussion centers on how heredity and service influenced who became boyars and when the position was awarded. These chapters are supported by the appendixes: Appendix 1 is a discussion of how ages and lifespans might be reckoned for Muscovite boyars; Appendix 2 is a profile of all boyar families; it lists all boyars according to the family they belonged to, as is consistent with the book’s interpretation. Such a format makes clear the hereditary and collateral nature of boyar succession. Chapter 4 focuses on political hierarchy: how status and power were ap­ portioned among the great families. Chapter 5 is an examination of po­ litical association and conflict; a study of Ivan IV’s minority from 1533 to the 1550’s illustrates its conclusions. The book ends in the mid-i55o’s, when Muscovy was on the threshold of a protracted era of threats to tradition. Some of those threats were pre­ sented by territorial expansion that necessitated ever more complex ad­ ministrative institutions, an increase in bureaucratic personnel, and an expanded army manned by the growing servitor classes in Moscow and the provinces. The Oprichnina (1564-72), the political competitions of Boris Godunov’s reign (1598-1604), and the disruptions of the Time of Troubles (1604-13) seriously threatened the Muscovite state. Ivan IV used the Oprichnina to attack directly the principles that are defined in this work as central to the proper functioning of court politics: hereditary succession in boyar clans, the grand-princely marriage as arbiter of politi­ cal power, and the political exclusivity of established boyar families. His compatriots in the Oprichnina further ravaged the established power hi­ erarchy by carrying out murders and property confiscations. Whether these combined actions of the Oprichnina fundamentally changed Mus­ covite politics or the composition of the elite is a subject for further study. But the fact that Ivan IV did try to use the Oprichnina to strike so deeply at Moscow’s political principles and established elite, and that disruption of normal political activity continued in the subsequent decades, suggests a natural ending point for our analysis of the founding and evolution of that political system.

♦ CHAPTER 1 ♦

The Formative Fourteenth Century

E n glish visitors to the court of Ivan the Terrible in the mid-sixteenth century marveled at the redoubtable tsar’s personal acquaintance with his court attendants: “It seems miraculous that a prince, otherwise occupied in great matters of estate, should so well remember so many and sundry particular names.” Their mistake was to think that it was not a “great matter of estate” for the tsar to know his servitors’ names. The apparent fact that Ivan IV knew personally all the members of his court—even when, according to the English visitor Richard Chancellor, they num­ bered over I oo —reveals the existence in Muscovy of political customs different from those known to this Englishman.1 Chancellor’s sovereign would also have known the peers of his realm personally, but that knowl­ edge was not the key to politics in England. Politics in Chancellor’s En­ gland was influenced more by parties, Parliament, and ideology than by personal acquaintance. In the Kremlin court that Chancellor saw, how­ ever, it was precisely personal association that shaped politics. The politi­ cal system of Ivan IV’s time, so different from that of sixteenth-century England, had been inherited from an era when the grand prince and his men were united by mutual dependence. The political customs of that simpler time had evolved as Muscovy had grown, but they had done so in ways consistent with their origins. To understand Muscovite politics in the crucial reign of Ivan the Terrible, one needs to look back to the four­ teenth century, when Moscow’s political system was established.

The Setting Muscovy’s regional eminence was achieved by the end of the four­ teenth century. John Fennell argues that already by 1359, the state had “emerged”: “the age of Tatar-dominated Suzdalian politics came to an end and the period of Muscovite consolidation —the fathering of the lands’ and the assimilation of the thrones of Vladimir and Moscow - be­ gan.” 2Beginning in mid-century, Muscovite rulers increased their territo-

The Formative Fourteenth Century

25

rial expansion in a drive that seldom slowed even in the most difficult of times. By the end of the century, the ruling Daniilovich dynasty had won an important victory over its rival in Tver’, had gained the favor of the khans of the Golden Horde at Sarai, and had skillfully allied with neigh­ boring Riurikid princes and even with the potent Gedyminid sovereigns of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Although historians agree that the Muscovite state was founded in the fourteenth century, they often look to earlier Rus’ history for the origins of Muscovy’s political order. Most of them see a continuum in political traditions from the Kievan period (tenth to thirteenth centuries) to the period of Muscovy’s preeminence (fourteenth to seventeenth centuries), based on the continuity of the ruling dynasty. Ivan Ill’s reign (1462-1505) is often regarded as a turning point from decentralized rule to mature Muscovite autocracy and centralization.3 But focusing on Kiev Rus’ and then Ivan Ill’s reign distracts our attention from the era when the prin­ ciples of political conduct and the composition of an enduring elite were established in Moscow. The princely institutions and Byzantine connec­ tions of Kiev Rus’ were merely background for the development of a po­ litical system that began when the Daniilovich princes established their court at Moscow in the fourteenth century. Ivan Ill’s “gathering of the lands” and service land grant (pomes fe) system, in which land was granted to cavalrymen conditional on their performance of military ser­ vice, only contributed to the development of that system. Kiev Rus’ contributed to Muscovy its ruling dynasty, the Daniilovichi, a branch of the Kievan Riurikids. Moscow adopted Kiev’s custom of leadership by prince and retinue (druzhina), as well as its patrimonial ap­ proach to governance. Muscovy also inherited the Orthodox church as the bearer of high culture and spiritual life. But the Muscovite political system evolved quite differently from its Kievan counterpart. The politi­ cal system of Kiev Rus’ was pluralistic, for the prince and his druzhina had to contend with local East Slavic elites and urban institutions.4 In northeast Rus’, however, Moscow’s ruling family and its military fol­ lowers did not encounter strong indigenous political institutions and classes. Moscow’s geopolitical concerns and cultural sources also sepa­ rated it from the Kievan legacy: Kiev was associated with Black Sea cul­ ture through trade and religion, whereas for Moscow Byzantium was defunct. Moscow’s trading connections with the Mongol and Eastern courts affected its administration, trade, and finance; such contacts prob­ ably also influenced its political customs, although linguistic and religious barriers limited cultural and social exchange between the Orthodox Rus’ and the Islamic Tatars. Continuity in dynasty and culture between Kiev and

26

The Formative Fourteenth Century

Moscow did not prevent the Kremlin court from establishing an indepen­ dent political system that was appropriate to specific Muscovite needs and historical circumstances. Institutional changes that occurred under Ivan III did not fundamentally change the political traditions that had begun to develop in the fourteenth century. Princely immigrants began to be made boyars during Ivan Ill’s reign, the central administration rapidly expanded, the army was cen­ tralized, and the service tenure land system began to be used more widely. But the way men won power was not altered, nor was the composition of the elite. As we shall see in Chapter 3, new families joined the elite but did not displace established ones; additional court ranks such as okol’nichii fit easily into the existing political order.5 Ivan Ill’s reign wit­ nessed evolutionary change, but in a political order that had been founded more than a century earlier. At the end of the thirteenth century, a line of the Riurikid dynasty settled permanently in Moscow. Most likely, the founder of the Muscovite dynasty was the son of Aleksandr Nevskii, Daniil (b. 1261 /62, d. 1303), from whom the Daniilovich ruling branch of Moscow derived its name.6 Concurrently a boyar elite (that is, a group of men whose families pos­ sessed a hereditary right to participate in the counsels of the grand prince) was founded. Members of the boyar elite, as the term is used here, are those men documented as being of boyar status and their direct line of descendants.7We know from testimony found in genealogical books that that elite was founded in the fourteenth century.8 Those genealogical books were compiled at the Muscovite court in the late fifteenth century and throughout the sixteenth century to record the rights of such families to high social and political status. They provide valuable information on the history of the elite, since they are records of families descended from the first Muscovite boyars; over time those clans divided into numerous branches, only some of which retained the right to be boyars. But all benefited from the high status they had inherited; it gave them “honor” and set them off from other military families. When the system of prece­ dence (mestnichestvo) was established by the early sixteenth century to regulate the status of members of the upper service class, only families entered in genealogical books were eligible to use it. The beginning of the writing of genealogies and the creation of the system of precedence thus show the evolution of the political system. By the beginning of Ivan Ill’s reign, the clans had expanded, the elite had grown, and oral tradition no longer sufficed to determine and to record status relationships within clans and among them. The earliest Muscovite genealogies for the oldest families give us some idea of when the boyar elite was formed.9 Those genealogies do not start

The Formative Fourteenth Century

27

with ancestors from Kiev Rus’ nor do they include ancestral service in principalities around Moscow in the fourteenth century. Rather, they be­ gin with men who served the Muscovite grand prince in the fourteenth century. Even when an individual’s pre-Muscovite ancestors were known, they were not listed, for ancestral service was considered irrelevant to es­ tablishing a place in the Muscovite elite. For example, the entry for the Akinfovich clan omits the clan’s ancestors who served in Tver’, and the Zernov-Saburov entry omits that clan’s Kostroma ancestors. Compilers of later genealogies who were less meticulous about the historical record in­ cluded these pre-Muscovite generations.10 Such genealogical records show that Muscovite boyar clans were “founded” as political families in the fourteenth century. Although in a biological sense families can be traced back indefinitely and therefore cannot be said ever to have been “founded,” political families are special. The timing of a family’s achievement of privileged status was a moment to be remembered, since its heritage justified the granting of rights unavail­ able to other families. In Moscow, during the fourteenth century, certain families attained power, symbolized by boyar status, and they coalesced into an elite. Because, in the fourteenth century, the grand prince and the boyar families worked out a system to regulate relations among them­ selves, the Muscovite political system may be said to have come into being in that century. One might well speak of a “long fourteenth century,” adapting Braudel’s concept, since the boyar elite was founded and its political customs were elaborated only gradually. S. B. Veselovskii conceived of three fourteenthcentury stages in the formation of Moscow’s boyar elite.11 Boyars un­ doubtedly began to gather in Moscow following the arrival of the first Riurikids at the turn of the fourteenth century, although no names are known of boyars who lived at that time. The earliest boyars and founders of families to be recorded lived in the 13 20’s. In a sense, the process of elite formation never ended: families died out and new ones were made boyar families. But one might choose the year 1408 as a turning point in the formation of the boyar elite, since in that year a new family-the Patrikeevy —came to court and disrupted the status hierarchy that had been established.12 That year is also a dividing line because few new families received boyar status thereafter until about the 1460’s. A knowledge of fourteenth-century conditions, then, is basic to understanding the gener­ ation of the political order. The patrimonial ethos and personal nature of Muscovite court politics can be understood by analyzing Kievan traditions, by reconstructing the membership of the court elite, and by analyzing the ideology of the chron­ icles; all these approaches underlie this study. The physical setting in

28

The Formative Fourteenth Century

which the expanding elite and dynasty came into being also helps explain why the political order developed as it did. The territory the Daniilovichi ruled was small, a circumstance that fostered informal political relations. Moscow’s territorial expansion followed the path of lucrative trade routes, but the state’s size did not increase significantly until the late fifteenth century. At the death in 1340 of Grand Prince Ivan Daniilovich Kalita, the second son of the founder of the dynasty, the Daniilovichi had expanded their Moscow patrimony only by a radius of slightly under 100 miles. By 1300 they had acquired Serpukhov, about 60 miles south of Moscow, and Kolomna, about 70 miles southeast of Moscow at the confluence of the Moscow and Oka rivers. Located on routes used by Tatars in raids, these cities protected Moscow’s southern flank. Pereiaslavl’-Zalesskii was ac­ quired in about 1302; approximately 85 miles from Moscow, it provided access to the Volga via the River Nerl’. Mozhaisk was acquired in about 1303; approximately 70 miles from Moscow, it lay on the trade route to Smolensk and to the Dnepr River. By the 1340’s Moscow’s territory mea­ sured about 175 miles from east to west, about 175 miles from north to south at its eastern end, and about 50 miles north to south in the west.13 This was not a large state. Under Ivan’s sons and successors, Grand Princes Semen the Proud (ruled 1340-53) and Ivan II (ruled 1353-59), Daniilovich territory ex­ panded north and west in accordance with trade and strategic interests. By winning Iur’ev-Pol’skii (about 95 miles northeast of Moscow) in the 1340’s, they extended their control into the old Vladimir-Suzdal’ lands and gained additional access to the Volga via the Kliaz’ma River. By an­ nexing the Vereia and Borovsk areas to the west in the 1350’s, they ac­ quired the headwaters of a route to the Black Sea. Under Ivan II’s son and heir, Dmitrii Donskoi (ruled 1359-89), Moscow extended its control of the Kliaz’ma River and won Dmitrov, a strategic entrepôt for trade to the west through Tver’. In the 1360’s Uglich and Kostroma, rich forest areas on the Volga, were won, as were two other centers of fur trading and for­ est product exports in the north, Beloozero and Galich. Increased control of the headwaters of the Oka and the Don routes came with the acquisi­ tion, under Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi, of the Medyn’ and Kaluga areas southwest of Moscow. By the last decade of the fourteenth century, Moscow’s territorial control extended from Medyn’ and Kaluga in the southwest to Riapolovo in the northeast (about 300 miles) and from Kolomna in the south to Uglich in the north (about 220 miles). Separated from the principality proper, but controlled by Muscovy, were the vast forest regions of Beloozero, Kostroma, and Galich to the northeast. Mus­ covy was not a very large area; and though its rival principality, Tver’, was even smaller, Novgorod, with its colonial hinterland, and the Grand

The Formative Fourteenth Century

29

Duchy of Lithuania were immense in comparison.14 Muscovy’s size did not require complex administrative networks. The goals of the dynasty and its rulers further excluded the need for complex administrative systems. Their major concerns were collecting the Mongol tribute (vykhod)ywhich brought financial reward and politi­ cal prestige.15 Other goals included exploiting natural resources for the grand prince, as well as defending and expanding his territories. The grand prince and his men in the fourteenth century were like those early medieval European kings so perceptively described by Georges Duby.16 They were a warrior band, united in the quest of booty and benefit; they regarded what we call their “state” as private property to be exploited. And they were a small group: the boyars numbered fewer than ten until the late fifteenth century, and at most 16 until the late 1540’s.17The “poli­ tics” they engaged in did not include service in public institutions in the cause of an abstract such as the common good. Rather, it concerned the pursuit of their self-interest by waging war, by taxing the population and transit trade, and by exploiting forest products. These goals explain the focus on commerce in Muscovite expansion and the rudimentary nature of Muscovite administration. The primacy of trade in this realm is evident in contemporary sources. Fourteenth-century agreements between sovereign princes in northeast Rus’, for example, protected their direct tax revenues and income from trade in horses and furs, from mead production, and from assignment of hunting rights. Agreements between Moscow, Tver’, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and other states included clauses protecting trade, such as: “And to the merchants and sellers of Great Novgorod and Torzhok and their suburbs shall be given safe passage through Tver’ and the Tver’ dis­ tricts.” 18 Muscovy’s grand princes profited handsomely from their right to collect the tribute for the Golden Horde. For their own profit, Mus­ covy’s boyars exploited the forest to obtain furs, honey, and wax, and they collected goods in kind as taxes from their dependent peasants. The Daniilovichi ruled their lands more like a merchant company than a territorial monarchy, not only because their goal was exploitation but because there were few indigenous social groups to provide manpower for a complex administrative network. The lands Moscow controlled in the fourteenth century were sparsely populated. Although the Rus* settle­ ment of the upper Volga region had preceded the establishment of the Kievan state, these lands were backwaters from the tenth through the fourteenth centuries. M. K. Liubavskii has diligently identified the nu­ merous villages in the Muscovite lands in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but S. B. Veselovskii reminded us that a village settlement (derevnia) averaged from two to three households, and villages were scat-

30

The Formative Fourteenth Century

tered within a thick forest. Communities used slash-and-burn cultivation as well as enclosed fields, both of which were indicative of low population density. Even as late as the sixteenth century, only the largest private land­ holders were able to consolidate their holdings and introduce the threefield system.19Town settlements did not begin to develop significantly un­ til the fifteenth century. Even then, according to Sakharov, only 29 towns in all of northeast Rus’ were sizable economic and political centers, and only eight of these were in the Muscovite lands.20 In such circumstances, establishing a central government presence in the countryside would have been difficult, had the Daniilovichi been interested in doing so. In the fourteenth century Moscow’s grand princes ruled through circuit administrators and fixed governors. These officials had only a few governmental functions and were primarily responsible for maintain­ ing the grand prince’s control and income. Their areas of jurisdiction included tax allocation and collection, criminal justice, and military de­ fense. This division of central and local responsibility is evident in char­ ters of local government.21 The fourteenth-century norm was that grandprincely appointees traveled regularly on a circuit around the territory to collect the prince’s tax (dany) and Mongol tribute and to serve as a court of appeal in criminal cases; the goods and services assessed on the com­ munity provided their means of subsistence.22 Some men were awarded monopolies (puti) on other princely prerogatives, such as the taxation of forest exploitation and of other nonagrarian activities that included horse trading (the koniushii put’), falconry (sokol’nichii), trapping (lovchii), brewing (chashniki), and victualing (stol’nichii). Most other civil respon­ sibilities were assigned to local landholders —both secular and eccle­ siastical—who enjoyed tax, juridical, and other immunities empowering them thusly.23 Not until the late fourteenth century did Moscow divide its lands into territorial units for the purposes of tax collection and admin­ istration; this was but a first step in the establishment of a territorial ad­ ministration —a process that was accelerated during Ivan Ill’s reign in the late fifteenth century. At the end of the fourteenth century, only 15 vice­ gerent (namestnik) positions and about 100 district administrator posts (volosteli) existed. These were one-year administrative assignments; ap­ pointees were compensated under the famed “feeding” (kormlenie) sys­ tem, in which communities provided cash and goods in kind for the offi­ cials’ upkeep.24 The grand prince and the boyars lived in the Kremlin,25 and were uninvolved in all but the most important of these activities. Moscow’s administrative simplicity contrasts sharply with the fairly elaborate administration relied upon by the Gedyminid dynasty-the Daniilovichi’s rivals in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Though a young dynasty that originated in ethnic Lithuanian lands, the Gedyminids in the

The Formative Fourteenth Century

31

fourteenth century controlled an immense territory. They did so by rely­ ing upon the elites and using the institutions that already existed in the lands they conquered —the old, once-sovereign Riurikid principalities in Kiev, Galicia, Volhynia, and Smolensk. These lands were more socially complex and more involved in trade with the Baltic region and central Europe than was the realm of the Daniilovichi; each had its own princely, aristocratic, and urban elites and administrations. The Daniilovichi en­ countered no such established infrastructure in the Muscovite lands in the fourteenth century, and they lacked the manpower and the incentive to create one. Only when Novgorod and Tver’ were annexed in the late fifteenth century did Muscovy absorb large established elites and acquire more complex administrative structures; then its administrative system rapidly changed. Muscovy’s fourteenth-century administrative simplicity meant that the grand prince’s appointee had little control over local communities. The vicegerent’s or district administrator’s responsibilities and jurisdiction were limited, even when settled in a town or district (stan) for a year. These officers had authority only over that part of the population which did not live on the sovereign’s own lands; the sovereign’s lands were ad­ ministered by a separate cadre of grand-princely officials, many of whom were slaves.26 In civil matters their jurisdiction was limited by the wide distribution of immunities; they heard only the civil claims of the free peasants (chernye liudi) living on other than grand-princely lands that were not covered by immunities. As S. B. Veselovskii pointed out, the compartmentalization of Muscovite society into hundreds of quasi­ independent communities at this time hindered effective central control. He also pointed out, however, that the use of ecclesiastical and private landholders to administer local government was unavoidable in view of the scarcity of manpower available for the central administration.27 Since landholdings were generally scattered and landholders as a rule did not reside on their property,28 landholders allowed local communities to rule themselves by applying customary law. Daniel Kaiser, in his study of Muscovy’s legal system, repeatedly stresses that local communities im­ posed customary law well into the sixteenth century, even though the state had introduced a more structured legal system in the fifteenth cen­ tury.29 Moscow’s rulers had a minimal conception of governmental func­ tions; many services the state might have provided - upkeep of public property, establishment of a judicial system, social welfare - they left to local communities. Court politics was thus designed to serve a leadership stratum fixated on territorial expansion and exploitation of transit trade, the forest, and settled populations. Politics focused on relations among men, rather than

3г

The Formative Fourteenth Century

on the organization of offices, ranks, and institutions. Political customs were shaped by Moscow’s geographical circumstances. The climate and living conditions prevailing in Moscow’s military garrison on the high bank of the Moscow River were harsh, intensifying the community’s vul­ nerability and making members of the elite conscious of the fragility of their own existence.30 Warfare also affected political norms: campaigns were waged annually, to protect Muscovy from hostile attack and to ex­ pand Muscovite territory. In both cases the necessity to maintain stability as a result of the military situation generated among the grand prince and his men a comradely spirit that was focused on personal loyalty and honor. Climate, political traditions inherited from Kiev, and the pressure of equally ambitious neighbors forced the grand prince, his boyars, and their men to depend upon each other. The fact that these circumstances allowed them to devise only the most rudimentary mechanisms for main­ taining order also encouraged them to forge personal bonds. The small size of the Kremlin and of Moscow itself further suggests a polity based on personal associations. Moscow was a tiny encampment in the fourteenth century. M. N. Tikhomirov suggested that fourteenth-century Moscow had a population of 20,000 to 30,000, but his figures cannot be accepted.311. E. Zabelin’s view, endorsed by later scholars, that fourteenth-century Moscow re­ sembled a “gentryman’s country estate” is a far more accurate description of the city than the assertion that it was an administrative center of a so­ phisticated state with a booming economy.32Fourteenth-century Moscow was virtually a rural settlement. The Kremlin covered about 47 acres and was thus about two-thirds of its present size. Within this walled fortress were the residences of the members of the Daniilovich family, their mili­ tary leaders, some merchants, and the metropolitan, as well as several ec­ clesiastical buildings. Each of these families or individuals owned a resi­ dence within the Kremlin walls that was surrounded by garden plots and outbuildings. To the Kremlin’s north and east were artisan neighbor­ hoods, but the radius of settlement was less than a mile. To the Kremlin’s west a village surrounded by uncleared forest was located at the site of the present-day Lenin Library.33 Beyond the settled center, forests, streams, and marshes covered what is now downtown Moscow. Villages of two to three peasant households were scattered in the forest roughly in a circle inscribing the present-day Boulevard Ring, less than one mile from the Kremlin. Slightly farther out was located a line of advance fortifications: in the 1280’s the Danilov for­ tress monastery had been built about two and one-half miles south of the Kremlin, on the approach road of Tatar raids. In the 1360’s the Andron-

The Formative Fourteenth Century

33

nikov Monastery was built east of the Kremlin, and in the 1370’s the Si­ monov Monastery was built southeast of it; both continued this frontier line at a similar distance. From the 1380’s into the fifteenth century a ring of fortress monasteries was built to protect the north and the north­ western frontier from attacks from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Vysoko-Petrovskii, Rozhdestvenskii, Sretenskii, Novinskii, and Sawinskii monasteries were located along the border of settled Moscow, which was from half a mile to about two miles from the Kremlin. Well into the fif­ teenth century, meadows, forests, and scattered settlements filled the areas between the center and these fortresses.34 The Kremlin fortifications were as simple as the modest size of the town suggests. They consisted of earthen ramparts topped by a wooden stockade until the reign of Dmitrii Donskoi (1359-89), when limestone walls were constructed. Stone was otherwise reserved for church build­ ings. In the early fourteenth century three small stone churches were built: the Dormition Cathedral, which was the metropolitan’s seat (built in 1326-27); the Church of St. John of the Ladder (built in 1329); and the Church of the Archangel Michael, which was the Daniilovich necropolis (built in 1333). A monastery church and other churches were built soon thereafter. Churches were small; the plan of the Church of the Birth of the Mother of God, built in 1393, was about nine meters square. Ap­ proximately fifteen stone structures —primarily fortification walls and churches —were constructed between the 1360’s and the 1420’s. Only after the middle of the fifteenth century did church and secular leaders use stone for their homes: Metropolitan Iona built a stone palace in 1450, and a successor expanded it in the 1470’s. Merchants and boyars also began to construct stone houses in the 1470’s. A stone palace for the grand prince was begun only in 1484.35 Wooden quarters certainly can be palatial, but the small size of individual rooms (necessitated by the hori­ zontal log technique of construction) and the scarcity of stone structures suggest a more modest level of wealth at the court in the fourteenth cen­ tury than that evidenced by the Kremlin building projects of the late fif­ teenth century. The small size of the Kremlin settlement in the fourteenth century sug­ gests that the political system of the Daniilovichi and their men was based on personal, comradely association - a suggestion reinforced by the small number of boyars who lived in the Kremlin in the fourteenth century. There were fewer than 15 boyar families in existence at any one time in the fourteenth century, and the number of boyars from those families fluctuated between about five and ten. The number of boyars and boyar families gradually increased until the late 1540’s. Boyar families and the

34

The Formative Fourteenth Century

sovereign limited access to the status in order to guard the exclusivity of their privileges, or perhaps a larger elite simply could not be accommo­ dated in a personal political system.36 Until the number of boyar families reached about ten in the fourteenth century, boyar status was apparently open to all men. Landed military men came to serve the Muscovite princes from all parts of northeast Rus*. Grand princes favored some of them with boyar status, allowing them to counsel the sovereign, to lead their retinues in his cause, to share the spoils of victory, and to pass their politi­ cal role on to their descendants. The grand prince’s choices were un­ doubtedly based on the men’s specific attributes; among the qualifications that promised conferral of boyar status were valor, wealth, and personal and family eminence. The relatively free access to boyar rank in the four­ teenth century was in sharp contrast to the limitations imposed during the fifteenth century. Becoming a boyar in the fourteenth century seems to have been as simple as being in the right place at the right time. Who were these men? S. B. Veselovskii pioneered the study of Moscow’s earliest boyars, and his works remain the most detailed histories of boyar families to date. Subsequent source publications have modified his list of early boyars in numerous details, but the list compiled for this study differs from Veselovskii’s only with regard to a few men.37 The boyars of the earliest Moscow Daniilovich grand princes —Grand Prince Daniil Aleksandrovich (died 1303), Grand Prince Iurii Daniilovich (died 1325), and Grand Prince Ivan Kalita (died 1340) —can only be identified approximately. Two such men are mentioned in the will of Grand Prince Ivan Kalita: Okatii, founder of the Okat’ev clan,38 and Afinii, founder of boyar Dmitrii Afin’evich’s clan.39These families may have settled in the Moscow area during the rule of the various princes who preceded the Daniilovichi. Several men who appear to have been boyar clan progenitors emigrated to Moscow in the time of Princes Iurii and Ivan Daniilovichi, that is, in the first four decades of the fourteenth century. The founder of the Vel’iaminov-Vorontsov clan, Protasii, for example, is mentioned in genea­ logical sources as having “come from Vladimir with Grand Prince Daniil” and as having been “the thousandman of Grand Prince Ivan Daniilovich.” 40 The Biakont-Pleshcheev clan also arrived in the first four decades of the fourteenth century. Genealogies of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries suggest that the clan founder, Fedor Biakont, “came from Chernigov” to serve Grand Prince Iurii Daniilovich (accord­ ing to one account) or Grand Prince Ivan Kalita (according to another).41 The Akinfovich clan came from Tver*, but early-sixteenth-century gene­ alogies show it descending from a boyar of Prince Aleksandr Nevskii,

The Formative Fourteenth Century

35

who was grand prince of Vladimir from 1252 to 1263. The boyars Ivan and Fedor Akinfovichi are mentioned in Muscovite sources in service in 133S/ 39 and 1347/48; they and their father, Akinf, are mentioned ear­ lier as being in service in Tver’ in 1304.42 Several boyar clans can be traced to boyars who were first mentioned in the middle of the fourteenth century. In later genealogies, two boyar clans straightforwardly identify their founders as boyars of Moscow Grand Prince Semen the Proud. The Kobyla-Koshkin clan was founded by Andrei Ivanovich Kobyla; he is attested in 1346/47 in service as a boyar, but his origin is not known.43 Similarly, the Otiaev-Khvostov clan’s founder, Aleksei Khvost, is attested as being in the grand prince’s service in 1346/47, but his origin is unknown; genealogical books start with the clan’s fourteenth-century service to Moscow.44 The Fominskii clan was a branch of the Smolensk princes and was founded as a Muscovite boyar clan in the 1340’s. It had an unusual entry into Kremlin politics: in 1345/46 Prince Fedor Fominskii married Grand Prince Semen’s second wife, Princess Evpraksiia of Smolensk, after she had been repudiated by the sovereign.45 Genealogical books trace the Vsevolozh clan from “Prince Aleksandr Glebovich-Vsevolod” of Smolensk, but S. B. Veselovskii suggests that the founder was Prince Aleksandr Glebovich of Briansk, who served in Pskov in 1341 and presumably entered Muscovite service in the middle of the century.46 The Zernov-Saburov clan came to Moscow from Kostroma, al­ though some genealogies include a now discredited Tatar ancestry.47 The origin of the founder of the Morozov clan is not known; V. L. Ianin has convincingly demonstrated the inaccuracy of a genealogy attributing a Novgorodian origin to the family.48 In the first half of the fourteenth century perhaps ten boyar clans lived in Moscow; they included those who possessed the highest status and the greatest power at court through the remainder of the fourteenth century: the Vel’iaminov-Vorontsov family, the Biakontov-Pleshcheev family, and the Akinfovichi. In 1356 the Khvostov clan lost boyar status through dis­ grace.49 During the long reign of Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi (ruled 1359-89), several new men joined the ranks of the boyars. The Minin family, of unknown origin, was probably founded in that period by Dmitrii, son of Mina; Dmitrii is mentioned as a boyar in the 1360’s.50An­ other newcomer was Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Monastyrev, who hailed from Beloozero; he is mentioned as a boyar in the 1370’s.51 In the 1370’s two new clans were probably founded. The Volynskii clan was founded by Dmitrii Bobrok Volynskii in the 1370’s; genealogies suggest that he came from Volhynia, which is plausible in view of the fact that the

36

The Formative Fourteenth Century

Gedyminids took over that once independent territory in the 1360’s.52 Ivan Rodionovich, the founder of the Kvashnin clan, is attested in 1375 as a boyar; he probably hailed from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.53 Aleksandr Beleut founded a boyar clan in the 1380’s; early genealogies are unclear concerning this clan’s origins, but its landholdings suggest that its members came from the Vladimir-SuzdaP area.54 Genealogical articles of the late fifteenth century reveal the existence of two new boyars in the 1390’s, but the origins of both Dmitrii Vasil’evich55 and Vladimir Daniilovich Krasnoi56are unknown. The Dobrynskii family joined the elite at the turn of the fourteenth century; the clan’s genealogy is unclear but its name suggests it had been settled in the Moscow area for about a generation.57 The permeability of the boyar elite characteristic of the fourteenth century continued with the addition of the Patrikeev princely family shortly after the end of that century. In 1408 the Gedyminid Prince Patrikei Narimuntovich arrived in Moscow from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with his son, Iurii; they were accompanying Svitrigaila, an unsuccessful contender for the Grand Duchy’s throne. Accom­ panied by a large retinue, they had considerable political prestige and connections. Svitrigaila and Prince Patrikei returned to the Grand Duchy, but Prince Iurii stayed and quickly “bypassed in status” many other boyars, as stated in a later account. The Patrikeev clan became one of the most powerful families at court in the fifteenth century.58 Until the first decade of the fifteenth century, Moscow’s elite was open to newcomers, but its composition stabilized after the Patrikeevy joined. No new clans joined thereafter until the dynastic war of the mid-fifteenth century. Some boyar families within clans died out; others lost boyar status in the course of the dynastic war and descended to the ranks of nonboyar military servitors. Of 19 boyar families mentioned as belonging to the elite up to 1407,11 retained their status beyond that date. Thus for the first half of the fifteenth century, the elite remained small enough for boyar and grand prince to know each other personally. In summary, the small size of Moscow’s territory, the small population and intimacy of fourteenth-century Moscow and the Kremlin, the limited circle of boyar families, Moscow’s subsistence economy, the rigors of cli­ mate and battle, and patrimonial princely traditions inherited from Kiev Rus’ all contributed to the development of a political system that empha­ sized personal association over abstract institutional or corporate rela­ tions. The Daniilovichi answered the challenge of maintaining control over their realm not by relying on representative institutions or on a for­ malized bureaucracy, or by developing the concepts of an impersonal state that more complex societies require. Instead, they built a political system based on a heritage that included the charisma of the sovereign dynasty,

The Formative Fourteenth Century

37

the tradition of boyars’ personal loyalty to the grand prince, reliance on kinship and patronage, and the overarching moral authority of the church.59

Boyars and Their Roles Boyars did not constitute a social class but were among the members of the landed military class descended from the comrades-in-arms of Riurikid princes and grand princes of Kievan times.60 The term “boyar” was probably derived from an Old Bulgar word indicating eminence or wealth, although many scholars have tried to derive it from Slavic root words meaning “warfare” (boi) or “big, eminent” (bol'shoi).6' All these etymologies accurately depict the social prominence and functional sig­ nificance of the boyars; in Muscovy boyars were distinguished by their dual role of military leader and political counselor, since political affairs fundamentally involved war and territorial control. They were the hand­ ful of men who had regular personal access to the sovereign and who ad­ vised him in decision making. Some early Muscovite sources use the term “boyar” more generally to identify the landed class or to refer to all the sovereign’s administrators. Some distinguish the boyars who per­ formed circuit tasks (putnye boiare) from those who lived in Moscow and were counselors at the sovereign’s side, or “admitted boyars” (vvedennye boiare).61 But this distinction had disappeared from sources by the fifteenth century; by and large, as used in Muscovite sources, the term “boyar” denotes a specific political function and the person carrying out that function. It is clear from surviving land transaction documents that boyars in the fourteenth century were landowners, but their full range of economic re­ sources cannot be systematically identified. For no secular individual un­ til the seventeenth century, other than Daniilovich family members, do family archives survive. Until the middle of the sixteenth century, govern­ ment documents did not systematically record individual boyars’ com­ pensations for their services. Thus we cannot ascertain the degree to which political competition may have been grounded in economic con­ cerns, or determine the ways in which boyars may have reaped economic rewards from political power. But from land documents that survive in monastic libraries and from scattered comments in chronicles and grandprincely treaties, one can reconstruct a boyar’s economic life in gen­ eral terms. As Veselovskii’s reconstructions of boyar clan histories show, boyars owned alodial land (votchina) in the Muscovite area. Some distri­ bution of land to favored servitors did take place, but typically land­ holders purchased their lands; the grand princes had too limited a land

38

The Formative Fourteenth Century

fund to distribute land regularly.63 Boyars also maintained ownership of property in principalities from which they had emigrated to Muscovy; that right, and the servitors’ right to leave Muscovite service freely for another principality, were protected in grand-princely treaties well into the fifteenth century.64 But in practice Muscovite sovereigns curtailed the right of free departure, even in the fourteenth century,65 an action that was important in the establishment of the state’s power, as numerous scholars have pointed out.66 It should be recalled that the boyars stood by their grand prince when lands were confiscated and disgrace was imposed on their departing comrades. This was not a policy by which the autoc­ racy crushed the “boyar aristocracy,” but one by which the forces of au­ tocracy-grand prince and boyars together —exerted control over their own number. Veselovskii argued that the “feeding” (kormlenie) system, by which communities provided upkeep and salary to officials stationed among them, played a far larger role than land grants in increasing servitors’ wealth; war booty was also a major source of wealth. Compensation in whatever form was probably not regularized until 1556, when norms of payment in service tenure land (pomest’e) and cash according to rank were established.67 In that decree, boyars, okol’nichie, and those holding other high ranks were to receive grants up to three times larger than those given to rank-and-file servitors; undoubtedly such a relative distribu­ tion had a precedent in earlier centuries, for it is clear from all sources that fourteenth-century boyars were wealthy men. They assembled large amounts of land, having received it or resources to purchase it from the sovereign or indirectly as a result of their association with him. The Mus­ covite sovereign in fact was obliged by tradition to bestow largess on his closest comrades; this gift-giving aspect of personal friendship is a leit­ motiv of political relations. Chronicles in Kievan times underscored the gift-giving role of the grand prince. I. Ia. Froianov has labeled this principle a key element in the patrimonial politics he depicts in Kiev; Veselovskii likewise con­ sidered this a key aspect of the grand prince’s relationship with his boyars in the fourteenth century.68 Muscovite sources testify to the practice; one fifteenth-century boyar’s will includes gifts from the sovereign, and in a chronicle the young Ivan IV is described as bestowing “upon his army and his commanders lavish favor, fur coats and drinking goblets” after a military victory in 1541.69Just as in North American potlatches, gift giv­ ing not only bound the boyars to their sovereign by imposing on them an obligation to serve, it tied him to them by obligations of patrimonial care. Land was the basic form of wealth in the Muscovite elite, but it was the populace settled on the land that made it truly valuable. Thus, land-

The Formative Fourteenth Century

39

holders recorded their lands as “villages” or even as lists of families.70Be­ cause of the small population, in the fourteenth century boyars depended for income less on grain than on other products resulting from exploita­ tion: forest products (honey, wax), furs, and salt and other mineral re­ sources. They did not live on their lands, which were scattered, but ad­ ministered them through bailiffs.71 Veselovskii has shown that boyar families in the fourteenth century can be considered wealthy in terms of their landholdings, but his demonstration that many clans had become impoverished as a result of partible inheritance by the end of the fifteenth century supports an argument that was prevalent before his time: the landed class as a whole relinquished its rights and yielded readily to au­ tocracy from Ivan Ill’s time on because of its impoverishment.72 But if one dissociates the lines that died off or fell out of boyar rank during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries from those that endured, then the boyars’ steady maintenance of ample landholdings is evident. Because the boyar Fedor Sviblo was disgraced at the end of the fourteenth century, for example, we know the extent of his confiscated landholdings: he owned slightly over fifteen large villages with associated smaller commu­ nities, located in six or seven provinces (uezdy).73 The wills of numerous other late-fifteenth- and sixteenth-century boyars also suggest their pos­ session of substantial wealth in the form of land.74Gustave Alef has traced the Patrikeev clan’s amassing of wealth in the wake of the annexation of Novgorod; Zimin has contended that boyars as a rule enjoyed significant wealth.75 Boyars, as distinct from the landed class from which they de­ rived, benefited from their power. The economic benefits of being a boyar may well have contributed to the intense competition for the rank and to the pressure to achieve higher status within the rank. Those benefits should also be regarded, however, as an incentive for preserving stability among men at court and for im­ posing checks on political competition to accomplish that goal. Such sta­ bility is evidenced by the continuous hereditary succession of boyar clans, by the relative avoidance of violence in political competition, and by the tolerance of an inequitable division of power and benefits among the boyars. These customs, all of which are discussed in subsequent chapters, testify to a mutual respect among boyars and between them and the grand prince. It was a respect grounded in self-interest. The boyars and grand princes depended upon their collective strength during the inces­ sant warfare of the fourteenth century to maintain and increase their resources. Excessive internecine conflict (exemplified by the fifteenthcentury dynastic war) threatened the elite’s power and consequently their livelihood. The boyars’ military might also acted to restrain violence and to promote the grand prince’s respect, for the boyars were armed and

40

The Formative Fourteenth Century

dangerous. In the fourteenth century their retinues formed the bulk of the sovereign’s armies. In the very real leverage they possessed with regard to the sovereign might be found a source of the respect, personal associa­ tion, and self-limiting constraints that are part of the political system we are examining. The Muscovite army in the fourteenth century was composed pri­ marily of private retinues. A small infantry was mustered from the local populations, but fundamentally Moscow’s army was a cavalry force.76 The grand prince mustered a retinue of service courtiers (dvoriane), or of free landed cavalrymen called “boyars’ sons” (deti boiarskie)-,77 his kinsmen in turn contributed their own retinues and those of their bo­ yars.78Finally, Moscow’s boyars apparently contributed their own retinues, composed of men whom the boyars supported with gifts of land or up­ keep.79None of the relatively few fourteenth-century sources clearly iden­ tifies a boyar’s retinue, but numerous earlier Kievan and later fifteenthand sixteenth-century sources do. In some fifteenth-century chronicles, for example, boyars’ forces are mentioned, and “boyars’ servitors” are specifically identified as having been transferred to the Novgorodian lands in the late fifteenth century.80In the sixteenth century several wealthy boyars retained such retinues. In 1509, boyar Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii led his men to battle. When Prince Semen Bel’skii and Ivan Liatskoi fled to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1534, many deti boiarskie went with them, suggesting political connections, if not direct sub­ ordination. In 1547, when a crowd attacked and killed Prince Iurii Vasil’evich Glinskii, it killed many of his deti boiarskie and “people” as well. In 1549 Ivan IV reprimanded the boyars and “their people” for cor­ ruption during his minority. When Prince Semen Lobanov-Rostovskii was arrested in 1554, so were his men. He was exiled and “his men were dispersed.” When Prince Andrei Kurbskii fled to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1564, he took with him many deti boiarskie, Ivan Petrovich Fedorov’s “men” are also mentioned.81 In the sixteenth century servitors were identified as being dependent on boyars belonging to the Mikulinskii, Mstislavskii, Serebrianyi, Obolenskii, Morozov, and other families. In 1607 Jacques Margeret spoke of “nobles” equipping their military ser­ vitors.82 Even in the etymology of the term syn boiarskii (plural is deti boiarskie), which Richard Hellie likens to the Carolingian puer regis (a slave dependent), one might see the suggestion of a boyar’s retinue: in ad­ dition to being impoverished descendants of boyars, early deti boiarskie may also have been members of the lesser landed class from which boyars took their military forces.83 The grand princes were apparently not able to demand a certain num-

The Formative Fourteenth Century

41

ber of cavalrymen according to a boyar’s or other servitor’s landholdings until an attempt was made to regularize the system in 1556. Thereafter, for each 100 cheti (about 130 acres) of good service tenure land or alodial land, all servitors were required to provide one fully equipped cavalry­ man.84 But it is likely that this principle was based on the practices of boyars who had settled their retainers on their land, thus providing the boyars with both military forces and laborers to work their scattered es­ tates.85 Scholars have traditionally argued that Ivan III began to dissolve boyars’ retinues in the fifteenth century, when he transferred numerous boyars’ servitors to the Novgorodian lands and made them servitors of the grand prince directly.86 Boyars then became the leaders of the various units of the grand prince’s army, both his personal regiment (dvor) and regiments mustered from the various regions recently incorporated into Muscovy.87 But the tradition of boyars’ maintaining groups of dependent followers, either as military retinues or as part of informal patronage net­ works, endured into the sixteenth century. Many of the cavalrymen provided by the boyars after 1556 were prob­ ably indentured servants; collectively they provided a sort of retinue for the boyars.88 In addition, boyars used patronage to build broader factions of political supporters. Patronage networks are not easily discernible in sixteenth-century sources; even the more numerous seventeenth-century sources rarely include evidence of such networks. Robert O. Crummey has nevertheless found sufficient grounds to postulate their existence in the seventeenth century, and it could be argued that they existed in the sixteenth century as well.89 Patronage networks are evident in the men­ tion of dependents of boyars in nonmilitary roles. When in 1536, for ex­ ample, Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii hosted an envoy from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, several of “his men” stood in attendance. At the same audience, “servants” of Prince Ivan Ovchina and Prince Ivan Paletskii greeted the ambassadors. The English envoy Giles Fletcher, ac­ customed to Elizabethan patronage politics, spoke of “the Godunovs and their clients.” 90These men were probably cavalrymen of the grand prince beholden to boyar patrons. Networks of allies and dependents can be inferred from other evidence as well. The hundreds of signatories of leading boyars’ surety bonds may have included their clients and allies, since such men would logically have been in a position to answer for their loyalty.91 Many men chosen as wit­ nesses by a boyar or lesser servitor to the drawing up of his will or other important documents were kinsmen, as would be expected, but some­ times they included men so senior to the principal that a patronage link is implicit.92 In some instances testators even referred to the men who exe-

42

The Formative Fourteenth Century

cuted their wills as “my master” (gospodin); although the term can be formulaic, often it was applied to a boyar of high status, suggesting a real dependency.93 Clients may also be discerned in the various families mentioned in descriptions of sovereign wedding ceremonies from 1526 to 1555; the humble Zhizhemskii, Mansurov, Veshniakov, Zhulebin, and Korobov families, for example, appeared frequently at such important events, sug­ gesting that they were patronized by one or more of the boyar clans in­ volved in these weddings.94 Even graveyards offer intriguing evidence: members of the Iur’ev, Iakovlev, Vorotynskii, Trubetskii, and NogotkovObolenskii clans and of the Khromoi line of the Akinfovich clan were all buried in the Iur’evy’s burial ground in the Novospasskii Monastery in Moscow in the first half of the sixteenth century. Perhaps some of these families had intermarried with the powerful Iur’evy, or were their allies or clients.95 The servitors implicated in the abortive revolt in favor of the future Vasilii III in 1497 may have been clients of a boyar leader. These men — Vladimir Gusev, Prince Ivan Khrul’ Ivanovich Paletskii, Shavia Skriabina, Poiark (brother of Ivan Runo), and Afanasii Iaropkin - were rank-and-file cavalrymen from excluded (izgoi) lines of old boyar clans.96 Their later success under Vasilii III suggests that they were clients of his boyar sup­ porters. Similarly, the three lesser servitors sent by the Shuiskie to kill Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii in 1542 were most likely Shuiskii clients.97 Such indications that boyars maintained networks of dependent mili­ tary men and political allies testify to the importance of affinity in Mus­ covite political relations. The existence of such networks is one of the rea­ sons, aside from tradition, that grand princes accorded boyars high status and gave them a real decision-making role. In the absence of alternative social groups and military support in the fourteenth century, Muscovy’s grand princes constructed a political order on the basis of comradely and interdependent relations with their military leaders and chief advis­ ers. Other circumstances in the fourteenth century made it possible for boyars to have real power at court. Dynastic primogeniture, for example, allowed children to take the throne and ill, infirm, and old men to keep it. Such a system of succession required that someone —like Moscow’s bo­ yars —be in a position of real power to maintain control in the event of a grand-princely minority. Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi was a minor when he occupied the throne from 1359 to at least 1366; although chronicles indicate that Donskoi himself held the reins of power, often ad­ vised by his cousin Vladimir,98 logic suggests otherwise. At his accession in 1359, Donskoi was nine years old and his cousin was six. It is more likely that from 1359 through at least 1366, the boyars and perhaps the

The Formative Fourteenth Century

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metropolitan took charge of Moscow’s political affairs and thus gained direct governing experience." In the absence of adult grand-princely rule, the boyars were left to negotiate with the Golden Horde, lead battles, de­ cide foreign policy, and make and administer fiscal policy and the law.100 Throughout Muscovite history, the dynastic succession system offered boyars the opportunity for independent rule at moments of monarchical weakness. In addition to Dmitrii Donskoi’s minority, boyars ran the state at other times when the grand prince was a minor (Vasilii II, 142.5-33; Ivan IV, 1533-47), or when he was ill (Ivan III from 1503 to 1505), cap­ tive (Vasilii II in 1445), or incompetent (Fedor Ivanovich throughout his rule, from 1584 to 1598). And Vasilii II’s blindness (1436-62) inhibited his military leadership, perhaps enhancing the boyars’ power. Had Mus­ covite boyars shared a typically aristocratic consciousness, had they envi­ sioned themselves as a corporate entity whose power rivaled that of the sovereign, had they aspired to institutional representation, they would have used these moments to attempt to win the privileges and protections of aristocratic estates. In similar circumstances in the fifteenth and six­ teenth centuries, Polish noblemen did precisely that: they constructed a parliamentary system and gained extensive corporate privileges and legal protections from kings who were weak and therefore dependent on them.101 But the Muscovite political elite was content to exercise power and enjoy its benefits behind the façade of autocracy, creating an effective system of government without recourse to rationalized institutions. In addition to Donskoi’s minority, the fact that the Daniilovich line was not prolific helped make the boyars an exclusive and enduring political elite. In the ruling dynasty only two or three sons per generation survived to adulthood in the fourteenth century.102 Those who became rulers en­ joyed fairly long reigns: Prince Iurii Daniilovich reigned for 22 years (1303-25); Ivan Kalita, 16 (1325-40); Semen the Proud, 12 (1340-53); Dmitrii Donskoi, 30 (1359-89); and Vasilii I, 36 (1389-1425). And, sig­ nificantly, until the death of Ivan Kalita in 1340, the dynasty did not sub­ divide Moscow’s territorial holdings.103 Even after 1340, the brothers of the grand prince seem to have remained resident in Moscow.104 When Prince Andrei Ivanovich’s son, Prince Vladimir Andreevich, fortified Serpukhov in the 1370’s, he began to establish a separate political center and elite, but even so Prince Vladimir did not take up permanent resi­ dence there. Not until the mid-fifteenth century did Daniilovichi in the appanages create territorial centers of sufficient permanence to allow the formation of appanage elites.105 These circumstances increased the power and cohesion of the boyar elite in the fourteenth century because they limited the number of princes who required boyars and thus kept low the number of families in court

44

T h e F o rm a tive F ou rteen th C e n tu ry

politics. As each Daniilovich laterally succeeded his brother or followed his father, his predecessor’s boyars were not replaced, but rather were incorporated into the court of the new sovereign. Although each Daniilo­ vich had his own elite of boyars,106 through the mid-fifteenth century bo­ yars served the grand prince and his brothers interchangeably.107Thus the boyar elite remained small, personally acquainted with the sovereign, and continuous at court. The fourteenth-century boyars* exercise of real power behind the fa­ çade of the sovereign’s autocracy was a precedent whose influence was ob­ servable in subsequent centuries. Several examples indicate how beholden the sovereign was to his boyars; they also reveal the stability provided by the court political system and suggest that consensus and cooperation be­ tween boyars and sovereign were at its root. The Muscovite dynastic war was sparked in 1433 in part because one Muscovite boyar—and later sev­ eral others-defected to the Galich opposition; the war ended in the 1440’s when the opposition dissolved and loyal forces gathered around Vasilii II, first outside the limits of the state and finally in the recaptured Kremlin. The same dynamic governed the election of Mikhail Romanov in 1613, confirming that the system of high politics remained essentially unchanged.108The Time of Troubles lasted as long as the various camps of boyars were divided over a new distribution of power. Once Kremlin and Tushino boyars had agreed upon a candidate under whom a satisfactory distribution of power could be established, stability was restored. Finally, during four tense weeks in August and September 1689, boyars journeyed one by one from the Kremlin, then occupied by the regent Tsarevna Sofiia, to the Trinity—St. Sergii Monastery, outside of Moscow, where Peter I was challenging her authority. When most of Moscow’s political elite had made the journey to declare allegiance to Peter, Sofiia’s rule was over; yet with those same boyars’ support her authority had previously been assured for seven years. In such instances, boyars did not take ad­ vantage of monarchical weakness to seek a change in the political system, although they struggled among themselves for relative power within that system. Only under Polish influence in the Time of Troubles did boyars pursue (unsuccessfully) legal confirmation of their power. The tasks boyars performed and the way Muscovite sources describe those tasks reveal the personal nature of fourteenth-century political rela­ tionships and of the traditional roles accorded the boyars. The personal bonds derived, as has been suggested, from patrimonial traditions inher­ ited from Kiev, and from the grand prince’s dependence on the boyars* military force. They may also have derived from Muscovy’s association with the Mongol Horde, for Mongol ideology granted the khan auto­ cratic authority, yet leading Mongol families traditionally retained a share of the rule.109

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Although not enfranchised and not organized along the lines of some contemporaneous West European aristocracies, boyars had real power. Most of what they did was essentially military: they administered con­ quered territories as vicegerents, countersigned charters of local govern­ ment or immunity grants, judged criminal cases, and negotiated peace.110 The key to their identity was that boyars had access to the grand prince. Boyars, at least some of them, were present at the signing of treaties; the most eminent of them witnessed the drawing up of grand-princely wills.111 Chronicle sources reveal that the grand prince “consulted” (zdumav) with his boyars before embarking on major campaigns, initiating build­ ing projects, choosing his marriage partner, or making similarly weighty decisions.112 In descriptions of court ceremonies boyars are mentioned immediately after the grand-princely family and princes.113In some chron­ icle tales boyars are depicted as standing at the grand prince’s deathbed, overseeing the transition of power after his death. Grand Prince Semen’s testament similarly instructs his brothers to heed the advice of the head of the church and of the “old boyars who have wished well towards us and our father.” 114Even the centralizing autocrat Ivan III refused to meet with German envoys unless accompanied by his leading boyars.115 The boyars’ power and status were ensured by tradition, not by char­ ters or privileges. They were friends of the sovereign and counselors who gave him “good advice”; their relationship to him was not conducted through the agency of any formalized institution. The term “Boyar Duma” is not encountered in Muscovite sources through the mid-sixteenth cen­ tury, although the root dumati (“to counsel”) is used to describe boyars giving advice as individuals and in small groups, a consummately private activity.116 The boyars’ decisions were apparently made in personal dis­ cussions. No records of proceedings are extant, although the court as­ siduously kept other official documents, starting in the fourteenth cen­ tury. The number of boyars was not fixed during the Muscovite period,117 and the fact that the court did not maintain rosters of the boyars in ser­ vice at any one time indicates the patrimonial nature of the political order. Formal assemblies of the grand prince with his boyars are not re­ corded until the seventeenth century, when there were so many boyars in the upper three dumnyi ranks that they constituted a formalized adminis­ trative institution.118 Boyars’ accession to high rank was not marked by public ceremony until the seventeenth century; boyars appear and disap­ pear in Muscovite sources from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries. The boyars did not self-consciously present themselves as an aristoc­ racy in the period from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth century. No political tracts, save the disputed Kurbskii writings, exist by boyars of any political persuasion, whether aristocratic or monarchical. (Ivan

46

The Formative Fourteenth Century

Peresvetov was an outsider to court politics.) The government maintained genealogical and military service books to aid in service assignment and for resolution of precedence disputes, but not (until 1682) to protect a family’s corporate rights. Tales in chronicles of political crises condemn boyars as families, not as an aristocratic class. In sum, Moscow’s boyar elite derived from the highest social class, but that social eminence was not accompanied by the aristocratic presumptions common to Western nobilities. Discussion of boyars’ power should use a vocabulary and conceptual framework that are sensitive to this distinction. To the rest of Russian so­ ciety, boyars constituted not a social force opposed to the sovereign, but one united with him. In their public roles, boyars administered autocracy. In association with the grand prince, they created norms of conduct for men with power. Using such a system of court politics, boyars and sover­ eigns apportioned what they called “honor” (chest’), a notion that in­ cluded distribution of power, status, and economic benefits, for all were inextricably intertwined.119 Boyars’ roles involved decision making not only about war, alliance, and administration, but about themselves. The customs they developed to regulate their interactions, to curb ambition, and to ensure stability comprise the heart of the system of court politics. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the boyars, together with the sovereign, limited the size of their elite; they established relative status among themselves; and they acquiesced in an inequitable distribution of benefits that corresponded to their hierarchical distribution of status and power. Honor was the commodity that made boyars special; only those who had it could participate in court politics.

Other Political Forces In the fourteenth century no social groups other than boyars, who were drawn from the military elite, had effective power or were involved in court politics. The grand prince and his family were the center of the political world in that century, as well as in subsequent centuries. But Daniilovich collateral kinsmen were considered above court politics; as members of that charismatic dynasty, they could not act as mere boyars, nor were they equals of the grand prince. Occasionally a collateral kins­ man would become influential at court; an example is Prince Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov under Vasilii I.120 But by and large, their exclu­ sion from Kremlin court politics became integral to the political system. Starting in the fourteenth century, Muscovite grand princes and their boyars systematically subordinated the grand prince’s brothers and other collateral kin, leaving princes only local power in their appanages. Treaties

The Formative Fourteenth Century

47

that defined the appanage princes’ subordination to the grand prince as the submission of a younger to an elder brother, or as that of son to fa­ ther, enjoined them from Kremlin decision making.121 This grandprincely policy frequently required rigorous enforcement, but oppression was a necessary price for political stability, and it was a price that Mos­ cow’s sovereigns and boyars were willing to pay (see Chapter 5). In the Muscovite political system - in theory, at least—all status, power, and gifts emanated from the grand prince; in him all power was situated. But the utility of this image for the system should not diminish our aware­ ness of his personal potential for leadership. Because of the circumstances just discussed that allowed boyars a claim to independent power— dynastic primogeniture, Kievan patrimonial traditions, and the grand prince’s dependence on boyars’ military and political support—the grand prince was well advised to work with his boyars rather than to impose policy on them. By respecting their power, seeking their support for his endeavors, and considering their desires in making his plans, the grand prince could hope to maintain a loyal following. Furthermore, the grand prince was not only a negotiator but also a mediator: his charismatic sovereignty put him above political struggle and enabled him to intercede and attempt to resolve differences among the boyars. Grand princes could decisively influence policy, as Ivan III did in his territorial expansion, as Vasilii III did when he undertook the nearly unprecedented step of di­ vorce and remarriage, and as Ivan IV did in the Oprichnina. Grand princes were not the sole actors in court politics, but they constituted the symbolic center and were the final authority that lent stability to the po­ litical order. In the fourteenth-century Kremlin there were a few scribes and under­ secretaries who kept the grand prince’s archives, but they were too few to constitute a chancery.122In a world where military conquest was the prin­ cipal activity of the political leadership, scribes did not merit political power. Their number began to grow in the fifteenth century; one or two eminent scribes in each generation appeared with boyars at important ne­ gotiations. Scribes in Muscovy were a part of the upper service class and could own alodial land. By the seventeenth century, high court scribes had been given places as court secretaries (dumnye d’iaki) and previously exclusively military boyars had assumed ministerial leadership posi­ tions.123 As a result of their integration into politics, senior scribes were allowed to participate in precedence disputes to attempt to protect their newly acquired “place” at court. One might argue that scribes gained a status equivalent to that of the boyars in the political elite starting in the late fifteenth century when their number increased. Scribes such as Aleksei Poluekhtov, Fedor Kurit-

48

The Formative Fourteenth Century

syn, Ivan Bersen Beklemyshev, Guba Moklokov, Menshoi Putiatin, Elizar Tsypliatev, Fedor Mishurin, and Ivan Viskovatyi figure prominently in certain court activities from the reign of Ivan III until the 1550’s. Several of them were wealthy enough to donate large sums to major monasteries. Some (Ivan Beklemyshev, Fedor Kuritsyn, Ivan Viskovatyi) were impli­ cated in religious controversies at court, and at least one (Fedor Mishurin) was sufficiently involved in court politics to be executed by the Shuiskie in 1538. The prominence of scribes in administrative sources might sug­ gest that the exclusivity of court politics was weakening. Such a conclusion would be unwarranted, however. Military men re­ mained the only individuals eligible to be boyars and to have decision­ making power through the first half of the sixteenth century. Scribes worked side by side with boyars in the Kremlin, but they had no “honor” in politics: they were not entered in genealogical books, they did not en­ joy hereditary or even temporary access to boyar rank, they did not inter­ marry with members of boyar families, and they did not participate in the system of precedence disputes. As a result, they did not act unilaterally in political affairs but rather exerted influence through factions headed by boyars. For example, Fedor Mishurin was an ally of the Bel’skii princes and was executed when the Shuiskie moved against that family in 1538. The exclusive exercise of power by the descendants of Moscow’s original military elite continued until internal political circumstances changed fundamentally, beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century. Neither did nonmilitary positions of court administration, such as the responsibilities of majordomo (dvoretskii) and court treasurer (kaznachei) confer effective political power. The grand prince’s properties were ad­ ministered in the fourteenth century by a staff of servants of the court (slugi pod dvorskim) that served under a majordomo, who was appar­ ently not a military leader or a boyar. Court administrative positions pro­ liferated in the late fifteenth century as the sovereign’s properties in­ creased, and the highest positions became honorific. Boyars began to assume titles such as majordomo and equerry (koniushii) and to benefit from the added income. In the 1590’s Fletcher said that Boris Godunov’s income for the equerry post he held was 1,200 rubles per annum —a fairly handsome remuneration.124 Men in such posts wielded power only when they became boyars or okol’nichie. For example, from the 1510’s to the 1540’s, Ivan Iur’evich Shigona Podzhogin was involved regularly in diplo­ matic and administrative sources as majordomo of the Tver’ land. But he was influential only inasmuch as he was allied with boyars. He was not made a boyar and did not found a hereditary boyar family.125 A small number of other such functionaries became prominent because they be-

The Formative Fourteenth Century

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came okoPnichie or boyars. Fedor Karpov, who had been a huntsman (lovchii), is an example.126 Some merchants lived in the Kremlin in the fourteenth century and may have provided financial services for the grand prince. But only in the fifteenth century was one of them-Vladimir Grigor’evich Khovrin made a boyar. His family history suggests a prejudice against noncavalry­ men in positions of honor. The Khovrin-Golovin clan of financiers was founded by Stepan Khovra, a Greek merchant from the Genoese port of Sudak who came to Moscow with his son, Vladimir, in the late four­ teenth century. Vladimir lived in the Kremlin, where he built a stone house and endowed a Kremlin stone church.127 Unprecedentedly, he is mentioned as a boyar although he was never a military man (it is signifi­ cant in this regard that he is mentioned as such only in judicial docu­ ments). Vladimir’s eldest son, Ivan Golova, is mentioned as a creditor of the royal family, but not as a boyar.128His second son, Dmitrii Vladimiro­ vich, apparently took Vladimir’s place as court treasurer and also became a boyar.129 This succession is unusual in comparison with the order of succession in military clans, which was that elder sons preceded younger sons as boyar (see Chapter 2). It suggests how different the Khovrin family was. Furthermore, no member of the clan was a boyar after Dmitrii, although the family retained its treasurer rank. The clan remained actively involved in court politics in the sixteenth century; marriage linked it with the Shuiskii, Khabarov, Pronskii, Iur’ev, and other boyar families.130 But its place was not secure; from the 1510’s to the 1550’s members of the two branches of the clan, the Khovriny and the Goloviny, joined boyars’ political factions, principally allying with the Shuiskie.131 But they did not have “place” in court politics as members of a hereditary boyar or okol’nichii family. In the late 1550’s, members of the Khovriny and Goloviny were again given rank at court as okoPnichie, but only after they had moved from the family’s traditional occupation of financier to serve in the military.132 This change in status, and the Khovrin clan’s mixed history of service at court, show that, by and large, rank at court was limited to men descended from military families of the fourteenth century and from later military immigrants. Even when the merchant class was formally organized into the gost’ and lesser corporations in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, its members did not receive place in court politics or decision-making power. They were accorded the fringe benefits of political power: they could own populated land as service land grants or patrimonies, and they used the same judicial body in the Kremlin that boyars did. But they had no politi-

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The Formative Fourteenth Century

cal status, their names were not entered in genealogical books, they did not participate in precedence disputes, and they did not advise in grandprincely deliberations.133 Scribes, financiers, and persons occupying nonboyar court posts were part of the broad political system within the framework of which the boyars and grand prince ruled. The role of members of the church hierarchy in politics was quite dif­ ferent, but it was similarly outside the sphere of honor, place, and effec­ tive power. Church hierarchs were, nevertheless, absolutely essential to the functioning of the political system from the fourteenth to the six­ teenth centuries. Although some prelates had at least part-time residences in the Kremlin, the only church hierarch who is consistently mentioned in chronicle and documentary sources as being involved in court politics is the metropolitan. In sources from the fourteenth to the sixteenth cen­ turies, metropolitans are described as accompanying the grand prince when he attended ceremonial occasions, at which they were given a more honored status than the boyars.134 Tales of metropolitans interceding on behalf of disgraced servitors and confronting the grand prince on issues of morality indicate the frequent involvement of the metropolitan in Kremlin activities throughout this period.135Two metropolitans were dis­ missed by court factions in Ivan IV’s minority in 1539 and 1542; Ivan IV himself is alleged to have ordered the murder of Metropolitan Filipp in 1568.136 Metropolitan Makarii is renowned for allegedly influencing the young Ivan IV and for leading a movement of church reform.137 Because of such involvements, historians have considered the metro­ politan an active force in political decision making. Prelates —virtual boyars in religious garb —are said to have represented the clans from which they descended, or to have acted as spokesmen for the church’s economic interests or for political factions.138 The implicit model is premodern Western Europe, where powerful political families placed a son in the church to tap the profits of, and gain the political access assured to, bishops and cardinals. But in Muscovy, only rarely had a metropolitan or bishop descended from a family so important that this argument might be made. As a rule, men from boyar clans from the fourteenth to the six­ teenth centuries seldom pursued a religious vocation; they did so only when under duress or near the ends of their lives. For example, of 81 members of the Vel’iaminov-Vorontsov clan named in genealogical books in the mid-sixteenth century, only one was a member of an ecclesiastical order. None of the 56 members of the Zernov-Saburov clan recorded by the mid-sixteenth century is mentioned as being a monk.139 Metropolitan Aleksii of the Biakont clan in the late fourteenth century and Bishop Vas’ian Obolenskii of Tver’ in the late fifteenth century are the only boyar descendants who were recorded as being hierarchs in this period.140 Simi-

The Formative Fourteenth Century

51

larly, no mention is made of boyar family men becoming secular priests. The reason for these patterns is not difficult to determine. Sovereigns and boyars relied on marriage, patronage, and kinship to construct alliances and create stability, and churchmen could not become fully involved in such a political game.141 Being celibate (celibacy was required of monks and church hierarchs, but discouraged with regard to priests), they had no kinsmen to marry off for the purpose of forming political alliances.142 For a man of a boyar clan to become a cleric was a dead end; it is not surprising that so few clerics are known to have descended from boyar clans. Nor was the church a politically powerful institution. The metropolitan did not have the support of public opinion, rallied by a network of re­ sponsive bishops, priests, and parishioners. By all accounts, not even in the seventeenth century did the Muscovite church have an institutional network whose components were sufficiently organized to give the metro­ politan secular political backing.143If a metropolitan was involved in poli­ tics, he was not involved in the same way as the boyars. Like others ex­ cluded from court politics, he did not have the power to make decisions, and he did not participate in the competition for “place” that was the essence of court politics. Nor did he have a political “place” to defend in precedence disputes. But he had a different sort of power, since he pos­ sessed a symbolic importance that added stability to court politics. One of his political roles was sacramental. Moscow’s elite used marriage to confirm political ties, and the grand prince’s marriage was the linchpin of the political world. The metropolitan, by presiding at the grand prince’s marriage, as well as at those of important boyar families, in essence ratified political settlements. Another of the metropolitan’s political roles was moral. Without a met­ ropolitan the political order would have been incomplete. He symbolized the blessing of God on the community ruled by the grand prince and his men; that community was composed of the sovereign, who brought God’s justice to the people; the boyars, who advised the sovereign; and the people.144 In ideal conceptions of Moscow’s political order, the metro­ politan helped the sovereign rule justly by giving him good advice; he also demonstrated Muscovy’s link with the divine in his performance of the liturgy, in which prayers for the grand prince, his family, and his prede­ cessors occur frequently. Court ceremonies led by the metropolitan — coronations, royal weddings, pilgrimages, public processions, and funer­ als-w ere dramas that demonstrated God’s blessing on the Daniilovichi. In performing canonizations and in sponsoring chronicle writing, the metropolitan established a historical heritage for the fledgling court. Even a foreigner perceived his symbolic importance. Reinhold Heiden-

5г

The Formative Fourteenth Century

stein noted, “The metropolitan does not belong to the [sovereign’s] coun­ cil, but sometimes the sovereign also calls on his advice, in part to win greater loyalty from the people, in part to show at least the appearance of heeding him.” 145 Without a metropolitan the Muscovite court would have lacked the symbolic justification of its power. The metropolitan’s responsibility to advise the ruler well and to con­ front him when he committed evil is stressed in early-seventeenth-century narrative sources on politics.146 In filling this traditional role, he served the court as a mediator in times of conflict and violence.147In the fifteenthcentury dynastic war, for example, a bishop, in the absence of a metro­ politan, interceded for both sides. During Ivan’s minority, a boyar asked the metropolitan for forgiveness for his brother who had fled Muscovy some years before. The metropolitan is depicted in several fifteenthand sixteenth-century chronicles as interceding for mercy for the grand prince’s imprisoned brothers or for disgraced boyars.148 In this role the metropolitan —like the grand prince - stood above court politics. Because the metropolitan’s presence at court was important in legiti­ mizing a theocratically envisioned state, it is not surprising that the Mus­ covite grand princes and the Lithuanian grand dukes vied persistently in the fourteenth century, seeking to place the metropolitan of all Rus’ in their realm.149 The same desire to capitalize on the metropolitan’s legiti­ mizing role explains his prominence in court affairs. When the sovereign was embarking on a campaign, for example, the metropolitan exhorted him to defend God’s cause; the sovereign in turn advised the boyars he was leaving behind to seek advice from the metropolitan in all matters.150 Particularly when the sovereign was incapacitated, the metropolitan was accorded (at least in theory, and in documents written by churchmen) the right to oversee political affairs. He was not, however, given real power. During Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi’s minority and youth, for example, Metropolitan Aleksii oversaw the taking of oaths (a Christian rite which involved kissing the cross); but he was not recorded as signing land char­ ters or performing other actions pertaining to secular or military affairs. Those were the province of the boyars.151 This pattern of metropoli­ tans’ performing mainly moral or religious duties was repeated by later metropolitans as well.152The boyars by and large did not honor the met­ ropolitan as a fellow adviser, and at various times when they were in power they cheated metropolitans, publicly humiliated them, and de­ posed them. For example, in the fifteenth-century dynastic war, Prince Dmitrii Shemiaka took advantage of the ranking church hierarch: he sent Bishop Iona to the opposition camp to fetch the sons of his captive. Grand Prince Vasilii II. Shemiaka, having promised to protect the boys, promptly imprisoned them and betrayed his promise to the bishop. In the

The Formative Fourteenth Century

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1540’s a metropolitan denounced the Shuiskii faction for excluding him from decision making, and for his outspokenness he was sacked.153 Be­ cause of the boyars’ exclusion of the metropolitan from decision making, we must assume that the metropolitan’s political significance lay in his symbolic role and his legitimizing function. In exercising their moral responsibility, metropolitans could and did intervene in political matters, which explains their frequent involvement in court crises. In chronicles metropolitans are described as confronting the grand prince over moral matters, as Metropolitan Filipp did when criticizing Ivan IV’s rapacity.154 In some cases the metropolitan’s dismissal during political struggles suggests that he had exasperated the less righ­ teous boyars or grand prince. In other cases, a recalcitrant metropolitan may have been dismissed to facilitate a new marriage alliance that would perpetuate dynastic succession, or to enable ambitious boyars to fulfill their hopes for a dynastic marriage tie. The involvement of a metropoli­ tan in court politics sometimes led to a conflict between the metropoli­ tan’s moral responsibility and the boyars’ political interests: the metro­ politan’s objections to the often bloody political struggles among boyar factions could have revealed the new leaders as illegitimate. By deposing a metropolitan, winning factions could discredit him; the new spiritual leader whom they appointed would then confirm God’s blessing on their rule. In one chronicle’s description of the dismissal of Metropolitan Daniil in 1539, he is accused of being malicious and corrupt. The chronicle was apparently supporting such a boyar faction, for the charge is uncorrobo­ rated by other sources.155This example suggests the symbolic importance of the metropolitan in maintaining the rectitude of the Kremlin political order. In sum, the metropolitan complemented the roles of the grand princes and boyars at court. His mediation smoothed political relations, and his benedictions on boyar and grand-princely marriages were considered ratifications of political alliances. Symbolically, the metropolitan held the political world together; were it not for his link with the divine, the sover­ eign’s rule would be a mere exercise of worldly power. The metropolitan unified the Muscovite political order by providing ceremonial opportuni­ ties for the godly community to gather together. The dividing line is sharp between the military elite and nonmilitary hierarchs and functionaries. The names of nonmilitary men were not re­ corded in genealogical books; the old-style cavalry was maintained as the privileged stratum even when new-style regiments gained prominence in the reformed seventeenth-century army. In Moscow’s early centuries, scribes, merchants, and church hierarchs did not have political honor or hereditary status at court. Scribes and church hierarchs played necessary

54

The Formative Fourteenth Century

roles at court, but in spheres separate from that of the boyars. Such a separation of roles grew out of the circumstances of the fourteenth cen­ tury. Muscovy at that time was a rustic military encampment consisting of the warrior chieftain and his men. Military service was the first prere­ quisite to gaining political power, and well into the seventeenth century the political elite was distinguished precisely by a comradely spirit and self-image that derived from that origin. Moscow’s leaders excluded new (noncavalry) military forces from owning land, from tax privileges, and from the institution of precedence. In the seventeenth century, because the cavalry was being antiquated by the use of infantry and artillery on the model of Western Europe, the boyars engaged in one last fling in cavalry-style luxury: they bought jewel-encrusted saddles, scabbards, gauntlets, ivory-inlaid pistols, and other finery.156These may seem useless baubles to us, but in a boyar’s eyes they had real purpose —they represented the historical justification of his power and privilege. Men who performed services for the court leader­ ship and hierarchs who brought the blessing of God to the Kremlin were necessary elements of the political order, but until well into the sixteenth century only military men had effective power. During the formative fourteenth century, the grand prince and the boyar elite sought a set of basic principles that would satisfy their com­ mon need for political stability and their families’ desire for power. They found these principles in the matrix of kinship and personal relations. To preserve the relations among families that were established in the four­ teenth century, boyars and sovereign chose heredity. As the basis for a hierarchy of status, they used marriage. And as the basis for forming po­ litical groups, they used kinship, marriage, and patronage. It is to the ap­ plication of these principles of court politics in the fourteenth and fif­ teenth centuries that we now turn.

