Killing the Enemy: Assassination Operations During World War II 9780755624294, 9781784530723

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This book is dedicated to Effa, Emylin and Evelyn

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has a unique journey. It started as a thesis studying the effectiveness of Special Operations and later ended as a study of Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations in the strategic setting of World War II. Along the way, as I dug deeper into archival resources and memoirs, I started to feel myself ‘returning’ to the dramatic and nostalgic scenes of action, something R.G. Collingwood would acknowledge as ‘reenactment’. What I experienced – the dangers, the excitement, the horrors and most importantly the triumph of the human spirit – need to be reiterated again. I hope that this book can humbly, retell these stories of the ultimate triumph of the free human spirit against oppression. The sacrifices made by these ‘actors’ in my book, need to be reiterated again, to remind us all that, ultimately, good always triumphs over evil. For this, I thank my editor, Tomasz Hoskins for his faith in my work, production editor Allison Walker and I.B.Tauris for their support in making this book available. This book will not have materialised without the generous support from a host of different organisations and individuals. Firstly, I would like to thank the Malaysian Ministry of Education and the National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM), for granting me a generous scholarship and study leave to pursue my doctoral research at the University of Reading. The then and current Vice Chancellor of NDUM, Jeneral Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Panglima Hj Zulkifli Bin Hj Zainal Abidin, Professor Dr. Tengku Mohd Bin Tengku Sembok, Lieutenant-Colonel (rtd) Ahmad Ghazali Bin Abu Hassan, Dr Tang Siew Mun, Associate

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Professor Dr Radziah Binti Abdul Rahim, and Associate Professor Daruis Bin Lidin, requires special mention for their strong support for my initial research application and career at NDUM. Many thanks to my doctoral supervisors, Dr Geoffrey Sloan and Professor Beatrice Heuser, for their excellent guidance and advice. I would like to acknowledge the critical reviews and comments of my examiners, Professor Colin S. Gray and Dr Alastair Finlan, that helped me bring the original manuscript to its final form. My appreciation is also extended to faculty members at the Department of Politics, Economics and International Relations, University of Reading, namely Professor Alan Cromartie, Dr Patrick Porter, Dr C. Dale Walton, Dr Jonathan Golub and Dr Alan Renwick. My deep appreciation to the anonymous librarians and staff at The National Archives, Kew Gardens; Imperial War Museum; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London; United States Air Force Historical Research Agency; and University of Reading Library, who had rendered their kind assistance and courtesy during my search for materials for my doctoral project. A host of friends and staff at the University of Reading’s Graduate School at Old Whiteknights House also contributed in keeping me sane and humoured during my tense research years. There are too many to list here but I am sure you know who you are. None of this would have been possible without the help of my family and loved ones. I would like to thank my late mother and father, brother and sister, and my in-laws for their support and care in ensuring that I succeed in my life. My greatest gratitude belongs to my beloved wife, Effa, for being a most patient, loving and understanding life partner. This book would not have been ready without your time and effort in ensuring that our two lovely daughters, Emylin and Evelyn, are well taken care of. This book is dedicated to the three of you. As the author of this book I am solely responsible for any errors or inaccuracies and for a book not better than this one. Adam Leong Kok Wey Kuala Lumpur

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Introduction The mere mention of Special Operations or leadership decapitation operations in World War II will conjure up images of secretive and high dramatics of commandos in action with a degree of romantic adventurism infused. Although numerous books have been written on the practice of Special Operations during World War II, none have specifically studied the effectiveness of Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations in that particular war.1 The importance of filling this vacuum guided the formation of the two main research objectives of this book, which are: firstly, to analyse the strategic effectiveness of leadership decapitation operations conducted by Special Operations in World War II; and, secondly, to study the tactical effectiveness of Special Operations conducting these operations.2 Four main case studies from World War II, namely the killing of Reinhard Heydrich; the capture of Major General Heinrich Kreipe; the killing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto; and the attempt to kill or capture General Erwin Rommel, have been used to understand and explain the strategic effectiveness of such operations. This book asserts that Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations during World War II yielded strategic effects in raising morale in desperate situations. These strategic effects had important consequences benefitting the political strategy of the belligerents engaged in such operations. In addition it is asserted that Special Operations provided a strong demonstration of the political will to fight in an

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economical manner. Special Operations were also found to be tactically effective in conducting such operations, but success hinged on a good understanding of how to use Special Operations with excellent support from intelligence. Strategic theories related to leadership decapitation are discussed and used as a foundation to understand how leadership decapitation achieves its intended result. A general theoretical background is necessary to set the foundation in understanding how leadership decapitation works and how it can be achieved. Although there are no implicit strategic theories solely on leadership decapitation, strategic paralysis theories that have linkages with leadership decapitation are critically examined as a foundation to understand how leadership decapitation could achieve its intended result.3 This book is conceptually influenced by Alastair Finlan’s proposal of using Special Forces to conduct a ‘third way of warfare’ – ‘in which opposing political leaders and institutions become the explicit aim of all military efforts from the outset of a campaign’.4 Finlan proposed the targeting and killing of the enemy’s leaders by Special Forces as a third form of warfare apart from the dual strategies of attrition or annihilation. He posited that killing off or disenabling the enemy’s leadership would erode the intelligence and talent of the enemy’s political leadership and supreme command. This would potentially disrupt both the political and strategic direction of the enemy in a conflict and facilitate a quicker end to war and avoid bloody battles. This book, however, analyses the effectiveness of this strategy in a broader context, not just limited to the targeting of enemy political leaders but also important enemy military commanders. James Kiras, in his recent landmark study on the relationship between Special Operations and strategy, tested strategies of decapitation and paralysis utilised by airpower.5 He studied the effectiveness of an aerial Special Operation conducting a strategic paralysis operation, the Dambuster raid (Operation Chastise). The Dambuster raid was conceived in order to strike at the enemy’s infrastructure and cause strategic paralysis of the enemy’s industrial output.6 The air raid was conducted by the British Royal Air Force 617 Squadron in 1943 to destroy the Ruhr Valley dams and succeeded in destroying two dams, the Mo¨hne and Eder. The raid, however, did not yield the intended result of destroying the heart of German war

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production by paralysing Germany’s Ruhr industrial area.7 Although Kiras mentioned the linkage of Special Operations conducting leadership decapitations in his book, he did not explore it further.8 This book covers this crucial gap by analysing the effectiveness of leadership decapitation conducted by Special Operations. This study of Special Operations will be based on an individual task, which is decapitating enemy leadership, and how it positions itself within the rubric of its related strategy. Special Operations generally have three core areas of tasks, which could be categorised as Direct Action (for example, commando raids and hostage rescue), Unconventional Warfare (which includes working with indigenous forces in hostile areas), and Intelligence Operations (reconnaissance and information operations).9 It is not possible to analyse appropriately the whole range of Special Operations’ capabilities and draw conclusions on its general effectiveness. The value of this book is that it studies the effect of Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations at two intrinsic levels of warfare, strategically and tactically. Special Operations functions integrally as a mean and way to meet an end. Each Special Operation has its intrinsic tactical and operational objectives which complement the overarching strategy of a particular campaign regardless if it is a great raid or an unglamorous operation in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of an indigenous group behind enemy lines. In essence, leadership decapitation operations and Special Operations are tactical operations. As strategy is done tactically, effectiveness at the tactical level should be addressed in conjunction with the effects it generates at the strategic level. This subscribes to Clausewitz’s view: Strategy thereby gains the end it had ascribed to the engagement, the end that constitutes its real significance. . .The significance of an engagement may therefore have a noticeable influence on its planning and conduct, and is therefore to be studied in connection with tactics.10 (Emphasis in original) However, regardless of whether the tactical operations fail or succeed, they will still have strategic effects, intended or unintended.11 The impact of these strategic effects provides context to understand how Special Operations or leadership decapitation operations yield strategic

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utility and contribute to the overall strategic performance of the polity utilising such operations.12 This also addresses the gap that Special Operations are often mistakenly treated as a tool exclusively for either tactical purposes or strategic purposes. As Colin Gray stated: Some readers may find it hard to believe that a subject as popular among military authors and journalists as SOF [Special Operations Forces] and SO [Special Operations], and especially their equipment and tactical methods, should be close to naked of strategic analyses.13 There exists a huge body of literature on the history of Special Operations units, their operations and tactics, but a detailed analysis on how these relate to strategy is still lacking. There are a few works that have contributed to the broader study of mapping Special Operations with strategy, the latest being the aforementioned works by Alastair Finlan and James Kiras.14 This book complements these works and is a continuation of an attempt to put Special Operations on a more solid theoretical footing. The practice of leadership decapitation by Special Operations in World War II also sparked a ‘renaissance’ on the utility of using such operations to advance a state’s foreign policy without direct intervention of military armed forces. A fine example is the wide practise of such operations to remove state leaders using covert Special Operations by the United States government, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. The successful attempts by the United States covert usage of leadership decapitation (using non-violent means), such as in Iran and Guatemala,15 pointed to the continuation of such conceptual practice sparked off in World War II. This book, however, does not claim that there is an explicit causal chain from the events of World War II to similar practice after World War II, but the similar general nature of such operations practised after World War II do point to a plausible influence. Furthermore, the importance of learning the lessons from World War II also provides a guide to the general nature of such operations, still contemporarily practised and termed as targeted killing. The next section lays out the key definitions of Special Operations, leadership decapitation, strategic effectiveness, and tactical effectiveness used in this book.

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Definitions What are Special Operations? Special Operations have existed in its conceptual form since ancient military history was first recorded.16 The practice of Special Operations-like concepts has vast historical antecedents, for example from ancient Greek military history,17 through the middle ages,18 from the Seven Years War to the Napoleonic Wars,19 in the American Revolution (War of Independence, 1775 – 82),20 and the American Civil War (1861 – 6).21 Due to the sheer length of the history of Special Operations practice, there is a plethora of definitions explaining what Special Operations are. These definitions can be divided into two categories; one based on a rigid assumption that Special Operations are what a Special Operations unit does, and the second on a broader definition of what a Special Operation is and a suggestion of who should conduct it. Ohad Leslau, an independent international affairs researcher, writing on Israeli Special Operations shares a similar view. He stated that there are two approaches to studying Special Operations; the first looks into ‘organization, equipment, selection and training of SOF [Special Operations Forces], to distinguish them from regular units’.22 The second focuses on ‘the uniqueness of the SOF’s operations and objectives’.23 One of the key definitions based on a Special Operations organisation can be traced to one of the largest employers of Special Operations units, the United States armed forces. The official definition of Special Operations in the United States military today is identified by the Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (JP 3 –05) as: Special operations are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.24 Other authors that defined Special Operations in a similar vein were Kiras,25 Robert Spulak. Jr,26 and William McRaven.27 An example of a broader definition based on Special Operations’ unique capabilities as opposed to an organisation is Luttwak, Canby and Thomas’ study on Special Operations, A Systematic Review of ‘Commando’ (Special) Operations

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1939–1980,28 in which Special Operations was defined as, ‘. . .selfcontained acts of war mounted by self-sufficient forces operating within hostile territory’.29 Colin Gray points out that the most useful definition of Special Operations is based on Maurice Tugwell and David Charters’s, which is also a broader definition based on the uniqueness of Special Operations; Small scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy.30 Finlan, writing on Special Forces, gives an interesting recommendation for a term that may clarify the confused state of Special Operations’ definitions: A better term, however, that would avoid much of the confusion would be ‘Different Forces’ because difference, in terms of relationship with strategy and its underlying nature, is the watermark of Special Forces and best guides their employment in war.31 Finlan points out that most of the misunderstanding and miscomprehension of Special Operations is due to the connotation of the term ‘special’, which had given it a false assumption that what Special Operations does is special and performed by ‘special men’. The association with the term ‘special’ had further alienated the Special Operations community from the wider conventional military forces. Finlan’s proposed term of ‘Different Forces’ may be able to repair the current state of confusion. The late M.R.D. Foot, a prominent Special Operations Executive (SOE) historian and ex-SAS intelligence officer during World War II, managed to provide a useful working definition of Special Operations, They are unorthodox coups, that is, unexpected strokes of violence, usually mounted and executed outside the military establishment of the day, which exercise a startling effect on the enemy; preferably at the highest level.32 Foot’s definition concisely sums up Special Operations’ most important ingredients for its operational success and survival, which are surprise

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and unexpected acts of warfare. For the purpose of this research, this author used Foot’s definition of Special Operations, which has more utility in explaining the distinct nature of Special Operations without being obstructively narrow in its focus.33

What is leadership decapitation? This book, for specific reasons, does not use the recent terminological construct of targeted killing or the age-old term of assassination.34 Assassination is commonly defined as political murder.35 It means to kill a leader of a party or organisation to initiate a takeover of power. It is also used to eliminate political opponents.36 Some important historic examples include the assassinations of Julius Caesar, Abraham Lincoln, Mohandas Gandhi, John F. Kennedy and Benigno S. Aquino Jr, among many others.37 It has been argued, however, that assassination defined as political murder is different from the killing of enemy leaders during war.38 John Yoo, in his War by Other Means, commented succinctly on this matter: ‘Killing an enemy soldier in wartime would not be assassination, because the attack has a lawful military, rather than political purpose.’39 Assassination can be more clearly defined as an act of criminal murder for political purpose, thus differentiating it from acts against military targets during war. The term assassination is not used in this book as in all the cases studied in this work, the officers targeted to be killed or captured were military personnel, except in the case of Reinhard Heydrich who was a SS-Obergruppenfu¨hrer (rank of Lieutenant General) in the Nazi’s Schutzstaffel (Protection Squads),40 a paramilitary organisation that also functioned militarily (Waffen-SS) during World War II.41 The contemporary term, targeted killing, also do not reflect the contextual background of the case studies as the following points below will explain. Targeted killing is an early twenty-first century terminology construct to define a way to kill terrorists ‘legally’ and, at the same time, strive to avoid the stigma of the term assassination.42 The use of the term ‘targeted killing’ actually originated in Israel in 2000, when Israel stated its policy to eliminate selected Palestinian militants.43 Most contemporary writings on targeted killings tend to focus on tactical effectiveness, legal issues, and morality of targeted killings. These studies have been dedicated to looking into the events of the last ten years in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It is

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argued by some terrorism experts that targeted killing is one of the few effective measures in countering terrorism.44 The argument of the tactical and operational effectiveness of contemporary targeted killing translated into strategic effectiveness and ultimately political effectiveness are still purely speculative at best.45 Borrowing and paraphrasing the title of an excellent article on the global counterinsurgency phenomena by David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith, the current discourse on the effectiveness of targeted killings focused too much on ‘Grammar but No Logic’.46 The term leadership decapitation is used here as this author believes that this term has a superior clarity for the purpose of this research, unburdened as it is by the debate on the ethics and legality of the terms assassination and targeted killings.47 Leadership decapitation is defined in this research as the killing or capturing of an enemy leader with the intention of destroying the source of the enemy strategy; to erode the enemy’s leadership qualities, intellectual strength, and to increase one’s own forces’ morale and lower the enemy’s. Leadership decapitation is also intended to trigger strategic and political effects. The terminology of leadership decapitation rather than assassination or targeted killing or strategic decapitation is used throughout this book as a standardisation of terms.

Strategic effectiveness For clarity and parsimony, this book follows Clausewitz’s concise definition of strategy as, ‘. . . the use of engagements for the object of the war’.48 (emphasis in original) So then, what is strategic effect? Strategic effect is defined by Gray as, ‘. . . the net result of our largely coercive behaviour of any and all kinds upon the behaviour of the enemy’.49 He sums this up further, ‘Strategic effect . . . by definition it can only be in the consequences of what we do.’50 Both intended and unintended strategic effects are generated by the strategies we employ.51 Strategic effects can only be ‘measured’ based on judgement guided by objective reasoning and logic rather than some mathematical or statistical process.52 Although strategic effects cannot be measured with mathematical precision, it can be observed in the enemy’s manner of response.53 The enemy’s response, or non-response, will enable us to understand if the strategy has resulted in its intended or unintended effects.

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Tactical effectiveness This author subscribes to Clausewitz’s definition for tactics as, ‘. . . the use of armed forces in the engagement . . .’54 (emphasis in original). This definition used in this book acknowledges that, ‘strategy is done by tactics’.55 In order to determine if a strategy may work, an excellent understanding of the limitations and capabilities of the tactics that implement the strategy is also important.56 This involves the study of the combat techniques used by the Special Operations units in the selected case studies to learn what are the keys or principles for the successful conduct of Special Operations. The support of other variables for successful or failed operations such as intelligence, local partisans or population, and uncontrollable factors such as weather, are also important for the final net analysis of the operations. Tactical effect also has a paradoxical influence on the overall strategic effect of an operation. A tactically effective operation may not yield the intended strategic effect and paradoxically, an unsuccessful tactical operation may instead yield healthy strategic effects.57 Therefore, tactical effects cannot be studied in isolation and must be analysed with the strategic outcome of the operation, hence this book’s adherence in combining the dual analysis of the tactical and strategic effectiveness of Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations. The next section explains why case studies from World War II are used in this book on Special Operations and Leadership Decapitations. Why World War II? The case studies for this research were selected from incidents that occurred during World War II. There are five reasons for the use of lessons from World War II which this sub-section will explain. Firstly, this was the first time in history where official ‘special operations’ formations were organised in the standing armies of the major belligerents rather than ad-hoc add-ons.58 Secondly, during the war, explicit operations targeting high-level enemy military commanders were conducted.59 The precipitation of such operations in World War II can be plausibly attributed to the prevalent notion and belief that the other side is ‘evil’; any moral issues concerning targeting enemy leadership were easily discarded.60 Furthermore, based on the Hague Conventions of 1907, the laws of war that were applicable during World

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War II had specified that it was permissible to use ‘ruses’ to kill or injure the enemy.61 The Hague Conventions, however, prohibited the killing or wounding of the enemy by ‘treacherous’ ways.62 What was construed as ‘treacherous’ was the wearing of enemy uniforms or falsely using flags of truce to attack the enemy.63 There was no prohibition on killing enemy leadership or specific mention on banning of ‘assassination’ of enemy personnel in the laws of war relevant to that era (or even in more contemporary time).64 Legally, it can be concluded that Special Operations in World War II conformed to the permissible use of ‘ruses’ as laid down in the Hague Conventions, and the specific targeting of enemy leadership to be killed or captured did not contravene the customary laws of war applicable. Thirdly, there were arguments that Special Operations (and commandos) did not contribute much to the overall campaigns of World War II.65 David Thomas argued in his study on the importance of commando operations that the various British commando formations had not made any ‘decisive effect’ towards the outcome of World War II. He stated, Summing up the importance of British commando forces in general in the second world war, it must be said that the contribution of commando operations has perhaps been overestimated with the passage of time . . . However, no commando operation in any theatre of war can be said to have an indispensable contribution to the tactical or strategic success of the regular army in any battle . . . Yet, no commando operation had a decisive effect upon any German military operation in war.’66 Thomas’s article focused primarily on military Special Forces and commandos during World War II, and the experiences from such operations conducted by the British, the Germans and the Soviets. Thomas, however, neglected to consider the conduct of British Special Operations by the Special Operations Executive (SOE). His analysis of Special Operations skewed towards the tactical side without deeper analyses at the strategic level. Hence, he overlooked some key important operations conducted by SOE and the United States military during World War II. More importantly, he did not analyse Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations (ie the killing or capture of enemy leaders).67

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The most scathing assessment of Special Operations in World War II, however, came from a prominent British Army officer, Field-Marshall Sir William Slim: This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it, should be expected to climb a tree.68 Slim’s views had been affected by Special Operations conducted within his theatre of war in World War II – the Chindits and Merrill’s Marauders in Burma. The combat performance of the Chindits in Burma produced mixed results with heavy losses of British manpower.69 The Chindits leader, Major General Orde Wingate, with his eccentric and unconventional behaviour that does not adhere to more common British Army officers traditions, may have further aggravated Slim’s perceptions on Special Operations.70 Slim added, ‘Private armies – and for that matter private air forces – are expensive, wasteful, and unnecessary.’71 However, he conceded that there is a form of Special Operations that may be worthwhile: There is, however, one kind of special unit which should be retained – that designed to be employed in small parties, usually behind the enemy, on tasks beyond the normal scope of warfare in the field. There will be an increasing need for highly qualified and individually trained men – and women – to sabotage vital installations, to spread rumours, to misdirect the enemy, to transmit intelligence, to kill or kidnap individuals, and to inspire resistance movements.72 Slim’s contradictory comments actually highlight the main issues on the utility of Special Operations during World War II, the use of larger commando formations as opposed to smaller units of men conducting limited acts of war such as ‘to kill or kidnap individuals’. This book aptly assesses Slim’s assertion on the utility of these special parties being used to hunt certain enemy individuals. Fourthly, the availability of primary resources, especially the recently declassified Special Operations Executive (SOE) files, would

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not limit the empirical depth of the research.73 Fifthly, concerning the methodological rationale behind selecting case studies from World War II, the analysis of case studies from a similar time-period and campaign allow a ‘controlled’ environment to be created in order to identify the key elements from each one unobstructed by elements of technology and temporally related experience. More importantly, each case study resides in a similar historical context. The operating principles, and intended strategic effects, however, are similar with the general nature of the phenomenon investigated.

The arguments thus far The literature on Special Operations and commandos is large. Generally, the literature can be categorised into three kinds of writings: memoirs and biographies of ex-serving members of the Special Operations community; historical narratives; and strategic analyses. For the first category, there is a huge collection of memoirs written and published by a host of ex-Special Operators or presumed operatives describing their combat experience.74 These memoirs, while giving us open access to some of the more intimate Special Operations moments, have also given birth to numerous dubious and fake personal accounts.75 In the second category, historical narratives tend to focus on the history of various Special Operations units, daring commando raids and hostage rescue operations.76 Such focus is understandable as the common public readers are interested in reading about daring, and romantic commando raids. For the third category, work based on strategic analyses is limited. It is this kind of study that is most beneficial for understanding about the strategic effectiveness and the utility of Special Operations, ironically still lacking in substance. In line with the focus of this book, which is essentially a strategic analysis of selected case studies from World War II, this literature review focuses on the major works relevant to the case studies and then review the contemporary literature based on strategic analyses of Special Operations. The literature on British Special Operations (Special Forces, Commandos and SOE) in World War II are numerous but detailed analyses of Special Operations being used in decapitating enemy leadership lack empirical evidence and context.77 For example, the raid on General Erwin Rommel’s headquarters was mentioned in St George Saunders’s The Green Beret: The Story of the Commandos, 1940 –1945 but

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the account was devoid of any strategic analysis.78 Similarly, in James Ladd’s Commandos and Rangers of World War II, Julian Thompson’s War Behind Enemy Lines, and H.W. Wynter’s Special Forces in the Desert War, 1940–1943, accounts of the raid were presented but no assessment of the strategic value, or even deeper investigation on why the operation was conceived and failed, were offered.79 Michael Asher’s Get Rommel!, a more recent work on the attempt to kill or capture Rommel, was also presented in a similar tangent, albeit with a more detailed narrative of the operation was given benefitting from some newly declassified archival material.80 Asher, however, was more scathing in his final analysis, stating that this operation was conducted so that the two commanders of the operation, Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Keyes and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert E. Laycock, could gain personal glories.81 Such personal criticism was based purely on a series of misplaced conjectures. Asher would have gained more insight had he conducted more research on the whole contextual background of why the operation was conceived and the real reasons behind its failure. All of these writings mentioned that the intelligence was faulty and that this was the primary reason for the failure of the operation. The deeper reason on why the intelligence was faulty and what really went wrong was not further explored. More significantly, the impact of the failure of the operation was not assessed in its strategic historical context. The treatment of the other famous killing conducted by Special Operations, the killing of Reinhard Heydrich is similar. Although there are detailed accounts of his killing, these serve more as a biography of the life and death of Heydrich rather than examining the strategic consequence of his killing.82 The latest biography on Heydrich, written by Robert Gerwath, was compiled in a similar vein although this work has profited from recently available archival material. Gerwarth’s work managed to incorporate a more detailed study of Operation Anthropoid as compared to his peers due to the recent declassification of SOE files.83 Gerwarth, however, did not analyse the operation that killed Heydrich within its strategic and political purpose. Gerwarth, like his peers, also focused on the often-described tragic consequences of the brutal reprisals meted out against the innocent civilian population of Czechoslovakia.84 Even prominent works on the subject of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) by SOE historians Foot, William Mackenzie and Nigel West mentioned Heydrich’s operation in minor detail without much

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assessment of its consequent strategic and political effects.85 All of these commentators focused on the tragic human cost as a result of this operation without further assessing the deeper logic behind the killing of Heydrich.86 The one successful SOE operation in capturing an enemy senior staff officer, namely the German Major General Heinrich Kreipe, was treated as a ‘childish’ operation by a prominent SOE historian.87 The two British SOE officers who planned and conducted the operation had published their own accounts of the operation. These accounts provided excellent details on the operation but lacked any explanation of the strategic and political effects that resulted, both intended and unintended.88 This operation, although it appeared to be of little significance at first glance, had far more important ramifications than it were initially apparent. The US aerial Special Operation that successfully killed Admiral Yamamoto also has its fair share of books written about it. Again, all of these works have focused on the tactical and operational details of the operation and the debate about which pilot actually shot down Yamamoto’s plane.89 There is, however, a compilation of conference proceedings on the Yamamoto operation edited by Cargill Hall.90 This compilation of proceedings from a group of academic scholars discusses all aspects of the operation including its strategic effects. This book complements this rare piece of scholarship with the author’s own investigation on primary sources located in the US Air Force Historical Research Agency and offers an original interpretation of the strategic utility derived from this operation.91 The lack of empirical investigation and explanation of the more serious contextual strategic significance of these operations in World War II posed a serious intellectual deficit on the important and intrinsic lessons to be learnt. These glaring gaps in the current state of literature on World War II leadership decapitation operations conducted by Special Operations will be covered in this book. In terms of academic treatise on Special Operations and its relationship with strategy, there are three main academic researchers on the subject who have contributed written works namely Kiras, Finlan and Gray. In Kiras’s work, he concluded that Special Operations works best in conjunction with conventional forces in achieving a cumulative attrition effect of eroding the enemy’s key material and moral sources.92

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He found, however, that since ‘strategy has an immutable nature’, it is difficult to deduce a strategy or strategic theory for Special Operations; Special Operations is functional and tactical in nature, what is important is the use of Special Operations and its effect at the strategic level.93 Kiras’ work mapped the practice of Special Operations with the dual nature of strategy – strategic paralysis, and annihilation and attrition. Kiras posited that it was difficult to induce a theory for Special Operations as the functions and tasks of Special Operations are vast and enormous. For a theory to explain how Special Operations contribute to strategy it can only be studied within the context of specific conflicts.94 Kiras concluded in his thesis that, In the end, Special Operations, are only as effective as the strategy that guides them, one that is sufficiently flexible, adaptable and sound to achieve the goals of policy in the most judicious manner possible.95 The importance of building a theoretical foundation in understanding Special Operations has been similarly argued by Finlan; Consequently, a theoretical basis for Special Forces will provide foundations on which Corbett’s ‘normal’, or in modern parlance, norms for the utility of Special Forces can be constructed. Indeed, mapping Special Forces within the classical body of strategic literature offers an opportunity to apply the timeless principles of war to these high-tech warriors of the modern age. In this vein, it is important to contextualize them in the light of the most influential strategic voices of the past in order to gain an insight into the future utility.96 Finlan briefly touched on mapping the strategic canons with the practice of Special Operations.97 He did not, however, build further on his argument for building a coherent set of principles from these classical texts related to Special Operations. Finlan also offered his perspective on the utility of Special Operations in the Malayan Emergency, the Grenada operation, the First Gulf War, and more recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.98 He stressed that on many occasions, Special Operations had failed to produce admirable results. Examples of such operations

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used in his argument were Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Anaconda. He described that the lack of understanding on the abilities of strategic application of Special Operations had led to major failures most of the time.99 Finlan also commented on the cultural difference in operating procedures between the US and British Special Operations formations as well the cultural differences within their services.100 The cultural differences within a state’s military service and Special Forces had led inadvertently to widespread rivalry and suspicion between the conventional senior officers with their Special Operations peers resulting in ‘friction’ among the services that led to detrimental planning and execution of operations. Finlan also touched on the advent of new military technology and its influence on modern military operations but stressed the importance and the need for human intelligence on the ground – regardless of how advanced surveillance technology may have grown, it is always better to have boots on the ground.101 Again, the ultimate question posed in Finlan’s book was whether conventionally trained senior military leaders and their political masters would have the ingenuity or the strategic awareness to employ Special Operations properly in a modern war. Based on the various case studies Finlan discussed in his book, he suggested that the misuse and misunderstanding of Special Operations’ strategic role is still as prevalent today as it was during the last few decades. Gray, one of the earliest strategists to touch on the subject of Special Operations, also dedicated a short section on ‘Special Forces and Unconventional Minds’ in his book, Modern Strategy and three chapters on Special Operations in an earlier work, Explorations in Strategy. Gray described Special Forces as ‘regular troops in guerrilla uniforms’.102 He also lamented the lack of research on relevant special operations strategic theory and strategic history.103 Gray stressed the need for a strategic theory that would explain what a small band of special operations operatives may achieve.104 In Gray’s Explorations in Strategy, he proposed that Special Operations have strategic utility in two ‘master claims’, and seven other ‘claims’.105 The ‘master claims’ were ‘economy of force’ and ‘expansion of choice’.106 Gray’s other seven claims were ‘innovation, morale, showcasing of competence, reassurance, humiliation of the enemy, control of escalation, and shaping of the future’.107 The familiar ‘economy of force’ epitomised what Special Operations were about – a small unit of selected men used to conduct an operation targeted to

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produce profound effects. Special Operations units highly trained in covert operations and capable of successful conduct of missions, were also suitable for a government to advance foreign policies that may require a covert military option apart from normal diplomatic channels. Such options had been used successfully by the British government in assisting ‘friendly’ governments in defending their states, for example the clandestine British assistance given to the Yemen and Oman governments in the 1950s and 1960s.108 In terms of theoretical conceptualisation, there are also two theories of Special Operations posited by McRaven and Spulak. McRaven’s theory focused on the tactical aspects of Special Operations.109 His theory explains how to conduct successful Direct Action (DA) Special Operations with his six principles of success, namely simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.110 McRaven’s deduced principles, however, are similar to Luttwak, Thomas, and Canby’s derived principles of planning for Special Operations (in parentheses) which they had posited: In SOs only the simplest succeeds [simplicity]. . .very specific definition of the objective [purpose and objective]. . .minimum force and maximal force [massing own strength and hitting at enemy’s weak points]. . .surprise as an absolute precondition [surprise]. . .security: negative and positive [security]. . .microplanning and flexibility [flexibility].111 McRaven’s theory resembles a body of principles of successful tactical variables to conduct successful assault commando missions. His theory does not address Special Operations per se, rather on DA or assault commando tactics. His theory posits itself as a theory of how DA types of Special Operations Forces succeed, influence and adhere to the basic principles of war. McRaven used eight case studies to test his theory. These case studies included the rescue of Mussolini, the rescue of Allied prisoners of war (POW) at a Japanese prison camp (Cabanatuan), the attempted rescue of US POWs at Son Tay during the Vietnam War in 1970, and the daring Israeli rescue operation at Entebbe airport in 1977. From these case studies, he inferred his theory based on his assumption of minimising Clausewitzian ‘friction’ and suspending the enemy’s relative superiority by Special Operations. McRaven, however, missed

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his point on Clausewitz’s discussion of ‘friction’. When Clausewitz discussed friction, he meant it as a factor that affects both sides of a conflict, not as a factor that can be simply erased: Clausewitz placed emphasis on the willpower of the commander as a crucial element in the inevitable presence of friction – not in creating or suspending its effects.112 This misuse of Clausewitz’s famous dictum is apparent and may be dangerous for scholarly studies. Clausewitz’s work must be read and understood within its context and not as a ‘dictionary’ to pick up suitable quotes to support one’s interpretation. Much of such misuse of Clausewitzian paradigms is also present in the following theorist’s work on Special Operations. Spulak, an analyst working in the RAND Corporation, claimed to have synthesised a theory of Special Operations that was posited as the following: Special operations are missions to accomplish strategic objectives where the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable risks due to Clausewitzian friction. Overcoming these risks requires special operations forces that directly address the ultimate sources of friction through qualities that are the result of the distribution of the attributes of SOF [Special Operations Forces] personnel.113 Spulak’s hypothesis of overcoming Clausewitzian friction overlooked an important part of Clausewitz’s dictum. When Clausewitz mentioned friction he implied that the enemy is also a source of friction. Unless an enemy is a willing partner in your enterprise, how does one ensure that Special Operations can overcome friction? Spulak also failed to explain the level to which unacceptable risk can be taken by Special Operations Forces. His theory appears to posit to the commander or policy maker that Special Operations is a panacea for high risk operations, able to overcome Clausewitzian friction. The history of various follies in misusing Special Operations Forces due to similar misunderstanding and over-optimistic expectations of Special Operations, paints a different picture. Spulak’s proposition is dangerous lest policy makers consider Special Operations units able to undertake extremely high-risk operations that may be, in reality, impossible tasks inevitably resulting

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in failure or in high casualty rates. Strategic history abounds with such fallacies, of the misuse of Special Operations Forces in high-risk operations with no understanding of the limits of their functionalities. Operation Mikado, conceived during the Falklands War (1982), serves as an excellent example of such misguided use of Special Operations. In Operation Mikado, the British military and policy makers had planned a daring Special Operation to land an entire Special Air Service (SAS) squadron on Argentinean soil and destroy an airfield being used by the Argentinean air forces to conduct anti-ship operations against the British fleet off the Falkland Islands.114 The SAS would then, upon successful completion of their mission, evade capture and escape on foot into a friendly neighbouring country, Chile.115 When told of the operation the SAS men, threatened to resign en-masse to avoid the inevitable slaughter of the SAS squadron.116 How does Spulak’s theory explain and verify this phenomenon?117 The other seminal scholarly work on Special Operations, though in a different context, is Eliot Cohen’s study on commandos and their civil – military relations. His work detailed the history of elite formations and their nexus with their civilian political masters. Cohen specifically studied the formation and the operations of elite military units of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Israel. Cohen stated that these elite military units tended to use up sizeable funds to sustain their training, their heavy use of equipment, and the higher allowance paid to their troops who were frequently appropriated from the cream of other army units into these elite formations.118 Cohen argued that the independent nature of these units had influenced these elite units sometimes to conduct operations without higher authority approval and posed a political risk to their states, for example in France.119 Cohen’s study was relevant during that period, as France had just experienced an attempted coup d’etat by French elite paratroops in 1961. He argued that the prevalent distrust of these elite units by conventional military leaders were well founded, and cautioned on the proper use of these units in military operations that must yield objective results.120 Cohen’s study was skewed towards a study of policy issues in the establishment of elite forces and the possible threat posed to civilian governments, rather than on the strategic performance of such forces. The failure of some famous US Special Operations in the 1980s also resulted in the mushrooming of a host of studies on policy and

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doctrinal issues related to US Special Operations.121 These failures include the rescue of United States embassy hostages in Teheran in 1980 (Operation Eagle Claw) and the Grenada invasion (Operation Urgent Fury) in 1983.122 These setbacks resulted in an increase in academic interest on how to improve the performance of US Special Operations.123 One of the major findings from these studies was that due to the existence of a large number of Special Operations units deployed by the US military, the uncoordinated nature of the various services’ Special Operations units had caused rivalries to emerge between them and resulted in problems using these units in any joint operation. This was especially evident in the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the doomed mission to rescue US hostages taken from the US embassy in Teheran, Iran. In order to improve coordination between the different Special Operations units, a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was established in 1980.124 JSOC paved the way for the further consolidation of US Special Operations Forces under one efficient command. The Department of Defence Reorganization Act of 1986, popularly known as the Goldwater – Nichols legislation, paved the way to the setting up of the US Special Operations Command (US SOCOM) in 1987.125 Similarly, in more contemporary times there has been a resurgence of literature on Special Operations being used in Unconventional Warfare in the face of two stubborn insurgencies being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq,126 and the elusive search for a solution, whereby Special Operations Forces are being used at the forefront of the fight against the insurgents in both of these countries.127 There is even one author who proposed a ‘tribal’ approach to be used by US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the various factions in that troubled state.128 The ‘tribal’ approach has similarities with the ‘hearts and minds’ approach successfully implemented by the likes of British Special Air Service (SAS) in the Malayan Emergency (1952– 8),129 and during the Malaysian – Indonesian Confrontation (1962 – 6).130 The US Army Special Forces also ran a similar programme known as the Civilian Irregular Defence Groups (CIDG), training mostly Montagnard tribesmen to fight against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War.131 Although the majority of studies on Special Operations tend to be skewed towards the experience of the US and British Special Operations,

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there are also numerous studies on other states’ operational practise of Special Operations. There is an increasingly significant contribution from a small group of Canadian scholars to the study of the effectiveness of Special Operations.132 This interest in Canada was spurred by the recent Canadian contribution of troops including its Special Operations units such as the Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) in Afghanistan under the mandate of the International Security Force – Afghanistan (ISAF).133 These Canadian studies have provided additional critical analysis of the effectiveness of Canadian Special Operations and the importance of having a coherent doctrine to use Special Operations. The Canadian perspectives are more rooted in explaining and proposing how Special Operations could be used optimally rather than providing analyses based on strategy and its performance in relation to that. There are also studies pertaining to different styles or nationalities of Special Operations namely on the utility of Special Forces from Israel,134 Rhodesia,135 Australia,136 and New Zealand.137 The skew towards these states’ Special Forces is understandable as these units have been used in a multitude of combat roles since their formation (in the case of Rhodesia, until its disbandment); all these studies argue that these Special Forces units were effective and had contributed to ‘strategic’ success. All the academic studies of Special Operations reviewed here have suggested that while Special Operations continues to be studied increasingly in some detail, the analysis of the effectiveness of Special Operations in relation to strategy still lacks in quantity. The large volume of material based on personal memoirs and encyclopaedic-like books on Special Operations, however, provide a strong beneficial foundation to understand the once-perceived secret world of Special Operations. The major gap in the literature review thus far revealed that there is no in-depth academic research study on the military and strategic effectiveness of Special Operations-run leadership decapitation operations, especially in the World War II period. Although there are some books written on the operations to attempt to kill Erwin Rommel, the killings of Reinhard Heydrich and Isoroku Yamamoto, and the capture of Major General Kreipe, these works are historical accounts of what happened and provide little, if any, analysis based on the framework of such operations as Special Operations. Analyses of these operations and their respective results in relation to the overall strategy and historical context of each

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respective theatre of operations are also weak. The main thrust of this academic research is to cover these gaps.

Research methodology, questions and hypotheses, and sources This is a ‘historical explanatory’ book. According to Stephen Van Evera, a political science professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a ‘. . . historical explanatory dissertation uses theory to explain causes, pattern, or consequences of historical cases’.138 Harold Winton, a Professor of Military and Strategic Studies, who had also served two combat tours in the Vietnam War as a Green Beret, provides a concise explanation of what theory, related to military and strategy, should be able to perform which are, ‘defines, categorizes, explains, connects, and anticipates’.139 This book, guided by strategic theory and logic, explains empirically and analytically the effectiveness of Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations in World War II. Research questions and hypotheses The two core research questions, as mentioned earlier are further explained below. Each research question also has its plausible hypothesis that this book aims to test and verify: 1. How strategically effective were leadership decapitation operations in World War II? The conduct of leadership decapitation attacks against enemy leaders is conceived with strategic utility; a tactical action with direct interaction at the strategic level. It is intended that the killing or capture of the enemy leader will yield significant results due to the spectacular fashion in which the enemy leader is killed and the audacity of killing the enemy target. The evidence examined in the case studies will determine the strategic effects of leadership decapitation operations. The definition of strategic effects and the problem of measuring strategic effects has been discussed in the subsection on ‘Strategic Effects’ earlier in this chapter. Hypothesis The preliminary literature review on the case studies selected and on the overall performance of Special Operations in World War II has shown that operations targeting enemy leadership have yielded important

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results in serving as a blow to the morale of the enemy and as a morale enhancer to the friendly forces. Although strategies of decapitation have the main objective of singularly destroying or disrupting the leadership capacity of the enemy with the hope that the enemy’s cohesive military action will be disabled or disrupted, and could be easily overwhelmed, this author hypothesises that these operations will not generate such optimistic effects but rather as a morale blow to the enemy and a morale enhancer for friendly forces (see Chapter 2 of this book for more discussion on morale). This morale effect, however, cannot be measured but can be observed in subsequent actions and reactions by both sides. This effect on morale, albeit intangible, has its own intrinsic strategic utility, especially if it is correctly used as an intended tool. The intangible morale effect has important implications for the context of each respective operation’s political strategy. This argument develops the first hypothesis pursued by this book: Although the overall performance of Special Operations in World War II did not have any decisive impact, Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations, however, yielded valuable intangible strategic effects that had immense utility in raising morale in desperate situations and as a strong demonstration of the political will to fight in a small economical manner.140 2. How tactically effective were the Special Operations units used in such operations? The main criteria for the intended outcome can be answered by the quintessential question – ‘Can it be done?’ Special Operations units were used in decapitation operations, as they are tactically suitable, highly trained and effective in conducting such high risk and secretive operations.141 Special Operations are also used in leadership decapitation operations, as they are deniable operations. Special Forces operating in small numbers of personnel, highly trained to operate behind enemy lines, will most easily slip in and slip out stealthily after the operation. If caught, their government can disassociate itself from them, and deny any knowledge of the operation. The human element in confirming the kill is important, and will limit collateral damage of lesser precise surgical strikes. Special Operations attempting to kill or capture an enemy leader, however, depends on reliable intelligence to succeed. The answer to this research question will highlight if Special Operations are successful in

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conducting leadership decapitation operations and the important factors that influence its success. It will also acknowledge that, ‘strategy is done by tactics’. In order to determine if a strategy may work, an excellent understanding of the limitations and capabilities of the tactics that implement the strategy is also important.142 Hypothesis Early indications are that the key to successful Special Operations were a good understanding by the commanders of how to employ Special Operations in support of the overall war strategy along with excellent support from intelligence. Targeting individuals to be killed or captured needed precise intelligence on the target’s movements and whereabouts as well as the most vulnerable time and place at which to conduct the operation. Without such detailed information, the operation would be akin to searching for a ‘needle in a haystack’. These two important variables in determining the success of a Special Operation raised the second hypothesis pursued in this book: Although Special Operations were tactically effective in conducting such operations, their success hinged on an understanding of how to employ Special Operations, and excellent support from intelligence and the timely dissemination of information. These two research questions will be addressed at the end of each individual case study chapter.143 Historical case studies are used to describe the individual background, the context, the conduct and the results of each operation.144 Each case study is discussed via its related historical context. Only by learning the context of each operation, could we better understand the reasons and the results, both tangible and nontangible, of each Special Operation. Rather than attempting to derive lessons from a general analysis across the board, this academic research looks deep within each case study to draw a more balanced and reflective account. The historical context, political background, strategic, tactical and morale issues of each individual case study is discussed in a plausible manner via historical explanatory and evaluative methods to provide a balanced assessment of each case study.

Sources Primary sources are derived from mainly archival documents, memoirs and official biographies. These case studies were selected due to the

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richness of supporting evidence available; a key aspect for conducting case study research. This book has benefited from the rich sources of information on World War II and primary information related to each study, which are readily available and therefore have not limited the detailed examination of the operations. Most of the War Office files and Special Operations Executive (SOE) files archived in the British National Archives in Kew Gardens related to the case studies have been declassified. Additionally, records of the related British commando and SOE operations located at the Imperial War Museum and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London were used as primary sources. Similarly, all the key primary records on the killing of Admiral Yamamato have been declassified, archived and are available for public viewing at the US Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Interviews were also conducted with contemporary experts in Special Operations to gain a general understanding of the nature of Special Operations.

Conclusion The following chapters in this book deal with the following matters. Chapter 2 assesses the theories of strategic decapitation and its nexus with leadership decapitation propounded by Sun Tzu, J.F.C. Fuller, and John Warden. Similar theoretical belief propounded by Thomas More is explored as well as the historical description of the practice of assassinations by the Nizaris sect. Robert Pape’s critical thesis on strategic decapitation is also examined together with the Soviet’s practice of leadership decapitation operations during the Cold War. The nexus between leadership decapitation operations, Special Operations, and its effects on morale is built upon and the importance of morale is discussed. The case studies examined in this book are not presented in a chronological order. Successful Special Operations conducted by the British and the United States are presented first followed by a failed operation conducted by the British. This order of presentation is used to build on the evidence of successful operations first and how these evidences were influential in a failed operation. Chapter 3 examines the case study of the successful use of Special Operations in the killing of Reinhard Heydrich in Czechoslovakia (Operation Anthropoid), and its consequences, notably the high

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civilian losses as a result of the operation and its moral implications, and how the strategic effects led to profitable political effects for the Czech government-in-exile. Chapter 4 assesses the successful SOE operation in capturing Major General Kreipe on the island of Crete, at the end of 1944. This often-overlooked operation was viewed as having little strategic effect, but the empirical evidence shows a different conclusion. The use of Special Operations to conduct leadership decapitation operations is not isolated to British Special Operations. In Chapter 5, the United States aerial Special Operation that successfully shot down Admiral Yamamoto’s plane, killing him, is examined. The case study in Chapter 6 traces the planning, the execution and the consequences of an unsuccessful Special Operation (Operation Flipper) which attempted to kill or capture the legendary enemy military commander, Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel, ‘the Desert Fox’, in Libya in 1941. The reason for the failure of this operation is also investigated. Chapter 7 concludes the book with a summary of the discussions, which answers the research questions and hypotheses.

CHAPTER 2 STRATEGIES OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION, STRATEGIC LOGIC, AND NEXUS WITH MORALE

Introduction On 11 September 2001, the United States suffered a shocking and devastating terrorist attack in which three hijacked civilian aircraft were used as flying bombs and hit two of the US’s main symbols of might. In the space of two hours, the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York were struck one after another by the hijacked aircraft. The towers, reeling from the shock of the impact and the subsequent fire, collapsed and killed nearly 3,000 innocent people and rescue personnel. The third hijacked airliner hit the Pentagon and a fourth hijacked plane, believed to be on its way to hit the Capitol or the White House, crashed near Pittsburgh. The passengers on this fourth plane learned what had happened to the three other planes via mobile phone communication and fought with the hijackers, which resulted in the crashing of the plane with the killing of everyone onboard. The attack was a well-planned terror operation conducted by a group of terrorists identified by investigators as Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is a shadowy terrorist group and has an extensive network around the world. It was made up of veterans of the Soviet–Afghan war and led by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national. Almost ten years later, bin Laden, now hiding in an uninviting bungalow in Abbottabad, Pakistan from the relentless hunt for him by

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the US military and intelligence community since the 9/11 attacks, was turning in for the night as on any other night in which he had comfortably slept in his chosen ‘spartan’ dwellings.1 In the early morning of 2 May 2011, he was jolted awake by the muted sound of a helicopter hovering above his bungalow. Moments later, shots were fired, and his bedroom door was kicked open. bin Laden knew the end was near when facing him were masked and heavily armed men armed with M4 carbines. bin Laden was cut down by two bullets, one hitting him at the chest and the other just above his left eye.2 bin Laden was killed instantly – ending his reign of terror. The Special Operation that killed him was over in just 40 minutes and had killed another four people who were all related to bin Laden. As an additional bonus, a treasure trove of intelligence was also collected from bin Laden’s home.3 What bin Laden did not know was that the operation that finally killed him was conducted by US Navy SEALs, a US Special Operations unit and the operation’s success was the result of years of painstaking but diligent intelligence gathering that finally zeroed on his position.4 While the success of the killing of bin Laden had been hailed as a major decisive point in the US’s global war against Al-Qaeda, the longer strategic benefit from this operation is still unknown at this stage.5 Most arguments on the effectiveness of contemporary targeted killings of enemy leaders have foregone an important contextual theoretical foundation that is more important in understanding how killing off enemy leaders would work – strategies of decapitation. James Kiras, in his landmark study on Special Operations and its nexus with strategy, has done an excellent and detailed analysis of strategies of paralysis, especially in the practice by air power.6 It is not the intention of this chapter to mimic Kiras’s work but to complement his analysis by focusing on the specific points of these theories related to leadership decapitation, which the following section elucidates. Although there are no strategic theories focusing solely on leadership decapitation there are some links between strategic paralysis theories with leadership decapitation, which the following section discusses.

Strategies of decapitation and leader decapitation A selection of strategic theories and practice related to leadership decapitation are analysed in this section to distil the essence of the

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strategic logic behind leadership decapitation. This is not a complete historiography of leadership decapitation theories and practice but an illustrative analysis of the strategic logic behind decapitating enemy leadership. The theories and practices discussed here are reviewed in chronological order and are chosen on the basis of relevance to the matter in hand and their value as a heuristic in explaining how leadership decapitation contributes to warfare. The concept of decapitating enemy leadership may appear to be a logical solution in modern warfare. Historically the killing or capturing of enemy leaders were intended to erode the effective command and control of the enemy forces causing the collapse of coherent military response and confusion, rendering the enemy forces to be easily defeated, and as a psychological tool to instil terror and lower the enemy’s morale. Such concepts have been prescribed since ancient warfare and the continuance of such ideas and practice in more recent times highlights the need to understand the logic of decapitating enemy leadership.

Sun Tzu: Attacking the enemy’s ‘strategy’ Sun Tzu’s Art of War has existed for almost 2,500 years and has been widely used and quoted in modern studies of strategy, both military and business. The origins, and even the actual writer, of this work are still much debated.7 Sun Tzu’s Art of War has 13 chapters and much of the writing is fairly straightforward. His work was purportedly influenced by the Taoist nature of Chinese philosophy prevalent during his time, where man and nature coexist in harmony. It is the search for such harmony that is paramount to success in the world, be it in life in general or in war. The first introduction of Sun Tzu’s Art of War into the Western world was a French translation by a French Jesuit missionary returning from China, Father J.J.M. Amiot in 1772.8 There are a few excellent English translations of Sun Tzu’s Art of War on the market today that supersede the original and widely available version translated in 1910 by Lionel Giles.9 The latest notable versions are by Samuel B. Griffith, Roger T. Ames, Ralph D. Sawyer, John Minford, Yuan Shibing, R.L. Wing, J.H. Huang, Victor S. Mair, Thomas Cleary, and Gary Gagliardi.10 The most often used translated version of Sun Tzu’s

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classical text, however, is still Samuel B. Griffith’s version published in 1971. In a conference on ‘Sun Zi’s Art of War and U.S. Joint Professional Military Education’, organised by the US Institute for National Strategic Studies and National War College, it was concluded, ‘that the widely used Samuel Griffith translation offers a number of advantages for teaching purposes’.11 In an interview with a Chinese scholar on Chinese military affairs and strategy, Dr Bi Jianxiang, Samuel Griffith’s version was also suggested by Jianxiang as the text to be used.12 Prominent Sinologist and Chinese strategic culture expert, Alastair Iain Johnston, despite his ability to read and translate ancient Chinese texts, also used Samuel Griffith’s translation for his landmark work, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History.13 Sun Tzu has often been credited with proposing a method of warfare that uses the most cost-effective means to reach its aims and logically assassination of enemy leaders would rank as one of the main ways of achieving that.14 A close scrutiny of his 13 chapters in his Art of War reveals no such explicit mention. Sun Tzu, however, stated that the best way to win a war is to attack the enemy’s strategies. 15 What constitutes the enemy’s strategies is not explained further in his text. It can be safely inferred that attacking the enemy’s strategy would also involve the killing or capturing of the main military commanders or advisors. Some later Chinese texts on warfare citing Sun Tzu reveal further evidence and a clearer picture of this. For example, later research on the Chi’ng Dynasty era texts on military methods reveal some citations and references to Sun Tzu’s Art of War. One notable reference from Sun Tzu: A Discussion of the Art of Warfare, recorded; The expert in using the military has three basic strategies that he applies: ‘The best strategy is to attack the enemy at the level of wisdom and experience . . .’16 This quotation suggests that Sun Tzu advised that the best strategy in war is to attack the enemy’s leaders or military planners. Although Sun Tzu had not overtly mentioned assassination as a way of warfare, he had provided a hint that it was practised during his writing of the text. The following passage from his chapter on intelligence in his Art of War provides a clue:

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Generally in the case of armies you wish to strike, cities you wish to attack, and the people you wish to assassinate, you must know the names of the garrison commander, the staff officers, the ushers, gate keepers, and the bodyguards.17 (emphasis added) It does appear that although Sun Tzu did not mention assassinating enemy leaders as a way of warfare, it was most plausibly a common practice at his time of writing. During Sun Tzu’s era in the Warring States period, the Chinese Kings had military advisors giving advice on military affairs to his generals. Killing these military strategists and generals would literally decapitate the enemy’s ‘brains’, and would have facilitated a faster and easier victory. Killing these military advisors and generals, if not the King himself, would also generate a psychological fear among the King and his court officials and this may lead to a downgrading of morale among the leadership of the enemy state. This point of inciting fear demonstrates a parallel with the practice of killing important officials and political leaders, not so much to disrupt military activities but to blackmail these officials or leaders for political concessions and power, as the next sub-section explains.

The assassins The Persian sect of Islamic Shi’ite known as the Nizaris practised a form of tactics that involved killing off enemy leaders or prominent figureheads in order to generate intended strategic and political advantages in the 1100s.18 The victims were usually high-ranking politicians and military personnel. The Nizaris who used these form of killings were named ‘assassins’ as they were perceived, albeit wrongly, to be under the influence of hashish when conducting their missions.19 The term assassination was in fact attributed to the Arabic word ‘hashsash’ and ‘hashashashin’, literally translated as ‘those who smoke hashish’.20 The assassins usually killed their victims in broad daylight and deliberately in the presence of many people in order to highlight their daring terror attacks.21 The assassins themselves were prepared to die for their cause. This form of killing served as a way of warfare for the Nizaris. Instead of using large armies, a small number of assassins, and sometimes a lone assassin, were used to kill or strike fear into the hearts

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of potential victims. This was often enough to induce the payment of tribute or political concessions by their victims who were allowed to survive or the replacements of their killed victims. The Nizari Assassins were very effective and managed to obtain political concessions from a host of Middle East emperors and kingdoms for their sect.22 For example, it was reputed that even Saladin, the famous Islamic warrior, was fearful of the Nizari Assassins, even more so as there were two attempts to assassinate him between 1174 and 1176.23 Although the attempts failed, Saladin had to take extra security precautions to safeguard himself and even had to sleep in a wooden tower.24 Saladin was reputed to have come to some agreement with the Assassins: he left them alone in their territories and was never threatened again.25 Marco Polo, the famous traveller, also described his encounter with the Assassins when he visited Persia in 1273.26 Marco Polo mentioned that the Assassins had a mountain fortress in the valley of Alamut and that he had seen the beautiful heavenly garden that had been elaborately built by the head of the Assassins who was known as the Old Man. Marco Polo observed how young men were given drinks that have been laced with drugs and then, when intoxicated, were led into the garden of paradise with rivers of honey, milk and wine, and beautiful ladies, similar to how heaven had been described in the Quran.27 After being allowed to ‘taste’ paradise for a while, and when they woke up in the real world they were convinced that they had experienced ‘heaven’s paradise’ and when they died for the Old Man, they would be sent there.28 This tactic influenced the obedience and devoutness to duty of the Assassins to complete their mission and get themselves killed in the process, ironically not dissimilar to the obsession of contemporary suicide bombers for matrydom. The Nizaris had demonstrated that rather than engaging in all out war with their foes, they were able to gain valuable political concessions through this method of conducting covert killing operations against selected human targets – a cost-effective way of compelling both their enemies and allies to accede to the Nizaris’ demands. The killings, or the demonstration of a killing attempt, were often used as a psychological measure to strike fear and to demoralise the enemy into colluding with the Nizaris.29

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Hunting down the leaders30 Sir Thomas More, a Western writer on political philosophy, also posited an interesting proposition in his hypothetical perfect world. More was an English lawyer and statesman during the reign of King Henry VIII. His career included stints as a Member of Parliament, as a diplomat and as King Henry VIII’s personal secretary and advisor. Thomas More’s book Utopia was first published in 1516. Utopia was the name of an imaginary Greek island in which More presented his version of an ideal society based on social equality and, more importantly for this discussion, a form of warfare. Without encroaching too much on the vast details of Utopia’s social construct debate, More had suggested a Utopian style of warfare: When the battle is at its height a group of specially selected young men, who have sworn to stick together, try to knock out the enemy general. They keep hammering away at him by every possible method – frontal attacks, ambushes, long-range archery, hand-to-hand combat. They bear down on him in a long, unbroken wedge-formation, the point of which is constantly renewed as tired men are replaced by fresh ones. As a result the general is nearly always killed or taken prisoner – unless he saves his skin by running away.31 More had proposed a way of warfare similar to using Special Forces (a select group of highly trained soldiers) to hunt and decapitate the enemy leadership. From More’s passage above, it can be inferred that Utopian warfare focused on destroying the enemy’s commander in the battlefield. The objective being to apply pressure on the enemy’s commander resulting in either his capitulation or his escaping from the onslaught targeting him. Decapitating the enemy command either by killing or capturing their commander or by inducing extreme psychological terror on him resulting in him moving away from the battlefield, losing effective command and control of his armed forces would render the enemy easily defeated. The loss of the enemy commander in the field would also serve as a morale blow for the enemy forces precipitating the disintegration of cohesive combat effectiveness and willpower in the battlefield.

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Although More provided sound tactical advice on warfare he was himself decapitated by his master, King Henry VIII, in 1535. More was against King Henry VIII’s separation of the Catholic Church in the Church of England and was accused of treason when he refused to take an oath swearing his allegiance to the Act of Succession. More was tried, found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. His idea of hunting down the leader of the opposing enemy however, continued to influence military thinkers. More’s Utopian warfare had uncanny similarity to that proposed by a strategist who posited along similar lines 400 years later and which the following section discusses.

