Kierkegaard's Livingroom: Faith and History in The Philosophical Fragments 9780773568747

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Kierkegaard's Living-Room Faith and History in Philosophical Fragments

In Kierkegaard 's Living-Room David Mercer weaves his way through the Philosophical Fragments, bringing the reader a new understanding of Kierkegaard's work. Placing the Philosophical Fragments in the context of Kierkegaard's others works, Mercer's commentary shows how literary style and character are used to reveal the nature of history and time. He shows us that Kierkegaard's expressed intent is to provide readers with the opportunity to choose or reject Christ. He explores the question of who Kierkegaard understands Jesus to be and why he believes that faith or history alone cannot answer this question, claiming that history is meaningful only when it is understood from the perspective of "sacred history." Kierkegaard's Living-Room explores what "sacred history" is, why it is so important to us, and why it depends on an incarnate God. Mercer argues that Kierkegaard is not tilting at windmills but responding to Hegel's view of history and Kant's view of faith, showing that Kierkegaard has much to contribute to the debates on liberalism and postmodernism. DAVID E. MERCER teaches philosophy at the University of New Brunswick and Mount Allison University.

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Kierkegaard's Living-Room The Relation between Faith and History in Philosophical Fragments DAVID E. MERCER

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

McGill-Queen's University Press 2001 ISBN 07735-2101-1 Legal deposit first quarter 2001 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP) for its activities. It also acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for its publishing program. Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Mercer, David Emery, 1944Kierkegaard's living-room: the relation between faith and history in Philosopical fragments Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-2101-1 1. Kierkegaard, S0ren, 1813-1855. Philosophiske smuler. 2. History - Philosophy - History 19th century. 3. Christianity - Philosophy - History 19th century. I. Tide. B 4373.P443M47 2000 198'.9 c00-900701-6 Typeset in New Baskerville 10/12 by Caractera inc., Quebec City

William R.M. Elderkin Scholar, Teacher, Colleague, Friend

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Contents

Acknowledgments ix Introduction

3

1 The Elephant in the Living-Room 11 i. Forceful Currents 18 ii. The Hegelian Knot 23 iii. Kierkegaard's Response to Plato's Temporal Present 27 2 The Preliminary Discussion of History and Its Structure in Either/Or 30 i. Relation as Consciousness 36 ii. The Value of Architecture, Sculpture, Art, Music, and Poetry in the Historical 39 iii. Poetry as a Historical Expression 43 iv. The Characters and the Historical 44 v. The Ethical and the Historical 49 vi. Marriage as a Historical Expression 54 vii. Outer and Inner History 55 3 The Poetic Study of the Temporal and the Eternal in Philosophical Fragments 59 i. The "Thought-Project" in "A": Can the Truth Be Learned? 65 ii. The 'Thought-Project" in "B": Can the Truth Be Learned? 68 iii. Kierkegaard's Rationale for the Divine Teacher 76

viii Contents

4 The Puzzle of the Absolute Paradox 82 i. The Assumption 86 ii. The Frontier 93 iii. The Nature of Sin 95 iv. The Offence 95 5 The Condition of the Follower 100 i. The Contemporary Follower 102 ii. The Gift of Faith 107 iii. The Advantage of the Contemporary

113

6 The Role of the Necessary in the Past and the Future 118 i. The Purpose of the "Interlude" 119 ii. What Is the Effect of Coming into Existence? 119 iii. The Nature of the Necessary 121 iv. The Possibility of Freedom in the Necessary 122 v. The Nature of the Historical 124 vi. The Certainty of the Past 127 vii. The Past as a Subject 129 viii. The Historian's Subject 131 ix. The Foundation of Belief 135 x. The Application of What Has Been Discovered 139 7 The One Who Comes after the Event 142 i. The Next Generation of Followers 143 ii. An "If/Then" Proposition 145 iii. The Awareness 147 iv. The Relation between the Types of Facts 150 v. The Absolute Fact 152 vi. Objections 158 8 Sacred i. ii. iii.

History 161 Christ and History 164 The Problem of Scripture 165 The Relation of Faith and History 169

9 Kierkegaard's Place in the Current Debate 174 i. The Modern Confusion 177 ii. Kierkegaard and the Philosophy of History 178 iii. Kierkegaard and the Value of the Incarnation 180 iv. Kierkegaard's Value in the Modern Debate 182 v. Kierkegaard and Feminism 182 vi. The Moral Issue 183 Notes 187 Bibliography 199 Index 205

Acknowledgments

It is important that I thank those who in a small and large way have helped me with the task. I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Professor William Elderkin, who aroused my interest in Kierkegaard back when I began my master's work under his guidance. He has been an excellent critic in this exercise from beginning to end. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr Oliver Davies and Professor Paul Badham of the University of Wales at Lampeter, who directed my doctoral dissertation. Together with Professor John Heywood Thomas they encouraged me to write this book. Professor Heywood Thomas, who was my external examiner, was kind enough to invite me to his home in Nottingham to discuss my work. I want to thank Fr Marc Smith, who encouraged me to begin to think in an orderly fashion, and Fr Barry Craig, who listened with patience to the argument. I want to express my gratitude to the editorial staff at McGill-Queen's for their encouragement and support. In particular, Philip Cercone, who not only saw the value in what I had to say early on in the process but also has given helpful criticism and advice along the way to the book's completion. Judy Williams deserves credit for her patience in editing and in responding to my many questions. The reviewers, who because of the process must remain nameless, deserve to be recognized. Their criticism was invaluable and without it this work could not have been completed. I want to recognize the support and encouragement of the Corporation of the Parish of Marysville, where I hold the cure of souls, during the duration of this project. Finally I want to express my gratitude to my wife, Marlene, who, in the darkness of my despair that project would never see the light of day, gave me hope.

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Kierkegaard's Living-Room

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Introduction

The main purpose of this book is to examine the relationship between faith and history in S0ren Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments. Why faith and history? Because I believe that this is the fundamental question for Kierkegaard. There are excellent studies of Kierkegaard as a theologian, philosopher, communicator, student of the psychological structures of the self, and student of literature. They all contribute to our understanding of this Danish genius. But, as he says in his The Point of View for My Work as an Author, he is first and foremost a religious author and his primary concern is "related to Christianity, to the problem 'of becoming a Christian,' with a direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land as ours all are Christians of a sort."1 The fundamental questions that he asks arise out of the conviction that the divine nature in Jesus has been lost sight of, along with it, belief in who he is. To understand who Kierkegaard is as a philosopher, theologian, and student of all the other areas in which he engages, we must first see him as a Christian. For him the existential condition has a direct impact upon Jesus and who he is. Bruce Kirmmse argues, in his Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, that the attack can only be understood as a response to the social and political conditions of his age.21 agree that there is a direct relation between Kierkegaard's faith and his social conscience, but I think that the social awareness arises out of his religious convictions. As a result, I argue that we must begin with faith and history, if what Kierkegaard is saying is to be clearly understood. In terms of a social conscience, I think that Kierkegaard

4 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

indeed has one and does his best to ensure that we are made aware of our own. The popular view is that because Kierkegaard rejects Hegel's theory of history, he turns his back on all theories of history. In addition many believe that Kierkegaard rejects reason and consequently that faith and his "leap" are irrational. Reality, so this view holds, does not interest him any more than society and its problems. Other thinkers recognize that he is truly a man of faith, but believe that his faith is grounded in the self. History holds no interest for him and in fact is seen to be a threat to personal faith. Don Cupitt makes much of this interpretation and sees him as a champion of liberalism and postmodernism. My contention is that Kierkegaard is neither a liberal nor a postmodern; he is a conservative through and through. Both the word liberal and the word conservative have a myriad of meanings. For our purposes they are initially used to describe, respectively, those who reject or hold to the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is important to remember that, although Kierkegaard is a conservative, this does not mean that he does not attack those of his time who are conservative in their theology. To hold the right doctrine is important for Kierkegaard, but he also argues that we must always act in the light of faith. To do otherwise is to deny our freedom and divine grace. A great many of these popular myths about him have been or are being dispelled in the light of a renewed interest in his thought. The question of the relationship between faith and history is a topic that recent scholars such as Steven M. Emmanuel, David J. Gouwens, Robert C. Roberts, C. Stephen Evans, Patrick Gardiner, George Pattison, and Julia Watkin, among others, have discussed with varying degrees of success. However, their work has not considered the relation directly. Kierkegaard has a complex view of both faith and history that is developed against the background of the structures of the self and the stylistic structures of his works. The relation between faith and history for which Kierkegaard argues projects him to the forefront of modern discussions about revisionist history. All of this discussion, together with the question of the relevance of faith in the modern age, has its beginnings in his Philosophical Fragments. It is important that we sort through his terminology if we are to have any hope of grasping his position. The terms will be addressed as they are encountered in the text of the book, except for the term subjectivity. Of all the terms that Kierkegaard uses, this one has caused the greatest problems. What does he mean by his thesis "truth is subjectivity"?3 If he means that the truth is a series of mental constructs that exist only in the mind of the individual, then it is clear that the truth cannot be shared. In addition, it is obvious that as a result reality

5 Introduction itself is reduced to the same constructs. If this is the case, the quest for God and faith is hopeless. It is clear that this is not what Kierkegaard intends by the statement "truth is subjectivity." For him the truth is objective. The truth exists independently of the individual and is still the truth whether or not the individual is aware of it. However, the truth is chosen by the individual alone. It is a subjective choice made by the individual subjectively. In addition Kierkegaard creates a paradigm that encompasses knowledge/reason and understanding/thinking in order to demonstrate the difference between knowledge and faith. For him it is also clear that there is a relation between faith and history that when properly understood helps to clarify what it is that he is really all about. The struggle for the reader is to find his or her way through the many strands of Kierkegaard's ideas. As a consequence, a second purpose for this book is to aid the reader in this task by drawing Kierkegaard's other writings into the discussion. Considering that it took Kierkegaard about twelve years (1843-55) to write his corpus, the productivity in volume and content was phenomenal. It is even more amazing when one realizes that he produced Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety, Prefaces, Stages in Life's Way, and The Concluding Unscientific Postscript in three years (1843-5). This quality of workmanship in such a short period of time not only indicates a superior mind, but also that Kierkegaard must have had a complete schema when he began. For this reason alone his work should be considered in its entirety. The problem for us is to understand Kierkegaard's methodology. Why does he do what he does in the way that he does it? By way of example, it is not accidental that the fragmented structure of volume i of Either/Or is related to the necessity of the temporal unity that he discusses in the Philosophical Fragments and elsewhere in his writings. Kierkegaard is leading all of us who read him to consider the question, "How can a finite being engage the infinite being?" Reading his work makes it clear that Kierkegaard is not only a Christian seeking the foundation of his faith, but also a philosopher and theologian attempting to enable others to find their own way to the same faith. This process will help the reader to see where the Fragments stand in relation to the rest of Kierkegaard's philosophical works. The third purpose of this book is to provide a analysis of the Philosophical Fragments. There is a great danger that what Kierkegaard has to say will become lost in the debate about what we think he is saying. Therefore, I do cite scholars with reference to background and related matters, but when it comes to the Philosophical Fragments, I allow Kierkegaard himself to guide us whenever possible. I can only echo

6 Kierkegaard's Living-Room Arnold B. Gome's comment in the Prefaces to his two works Kierkegaard as Humanist* and Kierkegaard as Theologian^ in support of this approach, where he argues for letting "Kierkegaard speak for himself." The question of the relation between faith and history was the topic of my doctoral dissertation at the University of Wales. The Reverend Marc Smith, PhD of St Thomas University, in a discussion about the lack of clarity among scholars on the subject, remarked that what I was describing was not unlike "the elephant in the living-room." The phrase is used in psychology to describe the situation where a patient will not, or cannot, discuss a central problem that, when addressed, will clarify and resolve his or her difficulties. This led to my use of the phrase in the title of both the first chapter of the thesis and of first chapter of this book. When looking for a title for the book itself, I felt that the living-room had to be located somewhere. As a result, I have used the term to describe Kierkegaard's view of the world of ideas and existence. The elephant is not his but ours, and until it is confronted it will make moving in his living-room very difficult. So the fourth and final purpose for this book is to confront "the elephant" so that the relation between faith and history can be properly understood. This last purpose is perhaps the most difficult of all. It is my contention that an understanding of Kierkegaard must always return to the problem of the relation between faith and history. It is really the question of who Jesus is, and how we are to know who he is, that must be answered. For many that question has nothing to do with the work of Kierkegaard, but for me, and I believe for Kierkegaard, it is central. Kierkegaard makes it plain that there is no conflict between faith and history; that in the end the resolution to the question about Jesus will be found in the discussion about the relation between faith and history. A part of this voyage of discovery involves an examination of how Kierkegaard goes about his project. He presents to the reader the possibility of belief, and that is all that he does; the rest is up to the reader. As both a philosopher and a theologian, Kierkegaard is a rare commodity in this day and age. But he is also something else first and foremost - he is a Christian. For Kierkegaard human value cannot be rooted in the individual; for him subjectivism does not work. What is left is not relativism, but an objectivism that has a theological foundation. Kierkegaard emerges as a person who integrates philosophy and theology against the background of faith. He demonstrates that this confederation is most relevant to our age. When I first began to think about Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation between faith and history I was naive enough to believe that the problem had a simple answer. This has not proved to be the case. I also thought that Kierkegaard was not a consistent thinker, but

7 Introduction once again I have been proven wrong. At the beginning of this adventure into Kierkegaard's living-room, I must acknowledge that there are two books that are important to the topic that my book addresses. These works address many of the same themes that I explore. I have chosen deliberately not to engage them in a direct way. \bu the reader may think that this is a mistake, but before you decide, hear me out. The books are Louis P. Pojman's The Logic of Subjectivity and H.A. Nielsen's Where the Passion Is. In many areas their views are my views, but we do not always agree with one another. They both tackle the questions of the structure and style that Kierkegaard uses. But I believe that I consider the question of the relation between faith and history against the structural background of the whole of Kierkegaard's work. This is not what they set out to do. In addition I place Kierkegaard in the midst of the modern argument about truth and its possibility, and directly tackle the question of the relation between faith and belief and the question of the relation of faith and history. My book more directly engages the Philosophical Fragments in that I move more closely through the text. I would hope that the reader understands that I did not want to get into an argument with these two authors about style and method. It is very important to read their works after you read this book, if you have not already done so. It is also of vital importance to read the Fragments as you read my work. I hope that this enterprise will be illuminating and add to the student's enjoyment of the Danish Philosopher. Before I begin the discussion, I want to give a brief outline of the structure of the book. In the first chapter I place Kierkegaard in the context of his age and show what moves him to write and how he tackles the problems that face him. It is often difficult to determine how much one thinker influences another. This is even more the case when one is dealing with such a complex and revolutionary thinker as Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, it is evident that Kierkegaard came under the influence of many, and his final position, however much his own, was affected by those whom he read and those whose lectures he attended. The question of authorship is considered in the light of the role that the characters play in presenting the Kierkegaardian argument. The rationale that justifies this method is also explored. In this first chapter, I provide a consideration of certain terms such as liberal and conservative, faith/belief and history, and feelings and emotion. Other terms will be defined as they are introduced in the text. The questions of authorship and the role of characters and the role of authorship are both discussed, as well as the rationale that Kierkegaard uses to justify this style of presentation. In this chapter I discuss the important role that Kant and Hegel play in influencing Kierkegaard's argument.

8 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

It becomes clear that Kierkegaard is disposed to engage both these great minds in his struggle to understand the relation between faith and history. In addition, I point out that Kierkegaard engages not only Kant but also those who follow him and develop their own understanding of man's relation to God. This first chapter explores Hegel's view of history and freedom, examining Hegel's synthesis against Kierkegaard's response in the form of his own understanding of synthesis. I also examine the problem of the Platonic present as Kierkegaard understands it and his response, which resolves for him the relation of the temporal to the eternal. The clarification of these issues is critical to an understanding of Kirkegaard's argument. In chapter 2 I show how Kierkegaard uses Either/Or as a forum to draw out the structures of architecture, art, music, sculpture, and poetry in order to demonstrate the structures of the self. In addition I show how Kierkegaard draws out the relation between the self, history, freedom, time, and existence in the light of this discussion. It is a complex argument and we must be clear about the relations if we are going to understand what is taking place in the Fragments. The self exists in relation, and I argue that a part of the purpose of Either/Or is to explore the nature of this relation and its application. The vital role that experience plays is also addressed and so is the relation between memory, sense, and consciousness. I begin to trace the path of the development that leads to the whole question of the relation between faith and history in the context of the development of the self. At the same time I show how Kierkegaard uses the same structures to explore the historical. It is important to realize that Kierkegaard sees a connection between the historical and the self. I also argue that Kierkegaard demonstrates that Hegel manipulates freedom and in the process destroys it. This theme Kierkegaard returns to again and again throughout his work. The third chapter begins a more direct examination of the structures that I explored in chapter 2 as they are applied in the Philosophical Fragments. It is made clear that the Fragments are not presented as a practical solution to the problem of existence, but as a theoretical examination. Kierkegaard, as I point out, begins the task with no preconceptions as he addresses the fundamental question in terms of the value of historical evidence in our quest for the eternal. I discuss Kierkegaard's method as he examines the problem of becoming a Christian. The charge that this is not a serious exercise is answered. Finally, I look at Kierkegaard's argument for the grounding of the truth. In chapter 4 I explore Kierkegaard's distinction between passion and pathos, and their relation to reason. Kierkegaard has been accused of rejecting reason. This has led to the understanding that he

9 Introduction

believes that the Christian Faith cannot be understood. We must proceed very carefully here. Kierkegaard rejects reason when the term refers to Hegel's logic, but he does not believe that the Christian Faith cannot be understood and reflected upon by the human intellect. What he does say is that the activity of reflection is fraught with danger. Kierkegaard does draws a distinction between a man who thinks about his faith and a man of science. For him the pursuit of faith can be an intellectual activity, but not a scientific one. Again I return to Either/ Or to demonstrate how Kierkegaard uses the analysis of character to explore the connection of faith, self, and relation in existence. I argue that for Kierkegaard the critical relation is love. I also discuss Kierkegaard's return to the question of the difference between "being as Being" and "being as existence." I point out the importance of this distinction in his argument for the Incarnation. It is in chapter 4 that I establish the importance of faith for Kierkegaard and the fact that for him it is the point at which we must begin the quest for the absolute paradox. The last part of the chapter contains a discussion of the relation of the self to the god. In chapter 5 I revisit Kierkegaard's understanding of faith and his use of the term. I discuss how Kierkegaard deals with Lessing's argument with reference to the contemporary follower. I show that an existential being is essential for an encounter with the Incarnation. This chapter discusses the relation between an individual and historical events. The question of the value of the quality and quantity of historical knowledge and its relation to faith is considered. It is here that I establish that Kierkegaard redefines the understanding of witness and evidence in order to fit these terms into the category of the man of faith. This will be seen to be critical later in the examination of sacred history. In chapter 6 I argue that the "Interlude" is the pivotal point in the Fragments. Here Kierkegaard explores the nature of time and faith and their relation to events. He also he raises the problem of certainty and its relation to understanding. In addition I discuss his analysis of necessity and the relation that exists between necessity, freedom, the self, the historical, and the absolute paradox. It is here in the structure of the "Interlude" itself that Kierkegaard brings into focus all of the elements that we have been considering in his work. It is here that we see the full impact of his distinction between the eternal and the temporal categories and between belief and faith. In chapter 7 I discuss Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation of different generations to an event. He concludes that none stands in the position of advantage. Here I discuss the different types of facts that Kierkegaard qualifies. This leads to a discussion of the relation of

io Kierkegaard's Living-Room

faith to evidence. In turn it moves to a drawing out of Kierkegaard's distinction between secular and sacred history. We begin to explore the categories of sacred history, which in turn will lead to the discussion of exacdy what sacred history is and why it is important for Kierkegaard. It is in chapter 8 that I explore Kierkegaard's argument in Practice in Christianity in the light of the categories that he has developed primarily in the Philosophical Fragments. The distinction between secular and sacred history is shown to be valid. These categories are explored against the background of their application. This discussion stands upon the principle that faith is reasonable, that the "leap of faith" takes reason where it cannot go on its own. I argue that the culmination of the task that Kierkegaard has set for himself is reached in the final "either/or." Either we begin with historical evidence or we begin with faith. Kierkegaard's answer resides in faith. In chapter 9 I place Kierkegaard in the midst of the present scene. I argue that it is important to see him as a valuable contributor to our current debate. I also argue that his conservative Christian position still has credibility and value. From beginning to end, Kierkegaard argues for a faith that has the Incarnation as its focus.