Ф CHAPTER 2 Ф

Becoming a Boyar

O nce they had c o n q u er ed a lucrative territory, the grand prince and his boyars faced the problem of maintaining territorial control. Ad­ ministrative stability required internal peace: territorial administration could be maintained only if stable leadership from the center were as­ sured and if political leaders avoided internecine conflict. This require­ ment was consistent with the boyars’ ambitions to preserve their power and status and to pass them on to their descendants. The court was thus faced with the problem of maintaining continuity and power. In this chapter and the next we shall consider the subject of continuity by exam­ ining how the grand prince and the elite determined who would become a boyar.

How men became boyars at the Muscovite court is not a question to which historians devoted much attention until about the 1970’s. Most prerevolutionary scholars, more interested in the institutions of Musco­ vite government, assumed that the sovereign personally chose his boyars.1 Those historians who explored the question directly conceived the boyar’s role as one that required experience and expertise, and they tried to dis­ cern the career patterns that ensured attainment of this rank. Kliuchevskii, for example, aware of the increasing size of Ivan Ill’s court, suggested that servitors earned boyar rank by being promoted through a military or ad­ ministrative hierarchy of ranks. But he also stressed the tenacity of aristo­ cratic families in the boyar council and the ultimate importance of grandprincely favor.2 S. B. Veselovskii also offered this tripartite explanation. He wavered between describing boyar rank as a hereditary right of some families and as an office earned through service or bestowed by favor: “Heritage in the service class (sluzhebnaia rodovitost') generally did not guarantee to every do-nothing an advantageous service position; it opened doors for him. . . . It is obvious that precedence rankings of indi­ viduals generally did not hinder the prince from choosing the talented men that he required.” 3 A. A. Zimin similarly suggested various consid­ erations that influenced advancement to boyar rank, including service,

56

Becoming a Boyar

family heritage, the grand prince’s favor, and even obstruction by aristo­ cratic or gentry classes, but he emphasized most strongly advancement through hierarchical service ranks.4 Using records of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Gustave Alef has tried to establish how long men spent in their “apprenticeship,” ascending the cursus honorum to earn their “boyar’s hat.” Recognizing that numerous factors-m erit, ser­ vice, kinship, and favor-determined boyar succession, Alef ultimately ar­ gues that the grand prince controlled advancement to boyar rank in order to weaken or bolster certain classes at court.5 Ann Kleimola follows the Kliuchevskiian lead of examining career patterns, but she ultimately con­ cludes that attainment of boyar rank was the combined result of service, connections, kinship, patronage, and “luck.” 6 This approach —emphasizing the mandatory nature of service, the ad­ vantages of birth, the importance of the grand prince’s prerogative, and the utility of political networks or class affiliation - establishes important conditions that affected a man’s status at court. But in addition the re­ search for the present study has revealed an underlying regularity in boyar succession traceable to family and heredity, an idea suggested by Kliuchevskii’s definition of the “genealogical layers” of the “Boyar Duma.” Fundamentally, men became boyars because they were bom into heredi­ tary boyar families and lived to inherit that rank at court. Various com­ plications could arise, however. New families could be welcomed into the elite, and a man’s age and mortality in his family determined whether and when he would actually inherit the rank. The “inner circle” consisting of boyars and grand prince frequently manipulated advancement to suit its goals. Rifts within families complicated succession, and political struggles could obstruct boyar advancement. Finally, a dynamic grand prince or a powerful boyar could try to ignore the rules of succession, even though the regularization of such rules provided a basic stability at court. The generalizations offered in this chapter are based on a study of the family histories of all men identifiable as boyars from the 1340’s to 1555; those histories are detailed in Appendix 2. The rules of succession are de­ scribed here, as well as the few exceptions that prove that the overwhelm­ ing majority of men who became boyars did so because they were the men next in line in their family’s succession system. But first let us turn to the numerous indications in Muscovite sources of the importance of family in politics. Muscovite sources are full of references to the family in politics and society. It is striking, for example, that the grand prince’s court compiled genealogical books as frequently and as assiduously as it compiled rec­ ords of men’s military service. Both recordkeeping processes started at about the same time in the late fifteenth century.7 Genealogical books

Becoming a Boyar

57

were not heraldic family histories, but terse litanies of family members. They were used in precedence litigations initiated to protect family honor. A comparison of Muscovite genealogical books with West European ge­ nealogical records reveals that the two served similar purposes. Georges Duby has suggested that families in early medieval Europe began to keep records of their ancestry when benefits could be derived from the ability to prove ancient lineage.8 In Europe, landholding rights and position were protected by proof of family heritage; in Muscovy, such proof safe­ guarded place in the political elite, on which landholding rights and high status were based. But most of the genealogical traditions of Muscovy and early Western Europe were radically different. In early modern Poland, which shared some West European aristocratic customs, fanciful genealogies were gen­ erally compiled by the noble families themselves. They often suggested implausible ancestral links with antiquity or linked families in kinship relationships that were certainly fictive.9 In sixteenth-century Europe, seventeenth-century Poland, and Catherine the Great’s Russia, men often used noble family records illegitimately to enter the nobility and gain so­ cial privileges, but such records did not necessarily pave the way to politi­ cal office. In Muscovy, genealogical books were not so fanciful, perhaps because they were official records. It is true that brief references to fictional an­ cestors were added to various editions of the books in the sixteenth cen­ tury. Such legends were intended to enhance a family’s status in the chang­ ing elite in the early sixteenth century, but they were not credited in precedence disputes and were omitted from both the earliest and the “official” redactions.10 Muscovy’s more straightforward genealogical tra­ dition reflects the more practical utility of the family in politics. Elite families in Muscovy also presented themselves differently than did families belonging to European nobilities. Muscovite families used vir­ tually no heraldic insignia or family crests; birthright alone justified boyar honor, and heraldry was unnecessary. But in the West these were used as proof of nobility, and new families could be brought into the no­ bility if they were recorded under such shields. Of equal significance is that Muscovite elite families lacked the chivalric code and heroic tra­ dition of military exploits characteristic of other nobilities originally founded on military service. Muscovite tales of military heroism are rela­ tively rare.11The quality of a man’s military service does not seem to have been as important as the fact that he was born into the exclusive circle of military families-the so-called rodovityi clans-whose members were recorded in genealogical books. Family and kinship were important ordering principles in Muscovite

58

Becoming a Boyar

society as well as in Muscovite politics. Laws protected the untaxed popu­ lace-clerics, cavalrymen, merchants —from insult to the family honor (besehest*e). Mentioned in the 1550 Law Code (Sudebnik), such laws be­ came increasingly detailed by the time of the Law Code ( Ulozhenie) of 1649: its chapter ten contains 80 articles concerning dishonor penalties.12 In addition, within a certain time after the sale, family members had pri­ ority in repurchasing patrimonial (votchina) lands alienated by their kinsmen; this right was called rodovoi vykup.u Muscovites (the elite at least) also practiced what historians of West European societies have termed “ancestor reverence”: they donated money and land to monas­ teries in memory of deceased relatives, and they had the names of their family members inscribed in memorial registers in the monasteries they patronized.14In Muscovy as in the West, men called upon kinsmen to wit­ ness documents or to execute their wills.15 Family was also used as an organizing principle in elites beyond the Kremlin court. For example, the protocols of the “Hundred Chapters” (Stoglav) Church Council and a 1551 decree stipulated that a deceased village priest should be replaced by a man belonging to the same clan (rod); similarly, if one of the metropolitan’s boyars fell into disgrace for a serious offense, he was to be replaced by a man from the same clan.16 In military organizations heritage could have been an organizing principle. The mid-sixteenth-century “Book of a Thousand” (Tysiachnaia kniga) used two categories to classify cavalrymen: regional affiliation and family background.17The Law Code of 1649 allowed kinsmen to take over a dis­ abled or deceased man’s service land grant.18 In general, heredity main­ tained social distinctions. There was little mobility between traditional occupational and social groups (peasants and urban taxpayers); dynasties sometimes developed within such groups as merchants and scribes.19 Even some lesser court positions were hereditary.20 Several historians have argued that such political ranks as boyar and thousandman were he­ reditary in Kiev Rus’.21 S. B. Veselovskii argued strongly that court service in Muscovy was hereditary, although he did not extend the argument to include boyar rank.22 Muscovy’s sources reveal again and again the sig­ nificance of family in the ordering of society and politics. Many of these customs have equivalents in Western Europe, but politi­ cal relationships there were not determined primarily by family ties, as they were in Muscovy. Heredity served the purposes of Moscow’s fourteenth-century elite when it was faced with the challenge of per­ petuating its power. Merit and favor could have been other bases of politi­ cal recruitment, but they require a large pool of qualified talent, which apparently did not exist in the fourteenth century. As has been men­ tioned, Muscovite sovereigns in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries re-

Becoming a Boyar

59

lied upon private landholders for the performance of most local govern­ mental responsibilities, an indication that administrative personnel were lacking. The grand prince’s own retinue, the dvor, apparently did not be­ come sufficiently large to constitute such a pool until the sixteenth cen­ tury.23 Hereditary succession among the political elite provided a contin­ uous supply of men and gave them a stake in the Muscovite governmental enterprise. What had begun as a response to the challenges facing the court in the fourteenth century gradually became established tradition. Boyar clan histories provide proof that boyar rank passed hereditarily. In the remainder of this chapter we shall analyze the principles that regu­ lated hereditary succession. These “rules of the game” 24 were not based solely on primogeniture; they were altered by mortality and tradition.

Collateral Succession Once a man became a boyar, his descendants inherited eligibility for that rank. New families joined the boyar elite after a core of families had coalesced in the fourteenth century (see Chapter 1). Patterns of such inte­ gration are discussed in Chapter 3. Boyar rank also became hereditary for the new families’ descendants. Boyar families and their descendants con­ stituted the highest stratum of the Muscovite servitor elite and were the ones recorded in genealogical books. Because of customs (to be described later in this chapter) that limited the line of boyar descent, most lineages descending from a boyar clan progenitor eventually lost eligibility for boyar rank. Thus, of the large number of clans recorded in genealogical books, only a few lines enjoyed boyar status; the rest served in lesser leadership posts, eventually forming the “Moscow dvoriane.” 25 Customs within families determined whether a lineage would be eli­ gible for boyar rank and established the requirements for such eligibility. An unusual feature of this succession system was that boyar clans were patrilineal. This principle is graphically illustrated in genealogical books, which record linear descendants of male members of the clan but not de­ scendants of female clan members. Married women joined their hus­ band’s kin group, but women, whether married or unmarried, could not inherit movable property except in the absence of male heirs. The resi­ dence of married couples was as a rule patrilocal. Only men could inherit their family’s land; similarly, only men in the highest families could in­ herit boyar rank. The military elite from which boyars derived, different from the East Slavic peasantry in so many ways, may also have been unique in Mus­ covite society in that it observed patrilinearity, and for good reason: patrilinearity defines a stable group of ancestors and thus allows family

6o

Becoming a Boyar

property to be preserved over generations. Paul Friedrich’s work on Rus­ sian kinship terminology shows that the East Slavs traditionally utilized a bilateral kinship system, in which persons on both sides of the family constituted an individual’s reference group, and both men and women in­ herited movable property.26 Bilaterality does not create enduring family groups over time, since the kinship group is redefined in each generation. Scholars have linked patrilinearity with a heightened sense of family soli­ darity: West European elites adopted patrilinearity, according to David Herlihy and Georges Duby, in search of ways to preserve the regional authority and land they had acquired with the decline of Carolingian centralization.27 Elite patrilinearity is evident in the grand-princely succession in Kiev Rus’.28 This coincidence in the political customs of Kiev and Muscovy likely reflects a direct historical connection: Kiev bequeathed to Moscow a dynasty (although its princely politics subsequently developed accord­ ing to Moscow’s particular circumstances). Moscow’s rulers and elite also adopted from Kiev Rus’ the system of collateral political succession. In Kiev Rus’, members of the Riurikid dynasty succeeded each other collaterally, that is, the grand-princely title was passed across all eligible lineages in each generation and then passed to the next generation. This differs both from a linear system, in which the grand prince’s title or boyar’s rank passed from father to son, and from a lateral system, in which titles and ranks passed laterally within a single family but not across all branches in one generation of an extended clan. The Riurikid clan possibly adopted the practice of collateral political succession from their Khazar or Bulgar partners in trade and politics; it was used in Turkic steppe empires.29 The Riurikids of Kiev paired collateral succes­ sion with the practice of having princes rule a hierarchical succession of territories, each a stepping-stone to the grand-princely throne. This prac­ tice was abandoned at the end of the eleventh century, but collateral suc­ cession was retained. This “staircase” succession system enabled the Riurikid princes to rule a broad economic and political realm and at the same time to keep their many members committed to the dynasty’s unity. Collateral succession offered the same advantages to boyar clans in Muscovy: it allowed all members of the boyar line to share in the kinship group’s political fortunes and exerted a stabilizing and unifying force on the elite as a whole. It also offered greater flexibility than Kiev’s sovereign Riurikids could enjoy. Since there could be only one grand prince of Kiev, tensions were great among heirs impatient to assume the throne. But Muscovite boyar clans could circumvent the limitations of collaterality by making several members boyars simultaneously. Succession within some of the largest and oldest of Moscow’s boyar

Becoming a Boyar

61

clans provides a good example of such an inheritance pattern. The Veliaminov clan passed the rank laterally to each of three brothers in its second generation (see Figure i). The first historically attested clan mem­ ber, Vasilii Protas’evich, had died by 1356. Lacking brothers, he passed on his boyar’s position, and his thousandman’s position as well, to his el­ dest son, Vasilii Vasil’evich, who held these positions until his death in 1373.30Vasilii Vasil’evich’s brother Fedor Voronets was a boyar during his brother’s lifetime, which was not unusual in such an important family; Fedor apparently predeceased his brother Vasilii. In 1375, after the deaths of both elder brothers, the third brother, Timofei, inherited the boyar position.31 Their youngest brother, Iurii Grunka, apparently died before his turn came.32 In the Akinfovich clan, five of eight members in the first attested gen­ eration inherited boyar status in the second half of the fourteenth century (see Figure 2). Fedor Sviblo, the first historically attested clan boyar, is mentioned as such in the 1370’s; he served through the 1390’s. Sviblo was joined at court by his two next younger brothers, Ivan Khromoi and Aleksandr Ostei, in the 1380’s. Neither is mentioned after this decade, and presumably they died by the end of the century.33 Of the other broth­ ers in this generation, Ivan Zelen’, Fedor Korela, and Andrei Slizen’ are mentioned only in genealogical sources and were presumably not boyars. Ivan Buturlia was possibly a boyar in the first decade of the fifteenth cen­ tury. After the death of Aleksandr Ostei around 1390, only Ivan Buturlia was alive to assume the family’s position at court. The youngest brother in the generation, Mikhail Cheliadnia, is mentioned as a boyar from at least 1417 to 1423, probably after Buturlia’s death.34 The Akinfovich and Vel’iaminov families show distinctive collaterality in their political succession. One reason that collateral succession functioned so smoothly is that its rules were kept simple. We can readily see how complicated this practice might otherwise have become, and how vexing it might have been for am­ bitious younger men in the family to wait, as generations proliferated and the collateral lines of the clan extended seemingly endlessly. Mortality, however, simplified collateral succession by decreasing the number of men eligible to inherit political position. Clans or branches within clans regu­ larly died out, simplifying the problems of family inheritance. A related practice, based on the exclusionary principle, further re­ stricted the number of eligible heirs both in Kiev and in Muscovy.35 According to the exclusionary principle, a man was prevented from suc­ ceeding to a political position if his father had not also held that position. In Kiev, this meant that men whose fathers did not live to inherit the posi­ tion of grand prince could themselves never assume that position. They

( 1) V A S I L I I P R O T A S ’E V I C H

(2) VASILII

(3) FEDOR “ V oronets ”

(4) TIMOFEI

Iurii“Grunka”

( “V orontsov lin e”)

Ivan I non-boyar line

Mikula d.

Poluekht d.

Andrei

(5) SEMEN d.

(5/1) IVAN

I

I

VePiamin (“ Vel’iam inov line”)

(6) NIKITA Fedor

Ivan

Aleksei

I

I

.______I______, I I Vasilii Ivan

(1) SEMEN

non-boyar line

non-boyar line (2) MIKHAIL

1 Vasilii d.

Dmitrii

(3) OkoL/B IVAN d. non-boyar line

1

1 (5) HURII (6) IVAN d. d.

(4) FEDOR

(1) Okol. IVAN “Shchadra” I

1

1 1 Ivan (7) VASILII d. d.

1 Vasilii d.

Ivan “Sukhoi” d.

Ivan “Obliaz”

Konstantin

1

non-boyar line

non-boyar line

1

1 Afanasii d.

Fig. I. The VelTaminov Clan with Vorontsov and VelTaminov Lines. Capital letters show high court rank: “Okol.” indicates an okol’nichii; “OkoL/B” indicates an okol’nichii who subsequently became a boyar; capital letters without preceding abbreviations indicate a boyar. The numbers preceding capitalized names indicate the order of the man’s succession in his clan. The abbreviation “d.” below a name indicates that a man died without surviving male descendants. For documentation of all figures, see Appendix z.

Andrei Ivanovich “Akinfov”

I (1) FEDOR “Sviblo”

I

I

(2/1) IVAN “K h ro m o i”

(3) ALEKSANDR " O stei”

I

( “K hrom oi line”

Ivan “Zelen” d.

(4) IVAN “Buturlia”

Andrei “Slizen” ’

("B uturlin line”)

I

(3) ROMAN “Khromogo” d.

Ivan I

Iurii d.

dau. m. F. I. Saburov

non-boyar line

(4) FEDOR

(5) Okol./B GRIGORII “Davydov” d.

(5) IVAN

(6) Okol. PETR “Davydov”

1 1

(7) IVAN “Fedorov” d.

"Cheliadnia”

( "Cheliadnin line”)

I------Г

I (6/2) DAVYD

(5/1) MIKHAIL

non-boyar line

(See Fig. 6)

Semen d.

Fedor “Korela” d.

Ivan d.

Vasilii d.

(6/2) FEDOR

(3) PETR d.

(4) ANDREI

Vasilii d.

Mariia m. Prince S. D. Kholmskii

1 (6) IVAN d.

Ma riia Мгirfa m. m. Prince I. O. Prince D. F. Bel’skii Dorogobuzhskii

Fig. 2. The Akinfovich Clan with Khromoi, Buturlin, and Cheliadnin Lines. Capital letters show high court rank. “Okol.” indicates an okol’nichii; “Okol./B” indicates an okoFnichii who subsequently became a boyar; capital letters without preceding abbreviations indicate a boyar. The numbers preceding capitalized names indicate the order of the man’s succession in his clan. The abbreviation “d.” below a name indicates that a man died without surviving male descendants; the abbreviation “dau.” indicates a daughter whose first name is not known.

64

Becoming a Boyar

sometimes did so, nevertheless, but the result of such illegitimate claims was internecine war. The same principle regulated succession in Mos­ cow’s boyar clans: unless a man actually succeeded to boyar position, his male descendants had no right to claim the family boyar position at court. A few did, as we shall see later in this chapter, but they were rare exceptions. In practice, the stricture resulted in differentiation among kinsmen. As the descendants of a fourteenth-century founding boyar in­ creased, those of some lineages retained their right to be boyars by virtue of direct descent from a boyar, whereas those of other lines were relegated to lesser military service because some ancestor had not lived to take his place at court. The Veliaminov clan provides an example of mortality and the appli­ cation of the exclusionary principle (see Figure 1). In its second genera­ tion, three lines became excluded from boyar rank. The first was that of Iurii Grunka, who presumably had died before his turn came. His line survived but was excluded. Following Timofei Vasil’evich as boyar around the 1390’s should have been Timofei’s nephew, Ivan Vasil’evich. But Ivan’s line became ineligible for a different reason: Ivan betrayed the grand prince in 1375 and was executed in 1379. “Because of his disgrace Ivan’s sons did not take their place in their clan or in public status.” Ivan’s brothers, Mikula and Poluekht, also contributed to the clan’s attrition, for they had no male descendants.36 Thus, the entire elder line had either died out or been excluded by the turn of the fifteenth century. In the late 1380’s and early 1390’s, boyar rank in the clan went to the next two col­ lateral lines, founded by Fedor Voronets and Timofei Vasil’evich. Their sons, Ivan Fedorovich and Semen Timofeevich, were mentioned as boyars in 1389 and 1382, respectively.37 Because collateral succession meant there could be more than one boyar in a clan, ambitious cousins could gain access to the court simultaneously. But Semen Timofeevich had no sons, so the only remaining eligible line was that of Fedor Voronets. Mor­ tality and the exclusionary principle had decreased this large clan to one line in a half-century. The net effect of these limitations was to make political succession simply lateral, that is, to force the boyar rank to be passed along single lines in a clan, not across lines. As mentioned, mortality and the exclu­ sionary principle limited the number of eligible descendants of the found­ ing boyar. Furthermore, so many men in each eligible line were ambitious to become boyars that clans were frequently splintered into separate lin­ eages. (Anthropologists call this tendency for extended linear clans to break up into more manageable lineages “segmentation.” 38) Muscovite boyar families can therefore be thought of in two ways: as discrete fami­ lies each having one lineage, or as multiple lineages within a putative “clan.” In anthropological literature, the term “clan” is used to describe

Becoming a Boyar

65

the entire group of descendants of a known ancestor, fictional or real, which group keeps alive the memory of that progenitor as a source of group solidarity. In Muscovy, the ancestors of clans were historically at­ tested individuals, and a clan’s membership can easily be traced in ge­ nealogical books. The terms “lineage,” “line,” and “family” refer to the various branches within a clan, each of which has a separate political existence. The formation of separate lineages may be said to have been either ac­ tive or passive. Lineages developed passively as a result of differences in family members’ career patterns, geographical residences, and economic levels, as well as each individual’s need to keep his kinship group of man­ ageable size. By the third generation of a boyar clan new surnames often appeared, indicating division into separate lineages. In the Akinfovich clan, for example, by the 1420’s five surnames represented three boyar and two nonboyar lines (the Khromoi, Cheliadnin, Buturlin, Osteev, and Sliznev lines; see Figure 2). In practice, collateral succession across lin­ eages was maintained only in a clan’s first few generations, or when the clan was so small that separate lineages were not perceived as necessary. In some circumstances active division into lineages was necessary, be­ cause younger, impatient men, apparently during their elder brothers’ lifetimes, declared themselves heads of new lineages and aspired to boyar rank. They took new surnames, further differentiating themselves from the clan. The sons of Mikhail Cheliadnia became boyars immediately fol­ lowing him, presenting themselves as separate lineages to avoid waiting out the careers of many kinsmen senior to them. Other lines followed suit. The Akinfovichi were represented at court by three boyar lineages in the early fifteenth century. The sons of another youngest son, Fedor Koshka of the Kobylin clan, followed him immediately at court; at the same time the three eldest lineages in the Kobylin clan also claimed boyar status. Division was also prompted by worldly success. Representation at court by several boyars of one family simultaneously was generally a sign of that family’s high status in the inner circle, the most trusted counselors to the grand prince. This was true of the Patrikeev clan in the 1480’s and 1490’s, the Shuiskie at the height of their power in the 1540’s, and the Iur’ev line of the Koshkin clan after its Daniilovich marriage in 1547. This would explain the Vel’iaminov clan’s numerous boyars (see Figure 1). In the 1380’s it was represented at court by three boyars: Timofei Vasil’evich, his son Semen Timofeevich, and his nephew Ivan Fedorovich Vorontsov. Since the Vel’iaminov clan was too young to have developed separate lineages, such multiplicity of boyars indicated that it was one of the most powerful boyar clans in the Kremlin in the latter half of the fourteenth century.

66

Becoming a Boyar

The history of the sole remaining line in the VePiaminov clan in the fifteenth century, the Vorontsovy, shows that Muscovite clans used both collateral and linear succession as they expanded and contracted. The Vorontsov line was not a large family in the fifteenth century, perhaps as a result of mortality in war: it had only one surviving heir in each of three successive generations. Ivan Fedorovich passed the boyar position to his son, Nikita, in the 1420’s. With Nikita, the clan temporarily ended its boyar status, since Nikita’s son, Ivan, is mentioned in appanage service in the 1470’s and therefore could not serve as a boyar. But Ivan’s son, Semen Ivanovich, benefited from the fall of the Patrikeevy: in the first decades of the sixteenth century he was made a boyar.39 The two generations of Semen’s descendants were prolific enough to continue collateral succes­ sion among themselves, but in the second generation after Semen Ivanovich, the Vorontsov clan died out. One suspects that if the third gen­ eration had survived, linear divisions might have begun to develop. Semen, who died early in 1522, had four sons. The eldest, Mikhail, became a boyar between 1525 and 1531 and maintained the position and seniority over his brothers through 1536. His brother Dmitrii died at about the same time Mikhail did, leaving an excluded line, and his brother Ivan Semenovich assumed clan seniority and court rank. Ivan en­ tered high court service in 1538 as an okol’nichii, perhaps taking this lesser position because he was probably only in his thirties; he became a boyar between 1540 and 1543. Ivan Semenovich died between 1559 and 1560.40 He was joined as a boyar by his brother Fedor Semenovich be­ tween 1541 and 1544. Apparently Fedor was made a boyar as a mark of favor to the family. When Fedor was executed in 1546 along with his nephew Vasilii Mikhailovich, his own son Vasilii did not succeed him.41 Rather he was succeeded collaterally by Fedor’s eldest nephew, Iurii Mi­ khailovich. Iurii was made a boyar between 1547 and 1552 and was joined at court by his brother Ivan Mikhailovich, an okol’nichii, between 1552 and 1553. Ivan Mikhailovich’s okol’nichii status in this case most likely reflects his relatively inferior ranking in the family, subordinate to the boyar Iurii. By 1560 boyars Ivan Semenovich and Iurii Mikhailovich had died, leaving Ivan Mikhailovich as the only Vorontsov boyar. He died be­ tween 1565 and 1570 and was succeeded only in the mid-1570’s by Vasilii Fedorovich (an okol’nichii), the sole remaining and collateral heir. The Oprichnina may have prevented Vasilii from succeeding sooner, or he may not have been old enough to assume a position at court until then.42 The maintenance of collateral succession by this two-generation line of the Vorontsovy suggests family solidarity, as does the fact that uncle and nephew from opposite ends of the clan, Fedor Semenovich and Vasilii Mikhailovich, were executed together in 1546. Perhaps they were close associates; they may also have been close in age. Similarly, before his exe-

Becoming a Boyar

67

cution, Vasilii Mikhailovich had taken over family affairs by arranging the betrothal of his youngest brother, Ivan. Family solidarity is also suggested by the fact that Ivan Semenovich Vorontsov perhaps acted as a family patriarch to his surviving nephews after 1546; his name is mentioned in proximity to theirs in military assignments. Finally, Vasilii Fedorovich, the last remaining Vorontsov, was executor of the will of his cousin, Ivan Dmitrievich, in 1571/72..43

Collateral Succession and Precedence Norms The development of patrilinear clans suggests the relevance to family formation of the principles of precedence (mestnichestvo) —guidelines for determining seniority among members of clans. Perhaps these principles provide a blueprint for Muscovite political succession. A precedence liti­ gation occurred when a military servitor complained that his service as­ signment insulted his family’s honor and sued to prove it. To support his case, the plaintiff cited instances of his ancestors’ past service with the defendant’s ancestors; he emphasized not the quality of that service but the relative ranks held. The plaintiff then calculated how many places in their clans separated him and his opponent from the ancestors whose ser­ vice had been mentioned. If the plaintiff was more senior in his clan than the defendant was in his, and (or) if the plaintiff’s ancestor had served in a position higher than that held by the defendant’s ancestor, then the plain­ tiff claimed that he should serve in a position higher than that held by the defendant.44 Establishment of precedence necessitated the calculation of a man’s place in his family so that it could be compared accurately with another man’s place in his family. The rule used for such calculation was expressed in this way: “the son of the first brother has long been equal in status to the fourth [brother].” 45 According to this rule, fourth, fifth, and later brothers were considered to have the same rank in the clan as their first, second, and later nephews. In other words, each first son was numbered three ranks or places (mesta) junior to his father, and his younger broth­ ers were one rank apart from each other.46 Many members of a clan in various branches could thus have the same place in relationship to their common progenitor. Figure 3 shows how kinsmen in different branches of a clan might be numbered to indicate these relative rankings. If this were indeed a rule governing boyar succession as well as a method of ranking men in clans, then Muscovite boyar clans would have applied this principle: sons after the fourth son (for example, after son no. 7 in the third generation in Figure 3) would not become boyars. But boyar succes­ sion did not in fact stop with the fourth brother or son; in many in­ stances (such as Mikhail Cheliadnia of the Akinfovich clan and Fedor

68

Becoming a Boyar

Koshka of the Kobylin clan) men ranked fourth, fifth, and lower took their turns as boyars. The four-man ranking principle was apparently not relevant to political succession. What were the sources, then, of the four-man limitation custom? The four-man principle was probably suggested by the typical biological pat­ tem of boyar clans. Mortality decreased the number of men who survived to inherit from their brothers. The exclusionary principle limited the number of eligible lines in the clan, and division into lineages decreased the number of kinsmen vying for one boyar position. Consequently, sel­ dom were more than four eligible brothers of one clan in one lineage alive at one time. In the typical case, boyar rank passed laterally within lin­ eages to the one or two men who survived to take the position, then to the next generation, of which a similarly small number of eligible men survived. The four-man principle found in precedence cases parroted — and probably had its origins in-such biological development. The logic of the four-man principle is indicated by the growth patterns of clans. Men who were ranked the same in a clan according to prece­ dence numbering would have been about the same age and would have had approximately the same experience.47 It is not surprising that am­ bitious coeval kinsmen sought to form independent lineages. Accordingly, when a fourth or later son became the clan’s boyar, that often marked the division of the entire clan. For example, when Fedor Koshka, the fifth and last brother of the first generation of his clan, became a boyar in the last decade of the fourteenth century, those of his nephews who were ranked the same or higher than he in the clan also became boyars. His nephews Ignatii Semenovich, Fedor Aleksandrovich Kolych, and Grigorii Vasil’evich Vanteev are recorded as boyars contemporaneously with Fedor Koshka and as founders of the Ignat’ev, the Kolychev, and the Vanteev lineages.48 Father of Clan Founder

1 2 Clan Founder

4

7

8

3

5

9

10

6

9

10

4

7

11

8

12

Fig. 3 . Genealogical Seniority Rankings.

9

12

13

14

Becoming a Boyar

69

It appears that, as a rule, within three generations boyar clans divided into lineages whose extent was approximately as defined by precedence rules. The precedence rules would seem to have prefigured the statistical occurrence; the fourth brother who survived to take his turn in succes­ sion was a rarity in boyar clans. His age and ranking in his family put him on a par with his eldest nephews. The relatively small family, rather than the large clan, would appear to have been the key kinship group in boyar politics. But if boyars regarded themselves as members of lineages, and did not need the four-man ranking principle to regulate their succession, then what was the purpose of this complex system of comparative rank­ ings? Why did men continue to record themselves in genealogical books as members of large clans? The “clan” and precedence rankings were necessary to maintain social status. A Muscovite servitor had to maintain his identity with his clan, since all servitors claimed their privileged status on the basis of descent from a boyar progenitor.49 And descent from a common progenitor was the source of a man’s honor (chest*). Maintaining a record of that link was the purpose of genealogical books, compilation of which began when oral tradition was no longer sufficient for keeping track of the larger elite. Some precedence litigation may have been initiated in the late fifteenth century, but such suits were brought in significant numbers only from the second quarter of the sixteenth century,50 largely as a result of the growth of clans and the expansion of the elite. Originating in an effort to describe systematically the relationships of families in greatly subdivided clans, precedence ranking calculations in essence approximated reality, since over time large kinship groups divided into small families of about two or three men per generation and lasting only a few generations. The clan, therefore, was important in a Muscovite servitor’s most public presentation of his social status - the public defense of his family honor in precedence litigation. But most likely an individual’s personal loyalty and family economy were centered on his lineage within the clan. The family was small - larger than the modern nuclear family but much smaller than the clans recorded in genealogical books. Examples of groups that probably regarded themselves as families have already been men­ tioned: the founding boyar and first generation of the Vel’iaminov clan, and the two generations of thé Vorontsov clan from the 15 20’s through the 1560’s. Legal sources support the conclusion that Muscovite elite families were small and patrilineal. In the mid-sixteenth century, laws regulating the in­ heritance of landed property allowed kinsmen to leave their land only to sons, brothers, and grandsons.51 The Law Code of 1649 stated that “chil­ dren, brothers, nephews, or grandsons” could inherit a disabled or de­ ceased servitor’s obligations and service lands.52In practice, men left their

70

Becoming a Boyar

land and goods only to kinsmen to the fourth degree, that is, the circle bounded by grandsons. Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev in ca. 1499 be­ queathed some of his property linearly to his two sons and left the re­ maining portion to his wife. He could have left property to his orphaned nephews but he did not. Patrikeev did, however, name his son-in-law as one of the executors and his wife’s brothers as witnesses to his will. Petr Mikhailovich Pleshcheev, who died around 1510, also had numer­ ous collateral relations but left all of his property to his three sons. Like Patrikeev, he chose a kinsman, his elder brother’s son, as his executor.53 That the family, the key unit, was bounded by the third generation may also be implied by Russian Orthodox law, which prohibited marriage within the kinship group bounded by great-grandsons (that is, kinsmen to the sixth or seventh degree). It is also suggested by Iu. N. Mel’nikov’s finding that litigants in precedence cases almost exclusively used ex­ amples from the service of their immediate families —brothers, father, grandfather-in defense of their honor, even though they claimed to be defending the honor of their entire clan.54 Lateral kinsmen may not have regularly enjoyed inheritance rights, but as the wills just mentioned indicate, in-laws and collateral kin were con­ sidered members of a man’s personal kinship group. For example, Vasilii Fedorovich Vorontsov participated in the execution of the will of his elder cousin, Ivan Mikhailovich. Many land documents include references to brothers sharing estates or uncles taking care of orphaned nephews and nieces. Widows of collateral kinsmen and married children are also fre­ quently mentioned as sharing a common home with relatives.55 The Mus­ covite elite family most likely included brothers and their children, wid­ owed mothers, and various other relatives, until such time as the large size of each brother’s family or the political success of one group in the line prompted a redefinition of affiliation. Over generations clans divided into changing groups of kinsmen that considered themselves economic units. It is these groups that present themselves as lineages in boyar poli­ tics, and these are the groups whose formation had been suggested by the four-man limitation principle in precedence litigation.

Mortality, Age, and Politics Men who were eligible to become boyars and who lived to robust adulthood generally did become boyars. Heredity and longevity did not always guarantee accession, however. There were sometimes significant intervals between the death of a boyar and the succession of his heir. This may be an accident traceable to the sources, which do not allow us pre­ cisely to reconstruct and date a man’s full service career. More likely, such intervals in clan succession were related to mortality, age, and politics.

Becoming a Boyar

71

Mortality created significant intervals between adult brothers and be­ tween them and their cousins and nephews. This delayed succession since men also had to attain a roughly defined minimum age to assume their family’s boyar position. A political decision by the grand prince and the other boyars could further influence the timing of boyar succession. An understanding of these factors will help us to determine the regularity of collateral succession in clans. True mortality in a clan is not revealed in official Muscovite genealogi­ cal sources. If we relied solely on genealogical books, we would have a distorted idea of how small families were and how close in age their mem­ bers were, for the books tend to list only three or four men in one genera­ tion. Genealogical books were compiled fairly contemporaneously with the families themselves, but they recorded only the clan’s males who lived to at least age twelve.56 If we assume that about half the births in a family were female, and if we assume a mortality rate of about 50 percent, then two brothers who appear to be close in age in genealogical books may actually have been separated by a decade or more. Birth intervals were at least 18 months.57 Thus, the intervals between a boyar’s death and his brother’s or son’s succession may well have been long because the heir was much younger than the brother or father, and he was younger than the accepted age for boyar rank. If and when the heir reached that age, he generally succeeded. The evidence suggests that there was such an age below which men could not become boyars even if they were next in succession. Sources do not specify this age, nor do they reveal sufficient information to allow us to pinpoint it. But the calculations explained in Appendix 1 suggest the following conclusions. Men became boyars anywhere from their late twenties to their late forties, depending upon the eminence of the family, its political fortunes, and the political climate. The most powerful boyars seem to have made their kinsmen boyars at a young age, and they seem to have been able to make more than one family member a boyar or an okol’nichii at a time. Boyars in less powerful families had to wait until they had reached the right age, or more important until the grand prince and other boyars had agreed to let them join their number. Gustave Alef asserts that a man’s “apprenticeship” of service before he achieved boyar rank under Ivan III was about 25 years (about 15 years for okol’nichie), but that the apprenticeship was significantly shorter in the early part of the reign of Ivan IV.58 The difference in the lengths of the apprenticeships under Ivan III and the young Ivan IV reflects the interplay of political forces that controlled access to the position of boyar, particularly the fact that boyar accession was significantly altered by political conflict during Ivan IV’s minority. Politics, then, was the final determinant of the timing of boyar succession.

72

Becoming a Boyar

Political decisions, rather than genealogical continuity, governed the exact time when a man became a boyar after he had reached the right age, and also the choice of new families to enter the elite. Here we shall attempt to ascertain which individuals most likely contributed to the making of such decisions. Since some men became boyars later than their thirties and forties, even though their family’s boyar position might have been vacant for some time, it appears that some force was restricting the admittance of men to the group of boyars. That force would logically have been the grand prince and the other boyars. Scholars have generally given the grand prince pride of place in the decision-making process.59 Certainly the grand prince, if he were an adult and healthy, played an important part in selecting and influencing the political elite. Rulers were active in many aspects of court life. Grand princes are documented as judging court cases, issuing documents, and receiving diplomats.60 But the Daniilovich custom of primogeniture and the realities of power meant that other men had to have been involved, as was discussed in Chapter i. The grand prince and his favorites in the inner circle could act arbitrarily, but they risked provoking defections and violence, since boyars had access to military forces in the form of their own retinues and through their leadership of the centralized army (from Ivan Ill’s reign onward). Certainly the grand prince and the inner circle perceived other boyars as potential enemies, judging by the surety bonds frequently exacted from boyars whose loyalty was questioned.61 Boyars had a direct interest in the addition of new boyars to the court elite, since expansion threatened to change the balance of power among boyars and to diminish the share of benefits received by each boyar. A grand prince and the inner circle might have decided to make a man a boyar, but the decision affected all the boyars and most likely required the acquiescence of all of them. By and large, sources through the mid-sixteenth century do not depict the actual making of boyars, which in itself suggests the intimacy of court politics. In two rare sixteenth-century descriptions of men being ap­ pointed to boyar status during Ivan IV’s minority (1533-47), the boyars themselves are indicated as the appointers. This was admittedy an excep­ tional period. It was exceptional, however, not because the boyars par­ ticipated in the selection of other boyars, which the circumstances just detailed would suggest was the norm, but because it provides a rare op­ portunity to look behind the façade of autocracy at the working of court politics. Moscow’s government as a whole remained quite stable during Ivan IV’s minority, despite bitter court struggles; this too suggests that po­ litical activity during the minority period followed established patterns. The “Brief Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom” reveals that cer-

Becoming a Boyar

73

tain imprisoned boyars were freed in April 1538. The grand prince “set aside his anger at them and allowed them to gaze on his visage [literal translation: let them see his eyes] and favored them by granting them boyardom.” At the time of this event the grand prince was but eight years old, hardly of an age to make such decisions alone. The same chronicle depicts Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii requesting in October 1538 “that the grand prince bestow boyardom on Prince Iurii Golitsyn and okol’nichii rank on Ivan Khabarov.” 62 Each of these prospective boyars was next in his clan’s line of succession. In another chronicle the Shuiskie are said to have deposed the metropolitan in 1539 because he objected when “they awarded boyar rank without his consent.” 63 The power exercised by the boyars in these extraordinary times suggests that even in normal times boyars were involved in decisions concerning the distribution of power. The record of boyar succession also suggests that boyar factions could prevent succession in turbulent times, such as Ivan IV’s minority. Perhaps because political tensions then were so high that boyars could not agree on granting favors to each other’s appointees, the boyars seem collectively to have blocked advancement of eligible men. Of the 20 clans whose se­ nior men became boyars or okol’nichie or that joined the elite from 1526 to 1546, members of 13 of them become boyars or okol’nichie in the course of regular family succession. Of those 13, six (Bel’skii, Khokholek, Kubenskii, Kurbskii, Kurliatev, Karpov) were new families; they joined the elite as a result of the patronage of some family then in power. The other seven families (Cheliadnin, Gorbatyi, Patrikeev, Penkov, Repnin, Shuiskii, Dmitriev) were among the most powerful and prominent of the day. Seven equally important families remained out of office for an inter­ val, although in all but one case (the Iakovlev branch of the Koshkin clan), these families had men who were seemingly eligible for boyar rank. Men in the Serebrianyi, Khabarov, Khromoi, Pleshcheev, Tuchkov, Zabolotskii, and Iur’ev families waited from the decease of their pa­ triarch until at least 1547 for the succession of their next boyar. Once the minority struggles were resolved in 1547, however, the eligible men in all these families were quickly granted boyar status, each in the proper order of succession within his family.64 This pattern of delayed succession suggests that the cooperation among boyars that usually allowed a steady succession of boyars had ceased to exist. Only when the struggles were resolved could agreement again be reached, and almost every clan placed a man at court immediately. This sudden proliferation of boyars suggests the degree to which the timing of boyar accession was linked to political considerations; in this case the grand prince and the dominant boyars used the title to reward political

74

B eco m in g a B o y a r

allies. A similar proliferation after a political crisis occurred in the 1460’s (after the dynastic war) and in the early sixteenth century, after the fall of the Patrikeevy. The effect was to compensate all factions, to integrate new families into the elite, and to restore stability. The boyars’ consent was also required to eliminate a member of the elite. Grand princes could choose to disgrace a boyar, as formulaically depicted by many sources,65 but other boyars had to agree in order to avoid internecine strife. They need not have initially decided on the dis­ grace, but they probably had to have concurred in it. Even in situations as dramatic as the fall of the dominant Patrikeev family in 1499, violent ret­ ribution was avoided. Disgrace was frequent in the Muscovite elite; it substituted for destabilizing vendettas, which were not frequent. The causes of disgrace are sometimes known, such as the treason of Ivan Vasil’evich Vel’iaminov in 1375 and of Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh in 1433. Sources suggest treason as a cause of other disgraces, but circum­ stances suggest that the cause was really the offenders’ destabilizing ambi­ tion for exclusive power. This was probably the cause of the 1499 dis­ grace of Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev and of the 1514 arrest of Prince Mikhail L’vovich Glinskii. Regardless of the particular circumstances that prompted certain disgraces —such as the disgrace of the Khvostov clan in 1356, of the lines of Ivan Vasil’evich Vel’iaminov and Fedor Sviblov in the late fourteenth century, of the Basenok clan in the 1460’s, of the line of Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev in 1499, and of the Kubenskie in 154666—what is significant is that the collectivity of the boyars and grand prince reached a consensus concerning it and thus avoided factional strife. We have no transcripts of such discussions, but the evidence points overwhelmingly to such collective agreement. The Muscovite boyar elite was also faced with the task of renewing its numbers, a task complicated by the expanding pool of applicants that was a consequence of Moscow’s territorial acquisitions in the late fif­ teenth and early sixteenth centuries. Like all elites, it needed new mem­ bers to keep it vigorous, and the integration of some families from newly acquired areas may have seemed desirable. Like all elites based on hered­ ity, it also needed to compensate for members lost as a result of mortality. Here again, boyars can be assumed to have been involved in the making of decisions, simply acquiescing or participating more actively, for the rea­ sons just discussed. In accepting newcomers to the elite, the grand prince and the boyars were free to use criteria as broad as those used when the elite coalesced in the fourteenth century, as discussed in Chapter 1. For a family to be accepted into the elite, it had to offer something the boyars found useful.

Becoming a Boyar

75

Many of the men who became boyars in Moscow in the formative fourteenth century offered military prowess, retinues, and a knowledge of Moscow’s enemies such as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Dmitrii Bobrok of Volhynia, the Gedyminid Patrikeevy) and Tver’ (the Akinfovichi). Such assets later prompted acceptance into the boyar elite of new families that served loyally in the mid-fifteenth-century dynastic war (Obolenskie, Zvenigorodskie, Riapolovskie, Basenkov) and of other princely immi­ grant families in Ivan Ill’s reign. Some of the Shuiskie had been military leaders of Novgorod and Pskov from the 1440’s to the 1490’s, and others were serving Muscovy; as a clan, the Shuiskie joined Muscovite service in the 1470’s. Lesser servitors from excluded lines of boyar clans and from newly acquired areas represented the army leadership corps, whose inclu­ sion in the elite was expedient. Many newcomers to the elite, such as the Belevskii, Odoevskii, and Mezetskii princes, had laid claim to strategic lands on Muscovy’s border with the Grand Duchy; however, they were never made boyars. Some offered status as well as political advantage, since they were descended from sovereign families in their home prin­ cipalities: they included, from Tver’, the Kholmskie; from Iaroslavl’, the Penkovy; from Rostov, the Rostovskie; and from the Grand Duchy, the Bel’skie, Glinskie, and Mstislavskie.67 Practical benefits came when members of new families were accepted into the army and made military leaders, landholders, and semiprivileged “servitor princes” (sluzhilye kniazia). Another level of approval was re­ quired for grand prince and boyars to accept such newcomers as heredi­ tary boyars, however. Heads of immigrant princely families, no matter how eminent, were not immediately made boyars; in almost all cases im­ migrants did not receive boyar rank until they had married into a Mus­ covite family and had produced a native-born (second) generation. Such an interval allowed such clans to establish their place in the elite, demon­ strate their loyalty in military service, and build effective kinship and per­ sonal networks. The Patrikeevy married into the Cheliadnin family and into the ruling dynasty in the first half of the fifteenth century. The pa­ triarch of the Kholmskii family married into the Vsevolozh clan in the 1470’s. A Riapolovskii prince married a Patrikeev princess. The Bel’skii princes married into the Daniilovich dynasty and also intermarried with the Cheliadniny around the turn of the sixteenth century. The Rostovskie and Kubenskie married into appanage lines of the Daniilovichi in the late fifteenth century. And the Khovrin family married into the Shuiskii family in the early sixteenth century. All these families eventually acquired boyar status, often decades after arriving in Muscovy. (Appendix 2 gives these family histories in detail.) Such marriages usually provided a clan with a

j6

Becoming a Boyar TABLE I

Number of Boyars, Selected Years, 1371-1555

Year 1371 1389 1406-7 1433 1462 1490 1512 1525 1533 1555

Number of eligible families

Number of families actually represented

Number of boyars attested 7

10

6

10

7 5

11

6

6

8

9 13

11

13 15 18 27 23 24 46

13 16 9

6

8

5

11

12

40

40

Number of okol’nichie attested 4 9 7 3 15

s o u rc e : See Appendix 2 . n o te : The following lists of boyars and okol’nichie have been compiled on the basis of sources

indicated in Appendix 2 . Individuals listed held the ranks of okol’nichie (where marked okol.) or boyar (unmarked) in the given year; where surnames are listed alone, they indicate families that the sources indicate were eligible but that for some reason did not have a member in either rank in the givenyear. 1 3 7 1 :1. F. Sobaka Fominskii, I. R. Kvashnin, D. M. Minin, D. A. Monastyrev, V. V. Vel’iaminov, T. V. Vel’iaminov, D. M. Volynskii; Akinfovich, Kobylin, Okat’ev, Pleshcheev. 1 3 8 9 : F. A. SvibloAkinfovich, I. A. Khromoi Akinfovich, A. A. Ostei Akinfovich, A. A. Beleutov, I. F. Sobaka Fominskii, I. F. Uda Fominskii, F. A. Koshka Kobylin, S. V. Okat’ev, T. V. Vel’iaminov, I. V. Vorontsov Vel’iaminov, D. M. Volynskii; Minin, Morozov, Pleshcheev. 14 0 6 - 7 : 1. A. Buturlia Akinfovich, I. F. Koshkin, F. F. Goltiai Koshkin, K. D. Sheia Zernov Saburov, Vladimir Daniilovich, 1. D. Vsevolozh; Dobrynskii, Fominskii, Minin, Morozov, Pleshcheev, Vorontsov. 1 4 3 3 : F. M. Cheliadnin, A. K. Dobrynskii, V. I. Sobakin, Z. I. Koshkin, Prince lu. P. Patrikeev, I. D. Vsevolozh; Khromoi, Minin, Morozov, Osteev, Pleshcheev, Saburov, Vorontsov. 1 4 6 2 : F. V. Basenok, F. M. Cheliadnin, V. I. Sobakin Fominskii, Prince V. I. Kosoi Obolenskii, Prince I. V. Striga Obolenskii, Prince I. Iu. Patrikeev, M. B. Pleshcheev, 1.1. Vsevolozh, Prince I. A. Zvenigorodskii; Khromoi, Dobrynskii, Koshkin, Morozov, Osteev, Riapolovskii, Saburov. 1 4 9 0 ; Okol. I. V. Chebotov, A. F. Cheliadnin, V. F. Obrazets Dobrynskii, Prince D. D. Kholmskii, Iakov Z. Koshkin, Iurii Z. Koshkin, G. V. Popleva Morozov, Prince A. V. Obolenskii, Okol. I. V. Oshcherin, Prince I. Iu. Patrikeev, Prince I. V. Bulgak Patrikeev, Prince D. V. Shchenia Patrikeev, A. M. Ple­ shcheev, Okol. P. M. Pleshcheev, Prince S. I. Riapolovskii, V. F. Saburov, Okol. Prince 1.1. Zvenets Zvenigorodskii; Khovrin, Khromoi, Tovarkov, Tuchkov, Zabolotskii. 1 3 1 2 : Okol. M. K. Bezzubtsev, I. A. Cheliadnin, Okol. I. V . Khabar Dobrynskii, G. F. Davydov Khromoi, Okol. P. Ia. Koshkin, Okol. I. G. Morozov, Prince D. V. Shchenia Patrikeev, Prince M. I. Golitsa Patrikeev, Prince I. M. Repnia Repnin, Prince A. V. Rostovskii, Okol. A. V. Saburov, Okol. Prince P. V. Velikii Shestunov, Prince V. V. Shuiskii, Okol. 1.1. Tovarkov, Okol. Prince K. F. Ushatyi, S. I. Vorontsov, Okol. K. G. Zabolotskii; Dmitreev, Iaroslavskii, Penkov, Pleshcheev, Romodanovskii, Strigin-Obolenskii, Telepnev-Obolenskii, Tuchkov, Vel’iaminov, Zhulebin, Zvenigorodskii. г5 2 5 : Okol. 1. V. IGiabar Dobrynskii, Prince В. I. Gorbatyi, Okol. P. Ia. Koshkin, Okol. V. Ia. Koshkin, M. Iu. Koshkin, I. G. Morozov, Okol. V. G. Morozov, Prince M. D. Shcheniatev Patrikeev, Okol. M. A. Pleshcheev, Okol. A. V. Saburov, Prince V. V. Shuiskii, Okol. M. V. Tuchkov; Cheliadnin, Dmitreev, Khromoi, Penkov, Repnin, Rostovskii, Shestunov, Strigin, Telepnev-Obolenskii, Vel’iaminov, Vorontsov, Zabolotskii, Zhulebin, Zvenigorodskii. 1 3 3 3 : Prince D. F. Bel’skii, 1. V. Khabar Dobrynskii, Prince M. V. Gorbatyi, Prince B. 1. Gorbatyi, M. Iu. Koshkin, Okol. I. V. Liatskoi, I. G. Morozov, V. G. Morozov, Okol. Iakov G. Morozov, Okol. Prince I. F. Paletskii, Prince M. D. Shcheniatev Patrikeev, Prince V. V. Shuiskii, Prince I. V. Shuiskii, M. V. Tuchkov, M. S. Vorontsov; Cheliadnin, Dmitreev, Khromoi, Penkov, Pleshcheev, Repnin, Rostovskii, Saburov, Serebrianyi, Strigin-Obolenskii, Telepnev-Obolenskii, Zabolotskii, Zhulebin. 1 5 5 5 : Okol. A. F. Adashev, Okol. V . P. Borisov, Okol. D. A. Chebotov, Okol. I. Ia. Chebotov, Okol.

Becoming a Boyar

77

network of allies who could help to convince the grand prince as well as the other boyars of the desirability of adding a new hereditary boyar family. Patrons can be tentatively identified for some of the 3 5 families whose members attained boyar or okol’nichii rank between the 1520’s and the 1550’s. The Kubenskii and Paletskii princes and the Borisov and Bas­ manov families all joined the elite in this period and are all associated with the important Shuiskii princely clan.68 Men from the Karpov and Nagoi families and the Serebrianyi-Obolenskii princes also became boyars or okol’nichie between the 1520’s and 1555. They participated in grand-princely weddings in 1526 and 1547 which mostly involved the Obolenskii and Glinskii princes and the Iur’ev family, some members of which were perhaps their patrons.69 The sources do not fully explain the choice of one newcomer over other candidates, however. Because age, mortality, and political considerations frequently com­ plicated a man’s succession, the number of boyars at any one time be­ tween the fourteenth and the mid-sixteenth centuries varied widely. Many scholars have claimed that the number of boyars in Muscovy at any one time is indicative of the sovereign’s political policies. Dmitrii Donskoi is said to have begun a “golden age” for boyars because of the large number of boyars recorded in his time; Vasilii III, on the other hand, was said to have preferred the counsel of only a handful of boyars and scribes and thus is described as being autocratic.70 Gustave Alef argues that Ivan III, Vasilii III, and Ivan IV adjusted the number of boyars to reward untitled servitors and to check the influence of the aristocracy.71 The number of boyars was less a function of grand-princely policy than of the personal circumstances of each family, since boyar succession was hereditary. In the fourteenth century, the number of boyars often amounted to three-quarters of the total number of elite clans —certainly a large contingent of boyars (see Table 1). The fluctuation in the number of n o te t o ta b le I (continued)

V. D. Dmitreev, V. I. Khabarov Dobrynskii, Prince M. V. Glinskii, Okol. I. P. Golovin, Prince A. B. Gorbatyi, Prince 1. V. Gorenskii, D. F. Karpov, Prince lu. I. Kashin, Prince F. I. Kashin, 1. P. Fedorov Khromoi, G. Iu. lur’evKoshkin, Z. P. Iakovlev Koshkin, Okol. M. V. Iakovlev Koshkin, D. R. lur’ev Koshkin, V. M. lur’ev Koshkin, Prince D. I. Kurliatev, Okol. A. A. Kvashnin, Prince S. I. Mikulinskii, Okol. V. V. Mo­ rozov, P. V. Morozov, M. Ia. Morozov, Prince I. F. Mstislavskii, Okol. F. M. Nagoi, Prince D. F. Paletskii, Okol. Prince D. F. Paletskii, Prince lu. M. Bulgakov Patrikeev, Prince P. M. Shcheniatev Patrikeev, Prince F. A. Kurakin Patrikeev, Okol. S. D. Peshkov, Okol. D. M. Pleshcheev, A. D. Basmanov Pleshcheev, Prince 1.1. Turuntai Pronskii, Prince lu. 1. Shemakin Pronskii, Prince F. B. Romodanovskii, Prince S. V. Rostovskii, Prince lu. 1. Temkin Rostovskii, Okol. Ia. A. Saltykov, Okol. L. A. Saltykov, Prince V. S. Serebrianyi, Prince P. S. Serebrianyi, V. D. Shein, I. V. Bolshoi Sheremetev, Prince I. M. Shuiskii, Prince F. 1. Skopin Shuiskii, Prince P. 1. Guryi Shuiskii, Prince D. 1. Ersh Telepnev-Obolenskii, V. Iu. Trakhaniotov, I. S. Foka Vorontsov, lu. M. Vorontsov, I. M. Vorontsov, S. K. Zabolotskii; Bel’skii, Kolychev, Kurbskii, Repnin, Tuchkov, Vorotynskii.

78

Becoming a Boyar

boyars can best be explained by the boyars’ family histories rather than by political policy. The grand prince could decide to increase the total number of hereditary boyar families (as well as to disgrace a boyar, form military alliances, and arrange dynastic weddings and alliances). The ad­ dition of new clans to the boyar elite (detailed in Chapter 3) served to integrate new social forces without changing the system of court politics. Accession of the members of an established or newly created hereditary boyar clan gave the elite stability and continuity; custom and politics gave it dynamism. Becoming a boyar was a hereditary right, but the timing of accession depended upon the relative power of the grand prince, the es­ tablished boyars, their kin, and their allies; it also depended upon the ages and mortality of the family members. Many men died before claim­ ing their inheritance and succession passed regularly to the next in line. Between the fourteenth and the mid-sixteenth centuries, 93 families of 59 clans enjoyed boyar or okol’nichii rank; virtually no man in any of these families was bypassed, that is, denied his proper succession. The chrono­ logical evolution of the elite is discussed in Chapter 3 ; the succession in each family and clan is traced in Appendix 2. In the remainder of this chapter we shall examine several boyar family histories that show regu­ larity of succession within clans, and we will analyze the known excep­ tions to the rules of succession.

The System in Practice The Patrikeev family history shows how the possession of power and how age requirements altered succession (see Figure 4). The family was founded in Muscovy in 1408, when Prince Patrikei Narimuntovich emi­ grated from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. His son Prince Iurii is men­ tioned as a boyar by 1417; at Iurii’s death after 1445 succession passed to his son Prince Ivan Iur’evich, first mentioned as a boyar between 1458/ 59 and 1461-62. Prince Iurii’s son Vasilii was never recorded as a boyar and apparently died fairly young, in 1450, but he had children.72 Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev was the most powerful boyar of his day, and he used that power to violate the rules of boyar succession. He had his young nephews made boyars even though their father had not been a boyar and they were therefore technically ineligible for the rank. Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Bulgak (boyar no. 3 in Figure 4) and Prince Daniil Vasil’evich Shchenia (boyar no. 4) are first mentioned in 1457, and are mentioned as having been made boyars between 1470 and 1475, when they were probably only in their late twenties or thirties.73Thus in effect a new boyar lineage was created; the Patrikeev family was represented by many boyars and enjoyed multiple benefits at court.

(1) lURII PATRIKEEVICH

Г Vasilii

(2) IVAN

I

Ivan d.

(3) IVAN

(4) DANIIL

“Bulgak " {“Bulgakov line")

“Shchenia” “Shcheniatev line“)

(6) MIKHAIL “ Golitsa“ ( “Golitsyn line“)

(8) IURII “ BulgakovGolitsyn” I boyar line

Andrei

“Kuraka“ (“Kurakin line“)

(1) FEDOR d.

(2) DMITRII I non-boyar line

(3) PETR I boyar line

(5) VASILII d.

Ivan d.

(7) MIKHAIL

Dmitrii d.

(4) IVAN I non-boyar line

M ikhail d.

(5) GRIGOR1I I non-boyar line

(9) VASILII d.

(10) PETR d.

Evfrosiniia m. Prince 1. F. Bel’skii

Fig. 4. The Patrikeev Princes with Kurakin Line. Capital letters show boyars. The numbers preceding capitalized names indicate the order of the man’s succession in his clan. The abbreviation “d.” below a name indicates that a man died without surviving male descendants.

8o

Becoming a Boyar

Prince Ivan Iur’evich’s abuse of power led to his downfall; he and his immediate family were disgraced in January 1499.74 But the elder Patrikeev line (descended from Prince Vasilii Iur’evich) was not included in the disgrace, and it was able to maintain the clan’s presence at court. Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Bulgak lived until at least 1495, and his brother, Prince Daniil Vasil’evich Shchenia, survived until at least 1514/15. After Prince Ivan Bulgak’s death, his son Prince Mikhail Golitsa (boyar no. 6) claimed a place at court between 1502 and 1509, although his uncle was still a boyar.75This suggests the family’s continued power, since the Golitsyny did not present themselves in politics as a separate lineage at this time. The Patrikeev representation at court decreased in 1514, when Prince Mikhail Golitsa was captured in battle and held as a prisoner in the Grand Duchy. His next younger brother, Prince Andrei Kuraka, was never made a boyar and he died sometime after 1521. Prince Andrei Kuraka failed to inherit the rank because Prince Mikhail Golitsa was still regarded as the family patriarch. The court made every effort to win Prince Mikhail’s release, frequently engaging in negotiations with the Grand Duchy on his behalf. When he was finally released in 1552 (he was probably in his seventies), he was welcomed back to his place as a boyar.76 Nothing but his death, tonsure, or disgrace could have taken boyar status away from him. While Prince Mikhail Ivanovich was being held captive, Prince Mikhail Daniilovich Shcheniatev (boyar no. 7) was the sole clan member at court; he had become a boyar between 1512 and 1513, just before the death of his father, Prince Daniil. Shcheniatev was succeeded collaterally by those in the Golitsyn line, suggesting family solidarity between these two lines. The son of Prince Mikhail Golitsa, Iurii Bulgakov-Golitsyn (boyar no. 8), became a boyar between 1538 and 1540, a rare event in this period of competition at court. When the clan succeeded in placing another boyar at court between 1541 and 1546, it was Prince Iurii’s second cousin, Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich Shcheniatev (boyar no. 9), from the other Patrikeev lineage. Prince Vasilii Shcheniatev died soon thereafter, but he was followed in early 1549 by his brother Petr (boyar no. 10). In the af­ termath of the minority struggles, the Patrikeev clan was represented by two boyars at court simultaneously.77 The intermediate line of these men’s cousins also became boyars in the 1540’s. That line, the Kurakiny, descended from Prince Andrei Ivanovich Bulgakov Kuraka, who had died in the 1520’s without having become a boyar. These new boyars had been patronized by some unidentified fam­ ily-perhaps their own kinsmen, the Golitsyny and Shcheniatevy, or per­ haps the Vorontsovy, with whom they had intermarried.78 The history of the elder line of the Patrikeev clan (descended from Prince Vasilii

Becoming a Boyar

81

Iur’evich) reveals the interplay of politics, power, and kinship. Succession was collateral between the Golitsyn and Shcheniatev lines and was ac­ cording to genealogical ranking. The Patrikeev family’s power, however, allowed it to place several men at court simultaneously and to ignore the exclusionary principle, and it made members of the Kurakin-Patrikeev line attractive candidates for boyar rank. The Patrikeev clan’s manipulation of succession principles to their ad­ vantage was a practice that other families at the pinnacle of power also arrogated to themselves. The Iur’ev family did it in the 1540’s (see Chap­ ter 3 and Appendix 2), as did the Shuiskii family in the 1530’s and 1540’s (see Figure 5). Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii (boyar no. 1 in Figure 5) and his brother Ivan (boyar no. 2) were the Shuiskii clan’s first Muscovite boyars; they had risen to the top of the power hierarchy by 1538.79 As discussed more fully in Chapter 5, by the time Prince Vasilii died in No­ vember 1538, his family was in a position to manipulate court politics to its advantage. Prince Vasilii and his brother Ivan began in the late 1530’s to bring into power other kinsmen from technically excluded lines, inte­ grating them into the Shuiskii succession rather than creating separate lineages. Thus, they ignored the exclusionary principle but maintained collateral succession according to the genealogical ranking in the clan as a whole. In the late 1530’s, Princes Ivan and Andrei Mikhailovichi (boyars nos. 3, 4), who were second cousins of Princes Vasilii and Ivan Vasil’evichi in the elder line (descended from Prince Mikhail Vasil’evich), became boyars. In genealogical rankings the men were approximately equal, and it would seem that succession should have started with the elder line. (Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich ranked eleven, Prince Ivan Vasil’evich ranked thirteen; Prince Ivan Mikhailovich ranked eleven, Prince Andrei Mi­ khailovich ranked twelve - see Figure 5.) But undoubtedly because of their political acumen, Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich and his brother Ivan won the boyar rank first; once in power they opened up opportunities to other members of their clan to attain boyar rank. When Prince Andrei was exe­ cuted in December 1543, the only remaining living male Shuiskie were his son Ivan (boyar no. 7), his brother, Ivan (boyar no. 3), who had no sons, and Prince Ivan Vasil’evich’s son, Prince Petr Guryi (boyar no. 6). Princes Ivan Andreevich and Petr Ivanovich were apparently quite young, judging by the dates when they are first mentioned as being in service.80To main­ tain the clan in power, another Shuiskii line, also technically excluded, was brought into the boyar elite. Prince Fedor Ivanovich Skopin-Shuiskii (boyar no. 5) became a boyar between November 1542 and January 1544; he was a proper choice since he was more senior than the other living Shuiskii men. (He ranked fifteen; Prince Ivan also ranked fifteen

lurii Vasil’evich (i) Grand Prince of Suzdal’-Nizhegorod

Fedor (v)

Vasilii (iv)

Ivan (x) d.

Ivan (xi) d.

Vasilii (viii)

Mikhail (viii)

Vasilii (vii)

Ivan (xii) “S k o p a ’ (“Sko p in -

(3) IVAN (xi) d.

(4) ANDREI (xii)

( 1) VASILII (xi)

Dmitrii

(7) IVAN (xv) d.

Marfa m. Prince I. D. Bel’skii

Ivan (xv) “Gubka” d.

(2) IVAN (xiii)

Shuiskii line”)

(5) FEDOR (xv)

(8) VASILII (xviii)

I non-boyar line

Andrei (xvi) d.

(6) PETR (xvii) “Guryi”

(9) IVAN (xx) I boyar line

Nikita (xxi) d.

Fig. 5 . The Shuiskii Princes. Capital letters show boyars. The numbers preceding capitalized names indicate the order of the

man’s succession in his clan; roman numerals following names indicate the man’s genealogical seniority ranking, as discussed above in Chap. 2 and illustrated above in Fig. 3. The abbreviation “d.” below a name indicates that a man died without surviving male descendants.

Becoming a Boyar

83

but was in a younger line; Prince Petr ranked seventeen —see Figure 5.) Between 1549 and 1550, the rank passed collaterally to Prince Petr Ivano­ vich Guryi (boyar no. 6), son of Prince Ivan Vasil’evich, apparently as soon as he reached the proper age. When Prince Andrei Mikhailovich’s son, Ivan (boyar no. 7), reached the proper age in the 1570’s, he too be­ came a boyar.81 This succession is complex because various Shuiskii lin­ eages joined the clan succession (evidence of Shuiskii family power in the i54o’s). But succession remained collateral; boyar rank passed from se­ nior to junior men in each generation in order of precedence ranking and age. When Prince Petr Guryi became a boyar between 1549 and 1550, his cousin Prince Ivan Andreevich was more senior to him but was much younger. There were few anomalies in boyar succession in the 93 families of the 59 clans that enjoyed status at court from the fourteenth to the mid­ sixteenth centuries. Let us consider the apparent exceptions, which are five in number. Succession in the Rostovskii princely family was slightly irregular. Prince Aleksandr Vladimirovich preceded his elder brother, Prince Dmitrii, as a boyar at the Muscovite court. Aleksandr became a boyar between 1505 and 1505/6; Dmitrii became one between 1506/7 and 1517.82Prince Dmitrii’s possible earlier attainment of boyar rank may not be evident because of the paucity of sources. But if we assume the existing sources to be correct, we might explain this reversed order by the fact that Prince Aleksandr’s receipt of rank marked the family’s initiation into the Muscovite boyar elite. He clearly won the status and opened the door for his family to be accepted by the other boyars as well. After Princes Aleksandr and Dmitrii, succession was comparatively regular. Prince Al­ eksandr, who had no surviving sons, was followed by his nephew, Prince Andrei Dmitrievich, who was made a boyar between 1535 and 1536. Prince Andrei represented his clan during the difficult years of Ivan IV’s minority, but he died around 1550 and had no heirs or cousins in the boyar line. The family should have lost boyar rank after him. Instead Prince Andrei’s nephew, Prince Semen Vasil’evich, who was the grandson but not the son of a boyar, received the boyar rank between 1547 and 1553, in violation of the exclusionary principle (unless, of course, his fa­ ther had been a boyar briefly, but that fact had gone unrecorded).83 If this is the exception to the rule that it seems to be, it can be traced to the intense political atmosphere of the time. From 1547 to the 1550’s, the grand prince and the boyars made many new boyars and conferred boyar status on many new families in an effort to restore equilibrium at court and to put an end to the rivalries of the minority. Another anomaly is the succession of Petr Vasil’evich Morozov, a third brother who received boyar rank several years before one of his elder

84

B e c o m in g a B o y a r

brothers. The first three brothers in the Poplevin Morozov line (Grigorii, Vladimir, and Petr) had received okol’nichii rank in proper succession from the 1540*5 to the early 1550’s; Grigorii became a boyar between 1547/48 and 1549/50 and was followed by the third brother, Petr, be­ tween 1553 and 1554; the second brother, Vladimir, did not become a boyar until sometime between 1559 and 1561/62. This is the only such exception to the succession rules that cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; perhaps it reflects internal family rivalries. In two other cases —the Zvenigorodskii and Vorotynskii princely families (see Appendix 2)- a younger brother preceded an older brother to boyar rank because of the family’s unusual background: the older brother had a claim to sovereign rights in their home appanage and apparently the younger brothers were the first to win a place as Muscovite boyars. Otherwise, as shown in Appendix 2, succession in the nearly 100 fami­ lies studied here was in accordance with the rules of collateral succession. Families maintained their place at court unless they died out or were re­ moved because they were disgraced. New families joined the elite, thus giving boyar rank to all men in the founding generation and establishing hereditary succession in each lineage that was then founded by a man who had received the rank. Succession was collateral in the first few gen­ erations of a clan and was often lateral in the separate lineages that subse­ quently developed. Men succeeded their kin as boyars unless they died before reaching the proper age or before political circumstances per­ mitted. Such regularity indicates how flexible and workable the rules of boyar succession were. Application of the rules of collateral succession is exemplified by the history of the Akinfovich family. Collateral succession in the first genera­ tion of the Akinfovich clan and its division into separate lineages by the early fifteenth century have already been discussed. Because he was dis­ graced, Fedor Sviblo did not found a boyar lineage. His son Semen died in 1437, but not as a boyar (see Figure 2).84 Ivan Khromoi’s line remained important, however. Khromoi died sometime after 1389, and his sons did not assume a boyar position at court until after the rank had passed col­ laterally to their uncle, Mikhail Cheliadnia. In about the 1420’s, Ivan’s sons Davyd and Roman Ivanovichi (see Figure 2) were involved in politics separately from their uncle Mikhail Cheliadnia and were using the sur­ name “Khromogo.” Roman is mentioned as a boyar in the 1420’s and is also mentioned in 1434.85 Roman had no surviving sons, and the boyar position passed to Fedor, the son of Davyd Ivanovich, suggesting that he too had been a boyar. Fedor Davydovich is first mentioned as a boyar in the early 1470’s and remained a boyar through at least 1479.86

Becoming a Boyar

85

Fedor Davydovich died in approximately the 1480’s; his sons did not succeed him at court until the turn of the century (see Figure 2). Grigorii Fedorovich Davydov is first mentioned in 1475 but became an okol’nichii only between 1496 and 1501. Petr Fedorovich is first mentioned in 1495 and is mentioned in 1501 as an okol’nichii. Grigorii became a boyar by 1503 and lived until at least 1521. Petr is not mentioned after 1509 and probably died in the second decade of the century without having suc­ ceeded his brother as boyar.87 At Grigorii’s death, sometime after 1521, his nephew Ivan Petrovich Fedorov was the sole survivor of the line; he is not mentioned as being in service until 1536. Probably born between 1510 and 1520, Ivan Petrovich failed to assume his family’s boyar posi­ tion in the early 1540’s, most likely because of his youth or because of the turbulent political situation. He is mentioned as having been made a boyar between 1546 and 1547, however, and he remained in that position until his execution in 1568, during the Oprichnina.88 The cohesion of the Khromoi family is evidenced by their retention, to the sixteenth cen­ tury, of the family property: the lands in the Beloozero area that Ivan Khromoi had received in the fourteenth century from his wife, Agrafena Dmitrievna Monastyreva.89 Those in the Osteev line (see Figure 6) were less eminent at court than were their elder cousins, the Khromye (see Figure 2). The line’s founder, Aleksandr Ostei, is mentioned only in the 1380’s, and he was succeeded laterally by his brother Ivan Buturlia. By the 1420’s, Ostei’s sons, the boyars Roman and Timofei, like the Khromye, constituted a separate lin­ eage at court. Timofei apparently served in the appanages. Roman was succeeded laterally by Timofei, and after Timofei’s death, the rank passed to Roman’s son, Andrei Khrul’, who is mentioned only once as a boyar, sometime between 1462 and 1485.90 Timofei Aleksandrovich’s line was serving in the appanages when Andrei died without heirs, and the Osteev representation at court came to an end. Various descendants of Aleksandr Ostei were welcomed (either as boyars or as okol’nichie) to the elite, which expanded in Ivan Ill’s reign. Between 1485 and 1490, Ivan Vasil’evich Chebotov was made an okol’nichii, as was Ivan Andreevich Zhulebin in the early sixteenth century. In the 1550’s Chebotov’s grand­ son Dmitrii Andreevich became an okol’nichii and founded a new lineage (see Figure 6).91 In the Buturlin line, succession did not go beyond the line’s founder, Ivan Buturlia (Figure 2). He is mentioned as a boyar in 1406-7, but none of his sons was. The elder son, Ivan, is not mentioned in any sources and most likely died before his turn came. His brother, Iurii, is known only as the monk “Gennadii” at the Trinity-St. Sergii Monastery from the sec-

Andrei Ivanovich “Akinfov”

(1) FEDOR “Sviblo”

I

------------1-----------

(2) IVAN “ K hrom oi”

(3/1) ALEKSANDR

~Г~ Ivan “Zelen” ’ d.