Strategic paralysis In designing a strategy to overcome the horrendous human losses in the trenches and killing fields of World War I, and amazed by the new technological wonder of the time, i.e. tanks, John Frederick Charles Fuller conceptualised a way to overcome the stalemate of trench warfare with his originally named ‘Strategical Paralysis as the Object of Decisive Attack’.32 Fuller was a British Army officer trained at Sandhurst and had experienced colonial ‘policing’ in India prior to World War I. Fuller, who saw combat in World War I and was appointed as chief of staff of the Royal Tank Corps in 1916, planned the tank attack at the Battle of Cambrai in 1917.33 After experiencing first hand tank warfare, Fuller was convinced that the future of land warfare resided in tanks. His early experience in Cambrai meant he knew that tanks could assist the infantry in crossing the murderous ‘no man’s land’ through fields of barbed wire and reach and destroy the enemy’s trenches. However, he also realised that, without pursuing deeper behind enemy lines and destroying the key command, control and communication centres, and the supplies, the enemy could recover from the initial shock and counter attack effectively in a coordinated fashion.34 The key to tank warfare, Fuller posited, was in penetrating deeper behind enemy lines at the onset of action and to focus on destroying the command, control, communications and supplies of the enemy that would precipitate the faster collapse of the frontline troops and pre-empt any effective counter attacks. Fuller designed his ‘Strategical Paralysis as the Object of Decisive Attack’ to argue his case of how to use tank warfare to overcome the

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trench warfare stalemate. Fuller’s plan was later changed to ‘Plan 1919’.35 ‘Plan 1919’, as the date suggest, was to be used in 1919 with the hope of achieving battlefield victories, but before the plan could be used practically, World War I ended in November 1918. In Fuller’s Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, while arguing for his ‘Plan 1919’, Fuller used an example similar to that which More had proposed: It was that whilst Alexander’s phalanx held the enemy’s battle body in a cinch, he and his Companion Cavalry struck at the enemy’s will, concentrated as it was in the person of Darius. Once this will was paralysed, the body became inarticulate.36 Fuller’s ‘Plan 1919’ posited the usage of mobile tanks to infiltrate behind enemy lines and strike at the enemy’s rear, at the heart of the enemy’s leadership and command centres, to destroy them before frontal attacks began.37 Fuller envisioned that the mechanisation of warfare would enable fast mobile deep penetration attacks against the enemy and make it feasible to deliver a fatal shot at the ‘enemy’s brain,’ followed by frontal attacks at the enemy’s body.38 Fuller proposed a concept known as ‘brain and body’ warfare. He posited: I saw the intimate connection between will and action, and that action without will loses all co-ordination: that without an active and directive brain, an army is reduced to a mob.39 Fuller known to have been self-taught in various intellectual interests, including the occult, had most likely used an analogy from biology to explain his idea.40 He used the human anatomy and its biological function to illustrate his case. He deemed the enemy combat organisation as a human body, in that if the brain or the head is decapitated (or a shot taken at the brain), the human body would cease to function and collapse dead. Fuller further explained on what he hoped to achieve with his theory: . . . our new theory be to destroy ‘command,’ not after the enemy’s personnel has been disorganised, but before it has been attacked, so that it may be found in a state of complete disorganisation when attacked.41

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Fuller’s ‘brain’ consisted of the enemy’s command nodes, ‘. . . StaffArmy, Corps and Divisional Headquarters’,42 and the ‘body’, the enemy’s troops.43 He hypothesised that once the enemy’s brain had been destroyed leaving them, without effective leadership and command, the enemy would falter in confusion and render them more easily defeated in the first few hours of an operation.44 Fuller’s theory was dubbed as the ‘. . . grandfather of twentieth century paralysis theory. . .’45 After World War I, Fuller continued to deliver lectures on his ‘strategic paralysis’ theory and, with the advancement of tank technology in the 1920s, Fuller’s theory turned into a theory of mechanised warfare, which influenced the development of the German armour doctrine in the 1930s.46 Fuller was reputed to have indirectly contributed to the practice of German blitzkrieg tactics and operations in the early part of World War II.47 Fuller however, at the end of World War II, contradicted himself when he wrote on the moral decline in his The Second World War, 1939– 45: A Strategical and Tactical History with reference to assassinations of enemy military command staff; Though the obliteration of cities by bombing was probably the most devastating blow ever struck at civilization, other happenings show even more clearly the moral decline which characterized the war. Millions were enslaved; millions were deported . . . Thousands were sterilized and tortured, and unknown numbers, like vermin, were gassed to death. Raiding parties attempted to assassinate opposing generals and their staffs, and revolt in the German occupied countries was sedulously fostered.48 Fuller’s assertion, and comparison of the moral decline of commando raids attempting to assassinate enemy military leaders with the deliberate bombing of civilians and the Holocaust, was alarming. His observation of the more massive destruction meted out in World War II (compared with the relative tameness of World War I) must have meant that he lost faith in his original ‘Plan 1919’, which was to cut down human losses by achieving a quicker tactical success on the battlefield – destroying key enemy command centres.49 Destroying these command centres would have involved the killing of enemy military general staff located at those centres. Fuller mentioned in his ‘Plan 1919’ that the

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enemy’s ‘brains’ would include the Staff of the enemy’s Army, Corps and Division levels of organisation. The justification for killing enemy military leaders in his ‘Plan 1919’ remarkably escaped Fuller’s moral compass then. Fuller also curiously commented in his Memoirs, published a few years before the outbreak of World War II, on the logic behind his ‘Plan 1919’ in this passage: It is no longer a question of: Had Napoleon possessed a section of machine guns at Waterloo, would he not have won that battle? But: Had he been able to kidnap or kill the Duke of Wellington and his Staff at 9 a.m. on June 18, 1815, would he not have done equally well without firing a shot? Would not the sudden loss of command in the British Army have reduced it to such a state of disorganisation that, when he did advance, he would have been able to walk through it?50 Fuller must have also observed that, although the Germans’ Panzer divisions did have some stunning successes in Europe and North Africa, the overall conduct of mechanised warfare in World War II produced results that were different from what he had proposed in ‘Plan 1919’. Even with the support of air power and more technologically advanced tanks and mechanised support vehicles, the belligerent armies still had to fight battles of attrition and resort to destroying civilian centres, in order to win. The most fatal flaw of Fuller’s ‘Plan 1919’ was the constructed image of the enemy military forces as a human body. Although a human body could not function without a head, an enemy military organisation is much more complex. There are ‘brains’ in every part of the enemy ‘body’ and not just at the head. The enemy military could still function even though the command, control and communication nodes had been destroyed as the unit commanders still could lead the men effectively. This was largely due to the distribution of command and decision making responsibilities to tactical commanders in the field to counter the eventualities of communication with the main headquarters breaking down. For example, during the Battle of Arnhem in 1944, even though the British paratroops did not have any communication with the main British forces (their radio sets did not function), the

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British paratroops still understood their operation and continued to fight on until, almost out of ammunition and with casualties mounting, they finally decided to surrender to the German forces.51 Plausibly, Fuller could have been shocked by the scale of total war that humans could manifest during World War II, which included the frequent destruction of cities and the killing of civilians without restraint. Fuller had proposed a humane way of fighting wars in his book The Reformation of War in which he stated: Why kill, why destroy? War is but a means to an end, the end is a more prosperous peace, and prosperity demands international co-operation, possibly the serfdom of one nation to another, but it cannot mean international destruction, for this is to turn prosperity upside-down.52 Fuller’s justification for his ‘brains and body’ warfare became apparent in that he believed and hoped that his proposed way of fighting could minimise human suffering and destruction, and lead to faster decisive victory by striking at the enemy’s leadership.53 The moral blow that Fuller must have suffered from observing the mass destruction of civilians and properties in World War II resulted in him avoiding writing and theorising about strategy after World War II and instead he wrote purely on military history.54 The proposition and hypothesis of strategic decapitation is also closely related to air power theorists who proposed the use of air power to destroy main enemy centres of military command and leadership, as well as civilian infrastructure and political leadership, which would ‘paralyse’ the enemy giving credence to theories of ‘strategic paralysis’. Italian General Giulio Douhet, the father of all air power theorists, proposed the use of bombing to destroy designated targets such as industrial plants, logistics hubs and links, and ‘certain designated areas of civilian population . . .’ in one bombing raid with the objective of breaking the morale of the enemy nation.55 Douhet, however, did not specify the deliberate targeting of enemy leaders in his proposed idea to bomb the enemy into submission. A recent theory of strategic paralysis that included targeting enemy leaders specifically as the core of a bombing campaign to subdue the enemy was propounded by Colonel John Warden III in his book The Air

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Campaign.56 Warden was a US Air Force officer assigned to study the deployment of air power in the Middle East and was head of Project Checkmate in the Pentagon. Project Checkmate later metamorphosed into Warden’s plans for the US air campaign during the First Gulf War (1990– 1).57 In his plan to engage Iraqi targets, Warden was famous for his assertion that air power could win the First Gulf War in six days. He was alleged to have proposed to General Schwarzkopf to bypass attacking the Iraqi ground forces and to focus on infrastructure and leadership targets, and that air power would win the war.58 In General Schwarzkopf’s memoir It doesn’t take a hero, Schwarzkopf vividly described the presentation by Warden and his plan – ‘Instant Thunder’.59 What Warden actually proposed was to strike not just at infrastructure and enemy targets, but to suppress and annihilate the Iraqi air defences.60 The attack of Iraqi ground forces was not included at the first stage due to the threat of mobile Iraqi anti-aircraft (AA) systems which were located in Kuwait, and much harder to locate than fixed AA sites in Iraq. Warden proposed that after the suppression of these AA sites, attacks on Iraqi ground troops located in Kuwait and Southern Iraqi borders with Kuwait, could start in earnest. General Schwarzkopf, however, wanted to hit at the Iraqi Republican Guard units on the first day of the air campaign.61 Both men agreed to use B-52s to bomb Iraqi ground formations on the first day of the air campaign as the B-52s can both fly and bomb at altitudes of 30,000 feet, thereby being almost immune to ground AA fire. Additionally, the B-52s have extensive AA countermeasure systems on board.62 The air campaign also included a series of strikes to ‘decapitate’ the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and his deputies from effectively directing the war by constantly destroying his command and control facilities, and his communication systems; it was intended to paralyse the effective functioning of the Iraqi military forces and their strategy by shutting off the ‘brains and nerves’ of the Iraqi state leadership from the military forces in the field, by blocking the communications of orders and instructions, and forcing the Iraqi leadership to be constantly on the run.63 Warden proposed the use of air power as a means of striking at selected targets, which he termed ‘centres of gravity’ that will yield profound strategic effects.64 Warden’s ‘five-ring model’ consisted of a concentric ring of five levels of targeting for effects. Residing at the

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centre of the ring is the enemy’s leadership. Moving out, the other four concentric rings are organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded forces.65 Warden’s theory is close to the proposed concept of leadership decapitation; the killing or capture of the enemy leadership, which resided at the core of Warden’s concentric ring. Warden conceded that air power must be used in harmony with other forces to derive the outcome required.66 He never posited that air power alone could deliver the victory desired. What Warden proposed is that air power can strike at the nodes of the enemy, thus weakening the enemy key ‘centres of gravity’ and enabling other forces to win rapidly. Warden’s concept was the striking at the outer rings of his ‘five-ring model’ towards the centre ring, which is the leadership. He posited that the centre ring could be forced to accept alternative decisions such as ending the war, and accept defeat, once all the concentric rings surrounding it were destroyed.67 Robert A. Pape’s book, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, tested the use of air power for decapitation strikes in the vein of Warden’s air power theory.68 Pape described decapitation as having three forms, leadership decapitation, political decapitation and military decapitation.69 Leadership decapitation entailed the killing of selected leaders of the enemy regime in the hope that the successors would sue for peace. Political decapitation involved the use of air power to create the necessary favourable conditions for a revolt or uprising against the enemy regime. Military decapitation utilised air power to destroy the communications and control infrastructure of the enemy in order to disrupt the command and control of its field forces. Pape however, refuted the effectiveness of air power in conducting decapitation operations. He argued that it is almost impossible to locate leaders and destroy them from the air.70 Leadership killing also did not always result in regime collapse. Political decapitation is also difficult to conduct and ensure the right conditions on the ground would occur for a positive revolt by the internal local opposition to the enemy’s regime.71 Pape’s argument did not take into account the capability of modern unmanned aviation technology that is now able to loiter in air space for 50 hours and strike with precise accuracy.72 Pape also looked strictly at air power as the means to deliver the decapitating blow without looking into the possibilities of Special Operations units running such operations; ‘boots’ were still needed on the ground to gather the intelligence necessary and work with local

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allies, and ultimately carry out the operation.73 A brief look into two Soviet cases of strategic decapitation (political leadership decapitation) in practice may shed some light on its use, and serve to disprove Pape’s allegations that decapitating leadership and ensuring regime change is almost impossible. Although it is not the focus of this book to study political leadership decapitation operations, it is interesting to examine and learn important strategic lessons from the Soviets’ practice of such operations during the Cold War, as the following section reviews.

Soviet Spestnaz doctrine During the Cold War the Soviets planned a series of strategic decapitation operations intended to kill NATO political and military leaders. These operations were endorsed and served as part of the doctrine of Soviet Spestnaz (Spetsalnaya Naznacheniya or Special Purpose Forces). During the Cold War, it was widely known that in the event of a ‘hot’ war, Soviet Spetsnaz would be the first to be sent in behind NATO lines to kill off as many targeted NATO military leaders, and political leaders, as possible.74 Assassination ranked as one of the main tasks of Spetsnaz ‘strategic missions’. The purpose of which was to destabilise the enemy’s political-military cohesiveness and spread national panic.75 Other Spetsnaz tasks included reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, commando raids and other special operations. Soviet doctrine for Spetsnaz always held that the killing of political leaders and the capturing of key political ‘centres’ was a major aim of any offensive action. This doctrine originated from the early formation of parachute detachments in 1929 and continued to develop in strength into the early 1930s. It was intended that these parachute units would drop deep behind enemy lines and eliminate key enemy points. They were also expected to build up a supportive local partisan base (Communist sympathisers) so that the advancing main army formations could link up with a welcoming supportive local population (proletariat).76 Some of these early parachute units were used during the Soviets’ involvement in the Spanish Civil War (1936– 9); Stalin had sent Jan Breznin to Spain to set up a select group of Soviet troops to seize control of Madrid as a ‘key point’ should the Republicans win the civil war.77 In the Spanish Civil War, the Soviets learnt important

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lessons in conducting Special Operations especially in guerrilla warfare and working with local partisans.78 These lessons were put to good use when the Soviet Union was invaded by Nazi Germany in 1941. During the first phases of the German invasion, large swathes of land in the west of the Soviet Union were swiftly overrun, and the Soviets had to rely on units of Spetsnaz who had stayed behind or were parachuted in and work with the local population to build a solid network of resistance organisations, which created havoc and led to the mass destruction of German lines of supplies and communications. For example, in an operation known as the ‘War of the Rails’, which was conducted by Spetsnaz with local partisans in German-occupied parts of Soviet Union from August to September 1943, a total of 215,000 rails, 836 complete trains, 184 rail bridges, and 556 road bridges were destroyed.79 In order to succeed in assassination operations, Spetsnaz would fully utilise the element of surprise and strike at enemy leaders before war was even declared. Spetsnaz were practical in their execution of their assassination operations; it would be difficult to kill enemy leaders in war due to heightened security but would be much easier to kill in peaceful times.80 Spetsnaz operatives could be more easily infiltrated into NATO states during peace time and would be activated just before a war was declared, striking at selected targets, including NATO’s political and military leaders. The ensuing chaos and incoherent command and control would give the Soviets crucial time to launch first strikes and invade Western Europe before the NATO states could regain their composure and render effective command of NATO armed forces. The deliberate targeting of NATO political leaders (presidents and prime ministers) would also render NATO nuclear weapons-armed states unable to retaliate immediately with any nuclear strikes due to the losses of key decision makers and authorisers of nuclear strikes. The Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979) serve as excellent examples of Soviet Spetsnaz practice of targeting political leaders and the strategic utility of such operations.81 In 1968 Czechoslovakia had a new liberal government under Alexander Dubcek who were attempting to conduct some liberal reforms. These reforms were politically and ideologically dangerous to the central communist control in Moscow. The Soviet Union was worried that if such moderate reforms were allowed to be carried out, a

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ripple effect may be created throughout other satellite states, especially those in the Ukraine. The reforms in Prague were subsequently labelled as the ‘Prague Spring’. The spring, however, was not allowed to uncoil itself when Moscow correctly identified that the decapitation of the Czech leadership was crucial in maintaining the previous status quo of Czech politics. After negotiations failed, Soviet Special Operations units, Spetsnaz, spearheaded an invasion on 20 August 1968. Spetsnaz’s main purpose, apart from taking control of Prague airport and radio and television stations, was the capture of Dubcek and members of his government. In the operation, Dubcek and some of his key cabinet members were successfully captured by Spetsnaz, and flown to Moscow.82 Dubcek was subsequently forced to agree to the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia and ultimately subjugated under Moscow’s rule, voiding his earlier reforms.83 Afghanistan, under President Hafizullah Amin, also posed a serious threat to Moscow in the late 1970s. Amin attempted to build an Afghani state that would be pro-Western and liberal as opposed to previous regimes that were Soviet-orientated.84 The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Soviet southern borders also worried Moscow.85 The events in Iran, which saw a fundamentalist Islamic revolution, demonstrated to the Soviets the threat to her southern borders if left unchecked.86 Moscow decided to take action to secure her southern flank. Again, Spetsnaz troops were used to spearhead an invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union on 24 December 1979.87 The main purpose of the Spetsnaz operation was similar to that in Prague 11 years earlier – the decapitation of Afghani leadership.88 Amin was hunted down, found and killed in his palace. After he was killed, a puppet government under Barbak Karmal was installed.89 Afghanis soon recovered from the initial shock of the Soviet invasion, and organised resistance quickly developed leading into a ten-year bloody insurgency campaign that ultimately led to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. In both of these cases, the Soviets correctly identified the key strategic decapitation points that were the state leaders and their leadership. Once these key state leadership were decapitated, in Czech’s case spirited to Moscow to ‘negotiate’ under duress, and in Afghanistan’s case summary execution, the two countries were paralysed against making any response to the violation of sovereignty by Soviet forces and the consequent regime change.

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These Soviet Spestnaz successes in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, however, have to be viewed with caution against the contextual background. Both of these operations were supported by large units of Soviet conventional forces, namely elite armoured Guards divisions. Although the leaders of these states were successfully eliminated or removed, the large number of Soviet troops, tanks and armoured vehicles ensured that any eventual hostilities from local armed forces could be countered or prevented from taking any effective action. The removal of Amin was also followed by the quick installing of a new leader, pre-empting any dangerous prolonged vacuum of power. More importantly, the removal of these leaders served as a morale blow to the people and military personnel of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan (initially) demonstrating to them that even their supreme leaders were not safe and could be easily eliminated or removed from power. These shaming acts yielded psychological effects making any initial resistance to the Soviets’ intervention futile.

The logic of leadership decapitation The killing or capturing of an enemy military leader appears to be a logical solution to the age-old dilemma of securing a quick decisive victory over an enemy.90 The theories related to leadership decapitation surveyed thus far propose two main objectives. Firstly, the killing or capture of enemy military commanders would precipitate the collapse of command and result in chaos and confusion for the enemy armies, rendering them easily defeated. Secondly, the targeting of enemy leadership has a profound effect of gaining morale and psychological advantage, and demoralising the enemy. Both of these objectives, however, are difficult to achieve due to two main reasons. Firstly, the difficulty in locating the target (enemy leadership) showed the complexities of carrying out such operations. This requires excellent intelligence and monitoring of the target’s whereabouts and movements before action can be taken. Even with modern surveillance technology, contemporary attempts at targeting enemy leaders had not been encouraging and have had mixed results. For example, the United States made numerous attempts to kill Fidel Castro, Moammar Gaddafi, and Saddam Hussein (at the outbreak of the First and Second Gulf Wars) but failed each time.

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Secondly, a major problem plaguing leadership decapitation is that we can never be sure of the consequent effects. There is no fool-proof way of determining the expected outcome of leadership decapitation, due to the eternal character of uncertainty and luck in war. Clausewitz’s dictum reverberates and echoes this paradoxical nature of strategy: No other human activity (war) is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war.91 A preliminary review of case studies from World War II, for example the killing of Yamamoto and the final removal of Rommel from the battlefield, showed no observable effects at the command and control levels. These cases, however, had observable effects on morale, either yielded intentionally or unintentionally. The killing of Heydrich failed to raise the morale of the local Czechs but instead managed to raise the morale of exiled Czechs and friendly allies fighting the Nazi regime raising international support and sympathy for the Czech national cause. The capture of Kreipe was conceived in order to generate effects on morale and succeeded in doing so in its respective context. Although, the strategic effect of military leadership decapitation in World War II, and its influence on subsequent command chaos cannot be ascertained objectively, the targeting of enemy leadership to generate psychological and morale effects had far more achievable and noticeable consequences. At this stage, it can be deduced plausibly that leadership decapitation operations conducted in World War II were not for the primary objective of destroying the key to the enemy’s command thereby leading to strategic collapse but were conducted with a more achievable objective of raising the morale of both friendly and own forces, and lowering the enemy’s morale.92 This then raises the question: Why is morale important?

The importance of morale To explain the importance of morale, two of the most enduring texts on war and warfare will be used, Clausewitz’s On War and Sun Tzu’s Art of War. These two texts have been chosen due to their continued relevance and superior heuristic qualities for the study of war and warfare regardless of period.

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Clausewitz mentioned the importance of ‘moral forces’ in his On War. His use of the term, or the translated term, ‘moral’, should not be confused with the common definition of moral in today’s discourse on war which is about the rights or wrongs, and the ethics of fighting. In explaining what ‘moral factors’ consist of, Clausewitz stated, ‘. . .the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit’93 (emphasis in original). What Clausewitz meant as ‘moral forces’ included numerous elements, for example the leadership qualities of the enemy commander, the fighting skills and motivation of the troops and public support. Morale in its essence is closely related to two of the three elements of Clausewitz’s ‘moral factors’ which are ‘the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit’.94 The ‘moral factors’ on which Clausewitz placed importance, and more importantly that support the crux of the discussion here, were later disclosed by Clausewitz as morale in one of the only moments where he used that term explicitly in his prescription for victory: If in conclusion we consider the total concept of a victory, we find that it consists of three elements: 1. The enemy’s greater loss of material strength. 2. His loss of morale. 3. His open admission of the above by giving up his intentions.95 In On War Clausewitz wrote of the importance of ‘moral factors’ (morale) succinctly in this passage: One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.96 Regarding the relationship between moral and actual combat Clausewitz asserted earlier in his text: When we speak of destroying the enemy’s forces we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered. The two interact throughout: they are inseparable.97 The psychological aspects of the population, the army and the political leaders must be harnessed and used to the advantage of one’s side. Morale is needed to build the confidence of the army, the population,

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and the political leaders to fight against an enemy. In the face of difficulties and major setbacks, boosting the morale of one’s side is of utmost importance to sustain the willpower of the armed forces and the people to continue fighting.98 Morale, an intangible variable, is an important element that influences the fighting spirit of a nation at war.99 Morale is important in order to gain the support of the people in a bloody venture against an adversary that will entail physical, material and emotional sufferings for the people. Morale is like an ‘unseen force’ that shapes the mindset and the spirit of a population. To ensure that the policies and objectives are met, building the morale of the people ensures continued support for a fighting cause, and boosting the morale of the armed forces ensures the fighting spirit of the soldiers is sustained. Similarly, the morale of the enemy must be dampened so that the quality of the fighting spirit and willpower of their people and armed forces depreciates.100 Clausewitz provided further proof on the importance of morale in his explanation of strategy in Book Three of his On War: Strategic theory must therefore study the engagement in terms of its possible results and of the moral and psychological forces that largely determine its course.101 Clausewitz’s numerous assertions on the importance of morale and psychological forces in war and warfare reiterated the importance of winning and sustaining the minds of the population and the armed forces. His claims on the importance of willpower and mindset, however, should not be confused with the more recent ‘hearts and minds’ non-violent way of warfare. According to Beatrice Heuser, Clausewitz was proposing the utilisation of decisive battles to create ‘spectacular victories’, and the capture of the enemy’s main capitals.102 These significant achievements would deliver psychological blows and break the willpower of the enemy population in resisting further.103 Clausewitz continued to place importance on morale when he cautioned against the loss of morale and, at the same time, the importance of gaining morale supremacy over the enemy in this passage: All in all, loss of moral equilibrium must not be underestimated merely because it has no absolute value and does not always show up in the final balance. It can attain such massive proportions that it overcomes everything by its irresistible force. For this reason it may in itself become a main objective of the action . . .104

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Similarly, Sun Tzu also stressed the importance of morale, albeit predating Clausewitz’s text by 2,000 years. The importance Sun Tzu placed on morale is underlined by his placement of this passage right at the beginning of the first chapter of his Art of War: War is a matter of vital importance to the State . . . Therefore, appraise it in terms of five fundamental factors . . . The first of these factors is moral influence . . . By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.105 Sun Tzu’s mention of the importance of moral, and what he explains as moral, is similar to our current connotation of morale. He underlined the importance of the support of a population of its government and the value in building and sustaining that support. Thus, it can be summed up that Sun Tzu understood the utility of gaining the moral support of the people to ensure that a state could go to war with an adversary. A strong supportive population would ensure that the army could fight an adversary while in high spirits or with strong morale. This point is highlighted again later in Sun Tzu’s text in this passage: And therefore those skilled in war avoid the enemy when his spirit is keen and attack him when it is sluggish and his soldiers homesick. This is control of the moral factor.106 Sun Tzu’s point above further explains that when an army, either one’s own or the enemy’s, has high morale, it would be difficult to defeat, and when an army has low morale, it would be more easily engaged and defeated. Similarly, Sun Tzu, an advocate of winning wars with the least amount of bloodshed, indicated that attacking the enemy’s will power and morale ranks as one of the most important aims of warfare.107 Sun Tzu’s maxim of the main objective in warfare is ‘attacking the enemy’s strategy’, has been interpreted by Michael I. Handel as including an offense against the enemy’s public opinion.108 Handel cited examples such as the wars in Vietnam and Algeria, whereby the loss of public support for the wars led to the ultimate withdrawal of US and French intervention in these conflicts.109 As this book analyses cases studies from World War II, it is worth citing Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, a senior British military

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commander in World War II, who best summed up the importance of gaining morale supremacy in war: The final deciding factor of all engagements, battles and wars is the morale of the opposing forces. . .Better weapons, better food, and superiority in numbers will influence morale, but it is a sheer determination to win by whomever or whatever inspired that counts in the end. . .Study men and their morale always.110 (emphasis added) Both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu provided clear hints at the heart of this matter, Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations to generate morale effects. Special Operations and leadership decapitation operations have the ability to be inspiring acts which showcase daring and highlight damage being inflicted on the enemy. Most studies on Special Operations also stress the achievement of ‘strategic results’ by highlighting the number of enemy personnel killed or quantities of enemy material destroyed, but fail to appreciate that sometimes, in fact and often, Special Operations are conducted to gain morale advantage over the enemy.111 Colin Gray in Explorations in Strategy has identified morale as one of the strategic utilities of Special Operations. He posited that Special Operations, being small daring ‘heroic’ acts, are more easily recognised opposed to larger battles between armies, and can be used to raise morale.112 Special Operations, when used successfully against the enemy, can also deny the enemy from maintaining morale supremacy.113 Special Operations are a few small audacious acts, usually conducted behind enemy lines, and striking at ‘key’ targets (such as targeting enemy leadership), which, apart from causing actual physical damage to the enemy, also serve as excellent ‘stunts’ to show the competence of one’s armed forces in fighting the enemy. A word of caution has to be added here – morale, has its own unique problem – it is impossible to measure mathematically. Although morale cannot be measured in numbers, its effects can be observed. Clausewitz mentions the intangible effect of morale in his On War: The relative value of each [the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit]

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cannot be universally established; it is hard enough to discuss their potential, and even more difficult to weigh them against each other. The wisest course is not to underrate any of them [ –] a temptation to which human judgement, being fickle, often succumbs. It is far preferable to muster historical evidence of the unmistakable effectiveness of all three.114 Clausewitz’s advice provided the basis for this book to assess the strategic effects of leadership decapitation operations conducted by Special Operations in World War II, which at this stage is hypothesised as generating important morale effects. Although morale cannot be measured, its effects can be assessed based on the reaction of the enemy, and friendly forces and population. What is more important is if any of these morale effects contributed to any observable change in the enemy’s behaviour and also the behaviour of one’s own side, and/or observable resultant events.

Conclusion This chapter has highlighted the strategic logic behind leadership decapitation and argued that more often, and more plausibly, leadership decapitation’s strategic value resides in triggering morale effects. Morale is also shown to have important value in war and warfare as emphasised by two of the most prominent strategists, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. The importance of morale, albeit intangible, is similar to the physical aspect of warfare. Morale serves as an important means in strategy that is often understudied when compared to other aspects of warfare. Leadership decapitation when used with the aims of gaining morale effects has a more plausible strategic logic than when used solely with the aims of destroying the enemy’s effective leadership and guidance, and the breakdown of command and control. Both leadership decapitation operations and Special Operations could garner spectacular events that could build or strengthen the morale of the side that utilises them and, at the same time, dampen the enemy’s morale. The combination of both of these types of operations – leadership decapitation and Special Operations – could achieve an ultimate alchemy of dazzling tactical acts that are able to generate astonishing morale effects strategically. For an extreme example, a case study in this book will show

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that even through the failure of a leadership decapitation operation where the Special Operations unit conducting it suffered high losses, intangible value can still be gained by the raising of morale and prestige of the state that conducted the operation. The next chapter on Operation Anthropoid – the assassination of SS Reichprotektor Reinhard Heydrich in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Morovia, Czechoslovakia by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) Czech Section, will test the strategic arguments laid out in this chapter.

CHAPTER 3 `

HITLER'S HANGMAN' BUTCHERED 1 — OPERATION ANTHROPOID2

Introduction This is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.3 British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain delivered these historical words in his speech on 30 September 1938, when he returned from the Munich conference at which the British and French governments agreed to Adolf Hitler’s demand for the acquisition of the Sudetenland (part of Czechoslovakia). It was widely believed at the time, and with great relief, that another bloody war had been avoided.4 What it actually amounted to was a prelude to Hitler’s expansionist dream, and on 15 March 1939 Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia, which was divided into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Morovia, and Slovakia. It was the beginning of a series of events that would lead to the outbreak of World War II. Czechoslovakia, which had not been invited to the Munich conference, had been betrayed by the major European powers she hoped would aid her, France and Great Britain. She would suffer tragically under the harsh and brutal rule of Nazi Germany. Czechoslovakia, with its huge industrial and manufacturing capacity, was an important industrial hub

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for the manufacture of weapons for Germany. To ensure uninterrupted war production and curb resistance activities, Reinhard Heydrich, reputedly, ‘the second most powerful man in the SS behind Heinrich Himmler . . .’5 was appointed as the new Nazi SS Reichprotektor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Morovia in 1941. Heydrich successfully pacified the Czechs with a ‘stick and carrot’ approach. Due to the efficient and sometimes brutal methods employed by Heydrich, the Czech people became subservient to the German occupation. Industrial productivity went up and the support for resistance activities was muted at best. Fearing a detrimental political future, the Czech government-in-exile in London decided to act. This chapter describes and evaluates a daring Special Operation conducted to change the fate of a nation. A leadership decapitation operation was planned and conducted, which yielded tremendous strategic and political effects for the Czech nation. It restored the political ambitions of the exiled Czech government, and safeguarded its survival when World War II ended.

An outline of the history of Czechoslovakia After four years of bloody trench warfare, World War I ended with the defeat of Germany by the Allied powers and the subsequent signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918. The victorious Allies dictated terms for the Treaty of Versailles, which was signed on 28 June 1919 by all the belligerents. Germany, being the loser, suffered humiliating reparations and losses of territory, along with her ally Austria-Hungary. One of the results of the annexation of these territories was the creation of new states, one of which was Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia had a population of 15 million, which consisted of 6.5 million Czechs, 3 million Slovaks, 3.25 million Germans, 700,000 Hungarians, 500,000 Ukrainians, and 60,000 Poles.6 By the 1920s Czechoslovakia had a democratic government and a much more vibrant economy than other European countries.7 Czechoslovakia’s economy was mainly driven by her manufacturing industry, and a well-educated population. Although Czechoslovakia had a stable socio-political situation, there were also some nationalist movements starting to demand autonomous states, namely the Slovaks and the Germans. Adolf Hitler who came into power in Germany in 1933, and then breached the Treaty of Versailles and finally annulled it in 1935, wanted

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to occupy some of Czechoslovakia’s land in the area bordering Germany, the Sudetenland. During this time the British and French powers were war weary and, in an attempt to avoid another war, decided to appease Hitler.8 Hitler had demanded Sudentenland be returned to Germany as its population was mostly German, and it was suspected that these people had been marginalised by the Czech government.9 Hitler promised that he would make no further claims for territories once he had obtained Sudetenland.10 In the ensuing conference to discuss this issue, Great Britain’s Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, and French Prime Minister, E´douard Daladier, met Hitler in Munich in 1938; a meeting famously dubbed ‘the Munich conference’.11 Czechoslovakia was very concerned about Hitler’s demand as the main defences and fortifications against Germany were located in Sudetenland. By conceding Sudetenland, the defence of Czechoslovakia would be compromised. As an early precaution against eventual hostilities, the Czech military was put on standby to counter the possibility of a German invasion should the Munich conference fail. Military assessments at that time recorded that the Czech military had a favourable chance of defending themselves against Germany’s planned invasion with the support of Czechoslovakia’s international allies.12 At the time, the Czech military was one of the best-trained and equipped in Europe, it had 1.5 million troops and was equipped for mechanised warfare.13 Had the Czech government decided to resist the intrusion militarily, they might have had a fair chance against the Germans’ military capability.14 The British and French leaders impending decision was skewed in Hitler’s favour. Czechoslovakia protested vehemently on the proposed solution to appease Hitler and, as a result, Czechoslovakia’s President Eduard Benesˇ was not invited to the conference. The major powers in the Munich Conference finally decided that Sudetenland would be given to Germany.15 The Munich Agreement was signed on 30 September 1938 by the four major powers present at that conference – Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy.16 Hitler was thought to have been appeased,17 and Chamberlain flew back to London and made his famous speech in which he declared that he had achieved the ‘peace of our time’.18 Czechoslovakia accepted the terms of the Munich Agreement and did not resist militarily as Benesˇ wanted to avoid any bloodshed.19 Benesˇ resigned from his post on 5 October 1938,20 and left Czechoslovakia on

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22 October 1938.21 He later exiled himself in London.22 He was replaced by Emil Ha´cha.23 The next sequence of events finally revealed Hitler’s real intentions. After having fooled the British and French governments, Hitler then invaded the remaining areas of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939.24 He divided Czechoslovakia into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and a separate territorial state of Slovakia.25 The area in Caparthian Ruthenia was occupied by Russians. Poland also grabbed the territory of Teschen and later some areas in Czech-Silesia and Slovakia; the populations in these areas included 77,000 Poles, 20,000 Germans and 123,000 Czechs.26 Nazi Germany appointed the first Reichprotektor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Morovia in Constantin von Neurath.27 A Sudentenland Nazi, Karl Hermann Frank, was appointed as the first State Secretary.28 President Ha´cha appointed General Alois Elia´sˇ as his Prime Minister in April 1939, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany.29 Elia´sˇ was a trusted friend of Ha´cha and it was hoped that he would cooperate fully with Ha´cha. On the contrary, Elia´sˇ was secretly collaborating with the Czech resistance movement and the Czech government-in-exile in London.30 Hard-pressed to make Germany self-sufficient in resources and industrial capability, as part of his lebensraum policy,31 Hitler targeted Czechoslovakia for its rich natural resources in coal and lignite, and for its arms factories and iron and steel works.32 Czechoslovakia had one of the strongest fundamental economies in Europe by 1930.33 The strong economy was contributed by three main areas of economic activities namely industry, agriculture, and trade. The regions of Bohemia and Morovia were key industry areas whereas agricultural activities were centred in Slovakia and Carpathia-Ruthenia. Coal was found abundantly in the northern region of Tesin, bordering Poland.34 After occupying Czechoslovakia, Germany turned her into an important arms manufacturer for war production. Among some of its most famous factories was Skoda, which manufactured tanks and artillery pieces.35 Steel and chemical factories also featured prominently in Czechoslovakia’s industry. An excellent example of the Czech’s arms producing capability was the British Bren gun (light machine gun).36 The Bren gun was originally designed in a town called Brno in Czechoslovakia. The design was accepted by the British military in

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1935. With the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the designer moved to Great Britain, and continued to manufacture the gun in Enfield. The combination of the first two letters of each town gave birth to the name Bren.37 Hitler next turned his attention to Poland, which he invaded on 1 September 1939.38 Britain and France, having suffered the indignity of the failure of the Munich Agreement with the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, signed defence agreements with Poland and were committed to assisting Poland to fight off the German invasion.39 Therefore, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939,40 and what followed was the kick-start of World War II. Meanwhile, in October 1939, Benesˇ had set up a government-in-exile, known as the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, together with his former head of military intelligence Frantisˇek Moravec.41 Benesˇ’s decision to set up a government-in-exile was encouraged when, during his visit to the United States in the spring of 1939, he met President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 28 May 1939. During that meeting Roosevelt declared his support for the survival of the state of Czechoslovakia.42 The British government officially recognised Benesˇ’s government-in-exile as an Allied government on 21 July 1940,43 and the US government followed suit on 29 July 1940.44 The Czech government-in-exile organised resistance movements from London and gave direction from there. One of the most important resistance networks in Czechoslovakia was Obrana Naroda, which consisted of ex-Czech military officers and soldiers who had not managed to escape from Czechoslovakia during the early days of the German occupation.45 More importantly, Benesˇ’s government-in-exile had the clandestine support of Elia´sˇ, and local Czech resistance groups. The Czech resistance movement, however, did not achieve much success, and any hope for success was even less in the wake of the appointment of Reichprotektor Reinhard Heydrich. Heydrich managed to locate and destroy various resistance movements but it was his success in Czechoslovakia that ironically heralded his own demise. In order to contextualise the events leading to Heydrich’s death, the following section will describe the Special Operations Executive and how it developed, while the subsequent section will illustrate Heydrich’s role, and the reasons behind his killing.

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The Fourth Arm The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was formed in July 1940 as a means of conducting sabotage and subversive operations against occupied Europe by the British, once referred to as the Fourth Arm of Britain’s military forces i.e. Land, Air, Naval, and SOE.46 The early beginnings of SOE were small research sections, all formed in 1938, within three different organisations. The first of these, commanded by Sir Campbell Stuart and known as EH after the place where it was based, Electra House, was a small branch within the Foreign Office which was studying the use of propaganda.47 The second, known as Section D and led by Major L.D. Grand was part of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), later known as MI6, and was studying secret operations and the development of plans for these. 48 The third research section, this one within the army, was called General Staff (Research), known by its famous acronym, GS (R) and was commanded by Major J.C.F. Holland. GS (R)’s task was to research irregular warfare. It was renamed MI (R) in 1939.49 At the onset of World War II and with the impending defeat of France, all these disparate units, which had overlapping duties, were ultimately merged, on 19 July by 1940, into a new organisation known as Special Operations Executive or by its famous acronym, SOE.50 The person responsible for writing the SOE charter was Neville Chamberlain who had earlier, on 10 May 1940, resigned as Prime Minister with Sir Winston Churchill succeeding him. Chamberlain had laid down the purpose of SOE in its famous charter, . . . a new organization shall be established forthwith to coordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas . . . This organization will be known as the Special Operations Executive.51 SOE came under the direction of the Minister of Economic Warfare, with its first leader, Dr Hugh Dalton, appointed by Churchill.52 The reason SOE was put under the Ministry of Economic Warfare was that its tasks were not meant to be strictly military but more towards working with workers’ unions, revolutionaries, creating Fifth Columns, and creating civil unrest and chaos in enemy occupied areas.53 Another reason why

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SOE came under a civilian command was that it was envisioned that it would form resistance groups in different countries in Europe and Asia. It was believed that with the involvement of people from various races, with different languages, religious beliefs and cultures, a new civilian organisation with members from both military and civilian backgrounds would offer a more robust and relevant organisation to conduct such sabotage and subversive operations in different states with different national characteristics.54 Churchill’s enthusiasm and support for the new means and ways to conduct warfare in the early desperate days of World War II was instrumental in the successful birth of the new SOE. Churchill famously told Dalton to ‘set Europe ablaze’.55 Two key persons were instrumental in the early formation of SOE’s operations. They were Major J.C.F. Holland and Major Colin Gubbins.56 Both of them were combat veterans of World War I, with Holland having observed T.E. Lawrence’s exploits in the Middle East theatre.57 In 1919, they were both posted in Dublin during the Irish Troubles (1916 – 21), and both had experienced first-hand the guerrilla tactics used by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).58 Gubbins had also seen guerrilla warfare when he was posted to Palestine in 1936. Each had studied the tactics used by the Boers in the South African War (1899 – 1902), T.E. Lawrence, guerrilla operations in the Russian civil war (1917 – 22), the Irish Troubles (1916 – 21), the Spanish civil war (1936 – 9), China’s war against Japan’s invasion (1937), and the Arab – Jewish conflict in Palestine.59 Major Gubbins used his wide experience to write two short pamphlets on guerrilla warfare, which were The Art of Guerrilla Warfare and Partisan Leaders’ Handbook.60 According to prominent SOE historian, M.R.D. Foot, these two pamphlets were never published in England, but thousands of copies in English and various other languages were distributed throughout Europe and south-east Asia, to be used by resistance movements.61 In its early days SOE consisted of three main departments: SO1 responsible for propaganda work; SO2 for operations; and SO3 for research. Later SO3 was merged with SO2. SO1 being responsible for propaganda work, had overlapping responsibilities with the Ministry of Information, and after much rivalry and disagreements between the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Ministry of Information, was

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finally detached from SOE and became an independent organisation known as Political Warfare Executive (PWE) under the auspices of the Ministry of Information.62 SOE operatives were carefully selected men and women, and had to undergo and pass training in various skills of their trade. These skills included hand-to-hand combat, demolitions, escape and evasion, resisting interrogation, weapons training, how to conceal oneself, how to move about in German-occupied Europe, communications, and parachute jumping. The pass rate was low, for example in one class of 14 potential operatives only three were finally accepted for SOE operations.63 SO2, which was responsible for controlling and organising operations in occupied and neutral countries, assigned sections to different countries. Among them were sections for France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Norway, Denmark, Burma, Malaya, and numerous others. SOE’s operations had mixed results. In Norway, SOE conducted Operation Gunnerside, which disabled a heavy water production plant in Telemark, Norway in 1942. Heavy water was needed in the production of atomic weapons. The SOE later sunk a ferry in a Norwegian lake, which was carrying the remaining heavy water to Germany. It was widely claimed that these operations, which effectively destroyed Hitler’s atomic weapons manufacturing capability, were enough to celebrate the existence of SOE.64 SOE was also successful in organising and assisting resistance groups for example in France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, where they conducted some successful operations.65 In Holland, however, SOE suffered its most humiliating setbacks when its section was captured and interrogated by, and subsequently worked for, the Germans. The Germans managed to intercept and manipulate most of the radio traffic between SOE in Great Britain and Holland, and captured all SOE agents who were subsequently sent to Denmark. This episode, famously know as the Englandspiel, was finally discovered in 1943. By then a total of 51 SOE agents, nine MI6 agents, and one MI9 agent had been sent straight into the arms of the Gestapo. Only seven of them survived the war – the rest were killed by execution or died in concentration camps.66 SOE, however, scored a major trump card in an operation to kill Heydrich. The following sections describe Heydrich’s role, the reasons he was chosen to be killed, and how the operation was conducted.

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Who was Reinhard Heydrich? Reinhard Heydrich was born on 7 March 1904 in Halle an der Saale.67 During his childhood he learned to play the violin, and was athletic with a keen interest in swimming and fencing. He joined the German Navy in 1922 as it was one of the few promising careers available during this era of economic troubles in post-World War I Germany. Heydrich soon proved to be an intelligent young Navy ensign and had a successful career in the Navy. However, he had a predilection for womanising, which led to his downfall in the Navy. In 1930, he had an affair with the daughter of a shipyard director but dumped her for another woman, Lina von Osten, to whom he later became engaged. The shipyard director was furious and reported the affair to his friend Admiral Erich Raeder, Chief of Naval Operations. Heydrich was charged with ‘conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman’, was found guilty and was dismissed from the Navy. He remained loyal to his fiance´e and married her on Boxing Day of 1931.68 As a matter of fate and coincidence, Lina was instrumental in getting Heydrich accepted as a member of the Nazi SS organisation.69 In 1931, Heinrich Himmler was setting up a counter-intelligence division in the SS and was looking for a suitable candidate to lead it. A friend of Lina, Karl von Eberstein recommended Heydrich to Himmler. An interview was set up, Himmler was thrilled by Heydrich’s intelligence and accepted him for the job.70 Heydrich started his job as Himmler’s ‘intelligence man’ on 10 August 1931 with just a borrowed typewriter and a pile of records from which he cut and pasted to form new records about threats to the Nazi party.71 He soon proved his abilities, setting up a network of agents from scratch to collect information about the Nazi party’s enemies. Heydrich’s rudimentary intelligence records, in a span of a year, grew into a huge database of information on potential threats to the Nazi party and proved its worth when it contributed some of the name lists for the purge of what became known as the ‘Night of the Long Knives’.72 When Hitler came to power in 1933, the Nazi party was split into two powerful factions, one the SS, and the other the SA led by Ernst Ro¨hm. Himmler and Hitler decided to purge the Nazi party of the SA factions, and conducted a series of arrests based on false charges and executions of the SA members. Ernst Ro¨hm and many members of the SA were killed in this Night of the Long Knives.73

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Heydrich’s rise in prestige within the Nazi organisation also saw him attacked by envious quarters within the Nazi party. He was accused of having Jewish blood through his grandparents.74 These rumours troubled Hitler and Himmler greatly as the possibility of the person in charge of the Nazi party’s counter intelligence apparatus having Jewish blood was distressing news for these practitioners of race supremacy. Hitler ordered an investigation to be conducted by the Nazi party’s official racial expert, Dr Achim Gercke. Dr Gercke concluded that Heydrich was of pure German origin and free from Jewish blood. The rumour had started because Heydrich’s grandmother used the name Su¨ss-Heydrich; Su¨ss was a common Jewish name.75 It was noted, however, in mitigating Heydrich’s case, the name Su¨ss was used commonly by Germans in the nineteenth century, thus the misunderstanding of Heydrich having Jewish blood.76 Heydrich’s fortunes continued to shine on him. On 27 September 1939 Himmler decided to merge the SD and SiPO (Gestapo and the Kripo) into a single organisation known as the Reich Main Security Office or Reichssicherheitshaumptant (RSHA). Heydrich was given command of RSHA, and assumed the title of Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Chief of the Security Police and SD). On 28 August 1940, Heydrich also became the President of International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).77 Meanwhile in Czechoslovakia, the Reichprotektor, Konstantin von Neurath, was deemed by Hitler as being too soft on the population there.78 This was due to a rise in resistance activities and inspired industrial strikes.79 The Czech population was also facing food shortages not due to rationing, but because of stock piling by black marketers, who then sold the food off for higher profits. This resulted in low productivity, mass inflation and discontent among the important industrial workforce.80 Anti-German resistance movements also aggressively promoted strikes and sabotages.81 The industrial strikes resulted in the decline of production output by about 18 per cent.82 Heydrich was deemed as the most suitable person to replace von Neurath,83 and was appointed as the Reichprotektor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on 27 September 1941 and subsequently promoted to the rank of SS-Obergruppenfu¨hrer (lieutenant general).84 Heydrich himself wanted the position as it would give him unlimited power and an important step up in the Nazi hierarchy. Heydrich knew that if he could prove to the Nazi party and to Hitler that he could

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pacify the Slav population in Czechoslovakia, he would be in an influential position to request more powerful positions in the east once Russia was defeated (in 1941, Operation Barbarossa had opened favourably for the Germans).85 Heydrich was determined to exterminate the Slav population in Czechoslovakia, and Germanise the Czechs. Those he deemed as ‘un-Germanise-able’ would be deported to concentration camps and eliminated.86 Heydrich wanted to incorporate Czechoslovakia as a part of Germany once victory was attained.87 When Heydrich arrived in Prague the first thing he did was to announce that he would destroy all resistance movements in Czechoslovakia and that the Germanic people would be segregated from those deemed as non-Germanic. In the first months under Heydrich the German security apparatus had managed to round up most of the resistance operatives and supporters – most of whom were executed and the rest sent to concentration camps.88 Heydrich’s second priority as Reichprotektor was to improve and increase productivity among the industrial workers.89 In the autumn of 1941, war production of arms was crucial for Germany as it was involved in the massive onslaught in east European Russia. The demand for arms and ammunition was insatiable.90 Heydrich wanted to increase the productivity of Czech industrial workers and had studied the problems faced by the industrial workers. He realised that the low morale of the Czech workers was mainly due to the difficulties in obtaining enough basic food necessities. There was a black market in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Morovia profiteering from the war effort. The workers demanded more fat, meat and tobacco, which had been hijacked by the black marketeers and sold at inflated prices. Heydrich’s efficient intelligence operations were used to counter these black marketeers in Czechoslovakia. His intelligence service infiltrated the black marketeers, whose numbers included both Czechs and Germans, and had most of them arrested. Again, he demonstrated his will to fight for the workers’ cause in executing even the German criminals who he termed ‘economic criminals’. Heydrich’s brilliant policy of tackling the black marketeers was a sound anti-resistance operation, which shows similarities to comments made by Santa Cruz de Marcenado in his work Reflexiones Militares (Military Reflections): Inflation and food scarcity are the most terrible sources of insurgencies, especially if the people believe that these are due to

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taxes, usury, or neglect on the part of the government . . . Weights and measures have to be sacred within the entire country. The falsification of goods has to be punished severely . . .91 Heydrich also ensured higher allocation of fat, meat and tobacco was given to the industrial workers, a fact he further exploited with propaganda highlighting his benevolence.92 He also gave the workers an extra day of rest on Saturdays and took over some of the luxury hotels to turn them into weekend leisure centres for the workers.93 Again, this was not dissimilar to Santa Cruz’s comments on how to counter an insurgency: ‘Public entertainment keeps the people busy and suppresses the spirit of revolt.’94 All these ‘carrots and sticks’ efforts worked wonders. Heydrich’s clever use of ‘carrots’ in the form of better perks for the workers, and ‘sticks’ in using his power to detain and execute black marketeers and resistance supporters, yielded unprecedented success. The gross industrial output of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Morovia increased by 23 per cent during Heydrich’s first few months of rule.95 Heydrich’s extremely efficient intelligence service in Czechoslovakia, a legacy of his days as the Gestapo chief, also resulted in numerous successes in tracking down the resistance movements and intercepting radio traffic between the resistance movements and London. Radio triangulation resulted in more arrests. Heydrich’s targets included ex-Czech Army officers and the intelligentsia. His purpose was to eliminate all potential sources of resistance activities.96 These arrests were followed by the interrogation and execution of the resistance (and suspected resistance) members. Those who were not executed were usually deported to Mauthausen concentration camp.97 Among one of Heydrich’s most notable examples of his violent crackdown was the arrest of Czechoslovakia’s Prime Minister, Elia´sˇ.98 Elia´sˇ was put on trial for collaboration with the Czech government-in-exile and was condemned to death.99 Heydrich, however, kept Elia´sˇ alive for the time being to be used as a hostage to keep the local Czech population away from mass anti-German occupation ideas.100 It was estimated that in the first 105 days of Heydrich’s reign, 486 people were executed and another 2,242 were sent to concentration camps.101 So successful were Heydrich’s efforts that all effective resistance movements and activities in Czechoslovakia almost ceased to exist. Only

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small numbers of Communist aligned resistance fighters prevailed, and a handful of Czech resistance operatives. 102 In the league of resistance activities in occupied Europe, Czechoslovakia ranked in the bottom position.103 Even the Prime Minister of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Morovia, Elia´sˇ, was arrested and sentenced to death, as seen above, for allegedly supporting the resistance movements.104 The President of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Morovia, Ha´cha, who was earlier forced by Hitler to concede the whole of Czechoslovakia to German occupation in March 1939, was further isolated during Heydrich’s reign and remained as a puppet figurehead.105 As a testimony to his effective and brutal repression of the Czech resistance and population Heydrich was given the nicknames ‘Hitler’s Hangman’ and ‘the Butcher of Prague’.106 Heydrich’s role in the ‘Final Solution’, the mass deportation and extermination of Jews, was also much recorded.107 Heydrich was appointed as the chair of the famous conference at the Interpol Villa in Grosser Wannsee on 20 January 1942.108 Among the notes in the minutes that were recorded at that conference were: ‘The object of the exercise was to purge German living space of Jews by legal means.’109 It must be noted, however, Heydrich’s role in the ‘Final Solution’ was not a deciding factor in the decision to kill him. At this stage of the war the German’s extensive programme to exterminate all Jews in Europe was not known in detail by the Allies.110

Why Heydrich needed to be killed? The Czech government-in-exile, based in London and led by Benesˇ, was ashamed of the tameness of the Czech population.111 Czechoslovakia had the lowest resistance activities in the German-occupied European states in the early years of World War II. This was partly due to the successful anti-resistance operations run by Heydrich that efficiently disrupted and eliminated much of the resistance movement and its leaders in Czechoslovakia.112 Another crucial factor that worried Benesˇ was the Czech Communist Party’s propaganda campaign that belittled the Czech government-in-exile as a puppet of the Western powers. The Czech Communists had boasted that only the Communist resistance movements were effective in fighting against the occupying Germans.113 Benesˇ was rightfully apprehensive about the growing legitimacy and

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support of the Communists’ cause if nothing was done to raise the image of Czech resistance movements aligned with his government-in-exile. In the memoirs of Moravec, he stated: President Benes became very embarrassed by this fact. He told me that in his consultations with representatives of allied countries the subject of meaningful resistance to the enemy cropped up with humiliating insistence. The British and the Russians, hardpressed on their battlefields, kept pointing out to Benesˇ the urgent need for maximum effort from every country, including Czechoslovakia. But at this time it was futile for us to send messages home asking for an increase in resistance activity. We tried. Nothing happened.114 More importantly, Benesˇ was also worried that the legitimacy of his government and Czechoslovakia’s future state status would be affected if the war ended soon or in the longer-term future, if no action was taken then to remedy it.115 He was desperate to demonstrate to his Allies the capability of Czechoslovakia in resisting the German occupation. It was on his mind that if the war ended without the annulment of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia would remain carved up, whereby Sudetenland would still be a part of Germany and Carpathia-Rutherland a part of Russia. He wanted to ensure that when the war ended Czechoslovakia would remain as it was on the world map prior to the 1938 Munich Agreement.116 Benesˇ mentioned in his memoirs the delicate political situation of the Churchill – Eden Government in Britain at that time. There were still some ‘Munich Agreement’ policy makers in Churchill’s cabinet, and any talks on annulling the Munich Agreement would have resulted in critical debates on the issue that may have escalated to wide public knowledge. Discussions on the Munich Agreement would have given further bad press on the British foreign policy in the 1930s to appease Hitler, which inadvertently failed.117 Britain was in a desperate situation in those early days of World War II, with the morale of the military and public sinking low, and any signs of cracks within the political divide in Churchill’s government were to be avoided at all cost. President Benesˇ faced a difficult and stubborn British Foreign Office on the issue of full recognition of pre-Munich Conference Czechoslovakia.118 On the second

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anniversary of the Munich Agreement, President Benesˇ attempted to persuade Churchill to announce the rejection of the Munich Agreement by the British Government. Churchill instead declared, in a public address, that the Munich Agreement had ceased to exist but the British Government was not ready to decide or agree on definite borders in Europe until the war was over.119 This was less than what Benesˇ had wanted – the full recognition of Czechoslovakia sovereign territory and frontiers as pre-1938 Munich Agreement. Benesˇ had faced an even colder French Prime Minister, Daladier, when negotiating the possible rejection of the Munich Agreement in the early days of World War II when Daladier was still in power – the French leader had refused even to meet Benesˇ.120 When Charles de Gaulle became the Free French leader, Benesˇ found a more sympathetic French leader with whom to discuss the issue of Czech sovereignty. Any French decision and action, however, would weigh heavily on British policy as the Free French was itself just an exile organisation and struggling to gain prominence. Benesˇ was anxious to obtain the agreement of the two Allied powers to liquidate the Munich Agreement and realised that he needed a political publicity coup to give a final push in his fight for the future of Czechoslovakia. Benesˇ had with him Moravec (the chief intelligence officer of the exiled Czechoslovakia Government) to ponder ways to raise the morale of the Czech people, and make them rise and actively resist the Germans, and more importantly, to create a significant event to highlight to the world the resolve of the Czechs to fight for their freedom. They considered killing the puppet President Ha´cha, but concluded that killing him would yield little or no effect. Then they decided the best target to kill was Heydrich himself. This was the first time a senior Nazi SS official was targeted for assassination, and would surely garner international acclaim. Burleigh gave a compelling argument on the decision made by the Czechoslovakia government-in-exile: Czech resistance activity was sneered at by the Polish exiles and generally discounted in London and Moscow, which had a humiliating effect on the exiled Czech government. If Benes was to have any hope of restoring an independent Czechoslovakia within its pre-Munich Agreement borders, then he had to give his allies a sure sign that the Czechs were resisting the Germans as much as their Polish neighbour.121

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It was thought that since Heydrich was successful in pacifying and brutally terrorising the Czech people into submission, he would serve as the perfect decapitation target. Moravec had provided another candid explanation for the decision to kill Heydrich: The purpose of this action would be twofold. First, a powerful manifestation of resistance which would wipe out the stigma of passivity and help Czechoslovakia internationally. Second, a renaissance of the resistance movement by providing a spark which would activate the mass of the people.122 Both President Benesˇ and Moravec also knew that by killing Heydrich, mass and brutal reprisals would be launched against the docile Czech population. There was an exchange of communication between the remaining Czech resistance leaders and Benesˇ when they learned of the plan to kill Heydrich. The resistance leaders warned Benes of the mass reprisals that would be unleashed on the Czech population with tragic consequences. Both Benesˇ and Moravec weighed up these objections but decided to carry on with the operation.123 Benesˇ stated, ‘Where national salvation was at stake, “even great sacrifices would be worth it”.’124 In Moravec’s memoirs, he provided further evidence that they knew of the consequences of the operation and the potential human cost but decided that the cost of human lives was worth it: The cost of Heydrich’s life would be high. I said this to Benes, who listened carefully to my evaluation and then said that, as Supreme Military Commander, he had decided that although the action would admittedly cost lives, it was necessary for the good of the country. He ordered me to carry it out.125 The violence against civilians was not new at that time as they had known from reports from the Eastern Front of the brutality of the German Wehrmact against suspected local Russian partisans whereby whole villages were wiped out. The ongoing Heydrich clampdown on resistance movements and his brutal executions of arrested resistance operatives and black marketeers had given no doubt to what the Germans were capable of doing.