1

The Elephant in the Living-Room

Unquestionably there were three major forces that influenced S0ren Kierkegaard and his work. First, the work of Rene Descartes led Kierkegaard to develop his theory of the self as the foundation for certainty and truth in his philosophy. Under the guise of Johannes Climacus,1 Kierkegaard demonstrated his debt to Descartes in Johannes Climacus, where he credited Descartes with providing his point of departure in method.2 Second, one of the principal forces in the philosophical world of Kierkegaard's age was Hegel. The impact that Hegel's philosophy had on the philosophical and religious thinking of the time was profound. It was against Hegel's view of the world and of history, and the effect that his view was having on the Danish church and in particular on Bishop Hans Lassen Martensen, that Kierkegaard felt compelled to react.3 Kierkegaard objected to the fact that Bishop Martensen's position enabled him to spread his Hegelian views with the sanction of both Church and State authorities. Third, the apathy to the Christian faith that was reflected in the lives of his fellow citizens, together with the understanding that being a Danish citizen made one a Christian as a result, spurred Kierkegaard into action.4 Since the Reformation, the Church had become a department of the state.5 As a consequence Denmark understood herself to be a Christian nation and the adjudicator in matters of morality. The Church, which had been historically the guardian of morality in that she was the conscience of the nation, had lost her voice and her independence. It was Kierkegaard's view that the Church had become a tool of the political establishment, and that faith and morality had

12

Kierkegaard's Living-Room

become subservient to state policy. The Church had surrendered her right to be the conscience of the nation.6 This meant that the Tightness or wrongness of an issue was determined by the state, which was seen to reflect the Christian principles. For Kierkegaard the problem had become how the Church, which appealed to a higher order for its authority, could remain loyal to that order when it had been made subordinate to the state. Kierkegaard's struggle was made even more difficult because what he considered as the cornerstone of what it meant to be a Christian was being challenged in another way. The traditional conservative view, that the Incarnation was at the centre of the Church's understanding of what one should believe as a Christian, had come under attack. The position that the Incarnation was not important as a central element in Church teaching had become more prevalent. This position, which has been identified as one of the marks of liberalism, went so far as to suggest that the Incarnation was not necessary.7 A liberalism that moved Christianity from an incarnation focus to a speculative and moralistic focus, as Stephen Evans argues, was going to undermine and transform the whole view of what Christianity was understood to be.8 The term liberal, though describing an intellectual movement that is complex and as a result difficult to define, does help to locate Kierkegaard and what he has to say in the context in which he found himself. Claude Welch argues that Kierkegaard is orthodox and theologically conservative,9 a position that I wholeheartedly support. It is my view that Kierkegaard is a conservative in that for him the Incarnation must be central to Christianity. His Christian conservatism affects all that he has to say in matters philosophical, theological, and political. At the outset it is important to clarify that there is a distinction between knowledge and understanding for Kierkegaard and those of his age. Kierkegaard did not countenance the kind of knowledge that Hegel speaks of that is related to science and is grounded in logic. Julia Watkin correctly points out that Kierkegaard rejects Hegel's theory that objective knowledge will lead us an understanding of reality and God. Hegel's view denies the subjective element in the individual. For Kierkegaard, in matters of religion the certainty of scientific knowledge is not desirable, nor is it possible.10 He makes it clear that the kind of certainty that this approach offers does not help us to understand the human character, nor does it lead us to an understanding of God. At the same time he is not suggesting that we are not capable of understanding in matters of faith and belief. We are rational beings in that we can understand our experience and our beliefs even when these involve God. Science provides us with knowledge that is certain in that it is grounded in empirical evidence

ig The Elephant in the Living-Room

and logic. Faith on the other hand gives us a certainty that suspends doubt when it is chosen. This important distinction must be kept in mind as we read Kierkegaard. However, it must be remembered that for Kierkegaard faith is not irrational and it is not blind. I am arguing that an understanding of Kierkegaard will be greatly advanced by an examination of his position on the relation between faith and history. Although it may appear at first glance that this an easy undertaking because his position on faith appears to be concise and clear, this is not the case. It is my position that the lack of clarity arises out of the fact that Kierkegaard understands that faith has both a subjective and an objective side. But before I present my position, it is important to listen to the current debate about the meaning of the Danish word tro, which is translated as faith and belief. C. Stephen Evans draws out the meanings of faith and belief by pointing out the distinction that Kierkegaard himself makes between belief in the ordinary sense and faith in the eminent sense, which relates the two terms to the Danish tro.11 Kierkegaard uses the term "eminent" when speaking of faith in relation to God. That Kierkegaard makes this distinction in the Fragments there can be no question, but it is not clear from Evans that belief is related to the will and at the same time is related to objective faith. David J. Gouwehns makes th comment that "Evans stresses that 'the condition' is given, yet still speaks of faith as if it were an independent act of the agent that one engages in order to 'acquire faith.'"12 Steven M. Emmanuel responds to Gouwens's criticism of Evans by pointing out that Evans "does see a role for the will in the acquisition of faith."13 Gouwens himself gives extensive consideration to the question of faith and belief. In the end he concludes that faith for Kierkegaard "is best understood as a passional response to revelation."14 On the other hand Emmanuel contends that one cannot be said to have complete faith unless one believes and that for Kierkegaard to have faith is simply to have the capacity to believe.15 Emmanuel argues that in the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard explains that faith is not an act of will but is the gift of divine grace, and that for Kierkegaard the will is involved in the "leap." The movement to faith must involve the act of the will in believing.16 I argue, as does Emmanuel, that it is a serious mistake to speak of faith or believing in isolation from each other. Mark C. Taylor, while reflecting on the question, expresses the relation in the following: "In the moment of faith, the sinner (the temporal self) is saved (becomes eternal). Faith is, thus, the inverse image of the Incarnation. In the Incarnation the Eternal becomes temporal but remains eternal; in the moment of faith, the sinner

14 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

realizes the possibility of eternal blessedness (immortality), but remains temporal."17 Taylor understands the moment of faith to be that point in which the individual embraces the gift of faith, that gift that only the Eternal can give, by an act of willing surrender. I hold that Taylor is right in that the act of surrender is accomplished by an act of will that we call believing which is related to faith in the eminent sense. Having taken into account all that these scholars have to say, are we any closer to an understanding of what Kierkegaard is declaring? I think that we are. It will be helpful to hear what Kierkegaard has to say before I make my contribution to the debate. Through Climacus, at two points in the Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard speaks directly to this problem. In relation to faith he says, "We have already shown how this occurs. It occurs when the understanding steps aside and the paradox gives itself, and the third something, the something in which this occurs (for it does not occur through the understanding, which is discharged, or through the paradox, which gives itself- consequently in something), is that happy passion to which we shall now give a name, although for 18

us it is not a matter of a name. We shall call it faith."

What Kierke-

gaard means is that faith is the gift of God. Then later he says of belief, "In contrast, it is now readily apparent that belief is not a knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression of will. It believes the coming into existence and has annulled in itself the incertitude that corresponds to the nothingness of that which is not. It believes the 'thus and so' of that which has come into existence and has annulled in itself the possible 'how' of that which has come into existence, and without denying the possibility of another 'thus and so', the 'thus and so' of that which has come into existence is nevertheless most certain for belief."19 For Kierkegaard this side of tro is related to will. But he goes further because he observes that belief, when it embraces its other aspect, faith, claims a certainty that abandons doubt. In fact the claim that Kierkegaard makes is that belief gives the believer absolute certainty when it embraces faith. This absolute certainty is not knowledge in the scientific sense, but it is the result of the suspension of doubt by engaging faith by an act of the will in believing. From this it is clear to me that Kierkegaard has connected this meaning of belief directly with freedom and volition. In all of this the exercising of belief in the act of willing does not separate itself off from faith; in fact it embraces it and they become one. The act of believing is not then an objective act, but a subjective act that can only take place within the self. The objective side that we call faith is not actualized in the self until it is engaged by the will in the act of

15 The Elephant in the Living-Room believing. The actualization of believing in the absolute sense is only possible because of the gift of faith; without faith, the act of believing would only be possible in the ordinary sense. It is important to remember that for Kierkegaard the condition called faith, together with belief, volition, and freedom, are given by God by grace. I point this out because it is often overlooked. All of the elements are in play at the same time, according to my reading of Kierkegaard. It is all made possible by grace, and I hope that this will become clear as I work through the Philosophical Fragments. But what is it that we are to believe? Kierkegaard in "The Interlude" will discuss this question. For now it is enough to say that I will believe certain things about a historical event based on historical evidence, and this is the use of belief in the ordinary sense. But the gift of faith enables me to believe one thing about this particular event that ordinary belief cannot attain when reason steps aside and belief embraces that gift of faith. It is in this relation that Kierkegaard speaks of faith in the eminent sense. But why about this particular event and no other? Because this particular event Kierkegaard argues marks the entering of the eternal into the temporal. Niels Thulstrup has a valuable discussion about the whole matter. He helps to clarify the different meanings that Kierkegaard assigns to the term tro. It is clear from Thulstrup's analysis that for Kierkegaard faith and belief in terms of Christianity are linked and must involve an act of will.20 We have faith as the condition, but we also have the gift of volition. As a result we are said to have faith and to be a believer when the will engages faith in believing. As I said earlier, the ambiguity of the term tro that is reflected in its translation into faith and belief is important to keep in mind if we are going to clarify the subdeties of meaning that Kierkegaard wishes to convey. I believe that the problem arises when we try to grasp in what sense Kierkegaard is using tro at any particular point. This distinction in meaning is reflected in the use in the Hong edition of Philosophical Fragments of the terms faith and belief in the translation of tro. The task of finding Kierkegaard's true position is frustrated by his intentional exploitation of the ambiguity of meaning in the term tro. But the ground of the ambiguity is even more deep rooted than simply in the Danish term. The Greek word merely21 has as its meaning faith, which in the Latin is "fides."22 Faith is a noun which carries with it the sense of trust, promise, and guarantee. It has about it the sense of a gift. Consequently "faith" has been understood to be the gift of God. The

Greek24 word TUiaioq23 means believing or faithful, which in the Latin is

credo. In both the Greek and Latin, believing and faithful are verbal forms and as a result imply an act of will. There is ah direct connectio

i6 Kierkegaard's Living-Room between believing and existence. In fact, the terms faithful and believing help to describe an active state of existence. Kierkegaard makes it clear that believing is only possible in this state.25 There is then a difference between faith and belief, a difference that is critical to an understanding of what Kierkegaard is arguing in the Fragments. The importance of this distinction will become clearer as we move through Kierkegaard's argument with reference to the relation between faith and history. Kierkegaard's understanding of history is as complex as his understanding of faith/belief. He holds that there is what he calls external and internal history. The self is related in different ways to these two types of history. In addition Kierkegaard holds that history is both sacred and secular. It is important to clarify these divisions that are at the centre of Kierkegaard's understanding of history if we are to understand history's relation to faith. It is only when Kierkegaard's understanding of history and of faith is clarified that the relation between history and faith can be considered. The relation between faith and history is the issue that students of Kierkegaard fail to address directly. Most seem to realize that there is a problem, but avoid talking about it. This is "the elephant in the living-room." I do not wish to suggest that no one has given any thought to the matter. What I am suggesting is that the discussion has lacked a degree of clarity. However, it is important to be aware of the context in which Kierkegaard writes before the "elephant in the livingroom" is confronted. It has already been pointed out that Kierkegaard's work results in part from his reaction and objection to the Hegelian understanding of history and view of the human person. In order to understand the direction that Kierkegaard's thought takes and why, we must examine in a limited way the Hegelian view. Kierkegaard had grave concerns about Hegel's theory of history and his dialectic. Another element to examine, before an exploration of the Philosophical Fragments can begin, is Kierkegaard's understanding of the temporal present. He saw the present as one of the major stumbling blocks to an understanding of the relation of the temporal and the eternal. Kierkegaard addressed this question in The Concept of Anxiety, where he responded to the Platonic analysis and offered his own solution to the difficulty. An examination of the problem as he saw it and of his resolution to the difficulty will assist in an understanding of the Philosophical Fragments. A part of the problem in understanding Kierkegaard's position stems from his use of pseudonymous authors and characters in what are classified as his philosophical works. It is difficult to sort out what in this authorship reflects what Kierkegaard thinks and what reflects a position that is not his own. As Stephen Evans points out in his well-

17 The Elephant in the Living-Room balanced discussion, there are those who argue that nothing in these works belongs to Kierkegaard, and who use what Kierkegaard says at the end of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to support their position. Evans goes on to say that there are those who choose to pay no attention to the pseudonyms and consider all that is found there to belong to Kierkegaard. One is reminded of C.S. Lewis's dictum at the beginning of The Screwtape Letters that there are two errors when dealing with devils; that is, to disbelieve in them and to have an obsession with them.26 Evans suggests that the pseudonyms and Johannes Climacus in particular need to be taken seriously while understanding that they may well reflect a point in Kierkegaard's own development.27 It is my view that the authorship does need to be taken seriously, but that it is also important to remember that they are Kierkegaard's creation. As a result they do not have a life of their own, but are always under his direction. It is fair to say that the pseudonyms do not always express his belief, but they can be said to be his in the sense that he uses them to present what he sees to be either the problem or the way beyond it. Perhaps the purpose of the pseudonyms is best understood when we have arrived at Kierkegaard's real purpose in writing these works. Mark Taylor refers us to a section early in The Point of View for My Work as an Author, where Kierkegaard declares without reservation that 'The contents of this little book affirm, then, what I truly am as an author, that I am and was a religious author, that the whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, to the problem 'of becoming a Christian,' with a direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land as ours all are Christians of a sort."28 Taylor argues for a unity of thought in the Kierkegaard's work.89 Although this does not suggest that there was not opportunity for development and reflection on Kierkegaard's part, it does suggest that there is a unity to his thought that is supported by the structure and style of the works. Roger Poole argues that there is nothing more in the work of Kierkegaard than the cry of a tortured soul. He argues that there is no philosophical and theological message or doctrine that is presented as a whole.30 Tempting as it may be to deal with Kierkegaard in such a manner, I do not think that one can turn a blind eye to the profound argument in which Kierkegaard has immersed himself. It is the question of who Jesus is that stands behind all that he writes. At the same time, I am not suggesting that there are not parallels between his characters and his own life. Kierkegaard is creative and innovative, of that there is no question. As Josiah Thompson says in The Lonely Labyrinth, those who knew Kierkegaard commented on his vivid imagination and his use of it.31 It is easy enough to see how such

i8 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

an active mind could generate such a structure to present his argument. Kierkegaard was an observer of the world and of himself; his Journals are a testament to this fact. In addition it is as important to acknowledge that Kierkegaard's relationship with his father and with Regine Olsen affected his life and work. To conclude that such relationships and life conditions completely shaped Kierkegaard and what he had to say, however, is to make him a prisoner of his own past and to deny him the possibility of his own authentic self. The nature of the characters and the structure of the argument in which they are engaged are, in my view, part of a well thought out master plan. But, as I have already observed, we can never lose sight of the fact that his works are the product of a creative mind. However he arrived at the final structure, it is apparent that throughout the work Kierkegaard was conscious of his purpose and method. We are left with the question of what is the nature of such a plan and what in the end is its ultimate purpose. The simple answer, if there is one, must be the destruction of Christendom and an awakening to true Christianity in citizens of the Denmark of his day and in all of us. How is this to be accomplished when the choice that is involved is subjective and is in everyway personal? The structures of Kierkegaard's argument are such as to present the opportunity for this desired awaking in all aspects of personal development. The characters make it possible for us to be aware of our own condition and then present us with the possibility of choice. But the choice itself and the possibility of embracing that choice are ours alone. Kierkegaard is careful to structure his presentation in such a way that he is always behind a screen of characters and authors. Julia Watkin presents much the same argument and agrees that this method enables the reader to come to his or her own conclusion without outside influence.32 Kierkegaard holds that because for each of us the struggle is personal, no one has the right to interfere. This goes a long way to explain why he has created such a labyrinth of characters and authorship: he will lead us, but he will not decide for us. It is important to point out at this juncture that in order for this to happen it is essential to Kierkegaard's understanding of the self that consciousness and freedom are gifts of grace as well. We cannot choose if this is not the case. It is in Either/Or that the elements that make up the human character first emerge. I.

FORCEFUL

CURRENTS

Are we to believe that faith has its foundation and origin in the self, or does faith rest in God and his grace? This question stands behind the problem of the relation between faith and history that Kierkegaard

19 The Elephant in the Living-Room set out to answer in the Philosophical Fragments. It arose partly as the result of the work of Immanuel Kant in his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone and the Critique of Pure Reason. Although I did not initially mention Kant as an influence on Kierkegaard, and his influence is less obvious because Kierkegaard does not engage him directly, he is as important a factor to be considered in understanding Kierkegaard as Hegel. It was Kant, together with Descartes, who shifted the focus from an external and objective foundation for religion and established the foundation for a purely subjective faith. The possibility of the knowledge of things in themselves was dismissed by Kant and he concluded that it was only possible to know things as they appear to be. This shift was to open the door to scepticism and reduce religion to conjecture. Kant's thesis leads to the conclusion that one cannot know God directly; one can only hope to speculate about his nature. Consequently, the argument is reduced to the level of the subjective, and faith, as a result, is based on practical reason. Kant contended that our awareness of God's existence rests upon the evidence that man has a sense of what is ethical and moral. In other words, the human need and an apparent desire for what is just and right suggest the possibility of the existence of God. There is disagreement among scholars about the influence that Kant had on Kierkegaard. Niels Thulstrup makes the claim that Kierkegaard did not show any real interest in Kant. On the other hand Ronald M. Green argues that not only was Kierkegaard influenced by Kant's methodology but he also paid Kant more than passing interest.33 Calvin O. Schrag claims that Green makes Kierkegaard out to be a Kantian,34 but this is not Green's position.35 I agree with Green that Kant's influence on Kierkegaard is much greater than many have supposed in the past. He argues that there are great parallels between Kant and Kierkegaard at the ethical level and even at the level of the religious.36 Judge William stands at the ethical stage and appears to view life from a Kantian ethical position, but there is more to Kierkegaard's ethics than Kant. In addition, even if Green is right and Kierkegaard depends a great deal upon Kant for some of his insights, that still does not make him a Kantian. Perhaps the following observation found in the notes in The Concept of Anxiety will help to clarify Kierkegaard's relation to Kant: "Both Hegel and Kant maintain that man possesses within himself the possibility of knowing and actualizing the good, something that is contrary to the Christian position."37 The missing element in both Hegel and Kant is grace. On this single point at least, and there are many others, Kierkegaard would part company with them both. I think that there is every indication that Kierkegaard considered that what Kant did to faith was as significant as what Hegel did to

20 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

history. Rant removed faith from the hands of God and made it a part of the human structure. Kierkegaard holds Kant ultimately responsible for the destruction of the classical God/faith paradigm. Early in the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard demonstrates the weakness of the Kantian thesis.38 Ronald Green believes that it is Kant whom Kierkegaard is engaging early in the Philosophical Fragments under the guise of Socrates.39 I agree, but the real point of contention is the whole matter of the nature of faith, whether or not it is objective, subjective or as I suggest has both an objective and a subjective element. In his own way Kant was as religious as, if not more religious than, others of his age, but his religion was not metaphysical in its foundation. He would not bow down to the traditional understanding of God because his reason would not or could not allow him to do so.4° Kant represents a strong current that swept others along. Kant inadvertently opened the door to liberalism because he had undermined the old conservative foundations. Within a few years the authority of Scripture and the authority of God-centred metaphysics was gone. It was a liberating experience to those who were immersed in the great upheaval, but it also led to doubt and uncertainty. Kierkegaard's exploration of the Socratic understanding of knowledge and his rejection of that theory in the Philosophical Fragments represent his rejection of the self as the source of faith. In criticizing those who held such a position, he places himself at the centre of the intellectual struggle of his time. Those who followed Kant, such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Ludwig Feuerbach, certainly opposed Kierkegaard's position, that God in his grace provides us with faith, and that belief arises as a result of an act of the will exercised in freedom. Schleiermacher, although influenced by Kant, still maintained that there was a being external to the self that he understood to be God. Feuerbach, however, believed that faith was grounded in the self and had little or nothing to do with a transcendent God. Schleiermacher attempted to establish a middle ground between the two camps of traditional orthodoxy and rationalism: Schleiermacher was deeply impressed by Kant's philosophy, and accepted Kant's demolition of rational, philosophical knowledge of God. But where Kant then found a place for religious faith in the realm of practical reason, in ethics and morals, Schleiermacher held that this was too inadequate. Neither metaphysics nor ethics is the home of religion, nor does either hold the key to its real nature. Where religion is reduced to either, and treated as if it were simply a form of knowing or a form of doing, it is lost to sight altogether. It has to do rather with the infinite, universal wholeness of all

21 The Elephant in the Living-Room things, of that all-embracing totality which may or may not be labelled "God," but which includes and enfolds everything within itself.41