“O s te r (“O steev line”)

I (See Fig. 2)

“

(4) IVAN Buturlia”

I

I

(See Fig. 2)

non-boyar line

1 Semen d.

(5) MIKHAIL “Cheliadnia” I (See Fig. 2)

Г Vasilii “C h eb o t” ( “C hebotov line”)

Г (1) Okol. IVAN

Andrei

I non-boyar line

1

Fedor “Korela” d.

(3) TIMOFEI

(2) ROMAN (4) ANDREI “Khrul” ’ d.

Ivan d.

Andrei “Slizen” ’

1

(1) Okol. DMITRII d.

Andrei

Iakov I

Iakov d.

(2) Okol./B IVAN d.

1 Iurii d.

Dmitrii d.

Fedor d.

Andrei “Z hu leb a ”

Fedor d.

(“Zhulebin line”)

(1) Okol. IVAN

I

non-boyar line

Vasilii

I

non-boyar line

Semen d.

Ivan I non-boyar line

1

Fig. 6. The Akinfovich Clan with Osteev, Chebotov, and Zhulebin Lines. Capital letters show high court rank. “Okol.” indicates an okol’nichii; “Okol./B” indicates an okol’nichii who subsequently became a boyar; capital letters without preceding abbreviations indicate a boyar. The numbers preceding capitalized names indicate the order of the man’s succession in his clan. The abbreviation “d.” below a name indicates that a man died without surviving male descendants.

Becoming a Boyar

87

ond or third decade of the fifteenth century through the 1450’s; he had died by the mid-1460’s. Iurii’s monkhood may reflect not personal piety, but his clan’s high position and his father’s ambitions: Iurii’s sister had been married to Fedor Ivanovich Sabur, one of the most important boyars in the late fourteenth century.92 He may thus have become a monk be­ cause he was politically disgraced, or simply because he was physically unable to carry on the succession. The Cheliadnin line (see Figure 2), founded by Mikhail Cheliadnia in the second decade of the fifteenth century, remained at the pinnacle of power until the 1540’s. Mikhail is not mentioned after 1423; he was suc­ ceeded directly by his third son, Fedor, first mentioned as a boyar in 1433/34. The eldest son, Ivan, married the daughter of the illustrious Gedyminid immigrant, Prince Iurii Patrikeev, probably around 1430-35. Ivan apparently died soon thereafter, since he is not mentioned in the relatively complete records of servitors in the chronicle accounts of the mid-century dynastic wars. The second son, Vasilii, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. The boyar succession remained in Fedor Mikhailovich’s line; he is recorded as a boyar from 1433/34 to sometime between 1462 and 1473.93 His son Petr (boyar no. 3) followed him imme­ diately at court; Petr is recorded as a boyar in a document of the late 1460’s and lived until at least 1479. The rank then passed laterally to his brother, Andrei, who is cited as a boyar from 1490 to 1500. Between 1506/7 and 1508/9, Andrei was succeeded by his eldest son, Ivan (boyar no. 5), an equerry. Ivan’s brother, Vasilii, was a majordomo by at least 1509, but he died by 1516 and is not recorded as a boyar. Ivan Andreevich was captured in battle in 1514, leaving a single heir, Ivan Ivanovich Cheliadnin (boyar no. 6), who was then apparently too young to assume his father’s boyar position. He is mentioned from the 1530’s and probably was born around 1500. He became an equerry, was made a boyar be­ tween 1537 and 1539, and died by 1541.94 With the deaths of Ivan Ivanovich Cheliadnin in the late 1530’s and Ivan Petrovich Fedorov of the Khromoi line in 1568 (both in Figure 2), the boyar lines of the Akinfovich clan died out. The proliferating Akinfovich clan divided into lineages according to the excluded status of some of them and the continued boyar status of others. In no case after the founding generation of a clan did the number of heirs to a boyar position number more than three, and across such gen­ erations boyar rank passed laterally. For such a large clan, the succession was remarkably regular. These examples indicate the importance of birthright in determining advancement to boyar rank. Age restrictions, the pattern of mortality in

88

Becoming a Boyar

each clan, and political tensions delayed succession, often so long that heirs to the rank died before inheriting it. The exclusionary rule and the division of clans into lineages make it difficult for the twentieth-century observer to ascertain the lineage in which succession was proceeding, a difficulty that is compounded by the scarcity and incompleteness of the sources. It would be a mistake to let the seeming complexity of the succes­ sion system described here lead one to the conclusion that succession lacked a systematic logic. The histories of 93 families in 59 clans from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries show that their succession fol­ lowed the rules enumerated here nearly all of the time. The way in which the rules of succession described in this chapter evolved and were applied was unavoidably determined by two circum­ stances: the high rate of mortality in a premodern state such as Muscovy, and the pressures of competition at court in Muscovy. The high mortality rate meant that men died at younger ages and that many men in each fam­ ily died, leaving large gaps between kinsmen. The balancing of political interests complicated all advancement: the boyars and the grand prince could change the composition of the elite and thus delay boyar succession (but not make it less regularly collateral). Modification of traditional norms by political figures is to be expected. The members of the estab­ lished political elite possessed the political and military power to have a say in decisions that affected them as a whole. To let every heir join the court immediately when eligible would have threatened the balance among the political factions and the distribution of benefits. Yet at the same time the elite recognized the importance of stability, of continuity of leader­ ship, and of a system that encouraged loyalty to the Muscovite court. Thus in general, the boyars acceded to a flexible set of norms that con­ strained their ambitions and allowed gradual integration of new men and new families into the elite. If we understand the three aspects of the sys­ tem—(1) the collateral direction of succession and the exclusionary prin­ ciple, (2) age restrictions and mortality in families, and (3) political con­ siderations-we realize that there is a logic to the succession of men to boyar role in Muscovy. This is a significant insight, since it helps us to understand the distri­ bution of power in the Muscovite Kremlin. Equally important, it estab­ lishes a point of view with regard to other aspects of Muscovite politics. Principles derived from or compatible with kinship relations and heredity may well have influenced how Muscovite political leaders chose allies and enemies; such principles might have been at the root of political crises, or they might have facilitated the resolution of political disputes. Viewing Muscovite politics as based on kinship suggests a broader conceptual framework for the analysis of Muscovite social structure-one that will

Becoming a Boyar

89

perhaps reveal a traditional society behind Muscovy’s rather sophisti­ cated centralized bureaucratic institutions. In Muscovy’s formative century, the political elite adopted a flexible system of succession. Grand princes favored clan founders with boyar status and then endowed their descendants with permanent, hereditary rights to the same place at court. Elite society was “traditional” in the Weberian sense of the term. Weber suggested that after the initially tur­ bulent era in which dynasties and nobilities of medieval Europe were founded, the political authority of “charismatic” leaders and their com­ rades was transformed into “traditional” authority, which was stable and hereditary.95 Long after charisma and change had yielded to tradition and stability, descendants of the original “charismatic” generation retained the right to a place in the councils of the ruler and to a high status in society. Weber’s model approximately describes the history of the boyar elite in Muscovy. From the “charismatic” generation of the Riurikids in the tenth century, Moscow’s Daniilovichi inherited “traditional” authority. For Moscow’s boyars, the “charismatic” generations occurred in the four­ teenth century when the Daniilovichi founded their state at Moscow. Over time, the high status of descendants of “charismatic” founders of elite families was accepted as tradition. Weber’s model further suggests that the boyars’ traditional authority was ultimately supplanted by the rule of law and of rational institutions that characterizes most modern societies. This raises the next issue of our concern: the significance of tal­ ent, favor, and achievement in awarding boyar rank in Muscovy.

♦ CHAPTER 3 ♦

Continuity and Change in the Boyar Elite

boyar elite employed traditional methods for ensuring its continuity. It awarded boyar and okol’nichii rank hereditarily on the basis of a man’s place in his clan: the order in which men received a rank was determined by principles grounded in custom; the age at which they received a rank was largely determined by mortality in boyar clans. Men often had to wait until their thirties to take their family’s position at court, even if it had been vacant for a decade. In the meantime they served: in the army, at court, and in diplomatic positions. The question arises whether a man’s service affected his promotion to boyar rank, and whether the principle of rewarding meritorious service came to displace heredity in the awarding of boyar and okol’nichii rank. Similarly, the ne­ cessity of choosing newcomers to those ranks offered the grand prince and boyars the opportunity to change the traditions of boyar succession. In this chapter we shall examine how these three factors —heredity, ser­ vice, and favor—determined the composition of the boyar elite from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries.

M u sc o v y ’s

Service Historians have long considered that service played some role in a man’s acquisition of boyar or okol’nichii rank. V. O. Kliuchevskii set a precedent for such an interpretation when he suggested that men be­ came boyars by being promoted within the military or court hierarchy. Kliuchevskii also asserted, however, that court positions like boyar and okol’nichii corresponded to particular family backgrounds. In the six­ teenth century, he claimed, court ranks constituted gradations of service and also indicated the holder’s family background.1 A. A. Zimin never fully discussed the subject of family background, but he stressed the court’s service positions more than had Kliuchevskii and implied that court ranks constituted a hierarchy that necessarily led to boyar rank.2 Gustave Alef, however, has modified this assessment. He feels that ad­ vancement in a hierarchy of service ranks was the fundamental way to

Continuity and Change

91

obtain a boyar position, but he cautions: “This is not to say that merit alone governed selection. Certainly family connections, advantageous marriages, and even close friendships played their time-honoured part in affecting decisions concerning promotion and assignment.” 3 Alef con­ cludes that such factors put men in a position to be chosen as boyars by the grand prince, the final arbiter of power. Ann Kleimola similarly ar­ gues that service was a “prerequisite” for maintaining one’s place in the elite but that a long term of service could often be a “political dead end.” For some members of the elite, long service led directly to boyar rank; for others it was useful in providing access to connections (some of which resulted in marriage alliances) that might lead to conferral of boyar rank. Particularly from the reign of Vasilii III on, Kleimola claims, political con­ siderations replaced service as the most important factor in promotion to boyar rank.4 Robert Crummey emphasizes service as a factor that —along with the sovereign’s favor, patronage, and heritage —influenced promotion to boyar and other court ranks in the seventeenth century. If he finds any factor dominant, it is perhaps the sovereign’s favor. Crummey rejects the notion that “genealogical seniority” in a clan guaranteed such promotion.5 Brenda Meehan-Waters, in her study of the early Petrine elite, argues that advancement in that elite was furthered both by service and by aristo­ cratic origin. Men of boyar descent in the Generalitet (the group of men holding the top four military and civil service ranks) advanced faster than Russian men of lesser family background; foreigners in Russian service often advanced even faster. Heredity still counted, but only indirectly, in­ asmuch as well-born families could place sons in the most prestigious schools and regiments and thus increase their personal connections.6 These interpretations parallel Weber’s model of rationalization: in the seventeenth century and in the Petrine period, service became increas­ ingly important to political advancement and family less so. Heredity as the basis of promotion was replaced by a generalized preference for aris­ tocratic class background. The research that supports the present study, however, suggests that the emphasis on service is too great, despite schol­ ars’ multicausal explanations. As we have seen, boyar career patterns and family histories point to heredity, rather than service, as the key to boyar advancement. It is interesting to note that Crummey’s statistics for the seventeenth century suggest that family background continued even then to be an important consideration in boyar succession, particularly for ap­ pointments to positions of the greatest power. Crummey reports that “over the entire seventeenth century 36 percent of all boyars and okol’nichie were direct descendants of men who had held the same ranks at least thirty years earlier.” Crummey also found that a significant percentage of

92

Continuity and Change

men from various social groups entered the boyar elite in genealogical order of seniority in their clans.7 It is not surprising that earlier historians perceived service as more im­ portant than family in the period from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth century: the historiography and the sources encouraged them to do so. The Petrine and Imperial Russian bureaucracies were readily at hand to influence Russian historians’ interpretations of Muscovite political ad­ vancement; Kliuchevskii made the analogy specifically. In addition, the sources these historians used focused on service. Most nineteenth-century Russian historians considered the political customs of the seventeenth century representative of those that had prevailed in Muscovy since the fourteenth century. Thus they relied heavily on sources originating at a time when service was more important to advancement.8The “Sheremetev list,” an important source for research on Muscovite politics before mili­ tary service books were published in quantity, was compiled late in the eighteenth century on the basis of a 1660’s military roster; it was pub­ lished by Novikov in 1791. This list of holders of court ranks from 1462 to 1676 was arranged chronologically and grouped men by their rank, implying visually that promotion through the ranks was the way to attain boyar rank,9 as was indeed the case in the eighteenth century. Yet the 1660’s list that was its source was a quite different type of document; like other “boyar books” (a form of roster that began to be compiled in the mid-sixteenth century), it was a record of land and cash compensation, not of political promotions.10 Sources before the mid-sixteenth century do not otherwise emphasize the hierarchy of ranks, nor, as we have noted, do they laud valorous or talented service.11 More significantly, it is not possible to determine from career patterns alone that men earned boyar or okol’nichii rank on the basis of the length or merit of their service. The research for this study revealed no fixed career pattern for those who became boyars. Ann Kleimola has reached two important conclu­ sions regarding advancement in the Muscovite military service that com­ plement the research presented here. She showed, first, that princes and nonprinces followed different paths to attain boyar rank, and, second, that men who were okol’nichie before becoming boyars followed differ­ ent career patterns than men who were not.12 A rough hierarchy of mili­ tary and court positions did exist, but the progression was not followed by all prospective boyars and okol’nichie. Cavalrymen started in a variety of lesser positions, such as personal bodyguard of the sovereign (rynda), captain (golova), cavalryman (syn boiarskii), or military chamberlain (postel'nichii). They moved to middle commanding positions in the regi­ ments or in the border guard, then on to more senior positions, such as first commander in the central regiment or regional vicegerent (namestnik).

Continuity and Change

93

Once they had achieved boyar rank, men served as the highest regimental commanders or as vicegerents in the most important regions.13 But the paths to higher ranks seem to have been different for each ser­ vitor, even allowing for the incompleteness of sources. Some men whose careers are well documented apparently never served in some positions. Roman Iur’evich Zakhar’in, who was never a boyar, and his brother Grigorii, who did become a boyar, are mentioned only as regimental commanders.14Prince Mikhail Daniilovich Shcheniatev is mentioned first as an envoy in 1511 and then as a boyar from 1512 to the end of his career ca. 1533/34.15 Other men served in a broader range of positions. Mikhail Iur’evich Zakhar’in, who became a boyar, is first mentioned in service as a military chamberlain in 1495, then as a regimental commander from 1506, then occasionally as a regional majordomo or a regimental commander from the 1510’s to the 1520’s.16 Prince Iurii Mikhailovich Bulgakov-Golitsyn is first mentioned as the sovereign’s bodyguard (rynda) in 1522, then as a middle-level regimental commander and vicegerent in the 1530’s and i54o’s, and as a boyar from between 1538 and 1540 to 1558/59. Prince Iurii Ivanovich Shchetinin, who was never a boyar, be­ gan service as an adjutant (striapchii) in 1522 and is recorded as a mili­ tary commander in 1540 and arms bearer (oruzhnichii) in 1547. Ivan Grigor’evich Morozov is mentioned in diplomatic service in 1494 and 1495; he served with the middle servitors (deti boiarskie) in 1495 and as a regimental commander beginning in at least 1501. He was an ambas­ sador to the Crimea in 1507. From the 1510’s to the 1530’s he also served as a subordinate vicegerent in Novgorod, Vladimir, and Kostroma, while continuing to perform some assignments as a regimental commander. Morozov became an okol’nichii between 1501 and 1509 and was made a boyar between 1521 and 1523.17 Sources do not reveal why some men served in more positions than others, but the variety in their careers sug­ gests that there was not a rigid hierarchy of service positions. Nor does a distinction appear to have been made between military and administrative service at court, although V. O. Kliuchevskii and A. A. Zimin argued that there was one. Kliuchevskii wrote: “The court admin­ istration became distinguished from the boyar; in the composition of the highest governing class developed two corps, the regular military boyar and the court service; in the latter a separate hierarchy developed, parallel to the boyar [hierarchy].” 18 But cavalrymen, such as Ivan Grigor’evich Morozov, Prince Iurii Shchetinin, and Roman and Mikhail Iur’evichi Zakhar’iny, mentioned earlier, served alternately in military and court positions. Ann Kleimola gives several examples of boyars and okol’nichie who mixed administrative and military service.19 Until the second half of the seventeenth century, no men who later became boyars spent their ca-

94

C o n tin u ity a n d C h an ge

reers as courtiers: all “earned their stripes” on the battlefield.20 Only chancery service was closed to future boyars and nonboyars alike in this period; it remained the preserve of scribes (d'iaki) into the seventeenth century.21 Court positions were not assigned hierarchically in the way Zimin im­ plied. A rough hierarchy of court responsibilities —diplomatic service, fiscal management, administration of the tsar’s lands —existed, but it was not a ladder up which men advanced to attain boyar rank. Rather, court positions fell into categories in which men tended to specialize. Within one category, men might move up a step or two. Chamberlains sometimes became huntsmen; keepers of the seal sometimes advanced to treasurers. Some posts even became hereditary within families for a time.22 But only a few of these lesser service categories included men who were or later became boyars. Furthermore, the court service of boyars cannot be shown to have been the basis for their promotion to boyardom. The lowest court positions were so lowly that none of their incumbents ever became boyars. These included the titles of groom, falconer, and military chamberlain (iaseVnichii, sokol’nichii, and posteVnichii, respec­ tively). A category that was a little higher in the hierarchy was the admin­ istration of the sovereign’s landholdings. These positions included the principal majordomo (dvoretskii), majordomos of revenues from various territories, and the huntsman (lovchii); some principal majordomos eventually became boyars, but most did not. Another category of service, fiscal management, included the keeper of the seal (pechatnik) and the treasurer (kaznachei). Finally, a category of court positions consisted of those with military origins, such as the arms bearer (oruzhnichii), equerry (koniushii), cupbearer (kraichii), and sovereign’s personal bodyguard (rynda). Some of the holders of these positions became boyars; most did not. Some men who held the positions of equerry, majordomo, and trea­ surer became boyars. But in no case can it be conclusively shown that ser­ vice in these positions earned boyar rank for the incumbent. All of the 11 principal majordomos from the i46o*s to the 1550’s identified by Zimin became boyars or okol’nichie, but all did so in proper order of succession within their families, so this was more likely the determining factor. Many regional majordomos, such as Daniil Romanovich Iur’ev and Dolmat Fedorovich Karpov, became boyars or okol’nichie, but each re­ ceived his boyar or okol’nichii rank in the regular line of succession in his clan. Most principal majordomos, such as Ivan Iur’evich Podzhogin, Ivan Andreevich Zhulebin, Prince Ivan Fedorovich Paletskii, Ivan Konstantino­ vich Saburov, and Andrei Nikolaevich Buturlin, were not descended from boyar lines and did not advance from court administrative service to the rank of boyar.23

Continuity and Change

95

The Khovrin clan dominated the position of treasurer through the mid­ sixteenth century; from the mid-fifteenth century to at least 1509, trea­ surers Vladimir Grigor’evich and his son Dmitrii were boyars. Their anomalous position in the boyar elite was discussed in Chapter 1: after Dmitrii Vladimirovich’s death around 1509, the treasurer position went to a series of his nephews, but the boyar succession stopped. That the treasurer post did not guarantee boyar rank is also confirmed by the fact that other treasurers in the sixteenth century (those from the Sukin and Trakhaniotov families) did not become boyars. The position of equerry was exclusively linked with boyar rank in that it seems to have been a reward for eminence; however, the position did not lead to the rank. By the sixteenth century, the position of equerry had become honorific and was the most powerful and lucrative court posi­ tion. In the 1590’s Giles Fletcher said that the position yielded its holder, Boris Godunov, over 1,200 rubles yearly, plus services from ample lands. Numerous other observers, including Possevino and Kotoshikhin, also named the equerry as the most important boyar.24 The fact that the position originated as an eminently military one is a further indication that the military ethos defined the boyar elite. The equerry position was hereditarily associated with certain families. The Cheliadniny held it from the early sixteenth century until the lineage’s demise in the 1540’s. The first recorded equerry was Ivan Andreevich Cheliadnin, mentioned as occupying the position in the 1500’s. When Ivan was captured in battle in 1514, the position may have gone briefly to his younger brother, Vasilii, but Vasilii’s death by 1516 left the clan with no adult male members to inherit the position.25 Ivan Andreevich’s son, Ivan, was then quite young: he was first mentioned in military service in 1533 and was probably born around 1500.26The next equerry after Ivan Ivanovich Cheliadnin is recorded as Prince Ivan Vasil’evich TelepnevObolenskii, mentioned as an equerry in 1534.27 At first it would appear that the position was simply taken over by another powerful family. But closer examination of the sources reveals that the appointment of Prince Ivan Telepnev-Obolenskii as equerry perpetuated the Cheliadniny’s asso­ ciation with the position: he was the only known living adult male relative of the remaining male Cheliadnin, Ivan Ivanovich, since Ivan Ivanovich’s uncle, Vasilii, had married Telepnev’s sister. At Telepnev’s death in 1538 Ivan Ivanovich Cheliadnin assumed the title of equerry and continued in the position until his death in 1541.28 Dying without male heirs, he ap­ pears to have left the position to the husband of his cousin, Mariia Vasil’evna, the only remaining female Cheliadnin. Ivan Petrovich Fedorov (her husband) was himself a distant kinsman of the Cheliadniny as a member of the Khromoi line of the Akinfovich clan and further perpetu­ ated the association of the equerry position with the Cheliadnin lineage.29

96

Continuity and Change

When Fedorov died in 1568 without male heirs, the equerry position was finally taken by a new family, the Godunovy. Being an equerry was a matter of inheritance, as was being a boyar; it did not determine the power and prestige of members of the boyar elite, but rather supple­ mented them. Service in court positions brought association with those in positions of power and sometimes eventually led to conferral of boyar rank. A few examples will suffice. The Saltykov clan was associated with the position of arms bearer in the early sixteenth century, and some of its members became okoPnichie in the 1550’s. An analysis of their careers shows that service in the position of arms bearer did not bring them the okol’nichii rank. Andrei Mikhailovich Saltykov was an arms bearer from 1508 to 1512 and his son Lev served as one from 1549 to 1564. Lev’s elder brother Iakov had not been an arms bearer but became an okol’nichii between 1547 and 1549/50; after him Lev became an okol’nichii be­ tween 1550 and 1553.30The arms bearer position might have brought the family into the favor of a powerful boyar who eventually helped the fam­ ily obtain okol’nichii rank, but the position did not in itself lead to the rank. Similarly, one family whose members held the position of hunts­ man, the Nagie, received high court rank,31 but other families associated with the huntsman position did not become boyars or okoPnichie.32 The position of sovereign’s bodyguard (rynda) was commonly held by future boyars, but again, no regular pattern is discernible.33 Some bodyguards did not become boyars, and many boyars were not recorded as having been ryndy. Of a group of six bodyguards mentioned in 1522, for ex­ ample, all but one (Khripunov) were sons of boyars. Only two of these five lived long enough to become boyars.34 Of a group of six recorded as bodyguards in 1547, one (Shchepin) was not the son of a boyar, and only he did not attain that rank.35 These men assumed the rank in order ac­ cording to their family’s established succession pattern, not by virtue of this service. The court position of cupbearer probably also prepared many scions of eminent clans to assume boyar rank by bringing them into contact with those in power. Ivan Ivanovich Cheliadnin was noted as a cupbearer in 1536, but he received boyar rank only when his turn came in his family.36 The differences between a future boyar’s career and that of a nonboyar in high military ranks are almost imperceptible, as these examples indi­ cate. Similarly, careers of vicegerents also show that the position did not lead directly to boyar or okol’nichii rank. Some vicegerents subsequently held such ranks, some did not.37 Even the highest military commands were not held only by boyars. Most men who held such positions were boyars when assigned to them; of the remainder, some later became bo-

Continuity and Change

97

yars, but many did not.38 Prince Ivan Semenovich Nogtev-Suzdal’skii and Prince Aleksandr Borisovich Gorbatyi-Shuiskii, for example, were distant kinsmen and served as commanders at about the same time. Prince Ivan served as frontier commander in various locations and as a first or second commander in the lesser military units (right flank and forward guard) in campaigns from at least 1537 to at least 1547. He was the vicegerent in Kaluga in 1540. Prince Aleksandr served as a commander in the rear guard from at least 1538 and is mentioned in 1540 as a commander in the forward guard. But by 1544 Prince Aleksandr was serving as a boyar and continued to do so until his death in 1565, whereas Prince Ivan never became a boyar.39The chief difference between the two men is that Prince Aleksandr’s father had been a boyar from the 1510’s through the 1530’s, but no boyars are recorded among Prince Ivan’s immediate ancestors. De­ scent from a boyar made Prince Aleksandr eligible for the boyar rank. Ann Kleimola and Robert Crummey correctly point out that Muscovy’s boyars were part of a “working elite” for whom service was a mandatory task, but not the sole determinant of boyar accession.40 This is because the boyar position was unlike other positions in the sense that the rank was not awarded primarily on the basis of service, competence, or valor. Administrative and military service positions were designations of function; boyar rank was a designation of honor and status. Positions in the rough hierarchy of ranks were differentiated according to level of re­ sponsibility and skill. However, the boyars’ role was not predominantly functional: nonboyars could perform most of the tasks that boyars per­ formed, such as leading the army, conducting negotiations, and admin­ istering provinces. But nonboyars could not have access to the grand prince, nor did they possess decision-making authority. Both were con­ comitants of “honor” -th e family heritage that set boyars apart from other cavalrymen. Honor was not earned but inherited, or bestowed on newcomers who then founded hereditary boyar families.

The OkoPnichii Rank It is also as a designation of honor that one should understand the okol’nichii rank at court; the rank began to be used regularly during Ivan Ill’s reign41 and was held by the group of men second to boyars in status. The okol’nichii rank was not the penultimate step in a hierarchy of ranks that led to that of boyar. Like the rank of boyar, it denoted and was de­ pendent upon an individual’s family status. Kliuchevskii pointed out that for some men, the okol’nichii rank was a step toward attainment of boyar rank, but he argued that it fundamentally denoted the family heritage of the holder. In the sixteenth and seven-

98

Continuity and Change

teenth centuries, ranks below that of boyar, from okoPnichii to court sec­ retary (dumnyi d*iak), evolved to represent what he called the “genealogi­ cal layers” of the elite.42 In contrast to Kliuchevskii’s genealogical focus, Zimin emphasized class differences and service. He concluded that par­ ticularly by the mid-sixteenth century, the members of the gentry had an opportunity to enter politics by working their way up to the okol’nichii rank.43 Gustave Alef has carefully analyzed the okoPnichii rank and gen­ erally follows this interpretation. He argues that most okoPnichie served at court in nonmilitary functions and suggests that in the late fifteenth century the position was a means by which members of lesser servitor families could attain boyar rank, since princes monopolized the military ranks.44 Ann Kleimola similarly points out that the okoPnichii rank was commonly held by nonprincely families and was associated with nonmili­ tary service.45 Yet the association of nonmilitary service with the rank seems less significant than its correlation with family heritage. The re­ search for this study confirms Kliuchevskii’s conclusion: the okoPnichii rank primarily denoted family honor. It seems to have been established in response to the expansion of the elite beginning in the late fifteenth cen­ tury, and it served the purpose of according status differentiation to the various newcomer families in Muscovy. In the sixteenth century the okoPnichii rank designated two or three different degrees of status. The most eminent princes never had to serve as okoPnichie. For the majority of the untitled families and for some lesser princely families, the position was held in advance of attaining boyar rank. For a few other families it was the maximum status they could achieve. The rank may initially have been functional; it is said to have been given in the appanage period (approximately thirteenth and four­ teenth centuries) to the men who prepared the sovereign’s lodgings when he traveled.46 In Ivan Ill’s time, however, it was an honorific title. New and established nonprincely families served in the okoPnichii rank before attaining boyar rank. (Families with this status are identified in Tables 5 and 7 on pp. 112 and 116 below; their histories are detailed in Ap­ pendix 2.) For most of them (for example, the Iur’ev, Iakovlev, Khromoi, and Morozov families), the okoPnichii rank was simply inherited in the regular hereditary succession that the families had been following for generations. Some families new to the elite, such as the Shein, Saltykov, and Sheremetev families, began court service as okoPnichie and then es­ tablished the custom of serving successively as okoPnichie and boyars. Kliuchevskii postulated that serving as an okoPnichii before becoming a boyar must have been something of a setback for men in nonprincely families,47 but it may in fact have enhanced the power of some, for it allowed nonprincely families regularly to place more than one man in a high rank at one time.

Continuity and Change

99

The pattern of appointments to this new rank shows deference to princely heritage, inasmuch as princes with eminent backgrounds - those descended from previously sovereign lines and Gedyminid lines-were not made okoPnichie. Almost all untitled families held the rank once it became common by the early sixteenth century, as did some princes with less eminent heritages.48 That the court would use ranks to denote family heritage is not surprising; numerous other indications of deference to princely birth can be noted among the elite. In genealogical records and in some parts of military service books, for example, princes were given pride of place before boyars, and the military career patterns of the two groups differed somewhat.49Even in the seventeenth century, Kotoshikhin defined court ranks in terms of the background of the families that held them.50 But the distinction was one of honor, not power. We should not overemphasize distinctions between princely and nonprincely heritage, for they obscure the more telling differences in power among families of different social backgrounds. In the first half of the sixteenth century, non­ princely families, such as the Cheliadniny and Iur’evy, and old princely boyar families, such as the Bulgakovy, Shcheniatevy, and Obolenskie, were much more powerful than the vast majority of the heralded new princely boyars. Furthermore, princely heritage did not determine the makeup of political groups once boyar rank was achieved; princes and nonprinces in the inner circle mingled, and they intermarried. The diffi­ culty scholars have had in finding consistent patterns in boyar appoint­ ments when they group boyars and okol’nichie according to princely or nonprincely heritage results from the making of such a distinction.51 The number of boyars and okoPnichie fluctuated too widely to be satisfac­ torily explained in terms of class competition. If, however, one looks at the histories of the families of new boyars and okoPnichie, one finds a definite genealogical continuity in the elite. The okoPnichii rank also indicated social distinctions in a different way: a few untitled families (such as the Dmitriev and Golovin families) were apparently integrated into the elite in this period and given a heredi­ tary right to hold only okoPnichii rank, an arrangement indicative of their lesser “honor.” Using the okoPnichii rank to integrate families of lesser status than families accorded okoPnichii-boyar rank probably had the advantage of meeting the court’s increasing need for commanders, diplomats, aides, and other men of rank. Many men served in such posi­ tions without receiving okoPnichii rank. But by granting some of these families a place at court, albeit only as okoPnichie, status distinctions could be maintained in an era of social change. Each new boyar or okoPnichii benefited economically from his access to court, although dis­ tribution of income and service tenure land was not regularized until the middle of the sixteenth century. Participants in court politics - boyars and

ioo

Continuity and Change

okol’nichie - also had access to resources that they could distribute among kin, allies, and clients, in turn making a larger segment of the cavalry more loyal to Muscovy. In the same way, the creation of further status distinc­ tions at court in the second half of the sixteenth century-the court gentryman (dumnyi dvorianin) and court secretary (dumnyi d'iak) ranks — had the effect of integrating the growing gentry and scribal classes into power. Understanding the okoPnichii rank as a distinction of status made in response to the changing composition of the elite allows a more con­ sistent interpretation than some that have been offered. Service as an okol’nichii was not a nonmilitary path to power, although it did include nonmilitary tasks.52 Virtually all men recorded as okol’nichie performed both military and nonmilitary roles. Of all new okol’nichii families, many of which belonged to excluded lines of boyar families founded in the fourteenth century,53 men in the Oshcherin, Chebotov, Basmanov, Peshkov, Kvashnin, Kolychev, Borisov, Sakmyshev, Ushatyi, Vel’iaminov, and Bezzubtsev families are mentioned only in military positions.54 Men in the Liatskoi, Sheremetev, Adashev, Shein, Saltykov, Karpov, Nagoi, Bezzubtsev, Shestunov, and Zhulebin families served in military positions and were also given diplomatic and other court assignments.55 And as noted earlier, the okol’nichii rank was not limited to untitled men but was also given to some princes who lacked eminent heritage (see Tables 5 and 7). The Iakovlev and Iur’ev lines of the powerful Koshkin clan provide a good example of succession patterns (see Figure 7) because that clan is so large and well documented. The Koshkin clan was the youngest branch of the clan founded by Andrei Kobyla in the middle of the fourteenth cen­ tury. At the end of the fifteenth century, two Koshkin brothers were bo­ yars simultaneously: Iakov Zakhar’ich (no. 7, a boyar from 1479 until his death in 1510) and Iurii Zakhar’ich (no. 8, a boyar from the 1480*5 to at least 1500).56 At the time of Iurii’s death, his sons were apparently too young to succeed as boyars. His eldest son, Mikhail, is first mentioned in service in 1495. But Iakov Zakhar’ich remained at court. When he died in 1510, his son Petr (no. 9) followed him almost immediately: he was given the rank of okol’nichii (not boyar) between 1495 and 1512 (an order of ranks that was by this time a common pattern in nonprincely families). Petr’s younger brother, Vasilii (no. 10), followed him at court also as an okol’nichii by 1516 / 17; this is the first mention of his service. Judging by the age of their father, Iakov, these men were born in the 1470’s or 1480’s, making them no older than their thirties in the second decade of the six­ teenth century - rather young to become boyars.57 The Iur’ev and Iakovlev lines formed one unit in politics in the first half

ANDREI KOBYLA

I (1) FEDOR KOSHKA

(2) IVAN

(3) FEDOR “Golciai”

Aleksandr “ Bezzubets"

(4) MIKHAIL

(“Bezzubtsev” and

I

________"5 heremetev” lines)

Ivan d.

dau.

dau.

Iakov d.

Fedor

dau.

Vasilii d.

(5) ZAKHAR1I (“ Zakhar’in line")

dau.

Ivan d.

Gavrilo d.

(6) ANDREI M ariia “Goltiaev” m. Prince laroslav d. Vladimirovich of Borovsk

(7) IAKOV (i)

(8) IUR1I (ii)

(lO )O k o l. VASILII (v)

Ivan (vi) d.

“ Liatskoi” (“Liatskoi line”)

(11) MIKHAIL (iv) 1

1

(12) IVAN (vii) d.

Ivan (v) d.

1

(14) VASILII (viii) 1 boyar line

1 (15) ZAKHARII (VIII) d.

Vasilii

(“Iakovlev line")

(9) Okol./B PETR (iv)

Grigorii (vii) d.

Anna d.m. Prince Fedor M ikhailovich

(17) OkoL/B IVAN (ix) 1 boyar line

(19) Okol./B VASILII (x) 1

boyar line

(13) OkoL/B DANIIL (ix) 1 boyar line

Roman (vi) (“ Iur’ev line")

(12) GRIGORII (vii) d.

Semen (viii) d.

(1) Okol. IVAN

\ Ivan d.

Ivan (ix) d.

1

Dolmar d.

1 (20) OkoL/B NIKITA (xi) 1 boyar line

1 Anastasiia m. Ivan IV

Fig. 7 . The Koshkin Clan with Iur’ev and Iakovlev Lines. Capital letters show high court rank. “Okol.” indicates an okoPnichii; “Okol./B” indicates an okol’nichii who subsequently became a boyar; capital letters without preceding abbreviations indicate a boyar. The numbers preceding capitalized names indicate the order of the man’s succession in his clan; roman numerals following names indicate the man’s genealogical seniority ranking, as discussed in Chap. 2 and illustrated in Fig. 3. The abbrevia­ tion “d.” below a name indicates that a man died without surviving male descendants; the abbreviation “dau.” indicates a daugh­ ter whose first name is not known.

юг

Continuity and Change

of the sixteenth century; the family was called the “Zakhar’iny” after its progenitor, Zakharii Ivanovich (no. 5). OkoPnichii Petr Iakovlevich (no. 9) became a boyar between May 1522 and February 1527, probably preceding Mikhail Iur’evich (no. 11), who was genealogically Petr’s junior and who became a boyar sometime between 1523/24 and 1525. Petr Iakovlevich died in 1533; Vasilii Iakovlevich had died in 1526.58 The Zakhar’in family succession was collateral, but there were signifi­ cant delays. Mikhail’s younger brother Roman is mentioned in military service from 1532, but when Mikhail died between 1537 and 1539* man, although probably in his fifties, did not advance to the rank of boyar.59 He died in February 1543 not having succeeded to the clan position (probably because of the harsh struggles that took place during Ivan IV’s youth). When collateral succession resumed, Grigorii Iur’evich (no. 12) became a boyar between 1543 and 1547. In the latter year, sig­ nificantly, his niece, Anastasiia Romanovna, married Ivan IV.60 The dynastic wedding in the Iur’ev line of the Zakhar’in clan seems to have increased the status of this line in relation to that of its Iakovlev cousins, and in 1547 succession in the two lines began to follow indepen­ dent courses, symbolized conveniently by their use in the 15 5o’s of differ­ ent surnames: Iur’ev and Iakovlev. But the two groups were not mutually inimical: the Iur’evy’s success was shared with the Iakovlevy. Grigorii Iur’evich was made a boyar in 1547, as was his nephew Ivan Mikhailovich (no. 12) sometime between 1539 and 1547. The distribution of court ranks followed lateral succession within the Iur’ev lineage. When Grigorii Iur’evich and Ivan Mikhailovich became boyars in 1547, the eldest son of the other remaining line was not overlooked. Daniil Romanovich (no. 13) was made an okol’nichii, the rank dictated by his lesser genealogical ranking (he ranked IX; Grigorii and Ivan ranked VII —see Figure 7) and by the fact that two of his senior kinsmen were already serving at court as boyars. This succession suggests the power that such highly ranked clans could wield, since Daniil was excluded: his father, Roman Iur’evich, had not been a boyar.61 In 1549 more members of the Iur’ev clan became boyars, making a total of four men serving in this high rank at court. The second son of Mikhail Iur’evich, Vasilii (no. 14), joined his brother Ivan (no. 12) at court as a boyar between early 1548 and January 1549. Almost simulta­ neously, between December 1547 and May 1548, the okol’nichii Daniil Romanovich, who was junior to Ivan and Vasilii in clan order (Daniil ranked IX to Ivan’s VII and Vasilii’s VIII - see Figure 7) and most likely also younger, became a boyar. This succession of junior men to the rank of okol’nichii while their seniors were boyars continued in 1559, when Nikita Romanovich (no. 20) became an okol’nichii. At that time his

Continuity and Change

103

uncle, Vasilii Mikhailovich (no. 14), was still a boyar (Ivan Mikhailovich had died in 1552, Grigorii Iur’evich in 1556), as was his brother Daniil (no. 13). Nikita’s okol’nichii position indicates his junior rank, and also presumably his relative youth: he is first mentioned in 1547 as a youth and was probably born in the 1520’s.62 Nikita, whose grandson became Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, became a boyar in 1565, at about the time that his elder brother, boyar Daniil Romanovich, died.63 In approximately 1550, when the Iur’ev family had established at least four of its members as okol’nichie or as boyars at court, the Iakovlev men began to assume positions as boyars and okol’nichie. Their succession, like that of the Iur’evy, strictly followed clan seniority. It is not clear why the Iakovlev men succeeded to their clan positions precisely at this point, and not, for example, immediately after the Iur’evy’s Daniilovich wed­ ding in 1547. Perhaps the Iur’evy were having difficulty getting other bo­ yars to accept so many new boyars from their camp. The eldest son of the eldest line, Zakharii Petrovich (no. 15), became a boyar between May 1550 and April 1551. Zakharii’s cousin Mikhail Vasil’evich (no. 16) was equal to him (both ranked VIII) in the Iakovlev line but was apparently younger. As befitted his ranking, Mikhail was the next member of the clan to assume a position at court, but not until between 1549 and 1555, and then only as an okol’nichii. This lesser rank probably reflects that younger age or the fact that his elder cousin was already a boyar at court. Boyar Zakharii Petrovich died in 1555; okol’nichii Mikhail Vasil’evich died in 1556.64 Thus the Iakovlevy had no representatives at court in 1556, except for their powerful Iur’ev kinsmen. Within a year, however, the gap was filled, again in accordance with clan seniority rankings. The eldest surviving cousin, Ivan Petrovich (no. 17), was made an okol’nichii between 1556/57 and July 1557; his cousin Semen Vasil’evich (no. 18), who was equal in rank but younger, became an okol’nichii between 1556 and 1557. Ivan Petrovich became a boyar by March 1558, and his cousin Vasilii Petrovich (no. 19), who was genealogically next in line, became an okol’nichii between 1554 and 1559. Semen Vasil’evich became a boyar between 1558 and 1559, as did Vasilii Petrovich between 1559 and 1567.65 In all of this advancement the clan seniority rankings were respected, and men who were too young to become boyars immediately (Petr Iakovlevich) or who were junior to men already serving as boyars (Mikhail Vasil’evich, Vasilii Petrovich, Daniil Romanovich, Nikita Romanovich) served as okol’nichii before becoming boyars. The succession patterns of the Kosh­ kin clan are typical of other okol’nichii-boyar families-for example, the Vorontsovy in the sixteenth century (see Chapter 2). Men in the boyar elite had to serve, primarily as cavalrymen and ad­ ministrators, but whether they performed well in such positions was not

104

Continuity and Change

important unless they belonged to families that were outside the group of hereditary families, in which case personal achievement or favor could elevate a man into the elite. But for most boyars and okoPnichie, the rank was a symbol either of family heritage or of power already achieved; their service in military and court positions had been a “prerequisite” for maintaining a place in the elite, but it had not earned them that rank. Men became boyars as a result of the dynamic interplay of two factors: (1) heredity, which created a pool of men destined for the rank, and (2) the ambition of boyars, okoPnichie, and outsiders, which demanded an expansion of the elite and which helped to determine when a man would inherit his rank. These two factors determined the evolution of the Muscovite elite. A steady succession was maintained over time, but allow­ ance was made for change as some families grew and others died out, as the annexation of territories brought local elites into Muscovite service, and as the increase in the size of Muscovy’s military generated an am­ bitious military and administrative servitor class. How the boyar elite evolved under such circumstances of social change is the subject of the next section.

Continuity and Change In the over 200 years between the establishment of a military center at Moscow in the early fourteenth century and the early decades of the reign of Ivan IV (ruled 1533-84), the size and composition of the circle of fami­ lies from which boyars came changed markedly.66 This elite, which con­ sisted of a few warriors in the 1320’s, had expanded to 46 families by ta b le

2

Composition of the Boyar Elite,

*

1 3 2 0 5-1407

Families founded sometime in the fourteenth century that endured to 140 7

Families that died out (with approximate date of exit)

Akinfovich Dobrynskii Fominskii Kobylin Minin Morozov Pleshcheev Saburov Vladimir Daniilovich Vorontsov (from Vel’iaminov clan) Vsevolozh

Khvostov (1356) Monastyrev (1378) Okat’ev (1390’s) Volynskii (1390’s) Beleutov (1400’s) Kvashnin (1400’s) Dmitrii Vasil’evich (1400’s) Afin’evich (1400’s)

so u rc e : See Appendix z.

Continuity and Change

105

table 3

Composition of the Boyar Elite, 1407-61 New families (with approximate date of entrance as boyars)

Families in 1407 Akinfovich Dobrynskii Fominskii Kobylin Minin Morozov Pleshcheev Saburov Vladimir Daniilovich Vorontsov Vsevolozh

Kobylin (1400’s; from Kobylin clan) Koshkin (1400’s; from Kobylin clan) Patrikeev (1417)' Cheliadnin (1420’s; from Akinfovich clan) Khromoi (1420’s; from Akinfovich clan) Osteev (1420’s; from Akinfovich clan) Obolenskii (ca. 1440’s)' Riapolovskii (ca. 1440’s)' Basenok (1450’s) Zvenigorodskii (1450’s)'

Families that died out (with approximate date of exit) Vladimir Daniilovich (ca. 1420’s) Minin (post-1420’s) Kobylin (ca. 1440’s) Vorontsov (ca. 1440’s)

Families in 1462 Basenok Cheliadnin Dobrynskii Fominskii Khromoi Koshkin Morozov Obolenskii' Osteev Patrikeev' Pleshcheev Riapolovskii' Saburov Vsevolozh Zvenigorodskii'

so u rc e : See Appendix г.

"Princelyfamily.

1555. In 1345 there were three or four attested boyars; in 1555 more than 50 men claimed a place at court as a boyar or an okol’nichii.67 Of 19 original fourteenth-century boyar families, only five held the rank con­ tinuously until the i55o’s.68 Most of the new families in the boyar elite were princely immigrants from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or from other Riurikid principalities; the others were descended from previously unknown nonprincely families. The change in the composition of the group of boyars, however, did not change the principles of court politics, such as hereditary succession and patterns of mediating conflict. The problem of adding new members is a crucial one for all political elites, for there is always a risk that new members will not perpetuate es­ tablished principles. It is a problem that cannot be avoided, and it was particularly serious in premodern eras when the mortality rate was high. The Muscovite elite continually faced this problem. Two-thirds of the 19 original boyar families (see Table 2) had died out by the sixteenth century (see Tables 3 and 4). By that century the elite had expanded to 46 families and was more than twice its fourteenth-century size. Most of the families that were brought into the elite in the sixteenth century retained their

TABLE 4

Composition of the Boyar Elite, 1462-1525

Families in 1462 Basenok Cheliadnin Fominskii Khabarov Khromoi Koshkin Morozov Obolenskii* Osteev Patrikeev* Pleshcheev Riapolovskii* Saburov Vsevolozh Zvenigorodskiy

New boyar or okol’nichii-boyar families (with approximate date of entrance to rank) Khovrin (1460’s) Starkov (1460’s) Zabolotskii (1460’s) Kholmskii (1470’s)* Oshcherin (1470’s) Tovarkov(1470’s) Tuchkov (1470’s) Chebotov (1480’s) laroslavskii (1490’s)* Penkov (1490’s)Rusalka-Morozov (1490’s) Bezzubtsev (1500*s) Romodanovskii (1500’s)* Rostovskii (1500’s)* Sakmyshev (1500’s) Shestunov (1500’s) Shuiskii (1500’s)* Vel’iaminov (1500*s) Vorontsov (1500’s) Zhulebin (1500’s) Gorbatyi (1510’s)* Repnin (1510’s)* Strigin (1510’s; from Obolenskii dan)* Telepnev (1510’s; from Obolenskii dan)* Ushatyi (1510’s)*

New okoFnichii family (with approximate date of entrance to rank) Dmitriev (1490’s)

Families that died out (with approximate date of exit) Basenok (1460’s) Fominskii (1460’s) Vsevolozh (1460’s) Starkov (1470*s) Osteev (1480’s) Oshcherin (1490’s) Riapolovskii (1499)* Chebotov (1500’s) laroslavskii (1500’s)* Rusalka-Morozov (1500’s) Kholmskii (1508)* Khovrin (1510’s) Romodanovskii (1510’s)* Sakmyshev (1510’s) Tovarkov(1510’s) Ushatyi (1510’s)* Bezzubtsev (1520’s)

Families in1525 Cheliadnin Dmitriev Gorbatyi* Khabarov Khromoi Koshkin Morozov Patrikeev* Penkov* Pleshcheev Repnin* Rostovskii* Saburov Shestunov* Shuiskii* Strigin-Obolenskii * Telepnev-Obolenskii Tuchkov Vel’iaminov Vorontsov Zabolotskii Zhulebin Zvenigorodskii*

Continuity and Change

107

position beyond the 1550’s, falsely implying a low mortality rate in this elite. Eighteen of the 37 boyar, okol’nichii-boyar, or okol’nichii families mentioned in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries remained in power until 15 50 - a survival rate of one-half.69The eliminations were a result of death and the exclusionary principle. This survival rate is similar to that of other medieval and early modern upper classes. For example, of sixteen German aristocratic families recorded in one region before 1200, ten had died out completely by 1300.70 Muscovite political traditions would probably have undergone radical change if they had allowed new social classes ready access to the elite. That just such a “social revolution” occurred between Ivan Ill’s time and that of Ivan IV has been a common interpretation. Prerevolutionary his­ torians emphasized either the influx of a new “feudal” aristocracy under Ivan III or the rise of a gentry in opposition under Ivan IV, or postulated that both occurred. Soviet scholars have followed this approach.71 The fallacy of this argument is that it assumes that Muscovy’s landed servitors had either conservative or progressive views, depending on their heritage. But heritage in Muscovy was not a good predictor of political values: so­ cial stratification in the elite was apparently not sufficient to create class antagonisms of the sort that separated high-born aristocrats from lesser gentry in some Western countries. The fact that the elite began to accept more princes under Ivan III reflects only the changing pool of contenders for power. New rules of political succession, association, and conflict resolution were not established when new families were admitted to court in the first half of the sixteenth century (see Chapter 5). Rather, political traditions were maintained as the elite evolved. The interpretations of the evolution of Muscovy’s elite as characterized by class confrontation on the one hand, or by organic continuity on the other, represent a classic dichotomy in theories of elite formation. Early theorists such as Pareto and Mosca analyzed the “circulation of elites” in political terms: as established elites degenerate, new classes and new ide­ ologies replace them. The process is as often revolutionary as it is grad­ ual, since political differences between the old and the new are often sharp.72 Although Pareto and Mosca based their theories on modern Western history, because they were motivated by a desire to explain mod­ em revolutions, more recent historians have applied the theories to pre­ modern periods. Marc Bloch, for example, echoed these ideas when he argued that the post-Carolingian French aristocracy consisted of new “soldiers of fortune” who had displaced the old Carolingian nobility.73 Other research, however, has shed doubt on the appropriateness of this approach. Studies on medieval aristocracies by Leopold Genicôt, Gerd Tellenbach, and Constance Bouchard suggest that elites grow organically,

io8

Continuity and Change

adapting and preserving political traditions while absorbing significant changes in personnel. Families in medieval aristocracies died out rapidly because of high mortality rates and the degeneration associated with endogamous aristocratic marriages. They were replaced by new families who intermarried with old families or who were appointed to the nobility by the sovereign. These new families may have been acutely aware and proud of their heritage (as Bouchard claims the members of the postCarolingian aristocracy were), but they achieved their high social status by integration, not confrontation, and their political customs were not fundamentally different from those of their predecessors.74They perpetu­ ated the established political order, although they changed its face. An analysis of the Muscovite elite reveals a similar gradual transformation of the elite unaccompanied by any change in established political customs. We shall examine that change, dividing the more than 200 years covered into four periods. We saw in Chapter 1 that in Muscovy’s formative period, the fourteenth century until 1407, at least 19 warriors became boyars and acquired the right to pass boyar status on to their descendants (see Table 2). As was discussed in Chapter 1, this was a century of struggle among several prin­ cipalities for regional power. Military men came to serve the Muscovite grand prince from his rival principalities; they also came from smaller principalities that were being overshadowed in the competition for re­ gional power, such as the various small appanages in the IaroslavP, Rostov, and Vladimir areas. By 1407, just before the arrival of the Patrikeevy sig­ naled the end of the formation of the elite, mortality had reduced Mus­ covy’s elite by more than one-third: eight of these 19 families had died out, some having left lines whose members served in nonboyar military ranks.75 The next period extends from 1408 to 1462, the time of the political settlement that followed the dynastic wars of the mid-fifteenth century (see Table 3). Ambitious newcomers in this period came generally from the Orthodox princes of the borderlands between Muscovy and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Most had served Vasilii II in the dynastic wars. At the beginning of this period, 11 families claimed the right to place members as boyars at court. Over the period, two of these families died out in their boyar lines (the clan of Vladimir Daniilovich and the Minin clan), two clans fell into nonboyar service, five new families were inte­ grated into the elite, and two old families, the Akinfovichi and Kobyliny, split into a total of five distinct boyar families, of which four survived un­ til 1462. Thus, as Table 3 shows, a total of 19 families held the boyar rank in this period, but by 1462 only 15 remained. The elite had increased by four families.

Continuity and Change

109

Four of the five new boyar families in this period were princely, but they did not let that heritage prevent them from developing close links with established boyar families. They intermarried with them, and they served in the same capacities as other boyars. For example, the Patrikeev family, according to chronicle sources, brought a large retinue to the Muscovite army in 1408 and served faithfully. After a decade it received boyar status and simultaneously negotiated marriage alliances with the royal family and with prominent boyar families.76 Other new arrivals were apparently given a place at court as a result of their loyal service to Vasilii II. They include the Zvenigorodskii and Riapolovskii princes, the Basenkov fam­ ily, and the Obolenskii princes, who also formed an advantageous mar­ riage alliance with the Vsevolozh boyar line.77 Two clans left the boyar elite in this period, although men of their non­ boyar lineages remained in service: Vladimir Daniilovich’s clan died out and the Minin clan lost its boyar rank for reasons that are unclear but are possibly related to the clan’s service in the dynastic war (see Appendix 2). Division within clans accounts for much of the change in the elite during this period; it is visible in genealogical charts and obvious from surnames, but sources do not reveal the particular circumstances that prompted division in each case. One of the four boyar lines of the Kobylin clan that were extant in 1407 died out after the 1420’s (Vanteev), and two (Koly­ chev, Ignat’ev) were demoted to nonboyar status by the 1440’s, possibly because they served in appanages. In the fourteenth century, service in the appanages did not initially disqualify a man from membership in the Moscow elite, but by the mid-fifteenth century it did.78 Only the Koshkin line remained as a boyar line in the Kobylin clan. In the Akinfovich clan, the line of Fedor Sviblo was eliminated between the 1390’s and 1406 be­ cause of his disgrace for unknown reasons. The Khromoi, Osteev, and Cheliadnin lines developed as separate families. The elder and third lines of the large and powerful Vel’iaminov clan died out by the end of the fourteenth century through a combination of disgrace (Ivan Vasil’evich), early mortality (Mikula and Poluekht Vasil’evichi), and lack of male heirs (Mikula and Poluekht Vasil’evichi and Semen Timofeevich were all child­ less—see Chapter 2). Only its Vorontsov line remained, but it was de­ moted into nonboyar service by the 1440*8. Similarly, the boyar line in the elder line of the Biakontov-Pleshcheev clan was extinguished, leaving only the younger line, the Pleshcheevy, to present the ancestral claim to a place at court. Perhaps most interesting is the Dobrynskii clan. Of nine broth­ ers in the first generation, five are recorded as boyars. The three youngest served on the side of the renegade Dmitrii Shemiaka in the dynastic war and lost their right to a place in the elite. The Dobrynskii family main­ tained its claim to boyar rank only because one of the brothers, Fedor

I io

Continuity and Change

Simskii, had died on the eve of the dynastic war, and his son, Vasilii Obrazets, was apparently too young to have actively supported his uncles’ treason. The 15 families in power in 1462 predominantly included old boyar families of the preceding period. The replacement of extinct families by new ones is, however, evident. By 1462, half of the fourteenth-century boyar clans had died out completely or at least in their boyar lines; of 19 clans, only eight remained. Gradually the composition of the elite was changing as newcomers entered, but those newcomers received their places as a result of intermarriage and skillful building of alliances. The third period, 1462-1525, encompasses the reigns of Ivan III and of his son, Vasilii III, until Vasilii Ill’s divorce (1525). This was a turbulent time for the elite. The grand prince and his boyars felt pressure from many sides to increase the latters’ numbers. Territorial annexations and defections to Muscovy brought high-born princely families from Tver’, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rostov, Suzdal’, and Iaroslavl’ that had once been sovereign and whose members were ambitious to attain the highest positions Muscovy could offer. The conquest of Novgorod brought greater administrative burdens and raised the difficult issue of whether the Novgorodian social elite should be integrated into the Muscovite one. Territorial expansion also generated a large reserve of military men in Muscovy, all of whom were candidates for administrative and military positions and were hopeful of gaining access to power at court. For Mus­ covy to ignore these growing pressures would cause social tension that might result in defections at the highest levels, as well as the disaffec­ tion of the rank and file. Therefore, it behooved Kremlin leaders to be­ stow favor on some of the contenders. They chose newcomers selectively, favoring men with the most prestigious heritages, eschewing men from Novgorod and Tver’, with only a few exceptions.79 For reasons that will be discussed fully in Chapters 4 and 5, political tensions were high at the time of Vasilii Ill’s 1525 divorce and 1526 remarriage and during Ivan IV’s minority, and they contributed to the gradual increase in the number of boyars and okol’nichie. In 1462, 15 families had the right to hereditary boyar status. In 1525, 23 families did. But these statistics do not reveal the extensive change that had taken place in the elite. Of the 15 families that were eligible in 1462, five had died out completely or at least in their boyar lines by 1525 (Basenok, Fominskii, Osteev, Riapolovskii, Vsevolozh); 23 new families joined between 1462 and 1525, of whom 12 had died out by 1525. One new family, the Dmitriev, had the status of hereditary okol’nichii. The Obolenskii family divided into an extended family consisting of the de­ scendants of its four elder brothers (for convenience, referred to as the

Continuity and Change

h i

Strigin line) and another family descended from two younger men, the Telepnevy, stepbrothers of the Striginy. Thus 40 families held positions of responsibility at some time during this period (see Table 4). Sources allow us to explain the political or biological demises of several of these families. Disgrace ended the boyar lines in the Basenok, Starkov, Riapolovskii, and Kholmskii families; the Kholmskii family died out en­ tirely, but the others continued in their nonboyar lines. The boyar line of the Vsevolozh family died out; the Sobakin-Fominskii family lost its boyar rank because its last boyar, Vasilii Ivanovich Sobakin, apparently outlived all men in the following generation, though his family did not die out completely. The Osteev family lost its boyar rank when Andrei Khrul’ Osteev died; the men in the younger line, descended from Timofei Aleksandrovich, had joined appanage service, thus necessitating their withdrawal from the Moscow elite. The Khovrin clan was discussed in Chapter 1. The other families dropped out of the elite because their descendants died before reaching the age required for accession to boyardom. Table 5 shows the status of the families in the elite at this time (14621525). Many of the newcomer families were princely and were given boyar status; a slightly larger group of newcomers, consisting of untitled families and lesser princely families, was given okoPnichii-boyar status. Grand princes and boyars selected new families preeminently on the basis of political considerations: as has been noted, men from Novgorod and Tver* were spurned after the conquests of those cities, and previously sov­ ereign princes were favored. Successful aspirants were doubtless aided by their intermarriages with established Muscovite clans and by their al­ liances with boyar networks. The Kholmskie, for example, were de­ scended from a collateral line of the ruling dynasty of Tver*. Upon coming to Muscovy in the 1460’s, before Tver’ was conquered, the family’s Mos­ cow head, Prince Daniil Dmitrievich, married a daughter of the last male Vsevolozh. By the 1490’s Kholmskii political connections were so strong that the family could arrange a marriage with the important Cheliadnin family and even with the sovereign Daniilovich family.80 The Rostovskie, descendants of the sovereign line from Rostov, had a similar history. They intermarried with appanage Daniilovichi81 and served Muscovy for three decades before being made boyars ca. 1506. The Penkovy’s ancestors had been sovereign in Iaroslavl’; they had served in Muscovy since the 1480’s and had intermarried with the Kholmskie. They were made boyars in the 1490’s.82 The Shuiskie and their kinsmen, the Gorbatye, had long served in Novgorod and Muscovy, and some in Muscovy had married into the Khovrin and Patrikeev families.83 Another newly arrived clan, the Khovrin merchant family, brought to Muscovy wealth and fiscal skills

112

Continuity and Change table 5

Status of Elite Families, 1462-1525 Boyar families Cheliadnin* Fominskii* Gorbatyi* Iaroslavskii* Kholmskii* Osteev* Patrikeeva Penkov" Repnin* Riapolovskii* Rostovskii* Rusalka-Morozovb Shuiskii' Starkov* StriginJ Telepnev" Tovarkov6 Vsevolozh6

Okol’nichii-boyar families Basenok Bezzubtsev£ Chebotov£ Khabarov Khromoi Koshkin Morozov Oshcherin £ Pleshcheev Romodanovskii' Saburov Sakmyshev£ Shestunove,£ Tuchkov Ushatyi^ Vel’iaminov£ Vorontsov Zabolotskii Zhulebin£ Zvenigorodskiiл

Okol’nichii family Dmitriev

s o u rc e : See Appendix 2 .

“Princelyfamily. *With the exception of the Cheliadniny, all these nonprincely lines died out before the okol’nichiiboyar distinction became common. 'Line died out before achieving boyar rank; possibly an exclusively okol’nichii family.

useful to the grand prince. After being given boyar status, the family fur­ ther integrated itself into the elite by marrying into the Patrikeev family.84 The identity of patrons of the Repnin-Obolenskii family and the reason for its being given boyar honor are not discernible. The base of the boyar elite was broadened by the addition of other less eminent families, thus allowing members of some of Muscovy’s new servitor groups to rise to positions of power. Despite its many new members and the establishment of the new okol’nichii rank, Muscovy’s elite in this period adhered to established customs of hereditary succession and it formed alliances based on per­ sonal loyalty and marriage ties. But the elite had continued to change. Of the original 19 fourteenth-century boyar families, only six (Akinfovich, Dobrynskii, Kobylin, Morozov, Pleshcheev, Saburov) were represented in 1525. All others had died out completely or at least in their boyar lines. By 1525 these families had been replaced by 16 families, of whom ten were princely and six nonprincely, reflecting the variety in the social pool from which boyars replenished their numbers. Status differentiations are

Continuity and Change

113

evident in the ultimate predominance of previously sovereign princely families and the use of the okol’nichii rank to distinguish lesser families from those of high princely birth. The fourth period encompasses the years 1526 to 1555. It begins with Vasilii Ill’s marriage to Elena Glinskaia and ends with the series of mar­ riages in the grand-princely family that took place between 1547 and 1555. Attrition as a result of mortality and the application of the exclu­ sionary principle, combined with resolution of the minority struggles, were catalysts of a major expansion of the elite. Of the 23 families belong­ ing to the elite in 1525, eight died out in this period. Two of these fami­ lies, the Saburovy and Cheliadniny, were descendants of families founded in the fourteenth century. Thus only five of the original fourteenthcentury clans remained in 15 5 5: Kobylin, Dobrynskii, Akinfovich, Moro­ zov, and Pleshcheev. A total of 37 families entered the elite during this period; about 14 joined before 1547, and the rest joined between 1547 and 1555.85 Of the newcomers, five died out in this period. The Koshkin clan divided into the Iur’ev and Iakovlev lines. In 1555, 46 families claimed the status of boyar or okol’nichii (see Table 6). Those families that fell from the elite —the Liatskoi and Kubenskii families —lost boyar rank as a result of disgrace. All the others simply died out in their boyar lines. This was a time when men descended from once sovereign princely families achieved boyar rank in large numbers, including even families in the category of “service princes” (sluzhilye kniaz’ia), such as the Bel’skie, Mstislavskie, and Vorotynskie, families that the court had held at arm’s length since the time of Ivan III. By the 1520’s some of them had produced a generation born in Moscow and had proven their reliability in military service; they had won the trust of sufficient numbers of boyars to be given political power. Other princely families that came to court in this period included the Glinskie and Kubenskie.86 Some princely and nonprincely families were given status as boyar or boyar-okol’nichii families; why they were chosen over other contenders cannot be determined, but they were likely favored by established boyar families. One can speculate con­ cerning some links. Perhaps the Kurliatev and Serebrianyi princes were patronized by their distant kinsmen, the Princes Strigin-Obolenskie, and perhaps the Khokholek-Rostovskii princes were patronized by their kins­ men, the Rostovskie. Perhaps the Iur’evy patronized their likely kinsmen, the Kurbskie, and the Shuiskie patronized the many families that have been associated with them (for example, the Pronskii, Shemiakin, Golovin, and Basmanov families). Chronicle references confirm only the speculation concerning the Shuiskie’s allies. Kinship probably gave rise to rivalries among boyars as often as to loyalties. A few nonprincely families became

114

Continuity and Change table

6

Composition of the Boyar Elite, 1525-55 Families in 1525 Cheliadnin Dmitriev Gorbatyi" Khabarov Khromoi Koshkin Morozov Patrikeev" Penkov" Pleshcheev Repnin" Rostovskii" Saburov Shestunov" Shuiskii" Strigin-Obolenskii" Telepnev-Obolenskii " Tuchkov Vel’iaminov Vorontsov Zabolotskii Zhulebin Zvenigorodskii"

New families (with approximate date of entrance to rank) Liatskoi (1523-26) Serebrianyi (1523/24-26)" Bel’skii (1526-27)" Paletskii (1526/27-31)" Khokholek (1530-34)" Kurliatev (1534-37)" Kubenskii (1537-39)" Karpov (1538-39) Iakovlev (1540’s; from Koshkin clan) Iur’ev (1540’s; from Koshkin clan) Shein (1537-42) Bezzubtsev (1539-42) Pronskii (1537-43)" Ushatyi (1541-43)" Kurbskii (1543-44)" Temkin (1541-46)" Nagoi (1533-47) Kolychev (1536-46/47) Adashev (1543-47)

Glinskii (1547)" Kurakin (1547-48)" Sheremetev (1545-49) Kvashnin (1547-49) Mstislavskii (1547-49)" Saltykov (1547-49/50) Shemiakin (1549-49/50)" Trakhaniotov (1547-50) Mikulinskii (1548-50)" Peshkov (1549/50-50) Vorotynskii (1550)" Basmanov (1551-52) Golovin (1552-54) Borisov (1549-54/55) Chebotov (1550-55) Romodanovskii (1552-55)" Gorenskii (1554-55)" Kashin (1555)"

so u rc e : See Appendix z.

JPrincely family.

hereditary okol’nichie families; any clue about what differentiated them from the nonprincely families that were given the higher status of boyarokol’nichii is contained only in the unrecorded counsels of the grand prince and boyars who agreed to give them the titles. Table 7 shows the status of the families that belonged to the elite in this period. The elite was becoming more princely: 23 of the 46 families belonging to the elite in 1555 were princely. Of the original 19 fourteenth-century boyar families, only five remained in the elite in 1555. They constituted only one-ninth of the boyar elite at that time, but, significantly, they were among the most powerful families. The elite had increased its num­ bers—in part by integrating new families, in part by compensating for mortality. In expanding the elite, the grand prince and the boyars avoided the institutional transformation that their Polish counterparts were allow­ ing in a similar situation. Unlike fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Polish kings and noblemen, Moscow’s grand princes and boyars did not give the lesser gentry a lower chamber in a parliament, nor did they create a Sen­ ate consisting of themselves and high-born newcomers, nor did they establish any legal infrastructure to protect their privileges as an estate.

Continuity and Change table

115

6

Composition o f the Boyar Elite, 1525-55 (continued across)

Families that died out (with approximate date of exit) Shestunov (1520’s)" Vel’iaminov (1520’s) Zhulebin (1520’s) Saburov (1530’s) Strigin-Obolenskii (1530’s)" Zvenigorodskii (1530’s)" Liatskoi (1534) Bezzubtsev (1540’s) Khokholek (1540’s)" Kubenskii (1540’s)" Penkov (1540’s)" Ushatyi (1540’s)" Cheliadnin (1541-42)

Families in 1555 Adashev Basmanov Bel’skii" Borisov Chebotov Dmitriev Glinskii" Golovin Gorbatyi" Gorenskii" Iakovlev Iur’ev Karpov Kashin" Khabarov Khromoi Kolychev Kurakin" Kurbskii" Kurliatev" Kvashnin Mikulinskii" Morozov

Mstislavskii" Nagoi Paletskii" Patrikeev" Peshkov Pleshcheev Pronskii" Repnin" Romodanovskii" Rostovskii" Saltykov Serebrianyi" Shein Shemiakin" Sheremetev Shuiskii" Telepnev-Obolenskii " Temkin" Trakhaniotov Tuchkov Vorontsov Vorotynskii" Zabolotskii

Eschewing institutional structures and legal protections, newcomers to the Muscovite elite joined established informal, patrimonial factions. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, the social transformation that oc­ curred in Muscovy from the late fifteenth century did not generate signifi­ cant political change. Political customs endured - notably the practice of hereditary succession —and political attitudes remained the same. That this was so is not surprising. Hereditary succession in this family-based elite was conducive to gradual change in political leadership, rather than radical displacement of old leaders by new men. Kinship and personal association were required for new men to be made boyars; such relation­ ships required careful planning over generations. Continuity in political custom resulted from this gradual social integration.