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The spectre of the Munich Agreement however, continued to loom over Benesˇ and he continued to regret Czechoslovakia non-military resistance against Germany’s aggression in 1938 even though the Czech military was one of the best in Europe at that time.126 Moravec himself echoed this view: If in 1939 Czechoslovakia, instead of yielding to the Munich decision, had fought Germany, as I am convinced it should have done, it would have suffered much greater losses than it did after Heydrich’s death, but it would have earned a worthier place in history.127 Had Czechoslovakia resisted militarily, the cost may have been high and most likely would have lost the war, but at least the Czechs’ could have prided themselves of having fought and defended their freedom, rather than forced to submit to the terms of the Munich Agreement.128 The killing of Heydrich would serve as a remedy for the humiliation from the Munich debacle. It was hoped that the expected brutal reprisals would jolt the docile Czech people to wake up from their dream state and incite them to increase their hatred for the German occupiers and raise resistance movements to conduct sabotage attacks against the Germans. This was terrorism in its philosophy.129 In Igor Primoratz’s study and edited volume on terrorism and philosophy, he posited that: Terrorism is meant to cause terror (extreme fear) and, when successful, does so . . . Terrorism is intimidation with a purpose: the terror is meant to cause others to do things they would otherwise not do. Terrorism is coercive intimidation. 130 What the Czech government-in-exile hoped for was the conduct of terrorist attacks by Czech resistance groups against the German occupation based on SOE’s doctrine of building terrorist operations behind enemy lines. In Moravec’s memoirs, he provided further proof that they hoped that the brutal reprisals would trigger mass resistance: Our hope that the Czech people would react to the German pressure with counter-pressure . . .131

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In order for terrorism to work, the general public must be brutally harassed by the occupier, and it was hoped that the killing of Heydrich and the impending reprisals would provide fuel to inflame hatred against the occupiers and the people to take arms to fight against the Germans. Colin Gray writing on the nexus between moral and strategy distinctly noted: Indeed, as a general rule terrorism and even some insurgencies can succeed only if they entice the government and its agents into defeating themselves morally, hence politically, and just possibly strategically.132 In a cover note of the ‘Detailed Report on Operation Anthropoid’, there is an interesting passage written by ‘MX’ on 30 May 1942 which stated: I understand that to begin with President Benes was somewhat apprehensive of the possible repercussions in the Protectorate, but that on second thoughts he has decided that it will stimulate the will to resist at home and gain the Czechs much credit abroad, and was well worth it.133 Thus, the killing of Heydrich can be identified with two main objectives: to create a spectacular event (the killing of Heydrich and the expected reprisals) which would highlight the Czech nation’s plight in the international arena; and to infuriate the Czech people, because of the expected reprisals, which would cause them to raise their resistance activities.134 The next section describes the planning and the conduct of the operation to kill Heydrich.

Operation Anthropoid Although the Czechoslovakia Army ceased to exist after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany in 1939, a large legion of Czech volunteers joined the French Foreign Legion in the hope of fighting for their country’s independence one day.135 Upon the start of World War II, the Czech members of the French Foreign Legion left and formed a Czech Division to fight alongside the British and French Forces.136 That campaign in 1940 ended in tragedy with the Allies retreating and evacuating from Dunkirk. Elements of the Czech Division was among those that had been successfully evacuated to Great Britain. The remains

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of the Czech force were re-formed as the Czech brigade.137 Members from this brigade volunteered to various other special formations such as the Commandos and SOE. They received specialist training in the hope of being sent back to Czechoslovakia to form resistance movements there. A number of SOE parties were subsequently dropped into Czechoslovakia to assist resistance organisations and to reinstate intelligence gathering and radio communication with London. Among these parties were Silver A and Silver B.138 These early SOE parties sent into Czechoslovakia achieved little due to the tight security imposed by Heydrich’s counter-resistance measures. The operation to kill Heydrich was given the code name Operation Anthropoid and was planned by Benesˇ, Moravec, and the Czechoslovak Mixed Brigade commander, Brigadier General Bedrˇich NeumannMiroslav.139 Ten Czech volunteers were selected from the Czech Brigade to undergo commando and SOE training in October 1941.140 All the men selected were bachelors and were not natives of Prague. This was done to safeguard the operation as when the team reached Prague none of the local population would recognise them and they would be able to disassociate themselves from any helpers within the Czech population in the city.141 It was feared that the Gestapo and German military would execute all those local Czech people (and their entire families) if it was discovered they had assisted the SOE operatives. The SOE men were given strict instructions not to contact local resistance operators and to operate by themselves. It was intended that the operation would give the impression that it was carried out by local resistance operators rather than SOE men sent from Britain. The secrecy of this operation necessitated the SOE men sent into Prague to avoid all contact with local resistance movement lest the secret be revealed. The ten Czech soldiers were interviewed on successful completion of their SOE training (they were still not told of their operation due to the high level of secrecy). During the interview, they were told that the operation was a near suicide mission. If they were successful, and avoided being killed during the attempt, the SOE operatives could expect to be hunted down aggressively by the German military and the Gestapo. Chances of them escaping back to England alive were very slim.142 After much testing and gruelling questioning the two men finally selected for the Special Operation to kill Heydrich were Josef Gabcˇı´k and Jan Kubisˇ.

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Gabcˇı´k was born on 8 April 1912 in Poluvsie. He joined the Czechoslovakia Army in 1934 and left in 1937 to work in a chemical warfare factory. After the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Germans, he moved to Poland in 1939, and then to France where he joined the Foreign Legion. He later took part in the French Campaign with the Czech Army during Germany’s invasion of France, and was evacuated from Dunkirk. He volunteered for the training and selection for Operation Anthropoid.143 Kubisˇ was born on 24 June 1913 in Dolni Vilemovice. He was also a member of the Czech Army when Czechoslovakia was occupied by the German Army. He, too, escaped to Poland and went to France to join the Foreign Legion. He also fought with the Czech Army in France and was decorated with the French War Cross for his heroic deeds. After evacuating from Dunkirk he volunteered for Special Operations training and was selected for Operation Anthropoid.144 Both Gabcˇı´k and Kubisˇ were finally airlifted out for the commencement of Operation Anthropoid on 28 December 1941.145 Their flight to Czechoslovakia, albeit hazardous, was uneventful. The Anthropoid team was supposed to be dropped at the east of Pilsen but due to the snowy conditions key landmarks were not spotted and the team was dropped at an estimated location near the intended drop zone.146 Gabcˇı´k broke his ankle during the parachute drop. Both Kubisˇ and Gabcˇ´ık soon realised that they had been wrongly dropped at the village of Nehvizdy, about 20 miles from Prague.147 They met a SOKOL member,148 and were brought to Prague where they could hide themselves while Gabcˇı´k nursed his injured foot. In Prague they were assisted by a resistance network known as JINDRA run by Ladislav Vaneˇk.149 At this stage, the real purpose of the Anthropoid Team was not known to the local resistance networks.150 Ironically, the strict instruction given to the Anthropoid Team not to make contact with local resistance was broken almost as soon as they landed.151 After spending months gathering intelligence about Heydrich’s movements in Prague, the real purpose of the Anthropoid team’s mission became apparent to the local resistance network,152 and Vaneˇk appealed to the Anthropoid team to abort the operations as it would lead to mass executions.153 The local resistance and the Anthropoid team had witnessed first-hand the brutal regime of control run by the Germans in Czechoslovakia. A message was reputedly sent to President Benesˇ in

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London asking him to stop the operation, but no reply was received.154 The Anthropoid team, however, had been given strict instructions for their operation and decided to carry on.155 Prior to their departure to Prague, the Anthropoid Team had already been instructed in Britain to kill Heydrich as he was on his way to work in his car. Although the Anthropoid Team were given some flexibility in the method chosen for the killing, following surveillance they stuck to the original plan as Heydrich travelled to his office in an unescorted open top car.156 However, to ambush and kill Heydrich while travelling in his car required precise information about Heydrich’s travel itinerary including the route, any escort and the timing. The Anthropoid team achieved their major breakthrough when an itinerary of Heydrich’s travel plans for 27 May 1941 was found in his office. They also realised from rumours that Heydrich would be leaving Czechoslovakia later on that day for Berlin and that this may be their last chance to kill him.157 The itinerary was obtained when a clock repair man known as Josef Novotny,158 who was also a local resistance informant,159 was sent to repair Heydrich’s office clock and saw a piece of paper with Heydrich’s travel plans for the 27 May. The repairman had crumpled the piece of paper and threw it into the waste basket. When the caretaker woman emptied the basket the repairman retrieved the piece of information from her and passed it to the Czech resistance network. From the recovered piece of itinerary, the Anthropoid team discovered that Heydrich would leave his home at Hradcany Castle at 9.00 am on 27 May to his office at Prague Castle. The journey would take him through the crowded streets of Prague and down a sloped road into a hairpin bend at which point his driver would need to brake hard to slow the car in order to negotiate the bend.160 It was here that the SOE men decided to ambush Heydrich and kill him with sprays of submachine gunfire and antitank grenades. Heydrich’s chauvinistic habit of travelling without any escort or bodyguards further assisted the SOE’s operation. He regularly rode with only his driver in his Mercedes open top car and was confident that his brutal clampdown on Czech resistance would ensure his personal safety up to the point of egotistic ignorance.161 He also considered that travelling without an escort was a propaganda triumph for himself and his policies. This was designed to have a psychological effect on the Czech population, showing that he was not afraid of them

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and a potent political tool demonstrating his superiority over the local Czechs.162 On that fateful morning, Gabcˇı´k was stationed at the hairpin bend with a Sten gun hidden under his rain jacket. Kubisˇ was on the other side of the road armed with anti tank grenades, Mills bombs and a suitcase bomb.163 Both men also carried pistols as personal weapons.164 They were assisted by another Czech SOE member, Josef Valcˇı´k, who had been dropped into Czechoslovakia and encountered the Anthropoid team in Prague by chance.165 Valcˇı´k was positioned further up the slope of the road and was to flash a mirror as a signal that Heydrich’s car was on the way. Then Gabcˇı´k would walk across the road. This was intended to further slow down the Mercedes at which point Gabcˇı´k would spray the occupants of the car with his Sten gun. Kubisˇ will follow up with the throwing of his antitank grenade, with an impact fuse, to finish off the car. The events however did not unfold as planned that morning. Heydrich was late leaving his home as he had spent more time playing with his children. It was past 10 in the morning before he left his house. Finally, at 10.32 am, Heydrich’s car approached the ambush site,166 and Valcˇı´k gave the mirror signal. As Heydrich’s driver slowed the car at the hairpin bend, Gabcˇı´k walked nonchalantly out into the road causing Heydrich’s driver to brake hard and the car almost came to a standstill. Gabcˇ´ık then swung his Sten gun from under his rain jacket and pulled the trigger. Both Heydrich and his driver, were stunned by this man facing them with a Sten gun which he was pointing at them while frantically pulling the trigger. However, nothing happened – the Sten gun was not working.167 After recomposing himself, Heydrich ordered his driver to stop the car instead of speeding away as he wanted to attack the would-be assassin. He rose from his seat and drew his pistol. Kubisˇ, hiding at the other side of the road, reacted at this moment and threw his anti-tank grenade at Heydrich’s car.168 It missed the car but exploded on the right hand side door and lower step fender. Heydrich was reputedly stunned and stood still.169 Other accounts said that he climbed out of the car and started firing his pistol.170 Both Kubisˇ and Gabcˇı´k escaped by bicycle and foot respectively. In their haste to escape, the Anthropoid team left behind a bicycle, a Sten gun magazine and an unexploded anti-tank grenade.171 These items, of British origins (except the bicycle) gave early indications to the Germans that

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the operation was conducted by foreign saboteurs based in Britain. Heydrich’s driver reputedly got out of the car and gave chase. As for Heydrich, one account mentioned that he had also chased after his attackers but collapsed a few steps away from pain due to a wound sustained from the bomb.172 Notwithstanding whether Heydrich chased after his attackers or not, he was found collapsed in pain near his car and a passerby stopped to help Heydrich. A lorry passing by was hailed down, and Heydrich was loaded on to the back of the lorry and taken to the hospital where it was discovered he had a sharpnel wound which had missed his main arteries and vital organs, but injured his spleen, diaphragm and left rib. He was operated on by the German medical superintendent, Professor Dr Diek. The extent of his internal injuries were not thought to be critical or life threatening, although surgery was warranted. Hitler was furious when he heard of the attempted killing and sent Himmler to Prague to start a wave of reprisals and also to check first hand on Heydrich’s condition. Himmler also brought his own personal doctor, Professor Dr Karl Gebhart, to treat Heydrich.173 As a first stage to avenge the attack on Heydrich, Hitler ordered 10,000 Czechs be arrested and executed, with the first 100 from the intelligentsia, to be executed immediately.174 After Himmler visited Heydrich, he collapsed into a coma and died two days later, on 4 June 1942. It was later discovered that he had contracted septicaemia. This was allegedly due to the contamination of the shrapnel that penetrated his body by horsehair from his car’s leather seats.175 It had started an inflammation that ultimately left him dead. The loss of Heydrich was greeted with grief and anger by Hitler. During Heydrich’s funeral eulogy in Berlin where he was given a state funeral, Hitler declared that if the Czechs wanted to avoid the total annihilation of the nation of Czechoslovakia the assassins must be surrendered immediately.176 Heydrich’s deputy, SS Lieutenant-Colonel Karl-Hermann Frank flew to Germany to meet up with Hitler in an effort to stop the reprisals. Frank envisioned that it would make the whole Czech population appear guilty. This would raise popular support for resistance activities. Mass executions of the industrial workers would also disrupt industrial activities vital for Germany’s war effort. Frank also suggested that Heydrich would have preferred to use his ‘carrots and sticks’ approach in reprisals – calculated executions of detained prisoners and suspected

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resistance operatives while using incentives in the form of rewards for information leading to the capture of the assassins.177 Hitler instead dismissed Frank from his post of Deputy Reichprotektor of Bohemia and Morovia and assigned Himmler to take personal charge of the reprisals. Hitler appointed SS General Kurt Daluege as the interim Reichprotektor.178 Himmler launched one of the most intense and largest manhunts in history, searching for the persons responsible for the attack. At that stage, it was not known if the attackers were local Czech resistance fighters or British SOE agents, even though some of the equipment left behind at the scene of Heydrich’s ambush pointed at British involvement.179 Despite the intense search for the attackers, the Germans had no leads. Meanwhile, the mass execution of the Czechs had begun. During the period from 28 May to 1 September 1942, 3,188 Czechs were arrested and 1,357 of them executed.180 Elia´sˇ, who had been arrested and held hostage, was finally executed on 19 June 1942.181 The first lead for the Germans, or what was thought to be a lead, was a fake letter found on a female factory worker, falsely implicating the small village of Lidice. The letter was written by her boyfriend who had boasted that he was involved in resistance activities. After arresting this couple the Gestapo tortured them and extracted information about two Czech pilots who were serving in Britain and had families in Lidice.182 Although the information appeared to be unrelated to the killing of Heydrich, the Gestapo wasted no time in ordering the annihilation of the village. The Germans were desperate to mete out exemplary vengeful acts and Lidice provided a convenient early choice. On 10 June 1942, all men in the village of Lidice between 15 to 84 years of age, a total of 173 men, were executed by shots to the back of the head. Nine men who had been working at factories were also shot after returning to the village together with two teenage boys who had just turned 15.183 The women and children (numbering 104) were sent to concentration camps. Nine children who were considered to be suitable for ‘Germanisation’ were forcefully sent to Germany for adoption by German families.184 Similarly, on the 24 June 1942, the village of Lezˇa´ky suffered a similar fate following the discovery of an illegal radio transmitter.185 The village was burned to the ground, and its inhabitants either shot or sent to concentration camps. At Lezˇa´ky, 57 villagers were executed.186 After exterminating the people, the two villages were torn apart and flattened. Even the dead were not spared – graves were dug out and the

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bones and remains were burned and thrown into various sites. The ponds in the villages were also filled with the rubble from the destroyed houses.187 Both Lidice and Lezˇa´ky were effectively wiped off the map of Czechosovakia. Meanwhile, in Prague, the Anthropoid team was hiding at an Orthodox Church coincidentally with five other SOE operatives. They had stumbled into the monastery by chance and hid there while the search for them outside the church was intensive. The invincibility of their successful hideout bears testimony to the team’s training and capability in maintaining secrecy. Their fate, however, took a twist when one of their fellow members, an SOE operative named Karel Cˇurda who had been hiding out in his mother’s house, became frightened of the deadly consequences should he be found and captured, betrayed the Anthropoid team.188 Also, Cˇurda allegedly betrayed the Anthropoid team for the reward of 10 million crowns given for information leading to the capture of the assassins.189 Cˇurda did not know exactly where the team were hiding but knew one of their contacts in Prague, Adolf Moravec. Moravec was a Czech resistance operative and ran a safe house in Prague for SOE operatives. Acting on Cˇurda’s information, Moravec, his wife and his son, Ata were arrested immediately. Moravec’s wife, however, managed to commit suicide just before capture.190 Subsequently both Moravec and Ata were brutally tortured under interrogation. The Gestapo knew that Moravec would not reveal anything but his son was near breaking point. They showed Ata the head of his mother in a fish tank and he broke down. Ata revealed that the SOE operatives were hiding in Prague’s Orthodox Church of SS Cyril and Method in Ressel Street.191 The Germans rushed to the church and surrounded it in the early morning of 18 June 1942. A firefight soon erupted when the Germans stumbled into the SOE men’s hideout in the church but, in the ensuing firefight, the SOE men managed to resist the Germans. The Germans resorted to filling up the church with smoke and tear gas, and flooding the crypts with water but to no avail. Finally, almost out of ammunition and to avoid capture, the SOE men decided to take their own lives. All of them killed themselves either with cyanide pills or by shooting themselves. The Germans, after capturing the church, arrested the priests Vladimı´r Petrˇek and Va´clav Cˇikl, the churchwarden Jan Sonnevend, and Bishop Gorazd. They were all subsequently tried and executed.192 After the war, in September

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1945, both Gabcˇı´k and Kubisˇ were posthumously awarded the King’s Certificate of Commendation and were mentioned in despatches.193

The outcome After Heydrich’s death, Benesˇ and his government attributed the successful killing of Heydrich to the Czech resistance movement. This he hoped would direct attention to the capabilities and the strength of the Czech resistance. He also wanted to avoid the perception that the attack was organised from Britain, as this would have served as a propaganda tool for the Nazis to blame the exiled Czech Government and the British for the consequences of the attack – the mass executions of Czechs.194 The news of the attempt on Heydrich’s life was announced on Prague radio on 27 May 1942 and was picked up by British radio intercepts. Although Heydrich was only wounded at that time, the news generated widespread celebration in Britain, raising Czechoslovakia’s government-in-exile’s prestige.195 The brutal reprisals unleashed on the Czech population, however, needed further assessment. The bigger moral issue of a state leader having to weigh the fate of the state and nation against the sacrifices of a few thousand of its citizens is not easy. As proved earlier, Benesˇ and his staff had known that the killing of Heydrich would definitely trigger mass brutal reprisals. Benesˇ was in a desperate situation at the end of 1941, when the operation was planned and launched. At that time, between the months of October and December 1941, the Allies were losing the war in Europe. The Russians had suffered a series of setbacks during the first stages of Operation Barbarossa. In the North African theatre, General Erwin Rommel was running circles around the British forces with just two Panzer Divisions, and in late 1941 and early 1942, the British Empire was losing its valued colonial possessions in the Far East to the Japanese (Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore). Pearl Harbor had been bombed by the Japanese, and albeit with the joining in the war effort by the United States, the immediate future in Europe looked dismal. If the war ended then, through a negotiated process between Britain and Germany, the fate of Czechoslovakia was uncertain. Czechoslovakia may have remained carved up by the 1938 Munich Agreement. Benesˇ was worried about this prospect and wanted to demonstrate that the Czechs were doing their

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bit in fighting for their freedom, and struggling for the reinstatement of the pre-Munich Agreement territorial rights. Benesˇ was also ashamed that the Czechs were not living up to the wider Allied expectations of vast resistance activities against the Germans occupiers. Czechoslovakia ranked bottom in the league of resistance activities. Benesˇ was further ashamed by the Czech population subjugating to Heydrich’s ‘carrots and sticks’ policies when the industrial workers actually churned out higher productivity rates in the war armaments industry in Bohemia. These precise factors influenced Benesˇ in deciding that the sacrifice of some of the Czech population was acceptable for the greater good of the state. He had lamented to his chief of intelligence, Moravec, how he had envied the resilience of the French people in raising productive resistance activities.196 Gray’s deft assessment of the moral issues and strategy drew a concrete answer to the moral dilemma in this study of the killing of Heydrich; If the cause is held to be sufficiently sacred, means and methods may obey no rule save that of an expediency equated with a necessity that should tolerate no compromise. Rarely, if ever, do politics forego anticipated strategic advantage primarily for reasons of conscience rather than caution in risk assessment.197 It must be argued also that had Heydrich lived he would have been no less brutal in his continued oppression of the Czech people. He had set out to Germanise the Czech states and eradicate those who were deemed unfit for Germanisation, which would have entailed the tragic killing of thousands of Czechs. What the killing of Heydrich did trigger was an acceleration of the process of killing in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps the most bitter memory in swaying Benesˇ’s decision to carry out the operation, even though the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians was at the back of his mind, was the regret that Czechoslovakia was not given a chance to fight for her freedom in 1938, but instead was betrayed by her Allies at the negotiating table. Had Czechoslovakia gone to war to defend her territorial sovereignty, this too would have cost thousands of deaths.198 This probable human cost would be substituted by the executions following Heydrich’s killing. Benesˇ, a staunch believer in democracy, believed that the mass brutal reprisals would throw something shameful back at the Allies who had appeased Hitler in Munich. Benesˇ’s intelligence chief and

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the person who had played a major role in planning the operation, selecting the team, and gathering all necessary intelligence support, Moravec, summed up the moral issue in a persuasive manner: In my opinion, the problem of cost can be reduced to a simple principle, so well understood by the parachutists Kubis and Gabcik: freedom and, above all, liberation from slavery, have to be fought for, and this means losses in human lives.199 The acceptance of the Czech government-in-exile in London of the harsh reprisals and human losses was further proven from this passage in a report on the killing of Heydrich prepared in the aftermath of Operation Anthropoid: There are no public regrets (Czech view in London) for the blow against HEYDRICH. On the contrary, the official tendency is to take great credit to the Czech nation for a telling blow.200 British Labour MP, Ronald T. Paget, provided further proof on this calculated deliberate move to incite reprisals in order to raise the hatred against German occupation after the war by stating: . . . among the tactics of underground and partisan war was provocation of reprisals in order to stoke up hatred against the occupying force and attract more recruits into the Resistance! That was the reason why we flew a squad into Czechoslovakia to murder Heydrich.201 The larger moral issue, however, was that the operation was carried out by SOE men in civilian clothes, which was a clear breach of the Hague Conventions of 1899. Article 1, Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II); 29 July 1899; Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Section I – On Belligerents, Chapter 1: On the Qualifications of Belligerents; Article 1 stated: The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps, fulfilling the following conditions: . . . To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance.202

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The Hague Conventions stipulated clearly that under the Laws of War a combatant must wear a sort of uniform, even as simple as an emblem. In the case of SOE men and women in various covert operations in occupied Europe during World War II, in which their work were conducted in plain civilian clothes, the Laws of War had blatantly been breached. It must be noted, however, that such breaches of internationally accepted rules of engagement were not usually investigated or prosecuted if performed by the victors of a war. After World War II, war crime tribunals were set up to punish the losers in that war, while the victors’ war crimes fell on muted ears and blinded eyes.203 The old adage resonates, ‘Fortune favours the victor.’ The brutal reprisals, however, worked in favour of the Czech cause. For example, the brutal slaughter of Lidice provided moral fuel and propaganda triumphs for Czechoslovakia. Various towns and villages in Great Britain and the United States were co-named with Lidice. It symbolises the evil and cruel Nazi regime that had to be fought and destroyed.204 The US Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, remarked: ‘If future generations ask us what we were fighting for in this war we shall tell them the story of Lidice.’205 It must be noted, however, that the disgust and anger over the wholesale massacres conducted by the Germans in Czechoslovakia may have been based on grossly miscalculated numbers of victims. In the SOE file (located in the National Archives, Kew Gardens), on its operations in Czechoslovakia, there is a report on the ‘Execution of Heydrich’ written on 24 August 1942, which was almost three months after the Heydrich attack. In this report, the number of victims from the Lidice massacre was noted as 1,200 men, women and children,206 four times more than the real number of victims. The uproar over the brutal reprisals may have been aggravated by the deft use of propaganda in the Allies’ media. The news of the brutal massacre by the Nazi regime in occupied European states was good propaganda to raise the morale of the public and gain wider support for the war against Nazism by providing convenient reasons and answers to ‘why we fight’ in the minds of the British and American people.207 The expected rise in resistance activities, however, failed to take place. Ironically this was due to the lesser degree of violence being unleashed onto the Czech population than Heydrich’s killing had been

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expected to trigger. The reprisals, although brutal, were on a lesser scale than those Hitler had originally ordered. An estimated total of 5,000 Czechs died as a result of the reprisal operations, half the number Hitler had originally ordered. This lesser degree of reprisals plausibly halted the expected surge in hatred towards the German occupiers and any increase in resistance activities. After the initial euphoria of the successful killing of Heydrich the subsequent resistance activities remained docile. This docility was aggravated by the mass executions of suspected resistance organisers and members, setting back further the already small resistance movements in Czechoslovakia.208 In 1943, there were demands from the Russians and the British for the Czech resistance to sabotage the Skoda arms works. Both demands were rejected by the Czech resistance movements who feared a repeat of the mass reprisals triggered by Heydrich’s killing.209 The resistance movements were also worried that any drastic operation against the Germans would lead to the final destruction of the remaining small and weak resistance networks. The strategy of killing Heydrich, however, had paid off in terms of the long-term international decisions to alter the fate of the Czech state and nation. The spectacular Special Operation was a morale-boosting act for the Czech government-in-exile and the Czech exiles living outside Czechoslovakia (even though it did not manage to raise the local Czechs’ morale). It also served as a propaganda triumph that provided the final catalyst to move the major Allied powers in renouncing the Munich agreement. The killing of Heydrich highlighted to the world the Czech resolve to fight for their freedom, and the ensuing mass killing of innocent Czechs, provided a convenient moral impetus that moved the major parties in the Munich agreement in 1938 to renounce that agreement. As an early indication of the future, the Czech government-in-exile obtained official US support for the repudiation of the Munich Agreement on 11 June 1942.210 Soon afterwards it was finally annulled by both Britain (5 August 1942) and France (29 September 1942).211 Benesˇ was proud of the recognition that was given to his rule and the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia sovereign rights after the war. This was his ultimate political objective, to reform Czechoslovakia after the war back to as it was prior to the Munich Agreement in 1938. Benesˇ remarked after the Lidice massacre:

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It is terrible what the Nazis do but from the political point of view these events brought one surety to us: the situation now cannot develop in which Czechoslovakia would not be recognised as an independent state. All the time I feared a negotiated peace. Negotiated peace is still the only hope for Germany, but now I feel secure . . . I was afraid that they would leave us in one way or another intergrated [integrated] with Germany . . . The executions . . . consolidated our state of affairs. This is the great political consequence of these events.212 Even after the war, Benesˇ and his government-in-exile decided not to reveal the origins of the assassination of Heydrich to avoid any potential backlash from the local Czech population who had suffered tragically at the hands of the Nazis compared to the relatively comfortable life of exiled Czechs returning home after the war. When the communists gained control of Czechoslovakia in 1948 the importance of the assassination of Heydrich was not discussed as the operation had nothing to do with the Czech communist resistance movement – it was still believed then that Heydrich was killed by local non-communist Czech resistance fighters.213 The truth behind the assassination was only revealed in 1964 by Moravec.214

The findings The usefulness of this operation will be revisited in relation to the two core research questions. 1. How strategically effective was this leadership decapitation operation in World War II? Operation Anthropoid was conceived by Benesˇ and the Czech government-in-exile to achieve two main objectives: to show the world that the Czech government was still in the fight against the Nazi regime in Europe; and to raise support for local Czech resistance activities and membership. The Czech resistance activities in Europe were ranked the lowest in occupied European states and the Czech government-in-exile ran the risk of losing its legitimacy as a recognised government in absentia. The low level of Czech resistance activities and

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the reputed collaboration of the Czech population with the Nazi regime run by Heydrich had relegated the fate of the Czech nation to that of a pariah state if the war were to end quickly. If the Allies were victorious the future of the Czech nation was also in doubt due to its submissive and conciliative attitude towards the Nazi regime. Benesˇ was desperate to change that situation and the bleak outlook it promised. Operation Anthropoid, the plan to kill Heydrich, was conceived in order to trigger a strategic outcome aimed at raising the status of Czechoslovakia’s resistance against the German occupation. President Benesˇ’ strategy also had a clearcut aim of advancing his political ambitions in the international arena. Benesˇ knew the killing of Heydrich would result in mass reprisals and brutal executions. It was intended that this effect would instil hatred towards the German occupiers and demonstrate to the Czech population the realities of being a subjugated state. He wanted to inspire widespread resistance activities as demonstrated in France, who he had always envied. His political aspirations of making sure that Czechoslovakia was reinstated to its territorial rights pre-1938 Munich Agreement pushed him into undertaking this daring operation. He calculated that the outcome of the operation, if successful, would raise the image and prestige of Czechoslovakia, and would give him an important trump card to bargain with the Allies to recognise the original state of Czechoslovakia and eradicate the question of Sudetenland after the war should the Allies be victorious. In terms of the aforementioned research question, Operation Anthropoid was successful in showing the world what the Czechs could do and were willing to do for the survival of their state and nation. The killing, and its aftermath, resulted in a watershed moment whereby the Allies decided to show their sympathies and gave morale support for the Czech nation, and agreed to repudiate the Munich Agreement. Czechoslovakia was assured of its pre-1938 territorial rights and full recognition of its national sovereignty and international rights as an independent state. The net strategic effect of a positive political outcome for the state of Czechoslovakia, albeit with a high human cost, was priceless. This is a clear-cut example of how to use strategy to achieve the ends. The strategy of decapitation of an enemy leader (Heydrich) achieved intangible morale effects that shaped the final political outcome. The operation, however, failed to achieve the second objective of raising local resistance activities and support. The mass and brutal

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reprisals actually destroyed most of the remaining resistance operatives and broke the network. The Czech resistance movement did not achieve a higher rate of operations than they had before the killing of Heydrich. An author, who was himself a French SOE operative, commented that if the people need to be harshly woken up to resist the Germans, such people were in actuality predisposed to have not much interest in resistance activities; no amount of morale encouragement to resist the Germans may work on them.215 Although the operation failed to raise local morale, the resultant raising of morale outside Czechoslovakia and, more importantly, the morale support heaped on Czechoslovakia by friendly foreign powers were invaluable for the ultimate Czech cause. 2. How tactically effective was the Special Operations unit used in this operation? Operation Anthropoid demonstrated the successful use of a small team of Special Operations operatives in conducting a leadership killing. A team of just two men, highly trained in Special Operations techniques, parachuted in and spent five months reconnoitring and surviving in a hostile environment. They continued to move around and stay inside Prague for about five months before carrying out their operation. It must be noted that Prague at that time was full of routine German military and Gestapo roadblocks and individual pass checks. The Gestapo was also on the constant hunt for resistance operatives and British SOE agents. There were also many Czech collaborators working for the Germans. The Anthropoid team had to survive the constant threat of being discovered and captured. Their ability to operate in such a hostile close urban environment again showed that a Special Operations unit of highly trained men could be flexible and able to operate behind enemy lines as well as be able to pounce on the enemy when the time was right. The support of the local population for the operation also enhanced its chance of success. The local population had given the Anthropoid team safe shelter and aided in the operation’s intelligence gathering. The Anthropoid team conducted successful intelligence gathering concerning Heydrich’s movements, which resulted in a successful operation. This operation also validated the golden principle of Special

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Operations – surprise. The attack on Heydrich was a complete surprise. The fact that the Germans did not know where the attackers had hidden after the attack nor their real identities, i.e. whether or not it was local resistance fighters, again point to the successful application of secrecy. The Anthropoid team, although suffered some niggling problems (e.g. the jammed Sten gun and the leaving of evidence at the scene of the killing), had conducted the operation with utmost professionalism. Even though they knew from local resistance networks that the killing of Heydrich would result in mass reprisals they persisted with their operation. All these points led to the successful conduct of a Special Operation.

Conclusion Operation Anthropoid, from the evidence evaluated in this chapter, was without a doubt a successful operation. The target, Reinhard Heydrich, was killed, and this resulted in the intended effect for President Benesˇ to demonstrate to the world that the Czechs still had some fighting spirit in them. The brutal reprisals following the killing were not an accident resulting from the killing but a cold and calculated move. The political ripples from the reprisals, and the killing of Heydrich provided morale fuel that consolidated Czechoslovakia’s position in the Allied powers, and guaranteed the survival of her national destiny. The deeper moral issues surrounding the deaths of the innocent Czech civilians are not easy to answer. The Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic spoke about these sacrifices in 2002: These people were not victims. They were heroes! Heroes who laid down their lives on the home front in a way that was no less exposed than the real fighting front . . . It was from their blood, too, that our freedom emerged in May 1945.216 On 27 May 2009, almost seven decades after the killing of Heydrich, a memorial statute was officially unveiled at the spot where Heydrich was killed honouring the brave SOE men and Czech people who died for the cause. At that event, Jirˇı´ Navra´til (who was a teenager when Heydrich was killed), was asked what he felt about the killing of Heydrich. He replied:

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Actually I think that it is the most important day, because all the world could see that the Czech people – in spite of all the old history – were against Nazism and would be free.217 And when Mr Navra´til was probed further on the human cost involved, he answered, ‘That was war, you see. It’s necessary in war to fight.’218 In Gray’s fine study on the relationship between strategy and morality, he provided a persuasive insight which ‘strategically’ fits as an apt closing statement to this case study; In practice, as a general rule the moral dimension to conflict is accommodated, tamed, and even deployed as a weapon, for such net strategic advantage as it can garner.219 (emphasis added) The next chapter discusses an audacious British Special Operation that captured a high-ranking German general in Crete; the only successful attempt of such a feat in World War II. This is a little discussed Special Operation which at first glance appeared to be insignificant in its overall strategic utility. It did, however, have deeper consequences for the Allies’ strategy in the Mediterranean as will be seen.

CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY OF THE KIDNAP OF MAJOR GENERAL KREIPE IN CRETE

Introduction Crete, an island with a population of 400,000, is located south of mainland Greece in a strategic position in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. In the early years of World War II Crete was an important island that simply had to be defended by the Allies in the face of German and Italian conquests in the Mediterranean area. A force of 58,000 British (and Commonwealth) troops was sent to defend Greece against an invasion by German and Italian forces,1 drawing precious manpower away from Generals Wavell and O’Connor’s command in North Africa just as the British forces were crucially needed for a final drive against the Italians in Tripoli in 1941.2 The German and Italian forces managed to defeat the Greek and British forces in mainland Greece. Some of these British and Greek forces were hastily evacuated to Crete leaving behind a substantial amount of heavy arms and equipment.3 Middle East Command decided to defend the island of Crete as they realised its strategic importance as it could serve as a major airbase and naval post to disrupt shipping activities in the Mediterranean Sea. The Germans followed up their success in Greece by launching the largest Fallschirmja¨ger airborne assault on Crete. The Germans soon captured the island in the face of initial concerted and stubborn

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resistance from the British forces. The Cretans resisted the German invasion almost immediately by helping the British forces in fighting the Germans.4 This action resulted in brutal reprisals carried out against the Cretans by the Germans after the island was captured.5 These reprisals fuelled even more resistance activities conveniently aided by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). SOE in Crete conducted some successful and important operations including the successful evacuation of Lieutenant General Angelico Carta, commander of the Italian forces in Crete, after the Italian Armistice in 1943, culminating in the successful abduction of the commander of German forces in Crete, Major General Karl Heinrich Georg Ferdinand Kreipe in May 1944 who was subsequently removed to Egypt. This operation, which has not been widely studied, is the only case where a plan to capture a German general was conducted successfully in a Special Operation. M.R.D. Foot, an eminent historian on SOE and resistance activities in World War II, declared that, ‘It was a model minor operation; but we must turn back to major ones.’6 Such assessment of the operation is rudimentary at best.7 The operation to capture Kreipe had wider and deeper strategic and political implications than appeared at first glance. This chapter describes this operation, and evaluates its strategic utility.

Crete during World War II: a brief outline Following the loss of Greece to the Axis forces at the end of 1940, Crete, with its excellent harbours, remained an important bastion for the Royal Navy. The naval bases on the island were used as a springboard to launch attacks against Axis shipping in the eastern Mediterranean.8 Crete’s Suda Bay, with its natural harbour for ships, had been termed the ‘second Scapa’ by Winston Churchill.9 He ordered the defence of Crete by turning it into a ‘fortress’ in the Mediterranean Sea. He hoped that a stubborn defence of the island would bolster morale in those days and add as a first major victory against Hitler’s military advances throughout Europe.10 Considered easily defensible with good sea supply from Egypt and maritime protection from naval invasion by the Royal Navy, the British overlooked another important dimension of warfare, air power. The British forces on the island did not have adequate airplanes to defend

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themselves from the Luftwaffe, who proved themselves to be tragically successful in the future battle of Crete. At the start of the German invasion of Crete the British had six Hurricanes, 12 Blenheims, and 18 Gladiators and Fulmars.11 Apart from the Hurricanes, these aircraft were obsolete in terms of combat power and were easily destroyed in early air attacks by the Luftwaffe before the start of the main invasion.12 On the eve of the invasion, only three Hurricanes remained and these were flown to Egypt to avoid imminent destruction, effectively leaving the air space of Crete at the mercy of the Luftwaffe.13 The lack of British airpower in Crete was ironic as the few airfields in Crete, namely at Heraklion and Maleme, were 700 miles away from the valuable Ploies¸ti oil fields in Romania and 250 miles away from North Africa. The importance of these airbases, in terms of their location and consequent capability to supplement combat air power that could disrupt shipping and destroy land-based targets, was not missed by the eagle-eyed planners in the Luftwaffe.14 While the German High Command was busy planning the launch of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe presented a plan to invade Crete based on their concern about its strategic value and the threat the British airfields there posed to the Axis’s strategic assets.15 By capturing Crete, the Germans would have captured all those airfields in Greece and Crete that posed any threat to the Germans’ southern flank in the invasion of Russia.16 The invasion of Crete would also be a first in a series of planned airborne invasions in the Mediterranean namely Cyprus, Malta and the Suez Canal.17 The plan involved the use of elite paratroopers to capture a few important airfields thereby allowing an air landing force to reinforce the German offensive. This would be bolstered by another German ground force landing from the sea. It was estimated that the defence of Crete by British forces would be weak as their numbers were small. The Germans also believed that the Cretans would not resist the invasion due to their dislike of the Greek monarchy, allied with the British, and that they would welcome the German invaders to expel the British occupiers.18 The German invasion of Crete would involve the 7th Flieger Division being parachuted and glider dropped onto Crete. The number of German troops earmarked for involvement in the operation was 45,000 men.19 Once landed, these first Fallschirmja¨ger units would attack and destroy the anti-aircraft batteries and capture the key airstrips in

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Heraklion, Maleme and Rehtymnon.20 The 5th Mountain Division would then be air-landed. The German invasion of Crete was codenamed Operation Merkur and led by General Kurt Student.21 The Germans, however, had their intelligence wrong in their estimation of the strength of the British forces and the fighting morale of the Cretans. The British Commonwealth forces in the Crete island numbered 15,000 British, 7,750 New Zealanders, 6,500 Australians and 10,200 Greeks, a total of almost 40,000 troops.22 The 10,200 Greeks were a hastily created body of local Cretans and Greek soldiers who had escaped from mainland Greece.23 The formation of these Greek ‘regiments’ would prove crucial in the future resistance activities of the Cretans and was the brainchild of the British commander in Crete, General Bernard Freyberg,24 a highly decorated New Zealand army general and veteran of World War I when he was awarded the highest bravery award, the Victoria Cross.25 The British also had a secret upper-hand – Ultra intelligence. Churchill and the British forces knew beforehand about the planned German airborne invasion and subsequent reinforcement from the sea.26 Nonetheless, the subsequent progress of the Battle of Crete demonstrated that without sound tactical leadership and operational command, and air superiority, even with superior foreknowledge, the British Commonwealth forces were doomed to failure. Operation Merkur was finally launched on 20 May 1941. The German invasion started badly when the first Fallschirmja¨gers parachuting in were cut down by the British defenders as they descended by parachute onto Crete in the areas of Heraklion and Rehtymnon. The German paratroopers encountered problems immediately. Their practise of jumping with only their combat knives, pistols, and hand grenades, and then collecting their main and heavy weapons from canisters proved fatal for them. In their parachute drop over the drop zones, they endured withering anti-aircraft fire from the British forces below and many were killed while still in their parachutes. Upon landing, they had to rush to their weapons canisters to get their weapons and many more were cut down doing so. The British definitely had the upper hand in the opening phase of the battle.27 Some serious misjudgements of the situation, however, resulted in a turn of events leading to the Germans obtaining advantage over the British forces.28 The turning point was when the 22 NZ Battalion under Colonel L.W. Andrew in charge of defending Maleme airfield, was caught in a vicious fight with the German

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paratroopers. Andrew, fearing being cut off, mistakenly withdrew his forces enabling the German paratroopers to capture that vital airfield.29 The capture of this airfield was crucial for the Germans to air-land additional troops and supplies. Operation Merkur also involved the naval landing of some 7,000 German troops. The landing fleet was caught by the Royal Navy and prevented from its amphibious landing operation. The Royal Navy lost two cruisers and a destroyer sunk by German air attacks during this action.30 The German forces had to rely on manpower landed by air, either parachute, glider or transport planes, to continue the invasion culminating in a total of 22,040 men air-landed successfully on Crete.31 The German paratroopers were outnumbered two to one by the British forces in Crete but possessed uncontested air superiority. The British further attempted to bolster the defences of Crete by sending in two battalions of commandos called ‘Layforce’ under Colonel Robert Laycock. Layforce landed on Suda Bay on the nights of 24 and 26 May 1941 and consisted of 500 lightly armed commandos.32 The balancing point in the battle had by then tilted in favour of the Germans. The German forces had advanced from both the north and the south of Crete, threatening to encircle the retreating British forces who were moving towards the south easterly tip of the Canea region towards the harbour of Sphakia. From Sphakia, the British planned to evacuate as many men and officers as possible to Egypt. The order to evacuate the surviving British forces came on 27 May 1941.33 A series of valiant rearguard actions was fought by the retreating British forces, but all were lost as the British forces disintegrated into a chaotic retreat in the face of unforgiving German aerial supremacy and persistent bombing. This resulted in a hasty retreat of British troops to Sphakia. The monarch of Greece, King George II, and the Greek Prime Minister Emmanouil Tsouderos, who had both sought refuge in Crete after the fall of Greece, managed to escape to Alexandria, Egypt. King George II had been identified by Hitler as the leader who needed to be captured in order to decapitate any form of Greek government-in-exile. The operation to evacuate King George II and Tsouderos was similar to the operation to capture Major General Kreipe; both of these important leaders of Greece were moved by foot across the White Mountains and through Cretan fields before embarking on a Royal Navy submarine off the coast of Ayia Roumeli.34

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The initial orderly evacuation descended into chaos as news that the Royal Navy, fearing heavy losses from air attacks, had decided to cut the evacuation operation to three nights instead of four. There was a famous case of Laycock jumping the queue and disregarding orders to lead his commando force to fight a rearguard action. This rearguard action ultimately left him and his men behind in Crete. Laycock was reputed to have disregarded orders and left his men on the field, escaping himself in the last evacuation from the beaches of Sphakia.35 This action lead to a general misunderstanding of Laycock’s intention to join Operation Flipper (operation to kill or capture Rommel) as detailed in Chapter 6. The evacuation extricated 17,500 British Commonwealth troops from Crete to Egypt.36 As a result of the cancellation of the fourth night of evacuations, 5,000 British, Australian and New Zealand troops were left behind, and many surrendered to the Germans the next day.37 As many as 1,000 men did not surrender and hid in the mountains or with local Cretans.38 The majority of them were subsequently evacuated by covert amphibious means, either by motor launches or submarines.39 The British forces lost 1,751 men killed, 1,738 wounded, and 12,254 taken prisoner in the defence of Crete.40 The Germans also suffered horrendous casualties with a total of 3,986 German troops killed or missing and 2,594 wounded.41 The Germans losses were so serious that Hitler ordered no further airborne operations be undertaken again during World War II.42 The German losses, some of them attributed to Cretan resistance fighters, resulted in widespread brutal reprisals against the Cretan population.43 The British forces’ poor performance in the defence of Crete was attributed to poor command and leadership in the British Commonwealth forces. This was further exacerbated by not having enough men to defend the island of Crete and the loss of air superiority. The British, however, had a naval superiority, which enabled them to evacuate their men and also to keep the Germans from reinforcing Crete by naval means, at least until the British forces abandoned the island for good.44 The defence of Crete, however, had inflicted heavy losses on the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, with three cruisers and six destroyers sunk and 17 ships damaged.45 Ultimately, the British defeat in Crete by fewer numbers of German forces was a major embarrassment in a series of disgraceful military setbacks in those bleak early years of World War II.46

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Cretan resistance activities A large number of Cretans had taken arms with whatever weapons they could get hold of, including kitchen knives and clubs, and joined the British forces during the Battle of Crete. They were known for their brutal methods of killing German parachutists by using knives and clubs, often cutting the throats or clubbing to death some of these unfortunate German parachutists. They were also said to have mutilated the dead bodies of German troops, claims that were found to be inaccurate. The mutilation of the bodies was actually due to the hot weather and the presence of birds of prey which ate the flesh of the bodies. Nonetheless, on 31 May 1941, the German General Student ordered his forces to conduct reprisals against the Cretans which he labelled as francs-tireurs.47 A large number of Crete civilians were executed and villages were destroyed as a result of these reprisals. For example, a total of 180 men were shot during the destruction of the villages of Kandanos, Selino, Kakopetro and Floria.48 In the village of Prasses, 698 Cretans were executed, a further 60 were shot at Kondomari,49 and a total of 147 were executed in the villages of Skines, Phournes and Alikianou.50 These early brutal reprisals further hardened the resolve of the Cretan population, who were traditionally fighters – generations before them had defeated a Turkish invasion – and they had no qualms about fighting against a new invader, the German and Italian troops garrisoned on their island.51 The Cretan resistance naturally rose against the German occupation. Adam Hopkins candidly summed up the Cretans’ resolve to resist the German occupation: An astonishingly high proportion of Crete’s people refused to acknowledge that they were beaten and fought back as best they could, covertly at first and later openly, often at the cost of their own lives.52 The SOE wasted no time in attempting to start a resistance movement in Crete, which was relatively easy as the resistance was already underway as a response towards early brutal German reprisals against the Crete civilian population.53 The Cretans were also involved in the hiding of a large number of British Commonwealth troops who were left behind after the evacuation, thereby sealing their affinity with the British rather than with the Germans. A number of SOE operatives were sent to Crete to train the resistance fighters, supply them with

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weapons and demolitions equipment, wireless radio sets, and secretly to evacuate some of the Allied soldiers left behind in Crete.

SOE in Crete The British early effort in planning clandestine stay-behind SOE teams in Greece was hampered by the mistaken belief that the Greek government, run by Fascist General Ioannis Metaxas with the endorsement of Greece’s King George II, would negotiate a peaceful alliance with the Axis powers, namely Germany.54 The British clandestine special operations groups of SOE and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) were surprised by the turn of events when Metaxas rejected a German ultimatum to submit to Axis forces in 1940.55 The German invasion was swift, and even though the British supplied some troops to assist the Greeks in defending the German invasion, the Greeks were soon overwhelmed. The remnants of some of the Greek troops and British forces managed to escape to the island of Crete. Meanwhile in Crete, SOE and Section D SIS officers John Pendlebury, Terence Bruce-Mitford and Jack Hamson started a resistance network in case the Germans launch an invasion of Crete.56 When Crete was finally assaulted by German airborne paratroopers in May 1941, the British and Greek forces were defeated.57 One of the first hastily formed SOE stay-behind teams was also lost when its leader, Pendlebury, was killed by the Germans.58 The early embryonic network was destroyed as a result of his death. Both SOE and SIS in Cairo then launched independent covert operations from scratch to infiltrate agents to assist the Cretan resistance network in conducting sabotage and subversion. Both SOE and SIS had a ready pool of experienced officers and troops recently escaped from Crete. Some of these had been left behind there for weeks before finally managing to escape to Egypt only to be sent back to Crete to conduct Special Operations. SOE and SIS, however, were not on the best of working terms. In the first few operations to initiate assistance to resistance networks in Crete they had to cooperate with each other. Due to the lack of trained wireless operators in both organisations, they were forced to share such precious personnel between them.59 The first clandestine Special Operations team went into Crete on 9 October 1941. This was a combined SOE and SIS effort led by SOE

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officer Jack Smith-Hughes, and his radio operator, SIS agent Ralph Stockbridge.60 This was followed by the successful insertion of the second SOE team on 23 October 1941 led by Monty Woodhouse.61 Another SOE officer, Xan Fielding was also successfully sent into Crete with a seven-man team in December 1941.62 As a result, by 1942, Crete was divided into three SOE operational sectors with each sector having its own SOE team conducting operations with the local resistance movements. These three sectors were commanded by Major Patrick Michael Leigh Fermor, Fielding and Tom Dunbabin.63 Leigh Fermor would later plan and lead the daring operation that captured Major General Kreipe in Crete. Leigh Fermor was a young British soldier who had travelled throughout Europe before World War II started. When the war started he enlisted in the British Army and was sent to the Irish Guards and put in General Lists after passing his officers’ training course. His knowledge of Greek and other languages led to him being posted to Albania, and then he fought in Greece and Crete.64 He eventually returned to Cairo, joined the SOE and was sent to Crete as an SOE operative, where he conducted numerous operations with Cretan resistance movements.65 SOE’s early operations in Crete aimed to contact local Cretan leaders and establish resistance organisations and networks. The purpose was to raise the morale of the local Cretan people and also to create a force to aid any future liberation plans by the Allied forces. SOE was also to help evacuate any British forces soldiers left behind and escaped prisoners of war (POWs) as well as selected Greeks and Cretans. These selected Greeks and Cretans would be sent to Cairo for training in guerrilla warfare, especially demolitions work. SOE was also responsible for gathering intelligence and transmitting it to Cairo. In line with SOE’s original spirit, to conduct sabotage on enemy, and to supply arms, ammunition and other essential items to local resistance fighters. SOE’s presence in Crete was not easy and was full of hazards. Even though the Cretan resistance was noted for its courageous fight against the German occupation, there were segments of the Cretan population who did not support the resistance movements due to the bloody reprisals conducted by the Germans. They also hated the Greek government-in-exile at the time, which was strongly backed by the

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Allies. Their affections were further complicated by the presence of Communist-supporting arms of Ethnikon Apeleutherotikon Metopon (EAM) or the National Liberation Front,66 and its military wing Ethnikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos Stratos (ELAS) or the National Popular Liberation Army.67 Neither EAM nor ELAS supported the SOE missions and on some occasions even betrayed them to the Germans.68 The reason for this was that the British policy at that time was to support the Greek monarchy and establish a democratic government in Greece after the war. The communist EAM/ELAS opposed these plans and, as a result, did not support the SOE operations.69 Apart from local rivalry among the Cretan population, who were divided along political ideological lines, there was an organisational political battle being fought in Cairo. SOE and SIS were rivals, although they cooperated at the tactical level, the leadership of the two organisations did not subscribe to similar practice.70 Due to this rivalry, it is believed that SOE responded by conducting some daring operations in order to outshine their SIS cousins. For example, SOE organised a daring operation in 1942 to sink HMS York which had been left damaged in Suda Bay during the Crete invasion by the Germans and subsequently abandoned by the British Royal Navy. The Germans were believed to be repairing it for future use. A one-man Special Operation, conducted by Arthur Reade, was launched to sink it. Reade landed by submarine on 27 November 1942, and spent six months wandering around Crete. He realised that it was impossible to sink HMS York by himself with the resources he had and was later evacuated from Crete and sent back to England.71

Early Commando raids in Crete The British conducted a few commando raids on airfields on Crete as they were put to good use by the Luftwaffe to supply Rommel’s Afrika Korps in the North Africa campaign. Special Operations were launched to destroy the airplanes in these airfields by the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS). On 23 May 1942 the SAS attacked the Heraklion airfield while the SBS attacked the Maleme, Kastelli Pediados and Tymbaki airfields.72 The SAS and SBS men landed in Crete and were guided to their targets by SOE officer Tom Dunbabin and local Cretan resistance fighters.73 The SBS teams found the Tymbaki airfield

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abandoned, and the Maleme airfield too heavily guarded. A newly installed electric fence at Maleme airfield did not encourage the SBS men to undertake further exploits there.74 The SBS men attacked the Kastelli Pediados airfield and, on 9 June 1942, destroyed five aircraft and almost 200 tons of aviation fuel.75 The SAS team (consisting of Captain the Earl of Jellicoe, Lieutenant Petrakis of the Royal Hellenic Army, and four French SAS personnel) attacked the Maleme airfield on 13 June 1942 and destroyed 20 Junkers 88 bombers. The six-man SAS team, however, was hunted down; Jellicoe and Petrakis were separated from the group to conduct evacuation plans when the Germans found the rest of the team. One was killed, and the three other Frenchmen were captured.76 The officer of the French team that was captured was Commandant Georges Berge´, who David Stirling credited as one of the co-founders of the SAS.77 Jellicoe and Petrakis were later successfully evacuated from Crete. As a result of these airfield attacks, the Germans unsurprisingly launched reprisals on the local Cretan population. A total of 50 Cretans from Heraklion were executed as a direct consequence of the attack on the Heraklion airfield by the SAS team. The executed Cretans included the former Governor General of Crete and the former Mayor of Heraklion.78 There was another SBS operation conducted to attack the Cretan airfields in June 1943. This SBS operation served as a diversionary raid in support of Operation Husky, the Sicilian landings by Allied forces in their first step to invade Italy.79 This SBS diversionary raid in Crete was intended to alert the Germans of (supposed) early raids in preparation for the fictitious Allied assault on Greece. The attacks were also conceived to destroy German aircraft that could threaten the invasion of Sicily. The SBS team, who landed in Crete on 23 June 1943, intended to attack the airfields of Tymbaki, Heraklion, and Kastelli Pediados. They found that the airfields in Tymbaki and Heraklion were not in use, and instead, under the recommendation of a SOE guide, attacked a fuel dump at Peza, which was successfully destroyed.80 The SBS team assigned to attack Kastelli Pediados airfield found it heavily guarded but still managed to penetrate it and destroyed five aircraft.81 They were picked up (less one man killed) by a motor launch on 11 July 1943.82 This operation again led to reprisals against the local Cretans resulting in another 50 Cretans executed as a direct result of the raid.83 These

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airfield raids, although yielding some minor results, did not achieve any spectacular triumph or boost the morale of the Cretans.