Schleiermacher had left the creedal statements behind and had introduced an understanding of grace as an experience. But to be fair, Scheiermacher was not speaking of a kind of irrationalism that one sometimes sees today expressed in terms of emotion. On the contrary, he understood that feelings are really an awareness without proof and have a relation to reason. Reason reflects on the awareness of reality that feelings provide. William Scott reminds us that "By feelings, Scheiermacher does not refer primarily to an emotional experience. He means rather an intuitive awareness of reality. Thus there is a rational (but not only a rational) dimension to feelings."42 There is also a clear distinction between feelings and emotion. Feelings then are for Schleiermacher related to what William Scott refers to as an intuitive awareness of reality43 and what Heywood Thomas calls insight.44 As a result feelings are understood to be connected to the divine and reason, whereas emotions are grounded in the subjective sensual experience. There was then a sense of reason and order about the new kind of Christianity. However, certainty was grounded in reasonable argument and not the result of creedal declaration and faith. Ludwig Feuerbach rejected any traditional notion of God and of revealed religion. This resulted in his denying any suggestion that there could be a transcendent God. For him religion was nothing more than a fantasy: Religion, then, is in the fullest sense fantasy. By being fantasy, by being in essentials completely and ruthlessly man-centred, it comes into conflict with science and philosophy. "Every object, of course, can be apprehended and known by man only in virtue of its relation to man - even in science," Feuerbach writes (W II, 282). But in philosophy and in science this mancentredness is controlled by reason and objectivity, by a concern with what actually is the case. To philosophy and to science, the distinction between the true and the false is fundamental. In religion, there is no such control and no such concern.45

Feuerbach's position was that man does not worship God but instead worships himself, for man makes himself God. As a result, the focus is not on a God who is beyond us, or even on a God in our midst; it is on ourselves.46 Schleiermacher and Feuerbach, as intellectual heirs of Kant, helped to shift the focus from a theocentric understanding of Christianity to an

22

Kierkegaard's Living-Room

anthropocentric position. They represent the activity in the intellectual world in which Kierkegaard was formulating his ideas. In addition they represent the liberal tendency of their age and are among the fathers of modern liberalism. However, they did not have the field to themselves, for they were challenged by the conservatism of which Kierkegaard was a forceful representative. Kierkegaard's reaction to Hegel often overshadows the fact that he was as concerned about the direction that the religious philosophy of Scheiermacher and Feuerbach was taking as he was about anything that Hegel produced. As I have said, a part of Kierkegaard's criticism of centring knowledge in the individual may well be a response to Scheiermacher and Feuerbach. What Kierkegaard attempted to do was to restore faith and grace to God. His intention was to demonstrate that the God-centred faith/ grace relation was as valid as it always had been. In order to do that, Kierkegaard challenged the foundations of the new science and the new religion. He did not stop the tide, but he did present a formidable foe for any who would face him. It will become clear that, although his method is in many ways unique and radical, the foundation upon which he stands is conservative. He emerged as one of the great defenders of traditional Christianity in spite of his apparent attack on all that the tradition had come to represent. As will become clear later, his argument is not with Christianity as such but with what he refers to as Christendom. There can be no doubt that Descartes, Kant, and Hegel helped to shape Kierkegaard's position. There were other minds at work, however, in addition to those already mentioned, that exerted an influence on the direction of his argument and its form. His thinking was influenced by Friedrich Schelling, who introduced Kierkegaard to a philosophical position that incorporated the concept of freedom. John Heywood Thomas points out that Schelling understood that "the real relation between God and Man is between the individual and God, and there is thus only an indirect (or more correctly a theoretical or abstract) relation between God and humanity. An equally significant point was the importance of choice for Schelling and his contention that positive philosophy is a philosophy that makes room for freedom."47 Heywood Thomas suggests that Kierkegaard may have looked to Schelling to confirm his view that our relation with God was expressed in terms of the individual's act in freedom called the "leap."*8 But Kierkegaard comments that his "leap" is much more decisive than Schilling's use of the term.49 There is little question that Kierkegaard regarded Schelling as the guide who helped him to find his final position on the nature of freedom.50 Further, some of his influence may well be seen in Kierkegaard's positive synthesis. However, Kierkegaard soon lost interest in

23 The Elephant in the Living-Room

Schelling - perhaps, as Niels Thulstrup suggests, because in the end what he saw was only another attempt at system building.51 Kierkegaard also mentioned Johan Georg Hamann as an influence in the development of his position. David J. Gouwens argues that Kierkegaard is favourably disposed towards Hamann because Hamann points out that reason cannot establish religious belief and understands and practises Socratic indirectness.52 Heywood Thomas makes the following observations: that in Hamann faith is seen as something not unlike insight; that Hamann makes it clear that faith has nothing to do with philosophy, and Kierkegaard agrees with Hamann in that he understood that faith was not "an operation of reason."53 One can also see Hamann's influence in Kierkegaard's attitude towards knowledge and understanding in relation to belief.54 II.

THE HEGELIAN KNOT

There are always undercurrents in philosophical systems. Kant is an undercurrent that we must be aware of in the reading of Kierkegaard, and he emerges as an undercurrent in the work of Hegel as well.55 It is helpful to keep in mind when reading Kierkegaard that while his response to Kant is cautious but reactive, Hegel's response to Kant is critical but optimistic. An examination of the work of S0ren Kierkegaard that has as its main focus the relation of faith and history in Kierkegaard's foundational work the Philosophical Fragments should provide some explanation of Kierkegaard's understanding of Hegel's view of history. This explanation is essential because Kierkegaard's reaction to Hegel shapes so much of what is said in the Philosophical Fragments and the Postscript. However, we should also remember that in the background of Kierkegaard's analysis of Hegel's theory stands his reaction to Kant's theory. It is what Kierkegaard understood to be the negative foundation of Hegel's dialectic and his view of the certainty of historical events that precipitates this strong reaction. In the Philosophical Fragments he comments that "The malpractice in Hegel is easily pointed out. The absolute method explains all world history; the science that is to explain the single human being is ethics. On the one hand, this is quite neglected in Hegel, and insofar as he explains anything, it is usually in such a way that no living being can exist [existere] accordingly, and if he were to exist according to the few better things to be found there, then he would instantly explode the absolute method."56 Kierkegaard understood that Hegel saw history as being structured and predictable, and for Kierkegaard this could only mean that there is no room for freedom. This lack of freedom results in the destruction of ethics and the denial of the value of the individual. For Hegel true value is found in the movement of history itself;

24 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

consequently the individual is reduced to a pawn. Niels Thulstrup points out that for Hegel the true individuals of history are the nations, and even they are swept up in the movement of history. Thulstrup contends that freedom in the sense that Kierkegaard uses the term does not exist in the Hegelian vocabulary. For Hegel necessity and freedom are synonyms.57 History for Hegel was a teleological system; he understood that history has a beginning and an end.58 Consequently, Hegel believed that an understanding of the principles that stand behind history would enable us to understand its course.59 He also believed that an understanding of history was linked directly to logical theory. Others of his day felt as Hegel did about the certainty of history and its role as a true science with its own laws and methods, but his philosophical system was the one that had the greatest impact. [These writers] professed to offer an insight into history more profound and valuable than anything which working historians could produce, an insight which, in the case of Hegel, by far the greatest of these writers, found its basis not in any direct study of historical evidence (though Hegel was not so cavalier about facts as he is sometimes made out to be), but in considerations which were purely philosophical. Philosophy of history, as practised by these writers, thus came to signify a speculative treatment of the whole course of history, a treatment in which it was hoped to lay bare the secret of history once and for all.60

History was a science for Hegel, but a science that was metaphysical in its nature. It was a movement that was governed not by human action in any way, but by universal principles directed by a logic that did not concern itself with human persons and human values. Hegel maintained that within the system he developed freedom is possible; he maintained, in fact, that a system based on logical principle is necessary if freedom is to exist at all. W.H. Walsh comments that "Hegel had portrayed history as a dialectical progress towards the realization of freedom, alleged to have been achieved in some degree in the Western civilization of his own day. In this progress different nations come successively to the fore, each making its contribution to the ultimate end."61 It is important to be clear about what Hegel intended his system to do; then his view of freedom will come into focus. His concern was with the broad sweep of history. It was the movement of history that concerned him, and it was this movement that he tried to understand. The rise and fall of nations and cultures were for him indicative of

25 The Elephant in the Living-Room

this understanding of history. In this great historical movement, Hegel conceded, the individual may well play a minor or major role. However, individual lives are of little consequence, except as they come in contact with the events of history. Individual morality and right judgment account for little in the end. In fact Hegel allowed that immoral acts might be committed by the great personages of history in order that the great plan of history could come to actuality.62 Hegel understood freedom to emerge as the result of a conformity to the plan or idea of history. When the plan of history has unfolded, true freedom will appear. When Hegel spoke of freedom he did not speak of a freedom to act as an individual; rather it is the freedom to reflect and to understand who one is in oneself. I said the world of freedom begins in Greece. Freedom's fundamental basis is that the spirit thinks itself, that the individual in his particularity has the vision of himself as universal, that each man in his individuality knows himself as universal, that his being is to be as a universal within a universal. His being is his universality and his universality is his being. Universality is this selfrelation, not to be in the hands of another, of a stranger, not to have his essence in something else, but to be at home with himself - as universal at home with himself, i.e. with the universal. This at-home-ness with oneself is the infinity of the self, i.e. personality.63

For Hegel each succeeding society marks a development in the historical process. This development allows freedom to emerge, but freedom is seen within the structures of the state. This freedom is seen as a conformity of the will to the structures that in turn reflect the universals. The individual, as much as he counts for anything, is free only when he conforms to the laws in order that others may exercise their freedom. The freedom to choose is expressed in the bending of the will to conform to the structures, to allow oneself to be moulded in order to fit into the structures that the state offers. The development of the individual as an individual is only understood in the context of the greater society. The will is free by having something universal as what it wills; in this universal I have my essence, my essential being, and therein I am equal with myself. And this implies that others are equal to me too, because they are just as universal as I am. I am free only inasmuch as I allow the freedom of others and am recognized as free by them. Real freedom presupposes the freedom of many; only amongst several people is freedom actual and existent. Thus is the relation of free men to free men established and thereby the laws of ethical

26 Kierkegaard's Living-Room life and justice. The free will wills only the specifications of the universal will. Thus, with these specifications, civil freedom, rational law, just political institutions are established.64

Freedom for Hegel was an expression of the structure to which the individual must conform if he is to participate in freedom. Hegel understood that this freedom emerges only as social institutions evolve, and saw freedom only in the context of the interactions of individuals within the social fabric and the institutions of state. It is this view of freedom that Kierkegaard rejects. For him man must be completely free to be man. Kierkegaard also reacted to the Hegelian theory of synthesis. In Hegel's system there are two elements called thesis and antithesis. These two elements stand in opposition to each other, the antithesis being the negative element. The tension that these two opposing elements generate results in the emergence of a third element that resolves the tension. This third element is the synthesis, which negates the negation. The synthesis contains aspects of both the thesis and the antithesis because it is established by a merging of the two opposing positions that results in their being dominated by the synthesis in order that it may emerge. The synthesis emerges as a new element as the result of the tension that the thesis and antithesis generate as they react to each other.65 It is this tension and its necessary resolution that in Kierkegaard's view destroys freedom. He expressed what he understood to be Hegel's view in The Sickness unto Death as he set out to resolve the Hegelian impasse. "In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation and in the relation to the relation; thus under the qualification of the psychical the relation between the psychical and the physical is a relation."66 It is a negative unity because in order to emerge the synthesis must dominate or overcome aspects of the thesis and the antithesis. It is important to remember that in the Hegelian system there is no choosing of the self; the self emerges as a matter of necessity. Kierkegaard resolved the problem of the negative element by establishing that it is the spirit that posits and sustains the synthesis in both the relation between the body and the psyche and the relation between the temporal and the eternal. For Kierkegaard nothing is lost or dominated. The thesis and the antithesis are brought together and this bringing together is not only supported but posited by the spirit acting freely. As long as the spirit posits, the self is sustained in the synthesis. However, this occurs initially only in a potential way for Kierkegaard, for the self must choose itself in freedom to be actual.

27 The Elephant in the Living-Room

The point that Kierkegaard made was that the synthesis does not result from a negation, or from necessity, and as a result is not understood in the Hegelian sense as a synthesis at all. Kierkegaard's synthesis is a creative force that generates the possibility for the self to choose and develop itself: "If, however, the relation relates itself to itself, this relation is the positive third and this is the self."67 In Kierkegaard's synthesis the thesis and the antithesis are brought together by the spirit; the synthesis is posited by the spirit in freedom. For Kierkegaard the self is not, as Hegel would have it, a synthesis that results necessarily; the self is freely chosen. 'The self is composed of the infinitude and finitude. However, this synthesis is a relation, and a relation that, even though it is derived, relates itself to itself, which is freedom. The self is freedom. But freedom is the dialectical aspect of the categories of possibility and necessity."68 In other words, the self has about it the concrete aspects of its nature as it exists and these elements do not change. By coming into existence they are historical and as a result they are necessary. However, the other aspect of the self is its possibilities and it is in its possibilities that the self exercises its freedom and is freedom. Kierkegaard maintained that the synthesis is posited by spirit, which means that there now exists the potential for the self to choose itself in the relation that is the synthesis. in. K I E R K E G A A R D ' S R E S P O N S E TO P L A T O ' S TEMPORAL PRESENT

The other principal problem that Kierkegaard must resolve if the discussion of the relation of faith and history is to proceed is the determination of the status of the present. The present has traditionally been understood to be a category of the temporal, and since Plato this has caused problems for the understanding of the temporal.69 Kierkegaard identified the difficulty and set out to resolve the question. He finally placed the present not in the temporal but as an eternal category. This adjustment enables Kierkegaard to redefine what he calls the moment and to identify the present as the point of meeting for the temporal and the eternal. Alistair Hannay supports this understanding of Kierkegaard's position with relation to the present and the eternal.70 Stephen N. Dunning understands this discussion as a refutation of the Hegelian view of the temporal,71 but there is much more involved. Kierkegaard is putting forward a new theory of the present in response to what has been the western view since Plato. This point is of even greater importance when we realize that Kierkegaard understands that man is a synthesis of psyche and body and that this synthesis

28 Kierkegaard's Living-Room has another expression as the synthesis of the eternal and the temporal.78 Dan Magurshak points out that Kierkegaard does break new ground with reference to the present, ground upon which Martin Heidegger builds.73 Magurshak goes on to say that Kierkegaard links the two expressions of the synthesis with the present.74 It is this linking that will loom so large in the discussion concerning the eternal's relation to the temporal in the Philosophical Fragments. The present in Platonic and Hegelian constructs is the point at which the past and the future meet in temporal terms. The present as a result can be said to have position. However, that position appears to be continually shifting in relation to any event as the event moves from the "not yet" of the future to the "has been" of the past. The question that Kierkegaard asks is, where does the future end and the past begin? The answer in temporal terms seems to be at the fine edge where the future and the past meet - that is to say, the present. Yet it appears that although a possibility may become an actuality in an event in the present, and the event passes in some form from the "not yet" of the future to the "has been" of the past, the present in which the transformation takes place is always with us, for as creatures of time we find ourselves always in the present. Kierkegaard suggests that the problem must be in the area of our understanding of the present and how it is related to events that occur in time. In Kierkegaard's resolution of the problem the present has no temporal value, and as a result, should not be considered as a category of time.75 The present and the eternal meet in the moment. Stephen N. Dunning points out that the moment is that point at which the eternal "breaks into time from the outside and limits it."76 The moment is a reality for consciousness. It is, as Kierkegaard said, difficult to understand but is related to the self s conscious activity in choosing the eternal.77 Kierkegaard concluded that 'The eternal, on the contrary, is the present. For thought, the eternal is the present in terms of an annulled succession (time is the succession that passes by). For representation, it is a going forth that nevertheless does not get off the spot, because the eternal is for representation the infinitely contentful present. So also in the eternal there is no division into the past and the future, because the present is posited as the annulled succession."78 This conclusion makes it possible for Kierkegaard to explain how it is that the believer is always contemporary with the absolute paradox. It was against the Hegelian and Platonic background that Kierkegaard developed his position, and he examined relation between the eternal and the temporal in this context. He did not discuss the Hegelian

29 The Elephant in the Living-Room

problems and the Platonic dilemma directly in the Philosophical Fragments; that discussion he carried on in other works. Nevertheless these elements are in the background throughout the Philosophical Fragments. Both Hegel and Plato provide Kierkegaard an opportunity to develop his thought and resolve what was for him a fundamental problem the relation between faith and history.

2 The Preliminary Discussion of History and Its Structure in Either/Or

S0ren Kierkegaard raises a fundamental question for Christian belief on the title page of the Philosophical Fragments. He asks if there is or can be a connection between history and faith. Can history serve as a reliable foundation for belief in the eternal?1 The question arises as the result of an understanding of the self that Kierkegaard has developed in Either/Or. The method in Either/Or is deliberate in that he moves through an examination of the self, beginning with the aesthetic. By the end of the work it becomes clear that for Kierkegaard there is a connection between being human and being religious. Reidar Thomte comments that if men could not remember what it was to be religious, they would also forget what it means to exist as humans. As he points out, it is in Either/Or that Kierkegaard begins the exploration of this relationship.2 Jacob Golomb suggests that it is a command on Kierkegaard's part that we make the transformation to a Christian existence. It is unfair to say that Kierkegaard demands that we become Christian, for his thesis is that the human creature is free. He makes no demand on us, but he does urge us to face our inauthentic selves. For him it is enough to present us with the opportunity to face the state of our own condition. As Alastair Hannay comments, "It is, I think, well-nigh impossible for a reader of Either/Or to avoid the conclusion that Kierkegaard intends the reader to prefer the ethical to the aesthetic view of life."3 But he goes on to observe that although this may be Kierkegaard's intention he will not interfere with an individual's choice. I wholeheartedly agree: it is out of character for Kierkegaard

31 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

to demand; he would see a demand in this context to be a denial of the opportunity of exercising freedom. Golomb goes on to suggest that Kierkegaard is only interested in examining how this transformation is to take place. As he puts it, "Kierkegaard's efforts are directed to the problem of 'to become a Christian,' not how to be one."4 As Kierkegaard himself says, this is his main concern.5 He is faithful to this concern in his philosophical works, but he is also concerned with existing as a Christian. For Steven M. Emmanuel, this is one of Kierkegaard's themes.6 To exist as a Christian from day to day is as great a struggle as becoming a Christian. There is always the risk that one will loose faith and fall away. It is important to keep the two elements of becoming and existing as a Christian in mind if we are to understand what Kierkegaard is about in his work. David J. Gouwens argues that this is the focus of Kierkegaard's later literature and that Kierkegaard's struggle is worked out in terms of suffering.7 I agree with Gouwens that suffering is a strong theme in Kierkegaard's writing, but we should not lose sight of the fact that joy bursts out of his Christian existence. Kierkegaard's Christian is not as dour an individual as he is often made out to be. Admittedly, Gouwens does acknowledge that joy is present,8 but I think that it is a stronger presence than he would allow. It is important to note that Kierkegaard does not begin by raising the problem of whether or not there is a God. He does address the question in the Philosophical Fragments? but it is for him a minor issue. He presupposes that God is, and, as we discover early in the Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard's question is related to whether or not the Incarnation is possible, and whether or not the Incarnate God can be known. The discussion is directed towards a resolution of the problem that Christendom has generated, namely a false sense of what it means to be a Christian. Consequently for him the fact that God is is a sufficient precondition for the discussion. By the end of Either/Or in 'The Balance between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality"10 he has established that the existing self can only be said to exist in relation to itself, others, and reality. Kierkegaard's concern is to establish that it is not the question of the nature of being that should be the subject of philosophy, but the question of what it means to be (to exist). It is this question that he resolves to answer. Either/Or serves as a forum in which Kierkegaard works out the relations, within the self and external to the self, that make the emergence of the authentic self possible.11 He demonstrates that central to the emerging self are freedom and possibility. Kierkegaard is careful to show that a balanced self must continually reach beyond

32

Kierkegaard's Living-Room

its own self, its historical self, if it is to remain authentic. He maintains that the self fulfils itself by striving in possibility to be what it is not, by continually choosing the many possibilities that it reaches towards in the future. David J. Gouwens is in agreement with this view. He argues that Kierkegaard makes it clear that Christianity is not simply a set of beliefs, but that it is a form of existence in which one is summoned to live out these beliefs by continually choosing or rejecting them.12 By a careful examination of certain aspects of Either/Or, we may gain an understanding of Kierkegaard's view of the self. Also, it will become clear that his understanding of the self reflects his understanding of history. The relation between the self and history can be clarified once it is understood that relation and existence are both grounded in time. Kierkegaard demonstrates that the self will only emerge by choosing itself. The choosing of the self is the beginning of continuity and a history. Self-continuity is only possible if there is an existential framework in which continuity in time and history is possible. This continuity is essential for the self to be aware of itself as a self.13 Later in The Philosophical Fragments he concedes that any event of coming into existence does establish a kind of history. The mere fact that something is in time, that it has an existence, means that it is historical. At this level the historical does not have consciousness existent in it and as a result there is no capacity for self-awareness.14 However true this is, Kierkegaard's main effort is directed towards an examination of the self and its relation to the historical. He holds that the self is historical in some way and that it must be understood as a historical entity. Consequently, it is primarily the examination of the concepts of continuity, time, and history with which he concerns himself. An authentic history, which expresses an aspect of the nature of the authentic self, depends upon continuity within the self. That continuity can only be expressed in a historical context, which is made possible by the existence of a temporal unity. Ronald L. Hall points out that for Kierkegaard authentic existence is concretely integrated into time. "The faithful self accepts the fact that the past is over and done, that is, the past is present to the faithful self as past, and the faithful self courageously welcomes the future as the realm of the not-yet, the realm of possibilities that allow freedom to be concretely actualized, that is, the future is present to the faithful self as future. Such continuity in time is the very heart of an integrated faithful existence."15 Authentic history can only be possible for the self because the self alone has the facility of consciousness that provides the possibility for self-reflection. It is within the framework of this continuity that time provides that this self-reflection is possible.