Competence and Change Since meritorious service did not help a man become a boyar (with the exception of some of the men allowed to found new boyar families), and since advancement to boyar rank was determined primarily by heredity, would not this political system have bred incompetence? In modern po­ litical and corporate institutions, choosing personnel on the basis of he-

ii 6

Continuity and Change ta b le

7

Status o f Elite Families, 1525-55

Boyar families Bel’skii" Cheliadnin Glinskii" Gorbatyi" Gorenskii" Kashin" Khokholek" Kubenskii" Kurakin" Kurbskii" Kurliatev" Mikulinskii" Mstislavskii" Patrikeev" Penkov" Pronskii" Repnin" Romodanovskii" Rostovskii" Serebrianyi" Shemiakin" Shuiskii" Strigin-Obolenskii " Telepnev-Obolenskii " Temkin" Trakhaniotov Vorotynskii"

Okol’nichii-boyar families

Okol’nichii families

Adashev Basmanov Bezzubtsev6 Borisov6 Chebotov6 Iakovlev Iur’ev Khabarov Khromoi Kolychev6 Kvashnin6 Liatskoi6 Morozov Nagoi6 Paletskii" Peshkov6 Pleshcheev Saburov Saltykov Shein Sheremetev Shestunov"’6 Tuchkov Ushatyi"16 Vel’iaminov6 Vorontsov Zabolotskii Zhulebin6 Zvenigorodskii"

Dmitriev Golovinf Karpovc

s o u rc e : See Appendix 1 .

"Princelyfamily. bLine died out before achieving boyar rank; possibly an exclusively okol’nichii family. eSeveral men or more than one generation in the family held only okol’nichii rank. ‘'In the 1 5 6 0 4 , a member became a boyar.

redity would dampen incentive and stifle the display of talent. But the sys­ tem of political succession used in Muscovy in the fourteenth through mid-sixteenth centuries provided sufficiently talented boyars, for tech­ nical expertise was not required of them. Boyars performed specific mili­ tary tasks, such as fighting, leading military units, deciding whom to declare war on and whom to ally with, and administering conquered ter­ ritory. The system of local administration was only rudimentary, as was the judicial system. The conduct of foreign relations required little knowl­ edge of international diplomacy and required no knowledge of foreign languages other than perhaps some Tatar and Belorussian. Scribes as­ sisted in the execution of policy but did not challenge the boyars’ ex-

Continuity and Change

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clusivity in leadership and decision making. Whatever help boyars needed was provided by them or by other military servitors, who acted as their aides. As Giles Fletcher pointed out, in the 1580’s the army solved the problem of truly incompetent generals by pairing them with more skilled junior commanders.87From the point of view of the boyar and the state, a boyar’s main concern was not the discharge of these functions but rather competition for power and prestige. To be a boyar meant to protect and enhance one’s family interests, and here the principle of hereditary succes­ sion served well. Beginning in their youth, men who could someday be­ come boyars were groomed to develop the political acumen necessary to compete with other boyars for power and benefits. Reliance on heredity was almost a necessity in the first generations of the boyar elite, when the pool of available servitors was small, and it continued to be valuable to Muscovy’s political actors through the mid-sixteenth century. Nevertheless, there was the problem of the men who were emotionally ill-suited to assume responsibility, and of the men who were truly in­ capable of adapting to the military service that was frequently the dayto-day occupation of men in the boyar elite. One wonders how the elite disposed of such men. Certainly there were few other occupations in Muscovy, and none was socially acceptable for members of the elite. Mer­ chants tended to come from foreign countries or from other classes; their occupation did not have sufficiently high status to attract military men. Chancery servitors were not numerous in the sixteenth century, and their profession, like trade, was disdained by the elite. Professions and colleges were nonexistent. Only one alternative suggests itself: the church. Vocations in the church may have offered a way for the elite to eliminate from eligibility clan members who were unlikely candidates for the posi­ tion of boyar. Certainly piety influenced some men to become part of the church hierarchy or to become a monk, but those men were probably not descended from boyar lines that would gain by having a man at court. Even nonboyar elite families rarely consigned their sons to the church. Examples of elite men taking monastic orders voluntarily are so rare as to suggest that the step was extraordinary. These men considered tonsure politically lethal; nothing short of murder could eliminate a man from the family-based political elite so rapidly as forcing him to be celibate. Many foreigners noted that forcible tonsure was used to expel men from the elite.88 As an example, when the Patrikeev clan was ousted in 1499, its patriarch, Prince Ivan Iur’evich, and his two unmarried sons, Vasilii and Ivan, were forcibly tonsured, and an in-law was murdered. As the monk Vas’ian, Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Patrikeev contributed his opinion when religious controversies arose, but he had no further involvement in boyar politics, nor could he have-the system simply did not allow it.89 Simi-

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larly, from the 1590*5 on Boris Godunov eliminated his rivals in the Iur’ev clan by banishing, murdering, or tonsuring them. A few survived his purges —notably Fedor Nikitich Romanov, who was forcibly tonsured in 1601. As Patriarch Filaret, he became the power behind the throne dur­ ing the reign of his son Mikhail Fedorovich, but he could never assume power as the secular head of the Romanov clan, which he genealogically was. The irrevocability of religious vows precluded this option, and he could not be unfrocked. Muscovy’s political customs gave the elite great flexibility. Hereditary succession provided strong continuity in political recruitment; monastic service may have provided an outlet for disposing of inappropriate heirs to boyar rank; and monastic service and disgrace could be used to elimi­ nate disruptive men. The elite accepted new members, but it avoided dis­ ruption by integrating new men on the basis of patronage, marriage, and years of service. Such flexibility might have allowed this system to con­ tinue indefinitely. But Moscow’s political order did change, however slowly. Robert Crummey, in his study of the seventeenth-century boyar elite, shows the path along which court politics evolved. Between the 1550’s and the end of the seventeenth century, Muscovy’s cohesive elite of boyar families was transformed into a corporate estate. Its political leadership was stratified into four separate ranks and institutionalized in a large Boyar Duma that was supported by numerous court functionaries. In general, power was wielded by a small inner circle of boyars; boyars outside the inner circle were mere executors of decisions made by the powerful few.90The reasons for this Weberian transformation have not been fully examined; one may have been the expansion of the elite by the 1550’s. As we have seen, the number of families whose men held boyar or okol’nichii rank had in­ creased from и in 1407 to 46 in 1555. The expansion of the political elite meant a gradual abandonment of the ideal of court politics as com­ radely counsel between servitors and sovereign. The expansion was fur­ thered by two political crises —the Oprichnina (1564-72) and the Time of Troubles (1604-13) —that resulted in the creation of rival elite groups. The crises were resolved only when the groups came to terms and united to form a large, integrated elite.91 In addition to the increasing size of the political elite, the court’s de­ mand for expertise generated change. Beginning in the late fifteenth cen­ tury, expansion in Muscovy’s contacts abroad, in its territory, and in the state’s claim to judicial authority necessitated the development of a more complex administration. This began a process of gradual change in the political customs described here. The state found the managerial person-

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nel it needed by increasing the number of boyars and okol’nichie at court. By the seventeenth century, boyars were changing their career patterns in response to the changing times: they took over leadership of the major ministries (prikazy). They also integrated some scribes into court rank.92 In that century, the number of boyars increased dramatically, making heredity a cumbersome principle for regulating political advancement. Heredity continued to determine the membership of the inner circle, but for the majority of boyars, okoPnichie, and men in other court ranks it was supplemented by service, favoritism, and expertise. By the time precedence was abolished in 1682, many of the rules and principles that had traditionally governed political relationships were no longer being observed. Let us review the rules that determined how men became boyars in Moscow and thus became eligible to play the game of politics in the Kremlin. The fundamental principle regulating political advancement at the Kremlin court from the fourteenth century to the mid-sixteenth cen­ tury was inheritance: only men belonging to established boyar lines could become boyars or okoPnichie. Those lines, as we have seen, separated from other lines in the clan as families expanded. Men in boyar lines as­ sumed their rank according to a succession system governed by various restrictions. In general, men could not succeed to offices that had not been held by their fathers, and they could become boyars or okoPnichie only after reaching a certain age, even if their senior kinsmen had died and a place was open at court. The requirement of a minimum age was flexible, however; its enforcement was dependent on the power of one’s family. Men served in various military and court positions both before and after becoming a boyar, but there was no rigid hierarchy of ranks that necessarily led to the position of boyar. Boyars’ service careers did not differ significantly from those of nonboyars, and particular combinations of service positions did not open the door to a boyar position. An il­ lustrious service career served to complement the status a man acquired as a consequence of belonging to a certain kinship group and derived from his marital and personal connections. Finally, a man took his place at court only with the agreement of those who were already boyars and okoPnichie. The withholding of such approval could only delay (not pre­ vent) accession to a boyar position. In only one or two instances was a man who was eligible for a boyar position bypassed in favor of other kinsmen. These men were either brought into power before their turn came to succeed, or were from excluded lines (see Chapter 2). Never was a clan’s right to succeed denied entirely, except when a member of the clan

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had suffered disgrace. During this period the 93 families in 59 clans that had the right to have boyars at court did in fact place them there, in ac­ cordance with the various “rules of the game.” Since hereditary succession was intended to eliminate the element of chance in political advancement, ambitious individuals did not concen­ trate on the goal of becoming a boyar, unless they were outsiders vying to attain boyar status. Therefore, boyars directed their energies to the com­ petition for power. Drawing upon their skills and shrewdness, they con­ structed networks of allies, patronized lesser families, blocked rivals, and formed marriage alliances. In all of this they relied upon heredity, family and personal loyalties, and particularly on ties made by marriage.

♦ CHAPTER 4 +

Marriage Politics

S inc e h er ed ity g o v er n e d succession to boyar rank, men who were not boyars devoted their energy to winning a place among the hereditary boyar families. Men in the rank, meanwhile, concentrated on increasing their power relative to other boyars. Their competition created a hier­ archy among the boyars at the top of which were the most powerful few. The inner circle that they formed was described by Jacques Margeret in about 1606: “The privy council is customarily made up of those closely related by blood to the emperor and meets in matters of great conse­ quence.” 1He thus revealed the principle by which the Muscovite boyars’ hierarchy of power was determined: kinship with the grand-princely family.

Hierarchy and the Primacy of Marriage That boyars maintained a hierarchy of power and prestige is clear from numerous references in Muscovite sources. Several such indications can be mentioned. Through the mid-sixteenth century, lists of signatories of grand-princely charters and wills consistently reflect a hierarchy, as do rosters of clans in genealogical books.2 One fifteenth-century source records the hierarchy of the boyars and their wives who were “bypassed in status” when Prince Ivan Patrikeevich arrived from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.3 Similarly, clans guarded their status jealously by the use of precedence disputes. Another indication of the existence of a hierarchy among the boyars is the fact that in fourteenth-century sources, the powerful few were frequently singled out as “senior boyars” (stareishie) 4 or the fact that the History o f the Grand Prince o f Moscow attributed to Prince Andrei Kurbskii occasionally refers to the sovereign’s “rada using an anomalous term meaning “council.” Similarly, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, foreigners described a group of boyars they called the “privy council” or “the Senators.” 5 Crummey has shown that the hierarchy continued into the seventeenth century: “Over the course of the seventeenth century, a group of four interrelated families oc-

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cupied the central position in the network of marriage that bound to­ gether almost all families of the court.” 6 Finally, Kotoshikhin speaks of the tsar’s “intimates” (blizhnye boiare or blizhniki).7 These references to an elite within the boyar elite have suggested to his­ torians the existence of institutional distinctions as well, but this in­ terpretation should be reconsidered. Some historians have asserted that boyars were divided into “senior” and “junior” boyars according to so­ cial class attitude, ideological viewpoint, or length of time in the elite.8 But the phrase “junior men” does not refer to the existence of political institutions; rather, it pejoratively connotes men who gave unwise coun­ sel.9 Furthermore, the collective terms that refer to the powerful few bo­ yars - stareishie, blizhnye boiare, and privy council - occur rarely, suggest­ ing that they do not denote permanent and primary aspects of Muscovite politics. Boyars enjoyed differing degrees of power, but their political cus­ toms did not formalize such distinctions, and such formalization is not indicated in Muscovite sources through the 1550’s; therefore, we modem students of Russian history should not assume it. Nor was the hierarchy of power among the boyars formalized in an institution such as a “King’s Council.” Anthony Grobovsky has demonstrated that the “privy coun­ cil,” or “chosen council” (blizhniaia duma, izbrannaia rada), long as­ sumed by historians to have existed during Ivan’s reign, was in fact never an institution per se, that there was no fixed membership in such a group, and that it took no distinctive political stance.10 “Chosen council” and “Boyar Duma” are among the terms of convenience that have been invented retroactively by historians11 and do not accurately portray Muscovite politics as described in sources through the mid-sixteenth century.12 Those sources refer to hierarchy but not to institutionally for­ malized divisions among boyars. As Veselovskii claimed, a small group can be identified within the boyars at any one time13: these are the men who signed documents first, who are mentioned in the sources more fre­ quently than other boyars, and who carried out the most important as­ signments, such as leading campaigns and conducting important negotia­ tions. Other boyars are mentioned less frequently and are recorded as serving in less important roles and as signing documents below more powerful men. The size and composition of the most responsible group varied and can only be estimated on the basis of extant political records. We should therefore adopt a terminology and an approach that accu­ rately reflect the personal bias of political relationships, as suggested by Kotoshikhin’s phrase, “intimates.” We might refer to the most responsible group as the “top” of the hierar­ chy, but given the thesis advanced here-that a man did not become a boyar by advancing up a service hierarchy - perhaps a more appropriate

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image is that of concentric circles around the sovereign. All boyars had access to the sovereign, but a privileged few were closest to him and were most directly involved in the exercise of power. As Heinrich von Staden, a German mercenary oprichnik, observed: “Whoever was close to the Grand Prince became scorched, and whoever was distant froze.” 14 Let us join Edward Keenan and Robert Crummey in calling the privileged few an “inner circle,” mindful that its size and composition varied with politi­ cal circumstances.15 Through the mid-sixteenth century, the inner circle was dominated by between one and four boyar families. The rest of the boyar families may have been their clients, or they may have been power­ ful families in their own right but not among the dominant clans in a particular generation. Clearly, these other boyar families were less in­ volved in decision making, but they were by no means excluded. A boyar became a member of the inner circle by winning the favor of the grand prince and the support of a significant number of boyars, and by developing a strong network of allies. Once having gained membership, he often solidified that position by marriage. In the period with which we are concerned (from the fourteenth century to the 1550’s), the leading boyars in the inner circle enhanced their position by establishing kin­ ship with the grand prince. Foreign travelers noticed this practice. Giles Fletcher, an English envoy to Muscovy in the 1580’s, was aware of politi­ cal leaders’ marriage and kinship ties and of the preeminence of a select group of boyars: “All matters are advised and determined upon by Boris Fedorovich Godunov, brother to the empress, with some five or six more whom it pleaseth him to call.” Fletcher explains that the position of the Godunov clan was “advanced by the marriage of the empress their kins­ woman” and attributes the high status of another of the favored boyars to the fact that “he hath married Boris his wife’s sister.” 16Antonio Possevino, a papal legate who visited Moscow from 1581 to 1582 to arrange a truce between Stephen Batory and Ivan IV, identified as the “twelve Senators” who “hear cases and refer the more serious to [the tsar]” a group pri­ marily including relatives of the sovereign.17Margeret described the privy council as consisting of the close relatives of the grand prince; Crummey showed that this trend continued through the seventeenth century.18 Marriage is a powerful instrument for creating reciprocal obligations between social groups. Cultural anthropologists such as Claude LéviStrauss and Marcel Mauss popularized the idea that alliances by mar­ riage can create trust between otherwise antagonistic groups or families.19 To each family, the son or daughter of the other family physically repre­ sents the alliance between them, and children born of the union perpetu­ ate the relationship. Marriage was a particularly effective form of associa­ tion for elites in premodern societies, since it could be used to control the

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devolution of property and to forge enduring political links. Boyars and dynasts in Muscovy, like West European kings and noblemen, regarded marriage as a political act. Sovereigns used marriage to cement alliances and acquire property.20 Marriage was an act so politically potent that it could provoke war, as for example when Ivan Ill’s government broke with Grand Prince Mikhail Borisovich of Tver’ “because he [Mikhail] wished to marry into the family of the King of Poland and had taken an oath to that effect.” 21 The Muscovite court used marriage to maintain political dependence. Muscovy’s client princes in Kazan’, for example, sought the sovereign’s permission to marry.22 Conversely, the court also prevented marriages for political reasons. Ivan III and his successors delayed or pre­ vented the marriages of some appanage princes in order to hinder the es­ tablishment of rival lines in the dynasty. To prevail in the intense competi­ tion among boyar families for power in the 1580*5 and i59o’s, Boris Godunov forbade the Mstislavskii princes from marrying; the first False Dmitrii allowed these bachelors to wed in 1605.23 In the seventeenth cen­ tury, grand-princely daughters were purposely not married in order to prevent the establishment of conflicting political alliances at court. Even Peter I arranged marriages for his boyars.24 New families often enhanced their position in the elite through mar­ riage alliances with boyar clans; such matches did not guarantee the con­ ferral of boyar rank but helped immigrants and other new families build a political network. (As mentioned in Chapter 3, men in the second gen­ eration of such families were typically allowed to become boyars. By then the newcomer family had usually become part of a Muscovite kinship group.25) Marriage created ties between boyar clans that were enforced daily: men called upon their fathers-in-law, brothers-in-law, or other kinsmen to witness important documents,26 and powerful boyars brought their sons-in-law to court with them as boyars.27 Like kinship relations, marriage ties did not guarantee political loyalty, but they helped consoli­ date political networks and created opportunities for alliances. Marriage with the grand-princely family automatically gave the boyars associated with it highest status and was the definitive determinant of political status.28 Competition for such a marriage - what we might call “marriage politics” - generated political conflict at court: families schemed to arrange the marriage of one of their females to an adolescent heir to the throne in the Daniilovich dynasty. Once such a match was agreed upon, the new Daniilovich male in-law and his allies and kinsmen dominated the boyar elite for at least a generation and usually longer. Sources clearly emphasize the significance of the grand-princely wedding. Rosters of the participants in grand-princely marriage ceremonies were deemed so important that they were placed at the beginning of official

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military service books.29Members of Mikhail Romanov’s court, intent on restoring tradition, made copies of sixteenth-century Daniilovich wed­ ding rosters, presumably so that Mikhail’s own wedding in 1624 would follow established patterns.30 Grand-princely wedding rosters continued to be kept at court through the eighteenth century.31 Grigorii Kotoshikhin, writing in the seventeenth century, confirmed the traditional political importance of the grand-princely marriage. Much of what he described reflected change in Muscovite politics and govern­ ment, but his discussion of the family lives of the tsar and the boyars indi­ cates that some customs remained unchanged. The significance of the grand-princely marriage and the existence of an inner circle among the boyars were remnants of the court politics of earlier centuries. Kotoshi­ khin was an undersecretary (pod'iachii) of the Muscovite Foreign Affairs Chancery who emigrated to Sweden in 1664 and later joined the service of the Swedish king, for whom he wrote an accurate and insightful descrip­ tion of the Muscovite court. He included information about the tsar’s pal­ ace life, his administration, and the size and sources of his revenues —all that Kotoshikhin felt his Swedish patrons should know about their rival court. A modem reader may be surprised to find that Kotoshikhin de­ voted his first chapter (one of his longest) to the tsar’s family life; he de­ scribed the tsar’s wedding ceremony in minute detail. Similarly, in his con­ cluding chapter on the home life of the boyars, he described the boyars’ marriage customs.32 Marriages were, in Kotoshikhin’s account, politically essential. His account is all the more important because it reflects the naive ideology of autocracy that the Muscovite court promoted and also because it reveals behind that façade important principles of Muscovite political reality. Kotoshikhin did not identify the significance of the grand prince’s wed­ ding directly. That must be deduced by readers, for his description of the sovereign wedding rites was extremely (although possibly not consciously) deceptive. He presented reliable information on such matters as the bu­ reaucracy and the state income, but he described political relations in a naive, unrealistic way. For example, he accurately reported that the Romanov clan in the seventeenth century did not allow its daughters to marry. One can readily understand that such a policy would prevent the Romanov clan from becoming entangled in conflicting foreign and do­ mestic alliances. But Kotoshikhin threw up the following explanatory façade: And it is not allowed that they marry princes and boyars of this state, since their princes and boyars are slaves and even in their petitions call themselves slaves and so it would place [the daughters] in eternal humiliation if the sov­ ereign gave [them] to a slave; and it is not allowed that they marry heirs to

12 6

Marriage Politics

thrones or princes from other states because they are not of one faith and it is not allowed to change one’s faith and desecrate one’s own; and also be­ cause they do not know the language and politics of other states and would thus bring shame on themselves.33

In this explanation Kotoshikhin ridiculed the Muscovites and thus pan­ dered to the Swedish king. More significantly, he faithfully transmitted the Muscovite ideology of autocracy by creating an impression of auto­ cratic omnipotence and by denying that sovereign marriages have any po­ litical significance. Kotoshikhin’s account of Aleksei Mikhailovich’s wedding is similarly naive, and in that respect it is consistent with traditional Muscovite de­ scriptions of sovereign marriages. (Earlier descriptions of Vasilii Ill’s and Ivan IV’s weddings in 1505 and 1547 were also specious; Kotoshikhin’s account is analyzed here because it is more detailed.34) He described the sovereign consulting with the church patriarch and the assembled boyars on whether to marry, then choosing the daughter of a highly placed man as if by chance: “And the tsar learned that one of his close counselors had a daughter, a maiden of fine stature and beauty and of developed intelli­ gence; and [he] ordered her taken to his palace.” But she died soon there­ after, probably murdered by the jealous boyar families, and the tsar “thought no more of well-born maidens, since he understood that this [death] had occurred because of hate and envy.” Later, in church, he spied the beautiful daughter of a middle-level servitor and chose her for his wife. In the ten pages he devoted to the sovereign wedding ceremony, Ko­ toshikhin promoted the façade of autocracy by depicting the tsar as making decisions unilaterally and by presenting the marriage as a love match made in heaven. The boyars’ practice of traveling throughout the realm to interview potential brides for the grand prince had the same effect. Before Ivan IV’s first marriage in 1547, boyars conducted “view­ ings” (smotriny) in which they examined eligible maidens. Princess Ovdotiia Gundorova, daughter of a provincial servitor and a prospective bride, was described as follows: “She is twelve years old. Her build is average, neither thin nor fat. Her eyes are dark. Her nose not long for her face. Her hair deep auburn. As for illnesses, [her father] Prince Vasilii said that his daughter, Ovdotiia, was ill with fever in infancy but now, thank God, there is no illness.” 35 Viewings and Kotoshikhin’s account depict Muscovite politics as literally autocratic, offering no role for the boyars or other political forces. In point of fact, nothing could be further from reality. Daniilovich wed­ dings were among the most politically choreographed spectacles in Mus­ covy. Since the precedent had been established in 1345 that Daniilovichi could marry into boyar families, all boyars were involved in choosing a

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bride. Such choices as Aleksandra Vel’iaminova in 1345, Princess Mariia Iaroslavovna (the Koshkin kinswoman) in 1433, Solomoniia Saburova in 1505, Princess Elena Glinskaia in 1526, and Anastasiia Romanovna in 1547 so accurately reflect the court political situation that they could not have been arrived at by chance or motivated by love. Once a sovereign’s bride had been chosen, numerous other alliances were made to consolidate the power of boyar groups. After Ivan IV was married in February 1547, for example, his younger brother and cousin quickly followed suit, later in 1547 and in 1549; each married a member of a boyar clan.36 Other Daniilovichi might be married abroad to preclude members of boyar families from marrying them, or they might be married into boyar families to broaden the inner circle or to compensate less suc­ cessful clans. When two men married sisters or two female members of the same family, the result was a solid kinship bloc. For example, the sis­ ter of the woman Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi married in 1366 was married at about that time to the son of a leading boyar; the dual dynastic and boyar marriages helped consolidate the inner circle. Similarly, soon after Vasilii III was married in 1505, his sister married a newly arrived Tatar prince, Kudai-Kul (baptized Petr), and his sister-in-law married a recent immigrant from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Prince Vasilii Starodubskii. The choice of these men served two purposes: it brought new men into the elite and it prevented boyar families from using the weddings of Vasilii Ill’s sister and sister-in-law to promote their own kin or allies in power. A comparable strategy was behind two other mar­ riages: that of Vasilii III to Elena Glinskaia in 1526, and that of her sister to a man from a boyar clan, Prince Ivan Daniilovich Penkov Iaroslavskii, in the autumn of 1527.37 Some Daniilovich marriages resolved crises and others resulted in a significant redistribution of power.38 The grand prince’s marriage remained important through the seven­ teenth century. Crummey shows that seventeenth-century tsars married into insignificant families such as the Naryshkin, the Miloslavskii, and the Lopukhin; the boyars of the inner circle then controlled those families and married into them to create their own kinship links with the sover­ eign. Dynastic marriages with relatively insignificant families prevented any one boyar clan from monopolizing power; eminent boyars, such as Boris Ivanovich Morozov, used such marriages to build their networks of allies. Peter I, intent on increasing his power and rationalizing govern­ ment administration, attempted to abolish traditional Muscovite mar­ riage politics. He decreased the domestic political utility of, and the pre­ dictability concerning, the marriage of the dynastic heir by abolishing the fixed order of succession, making succession appointive. Peter weakened a clan’s control over its womenfolk by proclaiming that betrothed couples

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should have the right to cancel arranged marriages. By forcing women to mix socially, he threatened parents’ ability to arrange marriages. Peter made a divorce more difficult to obtain, thus restricting a clan’s ability to form new alliances for purposes of economic or political advancement.39 Peter violated court tradition by refusing to associate with his in-laws, the Lopukhiny;40he eventually divorced Evdokiia Lopukhina and married an obscure foreigner. Finally, Peter’s absurd “court of fools” —evenings of drunken revelries among Peter and his cronies —mocked important Mus­ covite political and cultural traditions. Peter and his carousing friends not only ridiculed the church but also elaborately parodied court marriage ceremonies, as for example in their grotesque portrayal of the marriage of two dwarfs: “A very little dwarf marched at the head of the procession, as being the marshal. . . . He was followed by the bride and bridegroom neatly dressed. Then came the Czar attended by his ministers, kneeses (princes), boyars, officers, and others; . . . when these diversions were ended, the new married couple were carried to the Czar’s house, and bedded in his own bedchamber.” 41 Peter’s pointed parodies confirm the centrality of marriage in Muscovite society and politics even into the early eighteenth century. Through the mid-sixteenth century, Daniilovich marriages had direct political utility: the grand prince’s marriage was the linchpin of power relations among boyars in each generation.

The Veriaminov Ascendancy, 1345-1433 Muscovy’s inner circle of powerful boyars was usually composed of families related to the grand prince’s clan, plus their kinsmen and allies. Occasionally, in an effort to reach an agreeable balance of power among themselves, the boyars extended the inner circle to include two or three additional families. From the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, changes in the inner circle correlated directly with changing political circum­ stances. From about 1345 to about 1433, when the first inner circle was discernible, as many as six families figured in it; their boyars were men­ tioned more frequently and as serving in more eminent positions than boyars of other families. Although the Akinfovich, Kobylin, Volynskii, Vsevolozh, and Saburov families were prominent during this period, un­ questionably one family dominated power politics: the Vel’iaminovy. They were known for their military leadership in Moscow, and they were wealthy. They confirmed their dominance at court by a marriage with the Daniilovich clan in 1345: Aleksandra, daughter of the patriarch of the clan, Vasilii Protas’evich Vel’iaminov, married Prince Ivan Ivanovich, brother of Grand Prince Semen the Proud. Ivan Ivanovich later himself

Marriage Politics

i 29

became grand prince (Ivan II) in 1353.42 From 1345 to the 1430’s, the Vel’iaminov family maintained various grand-princely marriage links. The ways in which powerful boyar families used a marriage relation­ ship with the sovereign to solidify their power varied. The VePiaminov match meant that Grand Prince Ivan Ivanovich’s sons would be cousins of the next Vel’iaminov generation, so the Vel’iaminovy could dominate the inner circle for a few generations without necessarily establishing another sovereign marriage relationship. In such circumstances, the second gen­ eration’s grand prince could be married outside the principality, for for­ eign policy reasons, without threatening the inner circle’s hold on power. Kinship with the sovereign was not the inner circle’s only link to power. Powerful boyar families could prevent one family from monopolizing power by influencing the grand prince to choose a bride from an obscure family. This situation occurred at the turn of the sixteenth century and became the norm in the seventeenth century. Since kinship links endured from generation to generation, inner circles were remarkably continuous. Between 1345 and 1547, only four different inner circle groupings can be identified.43 One reason for the preeminence of the Vel’iaminovy was that some of them held the rank of thousandman (tysiatskii) in Moscow; however, the Vel’iaminovy remained preeminent at court long after the death in 1373 of the position’s last Vel’iaminov incumbent, Vasilii Vasil’evich. Vasilii Protas’evich and his sons, Vasilii, Fedor Voronets, and Timofei, were all boyars from the 1340’s to 1380’s.44 Their signatures on grand-princely wills and charters of this period appeared in first or second place. In his will Grand Prince Semen the Proud referred to Vasilii Protas’evich as his “uncle” - a term of affection for his brother Ivan’s father-in-law. Vasilii Vasil’evich in the next generation was similarly called “uncle” by Dmitrii Donskoi, and in this case the term was used not only affectionately but literally.45 The Vel’iaminov family has been depicted in many instances in close association with the Daniilovichi. Vasilii Vasil’evich’s widow, Mariia Mikhailovna, is mentioned in 1389 as the godmother of Donskoi’s last son. Her husband’s death and funeral are mentioned in the chron­ icles —something rarely done for secular individuals.46 The Vel’iaminov faction in the inner circle possibly broadened in the 1370’s, when Dmitrii Bobrok Volynskii became an affine of the Vel’iaminovy by marrying Dmitrii Donskoi’s sister.47 Ironically, the death of Grand Prince Ivan Ivanovich in 1359 helped the Vel’iaminovy to build a strong power base at court. He was succeeded by his nine-year-old son, Dmitrii. At the time, Grand Prince Dmitrii’s closest living relatives were his uncle, the boyar and thousandman Vasilii Vasil’evich Vel’iaminov; his mother, Vel’iaminov’s sister; his five-year-old

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brother, Ivan; two sisters; his six-year-old cousin, Vladimir Andreevich, and his other uncles in the VePiaminov clan, Fedor and Timofei Vasil’evichi. After Vasilii VePiaminov’s sister Aleksandra (Donskoi’s mother) died in 1363, he appointed himself kingmaker of his generation and ar­ ranged the marriage of the young grand prince so as to unite his own clan with the ruling house. “Vasilii Vasil’evich the thousandman married off his son Mikula, taking the eldest daughter of Grand Prince Dmitrii Konstantinovich [of SuzdaP], and for Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi, he took the younger daughter.” 48 The grand prince’s marriage outside the boyar elite with a princess from SuzdaP served to give Moscow a useful ally and also enhanced the VePiaminovy’s close relations with the Daniilovichi. As a result of his mar­ riage, Mikula VasiPevich, who was already Dmitrii Donskoi’s cousin, became his brother-in-law as well. The offspring of Mikula and of Grand Prince Dmitrii were thus cousins of each other, rather than the sec­ ond cousins they would have been as a result of the 1345 Vel’iaminovDaniilovich marriage alliance. In 1390, Dmitrii Donskoi’s son, Vasilii, was married to Sofiia, daughter of Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania.49 This match was intended to further foreign policy strategies and was rela­ tively unrelated to domestic politics, since the inner circle (dominated by the Vel’iaminovy) was already firmly ensconced. Prince Vasilii’s marriage protected the VePiaminovy’s power by depriving other boyar clans of an opportunity to form a kinship alliance with the sovereign. Regulating succession on the basis of heredity can result in a stable po­ litical elite because hereditary succession tends to ensure continuity over generations. However, it can also wreak havoc in the lives of individuals, for infertility and early death can radically alter the best laid political plans. This was the fate of the VePiaminov clan. By the early years of Vasilii I’s reign (1389-1425), it was evident that the boyar lines of the clan would not perpetuate themselves. Timofei VasiPevich and Ivan Fedorovich died sometime after 1389, leaving the clan with no obvious patriarch. Timofei’s only son, Semen, predeceased him, ending that line, while Ivan Fedorovich’s son, Nikita, was then apparently quite young —he is not men­ tioned in service until the 1420’s. In the elder line, Vasilii VePiaminov’s eldest son had been banished from the elite because of his attempted trea­ son in 1375; his two other sons, Mikula and Poluekht, had died with­ out male heirs, in 1380 and in the 1390’s, respectively. Dmitrii Bobrok Volynskii had also probably died by i39o.S0Only the VePiaminov women were still alive. They included the widows of Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi and of Mikula VasiPevich, who were the princesses of SuzdaP mentioned previously; Mariia Mikhailovna, the widow of Vasilii Vasil’e-

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vich; and the widow of Dmitrii Volynskii, Princess Anna, who was an aunt of the grand prince. Vasilii I also had one adult male kinsman, his first cousin once removed. Prince Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov, who was seventeen years older and may have been his ally and confidant.51 The Vel’iaminov clan was dying out, but its link with the Daniilovichi pro­ vided an opportunity for other families in the inner circle of boyars to vie for supreme power. In the 1390’s, two of the surviving women in the Vel’iaminov clan were married to men from two of the most important clans of the pe­ riod. Mikula Vasil’evich’s surviving daughter married Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh, who was already an important boyar. Another Vel’iaminov woman, named Mariia, who was probably the daughter of Poluekht Vasil’evich or of Semen Timofeevich, married Fedor Goltiai, of the Koshkin family.52The result of these two Vel’iaminov marriages was to pass on the Vel’iaminov mantle to a new inner circle, but at the same time to dis­ tribute power within the elite, thus ensuring a more broadly based con­ sensus. In the generation following these marriages, various families struggled to establish their primacy. The situation existing in the 1390’s provides a good example of the working of marriage politics. At times one family (such as the Vel’iaminovy in the late fourteenth century and the Patrikeevy one hundred years later) and its broader kinship and patronage groups monopolized power at court. (They are the men mentioned almost exclusively as serving in the highest positions.) At other times no one family could monopolize power. Sources reveal that as many as four families predominated, and the histo­ rian cannot readily distinguish a pecking order. As the Vel’iaminov clan began to dissolve, its monopoly was replaced by a broader distribution of power in the inner circle. The political hierarchy was rearranged in 1408 when Prince Patrikei Narimuntovich and his son Iurii arrived in Moscow as members of the entourage of Svitrigaila, a Gedyminid pretender to the Lithuanian throne. Svitrigaila soon returned to join the struggles in the Grand Duchy, but the Patrikeev princes remained. Prince Patrikei was the first cousin once re­ moved of Grand Princess Sofiia Vitovtovna, wife of Vasilii I, and he man­ aged within a decade of his arrival to forge an even closer alliance with the ruling family. By 1417 his son Prince Iurii was a boyar, and in 1418 Iurii married Vasilii I’s daughter Anna.53 The Vsevolozh and Koshkin families had to make room for the Patrikeevy, who gradually built up their influence in Muscovite politics. For the first two decades of the fifteenth century, these three clans were members of the inner circle; the three wills of Vasilii I, written from

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ca. 1406 to 1423, show that five families shared power: the Patrikeevy, Vsevolozhi, Koshkiny, Cheliadniny, and Saburovy.54 The first three of these were all mentioned prominently in other sources, but the name of Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh predominates. He visited the Golden Horde on Vasilii II’s behalf in 1425, when succession to the Muscovite throne was disputed; he also signed numerous charters.55 After the Vsevolozhi, the next most important family was the Koshkiny. In a letter of 1408 from Emir Edigei to Vasilii I, Ivan Fedorovich is mentioned as Moscow’s “se­ nior boyar” (stareishina); he also frequently signed charters and grandprincely wills. Ivan and his brothers held boyar positions at court steadily through the 1420’s.56 Prince Iurii Patrikeevich is not frequently men­ tioned in the sources of this period, but when he is mentioned, he ranks above all the other boyars. Prince Iurii signed two of Vasilii I’s wills, and he is depicted in sources as being closely associated with the royal family. When Grand Prince Vasilii II’s palace was burned in 1445, for example, he lived for a time in Prince Iurii’s home in the Kremlin.57 His career dem­ onstrates the fact that very powerful boyars are sometimes not as visible in the sources as are their more competitive peers.58 Although the important families maintained a balance of power in the first three decades of the fifteenth century, their ambition for primacy dominated court politics. The Patrikeevy married into the grand-princely clan in 1418, as we have seen. Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh also arranged two marriages calculated to strengthen his kinship with the grand-princely clan. Himself married to a cousin of Vasilii I, Ivan in the 1410’s married his daughter Elena to Vasilii I’s second cousin, Prince Andrei Vladimiro­ vich of Radonezh. In 1420/21 Vsevolozh married another daughter to the heir to the throne of Tver’, Prince Iurii Ivanovich. His plans, however, were thwarted by the 1420’s, when the plague claimed both Prince Iurii and Prince Andrei, leaving only the daughter of Prince Andrei and Elena, Vsevolozh’s grandchild.59 The Koshkin family matched these two Vsevolozh alliances with two of its own. In 1406/7, for example, Fedor Fedorovich Goltiai Koshkin married his daughter to the widower Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich of Borovsk, who was also the grand prince’s sec­ ond cousin.60 The boyar elite in the early decades of the fifteenth century was exten­ sive: at any one time it consisted of as many as ten boyars from about 13 families. But power in the inner circle was securely held by three families (Patrikeev, Vsevolozh, Koshkin), all of whom had marriage ties with the grand-princely family. The process of determining which family would gain a monopoly of power (as had the Vel’iaminovy in previous genera­ tions) took time: men assiduously curried the favor of the grand prince, recruited retinues, and garnered the support of the other boyars. The

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marriage of one of their daughters or kinswomen to the heir to the throne, Vasilii VasiPevich (Vasilii II), was the goal of each family’s intricate strategy.

The Rise of the Patrikeevy, 1433-99 In the early 1430’s, Vasilii II’s search for a marriage partner affected foreign policy and domestic politics. When Vasilii I died in 1425, he had left a ten-year-old son as his sole heir; three other sons had predeceased him (Iurii, Ivan, and Daniil). Young Prince Vasilii was quickly acknowl­ edged as the heir by most of the boyars and of the deceased grand prince’s brothers and kinsmen, but his accession by linear succession was not uni­ versally supported. One uncle of the new grand prince, Prince Iurii Dmitrievich of Galich, claimed the throne by collateral succession. Ini­ tially the young Vasilii II’s boyar supporters withstood Prince Iurii’s claim, with the backing of the khan of the Golden Horde and of Grand Duke Vytautas, the young heir’s uncle. Eventually, however, the events sur­ rounding Vasilii II’s wedding allowed Prince Iurii to defy the underage grand prince and to seize Moscow.61 The closest kinsmen and advisers of the grand prince in Moscow dur­ ing this period of tension when Prince Iurii raised his challenge were his uncles (including his father’s brothers and Prince Iurii Patrikeevich), the boyars Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh and the Koshkin men, and several women: his mother, Sofiia Vitovtovna; Vasilii IPs sister, Anna, wife of Prince Iurii Patrikeevich; Elena Vel’iaminova, wife of Prince Petr Dmitrie­ vich; Mariia Goltiaeva, widow of Fedor Goltiai Koshkin and a Vel’iami­ nova; Elena, widow of Prince Andrei of Radonezh and daughter of Ivan Vsevolozh; Mariia Goltiaeva, widow of Prince Iaroslav of Borovsk and Serpukhov and daughter of Fedor Goltiai Koshkin. Vasilii II and the bo­ yars in the inner circle or some group of them agreed that Vasilii II should marry a sister of a key appanage prince whose loyalty was needed: Prince Vasilii Iaroslavovich of Borovsk and Serpukhov.62 Prince Vasilii ruled an appanage on the border with Lithuania, and the Kremlin court under­ standably feared that some political faction in the Grand Duchy would try to take advantage of Muscovy’s internal dissensions by wooing such a border prince. This match with Princess Mariia Iaroslavovna of Borovsk and Serpukhov was arranged simultaneously with another that linked two men through sisters: Prince Vasilii Iaroslavovich’s other sister mar­ ried Prince Mikhail of Vereia, whose appanage holdings were similarly strategically located.63 Ostensibly these matches served foreign policy purposes, but they also climaxed the three-way struggle for predominance in the inner circle. Be-

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cause the new bride of Vasilii II was not only the daughter of an appanage prince but the granddaughter of Fedor Fedorovich Goltiai Koshkin and Mariia VePiaminova, the Koshkin family was the real victor in that com­ petition. Contemporaries recognized this marriage as a success for the Koshkiny: the author of one later fifteenth-century chronicle notes the bride’s princely and boyar heritages, calling her “Princess Mariia, daughter of Iaroslav and granddaughter of Mariia Goltiaeva [Mariia Veliaminova, wife of Goltiai].” 64 Certainly Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh recognized that the marriage had dashed his hopes for exclusive power. He defected to Galich and won a powerful place in Prince Iurii’s inner circle by arranging the marriage of his own orphaned granddaughter, the daughter of Elena Vsevolozha and Prince Andrei Vladimirovich of Radonezh, to Prince Vasilii Kosoi, son of Prince Iurii of Galich. The marriage took place by February 1433, almost simultaneously with Vasilii II’s nuptials; the paral­ lel is doubly striking in that the brides were both granddaughters of the rival boyars, Ivan Vsevolozh and Fedor Goltiai of the Koshkin clan.65 Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh*s defection also provided Prince Iurii with suffi­ cient political momentum to initiate a dynastic war that lasted from 1433 to the late 1440’s. In Chapter 5 we shall examine the problem of succes­ sion in the Daniilovich dynasty, that war’s basic cause. Here we will con­ sider the connection between its outbreak and marriage politics in the Kremlin court. Contemporary chronicles —and those written in the sixteenth century, when marriage politics was still being practiced —associated this wedding with the outbreak of dynastic war.66 One allegorical account, written after the strife had ended in the 1450’s and repeated in several later edi­ tions of the chronicle, did so particularly emphatically. The chronicler, who recounted the story “because so much evil came of this,” blamed the rebellion of the Galich princes on an insult inflicted on them by the grand prince’s mother and the boyars at Vasilii II’s wedding in 1433. The tale confirms that weddings were events charged with the spirit of competi­ tion.67 The two sons of Prince Iurii Dmitrievich, Prince Vasilii Kosoi and Prince Dmitrii Shemiaka, were depicted as attending Vasilii II’s wedding with no intention of making trouble. Prince Vasilii, however, wore a jewelstudded belt of gold he had received from Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh as part of the dowry of Vsevolozh’s granddaughter. This belt, the chronicler recounted, had been stolen in 1366 from the dowry of Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi by the boyar Vasilii Vasil’evich Vel’iaminov, at the time when Vel’iaminov’s son Mikula and his nephew Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi married two sisters, the princesses from Suzdal’ mentioned pre­ viously. Vasilii Vel’iaminov is said to have given it to his son Mikula, who in turn gave the belt to his son-in-law, Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh, who

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bestowed it on his daughter’s bridegroom, Prince Andrei Vladimirovich of Radonezh. After Prince Andrei’s death, Vsevolozh gave the belt to his granddaughter’s husband, Prince Vasilii Kosoi. According to the tale, when a Koshkin informed Grand Princess Sofiia Vitovtovna that her father-in-law’s purloined belt was being worn at her son’s wedding, she seized it from Kosoi. Incensed, he rushed off with his brother to Galich to plot rebellion against the grand prince.68 This tale has been justifiably called a fable,69 since it is simplistic and allegorical: an argument at the wedding may have provoked a feud, but only the involvement of powers such as Novgorod and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could have turned a boyar vendetta and the Daniilovich clan’s succession struggle into a war for regional power. Although it is un­ likely that the tale is true in all its details, its themes are significant. It shows how successive marriage alliances enabled Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh to reach the threshold of exclusive power, and thereby it illus­ trates that marriage with the sovereign was the fundamental way to achieve, and affirm, eminence. And because family solidarity was strong, insults to family honor, even if contrived by the chronicler in this case, were just causes for violent retribution. By the time the dust had settled after the dynastic war in the 1450’s, the Patrikeev family was clearly predominant; its successful politicking coin­ cided with the temporary decline of the Koshkin family. In the 1430’s and 1440’s, the adult men of the Koshkin family died, leaving no male heirs to safeguard their family’s interests in the 1450’s and 1460’s. At the time of the wedding in 1433, the family was represented at court by the boyars Andrei Fedorovich Goltiaev and Zakharii Ivanovich Koshkin. Andrei died in 1445; Zakharii is not mentioned after 1433 and probably died by the 1450’s.70The family was left with the two sons of Zakharii, Iakov and Iurii Zakhar’ichi, who were born in the 1440’s or 1450’s and thus were too young to be boyars. It had only its womenfolk to represent it at court; they were, admittedly, a powerful group. Mariia Goltiaeva, née Vel’iaminova, widow of Fedor Goltiai Koshkin, lived into the 1440’s; her daugh­ ter, Princess Mariia Iaroslavovna, the wife of Vasilii II, lived until 1485.71 Even though the Koshkin family had no adult male serving as a boyar from the 1440’s to about 1479, it did not lose status. Iakov and Iurii Zakhar’ichi Koshkiny took second or third place in the boyar hierarchy when they reached the required age starting in 1479. The Patrikeevy took advantage of the absence of the Koshkin family from the boyar hierarchy by establishing new kinship ties to other fami­ lies in the elite. They started with a strong association with the grandprincely family: Prince Iurii Patrikeevich was the brother-in-law of Vasilii II; when he and Vasilii II died, their sons (who were cousins) were close

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associates.72 The Patrikeevy’s decision to marry Prince Iurii’s daughter to the son of Mikhail Cheliadnia of the Akinfovich clan was evidence of that clan’s continued representation in the inner circle. Prince Ivan Iur’evich’s marriage to a woman from the Khovrin clan elevated that family in the hierarchy-an example of how influential the Patrikeevy were.73 The signatures on Vasilii II’s will in 1461-6274 reveal which clans had real power at the end of the dynastic war. The first signatory was Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeevich. His sister’s brother-in-law, Fedor Mikhailo­ vich Cheliadnin, signed a codicil of the will with him. The second and third signatories —Ivan Ivanovich Vsevolozh and Vasilii Ivanovich Sobakin —belonged to clans that were within one generation of dying out in their boyar lines. The fourth signatory, Fedor Vasil’evich Basenok, was a new boyar whose family would be ousted from the elite in disgrace within a decade. Signatures of the Koshkin family are nowhere in evidence be­ cause its male members were too young at the time. Boyars from most of the other new clans were not yet sufficiently integrated into the elite to be able to advance to the top of the hierarchy. The Obolenskii and Riapolovskii princes, for instance, although boyars, were a few decades away from achieving power in the inner circle. The opportunity for the Patrikeevy to excel over other families was good. Prince Ivan Iur’evich Parikeev used that opportunity to the fullest. He established a tightly knit group of kinsmen at court, thus creating an inner circle analogous to that created by the Vel’iaminovy in the late four­ teenth century. (Gustave Alef calls this the Patrikeevy’s “nepotic bloc.” 75) Prince Ivan’s kinship group included the Khovrin clan, whose patriarch, his father-in-law Vladimir Grigor’evich Khovra, from the 1460’s was also a boyar at court. Fedor Mikhailovich Cheliadnin may also have been an ally; however, his family link with the Patrikeevy was severed when his older brother, who was married to Prince Ivan’s sister, died without heirs. By the mid-1470’s, Prince Ivan had his nephews, Prince Ivan Bulgak and Prince Dmitrii Shchenia, made boyars, even though they were technically excluded: their father, Prince Vasilii Iur’evich, had apparently died too young to have become a boyar. Prince Ivan patronized one of the princely families at court by marrying his daughter Mariia to Prince Semen Ivano­ vich Riapolovskii, and in the 1470’s Prince Semen became a fixture in the inner circle. In the i49o’s, Prince Ivan Iur’evich’s eldest surviving son, Vasilii, joined his father, his uncle (Dmitrii Vladimirovich Khovrin), his cousins (Prince Ivan Bulgak and Daniil Shchenia Vasil’evichi), and his brother-in-law (Prince Semen Ivanovich Riapolovskii) at court. By 1495, six of the 17 boyars and okol’nichie at court were Patrikeev kin.76 They are also mentioned much more frequently than other boyars in sources compiled during the reign of Ivan III —often as serving alongside one an-

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other.77 In the wake of the conquest of Novgorod, the Patrikeevy also used their power to amass wealth and land in an amount far in excess of what other families acquired.78 So firm was the Patrikeevy’s control of power at court from the 1460’s through the 1490’s that Ivan III chose his second bride (his first wife died in 146779) from abroad, for diplomatic reasons. From 1469 to 1471, when the decision was made that Ivan III should marry Sofiia Palaeologa, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor,80 Ivan Ill’s closest kinsmen and advisers were his mother-Princess Mariia Iaroslavovna of Borovsk and Serpukhov, a Koshkin granddaughter-and several boyars and boyars’ wives: Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev; his wife, Evdokiia Khovrina; per­ haps his widowed sister, Elena Cheliadnina; and perhaps his widowed sister-in-law, Princess Mariia. Boyars in the Riapolovskii and Khovrin clans were associated by marriage with this advisory council. Iakov Zakhar’ich of the Koshkin clan was alive, as may have been Petr Fedorovich Cheliadnin. Ivan III married Sofiia Palaeologa in November 1472. The choice of Sofiia was motivated by Muscovy’s desire for prestige in the West and its need to acquire foreign military, manufacturing, engineering, and construction technologies. Sofiia’s sponsors in the Vatican, mean­ while, were hoping to commit Ivan III to an anti-Turkish alliance.81 A sec­ ond marriage in the Daniilovich clan, contracted in 1480, also shows the Patrikeevy’s dominance of marriage politics. The marriage of Elena Stepanovna of Moldavia to Ivan Ill’s eldest son by his first marriage. Prince Ivan Ivanovich Molodoi (“the Younger”), further strengthened Daniilovich-Patrikeev kinship relations. (It was also a step toward entan­ gling Muscovy in an anti-Turkish and anti-Polish alliance in Eastern Eu­ rope.) Elena of Moldavia was a first cousin once removed of both Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev and Ivan III. All three were descended from chil­ dren of Vasilii I: Elena’s mother was Vasilii I’s daughter Anastasiia, Patrikeev’s mother was Vasilii I’s daughter Anna, and Ivan III was Vasilii I’s grandson.82 Elena’s relationship to the Daniilovichi and the Patrikeevy might not have been significant were it not for the fact that Elena had no other male kinsmen in Moscow except the Daniilovichi and Patrikeevy of the inner circle. Once married, Prince Ivan Molodoi was in an even better position to assert his hereditary claim to the throne of Tver*. The campaign for Tver’ demonstrates the importance of marriage and family in political struggles.83 If the dynasty in Tver’ had died out, as seemed likely in the 1480’s,84 Prince Ivan Molodoi would have had a strong claim to the throne. Molodoi was the son of the incumbent Grand Prince Mikhail Borisovich’s stepsister and thus was a nephew of the Tver’ grand prince.85 In February 1483, the wife of Grand Prince Mikhail Borisovich of Tver’

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died, leaving him free to conclude the marriage alliance that won him the support of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and also offered him some hope of producing heirs.86 His actions gave Moscow an excuse to attack Tver’; Prince Ivan Molodoi was crowned grand prince of Tver’ after the city was conquered in 1485.87 The marriage of Elena Stepanovna of Moldavia and the heir apparent, Prince Ivan Molodoi, is an example of the extent to which the Patrikeevy monopolized power at the Kremlin court. For the other boyar clans of Muscovy, the match could only have been deflating. Prince Ivan Ivanovich Molodoi’s succession was assured: since 1471 (that is, on the eve of Ivan Ill’s second marriage in 1472), sources had referred to Molodoi as the “grand prince,” 88 thus asserting the priority of linear succession from Ivan Ill’s first marriage. Because Ivan Molodoi had a son, Dmitrii (born in October 1483),89 the rivals of the Patrikeevy could expect Patrikeev dominance at court to continue at least until the 1520’s, when Prince Dmitrii’s children might give other clans an opportunity to join the ruling circle by marriage. The other marriageable Daniilovichi, children of Ivan Ill’s second wife, Sofiia Palaeologa, were not attractive as political allies; they represented the collateral line, whose succession was unlikely if Prince Ivan Molodoi and his son Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Vnuk (“the Grandson”) lived normal lifespans. The plans of the Patrikeevy for continued domination went awry in 1490, when Prince Ivan Molodoi died unexpectedly.90 His death opened the way for other ambitious boyar families to marry into the collateral line in Ivan Ill’s family and to build a rival inner circle. In a situation that paralleled the one existing during the Vel’iaminovy’s last years in power, in the first decades of the fifteenth century two or three rival families joined to form a broad coalition directed against an inner circle domi­ nated by a single family. One of these families vying for power in the 1490’s was that of the Kholmskii princes; the lineage was founded by Prince Daniil Dmitrievich Kholmskii, who had come to Moscow from Tver’ in 1468. He was made a boyar almost immediately after his arrival and promptly married into a leading boyar family, the Vsevolozhi. Most likely in the 1470’s, he married one of the daughters of Ivan Ivanovich, the last surviving member of the elder line of the Vsevolozh clan. The three sisters of Prince Daniil’s wife were married to men in the Starodubskii princely family (Prince Vasilii Semenovich Mnikh), in the Patrikeev family (Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Bulgak), and in the Morozov family (Semen Borisovich Briukho); thus Prince Daniil could choose among several di­ rections of political alliance. He was a leading boyar through the early 1490’s and was mentioned in lists of signatories on important documents or in military command generally in second or third place after the Patrikeevy.91

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The Koshkin family was another Patrikeev rival. The brothers Iakov and Iurii Zakhar’ichi held high positions in both military and diplomatic service. The Cheliadniny also enjoyed high status in the elite in the i49o’s; they were represented by Andrei Fedorovich, a boyar until at least 1500. Their distant kinsmen in the Khromoi line, called the “Davydovy” in the 1490’s, were highly ranked boyars by the first decade of the six­ teenth century. The Obolenskii clan also maintained a relatively high place in the hierarchy.92 The Kholmskii princes emerged in the 1490’s as the dominant Patrikeev rival, having been aided perhaps by their Tverian heritage and connec­ tions, or perhaps by their Muscovite political network. That the family was building such a network is evidenced by the record of its marriage alliances in this period. In the 1490’s Prince Daniil Dmitrievich Kholmskii married his eldest son, Semen, to Mariia Andreevna Cheliadnina, daugh­ ter of the patriarch of the Cheliadnin clan. At about the same time, Mariia’s brother Vasilii Cheliadnin married Agrafena, daughter of Prince Fedor Vasil’evich Telepen’ Obolenskii.93Another boyar of the 1490’s was associ­ ated with this broad group by marriage. Prince Daniil Penko Iaroslavskii had emigrated from Iaroslavl’ to Muscovy by the 1480’s and was men­ tioned as a boyar soon thereafter. He married the daughter of Prince Daniil Dmitrievich Kholmskii and thus became the brother-in-law of Mariia Cheliadnina.94 Thus, in the 1490’s the prominent boyar families that rivaled the Patrikeevy included the Koshkiny and a KholmskiiCheliadnin-Obolenskii coalition; either could become the inner circle if circumstances changed. Eventually they did. The dominance of the Patrikeevy continued for several years after Ivan Molodoi’s death, even though these marriages hint at considerable politi­ cal realignment.95 Not until December 1497 was strong opposition raised to the Patrikeevy and to Prince Dmitrii Vnuk’s line of succession: Prince Vasilii Ivanovich and his supporters attempted a coup and the murder of Prince Dmitrii Vnuk.96The uprising, which failed, can be traced to dissat­ isfaction with the Patrikeevy on several counts. First, some boyars may have disagreed with the foreign policy of the Patrikeevy, because the truce the Patrikeevy had negotiated with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1495 was quickly broken once the opposition finally did assume power. Second, ambitious families may have been prompted to take action by the decision, made about the time the plot was being evolved, to crown Dmitrii Vnuk as the official heir, thus strengthening the position of the Patrikeev faction. The coronation ceremony was held as scheduled in February 1498.97Third, unrest might have been provoked by the decision, made in the summer of 1497, to marry Prince Fedor Ivanovich Bel’skii, a recent immigrant from the Grand Duchy, to Ivan Ill’s niece, Anna of Riazan’, daughter of Princess Anna Vasil’evna of Moscow and Prince

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Vasilii Ivanovich of Riazan’. This marriage expanded the Patrikeevy’s kinship group at court, since it brought into relation with Ivan III another man who was a first cousin once removed of Elena of Moldavia.98 (The first was Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev.) Not until the next generation were the Bel’skie trusted enough by the grand prince and the boyars to be awarded boyar rank. But starting then the BePskie were continuously present in the Kremlin and served as military leaders, thus steadily gain­ ing political status.99 The failure of the uprising, the coronation of Dmitrii Vnuk, and the Bel’skii marriage should have strengthened the Patrikeevy’s position at court, but the family appears rather to have angered the opposition by overplaying its hand. By January 1499, the opposition within the elite had garnered enough support among the boyars to force Ivan III to ac­ quiesce in the Patrikeevy’s disgrace. Here is a clear example of the grand prince’s interdependence with his boyars. Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev, his sons, and his son-in-law (Prince Semen Riapolovskii) were ousted from power: Prince Semen was executed and Prince Ivan and his sons were forcibly tonsured. The Patrikeev ascendancy had ended. Too much power had been amassed by too small a family and faction, causing an imbalance in the political order.100

The Post-Patrikeev Settlement Following the Patrikeevy’s demise, no one family emerged as domi­ nant-evidence perhaps that Ivan III and the remaining boyars distrusted the exclusive exercise of power by a family such as the Patrikeevy. Rather, a broad coalition was formed in the inner circle. It included the Kholmskii and Obolenskii princes, the Cheliadnin and Koshkin families, and the Bulgakov-Shcheniatev nephews of the disgraced Patrikeevy. The signato­ ries of Ivan Ill’s will (dated mid-1504) represent this broader inner circle; they were Prince Vasilii Daniilovich Kholmskii, Prince Daniil Vasil’evich Shchenia, Iakov Zakhar’ich Koshkin, and the treasurer, Dmitrii Vladi­ mirovich Khovrin.101 The Khovriny and the elder Patrikeev line had sur­ vived the disgrace, perhaps because they had made expedient alliances with the opposition, but more likely because the opposition wanted to mollify allies of the Patrikeevy in order to avoid violent reactions. The Kholmskii, Bulgakov-Shcheniatev, and Koshkin families are mentioned almost equally often and as serving in comparable roles in the decade fol­ lowing the Patrikeevy’s downfall. Until about 1509, the court was also opened to newcomers from both ends of the status hierarchy, who presumably were allies of the victorious families: high-born princes, men from excluded lines of old boyar fami-

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lies, and men from lesser service families (see Chapter 3). The integration of new families, some of which may have been patronized by the members of the new inner circle, was a common response to political tension. The Shuiskie, Rostovskie, and Vorontsovy - all of whom were linked with the Kholmskie by marriage or association in service, as discussed previ­ ously-were made boyars in the aftermath of the Patrikeevy’s demise. So also were the Romodanovskii princes, the Dobrynskie, the Morozovy, and others.102 Each of the families in the inner circle struggled behind the façade of relative unity to make itself dominant. The original rivalry that had sparked the boyars’ competition for power was not conclusively resolved until 1502, when Prince Vasilii Ivanovich, Ivan Ill’s son, succeeded in de­ feating Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich, Ivan Ill’s grandson, and his support­ ers.103 Even so, it was difficult for Prince Vasilii’s boyar supporters to establish a new balance of power among themselves. Competition con­ tinued for another few years until the new status hierarchy had been agreed upon. The Kholmskie apparently scored a victory in 1500, when Prince Vasilii Daniilovich Kholmskii married Feodosiia, Ivan Ill’s daugh­ ter by Sofiia Palaeologa.104 By 1502, Prince Vasilii Daniilovich had been made a boyar.105 The Kholmskii marriage created a link with the ruling family that established hierarchy in the boyar elite. The roster for the 1500 wedding ceremony shows the importance of the Kholmskii kinship group, the members of the broader inner circle, and some of the new families who came to power after the fall of the Patrikeevy. Prince Daniil Penko, the groom’s brother-in-law, was the wed­ ding’s thousandman, or master of ceremonies, and was given the place of the most honored guest.106The Obolenskie, who were predominant in the inner circle, were well represented. Prince Petr Nagoi —who succeeded his brother, Prince Aleksandr Vasil’evich, at about this time —was the groom’s best man; numerous other Obolenskie, including Prince Fedor Telepen’, soon to become a boyar, and several from collateral nonboyar Obolenskii lines, were also present. The sons of the deceased Prince Ivan Bulgak Patrikeev, who were cousins of the groom on his mother’s side, were at­ tendants of Grand Princess Sofiia, indicating a pragmatic alliance or at least a degree of reconciliation. Andrei Fedorovich Cheliadnin did not participate (he was perhaps deceased by 1500), nor did his young sons, who at that time had not yet been mentioned in service as boyars. Those from ambitious immigrant clans were also in attendance (the Shuiskii, Rostovskii, and Iaroslavskii princes) as well as representatives of the Vorontsov clan, which was soon to be awarded boyar rank. Leadership was shared by boyars from the Kholmskii, Cheliadnin, Obolenskii, Zakhar’in (Koshkin), and Bulgakov-Shcheniatev families in

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the early sixteenth century.107The Kholmskie, allied by marriage with the victorious prince and heir apparent, Vasilii Ivanovich, were nevertheless unable to establish predominance in the way the Patrikeevy had. One rea­ son was probably that their kinship link with the Daniilovichi had been severed in 1501, when Prince Vasilii Daniilovich Kholmskii’s wife (Ivan Ill’s daughter, Feodosiia) died without having borne children. In addition, Prince Semen Dmitrievich Kholmskii, who had married a Cheliadnina, had died, also without offspring. Prince Vasilii Daniilovich Kholmskii was thus the sole representative of his family. In 1508 his rivals forced him from power in disgrace.108 The Kholmskie’s successful rivals in the political elite appear to have been the Zakhar’iny (Koshkiny), represented by Iakov Zakhar’ich (Iurii Zakhar’ich had died around 1500); the Shcheniatev and Bulgakov lines of the Patrikeev clan, represented by Prince Daniil Vasil’evich Shchenia and Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Bulgakov (Prince Ivan Bulgak had died sometime after 1495), and Prince Vasilii Kholmskii’s Obolenskii and Cheliadnin in-laws, who survived Kholmskii’s disgrace. Ivan Andreevich Cheliadnin was the equerry and was made a boyar by 1509; his brother, Vasilii, was a majordomo from that time to his death late in 1515 or early in 1516. Their distant kinsmen, the Khromye, seem also to have benefited from the Cheliadniny’s power.109 The Telepnev-Obolenskii family ad­ vanced politically; Prince Fedor Vasil’evich Telepnev was made a boyar by 1506/7.110 In the first decade of the sixteenth century, competition among the boyars did not upset their apparent balance of power. Had a bride for the heir, Prince Vasilii Ivanovich, been chosen from a boyar family, the fa­ vored family would automatically have achieved the dominant position. That no family was thus honored suggests, again, that the boyars would not stand for exclusivity of power in the inner circle and that the grand prince had to tailor his desires to such political reality. This conclusion is also suggested by the eventual choice of bride, for the match allowed the broadened inner circle of well-established families to remain in power. A family was sought that would not threaten the balance of power in the elite. In 1499 the court tried to arrange a marriage with a Danish prin­ cess, and in 1503 Vasilii’s sister Elena was enlisted to find a suitable Euro­ pean and (or) Orthodox bride.111 Both these attempts failed, however, and there was concern that Prince Vasilii Ivanovich might not be married before his father’s death. His eventual choice of bride was significant for boyar politics. In September 1505 Prince Vasilii Ivanovich was married to Solomoniia Saburova, daughter of Iurii Konstantinovich Saburov,112 a member of an excluded line of a boyar clan founded in the fourteenth century. This clan had lost status since the last decade of the fourteenth century; its founder,

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Fedor Sabur, then ranked second or third in the court of Vasilii I. At the time of the 1505 wedding, Andrei VasiPevich Saburov was next in the clan’s line of succession, but he was too young to be a boyar. Iurii Konstantinovich Saburov, father of the bride, was made a boyar by 1509, but his boyar rank was apparently honorific, not hereditary, because his line was excluded. Andrei VasiPevich Saburov was also not given political power until 1509, when he was made an okol’nichii; he became a boyar by 1531.113The marriage of the future Grand Prince Vasilii III into a nonboyar line of a lesser clan represented a break with the custom of grand princes marrying into prominent boyar families, such as the Vel’iaminovy, Koshkiny, or Patrikeevy. Why was the Saburov clan chosen? The Saburovy were a safe choice for Vasilii III, and their selection served the purposes of the inner circle. The family was not sufficiently strong politically to threaten the balance of power among the Kholmskii, Zakhar’in (Koshkin), Bulgakov-Shcheniatev, Obolenskii, and Cheliadnin families, and its unobtrusive presence in the palace would allow the sov­ ereign and the boyars to get on with the job of governing. Choice of the Saburovy was actually a stalling tactic to prevent one family from emerg­ ing as clearly dominant in the elite. It also set a new pattern in marriage politics, since it was the first time a Daniilovich bride had been chosen from a relatively insignificant clan, rather than a leading foreign, ap­ panage princely, or boyar family. This became the norm in the seventeenth century.114Thus, certain boyars’ ability to control the grand-princely mar­ riage, if not to win that marriage for themselves, became the primary in­ dex of power at court. Indicative of the importance of stability to the inner circle in this first decade of the sixteenth century is the series of marriages that followed the wedding of Vasilii III. They did not increase the strength of any one group in the inner circle - further evidence that the grand prince and the inner circle carefully orchestrated Daniilovich weddings so as not to yield de­ cisive power to any one clan. These marriages served foreign policy aims, since they brought to Moscow a valuable ally from Kazan’ and a prince whose family had defected to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania a generation earlier. In January 1506, Vasilii’s sister was married to the newly christened prince of Kazan’, Kudai-Kul (baptized as Petr). In April 1506, Vasilii’s sister-in-law, Mariia Iur’evna Saburova, was married to a distant cousin of the grand prince, Prince Vasilii Semenovich Starodubskii, who had re­ cently returned to Muscovy after his father’s defection during the dynas­ tic war.115 Rosters of those present at these weddings do not survive; the only boyars whose names appear are Iakov Zakhar’ich of the Koshkin clan, who is twice mentioned as arranging the nuptials, and Grigorii Fedorovich Davydov, who is mentioned once.116 The course that Vasilii Ill’s second marriage took is also proof of the

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importance attached to maintaining a stable balance of power after the Patrikeev disgrace. With Solomoniia Saburova he had no children, and he and the boyars feared the consequences: the succession would go collat­ erally to his brother, whose appanage boyars would then displace the es­ tablished Muscovite elite. Therefore, Vasilii III and his advisers obtained a divorce, forced Solomoniia into a convent, and chose another bride: Princess Elena Vasil’evna Glinskaia, member of a princely family newly arrived from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.117 The Glinskii family would seem to be a threat to the inner circle (just as the Patrikeevy had proved to be following their arrival ioo years ear­ lier), since the Glinskii princes had been wealthy and respected in the Grand Duchy. Three Glinskii brothers, with their families and their entourages, had arrived in Moscow in 1508. Princes Ivan and Vasilii L’vovichi Glinskie are not mentioned in Moscow after that year; Prince Mikhail L’vovich Glinskii became the clan patriarch after the family’s ar­ rival in Moscow.118The clan also included Anna Glinskaia, Prince Vasilii’s wife (née Jaksic), of the ruling dynasty of Serbia, and the daughters and sons of Ivan and Vasilii.119 Prince Mikhail L’vovich had been educated in and had served in courts throughout Eastern and Central Europe.120 The marriage was actually beneficial to the inner circle, however. Elena Glinskaia was likely a controllable candidate from the point of view of the boyars, who could thus look forward to maintaining their established balance of power. Her father and one uncle were dead, and at the time of the wedding Prince Mikhail L’vovich was in prison in the Kremlin for at­ tempting to flee Muscovy in 1514. Elena had two brothers, Iurii and Mikhail, both born by 1508 but apparently not much earlier.121 She had one, perhaps two, sisters. Her most influential spokesmen were most likely her mother, Anna, and her aunt, the widow of Prince Ivan Glinskii, both of whom lived until the 1520’s. Since the Glinskii match associated the Kremlin court with a ruling family in southeastern Europe, and since Elena’s uncle had strong political connections in the Grand Duchy,122 the choice of Elena also served Moscow’s foreign policy aims, while at the same time it prevented any one boyar family from enhancing its power with a dynastic marriage and thereby upsetting the equilibrium of the inner circle. Nowhere is this more clear than in the roster of those attending Elena Glinskaia’s wedding in 1526. If this had been a victory for the Glinskie, one would expect many members of that clan to have been in atten­ dance.123 But instead the wedding ceremony was dominated by the four families of the inner circle: the Zakhar’iny, descended from the Koshkin clan, the Cheliadniny, the Davydovy, and the Obolenskie. The Glinskii clan would not be integrated into the elite for another two decades: Grand Princess Elena’s brothers became boyars in the late 1540’s.124

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Two lists of boyar wives (boiaryni) at court are further evidence that the Cheliadnin, Davydov, Koshkin, and Obolenskii families continued to be dominant after the 1526 wedding. One list, not dated, pertains to the seating hierarchy for a banquet held at Elena Glinskaia’s court. Mariia, widow of Grigorii Fedorovich Davydov (Khromoi line), and Irina, widow of Iurii Zakhar’ich (Koshkin family), shared first place in the list. The other names, in order, were as follows: Elena, widow of Ivan Cheliadnin; Princess Agrafena, widow of Vasilii Cheliadnin and sister of Prince Ivan Fedorovich Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii; Princess Anna Glinskaia, the bride’s mother; Princess Anastasiia, widow of Prince Ivan Glinskii; Agra­ fena, wife of Ivan Volynskii; Princess Agrafena, wife of “Nekhozh” (un­ identified); and Ovdotiia, wife of the treasurer, Ivan Ivanovich Tret’iakov. The other list, which records the attendance at a reception held in Janu­ ary 1536, includes Princess Anastasiia, wife of Prince Fedor Mikhailovich Mstislavskii and cousin of Ivan IV; Elena and Agrafena Cheliadniny; Marfa, wife of Prince Dmitrii Bel’skii and daughter of Ivan Cheliadnin; and Agrafena Volynskaia.125The order of the names in these lists is consis­ tent with the male boyar hierarchy at the time. The Bulgakov-Shcheniatev kinship group was then still ranked high in political sources, but ironi­ cally its members lacked the intimacy with the Daniilovich family enjoyed by the Cheliadnin and Koshkin women, which may explain its absence from this list. The absence of the Bulgakov-Shcheniatev group illustrates the exis­ tence of a hierarchy in court relations: whereas a few families shared the inner circle, several others, including the Bulgakovy and Shcheniatevy, were relegated to possessing less power outside of it. In the next chapter we shall examine how the inner circle maintained a balance of power and political stability with the rest of the boyars, despite the intense competi­ tion and the inequitable distribution of power among them. We shall ana­ lyze the denouement of the marriage politics of the first quarter of the sixteenth century as a case study in political conflict in Muscovy. When Vasilii III died in 1533, he left an infant son; the court consisted of an inner circle, with fewer marriage ties to the grand prince, and a number of “outer circle” boyars eager to reorder the political hierarchy. Mus­ covy’s future was, at best, uncertain.