To capture the ‘Butcher of Crete’ (Why?) The operation to capture ‘the butcher of Crete’ had its origins in the Allied landing in Sicily and subsequently Italy. The Allies landed on Sicily on 9 July 1943 and successfully captured the island on 17 August 1943. The capture of Sicily influenced Italian local politics, and on 24 July 1943 the Italian fascist regime returned a vote of no confidence in the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini. He was sacked the next day from his post as Prime Minister by King Victor Emmanuel III (Italy’s monarch).84 Mussolini was then arrested by the Italian Carabinieri and detained in various locations in Italy to prevent his escape or rescue by his loyalists. The new Italian leader appointed by King Victor Emmanuel III was Pietro Badoglio.85 The Fascist party was dismantled by Badoglio, who played a deceptive political game with the Germans. He wanted to avoid bloodshed and appeared to cooperate in the Axis partnership with the Germans but was secretly negotiating an armistice with the Allies. The armistice was finally agreed upon and signed on 3 September 1943.86 The signing of the armistice threw Italy into chaos as the Germans attempted to exercise their control over the country. The Germans invaded Italy and finally took over its government on 12 September 1943.87 Badoglio and the King of Italy fled to Malta. In the haste to escape Badoglio did not give any orders to the Italian military on how to react to the German invasion,88 so further chaos ensued as the Italians were torn between supporting or resisting the German occupation.89 The Italians had a division-sized force of 32,000 troops based in Crete under the command of Lieutenant General Angelico Carta.90 The Italians were entrusted with defending and maintaining security in the eastern part of Crete. After the Italian Armistice with the Allies, Carta contemplated whether to surrender his forces to the British or to the Germans. The Armistice technically left the Italian troops in Crete at the mercy of the Germans who had more men and much heavier arms and aircraft. The earlier deception plans of Allied landings in Crete and Greece further fuelled optimistic views within the Italian cadres of fighting with the Allies against the Germans. As an early precaution, Carta ordered his

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men to follow the Germans’ instructions but to secretly destroy their heavy arms, and in some instances, give their small arms to Cretan resistance fighters.91 He then contacted SOE Major Leigh Fermor for his advice via his intelligence officer, Lieutenant Tavana.92 Leigh Fermor was contacted by Tavana about the possibility of fighting alongside the British should they intend to invade Crete. After initial discussions, it was decided that the Italians had five choices open to them in Crete; firstly, to hang onto their weapons ‘at all costs’ and wait out for an impending Allied invasion of Crete; secondly, to hang onto their weapons and to fake allegiance with Germans while waiting for Allied invasion; thirdly, to give their light weapons to the Cretan resistance and destroy their heavy weapons along with ammunition and fuel supplies; fourthly to destroy all their arms; and, finally, to work with the Germans passively.93 Shortly after these discussions it was learnt that the Allies’ Middle East Command had dropped any plans for the liberation of Crete and the main Allied focus would be on the Dodecanese islands of Rhodes, Cos and Leros.94 This decision was made at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.95 The Allies’ decided that the main Allied thrust in the Mediterranean theatre would be the invasion of Sicily and subsequently, Italy. Leigh Fermor, on learning that that the British were not interested in invading Crete, suggested to Carta to instruct his troops to follow the Germans’ instructions in order to avoid bloody violence between them. They assessed that the consequences of not working with the Germans would result in a fight that the Italian troops could resist and hold out against impending German military takeover for four or five days at best.96 Any Italian resistance would also encourage the Cretans to support the Italians, and would result in expected brutal reprisals against the locals.97 Carta instructed his troops to keep together to avoid individual desertion in order to join Cretan resistance that could result in unwanted reprisals. He decided to negotiate with German commander General Friedrich-Wilhelm Mu¨ller; Carta wanted his Italian troops to keep their weapons and be interned in a location without any active participation in any war effort with the Germans. Mu¨ller was not agreeable and wanted the Italians to hand in their weapons and continue to work for the Germans in non-combat roles, essentially as labourers. After a series of disappointing negotiations with Mu¨ller, Carta decided not to proceed further. On 12 September 1943 the Germans issued an

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ultimatum to the Italians giving them three choices: to continue to fight with the Germans; to perform labour work for the Germans in Crete; or to be interned. Most of the Italians chose the last option.98 Leigh Fermor suggested that he could evacuate Carta out of Crete. A plan was put in motion after Carta agreed with Leigh Fermor’s suggestion on 15 September 1943,99 and he was smuggled out from his headquarters in Neapolis on 16 September 1943. Carta and the SOE operatives, along with local Cretan resistance fighters, moved on foot across the island to the evacuation beach, and Carta was successfully moved to Cairo by motor launch together with Leigh Fermor on 23 September 1943.100 On discovering the disappearance of Carta the Germans were furious and distributed leaflets in Crete offering rewards for the capture of Carta, dead or alive.101 Meanwhile, some of the Cretan resistance movement, in particular those working under a Cretan by the name of Bandouvas, rose against the Germans in eager and optimistic (though mistaken) anticipation of a British invasion of Crete. Bandouvas and his resistance group attacked a German outpost in Kato Simi after the Italian armistice was announced. He thought that the British would invade Crete soon, and wanted to present himself as an effective resistance leader. Bandouvas’s plan backfired when the Germans sent a larger force to investigate what happened in Kato Simi. Although this German force was ambushed, and suffered heavy casualties, the Germans relented and sent in another larger force that finally managed to destroy Bandouvas’s resistance force. Mu¨ller was incensed by the resistance’s actions and ordered harsh reprisals against the local Cretans. As a result, seven villages in the Viannos and Hierapetra areas were destroyed, which were Kato Syme, Ano Syme, Pefkos, Gdokhia, Mournes, Riza, and Myrthos. An estimated 1,000 civilians were shot, earning Mu¨ller the nickname the ‘Butcher of Crete’.102 When Leigh Fermor reached Cairo with Carta, he had an idea to use a similar operation to capture the much hated and despised Mu¨ller, and ship him back to Cairo. The operation was intended to create a spectacular stunt, to punish Mu¨ller for his atrocities, to lower the morale of the Germans, and to raise the morale of the Cretans’ in the aftermath of the brutal reprisals.103 Mu¨ller was an important leadership target to be decapitated in the context of Crete. He had implemented a harsh brutal clampdown on Cretan resistance movements by the wholesale massacre of Cretan

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villagers and the burning of their villages. Mu¨ller had earlier distinguished himself in the Eastern Front operations having earned the Knight’s Cross in 1941 and subsequently Oak leaves in 1942. After many combat operations in the Eastern Front, General Muller was transferred to Crete for a rest period of garrison duties, commanding the 22nd Air Landing Division. Among his most notorious brutal atrocities in Crete was the destruction of the villages in the Viannos and Hierapetra areas.104 The operation was also intended to highlight the close cooperation between British SOE agents and local Cretan operatives. Most of the other spectacular operations were conducted by outside forces such as the SBS commando raids highlighted in the previous section. The intended outcome of capturing a top level German commander was that it would be a bigger boost for morale than destroying a few airplanes and fuel dumps. Moreover, this operation would be conducted by local Cretan resistance fighters with SOE operatives who had worked with the resistance movements for two years and shared similar hardships with the locals.105 Equally important was the rise of communist-inspired resistance groups in Crete. British efforts to maintain their influence over the Cretans was threatened by the growing support for the local communist resistance groups, EAM and ELAS. The Cretan communists could have threatened the whole political landscape of Crete if left unchecked. There were indications of ELAS’s plans to disrupt the British-aligned resistance activities and attempts by the communists to hijack the resistance activities to their advantage. Leigh Fermor’s decision to conduct the operation no doubt was to counter the rise of the communist resistance movements and gain prestige for the British-backed resistance movements in the eyes of the local Cretans, and continue to instil faith in the support for the Allies, towards the final liberation of Crete and Greece from the German occupation. This operation would also demonstrate to the German forces that even their top commanders were not safe in Crete. Leigh Fermor knew that the operation was not impossible, as the recent operation to evacuate Carta had proved. The major issue was to avoid brutal and bloody reprisals from the Germans. Leigh Fermor wanted the operation to be as bloodless as possible.106 The shadow of the bloody reprisals against the Czech people after the killing of Reinhard Heydrich in 1942

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still loomed over SOE’s planning and conduct of operations against leadership targets. Mu¨ller, however, was subsequently reassigned Commander of Fortress Crete in Canae in August 1944, replacing General Bruno Bra¨uer. Mu¨ller’s position was replaced by Major General Kreipe on 1 March 1944.107 SOE, however, thought that Mu¨ller had been reassigned to the Dodecanese.108 The SOE team decided to carry on with the operation and capture Kreipe instead; had they known that Mu¨ller was still on the island they may have continued with the plan to capture him as originally envisaged, but they assumed that Kreipe was the new commander of German forces in Crete. Kreipe was a World War I veteran and had been awarded the Iron Cross for his bravery in that war. During World War II he was involved in the invasion of France in 1940 and Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, in 1941. He earned his Knight’s Cross for his actions at the Eastern Front. He was transferred to Crete for garrison duties for rest and recuperation from his combat operations on the Eastern front, and replaced Mu¨ller as the commander of the 22nd Airlanding Infantry Division in Crete.109 For the operation, Leigh-Femor selected another colourful SOE character, Captain Ivan William ‘Billy’ Stanley Moss, to join him. Moss was also a traveller and had joined the Coldstream Guards in 1939 when World War II started. He was initially assigned to Libya, and participated in Montgomery’s push against Rommel in North Africa. Moss later volunteered to join SOE and was sent to Crete.110 The following section describes the outrageous operation conceived by SOE, which was executed with finesse, adding glamour to SOE’s mystique and serving as a fine example of a superbly performed special operation.

The operation itself Leigh Fermor, Moss, and two Cretan SOE agents were flown from Egypt to Crete on 4 February 1944 to conduct the operation to capture Kreipe.111 They were supposed to parachute into Crete that night. Bad weather, however, prevented all of them from successfully parachuting except Leigh Fermor, who jumped and landed successfully.112 He was received by the Cretan resistance movement. Over the next few nights, various attempts were made to parachute the rest of the team into Crete but these were not successful. After two months, the team finally arrived

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by a naval motor launch and Leigh Fermor was reunited with his teammates on 4 April 1944.113 The operation to capture Kreipe also included a few local Cretan resistance fighters. The team conducted intelligence operations to find the best place to capture Kreipe.114 Initially, Leigh Fermor had wanted to capture Kreipe at his home at Villa Ariadne. Leigh Fermor and the Cretan resistance realised that capturing him at his home was too dangerous as it was too well guarded and surrounded by double layers of wire.115 While they were reconnoitering the best site for the capture they coincidentally saw Kriepe’s car drive past them and, incredibly, they exchanged waves.116 This struck them that the ideal method for the operation was to capture Kreipe when he was going home from work in his car. Kreipe did not have an escort and usually only had his driver with him. From their further intelligence-gathering operations, the team observed that Kriepe usually left his office between dusk and nine at night, and always used the same road to go home.117 Leigh Fermor, after reconnoitring the road, decided that the most suitable place for an ambush was at a T-junction. This T-junction was located on the road known as the Arkhanais road where it meets with the Houdetsi-Heraklion road. At this T-junction, Kreipe’s car would have to slow to a standstill before turning into the Houdetsi-Heraklion road to head towards his home in the direction of Knossos.118 The SOE team and the Cretan resistance helpers decided that the two SOE officers would use the ruse of wearing German military police uniforms, and conduct a fake roadblock to stop Kreipe’s car as it approached the T-junction.119 Three major risky issues, however, were identified with the operation: firstly, the need to ensure that the General’s car was stopped and not any other cars; secondly, the need to have a team ready to engage any cars or transports heavily laden with German troops while the ambush was underway or while escorting the general away; thirdly, the need to avoid expected bloody brutal reprisals against the local population.120 After discussions with the local Cretan resistance, the SOE team decided to solve the first issue with an ingenious suggestion from a Cretan resistance fighter, Elias Athanassakis. Elias suggested that he position himself further up the road and give the signal that the general’s car was approaching using a torch and an electric bell.121 The wire for the bell could be laid before the ambush. Elias’s suggestion was

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accepted, and he spent many evenings observing Kreipe’s car until he could recognise the shape of the car’s headlamps and even the sound of the car engine. For the second issue of engaging possible German soldiers, a band of resistance fighters (andartes) under Athanasios Bourdzalis would be used to bolster their manpower and firepower in order to counter any possible opposition from potential large force of Germans travelling along the road at the site of the ambush. This andartes group would hide themselves near the ambush point and deal with other vehicles and any German troops during the ambush.122 Once contacted for his role in the plans to capture Kriepe, Bourdzalis readily agreed to help and brought 20 men with him for the operation.123 The solution to the third issue involved the writing of a letter addressing the Germans that the operation was carried out by a British unit without local resistance assistance. This letter would be left in Kreipe’s car so that it would be discovered by the German search teams.124 The group now comprising the SOE men, the Cretan resistance party and Bourdzalis’s band of andartes, moved out to a location near the T-junction and hid in a dried-out river bed about 20 minutes away.125 After waiting for a few nights they decided to conduct the snatch on the night of 24 April 1944.126 However, the operation was postponed as Kreipe left his office early that day, before sunset, rendering the team unprepared for the ambush.127 In addition, Bourdzalis’s andartes were spotted by some local shepherds and it was deemed risky for the large group to continue with the operation for fear of news of non-local andartes being spotted in that area were passed to the Germans. Bourdzalis and his team of andartes were sent home after the SOE team decided to proceed without them.128 Instead the two SOE men would continue the operation with a core band of ten Cretan resistance fighters.129 At this point, the communist-inspired resistance movement in Crete, ELAS, deliberately warned Leigh Fermor in a letter that ELAS would betray them to the Germans if the operation to capture Kreipe were carried out.130 Leigh Fermor ignored the warning and decided to continue with the operation, as he knew that part of the purpose of the operation was to demonstrate to the Cretans of the capabilities of the British-backed resistance movements in Crete. On the night of 26 April 1944, the SOE team finally had their chance to launch their operation. As planned, the operation began with the

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stationing of two Cretan resistance fighters further up the road to give early warning of the approach of the General’s car. Kreipe left his office, after a game of bridge, at 9.30 pm that night and as usual, travelled alone in his car driven by his trusted driver.131 As the General’s car approached the watchers, the signal was sent. Upon learning that Kreipe’s car was approaching, Leigh-Fermor and Moss stepped into the middle of the road and shone a red lamp.132 As additional security, a Cretan resistance fighter was assigned to each SOE officer to assist in the manhandling of the driver and Kreipe if any resistance was offered. Four other resistance fighters would pounce on the backseat occupants, should there be any.133 All these resistance fighters were hidden in ditches on either sides of the road. As Kreipe’s car approached, the driver saw the stop signals being shone by two ‘German military policeman’, and duly stopped the car. Leigh Fermor then stepped beside the car and demanded to know who was inside. The driver answered that it was the Major General’s car.134 They then sprang into action. Leigh Fermor dragged Kreipe out of the car, and handcuffed him as he struggled.135 The driver was pulled out by Moss but, as he was doing so, the driver was seen reaching for his pistol with his right arm, and was coshed on the head by Moss with a life preserver.136 The driver was stunned by the blow and bled from his head. The other Cretan resistance fighters quickly pulled him out and held him.137 Kriepe was pushed into the foot space behind the front seats followed by three Cretan resistance fighters who sat on the back seat with their legs on the Major General. One of them held a knife at the Kreipe’s throat, while the two others were ready to stick their Marlin sub-machine guns out of their windows should they encounter resistance on the way.138 Moss took the driver’s seat with Leigh Fermor sitting beside him. Leigh Fermor then put on the Major General’s cap as another ruse and they drove away.139 As there were not enough space in the car, Kreipe’s driver was supposed to travel by foot with the remaining Cretan resistance fighters across the White Mountains region and rendezvous with the rest of the party at Mount Ida.140 Meanwhile, the SOE officers and the abduction team with Kreipe drove through Heraklion and to Yeni Gave´.141 During their journey they passed through 22 checkpoints. At each checkpoint, the car simply drove through as, on seeing the Major General’s car emblems and the front passenger wearing the Major General’s cap, the sentries stood to

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attention and saluted.142 They had driven for an hour and 45 minutes before reaching the disembarking point at Yeni Gave´.143 Upon reaching Yeni Gave´, Moss together with the rest of the party and the captured general abandoned the car and carried on by foot across Mount Ida to rendezvous with the other group holding the general’s driver.144 Leigh Fermor drove the car to a location near a beach where he left it, and in it the letter signed by himself and Moss indicating that the operation was conducted by British forces alone: Your Divisional-Commander KREIPE was captured a short time ago by BRITISH Raiding Force under our command. By the time you read this he and we will be on our way to CAIRO. We would like to point out most emphatically that this operation has been carried out without the help of CRETANS or CRETAN Partisans, and the only guides used were serving soldiers of His Hellenic Majesty’s Forces in the Middle East, who came with us. Your General is an honourable prisoner of war, and will be treated with all the consideration owing to his rank. Any reprisals against the local population will be wholly unwarranted and unjust.145 A British overcoat and a commando beret were also left in the car as further evidence.146 The aim was to make the Germans believe that the raiding party, together with the captured Kreipe, had left the island by submarine.147 After abandoning the car at the beach, Leigh Fermor carried on by foot to rendezvous at Mount Ida with the rest of the party.148 The German driver, however, was not with the other party and, when questioned, the Cretan resistance fighters answered that he had died of his head injury, and was buried in a hidden grave.149 The British SOE men, however, did not believe this story, and they quietly knew that the Cretans had killed the driver and buried him.150 The intended bloodless operation had ended with the killing of the driver, but the SOE men still hoped that this would not result in brutal reprisals. The SOE team with Kreipe then continued on foot and hid in caves during their escape through the mountainous region of the White Mountains. Most of the beaches where they intended to evacuate by motor launch were now constantly patrolled by the Germans.151 Kreipe

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was reported to have resigned himself to his unfortunate fate of being captured, and conducted himself throughout his capture and hazardous journey through the mountainous regions of Crete with utmost professionalism.152 He suffered two falls, one from a mule, and one into a ditch in the dark.153 As a whole, Kreipe was well treated by the SOE team and Cretan resistance fighters, being well fed and given medical attention. The SOE team, however, had trouble communicating with Cairo for motor launch evacuation due to their lack of wireless sets, again a typical hindrance of the day.154 They had to rely on another SOE officer, Tom Dunbabin, for communication of the location of the escape beach as he had a wireless set. Dunbabin would then relay the message and the location of the evacuation point to Cairo. Upon receiving the confirmation message from Cairo, Dunbabin would move to Leigh Fermor’s position to relay the information.155 Dunbabin, however, failed to meet up with the group as he was struck down with malaria.156 As a result of Dunbabin’s no-show, Leigh Fermor resorted to using local Cretan resistance runners to send the messages to two other SOE wireless operators located across the island to communicate with Cairo.157 The runners did not have an easy job as they had to traverse mountainous regions rigorously patrolled by German troops. When the messages finally reached Leigh Fermor, it was usually too late, as the time of any planned evacuation passed due to the delay in the runners’ return trip by foot. The runners often took two days to reach Leigh Fermor’s position and progress was further hindered as the SOE team was constantly on the move.158 The Germans searching for the captured Kreipe did not made life easy either. The Germans suspected that the abductors and Kreipe had not left Crete yet, and sealed the possible escape routes by putting troops and posts at most of the potential escape beaches in the southern sector of Crete, especially near Saktouria beach, from where the SOE team had originally intended to escape.159 The Germans also used a FieselerStorch observation plane to scout the terrain for any signs of Kreipe and his abductors immediately after his abduction.160 Leaflets were dropped warning the local Cretans that brutal reprisals would be unleashed if no information on Kreipe was brought forward.161 Finally, after travelling and evading the Germans for 17 days through miles of mountainous terrain, the team confirmed with Cairo the arrival of a naval motor

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launch, which would pick them up the next night at an unguarded beach near Rodakino on the southern side of the island.162 On 14 May 1944, they were finally evacuated from the island by a motor launch, ML 842, commanded by Lieutenant B.C. Coleman with a defensive party of Lord Jellicoe’s Special Raiding Service commandos.163 Kreipe, after the boat journey through the Mediterranean Sea, was received by a party in Mersa Matruh, and served as a prisoner of war (POW) for the rest of the war.

The outcome The operation was successful in its intended purpose of capturing Kreipe and sending him back to Egypt.164 The SOE team, however, were continuously hounded by thoughts of brutal reprisals against the Cretan population due to their exploit. During their escape, the villages of Kamares, Lokhria, Margarikari and Saktouria were destroyed,165 but according to Antony Beevor, the destruction of the villages had nothing to do with the capture of Kreipe.166 Rather, it was related to a gunrunning operation conducted by the people of these villages,167 and the suspected support of the villagers for the communist resistance. On 22 August 1944, four months after the capture of Kreipe, there was another massive destruction of villages in the valley of Amari, and the execution of civilians conducted by the Germans.168 It was argued by Antony Beevor and Professor Gottfried Schramm that the Amari destruction was also not related to the abduction of Kreipe but a cold calculated move on the part of the Germans to protect their exposed flanks from Cretan resistance attacks during the retreat to the west of Crete from Heraklion.169 The threat of reprisals by the Germans, however, did not deter the local Cretans in assisting the SOE team that captured Kreipe. It was widely known by the local Cretans that Kreipe had been abducted by both SOE operatives and local Cretan resistance, and the group was known to have passed through some Crete villages where warm welcomes and celebrations were held for them.170 This widespread knowledge of captured Kreipe passing by, however, did not result in any betrayal of the group to the Germans. This is a testimony to the local Cretans support for the British effort, and the indirect support for the resistance against the Germans. This SOE operation achieved its two main objectives, to capture a top German military commander and to avoid reprisals. The operation

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was carried out with precision and, although the General’s driver was killed, resulted in no further bloodshed. The operation met with some unexpected events and was complicated by the arrival of large groups of German soldiers who were searching for Kreipe.171 However, this did not prevent the SOE team from successfully completing their operation. The major moral issue in this operation, not described by many writers or commentators was the wearing of German military police uniforms by Major Leigh Fermor and Major Moss. Their ruse of disguising themselves as German soldiers was against the Laws of Armed Conflict as laid down in the Geneva Conventions and could therefore be construed as a war crime.172 In addition, the operation injured Kreipe’s driver later resulting in his death, most likely killed by the resistance fighters, and this was also a war crime. The driver was attacked by Moss while disguised as a German soldier and, when injured, was not given immediate medical attention but left with the resistance fighters to carry him across the White Mountains to the rendezvous at Mount Ida. The prospect of him being killed by the resistance fighters did not cross the SOE officers’ mind at that time. It was widely known that the Cretan resistance fighters rarely took prisoners. Most of the German soldiers captured in Crete by resistance fighters were executed.173 The two British SOE officers were responsible for the safety of the captured soldier who was a prisoner-of-war and they were negligent in this duty. The moral responsibility, however, favours the victors rather than the losers in a war. Kreipe, after being handed over to British officers in Mersa Matruh, acknowledged the fine treatment that had been accorded him by his captors.174 He was transported to London for interrogation and then sent as a prisoner of war to Calgary, Canada until World War II ended. He was then transferred back to Great Britain and was interned at the Island Farm Special Camp 11, until he was finally released in 1947.175 As for Mu¨ller, the original target, was later transferred to the Eastern Front and was eventually captured by Soviet forces in Berlin when Germany capitulated. He was sent to Athens for trial on war crimes and found guilty. Mu¨ller was sentenced to death on 9 December 1946, and executed on 20 May 1947 to coincide with the anniversary of the German invasion of Crete.176 Leigh-Femor was immediately awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO): ‘For his outstanding display of

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courage and audacity. . .’177 Moss was awarded the Military Cross for his part in the operation.178 The crucial question, however, is whether the operation in capturing Kreipe was worth all the trouble? What was the strategic outcome of this operation and how does it relate to the political effect? The next section analyses the operation that captured Kreipe based on the two core research questions.

The findings This operation’s utility will be revisited in terms of the two core research questions. 1. How strategically effective was this leadership decapitation operation in World War II? Notwithstanding the amazing deeds of the successful operation in capturing Kreipe, the bigger question is what had this operation achieved towards the wider campaign in Crete? The main reasons for the operation were to raise the morale of the Cretans and lower that of the Germans, for which answers can be provided. The morale of the Cretans was not high at that period of the war due to the relentless German harassment and the bypass of the GrecoMediterranean theatre by the Allies. In 1944, it was clear that the Allies were only involved in the liberation of Italy (and stuck there) without much news of further operations in the Mediterranean theatre or even the liberation of Greece and Crete. The Cretans knew that the next major operation would be to liberate Western Europe. Their hopes for freedom from the Germans to come soon were not high. The Italian armistice with the Allies did not change the conditions in Crete. The Italian soldiers were still being controlled and commanded by the Germans with no overt intention of joining the local Cretans in fighting against the Germans in the way some mainland Italian forces had by joining the Allied forces in gruelling battles to seize back control of Italy from the grasp of the remaining German forces. Even the commander of the Italian forces in Crete, Carta, had chosen to flee Crete. The capture of Kreipe (or the originally intended victim Mu¨ller) provided a valuable side show to raise the spirit of the Cretans. Even though the Allies had no immediate plans

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to liberate Greece and Crete, they were still very much involved in the daily operations to resist the German occupation in Crete. In the face of brutal reprisals against the Cretans, the morale of the Cretans needed to be raised to ensure continued support for the resistance activities. The operation that captured Kreipe succeeded in instilling pride and raised the morale of the Cretan population, as one Cretan relates: ‘Everybody felt taller by two centimetres the next day . . . out of 450,000 Cretans, 449,000 claimed to have taken part in the Kreipe operation.’179 After the much anticipated Allied forces invasion of Greece and Crete was found to be an elaborate deception plan by the Allies to cover the invasion of Sicily and Italy, the morale of the Cretans plummeted. The Cretans gave their unwavering support for the British forces from the time of their retreat from Greece. Cretans fought valiantly alongside British forces when Crete was invaded by the Germans and suffered terribly from the Germans for their aid to the British war effort. The Cretans’ continued spirit of resistance and allegiance to British SOE suffered a serious dent when the Allied strategy in the Mediterranean was revealed to have bypassed Greece and Crete. The destruction of the Viannos region as reprisals against Bandouvas’s resistance group uprising, which resulted in 1,000 Crete civilians being executed, had further dampened the Cretans’ morale. The operation to capture Major General Kreipe was rightly judged by Leigh Fermor as an operation to lift the morale of the Cretans and to continue the unity of resistance groups with the British war effort. After news of Kreipe’s capture, the Cretans celebrated triumphantly and some of the key celebratory Cretan shouts can be seen in Leigh Fermor’s personal report written for the Imperial War Museum in 1969: Just think, we’ve stolen their General! – The horn-wearers won’t dare look us in the eyes! – The horn-wearers came here looking for wool, and we’ll send them away shorn!180 (emphasis in original) The operation also lowered the morale of the Germans as there were claims within the German ranks that Kreipe had in fact defected and escaped with the British. This was certainly plausible after the defection and escape of Carta. This rumour further fuelled the fear that an impending invasion of Crete by Allied forces was on the way.181 The later German retreat into the Canae enclave to consolidate their defences further proved that the Germans were expecting an invasion soon. The SOE in Crete took advantage of these fears when Dunbabin’s team

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launched a propaganda campaign spreading rumours that Kreipe had indeed escaped on his own account, and encouraged other German soldiers to do the same by distributing leaflets stating, ‘Kreipe Befehl: Wir Folgen – Kreipe commands: we follow!’182 An SOE historian of this operation mistook these propaganda campaign leaflets as originating from German soldiers and used this as an argument that Kreipe was unpopular with the German soldiers based there, and therefore they were happy that Kreipe had been captured.183 The evidence of the progressive and intensive search for him after he was captured bore a different testimony to Kreipe’s importance. This operation, in all its intent, was a morale coup for the British SOE forces in Crete. With limited resources they demonstrated to the Cretans that they had not been forgotten, and at the same time still had to relentlessly fight the German occupation on disadvantaged terms.184 2. How tactically effective was the Special Operations unit used in this operation? This operation showed the deft usage of a Special Operation to continue the presence and psyche of British interest in the Cretan cause. The SOE team used in the capture of Kreipe proved that a small two-man unit could achieve disproportionate results. The utilisation of surprise was one of the key elements in the success of this operation. The whole operation surprised Kreipe and his driver, which resulted in their capture within minutes. The German forces also did not expect such an audacious operation that captured a high-ranking commanding officer. The element of surprise also played a key role during their escape through 22 road checkpoints. As the Germans did not know that such an operation could be conceived, they never knew what happened until much later. The SOE team showed their ability and flexibility in melting into the surroundings of Crete. Often working in two-man teams, the SOE operatives had to rely on the protection of local Cretan resistance movements to hide themselves. Operating for months at a time in high risk areas, and often being hunted by German forces with the risk of betrayal, the SOE operatives needed to be able in terms of physical strength and mental courage to cope with the stress of the job. In this operation the wearing of enemy uniforms by the two SOE officers was a successful use of deception, although it had contravened

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the laws of war. It deceived Kreipe and his driver into believing they were being stopped by a valid road-check. The escape in Kreipe’s car, whereby Leigh Fermor wore the general’s hat, continued the deception. The SOE operatives’ ability to build strong relationships and trust with the local resistance fighters enabled them to raise a small supporting unit for their operation. The planning and conducting of the operation to minimise casualties among the Germans in order to avoid reprisals was a prudent act. This operation again validates the point that a small unit of specially selected and trained men in Special Operations is able to achieve its objectives.

Conclusion The operation to capture Kreipe is not well noted by military history commentators. The operation was a successful Special Operation conducted to capture an enemy leader. Its purpose was not to destroy the ‘brains’ of the enemy but was conceived as a morale coup for the Cretans. Although the capture of Kreipe did not serve any tactical purpose, it had its strategic utility in demonstrating to the Cretans that the British were still supporting their fight for freedom, and in a small way managed to sustain the resistance morale and the wide support for the British by the Cretans. As an overall assessment of SOE’s operations in Crete during World War II, official SOE historian William James Millar Mackenzie provides a concise appraisal: The story of the Islands [Crete] is on a small scale a very favourable instance of the correct and careful use of SOE methods in their developed form, and has left behind it little bitterness and historical controversy.185 Crete’s resistance activities, raised and supported by SOE, did not result in a civil war between nationalist and communist factions as manifested in mainland Greece after World War II.186 This bears lasting testimony to SOE’s achievement in Crete, which resulted in general support towards British foreign policy there, and the lack of support for communist ideologically-based movements,187 no doubt assisted by the successful operation in capturing Kreipe. Although the Cretans had suffered tragically under the oppressive rule and brutal reprisals from the Germans, the Cretans generally continued to support the British-backed resistance movements until the Germans in Crete finally surrendered on 9 May 1945 to returning

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British forces. The following words spoken by an old Cretan man to Leigh Fermor aptly conclude this chapter: They’ll burn down all the houses one day. And what then? My house was burnt down four times by the Turks; let the Germans burn it down for the fifth time! And they killed scores of my family, scores of them, my child. Yet here I am! We’re at war, and war has all these things. You can’t have a wedding feast without meat . . .188 (emphasis in original) The next chapter analyses the successful aerial Special Operation that had shot down Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plane and killed him. The aerial Special Operation was conducted by a regular US Army Air Force P-38 composite fighter squadron. This Special Operation highlighted the value of precise intelligence coming together with skilful flying that culminated in a thrilling air ambush, a first of its kind in the short history of air power.

CHAPTER 5 `

THE YAMAMOTO MISSION'

Introduction On what proved to be the fateful morning of 18 April 1943 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto decided to fly in to visit some of his troops stationed at an island near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands in order to boost their morale.1 As Yamamoto’s plane, a Mitsubishi G4M ‘Betty’ (Betty) approached the island, together with another Betty and six Mitsubishi A6M ‘Zero’ (Zero) fighters, a flight of 16 US Army Air Force Lockheed P-38 Lightning (P-38) fighters appeared from nowhere.2 Surprise was complete and the Japanese flight was successfully ambushed. Yamamoto’s plane was shot and crashed into the jungle below, killing him instantly.3 The other Betty carrying Yamamoto’s Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral Matome Ugaki, was also shot down. Ugaki, however, survived the crash and was rescued by Japanese forces.4 The US Army Air Force lost a P-38 during the aerial ambush. What appeared at first as a chance meeting of the two rival forces was in fact a highly coordinated and secretly planned Special Operation. This operation’s strategic analysis has often been marred by a debate over which pilot actually shot down Admiral Yamamoto’s plane rather than focussing on the impact the operation had on US strategy in the Pacific theatre. This chapter discusses the ‘Yamamoto Mission’5 – the aerial Special Operation that killed Yamamoto and the consequent strategic effects.6 The crucial factors that influenced the successful conduct of the operation are also examined.

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Yamamoto’s background Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was born in 1884 at Nagoaka, Japan. His original family name was Takano.7 He was adopted by the Yamamoto family in 1916 and he used this family name since then.8 Yamamoto joined the Imperial Japanese Navy and saw combat during the Russo – Japanese War (1904 – 5). He fought in the famous Battle of Tsushima in which the Japanese navy defeated the Russian Baltic Fleet. In this battle, Yamamoto was injured and lost two fingers of his left hand.9 Yamamoto later studied English at Harvard University in the United States. However, he spent most of his time travelling and studying the industrial might of the United States. He was fascinated by the evolving petroleum industry and the future of petrolbased automobiles.10 He was also exposed to the widely available scholarly discourse on military matters in the United States, especially on the birth of the US Army and US Navy air power. Yamamoto believed that the future of naval supremacy was based on naval air power and not on the commonly held traditional belief in battleships during that era.11 When Yamamoto returned to Japan in 1921 he was made an instructor at the Navy Staff College where his innovative ideas, for the time, included predicting the future of naval power to be based on air power and fuelled by oil rather than coal.12 Soon after this he was posted to the United States again and served as the Japanese naval attache´ in Washington, D.C. from 1926 to 1928.13 Yamamoto was one of the early supporters of naval air power and advocated the building of more aircraft carriers for the Japanese Imperial Navy as opposed to building more battleships.14 After returning from the United States, Yamamoto rose steadily through the ranks of the Japanese Imperial Navy. He represented Japan at the London Naval Disarmament Conference in 1929 and the 1934–5 London Naval Conference,15 and was subsequently made viceminister of the navy at the end of 1936.16 He continued to expand on his assertion concerning the importance of naval air power and succeeded in getting Japan to build aircraft carriers. When Japanese right-wing politicians assumed power in Japan with the support of the army, Yamamoto opposed the Japanese government’s alliance with the Germans and Italians in the Anti-Comintern Pact because he felt that if Japan joined the treaty, Japan might have to

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engage in a war against Britain and the United States.17 Yamamoto’s opposition was countered with death threats and, to save him from these threats, he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet in 1939 and sent to sea.18 When the Second Sino –Japanese war began in July 1937 it marked the start of a sequence of events that finally led Japan to attack the United States.19 Japan, crippled by sanctions imposed by the United States due to her invasion of China in 1937, and needing urgent resources from south-east Asia, decided to launch a daring offensive in south-east Asia against British and Dutch colonies, Malaya and Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). To achieve such an ambitious objective, Japan had to protect her eastern flank from the possible intervention of US military forces based in the Philippines, which would also have to be invaded too. The Japanese knew that in order to safeguard their plans the destruction of the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet was of utmost importance. When the decision to go to war was imminent Yamamoto supported the plan to attack Pearl Harbor, as he knew that the only option to safeguard Japan’s main thrust into south-east Asia was the early elimination of the threat posed by the US Navy Pacific Fleet, especially the potent aircraft carriers.20 The Japanese finally decided to launch their ambitious campaigns and, notably, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was conducted successfully. The attack destroyed the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet’s battleships but failed to destroy any aircraft carriers, and inevitably led the United States into the war. Yamamoto still hoped the United States would sue for a negotiated peace settlement. However, the failure of the Japanese to make a declaration of war before the attack on Pearl Harbor was initiated caused outrage and fury and ensured that the war against the Japanese would be an all-out avenging fight to the end.21 The attack on Pearl Harbour was followed by a string of early war successes for the Japanese until the middle of 1942 when the Japanese began to suffer serious setbacks. Yamamoto was checked at the Battle of Coral Sea and was defeated in the Battle of Midway, losing four of his valuable aircraft carriers.22 The Japanese Imperial Army, although enjoying quick early successes in south-east Asia became stuck in attritional campaigns in the Solomon Islands, especially on the island of Guadalcanal. After fighting numerous major bloody battles the Japanese finally evacuated from Guadalcanal in

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February 1943.23 They consolidated their forces in the Western Solomon Islands and, on 7 April 1943, launched a desperate major air offensive, Operation ‘I’, which involved large-scale aerial attacks to deny the United States air supremacy by attacking and destroying US military airfields in Guadalcanal and New Guinea.24 The Japanese believed that Operation ‘I’ was successful due to inflated claims of success by the returning pilots who reported the damage meted out to be up to five times higher than it was in reality.25 In fact, little damage was caused to the US forces and none of the Japanese objectives was achieved.26 Yamamoto, however, was delighted by the news of the supposed success and planned to fly in to visit some of these pilots to show his appreciation for their successful missions as well as to boost his men’s morale. 27 His proposed visit to the frontline post in Buin on 18 April 1943 proved to be Yamamoto’s last flight out of his headquarters in Rabaul.

Yamamoto’s death warrant The operation to kill Yamamoto was initiated by US naval intelligence whose operatives intercepted and broke coded Japanese messages. The United States had a secret code-breaking system similar to the British Ultra, which was codenamed Magic.28 The Magic unit used cryptographers to break the Japanese codes with the aid of IBM computers.29 The Japanese were using the naval codes, JN25E14, to communicate the plans and the itinerary for Admiral Yamamoto’s visit to Ballalae from his headquarters in Rabaul on 13 April 1943.30 These naval codes were old ones that were supposed to be valid from 3 January 1943 until 14 February 1943 and were easily broken by US naval intelligence. A further message from a Japanese base using another less secure code, JN20H, was sent on 14 April 1943, and was also intercepted and deciphered by US naval intelligence.31 These coded messages carried detailed information about Yamamoto’s travel itinerary including dates, times, planes to be used, and who would accompany him.32 The deciphered and translated message detailing Yamamoto’s plans for 18 April 1943 are reproduced in full in David Kahn’s The Codebreakers:

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The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will inspect Ballale, Shortland, and Buin in accordance with the following: 1. 0600 depart Rabaul on board medium attack plane escorted by 6 fighters; 0800 arrive Ballale. Immediately depart for Shortland on board subchaser (1st Base Force to ready one boat), arriving at 0840. Depart Shortland 0945 aboard said subchaser, arriving Ballale at 1030. (For transportation purposes, have ready an assault boat at Shortland and a motor launch at Ballale.) 1100 depart Ballale on board medium attack plane, arriving Buin at 1110. Lunch at 1st Base Force Headquarters (Senior Staff Officer of Air Flotilla 26 to be present). 1400 depart Buin aboard medium attack plane; arrive Rabaul at 1540. 2. Inspection Procedures: After being briefed on present status, the troops (patients at 1st Base Force Hospital) will be visited. However, there will be no interruptions in the routine duties of the day. 3. Uniforms will be the uniform for the day except that the commanding officers of the various units will be in combat attire with decorations. 4. In the event of inclement weather, the tour will be postponed one day.33 The detailed itinerary and the well-known fact of Yamamoto’s penchant for punctuality sealed his death warrant. Commander Edwin T. Layton (Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet’s (CinCPac) intelligence officer) personally handed the information on Admiral Yamamoto’s itinerary to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the commander in chief of the US Navy Pacific Fleet.34 President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, were widely believed to have personally authorised and instructed Admiral Nimitz to launch the operation.35 However, other studies argue against this fact, claiming there is no evidence to show that Roosevelt ordered the operation.36 Historians generally agree that Admiral Nimitz obtained approval from the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox even though there is no documentary evidence of this.37 The order from Knox is reputed to have included a ‘please destroy message’ instruction, thereby destroying any written evidence of his knowledge of the operation.38

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There is also a suggestion that Nimitz may have made the decision himself. Yamamoto was a military officer and Nimitz had the authorisation to order an operation to kill an enemy military leader.39 The decision to kill Yamamoto, however, was not taken lightly by Nimitz as he was concerned that Yamamoto’s replacement may be a more effective commander. In deliberating whether to kill Yamamoto or not Nimitz reputedly asked his fleet intelligence officer Captain Edwin T. Layton: ‘The one thing that concerns me is whether they could find a more effective fleet commander?’40 They studied the capabilities of the other Japanese military commanders and decided that no one could replace Yamamoto. The selected ambush point to kill Admiral Yamamoto was within the flight distance from Henderson Airfield in Guadalcanal, making it feasible to conduct the operation. Nimitz finally decided and replied, ‘All right, we’ll try it.’41 Nimitz instructed his Southern Pacific commander, Admiral William Halsey, to conduct the operation to kill Yamamoto and added a personal message, ‘Good luck and good hunting.’42 It was widely believed at the time that killing Yamamoto, revered as a legendary military commander by the Japanese, would seriously demoralise the Japanese and blunt their strategy as he was believed to be the main ‘brain’ of Japanese military strategy in the Pacific war. The US decision to kill Yamamoto was much influenced by hatred of the Japanese.43 It was the Japanese who attacked Pearl Harbor without first declaring war, killing US troops and civilians. Further infuriating the Americans, Yamamoto was incorrectly quoted as saying that ‘the Japanese will dictate terms in Washington’.44 The Japanese were also treated as racially inferior by the US armed forces, who could not believe they could be surprised and defeated (for example in the Philippines) by an Asiatic race who had been portrayed with many inferior racist names such as, ‘yellow bastards’,45 ‘yellow dogs’,46 and ‘apes in khaki’.47 The decision to kill Yamamoto was also easy – he was a military officer and shooting down his plane, a military bomber, would not contravene any laws of war. It would be the same if Yamamoto were killed by sinking his fleet flagship, the battleship Musashi, and would not be morally wrong. The combination of hatred against Yamamoto, made the ‘bogeyman’ by the US media – especially with the famous assertion that he would dictate peace terms in Washington – and that

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he was a military commander meant there was no moral grounds to argue on in the decision to kill him. More importantly, the operation to kill Yamamoto was weighted against the risk of the Japanese discovering that the US forces had broken their codes.48 It was, however, decided that whether or not the Japanese found their codes had been broken they would most likely change their codes anyway and the United States’s code-breaking unit, Magic, would be able to decipher new codes in due time. The probable code-breaking effort would be unhindered as US forces had no immediate major operations in the next ten weeks. In the end, Nimitz decided to accept Commander Layton’s prudent suggestion of a cover story that Australian coastwatchers had given the information about Yamamoto’s flight.49

The ‘Yamamoto Mission’ After Nimitz decided to proceed with the operation and instructed Halsey to conduct it, the order was given on 16 April 1943 and the operation was to be launched on the morning of 18 April 1943.50 What followed was the hasty planning of the longest distance aerial intercept operation ever conducted. The P-38 fighter was selected for the job as it was the only fighter plane available at that time capable of flying the round trip from Henderson Airfield in Guadalcanal.51 The P-38 was able to fly higher, and climb and dive faster than the main Japanese fighter plane, the Zero.52 The Japanese Zero was well known for its manoeuvrability but the P-38’s superior speed and ceiling was effective in countering the Zero’s capabilities.53 The selected P-38 squadron would fly a 425-mile trip to intercept Yamamoto’s flight.54 The route taken was longer than the direct route of 315 miles because of the need to avoid Japanese radars and coastwatchers.55 The P-38s would need to loiter at the ambush point for 15 minutes to engage the Japanese flight and then fly back to base in Guadalcanal,56 which they were able to do with the aid of jettisonable fuel tanks.57 The P-38s were also armed with a set of formidable weapons, four 0.50-inch machine guns and a 20 mm cannon in the nose, giving a direct line of fire.58 A selected group of pilots from the US Army Air Force would undergo an aerial Special Operation that needed utmost secrecy,

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precision and surprise to be successful.59 Although the composite Squadron set up for the operation was not a Special Operations designated squadron, the nature of the operation itself was a Special Operation.60 It was the first operation to fly a 400-mile route at almost sea-waves top height, guided by compass in full radio silence; precise timing and flight speed were required to ensure that the US Army Air Force fighters would meet Yamamoto’s flight at the right spot at the right time. The pilots were chosen for their discipline and experience in combat flights. The nature of the operation had all the characteristics of a Special Operation – it was a surprise attack using a new method of engaging the enemy, and requiring razor-like precision in striking at a designated target of high value. It was originally intended to kill Yamamoto while he was on the subchaser travelling from Ballale to Shortland but the difficulties in identifying the correct boat rendered this option null. The pilots decided that the best option was to intercept Yamamoto while he was still in the air. The precise timing required to ensure that their flight would coincide with Yamamoto’s flight was the most crucial factor. The timing for the intercept was originally planned for 7.45 am, 15 minutes before Yamamoto was due to land in Ballale. The P-38 pilots, however, decided that intercepting him over Ballale may attract the Japanese land-based fighters located at Kahili airfield near Buin, who could then rush to assist the escort protecting Yamamoto’s plane. The US Army Air Force pilots then decided that the best option was to ambush Yamamoto’s flight at a position about 35 miles north-west of Buin. With the aid of the crucial intercepted intelligence reports, Yamamoto’s flight could be identified from his six escorting Zeroes.61 The estimated time that Yamamoto’s flight would fly over this position was 7.35 am.62 The composite squadron set up to ambush Yamamoto consisted of 18 P-38 Lightning fighters from the US Army Air Force’s 339th Fighter Squadron, Thirteenth Air Force and two pilots with combat experience from the 70th Fighter Squadron.63 These two pilots were Captain Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr and Lieutenant Rex T. Barber.64 Both of them had even shot and sunk a Japanese destroyer with just the P-38s’ guns.65 These two men, together with First Lieutenants James McLanahan and Joseph Moore were designated as the killer flight responsible for shooting down Yamamoto’s plane.66 The operation was commanded by Major John W. Mitchell.67 The main reason 18 P-38s were used for the

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operation was that the Japanese had about 75 Zeroes based on the airfield where Yamamoto would land and it was estimated that they could scramble 50 Zeros to escort Yamamoto in so the extra P-38s would have to deal with this potential risk.68 The P-38 Lightning fighters took off on 18 April 1943 at 7.25 am (American time),69 and flew at just 30 feet above sea-waves top in complete radio silence.70 This was to ensure that their squadron would not be detected by radar and ultimately, surprise could be achieved. Two of the P-38 Lightning fighters had to return to base shortly after take-off due to technical problems. These were McLanahan and Moore’s planes and their tasks were reassigned to First Lieutenants Besby Holmes and Ray Hine.71 The 16 P-38s continued the flight, which took two hours and 15 minutes to reach the ambush point just south of Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville.72 The P-38 Lightning fighters intended to intercept Yamamoto’s flight at a position 40 miles from Ballalae (and 35 miles from Buin).73 Yamamoto’s flight, however, had changed its plan and would land instead at Buin, located at the southern tip of Bougainville Island instead. This change in Yamamoto’s flight path did not alter the ambush point of the P-38s and actually flew the Japanese Admiral straight into the US Army Air Force aerial ambush.74 If the ambush was to attack Yamamoto’s plane as he landed in Ballale they would have missed him. Leading the P-38 squadron was Major Mitchell, who relied on only three rudimentary items to ensure that the squadron would arrive and meet Yamamoto’s flight at the correct position and time. These three items were his watch, his compass and his P-38’s airspeed gauge.75 Yamamoto did not disappoint his would-be killers. His bomber, a Betty, accompanied by another Betty and six Zero fighters, was right on schedule.76 The assigned killer flight of four P-38s peeled off to attack the Betty bombers, while the rest of the P-38s went in to attack the escorting Zeroes. The two slower Betty bombers were caught and shot down.77 The one carrying Yamamoto crashed into the jungle killing all its occupants. The other Betty, carrying Vice-Admiral Matome Ugaki, crashed into the sea; he and his pilot survived the crash and were rescued by Japanese troops.78 What happened next was a series of disputed claims about who had shot down Admiral Yamamoto’s

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plane. Two pilots, Lanphier and Barber, both claimed to have shot down Yamamoto’s plane, triggering debates that lasted decades.79 In the operation, the US Army Air Force lost a P-38 flown by Hine who was believed to have been shot down by a pursuing Japanese Zero.80 The P-38s did not shoot down any Japanese Zeroes on that operation although there were claims that they shot down three Zeroes.81 As expected, the Japanese sent 16 Zeroes from Kahili airfield to counter the US Army Air Force attack, but they arrived too late for any action as the US Army Air Force P-38s had already left the area.82 Yamamoto’s body was found the next day by the Japanese, allegedly in a sitting position as if deep in thought, still immaculate in his uniform and clutching his samurai sword.83 It was discovered that he had suffered two large-calibre bullet wounds, one in the head and the other in the chest.84 P-38 Lightning fighters were armed with four 0.50-inch machine guns and a 20mm canon. A hit by a 0.50-inch bullet in the head would have blown the head clean off; even a glancing wound would have resulted in serious damage. The bullet wound in his chest would also had resulted in a large exit wound that would had left his body with a nasty large hole in the middle, if not actually cutting him in half.85 The Japanese reports of Yamamoto’s almost surreal spiritual state might had been a propaganda plot to cover up his nasty death.86 The death was not reported in the Japanese press until 21 May 1943, and was met with national grief.87 A news broadcast on Radio Tokyo read: ‘while directing general strategy on the front line in April of this year, [Admiral Yamamoto] engaged in combat with the enemy and met gallant death in a war plane’.88 Yamamoto’s remains were cremated and shipped back to Japan for a state funeral. His remains were buried on 9 June 1943. Half of Yamamoto’s ashes were buried in a grave next to Admiral Togo, Japan’s greatest naval hero, who defeated the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima.89 The other half of his ashes were buried in his hometown of Nagaoka.90 The United States did not release the news that Admiral Yamamoto’s plane was shot down for fear of the Japanese realising that it was not a coincidental meeting but a pre-planned operation that had detailed intelligence of Yamamoto’s flight. The US military instead portrayed that they had only learnt about his death from Japanese reports released later.91

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The outcome The strategic utility of this operation, however, gave rise to various debates on whether killing Yamamoto was a strategically concrete decision. Arguing for the success of killing Yamamoto, it was widely believed that he was the most capable military commander and could outwit the US forces in the Pacific, giving credence to the claim that there ‘was only one Yamamoto’.92 This argument was substantiated by the fact that Yamamoto, having spent some time in the United States as the Japanese naval attache´ in Washington, D.C. and being educated at Harvard University, understood the power of the United States and may therefore have waged a successful war strategy in the Pacific Theatre against US military forces.93 Yamamoto was also a proponent of ‘decisive action’,94 and supported the use of naval air power. His daring raid on Pearl Harbor and his plan to ambush the US Navy’s aircraft carriers in Midway proved that Yamamoto had strategic acumen and the ability to use it imaginatively. On the other side of the coin, the Japanese military fortunes had certainly turned by the middle of 1943, and Yamamoto was believed to be the main reason for the numerous Japanese misfortunes. After the Battle of Midway, the naval and air supremacy of the Japanese forces in the Pacific were seriously impaired. The course of the war could not have been successfully altered by Yamamoto had he been alive. However, it could not be known, at this point in the war, what direction Yamamoto’s plans for the future of Japanese strategy would take or how useful he would be for Japan’s future war plans. All arguments against his usefulness were based on hindsight and not on what the Americans knew at the time. The argument that he would have been useful in discussing surrender terms at the end of the war if he were alive was also a moot point.95 A look at how the German chief of staff, General Jodl, had been treated by General Eisenhower during the surrender of Germany to the Allied forces could have shed light on how Yamamoto, being much hated by the Americans, might have been treated, thereby suffering a similar fate to General Jodl.96 That is, Yamamoto may also have been tried for war crimes and executed. As an analogy, his peer, General Tomoyuki Yamashita was tried and executed for war crimes after Japan surrendered unconditionally in World War II.97 Admiral Halsey’s remark on hearing

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the report that Yamamoto had been successfully killed summed up the general hatred towards Yamamoto during that time: ‘I’d hoped to lead that scoundrel up Pennsylvania Avenue in chains, with the rest of you kicking him where it would do the most good!’98 Yamamoto’s death was a tragedy for the Japanese. Yamamoto was a legend in Japan and his death caused widespread panic about the course of the war.99 Many Japanese politicians remarked that Yamamoto’s death was the beginning of the end for the Japanese war effort.100 The operation’s final net strategic effect remains debatable and overshadowed by a series of controversial claims about which pilot shot down Yamamoto’s plane, a debate that drags on today. Although the killing did not transform any immediate strategic advantage to the United States, the killing of Yamamoto ensured the Japanese lost a charismatic and legendary military leader who was able to compound the important intangible value of morale.101 The operation, however, threatened the entire secret code-deciphering services of both the United States and British for fear that the Japanese had discovered that the attack was more than a pure coincidence.102 The risk of the Japanese learning that their codes had been broken, and subsequently warning the Germans, posed serious threats to the whole Allied code-breaking effort. The British were incensed by such callous use of the Magic/Ultra intelligence, which could have compromised the whole Allied secret code-breaking efforts.103 Sir Winston Churchill was reputedly so incensed by the carelessness of the Americans in conducting the attack that he forbade the sharing of the top-secret Ultra intelligence with the United States for several months.104 Although this incident of not sharing Ultra secrets with the United States was not mentioned in Churchill’s memoirs, it was revealed in a biography of Churchill’s masterspy, ‘C’ or Sir Stewart Graham Menzies. In Anthony Cave Brown’s biography of ‘C’, Churchill was reportedly furious with the United States’ callous use of Magic for tactical operations and not for great occasions only. Menzies also reputedly stated that killing Yamamoto would not have any effect as the Allies already knew how Yamamoto would behave strategically and tactically, and killing him might have resulted in the appointment of a more competent replacement.105 In addition, the operation killing Yamamoto was conceived with no cover plan to explain how the United States managed to stumble upon him.106

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These accusations by Menzies, however, were unfounded. As seen above, the US planners of the operation deliberated on a cover story and also whether killing Yamamoto would result in a more competent replacement leader. Menzies further asserted that the British could have killed Rommel on numerous occasions but refrained from doing so as it could endanger the Ultra secret.107 This was a curious statement by Menzies, as the case study in the next chapter reveals that the British actually conducted two attempts on Rommel’s life; either Menzies or his biographer were totally ignorant of this fact or both of them sought to downplay the unsuccessful British attempts to kill Rommel.108 Luck, however, was on the Americans’ side, as the Japanese did not believe that their codes could have been broken and concluded that it was an accidental encounter.109 The United States deliberately covered up the operation stating that a coastwatcher had seen Yamamoto’s plane taking off and had tipped off the US military forces.110 After the operation P-38 lightning fighters were also flown over to the island of Buin to further create the impression that Yamamoto’s hit was coincidental rather than a deliberate planned attack.111

The findings This operation’s utility will be revisited in terms of the two core research questions. 1. How strategically effective was this leadership decapitation operation in World War II? The US Army Air Force Special Operation to kill Yamamoto yielded clear concrete tactical results; it achieved its objective of killing Yamamoto. Although it can be argued that it did not yield any immediate strategic effects, the tactical effects still yielded slow returns for the final strategic performance. The Special Operation that killed Yamamoto was one of the many actions in the Pacific Theatre that slowly eroded Japanese manpower and material in a campaign of attrition. J.C. Wylie in his seminal work on strategy, Military Strategy, A Theory of Power Control, posited two forms of strategy, a sequential strategy that involves a series of planned operations leading each one to the ultimate

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purpose of the strategy; and a cumulative strategy which entails a number of operations not linked to each other in a sequence but ultimately giving impact to the whole purpose of the strategic objective.112 Wylie argued that US conduct of the Pacific campaign was a combination of both sequential and cumulative strategies.113 The killing of Yamamoto can be explained as a part of the cumulative strategy propounded by Wylie, i.e. it was a single event that did not seem to have any direct link to the ensuing operations in the Pacific Theatre but in the end it made a significant contribution by removing a well-respected and popular Japanese military leader.114 Wylie’s point below further supports this author’s argument on the strategic performance of the killing of Yamamoto: But when these cumulative strategies have been used in conjunction with a sequential strategy, directed at a critical point within the enemy structure, there are many instances in which the strength of the cumulative strategy has meant the difference between success or failure of the sequential.115 The operation also yielded intangible morale effects. It certainly gave the Allies a significant morale boost and delivered a psychological blow to the Japanese.116 After all, Yamamoto, in the eyes of the US public, was the arch-villain who had attacked Pearl Harbor and was much hated – killing him was, in a way, avenging the anger and the shame of the Pearl Harbor attack.117 For the Japanese, Yamamoto’s legendary status was akin to that of a god – after his funeral, there were plans to build a ‘Yamamoto Shrine’ in his memory.118 The timely opposition from two of Yamamoto’s best friends, former Japanese Prime Minister Yonai Mitsumasa and Vice-Admiral Hori Teikichi, prevented the shrine from materialising. They said that Yamamoto believed that ‘to make a god of a military man is absurd’.119 The argument of whether Yamamoto’s death made any difference for US strategy in the Pacific was a moot point; for example, the largescale industrial power and huge manpower that the United States churned out for World War II would still have led to a Japanese defeat. The development of the atomic bomb and the subsequent death of Roosevelt that led to Truman becoming President, whose decision it was to use ‘the bombs’, were crucial factors that led to the ultimate defeat of

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Japan regardless of Yamamoto being alive or dead. These events were not known in April 1943. 2. How tactically effective was the Special Operations unit used in this operation? The US Army Air Force aerial Special Operation that killed Yamamoto was without a doubt a successful operation. What was more remarkable about this operation was that a group of pilots from different squadrons was assembled in short notice and assigned a Special Operation that required precise flight timing and navigation skills flying at very low levels. The pilots flew in complete silence just 50 feet above the wave tops. The P-38s did not have air-conditioning as P-38s usually flew at higher attitudes as interceptors. Flying at such low levels in the early morning in the Pacific resulted in extreme heat in the cockpit and it was reputed that some of the pilots flew without their shirts. The flight to Buin took almost two and a half hours and, even after suffering such immense hardships, the P-38 pilots were still able to operate at the top of their performance when they finally intercepted Yamamoto’s flight. In this Special Operation that killed Yamamoto, surprise was one of the key factors that aided the successful interception of Yamamoto’s plane. The Japanese did not expect the United States would be able to send P-38s such a long distance undetected by radar since the P-38s were hugging the wave tops. Surprise was complete as the P-38s jumped the Yamamoto’s flight. This operation showed what a totally unexpected method of attack could do; the Japanese thought they were safe in their own backyard but were rudely shocked by the sudden appearance of the US Army Air Force P-38 Lightning fighters. The skills and the experience of the pilots were proven when they successfully flew at the correct speed and direction culminating in the timely ambush of Yamamoto’s flight. Even with accurate information, the timely meeting of the two flights could not be guaranteed, especially in those days when there was no satellite guidance technology available or even radar range finders fitted to the planes. Although the fighter squadron that conducted the operation was not a designated Special Operations unit, the operation itself demonstrated that, with accurate intelligence and information, an operation to strike

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at an important enemy target by a selected unit of men, although not Special Operations trained, can still be successful.

Conclusion This leadership decapitation operation from the US experience in World War II show that operations to kill or capture enemy leaders were widely practised by the key players in the war. The Unites States killed the most hated Japanese military commander, but refrained from any other attempts to conduct similar operations. That no other Japanese military leader was targeted to be killed points to the important psychological impact Yamamoto had on the United States. The prestige of Yamamoto as a capable military commander and the legendary status he held both in Japan and the United States, warranted his demise. The strategic effect gained from killing Yamamoto was to boost the morale of the US forces in the Pacific and to cause the Japanese a serious depressing loss. The fact that half of Yamamoto’s ashes were buried next to Japan’s greatest naval hero, Admiral Togo, highlighted the prestige of Yamamoto in the minds of the Japanese. The aerial operation, although not conducted by Special Operations personnel, had all the hallmarks of a successful Special Operation and demonstrated that when a Special Operation is used with clear objectives and excellent support from intelligence, it could yield disproportionate results. The next chapter discusses and evaluates Operation Flipper – the operation to kill German Major General Erwin Rommel who successfully disrupted British strategic aspirations in the North Africa campaign to the point of threatening the British hold of the North African, Egypt and Levant areas, and Churchill’s grand strategy in the Mediterranean theatre.

CHAPTER 6 OPERATION FLIPPER (AND OPERATION GAFF)

Introduction In the last quarter of 1941, the Western Desert Campaign (Libya and Western Egypt) experienced see-saw battles that resulted in mixed fortunes for both sides of the Axis and Allied military forces. The Western Desert Campaign was initiated by the Italians in Libya after Mussolini decided to contribute to the Axis war effort by attempting to conquer Egypt and the Arab oil fields from the British. Mussolini’s adventure in North Africa began in September 1940, and his foray there resulted in major humiliating setbacks. The Italians lost all major battles, and were pushed back into Libya by the British forces.1 Hitler saw the need to assist his staunch ally and dispatched a contingent of German ground and air forces in early 1941 to strengthen the Italians. Led by Lieutenant-General Erwin Rommel these troops later became known as the Afrika Korps.2 Rommel had earlier led some successful tactical movements during the German campaign in western Europe and distinguished himself as a capable leader much favoured by Hitler.3 Rommel’s leadership set the pace for the next stage of the North African campaign, reversing many of the Axis misfortunes in the area. His leadership and tactical skills overshadowed those of the British commanders. During his earlier campaigns in 1941, Rommel pushed the British forces back into Egypt and forced British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to replace a succession of British commanders. Among those who suffered Churchill’s wrath as a result were the

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Commanders-in-Chief Middle East Command, General Sir Claude John Eyre Auchinleck,4 and General Sir Archibald Percival Wavell.5 Auchinleck himself dismissed two of the field commanders of the Eighth Army, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Neil Methuen Ritchie and Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham, for incompetence in action.6 Rommel, whose cunning abilities in planning strategic and tactical offenses that managed to surprise and defeat the British forces in North Africa, was dubbed the ‘Desert Fox’, and was seen as the main threat to the Allied strategy in the North Africa campaign. His leadership qualities meant morale among the Axis’ troops soared, and even the Italians began to perform better in the battlefield.7 Rommel’s tactical acumen, battlefield knowledge, and intelligent decision making worried the British intensely. Rommel’s omnipresence at the frontlines of battlefields with disregard for his own safety raised the morale of the German and Italian troops, and lifted his status to that of a legendary military leader.8 In respect of that a young British officer, Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes, came up with an idea to ‘cut off’ the ‘head and brain’ of the enemy to overcome the British setbacks – a daring Special Operation was conceived to capture or kill Rommel in his headquarters.9 This chapter describes the background to the operation to kill or capture Rommel, how the plan was carried out, and its consequences. It also assesses the intended strategic effects of killing Rommel, and what lessons can be derived. The next section highlights the important points that led to the Allies deciding to kill Rommel in a daring Special Operation. The context of the formulation of the plan within the Allied strategy in North Africa must be detailed in order to better trace the origins of why it was considered necessary to kill Rommel.