33 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

The self has memory because it has consciousness or mind. Kierkegaard makes only a passing reference to mind in his works. He understands that mind is a part of what makes up the self, but mind is not to be equated with the self. There is an indication of this position early in Either'/Or.16 Alastair Hannay sees mind as equivalent to soul and argues that this is a valid Kierkegaardian synthesis,17 but it appears that Kierkegaard understood the structure to be more complex. Although he does point out that "consciousness is mind,"18 upon careful examination it becomes apparent that he understands that consciousness is not simply mind. He goes on to argue that in addition to mind, consciousness is relation.19 What Kierkegaard understands relation to be and its connection to time are important to his understanding of history. It is my view that a part of the task of Either/Or is to explore the nature of the understanding of this relation, as it applies to the self, and to demonstrate that time and history must have continuity, if the self is to exist. For Kierkegaard, it is not enough that the self possesses memory and consciousness; the self does not emerge as a matter of evolution when these elements are brought together, nor does the self emerge as a synthesis resulting from a process of negation that takes place as a result of the bringing together of memory and consciousness. George Pattison observes that it is Kierkegaard's view that "We become selves only by an act of freedom."20 This "act of freedom" is at the heart of Kierkegaard's argument. Kierkegaard's position is that the thesis and the anthesis are brought together by the spirit: the self is posited by the spirit acting freely. This means that there now exists the potential for the self to choose itself in the relation that is the synthesis. The spirit is the meeting point for the psyche and the body, and for the eternal and the temporal. It is because the spirit posits the synthesis for both that freedom is possible. The self emerges in the tension between the psyche and the body that is made possible by the spirit positing the synthesis. As Alastair Hannay observes, one might assume that this is a reflection of the Hegelian synthesis, but that would be wrong. This positing of the spirit is dynamic and opens up possibilities for the self in freedom.21 For Kierkegaard the self does not emerge as a part of the process of growing into adulthood. It is not a matter of evolving. An adult may never become an authentic self. Kierkegaard holds that the self must be chosen, and this choice is always made in freedom. As has been mentioned, George Pattison correctly argues that for Kierkegaard we only become selves by an act of freedom.22 The self is a dynamic being that is free-acting and, to be authentic, must continually choose in terms of future possibilities. Once again the possibilities of which

34 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

Kierkegaard speaks can only be properly understood in relation to the choice that the self makes. The self exercises choice within the temporal framework, and as a result it is important to understand the temporal structures. The relations that exist between time, possibility, freedom, and history have provided a framework for the possible emergence of the authentic existent self. We must examine these relations before Kierkegaard's answer to the question of history's relation to the eternal can be discussed. It is in Either/Or that Kierkegaard begins to discuss the structures of the self. By an examination of the composition of art, music, and poetry he shows how these structures are related to each other. The genius of Kierkegaard is that he not only understood the structures of art, music, sculpture, and poetry but also used those structures, beginning with Either/Or, to convey what he understood to be the structures of the self. George Pattison suggests that Kierkegaard had only a passing interest in the way art could be used to demonstrate certain aspects of the self and the structures of time.23 I think that Pattison is unfair in his interpretation. It is clear that in Either/Or Kierkegaard gives careful consideration to the nature of art and shows clearly that it cannot express an adequate understanding of the self. The self emerges as the result of the choosing of itself, a choosing that is made in freedom. Kierkegaard makes it clear that to be authentic the self must be free, but also that the self is existential because of the continual choosing of itself. The self exists in relation. The relation is grounded in an existence in which there is a continual choosing of possibility. The relation in which the self exists is a relation of the self to its own self, with other selves, and with the world. The characters that appear in the early stages of Either/Or are presented in an abstract, even an extreme or distorted, form. Kierkegaard chooses this type of presentation to make the different aspects that make up the self apparent to the reader. In the authentic self all of these elements exist together in balance, but this balance is never static but always dynamic and changing. The "either/or" that the abstract characters present is a part of the overall theme of Either/Or. In the writing of Either/Or Kierkegaard is very careful to present the reader with a developing literary style as one moves from part i to part 2. The style demonstrates, as much as do the developing characters, the development and emergence of the more authentic self. FJ. Billeskov Jansen argues that the use of style is a vital part of Kierkegaard's method. He points out that Kierkegaard used Goethe as his source model for his style in Either/Or.24 What is taking place in Either/Or is at first confusing, until we remember that the structure of the work, together with the developing style and developing characters,

35 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

is being integrated within the interplay of the forms of art, music, sculpture, and literature. This integration forms a fabric for the Kierkegaardian thesis. All of these elements serve not simply as a background but in fact as part of the thesis itself. They are used to represent the emerging self. Bernard Zelechow argues for the integration of structure, style, and character,25 but he focuses on the musical. I am arguing that Kierkegaard's thesis is more developed than Zelechow seems to suggest. I believe that George Pattison is correct in saying that for Kierkegaard art and sculpture provide us with an escape from the continuity of time by freezing the moment of experience.26 This view is consistent with the approach that Kierkegaard takes. In addition, Mark C. Taylor holds that music is able to express both movement and immediacy, and goes on to say that literature is a more authentic form for the authentic self.27 Taylor is correct when he says that it is to literature that we must turn if we are to meet Kierkegaard's authentic self. Ronald L. Hall argues that language carries with it the element of continuity and that this is necessary if the authentic existential self is to be in relation with other selves and God. Both Hall28 and Arnold B. Come29 say that Taylor misses this point. But this is not the argument that Taylor presents at the end of Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship. There he argues convincingly that Kierkegaard does not support an authentic self existing in isolation from the human race, but quite the contrary. It cannot be denied that Kierkegaard sees contemplation of the Divine as a subjective activity, but he also acknowledges that authenticity involves community. Taylor observes that "Religion cannot drive us apart into the isolation of our idiosyncratic inwardness, but must draw us together into the laborious task of bringing to fuller expression our common humanity. Our purpose in seeking to change social structures should remain the creation of a world in which individual selfhood is as completely realized as possible."30 Literature provides us with a form that most fully represents a continuous integrated temporal framework, that is able to engage both past and future in a connected temporal context. This context if engaged by the existential being will make the change of self and society possible. Kierkegaard's use of these different elements, as a part of his method, is brought into clearer focus when we remember that part 2 was written before part i. He returns to write the early section of part i in its disjointed form as a background to the characters that are presented. The development in textual unity is made in parallel to the developing characters as he moves from the aesthetic through the ethical to the religious forms of the self. The style is deliberate in that

36 Kierkegaard's Living-Room it presents a disjointed structure that gradually develops an internal harmony and stylistic unity. Underlying the study of the self, and as a part of Kierkegaard's philosophical development, is his study of time. He sets out to examine the nature of time in order to answer the question of the relation of history to faith. If time is a series of unrelated moments, then history is not possible and the self cannot choose itself. If the self cannot choose itself, then the ultimate choice of faith cannot be made and there can be no true self-fulfilment. The nature of time, whether it is a series of unrelated points or a unity, is at the heart of questions relating to the nature of history. Questions about the Incarnation, and its historical significance, can only be asked with any hope of resolution if the structures of time have been first examined and understood. The relationship between the temporal and the eternal, when understood, will give an insight into the nature of the self. It will also provide a foundation for an understanding of history and the self s relation to history. The distinction between external and internal history that Kierkegaard begins to draw out in Either/Or and discusses in greater depth in Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments has its beginning in the examination of the structures of the self. I.

RELATION AS CONSCIOUSNESS

The connecting element in Either/Or is relation. But what does Kierkegaard mean by the term? In Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, Kierkegaard points out that there is a connection between reflection, relation, and consciousness.31 He does not argue that one of these conditions precedes the other or that one is more important than the other. What he does argue is that these elements are interdependent and that if a being is conscious then it can reflect and relate. Although he does not use the term, what Kierkegaard does is point out that the conscious being is the being that possesses the capacity for memory. It is memory that makes reflection and consciousness meaningful. It is consciousness or relation understood in this way that makes reflection possible. The possibility of reflection results from the experience of the immediate and the possibility of reflection upon that immediate by consciousness. Consciousness or relation is the precondition for reflection. John W. Elrod observes that consciousness is the original synthesis that enables the self to reflect.32 Kierkegaard holds that the "immediate" is reality. Elrod speaks of this immediacy in relation to the aesthetic and his mode of life.33 There is no question that Kierkegaard does discuss the aesthetic condition

37 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

in this context. However, his first concern is the relation of the subjective to the external. This distinction involves Kierkegaard in a discussion of how we can come to be aware of the external reality. Jean-Paul Sartre in his essay "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology" writes: "Husserl persistently affirmed that one cannot dissolve things in consciousness. You see the tree, to be sure But you see it just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst of the dust, alone and writhing in the heat, eight miles from the Mediterranean coast. It could not enter into your consciousness, for it is not of the same nature as consciousness."34 It is a long road from Kierkegaard to Husserl, but at the same time it is a short step. Husserl's intentionality would not be Kierkegaard's concern even if he were Husserl's contemporary, but Husserl understands himself to be in Kierkegaard's debt. As it is with Husserl, so it is with Kierkegaard, the subjective and the objective are distinct and separate. The conscious can and does engage the external reality, but the two do not ever merge. Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Sartre all hold that there is an external reality. This external reality is not shaped or created by consciousness, but it is interpreted. Kierkegaard does not concern himself with the how of the relation of the subjective to the objective in the same way that Husserl and Sartre do. Nevertheless, there is an important discussion by Kierkegaard about consciousness and reflection. What the consciousness does do by the process of reflection is try to understand what has been experienced. Reality is understood to be what is experienced and is the subject of reflection for consciousness. Mark Taylor makes passing reference to this point but focuses on Kierkegaard's discussion of the immediate in terms of the aesthetic and not in terms of reflection.35 I think that it is of vital importance to an understanding Kierkegaard's argument to consider the question of experience. The problems with reflection arise out of the fact that there is for Kierkegaard a gap between what is experienced and what consciousness understands about that experience. Kierkegaard's position is that at the level of the immediate there is truth, because there is not yet qualification, and as a result, not yet the possibility of error or abstraction. In other words, at the level of the immediate the senses do not lie; what is sensed is what is sensed. Kierkegaard understands that the problem is not with the sense experiences themselves, but with their interpretation.36 There is an immediacy about sensation that does not allow for reflection at that level. What Kierkegaard maintains is that immediate cognition, that is, the conscious awareness of the sensation, is as certain as the sensation itself. But the problem does arise when certain statements are made about or conclusions drawn from the sensation or consciousness of the sensation. The problem is with

38 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

reflection and as a result with memory as well. The mind wants to confirm what it is presented with in the immediate; it seeks qualification. For Kierkegaard then, the immediate, because it is not qualified, is defined as "indeterminateness,"37 and is what is the immediate focus of sensation and the very primitive awareness without qualification that Kierkegaard calls "immediate cognition."38 On the other hand, language about reality is ideality, and is a part of the process of reflection. With the introduction of reflection the process of abstraction begins, with its ever-present danger of the loss of or distortion of reality. By pointing out the difference between reality and ideality, Kierkegaard establishes the distinction between existence and thought. It is possible to reflect upon reality or actuality, but that reflection involves abstraction. The process of reflection can bring about the awareness of the division between the object (in this case reality or actuality) and the thinker. There is, then, always a division between the object and what is thought about the object. This division creates a tension between reality and ideality that Kierkegaard identifies as doubt. The tension is caused by the contradiction he calls consciousness. The focus of reflection for consciousness is the division between reality and ideality. The contradiction is consciousness, and the contradiction exists because it is consciousness. It is because of consciousness then that the difference between reality and ideality causes doubt to emerge. The consciousness is left with determining what is the nature of the true reality that the senses experience. Although the senses do not lie, consciousness is left wondering about the true nature of what is experienced. This wonder results from the fact that the consciousness can only reflect upon what the senses experience. Consequently, the conscious mind only has contact with reality in an indirect manner. The relation between the mind, the senses, and reality opens the possibility for doubt. The conscious mind may well doubt what it understands about reality because of its dependence upon the senses. In other words, the thought about the object and the object itself are in some way different, but which is the true reality? It is this puzzle upon which the consciousness reflects. This reflection can move in one of two ways: there can be a disinterested reflection or a reflection that is interested. It is when doubt becomes a matter of interest that the possibility of self-interest arises, because the reflection that involves concern creates the possibility of an interest that has the possibility of becoming self-interest. The development of this self-interest is worked out by Kierkegaard in an examination of the nature of architecture, sculpture, art, music, and poetry. The nature of the structures of the self is reflected in Kierkegaard's use of these elements.

39 History and Its Structure in Either/Or II.

THE VALUE OF ARCHITECTURE, SCULPTURE, ART, MUSIC, AND POETRY IN THE HISTORICAL

Kierkegaard begins the examination of the question of the historical in Either/Or with an examination of how the characters are related to each other, and to themselves. For him the structures of the self reflect the structures of history. He considers both the characters and the context in which they are presented to be of equal value. As a result he explores not only the characters but also the structures that give them their mode of expression. Kierkegaard understands that the subject matter and the vehicle that is used to convey information about that subject are related elements. The medium in which the subject matter is expressed is of vital importance. The subject matter will be restricted if the improper vehicle of expression is used. Kierkegaard argues that literature, art, music, and sculpture in themselves convey a form of meaning. He examines each of these forms of expression and uses them to illustrate their value.39 He approaches the problem in two ways, carrying out a discussion of the problems and then using the elements to express the structures of the self in terms of the characters in Either/Or. He begins the examination by considering the nature of architecture, music, art, sculpture, and poetry, and how they serve the expression of the subject matter that the characters are to convey. With certain qualifications, Kierkegaard makes a division between the subjects of architecture, art, sculpture, music, and poetry. In William Wimsatt's analysis of Gotthold Lessing's understanding of the relation of poetry and painting as a way of expressing the relation between space and time, we see the Kierkegaardian themes. "The difference between poetry and painting, [Lessing] says, is a basic difference, that between a medium of time and a medium of space. A medium of space can present corporeal objects directly and vividly; the same medium can present the actions of such bodies only indirectly and through images of the bodies themselves. Conversely, a medium of time can present actions directly and vividly, but can present bodies only indirectly and through actions."40 For this reason the arts, as a vehicle of expression and subject of study, were popular in the middle of the eighteenth century.41 Kierkegaard makes reference to Lessing and his definition of the relation between poetry and art.42 It is clear that Kierkegaard's analysis in these terms was not an oddity for his age. He places architecture, art, and sculpture together in one grouping because of their spatial mode of expression. Music and poetry are placed together because

4O Kierkegaard's Living-Room

they are expressed in the context of the temporal. However, he places a qualification on the value of music as a vehicle of concrete expression. Kierkegaard points out that the subject matter is important, but the chosen vehicle of expression is important as well. He understands that the subject matter is in some way related to consciousness. This consciousness has relation as the essential component. The subject matter itself is confined to a historical context. Architecture, sculpture, and painting are understood as vehicles of expression that are fixed in time because of their spatial mode of expression. As a result, they are not able to express development. Whatever they express, as Stephen N. Dunning points out, they cannot express it in a successful manner as a historical relation.43 They can only present or represent a single moment that does not convey any historical connection. Architecture, sculpture, and painting can and do express a universal theme, but that theme, Kierkegaard maintains, cannot express a historical relation. He holds that in each instance, they act as an occasion for the observer to discover whatever universal theme it is that they convey.44 On the other hand, poetry's structure lends itself to expressing historical relations because it expresses itself in time rather than in space. It is lasting in a way that architecture, sculpture, and painting are not. Whereas they can only express a universal theme in a fixed representation, poetry, by the nature of the structure of language itself and its connecting relations, provides a vehicle to express the temporal relation that is found in history. Poetry also can and does express the connected and developmental nature of history. Kierkegaard does not suggest that a historical event cannot be represented in art, but says that art cannot convey the temporal aspects of the historical relations. What he argues for is a connection between the art form as a vehicle of expression and the type of character one wishes to present. He is not arguing that art, sculpture, or music is not of value.45 What he will argue is that literature is the only possible medium that can express the authentic self. He holds this position because he understands that the existent being is a temporal being that must have memory and connectiveness in time. This relational mode is best expressed in literature. It is this understanding for which I am arguing. On the other hand, the medium which is used is not to be understood as the sole focus. The medium itself conveys certain aspects of the nature of time and history, and an examination of the medium will enable us to understand these elements. This is the case because the medium and the idea that it expresses are interrelated, and this relation is a dependent relation. The idea depends upon the medium as a mode of expression and the idea provides the medium with its

41

History and Its Structure in Either/Or

content. The question that Kierkegaard asks has to do with the effectiveness and capability of a particular medium in expressing the idea. He concludes that not all media are as effective; the effectiveness of a medium as a vehicle of expression for an idea is directly related to the medium's relation to existence. The more the medium reflects real life, the more authentic it can be said to be as a vehicle of expression. Its authenticity is directly related to the way in which it reflects the true nature of time. Why time, you may well ask? The answer is to be found within the structures of time and the structures of the authentic self. To be authentic is to be a conscious and a relational being that has memory. Kierkegaard is not arguing for a universal form of the human creature, but for a free, conscious, individual being. The conclusion that Kierkegaard draws is that abstract ideas cannot be seen to be any more than concepts or universals if they are not related to the particulars of experience.46 Furthermore, Kierkegaard holds that the richness of an idea is directly related to its concrete expression. Ideas are best understood out of our experience of them in a medium that is itself concrete. The concrete is that which has an expression that is in a relation of some kind. Understanding is only possible if there are relations between ideas. It is Kierkegaard's position that these relations are discovered in a historical existence and are made possible only because of the nature of history and consciousness. In the arts the idea that the artist has is made concrete in the context in which he works. In the case of sculpture and painting the idea is concrete in that it is expressed in the medium, but this mode of expression forever freezes the idea in time. As a result, Kierkegaard argues that art and sculpture lack a degree of authenticity in that they inadequately express existence in time.47 What he will argue for is that literature is the most valid expression of existence that is possible in the arts. The abstraction to which architecture, art, and sculpture are confined results from the fact that their mode of expression is spatial. The nature of space is such that it does not provide for a continuity of expression in the sense that space by itself is fixed. As a result, architecture, art, and sculpture as vehicles can only express whatever is expressed in isolation. Space is limiting in that it cannot make provision for connection. Music does not express itself in space but in time. However, music does not exist beyond the moment of its expression. Each note has a temporal existence, but that existence is momentary; it has no duration beyond the moment of its expression. Music comes closer to Kierkegaard's model of time and history than do architecture, art, and sculpture, but it still cannot serve as a complete model of expression.

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Kierkegaard's Living-Room

There are those who argue that music presents itself as a temporal expression that exists beyond the moment, but for Kierkegaard this is an illusion. If there is an existence beyond the moment it will be an abstraction because it will exist only in memory. One can listen to a musical score played and understand that it is a set piece, but because each note is confined to the temporal moment, music is held together only by memory. Music has overcome the restrictions of space but it has failed to deal with the problem of temporal existence.48 It is in the illustration of this lack that Kierkegaard shows the necessity of connectiveness. Kierkegaard uses the demonstration of the character that the musical expresses to show an aspect of the self and at the same time point to the essentialness of connectiveness in the historical. Each note exists only so long as it is played; the note itself does not have duration beyond that moment. As a result, the note does not have an extended existence; its duration is limited by its own relation to time and its own structure. The note cannot represent the temporal extension that is a part of history and that is necessary for the emerging self. It lacks duration in time, and, as a result, makes connectiveness and self-reflection impossible. Even when the work is considered as a whole it can only be viewed in an abstract manner, as a series of notes that were played and did exist at the moment of their execution. The element of continuity between notes is ever present in the musical work as it is played, but the continuity is confined to the moment; as a result the connectiveness is momentary. Once the work is completed all relation is a matter of reflection related to memory, not to existence. The unity is in a temporal sense confined to the moment of expression.49 It becomes clear that architecture, art, and sculpture point towards the universal, and that music points towards the temporal as expressed in the present. Bernard Zelechow suggests that Kierkegaard chooses to ignore the art in music in order to justify his position. Zelechow concludes that this results in an oversimplification of the complexity of the character Don Giovanni in Either/Orby Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard's purpose is to illustrate one extreme of the self by the use of Giovanni, renamed Don Juan. Zelechow unfairly comments that "Kierkegaard bolsters his rejection of Mozart's operas from the sphere of the religious by an elaborate definition of music which contains some sophisticated insights and much technical foolishness. Kierkegaard asserts repeatedly, without offering any justification for the assertion, that the essence of music is immediacy. If Kierkegaard was addressing a so-called pure 'absolute music,' his error would at least make sense contextually. But Kierkegaard considers instrumental music to be an unmitigated abomination."50 This is not what Kierkegaard is doing.