♦ CHAPTER 5 Ф

Consensus and Conflict

I n e a c h g e n e r a t i o n an inner circle of boyars dominated the court; these boyars enjoyed greater prestige and additional benefits of rule. As a group, boyars shared real authority with the sovereign, and the inequities of power among them gave rise to fierce competition. Ideology and cere­ mony, however, do not reflect these realities of hierarchy, conflict, and what one might call the patrimonial pluralism of court politics. Muscovy is depicted in contemporary sources as apolitical. Only the sovereign is presented as having political power; the boyars are treated as equals in their powerlessness. Although this interpretation is at variance with real­ ity, it reveals certain principles of politics: a normative code governing po­ litical relationships and the formation of political groups; a set of values that prompted outbreaks of violence among the boyars and that provided ways to control it. If we can successfully identify and trace these under­ lying principles of Muscovite politics, we may be able to distinguish be­ tween ideology and reality concerning events that occurred during times of political crisis —for example, Ivan IV’s stormy youth in the 1530’s and 1540’s.

The Façade of Autocracy The court was immensely successful in concealing the dynamism of its politics from the outside world and in convincing foreigners that Mus­ covy was ruled literally by an autocrat. Sigismund von Herberstein, an envoy of the Hapsburg court in the early sixteenth century, declared: “In the sway which he holds over his people, he surpasses all the monarchs of the whole world.” 1It comes as some surprise that the ideology and public ceremony of court politics diverged so radically from the reality that we have seen. There was constant sparring of ambitious men at court, yet Muscovite ideology denies that political interaction occurred. The sover­ eign is depicted as a literal autocrat; neither the boyars nor other indi­ viduals or social groups share authority with him.2 To some extent this

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political ideology developed from the theocratic vision of the churchmen who wrote chronicles, but it should not be dismissed for that reason. Not only churchmen promoted the façade of autocracy - the boyars them­ selves accepted it, which suggests that it was grounded in political reality. The sovereign was routinely described in chronicles and other ideologi­ cal writings as the sole decision maker, regardless of his age or abilities. Kotoshikhin’s specious description of dynastic weddings as irrelevant to pragmatic politics is consistent with the ideology of autocracy. Ceremony was an especially effective communicator of this ideology. During the reign of Ivan III, the Daniilovichi began to stage increasingly elaborate court rituals, such as coronations, public processions, formal audiences, and pilgrimages.3This ceremonial activity should be interpreted as a new emphasis on old principles, not as a break with tradition,4 since the themes that were stressed in these ceremonies —the sovereign’s omnipo­ tence and his paternal relationship with the boyars —had been enunciated extensively in writings and court ritual since before Ivan Ill’s reign.5 In these ceremonies and in written sources, Muscovite political inter­ action was presented as essentially moral and personal; thus it was denied what might be called public or constitutional legitimacy. Authors of writ­ ten sources, lacking a term for the collectivity of the boyars, referred to them by name or simply as “the boyars.” 6What modern observers would consider political relationships the sources referred to as personal ties: political conflict and ambition were explained by loyalty, friendship, and kinship. The political realm was depicted as being ruled over by the sov­ ereign alone; therefore, court politics was not characterized by pluralism, conflict, or compromise —all of which are fundamental to politics as gen­ erally understood. In ideology Muscovite politics had no dynamism; the state was a harmonious family, each member obediently playing his role in the community of God on earth. The sovereign was at the center of a theocratic vision of government: court ceremony presented him as separate from and superior to the bo­ yars. When he held audiences, he was seated on a throne raised above the level where the boyars sat; he was surrounded by splendid bodyguards (ryndy) who were regally garbed in white and carried ceremonial axes. The sovereign’s omnipotence was demonstrated by the immensity and splendor of his entourage.7 On festive occasions, the sovereign flaunted jewel-encrusted golden drinking cups, crowns, orbs, and scepters; sover­ eign and boyars alike were decked out in jewel-encrusted robes. (Much of this finery can still be seen in the Kremlin Armory Museum.) Even when (or perhaps especially when) the sovereign was incompetent and the bo­ yars were managing the state, court ceremony maintained the fiction that

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Moscow was ruled by its sovereign. When Ivan IV was six years old, he held audiences with two parties of foreign ambassadors but told them that he could not host a banquet for them because he was “still of minor age and sitting at table would be too tiring.” When he was twelve, the sovereign did carry out the elaborate ritual of such a banquet, greeting the guests and distributing food to them in the proper hierarchical order.8 Throughout, the implicit message was the centrality of the sovereign and the total subservience of others to him. Political disgrace reinforced the centrality of the sovereign; exile from the presence of the sovereign was the symbolic expression of such dis­ grace, which also included more tangible punishment, such as incarcera­ tion and confiscation of wealth. Unfortunates were said to have been de­ prived of the sight of the tsar’s “bright eyes.” 9The boyars were portrayed as passive and weak, implying that they recognized and accepted their subservience. As we have seen in Chapter 4, Kotoshikhin said that they were passive spectators of the tsar’s marriage making. The custom of holding public “viewings” of potential brides indicates that the boyars themselves participated in rituals that contradicted some of the most fun­ damental principles of court politics —in this case, the primacy of the sov­ ereign’s marriage in determining the boyars* hierarchy of power. Foreign travelers expressed dismay at what they perceived as the humiliation of the great men of the realm, who called themselves “slaves” and pros­ trated themselves before the sovereign. Olearius noted: “In addressing the Tsar the magnates must unashamedly not only write their names in the diminutive form, but also call themselves slaves, and they are treated as such.” 10Although these descriptions are inconsistent with reality, they evidence a concern for controlling the potentially powerful and ambitious boyars. Some ceremonies and written sources stressed the omnipotence of the sovereign, others elaborated a complementary and more complex theory of political relationships. According to presentations of the latter sort, po­ litical interaction was constrained by the tsar’s autocracy, but his friend­ ship with his advisers personalized and modulated politics. The sovereign was depicted as a man of great piety, by means of whose virtue God’s blessings were bestowed on the people.11 Sovereigns confirmed that image by marching in religious processions through Moscow’s streets bearing icons on festival days, and by making frequent pilgrimages to distant monasteries. On special occasions the tsar and his family distributed alms and granted amnesties. Acting out ideology, these processions had symbolic significance, for they communicated the ideal of Moscow’s so­ cial order; they also gave the populace an opportunity to affirm its unity as a community.12 In this ideological view of Muscovite politics, boyars

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were given legitimacy as advisers, reflecting in some measure their real power. Just as the metropolitan oversaw moral and religious matters, the boyars oversaw secular affairs. These men thus acted as liaisons between the grand prince and his people.13 That boyars had a traditional right to rule jointly with the sovereign is reflected in contemporary illustrations of court ceremony, where the tsar is depicted associating with his boyars, not dominating over them. It is also shown in descriptions of the grand prince’s attitude of comradely loyalty toward his boyars. Vasilii III, for ex­ ample, entreated his boyars to defend his kingdom and his minor son after his death as follows: “I [literally, we] am your bom sovereign, and you are my eternal boyars; and you, brothers, stand firm so that my son may be made the sovereign of the state and so that there may be justice in the land.” 14 Through the prism of an idealized ideology, these sources reveal the court’s desire that politics be conducted in unanimity without strife. In addresses to the “Hundred Chapters” (Stoglav) Church Council attrib­ uted to Ivan IV, the sovereign pleaded with the boyars to forget their “prior disputes” and be reconciled. He urged his prelates, boyars, and all his advisers to “help me, assist me, all of you together and in unanimity” in accomplishing the work of the council. The sovereign told the prelates: “Do not hesitate to speak in unanimity words of piety concerning our Or­ thodox Christian faith. . . . For it is with great zeal and joy that I agree to be your coservant and defender of the faith. . . . This is why, by [my] command, henceforth all disagreement shall be dispelled and total agree­ ment and harmony shall be maintained among us.” 15 This too was the theme of the “council of reconciliation” of 1549: Ivan IV summoned his boyars and forgave them transgressions they had committed during his minority; he urged them to be reconciled and in the future to rule “as one.” 16 The ubiquity of the theme of harmony and unanimity compels us to take it seriously as a principle of Muscovite politics. It is not consistent with the reality of court politics, which was marked by dissension, but it hints at limits on such fractious disputes. One such constraint was ex­ pressed ideologically by the assertion that all boyars were equal —equal in subservience to the sovereign, equal in their degree of access to him, equal in status and power. Implicit in their equality was harmony: the boyars should not disrupt their unity by contentiousness. Unanimity was the im­ plicit way for boyars to prevent and resolve political conflicts. The expec­ tation of rule by unanimity, or consensus, constrained individual boyars, regardless of their personal eminence. Boyars could not rule or aspire to rule. In keeping with the ideology’s emphasis on affinitive relations in politics, boyar ambition that caused strife was regarded as a moral defect,

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not as an unavoidable part of political interaction. Boyars were con­ demned in moral terms: for giving bad advice, for being corrupted by the devil, or for “not wishing well for the grand prince.” 17 A virtuous boyar was a man who “truly wished well for the grand prince, serving him in faith and justice.” 18 Boyars were criticized for taking action without first informing the sovereign,19as well as for seeking power independently and thus threatening society’s welfare. The following condemnation of the boyars at the 1551 Stoglav Church Council is attributed to the tsar: “The boyars and magnates, faithful and loving toward my forefathers, did not give me good counsel. For I considered them well disposed towards me, but instead they usurped independent power [samovlastie] for them­ selves. . . . I was orphaned, and the tsardom was made a widow. And so our boyars seized the opportunity for themselves . . . and no one pro­ hibited them from their totally unseemly undertaking.” 20 Muscovite ideology made it very clear that boyars were supposed to act as a unified group. One boyar was harshly criticized for refusing to attend upon the sovereign or to “counsel with the boyars on the affairs of the sovereign and state.” 21 Boyars were also criticized for having too ex­ clusive a relationship with the sovereign, for aspiring to excessive power, and for seizing goods beyond their proper share.22Tales written about the Time of Troubles attributed Boris Godunov’s misfortune to his ambition to rise above his place. Boris had accomplished, however briefly, the un­ thinkable: as a boyar, he had had himself proclaimed tsar (but only after the dynasty had died out, in 1598).23 In all these examples, containment of the boyars’ ambitions for the good of the court is implicit but is stated metaphorically: political interaction —conflict, compromise, and compe­ tition —is equated with moral turpitude. The overriding theme of political ideology is the pursuit of static harmony. Such ideological tenets suggest some rules of politics: the sovereign shall act as a unifying center; politi­ cal relations shall be based on such ties as loyalty, dependence, and kin­ ship; the boyars may participate in government but should restrain their competition to maintain stability (“unanimity” was the chroniclers’ term). It was the constant threat of instability —resulting from foreign wars, a fragile economy whose functioning was in part dependent upon a hostile climate, the administration of a large state by a small bureaucracy, and the boyars’ ambitions for power —that gave rise to such a conservative set of values. The ideology expressed the deepest concerns of Muscovy’s politi­ cal actors; a façade of autocracy was necessary to prevent chaos. The pri­ mary purpose of the ideology of autocracy described here was to impose limits on the boyars’ political competition. In theory, designation of the sovereign as the only legitimate political figure prevented boyars’ compe­ tition from threatening the state’s stability. Boyars fought to gain a greater

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share of power but not to replace the sovereign. They sought higher status but did not attempt to prevent others from seeking it. But in 1598, when the dynasty died out, boyar factions ignored all limits on competition and struggled to become sovereign. The result was the state of anarchy that Muscovy’s ideology and political controls had been specifically de­ signed to prevent. Typically, however, boyars were guided by this ideology and thus stabilized their potentially volatile political system.

Mechanisms to Maintain Stability At most times, relative stability was ensured because all boyars had some degree of power. In the early seventeenth century, a descendant of Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotynskii suggested this when he complained that a share of power was being denied to him and his family: “We experi­ enced disgrace, but a role in government was never taken from us.” 24 All boyars had a right to consult with the grand prince, but in practice the inner circle met with him more frequently. All boyars lived in or around the Kremlin;25 they attended court daily and consulted with the grand prince and with each other frequently.26 They served in the field as mili­ tary commanders or as vicegerents, but preferred service in the sover­ eign’s retinue, either participating in a campaign or based in the Kremlin. In those assignments boyars could maintain the personal contacts that ensured rule by consensus and that also frequently led to advantageous marriages.27 The involvement of all boyars facilitated attainment of the ideal of harmony at court; because of the real disparities of power and the resulting constant state of tension, consensus among them was required to maintain stability. Consensus between the grand prince and the boyars is evident in the distribution of power at court. The boyars in the inner circle had more power than the others, but they never succeeded in totally monopolizing power (although that would seem a logical goal). The Patrikeevy virtually achieved such monopoly in the 1490’s, but their overweening ambition resulted in their downfall (as we saw in Chapter 4). Consensus is implicit in the pattern of accession to boyar rank. As discussed in Chapter 3, con­ ferral of boyar or okol’nichii rank threatened to disturb the balance of power and therefore required the approval of the men already holding those ranks. The boyars and the grand prince sometimes delayed and at other times permitted accessions to boyar and okol’nichii rank. During times of political turmoil, few new appointments were made. However, the resolution of political crises (for example, those of the mid-fifteenth century and those occurring in 1499,1525,and the 1530’sand 1540’s) was followed by a cathartic redistribution of power and numerous promotions.

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The integration of new families into the boyar elite also required con­ sensus. The logic of court politics would seem to have encouraged ex­ clusivity. As some clans became more powerful, they expelled their rivals from politics. The inner-circle families, being more powerful, might be expected to choose not to tolerate less powerful boyars at court. But, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the number of clans whose men held boyar or okol’nichii rank gradually increased from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. Boyars consented to the sovereign’s desire to add to their num­ bers. There were advantages in doing so; for example, having a large court of illustrious princes and nonprinces might well bring prestige to the Muscovite government. In 1556, in an officiai letter to the king of Sweden, Ivan IV bragged that his boyars and vicegerents were “descended from Tsars of the Horde; [they came] from the Polish kingdom and the Grand Duchy, or from the Grand Principalities of Tver’, Riazan, Suzdal’, and others.” They were not, the tsar explained, “common folk.” 28 But more practical considerations may better explain the increasing size of the elite. Boyars were required for defense and military administration. The Muscovite army relied heavily on their retinues at first, but less so after the army had been expanded and centralized. Expansion of the military meant the integration of all newcomers—lesser cavalrymen from old Muscovite boyar families and from incorporated Riurikid principalities, as well as ambitious immigrants from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. As a result of territorial expansion, the rewards of service increased and were distributed to a broader group of lesser rank-and-file cavalrymen through boyars’ patronage networks. Their rank gave boyars access to wealth in the form of land and gifts (see Chapter 1) —largess that was also trans­ mitted through kinship and patronage networks. Patronage from the sov­ ereign in the form of social and economic privileges kept such groups as scribes and merchants out of politics. Consensus politics was clearly in evidence when the members of the court took action against one of their number, as when the boyars and the sovereign agreed to bring disgrace (opala).19 The fall of the Patrikeevy in 1499 was apparently the consequence of the agreement by all the bo­ yars and the grand prince on the necessity for their disgrace. There are numerous references between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries to boyars having their property confiscated or being exiled, forcibly tonsured, or even executed.30 As in the Patrikeev disgrace, their allies and kinsmen apparently consented, if perhaps grudgingly. When boyar fami­ lies did seek revenge, political crisis was the result; the mid-fifteenthcentury dynastic war and the struggles that occurred during the youth of Ivan IV are examples. These episodes of violence were, however, rare.

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Conflict arose over a limited number of circumstances, such as threats to a boyar’s power and perquisites, competition to marry into the grandprincely family, and succession disputes in the Daniilovich family. The mid-fifteenth-century dynastic war, the 1490’s dynastic crisis, and the turmoil of the 1530’s and 1540’s were such conflicts. Disgrace was some­ times used to prevent open conflict. That such a small number of major political crises occurred between the fourteenth and mid-sixteenth cen­ turies testifies to the boyars’ willingness to regulate their relations to avoid strife. Even when he had secured the agreement of his boyars for the punish­ ment of one of them, the grand prince sought to limit the degree of vio­ lence inflicted. Men who were imprisoned, for example, often died in captivity, but the punishment initially aroused less animosity among bo­ yars because the possibility of release remained open. Several imprisoned servitors are recorded as having been freed —evidence of the relative mod­ eration of this punishment.31 Other types of punishment—prohibition of marriage, exile from Moscow, forcible tonsure —all stopped short of the violence that would probably have provoked interfamily vendettas.32Exe­ cution was used only when the offense was serious and the court was united behind the decision. The execution of Ivan Vasil’evich Vel’iaminov in 1379 was justified because he had defected and had led Tverian troops in a campaign against Moscow. In the sixteenth century the Nikon chron­ icle included a comment on the shame brought to this great man fallen to evil: “He was slain by sword on the Kuchkov field near the fortress at Moscow by the order of Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich. And a multitude stood by, and many cried over him and grieved over his noble birth and eminence.” 33 When Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh was blinded in 1436 in punishment for his defection to Galich, the chronicles recorded no out­ rage; the punishment suited the deed.34 The rarity of, and the adverse reaction to, unsanctioned violence among boyars suggests that it violated political norms. In 13 56, Aleksei Petrovich Khvost was killed by rivals who then fled Moscow to escape vengeance. The public outrage was so great and the murder so unusual that chron­ icles and genealogical books kept it in the public memory for genera­ tions.35 Chroniclers recorded with indignation the murder in 1433 of Semen Morozov by two sons of the renegade Prince Iurii of Galich.36 Fur­ thermore, when an execution was carried out without the prior consent of the boyars, the aggrieved family took revenge, which often precipitated further conflict. The fifteenth-century dynastic war is an example of the cost of such violence and illustrates the Kremlin court’s determination to avoid it. That war was a consequence of the Daniilovichi’s and the boyars’ fail-

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ure to reach a consensus regarding the proper leadership of the state. Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh saw Prince Iurii of Galich’s assertion of a claim to the throne as an opportunity for himself to gain preeminent power, and he was able to win the support of other ambitious boyar and lesser ser­ vitor families. The government in Muscovy became increasingly less stable and a full-scale international conflict developed; Moscow’s rivals gathered their forces to win regional power. But even in the heat of crisis at the Kremlin court, the boyars and the Daniilovichi avoided anarchy by using violence reciprocally and by seeking reconciliation. In May 1436, Prince Vasilii Iur’evich Kosoi, son of Prince Iurii of Galich and heir to his claim for the throne, was blinded on the order of Vasilii II. But, significantly, he was not killed.37 Kosoi’s younger brother, Prince Dmitrii Shemiaka, did not seek vengeance for almost ten years; in July 1445 he saw his opportunity. The Tatars had defeated Moscow and had captured Vasilii II; Shemiaka led the attack, and in early 1446 he had routed Vasilii II’s supporters from the Kremlin and had captured the re­ cently released grand prince and his sons, wife, and mother-in-law. Vasilii II pleaded with his captors (in the words of the chronicler), “brothers, have pity on me, do not deprive me of seeing the icons of God and of his holy mother”; however, punishment was swift and retributive. Vasilii II was blinded, as Vasilii Kosoi had been in 1436.38 In both cases, the men were then imprisoned but not killed. The punishment perpetrated on them was harsh, but it was precisely reciprocal. Enemies in this political struggle generally sought reconciliation; when­ ever one princely contender won control, he negotiated treaties with his rivals and granted them appanages. Such grants allowed the opponents to carry on the struggle, but the practice continued nevertheless.39This pref­ erence for reconciliation over confrontation, and for mediation over con­ flict, is common in premodern societies.40 The combatants in the dynastic war had ample opportunities to kill or maim each other had they wanted to. In 1434 Prince Iurii of Galich captured Vasilii II’s wife and mother; rather than executing them, he exiled them.41 When Shemiaka captured Vasilii II and his family in 1446, he killed none of them.42The members of the Galich dynasty could have destroyed their enemies completely by kill­ ing Vasilii II and his sons, but they evidently respected a taboo on murder. They desisted not only because these men were Christian and belonged to a sovereign dynasty, but because they feared murder would provoke an unending cycle of violent vendettas. Execution was more frequent in boyar conflicts in the 1490’s, but it was still used with restraint. In 1497 a group of men, whom we have described in Chapter 4 as clients of boyar supporters of Prince Vasilii Ivanovich, were foiled in their plot to kill the heir apparent, Prince Dmitrii Vnuk. Six

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lesser servitors were executed for their complicity, but no boyars were, perhaps to avoid escalating the violence.43 Nevertheless, the precedent of murder was established, and it stimulated a reaction against the Patrikeevy, the boyar family in charge. When they were ousted from power two years later, punishment matched the punishment meted out in 1497. Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev and his unmarried sons were spared death and were tonsured; Prince Ivan’s wife was probably sent to a convent. Only Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev’s son-in-law, Prince Semen Ivanovich Riapolovskii, was executed-chosen perhaps because he was guilty of some ex­ traordinary transgression, perhaps because he was married and might have progeny who would perpetuate the enmity, or perhaps because at least one murder was required to avenge the 1497 executions and Riapolovskii had the lowest status.44 Whatever the explanation, relative political stability followed these executions. Blood was spilled for blood shed, but to resolve conflict, not to perpetuate it. Consensus between boyars and grand prince was perceived as neces­ sary to avoid violence and preserve stability. Recalcitrance and excessive ambition among boyars posed threats to that stability. Such threats were caused by at least two circumstances. First, there was an inequitable bal­ ance of power among boyars, even though all had some degree of power and shared in the benefits of rule. Second, the ties of kinship and alliance that united the boyars imposed retributive obligations. To help avoid vio­ lence, the court relied on numerous norms and customs. Tradition pro­ hibited murder and the use of extreme violence against individuals in the event of conflict. When murder was resorted to, it was frequently accom­ panied by another execution intended to reduce tensions rather than to escalate them. Metropolitans offered to mediate and grand princes offered to negotiate in an attempt to avert the violence that could erupt in such an ambitious community.

The Grand Prince and Primogeniture The grand prince and the boyars also maintained stability by attempt­ ing to prevent disputes that might lead to a political crisis, such as dis­ putes over sovereign succession. They strove to ensure that collateral kinsmen of the ruler would not be regarded as legitimate contenders, and in so doing they developed a system of succession that was so predictable that boyars’ families could focus marriage strategies on winning a match with the heir to the throne. To boyar families, dynastic succession by pri­ mogeniture was preferable to collateral succession, because collateral succession meant that boyar families could not have enjoyed hereditary status: each grand prince’s boyars would have been replaced by the boyar

i5 6

Consensus and Conflict

elite from the new heir’s appanage.45 Maintenance of succession by pri­ mogeniture in the grand-princely family was therefore crucial to the sta­ bility of the political system. The Daniilovichi accomplished this and in this respect were unique among Riurikid dynasties. This remarkable achievement began inadvertently; only after its utility was generally ap­ preciated was it made into political policy. In fourteenth-century Moscow, succession in the Daniilovich dynasty was collateral in the two instances (1325,1353) when a brother survived his elder sibling, but since Daniilovich brothers at that time did not move from Moscow to create independent appanage courts and separate elites, their collateral succession did not displace the established elite. They re­ lied upon the same group of Muscovite boyars from generation to genera­ tion. From the reign of Grand Prince Ivan Ivanovich (Ivan II) (1353-59) to that of Vasilii I (1389-1425), Daniilovich succession was de facto linear, since heirs were few and the mortality rate was high.46 Boyar clans bene­ fited from the stability created by grand-princely succession by primogeni­ ture, and the Daniilovichi benefited from the paucity of heirs in that they avoided divisive disputes over succession such as those that had weakened the dynasties of Tver’ and other principalities. Like some of their early medieval West European counterparts, the Muscovite dynasty and boyars found succession by primogeniture to be useful in their drive for internal stability and for regional power.47 In 1425, the court again faced the pos­ sibility of collateral succession in the dynasty; it had been benefiting from its absence for over 100 years. At his death in 1425, Vasilii I left four brothers and a ten-year-old son, Vasilii; the collateral heir was Prince Iurii of Galich, Vasilii II’s uncle. Prince Iurii gained significant support only after the ambitious Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozh had defected in 1433; those boyars who joined the opposition may have done so because they were desirous of personal gain, or because they were apprehensive about allowing a ten-year-old child to succeed. After Vasilii II’s victory in the dynastic war,48 linear succession was the Daniilovich norm. The grand prince and his elite missed no opportunity to check the power of appanage princes and, if possible, to eradicate col­ lateral lines, rather than risk having an appanage prince claim the throne by collateral inheritance, as Prince Iurii of Galich tried to do. Following the death of Prince Dmitrii Shemiaka in 1453, Vasilii II had few surviving collateral kinsmen in Moscow who might assert such a claim. His uncles and most of his cousins were dead; one cousin, Prince Ivan Andreevich, had fled to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as had Vasilii IPs first cousin once removed, Shemiaka’s son, Ivan.49 Remaining in Muscovy were only two kinsmen: Vasilii IPs cousin and brother-in-law, Prince Mikhail An-

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dreevich of Vereia, who had been loyal throughout the war, and Vasilii II’s very distant cousin and brother-in-law, Prince Vasilii Iaroslavovich of Borovsk and Serpukhov. Also a loyal ally in the war, he was accused of treason in 1456 and imprisoned with three of his four sons. The eldest son, Ivan, fled to the Grand Duchy, where he remained until his death (which was by natural causes); Prince Vasilii Iaroslavovich and his other sons died after having been imprisoned in Uglich by the grand prince.50 Prince Mikhail of Vereia died of natural causes in i486.51 Vasilii II was survived by five sons. The court granted each of them an appanage but demanded that they remain subject to Muscovite au­ thority.52 The marriages of most of them were forbidden or delayed. At a time when heirs to the throne were marrying in their late teens (see Ap­ pendix 1), Prince Iurii died at age 31 without having been allowed to marry; Prince Andrei the Younger died at age 29, also before marrying. Prince Boris of Volok married at age 22 and was survived by two sons, but both died leaving no male heirs (Prince Fedor Borisovich was married at age 27 and died, leaving no male heirs, ten years later in 1513; Prince Ivan Borisovich died at age 23, unmarried).53 Prince Andrei Vasil’evich of Uglich married at age 23, but he was arrested in 1491 and charged with plotting against Ivan III. He died in captivity in November 1493. His two sons, Ivan and Dmitrii, were arrested with him and spent most of the rest of their lives in prison: the former died in exile in Vologda in 1522 at about age 44 and was later canonized for his suffering; the latter was re­ leased from prison in 1540, a contemporary chronicler poignantly noting that he had spent there “49 years and 4 months, from the age of seven.” He died within a year.54 So greatly had Ivan III, Vasilii III, and the boyars as a whole feared these two young princes that they kept them in prison throughout the reigns of a succession of sovereigns. Within ten years of Ivan Ill’s death in 1505, all collateral lines of his clan had died out, either by natural causes or as a result of the grand prince’s orders. In the early sixteenth century, policies toward collateral kinsmen re­ mained unchanged. Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Vnuk and his mother, Elena of Moldavia, were eliminated from politics once their star had fallen. Prince Dmitrii was not allowed to marry; he was imprisoned with his mother in April 1502 and died in captivity in February 1509, four years after the death of his mother, also in prison.55 In 1500 Ivan Ill’s govern­ ment welcomed back to Muscovy two Daniilovichi whose fathers had fled to the Grand Duchy in the dynastic war: Prince Semen Starodubskii, the son of Prince Ivan Andreevich of Mozhaisk, and Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Shemiachich, the grandson of Prince Dmitrii Shemiaka. The repatriates were given appanages in Muscovy, and in 1506 Prince Semen’s son, Vasilii, was married to the sister of Vasilii Ill’s new wife, Solomoniia Saburova.

158

Consensus and Conflict

Starodubskii lived out his life in Moscow without incident, but Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Shemiachich and his son were arrested and imprisoned in 152.3; Prince Vasilii was accused of colluding with his former allies in the Grand Duchy. He died in prison in 1529 or 1530. His son remained in prison for almost 40 years and died in 1561. This family suffered its final indignity in April 1534, when Prince Vasilii’s widow and two daughters were forcibly shorn.56 Vasilii III was as strict with his four brothers as his father had been with his siblings. Vasilii III did not allow three of his four brothers to marry; when Prince Andrei Ivanovich was allowed to marry in 1533, he was 43 years old, suggesting that his marriage was a final effort to per­ petuate a shrinking dynasty. But despite the need for dynastic continuity, the court continued to distrust those descended from collateral lines. Two of Vasilii Ill’s brothers, Dmitrii and Semen, predeceased him without having provoked major incidents.57 When the grand prince died in De­ cember 1533, leaving a three-year-old heir to the throne, the boyars im­ mediately saw the two remaining brothers as potential rivals for the throne. Within a week of Vasilii Ill’s death, they imprisoned his next youngest brother, Prince Iurii. He died in prison in 1536.58 Soon there­ after, in June 1537, the other brother. Prince Andrei of Staritsa, was ar­ rested and imprisoned with his wife and son. Prince Andrei died in prison in December 1537; his wife and son were released in 1540.59 During Ivan IV’s life, the only potential collateral heirs were his brother, Iurii of Uglich, and his cousin, Prince Vladimir Andreevich of Staritsa. Prince Iurii was never mentioned as an instigator of political intrigue; he died without heirs in 1563 at the age of 30. Both men married in their teens, but Prince Vladimir of Staritsa was monitored closely by the Krem­ lin court throughout his life. He was imprisoned from 1537 to 1540. His lands were traded for other lands and his servitors were twice replaced with grand-princely appointees - in 1540 and 1566. He was forced to submit to loyalty oaths in 1553 and 1554. Accused of treason during the Oprichnina, Prince Vladimir was executed in 1569 with his wife, Ovdotiia Odoevskaia, and their three children. Interestingly, Prince Vladimir’s three children from a previous marriage were spared, indicating perhaps the better political fortunes of their maternal clan, the Nagoi.60 The ultimate irony was that as a result of this strong suspicion of collat­ eral kinsmen, the Daniilovich dynasty died out in 1598 for lack of col­ lateral lines. Thus Muscovy’s future was to be determined by Ivan IV’s progeny. Ivan, approaching the end of his life in the early 1580’s, had three living sons. The eldest, Ivan Ivanovich, was killed, perhaps at the tsar’s own hand, in 1581; the youngest, Dmitrii of Uglich, died in sus­ picious circumstances in 1591. This left only the feebleminded Fedor

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Ivanovich, who succeeded Ivan as tsar in 1584. When Fedor died in 1598, he left no sons or daughters.61 The price of the stability so highly valued by grand princes and boyars was the Time of Troubles.

Political Association: Faction or Class? The conflicts that did arise in court were between factions organized along affinitive and personal lines, consistent with the ideology’s specifi­ cation of political relationships as personal ones. Factions appear to have consisted mainly of families and their allies and dependents. When Tsar Fedor Ivanovich ascended the throne, a chronicler described a faction based on family, friendship, and patronage: “The Nagie, Afanasii and his brother, were exiled to various towns and imprisoned. And, by the order of the Tsar and Grand Prince Fedor Ivanovich, Boris Fedorovich Godunov with his brothers and his uncles began to rule the entire Rus’ land: with Dmitrii, Stepan, Grigorii, Ivan, and with others of their advisers, and with boyars and court gentrymen (dumnye dvoriane) and court secre­ taries (d*iaki), with Andrei Shchelkalov and his colleagues.” 62 Political groups in the 1540’s were called by the names of their leading boyars: the “Bel’skie” or “Kubenskie.” One observer identified the associates of Tsaritsa Irina Godunova in 1604 as families: “the Godunovs, Saburovs, and Vel’iaminovs, who are all of the same house.” 63 Contemporaries understood that the inner circle was organized pri­ marily on the basis of families. Interpolations in chroniclers’ descriptions of Ivan IV’s illness in 1553 reveal boyars’ complaints about the tsar’s in­ laws, the Zakhar’iny: “We will swear our oath to you, sovereign, and to your son, Dmitrii, but we do not want to serve the Zakhar’iny, Daniil with his brothers; your son, our sovereign, is yet a baby in swaddling clothes, and the Zakhar’iny, Daniil with his brothers, will rule us. And we have already experienced [literally, seen] many depredations from the boyars in your minority.” 64 Kinsmen might be expected to be political allies. Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Paletskii, for example, sent his brotherin-law to intercede with Prince Vladimir Andreevich Staritskii in a dis­ pute with the grand prince precisely because the brother-in-law, Vasilii Petrovich Borozdin, was also the uncle of Staritskii’s wife.65 But kinship was not an infallible indicator of political alliance; men established over­ lapping marriage ties so that they could enjoy flexibility of association.66 Overlapping kinship alliances also encouraged political stability. As Max Gluckman has argued, “If there are sufficient conflicts of loyalties at work, settlement will be achieved and law and social order maintained.” 67 It was assumed that if men had kin and affines in rival factions, they would be less inclined to engage in violent competition and more willing

i6o

Consensus and Conflict

to submit to arbitration by the grand prince, the metropolitan, or other kinsmen. Incidents of disgrace also reveal political groups to have been com­ posed in large part of kinsmen. Quite often men who were executed or exiled in disgrace were linked by kinship or marriage: for example, the arrest of the Patrikeevy (the father, his two sons, and his son-in-law) in 1499; the execution of a Vorontsov uncle and nephew in the spring of 1546; and the execution of two Telepnev-Obolenskii cousins in January 1547.68 Numerous men, along with their wives and children, were ar­ rested, exiled, and even killed to prevent their lineages from being per­ petuated.69 As a rule one man’s disgrace affected a small group —often consisting solely of his direct linear descendants. Fedor Sviblo was dis­ graced in the late fourteenth century and his line was excluded from poli­ tics. From his brothers’ lines, however, were descended two of the most powerful boyar clans of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Khromoi and Cheliadnin clans. Ivan Vasil’evich Vel’iaminov’s treason in 1375 eliminated only his line. In a genealogical book compiled later, it was noted that “the sons of Ivan did not have a place in his clan and in public status ranking because of this disgrace.” 70 Vertically organized factions involving all social classes united by kin­ ship, marriage, or patronage provided broader support to boyar fami­ lies.71 This type of political association generally resulted in a politics based on pragmatic self-interest rather than on commitment to principles or class unity. Daniel Rowland draws a similar conclusion from his study of the political ideology reflected in the tales about the Time of Troubles. He finds that, according to the political ideology of such writings, “Mus­ covite Rus’ was perceived fundamentally as a sacred community normally connected to the will of God by the tsar, and not as a collection of classes or even of interest groups; ideology, therefore, instead of providing a means by which these groups could have conceptualized their differences, served rather to blur whatever differences may have existed.” 72 Rowland claims that the tales indicated “no substantial disagreement within liter­ ate Russian society over the nature of the state and how it should be run”; thus the tales implied that the goal of politics was the pursuit of the status quo, not the coordination of conflicting ideas.73 The political conflicts that occurred from the fourteenth century to the mid-sixteenth century did not begin as disputes over such issues as ide­ ology, religious belief, constitutional rights, and social class, although many of those conflicts eventually involved foreign policy or religious considerations. There are no ideological statements, platforms, or debates that suggest that political conflict stemmed primarily from anything other than the boyars’ self-interest. Hartmut Russ reaches this conclusion in his study of political conflict between Moscow’s grand princes and the

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boyars, and between the grand princes and their appanage kinsmen. So also have V. B. Kobrin, A. P. Pavlov, and other Soviet historians in studies of Muscovite politics. Robert Crummey forcefully argues that political conflict in seventeenth-century Muscovy was not traceable to class, ideo­ logical, or constitutional differences.74 In the same vein, Brenda MeehanWaters describes early eighteenth-century political groups as follows: “Elite politics during this period centered on the competition for posi­ tion, influence, and imperial favor between patronage groups based on kinship and patron-client relations. These groups rarely evaluated one an­ other in terms of policy issues: rather, their political world was divided into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’” 75 David Ransel, in his study of court politi­ cal groups of the Catherinian period (the late eighteenth century), depicts political alliances as personal ties between kinsmen or affines, or between patron and client.76 We can now make some general statements about what might be called traditional politics in Muscovy from the fourteenth to mid-sixteenth cen­ turies. Political groups cut across class lines; boyars’ self-interest was the primary cause of political conflicts; consensus, stability, and the balanc­ ing of ambitions were the guiding principles of political interaction. These conclusions are consistent with recent revisions of traditional inter­ pretations of early modern politics. Sir Lewis Namier, for example, as­ serted that personal factions, rather than ideological parties or classes in conflict, were the basis of eighteenth-century politics.77J. H. Hexter, rep­ resenting a more recent generation of scholars in the field of early modern British politics, notes that “historical researches . . . [since 1929] have revealed the sixteenth century [in England] to be an era during which the lines of class interest and national interest were traversed and fre­ quently—perhaps more frequently than not-dominated by other lines of allegiance and action.” 78 Muscovite political association was based on factions composed by kinship, marriage, and personal loyalties. Utilizing the flexibility pro­ vided by their large groups of supporters and by overlapping marriage alliances, Muscovite boyars competed at court without disrupting the stability of political relations. The interaction of political factions and the conduct of conflict in Muscovy are effectively illustrated by the turbulent events of the years when Ivan IV was an unmarried minor.

The Minority of Ivan IV, 1533-47 Vasilii III died in 1533 at the age of 54, leaving a young wife, Elena Glinskaia, and two sons, Ivan, age 3, and Iurii, only a few months old. Vasilii’s death upset the equilibrium that had been established by the political settlement represented by his second marriage in 1526. The

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Consensus and Conflict

Zakhar’in-Iur’ev, Telepnev-Obolenskii, Cheliadnin, and Khromoi families had shared power when that marriage was arranged, but none had direct kinship ties to Vasilii III or his young sons. New families - the Shuiskie, the Vorontsovy, the Rostovskie, and the Glinskie themselves —craved power. Vasilii Ill’s death meant that the hereditary boyars in the inner circle could no longer be assured of their positions. During the fifteen years that remained before Ivan IV would be of marriageable age, the boyars in­ creasingly failed to maintain a consensus; Muscovy was moving closer to a political crisis. There was legitimate reason to expect a political upheaval in Ivan IV’s youth, not simply because the inner circle was weak, but because a state is more vulnerable when the sovereign is young. Boyars might choose to back a rival contender to the throne, justifying his bid for power on the basis of the state’s need for strong leadership. Concern was voiced in a contemporary chronicle: “When Tatar khans beseiged Moscow, for our sins, then our sovereigns were not small children but could relieve great afflictions and could come to our aid themselves and help the land. . . . But now our sovereign the grand prince is young, and his brother is younger still: they cannot ride swiftly and can relieve no great afflictions. With small children how can we mount a campaign quickly?” 79Until Ivan IV was an adult and married, competition among the ambitious boyars would be a constant threat to stability. Many scholars have interpreted the struggles of the minority as a turn­ ing point in the development of Muscovite autocracy —a period during which the bankruptcy of the aristocracy was exposed, a progressive gen­ try began to emerge, and a centralizing monarchy won decisive power.80 But these interpretations perceive class conflicts among the boyars where none is evidenced in sources. Moscow’s boyar factions did not divide along lines of aristocracy and gentry, nor did Moscow’s boyars make ideo­ logical statements that can be identified with the interests of aristocracy or gentry. Rather these conflicts resembled those that occurred during dy­ nastic crises in the mid-fifteenth century and in 1499. Families, sup­ ported by broader factions, fought for primacy in the inner circle, sym­ bolized by a grand-princely marriage. New families were brought into the elite in order to reconcile and reward factions after the struggles were re­ solved, but the same few families remained in power in the inner circle. This was neither a defeat for the “aristocracy” nor a victory for the “gen­ try”; this terminology is inappropriate. This was a restoration of political equilibrium in a traditional polity. And struggles among the boyars nei­ ther advanced nor hindered the centralization of the state; that process endured unaffected. It is not surprising that such an interpretation has been proposed, for

Consensus and Conflict ZAKHAR’INIUR’EV

Zakharii Ivanovich

TUCHKOV

KURBSKII

Ivan Tuchko

Vasilii Tuchko

I

I--------1-------- 1 * I Iakov Iurii = Irina (See Figure 7) ca. 1470’s

I

Ivan

Mikhail

Roman

I

I

Vasilii Daniil m. Princess Anastasiia Dmitrievna Bel’skaia, ca. 1530’s-40’s

163

Mikhail

Grigorii

I

Nikita

Ivan

I

Anastasiia m. Ivan IV, Feb. 1547

Vasilii

Mikhail

Prince Mikhail Fedorovich Kurbskii

Mariia = Mikhail

Andrei

F ig . 8. K in s h ip a n d M a r r i a g e A l l i a n c e s , i 52 o ’s - 5 o ’s: Z a k h a r ’in y - I u r ’e v y .

The figure does not record the full membership of each clan; occasionally the order of birth of siblings has been rearranged.

sources reveal only a few facts —such as the names and dates of death of those who were killed and, in some cases, who did the killing. Situations can be reconstructed to determine who was alive and at court at a given time. But the narratives concerning this period are frequently laconic and, predictably, explain the events in terms of virtue and corruption on the part of boyars and grand princes. Scholars must fill in the gaps as best they can by reference to their interpretive understanding of Muscovite politics. The interpretation employed here is based on a prosopographical analysis of the participants in the struggles of the minority, as well as on an analysis of the struggles at the Muscovite court in the two preceding centuries. It analyzes political relations in ways consistent with the tenets of Muscovite ideology discussed earlier in the chapter. Rather than speak of classes and political programs, the approach employed here adopts a terminology of factions, family, and self-interest. Several factions and families vied for power in the years that preceded Ivan IV’s betrothal. One faction formed by the 1530*8 centered itself around the Koshkin family, called at this time the Zakhar’iny or Iur’evy (see Figure 8). It included the Tuchkov and Kurbskii families, which were possibly affines and may have been allies.81 A second faction formed by the i53o’s was dominated by the Cheliadnin and Telepnev-Obolenskii

CHELIADNIN

BEL’SKII

TELEPNEVOBOLENSKII

GLINSKII

Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Andrei Fedorovich Ivan m. Elena I

Prince Fedor Ivanovich m. Princess Anna, niece of Ivan 111, 1498

Semen

Ivan m. Princess Evfrosiniia Mikhailovna Shcheniateva, ca. 1520’s Ivan m. Princess Marfa Vasil’evna Shuiskaia, Nov. 1554

Dmitrii = Marfa 1520’s

Anastasiia m. Vasilii Mikhailovich lur’ev. ca. 1540 s

Marfa m. Prince Semen Daniilovich Kholmskii, ca. 1490’s

1

Ivan m. Princess Anastasiia Vasil’evna Glinskaia, ca. 1520’s Evdokiia m. Mikhail Iakovlevich Morozov, ca. 1540’s

Fedor Telepen’

Vasilii Telepen’

Vasilii = Agrafena Ivan 1490’s Ovchina

Fedor Ovchinin

Ivan Nemoi

Prince Lev Glinskii

~I

Elena = Mikhail 1527

Vasilii m. Anna

Mariia = (1) Prince Ivan = (2) Ivan Petrovich 1520*s Iosifovich 1530’s Fedorov I Dorogobuzhskii Ivan Dorogobuzhskii

lurii

Mikhail

Elena m. Vasilii III, 1526

Mariia m. Prince Ivan Daniilovich Penkov, 1527

Anastasiia m. Ivan Ivanovich Cheliadnin, ca. 1520’s

Fig. 9 . Kinship and M arriage Alliances, i ^ o ’s-so’s: Bel’skii and Telepnevy-Obolenskii Princes, Cheliadniny. The figure does not record the full membership of each clan; occasionally the order of birth of siblings has been rearranged.

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families, which had enjoyed a kinship alliance since before the fall of the Patrikeevy in 1499 (see Figure 9).82These two families were also linked in marriage with the Penkov, Glinskii, Khromoi-Davydov, and Dorogobuzhskii families.83 Although such alliances were not necessarily lasting bonds, in several instances these families associated with the Cheliadnin and Telepnev-Obolenskii families seem to have benefited from the same successes, as we shall see below. The Bel’skii clan, which was important during this period, may have profited from its kinship tie with the Cheliadniny84 when the Bel’skie re­ ceived boyar rank in the mid-15 20’s. The Bel’skie may also have profited from their Daniilovich kinship alliance. Prince Fedor Ivanovich Bel’skii had married Ivan Ill’s niece in 1498; therefore, his sons, Dmitrii, Ivan, and Semen, were first cousins once removed of Vasilii III and second cous­ ins of Ivan IV.85The Bel’skie also intermarried with the Shcheniatev family in the early sixteenth century.86 Fedor Mishurin, who had been a court scribe since the 1510’s, was allied with the Bel’skie.87 Having established such connections and having made alliances with so many families in the elite, the Bel’skie were in a flexible position on the eve of the minority struggles; they were on good terms with both the Cheliadnin-TelepnevObolenskii group and the still powerful Patrikeevy, called in this genera­ tion the Bulgakovy and Shcheniatevy. Such shrewd politicking eventually was rewarded in the years of the minority. The Shuiskie headed the third important faction in court politics formed by the 1530’s (see Figure 10). Two parts of the Shuiskii clan, those using the surnames “Gorbatyi” and “Shuiskii,” combined forces in poli­ tics.88 Marriages between the Shuiskie and families who were treasurers at court (the Khovrin, Golovin, and Tret’iakov lines of the Khovrin clan) established a lasting association.89 The Shuiskie were also allied by mar­ riage with the Poplevin line of the Morozov family,90 the Repnin clan,91 the Kurliatev and Pronskii princes,92 and the Zhulebin clan.93 Chronicles also identify Shuiskii ties with the Mstislavskii, Paletskii, and Kubenskii families. Around these leading families - the Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy, Bel’skie, Telepnevy-Obolenskie, Cheliadniny, and Shuiskie-other boyar families grouped in flexible networks. Ultimately the majority of these families formed an anti-Shuiskii bloc. The political associations of some fami­ lies cannot readily be identified. Some families (such as the Serebrianyi, Kashin, and Khokholek princes and the Shein, Saltykov, and Vorontsov families) may have been clients and allies of the leading families, or they may have sat on the fence until they had decided upon the most expedi­ ent political association.94 Some court scribes (including Ivan Iur’evich Shigona Podzhogin and Menshoi Putiatin) are also mentioned as having

DANI1LOVICH

SHUISKII

KHOVR1N

GORBATYI

Ivan III

Prince Vasilii Fedorovich Shuiskii

Vladimir Khovra

Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Gorbatyi

Vasilii III

Evdokiia = Petr (Kudai-Kul) 1506

Prince Fedor = Anasrasiia Anastasiia = Vasilii Mikhailovich ca. 1529 1538 Mstislavskii Marfa Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Bel’skii, Nov. 1554

Ivan Tret’iak

Ivan

Dmitrii = Evdokiia ca. 1500

Ivan

Ivan Golova Petr

Dmitrii

Agrafena m.

Ivan Grigor’evich Morozov, ca. 1500

Vasilii

Anna = Mikhail ca. 1500

И

Ivan

Boris

. Anastasiia = Aleksandr . ca. 1520’s

______________________________Ivan = Irina_____________________________ Jan. 1547

Fig. io. Kinship and M arriage Alliances, i 52o*s-5o’s: Shuiskii Princes. The figure does not record the full membership of each clan; occasionally the order of birth of siblings has been rearranged.

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been involved in political crises in this period, but their alliances are gen­ erally unclear.95 The rosters of the 152.6 wedding of Elena Glinskaia and the 1533 wed­ ding of Prince Andrei Ivanovich of Staritsa reveal the broad distribution of power among the boyars at this time. The Muscovite wedding cere­ mony was an elaborate ritual whose participants played roles enacting the drama of the event;96 the assignment of leading roles indicated close­ ness to the principals. Weddings in grand-princely families were also po­ litical events to which several factions might be invited to signify the con­ sensus of those important families concerning the alliance and the power relations that were established as a result of it. At the 1526 wedding, for example, the thousandman, or tysiatskii, was Vasilii Ill’s youngest brother Andrei. The grand prince’s first best man, or druzhka, was Vasilii Ill’s first cousin once removed, Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii, who was accompanied by his wife, Marfa Ivanovna Cheliadnina.97 The grand prince’s second best man, Mikhail Iur’evich Zakhar’in, and his wife rep­ resented yet another large kinship group. The grand princess’s best men (Prince Boris Ivanovich and Prince Mikhail Vasil’evich Kislyi Gorbatye) and their wives represented the Shuiskii clan. Anna, wife of Prince Mi­ khail, was the daughter of the now-deceased treasurer and boyar, Dmitrii Vladimirovich Khovrin. Also representing the Shuiskie and their habitual connections with the families who held the position of treasurer were the women who played matchmakers (svakht), the wives of Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Shuiskii and Iurii Malyi Trakhaniotov; Trakhaniotov was re­ corded as keeper of the seal in the first decade of the sixteenth century.98 The other attendants at the wedding were representatives of the Cheliadnin, Telepnev-Obolenskii, Zakhar’in-Iur’ev, Bel’skii, and Shuiskii families; a slight majority represented the Telepnev-Obolenskii-Cheliadnin fac­ tion. The January 1533 wedding of Vasilii Ill’s younger brother, Andrei of Staritsa, also provided an opportunity for reaffirmation of the political consensus; participants included members of the Cheliadnin-TelepnevObolenskii faction as well as the Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy and the Bel’skii and Shuiskii princes.99 Leadership at court from 1526 to 1533 was shared by the Shuiskii, Telepnev-Obolenskii, and Zakhar’in-Iur’ev clans. Mikhail Iur’evich Za­ khar’in and Princes Vasilii and Ivan Vasil’evichi Shuiskie are mentioned as holding top position;100boyars from the Tuchkov, Bel’skii, Vorontsov, Gorbatyi, Shcheniatev, and Morozov families are mentioned as occupy­ ing less important positions.101 Other families are mentioned less fre­ quently, and others were temporarily eclipsed, either because their men were too young to be boyars or because they were unable to place them at court. This was true of the Telepnev-Obolenskii and Cheliadnin families,

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but their subsequent success shows that their interests were protected by their womenfolk, affines, and allies. Some families and individuals retained power at the court but, for various reasons, are not mentioned frequently in sources. A Polish soldier who had escaped from Muscovite captivity in July 1534 reported to the Polish king later that year that the senior men at court were Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii, Mikhail Vasil’evich Tuchkov, Mikhail Iur’evich Zakhar'in, and Ivan Shigona Podzhogin. Indeed, those men were men­ tioned frequently at that time. But the soldier also reported that Princes Mikhail Glinskii, Dmitrii Bel’skii, Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii, and Fedor Mstislavskii had high status but were not trusted by the others.102 Only Bel’skii was then a boyar, but the others were important. Glinskii was the grand princess’s uncle and had been imprisoned from 1514 to 1527 because of his political ambitions. Prince Fedor Mstislavskii was an immigrant who had arrived in Muscovy in 1526. He was too new to be trusted as a boyar in the 1530’s, but he quickly began to build a political network. He married a cousin of the future Ivan IV around 1529; she was included in major court ceremonies during Elena Glinskaia’s reign (1533“3 8).103 The Telepnev-Obolenskii clan had no boyar at court be­ cause at the time it had no eligible males. In the 1530’s and 1540’s these families would be the leading contenders in the struggle to dominate Kremlin politics. In the years before Elena Glinskaia’s death in 1538, consensus among the boyars remained sufficiently strong to prevent serious conflict. Within days of Vasilii Ill’s death in 1533, the majority of boyars joined forces to protect their own interests and arrested his next younger brother, Iurii. Prince Iurii indeed may have been mounting a challenge that was sup­ ported by some boyars, the justification for which was stated in one chronicle: “It is impossible for the state of the grand prince to be strong since the sovereign [Ivan IV] is still young —three years old —and Prince Iurii is a mature man.” 104 Chroniclers’ accounts of this arrest do not re­ solve the question of Prince Iurii’s guilt because they implicate both the Telepnev-Obolenskii and Shuiskii families. Regardless of whether he was in fact mounting such a challenge, the arrest protected the interests of the majority of the boyars. Within a year of Prince Iurii’s death in prison in 1536, his younger brother, Prince Andrei of Staritsa, was arrested in anticipation of a similar challenge. He died in captivity seven months later, in November 1537. Chroniclers’ accounts identified the TelepnevObolenskii family as the instigator of the arrest, thus confirming its power at this time.105 Whether either of these Daniilovich princes was actually plotting with sympathetic boyars to depose the infant Ivan IV cannot be established from the tendentious chroniclers’ accounts. But it is clear that individual

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boyars were struggling to gain predominance in the early 15 30’s, since the court found it necessary to disgrace several individuals from prominent families. In the summer of 1534, Prince Semen Bel’skii and his ally, Ivan Liatskoi, fled to Lithuania. Bel’skii’s brother Prince Ivan Fedorovich was identified as a co-conspirator (sovetnik), as was Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotynskii, a recent immigrant from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Both were put in prison; Prince Ivan Vorotynskii died there in 1535.106 These four men may have been conspiring to upset the balance of power, or they may have been attempting to take advantage of Muscovy’s weak­ ness to make illicit alliances with their erstwhile homeland, the Grand Duchy. In a separate incident, Prince Mikhail L’vovich Glinskii apparently also attempted to seize control —a not unjustified aim, since he was the grand princess’s uncle and the closest remaining adult male kinsman of the young sovereign. But Glinskii failed to gain the boyars* support; he was arrested, charged with treason, and imprisoned in 1534; he died in prison in 1535 or 1536.107 The Telepnevy-Obolenskie took the lead in putting down his bid for power: Prince Mikhail L’vovich was imprisoned at the grand prince’s stables (koniushnia), which at that time were di­ rected by equerry Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii.108 With his brother Ivan in prison, Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii assumed a low profile at court, according to extant chronicles and diplomatic and mili­ tary records. But his later success suggests that he remained ambitious throughout the early years of Ivan IV’s minority. The Telepnev-Obolenskii and Shuiskii families were the apparent bene­ ficiaries of these disgraces in 1534, and of the circumstance that the Zakhar’in-Iur’ev family had no boyar at court after the death of Mikhail Iur’evich between 1537 and 1539. Two Gorbatyi princes and Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii led military campaigns in 1535. Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii and Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii played a leading role in two sets of diplomatic negotiations held in 1536. At one such session, Prince Vasilii Shuiskii addressed an ambassador; he was substituting for Ivan IV, who at the time was only six years old.109The Cheliadniny maintained a place at court through their women. An audi­ ence held for the wife of a Tatar prince in 1536 was dominated by women of the Cheliadnin and Telepnev-Obolenskii families, who were closely related.110 The death of Grand Princess Elena Glinskaia in April 1538111 upset the boyars’ precarious balance of power. They found themselves without an adult sovereign, a sovereign’s widow, or a direct kinship link to the sover­ eign to confirm their hierarchy, and many years remained before a new hierarchy would be established based on Ivan IV’s eventual marriage. Consequently, ambitious families saw a chance to grab power. The resulting political struggle was so intense that prohibitions on vio-

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lence were ignored. The Shuiskii faction was the winner of the initial stage of the struggle. A few days after Elena Glinskaia’s death, Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii and his faction imprisoned Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii and exiled his sister, Agrafena, the widow of Vasilii Cheliadnin. Prince Ivan Ovchina died in prison soon thereafter.112 The Shuiskie tried to ensure continuation of their supremacy by arranging a Daniilovich marriage. In June 1538, Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii married the only eligible kinswoman of Ivan IV, Anastasiia Petrovna.113 Since Anastasiia was a sister of Prince Fedor Mstislavskii’s wife, the Shuiskie thereby established a cooperative relationship with the Mstislavskie that would endure for decades. The marriage also meant that the nonboyar Mstislavskii clan now had a boyar ally who would be useful in its drive for power. Within weeks of Elena’s death, Ovchina’s imprisonment and death, and Agrafena Cheliadnina’s exile, the Shuiskie were being challenged by their rivals. The ostensible Shuiskii leader, Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii, apparently was able to force the Telepnevy-Obolenskie and their allies to free Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Shuiskii, whom they had imprisoned, but Prince Vasilii was not powerful enough to prevent his rivals from also releasing their own man, Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii.114Boyar consen­ sus with regard to a stabilizing distribution of power (with the Shuiskie in the dominant position) had not been achieved, and Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii had died at the Shuiskie’s orders. As the struggles continued, the violence escalated. There was a harsh confrontation be­ tween the two families in October 1538, when Princes Vasilii and Ivan Shuiskie succeeded in imprisoning Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii and murdering one of his alleged compatriots, the scribe Fedor Mishurin. The obvious target was Bel’skii, but Mishurin might have been chosen instead in an attempt to shield the most eminent figures from violence. The Mstislavskie played an important part in assisting the Shuiskie, inasmuch as Prince Ivan Bel’skii was imprisoned in October 1538 at the home of Prince Fedor Mstislavskii, a brother-in-law of Prince Vasilii Shuiskii. Mikhail Vasil’evich Tuchkov, probably a Bel’skii ally, was exiled at the same time.115 Metropolitan Daniil was deposed in February 1539 because, according to chronicles written in the 1540’s and those written a few decades later, the Shuiskie resented his association with Prince Ivan Bel’skii.116 Some scholars claim that this action is evidence of the church’s involvement in court politics and even of the class basis of political groups. They consider Metropolitan Daniil a “Josephite,” or an “acquisitor” (stiazhateV) - one who, with the progressive gentry, supported the centralizing goals of Vasilii III, Elena Glinskaia, and the Telepnevy-Obolenskie and their allies.

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They perceive Daniil’s successor, Metropolitan loasaf, as a “nonposses­ sor” who supported goals more consistent with the feudal aristocratic outlook of the Shuiskie.117 But neither the assertion that political groups tended to be divided between feudal aristocracy and progressive gentry nor the assertion that the metropolitan was involved in court politics ade­ quately explains the political events of Ivan IV’s minority.118 The inconsistency of such an interpretation of the roles played by church hierarchs can be demonstrated by analyzing the involvement of the metropolitans during this period. In July 1540 Prince Ivan Bel’skii was freed as a result of the intercession of Metropolitan loasaf, who was sup­ posedly a Shuiskii ally. When the Shuiskie again succeeded in imprisoning Prince Ivan Bel’skii in January 1542, Metropolitan loasaf was deposed, by the same Shuiskii faction that had installed him.119 In March 1543 the Shuiskie appointed Novgorod Archbishop Makarii as metropolitan —a strange choice, since he is usually regarded as a proponent of the cen­ tralization that the Shuiskie are said to have opposed. But in September 1543, Metropolitan Makarii suffered public humiliation by none other than his alleged patrons, the Shuiskie.120 This chain of events makes it difficult to accept the argument that the metropolitans were allied with boyar factions. They suggest rather that the metropolitan at court was a moral arbiter. Since the metropolitan represented God’s blessing on the court as currently structured, it might be assumed that boyar factions would find it necessary to depose a metropolitan to justify a new hierar­ chy of boyar power. That God approved of the metropolitan’s replacement was a foregone conclusion. One chronicler justified Metropolitan Daniil’s removal by saying that he was corrupt, thereby implicitly legitimizing the rule of the boyars who deposed him.121 Boyars might also have deposed metropolitans because the clerics protested the violence of these years. While Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii was in prison from 1538 to 1540, Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii, and after his death in November 1538 his brother. Prince Ivan, were the preeminent boyars. Prince Ivan Bel’skii was freed in July 1540, one month after his jailkeeper, Prince Fedor Mstislavskii, had died; the proximity of the events was probably not coin­ cidental.122 A broad coalition of powerful families briefly restored a de­ gree of stability from 1540 to 1543. In September 1540 the ten-year-old sovereign and his brother made a pilgrimage to the Trinity-St. Sergii Monastery, accompanied by Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii, Prince Ivan Shuiskii, and Prince Mikhail Kubenskii. Kubenskii, who was most likely a Shuiskii ally, was head of a powerful clan and a distant cousin of Ivan IV through his mother.123 Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii began to re­ appear in honored positions at this time; Ivan Ivanovich Cheliadnin was appointed boyar by 1539.124 The Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy had no men who

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Consensus and Conflict

were of the required age or who had been approved to become boyars, nor had the Mstislavskii men been made boyars. An unstable equilibrium existed between the Shuiskii faction and the BePskii-Cheliadnin faction. Competition between the Shuiskii and Bel’skii factions continued from 1540 to 1543. The Shuiskie prevailed from 1542 to 1543, having again imprisoned and exiled Prince Ivan Bel’skii in January 1542.. He was exe­ cuted in captivity in May of that year. The Tret’iakov family was allied with the Shuiskii in this, since it was at the home of the treasurer Ivan Ivanovich Tret’iakov that Prince Ivan was held captive before he was exiled. At the same time in January 1542, allies of the Bel’skie from the Bulgakov-Shcheniatev and Khabarov families were arrested and one was imprisoned in the home of Ivan-Foma Petrovich Golovin, a cousin of Tret’iakov and an ally of the Shuiskie.125 It would seem that the Shuiskie now enjoyed the support of most of the boyars, since these events did not provoke immediate retaliation. Perhaps the boyars had agreed to be ruled by a new inner circle dominated by the Shuiskie on the basis of their 1538 Daniilovich marriage. But the Shuiskie probably failed to gain lasting support; coalitions subsequently formed that eventually succeeded in ousting them. The chronicles contain frequent references to the Shuiskie’s allies and probable clients, including those not holding boyar rank and some who had recently received that post: the Kubenskii brothers; the Paletskie; the treasurer Ivan Tret’iakov and his cousin, Foma Golovin; Ivan Sheremetev; the Pronskii princes; and some members of the Morozov clan.126 The Bel’skie also had a broad basis of support consisting in part of the Telepnev-Obolenskii-Cheliadnin faction and allies in the BulgakovShcheniatev and Khabarov families.127Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii’s marriage alliance with the Cheliadniny may have made other families sympathetic to his family; the Glinskie, for example, had intermarried with the Cheliadniny and Telepnevy-Obolenskie, and thus may have been disposed to favor the Bel’skie.128 The important boyar Ivan Petrovich Fedorov, who was married to Mariia Cheliadnina (the widow of Prince Ivan Iosifovich Dorogobuzhskii), may have cast his lot with his wife’s kin. The young son of the executed Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii, Prince Fedor, who was the cousin of Fedorov’s wife,129may also have sided with the Bel’skie. The Bel’skie also shrewdly allied with the powerful Zakhar’in-Iur’ev clan.130 Anastasiia, one of Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii’s two daughters, married Vasilii Mikhailovich Iur’ev, probably in the 1530’s or 1540’s.131 Thus, powerful families such as the Cheliadniny, Telepnevy-Obolenskie, Glinskie, Fedorovy, Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy, and Bel’­ skie allied, undoubtedly against the Shuiskie and their equally broad coalition. The sympathies of other important families cannot be as read-

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ily identified. The Vorontsovy, for example, were active on their own and perhaps were also allies of one of the more powerful families —probably the Shuiskie.132 The Penkovy were linked with the Glinskie by marriage and may have been allied with them.133 These were among the factions and alliances that formed during the Shuiskii ascendancy from 1538 to 1542. Ivan IV was twelve years old in 1542, too young to marry and thereby enable the boyars to establish a new hierarchy and settle their rivalries. The prevailing spirit was one of hostility. Prince Mikhail L’vovich Glinskii and Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Vorotynskii had been killed during the Obolenskii ascendancy from 1534 to 1538, and Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii, Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii, and Fedor Mishurin had suffered death under the Shuiskie. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Shuiskie were defeated by rival families. In December 1543, Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Shuiskii was killed and some of his followers (Prince Fedor Skopin Shuiskii, Prince Iurii Temkin Rostovskii, Foma Golovin) were exiled. The compiler of the “Brief Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom,” who castigated boyar rule and lauded autocracy, described the thirteen-year-old Ivan IV per­ sonally ordering Shuiskii thrown to the dogkeepers. (The compiler of the Nikon chronicle added an ominous note: “and from that time the boyars began to regard the grand prince with fear.”) In earlier, less didactic chronicles, Shuiskii’s murder was attributed to ambitious boyars.134 Shuiskii’s murder marked the end of the Shuiskii drive to gain exclusive power but not the resolution of the conflicts. Rather it was the beginning of a period during which scores were settled and equilibrium was re­ established, and it was thus similar to the protracted period of readjust­ ment that followed the fall of the Patrikeevy in 1499. By the time a bride had been chosen for Ivan IV in 1547, all boyar factions had agreed upon a new hierarchy of power. The agreement proved lasting, in part because the court involved all important political factions in the reconciliation. The Shuiskie, for example, had not been excluded from power. After the death of Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Shuiskii in 1543, Princes Fedor Ivanovich Skopin and Aleksandr Borisovich Gorbatyi both became bo­ yars and joined Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Shuiskii at court. Two Pronskii princes and Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Paletskii, allies of the Shuiskie, were also awarded boyar rank in the 1540’s.135 Three men who were Bel’skii allies had become boyars by 1547: Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich Shcheniatev, Ivan Ivanovich Khabarov, and Ivan Petrovich Fedorov.136The Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy returned to prominence; Ivan Mikhailovich Iur’ev, Daniil Romanovich Iur’ev, and Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Kurbskii were made boyars by 1548. The Glinskii clan was finally awarded boyar rank; Princes Iurii and Mikhail Vasil’evichi Glinskie became the clan’s

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first boyars, between 1544 and 1547.137 No one faction had exclusive power in the two years before Ivan IV’s 1547 wedding. Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii is mentioned as occupying a position of honor, but so also are others, including men from the Zakhar’in-Iur’ev, Vorontsov, Paletskii, Rostovskii, and Bulgakov-Shcheniatev families, and, most inter­ estingly, Princes Ivan Mikhailovich and Fedor Ivanovich Shuiskie.138 Families used measured violence to settle scores, thereby averting anarchy. In the late 1540’s the targets seem to have been the Shuiskie and their allies. From December 1544 to August 1545, Prince Ivan Ivanovich Kubenskii was confined in prison. From October to December 1545 he was again imprisoned, as were Prince Petr Shuiskii, Prince Dmitrii Paletskii, Prince Aleksandr Gorbatyi, and Fedor Vorontsov.139 But more decisive action against the Shuiskie and the Gorbatye was not taken. Men who may have been their associates, as well as some men in other fac­ tions, however, became victims of the boyars’ stabilizing retribution. In the spring of 1546, Prince Ivan Kubenskii and two Vorontsovy —Fedor Semenovich and his nephew Vasilii Mikhailovich—were executed; Ivan Mikhailovich Vorontsov was tortured and Ivan Petrovich Fedorov was exiled.140Fedorov was the second husband of Mariia Cheliadnina, widow of Prince Ivan Iosifovich Dorogobuzhskii and maternal kinswoman of the once powerful Telepnev-Obolenskii family. Given his marriage alliance with a Cheliadnina who was descended from the Telepnev-Obolenskii family, Fedorov’s exile links the three executions just mentioned with the last two murders of the minority period. In January 1547 two teenagers were executed: Prince Fedor Ivanovich Ovchinin, son of the deceased Prince Ivan Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii, and his first cousin once re­ moved, Prince Ivan Ivanovich Dorogobuzhskii.141 The two youths repre­ sented the Telepnev-Obolenskii-Cheliadnin faction that had been domi­ nant at the beginning of the minority (see Figure 9). Their execution was perhaps the crudest moment of the minority struggles, since these young men were slain not because of what they were, but out of fear of what they might become. This series of executions on the eve of Ivan IV’s coronation and less than three weeks before his marriage to Anastasiia Romanovna of the Zakhar’in-Iur’ev clan apparently satisfied the boyars’ demand for requital and allowed various political groups to agree on a new distribution of power. Retribution was exacted not only from ostensible Shuiskii allies (the Vorontsovy and Kubenskie), but also from the Telepnev-Obolenskii and Cheliadnin clans. Kubenskii’s execution can be construed as punish­ ment of the Shuiskii supporters, inflicted by the Bel’skie in revenge for the executions of Mishurin and Bel’skii and for the exiles of Shcheniatev and Khabarov. The killing of the teenage princes might have been intended to

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exact retribution from the Telepnevy-Obolenskie and Cheliadniny; the Glinskie could blame those families for Prince Mikhail L’vovich’s death, as could the Shuiskie for Prince Andrei Mikhailovich’s death. Alter­ natively, these executions, which destroyed Prince Ivan Ovchina’s line in the Telepnev-Obolenskii family and also the Cheliadnin lineage, may have been a precondition before some other, unidentifiable aggrieved party would join the reconciliation. The exact motivations for these executions remain unclear, but the executions do indicate the intricacy of the boyar alliances and the diffi­ culty with which equilibrium was achieved. They served the same pur­ pose as did the tonsuring and execution of members of the Patrikeev fac­ tion in 1499: they reestablished stability. The executions did not escalate violence but contained it, thus allowing factions to reach agreement on a new and, as usual, inequitable distribution of power. The agreement was consolidated in Ivan IV’s coronation and wedding (January and February 1547, respectively) and evidenced by the distribution of boyar ranks in the immediately subsequent years. The coronation made both foreign and domestic audiences aware of Moscow’s newfound stability; the wed­ dings of Ivan IV and of his brother and cousin between 1547 and 1555 defined the new order of the political elite.142 The roster of attendees at Ivan IV’s wedding in 1547 is suggestive of the new distribution of political power. Ivan’s bride was Anastasiia Romanovna of the Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy, who were now one of the most prominent families. Although Anastasiia’s father, Roman Iur’evich, had died in February 1543, her numerous brothers and cousins had proved strong enough to win this alliance.143 Some of the Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy and their allies played ceremonial roles as the second best men of the groom and of the bride and as boyar wives (boiaryni). The Bel’skie were equally prominent. The durable Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii was given the place of honor as first best man; Marfa, his Cheliadnina wife, accom­ panied him. The wedding was also evidence of the rise to power of the Glinskii clan, which was represented by several members. In the spirit of reconciliation, members of the Shuiskii clan and its Mstislavskii kins­ men were also in attendance. The wedding was primarily a Zakhar’inIur’ev-Bel’skii affair, but it nevertheless had the effect of integrating the elite. The November 1547 wedding of Ivan IV’s brother, Prince Iurii Vasil’evich, indicated the continued authority of the Shuiskii faction. Prince Iurii’s bride was Princess Ul’iana Dmitrievna Paletskaia, whose father, Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Paletskii, was consistently identified in chron­ icles as an ally of the Shuiskie in the 1540’s. The wedding party included many Shuiskii allies as well as some Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy, Bel’skie, and

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Cheliadniny.144 The wedding in 1547 of Princess Irina, the daughter of Prince Aleksandr Borisovich Gorbatyi, to Prince Ivan Fedorovich Mstislavskii also confirmed the Shuiskie’s continued power at court, despite their apparent failure to gain supreme authority. This was a semiofficial dynastic wedding, arranged in the name of the grand prince and performed at court. The best men were Shuiskii allies —Ivan Ivanovich Tret’iakov, Fedor Ivanovich Sukin, and Ivan-Foma Petrovich Golovin. But funds from the grand prince’s treasury were contributed to the girl’s dowry and used to pay off Prince Gorbatyi’s debts and to redeem the pawned clothing of the bride and her mother. The mother of the bride was loaned a gown from the grand prince’s treasury for the trip to Moscow.145 This official sponsorship suggests that the Zakhar’in-Iur’ev—Bel’skii inner circle nei­ ther wanted nor was powerful enough to oust the Shuiskie from power. Such an inclusive distribution of power ensured that a boyar consensus would be maintained. Other dynastic weddings in this period indicated the same combination of ruling groups.146 A final indication of power relations in the aftermath of the minority struggles was the marriage in November 1554 of Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Bel’skii and Princess Marfa Vasil’evna Shuiskaia. To some extent it indi­ cates the continued high status of the Shuiskii family, but the wedding also shows the Bel’skie’s great influence at court. The chronicler described the situation as follows: “Tsar and Great Sovereign Ivan Vasil’evich [Ivan IV], autocrat of all Rus’, married to Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Bel’skii his cousin [sestrichna], granddaughter of Tsarevich Petr, great-granddaughter of his grandfather, Grand Prince Ivan Vasil’evich of all Rus’ [Ivan III], and daughter of Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii; and the sovereign gave her in marriage from himself, from his own home.” 147The bride was Ivan IV’s first cousin once removed (see Figure 10), and since her father had died in 1538, the year she was born,148 her marriage was treated as a grandprincely match. Its roster was entered in military service books with other Daniilovich weddings,149and it carried the same honor to the Bel’skii clan as comparable dynastic alliances did. This Bel’skii-Shuiskii alliance so soon after the bitter struggles of those two families during the minority testifies to the Bel’skie’s ascendancy, to the Shuiskie’s continued power, and particularly to the spirit of reconciliation that helped bring stability quickly after 1547. Between 1544 and 155 5, the court granted boyar or okol’nichii rank to many men from established clans, as well as to men from approximately 23 new families. The Romanovy rewarded their allies, kinsmen, and cli­ ents with such ranks; other clans were also compensated with marriages or new boyar and okol’nichii positions. Most of the new boyars and okol’nichie were from the Iur’ev and Iakovlev lines of the Zakhar’in-

Consensus and Conflict

177

Iur’ev family and their allies and affines in the Vorotynskii, BulgakovShcheniatev, Khabarov, and Bel’skii families.150 The Shuiskie and their allies in the Gorbatyi, Paletskii, Pronskii, Mstislavskii, Borisov, Morozov, Golovin, Sheremetev, and Basmanov families also placed men at court in high rank, as did the Vorontsovy, despite the recent execution of one of their number.151The newcomers also included the Glinskie and numerous other families whose allegiances cannot readily be identified.152Although the number of boyars and okol’nichie grew unprecedentedly between 1544 and 1555, the membership of the inner circle remained remarkably stable. Of the newcomers, only the Mstislavskie joined that exclusive group; the others remained on the periphery of power. This expansion was carefully controlled and was intended to confirm tradition, redistrib­ ute power, and reestablish stability. Some historians have suggested that the rise to prominence in 1547 of the Glinskii princes and the Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy after a period of domina­ tion by the Shuiskii and Bel’skii princely clans represented a victory for progressive new families and the gentry that favored centralization. A. A. Zimin (and, earlier, S. V. Bakhrushin) used the term “the government of compromise” with reference to this new stage in Muscovite politics. Zimin, like many scholars before him, considered the significant number of new boyars and okol’nichie admitted to the court between 1544 and 155 5, plus the prominence of Aleksei Adashev (an okol’nichii from a family new to the elite during this period) and of Sil’vestr (a priest of the Annunciation Cathedral in the Kremlin), as evidence that the old elite had been replaced by “new men” with new policies.153 Zimin himself re­ vealed the inconsistencies of this approach when he used precedence to explain, somewhat illogically, why the same families continued to main­ tain their power after 1547: “The increase by threefold in the size of the Duma bears witness to the efforts of the government to weaken the politi­ cal influence of several aristocratic families who monopolistically held power in the minority of Ivan IV. However, because of the existence of the system of precedence, this undertaking had limited success: into the Duma came new people, but all were still from the most eminent boyar and princely families.” 154 S. M. Kashtanov similarly attempted to classify the economic policies of boyar factions in the minority according to “feudal” or “progressive” outlooks. He attributed the inconsistencies he encountered to the “contradictory character of the evolution of feudalism in Russia.” 155 Both Zimin and Kashtanov were confronted by these prob­ lems because they were trying to analyze factional politics on the basis of class differences. Of the 23 families that achieved boyar or okol’nichii rank between 1544 and 1555, i i were of princely heritage, 12 of nonprincely back-

178

Consensus and Conflict

ground.156 Some families (the Mstislavskie and Glinskie) were descended from high-born princes. Most newcomers (such as the Kolychev, Adashev, and Kvashnin families and the Kurbskii, Kurakin, Temkin, and Romodanovskii princes) were lesser servitor families. All these newcomers have been treated in this study as clients or allies of some boyar faction, rather than as a gentry class, because of the lack of class distinctions in Mus­ covite sources and the absence of expressed consciousness of differences in estate. The homogeneity of the elite should be noted here. Intermar­ riage among the elite united untitled and princely, new and old families: for example, in the late fifteenth century one of Muscovy’s oldest families, the nonprincely Cheliadniny, married into the eminent Kholmskii and Obolenskii princely families, as well as into the less eminent Dorogobuzhskii princely family. Similarly, the Shuiskii princes formed marriage al­ liances with the nonprincely Khovrin clan, with the eminent Mstislavskii princely family, and with the less illustrious Pronskii and Paletskii princely families. Examples abound of marriages between nonprincely families (such as the Morozovy and Goloviny) and princely families (such as the Kubenskie, Mikulinskie, and Pronskie).157 Princely or nonprincely heri­ tages, or even different degrees of power among families with boyar or okol’nichii rank, do not appear to have aroused group, much less “class,” consciousnesses. It is difficult to ascertain the existence of a “gentry” among the victors in the minority struggles. Clans that had been at the pinnacle of power before the conflicts began continued to dominate the inner circle after their resolution. The Zakhar’in-Iur’ev clan, for example, was one of the oldest clans in politics; it had been a member of the inner circle since the 1390’s. The Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy were linked by kinship with the Gedyminid Bel’skie, a quintessential^ “aristocratic” clan. The Glinskii boyars were new to the court in 1547, but their Lithuanian princely and Serbian dynastic backgrounds made their “aristocratic” pretensions (if such were ever in evidence at the Muscovite court of this time, which is doubtful) just as defensible as those of the Shuiskie. Many of the new nonprincely families had long served at court as high administrators; they were not provincial cavalrymen but constituted the core of the Moscow dvoriane—the leadership corps of the army. That the Shuiskie continued in power after their ostensible defeat between 1544 and 1547 suggests the existence of a single boyar elite in which socioeconomic distinctions did not create political groups. The fact that previously dominant fami­ lies-including the Shuiskie, Mstislavskie, Bel’skie, and of course the Zakhar’iny-Iur’evy (who became the sovereign Romanovy) - continued to dominate the inner circle until they died out in the late sixteenth or seventeenth centuries suggests that the minority was not a turning point.