Background of the Western Desert Campaign (September 1940 – December 1941) World War II began badly for the British and her Allies in 1939. Following the invasion of Poland in 1939, the British sent an expeditionary force (British Expeditionary Force – BEF) to join the French in repelling Hitler’s imminent push towards France. The French invasion by German forces started on 10 May 1940, first with Operation Fall Gelb, followed by Operation Fall Rot.10 The German offensive entailed the use of combined arms tactics, whereby armoured forces and

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the airforce worked in conjunction in their strategic push against the Allies. The BEF and French military forces were outmatched by Germany’s agile strategy and combined arms approach. The British and French forces suffered heavy losses in men and material, and retreat was the only move the Allied forces made during this opening phase of World War II.11 The BEF was encircled in the Dunkirk area and invoked what was termed as the biggest evacuation in British military history.12 Churchill rallied the British people together and all sorts of ships and boats, including fisherman’s boats, were sent to Dunkirk to bring as many British and Allied troops back to British shores.13 One of the key players in the Germans’ successful implementation of combined arms tactics and ‘lightning’ warfare, nicknamed subsequently as Blizkrieg, was (then) Major General Erwin Rommel.14 After the successful evacuation in Dunkirk, France capitulated. Germany then prepared plans to invade Britain in what was to be Operation Sea Lion,15 and as an opening gambit, employed the Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF. The Battle of Britain followed, and was won by the British.16 Around this time the British territories in the Middle East were threatened with war by Germany’s close ally in Europe – Italy. Benito Mussolini, Italy’s dictator, decided to join the victorious Germans by invading North Africa from Libya towards the British protectorates of Egypt, Abyssinia and Somaliland.17 The Italians foundered in their thrust towards Abyssinia and Somaliland when their more technologically advanced forces were defeated by local tribesmen trained and led by British officers, and supported by small units of British troops. The Italian invasion of Egypt was beaten back easily by the British forces under the command of General Sir Archibald Wavell.18 This was the beginning of what was termed as the Western Desert Campaign.19 The war in the North African Desert firstly centred on Libya’s Cyrenaica and the western frontiers of Egypt and subsequently ended in Tunisia. This campaign lasted from September 1940 until May 1942. The initial stage was focused on Libya and the western approaches of Egypt. The emphasis in this case study will also centre on this period of campaign, notably from September 1940 to December 1941. The Western Desert Campaign is best remembered for its ‘table-tennis’ like character; a series of battles that saw both the Axis and Allied forces moving forwards and gaining ground, and then losing it and retreating. The Italians initiated

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the first offensive of the campaign on 13 September 1940.20 Commanded by Marshal Rodolfo Graziani the Italian force was ordered by Mussolini to march against the British towards Egypt in an ambitious plan to capture Egypt and the precious Suez Canal. The attack quickly developed into a stalemate for the Italians as the British Western Desert Force, under the command of Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor, countered the Italians’ offensive.21 O’Connor decided to take advantage of the Italians’ clumsiness whose attack had been blunted and stopped at Sidi Barrani, and launched a ‘raid’ in what O’Connor termed as a brisk offensive against the Italians. The offensive was known as Operation Compass.22 The ‘raid’ turned into a major successful offensive for the British, who pushed the Italians back into Benghazi. In this offensive, which lasted until February 1941, the British advanced 500 miles, and captured 130,000 prisoners, 500 tanks, and more than 800 artillery guns – the equivalent of an enemy army of 14 divisions. In comparison, the British suffered minor casualties losing 500 men killed.23 O’Connor planned to advance as far as Tripoli and capture that strategic port, but was opposed by the British chiefs of staff in London.24 The British chiefs of staff intended to remove some of Wavell’s troops from the Libya theatre and deploy them in support of the defence of Greece.25 The decision to halt O’Connor’s offensive at Benghazi may have prolonged the Western Desert Campaign. The implication of not capturing the port of Tripoli had tragic consequences for the British, as the coming events would highlight. Max Hastings, however, has argued that even if the British did not squander personnel and material in Greece, it was doubtful that O’Connor could sustain the fight all the way to Tripoli. Serious threats to O’Connor’s advance were posed due to the overstretching of logistics support, attrition in British armour and troops, and the landing of Rommel’s Afrika Korps.26 Hitler was frustrated that his close ally, Italy had stumbled in their forays in the Western Desert. Germany’s alliance with Italy, and Hitler’s decision to aid his ally, Mussolini, in North Africa cost Germany valuable resources in manpower and material. Hitler decided to send a German military task force to aid the fumbling Italians in Libya, diverting some of his precious Panzer units, military and naval logistics, and Luftwaffe units that were designated to be used for his impending invasion of Russia (Operation Barbarossa). The first German units arrived in Tripoli under the command of Rommel on 11 February 1941.27 If O’Connor had

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managed to capture the port before then the German landing may have been opposed, and the tide of the subsequent campaigns in North Africa could have flowed very differently. Notwithstanding the strategic mistake of not taking the port of Tripoli, the British forces were further diluted and weakened when three divisions and two brigades of its Commonwealth forces were sent to Greece to aid in the defence of Greece against invasion by the Germans.28 The German forces, now renamed the Afrika Korps under Rommel, launched an offensive codenamed Operation Unternetment Sonnenblume (Operation Sunflower) in March 1941.29 Although Rommel was instructed to perform a defensive role in support of the ailing Italian forces, he soon saw the advantage of taking the offensive when he assessed correctly that the British forces were spread too thin, and could be easily dislodged.30 In Operation Sunflower Rommel quickly defeated the British forces and advanced as far as Sollum by mid-April 1941, a distance of more than 800 miles.31 Tobruk was encircled and besieged by the German Afrika Korps. In the ensuing confusion of the battle, O’Connor was captured by German forces when he accidentally ventured into German lines.32 The British launched two counter-attacks attempting to relieve the siege of Tobruk; first in May 1941 (Operation Brevity) and then in June 1941 (Operation Battleaxe).33 Both of these offensives failed, and the disgraceful British losses suffered from these operations resulted in Churchill replacing the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Middle East, Wavell, with Auchinleck.34 Subsequently LieutenantGeneral Sir Alan Cunningham replaced O’Connor as commander-in-chief of the Western Desert Forces. The British Western Desert Force, as it was known then, was reformed and reorganised into a new formation on 26 September 1941 known as the Eighth Army.35 What followed next was another plan to relieve the siege of Tobruk, and push the Axis forces back. The plan was codenamed Operation Crusader, and was set to launch on the early morning of 18 November 1941.36 The operation to kill Rommel was conceived as the beginning point of this particular offensive.

Enter the commandos Special Operations in modern warfare bloomed as a standard organisation in the belligerents’ order of battle during World War II,

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in which multiple specialist units and commando formations were formed by both the Allies and the Axis militaries.37 The British were the first Allied power to institutionalise Special Operations units within its armed forces. British Special Operations were officially formed during the early years of World War II.38 Following Germany’s lightning assault on Europe and the strategic use of German Fallschirmjager in the Eben Emael operation, Prime Minister Winston Churchill demanded the formation of ‘twenty thousand storm troops or Leopards’ to strike back at occupied Europe.39 Churchill knew the value of commando operations, especially as he witnessed first-hand as a war correspondent the effectiveness of the Boer Kommando during the Boer Wars in South Africa.40 He claimed that, ‘The individual Boer, is worth from 3 to 5 regular soldiers.’41 In the summer of 1940 Britain was facing a precarious moment as she faced a strong German military that had triumphantly conquered western Europe in just a few weeks. The threat of imminent invasion of the British Isles was real and Churchill saw the need to attempt some raids on the European coastline to raise the morale of the British people and attempt to initiate a ‘reign of terror’ on the French coast, which would hopefully divert some attention from the Germans. The policy of conducting raids along the coastlines of France was seen as one of the few feasible strategies to hit back at German forces in those early days of World War II, where British military strength and material had been seriously eroded by the failure of the BEF, which culminated in the evacuation at the beaches of Dunkirk.42 The British had organised two different forms of Special Operations: one run by the civilian Ministry of War – the Special Operations Executive (SOE); and the other by units from the regular military establishment, initially known as the Independent Companies before being renamed the commandos. The SOE was tasked with subversion, sabotage and espionage activities inside occupied Europe, and subsequently in the Middle East and Asia.43 British commandos were officially formed on 6 June 1940, when the scheme conceived by (then) Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke was proposed by General Sir John Dill (then Chief of the Imperial General Staff – CIGS) to Churchill, and subsequently approved.44 Churchill instructed his Chief Staff Officer, General Ismay, to form new units suited for commando roles as illustrated below:

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Enterprises must be prepared, with specially-trained troops of the hunter class, who can develop a reign of terror down these coasts, first of all on the ‘butcher and bolt’ policy . . . The passive resistance war, in which we have acquitted ourselves so well, must come to an end.45 In order to join the commandos, the men selected needed to pass rigorous training that included extreme physical exercise, moving and living in the fields, mountain climbing, small unit tactics, hand-to-hand combat, silent killing, proficiency in weapons use and handling, and demonstrating high initiative. For example, commandos were not provided with barracks at their posting but were paid an extra allowance of four guineas and six shillings to find and pay for their own accommodation. They also had to find their own mode of transportation. They were simply given instructions to meet at a certain place at a certain time and how they got there was up to their own initiative.46 The first commandos derived from the Independent Companies that were originally formed to fight in Norway. With the fall of Norway their services were not needed and the men volunteered for commando training. The British commandos, although set up with a vision for Special Operations, were later relegated to conducting assault raids, usually be amphibious means. It lost the original intended purpose of striking behind enemy lines and building a strong resistance movement in occupied Europe in the early dark days of World War II. That task was given solely to SOE. During World War II the strength of the commandos reached more than 25 (battalion sized), formed into four brigades.47 The commandos served in all theatres of war, such as in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. The Western Desert Campaign was also significant as it served as a foundation where various other British Special Operations units had mushroomed. Generals Wavell, Auchinleck and, later, Neil Ritchie, were open to ideas of unconventional warfare, and it was in this theatre of operation that the early formations of some of the best and most successful British Special Operations units were born. These included the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Popski’s Private Army (PPA), Special Air Service – both ‘A’ Force and L Detachment (SAS), and a Jewish Special Interrogation Group (SIG). The SAS and the SIG were formed mostly with officers and men from commando units. The commandos

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were initially sent to Egypt as part of Layforce – a brigade-sized formation commanded by Colonel Robert Laycock.48 Layforce consisted of three commando battalions (Nos 7, 8, and 11 Commandos), and two smaller units (Nos 50 and 52 Commandos).49 Layforce was first used in a raid behind Axis lines in Bardia.50 The raid did not yield any tangible results in terms of destruction. Layforce was subsequently sent to Crete to aid in the defence of the island against the German invasion there.51 Although in this operation to defend the island, albeit in the early stage, the Allies inflicted heavy losses on the German paratroops who spearheaded the invasion, it soon descended into a humiliating evacuation and defeat of British forces.52 After the disastrous campaign in Crete, Layforce was almost destroyed and only a handful of its men was successfully evacuated back to Egypt. The remnants of Layforce (mostly 11 Commando as it was sent to Cyprus instead of Crete thus avoiding annihilation in Crete), were subsequently used in an attack on French Vichy forces in Lebanon. 11 Commando was tasked with securing the crossing of the Litani River to enable Commonwealth (British and Australian) forces to cross the river, and engage the French Vichy forces. The main intention of that operation was to capture Lebanon and Syria in what was codenamed Operation Exporter.53 The commandos succeeded in their objective of capturing the Litani River crossings allowing the British Commonwealth Forces to cross and successfully capture Lebanon and Syria.54 It was during this operation that the commanding officer of 11 Commando, LieutenantColonel Richard Pedder, was killed. Command of 11 Commando was then transferred to (then) Major Geoffrey Keyes (he was subsequently promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel). 11 Commando suffered heavy casualties during the operation at Litani River. However, it struggled on to survive disbandment.55 Keyes then decided to plan a Special Operation not attempted thus far in World War II. He learned from his military intelligence sources in General Head Quarters (GHQ), Middle East, of the whereabouts of the Afrika Korps leader’s headquarters, and planned an operation to capture or kill Rommel who was thought to be present there. This operation, if successful, would highlight the importance and the utility of 11 Commando and could avoid 11 Commando being disbanded.56 This was to be the first leadership decapitation operation to be conducted by British military forces in World War II.

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The plan to ‘Get Rommel’ Michael Asher, in his book Get Rommel, claimed that in September 1941 Keyes heard from his sources in the military intelligence at General Head Quarters (GHQ), Middle East, in Cairo, that Rommel’s headquarters had been discovered by Arab agents working for G(R), SOE, and located in Beda Littoria.57 Keyes’s source was Lieutenant Colonel Henry J. ‘Kid’ Cator (attached to a G(R), SOE),58 a friend and officer with whom Keyes had served in the Royal Scots Grey (Keyes’ original unit before joining the commandos). Keyes was excited at the prospect of conducting a Special Operation to decapitate the German military leadership and set about arranging a meeting with Cunningham, the General Officer Commanding, Western Desert Forces. Cunningham listened to Keyes’ idea and was receptive to the plan. Cunningham was hard pressed to start a new offensive against the Axis lines and relieve the siege of Tobruk.59 The offer of a diversionary attack in conjunction with his intended major counter offensive was attractive, especially with some probability of success and little risk of losses. Keyes’ proposal to use a small force of commandos to strike at various objectives during his planned operation offered an appealing economyof-force operation that may yield disproportionate results should Rommel be captured or killed. This operation, codenamed Operation Flipper, was planned to coincide with Operation Crusader, and a series of other Special Operations raids behind Axis lines conducted by the SAS, and a diversionary attack by the defenders of Tobruk. These operations were expected to cause confusion at the back of the Axis forces. Cunningham, reputedly inexperienced in armoured warfare, was receptive to any ideas on diversionary attacks that could avert some of his fears for the first major offensive that he would command.60 The official archival records, however, showed that the planning for the attack on Rommel’s headquarters was devised in Eighth Army headquarters and took several weeks to deliberate.61 Keyes was reported to have attended all the meetings and was involved heavily in the planning of Operation Flipper.62 Commander of Middle East Commando, Laycock, was also involved in the planning stage. The necessity of removing Rommel from the scene can be substantiated by other contextual evidence.

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The mystique of Rommel and his invincibility had bewitched the British troops since his rapid successes in Libya.63 His prowess in the battlefield had earned him a fearsome reputation among the troops of both the British and German forces. His presence on the battlefield alone was enough to raise the morale of the outnumbered German troops. Rommel’s tactical acumen and ability to use combined arms warfare gave him a distinct advantage over less experienced British senior officers. O’Connor was said to be his match but was unfortunately captured by German forces early on, rendering the British forces disabled temporarily in launching armoured and combined arms warfare.64 The removal of the Rommel factor was seen at that time as a most important, albeit desperate, measure to offset the Germans’ strategic advantage. Winston Churchill commented on the importance of this operation after the event: ‘In order to strike at the brain and nerve-centre of the enemy’s army at the critical moment . . .’65 Churchill, although not involved in the design and planning of this operation, certainly did not demonstrate any reservations on the possibility of killing a top enemy commander. In his biography on Rommel, David Young reproduced an order written by Auchinleck. The letter is reproduced in full below, and illustrates clearly the respect and awe the British forces had for Rommel: There exists a real danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a kind of magician or bogey-man to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able. Even if he were a superman, it would still be highly undesirable that our men should credit him with supernatural powers. I wish you to dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary German general. The important thing now is to see to it that we do not always talk of Rommel when we mean the enemy in Libya. We must refer to ‘the Germans’ or ‘the Axis powers’ or ‘the enemy’ and not always keep harping on Rommel. Please ensure that this order is put into immediate effect, and impress upon all Commanders that, from a psychological point of view, it is a matter of the highest importance.66

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It is also of note that, further on in the Western Desert Campaign, when General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery took over command of the British forces he explicitly mentioned that eliminating Rommel and his forces would be his priority. This is highlighted in his message; When I assumed command of the Eighth Army I said that the mandate was to destroy ROMMEL and his Army, and that it would be done as soon as we were ready.67 These high-level orders highlighted the supreme importance and prestige of Rommel as perceived by the British troops. His mystical abilities bewitched the British troops and Rommel elevated himself to the position of an idol.68 It does not need much further thought to consider the logical solution to this problem – destroy Rommel and the British forces would be able to regain both morale and the strategic advantage. Keyes was alleged to have conjured up the operation as a way for him to gain personal glory.69 His father, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes of the Zeebrugge raid of World War I, was a Victoria Cross holder and a national hero.70 He wanted to keep pace with his father’s achievements. Keyes also wanted to sustain the life of 11 Commando, it having almost been disbanded following the disaster in Crete.71 A small force of 110 men of 11 Commando was all that was left for Keyes to command.72 This operation was thought by Keyes to be a way of rebuilding confidence back into the commandos.73 Keyes wrote in his last letter home: It is dirty work at the cross roads with a veangeance [sic], on the old origin conception of Commandos; but with a smallish party and new means of progression. It has enormous possibilities and is my own shoe . . . If the thing is a success, whether I get bagged or not, it will raise our stock a bit and help the cause.74 In a final intelligence confirmation of the whereabouts of Rommel’s headquarters, Captain John Haselden of G(R), SOE, was sent on a foot reconnaissance mission to Beda Littoria, and finally, on 19 October 1941, he sent a report confirming Rommel as present.75 Bida Littoria was located 250 miles behind the Axis front lines, and was 18 miles from the coast, the perfect setting for an amphibious commando operation. A plan was hatched by Keyes to conduct a raid to destroy the

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headquarters, and Rommel himself, as he was presumably located there. The operation would be carried out by six officers and 53 other ranks from 11 Commando. It would coincide with the launching of the wider operation to crush the Axis formations codenamed Operation Crusader. In addition, it would be conducted in conjunction with two other operations carried out by the L Detachment, Special Air Service (SAS) on the night and early morning of 17/18 November 1941. L Detachment, SAS, 55 men and officers led by then Major David Stirling, would land by parachute near to two locations, Gazala and Tmimi. They would attack two airfields at each location and, after the attack, rendezvous at two locations to be picked up by the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) who would take them to Siwa Oasis on 20 November. The SAS men would then be flown out from Siwa Oasis to Kabrit (SAS base).76 Operation Crusader was planned to be launched on the morning of 18 November 1941. The operations behind enemy lines were coordinated to give strategic impact by distracting the Germans at the most crucial moment. The plan certainly at a glance sounded convincing and, with the small forces, should be able to create disproportionate results for the British army.77 The SAS men would parachute in, while the men for Operation Flipper (11 Commando) would land by submarine. Both units involved consisted of well-trained personnel and some of the men had had combat experience. Following Captain Haselden’s intelligence report and confirmation on the location of Rommel’s headquarters,78 on 24 October 1941 a small reconnaissance unit of two commando men and two Special Boat Service (SBS) men was sent to survey a possible beach landing site for Operation Flipper in Ras Hilal.79 One of the commando men was Sir Thomas Macpherson (then a Captain).80 After completing their survey of the beach, the small unit canoed out in folbots to rendezvous with the submarine HMS Talisman, which had earlier delivered them there. The rendezvous, however, was not successful and the small recon force, after two nights attempting to reach the submarine and with their folbots almost broken by the battering seawaters, decided to escape by foot. The German and Italian forces discovered their subsequent escape, and the unit was tracked down and finally captured.81 This alerted the Axis forces to a possible attempt to land commandos near Apollonia but they did not know about the actual plans.82 The

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captured commandos and SBS men did not reveal anything during their interrogation. In all respect, the actual plan to kill Rommel was only known to a few officers at that time, and the small recce party certainly did not know the real purpose of the commando landing that would take place. The failure of the recce party to return indicated to Keyes that his impending landing at that particular beach site had been compromised. He decided to land his force at another location, Chesuen-El-Chelb.83 The distance from this alternate landing site to Rommel’s HQ was about 18 miles. At this stage, Laycock, who had decided to join the operation, expressed doubts on the viability of the operation. He realised that even if the operation was successful in destroying Rommel and his HQ, the return leg would be extremely hazardous, especially the rendezvous with the submarines at night in rough weather.84 Laycock expressed his concern that it would be a suicide operation but Keyes was adamant to continue.85 On 9 November 1941 the plan was detailed to the officers and men taking part. The commandos were to board the submarines the following day and sail to the assigned landing beaches.86 Operation Flipper had four main objectives, the achievement of which were assigned to four detachments, which were: 1. Raid General Rommel’s house and the German HQ, believed to be at Beda Littoria. 2. Assault the Italian HQ at Cirene. 3. Assault the Italian Intelligence Centre at Apollonia. 4. Sabotage the telephone and telegraph communications at the crossroads 32546 [Cyrene].87 It must be noted however, that there was no mention of the actual intended purpose of the operation to kill Rommel. In fact, the Appendix to Order No 1 simply read, ‘. . . carry out raid to inflict maximum possible damage to enemy HQs Comms [communications] and installations’.88 The commandos would be ferried by the submarines HMS Torbay and Talisman, and land at a beach located near Chesuen-El-Chelb. At the beach, they would be guided by Haselden and, upon completion of the landing, they would be guided to their respective targets by local Arab guides. After achieving their targets, on the night of 17/18 November,

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the four detachments would move back to the beach, embark the waiting submarines, and sail back to Egypt.89

How the operation actually proceeded Operation Flipper was launched on 10 November 1941 with six officers and 53 other ranks of 11 Commando. The overall operation was commanded by Laycock, with the raiding operation on Rommel’s headquarters commanded by Keyes.90 The commandos set sail in two submarines, HMS Torbay and Talisman from Alexandria. On reaching the designated landing beaches on the night of 14/15 November 1941 a heavy swell was encountered.91 When the force disembarked the submarines, only half reached the landing sites due to the difficult sea conditions. The force was guided in by Haselden.92 As only half the force landed, numbering 30 men, Keyes and Laycock decided to alter their operational objectives and to attack just two of the four objectives – assaulting Rommel’s headquarters and destroying the Italian communications cable-mast at Cyrene.93 Laycock was to stay behind at the beach with three men to form a beachhead and to guard the food and ammunition dump, where the attacking force would return, and embark the submarines to escape.94 Keyes force moved out on the night of 15 November 1941, and with the aid of Arab guides reached Rommel’s headquarters with timely precision on the night of 17 November 1941, in spite of a period of heavy rainfall.95 Their attack on Rommel’s headquarters was timed for the midnight of 17/18 November, just about six hours before Operation Crusader was due to be launched. On reaching Rommel’s headquarters Keyes led the attack with only two men, Captain Robin Campbell and Sergeant Jack Terry. Keyes posted his other men to guard the approaches to the villa to prevent any occupants escaping the building. A further group of three men was instructed to destroy the electric generators for the house.96 There are different appraisals and accounts of what really happened during the assault on the villa. This research follows the official after-action report located in The National Archives, Kew Gardens, WO 201/720 and WO 373/19 files as the main primary sources. The purpose of the narrative is to reflect on the purpose of this current research, i.e. the strategic implications of the operation rather than the details of ‘who fired at whom first’.

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The assault began when the Keyes party, unable to find entry into the building via any doors or windows (they were all locked), decided to knock on the front door and trick the sentry into opening it. The deception worked and the sentry opened the door. However, a struggle ensued when the sentry realised that the uninvited ‘guests’ with blackened faces were enemy soldiers. In the struggle the German sentry shouted warnings before being silenced by a shot from Captain Campbell’s revolver. The shot was a loud signal to all in the headquarters that something was happening.97 The three commandos then conducted room-to-room searches. The first room was empty, but when Keyes opened the door to the second he saw a roomful of Germans. He fired a few shots from his pistol and closed the door while Campbell pulled a grenade pin. Keyes then opened the door for Campbell to throw in the grenade and as he was doing so, Keyes was shot and he slumped onto the floor. Campbell managed to throw the grenade into the room and shut the door. The grenade exploded and the room inside fell silent. Both Campbell and Terry then carried Keyes outside, and found out that he was already dead.98 The commando party guarding the outside of the building also shot dead two German soldiers, one a sentry running into the house upon the hearing the first shot fired, and another, a German officer shot while he was attempting to jump out from the second floor window.99 Campbell had gone back inside and was searching the back of the house, when he was shot in the leg by one of his own men positioned there.100 Campbell knew that with his injured leg there was no way the commandos could move back to the beach in time for the rendezvous. He ordered his men to leave without him. He decided to stay behind and take his chances of capture. He was later captured by the Germans and given medical attention.101 The group, now commanded by Terry, moved back to the beach rendezvous point guarded by Laycock.102 A party sent to destroy the communication cable-mast had not been heard from.103 Terry’s group subsequently managed to make contact with Laycock’s group at the beach that night. They could not, however move out to the submarines waiting for them due to the rough sea conditions and they decided to try again the next night.104 The group, ironically, was discovered the next day by the Italians in the area who had been alerted by the commando assault at Rommel’s supposed headquarters.105 After a series of small skirmishes, Laycock ordered his men to ‘escape and evade’ in small

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groups to three other alternative predetermined rendezvous points: an alternative beach, where the submarine HMS Talisman would be waiting; an area where the LRDG was known to be operating; and an area north of Cyrene to wait for the advance of the British Eighth Army in Operation Crusader.106 In the end, most of the force was captured by the Germans and Italians, and a few were killed by Arabs.107 Only two men from the whole operation made it back to the British lines.108 They were Laycock and Terry, both having walked for 41 days behind enemy lines before arriving back into British lines on Christmas Day.109

The outcome Even though the raid achieved total tactical surprise it failed to meet any of the operational objectives. The raid on Rommel’s HQ, although conducted with precision, allegedly failed due to faulty intelligence. There is conflicting evidence even as to whether Rommel had used the villa raided by Keyes. Interestingly, some German officers confirmed that Rommel had indeed used the villa near Beda Littoria as his headquarters. This was confirmed by Rommel’s Chief of Staff Afrika Korps, Lieutenant-General Fritz Bayerlein in his section in The Rommel Papers: It is interesting to note that Rommel had in fact formerly had his H.Q. in this house. He himself had had the first floor and his A.D.C.s the ground floor. The British must have received knowledge of this through their Intelligence Service.110 This point was further supported in a letter written by Ernst Schilling, the Commander of the German headquarters in Beda Littoria, which was attacked that fateful night, to Keyes’s family, and survivors of Operation Flipper after World War II ended: But sometimes he [General Rommel] visited Beda Littoria where a house was reserved for him and other high officers. This house was named ‘Rommel-Haus’.111 It was later discovered that Rommel’s actual headquarters at that time was located in Casa Bianca at Ain Gazala,112 which is about 50 miles from Tobruk. Rommel was reported to have commented on the audacity of the British assumption that he would stay so far behind his front lines.113 Beda Littoria was almost 200 miles behind German lines.114

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The villa that was attacked was used by his quarter-master chief as the logistics headquarters under Lieutenant Colonel Otto.115 Rommel, however, was not even in North Africa during the raid – he was in Rome.116 He had flown to Rome to gain support from the Italian command for an early offensive to break the siege of Tobruk and to celebrate his birthday, on 15 November, with his wife, and planned to fly back to Libya on 16 November. According to David Irving, a thunderstorm forced Rommel to land in Belgrade and he spent a night there.117 The next day his plane developed engine problems and was forced to land in Athens where he spent another night. Finally, on 18 November, he flew back into Libya.118 This under-investigated fact left many historians claiming that Rommel was in Rome and only flew back to Libya on 18 November, thereby pointing to the fallible intelligence available at the time of the raid – that Rommel was not even in Libya during the raid. The continuation of the operation, even with information that Rommel was in Rome, was judged with contempt and blamed for the subsequent failure of the operation and loss of personnel.119 Looking at the facts as provided by Irving, it appeared that Rommel indeed should have been in Libya on 16 November, and the intelligence sources may not have accounted for his flight problems and changes in time. If Rommel had reached Libya on 16 November and used the villa at Beda Littoria as his headquarters, Keyes’s commando raid may have yielded devastating results. On another note, the reason the Ultra intelligence decryption that discovered Rommel may not have been in Libya at the time and why that information was not relayed to the commando force has not been conclusively disclosed. On 3 November 1941 British intelligence, via the army’s Enigma, deciphered the coded German messages concerning Rommel’s impending arrival in Rome on 1 November 1941, and the message was passed to Churchill the same day.120 Churchill was also updated on visual confirmation of Rommel being at the Hotel Eden in Rome where he would stay until at least 15 November 1941.121 This message was deciphered on 17 November 1941 and Churchill received it the same day. Rommel’s return to Derna on the morning of 18 November 1941 was deciphered on the same day and also sent to Churchill that day.122 There is no record of what Churchill did with the information or whether he knew at the time that an

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operation was underway to kill or capture Rommel. Neither is there any literature describing to whom or to where the information was relayed within the Middle East Command. Most literature generally assumes that the information on Rommel was known by Middle East Command but cites no evidence as to whom it was disseminated, nor whether that person or personnel knew that the operation to attack Rommel’s headquarters was underway. The most plausible explanation is that, at this stage of the war, communications between the disparate units were difficult.123 The long chain of command and the various actions conducted by independent units, such as the commandos and the SAS, inevitably resulted in poor control and coordination at the British headquarters. Also, Operation Flipper had a number of objectives, its true function – to capture or kill Rommel – was shrouded in secrecy and known only to a select circle of officers in the General Staff at Eighth Army Headquarters. During those stages of the North African campaign the intelligence cycle was hazardous at its best. Ultra intelligence reports were often passed to the intelligence staff in Middle East Command who did not understand the importance or meaning of some reports, and this, at times, resulted in the late distribution of information.124 It was only in the spring of 1942 that the situation improved and coordinated dissemination of Ultra intelligence reports from Bletchley Park to Cairo was established.125 The secretive nature of Ultra decryption meant that only a select few had access to such important information lest the secret that the British had broken the German codes leaked out, rendering such decryption useless should the Germans take countermeasures.126 This definitely limited the number of officers with access to such highly sensitive and secretive information. It should also be stressed here that the historical records of the decrypted messages show the dates of Rommel’s trip to Rome and his departure from Rome, but as to whom that information was passed in the Middle East Command there is a void. Complicating matters further, by 17 November Keyes’ commandos were already near Rommel’s supposed headquarters, and there was no way to inform them as Keyes’ force did not have any radios and signallers. This was another important, but often overlooked, factor as to why the intelligence information was not transmitted to 11 Commando – there was no signaller attached to 11 Commando at the time. Laycock

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explicitly mentioned in his report that this lack of a radio operator was detrimental to the unit’s success.127 The reason there were no signallers was that the unit’s signallers (and the demolitions personnel) had been transferred to other Eighth Army units due to the impending disbandment of 11 Commando.128 Once landed ashore Laycock used his torchlight to send rudimentary Morse code signals to the waiting submarines coordinating the landing.129 When the submarines left, Keyes’ party had no means of communicating with Eighth Army headquarters or Middle East Command. Even if intelligence had reached the British headquarters and been properly disseminated, it would had been impossible to relay it to the landing party once they reached the beaches on the night of 14 November. Again, the real purpose of their operation to kill or capture Rommel was known only to a select few. The purpose of the operation as laid out before its launch only pointed to hitting critical German and Italian command and communication facilities without any explicit mention of killing or capturing Rommel.130 Therefore, the information of Rommel’s whereabouts may not have necessarily warranted channelling to Keyes and his commando force, even if they were contactable. Macpherson commented later that the intelligence provided by Haselden was not reliable. Macpherson asserted that GHQ in Cairo knew about Haselden’s suspicious intelligence but nonetheless did not urge caution against his reports.131 Macpherson also claimed that the amateurish conduct of GHQ and its senior commanders, along with their distrust of commandos, further aggravated the little cooperation that did exist between the commandos and GHQ.132 This lack of teamwork resulted in disorganised planning and running of commando operations leading to the ultimate intelligence and communication failures in Operation Flipper. The failure of the attack, with the loss of almost the whole raiding force, sealed the fate of 11 Commando. The operation was conceived by Keyes to save 11 Commando from disbandment, but ultimately did not manage to rescue it from its ultimate fate. There were even discussions on the total disbandment of all commando formations and the transfer of the men to depleted battalions. Only the intervention by Churchill prevented this from being realised.133 Keyes was posthumously awarded the highest gallantry award, the Victoria Cross.134 Terry, the only survivor from Keyes’s unit that had attacked

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Rommel’s headquarters, and who subsequently escaped and evaded the enemy together with Laycock, was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM).135 The other operations conducted at the same time by L Detachment, SAS who attacked the airfields in Timini and Gazala, also failed.136 The SAS lost 40 men killed or captured in these operations.137 These Special Operations, intended as a kick-start to Operation Crusader failed to achieve their objectives and many men were lost as a result. In the event, even Rommel himself was surprised by the Operation Crusader offensive.138 He was reputed to have disbelieved the early reports of an offensive launched by the British forces, and lost crucial moments in the opening phase of the campaign to counter the British attack.139 Rommel believed that the British advance was ‘. . . a reconnaissance in force . . .’140 Operation Crusader, on the final score card, was successful in that it relieved the siege of Tobruk and pushed the Axis forces back to El Agheila in January 1942, a successful advance of more than 300 miles.141 From El Agheila, Rommel launched a counter attack on 21 January 1942, and pushed the British forces all the way back to the town of Gazala, about 30 miles west of Tobruk.142 Due to lack of supplies and an overstretched logistics line, Rommel set up a string of defensive positions straddling the areas between the towns of Gazala, Bir Hakeim and Tobruk.143 These defensive positions were known as the Gazala Line and featured prominently in the next phase of the continuing see-saw battle of the North African Desert, the Battle of Gazala.

The findings This operation’s utility will be revisited in terms of the two core research questions. 1. How strategically effective was this leadership decapitation operation in World War II? In this operation, the intended strategic effect of killing or capturing Rommel was immense. By removing him as the leader of the Axis forces, it was envisaged that the Axis forces in North Africa would be unable to perform effectively both tactically and strategically. The operation was

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also intended to gain morale effects, i.e. raising the British troops’ morale, after a series of setbacks, and destroying the morale of the Axis troops. There is no doubt that the removal of Rommel would have had tremendous effects on morale. The morale of the British forces was low, largely due to the prestige of the charismatic Rommel. On the other side, to both the Germans and Italians, Rommel was a legendary leader. His tactical prowess in armoured and desert warfare surpassed that of the British commanders. His exploits and performance in the North Africa desert, and subsequently in western Egypt, particularly when considered with the fact that he had only two Panzer divisions and one light division,144 was excellent by any standards. Even though Operation Flipper failed, upon Laycock and Terry’s return on Christmas Day in 1942, the morale of the British troops was raised when news reports of their heroic venture were released.145 The news of a heroic attempt by a few brave men to destroy the enemy’s headquarters far behind enemy lines was given to the British press as a public relations coup.146 Placing the operation within the context of that period sheds light on why raising the British morale was important. The British morale was low at that time because of the heavy losses suffered during Operation Crusader and the invasion of its colonies in Asia, namely Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore, by Japanese military forces. The news of a few good men hitting out at the enemy against all odds epitomised the British character at that time, the indomitable spirit of stubborn resistance against the tyranny of Nazi Germany and then Japan in December 1941. Gerald Rawling commented on the raid: and the very audacity of the operation gave an appreciable boost to British morale at a time when it was badly needed. And if the raid was a failure it had at least added significantly to the legend of the British Commandos.147 Rommel’s removal would definitely have left a void in the Axis leadership in that theatre. Although historically ‘what if?’ is difficult to justify, in this case the plausible effect of the removal of Rommel is immensely in favour for the British cause. The British commanding staff were certainly outmatched and outwitted by Rommel in the North

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Africa theatre. Rommel had fewer men and material, and increasing problems of resupply and yet Rommel still managed to defeat the British forces in successive campaigns in the period from 11 February 1941 until the Second Battle of Alamein in October 1942. 2. How tactically effective was the Special Operations unit used in this operation? Tactically, the Special Operation, despite the major setbacks of lack of signals equipment and the foul weather encountered, was soundly successful. The commandos infiltrated behind enemy lines and reached the assumed German headquarters, their primary target. Their landing and approach to their intended targets were not detected. In view of the fact that only half of the men actually landed, the flexibility of the commandos in improvising their plans had given them the impetus to carry out the raid. This operation also utilised the principle of surprise to its ultimate effect. The covert successful infiltration by submarine, and concealed movement to the target were all conducted with the aim of surprising the enemy. The Germans had no idea that a commando force was coming to destroy their headquarters and, up until the first shot was fired, 11 Commando surprised the enemy. In the ensuing attack they killed four German soldiers and destroyed the assumed headquarters (Quarter Master headquarters). If it had been Rommel’s HQ, and he had been present, there is no doubt of the outcome of the operation. The foul weather that hindered their evacuation by submarines was beyond their control. The men who subsequently escaped and evaded the enemy on land had, to their credit performed their duty professionally. Three major factors hindered the successful conclusion of the operation – the outdated intelligence (as described in previous section), no signals (radio) equipment, and foul weather (choppy seas).

Get Rommel, again! (Operation Gaff) The British obsession with Rommel’s legendary prowess manifested again into another operation launched to either kill or capture him again in 1944 after the D-Day landings. This operation is detailed in this section as the author found that this second operation gave a feeling of de´ja` vu – two years later lessons were not learned from Operation Flipper and the same mistakes that plagued Keyes’ tragic operation

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persisted in the second operation to ‘get Rommel’. The story of the Allies perception of Rommel as the supreme military leader and the need to remove him would not be complete without learning about Operation Gaff. This section on Operation Gaff, however, will not be used as part of the analysis for this case study; its purpose is to highlight the importance that Rommel continued to play in the minds of the Allies and the effect of this on morale that harked back to the reason and importance of the initiation of Keyes’ operation. After the initial Allied landing on the Normandy beaches during Operation Overlord and the capturing of beachheads on 6 June 1944, the Allied advance was blocked by stubborn resistance by German forces under Field Marshal Rommel. Even with one Panzer Division, the 21st Panzer Division, Rommel effectively blocked British chances of reaching and capturing Caen on the first day. The British would ultimately capture Caen after two more months of bloody battles. Rommel was instrumental in the defence of the Normandy coastline as he had moved his command, Army Group B to the Normandy area.148 He was reportedly aghast at the meagre beach defence set up and decided to bolster the beach defences as well as defences in open land where he suspected gliders would be landed.149 Initially, Rommel predicted that the Normandy beaches would be the most likely landing place and wanted to place the Panzer divisions as close as possible to them.150 Rommel’s Supreme Commander in France, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, and other German divisional commanders, believed that the landings would take place in Calais, and wanted to place the Panzer divisions as far back as Paris to be used in pincer attacks once the Allies landed and moved inland.151 Rommel argued that the Allies should be disrupted at the beaches itself.152 However, he conceded later that the most likely place the Allies would land was in the Pas de Calais area.153 Rommel’s presence in Normandy greatly worried the Allied commanders. The importance of disabling Rommel continued to be an obsession for the Allied forces. Rommel’s charismatic and legendary reputation preceded him even though he was defeated in the North African campaign. The importance of removing Rommel from the scene resulted in another operation conceived to kill or capture him – Operation Gaff.154 Operation Gaff was conducted after the Allied Supreme headquarters received intelligence that Rommel’s headquarters was at Chateau De La

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Roche. This intelligence was confirmed on 18 July 1944.155 There was no attempt to kill or capture Rommel in the early stages of the Normandy landings. It was only after the landings and the eventual breakout from the Normandy area proved difficult due to Rommel’s tactical prowess in defending the German lines, especially during the crucial advance towards Caen, that a Special Operation was initiated, on 20 July 1944, to kill or capture Rommel, effectively removing him from the battlefield. The British SAS dispatched a select team of six French SAS men for the operation. The SAS team was given the following instructions that shed some light on the true objective of this operation; INTENTION 1. To kill, or kidnap and remove to England, Field Marshal Rommel, or any senior members of his staff. METHOD . . . If it should prove possible to kidnap ROMMEL and bring him to this country the propaganda value would be immense and the inevitable retaliation against the local inhabitants might be mitigated or avoided. . . To kill ROMMEL would obviously be easier than to kidnap him and it is preferable to ensure the former than to attempt and fail in the latter. Kidnapping would require successful two-way W/T communication and therefore a larger party, while killing could be reported by pigeon.156 It is clear that the SAS team knew that the most plausible option would be to kill Rommel rather than bring him back alive, as killing him would be much easier to both carry out and to report back to command. Capturing him would entail an escape and evacuation by foot through German lines with the possibility of a massive manhunt in progress, a feat extremely difficult to achieve. The French SAS team, under Captain S.W. Lee, parachuted into the area near to Rommel’s headquarters on 25 July 1944.157 They moved on to the target and befriended three local French men over the following days who, because the French partisans were not active in this area, served as guides.158 Together they spent five days moving to the target location, which they reached on 1 August 1944, only to learn that Rommel had been

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injured by a fighter attack on his car and had been transferred out of the area.159 This again points to lack of timely intelligence being collected and disseminated. Rommel was attacked in his car by a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Spitfire on 17 July 1944.160 He was being driven in his staff car after visiting his frontline battle commanders, and was returning to his Army Group B Headquarters, when his car was spotted and strafed by the Spitfire on a road from Livarot heading towards Vimoutiers.161 Rommel was seriously injured and evacuated to a hospital at St Germain.162 The Allies knew they had put Rommel out of action at the end of that day and the news was reported in the radio.163 In his report Charley Fox, the Spitfire pilot who shot Rommel’s car, included a chilling note: ‘1 STAFF CAR DAMAGED. . .? ROMMEL – YES.’ There was, however, a twist to Charley’s story. Initially, on the evening of 17 July 1944, the US military, along with two RAF Typhoon pilots, claimed that a P-47 had shot up Rommel’s car.164 It appeared that Charley Fox had got wind of the news that Rommel had been shot and wounded by a Spitfire aircraft ‘a day or so’ after he wrote his report, and from the location indicated he knew he had shot Rommel’s car and so he was reputed to have added the post-report acknowledgement of his target.165 What was more mystifying was that Operation Gaff was initiated by an Allied Expeditionary Forces Supreme Headquarters’ intelligence report dated 18 July 1944, confirming the location of Rommel’s headquarters, without mentioning that he had already been incapacitated by an air attack a day earlier.166 The order and instructions for Operation Gaff were issued on 20 July 1944, and signed by the commander of the SAS Brigade, Brigadier Roderick William McLeod.167 Operation Gaff was finally launched on 25 July 1944 with the parachuting in of the French SAS team.168 The operation would have been a repeat of the earlier Operation Flipper had the French SAS team not received information on 1 August 1944 that Rommel had been injured and moved to a different location.169 The commander of Operation Gaff’s French SAS team, Lee commented in his after-action report that he was glad that they did not have to attack Rommel’s headquarters as it was very well guarded.170 Instead, the French SAS team stayed on in the area and conducted sabotage missions against the German logistics lines. They assisted in the destruction of two railway trains and ambushed seven lorries, two cars and a motorcycle. They killed

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or wounded at least 16 German troops in their ambushes. The SAS team completed their operation on 13 August 1944 when they crossed back into US military lines.171 There are a few plausible answers as to why Operation Gaff was still carried out even though Rommel had been injured one week before the SAS team parachuted in.172 One of those possible answers was that intelligence sources were still not distributed to various units at that stage of the war. This answer, however, is quite difficult to substantiate if there were already news reports on the evening of 17 July 1944, claiming that a US P-47 had shot Rommel’s car. Such open source news would had easily reached SAS Brigade HQ, which would had acted appropriately and urgently as an organisation that dealt with high risk and secretive Special Operations. A second plausible explanation as to why the SAS had continued the operation was the contextual organisational rivalry – the SAS Brigade in 1944 was fighting the military bureaucracy for combat action. The SAS had longed for a piece of action that would hark back to the ‘strategic’ importance of its unit’s role in the North African campaign – destroying aircrafts and enemy material in spectacular fashion. The SAS Brigade was instead used during the Normandy landings to assist local French resistance networks in conducting sabotage action behind German military lines during the Normandy landings, something which the SOE was more capable of doing. The commando raid on the German Army Group B headquarters with the intention to kill (or capture) Rommel, if successful, would had achieved a pyrrhic success for the SAS Brigade. As for Rommel, he was later implicated in the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler; Hitler survived that bomb attack at the Wolf’s Lair. During that bombing, Rommel was being treated at St Germain hospital for his injuries. Somehow, the conspirators in Hitler’s assassination attempt – caught and under vicious interrogation – blurted out Rommel’s name as part of the ring that had planned Hitler’s assassination. Hitler decided outright that Rommel was guilty and gave him two choices; kill himself with poison pills and his family will be spared or a full public trial that will ultimately lead to his execution. Rommel chose the former, and killed himself on 14 October 1944.173 It was rather ironic that the German military leader most feared by the Allies, and after two failed attempts by

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British Special Operations to remove him, was finally killed by his own political master, Hitler.

Conclusion The British commando operations in World War II certainly had some effects on the Axis forces. The famous German Kommando leader, Otto Skorzeny, had mentioned in his memoir that he and his men had studied carefully all the Allied commando operations. He stated; We had to admit-enviously – that the allied commando operations were always aimed at our nerve centres – an oil depot on a Norwegian island, a radar station on the Channel coast at Dieppe, or Rommel’s headquarters in Africa, the attack on which probably failed only as a result of imperfect information.174 Such accolade by German’s most reputable, efficient and much respected commando leader and practitioner certainly provided evidence that the British commandos were conducting sound operations.175 What was interesting from Skorzeny’s statement was that he had noted that the commandos had raided ‘Rommel’s headquarters’, adding further proof that Rommel had indeed used the villa at Beda Littora as his headquarters. From the empirical evidence, it had been demonstrated that the intelligence of Rommel was in Rome had been obtained but had not been disseminated down the chain of command. It must be noted, however, that there was no hint that he and Keyes had foreknowledge that Rommel was not even in Libya during the start of their operation. If they had known that Rommel was not in Beda Littoria, it would be safe to conclude that they would not have launched the operation. The failure in this operation to kill or capture Rommel is not attributed to the poor performance of 11 Commando, which had conducted the operation as best as it could in view of the fact that only half the men were landed, and an improvised smaller force was used instead. They had still managed to reach their objectives in appalling weather, and had managed to destroy the supposed Rommel’s headquarters. Keyes’s loss was a fact of combat where men get killed, even though it is unfortunate. The force had managed to move back to the beaches at the rendezvous point without the searching German and Italian units finding them. Only

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the failure to re-embark back on the submarines due to stormy weather, prevented their timely escape and subsequently the delay led to their discovery by Italian patrols, which hunted them down. Although the operation failed to kill Rommel, it was still a moraleraising commando action that had justified the formation of the commandos by Churchill, and its suitability in conducting amphibious raids later reputedly led Churchill to authorise the St Nazaire raid in March 1942.176 Sir Thomas Macpherson’s words provided the apt conclusion for this case study, The Rommel Raid was a brave concept. It could have been somewhat better done, but in its long-term practical results the sacrifice was worthwhile.177 The next chapter concludes this book with overall analyses of the strategic and tactical effectiveness of the case studies and conclusion.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

Introduction This book started with dual objectives, firstly to analyse the strategic effectiveness of leadership decapitation operations in World War II and, secondly, to study the tactical effectiveness of Special Operations units in conducting leadership decapitation operations. Two core research questions were used as a guiding framework to test the proposition that leadership decapitation had strategic utility and that Special Operations were effective in conducting such operations. Empirical evidence was gained from four case studies of leadership decapitation conducted by Special Operations in World War II. In each individual case study, an indepth analysis and answers to the two research questions were provided. The case studies in this book have so far been consistent in pointing out that both hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 stand, regardless of whether the operation failed or succeeded in achieving its aim. The following sections summarise the findings, provide recommendations for future research, and conclude with an encapsulation of the book’s original contribution to knowledge.

Analysis Although at the end of each case study chapter, there is a ‘findings’ section that analysed each individual case study against the two core research questions, this section summarises these findings and validates the hypotheses stated at the beginning of this chapter.

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Strategically effective In the study of Operation Anthropoid, Rienhard Heydrich was correctly identified as the epitome of Nazi occupation in Czechoslovakia, and killing him would yield the dual effects of morale raising and mass brutal reprisals (to influence resistance activities). The Czech government-in-exile, under President Benesˇ, correctly assessed the political objective of the operation – to gain prestige for his government-in-exile and, at the same time, to demonstrate to the world the utility of Czech home resistance (as the operation was attributed to local Czech resistance fighters rather than to British-based Czech operatives). Benesˇ was also rightly worried for the future of Czechoslovakia at that crucial time. Richard Overy, writing on the reasons why the Allies won World War II, commented: On the face of things, no rational man in early 1942 would have guessed at the eventual outcome of the war. In the jargon of modern strategy, the Allies faced the worst-case scenario.1 Although Benesˇ knew from resistance communications that the killing of Heydrich would trigger brutal reprisals, Benesˇ decided to continue with the operation as he rightly understood the desperate situation he and his government-in-exile, along with his allies, faced at that time. The outcome of Operation Anthropoid, although resulting in tragic consequences for the thousands of Czechs killed in retribution, yielded the ultimate strategic and political goals. As a result of Operation Anthropoid, Czechoslovakia’s borders were formally recognised as those that existed prior to the 1938 Munich Agreement. This case study provided a clear example of the intangible value of raising international morale for the Czech cause by highlighting the atrocities committed by the Nazis to shape the moral and psychological dimension of the Allies into sympathising with the Czechs. More importantly, the startling result of Operation Anthropoid highlighted the close relationship of leadership decapitation with the universal nature of strategy – the unforeseeable factors of timing, luck and chance influencing the final strategic performance.2 The operation, with all its faults, still succeeded in killing Heydrich and, although it only achieved one of its two intended purposes, managed to yield the ultimate political outcome. While some authors state that the capture of Major General Kreipe was a sideshow conducted by the British SOE to fulfil some SOE

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officers’ adventure fantasies, a closer analysis of the archival materials revealed that the operation had far more significant impact than at first realised on the surface. The background to this operation revealed that the political setting of Crete being left behind by the Allies in World War II, and the setbacks suffered by the Cretan resistance movements, created a situation whereby SOE in the Middle East needed to do something to demonstrate continued British support for the Cretans, and to counter the threat of communist-aligned resistance movements gaining momentum in local Cretan politics. The successful capture of Kreipe served as testimony to the value of a Special Operation, conducted with limited objectives in mind, in yielding important results. Again, the intangible value of raising the morale of the Cretans was significant in ensuring that the Cretans continued to side with the British forces, especially in the aftermath of Germany’s defeat in World War II. The killing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto has been often criticised for its limited value and because, alive, Yamamoto may have been a bigger asset for the Americans for his lack of strategic vision. Yamamoto was often blamed for leading the United States into a war with the Japanese with his Pearl Harbor attack, which ultimately led to the final defeat of Japan. Again, context is important. Regardless of Yamamoto’s support of a war against the United States or not, he was first and foremost a military commander and subject to orders from his higher military commanders and political leaders. The political situation in Japan, led by the military junta, had already decided that going to war with the United States was necessary to guarantee its plans to secure the Asia Pacific sphere for its future economic and power expansion.3 With the decision made by the political entity in Tokyo, Yamamoto knew that he had to plan a strategy to win a war in the Pacific with the United States as soon as possible.4 He decided to destroy the hub of the US power in the Pacific with a surprise attack on the US Navy fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (for all intents and purposes a Special Operation too). Yamamoto knew that even if he had successfully destroyed the US Navy fleet in Pearl Harbor, together with its aircraft carriers, the Japanese military had, at most, a year to a year and a half to run around the Asia-Pacific region with impunity before the might of the US industrial power would recover from the loss of the naval fleet. Then the best option for Yamamoto was for Japan to sue for a negotiated

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peace in the Asia-Pacific region.5 However, this was not the case and the events that unfolded in the Pacific sealed Japan’s demise, sooner or later. Although Yamamoto was belittled for his loss at the Battle of Midway, his canny operation to lead the US Navy aircraft carrier fleet into an ambush and destroy it was a clear indication of his capability as a naval strategist and military commander. Yamamoto understood the strength of the Japanese naval fleet and the pressure of time against him. He needed to destroy the US naval threat in the Pacific to gain time for the Japanese land forces to consolidate their conquests of land in the Asia-Pacific region before the Americans could rebuild their fleet. Yamamoto, however, underestimated the United States and, particularly, the Allied code-breaking effort that had managed to read his every move. In this respect, Yamamoto was defeated by his own intelligence services who failed to secure communications and counter the intelligence activities of the Allies. Yamamoto, after the successful Pearl Harbor attack, had gained such prestige in Japan that he had been almost raised to the level of a demi-god by the Japanese. As for the Americans, he was the arch villain ‘that did Pearl Harbor’. The hatred against Yamamoto was strong and when the chance came to kill him it was an easy decision, although it still entailed careful deliberation on the consequences of the attack – i.e. potentially revealing to the Japanese the secret codebreaking efforts by the Allies. The main strategic utility of this operation, again, was gaining the intangible value of raising the morale of the US forces fighting in the Pacific and the destruction of Japanese morale. The death of Yamamoto also resulted in the loss of the most capable Japanese naval commander who could prove himself to be a continued credible threat to US naval strategy in the Pacific theatre. Although the subsequent removal of Rommel from the battlefield after the D-Day landings in Normandy due to the injuries he sustained in the aircraft attack on his car, and his subsequent, albeit forced, suicide for his suspected role in the plot to assassinate Hitler, did not have any observable detrimental effect on the combat capabilities of the German military forces,6 the potential killing or capturing of Rommel would had yielded important strategic utility for the British forces in North Africa at the end of 1941.

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Operation Flipper, however, still managed to raise the morale of the British forces in North Africa facing, as they were, a formidable foe in Rommel, the Desert Fox. The intangible value of the ‘romantic’ allure of the commandos, highlighted the best of British character, the indefatigable spirit against adversity at all costs. The failure of the operation, paradoxically, became a morale booster for exactly the same reason; a few good men going against all the odds attempting to kill a legendary enemy commander. The side show of a ‘few good men’ conducting an audacious yet ‘romantic’ operation had again given a boost to British public support for the war, a public tired of the clumsiness of some of the British military commanders, which had yielded humiliating defeats in the North African campaign in 1941.7 Even though the Allies attempted and conducted leadership decapitation operations against enemy leaders, these were targeted mainly at military leaders and not political leaders, albeit in Heydrich’s case, a para-military governor with the rank of lieutenant general. The British did have plans to kill Adolf Hitler but never got around to carrying them out.8 The Germans were also alleged to have planned an operation to kill the Allied Big Three (Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill) during the Teheran Conference at the end of 1943.9 It would be impossible to assess the ‘what if’ questions and the limitless scenarios if Axis or Allied political leaders were killed or captured during World War II. All the case studies analysed in this research yielded valuable intangible morale effects. Morale is an inherent part of strategy that must be harnessed and used for the benefit of one’s side, and used cunningly against the enemy. As all forms of war are conducted by humans, warfare is inherently a moral endeavour by humans. The moral endeavour of humans to both perform and sustain violent combat action requires immense willpower or morale. The influence of the mind on combat performance, and the will of the soldiers, commanders and political masters are equally important in sustaining the fight against an opponent. The acts of Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations, as detailed in this book, reveal that the most important factor to influence the conduct of such operations is the expected utility these operations have in raising the morale of the side conducting the operation and dampening that of the opposing side. Even in the event of failure, as in the case of the Rommel raid in North Africa, the effects of that failed operation had tremendous value for the British

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Commonwealth forces at that desperate period. The Heydrich case has the unique distinction of raising not the morale of the local population in Czechoslovakia but the morale of the international community in the utmost doubtless necessity to fight against the ‘evil’ Nazis, and the annulment of the 1938 Munich Agreement resulting in full recognition of the pre-1938 Czechoslovakia borders. The capture of Kreipe achieved the objective of raising the morale of the Cretans and ensuring their continued support for the Allies. The memoirs of top US military commanders and participants in the Yamamoto Mission reflect on the sweet revenge meted out against the United States’ most hated enemy, and Japanese press reports reflect the loss of Yamamoto as akin to a loss in a major battle. The first hypothesis offered at the beginning of this book was: Although the overall performance of Special Operations in World War II did not have any decisive impact, Special Operations conducting leadership decapitation operations, however, yielded valuable intangible strategic effects that had immense utility in raising morale in desperate situations and as a strong demonstration of the political will to fight in a small economical manner, and has been empirically proven as valid. This book has also demonstrated that while we can explain and evaluate historical case studies, it would be an exercise of naivety to propose persuasive measurements and theories that can predict accurately the outcome of such events if repeated in the future. Contextual background is important in explaining why certain events unfolded and concluded in a certain manner, it would be impossible to replicate similar contextual situations with all the human elements involved, as war and warfare is after all a human exercise. Clausewitz was right when he commented on what is a military lesson: Incidentally, we repeat again that here, as in all the practical arts, the function of theory is to educate the practical man, to train his judgement, rather than to assist him directly in the performance of his duties.10 Similarly, the moral dimension of killing enemy leaders poses its own intrinsic dilemmas. The utility of leadership decapitation has to be weighed against the morality of war. Utilising Clausewitz again in the defence of this argument, the Prussian stated in his magnum opus:

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The maximum use of forces is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand.11 In Colin S. Gray’s examination of the relationship between strategy and morality, he provides a convincing argument that complements Clausewitz’s dictum above; If the cause is held to be sufficiently sacred, means and methods may obey no rule save that of an expediency equated with a necessity that should tolerate no compromise.12 Both of these dicta by Clausewitz and Gray may sound alarming to some war ethicists; the empirical evidence provided in this book points persuasively to the deliberation of the possible repercussions of leadership decapitation operations and its moral costs by the operations’ planners and their respective staff commanders in two cases, in which brutal reprisals would have most likely be meted out. In each case, the potential strategic utility of the operation outweighed the possible moral costs that may have been entailed. Furthermore, in Heydrich’s case, the predicted moral cost was used as a tool for strategic purposes – there was a cold calculated move to induce high moral costs on the Nazis occupying Czechoslovakia with predictable Nazi response. Gray again provides a compelling conclusion to the argument of the morality of leadership decapitation posed in this book; ‘Rarely, if ever, do politics forego anticipated strategic advantage primarily for reasons of conscience rather than caution in risk assessment.’13

Tactically effective On the objective of analysing the tactical effectiveness of Special Operations, this book has illustrated that the principle of using Special Operations in conducting leadership decapitation operations is sound. The principle of using small units of men, specially selected and trained in conducting Special Operations, utilising surprise, deceptive cover, and flexibility in operating behind enemy lines to execute their special missions with efficiency, was evident in each of the case studies. Both military commanders and political masters must understand how to use and juggle Special Operations with conventional forces to gain supremacy in warfare, and that itself is the most fundamental theory of how to use Special Operations.