43 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

What he argues is that there is a relation between the different art forms that express elements of the temporal related to our understanding of history and the self. Kierkegaard's Don Juan is modelled on Mozart's Don Giovanni, but Kierkegaard's use of the character is com plex. It will become clear that he uses the character to illustrate the different poles of the aesthetic self. This he accomplishes by splitting the character into two isolated elements, the musical Don Juan, who represents the lustful side, and the reflective Don Juan, referred to as the Seducer, who represents the reflective side of the self. It is apparent that Zelechow does not understand that Kierkegaard does not wish to oversimplify the importance of the art of music. Kierkegaard does not ignore music in his interpretation; on the contrary, he insists that the art in music demonstrates the element that he wishes to project. This enables Kierkegaard to present Don Giovanni, in the mode of the musical Don Juan, as momentary and extreme, and, as a result, use the character to illustrate one pole of the aesthetic self. Music exists in a moment of time, but has no lasting temporal existence.51 Stephen Evans agrees with this interpretation of Kierkegaard's use of music. He points out that it is in the context of the musical structure that Kierkegaard conveys the nature of raw sensuality. Evans does not agree with Zelechow that this is a distortion of the use of music as Zelechow suggests.52 Kierkegaard understands that the duration of the note and its relation to the other notes in the score present problems for the historical. The problems arise out of the fact that duration in music is limited to the temporal frame of its playing. It is this element in the structure of music that illustrates for him the nature of sensuous in the aesthetic. It should be remembered that the musical Don Juan is artistic in his form, but he has no continuity. He is pure lust, an extreme. The musical score, when played, is as momentary as Don Juan's lust. It has the form of life, but the life is only fleeting, it fades into abstraction in the moment of its playing. For Kierkegaard music gives us an insight into a part of the structure of the self and time, but there is another vehicle that will carry us further towards a more complete understanding. III.

POETRY AS A H I S T O R I C A L

EXPRESSION

What is it that Kierkegaard wishes to demonstrate about time and history that architecture, art, sculpture, and music cannot demonstrate? To answer this question it is necessary to examine the structure of literature. Kierkegaard does not intend to suggest that poetry has as its topic the present and the past to the exclusion of the future. Poetry for him has its main theme in the imagination and the possible,

44 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

rather than in the present or past. It is, however, in the structure of language and the literary art that Kierkegaard sees the reflection of the structures that are to be found in time and history. Time can have no meaning unless there is a connective relation enabling the moments in time to be reflected upon in a related structure. History, to be understood, must have the same element of relation so that consciousness can reflect upon it as well. The connectiveness of memory that is essential for consciousness is also necessary for history. It is through connectiveness that memory is able to make the relations meaningful. In addition the grammatical structure of language adds to the connectiveness that makes meaning in a historical sense possible. Poetry has a duration that music does not have, for music is expressed in and confined to the moment. The continuity and duration that one finds in poetry are the essential elements in time and history. This discussion appears in the early part of Either/Or in "The Immediate Erotic Stages" but is not developed in any great detail. In subsequent works Kierkegaard returns to the discussion periodically, but only in the context of a more direct discussion of the nature of history and time. It must be remembered that Kierkegaard is concerned that the discussion be confined to being as existence and not being as being. As a result a form such as poetry has a greater attraction for him because it does lend itself to a mode of expression that comes closest to experience. The poet interprets experience with the use of his imagination, but he uses the vehicle of literature to express that understanding. For Kierkegaard, the continuity that literature by way of its form conveys represents a model of the structures of time and history.53 The subject of history is what has been; it exists because of the nature of memory and consciousness. What is repeated arises out of memory and consciousness; it can never be reality nor can it be ideality, it can only be what has been; it can only be history.54 Against this background of music and poetry Kierkegaard presents the characters that he uses to express the structures of the self. At this point I want to clarify that history and time are directly related for Kierkegaard to the structures of the self. When he speaks of history and time, in some way this can be applied to his understanding of the self. There is no doubt that this makes the discussion complex and difficult to follow. IV.

THE CHARACTERS AND THE HISTORICAL

There is a relation between the developmental stages of the self and Kierkegaard's understanding of the structures of history. An examination of the characters that Kierkegaard uses to exhibit the structures

45 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

of the self will provide a better understanding of the structures of history. One of the underlying principles of history for Kierkegaard is that there is some form of interconnection between events and that this relation can be expressed in the historical. Behind this view stands the conviction that there is an external reality that can be understood. This understanding is made possible because of memory and a shared common meaning in the terms that are used to express ideas. An individual can learn from his past, by reflecting on his mistakes and profiting from them. The individual who has no awareness of history, who lives for the moment, cannot reflect. Kierkegaard portrays this character type at the aesthetic level, and introduces the type at the beginning of Either/Or as the musical Don Juan. The character represents the erotic in the aesthetic, standing as one of the two extremes in the aesthetic structure. The structures of the self are developed by Kierkegaard in this work in an existential situation and are displayed in some form of relation between individuals. The relations may be sterile or artificial, but they do help Kierkegaard to illustrate the structures of the self. The musical Don Juan is the seducer; he is without conscience and personality; he is driven by lust and is presented as the personification of lust itself. He lives for the moment of conquest, and once having achieved his goal, he moves on to the next challenge without pause for reflection. Kierkegaard presents him as having no history, and as not being aware of history. Don Juan has a universal element about him not unlike the gods of Olympus. He has the appearance of an individual, but his individuality is artificial because it presents a single element in the human character to the exclusion of all else. His humanness is lost in the distortion that does not allow a well-rounded person to form. As a result he is an abstraction and nothing more; in fact he cannot ever become anything more than he is.55 Consequently he does not seduce an individual, but in each seduction it is Woman that is his victim. He is not interested in the individual as a person, only in the passion of the moment. It is this universal element that Kierkegaard points to in the musical Don Juan. It is the element of music that expresses Don Juan's character. His presence is as a musical note, momentary and active. He cannot be engaged because he is gone at the instant of his formation. Here we see Kierkegaard's genius, for the note not only represents the elements of the character but is the very essence of the character himself. In addition in his dealings with any woman there is no recognition of the uniqueness of her individual character; there is only the abstract concept.56 Alastair Hannay argues that the musical Don Juan represents one side of the self, but that Kierkegaard has made this side represent the

46 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

whole. This abstraction appears as an individual but is more than an individual.57 But there is much more at work here. Kierkegaard uses this character in a far more profound and rich way than Hannay suggests. It must be remembered that this Don Juan is the musical character, and as a result, who he is is connected to the musical score. It is not the character in his literary form that is presented. I agree with Stephen N. Dunning, who argues for a more complex structure at work in the character.58 The lack of completeness in Don Juan is expressed in terms of the lack of duration in the musical note as played. Kierkegaard uses this lack of duration to express an unconnected immediacy. In addition to the erotic, the character Don Juan presents the contemplative extreme that results in an unresolved either/or. Don Juan represents the aesthetic and is portrayed in two extremes. The first pole is referred to as the musical Don Juan, who represents the erotic. At the other extreme Kierkegaard has placed the Seducer (the reflective Don Juan), who is given over totally to the intellectual side of the aesthetic. It is not the conquest that interests him but the plotting of the conquest. In each extreme of the aesthetic, the individual and the self are of no concern. This becomes apparent in the erotic and reflective treatment of the women. In each case the individual woman has no value or existence except as an object of erotic or intellectual focus. The different aspects of the aesthetical are exposed in these two extremes of character, and demonstrate the Kierkegaardian theme that the aesthetic leads away from the possibility of individual self-realization and authentic existence unless one is able to become self-reflective. Bernard Zelechow challenges Kierkegaard's use of Don Giovanni as a basis for complex polarized Don Juan and suggests that Kierkegaard's understanding has generated an imbalance in the character.59 But it must be remembered that Kierkegaard uses those aspects of character, art, and music that demonstrate the nature of the aesthetic. As Dunning points out, "Desire, then, is an abstract immediacy that can be expressed only by music."60 This observation is true, but I think that there is much more going on than appears on the surface. Music is directly related to the nature of the character in that the musical note does not exist except in the moment of its playing. It has no history in the sense that it does not have a continued existence. The lack of this connective element which is present in time and history, cannot be expressed by Don Juan's musical nature. With this in mind it does not appear that Kierkegaard's interpretation distorts the character beyond recognition. Kierkegaard saw that the musical note has no historical existence. It, like the musical Don

47 History and Its Structure in Either/Or Juan, exists in a moment of time with no history. Each note is an individual note that has no dependence on any other note in the musical score in terms of its existence. When the notes are played together they produce a pleasing sound, but although the sound has the illusion of the historical it has no duration beyond its performance. So it is with Don Juan. Although it seems that he is living a connected life with meaning and history, when we examine his life we discover that his existence is a series of unconnected events. The moment cannot have fulfilment because it is isolated and fleeting. There is no possibility for reflection because there is no connectiveness.61 Don Juan cannot be interpreted because he cannot be questioned. He represents the erotic drive in man that continually seeks fulfilment in passion and finds none. The life of the erotic, if such exists, has no substance and value. This type of individual cannot have a history, cannot be historical, because of the lack of connectiveness in his life and because he reflects the universal and nothing more. There is passion in the moment for Don Juan, but that is all there is. There is no existence beyond the moment, there is simply the next moment and the next. The reader is left with a sense of frantic despair, for the character takes and in the taking destroys all that he touches. The historical for Kierkegaard is directed towards the individual and his relation to existence. The argument that Kierkegaard puts forward against Hegel is directed at the problem of individual existence. Kierkegaard understands that Hegel's universalism in terms of history destroys any opportunity for the individual and his fulfilment. This discussion is one of the central themes in The Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. It is important to recognize that the preliminary discussion takes place in Either/Or, because it helps clarify Kierkegaard's method of developing themes throughout the works. The character of Don Juan demonstrates a part of the universalization of the individual that Kierkegaard objects to in his development of the structures of the self. This focus, on what is seen by Kierkegaard to be the elements in the universalization of man, leads away from the individual and his existence. It is for Kierkegaard another example of the concession to the old focus for philosophy of "being as being," instead of, as he would have it, a movement to "being as existence." Kierkegaard's position is that, for history as well as for the individual, the intent is to gain an understanding in terms of the relations in existence which will lead to self-fulfilment. Kierkegaard understands that history is only of value if it in some way can aid in the emergence of the fully realized self. At the other extreme in the aesthetic, Kierkegaard introduces the reader to another type of seducer, the contemplative Don Juan. This

48 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

seducer is not interested in lust and passion, he is not driven onward to each succeeding moment. This seducer is consumed by the intellectual plan that he develops for the seduction. It is the intellectual plan that provides the satisfaction, but in the end it is as destructive as the seduction. The woman that is the focus of the plan is not engaged as an individual but as a project that provides food for reflection and nothing more.62 But, as Kierkegaard points out, the two extreme elements of character cannot exist together. The musical Don Juan cannot be reflective and erotic at the same time, for then he would cease to give himself over to passion totally. Nor can the contemplative Don Juan be reflective and erotic at the same time, for then he would not give himself over to reflection totally. Kierkegaard represents this reflective or contemplative Don Juan as Johannes the Seducer, who is given over completely to developing methods for seducing the women in his life. He must study each woman and develop his plans accordingly. There is a sense in which he regards each woman as an individual, but that individuality is not seen as having any significance. His disinterested and detached interest regards the individual, as such, only as a case study that is a part of the seduction. There is enjoyment in the stolen kiss, but for whom?63 Enjoyment for Johannes, but it is an enjoyment that treats the woman as an object. As a result she is a victim and as such is deceived. The great tragedy is that she is destroyed in the deception. Such is the lot of those who engage the reflective Don Juan. The problem is no longer a lack of connection, but a lack of compassion. The reflective Don Juan is engaged in a process of abstraction that leads to the universalization of the individual. The aesthetic individual is completely self-serving; for him there is no moral value to life. Life itself is simply for detached observation. Things are mildly interesting, but they have no value in themselves. The lives of others are interesting only in that they may serve as objects of study. The aesthete seeks the occasion, but he seeks it to serve himself. After it is past it no longer has any value or interest and cannot in any way be viewed as having ethical value. It does not have the status of the Socratic occasion, for it does not lead to knowledge and understanding, but rather to the fulfilment of a disinterested curiosity. In this part of Either/Or Kierkegaard indirectly raises a question that will be the focus of much of what is to follow in his work. It is the question of the value and role of history in the actualization of the self. If history is to serve the role that Kierkegaard portrays in the character of Johannes the Seducer then it will lead away from any self-actualization. History will only provide universal themes and be a subject of disinterested study. History in this context is of no value because it does

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not contribute in any way to the emergence of the self. In fact, if history can only be the subject for a disinterested observer, then the movement is once again to the universal and the structures of reality. The individual cannot be served by this position, because, as Kierkegaard points out, the individual neither is recognized nor has the opportunity to actualize himself. Reidar Thomte points out that this view, prevalent in Kierkegaard's age, separates thinking and living. Christianity becomes no more than a series of doctrines that seem in no way to be related to life.64 What is true of Christianity is also true of the self. There is no longer any passion; it has been covered over by a series of qualifications. V.

THE ETHICAL AND THE HISTORICAL

In part 2 of Either/Or, Judge William struggles to rescue the young man "A" from the hopelessness of the aesthetical life. The Judge represents Ethical Man, who has a great concern and respect for others, a concern and respect that are lacking in the aesthetic. For him action has moral consequences, and as a result one is responsible for one's own actions. It is with the Judge that "either/or" begins to take on its true significance. Up to this point in the discussion of the aesthetic, choice has had no real meaning or value. The Judge introduces the importance of choice. To choose is to face the true importance of "either/or." To do otherwise - to reject possibility and engage "bothand," but more importantly, to reject "either/or" and its dynamic - is to embrace the Hegelian reality.65 For Kierkegaard this will mean the eventual destruction of history and the loss of the possibility of becoming an authentic self because, as Kierkegaard argues, Hegel's view of history does not allow for choice. The phrase "either/or" represents for Kierkegaard the starting point for an understanding of what it means to be human. At every moment in life, Kierkegaard believes one is faced, not with the false freedom that Hegel's system offers, but with the true freedom in which the self exists and can continue to choose to exist. This understanding of the self and freedom is at the heart of the struggle between the Judge and the young man "A." In the essay "Shadowgraphs" we are brought face to face with the fact that our actions may well have a negative impact on others. The argument so far has been that the victims are not victims at all; that the relationships that the women have with Don Juan are beneficial to them. Stephen N. Dunning argues that "Shadowgraphs" is a study in the structures of grief and how grief affects the three women. They are Kierkegaard's "three brides of sorrow." Dunning goes on to suggest that Kierkegaard uses the essay to illustrate a dimension of the Hegelian

50 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

view of history.66 Although Dunning emphasizes the grief element of the essay, I think that the Hegelian element is more important and in fact goes a long way to explain the reflective nature of the Society of Buried Lives, which studies the women, and the problem with history viewed from a scientific standpoint. It is clear that Kierkegaard understood that Hegel's theory of history excluded freedom and offered, as an alternative, a form of determinism. The essay is written from the young man "A"'s point of view. It reflects an amoral position, and a longing for Don Juan's life and principles. "A"'s justification for his admiration for Don Juan's treatment of the women is that they are richer for their experience; it is their fault that they do not see this richness. The three women that are presented share in common their sense of despair and hopelessness. They dwell in the past and have made the past their present and their future. The Society studies the women as detached observers. Kierkegaard uses the nature of the Society to illustrate a part of the problem with the Hegelian thesis that history is to be studied as a science. The Society will move us to a disinterested metaphysical position if we choose it. From this perspective we will not be able to engage life and our selves. It is not without significance that the Symparanekromemoi, the Society of Buried Lives, meets on the Feast of the Nativity of Saint John the Baptist. In Kierkegaard's day the feast had lost most if not all of its religious importance, and was given over to indulging in sexual passions. It had become to a great degree the feast of Don Juan. Saint John the Baptist is the great forerunner, the last of the Old Testament and the first of the New Testament prophets, sent to prepare the way of the Messiah. All of this has been lost in the same way that the Church as the proclaimer of the hope of eternal life has lost her true mission. For Kierkegaard the Church has as little relation to and significance for the Gospel as the feast has for its true purpose. Kierkegaard's essay is a polemic against the true state of the Church, the bishops, and the society of his day. The Society is without courage, for neither the Society as a whole nor the individual members have the courage to escape. They view their subject with dispassionate interest, seeking neither to change nor to be changed by the events that they see. They seek the principles that stand behind the events, but take no interest in the events themselves. As a result nothing has changed for the members of the Society.67 Their world view is a Hegelian one. There is nothing that they can do; what will be, will be. They are not interested in the lives of the women as individuals, as fully developed persons. They view them as two-dimensional shadows to be watched and studied as objects. They do not wish to be involved

51 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

and they are not interested in the lives of these women in a passionate way. Their quest is an empty one; they seek what they cannot find. The principles that they think govern the lives of these women in fact do not exist. Kierkegaard argues that such a quest leads to isolation. It is not possible to find the truly authentic self in such abstraction. In fact such a task is endless and without reward.68 Kierkegaard contends that the danger of history is that it leads us to a concern for the movement of the historical at the expense of the individual and the development of the self; but more than that, it also leads us to the acceptance of our own hopelessness. This for Kierkegaard is the greater sin, because with the acceptance of the certainty of events a person is forced to accept determinism as a fact of life. We will be forever seeking the individual and the authentic where it is not to be found. As a result we are thrown into the web of history and are given over to qualification but no authenticity. There is no way out of the web of history, and there can be no value for the individual in the Hegelian historical view. In order that history may run its course the individual may well be sacrificed. It is this everpresent sense of the abstract, and of the utter futility of individual acts in the face of the fatalism in Hegel's theory of history, that causes Kierkegaard to react. It is his view that if for Hegel history is simply the record of what the individual or the nation has done and if there is a scientific predictability to history, then freedom is lost and as a result Hegel's theory is to be avoided at all costs. Kierkegaard objects to the study of history for the sake of study and nothing more. History cannot be and must not be allowed to become a subject for the abstract study of the disinterested spectator. This view, which Kierkegaard feels results from the Hegelian fatalism, can only create a condition that destroys freedom. This study is not a valid study for Kierkegaard because it does not allow the individual to become interested in himself or in his relation to others. History does not allow for the emerging of the individual, but does provide for his destruction. The three women in "Shadowgraphs" demonstrate the Kierkegaardian understanding of the effect of the study of history upon the individual. The historical view allows the past to determine the future. In fact it is Kierkegaard's position that the past becomes the future in the historical view. Contemplation of the past removes the individual further and further from the possibility of choice and opportunity. The message that the sketch of the women gives us is that to live in memories is to dwell in a world of shadows, because, try as one might, the past cannot be brought back. The student of history is the disinterested observer, the objective observer, attempting to arrive at the truth for the sake of the truth. But this type of inquiry will not move