Consensus and Conflict

179

The resolution of the conflicts of the period represented a victory not of the aristocracy or gentry, but of certain families and factions over others. That state policy did not change dramatically after the minority is an­ other indication that the resolution of the minority conflicts did not bring a new leadership with new ideological platforms to Muscovite govern­ ment, as has been argued. Wars against the khanates of Kazan’ and Astrakhan (one of the military preoccupations of Vasilii III) continued under Ivan IV. The military and administrative reforms of the i55o’s con­ tinued the centralization and bureaucratization begun earlier. Centraliza­ tion was a slow process. A military reform intended to replace men from established families with 1,000 new cavalrymen, for example, was most likely not implemented; A. A. Zimin was of the opinion that administra­ tive centralization was not completed until the seventeenth century.158But territorial expansion, and the disruptions of the Oprichnina and the Livonian war, generated change that altered the elite gradually, producing noticeable institutional and political differences only in the seventeenth century. In his study of elite landholding from the late fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, V. B. Kobrin also rejects the concept that rivalry between aristocracy and gentry was the source of political conflict, making many of these same points in his argument.159In spite of its predominance in scholarly writings, the assertion that Ivan IV ended the minority struggles by personally interceding is also not based on fact. The sources do not reveal what Ivan IV’s personal role, if any, was. What the sources do indicate is that the boyars and the grand prince reestablished a distri­ bution of power agreeable to all.160 One should not exaggerate the significance of Adashev and SiPvestr in the sixteenth century. Their image as “new men” and powerful policy­ makers has been created by tendentious writers, both of their own day and of subsequent historiography. Chronicles of at least the late sixteenth century —the “ Tsarstvennaia k n i g a the History o f the Grand Prince of Moscow attributed to Prince Andrei Kurbskii, the “Piskarevskii Brief Chronicle” —were written with didactic purpose: the virtues and failings of Sil’vestr and Adashev were used to explain Ivan IV’s personal transfor­ mation in terms compatible with the moralizing discourse of Muscovite political ideology.161 Nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians used these individuals for the same end: to make sense of Ivan IV’s mystifying personality.162But these two men have been given a significance far greater than is warranted by their identifiable historical roles. Noninterpretive sources, such as military service and diplomatic records, indicate that the Adashevy were one of a handful of successful clans that came to power on the coattails of the Zakhar’in-Iur’ev-Bel’skii faction. Such documents im­ ply that the Karpovy and Nagie were equal to the Adashevy in signifi-

180

Consensus and Conflict

cance of positions and frequency of mention.163 The name of SiPvestr is virtually absent from documentary sources, and his historical role has likewise been exaggerated.164 No more than middling advisers at court, Sil’vestr and Adashev were later used as scapegoats in didactic inter­ pretive histories of Ivan IV and his reign. The minority of Ivan IV and the resolution of the minority conflicts in the late 1540*5 and i55o*s tested the principles of court politics. It was a period characterized by anarchy, vendetta, and the straining of kinship bonds. But at the conclusion of those 20 violent years, in 1547, as in ear­ lier years, heredity and personal connections remained the basis of conti­ nuity in leadership. Violence disrupted politics, but it was also allowed in measured amounts to release tensions, thus averting anarchy. The minor­ ity struggles had shown that marriage with the grand-princely clan was a fragile principle on which to build such a complex political system, but in the end it was confirmed as the best way to determine hierarchy. Old clans, some of which originated in the fourteenth century (Zakhar’inIur’ev) and the early fifteenth century (Bulgakov-Shcheniatev, TelepnevObolenskii), continued in power. The integration of clans (Shuiskii, Bel’skii, Glinskii, Mstislavskii, and Vorontsov, as well as numerous client clans and lesser servitor families) increased the size of the court but was not accompanied by a change in political customs or goals, or by a new political consciousnesses. The political order had survived intense crisis with its traditional reliance on kinship, marriage, and consensus intact.

Conclusion

analysis of political activity at the Muscovite court between the fourteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries, like the sources on which it is based, emphasizes family and affinitive relationships. It has been founded on a prosopographical study of the Muscovite boyar elite, on an analysis of Muscovite history in the given period, and, finally, on an interpretation of Muscovite political ideology. It is in some ways an anthropological analysis of politics, for it focuses attention on relationships among indi­ viduals and factions, rather than on classes or political institutions. Po­ litical conflict is viewed here as a balancing of interests, not as a collision of contradictory ideologies; political groups are considered to have been formed on the basis of family, marriage, patronage, and personal loyalties. Political competition was moderated by the pursuit of stability, for sta­ bility gave the Muscovite political system power to accomplish its goal of territorial expansion and strength to prevail against threats from outside. Social classes and institutions did exist in Muscovy, but they were not politically potent. Muscovite boyars and their clans did constitute a small, privileged estate, an “aristocracy,” but it was an aristocracy only in social terms. It did not wield power as a corporate estate. Similarly, Mus­ covy had institutions that were becoming increasingly complex —minis­ tries, a central and territorial administration —but they also had no power of their own in politics. Those agencies that did possess political power wielded it as a single unit. The ruler did not act politically as the “monar­ chical” branch of government, continually battling the corporate estates or institutions; rather he ruled through his charisma, commanding total loyalty and favoring selected men with personal relationships as advisers to him. Together with these counselors, the boyars, the sovereign ruled patrimonially; Muscovy’s grand princes and boyars concerned themselves with the public good only inasmuch as it was consistent with their own self-interest. Even in studies of West European history, where categories of public authority, corporate rights, and constitutional development are more ap-

T his

18i

Conclusion

plicable than in studies of Russian history, scholars are taking an ap­ proach similar to the one employed here. Influenced by the new social history, by the Annales school, by prosopography, and by numerous other trends and methods of analysis, scholars of medieval and early modern European history have been finding that the heralded “rational” institu­ tions and attitudes of Western politics, to use a Weberian term,1 were modulated in practice by the continued importance of loyalty to family, patrons, friends, and dynasty. Such patrimonial means of forming rela­ tionships —once considered pertinent only to the “private” sphere of life — are coming to be seen as important parts of the “public” sphere, including politics, in premodern settings.2 As we have seen in the Introduction, his­ torians of Muscovy have been generally unable to resolve the tension be­ tween rational and patrimonial factors in their interpretations of court politics. This work has attempted to develop an analysis of court politics that is consistent with the patrimonial nature of Muscovy’s politics and society well into the sixteenth century. An essential facet of Muscovite court politics was the exclusivity in power of the grand prince and his boyars. They appeased nonpolitical classes by offering them social and economic benefits, while denying them decision-making roles in leadership. They used a service land grant system and ultimately enserfment to compensate the expanding servitor class without yielding it power as a group. Grand princes maintained control over localities, and derived significant income from them, with­ out conceding autonomy to local governments. The grand prince and his boyars granted scribes landholding rights and privileges, such as access to the judicial system that the boyars themselves used; by the seventeenth century, the sovereign was even awarding court rank to selected scribes. But the bureaucracy as an institution was not enfranchised. Neither was the merchantry: Moscow’s merchants, a potential middle-class political force, were bought off with economic benefits and privileges. The moral authority of the church was essential to Muscovite political ideology and social cohesion; consequently, the sovereign and his boyars rewarded the church with land grants and treated its hierarchs with honor. But neither they nor the church’s other officials held decision-making power. The Muscovite court’s social exclusivity gave it a stability that allowed the state to rise to regional dominance by the mid-sixteenth century. Extensive territorial expansion continued in the seventeenth century, after the destructive Oprichnina and Livonian War were concluded. The state then had to contend with occasional uprisings —by the citizens of conquered Kazan’, by Cossacks, by disgruntled peasants —but no serious challenges to Moscow’s power were leveled. The state’s outward stability

Conclusion

183

was matched by strong continuity in its political system. For the most part, the court-grand prince, boyars, and their allies-preserved order by disciplining its own disruptive members, as in the 1490’s when it ousted the Patrikeev family, and as in numerous incidents of disgrace. The court imposed restraints on political conflict, restraints that were evident in the mid-fifteenth-century dynastic war and that contributed to a reso­ lution of the bitter struggles of the 1530’s and 1540’s. Starting in the second half of Ivan IV’s reign, however, the political sys­ tem suffered assaults that might have destroyed it. Ivan IV himself seems to have tried to dismantle the political order-by creating a new elite, by marrying many times, and even by killing his eldest son, if contemporary rumors about Prince Ivan Ivanovich’s death are to be believed. Ivan’s crea­ tion of the Oprichnina incited factional struggles among the boyars that resulted in the execution of many boyars and the eventual amalgamation of the Oprichnina’s new elite into the established Muscovite boyar elite. But the court political system was not thereby destroyed; the composi­ tion of the elite was changed and enlarged, but many of the same great families (such as the Shuiskie, Mstislavskie, Glinskie, and Romanovy) maintained power under the next tsar, Fedor Ivanovich (ruled 1584-98). Although outwardly politics and government in the seventeenth cen­ tury seem to have abrogated most of the principles of Muscovy’s patri­ monial political order, this impression is false. The number of central Muscovite ministries expanded, as did the number of high ranks at court and the number of men to whom such ranks as boyar, okol’nichii, court gentryman, and court secretary were awarded. But the bureaucracy as an institution continued to be excluded from decision making, and ironically, as the number of men in the top four court ranks increased, their power as a group diminished. Muscovy was still ruled primarily by a small num­ ber of powerful boyars in the inner circle. The peasants were enserfed in the seventeenth century, but that act does not indicate the rise of the lesser servitor class to political potency. Rather, petitions by servitors for enserfment complemented the government’s needs in the mid-seventeenth century for better local administration and tax collection. Enserfment furthered the gradual transformation of the landed cavalry into Mus­ covy’s local administrative apparatus, but it did not represent a step to­ ward political pluralism. Similarly, Polonized and eventually North Euro­ pean etiquette, art, and literature were brought to the court, but they were not immediately accompanied by Westernization of court politics. Some of the same key principles governed court politics even in the sev­ enteenth century. The restoration of the boyar elite by the Romanovy in the first decades of the seventeenth century, after the Time of Troubles,

184

Conclusion

favored sixteenth-century families and gave power to men from both win­ ning and losing factions.3 Consensus remained the means to settle politi­ cal conflicts. The Time of Troubles, for example, came to an end in 1613 only when all boyars agreed on a new distribution of power arranged around the primacy of the Romanov family. Marriage remained im­ portant in determining status hierarchy: just as the marriage of Boris Godunov’s sister to Tsar Fedor Ivanovich had been the crucial link with the Daniilovich family that established the balance of power among boyars in the generation after the Oprichnina, the marriage of Boris Ivanovich Morozov to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich’s sister-in-law in 1648 confirmed his status as the leading boyar of his time. Political conflict continued to be generated by factional ambitions and set off by succes­ sion crises. The clashes that occurred during Peter I’s youth (1682-89) between the Miloslavskie and Naryshkiny, kinsmen of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich’s two wives, for example, are as good a textbook case of court political struggles as those of Ivan IV’s minority that were described in this study. Some political traditions were modified in the seventeenth century. Tsars began to choose women from obscure families for their brides, for example, rather than selecting members of leading boyar families. This prevented an ambitious boyar clan from gaining too much power. In such circumstances, members of the inner circle intermarried with the sover­ eign’s new kinsmen, perpetuating the principle that the most powerful boyars shared a kinship link of some sort with the tsar.4 Although the Muscovite administration was becoming larger and more elaborate, al­ though the organization of the army and of the servitor classes was grad­ ually changing (as evidenced in the abolition of precedence in 1682), and although Muscovy’s preeminence in East European politics was rapidly expanding, politics at the pinnacle of power continued to observe tradi­ tional principles. The vehemence of Peter I’s attack on the vestiges of the political system described here suggests their endurance. These reflections on Muscovite court politics might be applied fruit­ fully to considerations of other aspects of Muscovite political structure, such as political integration. All governments must establish effective links with the societies they rule. Government by coercion would not have resulted in the stability that Muscovy obviously enjoyed. How did the grand princes and boyars gain societal acceptance of so exclusive a political system? At first glance, one-way communication from the central government to the masses would seem to have characterized Muscovite government. Central and local administrators executed policy made by the grand prince and boyars; the central government maintained the na-

Conclusion

185

tional defense and oversaw a unified monetary and judicial system. But these central functions did not give rise to a more broadly concerned gov­ ernment apparatus; involvement of the central government in provincial matters was minimal. Local communities governed themselves in areas such as the maintenance of public order, the upkeep of community prop­ erty, and the allocation of the tax burden. In doing so they used tradi­ tional methods, relying on cooperation among families in the village commune and applying customary law to settling disputes. Despite their tenuous ties with the localities, grand princes and the boyar elite achieved some degree of societal acceptance of their political order. To some extent the church provided a unifying cultural influence; its presence throughout the Muscovite state complemented the political centralization promoted by the court and gave Muscovy some degree of cultural homogeneity. The court itself furthered the development of po­ litical cohesion by sponsoring events and supporting customs that linked the center with privileged social groups (servitors, merchants, scribes). Some of these events have been misconstrued as being more modem and more Western than they actually were: in reality, they reveal the ingenious way in which Moscow’s traditional society confronted the problem of po­ litical integration. The Councils of the Land (zemskie sobory), the most formal of the events promoted by the court, developed the grand prince’s and boyars’ contacts with privileged social strata in a way consistent with the themes of Muscovite political ideology. The councils are frequently considered a protoparliamentary institution, which they were not.5 In many Western nations, the establishment of parliaments was accompanied by a move­ ment to ensure regularity of meetings, permanence of composition and size, and division into chambers representing constituent social estates.6 But Moscow’s Councils of the Land met irregularly (Cherepnin incor­ rectly described their meetings as frequent and regular) and had no fixed membership or statehouse; their members were not elected but selected, were expected to vote unanimously in a mass assembly, and had no right of initiative. The councils’ agendas were fixed by court leaders; their members merely rubber-stamped government policies. Nevertheless, these assemblies seem to have served an important function. Councils of the Land aroused support among the nontaxpaying social groups on important issues, such as the selection of a new dynasty, the declaration of war, and the making of peace. They allowed communica­ tion between the untaxed populace and the government, albeit through informal channels. Councils of the Land created tangible bonds between central and provincial servitor, between center and merchantry, scribes

186

Conclusion

and church hierarchs. They thus embodied physically the theocratic com­ munity that Muscovy’s political ideology postulated Muscovy to be and furthered political integration.7 The Muscovite central government entertained another means by which social groups, most frequently the servitor classes and the urban estates, communicated their desires to the government. Such groups did not enlist the help of their enfranchised legislators (for they had none), nor did they sue the government in the courts. Rather, they petitioned the sovereign directly. The wording of the petition (the petitioner describes himself as a lowly “slave” and seeks the ruler’s “favor”) reflects not so much the literal autocracy of the sovereign as the nature of the political system. Since po­ litical ideology tolerated no intermediary institutions between the central government and society, servitors and members of other social groups could only address the sovereign in a personal manner. Such requests also reflected the reality of politics; individuals sought favors not from repre­ sentative bodies, but from the personal source of all power and benefits. At the same time petitions allowed privileged classes to make effective contact with the government. Family honor was greatly venerated among families in the Muscovite elite; the concept was used, like Councils of the Land and petitions, to connect the court with the broader community in a way consistent with patrimonial social norms. Honor was the measuring stick by which the servitor class determined status in precedence litigation; the custom of awarding compensation to individuals whose family honor had been in­ sulted (the custom was called besehest*e) similarly maintained social hier­ archy among the servitors and in other nontaxed groups. The use of honor as the ordering principle of the elite complements Muscovy’s patri­ monial political relationships because honor, like consensus and petition, focuses on the individual’s personal dependence on the social group. Muscovy used it, rather than institutional mechanisms, to maintain sta­ bility in the elite broadly defined. These reflections suggest that Muscovite court politics was merely a part of a larger, integrated polity that derived its structure from personal connections - in this case, family ties, patron-client dependencies, and affinitive networks among groups-and that centered its ideology on these themes. Muscovy was not a “well-ordered police state,” a bureau­ cratically organized commonwealth whose ruler and officials served the public good.8 Muscovy was a minimally governed society in most ways, far more similar to medieval European states than to its European con­ temporaries. Muscovy’s historical writing and political ideology in the period from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries were medieval in their ideal of a godly community and their naive explanation of histori-

Conclusion

187

cal causation. Despite its overarching central administration, the state was medieval in its tolerance of regional loyalties and local autonomy. It was medieval in its legal attitudes and practices, even though rulers from Ivan III on attempted to inculcate more complex judicial practices and to make the application of written law codes more widespread. The empha­ sis on the ruler’s charismatic sovereignty that symbolically united Mus­ covite society into a single, theocratic community was similarly tradi­ tional. Court politics, with its emphasis on family, loyalty, and consensus, likewise reflected the patrimonial traditions of Muscovite society.

REFERENCE MATTER

APPENDIX 1

The Calculation o f Boyars* Ages

We c a n f o l l o w collateral succession in a boyar family if we have some knowl­ edge about the ages of its members and if we can estimate boyars* average ages at significant points in their lives. This Appendix is a detailed explanation of how the ages of boyar family members and average ages of boyars can be ascertained from the sources. We do not have comprehensive data on any one man - that is, the dates when he was born, started military service, got married, became a boyar, and died. At best, we have a few pieces of such information on an individual. In most cases, we have several mentions of a man being in service, but we do not know how close the first mention is to the beginning of his service career, or how close the last mention is to his death. For the sixteenth century the data are more complete than for earlier centuries, but they are still not comprehensive. Nevertheless, working with information on the few boyars or their kinsmen for whom it is available, we can make estimates of the average ages when men in Muscovy began service, mar­ ried, became boyars, and died. Using these averages, and estimating the birth in­ tervals within clans, we can show succession in boyar families to have been collat­ eral, as Appendix 2 demonstrates. Age at which a man entered military service is a useful datum. Most historians have taken 15 as the age of beginning service;1one reason is that a servitor could assume responsibility for his father’s service land grant at age 15 (the Law Code of 1649 stipulated age 18).2 In the seventeenth century, Kotoshikhin reported that sons of the tsars began to be seen in public at age 15.3 This conclusion is also suggested by the definition of minority in other European nations. The age at which Ottoman kings completed their minorities was 15; the age of majority of Polish noblemen increased from 12 to 18 between 1400 and the early eighteenth century.4 But a man’s first mention in military service books does not necessarily coincide with his fifteenth year. In the first half of the sixteenth century, many men had already attained a high rank when they were first mentioned in military service books. Some men became boyars ten years after their first mention, others as many as twenty years after it. Corroborative information is needed before a man’s first mention in service can be assumed to coincide with initiation of service. The average ages at marriage and the length of the average lifespan are also useful data for identifying a typical career. The men in the grand-princely family provide good information in these categories. Sufficient data to compute age at

TABLE A I . I

Vital Statistics o f Daniilovich Males Born

Name

Married

Died

Age at Age at marriage death

GROUP i : HEIRS APPARENT

Daniil Aleksandrovich Semen Ivanovich the Proud Ivan II Ivanovich Dmitrii Ivanovich Donskoi Vasilii I Dmitrievich Ivan VasiPevich Vasilii II Vasil’evich Ivan III Vasil’evich Ivan Ivanovich Molodoi Vasilii III Ivanovich Ivan IV Vasil’evich Ivan Ivanovich Fedor Ivanovich

1261/62 1316/17 1326 1350 1371 1396 1415 1440 1458 1479 1530 1554 1557

-

1333/34 1341/42 1367 1391 1417 1433 1452 1483 1505 1547 1571 ca. 1574

1303 1353 1359 1389 1425 1417 1462 1505 1490 1533 1584 1581 1598

-

17 15 17

20 21 18

12 25 26 17 17 17

42 37 33 39 54

2147 65 3254 54 2741

GROUP 2: NON HEIRS APPARENT

Andrei Ivanovich of Serpukhov Vladimir Andreevich Iurii Dmitrievich of Galich Andrei Dmitrievich of Mozhaisk Petr Dmitrievich Konstantin Dmitrievich Iaroslav Vladimirovich Vasilii Vladimirovich Iurii Vasil’evich of Dmitrov Andrei Vasil’evich of Uglich Boris Vasil’evich of Volok Andrei Vasil’evich of Vologda Fedor Borisovich Ivan Borisovich Iurii Ivanovich of Dmitrov Dmitrii Ivanovich of Uglich Dmitrii Ivanovich Vnuk Semen Ivanovich of Kaluga Andrei Ivanovich of Staritsa Iurii Vasil’evich Vladimir Andreevich of Staritsa

1327 1353 1374 1382 1385 1389 1389 1394 1441 1446 1449 1452 ca. 1476 ca. 1480 1480 1481 1483 1487 1490 1533 ca. 1533

1345/46 1371/72 1400/01 1403 1407 1406/7

1469 1471 1503

1533 1547 1549

1353 1410 1434 1432 1428 ca. 1434 1426 1427/28 1472 1493 1494 1481 1513 1503 1536 1521 1509 1518 1537 1563 ca. 1569

18 18 26

21 22 17

23

22 27

43 14 16

26 57 60 50 43 45 37 33 31 47* 45 29 37 23 56* 40 26* 31 47* 30 36*

n o te : Average marriage age for Group i was 18.5 years (17.8 years if Vasilii III is omitted). Average mar­ riage age for Group г was 12.3 years. Average lifespan of those who ruled was 46.6 years (those who did not rule lived an average of 42 years). Average lifespan of those who did not die prematurely was 38.6 years. "Did not rule. ^Executed or died in prison.

The Calculation o f Boyars' Ages

193

marriage and at death are available for 34 Daniilovichi who were born between the late thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. In Table A1.1 these men are divided into two groups: those who were heirs apparent and those who were not. The men in the first group married earlier, at an average age of 18.5 years; if we ex­ clude Vasilii III, whose succession was disputed in the 1490’s, the average mar­ riage age was 17.8 years. Those in the second group who were allowed to marry did so at a much higher average age, 22.3; some, who lived long lives, were not allowed to marry at all, particularly during the reign of Ivan III. Because the marriage of many men in the second group was delayed or forbid­ den, the first group is more likely representative of the elite as a whole. Its average marriage age is consistent with that established by custom among the East Slavs. At the Stoglav Church Council in 1551, the Russian Orthodox church defined the proper marriage age as 15 for men, 12 for women.5 In contrast, in the fif­ teenth and sixteenth centuries in some European countries men married in their early twenties or later; by the eighteenth century, their average marriage age had increased to the late twenties.6 Lawrence Stone and other historians have argued that this trend reflects growing commercialization: men were increasingly pres­ sured to establish themselves in a career and to accumulate a nest egg before as­ suming marital responsibilities.7The average marriage age also increased in Rus­ sia during the Petrine period. Before 1710 men in the elite married at the age of 24, on the average, and on the average at age 34 after 1710. The delay here, how­ ever, was caused by the state’s requirement of military training and service before marriage.8In fourteenth- to mid-sixteenth-century Muscovy, men in the elite mar­ ried at an earlier age because of the importance of perpetuating the family line, since political status was hereditarily determined. The average lifespan of the ten Daniilovichi who lived to ascend the throne was 46.6 years; that of their 16 non-heir-apparent kinsmen whose deaths were appar­ ently natural was 38.6 years. This may not be representative, however; the esti­ mated lifespans of numerous other members of the boyar elite suggest a higher average, as we shall see below. This information on ages at the beginning of service, at marriage, and at death among Daniilovichi does allow us to establish rough norms with which to supple­ ment information that we have on some boyars and their kinsmen. These include the following. Men began military service at about age 15; they married by age 20; births probably occurred every 18 months; half of those bom were female. (Richard Hellie finds birth intervals among slaves to have been much longer - four years - but the elite probably used wet nurses and thus maintained a higher rate of fertility than that of slaves.9) Thus men might have been separated from their brothers by at least three and probably more years. This is a logical conclusion when genealogical books record only two or three men in a generation, since all families probably had numerous births. Using these average ages, we can approxi­ mate for each such individual the date of his beginning of service, of his marriage, and of his death. With those estimates, we can approximate the date when a man became a boyar and his age at that time. The men on whom some information is available from which we can estimate, first, lifespan and, second, age at accession to boyar rank can be divided into two groups of boyars and their kinsmen.

TABLE A I . 2

C a re e rs o f 1 6 M e n in B o y a r L in e s

Name

Born

First mention

Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Shuiskii Prince Aleksandr Ivanovich Shuiskii Prince Ivan Ivanovich Shuiskii Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Bulgak Patrikeev Prince Daniil VasiPevich Shchenia Patrikeev Prince Ivan Fedorovich Mstislavskii Prince Iurii Patrikeevich Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev

1553 1555-60 1555-65 1565-70 ca. 1500" 1500-1505" 1440-50" 1440-50" 1530-35" 1390-1400* 1425-35"

1519 1522 1457 1457 1547 1408 1454/55

Prince Vasilii Iur’evich Patrikeev Prince Fedor Ivanovich Mstislavskii Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich Glinskii Andrei Mikhailovich Pleshcheev Prince Vasilii Daniilovich Kholmskii

1420-30" 1550-55" ca. 1530" by 1430 1475-80*

1576 1556 1445 1495

-

-

-

Died (or last mention)

1612 1613 1601 1638 1551 1542 (1495) (1515) 1585/86 1445-57 (1499) 1450 1622 1564 (1490) (1508)

First mention as boyar (age in parentheses) -

1526-27 (27) 1533-34 (29-34) 1470-75 (25-35) 1470-75 (25-35) 1547-49 (14-19) 1408-17 (17-27) 1458/59-61/62 (27-37) -

1577/78 (23-28) 1559/60-61/62 (32) 1485-90 (60)" 1502 (22-27)

Lifespan (years)

59 53-58 36-46 68-73 50 37-42 d 45-55 65-75 51-56 50-60 64-74 20-30 67-72 34 60 28-33 ^

n o te : Average age at first mention as a boyar was 27.4-32.8 years. Average lifespan was 49.2-54.8 years. (If premature deaths are excluded, average lifespan was 51.6-57.3 years.) ‘Estimate based on date of parents’ marriage or date of parents' birth. ^Executed or died in prison. ^Estimate based on date of boyar’s marriage. 'Okol’nichii, 1445-75 (45)cEstimate based on date of parent’s death.

The Calculation o f Boyars *Ages

195

The first group consists of 16 men in boyar lines for whom a date of birth is known or can be calculated reasonably accurately. (See Table Ai .2.) The following examples demonstrate the reasoning used in supplementing known data about these men. Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii, who was tsar briefly in the early sev­ enteenth century, died in 1612 at the age of 59; it is known that he was bom in 1553. If we assume that his next younger brother, Dmitrii, who died in 1613, was bom between 1555 and 1560, he probably lived between 53 and 58 years. The next Shuiskii brother, Aleksandr, is known to have died in 1601; if we place his birth between 1555 and 1565, we come up with an approximate lifespan of 36-46 years. The youngest of this group of brothers, Prince Ivan Shuiskii, died in 1638; even if he was bom as late as the early 1570’s, he lived at least 65 years. We know that Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel’skii’s parents were married in 1497. He was probably bom around 1500, since he is first mentioned in service in a responsible position in 1519. Since he died in 1551, he lived to about age 50. His younger brother, Ivan, was bom between 1500 and 1505, since he is first mentioned in service in a responsible position in 1522. He was executed in 1542, when he was probably in his late thirties. Prince Daniil Vasil'evich Shchenia’s father died in 1450, so Prince Daniil was bom by then. Since he died after 1515, he lived to at least the age of 65. His older brother, Prince Ivan Bulgak, however, was bom by 1450 and died after 1495; he lived perhaps 50 years. Table A1.3 shows a second group of 35 men in boyar clans for whom a lifespan can be estimated only with a broader margin of error, since data on them are less complete. The dates of birth of some can be roughly estimated on the basis of available information about their parents or siblings; for others, estimates of life­ span are based on the individual's first mention in service at age 15 or older. The length of lifespans may be exaggerated in Table A1.3, since a basic assumption is that the first man mentioned in genealogical books was the firstborn and that suc­ ceeding sons were bom approximately five years apart. Those first mentioned may not have been the first to have been born in their families; moreover, birth inter­ vals were probably often longer. But there seems to be no way to take these factors into account consistently for all men. Thus, some births may have been estimated to have occurred earlier than they actually did, but the table is at least internally consistent. A typical calculation about men in the second group is the following. Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Bulgakov lived until 1554 and is first mentioned in service in 1495. If he were between 15 and 20 at his first mention in service, he would have been bom ca. 1475-80 and thus lived 74 to 79 years. On the basis of his estimated date of birth, his son, Prince lurii, might have been bom ca. 1500-1510 (when the father was between 25 and 30 years old). Since Prince lurii died between 1558/59 and 1562, he lived between 50 and 60 years. The data on the three groups of men in Tables Ai.1-3 are fairly consistent about age at death. The grand princes in Table A1.1 lived typically to their late forties. The 16 men in boyar lines in Table A 1.2 lived an average of 49 to 55 years. (If we exclude the two among them whose lives were ended prematurely, the aver­ age is 52 to 57 years.) The 35 boyars and their kinsmen in Table A1.3 lived, on the average, between 52 and 61 years. (The average does not change significantly

TABLE A I . 3

C a re e rs o f 3 5 M e n in B o y a r o r B o y a r -O k o V n ic h ii L in e s

Died (or last mention)

First mention as boyar or okol’nichii [o] (age in parentheses)

1555-59/60 (25-35) 1512-13 (38-43) 1501-3 (43-53) [0 ] 1496-1501 (41-51) 1482-87 [0 ] (42-52) 1502-9 (29-34) 1538-40 (30-40)

Name

Bom

First mention

Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Bel’skii Prince Mikhail Daniilovich Shcheniatev Grigorii Fedorovich Davydov

1525-351470-75 ‘ 1450-60*

1555 1512 1475

1571 (1533/34) (1521)

Petr Mikhailovich Pleshcheev Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Bulgakov Prince Iurii Mikhailovich Bulgakov Prince Andrei Ivanovich Bulgakov Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Patrikeev Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Patrikeev Prince Ivan Ivanovich Patrikeev Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich Shcheniatev Prince Petr Mikhailovich Shcheniatev Prince Fedor Andreevich Kurakin Prince Dmitrii Andreevich Kurakin Prince Petr Andreevich Kurakin Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Kubenskii Prince Ivan Ivanovich Kubenskii Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbskii Prince Iurii Vasil’evich Glinskii Prince Mikhail Vasil’evich Glinskii

1435-45'' 1475-80* 1500-15101475-801450-601455-651455-651500-1505* 1500-15101490-1500* 1490-15001490-1500' 1490-95* 1490-1500* 1530-35' 1500-1510' 1500-1510'

1478 1495 1522 1495 1475 1488 1491 1541 1548 1536 1540 1538 1517 1524 1550 1520/21 1542

(1503) 1554 1558/59-62 (1521) (1493) (1531) (1499) (1547) 1565 (1566) (1566/67) (1574/75) (1547/48) 1546 1583 1547 1559

1494-95 (30-40) 1541-46 (41-46) 1548-49 (39-49) 1547-48 (48-58) 1555-59 (59-69) 1555/56-59 (59-69) 1537-39 (44-49) 1537-41 (41-51) 1555-56 (21-26) 1547 (37-47) 1544-47 (37-47)

Lifespan (years)

36-46 59-64 61-71 58-68 74-79 50-60 41-46 33-43 66-76 34-44' 42-47 55-65 66-76 67-77 75-85 53-58 46-56' 48-53 37-47' 49-59

Prince Fedor Vasil’evich Telepen’ Obolenskii Prince Ivan Fedorovich Ovchina Telepnev-Obolenskii Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Shuiskii Prince Petr Ivanovich Shuiskii Ivan Petrovich Fedorov Iakov Zakhar’ich Iurii Zakhar’ich Mikhail Iur’evich Zakhar’in Roman Iur’evich Zakhar’in Grigorii Iur’evich Zakhar’in Ivan Mikhailovich Iur’ev Vasilii Mikhailovich Iur’ev Daniil Romanovich Iur’ev

1450-60*

1491/92

1508

1502-6/7 (47-57)

48-58

1480-90* ca. 1480' ca. 1480' 1500-1510" 1500-1510m 1440-50" 1440-50" 1470-80° 1490-1500' 1490-1500' 1500-1510* 1500-1510* 1520-30*

1514/15 1500 1501 1539 1536 1479 1479 1495 1532 1532 1540 1547 1547

1538 1538 1542 1564 1568 1510 (1500) 1537-39 1543 1556 1552 1567 1564

1533-34 (44-54) 1508-8/9 (29) 1519-31 (51) 1549-50 (40-50) 1546-47 (37-47) 1479 (29-39) 1479-83 (33-43) 1523/24-25 (45-55)

48-58 58 62 54-64 58-68' 60-70 50-60 58-68 43-53 56-66 42-52

Nikita Romanovich Iur’ev

1520-30*

1547

1586

1543-47 (47-57) 1539-47 (37-47) 1548-49 (39-49) 1548 (18-28) [0 ] 1547 (17-27) 1565 (35-45) [0 ] 1559 (29-39)

5 7-67

34-44 56-66

n o te : Average age at first mention as a boyar was 38.4-46.9 years. Average lifespan was 52.4-60.7 years. “Bom 25-30 years after father’s date of birth. 'At first mention was probably age 15-30, since clan was not eminent. *Bom 30 years after father’s date of birth. 'Sister married 1526. cAt first mention was age 15, as suggested by date of death or last mention. ^Mother married post-1448. ^Mother died 1446/47; date of last mention also corroborates. 'Based on lifespan; also, was at least age 15 at first mention. 'Based on brother’s date of birth. mBased on lifespan. /Executed or died in disgrace. ''Father last mentioned 1433. «Father died 1500; date of last mention also corroborates. 0Was probably age 15 at first mention; father died 1500. *Mother bom 1470’s and married 1495-1500.

198

Appendix i

when those who were executed or died soon after being disgraced are excluded.) This evidence suggests that most men in the boyar elite lived at least 50 years, and some lived longer. This conclusion is substantiated by data on other societies. In medieval and early modern Europe, for example, those men who survived the years of high in­ fant and child mortality and reached the age of about 15 had lifespans that ap­ proximated modern norms. J. C. Russell noted that “medieval man, although his average length of life was short, had a normal span of life.” 10The average lifespan of the members of the Carolingian ruling dynasty was 57 years.“ Some medieval people are recorded as having lived into their nineties and beyond.12This conclu­ sion that most boyars from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries lived at least 50 years is also supported by statistics compiled by other scholars. Robert Crummey lists many boyars who lived into their sixties in his work on the seven­ teenth century, as does Brenda Meehan-Waters in her study of the Generalitet in the early Petrine era.13 These estimates of average ages at the beginning of service, marriage, and death can be used to estimate the age at which men became boyars from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries. The 16 men listed in Table A 1.2 became boyars at an average age of between 27 and 33, but other data show this figure to be low. The men in the sample belonged to Muscovy’s most powerful families, and they were able to assume the boyar position at an earlier age (some did in their twen­ ties) than men from less prestigious families. Thirty of the 35 men in Table A1.3 became boyars. They attained that rank, on the average, between ages 38 and 47, which may be a high estimate, since the length of lifespans may have been exag­ gerated in that table. Robert Crummey found that, on the average, men in the seventeenth century received the boyar title in their early forties; those from more highly placed clans received it earlier, and those from lesser clans received it later. Brenda Meehan-Waters found that members of the early Petrine elite attained boyar rank in their mid-fifties on the average, but this figure is higher because of the heavy Petrine service requirements.14 Because the estimates made here are based on small samples of men, they do not offer statistical certitude; however, for the Muscovite elite they do suggest average career patterns, average lifespans, and average ages at which men married.

APPENDIX 2

Clan Biographies

is a compilation of hereditary boyar families from the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries; it shows that boyar succession was collateral and regular. Families are described in the clans in which they are recorded in genea­ logical books; one clan may include several distinct boyar lines. A total of 94 families in 60 clans are described here; 93 of them in 59 clans held boyar or okornichii rank. The entry for each clan includes the history of boyar succession, the dates each man is recorded as having held a boyar or okol’nichii position, and the reasons for the failure of some family members to succeed. For full forms of the source abbreviations used in the citations, see the Notes, pp. 243-44. A p p e n d ix 2

Cross-References to Surnames Basmanov, see Pleshcheev-Biakontov Bezzubtsev, see Kobylin Biakontov, see Pleshcheev-Biakontov Bulgakov, see Patrikeev Princes Buturlin, see Akinfovich Chebotov, see Akinfovich Cheliadnin, see Akinfovich Chiulok, see Ushatyi Danilov, see Dmitriev Davydov, see Akinfovich under Khromoi Dmitrii Vasil’evich, see Afin’evich Fedorov, see Akinfovich under Khromoi Golovin, see Khovrin Goltiaev, see Kobylin under Koshkin Iakovlev, see Kobylin Iur’ev, see Kobylin Katyrev, see Rostovskii Princes under IGiokholek Khabarov, see Dobrynskii Khokholek, see Rostovskii Princes

Khromoi, see Akinfovich Kolychev, see Kobylin Koshkin, see Kobylin Kurakin, see Patrikeev Princes Liatskoi, see Kobylin Malogo, see Trakhaniotov Mamonov, see Dmitriev Nozdrevatyi, see Zvenigorodskii Princes Obrazets, see Dobrynskii Osteev, see Akinfovich Ovchina, see Obolenskii Princes under Telepnev Peshkov, see Saburov Poplevin, see Morozov Romanov, see Kobylin under lur’ev Saltykov, see Morozov Shcheniatev, see Patrikeev Princes Shein, see Morozov Shemiakin, see Pronskii Princes Sheremetev, see Kobylin Simskii, see Dobrynskii

200

Appendix z

Sleznev, see Akinfovich Sobakin, see Fominskii Strigin, see Obolenskii Princes Sviblov, see Akinfovich Telepnev, see Obolenskii Princes Temkin, see Rostovskii Princes Tret’iakov, see Khovrin Tuchkov, see Morozov Turuntai, see Pronskii Princes

Valuev, see Okat’ev Velikii, see Shestunov Princes Vorontsov, see Vel'iaminov Zabolotskii, see Vsevolozh Zakhar’in, see Kobylin under Koshkin Zhulebin, see Akinfovich Zvenets, see Zvenigorodskii Princes

I. Adashev The Adashev clan was founded by Fedor Grigor’evich, who was made an okol’nichii between Aug. 1543 and Dec. 1547 (AFZKh . . . Simonova, nos. 72-73, pp. 86, 87; RK, p. 112) and was made a boyar between Sept. 1552 and June 1553 (RK, pp. 138, 140). He is last mentioned in April 1554 (RK, p. 144; donation of April 1557, recorded in the Trinity memorial register [sinodik], fol. 373, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 61, n. 230). Fedor was succeeded at court by his son Aleksei, who was made an okol'nichii between June and Nov. 1553 (RK, pp. 141, i5o)-perhaps in March 1553, according to PSRL, 13 (pt. 2): 523 (7061). Aleksei was joined by his brother Daniil, who became an okol’nichii between summer 1558 and March 1559 (RK, pp. 174, 178). Neither attained boyar rank because both were disgraced ca. 1560 (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 354-55). Daniil was executed with his son, Taras, ca. 1562/63, thus ending the boyar line.

2. Afin’evich Afin’ii, founder of the Afin’evich clan, is mentioned only once, in the 1320’s or 1330’s: DDG, no. I , p. 10. He was succeeded by his son, Dmitrii Afin’evich, who is a boyar when he is first mentioned in the sources, in the 1390's: AFZKh, 1, no. I , p. 24. Dmitrii lived until at least 1406 and had no recorded surviving chil­ dren: DDG, no. 20, p. 57. Another man, known as Dmitrii Vasil'evich, is men­ tioned only in genealogies. Veselovskii incorrectly assumed that he and Dmitrii Afin'evich were the same individual: ISZ, pp. 69-70, 433. Cf. PSRL, 24: 232; and DDG, no. 20, p. 57. That Dmitrii Vasil’evich was a boyar around the turn of the fifteenth century is suggested by the fact that his daughters married some of the leading men of their generation: PSRL, 24: 231-32. His line ended with him because his only heirs were daughters.

3. Akinfovich Andrei Ivanovich Akinfovich founded the Akinfovich clan in the mid-fourteenth century. The first recorded boyar was Fedor Sviblo Andreevich, who is a boyar when first mentioned in sources, in 1375: DDG, no. 8, p. 25. He lived until at

Clan Biographies

201

least 1390-92 and had been disgraced by 1406: AFZKh, 1, no. 1, p. 24; DDG, no. 20, pp. 56, 57, no. 21, p. 58. Fedor’s son, Semen, died in 1437: Chronicle redaction, p. 58. He had been barred from inheriting the boyar rank because of his father’s disgrace; consequently, the Sviblov line ended with Fedor Sviblo. Fedor had been joined by brother Ivan Khromoi, who is mentioned only once, as a boyar, in 1389: DDG, no. 12, p. 37. Ivan was joined by brother Aleksandr Ostei, who is mentioned, probably as boyar, in 1384/85 (TL, p. 428 [6893]) and wbo lived until at least 1389 (TL, p.436 [6898]). The next brother, Ivan Zelen’, is recorded only in genealogical books; the rank passed to brother Ivan Buturlia, who was made a boyar by 1406 (BAN 17.15.19, fols. 347-48). The next brothers, Fedor Korela and Andrei Slizen’ Andreevichi, are not recorded in nongenealogical sources; Andrei Slizen’ founded the non-boyar Sliznev line. Ivan Buturlia was suc­ ceeded by brother Mikhail Cheliadnia by 1417 (DDG, no. 21, p. 59); Mikhail lived until at least 1423 (DDG, no. 22, p. 62). After him, eligible men in the Khromoi, Osteev, and Cheliadnin lines all claimed boyar rank; thus the clan was further divided into lineages.

Khromoi Line The eldest son of Ivan Khromoi, Davyd, is never mentioned, but his son’s boyar status suggests that Davyd was also a boyar. (The paucity of sources for this pe­ riod makes this conclusion acceptable.) Davyd’s brother, Roman, is mentioned in 1434 and is referred to as a boyar in a later precedence case (PSRL, 23: 148 [6942]; Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, p. 21). Roman had no sons and by 1472 was succeeded as a boyar by nephew Fedor Davydovich (PSRL, 25: 297 [6980]; PSRL, 20: 299 [6980]), who served until his death after 1477 (RK, p. 18). Fedor’s son, Grigorii Davydov, was made an okol’nichii between summer 1496 and April 1501 (RK, pp. 27, 31) and a boyar between 1501 and Jan. 1503 (RK, p. 31; and SbRIO, 35, no. 73, p. 350); Grigorii lived until at least early 1521 (SbRIO, 35, no. 89, p. 596). He was joined at court by his brother, Petr, who was made an okol’nichii between Oct. 1495 and April 1501 (RK, pp. 25, 31). Petr died after Sept. 1509 (RK, p. 44), before receiving the boyar rank. Grigorii’s nephew, Ivan Petrovich Fedorov, was the last remaining clan member; he became a boyar between July 1546 and July 1547 (PSRL, 29: 49 [7054]; RK, p. n o ). His execu­ tion in Sept. 1568 ended the line (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 462-63).

Osteev Line Roman and Timofei Aleksandrovichi are both mentioned as boyars, ca. i42o’s (Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, p. 20). They were succeeded by Andrei Khrul* Ro­ manovich Osteev between 1462 and 1485 (ASEI, 1, no. 330, p. 240), but the boyar line of the family ended with him. Timofei Aleksandrovich and his descen­ dants are mentioned in appanage service, ca. 142.7-56 (ASEI, 1, no. 52, p. 54) and ca. 1434-47 (ASEI, 1, no. 115, p. 92).

202

Appendix 2

Fifteenth-Century Chebotov Line Ivan Vasil’evich Chebotov, a grandson of Timofei Osteev, is an okol’nichii when first mentioned in sources between 1485 and 1490 (ASEI, 2, no. 400, p. 408); he is last mentioned in Feb. 1500 (RK, p. 16). His father, Vasilii Chebot Timofeevich, is mentioned only in a land transfer document in 1458 and was not a boyar (AFZKh, 1, no. 126, p. 117). Ivan’s rank was not inherited. His brothers, Andrei and Fedor, are not mentioned, and his sons, Andrei and Iakov, are men­ tioned only once in Aug. and June 1521, respectively, as cavalrymen (RK, pp. 67, 65); presumably, they died soon thereafter without having inherited the okol’nichii rank. Thus succession ended with Ivan Vasil’evich, but the family’s heritage in­ creased the likelihood that it would be reintegrated as a boyar clan. In the six­ teenth century, it was.

Sixteenth-Century Chebotov Line Ivan Vasil’evich Chebotov’s grandsons formed a line of okol’nichie and boyars in the 1550’s. Dmitrii Andreevich became an okol’nichii between 1549/50 and spring 1555, perhaps ca. 1551/52 (RK, pp. 125, 152; Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 113; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad’,” p. 35). He lived until at least 1559 (RK, p. 182) and was predeceased by his younger brothers, Iurii and Iakov, who are not mentioned in military service. Dmitrii’s elder brother, Ivan Andreevich, is mentioned in service from 1549/50 to 1553 (RK, pp. 125, 142) but apparently died before Dmitrii became an okol’nichii. Ivan was succeeded collaterally by his cousin, Ivan Iakovlevich, who was made an okol’nichii between Feb. 1547 and July 1551 (RK, p. 11; Sbomik Likhacheva, 2 [no. 11]: 219) and a boyar between July 1557 (RK, p. 163) and March 1558 (Zimin, ed., Tysaichnaia kniga, p. 112; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad’,” pp. 32,3 5). He lived until at least May 1570 (SbRIO, 71, no. 24, p. 666) and is mentioned as a monk by 1573 (Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 64, n. 275). The Chebotov boyar line ended with Dmitrii Andreevich and Ivan Iakovlevich, who were both childless.

Zhulebin Line Andrei Zhuleba Timofeevich Osteev is mentioned only as a diplomat (in 1472: ISZ, p. 74), not as a boyar, but his son Ivan Andreevich was made an okol’nichii between 1508/9 and Sept. 1509 (SbRIO, 35, no. 84XVI, p. 489; RK, p. 44), thus starting a new line. He lived until at least 1519/20 (RK, p. 64). He was pre­ deceased by his three brothers, Vasilii (not mentioned except for a reference to his marriage: Tikhonravov, ed., Vladimirskii sbomik, pp. 128-30), Semen (men­ tioned only in 1502: RK, p. 35), and Ivan Ovtsa (mentioned only in 1519: RK, p. 62). Ivan Andreevich should have been succeeded by his sons, but they appar­ ently died during the turbulent minority period, before being allowed to inherit the rank. The eldest son, Ignatii, is mentioned only in Feb. 1526 (RK, p. 10), Grigorii is not mentioned at all, Vasilii only in 1543 (RK, p. 105), Semen from 1540 to 1547/48 (RK, pp. 81, 115), and Semeika from Feb. 1526 to 1543 (RK, pp. 10,105). No Zhulebiny were alive in the aftermath of the minority struggles; therefore, the okol’nichii rank was not passed beyond Ivan’s generation.

Clan Biographies

203

Buturlin Line Veselovskii assumed that Ivan Buturlia was succeeded at court by his son, Ivan Ivanovich (who he thought was made a boyar by the 1450’s), and then by Ivan Ivanovich’s son Andrei, who is mentioned as a boyar in 1457 (ISZ, p. 71). (Ivan Buturlia’s second son, Iurii, was a monk: ASEI, 3, no. 230, p. 251; ASEI, 1, nos. 21, 54, 63, 185, 193, 308.) But the sources do not confirm this assumption; moreover, Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin lived in the first half of the fifteenth century. Veselovskii based his conclusion on the fact that an “Ivan Ivanovich” is men­ tioned in the 1460’s and later; he took this man to be Ivan Ivanovich Buturlin, but most likely those references are to Ivan Ivanovich Vsevolozh (ISZ, pp. 71, 149; ASEI, I , no. 213, p. 607, n.; ASEI, 1, no. 262, p. 611, n.; Alef, “Reflections,” p. 117). The reference to Andrei Ivanovich Buturlin as a boyar in 1457 in a docu­ ment of land exchange is problematic; none of the other attending officials re­ ferred to as boyars in that document is mentioned elsewhere as such. The rank seems to have been an honorific title in that legal context (AFZKh, 1, no. 115, p. 107); Kobrin found that judges called boyars did not necessarily actually hold the rank ( Vlas?, pp. 168-74). The Buturlin line lost boyar rank after the death of the line’s founder, Ivan Buturlia.

Cheliadnin Line Mikhail Cheliadnia was succeeded as a boyar by his son Fedor by 1433/34: ASEI, 3, no. 99, p. 136. Fedor’s elder brother, Ivan, is mentioned only in genea­ logical sources and died too young to inherit the rank: PSRL, 24: 232. Fedor lived until at least 1462-73 (ASEI, 1, no. 326, p. 236) and was followed at court by his son Petr, who was made a boyar sometime between 1465 and 1471 (ASEI, 2, no. 464, p. 504). Petr died after Oct. 1479 (RK, p. 19) and was succeeded by brother Andrei Fedorovich, who was most likely a boyar when mentioned in July 1490 (PDSn, pt. I , col. 28). Andrei lived until at least 1499/1500 (RK, p. 29). His son Ivan Andreevich was made an equerry by Sept. 1509 (RK, p. 44) and a boyar between 1506/7 and 1508/9 (SbRIO, 35, no. 84VII, p.483, no. 84XII, p.486). Ivan was captured in battle in April 1514 and died in captivity after the 1520’s: Herberstein, Notes, vol. 1, pp. 27, 29; SbRIO, 35, no. 94, p. 654; “Rodoslovnaia kniga,” p. 104. Ivan’s brother, Vasilii, died too young to inherit the rank of boyar; he is mentioned only as a majordomo from perhaps Feb. 1507 and certainly from Sept. 1509 to June 1513 (ARG, no. 29, p. 36; RK, pp. 44, 51). Zimin’s reference to him as a boyar in 1513 (“Sostav,” p. 50, n. 108) cannot be corroborated. Vasilii died by Feb. 1516 (ARG, no. 132, p. 129) and was suc­ ceeded by Ivan Ivanovich who was made a boyar between Jan. 1537 and Feb. 1539 (SbRIO, 59, no. 6, p. 66; and AAE, 1, no. 184, p. 160). Ivan died in 1541, and the Cheliadnin line ended with him (PSRL, 29: 41 [7049]; donations of Oct. 1541 and Sept. 1542 recorded in Trinity memorial register, fol. 318V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 56, n. 188; and GBL, fond 303, bk. 532, fol. 717V).

204

Appendix 2

4. Basenok Fedor VasiPevich Basenok was made a boyar sometime between Feb. 1446 and 1447-55, presumably as a result of his loyal service in the dynastic war: PSRL, 26: 202 (6954); ASEI, I , no. 203, p. 145; ASEI, 2, no. 450, p.490; ASEI, 3, no. 493, p.472. But he was disgraced in summer 1463: ISZ, p.440; Lur’e, Obshcherusskie letopisi, pp. 202-3. Therefore, his son, Nikifor, was not eligible to be a boyar, though he is mentioned from Sept. 1475 to Sept. 1490: PSRL, 25: 304 (6984); ASEI, 3, no. 423, p. 428. Boyar succession ended with Fedor VasiPevich.

5. Beleutov The Beleutov clan's first boyar was Aleksandr Andreevich, who is mentioned as such from 1384/85 to 1389, and possibly also in 1400 or 1416-17: PSRL, 4: 91 (6892); DDG, no. 12, p. 37; TL, p. 455 (6909); A SE I 3, no. 31, p. 54. His de­ scendants did not inherit the rank, however. His eldest son, Feodosii, fled to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and thus lost eligibility: LOII, Coll. 115, no. 106, fol. 80. Feodosii’s son, Olekhno, is mentioned as being in Moscow in the 1460’s and 1470’s, but is not mentioned as a boyar: ASEI, 1, no. 379, p. 277; ASEI, 3, no. 67, p. 100. Veselovskii (ISZ, p. 295) considered Aleksandr Andreevich's next two sons, Roman and Fedor, to have been boyars on the strength of later, unreli­ able genealogies, but no nongenealogical sources confirm this. Roman and the youngest son, Grigorii, are not mentioned in military service; Fedor is mentioned only in nongenealogical sources, in the 1440’s and in 1450, but not as a boyar (ASEI, I , no. 167, p. 122; AFZKh, 2, no. 1, p. 9). Aleksandr Andreevich's clan apparently lost boyar status, perhaps because of Feodosii's flight, perhaps because some Beleutovy served in appanages or were disloyal in the dynastic war. The pau­ city of sources makes confirmation impossible.

6. Bel’skii Princes Prince Fedor Ivanovich, founder of the Bel’skii clan in Muscovy, arrived there from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1481/82 (PSRL, 18: 269 [6990]), but he was not made a boyar, even though he married the niece of Ivan III in 1498 (PSRL, 28: 329-30 [7005]). His son Dmitrii Fedorovich became a boyar between Jan. 1526 and Feb. 1527 (RK, p. 9; SGGD, pt. 1, no. 155, p. 429) and died in Jan. 1551, as indicated by a donation in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 317, mentioned by Zimin in “Sostav,” p. 52, n. 134; see also PSRL, 4 [pt. 1, fasc. 3]: 553 [7°59])* Dmitrii was joined at court by brother Ivan, who became a boyar between Aug. 1533 and July 1534 (RK, pp. 82, 83) and was executed in May 1542 (PSRL, 29: 42 [7050]; Postnik, p.285 [7050]). Their younger brother, Semen, did not become a boyar because he fled to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Aug. 1534: PSRL, 26: 315 (7042). Ivan, son of Dmitrii Fedorovich, is first mentioned in military service in June 1555 and as a boyar in 1559/60: RK, pp. 15 0 ,18 3 ,187. (His placement at the beginning of the Dvorovaia tetrad’ list of

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boyars, ca. 1551, is an interpolation: Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad*,” p. 30.) He died in May 1571 (“Rodoslovnaia kniga,” pp. 83, 139) and was survived only by sis­ ters. The Bel’skii line thus ended with him.

7. Borisov Vasilii Petrovich founded a new boyar line near the end of his life. He is first mentioned in military service Й11514/15 (RK, p. 58) and became an okol’nichii between July 1549 and 1554/55 (RK> PP-121, i52)-probably ca. 1551/52 (Zimin, ed., Tysiachrtaia kniga, p. 113; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad*,” p. 35). He is last mentioned in 1554/55 (RK>P -152-)- His son, Mikhail, is mentioned only once, in 1564/65, and was apparently too young to inherit the rank: RK, p. 212. The boyar line ended with Vasilii.

8. Dmitriev The Dmitriev line, founded in the i490*s, appears to have sent only okol’nichie to court until the 1560’s, when one member became a boyar. Perhaps no member had lived long enough to become a boyar, or perhaps the family was elevated in status in the i56o*s. The first okol’nichii was Daniil Ivanovich (or Ivanov), who is first mentioned in the rank between 1494 and 1498 (Prince Boris Volotskii, whom he served, died in 1494; Daniil is mentioned as an okol’nichii in Feb. 1498 —ASEI, 2, no. 416, p. 449.) He is last mentioned in Feb. 1500 (RK, p. 16). Daniil was succeeded collaterally by a cousin of the elder line, Grigorii Mamon Andreevich, who ranked lower genealogically. (Grigorii ranked nine, Daniil Ivanovich ranked eight.) Grigorii was made an okol’nichii between July 1504 and Sept. 1509: ASEI, 3, no. 450, p. 441; RK, p. 44. The mention of him in 1480 in a late and unreliable redaction of a chronicle tale cannot be confirmed: PSRL, 6: 230 (6988); Lur’e, “Iz istorii,” pp. 84-85. All of Grigorii’s sons (Ivan, Fedor, and Ivan) died before he did. Ivan the elder is mentioned from 1486/87 to 1502 (Zimin, “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” p. 276; PSRL, 12: 254 [7010]), Fedor is not mentioned, and Ivan the younger is mentioned only once, in Oct. 1495 (RK, p. 26). Therefore, Grigorii’s line ended with them. Okol’nichii Daniil’s brother (Dmitrii Ivanovich), his first two sons (Ivan and Andrei), and his last two sons (Fedor and Mikhail) all predeceased him. Dmitrii Ivanovich is not mentioned, but Zimin says his sons served in appanages: “Udel’nye kniaz’ia,” p. 168. Ivan Daniilovich (or Danilov) is mentioned only in 1509/10 (Zimin, “Udel’nye kniaz’ia,” p. 178). Andrei Daniilovich is mentioned only in Jan. 1495 (SbRIO, 35, no. 31, p. 162). Fedor Daniilovich is mentioned only once, in Oct. 1495 (RK, p. 26), and Mikhail Daniilovich is not mentioned at all. At Grigorii Mamon’s death after Sept. 1509, the only eligible heir was Dmitrii Daniilovich (sometimes called Ivanov), who was Daniil’s third son. He succeeded Grigorii between July 1535 and July 1536 (RK, p. 87; SbRIO, 59, no. 5, p. 43) and is last mentioned in Jan. 1537 (SbRIO, 59, no. 6, p. 66). Dmitrii was succeeded as an okol’nichii by his son, Vasilii Dmitrievich Danilov, between 1553/54 and *555 (RK>PP154). Vasilii became a boyar between 1562 and 1563/64 (RK, pp. 196, 206) and

го6

Appendix 2

is last mentioned in June 1566 (SGGD, pt. 1, no. 192, p. 547; Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 376-77).

9. Dobrynskii The Dobrynskii clan was founded at the turn of the fifteenth century by Kons­ tantin Ivanovich Dobrynskii. The first recorded boyar was Andrei Sakhamik Konstantinovich, who is mentioned as such in the i42o’s (Korkunov, ed., Pamiatttiki, p. 20); he is last mentioned in 1435 (ASEI, 1, no. 117, p. 94). Andrei’s elder brother, Dmitrii, and his next two brothers, Vasilii and Pavel, are not mentioned in military service. The rank passed to brother Fedor Konstantinovich Simskii, who became a boyar sometime between his first mention in 1428/29 and his death in battle in 1445: PSRL, 5: 263 (6937); PSRL, 18: 194 (6953). (In the latter source he is incorrectly referred to as “Konstantin Fedorovich.”) Fedor probably was a boyar by the 1430’s, for his younger brothers joined him at court at that time. His next brother, Petr, is mentioned as a boyar in 1436 (ASEI, 1, no. 128, p. 99). The next younger brother, Ivan, is mentioned as a boyar between 1432 and 1445 (ASEI, I , no. 105, p. 84), as is the youngest brother, Nikita, (ASEI, I , no. 84, p. 71). Brother Vladimir is not mentioned. All of them lost boyar status because of their treason in 1446 in the dynastic war: PSRL, 25: 264 (6954; here they are called the “Konstantinovichi”); DDG, no. 61, pp. 196,199. The boyar line now consisted solely of the descendants of Fedor Simskii, who had died before the treason. Fedor’s son, Vasilii Obrazets, became a boyar between July 1471 and Oct. 1475 (PSRL, 20: 289 [6979]; RK, p. 17); he is last mentioned sometime between 1485 and 1490 (ASEI, 1, no. 524, p.402). Vasilii’s son, Mikhail, died in battle in Sept. 1496 and therefore did not succeed his father (PSRL, 24: 216 [7015]); his second son, Ivan Khabar Vasil’evich, became an okol'nichii between Sept. 1508 and Sept. 1509 (RK, pp. 43, 44) and a boyar be­ tween 1522/23 and May 1528 (RK, pp. 70, 72). Ivan Khabar was possibly a boyar in 1523/24 (Tikhomirov, “Novyi pamiatnik,” p. n o [7032]), but he is not mentioned as such from Dec. 1525 to Feb. 1527 (ibid., p. 112 [7033]; Zimin, “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” p.281). He died between Jan. 1533 and Oct. 1541 (RK, p. 14; donation in 1541 recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 316, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 49, n. 95). Ivan Khabar’s second son, Ivan Ivanovich Khabarov, became a boyar between June 1543 and June 1547 (RK, pp. 106, 112), and is not recorded as an okol’nichii. The eldest son, Vasilii, is mentioned only in May 1522 and predeceased his father: RK, p. 68. Ivan Ivanovich served until at least June 1555 and died as a monk after Nov. 1555: RK, p. 152; Titov, ed., Vkladnye, pp. 22-23. The line continued after his death.

10. Fominskii Prince Fedor Konstantinovich Krasnoi Fominskii founded the Fominskii clan in Moscow and became a boyar presumably at the time of his marriage to Grand Prince Semen’s divorced wife in 1346: TL, pp. 367, 368 (6853, 6854); Chronicle redaction, pp. 27, 40. This is the last mention of him. His descendants did not use

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the princely title but retained the boyar rank. Prince Fedor’s eldest son, Mikhail Kriuk, is not mentioned as a boyar in this poorly documented period, but presum­ ably he was a boyar because his father and sons were. Mikhail is mentioned in a document dated 1381-1417: ASEI, 1, no. 2, p. 26. He was succeeded by Ivan Sobaka Fedorovich, who is a boyar when first mentioned in sources, in 1371: DDG, no. 6, p. 22. Ivan Sobaka is last mentioned between 1390 and 1392 (AFZKh, I , no. I , p. 24); he was joined at court by his youngest brother, Ivan Uda, who is mentioned as a boyar in 1383/84 (Ustiug, p. 63 [6892]). Uda is last mentioned in 1392/93: TL, p.443 (6901). Boris, the brother between Sobaka and Uda, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. By the i42o*s, Boris and Ivan Mikhailovichi Kriukovy were both boyars: Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, p. 20. Boris is not otherwise mentioned but Ivan is, between 1380 and 1417, and ca. 1430: ASEI, I , no. 2, p. 26, and nos. 70, 71, pp. 63, 64. By the early fifteenth century the line of Ivan Sobaka received boyar rank: Semen Ivanovich Trava and Vasilii Sobakin are mentioned as boyars in the 1420’s (Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, p. 20). Trava is not otherwise mentioned, but Vasilii lived until at least 1461-62: DDG, no. 61, p. 198. He outlived his nephews, Grigorii and Ivan Semenovichi Traviny, and his son, Mikhail Sobakin, none of whom is mentioned in non­ genealogical sources. With the death of Vasilii Sobakin, the boyar line of the Fominskii clan came to an end.

i i . Glinskii Princes Princes Ivan Marnai, Vasilii Slepoi, and Mikhail L’vovichi Glinskie were the first members of the family to arrive in Muscovy, in summer 1508: PSRL, 26: 299 (7016). None of them became boyars, although Prince Mikhail L’vovich was emi­ nent at court until his death in 1534. His niece. Princess Elena Vasil’evna, married Vasilii III in Jan. 1526 (RK, pp. 9-10). Zimin’s identification of Prince Mikhail as a boyar is incorrect (“Sostav,” p. 52, n. 139, and p. 53, n. 145); when mentioned in Jan. 1533 and 1534 he is not referred to as a boyar: RK, p. 14; PSRL, 13: 79 (7042). Prince Iurii Vasil’evich, the first boyar, received the rank by Feb. 1547: RK, p. 10. He was killed in a Kremlin riot in July 1547: PSRL, 29: 54 (7055). A younger brother, Ivan, predeceased him; he is mentioned only in 1520/21, March 1542, and June 1543: Zimin, “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” p. 276; SbRIO, 59, no. 9, p. 147; RK, p. 106. The third brother, Mikhail, was made a boyar between July 1544 and July 1547: RK, pp. 108, n o . He died between March and De­ cember 1559 {RK, p. 180; donation of Dec. 1559, recorded in the Trinity memo­ rial register, fol. 151, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 59, n. 213). Prince Mikhail was succeeded by his cousin, Vasilii Mikhailovich, who was technically excluded (izgoi), but when a clan was first awarded boyar rank, the rank was ap­ parently open to brothers and cousins in all the collateral lines of the clan. (This was the case of boyar succession in the first generation of the Chebotov line in the 1540’s, as was discussed previously.) Prince Vasilii was made a boyar between 1559/60 and 1561/62 {RK, pp. 187, 193) and died by 1564 (RK, p. 209; dona­ tion of July 1564, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 151V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 71, n. 353). He had no sons, but succession continued in the line of Prince Mikhail Vasil’evich.

2o 8

Appendix z

12. Gorbatyi Princes The first boyar in this clan, which was distantly related to the Shuiskii princes, was Prince Boris Ivanovich. He received boyar rank between May 1512 and March 1513: RK, pp. 45, 51. He died in 1537/38: Gorskii and Leonid, eds., “Spisok nadgrobii,” p. 83. None of his brothers is mentioned in military sources, and none of his sons survived later than the early 1520’s. The four youngest are not mentioned in military sources; Andrei Borisovich is mentioned only between 1516 and May 1522 (RK, pp. 59,69). Prince Boris Ivanovich was succeeded later­ ally by kinsmen who were technically excluded but who were eligible because the family had just attained the boyar rank in that generation. (A similar pattern of succession was followed by the Chebotov line and the Glinskii princes in their first generations.) The rank passed collaterally to Prince Boris Ivanovich’s cousin, Prince Mikhail Vasil’evich, who was made a boyar between Aug. 1528 and July 1529: RK, p. 72, 73. He died in 1535, leaving no sons: PSRL, 26: 316 (7043). Boyar rank then passed to Prince Boris Ivanovich’s line. Prince Aleksandr Borisovich became a boyar between Dec. 1540 and Jan. 1544 (RK, pp. 101,107) and was executed with his only son, Petr, in Feb. 1565, thus ending the Gorbatyi boyar line (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 373-75).