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Operation Anthropoid was a strong demonstration in the utility of using a small Special Operations unit. The SOE Anthropoid team’s two members infiltrated Czechoslovakia and spent about four months planning for their operation, eventually achieving their intended objective. This operation also highlighted the importance of the leader, in this case Benesˇ and his staff, understanding how to use a Special Operation to achieve the ultimate objective. If a larger military unit of conventional nature had been used in this operation, the unit could have been annihilated the moment it had landed in Czechoslovakia. In this operation, the only option was to use a small team of highly trained Special Operations personnel to conduct the daring operation to kill Heydrich. Meanwhile in Crete, the SOE operatives there showed that the deft usage of an excellently executed Special Operation was able to sustain an indirect presence of British military aid to the Cretans. The SOE operatives continued to train resistance fighters on sabotage and supplied them with weapons. This Special Operations unit sustained resistance combat operations against the occupying German forces. It culminated with the capture of Kreipe, serving a morale victory for the Cretans. Additionally, the SOE operations in Crete demonstrated the value of using Special Operations in this part of the campaign in the Mediterranean. The Allied forces main concern was in mainland Italy, and that is where most of the conventional forces were being used in a large-scale campaign. In order to sustain the image of continued Allied interest in the freedom of Greece and Crete, SOE teams provided the indirect forces that continued combat action against the Germans while the main forces fought it out in Italy. Additionally, both of these operations succeeded because of the support the Special Operations personnel had from the local resistance movements in providing secret hideouts, food, local intelligence, manpower and, also, in keeping the men sane and comfortable with such supportive humans in the midst of the enemy. The US Special Operation that successfully killed Admiral Yamamoto was a case of using a unit of conventional force to conduct a Special Operation. The US P-38 Lightning fighters that shot down Yamamoto’s plane were not from a special operations unit but were nonetheless used in a special operation to kill Yamamoto. This case highlighted that, given sufficient intelligence, a unit of conventional

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force can be used in a special operation in accordance with the golden rule of special operations – surprise. The ambush of Yamamoto in the air was a precisely timed unorthodox operation that was a first of its kind. In Operation Flipper, a force of specially trained commandos was sent behind enemy lines in a classic Special Operation to attack an enemy’s headquarters, with the ultimate purpose of killing the enemy commander. Operation Flipper was intended as a ‘knockout’ blow before the main direct force operation (Operation Crusader) was launched. The intended effect, if achieved, would have yielded disproportionate results. The German Afrika Korps and Italian forces would be left without their charismatic leader, and this would have resulted in the plummeting of German and Italian morale, at the same time it would have given a much needed morale boost for the British forces who had suffered major setbacks in those early stages of the war. Lieutenant Colonel Keyes and 11 Commando infiltrated behind enemy lines and successfully attacked the presumed enemy headquarters. The subsequent evacuation was not successful due to the bad stormy sea conditions which prevented the commandos’ escape; clearly the weather conditions were beyond the control of the commandos. It must be added, however, that in the cases that succeeded, one of the main criteria for Special Operations’ success was the accurate and timely dissemination of information on the location and whereabouts of the intended human target. Critical information regarding the security detail and the vulnerability of the target was also crucial to the outcome of the operations. Knowledge of the ultimate final outcome of the operations at the strategic and political level, especially in both Heydrich’s and Kreipe’s case, were equally important. This required indepth understanding of the potential reaction of the enemy forces, and the effect on the morale of both the enemy population and the friendly population. The key to gaining all this information is intelligence. Sun Tzu, writing on warfare more than 2,000 years ago, provided one of the strongest arguments for the importance of intelligence. In his Art of War, there is an entire chapter dedicated to the importance of intelligence.14 Sun Tzu’s famous dictum rang true in the cases studied here, ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.’15

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In an interview with this author, retired Royal Marines Special Boat Service (SBS) commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Fry, proposes three principles of how Special Operations should be contextualised. They are: 1. Special Operations must be used with conventional forces to gain synergy of force. 2. The more asymmetric the conflict, the more useful Special Operations is. 3. Special Operation requires extensive support of intelligence for successful conduct of operations.16 Fry’s first and third principles are of most interest here. They substantiate the notion that Special Operations cannot work alone – they must work in conjunction with regular forces to succeed. Special Operations complements conventional forces and works best to, proverbially, ‘kick doors open’. All the case studies highlighted that while Special Operations were successful in killing or capturing the targeted enemy leaders, the war still had to be fought with large-scale conventional military forces to ultimately defeat the enemy and win the war.The examination of the case studies and empirical evidence presented validate the hypothesis presented at the beginning of the book: Although Special Operations were tactically effective in conducting such operations, their success hinged on an understanding in how to employ Special Operations, and excellent support from intelligence and timely disseminated information.

Conclusion This book highlights that Special Operations need more in-depth studies to understand their unique capabilities and contributions to warfare. Special Operations have a broad range of capabilities, and each of these capabilities has different effects to the overall strategy of a campaign. Although a recent study concluded that Special Operations works best in conjunction with regular forces to erode the enemy’s material and manpower in campaigns of attrition,17 more in-depth studies on individual capabilities are needed. Special Operations are able to conduct commando raids and rescue operations, advise friendly government

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forces, and conduct both insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare, reconnaissance, intelligence, deception and humanitarian operations, along with many other roles. Individual studies of each capability and how it translates into strategic effectiveness and enhances the attainment of policy goals are valuable in ensuring the correct understanding of how to use Special Operations and to ensure the survival of their limited resources. The lessons of strategic history are not lost as the recent example of Special Operations conducting a leadership decapitation operation shows – that is, the killing of the most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden, by US Navy SEALs in April 2011. The operation’s success served as a large morale-boosting event for the American public and reignited US President Barack Obama’s popularity in the midst of a crippling financial crisis faced by the United States and Obama’s bid for his second presidency term. The successful Special Operation that killed bin Laden was similar to the successful killing of Heydrich in 1942 in that it created a spectacular event and a ‘symbolic victory’ for the Obama administration.18 Basking in the optimistic and ‘feel good’ public sentiment seven weeks after the successful operation, Obama revealed a schedule for the withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan.19 Obama was accused by his political opponents of using the successful killing of bin Laden in his re-election campaign in 2012.20 Cindy Rugeley, assistant professor of political science at Texas Tech University, commenting on the killing of bin Laden and the deft use of Obama capitalising on the event in his re-election bid, stated: ‘It made the country feel good.’21 Ironically, there has also been continued misuse of Special Operations. A recent case serves as an excellent example. A whole detachment of 22 US Navy SEALs, some of whom may have taken part in the operation that killed bin Laden, were killed when their Chinook helicopter was shot down in Afghanistan while conducting a rescue operation to assist in the evacuation of trapped US Army Rangers who had stumbled into a well-laid ambush.22 The use and loss of such highly trained and specialised soldiers in such a way highlights the continued misuse of Special Operations units in contemporary times. For such operations regular infantry or US Marines forces with support from heavy weapons and air assets were more suitable for the role. The lessons of Mogadishu

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(Task Force Ranger) were evidently lost in this operation, and even in the aftermath of some successful use of Special Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, misuse of Special Operations continues. Being a small investment Special Operations is able to obtain a substantial payoff, provided there is an understanding what the payoff is intended to generate. The use and misuse of Special Operations have been marred by the common perception that Special Operations units are a sort of multipurpose tool, i.e. ‘Swiss Army Knife’ that can be used for audacious and near impossible missions. Special Operations are as effective as the consequence of the operation intended in relation to the overall strategy. Special Operations is not a panacea that can solve commanders’ difficult intentions and objectives. Keeping that in mind would have resulted in less-inflated expectations of Special Operations and their perceived utility. Summing up, this book’s original contribution to knowledge in the strategic history of Special Operations are in these aspects; it has studied in detail Special Operations’ role in decapitating enemy leadership and had shown its respective strategic and tactical results within the context of a global war, World War II. This author has found that Special Operations had intrinsic value in conducting leadership decapitation operations in World War II, and that value in support of a strategy resided in its intangible ability of boosting friendly morale and deflating the enemy’s morale. Special Operations were also proven to be tactically effective in conducting such operations provided that sound intelligence support was accorded and the commanders clearly understood how to use Special Operations as an important adjunct to the main war effort. This research on leadership decapitation by Special Operations in World War II has uncovered a series of new evidence on the impact of such operations in World War II. The Special Operation that killed Heydrich secured the future of Czechoslovakia territorial sovereignty and the capture of Kreipe in Crete was a cost-effective way of demonstrating to the Cretans that the British had not abandoned the resistant but brutally oppressed Cretans.23 These two successful operations, together with the killing of Yamamoto and the attempts on Rommel, were found to have generated effects on morale that provided added cumulative strategic effects leading to the sound strategic performance of the Allies’ ultimate defeat of the Axis forces

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in World War II.24 Clausewitz’s maxim on the relationship between actual combat and morale again ring true in this aspect and serves pertinently as the concluding words: Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.25 (emphasis in original)

NOTES

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. There are studies on the operations that attempted to kill Field-Marshal Rommel and the killing of Admiral Yamamoto, but analysis based on these incidents as Special Operations and how strategically effective they were in relation to the context of the campaign is non-existent. Most studies mention what happened but not how the incidents happened, why and how effective they were, or the consequences of such operations. For example see Michael Asher: Get Rommel: The Secret British Mission to Kill Hitler’s Greatest General (London: Orion Publishing Group, 2004); and Donald A. Davis: Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2005). A recent PhD thesis was written on the birth and growth of Special Forces in World War II but lacked any strategic analysis especially pertaining to the use of Special Forces in leadership decapitation operations. See Andrew Lennox Hargreaves: ‘An analysis of the rise, use, evolution and value of Anglo-American commando and special forces formations, 1939– 1945’, unpublished PhD thesis (War Studies Department, King’s College London, London, 2008). 2. Further explanation on the development of these questions and the hypotheses that this academic research pursues is in the sub-section ‘Research Questions and Hypotheses’. 3. The strategic theories pertaining to the utility of leadership decapitation and its nexus with strategic paralysis theories are examined in the next chapter. 4. Alastair Finlan: Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by other means (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 25. 5. See James D. Kiras: Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006). 6. Ibid., pp. 53 – 7. 7. Ibid.

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8. Ibid., p. 16. 9. Each state has its own peculiar set of tasks for its Special Operations units but may be categorised into these three broad categories. See Alastair Finlan: ‘The (Arrested) Development of UK Special Forces and the Global War on Terror’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 35 No. 4 (October 2009), pp. 974– 5. 10. Carl von Clausewitz: On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 142. 11. Colin S. Gray: Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 11. 12. See ibid. 13. Kiras: Special Operations, p. xi. 14. There are a few other studies linking Special Operations with strategy, for example see Colin S. Gray: Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 286– 90; ibid.: ‘Handful of Heroes on Desperate Ventures’, Parameters, Vol. 29 No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 2 – 24; ibid.: ‘Special Operations: What Succeeds and Why? Lessons of Experience, Phase I’, unpublished report (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 1992); ibid.: Explorations, pp. 141– 87; Edward N. Luttwak, Steven L. Canby and David L. Thomas: ‘A Systematic Review of ‘Commando’ (Special) Operations, 1939– 1980’, unpublished report (Potomac, MD: C and L Associates, 1982); William H. McRaven: ‘Special Operations: The Perfect Grand Strategy?’, in Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon & David Last (eds): Force of Choice: Perspectives on Special Operations (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), pp. 61 – 78; Susan L. Marquis: Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997); Thomas K. Adams: US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (New York: Frank Cass, 1st edn 1998, ppb. 2005); and Lucien Vandenbroucke: Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 15. See John Prados: Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1986), pp. 92 – 107. 16. For example, Homer’s tale ‘The Iliad’ of the Trojan – Greece War has one of the most important early examples of Special Operations – the ‘Trojan horse’ account. Even if the story was a mythical narration, the originator of this story had demonstrated in the ‘Trojan horse’ that the ideas of using Special Operations to overcome tactical obstacles to obtain strategic effects had existed in the thoughts of ancient mankind. See Robert Graves: ‘The Fall of Troy’, in John Arquilla (ed.): From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (London: University Press of America, 1996), pp. 2 – 9. 17. See H.G. Robertson: ‘Commando Raids in the Peloponnesian War’, Classical Weekly, Vol. 37 No. 11 (1944), p. 130, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4341856, accessed on 25 December 2011. 18. For an excellent overview see Yuval Noah Harari: Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100– 1550 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2007).

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19. See Beatrice Heuser: ‘Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People’s War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33 No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 139– 62. See also Lewis Michael de Jeney: The Partisan, or the Art of Making War in Detachment, trans. An Officer of the Army (London: R. Griffiths, 1760); and Andreas Emmerich: The Partisan in War, of the use of a Corps of Light Troops to an Army (London: J. Debrett, 1789). 20. See Johann Ewald: Diary of an American War: A Hessian Journal, trans Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979); and Johann Ewald: Treatise on Partisan Warfare, trans. Robert Selig and David Skaggs (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991). 21. See Thomas J. Evans and James M. Moyer: Mosby’s Confederacy: A Guide to the Roads and Sites of Colonel John Singleton Mosby (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co, 1991). 22. Ohad Leslau: ‘Worth the Bother? Israeli Experience and the Utility of Special Operations Forces’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 31 No. 3 (December 2010), p. 511. 23. Ibid. 24. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Publication 3 – 05 (17 December 2003), p. I-1. The US Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (JP 3 – 05) further identified nine core tasks for US Special Operations Forces (USSOF), which are direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defence, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and information operations. See ibid., p. II-3. 25. Kiras’s definition was, ‘Unconventional actions against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained campaign, undertaken by specially designated units, to enable conventional operations and/ or resolve economically politico-military problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to accomplish with conventional forces alone.’ See Kiras: Special Operations, p. 5. 26. Spulak stated, ‘Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, specially organized units manned by carefully selected people using modified equipment and trained in unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives. Further, the successful conduct of special operations relies on individual and small unit proficiency in specialized skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation against adversaries often unprepared to react. It has often been stated that the unique capabilities of SOF complement those of conventional forces.’ See Robert G. Spulak: ‘A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of SOF’, Joint Special Operations University Report 07 – 07 (October 2007), p. 1. 27. McRaven’s definition was: ‘A special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a political or military imperative.’ See William H. McRaven: Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special

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28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33.

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Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), p. 2. McRaven acknowledged that it was difficult to give a proper definition of Special Operations and his definition in his work was conjured up purposefully for his study. See ibid., p. 3. Luttwak, Canby and Thomas: A Systematic Review, p. 1. Ibid. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters: ‘Special Operations and the Threats to United States Interests in the 1980s’, in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar and Richard H. Shultz (eds): Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 35; and Gray: Explorations, p. 145. Colin Gray had further mentioned, and defined Special Operations as capable of handling 17 important aspects that give it strategic utility. These 17 aspects can be summarized into three main core themes which are ‘. . . a state of mind; forces; and a mission’. See Gray: ‘Handfuls of Heroes’, pp. 2 – 24; and ibid.: ‘ Special Operations: What Succeeds and Why?’, p. 27. Gray agreed that Special Operations is an understudied area especially within its strategic utility and its overall influence to the course of its campaign or war. It is much easier to analyse the tactical utility of a Special Operations mission or what constitutes a Special Operations unit than conceptualising it at the strategic level. The study of Special Operations as a means of strategy is also similarly lacking. See Gray: ‘Handful of Heroes’, p. 154. Harari in his study of Special Operations in the age of chivalry had provided another interesting definition; ‘The difference between ‘special’ operations and ‘regular’ combat operations is more complicated. In their execution, special operations are frequently similar to combat operations that involve the use of surprise and subterfuge. In their impact too, regular combat operations could sometimes have strategic and political impact disproportionate to the resources invested in them. The difference between special operations and regular combat operations lies therefore not in their execution or in their impact, but in the preconceived matching of impact and execution.’ See Harari: Special Operations, pp. 1 – 2. Finlan: Special Forces, p. 3. M.R.D. Foot: ‘Special Operations/I’, chapter in Michael Elliott-Bateman (ed.): The Fourth Dimension of Warfare: Vol. 1, Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970), p. 19. A note of contemporary terms: British Special Operations units (Special Air Service and Special Boat Service) have been known as Special Forces. The US uses Special Operations Forces as an overarching term to cover all Special Operations units. The US Army has its own Special Forces Groups, not to be confused with the British Special Forces. See Finlan: Special Forces, pp. 7 – 8. The term assassination was believed to have originated from the Arabic word ‘hashsash’ and ‘hashashashin’, literally translated as ‘those who smoke hashish’. See Ronald White: ‘A Prolegomenon to a General Theory of Assassination’,

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36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

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Assassination Research, Vol. 5 No. 1 (2007), p. 7, http://www.assassinationres earch.com/v5n1/v5n1white.pdf, accessed on 23 July 2012. Oxford dictionary’s definition of assassin is ‘a person who murders an important person for political or religious reasons’. Oxford Dictionaries Online, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/assassin?q¼assassin, accessed on 19 May 2012. See also White: ‘A Prolegomenon’, p. 8. Franklin L. Ford: Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 8 –18. For a recent work on the history of assassinations see Lindsay Porter: Assassination: A History of Political Murder (London: Thames & Hudson, 2010). Ford: Political Murder, pp. 1 –2. John Yoo: War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), p. 60. I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot (eds): The Oxford Companion to the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 526. and p. 1044. Robert Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman: The Life of Heydrich (London: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 225. The most celebrated assassination programme run by the United States was the Phoenix Program, which was carried out by the CIA and US Special Operations personnel during the Vietnam War. The Phoenix Program was reputed to have killed 26,369 Viet Cong (VC) members. The moral and legal implications of such killings, however, overshadowed any objective strategic reasoning behind these operations. The programme was reputed to have targeted not just VCs, but also villagers who had feuds with South Vietnamese government officials. See Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks: ‘CORDS/ Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future’, Military Review (Mar-Apr 2006), p. 20; Stanley Karnow: Vietnam: A History (London: Pimlico, 1st edn 1983, ppb. 1994), p. 617; Gabriel Kolko: Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: The New Press, 1st edn 1985, ppb. 1994), p. 397; and John Prados: The Hidden History of the Vietnam War (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1st edn 1995, ppb. 1998), pp. 218–9. Due to the dubious quality of assassinations and the bad press gained from some of the covert assassination operations conducted by the US military and the CIA, such as the Phoenix program, assassinations were subsequently outlawed by US presidents. The first US president to endorse the outlawing of assassination was President Gerald Ford in 1977, and this has been further endorsed by every US president ever since. See Prados: The Hidden History, pp, 219–20; Ward Thomas: The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 49; and Yoo: War by Other Means, p. 60. In the United States, after the devastating 9/11 attacks, US leaders and policy makers were more supportive of assassinations of terrorist operatives. The term ‘assassination’, however, is now considered a taboo term with evil connotations and forbidden by EO12333, was replaced by the term ‘targeted killing’. It is now widely argued that ‘targeted killing’ of

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45.

46. 47.

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terrorist leaders and supporters is legal under US law and EO 12333. See Gary D. Solis: The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 542–3; and Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Department of the Army: ‘Memorandum: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination (DAJA-IA (27–1A)’ (Nov 1989), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use%20of%20Force/October%202002/ Parks_final.pdf, accessed on 24 February 2011. Nils Melzer: Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 28. Ibid., p. 98. See also Abraham D. Sofaer: ‘Responses to Terrorism: Targeted killing is a necessary option’, SFGate.com, 26 March 2004, http://www.sfgate. com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f¼/c/a/2004/03/26/EDGK65QPC41.DTL, accessed on 27 January 2011; and Asaf Romirowsky: ‘Targeted Killings’, FrontPageMagazine. com, 21 July 2006, http://www.meforum.org/980/targeted-killings, accessed on 17 May 2011. In some counter-insurgency campaigns, the killing of the insurgent leader terminally destroyed the insurgency, such as the killing of Che Guevara in 1967, effectively ending the Bolivian insurgency. See Audrey Kurth Cronin: How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 32. For arguments on the effectiveness of targeted killings as a ‘strategy’ see A.E. Stahl and William F. Owen: ‘Targeted killings work’, Infinity Journal, Vol. 1 No. 1 (Winter 2010), http://www.infinityjournal.com/article/3/Targeted_ Killings_Work, accessed on 29 December 2011; and Danny Steed: ‘Is there a future for targeted killing?’, Infinity Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1 (Winter 2011), pp. 17 – 20, http://www.infinityjournal.com/read/5/, accessed on 29 December 2011. Raffaello Pantucci provided a more balanced judgement on targeted killings. See Raffaello Pantucci: ‘Deep Impact: The Effect of Drone Attacks on British Counter-Terrorism’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 154 No. 5 (October 2009), pp. 72 – 6. David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith: ‘Grammar but No Logic: Technique is Not Enough – A Response to Nagl and Burton’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33 No. 3 (June 2010), p. 437. Jenna Jordan used the term ‘leadership decapitation’ in her study of contemporary targeted killing of terrorist leaders. Her study, however, did not explain what ‘leadership decapitation’ means and why she did not use the term ‘targeted killing’, which would have better reflected her core arguments. See Jenna Jordan: ‘When Heads Roll: Assessing the effectiveness of leadership decapitation’, Security Studies, Vol. 18 No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 719– 55. Patrick B. Johnston also used the term leadership decapitation in his conference paper. He used the term essentially to describe the practice of targeted killing in insurgencies. See Patrick B. Johnston: ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency Campaigns’, conference paper, 11th Annual Triangle Institute for Security Studies New Faces Conference (Chapel Hill, NC: 2010).

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48. Clausewitz: On War, p. 128. 49. Colin S. Gray: The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 171. 50. Ibid. 51. Gray has stated, ‘At its tersest, the concept of strategic effect explains what strategy does and how it delivers its value.’ See ibid., p. 176 52. Gray, Explorations, p. 166. 53. Gray: The Strategy Bridge, p. 172. 54. Clausewitz: On War, p. 128. 55. This is influenced by Colin Gray’s statement: ‘Strategy, military strategy at least, is “done” by tactics and by operations.’ Gray: Modern Strategy, p. 20. 56. Gray again provides the supporting argument; he stated, ‘. . . tactical competence is the material of which strategic effect is made.’ Ibid., p. 22. 57. Ibid. (and footnote 23 on same page) 58. See Colin S. Gray: Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 249. In Yuval Noah Harari’s study of Special Operations during the age of chivalry from 1100 to 1550 had also concluded that there were no similar permanent units assigned to conduct Special Operations except ad-hoc formations or regular troops assigned for specific dangerous Special Operations. See Harari: Special Operations, pp. 34 – 7. Andrew Lennox Hargreaves in his PhD study on the evolution of British and US commando units and Special Forces in World War II stated, ‘The Second World War was, however, the beginning of specialist formations as a coherent genus . . .’. See Andrew Lennox Hargreaves: ‘An analysis of the rise, use, evolution and value of Anglo-American commando and special forces formations, 1939– 1945’, unpublished PhD thesis (War Studies Department, King’s College London, London, 2008), p. 261. Robert Fry, a retired Royal Marines Lieutenant General and ex-SBS operative, supports this view. He stated that although there is a long history of Special Operations being conducted, ‘Yet most failed to survive the circumstances of their creation as regimes change, armies revert to orthodoxy and elite forces become a political embarrassment. One of the signal achievements of British and American special forces is to break this cycle, at least until now, by a process of constant adaptation.’ Robert Fry: ‘Survival of the fittest’, Prospect, November 2012, p. 28. 59. Apart from the four case studies in this book, there were plans made by SOE to kill important German leaders which were Adolf Hitler, Josef Goebbels, Lieutenant General Bruno Ritter von Hauenschild, Major General Otto Ernst Remer and SS-Obersturmbannfu¨hrer Otto Skorzeny. See Denis Rigden: Kill the Fu¨hrer: Section X and Operation Foxley (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999), pp. 9 – 59 and pp. 66 – 75.There was also an operation conducted by the SOE in western Europe that targeted and killed senior German officers and local collaborators. This operation was known as Operation Ratweek. See Philip Warner: Secret Forces of World War II (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1st edn 1985, hb. 1991), p. 183.

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60. There are parallel similarities with the moral argument of the Allies bombing campaign against German civilian centres, whereby the moral judgement of the Allies was indifference to the thousands of German civilians killed. See Jonathan Glover: Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), p. 82. Glover also added, ‘To many people, the Second World War was justified because it was necessary to prevent the worse evil of the triumph of Nazism.’ See ibid., p. 85. For examples and explanations of the racial hatred against the Japanese in World War II, see John W. Dower: War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). 61. In the 1907 Hague Conventions, it was stated, ‘Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered permissible.’ See “Article 24, Section II: Hostilities; Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907”, The Avalon Project (Yale Law School), http://avalon.law. yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp, accessed on 11 July 2012. 62. In the 1907 Hague Conventions, it was stated, ‘To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.’ See ibid., “Article 23”. 63. Stated in the 1907 Hague Conventions, “To make improper use of flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.” See ibid. 64. Bruce Berkowitz had argued that there was never any ban on assassinations under international law, even the more recent 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, did not prohibit assassinations. Berkowitz further asserted that assassinations were in line with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions in prohibiting ‘indiscriminate’ killing, by selective and precision killing of enemy individuals. See Bruce Berkowitz: ‘Is Assassination an Option?’, Hoover Digest, No. 1 (January 2002), http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/ 7926, accessed 11 July 2012. 65. Adrian Weale: Secret Warfare: Special Operations Forces from the Great Game to the SAS (London: Coronet, 1st edn 1997, ppb.1998), pp 135– 42. 66. David Thomas: ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939– 82’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18 No. 4 (1983), p. 698, http://www.jstor.org/stable/260308, accessed on 1 February 2010. 67. Harari shared a similar view. See Harari: Special Operations, p. 30. 68. William Slim: Defeat into Victory (Bungay, Suffolk: Cassell & Co Ltd, 1st edn 1956, hb. 1957), p. 530. 69. See Julian Thompson: The Imperial War Museum Book of War Behind Enemy Lines (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1st edn 1998, ppb. 2001), pp. 130– 256; and Eric Morris: Guerrillas in Uniform: Churchill’s Private Armies in the Middles East and the War against Japan, 1940– 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1989), pp. 191 –264.

180 70. 71. 72. 73.

74.

75. 76.

77.

78. 79.

80. 81. 82.

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Morris: Guerrillas in Uniform, pp. 31, 207 & 216. Ibid. Slim: Defeat, pp. 530– 1. The fourth and fifth reasons conformed to some of the main case selection criteria relevant to this book which are, ‘explaining cases of intrinsic importance’ and ‘select data-rich cases’. See Stephen Van Evera: Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 77 – 9. For example, see Mark Owen and Kevin Maurer: No Easy Day: Firsthand account of the mission that killed Osama bin Laden (London: Dutton, 2012); Dalton Fury: Kill bin Laden: A Delta Force commander’s account of the hunt for the world’s most wanted man (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2011); Chris Ryan: The One That Got Away (London: Book Club Associates, 1995); Tony Jeapes: SAS Secret War (London: Harper Collins, 1996); Duncan Falconer: First Into Action (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998); Andy McNab (Pseudonym): Bravo Two Zero (London: Corgi Books, 1995); Peter de la Billie`re: Looking For Trouble: SAS to Gulf Command, The Autobiography (London: Harper Collins, 1994); and Michael Asher: Shoot to Kill: A Soldier’s Journey Through Violence (London: Guild Publishing, 1990). For example, see Tom Carew: Jihad! The Secret War in Afghanistan (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2000) and Joel Hutchins: Swimmers Among the Trees: SEALs in the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1996). For example see C.E. Lucas Phillips: Cockleshell Heroes (London: Pan Books, 1st edn 1956, ppb. 2000); and ibid. The Greatest Raid of All (London: Pan Books, 1st edn 1958, ppb. 2000); McRaven: Spec Ops; Robin Neillands: The Raiders: The Army Commandos, 1940– 1946 (London: Fontana, 1st edn 1989, ppb. 1990); Mark Lloyd: Special Forces: The Changing Face of Warfare (London: Arms and Amour Press, 1995); and John Lodwick: Raiders from the Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1st edn 1947, ppb. 1990). In Colin Gray’s research and report on Special Operations prepared for the United States government, there is a broad range of case studies of Special Operations practice and its strategic utility. The chapters on World War II Special Operations are excellent and concise guides. See Gray: ‘Special Operations: What Succeeds and Why?’, pp. 79 – 167. See Hilary St George Saunders: The Green Beret: The story of the Commandos, 1940– 1945 (London: Michael Joseph, 1949), pp. 74 – 81. See James Ladd: Commandos and Rangers of World War II (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1978), pp. 120–1; Thompson: Imperial War Museum Book, pp. 53–5., and H.W. Wynter: Special Forces in the Desert War, 1940– 1943 (Richmond: The National Archives, 1st edn 2001, ppb. 2008), pp. 276– 87. See Asher: Get Rommel, p. 291. Ibid., p. 275. See Gunther Deschner: Heydrich: The Pursuit of Total Power, trans. Sandra Bance, Brenda Woods and David Ball (London: Orbis Publishing, 1st edn

NOTES TO PAGES 13 –14

83. 84. 85.

86.

87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

181

1977, hb. 1981); and Callum MacDonald: The Killing of Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich (London: Macmillan, 1989). See Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, pp. 1 – 13. Ibid., p. 285. William J.M. Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940– 1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000), p. 319; and Nigel West: Secret War: The story of SOE, Britain’s wartime sabotage organisation (London: Coronet: 1st edn 1992, hb. 1993), pp. 113–14. For an excellent work focusing on the moral cost of the killing of Heydrich, see Michael Burleigh: Moral Combat: A History of World War II (London, Harper Press, 2010). Ewan Mawdsley in his recent volume on the history of World War II, also gave a similar account albeit a brief one, focusing on the brutal reprisals and the common acceptance that the consequences of killing Heydrich were the annihilation of local resistance organisations and the instilling of great fear into the local population in resisting Nazi Germany’s occupation of Czechoslovakia. See Ewan Mawdsley: World War II: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 351. M.R.D. Foot: Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism, 1940– 1945 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1976), p. 181. See William Stanley Moss: Ill Met by Moonlight (London: George G. Harrap, 1950); and Patrick Leigh Fermor: Words of Mercury, ed. Artemis Cooper (London: John Murray, 2003). See Burke Davis: Get Yamamoto (New York: Random House, 1969); Davis: Lightning Strike; and Carroll V. Glines: Attack on Yamamoto (New York: Orion, 1990). See R. Cargill Hall (ed.): Lightning over Bougainville (London: Smithsonian Institution, 1991). In the Germans’ practice of Special Operations, two notable works by James Lucas and Charles Foley stand out. Lucas’s book offers an excellent historical analysis of German Special Operations in World War II. The depth of his strategic analysis, however, is lacking and too general. See James Lucas: Kommando: German Special Forces of World War Two (London: Guild Publishing, 1985). Charles Foley wrote the biography of Otto Skorzeny, Germany’s most famous commando. Foley’s work offered a rare insight into some of the more secret aspects of German Special Operations (still secret when Foley was writing his work in 1954) and benefitted from an interview with Skorzeny himself. Foley’s work, however, was superseded by the publishing of Skorzeny’s own memoirs in 1957. See Charles Foley: Commando Extraordinary (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1954, ppb. 1987). Skorzeny’s memoirs detailed his personal life in the German military and his subsequent capture and court martial. However, objective analysis of Skorzeny’s Special Operations’ performance is missing in his work. See Otto Skorzeny: Skorzeny’s Special Missions: The Memoirs of ‘The Most Dangerous Man in Europe’ (London: Greenhill Books, 1st edn 1957, hb. 1997).

182

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92. Kiras: Special Operations, p. 115. 93. Ibid., pp. 11 – 12. 94. Kiras’s thesis supports his claim by analyzing the effects of Special Operations being applied on the context of strategy. 95. Kiras: Special Operations, p. 113. In a private discussion between Kiras and the author in Old Whiteknights House, University of Reading on 14 December 2010, Kiras stated that the difficulties in building a theory of Special Operations is not unlike the problems in forming a theory of victory. 96. Finlan: Special Forces, p. 13. 97. Ibid., p. 25. 98. Ibid., pp. 160– 2 99. Ibid., pp. 24 – 5. 100. Ibid., pp. 84 – 96 101. Ibid., p. 128. This point was further echoed by Dr Rob Johnson in his seminar on Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI). Dr Johnson spoke of the effectiveness of UAVs which require a human element on the ground to direct them to their proper sphere of operation. Dr Rob Johnson: “Covert Operations: The ISI and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan”, Liberal Way of War Seminar, University of Reading, 7 December 2011. 102. Gray: Modern Strategy, p. 287. 103. Ibid., p. 290. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid., pp. 168– 9 106. Gray: Explorations, pp. 169– 80. 107. Ibid. 108. For example, the British had assisted the Omani Sultanate government twice by sending in the SAS to train Omani security forces, and took part in military operations against the rebels. The first operation was from 1958 to 1960, and the second from 1970 to 1976. See Tony Geraghty: Who Dares Wins: The Story of the Special Air Service (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1980), pp. 106– 37. For a concise overview of British assistance rendered to Yemen see Spencer Mawby: ‘The Clandestine defence of empire: British special operations in Yemen’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 17 No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 105–130, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306570, accessed on 17 November 2010. 109. McRaven: Spec Ops, pp. 1 – 25. 110. Ibid. 111. Luttwak, Canby, and Thomas: A Systematic Review, pp. 30 – 41 112. Kiras: Special Operations, p. 11. 113. Spulak: ‘A Theory of Special Operations’, p. 1 and p. 41. 114. Nigel West: The Secret War for the Falklands: The SAS, MI6, and the War Whitehall Nearly Lost (London: Warner Books, 1st edn 1997, ppb. 2000), pp. 139–40. See also Alastair Finlan: ‘British Special Forces in the Falklands War of 1982’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 13 No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 90–1.

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115. West: The Secret War, p. 144. 116. Ibid., pp. 146– 9 117. The operation appears to be a classic Special Operation – raiding an enemy airfield behind enemy lines. The operation was conceived to obtain immense strategic effects; however, even the elite SAS warriors chose not to proceed with the mission, threatening mass ‘mutiny’. 118. Eliot A Cohen: Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, Harvard Studies in International Affairs, No. 40 (Boston, MA: Center for International Affairs, 1978), p. 28. 119. Ibid., pp. 65 – 70. 120. Ibid., pp. 101– 2. 121. After suffering in the Vietnam War, the conventional US military viewed the unconventional warriors with suspect due to the legacy of some ‘dirty war’ activities conducted under the auspices of MACV-SOG, the US military downsized the US Army Special Forces from 10,000 men to around 3,600 in the mid-70s. See Richard H. Shultz, Jr: The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 343. Shultz’s book also gives an excellent overview of the covert operations conducted by the US during the Vietnam War. 122. See Richard W. Stewart: Operation Urgent Fury: The invasion of Grenada, 1983, CMH Pub 70 – 114– 1 (Fort McNair, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2011), http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/grenada/ urgent_fury.pdf, accessed on 27 December 2011; and Mark Adkin: Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (Lexington: MA: Lexington Books, 1989). 123. See Marquis: Unconventional Warfare; and Vandenbroucke: Perilous Options. 124. US Special Operations Command: ‘Joint Special Operations Command’, http://www.socom.mil/Pages/JointSpecialOperationsCommand.aspx, accessed on 7 March 2012. 125. US Special Operations Command: ‘History’, p. 7, http://www.socom.mil/ Documents/history6thedition.pdf, accessed on 7 March 201. See also Stephen J. Cimbala: The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 124. The awareness of the unique capabilities of US Special Operations was arguably and ironically not fully harnessed as evident in the failure of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. For analysis of this operation see Matt Eversmann and Dan Schilling: The Battle of Mogadishu: Firsthand accounts from the men of Task Force Ranger (New York: Presidio Press, 1st edn 2004, ppb 2006); Marshall V. Ecklund: ‘Task Force Ranger vs. Urban Somali Guerrillas in Mogadishu: An Analysis of Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Tactics and Techniques used during Operation GOTHIC SERPENT’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 15 No. 3 (Winter 2004), pp. 47–69, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0959231042000275560, accessed on 12 May 2010; and Mark Bowden: Blackhawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).

184

NOTES TO PAGES 20 –21

126. Unconventional Warfare (UW) in the US military is, ‘These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source . . . UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power.’ See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: ‘Doctrine for Joint Special Operations’ (Joint Publication 3 – 05, 17 December 2003), pp. II-7 – 8. 127. For example, in Afghanistan, it is reported that Special Operations units based there conducts an average of 1,000 missions every month; see Kimberly Dozier: ‘Building a network to hit militants’, AP Exclusive, 5 January 2011, http:// news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110105/ap_re_us/us_terrorism_special_operations, accessed on 6 January 2011; and Max Boot: ‘Statement of Max Boot’, Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, And Capabilities, 29 June 2006, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/statementbefore-house-armed-services-subcommittee-terrorism-unconventional-threatscapabilities/p11027, accessed on 5 January 2011. See also Mike Urban: Task Force Black (London: Little, Brown, 2010). 128. See Jim Gant: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan: One tribe at a time (Los Angeles, CA: Nine Sisters Imports, 2009). 129. Alan Hoe and Eric Morris: Re-enter the SAS: The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency (London: Lee Cooper, 1994), pp. 163–75; Geraghty: Who Dares Wins, pp. 23 – 7 and 32 – 6; and John Strawson: A History of The S.A. S. Regiment (London: Guild Publishing, 1st edn 1984, hb. 1985), p. 158. See also Roy Davis Linville Jumper: Death Waits in the ‘Dark’: The Senoi Praaq, Malaysia’s Killer Elite (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001). 130. Peter Dickens: SAS: The Jungle Frontier, 22 Special Air Service Regiment in the Borneo Campaign, 1963– 1966 (Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co, 1st edn 1984, ppb. 1991), pp. 109– 13; Geraghty: Who Dares Wins, p. 46 and p. 51; and Strawson: A History, pp. 190– 2. See also Jumper: Death Waits in the ‘Dark’. 131. Adams: US Special Operations Forces, pp. 82 – 7. 132. For example see Tony Balasevicius: ‘A Look Behind the Black Curtains: Understanding the Core Missions of Special Operations Forces’, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 7 No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 21 – 30; ibid.: ‘Unconventional Warfare: The missing link in the future of land operations’, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 9 No. 4 (2009), pp. 30 – 40; de B. Taillon, J. Paul: ‘Canadian Special Operations Forces: Transforming Paradigms’, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 6 No. 4 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 67 – 76; ibid.: ‘Coalition Special Operations Forces: Building partner capacity’, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Autumn 2007), pp. 45 – 54; Sean M. Maloney: ‘Who has seen the wind: An historical overview of Canadian Special Operations’, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 5 No. 3 (Autumn 2004),

NOTES

133. 134.

135.

136. 137.

138. 139.

140.

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pp. 39 – 48; Jamie Hammond: ‘Special Operations Forces: Relevant, Ready and Precise’, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 5 No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 17 – 28; and Travis A. Morehen: ‘A Selection Process for Special Operations Aviation’, The Canadian Air Force Journal, Vol.2 No. 4 (Fall 2009), pp. 6 – 23, http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/Journal/Vol2 – 2009/ Iss4-Fall/Sections/04-A_Selection_Process_for_Special_Operations_Forces_ Aviation_in_Canada_e.pdf, accessed on 28 December 2011. See Bernard J. Brister: ‘Canadian Special Operations Forces: A blueprint for the future’, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 5 No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 29 – 37. For the latest studies on Israeli Special Operations see Leslau: ‘Worth the Bother?’, pp. 509– 30; and Niccolo` Petrelli: “The missing dimension: IDF special operations forces and strategy in the Second Lebanon War”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 23 No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 56 – 73. See Charles D. Melson: ‘Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 16 No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 57 – 82. See also Ron Reid-Daly: Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts (Weltevreden Park: Covos-Day Books, 1999); Ron Reid-Daly and Peter Stiff: Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 1982); and Barbara Cole: The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (Transeki, South Africa: The Three Knights, 1984). See David Horner: SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle (St Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1989); and Ian McPhedran: The Amazing SAS: The Inside Story of Australia’s Special Forces (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2005). See Rhys Ball: ‘The strategic utility of New Zealand Special Forces’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 22 No. 1 (March 2011), pp. 119– 41; Ron Crosby: NZSAS: The First Fifty Years (Auckland: Viking, 2009); and William Darrell Baker: Dare to Win: The Story of the New Zealand Special Air Service (Melbourne: Lothian Publishing Company, 1987). Van Evera: Guide to Method, pp. 91 – 2. Harold R. Winton: ‘An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34 No. 6 (December 2011), pp. 854–6. See also Colin S. Gray: ‘Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory’, Prism, Vol. 3 No. 3 (January 2012), p. 20. Measuring tangible gain is also a difficult task. For example, Adrian Weale had argued that during the Malayan Emergency (1948 –60), the revived British SAS known as the Malayan Scouts during that campaign was responsible for only 1.7 per cent of the communist terrorists’ killed throughout the Emergency period i.e. 108 killed by SAS compared with a total of 6,398 Communist terrorists killed. See Weale: Secret Warfare, p. 251. Using a body count as an indicator of success is problematic and devoid of any strategic context similar to some Vietnam War assessment of successes based on body counts. See Everett Carl Dolman: Pure Strategy: Power and principle in the space and information age (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 36 – 8.

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141. The definition ‘tactical effects’ and the paradoxical consequence of tactics have been discussed in the subsection on ‘Tactical Effects’ earlier in this chapter. 142. This author find McRaven’s proposal of six principles that could yield tactical success for Special Operations which are simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose, provides a good grounding for tactical studies of Special Operations. See McRaven: Spec Ops, pp. 1 –25. McRaven however, did not study on the importance of intelligence support, and the strategic context of each of the eight case studies he used in the development of his principles. More importantly, McRaven’s principles focused on the execution point of combat action. He did not study on the equally (if not more) important planning aspects of each Special Operation, which could take a long time to plan and decide on the Special Operation, with intelligence support. The founding father of the British Special Air Service (SAS), Sir David Stirling (then a lieutenant) has in his handwritten proposal memo to the Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCGS) in the Middle East theatre, had produced perhaps one of the most important short notes on the tactics of Special Operations. The original handwritten memo for the formation of a Special Service Unit has since been lost but was reproduced by Stirling in his authorised biography. See Alan Hoe: David Stirling: The Authorised Biography of the Creator of the SAS (London: Warner Books, 1992, ppb. 1999), p. 61. What Stirling had written down was perhaps the tour de force of Special Operations tactics. He had highlighted these principles that are required for Special Operations to be successful which are: attacking enemy’s weak points; small units of selected and highly trained men capable to infiltrate the enemy positions by various means and conduct the operations; destroying enemy’s valuable assets; and surprise is of utmost importance. See ibid., pp. 62 –3. Again, Stirling did not state on the importance of precedent factors such as intelligence support in providing the information on enemy targets, and the logistical support of getting his men in and out of the enemy’s background. 143. A similar framework was used by Thomas M. Kane in his excellent study on the strategic performance of military logistics. In Kane’s study, he used four questions to address each individual case study; this author is impressed and influenced by Kane’s systematic framework of analysis. See Thomas M. Kane: Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 10–11. 144. Quantitative methods, which include statistical and mathematical modelling, are not practical tools for such study. The variables examined here are intangible and cannot be translated and measured with numerical precision.

Chapter 2

Strategies of Leadership Decapitation, Strategic Logic, and Nexus with Morale

1. Geoff Earle: ‘How we “SEAL”ed monster’s fate’, New York Post, 3 May 2011, http:www.nypost.com/news/local/how_we_seal_ed_monster_fate_Gd2Mvbs, accessed on 8 May 2011.

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2. See Nicholas Schmidle: ‘Getting Bin Laden: What happened that night in Abbottabad’, The New Yorker (8 August 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/ reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle?printable¼true, accessed on 24 August 2012, p. 12; Vince Coglianese: ‘Correcting the “fairy tale”: A SEAL’s account of how Osama bin Laden really died’, The Daily Caller, 7 November 2011, http://dailycaller.com/2011/11/07/correcting-the-fairy-talea-seals-account-of-how-osama-bin-laden-really-died/, accessed on 2 January 2012. There was another account of the killing which indicated that bin Laden had attempted to use one of his wives as a human shield thereby portraying him as a coward. See Nicole Jonston and Kate Andersen Brower: ‘Bin Laden killed after wife shot while rushing Commando, U.S. Account says’, Bloomberg, 4 May 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011– 0 5 –0 4/bin-ladenkilled-after-wife-shot-while-rushing-commando-u-s-account-says.html, accessed 8 May 2011. For an insider account of a SEAL that allegedly took part in the operation, see Mark Owen and Kevin Maurer: No Easy Day: Firsthand account of the mission that killed Osama bin Laden (London: Dutton, 2012). See also Peter Bergen: Manhunt: The ten-year search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad (New York: Crown, 2012). 3. Kimberly Dozier and Lolita C. Baldor: ‘Officials mine secrets of bin Laden papers, videos’, Associated Press, 8 May 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us _bin_laden/print, accessed on 8 May 2011. 4. Marc Ambinder: ‘The secret team that killed bin Laden’, NationalJournal, 2 May 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/the-secret-team-thatkilled-bin-laden-20110502?print¼true, accessed on 8 May 2011. 5. Although it is now known that bin Laden had continued Al-Qaeda’s operational leadership while in hiding, how his elimination will transfer into the main aim of annihilating Al-Qaeda is still unknown at this stage of writing. See ‘Osama maintained operational control of Al-Qaeda from his Abbottabad compound: US’, Yahoo! News, 8 May 2011, http://in.news.yahoo. com/osama-maintained-operational-control-al-qaeda-abbottabad-compound, accessed on 8 May 2011. 6. See James D. Kiras: Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 16 – 34. 7. Almost all translations had introductory notes debating the origins of the text, and who was Sun Tzu. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 1 – 12; Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), pp. 3 – 39; and Sun Tzu: The Art of War: Sun Zi’s Military Methods, trans. Victor S. Mair (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 1 – 55. 8. Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. Griffith, p. 179. 9. Lionel Giles: ‘Sun Tzu on the Art of War’ (1910), http://ctext.org/art-of-war, accessed on 5 January 2012. 10. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Griffith; Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993); Ralph D. Sawyer (trans.):

188

11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

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‘Sun Tzu’s Art of War’ in Ralph D. Sawyer (trans.): The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (New York: Basic Books, 1993); Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. John Minford (New York: Penguin, 1st edn. 2002, ppb. 2009); Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. Yuan Shibing (Ware: Wordsworth, 1998); Sun Tzu: The Art of Strategy: The leading modern translation of Sun Tzu’s classic The Art of War, trans. R.L.Wing (London: Thorson, 1997); Sun Tzu: The Art of War – The New Translation, trans. J.H. Huang (New York: William Morrow, 1993); Sun Tzu: The Art of War: Sun Zi’s Military Methods, trans. Victor S. Mair (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 2005); and Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. Gary Gagliardi (Seattle, WA: Clearbridge, 2002). Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS): ‘Sun Zi’s Art of War and U.S. Joint Professional Military Education’, Proceedings (6 October 2009), http:// www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/INSS%20Proceedings%20Oct%2009.pdf, accessed on 3 January 2012. Email discussions with Dr Bi Jianxiang from 27 November 2011 to 5 December 2011. Dr Bi Jianxiang is an academic researching on Chinese PLA and strategic affairs, and a lecturer in the University of Western England, Bristol. Alastair Iain Johnston: Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 267. Martin Van Creveld: The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London: Cassell, 1st edn 2000, ppb. 2002), p. 37. Ibid., p. 77. Yu¨ Shih-nan (comp. ): Pei-t’ang shu-sh’ao (1888), p. 116/1a, cited in Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare, trans. Ames, p. 231. Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. Griffith, p. 148. Yuval Noah Harari: Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100– 1550 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2007), p. 91. For a detailed account of the Nizaris see Bernard Lewis: The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Phoenix, 1st edn 1967, 2003). Harari: Special Operations, p. 91. Ronald White: ‘A Prolegomenon to a General Theory of Assassination’, Assassination Research, Vol. 5 No. 1 (2007), p. 7. Robert A. Pape: Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 1st edn 2005, ppb. 2006), pp. 12 – 13. Ibid., pp. 34 – 5. Ibid., pp. 98 – 9; and Lewis: The Assassins, p. 113. Lewis: The Assassins, pp. 113– 14. Ibid., p. 115. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 8.

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29. The Nizari sect was finally wiped out by the invading Mongols in the early 13th century. Hamilton Gibb: The Life of Saladin: From the works of ‘IMA¯D AD-DI¯N and BAHA¯’ AD-DI¯N (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 13 and p. 19; Lewis: The Assassins, pp. 91 – 5; and Harari: Special Operations, p. 30. 30. The famous fifteenth century Italian political philosopher, Niccolo` Machiavelli, had also mentioned, in The Prince, the utility of decapitating enemy political leadership to obtain positions of power in the Italian states. Machiavelli had proposed to his student prince ways to gain a position of power by means of killing his political opponent and also the opponent’s whole family tree to annihilate any blood ties that may challenge his power in the future. Machiavelli also proposed a cunning political intrigue of befriending a potential political threat and supposedly be his ally. The new-found ‘friend’ would then be used to achieve one’s policies. Once he had been made full use of and thus made redundant, he must also be killed. Machiavelli’s princely advice, however, is more closely identified with assassination or political murder as defined in Chapter 1 rather than a leadership decapitation strategy. For more details on what Machiavelli prescribed to gain personal power in politics, see Niccolo Machiavelli: The Prince, trans. W.K. Marriott (London: Dent, 1st edn 1958, hb 1965), pp. 11, 23, 44, and 46–8. 31. Thomas More: Utopia, trans. Paul Turner (London: Penguin Books, 1st edn 1965, ppb. 2003), p. 96. 32. J.F.C. Fuller: The Conduct of War, 1789– 1961 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1961), p. 243. 33. Van Creveld: The Art of War, pp. 169– 70. 34. Ibid., pp. 170– 1. 35. Fuller: The Conduct of War, p. 234. See also J.F.C. Fuller: Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936), pp. 318 – 41. 36. Fuller: Memoirs, p. 322. 37. Ibid., pp. 323– 5. 38. Ibid., pp. 322 and 326. 39. Ibid., p. 322. 40. Van Creveld: The Art of War, p. 169. 41. Fuller: Memoirs, p. 326. 42. Ibid., p. 325. 43. Ibid. 44. Fuller: The Conduct, p. 243. It is not the purpose of this book to elaborate on Fuller’s theoretical impact on mechanised warfare, however, for a succint overview see Brian Holden Reid: ‘J.F.C. Fuller’s theory of mechanized warfare’, chapter in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo: Strategic Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 108– 21. 45. Kiras: Special Operations, p. 17. 46. See Reid: ‘J.F.C. Fuller’, pp. 108– 10. 47. Ibid., p. 111.

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48. J.F.C. Fuller: The Second World War, 1939– 45: A Strategical and Tactical History (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948), p. 407. 49. Fuller’s vision for his form of future warfare would be ‘less brutal and far less destructive’. See Brian Holden Reid: ‘J.F.C. Fuller’s theory of mechanized warfare’ in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds): Strategic Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 110. 50. Fuller: Memoirs, p. 322. 51. For an excellent account see John Frost: A Drop Too Many: The memoirs of World War II’s most daring Parachute Commander (London: Sphere Books Ltd, 1st edn 1980, ppb. 1983). 52. J.F.C. Fuller: The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1923), p. 186. 53. See ibid., pp. 185– 8. 54. For example see J.F.C. Fuller: The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History, 3 vols (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1954– 56); ibid.: The Generalship of Alexander the Great (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958); and ibid.: The Conduct of War; Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier and Tyrant (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1965). 55. Giulio Douhet, trans. Dino Ferrari: The Command of The Air (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, original 1921, hb. 1983), pp. 20 – 3. 56. See John A. Warden III: The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Lincoln: to Excel Press, 2000). 57. John Andreas Olsen provides a detailed examination of Project Checkmate. See John Andreas Olsen: John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), pp. 183– 246. 58. Stephen Budiansky: Air Power: The War, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Iraq (London: Penguin Press, 2005), p. 414. See also Kiras: Special Operations, pp. 25 – 6. 59. For details of ‘Instant Thunder’ see also Olsen: John Warden, pp. 140– 82. 60. H. Norman Schwarzkopf: It doesn’t take a hero (London: Transworld Publishers Ltd, 1992), pp. 318– 20. 61. Ibid., p. 319. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid., pp. 318– 19. See also Olsen: John Warden, p. 189 and p. 202. 64. Warden III: The Air Campaign, pp. 7– 9. 65. Ibid., pp. 34 – 5. 66. Warden III: The Air Campaign, pp. 123–4. 67. Budiansky: Air Power, p. 414. 68. Pape: Bombing to Win, p. 79. 69. Ibid., p. 80. 70. Ibid. 71. Pape’s work was written in the middle of the 1990s in the aftermath of the disastrous US air support for the Kurdish uprising in Iraq following the end of the Gulf War in 1992.

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72. Pape’s book was published in 1996 and is devoid of any discussion on UAVs as a means of airpower. 73. Barry D. Watts, in his critique of Pape’s work, also agreed that Pape’s assertion on the inability of airpower to initiate and achieve leadership decapitation and political change has validity. See Barry D. Watts: ‘Ignoring Reality: Problems of theory and evidence in security studies’, Security Studies, Vol. 7 No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), p. 117. John Warden III had also criticised Pape’s work. See John A. Warden: ‘Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win’, Security Studies, Vol. 7 No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 172 – 90. See also Pape’s reply to Watt’s and Warden’s critiques of his work in Robert A. Pape: ‘The air force strikes back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden’, Security Studies, Vol. 7 No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 191 – 214. 74. Viktor Suvorov: Spetsnaz: The Story of the Soviet SAS, trans. David Flloyd (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1st edn 1987, hb. 1988), p. 6. 75. John J. Dziak: ‘The Soviet Approach to Special Operations’, in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar and Richard H. Shultz (eds): Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 105. The Soviet Union had three main types of Spetsnaz run by three different organisations; the KGB (Committee for State Security), MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the military. Each of these Spestnaz bodies, however, had assassination as one of its main tasks. 76. Ibid., p. 100. 77. Ibid., pp. 101– 2. 78. Ibid. 79. Suvorov: Spetsnaz, p. 26. 80. Viktor Suvorov provides an interesting hypothetical view of how Soviet Spestnaz would be used to spearhead World War III. See Suvorov: Spetsnaz, p. 180. Interestingly, Suvorov’s example of Spetsnaz using remote-controlled airplanes to hit the White House aiming to kill the US President had close similarities to the 9/11 attacks conducted by Al-Qaeda, and the current UAV/ drone attacks used by the United States and Israel to kill terrorist leaders. See ibid., pp. 179– 80. 81. Thomas K. Adams: US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (New York: Frank Cass, 1998, ppb. 2005), pp. 65 –9 and pp. 135–8. See also See Jiri Valenta: ‘From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion’, International Security, Vol. 5 No. 2 (Autumn 1980), pp. 114 –41. 82. Dziak: ‘The Soviet Approach’, p. 114. 83. Ibid., pp. 65 – 9. 84. Ibid., p. 142. 85. Rob Johnson: The Afghan Way of War: Culture and Pragmatism: A critical history (London: Hurst, 2011), p. 208. 86. Ibid.; and Adams: Secret Armies, pp. 142– 3.

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87. See Kenneth Allard: “Soviet Airborne Forces and Preemptive Power Projection”, Parameters, Vol. 10 No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 42–51, http://www.carlisle. army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1980/1980%20allard%20soviet%20ai rborne%20forces.pdf, accessed on 19 December 2011. 88. Dziak: ‘The Soviet Approach’, p. 115. 89. Johnson: The Afghan Way of War, p. 208. For a concise periodic assessment of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan see Lawrence E. Grinter: ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Its Inevitability and Its Consequences’, Parameters, Vol. 12 No. 4 (December 1982), pp. 53–61, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/ Articles/1982/1982%20grinter.pdf, accessed on 19 December 2011. 90. US covert operations attempting to overthrow governments in the 1950s and 1960s would also serve as examples of such operations. For an overview see John Prados: Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1986). 91. Carl von Clausewitz: On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 85. 92. The strategy of killing an enemy leader also involved a moral cost, not just in deliberating the justification of killing the enemy leader in question but also in the potential killing and injuring of innocent civilians in the operation to kill the enemy leader. Although the planned intention of killing an enemy may trigger some effects that may be prepared for, it may also trigger some effects that are unwanted, such as mass reprisals and killing of civilians in retaliation of the killing. Sometimes the temptation for the attacked government’s forces to react immorally, such as unleashing brutal reprisals against civilians, may be the intended effect. Moral cost can also be used as a useful intangible weapon, as the case study in the next chapter on Reinhard Heydrich explains. 93. Clausewitz: On War, p. 186. 94. Morale is commonly defined as ‘the confidence, enthusiasm, and discipline of a person or group at a particular time’. Oxford Dictionaries, http://oxforddictionaries. com/definition/english/morale?q¼morale, accessed on 17 September 2012. Raymond Aron described, ‘. . .morale or moral forces’. Although certain elements in Clausewitz’s ‘moral factors’ cannot be categorised under morale, nonetheless, Aron interpreted morale as similar to what Clausewitz meant as moral. See Raymond Aron: Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 117. Beatrice Heuser also used the term morale to explain Clausewitz’s ‘moral force’. Heuser stated: ‘The morale of the fighting forces, which Clausewitz called “moral force”. . .’, See Beatrice Heuser: Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 80. 95. Clausewitz: On War, pp. 233 – 4. For other notable discussions on Clausewitz’s ‘moral forces’ and morale, see Hew Strachan: Carl von Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), pp. 123– 9; and Hugh Smith: On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 74 – 7. For a study on the relationship between military leadership and morale, see Angelo Codevilla and

NOTES TO PAGES 46 –52

96. 97. 98.

99. 100.

101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111.

112. 113. 114.