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Kierkegaard's Living-Room

one to make choices for oneself. The ethical man, because he can reflect, can choose "either/or." That choice for Kierkegaard must be ultimately between good and evil. Kierkegaard contends that in a historical system given over to fatalism, there is no place for good, evil, or choice. It is important to understand what it is that Kierkegaard is objecting to in Either/Or. The work exposes the structure of the Hegelian view of history and in the process analyses its problems. Niels Thulstrup argues that Either/Or provides the structural groundwork for the argument against Hegel's view of history that is carried out in the Philosophical Fragments. The Judge is a key player in this development. Although he does not offer an alternative to Hegel, he does present the difficulties with the Hegelian view.69 Kierkegaard holds that a view of history that confines man to a fatalistic position is not viable, because it destroys freedom. It also confines man to a future that is controlled by the past. In fact, as becomes apparent in a reading of "Shadowgraphs," the past can become the only future. Kierkegaard maintains that the aesthetic philosopher will consider the past as the only proper subject, because it will not create the uncertainty that the future generates. The members of the Society want history to be Hegelian, to be a science and have a predictability about it that allows them to develop a historical plan. But in this history there is no opportunity for a person to develop, because there is no real choice. Freedom is restricted by the structures in which one exists; as a result there is no opportunity for the authentic self to emerge. The rules of history that have been discovered by an examination of past events allow the historian to develop a plan of history. The plan, once discovered, would provide man with the pattern that would lead history and mankind to its ultimate and predictable end. For Kierkegaard, man has to be free and radically so; he has to be able to make choices without restriction. This makes him responsible and gives him the dignity that Hegelianism would not and cannot allow. The ethical man makes the claim that he is indeed free and living in the world. He is free, but do his actions count? It cannot be denied that he has a concern, but can he claim to be responsible? Kierkegaard's answer is yes, because he does continue to choose and because he recognizes that his action has consequences for others. The philosopher at the aesthetic level makes no such choice. It is a matter of reflection, but only a reflection that views the historical as process. The process is relentless, it cannot be changed, it can only be studied. This means that philosophy is led to reject the possibility of change and embraces necessity.70 As a result, for Kierkegaard the

53 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

rejection of the possibility of an alternative adds to the hopelessness of history. It removes the possibility of freedom. There is no freedom because there is no future that can freely be chosen. The philosopher contemplates the evidence, but this contemplation is done in despair because it cannot be altered; it has become a poindess task in Kierkegaard's view. The Society studies, observes, examines, and contemplates the subjects in a detached manner simply for the sake of the process. The members are neither touched by what they see nor interested in affecting what they observe. In choosing the ethical an individual chooses the self, but in making such a choice he does not exclude the aesthetic. Kierkegaard is very clear that the self exists concretely in the world, and that this existence contains in itself both the aesthetical and ethical elements.71 It is this aspect of the structure of the self that is the most confusing. It would make sense that, in the light of all that Kierkegaard has had to say about the danger of the aesthetic, he would argue for an authentic self that is free from the constraints of the aesthetic. However, it becomes clear as we work our way through Kierkegaard's argument that the self is much more complex than it at first appears. The authentic self will have within itself elements of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious. To be authentic one must hold all of these elements in a dynamic tension that is never static and always reaching out towards the future in hope. It is by choosing the self, then, that the self will be known. The universals that aesthetic philosophy considers will not lead one to the self. As Kierkegaard understands Hegel's theory, the study of history leads down the same path, because it, as philosophy, is a study in abstraction. Each individual man must know his own self as an individual self. However, as the ethical contains with in it die aesthetic, so the self has a history that is a part of what it is. Consequendy, to know the self one must in some way know the historical self, but not based on the Hegelian model. Aesthetic man lives in a present that is moulded and shaped by his past. The past is his passion; by its study he hopes to determine the future. But for Kierkegaard it is a hopeless task because the past is a world of shadows. Donna Elvira has been captivated by Don Juan. He has forsaken her, yet she will not let go and struggles to retain what she once thought she had. The problem is that she struggles with memories and not with the future full of possibilities. For her memory is the future.72 But she hopes for what can never be again: she hopes to live the same events over and over. As a result she pushes reality farther away and escapes into the past, making it her future. She struggles pointlessly to make the historical the present moment.

54 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

This is the danger that Kierkegaard sees as arising from the study of the historical, either as an end in itself or as an attempt to establish a Hegelian science of history. As Robert C. Roberts argues, Climacus's point is that both God and man are free. There must be an unpredictable element to history if freedom is to be meaningful.73 But as he also points out, this does not rule out an element of certainty in events in some way. The difficulty is to understand exactly what this implies. Kierkegaard's characters struggle within the historical. It is by means of this struggle that he presents the magnitude of the problem that history presents. VI.

M A R R I A G E AS A H I S T O R I C A L E X P R E S S I O N

In the second volume of Either/Or Kierkegaard makes a comment concerning history in the context of a conversation about marriage. First love has about it a sense that there cannot be any change or development. It is an abstraction, in that it is forever fixed in time as a sculpture; it is perfection and cannot have possibility. It is this element of abstraction about first love that makes it unreal. The lovers cling to it because they fear that they will lose its perfection if they see in it possibilities. But we should note that this is first love and not the empty aesthetic game of the Seducer, which strips love of its passion. First love has about it an authenticity, but it is frozen in time. Marriage begins with the understanding that there is a possibility of movement. It is full of possibility and hope. Marriage engages the lovers in a dynamic that will lead towards the related existence of two authentic selves. This is a powerful and dynamic reality full of infinite possibility.74 History is related to movement, but a movement that grows out of the past. It is a reaching beyond what one was and is to what one can be. This reaching shapes the past not in terms of what it was but in terms of what it can be in the future. - a shaping that is directly related to value. This kind of renewing and transforming of the past experience is found in marriage. The relationship in marriage is dynamic in the sense that it evolves in a free manner. The past relation is built on and transformed.75 Kierkegaard sees this characteristic changing and transforming that takes place in marriage as essential to history. In some way history must be conscious of its own open-ended development as well; it cannot be disinterested in its own transformation. Marriage and history are self-reflective, but neither can be preoccupied with a past that is static. There must be a continual moving towards the future, and a continual transforming of the past into something else. What is true of marriage is also true of the individual. The authentic self transforms the past, not by engaging it, but by

55 History and Its Structure in Either/Or engaging the future and its possibilities. Value is not to be grounded in past relations, but in future relations. It is these future possibilities that enable the individual to come face to face with who he is.76 The golden age for marriage, the self, and history is not in the distant past that is to be longed for and sought after in vain. The golden age is to be found in the future in self-fulfilment. But this points to more than an ethical understanding of marriage. Stephen Evans says correctly that for the Judge ethical duty is the form of marriage.77 But I am suggesting that for Kierkegaard there is more to marriage than duty. There is the element of love and possibility that points to the future and freedom. George Pattison argues that marriage carries with it a deeper significance. "In the same way that the strong arm of the state serves to restrain the worst excesses of sinfulness in the larger social order, so marriage serves, in the words of the Book of Common Prayer, as 'a remedy against sin' for those who 'have not the gift of continency.' From this perspective, marriage is not seen primarily as serving purely human ends, but can only be understood within the Christian framework of creation, fall and redemption."78 This serves as a model for Kierkegaard's understanding of history. There is a necessity for connection between what has happened, what is happening, and what may happen in secular history and the reality of what Kierkegaard will call sacred history. The connective process that is present in marriage is a part of what history is for the individual. VII.

OUTER AND INNER

HISTORY

Kierkegaard expands his understanding of the nature of history for the life of the individual. With respect to the life of the individual there are two kinds of history,79 the outer and the inner. Each individual is the same in that he does not have what he struggles for and his life is given over to this struggle. Or he has what he strives for, but cannot claim it because something external to himself prevents him from taking possession of it.8° Kierkegaard defines history in terms of this struggle in which the individual strives to move beyond himself to something other than what he now is. So the individual is caught up in a struggle to become his possibilities. This struggle is not external to himself but is restricted by external forces. Kierkegaard understands the context in which this struggle takes place to be inner history.81 He defines the outer history in terms of possession and process, and argues that outer history does not have a true reality, using the term Realitet, which means "genuineness" or 'Validity."82 In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments he concludes that outer history is not reliable as a source of knowledge, arguing diat it is only an approximation.^ He

56 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

expands upon what he means by this term and its effect on his view of history in the Postscript?* Inner history engages the individual in a struggle with time. The struggle with time is the struggle to become, to develop to one's potential. But this development is not a matter of form; it is a free movement and is a matter of self-choosing.85 The inner struggle is related to the connectivity of the elements of time. The moments of time are not unrelated. The struggle is to bring the individual moments of time together. But the struggle also is to emerge as an authentic self in this temporal reality. The sum total of what has happened is the past, but this past in order to be understood must be related, must form a connected pattern. Coming to know oneself involves relating the moments of time to each other. This is because in the patterns that emerge from the connected moments a part of the self emerges. It is not only that part of the self has existed, but also that that part, which moves into the future, is shaped by the choices made in terms of the future. This struggle, the struggle with time, marks the beginning of inner history. Until the struggle begins there is only outer history, and that history has no real validity because it is not directed to the self but away from it.86 The outer history is the subject of art, and as a consequence is more abstract. It deals with concept and not with the developing individual. Kierkegaard holds that outer history and inner history represent two sides of the nature of man. Man must operate within a context; he does not stand in isolation. The external events that help to shape him are as much a part of who he is as are his choices. One must exist in order to become what one will be.87 Kierkegaard argues that the focus on the external reality and the struggle to understand it come first. Self-awareness follows the awareness that one exists in reality. As long as the struggle is external, the individual does not awaken to his potential, nor can he be in anyway aware of his own significance The self is not at risk in this conquest for that which lies beyond it, since the self is never chosen and is hidden because it is not the focus of interest. Outer history lacks validity because it does not and cannot validate the self. Only that which helps the self to emerge can in any way be considered as being genuine.88 Art and sculpture focus on this outer history and the closed individuality, because art and sculpture, according to Kierkegaard, are only able to deal with the abstract. They can only present a moment or an idea that is frozen. They cannot present that connection of moments that make up the inner struggle. Kierkegaard observes that the idea that sculpture expresses is fixed in a moment in time because sculpture removes that possibility of movement. As a result it cannot in any way be considered to be an expression of history. It may well represent a historical moment, but

57 History and Its Structure in Either/Or

because it lacks the movement in time that history engages it is not history.89 What the sculpture represents it represents in the abstract. The sculptor strives to express a universal theme, but for Kierkegaard this effort does not succeed. Sculpture can only present a moment in isolation from all other moments. The coming into existence that history in some way or other witnesses is the source of art and sculpture, yet that same art and sculpture cannot faithfully present history as history. Their focus is an abstract idea and although they appear to be presenting some aspect of the relations of the historical, they fail.90 External history leads away from the self and fosters the closing off of the awakening individual. Outer history is a part of the individual's existence, but that part of his existence that he cannot affect or directly control. Outer history is affected by outside forces. The individual can never come to a complete understanding of it. Kierkegaard holds that the individual's outer history is a part of what he has become, but a part that has been affected by a kind of necessity over which he has no control, because it lies beyond his field of choice. Every human creature lives as a historical being within an external history. He cannot control external history. However, he can give value to the inner history that is his alone by choosing his possibilities in the future. It is important to realize that he is historical in these two senses. They are both necessary for him to be truly historical. He lives in the world and as a part of that world, but his true self is not to be found in the external. It is only by choosing himself that he can escape the forces of external history and philosophy and can claim his inner history.91 It is his because it results from Either his choice of it in freedom, Or his rejection of it in freedom. It cannot be taken from him by the outer history, nor can he escape it. It is his because he has chosen it "either to his joy or to his despair." The choice that the individual makes in freedom is a choice that does not isolate him from the reality around him. The choice is his alone, but it involves him in relations. He chooses himself and this choice involves him with others and the world. The choice gains a history for the one who makes the choice, and at the same time because of the nature of history connects him with the history of others and the world. For Kierkegaard history that is freely chosen by the self is liberating. It does not control or shape the future but is controlled, shaped, and valued by the possibilities that are freely chosen in the future. This in turn does not cut the individual off from the world but connects him to that outer world.92 The history that results from the choice that one makes is different from the history that one has by merely coming into existence. Nature itself has a history in this latter sense. Kierkegaard will make this

58 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

distinction in his understanding of history in the Philosophical Fragments.^ In the history that results from a coming into existence, there is not a conscious awareness of the self, even if there is a self to choose. However, in the history that results from the free and conscious choice, the individual becomes aware of himself, and of the relation in which he stands with others and with the whole of reality. In fact, choosing, he chooses himself together with the world and its meaning.

3 The Poetic Study of the Temporal and the Eternal in Philosophical Fragments

Kierkegaard has made it clear in Either/Or that the self can only realize itself as an existential being in freedom. The self as a freely acting self must also be a self that has a connected past, and as a result, can be said to exist as a historic self. In Either/Or Kierkegaard has developed the framework for the historical self by an examination of its elements in his study of Don Juan in part i of Either/Or and in 'The Balance between the Esthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality" in part 2. He has demonstrated the necessity of connectiveness in memory and temporality. But this analysis does not address the question of the relation between history and faith. What Kierkegaard does in Either/Or is prepare the groundwork for a philosophical examination of the relation of the self to the historical and to the eternal. In addition, he demonstrates that the self, as a conscious being, is not only historical but reflective. Through the Judge it becomes clear that Kierkegaard has concerns about the ethical self. It is possible that there are echoes of a Hegelian world in what the Judge has to say. I think that it is very difficult to make out the Judge to be a Hegelian, however, because that would deny for Kierkegaard freedom and possibility. It is clear, from the position that the Judge takes, that choice and responsibility in the light of that choice are important principles by which to live. In his book Kierkegaard Patrick Gardiner argues for an admission on Kierkegaard's part that the Hegelian thesis permits self-fulfilment as a result of the social structures. Kierkegaard does see that for the individual to exist authentically he cannot live in splendid isolation.

6o Kierkegaard's Living-Room

However, this does not require Kierkegaard to acknowledge that the social structures must be present as Hegel conceives them. Gardiner points out that the Judge argues that the self is not an isolated being but can only fulfil itself in relation. This relation involves other selves, the natural order, and lived experiences. Gardener argues for a self that is understood to be social and not the result of "mystical doctrines."1 This, Gardiner suggests, is not unlike the Hegelian view, but Kierkegaard does not see Hegel in this light. In fact the term "mystical doctrines" points towards the ever-present Hegelian problem of ultimately deriving self-worth from the individual's place in the social order. This of course would be a social order which in turn is grounded in the Universal. For Kierkegaard, whatever value society may or may not have is derived from the individual's place in it and not the other way around. I do not think that the Judge's remarks as Gardiner cites them can be understood to mean an acceptance of the Hegelian thesis. In fact I think that they represent for Kierkegaard just the opposite. As Julia Watkin points out, fulfilment to be meaningful in Kierkegaard's world must be grounded in the individual's own relation with the divine. This is not the Hegelian reality, which sees social institutions as an extension of universal principles. Hagel's view implies for her, and I wholeheartedly agree, a denial of "personal lifestyle" and the fact that "the subjective-action aspect of ethics is not genuinely included in the big picture, distanced as it is from the observing individual."2 It is each individual who believes, and that choice must be made by that individual alone. In the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard begins to deal more direcdy with the relation between history and faith. However, it is important to remember that the Philosophical Fragments do not represent for Kierkegaard the solution to the problem of the relation between history and faith at the level of praxis, but instead provide an analysis of the question at the level of theoria. In the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard explores a series of what he refers to as 'Thought-Projects" in order to discover if it is possible to gain eternal happiness outside of the Christian context. Alastair Hannay understands these thought-projects to be offered as simply an alternative to Platonic idealism,3 but they are not a frivolous exercise on Kierkegaard's part. What he is doing is in earnest; he is beginning again, in order to leave no stone unturned. Hannay goes on to say that the other purpose for this work is a study of the relation between philosophy and Christianity.41 think that this is the direction in which Kierkegaard is leading us, but the discussion is begun in the Postscript. Although the framework and a great many of the elements can be given a Christian face in the Philosophical Fragments, the discussion is a project

61 Temporal and Eternal in Philosophical Fragments at the level of theory and not a practical discussion. Kierkegaard sets aside the examination of the question of history and faith in the Christian framework in order to conduct this investigation. It will help in understanding what is going on here to remember that in The Point of View for My Work as an Author Kierkegaard outlines the structure of his work. Here he reminds us that he is first and foremost a religious thinker. Although on occasion he denies that he is a philosopher and rejects philosophy, metaphysics, and the system (Hegel), he is still a philosopher. He does think and work in a systematic manner, but he does not use Hegel's structures or method. His understanding of terms and their use is precise, and must be carefully adhered to, if the reader is to follow his argument. Also, he attacks the problem of becoming a Christian from two different perspectives. In Either/Or he approaches the problem of becoming a Christian by moving from the aesthetical to the religious, an exercise that he completes in The Concept of Anxiety, Fear and Trembling, The Sickness unto Death, and Practice in Christianity. However, he understands that there is another dimension to the question of becoming a Christian. As a result, he approaches the problem from the philosophical, beginning with Philosophical Fragments and completing the exercise in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. Kierkegaard is candid about his two approaches to the problem. He sees the Concluding Unscientific Postscript as the turning point in his work. It is here that the problem of becoming a Christian is identified. Up to this point the approach has been indirect, through the use of pseudonymous authorship and character; now he moves to a more direct approach.5 Although it is important to understand that Kierkegaard deals with the problem in two ways, it is even more important to understand that the two avenues of advance are not kept distinct and separate. The discussion in his writing, whether it concerns the "aesthetical" or the "system," is interrelated. This relation becomes clear when it is understood that the aesthete views the world in a systematic way, because the system is a part of the method by which he deals with reality, as has already been demonstrated in the use of structure and style in the outline of the structures of the self in Either/ Or and their relation to the structures of history. In the Philosophical Fragments the same method is followed. The work begins as an ethicalphilosophical study, and as the work progresses becomes a religiousphilosophical study. Kierkegaard's postponing of the examination of the relation of history and faith in the Christian context is deliberate. In other words, the structure of this part of the exercise is a part of his overall plan. The relation of history to faith in the Christian context will follow when the question is put in its historical costume

62 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

in the Postscript. However, the end result of this investigation is the development of a framework which he will use to examine the question of the relation of history to faith within the context of the Christian religion. Kierkegaard's two separate yet interrelated approaches are a part of the complex fabric that he weaves to illustrate the nature of the self, the relation between the temporal and the eternal, the relation between faith and knowledge, and the relation between faith and history. At the beginning of the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard poses what is for him the question that is generated by the tension between history and faith. Can historical knowledge lead to faith in a being that is not historical?6 The question that Kierkegaard asks has two aspects: (i) Is historical evidence sufficient to establish an awareness of the eternal? and (2) Can faith be built on historical knowledge? Julia Watkin points out correctly that Kierkegaard is also addressing another question in the Philosophical Fragments, that of the relation between faith and knowledge. For Kierkegaard faith is not inferior to knowledge. Watkin argues that for him philosophical and historical certainty is not possible.7 This I think is a reaction on the part of Kierkegaard to Kant's view that faith is inferior to knowledge. Ronald M. Green, however, argues that Kant and Kierkegaard are in agreement on the relation between faith and knowledge.8 Kierkegaard holds faith and knowledge in sharp contrast, but insists that faith can offer us as much as knowledge. This view, which he makes clear in the Philosophical Fragments, is foreign to Kant in spite of what Green suggests. What Kant proposes is that the two realms of faith and knowledge are separate, but that knowledge of the physical world provided by practical reason is certain and objective. On the other hand, knowledge of God cannot be objectively deduced; it is related to freedom and morality, and as a result is subjectively established. Consequently faith is inferior to knowledge. Kant does not mean to suggest that God's existence is dependent upon us, but that there cannot be an objective proof of his existence.9 What Kierkegaard is asking is, why should we consider science any more certain than theology? If in the end it all comes down to a matter of faith, why is it that Kierkegaard explores the whole question of historical evidence and its reliability? It has been suggested by H.C. Wolf that Kierkegaard was interested in the question of certainty and the importance of historical truth because the Theological Faculty of the University of Copenhagen offered a prize to anyone who would write a response to this challenge: "In as much as the authority of the New Testament books has been the object of repeated attacks in recent times, so that the faith and the church appear to be endangered, a philosophical inquiry is

63 Temporal and Eternal in Philosophical Fragments requested into the question, if and how far the Christian religion is conditional upon the authority of the books of the New Testament and upon their historical reliability."10 It is true that the relation of faith and history was one of Kierkegaard's main interests. It is also true that, beginning with Either/Or, he developed the argument that enabled him to examine the problem in detail. This in itself suggests that the question had been puzzled over for a considerable period of time. In addition, his concerns with the university and the Church were long-standing ones. At least it may be said that such a question would have provided him with food for thought. Kierkegaard does make it clear in his writing that no position or person was safe from his scrutiny. The question then that Kierkegaard raises about the relation between history and faith is at the centre of his thought. The argument that he presents in the Philosophical Fragments begins at a point outside the Christian faith. C. Stephen Evans argues that this exercise is a thinly veiled attempt to give credibility to a position that Kierkegaard does not support in any way.' * There is no question that Kierkegaard has confidence in the Christian view, but he is determined to examine the question from a non-biased position. For Kierkegaard this is a serious voyage of discovery. Difficult as it seems for some to credit, Kierkegaard is engaged in a genuine quest for the answer to the question about the value and purpose of a faith in Christ. Not only must I, the reader, choose for myself, but that choice must be without influence. Kierkegaard suspends his own belief in order that I might find the truth for myself. In the argument Kierkegaard begins at a point outside the Christian faith in order to make the field level and fair. But this does not mean that he is being deceptive. It would be strange indeed for the champion of truth to stoop to deception in order for the truth to triumph. Kierkegaard has much more confidence in the truth than to use such tactics. Beginning with the Socratic position at the start of the Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard can, by the time he reaches the end, put the problem in its Christian context. Between the two points one finds a serious examination of the question of the relation of history to faith. What Kierkegaard is seeking to understand is the nature of history and faith, but he is also concerned to demonstrate whether or not history and faith are in some way interdependent. In other words, he asks the questions: ( i ) Are history and faith compatible, or do they destroy one another? and (2) If they do not destroy one another, can the interaction between history and faith be understood? As Kierkegaard will show, these questions are asked in the light of the dependability of historical evidence. The argument that follows in Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments

64 Kierkegaard's Living-Room discusses the nature of history and faith in the light of these questions. By the end of the Philosophical Fragments, having exhausted all of what for him are the possibilities that are available beyond the Christian context, he turns his attention to the question of the relation of history and faith within the framework of the Christian religion. He argues that there is an irony in the relation between faith and history in the Christian context. Christianity is historical in its claim concerning Jesus, yet at the same time it turns its back on the historical to establish the certainty of its foundation.12 What Kierkegaard has done is to pose again the question that is found at the beginning of the Philosophical Fragments,^ but this time in a Christian framework. What stands behind the problem in Kierkegaard's mind are the following questions: ( i ) Can the Christian claim concerning the divinity of Jesus Christ be justified on the historical evidence? and (2) Is faith's foundation to be found in the historical? In addition, Kierkegaard has been exploring the question of the relation between history and faith throughout the Philosophical Fragments. As Julia Watkins points out, Kierkegaard is about the business of demonstrating Christian doctrine in existential terms and at the same time criticizing these doctrines if they in some way fail to reflect the truth.14 In the restating of the original project, Kierkegaard poses the question, what is the relation between history and faith as understood at the level of the practical? Kierkegaard, having addressed the question at the level of theory in the Philosophical Fragments, will examine it again in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, in what he calls its "historical costume,"15 that is, at the level of praxis. By the end of the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard has established that it is possible for history properly understood and faith to be compatible within a philosophical system that is not Christian. The stage has now been set for the examination of whether or not all that has been said up to the writing of the Postscript can be expressed in the Christian framework. The specific task of this Christian philosophical system is to examine the Incarnation and its relation to the historical and the temporal. The Philosophical Fragments is written in the form of a hypothesis. Kierkegaard begins with what he calls a "Thought-Project."16 The structure of the argument that follows is expressed in a series of "if/ then" propositions. What Kierkegaard sets out to do is to examine the question of the relation between history and faith, and the relationship's possibility, from a number of theoretical positions. This project is in response to the question of the value of history and its relation to faith that is raised on the title page. If it is possible to understand the eternal without history, then it will be possible to dismiss history.