13. Gorenskii Princes The Gorenskii family, one of the many branches of the Obolenskii princes, re­ ceived the boyar rank between May 1554 and June 1555 when Ivan Vasil’evich became a boyar: RK, pp. 146, 152. He is last mentioned in July 1557: RK, p. 163. Succession continued in his line.

14. Iaroslavskii Princes This family was one of many families descended from the ruling dynasty of Iaroslavl'. Prince Semen Romanovich became a (possibly nonhereditary) boyar between Jan. 1493 and Oct. 1495 (RK, pp. 23, 24); he is last mentioned in 1503/4 (ASEI, 3, no. 217, p. 233). Of his three sons, Ivan is not mentioned in service, but Konstantin served from Oct. 1495 to at least 1519/20 (RK, pp. 25, 65). Petr is mentioned once in a possibly unreliable source in 1529/30 but is not mentioned in military service books: Zimin, “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” p. 273. Since Konstantin is referred to as a youngster (possibly age 12?) in a docu­ ment of 1463-78 (ASEI, 3, no. 199, p. 210), he might have inherited the rank in his thirties (ca. 1520), but he apparently died before reaching the required age. Their premature deaths ended the line.

15. Karpov Apparently all men who represented the Karpov clan at court were given okol'nichii rank. Fedor Ivanovich, the founder, is mentioned as an okol’nichii between 1538 and 1539: Prodolzhenie Drevnei, pt. 8, pp. 54-77; Savva, О posol’skom prikaze, pp. 336, 324-26. (In the latter document he is mentioned as

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209

an okol’nichii only in 1539.) He died between 1539 and 1542: AZR, 2, no. 218, p. 383. (This source calls him “Petr” Karpov.) Fedor’s younger brothers (Nikita, Semen, and Ivan Ivanovichi) predeceased him. Ivan is not mentioned, Nikita is mentioned from Oct. 1495 to 1524/25 (RK, p. 26; ARG, no. 236, p. 238), and Semen is mentioned from Oct. 1495 to June 1497 (RK, pp. 26, 28). Fedor was succeeded by his eldest son, Ivan, who was an okol’nichii between Feb. 1547 and Sept. 1549: RK, pp. i i , 15. Ivan is last mentioned in April 1551: RK, p. 131. The next brother, Ivan the younger, is not mentioned; brother Dolmat was made an okol’nichii between Jan. and Aug. 1550: RK, pp. 122, 129. Dolmat died after 1570/71 (RK, p. 241), and none of his younger brothers (Petr, Andrei, and Vasilii Fedorovichi) survived him. Petr is not mentioned, Andrei is mentioned only in Aug. 1538 (RK, p. 94), and Vasilii is mentioned only once, in Feb. 1547 (RK, p. 11). Succession continued in Dolmat’s line.

16. Kashin Princes Prince Iurii Ivanovich Kashin, a descendant of one of the many branches of the Obolenskii princes, received the boyar rank sometime between July and Sept. 1555 (RK, pp. 149, 153); he was executed in Jan. 1564 (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, p. 392). Prince Iurii*s next younger brother, Petr, is men­ tioned from Jan. 1544 to April 1549 and predeceased him: RK, pp. 107, 118. Fedor, the next brother, became a boyar between April 1554 and Oct. 1555, the date of his last mention (RK, pp. 144, 154). The next brother, Prince Ivan, out­ lived Prince Fedor but did not outlive Prince Iurii and did not become a boyar; Ivan is mentioned from July 1549 to Jan. 1560 (RK, pp. 119,184). The youngest brother, Andrei, is not mentioned in military sources. Succession continued in Fedor’s line.

17. Kholmskii Princes Prince Daniil Dmitrievich came to Moscow from Tver’ by 1468 (PSRL, 24: 187 [6976]); he was made a boyar between Oct. 1477 and Oct. 1479: RK, pp. 18, 19. He is last mentioned in 1492/93: RK, p. 24. His son Prince Semen apparendy died too young to succeed him; Semen is mentioned only in Oct. 1495 and June 1497 (RK, pp. 25, 28). Prince Daniil was succeeded by his other son, Prince Vasilii Daniilovich, who became a boyar in summer 1502: RK, p. 34; SbRIO, 35, nos. 71I, 72I, 74, 75VH, pp. 336, 339, 362, 381. In the description of his Feb. 1500 wedding, Prince Vasilii is not referred to as a boyar: RK, p. 16. He was disgraced in autumn 1508 and died in captivity apparently soon there­ after: PSRL, 23: 198; PSRL, 8: 250 (both 7017)- Prince Vasilii had no heirs, and the boyar clan ended with him.

18. Khovrin Vladimir Grigor’evich Khovra founded the Khovrin clan in Muscovy; it was descended from a Greek merchant family. Vladimir arrived in Moscow by 1449 / 50 (PSRL, 5: 270 [6958]); he became a boyar between Aug. 1458 and 1463 (AFZKh,

2io

Appendix 2

I , no. 126, p. 118; ASEI, 2, nos. 374-75, pp. 37°» 373) and *s lflSt mentioned in 1482/83 (PSRL, 26: 276 [6991]). Probably because of its nonmilitary origins, the family did not consistently follow the rules governing boyar succession. Vladimir’s eldest son, Ivan Golova, is mentioned from April 1472 to autumn 1503, but he did not succeed his father as boyar: PSRL, 23: 160 (6980); DDG, no. 88, p. 351. Perhaps he oversaw the family’s financial affairs. Neither of the next two brothers, Ivan Khaziuk and Ivan Tret’iak, survived Ivan Golova. Ivan Khaziuk is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources; Ivan Tret’iak is mentioned only once, in Oct. 1495 (PSRL, 26: 290 [7004]). The boyar rank that Vladimir had held went to the next brother, Dmitrii Vladimirovich, who is mentioned first in 1481 (DDG, no. 74, p. 276) and as a boyar between Nov.-Dee. 1492 and Feb. 1494 (SbRIO, 35, no. 18, p. 75, no. 24, p. 114). Dmitrii was also the court trea­ surer from at least Nov. 1491 to Sept. 1509: PDSn, pt. 1, col. 82; RK, p. 44. Dmitrii Vladimirovich is last mentioned in 1509 (SbRIO, 35, no. 84XVI, p. 489; RK, p. 44); with his death, the boyar line came to an end. Succession did not con­ tinue in the Golovin or Tret’iakov lines, whose men were in any case excluded, and the rank did not pass to Dmitrii Vladimirovich’s own sons (sometimes called the “Volodimirovy”), perhaps because they died too young, or perhaps because of a prejudice against awarding boyar rank to a nonmilitary family. Of the Volodimirovy, Iurii Dmitrievich is mentioned in military service from Oct. 1495 to June 1521 (RK, pp. 26, 67); Ivan Dmitrievich is not recorded as having had a military career. He died by Feb. 1549 but had been predeceased by his sons, Fedor and Aleksei: Leonid, ed., “Makhrishchskii,” p. 11; AFZKh . . . Simonova, no. 95, p. 106. Therefore, the boyar line ended with Dmitrii Vladimirovich.

Golovin and Tret’iakov Lines The position of treasurer held by Dmitrii Vladimirovich Khovrin apparently was usually passed collaterally. Dmitrii*s nephew, Petr Ivanovich Golovin, is men­ tioned as court treasurer in Dec. 1512 and is last mentioned in 1525/26 (RK, p. 49; ARG, no. 270, p. 272). He is referred to as boyar in diplomatic sources in autumn 1518, but this designation is titular: in the same document, men who were scribes were also called boyars (PDSn, pt. 1, col. 413). Petr’s brother, Ivan, is not mentioned; he was the last of that generation. The position then passed collat­ erally to Ivan Ivanovich Tret’iakov, who is first mentioned as keeper of the seal in June 1523 (DDG, no. 100, p. 415), and who was court treasurer from at least July 1538 to Jan. 1549, the year when he is last mentioned (AFZKh . . . Si­ monova, no. 57, p. 63; Kashtanov, nos. 375, 598). Ivan had no brothers; the col­ lateral heirs, the two sons of Dmitrii Vladimirovich Khovrin, had probably died by the i52o*s. The court treasurer position passed collaterally to Ivan-Foma Petrovich in the next generation of the Golovin line; he was court treasurer from at least July 1549 to 1555/56, when he is last mentioned (RK, pp. 14,160). IvanFoma was apparently also the first man in the Golovin line to receive the rank of okol’nichii; he is mentioned as such between Oct. 1552 and Sept. 1554 (RK, pp. 138, 148). He was succeeded by the line’s surviving men in order of seniority. Thus the rank went next to Ivan-Foma’s elder brother, Mikhail, who was made an okol’nichii between 1558/59 and 1559/60 (RK, pp. 176, 186). He died in 1564

Clan Biographies

zu

(RK, p. 208; memorial donations of 1564 and 1568 are mentioned in GPB, F IV, no. 348, p. 58; and AFZKh . . . Simonova, nos. 169-70, pp. 217-19). The rank then passed laterally to the fourth brother, Petr Petrovich, since the third brother, Vasilii, had died ca. 1555. (He is mentioned in military service between Sept. 1550 and June 1555: RK, pp. 129, 149.) Petr Petrovich is mentioned as an okol’nichii between Jan. 1560 and spring 1563 (RK, pp. 185, 201); he was executed, with brother Mikhail (probably the elder), in Feb. 1565 (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 373-74). The two youngest sons, Mikhail and Aleksei, died in the 1540’s: Veselovskii cites unpublished documents in ISZ, p. 448.

19. Khvostov The Khvostov clan was founded by Aleksei Petrovich Khvost, who was first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1346/47: TL, p. 368 (6855). The boyar line ended with his assassination and disgrace in 1356: PSRL, 15 (pt. 1): col. 65 (6864). His son, Vasilii, is not mentioned, but his descendants, called “Otiaevy” beginning with a later family member (Rumiantsev redaction, pp. 173-74), served in nonboyar positions.

20. Kitai-Novosil’tsev Vasilii Kitai Ivanovich is mentioned from 1474-75 (ASEI, 1, no. 430, p. 320) to Feb. 1478 (PSRL, 25: 322 [6986]) but is referred to as a boyar only once, in Oct. 1475 (RK, p. 17), when he was part of the grand prince’s entourage to Novgorod. (The “Vasilii Ivanovich” signature on Vasilii II’s will is that of Vasilii Ivanovich Sobakin Fominskii, not of Vasilii Ivanovich Kitai Novosil’tsev: DDG, no. 61, p. 199.) During much of his career, Vasilii served as vicegerent in Novgorod and other regions. His boyar title might be associated with this particular occa­ sion of grand-princely service in Novgorod and might be titular. Vasilii’s rank was not inherited: his brother, Mikhail, is not mentioned in military sources; his son, Dmitrii Kitain Vasil’evich, is mentioned in military service from Jan. 1494 until his capture in battle at Orsha in April 1514 (SbRIO, 35, no. 24, p. 134, no. 94, p. 654), yet he did not hold boyar or okol’nichii rank. This suggests that Vasilii Kitai’s line could not inherit the boyar rank.

21. Kobylin The Kobylin clan was founded by Andrei Ivanovich Kobyla, who is a boyar when he is first mentioned, in 1346/47: TL, p. 368 (6855). The first three of his sons (Semen, Aleksandr Elka, and Vasilii Vantei) are not mentioned as boyars, but their sons are, as are their father and younger brother. Because of the paucity of sources for the fourteenth century, the first three sons may be presumed to have been boyars. The fourth son, Gavrilo, is mentioned only as having a home in the Kremlin, in Nov. 1367 (PSRL, 18: 107 [6876]). The last son, Fedor Koshka, is a boyar when he is first mentioned, in 1389 (DDG, no. 12, p. 37). He is last men-

z iz

Appendix 2

tioned in 1393 (PSRL, 25: 221 [6901]) and probably died by 1408; Emir Edigei’s letter to Vasilii 1 of that year refers to Fedor as having died (PSRL, 4 [pt. 1, fasc. 2]: 407 [6916]). After Fedor, the clan split into separate lineages. Ignatii Semenovich, Fedor Aleksandrovich Kolych, and Grigorii VasiPevich Vanteev are the only men of the next generation who are recorded in sources during this poorly documented period. They are all referred to as boyars in sources of the early fifteenth century (Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, p. 19), but only the Koshkin line retained the boyar rank after their generation. Grigorii Vanteev had no heirs. Ignatii died in 1408 (PSRL, 18: 154 [6916]); his son, Aleksei, is mentioned in 1445 as leading troops from Vladimir (PSRL, 20: 257 [6953]). Seemingly by that time he would have inherited his father’s position. Perhaps he had joined ap­ panage service, thereby losing eligibility for the boyar rank. Similarly, one of Kolych’s sons, Andrei, is mentioned in 1445, but he did not succeed his father as boyar: Uspenie register, p. 27. Perhaps he, too, joined appanage service, or per­ haps he committed treason in the dynastic war. No other sources refer to these two men; therefore, it is impossible to identify the reason for their failure to succeed.

Kolychev Line During Ivan IV’s youth, the great-grandsons of Fedor Kolych constituted either a solely okol'nichii or boyar-okol’nichii line —the record is unclear. Ivan Rudak Ivanovich is mentioned in military service possibly between 1523 and 1525 (ac­ cording to an undated document whose dates are approximate: Bogoiavlenskii, “Bran’,” pp. 18-20), and certainly by April 1536 (RK, p. 90). He became an okol’nichii between April 1536 and 1546/47 (RK, pp. 90, 112); he is last men­ tioned in 1549/50 (RK, p. 124). Ivan’s elder brother, Stepan, and younger broth­ ers, Fedor and Fedor the younger, are not mentioned in military records. The rank passed to Ivan’s brother Ivan Umnoi, who is first mentioned in military service in June 1542 (RK, p. 103), became an okol'nichii between May 1548 and March 1549 (RK, pp. 116, 118), and died between Aug. 1553 and June 1554 (RK, p. 142; donation of June 1554, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 429, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 63, n. 256). Since Ivan Rudak had no sons, suc­ cession continued in Umnoi's line. Fedor Ivanovich Umnogo, who is first men­ tioned in Dec. 1547 (RK, p. 113), became an okol’nichii between June 1555 and Jan. 1558 (RK, p. 151; AI, 1, no. 154, item 9, pp. 260-62). He was made a boyar between 1558/59 and July 1561 (RK, p. 181; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad',” p. 33) and was certainly a boyar by Nov. 1562 (RK, p. 198). Fedor died between May 1570 and Jan. 1575 (SbRIO, 71, no. 24, p. 666; donation of 1575 mentioned in Veselovskii, Issledovaniia. . . oprichniny, p. 399). His brother, Vasilii Umnogo, is first mentioned in military service in June 1556 (RK, p. 157) and was made an okol’nichii between 1559/60 and March 1565 (RK, pp. 186, 216). He is last mentioned in early 1573: RK, p. 248. Fedor and Vasilii were joined at court by Mikhail Ivanovich Kolychev, who is described in genealogies as an elder uncle of these two Umnogo-Kolychev okol’nichie (Chronicle redaction, p. 46; Rumiantsev redaction, p. 152), but this assertion is probably incorrect. Mikhail may instead

Clan Biographies

213

be their much younger brother, or a son of one of them, since his lifespan co­ incides with those of Ivan Umnoi’s sons. Mikhail Ivanovich is first mentioned in military service in April 1554 (SbRIO, 59, no. 28, p.438); he became an okoPnichii after Vasilii Umnogo, between 1563 and 1566/67 (RK, pp. 202, 226), which is also the last mention of him.

Koshkin Line Fedor Koshka (see preceding discussion of the division of the Kobylin clan) passed his boyar rank to his son Ivan, who is first mentioned, as a boyar, ca. 1406: DDG, no. 20, p. 57. Ivan is mentioned after 1425-27 (ASEI, 1, nos. 47-48, pp. 51, 52) and was joined at court by his brother Fedor Goltiai, who is men­ tioned only once, as a boyar, in 1406 (DDG, no. 20, p. 57). After Fedor Goltiai’s death, his place was taken by the fourth brother, Mikhail Durnoi, who is first mentioned, as a boyar, ca. 1423: DDG, no. 22, p. 62. He is not mentioned after 1424: ASEI, 3, no. 239, p. 260. The third brother, Aleksandr Sheremet Fedorovich, is not mentioned. Mikhail was succeeded by Ivan’s three eldest sons (Ivan, Fedor, and Iakov), who are not mentioned in military sources; their names appear only in private documents between ca. 1415 and 1425 (ASEI, 1, nos. 30, 31, pp. 41, 42). The rank then passed to the youngest son, Zakharii, after a con­ siderable time because of his age. He is first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1433 (PSRL, 20: 238 [6941]); he died after 1433-38 but before 1453-60 (ASEI, 1, no. 130, p. 100; ASEI, 2, no. 354, p. 348). Zakharii was joined as a boyar by Andrei Fedorovich Goltiaev. (His elder brothers, Ivan and Gavrilo, are not men­ tioned.) Andrei is mentioned as a boyar by 1434 (PSRL, 26: 190 [6942]) and died in battle in 1445 (Uspenie register, p. 27). His death ended the Goltiaev line. Succession continued with Zakharii Ivanovich’s sons, after an interval because of their youth. Iakov Zakhar’ich is first mentioned, as a boyar, in Oct. 1479, when he was probably in his twenties, since he lived until March 1510: RK, p. 19; Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. i (reads 7011 but should be 7018 —mistransliteration of Cyrillic numbers). Iakov’s younger brother, Iurii Zakhar'ich, is first mentioned in military service in Oct. 1479 and was awarded boyar rank by Oct. 1483: RK, p. 19; DDG, no. 77, p. 292. He died after Nov. 1500: ASEI, 2, no. 422, p. 461; RK, p. 30. Brother Vasilii Liatskoi did not succeed to the posi­ tion of boyar, apparently because he moved to Novgorod; his surname is derived from the name of a Novgorod territory (ISZ, p. 151 ; Zimin, “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” p. 279). Boyar or okol’nichii rank next went to the sons of Iakov Zakhar’ich; they and their sons were called the Zakhar’iny. The eldest, Petr Iakovlevich, became an okol’nichii between Oct. 1495 and May 1512 (RK, pp. 26,45) and a boyar between May 1522 and Feb. 1527 (RK, p. 68; SGGD, pt. I , no. 155, p. 430). He died in June 1533: Kormovaia kniga. . . Novospasskogo, p. ii. Petr had been joined at court by the second brother, Vasilii, who is first men­ tioned, as an okol’nichii, in i5 i5 /i6 ;h e died between May 1522 and Aug. 1526: RK, pp. 59, 68; donation of Aug. 1526 mentioned in Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. i. The third brother, Ivan, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. Vasilii was succeeded collaterally by men in the Iur’ev line:

214

Appendix 2

Mikhail Iur’evich became a boyar between 1523/24 and March 1525 (RK, p. 70; AFZKh, I , no. 2a, p. 22), probably after his cousin Petr, who was genealogically his senior, was made a boyar between 1522 and 1527 (see above). In one chronicle Mikhail Iur’evich is mentioned as a boyar in 1523 (PSRL, 26: 312 [7031]; cf. RK, pp. 69, 70), but there are no data to confirm this. Zimin (“Sostav,” p. 51, n. 124) says he was an okol’nichii in 1520, but this is not corroborated by numer­ ous mentions of Mikhail Iur’evich through 1525: RK, pp. 67-70. Mikhail died between Sept. 1537 and Oct. 1539: RK, p. 93; donation of Oct. 1539, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 349, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 51, n. 124. He had been majordomo of Tver’ from at least 1515/16^) May 1522: RK, pp. 58, 68. After Mikhail, succession was delayed by the minority struggles. The next brother, Ivan, had died in July 1503 or perhaps in 1510 (Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. i; the discrepancy in this source’s date concerning Iakov Zakhar’ich discussed above also applies here). Roman, the next brother, progenitor of the Romanov dynasty, is first mentioned in military service in July 1532 and died between July 1537 and Feb. 1543 (RK, pp. 80, 92: Kormovaia kniga. . . Novospasskogo, p. ii). He may have predeceased Mikhail. After Roman’s death, the Iur’evy were not represented at court until Grigorii Iur’evich was made a boyar between June 1543 and July 1547 (RK, pp. 105,112); he died on March I , 1556 (Girshberg, “Materialy,” p. 32; donation of Sept. 8, 1558, mentioned in Gnevushev, Tsarskie praroditeli, pp. 137-38). One source (Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. ii) gives the date of his death as March 1567, but this is proba­ bly a mistaken transliteration of the Cyrillic numerals. Grigorii’s younger brother, Semen, is not mentioned. Thereafter, both the Iakovlev and Iur’ev lines sent many boyars and okol’nichie to court simultaneously. This reflects the clan’s success: Roman Iur’evich’s daughter Anastasiia had married Ivan IV in Feb. 1547 (RK, pp. IO-Il).

Iakovlev Line Zakharii Petrovich did not inherit the boyar rank from his father but received it after his second cousin, Ivan Mikhailovich Iur’ev, who was genealogically his se­ nior. The lur’ev line was favored over the Iakovlev line in boyar succession be­ cause of its marriage alliance, but the Iakovlevy also received many boyar posi­ tions. Zakharii became a boyar between May 1550 and April 1551: RK, pp. 126, 131. (His elder brother, Grigorii, is not mentioned.) Zakharii ranked eight in the Iakovlev lineage; he was followed by a cousin who also ranked eight but who was younger. Mikhail Vasil’evich Iakovlev became an okol’nichii between July 1549 and June 1555 (RK, pp. 119, 150). Zakharii Petrovich died in July 1555 (Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. ii); Mikhail Vasil’evich died in Oct. 1556 (Karlinskii, Kratkoe, p. 28; Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. ii, is incorrect). Ivan Petrovich Iakovlev, of the elder line, ranked nine in the lineage. He became an okol’nichii after the deaths of Zakharii and Mikhail, between 1556/57 and July 1557 (RK, pp. 162, 163), and a boyar between July 1557 and March 1558 (RK, pp. 163, 167). Likewise, Semen Vasil’evich Iakovlev, Ivan Petrovich’s cousin and genealogical equal (both ranked nine), became an okol*-

Clan Biographies

215

nichii (between June 1556 and July 1557, according to RK, pp. 157,163). Vasilii Petrovich, who ranked ten, became an okol’nichii between April 1554 and March 1559 (RK, pp. 145, 182). Semen Vasil’evich was promoted to boyar between March 1558 and March 1559 (RK, pp. 169, 178). Vasilii Petrovich became a boyar by Sept. 1567: RK, p. 227. Ivan Petrovich, Vasilii Petrovich, and Semen Vasil’evich were all executed in 1571, but succession continued with their descen­ dants: Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 476-77.

Iur’ev Line Following Ivan IV’s marriage to Anastasiia Romanovna Iur’eva in Feb. 1547, boyar and okol'nichii ranks were awarded to many men in the Iur’ev lineage. Grigorii Iur’evich received the boyar rank between June 1543 and July 1547 (RK, pp. 105, 112); his nephew but genealogical equal (both ranked seven), Ivan Mikhailovich lur’ev, was made a boyar between Dec. 1539 and Feb. 1547 (RK, pp. 100, 10). They probably became boyars simultaneously. Also in 1547 Daniil Romanovich, who ranked nine, was made an okol’nichii in the second half of the year (RK, pp. h i , 113). Although he ranked lower than the other men in the Iur’ev family, he was the eldest son of his father, and thus claimed representation in court rank. His line was technically excluded, but because his sister was the grand princess, the exception is understandable. Daniil was the majordomo from at least July 1547 to 1559: RK, pp. i n , 182 (Zimin says until 1564: “O sostave dvortsovykh,” p. 194). Between early 1548 and Jan. 1549, Vasilii Mikhailovich, who ranked eight, became a boyar (RK, p. 114; SbRIO, 59, no. 18, p. 266). He was also majordomo of Tver’, from at least Feb. 1546 to Jan. 1552: Zimin, “O sostave dvortsovykh,” p. 192. In the early 1550’s, the clan thus had three boyars (Grigorii Iur’evich and Ivan and Vasilii Mikhailovichi) and one okol’nichii (Daniil Romanovich) at court. Daniil Romanovich became a boyar between Dec. 1547 and May 1548: RK, pp. 115; Shumakov, ed., Obzor, pt. 3 (1912), p. 115 (docu­ ment no. 417). Ivan Mikhailovich died in June 1552 (Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. ii); Grigorii Iur’evich died on March 1, 1556: Girshberg, “Materialy,” p. 32. The place at court was not taken by Ivan’s youngest brother, also named Ivan, since he apparently died after he was mentioned in Feb. 1547 (RK, p. 10), nor by Dolmat Romanovich, who died in Sept. 1545 (Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. ii). Nikita Romanovich Iur’ev assumed it when he reached the required age. Nikita, who ranked eleven, became an okol’nichii in the first half of 1559: RK, pp. 176, 181. Daniil Romanovich died in Nov. 1564 (Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. ii), and in the middle of 1565 Nikita was made a boyar (RK, pp. 217, 218). Vasilii Mikhailovich died in April 1567 (Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. ii). Nikita continued as the family’s pa­ triarch until his death in April 1586 (Kormovaia kniga . . . Novospasskogo, p. iii).

Liatskoi Line Ivan Vasil’evich Liatskoi was made an okol’nichii between May 1522 and Dec. 1526, thus establishing a new lineage: RK, p. 69; SbRIO, 35, no. 102, p. 732. He

2 i6

Appendix г

and his descendants lost the rank when he fled to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with his son in Aug. 1534: PSRL, 29: 13 (7042).

Bezzubtsev Line The first Bezzubtsev line was descended from a son of Fedor Koshka, Aleksandr Bezzubets (who was never a boyar), through his youngest son, Konstantin. Kons­ tantin’s son Mikhail was awarded okoPnichii rank between May 1508 and Sept. 1509: RK, pp. 40, 44. Mikhail died between 1509 and 1519/20: donation of 1519/20, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 220V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 49, n. 98. His kinsmen died too soon after his death to inherit the rank. Mikhail's brother Zamiatnia lived until at least May 1514 (RK, p. 54); his son Grigorii is not mentioned, and sons Ivan and Vasilii are mentioned only until March 1520 (ARG, no. 186, p. 184). The line ended with Mikhail.

A Second Bezzubtsev Line This line was descended from Aleksandr Bezzubets’s eldest son, Ivan; Ivan's grandson, Ivan Ivanovich, was made an okol’nichii between ca. 1539 and 1542: Chumikov, “Akty Revel’skogo gorodskogo arkhiva,” pp. 5-7 (document no. 4); Barsukov, “Russkie akty,” document nos. 21, 26, 36, 50-54; RK, p. 104. Ivan died after Aug. 1547 (A/wB, 1, no. 52V, col. 199). He had no younger brothers, and his son, Lev, is not mentioned. Thus the line ended with Ivan Ivanovich.

Sheremetev Line The Sheremetev line is descended from Aleksandr Bezzubets’s grandson, Andrei Konstantinovich Sheremetev, an elder brother of okol’nichii Mikhail Bezzubtsev. Andrei Sheremetev’s grandson, Ivan Bolshoi Vasil’evich, was made an okol'nichii between April 1545 and July 1549 (RK, pp. 109,121) and a boyar by Sept. 1549 (RK, pp. 121, 15), thus founding a new line. He lived until 1570: SbRIO, 71, no. 24, p. 666. His next younger brother, Grigorii, predeceased him; he is not mentioned in military sources. The next brother, Semen, was made an okol'nichii between Nov. 1555 (RK, p. 155) and 1556 (according to Zimin, whose estimate was based on Semen’s placement in the Dvorovaia tetrad*: Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad’,” p. 36). He died Oct. 8, 1557 (Zimin mentions a donation of that date, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 171: “Sostav,” p. 68, n. 312; also, a donation of 1557/58 is mentioned in GBL, fond 303, bk. 530, fols. 584-85). Se­ men was succeeded by Nikita Vasil'evich, who became an okol’nichii between Nov. 1555 and July 1557: RK, pp. 155, 162. Between 1556/57 and 1558, the next younger brother, Ivan Menshoi, became an okol’nichii: RK, pp. 161, 170. Nikita became a boyar by 1558 (RK, p. 172); Ivan Menshoi was a boyar by 1:558/59 (RK, pp. 170, 176). Nikita Vasil'evich was executed in 1563/64 (RK, p. 201; /SZ, p. 161). Ivan Bolshoi died after 1566/67 (RK, p. 226), and Ivan Menshoi was killed in battle in Jan. 1577 (Razriadnaia kniga, 1550-1656 gg.9 1 :248 [7085]). But succession continued laterally; the youngest brother, Fedor, inherited the rank in the 1570’s.

Clan Biographies 22.

217

K u b e n s k ii P r in c e s

Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Kubenskii, who was descended from one of the many branches of the ruling dynasty of laroslavl’, entered military service in at least 1517 (PDSn, pt. I , col. 232) and became a boyar between Sept. 1537 and June 1539 (RK, pp. 94, 96). He is last mentioned in 1547/48: RK, p. 115. His brother, Ivan, was appointed central majordomo by 1524 (Sbornik Mukhanova, 2, nos. 286, 319, pp. 575, 599; AFZKh . . . Simonova, nos. 41, 46, 51, pp. 44, 50, 56) and joined Mikhail as a boyar between 1537 and 1541 (AGR, 1, no. 48, p. 57; Kashtanov, no. 426). Ivan was executed in July 1546 (PSRL, 29: 49 [7054]). The line ended with Prince Mikhail Ivanovich, since neither brother had surviving sons.

23. Kurbskii Princes Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Kurbskii, who was descended from one of the many branches of the ruling dynasty of laroslavl’, is mentioned as a boyar be­ tween June 1543 and July 1544 (RK, pp. 105, 108); he died between July 1544 and July 1548 (RK, p. 108; donation of July 1548, mentioned by Zimin in “Sostav,” p. 58, n. 207). Prince Mikhail's two brothers, Princes Vladimir and Fedor, predeceased him; Vladimir served in the military from 1519/20 to July 1521, when he was killed in battle (RK, p. 65; PSRL, 26: 311 [7029]); Fedor served from 1519/20 to at least Dec. 1535 (RK, pp. 65, 86). Mikhail was suc­ ceeded by his son, Andrei, who became a boyar between Sept. 1555 and Sept. 1556 (RK, pp. 153,156). Andrei lost the rank (as did the Kurbskii line) when he fled to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in April 1564: PSRL, 13: 383 (7072).

24. Kurliatev Princes Prince Nikita Vasil'evich Kurliatev, whose family was one of the many branches of the Obolenskii princes, started a lineage between Nov. 1534 and July 1537 (Postnik, p. 283 [7043]; RK, pp. 85, 91); he died after Jan. 1543 (SbRIO, 59, no. 12, pp. 206, 211). The status extended to his cousins and their descendants (see other examples of boyar rank being taken by all lines in the first generation in the Chebotov line and the Glinskii and Gorbatyi clans). Nikita's son, Daniil, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. The rank passed to Nikita’s nephew, Konstantin, a son of Ivan Vasil'evich, between July 1544 and 1549/50 (RK, pp. 108, 124). Another of Ivan’s sons, Mikhail Ivanovich, is not recorded as having had a military career. Prince Konstantin died after Sept. 1550 (RK, p. 130; donation of June 1551, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 410, men­ tioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 61, n. 236). He had been joined by his brother Dmitrii as a boyar between May 1548 and March 1549: RK, pp. 116,118. Prince Dmitrii and his entire family were forcibly tonsured in Oct. 1562: PSRL, 13 (pt. 2): 344 (7071).

2 i8

Appendix z 25.

K v a s h n in

Ivan Rodionovich founded the Kvashnin clan; he was first mentioned, as a boyar, in the early 1370*5: DDG, no. 8, p. 25. He died in the spring of 1390: TL, p. 436 (6898). His boyar rank did not pass to his sons (Dmitrii, IPia, and Vasilii) who apparently died before their respective turns came to inherit it. They are not mentioned in any nongenealogical documents, Il’ia is mentioned once as a boyar but in an unreliable source-an interpolation in the 1408 letter of Emir Edigei to Vasilii 1 (SGGD, pt. 2, no. 15, p. 16; cf. PSRL, 4 [pt. 1, fasc. 2]: 407 [6916]). Subsequent generations of the Kvashniny served in appanages; therefore, the boyar line ended with Ivan Rodionovich: ISZ, pp. 268-84; Zimin, “Udel’nye kniaz’ia,” p. 171; Zimin, “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” pp. 272, 284.

Sixteenth-Century Kvashnin Line Andrei Aleksandrovich, a great-great-grandson of Ivan Rodionovich, started an okol’nichii line between Feb. 1547 and Sept. 1549: RK, pp. 10, 14. He is last mentioned in July 1559 (AGR, 1, no. 74, pp. 196-207). The line ended with him, since neither his brothers nor his son are mentioned in military service books.

26. Mikulinskii Princes Prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii, or Punkov (from his father’s name), founded a boyar line between Dec. 1548 and Jan. 1550 (RK, pp. 117, 122); he died between the summer of 1559 and 1559/60 (RK, p. 182; donation of 1559/60, recorded in Kormovaia kniga Kirillo-Beloozerskogo monastyria, p. 85). The boyar line ended here; Prince Semen’s brothers Ivan and Konstantin are not mentioned, his brother Dmitrii died before him, in 1551 (GBL, fond 205, no. 178, fol. 20v), and Semen had no surviving sons.

27. Minin Dmitrii Minich founded the Minin clan; he is first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1367: TL, p. 387 (6876). Dmitrii’s father is mentioned in the Life o f Sergii o f Radonezh, written in the fifteenth century; whether he was a boyar cannot be ascertained: PSRL, 11: 128 (6900). Dmitrii’s brother, Aleksandr, apparently suc­ ceeded him. He is mentioned only once, presumably as a boyar, in 1382/83: PSRL, 20: 205 (6891); cf. TL, p. 426 (6891), in which his name is not included. Aleksandr was succeeded by Dmitrii’s sons, Vasilii and Stepan Dmitrievichi, who are mentioned as boyars in the 1420’s: Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, p. 20. Their sons are not mentioned; therefore, the boyar line ended with Vasilii and Stepan.

28. Monastyrev Dmitrii Aleksandrovich founded the Monastyrev clan; he is first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1371: DDG, no. 6, p. 22. He died in 1378 (PSRL, 25: 200 [6886]).

Clan Biographies

219

Because he was survived only by daughters (Rumiantsev redaction, p. 170), the boyar line ended with him.

29. Morozov According to a late-fifteenth-century genealogy, Ivan Semenovich Moroz founded the Morozov clan (PSRL, 24: 231); later genealogies include a falsi­ fied history (Chronicle redaction, p. 59; Ianin, “K voprosu о proiskhozhdenii Morozovykh”). The first recorded boyar was Ivan’s third son, Mikhail Ivanovich, who is mentioned only once, as a boyar, in 1382: TL, p. 425 (6890). Mikhail’s brothers (Fedor, Lev, and Dmitrii) are not mentioned. Mikhail’s son Vasilii was presumably a boyar, since both his father and his sons were, but that conclusion cannot be confirmed because of the paucity of sources for the first half of the fif­ teenth century. Before 1440, Vasilii is mentioned only in a land transfer docu­ ment: ASEI, I , no. 163, p. 119. Of his brothers, only Vasilii Sheia is mentioned, in 1446, and not as a boyar: PSRL, 23:152 (6953). Succession continued in Vasilii Mikhailovich’s line. His son, Grigorii Popleva, became a boyar between ca. 1463 and Oct. 1475; he died after June 1489: ASEI, 2, no. 374, p. 69; RK, pp. 17, 21. Grigorii’s son Ivan was made an okol’nichii between May 1501 and Sept. 1509 (RK, pp. 32,44; he is referred to in Sept. 1507 as an “okol’nichii-boyar,” but this is a titular designation used in diplomatic sources: PSRL, 6: 52 [7016]). He be­ came a boyar between June 1521 and Aug. 1523 (RK, p. 65; SbRIO, 35, no. 95, p.672). Ivan died between Sept. 1552 and Oct. 1554 (PSRL, 13 [pt. 2]: 518 [7061]; donation, dated before Oct. 1554, is recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 164V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” pp. 48-49, n. 89). Grigorii’s sec­ ond son, Vasilii, joined Ivan as an okol’nichii between July 1519 and Nov. 1522 (RK, p. 64; SbRIO, 35, no. 94, p. 643) and was made a boyar between Nov. 1522 and Oct. 1531 (RK, p. 79). Vasilii died between July 1541 and May 1544 and predeceased Ivan: PSRL, 30: 147 (7049); donation of May 1544, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 164, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 53, n. 146. The third son, Iakov, became an okol’nichii between Oct. 1495 and Aug. 1529 (RK, p. 26; SbRIO, 35, no. 105, p. 787); he died between July 1534 and Feb. 1541 (RK, p. 85; donation of Feb. 1541, recorded in the Trinity memorial regis­ ter, fol. 164, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 53, n. 150). The two younger brothers did not live to succeed. Grigorii is mentioned in Oct. 1495 and died at Smolensk ca. 1514 (RK, p. 26; Rumiantsev redaction, p.121); Roman “died young” (“Rodoslovnaia kniga,” p. 180). By 1544, both Vasilii and Iakov had died and Ivan Grigor’evich was the only Morozov boyar. He was succeeded not by his son, Semen (because Semen was apparently much younger than his cousins-see below concerning Semen Ivanovich), but by the son of Vasilii Grigor’evich, Grigorii, who was made an okol’nichii between June 1539 and Sept. 1543 (RK, p. 96; SbRIO, 59, no. 14, p. 218) and joined his uncle Ivan as a boyar between 1547/48 and 1549/50 (RK, pp. 115,124). Grigorii Vasil’evich is last mentioned in April 1551: RK, p. 131. His next younger brother, Vladimir Vasil’evich, be­ came an okol’nichii (by Sept. 1549: RK, pp. 14-15 - Grigorii was already a boyar then); the next younger brother, Petr, was made an okol’nichii between Jan. 1549

220

Appendix 2

and May 1551 (RK, pp. 122,133). For unknown reasons, Petr was promoted to boyar rank before his elder brother, Vladimir. Petr became a boyar between Dec. 1553 and spring 1554 (RK, pp. 143, 146; ca. 1551/52, according to his place­ ment in the Dvorovaia tetrad* [Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 112; Zimin, “Dvoravaia tetrad*,” p. 31]); Vladimir is not mentioned as a boyar until between 1559 and 1561/ 62 (RK, pp. 182,195). This is unprecedented; perhaps there was a split between the brothers. Vladimir was executed in the late 1560’s (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, p.415), and Petr died after 1569 (RK, p. 230). Mikhail Iakovlevich, who had the same genealogical rank (nine) as Vladimir Vasil’evich, became an okol’nichii between Feb. 1547 and Jan. 1549 (RK, p. 10; SbRIO, 59, no. 18, p. 266) and was made a boyar by Sept. 1549 (RK, p. 14). He was executed in 1573: Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 415-16. Semen Ivanovich, son of Ivan Grigor’evich Popleva, became an okol’nichii be­ tween Sept. 1547 and Sept. 15 52 (RK, pp. 11,13 8; ca. 15 51 / 52, according to his placement in the Dvorovaia tetrad* [Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 113; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad’,” p. 34]), after the death of his father between 1552 and 1554 (see above). Semen Ivanovich is last mentioned in Nov. 1553: RK, p. 13; donation of 1557/58, recorded in AFZKh, 1, no. 45, p. 59. Succession con­ tinued in this line.

Tuchkov Line Vasilii Borisovich Tuchko founded the Tuchkov line; he became a boyar be­ tween the late 1460’s and Oct. 1475: ASEI, 1, no. 330, p. 240; RK, p. 17. Be­ tween Jan. 1467 and Oct. 1475, Vasilii was joined as a boyar by his brother Ivan Tuchko, who was also the court majordomo: AFZKh, 1, no. 152, p. 134 (majordomo); RK, p. 17 (boyar). Both were disgraced ca. 1485, but that did not dis­ qualify the line: PSRL, 23: 162 (6993). Succession continued with their brother Semen Briukho, who became an okol’nichii between March i486 and April 1501 (SbRIO, 41, no. 13, p. 45; RK, p. 31), and a monk by Sept. 1507. He died ca. 1515 (donation ca. 1515, recorded in the Trinity book, fol. 129V, mentioned in Zimin, “O sostave dvortsovykh,” p. 183, n. 21). The youngest brother, Fedor, served in the military from May 1469 until sometime before 1497, but he pre­ deceased Semen and therefore did not inherit his rank: PSRL, 25: 281 (6977); ASEI, I , no. 612, p. 523. Semen was succeeded by Vasilii Tuchko’s son, Mikhail, who was made an okol’nichii between spring 1504 and March 1515 (DDG, no. 94, p. 373; SbRIO, 95, no. 7, p. 127) and a boyar between 1530/31 and Jan. 1533 (Zimin, in “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” p.272, cited an unpublished manuscript; RK, p. 14). Mikhail Vasil’evich died between autumn 1538 and June 1550: PSRL, 29: 135 (7047); donation dated after June 1550, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 193, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 51, n. 116. Mikhail was not succeeded by Vasilii, son of Ivan Tuchko, since the latter had died unmarried, probably before reaching his twenties: Chronicle redaction, p. 62. Mikhail Vasil’evich was joined at court by his cousin, Ivan Semenovich, men­ tioned as an okol’nichii between 151 4 /15 and Sept. 1534 (his last mention): Razriadnaia kniga, 1497-1605 gg., 1 (pt. 1): 151; RK, p. 88. These men were

Clan Biographies

zzi

succeeded by some of Mikhail Vasil’evich’s sons, the first two of whom apparently predeceased him. Ivan is mentioned only in Jan. 1526 (RK, p. 10), and Vasilii is mentioned from Jan. 1526 to at least June 1543 (RK, pp. 10, 104; Veselovskii cited an unpublished manuscript that gives the year of his death as 1548- ISZ, p. 207). The third son, Mikhail, became an okol’nichii between June 1556 and 1564/65: RK, pp. 157, 213. Succession continued in the Tuchkov line.

Saltykov Line The Saltykov line was descended from Ignatii, son of Mikhail Ivanovich Mo­ rozov. Ignadi’s great-grandson, Iakov Andreevich Saltykov, became an okol’nichii between Dec. 1547 and 1549/50 (RK, pp. 113, 124) and was made a boyar be­ tween June 1557 and Nov. 1562 (RK, pp. 163,199), thus starting a new line. He is last mentioned in 1572: RK, p. 245. The next two brothers, Fedor and Ivan, are not mentioned in military sources. Iakov’s third brother, Lev Andreevich, became an okol’nichii between July 1550 and June 1553 (RK, pp. 127, 141). Lev joined Iakov as a boyar between 1559 and June 1561 (RK, p. i8i;Shumakov,ed., Obzor, pt. 4 [1917], pp. 524-25 [document no. 1453]); he was also the arms bearer from at least March 1549 to the end of 1564 (Zimin, “O sostave dvortsovykh,” p. 196, n. 147). Lev was executed in 1571: Veselovskii, lssledovaniia . . . oprichniny, p. 441. Succession continued in the Saltykov line.

Shein Line lurii Dmitrievich, who founded the Shein line, was made an okol’nichii be­ tween July 1537 and March 1542 (RK, p. 91; SbRIO, 59, no. 9, p. 146); he died on Feb. 27, 1544 (Smirnov, “Drevnye nadgrobnye nadpisi,” p.423). Vasilii Dmitrievich succeeded him. First mentioned in March 1542 (SbRIO, 59, no. 9, p. 147), he became an okol’nichii between 1542 and April 1544 (AAE, 1, no. 201, p. 181) and was made a boyar by Dec. 1546 (SGGD, pt. 2, no. 34, p. 43). Vasilii died between 1549/50 and Aug. 1557 (RK, p. 124; donation of 1557, re­ corded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 344V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 58, n. 209). His brother, Ivan, became an okoFnichii between April 1540 and April 1546 (RK, pp. 99, 109) and was made a boyar ca. 1551/52 (Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 112; Zimin, “Dvoravaia tetrad’,” p. 31; RK, pp. 126,141); he died after Aug. 1553 (RK, p. 141). Succession continued in the next generation.

30. Mstislavskii Princes Prince Fedor Mikhailovich, founder of the Mstislavskii clan, arrived in Mos­ cow from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in July 1526 (PSRL, 8: 271 [7034]); be died, without having become a boyar, in June 1540 (PSRL, 29: 37 [7048]). His son, Ivan, became a boyar between Dec. 1547 and July 1549 and thus founded the boyar line: RK, pp. 113, 120. Ivan died in exile in 1585/86 (Piskarevskii, p. 92 [7099]), but succession continued with his son, Fedor.

222

Appendix z 31.

N agoi

Fedor Mikhailovich founded the Nagoi clan and is mentioned as an okol'nichii between Sept. 1533 and July 1547: PSRL, 13 (pt. 2): 410 (7042); RK, p. i n . He is last mentioned in July 1557: RK, p. 163. Zimin considered Fedor a boyar (“Dvorovaia tetrad’,” p. 33), but his references are inconsistent. Fedor is men­ tioned only as an okol’nichii in the “Book of a Thousand” (Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 55), but in the Dvorovaia tetrad’ he is referred to as both a boyar and an okol’nichii (Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, pp. 112,113). Fedor’s younger broth­ ers (Mikhail, Aleksandr, and Vasilii) apparently predeceased him. Vasilii is men­ tioned only in Jan. 1526 (RK, pp. 9,10); Mikhail is mentioned in Jan. 1526 (RK, pp. 9,10) and in a donation of July 1550 (recorded in the Trinity memorial regis­ ter, fol. 233, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 61, n. 239); and Aleksandr is men­ tioned from Jan. 1526 to 1553/54 (RK, pp. 9, 146). Fedor was succeeded by his sons by the 1570’s.

32. Obolenskii Princes Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Kosoi received boyar rank, probably in the late 1440's and probably because of his loyal service in the dynastic war: PSRL, 26: 202-6 (6954, 6955). He is last mentioned between 1462 and 1464: AFZKh, 1, no. 103, p. 99. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Ivan Striga, who became a boyar in the early 1460’s (Pskov, fasc. 2, pp. 51-52,148-49; AFZKh, 1, no. 103, p. 99; ASEI, 2, no. 464, p. 504) and died in spring 1478 (PSRL, 25: 323 [6986]). He was joined as a boyar by the next younger brother, Aleksandr, by Oct. 1475 (RK, p. 17); Aleksandr was killed in battle in Oct. 1501 (Pskov, fasc. 1, pp. 86-87 [7010]; PSRL, 26: 295 [7010]). The next brother, Iaroslav, was not eligible for boyar succession because he served in Pskov from ca. 1473 until his death in au­ tumn 1487: Pskov, fasc. 2, p. 192 (6981); Pskov, fasc. 1, p. 79 (6990, 6992). Petr Nagoi, the fourth brother, received the boyar rank after the deaths of Ivan Striga and Aleksandr, between Jan. 1493 and Feb. 1500: RK, pp. 23,16. Petr died after Sept. 1509: RK, p. 44. His stepbrother, Vasilii Telepen', is mentioned only from Jan. 1493 to Jan. 1494 (RK, p. 22; SbRIO, 35, no. 24, p. 113) and did not be­ come a boyar. The younger stepbrother, Fedor Telepen', joined Petr Nagoi as a boyar between July 1502 and 1506/7 (RK, p. 34; SbRIO, 35, no. 84, p. 483). Fedor died in battle at Kazan’, ca. 1508: Uspenie register, p. 33. From that point on, succession continued in the two branches of the clan formed as a result of Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Kosoi’s second marriage, which was to Princess Evpraksiia Mikhailovna Belevskaia (“Rodoslovnaia kniga,” p. 71). (His first wife, Mariia Fedorovna Vsevolozha, mother of the first four sons, had been seized in a Tatar raid in 1448/49: PSRL, 24: 231; PSRL, 23: 154 [6957]). Princess Belevskaia was the mother of the Telepnev brothers.

Strigin Line After Petr Nagoi, no clan member was immediately eligible for succession. Vasilii, the eldest son of Prince Ivan Striga, had become the monk Vas’ian (who

Clan Biographies

223

eventually became bishop of Tver’). He died in 1508: PSRLy 23:178 (6986); PSRLy 26 :299 (7016). The second son, Ivan Ivanovich Slykh, served in the mili­ tary from Aug. 1495 to 1514 / 15 but died after 1514 / 15 before inheriting a rank: RK, pp. 24, 56. His younger brother Fedor Gusei served from 1499/1500 to at least Oct. 1505 and predeceased Princes Petr Nagoi and Fedor Telepen*: RKy PP- 30, 37. The fourth brother, Ivan Shchetina, became a boyar between 1519/20 and July 1527 (RKt pp. 65, 70); conferral of the rank was probably connected with Vasilii Ill’s wedding in Jan. 1526. Ivan is last mentioned in Sept. 1532: RKt p. 81. Prince Ivan Ivanovich Shchetina’s younger brother, Vasilii Shikha, pre­ deceased him, having served from Oct. 1506 to July 1519: RK, pp. 37, 64. The youngest brother, Aleksandr, served from 1507 to at least Sept. 1537 but appar­ ently died during the turbulent minority period before being allowed to inherit the boyar rank: loasafskaia letopis*, p. 151 (7015); RKt p. 93. Ivan should have been succeeded collaterally by the son of Prince Aleksandr Ivanovich, but he was a monk. Neither of the sons of Petr Nagoi inherited the rank. Prince Andrei Petrovich served from June 1521 to Aug. 1533 but died at about the time of Prince Ivan Shchetina’s death; therefore, he was apparently too young to succeed: RKy pp. 66, 82. His brother. Prince Vasilii, is not mentioned in service. Prince Iurii Ivanovich Shchetina should have been next to take boyar rank, but he is re­ corded in service only from May 1522 to summer 1547 and apparently died too young to inherit the rank, or was perhaps prevented from doing so because ap­ pointments to boyar and okol’nichii rank were restricted during the years of the minority: RKt pp. 68, i n . Boyar succession in the Strigin line ended here.

Telepnev Line After the death of Prince Fedor Telepen’, ca. 1508, the next eligible man was Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Nemoi, who did not inherit the rank until between May 1522 and Jan. 1526 (RK, pp. 68, 9)-probably because he was too young. (His daughter’s marriage in 1527 suggests that he was probably in his mid-thirties then: Prodolzhenie khronografa, p.283 [7035]; SbRIOy 35, no. 104, p. 775.) Prince Ivan would have married about 17 to 20 years earlier, at about age 20. He is not mentioned after Jan. 1526: RK, p. 9. He was technically excluded, but the family’s power at the time of Vasilii Ill’s remarriage in 1526 explains the excep­ tion. His next brother, Fedor Lopata, died after April 1530, and was apparently too young to inherit the rank or was prohibited from doing so: RKt p. 56; Prodolzhenie khronografa, p.284 (7038). The next brother, Vasilii, who was ranked nine in the clan, is not mentioned in military service. Prince Ivan Nemoi was succeeded by his genealogical equal in a younger line, his cousin, Prince Ivan Fedorovich Ovchina. Ovchina became a boyar and an equerry between Aug. 1533 and Jan. 1534: RKy p. 82; AZRt 2, no. 175, item 12, p. 234. He was executed in April 1538: PSRLy 29: 32 (7046). (His elder brother, Boris, is not mentioned in service.) Ovchina was not succeeded by his cousin, Prince Fedor Vasil’evich (ranked ten), because Prince Fedor had been captured in battle in 1535 and died in captivity: Prodolzhenie khronografa, p. 287 (7043)- The rank passed instead to the son of Prince Ivan Nemoi, Dmitrii Ersh, who was made a boyar between May 1550 and April 1552: RK, pp. 126, 136; Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia knigaf

224

Appendix z

p. 112; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad’,” p. 31. His career ended when he was forcibly tonsured in Feb. 1565: PSRL, 13 (pt. 2): 396 (7073). Ersh’s elder brother, Petr, is mentioned only once, in Jan. 1526 (RK, p. 9); his younger brother, Fedor, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. Prince Ivan Ovchina’s son, Fedor (who was Ersh’s cousin), did not inherit the rank because he had been executed as a youth in Jan. 1546: Postnik, p. 287 (7055). With the tonsuring of Prince Dmitrii Ersh, the Telepnev boyar line came to an end.

33. Okat’ev The Okat’ev clan was founded by Vasilii Okat’evich, who is first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1350-51: DDG, no. 2, p. 13. His father is mentioned in Grand Prince Ivan Kalita’s will: DDG, no. 1, pp. 7, 9. Vasilii was succeeded by son Timofei Volui, who is mentioned only once, as a boyar, at his death in 1380: PSRL, 6: 95’96 (6888). Timofei was followed by his brother Semen, who is first mentioned in 1389, as a boyar: DDG, no. 12, p. 37. Semen died after 1390-92: AFZKh, 1, no. I , p. 24. He was succeeded collaterally by one of Timofei’s sons: Fedor Timofeevich is mentioned only once, not as a boyar, at his death in 1382/83. He predeceased his boyar uncle: PSRL, 11: 81 (6891). But Fedor’s brother, Daniil Timofeevich, became a boyar; he is mentioned, probably in that rank, in 1391: PSRL, 25: 220 (6900). He could not be succeeded collaterally by his cousin, boyar Semen Vasil’evich’s son, Fedor, who is not mentioned in military service. Daniil had no surviving sons; therefore, the boyar line of this clan came to an end. Nonboyar lines took the name Valuev.

34. Oshcherin Ivan Vasil'evich Oshchera, the founder of the Oshcherin clan, is mentioned as an okol’nichii between 1472 and 1475: DDG, no. 68, p. 224; RK, p. 17. He died between Feb. i486 and March 1493 (AFZKh, 1, no. 33, p. 50; Zimin cites an unpublished manuscript in “Sostav,” p. 45, n. 44). But no one succeeded him. Only one of his seven brothers-his younger brother, Dmitrii B obr-is mentioned in military service, around the 1460’s, and not as a boyar or an okol’nichii (ASEI, I , nos. 325, 335, 336, 389, pp. 234, 243, 283). Dmitrii Bobr predeceased Ivan Oshchera. Ivan Oshcherin, Ivan’s son, served from June 1493 to Sept. 1503 (SbRIO, 35, no. 22, p. 108; PSRL, 20: 374 [7012]) and was apparently too young (probably in his early thirties, about ten years after beginning his service) to succeed his father. His brother Mikhail is not mentioned. The okol'nichii line ended with Ivan Vasil’evich.

35. Paletskii Princes The Paletskii boyar line was founded by Prince Ivan Fedorovich, who became an okol’nichii between 1526/27 and Dec. 1531 (ARG, no. 286, p. 287; SbRIO, 35, no. 110, p. 840) and died by Aug. 1533 (donation recorded in the Trinity me­ morial register, fol. 222, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 53, n. 151). It was un­ usual for a member of a princely family to serve as an okol’nichii. Prince Ivan was

Clan Biographies

225

succeeded by his brother, Dmitrii, who was made a boyar between June 1542 and July 1547 (RK, pp. 103, n o ) , perhaps in 1546 (PSRL, 13 [pt. 1]: 148 [7054] -th is cannot be corroborated). He is last mentioned in 1558/59: RK, p. 177. Prince Dmitrii was succeeded collaterally by his cousin Prince Davyd Fedorovich, who was technically excluded but was allowed to succeed because he was a member of the family’s first boyar generation (see a similar succession pat­ tem in the first generations of the Chebotov, Glinskii, Gorbatyi, and Kurliatev families). He joined Prince Dmitrii as an okol'nichii between Sept. 1552 and June 1553 (RK, pp. 137, 141) —ca. 1551/52, according to his placement in the Dvorovaia tetrad* (Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 113; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad’,” p. 35). Prince Davyd died by June 1558 (donation of that date, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 222V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 66, n. 292); this was at about the time that Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich died (see above). Because Prince Davyd was not survived by brothers or sons, succession ended with him.

3 6. Patrikeev Princes Prince Patrikei Narimuntovich, founder of the Patrikeev clan in Muscovy, and his son, Iurii, came to Moscow in 1408 (PSRL, 25: 237 [6916]). Prince Iurii was made a boyar by 1417 (DDG, no. 21, p. 59) and died between autumn 1445 and Jan. 1457 (PSRL, 26: 200 [6954]; donation of Jan. 1457, mentioned in AFZKh, I , no. 30, p. 49). Prince Iurii’s son, Vasilii, died in 1450 and apparently pre­ deceased his father: PSRL, 5: 270 (6958). The second son, Prince Ivan Iur’evich, became a boyar between 1458/59 and 1461-62 (PSRL, 5: 272 [6967]; DDG, no. 61, p. 198); he died in disgrace after Jan. 1499 (PSRL, 26: 291 [7006]). During Prince Ivan’s lifetime, two of his nephews, Princes Ivan Vasil’evich Bulgak and Daniil Vasil’evich Shchenia, had been made boyars, both between Aug. 1470 and Oct. 1475: PSRL, 26: 229 (6978); RK, p. 17. They were technically excluded, but their uncle’s power explains this exception. Bulgak died after 1495 (RK, p. 25; one chronicle reports that he died in April 1498: PSRL, 6: 15, n. “d” [7006]). Shchenia died after 1514/15: RK, p. 57. Between early 1493 and Jan. 1494 (during their lifetimes), their cousin Vasilii Ivanovich became a boyar (RK, p. 23; SbRIO, 35, no. 24, p. 123); his elder brother, Prince Mikhail, is mentioned between Oct. 1475 and Jan. 1493 (RK, pp. 17, 22), but he died before succeeding (according to one chronicle, he died in June 1495: PSRL, 6: 15, n. “d” [7003]). Prince Vasilii Ivanovich was forcibly tonsured in Jan. 1499 but survived into the 1530’s: PSRL, 26: 291 (7006); Zimin and Lur’e, eds., Poslaniia losifa Volotskogo, p. 369. His younger brother, Ivan, was arrested, also in Jan. 1499, and is not men­ tioned after that: PSRL, 26: 291 (7006). That boyar line of the clan ended with them, but succession continued in the clan’s elder line.

Bulgakov and Shcheniatev Lines After his father, Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Bulgak, died after 1495, Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Golitsa (sometimes called Bulgakov) joined his uncle, Prince Daniil Vasil’evich Shchenia, at court as a boyar between summer 1502 and Sept. 1509:

226

Appendix z

RK, pp. 35, 44. He was captured in battle in April 1514 at Orsha and kept cap­ tive in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from 1514 to Feb. 1552: PSRL, 26: 305 (7023); SbRIO, 59, no. 23, p. 358. He returned to Moscow in Feb. 1552 and died after Sept. 1553: RK, p. 141; PSRL, 13 (pt. 2): 518 (7061). While in cap­ tivity he held the clan’s boyar position. His next younger brother, Prince Andrei Kuraka, served in the military from at least Oct. 1495 to June 1521 but pre­ deceased Golitsa (RK, pp. 25, 67). The third brother, Prince Dmitrii, did not suc­ ceed because he had been captured with Prince Mikhail Golitsa in 1514 and died in captivity: PSRL, 26: 305 (7023); Uspenie register, pp. 31-32. Just before Prince Daniil Shchenia died after 1514/15, his son, Prince Mikhail, became a boyar, between May 1512 and summer 1513: RK, pp. 45, 51. He lived until at least 1533/34: Ustiug, p. 108 (7042). After Mikhail's death, succession continued collaterally in the Bulgakov line, suggesting the existence of family solidarity, de­ spite the different surnames. Prince lurii Mikhailovich Bulgakov became a boyar between Aug. 1538 and April 1540 (RK, pp. 95, 99); he died between 1558/59 and July 1562 (RK, p. 177; donation of July 1562, recorded in the Trinity memo­ rial register, fol. 513V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 56, n. 186). His second cousin, Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich Shcheniatev, joined him as a boyar between July 1541 and April 1546 (PSRL, 13 [pt. 1]: 102, 139, and 13 [pt. 2]: 434 [7049]; KK, p. 109). Prince Vasilii died after early 1547 (RK, p. 112) and was succeeded by his brother, Prince Petr, who was made a boyar between Dec. 1548 and Sept. 1549: RK, pp. 117, 14. Petr was executed in 1565: Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 473-74. Succession continued in the Bulgakov line, but the Shcheniatev line ended with this generation.

Kurakin Line Prince Fedor Andreevich Kurakin, founder of the Kurakin line, is mentioned as a boyar of the tsar’s brother between April 1540 and Dec. 1547 and as a grandprincely boyar by May 1548: RK, pp. 9 9 ,11 5 ,116. He is last mentioned in 1566: PSRL, 13, (pt. 2): 403 (7074). All of Fedor’s younger brothers were apparently made boyars in 1556, because the youngest brother, Prince Ivan, became a boyar between April 1554 and June 1556: RK, pp. 144, 156. Prince Dmitrii became a boyar between June 1555 and summer 1559 (RK, pp. 151,181); he lived until at least 1566/67 (RK, p. 226). The third brother, Petr, was made a boyar between 1555/56 and March 1559: RK, pp. 160, 178. He is last mentioned in 1574/75 and was executed in the Oprichnina: RK, p. 256; Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichiny, p. 403. Succession continued in the line.

37. Penkov Princes Prince Daniil Aleksandrovich, who was directly descended from the ruling dy­ nasty of Iaroslavl’, entered military service in Muscovy at least by 1485 (PSRL, 23: 185 [6993]) and became a boyar possibly by 1492 (ASEI, nos. 285-89, 332, pp. 194, 197, 199, 202, 208, 314) and certainly between ca. 1499 and Feb. 1500 (ASEI, 2, no. 334, p. 322; RK, p. 16). He is last mentioned in Oct. 1501 (RK,

Clan Biographies

ъъ-j

p. 31) and was succeeded only by Prince Ivan, his third son. His eldest son, Prince Aleksandr, is not mentioned. Prince Daniil’s second son, Vasilii, is mentioned in 1515/16 and died between 1526 and 1530-apparently he was top young to in­ herit the rank, or he was not allowed to: RK, p. 58; Kashtanov, no. 237. (Prince Vasilii’s son, Ivan, is mentioned only in 1530: Kashtanov, no. 237.) Prince Daniil’s third son. Prince Ivan, became a boyar between Jan. 1533 and July 1534 (RK, pp. 13, 83) and died between Sept. 1537 and 1540 (RK, p. 94; donation of 1540, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 261, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 54, n. 154). The clan ended with Prince Ivan Daniilovich, since he had no sur­ viving sons.

3 8. Pleshcheev-Biakontov Fedor Biakont, founder of the Pleshcheev-Biakontov clan, is said to have come to Moscow from Chernigov in the early fourteenth century: PSRL, 15 (pt. 2): col. 437 (6885); Rumiantsev redaction, p. 123. According to genealogical sources, his eldest son, Feofan, was a boyar (PSRL, 15 [pt. 2]: col. 437 [6885]); the pau­ city of other sources prevents verification, but one of Feofan’s sons was a boyar. Fedor’s next two sons, Matvei and Konstantin, are not mentioned at all and had no descendants. The fourth son, Afinii, was Metropolitan Aleksii (in office 1353/54 to I 377: TL, pp. 404-6 [6885]). The last son, Aleksandr Fedorovich Pleshchei, is mentioned only in 1375 (PSRL, 18: 116 [6883]), presumably as a boyar since his father and descendants were. After Aleksandr Pleshchei, Feofan’s son Daniil Biakontov succeeded; he is first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1392: PSRL, 8: 63 (6900); cf. PSRL, 8: 52 (6895). He died in Feb. 1392: TL, p. 441 (6900). Daniil was not succeeded by his brother Stepan, since Stepan was a boyar for the metropolitan by the 1390’s: AFZKh, 1, no. 1, p. 24; Rumiantsev redaction, pp. 123, 124. Rather he was succeeded collaterally by Daniil Aleksandrovich Pleshcheev, who was presumably a boyar, although he is not mentioned in sources in this poorly documented period. After Daniil Aleksandrovich, boyar rank should have passed to Konstantin and Ivan Daniilovichi Biakontov, sons of Daniil Feofanovich, but Konstantin, who died in 1437 (Uspenie register, p. 26), was then apparently too young, and Ivan predeceased him. (Ivan is mentioned only in a private document dated before 1438: ASEI, i,no. i34,p. 104.) The Biakontov line ended with them; succession continued in the Pleshcheev line. Boris Daniilovich Pleshcheev is mentioned as a boyar in the 1420’s: Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, p. 20. He had two brothers, Ivan and Fedor, but only Ivan is mentioned in nongenealogical sources; he was killed in battle in 1445 and therefore did not inherit the rank (Uspenie register, p. 27). Boris was succeeded by his son, Mikhail, who is first mentioned, as a boyar, in Feb. 1447: PSRL, 26: 206 (6955). He became a monk by the 1460’s: ASEI, 1, no. 370, p. 270. Succession continued in the next generation, since of Mikhail’s three brothers, only one, Fedor, is mentioned, ca. 1428-32 (ASEI, I , no. 62, p. 59), and he predeceased Mikhail. Mikhail’s son Andrei, who succeeded him, is mentioned as an okol’nichii between 1445 and 1475: PSRL, 26: 199 (6894), ASEI, I , no. 181, p. 1 3 1 ; RK, p. 17. Andrei was probably made an okol’nichii after his father’s tonsure. He became a boyar be-

228

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tween 1485 and 1490 (RK, p. 20; PDSn, pt. 1, col. 26) and is not mentioned after 1490 (PDSn, pt. I , col. 26). Andrei’s next younger brother, Timofei Iurlo, was captured in battle in 1469 and predeceased him (PSRL, 23: 159 [6977]). The third brother, Petr, joined Andrei as an okol’nichii between fall 1482 and Oct. 1487 (PSRL, 20: 349 [6991]; SbRIO, 35, no. I , p. 4) and died after May 1503 (his will was written by Feb. 1510: ARG, no. 59, pp. 61-65). He was referred to as an “okol’nichii-boyar,” but that was a titular designation used in diplomatic sources (SbRIO, 35, no. 76I, p.413). None of the four younger stepbrothers (Grigorii, Ivan, Ven’iamin, and Fedor) succeeded. Grigorii is mentioned once, in Ï478-79 (Golubtsov and Nazarov, eds., “Akty,” pp. 82-83 [document no. 4]). Ivan’s will of 1482 is recorded (ASEI, 1, no. 499, pp. 377-78). Ven’iamin, a monk, is mentioned in Sept. 1495 (PSRL, 26: 289 [7004]). Fedor Meshok Mikhailovich is mentioned in military service from 1499/1500 to Feb. 1519 (RK, pp. 29, 64), but the place at court was taken by his nephew, Mikhail Andreevich, who was genealogically his senior (Mikhail ranked eight, Fedor ranked ten). After the deaths of Andrei and Petr, Mikhail Andreevich became an okol’nichii, between 1514/15 and 1516: RK, pp. 57, 59. He lived until at least Dec. 1532: SGGD, pt. I , no. 162, p. 448. By the time of Mikhail’s death, his uncle, Fedor Meshok, had died and none of Mikhail Andreevich’s brothers survived him to inherit the rank. Ivan Andreevich died in Aug. 1495: (PSRL, 26: 290 [7004]). Fedor Andreevich died before 1513/14: ARG, no. h i , p. 113. Daniil Basman was captured in battle in April 1514 (SbRIO, 35, no. 94, p. 654) and did not return from cap­ tivity. Afanasii, a monk, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. Mikhail Andreevich should have been succeeded collaterally by Petr Mikhailovich’s sons, but none survived past the 1510’s: Vasilii Petrovich is mentioned from Oct. 1495 to 1517/18 (RK, p. 25; ARG, nos. 152,153, pp. 147,148), Andrei is mentioned from 1510 to 1515/16 (ARG, nos. 59, 128, pp. 63,126); and Pavlin (or Ivan) is mentioned only in 1510 (ARG, no. 59, p. 62). Therefore, Mikhail Andreevich was succeeded by his sons. Fedor Mikhailovich served in the military from Dec. 1532 to July 1544 (SGGD, pt. I , no. 162, p. 450; RK, p. 108) but died too young to succeed; Dmitrii served from at least Dec. 1532 (SGGD, pt. 1, no. 162, p. 450) and became an okol’nichii between June and July 1555 (RK, pp. 149, 151; he is referred to as “Dmitrii Grigor’evich” when mentioned on p. 151, but there was no man in this clan by that name). He died between 1556/57 and 1561/62 (the date of his will): RK, p. 177; AGR, 1, no. 94, pp. 274-76. Succession continued in his line.

Basmanov Line A new boyar line was founded by Aleksei Daniilovich Basmanov Pleshcheev, who became an okol’nichii between April 1551 and Sept. 1552 (RK, pp. 131, 137) and a boyar between June and Oct. 1555 (RK, pp. 149, 153). He was exe­ cuted in 1570 (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 427-28). Succession continued in this line.

Clan Biographies

229

39. Pronskii Princes Prince Daniil Dmitrievich founded a boyar line when he received the rank, be­ tween July 1537 and Feb. 1543 (RK, p. 91; SbRIO, 59, no. 13, p. h i ) ; he is last mentioned in June 1550 (SbRIO, 59, no. 20, p. 333). Prince iurii Dmitrievich Pronskii is mentioned as a boyar from 1529 to 1531, when he served as the vice­ gerent of Smolensk, but the boyar rank is not corroborated by other sources. The designation “boyar and vicegerent of Smolensk” was probably titular in this case, as it was for Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Shuiskii in 1520 and for Prince Aleksandr Andreevich Khokholek Rostovskii in 1531-32 (see Khokholek line and Shuiskii family): SbRIO, 35, no. 105, p.786, no. 109, p.835. (On Iurii's career, see Zimin, “FeodaPnaia znat*,” p. 140. Alef claims that Prince Iurii was a boyar from 1529 to 1534: “Aristocratic Politics,” app I.) Succession continued with Prince Iurii’s nephew, Prince Ivan Ivanovich Turuntai, who was technically excluded, but was allowed to succeed because he was a member of the first generation (see a similar succession pattern in the first generations of the Chebotov, Glinskii, Gorbatyi, Kurliatev, and Paletskii families). Prince Ivan became a boyar between July 1544 and Feb. 1547 (RK, pp. 108, 11) and was executed in the late 1560*5 (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, pp. 431, 432). His brother. Semen, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. Prince Ivan was succeeded collaterally by Prince Petr Daniilovich, son of boyar Prince Daniil Dmitrievich; he was made a boyar between 1565 and 1566/67: RK, pp. 213, 226. Succession continued in this line, but Turuntai’s own line of descent ended with him because he had no sons.

Shemiakin Line Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Shemiaka founded a new boyar line; he was a distant kinsman of the members of Prince Ivan Turuntai’s generation (they had the same great-great-grandfather). He became a boyar between April 1549 and 1549/50, the year when he is last mentioned (RK, pp. 119, 124). His eldest son, Prince Iurii, succeeded him as boyar between Oct. 1554 and 1555 (RK, p. 144; Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 112; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad’,” p. 32) and died by April 1555 (RK, p. 144; donation of April 1555, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 131V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 67, n. 299). Prince Iurii’s brother Ivan did not survive him; he is mentioned from Feb. 1547 to Nov. 1550 (RK, pp. i i , 130). Prince Iurii’s youngest brother, Nikita, is not mentioned at all. None had surviving sons and the line ended with them.