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Paul Seabury: War: Ends and Means (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 1st edn 1989, ppb. 2009), pp. 88 – 91. Clausewitz: On War, p. 185. Ibid., p. 97. Clausewitz further added, ‘The spirit and other moral qualities of an army, a general or a government, the temper of the population of the theatre of war, the moral effects of victory or defeat-all these vary greatly. They can moreover influence our objective in very different ways.’ Clausewitz: On War. Clausewitz commenting on the intangibility of moral effects stated, ‘They cannot be classified or counted. They have to be seen or felt.’ Ibid. Colin S. Gray provided further support for the importance of morale: ‘. . . the most significant contributor [military effectiveness] by far to prowess in battle is morale’. Colin S. Gray: Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims in War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 94. Clausewitz: On War, p. 177. Beatrice Heuser: ‘Clausewitz’s Ideas of Strategy and Victory’ in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds): Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 146. Ibid. Clausewitz: On War, p. 232. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Griffith, pp. 63 – 4. Ibid., p. 108. Michael I. Handel: Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1st edn 1992, ppb. 2001), pp. 62 – 3. Ibid., p. 60. Ibid. and pp. 318– 19. Archibald Wavell: Speaking Generally (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 79. For example David W. Hogan, Jr argued that US Special Operations’ utility in World War II, ‘lie in the realm of morale and other intangibles’. See David W. Hogan, Jr: U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992), p. 4. Colin S. Gray: Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 175 –6. Ibid. Gray mentioned a few examples of Special Operations raising morale in World War II such as the Chindits, Merrill’s Marauders and the Doolittle B-25 raid on Tokyo. Clausewitz: On War, p. 186.

Chapter 3

‘Hitler’s Hangman’ Butchered – Operation Anthropoid

1. Reinhard Heydrich was nicknamed ‘Hitler’s hangman’ by the press at that time. See Robert Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman: The Life of Heydrich (London: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 13.

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2. Parts of this chapter have been argued and published in The RUSI Journal. See Adam Leong Kok Wey: ‘Operation Anthropoid: The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich and the Fate of a Nation’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 157 No. 2 (April/ May 2012), pp. 68 – 75. 3. Prime Minister’s Office: ‘Neville Chamberlain’, http://www.number10.gov.uk/ history-and-tour/prime-ministers-in-history/neville-chamberlain, accessed on 6 June 2011. 4. David Chuter: ‘Munich, or the blood of others’ in Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds): Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998), p. 66. 5. Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 1. 6. Jeffrey Record: The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), p. 21; and Philip Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ: A Leader of Democracy (London: Alliance Press, c.1945), p. 29. 7. For an outline of early Czechoslovakia state building see Zbyneˇk Zeman: The Masaryks: the Making of Czechoslovakia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976). 8. As an example France lost 1.3 million troops killed (1/8 of the adult male population) and 4.3 million wounded in World War I. See Record: The Specter of Munich, p. 15. Record also provided an excellent discussion on why Britain and France appeased Hitler, see ibid., pp. 13– 66. 9. For ethnic issues in Czechoslovakia, see Jaroslav Krejeˇi and Pavel Machonin: Czechoslovakia, 1919– 1992: A Laboratory for Social Change (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Wiekemann: Czechs and Germans: A study of the struggle in the historic Provinces of Bohemia and Morovia (London: Macmillan, 1st edn 1938, hb. 1967). Another author writing in November 1938 stated that the ethnic issues were played up by the Germans. He contended that the Czechs had been soundly betrayed by the British and France, and prophesised accurately that Hitler could never be appeased. See G.J. George: They Betrayed Czechoslovakia (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938). 10. Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, p. 84. See also Record: The Specter of Munich, p. 46. 11. See George F. Kennan: From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938– 1940 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein (eds): Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II (London: Frank Cass, 1999); and N.J. Crowson: Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and European Dictators, 1935– 1940 (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 93 – 103. 12. Eduard Benesˇ: Memoirs of Dr Eduard Benesˇ: From Munich to New War and New Victory, trans. Godfrey Lias (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 29; and Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, p. 77. French intelligence sources had estimated that Czechoslovakia, without any outside help from her allies, was able to resist the invasion by Germany at most for a month. France, which had a military alliance with Czechoslovakia, and Britain attempted to avoid an eventual war with Germany. Both of these powers resorted to negotiating with Hitler culminating in the Munich Conference. See Peter Jackson: France and the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Policy Making, 1933– 1939 (Oxford: Oxford University

NOTES

13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36.

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Press, 2000), pp. 279–97. The British military attache´ in Prague, however, had a more optimistic view on the capabilities of the Czech armed forces. He estimated that the Czechs could defend themselves, with Allied support, and resist the German invasion for three months. See Christopher Andrew: Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Sceptre, 1986), p. 560. Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, p. 77. Benesˇ: Memoirs, p. 29. British intelligence assessment indicated that Czechoslovakia would be safer without Sudetenland. The British intelligence and military chiefs were also inclined to appease Hitler as the solution to the crisis. See Andrew: Secret Service, p. 560. Maria Dowling: Czechoslovakia (London: Arnold, 2002), p. 54. See Record: The Specter of Munich; Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott: The Appeasers (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963); and Martin Gilbert: The Roots of Appeasement (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966). Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, p. 85; and Prime Minister’s Office: ‘Neville Chamberlain’. Record: The Specter of Munich, p. 46. Benesˇ: Memoirs, p. 51; and George: They Betrayed, p. 186. Benesˇ: Memoirs, p. 51. Ibid.; and Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, pp. 90. Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, p. 91. Ibid., pp. 92 – 3; and Benesˇ: Memoirs, p. 58. See also Record: The Specter of Munich, pp. 13 –22. Dowling: Czechoslovakia, p. 59. R.W. Seton-Watson: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948), pp. 369– 70; and Dowling: Czechoslovakia, p. 58. Ibid. Ibid. Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, p. 94. Michael Burian, Alesˇ Knı´zˇek, Jirˇı´ Rajlich, and Eduard Stehlı´k: Assassination: Operation Anthropoid, 1941– 1942 (Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic-AVIS, 2002), p. 25. Richard J. Overy: War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), p. 179. Richard J. Overy: ‘Economics and the Origins of the Second World War’, chapter in Frank McDonough (ed.): The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective (London: Continuum, 2011), pp. 491– 2. See also Overy: War and Economy, pp. 150–5. See A.H. Hermann: A History of the Czechs (London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 232; and Wiekemann: Czechs and Germans, pp. 160– 2. Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, pp. 30 – 1. Dowling: Czechoslovakia, p. 60. M.R.D. Foot: Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism, 1940–1945 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1976), p. 203.

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56 –58

37. ‘Bren light machine gun (UK)’, World Guns, http://world.guns.ru/machine/brit/ bren-e.html, accessed on 6 July 2011. 38. Oscar Halecki: A History of Poland (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1st edn 1978, ppb. 1983), p. 308. 39. Record: The Specter of Munich, pp. 65 – 6. 40. Ibid., p. 309 41. J.F.N. Bradley: Czecho Slovakia: A short history (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), p. 163; and Benesˇ: Memoirs, p. 110. 42. Benesˇ: Memoirs, pp. 75 – 81. 43. Ibid., p. 110; and Bradley: Czecho Slovakia, p. 163. 44. Benesˇ: Memoirs, p. 176. 45. Bradley: Czecho Slovakia, p. 164. 46. William J.M. Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940– 1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000), p. 84. An author has argued that the SOE was based on a similar organisation setup by the British to conduct sabotage and subversion operations in Europe during the Napoleonic wars. See Elizabeth Sparrow: Secret Service: British Agents in France 1792– 1815 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), p. xiv and p. 416. 47. Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE, pp. 5 – 7. 48. Ibid., pp. 4 – 5. 49. Ibid., pp. 7 – 11. 50. Ibid., p. 69. 51. Neville Chamberlain: ‘Paper on SOE’, cited in M.R.D. Foot: SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946 (London: Pimlico, 1st edn 1984, ppb. 1999), p. 21. 52. Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE, p. 75; and Martin Gilbert: Winston S. Churchill: Volume VI, Finest Hour 1939– 1941 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1983), p. 667. 53. Hugh Dalton: The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931– 1945 (London: Frederick Muller Ltd, 1957), p. 366. The setting up of Fifth Columns were misguided by the belief that the Germans used Fifth Columns during her successful speedy invasions of Poland, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium and France. See I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot (eds): The Oxford Companion to the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 1019. 54. Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE, pp. 64 – 5. 55. Dalton: The Fateful Years, p. 366. 56. Major Gubbins was later promoted through the ranks to Major-General, and was commander of SOE in August 1943 until its disbandment at the end of World War II. See Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE, p. 512. 57. Foot: SOE, pp. 5 – 6. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. These two pamphlets can be accessed online. See Colin McVean Gubbins: “The Art of Guerrilla Warfare”, http://www.scribd.com/doc/34556365/SOE-theArt-of-Guerrilla-Warfare-Gubbins, accessed on 11 November 2011; and ibid.:

NOTES

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86.

TO PAGES

58 – 62

197

‘Partisan Leader’s Handbook’, http://es.scribd.com/doc/12857951/PartisanLeaders-Handbook, accessed on 11 November 2011. Foot: SOE, pp. 9 – 10. Ibid., p. 28. See Peter Churchill: Of Their Own Choice (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1952), pp. 15 – 32. Foot: SOE, pp. 297– 9. Ibid., pp. 246– 357; and Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE. See Foot: SOE, pp. 178– 86. Gunther Deschner: Heydrich: The Pursuit of Total Power, trans. Sandra Bance, Brenda Woods and David Ball (London: Orbis Publishing, 1st edn 1977, hb. 1981), p. 13. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., p. 42. Ibid., p. 41. See also Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, pp. 51 – 2. Deschner: Heydrich, p. 46. Charles Wighton: Heydrich: Hitler’s Most Evil Henchman (London: Odhams Press, 1962), pp. 70 –1. Robert Gerwarth argued that since all documents related to the ‘The Night of the Long Knives’ had been destroyed, it cannot be ascertained for sure Heydrich’s role in this incident. Heydrich, however, used this incident for his own career promotion. See Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 79; and Wighton: Heydrich, p. 78. Deschner: Heydrich, pp. 58, 75 and 106. Wighton: Heydrich, pp. 22 – 3. Deschner: Heydrich, p. 61. Ibid. Ibid., p. 111. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 24; and Dowling: Czechoslovakia, p. 60. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 10. Paneth: Eduard Benesˇ, p. 108. Ibid., pp. 109. See also Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 221. Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 221. Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), LH 15/4/58: Papers of Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Newspaper cutting, ‘Regime of terror for Czechs’, Manchester Guardian, 29 September 1941. Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 225. Callum MacDonald: The Killing of Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 107. Heydrich was given this role due to the changing of policy in dealing with Jews and Slavs precipitated by the early quick success of Operation Barbarossa in the Eastern Front. See Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 224. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 112. For a detailed and concise description of Heydrich’s role in ‘Germanisation’ see Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, pp. 224– 56.

198

NOTES TO PAGES 62 –64

87. The National Archives, Kew Gardens (TNA), HS 4/39, S.O.E., Czechoslovakia, No. 37: Silver A, Silver B, and Liquidation of Heydrich: ‘Execution of Heydrich’, p. 2. 88. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 25. 89. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 112. 90. See Heinz Magenheimer: Hitler’s War: Germany’s Key Strategic Decisions, 1940– 1945 (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1997, ppb. 2004), pp. 65– 9. 91. Don Alvaro de Navia-Osorio y Vigil, Vizconde de Puerto, Marque´s de Santa Cruz de Mercenado: Reflexiones Militaries, chapter in Beatrice Heuser: The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (Oxford: Praeger, 2010), p. 137. 92. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 112. 93. Although some of the industrial workers, especially in the crucial arms industry did enjoy the extra benefits, the majority of the other workers actually experienced a decline in rations. Heydrich, however, propagandised his success. See Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 242. 94. Vigil, Vizconde, Santa Cruz: Reflexiones Militaries, p. 136. 95. Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 236. 96. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Execution of Heydrich’, p. 1. 97. Michael Burleigh: Moral Combat: A History of World War II (London: Harper Press, 2010), pp. 304–5. 98. The Times: ‘Iron Rule in Bohemia’, 29 September 1941, LHCMA: LH 15/4/58. 99. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 115. 100. Heydrich was ordered by Hitler to keep Elia´sˇ alive for the time being. See Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 229. 101. Seton-Watson: A History, p. 384. 102. Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 228. 103. Frantisek Moravec: Master of Spies: The Memoirs of General Frantisek Moravec (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1975), p. 210. 104. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 25. 105. Ibid., p. 7. See also Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 229. 106. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 208. Heydrich’s moniker of ‘butcher’ was popularly used at that time. See also The Daily Mail: ‘Heydrich is Dead: “Butcher” Head of Gestapo’, No. 17.653, 4 June 1942, p. 1. 107. See Robert S. Wistrich: Hitler and the Holocaust: How and Why the Holocaust Happened (London: Phoenix, 1st edn 2001, ppb. 2003); Deschner: Heydrich, pp. 141–82; Donald Bloxham and Tony Kushnor: The Holocaust: Critical Historical Approaches (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 129; and Gerald Reitlinger: The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939– 1945 (London: Valentine, Mitchell & Co., 1st edn 1953, hb. 1968), pp. 98 – 107. 108. See Wistrich: Hitler and the Holocaust, pp. 109– 15. 109. Cited in Deschner: Heydrich, p. 178. See also pp. 176– 9. See also Hans Safrian: Eichmann’s Men, trans. Ute Stargadt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

NOTES

110.

111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126.

127. 128.

129. 130. 131.

TO PAGES

64 –68

199

1st edn 1993, ppb. 2010); Dan Stone (ed.): The Historiography of the Holocaust (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), and Daniel Blatman: The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide, trans. Chaya Galai (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1st edn 2009, hb. 2011). Nazi atrocities were only starting to be known to the outside world in 1943. The full extent of the Nazi horror was only revealed during the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal after the war has ended. See Bruce M. Russett: No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry Into World War II (London: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), p. 42. Burleigh: Moral Combat, p. 305. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Execution of Heydrich’, p. 1. Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 9. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 210. Burleigh: Moral Combat, p. 306. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 208. Benesˇ: Memoirs, p. 203; see also Chuter: ‘Munich’, p. 66. See Benesˇ: Memoirs, pp. 197– 238. Ibid., pp. 199– 200. Ibid., pp. 90 – 1. Burleigh: Moral Combat, p. 305. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 210. Burleigh: Moral Combat, p. 305. Ibid., p. 306. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 211. Benesˇ: Memoirs., p. 29 and p. 51. In preparation for any eventual invasion by the Germans prior to the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia’s military had managed to mobilise 40 divisions and two brigades. These formations were further supported by artillery and tank units, and the Czechoslovakian Air Force. Czechoslovakia also had a line of fortifications straddling the German borders. See Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 6; and Moravec: Master of Spies, pp. 223– 4. Churchill had also given a similar view. See Winston S. Churchill: The Second World War, Volume V: Closing the Ring (London: Cassell, 1952), p. 400. Moravec: Master of Spies, pp. 223– 4. French intelligence sources had estimated that Czechoslovakia, without any outside help from her allies, was able to resist the invasion by Germany at most for a month. France, which had a military alliance with Czechoslovakia, and Britain refused to fight in an eventual war with Germany. Both of these powers resorted to negotiate with Hitler culminating with the Munich Conference. See Jackson, France and the Nazi Menace, pp. 279– 97. Igor Primoratz (ed.): Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 7, 16, and 24. Ibid., p. 16. Moravec: Master, p. 222.

200

NOTES

TO PAGES

69 –72

132. Colin S. Gray: ‘Moral Advantage, Strategic Advantage?’, The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 33 No. 3 (June 2010), p. 36. 133. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Cover Note from MX, 30 May 1942’. 134. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Execution of Heydrich’, p. 4. 135. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 14. 136. Ibid. 137. Ibid. 138. Ibid., p. 50. 139. TNA, HS 4/39: Cover letter on ‘Operation Anthropoid’. 140. Ibid. 4/39: ‘Operation Anthropoid’, p. 1. 141. Moravec: Master, p. 212. 142. Ibid., p. 213. 143. Ibid. 4/39: ‘Attached Note dated 22 January 1942’; and Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 14. 144. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 14. 145. Ibid., p. 18. 146. Ibid. 147. Ibid. 148. SOKOL is a Czech gymnastic association that was rooted on ideas of nationalism. See Mark Dimond: ‘The SOKOL and Czech Nationalism, 1918– 1948’ in Mark Cornwall and R.J.W. Evans (eds): Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918–1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 185 –205. 149. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 142– 3. JINDRA was the cover name of a resistance group run by Ladislav Vaneˇk. See Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 18. JINDRA was also part of the broader SOKOL network. See Dimond: ‘The SOKOL’, p. 194. 150. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Attached note dated 22 January 1942’. 151. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Operation Anthropoid’ cover note. 152. The local resistance in aiding the Anthropoid team in conducting surveillance of Heydrich’s movements managed to deduce the true purpose of the SOE operatives in Prague. See Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 58. 153. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Execution of Heydrich’, p. 3. 154. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 58; and Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 8. 155. For details of this controversial event, see MacDonald: The Killing, p. 157– 8, 167. See also Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, pp. 8 – 9. 156. The alternative means of killing Heydrich were to shoot him as he was getting into either the castle (Heydrich’s home) or his office; putting a bomb in his car or his railway train; blowing up the railway train; putting mines on the road Heydrich used to travel; or to shoot him in a public ceremony. See TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Operation Anthropoid’ cover note and ‘Attached Note dated 22 January 1942’. 157. Heydrich was supposedly flying to Berlin to meet Hitler, and may be reassigned into a different position and not returning to Czechoslovakia anytime soon. See MacDonald: The Killing, p. 166.

NOTES 158. 159. 160. 161.

162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194.

TO PAGES

72 –77

201

Ibid. Deschner: Heydrich, p. 240. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 58. There was an attempt to kill him by a Russian agent in March 1942. The Russian agent, carrying a sniper rifle, however, was arrested by the Gestapo. Despite the threat on his life, Heydrich continued to play little attention to his own personal security. See Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 276. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 117. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Operation Anthropoid’, p. 2. Ibid. Josef Valcˇı´k was part of the Silver B party parachuted in together with the Anthropoid Team. See Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 50. TNA, HS 4/39: “Operation Anthropoid”, p. 4. Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 10. Burian, et al: Assassination, p. 64. Ibid., p. 64. See MacDonald: The Killing, pp. 171– 2; and Deschner: Heydrich, p. 241. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Execution of Heydrich’, p. 5. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 172. Deschner: Heydrich, p. 248. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 65. Deschner: Heydrich, p. 265. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 218. Ibid., pp. 222– 3. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 175. Ibid., pp. 172 and 175. Deschner: Heydrich, p. 276. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 179. For details of this event see Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 71. Ibid., p. 72. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 218. Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 82. Ibid. Ibid., p. 25 and pp. 85 – 9. Ibid., p. 76. Deschner: Heydrich, p. 277. Ibid. Gerwarth: Hitler’s Hangman, p. 284. Deschner: Heydrich, p. 278. TNA, HS 4/70: ‘S.O.E.: Czechoslovakia, No. 68’. MacDonald, The Killing, pp. 180– 1. For an example of the German’s propaganda against the Czech government-in-exile and the British government for conducting the attack for selfish gains while disregarding

202

195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203.

204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213.

214. 215. 216. 217.

NOTES

TO PAGES

77 –86

the safety of the Czech population, see TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Translated transcript “Daily Report of World Broadcasts, 27 May 1942”’. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 217. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 223. Gray: ‘Moral Advantage’, p. 363. See Churchill: The Second World War, Volume V, p. 400. Moravec: Master of Spies, p. 223. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Execution of Heydrich’, p. 12. Cited in Wighton: Heydrich, p. 270. ‘Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II); July 29, 1899’, The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp, accessed on 29 June 2011. It is not the purpose of this research to discuss further if the acts of reprisals conducted by the Germans were just or unjust. For further discourses on reprisals see Michael Walzer: Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations (New York: BasicBooks, 1st edn 1977, ppb. 1992), pp. 207– 22; and Michael A. Newton: ‘Reconsidering Reprisals’, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Vol. 20 No. 361 (2010), pp. 361– 88, http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?20þDuke þ J.þ Comp. þ & þ Int% 27l þ L. þ 361 þ pdf, accessed on 29 June 2011. Wighton: Heydrich, p. 14. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 200. TNA, HS 4/39: ‘Execution of Heydrich’, p. 8. Foot: Resistance, p. 207. As a result of the post-Heydrich killing reprisals, more than half of the leadership in one of the largest resistance network in Czechoslovakia, SOKOL, had been decimated. See Dimond: ‘The SOKOL’, p. 194. MacDonald: The Killing, p. 204– 5. Seton-Watson: A History, p. 388. Bradley: Czecho Slovakia, pp. 165–6; and Benesˇ: Memoirs, p. 236. President Edvard Benesˇ: “Remarks to Jaromir Smutny”, cited in MacDonald: The Killing, p. 202. The subsequent events of 1948 in which Czechoslovakia was taken over by a communist coup d’e´tat will not be discussed in this chapter. For an appraisal of the Communist takeover, see Hubert Ripka: Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d’Etat (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1950). MacDonald: The Killing, p. 208. See Henri Michel: The Shadow War: Resistance in Europe, 1939– 1945, trans. Richard Barry (London: Andre Deutsch, 1st edn 1970, hb. 1972), p. 225. Jaroslav Tvrdı´k in ‘Foreword’, Burian, et al.: Assassination, p. 3. ‘Assassins of leading Nazi Heydrich finally honoured with Prague statue’, Radio Praha, http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/assassinsof-leading-nazi-heydrich-finally-honoured-with-prague-statue, accessed on 7 July 2011.

NOTES

TO PAGES

86 –89

203

218. Ibid. 219. Gray: ‘Moral Advantage’, p. 363.

Chapter 4 Case Study of the Kidnap of Major General Kreipe in Crete 1. Antony Beevor: Crete: The Battle and the Resistance (London: John Murray, 1991), p. 54. Max Hastings put the number of British troops sent to Greece at 56,000 men. See Max Hastings: All Hell Let Loose: The World at War 1939 –45 (London: Harper Press, 2011), p. 118. 2. Max Hastings, however, argued that even if the British did not squander personnel and material in Greece, it was doubtful if O’Connor could had sustained the fight all the way to Tripoli due to the overstretch of logistical support, attrition in British armour and troops, and the landing of Rommel’s Afrika Korps posed serious threats to O’Connor’s advance. See Hastings: All Hell Let Loose, p. 111. 3. These heavy arms (artillery) and equipment would had been useful in the future defence of Crete from the German airborne invasion. See ibid., p. 122. 4. George Psychoundakis: The Cretan Runner: His story of the German Occupation (London: John Murray, 1955), pp. 25 – 6. 5. Ibid., p. 28. 6. M.R.D. Foot: Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism, 1940– 1945 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1976), p. 182. 7. For example, Foot had described the operation had ended with the successful transportation of Major General Kreipe to Cairo by submarine; which was an error as Kreipe was transported out by a motor launch (boat). See ibid. 8. Beevor: Crete, p. 11. 9. Beevor: Crete, p. 66. See also Winston S. Churchill: The Second World War, Volume III: The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 238. 10. See Adam Hopkins: Crete: Its Past, Present and People (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), pp. 134– 9; and Winston S. Churchill: The Second World War, Volume III, The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 238. 11. Gavin Long: Australia in the War of 1939– 1945: Series 1 – Army, Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953), p. 214, http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/records/awmohww2/army/vol2/awmohww2army-vol2-ch10.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2011. 12. Ibid., p. 220. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., p. 197. 15. Beevor: Crete, p. 74. 16. F.W. Winterbotham: The Ultra Secret (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), p. 67.

204

NOTES

TO PAGES

89 –92

17. Matthew Cooper: The German Army, 1933– 1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1978), p. 368; and Paul Freyberg: Bernard Freyberg, VC: Soldier of Two Nations (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), pp. 330– 1. 18. Beevor: Crete, pp. 79 – 80. 19. Long: Australia, p. 219. 20. Beevor: Crete, pp. 78 – 9. 21. Ewan Mawdsley: World War II: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 291. 22. Long: Australia, p. 214. Antony Beevor gave a slightly different number of British Commonwealth and Greek troops totalling at 42,460. See Beevor: Crete, p. 346. 23. Long: Australia, p. 212. 24. Ibid. 25. Freyberg himself was involved in a one man Special Operation during the landings in Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. He swam ashore near Bulair and lit flares to deceive the Turks that a landing by British forces was in progress. His operation succeeded in distracting the Turks from the main landings on the southern tip of the Dardanelles Peninsula. See Freyberg: Bernard Freyberg, pp. 54 – 7. 26. Winterbotham: The Ultra Secret, pp. 67 – 8. 27. Beevor: Crete, pp. 108– 18. 28. Ibid., p. 127. 29. See Freyberg: Bernard Freyberg, pp. 300– 1. 30. Beevor: Crete, pp. 166– 71. The success of preventing the landing of German troops can be attributed to Ultra – the only successful utilisation of Ultra in this battle. The Royal Navy losses, however, were in vain. See Winterbotham: The Ultra Secret, p. 68. 31. Beevor: Crete, p. 348. 32. Ibid., pp. 193– 4. 33. Ibid., p. 207. 34. Hopkins: Crete, pp. 146 –7. 35. Antony Beevor called Laycock a coward for his action. Beevor, however, relied on Evelyn Waugh’s novel Officers and Gentlemen for his argument (Evelyn Waugh was Layforce’s intelligence officer). See Beevor: Crete, pp. 219– 21. More recently, Donat Gallagher, using archival records pieced together the most plausible events during the night and revealed that Laycock did not commit cowardice as reported by Beevor, but acted according to the events at hand during the last night of the evacuation where a state of confusion and panic had descended on the beach. See Donat Gallagher: ‘Misfire! Reassessing the Legacy of General Robert Laycock’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 153 No. 1 (February 2008), pp. 80 – 9. 36. Freyberg: Bernard Freyberg, p. 312. 37. Ibid., pp. 148– 9. 38. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 32.

NOTES TO PAGES 92 –95

205

39. Hopkins: Crete, p. 150. 40. Freyberg: Bernard Freyberg, p. 312; and Hopkins: Crete, p. 346. See also ‘Operation Mercury: The German Invasion of Crete, 20 May-1 June 1941’, Military History Encyclopaedia on the Web, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/ battles_crete.html#conc, accessed on 17 August 2011. 41. Beevor: Crete, p. 348. It was difficult to assess the actual number of Germans killed due to scattered war graves and the numbers who died at sea. An estimated number closer to 7,000 Germans killed was suggested in some reports. See Freyberg: Bernard Freyberg, p. 329. 42. Cooper: The German Army, p. 282 and p. 368. German airborne forces commander General Kurt Student had other airborne plans to capture Cyprus, Malta and ultimately the Suez Canal; all these plans were rejected by Hitler as he feared the high loss of men in Crete would reoccur. See Freyberg: Bernard Freyberg, pp. 330– 2. 43. The Cretans actually resisted the German invasion as soon as the Battle of Crete started. See Xan Fielding: Hide and Seek: The Story of a War-time Agent (London: Secker and Warburg, 1954), pp. 12 – 13; and Beevor: Crete, p. 116. 44. Freyberg: Bernard Freyberg, pp. 323– 7. 45. Hastings: All Hell Let Loose, p. 123. 46. Ibid., p. 124. 47. Beevor: Crete, pp. 236. 48. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 140. 49. Beevor: Crete, p. 237. 50. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 140. 51. For a review of Cretan history and resistance against foreign occupation see Hopkins: Crete, pp. 117 –61. 52. Ibid., p. 135. 53. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 27. 54. Nigel West: The Secret War: the Story of SOE, Britain’s Wartime Sabotage Organisation (London: Coronet, 1992, hb. 1993), p. 205. 55. M.R.D. Foot: SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive, 1940– 1946, (London: Pimlico, 1st edn 1984, ppb. 1999), p. 335. 56. West: The Secret War, p. 205. 57. There were no effective stay-behind plans by SOE in Crete as most of the policy planners perceived that Crete would not fall. See Bickham SweetEscott: ‘S.O.E. in the Balkans’ in Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg (eds): British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece (London: Macmillan Press, 1975), p. 7. 58. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 31. 59. See Sweet-Escott: ‘S.O.E. in the Balkans’, p. 8; and West: The Secret War, p. 207. 60. West: The Secret War, p. 207. 61. Ibid., p. 207. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid., p. 208.

206

NOTES

TO PAGES

95 – 98

64. The National Archives, Kew Gardens (TNA), HS 9/507/4: ‘Personnel File of Major Patrick Michael Leigh-Fermor’. 65. Ibid. 66. David H. Close (ed.): The Greek Civil War, 1943– 1950: Studies of Polarization (London: Routledge, 1993), p. xii. For a concise description of the origins of EAM/ELAS, see Edgar O’Balance: The Greek Civil War, 1944– 1949 (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 49 – 51. 67. Close (ed.): The Greek Civil War, p. xii. 68. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, pp. 130–1. 69. Ibid., p. 132. 70. West: The Secret War, pp. 209– 10. 71. Fielding: Hide and Seek, p. 165; and Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 49. 72. Beevor: Crete, p. 261. 73. John Lodwick: Raiders from the Sea: The Story of the Special Boat Service in WWII (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1st edn 1947, hb. 1990), p. 34. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid., pp. 261– 2. 77. Gordon Stevens: The Originals: The secret history of the birth of the SAS in their own words (London: Ebury Press, 1st edn 2005, ppb. 2006), p. 337. David Stirling, the founder of SAS praised highly Berge´’s role in the formation of the French SAS regiments, which were also highly effective. See ibid., p. 335. 78. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 140. 79. Beevor: Crete, p. 284. Operation Husky also involved one of the most successful deception operation conducted in World War II. In order to ensure the landing in Sicily would succeed, an operation was launched to deceive the Germans into believing that the main Allied thrust into Europe would be through Crete and Greece rather than through Sicily and Italy. One of the most famous deception operations in this campaign was Operation Mincemeat, the use of a dead body disguised as a downed and drowned Royal Marine officer carrying a bag of fake documents hinting that the Allied thrust would be in Greece. Operation Mincemeat miraculously succeeded. For detailed accounts see Ben Macintyre: Operation Mincemeat: The True Spy Story that Changed the Course of World War II (London: Bloomsbury, 2010); and Ewen Edward Samuel Montagu: The Man Who Never Was (London: Evans, 1953). 80. Beevor: Crete, p. 285. 81. Lodwick: Raiders, p. 63. 82. Beevor: Crete, p. 285. 83. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, pp. 140–1. 84. Richard Lamb: War in Italy, 1943– 1945: A Brutal Story (London: Da Capo Press, 1993), pp. 11 – 12; and Rex Trye: Mussolini’s Soldiers (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1995), p. 153. 85. Lamb: War in Italy, p. 12; and Trye: Mussolini’s, p. 153.

NOTES 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

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Lamb: War in Italy, p. 16; and Trye: Mussolini’s, p. 153. Lamb: War in Italy, p. 23. Ibid., p. 21. Lamb: War in Italy, p. 21; and Trye: Mussolini’s, pp. 154– 5. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 66. Ibid., p. 67. Ibid., p. 65. TNA, HS 5/728: ‘Report No. 6 by D/GR/10: The Italian Armistice and After’, p. 2. Beevor: Crete, p. 287. Mawdsley: World War II, p. 306. See also Keith Eubank: Summit at Teheran (New York: William Morrow, 1985), p. 62. TNA, HS 5/728: ‘Appreciation of the Political and Military Situation in Crete after the Capitulation of Italy’, p. 1. Ibid. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 3. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 68. Leigh Fermor was helping Carta into the motor launch. He was supposed to move back to the shore once Carta was safely onboard. The sea conditions, however, changed and Leigh Fermor could not disembark from the motor launch and as a result, sailed back to Egypt as well. Ibid, p. 68. Ibid., p. 67 – 8 and p. 141. Ibid., p. 83. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 68; and Beevor: Crete, pp. 291– 2. Patrick Leigh Fermor: Words of Mercury, ed. Artemis Cooper (London: John Murray, 2003), p. 86. Leigh Fermor: Words, p. 87. ‘Generalmajor Karl Heinrich Georg Ferdinand Kreipe’, Island Farm: Prisoner of War Camp, http://www.specialcamp11.fsnet.co.uk/Generalmajor%20Heinrich %20Kreipe.htm, accessed on 20 July 2011. Beevor: Crete, p. 303. ‘Generalmajor Kreipe’, Island Farm. Iain Moncreiffe: ‘Prologue’, in William Stanley Moss: Ill Met by Moonlight (London: George G. Harrap, 1950), pp. 14 – 16. Moss: Ill Met, p. 38. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 54. Beevor: Crete, p. 304. Ibid. TNA, HS 5/418: “Short Report on Capture of General Kreipe”, p. 1; and Moss: Ill Met, p. 64.

208 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159.

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Moss: Ill Met, pp. 78 – 9. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 64. Ibid., p. 65. Ibid. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 68; and Beevor: Crete, pp. 291– 2. Moss: Ill Met, p. 65. TNA, HS 5/418: ‘Short Report on Capture of General Kreipe’, p. 1. Moss: Ill Met, p. 81. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 81 – 2. Moss: Ill Met, pp. 83 – 5 and p. 89. Moss: Ill Met, pp. 85 – 6. TNA, HS 5/671: ‘Report on capture of General Kreipe’. Ibid. 5/418: ‘Short Report on Capture of General Kreipe’, p. 2. Moss: Ill Met, pp. 79 – 80. Ibid., p. 95. TNA, HS 5/418: ‘Short Report on Capture of General Kreipe’, p. 2; and Moss: Ill Met, p. 96. Moss: Ill Met, p. 95. Ibid., p. 96. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 97. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 85. TNA, HS 5/418: ‘Short Report on Capture of General Kreipe’, p. 2; Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 85; and Moss: Ill Met, p. 98. Moss: Ill Met, p. 102. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 85. TNA, HS 5/418: ‘Letter to the German Authorities in Crete’. Moss: Ill Met, p. 112. TNA, HS 5/418: ‘Letter to the German Authorities in Crete’. Moss: Ill Met, p. 102. Ibid., p. 118. Ibid., p. 119. TNA, HS 5/418: ‘Short Report on Capture of General Kreipe’, pp. 4 – 5. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid. Ibid., p. 4. Moss: Ill Met, p. 117. Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., p. 118. Ibid., p. 118; and Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 86. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 86.

NOTES 160. 161. 162. 163. 164.

165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172.

173.

174. 175. 176. 177.

TO PAGES

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Moss: Ill Met, p. 111. Ibid., pp. 111– 12. Ibid., p. 167. See TNA, HS 5/677: ‘Political and military liaison missions: MOONSTRUCK’; and Moss: Ill Met, pp. 146 and 176. William J. M. Mackenzie had stated that this operation was an ‘. . . admirably executed coup . . .’. See William James Millar Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940– 1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000), p. 483. Moss: Ill Met, p. 137. Beevor: Crete, pp. 310– 11. Ibid., p. 137. See Psychoundakis: The Cretan Runner, pp. 212– 13. Beevor: Crete, pp. 310–11, and 318; see also Psychoundakis: The Cretan Runner, p. 213. TNA, HS 5/418: ‘Short Report on Capture of General Kreipe’, p. 3. TNA, HS 5/671: ‘The General Who Was Taken For A Ride: British capture of a German Panzer Commander in Crete, by Major John North’, p. 6. In Section II, Article 23 of the Laws of War specifies that it is prohibited ‘To make improper use of a flag of truce, the national flag, or military ensigns and the enemy’s uniform, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.’ ‘Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II); July 29, 1899’, The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ hague02.asp, accessed on 29 June 2011. Even SOE officers conducted such atrocities towards German prisoners-ofwar. Vasili, the nickname of a New Zealand military officer, Dudley Churchill Perkins, had arrived in Crete and fought in the Battle of Crete. He was captured by the Germans but escaped and evacuated to Egypt with the help of the Cretan resistance. Perkins joined the SOE and was sent back to Crete where he successfully led a group of Cretan resistance fighters. He killed some German prisoners by having their hands tied behind their backs and then thrown down a deep cavern. Some of these Germans survived the fall but were badly injured. Vasili was lowered down to finish them off with his bayonet. See Murray Elliott: Vasili: The Lion of Crete (London: Century Hutchinson, 1987), pp. 126 – 7. Moss: Ill Met, p. 180; and TNA, HS 5/671: ‘The General Who Was Taken For A Ride’, p. 6. ‘Generalmajor Kreipe’, Island Farm. Stuart D. Stein: ‘Some noteworthy war criminals’, Web Genocide Documentation Centre, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/warcrimgenrls.htm, accessed on 5 December 2011. TNA, WO 373/46: ‘Recommendation for award of Military Cross to Captain Ivan Stanley Moss; and recommendation for award of Distinguished Service Order to Major Patrick Michael Leigh-Fermor.’

210 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188.

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Ibid. Manoussos Manoussakis, cited in Beevor: Crete, p. 311. Leigh Fermor: Words, p. 90. Kokonas: The Cretan Resistance, p. 89. Beevor: Crete, p. 311. See Foot: SOE, p. 336. Imperial War Museum (IWM), Cat. No. 15680 06/16/2: Private papers of D J Ciclitira 06/16/2: Newspaper cutting, ‘The Island of Doom’, Union Jack, No. 121, 1 June 1945, p. 2. Mackenzie: The Secret History of SOE, p. 483. See David H. Close: “Introduction”, in Close (ed.), The Greek Civil War, p. 5. See O’Balance: The Greek Civil War, p. 60. Leigh Fermor: Words, p. 91.

Chapter 5 The ‘Yamamoto Mission’ 1. See Ronald H. Spector: Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1984, ppb. 2001), p. 229; and Dan van der Vat: The Pacific Campaign: World War II: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941– 1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 261–2. 2. For technical details and development of each of these aircraft see Osamu Tagaya: Mitsubishi Type I Rikko ‘Betty’ Units of World War 2 (Oxford: Osprey, 2001); Akira Yoshimura: Zero Fighter, trans. Retsu Kaiho and Michael Greyson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); and John Stanaway: P-38 Lightning: Aces of the Pacific and CBI (London: Osprey, 1997). 3. R. Cargill Hall, ‘The Yamamoto Mission: A Retrospective’, in R. Cargill Hall (ed.): Lightning over Bougainville (London: Smithsonian Institution, 1991), pp. 22 – 4. 4. Ugaki provided an eyewitness account of the incident. He believed that the attack was due to a chance meeting and bad luck on the Japanese side. See Matome Ugaki: Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941 – 1945, trans. Masataka Chihaya, Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp. 350 – 60. 5. There was no official name for the operation that killed Yamamoto due to the secrecy of the operation at that time. It was famously and popularly known as the ‘Yamamoto Mission’. 6. There exists a myriad of Special Operations units within the US military during World War II. This operation that killed Yamamoto, however, were not conducted by a Special Operations unit but the operation itself can be defined as a Special Operation. This footnote serves to give a concise description of US Special Operations evolution and capabilities until the end of World War II. Although the US military today is one of the largest employers of Special Operations units (almost 57,000 men and women), most

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of these units can trace their roots to World War II, when the ‘boom’ in Special Operations occurred. The evolution of US Special Operations Forces (US SOF), however, can be traced further back to the earliest Rangers formed in 1750. The first Rangers were formed by John Goreham to wage an antiguerrilla war for the British against American Indian and French forces. They predated the more famous Rogers Rangers, formed by Robert Rogers, by six years. Rogers formed a battalion of woodsmen to ‘range’ through the wilderness to intercept the French and Indian forces. Rogers is considered a seminal figure in US SOF history. He was the first to codify principles of special operations warfare with his 19-point list of ‘Standing Orders’. His Standing Orders is still being used today by US SOF. In World War II, the US military started to form commando style units like the British commandos. The name Rangers was revived to differentiate between American and British commandos. The 1st Ranger battalion was formed in June 1942 and was trained by British commandoes in Scotland. Eventually, six Ranger battalions were formed and since responsibility for selection fell upon Colonel William Darby, the formation was nicknamed ‘Darby’s Rangers’. The 1st and 3rd battalions saw action in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, where they were almost wiped out in the Anzio landings. The 2nd and 5th battalions saw action during the D-Day landings at Normandy. The 2nd battalion distinguished itself by scaling the cliffs at Pont du Hoc amid heavy German fire and grenade attacks to disable a battery of heavy artillery believed to be there, threatening the Omaha beach landings. The 5th battalion landed with the US Army at Omaha beach and subsequently Brigadier-General Cota urged the Rangers to move forward and lead the attack to breach the German beach defences, leading to the famous war cry used as the current Rangers’ motto, ‘Rangers lead the way!’ The 6th battalion saw action in the Pacific and was successful in a prisoner-of-war (POW) rescue operation in the Philippines, in which more than 500 American POWs were rescued, known famously as the Raid at Cabanatuan. The Rangers were hastily disbanded after the end of World War II. No Ranger force existed (although some Ranger ‘companies’ were deployed by some regiments during the Korean War) until the US Army, eager to start afresh after the disappointment of the Vietnam War, began recruiting two battalions of Rangers in 1974. David W. Hogan, Jr: U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington DC: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992), pp. 11–23. See also William O. Darby and William H. Baumer: Darby’s Rangers: We Led the Way (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1980); Samuel A. Southworth and Stephen Tanner: US Special Force: A Guide to America’s Special Operations Units (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002); Shelby L. Stanton: Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam (New York: Orion Books, 1992); and Robert W. Black: Rangers in Korea (New York: Ivy Books, 1989). One of the most famous units of US SOF is the US Army Special Forces, popularly known as the Green Berets. The Green Berets trace their short but eventful history back to World War II. During a visit to the United Kingdom,

212

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

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General George C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff, received a briefing from Lord Louis Mountbatten on the vital need for commandos and special operations. This led General Marshall to authorise the formation of a combined Canadian and American unit, the 1st Special Service Force (nicknamed the Devil’s Brigade), whose task would be raids and strikes. Eventually six battalions were formed and saw service in the Aleutians, North Africa, Italy and southern France where the force almost fought itself to death. The Special Service Force was disbanded quickly after World War II. Hogan, Jr: U.S. Army Special Operations), pp. 23 – 8. See also Robert H. Adleman and George Walton: The Devil’s Brigade (New York: Chilton, 1966). There were other Special Operations units created for different roles within the US military establishment during World War II such as the Alamo Scouts and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS mirrored the functions of the British SOE, and was the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA – which was founded in 1947). All of the US Special Operations units were disbanded after World War II. The concept of a specialised raiding force was revived with the formation of the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 20 June 1952. Other US Special Operations units raised were the US Navy SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) Teams, US Air Force Special Operations and US Marines’ Force Recon (not accepted into the Special Operations community until recently). The rise in terrorist attacks in the late 1970s moved the US Army Special Forces to create a dedicated counterterrorist unit – Operational Detachment Delta, popularly known as Delta Force, based on the British SAS model. See Aaron Bank: From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (New York: Pocket Books, 1st edn 1986, ppb. 1987); Southworth and Tanner: US Special Force; Roy Boehm and Charles W. Sasser: First SEAL (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1997); and Charlie A. Beckwith: Delta Force: The Army’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit (New York: Avon Books, 1st edn 1983, ppb. 2000). Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto: The man who planned Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p. 17. Ibid., pp. 36 – 7. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., pp. 41 – 5. Ibid., pp. 49 and 86 – 90. Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, pp. 4 –6. Hiroyuki Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, trans. John Bester (New York: Kodansha International Ltd, 1979), p. 32. Agawa’s biography does not provide any sound strategic analysis of Yamamoto’s naval leadership but has its value in understanding Yamamoto’s background. For a concise analysis of Yamamoto as a naval fleet admiral see H.P. Willmott, ‘Isoroku Yamamoto: Alibi of a Navy (1884 – 1943)’, Jack Sweetman (ed.): The Great Admirals: Command at Sea, 1587– 1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 443–57. For another concise but critical assessment of

NOTES

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

TO PAGES

116 –118

213

Yamamoto’s career see Roger Pineau: ‘Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’ in Michael Carver (ed.): The War Lords (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1st edn 1976, ppb. 2005), pp. 390– 403. For a concise but excellent description of the development of Japanese naval airpower see Williamson Murray: War in the Air, 1914– 1945 (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1999, hb. 2000), pp. 109– 13. Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, pp. 7–8. See also Hoyt: Yamamoto, pp. 64–8 and pp. 80–4. Hoyt: Yamamoto, pp. 90 – 1. Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, p. 156– 7. Ewan Mawdsley: World War II: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 5. Ibid., pp. 54 – 73. Willmott, ‘Isoroku Yamamoto’, p. 450. Contrary to popular belief, Yamamoto was not the author of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. See ibid., p. 81, note no. 10. For an assessment of Japanese planning for the impending campaigns in Asia-Pacific including the attack at Pearl Harbor see also David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie: KAIGUN: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887– 1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 471 –86 and pp. 488–517. Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, pp. 271–4. For a recent account of the Battle of Midway see Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully: Shattered Sword: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005). Mawdsley: World War II, p. 228. Spector: Eagle Against the Sun, p. 229; and Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, p. 344. van der Vat: The Pacific, p. 262. Spector: Eagle Against the Sun, p. 229. Operation ‘I’ had further depleted the scarce valuable experienced Japanese pilots. See Murray: War in the Air, p. 193. Spector: Eagle Against the Sun, p. 229. William Friedman was credited with breaking the Japanese military codes by using ‘Purple’ (codename for the deciphering machine similar to the British Enigma). The end product from Purple was called ‘Magic.’ See Ronald Lewin: The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982), pp. 17 and 36 – 7; and John Keegan: Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda (London: Pimlico, 1st edn 2003, ppb. 2004), pp. 222–4. Rebecca Grant: ‘Magic and Lightning’, Air Force Magazine, Vol. 89 No. 3 (March 2006), http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/ 2006/March%202006/0306yamamoto.aspx, accessed on 14 July 2011. See ‘Message in old cipher led to Adm. Yamamoto’s death: U.S. documents’, Breitbart, 27 September 2008, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id¼ D93EVMD80&show_article¼1, accessed on 5 December 2011.

214

NOTES

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118 –120

31. Ibid. 32. See Grant: ‘Magic and Lightning’. Colonel Roger Pineau, USN (ret.) gave a slightly different account of the interception of the Japanese codes. He referred only to the code intercepted on 14 April 1943. See Roger Pineau: ‘The Code Break’, in Hall (ed.): Lightning, pp. 40 – 6. 33. David Kahn: The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 597– 8. A copy of the original message is also included in another work on US intelligence. See Lewin: The American Magic, pp. 188 –9. 34. Grant: ‘Magic and Lightning’. See also E.B. Potter: Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 231; and W.J.Holmes: Double Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 136. 35. This was mentioned in Nimitz’s authoritative biography. See Potter: Nimitz, p. 233. 36. J. Bowyer Bell: Assassin: Theory and Practice of Political Violence (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1st edn 1979, ppb. 2005), pp. 91 – 2; and Pineau: ‘The Code Break’, p. 43. Edwin P. Hoyt stated that the decision to kill Yamamoto was a ‘revenge’ for Pearl Harbour, and the true intention of the killing of Yamamoto died along with President Roosevelt. See Hoyt: Yamamoto, p. 250. 37. See Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, p. 20; and van der Vat: The Pacific, p. 262. 38. See US Air Force Historical Research Agency (USAFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: IRIS 01095140, K239.0512– 1863 C.1, Oral History Interview, ‘Transcript of Interview of Maj Gen John P. Condon, USMC (ret) by Cargill Hall’, pp. 6 – 7. Carroll Glines argued that these messages were ‘fictitious’. See also Carroll V. Glines: Attack on Yamamoto (New York: Orion, 1990), p. 9. 39. See Daniel L. Haulman: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, Air Power History, Summer 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3101/is_2_50/ai_n29007354/, accessed on 14 July 2011. 40. Potter: Nimitz, p. 233. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Yamamoto was held responsible for the ‘treacherous attack at Pearl Harbour’. See Naval Correspondent: ‘Yamamoto killed “In air combat”’, The Times (22 May 1943), p. 3. 44. Admiral Yamamoto actually wrote a letter in a sarcastic tone to a right wing Japanese leader, Ryoichi Sasakawa on 24 January 1941, months before the Pearl Harbor attack, questioning whether the Japanese had the capability to win a war against the United States and fight all the way to dictate terms in Washington, DC. See Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, pp. 25 –6. Admiral Halsey also stated that Yamamoto’s statement was taken at face value at that time. Yamamoto was ranked no. 3 in Halsey’s private list of public enemies;

NOTES

45. 46. 47. 48.

49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

TO PAGES

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215

Emperor Hirohito and General Tojo took the top positions in his private list. See William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III: Admiral Halsey’s Story (London: Whittlesey House, 1947), p. 155. See also Hoyt: Yamamoto, p. 250. The American press also reinforced Yamamoto’s statement to ‘. . . dictate peace with America at the White House . . .’ in the minds of the public. For example see ‘Yamamoto’, The Washington Post (22 May 1943), p. 6. The same newspaper article also referred Yamamoto as the ‘Nipponese fire-eater’. John W. Dower: War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 37. Ibid., p. 82. Ibid., p. 84. Kahn: The Codebreakers, pp. 598– 9. This disproved the argument that there was no adequate cover plan in place during the planning of the operation. For an example of such argument see F.W. Winterbotham: The Ultra Secret (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), p. 176. Kahn: The Codebreakers, p. 599. See also Walter Lord: Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 145– 6. Coastwatchers were members of the Coast Watch Association, also known as Section ‘C’ of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. Coastwatchers consisted mainly of Australian, New Zealand and Pacific locals. They aided the Allied war effort by gathering and providing intelligence about the Japanese in the Solomom Islands, and later in other Pacific islands. USAFHRA: IRIS 01095140, K239.0512– 1863 C.1,Oral History Interview, ‘Transcript’, p. 7 and p. 23. John W. Mitchell: ‘The Flight to Bougainville’, in Hall (ed.): Lightning, p. 70. John Stanaway: P-38 Lightning: Aces of the Pacific and CBI (London: Osprey, 1997), pp. 8 – 9. Ibid. 13th Fighter Command Detachment, APO 709: ‘Fighter Interception’, p. 3. Mitchell: ‘The Flight’, p. 70 and p. 72. Ibid. Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, p. 19. Ibid., p. 23. Roger A. Beaumont also asserted that this was a Special Operation. See Roger A. Beaumont: ‘Targeting Military Leaders: Another View’, in Hall (ed.): Lightning, p. 40. Mitchell: ‘The Flight’, p. 69. Kahn: The Codebreakers, p. 600. Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller (comp. ): ‘U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology, 1941– 1945’ (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1991). Haulman: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’. USAFHRA: IRIS 01095140, K239.0512 –1863 C.1, Oral History Interview, ‘Transcript’, pp. 12 –13.

216 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78.

79.

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122 –124

Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, p. 22. Ibid., pp. 20 and 23. Mitchell: ‘The Flight’, p. 71. Carter and Mueller (comp. ): ‘U.S. Army Air Forces’. 13th Fighter Command Detachment, APO 709: ‘Fighter Interception’, p. 2. Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, p. 22. Carter and Mueller (comp. ): ‘U.S. Army Air Forces’. Other sources mention that the flight took two and a half hours. See Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, p. 22. Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, p. 21. Had the US P-38 Lightnings ambushed Yamamoto over the island of Ballale, they may have missed Yamamoto’s flight. See Grant: ‘Magic and Lightning’. Mitchell: ‘The Flight’, p. 74. Ibid., p. 75. For a detailed description of the aerial action and the different contradictory observations by the pilots (including a surviving Japanese Zero pilot who had escorted Yamamoto’s flight) involved in the action on that day see R. Cargill Hall: ‘The Mission Panel’, in Hall (ed.): Lightning, pp. 76 – 102. See also USAFHRA: IRIS 1105929, 168.7285– 2, Rex T. Barber, ‘Yamamoto Mission Account and Statement’, pp. 2 – 4 and Appendix 1 – 2; and USAFHRA: IRIS 01095140, K239.0512 –1863 C.1, Oral History Interview, ‘Transcript of Interview of Maj Gen John P. Condon, USMC (ret) by Cargill Hall’, pp. 25 – 8. For full details of the aerial ambush from the Japanese perspective, see interview transcript with Hiroshi Hayasi. Hayasi was the Japanese pilot flying the ‘Betty’ carrying Admiral Ugaki. See USAFHRA: IRIS 01105635, K239.0512 – 1941 C.1, Oral History Interview, ‘Transcript of Interview of Hiroshi Hayashi by Jay Hines and translated by Hisashi Takahashi’. Both of them shared the kill initially; however, each of them later claimed full credit. The debate dragged on for years. See Richard H. Kohn: ‘A Note on the Yamamoto Aerial Victory Credit Controversy’, Air Power History, Spring 1992; Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, pp. 27 – 9; Blaine Taylor: ‘Daring intercept over open water! “Who shot down Yamamoto?” An Interview with Colonel Rex Barber’, http://ussslcca25.com/who-shot.htm, accessed on 13 December 2011; and Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr: ‘I Shot Down Yamamoto’, Reader’s Digest (December 1966), reprint, pp. 1 – 6. There are also a series of archived documents on the exchange of letters between Lanphier and Barber, critical of each other’s accounts. See USAFHRA: IRIS 1105929, 168.7285 – 2, Rex T. Barber, ‘Yamamoto Mission Account and Statement’; USAFHRA: IRIS 1105931, 168.7285 – 4, John W. Mitchell, ‘Letters from John W. Mitchell and Rex T. Barber to Thomas G. Lanphier and Replies from Lanphier’; and USAFHRA: IRIS 1105934, 168.7285– 7, John W. Mitchell, ‘Correspondence between Shingo Suzuki and myself, Rex T. Barber’. Even

NOTES

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

100. 101.

TO PAGES

124 –126

217

Caroll Glines argued in his book on the Yamamoto ambush that he believed Rex T. Barber is the pilot who shot down Yamamoto’s plane. See Glines: Attack, p. 210. The debate also formed a large part of Donald Davis’s book on the killing of Yamamoto. See Donald A. Davis: Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2005), pp. 267– 77 and 331– 65. Haulman: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’. Besby F. Homes: ‘The Engagement: Another View’, in Hall (ed.): Lightning, pp. 82, 100 and 102. Hall: ‘The Mission Panel’, p. 102. Ugaki: Fading Victory, p. 359; and van der Vat: The Pacific, p. 263. Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, p. 364. Donald Davis suggested that Yamamoto’s wounds could be caused by shrapnel. See Davis: Lightning Strike, pp. 299– 300. Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, p. 364. Hiroyuki Agawa, author of the leading biography of Yamamoto, stated that, hypothetically, one of the passengers on Yamamoto’s flight, Rear Admiral Takada, the fleet medical officer, could have survived the crash and dressed Yamamoto up in his presentable position before Takada himself died. See ibid., p. 360. See Davis: Lightning Strike, pp. 308–9. Potter: Nimitz, p. 234. Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, p. 391. Ibid. Haulman: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’. See also USAFHRA: IRIS 00144053, 216.1 – 2, Air Service Command, Weekly Informational Intelligence Summary No. 19-PT-M, ‘The strange death of Admiral Yamamoto’, p. 2. Edwin T. Layton: And I Was There (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1985), p. 475; and Samuel Eliot Morison: History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume VI: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942 – 1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962), pp. 128–9. Ibid., p. 264. Mawdsley: World War II, p. 205. For the Japanese point of view in support of this see Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, p. 389. Dean C. Allard: ‘The Academic Panel’, in Hall (ed.): Lightning, p. 61. Ibid., pp. 62 – 3. Halsey and Bryan III: Admiral Halsey’s, p. 157. See Edward T. Folliard, ‘Yamamoto Death Symbolizes dismal year for Japanese’, The Washington Post (23 May 1943), p. 17; and ‘Japan mourns death of “No. 1 enemy” of U.S.’, Chicago Daily Tribune (22 May 1943), p. 6. See also Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, p. 388. Ibid. Dan van der Vat gave a succinct argument that Admiral Yamamoto was certainly not a good commander strategically; he made many fatal mistakes

218

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

NOTES

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126 –131

which included the Pearl Harbor attack that led the US into the war, and the defeat in the Battle of Midway. Such blunders were actually more useful for the US, and Yamamoto may well have made more mistakes in the future that may actually have favoured the US. van der Vat, however, made a good point in exemplifying the intangible morale factor when he asserted that ‘. . . it is not the truth but what you believe that counts. . .’ See van der Vat: The Pacific, p. 264. Hall: ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, p. 26. Ibid. ‘The Mission Panel’, p. 102. Ibid. ‘The Yamamoto Mission’, p. 26. Anthony Cave Brown: ‘C’: The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill (New York: Collier Books, 1987), p. 469. Ibid. Ibid. The next chapter will discuss the failure of the British intelligence services, despite of the effectiveness of Ultra in pinpointing Rommel’s location, in the attempts to kill or capture Rommel. F.W. Winterbotham: The Ultra Secret (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), p. 176. The Japanese did have some initial suspicion that their secret codes may had been broken, but later dismissed this as impossible. See Pineau: “The Code Break”, pp. 44–5. Ugaki who survived the attack did not mention the possibility of the attack being a pre-planned operation and attributed it to pure luck and coincidence. See Ugaki: Fading Victory, pp. 359–60. C. Peter Chen: ‘The Death of Yamamoto’, The 456th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, http://www.456fis.org/OPERATION_VENGEANCE.htm, accessed on 13 December 2011. van der Vat: The Pacific, p. 265. See J.C. Wylie: Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 23– 9. Ibid., p. 25. The American public at that time continued to believe that Yamamoto was a credible threat. For example see Robert Bellaire: ‘Yamamoto held among the greatest of Jap leaders’, Los Angeles Times (22 May 1943), p. 3. Ibid., p. 27. The Japanese at that time still believed that Yamamoto would be able to turn the tide of the Pacific campaign against the US forces. See Hoyt: Yamamoto, p. 249. See Davis: Lightning Strike, pp. 310–11. Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral, pp. 391–2. Ibid., p. 392.

Chapter 6

Operation Flipper (and Operation Gaff)

1. J.R.M. Butler: History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series: Grand Strategy, Volume II, September 1939-June 1941 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957), pp. 374– 80

NOTES TO PAGES 131 –133

219

2. Erwin Rommel: The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart and trans. Paul Findlay (London: Collins, 1953), p. 98. 3. David Irving: The Trail of the Fox: The Life of Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 36. 4. Winston S. Churchill: The Second World War, Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate (London: Cassell, 1951), pp. 412– 24. 5. Winston S. Churchill: The Second World War, Volume III: The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950), pp. 308– 14. 6. See Philip Warner: Auchinleck: The Lonely Soldier (London: Sphere Books Ltd, 1st edn 1981, ppb. 1982), pp. 138– 9 and pp. 191– 3. 7. James Lucas: Panzer Army Africa (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1977), p. 43. 8. Ibid. 9. Operations to kill enemy leaders, however, were certainly not new to the British forces in spite of general beliefs that the British forces were too traditionalist in their doctrine and approach to warfare. It was reputed that in 1936, Captain Harry Fox-Davies of the Durham Light Infantry proposed to use selected troops trained in guerrilla warfare to destroy the commanders and headquarters staff behind the front lines of the enemy troops. See Michael Asher: Get Rommel: The Secret British Mission to Kill Hitler’s Greatest General (London: Orion Publishing Group, 2004), p. 84. Fox-Davies’s idea was approved by Wavell, at the time the chief of an experimental infantry unit, and when used in training exercises was successful. The more traditional military commanders decided to call off implementation of such innovative operations that did not conform to the traditional practice of military operations at that time. John W. Gordon: The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North Africa, 1940–1943 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 37–8. All these early experimental lessons were subsequently lost when the Durham Light Infantry reverted to its traditional role of light foot soldiers from its earlier role as a ‘hotbed’ of new innovative ideas and techniques. S.G.P. Ward: Faithful: The story of the Durham Light Infantry (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd, 1962), p. 453. 10. Butler: History of the Second World War: Volume II, pp. 175– 206. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., pp. 194–6; and A.D. Divine: Dunkirk (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1945). 13. See also Robert Jackson: Dunkirk: The British Evacuation, 1940 (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1976). 14. See Karl-Heinz Frieser: The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 campaign in the West, trans. John T. Greenwood (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005); Peter McCarthy and Mike Syron: Panzerkrieg: A History of the German Tank Division in World War II (London: Constable & Robinson Ltd, 2002, ppb. 2003), pp. 2 and 13; Jonathan M. House: Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), p. 56; and Mary R. Habeck: Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919– 1939 (Ithaca, N Y: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 206.