65

Temporal and Eternal in Philosophical Fragments

On the other hand, if it is not possible to dismiss history, then faith and history will have to be reconciled. Kierkegaard will argue for the traditional position that the Incarnation is necessary. As Stephen Evans points out, he stands against many contemporary theologians and holds to a conservative position.17 i. T H E " T H O U G H T - P R O J E C T " I N " A " : CAN THE TRUTH BE LEARNED?

In the "Thought-Project" Kierkegaard presents two hypotheses: (i) In "A" he presents the proposition: If truth can be learned, then is it to be found within the self? and (2) In "B" he asks: If truth can be learned, then is it to be found outside of the self? Behind the question of where truth is to be found Kierkegaard considers another fundamental question, the nature of time, and the relation of the temporal to the eternal. This discussion comes to the fore later in the Philosophical Fragments, but its significance is hinted at in the introduction to "B.'n8 Kierkegaard begins "A" by pointing out that "Can the truth be learned?" is the Socratic question, and that it is resolved for Socrates when he demonstrates that learning is a matter of recollection. The Socratic method relies on the principle that the truth is within and must be called forth by questions that lead the mind to recall what it already knows. It is never the case that you do not know for Socrates; it is a matter of not remembering.19 Socrates sees himself as a "midwife"; in other words, he understands his role to be that of one who enables those around him. Because knowledge is internal, and learning is a matter of recollection, Socrates acts as an agent to stimulate the learner to remember what he already knows. The teacher does not contribute to knowledge, except to act as an occasion to learn. Kierkegaard reasons that, viewed Socratically, the teacher and the occasion to learn are of no more than passing value. There is no one occasion or teacher that stands out as the occasion or teacher in the learning experience for Socrates. Any occasion or teacher will serve the purpose.20 Socrates seeks to help those around him to discover that knowledge is within and that this knowledge can be recalled. This helping must not draw attention to the teacher or his scholarship, because this would shift the focus to the teacher from the truth that is found within. The teacher cannot become a distraction, for then the teacher would act as an impediment in the seeker's quest to find the truth, and would serve to lead the seeker away from it. Kierkegaard understands that, for Socrates, any teacher and any occasion can serve to bring about the recollection, and as a result are incidental. The truth is to be found within. The individual becomes

66 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

the focal point for reality, because the knowledge that is within is knowledge of the eternal. The significant element in this paradigm is not the occasion or the teacher. For Socrates the centre point is the individual because the truth does not rest in an external reality, but within the individual to be discovered.21 Kierkegaard will point out later that this view of the self is not satisfactory. For him the self cannot be dismissed as easily for the sake of the truth. In the Socratic sense history is given second place, because it does not lead to the eternal. Relations in time are only of passing interest, because there is not one specific event above any other event that can lead us to the eternal. To think otherwise is to introduce the possibility that it is the event that is important. Kierkegaard points out that Socrates has the same problem with the event as he does with the teacher, because if the event has significance, then it will serve as a distraction and will lead the learner away from the truth. The only significant element in the quest for knowledge is the individual. Anything else is only of historical interest and nothing more, even if the teacher were Socrates or Prodicus. Relations external to the self are only distractions that lead away from the truth.22 What does Kierkegaard mean when he uses the term "historical interest"? Kierkegaard understands the term, as he uses it here, to convey a personal interest in one's own relation with reality. This relation is nothing more than an interest that is focused on who one is in relation to the external world, which for Socrates is not the true reality. For Socrates this interest will not lead to an awareness of the truth that is to be found within the individual, and as a result it is without value. In addition the historical may point towards certain external relations and give cause for the individual to reflect upon them. However, this reflection does not lead to the truth, because it focuses on the external. What is important for Socrates is that the eternal truth is found within the self. Kierkegaard reasons that the historical is of no consequence in the Socratic view, because it does not lead to the truth within, but only to an illusion of the truth. As Kierkegaard has pointed out, this false truth can be found in the teacher as well as in the historical. Consequently, at the end of "A" Kierkegaard maintains that for Socrates, the moment in which one meets the truth is only an occasion and is of no significance in itself. Robert C. Roberts drives this point home by pointing out that this is the mistake that Friedrich Schleiermacher, Rudolf Bultmann, and John Cobb all make. Roberts clearly establishes that this approach is on the surface both seductive and at first convincing. However, the folly of it all soon becomes apparent when one realizes that the Socratic Jesus neither can nor need be the Incarnate Jesus.23

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Temporal and Eternal in Philosophical Fragments

History is of no value in the pursuit of truth; in fact it can serve as a distraction. For the same reason, even time in the sense of the moment has no meaning or value in the Socratic model. Kierkegaard concludes that for Socrates the only aspect of reality that is concrete is the experience of the eternal that is found within the self. All else is only an illusion and a diversion that leads away from the truth. He argues that for Socrates the point of departure in time is of no value. This is because, at the point that one discovers that the truth has always been within, all else loses significance. In this context there is no "here" or "there," only a ubique et nusquam (everywhere and nowhere).24 The temporal point of departure is the present. As will be shown later, Kierkegaard considers that the relation between the past, the present, and the future is vital in his understanding of the relation between the historical and the eternal. However, at this point, he only hints at the problem that the present causes when it is understood as a temporal category.25 Kierkegaard suggests here only that the present has no spatial or temporal dimension, it is only a ubique et nusquam. As Stephen Evans observes, there are two things taking place here. First there is the discussion of whether the truth is to be found within or outside the individual. Second there is the discussion of the nature of the present and its significance in terms of what Kierkegaard calls the moment.26 I think that the discussion about Socrates and where the truth is to be found is a subtle dig at the Kantian thesis that God can only be known because he has made man a moral creature. Also I think that the question of time and its nature is significant if we are to understand the point that Kierkegaard makes about the necessity of a historical event as a point of departure. Kierkegaard will address the question of the present and its relation to time in the Philosophical Fragments and in the Concept of Anxiety. He understands that Plato sees the problem, and that he attempts to resolve the difficulty. It is Kierkegaard's view that Plato does not succeed in his endeavour. The present does emerge as pivotal in the Kierkegaardian thesis, and Kierkegaard does produce a resolution to the Platonic quandary when he determines that the proper category for the present is the eternal. His resolution to Plato's problem enables Kierkegaard to work out the relation between the historical and the eternal. This resolution opens the door to an understanding of the relation between history and faith. Also, it becomes clear that, in Kierkegaard's view, as a result of the new view of the present that he puts forward, history and faith are both understandable, but only in a relation with one another. The present does not seem to fit into any recognizable category, because it has no fixed point in time or space and yet is always present and is everywhere.

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ii. THE " T H O U G H T - P R O J E C T " IN "B": CAN THE

TRUTH BE LEARNED?

In "B" Kierkegaard discusses the second hypothetical thought-project. In both thought-projects it is important to remember that the Socratic dictum "know thyself is the goal. However, in "B," although knowledge of the self is still internal, the knowledge of the divine is external to the self. Stephen N. Dunning argues that Kierkegaard does not make it at all clear that the distinction that will be drawn out by the end of "B" is one that is clearly between the Socratic and the Christian.27 I agree that it is not clear that Kierkegaard is making a specific Christian distinction at this point, but is not through any lack of clarity. It is important to keep in mind that what Kierkegaard is setting out in the Philosophical Fragments is a series of theoretical projects and nothing more. Christianity is not a theoretical model but a practical one. As a result, at this point he is not discussing the Christian approach, and no matter how similar the illustration to Christianity may be, it is not Christianity. For Socrates, when you know yourself, you have knowledge of the divine, but in the "B" project, because the knowledge of the divine is external knowledge, it is always knowledge that is understood in relation to the self; as a result, the self needs the Teacher. Kierkegaard discusses the question under three subheadings: the "Preceding State,"28 the 'Teacher,"29 and the "Follower."30 Having examined the question in the Socratic context in "A," he poses the problem in a different context. Now Kierkegaard argues for a situation in which the moment is all-important. In fact it is to become the only moment that is important because it is the moment of transformation. It is that moment at which the eternal enters the temporal.31 In this second thought-project the moment takes on a decisive importance, because it is in this moment, and this moment alone, that the eternal, which before this point did not exist in time, begins to exist in time. The moment has become in this project the central point of focus for reality, and as a result is a radical departure from the Socratic view. Kierkegaard begins the "Preceding State" by pointing out that the problem of seeking the truth is equally difficult whether or not one has possession of it. However, Kierkegaard observes that Socrates removes this difficulty by establishing that everyone already possesses the truth. Kierkegaard reminds us that in the Socratic resolution the moment has no significance. It is in project "B" that Kierkegaard presents an the option to the Socratic project "A." He wants to consider the situation when one gives the moment what he calls "decisive significance." Stephen Evans32 argues that this discussion presents

6g

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Kierkegaard's reaction to Feuerbach's stand that religion is anthropocentric. Feuerbach's approach in the end reduces faith to a kind of subjectivism, which is the point that George Pattison makes.33 I cannot disagree with this thesis and reading of Kierkegaard, but I think that the real antagonist for Kierkegaard is Kant more than Feuerbach. If the moment is to have "decisive significance," Kierkegaard determines that the individual cannot possess the truth in any way, not even in ignorance, for this would reduce the thought-project to the Socratic position of recollection.34 If the problem is not going to be resolved Socratically, then the individual must be outside the truth, and not even moving towards it as a proselyte, but moving away from it in the state of untruth. Kierkegaard wants to establish that the state of untruth is not the same condition as ignorance. Ignorance presupposes that there is something that we are ignorant of, which means for Kierkegaard that one could recall the state when one was not ignorant. In the state of ignorance one is aware of what one is ignorant of, but in the state of untruth one is not even aware that one is in that state. But this creates a new problem, for if one is outside the truth in a state of untruth, how can one be reminded of that which one cannot recall? For Kierkegaard the relation between the teacher and the learner is critical. The teacher cannot help the learner to recollect what he has forgotten in terms of the truth, because that would reduce the teacher's relation to the learner to the Socratic position. But the teacher can and does act as the occasion that enables the learner to discover that he is in untruth. This action on the part of the teacher causes the learner to turn in on himself, because the teacher acting as an occasion thrusts the learner away. This turning in on the part of the learner causes him to discover that he is in untruth. This discovery concerning his own state of existence is his alone to make. In this act of discovery the teacher plays the Socratic role, because it is only the learner who can discover for himself that he is in untruth. Kierkegaard is not suggesting that the Socratic model is being adopted in "B"; what he is conceding is that the teacher acts like Socrates, in that he serves as the occasion to move the learner to discover his own state of untruth. The individual is of utmost importance because it is a matter of self-discovery. No one else can discover the truth but the individual concerned. It does not matter who knows the truth; if I do not know the truth then it is unknown to me. The moment then does take on a new importance in this context.35 The moment to which Kierkegaard refers is the foundational principle for the new "if/then" "B" proposition. That moment now is significant. Kierkegaard points out that the moment must be external to every individual. If it is not, then there will be as many significant moments

70 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

as there are learners. Alastair Hannay argues that this represents a break with the western philosophical tradition and illustrates that Hegel's system is nothing more than the culmination of the Platonic error.36 The importance of this point cannot be underestimated: in placing truth in a position external to the individual, Kierkegaard is arguing for a revolution in the foundation of western thought. He goes on to say that the teacher must bring the truth to the learner and must provide the condition for understanding the truth. Otherwise, if the learner were in the condition to understand, he would only need to recollect the former condition, which would place "B" in the Socratic. The reason that this is the case is because it would mean that the learner would no longer be dependent on the teacher but on himself to discover the truth.37 No question can be asked unless there are certain relational propositions. At least, no question can be asked that can hope to have an intelligent answer unless there are these relations. You have to be able to ask about something if you can hope to get an answer, and you have to be aware of that something if you are to ask about it. Kierkegaard's position is that there is a relation between every question and answer. His point is that if the learner does not know that he does not know, then he will never be able to come to that condition where he will know that he does not know, unless he is helped there. Kierkegaard goes on to say that as the "B" project is presently structured, the teacher cannot provide both the condition and the truth. (The truth that Kierkegaard speaks of here is the divine truth, and is not to be understood as scientific fact. It is the same truth that Socrates seeks in "A.") As Kierkegaard will show later, this will only be possible if the teacher is a god. Learning depends ultimately on the condition, for if the condition for learning is not there then learning is not possible. The presence of the condition rests with the god, for it is the god that provides the condition. Again for Kierkegaard it is a matter of transformation and not simply a matter of correction.38 At this point it is important to remember that Kierkegaard's argument about learning and where knowledge is grounded was a part of the mainstream debate of his day. As Patrick Gardiner illustrates, Kierkegaard's concern in this regard was also the concern of many of his contemporaries.39 In the new "if/then" project the truth is external to the learner and this places the learner in a state of untruth. In addition the moment has now taken on significance, because if the eternal is not within the individual then there must be a moment when the eternal has entered the temporal. This being the case, Kierkegaard maintains that the role of the teacher now must be different, because now the teacher must not only provide the learner with the condition but also lead the

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learner to the truth. The only teacher that is capable of providing the condition and leading the learner to the truth is the god. What follows is Kierkegaard's analysis of why it is god and only god who can be the teacher. Kierkegaard at this point is not suggesting that the god is in any way related to the Christian understanding of God.4° He begins by maintaining that existence presupposes creation. It is god who creates and as a result it must be god who provides the condition for understanding the truth. If one now exists in untruth, and is not aware of it, Kierkegaard's position is that this must mean that the individual now exists in a state in which the condition is not present, which Kierkegaard calls the state of untruth. The god did not remove the condition after having given it, nor is it possible that the condition was lost by accident. The condition for the truth was lost by the person himself in an act of choosing. The loss of the condition then is a conscious act on the part of the individual. The individual can blame no one else; it is through an act of will that the loss occurs. This act introduces the concept of responsibility and as a result removes the opportunity of shifting blame to the god or to someone else. At some point one is brought face to face with oneself and one's own responsibility.41 For Kierkegaard, the individual in untruth is there as the result of an act of volition. One is in the state of untruth as a result of choosing to be there, and one remains there as the result of choice. The choice is an act of rebellion. This view is in keeping with Kierkegaard's understanding of the nature and structures of the individual. The individual is conscious and as a result is able to have connected memory; the individual is free and as a result can act independently; the individual is capable of change and as a result can choose to be in untruth. The question for Kierkegaard then is, "Can the individual choose to be in truth?" Whatever the state in which one exists, one is there as the result of a free choice. As Kierkegaard points out, the god provides the condition, reminds the learner that he is in a state of untruth, and also reminds the learner that he is there as the result of his own choice. Kierkegaard calls the state of untruth sin. But this sin is not visited on the individual by some external being. The self is in this condition because he chose to be.42 However, although the learner is in the condition of untruth as the result of a free act of the will, in the state of untruth he is not free. It may appear that he is free, because he has chosen to be in this state, but his freedom is an illusion: as the result of his choice he has excluded himself from the truth. But what effect does being in the state of untruth have on his freedom? The act that places the individual in a state of untruth is an act made in freedom. As a result Kierkegaard argues that one is in

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untruth in freedom. By this he means that one arrives in the state of untruth by an act of the will; in other words the choice to act is a free act. However, he does not say that the state of untruth allows the individual to be free.43 Freedom for Kierkegaard cannot be restrictive or exclusive, but the state of untruth is exclusive, for one is excluded from the truth. As a result one is in a state that is equivalent to slavery, for one is not free to exist in truth. This exclusion from the truth means that the individual is not aware of the truth, and he cannot choose that of which he is not aware. As a result, it is Kierkegaard's position that the freedom that one seems to have in the state of untruth is an illusion. Kierkegaard is insistent that the learner is in the state of untruth as the result of his own action, but as insistent that the learner cannot remove himself from such a state, even though it might seem that if the learner willed himself into the state of untruth, then surely he should be able to will himself into the state of truth. As has been noted already, at this stage in the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard is not engaged in a discussion of the Christian faith, but he is making a point that is close to the heart of the Christian religion. The point is that man in the fallen state cannot save himself. Kierkegaard's argument deals with the problem at the non-Christian level. What he is demonstrating is that the learner cannot help himself if the limits of "B" are not to be overstepped; otherwise one reverts to the Socratic program. It is worth noting that throughout the argument Kierkegaard makes reference to the importance of the Socratic position. Kierkegaard understands Socrates to be the founder of philosophy in the western sense of the term. For Kierkegaard, Socrates is more than the "midwife"; he is the father of philosophy as we have received it. His great allegiance to Socrates results from the Socratic dictum "Know thyself." Nevertheless Kierkegaard argues that in the Socratic position the moment of "liberation" would no longer have "significance" and would fade. The moment in this case could be any moment that the learner chooses. Because the moment has lost its significance, the learner would not be aware of it, and as a result, would not be aware of his change of state.44 This would place "B" back within the Socratic. Consequently, Kierkegaard determines that the teacher must be understood in a new way and he introduces the terms "saviour" and "deliverer." One is saved from the slavery of sin and one is delivered from one's self. Guilt is then removed and the self is restored to the truth by the "reconciler."45 There are those who have argued that such terms indicate that Kierkegaard is really arguing for the Christian paradigm, but he has already pointed out this is not the case. We need