40. Repnin Princes The Repnin clan, a branch of the Obolenskii princes, was founded by Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Repnia, who became a boyar between Sept. 1508 and Nov. 1512 (RK, pp. 43, 47); he is last mentioned in Sept. 1513 (RK, p. 52). His eldest and youngest sons. Princes Vasilii and Vasilii the younger Mikhailovichi, appar­ ently did not succeed him. They cannot be easily distinguished in the sources. The

230

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elder appears to have served in the military from June 1521 to July 1537 (RK, pp. 67, 71, 72, 74, 75, 86, 87, 91; PSKL, W- *3 [7044]); the younger probably served from March 1529 to Sept. 1547 (RK, pp. 73, 76, 89, 94; Pskov, fasc. 1, p. 110 [7049]). Thus, Prince Vasilii the elder did not survive to inherit boyar rank. His brother Prince Petr succeeded Prince Ivan Mikhailovich between Aug. 1538 and June 1539 (RK, pp. 95, 96); he is last mentioned in Jan. 1544 (RK, p. 107). Prince Petr was followed not by the youngest brother, Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich, who died soon after 1547 (see above), but by his son, Prince Mikhail, who be­ came a boyar between 1558/59 and 1559 (RK, pp. 175,181). Prince Mikhail was executed in July 1564 (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, p. 433).

41. Riapolovskii Princes Prince Ivan Ivanovich was the first boyar; he probably received the rank by 1446, and certainly by 1450, for loyal service in the dynastic war: PSRL, 26: 202 (6954); ASEI, I , no. 236, p. 166; Ziborov, “K voprosu.” Prince Ivan is last men­ tioned in 1450, although some sources suggest 1457/58: PSRL, 20: 263 (6966); cf. PSRL, 26: 217 (6966). His brother Semen served in the military from at least 1446 to at least 1457/58 (PSRL, 26: 202 [6954]; PSRL, 26: 217 [6966]), but he apparently died too young to succeed Prince Ivan or was not permitted to. The third brother, Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich, became a boyar ca. 1463, which is also when he is last mentioned: ASEI, 2, nos. 374-75, pp. 370, 373. The youngest brother, Andrei, had died in 1437 (Uspenie register, p. 26), and Prince Dmitrii was succeeded by Prince Semen, the son of Ivan Ivanovich. Prince Semen was made a boyar between 1477 and 1482 (RK, pp. 18, 19) and was executed as a result of the disgrace of the Patrikeevy in Jan. 1499 (PSRL, 24: 214 [7007]). The boyar line of the clan ended with him.

42. Romodanovskii Princes Prince Vasilii VasiPevich founded the Romodanovskii clan. He served in ap­ panages in the 1470’s (ASEI, 2, nos. 189, 190, 233, pp. 120, 121, 155; ASEI, 1, no. 378, p. 276), and entered military service in Moscow by Oct. 1490 (SbRIO, 41, no. 27, p. 98). He became an okol’nichii between Sept. 1507 and Sept. 1509, the year when he is last mentioned (RK, pp. 38,44). As pointed out earlier, it was unusual for princes to hold this rank. Four of Prince Vasilii’s six brothers did not survive him. The next brother, Prince Ivan Likhach, served in the military from 1485/86 to 1515/16 (RK, p. 20; Zimin cites an unpublished manuscript in “Sostav,” pp. 50-51, n. 115). The next brother, Prince Semen, is mentioned only from 1501/2 to 1502 (RK, pp. 34, 35); Prince Iurii is mentioned only in 1495 (RK, p. 25); and Princes Fedor and Mikhail are not mentioned. Prince Vasilii VasiPevich’s brother, Boris VasiPevich, began military service in Oct. 1495 and was captured in battle with his son, Petr, in April 1514; they died in captivity: RK, p. 25; Karamzin, Istoriia, bk. 2, vol. 7, chap. 2, n. 125, col. 23. Prince Vasilii’s son. Prince Mikhail, is not mentioned in service. All died within a decade of the

Clan Biographies

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last mention of Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich and thus did not survive long enough to be permitted to succeed.

Mid-Sixteenth-Century Romodanovskii Princes Prince Fedor Borisovich, the second of six sons, started a new line when he was made a boyar between Oct. 1552 and spring 1555: RK, pp. 138, 152. He died after spring 1555 {RK, p. 152) and the line ended with him, since none of his brothers lived longer than five years after his death and he had no sons. His next brother, Prince Ivan, is mentioned only in 1555/56: RK, p. 159. Three of his five brothers did not survive him. The eldest brother, Prince Vasilii, and the fifth brother, Prince Mikhail, are not mentioned. The fourth brother, the elder Prince Petr, died in 15 44 / 4 5: “Rodoslovnaia kniga,” p.153. The youngest brother, Petr, is mentioned only in 15 58/59, and was apparently too young to succeed: RK, p. 177.

43. Rostovskii Princes Prince Aleksandr Vladimirovich founded the Rostovskii clan in Muscovy. He was made a boyar between Oct. 1505 and 1505/6 (RK, p. 37; SbRIO, 35, no. 84II, p. 480) and is last mentioned in Dec. 1522 (Barsukov, “Russkie akty,” docu­ ment no. 15). His elder brother, Prince Dmitrii, joined him as a boyar between 1506/7 and summer 1517 (Pskov, fasc. 1, p. 91 [7015]; RK, p. 61); he died after summer 1517. The two brothers succeeded in reverse order possibly because it was through Prince Aleksandr’s efforts that boyar rank was awarded to the Rostovskii clan; once in the rank, Prince Aleksandr was in a position to patronize his brother. Thereafter, succession continued lineally. Prince Dmitrii’s elder son, Prince Petr Dmitrievich, is mentioned from Feb. 1500 to June 1528 (RK, p. 16; SGGD, pt. I , no. 156, p. 430) and apparently did not survive long enough to inherit the rank. Prince Petr’s brother, Prince Andrei Dmitrievich, was made a boyar between June 1535 and July 1536: RK, pp. 87, 89. He is last mentioned in 1549/50: RK, p. 124. In the i54o’s and 1550’s, Prince Andrei should have been succeeded by Prince Aleksandr’s sons, Ivan and Vasilii, but Ivan is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources and Vasilii is mentioned only once, in 1521 (RK, p. 67). The line should have ended with Prince Andrei, but Prince Vasilii’s son, Semen Sviaga (apparently also called Lobanov), succeeded him as a boyar be­ tween Dec. 1547 and June 1553 (RK, pp. 113, 140), possibly in March 1553 (PSRL, 13 [pt. 2]: 530 [7061]). Prince Semen was technically excluded, but his receipt of the rank was probably a political concession made in pursuit of stability in the aftermath of the minority conflicts. He was disgraced in July 1554 (PSRL, 13 [pt. 1]: 238 [7062]) and was executed in the 1560’s (Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, p. 435).

Khokholek Line Prince Aleksandr Andreevich Khokholek Rostovskii entered military service in 1495 (RK, p. 25) and started a new boyar line when he became a boyar between

232

Appendix z

Aug. 1 5 3 0 and July 1 5 3 4 (RK, pp. 7 4 , 84)* He is referred to as “boyar and vice­ gerent of Smolensk” from Nov. 1 5 3 1 to Dec. 1 5 3 3 (SbRIO, 3 5 , no. n o , p. 8 3 9 , no. i n , p. 8 4 6 ) , but this designation was most likely titular (see a similar usage of such vicegerent positions in the Pronskii and Shuiskii princely clans). Prince Aleksandr died between April 1 5 3 6 and Oct. 1 5 3 8 : RK, p. 9 0 ; donation of Oct. 1 5 3 8 , recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 173V , mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” pp. 5 2 - 5 3 , n. 1 4 1 . His brother, Prince Ivan Katyr, was made a boyar between June 1 5 4 1 and Aug. 1 5 4 3 (RK, p. 1 0 3 ; SbRIO, 5 9 , no. 1 4 , p. 2 1 4 ) , which is also the year of his last mention. Succession continued in his line.

Temkin Line Prince Iurii Ivanovich Temkin started a new line when he became a boyar be­ tween Aug. 1541 and late 1546: RK, p. 102; TsGADA, fond 135 , sec. IV, rubric II, no. 5, item 11. He is last mentioned in Oct. 1559: RK, p. 183. Prince Iurii’s younger brother Vasilii was an appanage boyar in the 1550’s and was not eligible to succeed as a boyar in Moscow: RK, pp. 15,179. The youngest brother, Prince Grigorii, served in the military from June 1552 to at least summer 1562 and was either too young to succeed or was prevented from doing so by the disruptions of the Oprichnina: RK, pp. 136, 195. The line ended with Prince Iurii.

44. Rusalka Mikhail Iakovlevich Rusalka, a distant kinsman of the Morozov clan, was ap­ pointed court majordomo by Oct. 1475 (RK, p. 17) and became a boyar between Jan. and Sept. 1495, after which he is not mentioned (SbRIO, 35, no. 31, p. 163; RK, p. 24). His first two sons are not mentioned in nongenealogical sources, and his youngest son, Andrei, is mentioned only in April 1508 (Zimin, “O sostave dvortsovykh,” p. 186, nn. 34, 39); he apparently died too young to inherit the rank.

45. Saburov The first recorded boyar in the Saburov clan was Konstantin Dmitrievich Sheia, who is first mentioned, in that rank, ca. 1406: DDG, no. 20, p. 57. Konstantin was succeeded by his nephew, Fedor Ivanovich Sabur; his younger brother, Dmitrii, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. Fedor is first mentioned, as a boyar, ca. 1419-20: DDG, no. 21, p. 59. He died after 1425-27: ASEI, 1, no. 49, p. 595, n. Fedor’s brother Daniil apparently predeceased him; he is mentioned in two documents dated, respectively, 1410-25 and ca. 1420*5: AFZKh, 1, no. 259, p. 228; Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, pp. 20, 21. The other brother, Ivan, is not mentioned. Boyar rank could not pass collaterally to Konstantin Sheia’s line be­ cause he was survived only by daughters: PSRL, 24: 231. Therefore, succession continued in the Saburov line. Mikhail Fedorovich is first mentioned, as a boyar, ca. 1448 (PSRL, 6: 178 [6955]); he became a monk by 1460 (ASEI, 2, no. 361, P-355)- His brother Ivan Fedorovich joined him as a boyar, possibly by 1448,

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when he is referred to as a boyar at Grand Princess Sofiia Vitovtovna’s court, and certainly between 1465 and 1469, when he is referred to as a grand-princely boyar: ASEI, 2, nos. 323, 381, pp. 305, 380; ASE1, i,nos. 217-18, pp. 152,154. He is last mentioned between 1465 and 1469: ASEI, 2, no. 381, p. 380. The third brother, Vasilii Fedorovich, is first mentioned, as a boyar, between 1465 and 1469 {ASEI, 2, no. 381, p. 380); he lived until at least 1485-90 {ASEI, 1, no. 525, p. 404). The next brother, Semen Peshko, served in the military from 1469 to 1477 and predeceased boyar Vasilii: PSRL, 25: 282 (6977); RK, p. 18. The youngest brother, Konstantin, is mentioned only once, not as a boyar, in 1482 {RK, p. 19); he did not succeed Vasilii Fedorovich. Succession continued in the next genera­ tion. Mikhail Fedorovich was survived only by a daughter. Ivan Fedorovich’s two sons did not survive long enough to inherit the rank. Fedor Ivanovich Pil’em is mentioned only between 1474 and 1496; he died by 1497 {ASEI, 1, nos. 444, 448, 611, pp. 330, 336, 522). Semen Ivanovich is not mentioned. Of Vasilii Fedorovich’s five surviving sons, the first three (lurii, Semen, and Mikhail) pre­ deceased him. Semen and Mikhail are not mentioned and lurii died in May 1469 (Uspenie register, p. 29). The youngest son, Boris, is not mentioned. Only the fourth son, Andrei Vasil’evich, lived long enough to inherit the rank. He became an okol’nichii between Sept. 1508 and Sept. 1509 {RK, pp. 43,44) and was made a boyar between July 15 22 and Oct. 1531, when he is last mentioned (RK, pp. 69, 80). Succession could continue only in his line, but two of his three sons are not mentioned at all. Mikhail is mentioned only in May 1522 {RK, p. 68), and the line ended with Andrei. An anomaly is the succession of lurii Konstantinovich, whose line was excluded, but who was made a boyar between Oct. 1506 and Sept. 1509, which is also the year when he is last mentioned: RK, pp. 37, 44. He was awarded the rank presumably because one of his daughters had married Vasilii III in Sept. 1505 and another had married Prince Vasilii Starodubskii in April 1506: PSRL, 20: 375-76 (7014); RK, p. 16; BAN, 16.15.15, fols. 6i-6iv; Chronicle redaction, p. 12. Succession did not continue. Three of Iurii’s brothers (Boris, Daniil, and Timofei) are not mentioned in military service. His brother Ivan is mentioned from 1510 to 1525: Zimin, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv, p. 193; Zimin, “O sostave dvortsovykh,” p. 189. Zimin’s reference to Ivan as an okol’nichii (“Sostav,” p. 51, n. 119) is not corroborated; cf. AIuB, 2, no. 139, col. 251. Veselovskii contended that he died in 1548 (ISZ, p. 191) but he confused Ivan with a Saburov of another line. Ivan did not have the right to succeed, because Iurii’s boyar rank was honorific. For the same reason, none of Iurii’s four sons (Ivan, Andrei, Fedor, and Afanasii) was made a boyar. Andrei is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources; Ivan survived until at least June 1543 {RK, p. 105), Fedor survived until 1517/18 {ARG, no. 149, p. 145), and Afanasii survived un­ til 1552 {RK, p. 133). The boyar line ended with Andrei Vasil’evich.

Peshkov Line Semen Dmitrievich founded a new line when he became an okol’nichii between 1549/50 and Aug. 1550: RK, pp. 124, 129. He died after June 1560: Sbornik Likhacheva, 1, no. 13, p. 49. His younger brother, Nikifor, is mentioned only once,

234

Appendix г

as a child, in 1517/18: ASEI, 3, no. 233, p. 2.55. His son, Dmitrii Semenovich, and his grandson, Dmitrii Dmitrievich, are not mentioned in his will of 1560 and did not survive him: Sbornik Likhacheva, 1, no. 13, pp. 45,46,49. All the other men in Semen’s family predeceased him, so the line ended with him.

46 . Sakmyshev Afanasii Stepanovich founded the Sakmyshev clan when he became an okoFnichii, by April 1501. He lived until at least Sept. 1509: RK, pp. 31, 44. Two of his three sons (Ivan and Ivan the younger) are not mentioned in nongenealogical sources; the eldest, Dmitrii, is not recorded as having had a military career. He died on June 1, 1527 (Nikolaeva, “Novye nadpisi,” pp. 222-25) and apparently did not survive long enough to be allowed to inherit the okol’nichii rank.

47. Serebrianyi Princes Prince Semen Dmitrievich Serebrianyi, whose lineage was descended from one of the many branches of the Obolenskii princely clan, founded the Serebrianyi boyar line when he became a boyar between 1523/24 and Jan. 1526: RK, pp. 70, 9. He is last mentioned in July 1528: ARG, no. 43, p. 50. Of his seven brothers, whose surname was “Shchepin,” two predeceased him: his elder brother, Prince Ivan, is mentioned from March 1513 to June 1514 (RK, pp. 50, 55); the youngest, Tsygor, is not mentioned. The others died before boyar succession resumed in full force at the end of the minority struggles in the late 1540’s: Prince Daniil is men­ tioned only once, in Jan. 1531 (RK, p. 78); Prince Nikita is mentioned from June 1521 to 1534/35 and died before 1554/55 (RK, p. 66; GBL, fond 303, bk. 530, fol. 324V); Prince Boris is mentioned from Jan. 1531 to July 1540 (RK, p. 78; Zimin, “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” p. 287); Prince Fedor is mentioned only once, in Jan. 1531 (RK, p. 78); and Prince Dmitrii is mentioned from July 1534 to July 1544 (RK, pp. 85, 108; Zimin, ed., “Kratkie letopistsy,” p. 13 [7043]). Be­ tween July and Sept. 1549, the boyar rank passed to Prince Semen’s son Vasilii, who was genealogically equal to his deceased uncle Boris and senior to Boris's younger brothers: RK, pp. 121, 14. Prince Vasilii was joined as a boyar by his brother Petr between April 1550 and summer 1551, apparently after all his uncles had died: RK, pp. 124, 131; Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 112. Prince Vasilii lived until at least 1566/67 (RK, p. 224). Prince Petr, who had no surviving sons, was executed in the Oprichnina, ca. 1570 (RK, p.232; Veselovskii, Issiedovaniia . . . oprichniny, p. 443). His nephew Boris Vasil’evich died at about the same time; he served from at least Nov. 1562 to 1574/75 (RK, pp. 199, 256). The boyar line ended with Prince Petr Vasil’evich.

48. Shestunov Princes Prince Petr Vasil’evich Velikii, whose line was descended from the ruling dy­ nasty of Iaroslavl’, is mentioned once, as an okol’nichii, in Sept. 1509 (RK, p. 44). He is also said to have been prince of Pskov and was subsequently vicegerent

Clan Biographies

235

there, from 1510/11 to 1514/15. (He is mentioned as being in Pskov in 1509 but not as an okol’nichii: Pskov, fasc. 1, pp. 91, 92, 95, 97 [7015-19].) Prince Petr was the court majordomo, perhaps in 1489/90 (ASEI, 1, no. 541, p. 4 2 0 -h e is not referred to as a majordomo here but is performing a role typical for majordomos); he served in that position at least from 1491 (Ustiug, p. 99 [7000] - the reference here to “boyar” is not corroborated) to March 1506 (ЛАЕ, i, no. 142, p. 114), when he entered service in Pskov. Prince Petr was possibly a boyar in May 1514, but this mention at a diplomatic audience may be titular: SbRIO, 95, no. 6, p. 96. He is last mentioned in Jan. 1516: ARG, no. 131, p. 128. Of his eight younger brothers, six (Princes Bakhteiar, Dmitrii, Aleksandr, Andrei, Dmitrii the younger, and Vasilii) are not mentioned in nongenealogical sources. Princes Semen and Ivan are mentioned only in Oct. 1495, and did not outlive Prince Petr: RK, p. 26. His son, Prince Andrei, is first mentioned in 1515/16 (RK, p. 58) and died between 1529 and 1531 (RK, p. 74; donation of 1531, recorded in the Trin­ ity memorial register, fol. 209, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 53, n. 152), when he was probably in his thirties. Prince Andrei died before succeeding his father, and the okol’nichii line ended with Prince Petr Vasil’evich.

49. Shuiskii Princes Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Nemoi was the first member of the Shuiskii clan to attain boyar rank; he is first mentioned in the rank between Sept. 1508 and 1508/9: RK, p. 43; SbRIO, 35, no. 84XVI, pp. 488-89. Prince Vasilii was joined as a boyar by his brother. Prince Ivan, sometime between July 1519 and Oct. 1531: RK, pp. 64, 79. Prince Ivan was referred to as “boyar and vicegerent of Smolensk” in 15 20, but this was an honorific title, not employed consistently even in the document where the term is used (SbRIO, 35, no. 88, p. 574). The middle brother, Prince Dmitrii, is mentioned only in Feb. 1500 and died too young to inherit boyar rank: RK, p. 16. Dmitrii’s son, Prince Ivan Gubka, fled to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Rumiantsev redaction, p. 93, n. 3. Shortly before the death of Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich in Nov. 1538 (Postnik, p. 285 [7047]), his second cousins were allowed to receive boyar rank. Prince Ivan Mikhailovich became a boyar between June 1528 and Oct. 1538 (SGGD, pt. 1, no. 156, p.431; Chumikov, “Akty Revel’skogo gorodskogo arkhiva,” p. 4 [document no. 3]). His line was technically excluded, but the clan’s power at that time explains the excep­ tion. Such lineages were gradually integrated into the boyar succession founded by Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii. Succession among the distant cousins in these lines followed the order of genealogical ranking and the rules of collateral succession regularly. Prince Ivan’s younger brother, Prince Andrei Mikhailovich, became a boyar between Oct. 1531 and April 1538: RK, p. 79; PSRL, 13 (pt. 1): 123 (7046). Prince Ivan Vasil’evich died in May 1542 (Postnik, p. 285 [7050]); Prince Andrei Mikhailovich was executed in Dec. 1543 (PSRL, 29: 45 [7052]). Prince Fedor Ivanovich Skopin, first cousin once removed of Princes Ivan and Andrei Mikhailovichi, became a boyar between Nov. 1542 and Jan. 1544 (RK, pp. 104,107), and perhaps by Sept. 1543 (PSRL, 13 [pt. 2]: 443-44 [7052.]). He was succeeded by Prince Petr Guryi, son of Prince Ivan Vasil’evich. Prince Petr was

23 6

Appendix 2

less senior genealogically than the surviving son of Prince Andrei Mikhailovich (Prince Ivan Andreevich ranked fifteen, Prince Petr ranked seventeen), but he was older. He is first mentioned in military service in June 1539 (RK, p. 96) and be­ came a boyar between July 1549 and July 1550 (RK, pp. 121, 127). Prince Ivan Andreevich, son of Prince Andrei Mikhailovich, is first mentioned in July 1557 and became a boyar only in the 1570*5: RK, pp. 164, 234, 239. Prince Fedor Ivanovich Skopin died between July 1556 and July 1557 (RK, p. 159; donation of July 1557, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 254V, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 57, n. 192). Prince Ivan Mikhailovich died after 1559 (RK, p. 182). Prince Petr Guryi died in battle in April 1564 (Piskarevskii, p. 76 [7072]), but succession continued in his line and in the Skopin line.

50. Starkov The Starkov clan was founded by Ivan Fedorovich, who became a boyar proba­ bly because of his service in the dynastic war. He is mentioned only once, as a boyar, sometime between 1462 and 1478 (ASEI, 2, no. 370, p. 365). His sons apparently died after the 1470*5 and did not succeed him. Aleksandr served in an appanage in 1473 (AFZKh, 1, no. 82, p. 84); Aleksei is mentioned in the early i470*s (DDG, no. 68, p. 222; PSRL, 25: 303 [6983]). The boyar line ended with Ivan Fedorovich.

51. Tovarkov The first boyar in the Tovarkov clan was Ivan Fedorovich Us, who received the rank between 1471 and 1480: PSRL, 20: 289 (6979); PSRL, 26: 265 (6988). He lived until at least 1483: SGGD, pt. 1, no. 117, p. 289. Of his five younger broth­ ers, only Boris, the next younger, is mentioned. He was in appanage service until the early 1470’s: ISZ, p. 73. Vasilii, Ivan, Iurii, and Semen are not mentioned as being in military service. Ivan Tovarkov was thus succeeded by his son Ivan Ivanovich, who is mentioned as an okol’nichii in an undated document cited by Veselovskii (ISZ, p. 73). He died between Dec. 1505 and March 1512: AAE, 1, no. 113, p. 86; AFZKh, 2, no. 54, p. 55. Ivan Ivanovich’s younger brother, Andrei, did not succeed his father because he served in appanages until about 1520 (ARG, no. 130, p. 128; Veselovskii cites Andrei’s unpublished will: ISZ, p. 73). Since both Ivan and Andrei Ivanovichi were childless, succession ended with Ivan Ivanovich.

52. Trakhaniotov Members of the Trakhaniotov clan had served in Moscow since the turn of the sixteenth century, but the first boyar was Vasilii Iur’evich Malogo (or Trakhaniotov), who is mentioned as the grand princess’s boyar in 1547 (RK, pp. 10, 115) and as a grand-princely boyar between Dec. 1547 and Aug. 1550 (RK, p. 115; Shumakov, ed., Obzor, pt. 3 [1912-], P- 4 [document no. 11]). He is last mentioned in 1566/67: RK, p. 226. Neither of his brothers is mentioned in military service, but succession continued in his line.

Clan Biographies 53.

237

T r o e k u r o v P r in c e s

Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Troekurov, whose line was descended from the ruling dynasty of Iaroslavl*, founded the Troekurov boyar clan. He received the rank be­ tween May 1553 and July 1556 (RK, pp. 140, 159), and possibly ca. 1554-55 (according to his placement in the Dvorovaia t e t r a d Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 112; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad’,” p. 32). He lived until at least March 1562: SGGD, pt. I , no. 176, p.479. Of his three younger brothers, Princes Semen and Vasilii are not mentioned; Prince Mikhail served in the military from July 1537 to 1566/67 (RK, pp. 92, 225) and might have succeeded had not the Oprichnina disrupted Muscovite court politics.

54. Ushatyi Princes Prince Konstantin Fedorovich Ushatyi, whose line was descended from the rul­ ing dynasty of Iaroslavl’, founded the clan. He was an okol’nichii, an unusual rank for a member of a princely family to hold. He is first mentioned as an okol'nichii between Sept. 1508 and May 1512 (RK, pp. 42,45) and lived until at least 151 4 /15 (RKt p. 56). He had one elder brother (Prince Vasilii) and four younger brothers (Princes Ivan Liapun, Ivan Borodatyi, Iurii, and Petr); only one of the two Ivans survived him. Princes Vasilii and Iurii are not mentioned, and Prince Petr is mentioned only from 1491 to 1499 (Ustiug, p. 99 [7000]; PSRL, 20: 369 [7007]). The two Ivans are difficult to distinguish. Both are mentioned in Jan. 1495 (SbRIOy 35, no. 31, p. 163) and one Prince Ivan Fedorovich Ushatyi is mentioned in military service through May 1522 (RK, p. 68). Thus, one Prince Ivan had died after 1495, and the other died too young to inherit the rank. Prince Konstantin had no sons; thus that line ended with him.

Mid-Sixteenth-Century Ushatyi Line Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Chiulok, who was made an okol’nichii between Dec. 1541 and Aug. 1543 (RKy p. 103; SbRIOy 59, no. 14, p. 215), founded a new line. He is last mentioned in 1542/43 and died by 1544/45 (SbRIOy 59, no. 14, p.215; GBL, fond 303, bk. 532, fols. 7 7 5 - 7 7 ) . Prince Vasilii’s elder brother, Prince Iurii, served in the military from at least 1519 to at least 1532 and pre­ deceased him (RK, pp. 62, 80). Prince Boris, the next brother, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources, and Prince Iurii the younger is mentioned only in Aug. 1533 (RK, p. 82). Ivan, the youngest brother, is mentioned only in 1544/45 (GBL, fond 303, bk. 532, fols. 7 7 5 - 7 7 ) and apparently died too young to inherit the rank. Succession thus ended with Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Chiulok.

55. VePiaminov The Vel’iaminov clan was one of the most powerful Muscovite clans in the fourteenth century. Its founder, Vasilii Protas’evich Ven’iaminovich, is first men­ tioned, as a boyar and thousandman, in 1350-51: DDG, no. 3, p. 13. He died by 1356 (another man is referred to as “thousandman” in 1356: TL, p. 375 [6864]).

23 8

Appendix 2

Vasilii Ven’iaminovich was succeeded by his son Vasilii, who is first mentioned, presumably as a boyar, sometime between 1363 and 1374: ASEI, 3, no. 238, p. 260. Vasilii VasiPevich died in Sept. 1373: PSRL, 25: 189 (6882). Vasilii’s next younger brother, Fedor Voronets, is mentioned only in hagiographical and genea­ logical sources, but he was probably a boyar since his brothers and son were: PSRL, 11:31 (6886). The third brother, Timofei, is referred to as an okoPnichii in the early 1370*5: DDG, no. 8, p. 25. He died after 1389 (DDG, no. 12, pp. 36-37). Succession continued in the next generation, because Vasilii*s next younger brother, lurii Grunka, is not attested in nongenealogical sources, with the exception of an unreliable, later redaction of a chronicle tale: PSRL, 4 (pt. 1, fasc. 2): 486 (6888). All of the men in the elder line predeceased Timofei. Ivan VasiPevich defected to Tver’ in 1375 and was executed for this offense; his descendants therefore lost boyar rank (PSRL, 25: 190 [6883], 200 [6887]; Rumiantsev redaction, p. 135). Mikula VasiPevich died in 1380, before having become a boyar (PSRL, 25: 204 [6888]). Poluekht VasiPevich is mentioned only at his death, caused by “falling off a church**; he apparently died too young to inherit boyar rank (PSRL, 24: 232). Succession continued in two lines in the i38o*s: Ivan Fedorovich Vorontsov is first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1389: DDG, no. 12, p. 37. He died after 1390-92: AFZKh, 1, no. 1, p. 24. Semen Timofeevich, son of Timofei VasiPevich, became a boyar by 1380-82: ASEI, 2, no. 340, p. 338. He died after Oct. 1382: PSRL, 20: 204 (6890). Since Semen had no sons, suc­ cession continued in the Vorontsov line, the sole remaining boyar line. Nikita Ivanovich Vorontsov is first mentioned, as a boyar, around the 1420*5 (Korkunov, ed., Pamiatniki, pp. 20, 21); he is last mentioned between 1432 and 1445 (ASEI, I , no. 96, p. 78). Nikita’s eldest son, Timofei, is not mentioned in military service. His next son, Ivan Nikitich, moved to appanage service, where he is referred to as a boyar by 1472: DDG, no. 68, p. 224. The boyar succession ended with Nikita Ivanovich.

Vorontsov Line Semen Ivanovich Vorontsov, son of Ivan Nikitich, reinstated the family at court after his father had joined appanage service. Following the fall of the Patrikeevy in 1499, Semen Ivanovich was made a boyar, between Sept. 1501 and Aug. 1505 (RK, pp. 33, 35), perhaps as a result of the patronage of the Kholmskie, with whom both Ivan Nikitich and Semen Ivanovich are associated (SGGD, pt. 1, no. 104, p.250; RK, p. 17). Semen died between Feb. 1521 and May 1522 (PSRL, 24: 219 [7029]; donation of May 1522, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 160, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 50, n. 113). After Semen’s death and by July 1531, his eldest son, Mikhail, became a boyar (RK, pp. 70, 75); he died after April 1536 (RK, p. 90). The second son, Dmitrii Semenovich, is mentioned from July 1519 to Sept. 1537 (RK, pp. 63, 94); he apparently died too young to inherit the rank, and was perhaps also among the men whose succession was delayed during the minority struggles. The third son, Ivan Foka, was made an okol’nichii between Oct. 1537 and Aug. 1538 (RK, pp. 93, 95) and a boyar be­ tween Dec. 1540 and June 1543 (RK, pp. 100, 104). He died between summer

Clan Biographies

239

1559 and May 1560 (RK, p. 181; donation of May 1560, recorded in the Trinity memorial register, fol. 161, mentioned in Zimin, “Sostav,” p. 67, n. 191). Be­ tween Jan. 1541 and Jan. 1544 (during Ivan Foka’s lifetime), the fourth son, Fedor Semenovich, became a boyar: RK, pp. 101, 107. He was executed in July 1546 along with his nephew, Vasilii Mikhailovich (PSRL, 29: 49 [7054]), who was not a boyar (Zimin considered him a boyar but this is not corroborated: “Sostav,” p. 58, n. 208). Fedor was succeeded collaterally by the executed nephew’s brother Iurii Mikhailovich, who was made a boyar between July 1547 and June 1555 (RK, pp. 112, 150); he died after July 1557 (RK, p. 162). Iurii’s brother Ivan joined him at court; he is first mentioned, as an okol’nichii, in Sept. 1552: RK, p. 137. Ivan became a boyar between 1552 and May 1554 (RK, p. 145) and lived until at least March 1565 (RK, p. 214). The sons of Fedor Semenovich succeeded him collaterally by the 1570’s; the son of Dmitrii Semenovich was excluded, since Dmitrii had not served as a boyar.

VePiaminov Line The Vel’iaminovy were descended from the excluded Iurii Grunka. His greatgreat-great grandson, Ivan Vasil’evich Shadra, is mentioned as an okol’nichii be­ tween 1499/1500 and May 1503; he died after Sept. 1509: RK, p. 30; SbRIO, 35, no. 76, p. 427; RK, p. 44. Ivan Shadra’s next younger brother, Ivan Sukhoi, and the youngest brother, Konstantin, are not mentioned in nongenealogical sources, but the third brother, Ivan Obliaz, survived until 1526; he served in both the grand-princely and appanage courts: RK, pp. 30, 38, 47, 66; SbRIO, 35, no. 102, pp. 752, 759. Ivan Shadra’s son, Vasilii, survived him until around 1540 and also served occasionally in appanage courts: RK, pp. 56, 66; ARG, no. 271, p. 274; GBL, fond 303, bk. 536, no. 129, fols. 185V-86v. Vasilii’s brother, Afanasii, lived until Sept. 1525: ARG, no. 251, p. 253. One of these kinsmen of Ivan Shadra may have been old enough to have succeeded him, but their exact ages are not known.

56. Vladimir Daniilovich Vladimir Daniilovich is first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1394: PSRL, 25: 225 (6903). He is last mentioned in 1416-17: ASEI, 3, no. 31, pp. 53-54. His sole survivor, his son Dmitrii, is not mentioned in nongenealogical sources and proba­ bly predeceased Vladimir Daniilovich, thus ending the boyar line. Veselovskii (ISZ, pp. 458-59) confused Dmitrii Vladimirovich with the man of the same name in the Khovrin clan (cf. clan genealogies: PSRL, 23: 231; Rumiantsev re­ daction, p. 180).

57. Volynskii Dmitrii Mikhailovich Bobrok is first mentioned, as a boyar, in 1371 (DDG, no. 6, p. 22); he died after 1389 (DDG, no. 12, p. 36). His sons from an appar­ ently pre-Muscovite marriage did not succeed him, probably because they were

240

Appendix г

descended from a family that was not a part of the Muscovite elite. Bobrok’s sec­ ond wife was Princess Anna, sister of Dmitrii Donskoi, but the sole son of this marriage, Vasilii, died at age 15 after falling off a horse. Thus the boyar line ended with Dmitrii: Chronicle redaction, p. 54.

58. Vorotynskii Princes Prince Vladimir Ivanovich Vorotynskii founded the boyar line when he received the rank in 1550: Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 54. He died between June 1553 and 1553/54: RK, p. 141; donation of 1553/54, recorded in Shumakov, ed., Obzor, pt. I (1899), p. 25. Prince Vladimir’s next brother, Prince Mikhail, became a boyar between 1562 and 1565 (RK, pp. 195, 222); the third brother, Prince Aleksandr, had been made a boyar between 1558 and 1559/60 (RK, pp. 172,185). The reason for delay in the accession of Prince Mikhail is probably that he continued to serve as a semi-independent prince until then; he is referred to in the sources as sluga, or “servitor prince” (RK, pp. 12, 133, 135-38, 141, 156,163,178,189), and his patrimonial lands were fully integrated into the Mus­ covite administration around 1560/61 (Kobrin, “O formakh,” p. 8; Kobrin, “Zemlevladel’cheskie prava,” p. 47).

59. Vsevolozh The first boyar in the Vsevolozh clan was Dmitrii Aleksandrovich, who is first mentioned, as a boyar, between 1390 and 1392: AFZKh, 1, no. 1, p. 24. He lived until at least 1394: PSRL, 25: 220 (6900 [sic]; should be 6903 —see Presniakov, Obrazovanie, pp. 277-78, n. 1). His younger brother, Ivan, is mentioned only once, in 1391, and was not a boyar: PSRL, 4 (1848): 99 (6900). Dmitrii was suc­ ceeded by his son Ivan Dmitrievich, who was a boyar between 1397/98 and 1406: TL, p. 449 (6906); DDG, no. 20, p. 57. Ivan’s brother, Fedor Turik, is mentioned only once, as having died between 1428 and 1432 (ASEI, 1, no. 58, p. 57). He was not a boyar. Ivan Dmitrievich was executed in 1433-34 (Lur’e, “Rasskaz,” p. 10; PSRL, 23: 148 [6941]), but succession continued in this line nevertheless. Ivan Ivanovich Vsevolozh is first mentioned between 1447 and 1455 and suc­ ceeded his father by 1461-62: ASEI, 1, no. 213, p. 149; DDG, no. 61, p. 198. He is last mentioned between 1465 and 1469 (ASEI, 2, no. 381, p. 380); because he was survived only by daughters (PSRL, 24: 230-31; Rumiantsev redaction, p. 139), the boyar line ended with him.

Zabolotskii Line The Zabolotskii line was founded by a descendant of Ivan Aleksandrovich Vsevolozh, who was not a boyar. His grandson, Grigorii Vasil’evich Zabolotskii, was made a boyar between 1455-61 (ASEI, 1, no. 293, p. 209; Nazarov gives these dates in “Dmitrovskii udel,” p. 59, n. 78) and 1462-64 (ASEI, 1, no. 262, p. 190; AFZKh, I , no. 103, p. 99). Grigorii died by 1478 (ASEI, 1, no. 455, p. 341) and was succeeded by his second son, Petr Grigor’evich. (Ugrim, the elder

Clan Biographies

241

son, is not mentioned.) Petr became an okol’nichii between Jan. 1494 and Jan. 1495 (SbRIOy 35, no. 24, p. 113, no. 31, p. 163) and died after June 1504 (Razriadnaia kniga, 1475-1605 gg., 1 [pt. 1]: 81- 86). The third son, Konstantin Grigor’evich, succeeded Petr as an okol’nichii between Dec. 1506 and Sept. 1509: PSRL, 13 (pt. 1): 5 (7015 ) and RK, p. 44 . He is referred to as a boyar in 1503 and as an “okol’nichii-boiarin” in 1506, but these are titular designations used in the diplomatic service: SbRIO, 35, no. 76, p. 413 ; PSRL, 13 (pt. 1): 5 (7015). Kon­ stantin died after Dec. 1512: RK, p. 48 . The next two sons predeceased Petr and Konstantin. Vasilii Grigor’evich is mentioned between May 1493 and Oct. 1495 (SbRIO, 35, no. 21, p. 92 ; RK, p. 25); Aleksei Grigor’evich is mentioned be­ tween Oct. 1495 and May 1512 (RK, pp. 25, 46 ). Konstantin was succeeded by his sons, since okol’nichii Petr Grigor’evich had no surviving sons. Semen Kon­ stantinovich became an okol'nichii between Aug. 1541 and 1549/50 (RK, pp. 102, 124) and a boyar by April 1552 (RK, pp. 133- 34; Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga, p. 112; Zimin, “Dvorovaia tetrad*,” p. 31). He died after July 1557: RK, p. 162. His brother, Vladimir, is not mentioned. Succession continued with Semen’s descendants.

60. Zvenigorodskii Princes Prince Ivan Aleksandrovich Zvenigorodskii is first mentioned, as a boyar, be­ tween 1447 and 1455; his rank was probably a reward for his loyal service in the dynastic war: ASEI, 1, no. 201, p. 144. He died in 1476: Pskov, fasc. 2, p. 204 (6984). The succession after Prince Ivan of his son. Prince Ivan Zvenets, as an okol’nichii between 1488/89 and 1490 (RK, p. 21; PDSn, pt. 1, col. 26) was an anomaly: princes generally did not serve in the rank. He died between Sept. 1496 and 1497/98: PSRL, 12: 245 (7005); Prodolzhenie khronografa, p. 272 (7006). Prince Ivan Zvenets was succeeded by his brother, Prince Vasilii Nozdrevatyi, who became an okol’nichii between 1506/7 and Sept. 1509; he died after 1509: RK, pp. 38, 44. Prince Andrei, son of Prince Ivan Zvenets, did not succeed collaterally, since he predeceased his uncle, Prince Vasilii; he is mentioned only between spring 1504 and April 1506 (DDG, no. 93, p. 372, no. 98, p. 407). Nor could Prince Vasilii be succeeded by his two sons, because they apparently died too young. Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Nozdrevatyi-Zvenigorodskii is mentioned first in military service in Aug. 1532 and is not mentioned after Aug. 1538: Zimin, “Namestnicheskoe upravlenie,” p. 274; RK, p. 94. His brother, Petr, is not mentioned. Thus succession ended with their father’s generation.

NOTES

The following abbreviations are used in the Notes. Complete authors’ names, titles, and publication data are given in the Bibliography, pp. 289-308. AAE

A k ty , sobrannye v b ib lio teka kh i a rkb iva kh R ossiiskoi im perii A rkheograficheskoiu ekspeditsieiu Im p . aka d em ii n auk.

AE

A rkheograficheskii ezh egodnik za . . . god.

AFZKh

A k ty feodaV nogo zem levladeniia i kh oziaistva X IV -X V I vekov.

AFZKh . . . Sim onova

A k ty feodaV nogo zem levladeniia i khoziaistva: A k ty M o sko vsko g o S im o n o va m onastyria (1506-1613 gg.).

AGR

Fedotov-Chekhovskii, A. A., ed. A k ty , otnosiashchiesia d o grazhdanskoi

AI

A k ty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye. . . .

A Iu B

A k ty , otnosiashchiesia d o iuridicheskogo byta drevnei Rossii. . . .

ARG

A k ty R u ssk o g o gosudarstva, 1 505-1526 gg.

raspravy drevnei Rossii.

A SEI

A k ty so tsiaV no-ekonom icheskoi istorii. . . .

AZR

A k ty , otnosiashchiesia k istorii zap a d n o i Rossii, . . .

BAN

B iblioteka A k a d e m ii na u k SSSR, Division o f the Manuscript and Printed

Book. Chronicle redaction

Bochkareva, Z. N., and M. E. Bychkova, eds. N o v y e rodoslovnye. . . .

C hteniia

C hteniia v Im p era to rsko m obshchestve istorii i d revnostei rossiiskikh pri M o sk o v s k o m universitete. S b o m ik .

DDG

D u k h o v n y e i d o g o v o m y e gram oty. . . .

DRV

Novikov, N. [I.], ed. D revniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika.

Forschungen

Forschungen zu r O steuropäischen G eschichte.

GBL GPB

is t and 2d eds.

G osudarstvennaia b iblioteka im . V. I. Lenina, Manuscript Division. G osudarstvennaia publichnaia biblioteka im . M . E. SaltykovaShchedrina, Manuscript Division.

IA

Istoricheskii arkhiv.

IS Z

Veselovskii, Issledovaniia p o istorii klassa slu zh ilykh zem levladeVtsev.

IZ

Istoricheskie zapiski.

Kashtanov

Kashtanov, S. M. “Khronologicheskii perechen’ immunitetnykh gramot XVI veka.”

244

Notes to Pages 2-3

LOH

Leningradskoe otdelenie In stitu te istorii SSSR A N SSSR, Archive.

M ERSH

T h e M o d e m E ncyclopedia o f R ussian a n d S o viet H istory.

NPL

N o vg o ro d ska ia pervaia leto p is' starshego i m ladshego izv o d o v.

PDSrt

P am iatniki d ip lom a tich eskikh snoshenii drevnei R o ssii s d erzhavam i inostrannym i. . . .

Piskarevskii Postnik

Iakovleva, O. A., ed. P iskarevskii letopisets. Tikhomirov, M. N ., ed. “ Zapiski о regentstve Eleny Glinskoi i boiarskom pravlenii 1533-1547 gg.”

Prodolzhenie khronografa

Shmidt, S. O., ed. “ Prodolzhenie khronografa redaktsii 1512 goda.”

PRP

P am iatniki russkogo prava.

Pskov

Nasonov, A. N., ed. P sko vskie letopisi.

P SR L

Polnoe sobranie ru sskikh letopisei.

RBS

R u sskii biograficheskii slo v a r\

RK

R azriadnaia kniga, 1 4 95-1598 gg.

Rumiantsev redaction

Bochkareva, Z. N., and M. E. Bychkova, eds. N o v y e rodoslovnye. . . .

S b o m ik Likhacheva

Likhachev, N. P., comp. S b o m ik a k to v . . . .

S b R IO

S b o m ik Im peratorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva.

SG G D

Sobranie go su d a rstven n ykh g ra m o t i d ogovorov.

Sheremetev list

Novikov, N. [I.], ed. “ Posluzhnoi spisok.”

TL

Priselkov, M. D., comp. T roitskaia le to p is\ . . .

TsGADA Uspenie register Ustiug

TsentraVnyi gosudarstvennyi a rk h iv d revn ikh a kto v.

Serbina, K. N., ed. U stiuzhskii letopisnyi svod. . . .

V ID

Vspom ogateV nye istoricheskie distsipliny.

Novikov, N. [I.], ed. “Sinodik.”

Introduction 1. Recent work on the growth of the Muscovite autocracy includes Zimin, R ossiia na rubezhe, pp. 138-77, 233-62; Rossiia na poroge, chaps. 10 and 16; and R efo rm y, chaps. 4-8. Also Kashtanov, SotsiaVno-politicheskaia istoriia; essays by Alef in R ulers a n d N o b le s; and Kleimola, “The Changing Face,” “Up Through Servitude,” “Muscovy Redux,” “Mus­ covite Autocracy,” “Military Service,” and “Patterns.” 2. Werner, “Important Noble Families,” pp. 176,177. 3. Prerevolutionary scholars include Kliuchevskii, Boiarskaia d u m a , chaps. 9-16; Platonov, Lektsii, pp. 154-226; and Presniakov, M o sk o v sk o e tsarstvo, chaps. 3, 5,10. This interpretation is a staple of Soviet historiography: Smirnov, O cherki; Zimin, R ossiia na rubezhe, Rossiia na poroge, R eform y; Kashtanov, SotsiaV no-politicheskaia istoriia; Skrynnikov, Ivan G roznyi. 4. Nosov, Stanovlenie, is representative of the interpretation that the governmental re­ forms of the 1530’s and 1550’s provided for local autonomy. The reforms provided only

Notes to Pages 3 -11

245

administrative autonomy, however. Nor were the Councils of the Land representative in­ stitutions: Kliuchevskii, K urs, pp. 367-69, 391-94. 5. On this point, see Chap. 5. Crummey argues that even in the seventeenth century, political struggle was motivated not by ideology, policymaking, or class consciousness but rather by the self-interest of political factions: A ristocracy a n d Servitors, chap. 4, esp. pp. 86-87. Meehan-Waters makes a similar distinction between the complex social organi­ zation of Petrine Russia and its politics, which was motivated not by class or ideology but by personal ambition: A u to cra cy a n d A ristocracy, chap. 6, esp. pp. 148-60. 6. Richard Pipes has formulated this argument in R ussia U nder th e O ld Regim e, esp. pp. 21-24. 7. Weber, E co n o m y a n d Society, vol. 3, pp. 1006-69. See also the essays on early medi­ eval politics translated in Reuter, ed., T h e M edieval N o b ility; and Duby, T he Early G row th. 8. R K , pp. 9-17. 9. I advance this argument and give relevant sources in Chap. 1. 10. On Muscovite ideology, see Chap. 5; see also Nancy Kollmann, “The Grand Prince” ; Rowland, “Advice.” 11. Initially the okol’nichie performed an administrative function (they were infre­ quently mentioned in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries); by the end of the fifteenth cen­ tury, however, the okoPnichii rank had become an honorific title, second to boyar. On the rank, see Chap. 3. 12. Crummey makes this argument with regard to the seventeenth century; see A risto ­ crats a n d Servitors, pp. 74-81, 86-88. Chojnacki, in “Patrician Women,” advances the simi­ lar view that marriage ties prevented factional conflict in Renaissance Italy. 13. Presniakov, M o sk o v sk o e tsarstvo, p. 32. 14. Weber, E co n o m y a n d Society, vol. 3, pp. 1006-69; Weber, Social a n d E conom ic O r­ ganization, pt. 3. 15. For a general survey of trends in research since the 1930’s, with emphasis on the period since i960, see Stone, T h e Past a n d the Present, pp. 3-44. For examples of trends in early modern British history, see Hexter, Reappraisals, pt. 2; in European medieval history, see Reuter, ed., T h e M edieval N o b ility ; and Lewis, R oyal Succession; in Italian Renaissance history, Kent, H o u seh o ld an d Lineage; Herlihy, “Family Solidarity” ; Chojnacki, “Patrician Women”; and Heers, Fam ily Clans and Parties. 16. Karamzin, Istoriia, bk. 2, vol. 5, chap. 4, cols. 218-22; bk. 2, vol. 6, chap. 7, cols. 210-18; bk. 2, vol. 7, chap. 3, cols. 105-12; bk. 2, vol. 8, chaps. 1, 2, 3. 17. Ibid., bk. 2, vol. 5, chap. 4, cols. 218-19. Solov’ev also implied that the grand prince made boyars, but he did not deal with the question directly (Solov’ev, Istoriia, bk. 3, vol. 5, pp. 154-58). Juridical historians agreed with Karamzin’s presentation of this issue: D’iakonov, O cherki, p. 288; Sergeevich, R u ssk ie iuridicheskie, vol. 1, bk. 2, pp. 402-3; D revnosti, vol. 2, bk. 5, p. 386; Vladimirskii-Budanov, O bzor, p. 163. Platonov also implied the grand prince’s autonomy with regard to boyar appointment while simultaneously stressing the political power of the high and lesser servitors (whom he called Moscow’s “aristocracy” and “gentry”): Lektsii, pp. 168-71. Veselovskii said that for some boyars the rank was he­ reditary, but in all cases the sovereign had the right to appoint boyars as he wished: ISZ, pp. 44, 259, 465-66, 474-75; see also Veselovskii, Issledovaniia . . . oprichniny, p. 127, on the prince’s choice and service careers of boyars. 18. For the usage of the term “metahistorical,” see M etahistory, Hayden White’s in­ sightful study of nineteenth-century historical writing. 19. Solov’ev, Istoriia, bk. 1, vol. 1, pp. 55-59; bk. 2, vol. 4, pp. 647-59; bk. 3, vol. 5,

pp. 154-5820. Kavelin, “Vzgliad na iuridicheskii byt”; Chicherin, “Obzor istoricheskogo razvitiia

246

Notes to Pages 11-16

sel'skoi obshchiny v Rossii”; Samarin, “O mneniakh Sovrementtika”; Kireevskii, “On the Nature of European Culture.” 21. Vladimirskii-Budanov, O bzor, pp. 158-74. I. D. Beliaev ( L e k tsii) was, admittedly, Slavophile in his politics, but his textbooks did not give strong evidence of that view: Rubinshtein, R usskaia istoriografiia, p. 287. 22. Sergeevich, R u sskie iuridicheskie, vol. 1, bk. 2, pp. 397-422; D revnosti, vol. 2, bk. 5, pp. 382-453. 23. Kliuchevskii, Boiarskaia du m a , pp. 2, 3. 24. Ibid., chaps. 5-7, 9-20; Kliuchevskii, Kurs, lects. 27-28 and Istoriia soslovii, lects. 13-14. 25. See, for example, essays by Got’e and Stashevskii in Dovnar-Zapolskii, ed., R usskaia istoriia v ocherkakh, vols. 2 and 3. 26. Pavlov-Sil’vanskii, Feodalizm v drevnei Rusi. 27. Platonov, Lektsii, pp. 154-88. Platonov has remained influential in the United States in part because of recent translations of his works on Ivan IV, Boris Godunov, the Time of Troubles, and the seventeenth century: Ivan the Terrible, Boris Godunov, The Time o f Troubles, Moscow and the West. 28. Markevich, Istoriia m estnichestva; Korkunov, ed., P am iatniki. 29. Rozhdestvenskii, Sluzhiloe zemlevladenie, p. 146 and chap. 1. 30. See Baron, “Plekhanov’s Russia”; and Schiebet, “Prerevolutionary Russian Marxist Concepts.” 31. Presniakov, O brazovanie and M o sk o v sk o e tsarstvo. 32. On controversies in Soviet historiography, see Shteppa, Russian Historians; Black, Rewriting; Mazour, Writing; Baron and Heer, eds., Windows; Barber, Soviet Historians. Early Soviet Marxist interpretations include Lebedev, Grekov, and Bakhrushin, eds., Istoriia SSSR, sec. B, chaps. 1-3 (chaps. 1-2 by К. V. Bazilevich; chap. 3 by S. V. Bakhrushin); Ocherki istorii SSSR. . . . IX -XV w ., 2, chaps. 1-2 (authors unnamed); Ocherki istorii SSSR. . . . XV v.-nachalo XVII v., chap. 1 (authors: A. A. Zimin, S. M. Kashtanov, la. S. Lur’e, A. N. Mal’tsov, A. G. Man’kov, A. N. Nasonov, M. G. Riabinovich, and A. V. Chernov). 33. Cherepnin, O brazovanie, pp. 9-10 and chaps. 1-2. 34. Ibid., pp. 734-810; Cherepnin, R u sskie feodaVnye, 2: 289-306. 35. Smirnov, Ocherki; Kashtanov, “Immunitetnye gramoty” and Sotsial'no-politicheskaia istoriia. 36. See, for example, Vipper, Ivan Groznyi, chap. 1; Nosov, Stanovlenie, pp. 9-13; Skrynnikov, Ivan Groznyi, pp. 3-4; Zimin and Khoroshkevich, Rossiia, pp. 6-8. 37. Zimin, R efo rm y, chaps. 5-8; Zimin, Rossiia na rubezhe, pp. 160-77; Nosov, “Boiarskaia kniga,” p. 227; Skrynnikov, Ivan G roznyi, pp. 5-64. On this generation of scholars, see Crummey, “Ivan the Terrible,” pp. 64-70. 38. Zimin, Reformy, p. 171; Rossiia na poroge, pp. 410-11. Other historians similarly treat family and noneconomic factors as secondary forces. See Kuchkin, “Iz istorii genealogicheskikh,” p. 379. Even the redoubtable M. B. Sverdlov does so in his “Genealogiia.” 39. Froianov, Kievskaia R u s \ O ch erki so tsia l’no -p o litich esko i istorii and K ievskaia R u s \ O cherki so tsiaV no-ekonom icheskoi istorii; Kobrin, V la st’; Mel’nikov, “Mestnichestvo” ; Pavlov, “Praviashchie sloi” ; Bogdanov, “Letopisnye”; Sedov, “Sotsial’no-politicheskaia borba.” Cf. M. B. Sverdlov’s monograph, which is implicitly critical of Froianov: G enezis i Struktur a.

40. For further discussion of this problem, see Nancy Kollmann, “The Grand Prince” and “Consensus Politics” ; Crummey, “Ivan the Terrible,” p. 70. 41. Nancy Kollmann, “Veselovskii”; Levshin, “Bibliografiia” and “Obzor.” Recent pub-

Notes to Pages 16-18

2.47

lications include A k ty pistso vo g o delà and Veselovskii, T rudy p o istochnikovedeniiu. See Crummey’s comments on Veselovskii’s influence in Soviet historiography in “Ivan the Terrible,” pp. 62-64. 42. IS Z ; Veselovskii, Issle d o va n iia . . . oprichniny. 43. Daniel Waugh points out that Zimin's 1947 dissertation included prosopography and preceded publication of Veselovskii’s major works; see “A. A. Zimin’s Study,” p. 23. 44. Kobrin, “Sostav” ; Bychkova, R o d o slo vn ye knigi; Istoriia i genealogiia. 45. See Lawrence Stone's essays on historiography and collective biography: The Past a n d the Present, pp. 3-73. 46. Grobovsky, T h e " C hosen C o u n c i l Keenan, review of Nosov, Stanovleniet in K ritika, 7 (1971): 67-96; Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways” ; Halperin, “Master and Man,” p. xiii; Hellie, E nserfm ent, p. 22; Kleimola, “The Changing Face.” 47. See Alef’s “ Crisis,” “Aristocratic Politics,” “ Reflections,” and other essays in Rulers a n d N obles. See Kleimola, “Up Through Servitude,” “The Changing Face,” “Muscovy

Redux,” “Muscovite Autocracy,” “Military Service,” and “Patterns.”

48. Russ, A d e l u n d A d elso p p o sitio n en , “Der Kampf,” “Elena Vasil’evna Glinskaja,” “Machtkampf oder ‘feudale Reaktion’?,” and “Der Bojar.” 49. Crummey, A ristocrats a n d Servitors; Meehan-Waters, A utocracy an d A ristocracy. 50. Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways,” “Ivan the Terrible,” pt. 1, and “The Tsar’s Two Bodies.” 51. Documents include Bochkareva and Bychkova, eds., N o v y e rodoslovnye knigi; R K ; R azriadnaia kniga, 15 5 0 -1 6 3 6 gg.; R azriadnye knigit 1 5 9 8 -1638 gg.; R azriadnaia kniga, 15 5 9 -!6 0 5 gg.; R azriadnaia kniga, 1 4 /5 -1 6 0 5 gg.; Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga; Boiarskie spiski; A SE I; A F Z K h ; many vols, of P SR L. Source studies: Bychkova, R o d oslovnye knigi; Buganov, R azriadnye knigi , “ ‘Dvortsovye razriady’,” “Opisanie spiskov razriadnykh knig,”

“ 'Gosudarev razriad’,” “Sokrashchennaia redaktsiia . . . , 1550-1636 gg.,” and “Sokrashchennaia redaktsiia . . . , 1559-1605 gg.” Monographs and articles are too numerous to list; consult the Bibliography for works by Alef, Buganov, Bychkova, Cherepnin, Dewey, Dmitrieva, Floria, Froianov, Gol’dberg, A. D. Gorskii, Grekov, Iushko, Kaiser, Kashtanov, Keenan, Khoroshkevich, Kleimola, Kobrin, Kuchkin, Lur’e, Nazarov, Nosov, Rowland, Russ, Semenchenko, Shmidt, Shulgin, Skrynnikov, 1. 1. Smirnov, M. N. Tikhomirov, Zimin, Zlotnik. 52. A word about conventions used in the text. Russian form has been maintained in the pluralization of proper names, patronymics, and surnames. For example. Prince Ivan Iur’evich Patrikeev’s three sons were Princes Mikhail, Vasilii, and Ivan Iur’evichi Patrikeevy. The plural of Shuiskii is Shuiskie; the plural of Nagoi is Nagie. Women’s surnames end with the letter a or the feminine adjectival ending. For example, the daughter of Prince Fedor Obolenskii was Princess Agrafena Obolenskaia; the daughter of Vasilii Cheliadnin was Mariia Cheliadnina. The word “okol’nichii,” designating the second court rank, is generally not translated; for a discussion of the rank’s function and significance, see Chap. 3. Con­ cerning dates, since Muscovites began their year in September and calculated it from the creation of the world (5,509 years before the birth of Christ), their year 7054 extended from Sept. I , 1545, to Aug. 31, 1546, expressed here as “ 1545/46.” Occasionally a date is given in the form “ 1461-62.” This indicates that the given event occurred within those years but that sources do not allow more exact dating. 53. Military service books (razriadnye knigi) published before the postwar era are not credited (for example, Valuev, ed., R azriadnaia kniga; Miliukov, D revneishaia ), since they were not based on comprehensive manuscript analysis. Soviet scholars, particularly since the war, have made great advances in the study of sources, including military service books. The G osudarev razriad (“Sovereign’s military service book”) redaction of the books (RK ;

248

Notes to Pages 19-26

R azriadnye knigi, 1 5 9 8 -1 6 3 8 gg.), should be considered the most authoritative; the “Ex­ panded Version” and its various “abbreviations” (R azriadnaia kniga, 1 475-1605 gg.; Razriadnaia kniga, 1 5 50-1636 gg.; Razriadnaia kniga, 155 9 -1 6 0 5 gg.) are not as reliable in

their attributions of boyar or okol’nichii rank. 54. Zimin, “Sostav”; Alef, “Reflections,” app. I, and “Aristocratic Politics,” app. 1; Kleimola, “Patterns,” app. 1. 55. Primary sources have been used in all cases. A. A. Zimin's lists of boyars, vicegerents, court functionaries, and others are useful, but they are not without mistakes. Many un­ corroborated references come from interpolations in military service books, particularly in books concerning the Saburov, Buturlin, and Bezstuzhev families. Genealogical compendiums edited by Lobanov-Rostovskii, Dolgorukov, and, to a lesser extent, Baumgarten con­ tain erroneous transliterations of Old Style to New Style datings and also contain uncor­ roborated dates of death and marriage alliances. Accurate genealogical charts of princely families can be found in Forssmann, D ie Beziehungen; Dworzaczek, G enealogia. A word about terminology: “clan” is here used to refer to the collectivity of a single ancestor's de­ scendants; “family” refers to the various lines of kinsmen with different surnames that de­ scended from him. 56. Veselovskii's studies of landholdings are still valuable: see FeodaVnoe zem levladenie and IS Z . For further discussion of boyars' economies, see Chap. 1. 57. On the Voskresenie chronicle, see Levina, “O vremeni sostavleniia.” On the “Brief Chronicle,” see Zimin, I. S. Peresvetov, pp. 29-41. 58. Edward L. Keenan, Jr., has pointed this out in “The Trouble with Muscovy.” 59. Russ similarly points out the significance of the chronicle’s idealized depictions of the grand prince's relations with his boyars: A dels u n d A d elso p p o sitio n en , chap. 1. 60. Crummey, A ristocrats a n d Servitors, particularly chaps. 1-4. 61. Keenan, T h e K u rb skii-G ro zn yi A p o cryp h a and “Putting Kurbskii in His Place” ; re­ sponses by Skrynnikov in Perepiska; Lur’e and Rykov, eds., Perepiska lva n a G ro zn o g o ; and Rossing and R0nne, A p o c r y p h a l- N o t A p o cryp h a l? On the ideology of the letters, see N0rretranders, Shaping. 6 z. A consistent ideology can be found in sources from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century; see Chap. 5 for further discussion. Daniel Rowland, in “Advice,” ably analyzes Muscovite ideology on the basis of early-seventeenth-century compositions.

Chapter 1 1. Berry and Crummey, eds., R u d e a n d Barbarous K ingdom , p. 27. 2. Fennell, T he Emergence, pp. 7-8. 3. On the assumption of continuity, see the surveys by Sergeevich, R u ssk ie iuridicheskie, vol. I , bk. 2, and D revnosti, vol. 2, bks. 3-5; Vladimirskii-Budanov, O b zo r; Kliuchevskii, Boiarskaia dum a; D’iakonov, O cherki. On Ivan 111, see Kliuchevskii, K urs, lect. 2 5 ; Platonov, Lektsii, pp. 154-73; Fennell, Ivan the G reat; Zimin, Rossiia na rubezhe; Alef, “Aristocratic Politics.” 4. Froianov, Kievskaia R u s‘. O ch erki so tsial'no-politicheskoi istorii, chaps. 2, 5. 5. The rank of okol'nichii was used occasionally in the fourteenth century (TL, p. 396 [6882]; D D G , no. 2, p. 13, no. 8,p. 25), but it was employed regularly at court beginning in the late fifteenth century (see Chap. 3). 6. On Moscow's early history, see Tikhomirov, Srednevekovaia M o skva , chap. 1; Tikhomirov, “Drevneishaia istoriia g. Moskvy” ; Artsikhovskii and Tikhomirov, “Drevneishaia Moskva”; Fennell, T h e Emergence; Kuchkin, “Rol' Moskvy.” 7. How boyars are identified in this study is discussed in the Introduction; patterns of descent are discussed in Chap. 2.

Notes to Pages 26-3 о

249

8. Veselovskii also depicted the fourteenth century as formative: \S Z t pp. 465-519. 9. These genealogies, appended to the Typography chronicle, lack the legends of mythical founders which began to appear in genealogical books in the early sixteenth century and which obscure the origin of clans: P SR L, 24: 227-34. Genealogical books compiled around the 1540's contain some legends: Bochkareva and Bychkova, eds., N otrye rodoslovnye knigi X V I v. (Chronicle and Rumiantsev redactions). The “Sovereign’s genealogical book,” written in 1555, omits legends: R o doslovnaia kniga kn ia zei i dvorian rossiiskikh. Later sixteenthand early-seventeenth-century redactions are replete with legends; see “Rodoslovnaia kniga.” The redactions are identified and legends discussed by Bychkova: R odoslovnye knigi, esp. chap. 6. 10. On the Akinfovich clan, cf. P SR L , 24: 231, with Chronicle redaction, p. 58, and Rumiantsev redaction, p. 127; on that clan’s pre-Muscovite service, see TL, p. 352 (6814); P SR L, 18: 93, 96 (6847, 6856). On the Zemov-Saburov clan, cf. PSRL, 24: 231, with Chronicle redaction, p. 50, and Rumiantsev redaction, p. 118; on the clan’s pre-Muscovite service, see TL, p. 352 (6813). Later generations tended to accept mythical ancestries of clans: Bychkova, R o d o slo vn ye knigi, chap. 6. Princely families, however, were included in the genealogies as a demonstration of the dynasty's Riurikid heritage; princes traced their families back to Kiev Rus’ and were included even if they had not yet been made boyars in Muscovy. 11. The three stages: (1) until 1328; (2) from 1328 to 1359; (3) in Dmitrii Donskoi’s reign, 1359-89 (IS Z , pp. 465-85)-

12. P SR L , 25: 237 (6916); R K , p. 17. 13. On Moscow’s trade routes, see Solov’ev, Istoriia, vol. 1, bk. 1, pp. 72-77; Tikhomirov, Srednevekovaia M o sk v a , chap. 4; Tikhomirov, “Drevneishaia istoriia g. Moskvy,” pp. 390-98; Zabelin, Istoriia g. M o skvy , pp. 8-12. For maps, see Chew, A tlas o f Russian H istory, maps nos. 7-11; O ch erki istorii SSSR . . . I X - X V w . , vol. 2, appended map no. 1; and maps in Kuchkin's Form irovanie, between pp. 316 and 317. 14. For a map, see Chew, A tlas o f Russian H istory, map no. 9. For further discussion of Muscovy’s fourteenth-century expansion, see Howes, T he Testam ents, chaps. 1 and 2; Iushko, “O nekotorykh volost'iakh” ; Kuchkin, “K izucheniiu,” “Starodubskoe kniazhestvo,” and “Zemel’nye priobreteniia.” 15. For one view concerning the Mongol tribute, see Roublev, “Periodicity” and “Mon­ gol Tribute.” 16. Duby, Early G ro w th , pp. 36-38; see also Presniakov’s description of early Moscow as a comradely encampment (M o sk o v sk o e tsarstvo, chaps. 2-4).

17. See Table 1 and notes thereto. 18. DDG, no. 9, p. 27. 19. Liubavskii, O brazovanie; Veselovskii, Selo i derevnia, pp. 12-33, 13032; Kopanev, “Naselenie” ; Smith, Peasant Farm ing in M uscovy, pp. 26-32; French, “Three-Field Agri­ cultural System” ; Cherepnin, O brazovanie, chap. 2; Köchin, SeVskoe khoziaistvo; Kobrin, V last ’, p. 28. 20. Sakharov, G oroda, pp. 82-101, 128; Cherepnin, O brazovanie, chap. 3; French, “Early and Medieval Russian Town,” pp. 258-63. 21. Charters of local government (u stavnye gram oty) survive from Novgorod, Smolensk, and Vladimir-Volhynia from 1137, 1150, and ca. 1289, respectively (PRP, 2: 117-18, 39-42, 29) and from Dvina (1397-98) and Beloozero (1488) {PRP, 3: 162-64, 170-74). 22. D D G , nos. 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, i i are typical documents relating to local administration and assessments. 23. Veselovskii describes the lack of cohesion that characterized fourteenth- and fifteenthcentury administration: FeodaPnoe zem levladenie, pp. 113-29, 208-11, and chap. 13. On administration, also see Vladimirskii-Budanov, O bzor, pp. 75-86, 192.-*oo; Sergeevich,

250

Notes to Pages 30-34

R usskie iuridicheskie, vol. 1, bk. 2, pp. 331-521; O ch erki istorii SSSR . . . IX-XV w . , vol. 2, pp. 56-68, 144-66; Dewey, “Immunities in Old Russia” and “Decline of the Muscovite N a m e stn ik ”; Howes, Testam ents, chaps. 3-5. On judicial immunities, primarily in the fif­ teenth century, see A. D. Gorskii, “O votchinnom sude.” 24. Kashtanov, “Finansovoe ustroistvo”; Veselovskii, FeodaVnoe zem levladenie, p. 76. For a discussion of the publication of ko rm len ie grants and immunity charters, see PRP, 2: 195-200; PRP, 3: 85-161. (The item on 2: 198 is a fourteenth-century immunity from Muscovy.) 25. Historians assume this, based on fifteenth-century references. See Zabelin, Istoriia g. M oskvy; Tikhomirov, “Moskva - stolitsa,” p. 41; Bezsonov, “Stroitel’stvo moskovskogo Kremlia,” pp. 104-5; Bakhrushin, “Moskva v period,” p. 187. See also appended maps in Istoriia M o skvy , vol. 1; and in Bartenev, M o sk o v sk ii krem V v starinu i teper*. Fifteenthcentury references to boyars’ homes in the Kremlin abound: D D G , no. 61, p. 199, no. 86, p. 347, no. 89, p. 358, and no. 91, p. 370. There is no reason to doubt that boyars would have lived in the Kremlin in the fourteenth century; in fact, a greater percentage of all the boyars probably lived there in the fourteenth than in the sixteenth century, when offices, grand-princely palaces, and ecclesiastical buildings crowded out all private homes except for those of the most powerful of boyars. See Bakhrushin, “Moskva v period,” p. 187. For references to boyars* Kremlin residences in 1350, 1367, 1400, and 1408, respectively, see T L , pp. 372 (6859), 386 (6876), 455 (6909), and 467 (6916). 26. On the central administration, see Kliuchevskii, Istoriia soslovii, lect. 9. 27. Veselovskii, FeodaVnoe zem levladenie, pp. 115,114. 28. On scattered landholdings, see Veselovskii, FeodaVnoe zem levladenie, pp. 146,155. 29. Kaiser, G ro w th o f the L a w , pp. 16, 41, 84-85, 93, 113, 120-22, 126, 128, 135-41, 148,153, 163, 164, 171, 175, 183,186-88. 30. Keenan develops these themes in “Muscovite Political Folkways,” pp. 8-12. 31. Tikhomirov took figures from chronicle accounts, which are rarely reliable. Archeo­ logical evidence shows Moscow to have been too small to accommodate so large a popula­ tion. Tikhomirov’s portrayal of Moscow as a trade and manufacturing center in the four­ teenth century supports his argument that the rise of Moscow was a consequence of its economic growth, as does Rabinovich’s depiction of it as such even in the twelfth century. Tikhomirov himself refutes Rabinovich’s claim. Rabinovich, О drevnei M o skve , pp. 61-81; Tikhomirov, Srednevekovaia M o skva , chap. 1, esp. pp. 10-12, 66-68. See also Tikhomirov, D revniaia M oskva. 32. Zabelin, D o m a sh n ii byt, vol. 1, p. 14; Sytin, Istoriia p la n iro vki; Smirnov, “Moskva” and Posadskie liudi, vol. 1, p. 19. Sakharov argues that Moscow was a dynamic economic and administrative center in G oroda, pp. 177-79. 33. Tikhomirov, Srednevekovaia M o skva , p. 25. 34. Ibid., pp. 13-29, 32-59; Tikhomirov, “Moskva - stolitsa,” pp. 65-74; N. Ia. Tik­ homirov and Ivanov, M o sko vskii KremV, p. 17; Istoriia M o skvy , vol. 1, appended map no. 2; Sytin, Istoriia planirovki, pp. 28-40 and map on p. 39. 35. See N. Ia. Tikhomirov and Ivanov, M o sk o v sk ii KremV, chaps. 1-2; and Sytin, Istoriia planirovki, pp. 28-40.

36. On the numbers of boyars, see Table 1 and notes thereto. 37. Appendix 2 consists of the family histories of all boyar clans. Veselovskii refers to some of the following fourteenth-century men as boyars. But they are not attested as being of that rank in other than genealogical sources, nor are their descendants; therefore, these references probably are later interpolations and I have not included them. They include Semen Melik, who is mentioned only in 1380, and not as a boyar: T L , p. 420 (6888). For the genealogy, see Chronicle redaction, p. 57; Rumiantsev redaction, pp. 176-77. Melik

Notes to Pages 34-36

2.51

married the daughter of Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Monastyrev; see Rumiantsev redaction, p. 170. Cf. IS Z , pp. 292, 492, 498. Aleksandr Borisovich Pole founded the Polev clan; he is mentioned ambiguously in 1389 and 1400 and was probably not a boyar: P S R L , 5: 244 (6898); P SR L , 4 (1848): 104 (4909). Further evidence for that conclusion is the fact that none of his heirs attained boyar status. For the clan genealogy, see Rumiantsev redaction, p. 181. Cf. IS Z , p. 371. The Sudimont family (also not a boyar family) is entered in some genealogies, but its claim is based on falsified documents: Zimin, “Istochniki,” p. h i ; Zimin, (