220

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133 –135

15. See Peter Fleming: Invasion 1940: An account of the German Preparations and the British Counter-measures (London: White Lion, 1957); and Kenneth Macksey: The German Invasion of England, July 1940 (London: Corgi, 1st edn 1980, ppb. 1981). 16. For Battle of Britain details, see Air Ministry: The Battle of Britain: An Air Ministry account of the great days from 8th August – 31st October 1940 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1989); John Ray: The Battle of Britain: Dowding and the First Victory, 1940 (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1994, ppb. 2002); Richard J. Overy: The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality (London: Penguin, 2000); Stephen Bungay: The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000); Williamson Murray:War in the Air, 1914– 45 (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1999, hb. 2000), pp. 121– 9; ibid.: Strategy for Defeat: The Lufftwaffe, 1933– 1945 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1983), pp. 39 – 56; Kenneth Macksey: Military Errors of World War Two (London: Cassell, 1987, ppb. 2002), pp. 41– 6; David Garnett: War in the Air: September 1939 to May 1941 (London: Cahtto & Windus, 1941), pp. 122– 53; and Jonathan Falconer: Life as a Battle of Britain Pilot (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2007). 17. See Jeremy Black: World War Two: A Military History (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 56 – 7. 18. Ibid. 19. Ewan Mawdsley: World War II: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 297. 20. Butler: History of the Second World War: Volume II, p. 320. 21. For a concise description of this phase of the North Africa campaign see Max Hastings: All Hell Let Loose: The World at War 1939– 45 (London: Harper Press, 2011), pp. 110–11. 22. Correlli Barnett: The Desert Generals (London: William Kimber, 1960), p. 33. 23. David Fraser: And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983), p. 124. 24. Barnett: The Desert Generals, p. 57. 25. Rommel: The Rommel Papers, p. 95. 26. See Hastings: All Hell Let Loose, p. 111. 27. Lucas: Panzer Army, p. 36. 28. Ibid., pp. 57 – 9; and Fraser: And We Shall Shock Them, p. 132– 3. 29. Butler: History of the Second World War: Volume II, p. 386– 7. 30. See Rommel: The Rommel Papers, pp. 100– 21. 31. Calculated from Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/, accessed on 24 May 2011. 32. Churchill: The Grand Alliance, pp. 182 and 192. 33. Butler: History of the Second World War: Volume II, pp. 525– 7. 34. Ibid., pp. 530– 532; and Warner: Auchinleck, pp. 97 –100. 35. Barnett: The Desert Generals, p. 84. 36. Ibid., p. 87.

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221

37. The evolution of US Special Operations has been dealt with in this book’s Chapter 5 (fn 6). For accounts of German Special Operations in World War II see Charles Foley: Commando Extraordinary: Otto Skorzeny (London: Cassell, 1954, ppb. 1999); and James Lucas: Komando: German Special Forces of World War Two (London: Cassell, 1985). 38. For recent historical research on the development of US and British Special Forces and commandos in World War II, see Andrew Lennox Hargreaves: ‘An analysis of the rise, use, evolution and value of Anglo-American commando and special forces formations, 1939– 1945’, unpublished PhD thesis (War Studies Department, King’s College London, London, 2008). 39. Adrian Weale: Secret Warfare: Special Operations Forces from the Great Game to the SAS (London: Coronet, 1st edn 1997, ppb 1998), p. 57. 40. For a personal account of a Boer Kommando see Deneys Reitz: Commando: A Boer Journal of the Boer War (London, The Folio Society, 1st edn 1929, hb. 1982). 41. Winston Churchill: My Early Life (London: Eland Publishing Limited, 1st edn 1930, ppb. 2002), p. 298. 42. Barry Hunt and Donald Schurman: ‘Prelude to Dieppe: Thoughts on combined operations policy in the “Raiding Period”, 1940– 1942’, in Gerald Jordan (ed.): Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900– 1945 (London: Crane Russack, 1977), pp. 187– 8. 43. See Chapters 3 and 4 of this book for concise background information about SOE. 44. Winston S. Churchill: The Second World War, Volume I: The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell, 1948), p. 218; and Dudley Clarke: Seven Assignments (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948), pp. 205– 8. 45. Ibid. The Second World War, Volume II: Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell, 1949), p. 217. 46. Hillary St. George Saunders: The Green Beret: The story of the Commandos, 1940– 1945 (London: Michael Joseph, 1949), pp. 36 – 7. 47. James Ladd: Commandos and Rangers of World War II (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1978), pp. 251– 62. 48. H.W. Wynter: Special Forces in the Desert War, 1940– 1943 (Richmond: The National Archives, 1st edn 2001, ppb. 2008), p. 239. 49. Saunders: The Green Beret, p. 64. See also The National Archives, Kew Gardens (TNA), DEFE 2/711B: Lecture by Brigadier R.E. Laycock, Section on ‘“Layforce”: Diary to Disbandment’. 50. Saunders: The Green Beret, pp. 65 – 7; Ladd: Commandos, pp. 114– 17; and TNA, DEFE 2/711B: ‘Layforce’. 51. Butler: History of the Second World War, Volume II, p. 510– 15. 52. TNA, DEFE 2/711B: ‘Layforce’; Saunders: The Green Beret, pp. 65–8; Ladd: Commandos, p. 118; Ralph Bennett: Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941– 1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1989), pp. 51–62; and Geoffrey Warner: Iraq and Syria, 1941 (London: Davis-Poynter, 1974), p. 136. See also Anthony Beevor: Crete: The Battle and the Resistance (London: John Murray, 1991).

222

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138 –141

53. Butler: History of the Second World War, Volume II, pp. 516– 23; Saunders: The Green Beret, pp. 70 –1; TNA, DEFE 2/711B: ‘Layforce’; and Bennett: Ultra, pp. 64 – 5; and Warner: Iraq and Syria, p. 122– 58. 54. For another account of the Litani River operation, see Hamish Ross: Paddy Mayne: Lt Col Blair ‘Paddy’ Mayne, 1 SAS Regiment (Stroud: The History Press, 1st edn 2003, ppb 2008), pp. 34– 53. 55. Elizabeth Keyes: Geoffrey Keyes of the Rommel Raid (London: George Newnes Ltd, 1956), p. 195. 56. Imperial War Museum (IWM), 05/73/1: Papers of Colonel Sir Thomas Macpherson, Papers Relating to the ‘Rommel Raid’, 1941 – 1999, Introduction in Hans Edelmaier: The Rommel Raid, p. 2. 57. Asher: Get Rommel, p. 82. 58. G(R), SOE was formerly designated as Military Intelligence Research or MI (R), which was responsible for irregular warfare. After merging under the Special Operations Executive (SOE), it was redesignated simply as G(R). 59. Asher: Get Rommel, p. 83. 60. For an assertion on Cunningham’s lack of experience in armoured warfare see Barnett: The Desert Generals, p. 81. 61. TNA, DEF 2/711B: ‘Attack on General Rommel’s HQ (Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes V.C.)’, p. 18. 62. IWM, 05/73/1: ‘Reconnoitring the Rommel Raid’, p. 2. 63. Hastings: All Hell Let Loose, p. 130. 64. Churchill: The Grand Alliance, pp. 182 and 192; Rommel: The Rommel Papers, pp. 104 and 118; Asher: Get Rommel, p. 84; and Barnett: The Desert Generals, p. 63. 65. Churchill: The Grand Alliance, p. 498. 66. David Young: Rommel (London: Collins, 1950), p. 23. David Young was a Brigadier-General attached to the 10th Indian Infantry Brigade in the North African campaign. He had read first hand this order but after the war could not find an original copy of this famous order. He managed to get hold of a German translated copy from Rommel’s family. 67. TNA, WO 214/19: ‘General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery: Account of Operations, Egypt and Libya. 23 October 1942 – 23 January 1943, Personal Message’, File No. 3 – 1. 68. Max Hastings asserted that Churchill’s dogged effort to win a major campaign in North Africa had instead led to numerous humiliating battlefield defeats of British forces inflicted by Rommel leading to further demoralisation of the British people. See Hastings: All Hell Let Loose, p. 138. 69. Asher: Get Rommel, p. 275. 70. See Roger Keyes: The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939–1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 226. 71. Lord Roger Keyes letter to Lord Hastings Ismay in Keyes: The Keyes Papers, p. 229. 72. Ibid.

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223

73. Asher: Get Rommel, p. 81. 74. IWM, 05/73/1: ‘Letter from Lieutenant Colonel G.C.T. Keyes M.C., The Scottish Commando, Middle East Force, dated 13 November 1941’. 75. Wolf Heckmann: Rommel’s War in Africa (London: Granada, 1981), p. 163; and Asher: Get Rommel, pp. 105 and 114. Captain Haselden was awarded a Military Cross for his successful reconnaissance action. See World War 2 Awards.com: ‘HASELDEN, John Edward “Jock”’, http://www.ww2awards.com/person/ 45647, accessed on 16 March 2012. 76. Alan Hoe: David Stirling: The Authorised Biography of the Creator of the SAS (London: Warner, 1st edn 1992, ppb. 1999), pp. 92 – 107; and Wynter: Special Forces, pp. 308– 10. 77. John Lewes: Jock Lewes: Co-founder of the SAS (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1st edn 2000, ppb. 2001), p. 223. 78. Heckmann: Rommel’s War, p. 163. 79. Asher: Get Rommel, p. 123. 80. Tommy Macpherson and Richard Bath: Behind Enemy Lines: The Autobiography of Britain’s Most Decorated Living War Hero (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2010), pp. 67 – 71. 81. Ibid.; Asher: Get Rommel, p. 130; and Keyes: Keyes, pp. 201– 2. 82. F.H. Hinsley: British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1st edn 1993, hb. 1994), p. 188. 83. Chesuen-El-Chelb is also known as Khashm al-Kalb; for this research Chesuen-El-Chelb will be used as this was the name reported in the archival materials. 84. Tommy Macpherson also remarked that when he heard the news of the failure of the raid while he was in a prisoner-of-war (POW) camp, he knew that the operation would be difficult due to the risky evacuation by submarine as he and his party had experienced. Macpherson’s remarks, however, were of moot point as he was interned in a POW camp during the operation and had no way of reporting the difficulties the impending operation may face. See Macpherson and Bath: Behind Enemy Lines, p. 74. 85. TNA, WO 373/ 19: ‘Recommendation of V.C.: Lieutenant Colonel G.C.T. Keyes, M.C.’ 86. TNA, WO 201/ 720:, ‘Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report on Operation Flipper, 17/18 Nov 1941’, Appendix ‘A’. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 90. In Michael Asher’s Get Rommel, Laycock is potrayed as joining this operation for personal glory. See ibid., p. 275. Much of the criticism against Laycock by some historians,especially his conduct in Crete as commander of Layforce, was proven wrong by empirical evidence. See Donat Gallagher: ‘Misfire! Reassessing the Legacy of General Robert Laycock’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 153 No. 1 (2008), pp. 80 – 9.

224

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144 –146

91. TNA, WO201/ 720: ‘Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report on Operation Flipper, 17/18 Nov 1941’, p. 3. 92. Ibid., p. 2. See also IWM, 05/73/1: ‘Extract from the Official Report of Commander A. Miers V.C. D.S.O. R.N. of H.M.S. Torbay’. Haselden had earlier been ferried in by the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) and dropped near Gebel, from where he walked to the landing beach with two Arab guides. See Julian Thompson: The Imperial War Museum Book of War Behind Enemy Lines (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s. 1st edn 1998, ppb. 2001), p. 52. Haselden was awarded a second Military Cross for his action during this phase of Operation Flipper. See World War 2 Awards.com: ‘HASELDEN’. 93. TNA, WO201/ 720: ‘Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report’, p. 4. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid. 96. Ibid., p. 5. 97. Ibid., p. 6. 98. Ibid. 99. Asher: Get Rommel, p. 226. 100. He had forgotten that he had instructed his men to shoot anyone coming out the back door. See Keyes: Keyes, p. 235. 101. TNA, WO201/ 720: “Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report”, p. 6. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid., p. 7; and Keyes: Keyes, pp. 248– 50. 105. Keyes: Keyes, p. 247; TNA, WO201/ 720: ‘Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report’, p. 9; and Asher: Get Rommel, pp. 253– 5. 106. TNA, WO201/ 720: ‘Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report’, pp. 9 – 10; and Keyes: Keyes, pp. 249 –55. 107. Keyes: Keyes, pp. 249– 55. 108. Ibid., p. 254; and TNA, WO201/ 720: ‘Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report’, ‘Cover letter’. There was a third man involved in the operation’s beach recce and evacuation from the Special Boat Service (SBS), John Brittlebank, who also walked back into British lines one day earlier than Laycock and Terry. See Asher: Get Rommel, pp. 272–3. 109. TNA, WO 373/ 18: ‘Sergeant J. Terry’s Recommendation for D.C.M. award’, 11 January 1942. 110. Rommel: Rommel Papers, p. 156; see also John Connell: Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (London: Cassell, 1959), p. 337. 111. Ernst Schilling: ‘Letter to Vice Admiral, Naval Barracks, Minden, Westfalian’, in Appendix in Keyes: Keyes, p. 267. 112. Ibid. 113. In fact Rommel’s HQ was located in a road-house in Gazala. See David Irving: The Trail of the Fox: The Life of Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 108.

NOTES TO PAGES 146 –150

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114. Schilling: ‘Letter’, p. 267. See also TNA, WO 373/19: ‘Lieutenant Colonel G.C.T. Keyes Recommendation for V.C. award’, circa. January 1942. 115. Young: Rommel, p. 103. 116. Asher: Get Rommel, p. 80; Young: Rommel, p. 103; and Irving: The Trail of the Fox, p. 105. 117. Irving: The Trail of the Fox, p. 117. 118. Ibid. 119. For example see Asher: Get Rommel, p. 275. 120. TNA, HW 1/86, Government Code and Cipher School: ‘Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, messages and correspondence: General Rommel in Italy, Nov 1’, CX/MSS/396/T15. For a concise historical description of the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) see Michael Smith: The Spying Game: The secret history of British espionage (London: Politico’s, 1st edn 1996, ppb. 2004), pp. 257– 70. 121. TNA, HW 1/219, Government Code and Cipher School: ‘Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, messages and correspondence: General Rommel in Rome, Nov 13’, CX/MSS/438/T21. 122. TNA, HW 1/220, Government Code and Cipher School: ‘Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, messages and correspondence: General Rommel to return to Africa from Greece, Nov 18’, CX/MSS/441/T6; and Hinsley: British Intelligence, p. 188. 123. See Bennett: Ultra, pp. 101– 3. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid., p. 104. 126. House: Combined Arms, p. 155. 127. TNA, WO201/ 720: ‘Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report’, p. 3. 128. Ibid. 129. Ibid. 130. TNA, WO201/ 720: ‘Lt.-Col. Laycock’s Report’, Appendix ‘A’. 131. IWM, 05/73/1: Introduction in Edelmaier: The Rommel Raid, p. 4. 132. Ibid. 133. See Churchill: The Second World War, Volume IV, p. 789. 134. For Lt.-Col. Roger Keyes’s citation notes see TNA, WO 373/19: ‘Recommendation for award of Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes’. 135. TNA, WO 373/18: ‘Sgt. J. Terry: Recommendation for D.C.M. award’, 11 January 1942. 136. See Hoe: David Stirling, pp. 92 – 104; Ross: Paddy Mayne, p. 61 – 7; and Thompson: War Behind, p. 55. 137. Lewes: Jock Lewes, p. 230. 138. For a historical review of Operation Crusader see J.M.A. Gwyer: Grand Strategy, Volume III, June 1941– August 1942 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1964). See also J.A.I Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner (eds): The Sidi Rezeg Battles, 1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

226

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150 –155

139. Hinsley: British Intelligence, pp. 188– 9. 140. S.O. Playfair, F.C. Flynn, C.J.C. Molony and T.P. Gleave: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume III (September 1941 to September 1942): British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960), p. 39. 141. Ibid., p. 33; and Rommel: Rommel Papers, p. 179. 142. Rommel: Rommel Papers, pp. 180–3. 143. Ibid., p. 183. 144. Rommel initially landed in North Africa with two divisions (5th (later 21st Panzer) Light Division and 15th Panzer Division), renamed as German Afrika Korps on 19 February 1941. On 15 August 1941, it was reorganised as Panzer Group Africa which consisted of the 15th and 21st Panzer Division, and the 90th Light Division. There was some further reorganisation after Operation Crusader. See Lucas: Panzer Army, pp. 195– 6. 145. Keyes: Keyes, p. 256. 146. IWM, 05/73/1: ‘Rommel’s H.Q. Raided’, newspaper cutting from The Times, 31 December 1941. 147. IWM, 05/73/1: Copy of Gerald Rawling: ‘The Raid to kill Rommel’, p. 75. 148. By the end of January 1944, Rommel was made the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armies in the Netherlands stretching to the Loire in France. See Young: Rommel, pp. 191 and 194. 149. Rommel: Rommel Papers, p. 460; and Young: Rommel, pp. 189– 200. 150. Rommel: Rommel Papers, p. 470. 151. Ibid., p. 466. 152. Ibid., p. 468. 153. Young: Rommel, p. 203. 154. TNA, WO 218/191: ‘Reports on operations Normandy to Paris: Operations Titanic, Haft, Defoe, Gaff, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Dunhill, Bunyan, Trueform’, ‘Report on Operation GAFF’. 155. TNA, WO 218/191: ‘Appendix A: HQ Army Group “B”’. 156. Ibid. 157. TNA, WO 218/191: ‘Report on Operation Gaff by Capt S.W. Lee’, p. 1. 158. Ibid., p. 2. 159. Ibid., p. 1. 160. ‘Rommel Under Attack: Charley’s Story’, http://www.lancerusswurm.com/ rommel.htm, accessed on 7 December 2011. 161. Young: Rommel, p. 210– 11. 162. Ibid., p. 212. 163. The Telegraph: ‘Flight Lieutenant Charley Fox’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/obituaries/3381986/Flight-Lieutenant-Charley-Fox.html, accessed on 7 December 2011. 164. Ibid. 165. ‘Rommel Under Attack’, http://www.lancerusswurm.com/rommel.htm, accessed on 7 December 2011. 166. TNA, WO 218/191: ‘Appendix A: HQ Army Group “B”’.

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167. Ibid. 218/191: ‘SAS Brigade Operation Instruction No. 32; Operation GAFF – OC 2 SAS Regt’. 168. Ibid. 218/191: ‘Report by Capt RAYMOND LEE’. 169. Ibid. 218/191: ‘Report on Operation GAFF by Capt. S.W.Lee’, p. 1. 170. Ibid. 171. Ibid. 172. There are no archival reports or records on the reasons why Operation Gaff was still carried out if the United States and British knew they had shot Rommel by airplanes. The Germans had also reported in their press that Rommel had been shot by a Spitfire. See ‘Rommel Under Attack’, http://www.lancerusswurm.com/ rommel.htm, accessed on 7 December 2011; and The Telegraph: ‘Flight Lieutenant Charley Fox’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/3381986/ Flight-Lieutenant-Charley-Fox.html, accessed on 7 December 2011. 173. Young: Rommel, pp. 235 and 236– 7. 174. Otto Skorzeny: Skorzeny’s Special Missions: The Memoirs of ‘The Most Dangerous Man in Europe’ (London: Greenhill Books, 1st edn 1957, hb. 1997), p. 109. 175. Keyes’s action was forever etched in the legendary memories of the commandos. See The Western Daily Press: ‘Farewell to the Commandos: Men who became a Military Legend’, Vol. 175 No. 28,986, 26 October 1945, p. 1. 176. IWM, 05/73/1: Introduction in Edelmaier: The Rommel Raid, p. 5. 177. Ibid.

Chapter 7 Conclusion 1. Richard Overy: Why the Allies won (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), p. 15. 2. The case studies also demonstrated that even with predicted possible ends and a correct matching of means to achieve the ends, the influence of the meddlesome trio of luck, chance and uncertainty bred unsuspecting results. There is no foolproof way to determine the expected outcome of leadership decapitation due to the eternal character of uncertainty and luck that have a continued and unexpected influence at all levels of war. Clausewitz’s dictum reverberates on the eternal character of strategy; ‘No other human activity [war] is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war.’ See Carl von Clausewitz: On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 85. 3. For an excellent concise narrative on why the Japanese decided to go to war see Ewan Mawdsley: World War II: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 190– 8. See also Max Hastings: All Hell Let Loose: The World at War 1939– 45 (London: Harper Press, 2011), pp. 194– 5. 4. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto: The man who planned Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p. 107. 5. Hiroyuki Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, trans. John Bester (New York: Kodansha International Ltd, 1979), p. 292.

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6. Interestingly, the Germans were able to continue sustained combat operations under the effective leadership of other German military commanders. The Germans’ subsequent defeats were due to other major factors such as the loss of, firstly, air superiority and, secondly, major attrition of manpower and material in the Eastern Front in the fight against the gigantic Soviet armies. The Germans’ woes were further aided by the ineffective leadership of Hitler during the last phases of the war. 7. The US attempt to rescue prisoners-of-war (POWs) held in a North Vietnamese prison camp in Son Tay during the Vietnam War in 1970 resembled a similar situation. Although the rescue failed to bring home any US POWs, the operation yielded favourable consequences for the United States. More importantly, it boosted the morale of some of the POWs who had been held captive under horrendous conditions for years – they knew they had not been forgotten. See Benjamin F. Schemmer: The Raid (London: Book Club Associates, 1976), pp. 283 and 293. 8. There were reasons why it was not conducted. Among those reasons were the difficulties infiltrating Germany without local support. The SOE had a section known as Section X to study the possibilities of killing Hitler. The most famous operation that almost kicked off was Operation Foxley. See Mark Seaman: ‘The Foxley Report: Secret Operations in World War Two’, BBC History, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/foxley_report_01. shtml#two, accessed on 16 December 2011. See also Mark Seaman and Ian Kershaw: Operation Foxley: The British Plan to Kill Hitler (Richmond: PRO, 1998); and Denis Rigden: Kill the Fu¨hrer: Section X and Operation Foxley (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999). 9. The Germans initially under the legendary and capable special operations officer Otto Skorzeny had allegedly planned, and nearly conducted, an audacious leadership decapitation operation that if it had succeeded, would have serious implications on the course of World War II – Operation Long Jump to kill or capture US President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin during the Teheran Conference in 1943. For details of this operation see Laslo Havas: Hitler’s Plot to Kill the Big Three (New York: Bantam, 1971); ‘How “The Lion And The Bear” Were Saved’, Russia Beyond The Headlines, http://rbth.ru/articles/2007/11/29/lion_and_bear.html, accessed on 29 November 2007; and Yury Plutenko: ‘Tehran-43: Wrecking the plan to kill Stalin, Roosevelt and Chruchill’, Ria Novosti, http://en.rian.ru/ analysis/20071016/84122320.html, accessed on 9 November 2011. Operation Long Jump, however, had been argued as a Soviet propaganda operation to claim credit for the competence of Soviet intelligence services in pre-empting Operation Long Jump. The Soviet’s claim was also to force US President Roosevelt to move in and stay at the Russian embassy as a security measure, in order to bug Roosevelt’s confidential conversations. See Keith Eubank: Summit at Teheran (New York: William Morrow: 1985), pp. 188– 97; and Winston S. Churchill: The Second World War, Volume V: Closing the Ring (London: Cassell,

NOTES

10. 11. 12. 13.

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229

1952), p. 303. Skorzeny was also involved in a leadership decapitation operation in Hungary. Hungary, under the Regent Admiral Miklo´s Horthy, towards the end of 1944 decided to approach the Allied powers to negotiate a peace agreement. See Nicholas Horthy: Memoirs (London: Hutchinson, 1956), pp. 227– 8. This was found out by the German intelligence and Hitler was worried that, if this happened, Hungary would be lost and about 1 million German troops based in Hungary could be trapped and captured. See Charles Foley: Commando Extraordinary (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1954, ppb. 1987), p. 104. Nazi Germany’s southern flank would also be exposed to an invasion by Soviet forces. Hitler decided to act; he wanted to remove Horthy and place a new puppet government in Hungary that would continue to support Nazi Germany. Skorzeny was summoned to lead a Special Operation to capture Horthy and bring him back to Berlin. See Otto Skorzeny: Skorzeny’s Special Missions: The Memoirs of ‘The Most Dangerous Man in Europe (London: Greenhill Books, 1st edn 1957, hb. 1997), pp. 130 – 3. Skorzeny moved to Bucharest with some of his men and assisted the German Security Police in an operation that captured Horthy’s son, Niklaus Horthy. See ibid., p. 135. The capture of Horthy Junior, however, did not succeed in blackmailing Horthy to reverse his decision to work with the Soviets. On 15 October 1944, Horthy announced that Hungary and the Soviet Union had agreed to an armistice. See Horthy: Memoirs, pp. 229 – 30 Hitler responded immediately – he ordered Skorzeny to forcefully remove Horthy from power. The next morning, Skorzeny’s troops marched into the Citadel (Horthy’s home and seat of power in Budapest) with four Panzer tanks. Upon entering the Citadel, however, they found that Horthy had left earlier in the morning with Dr Edmund Veesenmayer (Plenipotentiary of the Reich in Hungary) for Hatvany Palace, the headquarters of the German SS forces. See ibid., pp. 216 and 233. Skorzeny’s operation, however, failed to capture the Hungarian leader, although much of what was written about him appeared to credit him for the capture of the Hungarian leadership. For example, the entry in The Oxford Companion to the Second World War erroneously stated: ‘Otto Skorzeny . . . he kidnapped Horthy’s main negotiator, his son, and then bluffed his way into the Admiral’s citadel and forced him to reverse his announcement of an armistice with the USSR.’ See I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot (eds): The Oxford Companion to the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). p. 1011. Horthy was replaced by Count Sza´lasi, and Hungary continued her allegiance with Germany and was finally defeated by the invasion of Soviet forces in 1945 that also destroyed large sections of Budapest and Hungary. See Horthy: Memoirs, p. 240. Clausewitz: On War, p. 359. Ibid., pp. 75 – 6. Colin S. Gray: ‘Moral Advantage, Strategic Advantage?’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33 No. 3 (June 2010), p. 363. Ibid.

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14. Sun Tzu: The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 144– 9. 15. Ibid., p. 84. 16. Interview with Lieutenant-General (rtd) Sir Robert Fry, ex-Royal Marines Special Boat Service (SBS), and Deputy Commander of Multi-National Forces in Iraq (2003/04) on 19 April 2010 in University of Reading. 17. James D. Kiras: Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 115. 18. Nicholas Schmidle: ‘Getting Bin Laden: What happened that night in Abbottabad’, The New Yorker, 8 August 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/ reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle?printable¼true, accessed on 24 August 2012, p. 15. See also Robert Fry: ‘Survival of the fittest’, Prospect, November 2012, p. 28. 19. Ibid. 20. Brittany Hoover: ‘Experts: Obama campaign uses bin Laden killing to advantage, Republicans focus on economy’, Lubbock Avalanche Journal, 10 September 2012, http://lubbockonline.com/election/2012 – 0 9– 10/expertsobama-campaign-uses-bin-laden-killing-advantage-republicans-focus, accessed on 12 September 2012. 21. Ibid. 22. Martha Raddatz, Luis Martinez and Mike Boettcher: ‘30 Americans Killed Including 22 SEALs When Afghan Insurgents Shoot Down Helicopter’, ABC Nightline, 6 August 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/natocrash-31-americans-killed-including-25-navy/story?id¼14245387, accessed on 30 May 2011. 23. This counters the claim that Special Operations did not produce any important effects in World War II. The most recent commentator on this is Robert Fry. He stated, ‘. . . the SAS and other units appealed to something deep within the British martial soul but they did not win the Battle of the Atlantic, form part of the bomber offensive or deliver a nuclear weapon’. See Robert Fry: ‘Survival of the fittest’, Prospect, November 2012, p. 34. The Czechs and Cretans in World War II would beg to differ on this. This highlights the problematic study of Special Operations in World War II narrowly confined to legendary units such as the SAS, which has neglected the effects of Special Operations conducted by the SOE (for example), which was equally (if not more) impressive. 24. This author follows Colin Gray’s point on the sum of strategic effects on strategic performance. Gray states: ‘Strategic performance in war as a whole is generated by the strategic effect of the net costs and gains of the campaigns of which the war consists.’ Colin S. Gray: Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 20. 25. Clausewitz: On War, p. 93.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources (unpublished) The National Archives, Kew Gardens

ADM 199/889: Records of the Admiralty, Naval Forces, Royal Marines, Coastguard, and related bodies: Clandestine operations in Aegean Islands. DEFE 2/205: Ministry of Defence: Operation Flipper. ——— 2/349: Ministry of Defence: Typescript of WO 201/720. ——— 2/711B: Ministry of Defence: Lecture by Brigadier R.E. Laycock. HS 4/39: S.O.E., Czechoslovakia, No. 37: Silver A, Silver B, and Liquidation of Heydrich. ——— 4/58: Sabotage of Skoda works at Plzen; intelligence network based on Domazlice, Plzen, Beroum, Praha, Ceske, Budejovice. ——— 4/70: S.O.E., Czechoslovakia, No. 68: Czechoslovakia, citations for awards. ——— 4/79: Czech papers: intelligence; future of SOE in Czechoslovakia; policy; news flashes; situation in protectorate; Czech government officials; appointment of Heydrich. ——— 5/418: Appointment of political adviser; EOK organisation in Crete; subversion of German troops; 999th Fortress Regiment and Illmer plan mutiny; training operation BUCKRAM; ELAS activities; Political Committee; capture of General Kreipe; game book; Capetanos organisation; Greek crisis; Force 133 Liaison. ——— 5/671: Reports on resistance groups; capture of General Kreipe; history of EOK (Central Committee of Organisation). ——— 5/677: Political and military liaison missions: MOONSTRUCK. ——— 5/723: Individual Reports: Crete; Lt Colonel T J Dunbabin; part 1. ——— 5/724: Individual Reports: Crete; Lt Colonel T J Dunbabin; part 2. ——— 5/728: Individual Reports: Crete; Major P M Leigh Fermor. ——— 5/731: Individual Reports: Crete: situation reports from Major J SmithHughes. ——— 6/624: Operation FOXLEY. ——— 7/55: History 31A Vol. 1: Lecture Folder STS 103.

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——— 8/428: SOE activities in Greece and islands of Aegean. ——— 9/507/4: Special Operations Executive personnel files: Patrick Michael Leigh Fermor – born 11.02.1915. HW 1/186: Government Code and Cypher School: Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, messages and correspondence: General Rommel in Italy, Nov 1. ——— 1/219: Government Code and Cypher School: Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, messages and correspondence: General Rommel in Rome, Nov 13. ——— 1/220: Government Code and Cypher School: Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, messages and correspondence: General Rommel to return to Africa from Greece, Nov 18. ——— 1/222: Government Code and Cypher School: Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, messages and correspondence: Rommel arrived by air in Derna Nov 18. ——— 19/172: Government Code and Cypher School: 95981–96776. 96437– 96438: Kidnapping of General Major Kreipe by English commando party on Crete. ——— 19/178: Government Code and Cypher School: 100371– 101126. 100377: General Kreipe, captured in Crete, said to have been taken to Cairo. WO 201/720: Lt. Col. Laycock’s report on ‘Operation Flipper’. ——— 214/19: Operations by the First Army in North Africa, November 1942May 1943: Personal Message from the Army Commander. ——— 218/171: 11 Commando (‘C’ Battalion, Layforce). ——— 218/191: Reports on operations Normandy to Paris: Operations Titanic, Haft, Defoe, Gaff, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Dunhill, Bunyan, Trueform. ——— 373/18: Recommendation for award of Distinguished Conduct Medal to Sergeant John Terry. ——— 373/19: Recommendation for award of Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes. ——— 373/46: Recommendation for award of Military Cross to Captain Ivan Stanley Moss; and recommendation for award of Distinguished Service Order to Major Patrick Michael Leigh Fermor.

Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives

DOBRSKI 22: Papers of Count Julian A, Dobrski alias Lt Col Julian Antony Dolbey: Papers relating to SOE Propaganda Operation Kreipe. LAYCOCK 5/5: Papers of Maj Gen Sir Robert Edward Laycock including official report on the conduct of Lt Col Geoffrey Keyes. ——— 6/7: Papers of Maj Gen Sir Robert Edward Laycock: Offical correspondence on topics including the death of Lt Col Geoffrey Charles Tasker Keyes. ——— 6/14: Papers of Maj Gen Sir Robert Edward Laycock: Offical correspondence on topics including the memorial service for Lt Col Geoffrey Charles Tasker Keyes. LH 15/4/58: Reference material, World War Two, 1939– 1945: Newspaper cuttings relating to Czechoslovakia, 1939 – 1946, including assassination of SS Obergruppenfu¨hrer Reinhard Heydrich, 4 June 1942.

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Imperial War Museum

Cat. No. 13335 05/73/1: Private Papers of Thomas Macpherson. ———. 13338 05/74/1: Private Papers of W S Moss. ———. 15680 06/16/2: Private papers of D J Ciclitira.

Air Force Historical Research Agency (Department of the Air Force, USA)

IRIS No. 1095140: The section on ‘Participation in Yamamoto Mission’ in interview transcript of Maj Gen United States Marine Corps (Retired) John P. Condon. ———. 1105635: United States Air Force Oral History Program: Transcript of oral history interview of Hiroshi Hayashi. ———. 1105929: Yamamoto Mission account and statement. ———. 1105931: Letters from John W. Mitchell and Rex T. Barber to Thomas G. Lanphier and replies from Lanphier concerning the Admiral Yamamoto mission. ———. 1105934: Correspondence between Shingo and Rex T. Barber. ———. 144053: Weekly informational intelligence summary: Section on ‘Strange death of Admiral Yamamoto’.

Primary Sources (published) Doctrine Publications

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (US): Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, Joint Publication 3 – 58 (1996). ———: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Publication 3 – 0 5 (17 December 2003). Chiefs of Staff (UK): British Defence Doctrine (Second Edition), Joint Warfare Publication 0 – 01 (2001). Secretary of the Air Force, United States Air Force: Special Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2 – 7.

Field Manual Publications

Headquarters, Department of the Army, US Army, Washington, DC: FM 31 –2 0 –3: Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces, Field Manual 31 – 2 0 – 3 (1994). ———: FM 3 – 0 5 – 1 30: Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare, Field Manual 3 – 0 5 – 1 30 (2008).

Government Publications

Air Ministry: The Battle of Britain: An Air Ministry account of the great days from 8th August – 31st October 1940 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1989). Best Jr, Richard A. and Feickert, Andrew: Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA paramilitary operations: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2005).

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Briscoe, C.H., Finlayson, Kenneth, Jones Jr., R.W, Walley, Cherilyn A., Aaron, Dwayne, Mullins, M.R. and Schroder, J.A.: All Roads lead top BAGHDAD: Army Special Operations in Iraq (Fort Bragg: USASOC History Office, 2006). Burian, Michael, Knı´zˇek, Alesˇ, Rajlich, Jirˇı´, and Stehlı´k, Eduard: Assassination: Operation Anthropoid, 1941– 1942 (Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic-AVIS, 2002). Butler, J.R.M.: History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series: Grand Strategy, Volume II, September 1939-June 1941 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957). Feilding, Sean: They Sought Out Rommel: A diary of the Libyan Campaign, from November 16th to December 31st, 1941 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1942). Gwyer, J.M.A.: Grand Strategy, Volume III, June 1941– August 1942 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1964). Playfair, S.O., Flynn, F.C., Molony, C.J.C. and Gleave, T.P.: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume III (September 1941 to September 1942): British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960). Rigden, Denis (intro): SOE Syllabus: Lessons in ungentlemanly warfare World War II (Richmond: The National Archives, 1st edn 2001, ppb. 2004). Spulak, Robert G.: ‘A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of SOF’, Joint Special Operations University Report 07 – 07 (October 2007). Wynter, H.W.: Special Forces in the Desert War, 1940– 1943 (Richmond: The National Archives, 1st edn 2001, ppb. 2008).

Memoirs

Asher, Michael: Shoot to Kill: A Soldier’s Journey Through Violence (London: Guild Publishing, 1990). Bank, Aaron: From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (New York: Pocket Books, 1st edn 1986, ppb. 1987). Beckwith, Charlie A.: Delta Force: The Army’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit (New York: Avon Books, 1st edn 1983, ppb. 2000). Benesˇ, Eduard: Memoirs of Dr Eduard Benesˇ: From Munich to New War and New Victory, trans. Godfrey Lias (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954). Boehm, Roy and Sasser, Charles W.: First SEAL (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1997). de la Billie`re, Peter: Storm Command: A personal account of the Gulf War (London: Harper Collins, 1992). ———: Looking For Trouble: SAS to Gulf Command, The Autobiography (London: Harper Collins, 1994). Chant-Sempill, Stuart: St. Nazaire Commando (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1st edn 1985, hb. 1987). Churchill, Winston S.: The Second World War, Volume I: The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell, 1948). ———: The Second World War, Volume II: Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell, 1949). ———: The Second World War, Volume III: The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950). ———: The Second World War, Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate (London: Cassell, 1951). ———: The Second World War, Volume V: Closing the Ring (London: Cassell, 1952). ———: My Early Life (London: Eland Publishing Limited, 1st edn 1930, ppb. 2002). Clarke, Dudley: Seven Assignments (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948).

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Constance, Harry and Fuerst, Randall: Good to Go: The life and times of a decorated member of the U.S. Navy’s elite SEAL Team Two (New York: Avon Books, 1998). Darby, William O. and Baumer, William H.: Darby’s Rangers: We Led the Way (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1980). Eversmann, Matt and Schilling, Dan: The Battle of Mogadishu: Firsthand accounts from the men of Task Force Ranger (New York: Presidio Press, 1st edn 2004, ppb 2006). Ewald, Johannd: Diary of an American War: A Hessian Journal, trans Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979). Falconer, Duncan: First Into Action (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998). Farran, Roy: Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1948, ppb. 1999). Fermor, Patrick Leigh: Words of Mercury, ed. Artemis Cooper (London: John Murray, 2003). Fielding, Xan: Hide and Seek: The Story of a War-time Agent (London: Secker and Warburg, 1954). Follows, Roy: The Jungle Beat: Fighting terrorists in Malaya (Bridgnorth: Travellers Eye Ltd, 1999). Frost, John: A Drop Too Many: The memoirs of World War II’s most daring Parachute Commander (London: Sphere Books Ltd, 1st edn 1980, ppb. 1983). Fuller, J.F.C.: Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936). Fury, Dalton: Kill bin Laden: A Delta Force commander’s account of the hunt for the world’s most wanted man (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2011). Geddes, John: Highway To Hell: An SAS veteran’s bloody account of the private army in Iraq (London: Arrow Books, 2007). Gormly, Robert A.: Combat Swimmer: Memoirs of a Navy SEAL (London: Onyx Book, 1999). Jeapes, Tony: SAS Secret War (London: Harper Collins, 1996). Hall, R. Cargill (ed.): Lightning over Bougainville (London: Smithsonian Institution, 1991). Halsey, William F. and Bryan III, J.: Admiral Halsey’s Story (London: Whittlesey House, 1947). Hilsman, Roger: American Guerrilla: My War Behind Japanese Lines (New York: Brassey’s, 1990). Horthy, Nicholas: Memoirs (London: Hutchinson, 1956). Kennan, George F.: From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938– 1940 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968). Lawrence, Thomas Edward: Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935). Layton, Edwin T.: And I Was There (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1985). Long, Gavin: Australia in the War of 1939 –1945: Series 1 – Army, Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953). Maclean, Fitzroy: Eastern Approaches (London: The Reprint Society, 1st edn 1949, hb. 1951). Macpherson, Tommy and Bath, Richard: Behind Enemy Lines: The Autobiography of Britain’s Most Decorated Living War Hero (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, hb. 2010). McAleese, Peter: No Mean Soldier: The story of the ultimate professional soldier in the SAS and other forces (London: Cassell, 1st edn 1993, ppb. 2000).

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McNab, Andy (pseudonym): Bravo Two Zero (London: Corgi Books, 1995). Mercer, Peter: Not by Strength by Guile (London: Blake, 2001). Moravec, Frantisek: Master of Spies: The Memoirs of General Frantisek Moravec (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1975). Moss, William Stanley: Ill Met by Moonlight (London: George G. Harrap, 1950). Owen, Mark (pseudonym) and Maurer, Kevin: No Easy Day: Firsthand account of the mission that killed Osama bin Laden (London: Dutton, 2012). Psychoundakis, George: The Cretan Runner: His story of the German Occupation (London: John Murray, 1955). Reitz, Deneys: Commando: A Boer Journal of the Boer War (London: The Folio Society, 1st edn 1929, hb. 1982). Rommel, Erwin: The Rommel Papers, ed. Liddell Hart, Basil H. and trans. Findlay, Paul (London: Collins, 1953). Ryan, Chris: The One That Got Away (London: Book Club Associates, 1995). Schwarzkopf, H. Norman: The Autobiography: It doesn’t take a hero (London: Bantam Books, 1992). Skorzeny, Otto: Skorzeny’s Special Missions: The Memoirs of ‘The Most Dangerous Man in Europe’ (London: Greenhill Books, 1st edn 1957, hb. 1997). Slim, William: Defeat into Victory (Bungay, Suffolk: Cassell & Co Ltd, 1st edn 1956, hb. 1957). Smith, Michael: The Spying Game: The secret history of British espionage (London: Politico’s, 1st edn 1996, ppb. 2004). Spence, Cameron: Sabre Squadron (London: Penguin, 1st edn 1997, ppb. 1998). Stainforth, Peter: Wings of the Wind (London: Grafton Books, 1st edn 1952, ppb. 1988). Starinov, I.G.: Over the Abyss: My life in Soviet Special Operations, trans. Robert Suggs (New York: Ivy Books, 1995). Thompson, Julian: No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic, 1982 (London: Leo Cooper, 1st edn 1985, hb. 1992). Ugaki, Matome: Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941– 1945, trans. Chihaya, Masataka, Goldstein, Donald M. and Dillon, Katherine V. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). Wade, Leigh: The protected will never know (New York: Ivy Books, 1998). Wavell, Archibald: Speaking Generally (London: Macmillan, 1946). ˝ cs, La´szlo´ (eds): The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy Zinai, Miklo´s and SzU (Budapest: Corvina, 1965).

Manufactured memoirs, hoaxes, or questionable sources

Carew, Tom: Jihad! The Secret War in Afghanistan (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2000). Hutchins, Joel: Swimmers Among the Trees: SEALs in the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1996).

Online documents

‘History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War. United Nations War Crimes Commission. London: HMSO, 1948’, Web Genocide Documentation Centre, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/ warcrimgenrls.htm, accessed on 17 August 2011.

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Gubbins, Colin: ‘Art of Guerrilla Warfare’: http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 34556365/SOE-the-Art-of-Guerrilla-Warfare-Gubbins, accessed on 11 November 2011. ———: ‘Partisan Leaders handbook’, http://es.scribd.com/doc/12857951/PartisanLeaders-Handbook, accessed on 11 November 2011. Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Department of the Army: ‘Memorandum: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination (DAJA-IA (27–1A)’ (Nov 1989), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use%20of%20Force/October% 202002/Parks_final.pdf, accessed on 24 February 2011. Prime Minister’s Office: ‘Neville Chamberlain’, http://www.number10.gov.uk/ history-and-tour/prime-ministers-in-history/neville-chamberlain, accessed on 6 June 2011. Taylor, Blaine: ‘Daring intercept over open water! “Who shot down Yamamoto?” An Interview with Colonel Rex Barber’, http://ussslcca25.com/who-shot.htm, accessed on 13 December 2011. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration: ‘Executive Order 12333– United States intelligence activities’, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ codification/executive-order/12333.html#2.11, accessed on 13 February 2011.

Online newspaper and magazine articles

Ambinder, Marc: ‘The secret team that killed bin Laden’, NationalJournal, 2 May 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/the-secret-team-that-killedbin-laden-20110502?print¼;true, accessed on 8 May 2011. ‘Assassins of leading Nazi Heydrich finally honoured with Prague statue’, Radio Praha, http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/assassins-of-leading-nazi-heydri ch-finally-honoured-with-prague-statue, accessed on 7 July 2011. Coglianese, Vince: ‘Correcting the ‘fairy tale’: A SEAL’s account of how Osama bin Laden really died’, The Daily Caller, 7 November 2011, http://dailycaller.com/ 2011/11/07/correcting-the-fairy-tale-a-seals-account-of-how-osama-bin-ladenreally-died/, accessed on 2 January 2012. Dozier, Kimberly: ‘Building a network to hit militants’, AP Exclusive, 5 January 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110105/ap_re_us/us_terrorism_special_ operations, accessed on 6 January 2011. ——— and Baldor, Lolita C.: ‘Officials mine secrets of bin Laden papers, videos’, Associated Press, 8 May 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us_bin_laden/print, accessed on 8 May 2011. Earle, Geoff: ‘How we ‘SEAL’ed monster’s fate’, New York Post, 3 May 2011, http: www.nypost.com/news/local/how_we_seal_ed_monster_fate_Gd2Mvbs, accessed on 8 May 2011. ‘Flight Lieutenant Charley Fox’, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ obituaries/3381986/Flight-Lieutenant-Charley-Fox.html, accessed on 7 December 2011. Grant, Rebecca: ‘Magic and Lightning’, Air Force Magazine, Vol. 89 No. 3 (March 2006), pp. 63 – 7, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Magazine Archive/Pages/2006/March%202006/0306yamamoto.aspx, accessed on 14 July 2011. Hoover, Brittany: ‘Experts: Obama campaign uses bin Laden killing to advantage, Republicans focus on economy’, Lubbock Avalanche Journal, 10 September 2012,

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Watts, Barry D.: ‘Ignoring Reality: Problems of theory and evidence in security studies’, Security Studies, Vol. 7 No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 115– 71. White, Ronald: ‘A Prolegomenon to a General Theory of Assassination’, Assassination Research, Vol. 5 No. 1 (2007), pp. 1 – 22. Winton, Harold R.: ‘An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34 No. 6 (December 2011), pp. 853– 77. Wylie, Neville: ‘Ungentlemanly Warriors or Unreliable Diplomats? Special Operations Executive and ‘Irregular Political Activities’ in Europe’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 20 No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 98 – 120. Yu, Maochun: ‘“In God We Trusted, In China We Busted”: The China commando group of the Special Operations Executive (SOE)’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 16 No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 37 – 60.

Unpublished reports, discussion papers, conference papers, and theses

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LeMire, Guy A.: ‘Employing Special Operations Forces to Conduct Deception in Support of Shaping and Decisive Operations’, unpublished master thesis (School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002). Luttwak, Edward N., Canby, Steven L., and David L. Thomas: ‘A Systematic Review of “Commando” (Special) Operations, 1939 – 1980’, unpublished report (Potomac, MD: C and L Associates, 1982). Menzoff, Julius A.: ‘On the Wings of Hermes: SOE and OSS operations in Greece 1940– 1945’, unpublished PhD thesis (AddRan College of Arts and Sciences, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas, 1999). Newell Jr., Thomas: ‘The use of Special Operations Forces in Combating Terrorist Financing’, unpublished master thesis (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006). Stone, Kathryn: ‘Employing CIA operatives in a warfighting role alongside special operations forces’, unpublished master thesis (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2003). Thomas II, Joel W.: ‘Special Forces and the art of influence: A grassroots approach to psychological operations in an unconventional warfare environment’, unpublished master thesis (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006). Winters, Edward G. and Paro, Kent A.: ‘The Misuse of Special Operations Forces’, unpublished master thesis (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1994).

Internet Sources

Boot, Max: ‘Statement of Max Boot’, Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, And Capabilities, 29 June 2006, http:// www.cfr.org/terrorism/statement-before-house-armed-services-subcommitteeterrorism-unconventional-threats-capabilities/p11027, accessed on 5 January 2011. Chen, C. Peter: ‘The Death of Yamamoto’, The 456th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, http://www.456fis.org/OPERATION_VENGEANCE.htm, accessed on 13 December 2011. Giles, Lionel: ‘Sun Tzu on the Art of War’ (1910), http://ctext.org/art-of-war, accessed on 5 January 2012. ‘Generalmajor Karl Heinrich Georg Ferdinand Kreipe’, Island Farm: Prisoner of War Camp, http://www.specialcamp11.fsnet.co.uk/Generalmajor%20Heinrich% 20Kreipe.htm, accessed on 20 July 2011. ‘Operation Mercury: The German Invasion of Crete, 20 May – 1 June 1941’, Military History Encyclopaedia on the Web, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/ battles_crete.html#conc, accessed on 17 August 2011. Seaman, Mark: ‘The Foxley Report: Secret Operations in World War Two’, BBC History, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/foxley_report_01.s html#two, accessed on 16 December 2011. Stein, Stuart D.:‘Some noteworthy war criminals’, Web Genocide Documentation Centre, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/warcrimgenrls.htm, accessed on 5 December 2011.

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‘Sun Zi’s Art of War and U.S. Joint Professional Military Education’, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS): Proceedings (6 October 2009), http://www. ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/INSS%20Proceedings%20Oct%2009.pdf, accessed on 3 January 2012. World Guns: ‘Bren light machine gun (UK)’, http://world.guns.ru/machine/brit/ bren-e.html, accessed on 6 July 2011. World War 2 Awards.com: ‘HASELDEN, John Edward “Jock”’, http://www. ww2awards.com/person/45647, accessed on 16 March 2012.

Internet Websites

Air Force Magazine: http://www.airforce-magazine.com Assassination Research: http://www.assassinationresearch.com Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC): http://www.dtic.mil Encyclopaedia Britannica: Britannica Academic Edition: http://www.britannica.com Google Maps: http://maps.google.com/ Google Scholar: http://google.scholar.co.uk Infinity Journal: http://www.infinityjournal.com JSTOR: http://www.jstor.org/ Military History Encyclopaedia on the Web: http://www.historyofwar.org MSP News: http://www.mspnews.com Oxford Dictionaries Online: http://oxforddictionaries.com The Avalon Project (Yale Law School): http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ hague04.asp US Army War College: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/ US Special Operations Command: ‘Joint Special Operations Command’, http:// www.socom.mil/Pages/JointSpecialOperationsCommand.aspx

Seminars

Dr Geoffrey Sloan: ‘The British State and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure of Response?’, Department of Politics and International Relations Research Seminar Series, University of Reading, 23 October 2012. Dr Rob Johnson: ‘Covert Operations: The ISI and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan’, Liberal Way of War Seminar, University of Reading, 7 December 2011.

INDEX

Afghanistan, 15, 20– 1, 42 – 44, 169– 70, 184 n.127, 192 n. 89 airpower, 2 strategic utility, 191 n. 73 Warden’s theory, 38 – 40 Alexandria, 144 Amari, 108 Amin, Hafizullah, assassination of, 43–4 Apollonia, 142– 3 appeasement, policy of, 52 assassinations, 7 assassins, 31 – 2 Auchinleck, General Sir Claude, 132, 135, 137, 140 Badoglio, Pietro, 98 Ballalae, 119, 122– 3 Bandouvas (Cretan guerrilla), 100, 111 Barber, Lieutenant Rex T., 122, 124 Bardia, 138 Beda Littoria, 139, 141, 143, 146– 7, 157 Benes, Eduard, 54, 56, 64 – 70, 77– 82, 160 Benghazi, 134 Betty, Japanese bomber, 115, 123 bin Laden, Osama, 27, 28, 169 Bohemia and Morovia, Protectorate of, 52 – 3, 55, 61 – 4, 75, 78

Bougainville, 115, 123 Bren gun, 55– 6 Buin, 118– 9, 122– 3, 127, 129 Burleigh, Michael, 66 Cairo, 94, 96, 100, 106 –7, 139, 148–9 Carta, Lieutenant General Angelico, 88, 98– 100, 111 Casablanca Conference, 99 Chamberlain, Neville, 52, 54, 57 Checkmate, Project, 39 Churchill, Sir Winston, 57 –8, 65 – 6, 88, 90, 126, 130– 3, 135– 6, 140, 149 Clausewitz, Carl von, 18, 45 – 50, 164–5, 171 coastwatchers, 121, 127, 215 n.49 commando, 12, 17, 19, 36, 70, 91 – 2, 96, 101, 108, 135– 8 Crete, 87 – 114 Cˇurda, Karel, 76 Czechoslovakia, 52 – 86, 164– 6 Dalton, Hugh, 57 – 8 decapitation leadership, 1 –8, 22 – 4, 28 – 9, 40 – 1, 44 – 5, 47, 50 strategic, 8, 38, 41, 43

260

KILLING

direct action, 3, 17 Dunbabin, Lt Col. Tom, 96, 107, 111 EAM, 96, 101 ELAS, 96, 101, 104 Enigma, see intelligence Fielding, Major Xan, 95 Finlan, Alastair, 2, 4, 6, 14 – 16 Foot, M.R.D., 6 – 7, 13, 58, 88 Fox-Davies, Captain Harry, 219 n.9 Fuller, J.F.C, 34 – 8 Gabcˇı´k, Josef, 79 de Gaulle, General Charles, 66 Geneva Conventions, 109 Gray, Colin S., 4, 6, 8, 14, 16, 49, 69, 78, 86, 165 Guadalcanal, 117– 8, 120– 1 Halsey, Admiral William Frederick (‘Bill’/‘Bull’), 120–1, 125 Harari, Yuval Noah, 175 n.30, 178 n.58 Haselden, Captain, 141–4, 149 Heraklion, 89, 90, 96 – 7, 103, 105 Heuser, Beatrice, 47 Heydrich, Reinhard, 53 – 86 Hitler, Adolf, 53 – 4, 60 – 1, 64 – 5, 74 – 5, 131– 4, 156, 162– 3 Holland, J.C.F., 57 – 9 Ida, Mount, 109 intelligence codebreaking, 118– 9 Enigma, 147 failure, 146– 9 importance, 90, 114, 122, 124, 129 Magic, 118, 121, 126 Ultra, 126, 147– 8 Israeli Special Operations, 5, 7, 17, 21 Joint Special Operations, U.S. Doctrine for, 174 n.24, 184 n.126

THE ENEMY

Keyes, Lieutenant Col. Geoffrey, 13, 132, 138– 9, 141–152, 157, 167 Kiras, James D., 3, 4, 5, 14 – 5, 28 Kreipe, General Heinrich, 87 – 114 Kubisˇ, Jan, 70 – 1, 73, 77, 79 Lanphier, Jr., Captain Thomas G., 122, 124 Lawrence, Thomas Edward, 58 Laycock, Lieutenant Col. Robert, 91 – 2, 138–8, 143– 151 Layforce, 91, 138 Leigh Fermor, Major Patrick, 95, 99, 100–9, 111, 113–114 Lezˇa´ky, 75 –6 Lidice, 75 – 6, 80 – 2 London Naval Disarmament Conference, 116 Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), 137, 142, 146 Macpherson, Sir Thomas, 142, 149, 158, 223 n.84 McRaven, Andy, 5, 17, 174 n.27, 186 n.142 Menzies, Sir Stewart Graham, 126– 7 Mersa Matruh, 108– 9 Mogadishu, 169, 183 n.125 Montgomery, Bernard Law, 102, 141 morale, 8, 16, 23, 29, 31, 33, 38, 45– 51, 65 – 6, 80 – 4, 88, 95, 98, 100–1, 110– 3, 126, 128, 130, 132, 136, 140– 1, 151, 160– 4, 167, 169– 171 morality, 7, 86, 164– 5 Moravec, Adolf, 76 Moravec, Frantisˇek, 56, 65 – 8, 70, 78– 9, 82 Moss, Captain William Stanley, 102, 105–6, 109– 10 Muller, General Friedrich Wilhelm, 99, 101 Munich Agreement, 54, 65 – 8, 77 – 8, 81– 3, 160, 164

INDEX Nimitz, Admiral Chester William, 119– 21 Novotny, Josef, 72 Operations: Afghanistan (by Soviet Spetsnaz), 43 Anaconda, 169– 70 Anthropoid, 52 – 86 Flipper, 131– 52 Gaff, 152– 56 General Kreipe, 87 – 114 Prague (by Soviet Spetsnaz), 43 Yamamoto, 115– 130 P-38 Lightning, 166 Pape, Robert, 40 – 1 Pearl Harbor, 77, 117, 120, 125, 128, 161– 2 Reichprotektor, 51, 53, 55 – 6, 61 – 2, 75 Rommel, General Erwin, 131– 52 Roosevelt, President Franklin D. 56, 119, 128, 163, 223 n.9 Schutzstaffel (SS), 7 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS; MI6), 57, 94 Sicherheitsdients (SD), 61 Skorzeny, Major Otto, 157, 228– 9 Special Air Service (SAS) 19 – 20, 97, 137, 139, 142, 148, 150, 154– 6 Special Boat Section/Service (SBS), 96, 168 special forces, definition, 15 – 6 special operations, definition, 5 – 7 Special Operations Executive (SOE), 57

261

special operations, history of United States, 210 n.6 Spetsnaz, 41 – 43 Sphakia, 91 – 2 Spulak, Robert, 5, 17 – 9, 174 n.26 Sten gun, 73, 85 Stirling, David, 97, 142 strategic decapitation, see decapitation strategic effectiveness, definition, 8 Sun Tzu, 29 –31 tactical effectiveness, definition, 9 targeted killing, 28, 176 Terry, Sergeant Jack, 144– 6, 149, 151 Ugaki, Vice-Admiral Matome, 115, 123 Ultra, see intelligence unconventional warfare, 3, 20, 41, 137 United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 20, 183 n.124 Valcˇı´k, Josef, 73 Vaneˇk, Ladislav, 71 Vasili, 209 n.173 Warden III, John see airpower Wavell, General Archibald, 48– 9, 87, 132–5, 137 White Mountains, 91, 105, 106, 109 Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku, 115– 30, 161–2, 164, 167, 170 Zero, Japanese Mitsubishi A6M fighter, 115, 121– 4