73 Temporal and Eternal in Philosophical Fragments to remind ourselves that Kierkegaard is operating at the level of a "thought-project" and nothing more. Kierkegaard's introduction of these concepts leads him to see the role of the teacher as that of a judged Although the teacher in this new condition cannot influence the learner, he does provide the learner with the condition and the truth. This teacher, however, cannot be forgotten, nor can he be allowed to become of merely passing interest, because it is the teacher that makes the coming to the truth possible. At the end of "The Teacher" Kierkegaard has established the importance of the "moment." The moment has been transformed. It is no longer one of a series of ordinary moments, but a moment that has taken on an eternal import. For this is the one moment that is the fullness of time.47 At this point in the Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard touches on what for him will become one of the major issues in the discussion of the relation between history and faith. He points out that the "moment," in the context in which he has been speaking, must have a special significance, because this moment is the one in which the temporal and the eternal meet. It would appear, he says, that the moment is bound by the temporal categories. In other words, it comes into existence; it has potential existence in the future; it exists in the present; then it fades into the past and exists in a historical sense. In this context it has no more than Socratic significance. But it must be decisive, because it is the moment in which the eternal enters the temporal. If this is the case in "B," and it is, then the moment does not seem to fit into the standard understanding of the temporal categories as the future, present, and past have been understood to do. This problem is central to what is to follow in the Philosophical Fragments and the Postscript and must be understood before the question of the relation between the temporal and the eternal can be resolved. The resolution of this question will enable the relation between history and faith to be understood. Kierkegaard discusses the relation between the future, present, and the past as outlined by Plato. He points out the problem that Plato raises with the present as a temporal category and offers his own answer to Plato's difficulty. Kierkegaard's purpose here is to introduce the problems and lay out the foundation for the further discussion that he develops further in the Philosophical Fragments, and in Postscript and The Concept of Anxiety. Kierkegaard is correct: the defence of the moment as significant in this "if/then" project in "B" is vital, if the discussion is to escape the return to the Socratic structure as articulated in "A." If he is to defend the position that the moment in "B" is of such significance that it is

74 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

to be equated with the fullness of time, then he must maintain its importance and its independence from the individual. Stephen Dunning points to The Concept of Anxiety for the full development of the concept of the moment. It is in terms of the moment that the past, present, and future take on their true value and meaning.48 It is in the light of this understanding that Kierkegaard defends his position and resolves what he sees as the problem with the present. As Dunning suggests, Kierkegaard's discussion, as it relates to the present, is to be found in the Concept of Anxiety and the Postscript. Having resolved this question, Kierkegaard develops both the theoretical argument and the practical application of that argument in the Christian context. In the process he also lays the foundation for the resolution of the question of the possibility of the compatibility of history and faith. Kierkegaard now turns his attention to the learner. He begins by pointing out that although the learner, when we first meet him, exists in a state of untruth, he is still human. His humanity does not depend upon whether or not he exists in truth; his humanity is a part of his given condition.49 However, his receiving of the condition and the truth do have an effect on him, for now he is a different person. Kierkegaard maintains that this difference is so great that the person is not recognizable; he has become a "new person."50 In the former state of untruth the individual, although he was not aware of it, was moving away from the truth, but now as a new person his direction has been dramatically altered. Kierkegaard declares that the individual is now travelling in the opposite direction. For Kierkegaard this turning around can only be described in one way. He uses the term conversion deliberately, because it is the only term that can describe this transformation adequately. Conversion is more than a change of direction and focus; it is a radical shift that transforms the individual.51 The state of untruth was arrived at by the individual's own choice, and his conversion cannot take place, according to Kierkegaard, until the individual becomes aware of his state of untruth. Kierkegaard asks how it is possible to leave the old state without feeling sorrow. He declares that it is not possible, but qualifies the sorrow by maintaining that it results from being in the state of untruth for such a protracted time. The sorrow is not the result of leaving the state of sin, but of the self s new awareness of the condition in which he had existed. He is sorry for having lived there for so long. This gives the sorrow a designation. Kierkegaard calls it repentance. Repentance does not encourage one to return to the sinful state but to reject it.53 This concept can be directly linked to the understanding that Kierkegaard has already established that it is to the future that we must look if we are to find our true selves.

75 Temporal and Eternal in Philosophical Fragments

Kierkegaard now takes the understanding of conversion and gives it another dimension. This conversion is from untruth to truth; from a state of non-existence that has no freedom to a state of existence that has freedom. It is then a dramatic change in existence on the part of the individual. This is rebirth and it is not an external event that involves others and the world. It is a transformation that is subjective and personal. It is a act of the will that opens the door from non-existence to existence.53 Kierkegaard points out that when one is born into the world the first time, this is a singular and individual event. When one moves from the state of "not to be" to the state of "to be," again this is a singular and individual event. There is a difference between the first and second events, but they are both a type of birth. The second event is, as he says, the change in the state of existence brought about by the movement from untruth to truth. Kierkegaard observes that the transformation is a transformation in the individual and is an internal transformation; consequently, he observes that we can be baptized in the sense of being washed en masse because that is an external action, but we cannot be reborn en masse because that is an individual experience and transformation. This transformation depends upon our exercising the use of our will in freedom. In addition, Kierkegaard points out that there is a parallel to be drawn between the role of Socrates as midwife in the theory of knowledge as recollection, and the role of the teacher in the theory of rebirth. Nevertheless, Socrates is owed nothing whereas the divine teacher is owed everything. Not only does the teacher provide the moment and the occasion, but it is the teacher who reveals himself because he is the truth. The result is that the moment and the teacher are of vital importance, because the moment marks the external event in which the eternal enters the temporal, and it is the teacher who reveals himself, because the teacher is the truth. It is important to note that at this stage Kierkegaard identifies the teacher as a god; in other words, the teacher is simply a divine being, and can be any divine being. This argument is set within the context of an "if/then" proposition. Kierkegaard in this "B" proposition uses terms such as disciple, which he renders as "follower" or "learner." The Latin root of disciple is discipulus, which is derived from disco, meaning "to learn," and puer, meaning "son."54 A disciple is a son of learning. The grounds for rendering disciple as "follower" are in the understanding of the term to describe someone who follows someone or something in order to learn.55 Conversion he uses in the sense of being turned around. The Latin root of conversion is converto, which means to turn or whirl around, to wheel about, to cause to turn, to turn back, reverse.56 He

76 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

uses the term repentance in the sense of "feeling sorrowful." The Latin root of repentance is paeniteo, which is derived from poena, meaning indemnification, compensation, satisfaction expiation, punishment, penalty. The meaning of paeniteo is to repent or be sorry, and in its neuter form it means be sorry.57 Kierkegaard uses repentance in the sense of sorrow or regret, and in addition he uses the term in the sense of suffering. Kierkegaard does not give the terms a Christian context in the "thought-project," and to suggest that he does so, or that there is an underlying Christian influence, is not to be true to the tone that he sets at the beginning of Philosophical Fragments. As I have said before, Kierkegaard makes it clear that this is a secular exercise. The words are treated as secular words and they are not at this point used within the "historical costume" that he will give them in the Postscript. The moment becomes the point at which there is an awakening. One becomes aware of the state in which one has been existing. For "B" this moment is the pathos of the learner, as was recollection for Socrates. "Whereas the Greek pathos focuses on recollection, the pathos of our project focuses on the moment, and no wonder, for is it not an exceedingly pathos-filled matter to come into existence from the state of 'not to be'?"58 But why does Kierkegaard maintain that this coming into existence in rebirth should cause suffering and sorrow? Because the condition of untruth in which the individual formerly existed has been a condition in which the individual was not aware that he was not in the truth, nor did he realize that such a thing as truth existed. The sorrow arises out of the fact that he has been so long coming to this awareness. As Kierkegaard understands the task before him, it is to help the individ ual become aware that he has existed in untruth. Kierkegaard argues that one cannot make this discovery on one's own.59 As a result, there is justification for helping anyone to become aware of this condition. Kierkegaard has presented in "A" of the "Thought-Project" the Socratic position that argues that knowledge is internal, and in "B" the alternative position that knowledge is external. In "A" the teacher and the occasion are of no importance, but in "B" he argues that if knowledge is to be external, then the moment and the teacher become sig nificant. The moment becomes critical to the whole argument, because it is that singular moment in which the eternal enters the temporal. in. K I E R K E G A A R D ' S R A T I O N A L E FOR THE DIVINE TEACHER

In "The God as Teacher and Savior" Kierkegaard examines the Socratic teacher as set forth in "A" and the teacher as set forth in "B."

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This examination enables Kierkegaard to declare the disadvantage of the Socratic position and the value and necessity of the divine teacher. Kierkegaard begins by pointing out that because Socrates is a human, he is born in a specific place and time. His temporality requires that he grow up under the influence of the social conditions that surround him. In addition he has an influence on those around him. When he feels that he is ready, he presents himself as a teacher, and begins the process of teaching. In so doing he fulfils himself and the expectations of those around him. Kierkegaard argues that Socrates teaches and the student learns and, as a result, "[The teacher's] relation, therefore, is at all times marked by autopathy just as much as by sympathy."60 For Kierkegaard this is the way that Socrates sees things because Socrates refuses any payment for what he did. Socrates' dedication to his vocation is explained by his love of the divine. On the other hand, Kierkegaard points out, the god needs no student to help him come to an understanding of himself, and no occasion can affect him. Why does he appear? Kierkegaard answers the question by an appeal to Aristotle. There is movement according to Aristotle axiVTjToq Tiavra /wet ("unmoved, he moves all"), but this movement is not simply a matter of self-movement, it is an act of love.61 The action of the divine is to be understood as an expression of love in response to the need found in the temporal. This action finds its expression in the temporal in the moment. The moment results from the divine action which is in keeping with the divine love.62 From the point of the divine, Kierkegaard says, the foundation of the divine action must be love and that love must be understood to be expressed as a seeking of the learner in order to win him. It is not then a selfish love on the part of the god. It is a selfless love, a love that is expressed in terms as a love for the other. It is as it turns out an expression of the divine love, because any other love would be defective.63 Here is to be found the great puzzle: how can the temporal come to terms with the eternal, even if the eternal enters the temporal; and how can the eternal enter the temporal without destroying it? The inequality that is found in the relation between the temporal and the eternal is also present in the relation between the teacher, who is a god, and the learner, who is a mortal. For this reason the love that exists is unhappy. How then is this unhappiness to be resolved without destroying the mortal?64 Kierkegaard sees the problem for the god to be one of difference and reconciliation. The question becomes: how is the divine to make himself known to the learner, and at the same time, because of the difference, not destroy the learner? It is this question to which Kierkegaard now turns his attention. Kierkegaard reasons that at one level, lovers are unhappy because they cannot have one another. But there is another kind of unhappiness

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that does not result from isolation but rather from the lack of understanding. The separation between the god and the self cannot be resolved by emotion. It can only be resolved by an understanding that must begin with the divine. It is the divine who must make the first offer because it is only the divine who truly understands.65 The true peace is to be found not in the emotions, but in the intellect. Kierkegaard argues that it is the superior intellect that understands the real problem, and it is the superior intellect that alone can initiate the resolution. Kierkegaard next provides the analogy of the king and the maid to illustrate not only the problem of difference and understanding, but also its resolution. This is a part of the preparation for the philosophical examination that follows in the Philosophical Fragments and the Postscript. The use of a direct analogy is a development and extension of what was done in Either/Or. The king loves the maid and wants her love in return; however, he has to deal with the question of their relationship. Would she be happier if she did not know who her lover truly was? To be loved in obscurity and retain the self would be better than to love and be overcome by a superior being. How can the superior being love the inferior being as an equal? There seems to be no resolution to the problem because there can be no true understanding.66 But out of the impossible the possible emerges. At this point Kierkegaard breaks in on the analogy and summarizes the argument in a philosophical context before proceeding to resolve the problem that has been presented.67 He reminds us of the problem that the Socratic position generates for us and that it is to be avoided at all costs. It should be noted that the "A" and "B" sections that Kierkegaard sets out here are not to be confused with the "A" that discusses the Socratic understanding of learning and the "B" that he offers as an alternative in 'The Thought-Project." For sake of clarity in this text the sections will be marked as 'A' and 'B.' Kierkegaard offers two resolutions to the problem in 'A'68 and in 'B' respectively.69 In 'A' he proposes that the division be solved by way of an ascent. The learner is drawn up to the god and in the joy of the divine embrace the misunderstanding is forgotten.70 However, this is really not a resolution to the problem, for although the maiden would respond in a positive manner, it is a form of deception. The girl would choose, but not in freedom. What is true of the king and the maid is also true of the god and the learner. In addition, the unity is accomplished by the learner forgetting himself, and this unity does not accomplish a true unity. It will become clear in the later works that Kierkegaard is concerned that the self not be lost in the pursuit of the truth, and that the action of the individual, in choosing the truth, must always be made in

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freedom. These two principles are suggested in this analogy and Kierkegaard's accompanying commentary. The acceptance of the king by the maiden results from the adoration in 'A,' and even if the maiden and the learner appear to be happy, the king and the teacher will not be happy because the relationship does not result from understanding. The unity that is sought by the use of the ascent does not produce the satisfactory result. It leads to sorrow and disappointment. Apparently, when the finite meets the infinite the finite will be destroyed.71 The point that Kierkegaard makes is simply that a Pyrrhic victory is no victory at all. The self has freely chosen untruth. In some way it must also choose truth. The choice must be free and it must also be real. What is offered in 'A' is a resolution, but a resolution that in essence destroys the self, because the self surrenders the freedom that Kierkegaard will later demonstrate to be its essence. Having demonstrated in 'A' that ascent does not provide a satisfactory unity, Kierkegaard turns his attention in another direction. He begins by reminding us of the ever-present danger of slipping back into the Socratic, together with the danger of the learner's being deceived into thinking that he is always in debt to the teacher. In addition Kierkegaard reminds us that the moment must be always significant if knowledge is external and the learner exists in untruth. The god, who is the teacher, assists and also gives birth to the learner, because the learner moves from "not to be" to "to be."72 The learner is in debt to the god for everything and this debt is profoundly different from a debt between two humans. The transformation is so profound that it cannot be expressed in any other term than that of procreation. The assistance that is offered from one human being to another places the helper in the position of the Socratic midwife. However, when the god appears, the assistance is of such a nature that it is procreative. This results from the fact that the love of the god is a regenerative love; consequently the human being is transformed and not simply restored. Because this is an expression of the divine love it cannot be compared to love between two persons. It is of a much higher order and generates a new being in freedom.73 Now Kierkegaard proposes an "if/then" proposition to resolve the difficulty. The ascent has failed; as a result the obvious solution is to propose a descent. The rationale is clear: if the ascent leads to the destruction of the self, then the alternative is that the divine must descend. Because it is to be a divine descent, the divine must be hidden. The concealment must be complete in order that the divine may not be accidentally discovered.74 As it will turn out, the discovery must be one of revelation and faith, not of historical accident. Otherwise the individual might well think that the god is not necessary.

8o Kierkegaard's Living-Room

In this resolution, Kierkegaard presents the foundation of the argument that is to follow concerning the relation of the historical and the eternal. The question that becomes evident as a result of this solution is, how can we know that the eternal has entered the temporal, if the eternal is not cloaked, but takes on the form of a servant as his true form? The eternal cannot be deceptive, if he is eternal. As a result, the entering into the historical by the eternal must in some way take on the historical. But it must not be an act of hiddenness; it must be a true entering into the historical in the form of a servant. This entering-in having taken place, what is to be gained? If the learner sees nothing more than a servant, and if that is what the god has become, how can any more than that servant be seen? The point that Kierkegaard makes in this resolution is that this entering into the temporal by the eternal is not an illusion. It must be real. To be in the form of a servant means that the divine must take upon himself all aspects of the servant. He must be as the servant is in everything.75 The problem of recognition is resolved when we remember that Kierkegaard has shifted the problem from a question of "Being as being" to one of "being as existing." Kierkegaard argues in De Omnibus Dubitandum Est that philosophy begins with doubt and that doubt begins in existence. Furthermore, the resolution to the question of being is not to be found in seeking to understand Being as being. It can only be meaningfully understood in existence in terms of "being as existing." This new insight into philosophy's study of being begins with Descartes, and for Kierkegaard is revolutionary. Kierkegaard now sees the problem as one that deals with existence and no longer as a question of Being as such. Consequently, the god is recognized as being the servant by reason of his existence as that servant. The god reveals himself by not revealing himself. This resolution to the problem of how the god enters the temporal and how he is discovered to be the servant is a resolution that only the god could conceive.76 Having presented the problem in what he calls its poetic form,77 Kierkegaard now begins to discuss the question in its philosophical context. Having discussed the question of where the truth is to be found by an examination of the Socratic view that it is to be found within, and finding this resolution unsatisfactory, Kierkegaard moves on to examine the question again by placing the truth outside the learner. This second proposition has necessitated giving the moment significance. Consequently it not only opens up for Kierkegaard the possibility of resolving the question of where knowledge is to be found, but also makes it possible for him to examine the more central question for him, the relation of the historical to the eternal. In the

81 Temporal and Eternal in Philosophical Fragments

"Absolute Paradox" that forms chapter 3 in the Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard proposes that the resolution to the question of how the eternal enters the temporal is only to be understood in a paradox. In what is to follow he resolves the problem of the relation of the learner to the teacher and addresses the question of the relation of the historical to the eternal.

4 The Puzzle of the Absolute Paradox

Kierkegaard begins his discussion in the "Absolute Paradox" by pointing out that Socrates' desire to know fulfils itself in knowing, and that the focus of the Socratic desire is self-knowledge. Kierkegaard holds Socrates' pursuit of knowledge in high regard because of its focus on self-knowledge, and because the seeking is full of passion. It is the lack of passion together with the failure to seek self-knowledge that is at the heart of what Kierkegaard understands to be the problem with modern philosophy. Philosophy is no longer a matter of the seeking for the truth, as it was with Socrates, but has become a matter of seeking the truth in systems. The irony for Kierkegaard is that the truth that modern philosophers seek is destroyed by these systems.1 He is not suggesting that there is no place for knowledge and understanding, but he does reject the systems. Here as always he means the Hegelian method because he understands it to disallow freedom. Alastair Hannay argues that for Kierkegaard one of the major problems with Hegel's system is that it does not allow for possibility in development.2 It is Kierkegaard's contention that there can be no freedom or passion in the inevitability of a system. Man must be engaged in his own existence, and it is in this engagement that Kierkegaard sees passion and freedom at work. I think that Kierkegaard's disdain for Hegel is reflected in the fact that his comments concerning "system" are always given in a negative light. Arnold Come suggests that Kierkegaard's condemnation of philosophy has far-reaching consequences. He argues that Kierkegaard also condemns theology for much the same

83 The Puzzle of the Absolute Paradox reason. In both the Postscript and Practice in Christianity Kierkegaard argues that there were neither theological nor philosophical professors in the early Church. The damning thing for Kierkegaard is that in his age faith, which was at the centre, has been removed and replaced by rote that requires no passion and no faith. As a result we have become smug and confident because we have forsaken the passion.3 What Kierkegaard holds to be true about passion he also maintains to be true about pathos. He demonstrates this relation by a most interesting analogy. The relation between passion and pathos is like the relation between scurvy and green vegetables. He develops this idea to include the relation between lust and marriage.4 The use of green vegetables will help to eliminate the scurvy; in other words, the cure for scurvy does not perfect the scurvy but transforms it. For Kierkegaard the man of reason is not a logical man of science but any man who can understand. This distinction will help us to see what Kierkegaard's real concern is. It is reason in the sense that Anselm sees faith seeking understanding. Kierkegaard is suggesting that the modern age needs pathos in order to be cured of its ills; reason alone is not enough. As Julia Watkin points out, for Kierkegaard, Hegel's equating truth with existence pushes aside the individual. It is not the rational theory that will transform the age, but the individual in existence.5 The cure will transform the age, not destroy it - the age will become a new age, reborn. It is paradoxical, but in the same way the lust of the age can be seduced by the seducer's diary and transformed to support marriage. What Kierkegaard is not maintaining is that reason in the sense of understanding must be rejected for passion or pathos; however, he is insistent that reason by itself is as dangerous as any enthusiasm. There is for Kierkegaard a distinction between passion and pathos, although both words come from the same Greek word pathos. For him "passion" is directly related to faith, whereas "pathos" refers to emotion.6 Emotion, faith, and reason must be brought together. One should pursue knowledge and life with enthusiasm and passion, but one must also allow for reason. The nature of self-knowing is so attractive for Socrates because he understands that, in the process of knowing one's own self, one knows the divine.7 Stephen Evans argues that those who see Kierkegaard as a supporter of a kind of irrationalism are mistaken. Along with Evans I believe that what Kierkegaard does is work out the relation between reason and faith.8 However, he is not suggesting that passion or pathos are to be without restriction; passion and pathos must be transformed. Kierkegaard is not intending that either passion must destroy pathos or pathos destroy passion. The relation must be

84 Kierkegaard's Living-Room

such that passion and pathos can exist together.9 In some way there must be a tension that will allow understanding and faith to exist together. This tension will exist in Kierkegaard's positive synthesis. This discussion serves as a starting point for Kierkegaard's examination of the question of paradox. He sees, in the relation between the desire to know and knowing, an apparent contradiction. It is paradoxical, Kierkegaard observes, that the desire to know is lost in the knowing. If there were nothing left to know, what would happen to that element of human nature that causes a person to desire, and what then would happen to him? The paradox surely will not allow this to happen. Each passion seeks to destroy itself. What is left of seeking if there is complete fulfilment? Here in is found another paradox.10 All of this discussion is intended to develop an understanding of the nature of paradox. The word paradox has as its root the Latin word paradoxum from the Greek 7KXpa5o^o